Major Research Paper

The Road to Zero Hunger:
A Case Study of Canada’s Policy Agenda-Setting for Global Food Security

API 6999

Professor Marc Saner

Abstract

The emergence of food security as one of Canada’s top international development priorities in 2009 was an important shift in Canadian foreign aid policy, which begs the question of how the policy came into being and how this change can be explained. This paper will focus on the agenda-setting aspects of Canadian foreign aid policy by using the exemplar case study of the policy agenda-setting process that shaped Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy. Agenda-setting is the process of moving a problem to the attention of government so that solutions can be considered. Understanding policy agenda-setting is crucial to steering policy-making and informing decisions in response to ever increasingly complex and interconnected global challenges. Moreover, this case study is based on information obtained from in-depth interviews, official reports and documents obtained through ATIP. John Kingdon’s agenda-setting framework provided the theoretical lens for this research and NVivo was used for the text analysis. This research identified nine key factors, in which problem framing, policy considerations, and politics, as well as the role of evidence, and values relate to power and social change in the context of Canada’s approach to addressing global food insecurity. The case history aims to provide new details and perspectives to those who were paying close attention to the 2007-2009 policy agenda-setting process, while the nine key factors and the opening of the policy window by key actors provide insights to future policy analysis and development.
Acknowledgements

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Many thanks to the many dedicated professors and my accomplished colleagues in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and the Institute of the Environment for challenging me intellectually and motivating me over the last two years. Also, I would like to thank the talented and hardworking colleagues of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the Food and Agriculture Agencies of the United Nations in Rome, whom I had the great privilege to work with as an intern during the writing of this research.

I also thank my sisters and parents for their many years of unconditional support and freedom. I am also grateful to my partner who supported me through this venture.

Lastly, I am truly grateful to the have had the chance to pursue higher post-secondary education and for the many formative opportunities and brilliant people who have made it a worthy journey. I’m not a master but I found comfort in the following quote by Stephen McCranie:

“The master has failed more times than the beginner has even tried.”
Key words

Food security, agenda-setting, Kingdon model, public policy, policy window, food crisis, official development assistance, foreign aid

Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada</td>
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<td>AFSI</td>
<td>L’Aquilla Food Security Initiative</td>
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<td>ATIP</td>
<td>Access to Information and Privacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Canadian Cooperative Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Framework for Action</td>
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<td>CFGB</td>
<td>Canadian Foodgrains Bank</td>
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<td>CGIAR</td>
<td>Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency¹</td>
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<td>CIFSRF</td>
<td>Canadian International Food Security Research Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development²</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFO</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FSPG</td>
<td>Food Security Policy Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLTF</td>
<td>United Nations System High Level Task Force on Global Food Security Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIFDC</td>
<td>Low-Income Food Deficit Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Multilateral Environmental Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFIDC</td>
<td>Net Food Importing Developing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>OECD-Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WFS</td>
<td>World Food Summit</td>
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¹ CIDA was merged with the DFAIT to form the DFATD in June 2013.
² DFATD was renamed Global Affairs Canada or GAC in November 2015.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION

Historical Context

From 2007 to 2009, the confluence of successive crises consumed the world, global oil prices quadrupled from 2003 to their peak in mid-2008; around the same time, prices of food commodities such as maize and wheat doubled, and the price of rice nearly tripled. On April 17th, 2008 the front page of *The Economist* alerted of “The silent tsunami: The food crisis and how to solve it”. During that same week, the Haitian government fell after a week of violent riots on the streets of Port-au-Prince over food price spikes (Delva & Loney, 2008). Soaring food prices heavily impacted the hundreds of millions of people living in vulnerable situations, as many people living in poverty depend on agriculture for their livelihoods and employment. Civil unrest was reported in over 30 countries as people’s ability to access affordable food declined drastically.

The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation’s (FAO) Food Price Index doubled from 2002 to 2008 (FAO, 2008). It was estimated that 74 low-income countries and 71 middle-income countries were affected by the acute increase in commodity prices, prompting numerous food-related riots as food insecurity and hunger rapidly soared (Headey & Fan, 2008). At an emergency meeting of the UN High-Level Conference on World Food Security in Rome, the former President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick, described the urgency of the crisis:

> Riots in over 30 countries, 30 million Africans who will likely fall into poverty, 100 million people worldwide who are at risk, 850 million people who are malnourished; 2 billion people who are struggling every day to put food on the table. If we cannot act now, when?

> - Robert Zoellick, June 4th, 2008
By June 2008, the prices of basic foods on international commodity markets reached their highest levels in 30 years, pushing an additional 115 million people - more than three times the total population of Canada - into chronic hunger, threatening both global food security\(^3\) and human development (FAO, 2009). As a consequence of the 2007-2008 world food price crisis, it was estimated that globally one billion people, or one in every six were food-insecure in 2009 (IFPRI, 2010).

In recognition of the severe impact of hunger on human development, the previous Canadian Minister of International Cooperation Beverley Oda declared increasing global food security as one of the three top official development assistance\(^4\) (ODA) priorities of Canada in 2009. The announcement gave rise to Canada committing an astonishing CAD $1.18 billion to global food security efforts to reducing hunger and malnutrition over three years.

**Canada’s Commitments & the 2009 Food Security Strategy**

The world food price crisis coincided with and reinforced a 2009 Canadian government statement elevating global food security as one of Canada’s international development priorities. At the 2009 G8\(^5\) L’Aquila Summit held in Italy, one of the most significant agreements reached by G8 head of states was the joint Declaration on Global Food Security also referred to as the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). Canada announced the doubling of its ODA in support of increasing food security by committing to an additional $600 million over three years.

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\(^3\)The 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) defines food security as the existence of food “when all people, at all time, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2003).

\(^4\) The OECD-DAC defines ODA as aid provided by official agencies and their executive agencies that is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and is concessional in character.

\(^5\) The Group of Eight or G8 is a group of leading industrialized countries, comprising about 50 percent of global nominal GDP. In 2009, this group was comprised of Canada, United, States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia. In 2014, the G8 was changed to the G7 or the Group of Seven. Russia’s participation in the G8 was suspended due the country’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia was the last entry to the G8 in 1997, before which the organization was also known as the G7.
bringing the total Canadian ODA directed to food security to CAD $1.18 billion (Tomlinson, 2012). As part of the G8 AFSI, Canada’s commitment was made in concert with leading industrialized countries and head of international organizations pledging USD $20 billion over three years to help Southern farmers boost productivity and increase sustainable agricultural development (G8, 2009). It was a substantial recognition of the urgent need for decisive action against global hunger and poverty and signaled a new emphasis on sustainable agricultural investment previously absent from G8 communiqués.

Canada’s global food security commitments were reinforced when Minister Oda unveiled the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) Food Security Strategy on World Food Day (October 16) 2009 in Winnipeg, Canada (DFATD, 2009). Canada’s Food Security Strategy, designed as a comprehensive approach to address immediate food needs in Southern countries and to find long-term solutions to food insecurity, aimed to increase the availability and access to nutritious food; increase the stability of food supplies by increasing agricultural productivity; and improve the global food system. Canada’s international food security efforts were achieved through supporting three strategic paths of action:

- **Food assistance and nutrition** to provide more flexible, predictable and needs-based funding to meet the emergency and long-term good and nutrition needs of the most vulnerable and higher-risk populations;

- **Sustainable agricultural development** to build the capacity of small-scale farmers, related organizations and government policies and to support national and regional agricultural and food security strategies;

- **Research and development** to broaden and deepen publicly available research that makes significant improvements to food security outcomes.

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6 CIDA was absorbed into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) in summer 2013 by act of Parliament of Canada. DFATD was later renamed Global Affairs Canada (GAC) in November 2015.
After L’Aquila, Canada hosted the G8 Summit the following year. At the 2010 G8, Canada along with other world leaders launched the CAD $5 billion Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH), which called for reduction of maternal, infant and child mortality with a strong connects to the food security and nutritional health of newborns during their first 1,000 days and nursing mothers. In 2011, Canada became the first G8 country to officially meet its AFSI commitment and disbursed CAD $1.18 billion for sustainable agricultural development and alleviating global hunger. Canada’s contribution to food security peaked at CAD $909 million in fiscal year 2009-2010 with 55 percent of resource directed to Africa (CIDA, 2009–2010).

**Research Question**

Against the backdrop of the 2007-2008 world food price crisis, improving global food security emerged as one of the top priorities in Canadian foreign aid policy. This research paper examines the key factors that influenced the policy agenda-setting process that led to Canada's L'Aquila G8 Summit global food security commitments and CIDA’s subsequent 2009 *Food Security Strategy*. I examined Canada’s international food security policy through the lens of John Kingdon’s agenda-setting framework of policy change (the Kingdon model) based on the following research question:

**what were the key factors that influenced Canada’s decision to support the 2009 L'Aquila G8 Summit global food security commitments and its subsequent Food Security Strategy?**

On the basis of this analysis, I will also provide a view on where Canada’s international commitment for food security may be headed.

**Sub-Questions**

- What was the history on how international food security gained prominence in Canada’s political agenda space?
- Who were the policy entrepreneurs and prominent members of the policy community?
- What was the role of evidence in influencing Canada’s 2009 *Food Security Strategy*?
- What were the key values that drove the strategy?
PART II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Kingdon’s Agenda-Setting Framework

The emergence of food security as one of Canada’s top international development priorities in 2009 was an important shift in Canadian foreign aid policy, which begs the question of how the policy came into being and how this change can be explained theoretically. To answer the research question and sub-questions, John Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams agenda-setting framework was used as the theory of change with which to analyze and understand the inner dynamics and factors that influenced Canada’s decision to support the 2009 L'Aquila G8 Summit global food security commitments and its subsequent Food Security Strategy. Kingdon’s model to policy change identifies three streams - problems, policies and politics. When these streams converge a policy window opens that facilitates policy change.

Actors, may they be states, policy makers, politicians, members of the private sector or civil society, who promoted specific solutions by combining the three streams, are labelled “policy entrepreneurs.” Policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in facilitating and anticipating the opening of a policy window. In other words, policy change occurs during a window of opportunity when policy entrepreneurs successfully connect two or more streams of the policy process: the way a problem is defined; the policy solution to the problem; or the political climate surrounding the issue.

