Understanding Government Decision-Making: Canada’s Disaster-Relief in Haiti and Pakistan

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For my Mama and Abu Jaan.
Praying that you always remain pleased with me.

And to Coach Gavin.
Third time lucky.
Abstract

Canada coordinates its responses to natural disasters abroad through implementing its ‘whole-of-government’ policy framework. The two largest natural disasters that struck in 2010 were the January earthquake in Haiti and the flooding in Pakistan seven months later. In contrast to the fast and robust earthquake relief provided to Haiti, Canada’s response to the Pakistan floods was minimal, especially when considering the extent of damage sustained. This dissertation applies a public administration lens to trace factors that led to the Government of Canada’s 2010 disaster-relief decisions. It develops a multi-level theoretical framework to holistically explore the role of problem-definition in shaping decision-making. It applies historical institutionalism at the macro level; recognizes the role of case-specific details and arenas at the meso level; and uses the logic of appropriateness to identify informal institutions affecting individual action at the micro level.

Analysis of interviews, government documents and media coverage indicates that bureaucratic actors involved in the whole-of-government approach recognize that their role is ultimately removed from final disaster-relief decisions. There is an informal acceptance that political will, more than needs in the disaster-affected region, shapes implementation decisions. Consequently, technical assessment is inadvertently affected, and recommendations reflect what is deemed most in line with ministerial disposition to assist. The primary motivators for Government of Canada action are found to be the gaining of public support or the need to subdue targeted criticisms. Findings indicate that as a result of its media appeal, there was a strong incentive for the deployment of military assets in response to the earthquake in Haiti, even when doing so was not in the best interest of the affected region. Where Canada could respond only with non-military means, there was less incentive for action. This leads to supply-driven relief rather than a needs-based humanitarian response.

With the developed theoretical framework, process-mapping and media analysis methodologies, and the actor-centred approach adopted, the dissertation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to existing public administration literature on decision-making and problem definition. It also presents a hitherto unexplored perspective on donor behaviour for consideration by international relations and development scholars.
Acknowledgements

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All that is, is due to Him. He is the facilitator of everything. God has placed people in my life who have enabled me to successfully complete this doctoral journey. For this blessing, amongst all His blessings, no Praise will suffice. I share a few words with these special people here.

My loving parents, from the moment I was born, you have sacrificed so much to give me a life full of opportunity. No words of appreciation can do justice to your unconditional love. I pray for your acceptance into the highest ranks of Paradise. I love you dearly.

My brother Aadil, your encouragement and support light me up in ways that you do not know. You are my rock. My amazing sister K, your faith in me empowers me. There is so much that I have learnt from you, and so much about you I wish to emulate. My sister Hayat, since I was a little girl I have had your footsteps to follow. You paved the path, and I pray that we always remain close. My nieces Raiyaan and Iynaara, we are together Team Mombasa. You make me want to be better every single day.

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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Development, Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATIP</td>
<td>Access to Information &amp; Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoG Ministers</td>
<td>Prime Minister, and Ministers of: Foreign Affairs, National Defence &amp; International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Canadian Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CFM</td>
<td>Consular Affairs Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA-IHA</td>
<td>CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance program</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>Canadian Television Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Disasters Emergency Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKPol</td>
<td>Directorate of Peace Keeping Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission, Ambassador</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAE</td>
<td>International Assistance Envelope</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISBAD</td>
<td>Canadian High Commission in Pakistan (Islamabad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISST</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence Assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Canadian embassy abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Memorandum to Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>Pakistan Natural Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGDs</td>
<td>other government departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Organisation International de la Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recce</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitrep</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJS</td>
<td>Strategic Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Relief Taskforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>START-IRH</td>
<td>DFAIT’s Humanitarian and Disaster Response Group within START</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Taskforce on Natural Disasters Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBS</td>
<td>Treasury Board Secretariat</td>
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Chapter 1.0. Introduction

On January 12 2010, an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude on the Richter scale hit Port au Prince, Haiti. The earthquake caused an estimated death toll of 220,000 people, displaced around 1.5 million, and resulted in extensive infrastructure damage (DEC, 2010). The Haitian government was incapacitated. United Nations (UN) offices were severely damaged or destroyed. This included the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Port au Prince, whose functioning was directly affected by the death of the Head of Office’s entire family (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). Although UN clusters1 were activated within three days of the earthquake, it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. This state of affairs, however, did not inhibit a multitude of international actors from providing more immediate support to Haiti. Canada is a case in point.

Only hours after the earthquake struck, Canada launched a large-scale disaster-relief response effort. This was manifested by interdepartmental collaboration between fourteen federal level departments, and included financial aid commitments of over CAD 400 million (FATDC, 2012). Canada conducted its own needs assessment, decided how best to match its resources and capabilities to those needs, and initiated unprecedented measures to deal with the evolving situation. These included launching a fund to match donations made by Canadians; implementing special immigration and adoption measures; and launching Operation Hestia, whereby almost 2050 Canadian Forces (CF) personnel engaged in aid efforts on Haitian soil. Less than 24 hours after

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1 Designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), clusters are composed of UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action. These include water, health and logistics. Clusters are used for planning, coordination and execution of humanitarian assistance (for more details see Humanitarian Response, n.d.).
disaster-onset, Canadian personnel were already engaged in medical relief efforts in Port-au-Prince².

Due to this timely intervention, efficiency of response, and the evident impact of Canadian financial contributions, resources, and personnel deployed to Haiti, Canada's response received praise both domestically and internationally. On June 14, 2010, the interdepartmental team received the Public Service Award of Excellence for “Exemplary Contribution under Extraordinary Circumstances” (TBS, 2010). Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, former U.S. President Bill Clinton publicly hailed Canada's efforts in Haiti as “unbelievable” (Akin, 2010). Commenting on Canada's military assets having to leave Haiti at the end of its mission, the United Nations (UN) Head of Humanitarian Aid in Haiti, Nigel Fisher, told The Canadian Press that “many felt that they wished they had stayed because they were extremely effective” (quoted in Aniss, 2010).

Aid efforts for response to the earthquake in Haiti were coordinated through Canada's Whole-of-Government Framework (also referred to herein as 'Framework'; FATDC, 2013). The Whole-of-Government Framework is characterized as an effective policy framework for action, particularly because of its ability to ensure “a coordinated, principled and appropriate cross-government response to major humanitarian emergencies” (OECD, n.d., para 4). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has also characterized it as a best practice (DAC 2007; DAC 2012). It requires close collaboration between Canada's foreign affairs ministry (Department of Foreign Affairs

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² Unless referenced, information specific to Canada's responses to natural disasters abroad has been obtained from primary sources, particularly government archive documents and interviews (see Data Gathering Sources for more information). Preliminary findings of this dissertation have been published in Mamujji, 2012. Permission for reproduction of parts of that text has been obtained from the journal editor.
and International Trade, DFAIT): development agency (Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA): and the defence department (Department of National Defence, DND)\(^3\). The collaboration of the three departments arguably “[is the] best use of all available expertise, exploits local knowledge, and ensures that complementary functions are coordinated on an interdepartmental basis” (DND, 2006, p. 5). Together with the Privy Council Office (PCO), the official non-partisan advisory body to the Prime Minister, DFAIT, CIDA and DND form the permanent members of the Taskforce for Natural Disasters Abroad (also referred to herein as ‘Taskforce’). The application of this same policy framework in response to flash floods in Pakistan seven months later, however, resulted in a markedly different response from the Government of Canada.

Following their onset on July 21, 2010, monsoon rains caused mass flooding in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan regions of Pakistan (SRC, 2010). With almost one-fifth of the country underwater, the floods led to the death of about 1,500 people, affected more than 20 million people, and detrimentally affected the country’s economy (UN Dispatch, 2010). During his tour of the damage in Pakistan, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, “the world has never seen such a disaster. It’s much beyond anybody’s imagination...waves of flood must be met with waves of support from the world” (quoted in Huffington Post, 2010).

\(^3\) The Canadian federal government operates within the Westminster parliamentary model of governance. It uses the term ”department” when referring to its ministries under the direct control of a minister and ”agency” to refer to semi-autonomous organizations that are subject to ministerial policy direction. All ministers are elected members of Parliament and also members of the Cabinet (council of ministers), which is led by the Prime Minister. In March 2013, the Government of Canada announced that CIDA would be folded into DFAIT, with the combined organization renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). There are five ministers working out of this department, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and including the Minister of International Cooperation (Parliament of Canada, 2013). Both these ministers directly participate in decision-making related to Canada's humanitarian relief efforts. This merger minimally affects the whole-of-government approach described in this chapter. As such – and as the events described in this dissertation pre-date the reorganization – the earlier titles for the agencies are used.
Although the flooding in Pakistan killed relatively less people, the extent of damage based on the number of people displaced; the risk of infectious disease from contaminated water; and destruction of basic infrastructure, far exceeded the catastrophe caused by the earthquake in Haiti. The earthquake affected 3 million people, compared to 20 million affected by the flooding; and 6 million people were displaced in Pakistan as compared to 1.5 million in Haiti (Ferris, 2010; UN Dispatch, 2010). Ban Ki-moon noted that the number of people affected as being greater than “the entire population hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Kashmir earthquake, Cyclone Nargis and the earthquake in Haiti — combined” (UN, 2010).

