The Hand that Feeds:
NGOs’ changing relationship with the Canadian International Development Agency under the competitive funding mechanism

Nuala Nazarko

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School of International Development and Global Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of Dr. Reginald Litz, a remarkable teacher and professor who supported me in my pursuit of graduate studies. Dr. Litz inspired, motivated and believed in the richness of learning. His teachings and creativity had a positive impact on hundreds of students and I count myself very fortunate to have been one of them.
ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes Canadian NGOs’ relationship with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in the context of the competitive funding mechanism. It captures NGOs’ perspectives on the changing CIDA-NGO relationship, noting the range of NGO responses regarding advocacy efforts, public engagement, organizational priorities and overseas partnerships. The findings indicate that the relationship between CIDA and NGOs cannot be defined as partnership, but rather as one that spans the categories of “contracting” and “extension” in the Brinkerhoff (2002) partnership model. Additionally, employing Elbers and Arts’ (2011) typology, the thesis concludes that NGOs seek to “influence” CIDA through meetings with officers and politicians, “buffer” their partners from negative CIDA impacts, “shield” themselves by limiting their level of CIDA support and “compensate” by funding advocacy and public engagement from internal sources. Moreover, I include “innovation” as an additional strategy that NGOs can employ as a response to donor conditions.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**DEDICATION** .................................................................................................................. ii  
**ABSTRACT** ...................................................................................................................... iii  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ................................................................................................. iv  
**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** ......................................................................................... 1  
- Topic and General Problematic ................................................................................... 1  
- Research Questions, Hypothesis and Objectives......................................................... 2  
- Methodology and Thesis Outline ............................................................................... 6  
**CHAPTER 2: DONOR-NGO RELATIONSHIPS** ................................................................. 10  
- Civil Society and NGOs .............................................................................................. 11  
  - Concept and Theory ............................................................................................... 11  
  - The Role of Development NGOs in Civil Society .................................................. 14  
  - Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of NGOs ......................................... 18  
- Impact of Official Donor Funding on NGOs ............................................................... 19  
  - Accountability ......................................................................................................... 22  
  - Advocacy and Public Engagement ....................................................................... 25  
- The Concept of Partnership ....................................................................................... 28  
  - Frameworks for Partnerships and NGO-Government Relations ....................... 31  
- NGO Responses to Donor Conditions .................................................................... 34  
- Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 36  
**CHAPTER 3: CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CIDA-NGO RELATIONSHIP** ........ 38  
- Canadian Civil Society ............................................................................................. 39  
- The CIDA-NGO Relationship .................................................................................. 46  
  - History .................................................................................................................... 46  
  - Bureaucratic Delays and Political Decision Making .............................................. 48  
  - The Results Agenda and Priority Themes .............................................................. 49  
  - Foreign Policy Priorities ....................................................................................... 51  
  - Defunding NGOs .................................................................................................. 54  
  - New Partnership with NGOs: A Call-for-Proposals Funding Mechanism .......... 56  
  - Recent Events: The Trends Intensify .................................................................... 60  
- Canada and Development Effectiveness Principles ................................................. 64  
- Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 66  
**CHAPTER 4: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS** ............................................................................. 69  
- General Feedback on the Call-for-Proposals Funding Mechanism ....................... 69  
- Responses to Specific Interview Questions ............................................................ 72  
  - Question 1: Relationship with CIDA ................................................................. 72  
  - Question 2: Challenges Aligning with Priority Countries and Thematic Areas ...... 75  
  - Question 3: Impacts on Overseas Partnerships ................................................... 76  
  - Question 4: Impacts on Public Engagement and Advocacy .................................. 77  
  - Question 5: Ability to Maintain an Independent Mission .................................... 78  
  - Question 6: Accountability to CIDA and Beneficiaries ....................................... 79  
- Impacts on Development Effectiveness .................................................................. 80  
- Analysis of Partnership ............................................................................................ 85  
  - Mutuality and Organizational Identity of Canadian NGOs .................................. 86
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Topic and General Problematic

The Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA)\(^1\) relationship with Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has come under criticism over the past few years. This criticism has largely stemmed from the defunding of longtime CIDA recipients and the agency’s change in 2010 to a new structure to partner with NGOs including a call-for-proposals funding mechanism. The new model marked a significant change from what had historically been a responsive funding relationship with NGOs, whereby organizations would submit proposals based on their own priorities and areas of expertise.

Many academics, government opposition critics and journalists argue that the funding cuts to NGOs were ideologically driven and employed, at least in part, as a way of silencing NGOs whose views conflicted with the priorities of the Canadian government (CCIC, 2010). Development experts also suggest that the funding cuts and the new funding mechanism are affecting NGO legitimacy by hampering advocacy efforts, violating institutional autonomy and threatening accountability to NGO beneficiaries in developing countries (CCIC, 2012; Babbage, 2010; Barry-Shaw and Oja Jay 2012; Brown, 2012; Gergi, 2011). I am interested in the volatile relationship between CIDA and NGOs and how recent changes are affecting the notion of

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\(^1\) In 2013, the Canadian International Development Agency merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to become the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). Throughout this thesis the development agency will be referred to by its original name, by which it was known at the time that the new civil society funding mechanism was introduced.
partnership, the principles of development effectiveness, as well as creating opportunities for NGOs to respond.

The present chapter outlines this thesis’ main research questions, rationale and methodology. It also sets the context for the remainder of the thesis by highlighting development effectiveness principles and the trend towards increased proportion of aid being channeled through civil society organizations, especially NGOs based in the global North.

**Research Questions, Hypothesis and Objectives**

This thesis explores the relationship between CIDA and Canadian NGOs under CIDA’s new partnership model and the call-for-proposals funding mechanism. It looks at the extent to which the relationship can characterized as a partnership, the effects that the new call-for-proposals mechanism is having on development effectiveness and the ways that NGOs are managing and responding to the challenges faced in the new CIDA environment. The following questions guide the research and analysis of the thesis: How have changes to CIDA funding modalities, namely the new call-for-proposals mechanism, affected Canadian international development NGOs? How are these changes impacting the CIDA-NGO relationship?

The main research question is predominantly informed by Edward and Hulme’s (1998) article: “Too Close for Comfort: The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations.” As noted above, analysts and development experts have argued that

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2 Throughout the thesis Canadian international development NGOs will be referred to as NGOs, Canadian NGOs or international development NGOs.
recent changes to CIDA’s new call-for-proposals mechanism have reduced the legitimacy of Canadian NGOs. As these arguments directly relate to Edwards and Hulme’s (1998) research, it will be employed to inform the sub-questions of this thesis. A report published by the Canadian Council on International Co-operation (CCIC) in early 2012, which surveyed international development organizations for their views and opinions regarding CIDA’s new civil society funding mechanism also inform the sub-questions.

Based on literature reviews, my main hypothesis is that new CIDA funding mechanism threatens the autonomy of Canadian NGOs by increasingly encouraging them to shift to government priorities, focus on short-term projects, scale back on advocacy activities and act as service providers of CIDA contracts.

Through my analysis, I employ Elbers and Arts’ (2011) typology and find that Canadian NGOs have a range of options for how they respond to some of the impacts and pressures that result from CIDA funding. For instance, NGOs seek to “influence” CIDA through meetings with officials and politicians, “buffer” their overseas partners from negative CIDA impacts, “shield” themselves by limiting their level of CIDA funding and “compensate” by funding advocacy and public engagement from internal sources. I build on Elbers and Arts’ (2011) typology by adding “innovation” as an additional NGO strategy. NGO’s “innovate” by finding new ways of working that mitigate the negative effect of donor conditions.

The sub-questions of the thesis are as follows:

- How have changes to CIDA funding, namely the new call-for-proposals mechanism, affected Canadian NGOs in terms of:
○ Advocacy efforts?
○ Public engagement or education activities?
○ Organizational priorities?
○ Overseas partnerships?

• How do Canadian development NGOs describe their changing relationship with CIDA? Can this relationship be characterized as one of partnership?

• How has the evolving CIDA-NGO relationship affected NGO accountability? How do development NGOs remain accountable to CIDA ("upward accountability") and their constituents and beneficiaries ("downward accountability")? To what extent are these accountabilities compatible? How do NGOs reconcile these potentially competing accountabilities?

• How do NGOs manage and respond to some of the impacts and pressures brought about by changes to CIDA funding?

By exploring the relationship between CIDA and Canadian development NGOs, I hope to advance the discussion on official donor funding and its effect on NGOs’ programming, overseas partnerships, advocacy and public engagement, as well as accountability to funders, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. Learning from the Canadian NGO experience, I hope to contribute, in a small way, to the debate on civil society theory. Furthermore, I hope to determine whether the criticism of both CIDA funding cuts and the agency's new call-for-proposals funding mechanism is supported or contradicted by the views held by Canadian development NGOs interviewed in the study.
Rationale and Significance

Though a number of NGOs have publicly criticized CIDA, the wider Canadian NGO community has remained relatively silent regarding their relationship with the Government of Canada’s development agency. There is limited research on what the broader Canadian international development community thinks about the impact of official donor funding on their relationship with CIDA and the effects it has on their programs, priorities and overseas partnerships. A survey conducted by CCIC in 2012 on the impact of CIDA’s call-for-proposals mechanism suggests that Canadian NGOs feel pressure to change organizational priorities and scale back on advocacy activities (CCIC, 2012). However, the survey method did not allow for in-depth discussion exploring how CIDA funding affects organizational priorities, advocacy and public engagement activities, as well as accountability. Moreover, it did not include an extensive discussion on how NGOs are managing and responding to some of the challenges in the new CIDA environment. More broadly, there has been limited analysis on the impacts of official donor funding on NGOs in the global North. The few studies that have been conducted raise important questions and concerns regarding NGO autonomy over programs and priorities.

It is important to explore these concerns given the increase in official funding to NGOs particularly in the global North, as evidenced through the reports by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to a 2013 OECD report, more ODA is channeled through NGOs based in their own countries rather than developing countries. For instance in 2011, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members allocated approximately ten times as much aid through
NGOs based in their countries than through developing country NGOs. OECD data also indicated that ODA that is earmarked for donor-initiated projects is much higher than aid for core support, which led the authors of the report to conclude that NGOs are being employed as “implementing partners” or “contractors” for donor countries (OECD, 2013: 5).

Methodology and Thesis Outline

As mentioned above, this thesis attempts to shed light on the CIDA-NGO relationship and the impact of official donor funding on Canadian international development NGOs. This research applies a variety of qualitative research methods, including literature reviews and 18 semi-structured participant interviews. In doing so, it involves multiple research subjects and applies various perspectives to the research questions. In order to conduct an extensive and in-depth review of relevant literature, I use academic journals, books, news articles, government documents and gray literature. The diversity of these sources helps to ensure a well-balanced overview of available literature.

Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical and analytical underpinnings of donor-NGO relations. My analysis is guided by a review of civil society theory, the impact of official donor funding on NGOs, an overview of partnership literature and frameworks for analyzing government-NGO relations, as well as a typology for categorizing the ways that NGOs respond to donor conditions. In Chapter 2, two dimensions of my analytical framework are presented that are later employed in the analysis section in Chapter 4. Brinkerhoff’s (2002) partnership model is used to analyze the CIDA-NGO relationship,
which distinguishes partnership from other types of relationships. The work of Elbers and Arts (2011) provides a second analytical framework employed in Chapter 4 as a way of interpreting “how” Canadian NGOs navigate the changing relationship with CIDA and “what” they are doing to manage any possible challenges and opportunities.

As the case study of the thesis centers on development NGOs in Canada, Chapter 3 maps the historical relationship between CIDA and NGOs, explores recent CIDA trends, as well as cuts of CIDA funding to NGOs and the various responses to these cuts from inside and outside the NGO community. Following this, I review CIDA’s new call-for-proposals funding mechanism for Canadian civil society organizations and some of its impacts on NGOs.

Chapter 4 includes the analysis of my interviews with NGO participants and key informants. The interview portion of my thesis comprised 18 in-person and telephone interviews, each approximately 30-60 minutes in length. The objectives of the interviews were to gain a sense of the CIDA-NGO relationship from the perspective of NGOs, as limited literature exists in this area, as well as to provide insight regarding the effect of official donor funding on international development NGOs in the global North.

I employ two dimensions in my analysis of the interview responses. Brinkerhoff’s (2002) partnership model is used to analyze the CIDA-NGO relationship, which distinguishes partnership from other types of relationships including “contracting, extension, co-optation or gradual absorption”. I contribute to this model by determining that the CIDA-NGO relationship cannot be defined as a partnership and more closely resembles a relationship between contracting and extension.
The work of Elbers and Arts (2011) provides the second dimension of my analytical framework as a way of interpreting “how” Canadian NGOs navigate the changing relationship with CIDA and “what” they are doing to manage any possible challenges and opportunities. The typology identified by Elbers and Arts (2011) includes four main strategies used by organizations: avoiding, influencing, buffering and portraying. I build on this framework by adding “innovation” as a fifth strategy that NGOs can employ as a response to donor conditions.

I selected NGOs based on the proportion of funding received by CIDA to ensure that a diverse cross-section of organizations was included in the study. I then created a broad database of NGOs segmented by proportion of CIDA funding from information found in the organizations’ annual reports and tax returns on the Canada Revenue Agency’s (CRA) website. NGOs that had different proportions of CIDA funding were contacted for interviews. I also selected NGOs that were both members of CCIC and NGOs that did not hold CCIC membership, in order to ensure that a variety of organizations were included. I identified CCIC member-organizations through the umbrella organization’s membership list and NGOs that did not hold CCIC membership were identified through an online search of international development NGOs with operations in Canada. I also interviewed several key informants as a way of providing greater context and nuance on the research topic. These key informants include several academics and NGO representatives who have expertise on the subject matter.

Representatives of selected NGOs and key informants were interviewed in a semi-structured manner based on the questionnaire provided in Appendix 1. The list of interview participants is included in Appendix 2 and 3. A semi-structured interview
allowed all participants to respond to the same questions, but also left space for adaptation to interview subjects and for further probing. Contact with interview subjects was made by phone and email, using the contact information provided on the NGO’s website. A snowballing technique was also employed through my own network of contacts within the NGO community. The Director of Programs (or equivalent) was approached for interviews in larger organizations and in smaller organizations, the Executive Director; however, in some cases the interview participant was at the manager or program officer level.

It is important to note that the research study posed several limitations. First, the topic is sensitive in nature; many of the NGOs in the study are recipients of CIDA funding and this likely affected their willingness to disclose their identity or be as open in their criticism. As a result, it was not surprising that many interview participants selected to keep their identity and organization anonymous. Another limitation involves the scope of the research. Given the time and resource constraints of a Master’s-level thesis, only a small number of Canadian NGOs could be interviewed. As such, the sample was not fully representative of the development community in Canada, limiting the extent to which generalizations can be made from the research findings.

The next chapter delves into the theoretical and analytical literature in order to understand better the donor-NGO relationship, including a review of civil society theory, the impact of official donor funding on NGOs and an overview of partnership literature.
CHAPTER 2: DONOR-NGO RELATIONSHIPS

This chapter outlines the theoretical literature relevant to understanding the CIDA-NGO relationship. It helps to formulate the main hypothesis that CIDA funding reduces the autonomy of Canadian NGOs by encouraging them to shift to government priorities and short-term projects, scale back on advocacy activities, and generally serve as service providers of CIDA contracts. Moreover, the chapter discusses the factors that influence Canadian NGOs’ accountability to different stakeholders and identifies two typologies that form the analytical framework employed in Chapter 4.

First, this chapter looks at civil society theory, as it forms a theoretical basis for understanding the relationship between CIDA (the state) and Canadian NGOs (civil society). Second, I explore the role of international development NGOs in the context of civil society, including a definition of their work, their comparative advantages and disadvantages, as well as a classification system for their areas of focus. Third, I delve into literature on the effect of official donor funding on NGOs more generally and then specifically in terms of NGO accountability and advocacy. The final part of the chapter includes a brief overview of partnership literature, which is relevant in the context of the CIDA-NGO relationship, as the branch under which NGOs receive funding is known as the “Partnership with Canadians Branch”. From here, I move to a review of analytical frameworks for analyzing partnerships and government-NGO relationships and a brief discussion on the ways that NGOs can respond to the limitations of partnerships and donor conditions.
Civil Society and NGOs

Concept and Theory

At the conceptual level, current development literature considers civil society in two different ways: made up of “associations” or consisting of the “arena” where ideas about the economy and society are debated (Bebbington and Hickey, 2006). Civil society as “associations” is known as the voluntary sector and includes organizations focused on delivering social services to marginalized groups (Najam, 2000: 378). Civil society as an “arena” for action is often depicted within a circle that overlaps with two other circles: the state and the private sector (Van Rooy, 1998). The state sector makes up the political system, which is focused on social order, whereas the market sector is concerned with the production of goods and services, including the objective of profit (Najam, 2000: 378). The egalitarian description of the three sectors receives criticism for representing a balance and separation that oftentimes does not exist in reality, particularly when each group wields different levels of power. The depiction also fails to take into account the competing ideological positions that exist among the three sectors (Van Rooy, 1998).

