CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN EXPLORATION OF ISRAEL AND CANADA AS “BEST FRIENDS”

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Abstract

In 2012, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird stated that Israel has “no better friend” than Canada. And indeed, an analysis of the voting records of Canada at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Council, Security Council, and the General Assembly reveals a clear political bias in the voting of the Stephen Harper government towards Israel, a bias that isolates Canada from most of the international community. Not only is Canada supportive of Israel, but a review of Canada’s political and economic relationship with Israel shows that the current relationship is much closer than that of between previous governments. This shift can be explained in part by this current government’s ideological support for Israel, in part by their aspiration to make economic conservatism central to Canadian foreign policy, and, as an aspect of their strategy to appeal to the Conservative voter base. This support for Israel is further reinforced through the secondary factors of a disinterested Canadian public, an underlying orientalist power structure, and the influence of the pro-Israeli lobby. Canada’s new closeness with Israel is not likely to have any long-lasting implications for Canada’s role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict; however, it has likely decreased Canadian influence in the Middle East and contributed to a broader Canadian-led cooling of relationships with the international community.
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1. Introduction

“Canada and Israel – best friends forever?” reads the headline from a 2013 article in the Times of Israel (Ahren). This idea that Canada and Israel are “best friends” and that the relationship between the two countries is close has been repeated multiple times in newspaper articles and by government leaders since the Conservative government led by Stephen Harper came to power in 2006:

“IIsrael has ‘no better friend in the world than Canada,’ John Baird says” (2012)

“IIsrael’s staunchest ally: Stephen Harper has transformed Canada’s Mideast policy” (Goldstein 2012)

“In Israel, Harper puts Canada’s ‘best friend’ status into practice.” (Clark 2014)

“‘Through fire and water, Canada will stand with you’: Harper gives historic first address to Israeli parliament.” (Ivison 2014)

Foreign Minister John Baird and Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s statements on the closeness of the relationship between Israel and Canada, as evidenced in the above newspaper titles, are not just words: under the current government, political support for Israel is a foreign policy priority. While never mentioned in a prior Speech from the Throne, defending Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state was the first foreign policy issue mentioned in the 2013 Throne Speech (Speech from the Throne 2013). As Roland Paris points out, the Throne Speech,

“…offers the best glimpse of the government’s policy intentions for the new session of Parliament. It provides a framework for ministers and their officials to follow in the months to come.

[…]

What message did it send about Canada’s foreign policy priorities to list this [the defence of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state] as the first issue?” (2013)
This question is central. Why would the Conservative government list Israel as its first foreign policy issue in the Throne Speech and not other high priority issues such as what he suggests: US-Canada relations, strengthening international law, or climate change (Paris 2013)?

Answering this question, discovering the reasons behind this strong support for Israel, and exploring the implications this will have on Canada’s future multilateral relationships, is the heart of this major research paper. My research questions for this paper are as follows:

1) What is Canada’s historical relationship with Israel, and has that relationship changed under the leadership of Stephen Harper?

2) What are the driving factors that have influenced this change in relationship between Canada and Israel?

3) What are the implications of this change in level of support for Israel for Canada’s role in the Israel-Palestine conflict, Canada’s relationships in the Middle East and more broadly, Canada’s relationship with the international community?

4) What research gaps exist on this topic of Canada-Israel foreign policy, and how has this impacted the completion of this major research paper?

First, this paper will start by situating the current relationship between Canada and Israel in its historical context, by tracing Canada’s relationship with Israel back to 1948.

Next, the current government’s relationship with Israel will be analysed. This section will examine the political and economic ties between the two countries, and will include an analysis of Canada’s voting patterns at the United Nations.

The third section of my paper will explore popular explanations for this current policy stance on Israel. Critics of the government’s policy have attributed the support for Israel to various factors, all of which will be examined: the Conservative government’s focus on tailoring
its foreign policy on Israel to its domestic support base (Joe Clark), ideological support for Israel (Mira Sucharov, Gerry Nicholls, Michael Taube), a belief in economic diplomacy (Colin Robertson), and the strength of the pro-Israeli lobby.

My paper will end with a discussion of the implications of this foreign policy direction for Canada’s relationships with Israel and Palestine, with the Middle East, and with the international community more broadly. This analysis will include exploring the failed Canadian bid for a seat on the Security Council in 2010, as well as the Qatari proposal in 2013 to relocate the International Civil Aviation Organization from Montreal to the Middle East, among other international rebukes.

I will conclude by noting that while under Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government Canada has become strongly supportive of Israel, it remains to be seen whether Canada’s stance will have long-term repercussions for any potential role it may have in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it has likely decreased Canadian influence in the Middle East, and contributed to a cooling of relationships with the international community that will impact Canadian multilateral relationships for years to come.

2. Methodology

This paper is a critical literature review, and uses the theoretical lens of liberalism to evaluate Canada’s relationship with Israel. Liberalism defines individuals and groups as the primary actors in the international system; the relationship between these actors and government are the factor that determines state behaviour (Slaughter 1995, 728). Liberalism argues that the outcome of state interactions is due to the “configuration and intensity of state preferences” (728). In contrast to other theories of international relations such as realism (which looks at concentrations
of state power measured in terms of military or economic power) or constructivism (which focuses on the construction of social context through examining identities and beliefs) (Slaughter 2011, 4-5), liberalism focuses on “the ways in which interdependence encourages and allows individuals and groups to exert different pressures on national governments” (Slaughter 1995, 724, 728). There is a theoretical overlap with realism (which assumes that states are the primary actor in an anarchical international system, who act in ways which maximize their power) (722) with the discussion of Canada as a “middle power”. With the addition of Edward Said’s concept of orientalism, post-colonial critical theory is also touched on (which is concerned with the construction of power and the State) (Slaughter 2011, 5). However, the primary lens of this paper is liberalism.

To this end, I have examined the strength of Canada’s relationship with Israel through the measurements of economic ties (trade agreements, exports/imports, strength of business communities, etc.) and political support (financial donations, number of visits by parliamentary officials, public expressions of support, action in multilateral forums, trends in voting patterns, etc.).

Sources used for this paper mostly include academic books, but also academic research articles on Canada’s historical relationship with Israel. It is important to point out that the existing literature on the history of relations between Canada and Israel is sparse (Bercuson, Kay, Hillmer, Ismael, Miller, Tauber, Husseini). It appears that there is a very clear divide in the existing literature between referring to Canada’s approach as being either “pro-Israeli” or “balanced and even-handed”. This is most likely due to two factors: one is the low number of academic publications on this topic; the other is the Israel-Palestine conflict. Without a large variety of academic sources, there is to date no common or agreed-upon narrative regarding the
Canada-Israel relationship. In addition, the two narratives prevalent within the literature are likely an extension of the larger conflict between Israel and Palestine, as those who are sympathetic to the Israeli side are more likely to characterize the relationship as neutral or balanced, while those with Palestinian sympathies likely view the Canadian-Israeli relationship as pro-Israeli. Until this field gains additional scholars to balance out the narratives involved, it will be difficult to confidently characterize Canada’s history with Israel as one or the other.

My research into Canada’s economic and political relationship uses governmental reports and data from official sources such as Statistics Canada, Export Canada, Parliament of Canada, and the Prime Minister’s Office. I have also used academic articles, newspaper articles, public polls, and government announcements in order to find evidence of policy changes, the details of events, the extent of public support, and analysis of these events. Furthermore, I made an effort to find analysis done by former public servants (ambassadors, diplomats, etc.). Since the conflict is a political topic, I remained skeptical of information from lobby groups and “pro-Israeli” or “pro-Palestinian” non-profit organizations. The amount of information specific to Canada’s relationship with Israel is limited: while there was plenty of analysis in newspaper articles on the relationship, the amount of academic literature on the topic was sparse, making it difficult to evaluate the differing claims made in the analysis in newspaper articles.

I have conducted archival research into Canada’s voting history at the United Nations through the electronic archives of the Security Council (1946 to present), the Commission on Human Rights¹, and the Human Rights Council (1993 to 2009) to determine the resolutions related to Israel that Canada has voted on. For each of these bodies, I manually read through the online database of resolutions for each year that Canada was a member of these committees and double-checked each resolution that related to the Middle East for relevancy to Israel. I then

¹ Electronic records for this United Nations body were only available from 1993 onward.
cross-referenced the resolutions found manually with those listed on the “Question of Palestine” United Nations website. Due to time constraints\(^2\), only a preliminary scan of United Nations General Assembly resolutions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict (as opposed to all resolutions related to Israel) were looked at, from 1946 to 1980.

Lastly, it is important to note that while this paper focuses on the relationship between Israel and Canada, the Israel-Palestine conflict impacts the economic, political, and social development of Israel, and therefore Canada’s relationship with Israel. As such, Canada’s role in the Israel-Palestine peace process has also been included where significant; however, information regarding Palestine and Palestinians has only been included as it relates to the peace process or to the development of Israel.

3. Canada’s Historic Position on Israel

i. The Creation of Israel

According to David Bercuson, the current Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, Canada played a crucial role in the selection and the securing of majority support for the partition plan that created Israel in the first place. In 1947, the Mackenzie King government sent Justice Ivan Rand to represent Canada at the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine. Due to Canada’s relationship with Britain, they were

\(^2\) Starting in the mid-1970s, an increase in the number of resolutions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict is visible. The number of resolutions related solely to the Israel-Palestine conflict went from, on average, 5 or fewer resolutions prior to 1973, to, on average, 13-15 resolutions per year by 1980. This does not include other resolutions related to Israel, such as resolutions on the Suez Canal crisis, the 1973 War, the 1982 War with Lebanon, among others. The amount of time required to conduct a thorough investigation of all of Canada’s voting related to Israel at the United Nations General Assembly is beyond the scope of this major research paper.
expected to follow British lead$^3$ and to even be slightly pro-Arab (Bercuson 1985, 239).

However, Rand and his assistant Leon Mayrand both believed in the importance of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, and their perceived neutrality as representatives of Canada enhanced the weight given to their arguments (Tauber 2002, 12). Rand’s advocacy was essential for the selection of partition by the committee; as Mayrand put it, he was, “by far the main contributor to the partition scheme with economic union” (Mayrand cable, cited Tauber 2002, 26). The Canadian Cabinet on the other hand, and especially Mackenzie King himself, took a more pragmatic response to Canada’s involvement in this plan. King did not want to get involved in the issue (26), as he strongly wanted to follow Britain’s lead (Canada-Israel Committee 1979, 16).

King was also in sharp contrast to his Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson. At the Ad Hoc Committee that followed UNSCOP, Pearson supported the idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East and was “forceful” in mediating between the British decision to withdraw from the mandate area and the lack of American willingness to take responsibility for any consequences of partition (Tauber 2002, 30). Without him, two-thirds majority would not have been obtained for the partition plan (Tauber 1998, 93).

While the Zionist lobby in Canada pushed for the government to recognize the state of Israel after it was established in May 1948, Canada only granted recognition in December 1948 after King was replaced in November that year by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. According to Elizabeth MacCallum, the Department of External Affairs Middle-East expert in 1948, this was a form of “compensation” for not supporting Israel’s admission to the United Nations at the Security Council in December 1948 (MacCallum in Tauber 2002, 118). At the time, Canada had

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$^3$ Britain originally wanted to maintain a trusteeship in Palestine, but as the area became more violent, Britain’s position changed to support any end to the Mandate that had the agreement of both Arabs and Jews (Bercuson 115)
abstained on the resolution, citing a lack of time to consider the consequences of approving the application (S/PV.386 1948). Instead, Canada had supported France’s resolution to postpone consideration of Israel’s application for admission to the United Nations for one month (S/PV.386). 1948 was also the year that Canada supported United Nations General Assembly resolution 194, which recognized the Palestinian right of return to their homes (Heinbecker 2011, 165).

The governmental approach to Israel following 1948 was guided by practical as well as ideological concerns. Practically, Israel was a reliable supporter of the West in the Middle East, and one of the region’s only stable democracies (Canada-Israeli Committee 1979, 32). Ideologically, as Pearson put it many years later in his memoirs: “I must admit that I became emotionally involved in a very special way” as a Christian who grew up learning about the importance of Jerusalem (Bercuson 1985, 233). Pearson never “wavered in [the] view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine,” and it is this emotional attachment that motivated successive Canadian governments to support Israel (239). An additional factor explaining Canada’s participation in the creation of Israel is the idea of Canada’s place as a middle power. Hassan Husseini (2008) argues that as a rising middle power, Canada invested in multilateral approaches in order to balance the power of the United States and check the Soviet influence internationally (42). Canada had not been directly affected by World War II and was in a good position after it ended in 1945 (43). The creation of the United Nations gave Canada new avenues to obtain influence, as it allowed Canada to maintain its North Atlantic relationships with Britain and the United States, build international institutions through which Canada’s “middle power” could be recognized, and contribute to creating post-war peace (43). In this way, Canada’s position on Palestine and Israel
can be seen as emblematic of power positioning between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as its response to strategic and ideological factors.

ii. 1948 to 1980

After 1948, Canada’s position on Israel changed from one where the Prime Minister wished to “move carefully” (Pearson in Tauber 2002, 118) to one which has been characterized by Bercuson and the Canada-Israel Committee as having balanced support for the existence and security of the Israeli state on the one hand with its efforts to maintain good relations with Arab states on the other (led by St. Laurent in 1948 and later Pearson in 1963) (Canada-Israel Committee 1979, 32; Bercuson 1985, 239). It took nearly a full decade before Israel and Canada exchanged fully-fledged resident ambassadors, and when it did, Canada, along with other countries, placed its embassy in Tel Aviv instead of Jerusalem\(^4\) (Kay 1996, 100-1). In the period following the creation of Israel, while both St. Laurent and Pearson were supportive of Israel, the Canadian government resisted the pressure from Israel to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem, and encouraged Israel to make a symbolic donation to the Palestinian refugees (26, 28).

As prime minister, Diefenbaker (1957-1963) was strongly supportive of Israel; however, his policies were virtually unchanged from those of his predecessor (108). Later, under Pearson’s leadership, the Suez Canal Crisis was an opportunity for Canada to flex its muscles as a mediator and to make a name for itself between the United States and the Soviet Union. Pearson also led the pack in the establishment of the first United Nations Emergency Force in 1956, which

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\(^4\) Under the original Partition Plan, Jerusalem was to be an international zone; however, the armistice lines following the 1948 Arab-Israel War cut the city in half as Israel captured West Jerusalem and Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the Old City ("Primer on Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict" n.d.). In the Six Days War (1967) Israel took East Jerusalem and the Old City, after which Israel encouraged states to transfer their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem so as to obtain recognition and legitimization of their annexation of Jerusalem (Flicker 2002, 117).
secured and supervised the ceasefire of hostilities, as well as monitored the withdrawal of French, Israeli, and British forces from Egypt. Kay argues that Canada’s first considerations in the crisis were its Western allies (again, strategic considerations are a focus for Canada as middle power), and then secondly Israel’s needs for security (2010, 105). Following the 1967 war, Canada supported UN Security Council resolution 242, which declared Israeli sovereignty over land acquired by force to be illegitimate and acknowledged the right of each state in the Middle East to live in peace within defined boundaries (Heinbecker 2011, 265).

