Assemblages of Intervention: Politics, Security, and Drug Trafficking in West Africa

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## Table of Contents

**Abstract**: .......................................................................................................................... iv

**Acknowledgements** ........................................................................................................... v

**Acronyms** .............................................................................................................................. viii

**Chapter 1: Introduction** ....................................................................................................... 1

Theorizing connected spaces of intervention ........................................................................ 8

Case study justification: Capacity-building in Mali and Niger: AIRCOP; and the Container Control Programme (CCP) ................................................................. 13

**Approach to Data Collection** ............................................................................................. 18

Multi-sited Ethnography: looking for practices...................................................................... 19

Data Analysis.......................................................................................................................... 25

**Chapter Overview** .............................................................................................................. 26

**Chapter 2: Examining Existing Understandings of the Governance of Borderless Threats** .......................................................................................................................... 30

**Security Studies and borderless threats** ............................................................................. 32

The Copenhagen School’s Securitization Framework ......................................................... 34

The Paris School critique of security.................................................................................... 41

**Global Governance of Transnational Issues and their Limits** ........................................ 46

Liberal accounts of Global Governance.............................................................................. 48

Realist accounts of Global Governance............................................................................. 50

Constructivist accounts of Global Governance................................................................. 51

European Security Governance ......................................................................................... 56

**Approaches to International Statebuilding Interventions** .............................................. 59

The Technical Current: Functional liberalism.................................................................... 60

The Radical Current: the view of Western imposition......................................................... 66

**Conclusion** ......................................................................................................................... 73

**Chapter 3 – Global Security Assemblages and Fields of Intervention** ................................ 75

Assemblages and governance............................................................................................... 76

Authority and Recognition: field, doxa, and forms of capital ........................................... 85

Practices of Extraversion: Weakness as strength; Local knowledge; and Transnational Gate-keeping .............................................................................................................. 95

Discourses of Vulnerability and Willingness........................................................................ 97

Mastery of Insider Knowledge............................................................................................. 104

Transnational Gatekeeping ................................................................................................. 107

Assemblages of Security Intervention in West Africa.......................................................... 113

**Conclusion** ......................................................................................................................... 120

**Chapter 4 - By Land: Intervention in the Interior Sahelian Belt** ....................................... 121

The crowded international security field in the Sahelian belt ............................................ 122

Field dynamics of international capacity-building interventions in the Sahel.................. 133

Conflict, resources and rents: Extraverted practices of security by political and security elite in the Sahel........................................................... 146
Practices of extraversion amongst Meso-level security actors..........................158
Security tools, technologies: Uses and Abuses ..................................................159
International security training: Access to a key material and symbolic resource ....171
Extraverted Practices, international capital, and conflicts between security units...175
Conclusion ............................................................................................................183

Chapter 5: By Air – Drug Interdiction at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport (LSS), Senegal.................................................................185
AIRCOP Project Design .....................................................................................187
The (post)colonial field of security in Senegal...................................................192
The structure of Internal Security Services in Francophone African Countries, and their responses to global structural transformations ....................................193
Inter-agency competition and AIRCOP implementation ...............................199
Competing practices, and justifications of (non)inclusion in AIRCOP: Authority in the field of law enforcement .........................................................200
Global opportunities for capacity-building and strategies of selection ..........210
Adaptability in selection of diverse patrons in connected fields ....................211
Fueling mutual distrust through AIRCOP governance ......................................217
Interdiction efforts and public/private actors at LSS International Airport: Rescaling the governance of drug trafficking ...............................................224
Negotiation, private interests, and structural constraints at LSS ....................226
CAAT drug interdiction success: reinforcing governance rescaling and new interdiction practices .................................................................................234
Conclusion ............................................................................................................238

Chapter 6 – Governing Borderless Threats by Sea: Senegal and the Container Control Programme (CCP) .................................................................241
The Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD): The heart of Senegal’s liberal economy ....245
The UNODC, World Customs Organization (WCO), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) ........................................................................247
Security rescaling via discipline in the Dakar PCU ............................................249
Disciplinary surveillance and the design of the CCP .......................................250
The limits of international discipline: Needing material and symbolic incentives ....259
Rescaling governance and dealing with rivalries in Senegal’s field of security ......264
Competing structures of authority: State-society relations and their effects on security governance through the CCP ...............................................275
Religious, politico-economic authorities, the PAD, and the PCU ....................276
PAD administrators, security, and the work of the PCU ..................................281
Conclusion ............................................................................................................287

Chapter 7: Conclusion ........................................................................................289
Research implications of global assemblages of security intervention? ..........291
Global assemblages of security intervention and the internationalization of the West African state? .................................................................293
African security agents and the development of a transnational constabulary ethic? .................................................................299
The consequences of international security assistance: forces of stability or instability? .................................................................306

Bibliography ........................................................................................................313
Abstract:

International actors from International Organizations, Western States, Think tanks, risk management consultancies, NGOs, and private security companies understand borderless threats like clandestine migration, drug trafficking, and international terrorism to emanate from ‘ungoverned spaces’ in the Global South. The Sahelian sub-region of West Africa has taken a prominent place in global discourses of insecurity and borderless threats. These non-traditional security concerns have been translated into an expanding array of transnational governance initiatives that bring together the activities and practices of a wide range of state and non-state, global and local, and public and private actors in efforts to deal with the challenges that borderless threats are assumed to present. This dissertation argues that attempts to govern drug trafficking in the Sahel are producing global assemblages of security intervention: shifting, multi-scalar, institutional orders that reorient and reconfigure the security practices, knowledges, mentalities, technologies, and priorities of multiple sets of governance actors across disparate jurisdictional spaces. The effects of the transnationalized security governance and capacity-building initiatives that unfold in simultaneous, connected spaces of intervention amplify and alter positions of social power and prominence in local fields of conflict. Through the practices and projects of global security experts and capacity-builders in the Sahel, new forms of international capital are introduced and become realized in local settings that intensify rivalries between local, national, and regional security institutions over the question of the recognition of their authority over security matters. In their relationships with international capacity-builders and other global actors, sets of local recipients of security governance interventions practice forms of extraversion whereby their structural positions of dependence and differentials of power and resources are leveraged to accumulate forms of international capital that they then use to dominate the fields of power in which they are embedded. The dissertation examines three components of the assemblages of security intervention in West Africa: the effects of the transnational field of capacity-building in the Sahelian interior; the establishment and operation of the UNODC Airport Communications drug interdiction project (AIRCOP) at Dakar’s International Airport, and the joint UNODC/World Customs Organization Container Control Programme operating at the port of Dakar. It advances new empirical material from these case studies, and makes contributions to debates in three sub-fields of International Relations: critical security studies, global governance, and international statebuilding.
Acknowledgements

There are several individuals that must receive due acknowledgement for their support in making this Ph.D. thesis happen. I’m sure that the list will not be complete. It is late at night. I’m on the bus, typing out this document, experiencing a caffeine-induced haze that will most likely affect the outcome of remembering who deserves mention of their support. If I forget to mention someone in particular, I apologize in advance.

First, social science research is never an individual effort. Multiple people have contributed to how I have come to understand the complicated, transnational politics of capacity-building and security governance against borderless threats. While the words, interpretations, and argument is mine, this does not mean that I figured this out on my own. Far from it. I take full responsibilities for any errors found herein.

First and foremost is Rita Abrahamsen. Ever since I read her book Disciplining Democracy in the summer of 2006, I knew that I wanted to be mentored by her, and to engage with her insights regarding security politics in Africa. I was so lucky, indeed blessed, to have had the chance to work with her as a Master’s student at the University of Wales-Aberystwyth, and then serendipitously in 2009 when she started her position at the University of Ottawa. Thank you so very much, Rita, for your moral support, engaging critiques, and steady hand to make sure that I completed this difficult but very rewarding task. I can only hope to be as good a mentor and supervisor for anyone in my future stewardship as you have with me. Michael Williams was instrumental in helping me better understand the politics of security, and for sparking my thinking about Critical Security Studies. He deserves a special mention for his moral support and engaging pedagogy. Cedric Jourde’s moral support and in-depth knowledge of several Sahelian countries has been incomparable. I’m so glad that by chance we arrived at the Centre d’Archives d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence on the same day in the summer of 2011 and started chatting about the follies of ‘ungoverned space’ thinking. Your knowledge of the complex dynamics of the Sahel intensified my interests that I can now healthily call an obsession.

Supervisors are official. Colleagues and friends are not. Conversations with several other individuals have formed my thinking as well. Mark Salter’s pedagogy was instrumental in making me realize and become a ‘born again postie.’ His moral support has been a required dose of oxygen in very challenging times. Jacquie Best and Mat Patterson have almost cheered me on, shared their insights, commented on ISA papers, and been exemplary in showing me what true academics and community makers should look like. Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones have also been very supportive of this effort, and conversations with them have shaped my thinking about the question of the politics of scale in security and assemblages of intervention. Finally, and most importantly, there has been a tight-knit set of graduate students at the University of Ottawa that have consistently built each other up, supported one another’s research endeavours, and reduced the stress of the research by finding and making time for nerdy jokes and laughter. Phil Mamadou Frowd, Chris Leite, and Can Mutlu have been the most ardent of
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I won’t devote too much space here to acknowledge them. But it is important to state categorically that my interlocutors in the Sahel, Vienna, Washington DC., and New York have made this possible, and have added a level of detail that would have made this dissertation a very drab affair. Thank you, thank you, and thank you for spending your time speaking with me. Inch’Allah, we shall meet again and I can in some way return your kindness and sincerity.

My time researching has also been about community. My community in Ottawa has been developed in close, service-related interactions with members of the Champlain Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. While away on field research, members of the ward shovelled snow from my driveway so my pregnant wife wouldn’t have to. They dropped off Oreo cookies randomly at our doorstep, provided me rides home late at night after long hours of composing this work, and bought me several cans of Monster Energy Drink (LDS folks try not to drink coffee or tea). Several families have looked after our children while my wife worked, allowing me to read or write in my window-less office at the FSS building. Others helped calm me down by taking me for a much-needed Dr. Pepper slurpee, or buying me a Peanut Buster Parfait and allowing me to stress eat, or by coming over at inconvenient times to serve my family by providing me with a Priesthood blessing. Your prayers have been needed, welcome, felt, and answered, as they have constituted answers to my own.

Finally, family members have supported me through thick and thin. David and Meagan, Jenn and Brent, John and Darcia, Mom and Terry, and Dad and Norma, you all gave of your time, money, love, and service to the girls and me. I don’t know how I can ever repay your for this support. All I can do is try to live up to the standard that you all
exemplify. I love you, and am indebted to you beyond measure. Finally, Anyanka, Beatrix, Philippa, and Chrysalis... You have sacrificed so much in order for me to be an eternal/perpetual student. Thank you for being understanding of the time that I have needed to be away, and your willingness to sacrifice so much time apart. Thank you for being patient when I have been cranky when this argument hasn’t been as cooperative or coordinated as it was supposed to be (coordination is short hand for competition). Thank you for keeping the house a place where I can experience peace, joy and love. Chrysalis, thank you so much for teaching our girls to be strong, compassionate young ladies. You make life worth living. They say that doing a Ph.D. will children is difficult... Sure. But I wouldn’t trade the hugs that I get from my four girls the moment I walk through the door when I arrive home after a long day of thinking, researching and writing for anything. Without you all, I am very little indeed. Thank you, and I promise that I will be gainfully employed soon, God willing.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFIS</td>
<td>Automated Fingerprint Identification System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>Africa International Support Mission for Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automated Identification of Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCAO</td>
<td>Appui à la lutte contre le traffic de cocaine en Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTRAF</td>
<td>Anti-organized Crime and Counter-narcotics Enforcement in Cape Verde Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSP</td>
<td>Adjustment of Transport Sector Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNLPC</td>
<td>Brigade nationale de Lutte Contre la Piraterie et la Contrefaçon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>Cellule Aéroportuaire Anti-Trafic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>US Customs and Border Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Global Container Control Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN</td>
<td>Customs Enforcement Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENCOM</td>
<td>Customs Enforcement Network Communications Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTIF</td>
<td>Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILD</td>
<td>Comité Interministériel de Lutte contre la Drogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPRI</td>
<td>Copenhagen Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Container Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Direction de la Coopération Internationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGPN</td>
<td>Direction Générale de la Police Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLCF</td>
<td>Direction de Lutte Contre la Fraude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRE</td>
<td>Direction de Renseignements et des Enquêtes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Direction de Surveillance du Territoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAM</td>
<td>Ecole Nationale d’Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU CAP</td>
<td>European Union Capacity-Building Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNID</td>
<td>Fichier National des Informations Douanières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>international financial institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Police Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPS</td>
<td>International Ship and Port facilities Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAITF</td>
<td>Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMCU</td>
<td>Joint-maritime control units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSS</td>
<td>Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-traditional security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Office Central des Stupéfiants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRTIS</td>
<td>Office Central de Répression des Trafics Illicites et des Stupéfiants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>UN Mission for Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Port Autonome de Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Police de l’Air et des Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCU</td>
<td>Port Control Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIGN</td>
<td>Peloton d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDS</td>
<td>Parti Nigerien pour la Democratie et le Socialisme-Tayayya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>ECOWAS Regional Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Renseignements Généraux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCLCT</td>
<td>Service Central de la Lutte Contre Terroriste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTIP</td>
<td>Service de Coopération Technique Internationale de Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>Safety of Life at Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Surveillance du Territoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSTCP</td>
<td>Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Drugs and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Ugandan People’s Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACI</td>
<td>West African Coast Initiative</td>
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<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Narco-terrorism is on the rise”...[in the Sahel]... Several hundred of heavily armed individuals are connected to the traffic of hostages and drugs... If we leave them alone, it is the entirety of Africa, West and East, and Europe that are threatened... If we want to avoid, within the next few months, our countries being struck by narco-terrorism, we must act.”

– Laurent Fabius, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2012

The 2 April 2013 was a bad day for former Navy Chief of Guinea-Bissau, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto. He was in the process of orchestrating a major cocaine trafficking operation with purported Colombian rebels belonging to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The deal was relatively simple: Na Tchuto and other high-ranking military officials in Guinea-Bissau (including the Chief of the Armed Forces, Antonio Indjai) would facilitate the importation of thousands of kilograms of cocaine, in exchange for surface-to-air missiles paid to the armed group. To his surprise, the ‘rebels’ were actually United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, and Na Tchuto was the target of a complex international law enforcement operation. Na Tchuto was arrested, along with two others, in international waters off Guinea-Bissau’s archipelago. He was subsequently transported to neighbouring Cape Verde, and finally extradited to the United States to appear before a judge in Manhattan’s Southern District court of New York (Nossiter 2013).

Many political and military officials have recently been accused of, or criminally charged with, drug trafficking or profiting from the trade in West Africa. In May 2008, then Prime Minister of Guinea informed the American Ambassador that the leading drug
trafficker of the country was none other than Ousmane Conté (son of the late President Lansana Conté). Conté was arrested early the following year (U.S. Embassy Conakry 2008; BBC 2009). In 2005, Eric Amoateng, a former Ghanaian member of parliament, was arrested in New York and convicted of trafficking over 100 pounds of heroin into the United States (BBC News 2005; U.S. Embassy Accra 2007; Aning 2007: 199-204). In the biggest narcotics case in Sierra Leonean history, Ibrahim Kemoh Sesay, the country’s former Minister of Transportation and Aviation and current Minister of Political and Public Affairs, was accused of permitting a plane carrying over 700kg of cocaine to land at Lungi Airport in July 2008. His brother was convicted of criminal conspiracy, along with fourteen other individuals of Sierra Leonean and South American citizenship. The country’s police were subsequently aided by specially-invited Scotland Yard drug crime investigators (Blair 2009; Africa Confidential 2009). 1 In November 2009, a Boeing 727 departed from Venezuela and landed in the Gao region of northern Mali, transporting a sizeable amount of cocaine – some estimate between five and ten tonnes – a scheme that many say involved knowledge and planning by high-level Malian state authorities (Lacher 2012; Lebovich 2013; Thiolay 2013). These instances do not even scratch the surface, as attested by smaller drug trafficking operations involving hundreds of ‘drug mules’ and couriers (if not many more) who transit the sub-region on a regular basis (see UNODC 2013: 9-19). The list of West African involvement in drug trafficking operations grows at a steady pace, and has drawn the attention of Western states and international organizations concerned with the trade’s security implications.

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1 Ahmed Sesay was sentenced to five years in prison and fine with 300,000,000 Leones (between $50,000 and $100,000). He paid his fine, but served less than three years.
Borderless threats like drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime have topped global security agendas. There is an increasing consensus in international policy-making circles that these types of transnational phenomena cannot be solved by any one state, but require solutions that include the synergies and practices of multiple state and non-state, public and private actors. This is especially the case when borderless threats are assumed to incubate in so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the Global South; areas that are seen to serve as global launching pads for threatening enterprises. International actors also widely agree the Sahel sub-region of West Africa typifies these concerns: its governments are weak and have limited abilities to control their territories, and populations, making the region a sanctuary from which transnational groups of ‘narco/gangster jihadists,’ ‘human smugglers,’ ‘bandits,’ ‘kidnappers,’ and other ‘criminal elements,’ can conduct dangerous attacks on the international community (see UNSC 2012; Barluet 2012; Lewis and Diarra 2012; Shelley 2014). By 2005, the Sahel had become an epicenter for a multiplying host of international security governance initiatives to buttress the capacities of regional states, and crime fighting and capacity-building in the Sahel has supplanted more exceptional cases of war fighting (see Andreas and Price 2001; Adamson 2005).

This dissertation investigates transnational interventions enacted in the Sahel, where international efforts to build its states’ abilities to control, monitor, and surveil their territories, borders, and populations have become especially concentrated, prominent, and current. The dissertation’s central argument is that international efforts to govern borderless threats in West Africa are solidifying the establishment of global assemblages of security intervention. These assemblages are multi-sited institutional
orders that extend and couple security rationales, practices, and understandings across multiple scales. Within these assemblages, everyday cooperation and conflict between global and local security professionals stems from competing claims for recognition of expertise and authority over the question of how, who, and where is best to govern borderless threats. Assemblages of security intervention are transformative since within its connected spaces the relationships of power, and authority of engaged actors, and their control over crucial resources are reconfigured by the introduction of new global security initiatives, and the new forms of symbolic and material rents that become activated and realized in and across its connected scales.

The dissertation focuses on three components of the assemblage of security intervention in the Sahel to tackle drug trafficking as they unfold in Senegal, Mali, and Niger, the main countries under investigation in this study. All three countries benefit from manifold international capacity-building measures conducted by an avalanche of global security actors to build the capacities of their security institutions, and to furnish them with much wanted equipment and technical knowledge. Driven by fear of an impregnable “crime-terror” nexus (see Alda and Sala 2014; Bøås 2015) the governments of Mali and Niger have created new inter-agency law enforcement units, have seen their border posts revamped, been equipped with vehicles and other security tools and technologies, and have implemented trans-regional law enforcement structures in cooperation with a huge array of international actors. In Senegal, International Organizations (IOs) like the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and

2 While I concentrate the majority of the analysis on these three countries, when relevant, insights are drawn from fieldwork conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire as well.
international police liaisons have implemented trans-regional security governance initiatives based at the Leopold Sédar Senghor International Airport, and the Autonomous Port of Dakar (PAD), to enhance the capacities of the country’s drug interdiction law enforcement institutions. This dissertation dissects these various governance programmes in order to demonstrate how the borderless threat of drug trafficking is governed in a part of the world were security has never been administered in a way similar to Western liberal states.

Investigating the rise of these types of security practices in spaces of intervention, each justified in the name of governing borderless threats, is significant for several reasons. First, the multiplication of transnational security governance initiatives incorporating spaces of intervention highlights the consolidation of a global law enforcement architecture connecting multiple, disparate legal jurisdictions beyond the territorial confines of any one state: global assemblages of security intervention (see Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). These initiatives problematize neat sovereign divisions, and bring together an array of state and non-state, global and local, public and private actors, their diverse practices, and rationalities/mentalities of security (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). Assemblages of security intervention comprise the interactions of sets of actors operating at multiple spatial scales but whose discourses, practices, and sociopolitical contests intersect in a distinct space and object of governance (see also Latham 2001). An important implication of this fact for thinking about security is that while the identification of borderless threats may hint at the adoption of a particular ‘emergency’ logic to counter them (Buzan et. al. 1998), in reality their transnational qualities make for a wide range of day-to-day, regularized forms of governance and
intervention that are anything but “exceptional.” A major contribution of this research is to show how one of these borderless threats, drug trafficking, is governed in actual practice in spaces of intervention in West Africa. It may occasionally involve dangerous law enforcement sting operations off the Guinea-Bissauian archipelago described at the start of this discussion, but more often than not it involves “common place” capacity-building initiatives and information-sharing schemes that are rarely examined in a sustained way, particularly in the African setting (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007: 18). Africa, long viewed as a ‘forgotten continent’ suffering from ‘marginalization’ in global affairs, is a space that is becoming more and more entrenched in these transnational security governance dynamics from where new configurations of power and authority are emerging, albeit in a selective, and often non-inclusive way (see Ferguson 2006: 23; Harman and Brown 2013; Erforth 2014).

Second, the establishment of this constellation of security actors is creating new transnational relationships, which reconfigure power relations across connected local and global spaces. An investigation of these relationships demonstrates how international capacity-builders and IO experts function in specific settings that are not their own national jurisdictions, and how they interact with political actors ‘on the ground/in the field.’ This research demonstrates the consequences of their involvement. In spaces of intervention, coalitions of intervening parties, in conjunction with groups of recipients, hold divergent understandings of security, legality and illegality, and the appropriate ways, locations, and actors with which to combat borderless threats. By investigating the complex and fluid relations between different sets of global, national, and local actors and associated their practices, we come to better understand the outcomes of global security
governance processes. Doing so reveals an important truism worth repeating: security governance is not about finding a way to include disparate actors, and to coordinate their efforts in cooperative ventures - global security governance is political in that it reconfigures relations of power and control over resources, which means that any site of security governance is a site of contestation. This dissertation makes a key contribution in demonstrating how international security assistance to strengthen the rule of law in places like the Sahel creates new forms of material and symbolic resources that are realized in local settings, and as a result are riven with competition and conflict.

Third, the multiplication of state and non-state, public and private, global and local actors all intervening in the security affairs of the Sahel can tell us about how authority is shaped in spaces of intervention. This research shows that international actors may challenge local structures of authority found within its connected spaces of intervention; but this does not mean that they supplant, subvert, or dominate them. In the literature on global governance, IO experts, transnational advocacy groups, and other epistemic communities wield important authority that can compel state actors to shape their policies according to the dictates of bureaucratic or scientific expertise (see Hass 1992; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Much of the literature on international statebuilding, from a variety of theoretical perspectives, also presupposes the authority and consequence of interveners over recipients of intervention (Barnett 2006; Krasner 2004; Richmond 2010; Chandler 2006). Does this mean that in the case of the Sahel, international actors and expert authorities performing capacity-building initiatives dominate the governance of security? The proliferation of security governance initiatives in the Sahel visibly indicates that international experts are not automatic authorities in
security and policing matters; they must ultimately rely on local partners or agents to get things done. The establishment of authority requires recognition from relevant global and local security agents based on the forms of capital they command, and the transnational connections and opportunities they can muster. Another key contribution of this dissertation, therefore, lies in demonstrating that local political authorities shape the processes of intervention as much if not more than international actors even though, in the context of Africa’s asymmetrical relations of power, their authority is not assumed to be as consequential as that of international experts (see Sending 2011).

*Theorizing connected spaces of intervention*

The dissertation adds to literature that complicates our notion of what Barnett has diagnosed as an unfortunate dominance of conceptually “bundling” and “collapsing” the state, authority, and territory in IR thinking (2001: 48-55; Agnew 2009; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hameiri and Jones 2015a). Researching intervention politics in African settings demonstrates the silliness, and possibly even the danger of following the assumptions of this “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994). Governments in Africa, arguably, have never maintained control over the territorially confined spaces of sovereignty, but have had to negotiate and compete with multiple structures of authority within and across modern states (see Herbst 2000; Roitman 2005; Lund 2006). Crucially, these dynamics have not been confined to local territories, but have historically tended to extend outwards in a highly transnational fashion, linking local spaces and politics on the continent and weaving them into the political fabric of global ones (Bayart 2000). Like during the colonial era, where events unfolded in the colonies that reverberated across and reconfigured politics in the métropole and vice-versa (see Cooper and Stoler 1997),
spaces of intervention are transnationally-connected, co-constitutive and mutually generative social fields. What is needed, then, is a theoretical framework that can capture the dynamic, shifting interactions between coalitions of actors operating in local settings that are spatially connected through security practices enacted across geographic scales, and which highlights how power and authority are recognized amidst and because of these transnational connections. A useful way of teasing out these relationships is through assemblage thinking, synthesized with insights from Bourdieusian field theory as accomplished by Abrahamsen and Williams (2011, 2014), and coupled with Bayart’s notion of extraversion.

Assemblage thinking provides us with a way of understanding the manoeuvrings and encounters of competing sets of actors that occur across political geographies in the production of new scalar governance arrangements against borderless threats while taking into account the multiple agencies, practices, knowledges and forms that such transformations incorporate. There is nothing definitive about the specific characteristics of these security assemblages. Almost by definition, they are constantly being assembled and disassembled in unique ways, incorporating changing coalitions of actors and their relational and historical baggage, and rearticulate political relations and distinctions that have tended to structure the politics of contemporary states (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 3).

This view provides a conceptual openness that is a definitive strength in conceptualizing the politics of everyday interventions because it complicates viewing actors in fixed or binary terms, and is a way of mapping out the shifting networks and constellation of practices that are evinced in these new geographies of power. Interveners
compete over how capacity-building measures should occur, and seek to have their claims recognized on a wide variety of issues and in myriad ways. Some of these issues include how to define the threat to be countered, how best to accomplish their tasks, which groups amongst the local population should be included, or what equipment should be provided and when. The security governance initiatives of international actors will privilege some agendas, interests, and visions of what the state ought to be, which inevitably results in conflict and resistance amongst interveners and coalitions of the intervened. Similarly, an intervened population is not an autonomous mass subjected to intervention, as often stylized in the literature on statebuilding interventions (for a critique of the stylized vision, see Hameiri 2010). Coalitions of actors may or may not share the values of an intervention, responding to them in ways that support their political visions and preferences. Changes in economic, political or social circumstances might alter those positions, and warrant different, perhaps more resistant or acquiescent, strategies to be adopted. The assemblage approach is a way of accounting for the fluid, contingent, complex relationships that are evidenced within spaces of intervention.

Ultimately, determining these facets of how security governance is to occur, and the shape that assemblage of security intervention will take, depends upon socio-political contestation and the recognition of authority. Bourdieu’s concepts of fields and forms of capital help to conceptualize how authority is generated, recognized and maintained within assemblages of security intervention. Fields are configurations of relations between positions within specified spaces that are occupied by agents and institutions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97). Agents operating within a field cooperate and compete for multiple sources of capital, therein positioning themselves in relation to other
field agents in the exercise of power and authority. The emphasis on forms of capital and
social recognition allows for a nuanced understanding of the production and maintenance
of authority. Authority can be described as recognized domination and a resultant social
deferece of actors. Forms of capital lend themselves to the recognition of some
participants and the capacities that they wield in any given field over that of others. An
examination of fields, and the jockeying for forms of capital in it, is a dynamic heuristic
device capable of articulating multiple exercises of power and authority and how these
come into being.

Since addressing borderless threats through new transnational forms of regulation
means that the economic and political interests of locally affected coalitions of actors will
be threatened or harmed, particular practices of extraversion become important to analyze.
Bayart defines extraversion as mobilizing power relations of inequality and converting
them to acquire resources used “in the service of autochthonous objectives” (2005: 71).
Practices of extraversion, therefore, are key means of operating at the interface between
such global and local fields. In an acute move of political ju-jitsu, transnationally-
connected actors in spaces of intervention judge the nature and opportunities of security
interventions to “negotiate and appropriate authoritative security agendas” in ways that
will buttress their recognized authority in adjacent and conjoined fields of conflict of
which they are participants (Bachmann 2012: 128). Three practices of extraversion are
especially salient: mobilizing a discourse of simultaneous vulnerability to borderless
threats coupled with political willingness to confront them; practicing mastery of insider
knowledge; and the practice of transnational gatekeeping (see Cooper 2002). The first
plays on and accentuates the security concerns of international partners who buy into this
framing and reward helpful dependents in a form of transnational clientelism. The second
displays an important resource that can be traded, or manipulated/exaggerated by local
actors in spaces of intervention in return for recognition of status and prestige from
international partners. The third marks one’s institutional position “at the interface of
national and world economies,” (ibid.: 141) manipulated as a way of controlling and
greasing transnational forms of patronage through a recognized ability to mobilize forms
of capital, and other resources or networks. Therefore, access to the security governance
initiatives and practices of assemblages of security intervention equals participation and
negotiation of control over dominance in conjoined security and political fields.

The theoretical framework can account for the shapes that highly asymmetrical
relations of power take between global security actors and African recipients of
intervention through the latter’s practices of extraversion, how authority in security
matters is a result of competition in fields over forms of global and local capital which
are mobilized and realized in local settings, and how power relations are reconfigured
across connected, multi-scalar assemblages of security intervention. The assemblage
thinking approach mobilized in these pages, therefore, contributes to theoretical
discussions on global assemblages in two ways. First, it highlights how the contingency
of the assemblages of security interventions in connected spaces of West Africa are
derived from the political struggles for dominance within specific and conjoined fields of
governance, a view which buttresses other field-inspired conceptualizations (see
Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). Secondly, the synthetic formulation that draws on the
notion of extraversion from Bayart, but with a Bourdieusian-twist, contributes
theoretically by questioning and displacing the preponderance of an intervener-driven
view which has informed some other assemblage research on intervention, where intervening experts purportedly provide the dominant logic of assemblages of intervention (see Holmqvist et al. 2014: 8; Doucet 2015). The theoretical and methodological avenue taken here questions that view, and instead gives pride of place to the practices of intervened agents in their extraverted and asymmetrical relationships of power with global forces in order to manipulate and subvert the latter, and thereby seek to dominate the local fields in which they are embedded.

*Case study justification: Capacity-building in Mali and Niger; AIRCOP; and the Container Control Programme (CCP)*

This dissertation examines three components of these assemblages for West Africa: the broad array of capacity-building initiatives implemented in the Sahelian interior since the early 2000s examined in chapter four; the establishment of AIRCOP at LSS international airport in Dakar examined in chapter five; and the joint UNODC and World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme (CCP) operating at the Autonomous Port of Dakar examined in chapter six. All evince transnational, “joined-up security” characteristics, which move away from national logics and capacities towards involvement from a diverse and flexible set of transnational security actors and practices (see Bevir 2015).

The cases were chosen because they demonstrate the spatial and political features of global assemblages of security intervention against drug trafficking in West Africa. Capacity-building security governance initiatives examined in chapter four, like France’s *Justice et Sécurité en Région Sahélo-Saharienne* (JUSSEC), the U.S. Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSTCP), and the EU’s EUCAP-Sahel Niger and Mali
missions, operate across the territorial boundaries of each state in which they have been implemented. The programmes seek to regionalize law enforcement operations and information-sharing against transnational organized crime between the security institutions of Sahelian states. They connect disparate efforts across state spaces through joint training programmes for police, customs, gendarmes, and other law enforcement agents like state prosecutors, often in platforms that bring together representatives from each country simultaneously in regional workshops and exercises, and through information-sharing structures (see Partenaires Sécurité Défense 2013; Warner 2014).

AIRCOP and the CCP also extend and couple the capacity-building efforts of international experts even further through the implementation of joint training sessions, work study tours, and secured communication systems. These two projects have created inter-agency law enforcement units that are trained in the use of security tools and technologies to forecast the arrival of narcotics, and for the CCP other goods/objects categorized as high-risk, in West Africa. The inter-agency units are connected to regional counterparts, as well as trans-continentally, with AIRCOP units also based in Latin America, and CCP units based in Latin America and Central Asia. Both projects also attempt to incorporate the security efforts of private actors such as airline companies, and airport and port officials and staff. The security actors involved in these governance initiatives pursue their work in a multi-scalar logic, taking into account disparate jurisdictions, and the networked manner in which drug trafficking and other borderless threats affect West Africa and abroad.

The three cases equally show similarities in terms of the politics of contestation in everyday capacity-building interventions. There is a plethora of international security
assistance programmes on offer in the countries of the Sahel, which represents a multitude of actors holding particular interests in ways of governing borderless threats. Bringing together so many security actors and their associated rationalities and practices is not completed in a rational manner, but involves competition and conflict over the appropriate methods, partners, and practices to combat non-traditional security (NTS): it is more a matter of bricolage, making do, and struggling over, than rationally designing and coordinating (see Hameiri and Jones 2013; Abrahamsen and Williams 2014). Competition between international actors has consequential effects on adjacent security fields between the institutions of security assistance recipients. International security assistance to West African states reconfigures the relationships between Sahelian state security institutions, amplifying competitive pressures between them over material resources and security recognition. Newly created inter-agency drug task forces become fraught with contestation over how properly to control drug trafficking, and who should be involved. Less globally-oriented units are sidelined, causing frustration amongst those security sectors of Sahelian states. Rivalries between institutions also translate into animosity between clients and patrons. In Senegal, for example, units within the National Police deride the efforts IO experts, and search for alternative ways of pursuing transnational security governance with competing international patrons since the former tend to support their rivals. Nigerien customs officials, similarly, have withheld donated equipment to be given to the country’s inter-agency drug unit and rapid reaction force since their agency was not initially selected for capacity-building measures by some international missions.
The three cases also demonstrate the extraverted practices of recipients of capacity-building initiatives in the Sahel. Political and security actors from these states have adroitly used the security concerns and discourses of the threat of instability and contagion to acquire international resources with which they seek to consolidate their authority. Political leaders and security officials have coupled the discourse of vulnerability with the discourse of political willingness, and by demonstrating they can mobilize an operable level of resources to counter borderless threats. Global security actors recognize the authority of African recipients of security assistance, a fact that gives these actors important levels of influence over the shape of intervention interactions. The three cases show that although asymmetrical relations of power mark the Sahelian actors’ interactions global partners, they successfully shape how global security initiatives are undertaken in practice, although this occurs in contingent ways.

The cases show important differences as well. First, unequal power relations between coalitions of international actors and sets of recipients of capacity-building interventions can take on distinct forms: “subalterns might not just accept or reject the definition… [of governance]… but also misread, misunderstand, appropriate, or rearticulate the carefully defined scope of their putative responsibilities” (Muppidi 2005: 283). While practices of extraversion occur in all of these cases, there is significant variation in how recipients of international security assistance respond to the security visions, practices, and governance initiatives that international actors seek to implement. Security and political actors in Senegal have successfully framed their country as a beacon of stability in a violence-stricken region. As a result, they have been more resistant to some of the features of transnational security governance initiatives on offer.
from international experts, and have even refused capacity-building projects when they perceive them as taking insufficient account of their authority in security matters. Conversely, Malian and Nigerien actors have displayed more positive and seemingly acquiescent reception of international programmes, such that international partners have argued the countries’ political and security actors lack ‘national ownership’ of security sector transformation. The practices that Malian and Nigerien security actors have pursued through their relationships with global security experts, however, has been much more ambivalent, as they have used security governance initiatives in ways that reflect local security and economic concerns while stressing their willingness to adopt and abide by global ones.

Finally, the three cases differ with regard to the effects of competing structures of authority evinced in adjacent and connected fields. AIRCOP is viewed by many international actors, political actors, and some security institutions as a successful case of security governance rescaling since it facilitates the interdiction of incoming narcotics traffickers at LSS international airport. While there are competing authorities that maintain distinct preferences regarding how drug control at the airport should occur, none of the global and local, public and private actors challenge the overall objective of the project: to interdict traffickers by forecasting their arrival. Similarly, capacity-building initiatives in Mali and Niger that rescale security governance are pursued in a more or less unimpeded fashion, since they are not viewed as significant challenges to illicit operators that comprise salient nodes of authority in these countries’ security or political fields, and since it is debatable if drug trafficking is even believed to be a security risk to
these countries compared to the threat of terrorism. However, the case of the CCP shows that security governance rescaling at Dakar’s port may challenge the preferences of many coalitions of actors connected transnationally via Senegal’s trade and religious diasporas, and the country’s political elite, and as a result the programme has not produced seizures of high-risk goods that the country’s security institutions deem important. Thus, this case shows that the authority of local field agents, and how their influence on national security actors can in many situations trump the logics and practices of surveillance of international security experts.

**Approach to Data Collection**

Assemblage thinking is an international political sociology (IPS) approach. In particular this approach links macro-level processes to micro-level realities. Salter provides a salient description: IPS is a research stance

> That balances theoretical analysis and empirical material, with an overtly political but not prescriptive frame. By focusing on the system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global, international political sociology explores the intersections of power and authority that shape the governance of these specific institutions. By eschewing a strict linguistic turn, international political sociology examines not simply the language of politics but also a wider notion of discourse including practices, institutions, and authorities (2007: 49-50).

This means that global discourses and norms regarding political and economic phenomena such as security, criminality, and war are inherently linked to quotidian practices and routines that occur in and are constituted by local settings. IPS research seeks to tease out the webs of meaning and ways of doing that form the connective tissues that fuse the macro and micro. My own research has focused on security practices

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3 This assessment may be changing in the Sahelian interior, however, as control over key trafficking routes is entailing increasing occurrences of violence conflict, notably in Mali’s post-conflict Kidal and Gao regions.
by conducting a multi-sited ethnographic approach that combines semi-structured interviews and participant observation with policy and documentary analysis.

The practice turn has invaded the discipline of IR (see Leander 2005; Büger and Villumsen 2007; Williams 2007; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Best and Gheciu 2014). In the simplest terms, examining practices involves asking questions about what political actors do routinely. In terms of IPS, thinking about practices means looking for minute ways of doing that are not limited to one spatial scale, or which focuses solely on the routines or performances of state officials, but which connects several of scalar modes action of multiple types of actors, state and non-state alike, in a relational way. As such, this view shares Adler and Pouliot’s definition of practices: they are “socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (2011: 6). Examining practices allows for an understanding of the co-constitutive ideational and material dynamics of interactions between actors, and how they reproduce or change their social environments.

*Multi-sited Ethnography: looking for practices*

This dissertation assumes that it is necessary to gather evidence from as close to its source(s) as possible, and to examine the contexts that shape how security is understood and applied concrete circumstances. This does not mean that I found it necessary to remain in one site of field research for twelve months in customary anthropological style – immersion has its limits (see Schatz 2009). Following the IPS approach in practice means researching problems that connect several sites where global and local discourses and authorities routinely converge and conflict. Due to the multi-scalar, multi-sited nature
of global assemblages of security intervention in West Africa, I undertook seven months of research split unequally in several sites that connect some of the transnational spaces of drug trafficking governance for West Africa.

In order to examine how transnational security governance happens in practice, it was necessary to undertake what Marcus has called “an ethnography in/of the world system.” I wanted to see how security professionals engage with and relate to one another, how they compete for prominence in settings that are transversal, and to understand the meanings they attribute to their actions and their outcomes in specific security governance sites (see Côté-Boucher et al. 2014: 197-198). This meant moving “out from the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space” (Marcus 1995: 96). This dissertation pursued a method that does not eschew participant observation, per se, but which recognizes that discourses are present in multiple simultaneous locations “but are not of any particular location” (Feldman 2011a: 33). This directs the researcher to recognize the entanglements and historical contingencies involved in global governance, making it necessary to follow projects, policies, metaphors/narratives as they travel, and to not be “too fixed to a few places” (Feldman 2011b: 46; Gusterson 1997). Bringing these views together, the research that was conducted here was decidedly multi-scalar, and which blended participant-observation with semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and focus group discussions.

In total, four research trips over the span of seven months yielded 134 semi-formal interviews (sometimes conducting two or three interviews with the same interlocutor), five focus group discussions, and several opportunities for participant
observation in a range of formal and informal settings. I spoke with officers of Sahelian state security institutions at multiple levels of rank, international capacity-builders and trainers, European and North American police liaisons, Western diplomats, Sahelian and Western military personnel, international organization project managers and analysts, current and former rebels, journalists, think-tank leaders, religious leaders, members of Sahelian National Assemblies, smugglers, migrants, fishermen, some reputed traffickers, and other ordinary folk. In order to achieve a high number of carefully selected individuals that could provide relevant information on the governance of drug trafficking in the Sahel, I used a snowball approach that built on existing contacts made by more formal means. The formal avenues that I pursued facilitated means to observe how security policy unfolds in policy-making settings and locations of actual governance. However, interviews that I pursued through informal means opened up opportunities to uncover webs of meaning that shaped how my interlocutors relate to one another, negotiate, engage in quarrels, and display their animosities. The snowball method opened up in revealing ways the relations and associations that linked networks of actors and their shifting alliances and allegiances. Mapping these associations provided me with important insights into how these actors view one another, and to realize the ad hoc nature, and blurred division between formality/informality that makes transnational security governance happen in places like the Sahel.

Pursuing this research strategy led me to several interconnected research sites. The armed rebellion in Mali’s north in late December 2011, coupled with a coup d’état in Bamako in April 2012, made research in Mali infeasible, however research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana indicated that
Ouagadougou and Dakar were indispensable locations for examining how regional insecurities were being managed. Dakar in particular was crucial, since a critical mass of regional capacity-building endeavours are undertaken there, and it is the seat of large Western embassies and offices for IOs.

In Accra, attending the UNODC’s annual meetings of the Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies of Africa (HONLEA) allowed me to observe the discussions, posturings, and performances of law enforcement diplomacy. Participating in these discussions also circumvented long waits for official research authorization, and gave me a broader regional view of efforts to combat borderless threats. In between meeting sessions, I conducted semi-formal interviews with senior law enforcement officials to see how they understood the mounting insecurity of the Sahel, and their governance efforts to tackle it. Most importantly, by attending the meetings I was given a small Rolodex of global and national law enforcement professionals for the African continent.\textsuperscript{4}

In Burkina Faso, formal research was importantly supported by informal approaches. Political and economic elites of the sub-region regularly meet in hotel lobbies to solidify deals, meet to socialize over beer and peanuts, and to ‘hold court’. I began using my time to speak with businessmen (especially importers) about their experiences with state security institutions like the national customs agencies. Many of these individuals introduced me to gendarmes, police, customs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who were willing to speak with me when they were off duty.

Due to the unfolding conflict in northern Mali, Ouagadougou became an important hub for peace talks, and preparations for an eventual military intervention. This

\textsuperscript{4} On file with the author.
made it possible to interview military, police, and diplomatic staff based at the American and French embassies, and northern Malian rebel officials, including officers from the National Gendarmerie, and officials in the Centre National de Coordination de Lutte Contre la Drogue (CNCLCD). My second meeting with the Gendarmerie’s *Section de Recherche* coincided with a working meeting with four Guinean drug law enforcement officials, allowing me to further expand my insights into the governance of drug trafficking in the region.

In order to pre-empt the bureaucratic process of requesting official access from Senegalese authorities, I requested access from the director of the national drug police, *l’Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite de Stupéfiants* (OCRTIS), for access to this unit. Realizing that I had connected research on drug control in several *pays limitrophes* (and that I had used the names of his regional counterparts) this official accepted, put the service at my research disposal, and contacted other Senegalese officials on my behalf. The official sent me to observe drug control practices of the *Brigade de Stupéfiants* unit in Ziguinchor, at the border with Guinea-Bissau, and access to observe the work of specialized international inter-agency anti-trafficking unit members based at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport, and the Port Autonome de Dakar in a second research visit conducted in January and February 2013. The director of Senegal’s *Comité Interministérielle de Lutte contre la Drogue* (CILD) accepted my request to attend the meetings of the *Initiative de Dakar*, a regional drug law harmonization regime which includes Senegal, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, and Gambia, with Niger and Mauritania as observer states. My attendance at this meeting facilitated the development of contacts of Senior Law Enforcement officials in Mali and Niger, where I
would eventually conduct research in the spring of 2013, following the French SERVAL military intervention, circumventing the need to be granted official access. I conducted fieldwork in Bamako and Niamey in April and May 2013.

Finally, in October and November 2013, I was hired as a consultant to aid in a mid-term review of a European Union security governance initiative that spanned three Sahelian states: Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. The experience, nevertheless, provided me with firsthand observation of how international capacity-building projects unfold in practice, and has shaped my thinking. In between these research visits to Sahelian countries, I also conducted interviews with international actors based in New York, Vienna, and Washington DC.

This quick overview of my research itinerary is important for two key reasons. First, in heeding Marcus’ invitation it quickly became evident that the creation and implementation of transnational security governance initiatives is never limited to one of IR’s levels of analysis. The projects that are examined in this dissertation are spatially polyvalent, and incorporate diverse sets of actors that compete over how security governance will affect their positions of power and the pursuit of their interests. It would not make sense to examine only the inner workings of international organization experts based at UNODC headquarters in Vienna (where a large scale of international projects geared to tackle transnational criminality are initially created and managed) if I wanted to examine how transnational security governance against this borderless threat occurs in practice. I would have to see how those sites and their politics modulate the forms that governance initiatives take.
Second, the interplay of formal and informal means of ‘making things happen’ in my sites of research revealed that many of my interlocutors straddled public and private roles and interests (see Bayart 1993: 69-71). This highlighted the importance of recognizing the subject position of the interlocutor, and how the context in which s/he was being interviewed affected the types of responses given. Sometimes leveraging my inclusion in high-level meetings, or sharing open but privileged information regarding drug trafficking through West Africa in areas other than where a current interview was taking place, was a useful strategy that made some of the ‘official’ interlocutors be more open and engaging in sharing their experiences. This made it easier to be accepted in what is generally considered a closed-off field inhabited by participants reluctant to share law enforcement practices. Still other times it was necessary to highlight that I was a Canadian student, seeking to learn as much as possible from their expertise and knowledge.

Data Analysis

Based on information gathered, I used a discourse analytic method to excavate actors’ security understandings, and their sociopolitical/institutional contexts. Discourse analysis is appropriate for understanding the content of interviews as it uncovers how interlocutors are dependent on a “discursive framing of the issue in question,” and the social consequences of that framing (Hansen 2006: 22-29). I examined the implicit regularities and correlations that structure these understandings, and how security is practiced in my research sites. As argued by interpretivist ethnographers like Wedeen, discourse analysis and ethnography are complimentary since the former relies on “a sensitive, if not empathic, understanding of the conditions under which a discourse is produced…” while
ethnography is “one particularly good way of grasping a discourse’s observable effects” (Wedeen 2009: 82; see also Jourde 2009).

This method made it possible to stress the security contexts of particular spaces, while being cognizant of their similarities and connections to other parts of the world. I have attempted to interpret the stated understandings of my interlocutors, to be aware of how they framed these issues, their conflicts with counterparts, the types of practices in which they engage and how they are justified, and the tools and technologies that are used in this process. In particular, the discourse analysis I conducted focused on the disjunctures between the functional/technical designs of official descriptions of security governance initiatives that are implemented in the region with the conflictual statements of my interlocutors in order to highlight their politics. Information in the interviews highlighted the competitions that occur over control of material and symbolic resources used to consolidate one’s authority over security governance. Whenever possible, the interview information selected for direct analysis is triangulated by evidence documentary sources, or when possible made in comparison to similar cases found in secondary academic literature.

Chapter Overview

The dissertation begins with a theoretical investigation of how borderless threats are governed, followed by three empirical chapters that examine the conflicts inherent to global assemblages of security intervention in West Africa.

Chapter two, which follows this introduction, critically assesses the literature in three sub-fields of the IR discipline: security studies, global governance, and international statebuilding. While the critical literature on security provides intriguing perspectives on
how we conceive of the social nature of threats, these approaches are limited for the purpose of understanding the transnational governance of security, which is largely neglected in the literature. Debates in global governance, despite not having tackled the question of security until relatively recently, have advanced our understanding of the variegated types of actors and ways of governing other transnational issues. But these insights tend to follow an actor-analytic approach that makes it difficult to understand why certain types of actors have become important and authoritative in the governing process in the first place. Finally, the literature on international statebuilding is an empirical outgrowth of these two sub-fields, and as a result is challenged in similar ways. Functional accounts explain the governance of borderless threats as a key component of statebuilding interventions, but obscure the complex relations between actors involved in these missions, and overstate the power of international actors. Radical accounts complicate this view by highlighting the political nature of interventions, but nevertheless fall into the trap of dichotomizing intervener from intervened populations.

Chapter three combines useful insights from the previous discussion of IR with those found in critical human geography, sociology, and African studies to generate a theoretical framework for explaining the governance of transnational security: global assemblages of security intervention. These are shifting, multi-scalar institutional orders that converge on spaces of intervention in the governance of borderless threats (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Berndtsson and Stern 2011). The introduction of new and experimental forms of governance in spaces of intervention reorient and rescale security politics away from national spaces and logics towards transnational ones, which reconfigure relationships of power and amplify contests over control of socioeconomic
resources. These assemblages cut through and connect fields of practice, and have significant effects on the competition for authority in security matters by their introduction of international forms and sources of capital in local settings. In West Africa, sets of local actors use the highly uneven relations of power with international actors to acquire symbolic and material resources that are then used to dominate the fields in which they are participants. Security governance rescaling is fraught with contestation over the location, means, and modalities by which security problems should be managed.

Chapter four deals with the assemblage of security intervention in the Sahelian interior to tackle drug trafficking by land. Examining the vast array of international security actors currently operating in and on this space, and the consequences of their involvement, the chapter shows how new security initiatives reflect attempts to rescale governance to better deal with transnational threats like drug trafficking, but are significantly challenged by two crucial factors. First, international capacity-builders compete amongst themselves within the theatre of intervention over how capacity-building ventures should be pursued. Second, new global initiatives create significant rents for the leaders of these states and members of its security institutions, opening up multiple avenues to political and security elites to engage in practices of extraversion. Forms of capital acquired by connecting to international actors and their governance arrangements are used to consolidate authority to shape action in the security field, but also are used in ways that directly counter their intended purposes, for example by facilitating some groups’ involvement in drug trafficking.

Chapter five examines the operation of a flagship transnational security governance initiative in Senegal: the UNODC Airport Communications Project
(AIRCOP). Through secured communications systems and databases, AIRCOP connects the work of law enforcement units across the region and Latin America to enhance transnational drug control. UNODC and other international police liaisons based in Dakar have created inter-agency law enforcement units and trained them in risk profiling to detect trafficking at Dakar’s LSS international airport. The project has reconfigured Senegal’s field of drug control and amplified tensions between the country’s three internal security services: the national police, gendarmerie, and customs agency. Since UNODC is understood to support the national customs agency, Senegal’s drug police have resisted the IO’s experts’ efforts, and those international police liaisons that articulate support for the project, and accuse them of forms of subtle forms of neo-colonialism. Non-state, private actors based at the airport also contest the operation of the unit, and complicate how its governance occurs in practice. While the operation of the project is severely hampered by these contests, it nevertheless successfully rescales security governance, and has enhanced collaboration between some national and international security actors.

Chapter six examines the operation of another UNODC programme based at Dakar’s seaport: The Container Control Programme (CCP). The CCP connects the work of inter-agency container profiling security units in West Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. IO and Western experts have trained these units to profile shipping containers prior to their arrival at port based on risk indicators selected by UNODC and the World Customs Organization in order to detect any high-risk goods that may threaten the global economy and security. It has equipped them with secured communication systems and risk databases that are linked to IO headquarters and a transnational network of customs
and policing actors. The chapter shows that international experts distrust the members of
the unit, and have designed subtle forms of discipline, including alluring incentive
structures, to control the unit, and have its members perform global security practices.
Nevertheless, the efforts of international actors are thwarted by competing structures of
authority in the country that contest this vision of security in favour of other forms of
governance rescaling. In particular, Senegal’s religious, political, and socioeconomic
elites contest the forms of security governance rescaling a fully functioning CCP at the
PAD would entail since this could potentially harm their economic preferences, and thus
their dominance in local fields.

Chapter seven concludes the dissertation by discussing its implications for four
questions: the research implications of global assemblages of security intervention;
security governance rescaling and the degree to which West African states are being
internationalized and what this means for sovereignty; the question of the internalization
of global security norms by West African security actors; and the consequences of
international security assistance on political stability and instability related to the
governance of drug trafficking in the sub-region.

**Chapter 2: Examining Existing Understandings of the Governance of Borderless
Threats**

This chapter examines the three most relevant sets of literature in the discipline of
International Relations that deal with the question of the governance of borderless threats
in the post-Cold War era: international security studies (in particular its critical variants);
global governance; and international statebuilding. The themes that are expressed in these
three literatures with regard to managing borderless threats run along very similar
analytical and epistemological tracks, but rarely intersect. This dissertation is an attempt to put them into conversation.

The enormous (and constantly growing) literature in security studies has done very well at demonstrating how issues like drug trafficking become understood as security problems – threats – but has not significantly advanced our knowledge of how they are governed, particularly when threats take on trans-territorial dynamics. The study of global governance has done better at providing explanations of why and how non-security issues become encompassed into governance efforts and the role of non-state actor authorities in governing. Nevertheless, conventional accounts tend to simplify the complicated empirical features of new and experimental governance efforts by retaining an ontology of actors, making it difficult to explain how authorities become so in global governance processes. When global security governance is outlined in its empirical complexity it is described in functional ways that erase an analysis of power from the equation. Lastly, the literature on international statebuilding in many ways replicates the inadequacies of global governance research. Liberal, realist, and constructivist variants pursue a technical/functional orientation to pin down ‘what works’ to govern threats and rebuild postconflict states. In doing so, they bundle authority nearly exclusively to states and international interveners. Poststructuralist accounts of spaces of intervention, however, are helpful for this discussion, but still often fall into the trap of establishing static dichotomies that divide international from local, and state from non-state actors. This results in an overstatement of the power exercised by the former, and which fetishizes the abilities and forms of politics of espoused by the latter.
Security Studies and borderless threats

This section examines how theories associated with the widening and broadening debates that took place in the 1980s-90s have come to understand borderless threats. In particular, it examines the influential accounts developed by broadly social-constructivist approaches to security, notably those influenced by the Copenhagen and Paris School approaches (see CASE 2006). These theoretical approaches have contributed significantly to how we analyze security’s broadened agenda. Nonetheless, much of the research in this agenda has not taken into account how new threats are governed once they are deemed threatening. This makes it difficult to understand that there are unexpected trajectories associated with the governance of security once something is ‘securitized’: acknowledging the way that something comes to be understood as threatening does not help in showing how they are dealt with in practice. Sometimes these securitizations simply fail (see Salter 2010). Other times they become governed in ways that the initial securitizing actors did not expect or anticipate. Moreover, the transnational way that threats have been conceptualized in the broadening of the security agenda means that they will be governed in new and experimental ways. These threats’ transboundary qualities open up contested avenues of governance.

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in the theoretical assumptions of the discipline of international relations with regard to security. Security scholars asked themselves what ‘counted’ as a legitimate security question when the assumptions that had dominated the discipline had proven so ill-equipped to both predict and explain the historical transformations undergone in that period. If the primary tenets of the dominant security paradigms and structural explanations of the international
system demonstrated such a degree of analytical ineptitude, then upon which foundations could analysts of international relations base their explanatory claims concerning security — i.e. who is to be secured (states, sub-state groups, identities, individuals, the globe) from what threats (other states, terrorists, human traffickers, resource scarcity, migratory flows, the environment) and how is this to be accomplished? Indeed, many scholars debated whether this should happen at all (Walt 1991; Booth 1991; Buzan 1991; Krause and Williams 1997). The advent of these questions is now commonly referred to as the widening or broadening the debate on security (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 187-224).

