Sellars and McDowell on Kant’s Theory of Perceptual Synthesis

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Abstract

This dissertation explores Kant’s theory of perceptual experience. A reconstruction of Kant’s conception of perceptual synthesis is pursued through an examination of two interpretations given by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. The two interpretations defended by Sellars and McDowell emphasize on the conceptual synthesis of the understanding in shaping the sensory consciousness. Also, the two interpretations seek to articulate a conception of external constraint in perceptual activity that is answerable to independent reality. The external constraint is necessary to explain the occurrence of perceptual experience. The manifold of sense is considered as an external constraint in perceptual synthesis. Sellars takes sheer receptivity as providing this constraining element in perceptual experience, whereas McDowell argues that sensations as informed by the understanding can sufficiently provide this constraining content. After examining both interpretations, I will argue that Sellars and McDowell incorrectly take external constraint as appropriated by the concepts of the understanding. To defend this claim, I will reconstruct Kant’s conception of perceptual experience by demonstrating that Kant posits the manifold of sensations as independent of the operation of the understanding. The manifold of sensations constrains the conceptual content of experience through the synthesis of apprehension. In this synthesis, the manifold of sensations resists the figurative synthesis of imagination from being re-constituted through the extensive forms of space and time.
Introduction

Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell offer two different interpretations of perceptual experience. Both interpretations rely on Immanuel Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis that is presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Perceptual synthesis involves the process of applying concepts to the material content of perception. The two interpretations of Sellars and McDowell aim to grasp the role of the material content by construing it as an external constraint on the perceptual activity. The conception of external constraint is significant for both Sellars and McDowell. However, Sellars argues that this external constraint is represented by the non-conceptual role of sheer receptivity, whereas McDowell contends that the conceptual shaping of sensibility provides the constraining element for perceptual experience. These two interpretations of the role of external constraint are reflected in Sellars’s and McDowell’s understandings of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis. In the following, I will reconstruct the two interpretations that are defended by Sellars and McDowell, and finally examine Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis. I will argue that Sellars and McDowell misconstrue Kant’s conception of external constraint by conceiving it as potentially shaped and structured by the conceptual synthesis of the understanding.

Sellars on Kant’s Theory of Perceptual Synthesis

In *Science and Metaphysics: Variations of Kantian Themes*, Wilfrid Sellars offers a Kantian interpretation of sense impressions by arguing that they are an external manifold of sense provided by sheer receptivity. Sellars’s contends that the content of sheer receptivity plays
the role of an external constraint that guides perceptual activity. The need for an external constraint stems from his belief that perceptual experience contains propositional content. If objective perception is understood to involve making a propositional claim about the world, the pure sense content seems to be left unexplained. According to Sellars, the sense content neither contains a claim about outer environment, nor does it include a propositional content. Yet, perceptual experience possesses an immediate and sensory content, so elucidation of the possible relation between immediate sense content and the propositional content of perception is essential. To achieve this end, Sellars in his different writings though mainly in “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind”, argues that the sense content of perceptual experience is construed analogically from the physical objects that are inter-subjectively present in the logical space. Instead of construing sense content as consciously mediating between the perceiving subject and external objects, Sellars argues that what explains the occurrence of perceptual activity is not that sense content is consciously present in the perceiving subject. Rather, the mere positing that sense content plays a mediation role is a theoretical construct employed for transcendental reason. The external manifold of sense can be explained through a modelling relation between physical objects and sense content. This modelling relation is conducted through an analogical extension of the structural attributes of physical objects to sense content. The challenge to Sellars’s argument is to consider to what extent this analogical and modelling relation is successful in providing an explanation of sense content as immediately presented through perceptual experience, and whether the analogically construed external manifold of sense can sufficiently constrain perceptual activity. Sellars’s reconstruction of Kant’s theory of
perceptual synthesis requires first examining Sellars’s own theory of the epistemological role of sense content in perceptual experience.

**Sellars on the Epistemology of Perceptual Experience**

In “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind”, Sellars criticizes the empiricist conception of perceptual knowledge as resting on un-interpreted sensory episodes of experience. This traditional conception of empirical knowledge assumes that a given non-conceptual manifold of sense is capable of grounding perceptual knowledge in virtue of the sense content’s mode of self-presenting. For example, the subject arrives at the perceptual judgment that a red and triangular object is present in an environment primarily by the occurrence of certain modifications in sense receptive faculties caused by the presence of the red and triangular object. According to the empiricist conception of perceptual knowledge, the sense content is generated in the subject’s experiential content through these modifications and sensory change, and the subject, by merely taking the sense content to be the reason for arriving at a perceptual judgment, is warranted to make the perceptual judgment ‘I see a red and triangular object out there’. Sellars finds this conception of perceptual knowledge objectionable. He understands that it falsely assumes that sense content contains a claim about the world, or can represent the world in a certain way.\(^1\) Sellars offers an alternative conception for what constitutes an epistemic warrant for subject to take an object as presenting itself perceptually. He places perceptual knowledge

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\(^1\) In “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind”, Sellars writes, ‘There is no reason to suppose that having the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or epistemic fact. There is, of course, a temptation to assimilate ‘having a sensation of red triangle’ to ‘thinking of a celestial city’ and to attribute to the former the epistemic character, the intentionality of the latter. But this temptation could be resisted, and it could be held that having a sensation of a red is a fact *sui generis*, neither epistemic nor physical, having its own logical grammar’, §7, p.133.
in the logical space of reasons, where experiential episodes are warranted through normative and conceptual practices of justifying one’s standing in this space. He writes:

The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.²

The logical space of reasons is the framework with which a subject can articulate her epistemic standing by relying on inter-subjective norms of justification. In this framework, there is neither a direct apprehension of facts independently of the space of reasons, nor a self-presenting manifold that features in the subject’s recognitional capacity without presupposing the subject’s public conceptual framework. Sellars’s critique of sense content—that which supports or underlies empirical knowledge independently of conceptual content—seeks to demonstrate that sense content cannot ground empirical knowledge. In this account, empirical knowledge does not require a foundation; the sense content does not ground a subject’s perceptual view of the world. Sellars’s alternative conception of perceptual knowledge stresses the subject’s ability to report her epistemic standing within the space of reasons by representing the world via the public language available in the logical space. A subject becomes aware of ostensible objects not through an act of sensing but by perceptually responding to their presence. This perceptual response is a reliable and differential act of taking an object to be of a determinate kind. In this immediate perceptual response to the presence of an object, a subject is implicitly endorsing a certain standing in logical space. Since this act of perceptual response contains a predicative or conceptual structure, it presupposes the logical space of reasons. Epistemic

² “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind” §36, p.169
warrant for a perceptual response does not stem from an intrinsic authority derived from the perceptual response itself, but rather it is inferentially linked with other acts of representation. Representing a state of affairs involves extending this epistemic warrant to the cases of visual perception that already carry an evidential link with the subject’s knowledge about the world. For instance, in making a non-inferential, observational report, Sellars argues:

For the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form $X$ is a reliable symptom of $Y$. And to admit this requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge ‘stands on its feet’.3

Rather than using a perceptual response to confer a particular form of epistemic grounding for the rest of knowledge, epistemic authority is already built into an act of a perceptual response by the inferential system of logical space of reasons. An act of perceptual response is not a self-warranted experiential episode, because it presupposes the framework of logical space of reasons.

In rejecting a self-warranted experiential episode, it is important to explain how the immediate sense content enables a subject to be in a position to judge about the presence of objects, and achieve an explanation without construing this perceptual content as an autonomous episode. Sellars rejects the idea of experience as resting on a self-standing sensory manifold and argues in favour of experience as registration of the immediate presence of objects. The key is placing the immediate sensory content in the logical space of reasons without presupposing any form of givenness and explaining that which is present

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3 Ibid., §36, p.168
in perceptual experience as other than⁴ what is conceptually recognized to be an object in an observational report.

For an experiential episode to contain a claim it must play a role in the normative space of reasons.⁵ In other words, the content of representation is objective in virtue of it playing a functional and inferential role.⁶ Sellars contends that the normative space of reasons is an irreducible space of representation that is not based upon non-conceptual given content. For this reason a subject in space of reason is already equipped with machinery of concepts. Actual representation requires what Sellars calls a system of representables,⁷ whereby the structure of representable content guarantees the evidential and conceptual link with other anticipatable moments of representations. This pattern of experience underwrites the objectivity of experiential content. In Kantian fashion, Sellars goes further to claim that this content in representing does not exist simpliciter. It is dependent on the subject’s conceptual system of a potentially representable content. The idea of ‘containing’ a manifold of potential representation helps to explicate the relation of ‘existing as represented’ and existing simpliciter. Existing as potentially representable content in logical space is different from existing simpliciter,⁸ since logical space which contains the content of potential representings exists only as represented content. An object of perceptual experience is construed as a pattern of potential series of different conceptual

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⁴ By the use of ‘other than’, Sellars refers to the content of perceptual experience that is not conceptualized in perceptual content. “Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness” p.437
⁵ The use of ‘containing a claim’ in describing perceptual experience refers to Sellars’s conception of perceptual experience as implying an endorsement of the propositional content that is contained in it. He explains, ‘For to say that a certain experience is a seeing that sometimes is the case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and—which is the point I wish to stress—to endorse that claim’, “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind” §16, p.144
⁶ This is characterized by Sellars as ‘language entry transitions’ in which ‘The speaker responds to objects in perceptual situations, and in certain states of himself, with appropriate linguistic activity.’, “Meaning as Functional Classification” p.87
⁷ Kantian and Pre-Kantian Themes p.23
⁸ Science and Metaphysics p.36
representings rather than a series of sense impressions, because logical space as represented content is inter-subjective. The construction of objects through a process of abstraction from sense content requires making generalizations by noticing similarities and differences in sense content. Sellars rejects such construction of objects because it assumes that how an object looks to a perceiver is prior to considering it objectively through standard conditions of appearing in logical space. He elaborates his position:

Once it is granted that the framework of physical things is not reducible to that of actual and conditional sense contents...we see that the very selection of the complex patterns of actual sense contents in our past experiences which are to serve as the antecedents of the generalizations in question presuppose our common sense knowledge of ourselves as perceivers, of the specific physical environment in which we do our perceiving and of the general principles which correlate the occurrence of sensations with bodily and environmental conditions.

This leads to the following conclusion:

The fact that the noticing of complex uniformities within the course of one's sense history presupposes the conceptual picture of oneself as a person having a body and living in a particular environment of physical things will turn out...to be but a special case of the logical dependence of the framework of private sense contents on the public, inter-subjective, logical space of persons and physical things.⁹

Representation of the series of sense contents presupposes that a subject is able to represent her environment conceptually. Sellars extends this form of phenomenalism, where an object of experiential episode is construed through actual and potential series of conceptual representings, to Kant's theory of appearance:

Kant's phenomenalism can be put, in first approximation, by saying that physical objects and events exist only 'in' certain actual and obtainable conceptual representings, the intuitive representings synthesized by the productive imagination in response to the impressions of sense. I say exist only 'in' such representings, for no res extensa exists simpliciter or in itself. A phenomenalism which construes the physical world

⁹ "Phenomenalism" p.328
as a system of available contents in this sense differs radically from phenomenalism which construes the world as a system of available sense impressions, for it construes physical appearances as irreducibly physical.\(^\text{10}\)

According to Sellars, Kant’s phenomenalism considers logical space as merely represented content that is immanent in acts of representings where the contents of these acts of representings exist only ‘in’ this logical space.\(^\text{11}\)

**Sellars’s interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Sensible Intuitions**

In *Science and Metaphysics*, Sellars interprets Kant’s theory of sensible intuition in line with his critique of the non-conceptual given. His interpretation is not entirely in agreement with Kant’s conception of intuitional manifold. Indeed, he seeks to correct some of Kant’s commitments regarding sensory cognition. He provides a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis by locating the sensory content of perceptual experience to be external to the form of intuition without embracing this content as a purely given manifold. Sellars acknowledges that Kant’s theory of understanding, which conceptualizes sensations as the matter provided for understanding that produces a unity of intuition, is helpful to see the role that sensations have in giving real content to perceptual experience. In Sellars’s interpretation of Kant, sensory content of

\(^{10}\) *Science and Metaphysics* p.48

\(^{11}\) Sellars finds this passage in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as pointing towards this conception of space to be represented content, Kant writes ‘Nothing whatever is in space save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange that a thing can exist only in the representation of it, but it this case the objection falls in as much as the things with which we are concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is, representations’ (A375). In his essay, “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, Sellars illustrates his interpretation of Kant’s idealism where he writes, ‘For Kant, then, an act of intuiting a manifold is a thinking of a this-such in space and/or time. The this-such is something that exists ‘in’ the act. The problem with which Kant is dealing can be characterized initially as that of whether individuals in space and/or time also have existence *per se*. Kant’s answer, to anticipate, is that these intuited items exist only ‘in’ acts of intuition. That is, no item in space and/or time exists *per se*. He will nevertheless insist that some items which exist in acts of intuition are actual. This obviously requires a distinction between *actuality* and *existence per se*, which were conflated by his predecessors.’ p.407-8
perceptual experience is an external constraint that guides perceptual activity. Sellars finds Kant’s consideration of sensations to be important in explicating how perceptual experience have content and also in providing external constraint to guide perceptual activity. But he also finds that the relation between the sensory matter provided externally and the role of the spontaneous understanding to unify it, is not clearly elucidated by Kant. Sellars offers an account of how this relation should be construed.

In perceptually confronting an object, the perceiver ‘interprets’ the given data to be representative of something beyond what is given. In order to go beyond what is given in the immediate perceptual content, the perceiver must follow an ‘objective’ recipe whereby this immediate content indicates the presence of something objectively perceived. In his theory of perceptual experience, Sellars emphasizes the minimal conceptual content in perceptual experience to explain how a perceiver ‘infers’ the presence of an object where immediate content is interpreted to be a moment within one experiential episode. Minimal conceptual content in perception makes this immediate content objectively representative of something beyond it. In this case ‘objectual seeing’ of immediate presented object, becomes propositional in its content. This requires further elucidation of the relation between propositional content in perception and the objectual seeing. Sellars considers all these important distinctions in perceptual act through Kant’s theory of intuitional manifold.

Intuitional manifold is construed by Sellars as passive reception of material content in perceptual experience. This is also how Kant considered it to be. But Sellars argues that Kant conflated two senses of intuition that must be distinguished in a perceptual act. In Kant’s distinction of the sensibility and the understanding, sensibility refers to the subject’s
immediate sensory relation with an object, while the understanding refers to the faculty through which the content by the presence of an object becomes synthesized and unified. The understanding is considered to refer to the conceptual representation while sensible intuition involves the non-conceptual representation. This distinction is sustained in order to explain how the spontaneous function of the understanding requires external content through passive receptivity. Although Kant’s distinction between sensibility and the understanding seems to be clear, Sellars argues that it must not be taken at face value and that intuition is in fact Janus-faced. Instead of construing this bifurcation of the perceptual act as only involving conceptual and non-conceptual content, there is a type of intuitional content called spontaneous receptivity. The understanding, Sellars argues, turns to have its own mode of receptivity. Equally important, there is a second type of intuitional content characterized by Sellars as sheer receptivity, which is independent from the conceptual shaping of the understanding, and forms the external matter provided for the understanding which is taken to be the matter that is represented.

With a spontaneous receptivity, the understanding represents singular objects through a demonstrative use of concepts. The presence of an object is conceptually mediated and concepts figure in demonstrative content. Sellars argues:

A plausible suggestion is that ‘intuitions’ differ from other conceptual representations of individuals by not being mediated by general concepts in the way in which, for example, the individual which is perfectly round is mediated by the general concept of being perfectly round. A more positive clue is provided by Kant’s reference to intuitions as ‘in immediate

12 *Science and Metaphysics* p.2
13 He writes, ‘“Intuition” turns out to be Janus-faced, and the understanding to have its own mode of receptivity’, *Ibid*.
14 ‘We seem, therefore, to be led to a distinction between intuitions which do and intuitions which do not involve something over and above sheer receptivity’, *Ibid.*, p.4
relation to an object’ (A68;B93). He elaborates on how this immediate relation is viewed; “immediate relation’ can be construed on the model of the demonstrative ‘this’. On this model, which I take to be, on the whole, the correct interpretation, intuitions would be representation of thises and would be conceptual in that peculiar way in which to represent something as a this is conceptual’. Spontaneous receptivity represents thises as conceptual in a different manner than the general concepts that mediate the representation. In a conceptual singular representation an objects is represented as already containing a categorical structure that allows for a perceptual act to identify an object to be of a determinate kind. Categorical structure is presupposed as implicit in an object. Therefore, the intuitional manifold, as Sellars suggests, is conceptually informed by the understanding.

To shed more light on how the conceptually informed manifold is different from an explicit propositional assertion, Sellars’s distinction between ‘believing in’, and ‘believing that’, which is operative in his discussion of the intuitional manifold can be examined. In a perceptual taking, an object is indicated using a complex demonstrative phrase that presupposes a perceptual context. A subject-term in a linguistic propositional assertion is provided through an act by taking an object as indicating a complex particular. ‘Believing in’ is the act of taking a particular as a subject-term for perceptual belief. The notion of a bare particular is incoherent here, because a bare ‘this’ does not need a ground for

\[15 \text{ Ibid., p.3} \]
\[16 \text{ Ibid., p.3} \]
\[17 \text{ “Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness” p.435} \]
\[18 \text{ “Particulars” p.282} \]
differentiating it, whereas a complex particular contains categorical content that makes it possible to differentiate it and identify it perceptually. However, a perceptual taking does not explicitly endorse the categorical content of a complex particular in the same fashion as a propositional assertion which takes the form of ‘believing that’, rather this categorical content is implicit in the complex particular. For instance, in a perceptual taking, a complex demonstrative reference occurs through presupposing a categorical structure contained in an object. Sellars illustrates this point:

An ostensible seeing belongs to the conceptual order. Appropriately characterized in semantic terms, it is analogous to a linguistic episode. Not, however, to sentential occurrence, thus

There is a cube of pink over there which faces me cornerwise
or
That, over there, is a cube of pink which faces me cornerwise
but, rather,
That cube of pink over there facing me cornerwise...
where the dots indicate the place for explicit predication, e.g., ‘is made of ice’.

67. One might put this by saying that what is taken by a perceptual taking is an object, rather than a state of affairs. Yet the ‘object’ is not simply an object as contrasted with a state of affairs, for it implicitly contains a state of affairs much as
That cube of pink over there...
‘implicitly contains’
That over there is a cube of pink.