There is no single discourse on civil society: the theory is ambiguous and can be interpreted in a number of ways. While this thesis adopts a liberal approach throughout the analysis, the following provides a brief overview of some of the salient aspects found in contemporary civil society theory. In Mohan’s review of Hyden’s (1997) classical liberal theories on civil society, he identifies two measures for analyzing and understanding civil society. The first measure refers to the extent to which civil society

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and the state are considered connected or separate. The second measure is concerned with whether or not civil society includes economic interests or autonomous associations necessary to oppose the power of the state and keep its citizens safe and secure.

Hegel made a distinction between the state and civil society, viewing it as a separate space consisting of economic relationships in a capitalist society. He considered civil society as made up of opposing powers and argued that the state is important to balance the different interests in society. He suggested that civil society would not be “civil” unless it remains under the “higher surveillance of the state” (Van Rooy, 1998: 9). These ideas were taken further by Hegel’s followers on each side of the political spectrum: Marx to the political left and Tocqueville to the right.

Tocqueville inspired the liberal “association” school, which argues that a healthy, pluralistic democracy requires an active civil society (Mohan, 2002). Under this school of thought, civil society is considered necessary for better governance as its main role is seen as monitoring the actions of the state. Differing slightly from the “association” school is the “regime school”, which does not consider that improved governance will be realized simply as a result of an active civil society and therefore offers particular suggestions for helping to create better governance such as state reform (Mohan, 2002:127).

Karl Marx moved Hegel’s ideas in a different direction by arguing that civil society played a key role in the capitalist system and simply reflected the interests of the dominant class (Edwards, 2009). Supporting Marx’s critical perspective of civil society, Gramsci introduced the idea of hegemony, or the controlling power of one
“class” over the other. He argued that the state and civil society were dependent upon one another rather than separate, and viewed civil society as an arena where hegemonic ideas (regarding economy and social life, for example) were established. In Gramsci’s view, civil society supported the state through consent and thus the two spheres worked together to influence public opinion, as well as maintain the ideas and political projects of the dominant class (Mitlin et al. 2007: 1713). Certain aspects of the above theories have influenced contemporary understandings of civil society.

In contemporary development literature, civil society often falls into two schools of thought stemming from the above theoretical leanings: the post-Marxist and neoliberal approaches (Bebbington and Hickey, 2006). The post-Marxist school advocates increased social movements within civil society that have the ability to transform economic systems and social life. The neoliberal approach, on the other hand, views civil society as a service-oriented voluntary sector and calls for a limited role of the state in delivering social services. It also promotes a greater role for the private sector (Bebbington and Hickey, 2006).

By way of categorization and definition, entities such as churches, trade unions, special interest associations, the media, and NGOs make up some of the many actors in civil society (MwMakumbe, 1998: 305). While these actors are often seen to be separate from both the state and private sector, they are officially registered with the state to pursue their work and activities (Kilby, 2006: 952). The following definition of NGOs presented by Kilby (2006) provides a useful normative definition in the context of the thesis: as non profit and non-governmental, NGOs are “self-governing independent bodies, voluntary in nature, and tend to engage both their supporters and constituency
on the basis of values or some shared interest or concern, and have a public benefit purpose” (952).

A review of civil society literature raises important questions about the relationship between the Canadian government and Canadian international development NGOs. This literature highlights the extent to which NGOs can be viewed as wholly independent actors or as representing the interests of CIDA and the Canadian government more specifically. The depiction of civil society as maintaining a role that is equal and balanced with the state provides a guideline against which the relationship can be further examined in the analysis section. Are these boundaries clearly defined, or do these boundaries change depending on the power of each group? The next section delves into this discussion and the following chapter explores how some of the recent trends affecting the CIDA-NGO relationship serve to weaken the independence of Canadian NGOs.

The Role of Development NGOs in Civil Society

Development NGOs form a diverse and varied group. Atack (1999) defines these diverse aspects according to the following factors: “geopolitical base (North or South), size, type of activity (operational, educational, campaigning etc.), and ideology or motivation” (855). International development NGOs may be categorized as membership organizations “that help themselves” or service organizations “that help others” (Bratton, 1989: 571). Based on this categorization, Northern-based development NGOs such as those based in Canada are often considered to be service
organizations, as their legitimacy is based on the fact that they exist to serve the needs of people who are not necessarily members of their organization (Korten, 1990: 96).

Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington (2007) explore the role of NGOs in international development around three dimensions. First, as highlighted above in regards to civil society theory, forming part of three interconnected arenas: the state, civil society and the market. Second, as it relates to local and global practices that “define what NGOs do and are”. Third, concerning the perspective of development as a “targeted intervention and/or a process of social change” (Mitlin et al., 2007: 1701). For the second dimension, Korten’s (1987) classification system provides a practical way to define what NGOs do and are. He identifies three NGO strategies or “generations” as they represent an evolution of strategy in sequential order. The three strategies, or “generations” of NGOs, include the following:

1. **Relief and welfare**: “the direct delivery of services to meet an immediate deficiency or shortage experienced by the beneficiary population such as needs for food, health care or shelter” (Korten, 1990: 115).

2. **Local self-reliance**: “the development of capacities of the people to better meet their own needs through self-reliant action” (Korten, 1990: 118).

3. **Sustainable systems development**: the involvement with “larger institutional and policy context or participation in the process of policy formation by governments and multilateral organizations” (Korten, 1987: 148).

In a later analysis, Korten also highlights an additional NGO strategy or a “fourth generation”, including propping up “people’s movements” and supporting broader “social vision” such as NGOs’ involvement in political advocacy (Korten, 1990: 127).
instance, this might include NGOs advocating for less spending on military operations abroad or changes to unfair international trade regulations that can negatively impact specific communities in the global South (Atack, 1999: 856). Brodhead (1987) supports this type of NGO strategy; he suggests that political advocacy must play an important role among Northern NGOs as it is industrialized countries that hold considerably more power in the multilateral system and the operation of the global economy vis-à-vis developing countries (4).

The different types of development interventions that Canadian NGOs support can be classified using Korten’s strategies. This is important in the context of the thesis because it helps to understand the type of activities that are supported by the NGOs impacted by CIDA’s new funding mechanism and possibly how these activities have been changed or altered. Of particular importance to the Canadian context is Korten’s fourth strategy, which speaks to political advocacy. As noted above, Northern NGOs may have a comparative advantage over their Southern counterparts in pushing this type of activity forward. What does this mean for Canadian NGOs? Does the current CIDA-NGO relationship support or hamper these types of efforts?

The third perspective regarding the role of international development NGOs presented by Mitlin et al. (2007) is their role as an intervention and/or as a process of social change. This can be understood within a framework whereby development is broken down into two categories: “little d” development and “big D” Development (Hart, 2001 in Mitlin et al., 2007: 1701). Little d/development relates to the “uneven processes that underlies capitalist development” (Mitlin et al, 2007: 1701), whereas big D/Development constitutes a “project of intervention in the third world that emerged
in a context of decolonization and the cold war” (Hart, 2001: 650). In Mitlin’s view (2007), NGOs are part of both little d/development and big D/Development: “whether as project implementers, knowledge generators or political activists, all NGOs are involved some form of intervention as well as form a part of the societies and political economies in which they work” (1701). Development alternatives can be viewed under both of these conceptions. Alternatives as they relate to big D/Development are connected to mainstream interventions such as different ways to carry out microfinance, project planning and service delivery (Mitlin et al, 2007: 1701). Development alternatives can also be conceived as little d/development as they relate to alternative ways of organizing the economy and political structures. An example of little d/development can be seen in the efforts of an international peasant movement like Via Campesina that advocates small-scale sustainable agriculture over corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies with the goal of advancing “social justice and dignity” (Via Campesina, n.d).

The types of interventions that NGOs pursue are relevant to the thesis analysis as they provide a guide for how Canadian NGOs can be categorized. Do Canadian NGOs tend to support “mainstream” interventions or “transformative” development? How does CIDA funding affect a preference for either of these approaches? Killick (2004) argues that Canada’s DAC membership and subsequent adoption of the aid effectiveness principles means an ideological preference for neoliberal development, or “mainstream” interventions. The interviews with NGO participants will help shed light on this debate.
Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of NGOs

International development literature acknowledges that NGOs play an important role in strengthening civil society, local governance and empowering local communities (Kilby, 2006: 951). Indeed, the NGO community has grown as a result of the perception that they have unique access to marginalized communities and oftentimes can deliver services in a more cost-effective way than governments (Ebrahim, 2003: 192). An overview of several generally accepted comparative advantages among governments and NGOs supports these claims. Because NGOs can more easily reach the poor, they are strong intermediaries between local communities and other parties, and tend to be seen as having more flexibility and ability to innovate than governments (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 24). Governments and official donors, on the other hand, allocate significant financial resources and may be in a good position to fulfill facilitation roles. They also can provide legal and institutional frameworks that are important for partnership and collaboration among development actors (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 24).

Other scholars argue that the advantages of NGOs lie in their ability to create a system of “checks and balances” within the international system by constituting a “countervailing power” to the state and market (Fisher, 1997; Clarke, 1998 in Ossewaarde et al., 2008: 43). This power stems from NGOs’ moral identity, such as representing the poor and working to advance human rights. Yet, there is a body of literature that suggests that NGOs do no always live up to their seemingly altruistic missions:

They [NGOs] are accused of failing to reach the poor; to be selective in their activities; to mismanage their organizations; to bow to the wishes of their
This critique raises important questions about NGOs legitimacy, or their ability to act appropriately on behalf of the people they are working to represent or serve. Further, it raises concerns about accountability, effectiveness and transparency that will be further discussed in subsequent sections and explored in the analysis section of Chapter 4.

Impact of Official Donor Funding on NGOs

Official donors like governments and multilateral organizations often establish development interventions in line with the big D/Development or mainstream interventions discussed above. This has led to criticism that NGOs may be “too close for comfort”, in the words of Edwards and Hulme (1998), to official donors, possibly compromising the innovation, autonomy and accountability of NGOs.

NGOs’ financial dependence on donors often results in an unequal power relationship (Ebarhim, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2002 in Elbers and Arts, 2011: 715). Evidence suggests that the advantages offered by NGOs such as those noted above (i.e., strengthening civil society, empowering local communities, etc.) do not outweigh the influence of donor funding (Elbers and Arts, 2011: 715). As a result, scholars have argued that donors are dictating the areas of focus or, more specifically, setting the agendas for development NGOs (Mawdsley et al., 2002) Agenda-setting has gone hand-in-hand with donors’ increased preference for project-based funding, which has marked a shift away from what has historically been more flexible core funding.
arrangements between official donors and NGOs (Wallace et al., 2006). Arguably, the short-term projects are less effective and responsive than long-term programs implemented through NGOs with core donor funding. Smillie (1993) highlights the disadvantages of project approaches supported by governments:

Project funding is slow, inefficient and bears little relationship to the reality of the lives of the rural people with whom most NGOs work. Life does not work on a project cycle; farmers need seeds and inputs on time; clinics cannot be closed; teachers cannot be laid off while a project proposal is awaiting approval or a second phase. Or, rather, seeds can arrive late and clinics can close, but the cost is high. It might be said that development delayed is development denied (Smillie, 1993: 172).

These trends highlighted above may be leading to a relationship where NGOs are operating more like sub-contractors or service-providers for donors and governments (Mawdsley et al., 2002; Hailey, 2000; Roberts et al., 2005 in Elbers and Arts, 2011: 715). Evidence indicates that one of the reasons that donors are inclined to employ NGOs as service providers is because relations can be easily severed when required (Smith and Lipsky, 1993 in Edwards and Hulme, 1998: 4). Perera (1996) and Hodson (1996) support this view by arguing that donors may remove their NGO support when established targets are not realized (as cited by Edwards and Hulme, 1998: 6). In response, many development experts conclude that Western donors should move away from “contract culture” and instead focus on “funding arrangements which provide predictability and stability in the long term” (Brown, 2012: 299).
The more competitive environment created as a result of an increase in donor funding also brings with it a range of impacts. Competition among NGOs does not encourage cooperation that might lead to formation of effective development policy (Miller, 1994; Covey, 1995 in Edwards and Hulme: 1998: 8). It may also mean that large NGOs can more easily acquire funding and official support at the expense of smaller NGOs (Jorgenson, Larsen and Udsahl, 1993: 6). This has implications for the role of NGOs in maintaining a healthy and plural civil society: by controlling the majority of resources and dominating the ideas in the sector, these larger NGOs may block their smaller counterparts and reduce the range of voices and approaches to international development (Edwards and Hulme, 1998: 8). In contrast, some scholars contend that competition actually helps to improve NGO accountability and performance by motivating NGOs to operate more efficiently (Parks, 2008: 218). According to Parks, the theory is that ineffective NGOs would disappear and strong ones would flourish in a highly competitive NGO environment.

The impact of official donor funding on development NGOs serves to outline the debates and questions that are applied to the Canadian context in the analysis section of Chapter 4. This review helps to establish a main component of the hypothesis; that is, the extent to which funding from CIDA links NGOs to development agendas established by the government. The literature suggests that CIDA funding likely shifts NGOs towards short-term projects thus encouraging them to become sub-contractors. This is explored in discussions with NGO interview participants to assess its relevance to the Canadian context. The literature also points out that an increase in funding may decrease collaboration among the NGO sector and crowd out smaller NGOs. As a result,
I expect Canadian NGOs interviewed to limit involvement with other NGOs and the recipients of CIDA funding to be dominated by large NGOs.

**Accountability**

Accountability to constituents, beneficiaries and donors is important to NGOs’ legitimacy. Edwards and Hulme (1998) describe it as “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions” (9). Building on this, Ebrahim (2003) notes a “dual perspective” inherent to NGO accountability: there is an “external” aspect of being held responsible by others, and an “internal” aspect of being responsible oneself expressed through “individual action” and values of the NGO (814).

NGOs have multiple accountabilities to patrons, clients and to themselves (Najam, 1996). NGO-patron accountability has been termed “upward” accountability (including donors, foundations and governments) and the term “downward” accountability captures accountability to constituents and beneficiaries (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 967). Tandon (1995) takes the meaning further to include accountability to NGOs themselves identifying three aspects: to their values and mission, to their performance in relation to their mission, and their role as civil society actors (as cited by Kilby, 2005: 954). These multiple accountabilities present many challenges for NGOs as it is impossible to be accountable in the same way to all parties. Problems come in the form of either “over-accounting”, due to multiple accountabilities, or “under-accounting” because one actor believes that another authority is paying closer attention to outcomes (Edwards and Hulme, 1998: 10). Additionally, there is always the fear that
accountability will lean towards the most powerful constituent, which is often the largest donor to the organization.

Funding from official donors may result in a multitude of difficult requirements for NGOs in such areas as project appraisal, reporting, evaluation and accounting (Salamon and Anheier, 1993; Smillie and Helmich, 1993). A greater focus on “logical frameworks” and “results-based management” (RBM) (monitoring and evaluation models often demanded of NGOs by donors) may be in direct conflict with the ability of NGOs to be flexible and responsive to the needs of their beneficiaries and the changing contexts of developing countries. This focus on short-term results prioritizes “accountancy” over actual “accountability” as many development outcomes are difficult to measure. This is because outcomes can take years to achieve, such as a shift in social attitudes towards women (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 968). This view is supported through an evaluation of results-based management approaches among UN agencies that identified a number concerns. The report concluded that “the determination of development success does not lend itself to impartial, transparent and precise measurement” (United Nations: 2008: 2) and that the formal approach to measuring outcomes through RBM reduces innovations and flexibility (United Nations, 2008: 20).

The top-down nature of measurability frameworks may shift accountability away from grassroots constituents and upwards to donors, emphasizing hierarchical management structures (Edwards and Hulme, 1998). These “professional” requirements of donor conditions can turn NGOs into professional service delivery organizations, rather than organizations that represent the needs of the poor (Markowitz and Tice, 2002).
Kilby (2006) proposes a practical framework for analyzing accountability that includes “depth of accountability” and the “level of formality” in NGO processes to measure “downward” accountability (954). He establishes this outline because there are often no requirements for “downward” accountability and notes that NGOs have accountability measures that are in place that range from formal to very informal. He concludes “depth” and “formality” are correlated with strong empowerment outcomes, and that broad “World View” values of an NGO influence the extent to which “downward” accountability takes place.