The Kingdon model is commonly used for studying case studies on policy change. Babu (2013) used the Kingdon agenda-setting framework to examine at the factors that influenced the 2007-2008 global food prices crises in 14 countries. Lorenzoni and Benson (2014) applied a mix of the Kingdon framework and Discursive Institutionalism to study institutional innovation and
change in regards to the UK’s adoption of its 2008 Climate Change Act. Mazarr (2007) applied the agenda-setting framework to help explain the United States’ decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Travis and Zahariadis (2002) used Kingdon’s agenda-setting framework to analyse and critique U.S. foreign aid policy. Similarly, the United Nations’ recognized Balarajan and Reich’s 2012 World Bank paper on the “Political economy analysis for food and nutrition security” also applied the Kingdon model to measure the political commitment to improving global food security and nutrition.

In this case study, my aim is to explain the key factors that influenced Canada’s decision to prioritized global food security in its foreign aid policy. By using the agenda-setting model to explain the factors that influenced Canada’s decision, I attempt to move beyond a simplistic cause-effect model of policy change and dive deeper into how policy, evidence and research relate to power and social change.

**Research Methodology**

This research was carried out through a thorough desk review, archival study (Phase 1), and semi-structured interviews (Phase 2) with key actors who influenced and helped formulate Canada’s international food security policy. The timeframe of my research covers three years from 2007 to 2009.

The first phase of this study, a comprehensive desk review of the most recent international and Canadian development food security literature regarding the 2007-2008 global food security crisis was conducted using the University of Ottawa library’s research databases such as International Political Science Abstracts, the IDRC Digital Library, Google Scholar, the OECD iLibrary, and the Canadian Public Policy Collection. This included a review of grey
literature by international organizations and civil society organizations (CSO) and peer-reviewed scholarly articles. An archival study was also undertaken; it looked at Canadian government press releases, official statements and annual performance reports and audits of Canada’s international food security commitments. Three Access to Information requests\(^7\) (ATIPs) were filed in late 2014 to gather institutional information and internal communications that were not readily available regarding the formulation of and consultations on Canada’s 2009 *Food Security Strategy*, only two ATIPs were used for this research. After locating the archival sources, the information was systematically interpreted and analyzed to reveal the evolution of thinking and planning by the Canadian government about Canada’s response to the 2007-2008 world food price crisis and its decision to make food security as one of Canada’s top foreign aid priorities.

The second phase entailed the use of *semi-structured, in-depth topical and contextualized interviews*, an ideal type for policy-change research (Balarajan and Reich, 2012; Fox et al. 2014). Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted. There was an even distribution of respondents from academia, the federal government, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society. The goal of the interviews was to gain crucial insights from insiders and provide and more detailed description of Canada’s aid policy agenda-setting process and the political dynamics of how global food security gained prominence in Canada’s foreign aid agenda. These interviews were a purposive chain referral sampling of the Canadian food security policy community. The chain referral sampling is a non-probabilistic sampling technique that helps identify potential subjects in studies where subjects may be hard to locate.

\(^7\) Documents were obtained under the *Access to Information Act*. The *Access to Information Act* gives any person or corporation present in Canada a right to information that is contained in government records through access to information requests.
Targeted and contextualized information resulting from in-depth interviews is one of the major strengths of this methodology, as opposed to circulating a survey to practitioners and policy makers that only allows for respondents to select among previously determined answers or ask for short responses. The more personal nature of this research methodology and the establishment of a relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee can facilitate the disclosure of information (in addition to the ATIPs) that is not easily obtained through other research methods.

The appropriate research ethics clearance was granted by the University of Ottawa’s Office of Research Ethics and Integrity under certificate number 02-15-17, certifying that this research operates in accordance with the 2010 Tri-Council Policy Statement and other regulations. No special conditions and comments were place on this research.

To guarantee confidentiality and anonymity of interview participants, all identifying information, such as names, professions and place(s) of work were removed and replaced with coded information. In this research, interview participants are referred to as government officials, international public servants, academics, private sector or civil society actors, except for those who wished to be identified by name. Public officials and senior executives who are or were senior members of the Canadian public service (e.g., ambassadors and senior advisors) are referred to as 'senior government official'. This name rule also applied to senior members of the international public service, the private sector, the academia, and civil society actors. In a number of circumstances interview participants have chosen to waive their right to privacy. In addition to obtaining consent for the interview, I asked whether the interview participants wanted their identities revealed or not. The reasons for revealing the identity of participants who
have consented is for the purpose of historical accuracy and because the identity of the person is closely affiliated with their professional capacity (e.g. head of an organization).

During the interview, participants were advised that they would receive sections of the transcript of the interview for their review and validation if they were to be quoted. The encrypted interview transcripts were sent to each of the designated interviewee's preferred email address. Then, the interview participants were given a timeframe of 5 working days to review the content of the transcript and submit modifications. Where modifications were received, the modified version replaced the original transcript.

An axial coding framework was used to code selected interviews and ATIPs in NVivo 10. Only 5 interviews were transcribed based on the participant’s seniority, level of knowledge relevant to this research, and a balanced representation based on the five sectors: academia, federal government, international organizations, private sector, and civil society. Text analysis and a set of tags (NVivo nodes) were developed to code the five interviews based on the methods used in Balarajan and Reich (2012) and Fox et al. (2014) and the preliminary results from the Phase 1. The remaining interviews were used to enhance and build the background research of this paper.

Out of the five interviews used for this study, all participants consented to be interviewed and three consented to have their names revealed: Iain MacGillivray, Jim Cornelius and Joshua Ramisch. Iain MacGillivray is the Special Adviser to the President of International Fund for Agricultural Development of the United Nations (IFAD). During the period of 2008 to 2010, Iain was the Special Adviser to former CIDA’s Vice President, Canada’s

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8 NVivo 10 is a qualitative text analysis software developed by QSR International
Special Representative to the High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF), as well as the Principal Adviser for Agriculture. In 2010, Iain was awarded the President’s Award for Excellence for his work developing Canada’s Food Security Strategy. Second, Jim Cornelius is the Executive Director of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB). The CFGB, headquartered in Winnipeg, is a partnership of 15 churches and church agencies working together to end global hunger, and it also chaired the Canadian Food Security Policy Group (FSPG) in 2009. Lastly, Joshua Ramisch is an Associate Professor at the School of International Development and Global Studies (SIDGS) of the University of Ottawa. Ramisch’s research interests include food security, political ecology, climate change, and natural resource management. For the purposes of this research, Iain MacGillivray will provide a perspective from a multilateral agency, Jim Cornelius will represent a view from the Canadian civil society organizations working on global food security issues, and Joshua Ramisch will share his view as part of academia. Two other interview participants who wish to remain anonymous were executives in their own professional domains of the Canadian public service and the private sector. Both played important roles or had relevant experiences in shaping Canada’s foreign aid agenda as it relates to food security.

Limitations: Although there are considerable strengths to using the Kingdon model, there are also limitations. One of the key limitations of the Kingdon model is its strong focus on the policy window as the incremental “eureka” moment when the three steams join up. As a result, the model does not adequately capture the complex chronologies and feedback loops that may exist within and between the three streams, hence potentially less able to capture the power imbalances, historical relationships and the interdependences and interactions between them. I tried to overcome these limitations by using the Kingdon model principally as the initial lens and
also to provide the structure for the presentation of results. A more significant limitation of the research methodology is the relative small sample size of 11 interviewees with 5 being transcribed may heavily impact the research results. However, any dominant views were balanced by the diverse range of interviewees representing different sectors, policy texts, academic literature, and official documents acquired by ATIPs.

PART III: RESULTS

This section follows a format adapted from Balarajan and Reich (2012), which is outlined in Table 1 below, showing the broad categories of factors influencing the problem, policy and politics streams that shape agenda-setting and policy change.

Table 1: Key elements of the Kingdon Model as identified by Balarajan and Reich (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Stream</th>
<th>Policy Stream</th>
<th>Politics Streams</th>
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| - Credible indicators of severity  
- Focusing event  
- Issue framing (external)  
- Policy Advocate or Champions  
- Competing priorities  
- Civil society mobilization | - Policy community cohesion (agreement on internal framing of problem or solution)  
- Guiding policy institutions  
- Viable policy alternatives  
- Policy entrepreneurs  
- Effective interventions | - Political transitions  
- Interest group mobilization  
- External/Global influences (norms promotion, resource provision) |

Problems Stream

In the first stream, problems refer to the process by which particular conditions are recognized and defined as problems requiring policy solutions. Conditions become defined as a problem when policy makers come to believe they are able to manage it. Problems can be driven by external events or conditions and the framing of problems can be interpretive (existing rules and policies), political (partisan politics, electoral base and ideology) and, often value-based (cultural, societal and religious norms). Defining and framing a problem has real consequences
as it can create winners and losers, as well as externalities. Values also play a significant role in defining problems because personal and societal values can consciously and unconsciously guide one’s interpretation and conception of a problem, and its ideal response and whether it is appropriate for government to take action.

**CREDIBLE INDICATORS OF SEVERITY & FOCUSING EVENT**

This section attempts to understand the indicators and signals that made the 2007-2008 world food price crisis a focusing event. Food insecurity arises from deep-rooted structural problems. The crisis exposed just how interdependent and vulnerable the global food systems were. “There was drought in Australia, Ukraine and a couple other key places…maybe something is changing in the fundamentals” (Interview with J. Ramisch, July 22, 2015).

**Series of weather shocks**: Weather shocks intensified by climate change’s effects offer a credible explanation for the poor harvests of key staples before and during the 2007-2008 world food price crisis. According to the United Nations, climate change will act as a hunger risk multiplier as it exacerbates current vulnerabilities. Agriculture is considered to be one of the most vulnerable sectors to the impacts of climate change as it is highly dependent on climate conditions. In 2006, severe drought in Australia signalled the first in a series of weather shocks around the world that lowered global grain and food production and supply. In late 2006, Australia suffered its “worst drought in 1,000 years” (Vidal, 2006). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the annual rainfall in 2006 was 40-60 percent below normal across most of the country. The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), more commonly known as El Niño, and climate change were cited as significant contributors to the drought. Poor harvests were also

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9 Focusing events are “key events that cause members of the public as well as elite decision makers to become aware of a potential policy failure” (Birkland, 1994).
reported in the United States, Argentina, India, Russia and Ukraine. The extreme weather in
many major cereal exporting countries decreased global grain reserves and contributed to the
price spikes causing multiple food-related demonstrations in over 30-plus countries and a drastic
increase the number of people around the world experiencing hunger.