68. This portmanteau ability of terms to encapsulate predication is no mere device of economy. For in perceptual contexts, the subject term (which refers to the perceptual object) is not only a subject of predication but also, as term, a perceptual response. And to refer to an object, it must be not only a response but a response to a (correctly or incorrectly) identified object. And it is, of course, the predication contained in the subject term that carries the criteria of identification.19

It is in this way that that which is perceived in an objectual seeing, implies a form of occurring believing or ‘believing in’, where an object, as Sellars argues, is indicated through a schema of this-suches.20 A counterpart of this schema in Kant is the representations of

20 A similar interpretation is given by Dieter Henrich in “Identity and Objectivity”, where he writes ‘If the particular continues to be subject to the expectation implicit in the subject-predicate form, then, together
intuition or ‘intuition of manifold’. But as Sellars emphasizes, the recognition of a manifold as a conceptual representation of objects requires the operation of a spontaneous function of the understanding to synthesize this given content. For this reason it is a representation of a manifold and it is not an external manifold given to be represented.\textsuperscript{21} Regarding an external manifold, it is given through the reception of sense impressions that causally mediates between the perceiver and the ostensible object, which is characterized by Sellars as sheer receptivity. Given the distinction between a representation of manifold and an external manifold, Sellars contends that the sensory matter provided by sheer receptivity constitutes an independent mode of intuitive content that has not yet been conceptualized. Sellars argues that this distinction helps grasp how Kant’s theory of receptivity should be understood. Sellars posits the importance of an external manifold for epistemological reasons:

The latter manifold has the interesting feature that its existence is postulated on general epistemological or, as Kant would say, transcendental grounds, after reflection on the concept of human knowledge as based, though not constituted by, the impact of independent reality. It is postulated rather than ‘found’ by careful and discriminating attention. The concept of such a manifold is, in contemporary terms, a theoretical construct.\textsuperscript{22}

Sheer receptivity is independent and external to the minimal conceptual representations needed to synthesize the intuitive manifold. Sheer receptivity is not a representation of complex attributes. Yet, this external matter of receptivity is taken into account by

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\textsuperscript{21} Unlike sense impressions, this intuitional representation is recognition of the manifold as a manifold, ‘...We find to the effect that receptivity provides us with a manifold of representations, but not with a representations of a manifold, which latter he [Kant] proceeds to equate with representations of a manifold as a manifold’, \textit{Science and Metaphysics} p.7-8

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, p.9
perceptual synthesis to make sense of perceptual experience as 'based, though not constituted by, the impact of independent reality'.

In recognizing the presence of sense impressions in perceptual activity, a challenge arises to locate this sensory content. In the case of Kant's conception of intuitional form, the challenge becomes locating sensory content that is independent from the subject's conceptual representing. Taking this challenge, Sellars posits sense impressions to be the matter given by sheer receptivity. He claims that sheer receptivity explains occurrence of minimal conceptual representations, and argues that sensory content is not found but rather postulated since perceptual experience is caused by something external to it. The externality of sense impressions becomes significant to account for the occurrence for the minimal conceptual representations. But in what respect sheer receptivity is capable of explaining minimal conceptual representations? Sellars argues that sense impressions are theoretical constructs posited for epistemological reasons. This implies several consequences for him. One is that the subject cannot apperceive sense impressions. In other words, they are not recognized in a perceptual act as independently contributing to provide external content through experience. The sense impressions given through an outer manifold of sense are not apperceived states of consciousness. Essentially, sensory consciousness is an objectless act of sensing, because there is no objective and external correlate to an act of sensing except non-conceptual consciousness states of subject.

An act of sensing does not amount to an objective representation of an object since a perceptual change in the subject implies no existential import to this act of sensing. Sellars denies that sensations, occurring in the experiential content of perception, can lead to an
inference of the existence of an object occasioning these sensations. Sensing as such does not contain a relational fact. In “Phenomenalism”, he elaborates on this point:

Having a sensation is not a conceptual fact. Nor does the ability to have sensations presuppose the possession of a conceptual framework. To bring out the force of this claim, let us consider the following objection. ‘How’, it might be asked, ‘can S have a sensation of a red triangle fail to entail

There is a red triangle

unless having a sensation of a red triangle is a matter of there appearing to be (and hence, possible, merely appearing to be) a red triangle?’ To this challenge the answer, in general terms, is that if

S has a sensation of a red triangle

had the sense of

S is in that state which is brought about in normal circumstances by the action on the eyes of a red and triangular physical objects

then

S has a sensation of a red triangle

would not entail

There is a red triangle

though it would, of course, entail that there are such things as red and triangular physical objects.23

Thus, in perceptual experience, a subject is presented with an object, but this perceptual experience is not construed as

‘S is presented with a sensation of a red and triangular object’

for such a construction would require positing a particular state that is recognized by the subject whereby she infers the existence of an object through it. This is an invalid inference that moves from the possession of a particular conscious state to infer the existence of an object. Having sensations cannot lead to such existential inference. Rather, sensations are states that are attributed to the subjects which brought about in the normal and standard conditions for the appearance of physical objects in logical space. In essence, sensations are only qualitative and affective states attributed to the subject with no existential or objective

23 “Phenomenalism” p.317
correlate. Sellars argues further that such states contain content that is carried from the structural attributes of objects through analogical predication. In this latter claim, sensations become analogically constructed from an ostensible physical object in an inter-subjective framework. The qualitative and affective attributes of content perceived by a subject are generated through an analogy with the facing surface of the physical object. Inter-subjective content is relocated from the structural attributes of objects in logical space to become states of subject. But how is this relocation possible? Before addressing this question, Sellars is careful to make this point clear that the states of a subject are not particulars. Sense impressions are not particulars that mediate between a subject and ostensible objects by virtue of their categorical status as sense impressions, and this is necessary in order to understand how analogical predication proceeds by re-categorizing the attributes of a facing surface of an object from the physical object to become states of a subject. This re-enforces Sellars’s claim sense impressions are theoretical constructs that posited for epistemological reasons.

In perceptual experience, an ostensible object is presented to a subject who perceives a facing surface of the object. Sellars distinguishes between seeing an object as, and what is seen of the object. The latter type of seeing implies recognizing dependent particulars such as shape and colour. Seeing an object as or taking it to be of a particular type constitutes an objectual seeing. This type of seeing involves conceptual interpretation and thus perceiving the object as a whole. The act of seeing dependent particulars of an object, such as a pink ice cube’s pinkness, or geometrical shape, requires reinterpreting the

24 “Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness” p.436
relation of 'belonging to'\textsuperscript{25} which relates the sense content of an ostensible object to the object perceived. This relation of 'belonging to' defines the manner in which sense content as it is exemplified in dependent particulars is abstracted from objectual seeing of an ostensible object. Sellars contends that the mistake of classical phenomenalism is the tendency to reify the surface of an object presented to a subject and infer the presence of ostensible object:

There are two radically different trains of thought which might lead one to distinguish between a 'basic' and a 'derivative' sense of 'seeing x', and, correspondingly, of 'seeing that x is Ø'. One of them is rooted in a distinction between physical objects and their public 'surfaces'. It is, in essence, a misinterpretation of the fact that we can see a book without seeing its back cover or its inside, and amounts to a distinction between what we see without supplementation by belief or taking for granted (i.e. a public 'surface') and what we see in a sense (see\textsuperscript{2}) which consists of seeing in the former (see\textsuperscript{1}) a 'surface' and believing or taking it to belong to a physical object of a certain kind. It is worth insisting once again that this reification of surfaces into objects of perception is a mistake. It is simply not the case that we see 'surfaces' and believe in physical objects. Rather, what we see is physical object, and if there is a sense in which 'strictly speaking' what we see of the physical object is that it is red on the facing part of it surface and rectangular on the facing side, nevertheless the physical object as having some colour all around (and all through) and some shape on the other side is the object seen, and not an entity called a 'surface'.\textsuperscript{26}

The reification of surfaces, understood as demanding a relation over and above the perceptual relation between the primary act of seeing as and a physical object, leads to a production of independent particulars of limited visual view since they are detached from objectual seeing. Such production of particulars implies the reification of sense impressions as categorically present in the sensory consciousness of a subject. In order to resist this reification of sense impressions into particulars, Sellars undermines the assumption

\textsuperscript{25} The question of 'belonging to' is also introduced by Henry Price in his book, Perception. He frames the question in the following way: 'What concerns us is not the nature of sense-data, but only their relations: their relations, first, to the material things to which they somehow 'belong'; and secondly, their relation to the perceptual act, that is, their 'presentative' function, by which they help to make us conscious of these material things.' Perception p.104

\textsuperscript{26} “Phenomenalism” p.309
undergirding the production of particulars, by rejecting that a manifold of sensations as categorically present in a subject mediates between a subject and the belief in the presence of object. Seeing some properties of an object presupposes the objective presence of that object in perceptual experience. An assertion that immediate perceptual content requires objective procedures to go beyond that content, places the perceptual taking of an object before the discrimination of dependent properties seen in an ostensible object, which undermines the demand for an extra relation between sense content and ostensible object in logical space. Sense impressions, as analogically constructed from the facing surfaces of ostensible objects, are not taken analogically in virtue of their presence in the subject as sense impressions. The analogy does not abstract from the perception of sense impressions, and the re-categorize them into states of a subject. This would assimilate the intentionality of sensations into the intentionality of conceptual acts. In order to avoid such assimilation, Sellars recommends that the analogical extension of the attributes of physical objects not be mediated by something over and above what is conceptually represented in logical space. Unlike the sense datum theories of perception that understand sense content to be carrying informational content independently of the conceptual space of representation, Sellars, as explained above, blocks the temptation to construe sense content as able to represent or carry informational content. This temptation is manifested in the construction of sense impressions as particulars that possesses some unique relation with an object beyond their presence in the limited visual perception of that object.

It was indicated above that the positing of sense impressions as analogical and

27 He writes 'Here it is essential to note that the analogy is between sense impressions and physical objects and not between sense impressions and perceptions of physical objects. Failure to appreciate this fact reinforces the temptation to construe impressions as cognitive and conceptual fact which arises from misassimilation of the 'of ness' of sensation to the 'of ness' of thought', Ibid., p.337
theoretical constructs is to explain the occurrence of minimal conceptual representations. In *Science and Metaphysics*, Sellars argues that the guidance of minimal conceptual representings is achieved by taking sense impressions as external to this conceptual order of representation. But more is required to define what is meant to guide perceptual experience by an external constraint. External guidance for conceptual representings might suggest that pure sense content or the external manifold of sense is a type of content which a subject perceives an object through it. Contrary to this suggestion, Sellars argues that the external manifold of sense is posited through reflection on the concept of human knowledge as answerable to something outside conceptual representation. It is also not posited to guide perceptual activity as to make it possible to differentiate between normal and abnormal perceptual experience. External content is not introduced to account for behavioural discriminations. Sellars explains this point:

For even in normal cases there is the genuine question, ‘Why does the perceiver *conceptually represent* a red (blue, etc.) rectangular (circular, etc.) object in the presence of an object having these qualities?’ The answer would seem to require that all the possible ways in which *conceptual representations* of colour and shape can resemble and differ correspond to ways in which their *immediate non-conceptual occasions*, which must surely be construed as states of the perceiver, can resemble and differ.²⁸

He concludes ‘Thus, these non-conceptual states must have characteristics which, *without being colours*, are sufficiently analogous to colour to enable these states to play this guiding role’.²⁹ Non-conceptual states of the subject are able to explain the occurrence of conceptual representations through the analogical extension of shape and colour predicates from ostensible objects to these states. One essential feature of such external guidance is that perceptual object themselves cannot have its guiding role except by

²⁸ *Science and Metaphysics* p.18
extending the structural attributes of facing surfaces of that object to the states of the subject. Relocation of structural attributes is pursued for the purpose of explaining the occasioning of perceptual experiences. This analogical construction of sense impressions as states of a subject implies that there is a content that needs to be transposed or recategorized. Since a sense content does not carry an objective or existential correlate, then this content—to be transposed—is given by the attributes of a physical object and disclosable to a subject from a certain perspective. To give an intrinsic characterization of sense impressions is to characterize them in an analogy with physical objects:

How are we to understand the intrinsic character of raw feels? Obviously the sense impressions of red triangle is not, in the literal sense, either red or triangular; nor is the raw feel of being pricked on the hand by sharp object. The most that can be said is that the families of qualities and relations which intrinsically characterize raw feels or sense impressions correspond in a certain way to the families of qualities and relations which characterize perceptible objects and processes...that the logical space of the qualities and relations which characterize raw feels is, in certain respects, isomorphic with the logical space of perceptible qualities and relations of physical objects and processes.30

For instance, in transposing colour from a physical object to become a non-consciousness state of a subject, the categorical transposition proceeds from an ostensible object in determinate physical space:

As I see it, is that with respect to color we have no determinate category prior to that of the physical. The latter is our point of departure. We approach the problem of constructing new forms of concept pertaining to color not by throwing away concepts of the colors of physical objects, but by transposing our concepts into a new key.31

Sellars asserts that categorical transposition—the relocation—of physical attributes seeks to give a new categorical characterization of these attributes in a different structure. But

30 “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem” p.358-9
31 “The Lever of Archimedes” p.244-5
the content abstracted from physical objects is *categorically neutral* and for this reason it is possible to construct sense impressions in a new determinate categorical status. He explains further:

> The one thing we can say, with phenomenological assurance, is that whatever its "true" categorical status, the expanse of red involved in an ostensible seeing of the very redness of an apple has *actual existence* as contrasted with the *intentional in-existence* of that which is believed in *as believed in*. But notice that the family of concepts to which this contrast belongs consists of *transcendental* concepts, i.e., concepts which apply across categories. An expanse of red could be something *actual* and be either a sense datum in visual space, a manner of sensing, or a spatial constituent of a physical object.32

The introduction of a new categorical structure for sense impressions does not imply that for sense impressions to be presented perceptually to the subject, they must belong to a categorical structure. This would constitute a form of givenness. Rather the new categorical structure assigned to sense impressions, is for explaining how a red triangular object is presented to the subject other than what is thought of it. Such an explanation preserves the content taken from physical objects and transforms it into a different categorical form.33

However, the new categorical status given to sense impressions acquires a reporting role in language, where the subject becomes trained to give a description of the qualitative content of her experience. Instead of relying on introspection, a subject can report her experience using the new categorical status of sense impressions that presupposes inter-subjective discourse.34 In this case, sense impressions cannot take place as mediating content in perceptual activity except by construing them as theoretical constructs in a new categorical form for the purpose of guiding conceptual representations.

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32 "The Lever of Archimedes" p.245
33 Sellars illustrates the notion of preserving content, 'The pinkness of a pink sensation is ‘analogous’ to the pinkness of a manifest pink ice cube, not by being a different quality which is in some respect analogous to pinkness, but by being the same ‘content’ in a different categorical ‘form’", "Is Consciousness Physical?" p.73
34 "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind" §62 p. 195
Sellars on the Productive Synthesis of Imagination

In synthesizing the intuitional manifold, the understanding functions indirectly on the sense content through the synthesis of imagination. The synthesis of imagination is essentially the understanding functioning under the guise of its productive synthesis operating on a given manifold. This is Sellars’s view of the general role of the productive synthesis of imagination in his interpretation of Kant’s theory of imagination in *Science and Metaphysics*. His position on the function of the productive synthesis of imagination in bringing outer sense content into a relation with the conceptual shaping of the understanding is developed later in his paper titled “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience”. On both occasions, Sellars finds Kant’s theory of productive synthesis of imagination to be essential in conferring unity on perceptual experience. For this reason, it is important to examine how Sellars employs the Kantian notion of imaginative synthesis to fill gaps in perceptual experience.

The distinction that Sellars makes between the manifold of intuition and sheer receptivity takes into account the notion of the form of intuition in Kant’s theory of experience. Sellars finds Kant to be arguing for an incoherent position about intuitional form by ascribing an intuitional form to the outer sense. This ascription does not take into consideration that this outer sense does not contain any structural features since an outer sense lacks a spatial form. Moreover, an outer sense is not reached by the conceptual informing of the understanding because it is a theoretical construct that is posited for transcendental reasons. For Sellars, the Kantian ascription of intuitional form to an outer sense does not recognize the difference between representations of intuitional manifold and the outer manifold provided for this representation. This is related to Kant’s failure to make the
distinction between sheer receptivity and conceptualized intuitions clear. Kant conflates two levels of representing when he judges that a spatial form of intuition that is synthesized by the understanding can be extended to sheer receptivity:

It might be thought that Kant is simply denying that the representations of sheer receptivity represent anything as having what might be called a categorical structure or complexity. Certainly the distinction between categorical structure and, say, spatio-temporal structure is essential to his argument, but it does not operate in this way. It might also be thought, in view of his thesis that Space is the form of outer sense, that he would admit that sheer receptivity can provide us with a representation of a spatial structure. I am convinced, however, and shall argue that this is not the case. He is committed to the stronger claim that what the representations of sheer receptivity are of is in no sense complex, and hence that the representations of outer sense as such are not representations of spatial complexes. If I am right, the idea that Space is the form of outer sense is incoherent.  

Since outer sense does not contain any categorical structure, it is not possible to represent it as containing a structural manifold. For this reason, according to Sellars, the Kantian position of extending a spatial form of intuition into an outer sense is incoherent. Sellars believes that this failure in Kant’s account can be corrected by considering the possibility that there is another form that can be ascribed to sheer receptivity. The form of receptivity is distinct from the form of intuitional manifold, which is the only type of form that Kant considered. Sellars’s analysis of Kant’s position is that in order to see sheer receptivity as playing a role in constraining the perceptual activity from outside, it must possess a unique form as well. Since there are spatial and temporal forms for intuitional manifold, there must also be spatial and temporal forms in representing sense impressions. Similar to qualitative predicates, such as colour, which are relocated from the attributes of physical objects in logical space by analogical extension, the structural attributes of physical objects such as spatial and temporal forms also can be relocated to sense impressions to become

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35 *Science and Metaphysics* p.8
states of a subject. Spatial and temporal forms of intuitional manifold are taken to be models for this analogical concept formation.

The interpretation that sense impressions have a spatial form might not be different from Kant’s ascription of intuitional form to an outer sense, given Kant’s incoherent position, but Sellars believes that the two forms cannot be the same according to his overall interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience, which involves both sensuous qualitative content and intuitional manifold that is conceptually informed. He links these two together:

To reconcile the insights contained in Kant’s treatment of ‘sensibility’ and ‘intuition’, the distinction we have been drawing between the impressions of sheer receptivity and the intuitions of the productive imagination must be paralleled by a corresponding distinction between two radically different senses of spatial terms, in one of which we speak of impressions as having a spatial form, while in the other we can speak of the objects of intuition as having a spatial form.36

But there seems to be a problem in describing the relation between the two types of forms. Sellars again employs his theory of analogical concept formation. Through the analogical extension of structural attributes of physical objects into the posited theoretical constructs of sense impressions, the relation between the forms of sense impressions and the form of the intuitional manifold can also be explained. The assumed attributes of sense impressions are the counterpart of the physical attributes of ostensible objects, but they are not represented in the productive synthesis of imagination. Sellars clarifies:

There would be the attributes of and relations between the impressions of pure receptivity. Though, as has been pointed out, we conceive of certain attributes and relations as counterparts of spatial attributes and relations proper, they would not literally be the spatial attributes and relations in terms of which we conceptually represent physical objects and events.37

36 Ibid., p.8
37 Ibid., p.29
The structural attributes ascribed to sense impressions are not apperceivable by the subject as part of the intentional content of perceptual experience, but they are assumed to play an external guidance role by ordering sense impressions. Sellars recommends that sensational spatiality serves as an external constraint without featuring in the conscious act of representing as an independent manifold. This description of an outer sense as containing an independent structure from the intuitional manifold seems to contradict Kant’s official position on having only one mode of formal intuition in perceptual experience, but Sellars contends that Kant’s overall conception of experience requires postulating such an external form of sensational spatiality and temporality. Sensational spatiality is structurally analogous to the intuitional form that is conceptually synthesized in the productive synthesis of imagination.