As stated by Krause and Williams, the debates surrounding the nature of security “often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical issues concerning to what and to whom the term security refers” (1997: 34). For many traditional security analysts, security is the domain of rational and unitary state actors engaged in war: “security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991: 212). Security, in these terms, retains an objective reality as to what is considered a threat and to whom: invading armies and states. Other objectivist-thinkers of security argue that the state-centered nature of contemporary neo-realism needs a human face; one which centers on individual human beings (‘real people in real places’) in search of bread, knowledge, and freedom (Booth 2007: 110; see also Wyn Jones 1999; Kaldor 2007). This second view opened up the possibility of a multitude of threats to be acknowledged and tackled. The wider objectivist view has now come to place issues like poverty, migration, drug trafficking, identity conflict, terrorism, and the environment (i.e. Non-traditional security threats) at the forefront of most contemporary security studies (Hameiri and Jones 2013).
Not all threats are important to all actors at all times. Theories that have placed an important emphasis on historical context, cultural situatedness, and the socially constructed nature of security have considerably improved our understanding of security. In this theoretical view, threats are not objective ‘things’ or ‘givens’ that are immediately recognizable. Security threats are instead the function of intersubjectively-held beliefs that are formed and solidified through discursive processes which frame an issue as posing a knowable danger against a valued referent object, and political acts to counter that danger (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). Security becomes what it is through processes of ‘securitization’. Constructivist and Post-Structuralist research outlining this process of securitization has become extremely influential in security studies. However, most of the research on securitization has avoided the question of how these newly-securitized threats are governed in practice. The next section explains and critiques the securitization framework along these lines.

The Copenhagen School’s Securitization Framework

One of the most prolific and influential approaches to security research is the theory of ‘securitization’ developed by those associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), primarily Buzan and Wæver. The major contribution of the Copenhagen School approach is its concept of “securitization.” Security is not an objective reality that is measurable and quantifiable, but is a discursive practice that constitutes actors: “whenever something took the form of the particular speech act of securitisation, with a securitising actor claiming an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this was a case of securitisation” (Wæver 2011: 469).
While the objectivist understanding of security focuses on quantifiable measurements of an external reality and/or the appropriate methods of responding to those external realities according to ‘real’ political priorities, the theory of securitization instead views security as the result of a linguistic act whose construction is brought about by political actors.

From Wæver:

Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something else is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it (Wæver 1995: 55).

Security is the specific act of speaking it by calling up extraordinary means of countering insecurity. Securitizing actors, nevertheless, require specific conditions that make the securitization felicitous: they need to follow the grammar (tone, keywords, tropes) of security and threat; they must have a relationship with an audience which will come to accept the exceptional terms of the securitization move; and the securitizer must be speaking from an institutional position of authority (Buzan et. al. 1998: 31-33; Williams 2007: 65).

The securitization concept has been so important since it highlights the intersubjectivity of threat constructions, both in terms of where they take place and by whom. As explained by Williams, treating security as a discursive speech-act provides “for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened… can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state” (2003: 513). The security agenda is therefore expanded, as the model focuses on how security is defined in particular social contexts that are meaningful to the actors involved.
However, the analytical concentration on the “productive moment” (Wæver 2011: 468) of securitization also limits other important questions about security and its politics.

Focusing on the speech act obscures the other necessary aspects of producing a situation of security. Although Buzan and Wæver stress the intersubjective establishment of the existential threat, numerous critics have pointed out that a sustained focus on the speech act leads to its over-emphasis above security practices and techniques (Huysmans 2006), images (Vuori 2010; Hansen 2011), mundane physical actions and tools (Balzacq 2005; 2008), the gradual movement of an issue from normalcy to exception that establishes a threat’s intersubjectivity (Abrahamsen 2005), and the historical, political and social contexts that give security speech resonance (McDonald 2008).

What is missed by these important correctives and critiques to the initial securitization theory is that the transboundary qualities of non-traditional security (NTS) threats may not make it possible or desirable for state elites to counter them in the Schmittian form of exceptional security that the framework stipulates must occur if a successful securitization is produced. More often than not, governing borderless threats shifts relations between security actors to transnational scales, creating calls for security governance that betray the spatial and territorial constraints of states. These threats are recognized as dangers precisely because they challenge the territorial constraints of state sovereignty (see Huysmans 2008; Agnew 2009). If there are pragmatic effects of the securitization process beyond the level of the nation-state, and these take on the form of governing borderless threats through new and experimental governance arrangements, then the original framework, couched in the jargon of the exception, loses much analytical utility.
A crucial feature in the production of transboundary threats, therefore, is how they are framed in terms of a pragmatic need for multi-scalar governance, since calls to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, climate change, and the like “have expanded in scope, beyond the national level, and urge commensurate shifts in governance to manage the problem. This rescaling of non-traditional security issues – the scope of the threat, its referent object, and its governance – is the most crucial aspect of their securitization” (Hameiri and Jones 2013: 466). In other words, while prior to the end of the Cold War threats were determined as confined to or in national states, the borderless aspects of contemporary threats give rise to calls for new forms of security governance that are equally transboundary. For example, with regard to drug trafficking in West Africa, Cockayne and Williams present this diagnosis:

The invisible tide of drug money flowing into West Africa will fuel political instability and violence between both local and foreign factions, as they compete for control of the trade or use its profits to compete for political power. The result could well be an extended period of ‘drug wars’ in West Africa… since West Africa is already the location of large numbers of armed groups, and is awash with a ready supply of small arms and light weapons, drug-money-fuelled armed violence seems all the more predictable… The impacts of drug trafficking through West Africa will not be limited to West Africa (2009: 9-11, 18).

Framing the threat of drug trafficking in West Africa in such a way – as a connective tissue that sutures armed political instability with transnational criminality – moves the question of the acknowledgement and acceptance of this threat, as well as any exceptional attempts or responses to countering it, beyond the reach of specifically national securitizing elites. This leads some researchers of security governance to note that contemporary threats have come to be governed as a function of “global interdependences and expanding security agendas that create a demand for new forms of governing” (Ehrhart et. al. 2014: 121). Cockayne and Williams, for example, argue that
countering West Africa’s drug problem will require “a mix of institutions encouraged by political support ‘from the top’ but dealing with problems on the ground and ‘from the bottom’ is needed… At the same time, cooperation and coordination need to operate at multiple levels” (2009: 19).

Calls for transnational security governance arrangements have proliferated in both academic and policy circles. Jojarth (2009: 9) declares, “The transnational dimension of these…[global trafficking]… flows requires an internationally coordinated response.” Mittelman makes an astute diagnosis of the transnational convergences of power and production that birth situations of “hyperconflict,” in which “Non-traditional threats, including climate change, pandemics, transnational crime, and cross-border terror emanate from above and below the nation-state. Thus, there cannot be a neat separation between national and global security. Nor is there a sharp division between internal and external security. Sundry threats at home have extraterritorial dimensions” (2010: 164). Countering these transnational threats, for Mittelman, requires the interconnected agencies of states, international organizations, regional bodies, and civil society and transnational social movements to continue engaging in “multilevel global governance” to help to create “alternative futures” (ibid.: 172, 177).

Calls for governance that transcend the national level abound in the policy documents of states and international organizations. With regard to political instability in West Africa and the Sahel, the United Kingdom’s House of Common’s Foreign Affairs Committee’s affirms “issues having a regional impact… require a cross-cutting, multilateral approach. These could include the monitoring and intercepting of attempted cocaine landings on the West African littoral (with particular attention paid to Guinea-
Bissau)… [and]… schemes to strengthen border controls across North and West Africa and monitor the movements of criminal or terrorist groups across borders” (2014: 51). The United States’ 2011 *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* puts a policy emphasis on “promoting flexible networks of law enforcement and diplomatic partners… [to]… leverage the expertise and infrastructure of committed governments and respond more quickly to changing dynamics in transnational criminal threats… By building cooperative platforms and networks incrementally, the United States will generate greater collective action, joint cases, and common strategic approaches with our international partners to combat transnational criminal threats” (2011: 26-27). The European Union’s strategy *Long-term Responses to Global Security Threats* states:

> By their very nature, security issues such as organized crime, terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs, human beings and arms, and threats to critical infrastructure, are interconnected and transcend boundaries… Under a tailored approach, key countries in a region are identified and the capacities of local law enforcement and security units strengthened by setting up or strengthening specialized inter-agency units. Regional coordination functions are then established, making use of existing structures whenever possible, to foster regional and trans-regional cooperation (2011: 10).

Finally, the United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change argues:

> The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours (2004: 1).

Wæver’s recent ponderings on the securitization framework defend the speech act emphasis because it stresses the politics that securitizing moves create: “the definition of securitization … insists on securityness being a quality not of threats *but of their handling*,
that is, the theory places power not with ‘things’ external to a community but internal to it” (2011: 468). He does concede that the rise of acts/practices that do not “take the form of justifying extreme measures by reference to threats… does represent a serious challenge to securitization theory” (2011: 474). In order to support the political agenda of the theory, however, he sees it necessary to retain a narrow conceptualization, resulting in a neglect/disinterest in the question of security governance. The point being made here is not to omit the importance of the discursive identification of threats. If the crux of the theory, however, are “the effects that securitization has that make it attractive (or not) for various actors to pursue” (ibid.: 476), then the neglect of transnational security governance is a major pitfall. The above statements clearly outline how many threats are now managed through political relations according to a transnational logic that mirrors their transboundary qualities, and through experimental means that cannot be deemed ‘emergency measures’. Indeed, it would be difficult to pursue extraordinary policies at the transnational level because governance involves multiple types of actors, not solely national elites buttressed by the decisionistic powers of sovereignty. Calls for transnational governance initiatives show how non-traditional security “does not necessarily involve legitimizing or taking exceptional measures… [in]… a timeless, generic” form of exceptional security politics (Hameiri and Jones 2013: 464) since borderless threats are not understood to be confined to national securitizing elites attempting to convince an national audience “internally within the unit” (Buzan et. al.

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5 When this dissertation refers to governance, I mean the wide range of activities of multiple sets of public and private, state and non-state actors in their attempts to define the causes and nature of security issues, and then concoct projects, strategies, plans, policies and related devices to manage them, including the actual management of these issues in practice (see Smouts 1998).
1998: 26), as the securitization framework requires. New forms of security governance do not remain at this level, but are managed through multi-scalar governance arrangements that are more appropriate in dealing with the Mobius ribbon qualities of internal-external security (see Bigo 2001; Bevir and Hall 2014).

The Paris School critique of security

A second and important critique to be made of the Copenhagen School securitization framework, corrected by research of adherents to the ‘Paris School’ of Security Studies and other post-structuralist research, is its neglect of quotidian security practices. The securitization of an issue, as outlined by the Copenhagen School, requires a discursive move, acceptance by a relevant audience, and the bringing forth of emergency measures to counter an existential threat to a cherished referent object, usually the state. However, this view does not recognize how the ever-expanding set of issues understood in security terms are governed in banal, quotidian and mundane ways, lacking in the urgency and exceptional qualities the Copenhagen School hypothesizes. Most of these issues are governed as potential threats, or risks, and not as fully formed existential dangers that will annihilate us all (see Wæver 1995: 56). Abrahamsen has remarked with regard to the question of United Kingdom’s understanding of its insecurities arising from Africa’s underdevelopment:

While ‘securitization’ is increasingly evident, policies toward the continent are still subjected to the normal rules of the liberal democratic political game, and the continent, while frequently presented in terms of threat, has not merited emergency action… most security politics is concerned with the much more mundane management of risk, and security issues can be seen to move on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/ troublesome to risk and to existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy” (2005: 59).
Instead of implementing exceptional security measures then, these risks are generally institutionalized in seemingly innocuous ways, and managed through systems of prevention and detection by experts skilled in the arts of risk management. For example, the European Union has consistently funded regional organizations like the African Union in the development and operationalization of security ‘Early Warning Systems’ which would alert the international community to risks of the outbreak of violent instability on the continent before its actual occurrence (see Franke 2009; Engel and Gomes Porto 2010). Such a system is risk-centred, and aims to assess pre-emergency situations, and potential threats in Africa, should these ‘spill over’ to Europe or beyond.

As a result, understanding non-traditional security issues as threats does not always require calls for urgent exception, but are more often than not governed by technocratic means. Balzacq (2008) shows that bureaucratic or managerial forms of security politics nullify the need for an audience to accept or reject a securitizing move by national elites. Neal (2009) and others have demonstrated that EU efforts to control migration through the creation of the border control agency FRONTEX were not driven by an urgent and exceptional politics following the 11 September 2001 attacks, but by an incremental political process undergirded by logics and practices of risk (see also Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Leonard 2010). In a critique of Beck’s risk society thesis, Van Munster and Aradau show that post-9/11 US and European counter-terrorism policy is governed by a dispositif of precautionary risk that supplements previously used technologies of risk management in matters of immigration, policing, surveillance, disaster management, and transportation (2007; 2011). Amoore and de Goede show how risk assessment and “dataveillance” has been applied to a broad array of issues such as US travel policy, and
international finance, in which borderless threats like terrorism are “made measureable and manageable” to a constellation of state and non-state institutions and actors (2005: 149; 2008). Finally, in his analysis of how the Saharan-Sahelo band region came to be classified as a breeding ground for terrorism and criminality, Lacher (2008) shows how Saharan populations became an object of international government through the risk logics and practices of bureaucratic professionals seeking to make this space knowable and amenable to their forms of security governance. These studies all emphasize that transboundary threats are not governed by an exceptional logic, but by routine practices and rivalries of multiple actors, having been developed in various settings and subsequently applied to security governance (see Bevir and Hall 2014).

Bigo’s political sociology approach on the melding of internal and external security concerns in Europe charts the clearest articulation of some of the problems of the Copenhagen School framework (see Bigo 2002). The central assumption of the Paris School security research is to analyze the practices of security professionals in creating (in)security. Brushing aside a productive security speech act, Bigo’s research instead emphasizes the Bourdieusian concept of the Field and Habitus, and “a Foucauldian approach to security, territory and population which places the emphasis on security as norm,” risk, and discipline (2009: 13; see also CASE Collective 2006). For Bigo, insecurity is a function of bureaucratic routines, rivalries and competitive interests between professionals of security to define which threats pose the greatest danger, and how to appropriately govern these potential threats. Multiple actors comprise fields of security, “where security agencies (police, gendarmeries, custom officers, army and

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6 A name by which these associated scholars never self-refer, but are ‘called’ by others, often to their chagrin.
information services, private security agencies and more marginally local security agencies, pro and anti-immigration agencies) participate *de facto* in the global redefinition of their respective attributions” (Bigo 2000: 174). The integration of these multiple actors into the same security field makes it so “the inherent differences between kinds of threats disappear” and a continuum of non-traditional security issues is created “with real consequences not only for its intended targets, but also for security agencies and their relation to the political” (CASE Collective 2006: 458-459). This approach means that Paris School associated research not only examines the social construction of threats that produces security understandings and practices, but also the on-going governance of threats.

These insights significantly inform this dissertation’s theoretical approach elaborated in the following chapter. Nevertheless, the Paris School research has not provided much empirical evidence of cases of the transnationalization of security governance outside of the European or North American contexts (for exceptions, see Voelkner 2011; Martin-Mazé 2013; Frowd 2014). Examining the security practices of professionals in the Global South is an important task since security in these contexts does not generally form part of national and deliberative public discourse, but is more often than not constituted by the work of transnational networks of security experts. Secondly, while the practices of security professionals is key to understanding security governance, Paris School type research often over-privileges the part that security professional play while not taking into account a more sustained view of the wider socio-political contexts in which their work is embedded (for an important exception, see Bonelli 2005). This may be in part due to the rigid adherence to the Bourdieusian
understanding of the bounded nature of fields being tightly delineated to a particular set of recognized actors. Sometimes the effects of struggles in adjacent and connected fields of power drop out of the analysis, and risks limiting our view of security governance to the role of ‘securocrats’ operating in their own autonomous social universe as if they are not affected wider local political and economic contexts (Hameiri and Jones 2015b). Research has shown that there are new entrants to the field of security, like private security companies, or political or economic actors that put significant pressure on the way that these security fields operate, all of which have stakes in the governance of non-traditional security issues (see Avant 2005; Leander and van Munster 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). A consequence of not recognizing the effects of adjacent structures of power is an inability to explain variation of why some transboundary threats are governed in particular ways when others are brushed aside, or why in some places particular transboundary threats are viewed as objects of governance when other similar threats do not take on similar gravitas.

What one takes from debates in security studies regarding the nature of transnational threats, then, is that they are historically and socially produced; these threats may constitute existential dangers, but are more often understood as risks; and that some security actors have become more powerful than others in defining what is considered a threat and how to counter it. The securitization framework is useful only insofar as it helps to explain the discursive element of calling forth threats. But as discussed above, students of security are left questioning what happens after a securitizing move is made, especially when the exceptional measures called for are not produced. More often produced are multi-layered governance experiments, which Copenhagen School scholars
do not explore, and Paris School scholars explore only a small-range of actors affecting the security field instead of that field’s wider socio-political contexts, usually only in their European variety. In order to better understand how borderless threats are governed in practice we need a framework that can explain how a variety of governance arrangements are made.

The next section examines the literature in global governance that has attempted to explain how transnational issues are governed. Where transnational organized crime has been analyzed, the discussion focuses on how the literature on global governance understands the management of this borderless problem.

**Global Governance of Transnational Issues and their Limits**

The literature on global governance, with only some exceptions, has not examined transnational security issues. One potent reason for this is that until quite recently, security issues were assumed to be the domain of states in a system of international anarchy (see Waltz 1979; Milner 1991; Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane and Martin 1995). The assumptions of that more rationalist and state-centric literature is that states constantly facing security dilemmas will not relinquish their control over military policy to international institutions or other global actors in a system of anarchy.

However, since the late 1970s, scholars throughout the social sciences have debated how states deal with multiple transnational economic or environmental issues, and what the effects of these problems will be for states (see Keohane and Nye 1977; Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Held and McGrew 2007). The transnational characteristics of these issues, their global reach, make it increasingly difficult for any state, no matter how powerful, to be “under the illusion that it can protect its population
from such threats” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014a: 209). Despite many manifestos calling for the study of global governance in the wake of the ‘failure of IR theory’ (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014b), however, most accounts of global governance fall neatly under the dominant theoretical approaches to IR. I therefore structure the discussion here on these dominant theories: Liberal Institutionalism; Realism; and Constructivism. Feeding off institutionalist accounts, a burgeoning literature on security governance has emerged which describes transformations in new global institutional arrangements to manage borderless threats. Unfortunately, the literature on security governance has been Euro-centric in empirical focus, and self-statedly atheoretical (see Sperling and Webber 2014).

Most of these accounts are actor-centric, which limits their analytical utility. Liberal institutionalist accounts argue that shared interests in solving collective action problems compel global actors (especially powerful states) into functional/technical cooperation and governance efforts beyond the reach of more parochial interests (Keohane 1984; Kahler and Lake 2009). This view neglects the politics driving governance efforts, as if relations of power or fundamental disagreements and visions of governance arrangements were not relevant. Realists argue that powerful states dominate any form of global governance and the work of international institutions (Grieco 1988; Legro and Moravscik 1999), but their accounts are overly state-centric, do not acknowledge the importance of alternative sites and forms of authority other than states, and cannot explain why states support governance efforts that do not work according to the vision outlined by them. Constructivists argue that private non-state actors are involved in establishing global governance arrangements through the adoption of norms which are often at the expense of the authority of states (Checkel 1998; 1999; Risse 1999).
But constructivists’ adherence to ideas ‘all the way down’ cannot explain why some norms are adopted when others are not, why some authorities are more successful in establishing governance efforts over others, or how specific non-state actors became recognized as authorities in the first place. In short, since these approaches do not analyze relations between actors, they are unable to explain the complexity and variety of outcomes and effects that we are seeing with regard to the global governance of borderless threats.

**Liberal accounts of Global Governance**

Liberal institutionalists argue that we currently live in a Liberal World Order (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Sørensen 2011). They argue that rational state actors, through the establishment of international institutions and organizations, can accomplish the governance of transnational issues in cooperative ways that benefit all actors concerned, including against transnational organized crime (see Keohane 1984). For Hurrell, this type of theorizing is “rationalist in method and technocratic in character” (2005: 34). Institutional arrangements created to counter transnational issues are designed with varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation mechanisms that solidify into forms of hard or soft ‘legalization’ (Abbott et. al. 2000). Many agree that the degree of variability of these arrangements and their effects hinge on the design of institutions and their regulations to either compel or incentivize state governments or non-state actors to follow through with designated prescriptions for behaviour (Koremenos et. al. 2001). Thus, Jorjath, in her analysis of global institutions against illicit trafficking, argues that institutions created by states must be designed to have sufficiently strong credibility to dissuade actors from reneging on their promises. However, this places policy-makers in a
difficult position since an institution with more precise designs aimed to make participants comply through obligation mechanisms will come at the expense of institutional flexibility (2009: 58). It is the goal of rational policy-makers to choose the most coherent institutional arrangement given the problem at hand (see also Shelley 2014). According to this view, global governance is about creating institutional designs that function to solve common problems affecting multiple states.

Unfortunately, the emphasis on institutional design marginalizes the role of politics and power. Institutional design is a function of political contestation across multiple scales: local, national, regional, and global. At multiple levels of the governance process, different actors contest the content of governance: who ought to be involved and in what capacity. This is something that Efrat (2012) has observed in his study of international cooperation against trafficking in illicit goods. Efrat argues that international cooperation is contentious due to fundamental differences of interest between states that experience negative externalities of illicit trade versus those states that generate and benefit from externalities. The former seek international regulatory agreements to shift the burden of externalities onto the latter (ibid.: 26). For Efrat, since the purpose of international cooperation against illicit trade is to reduce negative externalities, societal preferences (which may run at counter-purposes) that shape governmental priorities best explains the governance of these borderless threats when the international distribution of power is taken into account: “The variation in government preferences fuels an international political conflict, and the distribution of power determines who prevails and what the regulatory outcome is” (ibid.: 33). In other words, social groups influence the aggregate preferences of states, which then seek to regulate some forms of transnational
phenomena over others. This is not a technical issue in need of functional solutions from which policy-makers must choose. Instead, that choice is premised on societal pressures, usually domestic ones, which conflict with values and interests held by opposing groups in other states. This outcome is then balanced against the strength of states internationally, as some states are more able to create international forms of regulation meant to protect their domestic constituencies than others (ibid.: 51-53).

**Realist accounts of Global Governance**

Realist accounts of global governance, oddly lost in the onslaught of liberal interpretations, have been useful in maintaining a focus on powerful states in either supporting or obstructing transnational governance issues (see Sterling-Folker 2005; Hyde-Price 2006). International institutions, for realists, are viewed as the tools of dominant states. Institutions are discarded when the benefit they render is exhausted. Drezner shows this most clearly in his critique of the role of non-state actors in international regimes. For him, only great powers like the US and EU hold the necessary material clout to create and maintain international institutions:

> Great powers – defined here as governments that oversee large internal markets – remain the primary actors writing the rules that regulate the global economy. The key variable affecting global regulatory outcomes is the distribution of interests among the great powers. A great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue. Without such a concert, government attempts at regulatory coordination will be incomplete, and non-state attempts will prove to be a poor substitute (2007: 5).

While maintaining that powerful states are important in the global governance of transnational issues, his view is lacking for several reasons. First, governance outcomes fail to work as powerful states intend them to. Nevertheless, these states still continue to fund and support the majority of those institutions they have created (see Keohane and
Martin 1995). Drezner’s analysis does not consider the aftermath of an institution’s creation, where some institutions take on a life of their own, and evince pathological features (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004). If it is the case that institutions change, it becomes necessary to study how these change in practice. Second, the realist account focuses inordinate attention on “sovereign political units” (Sterling-Folker 2005: 18), and is therefore trapped in an overly statist ontology and what Agnew (1994) has dubbed ‘the territorial trap’. Multiple groups within the state have competing preferences and values, which, once supported nationally, may change over time. Realist scholarship on the governance of transnational issues ignores how some parts of a state, or some coalitions of a society, may either support or oppose global governance efforts. While they account for power, albeit in a crude and overly material way, their steady support of ‘blackboxing’ the state results in an incomplete analysis of how states adopt their interests, and subsequently, how transnational issues are governed and who does the governing.

Constructivist accounts of Global Governance

The constructivist scholarship on the governance of transnational problems serves as a necessary corrective to the imposing statist ontology of the realist view, and the apolitical view of most neoliberal institutionalist research on the governance of transnational issues (see Hurrell 2005). It examines how actors other than states participate in global governance efforts. These include transnational advocacy networks, international organizations, NGOs, global social movements, and other non-state authorities that operate through forms of persuasion and socialization in order to change the understandings and behaviours of states and individuals (Keck and Sikkink 1998; O’Brien et. al. 2000; Avant et al. 2010).
In this view, non-state actors take on significant power and authority in global governance (Finnemore and Sikking 1998; Weiss and Wilkinson 2014a). Hall and Biersteker rightly assert that non-state authorities “set agendas, they establish boundaries or limits for action, they certify, they offer salvation, they guarantee contracts, and they provide order and security. In short, they do many of the things traditionally, and exclusively, associated with the state” – they govern (2002: 4). Transnational advocacy networks influence global governance processes by mobilizing their scientific expertise, making them “providers of objective knowledge” (Price 2003: 587-589) that have “epistemic value to multiple communities across disparate social and spatial geographies” (Haas 1992: 16-19). Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2006) historical narrative on the creation of global crime control places a strong emphasis on the role of such “transnational moral entrepreneurs” in shaping how certain cross-border economic behaviours were redefined as deviant and in need of global criminalization. Police chiefs, communities of experts like criminological associations, new international organizations, and anti-slavery and temperance protest movements significantly contributed to this process of advocating for and designing forms of governance against transnational crime. Examining the role of these new actors and their influence on the governance of transnational issues has improved our understanding of global governance, and how ideational powers can shape political outcomes.

Not all non-state actors solve problems. Many authors also understand transnational organized crime actors as non-state authorities that significantly challenge the authority of states. Hall and Biersteker categorize transnational criminal organizations as ‘illicit authorities’: “groups that enjoy a legitimate social recognition to the extent that
they step into a power vacuum left by a weak state and provide public goods that the state fails to provide” (2002: 16; see also Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Baylouny 2010). Strange argued that the impersonal forces of integrated world markets, facilitated by rapid advances in technological and economic change, embolden transnational criminal organizations, making them “perhaps the major threat to the world system in the 1990s and beyond” (1996: 121; see also Mandel 2011). Williams argues transnational organized crime corrodes the power and authority states, and ought to be “understood as the HIV virus of the modern state, circumventing and breaking down the natural defenses of the body politic”, and “forces of disorder and danger” (2002: 165; 2010: 44). The perspective is clear: transnational crime organizations can take on authority whereby they supplant the state’s position as the ultimate authority of the public good within a territorial space.

Whether non-state actor authorities are understood in the constructivist literature to support or subvert global governance, they are classified by a similar logic: the types of authority that they wield. Hall and Biersteker outline three sub-types of authority for non-state actors: “market authority, moral authority, and ‘illicit’ authority” (2002: 9; see also Cutler et. al. 1999 for discussions on ‘private authority’). International Organizations (IOs) exhibit mixes of four types of authority (rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority), which together comprise their overarching authority as bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Expert authority is of central importance in donning professionals with the self-perception that there are guardians of the public good: “by emphasizing the ‘objective’ nature of their knowledge, staff of IOs are able to present themselves as technocrats whose advice is unaffected by partisan squabbles” (ibid.: 24-25). This allows IOs to exercise significant power to shape how the world is categorized, both in defining
the contours of a world problem, and the ways in which these problems should be solved (see also Risse 1999: 186).

The constructivist view is important and useful for this dissertation. It recognizes that global governance arrangements reflect the ability of non-state actors, like epistemic communities and experts, to frame international problems as needing new forms of transnational governance. Through this process, the power of these experts is significantly enhanced (see Adler and Haas 1992; Helleiner 1994). This is not a functional response, nor one dominated by an ahistorical state entity, but a situated and contested one involving multiple interacting social forces. Indeed, constructivist research has demonstrated that the national/statist level of analysis is cut through by ‘the global’, and that this process is not natural, but is socially produced. Andreas and Nadelmann’s account of efforts to govern Europe’s early experiences with counterfeiting, for example, shows that simply because crime may cross sovereign borders does not mean that patterns of governance will take on transnational characteristics, not without significant work and even more conflict amongst multiple actors in producing that type of governance outcome (2006: 88-91).

But significant questions and problems remain. First, such a framework stunts our analysis of the complex dynamics involved in efforts to govern the globe due to an actor-centric understanding of the world. Under such an analytical strategy, state and non-state actors start to take on reified qualities, which makes it harder to explain shifts in how they came to be viewed as such (see Emirbayer 1997; Mitchell 1991). States, and their putative opposites (non-state actors) remain conceptually bound as coherent, unitary entities, a conception that is rarely questioned (but see Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012).
Commensurately, instead of explaining how non-state actors attain new types of authority that enable them to govern transnational issues, these forms of authority are assumed (for an important exception, see Neumann and Sending 2010; Avant and Haufler 2014). As such, it risks presenting an ahistorical view of the authority of an actor, and how they came to obtain it. This view does not account for how a particular form of authority actually emerges, how it is maintained, or if it can be lost. As such, the ‘types of authority’ typology that constructivists maintain is at pains to explain variations in authority and their effects. This approach leaves us with important questions: Which ideas, knowledges, norms, or forms of authority become dominant in particular circumstances? How do the ‘global governors’ of the world attain this authoritative status while others do not (Avant et. al. 2010)? Why are some of their framings to govern globally (instead of nationally or locally) felicitous? If non-state forms of authority weaken the authority of states, why do states so often support the efforts of non-state actors (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011)?

Types of authority do matter in global governance. Maintaining a framework that stresses the attributes of actors, however, cannot explain the relational qualities of authority genesis, maintenance and loss.

This view that places state actors against non-state/private authorities, the former ceding power and authority to the latter, presents a second challenge. This view fails to recognize the role of state sectors and institutions in fostering contemporary social and economic changes associated with globalization and responses to it. ‘Criminal’ actors retain that classification because of the power of state actors to categorize some cross-border economic actions as prohibited or illicit (Andreas 2011). State actors combine in networked forms with NGOs and IOs to push forward legal mechanisms and policing
practices to tackle ‘illicit’ behaviours associated with transnational organized crime. Moreover, there are often short-term coalitions between state and international actors and criminal elements in governance efforts. For example, fighting against armed Islamic groups in Mali or Somalia may warrant cooperation between state military actors and non-state authorities which can govern areas beyond the control of the state or international forces, even though the latter participate in ‘illicit’ activities that bolster their authority with local populations (see Reno 2001; Bayart 2007: 52-58; Menkhaus and Shapiro 2010). We need to recognize the symbiotic and endogenous relationships that state institutions foster in collaboration with so-called ‘private actors’ through acts of regulation and deregulation, and how this affects the authority of relevant actors (Sassen 2006). States do not necessarily lose authority or are doomed to crumble under the pressures of systemic change. Global non-state/private/illicit actors and forces are not swarming over and constantly weakening an ‘inside,’ container-like state. On the contrary, state economic sectors and institutions are enmeshed and rescaled in such processes, as its institutions restructure internal power relations through the adoption of neoliberal practices of deregulation, liberalization of trade and privatization. Particular institutions within states redefine themselves with a global orientation, which may result in other competing state institutions needing to respond to these newly dominant organizing logics.

*European Security Governance*

Global *security* transformations are likewise involved in this process. A growing literature on European security governance acknowledges this trend, and seeks to evaluate “the expansion of security threats and risks, and the proliferation of actors and
mechanisms to address them” (Sperling and Webber 2014: 129). This literature concurs that the end of the Cold War has allowed for a multiplication of security-related actors, agencies, transgovernmental task forces and regional security institutions that operate across multiple spatial levels. This literature describes how both state and non-state actors interact in often novel and experimental ways to govern the perceived risks that are attached to global economic change (see Rosenau and Otto-Czempiel 1992; Kenney 2005; Kirchner and Dominguez 2010).

Following earlier work liberal institutionalist research on security cooperation, Krahmann and others have adopted the position that governance “denotes the coordination of social relations … (processes and structures)… in the absence of a unifying authority at the subnational, national or international levels” (2003: 11). Elsewhere, she explains that in this decentralized and fragmented security environment, “resources are dispersed among a range of public and private actors who have to coordinate their efforts in order to solve their common problems” (2005: 13). Others similarly posit that governance involves “the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes” that derive from the collective purposes of pursuing often very similar interests in tackling common threats (Webber et. al. 2004: 4; see also Kirchner and Sparling 2007).

This is an important contribution empirically. But this literature does not advance any theoretical understanding of how these security governance arrangements occur, or how, and why they may vary. As an outgrowth of European integration studies, the
analysis is heavily influenced by functional accounts of governance. The pluralization of security actors and networks is conceived as a function of and response to transnational security threats, or as the extension of European Union multilateral governance to security issues. Since this literature has been primarily descriptive, the studies of these new governance arrangements have been acknowledged as “pre-theoretical” (Christou et al. 2010: 342), and methodologically content to simply map security governance within the European region, or sometimes its spread across the Atlantic (Kirchner 2006; Sperling and Webber 2014). This has led to a tendency in this literature to assume that security governance occurs in regions of high political or economic development, or nearly exclusively through the medium of regional security organizations like the EU at the expense of variable, less formalized security governance initiatives in other regions, or ones that are trans-regional. The end result is that forms of security governance that are not formal and institutionalized, as those found in Africa or Asia for example, are viewed as deficient and “weaker forms of regional security collaboration” (Kirchner and Dominguez: 2010: 14).

Abrahamsen and Williams nicely sum up the widely held position of the security governance literature: “governance thus becomes a question of how these multiple actors can work together and especially how public authorities can establish optimal relations in the new situation” (2011: 83). The European security governance literature describes important clues regarding the proliferation of actors on the security scene, but its narrow view of governance as a process of functional ordering does not explain how shifts in structures and relations of power allow for the production of these new governance actors, their authority, the arrangements and concomitant practices that they take in the first
place (ibid.; see also Walters 2004). The techno-functional aspect of this narrow understanding of governance hides important dynamics of power. It premises the purposive, and ultimately a consensual way of doing security politics, instead of highlighting the conflictual mentalities and practices that such a fragmented security scene will inevitably exhibit (Merlingen 2011: 156). What is crucial here is not simply to assume that the new challenges that graft onto neoliberal globalization immediately result in functionally-adaptive responses by state, supra-state, sub-state or non-state security actors. Instead, this new security problematic “reflects transformations in structures of governance at the level of micro-practices of everyday life and the macro-practices of global politics,” and as such is brimming with political manoeuvrings and reorientations in relations of power and authority (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 83). In short, governing borderless threats reconfigures power relations across multiple connected spaces.

**Approaches to International Statebuilding Interventions**

Research on international statebuilding is an empirical outgrowth of the combined literatures in security studies and global governance and is confronted with similar analytical challenges. It examines the specific policies related to managing international conflict stemming from politically fragile regions through global governance efforts, and the implementation of transnational governance initiatives.

Two broad currents have driven debates surrounding international statebuilding: a “technical current” articulating a normative position for the need to build the capacity

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7 While the term ‘liberal peacebuilding’ was in vogue for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, I use the term ‘international statebuilding’ to describe interventions to transform the states and societies of the global south. This follows the trend in policy-
of postconflict states in order to buttress international order and stability; and a more “radical current” that argues that statebuilding interventions buttress the powers and values of Western states in global governance to the detriment of populations in the global South. While approaching the topic from very different theoretical and epistemological directions, both currents share an understanding of a chasm-like power and authority imbalance between international interveners and local intervened populations.

The Technical Current: Functional liberalism

The technical current of research of international statebuilding seeks to learn lessons from experiences with intervention to ‘fix’ features of ‘state failure’, by building state capacity and strengthening governance. Not only does this agenda stem from the desire to reduce high levels of violence that beset millions of people in areas of political instability, but also because of how conflict in fragile states tends to regionalize, and is understood by many researchers to have the potential to foster transnational threats to global order (see Krasner 2004; Rotberg 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2009; Bøås and Jennings 2007). International statebuilding, therefore, becomes one way to govern borderless threats from the global south. As a result, much of the technical current examines whether or not interventions succeed or fail, and why. Most of this research concludes that interventions fail to develop the institutional capacities of fragile states due to their poor planning, coordination, and implementation, or insufficient knowledge of local cultures resulting in the imposition of ill-conceived capacity-building programmes (Paris 2004; Chesterman 2007; Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007; Hutchful 2012). This research is guided by a

making and academic circles that international statebuilding encompasses liberal peacebuilding (see Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010).
normative imperative: the (re)construction of a centralized bureaucratic authority that functions over a geographically defined territory. Like dominant global governance approaches, this research maintains an ontological view of stable actors, measured by liberal assumptions of statehood where authority must reside in centralized, coercive, bureaucratic institutions over a given territorial space.

Most research of the technical current views political instability and intra-state conflict as objective threats to states, communities, and international order. Statebuilding efforts are required as a way to govern those threats through the consolidation of a centralized state authority. For example, Paris argues that rapid liberalization and democratization supported by international actors can result in a relapse of intra-state violence and the failure of international peacebuilding efforts. Instead, achieving stable liberal democracies following civil conflict requires global governance efforts to build state institutions and a central authority that is effective in providing Weberian-style security and bureaucratic neutrality (2004: 187-207). In other words, post-conflict states must bundle together bureaucratic institutions, their territories, and their authority together, with global governance actors midwifing this process. Keohane (2003) similarly argues that the institutions of an intervened state and the degree of its political authority are measured by their functionality and centralization. International interventions must “lead to a non-abusive, self-sustaining structure of political authority”, which will require a redefinition of sovereignty that limits the political autonomy of “troubled societies” while enhancing the authority of external actors as a way to achieve international stability (2003: 275-276, 296; see also Chesterman 2005; Chesterman et. al. 2005).
Neorealist approaches share the diagnosis of the objective threat of state failure to the international community, the state institutions/authority/territory viewpoint, and how experimental forms of international governance can prevent borderless threats. Krasner (2004) argues that the fundamental rules of international sovereignty no longer apply since the consequences of fragile regions of the world spill over into the international arena. New forms of international governance “such as de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty, should be added to the list of policy options” for international actors seeking to counter these threats (ibid.: 86). Fearon and Laitin agree: the post-Cold War world is more threatened “by consequences of political disorder, misrule, and humiliation in the third world” than by aggressive great powers (2004: 6). Given the diffuse and transnational characteristics of these threatening consequences, neo-realists maintain that multilateral governance directed under the leadership of the world’s major powers should develop neo-trusteeships to coordinate international efforts to rebuild fragile states to share the burdens of international statebuilding. The inability of a state to maintain control over its territory – for Krasner “a description of the nature of domestic authority structures”– is a deficiency that must be corrected by the global governance of authoritative external sovereigns (Krasner 2004: 89; see also Krasner and Pascual 2005). In such circumstances, ‘Neo-Trustees’ should wield authority over collapsed states until such a time when a “functioning state capable of providing order” is present, to whom authority could be passed (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 36-37). All other potential sources of authority run counter to the control of the desired ultimate arbiter, the central sovereign state.
Some constructivist analyses also share an assumption of the lack of authority in post-conflict societies, and the objective reality of the threat posed by political instability. Zaum (2007: 35-40) explains that instead of shielding states from external intervention, sovereignty norms now justify the international community’s resort to it as a function of global governance in circumstances where states lose or abdicate their tasks of territorial authority and provision of security (see also Wilén 2012: 14-22). Lake argues, “whatever else it might entail, state building is first and foremost a process of restoring the authority of the [intervened] state,” and authoritative states provide security and order while ones that do not pose a potential threat to global order (2013b: 69; see also 2010). For Barnett, the 9/11 attacks sedimented a global view of the dangers that failed states pose “to themselves and to international security,” and that intervening to implement “a package of institutional fixes” based on republicanism is one way of preventing this borderless threat (2006: 93). He explains that authority is vested in legitimate republican institutions that facilitate the provision of public goods like security and stability. Only those local actors that graft themselves onto the institutional bases of republicanism are esteemed as exercising/possessing authority. The authority of intervening peacebuilders is not questioned, while actors within the postconflict state only graduate to authority and ownership after espousing liberal republican values and institutions (see Richmond 2009a: 560). This is odd, since Barnett had extolled the need for IR theory to release itself from its “zero-sum myopia” with regard to authority (2001: 62).

Three related problems are present in the approaches found within the technical current. First, these approaches measure the outcomes of success or failure of statebuilding interventions as a form of governing borderless threats based on attaining an
ideal-typical Western state model while ignoring the power dynamics and political struggles involved in intervention projects. It presupposes a form of politics that statebuilding experts believe ought to be applied in postconflict contexts instead of analysing the power dynamics and political struggles involved in the social engineering attempts of intervention efforts themselves (Hameiri 2011: 192; Egnell and Haldén 2009). Such a focus misses the crucial political nature of statebuilding interventions – how they reorder and transform the distribution and exercise of power and resources, both within intervener and intervened states (Hameiri 2010: 25).

Second, like much global governance literature presented above, its ontology of actors presents a challenge to understanding empirical features of contemporary interventions: states, societies, and international organizations are viewed as coherent and stable entities, most often in conceived in binary form. The actor-centric analytical framing intonates timeless, politics-less entities, which obscures the complexities that bleed through actor categories of state/society, state/non-state, public/private, and interveners/intervened. Spaces of intervention are comprised of multiple categories of actors representing states, IOs, NGOs, and private multinational companies, each attempting in a myriad of ways to govern borderless threats by reconstructing state institutions. Intervening actors are drawn together in dynamic coalitions and groupings that betray the formalities of ideal-type state structures or bureaucratic and centralized institutions. Coalitions include actors from multiple groups, originating from initially separate local and foreign locales, but which then converge and are networked in unique and contextual ways in the theatre of intervention depending on recognition of authority and pursuit of competing interests. Thus, intervened states and societies are not
dehistoricized autonomous actors that range in “degrees of statehood” (Clapham 1998), or container-like actors that are “repositories of power and authority within borders” over a separate domestic society (see Rotberg 2004: 27). Such a conceptualization ignores the multiple power struggles and emergent political relationships involved in governing transnationally (Mitchell 1991; 2002; Jessop 2008).

Third, an actor-centric framework tends to overstate the power, authority, and causal significance of international intervening actors over local ones. Paris’ (2004) analysis of the institutionalization before liberalization thesis assumes the power of international peacebuilders to build domestic institutions, which will then usher in peace without analysing the political practices of local populations and elites. While Fearon and Laitin (2004) argue that geographical features in many failed states are propitious to sustained guerrilla warfare, the power and practices of the guerrillas to contest international interventions is not given any sustained analysis, and their political grievances are specifically given no causal importance. Barnett (2006) intonates the relative success of republican institutions over liberal ones implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, but gives no attention to the demands, beliefs, or political preferences of local actors, and how these have affected the outcomes of US interventions. By focusing on the pre-eminence and power of “particular types of actors, these accounts make unduly strong assumptions about the lack of power of other groups” instead of examining the relationships between them (2011: 65; see Jackson and Nexon 1999).

When its lack of analysis of the politics of intervention and obsessive ontology of actors are combined, one sees that these accounts obscure the dynamic struggles over the recognition of authority across spaces of intervention and solidifies its zero-sum view.
These relationships diffuse through formal institutions like states or international organizations, as well as informal ones – which breaks down any understanding of entity coherence (see Owens 2008; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). We need explanations of statebuilding interventions that map out the multiple poles of authority in and across spaces of intervention, and which analyze the complex competitions, strategies, and practices that shape how these forms of authority are constituted and recognized (Kauppi and Madsen 2014). This requires moving beyond the normative emphasis of liberal statebuilding as a category of analysis (Eriksen 2010: 238), to an actual examination of how power is exercised in intervention contexts, how authority may shift between actors, and how understandings of politics and security change resulting from new interventionary practices (see Hameiri 2010; Mac Ginty 2011).

The Radical Current: the view of Western imposition

Although there are several theoretical variants, the radical current of statebuilding research resolves some of the challenges of research in the technical current. Radical views demonstrate how international statebuilding reflects the hegemonic position, and security, military, political and economic interests of Western states (see Chandler 2006; Pugh et. al. 2008). International statebuilding interventions do not create peaceful order, but serve as riot control mechanisms for areas of the globe that resist liberal forms of global governance “via the imposition of the liberal peace project” (Taylor 2010b: 156).

Much like the critical security studies literature, this research outlines how there is nothing natural or evident regarding the view that postconflict spaces are threatening. Instead, it analyzes how security has become increasingly entrenched in the foreign policy and development mantras of Western states and international institutions in
relation to non-Western states in order to govern borderless threats (see Duffield 2007a). This view is problematic for these authors who question whether it is appropriate to append “threat-defense logics” to policies that ultimately aim (or at least pay lip-service) to reduce poverty or alleviate suffering (Elbe 2006: 129; see also Abrahamsen 2005). The discourse and practices of the security/development nexus, and the global governance of statebuilding produce and secure Western ways of life and politics (Cooper 2006; Duffield 2007a; McCormack 2011). Importantly, the research of the radical current posits that there is a significant coercive element to interventions, regardless of its scale, implying that populations that undergo them must or will comply with the demands and power of Western interveners.

Duffield’s Foucauldian-inspired research is emblematic of the radical view. Western governments and international organizations have radicalized both security and development discourses, providing them with expanded mandates and responsibilities to “shift the balance of power between groups and even to change attitudes and beliefs” in post-conflict spaces through statebuilding interventions (2001: 15). Duffield calls such interventions “liberal strategizations of power” (Duffield 2007b: 227); projects that take the processes of life at the level of populations as the target of intervention and operationalization of power in development work (see also Jabri 2013).

When necessary, disciplinary control and biopolitical forms of regulation are coupled with exceptional violence in the governance of intervened populations. Geopolitical concerns of threats to states and biopolitical concerns over how to best enable the security of populations are mutually reinforcing and complementary. Liberal statebuilding, in this view is “a technology of security, consolidating the West’s
sovereign frontier by supporting and including that life which is useful and capable of self-organization while excluding the useless and destabilizing” (Duffield 2007b: 232; 2005). De Larrinaga and Doucet show that the inclusion of a multitude of threats to human security in the global South facilitates and amplifies “the exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention, whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as initially conceived or in the service of maintaining global order” as crafted by Western powers (2008: 532). Security, therefore, does not aim to protect or enable an enhancement of life chances of populations residing in post-conflict spaces. Statebuilding interventions implement interventionary techniques that aim to create a form of security that supports the West’s values and interests and to quarantine undesired, potentially threatening elements from the global south: governing borderless threats.

International organizations (IOs) feature prominently in these discussions (see Merlingen 2003, 2011). IOs indicate the types of governance best practices that they deem appropriate for achieving economic success and political stability, and place governments of the global south under restrictive forms of surveillance in order to achieve it (see Fougner 2008; Newman 2009). Sending and Neumann argue that IOs implement “policelike elements under the name of statebuilding… a police rationality of governing” (2010: 134, 154). Similarly, Laura Zanotti demonstrates how IOs promote the adoption of good governance procedures to be “imposed on reluctant followers through an array of disciplinary instruments” in order to maintain global peace and security, and will “punish the behaviours of governments with regard to fields that were previously considered to fall within their sovereign jurisdiction” (2005: 472-476, 466).
International governance monitoring has created “governance states” in Africa. Such states are characterized by an especially high degree of external influence – from the World Bank, IMF and a range of other donors and creditors. But, governance states are also characterised by a certain ‘post-conditionality’ in their sovereign frontier politics; that is to say, the period during which donors constantly policed reform through the threat of a freezing or withdrawal of funds has passed. In other words, the main mechanism for external intervention in the sovereign frontier – conditionality – loses some of its salience at the same time as external agencies become more preponderant… Governance reform is employed more in the fashion of a ‘carrot’ than a ‘stick’; the conditioning of funding on effective implementation which is closely monitored is replaced by the allocation of funding as an incentive to carry out reforms… which are still closely monitored! (Harrison 2004: 71-74, emphasis in original).

This view shows how IOs govern through the willingness of states to create the types of dispositions and knowledges that can be enacted on their citizenries, allowing these populations to best seek after its own interests and well-being (Foucault 2007: 108). In the process of embedding liberal norms and practices inherent to governance reform, agents of governance states like Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and others internalize neoliberal standards with the help of IOs and bi-lateral donors, where the latter should not be conceived as a “strong external force on the state… [but]… as part of the state itself” (Harrison 2004: 75).

If the intervention policies of leading Western states and IOs reflect colonial mentalities that disregard the life chances, agency and autonomy of local populations in their governance of borderless threats, then research into local and ‘everyday’ sites of resistance to statebuilding projects is needed. Richmond, Mac Ginty and others have taken up this research position most prominently. They stress how the norms and strategies found in official mandates of international interventions “collide with the everyday lives of local actors affected by conflict,” which requires an analysis of the
“shared interface” marking where the international and the local meet (Richmond and Mitchell 2012: 1).

In practice, statebuilding interventions have not sufficiently negotiated with the everyday life practices of local actors. Resistance incites international interveners to frame local responses to intervention as antiquated and illiberal. According to Richmond, “local agencies, whether resisting aspects of statebuilding or co-opting it, have begun to find ways of claiming ownership of a politics that responds to needs and identity issues” (2010: 669). More local and authentic needs include those which are “constituted and affected by dimensions of security, rights, needs, custom, culture, identity, religion, customary institutions and practices, as well as local norms, hierarchies, and economic and social systems” which are discounted by international interveners (Richmond 2012: 118). Similar to Duffield’s assessment, therefore, the forms of security on offer for intervened populations is Western-oriented, and lacking in substance for targeted populations (see Richmond 2014: 62-102). Instead of providing for locally meaningful needs, international interventions create “empty states in which citizens are generally not seen or heard” (Richmond 2009b: 63). The power exercised by international interveners is coercive, disciplinary, pursued by “imposition” (Richmond 2012: 124), which often results in “a loss of agency on the part of local actors” (Richmond and Mitchell 2012: 6).

The consensus in of the radical current is clear: the policy-options and political autonomy of intervened governments are severely limited by “metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation” (Duffield 2002: 1066). Western tutelage of states in the global South constitutes a deepening of control of key state functions. These desired characteristics are accomplished by the insertion of sovereign capabilities undertaken by
the international donor community into the very bureaucratic structures of intervened states, wherein the West “decides the core economic, social and security functions of government” (Duffield 2007a: 171).

These are important insights that correct much of the functional orientation of the technical current. But significant analytical challenges remain. First, the coherence of the interests of statebuilding interveners and their (neo)“liberal project” are overstated (see Berdal and Zaum 2013; Selby 2013). While it is true that an emerging set of global state and non-state actors participate in statebuilding interventions, the objectives, interests, and values of these actors are legion and are subject to change. To assume they all share the same qualities and rationales for intervening, or that these qualities all fall under the rubric of some international Liberal ethos, is empirically incorrect. Obscuring the variations of statebuilding interventions in such a way robs the concept of any analytical purchase and ability to distinguish between forms of intervention (see Paris 2010).

Second, the research in the radical current aggrandizes the power of international actors to an extent that the exercise of power by populations in sites of intervention is caricatured, fetishized, or simply not acknowledged at all (see Sending 2011; Charbonneau and Sears 2014). The literature of the radical current posits that due of their lack of power (or inability to exercise it) against the international interveners, recipients of statebuilding efforts must either comply out of economic or security necessity, or willingly accept the policies and programmes of intervention out of having been convinced that international experts do indeed have the correct formulas that will

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8 This problem is acknowledged and analyzed by some authors whose research falls into the radical current, notably Mac Ginty who admits, “the liberal peace also has ‘feet of clay’” (2011: 2).
solve the problems of instability and poverty that their states experience. To cite Harrison, neoliberal engineering in Africa is internalized by “an increasingly powerless set of states in the African region” who are to varying degrees taken over by an “increasingly powerful set of global institutions” (2004: 6). The control and regulatory powers of international actors dominate over recipients of intervention, whose interests, practices, and tactics play second fiddle: “local actors are seen to be relatively powerless, or that their power is used as an empirical basis for claiming that external actors cannot assume that social engineering-type of interventions will work” (Sending 2011: 55; see also Sabaratnam 2013). Oddly enough then, the literature of the radical current shares the assessment of the technical current: their analyses give us the strong impression that rationalist conceptions of the systemic pressures of the international realm and anarchy, the dominance of the ‘Great Powers’ over the international states-system, and the unevenness of the material distribution of power were/are indeed correct (see Richmond 2012: 121)! The autonomy of actors in weak or failing states is severely hampered due to their multiple lacks, making them takers of international statebuilding efforts regardless of their interests or practices.

This has a direct impact on understandings of authority in spaces of intervention. In accounts of the radical current, like the technical research it critiques, international actors hold “overwhelming authority” over resistant intervened populations (see Richmond 2010: 685-686; Duffield 2007a: 28, 54; Mac Ginty 2010: 399, 402). In the multi-connected sites of statebuilding interventions, however, such binary conceptualizations of authority ring false. Authority is present in numerous simultaneous sites that span the connected spaces of intervention. It emanates from multiple positions
of power that can be institutionally formal or informal, or which bridge the divides marking public or private, state or non-state, and global or local (see Albrecht and Wiuff Moe 2014). By retaining such a stunted view of authority, the research of the radical current obscures how these multiple actors compete for the spoils of authority recognition, even by attempting to frame their governance efforts as ‘local’ or ‘international’ in their search of power, resources, and the consolidation of their authority.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has considered theoretical approaches to security, global governance, and international statebuilding to see these accounts explain the governance of borderless threats. Copenhagen School research makes an important contribution to our understanding of the discursive production of threats, but does less well in accounting for how the transnationalization of governance efforts to counter NTS issues changes how they are tackled in practice (see Hameiri and Jones 2015a). Approaches that do examine the work and competition of transnational networks of security experts in managing threats are helpful, but at times efface the broader socio-political and economic contexts that explain variation in the outcomes of transnational security governance, and have not provided accounts of this process in contexts found in the global south. Debates in the research on global governance have enhanced our understanding of the role of non-state actor authorities in governing transnational issues, but have tended to follow an actor-centric analytical tact that makes it difficult to explain the circumstances in which authority is acquired in the first place. Much of the research on international statebuilding adopts the ontology of actors approach, which obscures the complex ways that multiple sets and types of state and non-state actors cooperate and compete in spaces
of intervention in their governance of borderless threats. Radical accounts explaining the structural forms of power and domination in spaces of intervention improve on this view. Nevertheless, in these radical accounts the power and authority of international actors is overstated, leaving us to believe that local actors are forced to accept the regulatory measures designed by external officials and expert authorities.

What is needed is a theoretical approach that can explain how multiple forms of authority are contested, created and maintained in the relationships present in the governance of borderless threats within connected spaces of intervention. Such an approach needs to take into account the broader socio-political and economic contexts in which security governance arrangements to tackle borderless threats are embedded. The next chapter builds on the insights examined above by applying the assemblage approach and Bourdieusian field theory to intervention.
Chapter 3 – Global Security Assemblages and Fields of Intervention

This chapter develops the theoretical framework for understanding how borderless threats are governed and authority created and maintained in spaces of intervention. To do this, I use insights from assemblage thinking drawn from critical human geography and the approach developed by Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) in their work on global security assemblages. The latter’s conceptualization has employed Bourdieusian relational sociology, which when applied to spaces of intervention can account for the genesis and maintenance of forms of authority in matters of security governance. These literatures are then brought together with Jean Francois Bayart’s notion of extraversion (2000), which I modify as practices of extraversion, and its focus on external dependence to maintain prominence in local socio-political conflicts. Specifically, the outcomes of new security governance arrangements to tackle borderless threats in the global South are not dictated by the regulatory methods of interveners, but are instead determined by dynamic socio-political contestation amongst coalitions of actors that use the international as a key resource in pursuit of their own local agendas and interests.

The chapter makes three analytical moves with the following sections: first, I outline assemblage thinking developed by critical human geography and the key insight regarding the question of scale and the disassembly and reassembly of the state (Sassen 2006; Hameiri and Jones 2015a). Second, the outcomes of competing claims regarding security governance arrangements hinge on recognition of authority in matters of security. The section uses Bourdieu’s understanding of fields and forms of capital to do this, as it helps to explain how authority is recognized, generated, maintained or lost between field participants. Third, I outline the practices of extraversion undertaken by these different
coalitions of field participants in African settings. Whether or not, and how, the reconfiguration of states undergoing intervention occurs will be determined by socio-political conflicts that reflect wider state-society relations and local political economic concerns. Practices of extraversion involve how coalitions of actors use their structurally weak position internationally to garner the material and symbolic resources that scale affords in order to advance one’s political and economic position at another desired scale, usually in local fields. A fourth section then demonstrates how these three elements come together to explain my understanding of assemblages of intervention. Assemblages of security intervention shift and reorient the strategies and practices of actors in conjoined fields of authority, resulting in conflicts over who, where, and how borderless threats should be countered in connected spaces of intervention.