**Lower world cereal stocks:** At the end of 2006, world cereal stocks declined for the
third consecutive year, with wheat falling to its lowest level since 1981 (FAO-Crop Prospects
and Food Situation, 2006). Poor grain harvests due to an abnormally cold winter were reported
in the United States, Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine (FAO-Crop Prospects and Food
Situation, 2006). By 2007, the decline in grain production in India, Egypt, Morocco and
Mongolia further impacted global grain supply and prices (FAO-Crop Prospects and Food
Situation, 2007). By the end of 2007, the number of countries experiencing food emergencies
requiring external assistance rose to a staggering 37 (FAO-Crop Prospects and Food Situation,
2007). Following two years of below-average harvests due to severe drought in Eastern Africa,
the United Nations estimates that 7.9 million people in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea
required emergency food aid (FAO-Crop Prospects and Food Situation, 2007). Insufficient
rainfall and adverse weather patterns in the Horn of Africa and in Central Asia, as well as
cyclones and floods in South and Southeast Asia continued into 2008, affecting global cereal
stocks (FAO-Crop Prospects and Food Situations, 2008). According to FAO, African countries
were particularly vulnerable to the food crisis in 2008 and many of these countries when
superimposed were also CIDA’s African development partner countries on the continent:
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Niger (See Appendix I).

**Commodities markets and trade:** The oil, commodities, and financial crises took many
policymakers and governments by surprise. In reaction, governments’ stimulus packages
restricted food exports and promoted “buy domestic” trade policies in order to secure domestic reserves (IFPRI, 2010). Many developing countries reacted by altering trade and domestic agricultural policies and attempted to stabilise domestic markets. Rice prices were volatile. From 2005 to late 2007, the price of rice rose to over 50 percent from an all-time low in 2005 and increased by another 140 percent by 2008 (Ghosh, 2010). The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2010) suggests that the costly surge in rice prices in 2008, especially in Asia, was largely caused by global commodities traders’ reactions to export restrictions and opportunistic speculation, in addition to hoarding and protectionist trade policies by a number of important grain and rice producing countries.

Developing countries in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Latin America, saw their trade balances worsen due to the food price jumps. Soaring food and fuel prices impacted the poor the most as they were required to spend a higher proportion of their income on food. The price hikes have fallen hardest on the poor in the 82 nations designated by the United Nations as low-income food deficit countries (LIFDCs) (Fleshman, 2008).

**FAO Food Price Index**

*Index:* Since 2007, global food prices have remained relatively high (Figure 1). The World Bank warns that high and volatile food prices are the “new normal,” as hundreds of millions continue to suffer from hunger and malnutrition (World Bank, 2012). The index doubled from 100 in 2002 to nearly 200 in 2008, and by mid-2008 real food
prices increased by 64 percent above their 2002 levels (FAO, 2008). Food prices dropped in 2009 as the US and many of the world’s major economies slipped into recession but rose again in 2011, surpassing 2007-2008 levels. In response, FAO launched its Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP) in 54 countries, to help small farmers and vulnerable households mitigate the negative effects of rising food and input prices in December 2007 (FAO, 2009a). See Appendix II for a selected number of countries in ISFP and their domestic grain price changes.

**Food-related unrests:** Massive demonstrations against higher food prices erupted in many LIFDCs, many are also considered fragile states: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, Senegal, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Joshua Ramisch (interview July 22, 2015) noted that while many of these protests were rooted in opposition to leaders like Cameroon’s president Paul Biya or Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak who had been in power for 30 years, people took to the streets to protest the high cost of ‘food rather than political repression because if you talk about politics you are going to get shot or locked up.’ These protests did have their political impacts, most notably the resignation in April 2008 of Haiti’s Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis. By the end of the crisis, over 40 countries experienced some form of massive public unrest or food riots against the increased price of basic staples like rice and maize, which also fueled the call for political change, as well as protracted crises that spread across the Arab world in early 2011 (ICRC, 2011; UN High Level Task Force, 2009).

**Rise in global hunger:** The soaring food prices caused acute malnutrition and hunger. In many parts of the world, higher food prices exacerbated local and regional humanitarian crises. The FAO estimated that the 2007-2008 food price crisis increased the number of people who were living in hunger or were chronically malnourished from 800 million to 1.02 billion (FAO,
In 2007, a record 47 countries faced food crises requiring emergency assistance, with 27 of these countries in Africa, 10 in Asia and 10 in other parts of the world (FAO, 2008a). Humanitarian responses to the crisis worldwide also became more expensive as high food prices and oil prices drastically raised operational and procurement costs for the World Food Programme of the United Nations (WFP), the largest humanitarian agency in the world responsible for the delivery of food assistance to refugees and people living in emergency situation. Due to higher fuel and food prices, WFP had to appeal for an additional $755 million in 2008 to maintain its activities at the 2007 level (Mousseau, 2010).

ISSUE FRAMING & CANADA’S LEADERSHIP

The 2007-2008 spikes in global food prices served as a clear call to the international community to recognize the inadequacies of the global food system and as a catalyst for change. This section explores how the food insecurity issue was framed and Canada’s leadership on the world stage.

**Canadian Values and Non-Partisanship:** Canadians identify with agriculture. A Senior Government Official (Interview, August 10, 2015) observed that Canadians respond very strongly to pictures and stories of “…starving people, starving children and mothers who cannot feed their children”. Iain MacGillivray, the Special Advisor to the President of IFAD, who was Principle Advisor for Agriculture at CIDA in 2009, said that Canadians believe that Canada is a “powerhouse in terms of agriculture” and Canada has a strong constituency around food and agriculture issues. Although ‘a small percentage of the Canadian population lives in rural areas and works in agriculture and they share a very strong value system that still remains in the Canadian psyche’ (MacGillivray, July 27, 2015).
Global hunger cuts across partisan lines and compels people and governments to act because it is a basic, universal need. Jim Cornelius (Interview, July 13, 2015), the Executive Director of the CFGB, believed that “whether it is the Conservatives, Liberals or NDP… [hunger] crosses ideological lines. It does not matter who we were talking to on the whole political spectrum, they all agree that hunger is not acceptable and we all need to do something about it, including government”. In a 2014 Ipsos-Reid survey of Canadians’ attitude about world hunger reveals that majority of Canadians want the government to address world hunger. Out of the random sample of 1,002 Canadians aged 18 and over participating in the survey, 61 percent think Canada should do more to help farmers in the South, 56% of respondents said they would be willing to advocate the Canadian government to do more to end global hunger, and 52% say they would donate to help that cause (Canadian Foodgrains Bank, 2014). The survey was paid for by Canadian CSOs, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB) and Development and Peace.

**Canada’s Moral Responsibility & Trade Interests:** Majority of the interview participants said Canada’s efforts to increase international food security was a moral responsibility and it was “the right thing to do” (Interviews with Private Sector Executive, July 28, 2015; Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015; Iain MacGillivray, July 27, 2015). The Senior Government Official stressed that investment in global food security is “a very smart thing to do and the right thing to do. There’s the value proposition, but also from a political point of view…it's definitely a political winner in focusing on a very basic need, but I wouldn't want anyone person to think that it was done for that reason… It's kind of like motherhood; it's hard to disagree with”. A Private Sector Executive (Interview, July 28, 2015) expressed that “Canada is in an enviable position [compared to] most countries in the world. We have excess amount of food and we can produce it. It is our moral responsibility to make sure we share that”. Iain
MacGillivray, explained that there was “a clear sense, I think, [that] there was a moral responsibility to support food security because we are so lucky” and “Canadians felt that Canada as a powerhouse in terms of agriculture”, which may have benefited from higher global food prices ‘Canadians thought how can they benefit from the crisis but also help?’ Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s (AAF) (2013) statistics show that in 2008, at the height of the world food price crisis, Canada was the world’s fourth-largest exporter and sixth-largest importer of agricultural products, with exports and imports valued at CAD $38.8 billion and CAD $24.9 billion, respectively; equaling to a total surplus of CAD$13.9 billion.

**Canadian Leadership & Expertise:** An Internal CIDA document from June 2008 revealed that Canada was “well-positioned to maintain a strategic leadership position” on global food security issues (ATIP - A201401862, 2015, pp. 86-87). By then, CIDA already had in place a policy framework making food security a key thematic priority for the agency and Canada had competitive suppliers to implement the strategy. Canada was also leading by example among donors in terms of its financial contributions to improving global food security. The document also revealed Canada’s 2006 ODA spending on agriculture was well above the OECD-DAC\(^\text{10}\) average. Ottawa was the top bilateral donor in food security as a percentage of total Canadian ODA, disbursing 11% or $194 million in 2006. Canada was also one of the first to respond to the global food price crisis with additional contributions to the UN’s WFP and astonishingly completely untying food aid in April 2008 (ATIP-A201401861, 2015). About two-thirds of Canada food security budget was devoted to humanitarian emergency assistance. In late 2009, during an official visit, Terri Toyota, Director of Government Donor Relations for the WFP, proudly recognized Canada’s strong commitment to supporting humanitarian food aid and

\(^{10}\) OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a group of the main international assistance donors responsible for defining and monitoring global standards and guidelines in the area of international development.
“continues to show bold leadership with a comprehensive approach to the world's food security solutions” (CIDA, 2009a).

For Canada, food security is an area of “great expertise and long-standing comparative advantage, so that was a bit of a no brainer” said a Senior Government Official, (Interview, August 10, 2015). Canadian expertise in biotechnology and nutritional security also brands Canada as a competitive global leader in food security. A Private Sector Executive (Interview, July 28, 2015) explained that Canada has the “technology we have developed… [to grow] crops in a dry environment…[that is] actually transferable…to developing countries so they can someday grow their own food and supply their own needs”.