If there is sensational spatiality, there must as well be a temporal form for sense impressions that is different than the temporal form represented by the conceptualized manifold of intuition. The sensuous qualitative content of perception has an external temporal order which includes *simultaneous present* manifold that generates a conceptual representation of temporal successiveness in the sensuous states of the self. This \(\tau\)-dimension of the temporal form in sense impressions is ontologically simultaneous since the posited temporal order does not represent successiveness in itself. What Sellars is characterizing is perceptual experience that is temporally structured through successive

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38 ‘Kant’s failure to distinguish clearly between the ‘forms’ of receptivity proper and the ‘forms’ of that which is represented by the intuitive conceptual representations which are ‘guided’ by receptivity—a distinction which is demanded both by the thrust of his argument, and by sound philosophy—had as its consequence that no sooner had left the scene that these particular waters were muddied by Hegel and the Mills, and philosophy had to begin the slow climb ‘back to Kant’ which still underway’, *Ibid.*

39 *Kant and Pre-Kantian Themes: Lectures by Wilfrid Sellars* p.129
states of an empirical self rather than the experiencing of objects.\textsuperscript{40} The instantaneous temporal content of sense impressions enables the subject to represent the sequential content of time in intuitional manifold by representing the sequential states of perceptual experience. Sellars elaborates:

[W]here Kant is talking about time as a form of inner sense, strictly speaking, he is really not talking about time as an intuition. He is talking about time as a kind of ordering of sensory states such that they become \textit{experienced as} temporally ordered. The sensory states in the $\tau$-dimension can be ontologically simultaneous; but they \textit{generate} an experience of sequence. Now they only generate that experience of a sequence because of many other factors that are involved; so, this is, for Kant, necessary condition for being an experience of a sequence but not a sufficient condition. A sufficient condition requires, needless to say, the whole apparatus of the categories and forms of thought.\textsuperscript{41}

Hence a theoretical construct of simultaneous temporal order can be ascribed to sense impressions in order to serve the function of guiding the perceptual activities of the understanding, and this is similar to the analogical construct of sensational spatiality in an outer manifold.\textsuperscript{42}

The intuitional forms of space and time ascribed to sense impressions are not part of the productive synthesizing function of imagination. They essentially constitute pre-synthetic manifold that structures the sense content of perceptual experience which has a voice in the outcome of the perceptual synthesis. The relation between space and time in either the intuitional manifold or external manifold of sense becomes important in comprehending the combinatorial roles of the synthesis of apprehension and productive synthesis of

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}, p.125-6

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 126-7

\textsuperscript{42} “There seems, at least, to be no absurdity in the idea that the features of sensory representings by virtue of which they guide the understanding in its conceptual representation of temporal relations between perceived events is not \textit{directly} the temporal relations of the impressions but rather counterpart relations within a co-existent structure of sensory representations’, Sellars refers here to the simultaneous structure of $\tau$-dimension of sensory states which cannot be conceptually represented in the understanding but it is a necessary condition for representing the manifold as successive. \textit{Science and Metaphysics} p.231
imagination which are both guided by the spontaneous unifying act of the understanding. In Sellars’s reconstruction of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, the role of imagination is to let the understanding produces a unity in the representation of the intuitional manifold. When the understanding aims to produce this perceptual unity, it acts under the guise of imaginative synthesis. In this interpretation, the imaginative synthesis is essentially guided by the understanding, but it is also in a direct contact with the given content of the external manifold. After elucidating sense impressions as theoretical constructs, the imaginative synthesis functions only to represent the intuitional manifold of this-suches. Sheer receptivity is external to this conceptual synthesis of the imagination. The limited function of the imagination in generating conceptual representations of singular objects dictates that imaginative component of perceptual experience only represents particulars. But this does not explain how gaps in perceptual experience are filled in the synthesis. Productive synthesis of the imaginative represents the sensible content of a manifold and only mediates between the discursive representations and the purely un-synthesized given manifold. This role of mediation between receptivity and the spontaneous act of understanding is defined as the understanding acting under the guise of productive imagination:

[W]e are not surprised when, after vaguely characterizing ‘synthesis’ as ‘the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul’ (A78;B103), it turns out, most clearly in the second edition [of Kant’s First Critique](B151-3), that this imagination, under the name ‘productive imagination’, is the understanding functioning in a special way. Since what we typically speak of as ‘imagined’ are individual states of affairs, the use of this phrase to refer to the understanding qua engaged in that representing of individuals which involves receptivity, and is basic to experience in not inappropriate.⁴³

⁴³ Ibid., p.4
To unify receptive content, the understanding acts through the imaginative synthesis. In this function assigned to the productive synthesis of the imagination, neither the external manifold of sense nor sheer receptivity is included within the synthesis process. Rather it is accounted for externally and independently of the process of synthesis. The synthesis of apprehension is understood as the stage of perceptually engaging directly with external manifold of sense. Sellars argues that this stage of engaging with sense content marks the first step of the productive synthesis of imagination in ‘taking up’ the outer content of sense.\textsuperscript{44} In other words, the synthesis of apprehension is conceptually guided. Through the imaginative synthesis, apprehended and synthesized content is not a separate manifold but rather content that is taken by the perceptual process. On the contrary, sheer receptivity represents external content through the synthesis of apprehension as Sellars indicates when he affirms the non-conceptual character of this content and indicates that it has ‘a voice in the outcome’ of the perceptual synthesis.\textsuperscript{45} Since the external manifold of sense is not included within the productive synthesis of imagination—it externally exerts an influence—the productive imagination takes this manifold into account as a constraint on imaginative content. In this interpretation, therefore, the imaginative content in perceptual experience is not playing the role of an external constraint. This constraining role is assigned only to sheer receptivity and material content supplied for synthesis of apprehension.

Sellars’s position on the role of the productive imagination changed in his later essay “The Role of Imagination on Kant’s theory of Experience”. His new position gives imaginative

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.16
\textsuperscript{45} "Thus, when he [Kant] speaks of the productive imagination as ‘taking up’ (A120) the manifold of outer sense into its activity (the synthesis of apprehension) the metaphor implies, of course, that the manifold is an independent factor which has a strong voice in the outcome’, Ibid.
synthesis the ability to represent the sensory content of experience which is the content other than what is believed in about an ostensible object. The change is the suggestion that imagination has the dual functions of conceptually representing conceptually objects and also constructing sensory image-models of these objects. The question then concerns whether the image-models of objects can serve the function of external guidance since they are now part of the imaginative content of perceptual experience. The imaginative synthesis serves to fill gaps in perception through representing features which are not immediately present in objects such as their non-visible geometrical and qualitative features. This task is possible by constructing image-models of objects by the productive synthesis of imagination. Sellars links such imaginative content to the conceptual act of understanding. This link can be construed through the schematizing process of the understanding. The process of schematizing in perceptual experience demonstrates the relation between imaginative content and conceptual synthesis. In this schematization of concepts in relation to objects, image-models are produced to fill gaps in the geometrical and qualitative features of ostensible objects.

As explained above, Sellars differentiates between what is ‘believed in’ about an object and that which is other than what is ‘believed in’ such as qualitative content of perceptual experience. The latter content is what was referred to above as an objectless act of sensing which does not include any existential or objective correlate. In a perceptual taking, an object is experienced to indicate the presence of complex particular. However, there is more to experiencing an object than this conceptual component—an object contains dependent particulars. Dependent particulars are exemplified in the cases of experiencing a book as having a back cover and pages inside it. This content is not ostensibly present to a
subject observing a book from above, but she perceptually takes the object to contain that content. The mode of presence for this content in perception is by virtue of being imagined.\textsuperscript{46} Non-visible content is present through the imaginative function in perception. It is contained in the subject's act of perception and not found externally through an objective correlate.\textsuperscript{47} In this case, qualitative content is not presented to a subject as qualitative content because this assumes that independent particulars mediate between an object and subject. It was argued above that such construction of qualitative content as independent particulars reifies them to be mediating content that inferentially relates the subject to objects. Sellars argues that sense content does not present itself to be independently causing this perceptual response. Qualitative content is represented here by the image-models of objects which are not different from what Sellars describes as sheer receptivity. The notion of sheer receptivity acquires a different meaning when it becomes attached internally to the productive synthesis of imagination instead of simply acting externally on the process of perceptual synthesis. This becomes clear in Sellars’s pronouncement that this qualitative content is constructed by the imagination’s schematizing process. In order to demonstrate this point, Sellars argues that image-models in perception are perspectival in their character whereby the schematizing process of imagination takes into consideration the subject’s spatial orientation in relation to the perceived object. This schematizing operates according to a general concept of the object:

\begin{quote}
Still more important is the fact that although the image-models are perspectival in character, the objects in terms of which they are conceptualized are not. Thus, apples are not perspectival in character. The concept of an apple is not the concept of a perspectival entity. Apples are \textit{seen}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{46} “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience” p.457
\textsuperscript{47} The \textit{actual} volume of white is experienced as contained in the \textit{actual} volume of red. Yet if the actuality of the white apple flesh consists in it being \textit{imagined}, it must be dependent for its existence on the perceiver; it must, in a sense to be analyzed, be “in” the perceiver, \textit{Ibid.}, p.457
from a point of view. Apples are imagined from a point of view. A spatial structure is imagined from a point of view. Yet the concept of a spatial structure, e.g., a pyramid, is not the concept of a point-of-viewish object. Thus, we must distinguish carefully between objects, including oneself, as conceived by the productive imagination, on the one hand and the image-models constructed by the productive imagination, on the other.\textsuperscript{48}

In this explanation, Sellars provides an idea of how the relation between image-models and concepts can be described. He adds further that the schema mediates between a non-perspectival concept and an image-model:

The productive imagination is a unique blend of a capacity to form images \textit{in accordance with} a recipe, and a capacity to conceive of objects in a way which \textit{supplies} the relevant recipes. Kant distinguishes between the concept of a dog and the schema of a dog. The former together with the concept of a \textit{perceiver} capable of changing his relation to his environment implies a family of recipes for constructing image models of \textit{perceiver-confronting-dog}.\textsuperscript{49}

These schemas function to guide the construction of image-models. But schemas are produced in a way that takes into account the subject’s spatial position in relation to an object. In light of this, it is clear that spatial and temporal content is included in the schematizing process of imagination, because image-models require the inclusion of a representation of the geometrical and temporal relation of ‘a perceiver-confronting-dog’.

Sellars concludes his treatment of imaginative synthesis in Kant’s theory of experience:

Kant emphasizes the difference between intuitions on the one hand and sensations and images on the other. He emphasizes that it is intuitions and not sensations or images which contain categorical form. When he speaks of synthesis in connection with perception, he has two things mind:
(1) the construction of image-models
(2) the formation of intuitive representations (complex demonstratives)
There is also the synthesis which is the formation of the explicit judgment, thus

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p.460
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
(3) (This cubical substance) is a piece of ice.\textsuperscript{50}

Image-models function to construct the qualitative content of perceptual experience by the conceptual contribution of the understanding that provides schemas of concepts in the process of constructing this content. But image-models are not provided externally through sheer receptivity. Rather Sellars’s position here affirms that this sense content becomes internal to the imaginative synthesis, and the structural attributes of sense impressions in sheer receptivity such as space and time thereby become the structural features of the image-models in this imaginative synthesis.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
McDowell on Kant’s Perceptual Synthesis

Sellars’s idea of space of reasons is fundamental in John McDowell’s conception of perceptual experience. The logical space of reasons involves placing one’s experience in the conceptual space of representation, and this placing avoids giving an empirical or causal description of how perceptual experience engages with objects. According to Sellars, providing a purely empirical description of the perceptual process, leads to a naturalistic fallacy that conflates epistemic norms with natural facts. McDowell concurs with Sellars regarding this assumption and shares with him a rejection of the given as a self-authenticating experiential episode. However, McDowell disagrees with Sellars about where to locate sense impressions in relation to conceptual articulation within the space of reasons. As explained above, Sellars conceives of sense impressions as theoretical constructs generated through an analogical extension of the attributes of physical objects, but McDowell considers this way of constructing sense impressions to be insufficient in characterizing the rational role of sense impressions in constraining perceptual activity. According to McDowell, for this reason, the notion of sheer receptivity, which Sellars ascribes to Kant, is not demanded by Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis. McDowell’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of sensory consciousness tries to make sense of the rational role of sense impressions without positing an independent mode of receptivity that is external to intuitional manifold. According to McDowell, the problem of Sellars’s interpretation of Kant is that he locates the deliverance of senses as external to the domain of the understanding which makes sense content unable to play the guiding role for perceptual activity. The notion of an external constraint for McDowell must not be construed in a way that makes it beyond the reach of space of reasons, because this would
constitute a return to the myth of the given. Experiential intake, rather, should be conceived as not being detached from or external to the conceptual role of the understanding. For McDowell, taking sense content as potentially informed by the understanding, does not disallow sense content from playing the external guidance role for perceptual experience, but the conceptual informing of the understanding is drawn into sense impressions.

To make sense of how McDowell incorporates this manifold of sense impressions into the conceptual space of reason without lapsing into a new form of the myth of the given, it is important to understand his general view of experience as bringing subject in direct and immediate contact with outer reality. Generally speaking, McDowell’s theory of perceptual experience ultimately consists of rejecting the guiding assumption in most of traditional accounts of experience which is construing the relation of the mind to the world as an interfacing relation that separates the mind from engaging with objects. It might seem as if rejecting this assumption is an easy step in grasping the perceptual relation, but it is implicit in most traditional conceptions of perception and so it must be challenged. McDowell criticizes two important theses about perceptual content; common factor theory of experience, and the interiorized conception of the logical space of reasons. Understanding McDowell’s criticisms and the alternative picture that he provides in his theory of perceptual experience is important also in understanding both his critique of Sellars’s reconstruction of Kant’s synthesis and his interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis that he defends in some of his writings especially in his Woodbridge Lectures. In these lectures, McDowell locates the errors of Sellars’s interpretation of Kant
and he gives an alternative interpretation that takes the rational role of sense impressions more seriously.

**McDowell on the Epistemology of Perceptual Experience**

McDowell argues for a disjunctive theory of experience. This disjunctive theory is usually contrasted with the common factor conception of experience. Disjunctive theory stresses the rejection of the idea that subjective experience somehow shares indistinguishable features with another experience that fails to be about the world. For instance, the common factor conception assumes that experience as such does not carry with it a route to the world, but rather this route must be guaranteed independently of the experiential content. The disjunctive account objects to this idea of construing experience as demanding an extra requirement for reaching outer reality other than what is already given in a perceptual content. The traditional challenge posed to perceptual experience is the possibility of illusion. The argument regarding illusion states that some appearances are indistinguishable from others that do not put a subject in relation with the outer environment. Consequently, perceptual experience becomes indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the surrounding environment. For McDowell, in ascribing to perceptual experience an essential route to objective reality, this sceptical challenge dissolves. That experience is not articulated in abstraction or independently from the world is significant because it undermines this sceptical worry. McDowell seeks to revise what he considers to be an ill-conceived notion of appearances that takes experience to be neutral in relation with facts. In having experiential content, the disjunctive theory does not require something beyond what is already and visually available to subject. This requirement for
an external ground to adjudicate between an illusory experience and a true one becomes unnecessary once it is recognized that having content is already accounted for by the internal content that is placing a subject in direct contact with outer reality. Equally important, this content is the enabling condition that makes a subject knows about the presence of an object in the environment. Reconceiving experience in the way that is recommended by McDowell indicates that experience is not somehow beyond the rational relation of the subject’s view. This view of experience presumes that the subject’s view of the world is not independent or external but rather it is rationally reachable. This is indicated in the idea that having experience is not indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the outer environment. McDowell illustrates this claim by comparing Kant’s view of experience to David Hume’s:

Consider Kant's advance over Hume. Hume inherits from his predecessors a conception according to which no experience is in its very nature—intrinsically—an encounter with objects. What Kant takes from Hume is that there is no rationally satisfactory route from such predicament to the epistemic position we are in (obviously in, we might say). Transcendental synthesis (or whatever) is not supposed to be such a route; the whole point of its being transcendental, in this context, is that it is not supposed to something that we—our familiar empirical selves—go in for. It would be a mistake to think we can domesticate Kant’s point by detranscendentalizing the idea of synthesis, so as to suggest that the idea of encountering objects is put in place by interpretation of data, perhaps by inference to the best explanation; with the interpreting being something we do, or at least something that might figure in a “rational reconstruction” of our being in epistemic position we are in. That would just be missing Hume’s point. Kant does not miss Hume’s point. He builds on it: since there is no rationally satisfactory route from experiences, conceived as, in general, less that encounters with objects—glimpses of objective—to the epistemic position we are manifestly in, experiences must be intrinsically encounters with objects.51

McDowell’s point is to view perceptual experience as not demanding some interpreting data beyond what is perceptually available to make the contact between experience and reality possible. The openness of mind to outer reality does not demand constructions of

51 “The Content of Perceptual Experience” p.344
special mediating entities between itself and the world. In this context, according to McDowell, Kant’s view of experience involves having objective purport intrinsically rather than taking perception to be a particular form of an objectless experiencing.