Under Pierre Trudeau, Canada committed itself to supporting multilateralism and the United Nations; however, he was cautious to avoid taking sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This continued through to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp reiterated Israel’s “right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries” in 1973; however, for the first time in Canadian history, he also held meetings with various Middle East representatives to develop and maintain relations with the Arab countries (Miller 1991, 10). This expansion was due to the fact that under Trudeau’s leadership, Canada’s main priorities were how to extend its domestic interests abroad (10). This also explained Canada’s decision to participate in the second United Nations Emergency Force at the end of October 1973: as a means of building relationships with other countries, promoting Canada, and again, exerting itself as a middle power (10).

After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Canada shifted from supporting the United Nations and international liberalism to nationalism in its foreign policy as policymakers became increasingly skeptical about the role of peacekeepers in the resolution of international conflicts (11), after having gained firsthand experience in peacekeeping with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights in 1974. This time period also marks Canada’s shift to
discussing the Middle East situation outside of the UN, as Canada started to recognize the importance of the Palestinian issue as not only a refugee issue but a political problem for Israel and the Middle East (11). This shift is most likely in connection with the 1973-1974 oil embargo by Arab states, which caused Canada to disassociate itself from the American pro-Israeli Middle East policy (Hassan-Yari 2012, 316). This disassociation was not enough to overcome Canada’s interest in expanding its economic ties: in 1976, Israel and Canada explored bilateral economic cooperation through the creation of the Joint Economic Commission, and in 1977, Canada and Israel negotiated the Double Taxation Agreement in an effort to eliminate double taxation and to prevent tax evasion (“Canada-Israel Relations” 2012). In 1979, Prime Minister Joe Clark created waves when he proposed to relocate Canada’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This was met by a witheringly negative reaction from Arab leaders, which prompted the Clark government to review Canada’s relationship with the Middle East (Brynen 2007, 75). The review culminated in a report that remarked upon recognizing the significance of the Palestinian refugee issue, as Palestinians have “now emerged fully conscious of their identity and anxious to give that identity political expression” (75). This was the first recognition that a policy that gave more consideration to the Palestinians would be required, and led Canada to the belief that any proposed solution needed to provide a “territorial foundation for political self-expression of the Palestinian people, consistent with the principle of self-determination” (Miller 1991, 11).

iii. 1980 and Onward

The 1983 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a turning point for Canada as the Secretary for State Allan MacEachen publically spoke out against Israel: “Canada strongly opposes the Israeli invasion of Lebanon […] we continue to support Israel’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon” (15). While the Canadian public historically had been pro-Israel and
sympathetic to the plight of the Jews, this changed as the war highlighted the importance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the Middle East as well as the impact and reach of the first Palestinian intifada (Brynen 2007, 75). These two events were important as they sensitized the Canadian public to the rights of Palestinians (75). While this influenced the Canadian public, the government held back from changing its approach partly due to its support for Israel, and partly because there was concern about the message it would send to Quebec sovereignists by supporting Palestinian self-determination (75).

After this, Canada became increasingly involved with the Middle East as a whole. In 1986, Canada first defined its Middle East policy in an ambassadorial speech, where Clark, now Secretary of State for External Affairs under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, spoke of Canada’s support for the existence and security of Israel (and the need for the Palestinian Liberation Organization to acknowledge this right), a peace settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, and recognition of the rights of Palestinians (Joe Clark in Blanchette 1994, 17). He also talked about Canada’s initiatives (aid package for the West Bank), its support for moderation in the conflict, and he surprised Middle East governments by speaking in Israel about Canada’s commitment to a Palestinian home within a defined territory (Kirton & Lyon 200). Up until this point, while Canada had previously recognized Palestinian right of return in 1948, Canada had not recognized the principle of Palestinian “self-determination”, which was a point of embarrassment for Canadian diplomats who did not see this policy as being in Canadian best interests (Lyon 17). Following this speech, the government recognized Palestinian right to self-determinism in 1987 after years of only expressing support for a Palestinian “entity” or “homeland” (instead of a state) (Brynen 1989, 77). Recognition of these two points showed an important turning of Canada towards a more balanced approach to the conflict.
In 1991, Canada was assigned the job of chairing the Refugee Working Group, which complemented the efforts of Israelis and Palestinians to address the refugee issue (“Middle East Peace Process” 2013). Canada was assigned this responsibility due to its reputation for balance and non-partisanship in dealing with all parties, as well as due to its knowledge of refugees after years of refugee resettlement (Goldberg & Shames 2004, 208). In fact, Israel’s foreign minister, David Levy, stated that he would only agree to the creation of the Working Group if it were chaired by Canada (Robinson 2011, 699). The Canadian government participated in this project partly so they could show various niche constituencies that Canada was impartially supporting peace in the Middle East, as well as due to the prestige attached with “doing a favour” for its biggest ally and trading partner, the United States (702). Canada also became a member of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, both of which coordinated donor efforts, the first for the West Bank and Gaza, and the second for the Palestinian Authority (Brynen 1989, 76).

The Chrétien (1993-2003) government made economic expansion a priority. In 1993, they renewed the Joint Economic Commission and created the Canada-Israel Industrial Research & Development Foundation, with the aim of increasing collaboration between Israel and Canada through funding a portion of research and development costs for jointly-developed technology-based products and processes (Marr n.d., 1). Canada also initiated negotiations in 1997 with Israel for a free trade agreement (“A Short History of Canadian-Israeli Relations” 2012). These agreements were in line with the priorities at the time, which were to widen Canada’s network of free trade partners (Holroyd 2002, 89). They did not stop Chrétien from recalling his ambassador to Israel, David Berger, after finding out that Israeli intelligence officials used Canadian
passports to conduct an assassination attempt of a Hamas operative in Jordan (“A Short History of Canadian-Israeli Relations” 2012).

According to Brynen, it was under Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003-2006) that the government began to tilt back towards supporting Israel: the government voted against General Assembly resolutions that Canada had previously supported, considering them to be “unbalanced” or “excessively politicized” although there were few other countries that agreed with this assessment (1989, 78). A notable example comes from 2004, when Canada abstained on United Nations General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 that called for Israel to abide by the International Court of Justice’s opinion on the illegality of the constructed barrier (“the separation barrier”) that separates the West Bank from Israel (78). Out of the Western countries, only Australia and the United States (Israel’s traditional ally) voted against it (78). At the same time, Martin also took steps to increase the security of Israel through participating in the United States Security Coordinator Mission in 2005, which directs all facets of the American security sector assistance to the Palestinian Authority and synchronizes international supporting efforts (“United States Security…” n.d.).

In summary, looking at this past, Canada and Israel have had good relations through most of Israel’s short history. At the creation of Israel, Canadian leaders were motivated to support the new state out of sympathy, strategic considerations, and a feeling of connection with the Jews, who they perceived to be “modern” and “democratic” like them. Politically, Canada’s approach remained relatively sympathetic towards Israel until the 1970s, when the Palestinian cause started to gain attention and Canada became aware of the politics of the conflict. The 80s and 90s mark the most “fair-minded” period in Canada’s history towards Israel, followed by a tilt towards Israel again under Martin. In addition to Canada’s sympathy towards Israel, Canada’s
foreign policy with this country has also been motivated by domestic and strategic considerations. As a whole, Canada’s relationship with Israel has typically been an extension of a broader foreign policy strategy for engagement with the international community, with Canada’s sympathy for Israel playing a minor role. Barring Joe Clark’s proposal to move Canada’s embassy to Jerusalem, governmental leaders have publicly stayed relatively neutral in the conflict, and Canada’s relationship with Israel, barring Martin, has generally reflected that neutrality.

### 4. Historical Voting Patterns: 1948 to Present

This neutrality is reflected in Canada’s votes on Israel-related resolutions in multilateral fora.

| Table 1: Canada’s Voting Record on Resolutions Related to Israel at the Security Council, 1948 – 2000 |
|---|---|---|
| For | Against | Abstention |
| 1948 - 1949 (King & St. Laurent) | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| 1958 - 1959 (Diefenbaker) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1967 - 1968 (Pearson & Trudeau) | 13 | 0 | (Trudeau) 2 |
| 1977 - 1978 (Trudeau) | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 1989 - 1990 (Mulroney) | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| 1999 - 2000 (Chrétien) | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total** | **65** | **0** | **2** |
| **97%** | **0%** | **3%** |

Historically, Canada has supported every resolution related to Israel in its total of ten years sitting as a non-permanent member of the Security Council (see “Error! Reference source not found.” for resolutions discussed in this section), except for two resolutions in 1968. Many of these resolutions were passed unanimously; they were also neutral in that they called for a cessation of hostilities by both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or they struck or renewed the mandate of the United Nation Disengagement Observer Force or the UN Emergency Force. However, a few resolutions were one-sided: R256 (condemning military actions launched by Israel), R262 (condemning Israeli military action against Lebanon’s civil International Airport), and especially R242 (calling for Israeli...
withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war). The two resolutions that Canada abstained from, R252 (condemning Israeli actions and calling upon Israel to rescind measures) and R259 (dispatching a Special Representative to the Arab territories and to Israel to report on implementing a previous resolution asking Israel to ensure the safety of inhabitants in areas where military operations have taken place) were the only two resolutions where Canada (under Pierre Trudeau) followed the lead of the United States to abstain in the voting. Otherwise, while the United States voted for every resolution in the years examined, on the few occasions that the United States voted to abstain (R66 – 1948 – stabilizing the hostilities in Southern Palestine, R641 – 1989 – deploring the deportation of Palestinian civilians and calling for a return of inhabitants to occupied Palestinian territories, and R1322 – 2000 – supporting a peaceful conclusion to the Israel-Palestine conflict), Canada did not follow this lead. Interestingly, Canada also did not follow the lead of Britain either, notably when Britain abstained on resolution 42 (Security of Palestine) and 69 (Admitting Israel to membership in the United Nations) in 1948.

The voting on resolutions related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict at the General Assembly from 1946 – 1980 (see “Error! Reference source not found.” for resolutions discussed in this section) also show a change during Trudeau’s years as prime minister (1968-1984). Voting at the General Assembly prior to 1968 shows that Canada generally supported the status quo, as it supported almost all of the resolutions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, between 1968 and 1980, Canada voted against or abstained on more than half of these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 – 1967 (King, St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, Pearson)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 – 1980 (Trudeau)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The voting on resolutions related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict at the General Assembly from 1946 – 1980 (see “Error! Reference source not found.” for resolutions discussed in this section) also show a change during Trudeau’s years as prime minister (1968-1984). Voting at the General Assembly prior to 1968 shows that Canada generally supported the status quo, as it supported almost all of the resolutions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, between 1968 and 1980, Canada voted against or abstained on more than half of these...
resolutions. Over the course of Trudeau’s time in office, the Canadian voting pattern became more sympathetic and supportive of the Palestinians as a number of the “Against” votes are changed to “Abstention” or “For” during Trudeau’s later years in office. While I have not had the time to investigate the resolutions between 1980 – present day at the General Assembly, my expectation is that Canada’s voting pattern would likely show a pro-Israeli tilt in the early 1980s under the strongly pro-Israel government of Brian Mulroney that reverses in the late 1980s (as described by Kirton & Lyon 1985) so that Canada’s voting is in line with the defined position on the conflict as outlined by Joe Clark.

Table 3: Canada’s Voting Record on Resolutions Related to Israel at the Commission on Human Rights & Human Rights Council, 1993 – 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 – 2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 – 2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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Table 4: Canada Votes at the UN Human Rights Council & Commission on Human Rights, 1993 - 2009

Looking at Canada’s voting patterns at the Commission on Human Rights, and later the Human Rights Council, from 1993 and onward (see “Error! Reference source not found.” for resolutions discussed in this section), another clear trend emerges. Fairly consistently through the 1990s, Canada supported resolutions condemning Israeli settlement construction in the occupied Arab territories and the human rights situation in southern Lebanon, resolutions promoting the

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5 Kirton and Lyon write that by 1986, Canada’s voting pattern showed that the “marginal tilt towards Israel had […] evolved into a marginal tilt against it.”
Middle East peace process, as well as resolutions condemning the human rights situation in Southern Lebanon and West Bekaa. During this time, Canada also consistently abstained on resolutions focusing on the human rights situation of the occupied Syrian Golan and the occupied Arab territories, as well as resolutions on the overall situation in occupied Palestine. The general pattern here was almost entirely either to support or abstain from resolutions; with only one exception (1993/2), Canada rarely voted against human rights resolutions criticising Israel.

All of this is in line with Canada’s current written foreign policy stance on Israel: supporting a just and lasting peace process between Israel and Palestine, supporting Israel’s right to live in peace, supporting the Palestinian right to self-determination, condemning settlement construction in occupied land, and opposing biased resolutions that are political or polemic (“Canadian Policy on Key Issues…” 2014). The rhetoric by ambassadors during this time was also in line with the written Canadian policy on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: as stated by Ambassador Duval in an address to the General Assembly in 2001,

“Canada stresses the need for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, there is no way to resolve the dispute but through diplomatic channels. Violence must end, and negotiation must resume. Both Palestinians and Israelis continue to suffer, and both must take the necessary steps to end the suffering. Canada abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/56/L.22 [Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine] because the text does not sufficiently recognize the violence inflicted against civilians on both sides of the conflict. The horrific events of the past 48 hours demonstrate the tragic scale of civilian suffering. We urge the parties to take the necessary steps to end these senseless cycles of violence.” (General Assembly resolution 56/PV.72 2001)

Evident in Duval’s statement is the support for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a manner that is respectful of both parties. The comment about insufficiently
recognizing violence inflicted against both sides is most likely in response to the Palestinian intifada and provides the rationale for the policy position change in 2001, when Canada’s voting pattern started to change.

This change is evident: Canada abstained on the resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories in 2001 instead of its usual pattern of supporting it; the year after (2002) voted to support it again; and lastly, in 2005, switched to abstain from this resolution. In 2002, Canada voted against a resolution that condemned the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories by Israel, which is a change from Canada’s historical position to abstain from this resolution. A third change is Canada’s position on the situation in occupied Palestine: while historically abstaining from this resolution, Canada voted against it in 2002, and then in 2003 voted for it. In general, between 2001 and 2005, Canada’s voting related to Israel is inconsistent and incoherent. These changing in voting records could be due to


Table 5 – Note that the number of “For” votes in 1978 was 30
increased political pressure on Chrétien by Israel or pro-Israeli lobby groups as a result of the Palestinian intifada in 2000. It could also be related to a shift in foreign policy direction following the events of September 11.

