Managing the ‘party’
Third parties and the organization of labour in Ontario strip clubs

Tuulia Law

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Department of Criminology
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa

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Abstract

Amidst a considerable body of literature on erotic dance, the voices of third parties, that is, the people who organize, supervise, manage or coordinate the labour of dancers, seldom appear. Yet, these third parties provide a setting and services that are vital to dancers’ entrepreneurial success. Furthermore, perceptions of third parties as exploitative and coercive perpetuate framings of erotic dance – and sex work in general – as harmful, which in turn invisibilize dancers’ work, as well as their skills, labour rights and grievances. Drawing from qualitative interviews with 15 third parties and 15 dancers, as well as regional regulatory texts, this dissertation seeks to trouble these stigmatic assumptions by shedding light on the work of third parties and the organization of labour in Ontario’s erotic dance sector.

Mapping the occupational roles and relationships amongst third parties (e.g., managers, bouncers, disc jockeys) reveals the organizational structure and peripheries of the strip club. Through this map, we see how third parties together form the organizational structure, which operates as a parallel entity to dancers who, as independent contractors, are for the most part responsible for their own work activities and income. At the same time, because dancers and third parties must equally provide quality service to their shared customers, they are both interdependent on, and independent of, each other. This relationship ‘plays out’ through occupational and situationally adaptive performances, which reiterate and resist normative gender, racial, and class scripts to produce the ‘party’ environment of the strip club. Simultaneously ambiance and organizational culture, the ‘party’ environment shapes third parties’ and dancers’ occupational performances for, and perceptions of, each other. The continuity of performance required to maintain this environment also results in third parties reproducing certain regulatory discourses and mechanisms in their surveillance and rule enforcement practices, and disregarding and subverting others, which in turn impacts upon dancers’ safety. Third parties’ relationships with each other and dancers are also permeated by stigma, stereotypes and perceptions of risk that echo regulatory and broader social discourses. These findings demonstrate that third parties’ engagement with regulation and normative discourses are deeply interrelated and impact the quality of the services they provide to dancers. On this basis it is argued that the context and conditions of dancers’ labour will be improved by rethinking narrow-minded regulatory frameworks and social norms.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

In the face of longstanding disputes over whether involvement in commercialized sexual acts constitutes choice or victimization, there is a growing body of literature that sees sex work as labour involving “varying degrees of coercion, exploitation, resistance and agency” (Sullivan 2008: 74). This point of departure reflects an understanding of neoliberal labour markets as environments not of freedom of choice but rather of dependence and compulsion (Westcott et al. 2006). Indeed since the 1980s, alongside workers in the service industry, working class occupations and the public sector – especially women, racialized people and immigrants – erotic dancers\(^1\) have suffered a decline in wages and increasingly precarious working conditions (Bruckert et al. 2003; Ilcan et al. 2007; Vosko 2000, 2010) characterized by uncertainty, lack of control, and limited access to regulatory protections (Vosko & Clark 2009: 27).\(^2\) In this respect, dancers’ struggles can be seen as analogous to challenges faced by other workers; and if this is possible, so, too, is recognizing the importance of the body, or embodiment, in other forms of work, for example in the service sector (West & Austrin 2002), and in turn the potential relevance of dancers’ struggles to other labour contexts.

Labour force participation is also an everyday experience in which “workers’ sense of dignity and satisfaction are formulated on an ongoing basis, and relative to what occurs in their particular workplaces” (Roscigno & Hodson 2004: 15). An important

\(^1\) The literature employs the term ‘erotic/exotic dancer’ more often than ‘stripper’ (see Bouclin 2006; Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010; Egan 2004; Lavin 2013; Reed 1997). In the interest of brevity, and also to reflect colloquial/industry usage, this dissertation will use the term ‘dancer.’

\(^2\) According to Hyslop-Margison and Welsh (2001), as many as three quarters of Canadian workers are employed in the service sector, while Vosko et al. note a “general shift away from full-time permanent employment [that] has affected women and men differently as evidenced by women’s continued over-representation in part-time work and an increased prevalence of the own-account form of self-employment among men” (2003: 6).
factor affecting workers’ dignity and satisfaction, and the workplace itself, is their relationship with management (Casison 2003). This relationship is both organizational (i.e., conditioned by the structure of the workplace) and interpersonal (manifesting as a series of repeated interpersonal interactions). While organizational attitudes toward workers have been characterized as apathetic in regard to occupational health and safety, and resistant to protective regulations (Bittle 2012), interpersonal relations between workers and management – especially in the context of working women – have long been shaped by discourses of immorality along with normative, gendered and classed notions of respectability (see Johnson 2007). However, scholars have argued that workers’ agency (however constrained) should not be invisibilized (Mohanty 2003), nor should their resistance, especially in everyday defence of their dignity in the workplace, be overlooked (Scott 1985).

Although managerial actors play an active part in shaping workers’ experiences, they do so from different roles and positions. Because of this, below the ownership level of an organization, managerial actors can be seen as both exploitative agents of capital and subjugated workers (Willmott 1997: 1353), who may not have the authority or capacity to adequately attend to workers’ rights, needs, health and safety (Bolton & Houlihan 2010), and who may misbehave or resist organizational goals and rules (Young 2000). As such, this study employs the business term ‘third parties’ in order to allow for the inclusion of all actors who in some way organize, supervise, manage or coordinate the labour of erotic dancers, including (but not limited to) managers, disc jockeys (DJs), and security personnel (bouncers).  

In this respect, investigating the work and resistance of

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3 The term ‘third parties’ necessarily excludes persons who are not involved in the organization of dancers’ labour, such as ‘busboys,’ maintenance staff and romantic partners.
individuals working as third parties can highlight their role in the reproduction (or transformation) of organizational and social structures (see Adler et al. 2007; Cohn 2000; Green 2005). In the erotic dance sector, these structures converge in the employment relationship: dancers are considered independent contractors who are charged a fee to access the club’s facilities and customers in order to conduct their business selling lap dances, yet their access to the club is conditioned by narrow hiring criteria informed by normative gender, racial and class expectations (Bruckert 2002). At the same time academics note that managerial actors in the sex industry also provide helpful services to workers, including security and advertising (Bruckert & Law 2013; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming; Gillies 2013).

Workers’ sense of dignity and satisfaction in the erotic dance sector is also impacted by the marginalization and stigmatization of their labour (Bruckert et al. 2003), and in this respect some of the challenges they face are particular to, or compounded in, the sex industry. In addition to informing interactions between workers, third parties, and customers (Bruckert 2012; Egan 2004; Hudson & Ohhuysen 2009), stigma is reflected, reproduced and affirmed in regulation (Hannem 2012) – most significantly, in bylaws that prohibit the very activity around which the economy of Ontario’s erotic dance sector revolves, lap dancing. Although erotic dance is not criminalized per se, it is subject to extensive regulatory frameworks at the municipal level, as well as provincial statutes, and federal laws (Lewis & Shaver 2006) that coalesce to resemble the criminalization of

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4 As liquor purveyors, strip clubs are subject to the Ontario Liquor Control Act. Additional regulations apply to particular occupations: bartenders and waitresses are required to be certified to safely and responsibly serve alcohol (AGCO n.d.) and bouncers are required to complete a provincial security certification program (Ontario 2015).

5 Since the introduction of lap dancing in the 1990s, strip club owners and dancers have been charged under the bawdy-house and indecency provisions of the Criminal Code (Bruckert & Dufresne 2002).
prostitution insofar as they manifest as “moral surveillance” rather than improving workplace conditions or safety, or worker rights (van der Meulen & Durisin 2008: 304; see also van der Meulen & Valverde 2013). Moreover, because of the independent contractor relationship, as with the growing number of Canadian workers in part-time, temporary, and precarious jobs in other sectors (Fogel & Quinlan 2011; Vosko et al. 2003), dancers’ work falls outside the purview of labour and occupational health and safety regulation (Couto 2006). In short, dancers are marginalized through over- and under-regulation that both disregards their labour and characterizes it as risky.

It is this over-estimation of risk and lack of recognition of labour that support the construction of sex workers as victims. However this is only half of a dichotomy – for there to be a victim there must also be a victimizer, and according to dominant perceptions of the sex industry this is the third party. We see this in the conflation, in both popular culture and academic research (e.g., Holsopple 1999; Hughes 1999), of sex industry third parties with ‘pimps’ and traffickers and the inevitable negative connotations, and racial and social profiling this characterization carries with it (Bruckert & Law 2013; O’Connell Davidson 2006; Weitzer 2012). In spite of the increasing prevalence of academic studies taking a labour perspective, and the visibility of sex workers arguing that their activities should be viewed as work, regulations governing the sex industry in many jurisdictions remain centred around victimization, inherent risk and violence, and are increasingly turning their attention towards third parties (Bruckert & Hannem 2013a; Jordan 2012; Sanders & Campbell 2014). This shift has informed Canada’s most recent legislative approach to prostitution, which criminalizes third parties

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6 For a critique of researchers’ conflation of third parties with ‘pimps,’ see Bruckert and Law (2013).
7 It should be noted that a labour perspective is not tantamount to a sociology of labour perspective or methodology.
and clients, framing them as exploiters (see Bill C-36 2014), and ignoring the Supreme Court’s criticisms of criminalizing (among other aspects of sex work) people who offer services including security (see Canada v Bedford 2013). Thus, for sex workers to truly be recognized and treated as workers, the other half of the dichotomy needs to be debunked. This study, then, aims to challenge assumptions of victimization in the sex industry by examining the work of third parties. Moreover, situating this investigation in the regulatory context of erotic dance in Ontario provides a critique of municipal regulatory regimes mimicking the moralistic focus of the criminalization of prostitution, and its consequences on workers’ relationship with management, and occupational health and safety. Although I count myself amongst the scholars arguing that decriminalization is a safer and more effective approach to sex work (e.g., Bruckert & Hannem 2013a; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009; van der Meulen & Durisin 2008), like them I acknowledge that decriminalization is not a panacea. As such, this research provides a glimpse into issues emanating from local regulatory approaches that can arise in the absence of a national legal (i.e., labour) framework.

In focusing primarily on third parties, this research aims to interrogate assumptions and contribute to the limited substantive scholarly knowledge about management in the indoor sectors of the Canadian sex industry (Canada 2006; Lowman 2001). As indicated in the opening comments about the labour market, starting from a labour perspective precludes broad characterizations of either exploitation or resistance, and instead directs the discussion toward organizational structure and relationships. This lens has already proven invaluable in examining dancers’ experiences, delineating the problems they face, and defending their labour rights (see Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al.
2003; Chapkis 2000; Lewis & Shaver 2006) – it is employed here to examine third parties’ work and the ways in which it impacts upon dancers’ labour. In addition to examining the services third parties provide to dancers, this research also explores how third parties labour in a specific regulatory context and in a business engineered around the performance of heteronormative gender. While dancers’ performances constitute the focus of the strip club, third parties are also performing in their occupational roles since they too are seen by, and must regulate the behaviour of, the audience (see Goffman 1959). In this respect third parties’ performances can be seen as endeavouring to manage the club environment, its players and audiences (customers, dancers, and other workers), workplace relationships, and the provision of services to dancers. Because third parties are organizational members and authority figures, their occupational performances may also reproduce and/or challenge gender, class and racial scripts, stigma, and other social and industry norms and discourses. Investigating managerial practices also sheds light on how regulation is enforced (or not), and the implications for dancers’ safety and wellbeing. It is these concerns and their interplay that this dissertation explores.

**Research question**

Refining the reflections, issues and queries outlined above, this project is guided by a number of inter-related research questions. The principal research question is:

- How do third parties interact with dancers and with each other in the strip club, and how is this conditioned by organizational systems and processes, social roles, and the legal context?

The secondary questions address numerous inter-related concerns regarding the relationships amongst and between third parties and dancers, including: how dancers
interact with third parties; workplace safety and security; power and resistance; as well as the impacts of stigma, gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality and body size.

**Project parameters**

To answer these questions I undertook a qualitative, in-depth examination aiming to map and unpack the work that third parties do in strip clubs. It is important to note that this project does not aim to theorize (from a social or moral perspective) about *why* people work in strip clubs, but rather *how* these social actors interact with each other and with dancers to (re)produce, and perform in, this environment, as well as the challenges they encounter and the solutions they devise day to day. In addition to third party roles and responsibilities then, I am interested in the organization of labour at strip clubs.

This project focuses on Ontario’s erotic dance industry, examining the experiential knowledge of third parties and dancers working in Ottawa and Toronto in an analysis that takes into account the context of social norms, and regulatory discourses and mechanisms. This investigation spans from the year 2000 to 2014, a period in which the practice of lap dancing has become so entrenched as to be central to the economy and organization of erotic dance in these two cities. This study examines two cities for a number of reasons. Not only are the practices in and regulation of the erotic dance sector comparable in Toronto and Ottawa; including two municipalities also enlarged the demographic pool, facilitating recruitment and enhancing participants’ anonymity and security. With respect to the focus on female strip clubs, although there are clubs featuring other types of gender performance (i.e., male, trans), they represent such a minority of the industry that it was neither feasible nor adequately secure to include workers at such establishments.
Synopsis

The following chapter, *Locating third parties in the erotic dance literature*, draws on studies from a variety of disciplines, including criminology, gender studies, and organization studies, to tease out existing (albeit scant) empirical and theoretical insights about the work of third parties in strip clubs. It situates the present project as an extension of the scholarship about erotic dance, comparing the work of dancers and third parties to position the latter as stigmatized labour conditioned by organizational roles and structures through which power and resistance circulate. The chapter also situates third parties’ work as occurring in an environment in which gender, class and race are performed and reproduced, and as shaped by regulatory frameworks and security risks. Upon examining these themes, the chapter demonstrates that this research contributes perspective and nuance that can only be garnered by speaking with third parties.

Building from the leading theoretical approaches used in the literature, *Chapter 3: Theoretical framework* develops an integrated theoretical approach suitable to an intersecting organizational, personal, and social analysis of work performances and relationships in strip clubs. To do this, the chapter draws on Goffman (1959; 1963) to consider how individuals interact and manage their social impressions by performing roles befitting to particular contexts, and in turn, how others measure them against social expectations. The latter are addressed using Foucault’s (1977; 1980; 1982) theories regarding knowledge, discourse, power and resistance, in concert with intersectional feminist theory, which furnishes tools to examine gender, class and race, and their mutually constitutive relationship with social structures. To consider the impact of discourses, norms and interactions on organizational structures and processes, the
theoretical framework also incorporates concepts from organization theory and critical management studies.

Chapter 4: Methodology outlines the methodological approach for which the theoretical tools in the previous chapter are designed to address. In particular the chapter examines the methods and methodological choices guiding the project, which used interviews to get at the experiential knowledge of third parties and dancers and document-based research to identify the social and regulatory discourses, structures and mechanisms to contextualize them. It offers a reflection on the ethical and epistemological considerations for accessing, protecting, and respectfully and responsibly analyzing the situated knowledges of marginalized and stigmatized individuals. Equally importantly this chapter details the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the project: data collection methods for the documentary analysis (featured in Chapter 5); ethics approval, recruitment, transcription and participant demographics from the interview-based research; data analysis; and project limitations.

Drawing on the conceptual tools of Foucault (1977) and Smart (1989), introduced in the theoretical framework, Chapter 5: Tracing regulatory discourses and mechanisms in Ontario sketches the social, economic and regulatory context in which the participants of this study work, via a discursive analysis of regulatory documents. After briefly outlining the development of the social and economic organization of Ontario’s erotic dance industry, the chapter examines and reflects upon the production and consequences of transforming, intermingling and conflicting discursive constructions of erotic dance as immoral, harmful, and labour. In doing so it reflects on the reproduction of stigma by and amongst different social groups, and also structurally through regulation (Hannem 2012).
In addition to presenting the regulations resulting from these discourses, which third parties and dancers must negotiate on a daily basis, Chapter 5 provides a glimpse of how regulatory discourses and mechanisms have conditioned social relations with and amongst strip club workers; the following three chapters elaborate on how they circulate through professional roles and relationships in the club.

The first of three analytical chapters drawing on interviews with third parties and dancers, Chapter 6: Parallel structures uses Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical terms to map third parties’ occupational roles and relationships in the setting of the strip club. Drawing from Willmott’s (1997) and Bolton and Houlihan’s (2010) reflections on organizational structure, it characterizes dancers and the club as parallel structures, each with their own interests, that are both independent of and interdependent on each other. It then addresses third parties who are unaffiliated with, and operate outside of, the organizational structure of the club, including the interlopers discursively constructed as ‘pimps.’ In this latter discussion we begin to see how social norms and stereotypes inform organizational discourses circulating as ‘truths’ (Foucault 1980), and in turn third parties’ and dancers’ relationships with unaffiliated third parties; the next two chapters examine how these discourses impact upon relationships amongst club workers.

Turning to what happens in the strip club, Chapter 7: Risk management, power and resistance in strip club organizational structure(s) and culture examines the strategies through which strip club third parties and dancers aim to control the behaviour of customers and each other, and simultaneously maintain the ambiance of the club. In

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8 This term is in quotations because, as we will explore in chapters 2 and 6, both the literature, and third parties and dancers, rely more on stereotypical assumptions than empirical knowledge to identify men (rarely women) as ‘pimps.’ This is not to say that exploitative relationships between dancers and third parties unaffiliated with strip clubs do not exist, but rather to question the usefulness of a label that so powerfully reiterates intersecting racial, class, and gender stereotypes.
doing so it introduces the concept of the ‘party’ environment, a construct that builds on explorations of dancers’ performances and the normative expectations around which strip clubs are organized, identified in the literature in *Chapter 3*. Looking at the ‘party’ environment as both a continuous performance (Goffman 1959) and an organizational culture (Daft & Armstrong 2009) positions risk management strategies to be understood as situationally adaptive performances which both reproduce and subvert normative gender, racial and class scripts. The chapter also examines how power relations, and points and strategies of resistance (Foucault 1977), unfold in the ‘party’ environment of the strip club.

Incorporating both the ‘party’ environment and the parallel structures discussed in previous chapters, *Chapter 8: Performances and perceptions in parallel structures* takes a broader view of third parties’ occupational roles, to consider the impact of normative discourses and workplace organization and culture on the relationships between third parties and dancers. Situating third parties’ and dancers’ as separate ‘performance teams’ (Goffman 1959), the chapter demonstrates how stigma and gender, racial and class scripts permeate third parties’ performances for, and perceptions of, each other and dancers. It also highlights how third parties’ and dancers’ professional relationships are shaped by one another’s perceptions of their role performances for customers. This allows us to examine the convergences and tensions between performance and perception, and stigma awareness and management.

In closing, *Chapter 9: Conclusion* offers a final reflection on third parties’ roles, the management of the ‘party,’ and the organization of the parallel structures. It summarizes the importance and shortcomings of the services third parties provide to
dancers, as well as the challenges and strategies these workers share. After presenting the project’s substantive and theoretical contributions, touching on the themes of performance, stigma, discourse, regulation(s), power and resistance, the chapter discusses its social and policy implications. It concludes by considering the study’s limitations and how they can be addressed through future research.
Chapter 2. Locating third parties in the erotic dance literature

Although few studies about erotic dance include interviews with strip club third parties, this body of literature does provide some insight into what Letkemann (1973: 1) might describe as “the technical and organizational dimensions” of their work. While some studies consider the management of strip clubs from the perspective of dancers (see Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2004, 2006, 2009; Bruckert et al. 2003; Holsopple 1998; Lewis 2000; Lewis & Shaver 2006; Maticka-Tyndale 2004), others include information garnered from (usually one or two) third parties as a secondary focus to dancers’ work and experiences (see Barton 2006; Brooks 2010; Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a & b; Egan 2004; Frank 2002a; Lavin 2013; Lewis 2006; Lilleston et al. 2012; Murphy 2003; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010; Ross 2009). Most of these studies only examine third parties employed by strip clubs – managers, bouncers, disc jockeys and bartenders – however scholars have additionally mentioned other third parties operating outside of the club as part of the landscape of erotic dance, for example agents (Althorp 2013), and ‘pimps’ (Holsopple 1998). Only DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) focus explicitly on the perspectives and roles of third parties – particularly bouncers.

Academic scholarship about the work of third parties, while limited, highlights notable similarities to dancers’ labour. For example DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004) research draws attention to the importance of gender performance in third parties’ occupational roles, the impacts of organizational structure or “power arrangements,” and the challenges of balancing social control in the workplace with state regulation, all of which have been shown to influence dancers’ work. Other research on the erotic dance sector, and the sex industry in general, suggests that stigma also impacts various aspects
of the relationships between dancers and third parties (Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Bruckert & Law 2013; Chapkis 2000; Couto 2006; Egan 2004; Law & Bruckert 2015; Price-Glynn 2010; van der Meulen & Durisin 2008).

Drawing largely from studies about female strip clubs in Canada, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom (UK), as well as some personal accounts, this chapter presents existing scholarly knowledge about third parties through the inter-related themes of: labour; stigma and stereotypes; organizational structure and practices; power and resistance; the performance and reproduction of gender, race and class; perceptions of risk and mechanisms of regulation. The chapter also incorporates relevant insights on third parties, their work, and the issues they face, from a variety of disciplines, including feminist and gender studies, critical criminology, deviant career sociology, and critical management studies.

**Recognizing labour in the early literature**

In the 1960s and ’70s, scholars studied erotic dancers as part of a strand of criminology that examined crime and deviance *as work* (see Boles & Garbin 1974; Enck

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10 Studies that were conducted in the USA include: Barton (2006); Bradley-Engen and Hobbs (2010); Bradley-Engen and Ulmer (2009); Brooks (2010); Egan (2006a & b); DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004); Fischer (1996); Lavin (2013); Lilliston et al. (2012); Murphy (2003); Price (2008); Price-Glynn (2010); Sherman et al. (2011).

11 It appears as though two scholars share a monopoly on this subject in the UK: Colosi and Hubbard (see Colosi 2010a & b; Hubbard 2001, 2009; Hubbard et al. 2008a & b; Hubbard & Colosi 2012; Hubbard & Whowell 2008). Jones et al. (2003) have also examined the regulation of erotic dance. Exceptions include Sanders and Hardy (2012), and Mavin and Grandy (2013).

12 Mostly recounting women’s experiences of stripping from the 1970s to the 1990s in the US (with the exception of one Canadian, see Tracey 1997), dancers’ autobiographical accounts are sometimes titillating, sometimes reflexive, cynical, angry or nostalgic (see Brooks 1997; Cody 2005; Frank 2002b; Funari 1997; Kraus 2007; Morgan 1998; Reed 1997; Sundahl 1998). There is also one autobiographical piece by a third party – a woman who worked as a cashier in a US club (see Blowdryer 2009). These autobiographies offer insightful perspective and observations gleaned from years of immersion in the world of erotic dance, that may be richer, if perhaps less systematic, than scholarly methods such as ethnography – their truths are no less valid. In this chapter these accounts are included to fill the gaps where academic studies fall short.
& Preston 1988; McCaghy & Skipper 1969; Skipper & McCaghy 1970). Along with academics interested in other ‘deviant careers’\footnote{It should be noted that deviant career sociologists were interested in careers as sojourns in deviance (e.g., Becker 1963), not as work per se.} they paid particular attention to the “technical and organizational dimensions of such behavior” including “what criminals do, their methods of operation, careers, life styles and relationships with each other” (Letkemann 1973: 1; see also Polsky 1969). More contemporary iterations of this perspective focus on how women come to choose, and subsequently manage their identity in, a stigmatized occupation (see Forsyth & Deshotels 1998; Lewis 1998; Tewksbury 2000; Thompson & Harred 1992; Trautner & Collett 2010).

Successive generations of feminists have debated whether involvement in the sex industry constitutes danger and immorality (Walkowitz 1992), male violence and domination (MacKinnon 1987; Dworkin 1985) or (in a simultaneous, competing perspective) “a heroic overcoming of gender norms, a high-water mark of autonomy and agency” (Showden 2011: xvii), a (constrained) choice (Aronson 2006), or sex work (Leigh 1997) in other words marginalized labour (Bruckert et al. 2003) that can be both liberating and exploitative (Brooks 2010; Showden 2011). However as the contemporary literature evinces, scholars remain largely divided between two paradigms – victimization (e.g., Perrin 2014; Farley 2005) and labour (e.g., Bruckert 2014; Namaste 2005).

Similarly, amidst a growing body of literature on erotic dance that has expanded since the proliferation of strip clubs in the 1980s (Frank 2002a), although academics have taken diverse positions most of the scholarship is informed by one of two perspectives. Scholars who view stripping to be inherently threatening or harmful also characterize it as unskilled (see Couto 2006; Fischer 1996; Holsopple 1998), while those who view
erotic dance (and sex work in general) as stigmatized, precarious and/or marginalized labour understand dancers as skilled workers exercising agency in an environment that can be both empowering and constraining (see Bouclin 2004, 2006, 2009; Bradley 2008; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Chapkis 2000; Colosi 2010a & b; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Egan 2006b; Fogel & Quinlan 2011; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009; Lavin 2013; Lewis & Shaver 2006; Machen 1996; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Ross 2000, 2009). In tandem with the latter perspective, recent scholarship argues that it is only by looking at what third parties do that we can comprehensively understand how sex industry organizational structures and labour conditions ‘play out’ and impact sex workers (Bruckert & Law 2013; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming). As we will see, third parties’ occupational roles and relationships are in many ways similar to mainstream management. An important difference however, is that alongside sex workers, managerial individuals in the sex industry must grapple with stigma (Bruckert & Law 2013).

**Stigmatized labour**

Numerous scholars have used Goffman’s theorization of stigma to address the social judgment faced by workers across the sex industry (see Bruckert et al. 2003; Pheterson 1998; Scambler 2007) as well as by erotic dancers in particular (see Lavin 2013; Trautner & Collett 2010). Goffman defines stigma as an attribute that is perceived as deeply discrediting, which reduces its bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (1963: 3). Bruckert (2012) argues that stigma has a profound effect on sex workers’ lives because their work is framed as an immoral and/or dangerous activity that comes to be viewed as their master status (see also Hannem & Bruckert 2012). Furthermore, academics who understand erotic dance as stigmatized labour
(Bruckert et al. 2003) insist that stigma is connected to, and may exacerbate, emotional health risks, sexual harassment and sexual assault faced by dancers (Brooks 2010; Lewis et al. 2005; Maticka-Tyndale 2004). Scholars further assert that stigma engenders conflict in the employment relationship, impedes management from recognizing dancers as skilled workers, and also informs third parties’ surveillance of dancers’ conduct (Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Couto 2006; Egan 2004; Law & Bruckert 2016; Price-Glynn 2010).

As eminently visible in popular imagery depicting them as creeps, nefarious criminals, and exploiters, third parties are also stigmatized (Bruckert & Law 2013; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming). Like dancers, too, strip club third parties face interpersonal stigma in concert with class and racial discrimination (Ross & Greenwell 2005; Ross 2009). This is perhaps especially the case with a third party about whom little is known, the ‘pimp.’ Although this third party appears (albeit seldom14) in the erotic dance literature (as we will soon see), it can be difficult to tell whether research findings confirm the ‘pimp’ stereotype, or if methodological approaches are shaped by stereotypical assumptions. As Benson argues, the image of the ‘pimp’ circulated in popular culture “perpetuates entrenched and dangerous stereotypes that characterize Black males as violent, rapacious beasts” (2012: 430; see also Tyree et al. 2011). A related stereotype, the trafficker, who is characterized as evil, foreign, and affiliated with organized crime, and also often racialized (Berman 2003; Pajnik 2010; Weitzer 2014), is given considerable attention in the media, as well as by law enforcement officials and scholars (see Dank et al. 2014; Farrell & Fahy 2009; MLS 2012b).

14 As Lowman (2001) notes, little is known about pimps, their relationships with sex workers or dancers, or their prevalence in strip clubs, especially in Canada.
While some studies effectively perpetuate stigmatization, third parties’ experiences of stigma are largely absent from the erotic dance literature, which has so far focused on dancers’ strategies to manage stigma at work and in other social interactions (see Bruckert 2002 & 2012; Trautner 2010). However some research by organization scholars suggests that stigma informs how third parties operate. For example Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) note that third parties working in gay men’s bathhouses endeavour to mitigate stigma in their interactions with outside contractors, such as accountants and suppliers (see also Hudson 2008). Devers et al. also focus on stigma at the organizational level, which they term “organizational stigma,” defined as a “perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization” (2009: 157). Looking instead at individual interactions, Ashforth et al. (2007) differentiate managers’ experiences of stigma from those of workers by virtue of the fact that managers are further removed from the stigmatized activity (e.g., lap dancing). Along with other scholars (e.g., Ashforth & Kreiner 1999; Bolton 2005; Bove & Pervan 2013; Stacey 2005), these authors look at stigmatized labour, or ‘dirty work,’ from an organization and management studies perspective.

**Organizational roles and structure**

When we look beyond stereotypes of sex industry third parties as exploiters, we see that their labour resembles that of managerial individuals in other sectors (Bruckert & Law 2013; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming). As in the incall/outcall sector of the sex industry, there are a variety of third parties in the erotic dance sector who inhabit different business arrangements with dancers. Using Bruckert and Law’s (2013) typology of business relationships, third parties who work for strip clubs are comparable to
employees of an agency that provides a facility and services to dancers, while other third parties resemble associates who are partners or collaborators working with dancers (e.g., agents).

Turning to the first category – club-affiliated third parties – scholars describe owners as relatively uninvolved in day-to-day operations (Kraus 2007; Lavin 2013), unless they are also the manager (usually at a small club) (Bruckert 2002; DeMichele & Tewsbury 2004; Price 2008). Recounting her personal experience as a dancer in “hustle bars” in New York in the early 1980s, Kraus (2007) lists hiring, firing and distribution of salaries as part of the manager’s responsibilities; she further notes that the manager offered advice and helped dancers to increase their earnings. Murphy (2003) additionally found managerial responsibilities to include: branding, developing a business plan, expansion, increasing revenue, handling staff, and preventing conflict between dancers. In general, it seems managers inhabit a role described by Bruckert (2002) as formal, supervisory authority.

Other strip club third parties identified in the literature can be characterized as ‘middle management.’ One such role is that of the disc jockey (DJ), whose authority over, or responsibility for, dancers is largely limited to the stage (Bruckert 2002; Lewis 2006; Price-Glynn 2010). DJs’ responsibilities are reported to include: sequencing stage shows, and organizing dancers’ music and lighting; promotional announcements; monitoring for inappropriate behaviour by customers towards the dancer on stage; and keeping track of dancers’ shifts (Bruckert 2002; Lewis 2006; Price-Glynn 2010). Bruckert (2002: 45) characterizes the DJ’s job as a conflict of interests between having to monitor (and, from his less-than-managerial position of authority, sanction) the behaviour of dancers, and
depending on their tips to supplement his income. DJs appear to have more authority and responsibilities in the US (see Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009); for example in the nude table dance clubs Frank (2002a) studied in the US, DJs provide an extensive introductory and training speech to newly hired dancers.

Security personnel (bouncers or doormen\textsuperscript{15}) constitute another role identified in the literature that combines managerial responsibilities with other tasks. Bouncers are generally described as responsible for security, monitoring dancers’ and patrons’ conduct, and collecting fees (Bruckert 2002; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Egan 2004; Lewis 2006; Lilleston et al. 2012; Price-Glynn 2010). They may also “escort female employees to their cars” and perform other tasks (like cleaning) related to the general operation of the bar (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004: 544).

Another third party, who appears seldom and only in studies conducted in the US, is the ‘housemother’, a woman who helps dancers with their costumes and makeup (Murphy 2003: 311) or who organizes dancers’ shifts and offers them support, manages conflicts, and provides resources such as costumes and equipment in exchange for tips (Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010). According to Price-Glynn, the club, together with dancers, hires veteran dancers “for their experience and knowledge” to fill this role (2010: 8). Bradley-Engen and Ulmer (2009) identify yet another third party, apparently unique to “show clubs” in the US where dancers are not allowed to socialize with customers in the bar: the lap dance attendant, a go-between who informs dancers about customer requests for lap dances. Additionally although it appears bartenders are not usually involved with dancers’ labour, some scholars describe them as having occasional

\textsuperscript{15} Although ‘bouncer’ and ‘doorman’ usually refer to the same occupation, at some strip clubs in the US these roles are separate, the latter taking care of entry fees and IDs and acting as daytime bouncers, the former exclusively attending to security (Price-Glynn 2010; see also Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009).
(Bruckert 2002) or considerable (Price 2010; Price-Glynn 2008) managerial responsibilities and authority.

Though rare in the literature, there appear to be other third parties involved with organizing, supervising, managing, or coordinating dancers’ labour, outside of the club. Price-Glynn (2010) describes companies (in the US) that manage travelling dancers and provide them with training, booking, lodging and transportation to clubs in nearby cities. Price-Glynn (2010) suggests that dancers are generally satisfied with these agencies, however Althorp (2013) reports that travelling stage dancers in Western Canada are often dissatisfied with their agents.

The final category of third party identified in the literature is the ‘pimp’ – a term that is heavily loaded with negative connotations that often pervade the scholarship in which it appears. As with the topic of the sex industry in general however, scholarly positions diverge considerably. Some regard pimping as violent and/or manipulative exploitation of one or more women by a man and characterize all relationships with third parties in the sex industry in this way (see Barry 1995; Holsopple 1999; Hughes 1999). Others academics suggest that sex workers inhabit a variety of service or business relationships and income sharing arrangements, ranging from beneficial to exploitative, with third parties whom Bruckert and Law (2013) refer to as associates (see Marcus et al. 2014; Hoigard & Finstad 1992). Although much of the existing literature connects pimping to street-based sex work (see Armstrong 1983; May et al. 2000; Marcus et al.

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16 Although studies most often describe male ‘pimps,’ May et al. (2000) heard anecdotal accounts of female ‘pimps’ who were no less coercive than their male counterparts.

17 Though they employ graphically negative language to express their disdain for prostitution, describing it as a woman “rent[ing] out her vagina as a garbage can for hordes of anonymous men’s ejaculations” (180), Hoigard and Finstad (1992) report that women working in the sex industry differentiate boyfriends from pimps. They further suggest that the stereotype of the “evil” pimp propelled some of the women and men with whom they spoke to disidentify with the term ‘pimp,’ for example rejecting economically parasitic romantic relationships as pimping relationships (Hoigard & Finstad 1992).
2014; Norton-Hawk 2004; Raphael & Myers-Powell 2010; Weinkauf 2010), some scholars suggest connections between strip clubs, and exploitation and prostitution of underage young women by gangs or organized crime (see Claude et al. 2009; Dorais 2009; Dorais & Corriveau 2009; Poulin 2007). For example in the “prostitution ring” they studied, Morselli and Savoie-Gargiso (2014) noted that the “majority of prostitutes in this network also worked as dancers in strip clubs in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick” (252) and that the network also included “chauffeurs, clients, and strip club managers and staffing agencies” (254). Their absence from the rest of the literature indicates that such networks are not the norm in strip clubs. However, corroborating assumptions/concerns by researchers (e.g., Holsopple 1998) and some dancers (see MLS 2012b), self-identified ‘pimps’ in a US study by Dank et al. (2014) confirmed that they recruited women at strip clubs.

**Power and resistance in the employment relationship**

Findings of exploitation in the sex industry are, of course, not restricted to coercion and violence but also include economic, or labour, exploitation. In this regard scholarly understandings of erotic dance as labour (see Bouclin 2004, 2006, 2009; Bradley 2008; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Colosi 2010a & b; Egan 2006; Fogel & Quinlan 2011; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Lavin 2013; Lewis & Shaver 2006; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Sanders & Hardy 2012) echo critical reflections of the neoliberal labour market insofar as they acknowledge that workers’ agency is only exercised in a context of economic dependence and capitalist exploitation (Hodson 1999; Westcott et al. 2006). As with agencies in the incall/outcall sector (see Bruckert & Law 2013), although dancers are considered independent contractors they more closely resemble dependant
contractors or employees, insofar as they must perform certain tasks for the club in exchange for access to its customers (whom they can solicit for lap dances) often without being paid a wage (Bouclin 2004; Bruckert 2002). This relationship resembles independent contractor relationships in various sectors of the Canadian labour market (e.g., taxicab and truck drivers), whom Fudge et al. (2003: 193) describe as, paradoxically, categorized as self-employed yet dependent on the sale of their labour and subject to inferior working conditions and terms (see also Fudge 2003).

As with the division between workers and managers in other occupations, dancers and third parties are generally characterized as having opposing interests (Chapkis 2000; Bruckert 2002). As such, questions of power and control feature significantly in the literature. Some scholars discuss power in terms of who ‘possesses’ greater quantities, whereas others use a Foucaultian conception of power as circulating in a network of relations (this will be elaborated in Chapter 3). Unsurprisingly, the latter group reports a higher number of instances of resistance by dancers and discusses them in a more nuanced manner than the former. Indeed resistance is conspicuously absent from some studies (e.g., Holsopple 1998; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010) even though some of the behaviours of dancers documented therein could be described as such. However, others highlight how challenging working conditions motivate dancers to engage in individual acts of resistance on a regular basis, and sometimes, collective resistance as well (see Althorp 2013; Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a & b; Egan 2004; Lavin 2013; Lewis 2006; Murphy 2003). Some of these studies also indicate that third parties engage in resistance, but seldom articulate it in this way. Thus, a Foucaultian approach to power allows us to see that third parties’ as well as dancers’ capacity to exert power and/or resistance is not
reducible to their position in the organizational structure, even though it is conditioned by this context as well as broader social and regulatory discourses and mechanisms. Before we turn to the resistances identified in the literature however, we must examine the mechanisms of power to which they arise in response (Foucault 1982).

Amongst the obligations imposed on dancers in Ontario clubs, Bruckert et al. (2003: 31) include being “present for a pre-determined period of time, provid[ing] between one and five shows of three songs each, comply[ing] with the house rules and remain[ing] available and attractive to clients” (see also Bouclin 2006). According to Althorp (2013), dancers in Alberta and BC receive higher wages than their colleagues in Eastern Canada, but are also subject to greater control by third parties. While Chapkis (2000), DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004), Egan (2006b), and Maticka-Tyndale (2004) note that some clubs insist that dancers consume alcohol in order to solicit customers for drinks, Barton’s (2006) study documents a false drink system enabling dancers to avoid alcohol without compromising this requirement. Researchers also note rules pertaining to dancers’ reliability as employees, which are designed to motivate dancers to: respect schedules and fees (some clubs also demand a percent of lap dance earnings, see Althorp 2013; Egan 2004; Sanders & Hardy 2012); and groom, dress, behave and perform appropriately (Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2006; Bruckert 2002; Chapkis 2000; Egan 2004). Comparatively, it appears that strip clubs in the US impose more obligations and constraints on dancers. Fischer (1996), for example, describes management exercising considerable control over dancers’ schedules, stage performances, private dances, music, costumes, and behaviour. Dancers in Barton’s (2006) study were also obliged to attend staff meetings every night, whereas Fogel and Quinlan (2011; see also Bradley-Engen &
Ulmer 2009; Murphy 2003; Price-Glynn 2010) note mandatory tip sharing with other employees.

Failure to comply with club rules and expectations may result in disciplinary measures including fines (which vary widely), withholding of salary, suspension and termination (Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2004, 2006; Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Egan 2004; Fogel & Quinlan 2011; Price-Glynn 2010; Sanders & Hardy 2012). However, Lavin argues that because dancers are independent contractors, they are “difficult to discipline into a systematic work schedule” (2013: 376; see also Bruckert 2002). Indeed some studies describe dancers as able to control their schedules and choose their shifts with few, inconsistent, or no repercussions for tardiness or absence, while at the same time characterizing third parties as capricious and micromanaging (Barton 2006; Bruckert 2002; Fogel & Quinlan 2011). These findings are not contradictory or misinterpreted; rather, they reflect arbitrary and inconsistent approaches to rule enforcement. Several authors note that even in the same club, rules may differ from day to day and from dancer to dancer (see Bruckert 2002; DeMichele & Tewsbury 2004; Lavin 2013).

While dancers are subject to mandatory unpaid labour and managerial discipline, they receive little in return from clubs. Indeed clubs in the UK and BC are reported to issue contracts to dancers, detailing rules, fees, penalties, and duties, but few managerial obligations towards them (Althorp 2013; Colosi 2010a). This is particularly apparent in the dearth of measures (or concern) identified by scholars in regard to dancers’ occupational health and safety. Several scholars suggest that facilities are not regularly cleaned and that safety measures are inadequate (see Althorp 2013; Brooks 2010;
Bruckert et al. 2003; Couto 2006; Price-Glynn 2010). Exceptionally, Colosi (2010a: 166) notes that the physical conditions of the strip club she studied were, for the most part, safe and clean.

Scholars have identified numerous strategies mobilized by dancers both to manage inadequate safety oversight and resist unreasonable demands by third parties. With regard to the former, Egan describes dancers’ “reinscription” of club surveillance cameras, which they evoked in order to prevent customers from crossing their personal boundaries “without having to break their performances of feigned intimacy” (2004: 319; see also Law & Bruckert 2016). In the face of employment-like obligations imposed on them by third parties, dancers have been shown to engage in a variety of individual resistance strategies, which include: covertly collecting extra lap dance money and tips, allowing touching, and using drugs; and occasionally refusing to go on stage and/or be continually present on the floor, or not showing up for shifts (Bruckert 2002; Egan 2004 & 2006b; Lavin 2013; Lewis 2006; Murphy 2003). Colosi highlights dancers’ use of “more unconventional and nuanced methods” (2010a: 164), such as emphasizing having ‘fun’ over doing work, developing and following their own rules of conduct, and bribing managers with sexual favours and drugs (see also Colosi 2010b; Murphy 2003). Bruckert (2002) further suggests that dancers involve other workers, such as bouncers, waitresses and DJs in their resistance to managerial surveillance via mutually beneficial arrangements, usually in the form of tip-sharing (see also Lewis 2006). Echoing organization scholars’ arguments about other workplaces however (see Prasad & Prasad 2000; Willmott 1997), Egan (2006: 146) argues that such individual forms have little to no effect on structural inequities in the workplace.
Scholars seem to agree that, in the face of workplace inequities, dancers’ organized resistance has been limited. Although many dancers interviewed by Althorp (2013) expressed interest in a union, they surmised that it would be highly unlikely that enough of their colleagues would be interested in or able to agree on this kind of collective action. In this regard, Colosi (2010a: 31-2) notes that, despite being an oft-discussed topic in the change room, many dancers feel unionization “would never be an effective solution to their often unfair treatment.” Backlash from management, including hostility, fines, dismissal and ‘blacklisting,’ or the fear thereof, has also impeded collective organizing (Althorp 2103; Bouclin 2004 & 2009; Bruckert 2002; Couto 2006; Egan 2006; Machen 1996; Price-Glynn 2010). In short, it appears organized resistance by dancers is rare (Bruckert 2002; Egan 2006; Machen 1996), contested (Bouclin 2006) and short lived (Bouclin 2004a & b; Gall 2012). Additional hurdles to organized resistance identified by scholars include stigma and the employment relationship, however some studies note that the flexibility of this relationship, for example with regard to scheduling, makes it appealing to dancers (Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2004, 2006, 2009; Chapkis 2000; Colosi 2010a; Couto 2006; CUPE 2005; Egan 2004 & 2006; Machen 1996; Price-Glynn 2010).

Though not comparable to collective organizing in the sense of a union or a professional association, occasions of collective resistance by dancers have been noted in the literature (see Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a). For example, Bruckert (2002: 101-103)

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18 This is not to say that dancers have never managed to organize. Dancers at San Francisco’s Lusty Lady famously formed a union and then transformed the club into a worker-owned collective (Brooks 1997). However as waged employees, their employment relationship was more amenable to unionization. More recently, a group of dancers convinced the Nevada Supreme Court that they should be recognized and paid as employees, rather than merely earning tips as independent contractors (Conti 2014). Similarly, a group of New York City dancers were awarded $10.8 million in back wages by a federal judge who ruled that their club could not treat them as independent contractors and had to pay them minimum wage (CBS 2014).
observed ad-hoc strategies by Ottawa dancers including passive non-compliance when
the municipality attempted to impose dancer licensing, boycotts of ‘dirty’ clubs, and a
walkout in protest of a manager whom they perceived as a tyrant. Colosi (2010a: 31)
reports that dancers argued with management and threatened to strike, however these
occurrences of resistance were short-lived and dissolved by threats of termination.
Communication of individual resistance strategies amongst dancers can be seen as
another form of collective resistance, as individual resistance strategies spread and
become common practice (see Colosi 2010b; Egan 2004).

Like dancers, third parties also resist the relations of power implied by their
position in the organizational hierarchy, by disregarding club policies or rules19 for their
own benefit. For example both Bruckert (2002) and Lewis (2006) describe opportunistic
alliances between dancers, DJs, and bouncers in Ontario. Bruckert refers to this as an
“informal economy of favours” through which dancers “carefully negotiate interpersonal
relations and labour practices to maximize their income” not only by offering tips but
also by developing friendly relationships with club staff (2002: 108; see also Lewis 2006).
However cooperation between third parties and dancers has seldom been analyzed in
terms of resistance by third parties. Instead we must turn to organization scholars’
discussions of managerial resistance, in order to see how third parties resist as individuals
occupying organizational positions that involve authority but (with the exception of
owners) limited control over the organization (Willmott 1997). Perhaps the most
important contribution of this small body of literature (upon which Chapter 3 will
elaborate) is not that managerial resistance is distinct from employee resistance, but that

19 Although the literature largely focuses on rules and disciplinary practices as they apply to dancers,
DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) note that as employees bouncers are subject to rules as well; they are not
permitted to drink or do drugs at work (see also Lavin 2013), or to have sex with the dancers.
it occurs in organizations at all (Young 2000; Willmott 1997). Acknowledging managerial resistance allows for a nuanced middle ground between cynical and romantic interpretations of workplace resistance (Mumby 2005; Willmott 1997).

**Performing, reproducing and resisting gender, race and class in the club**

In addition being a site of interpersonal and structural power struggles, the strip club is also a highly gendered, raced, and classed context that significantly impacts dancers’ and third parties’ labour. As we will see, scholars draw connections between the distribution of labour and authority, the performances and behaviours of third parties, the image and environment of the club, dancers’ capacity for resistance, and the reproduction and/or resistance of normative gender, racial and class expectations.

Researchers note that occupational roles, and in turn authority, in the erotic dance sector are distributed according to heteronormative gender roles. Although a few scholars mention that managers and bartenders are occasionally women (Bruckert 2002; Price 2008; Lewis 2006) a gendered division of labour is apparent across the literature, with men predominantly occupying manager, bouncer, bartender and DJ positions, and women working as waitresses, ‘shooter girls,’ and dancers (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Lewis 2006; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010). It appears as though it is the traditionally male roles that are imbued with formal authority and opportunities for career advancement; indeed the only promotion opportunity for dancers noted in the literature was to the position of housemother (Price-Glynn 2010). This stands in contrast to other sectors of the sex industry, such as escorting, brothel work, and erotic massage, in which female third parties and opportunities for women to be promoted to management positions have been noted (Bruckert & Law 2013; Goldstein 1983; Heyl 1974 & 1977).
In spite of this apparent “gendered ‘hierarchy” (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004: 545), academics argue that the power dynamics at strip clubs cannot simply be reduced to male management controlling female workers. Some authors employ a Foucaultian understanding of power to highlight the ways in which dancers challenge relations of power (see Bruckert 2002; Egan 2004; Frank 2002; Murphy 2003), while others look at resistance in regard to gendered norms. For example Ross and Greenwell (2005: 157) found that none of the dancers they interviewed “ever considered herself a powerless dupe of patriarchal control, in spite of difficult, sometimes demoralizing working conditions, and a steady climate of moral opprobrium.” Scholars further suggest that dancers subvert organizational hierarchy by strategically manipulating heteronormative gender roles in their relationships with managers and clients (see Bruckert 2002; Frank 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Murphy 2003).

A reversal of gender norms is also visible in studies that emphasize the status and influence dancers gain from earning more money than third parties (see Lewis 2006; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010; Reed 1997). Frank suggests that traditional scripts are simultaneously inversed and perpetuated in dancers’ interactions with customers, in “social inversions” in which the women are the active sexual subjects in an environment that reinforces traditionally masculine activities and modes of consumption (2003: 65; see also Bruckert 2002; Frank 2002a; Liepe-Levinson 2002; Murphy 2003; Wolkowitz 2006). Other scholars conclude however that such performances ultimately reinforce heterosexual male privilege (see Pilcher 2009; see also Pasko 2002; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010; Trautner 2005; Wood 2000).²⁰ Ross makes a similar point about race,

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²⁰ An (albeit rare) exception to the reproduction of heterosexual norms and privilege is events or clubs featuring female dancers and catering to lesbian customers (see Brooks 2010; Frank & Carnes 2009).
arguing that dancers’ performances of the sexual and racial ‘other’ reinforce customers’ sense “of their own normality and cultural dominance” (2000: 239; see also Brooks 2010). Nuancing this point, Ross and Greenwell found that black dancers used satirical parody to covertly resist racialized, sexualized expectations even as they incorporated them into their performances (2005: 152; see also Law 2012).

Scholars focusing on the performance of gender at the workplace draw on Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical perspective (see Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; Lavin 2013; Murphy 2003), or alternatively, apply organizational perspectives to position strip clubs as “gendered organizations” (see Trautner 2005; Price 2008). Gender-based analyses of performance for the most part focus on female erotic dance (see Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Ronai & Ellis 1989; Frank 2002b; Hanna 1998; Liepe-Levinson 2002; Mavin & Grandy 2013; Murphy 2003; Reid et al. 1994; Ronai 1993; Ross 2009; Trautner 2005; Wesely 2003, 2002; Wolkowitz 2006). Yet other studies demonstrate that the performance of gender is equally important for men. The limited literature focusing on male erotic dance (see DeMarco 2007; Dressel & Peterson 1982a & b; Escoffier 2007; Kaufman 2009; Margolis & Arnold 1983; Montemurro 2001; Montemurro et al. 2003; Pilcher 2011; Scull 2013; Smith 2002; Tewksbury 1994), as well as studies that compare male and female stripping (see Bernard et al. 2003; Liepe-Levinson 2002; Pilcher 2009; Ronai & Cross 1998), highlight some notable differences in the performance of gender between male and female dancers, namely that they engage with, benefit and suffer from (hetero)normative gender expectations in very distinct ways.

A limited number of studies have additionally shown gender to inform third parties’ perceptions of risk. In the incall/outcall sector of the sex industry, Bruckert and
Law (2013) note that, while some third parties worried about theft by sex workers, men who manage male sex workers also expressed concern about their own physical security. This highlights the material and perceptual ramifications of beauty norms for men and women, notably that (hetero)normatively attractive men are likely to be larger and stronger than their customers, whereas the opposite is likely to be the case for women sex workers (Bruckert & Law 2013). DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) similarly note the importance of masculinity for bouncers. They suggest that violence is not a routine aspect of the job and that bouncers are discouraged from excessive use of force; rather, their conspicuous masculine, aggressive presence serves as deterrence (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; see also Bruckert 2002; Hobbs et al. 2005; Rigakos 2008).

The literature also shows third party attitudes and management styles to be informed by heteronormative gender scripts. Murphy (2003: 320-321) characterizes managers’ attitudes as “patriarchal,” noting that one manager acknowledged dancers were central to the success of the business even as he saw them as manipulable sexual objects (see also Price 2008). Similarly Bruckert (2002) argues that managers perceive dancers as unreliable, unprofessional and morally suspect which in turn conditions their governance strategies (see also Bruckert 2012; Law & Bruckert 2016). This perception is also gendered: several studies highlight third parties’ sexist and infantilizing attitude, which is reflected in their use of the term ‘girls’ when referring to dancers (Bruckert 2002; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010). However Lerum (2004: 769) suggests that both workers and managers at the US strip club she studied used sexualized techniques to gain influence over each other and, moreover, that such behaviour is neither necessarily offensive nor inappropriate. In contrast to Erickson’s (2010) documentation of waitresses’
complaints of sexual harassment, Lerum observed only one instance in which a dancer interpreted a sexualized joke by a manager as a possible instance of sexual harassment. This led her to suggest that nebulous power relations between dancers and managers complicate the identification of sexual harassment (Lerum 2004).

While third parties’ and dancers’ performances may simultaneously contest and reiterate normative gender and racial scripts, another important way in which norms are reproduced is through the hiring process through which strip clubs, like other sex industry businesses (see Bruckert & Law 2013), construct their image. Scholars highlight how (hetero)normative Western beauty standards inform managerial hiring and scheduling practices and maintenance expectations in regard to dancers’ appearance, pertaining not only to dress and coiffure, but also age and weight, as well as preferences for large busts, and restrictions on tattooed and racialized women (Bradley 2008; Bouclin 2006; Brooks 1997 & 2010; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Law 2012; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Price-Glynn 2010). Although Bruckert and Frigon (2003: 52) argue that strip club managers increasingly appreciate a variety of body types, policies and practices informed by a narrow definition of beauty appear to be common across the sex industry (Bruckert & Law 2013; Chapkis 2000). Moreover as Bruckert (2002: 104) notes, dancers who conform to normative beauty standards have an increased capacity to challenge relations of power in the workplace.

A number of authors have noted institutionalized racism in the erotic dance sector, in hiring practices that treat white women preferentially and racial ‘quotas’ that serve to limit the number of black women per shift (Bouclin 2006; Brooks 1997 & 2010; Bruckert 2012; Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Law 2012; Price-Glynn 2010). Bouclin (2006)
additionally mentions Ottawa strip clubs restricting the number of Latina, Asian and Aboriginal women. Scholars also note pay differences informed by race, with white dancers (and dancers who are light skinned or who pass as white) earning more than women of colour, either through preferential shift distribution or compensation by management (Brooks 2010, 1997; Ross & Greenwell 2005) or by the normative (racist) preferences of clients (Law 2012). Further, as Brooks argues, clients’ perceptions of black dancers as “worth less sexually” and “hypersexual” make them more likely to be violent towards black dancers, at the same time as (both black and white) managers are less likely to protect black dancers because they have internalized these same negative stereotypes (2010: 79).

In the US, such racially biased practices seem to have led to some degree of racial segregation in the erotic dance industry – scholars describe (de facto) white strip clubs with limited positions for racialized women, and (overtly) black strip clubs, which are perceived by both dancers and customers as ‘lower class’ (Brooks 2010; Frank 2003). Demonstrating the intersection of race and class in the construction of reputation, Ross and Greenwell (2005) describe Vancouver’s striptease scene between the 1940s and 1970s as divided between more ‘respectable’ clubs that preferred white dancers, and clubs in working class and “ethnic enclave” (144) neighbourhoods that proclaimed reputations of “raunchier acts” (145), where racialized dancers were over-represented. Similarly Trautner (2005) argues that contemporary middle- and working class strip clubs offer different displays of female sexuality to appeal to their audiences. Moreover Bradley-Engen and Ulmer (2009) observed that clubs projecting a ‘higher class’ status
exercise stricter aesthetic requirements and more formal hiring processes (i.e., auditions) than their ‘lower-tier’ counterparts (see also Egan 2006).

Furthermore, DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) suggest that rule enforcement, especially in regard to touching, is connected to the class status that a particular establishment is attempting to project. They characterize the working class club they studied as a “dive” because it makes little to no attempt to stop touching between dancers and customers (although overt acts of prostitution are not allowed), and the earning potential for dancers is relatively low (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004). Similarly in the clubs featured in Lilleston et al.’s study (2012), which are in a “bad neighborhood” (564), numerous dancers offer sex with few objections from management; sexual transactions sometimes even take the form of a “buy-out,” wherein “the customer pays the club to leave with the dancer” (564). Gathering together the above scholarly insights we see that strip clubs are environments that are (re)produced and conditioned by performances and interpretations of gender, race and class.

**Risk and regulation**

The literature also demonstrates how gender, race and class intersect with stigma in the construction of strip clubs as risky. Academics highlight clashes and convergences in state and strip club workers’ perceptions of, and strategies to manage, risk.

Scholars argue that race and class inform strip club workers’ perceptions of risk. Lilleston et al. 2012 suggest that third parties’ approach to customer screening is informed by perceptions of black men as dangerous (see also Koskela 2012; Law & Bruckert 2016). Ross and Greenwell (2005) note that white dancers sought to avoid clubs that welcomed working class, racialized patrons, based on assumptions they were “shady”
Similarly Frank (2003) suggests that customers perceive black dancers as more aggressive, and black strip clubs as having “rough[er] crowds” (2003: 68). Brooks (2010: 78) notes that even black dancers perceive black clubs to be more dangerous, expecting customers to be more “rowdy” and security to be less effective as compared to white clubs. Together these studies demonstrate that perceptions by strip club workers effectively reproduce stereotypical assumptions constructing certain populations – especially black men – as risky.

In addition to their own perceptions of risk, strip club workers must contend with state mechanisms designed to mitigate risk. Scholars identify intersecting discourses of morality, health, and harm in these regulatory strategies. Bruckert and Dufresne (2002) dispute the claims of health risks on which Toronto, Ottawa and other municipalities in Ontario justified their prohibition of lap dancing, arguing it instead derived from a discourse of morality (see also Bruckert 2002; Lewis 2000). Similarly Jackson argues that bylaws frame dancers as “potential prostitutes” (2011: 361). Scholars also draw attention to moral subtexts in claims by communities of potential harm, or ‘secondary effects,’ such as increased crime rates and decreases in property values (Hanna 2005; Hubbard 2009; Hubbard et al. 2008; Frank & Carnes 2009). Another discourse the literature identifies frames strip clubs as harmful and demeaning to, and exploitative of, women (Hubbard & Colosi 2012) or more generally, harmful to the moral order and the nuclear family (Bouclin 2009). This discourse has been used by municipalities and community groups to limit the number of strip clubs, and sex industry businesses altogether, to mitigate the ostensible risks of living near or visiting them (van der Meulen & Durisin 2008: 296; see also Hubbard 2009), and by the Supreme Court of Canada to
outlaw lap dancing with *R v Mara* in 1997 (see also Bruckert & Dufresne 2002). Similarly, discourses informing Canada’s regulatory approach to migrant dancers, which hold them to be simultaneously victims of trafficking, and morally contaminating and contaminated, have limited their numbers, rights and mobility (Law 2012; Macklin 2003).