Despite the severity of the flooding, international contributions to the relief efforts in Pakistan only trickled in (Guardian, 2010). In the case of Haiti, the UN flash appeal was issued on January 15, three days after the earthquake (Ferris, 2010). In the case of Pakistan, it was launched on August 11, 12 days after the first OCHA situation report was issued. 82% of Haiti’s UN flash appeal was funded two weeks after the earthquake had struck⁴. This contrasts with the 57% of the Pakistan UN flash appeal that was funded over the same timeframe (Ferris, 2010). A study by Indiana University’s Center on Philanthropy claimed that 5 weeks following the onset of flooding, donations by individuals, foundations and companies in the United States totaled just USD 25 million; but that in comparison, Americans donated USD 900 million within five weeks of the earthquake in Haiti (discussed in Neely, 2010). According to an Angus Reid public opinion poll, donations from Canadians to Haiti outnumbered those to Pakistan by a 9.5-to-1 margin (Angus Reid, 2010).

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⁴ A flash appeal is triggered by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator within one week of an emergency, and is a tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response for the first three to six months of an emergency.
Canada responded to the flooding in Pakistan with over CAD 70 million in humanitarian assistance, which included matching donations by the Canadian public (FATDC, 2012b). It also provided relief supplies and funded a temporary bridge program to help with the damaged infrastructure in the country. While welcome, this response was markedly smaller than compared to the Canadian disaster-relief intervention in Haiti earlier that year (see Appendix A for details of the Government of Canada’s response to both disasters). The research pursuit of this dissertation stems from the empirical observation of Canada’s varying response, especially given that the same Whole-of-Government Framework was used to guide Canada’s response to both 2010 natural disasters. It seeks to understand the decision-making process that took place in both cases in order to better explain how Canada arrived at its disaster relief interventions. The following section discusses the findings of studies and commentaries that have explored reasons for the varying responses to the 2010 events.

1.1. Understanding the Varying Response to the 2010 Natural Disasters

A number of media reports and studies in grey-literature provide explanations for the varying response to the 2010 natural disasters, both internationally and specifically within Canada. Explanations discuss 1) the nature of disaster; 2) media coverage; 3) public opinion; 4) aid mismanagement; 5) differences in context (time of year; donor fatigue; and geographic proximity); and 6) nature of diaspora communities.

Floods are described as not having the same appeal as an instant disaster like an earthquake (Ferris, 2010; Neely, 2010; Pedrero, 2010; Taber, 2010; The Canadian
Floods are argued to solicit fewer donations over time because they are slow moving, and due to the lower death toll that they cause. Furthermore, injuries that are characteristic of earthquakes are intensely newsworthy. This is in contrast to the major health threats affecting victims of flooding, including cholera, gastrointestinal ailments and skin diseases, which are difficult to depict and do not carry the same visual effect as many earthquake related injuries (Agrell, 2010; Khan, 2010; Neely, 2010; The Canadian Journalism Project, 2010; Van Fleet & Winthrop, 2010).

Public opinion on both countries is also different, and this was cited as a major reason for the slower worldwide response to the flooding (Agrell, 2010; Blanchfield, 2010; Ferris, 2010; Hughes, 2010; Pedrero, 2010; The Canadian Journalism Project, 2010). Given that Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere, it is perceived as a vulnerable country in need of development assistance. Pakistan, however, is coloured by a complex storyline of insurgency, regional conflict, nuclear weapons, links to terrorism and terrorist groups. As a result, Pakistan has an image deficit that affects sympathies towards it.

Differences in the opinion of the management of aid responses in either country also differed (Agrell, 2010; Angus Reid, 2010; Ferris, 2010). Haiti’s earthquake left the government incapacitated, and therefore international actors coordinated relief-efforts. In Pakistan, however, Pakistan national authorities took a leading role in managing international actions. There was a widely held perception that relief money would not be put to good use in Pakistan due to what is considered to be a corrupt and incompetent government. There were also reports that some charities operating in the
flooded areas had links to Islamic militant groups (Javed, 2010; Pedrero, 2010; Taber, 2010). Pakistan’s President, Asif Ali Zardari, was also highly criticized for continuing his Europe tour at the start of August while the floods were escalating in degree (Javed, 2010; Ferris, 2010; Hughes, 2010). This contributed to an image of a government that did not care for its own people, which consequently raised questions about why the world should care.

The context of both disasters also differed. The flooding in Pakistan occurred in the summer of 2010. Some commentators argue that it is harder to solicit donations in summer, given that many people are away on vacation, or pay less attention to the news (Agrell, 2010). Furthermore, it is argued that coming so soon after the January earthquake in Haiti, donors were reluctant to contribute to the flooding in Pakistan because of economic strain (Agrell, 2010; Neely, 2010; Pedrero, 2010). The relative distance of Pakistan from North America is argued to have contributed to a more removed perception of the policy problem (Ferris, 2010; The Canadian Journalism Project, 2010). Further, cultural, religious and language differences are also cited (Agrell, 2010; Neely, 2010; Taber, 2010). This resulted in a decreased sense of responsibility to provide assistance as compared to Haiti. The proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan, in which there remains an ongoing war on terrorism, is also noted as an explanation for the variable response (Agrell, 2010; Blanchfield, 2010). Specific to Canada, the presence of a large number of Haitians living in the country, with a strong concentration in Montreal, is argued to have generated considerable interest in responding to the earthquake in Haiti (Ferris, 2010). Canada’s former Governor General, Michaëlle Jean, is also of Haitian origin and was in office at the time. One study
also cited the lack of a televised telethon as an additional reason for the slower Canadian response to the Pakistan floods (Angus Reid, 2010).

While useful, these explanations are probabilistic considerations to explain policy outcomes. Except for opinion polls (Angus Reid, 2010) and public opinion quotes in newspaper articles, no formal methodology is employed. Rather than identify administrative processes that lead to the observed policy decisions, the commentaries provide likely correlations to explain donor behaviour. Given that they are often unsubstantiated, they provide incomplete analysis that does not take into consideration complex independent and interdependent variables to explicate Canada’s variable response. Moving away from this level of abstraction, the dissertation looks inwards into the mechanics of the government. It seeks to explore government decision-making in humanitarian crises, with an eye on the agency of political actors, bureaucratic advice and media coverage. As outlined in subsequent chapters, this research pursuit is guided by a detailed theoretical framework.

1.2. Research Questions

Inspired by the empirical puzzle of Canada’s variable response to both 2010 natural disasters, the primary research question is:

**What explains the varied scope and configuration of Canada’s disaster-relief decisions following the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?**

*Scope* refers to the speed in which the whole-of-government community mobilized upon understanding the humanitarian need; the level of interest in intervening by policy actors; and the extent of government investment of finances and
resources to responding to the natural disaster. *Configuration* refers to the actual tools that were provided in the response, such as the provision of cash, relief-supplies, military resources and the implementation of special immigration measures, amongst others.

Whether they are manmade or natural - or combinations of both - disasters defy geographical, social, and cultural boundaries. While entire disciplines focus on disaster issues, such as Disaster and Emergency Management, there are also a myriad of sociological; and political issues, as well as international relations concerns, that are applicable to uncovering disaster complexities. In this dissertation, the application of a public administration lens to the empirical puzzle helps in understanding the dynamics of government decision-making.

Harold Lasswell (1956) defined politics as “Who Gets What, When, How”. By exploring the ‘what’ of Canadian aid packages provided to Haiti and Pakistan after their catastrophic 2010 natural disasters; the ‘when’ of the timing of Canadian involvement; and the ‘how’ of decision-making; this dissertation provides a public administration understanding of the empirical question at hand. In order to address the primary research question, the research adopts an actor-centred approach and asks the following secondary research questions:

**What influenced the actions of bureaucratic and political actors when implementing Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework?**

**How did problem definition influence the implementation process during Canada’s response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?**
The research is actor-centred given its approach of understanding government decision-making from the perspective of the day-to-day actions and interactions of implicated bureaucratic and political actors following disaster onset. It employs institutionalism and “detailed-narrative” process-tracing methods (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 2010), to explicate processes at play during the implementation of the Whole-of-Government Framework. The dissertation disaggregates the implementation stage of the policy processes into specific moments, and emphasizes the important role of case-specific problem definition for understanding policy decisions. This facilitates the exploration of how the ideas held by bureaucratic actors, including the understanding of their influence in the government machinery, shapes decision-making in government.

1.3. Theoretical and Empirical Contributions to Knowledge

This dissertation is a valuable addition to academic literature on decision-making in Canadian foreign policy. As is shown in the literature review, most existing studies focus on explaining continuity or change in Canadian foreign policy, primarily through imploring a historical, macro-level perspective. There is limited focus in the field on the implementation of specific policies, or the administrative processes which shape Canada’s foreign policy decisions and their outcomes. Literature on Canada’s development and humanitarian policies in particular explain aid-patterns through broad trends. Where the role of individual actors is discussed, here too analysis is usually based on historical commentary. While the role of external actors such as non-governmental organizations, other donor countries, and international institutions in
shaping the decisions of Canada as a donor countries is explored, there is limited insight provided on the role of bureaucratic actors during implementation (see Farrell, 1969; Nossal, 1985/1997; and Desrosiers and Lagassé, 2009 for partial exceptions).

Further, there is more emphasis in the field on Canada’s international development efforts rather than its humanitarian assistance, especially where responses to natural disasters abroad are concerned. While Angus Reid (2010) conducted a survey to compare Canadian charitable responses to the 2010 natural disasters by members of the Canadian public, a comparative academic analysis on the actions of the Government of Canada that year has not been conducted. And, while Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework is praised for its efficiency by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC, 2007, 2012) and has been the subject of a cross-country comparative study (Patrick & Brown, 2007), most research focuses on its use in failed and fragile states (Cooper, 2005; Traverse & Owen, 2008). Decisions taken via the implementation of the Whole-of-Government Framework in natural disaster settings, however, are understudied (see Warner, 2013 for an exception). No academic studies have been undertaken to detail actual processes that take place when the Framework is implemented. Through interviews with involved civil servants and analysis of data retrieved from Access to Information & Privacy (ATIP) requests, this dissertation presents empirically substantiated step-by-step processes of the interdepartmental efforts that took place leading up to the decisions of the 2010 disaster-relief efforts. The study also augments findings in Mason (2011), wherein she conducted analysis of Canadian media coverage after the earthquake in Haiti. This
dissertation conducts a comparative study of both print and television news coverage following both 2010 natural disasters.