However, it is in 2006 that a new change in the voting pattern is apparent: Canada voted against every single resolution related to Israel that it had previously abstained or voted for. This is obvious in Table 4 and Table 5, where the “Against” vote dominates after 2006 whereas “For” and “Abstention” dominate prior to 2000. The only resolutions that Canada supported between 2006 and 2009 were those supporting the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and a resolution in 2007 on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory.

The Canadian delegation explained this change in voting patterns in 2006 by stating in response to one of the resolutions (S-1/1) that Canada might have been able to “support the resolution had the text been more balanced”, and ended by calling “on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to fully respect international humanitarian law and principles… we cannot accept the Council focusing all of its criticism of Israel while ignoring that party’s legitimate security concerns” (Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights 2007). This voting pattern contradicts the declared Canadian policy to consider Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories to be a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as its historical position on these resolutions. Canadian officials have explained this voting by arguing that the resolutions are “one-sided, unbalanced, and do […] not address the complexities of the issues, nor seeks to address the true actions and responsibilities of all parties” (Foreign Affairs Media Relations Office 2011). The government also states that this new voting pattern reflects a frustration with the current UN process, and argues that the conflict is an issue that should not be dealt with at the
United Nations but should be resolved by the two parties instead (Foreign Affairs Media Relations Office 2011).

In summary, while Canada’s voting patterns have historically shown the Canadian leadership to be relatively balanced in their approach to resolutions on issues related to Israel within multilateral forums, a clear political bias towards Israel is evident in the voting of the Canadian government (under Stephen Harper) at the United Nations. This voting pattern is quite significant because voting against resolutions critical of Israel isolates Canada internationally; the only countries other than Israel that vote against these resolutions, with few exceptions, are the United States, Australia, and some American semi-independent colonies.

5. Current Governmental Position

Canada’s voting pattern at the United Nations shows that the Conservative government has a much more supportive stance towards Israel than previous governments. In addition to this tilt, it is also possible to see that the current Canadian government has taken steps to strengthen Canada’s political relationship with Israel outside of voting forums, and as well has encouraged Canada’s economic relationship with Israel.

i. Political Relationship

This change in voting at the United Nations is not surprising, given the rhetoric of the Canadian government that caters to domestic audiences. “Israel has no greater friend in the world today than Canada,” declared Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird in May 2012 (“Canada is Israel’s ‘Best Friend’” 2012). He stated this in front of an audience that included ambassadors and foreign ministers at the American Jewish Committee Global Forum; he went on to say that, “we make it clear that Israel’s right to exist is non-negotiable. We vote against one-sided and unfair
resolutions” (“Canada is Israel’s ‘Best Friend’ 2012). Such statements encapsulate the
driendlyness between the current government and Israel, as well as Canada’s approach to the
Israel-Palestine conflict.

This political relationship commenced in 2006 with Harper government’s unwavering
support for Israel during its campaign against Hezbollah over the course of the Israeli
intervention into Lebanon. In contrast to the international community’s request for moderation,
the Canadian government characterized Israel’s response to the Hezbollah as “measured” at the
G8 summits in St. Petersburg and used the summit and the subsequent gathering of the
Francophonie to actively block ceasefire resolutions that were increasingly supported, including
by the United States (Elmer 2010). In a similar way, the Harper government appeared to blame
the United Nations when the Israeli Defence Force killed a Canadian peacekeeper (Major Paeta
Hess von Krue dener) by bombing an unarmed United Nations observation post (Hein becker
2011, 202), even though the Canadian Forces board of inquiry into the killing found his death
was caused by the Israeli military (Pugliese 2012).

In January 2014, during Prime Minister Harper’s visit to Israel, he was given the honour
of being the first Canadian prime minister to ever address the Knesset (the Israeli parliament)
(“Canada and Israel Set Course for Stronger Bilateral Relations” 2014). This was Prime Minister
Harper’s first official delegation to Canada, and its size is indicative of the significance the
government placed on this trip. Not only was this Harper’s first visit, but it was also the first visit
by a Canadian prime minister to Israel since 20006 (“Canada and Israel Set Course for Stronger
Bilateral Relations” 2014).

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6 Jean Chretien’s 2000 visit to Israel was the first time a sitting Canadian prime minister had paid an official visit to
Israel (“Chretien arrives in Israel...” 2000).
This trip was pre-empted by a high number of visits by dignitaries between the two countries since 2006 where topics discussed range from trade, regional security (including concerns regarding Iran) and the peace process. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon visited Israel in 2009, and Minister of International Trade as well as Minister of Public Safety Peter Van Loan visited in 2010 and 2011. Treasury Board Minister Vic Toews and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (the Americas) Peter Kent travelled there in 2010. Minister of Defence Peter MacKay went in 2011 (“Canada-Israel Relations” 2012). Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and the late Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty have most recently visited Israel and the West Bank in January 2014 for a series of high-level meetings on the Middle East peace process, regional security, and economic cooperation (“Canada-Israel Relations” 2012).

These visits have in turn been reciprocated by Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Canada in May 2010, followed by Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour Shalom Simhon also in 2010. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made an appearance the following year (2011), and President Shimon Peres made a trip to Canada in 2012. During Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Ottawa in May 2013, he was as much of a tourist (visiting the CN tower) as he was a foreign dignitary (speaking at the annual Walk with Israel event in Toronto) (“Israeli Prime Minister due in Ottawa…” 2010).

In addition to this increasing amount of personal interaction between the leadership of both countries, the Harper government has gone a step further in signing defence pacts with Israel. This includes the 2008 Declaration of Intent on public safety, Principal Memorandum of Understanding (2011), and the 2014 Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership Memorandum of Understanding (“Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership – Memorandum…” 2014). The 2008 Declaration was the first agreement ever between Israel and Canada on cooperation on public
safety issues, and it paved the way for the non-binding Principal Memorandum of Understanding, which laid the cornerstone for defence cooperation between the two countries in the areas of counter-terrorism; training; search and rescue; intelligence; command, and control, and the sharing of new technologies (“Minister Nicholson welcomes…” 2011). The Strategic Partnership Memorandum built on the previous two memorandums to facilitate stronger cooperation in the energy, security, business, and academic sector (“Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership MOU” 2014). These security agreements strengthen the defence and security cooperation between Israel and Canada substantially and represent a significant investment in bringing the two countries closer together.

The emphasis on developing a closer relationship between Israel and Canada is also reflected in the policy priorities of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (“the Department”), in particular in the Reports on Plans and Priorities (RPPs) and the Departmental Performance Reports (DPRs). Supporting Israel’s “right to security” became a yearly priority in the RPPs starting in 2011 (2011, 20; 2012, 14; 2013, 14; 2014, 18). Canada’s political position on Israel strengthened when the language changed, first in 2013–2014 to “supporting Israel’s right to exist” (emphasis added), and then in 2014–2015 to “defending Israel’s right to exist” (emphasis added) (2013, 14; 2014, 18). This change highlights a closer relationship between Canada and Israel in which Canada is prepared to not only support Israel, but also to do so against those who disagree with Israel’s position.

While the DPRs show that the work of the Department reflects a more neutral support for traditional Canadian positions on the Middle East peace process, it should be noted that they only...

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7 The RPPs give an overview of the departmental goals for the year, and they go back to 2006–2007 on the Department’s website.
8 The DPRs report on progress achieved in meeting that year’s goals as outlined in that year’s RPP, and they go back to 2006-2007 on the Department’s website.
go up to 2012-2013, the year before the language change became evident in the RPPs\textsuperscript{9}. That being said, there are instances where unilateral support for Israel comes through in the choice of wording: in the 2008-2009 DPR, Canada “supported Middle East resolutions that foster peace and do not single out Israel” (2009, 10); in 2010-2011, Canada “maintained strong support for the State of Israel” while supporting a two-state solution (2011, 21); and, in 2012-2013, Canada supported a two-state solution “negotiated directly between the two parties”\textsuperscript{10} (2013, 22). The acknowledgement of Israel’s right to security and the opposition to one-sided resolutions is a traditional Canadian foreign policy position (“Canadian Policy on Key Issues…” 2014); however, as seen in the previous section on Historical Voting Patterns, the current government has used the argument of bias to vote against resolutions that have had longstanding Canadian support or abstention. Therefore, this emphasis on neutral resolutions is an example of the way the current government has subtly influenced the operations of the Department so that they reflect a greater level of support for Israel.

The last noteworthy point of discussion in regards to these documents is as follows: in every DPR and RPP since 2006, any reference to the Middle East peace process has also included an implicit or explicit reference to the two-state solution. However, the term was removed in the 2014-2015 RPP (2014, 18). As this change is in contrast to Canada’s written foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict that establishes support for the two-state solution, it is problematic that the reference to the two-state solution was dropped and it may signal a greater shift away

\textsuperscript{9} It will be interesting to see whether this shift continues within the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 DPR.

\textsuperscript{10} This is a reference to the Canadian government’s criticism that the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations in 2011 was “unilateral” and therefore not conducive to peace (“Canada rejects Palestinian statehood bid at UN” 2011). The bid was a campaign launched by the Palestinian Authority in 2011 to upgrade the status of the Palestinian Authority from “permanent observer” status to a full member-state (“Q&A: Palestinians’ upgraded UN status” 2012). After their request failed at the Security Council, their request for non-member observer status was approved by the General Assembly (“Q&A: Palestinians’ upgraded UN status” 2012).
from traditional Canadian foreign policy priorities within the Israel-Palestine conflict than has been exhibited to date.

    Given the relationship between the Israeli and the Canadian leadership, the strengthening of defence cooperation, the increase in pro-Israeli rhetoric, and the change in foreign policy priorities within the RPP and DPR, it is not surprising that the government has taken unprecedented steps in support of Israel. Canada was the first government to label Hamas as a terrorist organization in 2006, and the first government to withdraw aid from the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority when the party was voted in as the ruling power in 2006 (Brynen 2007, 78). At the time, Foreign Minister Peter McKay announced that “until such time as we see a change in position from the Hamas government and the Palestinian Authority, there will be no direct contact, and there will certainly be no aid flowing through that government” (CTV “Canada cuts relations with Palestinian Authority” in Kirton 2013, 17). The Canadian government also put on hold a $50 million aid package for Palestine assembled by the former Liberal government under Paul Martin in response to a G8 commitment in 2005 (17). Officially, this reaction was due to the fact that the Hamas-led government did not address the concerns raised regarding non-violence, the recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap for Peace (General Assembly resolution 61/PV.80 2006). However, the government also clearly stated that it would “continue to support and respond to the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people” (General Assembly resolution 61/PV.80 2006). The Canadian government also boycotted the 2009 human rights conference in South Africa because of concerns of how Israel would be treated (Heinbecker 2011, 201).

    Additionally, it is important to note that Canada is at times more politically supportive of Israel than the United States, Israel’s staunchest ally. At the United Nations, Canada’s voting on
Israel frequently isolates it from other countries except for the United States – but Canada has gone beyond the United States in supporting Israel. Don Shapiro, US ambassador to Israel, condemned Israel for settlement construction during peace negotiations (Times of Israel Staff 2014), and John Kerry has come out in criticizing the Israeli government for their handling of the peace talks and stated that if the peace talks do not succeed, Israel may become an “apartheid state” (“Kerry: Israel risks becoming apartheid state” 2014). These are strong statements in contrast to the statements of the Canadian government. In the most recent military strike on Gaza (2014), the Conservative Party of Canada put out a video illustrating Canada’s unconditional support for Israel (“Through Fire and Water” 2014), whereas the United States government expressed support for Israel’s right to defend itself and alarm over Israel’s response (“Obama’s Statement on Israel” 2014). Furthermore, the Harper government has stayed silent on the years-long blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel, while both Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama called the blockade unsustainable and unacceptable (Heinbecker 2011, 204). In this sense, Canada is not following the United States; in these situations, Canada is leading the United States in expressing political support for Israel.

These moves show a marked contrast to Canada’s past, and even to the actions of the Martin government. Canada has always been characterized as “status quo” in its commitment to the preservation of the current order (Roussel 2012, 136). While Canada has historically been sympathetic towards Israel, it has never been so pro-Israeli that it has led the international community in responding to events in Israel and Palestine, or so pro-Israeli that it isolates itself from the rest of the international community through its votes on Israel. And while the Martin government showed a shift in its voting pattern at the United Nations in Israel’s favour, Stephen Harper has taken that support to unparalleled levels.
ii. Economic Relationship

In addition to the close political relationship, Canada and Israel are also becoming closer economically. While Israel is not one of Canada’s top ten trading partners – in fact, Israel was Canada’s 44th trade partner in 2013 in terms of merchandise exports (“Canada’s Merchandise Exports” 2014) – Israel is Canada’s fourth-largest merchandise export market in the Middle East and North Africa. What is more, Canada’s exports to the Middle East & North Africa as a region have been increasing: the nominal value of trade to the Middle East & North Africa region has more than doubled from $2.2 billion in 2002 to $4.8 billion in 2011 (“Canada’s State of Trade…” 2012, 67).

In 2011, bilateral merchandise trade between Canada and Israel was valued at $1.38 billion. Canada mainly imports pharmaceutical products, electrical machinery, precious metals and stones, machinery and medical instruments from Israel, while Israel receives precious metals and stones, electrical machinery, sulphurs, paper and paper products, and medical instruments from Canada in turn. Furthermore, there is a small but growing business community between Israel and Canada: there are 198 Canadian companies that Export Development Canada supports in Israel, and 354 international buyers insured (“Israel: Country at a Glance” n.d.). The total business volume of Canadian companies in Israel is $275.22 million CAD (“Israel: Country at a Glance” n.d.).

This merchandise trade has accelerated under the Harper government. Following the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement by Chrétien in 1997, it was expanded in April 2013 when the Canadian government negotiated a more modernized free trade agreement which eliminated tariffs on industrial products and some agricultural and fisheries products. This agreement promoted academic, security, and business partnerships (“Israeli premier…” 2013),
and it is the third bilateral free trade agreement to be signed by Canada after the North American Free Trade Agreement and a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile (signed in the same year as the one with Israel) (Kirton 2013, 44).

This free trade agreement precipitated an almost-doubling of Canada’s goods merchandise imports and exports with Israel:

Table 6: 1995 - 2013 Trade: Canada - Israel Imports and Exports in Constant 2002 Dollars, Weighted for Appreciation in Currency

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Table 7: 1995 - 2013 Trade: Canada - Israel Imports and Exports in Constant 2002 Dollars, Weighted for Appreciation in Currency

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Starting in 1995 and accelerated by the free trade agreement signed with Israel in 1997, Canada’s imports from Israel have grown from just under $300 million to the current plateau of just under $1.0 billion (245% increase). Interestingly, this trade relationship is mostly an increase in imports to Canada, as exports have stagnated around $300 million. As the graph shows, there has been some deviation in this increase: exports and imports took a hit in 2001/2002 when Canada was impacted by the collapse of the telecommunications equipment industry (Dion et al. 2005, 7). This decline also coincides with, and can likely be attributed in part to, the second Palestinian intifada (2000 – 2005). Imports showed the sharpest growth rate between 2007 and 2008, Stephen Harper’s second year in office, right before the recession impacted Canada (5). Not surprisingly, given the recession, imports grew more between 1995 and 2006 (175%) than they did between 2006 and 2013 (26%); however, it is surprising that imports to Israel have been positive since 2009. Exports show a similar trend: more growth prior to 2006 (59%) than after 2006 (-32%). Considering that Canada made Israel a priority market as it is perceived to have potential for broad Canadian commercial interests, it is intriguing to note the lack of growth in
exports under the Conservative government. However, Canadian investment in Israel was pegged at $258 million in 2007, whereas Israeli investment in Canada was $878 million in 2007, so the relationship is more complex than can be described through imports and exports alone ("Global Markets Action Plan" 2013, 28).