Assemblages and governance
Conceiving contemporary threats as borderless challenges understandings of world politics based on a system of sovereign states with impermeable territorial boundaries (see Agnew 1994; Chilton 1996). Drug trafficking provides an apt example. It is argued to be one of the most lucrative of all forms of trafficking, and “a source of destabilization of countries… linked to other forms of organized crime – trafficking in arms and human beings, corruption and money-laundering – which corrode other institutions and the legitimate economy” which “hinders development and fosters radicalization” (UNSC 2013). The transnational features of drug trafficking, like other borderless threats, lead observers to note, “new security threats of the post-Cold War era cannot be effectively addressed by established realist and liberal practices” (Bevir 2015: 32; see also Kinnvall
and Svensson 2015: 1-8). New forms of governance are required that break away from this overtly statist ontology.

In creating new forms of governance, the question of scales is paramount. Following Jessop, I understand scales as comprising “the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size: for example, local, regional, national, continental, and global” which are socio-politically configured (2008: 105). Specifically, if borderless threats are beyond the capacity of any individual sovereign state to tackle, then governance must move beyond the national scale towards others that are better suited to taking on this task. To understand how the governance of threats comes about, I turn to Sassen’s discussion on the disassembly and reassembly of national states.

Sassen (2008; 2014) shows that globalization cannot be equated solely with increased flows of goods, capital and people, or with technological advances that compress space and time to erode or weaken states. States are shaped by such global structural transformations; but the way in which this is accomplished should not be understood as an antagonistic relationship between a ‘global’ force that weakens a ‘national’ one. Instead, sectors of states and key institutions recompose and even accentuate global transformations, driving the very process of economic globalization from within national territorial boundaries at times in collaboration or through the activities of global non-state or private actors. It is worth quoting her at length:

The emergent, often imposed consensus in the community of states to further globalization is not merely a political decision of accepting (or rejecting) that consensus. It entails specific types of work by a large number of distinct institutions in each of these countries, and thereby partly shapes the actual work of states… We generally use terms such as deregulation, and privatization to describe the changed authority of the state when it comes to the economy. The problem with such terms
is that they do not register all the ways in which the state participates in setting up the new frameworks through which globalization is furthered, nor do they capture the associated transformations inside the state (2008: 232-234).

Rather than only adapting to global structural transformation and the proliferation of non-state private actors (Weiss 1998; Sassen 2008: 169-170), state actors have instigated the very development, support and institutionalization of global economic change embedded within domestic institutional arrangements.

Three key elements of state work are identified in this process. First, states undergo a process of “disassembly” of national institutions and related functions that were once national and public but become denationalized and taken over by private actors; second, the development of particular “capacities” or “capabilities” of private actors are solidified, and their orientation towards global markets occurs in order to facilitate activities directed at that scale; and lastly, there is a recomposition, or partial “reassembly” of the state whereby particular global-oriented departments and institutions function as centres for the support and operation of global capital, and which “reorient their particular policy work or, more broadly, state agendas toward the requirements of the global economy” (ibid.: 20-21). In this way, transformations embedded and endogenous to the formation of states constitute global structures and assemblages. This does not mean that the state is fading away, or doomed to crumble under the pressures of systemic change. Nor does it mean that there are not unintended consequences to such global/outward looking economic orientations, which attempt to highjack or profit from such new global assemblages. Particular institutions within states redefine themselves, which may result in other competing state institutions needing to respond to these newly dominant organizing logics.
Such realignments within the state and their orientation towards the requirements and logics of global capital refashion power relations that place globally-focused departments and strategic institutions at the forefront in government agendas (Sassen 2014: 117-118). Ministries of economy and finance, departments of transportation, the executive branches of government and central banks take on new positions of importance and dominance in this setting (Helleiner 1994: 190-191). These state institutions become central points of contact for instituting the normative logics of neoliberal globalization, many times locking in neoliberal economic paths through constitutional amendment (Gill 2002; Gill and Cutler 2014). Moreover, as such internal shifts in intra-state power relations have occurred, increasingly transgovernmental networks, constituted by private actors, intergovernmental agency actors, and government elites often simultaneously link together to form policy-specific coalitions that aim to foster integrated responses to common causes and to solve problems associated with the demands of global capital (see Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004). These global-oriented institutions become transformed into magnets for private, transnational, and intergovernmental actors who then attach onto projects that are geared towards neoliberal capitalism, possibly in search of support from opposition from other components of the state that would seek to challenge and potentially hinder such state realignments (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 92).

Like most research on the transformation of the state under conditions of globalization, Sassen’s focus is centred on global economic change. But a focus on the dynamics that she has so cogently explicated highlights important aspects of change that has also occurred in the realm of global security transformations (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hameiri and Jones 2015a). Proceeding in tow with the disassembly and
partial reassembly of states, we have seen a shift in security practices and logics among security actors. These transformations draw together once separate understandings of threat and corresponding practices of defense to more global orientations: security governance is rescaled in response to borderless threats. Conceiving of borderless threats as such occurs due to a perceived expansion of the scope of these threats, and a related need for governance beyond the traditional referent object of the state (Hameiri and Jones 2013: 465). The fact that this process spans multiple scales of practice means that the exceptional or emergency measures that are a function of sovereignty are muted. This does not mean that state officials are not intimately involved in the securitization of borderless threats. Indeed, key state institutions participate in the discursive creation of threats and then justify an expansion of security governance beyond the national scale to counter them, thereby reorienting their roles and institutional understandings towards a reassembled scalar orientation. This justification also involves advocating for the need to incorporate the efforts of regional organizations, other state sectors or institutions, private security companies, NGOs, transnational groups of experts, and the related institutions of other states to combine in complex transnational governance arrangements.

Crucially, governing borderless threats is not a question of rationally ascertaining or designing the best way to have multiple actors participate in new governance arrangements, contra functionalist accounts. This process is always contested, as the outcome of new governance arrangements involves competing interests, understandings, and elevated political and economic stakes, privileging some positions over others. The

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9 I do not examine private security actors in drug interdiction, per se. What is important for me in Sassen’s formulation is how state institutions and sectors advocate for the need to reorient their roles and responsibilities towards a global scale, and develop capacities in new ways in order to be reassembled to make them more equipped to operate globally.
centrality of socio-political contestation has been most clearly expressed in the research of critical human/political geographers who insist upon an analysis of “on-going transformations, strategies, and struggles” tied to the making of the national state and the inter-state system (Brenner and Elden 2009: 364; Sassen 2008: 365-375; Jessop 2008: 105-106; Agnew 2009). Defining a political situation as an urban, local, regional, national, transnational, inter-continental, or global problem is not a neutral assessment. Each of these scales incorporates different sets of actors, with distinct political understandings, practices, interests, imaginaries, and resources that will privilege the social positions of some coalitions of actors over others. Coalitions of actors will join together to advance their distinct social positions and interests in support of or resistance to different governance schemes, creating what Barry has aptly termed “transnational knowledge controversies” (2006: 325). No one scale more appropriately deals with a borderless threat than any other in objective terms. Instead, each scale articulates the political agendas of interested sets of actors, and the security governance arrangements created against borderless threats are the outcomes of competition over those particular agendas and interests (Brenner 2004; Agnew 2005; Hameiri and Jones 2015b).

Assemblage thinking provides us with a way of understanding the political manoeuvrings and encounters of competing sets of actors and the thick social institutions that produce new scalar governance arrangements against borderless threats. 10

10 Assemblage thinking has gained significant academic attention since the publication of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987). The theoretical literature on assemblages is large, incredibly complex, and extremely diverse as it has influenced and been influenced by the varying disciplines that pushed forward assemblage thinking – especially in human geography (see Robbins and Marks 2010; Dittmer 2014) and anthropology (Ong and Collier 2005; Marcus and Saka 2006). This complexity cannot be examined in its entirety here.
Importantly, assemblage thinking involves a methodological approach, descriptive tool, tactic, or way of thinking about the multiple processes of historicity and relationality involved in complex socio-spatial change, instead of a theory as such (Sassen 2006: 402-403; Sassen and Ong 2014: 18). Indeed, assemblage thinking involves recognizing the complexities, fluidities and potential contradictions in diverse social relations that cut across space.

Assemblages involve a compound of diverse parts operating within a larger socio-spatial formation or whole that is provisional and contingent (Anderson and McFarlane 2011: 124). The combinations of these assemblages enable new forms of political action and social understanding that are emergent and generative. They unveil a general reconstitution of social relations that blurs categorical divisions such as the social/material, subject/object, human/nature, global/local and structure/agency, (DeLanda 2006). These commonalities form the backbone of the analytical approach taken in this dissertation in examining the socio-spatial transformations that occur with regard to the governance of borderless threats, and how states are changing as a result. Assemblage thinking can help to analytically capture these important political transformations while taking into account the multiple agencies, practices, knowledges and forms that such transformations incorporate.

Following Abrahamsen and Williams’ important theorization, I understand global security assemblages as multi-sited institutional orders that link the governance spaces and practices of both governmental and non-governmental agents across disparate political jurisdictions. In their analysis of the rise of global security privatization, Abrahamsen and Williams explain how such security assemblages consist of “complex
hybrid structures that inhabit national settings but are stretched across national boundaries in terms of actors, knowledges, technologies, norms and values” (2011: 95). In other words, such assemblages are constitutive of spaces that balk at neat sovereign delineations. As a conceptual apparatus, these assemblages help to account for how security discourses and practices play out and are adopted (or rejected) in specific, more often than not, simultaneous, locales. The geographical locations and spread of global security assemblages, however, are specific to key sites of security concern, as dictated by the contests between interested coalitions of political actors representing public and private interests and discourses. Thus, these global security assemblages are not set in stone, but take the forms that they do because of intense socio-political competition. The powers that are exercised within these assemblages might cut across global spaces and radiate important effects of domination as they coalesce around particular nodes, sites and actors, but they are nevertheless contingent, historically and geographically specific, and contested. Global security assemblages do not continually integrate and envelop, so much as embed and branch out of particular security-centred spaces.

Security cooperation operative within global security assemblages occurs in multiple spaces, and involves the participation of heterogeneous sets of actors including state and international organization officials, independent programme evaluators and consultants, private security firms, risk consultants, development and NGO actors, in addition to a wide-range of informal actors. The work of these involved actors occurs across spatial scales, such that it can be simultaneously global and local. The binary distinction between these two categories does not hold sway within these security assemblages. It is thus more accurate to state that the types of security work
accomplished within global security assemblages connect and incorporate political action in and through multiple connected localities.

Security practices that occur within global security assemblages are inherently contingent and place-specific, but nevertheless can be locked into particular patterns and trajectories that temporarily culminate into a larger whole. In this vein, Sassen argues that “capabilities can be shifted towards objectives other than the original ones for which they were developed,” and “can jump tracks and become part of new organizing logics” (2006: 6-9). Similarly, Abrahamsen and Williams have explained that assemblages can be thought of as “a disaggregated structure with both material and ideational dimensions, that are put together in a Bricolage, and that functions as a systematic whole” (2014a: 26).

For example, the participation of security agents located within security assemblages are often impromptu, informal and based on the functional requirements of specific operations which would attempt to match the network-like, project-based activities of transnational criminal groups (see Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 20-21; Andreas and Nadelman 2006: 141-146). Informality, nevertheless, creates a thick social institution of knowledges and values for global and local actors engaging in transnationalized forms of security governance, which enhances the contingency of global security assemblages.

Global security assemblages are emergent and generative. New security logics, practices, technologies and knowledges can be adopted, deconstructed, adapted, resisted or discarded by involved actors. The adaptations undertaken by security actors within these assemblages, while building on previous practical iterations, are nonetheless open to change according to the struggles between invested actors in defining how and where new security governance arrangements ought to take place. Key to this process is the
recognition of actors as valid participants in governance efforts. The forms of cooperation and negotiation that occur within security assemblages involve more than the formal institutional development of international forums, organizations, or tools that may facilitate information-sharing between national states in security efforts. The governance measures and strategies of security that are produced in security assemblages may be framed as a set of functional or coordinated responses to counter borderless threats, and organized around networked forms of social organization. The empirical chapters of this dissertation, however, demonstrate that using the term ‘coordination’ is shorthand for the more accurate dynamic involved: competition. The types of security cooperation that occur within global security assemblages involve a heterogeneous set of connecting parts that come together through complex, structured competition over the boundaries or operational confines of security cooperation. These forms of cooperation, like the coalitions of actors that advance them, must be recognized as authorized participants with valid claims of inclusion amongst the governance actors involved. The question of authority in security matters, therefore, is of central importance to global security assemblages.

In order to account for how authority is created and maintained within global security assemblages, the discussion now turns to an examination of Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of social power.

Authority and Recognition: field, doxa, and forms of capital

Bourdieu’s unique approach to understanding power relations concentrates on showing how the practices of social actors evolve out of an on-going interaction between their own schemes of perception in relation to the structural positions of power of other social
agents within a given field of action.\textsuperscript{11} This is a conception of social action that posits a relational ontology. Bourdieu’s approach is one that insists upon determining the strategic qualities of interest-driven actors that seek to advance their social position within distinct social settings of “self-organized contestation” (Martin 2003: 30; see Bourdieu 1984, 1998).

Bourdieu has explained that a field is a particular configuration of relations between positions that are occupied by agents and institutions within specified social settings. Fields have specific social boundaries that are validated by one’s dispositions and forms of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97). Fields are social settings of conflict (which can be either physical or symbolic) that draw together a range of interested actors around a given agenda, issue area or policy. Fields exhibit intense forms of competition over the meaning of their political stakes; which ‘ways of doing’ or practices should be accepted by field participants; and the way that this social space is organized. This is very important, since the categories of practice that are agreed upon through competition in a given field will delineate how social agents perceive themselves

\textsuperscript{11} While extremely important to Bourdieu’s understanding of social relations, this dissertation explicitly brackets Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus. Bourdieu explains the habitus as “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations” that allow for action and understanding in a given field (Bourdieu 1977: 77-8). The habitus instils in actors social understandings that are derived from human experiences (both unacknowledged and semi-conscious) and their recognition of how specific fields operate. The habitus constitutes one’s inclination towards types of social activities that have been structured by one’s past social conditions, and the social weight of participating in behaviours that are acceptable to a specific field of action in the present. This leads, in part, to the social reproduction of fields, and of one’s position within a field. Acquired over time through a process of gradual inculcation, the habitus provides the basis of understanding for one’s social position, of the forms of power that are to be desired or expected, and generates knowable expectations for the actions and responses of others. The habitus, therefore, orients action, without determining it. But it is still adaptable to changing external conditions.
and others. In this way, fields are social spaces structured by the distribution of forms of power, manifested in different kinds of resources, or capital tied to that agenda or issue (Bourdieu 1998: 32-34). Crucially, the current composition of a field of struggle is configured by past struggles within that field, and by the wider structural and historical shifts in which they are embedded (see Bourdieu 1962, 1979; Vauche 2011: 340).

Forms of capital reflect and shape what is valued within the field. Thompson notes that fields are “always the site of struggles in which individuals seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital specific to it” (1991: 14). This means that fields are defined by the stakes connected to the acquisition and potential loss of these types of resources. Fields are not immutable, but are instead social spaces that act as structured forces on its participants (on how they understand themselves and others) and on their behaviours. The dominant acquisition of a particular form of capital will in large measure dictate the types of actions available to that individual. Fields, therefore, provide the social contexts necessary for individuals to determine appropriate strategies of action. An actor’s practical sense and manoeuvrability within a field hinges on the operation and spread of forms of capital that structure actions’ very possibility.

Fields, therefore, and the forms of capital over which field participants compete, must be relatively autonomous social spaces: not all actors can participate in a field’s political stakes, agree to its ‘seriousness’, or be equipped with the dispositions or ‘feel for the game’ that a field’s social laws require for recognized participation (Bourdieu 1990: 66; 1998: 79-81). Action within fields, and attempts to reconfigure the structured positions of capital that define their organization, are imbued by the dominant logic of that specific field: the doxa. Leander has usefully compared the doxa to a ‘script’ of
unwritten, unquestioned common sense that is necessary for individuals to internalize: it is a sense of socio-political limits (2011: 303-306). For Bourdieu “every established order tends to produce… the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (1977: 164). The constraints of the doxa dictate the operation of fields. Its rules take on a taken for granted character and composition producing an “uncontested acceptance of the daily lifeworld” for social actors as they occupy specific positions within a field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 73-74). Participants in fields of struggle can come to recognize the limits of social behaviour in the acquisition of forms of capital in such an unquestioning way that participation seems to expect obedience to the field’s logic, even without the direct awareness of that obedience by its participants. Bourdieu calls this a “state of unthought” (1998: 121, 129).

While the occupancy of a field’s structured positions may change, the logic of the field in question often remains rooted, and only changes when relations of capital specific to a field are significantly altered. Thus, the operation of fields can develop such an unquestioning acquiescence on the part of its participants that “what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu 1977: 167). This means that actors must be recognized as participants in specific fields. They must share knowledge of the political stakes of a field of struggle, what it is about. Competition within fields is about the contours of that doxa – its specificities, and the approaches to governing the particular issue-area or policy that gives that field its agreed upon status: security; health; art; education, etc.

Command of resources, or capital, is central to marshalling effective action around the given stakes of a field of action. These different forms of capital endow the
actors that acquire them with different capacities for action. Field participants attempt to “safeguard or improve their position and to impose the principle of hierarchization that is most favorable” to them based on the forms and amount of capital in their possession (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101). In other words, different forms of capital are used strategically in order to dominate any particular field, to master its logic and maintain its doxa. Of the several different forms of capital, four seem particularly important with regard to the fields that are examined here: cultural, political, economic and symbolic capital.

Cultural capital involves those competencies; forms of expertise; and advanced training that are acquired by field participants (see Dupont 2004: 85-86). The increased emphasis on policing transnational organized crime, for example, has been accompanied by the creation of specialized police services with operational mandates geared towards detection, investigation and management of this borderless threat. To be included in such a security institution involves recognition of competence within the issue area of policing transnational organized crime, and lends social weight to the declarations and actions made by these institutions and its members. This form of capital is transmitted through specialized training sessions, or exchanges with foreign police services and training academies. Cultural capital often comes in the material form of certificates, or other bona fides that shield or arm those individuals that have acquired them. Adoption of new crime-fighting techniques or upgrades in policing equipment also lends social weight to those agents and institutions that are selected for these types of qualification. The introduction and work of specialist security units, like the specialized anti-trafficking units developed and operating in West Africa explored in the following three chapters,
can significantly alter the relations of power within a field of security, as security agents attempt to curry the favour of dominant field participants who perform the selection process in order to acquire cultural capital. Being selected for specialized training constitutes an investment in cultural capital, both for participants or units selected, and individuals involved in selecting.

Selection for specialized training may be connected to two other important forms of capital: political and economic capital. Bourdieu notes that political capital is founded on a belief system whereby groups endow an individual with the same powers that the group already believes the individual to have acquired (Bourdieu 1991: 192-194). This recognition endows the individual with a political clout or significance, which can be manifested in the mobilizing of adherents in support of a particular cause. Therefore, political capital is generated by one’s proximity to government decision-making and an ability to sway the decision-making procedure. Those individuals and institutions that have acquired political capital exercise a significant degree of power in articulating their vision(s) of the world. This is certainly the case for state security institutions, like police agencies, as they are one of the most visible manifestations of a state’s sovereignty (Garland 1996: 448-449). This is not to say that police and other security officials are not also severely constrained by the practices and strategies of professionals of the political field. In many African countries, for example, it has been demonstrated that police officials govern according to the preferences of powerful political leaders (see Hills 2007). Nevertheless, the visions of crime, security and order that are articulated by police

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12 This is especially the case in the West African setting, where command of the political field is inherently connected to strategies of accumulation in the economic field, what some authors have called ‘straddling’ (see Bayart 2009: 69-71).
officials often influence contests between state politicians. Police officials lobby for increased budgets, for particular penalties to be attached to specific infractions, and in support of candidates during election periods that are framed by discourses of law and order, or security and development.

Economic capital is inherently connected to political capital. Economic capital refers to those material possessions and financial resources that individuals can muster in support of their strategies within a specific field. Bourdieu argues that economic capital is one of capital’s most fundamental forms, and a necessary element within all power relations (Bourdieu 1997: 53-54). In settings marked by resource scarcity (or perceived as such), marshalling a network of adherents to a particular cause often requires the financial means to bring a group together in the same place, or to advertise the importance of a particular worldview through media or other outlets. One important way that social agents become recognized as important players in the political field is by using the economic capital they have previously amassed to influence the outcome of political contests by financially supporting networks, or by purchasing tools used to increase social visibility. In terms of policing, those individuals that can influence the allocation of budgets, or leverage offers for economic support from national or international sources can convert economic capital into various forms of material objects (like operational equipment, additional officers, renovated work spaces, etc.) that may increase policing capacities, and in so doing solidify their position within the field of security.

The acquisition of economic capital by a field participant does not necessarily mean that his/her ability to exercise power will increase within a given field. The dynamics of fields require the valorization of particular kinds of capital and the capacities...
that derive from their use. A good example of this is demonstrated in Chapter six’s discussion of capacity-building measures in Niger. European police liaisons find that due to the intensely competitive nature of the field of capacity-building in the Sahel, and the scale of opportunities for capacity-building projects that such a crowded field affords, Nigerien internal security forces have acquired too much over-specialized training, too much cultural capital. This situation has not necessarily improved the law enforcement capabilities of the country’s specialized counter-Transnational organized crime agencies. Instead, it has produced a relatively small but bloated upper class of Nigerien security professionals, leaving the vast majority of ordinary police, gendarmes, and National Guardsmen without basic training skills, and in search of opportunities and access that the former have solidified.

Field participants need to recognize the value of capital, which means that some forms of capital may retain their value in a particular field, but will be less relevant to other connected fields. The ways in which fields are constituted by different structured positions and acquisition of distinct forms of capital means that these fields are sites of tension, flux and possible transformation. In this setting of tension, the recognition of one’s position or status within the field becomes one of the most important aspects of action within these structured social settings. The prestige or legitimacy associated with actions undertaken within a field, and the ability to underwrite or shape how a field operates or is defined, Bourdieu has named “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1990: 115-117; 1991). For example, officers of specialized inter-agency law enforcement units in West Africa that bring about large seizures of drugs significantly enhance their policing prestige; their symbolic capital. Such a feat provides them with a recognition by other
field participants that they are professional, transparent, ‘straight-shooters’, and trustworthy. For Western capacity-builders, the performance of law enforcement via drug seizures is used as a metric to measure the effectiveness of their training of West African security agencies. Those national security agencies that do conduct seizures are consistently selected for additional training, thus enhancing the recognition of their cultural capital, while also most likely increasing their economic capital. This simultaneously enables state political officials to capitalize on this recognition nationally, creating an enhancement of their political capital, since capacity-building programmes are negotiated by national political elites like government ministers. Conversely, law enforcement units that do not perform high-profile seizures are often sidelined in the security field, producing a loss of material capital in the form of financial budgets, or a loss of symbolic capital from a perceived recognition of incapacity, ineffectiveness, or generalized corruption within the unit.

Bourdieu’s analysis of social power helps us understand the genesis and maintenance of authority within fields. Field dynamics hinge on competition for the recognition that forms of capital in part afford (Bourdieu 1984: 21-23). Crucially, Bourdieu argues that “the concentration of a symbolic capital of recognized authority” gives value to the endeavours of any social agent when “it is perceived through categories of perception” of other agents wielding lower degrees of this key resource within a field of struggle (1998: 47). In each field of struggle, therefore, social agents recognize the principles of domination of that structured social space, based on the acquisition and maintenance of symbolic capital: “Symbolic capital enables forms of domination which imply dependence on those who can be dominated by it, since it only exists through the
esteem, recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others” (Bourdieu 2000: 166; see also Steinmetz 2006, 2013). This means that both ends of a hierarchical relationship, dominant and dominated, require recognition of their status as valid participants within any social field. In terms of authority, social agents within fields compete over the authorization of their participation. Those that acquire symbolic capital hold the highest stakes in allowing for the participation of those subordinate actors that wield less of it, which makes the latter acquiesce to their very domination. Although the concentration of forms of capital may have been completely arbitrary or had occurred by chance, they are nevertheless “unrecognized” or “misrecognized” by the dominated who believe the doxa of a field to be legitimate, and that they ought to submit their subordinate status (Bourdieu 1991: 169-170; 1998: 95). This means that the categories of evaluation of any field of struggle tend to replicate themselves over time, making it difficult (though not impossible) to modify due to the complicity of subordinate actors in submitting to their dominated relationships with the dominant authorities retaining a concentration of symbolic capital.

Social agents competing in fields of power require recognition by others to even be part of the game, and seek after the forms of capital that inform that game’s very criteria. Once recognized, they are deemed authorized agents. However, that authorization can be lost if social agents lose the symbolic capital that forms the basis of their inclusion within that field of struggle. The next section describes a crucial way in which social agents in African settings become recognized authorities, through the concept of practices of extraversion.
Practices of Extraversion: Weakness as strength; Local knowledge; and Transnational Gate-keeping

The question of how one becomes recognized as an authority in global governance is particularly salient with regard to Africa. The continent is consistently diagnosed as needing outside authorities to correct perceived governance deficiencies in its numerous ‘failed states’ plagued by large scale violence and fuels endemic corruption, which cause or facilitate an expansion of borderless threats (see Kaplan 1994; Rotberg 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Shelley 2014). The global structural disadvantages its governments face, it is argued in much of the literature on statebuilding interventions, make out African populations to be takers of Western interventions: always acted upon and globally governed, and never acting to shape or govern in global governance efforts (see discussion in previous chapter). How in this setting is it possible for agents of African states to be considered global governance authorities of no matter which typology (private, popular, moral, illicit, etc.)?

The answer is that agents of African states engage with the very categories of evaluation assigned to them by embracing their dependence internationally, and subsequently use resources derived from their subordinate international status to govern locally in ways that consolidate their acquisition of forms of capital within local fields. Jean-François Bayart (2000) calls this pattern of action “extraversion.” He argues that the purported subservience of African political agents to European and Asian political systems of domination did not mean that the former did not actively participate in the establishment of dependence: they instead actively pursued strategies that enabled
dependence in order to be recognized as authorized interlocutors internationally. It is worth quoting Bayart’s position at length:

The leading actors in sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power and in intensifying the exploitation of their dependents by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment… Far from being the victims of their very real vulnerability, African governments exploit, occasionally skillfully, the resources of a dependence which is, it cannot ever be sufficiently stressed, astutely fabricated as much as predetermined. Both on their political stage and within the world system, they pursue their own objectives, within the margins of failure and success that the implementation of any strategy entails” (Bayart 2009: 25-26).

While this thesis has been met with vehement criticism (see Leys 1996; Bryceson 2000; Meagher 2005), practices of extraversion importantly highlight the varying forms of agency available to subjects placed in asymmetrical positions of power. The notion also highlights the contested and often costly nature of such strategies and related practices. Resources and authority are claimed by governors of African states in their attempts to consolidate rule, a strategy which is also used by other actors on the continent that contest that rule and seek to supplant them (see Tull and Mehler 2005; Pommerolle 2010). Thus, practices of extraversion hinge on the competition for resources (both symbolic and material) related to the recognition of authority status in Africa, where establishing social ties of dominance with the international sphere becomes a key form of convertible capital. African governors become recognized as authoritative actors in global and local governance by virtue of being the best at enabling foreign intervention.

Three specific practices of extraversion are crucial in leveraging the international in order to garner credibility, prestige and material resources needed to maintain local dominance: the strategic framing of discourses of vulnerability and willingness; mastery over forms of ‘insider knowledge’; and transnational gatekeeping. Each of these practices
confers authority on African actors, making possible an increase in international forms of capital from their dealings with international forces, from which they fabricate means to pursue their own political objectives to be governed differently and on their own terms. Acknowledging these practices leads us to highlight the varying degrees to which African political actors can manoeuvre within global structures of dependence and dominance, between forces of coercion and wilful internalization of international liberal norms.

*Discourses of Vulnerability and Willingness*

The category of ‘fragile state’ can pay significant symbolic and material dividends to African political leaders and individuals connected to its security institutions (Fisher 2014). The term ‘fragile state’ has been critiqued *ad nauseum* in academic circles from a number of theoretical perspectives (Hill 2005; Call 2011; Ayers 2012; Jones 2013). Nevertheless, the term is central to the policy-making establishments of the international donor community. In these assessments, the idea of fragile states is consistently connected to understandings of borderless threats. Drug trafficking, refugee flows, illegal immigration, terrorism, and disease, according to the international donor community, incubate in the ungoverned spaces of failed and fragile states (see World Bank 2011; Pham 2007).

African political leaders are well aware of this fact. Being categorized as ‘politically fragile’ provides a set of opportunities for political leaders to have their authority recognized due to the borderless features of non-traditional security threats (see Reno 2001; Englebert 2009). Political leaders and security professionals representing African states have used the category of state fragility to manipulate and instrumentalize understandings of security to garner political and economic support from the international
community (Fisher 2014: 317; Beswick and Hammerstad 2013). By discursively agreeing to the risks of political instability present locally, and acknowledging that these risks are transnational in scope, African governors engage with a discursive frame of instability that is meaningful to Western policy-makers. Mobilizing a discourse of lack of security capacity becomes an important practice that plays to and incorporates the concerns of the international donor community in return for financial and technical support to build the security agencies of fragile states. It is an acknowledgment of a dependence on the international that enables African political actors to engage in a wide array of policy options and to use its attendant resources to pursue practices that secure rule domestically. Once acquired, these actors use international resources to consolidate patron-client relationships, accommodate competing elites, and to consolidate dominance in local fields (see Reno 1998; 2001; Bayart 2009).

Not all African governments can portray themselves as fragile states uniformly. For example, some African governments can tap into discourses of the threat of Islamic terrorism associated with the global War on Terror more readily and successfully than others. It would be difficult for political leaders in Malawi, Lesotho, or Cape Verde to claim that their territories represent global security risks associated with terrorism, for example, while the governments of the Sahel, and the Chad Basin do so regularly and have these claims recognized by international actors. Significant portions of the populations of these states are Muslim, and each face challenges in controlling large geographical spaces of national territory.

Similarly, political leaders of relatively stable African states whose neighbours are unable or unwilling to control large swathes of territory can use their reputation as
bastions of political stability to acquire symbolic and material resources from the international community. Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya actively and successfully frame their involvement in the stabilization of neighbouring Somalia – a space that regularly stirs up Western states’ perceptions of insecurity, vulnerability to terrorist attacks and international humanitarian disaster – as the key to governing this purportedly ungovernable space (Bachmann and Honke 2009; Feyissa 2011; Fisher 2012). These examples demonstrate how agents of African states must strategically use those discourses of vulnerability that most closely pertain to their specific historical, social, and geographic circumstances.

By framing the necessity of supporting their efforts to tackle borderless threats, African governors manage to deflect international pressures to adopt certain governance reforms and rearticulate Western security concerns in ways that justify their own security interests in state-formation. This is not to say that African political and security actors are not placed in a highly asymmetric position of power in their relationships with statebuilding interveners, or that they automatically refuse or only provide rhetorical support for the security practices and institutions that international experts recommend. It does mean that when pushed by the latter to adopt international forms of security governance African governors are neither forced to do so, nor willingly acquiesce due to disciplinary or biopolitical control. While this may be the case in some circumstances, more often than not they will amplify the discourse of their own weaknesses in security matters in order to curry favour with the international donor community, and will subsequently use symbolic and material resources given to secure local positions of power, even at the expense of international understandings and practices.
Mobilizing the discourse of vulnerability is often coupled with that of political willingness. Framing political willingness and a lack of capacity to effectively counter borderless threats in Africa is a key practice of African political leaders and security professionals. Having this discourse successfully acknowledged by international partners provides enhanced international credibility, and the accrual of important forms of financial support. The global War on Terror has provided one potent symbolic resource for African political leaders to secure international legitimacy, foreign revenues, military and policing technology, and even increased development funds to counter violent extremism. As we will see in the empirical chapters of this work, the threat of transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, particularly when connected to terrorism, are important discursive tropes that agents of African states utilize in garnering international support. However, it is only those institutions and coalitions of actors on the continent that effectively present the political will to tackle borderless threats that become recognized as key authorities in security. For example, the government of Guinea-Bissau was slotted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and Police Division (UNPOL) for inclusion in the West African Coast Initiative (WACI), which aims to create specialized inter-agency anti-trafficking units meant to tackle drug trafficking from Latin America. Guinea-Bissau, however, is considered Africa’s first ‘narco-state’, where state military and political officials have been directly involved in facilitating the trans-shipment of cocaine by Colombian and Venezuelan traffickers (Ellis 2009: 191-192; Carrier and Klantschnig 2012: 110-111). As a result, the programme has been suspended in Guinea-Bissau. Conversely, the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia have demonstrated both their need for the development of the initiative, as
evidenced by police seizures of large amounts of cocaine and the dismissal of government ministers (Africa Confidential 2008; Weiser and Rashbaum 2010; Bhattacharjee 2015), and their political willingness to do all that is required for international sponsorship to implement it. As a result of this demonstration of political willingness, both countries now have equipped, trained, and operational transnational crime units (TCU), which benefit from important international reputational prestige.\textsuperscript{13}

Discourses of willingness, of course, must be backed by institutional positions of prominence in local fields of power, and a necessary accumulation of material and social capital to credibly follow through with articulations of willingness to tackle non-traditional security issues. African political and security actors need to demonstrate their access and ability to muster a baseline level of support and resources in their efforts to frame vulnerability and willingness to international actors. Thus, one way to demonstrate political willingness is through contributing meagre military resources to risk oriented conflict prevention institutions like the African Standby Force, or for UN peacekeeping missions (see Williams 2014). By committing troops to complex peace operations, African political leaders often secure training for their police and military forces in an array of counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics curricula from Western donors, for example through US State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme, France’s \textit{Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix} (RECAMP), or the European Union Training Missions (EUTM). States like Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Senegal, all heavily dependent on Western financial aid, have participated in these multilateral security

\textsuperscript{13} Interview, UNPOL trainer, 2 December 2012, New York; interview, UNOWA official, 25 February 2013, Dakar.
ventures. Uganda has committed troops to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and Kenya was a significant contributor of troops to the 2004-2006 UN Mission for Burundi (ONUB), as well as police officers for AMISOM. Senegal is a significant troop contributor to the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI). As a result, these actors are recognized as authorities in peacekeeping on the continent due to their political willingness to consistently participate in complex peace operations, and credible claims to deliver resources in these efforts.

This does not necessarily mean that the members of these security institutions or governments have internalized liberal or multilateral norms of security governance. Each has used their security forces for domestic pacification and regime consolidation (see Branch 2011; Tankebe 2013; Wilén et. al. 2015). Ugandan leaders have framed themselves as key allies in fighting terrorism in East Africa, for which they maintain significant aid flows (some estimating nearly 50% of the state budget in 2011 – see Sjögren 2013: 7), and counter-terrorism training from key donor states such as the United Kingdom and United States (Fisher 2013). But Uganda’s long-term involvement in the Congo wars (1996-2003), and Museveni’s recent contradictory behaviour in both mediating and having the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) participate in active combat in South Sudan, would have us question the extent of the regime’s commitment to regional stability and multilateralism (Warner 2014b). The Museveni regime has used a

14 Ugandan Defence Minister, Chrispus Kiyonga, stated that Ugandan military intervention in South Sudan was to prevent genocidal violence: “We saw what happened in Rwanda. Millions of people were killed as African states and [the] UN looked on. We must not allow a repeat” (IRIN 2014). The intervention comes on the heels of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. This provides yet another example of
strategy of plundering the Congo’s natural resources, especially gold – a resource that the country does not produce but does officially export – in its domestic statebuilding efforts, and has continued to receive international debt relief and donor leniency over its lackluster democratic performance (see Reno 2002). Kenya also remains one of the top recipients of Western security assistance on the continent, including training in counter-narcotic and anti-trafficking operations from multiple Western partners. Since the end of the Cold War, Kenyan politicians have used “Western officials’ fear of violence and disorder and their reliance on cooperation in the realm of security, among other factors, to resist to a significant extent Western pressure for democratization and accountability for large-scale political violence” (Brown and Raddatz 2013: 4; Whitaker 2008). While economic and political conditionality have been stressed by the international donor community, and despite Kenya being heavily dependent on Western sources of aid (32% of the government budget by 2011 according to the World Bank), Kenyan political elites have simultaneously demonstrated a political willingness to concede to international governance norms while latching onto hot topic issues which provide them with key resources used to consolidate rule domestically at the expense of these norms (Bachmann 2012).

Maintaining dependency on the international stage by framing their polities as vulnerable to borderless threats yet politically willing and able to mobilize resources needed to comply with new forms of security governance is a key practice of extraversion

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the strategic use of symbolic representations of state weakness and discourses of instability in justifying foreign policy and seeking in an extraverted way material resources and credibility from the international donor community.

for African governors. In so doing, these political actors become recognized as authoritative partners in global governance arrangements. Nevertheless, while the international donor community may be attempting to steer African regimes in matters of liberal security, African political leaders may not be being let steered. Worse, they use their hierarchically dominated position internationally to convert forms of capital derived from that relationship to secure their own domestic political and economic interests. By engaging with the security concerns of the international donor community, African governors creatively tap into the sympathies, expectations and security rationales of global governance to blunt what might be construed as overbearing donor demands.

*Mastery of Insider Knowledge*

When Western states and international organizations stubbornly abide by the discourse of state fragility and their risk of contagion to borderless threats, they place themselves at a disadvantage in their interactions with African governors. The disadvantage is that their knowledge is necessarily ambiguous and incomplete. This circumstance allows agents of African states to position themselves as local experts with insider knowledge, which is required by external interveners. Simply put, African political and security elites know more about ‘what is going’ locally than external actors. This may be in actual terms: African governors know the geographical, social, religious, and economic features of their country or sub-region better than external actors. African governors maintain patron-client networks that provide them with crucial information on their rivals and enemies in return for financial or political support. However, as Jourde aptly notes, the lack of knowledge of external actors couples with the discursive representations of state fragility, which shapes the type of information that external actors seek in the first place:
“Even if a government had substantial information about the domestic and foreign politics of another country, its understanding will always be limited by the representations it uses to interpret that information. It is limited by the very questions it asks about that other country and, perhaps more importantly, by the questions it does not ask, by the issues it emphasizes and those it ignores. These inherent weaknesses and limitations open the door for various framing strategies from the part of weaker states vis-à-vis their hegemonic counterparts” (2007: 486).

Agents of African states offer up information to external actors, information that the latter need in order to craft their interventions, which can be radically simplified, potentially fabricated, or simply exaggerated, and framed in such a way to support the giver of information and intelligence at the expense of other competing local perspectives. Even though the relationships of power between agents of African states and Western states and international organizations may be highly asymmetrical, the former can still manipulate the image of vulnerability that the latter assume, and frame their key insider knowledges as a crucial resource that international actors desperately need. When international actors adopt the interpretations of state fragility that are provided by agents of African states, the latter are donned with an authoritative status that increases their symbolic or material capital, and thus their authority. Agents of African states may then use this increase in capital to consolidate their domestic or regional political positions.

International recognition of the sovereign status of state officials plays an important role in validating the mastery of insider knowledge, even in purportedly failed states. For example, members of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) are given diplomatic status by a wide range of international actors, despite the fact that its ability to rule domestically is virtually inexistent. The TFG is severely fragmented by complex clan, family, religious, and business dynamics that put its members into context-specific, fluid allegiances with terrorist and criminal networks in practical ways that the
international donor community would frown upon (see Menkhaus 2007; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012; Hammond 2013). Nevertheless, by recognizing the authority of members of the new Somali Federal Republic, the latter have become indispensable guides for international actors needing to understand this opaque political atmosphere, born of concerns with the risk of borderless threats that potentially emanate from the Horn of Africa. Scott refers to such individuals that master insider knowledge as “local trackers”. Their mastery of insider knowledge is used as a practice of extraversion, however, since these local trackers “are likely to interpose their own particular interests” (1998: 54, 64, 78).

African political actors convert the symbolic capital that diplomatic status endows to a form of “legal command” that “underwrites the convertibility of state institutions in the market for domination and extraction” over domestic populations (Englebert 2009: 80; see also Biersteker and Weber 1996; Reno 2001). International recognition of authority makes it possible for them to use the information resources of the state apparatus (official security and intelligence services for example), and other political configurations and mechanisms (unofficial militias, commercial networks, etc.) to centrally manage information. Once acquired, African political actors provide international audiences with relevant information, which is framed in a way that puts the information provider in a positive, if not indispensable position of authority. African governors can then instrumentalize their sovereign recognition and insider knowledge to demand international forms of capital from the international community in their efforts to maintain order locally or regionally, for example by giving law enforcement and military equipment or specialized training to state security institutions. These forms of
international capital then enhance their capacities to master insider knowledge, and partially shields them from international interference (Brown 2013: 279).

Transnational Gatekeeping

Intimately related to the mastery of insider knowledges as a practice of extraversion is the practice of transnational gatekeeping (see Cooper 2002). African political and security actors position themselves as the interface between local political economies and global political and economic forces in order to solidify their authority. Doing so makes it possible to mediate between different scales of governance, and to implement strategies to push for the types of governance arrangements that will best suit their purposes, their understandings of the governance object in question, and their interests.

The extraverted practice of transnational gatekeeping must be understood in the broader global political economic context in which the continent is embedded, and the structural forces that have shaped the continent’s present trajectory (Ferguson 2006: 25-49). With the exception of Liberia, all West African states experienced European formal colonial rule. Colonial administrations divided the continent into artificial territorial domains without reconciling these new units with existing social divisions. Territories were officially brought under the rule of law, but in practice colonial administrations controlled the colonies at the lowest possible financial cost, which entailed a significant degree of personal discretion by administrators instead of following official bureaucratic procedures. Rule was carried out through complex interactions between rulers and ruled, with formal rules often replaced by impromptu, practical strategies (see Chabal and Daloz 1999: 12-13; Cooper 2005: 51-52; Ellis 2011: 31-65).
Collaborating with colonial administrators presented opportunities for well-positioned Africans to acquire a series of rents and privileges from the colonial enterprise that they could not acquire from existing connections (Berman 1998: 316-317). Indigenous officials serving colonial administrations could simultaneously accumulate symbolic and material resources from a system of foreign rule viewed as illegitimate by colonized populations while imparting those resources to their own informal networks of patronage. Many of these indigenous officials took the reigns of political rule at independence, having developed a habit for using public coffers for personal gain (see Young 2004).

The newly minted regimes created at independence were viewed with a high degree of political legitimacy by their citizenries, but legitimacy only lasted a short time. Governmental legitimacy often cohered around the personality of individual rulers (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Superpower financial and military support was a bulwark for African political leaders, as it was used in an extraverted fashion to consolidate rule and to grease the gears of patronage (Laidi 1990; Clapham 1996; Reno 1998: 18-24). National alliances made during this period, however, became weakened by competition between and across ethnic and party groups over sources of patronage resources. Allen explains, in this period “long-standing local (and subsequently national) divisions became politicized, while party conflicts became redrawn and reconstructed as communal conflicts. Political conflict became increasingly violent as well, as ruling parties attempted to prolong their hold on power” (1995: 304). In states where national political parties could not dominate, leaders found it difficult to maintain control, which led to political instability, ethnic or religious factionalism, and the involvement of militaries.
At the end of the Cold War, African political regimes found their sources of patronage severely contracted, which loosened their grip on patronage networks (Reno 2009; Schmidt 2013). Under these circumstances, where the state’s institutions of repression were used to quash political dissent (or competition from rivals), the possibility of creating the idea of a public good has been truncated (see Hawthorn 1991). A general understanding has taken root in the minds of many West African citizens of the state’s predatory nature. These dynamics solidify trust in private and informal networks of solidarity, as the state and its agents are viewed pejoratively: as armed criminals (see Utas 2012).

Interactions with international financial institutions (IFIs) also significantly contributed to a weakening of state institutions (Reno 1996; Bates 2008). Rapid industrialization was a priority for African governments after independence. They took a ‘hands-on’ approach to both macro and micro economic policy. IFIs lent significant funds to African states to support large-scale infrastructure projects. However, mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, the failure of grand infrastructure projects requiring regular up-keep and financial resources to remain functional, exogenous shocks like the 1973 oil crisis, and other factors combined to undermine state-led development.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, preferential access to state licenses and to state-owned enterprises became a source of

\textsuperscript{16} A UNODC (2005: 3-4) report on criminality in West Africa designates the 1970s, and in particular the 1973 oil crisis, as a watershed moment in the development of organized crime in the sub-region, even though other institutional and historical factors were present much earlier, notably inter-ethnic trading systems that are typical to the continent and foreign colonial rule.
political patronage for state technocrats who used the medium of the state for personal or political gain. The failure of these economic policies to produce their intended results brought criticism of African regimes and decreased political legitimacy. In order to bolster political support, regime elites continued using the state’s economic coffers to maintain clientelist networks, thus exacerbating the region’s economic and political outlook (see Berman 1998: 333-336).

Mounting external debt led African governments to turn to the World Bank and the IMF for economic support. In return for loans to stabilize the economies of individual states, IFIs made strict stipulations on how loan monies were to be spent (see Van de Walle 2001). Reforms involved loosening the grip of the debtor states on national economies through economic liberalization (removing price controls, removal of import quotas and lessening tariff rates, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, etc.), and reigning in spending on public services and currency manipulation. National citizenries (especially women) suffered the brunt of structural adjustment programmes as both the public sector and existing private sector employment experienced large-scale lay-offs. Public employees that did retain their jobs often experienced their government’s inability to regularly pay their salaries. While producing pockets of economic growth on the continent, especially around extraction enclaves, the general experience with structural adjustment has been economic decline, social disenfranchisement, and the slow decay of state institutions, notably in the service sector (Riddell 1992: 60-62; Zack-Williams 2013). These economic dislocations have exacerbated social exclusion, the marginalization of youth and less well-connected ethnic groups, and violent conflict on the continent. Loss of patronage in some circumstances (or for those without patrons, the loss of what paltry
services the state once provided) increased the allure of securing financial resources through informal economies, inter-continental migration, or through the use of violence (see Chabal and Daloz 1999: 81-87; WACD 2014: 12). Unlike for ordinary citizens, however, the economic reforms advocated by IFIs and western states also had the effect of tightening the hold of economic resources at the tops of the political echelons of West African states (see Bayart 2009: 225-226).

In a context of severe economic contraction and a weakening (or lack) of state institutions, being able to secure access to financial resources is of profound political importance. Since local economic production in Africa has stagnated until recently, financial resources from global and informal sources have taken on increasing importance. Numerous African governors jockey for socio-political positions that will enable them to practice transnational gatekeeping because this will enable control over resources with which they can control patronage (see Cooper 2002: 157; Ellis 2011). To be recognized and distinguished as a central node in a transnational network of clientelism enhances the symbolic capital of African governors because they are seen as individuals who validate multiple interventions on the continent, from public and private, licit and illicit social forces. This opens up policy options for African governors that may not be available to their competitors and rivals.

For example, Reno has shown how commercially-savvy African leaders employ “conscious strategies that will secure links to the global economy”, sometimes at the expense of strong state institutions (Reno 1996: 15). Many African governors have drawn significant sums of monetary support from international firms during times of official aid austerity by using their recognized sovereign status as a gateway to guarantee continued
access for those firms that are willing to operate in areas experiencing violent insurgency, substituting diplomatic channels of aid for commercial ones tacitly supported by donor governments (Reno 2001: 208-214). As chapter four demonstrates with regard to the illicit economies of trafficking and ransom in the Sahel, former leaders of armed rebellions in Niger, for example like Mohamed Akotey, have positioned themselves as mediators employed by transnational firms in order to garner support from northern Sahelian populations. When French citizens and AREVA mining company employees were taken hostage by criminal networks and sold to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Akotey was called upon by Nigerien President, Mahamadou Issoufou, to secure their release as requested by French Presidents Nicholas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande. Akotey’s recognized position as a transnational gatekeeper and link between multiple illicit actors, mining giant AREVA, and the Nigerien and French states, made possible by Issoufou’s authority as president, increased his symbolic capital and authority over transnational security matters in the Sahel and North Africa. Furthermore, his expertise in the local particularities of illicit economies of the Sahel has guaranteed his inclusion to consult global governance actors in security governance arrangements for this politically fluid and risk-laden space.

The extraverted practice of transnational gatekeeping is not only kept to official and diplomatic purposes in Africa, as this last example demonstrates. Agents of African states may simultaneously be accruing multiple and diverse sources of economic and political support that could be operating at cross purposes and governance norms. While Western state and IO actors lobby government ministers in West Africa to implement international norms, practices, and standard operating procedures, for example, these
ministers might be simultaneously negotiating terms for the entry and stockpiling of cocaine on state territory with Latin American criminal organizations (see Africa Confidential 2011; Utas 2012: 5-6; Vigh 2012; Shaw 2015). What is important to recognize is that the extraverted practice of transnational gatekeeping is done in such a way so as to generate or maintain forms of capital that will enable the recognition of an individual’s authority in political and economic matters “according to their scale and to the means at their disposal” (Bayart et. al. 1999: xvi). As such, African governors evaluate sources of support and benefits of the recognition of their authority that these sources afford in an equal opportunity way, no matter its social or geographic provenance. They then pursue strategies that are contingent on their priorities and interests and the continuation of their recognized status, as much as possible.

*Assemblages of Security Intervention in West Africa*

Spaces of intervention in West Africa provide a unique look into the contests over the governance of borderless threats in practice, questions of authority related to matters of security, and the practices of extraversion that are utilized to safeguard that authority and convert it into rule over competing actors at the local scale of intervention. The assemblages of intervention that are produced through complex interactions between several competing social forces reconfigures political order across domestic spaces and connects them to new spatial scales. These assemblages also complicate the distinctions that have traditionally guided our understanding of modern politics, like the local vs. the global, the public vs. the private, and the state vs. the non-state. Assemblages of intervention complicate the interveners vs. the intervened distinction.
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011: ch. 4-5) demonstrate in their analysis of global security assemblages operating in Africa that security’s public and private actors cannot be so easily distinguished. Instead, they show how new forms of governance are being produced between public and private security actors, which blurs and reconfigures the public/private distinction, and which yields sometimes contradictory effects on state authority and power. Berndtsson and Stern also show how public and private actors recast those neat distinctions and in so doing reframe the terms of “legitimate power, knowledge, and authority in the Stockholm-Arlanda security assemblage” revealing “the inadequacy of maintaining sharp lines of distinction between public and private security provision and governance” (2011: 422-432).

Within spaces of intervention, multiple sets of actors compete over a specific object of governance, like security. Due to the borderless features of non-traditional security threats, spaces of intervention become key sites of contestation over how and where to govern these threats effectively, or for some whether this should be done at all. In West Africa, for example, the security and policing services of national states, police and security officials representing foreign governments or international organizations, private security companies and risk consultancies, and local protection ‘vigilantes’ or ‘militias’ interact over how to deal with drug trafficking. Far from being a technical issue, however, sets of interested security actors contest the meanings, practices, and implications of tackling such a borderless threat.

The question of the scale of governance by which this ought to be accomplished is a key concern for actors in spaces of intervention (see Hameri and Jones 2015a). Sets of actors will articulate distinct interests in how to govern based on the specific scale at
which they are accustomed to operating, and which best safeguards a continuation of meeting those interests. Security actors representing IOs like INTERPOL or UNODC make claims for the need to involve regional actors, or to create intercontinental governance mechanisms to prevent the shipment of narcotics. However, specific strategies of accomplishing their tasks and the safeguard of their vision for governance may contradict or confront the efforts of the governing administrations of their IOs based elsewhere, or of other institutional groupings within those organizations that do not share the same vision of governance. This is also the case for the efforts of foreign police and other security liaisons stationed abroad. In their attempts to conduct transnationalized policing cooperation in spaces of intervention, their efforts may be positioned against related security institutions who propose alternative ways of accomplishing these tasks, other scales or geographic locations more concordant to their ways of doing, and the maintenance of their control over resources and power.

Coalitions of actors from these states, state sectors, and institutions disassemble from strictly national forms and practices of operation, and become reassembled to operate at simultaneously global and local scales of action that couple their new responsibilities and outlooks with like-minded actors from IOs, NGOs, or transnational firms. The Global Container Control Programme (CCP) examined in chapter six is an apt example. It brings together UNODC actors, World Customs Organization actors, state customs representatives, port officials, global shipping firm representatives, and security risk consultancies, in complex interactions over the governance of security of global shipping. Their operations are transterritorial deployments (Latham 2001). Their activities de-link threats and their security governance from strictly national settings, and
reframe them in de-bounded, transversal ways that span multiple scales (Aas 2012: 238-239). Nevertheless, these actors all seek to safeguard their interests in a rapidly changing environment, and recognize the political stakes of losing in such a venture. As such, they compete over how to govern borderless threats, and who should be involved in this process.

Being recognized as an authorized claimant in the governance process of such an intervention is a crucial question. The authority of some actors bears more importance than others. This recognition is a function of the competition over material and symbolic resources (forms of capital) that are used to consolidate one’s position to participate in the governance of a security arrangement like the CCP. It is the competition over recognition of authority status that gives significant social weight to an actor’s arguments over the question of scales of governance. Specific scalar arrangements will reflect the power, practices and interests of actors that can dominate this field of struggle and define the contours of its criteria of evaluation: its doxa. The connected sites where the CCP operates as an object of governance, therefore, become assembled spaces of authority competition, frustration, tension, and even animosity due to the fluid and contingent nature of shifting relationships of power within this global security assemblage. Since multiple, shifting coalitions of governance actors compete over how and where to govern borderless threats, the ‘intervener’ category is severely challenged.

Spaces of intervention are not empty. They are politically and socially dense spaces of local interaction. Actors permanently residing in spaces of intervention have particular understandings of politics, security, appropriate social behaviour, and the role of the state. These actors are not a uniform mass of individuals, however. Spaces of
intervention are constituted by multiple coalitions of local actors seeking to defend and maintain their social positions, material interests, authority, and ways of doing. The way that their interactions with the sets of intervening actors engaged in interventions will evolve will be contingent on the maintenance of their situated interests, and in favour of the scale that best defends them.

In spaces of intervention considered politically fragile, the governance of borderless threats will result in disassembly and reassembly of particular security institutions recognized as valid, capable stakeholders in transnational security. Sets of intervening actors advocate for this process, and bring the regulatory mechanisms and material inducements at their disposal to see the process through. The practices and orientations of some of the state security institutions stationed in the national setting will be disassembled from their national scale of operations, and reassembled and coupled with global partners. Security institutions and bodies that are not reassembled and connected to global structures of security governance will contest this process, as their political importance and the material resources that it entails will be diminished. The local field of security, therefore, is constituted by sets of authorized security actors competing over forms of capital that enable them to be involved in security governance. The practices of sets of intervening actors amplifies the contestation over recognition within local fields, since operating with a global orientation and with global partners will mean access to the acquisition of additional material and symbolic resources from these sources.

As evidenced in Chapter five’s examination of the rivalries amongst Senegal’s internal security institutions over international security training, some actors are
recognized by intervening actors as key stakeholders in the governance of drug trafficking, or illegal migration (see Andersson 2014b; Frowd 2014). Crucially, intervening actors are not participants of national fields of struggle: a French police liaison team is not a rival of the Senegalese national drug police, OCRTIS. Nevertheless, the recognition by French police liaisons of OCRTIS enhances the authority of the latter, which repositions them in relation to Senegalese Gendarmes or Customs units also tasked with investigating drug trafficking and other related borderless threats like money-laundering. In this conceptualization, relatively separate, autonomous security fields overlap and are interdependent due to the ways they become connected through the multisited scalar features of assemblages of security intervention.17 This makes them global spaces of structured competition, as authorized actors contest the processes of rescaling security governance.