On nutrition, the Senior Government Official, (Interview, August 10, 2015) revealed that “Canada has been a pathfinder in terms of nutrition, and evidence-based research and nutrition like [the] Micronutrients Initiative”. Jim Cornelius (Interview, July 13, 2015), similarly shared that ex-CIDA official Ernest Loevinsohn played a very important role in nutrition and he built up staff with expertise in nutrition” which was “an orphan child in development at that time, so Canada became a major leader in the area of nutrition” globally. Canada’s leadership in investing in agriculture, food aid and nutrition, and Canadian private sector’s strengths in agricultural technology shaped how CIDA framed the problem of global hunger and malnutrition.

COMPETING PRIORITIES & BROADER CONTEXT

Canada in Afghanistan & Haiti: Afghanistan and Haiti were top Canadian foreign policy priorities and funding at the time (See Appendix III). Canada’s military and civilian involvement in Afghanistan aimed at combatting militant extremists from 2001 to 2014
channeled much of Canada’s humanitarian and bilateral development resources to the reconstruction of the country. By the mid-2000s, the increased importance on greater policy integration among Canadian government departments working overseas by adopting a “whole-of-government approach” also translated into a closer coupling of diplomacy and defense interests with that of development and humanitarian interests (the 3Ds) (Brown, 2008). As Canadian Forces joint military mission continued in Afghanistan, the 2008-2009 Report to Parliament on Canada’s ODA reports that the country was Canada's largest bilateral aid recipient to the amount of CAD $224 million in reconstruction and development assistance. Professor Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015) observed that “the conflict and supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan was huge in terms of the driving seat of [the food security] agenda. So in a sense the food security stuff was playing out on a very small part of a dance floor that was dominated by the Afghanistan elephant”.

According to CIDA, Canada “is a leader in coordinating many donor activities” in Haiti (CIDA, 2008-2009). Haiti remains the most fragile country in the Americas with the lowest human development score on the Human Development Index in the Western Hemisphere. Due to Canada’s “La Francophonie commitments to Haiti and because all the geostrategic and pure humanitarian issues,” Ramisch predicts that Canada will continue demonstrate its strong commitment to the only sovereign francophone country in the Americas (Interview with Ramisch, July 22, 2015). During the 2008-2009 fiscal year, Haiti was the second largest bilateral recipient of Canadian ODA. When the devastating 7.0 magnitude on the Richter scale earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, Canada was one of the first donors to answer the humanitarian emergency generated by the devastating earthquake. CIDA delivered $227 million in aid to Haiti in 2009-2010, which included food assistance to the country (CIDA, 2009–2010).
Financial Crisis: The 2009 Food Security Strategy acknowledged both the financial crisis and economic recession aggravated the stability of the global food system as energy insecurity and high energy prices drove up agricultural inputs and transportation costs continued to negatively affect the availability and access to food. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and oil prices spike absorbed much of the attention and resources of governments, including Canada’s. When the Lehman Brothers, a major US financial institution implicated in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, collapsed in September 2008 “suddenly the whole global economy was in a tailspin…[the global food price crisis] slipped off the radar…because of the world economy’s slowdown and it kind of went off but the wheels have been put into motion” said Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015). Most of the world’s major developed economies were in the deepest post-Second World War economic recession and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that global GDP contracted by an alarming 6.25 percent during the last quarter of 2008 and global trade shrunk by a staggering 11.75 percent in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Canada’s nominal GDP contracted by 1.2 percent in 2009 and through Canada’s Economic Action Plan, close to CAD $30 billion of economic stimulus or 1.9 percent of the economy was injected to stabilize the Canadian economy (Finance Canada, 2009).

Policies Stream

Policies constitute the second stream of the Kingdon model. Policies are informed by a wide variety of ideas suspended in the “policy primeval soup11” (Kingdon, 2011, 116). Policy ideas are produced by a policy community of specialists composed of networked bureaucrats, academics, think tank researchers and thought leaders who share a common concern in a policy

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11 Kingdon (1995) describes ‘policy primeval soup’ as where ideas are exchanged and debated as people try to convince each other of the worthiness of particular ideas and some will gain in popularity while others will lose traction and fade away.
area. Over time, through the natural selection or competitive process, some ideas survive scrutiny and prosper and others get repackaged or fade away.

Policy entrepreneurs are individuals, whether inside or outside government, from the specialist community in a particular policy domain. The defining feature of entrepreneurs is that they are willing to invest their resources in hope of a future return. To these entrepreneurs, return on investment can be the uptake or approval of a particular policy, political participation, or career promotion. These individuals understand that the chance for a problem to raise on the public policy agenda increases if a solution is attached to the problem.

**Policy community cohesion:** There was wide agreement within the policy community in support of the 2009 *Food Security Strategy*. CIDA consulted 12 members of the FSPG, the Micronutrient Initiative, 11 farmer organizations, 10 social and economic empowerment groups, 5 federal departments, 3 think tanks, IFPRI, and the World Bank, as well as the Israeli Delegation from MASHAV\(^\text{12}\). Five federal departments and entities were consulted during this process: the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), Department of Finance, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). According to an internal CIDA presentation (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 53), due to the tight timeline of events there were “limited opportunities for consultations”. Between August 4 and September 1, 2009 CIDA conducted technical consultations on its *Food Security Strategy*. This was a month after L’Aquila G8 Summit in July and a month and half before the announcement of the *Food Security Strategy* by Minister Oda on World Food Day 2009.

\(^{12}\) MASHAV is Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation.
“There was broad support for food security being an area of particular priority for Canada. There were certainly a lot of Canadian NGOs13 who had always done a lot in that area” said the Senior Government Official (Interview, August 10, 2015). The Canadian Food Security Policy Group (FSPG)14 was then chaired by the CFGB. Jim Cornelius (Interview, July 13, 2015), the Executive Director of the CFGB noted that, “when the [food security] policy was announced it was broadly supported by the Food Security Policy Group…It was largely endorsed by the FSPG, as a good policy framework, which the NGOs, CSO community can support and engagement with”. However, ATIP documents revealed that some members of the FSPG were cautious about the strategy and this will be explored later in this section.

In 2009, CIDA’s outreach and partnerships with the Canadian private sector doing business in agriculture and agri-food industry were not as strong when compared to its networks in the Canadian food security CSO community, the FSPG. ATIP documents showed that there was virtually no private sector representation aside from a former head of the now-defunct International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) and Canadian farmer organizations such as UPA Développement international (UPA-DI) and the National Farmers Union (NFU) in the consultations (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp 13-14). “Canadian agribusinesses and [the] private sector did not play… a sufficient role. There might be people invited to consultations…Canadian agriculture has not been an issue, other than on the export [side], where there were issues around the untying of food aid but that happened before the Food Security Strategy” (Interview with Private Sector Executive, July 28, 2015).

13 Non-governmental organizations
14 FSPG was formed after the 1996 World Summit on Food Security, bringing together over 20 Canadian international development and humanitarian agencies, farmers’ organizations and human rights groups in sectors related to enhancing sustainable agriculture and food security in developing countries and Canada.
Within CIDA, departmental priorities frequently change as junior ministers are appointed and revolve through its door (See Appendix IV). Food security emerged prominently as a priority in 2002-2003 under the strategy Promoting Sustainable Rural Development Through Agriculture under the former Liberal Minister of International Cooperation Susan Whelan (2002-2004), who is the daughter of former Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan. There were extensive consultations leading up to the 2002-2003 strategy. However, Susan Whelan’s strategy faced “a lot of resistance within the Agency because agriculture… [was] not seen as a pressing issue” back in 2003, said Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015). When the Liberal Party candidate Susan Whelan failed to win back her seat in Parliament during the 38th General Election in 2004, other priorities superseded the focus on agriculture and food security. By 2009, CIDA officials “had been softened up to [food security], and because it has been not just a five year but maybe more like a 12-year process, it might have legs and might have its defenders within CIDA” who see its merits observed Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015). The frequent reprioritization of international development agendas and the prior short-lived attention on agriculture in 2003 may have assisted in reorienting CIDA to food security in 2009.

Guiding policy institutions: The crisis exposed existing vulnerabilities of households, government and the international system to food insecurity and malnutrition. To counteract the 2007-2008 world food price crisis, two major global guiding policy institution were influential in informing the thinking and building the architecture of Canada’s response: first, the creation of the United Nations System High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF) in spring 2008 and its Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) and second, the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report (WDR) on Agriculture for Development. On April 24, 2008, the United Nations Secretary-General established the HLTF. The task force underscores the
urgent need to improve food and nutrition security worldwide. The HLTF’s 2008 CFA presented two sets of action focused on assisting the **immediate needs** of vulnerable populations and **building resilience** (Mousseau, 2010). The HLTF played an important role in formulating a coherent response to the crisis and informed the development of strategies at the country level and supported international coordination efforts. Before 2008, Canada and other donors’ efforts on food security were less consistent and siloed into narrow sectoral approaches and interventions. Through the CFA, sectors such as food assistance, agricultural development, and research were streamlined into one wide-ranging policy. The CFA’s two-track approach was dominant in the design of CIDA’s 2009 *Food Security Strategy’s* three paths of action, and the *Strategy’s* overarching goal and objectives were “harmonized with the HLTF’s CFA” (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 180). Furthermore, the CFA also strengthened CIDA’s “understanding of the difference between short-term (food aid) and long-term (agdev, research, improved markets) interventions” (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp 52).

The HLTF start to redirect the global political attention on the crisis and soon after the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched the Global Partnership on Food and Agriculture (GPFA) to galvanize political, technical and financial resources at a Rome Conference in June 2008. At the 2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaido, Japan, G8 leaders made food security a major thematic issue during the meeting. This was followed by a High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All in Madrid in early 2009. By the summer of 2009, the G8 leaders in L’Aquila, Italy issued a strong joint declaration, backed with a strong pledge to raise $20 billion over three years for agricultural development and investment, which led to the ASFI.