From a theoretical perspective, the dissertation develops a holistic, multi-level institutional approach to understand government decision-making during implementation. Taking into consideration the role of structure, context, and agency, it explores decision-making at three levels: macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-foundational. It applies historical institutionalism at the macro-institutional level, recognizing that there are formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions which are embedded in institutions. These factors influence and shape the behaviour of different political actors, the decisions taken, and the consequential outcomes. In the case studies of Canada’s 2010 disaster-relief responses in Haiti and Pakistan, meso-contextual and micro-foundational level analyses are used to understand the effect of case-specific problem definition on decision-making.

Meso-level analysis explores the role of contextual factors such as the implementation of standard operating procedures in the Whole-of-Government Framework, and the role of media in shaping problem-definition. Micro-foundational level analysis explores how policy actors understand their role in decision-making processes, and how this perception subsequently affects policy output. In highlighting the role and complexity of case-specific problem definition, it presents a hitherto unexplored perspective for understanding donor-country trends. In particular, it argues that the way in which bureaucratic actors understand their role during implementation, affects relief decisions.
There is also value in this dissertation for academic literature on disasters. The literature discusses what a disaster is (Perry, 2007; Quarantelli, 1998), typologies of disasters (Berren, 1980), organizational change induced by disasters (Bardo, 1978), and decision-making in disaster-settings (Aldunate, 2005; Suparamaniam & Dekker, 2003). Case studies have explored disaster-relief coordination efforts (Drabek, 2004; Drabek and McEntire, 2002; McEntire, 2002), lessons-learned from post-disaster analysis (Farazmand, 2007; Kapucu, & Van Wart, 2006; Leitmann, 2007), and the role of resilient communities in disaster recovery and mitigation (Comfort et al, 1999; Cutter et al, 2008). Horizontal issues such as risk management (Keller, 1996), organizational learning (Alesch, et al, 2001), leadership perspectives (Brattberg & Sundelius, 2011; Boin & Hart, 2003; Rosenthal, 2003) and crisis communications (Longstaff & Yang, 2008; Ulmer et al, 2010) are also addressed. By applying a public administration perspective to Canada’s disaster-relief responses, the dissertation contributes to the understudied area of interdepartmental dynamics and government decision-making in donor countries.

By bringing in a public administration perspective, the dissertation outlines an original **Disaster-Relief Analytical Grid** that helps explain the interdepartmental collaboration required in implementation of the Whole-of-Government Framework. It does this both by identifying both independent and inter-dependent tracks manifested during Canada’s responses to catastrophic natural disasters abroad which affect the decisions taken. With this understanding, the dissertation offers practical tips that may help in bringing donor countries closer to compliance with principles of Good
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Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), wherein there is a requirement for impartial and needs-based responses to humanitarian crises (see Hilhorst 2005; Walkers 2005).

1.4. Summary of Findings and Structure of the Dissertation

Based on detailed process maps of the responses, in-depth interviews, ATIP documents, and media-analysis, it is ascertained that political will is the primary determinant of implementation decisions, and that this may result in a bypassing of guidelines in formal policy frameworks. In the case of Canada’s response to the earthquake in Haiti, political actors were proactive, and at times bypassed guidelines outlined in Canada’s Whole-of-Government approach for responding to natural disasters abroad. Based on their understanding of this political will, disaster-relief recommendations made by bureaucratic actors catered to the desire for increased action, even where this did not serve the best interests of people in the affected regions in Haiti. On the contrary, political actors adopted a reactive stance to the flooding in Pakistan, and bureaucratic actors deemed it appropriate to limit the range of relief-options they recommended.

Triangulating these findings with the analysis of print and television media coverage following both natural disasters, two important decision-making determinants emerge. Firstly, the main driver of political will is the desire to harness favourable public opinion and neutralize criticism. This is reflected by the way in which the disaster in Haiti was perceived as ‘Canada’s problem’, raising expectations for Government of Canada action. Secondly, while they understand that their role is to make recommendations based on needs on the ground as per humanitarian principles,
bureaucratic actors feel disempowered in affecting decision-making, particularly when their opinions are not already in line with the will of political actors. Accordingly, their definition of need tends to expand to include expectations that may help assure political alacrity, which in turn can affect the nature and content of the ‘technical’ disaster-relief recommendations that they provide.

The dissertation begins with a review of literature on Canada’s foreign policy, government decision-making, and humanitarian assistance, identifying gaps that the research is able to fill. The next chapter develops a theoretical framework inspired by public administration literature on the policy process, problem definition and the politics/administration dichotomy that seeks to answer the research questions holistically. Linking the theoretical framework to the methodology, the subsequent chapter describes the triangulated data-gathering techniques used in the study. This is followed by detailed data analysis, which presents findings at macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-institutional levels. The dissertation concludes with a discussion chapter and concluding remarks.

When a government makes two seemingly different decisions in two comparable cases, the complexity of independent and interdependent variables necessitates a holistic approach to understanding government decisions. By employing principles of public administration, this study unpacks Canada’s 2010 disaster-relief decisions from the perspective of structure, context, agency and ideas, and lends unique insight into the dynamics between political and bureaucratic players acting within the government machinery.
Chapter 2.0. Literature Review

By virtue of the empirical problem explored and the public administration lens it applies, this dissertation makes four important contributions: 1) it supplements existing literature on Canada’s foreign policies by examining underexplored areas of disaster-relief; 2) building on existing approaches, it advocates for a multi-level framework for understanding government decision-making; 3) it adds to existing literature on the determinants of international aid and humanitarian efforts by presenting a public administration and implementation perspective; and 4) it contributes to literature that explores the coordination of international relief efforts through a unique donor-country example – Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework. The literature review assesses research in each of these four categories, and provides an explanation on the ways in which this dissertation compliments and contributes to research in those areas.

This chapter begins with a brief review of contemporary literature on Canada’s foreign policy, with the aim of understanding the general areas of focus and methodology employed in recent scholarly works. The chapter then provides an assessment of government decision-making processes, and presents a case for methodological pluralism. This is followed by a focus on literature that explores the determinants of donor behaviour, coordination in disaster research, and studies on Canada’s foreign aid practices. These discussions directly inform the following chapter, which presents the theoretical framework used to guide data analysis.
2.1. Canada’s Foreign Policy: Review of Contemporary Literature

By exploring Canada’s framework for responding to international natural disasters from a public administration perspective, the dissertation makes a contribution to existing literature on Canada’s foreign policies. There are a number of books and readers that explore Canada’s foreign and security policy (see for instance Farrell, 1969; Dewitt & Kirton, 1983; Nossal, 1985/1997; Dewitt & Leyton-Brown, 1995; Bow & Lennox, 2008). One of the earlier comprehensive books focused on Canadian public administrative dynamics in the making of Canadian foreign policy is by Barry Farrell (1969). Farrell (1969) focuses on Canada’s professional diplomats in the then Department of External Affairs, and those that are most closely in association with them in the political process, namely: 1) the Prime Minister; 2) the cabinet as a collective working group; 3) senior officials close to the cabinet; and 4) the Secretary of State of External Affairs. He acknowledges that “A foreign policy is the result of a process – an organization – of people and institutions” (p. 2), and advocates for an analysis of history, personalities, departmental structures in order to adequately understand foreign policy. The book is an effective guide to the functioning of the Department of External Affairs at that time, and in putting the power in both the political and bureaucratic arms of government in perspective based on particular historical instances.

Adopting a similar multi-dimensional approach, Nossal (1985, 1997) develops his own framework for analysis of Canada’s foreign policy. Highlighting that foreign policy is “forged in the nexus of three political environments – international, domestic, and governmental” (Nossal, 1985, p. 7), analysis is centered around these three
spheres. At the international level, the focus is on the external environment and the condition of the state in that environment, including Canada’s location, economic structure, group dynamics, capability and power historically and in contemporary times. At the domestic level, attention is paid to the nature, composition and background of Canadian society, its historical cleavages, political form and societal demands for foreign policy behaviour. At the level of governmental politics, the competing conceptions of national interests, contending views on the best course to follow, and trade-offs and compromises by officials are analyzed. Nossal (1985, 1997) details the role of the Prime Minister, foreign policy bureaucracy and the influence of parliament.

At the time of writing this dissertation, one of the most recent and comprehensive works that attempts to co-relate Canada’s foreign and security policy with traditional public administration approaches is Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson’s (2008) book entitled Canada’s International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives and Politics. Tomlin et al (2008) bridge contemporary explanations of Canadian foreign policy with public policy literature, offering a detailed account of the foreign policy making process by analyzing various scenarios through Kingdon’s policy steams model (Kingdon, 2003)\textsuperscript{5}. Given their explicit drawing on public administration literature, this work is of particular importance for this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{5} According to Kingdon’s (2003) model, there are three streams of processes in government agenda-setting: problems, policies and politics. In order for an idea’s time to come, a policy-window must open. This occurs when there is an alignment opportunity and each of these three streams meet simultaneously. Through a process of organized anarchy, a problem must be recognized, a solution must be available and political circumstances must be accommodating to the policy change.
Tomlin *et al* (2008) begin their analysis by arguing that most scholars writing on Canada’s foreign policy do so at one of three levels: the individual level (Level 1), which highlights the psychological dispositions of leaders, and the role of human agency and leadership in policy-making process; the national level (Level 2), which analyzes the structure and nature of political systems, the role of public opinion and media, and the impact of bureaucratic and organizational behaviour; and finally the systemic-level (Level 3), focusing on the structure of international or regional systems, and the distribution of power. Tomlin *et al* (2008) argue that scholars of international relations differ on which of these levels should be used to explain state behaviour and policy outcomes, and may combine approaches across levels (see for instance Michaud, 2006 which can fall into both Level 1 and Level 2 categories and Nossal 1985/1997 which falls into all three).