Due to Africa’s historical mode of dependence on global structures and forces, many actors at the local scale of spaces of intervention attempt to frame how they are the best and most qualified at facilitating intervention and the rescaling of state institutions. For example, they might show how they have transnational connections that will make newly-created security institutions run smoothly, and be accepted by groups affected by the introduction of new security governance arrangements. Being recognized as having these qualities involves practices of extraversion, where political elites “employ their dependent relationship with the external world to appropriate resources and authority in order to establish or reinforce their power over domestic competitors” (Peiffer and Englebert 2012: 361).

17 For a similar view but utilizing the concept of ‘weak fields’, see Vauchez 2011.
In the assemblages of security intervention examined here, three key practices of extraversion are used by sets of local political and security actors to foster the recognition of governance authority: mobilizing a discourse of vulnerability to borderless threats coupled with a discourse of willingness to counter them through an ability to deliver on security governance efforts; the mastery of insider knowledge used to provide intervening actors with information framed by one’s situated interests and understanding of the threat; and the practice of transnational gatekeeping which governs access to the local resources and networks of individuals that are required to accomplished governance efforts in a space of intervention. These practices of extraversion are utilized in order to acquire forms of capital that will be used to consolidate rule at the scale in which individual or coalitions of actors seek to dominate. This means that some local actors may lobby for involvement in the disassembly and reassembly of the state to be connected to some global actors instead of others, should the latter best advance the former’s social position. Conversely, it may also mean that the authority of alternative governance actors is recognized that severely contest the rescaling of state security institutions, as this may damage their financial and political interests. Moreover, as circumstances change, the strategies and practices of extraversion used by local governance actors in spaces of intervention will adapt and be reoriented to new and contingent circumstances. As multiple actors located at the local scale of intervention will position themselves to best safeguard or enhance their interests and authority in relation to their competitors and multiple sets of global actors, the category of ‘the intervened’ is radically complicated.
Conclusion

Assemblages introduce “a radical notion of multiplicity into phenomena which we traditionally approach as being discretely bounded, structured and stable” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 608). It enables us to outline newly emerging political reconfigurations that complicate traditional categories of modern politics like the state, authority, intervention, the public or private spheres, and licit or illicit economic activities. Analyzing these reconfigurations involves taking into account the specificities of the assemblages of intervention themselves, their production, the relationships and struggles of its actors, the political stakes involved in their operation, and the contingent processes that can combine in situated, novel and distinctive ways. It is a theoretical framework that can explain and identify, as Abrahamsen and Williams argue (2011), the types of interactions operative in new geographies of power, how its actors come to relate to each other and assess each other’s authority in security matters, and how they develop their understandings of these political categories.

This theoretical framework will now be employed to examine the assemblages of security intervention for governing drug trafficking in West Africa according to three of the sub-region’s general entry points: by land; by air; and by sea.
Security governance against transnational criminality in the Sahel does not conform to notion of the state based on the Weberian ideal type. Over the last fifteen years, the Sahelian region has witnessed a rapid proliferation of transnational and regional governance initiatives to pragmatically tackle transnational criminality in these vast ‘ungoverned’ spaces. Initiatives draw together a wide range of political actors representing numerous scales of governance: governments of West and North Africa; African regional organizations; international institutions and IOs like the EU, United Nations bodies, INTERPOL, and IFIs; many Western donor states; and a wide range of non-state, private, and informal actors. Conflicts, negotiations, and accommodations over new forms of security governance, and the new security practices and logics they entail, span and connect sites and procedures of decision-making across the globe.

Attempts to rescale security governance to better deal with transnational threats like drug trafficking are significantly challenged by two crucial factors: first, global security experts and capacity-builders compete over the delivery of their programmes – how, with whom, and by which means – within spaces of intervention. ‘Coordination’ between international actors in the Sahel is shorthand for competition.

Second, global discourses about the risk of Sahel’s ungoverned spaces create significant and prestigious security rents for state leaders, as well as meso-level agents and bureaucrats of its security institutions. The introduction of these security rents has resulted in forms of transnational security clientelism, which leads to potent conflicts in local security fields over the international provision of equipment, the symbolic returns tied to international trainings, and other forms of capital.
These two factors significantly shape how authority is generated and maintained in security matters. International forms of capital are used to consolidate authority to retain continued involvement and dominance in shaping the state’s security priorities, and to enhance the social standing and personal enrichment of individuals that accumulate them. The large-scale influx of initiatives, and its resultant confusion and conflict for actors in the transnational field of capacity-building opens multiple avenues to politico-security elites of Sahelian countries to engage in practices of extraversion.

To do make these arguments, the chapter makes four moves. First, it maps out and examines the crowded and fragmented sites composing the international capacity-building field operating in the Sahel. Second, it analyzes the politics of contestation surrounding the delivery of governance initiatives between international capacity-builders. The third section shows how fragmentation and conflict marking the field of capacity-building provides the political and security elites of the region new options to engage in practices of extraversion, and how these practices are subverted by security governance recipients. The fourth section shows how international forms of capital that global security experts introduce to Sahelian security fields spike their competitive dynamics, complicating how capacity-building initiatives unfold in practice.

**The crowded international security field in the Sahelian belt**

The number of global security experts currently operating in the Sahel, or on the Sahel but from national capitals, is staggering in terms of its scale. This trend is not only the result of the most recent military intervention by the French military in January 2013, or the establishment of the United Nations’ Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) established July of that year. Focusing solely on the
development of the French and UN military interventions in Mali obscures the consequences of the more widespread and commonplace capacity-building programmes and the seemingly innocuous practices of intervention that they entail for Sahelian countries. A much wider set of international actors are involved, whose practices and impacts on Sahelian political and security actors should be analyzed. More common, small-scale interventions constitute important openings for security governance and clientelism to be transnationalized in the Sahel.

Many authors insist, for example, that the French SERVAL military intervention in Mali took at least a year of French lobbying of the United States, the UN, and European Union partners to have these other actors shake off their intervention “malaise” to become more engaged in the likelihood of a military intervention (Marchal 2013: 490-493; Erforth 2015). Charbonneau and Sears have argued that “if the ‘liberal peace’ seeks to unite the world under its hegemonic agenda, it was in no hurry to bring Mali back into the fold in 2012” (2014: 196). Military intervention in Mali was indeed not initially palatable for many international actors. Capacity-building initiatives, however, have been extremely so. An over-zealous focus on military intervention to re-establish state control in Mali neglects to acknowledge the multiple security governance initiatives that have been implemented there, and in neighbouring states, most of which are geared toward governing borderless threats. The overt focus on military intervention also neglects the profound effects that statebuilding interventions have had on beneficiary institutions that accept international projects, and the local practices of extraversion that they enable.

The multiplication and spread of statebuilding interventions in the Sahel has been steadily increasing for over a decade and has only culminated in response to on-going
political-security crises in Mali. The United States, the European Union, INTERPOL, UNODC, France, Spain, Denmark, Canada, and others have all introduced security initiatives in Sahelian countries aimed at strengthening the capacities of their justice and security sectors against transnational organized crime, some as early as 2003, if not earlier. These have included statebuilding projects of police decentralization, border security, counter-terrorism, counter transnational organized crime, counter violent extremism, peacebuilding, human rights, and governance and the rule of law.

French governments have maintained significant political relationships with its former colonies in security matters since the independence period. Since decolonization, its security relationships with African political leaders have been informed by a personalized and nepatrimonial logic, which connected a wide network of individuals on the continent to high-level French authorities from both the public and private sectors (see Médard 1997; 2005: 30-31; Renou 2002: 9-10).

Throughout the 1990s, domestic economic pressures pushed French politicians to reform these opaque, networked political relationships. Financial support in the form of bi-lateral funding for African countries dropped significantly throughout the 1990s (see Conte 1994; Verschave 1994). During this period, French governments ended conscription, professionalized its armed forces, and reduced its national defence budget (Marchal 1998: 360). To do so, the French government headed by President Chirac intended to reduce its presence in Africa, and to reduce its troop levels by 40% by 2000 (Utley 2002: 134-135).

French demands for African reform, and the reform of its own political and military structures, however, do not mean that support of African political elites was
diminished. Successive French governments continued to support autocratic political leaders, with reforms appearing to be only cosmetic in nature (Renou 2002: 24). Throughout the 1990s to the present, French governments have been lax in support of democratic reform, and according to some authors, have been directly complicit in undermining democratic processes in Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger (Chafer 2002; Charbonneau 2008). Economically, French decision-makers have continued support of political elites that were pro-France, sometimes through funding via multilateral forums, in particular via the European Union (Marchal 1998: 358; Renou 2002: 15-16; Médard 2005: 35-37). France’s military capabilities and the formation of national rapid reaction forces made permanent bases on the continent less necessary than smaller, ad-hoc stations, which means that French military support of African governments remains significant (Renou 2002: 20).\(^\text{18}\)

France has also consistently maintained a transnational network of French and African politico-economic and military elites in order to maintain its influence in Africa. This has been accomplished through small-scale, recurrent, and widespread intervention practices such as military training exchanges in France and in Africa, or by embedding French civil servants within African ministries of defense and interior. French governments continue their financial support of many African militaries, and back their involvement in complex peace operations under the aegis of the African Union or the UN (Taylor 2010a: 57-58; Charbonneau and Chafer 2012: 276-279). Charbonneau (2008) has

\(^{18}\) Interview, French military officer, 25 July 2012, Ouagadougou; Interview, French military officer, 12 April 2013, Bamako; Interview, Senior French Diplomat, 22 April 2013, Niamey.
gone so far as to dub France’s post-Cold War political conduct for the continent as a “new imperialism”.

France’s establishment of the Service de Coopération Technique Internationale de Police (SCTIP), refurbished 1 January 2011 as the Direction de la Coopération Internationale (DCI), solidified its privileged security relationships with African governments in matters of law enforcement. The SCTIP was created in December 1961 to provide France’s former colonies with continued development of security institutions after independence. In the 1980s, this service rapidly expanded to other areas of the globe. Like the SCTIP, DCI actors implement international cooperation of the French National Police and Gendarmerie abroad, and formalize the network of police liaisons representing the French Minister of the Interior in diplomatic missions. Its objectives are to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to bilateral partners, operational support, intelligence gathering in criminal investigations, and logistical support for criminal justice activities taking place in France (Chevrel and Masseret 2005: 60-61). Delegations of these police liaisons and capacity-builders have been present in Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Niger since May 1959 (Tiquet 2013: 53-55). As of June 2014, there are eleven DCI representatives based in Senegal; five DCI

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20 The French Gendarmerie has operated within France under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior since May 2002. Abroad, there is significant coordination between the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the activities of gendarme officers within the DCI. However, the Ministry of the Interior tends to pull its weight amongst the three ministries regarding DCI activities, including those led by Gendarmerie officers abroad (Interview, senior French security official, 17 July 2012, Ouagadougou; interview, Senior French Security Official 14 August 2012, Dakar; for a brief history of the international activities of the French Gendarmerie, see Chevrel and Masseret 2005).
representatives based in Mali;\textsuperscript{21} seven DCI representatives based in Niger; and seven DCI representatives based in Burkina Faso.\textsuperscript{22} The historical relationships developed during the colonial period have made French security and statebuilding activities profoundly important in West Africa.

While significant, French security officials are not the only players in this game, nor are they necessarily the most important. Several other international partners implement capacity-building programmes in Sahelian countries. Each draws on their agency’s or state’s perceived strengths, programming niche, or preferred issue area in designing and implementing programmes under the general umbrella of strengthening the security institutions of recipient states, and to foster trans-regional cooperation.

Since 2008, for example, German cooperation has implemented a number of capacity-building projects with the objective of strengthening the national police forces of Chad, Mauritania, and Niger (see GIZ 2014). The thematic focus of these projects has been border security, scientific and technical investigatory methods, and police/project management for national directorates (CoE 2013a). German components within UN-MINUSMA have also committed to provide police training under the UN mission mandate.\textsuperscript{23} Prior to 2010, Danish officials have made committed efforts to implement

\textsuperscript{21} Turnover in late 2014 has made this number smaller than what has been the case for the DCI in Mali over the last ten years; phone interview, French DCI officer based in Bamako, 2 March 2015.

\textsuperscript{22} There are 22 DCI Delegations across the continent (Interview, senior French DCI official, Niamey, 29 April 2013). While there are seven DCI officers in Burkina Faso, two of these are fire fighters that implement training for Burkina Faso Fire Service.

\textsuperscript{23} Personal e-mail communication to the author from a Senior German Defense official based at the German Embassy in Bamako, 26 September 2013.
counter-organized crime and rule of law capacity-building programmes in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.24

Spanish police liaisons have been posted since the early 2000s at embassies in Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.25 The majority of Spain’s security agreements, training programmes, and operational actions with Sahelian governments have focused on stemming clandestine migration from West Africa towards the Canary Islands. The Spanish Guardia Civil has provided training and equipment to Senegalese, Mauritanian, Malian, and Nigerien gendarmes in border control through the West Sahel Project financed by the European Union (CoE 2013b; Frowd 2014; Andersson 2014b).26 The priority of combatting clandestine migration has meant that the bulk of Spanish security-related capacity-building personnel and attention occurs with security forces from countries of the Atlantic coast. Security forces from interior states like Mali and Niger, however, do participate in Spanish training initiatives, even when this means flying officers from Bamako or Niamey to Dakar for regional training workshops.27 Small teams of Spanish police and Guardia Civil liaisons are based in Bamako and Niamey in addition to Dakar. While there is a thematic focus on stopping migrants from crossing by boat to Spanish territory, from the viewpoint of the Council of the European Union, Spanish, and other international partners, the establishment of a comprehensive border control system

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24 Interview, DANIDA official, 11 April 2013, Bamako; Interview, DANIDA official, 25 April 2013, Niamey.
25 The first Spanish Police Liaison officials began operating in Senegal in 2002. Interview, two senior Spanish Police officials in Dakar, 13 September 2012. The Spanish Liaison based at the embassy in Bamako is responsible for Spanish internal security cooperation undertaken with the government of Burkina Faso.
26 The West Sahel Project ran between January 2011 and March 2013. Still, training is implemented when possible by Spanish Police Liaisons in the target countries (Interview, two Spanish police officials, Bamako, 16 April 2013.
27 Spanish police official, 17 April 2013, Bamako.
will have a direct impact on limiting drug trafficking through the Sahel (CoE 2013c). Spanish security cooperation, therefore, is significant, if not extensive in the Sahel’s interior regions (see Davis 2015: 265).

In keeping with the 2003 security strategy, the EU has also entered the field of security in Sahelian countries. Following the endorsement of the EEAS Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (EEAS 2011) by the European Council in July 2011, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has undertaken two civilian missions (one mission each for Mali and Niger), and a mission funded by the EU’s Instrument for Stability (IfS) called the Counter-Terrorism in the Sahel Project (CT-Sahel). The security strategy stresses that in order to prevent transversal threats like organized crime from harming Europe “the first line of defence will often be abroad” and requires the need to “be ready to act before a crisis occurs” (EU 2003: 7).

The EUCAP-Sahel Niger mission began in July 2012 with a main objective to enable Nigerien security institutions to implement their national security and development strategy, to provide regional coordination for international capacity-building measures undertaken in the country, and to provide training in methods to combat common security problems (CoE 2012). By providing training, mentoring, advice and assistance, EUCAP-Sahel seeks to strengthen the law enforcement and crisis management capacities of the internal security forces to tackle borderless threats like terrorism and organized crime with a view to enhance the regions’ political stability.

The Mali mission, EUCAP-Sahel Mali, is in many ways an extension of the Niger mission. It operates with roughly the same objectives, but is also tasked with the reform of the Malian security sector and to help re-establish the authority of the Malian
central state over its entire territory (CoE 2014a). The mission is also tasked with coordinating their efforts with those of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), which is tasked with training Malian Armed Forces battalions, MINUSMA, and other international actors on the ground. Staff from the EUCAP Sahel missions are drawn primarily from the EU member states and EEAS employees, but since Niger and Mali are both francophone countries, France and Belgium provide the highest number of staff.

Lastly, since 2003, the United States has been actively implementing capacity-building measures with the introduction and completion of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, and this project’s conversion into the multi-year on-going Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSTCP). The programme covers ten countries in North Africa and the Sahel: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. TSTCP’s primary objective is to build long-term counter-terrorism capacity of the internal security sectors of partner countries, including specialized units of the armed forces. Counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism programming has undergirded the majority of the TSTCP capacity-building projects for the Sahelian countries. Nonetheless, officers from a wide range of specialized units of the internal security forces, including counter-narcotics or Customs criminal investigations units, participate in US-led training. TSTCP trainers and recipients interviewed averred that multiple types of law enforcement officials ought to participate in training to produce inter-agency synergies in response to the inter-connected dealings, strategies and potential partnerships of

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28 Interview, two EUCAP-Sahel officials, 15 April 2013, Bamako.
29 The EUTM was launched on 18 February 2013 (CoE 2013a).
30 Interview, three EUCAP-Sahel Niger officials, 25 April 2013, Niamey.
trafficking networks and armed Islamist groups operating in the Sahelian belt.\textsuperscript{31} Alongside TSTCP programming, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) also implements law enforcement capacity-building with a specific thematic focus on countering drug trafficking throughout the region. AFRICOM partners also actively participate in regional drug law enforcement harmonization, for example by providing legal expertise for the Dakar Initiative.\textsuperscript{32}

There are also capacity-building activities that are purposefully hidden from the view of the Western governments and IOs that normally take on these tasks, to their pointed frustration. For example, capacity-building exercises and the provision of equipment, funds, and international police and military exchanges occur through bilateral arrangements between governments of Sahelian countries and Algeria, Morocco and elsewhere that are \textit{expressly not coordinated} with the efforts of ‘the usual suspects’ of statebuilding in sub-region.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to these capacity-building activities, individual agents of the internal security forces of the Sahel are selected from specialized drug enforcement, rapid

\textsuperscript{31} Interview, Senior Burkina Faso DST officer, 8 July 2012, Ouagadougou; interview, two Burkina Faso officers from the national Gendarmerie’s Investigatory unit Drug Section, 31 July 2012, Ouagadougou; interview, 3 Malian PIGN officers, 15 April 2013, Bamako; interview, three Nigerien SCLCT officers, 23 April 2013, Niamey; interview, CCLAD official, 24 April 2013, Niamey; Interview, senior US TSCTP official, 10 June 2013, Washington DC; interview, senior US Regional Security official, 10 June 2013, Washington DC.

\textsuperscript{32} Participant Observation in Dakar Initiative Law Enforcement Pillar meetings, Dakar, 10-12 September 2012; interview, AFRICOM official, 11 September 2012, Dakar; interview, AFRICOM official, and US State Department Official, 27 April 2013, Niamey.

\textsuperscript{33} The frustration at the opaque nature of the capacity-building efforts of North African states in particular was a theme that resurfaced in several interviews conducted with French police liaisons working at embassies in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
reaction, and counter-terrorism units for training exchanges abroad in Turkey, Ghana, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, France, the United States, Canada, and even as far as Japan.\footnote{Finding agents that had been sent for training abroad from among these specialized units was a regular occurrence over the fieldwork conducted. For example, lists of graduates from specialized counter-terrorism and drug trafficking training courses are posted in framed class certificates on the walls of several corridors of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana. With copies of these lists, I later interviewed several of the individuals that had participated in these trainings in visits to Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali.}

Other IOs like the World Bank, UNDP, UNODC and INTERPOL are active in the capacity-building field as well, and regularly provide regional workshops, training projects, policing materials, and several regional interoperability law enforcement platforms in such issue-areas as drug trafficking, human rights, judicial cooperation, anti-money laundering, human trafficking, etc. Private consultancies and companies sent to Sahelian countries to assess the efficacy, adaptability and management of capacity-building projects are also frequently in the field. IOs operating in the Sahel, along with other Western governments (like Belgium, Italy, Norway, Switzerland),\footnote{For Norwegian involvement and funding in Mali following the SERVAL intervention, see Francis 2013: 8-9.} also sub-contract work to security think-tanks, NGOs and local civil society organizations to provide information, analysis, and general conflict knowledge regarding threats that are prevalent in the Sahel in order to inform policy makers.\footnote{For analysis on the International Crisis Group’s role in the development of conflict knowledge, see Third World Quarterly volume 35 issue 4, Special Issue, “Knowledge Production in Conflict: the International Crisis Group.”} For example, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) think-tank, based in South Africa, the NGO International Alert, the US-funded Centre for African Strategic Studies, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), and many others also conduct regular security-related training workshops for the agents of the internal security services of the region. One would be hard pressed not to
find some security-related conference, week-long training project, workshop, or new capacity-building initiative unveiled by an international actor, on a monthly, at times even bi-weekly basis, in Bamako, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, and especially Dakar (European Commission 2014a: 134).

This cursory mapping of international actors and the capacity-building programming they have conducted since the early 2000s provides only some of the major brush strokes of the field of capacity-building intervention in Sahelian countries. Mapping the activities and initiatives that are on-going is incredibly complicated. Not including the EUTM or MINUSMA, at least 122 capacity-building projects and programmes were operating across the region by the end of 2013 alone: 16 programmes in Burkina Faso; 37 in Mali; 21 in Mauritania; 14 in Niger; 10 in Senegal and 23 operating in multiple countries across the region (see ibid.: 53). Poor visibility and advertising of statebuilding projects, however, means that the actual number of projects involving the security and justice sectors of Sahelian countries is probably much higher. The transnational field of security in the Sahel is thus very crowded.

Field dynamics of international capacity-building interventions in the Sahel

The configuration of field positions and animosities are contingent upon historical relationships. The influence of actors in the field of capacity-building for the Sahel, and the recognition of their authority and expertise, depends on historical and diplomatic relationships developed in the sub-region. But as important as this is, historical

37 Interviews with three security consultants, one from Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), two from Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2013, Niamey. The number of activities in Senegal was admittedly much higher than those indicated in their analysis, especially since Dakar’s infrastructural capacities make the city a draw for international capacity-builders seeking to conduct training workshops, and hold meetings for cross-regional governance initiatives.
experience must be matched by the capacity to mobilize forms of symbolic and material
capital in their interactions with other global security experts, and Sahelian counterparts.
An understanding of an actor’s experience in security matters and the accrual of their
trust by African recipients structure the field of security capacity-building in the Sahel.
The recognition of authority of actors undertaking security capacity-building hinges on
these two forms of symbolic power.

In this respect, French capacity-building officials maintain a high-level of
credibility and political clout in their security relationships in the sub-region and among
international capacity-builders. French military capacity, and ability to politically
influence governments in West Africa is preponderant, derived from its postcolonial
relationships with its former colonies (Renou 2002: 6-7). DCI officials in particular are
recognized as law enforcement authorities and key interlocutors within the international
capacity-building community present in locations of intervention in the Sahel. Their long-
term historical experience with African security officials, and knowledge of many
specific details regarding borderless threats that are understood to emanate from this
region, is nearly universally recognized by international capacity-builders. The historical
pattern of mentoring African security forces by residing in the capitals of West African
countries, and maintaining regular (if not daily) contact with their Nigerien, Malian,
Burkinabe, counterparts, provides them with a credibility of knowledge that is arguably
unmatched in the field of capacity-building intervention.

By developing advisory relationships with national law enforcement agents, DCI
liaisons officers interviewed believe the substance of their work is more in tune with the
local realities of security ‘on the ground’ than that of other international actors. For
example, a senior DCI official in Ouagadougou explained that border security in the country is significantly shaped by animist practices of local communities in frontier regions that significantly influenced Burkinabe border guards: “of the eleven official border crossings of the country, three in the east were not controlled by state actors in 2011 because the local communities insisted these places were cursed by evil spirits. How are other international police going to know this when they aren’t here? We know African mentalities.”38 Similar assessments were made by DCI based in Senegal: “We have been told, in all sincerity, that suspects have escaped police custody because they can run through walls. Our partners do not have much experience in this type of mentality.”39 Capacity-building experience, and ‘knowing’ African police mentalities, is argued to enhance DCI credibility and to give them recognized expertise.

A key aspect of this expertise is the act of trying to foster a respectful relationship with national law enforcement agents while simultaneously maintaining a significant degree of distrust of their policing abilities, knowledges and values. This balancing act translates into the practice of ‘following up’: routinely monitoring the activities of African counterparts. DCI liaisons (attempt to) meet on a daily basis, preferably in the morning, with the senior official(s) of their national counterparts in the Police, National Guard, or Gendarmerie forces.40 During these meetings, the DCI liaison briefs security officials on any on-going investigations, upcoming training given by French security cooperation, and to offer their advisory services regarding the organization and functions

38 Interview, French DCI official, 20 July 2012, Ouagadougou.
39 Interview, French DCI official, 8 August 2012, Dakar.
40 Participant observation, Bamako, 22 April 2013; interview, French DCI, 9 August 2012, Dakar; interview, French DCI, 26 January 2013, Dakar; Interview, senior French security official, 15 April, 2013, Bamako.
of the internal security services. But the routine of meeting regularly amounts to more than a functional arrangement aimed at sharing relevant information between law enforcement agents. Built into the ethos of DCI work is a belief of the need to provide mentorship to African police, and reflects France’s historical and institutional connections with its former colonies in matters of security. DCI liaisons recognize and are quick to indicate their expertise in not only knowing, but also knowing how to manage “African police mentalities.” Such management practices include always displaying signs of deference like saluting, working through the networks of security officials, knowing about their religious leanings, and providing them with small gifts like phone cards to distribute to officers under their stewardship. As much as these practices may diffuse tension between DCI and local security officials, these ‘partnerships’ are informed by a lack of trust in the professional capacities and social leanings of the latter. One DCI interlocutor maintained, “They feel like we are constantly looking over their shoulders. They work hard, but not smart. We have to teach them otherwise we will experience threats back home.” Relationships between the DCI liaisons and Sahelian security counterparts are a function of surveillance as much they are of training, since recipients of advisory relationships rarely advise DCI officers on how to practice security. Even if DCI officers have significant capacity-building experience in the Sahel, therefore, their practices tend to reduce the trust of Sahelian counterparts, which means that their symbolic capital is not unlimited (see Andersson 2014b).

41 Interview, French DCI, 22 April 2013, Bamako.
42 This was a recurrent theme in each of the interviews conducted with DCI Liaisons conducted in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal.
43 Interview, senior French DCI, 20 July 2012, Ouagadougou; interview, senior French DCI, 29 April 2013, Niamey.
44 Interview, senior French DCI, 22 April 2013, Bamako.
Newer arrivals to the Sahelian field of security capacity-building rely on the historical relationships the French have cultivated since the colonial era, and knowledge of the local security terrain that is banked by DCI Liaisons: they recognize their authority. Nevertheless, they challenge French dominance in the field of capacity-building, and maintain different approaches to secure the trust of recipient actors. This includes articulating to recipients of capacity-building how they pursue their objectives in legitimate ways that are not colonial but as international partners, thereby hinting at perceptions of France’s illegitimate interests in Africa (see Abrahamsen 2004). The fact new capacity-building actors are not French, and are therefore unencumbered by historical relationships premised in colonialism, enhance the symbolic credibility of new capacity-building actors in their interactions with Sahelian security and political officials. Their inclusion into the security field has the effect of producing and intensifying rivalries between international security experts.

Conversations with German, Danish, Spanish, Canadian, and US officials stressed the importance of needing to communicate their vision for implementing capacity-building projects with French embassy DCI officials upon their arrival to locations of intervention. Danish and German interlocutors, for example, recognize the authority of DCI officials in capacity-building efforts and knowledge of security concerns in the Sahel. These officials insisted that the practice of first communicating with French embassy officials was necessary in order to limit the duplication of effort between Western donor community actors on the ground. Gauging the French viewpoint was also crucial in developing a baseline for their own knowledge of the practices of local law enforcement actors, and initial knowledge of which partners they could trust and could benefit from
capacity-building measures. Moreover, being briefed on the security assessments and intelligence reports by DCI officials regarding the level of threat to the diplomatic community was argued as an essential practice for newly arrived statebuilders, at least until sufficient knowledge and an interpretation of local security conditions could be acquired on their own.45

Spanish recognition of DCI authority over capacity-building and security in the Sahel is even more prominent. Since sustained level of cooperation between Spanish liaisons and national partners in Sahelian countries is a relatively recent development, combined with severe budgetary constraints placed on Spanish cooperation with Mali and Niger, Spanish liaisons have looked to their French counterparts to better understand the dynamics underpinning existing relationships of security cooperation with Sahelian security institutions. For several Spanish security officials interviewed, Spain is really only “France’s poor cousin.”46 For this reason they argue that Spanish cooperation in Mali and Niger cannot be counted on to provide the same scale of statebuilding activities as the DCI. The Spanish embassy staffs in Mali and Niger are very small (only some 12-15 individuals). While Spanish police liaisons share DCI understandings of Europe’s vulnerability to borderless threats (illegal immigrants, drugs through West Africa but also directly from Latin America, and terrorism), there is only a minimum of what their cooperation with security institutions in Mali or Niger can practically accomplish. As a result, coordination with DCI, and joint participation in training exercises for Malian and

45 Interview, Danish diplomatic official, 12 April 2013, Bamako; interview, German military official 13 April 2013, Bamako; interview, DANIDA official, 25 April 2013, Niamey; interview, German GIZ official, and German capacity-building official, 3 May 2013, Niamey.
46 Interview, three senior Spanish police officials, Dakar, 13 September 2012; interview, two senior Spanish police officials, 16 April 2013, Bamako.
Nigerien occurs often. This is not to imply that if Spanish police liaisons were able to mobilize sufficient economic capital to perform more and larger capacity-building measures, that they would forego recognizing the DCI’s authority in these matters. Even where Spanish cooperation guarantees more substantial funding in line with its security priorities, for example Spain’s security cooperation with the governments of Senegal and Mauritania, they still regularly attempt to coordinate training efforts with DCI officers, learn from their stories, practices and strategies, and subsequently frame their interactions with recipient law enforcement officials to reflect this close relationship.

While newer capacity-building field actors recognize the authority of DCI and other French diplomatic officials, and many aspects of the latter’s understandings of threats present in the Sahel, they do not immediately comply with French demands, or follow their capacity-building strategies.

German and Danish officials stressed their involvement in the Sahel was derived from a genuine concern to tackle borderless threats before they arrived at European doorsteps in a less constrained, and more legitimate way than compared to their French counterparts. They stressed that their interventions are accomplished in comprehensive, technical ways that do not undermine African priorities, but compliments them (see DANIDA 2012; Kolb 2013). French historical and political relationships with Sahelian populations limit what they can do in capacity-building relationships in the Sahel. Germany and the Nordic states do not experience these limitations or a lack of trust since their international cooperation in the Sahel has historically been oriented towards development and humanitarian objectives, and preventive forms of conflict management.
(see Mehler 2002); not geopolitical ones like France’s history in the sub-region. Their relative newness and perceived legitimacy were argued to enable them to receive the trust of capacity-building recipients from Sahelian security institutions, making it possible to yield important intelligence regarding the nature of borderless threats, and how they should be countered.

Leveraging the discourse of comprehensive approaches to security and development is another way that German and Danish officials view their authority in capacity-building and security in the Sahel increased. They argued that French understandings of security do not sufficiently take into account the complex inter-related dynamics of development and security for Sahelian populations. More comprehensive approaches, for example those that emphasize countering the process of violent extremism and radicalization, conflict reconciliation among northern communities, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) for former rebel combatants, and general rule of law governance support are all areas that are missed by DCI capacity-builders, but are approaches in which their cooperation has excelled in West Africa. Importantly, German officials argued that such an approach compliments rule of law initiatives due to the transnational and mobile lifestyles of many Sahelian communities. If successful in their interventions, the regular patterns of mobility of Sahelian populations will present less of a risk than they currently do since cross-regional

47 While Nordic states are only more recently conducting capacity-building initiatives for Sahelian security institutions, their experience in humanitarian and peace-brokering activities in the Sahel date from the 1970s.
48 Interview, DANIDA official, 11 April 2013, Bamako; interview, DANIDA official, 25 April 2013, Niamey; Interview, German GIZ official, and German capacity-building official, 3 May 2013, Niamey.
forms of governance to prevent local radicalization and criminality will increase the security of northern communities.

Their ability to forge multilateral partnerships with IOs that do focus on such issues and which frame security sector reform as needing a comprehensive approach, like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and more recently UNODC, dons their efforts with a higher level of recognized legitimacy amongst recipients of their interventions (see Knudsen 2014 for Danish case). German capacity-builders in Mali pushed for operating through the EUTM, UNODC, MINUSMA, and other UN bodies to undertake security initiatives so that the legitimacy of their interventions is increased. With German support, UNODC has most recently conducted border control seminars in Bamako which brought together immigration, customs, and drug enforcement officers from Senegal, Mali, Togo and Ghana to focus on how to govern Sahelian borders (UNODC 2015). German police officers within MINUSMA have taken an active role through the framework of the mission, and maintain that multilateral forums are the most legitimate and effective means of rebuilding the Malian security institutions.

Articulating a different vision of security for the Sahel, and their regular participation in efforts in a multilateral way impels Danish and German policing experts to challenge French dominance in the field of security capacity-building. While they lack longer-term experience in countering borderless threats in the Sahel, by engaging in multilateral initiatives, ones that seek to involve broader coalitions of international and local actors in capacity-building, these newer entrants to the field of capacity-building intervention understand themselves to be building the trust of the recipients of
interventions, and thereby enhancing their authority and the acquisition of symbolic capital.

Not only does their self-perceived legitimacy in performing capacity-building initiatives provide them with symbolic credibility, the governments of Denmark and Germany are also widely viewed as most able amongst EU countries to mobilize funds for security-related capacity-building initiatives. Both of these states provided significant financial and logistical support for the MINUSMA precursor, the Africa-led International Support Mission for Mali, AFISMA, as well as pledging millions of euros to reconstruct the Malian state following the crisis (see Affa’a-Mindzie and Perry 2013; Rein 2014: 123). A former UNODC official present in Bamako stressed that counter-transnational organized crime initiatives and police capacity-building projects for Sahelian states conducted under the auspices of the EU are primarily funded by Germany and the Nordic states. The ability to pay when the need arises significantly contributes to the recognition of their authority over security matters in the sub-region, as recipients have realized that the Nordic countries and Germany are consistently more able to do so than France or Spain. Moreover, the lack of a colonial relationship with Sahelian governments also makes it easier for Danish and German actors to reduce funding should security priorities shift elsewhere. Danish and German capacity-builders can mobilize the required economic capital to pursue their activities in the Sahel, a fact which is begrudgingly recognized by French partners.

49 Interview, former UNODC official in Bamako, now aid consultant, 19 April 2013.
50 Interview, U.S. Department of State official, 10 June 2013, Washington DC; interview, German military official 13 April 2013, Bamako; interview, French Foreign Policy Researcher, 3 December 2014, Duisberg.
US capacity-building experts from the Department of State, Defense, and AFRICOM share a similar outlook regarding the authority of their French counterparts. While the French and US militaries have created mutually beneficial arrangements in conducting counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel based on their comparative advantages in military combat (see Tinti 2014; Lewis 2014a), capacity-building initiatives between the two countries have not been complimentary, but conflictual. DCI officials stressed their frustration with US capacity-building experts from AFRICOM and Washington, and viewed the latter as interlopers in the Sahel. One DCI official stressed that US capacity-building undermines their own work since “the Americans come, provide training, give large amounts of equipment, and then leave.” The US practice is in stark contrast to how DCI officials pursue long-term advisory relationships with African law enforcement officials. The long-term experience that French security officials have developed, according to him, was not recognized by US capacity-builders. For this interlocutor, their short-term emphasis does not sufficiently take into account the need to mentor the security forces, and that these quick trips to the Sahel to provide training only frustrate France’s long-term efforts, since recipient actors will take advantage of these different capacity-building practices.

51 The US military has provided military drone and satellite intelligence to the French military leadership for the on-going counter-terrorism operation Barkhane, and has used its transport planes and refueling tankers to aid French troops (see Hicks 2014a; Larivé 2014). Barkhane troops have undertaken combat missions across the Sahelian belt, in partnership with Chadian, Nigerien, and Malian troops. US drone strikes have reportedly occurred in northern Mali, and southern Libya. The most recent US strike has allegedly killed the notorious Islamist and trafficker, Mokhtar Belmokhtar in mid-June 2015 (see BBC News 2015a).

52 Interview, senior French security official, 2 May 2013, Niamey.
US capacity-builders have taken note of French frustration, but insist that contacts they have made with military and law enforcement officers in Africa are significant. The US has developed relationships through their International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET) funded through the US State Department, joint military exercises like Operation Flintlock that has been conducted annually since 2006, the US Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme since 1997, and TSTCP since 2003 (see AFRICOM 2012a; AFRICOM 2012b; Schmitt 2015). Three US officials interviewed in Niamey argued that their French counterparts did have important experience in the region, making them serious interlocutors in determining how to pursue US-led capacity-building initiatives. This experience, however, does not mean that US relationships with African partners was not warranted, or that the French had a monopoly on security matters in the Sahel. Their experience in training Latin American militaries and police to fight insurgencies involved in the production and trafficking of cocaine in Latin America, groups such as Sendero Luminoso, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), secured their involvement and authority in law enforcement and capacity-building initiatives in West Africa, especially since connections between some of these groups and West African transnational criminal networks seem to be materializing in the sub-region (see Ellis 2009: 192; Cockayne and Williams 2009: 18-19; Shaw 2015).

They also stressed that US capacity-building initiatives in Africa were based on the diffuse nature of contemporary, borderless threats, and upon the willingness and requests of governments that they could trust to combat them. One of these interlocutors explained that “if the French act towards us, demanding us to inform them on any and all
plans and projects for training with African partners, as they do with the people here, no wonder we get calls from Nigerien and Malian security officials to come and provide training.” US capacity-builders, therefore, contest the salience and authority of French security officials, maintaining that their credibility internationally, and increased involvement on the continent in a way that respects their African partners, supplants in many ways French historical prestige and knowledge of African security. In their relationships with recipient security forces, US capacity-builders increasingly attest that they need “to do business in a manner that is acceptable and digestible to their ways of doing business” (AFRICOM Public Affairs 2012). Doing so, US capacity-builders find, increasingly supplants the authority of French security officials who refuse to do so.54

Finally, like German, Danish, and EU actors, U.S. capacity-builders noted that their government was able to secure and deliver the economic and material capital necessary to pursue modest but significant in-roads in their security governance initiatives in the Sahel. Costs incurred for regional TSTCP programming between 2008 and 2013 totalled US$140 Million, less than half of its budget allocation (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2014). Compared to the estimated US$ trillions spent in U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, TSTCP and other law enforcement capacity-building initiatives undertaken in the Sahel by U.S. actors is pocket change. One US Department of Defense official argued that American involvement in tackling drug trafficking and other borderless threats in the Sahel “reduce the costs of French efforts”

53 Interview, two AFRICOM law enforcement capacity-builders, and US State Department Official, 28 April 2013, Niamey.
54 Interview, Senior US State Department official, 10 June 2013, Washington DC.
and that their French partners ought to thank them forshouldering the burden that was supposed to be theirs.55

French DCI officers have historically dominated the field of capacity-building intervention. New entrants to this field recognize but challenge this authority. German and Danish pursue the acquisition of symbolic capital in this field by their adherence to practices of multilateralism, and pursuit of capacity-building and regional rule of law efforts in comprehensive and holistic ways. These are strategies designed to depoliticize their interventions to acquire recognition of their legitimacy by capacity-building recipients, while highlighting the liabilities of French security interests and histories. US capacity-builders also framed their authority in terms of experience in border control and countering insurgencies against drug trafficking cartels in Latin America. Their enhanced respect for the autonomy of African actors is mobilized in order to gain recipient recognition of their difference from French capacity-building actors. French capacity-builders maintain that their authority is unmatched because of their experience, but recognize the limited strategies they are able to pursue because of a lack of material and economic capital, which can be a source of resentment in field relations.

Conflict, resources and rents: Extraverted practices of security by political and security elite in the Sahel

The cumulative effect of contestation amongst actors in the Sahelian capacity-building field for sets of recipients of these interventions are heightened opportunities to conduct practices of extravagation, and the accrual of symbolic and material international security rents. Contestation does not only enable Sahelian heads of state and connected political

55 US Department of Defense official, 13 June 2013, Washington DC.
elite to highlight their dependence on competing international patrons. These practices diffuse to meso-level security actors and bureaucrats who also seek to consolidate their authority in local fields by creating and solidifying webs of transnational security clientelism.

African political leaders often elicit as much influence on their capacity-building counterparts from Europe and North America as these governments do on them (see Marchal 2013: 489). One prominent way that governments in the Sahel have put their security politics on the international agenda is by leveraging the discursive power of the threat of organized crime and the War on Terror, and projecting these to the international donor community. Combatting these borderless threats has become a symbolic resource for agents of Sahelian states. Governments and security elites have simultaneously used the discourse of political willingness but structural incapacity to stem these threats in order to procure international security prestige and rents while remaining complicit in the continuation of illicit activities. These practices of extraversion, which express weakness and dependency on external relations, are mobilized to secure resources then used to dominate locally, functioning “as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggle” (Bayart 2000: 222).

International security rents take the form of security cooperation agreements, promises of development projects, potential loan reduction or cancellation, the creation and support of specialized security units and other forms of technical assistance. In the words of an observer of Ugandan strategies of extraversion in the War on Terror, sometimes “it pays to be fragile state” (Fisher 2014). It is not only the heads of state that are well versed in these extraverted practices (Jourde 2007: 484). We will later see how
practices of heads of government to acquire security rents seep into the meso-level of the state’s security institutions.

This is a lesson that Burkina Faso’s former President Blaise Compaoré, Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou, and Chadian President Idriss Deby-Itno, have all mastered. Each of these ‘partners’ in the Sahel’s war on the drug-terror nexus have capitalized on the concerns of Western powers and IOs, and have successfully lobbied for increased security cooperation in meetings with Paris, Brussels, Washington, Madrid, Ottawa, New York, and Vienna. Material and symbolic support given by international actors in return for willingness to tackle borderless threats have then been mobilized by these actors to sideline political opponents, maintain the co-accountability of local patron-client networks, and ultimately to maintain stability and rule over a given territory.

Compaoré fashioned himself as an (if not THE) indispensable resource for the West African region. For the last twelve years, Compaoré has acted as regional mediator in Togo following the death of Gnassingbê Eyadéma; Côte d’Ivoire’s protracted civil war(s); Guinea-Conakry’s post-Conté military junta and violence against civilians in Conakry by armed forces under self-proclaimed president Dadis Camara. Until his forced departure from power in late October 2014 from a civilian uprising, he was the chief mediator of the conflict in Mali between northern rebels and the government in Bamako. Compaoré was given this position by 2012 ECOWAS president, Ivoirian head of state, Alassane Ouattara, who he had supported over Laurent Gbagbo in 2011 (Bavier 2014). On at least three occasions Compaoré’s government has also helped secure the release of Western hostages from Islamist terrorist organizations since 2007, notably securing the release of two UN diplomats, Robert Fowler and Louis Guay, held hostage by AQIM
militants (Roger 2013). Compaoré skilfully used the practice of leveraging his transnational connections by acting as a key mediator and perceived force of regional stability increased his international status.

Compaoré gained important increases in material and symbolic capital as a result of these practices of extraversion. Hilgers notes how Compaoré’s mediation efforts in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis boosted his national and regional popularity as a defender of ethnic groups spanning the Malian, Ivoirian, Burkinabe borderlands (2010: 355-356). French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, praised his mediation efforts between Malian government and northern rebel groups during his multiple trips to Ouagadougou in 2012-2013, as well as his negotiations to secure European hostages from AQIM. Over the course of his presidency, Burkina Faso received over US$ 13 Billion in official donor assistance. At the behest of the Bush Administration, US capacity-builders included Burkina Faso’s security institutions in the TSTCP platform because of Compaoré’s regional mediation efforts, the country’s political stability, and for having hosted Operation Flintlock exercises (Miles 2012: 41). Development funds were used to secure alliances with political rivals, to co-opt members of opposition parties by offering them key positions within government ministries, and to maintain the support of high-level military officials (see Harsch 1998: 637-638; Santiso and Loada 2003: 411-412). Perhaps most importantly, as he fled the Presidential palace towards his stronghold in Po in the country’s south, Compaoré was airlifted to safety to Côte d’Ivoire by the French Air Force (Frère and Englebert 2015: 296). Compaoré’s practices of extraversion furnished

56 Interview, RCMP hostage negotiator and UNOCI police officer, 13 February 2013, Abidjan; Interview, driver to Nigerien hostage negotiator, 23 November 2013, Niamey.
57 I watched one of these televised speeches, 27 July 2012, Ouagadougou.
58 Figure accessed at stats.oecd.org.
him with forms of international capital, important symbolic and material resources with which he consolidated authority over local political and security fields, regionally, and in Burkina.

The former president, however, was simultaneously playing the role of negotiator and instigator; Compaoré was responsible for financing several rebel movements in West Africa, and the prolongation of several of the sub-regions’ civil wars (Reno 2009: 56; Mehler 2012: 204). He was also an integral cog in the kidnapping and trafficking industries in the Sahel. Compaoré has protected valuable allies connected to northern Malian and Nigerien Arab and Tuareg elite, and has provided them sanctuary in Ouagadougou. For example, Moustapha Ould Limam Chafi, a Mauritanian national placed under an international arrest warrant, had been a special adviser to Compaoré for several years. Chafi was instrumental in developing the networks and logistical backing for the successful introduction of cigarette smuggling from the ports in Cotonou and Lomé, north through the Sahel into Algeria and Libya where part of these stocks remained, while the rest is trafficked into Europe. Francois Compaoré, the former President’s brother, provided financial backing for the initial efforts.59 Chafi’s ability to mobilize networks across the Sahel that he had solidified through years illicit dealings with Ifoghas Tuareg elites like Iyad ag Ghali and Alghabass ag Intallah, or Arab Lamhar businessmen and reputed cocaine trafficker, Baba Ould Cheikh, provided him with a significant degree of social and symbolic capital. The relationship between Compaoré and Chafi has been put to use several times in negotiations with AQIM militants to secure

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59 This information was reiterated by at least ten different sources in Mali and Niger during interviews conducted in Bamako and Niamey with state law enforcement officials, politicians, informal actors, former cigarette smugglers and one hostage negotiator in April and May 2013.
the release of European hostages. Each time that the negotiations have been successful, Compaoré’s own symbolic capital and power is increased, as he was recognized by Western powers as a political leader who knows and influences the right networks at the right time (AFP 2011; Global Initiative 2014: 13).60

Issoufou presents a similar case. He ardently called for international military intervention in Mali, his calls reportedly pushing France’s Hollande to accept prior to the official request from Malian interim-president Dioncounda Traoré (Marchal 2013: 489; Lecocq et. al. 2013: 354-355). Niger has been a key partner in global efforts to combat borderless threats in the Sahel. Since February 2013, American Predator drones have been based out of Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport (Whitlock 2013; ICG 2013: fn136). Anywhere from 40 to 100 US security personnel tasked with advising Nigerien security officials are presently stationed in the country (Pace and Burns 2013).61 French Special Forces have operated in the Arlit and Agadez regions to protect critical infrastructure and employees at uranium mining sites since at least January 2013, although multiple security officials argued that French military commandos had been operating near the mines following the kidnapping of seven AREVA workers by armed groups in September 2010. Three French Harfang drones are also based in the country (see Reuters 2013a; ICG 2013: 42). These agreements were all made possible by Issoufou, who actively petitioned international actors to more readily engage in supporting the country’s existing security efforts. Coupled with sustained discursive reiterations of Niger’s vulnerability to contagion from borderless threats in interactions with

60 Interview, senior French DCI official, 20 July 2012, Ouagadougou.
61 I have spoken to and interviewed several of these officials in Niamey from April-May 2013.
international actors, and even via multiple global media sources, Issoufou’s willingness to use Niger’s security forces to combat borderless threats, and its territory as a base of international military operations, successfully leveraged security concerns and resulted in him and the country gaining important material and symbolic rents.

Having so many international capacity-building and other security actors based in Niger provides additional political and economic support for Issoufou. Their involvement in countering the north’s borderless threats, operationally and through capacity-building, makes it less likely that Niger’s armed forces and security institutions, historically so entangled in national politics, would challenge Issoufou’s government. International actors provide an important influx of cash into Niamey’s local economy, especially for politically connected economic actors involved in its housing, transportation, and ICT markets, since they can (and have) ratchet up prices on goods and services that international capacity-builders need, and are assumed to be able to pay.62 It is expected that Issoufou’s calls for international actors to use Niger as a staging ground in regional interventions also increased his bargaining power with French-state owned mining company AREVA to better the terms of uranium extraction in on-going lease negotiations (Grégoire 2011; Hicks 2014).

Like Compaoré, Issoufou has been an important gatekeeper for international actors seeking brokers able to negotiate with illicit actors in the region, and to provide information regarding potential vectors of instability, for example regarding the movement of drug traffickers or armed Islamic networks that are involved in kidnapping for ransom. This position is enabled due to his access to and co-option of notable

62 Interview, three senior EUCAP-Sahel officials, 25 April 2013, Niamey.
politico-economic figures from Niger’s northern Arab and Tuareg communities like former leaders of Niger’s northern rebellions of the 1990s. Issoufou maintains patron-client relationships with important northern elites such as Rhissa ag Boula, Mohamed Anacko, and Mohamed Akotey, or prominent commercial actors and former politicians such as Cherif Ghabidine, and Mohamed, Boubacar, and Baba-Ahmed Rimbo.

Boula’s career in Nigerien tourism helped him to accrue significant economic capital. His involvement in rebellions of the 1990s added a good measure of social capital amongst northern populations, which combined providing him with a level of prestige that made him a key intermediary for the Nigerien political elite. He later served as the country’s Minister of Tourism for several years, and in September 2011 was appointed special counselor to Issoufou, where he played a central role in demobilizing Nigerien Tuaregs leaving post-intervention Libya and incorporating them into the country’s security services (see Salah 2012: 6; see also Deycard 2012; Guichaoua 2012).

Mohamed Akotey likewise became entrenched into the Nigerien political elite. Akotey was Niger’s Minister of the Environment, a key liaison directing UNDP reinsertion projects of former combatants in 2006, and chief administrator of the AREVA mining group’s Imouraren mine in 2009 (Deycard 2012: 62; Carayol and Abba 2013). Member of the Ifoghas clan, and cousin to the notorious and enigmatic Kidal Tuareg and AQIM ally, Iyad ag Ghali, Akotey was chosen by Issoufou to act as Niger’s chief negotiator with AQIM leaders holding several French hostages from bases in northern

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63 Personal email communication with former MNJ rebel, 18 November 2014.
Mali (ibid.; Le Point 2013).\textsuperscript{64} It is unknown how Akotey was rewarded from these efforts. Nevertheless, he remains a key client and transnational broker to Issoufou.

Cherif Ghabidine, a Berabiche Arab with family connections to prominent notables based in Timbuktu, profited from his tribal relations across the region to solidify his local business ventures in Zinder and Agadez throughout the 1980s-90s. After 2004, Ghabidine became a key node in the Sahel’s burgeoning drug trafficking economy, responsible for liaising with Nigerien military and administrative authorities to secure drug convoy escorts passing through the country.\textsuperscript{65} He then reinvested profits from this work to conduct his own drug trafficking operations, and to employ small groups of armed interception networks, slowly consolidating his position as one of the Sahel’s most prominent traffickers. He was elected to Niger’s National Assembly as a member of Issoufou’s Parti Nigerien pour la Democratie et le Socialisme-Tarayya (PNDS), and now also serves as the President’s special advisor. Through this connection, Ghabidine is rewarded numerous public contracts from the Nigerien state, notably the recent agreement to use his transport company to move French military equipment for its anti-trafficking and counter-terrorism operation Barkhane to its positions in Niger’s far northern towns of Madama and Dirkou. Ghabidine often uses his largesse to bankroll other PNDS candidates.\textsuperscript{66} Issoufou’s co-option of these officials, and their mutual economic and political networks of support, makes him a prominent transnational gatekeeper and recognized authority between global and local actors in Sahelian security matters.

\textsuperscript{64} Interview, Akotey’s close associate, and counsellor to Nigerien President, 23 November 2013, Niamey.
\textsuperscript{65} Personal email communication with close associate of Ghabidine, 22 November 2014.
\textsuperscript{66} Interview, ICG Niger analyst, 5 December 2014, Ottawa.
Long-time Chadian president, Idriss Déby-Itno, also masters the extraverted practices of using the discourse of vulnerability and willingness, insider knowledge, and transnational gatekeeping. He has long been an advocate for increasing Chad’s role in providing regional stability. For this, Déby’s regime has received long-term French military and political support since taking over the country by force in 1990, albeit with the support of French enemies in the Qaddafi regime (Marchal 1998: 363; Cornwell 1999: 78-79). It is arguable that France’s dominant priority for Chad is to keep Déby in power since he provides a level of dependability for the former colonial power by his willingness to tackle complex security issues in west and central Africa (ICG 2008: 19). Déby has allowed the UN and EU use Chadian territory to undertake complex peace operations and humanitarian assistance to Darfur (see Bono 2012). Framing Chad as a credible international partner providing indispensable regional stability also helped the regime to secure World Bank funding to build the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, funds from which were used to purchase large amounts of military hardware (see Pegg 2009). Oil revenues are now used to consolidate Déby’s patron-client relationships domestically and across the region.

The War on Terror provided an additional discursive structure masterfully utilized by Déby: Chad’s ability to counter terrorism and organized crime nationally, and as a necessary check to maintain the region’s stability against ‘rogue states’ like neighbouring Libya (despite Qaddafi’s continued financial support for Déby) and Sudan (Hansen 2013: 588). Déby’s willingness to use the Chadian Armed Forces to attack GSPC kidnappers in March 2003 to secure European hostages taken by the group provided him with a reputation of credibility and partnership in tackling borderless threats regardless of the
military’s failure to deliver on its promises (Africa Confidential 2004; Lecocq and Schrijver 2007: 145, 152). Since 2003, the US has provided large amounts of military assistance to the Déby regime, supported its important role as an anchor state partner in the TSTCP, and more recently hosted the 2015 Flintlock military exercises in N’Djamena (see Matfess 2015). The United States is by far Chad’s largest oil consumer, and multiple American oil firms have invested billions in its energy sector (Hansen 2013: 587). This support has allowed Déby to create and maintain the largest military force in Francophone Africa (Fisher and Anderson 2015: 137). Déby’s regime enjoys longevity because it is driven by international rents and “global political capital” made possible by this “military activism” (Debos 2014).

An important way that Déby has solidified his position as a transnational gatekeeper is by willingness to intervene militarily in the region, and using heavy-handed violence to quash drug trafficking operations passing through Chadian territory (see Brachet and Scheele 2015: 739-740). After accepting to intervene militarily in Mali’s north in January 2013, French President, Francois Hollande, actively courted Déby to have Chadian troops support SERVAL operations. French troops based in N’Djamena entered Mali on 11 January 2013, and were followed by over 2000 Chadian troops less

67 The small, ill-equipped, and poor Movement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) actually rescued the hostages from the GSPC.
68 Several interlocutors in Mali and Niger insisted that passing through the Chadian Tibesti region in drug convoys presented significantly higher risks than having trafficking convoys pass through Libya towards Egypt, since Chadian security forces had a reputation of killing traffickers instead of negotiating with them. Still others do chance this route, especially when connected to local power brokers involved in transborder smuggling, particularly with Libyan networks. Interview, 3 MNLA rebels, 21 July 2012, Ouagadougou; Interview, Nigerien Customs official (former rebel, 27 April 2013), Niamey; Interview, four former MNJ and MJAN rebels, 3 May 2013, Niamey.
than a week later (Libération 2013). Chadian troops fought alongside French forces in the rugged Adrar des Ifoghas mountain range, and have been integral in securing the Kidal region. By April that year, 36 Chadian troops had been killed and 74 injured, higher than losses from any other African intervening forces in the country (Diouara 2013; RFI 2013a). For hesitant Western states unwilling to be embroiled in complex African conflicts, Déby’s ability to mobilize an economy of security forces makes him an indispensable transnational gatekeeper, from which he gains important symbolic and material resources.