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15 Agricultural development.
Second, the 2008 *WDR on Agriculture for Development* was fundamental in defining policy solutions as it provided much needed evidence on agriculture as an effective engine of poverty alleviation and economic growth. The report found that at least a third of the world’s population living in poverty were in rural areas, and concluded that investment and “growth in agriculture is on average at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth outside agriculture” (World Bank, 2007, pp. 6). The timely and evidence-rich 2009 WDR report generated much attention in policy communities in capitals. Jim Cornelius (Interview, July 13, 2015), the Executive Director of the CFGB asserted that “the World Bank Report on Agriculture was also very important…it detailed the economic analysis and all sort of stuff and made [sic] a strong case for investment in agriculture. It really helped to overcome the hurdle, that evidence hurdle” needed to convince the Canadian government to act and the value of investing in agriculture. Nonetheless, it is still important to note that the WDR 2008 “was launched in 2007 and [it] did not expect the food price crisis…The trend was showing that the rate of growth on [agricultural] productivity was less than growth in population. So there was deep concern in the international food security community but there was little concerned coming from donors” explained Iain MacGillivray (Interview, July 27, 2015). The HLF’s CFA and the World Bank’s WDR 2008 were two pivotal policies that facilitated Canada and other’s policy measures to the crisis.

**Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda:** Food security became a priority for Canada’s foreign aid agenda during a time when the government “wanted to rethink its approach to international development and international assistance” (Interview with Senior Government
Official, August 10, 2015). Aid effectiveness\(^\text{16}\) was an anchor of the colossal ship that was the Canadian aid policy, which included food security. Canada’s 2007 Budget Plan called for the government to “enhance the focus, efficiency and accountability of Canada’s international assistance efforts” (Finance Canada, 2007, pp. 262). Canada endorsed the *Accra Agenda for Action* at the 2008 Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which aimed at reforming the way developed and developing countries work together and the way ODA is given and spent, which later informed Canada Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-2012 (CIDA, 2009d).

An important aspect of aid effectiveness is accountability. Canada advanced aid accountability at the G8 during a meeting of G8 Development Ministers in 2009. At the L’Aquila G8 Summit, Canada insisted on establishing an accountability and transparency framework on the AFSI to hold member governments accountable to their development commitments. Canada’s leadership led to the G8 head of states to “[adopt] a full and comprehensive accountability mechanism by 2010 to monitor progress and strengthen the effectiveness of [their] actions” (G8, 2009a, para. 3). The L’Aquila G8 communiqué also created the first *G8 Preliminary Accountability Report* at L’Aquila with the full report delivered in 2010 at the Muskoka Summit in Canada. Canada campaigned for greater accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the G8’s international development commitments, setting the stage for Canada’s G8 presidency the following year, where Canada launched its MNCH Initiative.

Additionally, under the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, the former CIDA underwent a process of reprioritization to focus “more geographically and also to focus more on thematic [sic].

\(^\text{16}\) Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda launched in 2007 committed the government to making its international assistance more efficient, focused and accountable according to five central pillars of the OECD-DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005): Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability.
Identify fewer areas and there would be more concentration of efforts” (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015). In May 2009, as part of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, CIDA announced five priority thematic areas that would direct Canadian ODA spending and CIDA’s programming would be concentrated in 20 countries of focus (CIDA, 2010). Food security was the first thematic announced among the new priority thematic focuses (See Appendix IV for the full list of priorities).

**Modernization of food assistance:** In response to the world food price spikes, in April 2008 Canada announced it would contribute $230 million in food aid and “fully [untie] restrictions on where food can be purchased” (CIDA, 2008). By untying food aid, Canada was “maximizing the effectiveness of its contribution.” CIDA expected that by doing so, it would “provide the WFP and the CFGB with the flexibility to procure food commodities from all countries—especially developing countries. By removing these restrictions, Canada [was] also promoting the growth of local and regional markets in developing countries” (CIDA, 2008). For years the CFGB and other groups have been advocating for the untying of food aid. The decision to “untie food aid was hugely popular. It was something that was important and the people were not suspecting… the Conservative government would do” explained Jim Cornelius (Interview, July 13, 2015). The transition from food aid to food assistance, as well as the emphasis on nutrition to address hidden hunger was “a modernization agenda” to transform food assistance.

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17 CIDA was responsible for three priorities food security, sustainable economic growth and children and youth. While the other two priorities (advancing democracy and promoting global security) were led by other government departments.

18 CIDA’s 20 countries of focus: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Caribbean Region, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Vietnam, and West Bank and Gaza. In 2014, DFATD’s countries of focus increased from 20 to 25 to also include Burma, Mongolia, the Philippines, Benin, DRC, and Jordan. Focus on Sudan shifted to only South Sudan. Bolivia was changed to a partner country.

19 Undernutrition is also referred to as hidden hunger. Undernutrition occurs when there is a deficiency of calories or of one or more essential micronutrients.
by making it more effective (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015). The move from food aid to food assistance meant that the WFP would not only deliver emergency food assistance to those in need, but that it would also try to modernize and to deliver solutions and development to address hunger, while leveraging on its comparative advantage (WFP, 2010). In 2012, Canada chaired the renegotiation of the Food Assistance Convention (FAC) and ratified it in 2013. The FAC legally binds Canada to provide at least $250 million annually in more predictable and quality food assistance (CIDA, 2013).

Alternative Policy Considerations: Kingdon noted that not all ideas are made equal and only a select few informs policy. What ideas failed to make it into the 2009 Food Security Strategy? When asked, “What might a different government do to reform the existing Strategy?”, a Senior Government Official (Interview, August 10, 2015) responded that they may want to “add something that was really missing” as “some people were critical that there was not more for the environment or environmental policy, green technologies or green development”. The Senior Government Official’s view was also found in the Strategic Environmental Assessment of CIDA’s 2009 Food Security Strategy. Unlike an environmental impact study, the Assessment developed recommendations and programming options on how CIDA can better integrate the three cross-cutting themes of environment, gender equality and governance into its Food Security Strategy (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 95-110).

On the question of integrating environmental sustainability into the Strategy, the Assessment called for the adoption of more “ecologically sustainable practices” through focusing on four areas: (1) integrated water resource management, (2) sustainable land management, (3) biodiversity protection and enhancement, and (4) climate change adaptation and mitigation. This recommendation mirrored comments by the Canadian Cooperative Association’s (CCA) during
the technical consultations, cautioning that “there [was] little to no reference to environmental concerns” in the draft Strategy (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 16). Another organization, the Agricultural Institute of Canada (AIC) insisted that “agriculture must play a major role in mitigating against climate change” and commented that “GMOs [were] not mentioned. They have a great potential to [increasing] production but they also pose a potential threat to the environmental and control of genetic resources” (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 18).

To further intergrate good governance practices in the Strategy, the Assessment further recommended strengthening political accountability and transparency, legal empowerment of the poor (including their right to food), and the capacity of government and civil society to address food security” at various levels (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 106). The Assessment suggested Canada to contribute to “effective governance of the global food system” and remain “strongly engaged in international policy discussions with multilateral partners” including the three Rome-based agencies: FAO, IFAD and WFP. However, the FSPG wondered, “how can the Strategy support the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), in particular how can the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification\(^20\) (UNCCD) be better implemented” (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 24)? Closer to the ground, the Assessment highlighted the Strategy should support legal empowerment intruments such as land tenure rights of women and smallholder farmers and the protection of indigenous peoples’ territories. This also mirrored apprehensions raised by CCA underlining the “inability to access land, lack of land tenure, and inequitable land distribution [which] often contributes (sic) to food insecurity” for groups who have little power, such as women and smallholder farmers (ATIP-A201401861, 2015, pp. 16).

\(^{20}\) Canada became the first country to ever withdrawal from the UNCCD treaty in 2013.
In the official draft of Canada’s 2009 *Food Security Strategy*, some of the *Assessment’s* language that was supportive of “agroecological approaches that boost farmers’ resilience to climate change while minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, combatting desertification, and preserving and promoting biological diversity” were inserted. The *Strategy* also acknowledged climate change in its preamble and women’s control over the means of agricultural production and “land ownership is becoming weaker” (CIDA, 2009c). Further on climate change and food security, Canada contributed to CAD $5.5 million in the CGIAR research program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) in early 2010 as part of its 2009 L’Aquila commitments (CIDA, 2010a).

**Politics Stream**

Policy, of course, cannot be separated from *politics*. A range of forces, such as public sentiment, pressure groups, election outcomes, partisanship, and changes in government, routinely clash and coalesce in the political arena with far-reaching policy implications. Elections, for instance, have a powerful effect on the policy agendas of governments. Unlike consensus building among policy specialists, which uses persuasion, consensus building among political actors takes place through a bargaining process. Policy makers and politicians must judge the degree of consensus among organized political forces and whether the balance of forces in the political stream favours action. This section will explore the political factors that influenced the agenda-setting of food security.

**Political transitions**: The 40th Canadian General Election was held on Tuesday, October 14th, 2008. The election resulted in the Conservative Party of Canada, led by former Prime
Minister Stephen Harper, forming a minority government\(^{21}\) with the Liberal Party of Canada as the Official Opposition (Library of Parliament of Canada, 2008). The Conservative Party of Canada formed its second consecutive minority government, and they gained in the number of seats in Parliament as compared to the results of the 2006 election. After being re-elected back into Parliament for the third time, Beverley Oda was reappointed to the same cabinet portfolio as the Minister of International Cooperation. Aid effectiveness\(^{22}\) was a major policy focus for Canada, this was in preparation for the *Auditor General of Canada’s Fall 2009 Report on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*. The CIDA’s Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-2012 approved in July 2009, consolidated guidance for the Agency to meet its commitments to aid effectiveness and focus CIDA’s priorities. Seven months after her re-election, the former Minister for International Cooperation announced the three priority themes that would guide the former CIDA’s agenda, and increasing food security was the first on that list when it was announced on May 20, 2009 (CIDA, 2009b), two months before the 2009 L’Aquila G8 Summit and five months away from the announcement of the its *Food Security Strategy*.

**Interest group mobilization:** Interest groups such as the CFGB, which was also the chair of the FSPG, had “been lobbying [for] the support of the government and the previous government for some time” in its efforts to tackle food security issues and played a key role in getting those issues on the Conservative government’s policy agenda (Interview with J. Cornelius, July 13, 2015). Jim Cornelius, the Executive Director of the CFGB, further explained that his organization was “central in putting the issue on the table” and they did so “in a way that

\(^{21}\) A minority government or hung government exists when the governing political party does not hold a majority of seats in the Canadian House of Commons. In 2008, the Conservative government won 143 seats of out a total of 308 seats in Parliament, 12 seats short of a majority.