Upon analyzing these discourses, academics conclude that regulatory regimes informed by stigmatic assumptions and moral concerns often overlook tangible risks to health and safety (Hannem 2012), which can significantly impact upon workers’ wellbeing as well as their relationships to third parties across the sex industry (Bruckert & Law 2013; Chapkis 2000; Craig 2011; Frank 2005; Ham & Gerard 2013; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009; Lewis 2000; van der Meulen & Durisin 2008). Several Ontario studies suggest that management and existing regulations are ineffective in preventing workplace sexual harassment or assault, and that dancers seldom feel they can use state or workplace avenues of recourse due to stigma and financial concerns (see Lewis & Shaver 2006; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; MLS 2012a). In this regard Frank (2005: 503) notes that, although rare, pragmatic enforcement by third parties of rules and bylaws against touching can decrease instances of sexual assault and empower dancers to exert greater control over their transactions with customers. Conversely, van der Meulen and Durisin (2008) argue that sex workers in sectors which are subject to prohibitive municipal regulations would be better served by a decriminalization model emphasizing occupational health and safety and worker rights (see also Craig 2011; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009).

Recognizing the prohibition of lap dancing as a risk to their profits, Ontario strip club owners have at various times organized to resist state regulation by forming their
own business associations to lobby for regulatory change (Bouclin 2004b; Law 2015). However, a more common response by third parties is systematic disregard of regulations viewed as inappropriate or overly broad, often by allowing touching in municipalities where it is prohibited (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Law & Bruckert 2016; Lilleston et al. 2012). Some studies reveal more overt resistance to state regulation: Price-Glynn (2010: 157) notes third parties subverting state regulation via “donations to local police” while Lavin (2013) describes managers opting to pay occasional fines instead of changing their practices to comply with regulations.

At the same time, as local business operators third parties are subject, and thus must at least feign compliance, to municipal regulation. In this regard scholars note that club rules, while not always followed or enforced, are often modeled after municipal bylaws (Frank 2005; Law & Bruckert 2016). However, several studies suggest that management does not enforce rules against touching or the provision of sexual services consistently or, in some cases, at all (see Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Lavin 2013; Law & Bruckert 2016; Lilleston et al. 2012; Morgan 1998; Price-Glynn 2010). Similar observations have been made about the incall/outcall sector in Canada – Bruckert and Law (2013) and van der Meulen and Durisin (2008) argue that third parties often only communicate the sexual services offered at their businesses through euphemism, and do not provide safer sex supplies to sex workers. Through this wilful blindness third parties mitigate the legal risks to themselves and the organization, displacing legal liability, as well as the responsibility to manage personal security, onto

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21 This seems to have gone unremarked upon in the literature save for my own research (Law 2015), and a brief mention in Bouclin’s (2004) study where it is not framed as resistance. This may be because, like a Business Improvement Area, a third party organization like the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada (AEAC) is made up of business owners, and carries out its work outside of the businesses that comprise it, making its activities invisible to a researcher focusing on a particular club or on dancers’ labour.
dancers (Chapkis 2000; Lewis 2000; see also Bruckert & Law 2013; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale 2000).

**Moving forward: Shifting the focus toward third parties**

The literature(s) discussed in this chapter highlight numerous points of comparison between dancers and third parties, which can inform further research about the latter. Perhaps the most important of these is labour. Scholars who view erotic dance as labour underscore the importance of analyzing the implications of stigma rather than perpetuating assumptions about the sex industry as inherently harmful, which they argue can exacerbate risks faced by dancers. Extending this insight to third parties, we see that negative stereotypes obscure the ways in which third parties may be beneficial to sex workers. In turn, a labour perspective allows for differentiation between helpful services and unethical practices such as workplace discrimination or mandatory unpaid labour, as well as the identification of, and the development of strategies to surmount, concrete workplace issues. Additionally since organization scholars have identified several contradictory ways in which managers and organizations deal with stigma, investigating how third parties in strip clubs manage stigma (e.g., with or against dancers) may highlight points of solidarity and/or stratification in the erotic dance sector.

Scholars have also examined a variety of strip club organizational structures and occupational roles. The latter can be divided into principal third parties (managers, bouncers, DJs), auxiliary or occasional third parties (bartenders, housemothers, attendants), and peripheral or unaffiliated third parties (agents, ‘pimps’). Existing knowledge on the roles of these individuals suggests that they together (re)produce the workplace and shape dancers’ experiences of labour. This in turn suggests that the
relationship amongst third parties is important. Given the regional variation in organizational structures, and the paucity of information on how principal, peripheral, and unaffiliated third parties work with each other, an examination of third parties’ roles and inter-relationships in Ontario provides needed specific and general information.

Although the literature has examined power and resistance at strip clubs quite extensively, this investigation has so far been largely limited to dancers’ perspectives and experiences. However a few studies demonstrate that third parties sometimes behave in ways that counter their occupational role or responsibilities, which, consistent with organization scholars’ investigations into other milieux, suggests that they also engage in resistance even though their actions are seldom described in this way. Moreover, as we have seen, sometimes third parties appear to subvert organizational rules in cooperation with dancers. Academics also argue that dancers’ resistance strategies can meaningfully impact their work. In these respects, attentively examining third parties’ resistance and how it affects dancers will yield a deeper understanding of the circulation of power in strip clubs than one derived from assumptions about occupational titles and organizational structure. Highlighting everyday resistance strategies, then, and their meanings for and effects on individuals, responds to calls by scholars to debunk assumptions about managerial control (Willmott 1997), and violent or extreme exploitation in the sex industry (Weitzer 2014).

The erotic dance literature has also considered managers’ normative attitudes towards gender, race and class, which include discriminatory hiring practices premised on narrow definitions of beauty, and social profiling of customers. Scholars have further argued that third parties’ engagement with these norms may affect the environment of the
club – who is permitted access to the space (as a worker or a client), what kinds of behaviours are acceptable (and by whom), and what level of risk is tolerable. Additionally, the findings of DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) and studies of nightclub bouncers suggest third parties’ performances of and engagement with gender, race and class are important to their occupational roles.

As the literature has demonstrated, third parties are responsible for enforcing the laws and municipal regulations that apply to strip clubs. How third parties choose to adopt or ignore these regulations has also been shown to affect dancers’ labour, by limiting the services they can provide or by exacerbating the risks they face through wilful ignorance. Moreover, just as they have been shown to shape dancers’ labour in other ways, issues of race, gender and class norms, stigma, power and resistance, along with occupational roles and organizational structure, may converge in the management of risks in the strip club, in which third parties (should) play a key role. Before turning to the voices of third parties – which have been so far virtually absent from scholarly research – in the second half of this thesis, the coming chapter looks more exhaustively into some of the theoretical tools to address these inter-related themes.
Chapter 3. Theoretical framework: Towards an integrated analysis of performances, processes, power and resistance in strip clubs

As we have just seen, numerous scholars (e.g., Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Law 2012; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Trautner 2005) note that strip clubs are shaped by particular performances and expectations of gender, race, class and sexuality. However, West and Austrin (2002) argue that focusing on sex and gender relations and discourses neglects to take into account other important workplace practices and influences, advocating for an analysis that also considers networks and relationships, and the local and broader social context. In this respect Foucault’s (1977; 1982) network of power relations has proven useful in examining relationships amongst workers and management in organization studies (Knights 2004; Mumby 2005; Young 2000), as well as dancers and their clients (e.g., Bruckert 2002; Egan 2004; Frank 2002; Murphy 2003). Conversely Price (2008: 368) criticizes interaction-based studies employing this model for overlooking the broader social mechanisms in which these interactions unfold.

Endeavouring to accommodate these concerns, this chapter develops an integrated theoretical framework to address the interplay of interpersonal interaction, organizational structure, social discourses and regulatory mechanisms.

Following other scholars who have examined dancers’ workplace performances (e.g., Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; Lavin 2013; Murphy 2003) and negotiations of interpersonal interactions (e.g., Bruckert et al. 2003; Lavin 2013; Trautner & Collett 2010), this chapter uses Goffman’s (1959; 1963) work as a point of departure to explore both role performance and stigma management by third parties. Since looking at third parties’ roles also constitutes an investigation into organizational structure, Goffman
(1959) is put into conversation with organization theory. In turn, conceptual tools developed by Foucault (1977) and feminist theorists are incorporated to examine the discourses and social norms (e.g., gender, race, class) that produce the meanings that individuals make of social interactions at work (see Hacking 2004; Hannem 2012). Integrating these tools and perspectives yields a theoretical framework suited to examining the diverse constitutive facets of strip clubs, as: locales of performance and consumption of gender and sexuality; structured organizations comprised of professional and social relationships, and influenced by legal and normative discourses; and networks in and through which power and resistance circulate. The first half of this chapter addresses these themes at the level of interpersonal interaction, while the second half is concerned with organizational structure and relationships – discourses and power relations are considered throughout. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of how these concepts can be applied to organizational performances, relationships and structures in the erotic dance sector.

**Interpersonal interaction: Performances and perceptions**

According to Butler’s (1990; 2004) theory of gender performativity, gender is repetitively enacted in the (re)production of identity (see also McInlay 2010). Similarly, in their analysis of gender as a situated identity that people ‘do’ in ways that sustain and legitimate institutional arrangements, West and Zimmerman (1987) argue that “gender has no specific site or organizational context” (128). Like McInlay (2010) I am not concerned with gender as an ongoing process of identity work or social intelligibility, making performance a more appropriate concept as it is amenable to specific tasks carried out at particular times. Indeed it is precisely organizational roles – involving
contextually specific iterations of gender, race and class – in which I am interested. As such Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective, which he specifies is especially suitable for the analysis of social life as it occurs within the confines of a concrete space such as a business or industrial establishment (1959: xi), can provide a nuanced point of departure for an analysis of the players in strip clubs.

Goffman (1959) developed what he called a dramaturgical approach to make sense of how individuals behave in the presence of others, and the meanings conveyed by, and interpreted from, these performances. Reflecting on the social interaction, Goffman (1959) suggests that individuals perform particular expressions of themselves in order to foster impressions that define the social situation for, and evoke appropriate behavioural responses from, other individuals in their presence (their audience). These expressions, which Goffman refers to as pre-established patterns of action, parts or routines, enacted repeatedly, foster social relationships between the performer and the audience (1959: 16). In this respect the performance of a part reflects and affirms a particular social role. In turn, Goffman defines a “social role as the enactment of rights and duties attached to a given status” (1959: 16). A social role can involve one or more parts but is presented in a consistent manner to the same type of audience or persons (Goffman 1959: 16).

Every performance involves what Goffman calls a “front,” which supports the performer in defining the situation for the audience, and which comprises a “setting” and a “personal front” (1959: 22-24). The setting consists of the scenery and props required to stage a performance (Goffman 1959: 22). ‘Personal front’ refers to the expressive equipment of the performer, which may include: a work uniform; gender, size, race, age or other personal characteristics; and particular inflections of speech, gesture, or facial
expression (Goffman 1959: 24). The performance occurs in (and is limited to) a place (and time) Goffman calls the “front region,” where performers must perpetually enact their roles, whether interacting directly with the audience or not (1959: 107). It is in the “back region,” where performers craft the illusions they will stage in the absence of the audience, that performers may relax and ‘step out’ of their roles (Goffman 1959).

Applying Goffman’s perspective to commercial social establishments, for example a restaurant, we see that the service area where the customers are received and seated constitutes the front region. Hidden from view of the clientele, the kitchen can be understood as the back region. Of course there are many roles being performed simultaneously in a service industry organization that work together to attract, cater to, entertain, and regulate the behaviour of the audience (its clientele). At the same time, a restaurant manager may be performing his or her role in the kitchen when directing the cooks, which suggests that each actor may be performing for multiple audiences, for example customers, colleagues and superiors. We will see how multiple roles can work together (or not) by examining group, or team, performance (Goffman 1959), through the lens of organization theory later in the chapter. First however, we must examine the social and personal limits and possibilities of individual performance.

Since a performance, and the information expressed therein, serves to define a situation and structure the social interaction in which it occurs, its success relies on the communication of shared meanings. In other words, performances are evaluated according to socially prescribed norms (Goffman 1959). This means that the range of performances accessible to an individual is not infinite. Rather, as Dahrendorf suggests, social roles are “bundles of expectations directed at the incumbents of positions in a
given society” (1968: 22). Thus, most people might expect (or reluctantly accept) that a soldier may be ordered to kill persons perceived as enemies of the state, as part of their occupation; however most people would view a fatal end to a quarrel between two neighbours as murder. Of course, an individual occupies many social roles (for example our soldier might also be a neighbour and a parent) and these cannot help but overlap; as Dahrendorf points out, inasmuch as an individual is more than their social roles, each role cannot entirely prescribe an individual’s performance of it (1968: 25). As we will see in the coming pages, an individual’s role performance is also influenced by their social and personal attributes, the systems and norms enabling and limiting the roles they inhabit, the discourses that assign meaning to particular attributes and roles, and their negotiation of all of these things.

Performance expectations: Gender and sexual scripts

According to McInlay (2010: 234), performance involves an individual following or refusing to follow a script. In turn, scripts can be understood as “normative clusters that specify the parameters for lines of action in given social contexts. With regard to sexual behavior, sexual scripts specify how to behave sexually” (Longmore 1998: 51; see also Simon & Gagnon 1986). Thus scripts inform the performance and interpretation of roles, sexual and otherwise.

Many service industry occupations, for example server (Paules 1991; Spradley & Mann 1975), flight attendant (Hochschild 1983), and erotic dancer (Bruckert & Frigon 2003), can be seen to include both sexual and gendered scripts, in the form of expectations about how women should embody and perform a particular kind of sexuality and femininity. Moreover these expectations often include specific iterations of class and
race (Mirchandani 2003; see also Bruckert 2002; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Trautner 2005). With regard to typically male occupations, heterosexual masculinity is eminently visible in the role demands of the bouncer, who is expected to have hyper-masculine attributes, including a muscular physique, and to channel them into a physically intimidating and sometimes violent performance (DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Hobbs et al. 2005; Rigakos 2008). Similarly, Sjolander and Trevenen (2010) argue that, in spite of the increasing inclusion of women in the US military, the role of soldier remains strongly attached to intersecting scripts of masculinity, whiteness and heterosexuality. Thus a variety of workers reproduce heteronormative gender in their occupational performances, at the same time as these norms effectively contribute to the achievement of their occupational tasks of subtly or aggressively controlling their respective audiences.

While an individual must perform roles particular to their occupation, these roles may take on different expectations depending on the performer’s personal attributes. It is here that the performance of occupational roles becomes entangled with gendered expectations. According to Guadagno and Cialdini (2007), men in corporate organizations tend to use impression management tactics that are assertive and dominant and thus more consistent with normative masculine characteristics, whereas women employ relatively passive or submissive tactics typically associated with normative femininity. So too, gender norms influence the perception of occupational performance. While men receive positive evaluations and salary increases for using masculine impression management tactics, women are frequently punished for transgressing gender norms when they adopt the same tactics (Guadagno & Cialdini 2007: 492).
Moreover, Whitehead (2002) argues that traditional gender norms continue to influence work and organizational life in general, materially impacting individuals’ access to, and success in, the labour market. Men have predominated the managerial ranks for so long that organizational power and authority, and the very notion of paid work, remain more closely associated with (white) men and masculinity than with women and femininity (Collinson & Hearn 1996; Whitehead 2002). This is visible in the archetypal masculine qualities sought in corporate managers – “authoritarian, paternalistic, entrepreneurial, careerist, instrumental, ruthless, rational, unemotional and distant” (Whitehead 2002: 129) – as well as the lack of respect and recognition garnered by jobs associated with and dominated by women, such as domestic and service work (Moukalif 2009; Vosko 2000), and healthcare (Banerjee et al. 2008). Such ‘women’s work’ is often regarded as unskilled labour (or comparatively unskilled, e.g., nurse vs. doctor), while male dominated fields (from corporate management to the trades) are associated with skill (Collinson & Hearn 1996: 9; see also Vosko 2000). As a result women, especially those from ethnic and racial minorities, continue to be under-represented in positions of leadership internationally, in spite of the increasing number of women entering into managerial and professional positions previously dominated by men (Acker 2009: 200; see also Guadagno & Cialdini 2007). In short, as Acker (2009) argues, organizations continue to perpetuate gender, class, and racial inequalities (see also Green 2005). As we will next examine, gender norms support the social and economic hierarchies of larger systems including capitalism, which in turn reproduce normative identity categories (Fellows & Razack 1998; Mohanty 2003).
Performing in and through systems and discourses: Understanding the precedents of social interaction

If work roles encompass normative gender performances and expectations, they also exclude certain behaviours and attributes. However Goffman’s approach (along with symbolic interactionism in general) has been critiqued for being largely limited to interpersonal interactions rather than the social institutions and structures they play a part in reproducing (Hacking 2004; Hannem 2012). Thus, to understand how norms can exclude and disqualify, we must investigate the discourses that make them intelligible and the institutions through which they are reproduced.

Discourse, for Foucault (1972; 1977), is a vehicle through which knowledge is produced and meaning is ascribed to social practices and personal conduct. Foucault (1972) insists that discourses are more than groups of signs or statements – they are simultaneously “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (49) and which change over time. In this manner, discourse gives meaning to social practices (see also Hacking 2004). Foucault further argues that discourse, truth, and power are always interconnected: power relations manifest in the dominance of certain discourses over others, circulated in and through political and economic apparatuses (e.g., media, education, military) as ‘truths,’ which in turn support the power relations, and social groups, through which they were constituted (Foucault 1977; 1980).

Foucault (1982) characterizes power relations as modes of governance that can be repressive or disciplinary (among other forms). At the same time Foucault (1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) insists that power is not possessed or appropriated by individuals but instead circulates in a network of relations, such that individuals “are always in the position of
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power” (1980: 98). In this network of relations, then, power is always an action upon a previous action, such that power relations between ruling and working classes are asymmetrical, and often (though neither inevitably nor consistently) reinforce existing social structures (Foucault 1982; Scott 1985). Before turning to the circulation of power in organizations in the latter half of this chapter, we must consider the exercise and effects of power through systems and institutions, and on individuals.

Building on Foucault, Smart (1989) examines the ways in which social structures and dominant discourses are mutually reaffirming in her analysis of the legal system. She argues that law works through two parallel modes of power, the juridical (repressive) and the disciplinary (reproductive), which each have their own discourse, respectively that of rights and that of normalization (Smart 1989). Each of these discourses is mutually affirming; for example in accepting the discourses of medicine and the ‘psy’ professions, law extends into the private lives of citizens, thus retaining its juridical power to extend or deny rights while exercising newer and more subtle mechanisms such as surveillance and discipline (Smart 1989: 17; see also Foucault 1977). Bruckert and Hannem (2013a) highlight a poignant example of political and economic management that reinforces normative discourses (see Foucault 1982) through state (police) surveillance and denial of rights: the criminalization of prostitution. They argue that the asymmetrical regulation of prostitution, which criminalizes third parties and clients (but not sex workers), reifies discourses framing prostitution as inherently violent and an act through which men exploit women (Bruckert & Hannem 2013a; see also Sanders & Campbell 2014). This exacerbates street-based sex workers’ risks of violence by driving them to more isolated
areas where clients are less likely to be noticed by police (Bruckert & Hannem 2013a; Jordan 2012).

Foucault also characterizes contemporary Western societies as ordered more subtly by disciplinary power, which operates through state institutions such as the school, the army, and the prison. Continually streamlining bodies towards efficiency and docility through measuring, evaluating, hierarchically organizing and controlling their movement through time and space, disciplinary power manifests as surveillance that fosters self-surveillance and, finally, self-discipline (Foucault 1977). For Weedon (1987), who interprets Foucault through a feminist lens, institutions including the school and the workplace reiterate gender and class through differentiating amongst individuals’ abilities and skills, which in turn shapes their self-perception. In short, the class, gender and race hierarchies that make up the social order become entrenched in individuals through disciplinary power.

On a broader level, Fellows and Razack argue that relations of power are *interlocking*, insofar as “systems of oppression come into existence in and through one another so that class exploitation could not be accomplished without gender and racial hierarchies; imperialism could not function without class exploitation, sexism, heterosexism, and so on” (1998: 335; see also Mohanty 2003). The reproduction of socio-economic structures through discourse and practice is illustrated by Willis (1977). He describes how ‘class culture,’ comprising experiences and patterns of relationships, informs the choices and decisions individuals make at particular times, and also structures how these choices arise and are experienced and defined (Willis 1977: 1). Thus, by leaving school to seek employment in manual labour jobs, and engaging in
stereotypically masculine and sexist behaviour with male colleagues and in leisure activities, working class youth cement their membership in, and reproduce, working class culture (Willis 1977). Although the boys’ participation in factory work in turn reproduces the subordination of the working class (Willis 1977), as we will consider shortly it also contests middle class success goals (i.e., social advancement through education) in the pursuit of immediate gain (Scott 1985). Whereas Willis (1977) examines how class culture invites participation, Green (2005) highlights its exclusiveness. In the corporate workforce, Green (2005) identifies ‘work culture’ as a mechanism that excludes those who do not ‘fit in,’ thereby reproducing a white, middle class, male norm in organizations.

The notion of interlocking systems of oppression builds from Crenshaw’s (1989; 1991) influential theory of multiple marginalized identities intersecting. Comparing black women’s experiences of discrimination to traffic going through an intersection, which could come from any direction, or several ways simultaneously, Crenshaw argues black women may experience discrimination on the basis of race or gender or as black women in particular (1989: 149). Banerjee et al. (2008) illustrate the co-occurrence of intersecting discrimination and interlocking oppressions in arguing that violence against personal support workers is, overwhelmingly, an issue of violence against women, and especially women from racialized and/or immigrant groups. Structural barriers such as a lack of recognition of foreign credentials, and limited access to education and training contribute to the over-representation of these particular groups of women in such professions. Their work is further impacted by the under-valuation of women’s skills and labour, overstaffing and inadequate occupational health and safety measures in the
healthcare sector (Banerjee et al. 2008; Leblanc & Barling 2004). In turn, women’s experiences and interpretations of workplace violence are shaped by their cultural and racial identities (Welsh et al. 2006). In Welsh et al.’s research, black women found sexual harassment to be manageable and not as serious as racism/racial harassment, while migrant women workers interpreted sexual abuse more ambiguously, expressing greater concern about the limitations engendered by their lack of citizenship (2006: 103). Thus, an individual’s experience is influenced by intersecting identities and interlocking oppressions working in and through each other.

**Adapting performance: Resistance and agency**

Against the constraints of the norms and discourses, systems and social structures discussed above, Foucault and feminist scholars highlight tools and strategies with which individuals can negotiate their roles, experiences, and identities. Although Foucault’s conceptualization of power as continually circulating offers considerable leeway for resistance, he concedes that power is not equally accessible. Rather, as we have seen, certain power relations (e.g., socio-economic class) are reproduced through discourses and social institutions (Foucault 1980; Smart 1989). However, just as feminists insist that agency is exerted amidst interlocking systems of oppression (Madhok et al. 2013), Foucault (1980) suggests that power is never without resistance, which invariably also exists in the network, in dynamic relation to power. Although resistance can occasionally take the form of radical ruptures, more often these points of resistance are mobile and transitory, occurring at the level of groups and individuals (Foucault 1978: 95).

Finding Foucault’s theorization ambiguous, Munn and Bruckert (2010) offer a methodologically informed and empirically applicable definition of resistance,
characterizing it as an agentic challenge to a particular manifestation of power relations that subverts, contests, or counters them through specific procedures by drawing on skills and/or resources, resulting in an action (or inaction, e.g., withholding labour power).

Applying the concept to class, Scott (1985) describes resistance as including any act by a member of a subordinate class (e.g., labourers), out of self-interest, that opposes claims made on them by a superordinate class (e.g., employers). Although such acts may in isolation appear insignificant, Scott (1985) argues that marginalized populations can make their presence felt by the state (or superordinate classes) through the pressure built up by consistent, repeated patterns of small scale or “everyday forms” of resistance. Further reflections on resistance in the context of organizational power relations are offered later in the chapter; first we must contextualize resistance at the individual level.

With regard to performance and interpersonal interaction, an individual’s performance of a role may include elements of discipline and resistance simultaneously. Craig (2006) illustrates this in arguing that women’s engagement with the more changeable aspects of normative beauty (e.g., hairstyle) should not necessarily be interpreted as signs that they are “cultural dupes” but instead that they are accepting certain expectations or scripts while contesting others (see also Tibbals 2007). In this regard women’s beauty practices can be seen as challenging and reproducing normative scripts simultaneously albeit in contradictory ways.

This brings us to the question of agency. McNay describes agency as a capacity to act creatively and autonomously within the constraints of an individual’s sense of self (McNay 1999: 318). Of course agency is also situated – that is, enacted within systems (e.g., capitalism) and intersecting marginalizations (e.g., race, gender, class, ability) – and
for this reason, Showden argues that it is frequently partial (2011: 6). However these constraints do not negate agency; Madhok et al. (2013) reject the idea that agency is a measure of an absence of coercion. Drawing on these three authors, I use agency here to refer to the capacity for innovative action that an individual negotiates within external (e.g., social structures and norms) and internal constraints (e.g., personality, biology). A social actor’s performance of a role, then, can be seen as an amalgam of agency, context and social location.

**Stigma and the limits of impression**

Inasmuch as roles allow for some degree of individual interpretation in their embodiment (Dahrendorf 1968), the perception of a role is also important – performance, after all, requires an audience. According to Goffman, “[s]ociety establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories… transforming them into normative expectations” (1963: 2). Thus, when normative expectations are not met, either because of inappropriate behaviour or personal attributes deemed by the audience to be unsuitable for the situation (i.e., against [stereo]type), the performance is perceived as inadequate.

Negative perception can have more salient effects than a shattered impression resulting from an unsuccessful role performance; it can lead to a person being discredited (Goffman 1963). Even if the performer is otherwise adept, their impression can be ruined when a single attribute is perceived as inconsistent with the role, effectively displacing the role as the individual’s “master status,” that is, a trait that overshadows any other characteristics an individual possesses (Hughes 1945: 357; see also Becker 1963: 33). Goffman (1963: 3) describes an attribute perceived as deeply discrediting – “a failing, a
handicap, a shortcoming” – as a stigma, which reduces a person “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.” Goffman (1963) insists that stigma is relational, as the product of an interpersonal interaction in which one person is discovered by another to possess an undesirable attribute. Stigma may alter the way an individual is treated by others as well as the way they present themselves (Goffman 1963), especially if they anticipate being stigmatized in routine social interactions (Pinel 2004).

Drawing on Goffman’s (1963) and Jones et al.’s (1984) discussions of stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that stigma is a process consisting of labelling, stereotyping, differentiation, status loss and discrimination. This draws our attention to the close relationship between stigma and power relations; as a reflection of dominant norms, already marginalized groups are more likely to be stigmatized, which may in turn reinforce or exacerbate their marginalization. Link and Phelan (2001) illustrate this point by highlighting the effects of stigma on the mentally ill, who are seen as their illnesses, and therefore as lesser humans and unworthy recipients of state resources, resulting in a dearth of funding, programs, and medical interventions (see also Bruckert & Hannem 2013a). Interpersonal stigma also impacts the daily lives of the stigmatized habitually and profoundly (Hannem & Bruckert 2012). For example sex workers in Bruckert and Chabot’s (2010) research reported that stigma was detrimental to their romantic relationships, their self-esteem, and their interactions with people in their communities (e.g., violence or dismissal by police officers, eviction, and hurtful comments).

We can turn to Pheterson (1998) to see how stigma is produced in relation to sex work. Pheterson (1998) describes the “whore stigma” as “a mark of shame or disease on an unchaste woman” (1998: 231). Unchastity comprises two dimensions: impurity and
defilement (Pheterson 1998). Pheterson (1998) characterizes impurity as an attribute associated with identity (e.g., dirty, adulterated), and uses defilement to refer to conduct, specifically female sexual experience or a reputation thereof. Thus, dancers are stigmatized because of their promiscuous reputation garnered by naked, erotic dance in public view, in concert with assumptions about their being diseased (as noted by Bruckert 2002; Bruckert & Dufresne 2002; Lewis 2000; Jackson 2011). Similarly Bruckert (2012) argues sex workers are characterized as both risky to public morality and health, and at risk of victimization (see also Bruckert & Hannem 2013a). In turn, the risks sex workers are assumed to face may play a part in stigmatizing the people who work with them.

Stigmatic assumptions about third parties in the erotic dance sector and the sex industry in general are abundantly visible in popular stereotypes depicting them as violent, immoral, parasitic or seedy – necessary opposites to the abused, desperate or duped women they are presumed to be exploiting (Bruckert & Law 2013; Sanders 2006).

**Contextualizing performance: Organizational considerations**

Just as the experiences and performances of individuals are impacted by normative expectations or violations thereof, they are also context specific. Recalling that Goffman’s dramaturgical tools were designed to examine social life as it unfolds in a social establishment, we now turn to consider this context. Here it is important to note that, just as a performance is only successful if the performers carry it off without betraying how their illusions are constructed (Goffman 1959), an organization is not a

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22 Although Bruckert (2012) employs this term, she does not specifically define it. Rather, it derives from Goffman, who reflects on the tendency to “believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination… We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents” (1963: 5). Thus, a stigmatic assumption can be understood as an ideologically informed belief about a discrediting attribute that an individual possesses, which explains their inferiority and riskiness, is taken for granted as ‘common knowledge,’ and is associated with other negative characteristics, often reducing their social standing, reputation, and chances of success.
stable entity but rather an ensemble of individuals and (discursive) elements that, insofar as they must work together, are continually at risk of not doing so (Handy 1993). In this respect, using Goffman to look at organizations allows us to see them as potentially chaotic groupings that must constantly strive to balance the diverging interests of their members. This section applies questions of performance and perception to the organization through each of its components, as: a social entity with an organizational culture; a business directed by particular goals; and a network of relations; embedded in a particular social, regulatory, economic and geographical context (Daft & Armstrong 2009: 9). Considering these components also allows us to see how the normative expectations and discourses introduced in the first half of this chapter are reproduced through each.

**Organizations in the external environment: Confronting regulation and norms**

The external environment provides an organization with a physical setting and customer base, as well as a regulatory context informed by local and broader culture, norms, and laws. In other words the environment determines whether an organization is viable; as Tani (2002: 364) argues, dominant sexual values impact the location and visibility of sexual commerce. As noted in Chapter 2, municipal regulation imposes greater limits on strip clubs than ‘mainstream’ businesses (see also Law 2015). This can be seen as an enactment of structural stigma, which Hannem (2012: 24) defines as arising from an awareness of a stigmatic attribute held by a particular social group, through which the group is viewed as risky or immoral, and in turn in need of careful management. Hannem specifies that this stigma is not interpersonal but rather is produced through institutional and conceptual *structures*, resulting in “a myriad of
interventions, regulations, and surveillance” (2012: 24). Because these interventions are justified through risk and difference, they perpetuate stigma rather than helping the target group (Hannem 2012: 25). Bruckert and Hannem (2013a) characterize the criminalization of communicating for the purposes of prostitution as structural stigma because it aims to protect communities from exposure to prostitution and sex workers from victimization; instead however, it increases the risks sex workers face (see also Canada v Bedford 2013). This legislation informs the approach taken by sex industry businesses to advertising their services – many use euphemistic language rather than referring to sexual acts directly, which can result in miscommunications that have negative consequences for worker safety as well as the success of the business (Bruckert & Law 2013).

Management scholars similarly note numerous ways in which organizational members can manage stigma. Devers et al. (2009) suggest that because organizations are made up of multiple components, they can redraw their boundaries to exclude the offending member or part. This separation is akin to what Goffman calls stratification, in which a hierarchy is formed in a stigmatized group, those with the less apparent or obtrusive stigma disavowing and feeling ashamed of their more obvious counterparts (1963: 107). Another organizational strategy proposed by Devers et al. involves claiming the offending party acted in defiance of or independently from the rest of the organization (2009: 158). Devers et al. (2009) further suggest that the use of such tactics make organizations unlikely to push for social change, as disassociating from the stigmatized conduct is simpler and more efficient. Alternatively, Ashforth et al. suggest that managers of stigmatized occupations are “in the interesting position of having both a subidentity with a status shield (as a manager) and a subidentity with a status threat (as a
member of a stigmatized occupation)” (2007: 167). Ashforth et al. (2007: 157) found that these managers seldom invoked their superior organizational position, distanced themselves from workers, or blamed them for the stigma in order to separate themselves from it. Instead, managers usually saw themselves “as responsible for and ‘in the same boat as’ their subordinates” (Ashforth et al. 2007: 157; see also Sandiford 2007).

A concern to manage stigma may also inform an organization’s interactions with other organizations, individuals, and institutions. For example Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) found that employees of gay bathhouses were directed to keep delivery people away from the baths (and the sexual activities occurring therein) to protect customers from stigma (Hudson & Okhuysen 2009). In this respect, stigma may not necessarily determine an organization’s lifespan or practices, but rather presents particular challenges that necessitate strategic accommodation.

Recalling Tani’s (2002) comment, if sexual commerce is influenced by sexual values, it is also, like ‘mainstream’ business, influenced by other discourses and norms prevalent in those same contexts. As Cohn (2000) argues, managerial policies and attitudes reflecting social norms (and normative expectations about who is skilled or responsible, as previously discussed) have the effect of excluding minorities from the workplace, and in this respect reinforce, and are fundamentally connected to, social stratification (see also Gingrich 2008; Green 2005). As noted in Chapter 2, sex industry hiring practices informed by Western beauty ideals that favour white, slim, young women both discursively and materially reproduce privilege for white women and disadvantage for racialized women. However organization scholars have suggested that there is tension
amongst the managerial ranks (Bolton & Houlihan 2010; Young 2000), which may mean some managers are reluctant to enforce norms they perceive to be discriminatory.

**Organizational culture and sexuality**

In addition to being influenced by broader social norms and discourses, organizations also have their own cultures. Daft and Armstrong (2009: 335) define organizational culture as “the set of values, norms, guiding beliefs, and understandings that is shared by members of an organization and is taught to new members.” In this respect organizational culture fosters a sense of belonging and commitment amongst members by communicating the organization’s beliefs and values, and guiding members in interacting and working with each other, thereby helping the organization meet business goals and customer needs (Daft & Armstrong 2009: 336). Organizational beliefs, norms, values and understandings can also be seen to include discourses, or ‘truths,’ that characterize and are reproduced in an organization’s culture (see Foucault 1980). In these respects, organizational culture discursively and concretely shapes the roles organizational members perform for different audiences (Goffman 1959), including peers, superiors, subordinates, and customers.

In some workplaces (such as strip clubs, restaurants, and night clubs), sexuality and gender figure prominently in the services offered and roles performed by workers, in turn influencing organizational culture. Erickson (2010) describes workplaces “in which there is no pretence of hiding sexualized talk and touch” (186) as having a “sexually overt work culture.” In her study of workplace relationships at a restaurant, Erickson (2010) found that waitresses had a difficult time defining and defending claims of unwanted touch in a work culture in which sexual banter and touch are, to varying extents,
tolerated in co-worker interactions and expected in the service interaction (see also Spradley & Mann 1975).

Lerum (2004: 758) offers a more nuanced analysis of sexuality in the (service) workplace, suggesting that sexualized banter amongst coworkers can contribute to morale and camaraderie, but also to sexual harassment, isolation and labour exploitation. Identifying various uses and interpretations of sexualized practices amongst workers, Lerum argues that their meaning depends on: the extent to which individuals share values, ideologies and goals; the structure of the organization (i.e., flat or stratified); and how closely individuals coordinate their labour (2004: 758). Thus, organizational discourses only construct member behaviours (sexual or otherwise) as acceptable or inappropriate to the extent that they are circulated and reinforced through the structure and membership of the organization. In this respect, overt or institutionalized sexual practices are neither exclusively exploitative nor necessarily empowering for workers. At the same time, as West and Austrin (2002) suggest, it is important to remember that while sexuality and gender impact how people work in many ways, organizational culture and practices are not entirely determined by them. Instead they insist that sex work and mainstream work alike are “constituted through networks… includ[ing] governments and police… workers, collectives, managers” (497) that overlap to (re)produce discourses, identities and gender relations (West & Austrin 2002).

Organizational structures, relationships and performance teams

One such network is, of course, the organization itself, as a structured and coordinated system (Daft & Armstrong 2009: 9) made up of members occupying different roles. Here it is useful to return to Goffman’s dramaturgical theory. Goffman
argues that performances are often carried out in a team, which he defines as “a set of individuals whose intimate co-operation is required… in relation to an interaction or series of interactions in which the relevant definition of the situation is maintained” (1959: 104). However, workers and managers in an organization are not members of a team simply by virtue of being in the same organization; rather they can only be considered teams if (and when) their performances sustain each other and the social situation as a whole, in other words if they are mutually dependant (Goffman 1959: 82). This means that members of a team are privy to the requirements of each other’s performances, they collaborate in the performance in the front region, and also share in its preparation in the back region (Goffman 1959).

Goffman (1959: 98) refers to the individual charged with overseeing the activities of, and allocating roles and responsibilities amongst, team members as the director. However, a third party with formal authority may share minimally in workers’ performance or absently provide guidelines for it, as in the relationship between real estate companies and realtors. Alternatively, third parties’ participation in team performances with workers may be transitory, insofar as they may perform with workers in front of customers but also perform alongside other managerial individuals for owners or workers. Thus, as someone who organizes, supervises, manages or coordinates the work of others, a *third party* may not necessarily occupy the role or have the authority of a *director*. For example, Burawoy (1979: 51-52) describes the “scheduling man,” who distributes work on the factory floor and monitors the output of workers, but who has no formal authority and as such, must rely on his “bargaining strength” to motivate workers. If his bargaining is unsuccessful, the scheduling man can appeal to his superiors, the
foreman and, subsequently, the superintendent – who are endowed with formal authority – to compel workers to be more productive (Burawoy 1979: 52, 226). This resembles the position strip club DJs were described as inhabiting in Chapter 2. At the same time, Burawoy’s scheduling man is also facilitating the exploitation of workers’ labour by encouraging productivity, which increases factory profits. Thus, third parties participate in the reproduction of organizational and social structures (e.g., capitalism and class divisions), whether as managers or workers, directors or performance team members.

The authority of third parties, and their relationship to workers, is also conditioned by the employment relationship. Broadly speaking, the employment relationship is an economic, social, psychological and political relationship in which workers trade their manual and mental labour for compensation from their employers (Lewis et al. 2003: 4). Although Lewis et al. (2003: 7) distinguish between employees, who have a contract of employment/service, from those contracted for services, who are normally thought of as self-employed, they argue that this distinction is nebulous (see also Fudge et al. 2003). This can be seen as part of the growth of non-standard labour (i.e., jobs offering less security than a permanent, full-time employment relationship in terms of hours, wages, and benefits [Vosko et al. 2003: 1]), which continues to erode the differences between employees and the self-employed. The latter category can be further divided between independent contractors, who own their own means of production, and dependent contractors, who rely on their employers and are subject to their control but with little recourse (as compared to employees) against unfair labour conditions (Fudge et al. 2003; see also Vosko 2010). Organizations can also operate with multiple employment relationships; for example a software company can hire independent contractors (e.g.,
consultants) for specific needs while maintaining a base of permanent employees (Gallagher & Sverke 2005). Thus organizations can be structured in a variety of ways, and may include multiple teams of workers, teams that include workers and third parties, and/or third parties or workers who perform independently of any team.

**Power and resistance in organizations**

Considering this variety and ambiguity of components, organizations may not operate in as “structured and coordinated” a manner as they were designed (Daft & Armstrong 2009: 9). Instead, in keeping with Foucault’s insistence that power cannot be possessed by individuals but rather circulates in a network of relations, Handy argues the exercise of power and influence in organizations is not completely fixed by virtue of hierarchical position; it is also informed by the personal opinions, values, and attributes of, and the relationships between, organizational members, which change with the membership of the organization over time (1993: 125). Recalling that resistance constitutes a marginalized class or person contesting a relation of power (Munn & Bruckert 2010; Scott 1985), the workplace can be seen as a locus of “asymmetrical exchange” (Burawoy & Wright 1990: 253, qtd. in Hodson 1999: 295) in which management and workers inhabit positions that facilitate certain mechanisms of power and strategies of resistance (Foucault 1978).

Although conceding that organization theorists have made fruitful use of Foucault’s theories of power, and especially of discipline, Knights (2004) maintains that organization studies must go beyond conventional theorizations of conflicting interests between management and workers. Indeed some organization scholars have done this. Whereas Foucault is useful for ‘seeing’ resistance (i.e., in response to power), these
scholars offer ways to make sense of its occurrence in the workplace. In the coming pages we will examine a number of characterizations of organizational resistance, as: ambiguous (Burawoy 1979; Mumby 2005; Thomas & Davies 2005; Prasad & Prasad 1998), occurring in response to spatial and temporal opportunity (Cohen & Felson 1979; Ilcan 1998), creative (Hodson 1991; Knights 2004; MacLean et al. 2006), and personally meaningful (Bosworth & Carrabine 2001; Knights 2004; Young 2000). Exploring these conceptualizations allows for the formulation of an operationalization of resistance appropriate for this study.

For Mumby (2005), resistance in organizations is an effort to engage in an individual, collective, routine or organized practice that at some level challenges or disrupts workplace patterns and structures, which may or may not be entirely successful in its aims. In this respect, Mumby argues that resistance ought to be studied “as a set of situated discursive and nondiscursive practices that are simultaneously enabling and constraining, coherent and contradictory, complex and simple, efficacious and ineffectual” (2005: 38; see also Thomas & Davies 2005). Similarly Prasad and Prasad include both overt and subtle resistance strategies in their typology of workplace resistance, but also identify more “ambiguous accommodations to authority” (2000: 388; see also Prasad & Prasad 1998; Scott 1985). In the latter category they include “making out,” a term coined by Burawoy (1979) to describe the process in which factory workers forge opportunistic relationships with each other in order to increase their output, which simultaneously earns them more money, increases the company’s profits, and reiterates an organizational culture of competition and manipulation.
Recalling Goffman’s (1959) insistence that his dramaturgical principles are best employed in the analysis of performances played out in the physical confines of a social establishment, we can also attend to the ways in which the arrangement of space, for example in a factory or a restaurant, can open up certain possibilities of resistance and limit others (see Ilcan 1998). In turn, these opportunities may ebb and flow over time (see Cohen & Felson 1979). The space may also be organized in such a way as to facilitate surveillance by management and/or the state. The archetypal example of this is Bentham’s Panopticon – a ring of cells surrounding a central tower, from which guards are able to see the inmates, who are unable to determine when they are being watched – which facilitates the exercise of disciplinary power by fostering self-discipline through the continual and unverifiable spectre of surveillance (Foucault 1977: 201). Alternatively some organizations achieve widespread surveillance through technological means (Ball 2010). As Goffman (1961) has argued however, even institutions employing extensive surveillance regimes do not completely control their inmates’ behaviour (see also Bosworth & Carrabine 2001).

Hodson (1991) underscores the immense creativity in workers’ strategies to preserve their autonomy and dignity in the face of difficult workplace conditions. One example of this is mill workers’ fabrication of homers – objects (such as ashtrays) for personal use manufactured at the worksite, during work hours, with factory materials (MacLean et al. 2006: 62). As seen in the erotic dance literature, workers can also resist by creatively appropriating gender, race and class to serve their own ends (Frank 2003; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Trautner 2005). At the same time however, such tactics are ambiguous because they also contribute to the reproduction of these norms (Ross 2000).
Bosworth and Carrabine suggest that an analysis of resistance should acknowledge “the possibility that many human actions, whether subversive or not, have meaning – both for the actor and his/her audience – which are largely separate from their effects” (2001: 506). To this end they differentiate between accepting institutional values and wanting to avoid conflict, as reasons for not resisting (Bosworth & Carrabine 2001: 506). Furthermore Prasad and Prasad (2000) note that seemingly compliant practices may in fact be resistant or oppositional. The latter speaks to Goffman’s (1961) description of patients and nurses in an asylum feigning compliance with institutional edicts when they are being inspected.

Although resistance by managers or third parties may conform to the above characterizations, individuals in these positions may also be responding to particular structural challenges. Just as third parties can be managers or workers, managers are also subject to, and resist, the asymmetries of the workplace. Willmott (1997) argues that managers situated below the ownership or executive level of an organization grapple with their “contradictory and precarious positioning with[in] capitalist relations of production” (1997: 1353; see also Young 2000). It is contradictory because they are simultaneously exploitative agents of capital and subjugated workers – at once charged with and targets of surveillance – who must exert control over workers but cannot exercise control over the organization. The precarity of managers’ position is visible in their need to defend and justify their continued relevance as workers (Willmott 1997: 1353). In this respect, Willmott suggests that the importance and worth managers attach to their work is conditional upon the ascription of failings to other employees (1997: 1353) – indeed a manager would not be required if employees organized their own schedules, were self-
motivated and disciplined, and resolved conflicts and issues amongst themselves. Like their employees, managers also often prioritize their own career concerns over those of the organization (Willmott 1997).

Young (2000) suggests that, like the erotic dancers described above, managers resist using gendered strategies. Alternatively, they may re-articulate institutional hierarchy by highlighting other aspects of their role such as facilitator or negotiator while downplaying their managerial responsibilities (Young 2000). Additionally Ball (2010: 94) notes that lower-tier managers sometimes subvert organizational hierarchy by colluding with employees in working around surveillance measures in order to seemingly produce desirable results, thereby resisting without actively challenging, breaking or sabotaging the overall practices of the organization. Similarly, Watson (2003: 83) describes “coalitions of interest” in which organizational members establish their own hierarchies reflecting their own goals and interests, in spite of the existence of the formal hierarchy of the organization. Thus we find parallels to Bruckert’s (2002: 108) “informal economy of favours” in organization scholarship.

Bolton and Houlihan (2010) offer a useful reflection on organizational conflict, suggesting an alternative, practical relational structure in service organizations. They focus on frontline service sector managers, who must ensure, but do not personally deliver, quality service to customers, while balancing their various roles and responsibilities with overseeing workers’ provision of services, handling customer complaints and respecting the directives of upper management (Bolton & Houlihan 2010). Bolton and Houlihan locate these managers in what they call the “worker-manager-customer triangle” of interactive service work. At each point of this triangle are different
actors who are essential to the operation of service-based businesses – workers, managers, and customers – each of whom may have divergent interests and/or goals, which imbue their relationships and interactions with tension (Bolton & Houlihan 2010: 378). Through the worker-manager-customer triangle, conflicts between company policies, customer satisfaction, adequate supplies, and fair treatment of workers become apparent, as does managers’ choice between resistance and inefficiency or injustice in resolving such challenges (Bolton & Houlihan 2010). In short, the worker-manager-customer triangle illustrates how relational structures built from everyday practices and challenges may operate at variance with organizational hierarchy. It also provides a lens to focus an operationalization of resistance appropriate for this thesis, drawing from the scholars referred to above. Thus resistance can be understood as an agentic, discursive or non-discursive reaction to an organizational member, customer or structure, an internal or external regulation, or a normative discourse, that may or may not be framed by its author or target as resistance but that in effect or intent challenges a relation of power.

**Applying the theory to third party work and relationships in strip clubs**

As evinced by the scholars and theories referenced in this chapter, existing frameworks address either organizational structure and resistance, or stigma and sex work. While organization theorists have refined theoretical tools applicable to managers and workers contesting organizational hierarchy, they have paid negligible attention to the sex industry; similarly, as noted in *Chapter 2*, criminologists and other scholars focusing on the sex industry have paid insufficient attention to management to develop adequate theoretical approaches for its study. In response, this chapter has endeavoured to develop an integrative theoretical framework to shed light on and nuance our understanding of the
work performances and relationships, challenges and strategies of third parties in the erotic dance sector. I now turn to how they can be applied to my research, in specific, integrated, and cumulative ways.

The impacts of social structures and norms on organizations and individuals that have been discussed in this chapter will inform the exploration of regulatory discourses and efforts focused on the erotic dance sector in Chapter 5. Subsequent chapters will consider how these and other discourses circulate through the strip club and amongst third parties and dancers. The first of these will employ Goffman’s dramaturgical terms, in concert with organization theory, to sketch the membership, and in turn the structural, physical and discursive boundaries of the club. Next, incorporating the concept of organizational culture will allow for a deeper investigation into the combined impacts of organizational structure and culture, and normative scripts, on the strategies enacted by third parties and dancers in defence of their safety and security. Finally, considering role performance alongside stigma in examining interpersonal social and professional relationships between third parties and dancers will shed light on how strip club workers manage stigma through normative and resistant discourses and performances. In short, an integrative theoretical framework is essential for understanding how organizational structures, regulatory discourses, and gender, class and racial scripts manifest, are reproduced and resisted by, and ‘play out’ in power relationships between, third parties and erotic dancers.
Chapter 4. Methodology

As the language used to this point has undoubtedly evinced, this project builds from an understanding of erotic dance (along with other occupations in the sex industry) as labour. Indeed such a perspective is imperative for a nuanced exploration of managerial practices, since beginning from an understanding that all sex work is violence would reduce management to harm and manipulation, leaving questions of occupational health and safety, labour rights, and best and worst practices unaddressed. At the same time, using a labour lens is not tantamount to equating sex work with empowerment. As Frank (2007) has observed, both the question of empowerment versus exploitation and its answer – that stripping can neither be characterized as one nor the other – have been exhaustively reiterated by academics.

Moving on from this tired refrain, this project follows in the footsteps of other researchers who have addressed specific aspects of labour in the erotic dance industry (see Althorp 2013; Bradley-Engen & Hobbs 2010; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Colosi 2010a & b; Lewis 2006; Lewis & Shaver 2006; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Maticka-Tyndale et al. 2000; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010). In drawing from organization scholarship it shifts the conversation to managerial processes and practices, taking note of Mumby’s apprehensions about the dichotomy in (but not unique to) organization studies, in which academics either romanticize and exaggerate worker resistance, or characterize it as ineffectual against managerial hegemony (2005: 37). Similarly Willmott (1997) cautions against assuming that managers are uniquely concerned with controlling workers, suggesting scholars should allow for resistance by and amongst these actors as well.

23 In so doing, I am not engaging in sociology of labour (see also footnote 7).
Informed by these insights, I endeavoured to attend to the “messy actualities” (Osborne 1993) and the “productive engagement” (O’Malley et al. 1997) in third parties’ labour, and their relationships with dancers and with each other, by using interviews to get a glimpse of their perspectives and everyday experiences (Smith 1987). In this respect it is important to note that, although this project includes documentary research into laws and regulatory discourses, it uses these to provide context – the primary concern is with social interaction. This choice of scale is informed by an interest in challenging stereotypes about third parties (and, in tandem, workers); as Weitzer (2014) argues, it is microlevel investigations, rather than macrolevel claims, which are best suited to nuance our understanding of relationships in, and inform contextually appropriate policy and enforcement approaches to, the sex industry.

This chapter begins with an overview of the research and the questions it sought to answer. Next, it delves into some of the methodological and ethical considerations of researching erotic dance. It then details the methods of the research, including the ethics process, data collection methods, participant demographics, data coding and analysis. In closing it presents a reflection on the project’s limitations.

**Research questions**

The principal research question of this project is:

- How do third parties interact with dancers and with each other in the strip club, and how is this conditioned by organizational systems and processes, social roles, and the legal context?

The secondary questions it sought to address are:

- How do dancers interact with third parties?
- Do third parties and dancers optimize safety and security in the workplace, and if so, how?
- How do third parties and dancers exercise power and engage in resistance at work?
- Do stigma, gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality and body size ‘play out’ in workplace relationships, policies and practices and if so, how?

**Overview of the research project and approach**

To answer these questions, this project draws, in part, from a larger SSHRC funded research, entitled *Rethinking Management in the Sex and Adult Industry* (hereinafter the *Management Project*) led by Dr. Chris Bruckert, that interviewed 75 third parties and 47 sex workers who work(ed) in the incall/outcall, strip, and street sectors of the sex industry in Eastern and Central Canada as of the year 2000. This thesis uses only the data from the erotic dance sector (specifically female strip clubs) in Ontario collected as part of the *Management Project*, in which I was involved as an interviewer and a research assistant. As I elaborate below, these data were supplemented with additional interviews with strip club third parties and dancers that I conducted and transcribed, as well as text-based research of regulatory discourses and mechanisms. The purview of this investigation spans from 2000 to 2014 – a period in which the practice of lap dancing has become so entrenched as to be central to the economy and organization of erotic dance in Ontario – and includes both Ottawa and Toronto.

**Piecing together partial knowledges: Methodological considerations**

This project is informed by a critical intersectional epistemology, which rests on the premise (elaborated in *Chapter 3*) that “axes of oppression such as racism and sexism are not separate, in reality or conceptually, but are intrinsically connected so that any
racial identity, for instance, is experienced in a gendered way” (Hunter 2002: 127). Thus, individuals from a particular social group are best positioned to create knowledge about the reality of that group – Collins (1991) refers to the situated knowledge of a social group as partial perspective (Hunter 2002). This does not preclude other groups from representing that reality, but this must be done with reflexivity, caution and, ideally, with feedback from or follow-up with the group under study (Hunter 2002). As such I have endeavoured to piece together an assemblage of partial knowledge(s) from the situated experiences of individuals who share a particular workplace and legal context, as well as from documentation (e.g., laws, records) of the discourses and regulations that condition their experiences. Since third parties in strip clubs have seldom been the object of academic research (as discussed in Chapter 2), this is comparable to a methodological approach described by Smith (1987) that “creates the space for an absent subject, and an absent experience that is to be filled with the presence of actual women [and men] speaking of and in the actualities of their everyday worlds” (1987: 107), while interrogating the relations and social structures in which these experiential narratives are embedded.

**Researching strip clubs: Ethical concerns and reflections**

A key ethical concern in interview-based research is being respectful of interviewees’ stories and meanings (Mishler 1986; Personal narratives group 1989). Although coding (and indeed, any kind of data analysis) in effect alters participants’ narratives, a thematic coding process (elaborated below) proved helpful in endeavouring to minimize distortion of participants’ intended meanings.
These concerns also shaped the early stages of the project: so as not to conflate participants’ knowledge with my own, I reflected upon my experience according to Ahern’s (1999) bracketing guidelines, and upon my social location, in the tradition of feminist reflexivity (see also Egan & Frank 2005; Hunter 2002). Indeed as I argued in Chapter 3, social location, context and personal experience are inter-related and inform interpretive frames. In this regard, my reflections centre around my own work experience, which has influenced both my understanding of labour and my decision to enroll in graduate school (to get a more ‘respectable’ job).

Through my experience in various manual and/or low-status jobs over a number of years, I have come to understand workers as skilled in innovating strategies to enjoy their time at work, in spite of the constraints of unequal social positions and inequitable workplace structures. This is certainly how I would characterize my own workplace resistance (though I would not necessarily have articulated it as such at that time). As service or sales jobs, these were often neither well paying nor respected. At the same time they were working class positions, in some of which my middle class upbringing and slim, white, feminine presentation garnered certain advantages. However, some were jobs that felt very gendered (e.g., cleaning lady) or took place in overtly sexist environments (e.g., a restaurant kitchen where male cooks received preferential treatment). Throughout my eclectic work trajectory, I have worked with managers who were overbearing (in a sales position), verbally and emotionally abusive (in a restaurant), or, in several other jobs, relatively uninvolved or absent. Amidst these experiences, I can think of few managers whom I liked or entirely respected. This has alerted me to the necessity of speaking to managerial individuals directly, as relying only on workers’ accounts of third
parties may result in little more than a litany of complaints. It has also underscored the variety of resistance strategies that workers enact, which may have trivial effects on workplace structures and relations but may be satisfying for workers. Reflecting on these experiences has helped me remain aware of the difference between an interest in meaningfully discussing questions of power, injustice, and occupational health and safety, and a bias that simplistically blames workplace issues on third parties.

Researching the sex industry also presents particular ethical challenges. As Shaver (2005) points out, it is impossible to obtain representative samples in a stigmatized, criminalized, and often, clandestine industry. There is also a lack of trust of academics amongst people involved with the sex industry, who are justifiably suspicious of researchers’ motivations and analytical perspectives, and critical of research that gives nothing back to participants who contribute their knowledge and time, and take social, emotional and legal risks in doing so (Maggie’s nd; van der Meulen 2011). These challenges, in turn, entail considerations in the design of a research project and obligations for the researcher (Maggie’s nd; Bruckert 2014). As such, I have retained some of the concerns and insights voiced by the sex worker organizations that were involved in the Management Project. Data and conclusions from this research will also be part of a resource that will be produced for Ontario’s erotic dance community. Additionally I made sure to give my participants an honorarium as a token of appreciation for sharing their time and knowledge with me, and developed measures (which are elaborated in the coming pages) to protect their identities.

I have also been careful to remain cognizant that dancers constitute a community that has experienced significant conflicts. Indeed like any community (see Kobayashi
dancers are divided on many issues; even the very basis of their income – lap
dancing – has been the subject of fervent disagreements (Bouclin 2006; see also MLS
2012b). Moreover dancers may or may not identify as sex workers (Bruckert 2002), and
similarly third parties may not think of their workplaces as part of the sex industry. This
was the reason why the Management Project was careful to use the term ‘adult industry’
in its appeals to third parties and dancers, and why I later employed the (more commonly
used) term ‘exotic dance industry’ in recruitment materials.

**Ethics process and procedures**

I applied to the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board and received ethics
approval in June 2014 (see Appendix I). As with research on any marginalized and
stigmatized community, two ethical concerns in particular informed the construction of
my interview guide, the planning of my interview data collection, and the way I engaged
with (potential) participants. These concerns included: how to deal with potentially
sensitive information in a respectful manner, and how to safeguard anonymity and
confidentiality.

With regard to sensitive information, I designed my interview guides and
approach in such a way as to keep the focus on third parties, their practices and policies,
and dancers’ relationships and interactions with them, while not asking directly about
topics that might cause participants to feel uneasy. I was especially concerned with the
latter in interviews with dancers, whom I asked about instances of misconduct by third
parties (sexual or otherwise), but was careful not to ask for gratuitous details and made
sure to be prepared to respond in a considerate and respectful manner. A list of resources,
which included the names and contact information of relevant and accessible (i.e.,
affordable, non-judgmental) community-based, healthcare, and legal aid organizations, specifically tailored for Ottawa and Toronto, was also made available to dancers and third parties during the interview.