McDowell’s emphasis on the idea that experiential content as such does not share some common qualities that make it indistinguishable from deceptive appearances is paralleled with his critique of an interiorized conception of space of reasons. The idea of an interiorized space of reasons makes the world’s contribution to the subject’s experience of it an external type of imposition because it assumes that the unaided subject’s view is incapable of achieving a flawless standing in the space of reason without any external ‘favour’ from the world. This interiorized conception of reason amounts to making the world to be outside of a subject’s rational view. It was clarified above that the subject’s view does not involve a form of detaching one’s experience from the world. To draw more consequences from this conception of experience, it is important to realize that being in space of reasons does not imply that an epistemically satisfactory standing is guaranteed by an extra condition provided by the world. This extra condition is not operating outside of space of reason but it is part of the warrant-constituting significance of experience. The interiorized conception of the space of reasons falsely assumes that either this extra condition has to be outside a subject’s rational view or there is no such external condition provided by the world. To encounter this notion of an external condition, there must be a way to rethink this idea of the appropriate standing in the logical space of reasons other than this interiorized conception. McDowell’s argument is to view the appropriate standing as a combination of a subject being in the logical space of reasons as well as that subject becoming open to what the world affords in this space. A combination of these two seems
to be impossible given the idea that experiencing the world falls short of fact. But McDowell does not view experience in this way:

The essential point is this: it is not by exercising a self-standing capacity to know how it is with one that one knows one’s experience has an epistemic significance of that sort. One’s knowledge that there is something red and rectangular in front of one includes knowledge of its own credentials as knowledge. And it is the knowledge it is because it is a non-defective act of a capacity to know such things through perception. That capacity is a capacity to be in positions in which one knowingly has such environmental realities present to one.\(^{52}\)

By leaning toward a conception of experience that can offer a subject a deceptive appearance whereby the world neither becomes able to present facts nor offers guidance, this ultimately leads to make experience a self-contained game that is detached from outer reality. This consequence follows once experience is neutralized in relation to the existence or non-existence of outer reality. McDowell argues that the appropriate standing in the logical space of reasons is not determined by the world giving subject favours from outside of this space, and so this interiorized conception of the space of reasons needs be rehabilitated:

Whether we like it or not, we have to rely on favours from the world: not just that it presents us with appearances—which, as I have remarked, the fantasy view can already accept as a favour the world does us—but on the occasion it actually is the way it appears to be. But that world does someone the necessary favour, on a given occasion, of being the way it appears to be is not extra to the person’s standing in the space of reasons. Her coming to have an epistemically satisfactory standing in the space of reason is not what the interiorized conception would require for it to count as her own unaided achievement. But once she has achieved such a standing, she needs no extra help from the world to count as knowing.\(^{53}\)

Perceptual experience does not disclose the world through glimpses of some parts of it but it is already constituted by warranted moves that are subject to critical and scrutiny within the logical space of reasons:

\(^{52}\) “Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful” p.151
\(^{53}\) “Knowledge and the Internal” p.406
If moves in the space of reasons are not allowed to start from facts, riskily accepted as such on the basis of direct modes of cognitive contact with them as perception and memory, then it becomes unintelligible how our picture can be a picture of space whose positions are connected by relations reason can exploit, such as that one of them is reliable ground for moving by inference to another. If the space of reasons as we find it is withdrawn from the objective world as it makes itself manifest to us, then it becomes unintelligible how it can contain appearances, content-involving as they must be, either.54

The relation of the logical space of reasons to the world is not characterized the way that an interiorized conception implies, namely that the space of reasons is withdrawn from the world where an appropriate standing in the space cannot be constituted without external favours from the world. This conception of the space of reasons stems from a presumed notion of experience where the contents of experience can be articulated in isolation from the world. It is indicated above that McDowell rejects the common factor conception of experience which takes the relation between experience and the world as demanding an extra requirement in order to reach objects. For this reason, McDowell argues that an appropriate standing in the space of reasons is constituted by the way the world presents itself to a subject as it is actually arranged.

Since experience possesses content by virtue of its openness to outer reality, the notion of openness elucidates the way sensory contact with objects is possible. For McDowell, the affordances given by the world in perceptual experience are not external in the manner that they impose something outside of the rational link a subject has with the world. Like Kant, McDowell contends that perceptual experience possesses an objective purport by the combination of two parts that operate together; spontaneity and receptivity. Receptivity which provides external sensory content is subsumable under the spontaneous act of the understanding and bounded by the conceptual structuring of the understanding.

54 Ibid., p.409-10
McDowell on Receptivity

The form of togetherness that brings receptivity and spontaneity is fundamental in McDowell’s account of perceptual experience and his rehabilitation of Kant’s conception of perceptual activity. The crucial element is how the conceptual role of the understanding is drawn into receptivity which makes sensory contact with objects. Put differently, it is how the understanding which bestows conceptual unity on the intuitional manifold becomes related to the external manifold of sense. To restate McDowell’s conception of experience; experiential content is an enabling condition for knowing the world, and this enabling condition is not provided externally to the content that is available to the subject, but rather the act of representing the world does not presume some form of an interfacing relation with it. Equally important, the idea that the world is not somehow distinct from a subject’s conceptual representing does not amount to an interiorized conception of the logical space of reasons, but contrary to this image, an appropriate standing in the space of reason is constituted through having the world provides us guidance by being the way it is actually arranged. Holding such a view that experience is open to facts requires defining how the sensory consciousness of objects is possible in perceptual experience. In the Woodbridge Lectures, McDowell tackles this issue by examining the sense of togetherness that subsists between receptivity and spontaneity in Sellars’s interpretation of Kant. McDowell argues that a fully Kantian view of intentionality is inaccessible to Sellars because of some philosophical commitments that Sellars holds in his interpretation of Kant in *Science and Metaphysics*.55 McDowell specifically criticizes Sellars’s interpretation of how the understanding is operative in receptivity. Sellars posits an independent form of

55 “Sellars on Perceptual Experience” p.3-4
receptivity, sheer receptivity, that acts as an external constraint on perceptual activity, whereas McDowell takes sheer receptivity as non-conceptual and thus a return to the myth of the given, which thus must be repudiated. McDowell instead argues that constraining content can be provided through the sensory consciousness that is conceptually informed by the understanding.

In his reconstruction of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, Sellars argues that sense impressions are non-apperceivable content that is categorically relocated from physical objects in inter-subjective space to the subject. Sense content is analogically extended from the content available in conceptual intuitional representation. Since this representation contains propositional content in the form of ‘believing in’, it contains a claim about outer environment. Equally important, Sellars argues that intuitional content is not sufficient to guide conceptual activity but the external manifold of sense can provide an external constraint. The notion of containing a claim in perceptual experience is important in McDowell’s analysis of Sellars’s view in so far as it pertains to Kant’s conception of perceptual content. In McDowell’s analysis, the manifold of sense provided by sheer receptivity cannot contain a claim about outer environment since it is characterized in terms of what is below the line. To illustrate this idea, McDowell draws a line between what is conceptually available in the logical space of reasons and that which is characterized below this space.\(^5^6\) The distinction is intended to explain that for perceptual experience to contain a claim about outer environment, it needs to be conceptually structured—it must be characterized in terms of what is articulated above the line in the space of reasons. Since the content of sheer receptivity is not articulated in this space, McDowell maintains that

\(^5^6\) *Ibid.*, p.9
Sellars’s conception of sheer receptivity seeks to ground perceptual objective content in an external view from the logical space of reasons.\textsuperscript{57} Perceptual experience, in Sellars’s account, possesses objective content in virtue of being constrained by a flow of sensations that occurs below the aforementioned line. Acknowledgement of the presence of such content provides transcendental ground for perceptual experience ‘as based, though not constituted by, the impact of independent reality’.\textsuperscript{58} McDowell considers Sellars’s taking of sheer receptivity as an external posit demanded by transcendental reflection on human knowledge, to be unsatisfactory because it fails to ground sensory content within the logical space of reasons. McDowell proposes reconceiving sense content in perceptual experience without positing an external manifold of sense. McDowell’s proposed account of sense content is also introduced in relation to Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis. For McDowell, the cooperation of receptivity and spontaneity in perceptual experience can provide a way to account for objective content in such experience by taking the spontaneous activity of understanding as conferring unity on intuitional content and in effect becoming in sensory relation with external objects. The manner in which perceptual activity is related to the intuitional form also defines how the understanding informs the sensory consciousness of objects. Ultimately, this relation indicates that the conceptual informing by the understanding leads to an ordering of sense content as it is organized in the intuional forms of space and time. In this respect, McDowell seeks to demonstrate how this logical structure of the understanding implicit in an act of judgment can be

\textsuperscript{57} McDowell writes, ‘There is a temptation to supposes transcendental philosophy would have to be done at a standpoint external to that of the conceptual goings-on whose objective purport is to be vindicated—a standpoint at which one could contemplate the relation between those conceptual goings-on and their subject matter from sideways on. Sellars’s move fits this conception; he undertakes to vindicate the objective purport of conceptual occurrences from outside the conceptual order.’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.17

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Science and Metaphysics} p.9
extended into the intuitional representation and consequently to structure sensory consciousness.

For the understanding to be implicated in receptivity, it requires a certain type of engagement with the external manifold of sense. This engagement refers to the form of logical togetherness that is manifest in perceptual response to the presence of objects. The logical togetherness in receptivity is an extension of the peculiar form of togetherness in the exercise of judgment. McDowell argues that this logical togetherness in an independent act of judgment is itself extended into the perceptual response in intuitional representations. Since the intuitional manifold requires the operation of the understanding to be able to represent objects, it is inconceivable to take this manifold as independently providing content for perceptual experience without the mediation of concepts. To make this clear, McDowell draws from Kant’s derivation of pure concepts of the understanding where it is argued that the logical unity of concepts is the same unity exercised in intuitional representations. Kant states his understanding of this relation clearly in ‘Clue’:  

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be accomplished by general logic.59

As far as conceptual unity is involved in bringing logical structure into intuitional content, this unity is the same logical unity contained in an act of judgment. McDowell argues that Sellars’s construction of the role of sense impressions as yielding independent content for

59 *Critique of Pure Reason* A79/B105
the understanding, is not able to embrace the full import of Kant’s derivation of concepts as structuring intuitional manifold. To fully realize Kant’s theory of perceptual experience, intuitional content must be construed as already bounded by the spontaneous activity of understanding. But how can intuitional form be different from the understanding since intuitional form is constrained by the conceptual shaping of the understanding? McDowell’s answer is to conceive of intuitional presentation as an immediate presentness of objects to a subject. Through this immediate presentness, objects actualize the conceptual capacities of the understanding in intuitional representations with a peculiar mode of logical togetherness. The particular exercise of logical togetherness in intuitional representation is affected by the ‘same function’ that Kant attributes to the understanding. McDowell offers his reconstruction of Kant’s ‘Clue’:

The function that gives unity to the various representations in a judgment whose function content we can imagine capturing from the subject’s viewpoint as that there is a red cube there (the function that unites the various conceptual capacities exercised in such a judgment), or this (this comes to the same thing) the function that gives unity to the various representations in an ostensible seeing with the same content (the function that unites the various conceptual capacities actualized in such an ostensible seeing), is the same function that—in the sort of case in which there is an intuition; that is, in the sort of case in which ostensible seeing is a seeing—gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition of the red cube there or that red cube, to speak again from an imagined occupation of the subject’s viewpoint.60

Exercising the conceptual function of understanding in uniting intuitional content produces a counterpart of logical togetherness in that intuitional content. McDowell also seeks to extend this conceptual structuring of intuional manifold by the understanding to the sensory consciousness of objects. Thus, the conceptual informing of an intuional manifold

60 “The Logical Form of an Intuition” p.33
can account for the sensory presence of objects in perception without locating the deliverances of sense perception external to this manifold.

According to McDowell, Sellars’s mistake is not to exploit the content available in the intuitional manifold which is represented in demonstrative content that indicates the presence of complex particulars. This content is sufficient to account for the external constraint that guides perceptual activity. The motivation behind positing sheer receptivity is to find an external constraint for the conceptual activity of the understanding, and in effect to describe conceptual activity in terms of what is below the aforementioned line, but searching for an external constraint in McDowell’s argument does not require such external characterization of the relation between external manifold of sense and the understanding. The sensory consciousness of objects informed by a higher faculty of understanding can be taken as that which provides a constraint on perceptual activity. Outer intuition is informed by the understanding to bring objects into view without viewing the relation between outer intuition and the understanding as an external imposition on a manifold by ordering it, but rather this relation is suitably described as an internal relation between different types of engagement with the world. In both, receiving outer content or conceptual ordering of the understanding, the same form of togetherness is operative. In receiving outer content, the logical togetherness of perceptual experience does not act voluntarily but rather is imposed to perceptually respond to the presence of objects, whereas in the act of judgment this logical togetherness is exercised freely:

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61 McDowell defines his conception of external constraint as internal to the conceptual order of thinking, he defines it as follows, ‘The norms that constitute the content of empirical concepts are determinations, responsive to the specifics of the world as it presents itself to us, of norms that are internal to thinking as such. So the external constraint I have been talking about, constraint by objects, is authorized from within the practice of thinking, by norms that are constitutive of the practice’, ‘Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint’ p.105
As actualizations of conceptual capacities with the appropriate togetherness, the judgment and the ostensible seeing would be alike. They would differ only in the way in which the relevant conceptual capacities are actualized. In the judgment, there would be a free exercise of the conceptual capacities; in the ostensible seeing, they would be involuntarily drawn into operation under ostensible necessitation from an ostensibly seen object.62

The distinguishing feature of intuitional representation is the presence of objects immediately in the subject’s perceptual view which makes the understanding involuntarily actualizes its function in intuitional representation. For McDowell, instead of sheer receptivity or the mere flow of sensations, ostensible objects become the constraint in perceptual experience:

Sellars’s idea is that for thought to be intelligibly of objective reality, the conceptual representations involved in perceptual experience must be guided from without. And indeed they are, I can say. But there is no need for manifolds of “sheer receptivity” to play this guiding role. In a way we are now equipped to understand, given the conception of intuitions adumbrated in the passage from the “Clue”, the guidance is supplied by objects themselves, the subject matter of those conceptual representations, becoming immediately present to the sensory consciousness of the subjects of these conceptual goings-on.63

In this description, McDowell’s theory of perceptual experience defines how a perceptual experience can contain a claim about the world by virtue of having its perceptual content to be subsumed under the logical togetherness that operates in an act of judgment. In this way, perceptual claims purport to be about the world by including the content delivered from the sense which is conceptually mediated. Once the sensory consciousness of objects becomes informed by the spontaneity of the understanding, an objective relation with external objects is possible. Therefore, the logical structuring of the intuitional manifold by the understanding implies informing the sensory consciousness of perceptual objects.

In attributing to the logical structure of intuitional form the ability to sensibly present

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62 “The Logical Form of an Intuition” p.31
63 Ibid., p.39
objects in perceptual experience, McDowell interprets intuitional form in Kant’s view as entailing the sensory consciousness of objects. In this alternative interpretation, sense impressions do not occur independently of formal intuition but they guarantee the intentional directness of sensory consciousness by the conceptual informing of the understanding. The intentional directness of sensory consciousness is itself accounted by the intuitional form that is conceptually ordered by the understanding:

We can still say sensory consciousness contains sensations. But the intentionality of intuitions is accounted for by the fact that in intuitions sensory consciousness itself is informed by the higher faculty. The thinkings that provide for intentionality of perceptual cognitions are not guided by sensory consciousness, as it were from without. They are sensory consciousness, suitably informed.64

Since this intuitional form can account for the sensory consciousness, then—contra Sellars—there is no need for the forms of sheer receptivity. Sellars proposes that for the content of sheer receptivity to be able to guide conceptual activity, spatial and temporal forms of sensational content need to be posited. In contrast, McDowell argues that such sensational spatiality is neither demanded by Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, nor does it sufficiently play the constraining role on perceptual experience.65 In this case, Sellars’s strategy of modelling sense content on intuitional form by analogical extension is not required because the sensory consciousness of objects in intuitional manifold informed by a higher faculty is the only content that can serve to constrain perceptual experience. Thus Sellars’s aim of directly characterizing this sensational content by taking intuitional forms as analogical models for constructing sense impressions does not succeed in so far as this modelling relation between intuional forms and sense impressions seeks to give

64 “Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars” p.119
65 “The Logical Form of an Intuition” p.29
direct specifications of the external manifold of sense. Alternatively, McDowell contends that it is possible to provide an indirect specification of this outer manifold by abstracting from its intentional directness in relation with intuitional forms:

On this view, the sensory aspect of perceptual consciousness of objects is not secured by items that by virtue of autonomous sensational properties, guide other elements in perceptions into having certain intentional contents. The relevant items are possessors of intentional content, but considered under an abstraction from their intentionality. So the indirect style of specification for their sensational character is perfectly legitimate.66

McDowell’s method of indirect specification of sensations by abstraction from intentional directness, proceeds differently from Sellars’s analogical extension that ascribes to sensations formal and structural attributes given intuitional forms. The alternative method proposed by McDowell omits from sensations their role as cognition enablers and considers them to be mere affections of sensibility.67 McDowell argues that this method does not need to consider sensations as playing the cognitive role of constraining perceptual experience, and in this case indirect specification does not ascribe formal structure to sensations:

In this picture, spatial specificity figures in the complete truth about items that are visual sensations, but not in descriptions of their character as sensations. There is no need for the purely sensational spatiality whose absence from Kant Sellars complains about. And there is another respect in which this picture promises to line up more closely with Kant than Sellars can manage. In this picture, the idea of magnitude gets a rip on sensations as such, only in the guise of intensive magnitude.68

McDowell finds that his method of indirectly specifying sensations fits more with Kant’s intention. This specification avoids reconstructing sense impressions in specific models, since it ultimately results in ascribing to them a cognitive function independently of their

66 “Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars” p.120
67 Ibid., p.121
68 Ibid.
occurrence in sensory consciousness which is informed by a higher faculty of the understanding.

One essential attribute of immediate perceptual experience is to have objects presented sensibly to the subject. The immediate presence of objects entails the occurrence of sensations by affecting the subject in some manner. But can this affective relation between subject and external objects be defined as an extension of the subject’s ability to judge? McDowell argues that Kant’s conception of perceptual experience, in the relation between the intuitional manifold and the logical use of understanding, can provide a way to answer this question. Kant’s fundamental idea of intuitional form reflects a form that brings the sensory and given content of perception into a spatial and temporal organization. The logical use of understanding makes the temporal and spatial orders explicit by spontaneously unifying spatiality and temporality. Without this intuitional order conferred on perceptual content, an immediate relation with objects cannot be guaranteed.