\(^{22}\) Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda launched in 2007 committed the government to making its international assistance more efficient, focused and accountable according to five central pillars of the OECD-DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005): Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results, and Mutual Accountability. In 2014, a list of partner countries was also included.
the Conservative Party will [sic: would] see themselves in it [by] translating our policy asks into language [so] that they can be understood and find acceptable”. CFGB was an effective broker and translator of an interest group’s asks into policy…

The CFGB began to have an active conversation with the Conservative Party around these issues. And we started to get them involved and they were supportive of the untying of food aid as a strategy…When they came to power, we were able to pick up on that conversation with them and began to have further conversations with Ministers who were appointed. When Ms. Oda became Minister [for International Cooperation], she became very interested. On the food aid side, they were able to make the argument that the Liberal had not met their commitments of totally untying food aid and they were able to meet their commitment.

- Interview with Jim Cornelius, July 13, 2015

**Rural Canada & a Simple Message:** Iain MacGillivray (July 27, 2015) said that Canadians believe that Canada is a “powerhouse in terms of agriculture”. Though only “a small percentage of … [the entire] Canadian population… lives in rural areas and [even fewer] work in agriculture…. there are very strong values within the Canadian psyche that has certain constituency around food and agriculture” (MacGillivray, July 27, 2015). According to Statistics Canada’s Census of Agriculture 2011, from 2006 to 2011 there were 6.1 million Canadians living in rural areas, or about 20 percent of the entire population. There were 650,400 farmers in 2011 in Canada and of those almost 90 percent were rural and 45 percent were Canadian farm operators (Statistics Canada, 2015a). Of the Canadian farm operators about 55 percent were over the age of 55 and only 10 percent were younger than 40 years old. From 2001-2011, there has been an decreasing trend as there were fewer farm operators and farms in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2015). Among the Canadian farm population 82 percent reported a religious affiliation,

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23 According to the OECD-DAC, tied aid are official grants or loans that restrict procurements to companies to companies in the donor country or a small group of countries. Untying aid is the removal of the legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for aid funded procurement.
much higher than the Canadian average. Roman Catholic (38%), United Church (19%), and Lutheran (5.6%) were the most frequently reported. Major Christian denominations represent the overwhelming majority, at 89.2 percent, whereas all other religions made up 10.8 percent (Statistics Canada, 2015a). Several faith groups’ community work and soup kitchens feed the poor and homeless populations, making them sympathetic to global hunger issues. These Christian groups are also part of the CFGB partnership, which has a long history working in emergency food assistance.

“There were domestic reasons [for the government] showing support for food and agriculture as part of a fairly low-cost foreign policy gesture rather than a strong commitment to rural development in other meaningful ways, so it showed to be a symbolic connection” to the elected government’s political and electoral base, said Professor Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015). Also, unlike most other complex development issues such as climate change or structural inequality, the average Canadian understands hunger and the basics of food security. The Senior Government Official (Interview, August 10, 2015) explained that Canada’s support for food security was a “no brainer” because “it would be very difficult to walk away from food security as a priority. It’s a very difficult politically for governments to say we don’t care about this issue anymore when this is such a basic issue…hunger and nutrition are such basic issues”.

The government wanted to select an international development issue that every Canadian…
External & Global influences: This subsection explores the external and global influences on the shaping of Canada’s 2009 food security policy. The G8 is a governmental political forum composed of the largest industrialized democracies, which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. As a global forum, the G8 was “instrumental in terms of elevating the importance around particular global issues and drawing attention to them and leveraging all countries to join forces, trying to make a significant impact-contribution” (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015).

The 2007-2008 world food price crisis raised G8’s interest in global food security and malnutrition. Before L’Aquila, the G8 leaders produced a Leaders Statement on Global Food Security at the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in Japan and over USD $10 billion were committed to short, medium and long-term interventions. Food security was even a more prominent global issue and formally was part of the 2009 G8 L’Aquila Summit. The G8 leaders committed themselves to USD $20 billion over three years (2009-2011) under AFSI and signaled a new emphasis on sustainable agricultural investment and food security largely absent from previously G8 communiqués. The G8 “has galvanizing power; in terms of mobilizing, from a communicating point of view and resourcing point of view” (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015). The year after L’Aquila, Canada hosted the Muskoka G8 Summit in 2010. The G8 summitries raised food insecurity and malnutrition on the global agenda and Canadian policy.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): Food security was also high on the UN’s global development agenda. World leaders established the MDGs following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000. The MDGs were a set of eight far-reaching and ambitious goals to improve human well-being by 2015. The MDGs’ authority stems from their
perceived morality, expertise, rational and delegated power. By establishing categories, fixing meanings and diffusing norms they were able to obligate governments to improve human development and dignity. MDG1 aimed to halve the proportion of global hunger by 2015, which was based on the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) targets\footnote{The 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) targets obligated governments to eradicate hunger in all countries and reducing the number of undernourished people to half no later than 2015. The summit also provided the first definition of food security and the right to adequate food.} has “galvanizing and compelling force and a moral authority” observed Iain MacGillivray (Interview, July 27, 2015). The number of hungry has not significantly went down between 1996 and 2015, and “we still have 800 million people hungry in this world” and it is very concerning that “everyday there are people who go to bed hungry”. As the MDGs global targets comes to an end in 2015, the new post-2015 “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) would have staying power, as long as we continue to have 800 million people in chronic hunger…it's not [going to] away as an important area for international public policy” (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015). With food security a top priority for international governance bodies such as the UN and G8, there was considerable global pressure for Canada to join the fight against global hunger and strengthen food security.

**Policy Entrepreneurs**

Policy entrepreneurs are actors, including states, policy makers, politicians or members of civil society, who promote specific policy solutions by combining the three streams – problem, policy and politics. Policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in facilitating and anticipating the opening of a policy window. In other words, policy change occurs during a window of opportunity when policy entrepreneurs successfully connect two or more streams of the policy process. Out of the many who contributed to supporting the Canadian food security
agenda-setting process, one key policy entrepreneur was identified in the interviews conducted for this research as having an instrumental role in raising the profile of food security in the context of Canada’s foreign aid policy in 2009: Jim Cornelius, the Executive of the Winnipeg based Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB).

Multiple interview participants noted that the **CFGB Executive Director Jim Cornelius** was an important policy entrepreneur who was central in facilitating, anticipating, and advancing the standing of global food security as a policy priority for the government. Iain MacGillivray (Interview, July 27, 2015) explained that the “Canadian Foodgrains Bank, I think [in] particularly was the most vocal [group calling for action on global food security] and the most listened to by the Canadian government… [it] has a lot of reach with the farming community, rural community in Western Canada. Whether it was a Liberal or Conservative government they always had a good rapport with government and senior leaders.” The CFGB was the major driver of food security issues as it was also the former chair of the FSPG. The CFGB had conducted the preparatory and advocacy work, engaging with senior officials and provided evidence long before the 2007-2008 world food price crisis. “When the food crisis emerged in 2008… it became a moment all this campaigning [could] begin to advance as now there is global attention on the issue. You advance on the political level as there were prior conversations on the issues for many years” Jim Cornelius shared (Interview, July 13, 2015). Stuart Clark, the then Senior Policy Advisor at the CFGB and other members of the FSPG, such as World Vision, CHF, Inter Pares, CARE Canada, and USC Canada were also highlighted as actors who contributed to advancing food security in Canada’s foreign aid policy.

From the interviews, Margaret Biggs, the then President of CIDA and Diane Jacovella, the then Vice President for Multilateral and Global Programs were noted as strong champions
for food security. Internationally, Robert Zoellick, the then President of the World Bank, who put out a *10 Point Plan* in support of agriculture in 2008, David Nabarro, the Coordinator of the HLTF, Josette Sheeran, the former head of the UN WFP, and lastly the Katherine Sierra, Chair of the CGIAR were also cited as strong advocates and policy champions.

**PART IV: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION**

**The Strategy’s Three Paths of Action**

CIDA’s three paths of action outlined in the 2009 *Food Security Strategy* define the strategic area of Canada’s focus on combating global hunger. The three paths of action focused efforts on (1) food assistance and nutrition, (2) sustainable agricultural development, and lastly, (3) research and development. As noted previously, the HLTF CFA’s two-track approach and the World Bank’s WDR 2008 significantly influenced the design of CIDA’s three paths of action in the 2009 *Food Security Strategy*.

**The food assistance and nutrition path of action** aimed to provide more flexible, predictable and needs-based funding to meet the emergency, long-term and the nutritional needs of the most vulnerable populations. The CFGB and other key players within Canada’s food aid establishment have consistently received a very large share of CIDA’s budget. Majority of Canada’s contribution to agriculture or food security or about two-thirds was to humanitarian emergency assistance in protracted crises as “that was the way the budget got spent really quickly and always has been” claimed Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015). The CFGB and the FSPG were also instrumental in advocating for the unprecedented decision to untie food aid in 2008. On nutrition, Canada was a global leader in nutrition and ‘the evidence base was so compelling it was built into the food assistance equation because it was a question of life
or death’ for children with permanent deficits in their first 1000 days of life to prevent malnutrition and stunted growth (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015).

Secondly, the sustainable agricultural development path, which aims to build the capacity of small-scale farmers, related organizations and government policies and to support national and regional agricultural and food security strategies, was built into CIDA’s economic growth strategy and the cross-cutting theme of gender (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015). The FSPG, with members like CARE Canada, USC Canada and Inter Pares, was more interested in sustainable agricultural development and less on the food assistance (Interview with Jim Cornelius, July 13, 2015). As the preponderance of farmers in the South are female small landholders, this second path of action was not just about increasing agricultural productivity, it was also about “poverty reduction and livelihoods, which was consistent with the former CIDA’s cross-cutting focused on gender” (Interview with Senior Government Official, August 10, 2015).