Recognizing the possibility that some participants might have unanticipated emotional reactions during the interviews, I endeavoured to optimize their level of comfort by emphasizing the importance of their contribution, providing reinforcement and positive feedback without judging their responses, using familiar language, occasionally asking the interviewee how it's going for them, and by paying close attention (Patton 2002; see also MacLean et al. 2006). I additionally invited participants to ask me personal questions before each interview began. If time permitted, we often enjoyed a friendly conversation afterwards.

Because of the stigma they face from their work, it was imperative to safeguard participants’ identities. I attempted to encourage participation by communicating my commitment to anonymity and confidentiality in my recruitment materials and consent form (see Appendices II and III). Additional security measures were taken during the interview and transcription processes, which are detailed below.

Data collection methods

This project employed empirical as well as document-based research methods. Specifically, in order to build a comprehensive picture from the voices of all of my interview subjects, I compared their accounts against each other and with my document-based research about the legal context of erotic dance in Ontario. The latter data was gathered in 2013, while the interviews were conducted from 2011 to 2014.

Document-based research
This phase of the research focused on the practices in and economy of, as well as the regulatory discourses and mechanisms governing, erotic dance in Toronto and Ottawa. For this component, I drew from a variety of sources relevant to the development and content of municipal, provincial and federal regulation and enforcement pertaining to the erotic dance sector, between the years 2000 and 2013 (to mirror the interview data). The foremost of these was newspaper articles. I selected (77) relevant articles from Ottawa and Toronto newspapers, including The Globe and Mail, The Ottawa Citizen, National Post and Toronto Star, using the search words ‘Toronto’ or ‘Ottawa,’ ‘strip club,’ and ‘law’ or ‘regulation.’ These newspapers were chosen because they express somewhat different political stances, and because they are produced in the cities with which the interview component of the project was concerned (municipal regulation in Toronto and Ottawa is unlikely to be covered in newspapers focusing on other regions); they were also available free of charge through the Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies database at the University of Ottawa. I first used the newspaper articles to create a timeline for each city, which proved helpful in subsequent searches for other documents, for example new laws and bills that were proposed but never passed. In addition to using the newspaper articles for the timeline, I used the statements attributed to stakeholders in the articles in my findings (in the absence of other evidence) because I was interested in how regulatory discourses transform and intermingle. This was informed by Phillips’ (2003) differentiation between stakeholders and influencers; as an influencer and not a stakeholder, the media constitutes a vehicle by which discourses are communicated, circulated and validated whether or not these statements accurately represent what stakeholders said (see Hall et al. 1978). To the extent that newspapers render events
intelligible by classifying and contextualizing them within dominant (but not necessarily stagnant) narratives (Hall et al. 1978), then, the news media can be seen as a discursive barometer.

The discourses articulated by self-named stakeholders (e.g., local community members, politicians, dancers and third parties) were gathered from other regulatory documents drawn upon in this component of the research, including: current and archival municipal documents (bylaws, city council and committee meeting minutes and reports); relevant court cases; federal legislative documents pertaining specifically to erotic dance; and publicity, educational materials and/or records issued by three of the organizations involved in these discussions, the Dancers’ Equal Rights Association, the Exotic Dancers Alliance, and the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada. With the exception of the organizational materials, which were gathered from the organizations’ websites and local activists, the above sources were searched using terms that would yield information relating to strip club regulation, and then refined to accommodate the language used in each type of document. For archives, the terms ‘adult’, ‘entertainment’, ‘parlour’, ‘license/ing’ and ‘bylaw’ were used. I searched for court cases on CANLII using the terms ‘adult entertainment,’ ‘lap dancing’ and ‘champagne room,’ and then selected cases based on their relevance to Ottawa and Toronto (I also consulted pivotal cases from the 1990s that were referenced in the cases found in initial searches).

To analyze these texts, I read and sorted the sources into themes emerging from the literature as well as from the data. The three principal thematic categories were: discourses (which were condensed into five sequential and overlapping thematic groups), legal details (from court cases and legislation, to be used as supporting evidence) and
stakeholders (and examples of their opinions and regulatory interventions). I then organized this information into five thematic periods from 2000 to present, which are presented in Chapter 5 preceded by the social, economic and regulatory developments that allowed for these regulatory discourses and mechanisms to emerge.

This document-based component informed several other aspects of the research. It proved useful in designing and adapting interview guides, and knowing what topics to probe in interviews. The material gathered in this stage additionally influenced the analysis of the interview data, for example in comparing participants’ experiences and understandings of municipal regulation to its aim and contents. As such it is featured to where relevant in Chapter 6, 7 and 8.

**Interviews**

Ethnography has been a popular method used by scholars studying strip clubs. However, in a context where covert illegal behaviour – for example drug use and ‘extras’ (sexual services provided in the club for an additional fee) – may occasionally or routinely take place, participants may feel more comfortable sharing their impressions and accounts of such activities outside of the performance setting and away from co-workers. Additionally, as Devereux (1967: 6; see also Egan & Frank 2005) argues, the researcher’s presence may influence the role performances of research subjects. As such, semi-structured, in-depth interviews seemed the most suitable approach to researching labour activities in a legal “gray area” (Chapkis 2000), as they allow for “exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive

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24 Academics who have used ethnography to study erotic dance include: Barton (2006), Bradley-Engen & Hobbs (2010), and Murphy (2003). Others delved even deeper, conducting their studies via participant observation, working in strip clubs either as a dancer (see Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; Colosi 2010a & b; Dudash 1997; Egan 2006; Frank 2002a, 2003, 2005; Lavin 2013), a bartender (see Bruckert 2002), a cocktail waitress (see Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010), or a bouncer (see DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004).
issues and enable probing for more information and clarification of answers” (Barriball & While 1994: 330). In acknowledging the analytical depth that can come from ethnographic observation however, I have attempted to ‘reconstruct’ the space of the strip club in Chapter 6 as a setting to enliven Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical perspective and to physically situate third parties’ and dancers’ activities and interactions, and to map the ways in which surveillance (and counter-surveillance) is facilitated and obscured (see also Law & Bruckert 2016).

In addition to individual, semi-structured interviews, this project draws from focus groups carried out as part of the Management Project to explore and compare dancers’ experiences of the practices and processes described by third parties. According to Berg (2009: 163), focus groups are an effective way to facilitate dynamic group discussions in which participants can brainstorm and build on ideas, which can in turn generate more ideas, topics and issues than individual interviews. Focus groups also provide researchers with clues as to how members of a population interact, and arrive at or alter their conclusions about particular topics in a group setting (Berg 2009: 165). Focus group participants may “provide checks and balances on each other,” allowing researchers to ascertain if certain views are false or extreme, which views are shared across the group, and the extent to which there is a diversity of opinion (Patton 2002: 386). Of course, as compared to individual interviews, focus groups provide less opportunity for elaboration and personal detail. As such, it was important to include both the focus groups and the individual interviews in the present project. All interview processes and recruitment strategies are detailed in the following pages.

*The Management Project*
The Management Project research protocol and interview guides were informed by a community advisory group made up of sex workers and representatives from regional sex worker rights organizations (whose concerns and members include erotic dancers), including Maggie’s in Toronto and POWER (Prostitutes of Ottawa-Gatineau Work, Educate, Resist) in Ottawa. Data collection for the Management Project was carried out in two phases: the first focused on third parties, the second on sex workers with experience working with third parties.

Recruitment for the first phase of the research, which consisted of semi-structured individual interviews with third parties in the incall/outcall, strip, and street sectors of the sex industry, took place between October 2010 and January 2012. Recruitment materials were disseminated in a variety of venues, including: the Management Project’s website, hosted by the University of Ottawa; newspaper advertisements; all CERB (Canadian Escort Review Board) endorsed sites and listings; press releases and media coverage in Ottawa; and sex work related email listservs including FIRST (Canada-wide); and by participants themselves (snowball sampling). Members of the research team and project interviewers also reached out to their personal, social and professional contacts. The social service and sex worker organizations involved with the Management Project also helped with recruitment by distributing information through their own networks. Finally, to accommodate the relative lack of importance of online communities and the Internet in general for the erotic dance sector, recruitment letters were mailed to 38 strip clubs and two erotic dance agencies in Ontario, and 41 strip clubs in Quebec.

Thirteen third parties working in the erotic dance sector participated in the first phase of the Management Project. Of these, 11 worked at female strip clubs, one worked
at a male strip club, and another worked at a trans strip event, all in Ontario.

Unfortunately, because the latter two interviews fell outside inclusion the criteria for the present project, they had to be excluded from my data set. *Management Project* interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes to four hours, with an average duration of two hours and 15 minutes. Third party participants (from all sectors) were given an honorarium of 100 dollars. These interviews, as well as the focus group interviews in the second phase, were transcribed by a professional transcriber employed by the *Management Project*. The transcriber removed identifying details contained in the interviews; later, as part of the coding process (detailed in the coming pages), Dr. Bruckert and I reviewed the transcripts again to ensure anonymity. Participants were asked to choose their own pseudonyms for all interviews (including those I conducted later as well as the focus groups), and to bolster their anonymity, were discouraged from using their ‘stage name’ or ‘DJ name.’ Those who declined to choose their own pseudonym were assigned one by the researchers. Third party participants were also asked to describe their own occupational titles (by *Management Project* interviewers and in the later interviews for this project), and these self-ascriptions appear alongside the names of third parties in my findings chapters.

The second phase of research for the *Management Project* consisted of focus groups with workers in the same sectors as the third parties interviewed in the first phase. These guided group discussions (Berg 2009: 158) were intended to verify the information garnered from third parties in the first phase, and to explore how third parties’ policies and practices actually ‘play out’ and condition sex workers’ experiences of the workplace (Bruckert & Law 2013: 116). The focus group interview guides were specifically tailored
for each sector, drawing from the third party interviews in the first phase of the project (Bruckert & Law 2013: 116).

Recruitment for the second phase of the research was conducted from January to June 2012, and was carried out through the same channels as the first phase. However due to the lack of success of that particular method, flyers were not mailed to strip clubs for this phase. Instead, information about the dancer focus groups was distributed via flyers and word of mouth to and amongst dancers in Ottawa and Toronto. The focus groups took place in April and June 2012. Focus group participants were asked to complete demographic information forms that also asked about their tenure and occupations in the sex industry, and to say their chosen pseudonym at the beginning of the discussion and when they spoke to facilitate the correct attribution of their respective comments by the Management Project’s transcriber. To protect dancers’ anonymity the city in which the focus groups took place will not be specified in the findings chapters.

Focus group A was facilitated by two research team members from the University of Ottawa: Dr. Collette Parent and Dr. Chris Bruckert. With only two participants, this focus group resembled a group interview, insofar as each participant had ample and relatively equal opportunity to speak. Focus group B, which I facilitated alongside Dr. Bruckert, was relatively large with six participants, and in spite of my and my co-facilitator’s efforts, not all the dancers contributed equally over the course of the discussion. Each focus group lasted approximately two hours, and participants were given an honorarium of 75 dollars.
Although the Management Project attempted to recruit participants in the erotic dance sector in Quebec and the East Coast, this effort proved unsuccessful. This influenced my decision to focus only on Ontario in my doctoral research.

**My project**

Since the Management Project had only reached 11 erotic dance sector third parties and eight dancers, I decided to expand the sample for my dissertation. For this stage of data collection I conducted all the interviews myself. In order to ensure that my data set would match the data collected by the Management Project, I used essentially the same interview guide for third parties, save for some minor adjustments including adapting the language to be more specific to the erotic dance sector as opposed to the sex industry in general, and removing questions that had proven to be ineffective.\(^{25}\) Topics touched on in the interview guide included: third parties’ daily schedules, roles and responsibilities; their relationships (both personal and professional) with dancers and other staff; organizational strategies and practices; hiring and discipline; risks and strategies to manage them; laws and policies; experiences of stigma and social judgment; the impact of third parties’ work on their private life; work history; opinions of the sex industry; and demographic information (see Appendix IV). I recruited research participants using the same operationalization of ‘third party’ as the Management Project: people with experience organizing, supervising, managing, or coordinating (for example as a manager, DJ, owner, agent, etc.) people working in the exotic dance

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\(^{25}\) The Management Project third party interview guide included a question asking participants to reflect on their social location and how it affected a specific aspect of their work, at the end of each section of the interview. For example, after the first section: Earlier you described yourself as *(draw on gender, ethnicity, nationality and class description provided)*, how do you think this impacts/impacted on your work? Interviewers frequently reported that this question often frustrated or angered participants, who did not understand the question or its relevance and found it to be repetitive.
industry in Ottawa or Toronto as of the year 2000. This definition was included on all my recruitment materials (see Appendix II).

I also solicited individual interviews with women who have worked regularly as erotic dancers (at least twice per week for at least one year) in strip clubs in Ottawa or/and Toronto, as of the year 2000. In order to reach a wider array of participants, and to ensure the integrity of the data by recording each individual’s voice only once, dancers who took part in the focus groups were not eligible for the individual interviews. The purpose of these interviews was to expand on some of the issues raised in the focus group interviews in greater depth, and to elicit information that dancers might be reticent to share in a more public setting such as a focus group, for example on the provision of ‘extras,’ often a taboo topic at strip clubs. Additionally differences in form between the individual and focus group interviews meant that the questions were more open-ended in the former, allowing participants to answer more organically, and more focused and collective in the latter. Because of these differences, dancers are described either as focus group participants (in focus group A or B) or simply as dancers in chapters 6, 7, and 8, in which the interview data is presented.

The guide for the individual dancer interviews was developed using data from the focus groups. It also included some of the same issues addressed in the third parties interview guide, in order to ascertain dancers’ perspectives on and experiences of third party practices and policies. As such, the topics touched on in dancer interviews included: dancers’ interactions with third parties and their accounts of what third parties do (and do not do) for them; workplace relationships and conflict management; measures to protect dancers’ health, safety and security; club rules and expectations; ‘extras’; hiring, training,
discipline and firing; fees, rates and schedules; dancers’ understanding of laws and regulations; dancers’ opinions about third parties, the sex industry and the erotic dance sector; their experiences of stigma and social judgment; income, education and work history; and finally, demographics (see Appendix V).

I recruited participants by distributing flyers and information through my personal networks and through snowball sampling. I also relied heavily on social media. I posted recruitment notes (for both third parties and dancers) on Facebook, on my personal page, as well as on sex worker group pages (with permission), and other sex worker friendly groups and pages. I initially posted the notices in June 2014, after receiving ethics approval, and again at the end of July, in mid-October, and in early December 2014. Some of my contacts re-posted the notices one or more of these times. Other online strategies included sending my recruitment letters to the sex worker rights listserv FIRST, and getting it posted on the blog Kwe Today and on CERB. After getting more interest from Ottawa dancers than Toronto dancers, several recruitment notices were posted near strip clubs in downtown Toronto. Given that sex worker groups do not include management, I also emailed the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada to solicit their help in distributing the call for participants to third parties who were members of the organization. However their reply appeared (perhaps understandably) suspicious of my motives, discouraging any further communication.

Consistent with the Management Project, I offered both the third parties and the dancers whom I interviewed individually an honorarium of 100 dollars. All of these interviews lasted between 1.5 and three hours, with an average length of 2.5 hours.

26 These groups included: POWER and Students for Sex Worker Rights in Ottawa, and Maggie’s and SPOC (Sex Professionals of Canada) in Toronto.
27 Special thanks to the anonymous author of this blog.
interviewed dancers and third parties from June to December 2014. Interviews were conducted at a location of participants’ choice; they could choose between a neutral non-commercial location (i.e., a sex work friendly community space); their home; or the University of Ottawa.

I undertook a number of measures to protect participants’ confidentiality and anonymity before, during and after the interviews. In the recruitment process, I did not collect participants’ names or contact information unless required for organizing the interview, after which point I destroyed all records of communication between the participant and myself. Additionally, all of the emails between myself and the people who withdrew from participating were deleted as soon as they indicated they were no longer interested. No names were recorded during the interviews; instead, I indicated participants’ oral consent with a checkmark on consent forms rather than using their signature (see Appendix III), and asked participants to choose a pseudonym before each interview began so that no real names were recorded. Once completed, I transcribed each interview myself, removing any identifying details (including but not limited to: names of businesses and people, identifiable speech patterns, particularly recognizable anecdotes), and deleted the digital voice files as soon as each transcription was finished.28 Unlike the interviews gathered as part of the Management Project, for which access was approved for the entire research team, access to this subset of interviews was limited to myself and my supervisor, Dr. Bruckert.

**Recruitment challenges**

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28 Similarly, the Management Project used pseudonyms, removed identifying information from transcripts, safely stored the data and made sure it was never electronically transmitted (Bruckert & Law 2013: 102).
Academics have noted difficulties particular to researching the sex industry, such as stigma and a lack of trust in academia (Dudash 1997; Maggie’s n.d.; Shaver 2005; van der Meulen 2011). Although my project was vetted by sex worker organizations before they agreed to let me post my recruitment notices on their social media outlets, it is doubtful that my project was entirely immune to suspicion from individual dancers and third parties. Additionally, because strip clubs are not illegal and thus may openly advertise their presence, people who work exclusively in the erotic dance sector have little need for online sex industry forums such as CERB. Even though I was aware of these challenges, I found participant recruitment to be more difficult than I imagined it would be. In my own recruitment efforts (as opposed to the larger Management Project), I was only able to obtain interviews with four additional third parties and seven dancers. Given this sample size, there was somewhat significant participant attrition; two dancers and two managers who had initially agreed to participate either fell out of touch or informed me that they had changed their mind and no longer wished to take part in the research. It is also worth noting that this portion of participant recruitment was happening at the same time as the legal follow-up to the Canada v Bedford (2013) decision, when Canada’s new prostitution laws were being debated in Parliament and in the news. I believe that this may have made people affiliated with the sex industry more reticent to participate in research that asks them about their work – especially since the new law criminalizes third parties (see Bill C-36 2014). Fortunately, with the Management Project interviews, I managed to obtain a total of 15 third party and 15 dancer participants.

Demographics
In spite of some difficulty and attrition in the recruitment process, 30 people proved to be a sufficient number of participants for this project. Because some of the coding had been completed on the interviews gathered as part of the Management Project before the second round of interview data was collected, I was able to determine that saturation had been reached after conducting four more third party interviews, because they were eliciting little new information and had much in common with the previously collected data (Munn & Bruckert 2013). Additionally, given that Toronto has 17 strip clubs and Ottawa has only nine (MLS 2012a; Ottawa, bylaw 2002-189), 15 third party interviews seemed like a representative sample. With respect to the dancer interviews, the latter criterion was less important due to my focus on third parties. As anticipated the individual dancer interviews provided more personal details than the focus groups, however similarities between respondents’ narratives became increasingly clear at about five individual interviews, after which point I conducted an additional two interviews. In short 30 interviews adequately reflected the social processes and structures on which I was focusing (Munn & Bruckert 2013: 185-6).

While their personal stories are not the focus of this dissertation, the demographic information provided below serves to sketch the characteristics, life- and career experiences of participants. As we will see, they come from a variety of backgrounds, many have mainstream work experience, and they represent a broad age range. In other words they are a diverse group of people who do not embody the stereotypes ascribed to their industry. My aim in presenting these details, then, is to humanize participants, especially third parties, about whom few personal details are available in the literature. In this regard I urge readers to compare the following details against dominant
representations of ‘pimps,’ unscrupulous and seedy men, or even traffickers – what emerges is a portrait of a varied yet quite ordinary group of workers. Moving past these stereotypes allows us to evaluate the quality of third parties’ work, and the ways in which they support and fail to support dancers. Importantly, including information about participants’ lives in aggregate form in this chapter also more securely protects their anonymity than displaying it alongside their narratives in Chapter 6, 7, and 8, in which only participants’ name (i.e., pseudonym) and occupation (or, for some dancers, focus group) are listed.

Third parties

All except one of the third parties interviewed were men, and the one female participant was also the only bartender in the study. One third party identified as Asian-Canadian and two identified themselves as black, however the rest were white (all Anglophones save one who identified as French-Canadian). With one exception all identified Canadian as their nationality. They came from mixed class backgrounds: the majority (8) were from the middle class; four were from the lower middle class; two were working class; and one was from the upper middle class. As for formal education, three participants had completed university; four had completed college; another four had some college education; two had their high school diploma; and the remaining two had not completed high school. Participants were between 20 and over 60 years of age.

With regard to their work in the erotic dance sector, some interviewees had worked only in one third party position, however others spoke about simultaneous or successive roles: four were disc jockeys (DJs) and managers; three were DJs; two were managers; two were bouncers and managers; two were bouncers; one identified himself
as a driver/protection provider; and as previously mentioned, one was a bartender. Six third parties worked or had worked in Ottawa, another nine in Toronto.\textsuperscript{29} At the time of the interviews, eight currently worked at strip clubs and seven no longer worked as third parties. In contrast to the findings of the Management Project interviews from the incall/outcall sector (see Bruckert & Law 2013), none of the strip club third parties had themselves had experience as erotic dancers or as sex workers in other sectors. That said, many had enjoyed extensive careers working in strip clubs – five had done so for 20 years or more; four had worked almost as long, between 14 and 17 years; four had worked as third parties for approximately four to five years; one had worked for two years and another had only six months experience at the time of the interview.

Participants were also asked about their income in the most recent year they had worked in the erotic dance sector; not all of the (especially former) third parties were able to answer this question, however of those who did, most (8) reported being in the $40,000 to $60,000 range, only one (a manager) reported making $60,000 to $80,000, while another two had made $20,000 to $40,000, and one made less than $20,000. These salaries are certainly modest in comparison to the extravagant earnings of ‘pimps’ and traffickers in the popular imagination (and some studies, e.g., Leidholdt 1993). Indeed, in the individual interviews, dancers reported making $300 to $700 per night, or $40,000 to $100,000 per year,\textsuperscript{30} seemingly generally out-earning the third parties with whom they worked. This discrepancy challenges stigmatic assumptions about financial exploitation of sex workers by third parties.

\textsuperscript{29} Of these one had spent a few months working in Ottawa but most of his experience had been in Toronto.

\textsuperscript{30} These two income ranges are not related; rather, dancers were given a choice between estimating their income earned per year or per day. Some chose the latter to accommodate for inconsistent schedules from week to week or month to month, while others thought the former was a more accurate estimation approach.
Most of participants’ experience as third parties was limited to the erotic dance sector, however three had also worked in other sectors of the sex industry: one as a driver and (temporarily) a manager at an escort service; another had managed a webcam site; and another provided driving and security services to escorts. Participants had a wide range of work experience outside the sex industry as well. Some of this experience was related to the jobs they did at strip clubs: three DJs had worked in radio, one of whom also had experience DJing weddings and clubs and in recording studios and television; two bouncers had worked security in other bars (one had also done private security), and another had served in the military; one manager had managed a nightclub; and the bartender had experience in hotel management. In addition, participants had a variety of experience in unrelated jobs, which included: sales clerk (3); cook (3); construction (6); server (3); stock broker (1); information technology expert (2); factory worker (1); landscaper (1); lab technician (1); government worker (1); office worker (1); teacher (1); mechanic (1); driver (1); and social worker (2). The majority (11) had managerial experience outside of the sex industry, including four who operated their own business. From their varied experiences, we can see that these individuals are not outside the ‘mainstream’ labour market but participate(d) in it simultaneously, occasionally, before, or after their work in the erotic dance sector. This suggests that these individuals were able to apply the skills they learned as third parties in the erotic dance sector to ‘mainstream’ jobs, and vice versa.

*Dancers*

Most of the dancers interviewed identified as women, save for one, who embraced a gender-neutral identity but for whom a female pronoun was acceptable. As compared to
third parties, dancers are more difficult to categorize by city; one participant in each
focus group talked about a breadth of experience working in the other city, and many
other dancers mentioned touring or working in various cities. Dancers in Toronto spoke
of occasionally travelling to other parts of Ontario, while most dancers based in Ottawa
had sometimes worked in Gatineau. Roughly however, six dancers (had) worked in
Ottawa and nine in Toronto. This is another reason, in addition to concerns about
anonymity, that they are listed simply as dancers or by focus group (A or B) in the
findings chapters.

Dancers who participated in the study were between 20 and 50 years old. These
participants had all spent a significant amount of time in the industry, ranging from three
to 18 years, with an average of 7.5 years of experience. Although they were all Canadian
citizens, two had not been born in Canada, having emigrated from Eastern Europe. Most
of the participants were white, however one was Asian, and another identified as
Aboriginal but specified that because of her light skin, she passed as white. Five of the
women had worked solely as dancers; two very occasionally provided private (i.e.,
outside the club) services (without sex) to select clients and two had occasionally
provided sex for preferred clients (one of these women had also worked as a dominatrix),
and another had worked as an escort for one night; the remaining six had worked in
various other sectors of the sex industry, and of these, five had provided full service
(intercourse), while the last had not. Eight of the women were working as dancers at the
time of the interview; the remaining seven were no longer dancing.

As previously mentioned, more personal information was gathered in the
individual interviews than the focus groups. As such, the following applies only to the
seven dancers who were interviewed individually. Of this subset of participants, two were middle class, three were from the lower middle class, one identified as upper middle class and another as working class. As a group, the women were quite educated, and notably, more educated than the third party participants: two women had undergraduate and law degrees and of these, one additionally had a Masters’ degree; one had an undergraduate degree as well as some college education; another two had some college and some university education; one was currently enrolled in an undergraduate program; and the final participant had a college education. Challenging stigmatic assumptions framing erotic dance as a desperate resort of underclass women, here we see that the women in this occupation come from a variety of social locations and backgrounds (see Nagle 1997).

Data analysis process

To ensure analytical rigour to the best of my ability, I began coding the interview data with my supervisor, Dr. Chris Bruckert, using the qualitative analysis software program NVivo. Team coding allowed for discussion and more careful reflection about how data was categorized and conceptualized, and provided useful insights for coding and analysis in later stages of the project. Initially, codes arose from the literature, the interview guides, and from what we recalled from the focus groups; some were also drawn from a list of codes that we had developed for coding the incall/outcall sector interviews of the Management Project (see Bruckert & Law 2013). They were then refined into two lists of codes – one for the third party interviews and a second for the dancer focus groups. Coding the third party and the dancer interviews separately allowed us to use some of the same codes, and subsequently to explore differences between the
two, while allowing for the development of codes specific to each. These discussions yielded extensive lists of codes and direction for data sorting, making it unnecessary to continue coding as a team; I finished the coding alone.

After collecting the second batch of data, I added the new third party interviews to the existing NVivo file in order to continue using the codes developed with Dr. Bruckert. Since some time had passed since the previous round of coding, I re-read the contents of existing codes to ensure a consistent interpretation. Over the course of this process, I took note of ideas to re-code or attend to in the horizontal analysis. Similarly, I added the individual dancer interviews to the existing dancers NVivo file, as they touched on many of the same issues as the focus groups. Since the individual dancer interviews provided elaboration and more personal information, I created more codes to accommodate new details and nuances. These latter codes were developed from the individual dancers interview guide, and also reflected themes that dancers had raised themselves in the interviews. Some were also added to match the new codes in the third parties file (e.g., performance).

As in the team coding stage, passages involving or pertaining to multiple themes, meanings or implications were coded under several codes simultaneously. Inasmuch as trends were observable across interviews, each interview was unique – some participants emphasized the same point or experience repeatedly, some talked at length in response to certain questions or prompts or during the whole interview while others were relatively brief or unwilling to elaborate (fortunately, this seldom occurred). Because of these variations, some interviews were coded more densely than others (i.e., more codes were used and/or more material was coded).
Because the interview data were collected over a two-year period, each time I coded new data and new patterns emerged, I looked at the previously coded data again to see if it fit into any of the new codes. In this way I coded and re-coded until such time as no new patterns were emerging. Along with the codes from other *Management Project* data and the literature, this process resulted in extensive codebooks. There were 123 codes in the third parties file. Although most codes were used as categories to sort the data, some had other functions: for example ‘Workplace relations’ served merely as a heading in the dancers’ file, with no information stored in it; its subheading, ‘Relationships to third parties’ was also a code itself; and the subheadings under it were simply codes. The dancers file, which was similarly organized, contained 112 codes. Although most of these codes were used for the analysis chapters, some codes (e.g., ‘Work history’) were only used in the demographic information presented in this chapter, whereas others were found not to apply to the research questions of the present project and were not used. (Dr. Bruckert and I had consciously chosen to over-code for future avenues of research; this does not mean that selections of data were excluded, however, but rather that much of the data were sorted into multiple codes). To facilitate the analysis process, I transferred the information from each code into a Word document and then sorted the codes into three thematically grouped folders (one for each findings chapter) and a general interest folder (for codes pertaining to multiple chapters); I also collapsed some similar codes into each other. Of course this did not mean I only used the codes in each folder in only one chapter; sorting the codes in this way merely made the analysis process more manageable and systematic, and less daunting. The final list of codes for third parties and dancers, respectively, can be found in Appendices VI and VII.
Even though the findings from the incall/outcall sector (see Bruckert & Law 2013) alerted me to certain workplace practices, policies and trends, I was not working with specific research hypotheses, but rather looking to draw conclusions from my empirical data, making this project more inductive than deductive (see Patton 2002). Indeed the project was guided by research questions, not hypotheses; moreover some of the findings were quite surprising. For example drawing from the literature, I deduced that participants would perform gender, class and race, however the extent and variety of ways in which participants used performance, especially in regard to security, was an inductive finding. Upon reflecting on the data in the analysis process, I also realized that some of the deductions drawn from the literature are in fact more nuanced. This allowed me to advance or present alternatives to existing interpretations, for example about dancers’ peer surveillance practices, which I frame as price-fixing rather than discipline (see Chapter 7).

To accommodate these emerging findings, I refined my theoretical framework while coding the data. Layder describes such an approach as “adaptive theory,” which is neither explicitly inductive nor deductive but a combination of both, and which “shapes, and is shaped by the empirical data that emerges from research. It allows the dual influence of extant theory (theoretical models) as well as those that unfold from (and are enfolded in) the research” (1998: 133; see also Munn 2009: 94-95). In short, Layder (1998) advocates for a dialectical relationship between theory and data. For example, I shifted my theoretical focus from stigma to Goffman’s dramaturgical tools as I increasingly noticed the significance of role performance in the narratives of third parties. In this respect, although symbolic interactionism has figured significantly throughout the
project, as it allows for a consideration of “the structure, process and products of social interaction” (Cahill 1998: 191) between third parties and dancers, my use of Goffman’s theories adapted to accommodate the concepts emerging from the data. This in turn required a reorganization of the theoretical framework. Thus, Goffman’s performance teams were integrated with a Foucaultian understanding of power as well as tools from critical management studies, an extension of organization theory that critically examines management processes and structures (see Alvesson et al. 2009; Thompson & O’Doherty 2009; Daft & Armstrong 2009).

Project limitations

This project is premised on the notion that interviews are an effective method of uncovering the situated knowledges of people who work in a stigmatized labour market sector. Like any method of data collection, interviewing has particular limitations. As Fontana and Frey (2005) point out, the interview is a contextually bound, collaborative effort by the researcher and the respondent. While the former might fail to understand the meaning or importance of certain reflections, experiences, or language used by the interviewee, the latter may misremember particular events or attempt to please the interviewer with their responses (Fontana & Frey 2005). For this reason, it is perhaps more accurate to understand the interview as a narrative of experiences and reflections captured at a particular moment in time. Nevertheless, I attempted to observe patterns and discrepancies by comparing participants’ accounts to each other.

Of course that this project that is predominantly concerned with social interactions in a workplace – even if these interactions are contextualized within social and local discursive and regulatory trends – is itself a limitation. Although this research
uncovers important information about, among other things, risk management strategies and organizational structures at strip clubs, focusing on the interpersonal level yields limited insight about generative mechanisms and social structures. This particular limitation, then, is a consequence of the design and focus of the research.

Even though I used multiple channels to communicate my recruitment information, interview-based research is also limited by a lack of control over who ultimately chooses to participate. As Sanders (2006) notes, people working for unscrupulous employers in the sex industry may be relatively reluctant to participate in research as compared to those who work at more reputable establishments – this may have affected my sample as well, especially since third parties may feel they play a part in creating good or bad working conditions for dancers. With a majority of white respondents, this project also lacked racial diversity. As such, my sample may not accurately reflect the racial demography of the erotic dance sector. On the other hand, a minority of racialized participants may be an effect of systemic racism in the industry (see Bouclin 2004; Brooks 2010; Law 2012), however my ability to comment on this is limited by the qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) nature of the project. That said it is obvious that hearing from greater number of racialized people would have provided richer data about such matters (Hunter 2002).

Additionally, because my focus is on female strip clubs, this project will not be able to offer in-depth insight about work relationships and conditions in trans and male strip clubs. Similarly, strip club practices vary across the country and as such my analysis of the challenges engendered by regulation may have limited applicability outside the geographical regions I am studying. In spite of these limitations, this research uncovered
many interesting findings that are broadly applicable to relationships between managers and workers in the sex industry as well as other sectors of the labour market.
Chapter 5. Tracing regulatory discourses and mechanisms in Ontario

Foucault argues that discourse is a vehicle through which knowledge is produced and meaning is ascribed to social practices at a particular moment in history (1977; 1980). In turn, as Smart (1989) asserts, power relations manifest in the reinforcement of certain discourses as ‘truths’ through state (e.g., juridical) mechanisms. This chapter, then, draws from regulatory texts including municipal records and minutes, as well as court documents, put in conversation with advocacy group materials and academic literature, to reflect on the production, intermingling, and consequences of discursive constructions of erotic dance as harmful, immoral, and labour. It additionally includes newspaper coverage of municipal regulatory issues and debates, not as a source of empirical data but (as noted in Chapter 4) because news coverage can be seen as a barometer of dominant narratives (see Hall et al. 1978; Phillips 2003). Examining these documents provides a legal analysis supplemented by a consideration of prevailing narratives.

As discourses do not appear out of nowhere but are in some way continuous with previous discourses (Foucault 1972), the chapter begins by briefly situating erotic dance historically, economically, and socially. It then examines recent discursive and regulatory developments in Ontario, by presenting converging and conflicting statements and interventions by various groups in a thematic series. As we will see, these competing discourses yielded contradictory results. Although government officials reproduced stigma structurally through regulation associating lap dancing with prostitution and trafficking (see Hannem 2012), strip club owners and dancers attempted to foster social

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31 Although I agree that the term 'sex work' more meaningfully acknowledges work in the sex industry as labour, I use the term 'prostitution' throughout this chapter to: (1) avoid confusion between different sectors of the sex industry, (2) avoid classifying erotic dance as sex work, since not all dancers identify as sex workers (Bruckert 2002), and (3) retain the language used in the regulatory discussions.
and regulatory change by advancing a labour discourse. At the same time however, dancers and club owners reaffirmed the legitimacy of the whore stigma (see Pheterson 1998), by attempting to dissociate themselves from ‘dirty’ dancers and erotic massage parlours. As a result, practices prevalent in contemporary strip clubs in Toronto and Ottawa are incongruent with, and subject to conflicting interpretations of, overlapping (e.g., local, federal, organizational) regulatory frameworks.

**Prior discourses and practices of erotic dance**

Since women began undressing on stage in the West in the late 1800s, numerous self-identified stakeholders, including purity campaigners, local residents, municipal politicians, feminists and performers themselves have raised concerns about the decency, (im)morality, and riskiness of erotic dance, as well as the behaviour of, and attitudes towards, erotic dancers (Shteir 2004; Walkowitz 1992). As shown in *Chapter 2*, recent scholarship demonstrates that these discourses persist; various communities continue to frame erotic dance as a health risk (Bruckert & Dufresne 2002), harmful to neighbourhoods (Hanna 2005; Hubbard 2009), and exploitative of women (Hubbard & Colosi 2012). In this chapter, we will see that such discourses have impacted regulatory strategies in Canada.

Although they can be traced back to longstanding discourses of danger and immorality surrounding prostitution (Valverde 1989; Walkowitz 1992), contemporary regulatory discourses and strategies have also developed in response to evolving practices of erotic dance. The form of stripping that currently dominates Ontario’s industry originated with the introduction of full nudity in the 1970s and the subsequent proliferation of strip clubs across the US and Canada in the 1980s (Egan 2006a; Shteir
Dancers crossed a new boundary in the early 1980s with the advent of table dancing; customers could now purchase a personal performance for five to ten dollars and see a dancer perform up close on a small wooden stage (Bruckert 2002; Tracey 1997). This effectively transformed stripping from entertainment to service work (Bruckert 2002: 12), which Frank (2002a: xxv) situates as part of late capitalist consumer culture’s preoccupation with spectacle, experience, and individualized services. Furthermore, because table dances provided income from ‘tips,’ management reduced dancers’ wages to 30 to 40 dollars per eight hour shift (i.e., approximately minimum wage) and began charging dancers a house fee of ten dollars (Bruckert et al. 2003: 31). The 1990s saw the introduction of lap dancing and champagne rooms, which brought about yet more profound changes to the industry, its regulation, and its organization of labour.

**The re-organization of labour in the lap dancing era**

More intimate than a table dance, a lap dance typically involves a dancer sitting “between her customer’s legs or directly on his lap … moving her body against the customer’s in order to arouse him” (Lewis 2000: 203). Lap dancing also allowed customers to touch dancers for the first time, in the privacy of a champagne room (Bruckert et al. 2003). In return for this closer-contact service, dancers were able to charge a premium rate of 20 dollars per song. Dancers’ labour now comprised “two very different types of duties”: stage shows, which demand performance and dance skills, and selling lap dances, which a dancer may govern in accordance with her personal boundaries and perceptions of risk, and the rules of the club, and combines interpersonal and sales skills (Bruckert et al. 2003: 33).

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32 Minimum wage in Ontario between 1980 and 1990 went from $3.30 to $5.40 per hour (Canada 2015).
As lap dancing became the industry norm in cities across Ontario,\textsuperscript{33} salaries atrophied and lap dances became the sole source of income for most dancers (Bruckert 2002). Bruckert et al. (2003: 30) suggest that this was a by-product of the recession in the 1980s and 1990s, in which an increasing portion of Canadians were relegated to precarious and ill-paying service industry jobs (see also Vosko 2003). The majority of dancers were thus transformed from waged performers to independent contractors who pay the club a house fee in exchange for the space (the environment of the club itself), services (security, music, bar service) and customers they require to do their job (Bouclin 2004; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert & Parent 2007; Law 2012). In keeping with a history of substandard working conditions as compared to other performance trades (Ross 2009; Shteir 2004), as independent contractors dancers are not entitled to receive benefits, Employment Insurance, pensions, or the protection of labour legislation (Althorp 2013; Machen 1996). Yet dancers resemble employees insofar as they must comply with certain rules and expectations dictated by club management (Althorp 2013; Bruckert 2002; Couto 2006; Fischer 1996; Fogel & Quinlan 2011; Machen 1996).\textsuperscript{34} Numerous problems with the house fee system have also been identified, including inconsistency and unreasonable increases; the income the house fee provides also incentivizes management to expand the club’s roster of dancers to a number greater than its clientele can support, reducing potential income amongst dancers, in turn making them more likely to engage in riskier activities (DERA 2002; Maticka-Tyndale 2004).

\textsuperscript{33} Although lap dancing is commonplace in Toronto and Ottawa, erotic dance practices vary considerably across different countries and regions. That said lap dancing is offered, in spite of being sanctioned, in most municipalities across Ontario (Bruckert 2002; Maticka-Tyndale 2004).

\textsuperscript{34} It should be noted that these conditions are not particular to the sex industry nor the erotic dance sector. Fudge et al. (2003: 193) note that, “most self-employed people resemble employees…in the sense that they are economically dependent on the sale of their labour and are often subject to inferior terms and conditions of work.” According to Vosko et al. (2003), many Canadians are involved in precarious or non-standard work, which they characterize as low paying, without benefits, and often temporary or part-time.
The development of regulatory discourses and practices in Ontario

The 1990s: Societal harm or personal risk?

The privacy of champagne rooms made it difficult to ascertain the extent of the contact that was occurring in lap dances in the 1990s, resulting in “a blurring of the boundaries between stripping and prostitution” (Lewis 2000: 203; see also Bruckert 2002). As such the decade was riddled with regulatory inconsistency and uncertainty as to precisely what was permitted in a lap dance, resulting in (and also emanating from) the creation of municipal bylaws, the application of various federal laws, and the laying and contestation of criminal charges relating to bawdy houses, obscenity, public nudity, and public acts of indecency (Bruckert 2002; Lewis 2000; Lewis & Shaver 2006).

Two criminal cases in particular, centering on whether or not a strip club could be considered a common bawdy house, have had an important impact on Ontario’s erotic dance industry. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in *R v Mara* that the touching between a dancer and a patron during a lap dance in a Toronto strip club was indecent, on the basis that it “is harmful to society in many ways: it degrades and dehumanizes women; it desensitizes sexuality and is incompatible with the dignity and equality of each human being; and it predisposes persons to act in an antisocial manner” (1997: para 12). In noting the risks dancers faced “from the activities’ similarities to prostitution” (*R v Mara* 1997: para 37), the court also equated prostitution to individual harm. However this was “not a central consideration” in the court’s finding of indecency; instead, the judges highlighted “the attitudinal harm on those watching the performance as perceived by the community as a whole” (*R v Mara* 1997: para 37). In short *R v Mara*
rendered lap dancing illegal as of 1997, reducing its availability in Ontario (Bruckert & Dufresne 2002).

Two years later, the Supreme Court effectively reversed this decision, acquitting the owner of a Quebec strip club of a bawdy house charge for allowing lap dancing in *R v Pelletier*. Unlike Mr. Mara’s strip club where touching had occurred in plain view of other patrons, the lap dances at Mme. Pelletier’s club had been performed in partially enclosed booths (*R c Pelletier* 1993). The majority (3) of Supreme Court justices agreed with the trial judge’s assessment that because the touching had occurred out of public view and could thus be considered private, it was not an indecent act (*R v Pelletier* 1999; *R c Pelletier* 1993). Moreover, the trial judge had interpreted the absence of complaints by other customers and neighbourhood residents as an indication that the activities in question did not exceed community standards of tolerance (*R c Pelletier* 1993). However, *Pelletier* was not a complete break from *Mara*: two justices dissented, characterizing the behaviour as “sexual contact” that was “not private in nature” and thus indecent (*R v Pelletier* 1999: para 4).

Concurrent to the courts’ deliberations, municipalities in Ontario banned lap dancing indirectly with bylaws against touching. As Bouclin (2004b) notes, two Toronto area dancer-led groups, who framed lap dancing as harmful by associating it with prostitution, were instrumental in crafting Toronto’s erotic dance bylaws; however both groups declined as lap dancing became a normative practice and dancers adapted. In spite of club owners’ failed attempts at collectively challenging them (see Bouclin 2004b; *OAEB  v Metropolitan Toronto* 1995 & 1997), bylaws explicitly prohibiting touching
were introduced. Following Toronto’s bylaw in 1995, in 1996 Ottawa similarly prohibited:

….any adult entertainment performer providing live entertainment or services designed to appeal to erotic or sexual appetites or inclinations to touch or be touched by or have physical contact with any other person in any manner whatsoever involving any part of that person’s body. (bylaw 2002-189, s 20)

Along with other Ontario municipalities Toronto and Ottawa justified their prohibition of touching on the basis of health risks, as well as “crime prevention concerns” (*Toronto v Zanzibar* 2007: para 60) and “consumer protection” (*AEAC v Ottawa* 2007: para 4), respectively. However Bruckert and Dufresne (2002) argue the bylaws derived from a discourse of morality (see also Bruckert 2002; Lewis 2000). This observation can also be applied to provincial regulations. Although dancers were, in principle, included in Ontario’s *Occupational Health and Safety Act* in 1995, this was part of a public health initiative to minimize the transmission of HIV/AIDS rather than to protect them from workplace risks (Bruckert 2002).

Moral suspicion and perceptions of lap dancing as risky are also visible in other Adult Entertainment Parlour (strip club) bylaws that facilitate surveillance of dancers and patrons (Bruckert & Dufresne 2002). In Ottawa, club floor plans must be approved by municipal and police officials (Ottawa, bylaw 2002-189). Similarly, Toronto’s bylaws included a requirement for private dances to be performed in an area within view of the stage (*Toronto Municipal Code* 2010).

Another way that municipalities surveil strip club actors is through licensing. Both cities require owners and operators to obtain annual licenses, but only Toronto licenses dancers. Interestingly, Toronto dancer groups supported the institution of licensing but Ottawa dancers did not (Bouclin 2004a; Bruckert 2002). Both operator and
dancer licenses are disproportionately costly, subject to review by the police, and refused if the applicant has been convicted of prostitution-related offenses (Toronto 2012a; Ottawa 2013). In short, the bylaws appear to be engineered to prevent or at least minimize the assumed social and personal harms of prostitution and prostitution-like activities (see Jackson 2011).

‘Dirty girls’ and sex for sale

After the R v Pelletier ruling in December 1999, lap dancing became more prevalent in Ontario, making it the subject of much debate. Newspaper coverage, dancers, and community and government representatives framed lap dancing as “sex for sale” (Jaimet 2000b). Moreover, dancers, owners, and (in Ottawa) clients were charged with prostitution-related offences in raids carried out throughout 2000.

Residents and representatives of a Toronto suburb were vociferous in their opposition to a proposed “red-light district” (of two strip clubs), which they framed as “morally wrong and bad planning” (Ferenc 2000), and an “open invitation to prostitutes, drug dealers and battling drunks to take over their community” (Swainson 2000). Similarly, an Ottawa borough mayor suggested using the Ontario Municipal Act to limit the number of strip clubs in the soon-to-be amalgamated city of Ottawa, and was quoted as saying, “It's a quality of life issue and a community-value issue” (Gray 2000). It appears both municipalities subsequently made use of the Ontario Municipal Act (2001) to restrict zoning, in effect limiting the number of strip clubs. As a result, although 63

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35 Adult entertainment licenses in both cities are also by far the most costly licenses. In Toronto, a strip club owner or operator license costs $5,884.12 (or $11,871.30 for a combined owner/operator license) the first year and must be renewed for $5,699.03 each year thereafter, whereas a comparable business license (for a nightclub) costs $354.73 and $254.55 each year thereafter (Toronto 2012a). In Ottawa the owner fee is $3,158 per year and the operator fee is $599, and other businesses do not require licenses for both owners and operators, while a restaurant license costs $178 (Ottawa 2013). In Toronto, an entertainer (dancer) license costs $367.36 on first application and $258.70 each year thereafter (Toronto 2012a).
owners’ licenses are available in Toronto, they are so onerous to obtain or transfer that there are currently only 17 strip clubs in operation (MLS 2012a; *Toronto Municipal Code* 2010). Similarly there are only nine strip clubs in Ottawa due to severe zoning restrictions (Ottawa, bylaw 2002-189).

Ottawa officials also framed lap dancing as degrading to women. City councillors instructed police to “stamp out lap dancing,” calling it “demeaning” and likening it to prostitution (Jaimet 2000b). Similarly, the police “[took] the standpoint that any acts committed in these [adult entertainment] parlours may very well exceed the standard of what the community is prepared to tolerate” (Stonehouse 2000). Consistent with this discourse, police conducted a “sweep” targeting both strip clubs and street-based sex work shortly thereafter (Campbell 2000).

These interconnected discourses associating lap dancing with harm, prostitution, and crime materialized in Ottawa’s bylaw revisions, which contained a requirement that “the Chief of Police has reported in writing as to the good character of the applicant” for strip club owner, operator, and “attendant” (dancer) licenses (Ottawa, bylaw L6 2000: s1). Although this provision came into force on December 20, 2000, the city of Ottawa amalgamated its municipal administrations on January 1, 2001, and attendant licensing was dropped out of concern for dancers’ privacy (*AEAC et al. v Ottawa* 2005a).

In Ottawa, the prostitution discourse was also mobilized by the Dancers’ Equal Rights Association (DERA), a dancers’ group founded in 2000 that claimed lap dancing: creates a hostile division between the women who choose to lap dance (referred to as “Dirty Girls”) and the women who remain traditionally “visual only” (referred to as “Good Girls”). The “Dirty Girls” end up making more money and the “Good Girls” make much less, this puts financial pressure on the “Good Girls” to lap dance. If the women were not being financially exploited by the owners there would be no lap dancing or “private areas” as the women would simply
refuse to engage in high risk activities because they would have a choice. (DERA 2002: 8).

As Bouclin (2006) argues, DERA’s differentiation between “Good Girls” and “Dirty Girls” effectively othered and excluded immigrant, older, and racialized dancers who, as noted in Chapter 2, have both a lower income earning potential and a lesser capacity for resistance to managerial control regimes, as compared to the white, educated dancers comprising DERA’s membership. These dancers communicated their message through Ottawa’s newspapers, characterizing lap dancing as “unsafe, unhygienic and demeaning” and “prostitution” (Stonehouse 2000; see also Jaimet 2000a & b).

Strip club management in the two cities also responded to Pelletier slightly differently. In Ottawa, some club owners threatened to challenge the bylaws (Stonehouse 2000), while others claimed not to support lap dancing but suggested that some dancers might allow touching (Jaimet 2000a & b). Management in Toronto appears to have made no such claims. However, bawdy house charges against two strip club operators were dropped in 2003 (R v DiGiuseppe 2008).

Toronto police also charged some club owners with procuring and some migrant dancers with immigration violations in a year-long investigation into trafficking and organized crime in strip clubs, called Project Almonzo. The project was lauded as “successful” in a government-funded report (McDonald et al. 2000: 68).36 Concurrently, Citizenship and Immigration Canada began “scrutinizing ‘burlesque entertainer’ [erotic dancer] applications more closely” (Jimenez & Bell 2000) “after discovering some [migrant dancers] were prostitutes” (Bell & Jimenez 2000). Thus, it appears that

36 Ultimately, however, “all charges that were laid [during Project Almonzo] were withdrawn or stayed” (Locomotion Tavern v Ontario 2010).
authorities mixed concern about harm to migrant women with blame and punishment for prostitution (see also O’Connell Davidson 2006).

From 2000 to 2002, then, municipal councils and police as well as some Toronto area residents and Ottawa dancers framed lap dancing as harmful to the community and to women, and dancers’ health and safety, by associating it with prostitution. In doing so they stigmatized and excluded dancers who chose to lap dance, framing them as “dirty” and “prostitutes.”

**From prostitution to labour concerns**

Although DERA had positioned lap dancing as a threat to dancers’ health and safety, this discourse shifted more towards labour conditions in 2004 and 2005. In Ottawa, this was initiated as part of the city’s amalgamation with surrounding municipalities, which reopened the discussion on dancer licensing (among other bylaws). Newspaper reports about the proposed licensing changes featured dancers’ and club owners’ concerns about privacy, stigma, and cost and their objections to regulating stripping differently than other service jobs (Corbett 2004; Gray 2004). Dancer licensing was finally removed from the city’s agenda after DERA, accompanied by club owners, sympathetic community groups, and a large number of unaffiliated dancers, formally objected to it at a municipal hearing (Bouclin 2004b; Deputy City Manager 2004).

With other provisions of Ottawa’s bylaw, however, dancers were divided. Despite mentioning some dancers’ financial concerns, DERA had not challenged the no-touching provision, instead affirming it as a tool “to protect the health and safety of the dancers and to minimize nuisances” (EPSC 2004: np). These divisions became more apparent in 2005, when a group of Ottawa strip club owners (represented by the Adult Entertainment
Association of Canada, or AEAC) mounted a court challenge arguing the provisions forbidding close contact touching and champagne rooms were detrimental to their business (AEAC et al. v Ottawa 2005b). In this challenge, 45 dancers disputed the City’s framing of health, safety and public protection as justification for the bylaw amendments (AEAC et al. v Ottawa 2005a: para 4). Furthermore these dancers argued that DERA was a group of former dancers with no experience lap dancing, who did not represent their interests (AEAC et al. v Ottawa 2005b: para 7). However, in finding that the city’s consultation with DERA was fair, in “the absence of any other organized group to speak for them” (AEAC et al. v Ottawa 2005b, para 13), the judge did not recognize the dancers who supported lap dancing. The challenge failed, as did a 2007 appeal, leaving the bylaws unchanged (AEAC et al. v Ottawa 2007).

In spite of virtually no feedback from the general public (EPSC 2004) save for one letter to the editor insisting strip clubs “provide legal entertainment and should be registered as any other (liquor-licensed) establishment” (Kolbuszewski 2004), Ottawa city council nonetheless incorporated additional location restrictions and the prohibition of “nude, naked, topless, bottomless, sexy and other words or pictures or symbols of like meaning” from strip club signage into the harmonized bylaw (Ottawa, bylaw 2004-353, s 1(b)). Thus, in spite of the lack of public objections, the city council continued to support a discourse of social harm.

By contrast, newspapers began covering labour concerns, featuring a dancer advocating for improved working conditions (Tralee 2004), a study about unfair labour practices in the sex industry (see Maticka-Tyndale 2004), and a report on exploitative working conditions that addressed stripping alongside other occupations (Danese 2004;
Greenaway 2005; Greenberg 2005; see Law Commission of Canada 2004). However, the labour minister of Ontario rejected a call to boost inspections at strip clubs (Greenberg 2005). This lack of willingness to provide labour oversight is particularly unfortunate given that, according to Bouclin (2004b), Ottawa clubs had virtually ceased paying wages to dancers by 2004, treating them instead as independent contractors, save for approximately one quarter of dancers who remained ‘scheduled’ (i.e., salaried employees). Thus, provincial and municipal governments and courts seemed reticent to relinquish the discourse of immorality when the media and the public were beginning to acknowledge erotic dance as labour.

**A new threat to the community: Body-rub parlours**

Concurrently, a new target of concern emerged in Toronto city council discussions of adult businesses – erotic massage, or body rub, parlours, which offer closer contact and more sexual services than strip clubs generally do (Lewis & Shaver 2006; van der Meulen & Durisin 2008). Strip club owners quickly mobilized to frame erotic massage parlours as a moral and health threat, and as a result were invited to take part in the development of municipal regulation for these businesses (Toronto 2004: 63). After a staff report described body rub parlours as “illegal enterprises” that “are a nuisance to the neighbourhood” (PTC 2005b: 2), city council decided to limit their allowable hours of operation (PTC 2005a) and also made holistic establishments, body-rub parlours and strip clubs into distinct business categories, in an effort to safeguard the “reputation [of other businesses] … and public health and safety” (Toronto, bylaw 719-2005: 1).

At the same time, Toronto councillors decided to increase the police budget to fight drugs (“grow-ops”), child pornography, and “gangs,” agreeing to fund the salaries
of 200 more police officers via increased licensing fees for both body-rub parlours and strip clubs (Toronto 2005a: 93). Although this municipal edict evinces a persistent link between strip clubs, crime, and social harm, they now seemed a lesser target as compared to erotic massage parlours: councilor Howard Moscoe was quoted as saying that he was no longer concerned about prostitution in strip clubs: “it's passed on to illegal body-rub parlours” (McGinn 2007). The AEAC endeavoured to contribute to this shift, telling the media that “illegal massage parlours” were threatening their business (Popplewell 2008) and later recommending a definition of prohibited sexual activities to city council in order to facilitate bylaw infraction charges against them (Lambrinos 2009b).

Unlike Toronto, Ottawa grouped body-rub parlours, strip clubs, and adult entertainment stores together as “Adult Entertainment Establishments” (EPSC 2005). This appears to have propelled strip club owners to try to distance themselves from erotic massage parlours both physically and conceptually. After the city council struck one strip club from Ottawa’s list of permissible establishments in 2007, the AEAC demanded increased surveillance, fewer licenses, and reduced hours for massage parlours as well as a distance of 1,000 metres between these businesses and strip clubs (CPS 2007). The city complied, and licensing committee minutes show numerous bawdy house charges and bylaw infractions at massage parlours, but not at strip clubs, in 2008 and 2009. Thus, between 2004 and 2009, strip club owners in both Ottawa and Toronto seized an opportunity to redirect intersecting discourses of harm, prostitution and criminality away from themselves and toward erotic massage parlours.

Targeting trafficking, targeting migrants
At the same time as municipal suspicions about prostitution were shifting toward erotic massage parlours, officials in Toronto were becoming increasingly concerned about trafficking in strip clubs. Framing migrant dancers as victims of exploitation, the trafficking discourse exploded with the Sgro (“Strippergate”) scandal in 2004 and 2005, in which the media and opposition politicians accused immigration minister Judy Sgro and the federal Liberal Party of facilitating trafficking through the foreign exotic dancer visa program (Law 2012). In following, immigration and trafficking concerns began to inform Toronto city council’s development of protocols and strategies regarding the sex industry (Toronto 2004; Toronto 2005b).

Even though the Liberals had significantly reduced the number of visas granted to foreign dancers in 2004 (Barnett 2007), their Conservative successors further embraced the trafficking discourse with the introduction of Bill C-57 (2007: s 1.4), which aimed “to protect foreign nationals who are at risk of being subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment, including sexual exploitation.” According to Conservative immigration minister Diane Finley, the bill was particularly concerned with “exotic dancers, [who] may be exploited or become victims of human trafficking” (Barnett 2007: 2). The manner in which the bill proposed to protect these at-risk persons was to refuse them entry into Canada (see Barnett 2007). Scholars argue that state-sponsored anti-trafficking measures such as this merely condemn sex work rather than meaningfully helping victims of trafficking, of whom they identify very few (O’Connell Davidson 2006; Weitzer 2012).

In response to Bill C-57, both migrant and Canadian dancers voiced their objections to journalists, insisting that “work[ing] as an exotic dancer is not humiliating or degrading” (Wattie 2007) and that “we work hard to make the money to make
something of ourselves” (Taylor 2008b). The AEAC and “dozens of dancers” also voiced their disapproval of the bill at Toronto City Hall (Wattie 2007). In addition, a variety of sex worker and other advocacy groups argued that Bill C-57 “may harm the very people it is trying to help by driving foreign exotic dancers into underground establishments where they will be beyond the reach of those monitoring workplace health and safety standards or …other forms of exploitation” (Barnett 2007: 9). This argument echoes Agustin’s (2007: 8) criticism of “isolationist immigration policy” which, by aiming to manage and control vulnerable, poor, and undocumented people, in effect reproduces their marginalization.