Both Sellars and McDowell make certain assumptions in their interpretations of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis. One fundamental assumption is that sense content as an external constraint can be shaped and appropriated by the understanding. Sellars assumes that the sense content of sheer receptivity is structured by models taken from the conceptual synthesis of understanding in his method of analogical extension. Sheer receptivity is introduced by this analogy with public models of physical objects in logical space of reasons. In the case of Kant’s conceptions of perceptual experience, these models are intuitional forms of space and time that are ascribed to receptive content. McDowell assumes that the understanding is already operating in the intuitional manifold except in the case of intuitional representation, and the understanding is actualized involuntarily. He
considers the formal structure of intuitional representation as sufficient to represent the sensory content of perception, and for this reason there is no requirement to posit a unique form of receptivity. Both interpretations, I will argue, are incorrect in positing an external constraint that is essentially appropriated and introduced through synthesis of concepts. In Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, there is an external constraint provided by the sensations, but this constraint on perceptual experience is not shaped by the understanding or the figurative synthesis of intuitional forms—it is given externally in the synthesis of apprehension.
Kant on Perceptual Experience

I will argue in the following that Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis can be examined in three different phases. The first is by an elaboration on Kant’s logical structure of intuition in the temporal schematization of concepts. Concepts are schematized in intuional manifold by the productive synthesis of imagination in its schematic function. The schematic exhibition of concepts in the intuitional manifold does not conceptually convert or inform the formal constraints of perceptual experience but it seeks to let concepts be exhibited in intuional manifold. The second phase is to examine Kant’s conception of inner sense by finding the distinguishing content provided in inner sense. This distinguishing content of inner sense is the perspectival aspect of perceptual experience. The third phase concerns the synthesis of apprehension or the sensory intake of experience in Kant’s conception of perceptual experience. I will argue that the constraining function of sense content is manifest in the intensive structure of sensations which resists the conceptual shaping of empirical intensive consciousness.

The Logical Structure of the Intuitional Manifold

In order to understand Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, it is important to reconstruct the fundamental notion of synthesis. Synthesis is of central significance in the Transcendental Deduction of Categories of *Critique of Pure Reason*⁶⁹ where the pure and logical function of the understanding is examined in relation to sensible intuition. Kant argues that experience is constituted by two fundamental components through which

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⁶⁹ In the rest I will use the standard method of referring to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* in either A edition or B edition of the First *Critique*.
objective experience becomes possible. These two constitutive parts of experience are the understanding and sensibility. As sensibility provides outer matter, the understanding gives unity and order to this sensible content. Through such cooperation, experience attains objective content about outer reality. Perceptual synthesis involves how this relation of form and matter or spontaneity and receptivity can be construed. In making the distinction between form and matter in perceptual experience, Kant does not imply that matter provided through sensibility is a confused conceptual representation or that pure concept can be extracted from sensory matter. This distinction shows how concepts acquire real content in experience and that the content is acquired by having matter in sensible intuition. In acquiring content, conceptual articulation becomes essentially related to sensible objects given in the intuitional manifold. Kant calls this act of relating concepts to the intuitional manifold an act of synthesis by which the understanding informs the given and sensible objects.

An act of synthesis must be understood as the necessary relation that concepts must have with objects in sensible intuition to acquire real content. This relation is construed to be between concepts and the manifold of images rather than concepts and the pure intuitional forms of space and time. The conceptual structuring of the pure form of intuition does not provide content for concepts in representing the real in space. In order to have objective content, concepts must reach the material given in sensible intuition, which is done through the intuited manifold in empirical intuition rather than in pure forms of intuition.

70 'If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no objects object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought.' B75/A51
This does not imply a rejection of the distinction between matter and form in the intuitional representation, but it attempts to make sense of the idea that concepts acquire real content in relation to the sensory manifold given in an intuitional content instead of taking real content to be acquired by relating concepts to the pure form of intuitions. Pure intuition possesses metrical structure that allows it to provide an independent content distinct from concepts but such content does not by itself provide a real relation with objects in outer sense. Sense impressions must be brought into spatial and temporal to make this connection with sensible objects possible. This function recognizes the distinct matter given in the intuitional manifold. In recognizing this material content of intuitional representation, the imaginative synthesis schematizes the category of reality as signifying something real in intuition that is resistant to the conceptual structuring of the understanding. Therefore, in order to have this sensory matter within intuitional representation, it is not by attending merely to the pure form of intuition—there also has to be a recognition of affective content given from outside.

Synthesis of intuitional manifold provides content for concepts. The idea of having content through synthesis of sensible intuition is found in Kant’s argument of the Transcendental Deduction where he argues in effect that the intuitional manifold is necessarily subject to the categorical synthesis. Arguing that concepts necessarily relate to sensible intuition in the Deduction does not provide the rules for subjecting intuitional forms to the categories, since the procedures for subjecting the intuitional forms to concepts is fully explicated in the Schematism. Both in the Transcendental Deduction and Schematism, Kant contends that objective content of experience is given by the cooperation of intuition and concepts. In demonstrating how concepts are essentially related to the
intuitional manifold, Kant defines synthesis as the act of putting different representations in one cognition:

By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. Such synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the content is concerned. The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or a priori) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition.\(^\text{71}\)

Mere analysis of concepts does not make a contentful contribution to experience. To acquire content is to relate concepts to the synthesis of intuition either in a priori manner or empirically in the sensible synthesis. But this synthesis also involves imparting unity and structure on this manifold by ‘comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition’. Thus, synthesis can be generally described as uniting the manifold by putting different representations together and then recognizing this composed manifold as one cognition. Having content is then understood as relating to real objects in space and time, and it does not only exhibit pure geometrical shapes and figures in imaginative content. Geometrical content cannot by itself establish an intentional relation with outer objects since it can be detached from the actual sensory presence of objects. Yet, there are intuitive and formal constraints in representing ostensive objects in pure space. For this reason the constraints built into the forms of the intuitional representations must be distinguished from the external constraint of material content provided externally in the manifold of sensations.\(^\text{72}\)

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\(^\text{71}\) B103/B78
\(^\text{72}\) These formal constraints in representing pure intuition are given in the Transcendental Aesthetic by Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time.
In this case, synthesizing an empirical manifold brings objects into perceptual view that makes the contact with outer objects possible. However, Kant adds an important point about synthesis in mere intuition:

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be accomplished by general logic.\(^{73}\)

Since this point plays major roles in both of Sellars's and McDowell's interpretations, it is important to examine its relation with the Transcendental Deduction where this ‘same function’ acquires a different role by conferring unity to the intuitional manifold. Concepts give unity and order to the manifold. The involvement of a conceptual act in intuitional representation does not erode the fundamental distinction between spontaneity and receptivity. In fact, this conceptual involvement in receptivity or the intuitional manifold is essentially about relating conceptual content to the manifold rather than elevating this intuitional manifold to be cognized as conceptual content. Affirming this necessary relation with sensible intuition does not imply taking the manifold as potentially convertible into conceptual content as such, or taking it to be a relation of subject and predicate. This construal misses Kant's essential point about synthesizing the sensible intuition in relation to conceptual content. Mere synthesis of intuition does not constitute a logical relation among concepts. It involves extending beyond analysis or conceptual articulation to bring objects into view in outer intuition. As for the ‘same function’ it refers to an act of making a

\(^{73}\text{A79/B105}\)
judgment, but it does not essentially refer to a conceptual act. Kant gives this characterization in describing the pure understanding:

The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding. In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances.  

As apperception connects with the synthesis of imagination in producing unity in the synthesis of the intuitional manifold, apperception acts as pure understanding. In this case, the ‘same function’ can refer to a pre-discursive act of unifying the intuitional manifold instead of taking it to subsume the manifold under judgmental content. In conferring unity on the intuitional manifold by the unity of apperception, the apperceptive act acquires a different role of conceptualizing this manifold as a manifold and this is possible via pure understanding. In the act of synthesizing the manifold, the understanding functions through the imaginative synthesis and in this process of bringing the manifold into a relation with pure understanding, the forms of intuition—space and time—become determined and structured. This is clear in this passage:

For the standing and lasting I (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlate of all of our representations, so far as it is merely possible to become conscious of them, and all consciousness belongs to an all-embracing pure apperception just as all sensible intuition as representation belong to a pure inner intuition, namely that of time. It is this apperception that must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its function intellectual. For in itself the synthesis of imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle. Through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, however, concepts that belong to the

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74 A119
75 Here I follow Beatrice Longuenesse in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, and Wayne Waxman in *Kant’s Model of Mind*. Both authors attribute this ‘same function’ either to the capacity to judge as it is the case with Longuenesse (p.146/p.224), or to prediscursive original unity of apperception in Waxman’s interpretation (p.101). In each case, the ‘same function’ does not refer to a conceptual or predicative structure that is extended to sensible intuition.
understanding can come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation to the sensible intuition.\textsuperscript{76}

It is evident in Kant’s Deduction that an apperceptive act becomes conceptual once it is engaged with the productive synthesis of imagination in structuring the external manifold of sense. This enforces the idea that the understanding does not function predicatively as it seeks to subsume the intuitional manifold under its conceptual content, instead it is a matter of finding external content that is essentially extra-logico-logical. The determination of the intuitional content is not an internal conversion or enlargement of conceptual content, because this would imply that concepts cannot relate to actual and external matter that constitutes their content:

For every concept there is requisite, first, the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in general, and then, second, the possibility of giving it an object to which it is to be related. Without this latter it has no sense, and it entirely empty of content, even though it may still contain the logical function for making a concept out of whatever sort of data there. Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition, and, even if a pure intuition is possible \textit{a priori} prior to the object, then even this can acquire its object, thus its objective validity, only through empirical intuition, of which it is the mere form. Thus all concepts and with them all principles, however, \textit{a priori} they may be, are nevertheless related to empirical intuitions, i.e., to date of possible experience. Without this they have no objective validity at all, but are rather a mere play, whether it be with representations of the imagination or of the understanding.\textsuperscript{77}

In securing a reference to empirical intuition, concepts become objectively valid in relation to possible experience. Equally important, this reference to the intuitional manifold in objective experience for concepts to acquire its proper content is constitutive of the relation of the understanding to possible experience. The understanding does not operate freely and without any constraint since Kant suggests that if the function of understanding

\textsuperscript{76} A124
\textsuperscript{77} A239/B298
is to reach actual objects then a relation with empirical intuition must be essential to supply this content.

Defining synthesis as the act of putting different representations in one cognition and then recognizing the manifold as a manifold by combining the elements of that manifold, indicates that for a synthesis to yield knowledge of actual objects, it has to go beyond the mere passive reception of sensory data. For this to be possible, a synthesis must determine the manifold in a manner that does not entirely depend on the contingent sensory relation that a subject might have with ostensible objects and also to recognize that an a priori component of experience is operative in the perception of objects. Since it is argued that the sense content in the intuitional manifold is what determines the content of concepts, then it is crucial to explain how such a relation with matter provided externally in sense content makes actual contact with reality. The understanding informs this manifold through the formal intuition that is given and imposed on the manifold of sensations. The relation of matter and form in intuitional representation is sustained even if conceptual structuring by the understanding seems to inform only the form of pure intuition. However, such informing by the understanding does not limit itself only to the formal intuitional structure of the manifold, but as Kant argues, this conceptual structuring extends to the material contributed by sensory contact with outer objects in perceptual experience. Characterization of these formal constraints in perceptual experience that are contributed by the subject in pure intuition as a priori forms of experience must not entail that experience is an empty and formal play of representations. Kant’s conception of experience as cooperation of receptivity and spontaneity involves explaining how material given by outer reality can be incorporated in perceptual synthesis. This is possible by examining
how the matter of intuitional representation is structured in relation to formal intuition. In contrast to Sellars’s interpretation, the formal intuition cannot be extended through analogical construction to the receptive content, but it has to be exhibited schematically in the manifold of sensations through the productive synthesis of imagination. Similarly, McDowell’s description of the intuitional manifold as involving conceptual content becoming perceptually constrained by involuntary responses to objects, cannot do justice to the matter given in the intuitional manifold because it assumes that the formal constraints of intuitional representation are sufficient to bring ostensible objects into view. Both Sellars and McDowell fail to appreciate the difference between concepts and images of objects given in experience that Kant emphasizes. Equally important, they tend to assimilate intuitional form into the schemas given in pure productive imagination. To examine this feature of intuitional representation as consisting of formal constraints in Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, it is significant to turn to his idea of the schematic exhibition of concepts in pure intuition. This notion of schematic exhibition is elaborated by Kant in Schematism and the construction of mathematical concepts in pure intuition. Through schematism and construction in pure intuition, Kant provides an outline of how the understanding functions to provide conceptual content in the imaginative synthesis of the intuitional form.

Since the Transcendental Deduction establishes that experience essentially involves the use and application of pure concepts, and the categories of the understanding objectively determine the content of experience through the influence of the understanding on inner sense, Kant in the Schematism seeks to give an outline of the procedures that make this application possible. He *presumes* the applicability of concepts to experience as established
in the Deduction, but now Kant is addressing the question of how this application can be performed. He is challenged by the fact that pure concepts are heterogeneous in relation to the intuitional manifold.\textsuperscript{78} In pointing out that concepts do not share a common structure with intuitional representation, Kant is not thereby claiming that concepts cannot be applied to the intuitional manifold, but rather stating that a pure concept cannot be encountered experientially in an actual intuitional representation. For instance, it is not possible to refer to perceptual experience as instantiating a causal relation.\textsuperscript{79} The inability of the categorical structure of pure concepts to be demonstrated explicitly and directly in experience is due to the structure of the intuitional manifold which cannot serve the function of indicating the presence of a pure concept, whereas empirical concepts can be used extensionally to refer to a definite class that instantiates it. This procedure for concepts to be involved in the unification of the given content in intuitional representation requires what Kant calls a subsumption of concepts in the manifold of intuition.\textsuperscript{80} In this procedure, concepts function to unify the manifold of intuitions. But to achieve the objective of unification, the productive synthesis of imagination seeks to bring the manifold represented in the intuitional form into a mode of determination and structure that allows the subject to cognize outer content through it. The role of imaginative synthesis is manifest in the influence of the understanding on inner sense which brings the content of

\textsuperscript{78}‘Now pure concepts of the understanding, however, in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely un-homogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition. Now, how is the subsumption of the latter under the former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearances?’ A137/B176
\textsuperscript{79}A138/B177
\textsuperscript{80}A138/B177
inner sense into relation with apperception.\textsuperscript{81} In this latter act, the understanding confersunity on the intuitional manifold. The true function of the productive synthesis ofimagination in Kant’s conception of perceptual experience is difficult to discern since it isunclear whether imagination is essentially conceptual in applying concepts to outerintuition or only limited to the production of intuitional representations and thestructuring of forms of intuition. In essence, the productive synthesis of imagination andwhat Kant in the Transcendental Deduction calls a figurative synthesis is conceptual in itsschematic function whereby concepts work to unify the intuitional manifold,\textsuperscript{82} but theimaginative synthesis is not purely conceptual in its process of synthesizing forms ofintuition. This process of synthesizing the forms of intuition depends on representing theseforms within the empirical manifold of intuition.\textsuperscript{83} The distinction of schematic functionand synthesis of the manifold in the different tasks of the productive imagination is notexplicit in Kant. But that distinction can be taken to refer to different steps in one act ofsynthesis.

\textsuperscript{81} ‘That which determines inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuitions, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception (as that on which its very possibility rests)... thus its synthesis [the understanding] considered by itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of intuition. Under the designation of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, it therefore exercises that action on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, about which we rightly say that the inner sense thereby affected’, B153

\textsuperscript{82} For Kant, the schema that underlies pure and sensible concepts (A140/B180), is a product of the imaginative synthesis, ‘The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination’ (A140/B179).

\textsuperscript{83} In A120 note in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explicitly links imagination to perception, ‘No psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is so partly because this faculty has been limited to reproduction, and partly because it has been believed that the senses do not merely afford us impressions but also put them together, and produce images of objects, for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of impressions is required, namely a function of the synthesis of them’. This synthesis of impressions is essentially processed by the imagination in structuring formal intuitions, but this structuring only becomes conceptual in the schematization of concepts.
The schematic function of the productive synthesis of imagination becomes essential to inform the images of the empirical content in perceptual experience. The content of intuitional representation is determined in relation to the conceptual role of the understanding. It is commonly misconstrued that this schematic relation involves relating pure intuition to empirical intuition.\textsuperscript{84} It also often misunderstood that the relation constructs the synthesis of imagination in the process of schematizing concepts as seeking to ‘convert’ the forms of intuition into a different mode of content by elevating them to a higher form of conceptualization.\textsuperscript{85} Both of these interpretations are incorrect either in taking the schemata to be represented in the form of intuition or conceiving that is possible convert these forms to conceptual order. For Kant, the externality and independence of forms of intuition from the understanding is essential for having perceptual experience. The conversion of intuitional forms into forms of representation that are internally shaped by the understanding cannot make sense in Kant’s theory of pure intuition. Pure intuition is essentially a non-conceptual representation that provides content independently of the understanding. In the Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant argues that spatial and temporal forms of intuition are not given conceptually.\textsuperscript{86} These intuitional forms of representation depend neither on having concepts nor on receptivity of sensations—pure forms of space

\textsuperscript{84} In \textit{Kant, Ontology, and the A Priori}, Moltke S. Gram considers this relation to be between empirical intuition and pure intuition. He takes pure intuition to be the mediating schema (p.103-4). In \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism}, Henry Allison maintains that formal intuition can serve as the mediating schema. He argues that pure intuition cannot function as transcendental time determination, since it is insufficient for determining objects in time, whereas formal intuition of temporality possesses this indirect determining function of objects (p.216-7). I believe Allison’s interpretation suffers from the same problem of taking pure intuition as a mediating schema because this intuitional content becomes in either interpretations potentially shaped and constructed by figurative synthesis in its conceptual function.

\textsuperscript{85} In \textit{Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction}, Richard Aquila argues for what he calls the reductive analysis of the distinction between intuition and concepts. Intuition in this interpretation is elevated or converted to conceptualization by attending to the formal structure in intuitional form (p.57).

\textsuperscript{86} A25/A32.
and time are given a priori in experience.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{87}} The apriority of both intuitional forms is significant in Kant’s metaphysical expositions in Transcendental Aesthetics, but the role of pure intuition in cognition does not lose its importance in experience as Kant proceeds in the Analytic of the \textit{Critique} since he places more emphasis on the understanding in shaping the forms of intuition. The reason for conflating pure intuition with schemata is that this interpretation of the schematic process of imagination takes the understanding to be composing or constructing forms of intuitional representation and thereby the pure intuitional forms becomes dependent on conceptual structuring of the understanding. To the contrary, the schematic function of imagination does not construct formal intuition itself or impose it on the empirical manifold, but its function is to schematically exhibit formal content in perceptual experience by abstracting it from the manifold of sensations or disengaging the formal content from sensations.\textsuperscript{88} Schematic exhibition of the imagination does not aim to produce this formal structure of experience itself through the conceptual shaping of the understanding since this would result in making the construction of concepts in pure intuition a dispensable and unnecessary requirement for having experience. This goes against the essential role of constructing concepts in pure intuition which Kant takes to be giving content for synthesis. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that having the formal structure of experience exhibited through imaginative synthesis does not by itself constitute real content that represents the real in space and time. The formal constraints of perceptual experience do not provide actual content for experiencing objects despite being essential for constructing concepts in pure intuition. It can be argued

\textsuperscript{87} A23/B38, A31/B47
\textsuperscript{88} In \textit{Kant’s Intuitionism}, Lorne Falkenstein argues that figurative synthesis is a combination of tracing and outlining the boundaries of space and time rather than constructing them in conceptual synthesis (p.98-9).
that constructing concepts in pure intuition essentially involves the production of images for the empirical content of experience through the essential relation that synthesis of imagination has with the synthesis of apprehension.