The last path of action was research and development, which aims to broaden and deepen publicly available research that makes significant improvements to food security and nutrition outcomes. One of the cornerstones of this path of action was Canada’s IDRC-CIDA joint Canadian International Food Security Research Fund (CIFSRF). Contrary to Canada’s untying of food aid in 2009, CIFSRF research program funding sought “to harness the best of Canadian expertise and knowledge to develop solutions that result in lasting impacts for the food insecure” (Interview with Joshua Ramisch, July 22, 2015). CIFSRF-funded research had to then be undertaken through Canadian-developing country research partnerships, where Canadian technical know-how was leveraged (IDRC, 2015). This was effectively a new form of tied aid because it required research proposals to demonstrate the value-added role that Canadian
knowledge and partnership would play in the project. Another key beneficiary of Canada’s food security platform was the CGIAR Centres, a network of 15 research centres studying agriculture around the world. With Canadian funding, the CGIAR developed high nutrient dense crops and millions of farmers are now able to grow more nutritious crops (Interview with Iain MacGillivray, July 27, 2015). The research and development path of action was designed to find lasting solutions to food insecurity and malnutrition in the long term; meanwhile both food assistance and sustainable agricultural development sought to address more immediate and medium-term needs.

Untying Food Aid & Defusing Opposition

The eventual untying of Canadian food aid in April 2008 was critical to defusing potential opposition to the 2009 Food Security Strategy. Historically, the role of Canadian food aid and agricultural trade policies were closely linked. In The Making of Canadian Food Aid Policy (1992), the author suggests that food aid was “designed primarily to serve the needs of economic interests within Canada” (Charlton, 1992, pp. 177). Previously, the tying requirements for Canadian food aid were associated with export and surplus disposal rather than purely humanitarian concerns, which benefited the Canadian domestic economy, farmers, and the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB).

Due to this long history, politicians were cautious about untying food aid, fearing a negative response from rural voters. In the past, CIDA supported the untying of aid but AAFC opposed it (Canadian Foodgrains Bank, 2013). The eventual untying of food aid came when, under a Liberal government in 2005, CIDA moved to only untie 50 percent of its food aid in the humanitarian response to the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in late

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25 The Canadian Wheat Board was a marketing board for wheat and barley in Western Canada created by the Canadian government in 1935. The CWB was privatized in June 2015.
2004\textsuperscript{26}. Three years later in 2008, the Conservative government fully untied food aid and did the same for all aid by 2013. Once food aid became untied food security policies were also delinked from Canadian trade, making it less a politically-charged issue entrenched in economic interests.

There was broad support on the question of whether increasing food security should be a top foreign aid priority for Canada. Opposition from the private sector was not evident since large “agricultural companies were not headquartered in Canada” and they did not heavily lobby Ottawa to continue tie food aid (Interview with Jim Cornelius, July 13, 2015). Although the FSPG largely agreed with the CIDA 2009 \textit{Food Security Strategy}, with some reservations, Professor Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015) observed that the group was reluctant to scrutinize the government’s policies and programs. Instead many members “largely benefited from the current food policy regime\textsuperscript{27}, they got a bunch of money from the food aid component” and their reports adopted a less antagonistic stance to say Canada’s approach to increasing food security overseas was “all pretty good, could do better but it’s pretty good.” This was also indicative of the group’s financial anxieties and reflective of the government’s unwelcoming attitude toward dissent.

Therefore, the untying of food aid prior to the launch of Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy was critical to defusing potential opposition within and outside of government to the food security policy the government was devising. At the same time, members of the FSPG were not too openly critical of the government due to some members’ relationship with their main funder.

\textsuperscript{26} In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, it became clear to donors, like Canada, that sending tied food aid was no longer an effective humanitarian measure as majority of the population eats rice instead of grains grown in Canada and much of the affect countries’ inland agricultural land remain intact and unaffected.

\textsuperscript{27} Refers to the food assistance establishment and CIDA’s \textit{Strategy} implementing partners.
Ideological Undercurrents

Since the Cold War period, Canada and other Western governments have used food aid as an ideological tool against the spread of communism and rural insurgencies in what was then called the Third World. After the end of the Second World War, the American Marshall Plan, a $12 billion aid package for the reconstruction of Western Europe, had the clear aim of preventing and containing communism in Europe (Caouette, D. C.& Cote, D., 2012). As an ally of the United States, Canada also invested in food aid, as well as the Green Revolution, which were meant to counter communism. “Food was recognized as a political weapon in the efforts to defuse communist appeal in Asia… and from its beginning the development of the Green Revolution constituted mobilizing science and technology in the service of counter-revolution” (Cleaver, 1982). The concept of the “Green Revolution” was to oppose the “Red” Revolution or Communist revolutionary threat. “Basically [the idea was] to feed people, so they are not hungry and open to Maoist or other communist-inspired radical things” explained Professor Joshua Ramisch (Interview, July 22, 2015).

Reflecting upon the over 40 food riots around the world by the end of crisis, these food-related demonstrations in Burkina Faso, Egypt, Haiti, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Yemen and others were not purely about food insecurity but about human dignity and people’s rights, right to food and also political rights. The violent massive public protests “became framed as “food riots”… these were local circumstances of oppressive regimes, where you know oppression is intersecting with higher cost of living” (Interview with J. Ramisch, July 22, 2015). The fragility of the global food system and higher food prices also exposed the vulnerabilities of some governments’ oppressive control over their citizens, which also fueled the consequent call for political change across the Arab world. This also demonstrates that food
issues are clearly and have complex interactions between with our layered political-socioeconomic systems and that of the biophysical world around us.

During this same time, the strong influence of market-oriented technocrats and Western economists of the Washington-based institutions, namely the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury promoted the Washington Consensus to developing countries. Under the Washington Consensus many developing countries were forcibly advised to undertake structural liberalization to produce market economies, openness to trade, and macroeconomic discipline. These policies drastically lowered global food prices (until 2007), brought about the Green Revolution in Asia and increased food availability for most of the world, increasing overall global food security, but not all. According to a FAO study on why African countries became food importers concluded that despite African countries’ vast agricultural potential, trade liberalization in the agricultural sector increased the food import bill and decimated local production (FAO, 2011a). Tied food aid was created by Canada and other western countries as a way to send their grain surpluses to net food importing developing countries (NFIDC) in Africa and elsewhere as these countries’ ability to finance their food import bills deteriorated. Neoliberal agricultural development policies were also visible in the World Bank’s WDR 2008.

The World Bank’s WDR 2008 on Agriculture for Development presented extensive research and evidence that agricultural growth was “especially effective in reducing poverty” by raising farm incomes, generating employment and reducing food prices. The report, which highly influenced Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy, was deeply influenced by modernization theory28 and the neoliberal belief in market fundamentalism as the harbinger of

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28 Modernization theory refers to the W.W. Rostow’s linear and universalistic view of development in the Third World, where he posits the five stages of economic development.
improved development outcomes. About three-quarters of the world’s poor still lives in rural areas and increasing agricultural productivity is entrusted as the way to lift them out of poverty and escape hunger. An integral part of Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy focused on “increasing the availability of food by sustainably increasing agricultural production and productivity” (CIDA, 2009c). Members of the FSPG although endorsed CIDA’s food security policy, remained cautious of the Strategy as it concentrated too narrowly on agricultural productivity and market-driven solutions (ATIP-A201401861, 2015). According to Joshua Ramsich (Interview, July 22, 2015) ‘increasing agricultural productivity on an existing land base circumvents the need for land reform or the reordering of other power structures in rural areas.’

Based on the findings, these past neoliberal undercurrents continue to influence global food security and hunger policies, including Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy. Canadian development assistance “had never been about land reform, never been about restructuring agrarian economies, it has been about “how do we increase productivity?” It's very production oriented [and takes] a science and market-driven approach that goes back to the Second World War” (Interview with J. Ramisch, July 22, 2015). As a shift from the past, Canada was departing from a rights-based approach to development during this time. Some of “the [losers of the Strategy were] the human rights campaigners, or the people who defended the rights-based approaches29, such as the right to adequate food30 to development that were there in the late 90s and early 2000s” and much of the funding for their projects were not renewed.

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29 Rights-based approaches to agricultural development would not focus only on productivity gains but also people’s right to food, right to land, and free and prior informed consent as enshrined international human rights conventions.
30 The right to adequate food as a human right was first formally recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
PART V: CONCLUSION

The Policy Window & Key Factors

Issues rise on a government’s agenda when the three streams - problems, policies and politics - join up at critical moments in time. Kingdon labels these moments policy windows and defines them as “fleeting opportunities” for advocates of policy proposals to push their solutions (1995, 165). Recognizing that there will be few simple, unidirectional and independent factors shaping a complex policy agenda, I nevertheless attempt here to distill key factors that shaped both Canada’s L’Aquila commitments and its subsequent Food Security Strategy.

The key processes started in 2006 with a sharp increase in global food prices caused by production decline due to extreme weather and major droughts in major cereal and commodities exporting countries, led to restrictions or bans on exports to protect domestic prices (IFPRI, 2012). This was coupled with the onset of the financial crisis and skyrocketing oil prices lead to the food price shocks, which were caused food riots and political unrests in over 30 countries. The number of people who were living in hunger or were chronically malnourished increased from 800 million to 1.02 billion. The 2007-2008 world food price crisis was the focusing event that initiated the setup of the Food Security Interdepartmental Committee co-chaired by Finance Canada and CIDA and prompted the creation of inter-branch committee within CIDA to help prepare the strategic options paper on food security for the Minister of International Cooperation in the fall of 2008 (Interview with Iain MacGillivray, July 27, 2015).

The campaigning, advocacy, and preparatory work completed by the policy entrepreneur Jim Cornelius, the head of CFGB, which actively engaged senior government officials and politicians across the political spectrum, was an important factor in widening Canada’s policy
space on the issue. The CFGB was the primary driver of food security issues and “when the food crisis emerged in 2008… it became a moment all this campaigning could begin to advance as now there was global attention on the issue” said Jim Cornelius, adding that his organization had been discussing these issues with the government for many years (Interview, July 27, 2015). When the crisis hit, it galvanized international attention and captured world leaders’ attention. The 2009 G8 Summit at L’Aquila put the global spotlight on food insecurity and malnutrition and made them into global political and developmental priorities. The crisis also came at a time when the former CIDA was drafting its Aid Effectiveness Agenda, which seeks to concentrate the Agency’s efforts both geographically and thematically. The CFGB was also the chair of the FSPG brought together both the development and humanitarian actors to advance food security and the Strategy’s implementation. For a timeline of the major events see Appendix V.