Although Bill C-57 did not pass into law, the government continued to place restrictions on migrant dancers (Barnett 2007), in response to which club owners claimed to be suffering from a labour shortage (Jimenez & Campbell 2004; Popplewell 2008; Taylor 2008a & b; Wattie 2007). The AEAC also told the newsmedia that club owners monitored migrant workers, by “work[ing] with police to clean up the seedier aspects of the business, and [issuing] a brochure in five languages advising women of their workplace rights and reminding them that sex is prohibited in clubs” (Jimenez & Campbell 2004). In this respect, state surveillance informed by discourses of risk and immorality pervaded third party practices (see Bruckert 2002; Hannem 2012), as a disavowal of migrant dancers that echoed Ottawa club owners’ efforts to distance themselves from “dirty” dancers a few years earlier. Both of these instances are akin to Devers et al.’s (2009) findings, in which organizations distanced themselves from stigmatized conduct rather than attempting to support or protect individuals from stigma or its consequences. However club owners’ efforts may have been in vain, as the media
concurrently portrayed the federal government as suspecting them of having connections to trafficking and organized crime (‘Less than Meets the Eye’ 2008).

In spite of dancers’ attempts to assert their agency as workers and club owners’ efforts to defend their reputation (albeit at migrant dancers’ expense), politicians continued to frame stripping as coercive through a trafficking discourse. Newspaper reports quoting the federal minister of human resources as contrasting stripping to “family values and hard working Canadians,” and the Ontario minister of training as saying he “[did] not believe provincial government employees should counsel clients to train for a job as an escort or table dancer” (Whittington 2010: A15) further undermined the labour discourse. The trafficking discourse was cemented into law in 2012, when the federal government passed Bill C-10 (a renewed version of C-57), to protect “uniquely vulnerable young women” from “human trafficking” (Kenney & Finley 2012).

The Toronto bylaw review: Consulting which stakeholders?

Unlike their federal and provincial counterparts, Toronto city councillors slowly became more willing to listen to dancers and club owners, beginning in 2009. Although councillor Gloria Luby told the Toronto Star she had “no interest in that particular business” and councillor Doug Holyday said, “I can't think going to a strip club is appropriate” (Anonymous 2009a), three other councillors accepted the AEAC’s invitation and were ridiculed in the media for doing so (Anonymous 2009a & b; Hanes 2009). After unsuccessfully petitioning city council for a review of the bylaws (Lambrinos 2009a; Toronto 2010), the AEAC provided a pole dancing demonstration at city hall to enlighten councillors as to what went on at their clubs (Alcoba 2012; Rider 2012). Three years after being aggressively uninterested in stripping, councillor Luby was quoted as describing
the demonstration as “tasteful” and was “concerned the licences stigmatize women and ‘restrictive’ rules need to be rethought” while another councillor admitted she had worked as a cage dancer “back in the day” (Rider 2012). Thus councillors’ opinions transformed from distaste and moral judgment to identification with dancers and recognition that their struggles with stigma were perpetuated through the bylaws (see Hannem 2012).

Finally in March 2012, ten years after a city council committee had admitted the bylaws were “generally violated” (PTC 2002: 13), Toronto began to review its regulatory approach to erotic dance. As part of this endeavour, city staff undertook a report that solicited feedback from strippers, the police, and the public to evaluate the no-touch, dancer licensing, and view-from-the-stage provisions. The AEAC had submitted recommendations to refine the first provision to only prohibit contact of “sexual” body parts and remove the other two (MLS 2012b).

Much in the same way as corporations endeavour to manipulate workers to conform to their capitalist interests, for example through campaigns discouraging labour unionization (Logan 2004), it appears strip club owners attempted to compel dancers to cooperate with their regulatory interventions. Subsequent to a consultation for industry stakeholders, in which 20 dancers had participated and in which the AEAC had submitted a petition signed by more than 300 dancers, city “staff received several telephone calls from individuals who identified themselves as burlesque entertainers and who claimed that in many instances the petition was not signed voluntarily” (MLS 2012b: 35). City staff were similarly suspicious about a survey sent to dancers, as

approximately 111 surveys out of 150… appear to have been completed in the same handwriting, have nearly the same or similar answers to most questions…
and nearly all of them declare support for the recommendations submitted by Myron W. Shulgan, a solicitor representing the AEAC. (MLS 2012b: 35)

This suspicion was substantiated by “unsolicited information” to city staff indicating that some clubs had posted a notice requesting dancers bring in their surveys so that “management can help to fill it out properly” (MLS 2012b: 35).

In keeping with the observations of Bruckert and Parent (2007), Lewis (2000), and Bouclin (2006, 2009), dancers (who had completed their own surveys) espoused diverging perspectives. With regard to the no-touching bylaw, their opinions ranged from “Dancers are comfortable enough to say whether they want contact or not, we are not animals or children” to “touching leads directly to prostitution” (MLS 2012b: 41–43). Similarly, some dancers framed their work as sex work, while others carefully distinguished it from prostitution. At the same time, many acknowledged that touching is common in lap dancing and important to their financial wellbeing (MLS 2012b). Dancers also articulated consent and agency in relation to financial and labour concerns, and these issues were highlighted in newspaper coverage (see Doolittle 2012; DiManno 2012). As to whether to retain dancer licensing or replace it with a registry administered by the clubs, dancers were also divided. It is worth noting, however, that some dancers preferred licensing over a registry because they distrusted third parties’ management of additional personal information (MLS 2012b).

Consistent with previous police discourse, Toronto police did not support the elimination of licensing because they were concerned about trafficking (MLS 2012c). Admitting the bylaws were difficult to enforce however, they advocated for “more
specific language on what type of contact is prohibited” (MLS 2012b: 73).

By contrast, the majority of public respondents “[did] not support the no-touch provisions … [or] the unobstructed-view provisions,” while “nearly half” felt that licensing was unnecessary (MLS 2012c: 12). Regardless of whether these respondents comprised a representative sample, the absence of other commentary suggests Toronto’s residents no longer felt particularly threatened by erotic dance.

The licensing committee concluded that dancer licensing should be kept in place as a tool to mitigate (their concerns about) human trafficking (MLS 2012c: 33). Toronto’s city council finally adopted the proposed changes to the view-from-the-stage provision (Toronto 2012b) and refined the no-touch provision (which still prohibits most touching involved in lap dancing) five months later (Toronto, bylaw 243-2013). Thus, although the trafficking discourse still informed their understanding of erotic dance, Toronto officials did acknowledge some of the business and labour concerns articulated by club owners and dancers.

Concluding remarks: Stratification through competing discourses

As this chapter has shown through their continuing influence on municipal and federal regulation, discourses associating erotic dance with social and personal harm continue to circulate as ‘truths’ (see Foucault 1980; Smart 1989). In this respect Ontario’s regulatory approach to erotic dance can be characterized as structural stigma, which

37 It appears Toronto police officers had limited and discrepant understandings of the no-touch bylaw and, moreover, were unable to produce sufficient evidence of, for example, intent to allow physical contact (Toronto v Zanzibar 2007). As a result, when charges were laid they were often subsequently dismissed (e.g., Toronto v Zanzibar 2007; Vivace v Ontario 2005; see also MLS 2012b). Even when convictions have resulted, punishment has been minimal: a strip club operator charged with permitting physical contact was fined $250 for breaking a Vaughan bylaw with a maximum penalty of $25,000 (R v Mijatovic 2008), and under a similar charge, a Barrie strip club bartender was ordered to pay a fine of $700 for contravening a bylaw that had a maximum penalty of $5,000 (Bravakis v Barrie 2005). According to Ottawa police, “[e]nforcement efforts have been negligible” in Ottawa as compared to Toronto, however “self-regulation is more pronounced” (MLS 2012b: 8).
Hannem (2012) describes as reproducing the risk and immorality associated with a certain group through mutually reinforcing conceptual and institutional structures. The ‘truth’ of these discourses has even been evident amongst dancers and third parties, some of whom have attempted to distance themselves from prostitution by disavowing massage parlours and ‘dirty’ dancers, effectively engaging in what Goffman (1963) refers to as stratification, which Hannem and Bruckert argue ultimately reproduces existing stereotypes and the marginalization of the sex industry as a whole (2012; see also Bruckert 2002). In the case of third parties, who have relied on such tactics more often than dancers, this reflects Devers et al.’s (2009) argument that organizations sooner disassociate from stigmatized conduct by their members than push for social change.

On several occasions however, third parties did attempt to foster social, or at least regulatory, change (albeit in their favour) by advancing the labour discourse to challenge the bylaws. Third parties’ “status shield” as organizational authority figures (Ashforth et al. 2007) may have facilitated their participation in Toronto’s strip club bylaw review. However they appear to have used this shield to speak over dancers, as visible in their interference with the consultation process. Dancers’ increasing (if uneven) articulation of workplace issues, through a labour discourse that has appeared more frequently in newsmedia, is also notable. This of course parallels the increasing visibility of sex worker activism in general, as evident in the media coverage and success of the Canada v Bedford (2013) legal challenge to key components of Canada’s prostitution laws. However the labour discourse continues to be marginalized by the moral focus of municipal bylaws pertaining to erotic dance. As Frank (2005: 502) argues, “[m]oralistic regulation is often aimed at fixing problems that do not even really exist, and ignores
problems that should be addressed.” Indeed through their focus on prohibiting the assumed harm of prostitution-like activities the bylaws have done nothing to address problematic employment or workplace conditions. As we will see in the coming chapters however, while third parties may attempt to manage dancers as employees, dancers should consider considerable responsibility and control over their entrepreneurial activities.

The competing discourses explored in this chapter have also resulted in contradicting opinions, regulatory practices, and mechanisms. Newspaper coverage featuring discussions of consent and stigma, and what appears to be a decrease in anxiety and mobilization by local residents in regard to strip clubs (as represented in newspaper coverage and Toronto’s bylaw review consultation report [MLS 2012c]), suggests an increasing recognition of erotic dance as a nuanced labour experience. At the same time as councillors appeared eager to hear from dancers however, the few changes that actually resulted from Toronto’s bylaw review suggest that municipal officials (including councillors, staff, and police) continue to prioritize concerns about trafficking in the design of municipal regulation. Popular attitudes more broadly suggest a similarly reluctant warming to erotic dance; this can be seen in the popular trend (in Canada, the UK, the USA, Europe and Australia) of pole dancing as artistic, aerobic exercise that mimics the salacious elements of stripping without acknowledging or supporting dancers’ struggles against stigma or labour exploitation (Whitehead & Kurz 2009).

As the coming chapters will show, competing discourses of harm/risk, immorality, and labour circulate at the organizational level amongst strip club workers and have a significant impact on how third parties and dancers personally and professionally relate to each other. In this respect, stigma is reproduced structurally through the bylaws (Hannem
as well as through interactions, organizational culture and practices at the strip club. Furthermore the bylaws, and third parties’ understandings of them, inform club rules and practices.
Chapter 6. Parallel structures: Mapping the setting, organizational structure(s) and performers at the strip club

As noted in the previous chapter dancers are independent contractors who pay a house fee\(^{38}\) in exchange for which they are provided with a physical location outfitted with all the necessary equipment (a bar, a stage, etc.) constituting what Goffman (1959) calls a “setting,” as well as an organizational infrastructure produced by and comprising third parties (and other staff). This chapter argues that the relationship between the club/third parties and dancers cannot be adequately addressed either by conceptualizing third parties as occupying a contradictory position as supervisors and employees (Willmott 1997) or by the tensions inherent in the “worker-manager-customer triangle” (Bolton & Houlihan 2010). Instead, it proposes a dual model, in which customers must be satisfied by, and satisfy the needs of, the club and dancers in different ways simultaneously. In mapping this employment relationship, the setting in which it unfolds, the roles of third parties, and the ways in which these elements together impact dancers’ labour, this chapter positions strip clubs as comprised of parallel structures – the club, an organization whose membership includes principal and occasional or auxiliary third parties (including managers, disc jockeys (DJs), bouncers, and owners and bartenders), and dancers who operate as independent contractors but must also fulfill certain employee-like obligations. This organizational and spatial map provides a framework through which to examine third parties’ and dancers’ interactions.

At the periphery of this map are the third parties who are not affiliated with the club infrastructure, agents and ‘pimps.’ In examining third parties operating outside of

\(^{38}\) Participants also called the house fee a ‘stage,’ ‘floor,’ ‘DJ,’ or ‘door’ fee. To avoid confusion, I will only use the term ‘house fee.’
the club infrastructure in this chapter we begin to see how, in the absence of sufficient knowledge about or official relationships with these unaffiliated third parties, discourse informs club workers’ strategies to manage them. In particular discourses of risk and immorality introduced in Chapter 5 converge in dancers’ and club-affiliated third parties’ perceptions of and interactions with ‘pimps,’ to reinforce the boundaries of the club.

**The independent contractor relationship: Parallel structures**

Although third parties characterize dancers as independent contractors, the club and dancers depend on each other for financial success. Dancers pay a house fee of ten to 60 dollars (depending on the club and the hour they arrive) to access the club setting, infrastructure and services, however third parties exercise control over dancers’ access to the club through hiring and scheduling policies, rules and obligations, in order to ensure continual, quality (as defined by the club) entertainment for customers. Scott (bouncer and manager) clarified the financial aspect of this relationship as follows: “*The girl comes on a certain day, she has to pay [the house fee] up front or sometime during the course of the night to be allowed to work there. Other than that, all the money she makes is her own.*”

Because dancers are considered independent contractors and not employees, third parties need not particularly concern themselves with dancers’ entrepreneurial activities. As Marie (dancer) explained,

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39 Although some bouncers referred to themselves as ‘doormen’ instead of or in addition to ‘bouncers,’ these occupations appear to be one and the same. In keeping with the term most consistently used by other participants and to minimize confusion, I use the term ‘bouncer’ in my own discussion while maintaining the titles which participants used to describe themselves when quoting them.

40 Although this is the general rule in Ottawa and Toronto, three participants mentioned clubs requiring dancers to pay 50%, 15%, and 10% (on credit cards only), respectively, of their lap dance earning to the club. Similar obligations were reported in US clubs studied by DeMichele and Tewskbury (2004) and Egan (2004).
You walk in and nobody tells you how to dance, nobody tells you how to talk to customers, nobody tells you what to do other than you have to go on stage. You kind of look at what the other girls are doing and then, little by little, you learn. As far as training on how to talk to customers or how to behave with other dancers or anything, that’s all stuff that you learn, I guess [...] Because they don’t really care how you do, right, as long as you bring the DJ fee—and you look pretty, they don’t care how much money you make. That’s all up to you.

Some dancers expressed little interest – or even disinterest – in interacting with third parties. In focus group A, Donna and Sasha both felt that, “I just wanted them to leave me alone and not bother me” (Donna). Similarly, like Kristen (dancer), in order to prevent conflict Jill (dancer) tries “to avoid any notice from the managers, so even in that regard, I don’t really say hi to them.”

This perception of third parties being uninvolved with dancers’ labour is, in many ways, accurate, if we acknowledge that dancers’ business goals are sometimes at odds with those of the club (Bruckert 2002; Chapkis 2000). As Sal (manager) explains, “our business plan is, in a nutshell, is to sell alcohol. That’s the most important thing and that’s how we make our money.” Dancers’ goal, by contrast, is to earn money as entrepreneurs by selling dances, which may not necessarily help advance the club’s goal of selling alcohol. However, the centrality of dancers in the impression that the club is attempting to convey makes them integral to customer satisfaction and, in turn, the success of the bar through alcohol sales. In this respect, dancers and the club can be seen as inhabiting parallel structures – the organizational structure of the club, and the agglomeration of entrepreneurs that dancers collectively comprise – that are both dependent on and independent of each other. This is also a source of conflict, since third parties must ensure that dancers contribute to customer satisfaction but because they are not involved in the service interaction, they must do this by regulating dancers’ behaviour,
often from afar (see Bolton & Houlihan 2010) and for the most part (as we will see) without the incentive of a wage. At the same time, it is in dancers’ collective interest to give quality customer service, since poor service would hinder both their personal business and the success of the club, which would in turn attract fewer customers and hamper dancers’ earnings. In this respect, dancers and third parties can be said to inhabit an interdependent relationship that requires minimal interaction.

Although the notion of parallel structures refers to organizational structures, it is also used here to evoke the metaphor of two buildings. Recalling Goffman’s (1959) insistence that his dramaturgical perspective is most suitable for examining social life as it unfolds within the confines of a concrete space, the parallel structures are comparable to twin buildings situated opposite each other: the two structures are close, the inhabitants of each can (often, but not always, as we will see shortly) see their counterparts in the other, and as a matching set each structure helps to define the other (i.e., twins can only exist as two).

These parallel structures complicate and in some ways disrupt the notion of organizational hierarchy, resulting in nebulous professional relationships between third parties and dancers. Scott (bouncer and manager) offered the following reflection in this regard:

*Some of the managers and doormen are of the state of mind that these girls work for us, they don't work with us. They're not fellow staff members. They come in, they make this bar money and then they go. [...] So, that whole with and for slash gets a little blurry when it comes to the dancers [...] I mean, my job was to regulate them. But, without them, I'm not making money. So, in that sense, I kind of see them, you know, kind of almost equal. I have a little bit authority over them.*

Of course a mix of contract workers and employees is not unique to strip clubs, but has been observed in various sectors of the labour market (see Gallagher & Sverke 2005;
Ilcan 2007). As we will see throughout the remainder of this thesis, this lack of a fixed hierarchy makes the strip club a community in which power is not distributed by organizational title but rather circulates in a network, inciting resistance at various points (Handy 1993; Foucault 1980); a consequence of this mix of employment relationships particular to the sex industry, however, is that structural and interpersonal stigma inform the deployment of power and resistance. Moreover, as employees of the organization as well as managerial actors (Willmott 1997), third parties (with the exception of owners) share in the precarious working conditions of other service industry workers (Vosko 2009): “no benefits. You know, I don’t have health coverage. There’s no pension plan […] you might be making a little bit more than the guy who’s working at McDonald’s” (Fuzzy Pickle [hereinafter Fuzzy], DJ).

Although they do not provide dancers with the entitlements and rights of employees (Althorp 2013; Bruckert 2002; Couto 2006; Fischer 1996; Fogel & Quinlan 2011), the parallel structures of the strip club allow dancers considerable agency to govern their own activities (albeit, as the coming sections detail, within the limits of managerial and normative aesthetic and behavioural expectations). As Ashley (dancer) recalled:

*I felt very much in control of my own decisions in that environment. [...] you go there, you do what you wanna do, you work when you wanna work, you make your money, and then you leave, and you don’t have any—you don’t have to like prove to your company that you care about what you’re doing, [...] which was something that was really appealing to me about working at strip clubs.*

Echoing the complexities faced by workers considered self-employed contractors in other sectors of the contemporary labour market (see Fudge et al. 2003), at the same time

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41 Three third parties chose first and last names for their pseudonyms, however because the majority of participants did not, only their first name will be used subsequent to the first time they are mentioned.
times as they found some elements of this relationship liberated them from the constraints of more conventional employment, dancers recognized its exploitive aspects (Bruckert et al. 2003; Brooks 2010). In this respect several dancers expressed that their status as independent contractors left them feeling like precarious workers (see Vosko & Clark 2009). Carrie (focus group B) felt that “They [third parties] have a lot of power. [...] There’s a hierarchy [...] we’re at the bottom.” Charlene, Bobby, Leigh, Jen and Brigitte (focus group B) all agreed that dancers are “disposable” (Bobby) because “They’ll fire you and just hire somebody else” (Jen). As we will see however, it appears that termination is only used for egregious disregard of the club rules and expectations. Nonetheless, as in the findings of several other scholars (see Althorp 2013; Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a, Egan 2006), for the most part dancers appear unwilling to confront third parties regarding unfair labour practices: “There’s nothing you can do, really” (Jenna, dancer). As Bruckert (2002) suggests however, quitting is an avenue of resistance to unreasonable demands by management, albeit not necessarily an effective one, as Donna (focus group A) explains: “when I eventually got fed up with all the BS at my club, I just quit [...] so if you aren’t happy at one, you can always try another, although I find that most clubs have the same rules.” Donna’s comment is a reminder that, although personally satisfying, quitting a club does nothing to change the organizational or economic structures of the erotic dance industry, the labour market, or dancers’ need to participate in these structures (see Westcott et al 2006).

When quitting is not an option, dancers may merely “complain to each other and then we bite the bullet” (Kristen, dancer). Alternatively dancers take control of their working conditions, effectively resisting third party control (or necessarily supplementing
a lack thereof) by devising their own strategies to protect their finances and security, negotiating mutually advantageous arrangements with third parties (issues we will examine in Chapter 7), and by manipulating normative scripts (Longmore 1998; see also Simon & Gagnon 1986) in their work performances (as we will see in Chapter 8).

Even as they described occasional, casual collective resistance strategies (from complaining to withholding payment of tips or cuts), most dancers perceived collective action as unfeasible or futile, anticipating or having experienced hostile reactions from management (see also Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2004; Colosi 2010a). For example Shane (dancer) recalled that, “sometimes girls would share information about different things that were going on where dancers were trying to organize themselves and like, the managers would take the information away and get really mad.” Donna (focus group A) once “attempted to get collective action, and [...] they [her colleagues] weren’t interested. They were just too scared of getting fired and losing their job. And I do know that managers [...] will call other managers and report someone as a troublemaker.”

Tony (manager/DJ) spoke about getting just such a call. In Bouclin’s (2004b & 2009) research, Ottawa dancers similarly described managers cooperating to ‘blacklist’ labour agitators. Echoing Althorp’s (2013) and Price-Glynn’s (2010) observations of managerial unwillingness to improve working conditions, Leigh’s (focus group B) demands were met with hostility when she spoke up for her colleagues during staff meetings:

*I’d be like, [...] ‘We were wondering if perhaps, you know, we could have different chairs in the change room,’ or whatever – some kind of right, and then basically [...] I’d be dismissed, ‘I didn’t come here for that. This is the end of this meeting.’ And then he’d [the manager would] leave.*

Nonetheless, as we will see in the remainder of this section, the parallel structures engender certain advantages and disadvantages for the club as well as dancers: while
third parties control dancers’ access to the club through hiring, dancers sometimes resist schedules imposed by management or choose their own hours by freelancing, and contest club expectations and rules.

**Hiring, scheduling and freelancing**

One important respect in which dancers are subject to the authority of third parties (in this case, mostly managers) is hiring, through which dancers are granted permission (or not) to conduct their entrepreneurial activities in a club. Participants described a cursory hiring process. In Ottawa, “they take 2 pieces of ID and photocopy them [...] and then you’d go [work] on the floor” (dancer).\(^42\) Hiring in Toronto is nearly as brief, except that dancers must show a valid municipal license, which the manager photocopies to keep on file.\(^43\) Some clubs also have a “dancer contract” that details “some guidelines and rules and stuff, of the club” (Sal, manager) which like the contracts mentioned by Althorp (2013) and Colosi (2010a) focuses on dancers’ obligations to the club, and not the reverse. For the legal protection of the club, these contracts sometimes include clauses forbidding dancers from doing ‘extras’ or even lap dances.

Participants consistently noted that third parties provide very little training or support to new dancers (see also Murphy 2003). To accommodate for this dearth of training, Monica and Marie (dancers) looked to online dancer communities for advice, whereas Jill (dancer) and Jen (focus group B) accompanied a friend with more experience dancing on their first night. There were two exceptions: one Toronto third party worked

\(^42\) As mentioned in *Chapter 4*, in order to protect participants’ anonymity their names and cities cannot be mentioned together. As such, participants’ names are withheld from comments for which it is important to specify the city.

\(^43\) These files are often used to remind dancers to renew their licenses, a matter about which third parties (especially managers) appear considerably concerned. Although some dancers suspected this was primarily for the club’s protection, one Toronto dancer recalled how her club had provided a lawyer who got her fine reduced after she was caught with an expired license.
at a club where “they’ll get you your license, you can work it off on schedule”; whereas Dalton (manager) had a special process, which was part audition and part training (or screening) for inexperienced dancers:

You have the girl come in and she says, ‘Well, I want to be a dancer.’ And here she is, a hot girl, great, she’s got everything you need. Right? And I go, [...] ‘Well, what makes you think that you’re going to be able to take your clothes off in front of, you know, 200 guys?’ ‘Well, I can.’ [...] I’d say to them, you know, ‘Bra, panties, now, go walk around the room 10 times.’ You know, half of them couldn’t do it.

In contrast to Price-Glynn’s (2010) suggestion that club managers pressure waitresses to become dancers, like Dalton participants in this study acknowledged that being an erotic dancer is not a job that just anyone would feel comfortable doing.

Once hired, dancers may be subject to limits on when and for how long they can conduct their business – for example some clubs impose a five-hour minimum work period, while others do not let dancers leave the premises once they have signed in.

Although the demands made on dancers by clubs in Ottawa and Toronto are similar in many respects, the scheduling requirements differ considerably. In Toronto, dancers can elect to be on schedule, for which they receive a salary, or choose to freelance,\(^{44}\) whereas in Ottawa, dancers are required to be on schedule without being paid. According to participants currently working in Ottawa, dancers are obliged to work three shifts per week, including a slower shift, such as a daytime shift or a Sunday evening. Comparing this policy to those noted by Bouclin (2006), Bruckert (2002) and Bruckert et al. (2003), it appears that mandatory unpaid scheduling has become prevalent in Ottawa in recent years: while one dancer recalled “I had so much freedom [...] there was no schedule”

\(^{44}\) Dancers paying the club a house fee to work on a schedule of their own making is referred to as ‘freelancing’ in Toronto clubs.
when she had been a dancer in Ottawa from 2007 to 2009, another, having worked in
Ottawa since 2011, had only experienced the mandatory scheduling policy.

In Toronto, by contrast, scheduled dancers are compensated (more or less at
minimum wage) but significantly outnumbered by freelancers. As a result, it appears
Toronto clubs have little means of ensuring a consistently adequate number of dancers –
a problem which Ottawa clubs seem to have resolved by instituting mandatory scheduling.

A Toronto manager and DJ described this challenge as:

[A] very vicious difficult circle [...] there are some days where you have a lot of
girls and you don't have enough customers to service the girls. In which case then
you've got a lot of bitter women who think, ‘Oh, well, this is going to be a shitty
week.’ And then, they take the next day off. And then, the next day rolls around
and there are a lot of customers and there aren't enough girls. And then, the
customers leave because there's not enough girls to service the customers. There's
no way to fix it. There's nothing you can do. You can promote the bar all you like,
you can hire as many dancers as you want, but who shows up on a day-to-day
basis is completely random.

The unpredictability of a majority freelancer workforce has created leeway for scheduled
dancers to subtly resist managerial expectations (see also Murphy 2003), for example
during unpopular (e.g., afternoon) shifts, as one Toronto dancer frequently did, reasoning
“you could be, like, 20 minutes or half an hour late, and—it didn’t really matter.” Of
course, this leeway is not unlimited; another Toronto dancer noted that management
would stop scheduling dancers if they had missed too many shifts but would still allow
them to work as freelancers, while another woman who had danced in Toronto recalled
feeling she had to gradually reduce her scheduled shifts rather than suddenly switch to
freelancing, fearing she would otherwise be dismissed. To mitigate the unreliability of
freelancers, Toronto clubs offer fee reductions or reimbursements for stage shows
(usually ten to 20 dollars). Although some Toronto dancers said they would rather forego
the extra 30 to 80 dollars (salaries vary by club and shift) to decide their own schedule and not be required to do three stage shows, one woman was of the opinion that being on the schedule “motivates you to go to work” while for another “it’s a principle thing; I don’t want to pay the club to work there […] even though it’s really bad pay.” Thus while dancers recognize oppressive workplace policies that undervalue their labour or compel them to perform free labour for the club, they make sense of and respond to these conditions using different strategies, including resistance, manoeuvring, and reframing.

**Club rules and requirements**

The conditions of dancers’ employment relationship with the club include abiding by certain rules and requirements. It is in the design and enforcement of club rules that municipal regulations (see Chapter 5) come to life or, as is more often the case, are manoeuvred around (a matter we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7). In keeping with Handy’s (1993) argument that organizations are as fallible as the people that comprise them, these rules are neither consistent nor consistently enforced. Some rules are known to dancers and relatively commonly enforced (e.g., paying the house fee and being on time for stage shows); others are widely known but virtually never enforced (e.g., the municipal prohibition on touching); and still others are inconsistent in formulation, communication, and/or application. Rules pertain to scheduling (as we have just seen), the stage (as we will see in the upcoming section on DJs), dancers’ behaviour (e.g., appropriate interactions with customers and other dancers, no overt intoxication), finances (e.g., house fees and tips, prices for dances and time in VIP), and legal and/or

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45 Unlike dancers in the US (Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009) and Western Canada (Althorp 2013), where dancers earn money from customers’ tips or the club (respectively) for their stage shows, in Ontario dancers are compensated/tipped very little for this aspect of their labour. As a result, many dancers who participated in this study framed stage shows as taking away from valuable time in which they could be earning more money doing lap dances.
security concerns (e.g., no illicit drugs or sexual services, no [potentially jealous and disruptive] boyfriends). Additional expectations or guidelines vary by club (e.g., maintain a certain level of weight/fitness, be continually present on the floor, wear appropriately ‘sexy’ clothing and shoes).

Some rules are specific to each city. For example, three participants mentioned Toronto clubs that take a percent of credit card transactions for lap dances. In Ottawa, managerial interpretations of the municipal bylaw against touching has manifested in a rule requiring dancers to keep one foot on the ground at all times while performing lap dances. Describing this rule as “rather ridiculous,” one Ottawa dancer found that the one-foot-on-the-floor rule was enforced “even if I was sitting next to my customer [in the champagne room] and just wanted to have a drink and put my feet up because they hurt.” Also unique to Ottawa, though not occurring in all clubs, is the ‘showcase’ (similar to an event noted by Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009 at US clubs) – an unpaid, mandatory, nightly event in which dancers “go and line up, and then you have to do a little turn on the stage while the DJ announces you [...] then you have to go to some random customer that you pick just on the fly and give him a free table dance” (dancer). Ottawa dancers do not appear to like the showcase; one dancer found it did not result in customers purchasing a lap dance after their free table dance (as management suggested would be the case), while the interruption of the showcase had caused another participant to lose a lucrative customer.

The above list of rules and expectations appears surprisingly exhaustive when considered alongside the inconsistent or casual approaches reported by participants to enforcing them (see also Bruckert 2002; Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; DeMichele &
Tewksbury 2004; Jones et al. 2003; Lavin 2013; Price-Glynn 2010). Jill (dancer) explained how this can create a sense of ‘normlessness’ for dancers and customers:

Whenever there’s ambiguity or it seems like, contrary, it creates like, this feeling of conflict [...] They [customers] ’ll be like, ‘What are the rules?’ and I’m like, ‘Well technically speaking, the rules are you’re not actually supposed to touch me. You’re not supposed to be sexually touching me – don’t touch my tits, don’t touch my ass, don’t touch nothing.’ But like, the reality is that when you’re looking around, that shit is going on all over the place, you know? So it just seems like bullshit to say one thing and then to completely disregard that, which then in turn can make you feel like there’s no fuckin’ rules.

Kristen (dancer) reasoned that third parties are more interested in enforcing rules that benefit the club: “Usually the only rules that are super enforced are rules that involve paying the club and rules that govern when you work and when you show up.”

Whether or not managers or other third parties inform new dancers of the rules also appears to be inconsistent. Like Carrie (focus group B), when Marie (dancer) was first hired, the manager “explained to me the rules, like what was allowed, what was not allowed, like no sex, no kissing, the stage, the fees.” Although it seems DJs do not usually explain the rules to dancers (as in Frank 2002a), Studley Hungwell ([hereinafter Studley] DJ/supervisor) made an effort to “make sure if the girl is new to the bar – whether she’s new to the business or not – that she understands our house rules – because they differ from club to club.” By contrast in Ashley’s (dancer) experience, “[i]t was more like, as you go along, you figure out what’s ok and what’s not ok.” For Shane (dancer), “just none of it made sense [...] we didn’t get told anything.” Instead, as several dancers reported, “[t]hey just put up signs” (Jill), for example “a notice from the ministry saying

46 This term was famously tied to social control by Merton (1938), who described “normlessness” or “anomie” as the result of people, lacking access to legitimate means, turning to illegitimate means to achieve normative success goals. In this scenario, the strain put on the cultural structure by the social structure results in an anomic society. By contrast, my use of this term is akin to Bradley-Engen and Ulmer (2009) who simply use it to refer to social disorder or lawlessness.
what kind of contact would constitute a public health risk” (Kristen). In contrast to what Lavin (2013: 370) describes as “proactive social control through signs,” dancers were in agreement that signs are not an effective mode of social control or communication.

Club rules also appear to change over time. While Marie (dancer) found that the rules had become more stringent in regard to contact when she returned to dancing after an 8-month hiatus, and Monica (dancer) noticed the rules were enforced more strictly at night than during the day shift, Shane (dancer) found the rules changed from day to day: “Sometimes it was ok for clients to touch us and other times it wasn’t [...] that was just confusing cause I didn’t know what I was supposed to do.” Because she could never predict what the rules would be or how they would be enforced, Shane “was actually just really, really scared of the bouncers. They were terrifying.”

As we will further examine in Chapter 8, third parties’ enforcement of the rules is also informed by the discourses they draw upon to interpret dancers’ performances.

Some third parties are more systematic about rule enforcement than others. Sal (manager) “[let [dancers] bend some of the rules a little bit and stuff].” By contrast, Reverend (head manager and doorman) kept a record of dancer rule infractions: “if it’s a quiet shift and you don’t show up, I will write that down because I will be looking to see if it becomes a behaviour pattern.” Penalties for rule infraction can range from verbal admonishment to suspension, termination, or banning (i.e., firing with no chance of re-hiring). Echoing the literature (see Althorp 2013; Bouclin 2006; Bruckert 2002; Egan 2004), participants also mentioned fines for arriving late or leaving early on schedule or

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47 Shane’s anxiety, emanating from the unpredictability of the rules and of third parties’ enforcement of them, drove her to quit that particular club, and eventually to switch to working as an independent escort, which she preferred to stripping because she did not have to deal with third parties and could negotiate (and therefore decide and know) her own rules.
the stage, or damaging club property. However third parties seemed to favour the
aforementioned disciplinary techniques over fines, as Adam (DJ and manager) explained,

[A] night off, or a week off, or a couple of days off [is] way better than fining
anybody. It's got more impact. [...] If you take $20 away from somebody who
made $1000 [...] they're going to laugh at you [...] if you take their way of
making a living away from them for a day, it hits home.

That managers have the ability to cut off their source of income speaks to the necessity of
the club setting for dancers to conduct their business, and the importance of maintaining a
peaceful relationship with third parties for continued access to it. At the same time it is
important to note that, although dancers may feel that their employment is precarious, it
appears as though third parties seldom resort to termination, instead favouring short-term
suspensions or merely reprimanding dancers for fighting amongst themselves or getting
too physical during a lap dance. Out of the 15 dancers who participated in this study, the
majority of whom had experience working at numerous clubs, only four had been fired –
and only from one club – during their careers. In this respect it appears that for the most
part third parties selectively (to dancers, arbitrarily) employ discipline to deter dancers
from egregiously breaking the rules or trying to formally organize.

**The rules for third parties**

As employees of the club, third parties also have to abide by workplace rules.
Although these rules are comparable in Toronto and Ottawa, it seems they too are
flexible and not consistently followed. Some of these rules are specific to individual third
party roles – for example bouncers are discouraged from using excessive or unnecessary
force. Like the bouncers in DeMichele and Tewsbury’s (2004) and Lavin’s (2013) studies,
various third parties mentioned that they are not allowed to drink at work. However a few
participants suggested that this rule is overlooked in practice. For example Jimmy
Popsicle (hereinafter Jimmy) recalled being allowed to drink as a DJ; he had also “seen doormen drink on the job; I’ve seen management drink on the job; I’ve definitely seen dancers drink on the job; servers, yes. And I mean, that’s like that party atmosphere, you can’t control everything. And the owner’s barely there.” The next two chapters will reflect further on this party atmosphere and its influence on strip club organizational culture and practices.

As in DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004) study, bouncers and other third parties are not allowed to become romantically involved with dancers. As Gilles (manager) likes to tell new managers, “the best thing that’s not get involved with the dancer[s]. That’s a key number one.” However a number of participants had broken this rule: two dancers had had romantic or sexual relationships with third parties, and six third parties had dated dancers.

Kelly (bartender) offered a poignant reflection on the rules and their application:

*I got a manual48 one year ago that he [the owner] cooked up, and it was that [indicates one inch] big. [...] It makes no sense. [...] We’re supposed to always encourage bottle service, but like, if they’re [customers are] drunk, you can’t, but we’re supposed to. [...] Sales are like the most important. So we’re also not supposed to serve anybody when they’re intoxicated by the rulebook, but it happens [...] If a dancer says no to an alcoholic drink, we’re supposed to report it immediately, which we don’t. [...] I don’t know the rules we follow. [...] Nobody said, ‘These are the rules,’ they just sort of were like, ‘Do your best.’*

Thus, like dancers, third parties may find that in addition to being contradictory, club rules and municipal and provincial frameworks (in this case relating to alcohol sales) are sometimes at odds with their interests in accomplishing the tasks prescribed by their

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48 Kelly’s manual did not apply to dancers, only employees. Although formal guidelines of this sort are not common in the literature, Price-Glynn (2010) noted an expansive employee manual (for dancers as well) in a club she studied in the US.
workplace roles. Chapter 7 will elaborate on the consequences of these inconsistencies on the risk management strategies and personal interests of third parties and dancers.

The setting

As Jimmy’s (DJ) comment above suggests (and as Chapter 7 examines in greater detail), some rules and sanctions at strip clubs only apply if the offending behaviour is noticeable. This highlights the importance of visibility, and how the physical space of the club can obscure or facilitate it, in turn allowing for and preventing resistance strategies (see also Law & Bruckert 2016). In keeping with the ethnographic tradition of situating individuals in their physical context we now turn to examine the strip club as a workspace or, in Goffman’s (1959) terms, a setting. As the scenery and props for the interactions it stages (Goffman 1959), the setting is comprised of both the physical facilities and the layout in which third parties and dancers make use of particular spaces as part of their professional role performances, including shared and role-specific front regions, where performances ‘play out’ for customers, and back regions, where performers ready their illusions. Recalling the disparate goals of the parallel structures, the setting can be seen as serving a dual purpose: to stage the performances of third parties and staff, which are geared towards making money for the club through alcohol sales, and to facilitate dancers’ entrepreneurial endeavours. The setting provides numerous concrete (albeit perhaps insufficiently maintained) protections and supports to dancers. As DJ/supervisor Studley put it, “we provide all the physical equipment you need to do the job with the exception of what you are wearing.”

The different regions of the club are designed to accommodate various, changing performances and interactions by dancers and third parties. Both perform in the front
region of the strip club, which is visible to customers, and comprises: the stage, the club’s central visual focus; and the ‘floor,’ the public area where customers and dancers interact. The VIP, a separate area divided into un-enclosed private lap dance booths (participants used the terms VIP and champagne room interchangeably to describe both the area and individual booths), is a front region used more heavily by dancers than third parties, who (as we will see in the coming section) periodically circulate through it to monitor dancers’ interactions with customers. There are also multiple back regions in the strip club.

Dancers’ back region is, of course, their change room. To guard the secrets of the illusion dancers are crafting – as well as their safety – change rooms are often located on a different floor than the customers, or secured behind a locked door. In some clubs, dancers also have a private room or patio where they can smoke.\footnote{It should be noted that third parties sometimes made facilities available to dancers offsite, via hotels or rooming houses that were affiliated with some clubs. The first club where Sasha (focus group A) had worked “gave us [dancers] a place to live if we were from out of town.” The owner of Scott’s (doorman and manager) club also had rooms available for touring dancers to rent.} Third parties prepare their performances elsewhere: managers complete paperwork in their office, while bouncers, bartenders, and waitresses have their own change room(s) at some clubs.

In examining how each actor’s performance(s) and preparation are confined to particular regions of the setting, we see that the physical and organizational structures of the club are inter-related. Because third parties, along with other staff, maintain the setting for dancers, they generally have more access to dancers’ back regions than vice versa. For example although dancers may go to make requests (e.g., regarding the schedule) in the manager’s office, or be summoned there to get disciplined or receive their salary, this back region may otherwise be inaccessible to them. So, too, with staff change rooms, which dancers have neither a reason, nor a vested interest (as independent
entrepreneurs who derive their earnings from interacting with customers), in visiting. By contrast, disc jockeys (DJ) spend most of their time in a back region – the DJ booth – and only very occasionally interact directly with customers (e.g., greeting them on his way to and from the washroom), making the DJ booth the third party back region most accessible to dancers.

Just as third parties’ and dancers’ roles circumscribe them to particular regions of the club, their access to one another’s back region also imbues them with certain responsibilities. For example at Donna’s (focus group A) club,

 [...] they had the DJ booth right next to the dressing room, and so the DJ monitored the dressing room at all times. [...] it impacted my privacy because we didn’t have a place where us girls could just go and do our makeup and fix our hair and bitch about customers.

From an adjacent booth, DJs may also “nag us about stuff like, you know, ‘Get out onto the floor. Stop taking so long to do your hair’” (Sasha, focus group A). Other club employees, including managers, bouncers, and wait staff, may also access dancers’ change room to deliver services (e.g., drinks or food) to dancers, or monitor their safety (e.g., breaking up a fight). Here we see that third parties’ role performance is directed towards different audiences at different times and places in the club. Just as Bolton and Houlihan (2010) argue that managers’ roles involve interacting with workers and customers, separately or together, managers and DJs may be performing as authoritative third parties in front of dancers in the change room, making this space a back region for the latter and a front region for the former. In this respect, third parties and dancers are subject to different codes of behaviour in different places in the strip club (see Goffman 1961; Hacking 2004).
The setting is also important to the success of the impression performers are attempting to convey (Goffman 1959). In this regard the quality of the club’s facilities plays a role in attracting dancers to work there. As Tony (manager/DJ) remarked,

*If you get the dancers a comfortable, clean, safe place to work that’s a ‘Ya I’m going to go to [club name] and work there because they got security at night, they provide, wetnaps and Kleenex in the change room,’ you know we got lots of electrical outlets. I’ve worked in clubs where there’s one electrical plug in the whole change room, and you’re trying to get 14 curling irons in there, you know?*

Although dancers may choose not to work at a poorly equipped club, many indicated the amenities (e.g., change rooms, lockers, bathrooms) in strip clubs are often insufficiently maintained.

A commonly noted problem was the size of change rooms. Dancers reported that some clubs have a single change room “for about 50 ladies and waitresses” (Jenna) that can get “pretty cramped. At the end of the night, it’s a nightmare when everybody’s in there trying to get changed” (Jill). As a result of overcrowding there is a shortage of secure places for dancers to store their valuables: “when you get there, if you’re lucky, there’s a locker available. If you’re not, then tough luck for you” (Marie, dancer). For Monica (dancer), not having a locker had resulted in theft.

Although Monica and Marie (dancers) reported that their clubs were cleaned every day, Shane (dancer) found the daily cleaning to be insufficient, while Ashley (dancer) thought that strip clubs were as “grimy” as other nightclubs where she had worked. Like many of the other dancers, Jenna took issue with the poor condition of the bathrooms – at one club “we’re not trusted with hand towels,” and in another the change room had “two toilets, [in] one bathroom, and the partition between the two toilets is a goddamn shower curtain” – which made her “feel small and very powerless.” Jenna’s
comment illustrates the asymmetries of organizational power relations (Hodson 1999) – dancers indicated feeling that there was very little they could do as independent contractors to motivate management to improve workplace facilities or their upkeep.

In addition to affecting dancers’ morale, poor facility maintenance can be detrimental to their safety. While Kristen and Jill (dancers) reported that hand sanitizer dispensers were only occasionally filled, the stage can pose a more significant risk. In Kristen’s experience, third parties at some clubs did not clear the stage of safety hazards such as excess body oil between shows, “even if you make the request,” making it “very dangerous to be walking in big heels.” More worryingly, both Monica and Ashley (dancers) reported instances in which the pole had become detached from its moorings. Fortunately this was not universally the case. The stage “was cleaned regularly enough” for Monica (dancer), and according to DJ Fuzzy, “Basically, if [the stage] gets greasy or slippery, DJ’s got to take care of it, make sure it’s clean.”

Although participants reported occasional to routine inspections of club premises by police or other municipal agents, it appears these do not attend to the physical conditions of the establishment, in spite of bylaws stipulating that “premises and all fixtures and equipment therein shall be regularly washed and kept in a sanitary condition” (Toronto 2010: 279; see also Ottawa, bylaw 2004-343: 6). According to Sal (manager),

[Municipal regulators] make themselves out to sound so great, like it’s in the interest of the dancers – ‘Oh we’re there to inspect the clubs to make sure everything’s ok, and you know, everything’s safe and whatever,’ and they do nothing. They come in and they fill their quota of checking licenses, and then they leave.

Other participants confirmed that municipal agents are “very unpleasant” (Sasha, focus group A) and “just give us attitude” (George, doorman/bouncer). While these criticisms
of municipal inspections demonstrate an awareness of stigma amongst third parties (a matter we will explore further in *Chapter 8*), dancers’ descriptions of the physical conditions of strip clubs suggest that third parties do little to prevent breaches of municipal occupational health and safety standards. Instead, third parties appear to be focused on bringing the setting to life for customers, and ensuring that dancers are able to do the same. We now turn to examine the physical areas and responsibilities that third parties occupy in their professional roles – first, those affiliated to the club, and next, those operating in its peripheries.

**Club-affiliated third parties**

In their various roles, club-affiliated third parties both comprise and reproduce the organizational structure and work toward achieving its goals, in addition to providing services and support to dancers. In other words third parties organize and sustain the setting that enables dancers’ performances (see Goffman 1959). Club-affiliated third parties take on principal (managers, bouncers, DJs), occasional (owners), or auxiliary (bartenders) responsibilities organizing, supervising, managing or coordinating dancers’ labour. Some Toronto dancers had worked with an additional auxiliary third party, a ‘housemom,’ who works in the dancers’ change room offering them help and supplies (e.g., costume repair, getting takeout, beauty products) in exchange for tips. Unlike the housemom, who inhabits an exclusively supporting role in regard to dancers and who appears to be marginal in Ontario’s erotic dance industry (and as such, will not be discussed below), the third parties described in the coming pages balance their

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50 One Toronto focus group participant described this particular third party as “*more of a cleaning lady,*” contrasting her to housemoms she had worked alongside in the US, who were also “*sort of like unspoken referees a little – or supervisors – but they’re kind of like just somebody you can go to instead of the manager, like, instead of the men*” (see Murphy 2003; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010).
obligations relating to operating the club with their responsibilities to dancers. In this respect they are comparable to agency third parties in the incall/outcall sector (see Bruckert & Law 2013).

**Owners**

The only participant able to speak about strip club ownership from personal experience was Dalton, who had at one point in his career managed and co-owned a club. Otherwise however, most participants described owners as largely absent from, and uninvolved with, the daily operation of the business (see also Kraus 2007; Lavin 2013). For dancers, this means: “you don’t really see them. You can work there for years and not know who they are” (Jenna, dancer). As the ultimate authority at the club, owners are feared by some workers (including third parties), as Kristen (dancer) recounts: “when they’re there [...] you would see a lot less of some of the bullshit, because everybody was afraid for their jobs a little bit.” Here we see that, subject to the owner’s surveillance, third parties endeavour to deliver their best performance, in order to justify their employment and mitigate the precarity of their contradictory position (Willmott 1997).

As evinced by their participation in legal and bureaucratic processes to change municipal bylaws (see Chapter 5), it appears owners (like other capitalists) are more concerned with the success and profitability of the club than the activities of dancers. Decisions about, for example, hiring or rules impact both third parties and dancers’ labour. The guidelines they sometimes provide to other third parties in regard to the latter appear throughout this chapter; the direction they give to managers about the aesthetic they prefer for the former will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
However, some participants reported owners providing helpful services to dancers. For example Bobby (focus group B) mentioned an owner who helped her save money by “letting me put money in the safe every night [...] he’d bend over backwards for the girls.” Marie (dancer) had “heard of the owner doing nice things for other dancers. Like let’s say they’re in trouble, they don’t want to strip anymore, well he would hire them as waitresses instead or bartenders.” Thus it appears some owners are involved with their club and the people who work there, while others leave its operation to the other third parties they have hired.

Managers

Managers oversee the operation of the club on a day-to-day basis (see also Bruckert 2002; Kraus 2007; Murphy 2003). An important part of this is hiring and supervising the other third parties and support staff. Sal explained his relationship to his staff using a sports analogy: “so like I’m the coach, and then that’s my team, right, and so I’m there to try to like—to try to motivate them, and to try to get them to do their job to the best of their ability.” As part of this Gilles (manager) emphasized the importance of keeping “Harmony [...] between staff.” Like in other bars, strip club managers are also responsible for distributing salaries, counting money and/or taking care of banking, doing inventories and ordering supplies (e.g., liquor). Additionally they organize the schedules of the staff, and often, dancers. For Adam and Dalton (managers), a key aspect of scheduling was communication with, understanding for, and flexibility towards, workers. In these respects, managers are the directors of the team comprising the club’s organizational structure (Goffman 1959).
In order to attend to all of their responsibilities (and to ensure that other workers are doing the same), managers are perpetually moving around the bar. As a manager Dalton “would never allow myself to be in the office, except at the beginning of the night and at the end of the night. And the rest of the time, I was just travelling around, making sure that—not just making sure that my staff is doing their job, but also watching for hot spots.” Some managers also include customer relations in their rounds; for Adam, “[t]he best part of the job is being Johnny handshake.” Managers’ frequent circulation can be seen as another reason why dancers interact only minimally with them. Of course, because dancers are self-motivated contractors, there is little need for interaction between dancers and managers, unless there is a problem. In this respect Monica (dancer) recalled that most of her interaction with managers occurred when she was first hired.

In addition to their official responsibilities, managers (and other third parties, as we will soon see) sometimes recommend customers to dancers or vice versa. Other responsibilities or tasks are shared between managers, bouncers and DJs. Of course, the extent of managers’ (and other third parties’) responsibilities depends on the size of the club; larger organizations have more managers with fewer responsibilities, while smaller ones have fewer third parties with more diverse responsibilities. In tandem with bouncers, managers also monitor customers’ conduct.51

**Bouncers**

The principal role of the bouncer is, of course, security, which Marcus (doorman/bouncer) took very seriously: “my number one goal was to protect the people

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51 Some DJs mentioned that they monitor customers and inform bouncers and managers, through the radio system, about any misbehaviour. As the only male staff member present during daytime shifts besides the elderly owner, Studley (DJ/supervisor) also helps with security: “if there’s a couple of drunks that are fighting or something, there’s nothing he can do about it [...] I can certainly call the police and let them handle it, but it needs to be handled expeditiously, so it’s usually me that does that.”
working there, make sure that no harm came to any of the dancers, and also monitor the clients to make sure they weren’t too drunk or weren’t acting up. Just making sure that everybody was playing nice.” This responsibility sometimes extends outside the confines of the club: as in DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004) research, some participants noted that bouncers walk dancers to their car or a taxi. However for the most part it appears dancers’ interactions with bouncers centre around conflicts with customers. Otherwise, bouncers are responsible for tasks that are general to bar security, such as “making sure [customers] were legally of age to enter” (Marcus, doorman/bouncer), and occasionally, tasks like helping to stock the bar (see also DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004).

Bouncers are also responsible for surveiling dancers’ and customers’ conduct, especially in the VIP room, to ensure it does not violate municipal and/or club standards. At some clubs, this was exclusively “left to the doorman's discretion [...] with instruction [...] as to you know what should be allowed and shouldn't be allowed” (Adam, DJ and manager), whereas at others, managers took on this surveillance as well. In addition to ensuring that the dancers were behaving appropriately, Scott (doorman and manager) also had to:

make sure that sort of behaviour didn't happen with, say, the shooter girls or the waitresses. [...] I understand in the sense, you know, if you start flirting with the customers or what not, you know, you get them interested and you make more money. [...] But, then, once you start letting the customers, people who are not buying dances or anything touch people who are not supposed to be touched, waitresses, uh, the shooter girls [...] that's not what they're there for. That's what the champagne rooms and dancers are for.52

52 Finding it unfair to dancers, Kelly (bartender) confirmed that “some waitresses will sneak into the VIP to give dances.” Moreover, contradicting Price’s (2008) finding, an ample supply of dancers meant that managers did not ask female bar staff to become dancers. However, Reverend (head doorman and manager) explained that sometimes it was unclear whether women wanted to work as waitresses or dancers: “The worst is when girls come in [...] to be a server or something like that but didn’t specify. So when you [...] start to talk to her about everything [...] she gets very upset. And I’m like, ‘No, I wasn’t trying to be a pig, but the majority of the girls who come to see me want to dance. You did not state your intentions.’”
Scott’s comment also evinces a discursive divide between dancers and other club staff, which we will revisit in Chapter 8.

Although bouncers echoed DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004: 539) finding that violence is a potential but not necessarily routine aspect of strip club security, as in Hobbs et al.’s (2005) study they espoused varying attitudes towards the use of force. An imposing presence of a man, Marcus (doorman/bouncer) employed what he referred to as a non-violent strategy, preferring to “restrain people if they’re getting a little bit too rowdy. I have a black belt in Jujitsu, so it’s like a non-violent sort of martial art. Basically you get people in a lock so they’re incapacitated.” By contrast, Reverend (head doorman and manager), who “grew up on the streets and had to basically fight to survive at times,” said that:

I can be very patient [...] but on the other hand, with an altercation with a customer where they’ve touched any of the doormen in an aggressive manner, I am very quick to lose my cool, and I get very upset quickly, and I will tend to deal with it fast and aggressively because suddenly, someone is basically messing with a family member at that point.

To mitigate for discrepant viewpoints on, and tendencies toward, violence, senior bouncers endeavour to “make sure the other doormen didn’t take things too far, whether by physical force or just [...] be[ing] an asshole” (Scott, doorman and manager). This reflects Hobbs et al.’s (2005) finding that bouncers communicate strategies to each other informally. It also echoes DeMichele and Tewsbury’s insistence that bouncers must regulate customers’ behaviour in the least intrusive manner in order to “quickly return a setting back to one facilitating alcohol consumption and normal business practices” (2004: 540; see also Hobbs et al. 2005). In short, they must balance their security role with the club goal of selling alcohol.
Whether or not bouncers have managerial responsibilities depends on the size of the club. This appears more common in Ottawa, where strip clubs are generally smaller than in Toronto. For example, one participant works at a club where doormen are involved with hiring and scheduling dancers. However another Ottawa bouncer who sometimes occupied a junior management role commented, “it's not like I'd be involved in any decision making. It's just I'd be the one taking responsibility.” Here we see the managerial frustration with limited control over the organization noted by Willmott (1997).

Bartenders

The only bartender, and also the female third party,\textsuperscript{53} to participate in this study was Kelly. Although most of her duties, unsurprisingly, concern the operation of the bar, Kelly also has a number of responsibilities related to dancers’ labour, making her a third party as well. She is “in charge of giving cash advances to [the] customer to pay the dancer,” and handles the entry fee for the VIP section. Kelly also takes on some third party responsibilities that are not officially part of her job. For example she endeavours to resolve payment disputes between dancers and patrons before the bouncers get involved. She also recommends dancers to customers if requested, however “if they give me a laundry list of extras they’re looking for, I’m not going to get involved in that.” Kelly will also inform dancers if a customer is waiting for them.

Echoing Bruckert’s (2002) and Price’s (2008; see also Price-Glynn 2010) findings, some dancers described bartenders as having limited or occasional managerial responsibilities. For example at Jenna’s workplace, both bartenders and managers explain

\textsuperscript{53} While the other bartenders at Kelly’s workplace are men, it appears some strip clubs prefer to hire male bartenders and women are preferred at others, seemingly arbitrarily. For example when Dalton was a manager, he hired “really sexy” male bartenders to “keep the girls [dancers] happy.”
the hourly rates to customers before they begin their time in the champagne rooms (some other dancers mentioned waitresses taking on this responsibility as well). Alternately, Donna (focus group A) had danced at a club where “[i]he barmaid signed people in, and she had the authority to hire people if a manager was not there,” while Shane (dancer) had been hired by a bartender in one club and a DJ at another.

**Disc Jockeys (DJs)**

As their job title suggests, DJs are in charge of the music and the stage shows:

“You’re the control centre of the entire place, so keep it going. Without you, there is no party. You are the party, you know? And you have to be the part of the party that is invisible; it just keeps everything running” (Fuzzy, DJ). Because the stage is central to ‘running the party,’ the DJ resembles Goffman’s (1959) team director insofar as he organizes the dancers, but without the authority of the manager. Although DJs, in principle, organize the stage show roster on a “first come, first serve” (Chico, DJ) basis, they must be prepared to re-arrange it for numerous reasons. Fuzzy (DJ) named a few:

> If two husky blondes come in, I’m going to try not to put those two girls next to each other. Black girls – I’m not supposed to put black girls next to each other. If I find that, you know, the girls have a similar frame and hair colour, I won’t put them together – or similar names [...] because then, you’re just asking for confusion.

The way DJs organize and communicate the roster may differ quite significantly from club to club. As Brigitte (focus group B) explains:

> I’ve worked at clubs where [...] I sign up for a show, and I know what time it’s at, and I love that, and I’ve worked at clubs where I know I’m going to be on two times, and [...] he’ll know exactly how many girls [until my show], and I don’t mind that either. And I’ve worked at clubs where I have no idea when I’m going to be onstage.
The other participants in focus group B voiced their dislike of the latter arrangement – “I hate that” (Leigh). Charlene added: “it can be extremely stressful dealing with a DJ who is disorganized or otherwise incompetent.” A dancer may also request that a DJ change the time of her show if she wants to spend an extended period of time dancing for a customer, since leaving for a stage show may interfere with her income, as Ashley (dancer) explained: “that was kind of frustrating, cause [...] he either goes and finds another girl or he leaves.” The DJ may expect a tip for this service, an exchange we will examine in Chapter 7.

Acknowledging these challenges, DJs emphasized the importance of multitasking. As Studley (DJ/supervisor) explained,

On a busy night, I might have 30 girls [...] and every 10 minutes, I’ve got a different girl in there changing her music, changing her mind, changing her lights [...] So you have to be a juggler in that sense; you have to be able to please several different people at once and do it on the fly while you’re trying to do something else.