This increase in economic relations from 1988 to 2013 is within the broader context of an increase in economic integration with the global community as a whole: Canada has become more intertwined with other countries economically over the past three decades. Canada’s merchandise exports have increased by $51.3 billion between 2002 and 2011 ("Canada’s State of Trade…” 2012, 66). Stephen Harper has made economic diplomacy, or diplomacy that ensures that “all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada are harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors in key foreign markets” ("Global Markets Action Plan"), central to his foreign policy in 2013. This focus on economic diplomacy has led to an expansion in bilateral trade agreements, including the Arrangement for Industrial Security Protection between the Israeli Ministry of Defence and Public Works and Government Services Canada ("Canada-Israel Relations” 2012), the Memorandum of Understanding on International Development Cooperation ("Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership – Memorandum…” 2014), and the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (2012) ("Canada and Israel sign…” 2012)). These agreements (along with the expansion of the Free Trade Agreement, as previously mentioned) are a significant step in enhancing the economic relationship of and bilateral trade between Israel and Canada.

In addition to formal agreements, there are also four initiatives that support increased economic ties between Israel and Canada:
1) The Canada-Israel Industrial Research and Development Foundation (CIIRDF) has contributed to more than 150 collaborated projects since its creation in 1993, and between 2004 and 2009, the CIIRDF helped more than 300 companies explore business-research partnerships (“Canada-Israel Diplomatic Relations…” 2009, 13). According to each year’s respective Departmental Performance Report from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development, in recent years, the foundation has handled the initiation of an increasing number of projects: from six projects totaling $1 million in 2007-2008, to eight projects valued over $2 million in 2008-2009, to four projects worth a total of $4.5 million in 2010-2011 (“Departmental Performance Report” 2007-2008, 49; 2008-2009, 32; 2010-2011, 22).

2) The foundation manages the new $5 million Canada-Israel Energy Science and Technology Fund (2012-2015) that spurs the “development of innovative energy technologies and processes that enable the responsible development of […] resources” (“Israeli premier…” 2013). Interestingly, Canada had previously rejected Israeli proposals to create this fund in the late 1980s (Kirton & Lyon 1989, 198).

3) The Canada-Israel Technology Innovation Summits (2010, 2011) promoted partnerships in renewable energy, water, and neuroscience by providing project seed funding (Marr n.d., 1).

4) The Harper government announced a $5 million allocation for a Canada-Israel Technology Innovation Partnership in 2011, which is expected to generate $20 to $40 million in collaborative research and development (“Canada-Israel Energy Science…” n.d.)
These agreements actively promote economic development within both countries by building capacity for joint ventures in relations to security and research and development.

While Canada’s trend for increased economic ties with Israel was started under Chrétien and Martin, Stephen Harper has accelerated those economic ties by expanding an existing free trade agreement, investing in new economic Memorandums, and especially by funding joint research and development. While the trade relationship has seen less growth under the Harper government, this is more likely to do with the reduction in global trade (especially during the recession) than with a lack of effort on the part of Canada. These specific Israeli-Canadian initiatives show a distinct commitment by both countries to become increasingly economically connected, especially given the context of increased global economic integration.

6. Underlying Motivations

Fundamentally, this shift to being supportive of Israel, as well as cultivating closer economic and political ties with Israel, is part of a broader change of being less engaged in multilateral engagements internationally. Historically, Canada has been seen as a “model UN citizen” in that it has almost automatically been elected to any position in the UN that it has attempted to obtain (Williams 2010). Williams suggests that this is due to its “demonstrably principled international positions” and names the examples of how Canada has previously taken a different route than the United States in establishing relations with China; maintaining trade, travel, and diplomatic links with Cuba; supporting international tribunals and the International Criminal Court; and its creation and support for the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. However, according to Joe Clark, Stephen Harper has changed this focus by “aggressively narrow[ing]” foreign policy to
trade and military initiatives while “muzzling” diplomatic and development capacity (in Siddiqui 2013).

In recent years, the government has modified this stance somewhat to re-emphasize the importance of aid and Canada’s connection to Africa (Williams 2010). Regardless, the government has had little regard for international organizations and multilateralism, to such an extent that a criticism has been leveled in the media that the Harper government almost did not notice that there was a vacancy coming up in the Security Council in 2010 and that they were not prepared for the amount of effort it would take to obtain the seat (Williams 2010). In addition, the Conservative government is paying little attention to foreign policy in general, as evidenced by a $170-million cut from a $1.4 billion operating budget of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the closing of at least four trade consulates in the United States (out of twenty-one) and seven of the eighteen international trade offices in Canadian cities (Weston 2012). This low level of engagement and funding cuts explain and point to Canada’s shift in international politics in general; however, they play only a partial role in explaining Canada’s support for Israel.

i. Harper’s Personal Conviction

Stephen Harper himself identifies as being pro-Israeli. Gerry Nicholls, a colleague of Harper’s while Harper worked at the National Citizens Coalition (a conservative think-tank), stated that, “In our conversations, he’d say ‘Gerry, I’m very pro-Israel’… He was always saying that Canada needs to do more to support Israel, they’re an important ally… he looks at them as being people who uphold Western values.” (Gollom 2012).

Michael Taube, a Washington Times columnist and former speechwriter for Prime Minister Harper, agrees with Nicholls’ assessment. He writes that:
“Harper strongly supports liberal-democratic societies. He believes in greater individual rights and freedoms. He promotes a nation’s right to defend its own borders. He values intellectual discourse and freedom of speech. He has a great passion for history. He condemns hatred and religious persecution of adherents of any faith. He is firmly committed to wiping out terrorism from the face of the Earth. In short, Harper’s personal beliefs are remarkably similar to Israel’s beliefs. Hence, Harper’s position on Israel is based on principle.” (Taube 2014)

The portrait that is drawn by these two men is of an individual who believes strongly in religious and individual freedom, who condemns violence and cowardice, and who stands up against persecution.

This thread of strong moral conviction can be seen in the speeches given by Prime Minister Harper. In his address on Parliament Hill to a gathering of parliamentarians and experts attending a conference on combating anti-Semitism:

“We must be relentless in exposing this new anti-Semitism for what it is. Of course, like any country, Israel may be subjected to fair criticism. And like any free country, Israel subjects itself to such criticism – healthy, necessary, democratic debate. But when Israel, the only country in the world whose very existence is under attack – is consistently and conspicuously singled out for condemnation, I believe we are morally obligated to take a stand. Demonization, double standards, delegitimization, the 3 D’s, it is a responsibility, to stand up to them.

And I know, by the way, because I have the bruises to show for it, that whether it is at the United Nations, or any other international forum, the easy thing to do is simply to just get along and go along with this anti-Israeli rhetoric, to pretend it is just being even-handed, and to excuse oneself with the label of “honest broker.” There are, after all, a lot more votes, a lot more, in being anti-Israeli than in taking a stand. But, as long as I am Prime Minister, whether it is at the UN or the Francophonie or anywhere else, Canada will take that stand, whatever the cost. Not just because it is the right thing to do, but because history shows us, and the ideology of the anti-
Israeli mob tells us all too well, that those who threaten the existence of the Jewish people are, in the longer term, a threat to all of us.[…]

As I said on the 60th anniversary of its founding, the State of Israel appeared as a light, in a world emerging from deep darkness. Against all odds, that light has not been extinguished. It burns bright, upheld by the universal principles of all civilized nations – freedom, democracy, justice.

By working together more closely in the family of civilized nations, we affirm and strengthen those principles. And we declare our faith in humanity’s future, in the power of good over evil.” (National Post Staff 2010)

All of the subjects referenced above come out in this speech: support for freedom of speech, standing up for a civilized nation that is demonized, taking action against persecution. His admiration for Western modern states – “freedom, democracy, justice” – is evident, as is his support for freedom of speech – his reference to the necessity of being subjected to fair criticism. The point about the rise of “new anti-Semitism” is also a repeated theme, as he spoke about it at the Knesset during his visit to Israel in early 2014.

For his beliefs and his action, Harper has personally received support in Israel. As mentioned previously, he was the first Canadian prime minister to ever address the Knesset. He received an honorary doctorate from the Tel Aviv University (Taube 2014). The Hula Valley bird sanctuary that he visited while in Israel in 2014 will be renamed the “Stephen J. Harper Hula Valley Bird Sanctuary Visitor and Education Centre” (Taube 2014). Harper has been called a “personal friend” and a great leader by Netanyahu (Campion-Smith 2014).

In this way, Harper can be seen as an individual who has a strong personal relationship with Israel – with its leader, its morals, and its ideology – and in turn, he is supported by many Israelis and their leaders. Harper identifies with the struggles of Israel, and in turn he feels as if it
is his moral responsibility to speak out – not just because it is morally right, but because to not speak out could, in his eyes, lead to much worse action taken against the Jews and the Jewish state. This personal conviction and support for Israel may explain why the Harper government was receptive to the idea of such strong statements in support of Israel. And considering the power of the prime minister in the Canadian political system, a pro-Israeli prime minister can influence Canadian foreign policy in many ways, both subtle and overt.

ii. Government Ideology

It is not just Stephen Harper that exhibits evidence of being pro-Israeli, but other members of his Cabinet do as well. Junior Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Kent stated in 2010 that an “attack on Israel is an attack on Canada” (Chase 2010). He most likely felt comfortable making this statement as Harper said something similar in 2008; in 2011, this rhetoric was repeated by Defence Minister MacKay to Israel’s top military commander, Maj. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, when he said that a “threat to Israel is a threat to Canada” (Brewster 2012). While based on the non-binding defence pacts signed between Israel and Canada, this type of unqualified rhetoric is in line with Mira Sucharov’s belief that the Conservatives’ support for Israel is based on a belief in the “rightness” of Israel’s mission (Raj 2014). Indeed, Foreign Minister John Baird has stated in Canada’s address to the UN General Assembly in September 2011 that “too often Israel is on the frontlines of our struggle and its people the victims of terror. Canada will not accept or stay silent while the Jewish state is attacked for defending its territory and its citizens.” (“AJC Applauds Canadian Foreign Minister…” 2011)

11 “Our government believes that those who threaten Israel also threaten Canada, because, as the last war showed, hate-fuelled bigotry against some is ultimately a threat to us all, and must be resisted wherever it may lurk… In this ongoing battle, Canada stands firmly side-by-side with the State of Israel, our friend and ally in the democratic family of nations.” (Bloomfield & Nossal 2013, 153)
The use of the term “Jewish state” by Baird is interesting, as other than references by governmental leaders to Israel as a “Jewish state”, no country has formally recognized Israel as a “Jewish” state. In fact, Israel is still waiting on recognition from a number of different countries including most of the Middle East (Qatar, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, among others) and parts of Africa (Niger, Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, Oman among others) (“Israel’s Diplomatic Missions Abroad: Status of relations” n.d.). Palestinians argue that recognizing Israel as a “Jewish state” relegates its Arab and non-Jewish citizens to a second-class status and that it is unnecessary as Palestinians already recognized Israel’s right to exist in 1993 (Becker 2011, 10). However, Israelis argue that Jews need a homeland where they can be safe from anti-Semitism; Israeli leaders have started to invoke more frequently a “securitist orientation”, which rests on the idea that “the Jewish state is involved in a battle for survival with its Arab neighbours, and that a major military defeat would mean [Israel’s] annihilation” (Kimmerling, quoted in Marzano 2013, 108). The claim that Israel is a “Jewish” state comes from political Zionism, and is part of the Israeli political narrative on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bar-Tel & Salomon 2006, 26). By recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, John Baird and Stephen Harper are not only supportive of Israel but are explicitly taking a side in the conflict, as well as playing a role in normalizing Israeli political discourse within Canada.

Canada’s support for Israel is situated within the broader ideological context of economic conservatism. Colin Robertson, a former Canadian diplomat, believes that Harper’s goal is to position Canada as a rising power, instead of its historical position as a middle power, through making economic conservatism central to Canadian foreign policy (Robertson 2013). He defines this belief system as seeing the role of government as essential for enabling the market to create growth (so as to produce the greatest economic benefit for the most people), and according to
Robertson, Harper conceptualizes Canada as an “energy superpower” and wants Canada’s bilateral relations and economic-related multilateral forums to be used to gain economic advantages (Robertson 2013). Examples of this policy shift include targeting Canada’s foreign aid to be more “effective” in Latin American countries as opposed to African countries, and merging the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade so as to make development complement and support foreign policy (Robertson 2013). Robertson points out further that economic conservatism blinds the current government to the political realities of the necessity of pragmatism in international politics and positive political multilateral relationships (Robertson 2013). And indeed, Baird’s own words support Robertson’s idea that the Conservative leadership is “blindly” supporting ideology over pragmatic foreign policy when he stated that the Canadian government “rejects the concept of moral relativism in international relations” (“Canada is Israel’s ‘Best Friend’” 2012).