The literature on accountability helps to draw out the challenges that NGOs face in attempting to equally account to donors and beneficiaries. Relating this to the Canadian case, I expect the accountability of Canadian NGOs to shift toward CIDA, the most powerful actor, and away from grassroots beneficiaries. Many questions arise from the review of accountability that are relevant to my thesis. First, to what extent do RBM and logic frameworks demanded by CIDA impact NGOs innovation and flexibility in development activities? Second, are these demands encouraging international development NGOs in Canada to become more focused on “professional” requirements and less in tune with the people they serve in developing countries? Finally, what degree of formality exists among Canadian NGOs when attempting to maintain “upward” and “downward” accountability and what does this say about the CIDA-NGO relationship?
Advocacy and Public Engagement

A number of scholars call for a strong advocacy role among Northern NGOs. (Lewis, 2001; Edwards, 1999). Advocacy and public development education (which may also be referred to as public engagement) are ways that NGOs can address structural aspects of development such as hunger and poverty. It expands upon NGOs’ work in delivering programs, which may simply be dealing with “symptoms” of underdevelopment rather than the underlying “causes” (Minear, 1987). Addressing such structural aspects may mean focusing on underlying causes like unfair trade arrangements and the debt of developing countries. The political nature of development education and advocacy work further affects the relationship between donors and NGOs, especially when the donor is a government agency.

A common theme in the literature is that an increase in funding from governments or official donor agencies increases NGOs dependency and thus limits advocacy that might be critical of these funding organizations (Minear, 1987). Edwards and Hulme (1998) highlighted that some US NGOs were reducing their involvement in public campaigning because of a greater reliance on government contracts. They also noted that there was a similar concern that a reliance on government funding was limiting the ability of UK NGOs to speak out (Edwards and Hulme, 1998: 8). In spite of these claims, results from a survey testing the generalized criticisms of Northern NGOs’ advocacy indicated that there was no correlation between government funding and the advocacy expenditures of NGOs (Anderson, 2001: 225). Instead, findings seemed to reveal that the level of advocacy is influenced more by the NGOs’ policy orientation than their reliance on government funding. It is relevant to the discussion, however, to
highlight that barriers to NGO advocacy are not solely influenced by the level of government funding or an NGO’s policy orientation; limitations to advocacy also flow from the public’s perception and barriers placed by NGOs themselves, including the lack of any formal strategy and the failure to employ mechanisms to adequately evaluate advocacy efforts.

Public supporters could perceive funds not allocated to international programs as inappropriately used (Minear, 1987). This results in NGOs’ reluctance to use funds for advocacy and development education and may mean that NGOs focus most of their fundraising efforts on support to programming in developing countries (Minear, 1987: 205). As a result, it is difficult for NGOs to justify their advocacy work to donors and the public, especially in a competitive environment where donor funding is limited. Perspectives from NGOs gathered at an international symposium captured their concerns regarding the incentive to focus promotional activities on human suffering. One participant emphasized the pressure to focus on “one of life’s most tragic and intimate experiences... as a product to be packaged and sold” (Minear, 1987: 205). Evidence of this trend is obvious among the promotional activities of Northern NGOs, including Canadian organizations that frequently use imagery of starving babies and children with flies in their eyes. These activities are carried out without reference to the underlying causes of poverty and hunger, and therefore oversimplify the work required for effective development. Evidence that NGOs allocate low levels of spending to advocacy may be explained, in part, due to pressure from the public. Anderson (2001) found that NGOs reported advocacy expenditures were overall 4.1 percent of total
expenditures among Oxfam International affiliates and other Northern NGOs in 1996, a time that he expected NGO advocacy efforts to be prominent (Anderson, 2001: 226).

There is also some reason to believe that NGOs themselves limit their own advocacy by not having a strategy in place to carry out this type of work, although there are conflicting views on the topic. Edwards (1992) speaks of a failure to combine:

Different forms and levels of action in mutually supportive and reinforcing ways within a single strategy for change... working simultaneously and in a co-ordinated fashion at local, national and international levels, both in detailed policy work and public campaigning, education and media activity (Edwards, 1993: 164).

Yet, Anderson’s (2001) findings challenge this line of criticism: a survey of 23 NGOs indicated that most participated in advocacy and recognized it as a strategy, contributing human and financial resources to these efforts (227).

A final barrier to NGO advocacy may be connected to NGOs failure to employ mechanisms that evaluate the effectiveness of their advocacy and development education. This criticism is supported by evidence that suggests that NGOs have very few formal ways to evaluate their advocacy (Anderson, 2001: 228). Scholars argue that a greater focus should be placed on NGO's evaluation of advocacy efforts as it affects their ability to demonstrate the success necessary to attain resources to maintain advocacy activities (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Smillie, 1995).

The above discussion clearly reveals a debate in the literature regarding the affect of government funding on the advocacy of development NGOs. Do NGOs dependent on government funding limit the extent to which they speak out for fear that
they will lose an important source of funding, or does the lack of advocacy activities have to do more with NGOs’ policy orientation, the pressure they experience from their supporters and their failure to maintain an advocacy strategy? Through my interviews with representatives of Canadian NGOs, I will attempt to tease out these contradictions and illustrate some of the impacts affecting NGOs’ advocacy in the Canadian context.

The Concept of Partnership

The notion of partnership has become increasingly popular in donor-NGO relations and this trend extends to CIDA’s use of partnership language through their Partnership with Canadians Branch and Partners for Development program under which NGOs are able to receive CIDA funding. The following includes a review of partnership literature and several analytical frameworks that help to provide theoretical and practical guides for understanding the CIDA-NGO relationship.

Brinkerhoff (2002) divides the literature on partnership into three categories. First, she identifies the normative perspective, which is critical of government and donor practice, encouraging a greater role for NGOs and civil society. As such, NGOs generally promote this approach as it argues that partnership is the most moral way to deliver international development. This category includes a normative view of participation and empowerment, and speaks to values of “mutual influence, equality and reciprocal accountability” (20). Brinkerhoff (2002) argues that NGOs often employ partnership language because “partners may be perceived as morally superior to contractors, and because the rhetoric can afford opportunities to negotiate and create space for mutual arrangements” (20). The second category is the reactive perspective,
which responds to the criticism of the normative perspective by positively portraying donor, government and corporate partnership. This may be seen in the materials of international donors or governments, including their mission statements and annual reports (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 21). These efforts may be viewed as purely public relations activities, where the “rhetoric is strong, but the practice is weak”, while other activities may genuinely represent the organization’s activities (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 21). The instrumental perspective is the third category identified by Brinkerhoff. This literature views partnership as a way of achieving other objectives, such as those pertaining to “effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness” (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 21). This category is concerned with the types of relationships in partnerships and often includes “how-to” literature, as it explores the purpose of partnerships and how organizations might work together (21).

With vast partnership literature consisting of different perspectives, it is not surprising to note that there is not one broadly acknowledged definition. Barnett et al. (1999) defines partnership as “a common form between two parties that entered collaboration on a basis of mutual objectives and goals that otherwise were not attainable”. Picciotto (1998, cited in Aburgre 1999: 7) refers to partnership as a “means to an end”, including a “shared responsibility for outcomes, distinct accountabilities and reciprocal obligations”. Lister (2000) identifies several key elements covered by various practitioners and scholars that help to describe a “successful” partnership (3), which include the following:

- “Mutual trust, complementary strengths, reciprocal accountability, joint decision-making and a two-way exchange of information” (Postma, 1994: 51).
• “Clearly articulated goals, equitable distribution of costs and benefits, performance indicators and mechanisms to measure and monitor performance, clear delineation of responsibilities and a process for adjudicating disputes” (USAID, 1997, p1).
• “Shared perceptions and a notion of mutuality with give-and-take” (Tandon, 1990: 98).
• “Mutual support and constructive advocacy” (Murphy, 1991: 179).
• “Transparency with regard to financial matters, long-term commitment to working together, recognition of other partnerships” (Campbell, 1988:10).

While the above elements help to describe strong partnerships, there are many challenges presented by donor-NGO partnerships such as unequal power, a partner’s intention and a loss of or change to organizational identity with the conditions of funding (Cecchini et al. 2000). Indeed, control of resources is perhaps one of the most difficult limitations in maintaining genuine partnerships (Sizoo, 1996 in Lister, 2000: 3).

Nevertheless, strong personal relationships may help to overcome some of the challenges. Brown (1996) argues that when there is a stronger personal relationship in a partnership, there may be increased cooperation and a greater chance to overcome challenges brought about by varying levels of power and knowledge. While these personal relationships may provide a certain level of flexibility for NGOs, they also leave the NGO vulnerable to “changes or challenges to the leadership”, which can negatively impact partnership (Brown and Covey, 1989 in Lister, 2000: 4).
The above section reveals that the language of partnership used by NGOs and governments may be employed for different purposes, with the intent to serve the interests of each. This is likely the case with CIDA and Canadian NGOs. Though there is no common definition of partnership, the interviews with NGO participants serve to clarify their perspectives regarding what does and does not constitute a partnership with CIDA. The literature suggests that there are many challenges presented when attempting to work in partnership, however, strong personal relationships may help to navigate some of these difficulties. This is an area of exploration for the analysis: do personal relationships between CIDA officers and NGO staff help to make a more effective partnership?

**Frameworks for Partnerships and NGO-Government Relations**

A brief overview of the literature indicates that the NGO-government relationship has been analyzed from either the perspective of the NGO or the perspective of the government. Clark (1991) looks at the NGO side of the relationship and suggests that these organizations have three ways of interacting with government: “They can oppose the state, complement it, or reform it – but they can’t ignore it” (75). Conversely, looking at the other side of relationship and the attitudes held by governments towards NGOs, Commuri (1995) lists a range of government attitudes, including “supportive, facilitative, neutral, regulative and repressive”.

Najam (2000) employs the theory of strategic institutional interests to make sense of the government-NGO relationship. He develops a “Four-C’s” model, which looks at the ends (or goals) and means (or strategies) pursued by each party. He
suggests that governments and NGOs interact around four possible combinations. First, a relationship of cooperation is characterized by seeking similar strategies and goals. Second, a relationship of confrontation is one where each actor seeks different goals using different strategies. Third, a complementary relationship is one where both government and NGO share the same goals but prefer different strategies for achieving them. And finally, a relationship of co-optation results from employing similar strategies to achieve very different goals (383). The fifth possibility identified by Najam (2000) is a relationship of non-engagement where government and NGOs do not engage with one another on particular projects or issues (384).

In Brinkerhoff’s (2002) review of partnership literature, she suggests that there are two dimensions for defining partnership: mutuality and organization identity. Mutuality is defined by mutual dependence, and includes the responsibilities that each party has to the other. Mutuality also entails a “strong mutual commitment to partnership goals and objectives, and carries the assumption that these joint objectives are consistent and supportive of each partner organization’s mission and objectives” (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 22). Mutual interdependence forms an important part of mutuality and differs from “sequential dependence”. Sequential dependence is characterized as “A to B”, or where each organization works in relative isolation completing a component of an overall activity and then hands it over to the next organization in the sequence. Interdependence, on the other hand, is “A to B to A” or where organizations have recurrent processes to coordinate with each other. This type of interdependence involves “process integration” between partners and differs from relationships like supplier or contracting. (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 23). The process integration requires
ongoing communication throughout all stages of projects that may be formal or informal in nature. Brinkerhoff also notes mutuality allows partners to work together with less interference (i.e. fewer regulations) and that partners can openly share ideas and strategies (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 27).

According to Brinkerhoff (2002), organization identity often refers to the characteristics that make a particular organization “distinct” (23). Organizational identity does not have to do with maintaining specific organizational processes, rather it has to do with the maintenance of “core values”. Brinkerhoff examines organizational identity at two levels. First, to its “mission, values and identified constituencies to which it remains accountable and responsive” (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 23). Second, organizational identity must be seen in a wider “institutional view”, especially the “comparative advantages” it offers within its sector. In this case, it reflects back to NGOs’ role as civil society actors.

Employing these dimensions of mutuality and organization identity, Brinkerhoff (2002) develops a “relative scale” to define partnership which differs from other types of relationships: “contracting, extension, co-optation or gradual absorption” (22). Brinkerhoff depicts these relationships using a two-by-two grid. In this grid, high organizational identity and high mutuality represents partnership, high organizational identity and low mutuality represents contracting, low organizational identity and low mutuality represents extension and low organizational identity and high mutuality represents co-optation and gradual absorption.

The review of various partnership frameworks allows for the appropriate analytical structure to be selected for the Canadian context. Based on the hypothesis
that official donor funding encourages NGOs to act as sub-contractors, Brinkerhoff’s model is particularly suitable, as it was developed to examine the government-nonprofit relationship and specifically includes contracting as an option. Her use of mutuality encompasses many of the key issues highlighted by CIDA critics: independence, open communication and support of mission and objectives. Organizational identity also speaks to salient topics covered in the literature review on donor-NGO relations, such as the role of civil society actors and accountability. Moreover, where the criteria of other frameworks are difficult to evaluate from interviews alone, Brinkerhoff’s use of mutuality and organizational identity are two characteristics that can be explored through interviews with NGO participants. As such, Brinkerhoff’s work forms one dimension of the analytical framework for understanding the CIDA-NGO relationship in Chapter 4.

**NGO Responses to Donor Conditions**

The above frameworks do not consider the responses of NGOs in their relationship with donors. NGOs can employ a range of strategies to manage donor conditions (Elbers and Arts, 2011). Certainly, power asymmetries exist in the donor-NGO relationship, particularly as a result of financial dependence. However, Elbers and Arts (2011) assess the literature to determine the extent of this power dynamic. They delve into the concepts of “dialectics of control” presented by Giddens (1998, as cited in Elbers and Arts, 2011), who believes that any partner in any relationship has some way to counteract the power of the other. Furthermore, they use organizational institutionalist theory to shed light on organizational behaviour and employ these
theoretical ideas as well as evidence from research with 41 Southern NGOs in India and Ghana to develop a coherent typology. The typology identifies four main strategies used by organizations: “avoiding”, “influencing”, “buffering” and “portraying”. According to Elbers and Arts (2011), “avoiding” includes the tactics of “selecting”, “rejecting” and “exiting” which aim to “prevent exposure to donor conditions”. “Influencing” involves the tactics of “negotiating”, “persuading” and “involving” with the intent to “change content of donor conditions”. “Buffering” contains the tactics of “shielding” and “compensating” as a way to “mitigate impact of unavoidable donor conditions”. Finally, “portraying” aims to “pretend compliance with donor condition” through the tactics of “window-dressing”, “withholding” and “misrepresenting” (Elbers and Arts, 2011: 725).

Elbers and Arts (2011) analysis of 41 Southern NGOs in India and Ghana shows that the aforementioned strategies often require “alternative sources of funding or strong personal contact complemented by some level of trust” (729). The absence of these factors meant that the NGOs in the study had limited options available to them and would sometimes be influenced to manipulate the perceptions of donors.

Certainly Canadian NGOs are affected by the many challenges inherent to government funding, as explored in depth above. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that they do have ways to respond to these possible limitations. The work of Elbers and Arts (2011) provides a second dimension of my analytical framework employed in Chapter 4 as a way of interpreting “how” Canadian NGOs navigate the changing relationship with CIDA and “what” they are doing to manage any possible challenges and opportunities.
Conclusion

NGOs are important actors in international development, offering many comparative advantages vis-à-vis governments such as cost-effectiveness, flexibility and links to local communities in developing countries. In the global North, NGOs act primarily as service organizations as they exist to serve the needs of third parties (their beneficiaries) in areas of the global South. Indeed, NGOs have different areas of focus for their work ranging from relief and welfare to systems development through policy formation. However, donor funding tends to link NGOs to more mainstream development interventions such as humanitarian assistance and service delivery, rather than political advocacy and alternative ways for organizing the economy. This is something that will be further explored in the following section and through the interviews.

While policy literature depicts civil society (including international development NGOs) as separate from the state, this division does not always exist in reality. The boundaries may become blurred when the government wields significantly more power than the NGO, especially when the organization relies on the government for funding. The relative power of the donor over the NGO means that donor funding brings about a range of impacts, which may include a change to an NGO’s agenda to reflect the priorities of the donor or a shift to short-term projects over longer-term programs. It is often suggested that these impacts encourage NGOs to become contractors or service providers.