In order to make sure dancers are nearby, available for, and aware of, their stage shows, Jimmy (DJ) felt it was important to “be aware of where girls are going [...] You have to know where they’ll tend to be, who they hang out with.”

Indeed a good relationship between dancers and DJs is essential to the smooth operation of the stage and the club. Dalton insisted that part of his job as a DJ was “to be positive for the girls, and be positive about the work that they're doing.” For Fuzzy (DJ), this meant “just let[ting] them talk. Maybe they just need to vent for five minutes.” Indeed, Jill (dancer) admitted, “I probably talk to them [DJs] more than I talk to—well definitely more than I talk to anyone else who, like, officially works in any capacity for the club. [...] I would say I get [laughingly] more information from them than I do the managers.”
Similarly, Shane (dancer) was most comfortable talking to the DJ. Being charged with the order of the stage shows and being in a back region where the dancers often come for a moment of respite means that DJs are the third parties who interact most often and most intimately with dancers.

Because DJs’ responsibilities in regard to dancers revolve around shows, their involvement in rule enforcement is largely limited to the stage – “don’t be late for stage, stay up there for 3 minutes a song, get naked” (Studley, DJ/manager). Although DJs decide on the songs played between shows, for their time on stage dancers may choose their own music, which DJs must ensure is appropriate in both length (i.e., at least three minutes) and content. In order not to disrupt the continuity of stage shows, dancers must also inform or seek permission from DJs if they are arriving late, missing a shift, or leaving early. Some DJs noted additional managerial duties; Adam had been in charge of collecting the house fee and making the weekly schedule for the dancers at one club, while Studley had made the schedule for other DJs, supervised them, and taken care of the sound equipment as the head DJ.

Although DJs may urge dancers to interact with customers and enforce rules regarding stage shows and music, they are not in a position to fire dancers. However, Sasha (focus group A) insisted that DJs can “strongly recommend for people [dancers] to be fired.” For this reason, it is important for dancers to be civil with DJs. As highlighted by Bruckert (2002), DJs inhabit a contradictory position insofar as they exercise this authority at the same time as relying on dancers for tips to supplement their income.54

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54 Participants indicated there was some variation between clubs: DJs with more managerial responsibilities may receive a larger salary, whereas at some clubs DJs received a portion of each dancer’s house fee in addition to a salary and tips from dancers. Additionally according to former DJ Adam, DJs are more likely
Amongst the club-affiliated third parties, then, the DJ can be seen as having director-like responsibilities because he oversees dancers’ performances (Goffman 1959), while the manager is the director of the club as a whole. Because they moderate the conduct of dancers and customers, bouncers also play a principal third party role. By contrast because only a small part of their occupational roles involve organizing, supervising, managing or coordinating dancers’ labour, owners can be understood as occasional third parties, and bartenders as auxiliary third parties.

**Unaffiliated third parties**

While club-affiliated third parties comprise the organizational infrastructure of the establishment and together produce the setting that supports dancers’ performances (Goffman 1959), there are additional third parties who offer supplemental services to dancers.55 These peripheral third parties are instrumentally, informally or not at all affiliated with clubs. Participants described people who provided services to dancers as well as figures about whom much was suspected but little was actually known. Included in the latter are ‘pimps,’ whom participants discursively constructed and socially profiled in much the same vilified way popular culture does. As such, this section discusses the unaffiliated third parties with whom participants had experience – agents and agencies – as well as those with whom they were discursively engrossed, ‘pimps.’ Examining and comparing these relationships allows us to see how the organizational structure of the club extends to some peripheral third parties at the same time as it excludes others by to receive consistent tips from dancers if they are responsible for collecting the house fee. We will examine the issue of tipping in greater detail in Chapter 7.

55 Other affiliated persons who are not third parties insofar as they do not organize, supervise, manage or coordinate dancers’ labour include specialized costume providers who come to strip clubs to sell costumes to dancers, and drivers, who can be considered contractors because they are hired by dancers in a fee-for-service arrangement to perform a specific task (see Bruckert & Law 2013).
discursively constructing them as risky. As we will see, the competing discourses of
labour and risk identified in Chapter 5 circulate through the club, shaping policies and
practices that validate some peripheral third parties while discrediting others.

**Agencies and associates**

A third party tangentially affiliated to the club is the agent or agency, which
Bruckert and Law (2013) respectively describe as an individual (i.e., associate) or a
business that organizes or facilitates transactions between sex workers and clients. Only
Gilles (manager) and Bobby (focus group B) had had direct experience with these third
parties in Ontario. Gilles had helped a friend put an erotic dance agency together in the
1990s, whereas Bobby, a 48-year-old dancer who had been in the business 17 years, had
“had agents over the years […] They can find you good clubs or get you into a club
you’re trying to get into […] That was way back in the day.” In this respect agents in the
erotic dance sector resemble modeling agents, who facilitate transactions between
independent workers and clients (who in this context are clubs). Given Marie’s (dancer)
more recent experience with an agent in Quebec, and recalling that agents remain part of
the industry in Western Canada (Althorp 2013) and rural US (Price-Glynn 2010), it
appears agents are regional and no longer commonplace in Ontario.

The only participant in the research to resemble an agent in the lap dancing era
was Marcus, who “sometimes arranged stag parties” as an offshoot of his work as a strip
club bouncer. He kept this secret from club management because “[i]t just didn’t seem
like a good idea to tell the club that I was making money with their dancers, somewhere
else, that they weren’t getting a piece of [laughs].” Marcus explained how his stag
business worked:
Sometimes the dancers would come up to me and say, ‘Hey, this guy over here wants to hired me and my friend for a stag.’ So I’d be like, ‘Alright,’ so then I’d go over and talk to them to see how many people are going to be there, where is it, that kind of thing, and then determine how many security people I’m bringing, and then give them a quote, and they say yes or no, and then away we go.

For these private parties, Marcus drove the dancers to the venue (usually a private home). He would pay himself and the other security personnel 50 dollars per hour each, leaving the dancers to establish their own hourly rate – “They’d usually get 300 an hour” – which he would collect in advance. Marcus’ rules for client behaviour were: “You do not get to touch the girls; if they want to touch you, they will touch you, but you do not initiate it. [...] If anyone touches the girls inappropriately, you get one warning, you do it again, the show’s over and you lose your money.” That said he accommodated dancers who wanted to provide additional services, which he insisted take place out of view of other party guests, and for which he employed particular security measures: he inspected the room for cameras and made sure there was only one client, and would stand guard at the door. Since Marcus only offered this service when it was requested (either by customers or by dancers), perhaps the best way to describe it is an ad-hoc erotic dance agency. However, whereas agencies in the incall/outcall sector deduct up to 50 percent from the sex worker’s hourly pay rate to cover driving and booking expenses (Bruckert & Law 2013), security fees for Marcus’ stag party service were charged directly to the client.

Another third party in Bruckert and Law’s (2013) typology is the associate, an individual who organizes or facilitates the labour of sex workers, in an occasional or informal relationship, and who charges a fee for service or takes a portion of worker earnings. While the erotic dance agents above can be categorized as associates, one
research participant, Eric, a self-described driver and security provider, can also be described in this way.

Here it should be noted that, although participants mentioned driving services operating for the express purpose of taking dancers to and from work (see also Bruckert 2002), drivers are not third parties according to the operationalization used in this research because they do not organize, supervise, manage or coordinate dancers’ labour. Instead, drivers can be understood as contractors who operate on a fee-for-service basis (Bruckert & Law 2013), as unlicensed taxis that are advertised through word of mouth amongst dancers and sometimes club-affiliated third parties. Additionally, according to Jenna (dancer) some bouncers provide driving and security services to dancers offering services (e.g., escorting) outside the club. Jenna thought this service was helpful because “you work with them and you know that they’re legit and will keep you safe, and um, you know, they’re not gonna judge you. It’s a win.”

Although Eric drove dancers to, and picked them up from, work, he also provided supplementary services. While Kristen and Marie (dancers) had maintained friendly relationships with their drivers, other dancers had not, and it appears Eric had both a more informal and more personal relationship with one particular dancer, to whom he additionally provided emotional support. He described his job and explained how he became involved:

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I was actually minding my own business and a young lady approached me. The young lady […] seemed to go out of her way to do a lot of things for me, and that was to persuade me to really follow behind her. And I didn’t actually understand what was going on until actually we first came to the first club. So I drove her vehicle to the club, we went inside the club, I sat down, she spoke to the management, whatever the case was. And then it just ensued from there that anytime she wanted to go to work, that I would drive her, and I would look out for her. And I would sit in the club and I would watch certain things; she’d always
ask me to like, not let certain guys go talk to her, or to show certain guys that I am there so that they wouldn’t.

As part of his protection work in the club, Eric would “make sure that I’m very, very good with the bouncers. They understand that, ‘See those girls over there? They are mine. [...] Take care of them, watch out for my girls bro.’” Eric’s use of possessive language in talking about ‘his girl(s),’ as well as his description of their relationship, evoke certain characteristics of the ‘pimp’ (which will be considered in greater depth shortly):

[...] You have to invest in your commodity, so her gear; her clothes, her heels, her nails, her hair, her skin. Basically trying to treat her right is the key of all because basically once you put too much stress on the woman it shows, it shows in her appearance, it shows in her desire to get up and walk to work. I don’t think dudes understand that, more than they need to beat the shit out of her [...] No, your money, treat your money like you love your money, so I’m gonna love my money, I’m going to love my girl.

Eric and the dancer with whom he primarily worked seem to have had an informal financial arrangement: “She’d make like, five, six bills [$500-$600] certain nights, and I wouldn’t ask her for anything but at the end of the night she’d give me two bills.” This is a much higher portion of dancers’ pay than that demanded by the club and its third parties (via the house fee and tips), or the fees other drivers were reported to charge (which dancers insisted were similar to or cheaper than taxi fare), but not incall/outcall agencies (Bruckert & Law 2013). However Eric insisted: “I never took anything, I was given.”

Eric also eventually came to be responsible for managing the dancer’s money: “she kind of noticed that the money she gave me, I didn’t spend; I put it to one side, until it came to the point where she wanted me to control the money, all of the money.”

**Indeterminate affiliations: Locating the ‘pimp’ in organizational discourse and practices**
Dancers in focus group B demanded to know more about the driver/protection provider the researchers mentioned as an example of a third party operating outside of the organizational structure of the club, and when he was described, a number categorically defined Eric as a ‘pimp.’ However when comparing Eric to Marcus, a white man who made use of his official relationship to dancers (as a bouncer) for his ad-hoc agency, questions of legitimacy (leveraged by institutional affiliation or limited by a lack thereof) and race become apparent in the framing of a third party as credible or discredited (Goffman 1963). Eric himself said that, “I would more or less not want to be titled as a pimp; ‘That’s my man’, or ‘that’s my n------’, or whatever have you, works for me.”

The ‘pimp’ remains in quotations because it is difficult to build an accurate picture from accounts of him (rarely her) given by dancers and club-affiliated third parties. None of the third parties interviewed for this study described themselves as ‘pimps,’ and no dancers identified as having (had) ‘pimps,’ however they suspected they had identified ‘pimps’ in their clubs, and offered various theories and opinions about them and their relationships with dancers. Indeed, Adam (DJ and manager) confessed that, “I only heard four stories. Two of them were good and two of them were bad,” while Studley (DJ/supervisor) admitted “it’s just speculation.” Kelly’s (bartender) comment perhaps best sums up the entanglement of observation, suspicion, social profiling and stigma that informs participants’ accounts:

*There’s some [pimps] that I know, like I know they’ve got girls working in there, and some that I just know [of] because dancers tell me, and I’m—I don’t exactly know a lot about the relationship, and I think it varies from different girl-and-pimp [situations], so I don’t think it’s all the same, but I’m just against it.*

As such, rather than treating speculation about the presence or intentions of ‘pimps’ as fact (e.g., Holsopple 1998), the following pages unpack the ‘pimp’ discourse and reflect
on the extent and consequences of its circulation as ‘truth’ (Foucault 1980). Doing so allows us to see how, in the absence of empirical knowledge and institutionally sanctioned relationships, club-affiliated third parties and dancers identify and manage men whom they perceive as these particular third parties using approaches and strategies shaped by gendered, racial, and classed discourses. These strategies reinforce the boundaries of the club by discursively constructing men presumed to be ‘pimps’ as risky and immoral, underscoring the persistence and pervasiveness of stereotypes and stigmatic assumptions enabling stratification (Goffman 1963) amongst sex industry workers.

**The ‘pimp’ discourse**

Benson (2012: 430; see also Quinn 2000) argues that the stereotypical image of the pimp depicted in popular culture is “a heterosexual, hypersexual, patriarchal powerbroker, brilliantly manipulative at the art of controlling women and accumulating wealth.” This stereotype is visible in participants’ descriptions of the ‘pimp,’ who emerged in their narratives as: (1) black or otherwise ‘other’ men56 (2) who in some way manage the finances of dancers, (3) in a relationship involving manipulation and/or exploitation and (4) ‘extras’ or prostitution. Although it includes racial profiling, which is triggered by skin colour (CDPDJ 2009), this collection of characteristics accompanying stigmatized attributes together construct a social profile for “the type of person who fits into this stigmatized category” (Bruckert & Hannem 2013b: 298) – the ‘pimp.’

Echoing raced and gendered media portrayals of ‘pimps’ (Jeffrey & MacDonald 2006b; Tyree et al. 2011), most participants predominantly associated pimpping with black

56 Another (albeit relatively marginal) figure described by dancers, but not third parties, was the female ‘pimp.’ Most dancers (except Carrie) in focus group B had “seen girls pimpping other girls” (Leigh) meaning they “[t]urned them out and took their money” (Brigitte). As a new dancer, Ashley had been approached by a woman whom she framed as “as much of a pimp as anyone else” because “she made it seem like [escorting] was easy and glamourous and I’d be like raking in the cash.”
men (and, with regard to visitors to the club, black men with pimping), and several third parties assumed that any black man driving a dancer was a ‘pimp.’ Some participants connected other racial identities to pimping, albeit to a lesser extent. For example Fuzzy (DJ) suggested that in addition to “black male[s]” he was increasingly seeing “Arabs” who were ‘pimps’ and “Very rarely, I see a white guy doing it.” Although the men she suspected were ‘pimps’ were “all medium attractive, or very attractive, charming, black guys,” Kelly (bartender) acknowledged the role of racial profiling in her identification of these men, noting: “I could know many white pimps, I just don’t know that I know them.” Notably however, only a minority of participants considered that their or their colleagues’ assumptions about such men (regardless of their race) could be mistaken.

Other images circulating in connection with the ‘pimp’ discourse include foreign traffickers – imagined as “Eastern” (Berman 2003) or “dark, omnipotent criminals” (Pajnik 2010: 52) – as well as organized crime and gangs.57 Participants engaged with these stereotypes more or less critically. While Marcus (doorman/bouncer) suggested he had seen “some white males taking care of the Eastern European undocumented people, which would probably be in the same category as the pimp” he did not perceive these men as necessarily dangerous. By contrast Jill (dancer) appeared to be aware of the stereotypical tropes of the foreign trafficker, but still reproduced them (albeit uncertainly) in her interpretations of men in the club: “I could be wrong, [but] I feel like I’ve identified European pimps in the club, and they’re way scarier.” For some participants, criminal affiliation figured more significantly in their understanding of the ‘pimp’ than race. This

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57 Some participants also believed gangs and organized crime to be a part of the landscape of the strip club, framing them as a threatening (see MLS 2012b) or banal presence. With regard to the latter one third party even alluded to having grown up with ‘bikers.’ Unlike the discourses surrounding ‘pimps’ however, participants’ narratives around organized crime were not consistent enough to discuss as a discourse and too unsubstantiated to be used as data.
was especially true for Dalton (manager and DJ) – the only other black participant besides Eric (driver/protection) – for whom bikers and “that abusive kind of pimp thing” were one and the same.

Perhaps because the services that dancers provide are regulated (to an extent) by strip club third parties, prostitution figures less prominently in the ‘pimp’ discourse at the organizational level as compared to how pimping is talked about on a broader social level – visible, for example, in media coverage featuring street-based sex workers who are abused and controlled by ‘pimps’ (Bovenkerk 2011; Hallgrimsdottir et al. 2006; Jeffrey & MacDonald 2006b). However, Jill (dancer) and Donna (focus group A) understood ‘pimping’ as necessarily including the provision of ‘extras.’ This suggests that dancers continue to subscribe to the discourses of harm identified in Chapter 5, notably associations between prostitution, risk and exploitation.

Participants’ opinions diverged on whether the protection – the latter half of Eric’s job title – that ‘pimps’ reportedly claim to provide is helpful or illusory. Kristen (dancer) took the former position, associating ‘pimps’ with dancers who provide sexual services: “if you’re a prostitute, I guess it’s better to have protection,” while Sal (manager) framed appeals to protection as manipulation:

I remember a girl had said something about like being protected or something and I was like, ‘Protected from what?’ I’m like, ‘You’re safe here,’ and she’s like, ‘No, no, no – if you don’t have a man, then other pimps will come after you and try to get you, so like he protects me from like, the other guys,’ or whatever. [...] but anyone knows that there’s like, tons and tons of girls that work there and have no worries at all and they’re like, on their own.

It is interesting to note that, in Sal’s narrative, even ‘pimps’ rely on stigmatic assumptions about men who frequent strip clubs as risky and dangerous.
Participants’ engagement with the manipulation aspect of pimping ranged from echoing popular portrayals of the ‘pimp’ as an evil, manipulative and/or violent, extorter (Van Brunschot et al. 1999), to presuming him to be an unemployed romantic partner. For example Tony (manager/DJ) interpreted a relationship as pimping if: “*the guy that drops a dancer off and lets her work, and then she’s on the cell phone in the change room [...] and all I can hear her saying is ‘Well I’ve only made $400. Do I have to stay another two hours?’*” Dancers in both focus groups had overheard similar conversations, leading them to assume a coercive ‘pimp’ to be on the other end of the line. If indeed some dancers are involved with men who exploit them financially, (re)framing these relationships as domestic financial abuse, to which women who earn more money than their male partners are more vulnerable (Zavala & Spohn 2010), may be more useful, as resources to help women in these situations do not operate with the stigmatic assumptions that pervade prostitution ‘exit’ or ‘rescue’ programs. Of course, unequal financial contribution in a romantic partnership is not necessarily tantamount to abuse. In this respect Sal (manager) discredited the ‘pimp’ by contrasting him against the heteronormative ideal of the male breadwinner, characterizing him as a “*deadbeat, he doesn’t have a job, he just lives off her [...] but they call themselves pimps.*”

Other participants allowed that some financial arrangements between ‘pimps’ and dancers may be beneficial. Comparing dancers to men who work for him in his construction business, who “*hand their cheque right over to their wives [...] because they know that, if the money stays in their pocket, it's not going to be there tomorrow,*” Adam (DJ and manager) suggested some relationships may be akin to financial stewardship.

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58 For an example of how ‘exit’ programs operate using stigmatic assumptions about prostitution, see Ward and Roe-Sepowitz (2009). For a critique of these types of programs, see Law (2011).
Kristen (dancer) similarly speculated that, for some of her colleagues, it may be “easier to just get an allowance and have everything taken care of.” These narratives highlight the mutual interdependence and reinforcement of each of the elements of the ‘pimp’ stereotype; without manipulation, money management appears rather banal. Thus, in the absence of manipulation, an unaffiliated third party relationship resembles an agent (an associate who organizes or facilitates a sex worker’s transactions with clients) or a personal assistant (a person hired on a fee-for-service basis to provide administrative or business support or services) in the incall/outcall sector (Bruckert & Law 2013). Scott (bouncer and manager) described one such acquaintance:

*What he did was, as a friend [...] he booked the hotels for the girls [...] And then, the two girls, at the end of their weekend of working, they gave him—he didn't ask for it [...] They gave him money and they asked could they do this on a regular basis. [...] And that's all he did. He didn't even go the club where they worked.*

It is notable that the financial element of this relationship recalls the seemingly informal financial arrangement between Eric (driver/protection) and the dancers with whom he worked. Scott appeared to acknowledge that the dancers who worked with his friend had voluntarily entered into this business arrangement, contrasting him to “others who take the dancer as their personal property,” but this did not stop Scott from conceding that, “technically, yes, he was a pimp.” As we will see in Chapter 8, the ‘pimp’ discourse also plays an important role in the perception of club-affiliated third parties by dancers and by each other, as a foil to justify the legitimacy of their jobs and a comparison to discredit them.

*Identifying the ‘pimp’*

One way in which participants identified men as ‘pimps’ in the club was by reading their apparent relationship with dancers through the stereotypical characteristics
enumerated above. For example Marcus (doorman/bouncer) came to the conclusion that one particular black man was a ‘pimp’ after seeing him interact with “four or five of the dancers [...] he would pick them all up, and they would all just hand their money over to him.” However, Marcus recalled that, “he was nice to me and he seemed nice to them.” Reverend (manager and head doorman) and Jimmy (DJ) had the impression that men who had confronted them on behalf of dancers they had disciplined were ‘pimps.’

Bolstering the use of social profiling to draw conclusions about ‘pimps’ was a belief that such men do not talk about their work (or name themselves as such). Moreover, dancers insisted that, “in terms of having a girl self-identify and say ‘I’m being pimped,’ it’s almost impossible to get that information” (Jill, dancer). Because of this, some dancers read (notably, somewhat inconsistently) certain language used by others as code: “your man generally means pimp” (Donna, focus group A [contra. Miller 1987]); “they [dancers] call them their boyfriend or their man” (Monica). However Jill began to doubt this indicator of pimping after:

[…] being in a change room and hearing like, 70% of the girls referring to their man, but then also, knowing that a lot of these girls don’t do extras [...] so after being there for a while, you realize ok, these girls call their man their man, who’s their boyfriend, not someone who’s a pimp.

With little else to identify ‘pimps’ than observation informed by social profiling, participants often (but not always) reproduced the ‘pimp’ discourse.

Managing the ‘pimp’

Regardless of whether or not they felt certain who was a ‘pimp’ or who was in a relationship with one, it was important for dancers to protect themselves from men in the club whom they perceived as threats. It should be noted that dancers’ apprehensions in regard to such men derived more from an interest in protecting their financial wellbeing
and entrepreneurial independence than their safety. Donna (focus group A), Charlene and Leigh (focus group B) had all been approached by men offering to help them with their finances or their ‘lifestyle.’ Brigitte (focus group B) had declined a similar offer: “He was like, ‘You know, I’ll elevate you, and we’ll save money’.” In response to such tactics, Carrie, Jen, Charlene and Leigh (focus group B) began watching out for, and avoiding, men in the club who offered to coach them in how to improve their financial wellbeing. According to Jenna (dancer), men who “bother you to attempt to take your money” are often “black guys between 20 and 40” who “dress kind of like, very urban thug.” Noting that some dancers manage these apprehensions by avoiding certain demographics, Kristen (dancer) identified the drawbacks of this approach: “I’ve had some customers who were African American who I totally would have missed out on if I followed that prejudiced perception.” Similarly, Jill (dancer) suspects her colleagues’ unwavering belief that black men in strip clubs are ‘pimps’ to be unsubstantiated racial and social profiling.

Club-affiliated third parties also enumerated multiple strategies and policies designed to discourage the presence of ‘pimps.’59 At the club where Studley (DJ) worked, management was particularly attentive to certain attributes (“black guys”) and behaviours (“none of them want a drink, none of them want to pay cover, ‘Oh, I’m just waiting to talk to so-and-so,’ or whatever, then every girl that walks by, they’re calling them over”), while at Marcus’ club they were even more overt: as a bouncer, he “was instructed by management to keep an eye mostly on black males.” Such strategies reflect Koskela’s (2012) insistence that the targets of suspicion are often gendered and racialized.

59 Notably, these contrast sharply with Eric’s (driver/protection provider) account of being “very, very good with the bouncers.”
frequently resulting in young men of colour being perceived as suspicious. This prejudicial focus on black men may also have a direct impact on the labour opportunities of racialized dancers; the club where Fuzzy (DJ) works imposed a quota of “five black girls” ostensibly “because they’re trying to limit the amount of pimps they let into the club, and, I guess, the thought is that black girls will bring in the black guys” who are presumed to be ‘pimps.’

Additionally, as Scott (bouncer and manager) suggested, such screening strategies are difficult to apply: “I mean, we at our club did our best to keep the pimps out. The problem was we had to be able to prove they were a pimp. ‘No, no, I’m her boyfriend, I’m a regular customer, I just know her.’ It became difficult.” At Tony’s (manager/DJ) club, this problem was addressed through a blanket ban: “we don’t allow girls’ uh, their pimp, boyfriend, whatever you want to call him—they can drop her off and pick her up but they cannot be in the club while they’re working. It just makes for bad business for them, for us, and for the customer.” Here we see that the presence of men perceived as risky disrupts the image of the club that other performances sanctioned for the setting are attempting to convey (see Goffman 1959).

In spite of the above-noted screening practices, participants described ‘pimps’ as a looming presence in strip clubs. In response, third parties approached these suspicious men directly and indirectly. Along with the bouncers at her club, Kelly’s (bartender) strategy was informal: “we just sort of try to make it not fun for them to come in, so that they don’t.” When dancers alerted third parties to the presence of ‘pimps’ in Studley’s (DJ/supervisor) club, “we let them know right away, like, ‘You’ve got about 30 seconds to

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60 Racial limitations are common in Toronto and Ottawa, and seem to be based on various beliefs, not only about ‘pimps’ but also about customer demand and normative beauty. These latter aspects will be discussed in Chapter 7.
get out of this club or we’re calling the cops,’ essentially, you know. It’s something we don’t abide by in the club.”

Given these strategies and policies designed to manage ‘pimps’ and the array of opinions and beliefs held by dancers and club-affiliated third parties about them, it is clear that the ‘pimp’ is an enduring concern in strip clubs. It is also evident that these strategies are important to dancers’ sense of security at work. At the same time, these management strategies are problematic insofar as their reliance on social and racial profiling reproduces the ‘pimp’ discourse. Mirroring the broader cultural discourse circulated by the media, the organizational ‘pimp’ discourse operates through gendered and racial tropes, predominantly of the manipulative black ‘pimp’ (Bovenkirk 2011) and to a lesser extent, the dangerous Eastern European trafficker (Berman 2003; Pajnik 2010). That even people working in the erotic dance industry who are, in principle, more informed about its constituents, would label, separate, negatively stereotype, and thus stigmatize (Link & Phelan 2001) certain men suggests that the ‘pimp’ discourse is accepted and circulated as true (Foucault 1980) nearly as much in the strip club as outside of it.

As visible in the ways participants critically engaged with some aspects of pimping relationships while unquestioningly accepting others, the ‘pimp’ discourse significantly narrows our view of what may be a spectrum of relationships ranging from beneficial to harmful, romantic to strictly professional. Just as some scholars have insisted that women may be reluctant to admit they have a ‘pimp’ or do not feel that this term characterizes their relationship (Hoigard & Finstad 1992; Smith & Christou 2009; Weinkauf 2010), it is possible that framing women who are involved in harmful
relationships as being ‘pimped’ may merely insult and alienate them. In this respect, asking women about their relationships without relying on the ‘pimp’ discourse may facilitate distinctions between, for example, cases of domestic financial abuse and benign romantic or business associate relationships, and in turn more effective evaluations of whether and how to offer support (i.e., civil, criminal, social, or no intervention at all).

**Concluding remarks: Organizational architecture and discursive boundaries**

With the exception of the ‘pimp’ who remains shrouded in uncertainty and read through organizational discourse, this chapter has shed light on the ways in which third parties organize, supervise, manage or coordinate dancers’ labour, by providing them with an organizational infrastructure and a setting in which to conduct their business. Mapping the organizational structure and setting of the club has also exposed its boundaries and the ways in which they are extended, in imposing employee-like obligations on dancers, and discursively and materially enforced through strategies to identify, manage, and exclude the ‘pimp.’ As Chapter 8 will further elaborate by looking at stereotypes and norms circulating amongst club-affiliated third parties and dancers, this can foster distrust and undermine empathy and solidarity amongst colleagues, and reproduce stigma. In the case of the ‘pimp’ in particular, it may also isolate dancers suspected to be involved in harmful relationships.

This organizational map has also highlighted workplace structures and relationships that are both unique to strip clubs, and similar to those identified by organizational scholars, including Bolton and Houlihan’s (2010) “worker-manager-customer triangle” and the contradictory position of managers described by Willmott (1997). Nuancing characterizations of strip clubs as organizational hierarchies (e.g.,
Barton 2006; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Price 2008; Price-Glynn 2010), this chapter has shown that third parties are to varying extents torn between: being employees who must advance the club’s business goals, which are reliant upon alcohol sales and customer satisfaction; being supervisors tasked with making sure dancers respect club policies and provide good service to customers; and occupying supporting roles in regard to dancers. In turn, although dancers’ unconventional employment relationship allows them considerable agency to govern their entrepreneurial activities, it limits their capacity to challenge the organizational infrastructure and policies of the club. Third parties’ authority over dancers is also constrained insofar as most of their attention is directed towards running the club, rather than on monitoring the behaviour of individual dancers. In short, looking at the club as parallel structures allows us to see that, as the main attraction, dancers support the success of the club as much as it provides the infrastructure they require to sell lap dances. The organizational and physical schemas of the club laid out in this chapter also shape third parties and dancers’ performances of risk management and resistance, to which we now turn.
Chapter 7: Risk management, power and resistance in strip club organizational structure(s) and culture

As we have just seen, third parties and dancers use social (including racial) profiling to manage men they perceive to be ‘pimps,’ which reproduces organizational and broader discourses about these figures at the same time as it reinforces the boundaries of the club by excluding them. This chapter further explores how third parties and dancers make use of these and other organizational and social discourses to assess and manage risk. In doing so it considers the ways in which third parties and dancers situationally adapt, as well as reiterate and resist, gender, racial, and class scripts\(^{61}\) in the (re)production of the relaxing and uninhibited ambiance of the strip club. Expanding on the insights of Frank (2003), Ross (2000), and other scholars (Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; Brooks 2010; Bruckert 2002; DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Ross & Greenwell 2005), who posit the strip club as an environment shaped by (mostly white, heterosexual, affluent) men’s shared definitions of female beauty and sexuality (Ross 2000), in which customers can engage in traditionally masculine behaviours that are largely unacceptable in other social contexts (Frank 2003), this chapter introduces the notion of the ‘party’ environment. Simultaneously a performance that dancers and third parties put on for customers (Goffman 1959), and an organizational culture providing these players with interactional norms and understandings (Daft & Armstrong 2009), the ‘party’ is an environment in which alcohol and drugs, as well as sexism and racism, circulate. After examining its construction and characteristics, this chapter considers the implications and

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\(^{61}\) Following Longmore’s (1998) description, mentioned in the theoretical framework and elaborated in Chapter 3, ‘scripts’ can be understood as normative clusters of expectations for behaviour in particular social contexts, for example sexualized interactions (see also Simon & Gagnon 1986).
impacts of the ‘party’ environment on risk management and resistance in the strip club. It argues that third parties and dancers, from their respective positions in the parallel structures, instrumentally engage in and negotiate screening, surveillance, regulation(s) and tipping to minimize risk and maximize personal rewards in the ‘party’ environment.

A (white) guy’s environment: Environmental and structural sexism and racism

Like any other entertainment venue, strip clubs project a fun image to attract patrons. To this end third parties endeavour to create a ‘party’ environment that is appealing to the preferred customer, whom participants almost invariably described as a white, middle aged, middle class man – a demographic they perceived as both lucrative and low risk (see also Brooks 2010; Frank 2003; Ross & Greenwell 2005). This conforms to Ross’ (2000: 222) argument that strip clubs and other sex industry businesses in North America have long been governed according to the desires of “largely white, straight, monied men.” This in turn shapes the practices and expectations of third parties, to produce a particular gendered, raced, classed, and sexualized ‘party’ – a commercial performance by club workers that must appear effortless, relaxing and fun (see Bruckert 2002; Frank 2003). Echoing Frank’s (2003: 65) characterization of the club as an atmosphere that allows men to engage in stereotypically masculine behaviours, including vulgarity and aggressiveness, as individuals or in groups, DJ Jimmy described an ambiance “like a clubhouse [...] where whatever they [customers] say is safe.”

As a necessarily continuous performance the ‘party’ environment informs organizational culture. In addition to providing guidelines for third parties’ role performances (see Daft & Armstrong 2009; Goffman 1959), strip club culture normalizes some of the same problematic behaviours amongst third parties that the ‘party’
environment tolerates from customers (e.g., sexual and racial harassment). As we will see, this impacts dancers’ safety and wellbeing, influences how third parties and dancers assess risks and manage customer behaviour, and cooperate with and defy rules and regulations. Before turning to how the ‘party’ plays out, we must first examine its production, recalling that the strip club is a workplace to which access for dancers is mediated by hiring (i.e., aesthetic) criteria; other constitutive elements of the ‘party,’ such as music and who is considered an appropriate guest, also contribute to its appeal and exclusiveness.

Although he branded his club as ‘upscale,’ former manager Dalton recalled that it was also “pretty rowdy.” To create an environment that is simultaneously ‘upscale’ and ‘rowdy,’ it seems third parties tailor their policies to cater to the former, and their surveillance practices to allow for the latter. To this end they hire dancers who can project an ‘upscale’ aesthetic, and play music that is not “too gangster, [or] too [much] swearing” (Studley, DJ/supervisor) while tolerating boisterous (albeit not to the point of being disruptive) behaviour from patrons. In this respect even though clients’ behaviour does not conform to upper class expectations of reserve, third parties can cling to the ‘classiness’ of being a ‘gentlemen’s club’ by constructing the club as a white environment.

Echoing the literature (see Bouclin 2006; Brooks 1997 & 2010; Bruckert 2002; Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Law 2012; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; Price-Glynn 2010; Ross 2000; Ross & Greenwell 2005), hiring practices at strip clubs in Toronto and Ottawa largely conform to the heteronormative Western beauty aesthetic. Studley (DJ/supervisor) described the hiring policy at his club:
You don’t have to be 101 pounds, blonde, and wafer-thin to be beautiful, but we do expect you to take care of yourself; you know – put some effort into trying to look your best. [...] At the same time, like, to be blunt, you have to be discriminatory to run a business successfully [...] because your reputation as a business is based upon the entertainment that you provide, so if you can’t provide the entertainment that the clientele wants, they’ll go somewhere that does.

Here Studley both acknowledges (to an extent) the subjectivity of beauty (see Bruckert & Frigon 2003), and complicates it by putting it in business terms. As the roster of dancers contributes significantly to the club’s image, the hiring practices of ‘upscale’ clubs conform more narrowly to the Western beauty ideal, restricting opportunities for women who do not conform to it (see also Bradley-Engen & Ulmer 2009; Egan 2006b).

Equating ‘classiness’ to whiteness is especially limiting for black dancers (see also Brooks 2010; Ross & Greenwell 2005). Although aesthetic restrictions vary somewhat from club to club, most participants reported limitations on the number of black dancers allowed per shift, which ranged from two to five (see also Bouclin 2006; Brooks 1997 & 2010; Bruckert 2012; Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Law 2012; Price-Glynn 2010) at clubs hosting approximately 30 to 80 dancers on average per night. As Scott (bouncer and manager) describes, “I was told that there were only so many black girls allowed [...] The customers wanted usually the stereotypical white blonde big breasted bimbo or other variety of girls, Asian girls, brunette girls, redhead girls, but only so many blacks.” Only two of 30 participants worked at clubs without racial quotas; notably, these were working class establishments in ‘bad’ neighbourhoods. As Ross and Greenwell (2005: 158) argue, the discrepancy between working class clubs, which are more accepting of racialized dancers, and ‘classy’ clubs attempting to attract wealthy, white patrons discursively and geographically reproduces the classed and racialized divide between affluent and impoverished neighbourhoods (see also Bradley-Engen &
In this respect the ‘party’ environment extends beyond the confines of the club to mirror its surroundings.

Although other managers mentioned feeling uneasy about enforcing aesthetic restrictions, racial limitations were particularly troubling to Dalton, as a black man. He struggled with racial quotas, describing them as “a prejudice” in the industry that “runs very deep”:

*If you're black and heavy, you're certainly not getting in. If you're black, you may get in, but you better be real good looking, you know. And you better be not an instigator, right. And—Yes, so, that was a real contradiction for me, you know, being black and having to tell black women, ‘No, you can't work here.’ [...] Very, very difficult.*

Maintaining the club’s aesthetic standard extends beyond hiring dancers. Sal (manager), like some of the incall/outcall third parties interviewed as part of the Management Project (see Bruckert & Law 2013), was troubled by having to enforce his club’s aesthetic guidelines but also acknowledged it was necessary for business:

*I also feel really uncomfortable having to tell someone [...] ‘I'm sorry, we're letting you go because like, you've put on weight,’ or something, right. You sound like the biggest asshole in the world when you say that to someone. So I try to word it in as gentle a way as possible [...] A lot of times when we're letting girls go or telling them we're not hiring them, they'll say, ‘Why?’ [...] I use the word suitable [chuckle], I'm like, ‘Well, you know, we don't think that you're suitable anymore.’ [...] if it gets to a boiling point, I have to be like, ‘Listen, the owner and the management just don't think you're good-looking enough to work here, like, I'm sorry.’ And it's only come to that a couple times, and I really hate that.*

This indirect approach manifests in other ways as well; according to Jenna (dancer), “mostly they put up weird signs, and it's like, you know ‘Ladies, this is the dress code now,’ and [...] you know, ‘The holidays are coming and we should all look our best. Do your hair and makeup and your nails.’” For the most part however, dancers suggested clubs maintain their aesthetic standards by punitive means, by giving warnings to or
firing dancers who do not keep up their personal front (Goffman 1959) – in this case their body size and aesthetic.

The music in the ‘party’ environment is also engineered around the ideal (white, middle aged, middle class, male) customer. Participants reported that, almost universally, music guidelines at strip clubs strongly favour classic rock, while rap, and sometimes also hip-hop, is not allowed because it is imagined to attract the ‘wrong’ kind of customer – “G bangers” (Scott, bouncer and manager) – and alienate the ‘right’ kind of customer. These guidelines recall the stereotypical assumptions discussed in Chapter 6, through which black men are cast as risky and/or as ‘pimps’ are discursively and physically excluded from the ‘party’ environment (see also Law & Bruckert 2016; Lilleston et al. 2012).

**Inhabiting the ‘party’ environment**

For dancers, inhabiting the ‘party’ environment means dealing with various forms of harassment from customers, which are exacerbated by a financially motivated wilful blindness towards overconsumption of alcohol and illicit drugs. As Jill (dancer) explains,

> *When you’re in the club, gentlemanly behaviour is sort of like tossed out the window, and guys get really basic. And because people are so drunk most of the time, or inebriated on whatever they’re on, like um, there’s no room or place for like political correctness. [...] When you think about a strip club, it’s supposed to be like, wild, happy, fun, party! You know, not [in a teacher voice] ‘Let’s be on our best behaviour kids!’*

Especially for racialized dancers like Jill, discrimination is ever-present: “*I don’t feel like I’m a person or girl at my work, I feel like I’m an Asian girl at my work.*” Jill enumerated experiences of discrimination from colleagues and third parties as well as customers:
I’m stereotyped a lot. Like I’m a pretty quiet person [...] so I don’t talk to everybody at work. There was one stripper who I’d befriended, and she – the first time that we were hanging out talking, like having a cigarette – she informed me, she was like, ‘I didn’t even know you spoke English.’ [Laughs] [...] we had been seeing each other [at work] for about a year.

[...] People call me, you know, kind of like, offensive names, but I find that like [sighs], being offensive in a strip club is totally acceptable, basically.

 [...] There used to be a manager who worked there who creeped me out because he would tell me that he thought that Asian women were so beautiful, and he would just like randomly tell me that [...] And yeah I get it from customers all the time, like all the time, like [mocking a customer’s voice], ‘Oh, I think, you know, Asian women are really beautiful,’ or, they just have all kinds of opinions.

 [...] I have been called China girl by multiple bouncers.

Jill’s narrative speaks to how women of colour experience sexism and racism as profoundly intersectional (Crenshaw 1989); in the above comments we see that Jill is characterized by third parties and customers as an exotic other, and dancers as a foreigner.

The brand of boisterous masculinity tolerated from customers in the ‘party’ environment also informs strip club organizational culture insofar as it permeates the norms and understandings shared by third parties and dancers. Dancers recounted microaggressions by third parties as well as customers – “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults toward people of color” (Sue et al. 2007: 271) or “express hostility or indifference toward women” (Basford et al. 2014: 341). At the strip clubs, the whore stigma (Pheterson 1998) also informs microaggressions (a matter we will revisit in greater detail in Chapter 8). For example Brigitte (focus group B) had “stood behind [bouncers] and listened to some of the shit they say about the dancers [...] like, terrible, offensive, offensive, bored banter about how we’re all awful, and it just really brings a bad—like, you know, just a bad
Inasmuch as third parties’ behaviour reflected sexism and racism, dancers expected it – some tolerated it, while others were offended.

Indeed, only Marie (dancer) felt she had not experienced inappropriate behaviour from third parties. Otherwise most dancers (excluding two focus group participants for whom it was not clear) reported inappropriate (e.g., sexual or sexist) comments, and half (6) of this group had been subject to unwelcome touching or aggressive advances from third parties. Many participants (third parties included) suggested that the way some third parties interact with dancers is at best unprofessional, at worst it would be considered sexual assault and grounds for dismissal in a ‘mainstream’ work environment. As Basford et al. (2014) note however, although blatant discrimination may have declined in the (‘mainstream’) workforce, it is not disappearing but increasingly manifesting subtly and ambiguously through interpersonal interaction (i.e., microaggressions), and as Acker (2009) argues, organizational behaviour (e.g., assessing people based on ‘fit’ to sidestep anti-discrimination measures [Green 2005]).

It is important to note that not all dancers felt that the sexual attention they got from third parties was problematic, unmanageable, or particularly troubling (see also Lerum 2004). For example although Ashley (dancer) described third parties as being “overly friendly,” she noted that “for the most part, things were pretty professional.” Furthermore Ashley insisted that what Erickson (2010) refers to as a “sexually overt work culture” is not unique to the erotic dance sector:

*I don’t think that that’s exclusive to a strip club. I’ve worked in other places before where men have made comments about me, so I didn’t take offense, or even really—it didn’t even really like, throw me off, because you know, as a woman, in many places [...] men make comments about you being an attractive person.*
Sasha (focus group A) also found such behaviour to be manageable but ultimately chose to manage it in a different way:

*I had this creepy manager at this one club that especially liked me, and he would always, like, try to touch me while he was giving me the – the shift pay, so I just told him to stop that one day, and he was very surprised. I guess not a lot of people do that. [...] I was like, ‘This is not a lap dance.’ And he was like, ‘Okay.’ And that was that.*

Shane (dancer) recounted working with a DJ whom she felt “was very sexually inappropriate with me,” who “would like, come up behind me and grab me and just stuff like that. But he was like, he was nice and friendly, he wasn’t like, scary.” As a sexually overt work culture then, the ‘party’ environment normalizes sexualized talk and touch, and complicates labelling such behaviour as sexual harassment or assault (see Lerum 2004).

Sometimes, however, third parties’ sexual attention to dancers went beyond the limits of “touchy feely” workplace culture (Jenna, dancer). In these circumstances, dancers told of being punished for resisting third parties’ advances, or victimized. Jen (focus group B) recounted an experience of the former:

*We were pretty new at this club, and we were doing really well, and the owner approached us at the end of one night and was like, ‘I want you two girls to come and hang out with me –’ in other words, sleep with me. And we were like, ‘Oh, no. You know, thank you for the offer’ [...] and we got fired.*

The most brutal instance was reported by Shane, who recounted going to a club with a friend whom the manager sexually assaulted on their first (and only) night:

*He was like sexually assaulting my friend in the office, and she was freaking the hell out, and we—I like literally started like, fucking screaming, and grabbed her and we ran out of the strip club still wearing our dancer clothes and dancer shoes [...] And we were too scared to ever go back there for our clothes [...]
Unfortunately, third parties are neither tasked with, nor for the most part particularly interested in, regulating the behaviour of other club-affiliated third parties (as opposed to ‘pimps’ who are closely monitored). Of course, this does not mean that all club third parties are disrespectful towards dancers. As we will see in Chapter 8, third parties regulate their own behaviour according to varying understandings of what is appropriate for and expected of dancers and themselves.

It appears as though sexual harassment by third parties is not a particular concern of municipal bureaucrats either. As Sal (manager) points out, even though the bylaws were ostensibly created to protect dancers’ health and safety (see Chapter 5), “with my [adult entertainment operator] license came absolutely no education whatsoever.” Moreover, dancers seldom make use of existing complaints mechanisms (Lewis & Shaver 2006; Maticka-Tyndale 2004; MLS 2012b). Speaking to this, Jenna (dancer) found the idea of reporting inappropriate or unfair managerial conduct to a workplace- or industry-run complaints mechanism to be particularly unappealing. Instead she suggested that, “there should be some kind of like ombudsman-like person, you know? Someone from city [administration], let’s say. Like if you have a complaint and it’s legitimate, there should be someone whose job it is to look into that” (Jenna, dancer). Although the Ontario Human Rights Commission in principle covers the sex industry (see OHRC n.d.), filing a complaint through the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario is a lengthy bureaucratic process that may not appeal to dancers because it requires personal information (see HRTO n.d.; OHRC 2013). For this reason a municipally administered oversight system focused on prevention and response to anonymous complaints (which could also attend to the discriminatory hiring practices noted above) may be more
appropriate. In the absence of adequate regulation to address such behaviours by third parties, dancers manage them using individual resistance strategies that will be elaborated in Chapter 8.

**Fueling the ‘party’ environment: Alcohol and drugs**

In addition to sexism and racism from third parties and customers, the ‘party’ environment is replete with alcohol, as a function of the club’s organizational structure being fueled by alcohol sales. As with other night-time entertainment venues (see Degenhardt et al. 2005; Purcell & Graham 2005; Weir 2000), it is also a space where illicit drugs are available which, for some, contributes to the appeal of the ‘party.’ Since the latter are illegal and the former is provincially and municipally regulated, these substances are, in principle, treated somewhat differently. Dancers are allowed to drink at work – as Ashley (dancer) put it, “you could get fuckin’ hammered and [...] they wouldn’t care.” Moreover as in the findings of Chapkis (2000), Maticka-Tyndale (2004), and DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004), both Jill and Shane (dancers) worked at clubs where dancers were obliged to encourage customers to purchase drinks. By contrast participants reported rules against illicit drug consumption. For example Monica (dancer) worked at a club that “was pretty anti-drugs – not pot, no one cares about pot – but like if someone was doing coke or something, they would ban them.” As in Egan’s (2004) and Lavin’s (2013) research however, such rules do not preclude dancers resisting them – indeed several participants admitted they covertly used illicit substances at work.

In practice, the enforcement of these rules pivots on dancers being caught, either in the act of consumption or through being egregiously intoxicated. Moreover it seems as though third parties are not particularly interested in being hyper-vigilant about dancers’
drinking or drug use. Chico (DJ) voiced a common approach: “girls can’t be, you know, falling-down drunk or, you know, under the influence of some drug that they can’t do their show. Aside from that, most of it’s overlooked if they don’t—if the girl doesn’t look too bad.” Indeed it appears most third parties employ what Lavin (2013: 362) refers to as a “path of least resistance” approach: “you try to say, ‘Hey, you know, we don’t approve of people doing drugs in the bar, but we know what happens. So, if you’re going to do it, try to be discreet about it’” (Adam, manager and DJ). Sal (manager) explains his rationale for overlooking a modicum of drug/alcohol consumption:

I don’t know very many girls who don’t drink or smoke or do other things or--there’s not many girls who do nothing at all [at work]. And I know from DJing like, I was a better DJ if I had a couple beers while I was working, so you know, a stoned dancer is a happy dancer so let them do their thing. And like, I know this is like, [imitates owner’s voice] ‘Oh this is bad they’re smoking marijuana on our property’ or whatever, but in the long run they’re probably gonna do their job better, and that will only benefit the club. [...] I know girls, you know they bring in booze and they sneak shots in the change room and stuff like that, and I mean, I can look at it like, are they taking money away from the bar sales? Technically, I guess, yes, but it’s just—if there’s not a lot of guys downstairs – it’s like, slow, it’s early in the day, or something, and there isn’t the opportunity for them to have drinks bought for them, then at least this way they can still kinda get their buzz on. Again, I feel like, in the long run, it’s gonna benefit the club. [...] Especially when it’s like, just creating that party atmosphere [...]}

This does not mean third parties are completely apathetic towards dancers’ use of substances. Sometimes efforts to control substance use emanate from legal risks: for example at Studley’s (DJ/supervisor) club, the drinking age informs dancer hiring practices: “you only have to be 18 to be in there, but by our personal rule, we don’t allow anybody under 19.” Third parties also care about dancers’ wellbeing, and will endeavour to make sure dancers do not drive home inebriated, or help them into a taxi. Some were frustrated, however, by irresponsible substance use: “I saw her falling down the stairs, and you know, I grabbed her and made sure she wasn’t injured. [...] someone told me,
'She took some Ketamine.' I'm like, aw come on, you do Ketamine after work, not during work” (Marcus, doorman/bouncer).

At the same time, because clubs earn most of their profits through alcohol sales, Kelly (bartender) suggested that over-serving customers is quite common (in spite of contravening provincial liquor regulations). Overlooking patrons’ excessive alcohol consumption is of course not exclusive to strip clubs, but rather is a regular occurrence in nightclubs (Rigakos 2008), and a risk bouncers and managers endeavour to manage as smoothly as possible. Continuing to serve an intoxicated customer or dancer also benefits the bartender or waitress who is serving them, as Kelly (bartender) points out: “when I’m getting paid $8.90 an hour, I’m sacrificing money they were going to give me, to look out for them, like nobody tips you for cutting them off.” Similarly some dancers reported that drinking or using drugs with customers bolstered their dance sales, however others found intoxicated patrons too unruly.

Participants also spoke about (suspected) drug dealers in clubs where they (had) worked, whom some accepted as part of the environment whereas others found to be a troubling presence. Unlike upper management in DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004) study which appears to have been wilfully ignorant of drug use by dancers and customers, Adam had a practical attitude. He explained his understanding of, and approach to, the fabled ‘house dealer,’ as a manager:

*The dancers do drugs, the staff do drugs. It's just a business that caters to that sort of thing. Better to know the person who's in there selling stuff. You don't necessarily have to be friendly with them. But, you know, you know who they are. And, you know, and it's generally better to have a good relationship with them because you don't know who's behind them. And, on the other side of things, in that way, you can protect your [...] club by not allowing [...] anybody else in there other than the person you know. The worst occasion is having two people
doing the same thing, and them having a conflict in the middle of your bar. So, that's my philosophy: it's better the devil you know than the one you don't.

Other participants suggested that drug dealers may not necessarily be outsiders. While Marcus (doorman/bouncer) and Sasha (focus group A) reported working at clubs where bouncers sold drugs, Kelly (bartender) had been instructed by management to report dancers whom she suspected were dealing drugs to customers. Thus, we see a general awareness by third parties and dancers of drug and alcohol abuse in the ‘party’ environment, accompanied by strategies that, while diverse, are similar insofar as they attempt to minimize the visibility of overt intoxication and illicit drug use. To the extent that they are tolerated, then, these substances are normalized in strip club organizational culture. As such, third parties conceptualize substance abuse as relatively minimal or (given that over-serving and drugs are proscribed) worthwhile risk. Instead they are primarily concerned with risks that jeopardize the ‘party’ environment.

Assessing risk in the ‘party’ environment

Participants identified numerous legal, financial and safety risks they face at the workplace. As we will see, third parties and dancers both conceptualize and experience these risks differently from each other. The weight they assign these risks in turn informs the strategies they use to mitigate them.

In Toronto, managers articulated concerns about legal risks to themselves and the club, which they mitigated by keeping a photocopy of dancers’ municipal licenses on file. When possible, third parties may additionally alert unlicensed dancers (or dancers without proper immigration documentation\footnote{Only one Toronto manager, whose experience stretches back to the 1990s, mentioned alerting migrant women about state agents. Canada’s regulation of migrant dancers has become increasingly limiting since the late 1990s, when an influx of Eastern European dancers provoked concern about trafficking, causing}) when regulatory agents enter the club to
check dancers’ documents. In such an instance, the surveillance tools of the club are used to counter-surveil the state, as word spreads quickly through the security radio system, as third parties alert dancers and other staff, allowing for unlicensed dancers to exit the club before the inspection begins. Alternatively, at a Toronto club that one participant managed, third parties are particularly careful to make sure that dancers show a valid municipal license each day they work, a strategy meant to decrease inspections by the city: “When you make an effort, they [city officials] know, they appreciate, and that’s less pressure on the club, less pressure on the dancers and less pressure, period.”

Third parties in both cities also worried about being charged in relation to prostitution because of the ‘extras’ being provided in their clubs (without necessarily preventing them, a matter we will examine below). Additionally in response to the legal risk that violence enacted for security purposes poses to the club and to themselves, bouncers are usually instructed to “mak[e] sure I get hit first. That’s the only [thing] – because once that happens, my butt is covered [legally]” (George, doorman/bouncer). That avoiding municipal licensing violations and assault charges appear to be higher priorities than fully complying with bylaws or federal laws relating to sexual touching or services, or provincial alcohol regulations, suggests that third parties are more likely to attend to risks for which mitigation does not compete with the profits of the club or the satisfaction of customers. In other words, third parties prioritize the maintenance of the ‘party’ environment in their risk assessment and mitigation.

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Citizenship and Immigration Canada to implement “a number of unofficial measures to ensure that few applicants for exotic dancer visas were actually accepted” (Barnett 2007: 5). Foreign worker regulations were tightened in 2004, reducing the number of migrant dancers even further (Barnett 2007; Law 2012). The federal government effectively stopped issuing visas to migrant dancers, ostensibly to protect them from human trafficking, with the introduction of Bill C-10 in 2012 (Law 2015).
Legal risks also appear to be gauged on the likeliness and/or thoroughness of state intervention. According to third parties and dancers in Toronto, dancer licenses are subject to regular inspection, during which time dancers must conduct themselves carefully. By comparison liquor inspections in Ottawa and Toronto appear less consistent; while Kelly (bartender) described inspections in which officials, strangely, only looked at the paper license and did not check for overly intoxicated patrons in the bar, inspections at Reverend’s (manager and head doorman) club are exhaustive. With regard to lap dancing however, it appears that state surveillance has decreased over time:

When the bylaw first came out that there was no contact allowed between the dancer and the customer, the bylaw enforcement people were fanatical about it. Um, to the point where a girl who was dressed couldn't sit on a customer's lap without getting a ticket. Which is ridiculous [...] And, now, I don't think they're strict enough. I don't think they come in often enough. (Adam, manager and DJ)

This parties identified customers as security and financial risks to dancers and, along with dancers, agreed that customer misbehaviour is exacerbated by alcohol and drug consumption. However third parties also framed some risks as inherent; as Sal (manager) put it, “as sad as it is to say, a girl getting, like grabbed somewhere that she doesn’t want to be – it’s kind of an occupational hazard. And like, I’m more than happy to kick the guy out, like 100%, but that’s sort of the risk that they take, right.” Sal’s comment evinces that broader social discourses framing lap dancing as inherently risky (see Chapter 5) continue to hold currency amongst strip club workers. Given that routine resistance (i.e., disregard) of municipal bylaws appears to have eroded their enforcement over time (see Scott 1985; MLS 2012b), it seems that the stigmatic assumptions on which these regulations were based – and through which customers and lap dancing are constructed as inherently risky – remain, contributing to third parties responsibilizing
dancers to manage customers themselves. At the same time many dancers rejected popular risk discourses about customers, emphasizing that they are ordinary people, and interpreted instances of sexual assault from customers as examples of either ‘bad apples’ or human fallibility. These conflicting and co-existing interpretations of workplace risk speak to how organizational culture is shaped by, and circulates, both broad and specific (i.e., organizational) discourses.

However it is important to note that, generally speaking, and reflecting research findings that indoor sex work is relatively safe (especially as compared to street-based sex work [Canada v Bedford 2013; O’Doherty 2007]), dancers reported feeling safe at work. As Sasha (focus group A) put it, “I’ve always been more concerned about my financial security rather than my physical safety.” Dancers’ sense of safety also depends on the shift or time they are working, and their perception of bouncers (individually or collectively). Donna (focus group A) contrasted times when “I’m on the floor; there are people everywhere, so I don’t really feel unsafe,” to “sometimes when I was in the champagne room, especially when it was a day shift or a Sunday night, I was—you know, I’d be all alone,” at which time “it was nice to have the bouncer walking around and making his rounds.” While some dancers found the bouncers to be effective in protecting their security, others considered them unhelpful or even offensive, and Shane (dancer) felt “they were terrifying.”

Contravening stigmatic assumptions framing them as risky, third parties insisted they, in fact, face safety risks as well. As Marcus (doorman/bouncer) wryly remarked, “the risk is probably higher for security [personnel] than it is for dancers because the security people are usually the ones who are stopping you from doing what you want to
do.” Having witnessed physical assaults on bouncers but not dancers, Marcus noted that if weapons are pulled, bouncers are the most likely targets. As a manager, Sal also felt he was at risk of getting involved in physical altercations, “and it makes my stomach turn.” However Adam (manager and DJ) suggested that third parties can mitigate these risks: “your reaction to people is what determines how much risk you're in. I think if you're, you know, nice and polite and civilized, I think you lower your risk significantly. I think, if you're a dick, I think you raise your risks significantly.”

Gender plays an important role in the risks strip club workers face. Third parties appear more likely to be violently assaulted, either in a fistfight or with a weapon, while dancers face risks of sexual harassment and assault. Gender also affects how strip club workers perceive risk. The only female third party to participate in this research, Kelly (bartender) reflected: “That club where I work is in a very bad neighbourhood [...] I’ve never felt unsafe at work, even when there’s stuff going on outside [...] I’m never really vulnerable, except for the fact that I’m a woman.” Here again we see broader social discourses retaining currency alongside understandings informed by industry experience; Kelly rejects narratives of inherent risk within the club, but appears to embrace gendered and classed tropes of female vulnerability and ‘stranger danger’ in assessing the risks in its environs.