Furthermore, Canada’s position has been so “pro-Israeli” that it has gone against Israel’s wishes. For example, Israel actively lobbied against Canada’s threat to cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority after it launched a campaign to upgrade its status in the General Assembly in 2012 because of its potential for destabilizing the Palestinian Territories and the Palestinian Authority (Berthiaume 2013 “Israel urged Canadian government…”). If the underlying sentiment of this pro-Israeli ideology is to support Israel, then Canada’s reaction to the Palestinian bid for statehood comes off as a knee-jerk and blind response. This is not Canada’s only “knee-jerk” response; a second example comes in the form of Canada’s funding cut to the Palestinian Authority after the election of Hamas in 2006. A third example is when the Canadian government redirected $15 million in annual support away from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 2010, the Israeli
government lobbied against this as well even as some of the pro-Israeli lobbies in Canada supported it (Berthiaume 2013 “Israel urged Canadian government…”; Centre for Israel & Jewish Affairs 2010 “Canada Reallocates Funding…”; “Statistical Report on International Assistance 2010-2011” 2011). The Canadian government followed this reduction in 2011-2012 by giving no aid at all to UNRWA (“Statistical Report on International Assistance 2011-2012” 2012). These responses to the Palestinians are extreme, and they are also fundamentally irrational as they are against the interest of Israel itself. This shows a disconnect between the beliefs of the Conservative government and the needs of the Israeli government. While ideological blindness explains the initial reaction of the government to the bid for statehood and the election of Hamas, it does not explain Canada’s reduction in funding to UNRWA, as UNRWA’s role is apolitical in its mandate to provide human development and humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees (“Who We Are” n.d.).

iii. Appeal to Party Base

This strong support for Israel and this disconnect between the ideology of the Conservative government and the position of the Israeli government could also be explained as an appeal to the Conservative party base. Joe Clark argues that the Conservatives’ support for Israel is an attempt to pander to one specific diaspora:

“While all governments in the past have been aware of the sensitivities of several diasporas in Canada, they usually considered that in the context of broader Canadian foreign policy. But now it’s a more determining factor in the architecture of our foreign policy.” (Clark in Siddiqui 2013)

12 Note that the Statistical Report on International Assistance 2012-2013 documents $15 million in bilateral funding to UNRWA (2013, 22). Because these reports cover the fiscal year rather than the calendar year, this can likely be interpreted to mean that funding was reduced to $15 million in the 2010 and 2011 calendar years, and cut completely in the 2012 calendar year.
Indeed, the Conservative Party of Canada does contain a religious wing: an Ipsos Reid exit poll from the 2011 election shows that Conservatives did the best among Protestant voters (55%), and those who frequently attend a church or temple (50%) (Todd 2011). Furthermore, 52% of Canada’s Jews voted Conservative in the past election, while only 12% of Muslims voted Conservative (Todd 2011). In comparison, the New Democratic Party only received support from one in four Canadians who are the most religiously devout, while Liberals attracted 18%. Liberals also obtained 24% of the Jewish vote, with the New Democratic Party receiving 16% (Todd 2011). Out of these religious communities come the Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians, who are more likely than other Christian groups to support Zionism (Merkley 2012). This means that not only does the Conservative party receive support from the religious right-wing communities, but it also contains a higher proportion of those communities that believe the unification of Israel is an essential precondition for Christ’s return (“Israeli Prime Minister due in Ottawa…” 2010). In fact, an Environics Institute report from 2010 shows that while few Canadians believe that the Conservative stance is not supportive enough of Israel, those who do believe that are mainly non-mainline Christians and non-Christians (Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs) (37). This indicates that the Conservatives are under pressure from some in their support base to constantly become more strongly pro-Israeli.

Harper’s trip to Israel in January 2014 does show these close ties with pro-Israeli religious groups: with him went 208 Canadians representing diverse businesses, Jewish organizations and community groups, plus an official delegation of 30 MPs, senators, officials, and family (Carter in Do 2014). The delegation did not include any mainline Protestant leaders, but it did include ten influential evangelical Protestant pastors and leaders, as well as one evangelical Roman Catholic clergyman and 21 rabbis (Todd 2014). There were no Muslims,
Buddhists, Hindus, or Sikhs (Todd 2014). This delegation was unrepresentative of the religious makeup of Canadians, as more than 60% of Canadians are either mainline Protestant or Catholic while about 10% of the population are evangelical and about 1% are Jewish (Todd 2014). Considering that the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem is the third holiest site in Islam (Tucker & Roberts 2008, 70), the lack of Muslim invitees is an indication that the groups that were invited to visit Israel were chosen according to political considerations rather than religious connections. As such, the composition of this group can likely be considered to reflect the religious groups from which Harper receives his political support within the Conservative party.

These ties are also shown at the grassroots level within the Conservative Party: at the 2013 Conservative Party convention for example, one proposal stated that the Government of Canada “must continue to defend the democratic countries of the Middle East and the right of Israel to exist” (Dickin 2013). Grassroots motions like this clear the way for Harper to be supportive of Israel without worrying about a backlash from the party base.

These ties between pro-Israeli supporters and the Canadian government also explain part of the “irrational” aspect previously identified in the government’s support for Israel. Pro-Israeli Jews and Christians outside of Israel are less likely to be familiar with the nuances of the Israel-Palestine conflict than those living in the Middle East, and are more likely to misunderstand actions such as cutting funding to UNRWA and to the Palestinian Authority as being in Israel’s best interest.

However, Mira Sucharov argues that the Conservatives’ support for Israel is not due to partisanship or an attempt to sway voters. She points out that the Jewish community in Canada is much smaller than other communities that would have a “natural allegiance” to the Palestinian cause (Raj 2014). There are approximately 20,000 Canadians living in Israel, as well as
approximately 330,000 Jews in Canada (“Canada-Israel Relations” 2012) (as of the 2001 Census, “Population by religion…” 2001). Furthermore, about 107,000 Canadians are evangelical (“2011 National Household Survey: Data tables…” 2011), which has historically been a strong base of support for Israel (Brog 2014 n.p.). In contrast to this potentially pro-Israel group, there are approximately 276,000 Arabs and over one million Muslims in Canada (Statistics Canada 2006). This data seems to support Sucharov’s claim that the potential community of those who do not support Israel outnumber those who are potential supporters of Israel. She argues further that there are only a few seats in Toronto and Montreal where the Jewish vote is concentrated that the Conservatives could potentially lose based on their stance on Israel; moreover, they could hurt their electoral chances with the larger but dispersed Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim communities (Raj 2014).

However, these counterpoints are unconvincing. As already stated, the Muslim community (and likely the Palestinian and Arab communities as well) makes up a small percentage of the Conservative party vote in comparison to the Jewish and religious Christian vote, so it makes little sense that the Conservative party would worry about the Muslim or Arab vote when doing so would alienate their traditional supporter base. Furthermore, Muslims do not vote monolithically on the topic of Israel; first, neither political support for Israel nor Palestine is inherent to Islam, and second, as Muslims come from a variety of different countries and cultures, many do not have a personal connection to the conflict13. Discounting most of the Muslim population from the potential supporters of Palestinians means that the Jewish community alone outweighs the Arab population in Canada, which means that a pro-Israeli

13 Addressed in Section 6 “Pro-Israeli Lobby” is the idea that Jews are more cohesive as a voting group than Muslims. Considering that in a poll across 14 Arab countries, Arabs predominantly named Israel as a threat to “Arab national security” (73%), Arabs are also likely to vote cohesively on the Israel-Palestine conflict (“The ACRPS Announces the Results…” 2013),
stance will likely not lose the party an election. It is also worth pointing out that Harper has successfully led his party for the duration of his mandate with a pro-Israeli stance. Lastly, if his stance had not appealed or been connected to his party base in some way, it is unlikely that he would have been able to maintain his strong support for Israel as the leader of the party. Therefore, it is likely that strategic party considerations do play a role in the government’s support for Israel.

iv. Public Opinion

It is not only Conservative voters that support Harper, but public polling has showed that almost half of Canadians surveyed (48%) in 2012 believe that the federal government’s policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “strikes the right balance”, which contrasts with 23% who believe it is “too pro-Israel” and 3% who say the policy is “too pro-Palestinian” (Martin 2012). However, a second poll showed that Canadians also want a neutral foreign policy, as 48% of people polled indicated that they wanted the government to favour neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians, with 19% wanting the government to favour Israelis and 6% wanting the government to favour Palestinians (Payton 2012). This preference for neutrality has been declining over the past decade, with an increase in pro-Israeli support visible: in 2002 during the second intifada, 79% of Canadians believed that Canada should not take either side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ipsos 2002 “Eight-in-Ten (79%) Believe…”), with 16% expressing support for Israel and 12% expressing support for the Palestinians (Ipsos 2002 “Half (48%) of Canadians say…”). Even though the number of people who want Canada’s foreign policy to favour the Palestinians is decreasing, there is evidence of increasing Canadian dissatisfaction with the pro-Israeli policy: the number of Canadians who believe the government policy is too pro-Israeli has increased from less than 20% in the early 2000s, to 23%; then, in 2014, 26% of Canadians holding an
unfavourable view of Harper’s trip to Israel (Environics Research Group 2010, 44). These trend lines likely indicate that although the current governmental policy is generating a backlash among a portion of the Canadian public, there is still a strong (and increasing) core of pro-Israeli Canadians that support the actions of the current Harper government.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that nearly one in three respondents could not articulate a position on the issue (Martin 2012), nor were sure which side (if any) they wanted the government to favour in the conflict (Payton 2012). While the Canadian government justified their response to the bid at the United Nations by calling the actions of the Palestinians “profoundly wrong”, most Canadians were apathetic about the issue: 53% of Canadians had no opinion on the matter, with 35% of Canadians supporting it and 11% opposed to the bid (Environics Research Group 2011, 37). Even as recent as January 2014, when Prime Minister Harper visited Israel, 42% of Canadians had no opinion on his trip to Israel, 26% held an unfavourable view, and a third held a positive view of this visit (“Poll: Third of Canadians…” 2014). The conflict is a divisive issue, and the substantial number of Canadians without an opinion on this topic is likely a reflection of a lack of interest. Ignorance is also a strong possibility as a little over half of Canadians (54%) believed that Harper’s trip to Israel in 2014 would elevate Canada’s reputation in the world (“Poll: Third of Canadians…” 2014), regardless of the fact that Israel has tense relationships with the European Union, most important European states, and even the United States (Marzano 2013, 110).

If a substantial number of Canadians are not paying attention or are ignorant to the details of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, then it is understandable that public opinion on Canada’s foreign policy on Israel has changed so slowly. Furthermore, this disengagement
means that the Harper government has been able to pursue a Conservative-backed party policy without generating major disagreement from the Canadian public.

v. Orientalism

This lack of interest by the Canadian public, as well as the irrational aspect of the Canadian government’s support for Israel, may partially be explained by the underlying power structure between Israel and Palestine. An Israeli-based polling company found that 59% of the Jewish Israeli public want preference given to Jews applying for civil service jobs, 49% want the government to treat Jewish citizens better than Arab ones, and 42% say they do not want to live in the same building as Arabs, nor do they want their children to go to schools that also admit Arabs (Blomfield 2012).

This sentiment of racism in Israel is connected to and supported by the structures of orientalism. Orientalism, according to Edward Said, is a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1978, 4). As Said argues in his book The Question of Palestine, “Zionism and Israel were associated with Liberalism, with freedom and democracy, with knowledge and light, with what ‘we’ understand and fight for. By contrast, Zionism’s enemies were simply a twentieth-century version of the alien spirit of Oriental despotism, sensuality, ignorance, and similar forms of backwardness” (Said in Husseini 2008, 51). In Canada, this orientalism goes at least as far back as Canada’s visit to Palestine as a member of the UN committee to find a solution to the rioting in the British mandate area of Palestine in 1947. Committee members found the Palestinian Arabs to be “socially backward” due to their use of child labour, poor working conditions, and their practice of purchasing brides
from other countries; in contrast, they were impressed by the Jews, who they saw as running their businesses and cities using modern and “democratic” practices (Tauber 2002, 14-5).

These sorts of terms – “primitive”, “uncivilized”, “savage”, “undemocratic”, and “backward” – draw specifically on the long history of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy in European/North American identity (Salter 2002, 23). The “barbarian” lies in the middle of the spectrum, between “civilized” and “savage”; a society that is “barbaric” is one that is poly/monotheistic, lives under the presence of laws but is still ruled by despotism, and wears clothes but contains an exotic sexuality (23). This concept is rooted in the European mission to bring enlightenment and civilization to the undeveloped populations, and it lends support to the idea that “barbaric societies” (such as Arabic countries) are inferior to modern societies (98). These terms have been historically used to delegitimize Palestinians, and Palestinian aspirations within the conflict (Bar-Tel & Salomon 2006, 29).

Moreover, this language still exists today: a hint of it can be heard in Stephen Harper’s statement in 2006 when he says that Israel is a “democratic nation” and that to fail to defend it against its enemies is not the “Canadian way” (Sasley 2011 “Why Canada’s Views…”). The reference to the “Canadian way” is important, as it serves to define Canadian identity. As Arnold summarizes, “we define ourselves as much through what or who we are not as through what or who we are” (2010, 17). Every assertion of identity necessarily consists of both what something is ("Self") and what something is not ("Other") (Said 1978, 332). In this case, defining Israel as a “democracy” necessitates the construction of a negative identity of what Israel is not – other “non-democratic” countries. Foreign policy is a way to produce and reaffirm internal Canadian

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14 “Civilized” is characterized as Christian; supports the rule of law and democracy, is sovereign, has “European manners”, eats cooked food, and restrains their sexuality (Salter 2002, 23)

15 “Savage” is described as corresponding to animism, an absence of rules, the familial, nakedness, humans as food, animalistic sexuality, and direct colonial domination (23).
identity (Arnold 2010, 18). In the tradition of orientalism, Harper’s statement functions to differentiate Canada from the non-democratic Middle Eastern countries, while at the same time it aligns Canada with other similar countries and reaffirms Canadian identity as a “democracy”. This occurs because distinctions, especially moral distinctions, work to form, maintain, and strengthen social identity through cultivating a sense of superiority, creating context-specific meaning, and by inspiring action (Bar-Tel & Salomon 2006, 32-3).

A second example comes from Baird in 2011, when he stated that:

“Canada does not just ‘go along’ in order to ‘get along.’ We will ‘go along’ only if we ‘go’ in a direction that advances Canada’s values: freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

(“AJC Applauds Canadian Foreign Minister…” 2011)

Canada’s foreign policy is no stranger to values: Canada has made the promotion of democracy, human rights, free market economy, social justice, and wealth redistribution an essential feature of Canadian international action since the 1940s (Roussel 2012, 132). However, in this case, the invocation of traditional Canadian values has little to do with Canada’s historical identity of peacekeeping, multilateral engagement and institutions, or human rights (132). Instead, it is used for a specific purpose. Arnold writes that foreign policy and public diplomacy are a “state-directed” mechanism for creating a “national brand” in the minds of the Canadian and international publics (2010, 17). This rhetoric is therefore used to justify and normalize the actions of the Canadian government to the Canadian public (18).