Perhaps one of the most important benefits this creates for Déby’s regime and others is that international actors are willing to overlook the overt violence it exercises on Chadian civilians, and his simultaneous peace-brokering/destabilizing measures he pursues regionally. Déby was a key player in the conflict in Darfur, having consolidated and supported (possibly still supporting) many Darfuri rebel groups (see Marchal 2006, 2008). Chadian troops overwhelmingly participated in the 2003 overthrow of Central African Republic’s (CAR) Ange-Félix Patassé by former CAR military Chief of Staff, François Bozizé (Debos 2008). More recently, and despite claims that he was not involved in the internal politics of the CAR (Le Monde 2013), Déby supported the coalition of Séléka rebels led by Michel Djotodia like he had supported Bozizé (Käihkö and Utas 2014; Lombard and Batiana-Kinzi 2015). Chadian troops are alleged to have killed thirty civilians in a marketplace, and have been accused of child sexual abuse during the span of their intervention (see Welz 2014: 607-608; Laville 2015). Déby’s position of transnational gatekeeper and master of insider knowledge of the region’s

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69 Peacekeeping troops from France and Equatorial Guinea have also been accused of sexual abuse.
complex security dynamics makes him a recognized authority internationally, from which he and his supporters receive important material and symbolic international security rents.

This macro view of some of the extraverted practices of influential heads of state demonstrates an important insight. The discursive manipulation, political willingness, and institutional positions at the interface between global, regional, and local scales by these political actors enable the diffusion of transnational security clientelism in the Sahel in return for political support from client groups. As their countries become entangled in the security practices and transnational governance arrangements of the assemblage of security intervention, high-level political leaders consolidate their authority over political and security fields by facilitating the introduction of new international forms of capital brought by intervening actors.

**Practices of extraversion amongst Meso-level security actors**

Practices of extraversion are not limited to Sahelian heads of state. Global security initiatives are an important way that national-level supporters embedded within state security institutions are rewarded and their demands for support placated. Meso-level state security actors and bureaucrats are presented with multiple opportunities to undertake these practices. The competing visions and interests amongst capacity-builders, and their objectives to strengthen the sub-region’s security institutions create powerful incentive structures for local security actors to engage in new security governance arrangements. Local security actors routinely use the discourse of willingness but persistent material constraints to gain resources in the form of security tools, equipment, and technology from international actors. Capacity-building training measures are also a means for recipient security actors to dominate the fields in which they participate by
translating their institutional positions as gatekeepers within the security services to control access to international forms of capital in order to consolidate their local networks of support. Acquiring these symbolic and material resources from international projects does not preclude the possibility of using them in ways that counter the objectives of international capacity-builders. Many security actors in the Sahel form integral nodes in networks of other transnational actors, some of which engage in illicit economic pursuits, which means that skills taught in international training, and the provisioning of security equipment may be used in support of alternative forms of governance of borderless threats.

*Security tools, technologies: Uses and Abuses*

Global security experts in the Sahel do not arrive alone; a fact that is well known to recipients of intervention. International capacity-builders bring equipment and other resources with them that articulate how law enforcement and security ought to be practiced. Security tools and technologies such as laptop computers and related software and databases, bulletproof shields, helmets and other riot gear, audio surveillance equipment, drug testing kits and forensic equipment, and 4x4s, imbue social meanings for their intended use in security practices.70 Their actual use in practice, however, reflects the particular socioeconomic and political setting in which the security institutions are

70 These objects are ones that have typically been provided to the internal security forces of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. I was shown the equipment received by several specialized security unit members in Bamako and Niamey. Furthermore, in interviews with DCI and with EUCAP-Sahel officials, these interlocutors showed me pictures and lists of equipment provided. While the ceremonies are performed in the exchange of these security objects are promoted in national media in Sahelian countries (which is a practice of visibility enacted by statebuilders), the Internet sites of the media outlets often do not function over the long term, making it challenging to provide verifiable data. For the equipment provided by the CT-Sahel Project to Mauritanian, Malian and Nigerien security and justice institutions, see European Commission 2014a: 43).
embedded, and the incentive structures that acquiring them enables. While they may be used to perform tasks based on their intended purposes, many security tools are used to enhance and consolidate security authority over rival institutions and actors, or to increase personal enrichment and social status. Security tools and technologies provided by international capacity-builders in the Sahel, therefore, mediate relationships between sets of interveners and intervened groups within the space of intervention (see Leander 2011; Porter 2014: 224-225).

Border posts and 4x4 vehicles provide a salient example. International capacity-builders recognize that Sahelian security forces require equipment to make them “highly mobile armoured forces” to deal with the significant geographic constraints that hinder better control of vast expanses of territory (Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union, Directorate B Policy Department 2012: 29; see also Grégoire and Bourgeot 2011). The borders between Mali and Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger alone span 1300 km, 1000 km, 2240 km, and 800 km, respectively (see Duhem 2013). Traffickers and armed groups use border regions to their advantage by skirting frontier zones, and by maintaining close relations with local populations that have intimate knowledge of the terrain (Scheele 2009; Attalah 2013). Funding the creation of border posts placed at strategic locations, preferably to operate jointly between units from neighbouring states, and equipping them with tools and technologies that enhance their capacity to pursue mobile forms of territorial surveillance has been a priority for international actors from the EU, France, Canada, the US, and others (see UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee 2011; Frowd 2014; CoE 2015). It is understood by these
international actors as an important way to enhance the state’s “security footprint” in the north.71

As a result of this territorial rationale, increasing the ability of the Sahel’s security forces to move across remote expanses of territory and enhancing their ability to communicate between units have been key features of the construction of border posts by international actors. Training in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism is often premised on the requirement of border facilities. For example, through the TSTCP, a counter-terrorism desert training centre was built outside of Gao in 2008 towards the Mali-Niger border. From here, Canadian and American counter-terrorism specialists trained Malian internal security forces (gendarmes, national guards and police officers) in rural border security measures like engaging in hot pursuit, communicating between forces and other border posts, and trust-building interaction with local populations.72 4x4 all-terrain vehicles and radio equipment make these security practices possible. Border posts like this, therefore, are provided by international capacity-builders who teach border guards to use them in a way that follows a security logic of the central state’s role as the dominant authority in security provision for Mali’s vast northern territory. Capacity-builders assume that border posts project the presence and coercive power of the state, thereby replacing alternative systems of governance by state control prevalent in the Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions, which will help tackle drug trafficking and Islamic terrorism (see also Ministère de la Défense de la France 2010).

71 Interview, AFRICOM official, US State Department Official, 27 April 2013, Niamey. Similar assessments were made by French DCI officials in Mali, interview, 10 April, Bamako.
72 Interview, senior US State Department official, 10 June 2013, Washington DC.
The creation of new border posts by international actors provide agents of the security institutions opportunities to undertake practices of extraversion and seek to enhance their material capital. Senior Malian gendarme officers argued how the territorial spread of their forces and their role in providing crisis management ideally places them, instead of police units, to receive training and equipment tied to the installation of borders if only the necessary equipment would be provided by international sources. Its senior officers consistently reiterate the need for European, American, and IO actors to provide them with 4x4s, radio equipment, and other tools in addition to the creation of border posts northern regions.73 One senior Malian Gendarme official with experience in border control in the Gao region expressed his appreciation for the international security assistance programmes that many European actors had provided the gendarmerie over the past ten years, but then poignantly stated: “training without vehicles and other equipment is like throwing stones in the water and expecting them to float!”74 By constantly (re)stating their vulnerability to borderless threats due to a lack of security tools and technologies, but simultaneously demonstrating the willingness and a modest level of skills to tackle them, these security agents discursively reinforce their dependence on international sources.

Oftentimes, their arguments are successful in acquiring 4x4s and other security tools and technologies that enhance their ability to project power across territory. In July 2013, the European Union purchased 36 all-terrain 4x4s, and has plans to provide a total of 153 4x4s to the Malian security sector: 93 for the National Guard, and 60 for the

73 Interview, senior Malian Gendarme officer, 8 April 2013, Bamako; interview, UN official, 9 April 2013, Bamako; interview, EU official (former French DCI), 25 April 2013, Niamey.
74 Interview, senior Malian Gendarme officer from Gao Region, 15 April 2013, Bamako.
national Gendarmerie. Both of these institutions are tasked with border security, anti-trafficking, and rule of law functions in remote Sahelian areas.\textsuperscript{75} Similarly, in March 2013, Nigerien law enforcement agencies were given over €900,000 in all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles, camels and communications equipment under the EU’s *Programme d’appui à la Justice et à l’état de droit* (PAJED-II), much of which would be sent to northern regions of the country in order to facilitate patrols that branch out from remote state border posts (Ministère de la Justice de la République du Niger 2013).

Malian and Nigerien security units often use border security tools and technologies provided by capacity-builders in the ways that are intended. For example, several Malian and Nigerien gendarme and National Guard units have been able to perform sizeable drug seizures, discovered weapons caches, and have engaged in hot pursuit of armed groups in the desert in border areas, sometimes in conjunction with French security or military units, due to having been furnished with security equipment (see Xinhua 2013; RFI 2015; BBC News 2015b).

Even when capacity-building initiatives are not granted substantial sums of money, or are not designed to provide large levels of grandiose security equipment, security units of the Sahel still strive to be included in order to increase contact with international partners since it betters one’s chances for solidifying transnational security clientelism. EUCAP-Sahel Niger provides a good example. Unlike Trusteeship-style reconstruction efforts undertaken in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUCAP-

\textsuperscript{75} These funds are provided through the EU’s Instrument for Stability short-term, crisis funding. The initial 36 vehicles provided cost €9 Million (L’Indépendant 2013).
Sahel Niger has been allotted very meagre budgets.\textsuperscript{76} The majority of its funds are for the mission’s operational budget, with not much remaining when these fixed costs are paid. Three EUCAP-Sahel mission officials argued that when faced with the task at hand, the low amounts of funding are akin to a command to “empty the sea with only a spoon punctured with many holes.”\textsuperscript{77} Of the initial €8,700,000 allotted for the mission, only €450,000 was set aside for procuring equipment for Niger’s internal security forces. With these funds, the EUCAP-Sahel mission has renovated classrooms at the National Academy of the Gendarmerie, purchased desks, chairs, and laptop computers. It has also purchased computers for Niger’s intelligence service, the \textit{Renseignements Généraux} (RG), and laboratory forensics equipment that will be used in training sessions and given to the units.\textsuperscript{78} The provision of these types of equipment and technology may be useful in increasing the law enforcement capabilities of the Nigerien security institutions. By providing this equipment, EUCAP-Sahel advisors stress how their use by Nigerien law enforcement agencies will make it possible to better tackle security risks that beset the region, for example by enabling them to keep digitized records on criminal suspects, to properly detect illicit substances, and to maintain a professional and orderly work atmosphere that makes police officers want to be at work and responsible.\textsuperscript{79} Equipment provided by the mission instils particular understandings of how law enforcement measures against borderless threats should be undertaken in practice. Of the budget

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{76} €8,700,000 for 16 July 2012 to 31 October 2013 (CoE 2013d), followed by a further €6,500,000 for 1 November to 15 July 2014 (CoE 2013e), and finally €9,155,000 from 16 July 2014 – 15 July 2015 (CoE 2014b).
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Interview, three senior EUCAP-Sahel officials, 25 April 2013, Niamey.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Interview, senior EUCAP-Sahel official, 30 April 2013, Niamey; Personal communication with senior EUCAP-Sahel Official, 13 March 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Personal e-mail communication with EUCAP-Sahel official, 28 January 2015.
\end{itemize}
renewals, additional procurement funds are earmarked for the Nigerien internal security forces.  

While these sums might seem meagre compared to massive military interventions, it still opens the door for additional security equipment to be offered to Nigerien security units later, as the latter continue their extraverted practices. Nigerien security agents interviewed insisted that all that was necessary to ensure a continuing flow of equipment from EUCAP-Sahel was to demonstrate a willingness to improve their skills, and by learning the techniques and security practices taught in training sessions. This, coupled with constant reiteration of Niger’s security institutions’ *manque de moyens*, would seal the deal for a continuation of the mission beyond its first mandate; and secure additional financial resources and more security equipment from the EU and other international sources. Moreover, senior police, gendarmes, and RG officials argued that they had been advised by high levels of government to do all that was necessary to demonstrate the need in any way possible.  

Agents interviewed expressed gratitude for the equipment, but consistently outlined that it was not enough to overcome the challenges at hand. They were willing to learn more, but required more equipment and other means to demonstrate the knowledge acquired by training from international capacity-builders.

It is not always the case, however, that security agents in the Sahel adopt the security logics presented by global experts and equipment they provide. As capacity-builders attempt to inculcate understandings of security in local security agents through

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80 MINUSMA has also refurbished Malian Gendarmerie offices in Gao and Mopti for similar purposes (see MINUSMA 2015a, 2015b).
81 Interview, Senior Nigerien National Police Official, 25 April 2013, Niamey; Interview, Senior Nigerien Gendarmerie Official, 24 April 2013, Niamey; Interview, 4 Nigerien RG Officials, 26 April 2013, Niamey.
specialized training or advisory relationships, security agents often translate these understandings in ways that reflect an advancement of personal, not necessarily public, goods (see Sheptycki 2007; Hills 2009). One reason for this is that local concerns and understandings of the purposes of law enforcement or security, even agreement over what constitutes a threat, do not necessarily follow the same patterns of behaviour for local security agents as they do for capacity-builders. Historically, security forces in Africa have been used more for the security of the regimes in power than for the protection and advancement of the public good of the state or citizenry (see Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003; Hills 2007). This understanding of security and its associated practices still hold sway in states of the Sahelian belt. Security institutions and resources are often used for local and transnational gatekeeping purposes: political and security actors that maintain their sway over security institutions do so to solidify authority over patron-client networks.

For example, in Mali, while tasked to respond to situations of immediate crisis, the frequently trained Gendarmerie rapid reaction unit, the *Peloton d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale* (PIGN), is tasked to undertake specialized counter-terrorism, anti-kidnapping, and anti-banditry functions. Since its creation in 2006 in partnership with French cooperation, the unit has allegedly successfully dismantled several trafficking networks (Konate 2011).\(^\text{82}\) In order to fulfil its mandate, EEAS provided the unit with eight armoured 4x4s with machine gun mounts, and with other actors (especially the French DCI) have trained the unit in rapid response and crisis management (Bathily 2013; European Commission 2014a). Instead of focusing on these

\(^\text{82}\) Interview, two PIGN officers, 16 April, 2013, Faladie.
and other crisis response practices, however, the PIGN is instead regularly sent to protect members of the central administration’s entourage as they drive around the greater Bamako area, or to provide escort services for bank monetary transfers. International capacity-builders maintain that such activities would make it difficult to respond to an immediate security event, and can be accomplished by other units of the gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{83}

They recognize that there are political connections between senior Gendarmerie officials and the newly elected Ibrahim Boubacar Keita regime, which explains why the PIGN is used by its agents for regime security instead of having the unit prepared to respond to banditry and other forms of organized crime. The same dynamic held sway between former President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) and his use of the \textit{berets rouges} parachutist unit, which received copious amounts of international training in specialized security tasks, but which was normally assigned with providing the President’s family protection, and allegedly managing informal protection rackets with northern-based units of the military for drug trafficking operations (see Lecocq 2013: 61-63).\textsuperscript{84}

Thus, PIGN agents and other specialized security units must balance their strategies for the acquisition of capital between multiple patrons: they seek to demonstrate to capacity-builders present in Bamako that they can follow the latter’s security logic, but tend to still recognize the social standing of local political and security authorities (like senior ranking officers at the Chef d’Etat Major connected to the President’s inner-circle), and follow orders that contradict what they are taught by international actors. Malian political and security elites ultimately serve as gatekeepers.

\textsuperscript{83} Interview, French DCI official, 23 April 2013, Bamako.
\textsuperscript{84} Interview, senior official of the Malian Agence du Developpement du Nord (ADN, 15 April 2013), Bamako; interview, senior Malian Diplomat and former Kidal government official, 26 April 2013, Niamey.
within the country’s patron-client relationships, and facilitate access to international forms of capital that can be translated into career advancement or a transfer to a head position in the country’s north. It pays to recognize their authority, even if doing so contravenes the authority and security understandings of global security experts and their training manuals.

Security tools and technologies may also be used for personal enrichment or the increase of an officer’s social status when it is used to facilitate illicit economic activities and the support of transnational criminalized networks of clientelism. As demonstrated above with the discussion of Deby, Compaoré, and Issoufou, Sahelian governments and its security institutions are well known for working through informalized webs of illicit support. While 4x4 vehicles and radio equipment are frequently used for border security and law enforcement purposes, security officials in Mali and Niger have also used these to facilitate drug trafficking (Antil 2012: 312-313; Lacher 2013; Reitano and Shaw 2014: 9). In addition to subsidized goods like powdered milk, gasoline, and food stuffs smuggled from Algeria and Libya, since the mid-1990s, cigarette and drug trafficking through the Sahel has become an important economic activity for many groups from northern communities (see Julien 2011; Scheele 2009, 2012). Trafficking narcotics is facilitated by several of the sub-region’s ‘Big Men’ based in Tamanrasset (Algeria), Bamako, Gao, Niamey, or Agadez. They wield a seemingly inordinate social and economic capital to instigate action, mobilize networks, and to build loyal factions by transforming “social relations into strategic power and control” (Utas 2012: 6-7).85 In

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85 Interview, Development Practitioner from Ménaka, 14 April 2013, Bamako; interview, Arab Bérabiche Notable from Timbuktu, 15 April 2013, Bamako; interview, Tuareg senior customs official from Kidal, 21 April 2013, Bamako.
order to operate beyond the legal parameters established by global prohibition regimes and state law, local big men leverage the connections made possible by their social and economic capital to draw state representatives of the sub-region into their networks by bribing government or military officials (see Marchal 2013: 493; Ellis 2009; ICG 2012; Lacher 2012). This means that instead of being used to tackle the Sahel’s borderless threats, security equipment provided by international sources has in many cases been used to establish a protection economy for criminal elements moving drugs through the region.

One prominent report on high-level political support of drug trafficking in Mali argues: “government officials up to the highest levels were not only complicit, but began to intervene on behalf of traffickers on whom they were reliant, having ostensibly outsourced state security functions. The political protection allowed for all manner of high-profile incidents” (Global Initiative 2014: 12). This assessment extends in many ways beyond Mali (see ICG 2013; Aning and Pokoo 2014). Illicit economic operators are connected to well established political and security networks in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. There is high-level complicity with military officials of all these states. All that is needed to transit through these spaces are connections to officials from regional security forces, and the appropriate amount of funds to pay for their services or non-services. Military and security officials then coordinate gendarme, National Guard or armed forces patrols such that drug convoys have a precise set of time to pass through the territory unseen (generally 48 hours through a particular space). Patrols that stumble upon drug convoys will call their commands to ask for procedural advice, and are informed: ‘It’s ok. They are only moving cigarettes’ (see Global Initiative
If local military officers insist that the convoys are indeed moving cocaine or hashish, they are instructed to speak to their superior officers, who then let the drug convoys pass.

Border security, rapid response, and armed forces units based at border posts in Mali and Niger, are also frequently used to chase out competing armed groups known to be blocking the itinerary of a convoy, thus paving the way for transit without obstacle (see ICG 2012). A portion of these funds from trafficking acquired by state officials through complicity (by police, gendarmes, and military officials) are funneled back to Niamey, Bamako, Nouakchott, etc. at the end of every month to upper echelons of these services. This ensures that those ‘sur place’ stay in Agadez, Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Diffa, etc., and continue profiting from the trade, extended nodes in connected networks each receiving their cut. Villas, luxury vehicles, and travel to Europe are purchased, not otherwise possible on salaries usually paid to public servants.

The uses of security equipment by Sahelian security institutions, therefore, are dependent on shifting contextual circumstances, and assessments of how individual security units or officers stand to increase material or symbolic resources through practices of extraversion. This has the effect of breeding distrust, animosity, and competition in local fields of security.

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86 Focus group discussion with 9 Tuaregs from the Kidal Region, Bamako, 19 April 2013.
87 Interview, four participants of this ‘interception economy’, former MNJ and MJAN rebels, 3 May 2013, Niamey.
88 This information was triangulated by nearly every interview conducted with both state and non-state interlocutors, and testifies to the research cited above regarding state complicity in the drug trade.
Abuse of security tools and technologies also relates to the question of the provision of international security training itself and how it is used: for building security unit capacities to tackle borderless threats, for purposes that follow strategies for personal or private advancement, or a blurring of both (see Beswick 2014). In the case of countries in the Sahelian belt, security elites instrumentalize trainings as a form of international capital to consolidate authority within the security services to dominate the security field. As they are selected for specialized international training, agents of the security forces gain credibility and prestige within local networks of power, resulting in an economy of training wherein recipients position themselves to monopolize its opportunities. Selection is also a way to advance personal material outcomes. Training means access to international forms of material and cultural capital, which can be used to leverage oneself into a well-paid private sector or IO job, or into a security unit that is targeted by international experts for equipment upgrades, and the resulting symbolic capital international sponsorship signifies (Bourdieu 1991).

International capacity-builders operating regularly referred to specialized law enforcement units like Mali’s PIGN, the Office Central des Stupéfiants (OCS) (Mali’s recently created inter-agency drug police), Niger’s Office Centrale pour la Répression du Trafic Illicite de Stupéfiants (OCRTIS) or the SCLCT, as “the girls that every guy wants to take to the dance.” These units are internationally favoured security forces advanced by capacity-builders as key actors in the regional governance of Sahel’s borderless threats.

Interview, French EU capacity-builder, 10 April 2013, Bamako; interview, French DCI official, 23 April 2013, Bamako; interview, two Spanish police liaisons, 21 April 2013, Bamako; interview, Spanish EU capacity-builder, 28 April 2013, Niamey.
As a result, few officers interviewed from these units had not participated in international training exercises. Agents indicated that as they acquired proof of their expertise by attending international training exercises, their positions within well-equipped units was secured, or understood this strategy as a means of “writing your own ticket” to influence decisions regarding where, and to which units an officer is assigned by security officials.\(^{90}\) Agents expressed the need, then, to become a ‘trusted partner’\(^{91}\) of capacity-builders, who would then lobby national-level security decision-makers on their behalf.

In a development context, Smith (2003) has called this “the workshop mentality;” where “having people,” meaning social networks and connections to international sources of patronage, is used to make claims of authority in a local setting. Agents actively court international partners in hopes that they send them to Istanbul, Rabat, Saint-Cyr, Madrid, Moscow, Washington DC, etc. for international training internships, or to be selected for workshops held in the sub-region (see Charbonneau 2008: 81 for French military training numbers between 1999-2004).\(^{92}\) All expressed how training was necessary, helped build the capacities of the units, and improved their expertise, making them more able to inform national political actors of regional security dynamics. But in so doing trainings

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\(^{90}\) Interview, retired Burkinabe Gendarmerie official, 5 July, Ouagadougou; interview, Burkinabe officer of the Police des Frontières, 9 July, Ouagadougou; interview, Tuareg senior customs official from Kidal, 21 April 2013, Bamako; interview, retired Nigerien Customs official and former FIAA (*Front Islamique de l’Air et l’Azawak*, 27 April 2013), Niamey; interview, 3 Nigerien SCLCT officers, 30 April 2013, Niamey.

\(^{91}\) A “*Coopérant de grande confiance*” in French.

\(^{92}\) It is important, however, that these relationships are balanced with efforts to remain supportive of local security patrons who ultimately authorize such international exchanges (see ICG 2013: fn. 125); interview, former Gendarme and French Military Attaché to Mali, 16 April 2013, Bamako; interview French DCI official, 22 April 2013, Bamako; interview, Spanish police liaison, 29 April 2013, Niamey.
also develop a mechanism for influencing patron-client relationships, which are contrary to the professionalized, bureaucratic security logics of international interveners.

Sahel’s intervention assemblage is so crowded that it provides an environment of confusion over coordination efforts to the benefit of national security officials of the sub-region. This makes it possible for security agents to court multiple international patrons at once, and ‘play the field’ of international capacity-building. When I asked senior members of the Nigerien Service Central de lutte contre le terrorisme (SCLCT), senior officials of the Direction Générale de la Police (DGPN), and officials from the national gendarmerie of Niger regarding how international actors argue that it is the Nigerien government’s responsibility to coordinate capacity-building efforts, the answers were universal: “Why should they?” The confusion and lack of will for international statebuilders to coordinate on the ground, and the consistent push from national capitals to deliver capacity-building projects for the internal security forces regardless of local circumstances, creates an incentive to leave things be, even if such a strategy means duplicating statebuilding efforts.

When I pursued the issue further, and asked if any training project had been refused, the SCLCT officers calmly explained, “We are takers. We will always accept training and equipment that is offered. From this, we learn the different styles and ways of doing that come from each international partner.”93 The active lack of coordination, or coordination only to the degree that placates international actors and demonstrates a willingness to comply with the requests of capacity-building partners, translates into more projects, more opportunities to develop law enforcement relationships with security

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93 Interview, 3 Nigerien SCLCT officers, 30 April 2013, Niamey.
experts that may one day offer an agent a coveted *stage* in France, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Canada, the US, etc., and more equipment provided to specialized security agencies (see RFI 2014).

The introduction of such a large scale of capacity-building initiatives in countries of the Sahelian belt also yields several material perks that benefit selected agents. As international security trainings are often held in chic international hotels in the sub-region’s capitals, being selected for training translates into a week of comfortable air conditioning, expensive food paid for by Western donors, often a sizeable per diem, or travel throughout the sub-region. Trainees often opt to sleep at a friend’s home and use their per diem from a training session to support family members instead of paying for hotel accommodations in the capital. A lack of coordination between capacity-building actors regarding the rate of pay for per diems also creates competition over which partner’s training to prioritize – a significant practice when US-led training provides US$100 for a daily per diem, versus one for only €20 for EU-led training. ‘Opening up a market for per diems’ is a constant source of contention between statebuilders in Mali and Niger – one which local recipients of training do not care to fix. Moreover, at the end of the week’s training, security agents are awarded a certificate for skills learned, a material inscription of knowledge transmitted that can hopefully be translated into a better paying job with an international institution like the United Nations, or for an international NGO or aid agency. Attaining proof of security expertise, or at least some

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94 This was a strategy pursued by heads of regional antennas of Niger’s *Renseignements Généraux* (RG) when they were selected for training from EUCAP-Sahel Niger; interview, 3 officers from the Nigerien RG, 2 May 2013, Niamey.

95 Interview, French security official, 23 April 2013, Bamako; interview, Spanish EU capacity-builder, 27 April 2013, Niamey; interview, two AFRICOM law enforcement capacity-builders, and US State Department Official, 28 April 2013, Niamey.
degree of competence, like this means that officers from the Sahel’s specialized law
enforcement units collect security-training certificates, even if other members of their
corps have not received opportunities to do so. This coveted international form of
cultural capital can be used to consolidate one’s social position over potential competitors,
and help to create and nourish one’s own clientelistic networks within the security
institutions (see Chabal and Daloz 1999: 14).

All of these benefits directly enhance the social and symbolic capital of members
of the specialized counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism units established in the states of
the Sahel. The result of these extraverted practices, according to both French DCI and
EUCAP-Sahel officials in Niger, is that the internal security forces of the country are
over-specialized, and over-trained, but have still not mastered basic law enforcement
skills: how to write a police report, how not to contaminate a crime scene, how to work
with informants, how to conduct investigatory surveillance. However, there are other,
potentially more significant consequences from the introduction of multiple forms of
international capital: conflict between the security institutions.

*Extraverted Practices, international capital, and conflicts between security units*

What these practices mean for individual security officers caught up in relationships with
sets of interveners within Sahelian spaces of intervention is that new forms of capital are
created by international security assistance that are accessed and realized within specific
local settings. In so doing, it heightens tensions between security units in their
competition for the consolidation of authority and dominance in security matters:
international forms of material, economic, and symbolic capital amplify the conflictual
nature of security field dynamics, sometimes resulting in violence.
Revamping police offices, or providing desktop computers or Internet service for specialized security units may seem inconsequential to many observers. But in a setting of cash-strapped state budgets, wherein security units compete over material and symbolic capital that are used to maintain positions of prominence in the security field, the provision of such equipment is very important. Security institutions that receive equipment gain local prestige and honour due to their involvement in international capacity-building projects much to the chagrin of rival institutions that are not.

Being given security equipment constitutes an endorsement of a security institution’s claims of authority in security matters by international actors, which is recognized locally. For example, Niger’s OCRTIS, has been trained by EUCAP-Sahel and other international actors in several law enforcement techniques such as detecting fraudulent documents and intelligence-gathering (see EEAS 2015b). International capacity-builders have given OCRTIS security tools and technologies in connection with these types of training. While the unit is legally authorized to pursue drug control investigations nationally, competing security institutions in the country, like the Gendarmerie’s Section de Recherche, and the Customs Direction de Lutte Contre la Fraude (DLCF) and Surveillance du Territoire (ST), also exercise this legal mandate. However, OCRTIS agents are understood by many of the country’s competing units to wield the skills and technological tools that make its involvement in drug control have a taken for granted quality due to their regular contact with international capacity-

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96 During the fieldwork stage of this research, the unit was officially called the Centre de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Drogue au Niger (CCLAD). Its name was changed 8 May 2015 by Ministerial order.
97 I was shown equipment provided to CCLAD, SCLCT, and RG units on several occasions.
builders.\(^{98}\) While not forced to do so, even rivals in the Nigerien Gendarmerie have regularly called upon the unit to identify illicit goods seized, and to take over criminal investigations involving drug trafficking when an OCRTIS brigade is located in the region.\(^{99}\) They contest OCRTIS’ dominance, but recognize its authority.

This latter case presents a relatively stable, but still contested, example of how the some competing units recognize the authority exercised by a more specialized, internationally sponsored law enforcement unit. More common are the routine rivalries that mark West African security institutions that have derailed the designs of many global security governance initiatives. Inter-corps rivalries hamper the security practices and logics of global security experts, most of whom frame security solutions in terms of coordinated approaches that would bring together the region’s customs, gendarmes, police and national guards together in new ‘specialized’ anti-trafficking or counter-terrorism units.\(^{100}\) What is ironic about the creation of such specialized units is that the rivalries between the internal security forces of Francophone states are a direct result of structures established during the colonial era: “We provided to our Africans all of our security imbecilities,” acknowledged one senior French DCI official.\(^{101}\) The largest challenges that face the DCI efforts and EUCAP-Sahel mission is how to deal with the palpable tensions that are a regular feature of inter-security service corps rivalries. The socio-material resources that these interventions offer to the security institutions of the

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\(^{98}\) Interview, Customs ST officer, and 2 DLCF officers, 23 April 2013, Niamey.

\(^{99}\) Interview, senior French security official, Niamey, 26 April 2013; interview, two CCLAD (OCRTIS) officials, 2 May 2013, Niamey.

\(^{100}\) Interview, senior EUCAP-Sahel official, 30 April 2013 Niamey; interview, senior French security official, 2 May 2013, Niamey.

\(^{101}\) Interview, senior French security official, 15 April, 2013, Bamako.
Sahel, while not the source of these rivalries, spike the competitive dynamics that already exist in the security field.

France’s support for the development of the specialized Malian OCS provides a potent example. The OCS is a unit created in 2009 through strong SCTIP involvement and diplomatic backing that brings together elements from the National Police, the Gendarmerie and Malian Customs Agency. It is charged with all drug-related criminality in the country, and is a site of regular, targeted interventions from the French DCI, UNODC, US and EUCAP-Sahel Mali.

A narcotics police unit already existed in Mali, established in 1988 when Mali had signed the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. With the country’s newfound position of prominence as a space of transshipment along the cocaine route, the creation of the specialized joint-service OCS was viewed by international capacity-builders in Mali, especially the DCI, as the ideal moment for an institutional upgrade and strong push in capacity-building. As such the OCS sidelined the original drug police unit, the Brigade des Stupéfiants.

The Brigade has been completely sidelined. While observing the daily operations of the Brigade, it was apparent that its computers were old and did not have reliable/adequate Internet connection. The vehicle meant for the Brigade’s use was in a state of disrepair, and had been consistently so, its officers constantly attempting to fix it. Moreover, Brigade officers regularly strain for international support, to be selected in international training, and provided equipment.\textsuperscript{102} Newer material given by international observers at the Brigade des Stupefiants headquarters, and interviews with five Brigade Officers, 15 October 2013, Bamako.
partners, as well as state revenues, is channelled to the OCS instead of the Brigade. In April 2013, the Gao division of the OCS was nearly prepared to be re-stationed in the city – only months after French and Chadian forces had expelled Islamist rebels – meaning that the unit had acquired sufficient material equipment from international sources, and government support to take up their post in the north. The only member of the Brigade to be included into the OCS was its former commissioner, who was designated to the Adjoint position; none of the officers of the Brigade were included in the newly formed unit. While speaking with the members of the Brigade, the low level of morale was palpable. Brigade members argued in tones of desperation that they had a right as Malian police officers to be included more regularly in international trainings. Sometimes, this desperation and rivalry between the two services has led to fist-fights. On one highly publicized occasion which occurred at the Bamako Sénou International Airport, rival units fought over which team had the right to claim the arrest of a Sierra Leonean national trafficking cocaine in his luggage (Keita 2013). Getting members of the different security services into the same room with each other, let alone working together on an institutional basis is a recurrent challenge to implementing any security project in the sub-region.

Competition for inclusion shapes personal strategies for the accumulation of symbolic and material/economic capital from international sources. Members of

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103 I counted 5 OCS 4x4s at OCS headquarters in Bamako in April 2013.
104 News article read from original publication during fieldwork in Bamako, Mali. News of the scuffle was also broadcasted on the Malian National Television station, ORTM – viewed in Bamako, 11 April 2013.
105 The UNODC/UNPOL sponsored Sierra Leonean Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) has allegedly also sidelined the country’s original drug enforcement agency – see statement by Executive Director of Sierra Leone’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Turay 2014.
specialized units try to increase international sponsorship by providing insider knowledge and perform transnational gatekeeping that global security experts seek. As stark asymmetrical relations of power mark the interactions between international and Sahelian actors, one’s position as a gatekeeping node that channels valued information to police liaisons and capacity-builders becomes a key resource that can be converted into material and symbolic capital. Several individual officers of the Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien security institutions interviewed insisted that in addition to teaching specialized law enforcement skills, capacity-builders also seek information regarding criminality in the region, and the degree of corruption or complicity of local government and security officials. Being able to indicate particular brigades or officials that maintain close ties to alleged traffickers becomes a symbolically valued resource for police officers wanting to secure the trust of international actors. Their regular contact with international capacity-builders, and the demand for reliable information that this creates, establishes an incentive structure wherein knowledge and information from local sources is leveraged for inclusion in capacity-building projects, and with this the provision of security equipment. In essence, Sahelian security agents become the ‘confidential informants’ of international police actors. The benefits of this structure then feeds back into recognition of authority in security matters in the national setting, as officers that have not yet risen to positions of institutional prominence covet positions within specialized units by attaching themselves to agents that have solidified transnational law enforcement connections.

Similar to elsewhere in West Africa, these competitive dynamics between members of the different security corps are often played out when law enforcement agents are being selected for inclusion in specialized training or exchanges abroad. The
activities of Western police liaisons, for example in training that they attempt to perform, operational support they attempt to provide to their national counterparts, and even which individuals should be selected for capacity-building tends to remain first and foremost the results of negotiation, “bricolage and adaptations to local contexts and circumstances” (Tiquet 2013: 53). This field strategy is remarkably similar to the conditions of policing during the colonial period. Global security experts must often rely on the recommendations of the senior leadership of beneficiary institutions, or trusted agents that have previously proven themselves useful to capacity-builders, regarding who should be selected for security training. But this puts capacity-builders in a difficult and awkward position. The formal bureaucratic reporting strictures of transnational security governance initiatives run counter to the institutional understandings of African political agents who make such decisions according to a different rhythm associated with the social positions of symbolic or political capital of Malian or Nigerien ‘Big Men’. Capacity-builders and security big men (heads of units, divisions, or national directorates) hold different criteria for who should be selected for international trainings, resulting in stiff negotiations between these global and local actors. Malian and Nigerien security officials insisted that agents that demonstrate loyalty and leadership qualities are the ones who they choose for training.\footnote{Interview, senior Malian Police official, 15 April 2013, Bamako; interview with senior Nigerien RG official, 2 May 2013, Niamey.} Demonstration of loyalty to the unit and its leaders suggests the need to adhere to the personal logic of patron-client relations, and the spirit of ‘support for support’ that marks neopatrimonial systems of rule in the Sahel. International capacity-builders expressed how this is unacceptable, and instead seek to select officers that could demonstrate practical policing skills: reading and writing, and
the ability to write a police report; the ability to properly record data, preferably in digitized form (which was viewed as next to non-existent for Mali and Niger’s security agencies by French DCI and Spanish police liaisons); a demonstrated ability to forecast potential risks prior to them becoming threats; and some indication of a capacity to plan ahead. In order to limit their personal frustration, and to eventually ‘get things done,’ capacity-builders that pursue the strategy of maintaining advisory relationships (EUCAP-Sahel, DCI, Spanish police liaisons) averred the need to regularly desist with their overly rigid standards of selection and bureaucratic processes due to how often the negotiation process would push back project timelines, thereby upsetting bureaucrats of intervention that fund and design these projects in European capitals. Since capacity-builders operate at the interface of pressures from headquarters in Europe to complete training projects on time and in a visible way, and local strategies which are driven by a different security logic based on patron-client networks, EUCAP-Sahel, DCI, and Spanish capacity-builders stated a need follow ad hoc measures to make solutions work that will please as many of the global and local parties involved as possible. When I asked French DCI in Ouagadougou, Bamako, and Niamey how the selection process unfolds with national Sahelian counterparts, the answer was nearly universal: “We do what we can to select the officers that we know will succeed and show the drive to do so. But ultimately we need to negotiate and convince senior police leadership, and they have a perfect idea of who they

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107 Interview, two Spanish police liaisons, 21 April 2013, Bamako; interview, French senior EUCAP-Sahel Niger official, 30 April 2013, Niamey. The inability of Sahelian security actors to plan and react prior to an event was consistently repeated by nearly every capacity-builder interviewed.
prefer to receive the training. Usually it is those junior officers that have family connections, or ones that agree to pay.”

These practices of extraversion should not be understood as morally reprehensible actions that ‘dupe’ international capacity-builders (although this may be the case). In several West African countries, state bureaucrats and public servants are poorly paid or are not always paid at regular intervals. Many public servants, including those of the security services, are not given funds with which they can effectively pursue their duties, which results in demands made by them for payment from citizens who call for their help, even if it is just for gasoline or to purchase cell phone air time. These types of financial constraints, and the desire to advance one’s social standing through the accumulation of material wealth or symbolic capital are also potent motivating factors. They may alter how security practices taught in training sessions are pursued in practice, or how security tools and technologies that are provided from global security experts are used based on specific circumstances where multiple, sometimes contradictory, incentives are present due to the crowded and fragmented nature of the Sahel’s assemblage of security intervention.

**Conclusion**

Security governance initiatives to combat borderless threats in the Sahel are determined by conflicts over how to pursue capacity-building, and which authorities, both global and local, should be recognized and involved in such efforts. Competing understandings between international capacity-builders based in the Sahel are structured by the symbolic power of experience and recipient trust in security governance and international training.

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Conflicts over the delivery of security initiatives, and whom ought to be involved as experts and recipients of expertise beset relationships in connected spaces of intervention due to opposing logics of security and the resulting field strategies pursued by competing security actors.

These conflicts have facilitated the pursuit of practices of extraversion by recipients of global security governance initiatives. These practices are not contained at the level of the Sahel’s heads of government. Security units targeted for inclusion in international initiatives to combat borderless threats in the Sahel equally pursue extraverted practices and are incentivized to operate at cross-purposes between international actors. By leveraging the conflicts and lack of coordination that marks the field of capacity-building, security units in Sahelian countries maximize the material and symbolic security rents attached to the fragmented efforts of international actors. However, the introduction of multiple capacity-building interventions also crucially spikes the conflictual dynamics of the Sahel’s security fields.

Global interveners do not drive this intriguing and complex order of negotiation, conflict, and cooperation onto an autonomous, acquiescent, unknowing, and uncalculating group of African political actors. Marked by structural relations of asymmetry, different coalitions of Sahelian actors located in the connected spaces of intervention compete over resources derived from dependence on the international, and use these to consolidate security authority and to direct how security interventions will unfold in practice.
Chapter 5: By Air – Drug Interdiction at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport (LSS), Senegal

This chapter examines the socio-political contests of the assemblage of security intervention at an important site of connectivity of one of West Africa’s most politically stable states: Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport (LSS), Senegal. International actors have stressed the need to modernize Senegal’s security institutions to capitalize on the country’s political stability, and also because its infrastructural capacities and level of development are judged to be routinely exploited by transnational organized crime networks. To do this, international capacity-builders have developed specialized security units that incorporate elements of all of the country’s dominant law enforcement institutions in order to better tackle drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime. Capacity-builders connect the newly created specialized inter-agency units to similar counterparts across the globe through regional trainings, on-going security pedagogy, and technology transfers in order to expand the geographical scale of law enforcement efforts to trans-regional levels.

The UNODC’s AIRCOP project is one of the first international initiatives implemented in West Africa to have created this type of specialized inter-agency unit. AIRCOP is particularly interesting due to the expansive global spread of airports incorporating the project, and because of its perceived success in accomplishing drug interdiction. It is one of the region’s ‘flagship’ global counter-transnational organized crime capacity-building measures. AIRCOP’s security governance rescaling reconfigures Senegal’s field of security, challenges the security logics of its actors, and creates new security practices in the governance of borderless threats.
The chapter makes three arguments. First, in Senegal, the recognition of authority in security matters is tied to the colonial heritage of the internal security institutions in Francophone African states. This heritage structures competition between actors in the field of law enforcement as they position themselves in relation to global structural transformations and security governance rescaling efforts like AIRCOP to maintain their salience in determining security policy. Second, projects like AIRCOP amplify inter-agency rivalries over dominance in this field. It impels some security actors to find alternative sources of capital available from actors in adjacent fields like Senegal’s political field, or the transnational field of security capacity-building. This means that Senegalese security officials selectively choose from a wide range of patrons to support (sometimes national ones, others international ones) depending on how it will consolidate their authority over their competitors at different times. This situation fuels a mutual distrust between sets of global security experts and Senegalese security actors. Third, through projects like AIRCOP, the governance of borderless threats in West Africa is being transformed; security practices are being moved to simultaneously local and global scales, making drug control no longer a national game in Senegal, but a transnational one. Mutual distrust has an important consequence on governance rescaling in regard to AIRCOP: drug interdiction practices are shifted to transnational scales, but this takes place through tense negotiations between multiple governance actors – not due to functional or rational design responses (Slaughter 2004b; Jojarth 2009). The governance outcomes of the project are derived from struggles between sets of public and private, global and local actors over who ought to participate, and the appropriate scale at which drug interdiction law enforcement should be performed.
The first section of the chapter describes the AIRCOP project design before turning to the implementation and operation of AIRCOP at LSS International Airport. The second section describes the historical development of the internal security institutions of West African francophone states. The third demonstrates how the competitive dynamics of this field come to bear on the workings of AIRCOP. The fourth section shows how Senegalese security officials can be selective in the capacity-building measures they support and how this fuels relationships of distrust between some global security experts and ‘unsupportive’ national recipients of security capacity-building. The fifth section demonstrates how a multiplicity of public and private actors in the airports, each seeking to maintain their own interests and routines in drug control, alters how AIRCOP functions resulting in new security practices that do not necessarily measure up to the policing standards desired by Western law enforcement capacity builders.

**AIRCOP Project Design**

Interdiction programmes being implemented across West Africa clearly demonstrate the politics of the governance of borderless threats. Competing practices and conflicts among security authorities performing policing duties across disparate institutional spaces are focalised at key transnational spaces like the sub-region’s airports. AIRCOP is one such important interdiction initiative. This technical law enforcement capacity-building initiative is funded by the EU and Canada, with facilitation and implementation performed by UNODC. It is one of eight self-standing law enforcement capacity-building projects funded by the EU, which share the objective of strengthening beneficiary law enforcement agencies in Latin America and West Africa against transnational organized crime networks (European Commission 2013). While UNODC does not participate in an
operational law enforcement function, its representatives provide technical assistance which fashions the concepts, practices, and frameworks that facilitate the project’s interdiction efforts.

AIRCOP is intended to operate as a multi-agency transnational initiative to curb drug trafficking through advanced detection, and an enhancement of law enforcement capacity in matters of investigation and interdiction within participating airports. The programme connects law enforcement officers working in airports of the West African sub-region and further afield to airports in Brazil, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO) in order to monitor the arrival and departure of travellers moving along what has been come to be known as “the cocaine route” (see CORMS 2015a). The establishment of real-time and operational communications between these selected airports is meant to provide law enforcement in West Africa with up-to-date information on trafficking trends in order to head off potential threats to the states of the sub-region by communicating before the arrival of such threats. AIRCOP is designed as a key component of UNODC efforts of an integrated border strategy, with a focus on air borders.

\[109\] For regular and updated information on the EU-funded Cocaine Route Programme, see http://www.cocaineroute.eu/.

\[110\] There are ten international airports that are covered by the project’s first phase, each located in capitals of the states that have signed agreements with the United Nations: Sao Paulo; Dakar; Praia; Abidjan; Lagos; Bamako; Lomé; Accra. Guinea and Morocco are invited to join the AIRCOP project should funding be acquired. In phase 2, Cotonou, Douala, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Bogota, Caracas, Kingston and Punta Cana airports have been selected for implementation of the project. In phase 3, Niger and Mozambique, Peru and El Salvador will be added to the list of participant countries.

\[111\] The AIRCOP Project Coordinator recently presented this strategy and the overview of successes of the AIRCOP project at the European Commission’s ‘Cocaine Route
There are two dominant pillars to the AIRCOP programme. First, signatory countries are required to create specialized inter-agency law enforcement teams, or Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITF) that will be present on a 24-hour basis in selected airports. Members of these JAITF units are to be drawn from customs agencies, gendarmeries and national drug police. The JAITF units are to undergo specialized training in interdiction policy and practice. These practices include the development of risk forecasting techniques meant to identify trafficking profiles and monitor probable trafficking itineraries, how to conduct selected/targeted-control searches, and the mastery of ‘smart-technology’ methodologies, which are taught in training programmes led by UNODC project coordinators in collaboration with regional police liaisons stationed at several diplomatic missions throughout the region. It is assumed that the talents and skills of each member of the JAITF will complement individual security agency priorities, since members of the JAITF are selected from the different security services of these states. International trainers are meant to provide mentorship for the JAITF units (see UNODC 2014a; European Commission 2015).112

The second pillar is the implementation of ‘secure’ networked access to intelligence data and transnational organized crime alerts throughout the participant network. JAITF unit members are to be linked to information databases operated by INTERPOL and the WCO in order to tackle trafficking through smarter, more effective,
well-connected, “intelligence led counter-narcotics activities” (UNODC 2011: 66). Each JAITF member is assigned a user profile and access to the Customs Enforcement Network Communications Database (CENCOM), which allows for encrypted communication between CENCOM users, as well as the delivery and receipt of alert notifications of possible trafficking activities.

JAITF members are also given access to INTERPOL’s I-24/7 database, which facilitates communication between I-24/7 users, and provides access to information on wanted persons, stolen travel documents, international arrest warrants, biometric data and known criminal associates. Access to these databases is meant to enhance the synergy operating between law enforcement agencies’ national initiatives with those undertaken regionally and internationally. Connecting the participating JAITF units through an integrated platform is also designed to reduce operational redundancies and the duplication of law enforcement efforts. The project emphasizes the enhanced capacity of West African law enforcement’s use of technical models that signal particular risk profiles for JAITF users, allowing for the forward flow of information prior to the arrival of possible traffickers. Together, these pillars are understood as a necessary mechanism for increasing seizure rates in participating airports prior to possible entry to European markets.113

AIRCOP’s project design, therefore, seeks to connect decision-making procedures and security practices across disparate geographies. It gives global-oriented security institutions new capacities to perform security governance beyond the national scale

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113 Interestingly, the project draws on design elements of previously developed information exchange programmes utilized by the EU in preparation for the enlargement process from fifteen to twenty-five members.
towards transnational ones. The activities of AIRCOP beneficiaries and project managers institutionalize practices for accomplishing interdiction and border enforcement that does not recognize sovereignty as container-like, but instead as connected, contiguous sites that are vulnerable to what Beck (1999) has called “de-bounded risks.” Importantly, the project’s objectives are to curb drug trafficking flows closer to its sources of production: this is law enforcement by remote control, a form of policing outside of strictly national territory by assessing distant and potential future threats (see Bigo 2006). UNODC officials and Western police liaisons and capacity-builders teach policing by remote control to JAITF members. The premises of AIRCOP’s design highlight the diffusion of security expertise and knowledge regarding ideals on border security and drug interdiction. This is accomplished through the work of capacity-builders that perform their duties as they respond to the practices of African law enforcement officers and local field challenges, while simultaneously reporting to headquarters in international organizations and Western capitals and throughout the network of AIRCOP teams.

AIRCOP rescales the security governance of drug interdiction. However, as it does so, it exacerbates field struggles between Senegal’s security institutions over how to secure the country, where efficiency is a key form of symbolic power. The project is hampered by a wide availability of sources of patronage for security capacity-building, which means that Senegalese security actors can be selective in their choice of where to acquire forms of capital they need. As a governance initiative, it is severely challenged by relationships of distrust between governance actors. The outcomes of this governance initiative are a function of non-cooperative negotiation due to distrust between involved governance actors, and contests between them over their level of involvement in
AIRCOP. This means that global security experts that intervene through AIRCOP are not so powerful that they can force African governors to wilfully acquiesce in all interactions. Within the operation of AIRCOP as an assemblage of security intervention, negotiation and competition over rescaling is more prevalent than functional cooperation and coordination.

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**The (post)colonial field of security in Senegal**

The organizational structures of the internal security institutions in Senegal, inherited by the country at independence from France, create the institutional basis for competition over the acquisition of material and symbolic resources attached to the implementation of new security governance arrangements like AIRCOP. The inter-agency rivalries between Senegal’s internal security institutions severely complicate how AIRCOP operates in practice – its governance – since the project amplifies competition over the question of which institution is the best suited to provide security against non-traditional security threats.¹¹⁴

Each of the internal security institutions has had to respond to global structural transformations experienced in Senegal. These include rapid urbanization, the sub-region’s unceremonious insertion into the global economy through trade and financial liberalization of the late 1970s-1980s, rising global inflation and the lowering of commodity prices, the advancement of information technology (IT), and the illicit opportunities that these structural transformations afford transnational criminal networks (Ellis 2011: 27-28, 53-56). More than law enforcement adaptation to new forms of global criminality, however, many of Senegal’s security institutions (especially services charged

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¹¹⁴ The next sections rely heavily on participant observation in the LSS International Airport, and interviews conducted in the summer of 2012 and winter of 2013.
with tackling forms of illicit smuggling) lobbied government and international actors that
they had skills that made them best suited to have their capacities reoriented towards
other scales of governance. When Senegalese government actors, or Western capacity-
builders and IO experts have advocated for the disassembly of some internal security
institutions, or parts of them, and their reassembly into global, transnational scales of
governance responsibility, instead of others, this has only amplified the rivalries of
Senegal’s security institutions.

The structure of Internal Security Services in Francophone African Countries, and their
responses to global structural transformations

The genesis of the internal security institutions, and the field of security and law
enforcement in which its agents are embedded, must first be described in order to
understand how the assemblage of security intervention structures competition of security
roles. Security institutions in Francophone Africa are direct inheritors of colonial rule.
They consequently mimic the organizational patterns, legal mandates, and rivalries that
are a feature of policing structures in France (Haberbusch 2003: 303-306).\footnote{In most
postcolonial Francophone African countries, leadership of the internal security forces
remained under French officers for several years (see Igbinovia 1981: 126-127; Tiquet
2012, 2013). Thus, organizational patterns and policing practices in law enforcement and
training maintained colonial structures.

Francophone African states include three, or sometimes four different over-arching
security corps, following the French model: the Police; the Gendarmerie; the Customs
agencies; and for Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, the National Guard. The Police are

\footnote{For a historical view of the longevity of formal policing institutions implemented in
the colonial period and continued in use after independence, see Baker 2008: 50-73.}
designated as a civil institution and placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, while the Gendarmerie operate with military status and are placed, for the most part, under the Ministry of Defence of Francophone African states. Customs agencies operate under a semi-military status and are usually placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Historically, the police have been tasked with operating in urban milieus, while gendarmes perform law and order tasks in rural locales and at territorial borders (Bagayoko 2010: 31-39). Customs officers also have historically tended to perform their roles of tax and duties collection at territorial borders and key entry points to state territory like international airports. Each of these services is subdivided according to investigative or administrative (general law and order) responsibilities. Based on these organizational and territorial divisions, the policing institutions of Francophone African states have historically relied on distinct operating cultures and types of practices that place an emphasis on controlling some goods/people over others.

The former division of labour that placed national police forces in urban areas, while rural areas were left patrolled by the gendarmerie, blurred significantly through the 1990s. As the economies of African states were ripped open to international trade and financial liberalization, security institutions have converged on sites that they argue are vulnerable to risks associated with global forms of mobility. Dakar is an important example. A bulk of the sub-region’s concentrated economic and financial transactions, both licit and illicit, occur in Dakar, which serves as logistical hub for transnational organized crime networks. This makes the city a security focal point for Senegal’s specialized law enforcement actors, as well as international actors seeking to tackle
transnational criminality. Customs, gendarmes and national police increasingly find themselves conducting law enforcement work under very similar operational mandates and within the same geographic spaces – especially in urban centres and at border sites like LSS airport.

These socio-economic changes intensify competition over how security agents practice security: “each new way of formulating the question of security and each problematization of state order reworks the professional cultures of agents in uniform” (Debos and Glasman 2012: 9). Senegal’s security institutions are experiencing “hybridisation” from inter-institutional competition across public agencies, and through interaction with an ever growing source of private and societal forces in the provision of security governance (see Samb 2013; Badji 2014).

For example, customs officers have added to their traditional function of accruing state revenues and limiting tax/duties evasion new responsibilities in maintaining the security of the state by controlling the movement of goods across national territory. They argue they are the best suited to secure Senegal’s borders due to their institutional pedigree and knowledge of the trading communities based in Dakar. Officers of the agency’s Direction de Renseignements et des Enquêtes (DRE) argue that any type of fraud or smuggling, be it counterfeit toothpaste, gasoline, wildlife, etc. involves a level of criminality as dangerous to the state as illicit narcotics, that can result in negative consequences on the Senegalese economy and citizenry. Furthermore, global law

[116] The theme of the Customs Agency’s centrality in securing the country from borderless threats was recurrent in multiple interviews with officers conducted in July-September 2012, and January 2013.
[117] The importance of the DRE within the Senegalese Customs Administration has also been maintained, on a practical level, due to its ability to retain its staff longer than
enforcement experts, notably from INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO), support Senegalese customs officials, and influence them to adopt global standards for facilitating legitimate trade, and to use advanced technical methodologies to monitor for illegal trade (see Chalfin 2010a: 29-34).  

The Senegalese Gendarmerie, reflecting its military policing pedigree and position within the Ministry of Defence, has traditionally concentrated its efforts on the maintenance of order, making it central to the consolidation of the state (Sady 2011). In the aftermath of WWI, Gendarmes quelled food and labour riots, and later anti-colonial nationalist violence (see Haberbusch 2003; Thomas 2010, 2014: 236-262). Since 1974 the Senegalese Gendarmerie formally takes part in surveillance and intelligence-gathering functions (Bagayoko 2011: 209-210). While the responsibilities of the Gendarmerie have not changed in formal-legal terms, with political and economic liberalization their practices and targets have. Since the 1990s, it has shifted its focus towards detecting forms of criminality emanating from sites of potential social disorder. This includes surveillance of areas where radicalized individuals may be found, such as the quartiers populaires on the outskirts of Dakar.