Managing the ‘party’ environment

Following the assessment of customers as sources of various risks including potential disruption of the ‘party’ environment, theft, and (sexual) assault, participants enumerated multiple strategies to manage customers’ behaviour while maintaining a fun atmosphere in the club. To this end, third parties enact preventive and reactive strategies.
Some of these are policy-based, whereas others entail third parties (and, as we will see, dancers) performing gender, class and race in instrumental ways.

As managers pointed out, the club’s first line of defense is at the door, making screening an important tool to prevent trouble by refusing entry to potentially disruptive customers (see also Hobbs et al. 2005). At Sal’s club, bouncers employ an intentionally vague dress code – “we have a sign at the door, sort of like a disclaimer, saying ‘Dress code is in effect’ [...] we’ll just say, like to guys, ‘Sorry, you don’t meet our dress code’” – as a tool to prevent men they perceive as overly intoxicated or otherwise unsuitable from entering the establishment. Often, in screening out customers they perceive as dubious, bouncers subtly or explicitly direct their attention to black men they assume to be ‘pimps’ (as discussed in Chapter 6) as well as men they suspect are gang affiliated (see also Lilleston et al. 2012). If such men are allowed into the club, third parties are likely to pay particular attention to them. Another manager, Adam, made a point of stationing an imposingly large bouncer at the door of his club, to deter customers from misbehaving. This echoes Bruckert’s (2002) finding that clubs use bouncers’ conspicuous presence as a preventive security strategy.

Other preventive strategies are dictated by club policy. For example, along with other bouncers at his club George endeavours to minimize financial disputes by noting each dancer’s time of entry into a champagne room with a customer, in order to keep track of how many 20-dollar songs have passed, and therefore how much money is owed.63 Similarly, dancers described bartenders, managers, or waitresses explaining the hourly rates to customers before they begin their time in the champagne rooms in order to

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63 This finding contrasts with Lavin’s (2013) study, in which it was the DJ who kept track of the number of songs dancers perform for customers in the interest of safeguarding dancers’ financial wellbeing.
make sure they are well aware of how much money they are committing to spending. Dancers also noted some clubs post “signs that say ‘$20 per dance’” (Monica).

Some of these policies challenge dancers’ ability to maintain customers’ impression of the situation (Goffman 1959), as businesslike demands that contradict the feeling of intimacy they are attempting to sustain. For example some clubs oblige dancers to collect the money they are owed from customers after one, two or five songs. According to Scott (bouncer and manager), this policy is designed to prevent customers from spending more money than they can afford or be forced to pay. However, dancers complained it interrupted their ‘flow’ with clients. Shane (dancer) identified an additional problem: “you don’t ask for your money up front because you don’t know how many songs you’re gonna do up front.” Other policies are informed by the recognition that it can be very difficult to settle financial disputes. For example Sasha (focus group A) had worked at a club that compensated dancers up to five songs, or 100 dollars, for theft of service, and another where “they banned clients that didn’t pay.”

Surveillance is an also important tool to ensure customers’ behaviour does not overstep safety or legal limits. However some dancers were of the opinion that bouncers’ and managers’ surveillance of VIP is merely in the interest of legally protecting the club and third parties (see also Bruckert & Law 2013; Chapkis 2000; Egan 2004; Lewis 2000), that it is insufficiently frequent to deter or protect them from customer misconduct, or that it negatively impacts their business by interrupting customers’ perception of intimacy during lap dances.

Surveilling customers can be useful for third parties; it provides them with an understanding of the behaviour they can expect, which in turn informs the approach and
timing of their responses. According to Sal (manager), such decisions are key to a successful intervention, in order not to disrupt both an individual customer’s impression of the situation and the ‘party’ environment as a whole:

The last thing that I ever wanna do is like, squash people’s fun, but there’s also—there’s people that, a lot of times, they can’t really handle that, and so, for example, let’s say we really have a really loud, boisterous customer who’s being obnoxious and we want to get him out. [...] Well I know that like, if he hasn’t done anything that actually warrants him being kicked out, and you ask him to leave, he’s probably gonna freak out. So I’ll sit back and wait, because I know that like, within the next hour, this guy is gonna do something stupid enough that we can be like, ‘Ok man, it’s time to call it a night.’ So you know, you go over and give them some warnings and that, and just sort of sit back and wait, and then eventually it’ll happen. [...] It’s a fine line you gotta watch pretty close, make sure that he doesn’t like, go too far over the line too quickly without you actually being there to prevent it.

As evident in Sal’s narrative, intervening to prevent customers from further misbehaviour, whether by giving them a warning or ejecting them from the premises (by convincing them to leave or by physical means), can be a delicate interpersonal interaction. Aware of this, Marcus (doorman/bouncer) taught dancers hand signals to subtly communicate their issues to bouncers in VIP without aggravating their customer or disturbing neighbouring lap dances (see also DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004). Similarly Reverend (manager and head doorman) was careful not to disrupt nearby performances and impressions when he enforced the rules in VIP: “you’ll find a girl jerking a guy off [...] I’m not going to go in there, grab everybody, you know, throw them down and throw them out, but you know, it ends pretty quickly when you go in and you just have a chat with a girl saying, ‘Come see me in a minute.’ ” Attempting to balance their security responsibilities with maintaining the ‘party’ environment evinces bouncers’ and managers’ awareness of their participation in its production (see Rigakos 2008).
Third parties also endeavour to manage customers’ behaviour by mirroring their class and disposition (which may be interpreted through the lens of race) in an effort to approach them in a way they will understand. Thus, Marcus (doorman/bouncer) attempted to appeal rationally to customers he perceived as rational, while Sal (manager) projects a ‘street level’ persona to men he interprets as ‘pimps’ trying to recruit dancers at his club:

*I’ve had some pretty harsh words with some of them just because I knew that they’re like, they’re street level guys [...] I’ve literally gone over and said to guys, like, ‘These are our girls, so don’t come in here and think you’re fuckin’ recruiting any of these chicks, cause they’re ours,’ and that’s totally possessive of me to say, and they’re not ours at all, but I just say that cause it sounds tough [laughs] and hopefully they’ll get the message, right, is to just leave these [dancers], leave them alone.*

Here we see Sal referencing the (controlling) ‘pimp’ as he adapts gendered and racial scripts of aggression to leverage his influence in a specific situation.

Classed notions of respectability also inform third parties’ strategies to control customers’ and dancers’ behaviour. This includes intervening when customers’ behaviour exceeds the margins of acceptability of the ‘party’ environment, which after all, are not limitless. Leigh, Carrie and Brigitte (focus group B) had all worked for a manager whom they “loved” (Brigitte), who would intervene in situations such as: “one guy was saying to some girl, ‘Nice shitter,’ and Philip went over and tapped him on the shoulder and said if he couldn’t come up with more complimentary ways [...] to cheer for the girls, then he would ask him to leave” (Leigh). Conversely Dalton (manager) drew on gendered and classed notions of respectability, in tandem with risk discourses and responsibilization, to dissuade dancers from behaving in a manner that may increase their risk of sexual assault:
If you see a girl who's, you know, getting too drunk, you know, let her know what's going on. [...] ‘Listen, you know, you're better than that. You can't make any money [drunk], you know. This is not the kind of image you want to present of yourself. Think about it.’ [...] Only the bad guys want the, you know, the heavy drunk girls. They got bad intentions.

Considering Dalton’s advice to dancers alongside Sal’s earlier comment about the inherent risks of lap dancing, we see that the naturalization of customer sexual misconduct in the ‘party’ environment puts the onus to manage it on dancers. As we will soon see, dancers agreed that preventing such behaviour themselves is the most effective approach.

Third parties also described various reactive strategies enacted in response to financial disputes and physical or sexual assault. One strategy to reactively manage customers is invoking the spectre of the law, whether in the form of the liquor inspector who will revoke the club’s license, when refusing to admit intoxicated patrons, or the police who may be called upon to resolve a dispute. For bouncers, the latter was usually the last step of the negotiation process when dealing with a financial conflict (a situation which appears rather unique to strip clubs, as most conflicts at nightclubs appear to be fights between customers [see Hobbs et al. 2005]). Marcus (doorman/bouncer) had a fixed order of strategies for dealing with payment disputes between dancers and clients: he would first try to reason with the customer; next he would call two or three colleagues over to appear more intimidating; he would then threaten to call the police, which would sometimes include evoking possible ramifications on other aspects of the customer’s life, including his wife and workplace finding out about the situation. It was at this point, in Marcus’ experience that the customer usually capitulated. Thus, bouncers’ performance
of aggressive male dominance, through the use of pressure, intimidation, and threats of violence, can allow them to avoid actually using physical violence.

Threats to call the police were, however, seldom carried out. In contrast to nightclubs, which according to Rigakos (2008) commonly invite police officers to monitor their entrances or inspect their premises, it appears strip clubs seldom appeal to the police for help. Participants noted several reasons this option is not favoured, including waiting for the police to arrive (see also Rigakos 2008), and drawing unwanted attention to illicit activities that may be going on in the club (e.g., drugs, ‘extras’). They also saw it as largely ineffective, noting the police can do very little to resolve a financial dispute except record the parties’ information to begin a civil process. Moreover, as Reverend (manager and head doorman) remarked, “*due to the circumstances of the situation, it’s hard to prove everything.*” Third parties may also monitor lap dances more strictly than usual if there are police officers in the club, compelling dancers to comply with the municipal bylaws prohibiting touching. As Monica (dancer) put it, “*it was just basically like a buzz kill until they were gone, like no one would really be able to sell dances.*” In other words the presence of law enforcement disrupts the ‘party’ environment. Here we see two ways in which structural stigma (Hannem 2012; see also Bruckert & Hannem 2013a & b), through surveillance, interferes with dancers’ income: by discouraging appeals to police intervention to resolve security issues, and in preventing dancers from carrying out their principal income earning activity, lap dancing.

Third parties also intervene in a more ‘hands-on’ manner when required. For example bouncers may run after customers who leave the club without paying, and
managers or bouncers may hold a piece of the customer’s property (like a cell phone or drivers’ license) as collateral until he comes back with the money he owes the dancer. Some third party participants insisted that violence is necessary in certain situations, especially when physical and/or sexual assault are involved. However bouncers must use violence judiciously, both in the interest of protecting themselves and the club from legal ramifications. For this reason, managers and bouncers framed social skills as a first resort and a valuable security tool (see also Hobbs et al. 2005; Rigakos 2008).

As visible in the risk management strategies enumerated above, third parties draw on intersecting class, racial, and gender scripts in their performances of situation-specific masculinities. Although only male managers and bouncers participated in the study, Jill (dancer) described a female manager\textsuperscript{64} with whom she had worked as more effective than her male counterparts at negotiating with customers to ensure payment. Indeed Kelly (bartender) felt the same way about her aptitude for negotiation. Given the importance of gender performance in the abovementioned security strategies, it is not surprising that a female third party might excel at different – and less aggressive – tactics. Thus, both female and male third parties employ normative gender tactics to manage customer behaviour (see Guadagno & Cialdini 2007).

**Visibility and blind spots**

While the convergence of misdirected municipal regulation and tolerance for a certain level of customer misbehaviour render the security services of third parties all the more important to dancers’ safety, sometimes these services are precluded by concerns about legal risks posed by the very same regulations. This failure to help the group whose

\textsuperscript{64} Bobby (focus group B) and Sasha (focus group A) had also worked with female managers, while Sal (manager) and Jenna (dancer) had worked for female club owners.
safety municipal regulations were ostensibly designed to protect (see Chapter 5) is emblematic of structural stigma (Hannem 2012; Bruckert & Hannem 2013a). Additionally although security strategies are in principle facilitated by the layout of the club, some areas and actions elude the surveillance of third parties. As a result, security ‘blind spots’ may be temporal (e.g., occurring in the moments between managers’ and bouncers’ rounds in VIP), physical (e.g., due to the layout of the club), or intentional (i.e., wilful blindness) (see also Law & Bruckert 2016).

As bouncers and managers cannot focus their attention on monitoring the VIP at all times, the layout of the club impacts the effectiveness of surveillance. Although dancers can elect to take customers to lap dancing areas that are more easily accessible to third parties, sometimes they have to negotiate their way out of situations in areas of the club that are not immediately visible or accessible, rendering help unavailable. Of course there is one perennial limitation to visibility at strip clubs: “it’s always dark. There are lights, but they’re only very dim and they’re in certain places like the stage” (Jimmy, DJ). Dancers may also take advantage of these ‘blind spots’ to provide services that are not sanctioned by the club (‘extras’) – as Sasha (focus group A) noted, “they monitored some champagne rooms, but there were definitely some that were sort of tucked away in certain corners that girls who did extras, like, would go there with their regulars.” ‘Extras’ are also more likely to go unnoticed at certain times of day, for example when there are fewer third parties working on a slow (e.g., afternoon) shift.

Of course, there is variation in layout between clubs. Ashley (dancer) described one club in which “the VIP rooms are super secluded and like, really private and really small […] I didn’t like it.” By contrast dancers in both Ottawa and Toronto appreciated
that the champagne rooms at their clubs had been redesigned to facilitate surveillance (and to comply with new municipal edicts). At Monica’s club, “when they cut the [champagne room] walls down and things became more open […] the DJ himself could probably see a lot of what was happening.” Similarly at the club where Jill (dancer) works, “they used to have like semi-opaque partitions separating the booths […] and now, they’re clear partitions, so that if the bouncer is walking by, he can totally, clearly see into the booth, rather than like, having to like peek around the corner to look in.”

At some clubs, visibility is facilitated by electronic means (see also Egan 2004; Lilleston et al. 2012). In contrast to Egan’s (2004) findings however, it appears cameras are not relied upon as the primary tools of surveillance. Although Tony (manager/DJ), Reverend (manager and head doorman), and Donna and Charlene (dancers) noted that their clubs had cameras, like other participants they indicated that registration with the DJ or another third party (or at one club, a punch-clock) was the method used for verifying if dancers arrive on time for their shifts (see also Law & Bruckert 2016). According to Tony (manager/DJ), whose workplace has “a lot of cameras […] if there’s an incident where the police have to be called, we—our system, we can burn them a CD of the incident within a couple minutes and they have the evidence right there to take to court which is great.” Thus security footage may be used more as a record of events than as a real-time surveillance measure.

With or without security cameras, it appears that third parties purposefully occasionally or routinely turn a blind eye to touching during lap dances and, sometimes,

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65 As of 2013, Toronto’s bylaws specify: “All private rooms, booths or cubicles must have no more than three sides or have one side constructed of a transparent material … [to ensure] a clear view of its interior” (bylaw 243-2013: 11). Similarly, Ottawa’s layout requirements were amended in 2004, and aimed to remove visual obstructions obscuring lap dances (AEAC v Ottawa 2007: para 7; Ottawa, bylaw 2002-189; Ottawa, bylaw L6-2000). See also Chapter 5.
other activities as well. According to third party participants, this is in the interest of both business and protecting the club from legal ramifications (see also Devers et al. 2009; Hudson & Okhuysen 2009). As Adam (manager and DJ) explained, “if you’ve got a bouncer wandering around and poking his head in the booths every five seconds to make sure something not right is happening, you’ve ruined it for the client, who’s paying good money to enjoy, you know, a dance.” As a result, it seems third parties merely aim to “put a front on that you were following all the rules” (Dalton, DJ and manager). Dancers’ accounts confirm that third party surveillance of lap dances is often perfunctory. At Monica’s (dancer) club, “when the bouncer walks by, you stand up, and that’s all you have to do.” Similarly Jill (dancer) illustrates the pretence of compliance for municipal inspectors:

I feel like, in a way, it must be somewhat obvious though [...] I remember being three girls to one guy, and we were all just standing around him [...] in a semi-circle, like talking to him, and I’m like, this does not look like a [VIP] booth – this doesn’t look real.

Here we see that, rather than being concerned with preventing or mitigating harmful behaviour by customers, third parties endeavour to balance business interests with legal risks in their application of the bylaws prohibiting touching.

The extent to which dancers’ conduct is monitored varies from club to club, and overlaps (albeit not always) with the image the club is attempting to project (see also DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Lilleston et al. 2012). This may in turn affect the appeal or accessibility of a club to dancers. Kristen (dancer) had found that, “at the lower end clubs, it’s cheaper [house fees] [...] they didn’t ask how you looked before they let you work there. And in those clubs, a lot more—like they kind of turn their head away, and

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66 According to Kristen and Marie (dancers), some clubs will hire dancers (i.e., agree that they can work there) over the phone.
“it’s a lot harder to make money without doing extras.” Recalling the aesthetic restrictions that inform hiring, this suggests that dancers who do not fit Western beauty norms may find themselves at a club where there is greater pressure to provide additional services. Conversely, as Reverend (manager and head doorman) suggests, overly strict rule enforcement may negatively affect dancers’ income, making a club an unappealing workplace: “we are the cleanest club in the city. We do try hard to keep that. It can be very difficult sometimes [...] I think we were so strict at one point, we had no girls and had to even get a little more lenient on that.”

Of course just what ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’ means is open for interpretation, and may vary. For example as a manager Dalton defined ‘clean’ as “nobody ejaculates in my club.” By contrast, Tony’s (manager/DJ) club differentiates between kinds of touching: “no grinding, no you know, sexual activities. [...] But if the girls allow a customer to touch their buttocks or their boobs, that’s up to them.” Discrepancies and/or vagueness in rules can result in confusion not only for dancers who (as discussed in Chapter 6) may not have a clear understanding of which rules third parties expect them to follow, but also for rule enforcers. Initially enforcing the rules as they were communicated to him, George (doorman/bouncer) soon learned that their application, in practice, was quite different: “they tell me they don’t want the extras going on. They say to report it. I have reported it. I’ve gotten in more trouble than the dancers. So to me, it’s, what’s the point of the reporting?” In this regard it is worth noting that a ‘classy’ club may not necessarily be a ‘clean’ club, as Leigh’s (focus group B) comment suggests:

I’ve seen a thing where they had a sign on the changeroom that said [...] ‘Ladies, do not use streetwalker language with the customers,’ [...] like, just basically, talk in a lady-like way. Basically, it goes on, and they turn a blind eye, but you’re
not supposed to say, ‘Do you want a BJ?’ You’re supposed to let [customers] ask and then feel it out if that’s something you’re willing to do.

Recalling that ‘upscale’ clubs hold dancers to higher aesthetic standards than their working class counterparts, it seems this expectation extends to other aspects of dancers’ personal front, which includes not only size, age and racial characteristics, but also expressions and gestures (Goffman 1959). As Leigh’s narrative shows, dancers’ speech is also expected to be ‘lady-like.’ As we will see in Chapter 8, this converges with other qualities to construct particular constellations of racial, class and gender expectations for dancers’ occupational performances.

At some clubs third parties only turn a blind eye to ‘extras’ in particular circumstances, or for certain dancers or customers. For example as Scott (bouncer and manager) tells us, “there are some times, special, you know, permission was made—friend of the manager, whatever.” Dancers also complained about uneven approaches to ‘extras,’ which they equated to preferential treatment: “some girls will get fired for doing extras, and others have been there for ten years doing extras [...] it depends on their relationship with the management, and who knows what they have going on, but I find it really depends on the situation” (Charlene, focus group B).

In her nine years’ experience as an erotic dancer, Jenna had worked at many different clubs, and had observed that discipline in regard to ‘extras’ “depends on the place. Sometimes it’s like, could you be more discreet? Sometimes you just get dismissed, fired, suspended, etcetera.” For example at Marcus’ (doorman/bouncer) club management made a habit of turning a blind eye to ‘extras’: “we were just basically told, you know, if it’s going on, just make sure that the dancer’s not getting hurt and that everybody is being safe, but also warn them if police came in.” To this end, “we’d do a
special little knock on the booth just to warn them that there was police around” (Marcus, doorman/bouncer). Dancers may also base their choice of workplace on whether or not it aligns with the services they want to offer: “some clubs are dirty and some clubs are clean, and it's good to know what the expectations are, and what you can get away with” (Jenna, dancer).

It appears some third parties are willing to protect dancers’ safety even if they are offering ‘extras.’ However as Kelly (bartender) points out, “when there’s a payment dispute [...] we can’t charge the customer for extras, so [...] I’m not allowed to collect that money for them. I’m only allowed to collect the $20 a song.” Adam (DJ and manager) highlighted another potential implication of wilful blindness:

You would hope that, if someone was practicing sex in the strip club, which is supposed to be for entertainment and not for sex, that they would practice safe sex. But that's not really something you can police [...] because that would imply that you accept the fact that it's happening when it's not supposed to be happening.

Here we see that, although wilful blindness may be necessary for the club and third parties to be legally protected without interfering with customers’ expectations in regard to touching, it can mean that third parties are not aware of, and therefore not able to protect dancers in, risky or dangerous situations. Moreover as Chapkis (2000), Egan (2004), and Lewis (2000) argue, wilful blindness transfers the legal liability of ‘extras’ from the organization and third parties to dancers (see also Law & Bruckert 2016).

Lateral surveillance: Dancer price- and service-fixing

Wilful blindness has indeed proved effective in court. Perhaps most famously, in R v Mara, only club owner Mara was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada; the judges concluded that, unlike manager East who “was entirely responsible for the activity of the dancers at the tavern” (R v Mara 1997: para 48), Mara was not a third party to the activities in question, and could thus credibly could claim to be unaware of their inappropriateness. At the municipal level, police officers have on occasion failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of intent to allow physical contact to charge third parties of by-law infractions (see Toronto v Zanzibar 2007; MLS 2012b).
Dancers enact various strategies to mitigate security, health, legal, and financial risks to ‘fill in’ the gaps left by inadequate regulatory and third party oversight. All of these risks converge in the provision of ‘extras.’ To ensure equitable competition amongst themselves as independent entrepreneurs sharing the space of the club dancers endeavour to informally, collectively regulate the services offered therein, by surveilling each others’ conduct.

As discussed in Chapter 5, there has been disagreement amongst dancers as to what level of physicality is appropriate in interactions with clients since the advent of lap dancing (Bouclin 2006 & 2009; Bruckert & Parent 2007; Lewis 2000). Although ‘extras’ remain a contentious issue, dancers’ attitudes towards ‘extras’ and their colleagues who provide them appeared considerably more understanding than the anger and stigma evident amongst dancers in Bouclin’s (2004b, 2006) study (see also DERA 2002). Contemporary dancers are accustomed to lap dancing as the norm, whereas the cohort in Bouclin’s study sought to return to the table dancing they had known in the 1990s. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in the present study, even what constitutes an ‘extra’ is a matter of debate; as Ashley (dancer) suggested, “a lot of different people have a different idea of what is an extra. What’s extra, you know?” Ashley herself sometimes kissed customers she liked, at no additional charge, and did not consider this to be an ‘extra’ even while acknowledging it was against the rules. Although they reported that some of their colleagues considered it acceptable for customers to suck on their nipples but did not frame this as an ‘extra,’ Kristen and Monica (dancers) considered it to exceed the boundaries of a lap dance (as well as their personal comfort level). In spite of contrasting opinions and different personal boundaries however, none of the dancers who
participated in one-on-one interviews identified themselves as providing ‘extras’ (the topic was not broached in the focus groups.)

Many of the dancers who participated in the study were against the provision of ‘extras’ in the club, which they saw as unfair competition. Kristen (dancer) explained:

> It affects the income of all the other girls. Because if one girl’s giving blowjobs for 20 bucks a song, no other girl who doesn’t do that is gonna make any money, because she can’t compete with that, because they’re [customers are] not going to choose you if they can get more.

Similarly Jenna (dancer) was concerned with the price of ‘extras’: “I don’t care if you’re a ho, just try not to be a cheap one! That undercuts me.” Some dancers, like Sasha (focus group A), reasoned that customers are less likely to demand additional sexual services if they are performed out of public view: “if I can’t see it, then that means my customers can’t see it, so it doesn’t affect me.” However Donna (focus group A) felt that her colleagues providing ‘extras’ “puts all of us at risk of a bawdy-house charge.” By contrast Shane (dancer) was relatively unconcerned: “It’s none of my business […] I just would want her to be safe that’s all, not get caught by management.” With the exception of Monica (dancer), the majority of dancers did not object to their colleagues escorting outside of the club, as long as they left with clients discreetly.68

In order to minimize the impact of ‘extras’ on their finances as well as pressure from clients for services they are not comfortable providing, dancers engage in peer or “lateral surveillance” (Andrejevic 2005).69 This practice may coincide with the interests

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68 This discretion contrasts with establishments in Baltimore studied by Lilleston et al. (2012), where customers could pay the club to leave with a dancer. Neither the literature nor participants in this study suggest that such a practice, which Lilleston et al. (2012) describe as ‘buy-outs,’ occurs in Ontario. It also contrasts with Ross and Greenwell’s (2005) finding that dancers in the mid 20th century who combined stripping with prostitution kept the latter discreet to minimize stigma from their colleagues – although discretion remains important, contemporary dancers appear primarily concerned about fair competition.

69 As with other contemporary surveillance scholars, Andrejevic (2005) focuses mainly on technological means of surveillance. As such, my use of his term can be seen as part of my ongoing endeavour to
of third parties insofar as it minimizes legal risks for the club and its employees; indeed it appears some third parties rely on lateral surveillance as an effective regulator of dancers’ behaviour: “a girl who's not clean [provides sexual services] either has to clean her act up—or usually, you know, the girls assume or deter it to make the girl go away. [...] The girls sort of police themselves that way” (Adam, manager and DJ). In this respect peer surveillance may fill the gap left between wilful blindness and the lack of clarity, consistency, and communication of club rules (as noted in Chapter 6). Moreover as a collective effort operating as an informal social network between dancers, lateral surveillance dovetails with the class image of the club; for example dancers at an ‘upscale’ club may strongly discourage ‘extras’ (or at least the overt provision thereof) whereas dancers at a working class club (like Shane) are less likely to interfere if their colleagues offer additional services. However peer surveillance amongst dancers is not tantamount to discipline in the Foucaultian sense, insofar as it is not an internalization of managerial authority and training (Foucault 1977). Rather, it is a preventive and punitive mechanism that regulates prices and services in the agglomeration of individual entrepreneurs that makes up the dancer structure. In short, it is a mechanism of price- and service-fixing that ensures fair competition. Sasha (focus group A) provides an example of how lateral surveillance operates:

We had this new girl one time, and she didn’t really have any boundaries, and she was just doing whatever customers wanted, so the girls – the schedule[d] girls – kind of got together and shamed her out of doing that. [...] Her behaviour is [now] more in line with the rest of the girls.

Lateral surveillance can also commandeer the organizational authority of third parties, as Scott (bouncer and manager) explained: “when you had a club and one girl was known underscore the continuing relevance of human, rather than technological, tools and techniques of surveillance (see Law & Bruckert 2016).
for giving extras, we would get rid of her, not just because of the legal reason, [but] because the girls who didn’t want to do the extras, they got upset because they were losing money.”

Informal strategies arising from peer surveillance, including “gossip campaigns” (Sasha, focus group A), can be an effective way for dancers to protect their health and business interests by limiting customers’ expectations of ‘extras.’ However as Kristen (dancer) pointed out, such campaigns, meant to limit unfair competition, can themselves be unfair:

And the girls will gang up and attack girls for things like that sometimes, even though it’s hypocritical, because half the girls attacking the other girl will be doing that themselves. But it’s about whether you get caught, and whether other people are aware of it, so it’s about how discreet you can be, and that’s what’s really valued, is being discreet.

Moreover the gossip may not be true: “sometimes girls would get jealous if you were doing a lot of dances, and they would just say that you were doing something [inappropriate]” (Monica, dancer). Thus, echoing Hafen’s (2009) observations, gossip can function simultaneously as: social control (peer surveillance and regulation), which in turn reproduces organizational culture, in this case the ‘party’ as an environment of sexually charged fun but not prostitution; as resistance to managerial authority, insofar as it pre-empts (and in so doing takes the place of) third party surveillance (see also Bruckert 2002; Prasad & Prasad 2000); and as social comparison and boundary maintenance, for example to exclude new or unpopular dancers from the ‘in’ crowd (see also Law & Bruckert 2016).

While the lateral surveillance network sometimes upholds managerial interests, sometimes dancer price fixing manifests as defiance. Sasha (focus group A) told us about
dancers successfully resisting management’s sudden imposition of a ten percent cut of
their cash earnings, which they felt to be an unreasonable portion of their income. In
contrast to Egan’s (2004) study, in which dancers resisted paying the cut on an ongoing
individual basis, this was a collective act of passive noncompliance: “[dancers] just kind
of complained about it to each other, and then [...] everyone just stopped co-operating,
and then the managers never talked about it again” (Sasha). Jill (dancer) recounted an
income protection strategy that had spread through the dancer network at her club that
counters the principles of customer service: “there are many girls, and I do this too, if it’s
busy, I’ll just, if a customer comes along, I’ll be like, ‘There’s a 5 song minimum.’ I
don’t—I’m not gonna take off my clothes for a song, sorry.” It is interesting to note that
dancers in this study seldom conceptualized these and other strategies as resistance even
though they certainly contested the claims of management, in much the same way as
Scott’s (1985) peasants engaging in “everyday resistance”; perhaps the informality of
such acts (to dancers’ advantage) prevents third parties from recognizing them as
resistance as well.

Dancer self-management of risks

Recalling participants’ assertions that many workplace risks at the strip club
emanate from customers, dancers also described a number of other strategies to prevent
or manage intolerable behaviour in one-on-one interactions with customers. It is when
dancers find themselves (intentionally or unintentionally) out of view of third parties and
other dancers that these strategies become particularly important. Dancers listed
numerous verbal and physical methods to protect their bodily integrity and financial
security. While some of these strategies revolve around maintaining the customer’s
impression of the situation, the management more egregious behaviour is (fittingly)
comparatively overt and assertive. Before examining these strategies however, we
consider why they are required. As we will see dancers felt self-management of risks was
important because: third parties were sometimes unmotivated to intervene; prevention is
preferable to reaction; and in order to avoid stigma from managers or colleagues (which
in this situation, manifests as victim blaming).

As Jenna (dancer) points out, in spite of the tactics third parties enumerated to
manage customer behaviour, noted earlier in the chapter, the importance third parties
ascribe to the situation may only sometimes accord with dancers’ interpretation:

*It depends on the discretion of the staff member involved, and like, their mood
that day, and this and that, so you know, sometimes it’s a bit of a crapshoot
because sometimes you’re like, fuck it, you know, so-and-so looks annoyed today
and I just don’t want to bother him over 20 or 40 dollars.*

Monica (dancer), however, was of the opinion that bouncers and managers did:

*Nothing. I had a guy, like, whip it out basically, and masturbate onto himself
while I wasn’t looking, like really fast, and it was really gross and upsetting to me
[...] and the bouncers did nothing about it. I had a guy throw that beer bottle at
my head [...] I was covered in beer [...] and they didn’t do anything.*

Echoing the findings of Bruckert (2002) as well as Lewis (2006), some dancers felt they
were more likely to be helped by third parties if they tipped them (as we will discuss in
more detail in the following section). Carrie (focus group B) found that sometimes, even
then, they were reluctant. Another dancer in focus group B, Jen, was of the opinion that
third parties interpreted conflicts as “always your fault,” while Bobby and Brigitte (focus
group B) had been reprimanded for complaining about a customer’s behaviour. Jill
(dancer) highlighted another compelling reason behind dancers’ self-management of
risks: namely, that by the time a bouncer or manager intervenes, “that shit has already
happened to me, you know?” From these experiences, many dancers concluded that it was best to resolve their own issues.

Apprehension about being stigmatized by co-workers also plays a role in dancers’ self-management of risks. We see this in the aftermath of Jill’s experience of sexual assault by a customer:

“It really made me open my eyes, cause rather than people being like, ‘Hey, what happened the other night?’ girls were like, ‘Fucking girl’s a whore.’ And I was like, ‘No!’ I would never do that. That sh*t fucking happened to me. It scared the sh*t out of me. [...] And I remember after talking to a girlfriend of mine who was also sexually assaulted, and I told her, I was like, ‘Honestly, that is on you. It’s your body. You know, you have to—you do everything in your power, and it’s one thing if he overcomes you and overpowers you, but you gotta watch out for yourself.’ [...] And even if you explain the rules to them, you have to understand the context of what’s going on, like most guys, when they have a naked girl on top of them [...] it’s really easy, especially when people are drinking, for people to forget themselves. So you have to remember. You have to be less fucked up, to know what’s going on, or whatever. So I really take great responsibility for my own personal safety, cause I know that nobody else has my back.

Here we see how lateral surveillance, through gossip, can exacerbate harm and undermine solidarity. Moreover, Jill’s narrative highlights how dancers’ interpretations of their own and their peers’ experiences are permeated by the naturalization of customers’ aggressive masculinity in the organizational culture of the ‘party’ environment. In this context dancers are responsibilized to prevent sexual assault, while their failure to do so is read as the consensual provision of sexual services, or ‘extras.’

Because dancers feel they often have to act as their own enforcers, they develop their own screening practices and interactional guidelines. In the process of selecting their customers, dancers preventatively minimize risks by screening based on intuition and sometimes social profiling (as discussed in Chapter 6), to determine who is an

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70 Although Jill’s negative experience of gossip may appear to confirm gendered stereotypes about dancers as ‘catty,’ as Noon and Delbridge argue, “[g]ossiping is one of the most pervasive activities within organizations” (1993: 23).
agreeable or acceptable customer, who is “iffy” and who is a “red flag.” (Donna, focus group A). This allows them to avoid or abandon customers they deem to be potentially risky or unmanageable.

Dancers also emphasized the importance of vigilantly policing their personal boundaries. Although former dancer Monica had found this to be emotionally straining, others talked about it matter-of-factly: “you better start making some guidelines and rules for yourself so that you know what the fuck you are doing. Regardless of what the club is telling you to do, you better make sure you know what you want to do and what you are going to do and what you’re not gonna do” (Ashley, dancer). Reflecting on her 11 years in the industry, Carrie (focus group B) simply stated: “You have to be tough [...] you have to be diplomatic and know how to handle yourself when you’re being sexually molested – literally.” Thus while some scholars characterize dancers setting and policing their own boundaries as resistance to institutional control regimes (Bruckert 2002; Bruckert et al. 2003; Colosi 2010a; Egan 2004, 2006b; Lavin 2013; Lewis 2006; Murphy 2003), it is also a pragmatic and necessary security strategy.

Dancers protect their boundaries (i.e., the level of touch with which they are comfortable) physically and verbally. Physical boundary maintenance strategies are often integrated into dancing so that dancers can maintain customers’ impression of the situation (Goffman 1959), which as noted by Frank (2002, 2003, 2005), Pasko (2002), Pilcher (2009), and Wood (2000), is essential to the continued success of the business interaction. Dancers’ strategies in this regard include remaining aware of their bodies and proximity to customers and keeping a watchful eye on clients’ movements.
Verbal strategies, such as negotiations involving boundaries or services, are also
integrated into dancers’ performance. So as not to interrupt their soft, feminine
presentation, dancers invoke the wrath of third parties or the law (see also Egan 2004),
which they insist is more effective than simply telling customers ‘no.’ This gendered
performance may also draw on scripts of vulnerability, desperation, or powerlessness, as
visible in Kristen’s (dancer) narrative:

*I’ll tell them that, for personal reasons, I can’t work at other clubs anymore, and I
don’t want to get kicked out, and it’s kind of like, this is my only place I can work
right now. So I kind of use that to my advantage. [...] You kinda have to make it
look like: ‘It’s not that I don’t want to, it’s that I can’t. My hands are tied.’ You
know, because you never want to imply that, you know, ‘It’s just not in my
personal code of behaviour and you repulse me.’ [laughs] You can’t say that.

Similar to the findings of other scholars (see Bruckert 2002; Frank 2002a & 2003; Liepe-
Levinson 2002; Murphy 2003; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Wolkowitz 2006), such
strategies simultaneously subvert and perpetuate traditional gendered scripts – the
protecting man (in Kristen’s appeal to compliance through pity) and the vulnerable, or
innocent (in Jenna’s upcoming strategy), woman – that are in turn vital to the
maintenance of the ‘party’ environment. Jenna (dancer) describes her instrumental
evocation of innocence:

*Sometimes if someone’s giving me a hard time about come to my hotel or give me
a blowjob or this or that, you can very innocently be like, ‘You know, that’s illegal,
and I’m just not allowed to do that, and like, you’re soliciting prostitution and
that, I believe, in itself is a crime.’ And so sometimes you can like, totally shame
them into shutting up.

As Marie (dancer) points out, this strategy may not always be effective: “some guys don’t
really care about the laws or they’ve had extras with another girl before so they think all
the girls will do it.” This can inspire dancers to enact other approaches. Faced with a
customer “try[ing] to wear you down to buy sex,” Monica (dancer) sometimes elected to
“just keep saying no to that, and then they keep trying to get you to say yes, but in the meantime they’re still buying dances. So [...] you’re still making money while arguing.”

Other verbal strategies, including boundary communication, and (if needed) insistence, are comparatively more overt. Nonetheless attempting to integrate it with her performance of femininity, Marie (dancer) made a point of clearly communicating her boundaries to customers: “I would always tell them, like at the beginning of every dance, like in a jokingly like, cute way that like, where they’re allowed to touch, just so you set the expectations right away so you don’t have to interrupt them to tell them, ‘No you can’t do that.’” In former dancer Shane’s experience, asserting herself to customers was considerably easier than interacting with third parties.

Negotiation and communication are also useful tools for dancers to protect their financial security. For example, Monica (dancer) found maintaining customers’ ongoing consent to be an effective measure to ensure payment:

So, as I’m dancing usually as one song ends, I’d ask, ‘Do you want to keep going?’ but I pretty well never just let another song happen without alerting the customer it was the end of a song [...] I would always ask, just to like, let them say no, but if they didn’t say that, or unless they told me to stop counting or just tell them whenever we came to whatever number, at the end of every song I would ask. So I always had their verbal consent to keep going.

Importantly, dancers’ financial negotiations with customers must respect fixed standard prices of 20 dollars per song to ensure fair competition.

When customers become unmanageable, either by overstepping their boundaries or refusing to pay, dancers may act more assertively. Leigh (focus group B) describes an instance of the former:

I once, actually, scared the shit out of a customer because the guy [...] touch[ed] me how I didn’t want, and basically, I got so angry that I grabbed him by the finger [...] and I told him, ‘Listen. What you have done is a sexual crime. You
have sexually assaulted me.’ I said, ‘I did not give you permission to do that. I specifically told you ahead of time not to do that.’ I said, ‘You should—you should give me an extra $100 for that.’ And then the guy didn’t want to do it, and I said, ‘Listen.’ I said, ‘I should—I could take you to court and sue you for sexual harassment, like, sexual assault.’

As we see above, what Jenna (dancer) refers to as “… I explain to them, ‘You’ve been an asshole, give me more money or you’ll get in trouble,’” is extortion as revenge for boundary transgression. Dancers may even have to manage the situation with physical force: “you have to be aggressive with the customer. Some customers, you have to hold their hands down […] and [be] strong with them” (Carrie, focus group B). Recognizing this, some dancers at George’s (doorman/bouncer) workplace had requested he “teach them little self-defence moves” he had learned in the military. Alternatively, dancers can just “stop it […] if I’m doing one song with you and I find that you’re acting inappropriately or you’re not taking my direction in terms of what you can and can’t touch, then I stop the song and I say, ‘You owe me $20, and this is as far as we’re going’” (Jill, dancer).

For financial disputes, a common strategy to ensure payment was to hold a customer’s cell phone or other possession (Monica even developed a technique of holding ransom one of an uncooperative customer’s shoes) until they returned from an outdoor bank machine. Rather than emphasizing dancers’ femininity these reactive strategies instead draw on scripts of working class toughness, or drop the performance altogether. Visible in the variety of preventive, reactive, ‘feminine,’ assertive, verbal and physical approaches, dancers are immensely creative in their strategies to manage risks emanating from customers. While this kind of problem-solving exemplifies dancers’ agency, the context of inaction by third parties out of which it arises, which is in turn
fostered by dancers’ non-membership in the organizational structure of the club, remains problematic.

**Tipping and the informal economy of favours**

So far, we have seen that the ‘party’ environment is a sexualized atmosphere and work culture that by its nature gives rise to informal and subtle behaviour management strategies. It also creates conditions conducive to ad-hoc arrangements between third parties and dancers, which Bruckert (2002: 108) has called “the informal economy of favours” – the negotiated, instrumental relationships forged between dancers and third parties through which each endeavours to maximize their income and/or wellbeing. Taking place out of view of customers, the economy of favours can manifest as a covert business negotiation, a quid pro quo exchange, or a cooperative and mutually beneficial team performance (Goffman 1959), and sometimes, manipulation or blatant opportunism. Some of these interactions involve resistance on the part of dancers and/or third parties, for example in working around surveillance measures to covertly break club rules (see Ball 2010). In addition to being a leveller of dancers’ superior income and third parties’ organizational authority (see Lewis 2006; Reed 1997), the economy of favours is a bridge between the otherwise divergent interests of the parallel structures.

In spite of DJs claiming tipping “*is voluntary, not mandatory*” (Adam, DJ and manager), most dancers agreed that it is customary to tip the DJ at least five dollars per shift\(^7\) – “*I really can’t remember not—other than a handful of times, not tipping […] it’s not like you tip for good service, you just tip for service [laughs]*” (Marie, dancer). According to DJs, tips from dancers average between five and 25 dollars. Kristen

\(^7\) Ashley (dancer) stood out in this regard. She reported she “*never felt pressured to tip anybody […] And I never felt like I got treated better or worse if I did or didn’t.*”
(dancer) talked about the importance of having a good relationship with DJs, in which tipping and politeness play an important role:

[The DJ] can make the difference, like in how—you know, he can just be like, ‘Oh, well, this girl’s next on stage,’ or he could be like, ‘The amazing, beautiful, So-and-so is about to rock your world!’ You know, they can get the crowd worked up, they can make your lights better or worse, they can make your music quieter or louder, they can put you after, you know, the most athletically gifted girl in the club, or they can put you after somebody who’s brand new – they can make you look better or worse. They do have that power. And tipping them has a big reflection on how you’re treated.

The reverse is also true: the amount a dancer tips a DJ will depend on his attitude towards her. As Fuzzy (DJ) explained: “I tend to leave there with more money than the other DJs on any given night, and I think it’s because I try to connect a little bit with the girls.”

There is also an element of exchange, or fee for (additional) service, between DJs and dancers. One Ottawa dancer found there to be a standard rate for moving one’s stage show: “So you’ll tip him $20 and he’ll not put you on stage, but that’s usually the flat rate is $20 – they won’t do it for less than that.” Attesting that DJs expected a tip for this favour in Ottawa, another dancer reflected: “I never really did that though, so oftentimes I would get called to go on stage while I was giving dances in the back.” In this respect the economy of favours can be a way for third parties to exercise power over dancers’ otherwise autonomous entrepreneurial activities.

DJs negotiated the economy of favours in their own ways. For example Jimmy (DJ) endeavoured to make stage shows more appealing, to maximize his tips:

... under-promise and over-deliver. So you would say to a girl, if she wants to go on stage, [...] ‘Uh, I don’t know. I might not need you. Maybe?’ But in your head, you definitely do. [...] That’s how you make tips or whatever. People will be like, ‘Ok, what if I give you money?’ And immediately, it’s, ‘Yes, sure.’ [...] You had to make it look like these stage shows were really hot tickets, and like, ‘Oh you want to be on stage, girl. Everybody’s gonna watch you.’

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72 Toronto dancers did not mention a standard fee for this service.
Jimmy’s approach of awarding priority of stage shows to dancers who tip generously resembles that described by Bradley-Engen and Ulmer (2009). By contrast, Studley (DJ/supervisor) found that allowing dancers to reschedule merely made his job more difficult:

*I’m not flexible at all. I expect the same work from everybody. I don’t care how much money they offer me. I’ve had girls offer me $100 before to skip their stage, and it’s, ‘No, I’m sorry.’ I just – it’s not worth the hassle for me because the other girls catch on, and essentially, what you’re doing is you’re making somebody else have to work harder so she has to work less by doing that. And it’s not worth the headaches I get from the other girls for it, and it’s not fair to them.*

By choosing not to allow dancers to re-arrange or opt out of the stage roster, Studley prioritized the club’s wellbeing over his own financial interests. Of course this has implications for Studley’s income from tips, which he must earn through other means:

*[T]he only way I can really affect my profits whatsoever is through my attitude. [...] try to, you know, keep them at ease. If a girl wants, you know, some music downloaded or something like that [...] Basically, I’ll do whatever I can within the framework that’s been given to me to do my job.*

To this end some DJs help dancers with music selection and downloading songs from the Internet, or editing songs to comply with club guidelines.

The matter of tips is more complicated with regard to bouncers. Although some bouncers claimed that most dancers do not tip them, some clubs have a small mandatory fee (e.g., two dollars) that dancers must pay daily to supplement bouncers’ wages.

However some dancers found that additional tips were required for bouncers’ cooperation – “the only time a bouncer would really do anything for me was if I tipped him” (Donna, focus group A). Leigh (focus group B) found this to be problematic: “I don’t want to have to tip for my wellbeing and safety [...] I think that should be a non-tipping item. That’s what they’re being paid to do.” As George (doorman/bouncer) explains however,
the economy of favours works both ways: “you try your hardest to get the girl the money, and then with some of the girls, even then, the girls treat us like assholes [...] So it’s hard to go out of your way the next time.” Here we see that friendliness (or in this case, a lack thereof) can also be important in the economy of favours (Bruckert 2002).

Bouncers provide additional services to dancers that are not part of their job description – they will arrange dancers for customers, or vice versa. For example, “[customers] would say, ‘I’m looking for this, I’m looking for this kind of girl,’ [...] I hook the girls up with the client. The girl might give me a tip if they make a lot of money” (Scott, bouncer and manager). Sasha (focus group A) explains how tipping the bouncers can lead to a beneficial “cycle”:

So if you tipped the bouncers [...] when they got you a champagne room [...] they would get you more champagne rooms, so yeah, that could be good. You know, you could just be standing around looking at your cell phone, and then the bouncer would be like, ‘Come over here. Go in there with those guys,’ and then suddenly, you’d be making, like, $600. So you’d want to give them 50 bucks out of that or something [...] because you would have missed the boat otherwise.

By contrast Jill (dancer) found this ‘cycle’ to be unfair and manipulative:

Basically if patrons come in and they’re like, ‘Yeah, we’re good to go now,’ they will get immediately shuffled into a [VIP] room, like a booth, and [...] it’s a coordinated effort – one bouncer will stand in front of the door to the room and start calling to people on his like little microphone thingy, and then other bouncers in other areas of the club will start rounding up certain girls [...] that they like and that will tip them well if they put them in this room. So, if they’re standing in front of that door and you try to get in that room, they will be like, ‘No,’ and they’ll lie to your face, and they’ll tell you that they want these specific girls, but literally, they don’t. [...] I remember, one of the guys that was in that room was staring at me, and I didn’t even bother with him, cause I’m like, dude, you’ve been in there for fuckin’ hours [...] and then he came over, and I made money off of him in the last half hour of the night. [...] And he’s like, ‘I didn’t even like the girl that I was with,’ and [...] he spent $1500 on his girl. That could have been my money [...]
Sometimes dancers instigate these arrangements: according to Sasha (focus group A)

“girls who did extras [...] tipped out the bouncers” to turn a blind eye (see also
Blowdryer 2009). Other times they manifest as brazen opportunism:

We’ve even had doormen [...] who would try to extort from girls, whether it be
financial or sexual [...] basically, you catch a girl in a position where she’s
already breaking the rules to the point where she’d probably just get fired on the
spot, but instead, it’s like, ‘Oh, I’ll let this go if –’ I don’t know – ‘You sleep with
me or you pay me or both.’ (Reverend, head doorman/manager)

Managers’ involvement in the economy of favours appears less monetary, perhaps
because, as the highest position in the organizational structure below the owner, they are
paid more than other third parties who earn modest service industry wages as employees
(see Chapter 4). Jenna (dancer) explained that, instead of tipping, dancers at her club
foster good relationships with managers by bringing them cookies or coffee (cards). That
said, Donna (focus group A) had worked at a club where it was customary for dancers to
tip the managers, and at Jill’s (dancer) club dancers occasionally tipped the manager for
special favours. While the possibility of receiving a tip made recommending dancers to
customers more appealing to Sal, for Dalton, arranging a customer “when one of your
best girls is not making any money and she's bitching and she wants to leave” was an
important strategy for retaining top earning dancers, whose popularity amongst customers
makes them valuable assets to the club.

The final alliance in the economy of favours is between dancers and bar staff. At
the club where Jill dances,

the waitresses [...] will do things to help us hustle customers and also rip off
customers a little bit, time-wise, like they’ll knock off like 15 minutes from an hour
[in VIP], and they’ll be like, ‘Ok, your hour’s done.’ They will encourage
customers to be generous. We, in turn, do the same, at least I do. Like when the
customer is paying his bill, I’ll be like, ‘She was awesome! She left us alone, let’s
give her lots of money!’ And she’ll also usually do the same for me.
Similarly, as a bartender Kelly has alliances with dancers based on mutual respect:

“customers kind of ask for recommendations, I guess. So obviously I choose my friends.”

Jill also tipped the waitresses for not collecting the club’s fee on dances paid by credit card – “so if I’m going to make $300 even and clear, then I’m going to give you $20 cause you know, otherwise I would have to give like fuckin’ $45 to the club” – an arrangement in which both Jill and the waitresses benefitted at the expense of the club.

As a cooperative strategy this contrasts to Egan’s (2004) findings, in which dancers eschewed paying their required cut to the club by conducting their business out of view of the cameras.

As in the findings of Barton (2006) and Lewis (2006), dancers sometimes make arrangements with the wait staff to give them false drinks so they can avoid alcohol without refusing customers’ offers to buy them drinks – an arrangement which is beneficial to the dancer’s health without being detrimental to the waitress’ or bartender’s, or the club’s, finances, or to the ‘party’ environment. Although Kristen (dancer) had “heard of girls you know, splitting that money with the person they have that set up with,” the dancers with whom I spoke were more interested in not drinking than profiting from this arrangement. As we have seen, whether the arrangements it fosters are mutually beneficial, or favour one side (i.e., are exploitative), the economy of favours ‘plays out’ and fills ‘gaps’ in the divide between the parallel structures.

Third party resistance

While the economy of favours often involves resistance as negotiated or mutually understood exchange, for example with bouncers or DJs resisting managers and/or club rules for tips, third parties also engage in resistance for other reasons. Third parties may
break club rules for the benefit of dancers (which may or may not result in increased tips), out of frustration emanating from their lack of power to change organizational policies they perceive to be impractical, or because they feel undervalued as workers. After elaborating various instances in which third parties contest relations of power at the club, this section ends by drawing parallels between these examples and occasions of third party resistance to state regulation that we have already seen.

Resembling the economy of favours but falling short of an exchange, third parties may subvert club rules or policies for the benefit of dancers in aspiration of tips. For example Fuzzy (DJ) took advantage of a manager’s absence by cancelling a nightly promotional event that the dancers did not like: “it wasn’t that busy, and I didn’t want to interrupt the girls that were making some money to bring them out to do a free dance because at the end of the day, the more money the girls make, the better my night is going to be. [...] So I just skipped over it.” By not doing the ‘showcase’ (see Chapter 6), Fuzzy resisted by making a decision beyond his level of authority in the organizational network of relations (see Foucault 1980; Handy 1993), in turn prioritizing his own financial interests over those of the organization (see Willmott 1997).

Other forms are more sustained and emanate from frustration over a lack of control over the organization (Willmott 1997). Disagreeing with the policy imposed by the owner, Sal (manager) allows dancers to smoke marijuana in the indoor smoking room when the owner is not on the premises, both for dancers’ safety, so they can avoid having to go out into the “pretty rough neighbourhood” surrounding the club, and (as previously mentioned) so that dancers will be content and provide a better service to customers. This also resembles what Bolton and Houlihan (2010) call the “worker-manager-customer”
triangle of interactive service work, insofar as third parties sometimes find themselves resisting the directives of upper management in the interest of workers and in turn customers. Similarly, Kelly (bartender) perceives certain policies at her club as unfair to dancers, electing to waive them in the interest of dancers’ wellbeing. One of these is:

... a new policy where they’re charging the customer 10% and then they want to put the value on a gift card [...] and then when the dancer redeems the gift card, they want to take 10% from her [...] I don’t do it. I feel bad, like, making these girls pay. So until somebody really makes me do it, I’m not gonna.

Kelly also refuses to comply with a club policy prohibiting bar staff from giving full sized glasses of water to dancers, put in place to encourage customers to purchase them drinks.

Third parties also resist out of frustration and a sense of being undervalued as workers (Willmott 1997). For example Kelly’s (bartender) disregard of certain policies at her club emanates from her perception that she is underpaid:

*We’re supposed to upsell. So if a regular thing like a barshot is $8.50, we have things that go from $8.50 to $9.25 to $10.25 to $11.50 for every brand, so we try and sell the $11.50, and [...] as much as I’m supposed to do that, sometimes it’s worse for me if I do... I know if I upsell this, and I sell this, then it’s gonna come out to $20 even. It’s better for me not to do that, because nobody’s really gonna dig in their pocket, or break another 20. [...] And they pay me $8.90 an hour [...] I want to do a good job, and I’m honest and stuff but like, if it comes down to, if you really want me to upsell against all odds, like, you better pay me more.*

Like dancers, third parties occasionally take advantage of weak points in, or an absence of, surveillance over their work. In her job at coat check at a strip club before she began dancing, Kristen’s resistance was opportunistic. She had a “coalition of interest” (Watson 2003: 83) that she described as “*a profit sharing little scheme with one of the bouncers*” in which:

*we had to mark people down when they came into the club, and I would just not mark some people and take the money, and just give him a cut. And sometimes*
there’d be so many people coming in at once, I couldn’t possibly mark them all down, and there’d be a discrepancy at the end of the night in the money and we would just take the difference.

Third parties also reported disregarding the rules for financial or sexual benefits – as noted in Chapter 6, Marcus (doorman/bouncer) engaged dancers and customers from his club for his ad-hoc stag party agency, unbeknownst to his superiors, while other third parties flouted the rules against dating dancers.

While the above examples suggest that third party resistance resembles that of other workers insofar as it arises in response to organizational structure and policies (see Bolton & Houlihan 2010; Willmott 1997), third parties also attempt to subvert municipal and federal regulations. Like most of the individual resistance strategies enumerated above, these acts are covert, minimizing risks of state sanction or disruption of the ‘party’ environment, both of which would interfere with the club’s and dancers’ income. We have seen this in wilful blindness to dancers’ and patrons’ violations of various regulations including liquor licensing (i.e., over-serving) and municipal bylaws against touching. We have also seen more direct resistance to regulatory agents, when third parties notify dancers of the presence of police or bylaw officers in the club.

**Concluding remarks: Risk and resistance in the ‘party’ environment**

As this chapter has demonstrated, both the organizational culture (the ‘party’ environment) and structures (and their inter/independence) of the strip club impact dancers’ and third parties’ assessment and management of workplace risks. This is visible in third parties’ framing of sexual assault as an inherent risk and therefore, ultimately, something for which dancers are primarily accountable for managing. It is also apparent in third parties’ reproduction (through hiring and firing, microaggressions, or sexual
assault) of the sexism, racism and classism that contribute to the club’s image as a white, middle class, ‘party’ environment for men.

In keeping with the role expectations of the ‘party’ environment dancers and third parties adapt their performances to manage customers’ behaviour, instrumentally combining and performing gender, class and racial scripts. Inasmuch as their risk-management performances constitute resistance through intent (i.e., serving another purpose than they appear) and effect (by quashing customers’ attempts to exert power), they also perpetuate gendered, racial, and/or classed stereotypes of themselves or others. We have seen this in dancers’ performances of vulnerable, powerless women who want to please; bouncers enacting aggressive masculinity; and dancers and third parties screening and reacting through racial and class stereotypes of customers.

Because of the parallel structures of the strip club however, third parties appear more focused on the physical and financial security of the club than in addressing dancers’ conflicts with customers. Aware of this, dancers are more likely to seek third parties’ help to resolve financial disputes, preferring to preventively self-manage their risks of sexual assault by screening, being aware of their bodies, monitoring customers’ movements, and being careful in regard to their use of alcohol and/or drugs. Dancers also draw on the structure of the club in their own security strategies by referencing third parties, club rules and (in some cases) security cameras. But as we have seen, third parties and dancers bridge the gap between their otherwise discrepant individual and organizational interests through the informal economy of favours (see Bruckert 2002).

Furthermore, the parallel structures give rise to divergent concerns regarding, and strategies for resisting, state regulation. Both third parties and dancers use the (by)laws
instrumentally rather than strictly following them; this is visible in dancers’ and third parties’ invocation of the laws, prioritization of risks, wilful blindness by third parties, and dancers individually and collectively creating and enforcing their own rules regarding touching and ‘extras.’ At the same time, that third parties’ strategies for legally protecting the club leave dancers alone to manage potentially risky situations suggests dancers would be better served by regulation allowing them the agency to negotiate, consent to, or decline touching with clients.