As mentioned above, the process of schematizing concepts confronts the problem of heterogeneity between pure concepts and intuitional forms. The purpose of such schematizing is to outline of how this process is performed via the function of the productive synthesis of imagination. In schematizing concepts in intuitional manifold, the productive synthesis of imagination seeks to delineate the pure and formal structure in the manifold and to subsume them under the conceptual synthesis. In so far as the dual functions of imaginative synthesis are concerned, there must be a third mediating representation called a ‘transcendental schema’ to make the subsumption of the concepts possible. The only candidate for this mediation role is the temporal form of intuition. Kant gives the reason for choosing the temporal form to play the role of schematic mediation:

The concept of the understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental time-determination is homogenous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogenous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.\(^{89}\)

Characterizing time as the medium through which the schematization of the concept of understanding in sensible appearance becomes possible does not seem sufficient because there is no clear reason for choosing this temporal form to be the medium. There is no

\(^{89}\)A139/B178
indication of how time is homogenous with pure concepts of the understanding. In this case, Kant does not give one general account of how temporality is attached to all categories. Rather he gives a description for each category regarding the way it modifies temporality when it is schematized in sensible appearance. For instance, in schematizing the category of causality, Kant gives it a temporal ‘translation’ which states ‘The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule’. In this respect, there is no one definite temporal translation that underlies all categories, but translations are given for each category. Regarding the sensible content of temporal form, it is clear in Kant’s theory of intuitional form that time underlies empirical representation since it is the form of inner sense. Therefore by translating categorical content into a temporal structure, the categories become schematized in the sensible content of appearances. For instance, in modifying temporal form in relation to the sensible content given in the intuitional manifold, the concepts of understanding are essentially given temporal content involving the time successiveness, which is represented experientially. Temporal successiveness then essentially becomes the medium for the schematization. This suggests that a temporal form is exhibited in a specific temporal image of successiveness where this temporal form exhibited in empirical images of objects makes the schematization of concepts possible. But before elaborating on the temporal medium exhibited in sensible content, it is important to explain Kant’s distinction between schemas and images.

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90 A144/B183
In defining schema, Kant seems to be unclear about how schema can be different from concepts. A concept brings unity to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition while a schema is the procedure to bring this concept to bear on an individual intuition. Whether a schema is itself the procedure that unifies the manifold or only a mediating representation for concepts to be applied to sensible intuitional content, what seems evident in Kant’s description is that concepts require rules and procedures for their application to the manifold. It is possible for schemas to be the rules for unifying the manifold of intuition since schemas can potentially be represented as concepts without their temporal individuating conditions.\footnote{It can inferred that Kant’s definition of schema as only existing in thought which grounds ‘our pure sensible concepts’, that schemas are concepts when there is no temporalization of its content in relation to sensible intuition. \emph{A141}/\emph{B181}} Evidently, Kant ascribes to schemas a conceptual content but this is possible only when schemas are abstracted from the individuating conditions that are implicit in their application to sensible intuition. Kant defines a schema as a product of the imagination:

The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image.\footnote{\emph{A140}/\emph{B179}}

In Kant’s reasoning, since the pure synthesis of imagination has no other objective other than \emph{a priori} determination of the forms of sensibility, then it is not directly engaged with a particular intuitional representation. The empirical content of individual intuition cannot be the schema by which a concept can adequately be represented through. In fact, images are inadequate for representing the generality contained in conceptual representations.
For instance, Kant argues that a triangle cannot be given a particular representation in images:

No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not attain the generality of concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere.\textsuperscript{93}

This indicates Kant’s understanding of the difference between schemas and images in imaginative synthesis. Evidently schemas can retain the generality of conceptual content whereas images lack the generality intended to be represented in the intuitional manifold.

Kant gives the following explanation for the difference between an image and a schema:

Thus, if I place five points in a row, . . . . ., this is an image of the number five. On the contrary, if I only think a number in general, which could be five or a hundred, this thinking is more the a representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in an image in accordance with a certain concept than an image itself, which in this case I could survey and compare with the concept only with difficulty. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept.\textsuperscript{94}

Schemas only give the rules for representing concepts in possible experience, but images cannot serve this purpose since they carry particular and sensory content. Kant attributes the production of images to the empirical aspect of the synthesis of imagination, whereas schemas are produced in accordance with the \textit{a priori} form of sensibility that is temporal form.\textsuperscript{95} Since images are produced in the empirical component of imaginative synthesis, the schemas are generated in the pure synthesis of imagination. Although this might not

\textsuperscript{93} A141/B180

\textsuperscript{94} A140/B179/80

\textsuperscript{95} ‘We can say only this much: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive synthesis, the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure \textit{a priori} imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concepts, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate’ A141-2/B181.
provide a guide to see how schemas, as rules for representing concepts in the manifold, operate to bring concepts to bear on the manifold of intuition except by a priori determination of the form of inner sense, there is a way to make this schematizing function of imagination bear on the actual and empirical content of perceptual experience—through recognizing the material and sensational content of images in empirical intuition. Recognition of the material content of perception will later be elucidated in the examination of Anticipations of Perception, but for now Kant’s notion of the schematic exhibition of concepts in pure intuition can illustrate that the formal component does not supervene on the material and empirical content of perceptual experience because it involves exhibiting this formal content in the sensory manifold. In other words, the understanding shapes the form of ostensible object that is exhibited in the image of outer objects. Since a schema is an a priori determination of sensibility by productive synthesis of imagination, this a priori determination reaches empirical content through the informing of the form represented in the empirical manifold. In this case, there is no requirement for relating the empirical content to formal intuitions by constructing models of these intuitional forms that can be analogically extended to receptive content. This construal misses Kant’s point about schematic exhibition of formal content in the synthesis of imagination. As images of outer sense are given temporal content through the relation of successiveness represented in the experiential content of perception, the schematic function of the productive synthesis of imagination ‘temporalizes’ the categorical concepts in relation to this representation of successiveness in outer images. The imaginative synthesis does not determine the temporal form itself. The temporal form is determined as it is exhibited in the manifold of sensations. One of the reasons behind this interpretation
of the form of intuition as constituted by conceptual role of the understanding is to take the pure forms of intuitional representation to be produced in geometrical construction which essentially depends on the conceptual and inferential function of the understanding. Kant does not construe pure intuitions as generated from geometrical or ostensive constructions but rather in his account this intuitive representation is originally given.\textsuperscript{96} In the Transcendental Aesthetic, and especially in the Metaphysical Exposition of the concept of space, Kant illustrates what he intends by labelling the aesthetic concept of space as a pure non-conceptual intuition:

Space is not a discursive or, as it said, general concept of relation of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an \textit{a priori} intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it. Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition and indeed derived \textit{a priori} with apodictic certainty.\textsuperscript{97}

A spatial form of intuition grounds all geometrical concepts generated in geometrical and conceptual constructions. This geometrical construction proceeds to imaginatively exhibit formal intuition in pure geometrical shapes and figures as designating a grounding intuitive representation that warrants and constrains the process of generating spatial and ostensive objects. To construct a concept in pure intuition is to provide an outer figural image that gives it figurative content. This figurative content expresses universal validity which is represented by a particular intuition. However, this construction works through

\textsuperscript{96} Here I follow Daniel Warren in his paper “Kant and the Apriority of Space”, and Lisa Shabel in “Reflections in Kant’s Concept (and Intuition) of Space”. Both argue that the apriority of spatial form cannot be accounted for by the conceptual and inferential relations of concepts and especially in geometrical construction.

\textsuperscript{97} A25/B39
limitations of the general aesthetic concept of space and does not function by subsuming the general and original representation of spatial form under the conceptual synthesis in constructing a concept in pure intuition. The figurative content relevant for geometrical construction is expressed in the non-empirical and formal content of intuitional manifold. Kant explicates the method of this mathematical or geometrical construction:

But to construct a concept means to exhibit *a priori* the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical intuition is required, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual object, but must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a general representation), expresses in the representation universal validity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting an object corresponding to this concept, either through mere imagination, in pure intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely *a priori*, without having had to borrow the pattern for it from any experience. The individual drawn figure is empirical, and nevertheless serves to express the concept without damage to it universality, for in this case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of the act of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of the magnitude of the sides and angles, are entirely indifferent, and thus we have abstracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept of the triangle’. [emphasis added]98

In this process of constructing figures and shapes in pure spatial intuition, the formal structure of pure intuition is schematically exhibited as it is abstracted from the accidental and irrelevant content of empirical intuition. There is no imposition of external content on the sensory and material provided in sensible intuition. The geometrical construction in pure intuition operates to exhibit the necessary features in empirical intuition for generating ostensive objects that provide a geometer with content. It was indicated above that synthesis for Kant does not acquire real content in representing the formal features of empirical intuition, but rather intentional relation with outer objects in space and time must be provided in the manifold of sensations. For Kant, the construction of concepts in pure intuition does not necessarily function independently of the empirical synthesis of

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98 A714/B742
apprehension, since the productive synthesis of imagination is inseparable from the
synthesis of apprehension:

Now that space is a formal *a priori* condition of outer experiences, that this very same
formative synthesis by means of which we construct a figure in imagination is entirely
identical with that which we exercise in the apprehension of an appearance in order to
make a concept of experience of it.\(^9^9\)

The objective content of perceptual experience contains a manifold of sensations as well as
the formal and intuitional constraints which is given in pure intuition, yet this latter formal
content of intuition is insufficient to represent outer content in perception because this
also requires representing material reality in space and time. However, this formal
intuition is only exhibited schematically in this manifold of sensations in the process of
constructing concepts in pure intuition. In this case, there is no need for formal intuition to
be supplemented or imposed on receptive content by analogical models that warrant the
exhibition of these formal constraints in the external manifold of sense. The notion of
abstracting formal intuition from accidental or irrelevant content in empirical intuition
does not imply that this abstraction involves elevating or converting the formal content of
empirical intuition into a higher mode of representation. Rather it is merely about
attending to the act of representing them whereby the formal features of intuitional
representation become imaginatively exhibited. So far, the following conclusion can be
drawn, that the schematic process of productive synthesis of imagination does not
subsume pure intuition under the conceptual synthesis of the understanding to make pure
intuitional representation possible, and the geometrical construction in pure intuition
operates by limiting the intuitive original representation that is provided *a priori*. For this

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\(^9^9\) *A224/B271*
reason formal intuition is not produced conceptually but rather is exhibited schematically in sensible intuition, and this schematization allows a subject to attend or abstract the formal content of representation. The understanding in its ostensive construction of concepts aims to represent these formal features in the manifold of sensations and in the outer images of objects that are given as temporal images of successiveness. In this case, a transcendental schema of time-determination does not refer to the pure formal intuition of time, because the pure temporal form itself is not determined by the understanding in the schematic function of the imagination. That which is determined and structured by the schematizing process is the particular temporal form as it is exhibited in the manifold of sensations.

Contra Sellars, it can argued that intuitional forms need not be supplemented externally to the manifold of sensations via the analogical models of space and time, since the conceptual informing of the understanding reaches receptive and empirical content in a schematic exhibition of formal content in sensible intuition. In McDowell’s interpretation, he allows the formal constraints in intuitional representations to sufficiently provide empirical content for perception. But since these formal constraints for McDowell are conceptually shaped in the manner that they are purely given by the understanding, this leaves no space for the material content of perception to figure as actual content given to the subject. In this alternative interpretation, the schematic exhibition of concepts in the intuitional manifold does not subsume the temporal form itself under conceptual and categorical synthesis. Rather it merely attends to formal constraints of intuitional form and to exhibit them in specific outer images of ostensible objects where this modification of
temporal successiveness in perceptual experience can schematize concepts in empirical intuition.

**Kant on the Content of Inner Sense**

The act of representing the formal content of sensible intuition involves the affection of inner sense by the understanding through the imaginative synthesis. In this act of representing the temporal form of inner sense, the process of schematic imagination defines and determines the manifold of inner intuition. In his conception of inner sense, Kant ascribes to it a temporal form that is distinct from outer sense which is defined as possessing a spatial form. In outer sense, a spatial manifold provides the manifold of sensations as spatially arrayed, whereas inner sense is structured in the temporal form of successiveness. In the unification of the inner manifold of sense, the imaginative synthesis determines what is already contained in that manifold. As the conceptual determination of the understanding acts on this inner manifold, it confers unity for the purpose of representing the content of the manifold. However, this manifold of inner sense contains a temporal form that requires external analogy given in outer sense. The dependency of inner sense on spatial outer sense to acquire content is significant to examine since the manifold of inner sense constitutes the material by which the conceptual synthesis of the understanding and through the synthesis of imagination determines the manifold of sensations. The manner by which this outer sense provides content for inner sense is crucial for understanding how perceptual synthesis reaches ostensible objects.

In the geometrical construction of concepts in pure intuition, the formal constraints of empirical intuitions are exhibited to demonstrate the necessary features represented in
empirical intuition that are required for the geometrical construction to give content for mathematical concepts in pure intuition. The geometrical construction of pure figures in the spatial manifold schematizes concepts by effecting inner sense. Temporal form in intuition is the mediating representation whereby the schematization of concepts in sensible intuitions is possible. For this reason, the content of inner sense is important in the process of schematizing concepts or in exhibiting the formal content in sensible intuition. In the Schematism, Kant argues that since time is the form of inner sense, then it is through this form that the pure category exhibits itself in schematic imagination and it is through this exhibition that inner sense must be determined. This construction of concepts in the schematic function of imaginative synthesis is given an elaborate description by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction of Categories, where he explains how this effect on the inner sense by the imaginative synthesis confers unity on the manifold of sensible intuition. It was indicated above, that the imaginative synthesis or the figurative synthesis of imagination gives content to the images of temporal content represented in manifold of successiveness by exhibiting the formal constraints of intuitional representation. Since this schematic exhibition does not modify the temporal form itself but rather the temporal form as it is represented in a specific manifold of sensations, then this schematic exhibition must be related to the specific mode of temporal successiveness in empirical intuition. Concepts therefore become schematized in sensible appearances. Empirical intuition contains temporal relations that are abstracted to be the formal content that a subject attends to in order to attain the generality exhibited in empirical intuition. This feature of Kant’s concept of inner sense, as being determined by the imaginative synthesis acting on its temporal

100 A142/B181
structure, is also examined in the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant explains how inner sense is determined by imaginative synthesis.

In determining the inner manifold of intuition, Kant provides a general idea of how this inner manifold acquires its content. For inner sense to have content, it must be mediated by spatial form given in outer sense. Such spatial mediation is required because inner sense lacks the content given in receptivity. For instance, in effecting inner sense by imaginative synthesis, the form of this inner sense becomes determined, and this determination requires the act of a subject in having the figurative content of the intuitional manifold given externally. Kant illustrates this notion of an external and spatial mediation:

We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point, and we cannot even represent time without, in drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense.¹⁰¹

Determining the inner manifold of sense involves two steps, first giving external content to the inner manifold of sense through the spatial analogy of a straight line, and second attending to this act itself in determination of the manifold. As this external content given by outer sense is received, the inner sense is affected at the same time by the synthesis of imagination. But the important point here pertains to whether inner sense possesses content that is independent from the outer sense. How does spatial content contribute to the introduction of the temporal image of successiveness in inner sense? Kant gives an explication:

¹⁰¹ B154
Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend only to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the concept of succession at all.\textsuperscript{102}

Motion does not refer to the motion of empirical objects, but rather as defined by Kant, it is a description of space that is a successive synthesis of the outer manifold in spatial intuition, and which is performed by the productive imagination.\textsuperscript{103} In other words, this motion is expressed in the productive synthesis of imagination when it performs its constructive process of generating pure figures in outer intuition. Also, the motion of imaginative synthesis itself produces the concept of succession that is exhibited in empirical intuition. The concept of succession in the outer manifold brings the material content of outer sense into a spatial and temporal order. But succession demands the operation of the understanding in effecting inner sense, since ‘the understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense’.\textsuperscript{104} However, this operation of the understanding through the figurative synthesis of imagination to give content to inner sense is not possible without the mediation of a spatial analogy given externally by outer sense. In his description of inner sense as lacking self-representation, Kant argues that the ‘measurability’ of temporal form requires mediation of the spatial manifold:

If one lets space count as a mere pure form of the appearances of outer sense, from the fact that time, although it is not itself an object of outer intuition at all, cannot be made representable to us except under the image of a line, insofar as we draw it, without which sort of presentation

\textsuperscript{102} B155
\textsuperscript{103} ‘Motion of an object in space does not belong in pure science, thus not in geometry; for that something is moveable cannot be cognized a priori but only through experience. But motion, as description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy.’ B155
\textsuperscript{104} B155
we could not know the unity of its measure at all, or likewise from the fact that we must always derive the determination of the length of time or also of positions in time for all inner perceptions from that which presents external things to us as alterable; hence we must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the same way as we order to those of outer sense in space; hence if we admit about the latter that we cognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself.\textsuperscript{105}

Without external spatial content, time cannot be measured. In other words, successiveness in temporal images of empirical intuition is reflected upon to be the medium for acquiring figurative content in perceptual experience. In some references to the notion of ‘external temporality’ of spatial images, Kant contends that time itself is generated in the spatial synthesis of outer intuition ‘...numbering is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, because I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition’.\textsuperscript{106} Outer temporality represented in the sense content of spatial manifold is significant. Kant argues that within this spatial manifold an analogous temporal manifold is generated in outer content. Yet, this turns into grasping how the manifold of inner sense contributes to the figurative synthesis of imagination, in which Kant defines inner sense as only containing mere form without a combination.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant defines temporal form as the form of inner sense, but he adds that it gives only a determinate form without any actual content relevant for representing outer content. He says that time ‘can no more be intuited externally than

\textsuperscript{105} B156
\textsuperscript{106} A143/B182
space can be intuited as something in us'. But this ‘content’ of the form of intuition does not contain a representation of shape or position:

Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representation in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape we also attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing in infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those of the latter always exist successively. From this it is also apparent that the representation of time is itself an intuition, since all its relation can be expressed in an outer intuition.

The reference to spatial analogy helps explicate how temporal form lacks self-representation—by referring to an external medium given in outer sense. Although this characterization is given in the Aesthetic, Kant, as indicated above, assigns the determination of inner sense to the figurative synthesis of imagination whereby the content of the formal intuition of inner sense becomes recognized as represented in the spatial manifold by the act of drawing a line in the pure successive construction of shapes or figures. In the Aesthetic, more is added to explain how outer content becomes the material for manifold of inner sense:

It is not merely that the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these representations, which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession.