Taking the approach of scholars involved in research at Level 1, Michaud (2006) in his article, *The Prime Minister, PMO, and PCO: Makers of Canadian Foreign Policy*, provides a historical commentary on the Prime Minister’s role in Canada’s foreign policy. Historically, Canada’s foreign policy is dependent on who sits in the Prime Minister’s seat at any given time. With the election of Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, there was a clear shift from his predecessors, whereby “values such as Pearsonian internationalism would be reconsidered and subordinated to domestic concerns and policies” (Michaud, 2006, p. 39). Trudeau's lack of concern for foreign policy in favour of domestic affairs, continued with Prime Minister Jean Chretien. In the absence of a unified foreign policy strategy and direction for the country, Chretien gave foreign ministers the flexibility to develop and implement their own initiatives.
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy instructed DFAIT to work with a host of NGOs on his ban on landmines, such that “grassroots activists, not the Prime Minister, provided directives” (p. 42).

Also a Level 1 analysis, Nossal (2013) argues that much of Canadian foreign policy in the Harper era has been a direct attempt to differentiate itself from the Liberals; and to displace the Liberals as Canada’s natural governing party. One example offered by Nossal (2013) to support this argument is the Conservative government’s decision to refer to itself as ‘Canada’s New Government’, and the fact that Prime Minister Harper chose not to initiate a foreign and defense policy review, although this was a long tradition dating back to 1968 (Nossal, 2013). Boucher (2013) traces the history of Canada’s association with the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), showing the Harper government’s shift towards realist interpretations of internationalism, as reflected in Canada’s abandonment of the principle and the primacy of domestic interests and imperatives in foreign policy.

The emphasis on individual level and personal gain/loss arguments, however, does not necessarily provide a complete explanation for policy change in democratically elected governments. In these contexts, depending on the type of governmental system and the character of its leaders, the collective can shape policy-making to varying degrees. Examples include the participation of interest groups and political bargaining (Tomlin et al, 2009).

Falling within the Level 2 realm of Tomlin et al’s (2008) categorization, Michaud (2006) emphasizes the important role of the two central agencies, Privy Council Office (PCO) and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), in guiding Canada’s foreign policy direction.
PCO is considered as “a nexus of information from where policy advice to the prime minister emerges and interdepartmental coordination is orchestrated” (Michaud, 2006, p. 24-25). It has been observed that “when career foreign officers are handed senior responsibilities within PCO...one can assume that foreign policy questions get an attentive ear” (Michaud, 2006, p. 25). In fact, civil servants have complained that “it is often unclear...where specific policy decisions originate” (Brown, 2012, p. 13). Most recently, Canada’s Minister of International Corporation was reprimanded for changing a decision to approve funding for an NGO, by asking that the word ‘not’ be inserted in an official memorandum (Brown, 2012), highlighting top-down direction (Gecelovsky, 2013).

Gecelovsky (2013) makes the argument that policy-makers in Canada have more freedom and are less constrained than they are willing to admit. As an example he offers faith-based policy in Canadian foreign affairs, as displayed by the influence of evangelical Christians. Their influence is particularly evident in the country’s foreign policy towards Israel, and on development funding for women’s abortion rights. On the latter, Carrier and Tiessen (2013) employ gender analysis of foreign policy to show how the Conservative government has ‘written off’ gender equality from foreign policy, as exemplified in the Muskoka Initiative on maternal, neo-natal and child health. This is accomplished in part by detailed deconstruction of speeches and statements on the Initiative, which shows that it is difficult to address the broader health challenges faced by women due to the focus on mothers rather than women.

Also, under Level 2 analysis, Massie et al (2010) apply a constructivist approach (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1966) to strategic culture - namely “distinctive,
dominant, and persistent systems of ideas and practices” (Massie, 2009, p. 628). In their work, they show how a country’s culture and identity are inherent in formulating national interests, as well as in informing the manner in which to pursue these. Through the adoption of a longitudinal perspective, Massie et al (2010) argue that interdependence between security and development was stronger before 9/11, than that assumed by conventional wisdom.

Most works at Level 3 adopt liberal assumptions that favour international institutions as the preferred instruments of international peace and security, and emphasize Canada's middle-power status (Tomlin et al, 2008). Keating (1993) and English and Hillmer (1992) argue that as a result of being a middle-ranked power, Canada is not well equipped to play great-power politics in international relations; and instead advances its interests through effective diplomacy and membership in multilateral institutions. Canada’s international role and influence is also affected by the rise of neocontinentalism, which is a discourse categorized by seven elements: conservative values; belief that Canada is a principal power; a pessimistic conception of human nature; a realist-inspired national interest; keenness to use force; alignment with the United States as Canada’s most important ally; and a belief that international institutions are decreasing in their ability to act as vehicles for advancing Canadian interests (Massie and Roussel, 2013). Some literature on Canada’s aid trends, discussed in Section 2.4, also falls within Level 3.

It is difficult to place some works in Tomlin et al’s 3-level division, especially those that adopt more critical theoretical frameworks. Through an assessment of Canada’s relationship with Africa, Black (2013) argues that there has been a decline in
internationalism in Canada, and that it is deeper than just a shift of focus by the Conservative government. Rather, the decline reflects a decrease in public support for foreign aid, and a shift from state-centric internationalism that focuses on the role of donor countries in international development efforts, to individualistic global citizenship where there is increased support for civil society to play an active role. His analysis is based on an assessment of documents, speeches and announcements from 2009 onwards. Similarly, through focusing on the Arctic and climate change, Smith (2013) challenges the hidden assumptions of internationalism, arguing that using the latter as a framework predetermines and shapes the result of any relevant analysis. In particular, she shows how internationalism is taken as “Canada’s face to the world” (Smith, 2003, p. 30), which conceals the impact of climate change on actual experiences in the Arctic because it is state centric, lacks human dimension and assumes race neutrality.

Acknowledging the validity of literature at each of the three different levels – individual, national and systemic, Tomlin et al (2008) look to understanding policy outcomes in Canada’s foreign policies by “[capturing] and [explaining] the interplay of different variables across all three levels of analysis” (p. 21). By applying the policy streams model, Tomlin et al (2008) provide an explanation for change in the policy process, recognizing that “Canada’s international relations are messy and unpredictable” (p. 2). They elaborate on the problem, policy and political streams for each of: foreign investment, trade, defense, development, and human security policy processes. In their historical analysis, they identify moments in which problem, policy and political streams aligned, enabling policy windows to open, which together with
policy entrepreneurs, brought about policy change. The chapters on development begin with an examination of the historical evolution of Canada’s development agenda as experienced over five decades. Thereafter they explore the main actors and institutions in policy development, such as pressure groups, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions (Tomlin et al, 2008, p. 155). While Tomlin et al’s work attempts to be as comprehensive as possible, this dissertation addresses two significant limitations in their research.

Firstly, Tomlin et al (2008) focus on Canada’s development policies, but do not discuss humanitarian policies. This distinction is important, and is elaborated on in Section 2.3. Furthermore, while the objective of their book is to explore policy change, their analysis does not go beyond a macro-level discourse. There is limited discussion on the implementation of specific development policies, and on how change is actually manifested inside government. Rather, it provides important episodes of agenda and change in Canada’s foreign aid polices, dating back to the Second World War. Secondly, while the focus in Tomlin et al’s (2008) work is on external factors such as NGOs and international institutions that affect development policy, limited insight is provided on the role of bureaucratic actors themselves (see Desrosiers and Lagassé, 2009, for a notable exception). In fact, as shown in the works discussed thus far, where scholars do emphasize the role of internal actors in shaping and implementing foreign policy, here too the analysis is almost always limited to a historical commentary.

Moving away from a historical account and high-level concepts, this dissertation evaluates the dynamics of the day-to-day administrative machinery that is implicated during government decision-making. It attempts to understand Canada’s disaster-relief
decisions through a holistic approach, and places an emphasis on understanding the role of actors internal to the bureaucratic environment. The following section surveys literature on government decision-making, and presents an argument for multi-level analysis and methodological pluralism.

2.2. Understanding Government Decision-Making

Just as Tomlin et al (2008) showed that Canadian foreign policy is studied in a variety of ways, as exemplified by the three levels, government decision-making has been studied through multiple angles. This section provides an overview of the diversity of literature on government decision-making. The survey begins by exploring rationalistic models of decision-making, followed by explanations that focus on power structures, including external versus internal decision-making determinants, and finally on approaches that explain policy outputs through an ideological lens. This context is important in order to situate the approach adopted in this current study within existing literature.

Allison’s (1969) case study on the Cuban Missile Crises is the most seminal study of public decision-making. Allison introduces three different conceptual models of decision-making: Rational Policy Model (Model I); Organizational Process Model (Model II); and Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III). The models attempt to explain the actions of national governments. While Model I focuses on the acts or choices of individual decision-making agents, Model II examines the decisions of large organizations functioning according to certain regular patterns of behavior. The Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III), in turn, brings Models I and II together as it
argues that what occurs in government is the outcome of the many overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in national government departments. Model I assumes the rational comprehensive method of decision-making, which is one of the foundational theories of decision-making wherein economic principles are used to solve traditional political and administrative problems (Alison, 1969).