In highlighting the interplay of workplace performances and adaptive risk-management strategies, organizational culture and structure, and regulation, this chapter furnishes several theoretical and practical insights. The first is that resistance by strip club workers – to the state, each other, or customers – is often necessarily covert due to the requirement for an uninterrupted and seemingly effortless performance in the production of the ‘party’ environment. While immediately effective and individually meaningful, these resistances remain transitory and subtle – in other words the strip club is not an environment conducive to “radical ruptures” (Foucault 1978: 95). In following, if the strip club is a service-based business that engineers its ‘party’ environment to be desirable to the customers it wishes to attract, adhering to normative gender scripts and beauty standards is necessary to its success. In this respect aesthetic requirements and limitations at strip clubs are only likely to shift alongside broader social conceptions of beauty. We can further extend this insight to regulation: because municipal regulation and its enforcement continue to prioritize framings of lap dancing as immoral and harmful, shifting their focus towards labour rights would require the dismantling of discourses enabling the stigmatization of erotic dance (see Hannem 2012). Thus, dancers’
working conditions can only be meaningfully improved alongside changes in broader social attitudes about beauty, and what constitutes appropriate masculine and feminine (especially sexual) conduct. As we will see in the coming chapter, expectations and definitions of appropriate conduct also inform how third parties and dancers perceive and relate to each other.
Chapter 8. Performances and perceptions in parallel structures

I have a character. When I go in, I just—it’s like a costume that I put on. I’m not—you know, I’m not the married father when I’m at work. You know I’m Fuzzy Pickle. You know, I go in, and I do my thing, and I’ll—you know, I’ll throw my flirt out there, and you know, hopefully I’ll have fun. And at the end of my shift, I go home, and I’m a dad again. So that’s how I roll. (Fuzzy, DJ)

As Fuzzy’s narrative suggests, like dancers, third parties perform gender, class, race, and even sexuality at work. Moreover, as Goffman (1959) points out, these performances – especially those occurring exclusively in the front regions of the club – are necessarily continual. In this regard both dancers and third parties are simultaneously performers and audiences, watching and being watched by each other (see Murphy 2003). While the previous chapter focused on situational performance adaptations as strategies to manage risk, this chapter addresses how third parties’ social roles are constituted, and the ways in which these performances conform to, reproduce, and sometimes challenge the intersecting gendered, raced, and classed expectations and stigmatic assumptions of the audience(s) at the strip club. This chapter also argues that the parallel structures of the strip club separate third parties and dancers into distinct performance teams (Goffman 1959), and examines the social relationships as well as the gaps in understanding fostered by these disparate performances. Because the erotic dance literature has already explored dancers’ role performances (see Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Frank 2002b; Liepe-Levinson 2002; Ross 2009; Trautner 2005), and how they ‘play out’ in interactions with customers (see Egan 2006a; Frank 2002a; Murphy 2003; Wood 2000) this chapter focuses on third parties’ performances, as well as their interpretations of dancers’ performances and vice versa; it also delves deeper into dancers’ performances for third parties (see Bruckert 2002; Lavin 2013).
Putting on the suit: Third party role embodiment

As we saw in Chapter 7, dancers’ presentation of self contributes to the image and class of the club, playing a significant role in attracting customers. However third parties’ personal fronts – that is, their physical attributes, body language, style of dress and behaviour – are also important insofar as they communicate their occupational role to the audience (Goffman 1959). As a manager, looking the part was of paramount importance to Dalton who “dressed in slacks, a button down shirt and a tie, always. Always, always. Always had a tie on. And that’s just to get respect. [...] So, you wear that costume. And that was the only costume that I would wear.” As Adam explained, this presentation of self is designed to impress a particular image of the business on customers: “as a manager, you’re the face of the bar towards the clientele.” Also prominent in the front regions (Goffman 1959) of the club, bouncers “have to look a certain way [...] we have to wear dress shoes, dress pants, dress shirt” (George, doorman/bouncer). In short, donning a suit conveys archetypically male organizational authority (see Whitehead 2002).

Although DJs are less visible to customers and as a result, not always subject to rules about what they should wear, Jimmy (DJ) elected to wear a suit at work because it impacted how his co-workers perceived him: “if you dress like somebody who doesn’t have control or power, people will step on you. [...] if you dress the part, people will respect you for it.” Having dressed more casually his first month as a DJ, Jimmy noticed a significant difference in how he was treated by dancers once he began wearing a suit at work: “it was night and day.” Here we see that third parties are in fact dressing and performing for two audiences: customers and dancers.
It is interesting to note that Jimmy (DJ) and Dalton (DJ and manager), the only racialized men to be employed by strip clubs in this study, were also the only ones to say that wearing a suit to work contributed to being respected by strip club workers and customers. This suggests that, in keeping with the archetype of the organizational leader (see Acker 2009), the occupational ‘costume’ put on by third parties of colour – the suit – draws on notions of upper class, white, male authority and respectability. As with dancers however, there appear to be relatively few racialized third parties employed by strip clubs, suggesting that the effectiveness of this strategy, and (recalling the social profiling of black men in particular from *Chapter 6*) the opportunities available to racialized men to enact it in the first place, may be limited.

For Sal, along with the suit came a work persona:

> *When I go into work, like—the same way the girls become a character, right, and they use like a stage name and stuff, and the makeup and the high heels and all that stuff, and you know I’m the same way, right I gotta go into work and you know, I put on my best-looking Sopranos suit and play the role, you know? [...] I have to be like, sometimes like aggressive, like physically aggressive, and that’s not me at all. Like I haven’t been in a fight, outside of work, since I was in grade school probably. Yeah, so it’s just a persona.*

Here we see that third parties’ occupational roles additionally draw on masculine scripts of toughness.

As with dancers, the body can be an important part of third parties’ ‘costume.’

This is especially the case for bouncers, as visible in Marcus’ experience of being judged to be more suitable for security than tending bar:

> *I was going around looking for bartending jobs and ended up going to some adult entertainment ones, and they’re like, ‘Well, we don’t need a bartender but we need a doorman.’ Cause I’m like a pretty big guy – I’m 6’3”, 300 pounds – so they’re like, ‘Yeah, do you want to be a doorman?’*
This finding echoes the literature on nightclub bouncers, which emphasizes the immense importance of bouncers’ physicality (Hobbs et al. 2005; see also DeMichele and Tewksbury 2004; Rigakos 2008). In this context, as Sal (manager) insisted, physically intimidating bouncers may also increase dancers’ perception of security.

We have already seen (in Chapter 7) that bouncers perform aggressive masculinity to control customers. Like the bouncers in DeMichele and Tewksbury’s (2004) research, Scott (bouncer and manager) felt that he also had to perform for his colleagues:

\[
\text{A lot of them felt that I had a non-violent approach, like I was a sissy at one point, because I went like a month without fighting or something like that. And then, it takes one fight, you know, you take on four guys by yourself kind of deal and you, you walk away, then, you know, it's almost like you need to re-establish yourself every once in a while. Uh, that's within the staff. Because of the fact that they all knew I was going to university, they expected me to be, you know, walking with spectacle glasses, the educated. It was a weird balance between the two, being a strip club bouncer and a university student.}
\]

Here we see class, gender and racial scripts – of the ‘soft’ (white, male) scholar versus the (white) working class ‘man’s man’ (see Kimmel 2013; Whitehead 2002; Willis 1977) – intersecting in Scott’s perception of his colleagues’ expectations of him (see Pinel 2004). This suggests that in order to fulfill organizational expectations, bouncers must supplement their masculine performance with occasional displays of physical aggression. This finding echoes Hobbs et al.’s framing of “bouncing as class work” in which violence is drawn upon as a resource (2005: 10; see also Rigakos 2008).

**Acting the part: Friendliness versus professionalism**

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73 When compared against the ‘pimp’ discourse (see Chapter 6), in which black men are characterized as dangerous, underclass criminals, the toughness described by Willis (1977) as part of working class culture can be seen as relatively safe, rendering toughness as protection white by default.
The way that third parties interpret the expectations of their social role impacts their performance of it (Dahrendorf 1968). Because strip clubs, like bars more generally, are customer-service oriented businesses, third parties are expected to be friendly to customers, and, as in any job, convivial with co-workers. However, the sexually charged culture of the ‘party’ environment appears to make it difficult for some to separate friendliness from flirtatiousness, which can slip into sexual harassment. Of course sexual harassment is not unique to the sex industry, and has been identified as particularly problematic in the service industry (see Banerjee et al. 2008; Erickson 2010). Furthermore organizations with a human resources framework for addressing sexual harassment may not entirely or effectively prevent it (Basford et al. 2014; Brewis & Linstead 2000). However, the ‘party’ environment normalizes behaviour for third parties that dancers may experience as sexual harassment. As a result, third parties’ performances of friendliness as flirtatiousness risk being defined by dancers as unprofessional.

Some third parties framed flirtatiousness and professionalism as mutually exclusive, associating the former with sexual harassment or assault. Underscoring his professionalism, Jimmy (DJ) proudly stated:

*I never ever done anything to [dancers], never made any advances, never made any moves, because I knew that if I was gonna do this job, the only way to fly straight and to be, I guess, safe, was to not be that creepy DJ [...] like just when they’re picking their music, they’re putting their hands all over the girls and stuff, and like, getting them to sit on their lap. I’m not about that. I was raised a very respectful person. I know that, if I come to work, it’s really all I’m there for. I’m not—you know, you don’t mess around. And I was respected for that.*
Similarly Sal recalled dancers advising him not to make sexual (and especially physical) advances when he first began his career, as a DJ. With time and a promotion to manager, Sal grew increasingly uncomfortable with dancers flirting with him:

I’m 36 now, and I’ve got girls who are you know, like I guess I’m almost old enough to be their father and they’re like, you know, flirting with me and stuff like that, and it’s kind of weird. [...] when I was in my 20s and even when I was like 30 or something, like if a 20-year-old girl came up and flirted with me, I didn’t feel strange about it. I was like, hey, cool, yeah. But now [...] I’m not the one hitting on them, but I feel like a creep [laughs].

Sal’s and Jimmy’s experiences suggest that sexual harassment does not necessarily result from organizational authority (see Brewis & Linstead 2000), and moreover, that the ‘party’ environment also shapes dancers’ behaviour towards third parties.

Other third parties use flirting as a strategy to relate to dancers. Describing his approach to dancers as “professional, up-front,” Studley (DJ) also said “I flirt a lot when I’m working [...] it helps me break the ice with the girls a bit and kind of keep it on an unserious level.” Similarly Fuzzy (DJ) explained that, endeavouring to maintain a fun atmosphere, “I will harmlessly flirt with [dancers]. They will harmlessly flirt back, but at the end of the day, we all know that I’m the safety guy. They all know that I’m just talk.”

Although we have no way of ascertaining if this accurately reflects his colleagues’ perceptions of him, Fuzzy’s comment suggests that the ‘party’ environment is so engrained in organizational culture that third parties act as consumers as well as producers of its atmosphere.

While some dancers described third parties with whom they worked as both (or interchangeably) flirtatious and professional, others felt that sexual comments negated professionalism. Nonetheless, dancers are aware that many third parties engage with them and/or their colleagues flirtatiously, and instrumentally (and sometimes
begrudgingly) accommodate third parties’ invitations to participate in sexual banter or flirtation. For Brigitte (focus group B), these invitations felt like expectations she had to accommodate: “I would feel like if I didn’t flirt back with them that, like, it would cause problems.” That said Carrie (focus group B) was of the opinion that “flirting [...] will just [only] get you so far.” Not all dancers elected to respond to this behaviour in kind, however. Charlene (focus group B) insisted “I don’t flirt”; instead, resisting the seemingly common expectation amongst third parties of a sexualized interaction, she elected to keep her conversations personal but professional in order to ensure that “they’re always willing to help me out because I’m always interested in what they’re doing as people.” However Leigh and Jen (focus group B) recounted instances in which approaching third parties professionally was less effective than flirting. In short, some dancers used gendered and sexual scripts to their advantage, while several rejected them in favour of a non-gendered (i.e., professional) approach. Others found it easier to avoid interacting with third parties when possible.

Because some dancers interacted with him in the same way as they performed for customers in the front region, Scott (bouncer and manager) felt entitled to take certain liberties that other dancers did not welcome:

You know, with some girls, you know, they're in character, they're being the [...] seducing kind of girl or happy boppy go happy, I'm fun kind of girl, whatever. It's a second persona they develop on stage. And, sometimes, they do it with us as well, doormen, whatever. You know, they come in, they tease us. You know, they might come in and just grab our cock, you know, playing at one second and walk away, that sort of thing. You know, I might walk up and slap another one's ass. Now, with some girls, that was okay. [...] some other girls [...] they don't appreciate [that] and they give me shit.

Here we see how some dancers conforming to what they perceive as an expectation of flirtatiousness may be advantageous for them but appears to encourage behaviour that
other dancers experience as sexual harassment. Of course third parties who interpret flirtatiousness as a unilateral invitation to make sexual advances on dancers are effectively disregarding individual dancers’ right to refuse them (i.e., consent). While it is possible that some of the ‘fun’ dancers whom Scott described were merely participating in a joking sexual interaction that was not an instrumental performance, in contrast to Lerum’s (2004) findings dancers who participated in this study did not frame such interactions as “sexual camaraderie,” but instead as camaraderie or (tolerable or harmful) sexualized interaction. This aligns with Erickson’s (2010) finding that sexual harassment is both a characteristic of, and difficult to address in, a sexually overt work culture. Moreover, although some managers found men who are distracted by the dancers to be undesirable workers, it appears the only rule governing third party behaviour toward dancers (see Chapter 6) pertains to dating/sex. As Ashley (dancer) pointed out however, “a lot of where your money comes from is how you act towards other people” and as we have seen in the economy of favours (see Chapter 7), such unprofessional behaviour may negatively impact third parties’ income from tips.

**Perceiving co-worker performances: Interacting in the front region**

Because both dancers and third parties are always (with the exception of DJs) in the public spaces, or front regions, of the club, their interactions are informed by their necessarily ongoing performances of disparate roles: the dancers, as beguiling seductresses of customers (as opposed to reliable or rights-demanding workers); the managers and bouncers, as tough-guy overseers of public order (as opposed to organizational superiors or service providers with whom workers can reason and negotiate, or ask for help and support). As this section will argue, perceiving their co-
workers’ performance in the front region impacts the way third parties and dancers interact with each other, as well as how they perceive one another as working or not working. Thus although third parties may be aware that “everybody in there is wearing a mask, you know. Nobody is who they really are” (Studley, DJ/supervisor), there may be little chance for them to become acquainted with who dancers ‘really are’ (and vice versa). Third parties’ and dancers’ perceptions of each other are also informed by the parallel structures: dancers are not privy to all of third parties’ back region activities, and third parties do not see all of dancers’ performances (e.g., in private areas with customers). In this respect, although dancers and third parties collaborate to create the ‘party’ environment for customers, they constitute separate performance teams (Goffman 1959), leading to an incomplete understanding of what the other does. As we will see, to make sense of each others’ performances third parties and dancers rely on organizational and social discourses and stigmatic assumptions (see Hannem 2012; Hacking 2004), in turn reproducing them; this undermines professional relationships and emotional wellbeing at the workplace.

Taking care of the ‘girls’: Third party condescension

As in the findings of Bruckert (2002) and Price (2008; see also Price-Glynn 2010), third parties predominantly use the word ‘girls’ – not women, not workers – to refer to dancers.74 This habit reflects the dominant association between youth, desirability and sexiness, to stereotypical tropes of vapid female vanity. At the same time, it is an infantilizing term that perpetuates a framing of dancers as unreliable and unintelligent, and suggests an attitude of paternalism and condescension towards them.

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74 This term has become so normative in strip clubs that even dancers reproduce it.
Underlying the construction of dancers as ‘girls’ appears to be an assumption that beautiful women are unlikely to be intelligent. As a manager Adam was careful to screen dancers in his hiring process because he believed that “not all good looking women are smart or sane [but] the best looking women tend not to have any brains and they require a lot of babysitting.” Not wanting to threaten their professional relationships, dancers tolerated comments made by third parties that were indicative of such attitudes – for example Sasha (focus group A) reported that, “one DJ that I worked with [...] spent a lot of time complaining about how stupid the girls were, which I didn’t really like, but I wanted him to be on my side, so I kind of just listened to that.” This sentiment was also evident in the way third parties talked about, or compared themselves to, dancers. For example, in a discussion about the skills required for his job and how he learned them, Scott (doorman and manager) said: “I learned some negotiation skills [...] I mean, I can't believe I'm saying this; I learned a few things from the dancers.” Thus whether through a dichotomous view of women as either beautiful or smart, or simply by positioning them as inferior (to men), these comments suggest perceptions of dancers – and women – as unintelligent.

As Marie (dancer) pointed out, dancers’ performances for customers can also perpetuate the stereotype of dancers being uneducated:

*Talking to customers and stuff, they don’t want to hear about, like, your career goals and—well some of them do, but generally speaking, no. So, you know, you kind of learn not to talk about those things [...] Cause to make more money you act, like dumber [...] and you don’t talk about serious things or about goals and about school, cause when you do, some guys would get turned off by that, cause some guys want to feel like they’re in power, or they’re, you know, superior to you. [...] So yeah, I guess by your actions you kind of perpetuate that stigma [...] or stereotypes against dancers, I guess.*
While Marie consciously used the stereotype to her advantage by limiting her conversation about other life goals at work, this may inform third parties’ impressions as well. Indeed dancers reported that managers also did not expect them to be in school. For example when Marie came to work from class,

*I'd be dressed in, like, student clothes and with my bag to go to work, and then I got in to work and the strip club manager, he's like, 'Oh you know every time I see you I always think that I would never guess that you're a dancer' [...] And then you think, well, what is it supposed to look like, you know?

Donna (focus group A) had similarly received a mix of condescension and praise when she “had some managers be happy for me that I was in school and say, ‘Good girl. Good girl. Spend your money on school.’”

As with assumptions about dancers’ lack of education and/or intelligence, third parties’ impressions of dancers are informed by intersecting classism and sexism, and frequently included assumptions of: exploitative or abusive romantic relationships, “bad relationships with their parents” (Adam, DJ and manager), lack of marketable skills, financial desperation, addiction, and coercion. In short their impressions echo stereotypical tropes about dancers (and sex workers in general) as damaged, underclass women, and stripping as a last resort rather than an (informed, contextualized or constrained) occupational choice (see also Jeffrey & MacDonald 2006a & b; Halgrimsdottir et al. 2005). Often, this appears to result in third parties not viewing dancers as workers. These perceptions of dancers as vulnerable and lacking in moral judgment suggest that the discourses of risk and immorality identified in *Chapter 5* hold more truth (see Foucault 1977) amongst third parties than that of labour.

Some third parties, however, did not subscribe to these stereotypical tropes. For example Dalton (DJ and manager) and Marcus (doorman/bouncer), who had both been in
committed romantic relationships with sex workers (a dancer and an escort, respectively) shared the sentiment that the erotic dance sector comprises “a huge spectrum of women and their ideas” (Dalton). Gilles (manager) also thought of dancers as “Like any worker I work with and for since – just a worker.” It is interesting to note that Dalton, Marcus, Gilles, Sal (manager) and Tony (manager/DJ), who most appeared to see dancers as ordinary workers, also reported high levels of satisfaction with their job.

Nonetheless dancers reported feeling “a very, very, sometimes condescending attitude towards dancers” from third parties (Monica). Shane (dancer) added that DJs, bouncers and managers “would treat the dancers in very dehumanizing ways, like, I guess, a different class of women, and then like, just more like children I guess, but in a weird sexual way.” Indeed like the managers described by Murphy (2003) and Price (2008), third parties’ comments about dancers exhibit condescension, paternalism, and often, gendered and/or sexual expectations. Not only did they often refer to dancers as ‘girls’ but they also described them as irresponsible, unreliable and in need of counselling and close supervision. Seven out of 15 third party participants used the word ‘babysit’ when describing their responsibilities in regard to dancers. For example although his job was security, George also described himself as “a glorified babysitter. [...] I’m either babysitting drunk, immature men or I’m babysitting women that are drunk and can’t defend themselves or [...] that do extras.”

Sometimes these paternalistic attitudes manifest in third parties offering unsolicited advice to dancers. For example Studley (DJ) would advise dancers about their careers and the decisions they made in their lives: “every once in a while, I’d take a girl aside, and I’d say, ‘You know what, you don’t belong in this industry. Like, it’s going to
eat you alive, you know. The cool person you are is going to be gone; it’s going to suck the soul out of you.’ And [...] 99 percent of the time, I was ignored.” Although there are elements of moral superiority in Studley’s presumption that he knows better than dancers what is good for them, this sentiment may also arise from concern and frustration. In this regard Kelly (bartender) used the word ‘babysit’ to describe the way she feels attempting to ensure dancers do not drink and drive, as well as monitoring their drug consumption.

Framing the dancers as ‘girls’ who require ‘babysitting’ also speaks to third parties perceiving dancers as unprofessional; for example Chico (DJ) shared that, “I’d like to see girls treat it more as a 9-to-5 job, like if you come in for five hours, kick some butt for five hours, you know. Do your job; don’t bitch; don’t complain [...] take it seriously kind of attitude.” Such perceptions may impact third parties’ responses to dancers’ work-related grievances. For example after a financial conflict with a client, Jenna (dancer) recalled:

Basically for three hours it was supposed to be $1200, and he [the manager] got me $700 and said: ‘Well I think you’ve made enough money today.’ [...] it’s not like the guy didn’t have the money or whatever, it’s that after $700, he stopped pressing for the matter, like he just thought that was arbitrarily enough. And it’s like, that’s half of the—you know, a little more than half.

Here it appears that, in deciding how much money is ‘enough’ for Jenna, her manager fails to recognize her as a worker and in turn a victim of theft of service. Donna (focus group A) had witnessed a similar situation. Thus third parties’ perceptions of dancers as immature ‘girls’ they have to ‘babysit’ and morally educate invisibilizes dancers’ grievances, as well as their skills and judgment, as workers.

**Performing and manipulating appropriate femininity: Dancers’ class and attitude**
Third parties’ perception of dancers as non- or other than workers is informed by the continuity of their performance for customers in the front regions of the club (see Goffman 1959). That said, dancers are aware of the effects of their performances, and some manipulate the intersecting gender, racial and class scripts that comprise appropriate performances of femininity in the strip club to forge productive relationships with third parties as well as customers. As we will see however, some dancers do not have the physical attributes or are unable to produce the appropriate attitude to perform effectively in this regard.

Kristen (dancer) explained the ramifications of dancers acting as outgoing salespeople who are simultaneously ultra-feminine:

> You kind of have the perception of being a diva by the people that are familiar with the industry, so the managers, the bouncers. [...] I have had experiences where I was told I was not high-maintenance enough, that I would be more successful, more likeable and all this, if I was more high-maintenance [...] You know, ‘Buy me a drink,’ instead of waiting ’til you’re offered. You know, instead of talking to somebody for a bit, kind of feeling them out, and then maybe asking if they are interested in a private dance, you kind of would go, ‘Hey honey, let’s go for a dance’ [...] [like] a high-maintenance shark – you’re like a pageant girl and a shark at the same time.

While being a ‘high-maintenance shark’ may be an effective way to interact with customers, third parties also criticized dancers for having ‘attitude’ or causing ‘drama.’ According to Kelly (bartender), dancers’ ‘attitude’ is exacerbated by drunkenness:

> “they’re rude, and they yell, and they want what they want right now, and they don’t care if they’re 5th in line or 10th in line, they’re gonna get it.” For Jimmy (DJ), such behaviour was insufferable:

> I don’t want to be treated like I’m lesser than you. And often they’ll [dancers] do that. They’ll be—they’re on this horse where it’s just so high, and they’re like, ‘Nobody can touch me. I make this much money a week. Blah blah blah. I drive a
leased Lexus.’ [...] I’m like, you can either go on stage or you can’t. [...] I just didn’t have any time for people like that.

Jimmy’s comment suggests that third parties’ attachment to discourses of gender superiority and organizational authority (see Whitehead 2002) may be informed by feelings of being undervalued by, and having little control in, the organizational structure (see Willmott 1997).

Interestingly, according to dancers, ‘drama’ – for example fights between dancers or scenes resulting from extreme intoxication – elicits heavier discipline from third parties than drug use or ‘extras.’ Sal (manager) confirms this:

*If they [dancers] just follow the rules and whatever, you know, I mean, I let them bend some of the rules a little bit and stuff, and so that makes me, like, cool in their eyes. So they know that as long as they just go in and do their thing, there’s no drama and they’re not, like, starting shit with other girls and stuff like that, then everything’s gonna be cool.*

Jimmy’s (DJ) description of this ‘drama’ draws on tropes of female hysteria and underclass toughness: “you get to see these crazy sides of these girls. They get into fights sometimes, and one girl the other day was like, fighting another girl with scissors.” Of course as Studley (DJ/supervisor) points out, physically assaulting a co-worker is unacceptable (indeed it would be grounds for dismissal at any job): “*Girls argue all the time, but if there’s any sort of physical abuse – one or the other taking punches at the other – then both the girls are gone [fired].”* However Kristen (dancer) found that interpersonal conflicts were treated differently depending on which of the parallel structures each participant was a member:

*Usually if there’s a conflict [...] you resolve it between the two of you, or you’re gone, because they’re [managers are] always going to take the side of the paid worker, because the dancers pay to be there, and the people who are on the pay roll, I feel, like the DJs, the bouncers [...] they’re harder to replace.*
Dancers can, however, augment their perceived value to third parties by presenting as ‘high maintenance,’ as suggested by Kristen above – it is here that class becomes important. Having come from an economically disadvantaged background, Shane (dancer) reflected on how her personal front (Goffman 1959) had impacted her success as a dancer:

*I definitely was like, tacky looking. I wasn’t like, fancy, I didn’t have like, expensive outfits or anything, and I didn’t have expensive shoes, or—and my outfits, a lot of them were hand-made, so um, I didn’t notice that that was affecting me at the time. But now in my life [as an escort], I definitely like go the extra mile to like, at least pretend I look a little classier so I can make more money and be respected more. [...] looking rich in the sex industry is important if you want respect.Indeed Shane, whose performance of femininity as a dancer had been additionally limited by her short hair (she soon began wearing hair extensions), had felt a profound lack of respect from the bouncers, who severely disciplined and humiliated her. This in turn affected her security insofar as she did not feel comfortable asking for their help: “The bouncers, it was just like, don’t even try talking to them, you’re not a human being to them [...] I just felt so disrespected by them.” Shane’s experience stands in sharp contrast to Monica’s (dancer) recollection of clients complementing her middle class attributes:

*They would say something like, ‘Oh, you have really nice teeth, like I really like that you’re middle class,’ [...] I never had so many compliments on my teeth before in my life, and then that kind of showed me the privilege I had growing up, because I came from a rich suburb where everyone had dentists [...]*

With her conventionally attractive aesthetic, Monica was financially successful as a dancer and was seldom disciplined by third parties. This echoes DeMichele and Tewksbury’s finding that “the most attractive” dancers, who are also often “big money makers” (2004: 548-549) are virtually exempt from disciplinary repercussions for rule breaking. By virtue of being privileged through conforming to normative and industry
aesthetic and behavioural expectations, certain (i.e., white, heteronormative, slim, young) dancers’ privilege is amplified (see also Brooks 2010; 1997; Bruckert 2002).

In addition to their performance of class, how dancers perform race can also affect their income. As an Aboriginal woman with light skin, Shane (dancer) has always been aware of the advantage garnered by her ability to pass as white in the sex industry: “I realized you go down in value if you’re, like, Indigenous or a person of colour. So yeah sometimes I feel shitty because I will identify [myself] as white in my work and make a lot more money because of that [...] when I work and say I’m French.” Ross and Greenwell similarly note that, because colonial discourse casts Native women as sexualized but outside of the Western beauty ideal, “a biracial First Nations dancer’s best chance of success lay in passing herself off as anything other than Native” (2005: 153). Of course the extent to which dancers can perform race is limited by interpretations of their skin colour and features, which may strongly evoke and therefore be relatively fixed to one racial presentation, or alternatively, enable them accommodate a range of desires by passing as various ethnicities (Raguparan 2015).

Furthermore, the way third parties distinguish between being ‘high maintenance’ enough and having too much ‘attitude’ may be informed by race. Consider, for example, the following comment by Tony (manager/DJ):

A couple weeks ago I got a call from the bartender at The Candy Apple saying there’s two black girls that gave him terrible attitude, so they were almost physically removed from The Candy Apple, and they called us to give us a heads up, cause they heard, they were overheard saying ‘well lets go to Charlie’s’ [...] so we, you know, watch each others’ back.75

Tony’s specification that the two dancers with “terrible attitude” were “black girls” suggests the possibility of closer monitoring of racialized (and, given Jill’s relatively

75 The names of the two strip clubs in this passage have been changed.
conflict-free relationship with managers, specifically black) women – not only by individual third parties but amongst them and across clubs. While Ross and Greenwell (2005) have argued that third parties hold racialized expectations of black dancers’ stage performances, this practice suggests that black women’s personal fronts may also be read through a racist lens, leading to stricter discipline for what is perceived as more inappropriate ‘attitude.’

To avoid being read as having too much ‘attitude,’ dancers modify their behaviour in their appeals to third parties for help. Finding that the bouncers and managers were not always willing to intervene when she needed them, especially those with whom she was not on “friendlier terms,” Jenna (dancer) sometimes used the following strategy: “you just look really, really sad until they just fix it so that you’ll stop pouting and bothering them [laughs].” At the same time as it confirms third parties’ impression of dancers as childish, this strategy also draws on stereotypical assumptions about third parties, namely that as men (and not professionals, for example) they are susceptible to dancers’ feminine wiles. However as Studley (DJ) explained,

The stereotypes are only temporary until they get to realize that I’m not who they’ve stereotyped me to be, and then they’re more surprised, I think, than anything, you know, or – not always pleasantly, either. [Laughs] You know, like I say, once they realize that they can’t sweet-talk me to get their way or flash me a bit of boob or something, that – you know, then the attitudes change drastically.

While dancers’ manipulation of gender and sexual scripts – visible in Jenna’s performance of helplessness and dancers’ flirting – has been noted in the literature (see Bruckert 2002; Colosi 2010a; Frank 2003; Lavin 2013), Studley’s comment suggests that such strategies may not be consistently effective.
It is important to note that although performing ‘attitude’ can sometimes include sexual banter or flirtation this is not always the case. In this regard some dancers used ‘attitude’ strategically in negotiating with third parties – Monica referred to her approach as “kind of demanding [...] aggressive.” According to Kristen (dancer) this behaviour is in keeping with the inversion of gender at strip clubs described by Frank (2003): “the women become more aggressive, like I usually describe this job as, you know, a man comes into the club and it’s like sharks at a feeding frenzy.” Similarly Jill (dancer), who did not earn as much money as some of her colleagues, thought that aggressiveness and performance were essential to succeed: “it’s not like I want to be there for fun, you know, like hanging out in my fuckin’ underwear, being rejected [...] I’m not pushy the way that other girls are pushy, and I feel uncomfortable lying.” Although Sasha (focus group A) claimed to be “not much of an actress,” she approached third parties with whatever attitude was effective, using a friendly tone with the DJs and putting on a more insistent, or “nagging,” tone when negotiating with the manager about her schedule. These approaches share in the familiar trope of female ‘bossiness’; notably although aggressiveness and self-promotion are interpreted unfavourably in women in ‘mainstream’ organizational leadership (Guadagno & Cialdini 2007; Rudman 1998), they appear to be both expected and effective qualities in female erotic dancers. Thus while Frank (2003) notes that dancers invert gender by performing as the active sexual subjects in their interactions with male customers, they also invert normative expectations of gendered workplace behaviour with third parties.
Other dancers adopted more casual approaches. For example Marie (dancer) attempted to use her “positive relationship” with third parties as a platform for straightforward negotiation, which did not always work to her advantage:

*I find just being the most honest is what helped me, like just saying, ‘Listen, I’ve had this really crazy day, I’m exhausted, my contact lenses are going to fall out of my eyes [laughs], like can I just go home?’ And, yeah I guess sometimes it would work, they’d say yes, but sometimes if the manager was in a bad mood or the bouncer, he would just say no, or if there was not enough girls, it depends on a lot.*

Ashley (dancer) also found that she could foster good working relationships with third parties by being nice and friendly without having to perform like she did with customers. Like Marie she reported that she preferred to be honest and friendly with third parties and found that for the most part they acted professionally. It is important to note that both Ashley and Marie are white, blond, women who conform to the Western beauty ideal, and given the importance of dancers’ personal fronts to their relationships with third parties, as demonstrated by the contrast between Monica and Shane above, this may have contributed to the success of their casual approaches. At the same time, considering Marie’s remarking that being honest yielded inconsistent effects, it appears as though ‘bossiness’ may be more effective. Thus although not all dancers espoused it, ‘high-maintenance’ aggressive femininity, when performed neither too rudely nor too ‘dramatically’ (in other words consistent with expectations of whiteness and ‘classiness’), appears to be both an acceptable and efficient strategy for dancers to manipulate, win favour with, or contest the authority of third parties. Because such performances do not disrupt third parties’ expectations however, and sometimes do not subvert organizational power relations either, they more closely resemble ambiguous accommodations to authority than resistance (see Burawoy 1979; Prasad & Prasad 1998).
“They just stand around and jingle their change”\textsuperscript{76}: Third parties as not working

While dancers’ performances in the front region may cloud third parties’ perceptions of them as workers, it seems dancers may not recognize some third parties as working either; instead, some participants had the impression that bouncers and managers were merely ‘hanging around’ the strip club like the men in the audience. Indeed if bouncers and managers regulate customer behaviour by being aggressive masculine \textit{presences} ready to react but not wanting to disrupt the ‘party’ environment unnecessarily (as we saw in the previous two chapters), it is understandable that dancers may fail to recognize this performance as a conscientious effort. This lack of recognition of each others’ work, in which stigma also plays a role (as we will examine later in the chapter), contributes to a mutual lack of respect amongst dancers and third parties.

Just as dancers did not appreciate third parties’ surveillance duties, it appears that even some club owners (who are seldom in the front region) interpret bouncers’ presence as non-work, as Scott (doorman and manager) explained:

\begin{quote}
[The owner] felt that the doormen were getting paid to stand around. […] So, he started dropping more and more work for us. That includes going in the back and restocking the beer bottles, removing the empty beer boxes, clearing tables at the end, things like that.
\end{quote}

Diverting bouncers’ attention away from monitoring customers, especially around closing time when customers may be the most inebriated and thus more likely to cause trouble, may have negative ramifications for workplace safety. Of course as Reverend (manager and head doorman) admitted, security work can feel like doing very little when things are running smoothly in the club: “\textit{you have the easiest job most of the time. You get to sit

\textsuperscript{76} Quotation from Leigh (focus group B).
around; you get to chill out; you almost get to just chat with people and relax.” When trouble does arise however,

“It’s very physically demanding [...] you literally put your life on the line at times. You go from having – I’m relaxing, having a cigarette to literally running straight into a brawl sometimes to break it up where I’ve had my head cracked open; I’ve had my jaw broken; I’ve broken ribs; I’ve taken layers of skin out of my head, broken a collarbone, my hand, my nose. (Reverend)

Reverend’s experiences of workplace violence certainly contrast with popular assumptions framing third parties as risky or victimizers.

Dancers’ perception of third parties as not working also draws on their own classist perceptions of blue-collar workers as unskilled, unintelligent, or dubious:

I guess [pauses] it’s not always kind of the people with the best judgment who are hired to work in strip clubs or who choose to work in strip clubs [...] like males, adults, who’ve been working in the entertainment industry for a long time, like, people who are, like doormen or bartenders and they kind of make a life out of it, you know, like people with not much education or who don’t necessarily have a lot of other career options, you know, so it’s kind of, some people it’s like a last resort. [...] when you’re 50 and been a bouncer all your life, where are you gonna go? (Marie, dancer)

This can also be compared to stigmatic assumptions about dancers, who as we saw above are perceived to choose dancing as a desperate solution in the face of few options. In this respect normative judgments and stigmatic assumptions by both dancers and third parties diminish solidarity, empathy, and respect amongst them.

Such perceptions embolden some dancers to resist third parties. Monica (dancer) shared Marie’s opinion of third parties as underclass men and additionally thought of them as undeserving of her respect. Reflecting on her middle-class values, Monica described: “just seeing through them [third parties] and seeing them as ineffectual monkeys [...] and so I treated them like they didn’t have any power.” In concert with her conventionally attractive aesthetic – slim, young (Monica had worked from age 19 into
her early 20s), “blond and white and, I don’t know, no drama, like I didn’t do drugs or anything” – Monica channelled her “attitude of superiority” into a vehicle of resistance, enabling her to disregard her club’s scheduling policy: “it didn’t matter when I came in; I never seemed to get in trouble. […] I just like, wouldn’t show up or I would come in when I wanted, and just drift in and out.” Thus, like third parties who perceived themselves as superior to dancers by virtue of their gender and/or occupation (i.e., the “status shield” [Ashforth et al. 2007] garnered from not participating in lap dancing), dancers who felt superior in class also saw third parties as non-workers. As we will see in the coming sections, stigma also intersects with perceptions of class in comparisons drawn by club workers between stripping and prostitution, and third parties and ‘pimps,’ to discredit and invisibilize dancers’ and third parties’ labour.

**Perpetuating stigma: Dancing around prostitution and pimping**

Contributing to the structural tension and mutual disrespect between third parties and dancers is the proximity – both discursively and (albeit to an unknown extent) in practice – of stripping to prostitution. While (some) dancers’ uneasiness about being associated with sex work has been noted by Bouclin (2006, 2009) and Bruckert (2002), it appears third parties share in this feeling. This section addresses third parties’ and dancers’ discomfort with ‘extras’ and exploitative behaviour (read through the lens of the ‘pimp’ discourse introduced in Chapter 6), respectively, as well as how these perceptions are linked to the reproduction of stigma.

**‘Dirty girls’ and discomfort with prostitution**

Echoing the intersecting discourses of harm, immorality and prostitution articulated by municipal officials and (some) dancers and third parties in Chapter 5, a
common observation made by third parties who had enjoyed long careers in Ontario’s erotic dance sector was that touching and the proliferation of erotic massage parlours have irrevocably changed the industry. As Sal (manager) recounted,

*I can remember the second club that I ever worked at, when I was a DJ, and girls were coming up to me and they were complaining about this one girl that worked on the day shift with us: ‘Oh yeah, she’s dirty […] she’s back there in VIP and this guy is touching her boobs’ […] And then fast forward, like 15 years later, or whatever and that, I think, is pretty much a standard now, and I mean that’s sort of like the base and it just kinda [laughs] goes from there. […] the only way that the strip club industry could survive I guess was to move in that direction, because of the rub and tugs. […] I don’t even know how much they are but it’s like a fraction of what you would pay for lap dances. […] And you go, and you’re guaranteed to get your whatever, right? Whereas strip clubs, it was $20 a song, and depending on what girl you had, you could touch her boobs maybe, or maybe not, you know? So yeah, it just kind of manifested into what it is today. And I really, really, really hated it at first […] I was trying to keep the faith in the back of my head, I’m like, you know, they’re not all bad, it’s just like, a handful of these girls who are doing this stuff. You know, the rest of them are still good, good girls. And now, I just feel like it’s almost gone the other way. Now there’s like handful of good girls and then the rest of them are up to something.*

Sal’s comment refers to the initial years of lap dancing, during which time touching muddied the previously clear boundary between erotic dance and prostitution (Lewis 2000), and a distinction between ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ emerged (see DERA 2002). As Sal illustrates, even though the norm has shifted from a visual display (table dancing) to a tactile experience (lap dancing), the ‘good girl’/ ‘bad girl’ dichotomy remains. Many other third party participants similarly insisted that stripping and prostitution “should be different” (Scott, bouncer and manager) both on a moral and pragmatic (business) level.

Palpable discomfort with prostitution is visible in the following narrative by Adam (DJ and manager):

*Sexual contact is, for the club, is wrong. It's not supposed to be that way. Suggestive contact is exactly what it's supposed to be about. A guy comes in and gets his, gets a dance from, you know, he's married, unmarried, every guy has got a girl who's a fantasy girl. To get a dance from a girl who's the guy's fantasy girl*
and have suggestive contact is harmless. [...] Because he's fulfilled a fantasy and now he's, you know, he goes home happy. And I think that's okay.

Ironically, the desire to differentiate stripping from prostitution, which was dominant amongst third party participants in this study, contrasts with the actions of Ontario strip club owners’ advocacy groups, which advocated in favour of lap dancing in the 1990s (Bouclin 2004b; OAEBA v Metropolitan Toronto 1995 & 1997) and for the softening of Toronto’s touching bylaws in the 2010s. Notably the campaign to change Toronto’s bylaws articulated a labour discourse that appears to contradict the perceptions held by third parties at the club level, who instead see dancers as ‘girls’ who are ‘up to something’ and prostitution as ‘wrong,’ echoing discourses of risk and immorality identified in Chapter 5. More recently the AEAC, a club owners’ advocacy group, even advocated (unsuccessfully) for the decriminalization of prostitution and, in tandem, permission for “qualified entertainment clubs to provide enhanced services (i.e., prostitution)… [in] separately licensed areas within existing… clubs” (MPC 2014: 6) previous to the introduction of Canada’s new prostitution laws (see Bill C-36 2014). This discrepancy between owners, who are apparently in favour of additional sexual services in strip clubs, and many of the third parties who participated in this study (some of whom felt that advocacy by owners does not reflect their – or dancers’ – interests), may be related to the amount of time they spend in the clubs; whereas owners are seldom present in the club, the third parties they employ to operate it confront and manage ‘extras’ on a routine (if not daily) basis.

Third parties’ discomfort with prostitution also informs their interactions with dancers. It appears this is especially the case with bouncers, perhaps because they are the third parties most often tasked with monitoring dancers’ behaviour to ensure it does not
resemble prostitution. Unfortunately it can be in these instances that bouncers’ stigmatic perceptions of dancers affect their reactions to rule breaking, even when it is instigated by customers against dancers’ will. For example Shane (dancer) described scenarios wherein “the client was trying to finger me or something, and I flipped out [...] and then I got in trouble for accusing the client of doing that. [...] Basically got screamed at [by a bouncer] and called a whore and all sorts of different names.” This reaction by the bouncer illustrates the mutual reinforcement of the “whore stigma” and assumptions of unchastity (Pheterson 1998), as well as how, once defined as unchaste, women are understood as implicitly and generally consenting to sexual acts (Comack & Balfour 2004; see also Smart 1989). Furthermore it demonstrates how structural stigma at the level of municipal regulation pervades third party surveillance of dancers and reinforces interpersonal stigma (Hannem 2012). This is especially visible in the way Kristen (dancer) came to be discredited in the eyes of a bouncer at her club, affecting their future interactions:

A client made a move to touch me inappropriately, I smacked his hand away, bouncer’s walking by and said I didn’t smack his hand away fast enough and he became really upset with me and started accusing me of doing a lot of things that I didn’t do, and he said that I was going to be kicked out [...] And I had to argue my point and my case, and in the end he let me stay [...] and he became very sexually grabby with me after that point, almost as if, ‘I let you stay here, so you’re—you know, I can grab your ass when you walk in, I can tell you where I want to stick it in you,’ even though he was married and very open about that.

Not all the dancers who participated in this study reported feeling stigmatized by third parties, nor did most (save for Shane) think that third parties were universally unprofessional. For example Marie (dancer) “never felt judged by them for [being a dancer]. Like I think to them, it’s normal.” Indeed we have seen this attitude with some third party participants, particularly those who appear content with their job. Kelly
(bartender) even provides information about a local sex worker organization to dancers who offer services outside of the club.

**The ‘pimp’ as anti-hero**

Discomfort with prostitution also manifests in third parties’ engagement with the ‘pimp’ discourse. Just as they drew a distinction between stripping and prostitution, the majority of third party participants (including Eric, the driver/protection provider) actively endeavoured to differentiate themselves from the ‘pimp.’ In turn, dancers characterized third parties as, or compared them to, ‘pimps’ in order to discredit their character and/or their labour (see Goffman 1963). As we will see, these instances of stratification, which Goffman (1963: 105-106) describes as the dis-identification by stigmatized persons with individuals in their group who they perceive as exhibiting offensive and overt behavior that embodies negative stereotypes, perpetuate stigma amongst club workers.

While some dancers framed third parties as ineffectual (as non-workers or as unwilling to protect them), others saw them as agents of exploitation comparable to ‘pimps,’ especially when they were involved in extortion, for example when the economy of favours is abused (see Chapter 7). Echoing the organizational discourse constructing the ‘pimp’ (as discussed in Chapter 6), an important part of Jill’s interpretation of bouncers as ‘pimps’ is financial gain perceived as ill-gotten: “basically, they’re kind of doing, like, what pimps do [...] they’re not necessarily making as much money as an actual pimp would make, but they’re definitely receiving a benefit off of another girl doing work.” Perceiving financial transactions in the economy of favours as akin to pimping reinforces the stigma against third parties by discrediting their work, which in
turn can lead to counterproductive workplace relationships. According to George (doorman/bouncer), “[t]he dancers – they all just think we’re assholes until we do something for them.” Of course this is not universally the case – as we have seen, some dancers prefer to interact only minimally with third parties in order to maximize their productive working time and minimize the possibility of conflict.

The moral judgment and stigmatic assumptions of the ‘pimp’ discourse also foster disrespect amongst third parties, some of whom attributed qualities such as sexual impropriety or exploitation to their co-workers and other people affiliated with the erotic dance industry. For example although Sal (manager) was familiar with some driving services, he confessed that, “I’d rather get, like, a cool cabby that I trust,” framing drivers who focus solely on dancers as “kind of creepy.” A bartender who had worked in several strip clubs, Kelly insisted: “Every manager I’ve ever known was not a good person. [...] Except for the one. [...] if you want to do a job like that, you’re probably a dirtbag.” Although he himself had worked as a manager, Adam had also worked with managers as a DJ; reflecting on the latter experience, he described a manager with whom he had worked as “see[ing] dancers especially as a means to an end. I don't think he sees them as people at all. I think they're just meat that allows him to have a job and make money.” Additionally, like many of the dancer participants (and workers across the labour market – see Hodson 1999), third parties described their superiors or peers as corrupt, apathetic, or lacking in business acumen. Whether or not such perceptions are accurate, they nonetheless reflect Willmott’s (1997) suggestion that managers (in this case, other third parties as well) derive a sense of importance and accomplishment from the perceived failings of other employees. That these ascribed failings often dovetail with the
‘pimp’ discourse means that third parties reinforce stereotypes and stigma while
endeavouring to dissociate from them.

Much in the same way as they distanced themselves from prostitution,
distinguishing themselves from ‘pimps’ was important to third parties’ construction of
their job as work. As Gilles (manager) put it,

_I provide fantasy; I don’t provide sex. I provide, like, an environment where you
have a good time – one that’s fair, that’s legal. We respect all the law and
regulation, and we operate a good business. We can’t compare us to pimp or
massage parlour; that’s not what we provide at all._

Here we see Gilles bolstering the state-sanctioned (albeit tenuous) legitimacy of erotic
dance to shield his workplace from the stigma of prostitution and distinguish himself
from the discredited ‘pimp.’ Similarly Tony (manager/DJ) insisted: “It’s an honest living.
I’m not pimping.” This distinction often pivoted on the idea of choice, or taking or
controlling a woman’s money: “I’m not forcing anybody to do this job. They’re coming to
me looking for the work” (Studley, DJ/supervisor). Although like other third party
participants he acknowledged that his salary was indirectly funded by dancers’ labour
(insofar as they attract clients to, and therefore sustain the financial success of, the club),
Sal (manager) did not recognize any labour in ‘pimping’ at all: “I have a job […] those
guys are not employed. They’re just looking for a meal ticket.” As with comparisons by
dancers with their colleagues or other sex workers whom they perceive as less
professional, ‘classy,’ or otherwise inferior (Bouclin 2006; Bruckert 2002) this is of
course tantamount to stratification (Goffman 1963), insofar as third parties are situating
themselves as superior to their counterparts in other occupations, clubs, or sectors of the
sex industry. Hannem and Bruckert argue that although stratification may serve in
protecting stigmatized individuals’ self-worth it ultimately reproduces existing
stereotypes and the marginalization of the group as a whole (2012: 178; see also Bruckert 2002).

Even as they engaged in stratification, some third parties were critical of the prohibitive approaches to sex work taken by the state. For example Kelly (bartender) framed the regulatory context as facilitating exploitation by bouncers:

*I feel like the doormen take tips. They demand tips if they see things, and I feel like that’s just about what a pimp does. I feel very disgusted by it when I see it [...] And if it [lap dancing/prostitution] was like, more legal or less illegal or whatever, they [dancers] wouldn’t have to give anyone else their money [...] They tip the doormen to stay on their good side, but I don’t understand why the doormen think they deserve something, because nowhere at the club has anyone said, like, the girls can’t do extras.*

In suggesting that criminalization exacerbates exploitation by third parties, Kelly is echoing arguments made by academics, who in turn link it to a lack of recognition of work in the sex industry as labour (see Bruckert & Hannem 2013a; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009; van der Meulen & Durisin 2008). In this respect, Kelly’s comment can also be seen as illustrating the co-existence and circulation of conflicting discourses of labour and immorality (i.e., prostitution and the organizational ‘pimp’ discourses) in the strip club.

Other third parties only narrowly differentiated their jobs from ‘pimps.’ Dalton (manager and DJ) admitted that both pimping and managing involve manipulation, albeit on a different scale. For Jimmy (DJ), who was troubled by the ‘party’ environment and the role he played in reproducing it,

*There isn’t much [difference], really, when you think about it. I mean my job was to try and—I wouldn’t say manipulate, but try to kind of get a read on people and handle certain people a certain way. [...] And I essentially made money off what these girls did upstairs [in VIP], except I didn’t have any power over them. Everything that they did for me was of the kindness of their own heart. [...] But yeah, there are quite a lot of parallels [...] Probably another part of the reason why I didn’t like doing what I did, and why I had to get out.*
Although Dalton’s use of the term appeared absent of value judgment as compared to Jimmy’s, recalling the discussion in Chapter 6, manipulation is a key component of the discursive construction of the ‘pimp.’ Thus in addition to influencing their evaluation of unaffiliated third parties and their colleagues at the club, it seems the ‘pimp’ discourse pervades even club-affiliated third parties’ self-perceptions. For Jimmy, this appears to have discredited his work in his own esteem.

**Managing stigma as a third party**

As evinced in the way they positioned themselves in relation to the ‘pimp,’ third parties are eminently aware of the stigma they face (see Ashforth et al. 2007; Goffman 1963; Pinel 1999). Jimmy (DJ) enumerated the stigmatic assumptions about his work that were commonly identified by third party participants: “They think I’m a pervert. They think I do coke. [...] they think I’ve got a lot of money – I don’t. And you know, I’m supposed to be some sort of crazy party animal [...] And people call me a womanizer.”

To this Scott (bouncer and manager) added that most women “look down on me when they find out about [my work], because they see me as [...] some sort of oppressor or even abuser [...] the evil thug that, you know, abused women to make money in whatever capacity [...] a violent sexualized animal.” DeMichele and Tewksbury (2004) similarly note assumptions by strip club customers about bouncers having some degree of ‘ownership’ over dancers. Additionally as “[a] bouncer at strip club, I'm obviously not smart, apparently” (Scott). Chico (DJ) noticed: “I would get two different reactions. One was like, ‘Oh, yeah? Oh, yeah? [excited intonation in voice]’ and the other one was more ‘Oh, yeah [disappointed intonation in voice],’ you know. There was never any in-between.”
Like sex workers (see Bruckert 2012), third parties engage in a number of stigma management and information control strategies (Goffman 1963). In spite of their awareness of the stereotypes about their work, more than half (8) of third party participants were public about their work, while four disclosed their work somewhat selectively (e.g., to their friends and select members of their family, but not their children or casual acquaintances), and the remaining three were quite private about their work as a third party (including Eric, the driver and protection provider). Their decisions about disclosing their work were informed by what Pinel calls stigma consciousness, a form of self-consciousness about, or a focus on, stereotyped status – “the extent to which targets believe that their stereotyped status pervades their interactions with members of the outgroup” (2004: 39; see also Pinel 1999). These decisions also depended on participants’ social circles – for example whether they spent their time with people who are ‘wise’ (Goffman 1963), that is, sympathetic and familiar with the erotic dance industry, or outsiders. Thus, Fuzzy has told “very, very few people” about being a strip club DJ because “I don’t want to be objectified, and I don’t want to give myself that stereotype. I want people to know me for me before they find out what I do.” Like Adam (DJ and manager), Fuzzy can elect to pass as ‘normal’ (Goffman 1963) by only sharing information about his other job. By contrast George (doorman/bouncer), who is very open about his work, and who insisted “I have a really, really good family when it comes to talking and being open,” simply said, “I’m not ashamed.” For those who selectively disclose their jobs, deciding with whom to share this information is also conditioned by their moral opinion of erotic dance. While Reverend (manager and head doorman) had not disclosed his job to his children, Sal (manager) has “always tried to keep it away from
In addition to managing stigma by carefully considering whether and to whom to disclose their work, third parties resist dominant stereotypical perceptions by challenging their status as ‘truth’ (see Foucault 1980). Like dancers and sex workers (see Bruckert 2002; Law 2011), third parties counter the lack of recognition of their work by drawing attention to how their jobs resemble other occupations as well as the specific skills they require. For example managers agreed that balancing all of their tasks and responsibilities required not only excellent interpersonal social skills but organization, a general sense of responsibility, creative problem solving, and math/money management skills. Participants also emphasized that they enjoyed the responsibilities they were entrusted in their jobs. As a bouncer, Marcus highlighted the value of security and the essential role it plays in the success of the club and the work of his colleagues: “I liked the responsibility of being a protector [...] just making sure that everything was normal and safe.” Jimmy (DJ) additionally noted that he had perfected his social skills thanks to the ‘party’ environment: “before I started working there, I didn’t know a whole lot about, you know, the social environment. And then after working there, I could schmooze anybody. I could get free drinks out of a man!” Recalling Jimmy’s discomfort with the ‘party’ environment, noted above, we see that third parties may feel conflicted about their occupations.

Some third parties even managed to leverage these skills to their advantage in other jobs. On his CV and in job interviews, Jimmy highlighted the managerial skills he had learned as a strip club DJ, effectively transforming himself into a viable job candidate:
I’d write that in my reference [CV] so they’d ask me about it. And I said, well, my job was essentially [a] management position without the paycheck. So I was running the shows, talking to the girls, and having to handle all of that. [...] And it did me wonders. People were saying, ‘Oh, well if you can handle that, and you could handle it 9 hours straight, we could definitely put you somewhere to do something.’

Similarly although it had made Scott’s application to the police force more difficult, he had “made connections that I needed to get to the security fields” in his capacity as a strip club bouncer, and had been recruited by a private security firm.

Third parties also contested the dominant discourse that discredits them by emphasizing the positive aspects of their work. Paramount among these was the paycheck: “It’s a job. I get paid” (Reverend, manager and head doorman). Third parties also insisted they enjoyed the social aspects of working at a strip club – “It’s a fun job” (Adam, DJ and manager); “my day is never boring” (Tony, manager and DJ). As Fuzzy (DJ) said, “I have a good time. [...] I mean let’s face it: I look at naked women – you know, beautiful, naked women – all day, and I listen to music, and, you know, I laugh and make jokes.”

Other participants managed stigma by confronting public perceptions of people working in strip clubs (see Ashforth et al. 2007). Subtly challenging the stereotype of bouncers, Marcus (doorman/bouncer) “did my best to break the stereotypes of what a security person in a strip club is [...] [by] talking to them [customers] in a respectful way.” Chico (DJ) who was quite open about his job, expressed his frustrations about his family not taking it seriously:

In the beginning, my mom used to say, ‘When are you going to get a real job?’ and I – you know, because she was used to me being in, you know, a career thing, like radio. And I said, ‘You know, Mom?’ I said, ‘I get up every morning; I take the bus; I go to work; I do eight hours, and at the end of the week, I get paid. Where’s the part where it’s not a real job?’ [...] So I think the family had a bit of
a problem with it in the beginning. It took a while. It wasn’t like I was ostracized or anything, but I mean little by little, she came around.

Similarly Kelly (bartender) brought her mother to her workplace “on like a Sunday afternoon, just to check it out,” to dispel her worries and misconceptions. Thus, some third parties challenge stigma and discourses of immorality and risk by framing their work as ordinary and labour.

These tactics did not always prove effective in preventing ramifications on participants’ lives, in their relationships with friends and/or family members, or in their interactions with acquaintances. As with dancers (see Bradley-Engen & Hobbs 2010), working in the erotic dance sector can have deleterious effects on third parties’ romantic prospects. Adam (DJ and manager) recounted:

*I went out on a blind date with a normal girl [...] we went out for dinner and we were talking over a glass of wine and we ordered food and the, you know, the big question [...] ‘What do you do for a living?’ comes up and I can’t not be honest with her. So, I say, during the day, I do, I teach sport for, you know, for the company I worked for, and, on the weekends, part-time, I DJ at a strip club. She got up from the chair and left the restaurant.*

Reverend’s job as a bouncer had played a role in his divorce, while Scott’s (bouncer and manager) girlfriend simply did not want to hear about his work – something that sex workers struggle with as well (Bradley-Engen & Hobbs 2010; Bradley 2007). To mitigate these consequences, like some of the dancers in Bradley-Engen and Hobbs’ (2010) study, some third parties simply avoided dating outsiders (intentionally or as a result of their social circle being comprised primarily of work colleagues): “in my time, working in strip clubs, I don’t think I’ve dated any, what we call civilian girls” (Sal, manager). Ashforth et al. (2007) refer to this practice of restricting one’s social circle to the ‘in-group,’ or their “own” group (Goffman 1963), as social buffering. In this respect stigma
conscousness (Pinel 1999) influences how third parties organize their social and 
romantic lives. The impact was quite different for Kelly (bartender) who, as a 
heterosexual woman, was instead attuned to how stigmatic assumptions about risk 
impacted her boyfriend: “he thinks it’s risky, so I think he worries a bit.” Exceptionally, 
Chico, Studley and Fuzzy’s (DJs) romantic partnerships with women (who, notably, were 
industry outsiders) had not been affected by stigma.

**Managing stigma with dancers**

Given their awareness and experiences of stigma, it is not surprising that third 
parties are sympathetic, or ‘wise’ (Goffman 1963), to the stigma experienced by dancers. 
Although, as previously noted, third parties in some ways reproduce stigma against 
prostitution, in other respects participants appeared concerned about dancers being 
stigmatized. The latter is consistent with the findings of Ashforth et al. (2007: 157), who 
argue that managers act as though they are “in the same boat as” their stigmatized 
employees and, rather than distancing themselves from or blaming workers, manage 
stigma alongside them and on their behalf. Indeed Jenna (dancer) argues that such 
behaviour is appropriate and, moreover, expected:

> Well they work there too, so I don’t think they should have much of a high horse 
to be on. [...] There have been a few crazies that, you know, maybe have 
mentioned that like, we’re slutty or something, but I don’t think they generally last 
long or are well liked, and you know, I don’t think you can do well with that 
attitude.

Of course as we have already seen, sometimes third parties have such an attitude, whether 
or not they express it to dancers or other co-workers.