High-level officials of the gendarmerie have also pushed for the institution’s enhanced role as an integral component of Senegal’s border control. Gendarme brigades similar Customs sections in other Francophone West African countries. One of the most important reasons for this is that although the DRE units are not tasked with retrieval of ordinary customs duties at import, the Central Administration continues to pay bonuses on seizures logged by DRE teams for fraudulent and illicit goods as if there were duties paid.

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118 Interview, 3 senior Senegalese Customs officers, 30 August 2012, Dakar.
119 As of January 2013, the Senegalese Gendarmerie consisted of roughly 5700 officers. Interview, senior Senegalese Gendarme official, 15 January 2013. See also Badji 2014: 136.
120 Interview, senior Gendarmerie official, 8 August 2012, Dakar.
monitor the coastline, perform joint maritime operations with international partners, and pursue investigations into the movement of individuals they consider risky or suspicious. \footnote{Interview, three Officers of the Gendarmerie Section de Recherche, Dakar, 23 August 2012. For information on joint maritime patrols between Senegalese Gendarmerie officers and Spanish, see Frowd 2015.} Senior gendarme leadership argue that their mandate to secure border areas makes them ideally-placed to participate in peacekeeping missions abroad, and in counter-trafficking operations. One expert has determined that efficient and professional competency in border control skills demonstrated by the Gendarmerie has made Senegalese officers “more and more sought after by military commands in other states and by the administration of many multilateral organizations” (Badji 2014: 7). \footnote{My translation from French.}

Like many African police forces, Senegal’s National Police have been viewed as a provider of regime security, instead of the protection of its citizenry (see Diop 2013: 55). This trend solidified under the reign of President Abdoulaye Wade, from 2000-2012. Wade used the National Police, especially its Division of Criminal Investigations, \footnote{\textit{Division des Investigations Criminelles} (DIC).} as a tool of repression and surveillance against journalists, human rights organizers, political challengers, and anyone “known to advocate subversive positions in public” (Samb 2013: 349). Other police divisions with contacts close to the Wade regime used the platform of the DIC to stress the need for the institution to enhance its international credibility, especially since the country’s Gendarmerie were selected by international partners for joint border control partnerships in the early 2000s. \footnote{Interview senior Senegalese Police official, 15 January 2013, Dakar.} Upper-level representatives from specialized police agencies like the \textit{Direction de Surveillance du Territoire}, the \textit{Police de l’Air et des Frontières}, and the \textit{Office Central de Répression des Trafics Illicites et des}
Stupéfiants (DST, PAF, and OCRTIS, respectively), successfully became clients of Senegalese political elites, who act as key transnational gatekeepers in the country’s economic liberalization. Becoming clients of political elites gave specialized police services a more consolidated position within the country’s security architecture in governing borderless threats. OCRTIS was given the legal authorization and responsibility to liaise with global policing partners in December 1997. This mandate provides OCRTIS officers with opportunities to liaise with international partners like French DCI officers, Italian Guardia di Finanza, Spanish police liaisons, and US FBI and DEA agents, and to demonstrate the uniqueness of their capacities in law enforcement in order to further consolidate their authority over their competitors.

OCRTIS and DST leadership argue that their connections with such global partners in policing, through links to counterparts based in Dakar and to police officials of neighbouring countries, furnish them with the social networks, resources, and skills required to tackle borderless threats.

In Senegal, each service jockeys for position with its counterparts in order to justify its prominence within the state’s security field, and advancement in security governance rescaling. Similar to processes of post-Cold War transformation and European integration, dominating the control of transnational flows of goods and people has defined Senegal’s field of conflict between these actors (see Bigo 2000, 2005). Security institutions with border enforcement tasks have sought changes in their institutional remit

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125 Interview, senior Senegalese Police official, 6 August 2012, Dakar.  
127 Interview, French DCI official, 22 August 2012, Dakar; interview, senior Senegalese DST official, 26 August 2012, Dakar; interview, Senegalese Police official, 14 January 2013, Dakar; interview, Former US Defense Attaché to Senegal, 12 September 2012, Dakar.
so as to better latch onto opportunities for material, symbolic, and possibly criminal forms of capital in securing Senegal from borderless threats.\textsuperscript{128} These reformulations only intensify the rivalries between these corps when an international project like AIRCOP is introduced.

**Inter-agency competition and AIRCOP implementation**

Competition over how to accomplish drug interdiction policing tasks pervades the activities of the inter-agency team design of AIRCOP. Attempting to put officers from these three competing corps in the same room with the expectation that they can dovetail their unique capacities is a daunting task that is only partially successful. Twenty-one officers were selected and employed in the CAAT. Within one year, six of these (all of which were from the police) did all that they could to get out of the service, seeking to return to OCRTIS. Of the fifteen that remained, two-thirds would rarely come into work when scheduled. When they have, the unit’s members demonstrated a palpable frustration towards their corps counterparts due to differences in opinion regarding how to actively police the border. How the CAAT operates presents a puzzle. It is a global-oriented security governance initiative. Individuals selected for involvement in the CAAT are from law enforcement units that have leveraged their connections to transnational gatekeepers of the country’s political field, have developed and secured transnational law enforcement networks, and have themselves articulated to police liaisons based in Dakar the discourse of their country’s vulnerability to drug trafficking, political willingness, and a degree of capacity to counter this threat. Nevertheless, many of the police officers left

\textsuperscript{128} Interview, senior Senegalese Police official, 6 August 2012, Dakar; interview, senior Senegalese gendarmerie official, 8 August 2012, Dakar; interview, senior Italian Police official, 14 January 2013, Dakar.
the unit, and its operation is hampered by the behaviour of its remaining members. Instead of valorising the project, this situation seems to reflect a lack of international prestige.

*Competing practices, and justifications of (non)inclusion in AIRCOP: Authority in the field of law enforcement*

Tensions within the unit stem from two factors: first, unit members hold competing understandings of which risk indicators and practices yield the greatest effects in identifying and catching traffickers.¹²⁹ For example, CAAT agents disagreed on what types of individuals to inspect. Customs agents stressed the need to only investigate passengers arriving at LSS by employing risk forecasting analysis, and to leave policing the departure gates for other airport law enforcement. Risk forecasting, as a preferred security practice amongst Customs agents, reflects their understanding of the importance of their cultural capital accrued through advanced educational training, mastery of databases and digitized information, and involvement in controlling and taxing imported goods (see Chalfin 2010a).¹³⁰ In line with AIRCOP’s operational designs, they stressed how analyzing seemingly random indicators, which when combined point to a need for physical searches on specific risk candidates, yields the greatest chance of success in catching traffickers. This did not mean that other types of policing practices based on ‘gut-feelings’ were not warranted, but that discovering and exploiting patterns in trafficking, as the project’s design should provide, will accomplish the most important work of the unit. On the basis of various forms of flight information, such as itineraries,

¹²⁹ Interview, UNODC official, 8 August 2012, Dakar.
¹³⁰ Interview, UNODC official, 7 August 2012, Dakar; participant observation of UNODC presentation at HONLEA meetings, 26 June 2012, Accra.
method of payment, age, nationality of travellers, etc., customs agents argued they could better identify suspicious individuals. An example of this strategy was the practice of looking for individuals carrying expensive luggage and whether this matches the level of quality of the individual’s clothing; a disconnect in the two forms of apparel, they argued, is a matter of suspicion and is grounds for searching the individual.\textsuperscript{131}

Gendarmes contested this strategy, and argued that these indicators are not as noteworthy as suspicious types of behaviour that must be observed in person. For example, they insisted that walking throughout the airport to identify and evaluate which individuals avoid eye contact was a better way to identify traffickers. Odd body language, and how quickly individuals attempted to pass through security controls were better indicators, and could help to establish if any other individuals than passengers, like airport employees, are involved in trafficking endeavours.\textsuperscript{132} The case of Solomon Adelaquaye, former head of security at Accra’s Lokota International Airport’s involvement in facilitating drug trafficking to the United States, indicates the potential productivity of such a practice (BBC News 2013a).\textsuperscript{133} Gendarmes of the unit do not contest the logic of investigating arrivals, but also stress the need to monitor people at their departure in order build on social indicators of suspicion, and to identify networks of concern.\textsuperscript{134}

This led unit members to also disagree over which non-CAAT law enforcement agents based at the airport they could cooperate with and rely upon. CAAT gendarme

\textsuperscript{131} Interview, CAAT customs officer, 29 January 2013, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview, CAAT gendarme officer, 31 January, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview, two DEA agents with experience in Senegal and Ghana, 13 June 2013, Arlington.
\textsuperscript{134} Participant observation, 25 January 2013, LSS.
officers noted that they liaised with counterparts stationed in the LSS parking lots and the terminal’s main entrance, who would better inform them about suspicious looking individuals.\(^{135}\) Customs agents found that this was not the unit’s priority, and that OCRTIS officers could deal with this situation based on their own sources and confidential networks. Unit members did agree, however, that it was necessary to foster good relations with PAF agents since the latter are the “first line of defense” that arriving passengers must face at LSS.\(^{136}\) Pursuing some practices and law enforcement connections over others, differences reflecting the organizational cultures and historical relationships of the country’s security institutions, are a cause of contention over how to perform drug control at LSS, and severely affect how AIRCOP is governed in practice.

The second, and even more consequential source of tension in CAAT relations is how members of the security institutions frame their inclusion in security provision as a necessary public good, and maintain negative allusions and stereotypes of their competitors’ deficiencies resulting in inter-agency mud-slinging. These self-assessments and evaluations centre on what is valued in the security field, and what provides the means of dominating that structured space: the symbolic capital of efficiency and operational trust in drug control. Being recognized as an efficient security force that is trusted in pursuing law enforcement operations against borderless threats reflects the desires of each security actor/unit, and constitutes an understanding of their deserved inclusion in the security field. Performing large drug seizures, multiple seizures on a regular basis, or dismantling a trafficking network, for example, becomes a form of symbolic capital for law enforcement actors which is incrementally accrued over the

\(^{135}\) Interview, CAAT gendarme officer, 30 January 2013, Dakar.

\(^{136}\) Interview, CAAT customs officer, 29 January 2013, Dakar.
careers of individual officers and the history of the unit. Mobilizing rumours of corruption or ineptitude, i.e. a lack of operational trust in a rival actor, is a powerful discursive strategy intended to diminish the accrual of her/his symbolic capital (see Loveman 2005). The fact that no one agency monopolizes drug control efficiency in Senegal, and since operational trust is lacking between OCRTIS, the Customs DRE and its anti-trafficking unit Brigade des Investigations Criminelles et des Stupéfiants (BICS), and units of the gendarmerie, means that agents find it extremely frustrating to work with each other in the CAAT.

The self-image of OCRTIS officers interviewed was that the national police are the state’s integral security providers; it is the most competent law enforcement body to protect Senegal’s citizens’ liberty, property, and government institutions. Due to Senegal’s rapid urbanization, the police sustain the most regular interaction with Senegalese citizens (see Samb 2013). This fact puts them on the frontlines of security provision, which constitutes for them “a sacred public trust.”137 With regard to drug control, police officers stressed that OCRTIS has had the longest historical experience in protecting the country from this borderless threat, as well as the best track record, compared to the Customs and Gendarmerie.138 While they acknowledged that the Gendarmerie has performed some of the country’s largest seizures of cocaine in 2007...
(see UNODC 2007: 4-5), this occurred only by chance.¹³⁹ Only OCRTIS brigades consistently managed to arrest traffickers, and seize narcotics throughout the country in any degree of regularity, which enhances their symbolic capital and authority within Senegal’s field of drug law enforcement.¹⁴⁰

The self-image of police in Senegal, however, should not necessarily be taken at face value. Senegalese citizens consistently view the National Police Service to be one of the country’s most corrupt government institutions (see Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2001; Badji 2014: 28). National police have been implicated in attacks on Wade’s political opponents, and in relentless quotidian corruption and bribe taking (see Samb 2013: 348-352). Recently, the leadership of OCRTIS was accused of trafficking cocaine via Nigerian criminal networks, which has been a source of national embarrassment for the entire police institution (see Ba 2013; WACD 2014). Customs and gendarme competitors challenged the glaring disparity between police rhetorical self-understandings, and the recognized practices of predation by police officers to delegitimize their efficiency.

Conversely, the gendarmerie has experienced a greater popular legitimacy amongst the population, far beyond than that experienced by the country’s police (see Sady 2011; Badji 2014). While the police have seen a steady reduction of the number of officers

¹³⁹ On 27 June 2007, local residents of Mbour notified the Gendarme Brigade that a boat had washed ashore. Upon inspection, the Brigade found 1.2 metric tonnes of cocaine. They were able to determine an individual connected to the boat, searched that individual’s home, and found another 1.2 metric tonnes. For OCRTIS, while the seizure itself was appreciated, the act was a fluke. For pictures, see UNODC 2007. Interviews with residents living near the coast, 18-19 August 2012, Mbour; interview, UNODC Analyst, 31 January 2013, Dakar.
¹⁴⁰ Interview, senior OCRTIS officer and subordinate, 24 January 2013, Dakar; interview, four OCRTIS officers from Brigade des Stupéfiants – Ziguinchor unit, 5 September 2012.
since Wade’s 2000 election, the number of Gendarmerie has remained steady (Samb 2013: 351). Its territorial spread has provided them with a greater visibility to Senegal’s citizens. French and Spanish police liaisons noted in interviews that local populations have recognized the Gendarmerie’s role in protecting the country from borderless threats by which many of Senegal’s neighbours seem perennially plagued. The largest cocaine seizures experienced in the country occurred due to their connections to local populations that trusted the gendarmerie enough to inform local brigades of suspicious activities and events. As a result, the gendarmes interviewed articulated the institution’s national legitimacy, as well as its enhanced competencies and visibility as what makes them the most important provider of security nationally.

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1 It is nearly impossible to get a specific number of Police and Gendarme officers for Sahelian countries. European police officials stress that the national forces themselves do not know the precise numbers. However, estimates by the end of 2012 were roughly 5000 Senegalese gendarmes, vs. 4000 police. In order to remedy the dwindling level of police officers, on 30 March 2015, Senegalese Minister of the Interior announced the recruitment of 2000 officers, split evenly between the National Police and Gendarmerie (see SenewebNews 2015).

2 Interview, French DCI official, 22 August 2012, Dakar; interview, three senior Spanish police officials, 13 September 2012, Dakar.

3 Interviews in with villagers, 8-9 September, Ndangane. In 2007, Spanish-speaking ‘businessmen’ established a shrimp cultivation business and employed local villagers. The villagers were paid a daily wage that was significantly higher than what was the going rate for day labour in the country (Cfa 5000 vs. Cfa 1000-2000), which made the villagers more than willing to work, but suspicious of the operation. The business was a money-laundering and logistical front for the shipment and sale of cocaine trafficking. While details are murky, in interviews it is apparent that local gendarmes were notified of the strangers’ presence in the village and in nearby homes. When the capsized boat washed ashore in Mbour, two hours by boat up the coast, gendarmes followed the activities of these Spanish-speakers and arrested them in Mbour three days later. The homes near Ndangane were liquidated that night by unknown persons (although one was thought to be a Guinean welder that was in on the scheme). Villagers watched the story on the news, and subsequently stripped the shrimp cultivation basins of all useable material (see Ba 2007).
They also emphasized their inclusion in matters of international policing cooperation as a way to demonstrate their institutions’ validity and authority in the country’s drug control architecture. For example, since 1990, Senegalese gendarmes have been deployed in several UN missions, making Senegal a significant contributor of UNPOL officers. The national Gendarmerie Academy provides courses in peacekeeping practices, taught by French DCI and experienced Senegalese officers. Gendarme officials argued that involvement in two UN missions in particular, MINUSTAH and UNOGBIS, were especially pertinent since Senegalese units had to react to drug trafficking operators, and inform international law enforcement actors in these postconflict spaces of any intelligence gathered (see Cockayne 2009). Their officers’ experience in UN missions has donned them with a high reputation as some of the most professional and well trained amongst African contributing nations by UN, French and US officials (see U.S. Embassy Dakar 2006; Taft 2008: 73, 81), which, for them, guarantees their inclusion in the country’s border security and drug control.

More important than this for gendarmes interviewed, however, are the informal transnational law enforcement networks that complex peace operations have facilitated. For example, General Abdoulaye Fall, commander of UNOCI’s civilian police between 2004-2006, and head of the Gendarmerie High Command, and head of the Chief of Staff of Senegal’s Armed Forces from 2006-2012, is well known for having stressed the importance of Senegalese gendarmes to develop links to regional, and European law

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144 Interview, UNOWA official, 1 February 2013, Dakar.
145 Interview, DCI, 22 August 2012, Dakar.
146 Interview, 2 senior Senegalese Gendarme officials, 12 September 2012, Dakar.
enforcement officials through UN missions and other security training platforms.147 Section de Recherche officers maintained that the development of these informal links with counterparts in the region, Morocco, and in Europe, makes their efforts more nimble when investigatory information on a suspect is required.148 For these officers, since OCRTIS agents are not normally selected for inclusion in complex peace operations, and Customs officers never included, the gendarmerie upholds their dominance in efficiently pursuing drug control law enforcement and the protection of Senegal’s territory.

Like the National Police, Senegal’s Customs Agency suffers from citizens’ perceptions of corruption with an acute notoriety. Nevertheless, members of its BICS unit argue that their agents were defenders of Senegal’s security and, crucially, economic development.149 Due to the country’s expansion of trade and financial liberalization, DRE officials view their role in the governance of borderless threats as central to providing the state with revenues while simultaneously protecting the country from tax evasion, the introduction of goods that may harm ordinary citizens (like narcotics), and the functioning of the national economy. Customs officers in Senegal undertake more formal education than police and gendarmes, which is a crucial form of cultural capital that the former use to discredit the capacities of the latter. Lastly, Customs officers receive remuneration for customs receipts that they accrue, as a nationally systematized incentive

147 Interview, Former US Defense Attaché to Senegal, 12 September 2012, Dakar; interview, 2 senior Senegalese Gendarme officials, 12 September 2012, Dakar. Fall has undertaken training in Saint-Cyr, in Morocco, Germany, and the United States. He is currently serving as Ambassador of Senegal to China (see Fall 2015).
148 Interview, three officers of the Gendarmerie Section de Recherche, Dakar, 23 August 2012. The retention and use of regional/transnational contacts of gendarmes was common to discussions held with Burkinabe and Guinean Gendarmes held on 1 August 2012, Ouagadougou.
149 Interview, 3 Senegalese Customs Officers, 30 August 2012, Dakar.
to accrue the most revenue as possible, and to discourage graft. While Senegalese citizens maintain that this is patently not the case, BICS officers argued that the majority of their corps does not need to be corrupt since they received bonuses even on the seizure of illegal goods.\textsuperscript{150} For these reasons, DRE officers maintain that they are the most legitimate and integral partners in providing a public good of security.

These self-understandings and perceived organizational advantages create nearly insurmountable tensions within the CAAT, which becomes a micro-arena for challenging the authority of security counterparts. Gendarmes and police deride the inclusion of customs officers, seeing the latter as “just in it for the bonus”.\textsuperscript{151} They argue that once seizures are performed, customs officers do not have the necessary skills to pursue criminal investigations, and to dismantle trafficking networks. Police and Gendarme also relay those generally held beliefs of corruption among the Customs service prevalent of the national population: “Ask anyone about customs agents. They are the most corrupt of any state official.”\textsuperscript{152} In short, they question the authority of Customs officers in conducting policing efforts.

Gendarmes view the police as too politically motivated (see Badji 2014: 140, 157). They question the police’s impartiality as a security institution, and maintain that the investigatory methods that are used by police officers have an urban bias, which

\textsuperscript{150} Interviews, senior Senegalese Brigade des Investigations Criminelles et des Stupéfiants official, 14 August 2012; 16 January 2013, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{151} Multiple interviews with police and gendarme interlocutors routinely repeated this formulation regarding Customs agents.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview, four OCRTIS officers from Brigade des Stupefiants – Ziguinchor unit, 5 September 2012, Ziguinchor; participant observation of border crosser interactions with Senegalese Customs agents, 6 September 2012, Ziguinchor.
diminishes important attention to border zones. Moreover, they find that the police are ill equipped to undertake the types of intelligence gathering that are crucial to tackling trans-border crime, like profiling border crossers, crisis management, and mobile policing over disparate types of geographical terrain. Gendarmes not only have the historical experience with these types of law and order skills, but also have made important regional contacts, have secured the international recognition of these skills, and the historical ability to make due with tightened budgets to conduct these types of tasks (see Kaly and Faye 2011; Badji 2014: 161, 171). While Gendarmes view the police as authorized participants in security governance, they view the latter as second-rate security providers.

OCRTIS officers regard the Gendarmerie in a better light than anti-trafficking unit Customs officers, but still find that the former’s competencies are best suited to issues of national defence, as given by their military status: they are not ideally suited for long-term transnational criminal investigations. Finally, BICS and DRE officers find they have a broader sense of the relationship between security and economic development than police or gendarmes. Their advanced education was articulated in interviews as providing customs agents with an edge in securing the country from borderless threats over their competitors. They perceive their ways of detection and interdiction of illicit

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153 Interview, three officers of the Gendarmerie Section de Recherche, 23 August 2012, Dakar.
154 Interview, two Senegalese Gendarmes, 22 January 2013, Dakar.
155 Interview, 2 OCRTIS officers, 15 January 2013, Dakar; interview OCRTIS/CILD officer, 17 January 2013, Dakar.
156 Interview, senior Senegalese DRE official, 17 January 2013, Dakar; interview, 3 CAAT members (two Customs, 1 Gendarme), 25 January 2013, Dakar.
goods, honed over the course of their careers and the institution’s historical development, to be more sophisticated than the practices of their counterparts.

No one institution monopolizes symbolic power within this field. When each security unit challenges the inclusion of its counterparts in AIRCOP, the end result is the perceived illegitimacy of the project itself by involved actors, or at least in the eyes of the OCRTIS officers first assigned to the CAAT due to the unit’s infrequent drug seizures.¹⁵⁷ OCRTIS officers hold the legal-formal basis of authority as the specialized institution tasked with countering drug trafficking in Senegal. Since international capacity-builders have insisted on the need for the three units to learn how to coordinate their efforts and skills to make the CAAT an efficient security governance arrangement, this has pushed OCRTIS to leave the project.¹⁵⁸ In the eyes of UNODC programmers and European Police Liaisons, this increases the international legitimacy of DRE Customs agents, and gendarmes that have been willing to participate in AIRCOP.

**Global opportunities for capacity-building and strategies of selection**

Inter-agency animosity and rivalry has pushed OCRTIS officers to opt for alternative sources of international forms of capital to increase their recognition. Such a strategy is made possible by the Senegalese political and security elites’ success in convincing an array of international actors of the country’s political stability and simultaneous vulnerability to the sub-region’s borderless threats: there are many international sources of material and symbolic available for the practices of extraversion.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, 2 OCRTIS officers, 15 January, Dakar; interview OCRTIS/CILD officer, 17 January 2013, Dakar.
¹⁵⁸ Two police from the Police Judiciaire were included in the CAAT by mid-2013, personal e-mail communication with former senior CAAT official, 8 February 2014.
Senegal’s strategic military importance, enduring social and economic connections with Europe and North America, and political stability have been recognized by a multitude of international actors (see Villalón 2011; Arieff 2011; Dumont and Kante 2012; US Department of State 2014). International actors have also pinpointed Senegal as encircled by a breeding ground of borderless threats, and have implemented a sustained effort to maintain and enhance the capacities of its security institutions (both those conventionally known as ‘internal security institutions’ and its national armed forces) as a bulwark to the risks that instability presents. The country’s infrastructural capacities also make it an alluring location for capacity-building measures, as international expatriates can find many of the amenities of life that they are accustomed to in Europe and North America. Taken together, Senegal has become a key logistical hub for international security cooperation (European Commission 2014a). The internal security institutions acknowledge this, and adjust their strategies for the accumulation of symbolic and material resources tied to international security rents accordingly.

*Adaptability in selection of diverse patrons in connected fields*

Due to the large-scale international response to strengthen this bastion of political stability in the sub-region, security officials in Senegal can be selective in their choice of a capacity-building patron, especially when they do not agree with the methods of capacity-building measures that others have to offer. OCRTIS officers have taken this tact.

Because of the possibility of selectivity, representatives of the National Police expressed no qualms in critiquing the security values and knowledges of some UNDOC
capacity-building experts and programmers.\textsuperscript{159} For these senior police officials, AIRCOP programmers did not exercise the type of expert authority that shapes what constitutes a governance problem or how to solve it, as argued by Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 47). Key officials of the Direction Générale de la Police Nationale (DGPN), for example, were against the implementation of the AIRCOP project due to its flawed inter-agency programme design.\textsuperscript{160} They disagreed with the underlying security premises of the project and its methods. For example, the project only targets drug mules, but does not allow for continued surveillance of the larger criminal networks for whom these mules work. One official indicated that international capacity-builders often volunteer training programmes for local law enforcement officers that reflect Western security concerns that national security services do not consider as imminent threats. AIRCOP, for this interlocutor, represented not only a waste of time and money due to its lack of local knowledge of competition and rivalry between the security services, but also a lack trust in the abilities of Senegal’s police to operate as efficient, serious officers, which in his opinion, may have reflected a nuanced form of cultural prejudice masked in technical-speak.\textsuperscript{161}

Critiquing some international actors, in this case UNODC officials, also constitutes a show of political support for national political elites that need to balance their extraverted practices of transnational gatekeeping with the demands of national symbolic politics. For example, after tacitly supporting his police officers in leaving the CAAT, the

\textsuperscript{159} This is not to say that all UNODC staff was criticized. Some UNODC officials have very productive relationships with police officers from OCRTIS especially.
\textsuperscript{160} Interview, Senior OCRTIS official, 10 August 2012, Dakar; interview, Senior OCRTIS official, 15 January 2013, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{161} Interview, senior OCRTIS official, 10 August 2012, Dakar.
Director of OCRTIS was subsequently promoted to a very senior leadership position within the DGPN. His promotion was rumoured to have been because of his willingness to challenge international capacity-builders, a trait that was valued by Ministers of the Interior (first Bécaye Diop, then Cheikh Tidiane Sy), politicians widely known for supporting President Wade unquestioningly (especially Diop). Diop allegedly held similar opinions regarding a distrust of the intentions of European powers (especially France). At the time of AIRCOP’s initial discussions in 2009-2010 (following the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan (RAP) in 2008), Wade himself was playing an adroit game of fostering Senegal’s international credentials while simultaneously advocating Africa’s resurgence, international importance, and independence. This was not the firebrand accusations of neo-imperialism that Côte d’Ivoire’s President Laurent Gbagbo consistently reiterated, but a call for collaboration and partnerships with multiple, not exclusively Western, international actors on African terms instead of Western ones (see De Jong and Foucher 2010: 194-196; Banégas 2006, 2011; Piccolino 2012). Wade’s strategy balanced national political concerns for regime consolidation while leveraging international economic and security concerns over West Africa’s struggle for development and vulnerability to borderless threats. The OCRTIS official similarly framed his concerns about the project in terms of policing efficiency against this borderless threat, and his long experience in policing drug trafficking in the country. By tying himself to the Minister of the Interior, the Director of OCRTIS’ refusal to openly cooperate and support the implementation of AIRCOP was demonstrating support for the

162 Interview, French DCI official, 22 February 2013, Dakar.
163 Interview, French diplomat, 21 August 2012, Dakar; interview, Senegalese journalist, 23 January 2013, Dakar.
President of the Republic. While his newly acquired position in the DGPN occurred under a new Minister and President, his strategy of being a client of prominent actors of the political field by being resistant to international actors in the field of capacity-building yielded an important personal advancement of symbolic capital for the Director and OCRTIS itself in Senegal’s field of law enforcement. His appointment to the DGPN positioned him as a member of the centralized security apparatus, the Centre d’Orientation Stratégique, an organ that consolidates representatives from each of Senegal’s major security institutions under one administrative body which is beholden and accountable to the president alone. While OCRTIS’ international validation as a partner in police cooperation may have suffered in the eyes of UNODC officials, and the latter’s French DCI and Italian Guardia di Finanza supporters, the unit’s recognition of authority by the country’s political elite increased.

While Senegalese police officials took a more confrontational approach in expressing agency in their relationship with UNODC over AIRCOP, this does not mean they have taken the same tact with other international actors. OCRTIS recognize that collaborating with international experts in matters of police cooperation is a means of attaining forms of prestige from global actors, which can translate into material forms of capital, required to pursue their operational mandates. They also recognized that training platforms yield important law enforcement effects. For example, two OCRTIS officers were sent on UNODC training in Colombia, which facilitated the development of inter-regional law enforcement contacts, notably from Cape Verde. In December 2012, the OCRTIS officers, in cooperation with Cape Verdean Judicial Police, arrested a trafficker in Dakar with 4kg of cocaine, thus boosting the symbolic capital of the unit. International
training platforms and exercises are recognized, therefore, as an important source of cultural capital that cannot be rejected **tut court**.\textsuperscript{164} This means that they must pursue a range of strategies in their asymmetrical relationships with international partners (see Jourde 2007: 487). For example, OCRTIS (and other police) officials hold Spanish police liaisons in very high esteem, even though they know that Spain has less on offer in terms of donating security equipment than French policing partners (see Andersson 2014b: 122-123).\textsuperscript{165} Senegalese national police also covet involvement in American capacity-building projects, especially since they tend to provide high per diems for training courses, and have historically provided policing and security equipment for each training programme.

OCRTIS officers in particular also indicated that they preferred involvement in Spanish and American capacity-building actors’ measures because they view them as respectful partners compared to French DCI and some UNODC experts. Their strained relationships with UNODC developed increased ‘follow-up’ by the head of the French DCI. Frustrated by the unwanted monitoring attention drove one senior drug official to state her opinion that the French “still assume that Africans live in trees.”\textsuperscript{166}

Another reason that Senegal’s security actors seek to foster relationships with Spanish and US security experts is that the latter represent historically prestigious drug (and counter-terrorism) law enforcement institutions with global remit whose experience is valued and recognized. OCRTIS officers believed that FBI, DEA, and Spanish Police and Guardia Civil officers have tackled investigations involving drug cartels from Latin

\textsuperscript{164} Interview, senior OCRTIS officer and subordinate, 24 January 2013, Dakar.
\textsuperscript{165} Interview, senior OCRTIS official, 10 August 2012, Dakar. Interestingly, the chief Spanish Police Liaison was one of the only European policing partners to attend the Dakar Harmonization Initiative Conference in September 2012. This was a significant act for Senegalese law enforcement officials in attendance.
\textsuperscript{166} Interview, senior CILD official, 14 August 2012, Dakar.
America and the Caribbean for many years, making them some of the most efficient law enforcement experts in matters of international drug control, while UNODC programmers do not necessarily have operational backgrounds in policing transnational criminality.\(^{167}\)

Senegalese security officials seek to capitalize on their relationships with Spanish police liaisons in order to acquire internationally recognized symbolic and cultural capital. They do likewise in order to also accrue material capital that FBI and DEA partners can provide. This means that they may acquiesce to the demands of these two sets of partners more readily than those from the DCI, UNODC, and the Guardia di Finanza.\(^{168}\)

When these factors are taken into account, the fact that Senegalese police officers left the CAAT is clarified. Many police officers within OCRTIS and the CAAT admire senior police officers, and know that advancement of their careers is made possible through offering their support to the former. Some senior police officials are directly connected to Senegal’s political and economic elites, who successfully sell the image of Senegal’s attractiveness as a stable, willing international partner vulnerable to borderless threats to global audiences. Senior police leaders delegate responsibilities to their subordinates, and choose which agents will be put forward for international training programmes that state leaders negotiate with diplomatic partners. Acquiring certificates from US, French, Spanish, British, or IO-led training is a key form of cultural capital for both individual West African police officers, and their units. Supporting a senior officer

\(^{167}\) Of course, this assessment of UNODC experts is patently wrong – of all the UNODC officials I interviewed, only one did not have a law enforcement background. Interview with 2 officers of OCRTIS-Brigade des Stupefiants – Ziguinchor unit, 6 September 2012, Ziguinchor; interview, senior OCRTIS officer and subordinate, 24 January 2013, Dakar.

\(^{168}\) Other police liaisons based in Dakar include a Portuguese agent, and a British SOCA officer. I was never able to interview the Portuguese official, and few Senegalese law enforcement agents mentioned the importance of this partnership.
by visibly showing an unwillingness to fully endorse a project like AIRCOP through foot-dragging or other forms of subtle resistance can make the difference between remaining a police sergeant stationed at a post of little consequence, or one day becoming a captain conducting investigations from the DGPN headquarters in Dakar or even an embassy in another African capital or in Europe. Paradoxically, this means that the symbolic power of international actors is present, but can only be accessed when channelled through the medium of transnational gatekeepers tied to national political elites. The political field significantly shapes the possibilities for international cooperation of the security field.

*Fuelling mutual distrust through AIRCOP governance*

Foot-dragging, slow implementation, and a refusal of sustained police involvement in AIRCOP have stoked mutual distrust between OCRTIS and CILD officials, and their UNODC, DCI, and Italian counterparts. Setting up AIRCOP was intended to signal Senegalese political will to combat transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and its desire for regional approach via the Dakar Initiative, and the combined regional measures taken to tackle drug trafficking from Latin America enshrined in the ECOWAS RAP (ECOWAS 2008).[^169] The project was meant to orient Senegal towards a global security-focused audience that as a state it understands the complex risks associated with the threat of drug trafficking. While government and law enforcement officials touted their willingness and infrastructural credentials to the international donor community, in practice their willingness to challenge governance arrangements and be more selective

[^169]: The Dakar Initiative involves the harmonization of the legal frameworks for drug-related offenses in several neighbouring countries of the sub-region: Senegal, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali and Gambia, with Mauritania and Niger participating with observer status.
has been interpreted by UNODC officials and other European capacity-builders as a lack of cooperation and political will to modernize security institutions. As a result, interactions between UNODC officials and Senegalese security actors (decision-making leadership, OCRTIS, and officers from the CAAT) are marked by distrust over how border security practices should be performed.

UNODC officials expressed frustration with the implementation process at the inter-ministerial and programmatic levels for AIRCOP. These programmers ultimately answer for the success or failure of the project to its international funders. For DCI, and Italian police-liaisons and trainers that share a similar vision with UNODC officials, the lack of support for the implementation of interdiction programmes is often perceived as ‘stubbornness’, or ineptitude of local African security services. One French official insisted “planning isn’t an African strong suit;” meaning that law enforcement is a modern, proactive, professionalized and technical profession that contrasts with purportedly primitive forms of policing on the continent. This reflects the view that many Western police specialists articulated in interviews: their states and law enforcement agencies have mastered the ideal form of policing and are present in West Africa in order to implement social change in African policing towards that ideal. Not being able to reach that ideal means that other forms of policing cannot be trusted.

Nearly all UNODC and Western police liaisons interviewed articulated this generalized distrust of the capacities and political will of their Senegalese security

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170 One DCI official exclaimed, “It’s a shame. AIRCOP is an attractive initiative. But it just can’t work as it should because of rivalries and lack of political support to stop them.” Interview, French DCI official, 2 February 2013, Dakar.

171 Interview, DCI official, 22 August 2012, Dakar.

172 Interview, UNODC official, 2 December 2012, Vienna; interview, senior Italian Police official, 14 January 2013, Dakar.
counterparts, and certainly of the country’s political elite. During an interview over dinner, a UNODC official threw up his hands and exclaimed “I don’t think they really want to solve any of these drug problems,” implying that there are very real potential financial losses for the country’s politicians if AIRCOP worked as it should. OCRTIS officers were viewed as particularly suspicious actors, which reflected their support for national political elites who many international actors in Dakar assume might be connected to transnational criminal networks. While Senegalese Customs officers involved in the implementation of AIRCOP have been viewed in a much more positive light, the attitude of distrust still looms over interactions between the CAAT members and international capacity-builders.

Distrust of the CAAT’s members translates into a regular practice of ‘following up’ on the unit and others like it in the country. According to AIRCOP’s programming design, follow up is a central practice within the overarching security logic of mentoring local security agents (UNODC 2009: 15). The logic of mentoring is shared in the programmatic visions of most interdiction programmes in West Africa, and more general police reform programmes internationally (Horn, Olonisakin with Peake 2006: 116; Greener 2009: 110-115; Walby and Monaghan 2011: 278-279; CORMS 2014). European police liaisons frame follow-up as a technical measure to improve the law enforcement capacities of CAAT members, what one UNODC official compared to “sharpening a blade.” Trainers view their role as guiding the Senegalese security services towards the development of professionalized police mentalities that remain at arm’s length from the

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173 Interview, UNODC official, 7 August 2012, Dakar.
174 Interview, UNODC official, 10 August 2012, Dakar.
political drives and interests of traditional elites (see Neoclaus 2008). This involves routinizing methods of security governance and the use of sophisticated detection and investigatory techniques.

Follow-up, however, entails more than simply ensuring that CAAT members are maintaining skills. The security practices taught by UNODC programmers for AIRCOP are designed to change local policing habits to bring them in line with Western policing standards. It is a mode of disciplinary power that divides normal, valid forms of policing, from abnormal ones that need to be rooted out (Foucault 2007: 57). It is the role of UNODC experts to pass judgment on the skills, and by extension the interests or motives, of Senegalese law enforcement through this practice. Officers that master AIRCOP’s security practices are selected and bound together by standardized police work routines built into AIRCOP’s design, like basic use of computers and databases, arriving to work on time, and maintaining a profiling schedule based on LSS’s daily flight arrivals. When they do so, UNODC officials recognize CAAT members as trusted law enforcement partners. CAAT members that cannot, or that continually insist on challenging the vision of UNODC officials, are recommended for dismissal from the unit, or in the example of OCRTIS police, root themselves out.

When Western police liaisons and UNODC officials frame the project its technical terms, however, their political interests in seeking to govern borderless threats at a distance – away from populations in Europe – are concealed. European Police Liaisons interviewed in Dakar argued that professionalization and modernization of the Senegalese

175 However, many police liaisons and trainers recognize the systemic constraints and long term processes that this social change entails, often creating significant employment frustration.
security institutions was a lynchpin to properly govern drug trafficking and related borderless threats closer to their source of origin. Senegal’s economic, historical, and social connections with Europe, solidified in no uncertain terms by a large and vibrant Senegalese diaspora in countries like France, Spain, and Italy, shortens the distance between the continents and enables the development of “decentralized shadow economies, trans-border migratory flows, and non-state global insurgent networks” to harm European and international stability (Duffield 2005: 143). AIRCOP is a measure that will distance these types of threats from Europe: it helps to consolidate Europe’s “external sovereign frontier” (Duffield 2007b).

For CAAT officers, the implication of the practice of following up is that UNDOC officials believe they have forgotten, lost, or never mastered how AIRCOP is meant to run. CAAT officers uniformly resented the practice of UNODC follow-up, and viewed it a way of undermining senior leadership officials. The result is that CAAT members, notably the gendarmes of the unit (since OCRTIS do not participate) reciprocate the distrust of UNODC officials, and French and Italian partners. CAAT officers, therefore, are caught between multiple patrons. Catering to AIRCOP officials, and demonstrating a strict compliance to its intended project mechanisms means the securing of forms of capital derived from global security experts. This will help to consolidate one’s position of authority within the security field, and can also be used as a personal strategy of employment mobility in the future. On a more pragmatic level, however, they are Senegalese public servants, and beholden to their national chains of command. So when European police liaisons make impromptu visits to the CAAT team, CAAT members
notify their superior officers. Superior officers have interpreted such a practice as an indictment of Senegal’s security institutions.

The result is the reciprocation of relations of distrust between global (UNODC, DCI, Guardia di Finanza officials) and local actors (OCRTIS, CAAT gendarmes). OCRTIS and CAAT gendarmes, along with their senior leadership argue that the primary beneficiaries of managing drug trafficking in Africa are European: many capacity-building measures on offer reflect the security understandings of Western states. The sense of this partner distrust has been a consistent source of frustration for Senegal drug control officials. In August 2012, several official meetings to discuss potential programming opportunities between representatives of the Comité Interministériel de Lutte contre la Drogue (CILD) and the UNODC were cancelled by the CILD Director over a perceived lack of cordiality and arrogant demeanour of individual UNODC staff.176 Similarly, in December 2012, a newly appointed senior OCTRIS official refused to provide a European police liaison with seizure statistics and police training materials since he had felt that the request for information was actually a veiled indictment over a recently botched trafficking investigation.

OCRTIS, along with some senior officials of the DGPN, actively train their officers to be sceptical of the training that is received from Western capacity-builders and the

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176 The CILD is an inter-ministerial committee created after Senegal’s ratifying of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The CILD brings together representatives from each Ministry in Senegal to be informed of the ministries of issues of concern related to drug trafficking and use. The CILD is also the organizational platform which liaises with international partners for drug-related programming. A senior security official with the rank of commissioner (usually from the national police, but also from Senegal’s national Customs agency) has headed it since its inception, selected by the Minister of the Interior. The Committee holds less symbolic capital and prestige than OCRTIS.
allure of their overly technical solutions. One officer explained this to me in front of a subordinate, “CAAT is fine. We want to participate in forums with international partners. I’ve been on trainings similar to the CAAT. UNODC sent me to Bogotá to conduct training on drug seizures on the high sea. But the problem that we face is bigger than the CAAT. It doesn’t matter how wonderful the gas is if the car doesn’t work in the first place.”

This statement is more than an expression of discontent over the types of programmes offered by international partners that emphasize the adoption of sophisticated law enforcement techniques without recognizing local constraints (see Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007). It is also an analysis of the existence of a strategic game for the recognition of policing authority between global security experts and national ones, and a healthy distrust of the methods and intentions of technocratic forms of security.

While OCRTIS and other police officials recognize their relationships with global security experts are asymmetrical, they still find it necessary for dominant international partners to recognize their unique experience and expertise in law enforcement: they want recognition of their authority. They insist that if European police liaisons intend to make the country a shield to protect European populations from drug trafficking, then acknowledging the authority of the actors holding that shield, and have been doing so for many years, is more than warranted.

177 Interview, senior OCRTIS officer and subordinate, 24 January 2013, Dakar.
178 Interview, senior CILD official, 14 August 2012, Dakar; ; interview, Senior OCRTIS official, 15 January 2013, Dakar.
Interdiction efforts and public/private actors at LSS International Airport: Rescaling the governance of drug trafficking

Stating that there is mutual distrust between actors in an intervention relationship is not especially novel. It is a key premise of the ‘hybrid’ or ‘everyday’ variant of statebuilding research (see Mac Ginty 2011, 2014; Wilén 2012; Richmond 2014). What is distinct about the relationships between sets of actors involved in AIRCOP is how it has unique effects on the rescaling of security governance. The tacit assumptions of functionalist accounts of transnational governance networks trying to find the best way to solve transnational problems become clear when relationships of distrust are visible and when power asymmetries are present. Mutual distrust between governance actors has distinct outcomes for the way that drug interdiction is rescaled through AIRCOP. The way that the LSS CAAT operates displays tense forms of negotiation instead of mutual accommodation. CAAT officers maintain an ambiguous relationship regarding the level of acquiescence they display to UNODC programmers and French and Italian police liaisons in order to maintain their support for their national chains of command. Balancing these allegiances, and simultaneously trying to ‘make do’ with the project as it stands, means that AIRCOP’s rescaling of governance loses much of its intended design potential to govern drug trafficking at a distance.

Even amidst the generalized distrust between UNODC, French and Italian police liaisons, and Senegalese security actors (some much more vehement in their distrust than others), AIRCOP is still acknowledged by international actors as a successful security governance initiative. The CAAT successfully interdicts some of the drugs traveling the
cocaine route arriving by air. Ultimately, AIRCOP’s governance practices to curb drug trafficking in West Africa are rescaled to multiple connected non-contiguous sites, which is what the project intends. Even if AIRCOP does not work as UNODC programmers have designed it to, it has still produced a transnational structure of law enforcement networks that push the governance of drug interaction to transnational scales while embedding each CAAT within their concomitant national settings (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 95).

Due to UNODC programmers’ assumption of distrust, AIRCOP functions as surveillance of Senegalese security actors as much as it is for controlling drug trafficking. Nevertheless, assessments that the surveillance power of capacity-builders and police liaisons gives actors in the global south “little room to refuse” does not hold sway for the case of AIRCOP (Zaiotti 2011: 185). CAAT members use tools that AIRCOP has afforded them in order to be efficient in drug control investigations and to stop trafficking through LSS. But they do so in a way that indicates to UNODC officials that security governance rescaling cannot happen without accounting for CAAT members’ capacities and experience in drug interdiction, and the context of struggles with other governance actors within the space of LSS. Therefore, security governance rescaling through AIRCOP occurs as an outcome of contests over whom should be involved in aiding this initiative, and at what scale interdiction should take place. AIRCOP’s operation at LSS occurs against competing priorities of the CAAT, airport officials, private actors like airline representatives and individual travellers, in addition to the Senegalese security institutions and their manifold rivalries, and UNODC and other international police

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179 Some traffickers will always pass through LSS drug controls.
liaisons. The structural constraints of the airport itself also complicates its functioning, which requires the adaptation of its actual practice.

Negotiation, private interests, and structural constraints at LSS

It makes sense for senior Senegalese security officials not to challenge the technical premises and depoliticized character of UNODC interdiction projects too far. By accepting projects like AIRCOP, national political and security elites, for example the Minister of the Interior and head of the DGPN, accrue symbolic capital since the country becomes viewed as a trustworthy partner in tackling global threats like transnational organized crime. Senior Customs and Gendarmerie officials therefore have instructed their officers in the CAAT that refusing outright to work with international partners would only signal to the international donor community unwillingness to tackle transnational organized crime. One former UNODC official explained AIRCOP’s relationships between capacity-builders and the multiple levels of government actors in a recipient country as “the political theatrics of counter drug trafficking assistance!” Senegalese security officials accept technical assistance programmes like AIRCOP because of the forms of material and symbolic capital that can be accrued through their national security institutions’ participation. It is also a way to co-opt lower-level public agents, like the CAAT members, since interaction with global security experts results in a sort of diffusion of material and symbolic resources to them, such as internships abroad, international trainings, and the like.181

180 Interview, former senior UNODC official, 2 December 2012, Vienna.
181 Interview, Vienna, 2 December 2012; interview, senior UNOWA official, 1 February 2013, Dakar.
Senior leadership of the DRE, the CILD, and Gendarmerie, nevertheless have indicated to CAAT members that acknowledgement of the techniques and skills taught by UNODC programmers and other capacity-builders must be tempered by Senegalese experience and expertise in drug control.\textsuperscript{182} Global security practices, they stress, must only be recognized to the degree that they can be molded to Senegal’s context, and its priorities. In these circumstances, Senegalese customs and gendarmes officers in the CAAT balance their loyalties between European police liaisons and their specific commands.

For example, CAAT members follow the regional trend of always scrutinizing Nigerian passengers arriving at LSS. Due to their perceived notoriety in drug trafficking operations, as mentioned routinely in UNODC reports, Nigerian citizens are nearly universally searched at the LSS airport, and other airports in the sub-region where CAAT units are active (UNODC 2012a: 79, 84; Ellis 2009: 177). Maintaining this practice is important for several reasons. First, it is viewed as ‘easy pickings’ for the CAAT. Due to the frequency of trafficking ventures using Nigerian drug mules, profiling these individuals does not take much effort, and results in regular drug seizures and arrests. Second, the regularity of performing seizures accrues to the CAAT symbolic capital in Senegal’s security field. It also placates UNODC officials, and conforms to their understanding of Nigerian criminality, regardless of whether or not other West African nationals are just as involved in trafficking. This eases some of the distrust of UNODC officials towards the CAAT. Lastly, the competing practices of distinct CAAT members

\textsuperscript{182} Interview, senior CILD Official, Dakar, 23 August 2012; interview, senior Senegalese DRE official, Dakar, 17 January 2013; interview, 3 CAAT members (two Customs, 1 Gendarme), Dakar, 25 January.
can dovetail in a more acceptable form since Customs agents can profile their names before arrival to the airport, and Gendarmes can move about the space of the airport to listen for African English speakers with Nigerian accents. Targeting Nigerian travellers arriving at LSS for drug-checks is a ‘win-win’ situation for all involved.

Maintaining 24-hour surveillance of LSS by the unit, however, is not a practice that CAAT members find legitimate or effective, even though UNODC officials insist on this being done. CAAT members have informed their command structures that they regularly receive up-dates on the arrival and departure schedules of the airport from LSS officials. They regularly study these schedules, and adapt the times of work for unit members to fit with salient itineraries that may yield drug seizures. This is a significant point of tension between AIRCOP programmers and CAAT members. French and Italian police liaisons used this example as evidence of a lack of professionalism of Senegalese law enforcement. CAAT Customs agents on the other hand view this practice as the most efficient use of the tools provided by AIRCOP, as it is based on an analysis of risk and the development of profiling techniques that have been taught in AIRCOP training courses on risk profiling by UNODC programmers. This example shows that CAAT members do not acquiesce to UNODC officials in this case since they can argue that adapted scheduling is the most efficient means of performing drug control based on the risk flow of passengers to the airport. They are uncooperative, but abide by the vision of AIRCOP and its designers based on their specific priorities. When not at LSS, these CAAT officers argue that they are pursuing investigations elsewhere. While it was unverifiable that CAAT officers pursue investigations outside of LSS, this shows that
CAAT members negotiate with global security experts to demonstrate the superiority of their security rationales, and use AIRCOP in their own way and for their own purposes.

Negotiation is also the result of recognizing and adapting to constraints in the performance of drug interdiction in the complex social space of LSS. The operation of the CAAT unit requires the practical, learned efforts of its members due to local circumstances arising from disagreements over who needs to participate in governing drug trafficking at LSS. Competing understandings over how AIRCOP should be run minimizes the likelihood of achieving its lofty standards as envisioned by UNODC and other global security experts.

We see this dynamic with interactions between actors that promote the implementation of the CAAT, and airport officials and private actors at LSS. One of the key aspects of the AIRCOP project is the provision of tools that will enhance police and customs capacity to forecast which passengers arriving at LSS require additional scrutiny. Detection is facilitated by the networked access CAAT members are meant to have been granted to international criminal databases and secure communications systems. However, the LSS Airport Authority had consistently balked at requests from UNODC and Senegal’s Ministry of the Interior to even provide Internet access to the room which houses the CAAT. Not until the eve of the official inauguration of the project, at the personal request of the Minister of the Interior, did the LSS Airport Authority finally acquiesce to install secure Internet access to the 16 desktop computers in the CAAT office. In fact, finding a room to house the CAAT and its security equipment in most of the airports where AIRCOP Memorandums of Understanding have been signed is a regular challenge for the implementation process, nearly always due to the resistance of
Airport officials seek to maintain the profitability of LSS. The airport must comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for security against international terrorism. Drug mules moving through LSS, for these officials, is not as valid a security concern as an act of terrorism, and in any case a terrorist attack at LSS was viewed as very unlikely. In the acutely diplomatic language of the IO, the Secretary General of the ICAO had already gone so far as to say that security and technical cooperation and subsequent implementation of regulations at LSS were “inconsistent” (Abeyratne 2014: 4, 20). While the airport must comply with ICAO standards, implementing additional ones for dubious security reasoning was a low ranking priority. In other words, LSS officials have material incentives to not be involved in rescaling this form of security governance when they are already compelled by other international actors to reorient their operations in the fight against terrorism (see Salter 2008; Bennett 2009).

The project also assumes that information on travellers arriving in Dakar will be available to CAAT units; but such information is rarely available, as Advanced Passenger Information is not a component of WCO-CENCOM or I-24/7 databases. As such, CAAT officers have to rely on another set of actors for possible trafficking information: international airlines (see also Berndtsson and Stern 2011). Of roughly fifteen airlines that service LSS International, as of 2014, only one has yet been willing to offer advanced passenger manifests to the CAAT, a fact which seriously compromises the effectiveness of the unit’s advanced detection and interdiction efforts.

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183 Interview, senior UNODC Official, Dakar, 10 August 2012; Interview, senior CAAT official, Dakar, 25 January 2013; Interview, senior Côte-d’Ivoire security official, Abidjan, 5 February 2013.

184 Interview, LSS official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
While the official reasoning provided was that such information might breach expectations of customer privacy, there are two other more likely factors for airline resistance to comply with requests on passenger information. First, there is no law in Senegal that forces airlines to comply with such a request. Private airline operators, therefore, see no immediate need for supplying passenger records to the CAAT, whose practices may then result in unwanted consequences for the airliners, like delaying flight departures and slowing the security process.\(^{185}\) Second, in view of the purpose of the information (to better forecast risks of trafficking), many airlines may not seek to cooperate should this reduce or harm business opportunities. For example, if there is a security concern over a particular itinerary, this could result in the refusal of landing rights at LSS mandated by the Government of Senegal. For example, between 2005-2010, Turkish Airlines operated a direct flight from Sao Paulo to Dakar that regularly yielded cocaine seizures, such that the airline lost its right to service this itinerary.\(^{186}\) More recently, government officials have closed flights arriving from Ebola affected countries to LSS, which has had a significant impact on West Africa’s aviation market (Roby 2014; York 2014). Airport officials in Dakar alluded to a lack of increased cooperation from other airlines in CAAT efforts as it could involve a lost business opportunity, and a feeling that interdiction is a matter of sovereign law enforcement, not a private responsibility of an airline company. They also argued that while they did not want to see LSS become a popular entry point for drug traffickers, they would be very disappointed at the loss of revenues that would result from cancelations of additional airlines being

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\(^{185}\) Interview, representative of Brussels Airlines, Dakar, 23 February 2013.  
\(^{186}\) Interview, senior OCRTIS officer and subordinate, Dakar, 24 January 2013. The last seizure that impelled the Senegalese government to suspend landing rights involved the capture of 150 kg of cocaine.
barred from landing rights at the airport.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, private airlines have material interests in not directly supporting security governance rescaling. Providing passenger lists to security officials could present legal ramifications due to breach of customer privacy. Airlines are already compelled to perform immigration controls on passengers by checking passports and ensuring proper visas have been acquired, neglect of which resulting in stiff financial sanctions (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Walters 2006). Agreeing to add participation in drug trafficking interdiction to the regulations they are already compelled to follow is heavily resisted. It presents too great a financial risk for a security concern that is seemingly minimal and relatively inconsequential.

While these sets of private actors contest their involvement in security governance rescaling through AIRCOP, CAAT officers also have to ‘make do’ from many structural constraints at the airport. For example, while access to the I-24/7 database is one of the project’s key strategies, the Dakar LSS CAAT unit had not yet acquired access to this tool two years after the inauguration of the project: as of March 2013, the CAAT office’s sixteen computers were not linked to the database, even though the \textit{Police de les Air et Frontières} officers, literally steps away, do have access!\textsuperscript{188} Secure access to international law enforcement databases are central to many interdiction programmes implemented in West Africa. The CAAT’s lack of access, it would seem, is not unique. The UNODC capacity-building project “Anti-organized Crime and Counter-narcotics Enforcement in Cape Verde Project” (ANTRAF), designed to strengthen the interdiction capacities of the Cape Verdean Judicial Police through the implementation of connected, secured law enforcement databases (Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), Telephone

\textsuperscript{187} Interview, LSS official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
\textsuperscript{188} I thank Philippe Frowd for informing me of this fact.
Interception System, and the Real-time Analytical Database), could not provide access to
for the project. This was in large part because of the intransigence of the Cape Verdean
telephone companies, Cabo Verde Telecom and Angolan-owned TMais, which feared the
invasion of privacy of their customers by the Cape Verdean Judicial Police in how the
latter will use these databases (UNODC 2012b: 17, 25). For private companies that hope
for reliable payment interactions with their customers, it is also possible that the Cape
Verdean telephone companies doubted the reliability of the Judicial Police’s ability to
continually pay for their services. This was definitely the case for the phones placed in
the CAAT office at LSS. The phones in the office can only make intra-Airport calls – the
result of foot dragging from LSS officials unwilling to support the costs of landlines
should the DGPN be unwilling to foot the bill, and require the payment to come from the
LSS budget.  