Lindblom (1959) endorses the rational comprehensive method as the decision-making ideal. The assumption is that individuals are aware of their preferences and goals, and can rank them in order; and when faced with a number of options to achieve those preferences, they choose one that will maximize individual benefits and minimize costs (Allison, 1969; Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1969). For example, when it comes to selecting a policy instrument, it is assumed that an analysis of cost-benefit and technical feasibility will lead to a selection that is superior in efficiency and effectiveness (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006; Eliadis et al, 2005).

Rational choice explains that self-interest drives the actions of decision-making agents. Such exploration focuses on who the decision-making agents are, and how they shape the choice of policy outputs through their preferences. Frederickson & Smith (2003) claim that public policy makers are motivated by political calculus of electoral or ideological cost and benefit. Rather than assuming that policies are developed for the sake of public good, policy choices are made as a result of pursuing self-maximizing gain from a number of players – politicians, bureaucrats, regulators, interest groups, media and voters. These theories on decision-making are in line with the explanation offered by the Iron Triangle, wherein policymaking is reduced to a bargaining process
among parliamentarians, public bureaucracies and interest groups operating in a closed and autonomous manner (Howlett, 2005).

Realistically, however, the Rational Policy Model is weak, in that normative decision-making is rarely based solely on the choice of rational principles of efficiency and effectiveness (Jones, 2002). Although this approach is useful for analytic simplicity, it assumes government to be an undifferentiated, interest-free entity, without much attention being paid to power structures (Hood, 2007; Howlett, 2005). In fact, Allison (1999) and others reject the rational approach to decision-making; and demonstrate that strict rational choice theory is not the preferred process of Canadian decision makers (see for instance Arsenault, 1988; Boyd, 1988). For Allison, government is “a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do; and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of government” (1969, p. 702).

Michaud (2002) conducted a relevant Canadian study that explores decision-making with a focus on power structures. Through assessing multi-round ‘white paper’ policy processes, Michaud (2002) provides an understanding of how power structures work in the Canadian government, and shows the stratification of decision-making. Essentially, since Canada has central agencies that can be considered to be under the Prime Minister but above other ministers, the power structure represents a stratarchy where a few, but not all, actors can exercise power over others. In his book The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics: Governing from the Centre, Savoie (1999) argues that the incentives and constraints that motivate politicians “vary considerably depending on where one sits, and the difference is substantial” (Savoie, 1999, p. 327).
This is quite in line with the words first coined by Don Price, 'Where you stand depends on where you sit' (Allison, 1999).

Other studies place more emphasis on external influences that affect decision-making. Forester (1984), in his famous study, develops a model which suggests that decision-making styles vary according to six key contextual variables: agents; organizational setting; degree of isolation of other organizations; how well the problem is defined; availability of complete, accessible and comprehensible information on the problem and potential solutions; and, the time available to make a decision. Forester argues that these variables define the context of a decision-making process, and in turn give rise to different styles of decision-making. Acknowledging the cumbersome application of this model due to the high number of variables, Howlett (2005) identifies two variables related to the political-administrative environment that affect decision-making when it comes to instrument choice: state capacity and target complexity. State capacity combines the notions of problem, information and time, while target complexity refers to agents and setting to expound the intricacies of the decision-making context. Another study which looks at instrument choice is Doem (1974). His approach, however, takes on more of an ideological focus.

According to Doem (1974), instrument choice in Canada is ultimately determined by political calculations based not on incentives such as electoral advantage, but rather by an ideological preference. Assuming that all instruments are ‘substitutable’, this conception argues that in liberal democratic societies, governments prefer to use the least coercive instruments available and move ‘up the scale’ as necessary. Based on a continuum, the least coercive means to address a social problem
would be to either initiate a study, or to reorganize a unit of government, while the most coercive would be a form of direct regulation. The explanation given is that in liberal democracies such as Canada, there is a strong aversion to state control especially since power is decentralized, and this is reflected in instrument choices (Doem, 1974). Discussions on public administration decisions that focus on ideological preferences, such as Doem’s (1974) study, are quite prevalent in policy literature.

In his book Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, Welch (2005) explores individual-level explanations for how elites make foreign policy decisions, including psychological determinants, and argues that the default position is typically one of policy inertia. According to his analysis, elites decide to change policies only in order to avoid actual or impending losses, rather than to achieve gains; significant policy change is articulated in the “language of gains, losses, benefits, successes, failures, constraints, and opportunities” (Welch, 2005, p. 226). For example, when Prime Minister Mulroney’s government decided to establish Canada-US free trade arrangements in the 1980s, for example, although Brian Mulroney was not inclined to take risks, free trade was framed as a way to avoid the loss of secure market access rather than improving Canadian competitiveness.

In The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making, Surel (2000) argues that decisions “[match] certain normative and practical imperatives laid out by the previous elements” (p. 498). These include political, legal, ethical, programmatic, social and economic factors, operating both in domestic and global dimensions (see also Eliadis et al, 2005). By considering the role of these external factors, Surel (2000)
brings to light arguments that question the neutrality of decision makers in public policy through normative and cognitive frames.

Normative and cognitive frames serve as boundaries within which individuals in groups, organizations, and subsystems act. They provide different worldviews for understanding decision-making, and include “mechanisms of identity formation, principles of action, as well as methodological prescriptions and practices for actors subscribing to the same frame” (Surel, 2000, p. 496). Allison (1969, 1999) acknowledges that policy actors rely on different points of reference that affect their self-consciousness, causing them to frame a public problem in one way rather than another. These ‘informal institutions’ include variables such as knowledge, ideas and learning, and have been found to affect decision-making processes (Jann & Weigrich, 2007; Schmidt, 2010). What a cognitive approach shows then is the explanatory power of ideas, and the important role that institutional and contextual settings have on decision-making.

This brief survey of literature on decision-making highlights the complexity of public policy decision-making. While different studies and approaches grapple with the complexity of the decision-making processes, when analysis is focused on any one particular variable, other important decision-making determinants are dismissed. In order to address this complexity, this dissertation advocates a multi-level analytic framework, rooted in new institutionalism, to guide data analysis. This is discussed in the chapter dealing with the Theoretical Framework.
Focusing more directly on the subject matter of this study, the following section reviews literature that addresses the motivations and trends in international aid efforts. It begins by differentiating between humanitarian and development initiatives.

2.3. Aid Patterns: Theories and Observations

By asking what explains the varied scope and configuration of disaster-relief offered by Canada in response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan, this dissertation falls amongst those studies that explore aid patterns, both theoretically and through observations of donor behaviours. This section begins by differentiating between humanitarian and development assistance, and then provides a commentary on literature in the field, including on Canada’s aid efforts in particular. Given that the primary occupation of this dissertation is on bureaucratic processes, this review shows that most literature provides macro-level explanations for aid patterns, inevitably underemphasizing those issues that a public administration perspective considers germane for effectively understanding how government decisions are made.

Humanitarian and development assistance exist on a continuum. In general, humanitarian assistance is designed to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The focus is more short-term and in response to concerns a specific occurrence, and is often used synonymously with disaster-relief (Zhang et al, 2002). Development aid, on the other hand, has a longer-term focus and is aimed at responding to ongoing structural issues that may hinder economic, political and social development. As will be discussed,
although development is independent of humanitarian assistance, it does form part of the disaster management cycle.

A natural disaster is a major adverse event resulting from environmental processes of the Earth, including meteorological and geological effects. These processes are referred to as hazards in and of themselves, and are generally classified as natural disasters only when they impact human populations. Their impact is dependent on the degree of vulnerability of the affected area, as well as the type of natural disaster (Enarson et al, 2003). There is, however, a clear distinction between sudden and slow-onset natural disasters. Examples of sudden-onset natural disasters include earthquakes, hurricanes and tsunamis, while slow-onset disasters constitute processes such as climate change, almost all major flooding incidents and drought. Unlike sudden-onset calamities, slow-onset disasters do not have a clearly identifiable start-time; have resulting impacts that evolve slowly; do not have an identifiable low-point after which the worst is over; and usually expand to areas outside of where they are first revealed (Zamani et al, 2006). Slow-onset disasters have typically been found

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6 The most widely accepted understanding of disaster-relief, known as Comprehensive Emergency Management, consists of four phases: preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation (National Governors Association, 1978). Preparedness focuses on understanding how a disaster might impact the community and how education, outreach and training can build capacity to respond to and recover from a disaster. Response refers to addressing the immediate threats presented by a disaster event, including saving lives, meeting humanitarian needs (food, shelter, clothing, public health and safety), cleanup, damage assessment, and the start of resource distribution. Recovery refers to the restoration of all aspects of the disaster’s impact on a community and the return of the local economy to some sense of normalcy. It consists of two periods, the short-term (six-months to one year), where the focus is on providing immediate services to the disaster-affected communities, and the long-term (which can go up to decades) aimed at addressing the more serious or permanent impacts of a disaster. This stage also corresponds to longer-term development aid. Some Disaster Recovery Models are conceptualized as having four stages: 1) Emergency Period; 2) Restoration Period; 3) Replacement/Reconstruction Period; and 4) Commemorative, Betterment and Developmental Reconstruction Period (Haas, Kates & Bowden, 1977). Finally, the mitigation phase of Comprehensive Emergency Management involves steps to reduce vulnerability to disaster impacts such as injuries and loss of life and property.
to be more extensive in their impact, and more destructive in the long term than the sudden-onset events such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Pelling et al, 2002).

International Relations theory explains motivations of development cooperation through a continuum between realism and idealism. In the realist perspective, decisions taken by governments prioritize the needs of the donor country, with little room for value-considerations (Tisch & Wallace, 1994). Aid giving is then very much a political decision shaped by objectives such as strategic geo-political factors and economic and security goals, amongst others. Decisions taken are not governed by a desire to meet the needs of the most affected or underprivileged, but rather to ensure that interests of donor countries are maintained as the highest priority (Opeskin, 1996). While motivations for Canada’s foreign aid policies have varied historically, Brown (2011) attributes Canada’s contemporary development assistance to realist interests, including a preoccupation with prestige and the government’s commercial self-interest.