In these two examples not only has the orientalist assertion of Canada as a “democracy” been used to legitimize the current government’s support for Israel, but through the invocation of Canadian values, the Harper government is also attempting to weave pro-Israeli narrative into Canadian identity. Furthermore, this type of word choice also tacitly encourages support for Israel among Canadians who have little knowledge of the conflict, as it predisposes them to
support people who are “like them” (i.e. “democratic”, “liberal”). Conversely, it also disincentives support for Palestinians, as people are less likely to be sympathetic to the struggles of those with whom they cannot easily identify. This structural factor likely impacts and shapes Canadians’ tacit support Harper’s pro-Israeli stance and lack of interest in becoming informed about the conflict. Orientalism also likely plays a role in explaining Harper’s funding cuts to UNRWA: within these structures, his personal support for Israel combined with his emphasis on a foreign policy that is aligned with morals may incline him towards classifying anything that is “pro-Palestinian” as “anti-Israeli”. This inclination against anything “pro-Palestinian” plays a role in explaining the “irrational”, “knee-jerk” aspect of the Harper government’s response to Palestinian advancements in the Israel-Palestine conflict (such as the Palestinian bid for statehood16), as well as the Harper government’s decision to defund UNRWA.

vi. Pro-Israeli Lobby

It is important not to forget the existence of the pro-Israeli lobby within Canada, which may also explain part of the government’s pro-Israeli stance. The main organ of the lobby group in Canada is the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy. This is the primary organization responsible for coordinating and funding the activities of other groups, including the Canadian-Israel Committee, the Canadian Jewish Congress, and university outreach groups. While the political structure of Canada discourages lobbying of individual members of Parliament as the decision-making power rests in the hands of Cabinet, the Israeli lobby in Canada includes some powerful individuals, including the Asper family (who own CanWest Global Communications) and Norman Spector (Whitaker 2004, 197). In addition to the pro-Israeli lobby organizations and individuals, there are also pro-Israeli advocacy forces inside parliament. This includes the

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16 Described in greater detail in Section 7.i, “Error! Reference source not found.”.
Canada-Israel Allies Caucus (which is currently headed by Conservative MP James Lunney) and
the Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group (which replaced the previously-named Canada-Israel
Friendship Group). These groups work to create a greater friendship and goodwill between
parliamentarians of both Canada and Israel, thereby serving to further cooperation between
national parliaments of both countries (“Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group” 2011).

The lobby functions by arguing that Canadian values such as democracy and negotiation
should encourage policies more favourable to Israel, and that Canadian identity naturally
predisposes a closer relationship with Israel, as the Middle East’s only genuine democracy
(Sasley 2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). Canada’s military aid to the Middle East has typically
been very restricted, as Canada only gives aid to Egypt and directly to the Palestinians; this
means that the pro-Israeli lobby is mostly confined to diplomatic issues, such as the non-
recognition of the PLO and voting in the UN on Arab-Israeli issues (Lyon 1992, 11). When it
comes to their effectiveness as lobby groups, there are many factors that need to be taken into
consideration:

The first of these is the fact that the Jewish community has a long history of being
acclimatized in Canada economically, socially, and politically: the first Jewish synagogue was
established as early as 1768 and the first Jewish member of Parliament was elected in the 1870s
(Sasley 2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). Second, most of the pro-Israeli advocacy groups are
Jewish, and they have external factors that created domestic support for their cause: persecution
in Europe and the Holocaust both serve to raise awareness and sympathy for their position, as
well as lacking an independent homeland, which plays on nostalgic visions from the Bible
among Christian Zionists (Sasley 2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). Furthermore, because Israel
plays an important role in the identity of Canadian Jews, it is easier for the Jewish community to
come to agreement in support of Israel; combined with the fact that the Jewish communal institutions have become highly centralized, this makes it easier to concentrate resources (Sasley 2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). Lastly, the advocacy methods of the pro-Israeli groups are done within the framework of mutual-gain, where support for Israel is not seen to come at the expense of Palestinians… this makes their efforts to lobby seem more reasonable and logical in contrast to the Arab lobby groups, whose arguments are frequently zero-sum and unrealistic (for example, lobbying Canada to end air and trade links between Canada and Israel) (Sasley 2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). These factors help to make the pro-Israeli lobby groups more effective in their advocacy efforts.

Sasley asserts that the lobby has been most effective in creating a “climate of greater understanding” for Israel’s position, and in pressuring Canada to help to normalize Israel internationally (2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). An example of where their lobbying has had an influence is in Canada’s efforts to help move Israel from being isolated into the official Western European and Other Group grouping (2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). A second example is when Canada voted for Israel to be accepted into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). These are areas in which the pro-Israeli lobby has been able to have an impact, although these issues are not high profile. This group also played an instrumental role in convincing the Canadian Cabinet to list Hamas as a terrorist organization in 2006, as well as ensuring that Al Jazeera was not broadcast in Canada in 2003 (Whitaker 2004, 207 – 8).

However, Sasley argues that the pro-Israeli lobby cannot be considered to be influential as it has not been successful in achieving change on major policy positions, such as Canada’s position on the status of Jerusalem, the illegality of settlements, or the right to an independent
and viable Palestinian state (2011 “Who Calls the Shots?”). This argument against the effectiveness of the pro-Israeli lobby is not very convincing. Jerusalem, Joe Clark promised in 1980 to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as an attempt to lure votes away from the Liberals, and it was only after considerable opposition from Arab governments, the Department of External Affairs, and advice from the Right Honourable Robert Stanfield, a highly-respected statesperson, and especially business interests, that Clark withdrew his efforts to move the embassy (Lyon 1992, 19). Furthermore, as the Canada Israel Committee did not formally request the move in the first place, this cannot be considered an example of the ineffectiveness of the lobby (19). On the issue of the settlements, Canada has only spoken against Israeli construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank once despite its written policy against the settlements, and this lack of pressure is a change from previous Canadian governments. Third, supporting the right to an independent and viable Palestinian state is not in and of itself in contradiction with being pro-Israeli, so there is no evident lobby activity on that issue. These factors make Sasley’s argument about the ineffectiveness of the pro-Israeli lobby weaker.

In fact, in a study of Department of External Affairs (DEA) officials from 1987 who were responsible for Canada’s Middle East policies, they perceive that Canada’s position has suffered because of its pro-Israeli tilt, and that the source for that tilt is the Canada Israel Committee (6). They ranked the influence of the Canada Israel Committee as ahead of that of the Prime Minister’s and the DEA’s (6). In another question, they ranked the Canadian Jewish community as a 5.85 out of 7 as an obstacle to implementation of policy on the Middle East (Kirton & Lyon 1989, 195). The Canadian Jewish community was assigned the highest ranking as an obstacle to peace; higher than the prime minister (5.04), the Department of External Affairs (5.04), Israel
itself (4.92), or Cabinet (4.68) (195). These officials show an eagerness to enhance relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and oppose legislation to make the Arab economic boycott of Israel illegal (Lyon 1992, 15). Lyon mentions that this may be due to the fact that familiarity breeds sympathy, as these officials work on the Israel-Palestine policy; however, it is more likely the case that by gaining a greater understanding of the topic these officials were able to come to a more balanced position on the conflict, which is perceived by some as being “anti-Israel” due of the strength of the pro-Israeli lobby in Canada.

While the lobby has been effective in marginalizing individuals (such as Neil Macdonald\textsuperscript{17}) (Whitaker 2004, 205) and most certainly has played a role in influencing Canadian foreign policy, there is not enough current research on the lobby to determine the extent to which they have been able to influence the current government’s direction in foreign policy. Regardless, the lobby groups can be successful if Cabinet members deliberately seek out their council or if they are predisposed to be supportive of their aims. Harper has received awards from the Canadian Jewish Congress and as well has been honoured by B’nai Brith with a Stephen Harper Human Rights Centre being built in Israel. These are both signs of how highly the lobby groups regard Harper, and are indicative of the positive relationship between these groups and Stephen Harper.

7. Implications

The shift in relationship between Israel and Canada under the Harper government can be explained by a combination of factors: the prime minister’s personal beliefs, a pro-Israeli

\textsuperscript{17} After Izzy and Leonard Asper took over ownership of CanWest Global, they became renowned for their direct editorial interference (Nesbitt-Larking 2007, 121). They promoted a “powerfully pro-Israeli position in global affairs”, and Neil Macdonald was called out by Asper as being “anti-Israeli” (121)
ideology in the Canadian Cabinet, an attempt to demonstrate moral leadership to the Conservative party base, the pursuit of economic conservatism, a lack of interest or understanding of foreign policy by the Canadian public, orientalism, and a pro-Israeli lobby active in the Canadian political sphere. But what effect will this change in policy have on Canada’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Canada’s relationships with countries in the Middle East, and on its relationship with the international community more broadly?

i. Canada’s Role in the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Historically, Canada’s involvement in the conflict has included mediating, engaging in high-level diplomacy, providing troops for monitoring and enforcing border settlements, security zones, ceasefires, and other official agreements (Jacoby 2000, 84). As recent as 1997, Canada initiated a track two process between small groups of Palestinian and Israeli experts, former officials, and current officials (Brynen et al. 2003, 7). Today though, Canada’s major role in the conflict has more to do with supporting Palestinian refugees than participating in mediating the peace process. Moreover, the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development has changed substantially over the mandate of the Harper government, which can be seen in the Departmental Performance Reports (DPRs) in two specific ways. First, these reports document an operational change from concrete support towards symbolic support for the peace process. In this case, this has entailed a change from funding border management operations and donating humanitarian aid to Palestinians in 2006, to attending conferences.

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making ministerial statements, and conducting formal visits to the area in 2012 and 2013.

Second, the government pledged to donate $300 million over five years in 2007-2008 to support justice and security sector reform in the Palestinian Authority (“Departmental Performance Report” 2008, 33); however, this is the only concrete measure of support for the peace process since 2009 that has been made by the Department as outlined in the DPRs. It also appears to have been haphazardly implemented as the DPRs only report supporting security/justice reform in 2008-2009 and 2012-2013, and only vaguely reference the continued delivery of the pledge in 2010-2011 (2009, 10; 2013, 22; 2011, 18). This change in type of support for the conflict and its haphazard provision illustrate that the increase in support for Israel by the government has not been matched by an interest in becoming a proactive actor in the peace process.

This change has been matched by a decrease in the number of Canadians who believe that Canada can play a constructive role in the conflict, from 76% in 2006 to 65% in 2010 (Environics Research Group 2010, 44). However, there are former public servants who believe that Canada can still take action. Both Michael Molloy and Michael Bell believe that if Canada can establish itself as a fair-minded and serious partner in the peace process, as well as develop and express clear objectives in the conflict, it could play an important role working towards its resolution (Bell et al. 2007, 13, 15). However, the chance of Canada becoming a major player as a mediator in this conflict is low: the current Conservative government has not shown an interest or a willingness to commit the resources necessary for an active role in mediation (18).

Furthermore, despite policymakers’ wishes to have an active role in the area, Canada withdrew its peacekeeping battalion in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force between Syria and Israel in 2006 (17).
Could Canada even play a role as a mediator if it were willing? First, despite Canada’s pro-Israel bias, Palestinian negotiators may welcome Canadian mediation efforts in the hopes that Canada’s close relationship with Israel would translate into influence, enabling more positive activity from Israel during the negotiation process and encouraging it to make more commitments towards a peaceful settlement of disputes. However, its bias may also lead a potential Canadian mediator to invalidate the demands of the Palestinians by refusing to entertain them in a negotiation process, or it may be unwilling to push Israel, if necessary, to explore new options or commitments. What leverage Canada has in trade would have negative consequences for both countries if Canada used it as collateral to force progress in the peace negotiations. Moreover, Canada may not have the political clout necessary to enforce mediation outcomes even if it did take part, as its warm relationship with Israel does not preclude Israel to following Canada’s advice. This is especially true as Israel does not fundamentally see Canada as having the same kind of international significance as the United States does (Friedson & Gradstein 2014), even though Israel does not necessarily respond to American criticism – such as on the construction of settlements – either!

More importantly, in the short-term, the current government is not enhancing its ability to be perceived as a neutral future mediator in the conflict. The Conservative government has taken concrete steps that have damaged Canada’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority: after the symbolic Palestinian campaign to upgrade its status at the General Assembly, Canada recalled its heads of missions to Israel and Ramallah, and its permanent representatives to the United Nations in New York and Geneva back to Ottawa (Foreign Affairs Media Relations Office 2012). The Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat’s response to this was that the Canadian
government was “more Israeli than the Israelis[…] they have disqualified themselves from playing any role in the Middle East peace process” (Clark 2013 “Canada temporarily recalls…”).

In spite of this criticism, the Palestinian Authority still welcomes any support from the Harper government as they are not in a position to refuse it. After a visit to Canada in September 2013, the Palestinian Foreign Minister, Riyad al-Maliki, spoke about how surprised he was to have received a warm reception given Canada’s recent history of support for Israel. He stated that, “Either I want to stay hostage to actions that have happened […], or [I can] liberate that relationship from what happened and […] see if there is any possibility for engagement” (Berthiaume 2013 “Palestinian foreign minister…”). In fact, when Stephen Harper visited the West Bank during his visit to Israel in January 2014, President Mahmoud Abbas publicly thanked him for Canada’s financial aid and expressed his hope that relations between Canada and the Palestinians would improve. While a diplomatic nicety, this statement also underlies the wish for change that exists among Palestinians; the former Palestinian Minister of Industry and Trade expressed the hope that Canada’s visit could be a potential starting point for a change in Canada’s current policy towards Israel (Friedson & Gradstein 2014).

While Canada’s pro-Israeli policy is damaging their relationship with the Palestinian Authority and Palestinians, Canada has not unilaterally supported Israel in every situation: Foreign Minister John Baird once called the Israel government’s decision to conduct settlement construction in the E-1 area not “[helpful] to the cause of peace”19 (Ravid 2012). However, Canada has declined to speak out at any other time against Israel’s settlement construction, even though it is official Canadian policy to condemn settlement construction in the occupied Palestinian territories (“Canadian Policy on Key Issues…” 2014). Given Harper and other

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19 John Baird used these words to describe the position that Prime Minister Harper outlined to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a private telephone conversation on the construction of the E-1 settlements (Ravid 2012).
Cabinet members self-professed support for Israel, it is interesting that this is the only time that they have spoken against the actions of the Israeli government. The reason for this inconsistency may be due to the timing, as Canada’s reprimand came days after Canada voted against recognizing Palestine as a state at the United Nations. A second, more likely, reason may be the seriousness of the act. Building in the E1 area, or the area between East Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, would effectively complete a crescent of Israeli settlements around East Jerusalem and divide it from the rest of the West Bank and the other Palestinian population centres (Seitz 2005, 33). Not only this but it would nearly bisect the West Bank and jeopardize the prospects of a continuous Palestinian state (33). Construction of this settlement would have serious implications for the achievement of the two state solution as originally outlined in the 1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles (“Canadian Policy on Key Issues…” 2014) and a staple of every peace process since the failed Oslo negotiations (Camp David Summit in 2000, Roadmap for Peace in 2002, the Geneva Accord in 2003, etc.). For Canada to have explicitly or tacitly supported this construction would have meant actively working against Canada’s commitment to the two state solution (“Canadian Policy on Key Issues…” 2014). This may have been so serious of a violation that even the pro-Israeli Cabinet ministers could not morally support it as conscientious citizens. However, considering that Baird deliberately leaked the details of the private conversation between Harper and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the media, it is more likely that this was a strategic move by the government to be seen by the Canadian public as taking action to uphold “Canadian values”. Building in the E-1 area is a serious enough offence that it would have been difficult to characterize their lack of response as a part of Canadian identity if their inaction sparked a public backlash, and conversely, the seriousness of the violation also means that only the most radical
of Israeli supporters would oppose this step by the Harper government. Furthermore, this criticism evidently did not negatively impact Canada’s relationship with Israel, as the media reports that Prime Minister Netanyahu could not remember the conversation (Berthiaume 2012).