All things considered, by best of my judgment and based on the evidence collected through interviews, ATIPs, grey literature and academic articles, I identified a total of nine key factors – three for each of the three components in the Kingdon model, shown in Table 2, on the next page. These key factors, along with the policy entrepreneur (and other key champions) played a decisive role in facilitating and anticipating the opening of the policy window. In other words, these key factors contributed to Canada’s foreign aid policy change when the three streams – problem, policies and politics – converged to open a window of opportunity for the policy entrepreneur to advance the standing of global food security on the agenda of the government.
Table 2: Key Factor Contributing to the Canada’s 2009 Food Security Strategy Policy Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kingdom Model</th>
<th>Key Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Problems Stream** | • Food-related unrests in 40 countries against the higher food prices in many low-income food deficit countries (LIFDC).  
• FAO data demonstrating an abrupt surge in global hunger by 25 percent from 800 million to 1.02 billion.  
• Canada was well positioned as a food exporter and as a strategic global leader and had a comparative advantage and expertise in global food security issues. |
| **Policies Stream** | • UN’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis’ (HLTF) Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), informed by the World Bank’s WDR 2008 served as a strong guiding policy in formulating Canada’s Food Security Strategy.  
• The policy community, including the FSPG with some reservations, but broadly endorsed the 2009 Food Security Strategy.  
• The Strategy aligned with Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Agenda and complemented Canada’s combat, humanitarian and geostrategic roles in Afghanistan and Haiti. |
| **Politics Stream** | • Sustained interest group mobilization around Canada’s role in untying food aid and later in supporting global food security.  
• Government desire to appeal to constituencies in rural and agricultural Canada with a simple message about global hunger with a strong value system.  
• Political pressure from G8 leaders, especially from the 2009 L’Aquila G8 Summit, to meet the MDGs. |

Looking Forward

The 2007-2008 spikes in global food prices served as a clear call for the international community to recognize the inadequacies of our global food system and became a catalyst for action and policy change. Few would disagree with the position that global food security and nutrition is an important moral and international policy issue for Canada. In this light, Canada should leverage the gains made since the 2009 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) and its leadership position in the world of food security and nutrition. Using the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), also known as 2030 Agenda, as a roadmap forward, Canadian
policies should challenge “business as usual” and strive towards a world that embraces a multiplicity of environmentally sustainable agricultural systems at local, regional and global levels, and build the resilience of people’s livelihoods and food systems to threats and crises.

As the global population increases to over 9 billion by 2050, governance of future food systems at all levels, climate change, competition over key resources for food production, and changes in consumption and dietary patterns will be key drivers of change at the global level. Reflecting on the 2007-2008 food price crisis, as well as crises in the global financial, energy, and economic realms, warns of the delicate condition of the food systems and that near-future crises will increasingly be more “synchronous” and protracted (Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2007). We will likely see more simultaneous collapse of multiple systems – food, financial, economic and political in some countries, prompted in part by climate change and El Niño. The emergence of new humanitarian realities demands a move towards an integrated policy-making approach that reflects the complexities of sectoral challenges and that views the resources, experiences and knowledge of stakeholders, beneficiary populations, and actors as assets. This also calls for a rethinking of the long held divide between development and humanitarian action and values.

The adoption of the SDGs by world leaders at the United Nations in 2015 calls on all nations to strive towards the 17 aspirational goals, including Goal 2 - End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture by 2030. Despite significant population growth since 1990, global hunger has been reduced by 216 million in 2015 compared to 1990 levels, yet global hunger and malnutrition still remain unacceptably high (FAO, 2015). The State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) 2015 estimated that 795 million people continue to be undernourished in 2015; in other words, just over one in every nine people in the
world are hungry (FAO, 2015). In South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East progress in reducing hunger has been slow, and in some cases progress has been reversed by protracted crises. In these same regions, hidden hunger – the lack of micronutrients- also has a high prevalence. Under “business as usual” trends, global hunger is projected to decline to only 653 million by 2030, well above the proposed SDG 2 – Zero Hunger target (FAOiii, 2015). Without extra investments in areas such as social protection and pro-poor development policies, hunger will remain unacceptably high.

Complex challenges also present new opportunities. New actors in global governance, inclusive partnerships and multi-stakeholder platforms such as the UN’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and others will continue to brings together stakeholders may they be the private sector, civil society organizations, humanitarian actors, academia and research organizations to find ways to collaborate and provide synthesis of a number of pluralistic solutions and perspectives. At the 2015 G7 Summit, Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper and other leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the UN’s Zero Hunger Challenge31 and signed the G7 Broader Food Security and Nutrition Development Approach, through which the G7 aims “to lift 500 million people out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030” (German G7 Presidency, 2015).

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31 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2012 launched the Zero Hunger Challenge, a global call to action to achieve zero hunger, world without hunger.
This paper has presented a case study of the policy agenda-setting process that led to Canada’s *Food Security Strategy* and 2009 AFSI commitments. The case study highlighted how policy, evidence, and values relate to power and social change with the intent to better understand the policy-making process and inform future Canadian foreign policy decision-making. Looking ahead, assuring all people’s right to adequate food and the resilience of future food systems against new shocks and stressors, most notably climate change, will be paramount. As we work toward the 2030 Agenda, the notions of “leave no one behind” and “sustainability” contained in the 1987 Brundtland Report must inform our shared vision of a common future, by ensuring that this generation’s right to food does not jeopardise the right to food of future generations: a future of zero hunger.
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Interview Participants


Access to Information & Privacy


Government of Canada Reports, Press Releases & Census


Academic Articles, Other Grey Literature & Databases


The Road to Zero Hunger
Kai-Hsin Hung - GSPIA MRP, 2016


APPENDICES

Appendix I: African Countries Particularly Vulnerable to the Food Crisis

Source: (ATIP - A201401862, 2015, pp. 82)
### Appendix II: Domestic Food Grain Price Changes for Selected Countries (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual changes</th>
<th>Monthly changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 08/Aug 07</td>
<td>July 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>64.58</td>
<td>-12.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>112.27*</td>
<td>53.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>35.73</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>51.61</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>74.62</td>
<td>-5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>25.79</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>26.36</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>85.29*</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>65.70</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>46.05</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>53.77</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>89.35</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>48.12</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>89.58</td>
<td>-5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>102.43</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>59.66</td>
<td>24.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>115.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>85.30</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>129.63</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>58.62</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>39.53</td>
<td>-3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>132.64*</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>157.04*</td>
<td>48.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>86.64</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>-3.95</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>-3.84*</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>-3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>5.41*</td>
<td>-2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>10.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>45.83</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>8.52*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Price changes refer to July 2008 / July 2007

Source: (FAO, 2009a, pp. 30)
Appendix III: Top 20 Beneficiaries of Canadian Overseas Development Assistance in 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Over 100,000,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>232,414,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>119,474,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>105,145,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>50,000,001 - 100,000,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>99,829,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tanzania, United Republic of</td>
<td>93,978,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>86,813,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>83,489,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>75,151,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>54,493,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>52,424,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10,000,001 - 50,000,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Congo, the Democratic Republic of the</td>
<td>44,849,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire)</td>
<td>43,773,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>41,874,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Palestinian Territory, Occupied</td>
<td>41,191,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>35,323,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>32,751,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>31,684,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>29,733,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>28,306,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>25,729,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,358,434,670</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 1.36 billion USD in Canadian bilateral ODA represents about 70 percent of former CIDA’s total budget in 2009 and almost all of the 20 countries of focus. Please note these numbers were provided in USD and not in CAD.

Source: (European Commission, 2013)
## Appendix IV: Former CIDA Priority Sectors from 1995-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source document</th>
<th>Minister &amp; Party</th>
<th>Priority sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
• Women in development  
• Infrastructure services  
• Human rights, democracy, good governance  
• Private sector development  
• Environment |
• Basic education  
• HIV/AIDS  
• Child protection |
• Agriculture and rural development  
• Private sector development |
| 2003 | CIDA’s Policy on Promoting Sustainable Rural Development Through Agriculture | Susan Whelan (2002-03) (Chrétien - Liberal Government) | • National capacity  
• Knowledge for development  
• Food security, agricultural productivity, and income  
• Agricultural sustainability and natural resource management  
• Well-functioning markets |
• Health (focus on HIV/AIDS)  
• Basic education  
• Private sector development  
• Environmental sustainability  
• Cross-cutting theme: gender equity |
| 2009 | CIDA news release: Canada Introduces a New Effective Approach to Canadian Aid to its International Assistance | Josee Verner (2006-07) and Bev Oda (2007-12) (Harper – Conservative Government) | • Food security  
• Sustainable economic growth  
• Children and youth |

32 Table was adapted from the 2009 *Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons* (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009).
Appendix V: Timeline of Major Events of Canada’s Food Security Agenda-Setting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Release of World Development Report 2008 on Agriculture for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter 2007</td>
<td>Food Price Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>FAO launched its Initiative on Soaring Food Prices in 54 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>The Economist’s article on “The silent tsunami”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2008</td>
<td>Food Security Interdepartmental Committee created, chair by Finance &amp; CIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>CIDA increase food aid in response to crisis and untying food aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>CIDA Minister’s speech recognized need for strategy for food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF) formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2008</td>
<td>Within CIDA food security morphed into options for consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>High Level Conference on World Food Security convened in Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>HLTF drafting the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) to crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>G8 Toyako Leaders’ Statement on Global Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 2008</td>
<td>Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, financial meltdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 2008</td>
<td>The 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Canadian 40th General Elections – Elected a Conservative minority government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>FAO &amp; OECD-DAC, Madrid High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2009</td>
<td>CIDA discussion on draft paths of action of the draft Food Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2009</td>
<td>Government of Canada inter-departmental and cabinet discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>CIDA’s thematic priorities, including food security announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2009</td>
<td>Food security discussion with Canadian partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>G8 L’Aquila Summit and the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2009</td>
<td>CIDA’s Food Security Strategy technical consultations with stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>CIDA’s Strategic Environmental Assessment on the Strategy approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>CIDA’s Food Security Strategy announced in Winnipeg on World Food Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2009</td>
<td>Auditor General’s Fall Report on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>