Additionally, donor funding can create complex accountability requirements, particularly when it comes to a preference for “results-based management” tools. These
tools may conflict with the NGOs’ ability to be flexible and responsive to the needs of the people they serve and the changing contexts of developing countries. Advocacy may also be affected by government funding, limiting NGOs willingness to speak out. NGOs, although often maintaining less power in their relationship with donors, still have space and strategies that they can employ to help manage some of the above conditions.

The next chapter looks specifically at recent trends affecting the CIDA-NGO relationship and includes an analysis of the call-for-proposals mechanism. It highlights how the theoretical literature is playing out in practical terms within the Canadian context. Chapter 3 explores questions around the degree to which the state and civil society are connected or separate in Canada and examines the extent that CIDA is setting the agendas of Canadian NGOs whereby they act like service providers. Furthermore, it involves a discussion on the factors that influence Canadian NGOs’ participation in advocacy activities and provides examples of the effects on NGOs of results-based management systems demanded by CIDA.
CHAPTER 3: CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CIDA-NGO RELATIONSHIP

This chapter reveals examples from the Canadian context that support many of the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 2. Intimidation through the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA) audits is increasing a “chill” felt on Canadian civil society that may discourage civil society organizations and NGOs from engaging in advocacy, especially when they are recipients of government funds. Bureaucratic delays and political decision-making within CIDA is threatening an authentic partnership between the agency and Canadian NGOs. Moreover, an increased alignment with foreign policy as evidenced through priority countries, funding cuts to NGOs and CIDA’s call-for-proposal funding mechanism supports part of my hypothesis. That is, CIDA funding reduces the autonomy of Canadian NGOs by encouraging them to shift to government priorities, focus on short-term projects and generally represents a role whereby NGOs act as service providers of CIDA contracts.

An outline of this chapter is as follows. It starts by broadly exploring the civil society context affecting the relationship between the government and civil society organizations in Canada. It then turns its specific focus to the CIDA-NGO relationship, beginning with a brief overview of the history between CIDA and Canadian international development NGOs. Next, I discuss recent trends within CIDA, helping to contextualize the current environment. These trends include realities around decision-making, programming and the selection of development priorities. I then outline the spate of funding cuts experienced by NGOs setting the scene for the context in which CIDA redefined its partnership with Canadian NGOs by introducing a new funding
mechanism in 2010. Towards to end of the chapter, I provide a description of this new call-for-proposals mechanism, exploring some of the initial feedback and research on its impacts on the NGO community. Finally, I cover some of the recent events affecting CIDA and conclude with a section on development effectiveness principles.

**Canadian Civil Society**

Looking broadly at Canadian civil society, Phillips (2010) suggests that the Canadian government’s position toward the third sector is one of neglect and has resulted in an apathetic civil society in the country. She argues that the relationship between the government and civil society has not been clearly established under the current government, stating:

Prime Minister Harper has never given an official speech (at least not one that appears on the PM’s website) that acknowledges the contributions of voluntary and nonprofit organizations or sets out a vision for their place in society, the economy, and democracy (65).

In the 1990s, the Government of Canada made efforts to build a stronger relationship with the civil society sector through the Voluntary Sector Initiative (Philips, 2010). This Initiative strived to strengthen the capacity of civil society. In recent years, however, the government has made no official statements about civil society and according to Philips (2010) this has locked the sector in a “charity model” effectively relegating its purpose to providing services to the disadvantaged through private philanthropy, limiting the space for public debate on the role of civil society, as well as stifling nonprofit innovation.
Matters have been made worse by the “chill” on Canadian civil society, which has been well noted by the media, academia and civil society organizations over the last few years. This chill is demonstrated by the public funding cuts for research, public policy and advocacy activities. Some examples include cuts and changes to programs leading to less funding for environmental monitoring, as well as less funding for scientific research generally (Voices, n.d). The Voices Coalition, a non-partisan group of 200 members, keeps track of cases where the government attempts to silence civil society voices. The organization was created in April 2010 to address attacks by the government on civil society rights to criticize government policies. The Voices website includes the types of tactics that have been used by the government to silence or intimidate NGOs, including the following categories:

- Charitable status attacked/revoked
- Defunding
- Fired or forced resignation
- Harassment/Privacy violation
- Information Withholding
- Interference with independent institutions
- Surveillance
- Vilification/Smearing

There is a noticeable trend that the sectors of civil society to come under fire include those that maintain dissenting views to the Canadian government in terms of ideology and policy. Indeed, the Voices “hit list” includes the international development sector in
addition to environment, human rights, labour movements, and several others (Voices, n.d).

The relationship between the government and civil society in Canada has also been affected by the legal limitations placed on charities through the Income Tax Act, particularly as it relates to advocacy and public awareness activities. These limitations create a greater chill on civil society especially in terms of advocacy activities. CRA defines advocacy as support for a cause or particular perspective and may include public awareness campaigns, a representation to an elected representative or public office, participation in a policy development-working group, among other things (CRA, n.d). Under this Act, charities, in general, are not allowed to devote more than 10 percent of their resources to advocacy activities that are considered political. Political activities are those that include a call to political action and generally involve influencing either through public elected representatives or public officials to change or adopt laws, policies or decisions. Public awareness campaigns are not the same as political activities under the Act with CRA stating the following in regards to public awareness by charities:

When a registered charity seeks to foster public awareness about its work or an issue related to that work, it is presumed to be taking part in a charitable activity as long as the activity is connected and subordinate to the charity’s purpose. (CRA, n.d).

Overall, the limitation on political activities is clearly established by CRA: if charities do not meet the 10 percent regulation, their ability to issue tax receipts is revoked for one year (Dallaire, 2012).
The 10 percent regulation may not be clearly understood by Canadian civil society (Yundt, 2012). This raises questions regarding the extent that civil society organizations are staying away from advocacy due to fear that they fail to comply or a wider misunderstanding of the regulation. The authors of the Voluntary Sector Initiatives’ Broadbent Report, a report on the governance and accountability in Canada’s voluntary sector stated the following: “In our view, the 10 percent rule is badly formulated, poorly understood and potentially highly arbitrary in its application by Revenue Canada” (Yundt, 2012). As noted above, CRA does not necessarily view advocacy as a political activity, but rather, political activities that relate to an explicit call to action. As such, civil society organizations may stay away from political activities altogether because they are unsure about the line between sharing perspectives and pressuring a public official (Yundt, 2012).

Smillie (2012), however, argues otherwise in the case of international development NGOs. He suggests that the government deliberately seeks to silence NGOs’ voices and notes that organizations become complicit in this process when they stop engaging in advocacy in return for funding. In terms of public engagement, Smillie (2012) acknowledges that charities such as NGOs can conduct these types of activities according to CRA so long as they are integral to their mandate. Yet, he argues that development NGOs are also limiting public engagement based on “sensitivities to funders” (Smillie, 2012: 278).

While the 2012 Federal budget included an extra $8 million to help the CRA enforce these rules on charitable organizations, indicating a push to monitor advocacy activities closely, a study by the Canadian Press found that only 450 of the 85,000
registered charities in Canada use any of their resources for political activities. This indicates that Canadian charities are not overly active in political advocacy (Canadian Press, 2012). What remains unclear, however, is if civil society organizations are apathetic as suggested by Phillips (2010), and remain so through the lack of clarity around the 10 percent rule, or if their lack of involvement is linked more to a fear of punishment and sensitivities to funders, as argued by Smillie (2012). Though it is likely to be a combination of both scenarios, several audits of Canadian charities carried out by CRA help to make the case for the latter.

In recent years, CRA has conducted several audits of Canadian charities that have been critical of the government. Examples include Tides Canada, Canadian Mennonite magazine and the David Suzuki Foundation. CRA informed Tides Canada, a charitable environmental organization, that it would be audited in 2012. According an article in Canadian newspaper the *Globe and Mail*, Ethical Oil, a Conservative-connected group that promotes the Alberta’s oil sands, initiated the audit through a complaint. Ethical Oil demanded that the charity be audited and that its charitable status be revoked if found in violation of CRA’s 10 percent advocacy rule (McCarthy, 2012). The CEO of Tides, Ross McMillan, reported that the audit seemed to target Tides’ programs seen as critical of Conservative government policy:

> Some of the information requested of us by CRA does not appear to be random – many of the questions concern [...] projects with views that are not always aligned with government perspectives on both social and environmental policy (McCarthy, 2012).
In July 2012, CRA informed the Canadian Mennonite magazine that it risked losing its charitable status because of its political activities. The letter from CRA stated:

It has come to our attention that recent issues of the organization’s monthly periodical entitled Canadian Mennonite, have contained editorials and/or articles that appear to promote opposition to a political party, or to candidates for public office... Registered charities that engage in partisan political activities jeopardize their charitable status and can be subject to revocation (Gruending, 2012).

CRA provided examples of the articles in question, one of which included an editorial referring to “a militaristic Conservative majority government” (Gruending, 2012).

Another example of pressure placed on non-profit organizations that maintain views that conflict with those of the federal government include the three audits carried out on the Suzuki Foundation. In 2012, David Suzuki, the organization’s founder, resigned from the Foundation’s board based on the threats that the organization had received regarding its charitable status. Criticism by the Sun Media network suggested that the Foundation’s charitable status had been revoked because it was too political (Stoymenoff, 2012). In an open letter, David Suzuki said:

I am keenly aware that some governments, industries and special interest groups are working hard to silence us. They use threats to the Foundation’s charitable status in attempts to mute its powerful voice on issues that matter deeply to you and many other Canadians (Stoymenoff, 2012).

Initially the CRA audits seemed to focus largely on environmental organizations, however, during the writing of this thesis, the media covered new audits targeted at
international development organizations. These second-round audits were on “charities focused on foreign aid, human rights and poverty” and included Amnesty International and Kairos (Canadian Press, 2014b). CCIC and the opposition NDP criticized the government for the audits, highlighting the damaging effect they were having on organizations. The NDP requested a public hearing into the audits and NDP MP Murray Rankin stated: “We can’t let this fester much longer. We’ve got to clear the air. It’s bad for the reputation of the CRA and it’s bad for the environmental organizations and other charities that are somehow under a shadow” (Canadian Press, 2014a). CCIC, for its part, is working with a number of NGOs to create a delegation that can meet with CRA and discuss concerns with the audits. Through its work within the international development sector, CCIC warned that the political audits were destabilizing organizations, forcing them to neglect their mandate and projects overseas.

These above examples indicate some level of intimidation that cannot be discounted and likely have a wider impact on the sector, increasing the “chill” felt on Canadian civil society and possibly creating an environment of fear that discourages civil society organizations from speaking out on a range of issues. This has implications for Canadian development NGOs and the extent to which they feel comfortable engaging in advocacy activities, especially when they are recipients of government funding. The section below and the interview analysis in Chapter 4 help to explain how some of these debates and challenges are playing out within the Canadian NGO sector.
The CIDA-NGO Relationship

History

The relationship between CIDA and NGOs exists within the wider context that has seen pressure placed on civil society organizations. This section starts with brief overview of the historical relationship between CIDA and Canadian international development NGOs.

CIDA has a long history of working with NGOs in Canada. In 1968, the agency created an NGO division in which NGOs proposed projects and CIDA provided 75 percent of the funding (Brodhead and Pratt, 1996: 91). The work of the NGO division was coined the “responsive program” (Brodhead and Pratt, 1996: 1). The program continued into the 1980s wherein CIDA was responsive to priorities that were largely set by Canadian NGOs together with their partners in the South (CCIC, 2012:1). CIDA was considered a leader in its approach to NGO-led initiatives and led on a number of key issues advocated by NGOs, such as human rights and women and development (Brown, 2012: 290). Several larger NGOs gained a significant level of control and autonomy in the 1980s when CIDA began to provide program funding with a multi-year commitment. For smaller NGOs, the agency created a decentralized fund where decisions on funding were based on peer review. This was followed by distributions of “core funding” or “institutional funding” to larger NGOs in the late 80s and early 90s (Brodhead and Pratt, 1996).

The 1990s saw a reduced focus on truly “responsive” programming. Unlike in the past, the Canadian NGOs were given contracts based on “needs” set by the Canadian government. These “needs” tended to reflect foreign priorities and meant that NGOs
that were CIDA funded operated more like “implementers of policy” (Brodhead and Pratt, 1996: 101).

According to Rudner (1996), in 1995, development assistance and Canada’s interests became increasingly more connected under the foreign policy statement “Canada and the World”. This statement included NGO funding to sectors based on government preferences. While the funding was still considered "responsive", it represented a shift towards further policy alignment and control (Rudner, 1996: 207-208).

An increase in the financial dependence of NGOs on CIDA took place over the course of these changes, as indicated by the growth in the percentage of funding:

In 1975, 39 percent of NGOs relied on CIDA for more than half of their revenue. By 1984, this figure had increased to 59 percent of NGOs. A 1994 survey of 18 large NGOs found that one third relied on CIDA funding for at least 67 percent of their income, and two thirds received 25 percent or more of their income from government (Barry-Shaw & Oja-Jay, 2012: 59).

The historical overview of the CIDA-NGO relationship indicates some of the features of past CIDA funding considered innovative and supportive of flexible NGO-led development. These include the ability for NGOs to set the priorities of projects or programs based on their expertise and geographic areas of work, as well as CIDA support in the form of “core” or institutional” funding. Connecting to the earlier literature on the impacts of official donor funding on NGOs, this type of funding has been encouraged among development experts as a way to eliminate the “contract culture” prevalent among donors. Instead, a focus on more flexible and stable funding is
preferred as it allows NGOs to plan and develop programs over the long-term. Based on the CIDA-NGO history and literature that criticizes such inflexible funding arrangements, I expect the NGOs participants interviewed to also be critical of the impact that this type of funding has on their programs and beneficiaries.

**Bureaucratic Delays and Political Decision Making**

Recent criticism of CIDA has often focused on its complex and time-consuming bureaucracy. A report by the Auditor General found that it took up to 43 months – almost 4 years – to have a project moved from conception to approval (Flageole, 2009). The delays are frequently attributed to ever-changing leadership, which has seen 7 ministers since 2000 and the repeated change of sectors and themes. The defunding of certain NGOs in 2009 and 2010, discussed more fully later in the chapter, was accompanied by long waits regarding funding decisions: proposals might be approved by CIDA officers but they would often become backlogged in the minister’s office awaiting a final decision before the NGO could be notified of approval or rejection of funding (Babbage, 2010). An example of this is Horizons of Friendship, an organization that had their funding renewed in 2010 -- a year and a half after CIDA officials sent the proposal to the Minister for approval (Babbage, 2010).

A lack of clarity surrounding decision-making at CIDA has also raised concerns about transparency. An example of the unclear and politically driven decision-making process is demonstrated by the 2009 CIDA memorandum regarding interfaith group Kairos where an approved document signed by senior civil servants and the minister was altered with a handwritten “not” approved, denying the organization $7 million in
funding. Initially, the Minister of International Cooperation at the time, Bev Oda, denied that she knew who altered the document and later admitted to the House of Commons that she had ordered that the “not” be added, indicating that the decision to cut funding to Kairos was politically motivated (CBC, 2011).

The bureaucratic delays and political decision-making within CIDA go against many of the principles of partnership, as they do not nurture a relationship of trust, two-way exchange or transparency with Canadian NGOs. More specifically, these trends hinder mutual interdependence whereby there is process integration and ongoing open communication, both components of Brinkerhoff’s (2002) model. Based on these challenges, I expect NGO participants to be somewhat critical of CIDA, pointing to a relationship that cannot be easily defined as one of authentic partnership.

The Results Agenda and Priority Themes

The last few years have also been marked by CIDA’s increased focus on “results-based management”, a concept initially established by the OECD/DAC and then adopted by CIDA in the 1990s. Likely propelled by the need to demonstrate concrete outcomes with the use of public funds, CIDA’s attention on results became more pronounced in 2007 (Brown 2012: 87). While the Canadian public may have a preference for tangible results, development experts assert that development outcomes do not always translate to quick or easily measurable outcomes, particularly when they involve more complex and long-term goals like women’s empowerment or the realization of human rights. Arguably, CIDA’s main focus on measurable and tangible results may focus more attention on short-term projects such as the “signature projects” (Brown, 2012: 86).
Interestingly, while CIDA has increased its focus on results, it has continually changed the focus of its priority sectors and themes over the last decade and a half. In 2001, CIDA adopted the priorities of health and nutrition, basic education, HIV/AIDS and children. In 2002, they added rural development and agriculture (Canada, 2002: 14), and then changed the themes to good governance, health, basic education, private-sector development and environmental sustainability in 2005 (Canada, 2005: 11). Under the Conservatives, CIDA announced in 2009 the following priority themes: increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth and stimulating sustainable economic growth (DFATD, n.d.). While donors often agree on the need to focus on fewer sectors, a focus on only several sectors goes against development effectiveness principles of local ownership and donors’ alignment with recipient country priorities. Additionally, the constant change of priority themes and sectors also affects development effectiveness by increasing aid volatility (Brown, 2012: 92).