Overall, it is not evident that the closer relationship between Israel and Canada will negatively affect the relationship between Canada and the Palestinian Authority in the long-term, nor negatively affect its ability to play a meaningful role in bringing about peace between Palestinians and Israelis. While in the short-run this policy stance is increasing tension between Canada and Palestine, Palestine is politically weaker out of Israel and Palestine, and will likely welcome any help that Canada offer. However, Canada will run into more problems with Israel if it does not recognize that supporting the social and economic development of Palestinians is necessary to the security and prosperity of Israel. Israel faces Palestinian political violence as long as the conflict goes on, and a self-sustaining and secure Palestinian state will reduce Israel’s financial and human costs resulting from the conflict.

ii. Canada’s Role in the Middle East

In 2005, Canada’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Roderick Bell, stated that Canada has a special place in the Middle East, though it is perhaps undeserved (Momani & Antkiewicz 2007, 174). Since then, Harper’s shift in position has been characterized by non-profit organizations as moving from a genuine bridge-builder position to a stance that is aggressive (Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights 2007). The most visible response to Canada’s continuous minority position on votes concerning Israel has led to the Organization for Islamic Cooperation to “retaliate[e] by finding problems with otherwise innocuous consensus resolutions,” according to observations by non-governmental organizations (Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights 2007).
Canada has also received of sharp criticism from Arab countries over its support for Israel, its lack of support for Palestine’s bid for statehood, and its faux-pas of meeting an Israeli minister in East Jerusalem\textsuperscript{20} (Clark 2013 “Disgruntled Arab states…”). In the Arab world, these actions have created bitter feelings towards Canada, and have already started to materialize in concrete consequences for Canada’s foreign policy towards the Middle East (Clark 2013 “Disgruntled Arab states…”). In May 2013, Qatar made a bid to relocate the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to the Middle East in 2016. While Qatar did withdraw its bid, the ICAO is a major UN agency and losing it would have entailed more than diplomatic embarrassment: it would also have meant losing $119 million a year in growth for Montreal’s economy and would have resulted in subsequent domestic criticism (Clark 2013 “Disgruntled Arab states…”).

Furthermore, the Middle East receives only approximately only 1% of Canada’s imports and exports (Momani & Antkiewicz 2007, 161), so economically-speaking, the Middle East is a minor relationship for Canada. However, the region has shown strong growth in imports and exports in the previous decade, and the potential revenue from oil and gas trade make the Middle East a very profitable partner indeed (166). As stated by Momani and Antkiewicz, due to the perception of an impartial Canadian foreign policy and the friendliness of Canadians, Canadian businesses have been welcomed by Middle Easterners in the region (167). It appears that as of 2007, Canadian businesses have not been negatively impacted by Canada’s foreign policy actions in the Middle East (167). Without a survey of Canadian businesspeople working internationally, it is impossible to tell the extent to which Canada’s foreign policy has impacted

\textsuperscript{20} Similar to how Joe Clark’s plan to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv was a faux-pas (see footnote 4), meeting an Israeli minister in East Jerusalem is viewed as recognizing and legitimizing Israel’s annex of Jerusalem.
its citizens’ ability to work in Israel. However, it is likely that Canada’s reputation has taken a hit since Stephen Harper came into power in 2006.

This is because the Israel-Palestine conflict is still important to those in the Middle East, as the Israel-Palestine conflict fills an “emotional need” (Zisser 2012, 394). The Middle East as a whole reacted sharply to Israel’s military incursion into Gaza in 2009, and to Israel’s brutal reaction against the Turkish flotilla to Gaza at the end of May 2010 (394). This group reaction to Israel’s acts of hostility, as well as the Arab sympathy for Palestinians, can likely be attributed to the fact that 79% of the Arab public believes that Arab people are one nation (with minor differences between distinct nations) (“The ACRPS Announces the Results…” 2013). With this level of solidarity with Palestinians, it is no wonder that a review conducted by Mira Sucharov in 2003 found that, in terms of absolute and relative diplomatic influence, Canada had declined from the position of a “middle power to a minor power at best” (in Zahar 2007, 65). Given the pro-Israeli ideology of the current government, it is likely that that pattern has continued (and will continue) under Stephen Harper. It is therefore not surprising that Canadian support for Israel has garnered backlash from the Middle East; if Canada would like to maintain warm relationships with Middle Eastern partners, Canada will likely need to invest in those ties both politically and economically.

iii. Canada’s Role in the International Community

Internationally, Canada is in the minority with its pro-Israeli stance. As the Israeli diplomat, Abba Eban pointed out, “if Algeria introduced a resolution declaring that the earth was flat and that Israel had flattened it, it would pass by a vote of 164 to 13 with 26 abstentions” (Shalom 2004). While the intention of this quote is to highlight the “anti-Israel bias” at the United Nations, it illustrates the Israeli perception of the United Nations and the extent to which
Canada’s choice to support Israel makes Canada a black sheep internationally. The only others who support Israel are typically the United States and a few American semi-independent colonies. According to Heinbecker, many at the United Nations show solidarity for Palestinians because they can identify with the hardships this Arab population has faced. As he says, “for [the G77], the forty-plus years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank evoke memories of the colonialism they themselves endured.” The American (and now Canadian) support for Israel regardless of Israeli non-compliance with many United Nations resolutions is viewed by the global South as unfair.

One of the signs that Canada’s international reputation has suffered from this position was when Canada lost its bid for a Security Council seat in 2010 to Portugal, with 113 votes to 78. As reported by the media, UN diplomats said anonymously that this was in reaction to Canada’s unqualified support for Israeli policies and actions (as “Canada withdraws from race…” 2010). Heinbecker argues that the reasons why Canada lost the seat were clear: Canada’s “contempt” for the United Nations, Canada’s abandonment of its climate change commitments, its diversion and restructuring of aid away from African countries and towards the Americas, its unequivocal support for Israel, and its mismanaged bilateral relationships (2011, 7). He pointed out that Canada needed 132 votes to obtain a Security Council seat, and since the Organization of Islamic Cooperation makes up 57 of those votes and the African group makes up 50, this means there were a lot of countries that Canada had disappointed going in to the election process (“Panel Discussion on Canada’s Campaign…” 2009, 4). Given, as previously quoted by Williams, that Canada’s nomination for positions within international organizations has

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21 For an example, voting on A/C.2/68/L.27, a United Nations General Assembly resolution on the “permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources”, the voting was 162 Yes, 5 No, 9 Abstain (“Second Committee 2013). The “No”s were: Canada, Israel, Micronesia, Palau, and United States (“Second Committee” 2013).
traditionally been uncontested, and given that this is the first time in Canada’s six-decade history at the United Nations that it has not won the seat for which it made a bid (Levitz 2013), this is a sign of the international community’s displeasure with Canada’s current foreign policy, including Canada’s relationship with Israel.

In continuing along such a course without moderating its foreign policy position, Canada is likely to further disappoint its allies, especially those from the global South. This will likely have an impact when Canada will need those multilateral relationships for passing General Assembly resolutions on a given topic (especially pertaining to Israel or Palestine), or if Canada chooses to take part in the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the future. It may also contribute to a cooling of relationships between Canada and its international allies. However, in terms of broader implications, it must be kept in mind that Canada’s policy on Israel is only one aspect of its relationship with the international community and its importance should not be exaggerated. As such, it is unlikely that this will have concrete repercussions for Canada (such as economic sanctions, boycotts, or more subtle actions such as snubbing Canada at working group meetings or international forums) or have a long-term impact, unless Canada does something that is truly significant and shockingly controversial (such as funding Israeli settlement construction or jailing peaceful pro-Palestinian protestors within Canada).

Much more important and detrimental to Canada’s external relationships is the Canadian-led cooling of its multilateral relationships and international commitments, which will undoubtedly have an impact in future years. Canada announced that it will not run again for a Security Council seat in 2014. While the government declared that this is due to the fact that Canada will not give up its “principled foreign policy” for a seat, the truth of the matter is likely more of a combination of two factors. First, Canadian decision-makers likely recognize that
Canada would not, in all probability, be able to win the seat. Secondly, this is simply the consequence of continuing a foreign policy which places little to no importance on multilateralism and international organizations in general (Levitz 2013). While it remains to be seen what long-term impact will come of this, future Canadian governments will have to work hard to rebuild the relationships that the current government is so quick to dismiss. While Canada maintains its strong support for Israel, this factor is unlikely to win Canada many allies in the near future.

8. Conclusion

Since Israel’s birth, Canada has played a role in supporting its existence and security. This started with Pearson and Rand who advocated for partition of British-mandated Palestine at the United Nations in 1947 and 1948, and continued through the policies of the following governments. While Canada’s support for Israel has changed over the years from being tacitly or mildly sympathetic to explicitly or strongly sympathetic towards Israel, Canada’s foreign policy towards Israel has generally reflected domestic and strategic considerations, with ideological factors playing a more minor role.

Under the Martin government, and continued by the government of Stephen Harper, Canada has become much more supportive of Israel, in United Nations arenas as well as in its bilateral relations with Israel. The current governmental support for Israel can be attributed in part to the moral beliefs and pro-Israeli ideology of the leadership of the government, their aspirations to realize economic conservatism, and a strategic move on their part to appeal to the pro-Israeli community within their party. However, this stance also gains support from a disinterested and uninformed Canadian public, and exists within the structures of orientalism.
Lastly, while it is difficult to determine the extent to which the pro-Israeli lobby has had influence in Canada today, they have praised and rewarded Harper’s stance on Israel with multiple awards and a “Stephen Harper Human Rights Centre”.

Canada’s political support for Israel has resulted in international repercussions in the threat of relocating the International Civil Aviation Organization away from Montreal and in a diplomatic backlash from the Organization for Islamic Cooperation in the form of their pointed lack of support for Canadian resolutions. Canada’s support of Israel lends the country international legitimacy and credibility. While it is important to ensure that Israel can function as a proper member of the international community, it is also important that Israel follow the rules of international law and the norms of the international community. Lending support and credibility to a country that baldly flouts international opinion and international law is problematic as well as morally questionable, and reflects poorly on Canada’s judgement internationally.

Furthermore, a question should be raised as to how sustainable Canada’s foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict is domestically. As presented in the public opinion section, Canadian voters are becoming increasingly polarized on the topic of Canada-Israel foreign policy. While this foreign policy leads to a closer relationship between Canada and Israel and a tense relationship with Palestine, this policy will likely increase domestic tensions between certain groups of Canadians. In fact, this stance has already had domestic implications, as Canadians of Arab origin are feeling increasingly insecure about Canada’s domestic commitment to protect them: in light of increased discrimination and racial profiling following the events of September 2001, a strongly pro-Israeli government creates concern that the Canadian government will not support them as they would other Canadians, domestically and
internationally (Zahar 2007, 63). For example, the government’s handling of Maher Arar\textsuperscript{22}, a Syrian-born Canadian who was arrested on a stopover in the United States and deported to Syria, has reinforced fears among Arabs and Muslims that they are not equal citizens under the law (64). Jews are feeling similarly to Arabs, as anti-Semitism is still a problem in Canada with 14\% of Canadians expressing anti-Semitic beliefs (Clarke 2014). Given the increasingly interconnected spheres of domestic and foreign politics, this policy stance creates reverb among the Canadian population, especially the Arab and Palestinian population, and it will likely take years to fully realize the domestic effect of this policy.

If there are any lessons to be learned from Harper’s support for Israel, it is that it is not so easy to disregard either the opinion of the international community, the ties and importance of multilateralism, or the relationship between domestic and international relations. The reality today is that countries are increasingly interconnected and as a result, managing one’s bi- and multilateral relationships as well as being sensitive to the diplomatic repercussions of one’s actions domestically are much more important than in the past. If Canada continues to alienate its allies, not only through its strong political support for Israel but also through its withdrawal from multilateral institutions, it may have to worry about more concrete actions of the Arab and international community’s disapproval. A reputation takes years to build, and seconds to destroy.

The next federal election in 2015 will bring with it a review of the Conservative foreign policy, and it will be interesting to see whether the verdict will be that Canada took action to make, or just completely break, those relationships.

\textsuperscript{22} Maher Arar is a Syrian-born Canadian who was arrested on a stopover in the United States and deported to Syria, where he was jailed and tortured for a year (“9/11 saw Maher Arar learn ‘hard lesson’” 2011). The government launched a public inquiry into his situation, and he received an official apology from Stephen Harper and a $10 million settlement for Canada’s role in the deportation.
9. Annexes

Annex 1: Canadian Imports from Israel and Canadian Exports to Israel, 1994 – 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports (Current)*</th>
<th>Imports (Current)*</th>
<th>Consumer Price Index**</th>
<th>Exports (Constant)</th>
<th>Imports (Constant)</th>
<th>% Change in Exports (Constant)</th>
<th>% Change in Imports (Constant)</th>
<th>Exports/Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$172,111,027</td>
<td>$182,911,507</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>$200,829,669.78</td>
<td>$213,432,330.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$237,418,998</td>
<td>$240,836,562</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>$271,026,253.42</td>
<td>$274,927,582.19</td>
<td>34.95</td>
<td>28.81</td>
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<td>$240,199,831</td>
<td>$267,124,179</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>$270,191,036.00</td>
<td>$300,477,141.73</td>
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<td>$314,771,325</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>$278,841,108.41</td>
<td>$348,198,368.36</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>0.80</td>
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<td>$229,233,892</td>
<td>$417,166,171</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>$251,077,647.32</td>
<td>$456,918,040.53</td>
<td>-9.96</td>
<td>31.22</td>
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<td>$298,176,032</td>
<td>$442,692,797</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>$320,964,512.38</td>
<td>$603,274,390.08</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>4.29</td>
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<td>$324,321,260</td>
<td>$597,313,080</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>$359,245,379.35</td>
<td>$631,087,672</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>$388,387,452</td>
<td>$620,166,072</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>$388,387,452</td>
<td>$631,087,672</td>
<td>8.11</td>
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<td>109.1</td>
<td>$403,033,484.11</td>
<td>$759,774,528.97</td>
<td>10.31</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<td>5.22</td>
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<td>$860,394,701.35</td>
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<td>$1,217,908,653</td>
<td>114.1</td>
<td>$510,221,393.51</td>
<td>$1,067,404,603.86</td>
<td>33.36</td>
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<td>$385,006,882</td>
<td>$1,006,448,256</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>$330,478,010.30</td>
<td>$863,904,082.40</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>4.44</td>
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<td>$399,878,161</td>
<td>$982,436,835</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>$333,509,725.60</td>
<td>$819,380,179.32</td>
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<td>$218,266,656.53</td>
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<td>$1,058,896,443</td>
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<td>$310,146,815.15</td>
<td>$862,293,520.36</td>
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<td>-8.33</td>
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*Import and export data taken from the Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database