Contrarily, in idealism, decisions taken reflect moral and ethical tendencies, shifting the motivation behind aid towards conceptions of equality, humanity and justice (Opeskin, 1996). It is recognized and expected that rich states have a moral obligation to assist poor states, or their inhabitants, by transferring resources to them. Values regarding the social welfare and human needs of recipient populations arguably drive aid policies (Pankaj, 2005). In idealism, the political conditionality that is imposed on development aid is of secondary importance. Scholars on Canada’s foreign aid policies have noted that over time, Canada’s aid objectives have been moving away from *humane internationalism* – more altruistic provision of aid where priority is the
interest of those for whom the aid is intended - towards internationalism realism, where domestic gains, be they diplomatic, trade or security related, form the priority for aid intervention (Pratt, 2007). As elaborated on in this section, alternate explanations have also been provided to account for aid.

Moving beyond attributing aid-patterns simply to broad ideological trends, some studies have emphasized the importance of context in helping understand why certain policy decisions are taken. When the international community is looked at holistically, donor countries have been found to bandwagon on the disaster-relief actions of major donors (Fink & Radaelli, 2011). In a comprehensive study of humanitarian assistance allocation, Fink & Redaelli (2011) analyzed the determinants of international emergency support by studying aid disbursements made by OECD donor countries for over 270 rapid-onset calamities between 1994-2004. They found that political and strategic factors play a crucial role in the allocation of emergency aid, such that smaller, geographically closer, and oil-exporting countries are provided with more aid. It was found that affordability, past policy decisions, and bilateral relationships with recipient countries also affect the policy options which were considered (Pratt, 2000). Olsen et al (2003) found that the scale of emergency assistance that a humanitarian crisis attracts is determined primarily by the degree of political interest that donor governments have in that particular region, as judged from a security perspective, and the strength of humanitarian non-governmental and other international organizations present in the disaster-affected country at the time of onset. Where political interest and international development networks are stronger, they argue more aid is provided.

Using DAC data on bilateral aid flows, Alesina and Dollar (2000) show that
colonial past and voting patterns in the United Nations play more of a role in determining aid allocation by donors than the state of the economy or political institutions in recipient countries. This, they argue, is part of the reason that foreign aid has only been partially effective at promoting growth and reducing poverty. When considering determinants of American humanitarian aid decisions, Drury et al (2005) conclude that foreign policy and domestic considerations strongly influence allocations of military and economic development assistance. In particular, they conducted their study by analyzing U.S. foreign disaster assistance data from 1964 through 1995, and identified the following determining factors: i) U.S. foreign policy concerns or reservations about the potential recipient state; ii) domestic U.S. political concerns on budget deficits, the salience of the disaster, and disasters affecting the US; and, iii) domestic politics within the potential recipient state, as affecting aid disbursements. This study argued that intensity of media coverage was not necessarily a determinative factor for humanitarian aid provision or allocation. As described below, however, this is not a majority opinion.

With respect to actual composition of aid for post-disaster assistance, it has been found that the choice of the channel - be it bilateral or multi-lateral, and the type of assistance - such as cash or in-kind, is mainly determined by humanitarian aspects, strategic interests and institutional quality (Raschky & Schwindt, 2012). Disasters that are more severe and have caused more harm are likely to receive higher amounts of emergency aid (Fuchs & Klann, 2012). This allocation of aid based on humanitarian need is dependent on public awareness of the disaster. International natural disasters of great magnitude reach the agenda primarily through media propagation of news and
symbols of the event (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Referred to by some as the ‘CNN-effect’, media (particularly television) can arguably influence the foreign policy agendas of western governments (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Olsen et al, 2003; Robinson, 2002). Foreign aid disbursements have been attributed to the extent and nature of media coverage (Olsen et al, 2003), with publicized humanitarian disasters attracting more aid than political unrest in Canada specifically (Rioux, 2006; see also Martin, 2005). Some further studies also show that the type of a natural disaster affects the amount of coverage it receives.

The International Red Cross notes “sudden dramatic disasters like volcanoes or tsunamis are intensely newsworthy, whereas long drawn-out crises (difficult to describe, let alone film) are not” (IFRC, 2005). The difference in images of human suffering and infrastructure destruction caused by such disasters is said to contribute to the variable news coverage, and results in differing levels of attention paid to the problems by the public and officials. Some contend that this results in an over-financing of sudden-onset disasters, in contrast to under-financing of slow-onset disasters (Van Wassenhove, 2006).

A number of studies have specifically researched Canadian humanitarian aid trends. Macdonald and Hoddinott (2004) conducted a study to examine determinants of bilateral aid allocations in Canada from 1984-2000. In comparing the ‘trinity of mixed motives’ namely humanitarian, commercial and political considerations (Spicer, 1966), Macdonald and Hoddinott (2004) suggest that Canadian aid allocation is moderately altruistic, with increasing funds being based on commercial interests over time. They also argue that Canada provides more aid to recipient countries with better
human rights records and membership in the British Commonwealth or the Organisation International de la Francophonie (OIF) (Macdonald & Hoddinott, 2004). Rioux (2006) propounds that OIF membership is more determinative of Canadian aid allocation than military alliances. And, Nossal (1988) includes bureaucratic interests and budget constraints to the list of determinants guiding Canada’s development assistance program.

Several scholars claim that since the events of September 11, 2001, Canada has exhibited a trend towards funding development programming in failed and fragile states, with a shift towards the securitization of peacebuilding (Brown, 2012; Jacquet, 2002; Marclay, 2008). There is an assumption that failed and/or fragile states often serve as hubs for international insecurity, lack control over their own territories and are unable to adequately meet the needs of their citizens on their own (Brown, 2012). As such, increasing military involvement in stabilization and reconstruction projects in failed and fragile states is efficient from a development perspective. Baranyi and Paducel (2012) show, however, that the focus on security in failed and fragile states varies according to context, with Canadian engagement in Afghanistan having more military focus than the more development-heavy engagement in Haiti and Sudan.

While these explanations of aid trends are valuable in their own right, there is a lack of focus in this literature on understanding aid decisions through a focus on administrative processes and individual action. International aid efforts require coordination amongst a number of entities, making the dynamics of collaboration extremely relevant for understanding the actions of donor countries. The following section explains the importance of coordination in multilateral disaster-relief
initiatives, and presents academic research that discusses the role of individual actors in international development efforts and presents academic research that discusses the role of individual actors in international development efforts.

2.4. Coordination in Disaster Research

Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of United Nations, said about the challenges of disaster responses and disaster risk reduction, “the more governments, UN agencies, organizations, businesses and civil society understand risk and vulnerability, the better equipped they will be to mitigate disasters when they strike and save more lives” (UNISDR, 2011). In other words, the level of preparedness is a key factor in mobilizing and coordination efforts. Catastrophic natural disasters often leave affected governments with no choice but to declare a state of emergency, and to request international assistance for relief and reconstruction. In these cases, a multitude of actors, including local and regional players; bilateral donors; international agencies; non-governmental organizations; and concerned global citizens, seek to provide extensive relief-assistance to the affected region (Comfort 2007).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) is tasked with coordinating this outpouring of support, and for ensuring that the cooperative efforts amongst responding parties work towards meeting common goals in the aftermath of the disaster (UN-OCHA 2013). These are usually organized through a cluster system. Designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), clusters are composed of UN and non-UN organizations involved in the main sectors of
humanitarian action, including Water, Sanitation and Hygiene; Shelter; Health; and Logistics. Clusters are used for planning, coordination and execution of humanitarian assistance (for more details see OCHA, n.d.). Furthermore, OCHA triggers flash appeals within one week of an emergency, providing an overview of urgent life-saving needs and recovery projects that can be implemented within the first 3-6 months of the disaster. The cluster approach is activated in response to most major natural disasters in developing countries.

Given the practical nature of disaster-relief, most theories in the field are normative, designed to be helpful to emergency managers when it comes to the practice of their profession and making informed decisions (see for instance Lindell & Perry, 1992 and Drabek, 2004). Stallings (2006) notes that disaster research has been characterized by inductive field studies where researchers travel to the site of a reported disaster to observe behavior and conduct personal interviews. While the focus of many of these studies is on informing emergency managers when facing a disaster in their own locality (see for instance Oh, 2012; Waugh & Streib, 2006) or region (see for instance Lai, 2012; Schreurs, 2010), this dissertation takes interest in and examines mechanisms and literature concerning decision-making and coordination of international development and humanitarian efforts.

International development represents “the most prominent context within which collaboration has occurred since the nineteenth century” (McGuire, 2006, p. 34). In the context of international disaster responses, functional division is often blurred as national and international actors must act as a single network without necessarily having controlling or subordinating relations (Drabek & McEntire, 2003). Rather,
interactions in the international disaster response system depend on voluntary partnership and participation (Peters, 2002); and Oh et al (2014) discuss the brokerage role of international agencies in facilitating collaboration and coordination between regional entities. Over the last century, Korea, Japan, and China have traditionally been unable to collaborate due to deep-rooted rivalries and distrust arising from previous and ongoing conflicts and competitions. Oh et al (2014) assessed whether international agencies were able to act as brokers in facilitating collaboration between these countries during the 2011 Japan disasters. Their findings suggest that international actors were unsuccessful in acting as effective brokers. Another approach to discussing the role and effectiveness of international actors engaged in humanitarian and development initiatives is found in literature on actorness.