The conceptual and practical concerns regarding results-based management tools discussed in Chapter 2 are demonstrated through the case of CIDA and Canadian international development NGOs. Noting that CIDA maintains a significant focus on RBM tools, I expect the NGO participants interviewed to comment on the drawbacks of these types of reporting systems. Based on the discussion above and the literature from the previous chapter, it is likely that Canadian NGOs experience firsthand some of the limitations of RBM and logic frameworks such as lessened flexibility, more mainstream approaches to development and a focus on short-term projects rather than transformative long-term programs.
**Foreign Policy Priorities**

While the use of development assistance to advance foreign policy priorities of the Canadian government is not a new trend, it has intensified in recent years and is demonstrated through the employment of aid towards Canadian security and commercial interests. The increase in foreign aid starting in 2007-2008 to countries experiencing insecurity (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq and Sudan) provides a case in point (Swiss, 2012: 143). Swiss shows that overall development assistance spending in the security sector significantly increased from 2004-2005 to 2008-2009, he states:

DFAIT’s overall contribution to the International Assistance Envelope was 8% of the total in 2008-09, with nearly Cdn $423 million disbursed, of which $114 million was ODA related to security and stability programming. This marks a sizable increase from on $141 million of total ODA disbursed by DFAIT in 2004-05 of which only $13 million could be classified as spending on security-related issues (Swiss, 2012: 145).

More recently, the trend of development aid being employed for foreign policy priorities can be seen through the focus on Canada’s commercial interests abroad. The current list of CIDA’s priority countries to receive development assistance underscores the level of commercial influence over foreign aid decisions. In 2009, the government announced that it would focus 80 percent of its bilateral resources on 20 countries of focus. Development experts were quick to note that the selection of these countries of focus reflected Canada’s commercial interests (Brown, 2012; Walter, 2010). In recent years, CIDA stopped bilateral funding to extremely poor countries such as Cambodia, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Following these cuts, new
programs were launched in middle-income countries like Colombia and Peru, where the government currently has trade interests (Sheikh, 2012). According to the CIDA website, these countries were selected “based on their real needs, their capacity to benefit from aid, and their alignment with Canadian foreign policy priorities” (CIDA, 2014). Lupick (2009) notes that this was the first time that foreign policy priorities were publically highlighted as an official reason for selecting countries of focus (Lupick, 2009 in Brown 2012: 97).

The application of Canadian foreign aid to advance commercial interests is also evidenced by CIDA’s partnership with mining companies. In 2011, CIDA announced its intention to fund several pilot projects with NGOs and Canadian mining firms. This move baffled many in the NGO community and raised questions regarding CIDA’s responses to government priorities and NGO transparency. The NGO-mining company partnerships include World University Service of Canada and Rio Tinto Alcan in Ghana, Plan Canada and IAMGOLD in Burkina Faso, and World Vision Canada and Barrick Gold in Peru. CIDA provided $26.7 million to the pilot project and the partners committed almost $3 million (CIDA, 2011b). Many development experts argued that CIDA’s funding to profitable mining companies subsidized their CSR programs, which are traditionally the responsibility of the company. These experts pointed out that in the three pilot projects, CIDA is covering the greatest share of the cost (Coumans, 2011). Comments made by members of the NGO community also indicated concern regarding these types of partnerships. Robert Fox, Executive Director of Oxfam Canada, a recipient of CIDA funding, expressed his confusion, stating:
When we think about the private sector (in developing countries), we think first and foremost of farmers, of co-operatives, of microenterprises and small and medium enterprises that create employment, that create value, that create opportunity... why, if your priority was reducing poverty and promoting human rights, would you identify Canadian mining corporations as your priority in terms of your vehicle for economic development and reducing poverty? That's not apparent to us (Alamenciak, 2012).

Some donors of Plan Canada, an NGO partnering with IAMGOLD, complained that the mining companies have enough money to fund their own social programs and that Plan Canada should not be partnering with them. Plan’s President, Rosemary McCarney explained:

Would we try it again? Probably not... It’s upsetting to donors. People are mad.

The reality is that working with any mining company is going to be a problem.

There are going to be (employee) strikes and spills. Is it worth the headache?

Probably not (Westhead, 2013).

Evidence indicates that extractive activities frequently do not achieve long-term economic growth, substantial employment opportunities and may disrupt the social relations in developing countries and affected communities. For instance, due to the fact that mining operations are generally capital intensive and require little human labour, they do not tend to create meaningful employment opportunities for local people (Azabazaa, 2009). As well, minerals are often processed outside the country, hindering the development of “downstream industries” (Campbell, 2006). Extractive activities may also expose poor communities to social risks as indicated by the World
Bank Group (Pegg, 2006). The “rapid change in economic and social fabric society creates new forms of poverty where residents compete with new migrants for employment”, this, in turn, may lead to an increase in alcohol abuse, prostitution and child labour” (Pegg, 2006: 328 - 379). Canada’s Official Development Assistance Accountability Act requires Canadian international development assistance to contribute to poverty reduction, include the perspectives of the poor and be in accordance with international human rights standards (CIDA, n.d.c). The above concerns regarding the ability of the mining sector to create sustainable economic development raises questions about the extent to which CIDA’s support to mining companies contradicts this act.

**Defunding NGOs**

Since 2009, the CIDA-NGO relationship has been affected by the defunding of certain organizations. Many of these funding cuts were made to longtime recipients of CIDA support. The NGO community was quick to speculate that the cuts were a way of punishing organizations that held different political positions from the government and this had a wide effect of silencing development NGOs. The funding cuts started with KAIROS Canada when the federal government in November 2009 rejected its proposal for $7.1 million. CIDA did not explain the reason for discontinuing funding, except for stating that its priorities had changed and that KAIROS did not meet them (Gruending, 2011). Different theories on the reasons why KAIROS had its funding cut were expressed within the development community and media, including KAIROS’ work in Palestine, which was contrary to the government’s pro-Israel position. Throughout
2009, CIDA announced that funding to eight other NGOs would be eliminated or reduced (Babbage, 2010). In December 2009, a Quebec NGO called Alternatives had $2.1 million cut by CIDA. The organization was also critical of Israel’s occupation of Palestine (Barry-Shaw and Oja Jay, 2012). In April 2010, women’s rights organization, MATCH International, had its funding application rejected following 20 years of CIDA support.

The organization had been critical of the government’s anti-abortion position (Swiss, 2012). After 40 years of CIDA funding, CCIC also learned in 2010 that CIDA would not renew its annual funding of $1.8 million. Gerry Barr, the former President of CCIC indicated that the cuts were politically motivated, he said:

This is the politics of punishment… Today, you can see the emergence of a kind of partisan brush-clearing exercise and a punishment approach adopted towards those whose public views run at cross purposes to the government (Stewart, 2010).

The cuts to long-time CIDA partners continued into 2012, with the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) losing $2.9 million on a proposal for three years of funding (Greunding, 2012a). Catholic organization Development and Peace also had CIDA funding reduced significantly, from $44.6 million in 2006-11 to $14.5 million over a five year period (Development & Peace, 2012).

Barry-Shaw and Oja Jay (2012) argue that these cuts are not a new trend, but simply the most recent example of the Canadian government working through CIDA to narrow the political space of Canadian development NGOs. They note that past Liberal
and Conservative governments employed “politics of punishment” against NGOs that held positions contrary to respective governments, citing the following examples:

In 1975, the CCIC faced funding cuts after it criticized Canada’s position at the World Food Conference. In 1979, a radicalized Canadian University Service Overseas, the most prominent Canadian development NGO at the time, had its funding shut off completely. In the 1980s, NGOs supporting liberation movements of southern Africa and Central America were squeezed by CIDA. In 1991, the Inter-Church Fund for International Development, a precursor organization to KAIROS, faced CIDA’s wrath for its criticisms of structural adjustment. And in 1995, Canada’s national network of development education centres was effectively destroyed when CIDA slashed 100 per cent of its funding (Barry-Shaw and Oja-Jay, 2012).

**New Partnership with NGOs: A Call-for-Proposals Funding Mechanism**

Within the environment outlined above, CIDA established a new structure for partnering with NGOs. CIDA’s new Partnerships with Canadians Branch was launched in July 2010 after a review of the mandate of the previous Partnership Branch. The new Partnership framework aimed to "streamline the application process and reduce the administrative burden for project applications, leaving more money for real development work on the ground" (CCIC, 2012: 1). The Partnership with Canadians Branch includes the Partners for Development program, which involves a new funding mechanism to support Canadian NGOs. The new call-for-proposals funding mechanism is competitive in nature and marks a move away from the traditional model of
“responsive programming” whereby CIDA received proposals from NGOs based on NGOs' priorities, to a mechanism in which NGOs must respond to calls for proposals (CCIC, 2012). As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this is a shift away from “core funding” or “institutional funding” to NGOs. Additionally, where past contribution agreements between CIDA and NGOs included 10 percent of the budget for Public Engagement, under the new call-for-proposals mechanism there is no funding available for these types of activities. The Partners for Development program includes five categories and two special calls, as outlined below:

1. **Projects with Canada support of under $2 million** – support to Canadian NGOs with contributions between $100,000 and $2,000,000 to projects for a duration of up to five years.

2. **Project with Canada support of over $2 million** – support to Canadian NGOs with contributions of $2 million or more to projects for duration of up to five years.

3. **Knowledge Partners** – support to large and small-sized knowledge partner activities for evidence-based research and policy development.

4. **Volunteer Cooperation** – support to volunteer cooperation agencies focused on international development

5. **University Partners** – support to Canadian universities to reduce poverty in developing countries.

**Special Calls:** Haiti Recovery and Reconstruction and Muskoka Initiative Partnership Program (CIDA, 2013).
The thematic priorities and countries of focus as set out by CIDA provide a guideline for the calls-for-proposals (CCIC, 2011). Under the new funding mechanism, 80 percent of all projects funded must be within CIDA thematic priorities and 50 percent in CIDA’s 20 countries of focus (CIDA n.d.a). The selection criteria for the calls are as follows:

- Sound governance
- Support of Canadians
- Relevance to CIDA’s mandate and coherence with Canadian Government Policy
- Results
- Development Effectiveness (CIDA, n.d.b).

Calls for proposals for the “Under $2 million” and “Over $2 million”, as well as the University Partners were announced in 2011. As of April 2014, there has yet to be a call for the categories of Knowledge Partners and Volunteer Cooperation, although DFATD announced in November 2013 that Volunteer Cooperation organizations would have their funding agreements extended for one year (Foster, 2013). While CIDA indicated that there would be several calls for funding every year, this has not happened and April 2014 marks three years since the last funding call from the Partners for Development program.

These delays in announcing funding calls is hindering NGOs’ ability to deliver results to their beneficiaries and runs in conflict to the development effectiveness principle of predictable aid. The President of CCIC, Julia Sánchez, stated:

It is extremely hard to understand how this new mechanism is more effective from a development results perspective, especially in the face of the many
implementation challenges and unacceptable delays from which it has suffered (CCIC, 2013).

A survey was conducted in 2012 by CCIC and the Inter-Council Network of Provincial/Regional Councils to evaluate Canadian NGOs experiences with the Partners for Development program’s six call-for-proposal competitions. The survey also looked at the impacts of the funding mechanism on the NGO sector writ large. The report from the survey indicated that 50 organizations submitted proposals for the “Over $2 million” call-for-proposals of which 23 were successful. 167 proposals were submitted for the “Under $2 million” category resulting in 30 funding approvals (CCIC, 2012). The analysis highlighted some important impacts such as pressure for organizations to change their priorities in order to meet the criteria for an “acceptable” proposal, including overseas partnerships. However, CIDA countries of focus seemed to be less of a priority in the funding decisions. 64% of NGOs in the survey responded that they had reduced their public engagement activities and were unsure of how they would continue this work. A “chill” on advocacy work was also highlighted, capturing “the widely shared perception that CIDA looks unfavorably on organizations that do policy and advocacy work” (CCIC, 2012). Finally, the survey revealed that small organizations were, in general, less successful than larger ones with the call-for-proposals model, supporting the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 which speaks to a crowding out of smaller NGOs in a competitive funding environment. Overall, CCIC concluded from the survey that the new funding mechanism encourages NGOs to become “implementers of CIDA contracts” and thus represents a trend of “moving away from a longer-term program approach to a shorter-term project approach” (CCIC, 2012).
Brown (2012) argues that CIDA's new funding mechanism intensifies two key trends in foreign aid since the early 2000s at CIDA and within the Government of Canada more broadly. These trends include some of which are explored above: CIDA's control over NGO activities and the use of aid to advance Canada's foreign policy priorities abroad. While Brown (2012) observes that CIDA has always operated with much “centralized control”, he argues that the new framework brings NGOs even more in line with the geographical and sectoral priorities of CIDA. This creates development interventions driven by CIDA's priorities rather than by the needs of beneficiaries on the ground (293). Brown suggests that this means NGOs are less independent and increasingly reflect “executing agencies”, an argument supported by CCIC’s findings to the 2012 survey discussed above. Brown (2012) also highlights that the funding criteria under the new call-for-proposal mechanism of being “relevant to CIDA mandate” displays the government’s intention to increasingly control NGO activities. Furthermore, he suggests that the criteria of “coherence with Canadian Government policy” can be interpreted in a variety of ways, possibly creating a “censoring effect” on NGOs that criticize Canadian government policies (Brown, 2012: 294).

Recent Events: The Trends Intensify

While the interviews will look at the relationship between CIDA and NGOs within the new funding model of CIDA’s Partners for Development program, further events have taken place since the institution of the new funding mechanism, which are significant to the changing CIDA-NGO relationship and the continued use of development assistance to realize foreign policy objectives. These events include the
merger between CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the announcement of the Global Markets Action Plan and the cuts to the foreign aid budget.

In the 2013 budget, the federal government announced that CIDA would be amalgamated with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to form the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). The merger creates increased concern regarding the possible risk of giving the government greater control over the foreign aid program and development objectives. Soon after the merger was announced, CCIC and several NGOs publicly expressed concern about the merger moving Canadian development assistance away from the mandate of poverty reduction and further in step with foreign interests such as trade. Elly Vanderberg, the director of policy and advocacy at World Vision Canada, remarked

> We're particularly concerned about the needs of children, who are living in poverty and are subject to malnutrition and exploitation, and responding to their needs might not necessarily get us closer to our trade objectives or our foreign policy objectives (Mackrael, 2013).

Kevin McCort, president of Care Canada, went further to explain that the shift could mean that “development work becomes focused more on what can be achieved in the short term, and countries with long-term needs could be left behind” (Mackrael, 2013).

Development experts also voiced their concerns over the merger in the testimonies to the Parliamentary Standing Committee tasked to debate the sections of the budget implementation that dealt with the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act. The concern surrounded the vagueness with the way in which humanitarian assistance should be delivered. The legislation states that
humanitarian assistance should be delivered “in line with Canadian values and priorities”, which is problematic because it does not indicate that humanitarian assistance should be distributed based on the needs of people in developing countries (Parliament of Canada, 2012).

The merger and the parliamentary hearings were also characterized by a lack of openness and transparency: senior government officials were only informed about the merger a few days before it took place, or in some cases, the day that the announcement was made in the federal budget. Moreover, the committee hearings did not include CCIC participation, even though it is the largest umbrella association for Canadian international development organizations. Further demonstrating the narrowness of the consultations is the fact that the hearings were also not attended by the Minister of International Cooperation at the time, Julian Fantino.

The DFATD organization chart and vision statement, released in fall 2013, raised more concerns regarding the role that development will play within the new department. The vision statement states that DFATD was created to “promote Canada’s interests and values on the world stage” with no mention of sustainable development or international development best practices (Foster, 2013b). Under the new organizational structure, CIDA’s Partnership with Canadians Branch has taken on a new name: Partnerships with Development Innovation, perhaps indicating an increased focus on the private sector. Greater private sector involvement in international development has also come in the form of the controversial appointment of a Canadian mining industry CEO to the External Advisory Group, which works to put in place DFATD’s vision and structure (Swiss, 2013). The fact that civil society participation
was overlooked for involvement in the Advisory Council creates concerns over the extent to which the Canadian international development community will be consulted and considered in the priorities of DFATD in the future.