Receiving content from outer sense does not by itself constitute the material for the manifold of inner sense. There is also the act of ordering representations in the manifold

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107 A23/B37
108 A33/B50
109 B67
which precedes passive receptivity. This pure act of ordering representations in inner sense is defined as an act of self-activity of the mind:

Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representations, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form.\footnote{B68}

It is not only that the material provided in outer sense constitutes the content of inner sense, there is also the pure act of ordering the manifold in different temporal relations of successiveness or simultaneity. This ordering is defined in terms of the mind affecting itself by its temporal synthesis. Self-activity of the mind in its temporal synthesis of ordering representations contains independent content that is exhibited in the outer sense. This content is exemplified in the pure act of positing a temporal order in representations given from outer sense. This might appear to suggest something contrary to the notion of the figurative synthesis of imagination providing content for inner sense, and that the manifold of inner sense is only given through affection of the understanding on it. Nevertheless, this function of the figurative synthesis of imagination does not contradict the idea of the self-activity of the mind as giving content to itself through the pure ordering of temporal relations in representations. In generating the concept of successiveness in the manifold of intuition, the time-order that is constructed in the synthesis of apprehension is given in relation to the spatial manifold. The temporal form that is represented in the outer manifold becomes bounded by the spatial extent of outer intuition.
It is difficult to see how the idea of self-activity in the successive synthesis of imagination relates to the material content given in perception since Kant argues that the subject’s motion in figurative synthesis is the only mode of synthesizing the manifold that involves the production of images of successiveness in empirical intuition. The pure act of positing time order in representations is limited to the content given in outer receptivity via spatial manifold. The exhibition of the formal content of time in the manifold of sensations is to be mediated by the spatial manifold, but what difference does this form of inner sense make in representing this outer content? This question requires an examination of the relation that the figurative synthesis has with both inner sense and outer sense. The relation of figurative synthesis of imagination to the manifold of inner sense is interpreted as a relation comprised of two acts of synthesis. This interpretation is defended by Henry Allison in his book *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*. Allison argues that the self-affection involves a reflective taking of the manifold, where representations become objects for cognition. He writes:

The point is that in attending to its representations, the mind makes them into objects represented. Thus, instead of perceiving of a house by means of means of a succession of perceptions, all of which are referred to the house as representations thereof, I take this sequence itself as my object. As a second-order, reflective act, this presupposes a prior outer experience, therefore, the transcendental synthesis of imagination (the “first application”). Nevertheless, as a “second application”, this act involves an active seeking out by the mind of the representation it endeavors to make into objects of inner sense. It also requires a change of epistemic focus and with it a reconceptualization. Whereas the initial conceptualization is the act whereby the given representations are referred to an object, the second is the act whereby these representations themselves become objects.111

In this interpretation of the mind’s self-activity, Allison argues that the successive content of perception requires another mode of representation that is defined as a second

111 *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism* p.284
application of the figurative synthesis of imagination to the manifold. In this second order, the successive content of perception becomes itself an object for representation. He ascribes to the second order a reflective position that assigns to the immediate content of the synthesis of apprehension a different order of cognition that converts it to an object of representation. Both acts for Allison are characterized as an act of self-affection comprised by two applications of the figurative synthesis of imagination in affecting inner sense.\textsuperscript{112} This interpretation defended by Allison does not provide an answer to the question of how inner sense becomes involved in representing the outer manifold in the synthesis of apprehension. The successiveness of that empirical manifold of sense becomes the object for cognition in the second order of self-affection. This way of representing the manifold does not explain the immediacy of temporal form that is represented in the outer manifold in the synthesis of apprehension which is later taken to be reflectively gathered by the figurative synthesis of imagination in its second act. This interpretation amounts to the claim that the successive content of perception is indirectly cognized by a subject’s synthesis. It also indicates that the objective purport of perception, namely the act of referring perceptual content to an ostensible object, is only determined in the synthesis of the first application and not included in the second act of reconceptualization the outer manifold. This entails that the recognition of the objective reference of perceptual experience is meditated by a higher form of cognition. But this contradicts Kant’s emphasis on the immediacy of perceptual forms in the synthesis of the outer manifold.\textsuperscript{113} In

\textsuperscript{112} The reference to ‘first application’ of pure understanding to sensibility is mentioned by Kant in the B-Deduction of the Categories, ‘The imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition that is possible for us’ (B152).

\textsuperscript{113} The immediacy of intuitional form is important for intuitional cognition \textit{per se} (A19/B33).
recognizing this manifold to contain objective content, this recognition cannot be mediated by a second order of conceptualization. In addition, Kant’s reference to a first application of the figurative synthesis of imagination does not seem to suggest that there is a second and higher mode of conceptualization, and if there is a second application, it is not indicated how it might contribute different content from the first application of the figurative synthesis in the process of apprehension.

There is a different interpretation of the representation of the manifold of inner sense in the figurative synthesis. This interpretation of the content of inner sense is provided by Richard Aquila in *Representational Mind: A Study of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*. Aquila argues for a different approach for representing the content of inner sense in the figurative synthesis. In his interpretation, the content of inner sense, following Kant, is given from outer sense, but the important point lies in understanding how this content of inner sense distinguishes itself from the content provided in the outer manifold. Unlike Allison, Aquila does not take the act of self-affection to be comprised of two acts. Rather, he understands that there is no content other than the content of the outer manifold, but the modes of reflecting on this content are different. He explains how this is possible:

> What we need to consider is the possibility, then, that the very same sensory material might serve both as the vehicle for conceptualization of regions of space as containing objects enduring, and altering, through stretches of time and also as the vehicle for a more immediate and *intuitive* awareness of time. The latter would be an awareness that, though carried by that same material, more properly awareness of the flow of empirical consciousness itself than of the temporal features of the spatial reality that we are also aware of (i.e., conceptualize) as the object of that consciousness.\(^\text{114}\)

The content of inner sense is not different from material of outer sense, but it acquires a different relation with the synthesizing subject when an act of reflecting on it abstracts

\(^{114}\) *Representational Mind: A Study of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge* p.160-1
away the temporal relation relevant to the subject's empirical consciousness of outer objects. Aquila defines this act of reflection:

The fact that the material of outer sense is also that of inner sense implies that whatever of our own "self" is presented in inner sense is something that is at best reflected in the very objects that we also conceptualize as objects of outer sense, i.e., as bodies in space.  

In this interpretation, consciousness of oneself in the empirical consciousness of time operates on the same content of outer sense except it reflects on itself independently of the flow of outer content in relation to objects by attending to the mere act of reflection. Aquila's account is more consistent with Kant's writings about the nature of inner sense than Allison's interpretation. Kant asserts that the content for inner sense is provided externally in the outer manifold, but the problem is about differentiating the formal content of temporality in the inner sense, or what is referred to by Aquila, as the temporal awareness of the empirical consciousness, from outer content. Aquila suggests that the subject finds herself to be empirically reflected in the content of representations of the outer manifold in space. But Aquila's suggestion does not explain how this attending to the act of representing the manifold in outer sense can be abstracted in the synthesis of apprehension. Since this manifold contained in the object of attention or reflection, Aquila's account does not explain how this 'neutral' content in relation to the subject becomes objectively determined in representations of the temporal flow of empirical consciousness. Now, the same content or that the synthesizing subject uses to represent the empirical consciousness of time, does not contain a determining relation for how this representation of the empirical consciousness of time can be abstracted. For Aquila, attention to the 'flow

115 Ibid., p.161
of time’ in empirical consciousness requires motion in the subject’s act of synthesis.\textsuperscript{116} Despite his interpretation of the manifolds of inner and outer as containing the same content, Aquila’s suggestion for the subject’s act of synthesis that attends to the empirical consciousness of time, does not seem to differ from Allison’s argument for a second act of synthesis in order to attend to the temporal form of empirical consciousness that is exhibited in spatial content. Attending to the temporal content that is exhibited in outer sense demands a further act of synthesis that requires a different mode of synthesizing the manifold in order for the subject to view herself reflected in the time-order of the objects represented in space.

In his essay “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, and Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason},” Markos Valaris interprets Kant’s notion of inner sense. Valaris argues that there is a distinctive feature represented in the manifold of inner sense which is not included in the representational content of outer sense. For the form of inner sense to be reflected on the content provided in outer space, synthesizing the manifold through the figurative synthesis of imagination is insufficient. According to Valaris, what is distinctive about representing the inner manifold is recognizing the perspectival content of current perceptual experience. This recognition is produced by the manifold of inner sense when the subject recognizes that her current perception discloses a perspectival view of an object. Valaris elaborates on this point:

\textit{\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p.162}
awareness of its perspectival character...Experience of things in space and time, therefore, is not possible simply on the basis of the perspectival intuitions of outer sense. It further requires our taking these intuitions to be perspectival.¹¹⁷

This added component of perceptual experience, a representation of the perspectival encounter with objects, cannot be accounted for by the immediate outer content itself. It has to be represented through inner sense. This is the distinguishing role for inner sense to differentiate it from the representational content of outer sense. In Valaris’s account, it is clear how inner sense contributes to the figurative synthesis of imagination. In Allison’s and Aquila’s interpretations, there is no distinguishing mark for how the subject might attend to the temporal synthesis of figuratively representing an outer manifold. In reinterpreting inner sense to be the distinguishing content for the subject to represent an outer manifold as consisting of perspectival view, Valaris’s interpretation is satisfactory.

**Kant on the Synthesis of Apprehension**

The empirical content of figurative synthesis is exemplified in the synthesis of apprehension which surveys an outer manifold and then ascribes to it a representational unity. Since Kant in the Transcendental Deduction argues that the figurative synthesis of imagination produces its content by affecting inner sense in the act of drawing a straight line, both forms of intuition are jointly produced in the same act of self-affection. For this reason, a temporal form of intuition becomes exhibited in the sensory manifold of the synthesis of apprehension through a spatial analogy that brings pure successive synthesis into relation with the empirical content of perception. This is not possible without an outer ‘model’ of representing inner temporality in the synthesis of apprehension. This outer

¹¹⁷ “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, and Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” p.8-9
model is comprised of the spatial figures constructed in the empirical synthesis that allow for conferring a ‘unity of measure’ on the temporal content of perception. However, since the temporal content of the figurative synthesis of imagination is only produced through mediation in external sense, the intuitional immediacy of this outer model can be questioned. Valaris tackles the problem of possessing a temporal form which is produced only by the synthetic act of the productive synthesis of imagination. He argues that a temporal form cannot be represented internally in a synthetic act of the imagination, and so it must be located in receptivity rather than figurative synthesis of imagination. He elaborates on his position:

We have to recognize an immediate temporality that is not a result of the figurative synthesis at all. On this conception, time is the form of inner sense not because it is the form of the representations of inner sense but rather because it is the form according to which subjective states and events—primarily, episodes of affection—are ordered, regardless of their being objects of inner awareness. This order is, on the one hand, “immediate” precisely because it is independent of the figurative synthesis; on the other hand, it is inner, because it concerns subjective items. When representations are combined in the figurative synthesis, the result is a “mediate” temporality that pertains to the subject’s awareness of its states in inner sense, as well as to its perception of the objects of those states: it pertains, that is, to appearances in general. But this temporality is derivative of the immediate one, which pertains to subjective states and events simply in virtue of the structure of our receptivity.¹¹⁸

Valaris contends that representing inner temporality as given in figurative synthesis cannot address the problem of explaining outer temporality in the synthesis of apprehension. The figurative synthesis model of representing the form of inner sense does not ascribe temporal form to outer objects immediately but is mediated by imposing this form on its content. Therefore, a different model of temporality which does not depend on the synthetic activity of the imagination in constructing formal intuitions must be construed. Valaris’s point is that in asserting a temporal form on outer content, an external form is

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.16
imposed on the sense content only because it is the form that underlies the successiveness of receptive content. Valaris’s argument about outer temporality is centered on the problem of representing a temporal form in the synthesis of apprehension, and whether the temporal form exhibited in the apprehended manifold is given by the imaginative synthesis or it is merely posited by the synthesis of apprehension in the structure of receptivity. It is precisely by examining how original receptivity depends on the self-activity of the understanding which informs the temporal schematic exhibition in the manifold of sensations that the question of how understanding in its conceptual synthesis becomes involved in conferring unity on the manifold of intuitional representations can be answered. Valaris wants to argue that synthesis of apprehension possesses an immediate and outer temporality that cannot be accounted for by the synthetic process of figurative imagination.  

In answering this question, Kant’s doctrine of threefold synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction, and Anticipations of Perception should be consulted. The threefold synthesis provides a preliminary description of the synthesis of apprehension as a process of synthesizing the manifold together with the reproductive synthesis of imagination and recognition in concept. In Anticipations, however, Kant gives a more determinate treatment of the synthesis of apprehension in relation to sensory consciousness and in the

119 Following Valaris, I will consider the possibility of an ‘outer temporality’ in synthesis of apprehension. However, this model of outer temporality does not imply a rejection of the form of temporality exhibited in the figurative synthesis in the content of inner sense as Valaris’s proposed. I believe it is possible to keep the two models of temporality, namely the one represented in conceptual synthesis of imagination and the outer temporality of apprehension. The intensive form of temporality is only exhibited in the synthesis of apprehension which cannot be synthesized into a spatial image and this can be taken to indicate how sensations cannot be re-structured in a conceptual synthesis that requires positing spatial analogy for representing temporal successiveness in perceptual experience.
schematization of the category of reality that refers to the presence of sensations in empirical intuition.

The synthesis of apprehension is crucial in expressing the empirical aspect of the figurative synthesis of imagination in perceptual experience. It refers to the pre-synthetic manifold of sense that has not yet been synthesized by the understanding and it is taken by the imagination as an un-structured manifold of sense that provides empirical content in the synthesis of sensible manifold on intuition. As explained above, Kant understands that a schematic configuration of formal intuition in sensible content is what makes conceptual synthesis possible. But there are different stages in the process of representing the manifold of sense via the constructs of the images of space and time that are taken to be the formal constraints internal to intuitional representations. The synthesis of apprehension is the first stage of representing the manifold to the imagination in its reproductive function. Kant defines synthesis of apprehension as an *a priori* synthesis that produces space and time together with the reproductive imagination:

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis.\(^{120}\)

The synthesis of apprehension is the act of differentiating and distinguishing the manifoldness contained in one intuition and subsequently representing the manifoldness sequentially through an intuitional unity similar to spatial representation. To have one

\(^{120}\) A99
objective representation and also to represent the manifold of intuition as a manifold, the
synthesis of apprehension must survey the content of receptivity and impart structure and
order. It structures the successive manifold of sense impressions in a temporal order. The
synthesis of apprehension can also be exercised \textit{a priori} in producing time and space in
original receptivity.\textsuperscript{121} Kant argues that the synthesis of apprehension is not possible
without reproductive synthesis of imagination. Since the act of synthesizing the manifold as
it is contained in original receptivity provides succession of impressions, the reproductive
imagination produces a unity of images of ostensible objects.

The reproductive synthesis is grounded transcendently in experience, because without
having an objective affinity of appearances that allows experience to be grouped and
compared, a combination of the manifold is not possible. Importantly, the idea of affinity of
appearance assumes that experience is subject to the rule of representing it empirically.\textsuperscript{122}
Kant understands that subjecting the succession of appearances requires having a rule for
recognizing this succession as referring to one object:

\begin{quote}
Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next,
or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these
manifold representations after one another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the
preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the
successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed
to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously mentioned
thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could
ever arise.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

The conclusion that Kant draws is that the production of space and time depends on the
representation of succession in the manifold. But this production of temporal and spatial

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\textsuperscript{121} A100
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\textsuperscript{122} ‘The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, in so far as it lies in the object, is called the
affinity of the manifold’ A113.
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\textsuperscript{123} A102
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images does not entirely depend on the synthesis of apprehension—it also requires the conjunction of the reproductive synthesis of imagination to represent the succession of the manifold that exhibits the formal constraints of space and time in the external manifold of sense.124 The empirical synthesis of apprehension does not by itself produce the images of successiveness in the outer manifold, because it directly engages with the immediate sense content that is not being synthesized into the images of succession exhibited in the outer manifold. This process of synthesis becomes effective through the conscious recognition of unity of the manifold.125 In recognizing the unity of the manifold, a conceptual synthesis is required. Conceptual synthesis is mediated by the production of images of successiveness in the intuitional representation, which is the task of the reproductive synthesis of imagination. The production of images of objects gives unity to the subject’s perceptual view whereby the subject becomes aware of the different aspects of the object being perceived. Conceptual recognition confers unity on the images of ostensible objects. Hence, the synthesis of apprehension does not produce images of objects but rather its function is to incorporate the sensory content into the subject’s perceptual view in the process of recognizing the manifold as a manifold. Kant explains:

But since every appearance contains a manifold, thus different perceptions by themselves are encountered dispersed and separate in the mind, a combination of them, which they cannot have in sense itself, is therefore necessary. There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension. For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image, it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them.126 [emphasis added]

124 It can be argued that the reproductive synthesis of imagination is the transcendental synthesis of imagination as it is empirically associating the manifold of apprehension.
125 A103
126 A121
In the synthesis of apprehension, the subject passively receives sensory content caused by the presence of an object in her perceptual view. In the act of apprehending the outer manifold, the synthesis of apprehension is directed toward the immediate sensory content that is given from a specific spatial relation. Since the subject occupies a certain spatial orientation in her perceptual view, the apprehended object is perceptually disclosed from a determinate geometrical relation. But this immediate sensory content precedes the unifying function of the synthesis of productive imagination that generates perceptual images of objects. As explained above, the construction of images requires apprehending the manifold first, and then the imagination proceeds to generate this apprehended content into an image. The construction of perceptual images of outer objects exhibits the formal constraints in the intuitional manifold and thereby the subject can abstract the spatial and temporal content relevant for unifying the manifold. In abstracting this content, the subject acquires rotational and translational content of different geometrical relations. The production of images of ostensible objects to acquire the rotational and translational content is grounded in the necessary unity between space as a formal constraint internal to intuitional manifold and the outer sensible intuition.\(^\text{127}\)

Since the synthesis of apprehension involves the passive reception of sensory content, the content viewed by the subject is the content given in the affective relation that the subject has with specific aspects of an object. The question remains about how can sensory and empirical content, which is provided through the synthesis of apprehension, be represented in the conceptual shaping of the understanding? Put differently, the question is

\(^{127}\)“Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through the apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space.” B162
how can this sensory content features in the act of abstracting the formal content of experience? The sensory content is construed as resisting the abstraction of formal constraints in the intuitional manifold since it is not exhibited formally in the schematic configuration of concepts in the sensible intuition but rather represented as the material content of the intuitional manifold. Within the synthesis of apprehension, the mind seeks to represent the manifoldness of receptivity by representing it through a spatial analogy. Kant explains, ‘Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness’. In this case of representing the manifold sequentially by construing an external and spatially congruent relation that makes it possible to represent the temporal order of the succession of sense impressions contained in the intuitional manifold, the sensory content can be taken to indicate the presence of material reality affecting the subject through the construction of formal constraints of perception. But this indication cannot address the issue of representing the real in space and time, because it does not answer the question of how the ‘affective content’ can resist the formal exhibition of internal constraints of perception, namely the spatial and temporal forms of intuition. To address the issue, it is important to examine sensation itself as it is described by Kant in the Anticipations of Perception in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