Actorness gained prominence as a concept in academic circles in the European Union (EU) in the 90s as a way to conceptualize the EU’s role in global affairs. Historically, international actors have been linked to concepts of the state, nation and realpolitik, which made it difficult to account for the role of the EU as a unique player in the world. In their recent study, Brattberg and Rhinard (2013) explore the link between actorness and effectiveness using four indicators for their assessment: 1) Context, whereby an entity is recognized as a legitimate actor by counterparts in the international system; 2) Coherence, referring to an actor’s ability to aggregate values, preferences, institutional procedures and policies in its efforts; 3) Capability, encompassing variables such as the availability and ability to mobilize instruments, mechanisms and resources; and finally 4) Consistency, where an actor is assessed for its ability to carry out agreed policies in practice, including coordination. They apply this
framework in assessing the effectiveness of the EU and the United States as two entities that played a significant role in the disaster-relief efforts in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

During the response to the earthquake in Haiti, a number of donor countries sent in military troops to assist in the relief efforts. The military, quite noticeably, is increasingly being deployed to help during natural disasters in developing countries. The military provides airlifts, distributes supplies, does peacekeeping, and protects civilians in the affected countries. Natural disasters often cripple local law enforcement capabilities, and restoring law and order becomes part of the disaster response of donor countries. Medical teams also provide immediate care to affected individuals. This requires cooperation of civil and military operations. Brattberg and Sundelius (2011) explain that efficient leadership, interdepartmental coordination and cooperation between civil entities and the army, are the three key factors governing international disaster response. These factors involve multi-level interdepartmental communication for planning and execution, but have been found to lead to organizational overstretch, pressure on scarce resources, confusing chain of command, unclear reporting lines, and duplication of efforts (Wheeler & Harmer, 2006). Writing about responses to natural disasters that require military assistance, Suparamaniam and Dekker (2003) attribute coordination difficulties to a separation of knowledge and authority in international disaster relief work.

The military command-and-control model (see Dynes, 1989) is the way most disaster-relief is traditionally conceived (Suparamaniam and Dekker, 2003). Given that disaster-relief work involves spending state budgets, bolstering national reputations,
making political statements and investing in diplomatic capital, there are high-level constraints on decision-making, and these in turn lead to the centralization of the deliberative process (see also Mintzberg, 1979). While those on the ground are sometimes the most knowledgeable about how to respond to the crises at hand, they are often restricted in their actions. This amounts to a separation of authority and knowledge in disaster relief work, thus creating tension and imbalance, and making the coordination of international disaster-relief efforts difficult.

Suparamaniam and Dekker (2003) show, however, that this separation of authority and knowledge does not entirely hamper disaster-relief. Over time, there is a renegotiation of authority by necessity, whereupon those on the ground take action given their presence in the locality; are able to create informal networks to conduct their work; and utilise their relevant expertise in the provision of disaster-relief. This, they argue, makes international coordination difficult, because, “it can come down to the renegotiation of the very things that members higher up in the organizational hierarchies hold dear: reputations, political interests, and financial commitments” (Suparamaniam & Dekker, 2003, p. 317). The acknowledgment of this paradox of power and knowledge highlights the importance of understanding the role of individual actors involved in disaster-relief efforts.

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Based on this review, aid-patterns in international relations and development literature are often associated with broad philosophical perspectives and historical trends. Other studies augment this ‘bigger-picture’ focus, attributing aid-patterns to
contextual factors, key people in decision-making positions, and media coverage. While these provide insight on patterns of donor-assistance from a macro-perspective, they do not describe micro-level processes at work within a donor-country’s administration. While disaster research does delve into issues of international coordination, in these studies individual actors are often treated as single homogenous units, without much detail of their individual make-up or the processes that dictate internal decision-making. This applies to literature on brokering and actorness discussed in this review: the focus is on inter-agency coordination, without much attention to intra-agency dynamics. Even in research where individual international actors are the subject of focus, there is generally a lack of attention to detail.

Brattberg and Sundelis (2011) set out to analyze US and EU involvement in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In their analysis, they make statements such as “The U.S. government immediately set up an interagency task force to coordinate and facilitate humanitarian response through the Response Management Team (RMT), headed by USAID and carried out by OFDA (The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance)” (Brattberg & Sundelis, 2011, p. 368). What is not explicated, however, is the dynamic between the different actors making up this interagency task force. This lack of detailed study of individual actors, specifically those that are part of the bureaucracy, is limited even in literature on Canada’s foreign policy.

For example, in part two of Nossal, Rouseel and Paquin’s (2011) book International Policy and Politics in Canada, the authors analyze the historical dynamics of government machinery, where the main actors, identified as the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, the bureaucracy and parliament, are involved in the implementation
of Canada’s foreign policies. The chapters offer a historical commentary on the relative power of each of these entities in significant moments of Canadian history. Similarly, Rempel (2002) describes the foreign policy-making process by illustrating the changing role of the House of Commons and the decline over time in the Parliament’s influence on Canadian foreign and security policy.

Hynek and Bosold (2010) recognize that “The policy-making process is indeed a critical aspect of on CanFSP [Canada’s Foreign and Security Policy]...[and] that the rather crude and technocratic way of presenting the foreign policy process as a linear organizational chart, which has been the case in the past, is nowadays no longer appropriate” (p. xvii). Likewise, referring to what she terms as the concealed perspective of internationalism, and referencing the works of Sylvester (1996) and Enloe (1996; 2004), Smith writes:

I believe that we need to consider incorporating everyday practice into our understanding of Canada and the world. We need to look beyond statements and speeches by diplomats and prime ministers. We need to step away from the abstracts that we create in our constructions of Canada where we anthropomorphize the state but simultaneously neuter our analysis of emotional content. Who are the people affected by our policies and actions? What are the voices that we don’t hear when we spend all of our time dissecting the speeches of the prime minister or minister of foreign affairs (Smith, 2013, p. 205).

While Smith uses this argument to assess the impact on citizens, through the country’s actor-centered approach, this dissertation assesses the implementation of the Whole-of-Government framework by listening to the bureaucratic actors involved in the policy process. Rather than dismiss the state perspective though, as will be elaborated on in the following chapter, a multi-level framework is used to augment the insight provided by a state-centric approach with that of the human dimension.
In fact, in the concluding chapter of an edited volume entitled *Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid*, Brown and Raddatz (2012) state that it would have “been useful to include contribution from an expert in Canadian public policy to discuss interdepartmental relations in Ottawa and clarify how, where, and by whom decisions affecting Canada’s foreign aid are made” (p. 342). The authors also highlight the fact that the volume does not include chapters that discuss Canada’s humanitarian assistance, and that this is an area for further research. This dissertation aims to and is well-placed to fill these gaps.

Recognizing Canada’s role as a donor country in international disaster-relief initiatives, this research makes a unique empirical contribution to disaster literature through the two case studies it explores – namely the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and flooding in Pakistan. Its focus on interdepartmental dynamics also fills an identified gap in disaster literature. Even in research where individual international actors are the subjects of focus, this literature review has shown that there is generally a lack of attention to intra-agency dynamics. Furthermore, in recognizing the plurality of ways in which government decision-making has been discussed in the literature, a unique contribution of this research is the development of a theoretical framework that will aid in the exploration of implementation of the Whole-of-Government framework from multiple dimensions. This theoretical framework is developed in the following chapter. As will be shown, the framework lends itself to a methodology that will enable holistic, multi-level understanding of Canada’s responses to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan.
Chapter 3.0. Theoretical Framework

The primary research question seeks to understand what shaped the scope and configuration of disaster-relief offered by Canada in response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan. Based on the survey of decision-making literature offered in the Literature Review, there are a number of angles that can be taken to understand government decision-making. In order to gain a broad, holistic perspective towards the policy problem, a theoretical framework with multiple levels of analyses has been developed to guide this research study. The framework will augment the primarily macro-level focus of literature on determinants of development and humanitarian decisions, exploring the role of media in shaping aid efforts, and facilitating a public administration analysis through its actor-centred approach to understanding decision-making processes in implementation.

Multi-level and multi-perspective analysis to understanding decision-making has been encouraged by public administration scholars over time. Allison (1969) argued that rather than focus on his decision-making models as three separate conceptual lenses to look at the same phenomenon, researchers should be encouraged to mix characteristics of the three models together. Post-positivist approaches in the social sciences value multiplicity and complexity as hallmarks of humanity, leading to an emphasis on seeing the experience as “multiple, relational and not bounded by reason” (Henriques et al, 1998, xviii, quoted in Ryan, 2006).

In this vein, the theoretical framework is constructed by integrating different theories and lines of investigation, and its overall coherence is something that is
“[built], not something that exists ready-made” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 35). It recognizes the role of structure, context and agency in affecting decision-making. Canada’s disaster-relief decisions are explored through three perspectives and levels of analysis, namely macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-foundational (see Figure 3.1). For a macro-institutional perspective, it applies a historical institutional lens. In the meso-contextual level, it recognizes the impact of case-specific details and arenas on decision-making outcomes. And from a micro-foundational perspective, the role of agency is understood through the application of the logic of appropriateness. Exploration at each level helps explain the magnitude and scope of disaster-relief offered by Canada by explicating decision-making determinants.

**Figure 3.1: Levels of Analysis**

In articulating this theoretical framework, the chapter provides a review of literature on institutionalism; describes the understanding of the policy process that is assumed
in this study; as well as makes a distinction between the different players implicated by the Whole-of-Government Framework.