Finally, on the heels of the merger came the announcement of the Canadian government’s official foreign policy in November 2013 through the Global Markets Action Plan. Under the Action Plan “all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada will be marshaled on behalf of the private sector in order to achieve the stated objectives within key foreign markets” (Zillio, 2013). The statement made it clear that trade would become the main focus of Canada’s foreign policy.

On a positive note, a more open relationship with civil society may be evolving under the new Minister of International Development, Christian Paradis. In spring 2014, Paradis delivered several speeches emphasizing the importance of creating an enabling environment for civil society. In a statement at the High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in Mexico City, he indicated that the government would provide more predictable and transparent funding to CSOs (CCIC, 2014). Paradis also attended the NGO-filled CCIC Annual General Meeting in May 2014 where he emphasized the need to collaborate, engage and develop a coherent approach to Canadian civil society. However, in a nod to the government’s preference to align development with foreign policy priorities, Paradis’ comments also included a reiteration of the importance of working with the private sector and the benefits brought about through Foreign Direct Investment (DFATD 2014).

As the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 indicates, official donor funding presents the inherent risk of bringing the agendas of NGOs in line with those of their
government funders. Several examples highlighted above suggest that this is the case with CIDA and NGOs. The increased connection to foreign policy priorities -- as seen through mining companies pilot project, the DFATD merger and the Global Markets Action Plan -- more closely link the priorities of Canadian international development NGOs with those of the Canadian government. The cuts to particular NGOs also present some indication of this alignment as many NGOs to have their funding discontinued or proposals rejected maintained conflicting views to those of the government. The CCIC survey and Brown’s arguments support my main hypothesis that CIDA funding threatens the autonomy of Canadian NGOs by encouraging them to shift to government priorities, focus on short-term projects, scale back on advocacy activities and generally represents a role whereby NGOs act as service providers of CIDA contracts. As a result, I expect that the responses from interview participants to further support this hypothesis.

**Canada and Development Effectiveness Principles**

The relationship between CIDA and Canadian international development NGOs takes place against the backdrop of development effectiveness principles, which is highlighted here and employed in part of the analysis in Chapter 4. A specific focus on aid effectiveness took place in the early 2000s led by Western donors of the then 22 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC). The DAC held four High Level Forums to discuss and coordinate aid policy with a focus on development assistance. These forums introduced principles of development effectiveness, which evolved into the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Through the adoption of the Paris Declaration, 90 developing and 30 donor countries, together with 30 multi- and bilateral development agencies committed to the following five principles (United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 2008):

1. **Ownership**: Developing countries set their own strategies to reduce poverty, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.

2. **Alignment**: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.

3. **Harmonization**: Donor countries coordinate; simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

4. **Results**: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.

5. **Mutual accountability**: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.b).

Subsequent forums including the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation built on the Paris Declaration. The outcomes of these forums established the development principles of alignment with country-driven development, harmonization among donors, mutual accountability and

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4 The Development Assistance Committee is “one of the key forums in which the major bilateral donors work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts to support sustainable development” and currently consists of 29 country members (OECD, n.d.a)
transparency, predictability of aid flows and a focus on measurable development results.

In an effort to ensure that Canadian aid was in line with aid effectiveness principles and in the interests of the poor, the ODA Accountability Act (ODAAA) was passed by the Parliament of Canada in 2008. The ODAAA states that all of Canadian aid should lead to poverty reduction, take into account the perspectives of the poor, and be consistent with international human-rights standards (CIDA, n.d.c).

Certain development activities of the Canadian government are consistent with the aid effectiveness principles, such as untying aid (the removal of aid that is linked to funds used to purchase Canadian products and services), but many others go against the principles. These include the repeated changes of priority countries and sectors, a constant turnover in senior CIDA officials and an emphasis on signature projects rather than long-term programs (Brown, 2012). It can be argued that all of these activities contradict stated aid effectiveness principles as well as Canadian policies on local ownership, predictability of aid flows and the importance of long-term relationships with recipients (Brown, 2012: 83). Moreover, it has been noted that Canada’s view on aid effectiveness may be “a distinct, more narrow [sic] version” of the internationally agreed upon principles and focuses instead on internal organizational issues and accountability to Canadian taxpayers (Brown 2012: 83).

**Conclusion**

The “chill” on Canadian civil society has been well noted by the media, academia and civil society organizations themselves. The Voices Coalition, a non-partisan group
of 200 members, has kept track of examples where the government has attempted to silence civil society through such tactics as defunding, interference and the revocation of charitable status, to name a few. Civil society voices are also being stifled by CRA’s regulation to limit advocacy and political activities to 10 percent of their resources. Further, fear within the sector is growing amongst CRA audits of certain NGOs and non-profits that have been critical of the government.

Within this wider civil society context, CIDA introduced a new partnership model for working with NGOs, which included a call-for-proposals mechanism. This new mechanism marked a shift away from more responsive and core-funding arrangements of the past wherein NGOs presented proposals based on their own priorities and expertise. The short-term funding which now characterizes the CIDA-NGO relationship may harm Canadian NGOs’ ability to work with their overseas partners in a way that has a long-term impact.

The move to the new funding arrangement took place on the heels of other CIDA trends including delays in approvals, political decision-making and an increased focus on foreign policy priorities, particularly commercial interests of the Canadian government. To some extent, these trends threaten development effectiveness principles of predictable aid flows, country-driven development and transparency. The new call-for-proposals funding model was also introduced amidst the defunding of many NGOs, further eroding a relationship of trust between CIDA and the NGO sector.

Brown (2012) argues that the new funding mechanism intensifies trends of centralized control and the use of foreign aid to advance Canada’s self-interest (Brown, 2012). Indeed, a confirmation that development assistance is moving more in step with
foreign policy priorities has come to light through the DFATD merger and Global Markets Action Plan.

The next chapter outlines the findings from the NGO participant interviews, further exploring how the call-for-proposals mechanism has affected Canadian NGOs in terms of advocacy efforts, public engagement activities, organizational priorities and overseas partnerships. This feedback helps to assess whether the funding mechanism supports strong development outcomes and if the CIDA-NGO relationship can be defined as one of partnership. It also contributes to the literature by looking at ways that NGOs are managing the challenges and opportunities presented by their current relationship with CIDA.
CHAPTER 4: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

This chapter first broadly discusses the responses from NGO interview participants regarding their perspectives on CIDA’s call-for-proposals funding mechanism, speaking to both positive and negative feedback. It then provides an overview of the responses to the specific questions posed in the interviews. The final section of the chapter examines the participant responses in terms of the impact on development effectiveness, the definition of a successful partnership and the ways in which Canadian NGOs are managing and responding to the challenges faced by their relationship with CIDA.

Through my findings, I conclude that the development effectiveness of Canadian NGOs is hindered to some extent by the limitations posed through their relationship with CIDA. Moreover, I show that the CIDA-NGO relationship cannot be defined as one of partnership, but rather reflects one that spans the categories of contracting and extension according to Brinkerhoff’s (2002) partnership model. I also find that NGOs have a range of responses that they use to manage the challenges presented in their relationship with CIDA.

General Feedback on the Call-for-Proposals Funding Mechanism

On the positive side, several of the NGO participants felt that the new funding mechanism put competing NGOs on a more equal playing ground. At least three participants made comments about previous funding relationships being characterized by an “entitlement list” whereby CIDA funding tended to be allocated to NGO
“favourites” (Interviews 2, 3, 11). Although an NGO participant in Ottawa noted that this was likely only the case with a small group, the feeling was much stronger among NGOs based outside of Ottawa.

Being based outside of Ottawa we welcomed the new more competitive, level playing field kind of process that was rolled out in 2010 because we thought it would perhaps put an end to the kind of favouratism of the large NGOs that wouldn’t have to apply sometimes and get their continued contribution agreements renewed every year based on whether or not [they were] good friends with government of that time (Interview 2).

Additionally, the funding mechanism received positive feedback in regards to its move to include new and untraditional partners in development, as well as closer collaboration and cross-sectoral work with the private sector.

Several participants highlighted increased collaboration with provincial councils as a positive outcome of the proposal development process under the new mechanism, as evidenced in the case of the two Alberta NGOs that were interviewed (Interviews 1, 2). They explained that the Alberta Council for Global Cooperation (ACGC) supported them significantly in helping to navigate the new funding mechanism and even went as far as to call CIDA to get information for the sector. ACGC also hired two consultants to review applications for NGOs before they were submitted to CIDA.

In terms of the negative feedback, one of the greatest criticisms of the new call-for-proposals funding mechanism referenced by almost all NGO participants was the limited ability to engage with CIDA throughout the proposal development. Under the mechanism, CIDA officers were no longer able to communicate directly with NGOs
regarding their proposals. This marked a significant change from previous calls and many NGO representatives explained that they had benefitted greatly from this type of interaction in the past. Previously, it was noted that CIDA program officers were able to mentor NGOs through the development of proposals and provide feedback in terms of whether the proposal linked to priorities of CIDA funding. Many NGOs lamented the loss of being able to access the expertise of CIDA officers and specialists who in turn would help NGOs create better proposals.

[The] Competitive process where [you] can’t even talk to program officer while putting proposal together and it’s not collaborative or in partnership...I regret the loss of that...I don’t think it leads to better development, or leads to more learning, I don’t think it’s more efficient. I don’t think it results in better or more impactful programs...It’s a costly approach to doing aid. It denies partner NGOs of expertise that could benefit from interacting with CIDA officers who are very knowledgeable (Unattributable).

Throughout the proposal stage, CIDA only allowed NGOs to pose questions through their website. Research participants expressed their frustration at having struggled with this approach, noting that CIDA responses were often very generic answers and not specific enough to be provide relevant insight.

The lack of feedback on proposals was another area of criticism noted by a several NGO participants, although somewhat mixed in cases where proposals were submitted to CIDA, but only funded in part or not funded at all. This was the case for two NGOs interviewed. In the case of one, only about half of the original proposal was funded by CIDA, however, the agency never provided any indication as to why the
remaining activities were not funded. In the case of Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), its entire three-year funding proposal for $2.9 million was rejected. The interview participant reported that the organization often received little feedback or rationale when proposals were rejected including those submitted for special calls from the Partnership with Canadians Branch and for bilateral aid. For the “over $2 million” call, MCC did receive minimal feedback in the way of a two-page letter and the organization was also able to meet with CIDA officers for a consultation.

In reference to successful NGOs that received ongoing funding from CIDA, several participants spoke about the slow pace at which funds are distributed and the rate at which reporting forms seem to change within CIDA.

Responses to Specific Interview Questions

Question 1: Relationship with CIDA

When asked specifically about the organization’s relationship with CIDA, almost all NGOs reported a positive working relationship at the program officer level and participants expressed a unanimous respect for CIDA staff across the board. CIDA officers were considered to be knowledgeable and helpful. Yet, generally participants acknowledged that CIDA employees were often limited in terms of what information they could share with NGOs, or that they were not always kept in the loop of certain decisions or policies within the agency. Another common critique of the relationship was the constant change of CIDA staff resulting in several different officers being assigned to a NGO over a short period of time.
Many NGO participants highlighted that their relationship with CIDA in the past had offered more opportunities for engagement and that, at times, the interaction was rather informal. For example, an MCC employee explained that, starting in 1969, the organization would oftentimes submit its annual notebook or a summary of program activities and would frequently receive a block grant from CIDA. The Executive Director of Farm Radio explained they were given quite a bit more latitude in their past funding relationships whereby they would often submit proposals for the same type of activities such as putting together nine radio scripts. Like MCC, these activities were frequently funded. In terms of the informality of earlier relationships, one participant recounted confidentially that when they started to receive funding back in the 1980s the relationship was relaxed and casual with the initial meeting actually taking place in the home of their CIDA contact.

Of the seven participants who were asked if they would characterize their relationship with CIDA as one of partnership or contracting, the responses were vague and mixed. Three NGO participants strongly indicated that the idea of partnership did not exist with one participant going as far as to categorize it as a contracting relationship. In contrast, several other participants did categorize their organization’s relationship with CIDA as one of partnership and two NGOs noted that the relationship was more a hybrid or a mix of both contracting and partnership. One of the NGO participants who characterized the relationship as a hybrid did note that there was much larger role for the contracts officer than the “relationship manager” and that the contracts officer was more involved than they had been in earlier relationships. The
two quotes below help to demonstrate the range of views regarding whether CIDA was perceived as a partner or contractor:

By no way are we contractor or see ourselves that way, we definitely work together. This is because they have a mission that they can’t achieve without us, and we have objectives that we can’t do without them (Interview 11).

[Three years ago] That [relationship] changed significantly... and it coincided with a basic rethinking on the part of the government of its relationship with Canadian NGOs, where basically the notion of partnership was abandoned. The notion that we are an important development actor and the Canadian state has an interest in working with us...they moved instead to a model, which discounts our history, our expertise, insight and experience (Interview 5).

Chantal Harvard of CCIC mentioned that in her opinion the relationship between CIDA and NGOs was less of a partnership than it had been in the past. She explained that going back a few years, NGO employees had regular conversations with CIDA and jointly developed proposals. She did mention, however, that while the last few years have been marked with many changes to the CIDA-NGO relationship such as fewer opportunities to have open discussions and bring input at a policy level, there is still some collaboration between CIDA and NGOs. Particularly, she noted that there has been some improved communication under the newest Minister, Christian Paradis, who has held several roundtables with NGOs since summer 2013.
Question 2: Challenges Aligning with Priority Countries and Thematic Areas

When it came to the discussion on NGOs’ alignment with CIDA priorities, almost all participants interviewed were forthcoming about tailoring and aligning their proposals in some way to CIDA priority countries and themes. This practice was common for the NGO participants interviewed, as they frequently indicated the need to adapt funding applications for specific donors. Most participants reported that their NGOs did not have great difficulty with this alignment given their large and broad programming areas from which they could select countries and projects for the proposals. Many of the participants mentioned that their NGOs do not apply to all funding calls and that applications are only submitted where a link can be made between their mandate and the requirements of funding. In other words, NGOs did not report an indication of changing their programs and countries of focus to take advantage of CIDA’s priorities.

From the participant responses, there appeared to be no trend in CIDA funding in line with priority countries. The NGO in Interview 6 submitted a proposal for three countries for which only one was a priority and received funding for all three. A similar experience happened with International Development Enterprises, where they received full funding for a proposal that included Cambodia, a non-priority country. Conversely, one NGO interviewed had only 50% of their proposal approved, with the approval given to the four countries that happened to be priority countries for the government. These responses seem to support the findings of the CCIC survey on the impact of the call-for proposals mechanism that did not indicate that CIDA countries of focus were a major factor in the funding decisions.
Question 3: Impacts on Overseas Partnerships

Generally, participants did not indicate that changes to CIDA’s funding mechanism had greatly affected their overseas partnerships. Several NGOs noted that their relationship was slightly more directive than it had been in the past. This largely had to do with the level of reporting demanded by CIDA, which placed the Canadian NGO in the role of dictating requirements to the developing country partner. One NGO participant mentioned that bringing the partners to Canada to better understand the funding context had proven helpful in maintaining a good relationship because it enabled their partner to gain an understanding of the requirements and limitations placed on the Canadian NGO by CIDA. A focus on heavy reporting, or more specifically, the inputs demanded by CIDA was also reported as having difficult impacts on overseas partners.

The reporting is much more demanding....we’ve had to spend hours going through with CIDA officials if the work day in Malawi should be 7.5 hours or 7.75 hours and what should go on the timesheet. To me that is not results-based management. To me that’s supply management. It’s enormously time consuming and it makes no difference to lives of [our beneficiaries] and rural communities at all. I find that this nitty gritty focus on little things like counting minutes and inputs, although CIDA says its interest is in results, the opposite is the case. They are input obsessed and detail accounting obsessed...the way that they manage is they manage inputs. It requires a huge amount of human resources, which could be best better spend serving [beneficiaries] (Unattributable).
Delays in distributing funds were noted as negatively affecting partners, but there was also an indication that the new model brought about positive impacts for overseas partners. Several NGOs mentioned improvements in communication, enhanced capacity-building of beneficiaries and additional opportunities for training as a result of receiving CIDA funding through the call-for-proposals mechanism (Interview 1, 7, 10).