Lastly, while the CAAT stationed at LSS does have access to WCO-CENCOM,
very rarely are alerts sent between linked AIRCOP airports. This is due to a very practical
reason. Should CAAT officers lose their user name or password, they must call the WCO
headquarters in Brussels to have these reset, which is an unreasonable expectation since
poorly-paid West African police, gendarmes and customs officers would have to pay out
of pocket for the phone call. By 2013, several Dakar CAAT officers had forgotten/lost
this information and therefore do not log into WCO-CENCOM.  

While enhanced access to secure networked communication and information between international
institutions and regional/transnational law enforcement may be a pillar of AIRCOP, the
structural constraints of the LSS local context, and disagreements over which actors at the

189 Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 7 August 2012.
190 Interview, senior CAAT official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
airport should be involved in drug interdiction efforts temper the project design and desired statebuilding impact outlined by global security experts from the UNODC.

*CAAT drug interdiction success: reinforcing governance rescaling and new interdiction practices*

Paradoxically, these structural constraints and competing interests from private actors do not stop the CAAT’s remaining members from performing their work. Instead of refusing membership in the CAAT like OCRTIS officers, their search for efficiency in drug control, and the enhancement of symbolic capital it yields, pushes CAAT officers to find other ways to police arrivals at LSS as remotely as possible. Since only one airliner had agreed to provide passenger name records (United Arab Emirates), CAAT members have sought the help of airline employee intermediaries that can provide information on passengers: flight crews.  

191 CAAT members at LSS have developed relationships of trust with stewardesses and ticketing agents who can indicate to them any odd behaviours exhibited by passengers. For example, CAAT members have asked airline stewardesses that arrive at LSS to indicate which arriving passengers do not eat a meal. Passengers that forego eating are assumed to potentially be drug mules, since eating may induce bowel movements during the flight. If drug mules have swallowed cocaine filled in condoms (a routine trick of the trade), eating may mean evacuating trafficked product before passing through airport security and immigration controls.  

192 The strategy of asking low-level airline employees circumvents decision-makers that have been reticent to participate in AIRCOP measures, and had developed into a routine practice for CAAT members. 

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191 Participant Observation, 26 January 2013, LSS.
192 Interview, senior CAAT official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
193 Interview, 3 CAAT members (two Customs, 1 Gendarme), Dakar, 25 January.
CAAT members also ask ticketing agents and other airline employees at pre-screening if any passengers have acted suspiciously, or display odd body positions. They ask what types of clothes passengers wear depending on their type of ticket (economy, economy plus, first class), or if passengers have changed their clothes, in order detect suspicious behaviour that may indicate that a passenger is engaged in trafficking.\textsuperscript{194} In short, CAAT members adapt AIRCOP’s design to their own priorities and local circumstances. This means that they have developed a network of informants on whom they rely as information brokers similar to fostering relationship with community leaders in order to receive detailed information on the comings and goings of local communities, methods routinely practiced in many African police settings (see Oliver de Sardan 1999: 37-38; Blundo 2006; Baker 2008).

Out of this confluence of field strategies and structural dynamics linked together in the global/local space of LSS, CAAT officers have still participated in the consolidation of the global assemblage of security intervention and the rescaling of security governance against drug trafficking. We see this in how CAAT officers have co-opted some of AIRCOP’s features to implement adapted security practices that have been successful in the detection of cocaine traffickers. Some investigative techniques still rely on gritty police work and a reliance on situated forms of practical knowledge and \textit{savoir-faire} – the ‘gut feeling’ that gives a CAAT officer an inclination to question a particular individual over another due to a suspected demeanour that seems out of place (see Scott 1998, 311-320). However, CAAT officers utilize the technological tools at their disposal, which buttresses practical sense made possible by the tools provided through AIRCOP.

\textsuperscript{194} Interview, senior CAAT official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
Internet access allows CAAT officers to use websites that indicate the arrival of planes in Dakar – access to a tool that helps them to decide how to manage their time at work. The officers can also verify and estimate the average cost of flights among the different airlines that provide service to LSS, which aids in profiling passengers. For example, a trafficking itinerary was discovered in Dakar that had previously not been common to other successful seizures: the passenger travelled from Sao Paulo to Dubai, Dubai to Dakar.\textsuperscript{195} CAAT officers were able to determine the cost of such a trip, and questioned the passenger (a woman from Guinea-Conakry) what she had paid for the ticket. The suspect was unable to give an accurate price, providing a figure much lower than what an average ticket would cost for that particular itinerary. This, in addition to a lower quality of the suspect’s clothing (due to the perception that most travellers arriving from Dubai would be dressed in ‘higher-end’ wares), led the CAAT officers to determine that her luggage be searched. Hidden in an embedded compartment of two personal DVD players and in a bottle of baby powder (the suspect was not travelling with a baby), were several kilograms of cocaine.

The seizure information from this successful interdiction was added to the CENCOM database in late September.\textsuperscript{196} It provided key confirmation of a new trafficking itinerary and modality, as it helped to determine that women of Guinean origin

\textsuperscript{195} Passengers arriving from Dubai are generally considered to be either international businessmen, or part of Senegal’s international economic elite, many of which are successful importers of legal goods. Scrutinizing flights from Dubai on the basis of suspicions of drug trafficking would not initially seem logical to members of the security services, especially police and gendarmes. Customs officers, conversely would scrutinize these passengers, not for possible drug trafficking, but for customs infractions, false declarations, and whether passengers are failing to declare currencies over 1 Million CFA (1500 Euros). See Senegalese customs regulations, http://www.douanes.sn/rubriques.php?rubpage=75

\textsuperscript{196} Interview, senior CAAT officer, Dakar, 25 January 2013.
were increasingly used throughout the sub-region as cocaine traffickers. By 5 January 2014, five additional Guinean women following similar itineraries have been arrested for trafficking cocaine into LSS.\footnote{Personal email communication of seizures of cocaine from former Senior CAAT Officer in Dakar, received 8 February 2014.} During this period, only seven Nigerian traffickers were arrested for trafficking cocaine into LSS.\footnote{Before Côte d’Ivoire’s CAAT was fully operational, CAAT officers of the Felix Houphouët Boigny International Airport had been trained to routinely check Nigerian passengers travelling alone, regardless of the itinerary – interview, CAAT officer, Abidjan, 18 February 2013.} CAAT officers in Dakar believe that the fact that their arrests are becoming less frequent compared to women from Guinea indicates the development of new risk profiles becoming more important in cocaine trafficking runs through LSS.

CAAT customs officers also notified DCI, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and SOCA police liaisons based in Dakar’s several foreign diplomatic missions of this successful seizures.\footnote{Police cooperation between several CAAT officers (especially its officers from Senegalese Customs and Gendarmerie) and the DCI based at the French Embassy in Dakar, as well as relations with Spanish Police and Guardia Civil liaisons based at the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, is considered quite positive.} The new risk profile and itineraries taken by these traffickers has since extended the security practice beyond Senegal to countries throughout the sub-region, Latin America, and Europe, albeit through the work of the liaisons, and not through the CAAT’s use of the I-24 communications system.\footnote{Interview, senior CAAT officer, Dakar, 25 January 2013; interview, French DCI, Dakar, 26 January 2013.} Theoretically, all connected CAAT units in West Africa and Latin America should have this information and can base their profiling routines on this knowledge. Therefore, through this and similar experiences of units throughout the region and across the Atlantic, drug interdiction and surveillance has been rescaled to multiple simultaneous, connected spaces of intervention. It is no longer
one that is confined to a national space, and undertaken by solely national law enforcement and security actors, but by a set of regional and transnational actors participating in and through AIRCOP.

While information is only as good as that provided by the most recent catch, such successful seizures reinforce the negotiated, but potentially accommodative, processes at work within the global assemblage of security intervention. Attention to small, locally-significant details indicative of a practical sense of investigation that is “exceptionally difficult to teach apart from engaging in the activity itself,” (Scott 1998: 313) combined with tools and methodological approaches developed in Brussels and Vienna (UNODC Headquarters) together has led to a newly routinized security practice and form of investigative expertise for detecting cocaine trafficking in participating West African AIRCOP airports.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how non-contiguous sites, like the sub-region’s capital airports, increasingly become transnationally connected spaces in the governance of borderless threats. Political contests regarding AIRCOP’s governance are the result of the field-like operation of the global assemblage of intervention, which hinge on questions over which actors are best skilled to govern the borderless threats the project is meant to tackle, and how this is to be accomplished. This is neither a top-down nor a bottom up process. The way that AIRCOP operates to govern the non-traditional threat of drug trafficking in the space of LSS depends on the outcomes of struggles that sets of public and private, global and local governance actors engage in to acquire the forms of material
and symbolic capital. These forms of capital are used to have their authority recognized in the domain of drug interdiction (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 89-121).

Projects like AIRCOP reorient the local political economy of security. The operation of the assemblages through AIRCOP amplifies rivalries for the acquisition of material and symbolic capital between Senegal’s internal security forces which each have a claim on the expertise of how to govern borderless threats. International drug interdiction programmes entail several disciplining mechanisms to produce individual professionalized security experts. These programmes are not imposed on Senegalese subjects. They may be readily accepted in order to avoid a loss of international credibility, and to gain recognition of their capabilities and willingness: to gain symbolic capital (Gootenberg 2009: 26). But this does not necessarily mean that Senegalese officials (either those authorities representing the state in international diplomacy or agents of the internal security institutions) have internalized the security logics and discourses of countering drug trafficking. Some security actors resisted the implementation of AIRCOP, and tacitly supported their subordinates to do likewise. Others, instead of applying UNODC taught security practices unquestioningly, ambiguously supported the project, and appropriated its technical features to fit their locally-derived ways of doing law enforcement. Support for AIRCOP reflected the objectives of security actors to seek the recognition of their authority from the sources of various national or global scales that would help the most in the accumulation of symbolic and material capital. At times this means catering to national political elites. At other times, it means catering to international sources.
Capacity-building interventions like AIRCOP, and the security practices they create, are indicative of new geographies of power that link global institutions, discourses and structures to unique local settings from where new security practices and knowledges can emanate. These interconnected institutional spaces are inherently generative, and are born out of struggles between sets of global and local actors over how best to govern security. UNODC’s technical assistance project AIRCOP demonstrates a concrete instantiation of such a global assemblage of security intervention as it connects social relations and security governance strategies to control drug trafficking in disparate jurisdictional locales like Sao Paulo, Dakar, Dubai, Benin, Praia, Vienna, Brussels, Paris, Madrid (and possibly Lyon, should the LSS CAAT unit eventually be linked into the I-24/7 database maintained at INTERPOL Headquarters as intended).
Chapter 6 – Governing Borderless Threats by Sea: Senegal and the Container Control Programme (CCP)

The rise of global supply chains has made maritime ports some of the most globally oriented spaces the world over. These logistical hubs constitute spatialized expressions of power inherently tied to the functioning of the global capitalist economy (see Okechukwu 1996: 21-43; Chalfin 2010a: 163-191). They also function as a key locus of what Mann has called the “infrastructural power” of states (Mann 1984). Maritime ports have become a primary location where state forces exercise bureaucratic and regulatory authority to identify and partner with non-state actors in the evaluation of goods deemed appropriate for entry into sovereignty territory, and to accrue crucial fiscal resources through customs taxation. State bureaucratic institutions that extract revenue in standardized ways, like national customs organizations, take on important national roles with regard to amassing incoming fiscal resources, which are channelled and concentrated at maritime ports (see Sassen 2006: 20; see Hibou 2004). The politico-economic importance of maritime ports for contemporary states and the need to protect these global spaces, therefore, cannot be overstated (see Cowen 2014).

As a result, a proliferation of global security governance initiatives has occurred at maritime ports. The US Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) has implemented programmes like the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to protect national ports, and has posted American officers in foreign locations to ensure the pre-inspection and identification of high-risk containers in global ports prior to entry to the US (see Banomyong 2005; US Customs and Border Protection 2006). CBP attachés offices have been established in 21 countries with a main task to undertake international capacity-
building with national customs services. French customs attachés are also posted to several Latin American and North and West African countries (Douane Française 2014). They and DCI officers have implemented multilateral security governance initiatives like the regional *Appui à la lutte contre le trafic de cocaïne en Afrique de l’Ouest* (ALCAO) project. ALCAO provides technical assistance to West African drug law enforcement officers, many of which are based in the sub-region’s maritime ports (Partenaires Sécurité Défense 2013; Barry 2015). Under the EU Instrument for Stability (IfS), EU actors have also implemented security governance initiatives at maritime ports in West Africa, notably the SEACOP project. SEACOP establishes joint-maritime control units (JMCU) with the objective of strengthening cooperation and intelligence analysis at the regional and transnational level against maritime trafficking in the sub-region, and to undertake capacity-building of regional law enforcement units that operate near “sensitive coastal areas” (CORMS 2015b; Stambøl 2015). International organizations and Western states argue that securing the global supply chain while promoting the rapid passage of international trade flows through ports is an absolute necessity, and is simultaneously the most effective way to tackle borderless threats (Swedish Customs 2003; Ireland 2009: 2-6; UNCTAD 2012: 11, 63, 88).

The centrality of maritime ports and the role of national customs agencies in the process of revenue creation and surveillance of cargo have also been augmented due to transformations in global shipping. The development of containerization in global shipping is now the most prominent trade modality facilitating the circulation of consumer goods globally, with over 420 million containers shipped annually. This chapter examines the politics surrounding the implementation of an important global
security governance initiative in Senegal that takes shipping containers as its focal point: the joint UNODC-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme (CCP). Similar to how AIRCOP reorients the economic and security focus of Senegalese state officials towards a global orientation resulting in competition over security prestige and material goods amongst the country’s internal security forces, and conflict between the latter and international capacity-building experts, the CCP also makes the Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD) into a space steeped in conflict over how to combat transnational organized crime, and recognition of the authority to do so (or not to).

The argument made here is that although international capacity-building experts exercise disciplinary techniques and wield important material and symbolic capital to change the law enforcement practices of Senegalese agents through rescaling security governance at Dakar’s port, these efforts are thwarted due to competing structures of authority that contest this vision of security in favour of other forms of governance. Like the case of AIRCOP, security governance rescaling through the CCP becomes entangled in inter-institutional relations of power and rivalries that mark the country’s security forces. In this way, security governance rescaling becomes more about parsing out rivalries in the country than coordinating the efforts of multiple stakeholders in a comprehensive or holistic way (see Kirchner and Dominguez 2011; Bevir and Hall 2013; Bujun et. al. 2014). While some Senegalese law enforcement officers may come to agree with the forms of security that international experts proffer in training, port officials, religious leaders and communities, and national political elites also pull them in competing directions towards alternative sources of authority and capital. As a result, the security governance rescaling efforts of the CCP do not occur in Senegal as international
experts intend them to. Contrary to many assessments in the global governance and international statebuilding literature, the power and authority of these international experts do not necessarily compel Senegalese actors to acquiesce to their demands. Their intrusion into the security field, however, is consequential since it reorders relations of power in this space of intervention.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. It first demonstrates central political and economic importance of the PAD to Senegal, followed by a section that describes the objectives of the CCP. The third section shows how the CCP attempts to rescale security governance through disciplinary mechanisms enacted on Senegalese law enforcement agents. These mechanisms are not all powerful forces that control or compel Senegalese security actors. As such, material and symbolic inducements, like international exchanges, training sessions, security certificates, expensive meals, prestige or honour for involvement in specialized security tasks, etc. are created through the CCP that support disciplinary mechanisms. The fourth section shows the effects of the introduction of the CCP, and the forms of capital that it brings in tow, on dominance in the security field in Senegal. The country’s Customs Agency has become an important partner to international actors due to its ability to demonstrate the acquisition of forms of cultural capital that are valued internationally. This situation creates further animosity towards the corps by its local security competitors who contest the value of Customs techniques and the intentions of its agents. The final section demonstrates that although the Senegalese Customs agency takes on additional international standing because of their adherence to the CCP, they remain severely influenced by alternative structures of authority present in the country that hold an ambiguous position to rescaling security governance. Taken
together, as a global security governance initiative, the CCP does not refashion the management of security in a successful way, as intended by international actors. This does not mean that additional functional coordination is necessary, but rather that competing political and economic interests and values held by sets of affected actors in Senegal and beyond hold interests that incentivize them to derail the initiative.

*The Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD): The heart of Senegal’s liberal economy*

Senegal in the Twenty-first century is profoundly dependent on global trading partners for the import of staple foods, vehicles, manufacturing, high-tech and other luxury goods. The heart of economic and commercial flow of goods into Senegal is the Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD), upon which the country and the Sahelian hinterland heavily depend. The PAD is ideally located at the crossroads between Europe and Latin America, and the Atlantic coast of North America and Africa.

Since French colonial rule, tax revenues on imports accrued at the port has been one of Senegal’s major sources of income (see Boone 1992: 57, 149). Successive governments following decolonization made infrastructural improvements to the port an important economic priority (Daffé and Diop 2004). In the wake of IFI structural adjustment programme in the 1980s, West African governments, including Senegal’s, undertook liberalization and deregulation of their economies, including their exclusive involvement in control of maritime ports and other aspects of the transportation sector (Lombard and Ninot 2002: 131-132; Debris 2012: 3). Any subsequent infrastructural investments for the PAD continued via World Bank funded Adjustment of Transport Sector Projects (ATSP), albeit with the highly increased involvement of private

Former Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade actively demonstrated his ambition to make Dakar the first port of call for global actors engaging either militarily or economically with the continent (Lombard, Steck and Cissokho 2013: 651-653). The last infrastructural renewal occurred from 2005-2010, during which time the PAD extended the size of the container terminal in order to be capable of absorbing projected growth in container shipments.\textsuperscript{201} The size of the PAD and the depth of its waters facilitate the docking of global shipping tankers, which is not available to some of the neighbouring maritime ports of the sub-region. These infrastructural features only add to the allure of Senegal’s reputation for political stability. Senegal is the only West African state that has not experienced a coup d’état or extensive civil wars, compared to some other West African states where periods of civil conflict between 1990-2010 were seemingly endemic. Although the political conflict in Cote d’Ivoire did not seem to have the preferred effect, from the point of view of Senegal’s political and economic elite, of pushing sub-regional shipping towards Dakar (ibid.: 653), these factors combined have made the PAD an increasingly desired logistical stop for global shipping companies. The port accommodates some of the world’s major shipping companies including Grimaldi, Maersk-Line, Delmas, MSC and SDV.\textsuperscript{202} In total, an average of 90% of Senegal’s commercial exchanges, and 85-90% of its customs duties are tied to the PAD (Tamba 2013; Kanté 2015).

\textsuperscript{201} Interview, PAD official, Dakar, 28 January 2013.
\textsuperscript{202} Observations made while touring the PAD with port officials, 28 and 31 January 2013.
The UNODC, World Customs Organization (WCO), and the Container Control Programme (CCP)

In 2003, the UNODC and the World Customs Organization (WCO) began discussions for the creation of a programme that could build the capacities of customs and other law enforcement agencies in the Global South in order to manage the increased mobility of borderless threats like drugs, counterfeit goods, chemical, radiological and nuclear materials, and improvised explosive devices that they fear could attach onto global methods of trade – notably via containers. The outcome from these discussions was the Container Control Programme (CCP).

The CCP is a global border management interdiction programme run in partnership between the UNODC and WCO as implementing agencies, and beneficiary countries in the Global South. A pool of donor countries including the United States, Canada, the European Commission, and several EU member-states fund the programme, and also often take part in CCP capacity-building activities (UNODC 2011). The programme aims to enhance the security of the global supply chain by building greater state control “to minimize the exploitation of maritime containers for illicit drug trafficking and other transnational organized criminal activities” (UNODC/WCO 2012: 2).

To do this, UNODC and WCO officials help recipient governments create joint-agency Port Control Units (PCU)\(^{203}\), and align national laws related to illicit trafficking and organized crime with international conventions to facilitate the work of these specialized teams. International law enforcement experts are then selected by the UNODC and the WCO to train these PCUs in risk management, container profiling, and

\(^{203}\) In Senegal, the PCU is officially known as the “Unité Mixte de Contrôle des Containers.”
intelligence-led analysis of flows entering into marine ports, to target containers that exhibit a high-risk profile established from a set of risk indicators. This includes the provision of necessary equipment and tools required for profiling high-risk containers, enhancing communication and information-sharing between law enforcement agencies and PCUs globally through the platform of the WCO’s ContainerComm and the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) database on worldwide seizures information. These secure, communications systems are used to exchange information between operational PCUs, other authorized users in Vienna, Brussels, and by the WCO’s eleven Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices.

Since its creation in 2003, the CCP has spread to an impressive number of countries around the globe. Four countries were initially selected for the programme’s pilot development: Ecuador (Port of Guayaquil); Ghana (Port Tema); Pakistan (Karachi and Port Qasim) and Senegal (Dakar), reflecting its initial focus on the interdiction of illicit drugs – cocaine from Latin America transiting through West Africa, and heroin transiting through Pakistan from Afghanistan. These teams were not operational until 2007 (see Fazey 2007: 764). By 2011, the CCP had operational PCUs in eight additional countries (UNODC/WCO 2011: 1). By 2013-year end, the CCP had extended to fifteen countries with operational PCUs, and an additional 34 earmarked with funding for the implementation of the programme in the near future (UNODC/WCO 2013: 4). By the end of 2014, the CCP is operational in 24 countries, and funding has been acquired for expansion of the programme in 27 additional countries (UNODC/WCO 2014: 12).

204 Phone Interview, UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.
205 Afghanistan; Benin; Cape Verde; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Togo; and Turkmenistan.
Following one commentator of police reform in Africa, “the goal of reform is to have the people doing policing think, talk and act in specific ways, and the measure of success of reforms is whether they do or not” (Marenin 2007: 181). By attempting to rescale security governance through the CCP, UNODC experts use the programme’s design to practice forms of disciplinary surveillance on law enforcement agents in Senegal’s PCU to change their security habits and understandings.

As with AIRCOP, regular mentoring of PCU officers involves more than simply helping them maintain newly acquired capacities in risk profiling through recurrent training. It is also primarily a means of monitoring, assessing, correcting, and reorienting their individual law enforcement practices. In an independent evaluation of the CCP, the two objectives of the programme are noted to have been mostly successfully accomplished: first, to have “newly created inter-agency Port Control Unit (PCUs) consistently applying the acquired technical skills in the targeting, selection and inspection of high risk shipping containers;” and second, that “New tools and mechanisms for the collection, sharing and analysis of information about container crime, in particular CEN/ContainerComm and ICPO-Interpol I-24/7, are used regularly and effectively at the national, regional and/or international level, as appropriate” (UNODC 2013: vii). The practice of follow-up and recurrent training are required elements of successful security governance rescaling. It presumes that PCU officers will lack the desire, will, or know-how necessary to perform the work of container profiling and its related criminal investigations. If PCU members are using the tools consistently to profile
containers, UNODC and WCO actors will evaluate that the programme has met its objectives, and that that a PCU’s security practices and mentalities are being changed.

Since the CCP’s trainers are vetted by the UNODC and WCO, the majority of which are drawn from Western states, the programme adheres to a security doxa that equates Western forms of security with the appropriate model to be applied in places like Senegal.\(^{206}\) All deviating understandings and practices must be put to rigorous correction and persuasion, similar to the modus operandi of several police reform missions conducted by international organizations and security sector reform projects more generally (see Merlingen 2011: 160; Ryan 2011: 67-110; DeLarrinaga and Doucet 2014: 56-71). The initiative itself is couched in a logic of distrust of security agents in the global south.

The joint-agency composition of the unit, its on-going training and mentoring, and the use of ContainerComm, are each disciplinary mechanisms exercised on the PCU to monitor and correct the law enforcement practices of its officers. Disciplinary practices performed by these international capacity-building actors, however, are not all powerful. In Senegal, they must be coupled with material and symbolic inducements that persuade PCU officers to desire to perform the rescaling objectives of the CCP.

**Disciplinary surveillance and the design of the CCP**

For UNODC CCP administrators and trainers previously or currently involved in the implementation and administration of the CCP, the need for inter-agency collaboration

\(^{206}\) From 2005-2012, Western countries stacked the provision of CCP trainers from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States; compared to Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Mongolia, Pakistan and Republic of South Africa (see UNODC/WCO 2012: 13).
and participation is directly connected to the issue of corruption within the security institutions of states in the global south, and the need to mitigate its effects. UNODC international experts are very aware of the perceived challenges associated with working with law enforcement officials in West Africa. Corruption and political impunity within the security forces, for example, are themes that loom large in their assessments of the blockages that impede effective and successful law enforcement in Africa (OECD-DAC 2008: 5, 21; Africa Confidential 2010: 6; UNODC 2012: iii-iv, 71; UNODC/WCO 2014: 18, 22). Interestingly, UNODC and WCO officials involved in the CCP have designed the programme to diminish precisely these tendencies in West African countries.

Corruption, for these experts, is an expected component of working in ‘fragile’ states wherein law enforcement agents with family and social commitments may not be paid on a regular basis by the state. In such contexts, the enduring practices like accepting bribes, or seeking out patrons that can facilitate economic connections in exchange for police and customs officers “looking the other way,” for example, requires breaking down the chances for such opportunities. For the CCP, the composition and design of the PCUs is meant to do just this: by including agents from multiple law enforcement institutions in any one country, the solidarity amongst officers of the same corps/agency will be diminished and lessens the risk of potential corruption.

Inter-corps rivalries over how to govern borderless threats are built into the CCP’s design as an anti-corruption mechanism of surveillance in order to produce the co-supervision of law enforcement activities of its members. For UNODC programmers,

207 Interview, former senior UNODC official, Vienna, 2 December 2012; interview, UNODC Analyst, 31 January 2013, Dakar; telephone interview UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015. For these UNODC officials, lack of regular payments of to agents of the security institutions was not viewed as an issue in Senegal.
competition over the attainment of social and economic capital via networks of corruption instils discipline through a form of subtle coercion on the activities of the newly formed unit, and a “calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviours” (Foucault 1977: 137-138). One UN official argued that there is no way for a gang of agents to develop a system for corruption since the agents come from different law enforcement backgrounds and organizational cultures: “the inter-agency model is central to how the CCP works, and part of this is because it is an anti-corruption measure” (see UNODC/WCO 2014: 23).208

The initial inability to create a small network for corruption enhances co-surveillance of the PCUs due to existing security rivalries, at least in the short term. As PCU members are expected to surveil each other’s efforts in the work of the unit, the assumed fall-back position of following the security practices and law enforcement conducts taught by CCP trainers is reinforced.

UN officials interviewed argued that two forms of intra-PCU surveillance are to be expected. First, since all of Dakar’s PCU members are trained in container profiling, it was expected that agents would question each other’s choices of which containers to inspect, or those that are not selected for inspection. Disagreements over whether or not to inspect would most likely result in an inspection should conflict arise, resulting in more consistent work for the unit as a whole.209 Second, UNODC and WCO capacity-builders recognize that ports in West Africa are not well regulated when it comes to entry and exit of individuals due to lack of security controls and different understandings of acceptability regarding labour informality. UNODC officials expected the inter-agency

208 Telephone interview UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.
209 Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013.
design of the PCU to create a will to increase knowledge and suspicion about who visits PCU colleagues, resulting in an eventual limiting of non-essential visits. Due to mutual inter-agency mistrust, UNODC and WCO CCP administrators envisage that PCU agents will be left with few other options but to manifest their rivalries through competition and enhanced professionalism in the performance of their assigned profiling and investigatory tasks, if needed by reporting on the suspicious activities of their PCU colleagues to CCP advisors or Western police liaisons based in Dakar. For UNODC and WCO capacity-builders and programmers, rivalries will make members of Senegal’s PCU hard-working, more professional, better law enforcement agents.  

The centrality of the inter-agency approach also facilitates the direct disciplinary mechanisms of training, mentoring and monitoring by international trainers and officials. The CCP activities envision incisive, if not invasive, frequency in PCU on-site visits and training. The surveillance practice of mentoring as monitoring conducted by CCP trainers, then, attempts to foster or co-opt PCU officers into governing their own job performance and the values that they hold regarding what an agent of the state ought to be and do, with the modern liberal (read ‘Western’ state) as the template or telos to be achieved.

Over the course of the CCP’s decade in operation, globally, over 150 training events have been delivered, in addition to over 300 mentoring visits by CCP trainers conducted with a view of assessing and monitoring the performance of members of the operational PCUs (UNODC/WCO 2014: 13). In 2014 alone, the CCP conducted training for 1024 law enforcement officials (ibid.: 16). In Senegal in 2013, UNODC and WCO pre-selected global Customs experts conducted on-going, but periodic, mentoring and

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210 Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013.
training at the PAD from February to March, and September to December (UNODC/WCO 2013: 33). Similarly, mentoring training for the Dakar PCU was conducted in March, June, November/December of 2014 (UNODC/WCO 2014: 33). Additionally, regional training was conducted in Dakar for 13 agents from PCUs of the West African sub-region in October that year.

Frequency of monitoring is crucial in this endeavor, as is the need for PCU agents to respect and trust the capacities, if not personalities, of CCP trainers and administrators.\(^\text{211}\) For example, in Dakar, UNODC CCP regional experts regularly contact and attempt to foster relationships of trust with the leadership of the sub-regions’ PCUs.\(^\text{212}\) One UNODC official based in Dakar stated that the PAD’s PCU required significant monitoring in order to shape its members’ basic skills of “thinking preventatively.”\(^\text{213}\) Specifically, this expert noted how the unit, compared to the Ghanaian PCU, was stuck in the law enforcement practice of waiting and reacting as opposed to orienting their policing practices in line with the objectives of the programme to detect and prevent criminality. This meant that it was necessary to spend additional time visiting the unit to check if its members were “thinking like real police.”\(^\text{214}\)

\(^\text{211}\) For the most part, PCU officers (customs and gendarmes) ‘got along well’ with UNODC officials. However, when French DCI were involved in these interactions, the members were not pleased. They viewed the particular Customs DCI officer based in Dakar at the time to be quite condescending. Interview, senior Senegalese Brigade des Investigations Criminelles et des Stupéfiants official, Dakar, 14 August 2012; interview, senior PCU official, Dakar, 15 January 2013.

\(^\text{212}\) UNODC officials and programmers are able to meet with Senegalese law enforcement and political officials on a more regular basis than with their law enforcement counterparts in other countries of the sub-region since its regional office is based in the Dakar. Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013.

\(^\text{213}\) Interview, UNODC official, 23 January 2013, Dakar.

\(^\text{214}\) Interview, UNODC official, 23 January 2013, Dakar.
CCP advisors also attempt to develop similar relationships with European police liaisons stationed in Dakar. For UNODC regional experts, contact with both sets of law enforcement actors is necessary to secure a network capable of quick, functional, and reliable communication and information exchange in criminal investigations: it is an informal, but still technical law enforcement measure. Nevertheless, the latter’s self understandings of their job responsibilities is to ensure not only that communication and coordination between law enforcement actors in Dakar is achieved, but more so that recipients of CCP training follow through with the micro-norms associated with the programme, and that the tools provided by UNODC are indeed being used for their intended purposes, or indeed used at all. The responsibilities of UNODC CCP trainers, therefore, are couched in a logic of distrust of the security capacities and ethical willingness or integrity of Senegal’s PCU members to perform the security functions outlined by the programme.

Annual Progress Reports of the CCP emphasize this interpretation. In 2013, the UNODC and WCO argued that “the improvement of local capacities for container profiling with regular monitoring visits seems to be the most efficient way to counter organized crime activities on a long-term basis,” a statement which directly follows a short discussion of the potential lack of “credibility and integrity” within CCP operating countries (UNODC/WCO 2013: 10-11). The primary role for the CCP Regional and Country Programme Coordinators is for the correction and normalization of beneficiary

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215 In January 2013, I personally witnessed informal meetings between UNODC CCP experts and French DCI, British SOCA, Spanish Police liaisons, and an individual from the U.S. AFRICOM funded Africa Center for Strategic Studies, on several occasions, all by chance – in cafes, bars, hotels, and restaurants that cater the expatriate community as I used the Internet or interviewed other interlocutors.
law enforcement agents by showing the latter “best practices” in risk profiling, and when required by explaining/reinforcing the necessity and benefits of the inter-agency approach:

A central responsibility of programme personnel, including Coordinators at all levels, is to monitor and ensure that PCU officials understand and meet the expectations relating to their conduct as trained officials of the CCP. Officials not complying with the UNODC-WCO level of conduct will be excluded from future training and participation in the PCU’s activities (UNODC/WCO 2014: 21-22).

This distrust does not extend to practices of surveillance of the efforts of European police liaison officers, with whom UNODC officials share similar employment histories and beliefs in the values in “modern police work,” having previously been employed in various European law enforcement agencies, which they understand West African law enforcement officers to lack. As such, the ideal target to be achieved in the work of the PCU officers is based on a Western standard differentiated from abnormal and ineffectual law enforcement measures that are assumed to be the regular ‘par for the course’ in fragile states. This ideal can only be accomplished through specialized training that is regularly corrected by and through the mentoring activities and anti-corruption measures (i.e. “follow-up”) of IO training experts and their international law enforcement colleagues (UNODC/WCO 2014: 22).

Ultimately the practices of surveillance in the CCP programme design must be based on repetition and frequency in order to change the law enforcement practices of PCU agents to ones closer to leading state and IO standards. Due to the popularity and rapid expansion of the CCP, however, regional coordinators and trainers cannot perform co-located, side-by-side, mentorship as regularly as they hope. The geographical spread

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216 Conversation with UNODC official and British security official, Dakar, 21 January 2013.
of their surveillance and training responsibilities in the sub-region make them travelling security experts. Surveillance by remote-control, however, is made possible in the design of the CCP which allow for more or less continuous visibility of the actions of the PCU through its secured communications system. When UNODC trainers and Programme Coordinators are unable to perform on-site visits to check on the activities of a PCU (and therefore when PCU officers will not be “on their best behaviour”), they use deterritorialized forms of surveillance by verifying PCU use of ContainerComm.

UN officials interviewed insisted that this secured system of inter-PCU communication is a key modality required to combat trafficking. When PCU officers receive information on containers prior to their arrival at the PAD, they can assess its risk categories, request additional information on the shipper from CENCOM or Western police liaisons based in Dakar, and can communicate via ContainerComm in a secured way to regional and trans-continental partners to pre-empt and secure potential threats before they reach Senegal. Thus, it is argued to facilitate the identification and governance of non-traditional security threats before they are actualized in Dakar. While potentially increasing the functional efficiency of the unit, ContainerComm is also a security tool for international capacity-builders that facilitates practices of monitoring as it tracks the regularity of containers profiled, screened, and searched by PCU officers. UNODC and WCO officials use this data to evaluate the willingness and consistency of container profiling of their law enforcement partners in the PCU and devise subsequent strategies to ensure the CCP is operating as it is meant to.

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217 Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013.
ContainerComm can be used to help decide if UNODC and other donors should continue with the programme or whether or not to implement future capacity-building initiatives. UNODC officials have requested to senior Ministry officials in Senegal to kick PCU officers out of the unit for not utilizing the tools given to them to conduct container profiling.\textsuperscript{218} They can use the threat of suspending scheduled CCP activities altogether.

Both of these tactics have been taken with regard to the Dakar PCU. After a UNODC evaluation mission that took place shortly after this period of research found that the Senegalese government’s steering committee for the CCP does not meet regularly, and law enforcement agency ownership of the programme is “almost non-existent.” Without significant changes and the establishment of a roadmap by created by Senegalese actors, evaluators insist that “CCP should pull out of Senegal” (UNODC 2014: xxi). Deviations from the type of specialized, and professional law enforcement agents envisioned by these disciplinary practices are not wanted.

UNODC officials have pressed their Senegalese counterparts in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs of the need for the adoption of best practices to be developed and to which the security agencies must adhere.\textsuperscript{219} These do not always fall on deaf ears as the country’s substantial involvement in security-related programming indicates. When this form of persuasion has not resulted in a change of attitudes favouring the ideal functioning of the PCU, UNODC officials have enlisted other international actors, such as INTERPOL representatives, officials from the Delegation of

\textsuperscript{218} Interview, UNODC official, 23 January 2013, Dakar; telephone interview, UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.

\textsuperscript{219} Telephone interview, UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.
the European Union present in Dakar, and French DCI officials to also stress the need for Senegal’s security institutions, starting with the PCU, but also in conjunction with OCRTIS officers, to place the PAD as a higher drug control priority. Increased frequency in mentoring has been added to the schedule of the Dakar PCU activities whenever the profiling work of the unit has tapered off, notably due to the work stoppages resulting from the PCU’s leadership turnover.

_The limits of international discipline: Needing material and symbolic incentives_

Disciplinary practices undertaken by UNODC actors do not always produce their intended effect in police reform. IO officials for the CCP cannot command observance of their requests, and it is arguable that their European counterparts from the DCI, SOCA, Portuguese and Spanish liaisons cannot either (at least in the way that many assessments in the statebuilding literature would like them to). In large measure, UNODC CCP experts must rely on Senegalese actors’ judgments, security assessments, and arguments made by senior level security bureaucrats and Ministry officials of national ownership of the work of the PCU. While international actors cannot force their Senegalese counterparts to comply with the law enforcement practices that form the basis of training, to say that their lack of coercive or bargaining capabilities indicates a lack of power or consequence over the CCP’s operation in Dakar is inaccurate (Fazey 2007). To increase the likelihood of compliance these actors must combine disciplinary practices with practices of persuasion. Material and symbolic incentives are created to coax reluctant beneficiaries into changing their ways.

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220 Interview, three European diplomatic officials at meeting of the Dakar Initiative, Dakar, 10 September 2012.
These incentives are enacted on several sections of Senegalese state representatives. Extraverted acceptance of international security assistance serves the interests of Senegal’s political officials, government ministers, and leading security bureaucrats. Many African governments have attempted to capitalize on international perceptions of their vulnerability to borderless threats, and Senegal is no exception (Jourde 2007; Bachmann 2012; Fisher 2014). By presenting national political will to strengthen its security institutions by accepting and participating in global security governance initiatives like the CCP, Senegalese state officials enhance their symbolic capital since international actors view the government as a motivated security partner. Not only does their international standing increase, the inclusion that high-level officials secure also placates lower level officers within the security institutions who will benefit from the perks associated with international training. These material incentives abound: travel to international conferences and workshops, per diems, expensive lunches, and the social capital that connections to transnational security elites based in Europe or North America can afford by just gaining some key ‘face-time’. Being associated with specialized units that enjoy these benefits helps to mitigate a sense of frustration over unfavourable working conditions that is common for security institutions in some West African states. Thus, for high-level state representatives in Senegal, there are clear incentives to cater to the requests of global actors to criminalize particular political and economic practices deemed transnational risks like trafficking, at least to the degree that it does not interfere with how state elites want to control its populations. For them, Senegal’s participation in global security governance initiatives and international capacity-building efforts is a win-win proposition.
UNODC officials use many material and symbolic inducements for PCU officers in their attempts to maintain its design and to ensure a level of consistency by retaining trained officers. UNODC regional coordinators have mobilized training workshops as material and symbolic incentives for Senegal’s PCU. For example, in the short term, trainees can secure material capital acquired from the acquisition of training in the form of per diems, and meals in restaurants or hotels which Senegal’s expatriate community frequents as a special perk for selected candidates. Most European police liaisons and trainers interviewed in Dakar stressed that local officers would hardly ever have the chance to eat in the city’s ‘finer’ restaurants, and that this was a justifiable expense for training sessions instead of paying out larger per diems. Training sessions are held in posh hotels in Dakar, affording the trainees time in air-conditioned rooms – a welcome change to working in buildings without such amenities, as assumed by regional trainers. Where large expatriate communities or UN-missions or delegations are present, as in Dakar, the “bifurcation” of space dividing international experts from local populations is especially visible. Transgressing such a division by invitation to participate in training, UNODC CCP officials argued, is a unique experience for Senegalese trainees (see Lemay-Hébert 2011: 1828; Smirl 2015).\footnote{Interview, UNODC official, 23 January 2013, Dakar; interview, UNOWA official, 1 February 2013, Dakar.}

Training is sold as a potential to advance the life chances of willing participants. UNODC officials articulate the need for trainees to acquire professionalized law enforcement skills as a means of transforming their employment trajectories. By teaching courses based on global security norms framed by UN conventions on transnational organized crime, terrorism and human rights, UNODC trainers articulate how training
can inculcate a culture of professionalism within the unit, which not only strengthens the Senegalese state in combatting borderless threats, but will also strengthen individual CVs and employment strategies. The cultural capital of accreditation can then be translated into employment by/in an international organization (possibly as a CCP trainer as has been the case for former PCU members in Ghana, or as the WCO’s Regional Intelligence Liaison Officer)\(^{222}\), large NGO, or through consulting for a peacebuilding/security-related think tank or research institute, all of which pay significantly more than their salaries as civil servants.\(^{223}\) Cultural capital acquired in training can be converted into economic capital for successful trainees.

Another alluring material inducement for PCU members is the opportunity to undertake study tours in “Benchmarking ports” based in Europe, North America, or throughout the region. IO officials believe that these exchanges provide an opportunity to witness firsthand the profiling practices, forms of inspection, and other “working techniques” performed by experienced officers based in ports with some of the highest volumes of in-going and out-going trade flows across the globe (UNODC/WCO 2012: 14; UNODC/WCO 2013: 16-17). The daily work practices that are observed by PCU members can then be transferred back in the ports in their countries. Not only this, UNODC officials also insist that work-study tours create networks of law enforcement agents between the global North and global South, which as was discussed in the previous chapter, does happen with some regularity. Thus, similar to other historical

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\(^{222}\) Interview, Ghanaian Customs officer, 26 June 2012, Accra.  
\(^{223}\) French DCI officials, as well as officials from the EU Delegation noted that such international employment positions would pay roughly three to four times more than the average salary of a Senegalese law enforcement public servant, but would take away the potential for graft; interview, French DCI official, Dakar, 8 August 2012; interview, EU Delegation official, 11 September 2012, Dakar.
patterns of transnational policing, the CCP is meant to produce the networks of security agents that will facilitate faster, more adaptable law enforcement practices, even if on an ad hoc and informal basis, “to cut through red tape, to avoid diplomatic imbroglios, and to obtain more and better assistance from foreign colleagues” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 232; see also Gerspacher and Dupont 2007: 356; Gerspacher 2008: 181).

Work-study tours offer several material inducements and perks: international travel, staying in European hotels, high per diems, or potentially visiting friends that live in European cities. More importantly, in the context of the salient attraction to migrate and the establishment of Senegalese transnational diasporic networks based in Europe and North America (see Riccio 2003; Sinatti 2015), these exchanges grant trainees a perceived social importance and local prestige since so many people in Senegal desire and are motivated to leave the country to live abroad, even at great risk (Andersson 2014a; Mbaye 2014; Henshaw 2015). PCU members already exercise high levels of social capital in local communities by virtue of their employment as customs or gendarme agents. This only increases when word gets out that the agent who lives down the road is being sent to Rotterdam for training. Lastly, work-studies also make it possible for PCU officers to create networked relationships with international security actors, and are therefore highly coveted. The accumulation of social capital that international training solidifies is then brought back and can be converted into symbolic capital in the security field, and an increase in economic capital through better, higher paying employment positions.

Completing training courses in risk profiling or investigatory surveillance makes it possible for PCU agents to demonstrate forms of security prestige, a crucial form of
symbolic capital and recognition of authority in security matters. This can bolster their own particular personal and field strategies for employment endeavours in the medium to long term – for example to be transferred to Customs or Gendarme Divisions that target and analyse transnational insecurities, or in selection to participate in a UN peacekeeping mission. For example, one former head of the PCU was able to secure multiple training certificates from courses completed in Senegal, in regional training workshops, and at international training exchanges to benchmark ports through the CCP in Le Havre.²²⁴ Armed with this internationalized CV, and having dealt with the frustrations of leading the PCU for the mandated three-year period, this official then headed the Customs unit at the prestigious and lucrative Rosso border crossing with Mauritania, and was then selected to head the Communications Division of Customs Headquarters.²²⁵ This agent’s administrative abilities and profiling skills were attested through his acquisition of recognized, prestigious training certificates, and vetted by a relationship with UNODC and WCO trainers internationally.

**Rescaling governance and dealing with rivalries in Senegal’s field of security**

Like AIRCOP, the introduction of new forms of capital through the CCP fuels tension within Senegal’s field of drug law enforcement. Capacity-building initiatives inundate this field with a plethora of opportunities and international actors, each with its own priorities and practices of security. This was one of the very reasons why Senegal was chosen as a CCP pilot country in the first place: Senegalese governments have effectively framed the country as vulnerable to borderless threats due to its geographical position and close diplomatic relations with Western states, combined with its political willingness to

²²⁴ Interview, senior PCU Customs official, 28 January 2013.
²²⁵ Telephone interview, former head of the Dakar PCU, 3 March 2015.
tackle them through international partnerships (see Espagnol 2011; Arieff 2013: 2; Government of Canada 2013; RFI and Chanda 2015). Due to poor governance of the influx of capacity-building measures, UNODC, and French DCI officials find that Senegal’s security institutions are unable to even absorb all of the capacity-building measures that cater to their circumstances, similar to the majority of more or less politically stable countries in West Africa like Nigeria, Ghana, Niger and Mali (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2010: 23-25; US Department of State 2014). There are too many incentives available since the country’s political leaders will accept nearly any international security assistance on offer even if capacity-building measures are duplicated. Paradoxically, the introduction of so many security governance initiatives does not reduce tensions between Senegal’s security actors as one would assume should occur in a supply-driven marketplace. If anything, a hierarchy of capacity-building offers is established, which reinforces the animosities and competing visions between security actors. Rescaling efforts in the CCP, therefore, end up being more about parsing out and managing inter-corps rivalries than it does in governing borderless threats.

The Dakar PCU is one of the CCP’s most challenging units, and has been since the programme’s inception. The way the PCU is run demonstrates the difficulties inherent to changing Senegalese law enforcement habits to internalize international standards established by the programme’s Western security template. Rivalries between the security institutions of the state alter the operations of the PCU, and drive its composition

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226 Interview, UN official, Vienna, 2 December 2012; interview, former UNODC official, Vienna, 2 December 2012; interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013.
227 Interview, former senior UNODC official, 2 December 2012, Vienna.
228 Interview, UNODC official, Dakar, 23 January 2013; telephone interview, UN official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.
towards more involvement by Senegalese Customs agents, relatively less from the Gendarmerie, and even less from OCRTIS.

Since inter-corps rivalries and tensions are so heated, UNODC officials have had to rely on the country’s Customs leadership. In January 2013, the unit only had seven officers, five of which were from the Customs agency, and two from the Gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{229} In March 2015, the unit had ten officers, but was still dominated by the Customs agency: six Customs officers, three Gendarmes, and one officer from the Police Judiciaire. To date, CCP officials have struggled for the inclusion of OCRTIS elements to form part of the PCU. Moreover, the leadership of the Dakar PCU has changed four times, with only the second chief of the unit lasting the mandated three years as section head.\textsuperscript{230} The most recent head of the PCU was selected by the director of the agency, in consultation with the head of the DRE, because UNODC CCP officials insisted that what was needed was a dedicated customs officer that could manage working with agents from the police and the gendarmerie, and that would remain in the position for an extended period of time.\textsuperscript{231}

Senegal’s Customs agency has been very successful in courting CCP officials because of their ability to advocate security governance rescaling according to logics that dovetail with UNODC’s emphasis on trans-regional, networked approaches. Customs PCU officers interact closely with the DRE section, whose strong anti-smuggling and fraud emphasis has been reiterated to international actors with whom they are in contact.

\textsuperscript{229} Observed in visits to the PCU at the PAD in January 2013.
\textsuperscript{230} Interview, senior Senegalese Brigade des Investigations Criminelles et des Stupéfiants official, Dakar, 14 August 2012; interview, senior PCU Customs official, Dakar, 15 January 2013; telephone interview, senior PCU official, 18 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{231} Telephone interview, UN Official in Vienna, 27 February 2015; telephone interview, senior PCU official, 18 March 2015.
DRE and PCU customs officers also maintain close links to WCO BRLR officers and INTERPOL liaisons, maintaining that such links enhance regional law enforcement cooperation. Together, these specialized security actors orient their tasks towards countering borderless threats in a networked fashion and global orientation that appeals directly to CCP officials’ visions of effective security governance. Moreover, these actors articulate their competence and willingness to enhance national use of security technologies and tools, in particular from their mastery of CENCOM, Senegal’s national database on customs fraud (the *Fichier National des Informations Douanières* (FNID)), and the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) which provided by AFRICOM (see FATF 2014). UNODC officials insist that Senegal’s customs agents are best suited to lead the PCU, and plead for senior leadership to support their efforts.

Customs officials in Senegal acquire important forms of cultural capital in terms of their educational credentials and work experience that provides them with skillsets they view as imperative to correctly perform the tasks associated with container profiling (see Bourdieu 1997). While the leadership of the CAAT is meant to rotate between officials from each corps each two years, leadership of the PCU is designed to remain headed by a Senegalese Customs officer. Customs officers in the PCU explained in interviews that their unique experience with the control over the circulation of goods, knowledge of the legal apparatus in managing that circulation, and subsequent detention of both “licit-

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232 Interview, senior Senegalese Brigade des Investigations Criminelles et des Stupéfiants official, Dakar, 14 August 2012; interview, AFRICOM official, Dakar, 11 September 2012.
illicit” and illicit goods, make their corps the only appropriate service to manage the PCU. Prior to becoming a Senegalese Customs agent, individuals must acquire a formal university degree. To be promoted to an officer position, such as a Contrôleur, or the highest rank of Inspecteur, each agent must pass two to four years of advanced training, usually at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), where they become proficient in national Customs law and regulations, and organizational administration.

For the PCU’s Customs agents, the Police and Gendarmerie were universally considered as interlopers, interfering in an area of Customs’ purview: they did not know how to correctly profile containers, or how to conduct investigations based on the control of illegal goods entering the port since they lacked the formal educational training and historical experience required to accomplish such tasks, regardless of UNODC training received. They pressed this issue further, accusingly stating that the majority of Police and Gendarmerie were uneducated, and most often had used familial and social connections (if not bribery) to be chosen for employment. While these interlocutors insisted that they trusted that their police and gendarme colleagues in the PCU had merited their positions, their lack of experience and association with the police and gendarmerie institutions made their contribution to the proper functioning of the PCU very minimal. If anything, police and gendarme members of the unit were delegated the tasks of searching containers by hand with a gang of port day labourers.

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233 The majority of Customs agents interviewed for this research, in each research site visited, used the term “licit-illicit” to refer to legal goods smuggled into a country, as opposed to strictly “illicit” goods such as narcotics, guns, and counterfeit goods.
234 Interview, two PCU customs officers, Dakar, 31 January 2013.
235 Interview, senior PCU official, and observation of the inspection and search of two containers, Dakar, 1 February.
For two former OCRTIS directors, both since promoted to senior management of the DGPN, it is true that Customs officers do have a recognized specialization in controlling goods entering the territory – but that that was the limit of their expertise. Customs educational credentials, for them, did not amount to authority over how drug control should be performed in the country: their cultural capital does not convert to symbolic capital and power.

As examined in the previous chapter, the symbolic power within Senegal’s field of drug law enforcement is based in efficiency and operational trust, particularly in conducting important drug seizures. For police officials (and especially OCRTIS officers), customs agents do not hold the investigatory capacities to dismantle trafficking networks, or to even arrest criminal suspects once a seizure has taken place.

Like with regard to AIRCOP, OCRTIS officers chanted the “all they (Customs officers of the PCU) want to do is to get their bonuses!”236 This is a point of serious contention for Senegal’s specialized anti-trafficking units like OCRTIS, the Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières (CENTIF), and the Brigade Nationale de Lutte Contre la Piraterie et la Contrefaçon (BNLPC). Customs agents in Senegal are given a commission bonus each time that a lawful seizure is performed, allotted from the Caisse de lutte contre la fraude, which is based on the weight of the seizure and estimated value of the goods in question. While the payment of customs commissions for lawful seizures of smuggled “licit-illicit” tax-evaded goods, is a standard practice in most Francophone West African states, payment of the commission

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236 Quote from interview senior Senegalese Police official, Dakar, 4 August 2012; interview, senior OCRTIS officer, Dakar, 18 January 2013; interview, two OCRTIS officers, Dakar, 28 January 2013.
on illicit/illegal goods like narcotics is not common, but is paid in Senegal. Priding themselves on their investigatory capabilities, OCRTIS officers explain that it is no use working in a specialized joint-agency unit headed by a Customs agent since the purpose of these counter-organized crime measures will not be accomplished: for the Senegalese drug unit, Customs agents will not pursue investigations, even if they did have the official credentials to do so, since performing seizures is all that is required for monetary gain.

Both Gendarmerie and OCRTIS agents were scathing in their assessment of the performance of the PCU because of their distrust in the motives and capabilities of its Customs agents. Not only has the PCU headed by the Customs agency been unable to arrest any individuals for smuggling or trafficking, it has not even performed any narcotics seizures since the programme’s inception. This lack of seizures and criminal arrests limit the extent of prestige and honour that can be acquired by their rivals within the Senegalese Customs agency, when compared to their own success in performing narcotics seizures and arrests.

The lack of seizures in illicit goods had even been recognized by the UNODC, arguing that while none were reported in 2009 that the Senegalese PCU “remains vigilant” and is still an “effective deterrent” against trafficking through the PAD (UNODC 2009: 7). Seizures of “licit-illicit” goods, however, were reported by the Senegal PCU in 2010, 2012 and 2013: boxes of synthetic hair; expired cough medication; and some dialysis equipment in 2010 (UNODC/WCO 2011: 33); in 2012, the PCU carried out seizures of some Samsung televisions and some medicines and medical equipment (UNODC/WCO

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237 Interview, Senegalese Police official, Dakar, 14 January 2013; interview, senior CILD police official, 15 January 2013, Dakar; interview, two Senegalese Gendarmes, Dakar, 22 January 2013.
2012: 33); and in 2013, one container of counterfeit goods, and one stolen vehicle was seized by the PCU (UNODC/WCO 2013: 38). But for the Gendarmerie and OCRTIS, these seizures are only met with derision, and are proof that the Customs agents that lead the PCU are unable to do “real transnational organized crime law enforcement.”

The PCU has made no arrests, these interlocutors insisted. Moreover, since the inception of the unit, major cocaine seizures shipped in containers have been made in Europe which have been launched from the PAD, a fact known to OCRTIS through its weekly meetings with European police liaisons based in Dakar. For example, two containers launched from Senegal’s PAD containing 168 kg of cocaine en route to Belgium was seized at Tilbury docks in late April 2013, valued at £17 million (BBC News 2013b). For OCRTIS officers, the PAD was being used as a significant stockpiling station for narcotics flows headed to Europe, and for these interlocutors, proved the inability of the PCU to deliver law enforcement results. For them, the cocaine trade in Europe proved as much since Senegalese networks are regularly arrested in France for the trafficking and sale of cocaine (see Cornevin 2014 for a recent example).

Proof of the Senegal Customs’ inability to provide real seizures and arrests is evident since the only major seizure of narcotics at the PAD was undertaken by the drug unit as the lead investigating body, with only support from the port’s Customs division. In March 2006, after a seven-month investigation and waiting period in Dakar, OCRTIS allowed for the controlled delivery of 8.39 tonnes of hashish imported from Pakistan through the PAD, leading to the arrest of both a French and a Senegalese citizen. The

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238 Interview, three Officers of the Gendarmerie Section de Recherche, Dakar, 23 August 2012.
239 Interview, Senior OCRTIS officer, Dakar, 7 May 2013.
Customs division did not initially scan the container, even though its declared contents were 143 bundles of cotton and Senegal is a cotton exporter. Through OCRTIS informants, the unit gained knowledge of the import and had the Custom’s Division scan and inspect the container to verify its true contents upon arrival at the PAD. Once verified, OCRTIS waited for the container’s owner to recuperate the goods, and then made the arrests (see Seck 2006). This investigation occurred before the instalment of the PCU at the port, and the arrests took place months before the “theoretical training phase” of the programme. Admittedly, for these OCRTIS and Gendarme Section de Recherche officers, even though AIRCOP was conceived in Europe and does not take into account local conditions in Senegal, it at least managed to seize narcotics and arrest traffickers since the CAAT was headed by a Police official. In comparison, the CCP could never work to produce “real” law enforcement achievements since a Customs agent headed the PCU. Only seasoned investigatory officers, preferably those that had developed skills within OCRTIS or other ‘serious crimes’ Divisions within the Police Judiciaire held the recognized symbolic capital and credibility to seriously dent illicit narcotics trafficking in the country, including at the PAD (see Bourdieu 1991: 106).