The third parties who participated in this study were not only ‘wise’ in the sense 
of being related to dancers through the social structure, but also privy to dancers’ lives
and sympathetic to their struggles (Goffman 1963). The latter featured prominently in their narratives as an emotional toll of working in the erotic dance sector. For example George (doorman/bouncer) described his personal struggles with the effects (as he perceived them) of the environment on dancers (e.g., harassment, stigma):

... having to watch some of these girls go through what they have to go through [...] it’s tough, and I see it takes the toll on them [...] And even myself – I know, like, two weeks ago, I had to go home for a week because I just – I caught myself getting more and more – I guess – agitated, not only with the dancers but also with the customers where I would, I guess, try to provoke fights [...] I just needed a break.

More than sympathy, some third parties actively defended dancers when they encountered stigmatizing opinions about them. Marcus (doorman/bouncer), whose romantic partner is an independent sex worker, was particularly passionate in this regard, and recounted how he would endeavour to educate acquaintances about erotic dance:

I would challenge them. I’m like, ‘Why is it disgusting? They’re just working like anyone else would. Who cares if they’re taking their clothes off?’ Yeah, like, you know, ‘Nude artists’ models do the same thing and no one says they’re disgusting, like what’s the difference? They just happen to be dancing.’ Like [in an oafish voice], ‘Ughh, I just couldn’t do that.’ Like, ‘Well don’t do it! [Laughs] Don’t bug the people who are doing it. Like sure, it might not be the choice that you make, but it’s still a valid choice for someone who wants to do that.’

Marcus would react in a similar manner to stigma from customers: “a number of people that I kicked out of the club – they’re like [in an oafish voice], ‘What’s the big deal? She’s just a dancer!’ I’m like, ‘Well no, she’s a human being, and you don’t treat people like that.’” For Dalton (DJ and manager), the stereotype of dancers as public health risks (Bruckert & Dufresne 2002; Jackson 2011) was particularly egregious:

I would doubt that there's a dancer out there, even if your club said yes, or turn the blind eye to whatever hand jobs, blow jobs, sex [...] that would do it without a condom. [...] So, it blows my mind when people say, you know, ‘Yes, you're going to get all kinds of dirty diseases from a dancer.’ You're just not.
Dalton articulated the effects of stigma on dancers in a manner similar to Pheterson (1998): “[people] really do look at the dancer as a whore and as just a nobody.”

Other third parties incorporated sympathy for the stigma faced by dancers into their organizational relationship with them. Although his approach was informed, in part, by stigmatic assumptions about dancers having “some scars from their past,” Sal (manager) insisted that:

> *showing that you care [...] goes a long way in this business [...] It’s like, ‘I’m gonna go be a dancer – it’s probably gonna be like, I’m gonna get treated like shit.’ And then if they come to work for us and we treat them differently then, you know, it makes them loyal.*

For Sal, this included charging a reasonable house fee and treating the dancers in a professional manner. Another way in which third parties had shown some of the dancers in focus group B that they cared was to provide “reference letters [...] to say that I was a good, reliable employee. Sometimes they were kind enough to disguise it [the job] so I wouldn’t be prejudiced [discriminated against]” (Leigh).

For some third parties, concern about the consequences of stigma on dancers manifested in a feeling that clubs should be more proactive in regard to their labour rights. Acknowledging that the parallel structures foster problematic labour conditions for dancers, Chico (DJ) admitted: “*We don’t treat our employees right, or you know, we don’t treat everybody as equal employees [...] I mean racism is a big part of [it].*” Like some other third parties, Chico wanted to see “*more protection for the worker [...] it’ll be better for the entire industry.*” In speaking for better working conditions and against stigma third parties acknowledge dancers as workers, at the same time as they regard them as ‘girls’ in other respects.

**Other impacts of working as a strip club third party**
Faced with discrimination, discomfort, and other challenges in their jobs, third parties commonly identified their occupations as stressful. In this respect the ‘costume’ described at the beginning of the chapter also served, for some, as a tool to manage stigma and stress by separating their personal and professional lives. For example although Sal (manager) enjoyed his job, he said, “I always just treat it as a job, you know, and to just completely separate it” because “You can’t take this home with you and let it fester, and bother you and stuff, it’s not worth it, and it’s unhealthy.” As much as some third parties enjoyed the ‘party’ environment, others found it troubling for reasons including: seeing dancers get mistreated by customers or (as some participants assumed) by their romantic partner, the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse, what they perceived to be an increase in ‘extras’ in the erotic dance industry, and the social judgment experienced by dancers. What Jimmy (DJ) experienced as a disturbing and “poisonous environment” at his workplace caused him to feel “deep despair” eventually leading to “drinking a lot [at work] and coming home drunk. [...] I could feel myself losing control.” Studley (DJ/supervisor) dealt with this problem more effectively: “a lot of the girls are from different walks of life – you know, bad backgrounds, abusive backgrounds [...] and I really have to turn off a part of myself to deal with those girls because if I don’t, then it’s going to haunt me.”

Being a strip club third party also made participants ‘wise’ (Goffman 1963), even as they interpreted certain aspects of dancers’ performances as true reflections of their character (e.g., ‘dramatic’ or ‘high-maintenance’). Indeed although many described their jobs as fun and exciting, virtually all club-affiliated third parties insisted their work in no way resembled the male fantasy of it. Instead of basking in the attention of alluring
women, they found themselves frequently clashing with strongly opinionated women (this was especially the case for DJs, who interact with dancers the most) and “very desensitized to nakedness” (Reverend, manager and head doorman).

In spite of these challenges, and the difficulties of navigating stigma and the performance expectations of their roles, as with other professions (including sex work – see Bruckert et al. 2003; Law 2011) participants appreciated the financial rewards of their jobs and were proud to do them well. Having enjoyed ten years in the erotic dance sector, Dalton (manager and DJ) perhaps expressed this sentiment best:

*I loved the adoration [...] people would come up to me at the end of the night and say, ‘You’re great.’ [...] those were the kinds of things that really, you know, were life affirming—you know—that, yes, that I was doing something really good and that I was performing in the field that I had chosen to do.*

**Concluding remarks: The implications of role performance in parallel structures**

As this chapter has demonstrated, in a manner comparable to dancers (see Bruckert & Frigon 2003; Liepe-Levinson 2002; Murphy 2003; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Trautner 2005), third parties’ performances of their professional roles draw from intersecting gender, class and racial scripts. The third parties who are more visible to the audience are subject to stricter performance expectations, managers having to look the part of the be-suited, white, middle class businessman, and bouncers having to both appear and perform as aggressive, working class, ‘tough guys.’

This chapter has also shown how third parties are stigmatized, not only in their social interactions outside the club but by dancers and each other. Their awareness and experiences of stigma, in concert with their level of satisfaction and/or identification with their jobs, inform their approaches to stigma management. Although most third party participants felt uncomfortable (to varying extents) with prostitution and practices by
dancers resembling it, they were also aware of the negative impacts of stigma on dancers’ lives. This knowledge led some to treat dancers sympathetically or speak up on their behalf when they encountered people who discredited them (see also Ashforth et al. 2007). In this respect, third parties’ and dancers’ experiences of stigma serve as a bridge of understanding (albeit an incomplete one) between the parallel structures.

However because third parties and dancers perform on separate teams, each inhabiting a parallel structure with its own back regions and goals, neither fully ‘sees’ or respects the other’s work. As such they are not completely aware when and if the other is performing (or what they are ‘really like’ when they are not performing) and how much work gets done in areas to which they have limited access. This is perhaps especially true of third parties, who at most clubs are significantly outnumbered by dancers, with whom they may or may not be familiar due to variable work schedules. To fill this gap in information, behavioural and aesthetic expectations intersect with stereotypical tropes to inform third parties’ perceptions and treatment of dancers as sexualized ‘girls’ rather than workers. Gendered, racial and class expectations and stigma further inform third parties’ evaluation of the appropriateness of dancers’ performances – as ‘high-maintenance’ or suspect – to inform professional relationships. This appears to contribute to uneven rule enforcement and an invisibilization of dancers’ grievances as workers.

In response, dancers’ performance of femininity conditions their capacity for resistance – the more they conform to third parties’ expectations of a ‘classy’ aesthetic, flirtatiousness, and a ‘high maintenance’ but not ‘dramatic’ attitude, the more they are able (and emboldened) to resist other workplace expectations, such as scheduling. As noted by Bruckert (2002) and Egan (2006) however, the benefits of such resistance and
instrumentalism are individual, as third parties’ expectations of dancers remain unchanged. At the same time, dancers’ perceptions of third parties as not working or as comparable to ‘pimps’ reinforces stigma and stereotypes in the same way as third parties’ perceptions of dancers as ‘dirty,’ ‘girls,’ and non-workers. This tendency towards stratification suggests that discourses of immorality and risk continue to exert influence at the organizational level, fostering mutual disrespect amongst third parties and dancers. Because it is third parties who are responsible for setting and/or enforcing organizational policies however, this mutual disrespect has asymmetrical effects (see Hodson 1999), and supports organizational power relations in which dancers are subject to managerial capriciousness. Given that these discourses are reinforced by, and maintain currency through, regulatory mechanisms (see Chapter 5), the adoption of a labour framework may improve interpersonal workplace relationships, and in turn, dancers’ working conditions.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

“We’re all in this together – let’s have a good time”\textsuperscript{77}

In a critical analysis of their roles, performances, and risk management and resistance strategies, it is easy to lose sight of the everyday feeling of the work third parties and dancers are doing – ironically, even as this is just what is being examined under a theoretical lens. Both the third parties and dancers who participated in this study talked about their work with humour and insight and, in the same manner as workers in other labour market sectors, they liked some aspects of their jobs but not others. Third parties, like dancers, carefully crafted their role performances with creativity and pride. They also appreciated the money they earned as well as the variety of people they met in the club. In short, they saw being a third party as a job, which can occasionally be frustrating or tiresome, but is also uniquely exciting. Similarly, dancers expressed enjoying the dancing, the appreciative gaze of customers, and in spite of the microaggressions circulating in the ‘party’ environment, many also found it fun. Looking at these and other similarities, as well as points of conflict, between third parties’ and dancers’ occupational roles, experiences and strategies provides a more complete picture of their work that challenges dominant perceptions of them as victimizers and victims, respectively (see also Bruckert & Law 2013; O’Connell Davidson 2006; Weitzer 2012).

With this in mind, this chapter reflects on the challenges, tensions and strategies of third parties and dancers in Ontario, by presenting a summary of the project’s substantive and theoretical contributions, and social and policy implications. The interplay of performance, stigma, discourse, regulation(s), power and resistance are

\textsuperscript{77} Quotation from Chico, DJ.
considered throughout these discussions. The chapter concludes by contemplating the study’s limitations and proposing further avenues of research.

**Research contributions**

Alongside other criminologists studying the erotic dance sector and sex industry from a labour perspective (see Bouclin 2004b; Bruckert et al. 2003; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming; Bruckert 2014; Jeffrey & Sullivan 2009; Weitzer 2012), the aim of this research, while attending to criminological concerns such as regulation (through legal and interpersonal means), perceptions of deviance, and risk management (Garland & Sparks 2000; Ericson & Doyle 2003), is ultimately to shift inquiries relating to the sex industry out of criminology, and to challenge criminalization and other legal frameworks perpetuating stigma (Bruckert & Hannem 2013). This aim has informed my use of theoretical tools and concepts from critical management and organization studies.

In examining the professional roles and tasks of club-affiliated third parties this thesis has also challenged stereotypes about them by shedding light on the services they provide to dancers and also identifying the ways they contribute to and reproduce problematic working conditions. With regard to the former, although their jobs exist to provide services to and a setting for dancers, third parties’ occupational roles at strip clubs resemble those in other nightclubs. In Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical terms, managers are the directors of the club as a whole, as they distribute tasks amongst the staff and oversee the club’s operation as a setting for the performances of dancers and other workers. Disk jockeys (DJs) are the third parties who most resemble a director in regard to dancers, as they organize the order of the stage shows, and in turn have the most frequent contact with dancers. Another principal third party is the bouncer, who is
responsible for ensuring the security of the club, resolving financial disputes amongst
dancers and customers, and endeavouring to prevent (by screening), watch for, and
respond to (e.g., by ejection) unacceptable behaviour by customers. Strip club bartenders
can be considered auxiliary third parties, insofar as their role can include limited services
to dancers, such as processing lap dance and VIP entry fees, or hiring or other managerial
tasks in the absence of a manager. DJs and bouncers also sometimes share in managerial
 responsibilities, especially in smaller organizations. Owners can be described as
occasional third parties as it appears they are seldom, to a limited extent, or not at all
involved in the daily operation of the club. Participants in this research also had
experience working with unaffiliated third parties including erotic dance agents and
agencies (indeed one of the bouncers had for a time operated an ad-hoc agency of his
own) who organized for dancers to work at clubs or at private parties.

Another unaffiliated third party, the ‘pimp,’ was considerably more difficult to
obtain reliable information about, as participants’ experiences were limited to assessing
and on this basis managing their interactions with men who fit a particular social profile
(and racial stereotype). This profile emerged in participants’ narratives as a black man
presumed to be involved in managing the finances of dancers, who provide sexual
services in or outside the club, in an exploitative or manipulative relationship. Because
my findings about the ‘pimp’ were discursive rather than empirical, rather than exploring
the services provided by ‘pimps’ I analyzed how the organizational discourse about them
reaffirmed and (albeit considerably less often) contradicted negative stereotypes about
black men (see Benson 2012; Tyree et al. 2011). As such, the management of this figure
is discussed below as part of the summaries of organizational structure(s) and culture.
Conflicts and strategies in the parallel structures

This research has demonstrated that the strip club is a workplace comprising parallel structures, shaped by two different employment relationships. The club is the infrastructural organization, which includes third parties and other employees (e.g., waitresses) whose services transform the physical space of the club into a setting for dancers’ performances (see Goffman 1959); and the dancers, who as independent contractors regulate their entrepreneurial endeavours both individually and collectively, and as a group make up the club’s sister structure. While the club earns money by selling alcohol, it requires dancers to attract customers; in turn dancers rely on the club to provide the infrastructure they need to sell lap dances. Although these disparate goals make the club and dancers in some ways independent of each other, they are interdependent insofar as they both rely on the same pool of customers for their business.

The parallel structures also shape the perception and management of risks, as well as workplace relationships. Because third parties are concerned primarily with the success and security of the club, their risk management strategies (e.g., wilful blindness, waiting for customers to egregiously break the rules before intervening) often leave dancers in legal and/or physical jeopardy. However, as we have seen, dancers manage their own risks by screening their customers, negotiating and (covertly or overtly) physically defending their boundaries, and adapting their performances to manage clients’ behaviour or manipulate them into compliance. Moreover as entrepreneurs, dancers are focused largely on their individual goals and recognize the expedience of individualized resistance strategies, which can in turn perpetuate the favouritism and inconsistency by third parties that the parallel structures engender. In this regard, the independent
contractor relationship limits collective resistance by dancers. At the same time it shapes cooperative strategies; we have seen dancers organizing informally as a lateral surveillance network, through which they ensure that prices and services are maintained at a premium and ‘appropriate’ standard.

Dancers also expressed frustration that as independent contractors (and not employees) they have very limited leverage to challenge institutional racism or third parties’ demands for free labour (among other issues). Concurrently, they considered the flexibility of the independent contractor relationship appealing (see also Althorp 2013; Boucin 2004; Colosi 2010a) because they do not have to maintain the infrastructure of or be loyal to the organization, and can choose their customers and (albeit to a lesser extent in Ottawa than Toronto) schedules. As a result, most expressed little interest in, or hope in the plausibility of, collective organizing akin to unionization (see also Althorp 2013; Colosi 2010a; Gall 2012), which is also impeded by their status as independent contractors (Bouclin 2006; Couto 2006; CUPE 2005; Machen 1996). Comparing dancers to employees in the ‘mainstream’ labour market however, we see that the latter are not necessarily in a better bargaining position: employees considered part-time or occasional may not be able to access union or labour protection (Ilcan et al. 2007), an increasing portion of workplaces are hostile towards unionization (Vosko 2000), and unions are unfriendly to women and minorities (McKinstry 2006). Furthermore, sanctions against misconduct by corporations that exacerbate workplace risk appear to be inadequate (Bittle 2012; Vetter 2007). In this respect, dancers’ individual risk management strategies, as well as the lateral surveillance network and the informal collective resistance strategies
to which talk amongst dancers gives rise, are tools well adapted to their labour context. As we will consider shortly, policymakers should take these strategies into account.

The parallel structures also engender particular challenges for third parties. As independent entrepreneurs with little or no regard for the overall wellbeing of the club, dancers constitute an undisciplined workforce (indeed this is precisely what appeals to them about the independent contractor relationship). Additionally, the indignity of meagre or no wages (in Toronto and Ottawa, respectively) for being on schedule gives dancers ample incentive to resist when possible by being late, leaving early, or not showing up for shifts. Moreover, because virtually all of the club-affiliated third parties who participated in this study (save for Dalton, who had spent a period of his career as part owner of a club) inhabit a contradictory position as workers/management (Willmott 1997), they do not have the authority to improve the employment relationship by increasing wages or reducing the expectations imposed on dancers. Some third parties, such as bartenders, DJs and bouncers (who are not also managers or supervisors), do not even have the institutional authority to meaningfully sanction dancers. Instead, they endeavour to convince (or in some cases, compel) dancers to cooperate through negotiation, professionalism, or the “economy of favours” (Bruckert 2002).

The ‘party’ environment as organizational culture

In addition to being shaped by the parallel structures, third parties’ and dancers’ interactions and relationships are influenced by the environment they inhabit and produce. In analyzing this I have introduced the concept of the ‘party’ environment – an ongoing commercial performance tailored to create an ambiance welcoming to, and catering to the perceived expectations of, the customers a club wishes to attract (usually white, middle
class, men [see also Ross 2000]), and in which gendered, racial, class, and sexual scripts are enacted by both dancers and third parties – which also serves as the organizational culture of the club. Daft and Armstrong (2009: 335) describe organizational culture as comprised of institutionally enshrined “values, norms, guiding beliefs, and understandings” that reproduce an organization by transmission through its membership. In the coming pages we consider the research findings through each of these attributes of organizational culture.

The ‘party’ environment perpetuates heterosexual gender norms through the personal fronts dancers and third parties are required to maintain in their occupational performances (see Goffman 1959), and in tolerating customers’ stereotypically masculine behaviours (e.g., sexist microaggressions, ‘rowdiness’) (Frank 2003). We have seen that, like dancers (see Bruckert 2002; Law 2012; Ross & Greenwell 2005; Trautner 2005), third parties enact gender, racial and class scripts particular to their roles: bouncers embody tough, working class masculinity (see also DeMichele & Tewksbury 2004; Hobbs et al. 2005; Rigakos 2008); managers’ performance draws upon the archetypal image of white, male, organizational leadership (see Whitehead 2002); and DJs, whose performance for customers is largely vocal, may nonetheless elect to don a suit in order to bolster their personal front (see Goffman 1959) as a respectable authority to dancers. The continuity of performance required to maintain the ‘party’ environment also informs the ways in which third parties and dancers adapt their performances to control customer behaviour and situationally manage risk. Moreover the ‘party’ environment perpetuates Western beauty norms by shaping organizational employment practices, through which opportunities and shifts for black dancers are overtly limited; additionally women who do
not adequately maintain their personal front (Goffman 1959), especially in regard to their perceived fitness level or the consistence of their conduct with the class image of the club, are terminated. In comparison, white, slim, middle-class, feminine women enjoy a considerably wider leeway for resistance, and are seldom disciplined by third parties for breaking club rules (see also Bouclin 2004; Brooks 2010; Bruckert 2002). One organizational gender norm stands out in this regard: performed correctly (i.e., drawing from the same scripts through which dancers are perceived as attractive), an assertive attitude appears to be an effective way for dancers to interact with and confront third parties. This finding extends Frank’s (2003) observation that dancers invert normative gender roles in their interactions with customers; it also provides an interesting contrast to Guadagno and Cialdini’s (2007) assertion that female aggressiveness is perceived unfavourably in ‘mainstream’ workplace relations.

Strip club organizational culture also reinforces the organizational values of not (overtly) being a locale of prostitution, guided by beliefs that prostitution should be separate from stripping. It is here that stigma and discourses of immorality and risk become perceptible. Dancers recounted third parties perceiving their (presumed) conduct as immoral, and subsequently being severely disciplined, humiliated, or becoming targets of sexual harassment, illustrating the reproduction of the “whore stigma” (Pheterson 1998) through which women, once defined as unchaste, are perceived as no longer deserving of respect (Comack & Balfour 2004; see also Smart 1989). We have also this in the way third parties and dancers sometimes interpret sexual assault by customers as the consensual provision of ‘extras.’ Discomfort with prostitution is accompanied by stigmatic assumptions associating it with an unwelcome unaffiliated third party, the
‘pimp.’ The organizational ‘pimp’ discourse informed the screening practices of both third parties and dancers, which are largely targeted towards and perpetuate stereotypes of black men as risky (see also Koskela 2012; Law & Bruckert 2016; Lilleston et al. 2012). Dancers and third parties also invoke the ‘pimp’ as a negative comparison to discredit male colleagues they perceive to be disrespectful. All of these instances of disavowal are tantamount to stratification (Goffman 1963), as they create moral hierarchies at the strip club that perpetuate stigma (Bruckert & Hannem 2013). At the same time, some of the stigma management strategies enacted by third parties, including confronting social judgment about their work and on behalf of dancers (see also Ashforth et al. 2007), challenge dominant discourses about the erotic dance sector and its inhabitants.

Finally, organizational culture is a vehicle through which understandings between members are transmitted and reproduced. Because the ‘party’ environment is an ongoing endeavour by performers inhabiting different teams (see Goffman 1959), this can lead to third parties and dancers interpreting each others’ occupational role performances and adaptive risk management strategies as reflections of their character. Thus, third parties may interpret dancers as flirtatious and ‘high-maintenance’ even though these performances are intended to manipulate or encourage customers or third parties to cooperate. Additionally, third parties may interpret dancers’ performances for customers or some dancers’ flirtation with them as an invitation to engage in behaviour other dancers may experience as sexual harassment or assault. In this respect the ‘party’ environment not only tolerates but also perpetuates microaggressions and other misconduct by third parties as well as customers. In turn, although not all third parties
who participated in this study engaged in or expected sexual banter with dancers, most perceived dancers as irresponsible ‘girls,’ lacking in moral judgment or self-control (e.g., with regard to drug or alcohol use). In short, performing on separate teams inhibits professionalism, as well as third parties’ recognition of dancers’ resistant performances and labour grievances.

Social and policy implications

An important consideration shaping this project, gleaned from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, was that starting from a labour perspective not only challenges stereotypes of third parties but also facilitates the development of strategies to surmount concrete workplace issues. As this thesis has shown, dancers and third parties have themselves developed myriad strategies to manage the issues they face at work; to surmount these issues, however, requires change beyond the scope of interpersonal relationships or organizational infrastructure, in the interconnected arenas of social norms and discourses, the labour market, and state regulation of the sex industry.

The interplay of discourse and regulation is evident in the bylaws, which as we have seen are premised on, and perpetuate, discursive associations between lap dancing, prostitution, immorality, and risk. Hannem (2012) refers to this as structural stigma. Perceptions of immorality permeate the surveillance practices of third parties in tandem with their attitudes toward dancers, whom they suspect are “up to something” (Sal, manager). At the same time third parties’ adoption of the discursive construction of lap dancing as inherently risky results in the responsibilization of dancers to manage their own risks of sexual assault by customers. As a result, rules are inconsistent and arbitrarily enforced, and dancers are often left to manage their own security risks. Moreover because
municipal inspections appear to be concerned only with the moral and risk-related elements of the bylaws, third parties’ application of the bylaws responds in kind, by prioritizing the maintenance of licenses and the appearance of compliance with the prohibition of touching (see also Frank 2005). This effectively disregards occupational health and safety considerations in principal covered by municipal regulation, for example the cleanliness and maintenance of staff facilities, which dancers overwhelmingly described as inadequate.

We have also seen that (especially municipal) regulations inform the practices and strategies third parties and dancers enact to manage risk; while in some instances it leads to wilful blindness by third parties, they, along with dancers, also evoke municipal, provincial, and federal regulations (e.g., pertaining to touching, substance abuse, and prostitution) to manage customer behaviour. In this respect, a labour rights-oriented regulatory framework could regulate touching through consent rather than blanket prohibition, retaining dancers’ and third parties’ ability to control customers by drawing upon it while eliminating the need for wilful blindness (and along with it a point of conflict between the parallel structures). Thus, regulatory mechanisms consistent with contemporary erotic dance practices in Ontario would complement or improve upon risk management strategies already in play at strip clubs. Re-designing the bylaws to support dancer consent rather than prohibiting particular acts may additionally contribute to diminishing the stigma, victim-blaming, and vitriol that is sometimes evident in third party disciplinary practices and the lateral surveillance network. It would also make dancers more likely to make use of either existing (e.g., provincial labour standards) or new mechanisms (e.g., as Jenna [dancer] suggested, an anonymous system administered
municipally) to address sexual assault by customers, or third parties. Recalling club owners’ eagerness to speak on behalf of their industry – and over dancers – policymakers should endeavour to include dancers in regulatory revision processes, to minimize interference by third parties, and (given dancers’ reluctance to participate in previous consultations) consult research about the effects of regulation on dancers (see also van der Meulen & Durisin 2008).

However the ways in which strip club workers manoeuvre around bylaws (and their need for doing so) evince that regulations are not necessarily effective in achieving their (stated or latent) aims. This observation has also been made in regard to other sectors; issues of gender and racial discrimination and harassment have been shown to persist across the labour market in spite of organizational and state frameworks endeavouring to mitigate them (Acker 2009; Basford et al. 2014; Brewis & Linstead 2000; Green 2005). This suggests that even if discursive change is cemented in legal texts, the application or effects of these mechanisms will be limited if they challenge the ‘truth’ of discourses circulating more broadly (see Foucault 1980; Smart 1989). In this respect it is important to address the context in which workplace inequality and risk unfold.

As we have seen, in order for strip clubs to be financially successful, the ‘party’ environment mirrors and thereby reproduces dominant conceptions of beauty, and traditional gendered behavioural norms. In this respect, broadening the hiring criteria for dancers (e.g., lifting the race and weight restrictions) may constitute (or be perceived as) a considerable financial risk. This suggests that social definitions of female beauty, as well as appropriate male sexual conduct, and heterosexual male leisure will have to change first. Such changes would also benefit women working in other sectors of the sex
industry, as well as in the service industry, where overt sexuality in the workplace can be problematic (Erickson 2010). In tandem, greater respect for the work women do, and how they choose to conduct themselves sexually, would combat the stigmatization of sex work and also reduce discriminatory practices across the labour market. When we view dancers’ workplace challenges as synonymous with and linked to women’s and workers’ struggles, we also see that they are not inherent to the sex industry. Furthermore, highlighting the ways in which risks in the sex industry are exacerbated by moralistic regulation underscores the need to change the discourses through which these approaches continue to be validated.

Of course history has shown that discourses can co-exist but may also retain their authority over long periods of time (see Foucault 1972). Anti-racist movements in the US provide a trenchant example the mutual interdependence of social and regulatory change: in spite of regulatory changes precipitated by the civil rights movement in the 1960s, anti-black racism has continued, its visibility having recently erupted in coverage of numerous racially motivated murders of young black men by police and white Americans, spurring renewed energy into anti-racist activism in the form of the Black Lives Matter movement (Harris 2015). As Harris (2015) argues, these developments demonstrate that discursive transformation must accompany regulatory change to be meaningfully effective. Thus, it is more likely that third parties will be motivated to improve dancers’ working conditions if both regulatory mechanisms and dominant discourses shift toward recognizing erotic dance and sex work as labour, and in turn dancers as workers deserving of rights and conditions conducive to dignity and satisfaction. To this end sex workers (including some dancers, as we have seen) continue to endeavour to advance a
labour discourse through advocating against stigma, and lobbying for regulatory change (see Canada v Bedford 2013; Gall 2012; POWER 2014; SPOC 2014).

**Limitations and avenues for future research**

With regard to erotic dance (and sex work) in Canada, the conflicts between social movements, growing and established discourses, and amongst regulatory authorities (see Craig 2011; Lewis & Maticka-Tyndale 2000), warrants further research attention. The Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (Bill C-36), the new federal regulatory framework for prostitution introduced in 2014, is an important topic in this regard, given that it not only criminalizes third parties in the sex industry but also jeopardizes the distinction between prostitution and lap dancing on which the legality of the latter seems to rest. 78 Although the participants of this study (who were interviewed between 2011 and 2014) did not comment on this piece of legislation, its implementation may in future precipitate changes in the practices of, and relationship between, third parties and dancers.

Although this research has attempted to incorporate social and regulatory discourses into the analysis, its primarily focus has been on workplace interactions. In examining the discursive aspects of the relationships between third parties and dancers however, it has uncovered some important insights about broader social and labour

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78 The Canada v Bedford (2013) decision repealed certain sections of the Criminal Code on the basis that they exacerbated the risks faced by sex workers by prohibiting working indoors (s 210), hiring security guards (s 212(1)(j)), screening and negotiating with clients (s 213(1)(c)). In response the Conservative government re-criminalized similar aspects of prostitution with the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA [Bill C-36 2014]). While previous legislation targeted sex workers, framing them as immoral, risks to the community, and at-risk of victimization (Bruckert & Hannem 2013a), it is the latter that plays a key role in the framing of the PCEPA. The exploitation focus of the PCEPA is bolstered by its emphasis on the immorality and riskiness of third parties and clients. Though not explicitly targeted, strip club third parties and workers may be vulnerable to some aspects of the new regulations. For example a common bawdy house is now defined more ambiguously, and no longer specifically refers to prostitution (c 25 s 12(2)). Instead the PCEPA focuses on ‘sexual services.’ Moreover the very definition of the term ‘prostitute’ has been removed from the Criminal Code (c 25 s 12(1)). These aspects of the PCEPA make it potentially applicable to dancers, lap dancing, and strip clubs.
market issues worthy of further investigation. With regard to the latter, although dancers may be marginalized through inappropriate regulation, meagre wages or expectations of free labour, and the stress of arbitrary and unpredictable rule enforcement, they enjoy considerable job security (insofar as they can easily move between clubs and it appears they are seldom fired), and a good (if not reliably consistent) income for the amount time they spend at work (see Chapter 4; also Althorp 2013; Law 2012). When compared against workers in other sectors who are marginalized by temporary status, barely liveable wages, and unreliable or inconsistent shifts (Vosko et al. 2009), this suggests that although dancers are stigmatized they may not be precarious workers. Qualitative and quantitative research comparing the challenges faced by workers in the sex industry to those in precarious jobs in other sectors may uncover innovative workplace strategies and social and policy solutions appropriate for marginalized workers in different contexts.

This tentative characterization of dancers as marginalized but not precarious workers derives from data gathered from predominantly white dancers, with the exception of one Asian woman, and an Aboriginal woman who passed as white. As such, this characterization may not be applicable to black dancers and others whose bodies do not conform to the Western middle-class ideal of female beauty. Thus whether specific to the erotic dance sector, or comparing the sex industry to other sectors of the labour market, research pertaining to labour marginalization and precarity should include, and attend to the concerns of, racialized people. Further, a study about racialized dancers’ relationships with third parties would provide deeper insight into some of the findings about racial performances, expectations, and relations presented in this thesis.
Another issue that this research has only been able to address in a limited manner is the presence and activities of ‘pimps’ in the erotic dance sector. However in examining the organizational discourse surrounding the ‘pimp,’ this thesis has shed light on the predominantly negative reactions, opinions, and practices it evokes in strip clubs. This suggests that the term ‘pimp’ is so stigmatized and stigmatizing that people are unlikely to describe their occupation or relationship in this way. As such, future research into this elusive character may benefit from using alternative language. Indeed it has been through the use of neutral, business-oriented terminology that this research has demonstrated that club-affiliated third parties are both more complex and more ordinary than stereotypes portray, which has in turn yielded information about how they increase and undermine dancers’ safety (see also Bruckert & Law 2013; Bruckert & Parent forthcoming).

Although this study has examined third parties’ and dancers’ perceptions of workplace risks, for example physical and sexual assault, as a qualitative research endeavour it has not been able to quantify these risks or confirm whether or not participants’ perceptions are accurate. In this regard this thesis cannot speak to the prevalence of risks in the erotic dance sector, or make a comparison with other labour market sectors – both issues worthy of further exploration. Highlighting the risks faced by third parties in strip clubs is nonetheless important insofar as it both fills a gap in the literature and positions third parties as targets, and not (exclusively) perpetrators, of harm.

Finally this project has demonstrated the benefit of applying tools from organization theory to sex industry research, in order to explore how businesses operate. Of course the research results being released from the Management Project about other sectors of the sex industry in Eastern Canada are also foundational in this regard (see

Academics who are interested in furthering the de-stigmatization of sex work, in which the discursive construction of third parties plays an essential role, are encouraged to follow this example. Alternatively I urge organization studies and critical management scholars to recognize the sex industry as worthy of investigation, and to apply their own theories to expand the fledgling literature on its management.
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Ethics Approval Notice

Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christine</td>
<td>Bruckert</td>
<td>Social Sciences / Criminology</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuulia</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Social Sciences / Women's Studies</td>
<td>Student Researcher</td>
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File Number: 06-14-15B

Type of Project: PhD Thesis – Secondary Use of Data

Title: The grind: Third parties and the organization of labour in Ontario strip clubs

Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)  Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)  Approval Type
06/09/2014  06/08/2015  Ia

(La: Approval, Ia: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:
N/A
This is to confirm that the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board identified above, which operates in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement (2010) and other applicable laws and regulations in Ontario, has examined and approved the ethics application for the above named research project. Ethics approval is valid for the period indicated above and subject to the conditions listed in the section entitled “Special Conditions / Comments”.

During the course of the project, the protocol may not be modified without prior written approval from the REB except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) pertain to only administrative or logistical components of the project (e.g., change of telephone number). Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes which increase the risk to participant(s), any changes which considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project and safety of the participant(s). Modifications to the project, including consent and recruitment documentation, should be submitted to the Ethics Office for approval using the “Modification to research project” form available at: http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html.

Please submit an annual report to the Ethics Office four weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to request a renewal of this ethics approval. To close the file, a final report must be submitted. These documents can be found at: http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Office at extension 5387 or by e-mail at: ethics@uOttawa.ca.

Signature:

Kim Thompson
Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research
For Barbara Graves, Chair of the Social Sciences and Humanities REB
APPENDIX II: Recruitment notices

Third parties recruitment notice:

Seeking Research Participants

Do you have experience organizing, supervising, managing, or coordinating (for example as a manager, DJ, owner, agent, etc.) people working in the exotic dance industry in Ottawa or Toronto as of the year 2000?

Are you interested in discussing your experience in a study that will help people understand the work you do or did?

Would you be able to take part in a 2-3 hour interview?

Your anonymity is assured and a $100 honorarium is offered.

The research will:

Document the experiences of management in strip clubs from the manager’s perspective.

Explore the relationships between managers, dancers, and the other people involved in running the business (bouncers, bartenders, waitresses, etc).

Examine myths surrounding the exotic dance industry and the sex industry.

Identify how laws and policies influence your work.

Research conducted by: Tuulia Law, University of Ottawa
Research supervisor: Dr. Chris Bruckert, University of Ottawa

To participate in an interview or for more information contact: tlaw064@uottawa.ca

Dancers recruitment notice:

Seeking Research Participants

Are you a woman with experience working regularly as an exotic dancer (at least twice per week for at least one year) in strip clubs in Ottawa or/and Toronto, as of the year 2000? Are you interested in discussing your experience at work, and in particular with management (including managers, DJs, owners and others) in a study that will help people understand how the exotic dance industry works?

Would you be able to take part in a 2-3 hour interview?

Your anonymity is assured and a $100 honorarium is offered.

The research will:

Shed light on the work of people who organize, supervise, manage, or coordinate the work of erotic dancers, what they do, and their relationships with dancers.

Explore the relationships between managers, dancers, and the other people involved in organizing, supervising, managing, or coordinating the work of dancers (for example bouncers, DJs, drivers, agents, etc).

Examine myths surrounding the exotic dance industry and the sex industry.

Identify how laws and policies influence your work.

Research conducted by: Tuulia Law, University of Ottawa
Research supervisor: Dr. Chris Bruckert, University of Ottawa

To participate in an interview or for more information contact: t...
APPENDIX III: Consent form

Consent Form

Title of the study: The grind: Third parties and the organization of labour in Ontario Strip clubs

Researcher: Tuulia Law

Supervisor: Christine Bruckert
Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa
1-613-562-5800, ext 1814
bruckert@uottawa.ca

Invitation to Participate: I am invited to participate in the above mentioned research study conducted by Tuulia Law, under the supervision of Professor Bruckert.

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study is to collect information about third parties’ and dancers’ experiences and challenges at the workplace, and relationships with each other.

Participation: My participation will consist essentially of a one-time interview lasting approximately two hours, which will be audio recorded in full.

Risks: My participation in this study will entail that I volunteer personal information about my experiences of labour in the exotic dance sector, and this may cause me some emotional or social discomfort. I have received assurance from the researcher that every effort will be made to minimize these risks. A private location for the interview and my personal information being changed minimizes risks of social discomfort or accidental disclosure of information. If need be, the researcher will provide me with information on how to obtain counseling.

Benefits: My participation in this study will help provide a broader understanding of what happens at strip clubs, which will help work against stigma, discrimination and negative stereotypes about my job, myself, and the people I work with. It will also provide information that may be used by policy makers to improve industry regulation, for example by-laws, occupational health and safety measures, or labour rights.
Confidentiality and anonymity: I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that this information will be used for the researcher’s thesis and other publications and presentations relating to this study, in which my confidentiality and anonymity will be protected as follows: my real name will never be used, my name and any other identifying details will be changed in the interview transcript, and the audio file of my interview will be deleted once the transcript is complete. My identity will not be revealed in publications or in any other way, and any contact or personal information I have given in order to set up the interview will be destroyed after the interview.

Conservation of data: The data collected will be stored on Compact Discs in an undisclosed but safe location, and in electronic format on the researcher’s password protected Mac computer.

Compensation: I will be compensated $100 at the beginning of the interview. If I choose not to finish the interview or to withdraw from the study altogether, I may keep the full amount of the honorarium.

Voluntary Participation: I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences.

Acceptance: Oral consent has been given (indicated by check mark): ☐

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5 Tel.: (613) 562-5387 Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Researcher’s signature: __________________________ Date: __________________________
APPENDIX IV: Third party interview guide

Preamble
As I have already mentioned, as part of a research project that I’m doing, I am conducting interviews with third parties about their roles and responsibilities at strip clubs or in the exotic dance business in general, and their relationships with dancers. By ‘third parties’ I mean anyone who in some way organizes, supervises, manages or coordinates the work of dancers, for example: managers, DJs, bouncers, doormen, agents and maybe also bartenders and other people. This interview may touch on sensitive issues but I assure you that there are neither good nor bad responses to the questions. Moreover all of your comments will remain anonymous and confidential. I would also like to take this opportunity to remind you that we will not be using your name in the interview, nor will it be recorded anywhere else – we will only be using your pseudonym.

Preliminary Information
I want to confirm that the goals of the research have been explained, the consent letter has been reviewed orally and you have had an opportunity to ask questions and receive clarification regarding research goals, methods, researchers’ obligations and the rights of the participants or any other concerns.

In a couple of words how would you describe yourself or identify in terms of gender, ethnicity, nationality, and class?

In one or two words how would you describe your job?

Open invitation to speak
1. Let’s start with your story. Can you speak to your experience (as X), and how you came to be involved in this area. (establish whether they are a current or former worker)
   - What does being a (specify occupation) mean to you on a day-to-day basis?
   - What does it mean to you in terms of your life more generally and your identity?

Part I: The Work
We are now going to move on to a examine particular aspects of your work
2. Based on your experience, what are the principal roles of a (specify occupation)?
3. Could you describe what you do/did exactly in terms of your schedule, your tasks and so on? In general how do/did you work and how you organize your time?
4. How would you describe your responsibilities in terms of:
   - Supervision: Do/did you supervise the work of others?
Coordination: Do/did you coordinate the work of individuals who for you or with you? *(prompt as appropriate dancers, managers, DJs, bouncers, other staff)*

*If necessary prompt* Do/did you determine the location, the time or the types of services offered? If yes, could you please elaborate?

Training: Do/did you provide training? Explain what that looks/looked like.

Administration: Do/did you assume administrative responsibilities such as booking, promotion, advertising, drivers etc.?

Safety: Are there things you do/did to ensure the safety of individuals who work/worked for or with you? If so please elaborate.

Security: Do/did you provide security? If so please elaborate.

Crisis Management: Do/did you have a protocol in place in case of emergencies?

*If yes*

i. Can you describe it please

ii. Did you ever have to implement it?

Security: Do/did you provide security? If so please elaborate.

Are there any services you provide/provided that we have not asked about?

5. In regard to your expectations…

What are/were your expectations and requirements of individuals who work/worked for you or with you? *(prompt as relevant, dancers, managers, DJs, bouncers, waitstaff…)*

What sorts of disciplinary measures do/did you employ when workers do/did not meet your expectations or requirements? (i.e. fines, scheduling shifts etc., threats vs. actions)

6. How would you describe the relationship you have/had:

With those who work/worked for you and with you? *(prompt as relevant, dancers, employees, managers, DJs, bouncers…)*

With other third parties related in some way to dancers, for example agents, drivers, private managers or ‘pimps’ – please also describe what these people do.

*If relevant*

You have noted that some of the individuals who work/worked for you are/were ‘pimped’ or ‘turned out’?

Can you describe what that means?

Can you describe your relationship with their ‘pimps’?

We will now examine work-related skills and qualities:

7. Could you please speak to what, in your experience, are the qualities and skills necessary to work as an X in *(specify sector)*.

How did you acquire these skills and competencies? *(prompt if needed, for example where they transferred from previous employment?)*

8. Could you speak generally about what you like/liked and what you do/did not like/liked about your job.
Part II: Managing the business
Now we are going to turn to the different organizational aspects of your work, but this time in terms of managing your business.

9. Can you please tell us about your business plan? Here we are interested in your image of the business; what type of service do/did you want to offer, what kinds of clients and workers you are/were interested in attracting. In short how do/did you brand your business?

Now we are going to go into more specific questions about staffing and business practices

10. What are/were your criteria for hiring individuals who work/worked for you and with you (prompt, as relevant, sex workers, dancers, employees, managers, drivers, receptionists…)?
   If necessary: who would you hire and who would you not hire.
   o How do/did you recruit and retain these individuals?

11. How do/did you allocate work among those that work/worked for and with you (i.e. schedule, how are clients distributed to workers)

12. What are/were the rules at your place of business (prompt if necessary: for example in regards to drugs and alcohol; friends etc.). Please elaborate.

13. Do/did you partially or wholly provide equipment such as costumes, licenses, taxi fare, safer sex equipment, etc.?
   If yes, please elaborate

14. Do/did you use technologies in your business (i.e., Internet, computer, cell phone)
   If yes, please elaborate

Now we are switching to some questions about the financial aspect of the business

15. Can you please discuss your costs and the expenses you incur/incurred running your business
   o Could you please discuss your profit in the last year that you ran the business?

16. How are individuals who work/worked for you or with you paid?
   o Do/did you set and/or control prices?
   o Do/did you take a share of the prices or tips?
   o If yes, please elaborate

17. How do/did you maintain or increase profits
   o Do/did you advertise? If yes, please elaborate

18. How do/did you attract, keep or increase your clientele

19. Do/did you pay taxes? If yes please elaborate. (How do you file your taxes?
   Under what category (independent worker, contractor, etc)

And finally:

20. What are/were the benefits and rewards of the business for yourself and those that work/worked for you and with you?
Part III: Risks associated with the sex industry
We often hear of risks associated with your work and the sex workers who work/worked for you and with you (*prompt with precision - with respect to security, health, discrimination, psychological well-being, income*).

21. What is your opinion on the question of risks?
22. Do/did you think there are/were particular risks associated with your work? Are there risks for the people that work/worked for you and with you?
   - Have you ever had to deal with this risk? [probe for each risk identified]
     Please elaborate
23. Do/did you take particular measures to protect yourself, or the people that work/worked for you and with you, from these risks?

*If the individual has identified measures*
   - Do/did these measures have an effect on your business, your work and/or on your life?
   - (*If yes*) What are/were the implications of the measures you take to manage the (security concerns, health precautions, discrimination, psychological well-being, income)?

Part IV: Laws and policies
We will now turn to a discussion of the laws and policies that affect your work/business. Here we are referring to a range of laws including criminal code laws, immigration law, municipal bylaws, alcohol regulations, business law, licensing and tax requirements as well as the people who enforce them. [prompt to ensure range of laws/policies are considered]

24. When you think/thought about the laws, by-laws and policies that affect/affected how you work/worked or run/ran your business, what laws and/or do/did you think of?
   - More specifically, what laws, by-laws and/or policies are/were significant for you as an (x) in *identify sector*?
   - Do these laws, by-laws and policies help you or hinder you? Please elaborate
   - How do you think the laws, by-laws and/or policies could be improved?
25. Do/did you have a relationship with law enforcement that affects/affected how you manage/managed your business?
26. Have you ever had to deal with law enforcement or the legal system in your capacity as an (x) in *specify sector*?
   (If yes) Can you tell me about this
27. In the context of your work, what measures do/did you take to protect yourself, your business and the people who work/worked for you and with you from coming into conflict with the legal system?
   (If individual has identified measures)
28. Do/did these measures have an effect on different aspects of your work and/or your life?

*(Allow participant to discuss and reflect on the implications and add if necessary)*
o On the services your business offers/offer and the way you offer/offered them?
o On what you expect/expected from people who work/worked for you and with you?
o Do/did they hinder you, or the people who work/worked for you and with you, in any way?

Part V: Prejudice and social judgment
We are now turning to the question of prejudice and social judgment. Here I’m interested in your opinions and experiences.

29. What are the stereotypes associated with your managerial work as a *(insert type of work)* in *(insert sector)*?
   o From the general public?
o From the people that work/worked for you and with you?
o Do/did you ever find yourself encountering these stereotypes?

30. Have you encountered prejudice because of these stereotypes?
   *(If yes)*
o Which stereotypes?
o Could you please elaborate based on your own experiences?
o What measure do/did you personally take to negotiate or cope with these prejudices or stereotypes?

31. **How does your being a *(draw on gender, ethnicity, nationality and class description provided)* shape your experience of prejudice and social judgment, or anything else we’ve talked about so far?** *(prompt about: racial quotas if they have mentioned them, club rules relating to security, screening or music)*

We are now going to turn to some general questions about “the pimp”

32. What in your opinion is the stereotypical image of “the pimp”
   o Do/did you see a difference between the stereotypical image of ‘the pimp’ and the way you described your work at the beginning of the interview?
     i. Do/did you ever find yourself encountering these stereotypes about “the pimp”?
     ii. Does/did the stereotype have an effect on you? *(prompt if necessary, how you work, your presentation of self etc.)*

Part VI: Work and private life
Since parts of your work may be criminalized, we would now like to discuss the effect your work as a *(insert type of work)* in *(insert sector)* has on your social and personal life

33. Who knows that you are/were a (x) in *(specify sector)*
34. Starting with your social life how do/did you talk about your work with individuals associated with:
   o Housing *(specify as appropriate, landlord, mortgage holder etc.)*
o Financial institutions *(specify as appropriate; bank, ‘Money Mart’, social assistance etc.)*
35. In terms of your private life, how do/did you talk about your managerial work with:
   o Your partner/s?
   o Members of your family?
   o Your children?
   o Your friends?
36. Does/did the work affect your personal life? If yes can you elaborate?
37. How do/did you balance your work and personal life?

Part VII: Work History

Now we are turning to your work history.

38. Can you describe for me your formal or informal work related training and/or education.
39. Have you had jobs outside of the sex industry, and if so, what jobs?
   o In particular we are interested in jobs where you had managerial responsibilities.
40. What jobs have you done within the sex industry? Could you please list them starting at the first and indicate the number of months or years of experience you have in each?
41. Since when have you been working as a (specify occupation)
   o Why did you decide to become a (specify occupation)
     If appropriate
   o When and why did you stop being a (specify occupation)

Part VIII: The Industry

42. What is your opinion of the sex industry in general?
   o What are/were the particular challenges that are being encountered in (insert city)
43. What is your opinion of:
   o Sex workers
   o Clients
44. Are you familiar with any sex worker groups (insert city)?
   o What is your opinion of this group(s)
   o Would you be open to working with this organization(s)?
45. Are you familiar with the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada?
   o What is your opinion of this group?
   o Are you or your club a member? Why or why not?
Part VIII: General Information
46. How old are you?
47. Are you in a relationship, married or living common-law, separated of divorced? If yes, since when?
48. Do you have children? If yes, do they live with you?
49. In the last year you worked as a \textit{name occupation}, your total income was:
   \begin{itemize}
   \item Less than $20,000
   \item Between $20,000 and $40,000
   \item Between $40,000 and $60,000
   \item Between $60,000 and $80,000
   \item More than $80,000
   \item More than $100,000
   \end{itemize}

Part IV: Wrap-up
50. Do you have anything else to add?
51. Would you be able to direct us to other people who might be interested in participating in the research?

Thank you so much for taking the time to share your experiences with me. If you are interested in the results of the research please feel free to contact me. I should warn you that research takes time and if may be several years before the findings are released.
APPENDIX V: Dancer interview guide

Preamble
As I have already mentioned, as part of a research project that I’m doing, I am conducting interviews with dancers about their relationships with third parties in strip clubs. This includes anyone who in some way organizes, supervises, manages or coordinates your work: managers, DJs, bouncers, doormen, agents and maybe also drivers or other people. This interview may touch on sensitive issues but I assure you that there are neither good nor bad responses to the questions. Moreover all of your comments will remain anonymous and confidential, and we will not be using your name in the interview, nor will it be recorded anywhere else – we will only be using your pseudonym.
I would also like to take this opportunity to remind you that my project is focused on Toronto and Ottawa, so keep that in mind when you are answering the questions if you have worked in a lot of different cities.

Preliminary Information
I want to confirm that the goals of the research have been explained, the consent letter has been reviewed orally and you have had an opportunity to ask questions and receive clarification regarding research goals, methods, researchers’ obligations and the rights of the participants or any other concerns.

In a couple of words how would you describe yourself or identify in terms of gender, ethnicity, nationality, and class?

In one or two words how would you describe your job?

Open invitation to speak
1. I’d like to start with you telling me about your typical day at work. I’m interested in your interactions with third parties and other staff in the club (establish city/cities and whether they are a current or former worker)
   Probe about:
   o How do you do your job
   o Relationship with third parties – what do they do for you?
   o What, if any, authority do they have over you?
   o How do they affect your work and income?

Workplace relationships and conflict management
This section is about workplace relationships and conflict management. We will be exploring what third parties do for you, and your challenges and strategies in dealing with them.
2. Describe your relationship with (name third parties they have named)
3. What do (name different third parties) do to hinder your work?
4. What do (name different third parties) do to facilitate your work? Probe about cooperation, alliances, etc.
5. Tell me what happens when there is a conflict at work…
   - Between dancers
   - With a customer (over boundaries, behaviour or money)
   - With a DJ
   - With a manager
   - With the owner
   - With a bouncer
   - With other staff

6. Tell me about tipping at your workplace (who you tip, if it's mandatory, recommended or voluntary).

7. How does tipping or not tipping affect your relationship with (third parties they tip or choose not to tip)?

8. Earlier you described yourself as a (gender, ethnicity, nationality, class). How does this affect your relationship with third parties, your health and safety at the workplace, or anything else we have talked about?

9. Have you experienced discrimination from any third parties at your work, in regard to your ethnicity or any other aspects of your identity or presentation?

Health, safety and security

Now we are moving on to issues of health, safety and security at your workplace. Here I am interested in your experiences and opinions of the facilities and services that third parties offer you. (If clarification is needed:) An example of facilities would be the change room; an example of the services would be security.

10. How do or do not the third parties you work with safeguard your health, wellbeing and safety? Probe about:
   - Facilities (e.g., change rooms, staff washrooms, lockers, stage, etc.)
   - Services (e.g., security…)
   - Resources or supplies (e.g., hand sanitizer, costumes…)
   - Policies (e.g., managers telling customers the price of VIP bookings…)

11. Do they provide you with any other services or supplies?

12. What have the (name third parties) done when you have experienced inappropriate conduct from customers?

13. Have you ever experienced inappropriate behaviour from (name third parties) or other staff? If yes: What did you do about it? (Why or why not, how did that play out…)

Rules and expectations

Let’s move on to management’s expectations, the rules at your workplace, rule breaking and discipline, and how you negotiate or resist rules or expectations.

14. Tell me about the rules at your work. Probe about:
   - Official rules
   - Rules about your friends, boyfriend or girlfriend coming in to work
   - Expectations (unofficial/unspoken rules)
   - In relation to bylaws or other laws, for example prostitution laws
15. Tell me what happens when you, or any dancer, breaks the rules.
   o Tell me about the consequences or punishments for breaking the rules.
   o How does management find out about rules being broken?
   o Tell me about how often you break rules and why.
   o Tell me how you avoid or prevent being caught or punished.

16. Tell me about any other expectations that (name third parties) have at your work
    and what happens when you don’t live up to them. *Probe about: interactions with
    customers, outfits, shoes, stage shows…*

17. Tell me about how third parties treat extras or outside work at the club(s) where
    you (have) work(ed).
   o Club policy on extras and outside work [sex work]
   o Differences between third parties’ reactions to extras
   o Do you offer extras? *If yes,*
     o Who is aware of this?
     o How do you get around club rules and policies?

18. What do you do when you don’t like what management is doing, when you don’t
    like management’s expectations, or the floor fee, your schedule, club rules, or
    anything else at work that we’ve talked about so far? *Probe about individual and
    collective resistance tactics.*

Administration, policies and practices

Now I’d like to know about the policies, practices and administration at your workplace.
This includes things like hiring, training, and scheduling; as well as fees, prices and
wages.

19. Tell me about when you first started working. *Probe about:*
   o Hiring – what the hiring process looks like, reasons (given by
     management) for not being hired, racial quotas
   o Have you ever not been hired at a club? *If yes,* what did they say was the
     reason?
   o Licensing – i.e. did club help with it
   o Training
   o Communication of rules, dos/don’ts (*esp. in relation to lap dancing*)

20. Let’s talk about how you work. I would like to hear about your work as a
    freelancer, a house girl, or both, and why (*reformulate based on answer to
    previous question*). *Probe about:*
   o Floor fee
   o Wages/salary
   o Scheduling
   o How are prices set and controlled? What about customer tipping?
   o Different cities
Regulation
The next few questions address how municipal regulation and other laws affect your work and your relationship to third parties. This could include municipal by-laws, provincial laws regarding liquor and labour, and criminal laws, for example those that apply to prostitution, as well as immigration and tax laws.

21. Please describe the laws, by-laws and other regulations that apply to your work.
   - Where did you learn this?
   - From licensing or other city officials?
   - Management?
   - Colleagues?
   - Notices posted at your workplace?

22. Tell me about how these laws, by-laws and other regulations affect your work.

23. Tell me about how these laws, by-laws and other regulations affect your relationship with (name third parties) or anyone else you work with (clients, etc).

24. Tell me about the measures that third parties take to protect you from coming into conflict with the legal system. If they don’t name any:
   - How do you protect yourself legally?

General questions about management
Let’s move on to some general questions about third parties and what it’s like to work with them.

25. Based on your experience, what makes a good manager, DJ, bouncer, etc.?
26. Based on your experience, what makes a bad manager, DJ, bouncer, etc.?
27. What are the benefits and drawbacks of working with (name third parties)?
28. Is there anyone else who organizes, supervises, manages or coordinates your work or your finances? For example a driver, an agent, a housemom or anyone else? If yes, please describe what they do, and the benefits and drawbacks of working with them.

29. (Where and if they have mentioned it:) What do you mean by ‘pimp’ OR ‘man’?

Stigma and social judgment
We are now turning to the question of prejudice and social judgment. Here I’m interested in your opinions and experiences.

30. Tell me about your experiences of stigma, prejudice, and social judgment at work – this could be prejudice about who you are, what you do, the way you work, etc.
   - From third parties
   - From other dancers
   - From other staff
   - From customers

31. What measures do-did you personally take to negotiate, manage or deal with these prejudices and stereotypes?
32. In your opinion, what do third parties think of you and your work?
33. How does your being a (gender, ethnicity, nationality, class) affect your experiences prejudice and social judgment, both at and outside of the workplace?
General questions about the industry
34. What is your opinion of third parties?
35. What is your opinion of extras and the dancers who offer them?
36. What is your opinion of the exotic dance sector?
37. What is your opinion of the sex industry?
38. Have you ever heard of any dancer organizations or sex worker organizations in (city/cities where they have worked)? If yes, what do you think about these organizations? What is your experience with them?
39. Have you ever heard of the Adult Entertainment Association of Canada? If yes, what is your experience with and/or opinion of them?

General questions about your work
40. Please tell me a timeline of your work in the adult and/or sex industry.
   o When and where do or did you work?
   o (If it’s unclear) What sectors of the sex industry have you worked in?
41. Why do or did you work at a strip club?
   o What did you like and not like about it?
   o If applicable: Why did you stop dancing?
42. Tell me about anything that (has) changed during your time in the industry.
43. How often do or did you work and why?
   o Do you work at a few clubs regularly, mostly one club, or do you tour?
   o How many shifts per week? Day or night?

Wrap-up and demographic questions
44. How old are you?
45. Are you in a relationship, married or living common-law, separated or divorced?
   o If yes, since when?
46. Do you have children?
47. Your total income in the last year you danced was
   o Less than $20,000
   o Between $20,000 and $40,000
   o Between $40,000 and $60,000
   o Between $60,000 and $80,000
   o More than $80,000
   o More than $100,000
   o If monthly is easier, we can do that, too.
48. Please describe your educational background.
49. Do you have anything else to add?
50. Do you know anyone that would want to participate?

Thank you so much for taking the time to share your experiences with me. If you are interested in the results of the research please feel free to contact me. I should warn you that research takes time and it may be several years before the findings are released.
## APPENDIX VI: Third party codebook

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