**Question 4: Impacts on Public Engagement and Advocacy**

There was a notable impact on NGO programming in the areas of public engagement and advocacy, although the responses of impacts were mixed across participants. In terms of public engagement (PE), four participants highlighted little impact on these activities (Interview 3, 9, 11, 12); however, these NGOs noted that PE was not a central aspect to their mandates. Another four NGOs mentioned that the funding mechanism certainly impacted their ability to carry out PE activities, but reported that they had not scaled back significantly in these areas, rather they were funding PE from overhead or internal resources (Interview 8, 7, 6, 4). Two NGO participants were vocal about the struggles their organizations were facing as a result of cut backs to CIDA funding to PE (Interviews 1, 6). Oxfam explained that they were probably one of the last of the big NGOs to have offices across the countries to carry out PE activities and that the loss of CIDA funding was having a profound effect on their operations. Without CIDA funding, they could not fund many of their regional operations: offices in Saskatoon and Toronto had closed in 2013 and in the coming months the office in St. John’s was scheduled for closure. Change for Children also spoke about the impact that the lack of CIDA funding was having on their work:
[In the past] we were the go-to agency in Alberta for youth engagement on international development issues... We are struggling to maintain that reputation but we have no funding for that... We also used to be the go-to agency for the Diaspora community, so immigrants and refugees would come to us to participate in international development days (Interview 2).

Regarding advocacy, several NGO participants noted that CIDA funding did not have such a great effect on these efforts; rather, it was CRA’s 10 percent regulations that would have a wider “chilling” effect on the sector (Interviews 3, 4, 10). However, two participants were very forthcoming about admitting to the need to take a much more cautious and careful tone when engaging with the government about their work or international development policy (Interviews 5, 10).

**Question 5: Ability to Maintain an Independent Mission**

Overall, NGO participants mentioned no change to their values or mission as a result of CIDA’s new funding mechanism. Several noted having to be somewhat organic with their priorities or in some way cater to donors; a practice that often forms a part of board-level strategic planning. Still, participants generally did not feel as though they were compromising the independence of their missions, but simply adapting to funding realities. One participant explained that their mission had not been affected but that it was more so “how” they implement programs and “talk” about them that has been altered somewhat by CIDA requirements (Interview 10). Another participant who reported no changes to their NGOs mission at present, acknowledged the possibility of changes in the future, specifically in relation to the new DFATD model and its focus on
“innovation” referenced in their new organizational chart. The participant expressed that their NGO may need to adapt in the future and that these types of conversations were just starting to take place, indicating possible changes to their mission ahead (Interview 6).

**Question 6: Accountability to CIDA and Beneficiaries**

Questions on accountability were challenging to gauge with participants. Certainly, most NGOs could easily respond to the mechanisms in place to remain accountable to CIDA, of which many were mentioned. For example, narrative and financial reports, logic frameworks, annual reports and mid-term and final evaluations, to name a few. Mechanisms for accountability to beneficiaries were much more difficult for participants to recount. Those mentioned were often less formal in nature or mechanisms also used to report to donors such as consultations and surveys. Oxfam seemed to be an exception with more formal “upward” and “downward” accountabilities in place. The Executive Director highlighted their commitment to 360 accountability as well as 1-800 numbers and SMS texting for beneficiaries who are recipients of their humanitarian funding. In regards to CIDA’s accountability requirements, many NGO participants mentioned that the demands were time-consuming and cumbersome, requiring significant staff time or restructuring. Additionally, the demands for accountability to CIDA were highlighted by some participants as a challenge to overseas partners, putting increased pressure on them to learn new reporting requirements.
Overall, it seems that in most NGOs there is an inherent tension between the two accountabilities (to donor and beneficiaries), with accountability likely weighing more heavily towards CIDA. Nevertheless, it was impossible to determine a clear measure of which accountability took priority and the level of compatibility between the two from the interviews alone.

**Impacts on Development Effectiveness**

While the move to the call-for-proposals funding mechanism may be perceived as a fairer process creating an equal playing ground for NGOs to apply for funding and opening up funding to a diverse range of actors, there appear to be aspects of the new model and realities within the current CIDA environment that may be hindering good development programming.

Some comments by NGOs indicate that the competitive mechanism may threaten their relationship with overseas partners and work against long-term development. One of the participants that reported that their NGO had not significantly adjusted their proposal to CIDA’s countries of priority explained that some projects that were not accepted were those that had been previously funded by CIDA. The participant expressed frustration in these projects being cut off from a funding cycle that would ensure their progression and predictability in future. Another participant expressed this same frustration. Change for Children explained that they did not put in a proposal for their strongest program and partnership in Nicaragua because they knew that the country was not a priority for CIDA. This was despite the fact that the program had won
numerous international awards for development and had been previously funded by CIDA.

The “bidding” model of the CIDA’s new civil society mechanism was also criticized by several interview participants who felt strongly that the model was not an effective way to maintain the types of relationships required for long-term development or to realize transformative outcomes (Interviews 1, 3, 5).

[With a bidding process] you [would] think that the development process is about supplying photocopiers to a federal department or about building a bridge in China where you are looking at four different engineering firms and you know what the inputs are, the cost of production and outcomes and it’s about price, price, price. Development isn’t that process; your team, your experience, the depth of your relationships, your insight are all things that are difficult to measure from a questionnaire... Partnership is about long-term relationships. It doesn’t lend itself to a bidding model where this year you get money for this theme or project in one country and next year funding for another theme in another country. Change happens over time, a model of change is a complex process (Interview 5).

In terms of the predictability of funding for development assistance, participants expressed their frustration that CIDA had initially announced that funding calls would be made every year and that a calendar would be produced to keep them abreast of the funding schedule – neither of which had happened. The fact that April 2014 will mark three year’s since CIDA’s last call for proposals to civil society organizations is leaving Canadian NGOs in a place of limbo regarding the predictability of funding to carry out
their development work overseas. The lack of predictability is also intensified by CIDA’s funding disbursements and the management of NGO contracts, which are characterized by delays in distributing funds and constant changes to reporting requirements. These changes also seem to affect overseas partnerships and local ownership over development programs. In the interviews, several NGO participants spoke about the slow pace at which funds are distributed and the negative effect this was having on their overseas partners. They noted that these delays not only impacted their own planning but their partner’s ability to plan and progress with projects on the ground. Demanding reporting requirements and constant changes to CIDA reporting forms were also noted by NGOs as challenging. One NGO stated that at times it felt like forms were being “tried on” (Interview 7).

Additionally, when it came to reporting requirements, it appeared that most NGOs were unanimous in the increased staff time and attention required to meet CIDA demands. In some cases, the increased work for reporting meant hiring additional staff or significant staff restructuring. One NGO participant reiterated how the details of the reporting are not necessarily in the spirit of effective development. Such strict requirements, the participant explained, could discourage NGOs to take risks, moving them to a more conservative model that is most preoccupied with being compliant with funding rules.

[It is] more important to follow the details of the proposal than deliver real results on the ground. There is a contradiction of good development with this cautious government...NGOs tend to move to [become] more conservative, [that is] compliant with all rules...this discourages risks (Interview 10).
Similarly, another interview participant highlighted how the inflexibility of the contribution management system reduced the likelihood of achieving good development results.

The contribution agreement is much more detailed...and the money is extremely tightly controlled; there is no flexibility at all. We are doing development in an ever-changing world and if you want to receive results you have to be flexible. To so tightly control inputs (like money and human time) after a programme is approved, is to me, inevitably means you will not be able to achieve the results. Only way in ever-changing world you are going to achieve a result is to move (Interview 3).

Several interview participants also indicated that CIDA’s new funding mechanism is affecting advocacy and public engagement efforts, which forms an important component of NGO work and their ability to influence policy and carry out development education. The elimination of funding for public engagement was seen as a blow to NGOs role in generating conversations and disseminating information about the underlying causes of poverty and challenges to development. Dr. Nipa Banerjee, visiting Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, expressed her concern that a move away from public engagement funding might lead to a loss of discussions about development in places like church basements and among grassroots civil society in Canada. Further, an NGO participant pointed to CIDA’s preoccupation with “results-based management” as hindering their ability to focus on advocacy and research. The participant noted that even if their NGO would prefer to focus some attention on advocacy to deal with underlying development issues such as nutrition, it often did not take this liberty, recognizing that a focus on advocacy
or research in this area did not translate into reaching beneficiaries in the eyes of CIDA. Consequently, a shift in focus away from “results” might negatively impact the outcome of their proposal or evaluation with CIDA. The participant explained that if their NGO had two programming options either to reach more people with lower impact or reach less people with a greater impact, they would be inclined to present the one with more people to CIDA, recognizing that the numbers are viewed as most important to the agency.

Finally, several key informants and participants acknowledged that the structure of previous CIDA funding to NGOs allowed for more effective development to take place and that the new funding mechanism was a step away from what had been considered some of the most innovative aspects of previous CIDA funding. Jim Cornelius, Executive Director of Canadian Foodgrains Bank, and Dr. Nipa Banerjee, both noted that the program funding previously provided by CIDA to NGOs was unique and allowed for better development outcomes consisted with development effectiveness principles and long-term development. Additionally, Dr. Banerjee explained that the previous Partnership Program had been recognized as particularly novel among other bilateral donors for its inclusion of the civil society sector and that other donor countries had adopted components of earlier CIDA models. Supporting this further, one NGO participant explained that previous CIDA funding had allowed them to fund development more consistent with a rights-based approach. The participant provided the example of CIDA support being employed to empower beneficiaries to address their right to water through training, connection to national committees and participation through advocacy. The NGO participant explained that other donors are less likely to
fund this type of development, as they are more concerned with supporting something tangible and immediate like a well or a school. These comments make the case for the type of funding provided by CIDA in the past which was considered innovative and more in support of long-term development.

**Analysis of Partnership**

Brinkerhoff’s (2002) partnership model will help guide the analysis and understanding of the changing relationship between CIDA and Canadian NGOs. As indicated in Chapter 2, the main hypothesis of the thesis is that official donor funding encourages NGOs to act as sub-contractors and weakens their autonomy to function as wholly independent actors. Brinkerhoff’s model provides a useful framework as it includes contracting as a possible option and employs two dimensions for evaluating partnership (mutuality and organizational identity), which can be assessed from the interview responses.

The following analysis indicates that the CIDA-NGO relationship cannot be defined as one of partnership based on Brinkerhoff’s model, rather it is better explained as falling within a relative scale of contracting and extension. This conclusion stems from NGO participant responses that indicate a level of mutuality that is low and organizational identity that is high in respect to values and mission, but low as it refers to NGOs “comparative advantage” as civil society actors.
Mutuality and Organizational Identity of Canadian NGOs

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the characteristics that Brinkerhoff employs to define mutuality and organizational identity within a partnership. In terms of mutuality, she includes equal decision-making, mutually agreed objectives, frequent interaction, mutual trust and respect. For organizational identity she refers to the elements that make an organization distinct such as maintaining their unique mission and their “comparative advantage” vis-à-vis other types of organizations. Her definition of an ideal partnership provides a good review of many of these elements and is outlined below.

Partnership is a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labour based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner. Partnership encompasses mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision-making, mutual accountability and transparency (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 21).

The competitive funding model and the types of interactions between CIDA and NGOs present several challenges to genuine partnership when analyzed using Brinkerhoff’s criteria for mutuality. Interview responses indicated a lack of mutually agreed objectives, fewer opportunities for equality in decision-making, as well as little interaction with open communication between CIDA and NGOs. More generally, this can be seen in the move away from proposals being developed jointly with CIDA to the new funding model that required NGOs to submit proposals based on criteria set by
CIDA. Specifically, this is evidenced by NGOs not being able to access the expertise of CIDA program officers during the proposal development, the lack of feedback following submitted proposals and the sense that CIDA staff at times were limited in terms of the information that they could share with NGOs. Certainly frequent interaction was also weakened by what NGOs termed a “turnstile” of CIDA employees, which resulted in the assignment of different CIDA officers within a short span of time. This served to fracture communication and relationships built with earlier CIDA officers.

The lack of communication and interaction does not support what Brinkerhoff refers to as interdependence. Interdependence involves integrated decision-making and ongoing communication at all stages of a project development and implementation. It also means that there are fewer constraints between partners like approvals, regulation and forms. While there is certainly more interdependence after NGOs are approved for funding and assigned a CIDA officer to manage their contribution agreements, the lack of communication during the preparation of proposals does not allow for any interdependence early on in the program development stage. One NGO participant also indicated a lack of transparency at this stage. He mentioned that there existed some ambiguity around the level of cost sharing offered by organizations when competing for funding. The participant alluded to rumors within the sector that suggested that if organizations offer a greater match to fund their project (e.g., a 50 percent match as opposed to 25 percent), this might increase their chances of their proposal being approved. In terms of constraints around CIDA regulations, NGO participants that were successful in receiving funding mentioned the cumbersome and time-consuming aspects of CIDA reports, forms and evaluations, which oftentimes
changed. The heavy reporting requirements combined with a lack of interaction with CIDA during proposal development, does not characterize a strong interdependence between CIDA and Canadian NGOs. Rather, it seems that CIDA is dictating to NGOs the requirements of the funding arrangements with little space for equal decision-making and shared objectives.

The competitive funding model also questions CIDA’s commitment to mutual trust and respect, particularly with regards to its intention to work with NGOs over the long term. To illustrate, one key informant, who felt strongly that the new funding model was not in line with good development, expressed their thoughts for the government’s rationale behind the change to a “bidding” model. The informant explained that the model made it much easier for CIDA to deny funding to particular organizations, helping to eliminate the type of negative backlash that the agency historically would receive when funding was stopped to a particular NGO. The cut to the Canadian Teachers’ Federation overseas funding in 2011 was cited as an example that had garnered much negative coverage in the media. With the new model, the key informant explained, CIDA could simply point to an organization’s unsuccessful bid, rather than facing a criticism that they had cut a longtime partner. Another key informant agreed with this line of thinking and went further to explain that in her opinion the “bidding” model or “tendering process” increased the government’s ability to more tightly control the activities of NGOs. Indeed, these opinions point to a relationship that lacks elements of collaboration, transparency and joint decision-making.
Politically driven decisions regarding foreign aid have also had a significant impact on mutuality. Mutually agreed objectives, equality in decision-making and transparency were threatened by what was seen among interview participants as an increase in politically controlled decision-making with applications for funding being rejected not by CIDA officials but at the political level. One participant confidentially explained that they had spent two years working closely with CIDA to develop a proposal only to find out last minute that the Minister had ruled against the project because it had been decided, at a political level, that the priority in the country in question would change from governance to another thematic area. A similar situation occurred with Oxfam in which they had been encouraged by CIDA to develop a proposal to continue a successful multi-year CIDA program in Mozambique. While CIDA indicated that the proposal was excellent, it sat on the Minister’s desk for a year and a half. After much time waiting, the NGO was finally informed that the proposal would not be approved; the reason was that the Canadian government had decided to shift its focus in Mozambique from agriculture to education and health. The result had a negative impact on Oxfam’s relationship with its partners in Mozambique including the government of the country.

The shift to increased political involvement means that NGOs do not necessarily know the criteria against which their proposals are being considered. One NGO participant expressed how they did not know the “rules of the game” when requesting CIDA support. Several other NGOs felt the same regarding the lack of clarity around CIDA’s objectives for achieving successful international development outcomes but expressed that there was an obvious pattern even though no official policy was in place.
Most often, NGOs were referring to CIDA’s preference for private sector involvement, which they had noted as an obvious priority for the government even though it was not stated officially. This supports evidence in Chapter 3, which speaks to an increase alignment with foreign policy priorities. These politically driven decisions are not transparent and thus are in conflict with the nature of true partnership. They reveal a hierarchical relationship rather than horizontal one, wherein NGOs do not have the opportunity to be involved in mutually agreed objectives or equal decision making when it comes to the development programs that they are responsible for implementing.

The above discussion suggests that low mutuality characterizes the CIDA-NGO relationship, at least as it pertains to the points identified in the review of recent CIDA trends covered in Chapter 3 and the responses from the interviews with NGO participants. In regards to organizational identity among Canadian NGOs, it falls in the middle of a relative scale between high and low. As Brinkerhoff (2002, 23) notes, organizational identity includes two levels. The first refers to an organization’s commitment to its “mission, values and identified constituencies” and the second involves the maintenance of an organization’s “comparative advantages” or the role it plays within its sector.

In regards to the first level, the NGO participants indicated that their organizations maintain a relatively high level of organizational identity at present. This was demonstrated through interview responses, which revealed their continued commitment to the NGOs’ values, mission and beneficiaries regardless of CIDA funding. While several NGOs did report a shift away from some of their more successful or long-
term programs, overall the NGO participants interviewed did not feel as though their organizations were compromising their mission or values. Several key informants also confirmed this sentiment. A more significant shift may take place in future, however, as many NGO participants were unsure of how the changes under the DFATD merger might affect development priorities. The partnership with NGOs and mining companies is an early indication that NGOs might be encouraged to change their focus to fall more in line with the new foreign policy priorities under DFATD.