He broadly describes the nature of sensations as the material content of intuitional manifold. In the Aesthetic, he defines sensations as follows, 'The effect of an object on the capacity for representations, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition

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128 A100
which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical." Sensation is described as an affective quality within the subject, but Kant adds: ‘I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensations its matter’. This demonstrates that sensations as qualitative content within the subject can contribute to perceptual experience by becoming part of the content in perception. However, this qualitative content cannot contribute to perceptual experience without representing the formal content of space and time in the manifold of intuition that orders and structures the manifold. In the Anticipations of Perception, Kant argues that the category of reality is schematized through the recognition of sensational matter in experience. In other words, the affective quality ascribed to the subject becomes the medium for schematizing the concept of reality. The schematization of the category of reality requires a transcendental temporal determination that is possible by a ‘synthesis of sensations’ as it is characterized by Kant, which consists of filling time in experience. Time is the form that underlies the quantitative structure of sensations because it grounds the ascription of intensive quantity to the content that fills the temporal duration of perceptual experience. This notion of having sensations in experience implies empirical

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129 A20/B34
130 A20/B34
131 A20/B34
132 In the Schematism, Kant explains that category of reality is schematized through time by being either filled or empty, ‘Reality is the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of the two thus takes place in the distinction of one and the same time as either a filled or an empty time. Since time is only the form of intuition, thus of objects as appearances, that which corresponds to the sensations in these transcendental matter of all objects, as things in themselves (thinghood, reality) A143/B82
133 A145/B184
134 ‘Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, through which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an object, until it ceases in nothing (= 0 = negation). Hence there is a relation and connection between, or rather a transition from reality to negation, that makes every reality representable as a quantum, and the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as
consciousness of the receptive content that accompanies the formal structure of appearances. However, sensations cannot be measured by the formal content of pure intuition. The internal variation of sensations is measured by intensity rather than an extensive mode of measurement that is exhibited in pure intuition of space and time.\textsuperscript{135}

Kant explicates this fundamental feature of sensations in empirical consciousness:

 Now from the empirical consciousness to the pure consciousness a gradual alteration is possible, where the real in the former entirely disappears, and a merely formal (\textit{a priori}) consciousness of the manifold in space and time remains; thus there is also possible a synthesis of the generation of the magnitude of a sensation from its beginning, the pure intuition = 0, to any arbitrary magnitude. Now since sensation it itself is not an objective representation, and in it neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be encountered, it has, to be sure, no extensive magnitude, but yet it still has a magnitude (and indeed through its apprehension, in which the empirical consciousness can grow in a certain time from nothing = 0 to its given measure), thus it has an intensive magnitude, corresponding to which all objects of perception, insofar as they contain sensation, must be ascribed an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of influence on sense.\textsuperscript{136}

Evidently, manifold of sensation is not objective content in the intuitional manifold since it is not possible to encounter any of the extensive forms of intuition in it when it is taken by itself. This content of a sensation is construed in empirical consciousness as an intensive influence upon the senses, and the variation of intensity is measured by degrees of the force of the outer influence upon the subject. As a subject is affected externally, an act of apprehension allows for representation this degree of force. It seems that an act of synthesis of apprehension is described differently in the Anticipations by Kant. In the

\textsuperscript{135} Extensive measure is defined by Kant in the Axioms of Intuition, ‘I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representations of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter). I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing it in though, i.e., successively generating all its parts from one point, and thereby first sketching this intuition’ A162/B203. An intensive magnitude on the other hand is defined thus, ‘Now I call that magnitude which can only be apprehended as a unity, and in which multiplicity can only be represented through approximation to negation = 0, intensive magnitude’ A168/B210

\textsuperscript{136} B207-8
Transcendental Deduction, synthesis of apprehension successively surveys the receptive manifold to bring it later in the reproductive synthesis of imagination that forms an image of an object, whereas apprehension in the Anticipations is given this description:

Apprehension, merely by means of sensations, fills only an instant (if I do not take into consideration the succession of many sensations). As something in the appearance, the apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis, proceeding from the parts to the whole representations, it therefore has no extensive magnitude; the absence of sensation in the same moment would represent this as empty, thus = 0.¹³⁷

In representing what is contained in sensations, apprehension has the capacity to represent the affective change in the subject that is caused by the aforementioned force of outer influence. This does not contradict the way that the synthesis of apprehension is described in the threefold process of synthesis. The successiveness of apprehension is only possible by the construction of images in the reproductive synthesis of imagination which cannot present an instant of sensation, because it determines the unity of intuitional manifold by objectifying temporal consciousness through a spatial image. The idea of filling time in the synthesis of apprehension poses a challenge regarding the mode of temporal duration exhibited in this act of apprehension and whether it is the same temporal form given in inner sense that is represented by the act of figurative synthesis. It was indicated above that a temporal form requires a spatial analogy to represent it externally. Since spatial content does not consist of a sequence of instants or points,¹³⁸ the instant of sensation given in the act of apprehension cannot be included in a spatial analogy.

In representing temporal form that involves positing temporal relation in the succession of representations, the figurative synthesis of imagination makes it possible to view

¹³⁷ A167/B209
¹³⁸ A170
temporal order reflected in the content of the spatial manifold. By positing either a temporal relation of either succession or simultaneity, the content of a spatial manifold becomes recognized independently from the spatial form itself, because before the imposition of temporality, this content is indifferent in terms of whether it is successive or simultaneous. Imposing temporal order on the spatial content allows the subject to view the content of the outer manifold independently from the spatial structure itself due to the subject's constructive process that generates shapes and figures in pure space. The notion of effecting inner sense in the construction of geometrical images which Kant calls a motion in the subject was examined above, but it is important to highlight on the following:

Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend only to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the concept of succession at all. The understanding therefore does not find some of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense.

As outer sense becomes temporalized, time is objectively determined through the recognition of content in the spatial manifold. Consequently, the content of the spatial manifold acquires a certain temporal determination as either successive or simultaneous. However, in the recognition of the temporal order reflected in a spatial image by the figurative synthesis of imagination, a subject finds it difficult to construct a representative and spatial medium for the qualitative and affective content. Unlike quantity and other

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139 The 'neutrality' of spatial content is evident in Kant's discussion of progressive and regressive syntheses of spatial parts; 'But since the parts of space are not subordinated to one another but are coordinated with one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another, and space, unlike time, does not in itself constitute a series' (A412/B39), He also adds, 'consequently regressus and progressus in space appear to be one and the same' (A413/B440).

140 B155
mathematical concepts, quality cannot be constructed by the figurative synthesis of imagination. Kant explains:

For only the concept of magnitude can be constructed, i.e., exhibited \textit{a priori} in intuition, while qualities cannot be exhibited in anything but empirical intuition...Thus no one can ever derive an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality from anywhere except experience, and can never partake of it \textit{a priori} from oneself and prior to empirical consciousness. The shape of a cone can be made intuitive without any empirical assistance, merely in accordance with the concept, but the color of this cone must first be given in one experience or another.\footnote{A715/B743}

Qualities are not constructible in pure imagination because they contain an empirical content in the synthesis of apprehension that is given instantaneously,\footnote{The non-constructible character of qualities or matter is also emphasized by Kant in the ‘Dynamics’ chapter of \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science} §525 p.63} whereas construction in figurative synthesis requires positing successive spatial form in intuitional manifold. In representing the variation of the intensity of the affective content of sensations, there is no spatial extent that underlies its givenness.\footnote{The pre-spatial character of sensations is emphasized by Richard Aquila in 'The Relationship between Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant', yet he argues that this non-spatial form of sense is convertible into spatially arrayed content through the semantical system of relation that the understanding brings into the manifold (p.281-3). This semantical conversion of non-spatial manifold proposed by Aquila does not explain how the manifold of sense can still constrain or resist the conceptual and semantical imposition of the understanding, and to have ‘a voice in the outcome’ of perceptual synthesis.} But the synthesis of apprehension which presents the instantaneous synthesis of sensations exhibits a temporal order that grounds the reception of different degrees of force. For this reason, it can be argued that outer temporality in the synthesis of apprehension cannot be objectified through a spatial image. The reason behind the failure to bring the temporal form of instantaneous synthesis of sensations in the act of apprehension into a spatial form is the internal structure of sensations which cannot be given in an extensive spatial form.\footnote{In the Anticipations, Kant states ‘One can therefore abstract entirely from the extensive magnitude appearance and yet represent in the mere sensation on one moment a synthesis of uniform increase from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness’ (B218)}
This failure to objectify the external temporal form of the synthesis of apprehension is reflected in the form of inner sense of the figurative synthesis of imagination. Inner sense represents the perspectival content of perceptual experience, and the perspectival structure of the receptive content fixes the starting point for the subjects to orients herself spatially in relation to objects. Since the subject’s spatial orientation in relation to the object perceived is neutral as long as the temporal content of experiential content is not fixed, then this perceptual relation is entirely indexed through the temporal content of perceptual experience. A subject can discern the spatial relation and direction of her experience through the temporal form underlying experiential content. The material of perceptual experience causes the subject to generate the intensive empirical consciousness of objects. It follows that the temporal form of sensations grounds affective qualities in the subject. This form of temporality can therefore be called an intensive form of time.\textsuperscript{145} It grounds the flow of sensations in experience, and since it cannot be constructed through same process of extensive forms of space and time of the figurative synthesis of imagination, it resists being re-structured in an extensive and geometrical construction. In this case, the intensive content of the force of influence upon the subject, as it is grounded in this specific time-order, resists the mapping of its content into an extensive form of space. The failure to find a congruent relation or a spatial unit for measuring the force of the affective content in the subject, makes the subject realizes the indeterminate content of the temporal form underlying the reception of sensory content in the synthesis of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{145} It can be called intensive because it underlies the reception of sensations as either being filled or empty.}
apprehension. However, Kant argues that matter can be measured only by its effects,\textsuperscript{146} and in the case of perceptual experience, the sensibilia, or the matter of experience, is measured by its force of influence upon a subject. The matter is defined as repulsive force by Kant,\textsuperscript{147} where relative impenetrability of matter in outer space makes it possible to realize the presence of objects through the effects that they produce in other objects. Analogously, this idea can be reconstructed in the relation between synthesis of apprehension and reproductive synthesis of imagination. The reproductive synthesis of imagination constructs images of objects in the extensive forms of space and time which makes it possible to quantitatively measure spatial object. In order to inject a quantitative measure on the sensory content of experience, these measures can only be applied to the \textit{effects} of repulsive force.\textsuperscript{148} The synthesis of apprehension cannot bring its content into a spatial unit of measurement. The receptive content is measured by the degrees of intensity of the sensory consciousness, and the units of measuring the matter are only available in the

\textsuperscript{146} 'Matter is \textit{substantia phaenomenon}. What pertains to it internally I seek in all parts of space that it occupies and in all effects that it carries out, and which can certainly always be only appearances of outer sense' A277/B376

\textsuperscript{147} Reality is designated through the notion of moving forces as reciprocal cancellation, 'Realities of appearance, on the other contrary, can certainly be in opposition with each other, united in the same subject, one can partly or wholly destroy the consequence of the other, like two moving forces in the same straight line that either push or pull a point in opposite direction' A265/B321. In \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}, matter is defined as consisting of repulsive and attractive forces, §497-§500 p.33-36. This conception of moving forces also illustrates Kant's notion of 'real opposition' contrasted with logical ground in his 1763 essay "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy". In this essay, Kant wants to introduce the mathematical concept of negative magnitude which involves, according to him, a real opposition. A real opposition is defined by Kant as, '[In] every real opposition the two predicates must both of them be positive, but positive in such a way that, when they are combined, there is a reciprocal cancellation of the consequences in the same subject.' p.216

\textsuperscript{148} The idea of measuring intensive magnitude through their effects is defended by Daniel Warren in \textit{Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature}, p.22-30. Also Michael Friedman in \textit{Kant's Construction of Nature}, argues that effects of moving forces of matter in outer sense are measured by the phoronomical representations (spatio-temporal motion), 'Kant is only considering the effects of a repulsive force. Indeed, he is only considering the process of adding velocities directed away from the given center to (instantaneous) incoming velocities ("strivings to penetrate") directed towards the center–and this representation of the possible effects of a repulsive force is itself a purely phoronomical representation in pure intuition. What the first explication and first proposition of the Dynamics add to this representation is simply the concept of a cause or ground of the effects (motions) in question.' p.118
images of space and time in reproductive synthesis of imagination. It would appear that the extensive form of measuring the sensory content of perception, namely applying quantitative concepts to a manifold, is possible through the spatial and temporal forms of the reproductive synthesis. This constructive function of imagination is represented in the figurative synthesis. Thus, in sum, the schematic exhibition of concepts in the intuitional manifold hinges on structuring the formal constraints of perception which is possible by imposing an additive relation of measurement onto the manifold. The application of the additive relation to the sensations is to the effects that they produce within the process of perceptual synthesis. In other words, the sensory consciousness acquires a representative content by virtue of applying the extensive forms to effects rather than applying them to the manifold of sense directly as it occurs in synthesis of apprehension.

This sensory consciousness in the synthesis of apprehension refers only to empirical consciousness in the subject, and contributes to the cognition and perception of objects through the effects that are produced. Essentially, a qualitative change in the subject does not imply any representational content unless the qualitative content is synthesized in the extensive forms of intuition. In describing sensations, Kant does not ascribe to them any representational function in virtue of their mere occurrence in a subject. For example, in the Anticipations, he describes sensations as a subjective empirical consciousness:

The quality of sensations is always merely empirical and cannot be represented \textit{a priori} at all (e.g. colors, taste, etc.). But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to the negation \( = 0 \), only represents something whose concept in itself contains a being, and does not signify anything except the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general.\footnote{A175/B217}
Apart from this description of sensations as only an empirical consciousness, the content of sensations grounds the qualitative change within the subject and its affective quality is measured only in its effects realized by the figurative synthesis of imagination. Sensations as empirical consciousness become cognitively relevant by indicating an affective relation through their effects in the perceptual synthesis of figurative imagination. Hence, it can be inferred that sensations in the empirical synthesis of apprehension do not carry in themselves a representative function except through their effects. So either sensations are taken to represent the real in space,\textsuperscript{150} or as the mere effects of objects,\textsuperscript{151} these different representational functions of sensations are viewed by their effects on the synthesizing process and not by the mere presence of sensations in empirical consciousness. This feature of sensations as not essentially carrying an intentional directness to objects unless the content of sensations is placed within a process of synthesis, is pointed out by Gerd Buchdahl in \textit{Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy}. He argues that the role of sensations is demonstrated by different ‘cognitive occasions’:

For a start, we have to take it that the terminology of “the receptivity of sensibility” is primarily intended to contrast with “the spontaneity of the understanding”. It follows that the question as to from whence sensibility ‘receives its material’ is misplaced, if this is understood as a request for some additional objects as the source of what is thus received. Instead, the locution, “receptivity of sensibility”, must be understood as a phenomenological characterization of cognitive occasions, in the context of which sensibility simply \textit{finds itself} with such and such sensations, as an \textit{ultimate matter of fact}, where it should be remembered that the German for ‘sensations’ is ‘Empfindung’ – literary: ‘a finding’; or also: ‘something found within us’.\textsuperscript{152} This structure of sensations cannot be reconstituted in the process of synthesis by conferring on it an extensive magnitude. Rather the effects of sensations, as the primary

\textsuperscript{150}B207/A166
\textsuperscript{151}A20/B34
\textsuperscript{152}\textit{Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy} p.148
material of sensory consciousness, become synthesized in the process of exhibiting them in the intuitional manifold. This resistance in the structure of sensations to be re-arranged or appropriated by the shaping of the understanding is grounded in the indeterminate form of temporality that underlies the synthesis of apprehension. The temporal form of inner sense underlies the perspectival and receptive content of the synthesis of apprehension, and it cannot bring this sensory matter into a spatial form because sensations as qualitative and intensive content can only be shaped through their effects in the constructive synthesis of imagination. For this reason, ‘outer temporality’ of the synthesis of apprehension, as an empirical consciousness, is not represented in the figurative synthesis of imagination, and remains indeterminate. It was argued above that the schematic exhibition of concepts in the intuitional manifold requires determining the temporal content of experience. Since temporal determinacy is not available for the empirical consciousness, then concepts cannot be schematized in this manifold—concepts instead are constrained by this manifold. The constraining function of sensations is therefore evidently not provided within the conceptual shaping of the understanding or the figurative synthesis of imagination.

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153 The indeterminacy of apprehension is indicated by Kant in the Analogies of Experience, B219.
154 The unique temporal structure and indeterminacy of the acts of apprehension are also emphasized by Gordon Nagel in *The Structure of Experience: Kant's Systems of Principles* p.104/p.112.
155 The ‘temporal indeterminacy’ of what Eric Watkins calls ‘causality of the cause’, or the activity that brings about effects, can be used analogously to explain the temporal indeterminacy of empirical consciousness since only its effects are temporally determined in the figurative synthesis of imagination. *Kant and The Metaphysics of Causality* p.263-72.
Conclusion

I have argued that Kant's theory of perceptual synthesis can be reconstructed to provide content for conceptual synthesis. This content is provided by intentional relations with ostensible objects in space and time, and cannot be given only through the structuring of formal constraints of pure intuition. Concepts are exhibited by the schematic function of the imagination in the intuitional manifold. The sensory content of inner sense is defined by its perspectival content, and recognition of such perspectival content requires determining the temporal form of the synthesis of apprehension. But such determination of the temporal form in receptive content is not possible because receptive content in perceptual experience is defined by its intensive magnitude which is only realized through the effects of sensations in the figurative synthesis of imagination. The inability of the synthesis of apprehension to bring content into a spatial image demonstrates the constraining aspect of receptive content which is neither shaped nor structured through conceptual or imaginative synthesis. This indicates that Sellars's conception of the sensory content of experience as theoretical constructs generated from analogical extension of the structural attributes of ostensible objects, cannot be used to interpret Kant's theory of perceptual synthesis, since this re-categorization of sense content depends on the conceptual synthesis of intuitional manifold. Equally important, McDowell's interpretation of perceptual synthesis as the understanding informing the intuitional content, and in effect making sensory contact with objects, incorrectly considers the formal constraints of pure intuition as sufficient to represent the sensory content of perceptual experience. Both interpretations share a conception of external constraint—external manifold of sense—as
shaped and appropriated by the conceptual synthesis of understanding. In my reconstruction of Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis, it is demonstrated that an external constraint for perceptual activity is not conceptually structured.
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