Annex 2: Canadian Imports from Israel and Canadian Exports to Israel, Adjusted for Currency Appreciation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CAD/ILS Historical Exchange Rate*</th>
<th>% Change in Exchange Rate (Current year ER / Previous year ER - 1)*100</th>
<th>Exports Adjusted for Currency Appreciation (Current year constant export + (Previous year constant export x [% Change in export / 100]))</th>
<th>Imports Adjusted for Currency Appreciation (Current year constant export - (Previous year constant export x [% Change in export / 100]))</th>
<th>Adjusted % Change in Exports (Adjusted constant export / Constant export – 1) * 100</th>
<th>Adjusted % Change in Imports (Adjusted constant import / Constant import – 1) * 100</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.192</td>
<td>-1.14549</td>
<td>$271,072,063.11</td>
<td>$274,878,897.81</td>
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<td>0.02281</td>
<td>$287,942,173.96</td>
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<td>6.468045</td>
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<td>-1.3827</td>
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<td>32.77</td>
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<td>7.662454</td>
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<td>5.946329</td>
<td>$575,673,939.39</td>
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<td>58.46</td>
<td>3.54</td>
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<td>7.555181</td>
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<td>-2.2339</td>
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<td>$947,240,493.60</td>
<td>33.07</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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*Historical annual average exchange rate taken from OANDA.com, Historical Exchange Rates tool
Annex 3: Votes by Canada at the Security Council on Passed Resolutions Related to Israel


1948-1949 – Mackenzie King & Stephen St. Laurent
R42. 5 March 1948. Security of Palestine. FOR.
R43. 1 April 1948. Calls upon Jewish and Arab groups in Palestine to arrange a truce. FOR.
R44. 1 April 1948. Convoking special session of the General Assembly to consider question of future government of Palestine. FOR.
R46. 17 April 1948. Calls upon all parties to comply with specific terms for a truce in Palestine (cease military and other related violent acts, refrain from political activities, and protect safety of Holy Places). FOR.
R48. 23 April 1948. Establishment of Truce Commission for Palestine. FOR.
R49. 22 May 1948. Calls for a ceasefire and establishment of a truce in Palestine. FOR.
R50. 29 May 1948. Calls for a ceasefire and reduction of military activity in Palestine. FOR.
R53. 7 July 1948. Issues appeal to prolong truce. FOR.
R54. 15 July 1948. Orders governments to desist from military action and orders a cease-fire. FOR.
R56. 19 August 1948. Informs governments of their responsibility to prevent action violating the truce. FOR.
R57. 18 September 1948. Actions related to the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte. FOR.
R59. 19 October 1948. Addressing issues with the truce process. FOR.
R60. 20 October 1948. Creating a sub-committee to address S/1059/Rev.2. Adopted without vote.
R61. 4 November 1948. Calls for observance of truce and creation of committee to advise Acting Mediator. FOR.
R62. 16 November 1948. Establishes armistice and calls upon parties to seek agreement. Voted on in parts.
R66. 29 December 1948. Stabilizing the hostilities in Southern Palestine. FOR.
R69. 4 March 1949. Admitting Israel to membership in the United Nations. FOR.
R72. 11 August 1949. Expression of appreciation for those involved in stabilizing relations following the 1948 War. Adopted without vote.
R73. 11 August 1949. Creation of armistice commissions to maintain cease-fire and relieving Acting Mediator of responsibilities. FOR.

1958 – 1959 – John Diefenbaker
R127. 22 January 1958. Regulation of zone activities by Jordan and Israel. FOR.

R233. 6 June 1967. Call for cease-fire and cessation of all military activities. FOR.
R234. 7 June 1967. Demands a cease fire and discontinuation of all military activities. FOR.
R235. 9 June 1967. Authorizing Secretary-General to contact Israel and Syria to arrange compliance with R233 and R234. FOR.
R236. 11 June 1967. Affirms R233 and R234 and calls for return to cease-fire positions of troops. FOR.
R237. 14 June 1967. Calls upon Israel to ensure safety of inhabitants of areas where military operations have taken place and facilitate return of inhabitants who have fled those areas. FOR.
R240. 25 October 1967. Condemns violation of ceasefire and demands cessation of hostilities. FOR.
R242. 22 November 1967. Call for just and lasting peace in the Middle East. FOR.
R248. 24 March 1968. Condemns Israeli military action and calls for cessation of illegal Israeli actions. FOR.
R250. 27 April 1968. Refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem. FOR.
R251. 2 May 1968. Deplores the holding of the military parade. FOR.
R252. 21 May 1968. Condemns Israeli actions and calls upon Israel to rescind measures. ABSTAIN.
R256. 16 August 1968. Condemns military actions launched by Israel. FOR.
R258. 18 September 1968. Reiterates importance of observing cease-fire. FOR.
R259. 27 September 1968. Dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories and Israel to report on implementation of resolution 237. ABSTAIN.
R262. 31 December 1968. Condemns Israeli military action against Lebanon’s civil International Airport. FOR.

R408. 26 May 1977. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R416. 21 October 1977. Renew mandate of UN Emergency Force. FOR.
R420. 30 November 1977. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R425. 19 March 1978. Calls on Israel to cease military action against Lebanon and creation of UN interim force for Southern Lebanon. FOR.
R426. 19 March 1978. UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R427. 3 May 1978. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from Lebanon. FOR.
R429. 31 May 1978. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R434. 18 September 1978. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R438. Renew mandate of the UN Emergency Force. FOR.
R441. 30 November 1978. Renew mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.

1989 – 1990 – Brian Mulroney
R630. 30 January 1989. Renews mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R633. 30 May 1989. Renew the mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R635. 14 June 1989. Marking of explosives. FOR.
R636. 6 July 1989. Deplores the deportation of Palestinian civilians by Israel and calls for return of inhabitants to occupied Palestinian territories. FOR.
R638. 31 July 1989. Condemnation of hostage-taking. FOR.
R639. 31 July 1989. Renews mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R641. 30 August 1989. Deplores the deportation of Palestinian civilians and calls for return of inhabitants to occupied Palestinian territories. FOR.
R645. 29 November 1989. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R648. 31 January 1990. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R655. 31 May 1990. Renew mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R659. 31 July 1990. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.

23 Originally created to enforce a ceasefire between Israel-Syria during the Yom Kippur War.
R672. 12 October 1990. Condemns violence at Haram al-Sharif and calls upon Israel to respect its obligations under the Geneva Convention; requests a mission to the region. FOR.
R673. 24 October 1990. Urges Israeli government to receive mission in the occupied territories. FOR.
R679. 30 November 1990. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R681. 20 December 1990. Deplores resumption of deportation of Palestinian civilians; urges Israel to respect the Geneva Convention; requests Secretary-General to monitor situation of Palestinian civilians and to look into idea of a meeting between High Contracting Parties. FOR.

1999 – 2000 – Jean Chrétien
R1223. 28 January 1999. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R1243. 27 May 1999. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R1254. 30 July 1999. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R1276. 24 May 1999. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R1288. 31 January 2000. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R1300. 31 May 2000. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
R1310. 27 July 2000. Renew mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon. FOR.
R1322. 7 October 2000. Support for a peaceful conclusion to the Israel-Palestine conflict. FOR.
R1328. 27 November 2000. Renew mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force. FOR.
Annex 4: Votes by Canada at the Commission on Human Rights & Human Rights Council on Passed Resolutions Related to Israel

1. Commission on Human Rights

1963 – 1965 – Lester Pearson
No electronic records.

No electronic records.

1989 – 1993 – Brian Mulroney
No electronic records up to 1992.
1993/2. 19 February 1993. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine:
   Resolution A. AGAINST.
   Resolution B. ABSTAIN.
1993/3. 19 February 1993. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab Territories. FOR.

1994 – 2003 – Jean Chrétien
1994/1. 18 February 1994. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab Territories. FOR.
1994/3. 18 February 1994. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. ABSTAIN.
1994/4. 18 February 1994. Middle East peace process. FOR.
1994/5. 18 February 1994. Situation in occupied Palestine. ABSTAIN.

1995/1. 17 February 1995. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. ABSTAIN.
1995/6. 17 February 1995. Middle East peace process. ABSTAIN.
1995/67. 7 March 1995. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa. FOR.

1996/2. 11 April 1996. Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan. ABSTAIN.

---
24 Vote was 50-1-0.
1996/3. 11 April 1996. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**

1996/4. 11 April 1996. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab Territories. **FOR.**

1996/5. 11 April 1996. Situation in occupied Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**

1996/7. 11 April 1996. Middle East peace process. **Adopted without vote.**

1996/67. 23 April 1996. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and West Bekaa. **FOR.**

1997/1. 26 March 1998. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


1997/6. 26 March 1998. Middle East peace process. **Adopted without vote.**

1997/55. 15 April 1998. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and West Bekaa. **FOR.**

1998/1. 27 March 1998. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


1999/5. 22 April 1999. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


1999/7. 22 April 1999. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories. **FOR.**

1999/12. 23 April 1999. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and west Bekaa. **FOR.**

1999/55. 27 April 1999. Situation in occupied Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**

2000/4. 7 April 2000. Situation in occupied Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**

2000/6. 17 April 2000. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


2000/16. 18 April 2000. Human rights situation in southern Lebanon and western Bekaa. **FOR.**


2001/2. 6 April 2001. Situation in occupied Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


2001/7. 18 April 2001. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **ABSTAIN.**


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**25 Vote was 49-1-3. Does not state that Canada voted for this resolution; however, Canada is mentioned as a sponsor so it is likely that Canada did indeed support this resolution.**

2002/1. 5 April 2002. Situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory. **AGAINST.**
2002/7. 12 April 2002. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories. **FOR.**
2002/103. 16 April 2002. Situation in the occupied Palestinian territory. **AGAINST.**

2003/6. 15 April 2003. Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. **AGAINST.**
2003/7. 15 April 2003. Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories. **FOR.**

2005 – Paul Martin
2005/1. 7 April 2005. Situation in occupied Palestine. **FOR.**
2005/7. 14 April 2005. Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. **AGAINST.**

2. **Human Rights Council**

S-1/1. 6 July 2006. Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. **AGAINST.**
2/3. 27 November 2006. Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan. **AGAINST.**
2/4. 27 November 2006. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan. **AGAINST.**
S-2/1. 11 August 2006. The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli military operations. **AGAINST.**
3/1. 8 December 2006. Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: follow-up to Human Rights Council resolution S-1/1. **AGAINST.**
S-3/1. 15 November 2006. Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the recent one in northern Gaza and the assault on Beit Hanoun. **AGAINST.**

4/2. 27 March 2007. Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: follow-up to Human Rights Council resolutions S-1/1 and S-3/1. **Adopted without vote.**

6/19. 28 September 2007. Religious and cultural rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. AGAINST.

S-6/1. 24 January 2008. Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip. AGAINST.

7/1. 6 March 2008. Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip. AGAINST.


7/18. 27 March 2008. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. AGAINST.


9/18. 18 September 2008. Follow-up to resolution S-3/1: human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the shelling of Beit Hanoun. AGAINST.

S-9/1. 12 January 2009. The grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip. AGAINST.


10/18. 26 March 2009. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. AGAINST.

10/19. 26 March 2009. Human rights violations emanating from the Israeli military attacks and operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. AGAINST.


10/21. 26 March 2009. Follow-up to Council resolution S-9/1 on the grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip. AGAINST.

Annex 5: Votes by Canada at the United Nations General Assembly on Passed Resolutions Related to the Israel-Palestine Conflict


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62 (I)</td>
<td>12/15/1946</td>
<td>International Refugee Organization - Constitution - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 (S-1)</td>
<td>05/05/1947</td>
<td>Palestine question/Jewish Agency for Palestine hearing - GA first special session - Resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 (S-1)</td>
<td>05/15/1947</td>
<td>Palestine question/Establishment of UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) - GA first special session - Resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>181(II)A&amp;B</td>
<td>11/29/1947</td>
<td>Palestine plan of partition with economic union - General Assembly resolution 181</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>186 (S-2)</td>
<td>05/14/1948</td>
<td>United Nations Mediator in Palestine/ Appointment, terms of reference/ End of UN Palestine Commission - GA second special session - Resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>189 (S-2)</td>
<td>05/14/1948</td>
<td>UN Palestine Commission/Appreciation of its work - GA second special session - Resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>212 (III)</td>
<td>11/19/1948</td>
<td>Assistance to Palestine refugees/Establishing UNRPR, special fund - GA resolution</td>
<td>Adopted without vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>194 (III)</td>
<td>12/11/1948</td>
<td>Palestine question - UN Mediator report, Conciliation Commission to be established, Jerusalem status, refugees - GA resolution 194</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>273 (III)</td>
<td>05/11/1949</td>
<td>Israel membership in the UN - GA resolution</td>
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<td>303 (IV)</td>
<td>12/09/1949</td>
<td>Jerusalem/International regime/ Protection of holy places - GA resolution</td>
<td>Against</td>
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<td>377(V) A&amp;B&amp;C</td>
<td>11/03/1950</td>
<td>Uniting for peace - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>997 (ES-I)</td>
<td>11/02/1956</td>
<td>1956 war - GA emergency session - GA resolution</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
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<td>998 (ES-I)</td>
<td>11/04/1956</td>
<td>1956 war - GA emergency session - Resolution</td>
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<td>11/04/1956</td>
<td>1956 war - GA emergency session - Resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>11/05/1956</td>
<td>1956 war/Establishment of UNEF - GA emergency session - GA resolution</td>
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<td>1956 war/UNEF - GA emergency session - Resolution</td>
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<td>1002 (ES-I)</td>
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<td>1956 war/UNEF - GA emergency session - Resolution</td>
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<td>1120 (XI)</td>
<td>11/24/1956</td>
<td>1956 war - GA resolution</td>
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<td>1122 (XI)</td>
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<td>UNEF - Special Account - GA resolution</td>
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<td>01/19/1957</td>
<td>1956 war - GA resolution</td>
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<td>02/02/1957</td>
<td>1956 war - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>1125 (XI)</td>
<td>02/02/1957</td>
<td>UNEF functions - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>1237 (ES-III)</td>
<td>08/21/1958</td>
<td>Mideast situation/Jordan/Lebanon - GA 3rd emergency special session - Resolution</td>
<td>Adopted without vote</td>
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<td>1263 (XIII)</td>
<td>11/14/1958</td>
<td>UNEF - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>1337(XIII)</td>
<td>12/13/1958</td>
<td>UNEF financing - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1441(XIV)</td>
<td>12/05/1959</td>
<td>UNEF financing - GA resolution</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>1442(XIV)</td>
<td>12/05/1959</td>
<td>UNEF commander - GA resolution</td>
<td>Adopted without vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>1604 (XV)</td>
<td>04/21/1961</td>
<td>Palestine refugees/UNRWA reports - GA resolution</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
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<td>1725 (XVI)</td>
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