Unlike the first level of organizational identity, the second level referring to “comparative advantage” seems to be relatively low among Canadian NGOs. For example, the limitations (whether real or perceived; external or internal) to advocacy and public engagement as discussed in Chapter 3 and further highlighted through the interviews, presents challenges to Canadian NGOs ability to maintain a “comparative advantage” as civil society actors. NGOs’ role as civil society actors involves their ability to represent a diverse range of voices by engaging in activities that address international development issues at a policy level or through education to the Canadian public. As a result, the lines between civil society and the state appear to be somewhat blurred in this regard. The responses from NGO participants confirm that several NGOs are cautious in their advocacy. This supports the theoretical work of Brown (2012) and Smillie (2012), as well as the empirical work of CCIC (2012). When NGOs are unable to express opinions or views that are contradictory to those of the government, they are brought more in line with state and become less independent.

The three dimensions of NGO roles highlighted by Mitlin (2007) are helpful to this discussion, as they include NGOs’ purpose as it relates to civil society theory, as
mentioned above, as well as NGO activities and interventions. Regarding the different activities of NGOs, Korten’s (1987) strategies include the importance political advocacy. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Northern NGOs may have a comparative advantage over their Southern counterparts in being involved in these efforts. Under the CIDA-NGO relationship, however, this particular NGO activity is weakened. As a result, NGOs that are recipients of funding from CIDA may be linked to more “mainstream” development activities rather than transformative ones that present alternatives to the neoliberal type of development.

The discussion on organizational identity indicates that Canadian NGOs fall in the middle of this dimension. This creates a situation where the CIDA-NGO relationship cannot be defined as one of partnership based on Brinkerhoff’s model, but rather as one existing between contracting and extension. When one organization seeks out specific areas of expertise in another organization to fulfill “predetermined ends and means” this constitutes contracting (Brinkerhoff, 2012: 25). CIDA’s new mechanism relates closely to contracting; it is a move away from the model of “responsive programming” whereby CIDA received proposals from NGOs based on NGOs’ priorities and worked jointly to create programs. Instead, the funding mechanism makes NGOs respond to periodic calls for proposals (CCIC, 2012) largely based on CIDA’s priorities. As mentioned by several interview participants, it more closely represents a “bidding” or “tendering” model employed to carry out contracts.

Extension differs from contracting by representing a situation where one organization sets the objectives and plans, while the other has little say and “independent identity” (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 25). As noted above, the new funding
mechanism allows CIDA to set much of the overarching objectives of development programs through their thematic priorities and countries of focus. While NGOs are still able plan the details of the programs through their proposals, giving them ownership in this regard, their independent identity is weakened to some degree through limitations (whether real or perceived; internal or external) placed on advocacy and public engagement. This reduces their “comparative advantage” as independent civil society actors and their ability to represent differing viewpoints within their sector.

Analysis of NGO Responses

As discussed in Chapter 2, NGOs are not powerless in their relationship with donors and they have a range of strategies that they can employ to manage donor conditions. Organizational institutionalist literature provides some theoretical guidance for identifying these strategies. A typology developed by Elbers and Arts (2011) employs this literature and builds on it by using research with international development NGOs. As such, this typology forms the second component of my analytical framework and will help guide an analysis of how Canadian NGOs manage the conditions and challenges they face in their interactions with CIDA. Elbers and Arts’ (2011) typology includes four main strategies used by organizations: avoiding, influencing, buffering and portraying.

While the interviews do not provide sufficient information to come to definitive conclusions, some trends can be identified. The strategy of “influencing” was certainly used by some NGOs through negotiating, persuading and involving. Several NGO participants spoke about engaging CIDA through workshops and brown bag lunches to
provide opportunities for discussion on international development practice. Others spoke of engaging at the political level regarding funding decisions, with one participant confidentially disclosing that their organization did try to leverage some political influence during the last funding call through relationships between board members and Ministers. While most NGOs did not speak specifically about how their organizations were engaging at a political level, several provided general comments on the strategies that they had observed within the sector. The strategies included inviting a person linked to the Conservative government on their board, using “conservative” discourse in proposals and meetings, more meetings and lobbying with CIDA policy advisors (who were seen as having more influence than CIDA program officers) and contracting government relations representatives to influence and engage with Ministers. These strategies mentioned are perhaps not new in the NGO sector, but there was an indication from at least one participant that they are intensifying in the current environment.

“Buffering” was employed as a way to minimize some of the negative effects of donor conditions. This included “shielding” by some NGOs, which was used to protect certain overseas partners from CIDA funding. One NGO participant explained that they did not want to expose certain partners to the demands of CIDA funding conditions. Also related to “shielding” was the fact that many NGO participants mentioned frequent discussions at the Board level to establish limits on the level of CIDA funding in order to ensure organizational independence. In regards to “compensating”, many NGOs explained that they funded public engagement and advocacy from other funding
sources as to continue some work in these areas. This was specifically highlighted by two NGOs that work on mining issues.

“Portraying” relates to the responses used by NGOs to manipulate the perceptions of funders that they are in compliance with donor conditions. While it cannot be determined from the interviews if manipulation does in fact take place, NGOs did mention speaking the “language” of CIDA, particularly in terms of “results” and “value chains”. This helps to portray them in a positive light whilst not having to change their activities significantly. While the interviews did not indicate that NGOs had to greatly alter their thematic areas or programs of focus in their proposals, there was mention of language like “packaging” or “selling” a thematic area within a CIDA proposal. This also points to some light “window-dressing” when it comes to how NGOs present themselves to CIDA.

The tactic of “avoiding” interaction with CIDA could not be seen to a great extent among the NGOs interviewed, given that most of organizations included in the study had been successful recipients of funding in CIDA’s call for proposals. While this tactic remained outside the scope of the thesis, it is likely that it does exist among NGOs outside of the study. Anecdotally, there has been mention of certain NGOs making the decision to not approach CIDA in future because of fundamental differences in ideologies. Although not included in Elbers and Arts’ (2011) original list, innovation may be another category to add to NGO responses. Innovation can represent new ideas, new ways of working and new partnerships to overcome some of the constraints of donor conditions or funding realities. In this way, it differs from the tactic of “compensating” which involves using organizational funds to cover activities that
donors are unwilling to fund. For instance, several NGO participants talked about some of the unique ways that they were dealing with challenges presented by the relationship with CIDA. While not referring specifically to changes to come as a result of CIDA’s new funding mechanism, one participant associated with a volunteer-sending NGO explained how their CIDA funding was in peril 10 years prior. As a way of managing these constraints, they formed a consortium with another volunteer-sending agency and proceeded to redesign programs, reach out to new donors and work with the NGO partner to leverage funding that they might not have been able to on their own.

The Executive Director of Oxfam Canada also outlined ways that his organization was innovating to maintain a competitive advantage within the sector. He cited their Centre for Gender Justice, which established Oxfam Canada as a knowledge hub on gender-based violence. Oxfam was also one of two NGOs to highlight connections to international federations as a way to insulate their organization, to some extent, from the impacts of CIDA constraints. This can also be seen as an innovative way to respond to challenges presented within the CIDA-NGO relationship. In the case of Oxfam, they are already linked to a wider federation that enables them to access funding from other bilateral organizations and therefore not be entirely reliant on CIDA. In the case of the other NGO, they were on the verge of merging with a larger organization in the United Kingdom to create an international federation. Their hope was that the merger would bring greater funding opportunities to diversify programming, including advocacy and public engagement.
Conclusion

The range of responses from NGO participants indicates a complicated relationship with CIDA. While all participants expressed a positive working relationship with CIDA officials, their relationship with the agency itself appears to be less clear. Perspectives diverged greatly among participants regarding whether their organization’s relationship with CIDA could be characterized by one of partnership or if it more closely resembled contracting. Arguably, an NGO’s particular experiences with CIDA as well as the organization’s ideology towards development (i.e. radical vs. mainstream) affects these perspectives. In spite of what NGO participants reported, using Brinkerhoff’s (2002) partnership model, I show that the CIDA-NGO relationship cannot be defined as one of partnership under the new call-for-proposal mechanism and due to the wider “chill” affecting Canadian civil society. Rather, it more closely resembles a relationship that spans her categories of contracting and extension. As such, my research supports my hypothesis that CIDA funding encourages NGO recipients, to some extent, into a relationship that spans the categories of contracting and extension.

Finally, by employing the Elbers and Arts (2011) typology, I find that Canadian NGOs have a range of options for how they respond to some of the impacts and pressures that result from CIDA funding. For instance, NGOs seek to “influence” CIDA through meetings with officers and politicians, “buffer” their overseas partners from negative CIDA impacts, “shield” themselves by limiting their level of CIDA support and “compensate” by funding advocacy and public engagement from internal sources.
Moreover, I provide a theoretical contribution to the literature by including “innovation” as a fifth strategy that NGOs can employ as a response to donor conditions.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The year 2010 marked a shift in CIDA’s funding structure for partnering with Canadian NGOs. The structure included a new call-for-proposals mechanism, which represented a move away from what had historically come to be known as a “responsive” funding relationship with NGOs. This “responsive” relationship involved funding arrangements based on the priorities and areas of expertise of NGOs, whereas the new funding mechanism aligned much more with CIDA priorities.

This thesis analyzes Canadian NGOs’ relationship with CIDA in the context of the new funding model and other recent trends within the CIDA-NGO environment. It captures NGOs perspectives on the changing CIDA-NGO relationship, noting the range of NGO responses regarding advocacy efforts, public engagement or education activities, organizational priorities and overseas partnerships under CIDA’s new funding mechanism.

The main hypothesis of the thesis draws on Edwards and Hulme’s (1998) article “Too Close for Comfort: The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations”. As such, the hypothesis is that the new CIDA funding mechanism reduces the autonomy of Canadian NGOs by increasingly encouraging them to shift to government priorities, focus on short-term projects and scale back on advocacy.

Regarding NGO autonomy and a shift to government priorities, generally NGO participants mentioned no change to their values or mission as a result of CIDA’s new funding mechanism. Reference to how they “talk” about what they are doing and the possibility of the need to change areas of priority in the future were highlighted by a
few participants. Interview respondents did not report an indication of changing their organizational priorities or countries of focus to be more in line with CIDA. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this feedback was self-reported from NGO representatives and therefore is likely to have a positive bias towards a commitment to an organization’s mandate. The interview responses that revealed little change in NGOs’ countries of focus under the call-for-proposals mechanism support findings from CCIC’s 2012 survey.

In terms of advocacy work and public engagement activities, participant responses were mixed on the degree to which they are scaling back on these areas. Many noted that they would fund this type of work from internal resources, whereas others spoke of public engagement programs being shut down all together. There was also mention of the need to take a more cautious and careful tone when engaging with the government about their work or international development policy. Notably, several participants mentioned that CRA’s 10 percent regulation on political activity would likely have a greater effect than the new funding mechanism on their ability to carry out advocacy work. This is supported by the literature covered in Chapter 3, which indicates that civil society organizations are careful in their advocacy because of a lack of clarity around the 10 percent rule, or a fear of punishment and sensitivities to funders. The audits carried out by CRA point to the latter. These politically motivated tax audits, which have recently expanded to include international development organizations, are undoubtedly increasing the “chill” felt in Canadian civil society organizations, discouraging them from speaking out on a range of issues.
A shift to short-term projects seems to be encouraged to some extent under the new call-for-proposal funding mechanism. The “bidding” model of the CIDA’s new civil society mechanism was criticized by several interview participants who felt strongly that the model was not an effective way to maintain the types of relationships required for long-term development or to realize transformative outcomes. As well, several participants expressed frustration in projects being cut off from a funding cycle that would ensure their progression and predictability in future. This connects to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 which highlights donors’ increased preference for project-based funding; a move away from what has historically been more flexible core funding arrangements between official donors and NGOs (Wallace et al., 2006). Arguably, the short-term projects are less effective and responsive than long-term programs implemented through NGOs with core donor funding.

The most notable findings of the thesis are the determination of the NGOs’ relationship with CIDA and how they respond to some of the impacts and pressures that result from CIDA funding. Employing Brinkerhoff’s partnership model, I find that the relationship cannot be characterized as one of partnership, but more closely resembles one that spans her categories of contracting and extension. This supports earlier theoretical work of Brown (2012) and the empirical research of CCIC (2012).

Employing Elbers and Arts (2011) typology, I capture a range of actions that NGOs employ in response to the changing CIDA-NGO relationship. I show that NGOs seek to “influence” CIDA through meetings with officers and politicians, “buffer” their overseas partners from negative CIDA impacts, “shield” themselves by limiting their level of CIDA funding and “compensate” by funding advocacy and public engagement
from internal sources. I build on Elbers and Arts’ (2011) original list, by adding “innovation” as a tactic. Innovation can represent new ideas, new ways of working and new partnerships to mitigate the challenges faced as a result of donor conditions or funding realities.

Overall, the responses from interview participants indicate a complicated and sometimes tense relationship between the NGO community and CIDA. The participant responses reveal that development effectiveness of Canadian NGOs is hindered by a relationship with CIDA that has been characterized by delays in funding, cumbersome reporting requirements, inflexible contribution agreements, political decision-making and a removal of funding for public engagement. However, a more open and positive relationship with civil society may be evolving under Christian Paradis, the new Minister of International Development. Paradis has recently indicated that the government will provide more predictable and transparent funding to NGOs, as well as identified the need to develop a coherent approach to working with Canadian civil society. Nevertheless, the growing number of CRA audits of international development organizations suggests that the CIDA-NGO relationship will remain strained.

In closing, it is important to note that my thesis had some limitations. Primarily, the topic is sensitive in nature; many of the NGOs in the study are recipients of CIDA funding and this likely affected their willingness to disclose their identity or be as open in their criticism. Many NGO representatives are fearful to speak out and, as a result, the relationship between NGOs and CIDA may be even more strained than they let on.

While the sample of NGOs in my study is not fully representative of the development community in Canada, the findings are nonetheless indicative of the CIDA-
NGO relationship. In addition, the thesis could serve as a basis for future research. Specifically, it could be developed further through the application of the original analytical framework to a larger sample in Canada, as well as contribute to comparative work on NGO-government relations in other countries.
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Historical Relationship with CIDA (Introductory Question)
1) Can you briefly explain your organization’s historical relationship with CIDA?

Current Relationship with CIDA
2) How would you describe your organization’s relationship with CIDA? (i.e. partnership vs. contracting).

Organizations Priorities and Overseas Partnerships
3) Did the organization face any challenges in positioning its funding proposal(s) in line with CIDA’s priority countries/themes? Explain.
4) Has CIDA funding impacted your partnerships (to beneficiaries, constituents etc.) and/or programs of focus. How so?

Advocacy and Public Engagement
5) Is your organization involved in advocacy or public engagement activities (at present or in the past)? Can you tell me about these activities?
6) Has CIDA funding impacted your organization’s advocacy or public engagement activities? How so?

Independence/Ability to maintain independent mission
7) Has the value or mission of your organization been impacted as a result of CIDA funding? Explain.

Accountability
8) How does your organization remain accountable to CIDA and to its beneficiaries/constituents? (i.e. are there particular mechanisms that the organization employs?) In your opinion, are these accountabilities easily compatible? Explain.
9) To what extent does CIDA funding impact the organization’s accountability to its beneficiaries?

Dealing with Impacts
10) How does your organization manage the potential challenges and impacts brought about by CIDA funding?
## APPENDIX 2: NGO INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>CCIC Member</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Government Funding in 2012 (CRA)</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<td>Women's Empowerment Foundation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Nargis Jamal, Executive Director</td>
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<td>Change for Children</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lorraine Swift, Executive Director</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Bruce Guenther, Director for Disaster Response</td>
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<td>International Development Enterprises</td>
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<td>Bill Pratt, Executive Director</td>
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<td>Not Disclosed</td>
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**APPENDIX 3: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Cornelius</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Canadian Foodgrains Bank</td>
<td>December 11, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Nipa Banerjee</td>
<td>Visiting Professor and former CIDA employee</td>
<td>School of International Development and Globalization, University of Ottawa</td>
<td>December 17, 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jennifer Henry</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Kairos</td>
<td>January 21, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nik Barry-Shaw</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Co-author of Paved with Good Intentions</td>
<td>January 23, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chantal Havard</td>
<td>Government Relations and Communications Officer</td>
<td>Canadian Council of International Cooperation</td>
<td>January 29, 2014</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