UNODC officials’ backing of the Customs leadership is severely resented by Senegal’s high-level police officials. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, OCRTIS officers tend to leave UNODC-backed initiatives in favour of other international partners, notably ones led by Spanish police liaisons, or US-DEA and AFRICOM-led projects. Senegal’s drug police resist instead of comply with UNODC law enforcement advice and interactions because of their feelings of animosity (and perhaps bitterness) towards the

\[240\] Interview, three OCRTIS agents directly involved in the investigation, 21 August 2012.
country’s Customs officers.\textsuperscript{241} From 2011 to June 2014, OCRTIS leadership has rebuffed UNODC advances. During this time, the drug police have refused to participate in annual UNODC-led regional drug law enforcement meetings held in Accra and Addis Ababa, and UNODC officials were not invited to participate in the 2012 Dakar Initiative.\textsuperscript{242}

When asked why Senegal did not send representatives from its drug control institutions, senior level OCRTIS and CILD officers answered: “Two reasons: UNODC does not respect our competence and authority; and we already know how to conduct efficient drug control and what is happening with traffickers. We have nothing to learn from the UNODC meetings.”\textsuperscript{243}

These animosities translate into a competing vision of how to undertake drug control in Senegal that pits UNODC programmers against OCRTIS.\textsuperscript{244} Experience and efficiency in conducting drug law enforcement mattered for OCRTIS officials. This meant that police work was about routinely practicing long-term surveillance, undercover methods, and knowledge of community surroundings. The databases and other digital tools so cherished by the Customs agency and supported by UNODC were not as important as ones that facilitate the infiltration of criminal networks. OCRTIS officers

\textsuperscript{241}Not only do Senegalese Customs officers get bonuses from seizing smuggled goods, and have more opportunities for large-scale graft an informal arrangements with smugglers, Customs officers are also paid higher salaries than OCRTIS police and gendarmes; interview, CILD official, Dakar, 23 August 2012.
\textsuperscript{242}Participant Observation at HONLEA annual meeting, Accra, 25-27 June 2012, and Dakar InitiativeRegional Harmonization meetings, Dakar, 11-12 September 2012.
\textsuperscript{243}Quote from interview, senior Senegalese Police Official, Dakar, 4 August 2012; interview, CILD official, Dakar, 23 August 2012.
\textsuperscript{244}As emphasized in the previous chapter, some OCRTIS agents trust, respect, and recognize the authority and security expertise of some UNODC officials, especially ones that are based in Dakar. UNODC programmers for AIRCOP and the CCP have had these rough, conflictual relationships, which at times have ramped upwards in mutual expressions of frustration for the UN organization writ large.
instead catered to international partners that could provide night-vision goggles, audio equipment, vehicles, and gasoline. Moreover, since experience in conducting long-term drug control investigations was so valued by Senegal’s security agents, initiatives from international partners like the Americans, Spanish, and French were willingly accepted by OCRTIS. The latter recognized the authority of these actors in security matters more than the expertise of IO officials.

This leaves CCP and UNODC experts in a difficult position with little means of recourse, which results in their continual attempts to persuade OCRTIS and senior-level police officials at the DGPN. Since a former head of OCRTIS subsequently became the Director of the DGPN, their attempts at persuasion have been more or less fruitless, leaving them to take the fall-back position of supporting the security institution that shares a similar security doxa: The Senegalese Customs Agency.

The CCP, therefore, exhibits similar dynamics as AIRCOP since it is designed to incorporate officers from all of Senegal’s internal security institutions. Rivalries between them over competing claims of superior efficiency in drug control make the type of cooperation and synergies that CCP experts hope for very difficult to achieve in practice. Changes associated with the loosening of the state’s control of the economy, tightened state budgets, and proliferation of transnational flows, intensify contests between security agencies that have a stake in defining which threats to take seriously, and how to counter them. The fact that international actors seek to implement capacity-building initiatives to strengthen them only amplifies these dynamics, since international sponsorship means gaining forms of capital needed to dominate the security field.
**Competing structures of authority: State-society relations and their effects on security governance through the CCP**

The CCP not only has to deal with inter-corps security rivalries. Other non-security actors, ones that recognize alternative structures of authority present in Senegal, contest the rescaling of security governance at the port. PCU are indeed ‘wooed’ by inducements international actors put on offer, and are placed under disciplinary practices of surveillance by Western security experts. Nevertheless, the governance of borderless threats that the PCU is to provide is heavily constrained by broader socio-political conflicts that exist in Senegal’s state-society relations, and the structural context in which the global assemblage is embedded (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hameiri and Jones 2015a).

Powerful transnational groups tied to Senegal’s religious, and politico-economic elites that evince alternative structures of authority not based on security rationales successfully contest the type of security governance that UNOCD officials have designed for the country through the CCP. Officers of the country’s security institutions often fall under the sway of these elites’ patron-client networks, and the moral economies tied to the observance of social norms in Senegal. Thus, the configuration of positions of power and authority in Senegal’s religious field can influence practices of actors in the field of drug law enforcement. Indeed, if members of the PCU are practicing the risk profiling techniques that they are taught, all forms of illicit shipments arriving or transiting the PAD will be scrutinized, leading potential criminal networks to choose other methods of entry of their goods to the sub-region. Re-routing criminal operations to other ports diminishes the potential profits to be made by the informality or illegality that the PCU
should stifle. At minimum, the PCU’s practices increase the costs of such ventures. For a cash-strapped state administration seeking to maximize its incoming tax and customs revenues, increasing the time of release of goods or lengthening the processes of criminal investigations based at the PAD, creates an incentive to forego the strict application of the security governance envisioned by the CCP. In other words, having supported the rescaling of its economic governance, elites of Senegal’s political field are less inclined to rescale its security governance. PCU officers, therefore, become caught between alternative structures of authority: international capacity-builders and security experts, or coalitions of actors that include state officials, religious authorities, and powerful economic elites.

Religious, politico-economic authorities, the PAD, and the PCU

The case of religious and economic elite authority in Senegal demonstrates how state-society dynamics in Senegal have a direct impact on how the CCP and other security-related practices function at the PAD.

Religious authorities are extremely influential in Senegal, providing an essential legitimating link between postcolonial era governments and Senegalese populations (Cruise O’Brien 1975; 2003; Villalón 1995; Guèye 2002; Beck 2008; Dahirou and Foucher 2009). Islamic Sufi Confréries (Brotherhoods) exercise an authority that had historically provided political backing for political parties elected to national government. The authority of Senegal’s Sufi clerics (marabouts) is based on forms of recognized charisma or symbolic power, with which a marabout develops multiple relationships of dependence with individual disciples (taalibes) (see Villalón 1995: 115-148). This charismatic authority has prompted political and economic elites in Senegal to actively
court Sufi marabouts of note, especially during periods of electoral contest, since the marabouts’ endorsement may secure the allegiance of the disciples that follow him.

The centrality of religious authority is demonstrated by the importance of religious urban centres like Touba and Tivouane for national politicians. Political elites seek to deploy their own allegiance to important Sufi leaders in return for the promise of political solidarity (Seck 2010: 63-90). While a marabouts’ influence over the political choices of his disciples (taalibes) is not guaranteed (ibid.; Beck 2008: 80-97), particularly when many of the latter have developed extensive socioeconomic resources through transnational trade (Diop 1981: 92; Babou 2013; Ba Gning 2013: 522), their political sway and social presence in the country is significant.

The Mouride brotherhoods, which display the most rigorous application of the cleric-disciple relationship, have become the most influential Sufi order in the country. One important reason for the brotherhood’s rise to prominence is how this relationship tends to function as resilient “conduits of redistribution” and economic support, which places key Mouride clerics at the centre of vast political and economic networks, and positions them to have a direct influence on state economic policy (Diop 1981: 92; Villalón 1995: 187; Ba Gning 2013: 518-520). Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Mouride cross-border economic networks, based in large part on the smuggling of licit goods, became some of the largest and most resilient of West Africa (Bako-Arifari 2007: 186; Golub and Mbaye 2009; Meagher 2014: 12-14). Mouride brotherhoods’ “indispensable intermediation” with state officials facilitates economic transactions in the sub-region (Ba Gning 2013: 517). In return, Mouride economic actors have provided access to sources of
credit to small traders at the behest of Mouride religious elites, who then also follow suit and begin their own smuggling operations (Golub and Mbaye 2009: 598).

Due to the centrality of the port of Dakar in Senegal’s liberalized economy, it has become one of the most important political nodes for Mouride brotherhood intra-elite competition for political influence and economic advantage. Large spells of Mouride migration expanded rapidly since the 1980s towards Senegal’s urban areas, or further afield to Europe and North America. Transnational migration has linked Mouride business interests abroad with Mouride merchants in Senegal, who dominate the country’s economic opportunities (Seck 2010: 58; Buggenhagen 2012: 71-75). Operations at the PAD have thus become a central economic concern for Mouride confrérie commercial networks based in Touba linked to Senegal’s massive import-export economy.

The administration of the PAD has also become enmeshed in the political field strategies of Senegal’s multi-party democracy actors. The head of the PAD is a coveted position due to its economic importance and prestige, which only increases with the enhanced speed and profitability of the port’s public and private operations.245 The president of Senegal has selected the position of the Director General of the PAD since the privatization of the port’s management in the late 1990s. Since that time, Director Generals of the PAD have been staunch supporters of President Wade, and after 2012, former Wade apprentice and now vehement political rival, President Macky Sall. Each Director General has either been a member of the presidents’ political parties or party coalitions.

245 Interview, Senegalese journalist, Dakar, 23 January 2013.
Mouride notables based in Touba, Thiès and Dakar regularly court PAD officials to insist for the quicker release of imported goods, and less interference from Senegalese Customs. Mouride brotherhoods enjoy a special tax-free status, which allows for the maintenance of thriving informal market activities in Touba, and even higher profits on goods sold at markets should customs duties be reduced or ignored at the PAD (Cruise O’Brien 2003: 4, 27). Compared to the relatively recent introduction of the CCP to the port, Mouride economic and religious networks have been entrenched in Senegalese matters of state since the colonial era. This places customs agents in a very difficult position. It is their responsibility to appropriately establish and collect the import duties on all goods coming into the PAD as declared by the owners of imported goods. However, goods imported are often listed as the property of the Mouride brotherhood leadership (the Khalife), or as materials destined for use at the central mosque in Touba, which strips customs’ ability to levy duties on these goods. Moreover, it is also well known secret in Dakar amongst Mouride businessmen that fostering friendships with the customs officers is a useful business strategy, especially with those who are Mouride and benefit from the taalibe relationship. Customs officers themselves can list imported goods on state forms as headed to Touba, regardless of any other declaration, provided that ‘an arrangement’ can be reached amongst these actors through the brokerage practices of clerics (see Bako-Arifari 2007: 206).246 Thus, the everyday forms of corruption that are diffused through West African societies, so well explained by Olivier de Sardan (1999) and his co-author Blundo (2007), mitigate the CCP’s chief function to block the passage of borderless threats entering via the PAD.

246 Interview, Mouride businessman, HLM market, Dakar, 21 January 2013; I had similar discussions with several Mouride families in Dakar in August and September 2012.
This is not to imply that Mouride economic and religious elites are necessarily involved in the smuggling of illicit goods like narcotics, small arms, chemical, radiological, or nuclear materials required to make a dirty bomb, and the like. There is no immediate evidence to support such a claim, apart from the suspicions held by some divisions within the Senegalese Customs Agency, and those of European police liaisons based in Dakar. UNODC/WCO officials that provide CCP training to PCU members, however, do stress that if the programme is working as its design intends, any container that exhibits high risk characteristics, including those which may contain goods that are illegal or fraudulent, must be profiled, scanned, and searched by the PCU. Thus, the CCP is not solely interested in interdicting cocaine, but also includes the targeting of fraudulent or fake pharmaceutical drugs, cigarettes, toothpaste, batteries, etc. Nevertheless, in Senegal, fraudulent pharmaceutical products are found in every major market. The trade of illicit pharmaceuticals in Dakar and Touba (the two largest urban areas of the country) is dominated by Mouride economic networks, which recruit men who had formerly been taalibes in Touba to serve as market traders and hawkers (Howson 2012: 426; Diarisso and Goredema 2014: 6). Due to the recognized authority of the Mouride religious elite and the intermediary or brokerage function that they practice between state officials and economic elites, the functions of the CCP can be, and most likely are, diverted in favour of non-state, ‘licit-illicit,’ and potentially (for several law enforcement interlocutors) illicit networks. The passage of such goods contravenes the

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247 Interviews conducted with French and Italian security officials in Dakar equally showed that the latter also hold heavy suspicions on the involvement of these religious networks in the stockpiling and transshipment of cocaine in Senegal to Europe where in both countries, large Senegalese diasporas reside. However, these police officials have been unable to prove how these religious-economic networks are utilizing the port for trafficking ventures.
legal and formal apparatus of duties collection of the Senegalese state, which the CCP is supposed to curtail.\footnote{Interview, Senior Senegalese Police Official, Dakar, 4 August 2012; interview, French security official, Dakar, 25 January 2013.}

\textit{PAD administrators, security, and the work of the PCU}

PCU team members are well aware of these religious and political-economic dynamics, and the need to balance their private allegiances with the work of profiling and searching suspect containers. While the members of the PCU are officially beholden to their specific chains of command (Customs, Police, Gendarmerie), and informally to possible religious elites, they also recognize the need to follow the suggestions/regulations that come from the PAD administration. In line with best practices in port management outlined by international financial institutions (especially the World Bank), the public-private partnerships that are in place in the PAD have emphasized and planned for the need to reduce the administrative burdens associated with Customs regulations and processes at the port and to increase the speed of the release of imported goods (Conférence Régionale sur les Partenariats Publics-Privés 2008: 7; Conseil Présidentiel de l’Investissement 2011: 3; see Hibou 2004; Chalfin 2010a).\footnote{The PAD is operated as a public-private partnership between the state of Senegal (Société Nationale du Port Autonome de Dakar – SONAPAD) and a variety of multinational transport and logistics companies. The port is owned as a public enterprise and space, but the operation of port services, maintenance and construction of new terminals is open to processes of private international bidding for Build-Operate-Transfer service contracts (see UNCTAD 2003: 19, 27, 35).} Adding an additional security measure to the port’s operations conflicts with the economic imperative to increase the speed of arrival and release of shipping containers, as some containers may be perceived as exhibiting a heightened risk and require additional scrutiny.
The concern for the speed of release of containers is well understood by UNODC administrators who tend to reduce the CCP’s discursive emphasis on drug seizures and organized crime in favour of the economic and fiscal potential of facilitating the smooth passage of legitimate trade. In its 2012 Annual Progress Report, the UNODC and WCO emphasized that “efficient and cost-effective law enforcement systems and practices – a basis for the national security – recover lost revenue and create a favorable investment climate, ultimately leading to a safe environment and prosperous economy… whilst facilitating the free flow of legitimate trade” (UNODC/WCO 2012: 1, 10). The programme is sold strategically to both donors and recipients as a “winning solution” that enhances security and trade simultaneously by not adding additional “kinks” in the trade supply chain, which would “kill trade.”

Nevertheless, for PAD managerial officials embedded in Senegal’s political and economic elite, the CCP still can mean that additional containers to be scanned and possibly kept in the port while law enforcement agencies pursue criminal investigations, ultimately slowing the rate of business.

Moreover, if the security rationale behind the CCP is to have PCUs conduct criminal investigations into violations of intellectual property rights or the trafficking of narcotics, it is not immediately evident that PAD officials or the political elite of which they are part would share in this security understanding. They may not view smuggling or trafficking activities as threats. Due to the lucrative nature of these economic activities, and the less than immediately clear social danger that they pose, curbing smuggling of any of these commodities through the PAD may not be a shared priority (see UNODC 2005; Ellis 2009: 173; Reitano and Shaw 2014: 4). This puts the port’s leadership at odds

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250 Quotes from telephone Interview, UN Official in Vienna, 27 February 2015.
with the functioning of the CCP. PCU members that do not follow the advice of PAD officials put their careers in jeopardy due to the important political connections that the latter enjoy. As a result, members of the PCU often complained of being “stuck between the hammer and the anvil”: they need to facilitate the rapid flow of commerce into the country while at the same time securing the country from potential threats, which they view as opposite goals.\textsuperscript{251}

PAD administrators seek to make the port work as efficiently as possible given the existing logistical constraints. This means that the actual functioning of the PAD is in stark contrast with the example that the PCU members are taught in training and visits to European ports. For example, in extensive tours of the PAD with PCU members, they demonstrated that there were no CCTV cameras in the port. Access to the PAD is extremely lax, as the Gendarmerie tasked with controlling entry to the terminal where containers are searched, rarely perform their function.\textsuperscript{252} As a result, port employees, their friends, hawkers, individuals seeking daily work, visitors, in addition to state bureaucrats and PAD administrators, all enter sections of the PAD more or less unhindered. For PAD officials, given the circumstances, this is a necessary evil: unskilled workers are required in some areas of the port in order to increase the speed of release of goods.\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{251} Interview, three PCU team members, Dakar, 31 January 2013. This was the quote, meaning in Canadian vernacular, “between a rock and a hard place”.

\textsuperscript{252} I visited the PAD four times, and on each occasion, I walked post a Gendarme post and was not asked by anyone for documentation. I asked the PCU members if they had informed the Gendarmes of my visit, and they had not. Instead, the PCU members insist that this is a common occurrence in their section of the port. The only section where this is not possible is that used by the French Marine Nationale.

\textsuperscript{253} Foot traffic is not permitted in more mechanized areas of the port, notably the container mole operate by Dubai Port World.
Compared to the rigid controls that PCU members witness in their work-study tours in Le Havre or Rotterdam, the PAD looks more like a market than a port. While the CCP is designed to tighten this mobility bottleneck and to channel and control for high-risk goods arriving by container from those that are deemed normal, the PCU members view the daily operations of the PAD as loosening and opening up those controls. PCU officers are unable to assess the risk-levels of all those individuals flooding the port on a daily-basis. A senior PCU member frequently insisted that this was the normal condition of things at the PAD, a fact which was “not normal; it is bizarre. There are thousand of people running around the port, all coming and going. In Rotterdam, you don’t see anyone. It’s not normal.”

In reality, PAD officials wilfully bend some security protocols involving the internal functions of the port since they do not share the same interests as PCU members. PAD officials seek to accrue profits through the increased speed of the release of goods entering and leaving the port. To do so involves allowing the entry of hawkers, women selling food, and especially day labourers, to ensure that the PAD remains adequately staffed, and its employees acquiescent and with the energy required to perform their work. As a result, PCU officers view their colleagues in the PAD, who have not worked alongside UNODC, as subverting their work through lax application of security protocols.

Nor do PAD officials share the security understandings held by the PCU. If anything, their understanding of security involves those practices required in facilitating the secure entry of ships to the port. These practices include the use of marine patrols by a gendarmerie unit to surveil the port’s near entry, identifying ships via the Automated

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254 Interview, senior PCU Customs official, Dakar, 28 January 2013.
Identification of Ships (AIS) navigational system used in the port control tower, the use of radars to determine if unidentified ships are entering the space of the port, and ensuring that individual vessels have implemented safety and security plans. A coordinating body that undertakes the implementation of the International Ship and Port facilities Code (ISPS), which ought to guide the security standards of the PAD, does not include staff from the PCU. While the heads of the Customs’ Port and Maritime Divisions attend coordination meetings, the PCU does not answer to these command structures, but only work alongside them should the PCU order for containers to be scanned by the Customs Scanning Unit of the PAD. In other words, PAD officials seek to secure the functions of trade itself associated with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), not to secure against individual/tradable high-risk goods. This security understanding reflects the goal of making the PAD the most competitive and efficient logistical venue for trade in the West African region above other ports of the sub-region like Abidjan, Tema or Cotonou; a title coveted by the Senegalese government through its globally-extraverted and economically-liberalized orientation.

The end result of these competing security values for the CCP in Senegal is a frustrated PCU team. PCU members are willing and increasingly able to implement the goals of the programme and its vision of security, but know that they are unable to do so due to the complex state-society relationships imbued in how the PAD operates, and its associated political economy. This only drives PCU members to have to choose between local and global allegiances in order to advance their career motivations: either to global

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security experts and trainers from UNODC and EU donor countries who, through additional training and mentorship, may push for individual officers to secure training abroad or employment in a UN agency; or to their national leaders that can place them in more lucrative Customs or Gendarmerie divisions/positions where they will benefit from increased contact with economic and religious elite and the economic resources that they have on offer.

One PCU official from Senegalese Customs, upon touring this author through the PAD, lamented his need to get out of the position, which he had held for over three years, and to be reassigned elsewhere. While there are benefits to being a member of the specialized unit (for example their connections to homologues in other CCP countries and with experts in Brussels and Vienna, access to the material benefits from regular training conducted in posh hotels in Dakar and its related per diems, and the symbolic capital that comes from accruing training certificates with which to leverage into international employment opportunities), ultimately the work put him in a position that limits his financial opportunities in the short-term. Financial benefits from the routine ‘arrangements’ of daily work conducted by Customs and Gendarmerie may be hard to give up when traded in for a position of putative transnational import. For this very reason, a recurrent turnover of the leadership of the PCU in Senegal has been a constant frustration for UNODC officials: Senegal’s Dakar port PCU is understood as one of the most challenging PCUs in the programme, and one which requires more constant surveillance, re-training, and correction by UNODC trainers.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how multiple sets of actors compete over how borderless threats ought to be tackled in Senegal by examining the functioning of the UNODC/WCO Container Control Programme at the Port of Dakar. The CCP evinces a sophisticated transnational design that connects disparate political jurisdictions, multiple types of security actors, and their associated visions and practices of security. This chapter has demonstrated how UNODC efforts to implement security governance initiatives in a way that rescales how borderless threats are managed do not achieve their lofty objectives.

The programme itself seeks to rescale security governance beyond the national level through a set of disciplinary practices of surveillance on security actors from the global south like the members of the PCU; some rooted in local physical space (via the PCU and inter-agency design, and mentoring/training), and others in a deterritorialized form (monitoring use of ContainerComm). Ultimately, these disciplinary practices cannot compel security actors in Senegal to conform to the security logics of these international experts, or to perform the security practices they teach when PCU members choose not to, which means that incentives must be introduced that will coax national security actors to seek after them. This means that UNODC actors incentivize PCU agents to pursue practices of extraversion: forging links of dependence on UNODC officials to better acquire international forms of capital realized in connected spaces of intervention.

Unfortunately for the IO security experts from the UNODC examined here, their security governance rescaling is unsuccessful due to their introduction to Senegal’s security and political fields. The forms of capital that these international capacity-builders introduce to the country amplify the competitive relationships and animosities held
between national customs, OCRTIS, and gendarme drug control units. Since their visions of networked security governance have dovetailed those of with an out-going, technologically-hungry, and extraverted Customs agency, UNODC officials have drawn the criticism of other security institutions like OCRTIS. The way the CCP is meant to refashion security governance against borderless threats at Dakar’s port fails since coordination is blocked by the politics of competition over material and symbolic resources used to dominate the field of drug law enforcement. The CCP’s security governance rescaling in practice in Senegal equates to dealing with rivalries while attempting to govern borderless threats.

Competing authority structures in the country’s religious and political fields only hinder the rescaling of security governance further. Coalitions of religious, economic and political elites hold financial and political interests that run counter to the security practices of the CCP. The rescaling of capitalist economic governance in Senegal, and the centrality of the PAD within this complicated process, competes with the transformation of security governance introduced by UNODC CCP actors, and the DCI and EU officials that support it. It is debatable if national non-security elites even believe smuggling or trafficking the forms of goods that the CCP is designed to control is a threat at all. If they do not, then the work of the PCU will only harm their economic interests. Alternative configurations of authority, therefore, have a direct influence on the functioning of the CCP. PCU members are beholden to multiple authorities in adjacent fields, and must pursue practices in security efforts according to the pressures exerted by competing allegiances by making evaluations of how backing some actors over others will secure the recognition of their own authority in the security field.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

“The challenges faced in the Sahel do not respect borders and, therefore, neither can the solutions.”

- Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary General, 14 June 2013.

Globalization, many argue, has a ‘dark side.’ The position goes that insatiable, space-destroying, speed enhancing technologies erode sovereignty, resulting in a transfer of authority and power away from states to an ever-growing set of private actors, many of which are criminal. It creates a “sovereignty-challenging open global playground” that amplifies transnational organized criminal activity, and produces a legion of borderless threats (Mandel 2011: 21-23). The UN Secretary General refers to this very situation for the Sahel, and categorically affirms that the world needs solutions that are just as borderless and wide ranging as the nature of these challenges in order to win these “new wars of globalization” (Naim 2005: 5).

Globalization does indeed reconfigure and decouple how we understand and practice the relationship between state sovereignty, territory, political power, and authority. But this does not mean that states are eroding, withering or crumbling away, or are losing control. It means that multiple state and non-state, public and private, global and local, licit and possibly even illicit actors are governing states in ways that are spatially multi-scalar, networked, and deterritorialized (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hameiri and Jones 2015a; Doucet 2015). This includes the case of the field of security and law enforcement. Across the globe, even in spaces that represent some of the most deserted, poverty-stricken, and putatively ‘ungoverned’ that the world can offer, attempts to govern borderless threats are being managed within and through assemblages of
security intervention that couple and extend the knowledges, practices, norms and discourses, technologies, and mentalities of multiple sets of actors in a shifting, transnationalized archipelago of global governance. Assemblages of security intervention must not be considered rational or coordinated. Their creation and evolution are fundamentally political and contingent, since within its nested spaces of intervention the power, resources, and ways of doing of a multiplicity of actors are reoriented, reconfigured, and challenged, resulting in socio-political conflict in local fields of power.

The new modalities and transnationalized geographies of power that these assemblages evince introduce international forms of capital that are desired by competing coalitions of actors and institutions in local settings; key resources that they need to dominate the fields in which they are embedded. In the case of West Africa, this creates opportunities for local actors to leverage their connections at the interfaces and nodal positions within assemblages to tie themselves in unequal relationships with global actors to accumulate these forms of capital through practices of extraversion. When these transnational gatekeepers and masters of insider knowledge acquire international forms of capital, they use them to consolidate authority and symbolic power over competitors, therein shaping how a field’s governance object is understood and practiced.

The fact that assemblages of security intervention operate in ways that simultaneously complicate and converge the global and the local, the state and non-state, the public and the private, means that they fragment and blur the very distinctions that have historically structured modern conceptions of politics (like order, the state, community, and authority), and supplant their conventional spatial logics (Bartelson 2001). This makes them politically consequential for individuals located within their
sphere of gravity. In this conclusion, I present four sub-headings as broader questions that round out the insights regarding the politics of assemblages of security intervention that this dissertation has attempted to illustrate, in order to discuss some of the political implications of these complex, shifting, transnationalized networks of power and authority.

**Research implications of global assemblages of security intervention?**

The production of assemblages of security intervention has important analytical consequences for how we understand the governance of borderless threats. For example, this dissertation has demonstrated that security practices, logics, and discourses travel. As they do so, they are likely to have varied levels of impact on the capacities, institutional arrangements, and capital of sets of local and global actors, and the degree to which domestic and international spaces are converged. This is not a uniform, or universal process that is generalizable everywhere regardless of context, but a highly varied one (see Joseph 2010). Studying these complex relationships means paying due attention to the specific and contingent forms that fields of power take on as they are disassembled and reassembled in particular locations (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 217-237).

As such, three key analytical points follow: First, in order to avoid the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994), it is important to examine connected spaces of intervention in a way that sees the global in the local and vice-versa, but to not discount one of these scales to the advantage of the other. If we do so, it is possible to overemphasize the power of certain actors over others, as is the case in much of the literature on international statebuilding (see Barnett 2006; Richmond 2010; Sending 2011). Second, it means that analysis of politics in these connected spaces must grapple with socio-political conflict
and relations of power. International capacity-building actors, and the practices and discourses they bring in tow, will have varying effects on local fields of struggle as new forms of capital become realized in these newly-connected spaces. The practices and struggles of these local fields will then reverberate back to influence competition in the field of international capacity-building. Nuanced understandings of these dynamics will be lost if we focus solely on the characteristics of actors (global or local) in connected spaces of intervention, and do not account for what they find important, why, and how their relationships constrain or enable particular ways of being and doing. Third, it means that we must be aware and active in putting our normative and ideological baggage by the door when examining the politics of intervention. The transformative relationships that structure assemblages of security intervention cannot be discerned if we are constantly trying to place a particular template on the political and institutional arrangements found within connected spaces of intervention. Transnational security governance initiatives and capacity-building interventions are simultaneous expressions and conductors of significant transformations in the nature of contemporary states (see Hameiri 2010). This is something that much of the literature on international statebuilding, especially in its policy-oriented technical variant misses to its detriment (Paris 2004; Chesterman et. al. 2005; Lake 2010). Seeking to discover why capacity-building interventions fail to create functioning states in the global south matters less than understanding what types of politics they actually do create through their global interactions and asymmetrical relationships of power (Hameiri 2011).
Global assemblages of security intervention and the internationalization of the West African state?

These insights have important implications for the global politics of security in Africa and the “internationalization” of its states (see Cox 1987: 253-265; Brenner 1999; Bayart 2007: 30-76). Africa has occupied a prominent position in contemporary understandings of state failure, collapse, and the need for state reconstruction to assuage international security concerns (Milliken and Krause 2002; Bates 2008; Englebert and Tull 2008). In traditional IR thinking, fragile African states exercise little control or authority over their territories, and only remain states in name due to the recognition of their sovereign status from the international community of states (see Jackson 1990; Krasner 1999). This dissertation has demonstrated how representatives and security experts from IOs (like the UNODC, WCO, EEAS, and others), and powerful Western governments pursue attempts to rescale security governance in West Africa by building the capacities of its security institutions based on this very assumption: that fragile states cannot effectively not wield authority, and for this reason cannot control their populations, resulting in borderless threats like drug trafficking launching towards peaceful/secure and orderly spaces of the international community (see Kaplan 1994; Rotberg 2004). In other words, one of the main functions of the state, the capacity of its representatives to exercise coercive and symbolic violence within a precise territory, is being internationalized through capacity-building initiatives (see Giddens 1984; Bourdie 1999; Loveman 2005).

What does this signify for the exercise of authority and control of sovereign state actors in the Sahel? Following Cox but in regard to the governance of borderless threats, the internationalization of the state “is the global process whereby national policies and
practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of” transnational security (1987: 253). Similar concepts have been advanced, like “governance states” or “phantom states,” to describe how international actors and expert authorities take a central role in reorienting and reconfiguring the provision of state services and its mechanisms of governance, making them less accountable in the process (Harrison 2004; Chandler 2006). The dissertation shows that international capacity-builders, policing and security experts, have attempted to adjust the national priorities of West African law enforcement actors and institutions to align with the exigencies of better governing borderless threats. International experts, the tools and technologies that they bring with them, and the discourses and normativities they articulate, are all potential conduits for security governance internationalization. Projects like AIRCOP and the CCP are designed in such a way to connect the security practices, knowledges, and logics of actors in multiple, highly distinct settings through enhanced and secured systems of communication, regional and trans-regional training workshops, and via global technology transfers. Many of the latter are devices that enable international capacity-builders to pursue disciplinary and surveillance practices on the recipients of intervention, like the practice of following up, monitoring use of ContainerComm, or simply the practice of recurrent training and mentorship. Sahelian security actors have received copious amounts of law enforcement training and material equipment through these initiatives that imbue particular meanings about how to be professional law enforcement agents, and effective state authorities. They have likewise developed transnational law enforcement connections, if only on an informal level, which is also justified by international capacity-
builders as an important mechanism of security knowledge transfer. Internationalizing the security structures of Sahelian states seems to be the order of the day.

Nevertheless, these endeavours are not always successful in internationalizing West African state spaces and institutions, the most glaring case discussed here being the operation of the CCP. Even when Sahelian security institutions and practices are rescaled successfully, like in the case of the practices of the CAAT in arresting drug traffickers at LSS, success is not unequivocal, but is severely constrained and negotiated by the routines, practices, and understandings of CAAT officers. Therefore, just because some of the security institutions of Sahelian states are being transformed in internationalized, and rescaled ways does not necessarily mean that its actors have lost or exhibit less authority, less capacity to control the security rescaling process, or that they are somehow less sovereign actors. In fact, their authority and degree of control over the security governance process is significant.

First, the fact that there are capacity-building missions operating in Sahelian countries indicates that international actors do recognize the sovereignty, and therefore the institutional authority, of local government and security actors. Second, international capacity-builders quickly come to realize that recipients of their training and governance projects often ignore, change, co-opt, or refuse aspects that do not suit them. Recipients of capacity-building initiatives may even pursue practices through these initiatives that do not conform to their notions of appropriate law enforcement behaviour. Nevertheless, capacity-builders recognize that their mandates limit their ability to question the authority, or to control the practices of local government and security actors, even if the latter are pursuing criminal ventures, or are simply not exhibiting the degree of political will that
international actors wish they would. Even though there are vast differentials of power that mark relationships of international capacity-builders and local security actors in the connected spaces of intervention in the Sahel, the authority of the latter is not necessarily challenged by the former, and therefore many practices international actors find unacceptable continue, as involvement of the security institutions of Mali and Niger in facilitating drug trafficking clearly attests.

Third, in all of the cases explored above, there is little evidence of international capacity-builder imposition of security understandings or practices, and even less of an ability to guarantee their adoption by Sahelian security actors. This means that the authority of EUCAP-Sahel, DCI, UNODC, and other international capacity-builders is not universally recognized by Sahelian security actors in all cases and at all times. The fact that we see negotiation over the design, practices, costs, and implementation of initiatives like AIRCOP or the CCP means that Senegalese political and security officials challenge the authority of international capacity-builders. Sahelian security actors themselves hold varying levels of authority. This means that they are beholden to some local or global actors more than others depending on their evaluations of the best course of action given the constraining and enabling features of the fields in which they participate.

The relationships of Senegalese security actors’ with international capacity-builders evince different strategies of authority recognition, some which were acquiescent and respectful (for example how all of the specialized units find their interactions with Spanish and American police liaisons and capacity-builders), others resistant (OCRTIS officers and senior DGPN officials towards UNODC and DCI actors, and CAAT
Customs toward DCI liaisons), and still others that are ambiguous (Customs PCU and CAAT relationships with UNODC and WCO actors, and Italian Guardia di Finanza). This means that the capacity-building relationships in the connected spaces of intervention are not necessarily witnessing forms of “tacit trusteeship” where the authority of international actors is dominant but remains undeclared over local intervened actors (Andersen 2012). If anything, the authority of some international capacity-building experts is recognized by recipients of the Sahel’s security institutions; for others it is rejected; and still for others it is recognized but pushed aside in order to defer to the authority of more consequential set of local actors, all depending on evaluations of advancement in local fields of power.

Importantly, competing configurations of authority evinced in adjacent fields have crucial effects on the transnational governance of security in these connected spaces of intervention. Whenever the CAAT interdicts incoming narcotics traffickers at LSS international airport, the project’s international credentials, the local perceptions of the legitimacy of the country’s security institutions, and the credibility of the members of the inter-agency unit conducting these operations, are all enhanced: the symbolic capital of Senegal’s political and security actors grows. Ultimately, however, there is an incentive to allow the project function in a successful way, since catching the occasional trafficker does not significantly harm the interests of illicit operators based in the country. Law enforcement efforts that extend outside of the airport rarely occur even though security practices enabled there reach out through the structures of the assemblage. Similarly, the receipt of international capacity-building initiatives in Mali and Niger occur in a more or less unimpeded fashion since they are not viewed to significantly challenge illicit
operators that comprise salient nodes of authority in these countries’ security or political fields, and since it is debatable if drug trafficking is even believed to be a security risk to the country. Allowing the security institutions to accrue as many international security rents as possible may even consolidate the authority of illicit operators in these countries by reducing the costs associated with losing out to illicit competitors or non-state groups that tax their operations in the middle of the desert. However, the case of the CCP shows that security governance rescaling at Dakar’s port may challenge the preferences of many coalitions of actors connected transnationally via Senegal’s trade and religious diasporas, and elites competing in the country’s conjoined political, religious, and economic fields. The port is the economic artery of the country, if not the entire region. Senegalese trade and religious diasporas maintain significant authority through their capacities to enhance economic performance of the country, and in many ways the stability of its political institutions (see Villalón 1995; O’Brien 2003; De Jong and Foucher 2010). Since the operations of the CCP may induce additional risks to their operations, and certainly increase the costs of getting imported goods to market because of additional security measures the CCP introduces, they use their influence on national politicians, port officials, and the country’s security institutions to subvert how security is rescaled. As a result, the programme has not produced seizures of narcotics, or any other high-risk goods that the country’s security institutions deem important. This leads international actors to increasingly distrust Senegal’s political actors, since the port is assumed to be a major source of transit for narcotics. Thus, this case shows that the authority of local

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256 This assessment may be changing in the Sahelian interior, however, as control over key trafficking routes is entailing increasing occurrences of violence conflict, notably in Mali’s post-conflict Kidal and Gao regions.
political/religious/economic field participants, and their influence on national security actors, can in many ways trump the security logics, points of emphasis, and practices of surveillance articulated and used by international security experts.

The practices, logics, and capacities of the Sahelian state security institutions are being rescaled and internationalized to varying degrees, but this does not mean that their authority is lost in some zero-sum fashion to international actors. Nor does it imply that Sahelian political and security actors cannot significantly shape or manipulate control of the rescaling process. Instead, the processes of disassembly and reassembly of Sahelian security institutions reinforce the negotiated nature of African statehood, which does not alter “the continent’s structural dependency on the outside world” but open “up new avenues through which African political societies can negotiate the terms of their dependency” (Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 556). The assemblage of security intervention in the Sahel, therefore, evinces shifting, competing relations of power that are not driven in a unilateral, top-down direction, but which are patently multi-directional, cross-cutting, and contingent on shifting configurations of power and authority located in multiple, conjoined fields.

African security agents and the development of a transnational constabulary ethic?

Transnational security governance initiatives like AIRCOP, the CCP, JUSSEC, TSTCP, and the manifold capacity-building measures discussed above, seek to change how agents of Sahelian security institutions tackle borderless threats in ways that make them not only more effective, but in various ways more professional, rational, trust-worthy and democratic (Stenning and Shearing 2005; Greener 2012; Tanning and Dupont 2014). Shepytcki calls this the “Transnational Constabulary Ethic”: accountable policing by
“members of the constabulary itself and its various patrons… [who]…live by a practical ethic that is commensurate with the good of the global commons” even though the fragmentary global governance characteristics of transnational policing are not conducive to this normative vision (2007: 33). The evidence provided in the preceding pages regarding the practices of agents of African security institutions could be read as a cynical form of Afro-pessimism, and a statement of the impossibility of achieving Sheptycki’s agenda. Police, gendarmes, customs, and national guardsmen in Sahelian countries attach themselves to transnational security governance initiatives and related capacity-building measures in order to acquire symbolic and material resources that could better their personal, professional, social and economic positions. Especially with regard to the acquisition of material rents in the form of per diems, meals in highbrow restaurants, potentially finding employment in a cushy, well-paid international job for a private security firm, NGO, or IO, or simply supporting regime security instead of public security, lends itself to the interpretation that African police (broadly conceived) do not hold a vision of the need to develop a ‘public good’ to guide their actions as wardens of the state or global security: their practices are geared towards private and not public interests. Is it true then, as Sheptycki’s critics like Hills adamantly state (2009; 2012), that African police do not internalize liberal international norms of police service, transparency, and accountability, and to practice a global public form of security?

It is important to carefully assess the degree to which transnational security governance initiatives prompt recipients of capacity-building measures to internalize global security norms on an empirical level. Not doing so, and assuming a priori that African police do not internalize security norms out of automatic resistance to democratic
and international forms of security governance, or that they simply cannot achieve these standards because of a general lack of modern tools/resources/skills/understandings, can cause the sedimentation of a generalized belief in some inherent corruption, laziness, irrationality of African security actors, akin to orientalism (Said 1979). Conversely, assuming that a constabulary ethic or sense of ‘the public good’ can or should always be developed may make it easy to forget that recipients of security governance initiatives have a significant say in the matter, or which vaunts international liberal standards in a way that casts aside and makes deviant alternative forms of security governance that may be viewed with local legitimacy (see Richmond 2012).

First, when members of the security institutions foster transnational relationships with various formal/informal, state/non-state actors in search of an advancement of social standing (in the security field or others of which they are a part more generally), it does not mean that they exclusively seek after private/personal interests, or that these are not compatible with public ones (see Roitman 2001). Public and private interests are not necessarily dichotomous, but highly complimentary, ambiguous, and at times duplicitous. The idea of security needing to be provided in equal measure, its ‘publicness,’ is inherently connected to the historical development and consolidation of a political community and the modern state, the latter which is governed based on its particularity from opposing communities and interests (see Walker 1993; Loader and Walker 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 2014b). In the process of state formation, however, it is not only the ability to legitimately exercise coercive violence over a given territory, but also the capacity to shape and categorize the very definition of appropriate political and economic actions at a symbolic level and to create understandings of common concern,
which makes states the dominant form of political organization spanning the globe today (see Bourdieu 1995; Loveman 2005; Scott 2009). It is difficult to even think about security without it being perceived as tied to the state, which monopolizes the symbolic power to define the public good, and relatedly, to define what threatens it (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 112-119; see also Campbell 1998). To varying degrees, public force via institutions of security has always been used to support personal, private, or factional interests that dovetail with, and help to constitute that symbolic vision. Such is the case with the security forces examined here.

As I showed in chapters five and six, Senegal’s field of drug law enforcement is structured by perceptions of efficiency in drug control and its recognition. Performing drug seizures is a major way in which the symbolic capital of field actors is enhanced, which can translate into advancement in material forms of capital when international actors acknowledge effective and professional law enforcement behaviour. This does not mean that seizures are the be all and end all in measuring success in tackling drug trafficking. It is instead to indicate that seizures do occur with regularity, and have an important effect on the symbolic credibility of the security institutions that perform them; otherwise there would be no desire amongst public agents to seize drugs moving through the country since, ultimately, complicity with traffickers is more economically lucrative than being law abiding. Seeking to acquire forms of capital through drug seizures because it might land a customs or police agent a better job, or a week of training held in Dakar’s King Fahd hotel, is not incompatible with the idea of practicing security on the basis that it strengthens the public good, or collective interests in fostering political stability. Of course it suits the agendas of the security agents performing them, and may be pursued
for “instrumental reasons” (Hills 2012: 93). But the symbolic capital that agencies earn as they successfully pursue drug seizures enhances their recognition of authority, which by definition implies the acquisition of social deference from some political community – in this case, the citizens of Senegal – and therefore serves some level of their national collective interests. Seizing drugs is perceived by many in the country as an important security function for its populations, and the region, especially as Senegal’s communities witness the political instability of neighbouring countries where drug trafficking is perceived as a central undercurrent contributing to violent conflict, as in Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau (see Bøås 2012; Vigh 2012; Lewis 2014b). Indeed, seizures in the country are celebrated by its citizens and is widely publicized in the media, World Drug Day ceremonies where seized narcotics are publically incinerated and workshops held by OCRTIS and the CILD in Dakar are well attended, and scandals that have implicated high level officials of the security institutions’ involvement in drug trafficking have been publically decried, and are viewed as a source of national embarrassment (see RFI 2013b; WACD 2014: 24). Thus, one should not dismiss the possibility of the internalization of global security norms that are meant to foster the development of service in behalf of the public good, even though at times security agents may simultaneously pursue personal/private interests. This is a slow, contextual process that may indeed be developing in the country.

Similar to what Hills has argued, however, and as shown in the preceding pages, global security norms are manipulated and practiced in extraverted ways based on the pursuit of preferences held by coalitions of local security actors to better consolidate their authority in fields of struggle. This is one of the most important insights of this
dissertation: the extraverted practices pursued by agents of the Sahel’s security institutions shape transnational security governance initiatives and the liberal understandings of politics that the latter embody in significant ways for purposes that suit different sets of local actors. This might mean allowing one security concern to be put on the backburner in order to tackle another borderless threat that is deemed more consequential – an evaluation that is made by competing field participants vying for dominance locally, and not necessarily by global security experts that can shape those contests, but in no uncertain terms do not determine them.

There are times that understandings of threat do not match between global security experts and members of the Sahel’s security institutions, which has a direct bearing on how security practices are pursued (or if they are pursued at all). The Malian and Nigerien cases are instructive. Mali’s PIGN has used its agents and vehicles to escort members of the President’s family, or to provide protective services for bank deposits in Bamako. Border posts created by international actors have been used by national guards units to facilitate all manner of smuggling in goods from Algeria. Security tools and technologies that are acquired by Malian and Nigerien security units are used for purposes other than countering borderless threats, or even in support of them, for example by using 4x4s and radio equipment to facilitate the safe passage of drug convoys. On a more macro-level, the heads of state and other political officials in Sahelian countries have discursively articulated their vulnerability to borderless threats and political willingness to counter it, but in practice have allowed some to occur in order to combat others that they view as more pertinent. Nigerien President Issoufou’s transnational gatekeeping position and connections to actors that wield authority based on their socio-
economic and political standing in northern Sahelian communities has made it possible for the French military Barkhane counter-terrorism mission to be stationed in the far north of the country, even though the transportation companies providing these logistical services are owned by Niger’s most notorious traffickers. Deprived of economic opportunities for international tourism in Mali and Niger’s north due to terrorist and kidnapping activities, drug and other forms of trafficking are understood to be locally legitimate; a needed source of economic oxygen, and a means of redistributing monetary resources in one of the most poverty stricken areas of the globe (see Graham 2011; Reitano and Shaw 2014; Henshaw and Parkinson 2015). Allowing some trafficking to occur in the north of Niger, but not all as large seizures continue to occur by Malian and Nigerien security institutions, has been well received by its populations, and can account for a level of stability in the region, at least in the short term. This is not to say that the security agents and political officials in Niger and Mali never share common concerns with global security experts regarding borderless threats and how they should be governed. It is instead to acknowledge the former’s power and preferences as being guided by various legitimate purposes, ones that are in defence of some level of common concern, and which are dependent upon an assessment of which practices will yield the most consequential yield of capital given the structural constraints they face.

This should not be viewed as pessimism in the political and security decisions taken and implemented by West African actors, or that security is getting either better or worse with regard to governing borderless threats, democratic policing, and the future of security in Africa. It must instead be interpreted as a need to complicate dominant assumptions about security itself as a category, and its understanding of being driven by
global (read ‘Western’) actors at the expense of acknowledging the power and concerns of sets of competing local actors in spaces of intervention.

**The consequences of international security assistance: forces of stability or instability?**

Following an acknowledgement of the varying degrees to which global security norms are being internalized by Sahelian recipients of capacity-building initiatives, an important question can be asked: Should international actors continue to support rule of law interventions? This is a very complicated ethical question because of the potentially dangerous consequences of international security assistance on the fields of security and politics in spaces of intervention, and in West Africa more specifically.

This dissertation has shown that transnational security governance and capacity-building initiatives produce multiple opportunities for political and security actors in the Sahel to practice forms of extraversion, where their uneven relationships with international capacity-builders can be leveraged in order to acquire forms of capital that are realized in local settings through international security assistance. Training certificates from international security assistance programmes are incredibly meaningful and extremely consequential in their effects on actors competing in local security fields. They imbue meaning of a law enforcement actor’s cultural capital, which can be used to advance personal employment prospects, or to demonstrate qualifications and expertise in a particular security domain, thereby making that individual’s security claims more socially significant. Donations of security equipment, tools and technologies likewise increase their recipients’ level of material capital, which can not only enhance their capacities to better perform their jobs, for example by increasing a unit’s performance in drug interdiction or by making them more efficient in pursuing criminal investigations
and arresting traffickers, but also dons a security institution with recognition that it is a
global player in the governance of borderless threats: it increases their symbolic capital.
The development of transnational networks of security professionals, likewise lends
considerable social weight on a law enforcement actor, particularly when these
connections are leveraged to pursue criminal investigations, since she/he is viewed as a
credible partner who accumulates the symbolic capital of operational trust. These forms
of capital are used to solidify one’s personal or institutional position of power within the
security field and to dominate challengers’ counter-claims and practices: “police aid is
just another resource in local political struggles” (Marenin 1986: 544).

When security and political actors garner these important forms of international
capital, it significantly reshuffles the configurations of power in local fields, thereby
spiking their competitive features, amplifying its rivalries, and heightening its instability.
Moreover, international forms of capital that are realized in local settings through
transnational security governance initiatives, like the provision and acquisition of 4x4s,
riot gear, audio equipment, night vision goggles, and the social capital that
transnationalized social connections and relationships proffer can be used to consolidate
authority through violent, illegal, undemocratic, instability inducing ways which create
insecurity instead of enhanced protection. Sometimes it results in brawls between law
enforcement units at an international airport, as seen in chapter four. But the
intensification of rivalries between the security and law enforcement institutions of
Sahelian states resulting from competition over international forms of capital realized in
the local settings of the assemblage of security intervention can degenerate into much
wider, more violent forms and dynamics.
While the forms of transnational clientelism that assemblages of security intervention evince on the military forces of Sahelian states were not explicitly examined in this dissertation, a brief discussion is both applicable and in order. In April 2012, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo orchestrated the coup d’état of Mali’s president Touré. Sanogo was not a senior-level official of the Malian Army. He acted opportunistically during protests and general discontent in Bamako over the mishandling of the conflict unfolding in the country’s north (see Lecocq et. al. 2013). In order to pull off a successful coup, a leader that could mobilize a groundswell of support within the units of the armed forces present in the capital region to act, and who could capitalize on the support of the population was needed (Whitehouse 2012). A significant reason why Sanogo was selected to lead the coup because of his multiple rounds of training from American and French programmes abroad, not limited to basic infantry officer training at Fort Benning, English-language training at Lackland Air Force Base, intelligence training at Fort Huachuca, and courses at Quantico (Pincus 2013). Younger, lower-level soldiers looked up to him, and threw their collective weight behind the effort due to the recognized forms of symbolic capital that he had acquired through transnational security clientelism. This is not to imply that the coup would not have happened if Sanago had not received foreign training. In fact, rumours in Bamako suggest that he was the second choice for coup leader, after Colonel Abderamane Ould Meydou had refused the offer to lead the putschists. However, if these rumours are true, then this interpretation of the importance of international training as a crucial form of symbolic capital is confirmed, since Meydou has also participated in several international security courses.

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257 This was alleged in several interviews with Arab Malian notables in Bamako in April 2013. See also ICG 2012: 10-11, 19; Global Initiative 2014: 11.
Not only did the coup increase the country’s political instability by providing armed rebel groups in the north to rapidly pursue military advances in order to capitalize on the atmosphere of confusion in Bamako, it also resulted in a sustained involvement of the putschists in national politics for the next year and a half, and inter-corps violence between rival military units. Sanogo promoted his supporters to positions of high rank, notably the head of the National Gendarmerie (Bergamaschi 2013: 4), and was heavily involved in the political scene until he signed an amnesty (which was ultimately very short lived) that gave him 4-star General status (Reuters 2013b).258 The specialized 33rd Parachutist Regiment, Touré’s presidential guard, which had received TSTCP and French counter-terrorism training, and was given important operational material equipment from the president, was targeted by the ‘green berets’ regular armed forces units that had received less financial and symbolic support under Touré (Warner 2014: 74; Bøås and Torheim 2013: 1288). Sanogo and his supporters committed gross human rights violations against members of the ‘red beret’ parachutist unit, ranging from torture, sexual abuse, and extra-judicial killings (Bergamaschi 2013; Notin 2014).

This is just one prominent and recent example of how the forms of international capital that are on offer from inclusion in transnational security governance and capacity-building initiatives can heighten rivalries within the security field, leading not to an increase in the capabilities of state institutions to better perform their responsibilities over the means of coercion, but an increase in political instability and violence. President Déby’s authoritarian rule over Chadian national politics and involvement in stoking regional tensions, made possible by the important acquisition of symbolic and material

258 He was later arrested for human rights abuses against rival red beret soldiers.
rents from international sources in return for support in violently tackling borderless threats can be added to the list of potential increases in instability (Matfess 2015). In the summer of 2011, violence erupted across Burkina Faso between members of Compaoré’s well-trained and equipped President Guard units and Burkinabe Gendarmes and senior military brass, which made international actors fear that the country was next in line to become Africa’s newest failed state (see Hilgers and Loada 2013: 189, 194). The introduction of new international forms of capital made possible by capacity-building interventions and international security assistance can have demonstrable, consequential, and dangerous effects for political stability in West Africa.

Finally, not only do the violent capacities and powers of state actors in the Sahel increase by accumulating international forms of capital that transnational security governance initiatives and capacity-building assistance provide; these transnationalized relationships also increase the “informational capital” of state security actors, i.e. their devices, capacities, and resources manipulated to create and validate security knowledge (see Bourdieu 1999: 67). This has important political implications for the politics of international security assistance. We have seen in this research that the extraverted practices of Sahelian political and security actors, like discursively framing vulnerability to borderless threats and political willingness to mobilize existing resources to deal with them, practicing institutional and social gatekeeping at the interfaces of the assemblage of

259 While the dynamics of the 2011 seasons of unrest were much more complex in terms of the different types of actors involved and their competing motivations, for example from the political opposition, civil society groups, cotton producers and workers, etc., according to several interviews in Ouagadougou I conducted in July 2012, what initially sparked the riots and significantly fuelled the flames were rivalries between the state’s security institutions, set off by a brawl between gendarme and a Presidential Guardsman after the former had flirted with the latter’s girlfriend.
intervention, and mastering and trading local knowledge of the nature of these threats and transnational networks that participate in them in local spaces, validate the authority of these key West African security governors. Through this process, the informational capital of Sahelian state actors in many ways becomes a baseline of information from which Western government and IO establish their own threat assessments, and subsequently devise their governance initiatives. Of course there are limits of the degree of threat exaggeration and amplification that Sahelian actors can successfully sell; but their influence in producing a space of the Sahel as an object of security knowledge and government is significant (see Jourde 2007, 2011; Lacher 2008; Reno 2011). If Sahelian political and security actors manipulate their knowledge of borderless threats to their benefit, it follows that it is more than likely that they also exaggerate the extent of their weakness. I get the impression from the timeliness of narcotics seizures performed by specialized drug control units in West African states, at moments of heightened international criticism of complicity or neglect of political will in tackling the drug trade, that security and political actors in Sahelian states are much more capable than they let on.

Accumulating informational capital through transnationalized capacity-building relationships based on extraverted practices can be especially problematic in the case of the Sahel since there is significant evidence that political and security elites of these countries are either directly involved, or complicit in organized crime, especially drug trafficking (see Africa Confidential 2010; Lacher 2012; ICG 2013; WACD 2014; ICG 2015). It is important to note that organized criminal activity has always had a symbiotic relationship in the formation of modern states and the development and consolidation of global capitalism, a fact that is seldom remembered enough in IR and in policy-making in
general (see Tilly 1992; Volkov 2002; Bayart 2004; Andreas 2011). African state officials have mixed their strategies of being directly complicit, neglecting or ignoring, or actively repressing and controlling the drug trade (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012: 110-126). As international security experts intensify relationships with extraverted representatives of Sahelian states, and rely on them for local resources they can deliver, these experts strengthen and support the capacity of Sahelian elites to sideline political and economic rivals, rule by allowing access to organized criminal activities and markets, and more generally enhance their knowledge over local populations they seek to make more legible and manageable as they use security institutions to consolidate rule (Scott 1998; see ICG 2012, 2013 for Mali and Niger). Statebuilding has always been a messy and dangerous business. International policing, capacity-building, IO and other security experts should be aware of those dangers and recognize that their activities can in many ways transform the conditions of possibility of multiple sets of actors in several fields of power in the global south, and the political, not technical, nature of their activities.


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364