3.1. Macro-Institutional Analysis

Literature on institutionalism acknowledges the role of both informal and formal organizational arrangements in affecting behavior and stabilizing expectations. Institutions create actors and meeting places, organize relations and interactions amongst them, and link identities to prescriptive rules and practices (March & Olsen, 2004). Institutions are able to empower and constrain actors differently through the allocation of resources, and they dictate which rationality has primacy in particular situations (MacIntyre, 1988). Institutional analysis also explores the development and impact of distinct political rules, practices and procedures (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Replacing the behavioural perspectives of institutional research in the 1960s and 1970s, Hall & Taylor identified three main schools of thought in new institutional literature, namely historical institutionalism, rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, later augmented by a fourth introduced variant, discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2006). Historical institutionalism is concerned with explaining the structuring capabilities of the state as a result of past large-scale institutional trends and decisions (Hall & Taylor, 1996), and is used primarily to describe major changes over time (Schmidt, 2002). It recognizes that it is the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in institutions that influence and shape the behaviour of different political actors, the decisions taken, and the outcomes that result. Given that institutions within the state represent earlier
compromises between actors of uneven power, scholars of historical institutionalism argue that political institutions create constraints and opportunities for those involved in policy-making (Graefe, 2007; Lowi, 1969). Inherent in a historical institutionalism understanding is the idea that “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, pp. 262-263). Known as path-dependency, the idea is that one cannot understand the significance of a particular social variable without understanding how it got there, or the path that it took: there is continuity in the policy process (Pierson, 2000). And, where change is observed, there is a critical juncture from which the outcome can be traced.

While historical institutionalists have devoted more attention to explaining macro-political outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996), such that it is an apt method for measuring “big structures, large processes, and [making] huge comparisons” (Tilly, 1984), there is a more agent-centred perspective that cannot be neglected. Olsen explains that, “the challenge is to provide better understanding of the processes that translate institutionalized rules into political action and consequences, and of the processes that translate human action into rules and institutions” (2007, p. 4, emphasis added). While historical institutionalism has stronger explanatory power in lending insight into “history-making” decisions (Garrett 1992, p. 557), especially through its focus on path dependency, it falls short of being able to answer the question "how do institutions relate to individual action?" (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Focusing more specifically on internalized rules and practices, identities and roles, and on normative
and causal beliefs, rational and sociological variants of institutionalism provide a bridge to micro-foundational focus on human agency (e.g., Hall & Taylor, 1996, Thelen, 1999)7.

Borrowing from group theories and structural functionalism, in rational institutionalism the institution is considered to be a force that structures the collective behaviour of actors in collaborative settings (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Due to the uneven power distribution caused by political and economic structures, some interests are privileged over others, requiring actors to use these institutional arrangements to maximize utility based on their fixed preferences. The conflict among rival groups for scarce resources that results from these institutional structures forms the heart of politics, and is the basis of analysis in rational variants of institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lowi, 1969). On the contrary, in sociological institutionalism, social and political action is explained through a cultural approach that emphasizes the role of normative and cognitive frames, and meaning systems, in defining appropriate action (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scott, 2001). Rather than individual choice, decision-making is based on collective constructions that affect interpretations, identities, and self-image (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Sociological institutionalism aims to study the emergence, diffusion and transformation of these institutional arrangements, and explores their effect on conceptions of self-interest. Both sociological and rational institutionalism provide a line of analysis in which actors have a role in both producing and reproducing

7 Thelen (1999) compares rational and historical institutionalism in her paper “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”. She address the common distinction made between the macro-institutional focus of historical institutionalism, and the micro-foundational focus of rational choice institutionalism. While she recognizes this distinction, Thelen notes, “there has been much work within rational choice that, like historical institutionalism, embraces a non-functionalist, more historical view of institutions” (Thelen, 1999, p. 379). Given the empirical question being addressed in this study, however, the distinction between the micro-foundational focus on agents found in rational, sociological, and discursive institutionalist perspectives, as compared to the macro-institutional view of historical institutionalism, will remain.
in institutional structures because they account for “the inherent multiplicity or ambiguity of identities, the impact that discursive interaction can have on these identities or the preference functions associated with them, and the scope of the negotiation that takes place between agents and the institutions within which they act” (Hall & Taylor, 1998, p. 960).

Despite the existence of variants of new institutionalism, the superiority of historical institutionalism has been argued. Hay & Wincott (1998) explain that rational and sociological institutionalisms are overly structuralist, and that this is corrected by the calculus and cultural approaches to decision-making articulated in historical institutionalism. The calculus approach assumes that humans will behave strategically to maximize goal-attainment, and the cultural approach assumes that individual behaviour is described as being constrained by their worldview rather than by strategic calculation (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Jenson & Merand (2010) contend that there is potential in historical institutionalism to understand how the interaction of individuals affects the outcomes that ensue by considering the character of discursive processes. Historical institutionalists, they explain, believe that the preferences of individuals are multifaceted or ambiguous, and can be conditioned by active processes of discussion or contestation. In light of this, the theoretical framework applies a historical institutionalist lens to understand the 2010 disaster-relief decisions from a macro-perspective. Historical institutionalism highlights broad issues at play and focuses on explanatory variables that over time remain relatively stable. This includes an exploration into the factors that led to the emergence of the Whole-of-Government
Framework and considers the historical ties that Canada has with both Haiti and Pakistan.

The framework, however, also benefits from the explanatory power of sociological institutionalism for understanding agency, as it applies the logic of appropriateness framework at the micro-foundational level. Given the complementary nature of historical, rational, and sociological institutionalism, scholars conducting institutionalist research borrow thinking from other institutionalisms, or an amalgam of one another (Hall & Taylor, 1998). Hall & Taylor (1998) themselves encouraged the integration of insights from all new institutionalisms, explaining that from a theoretical perspective, each variant is interrelated with one another. Schmidt (2006, 2008) argues that discursive institutionalism - which argues that ideas, as communicated through the discursive interactions of different actors in the policy process, are useful in understanding the mechanisms of institutional emergence, survival, and reform - is complementary to all three previous of the new institutionalism approaches when the findings of historical, rational and sociological institutionalism are taken into account as background information. There have also been studies in which a cultural approach is applied to rational choice applications (Ostrom, 1998; Fligstein, 1996) and likewise, examples where scholars in the sociological tradition have benefitted from rational choice analysis (Fligstein, 1997). Given the differing foci when new institutionalisms are compared one against the other, the theoretical framework benefits from the strength of different perspectives at different levels of analysis.
3.2. Meso-Contextual Analysis

Policy actors in Canada were implementing the Whole-of-Government Framework during the 2010 relief interventions in Haiti and Pakistan. Meso-contextual analysis is aimed at explicating the case-specific details that shaped the implementation process. To truly appreciate the added value of this level of analysis, the conception of the policy process adopted in this dissertation must be understood.

One of the foundational frameworks for understanding the policy process in public administration literature is the stages approach (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Sabatier, 2007). Also referred to as the linear or sequential model, it was first introduced by Harold Laswell (1956) when he described the ideal-type of rational planning and decision-making (see also Brewer & de Leon, 1983). The approach understands public policy as comprising a series of stages that follow one another in a linear, rational and sequential fashion. The typical progression is from problem definition and agenda-setting, to policy formation and policy choice, and finally to implementation and evaluation (see Figure 3.2 for graphic representation).

**Figure 3.2. The Linear Policy Process**

When used in policy analysis, this approach can help researchers outline the development, application and execution of public policies.

Despite its popularity, the stages approach faces a number of criticisms. In light of analytical models such as the Cohen *et al*'s (1972) garbage-can, or Kingdon's (2003) analysis into windows of opportunity, the rationalistic division of stages in policy
processes is argued to be idealistic and not reflective of reality (Nakamura, 1987; Sabatier, 1991). The clear-cut separation between policy formation and implementation, for example, is arguably flawed since both stages are able to occur simultaneously, and often it is the implementation of one policy that gives rise to the formation of an additional policy (Jann & Weigrich, 2007). Nonetheless, it is precisely the division of policy processes into discrete and manageable phases that gives the stages approach its pertinence in the study of public administration. By describing the policy process as both rational and sequential, it serves as a heuristic tool to systemize what is most arguably a complicated process, and for organizing growing development in policy studies (Sabatier, 1991).

There is a general consensus amongst public administration scholars that implementation “develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (O’Toole, 2000, p. 266). It is described as occurring between policy choice and the (perceived) policy results (Ferman, 1990), and is followed by policy evaluation. The implementation stage has been disaggregated into the following broad steps: problem definition > policy output > execution (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). Hansenfled & Brock (1991) developed their taxonomy of implementation by conducting a thorough review of literature, and concluded that there is a policymaking stage in implementation which consists of: i) the framing of a problem or issue; ii) identifying possible solutions; iii) making an authoritative choice.

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8 The garbage-can model explains organizational decision-making from a systemic anarchic perspective. In the garbage-can model, decision-making is accidental and is the product of problems and solutions that get associated randomly (Cohen et al, 1972).
from these alternatives; and iv) specification of policy instruments\(^9\) (p. 466). Sabatier & Mazmanian (1980) and Hansenfled & Brock (1991) are the inspiration and sources for the implementation process applied in this study (see Figure 3.3).

Problem definition is one of the most determinative steps of the policy process (Bardach, 1996; Deleon, 1994; Dery, 2000; Sabatier, 1980). While it is among the first steps of the policy process in the linear model, it also applies to the implementation process. This study refers to ‘case-specific problem definition’ as the initial step of the implementation process. Deleon (1994) explains that the problem definition stage “frames and generates virtually everything that follows in the policy process” and that “our failures to examine problem definition sentence us to operate through a glass darkly” (p. 89).

**Figure 3.3. Moments in Implementation of the Whole-of-Government Framework**

\(^9\) ‘Policy instruments’ is a generic term that refers to the techniques available for governments to implement their public policy objectives. When public policy makers implement a policy, they must select a particular technique by which to obtain their policy goals, while directly responding to social, political, economic, and administrative concerns. The outcome of these deliberative efforts is the policy output. There is debate on whether instrument choice is actually part of the policy formulation or the policy implementation stage (Linder & Peters, 1989; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). Given that the Whole-of-Government Framework lists available policy instruments in what is known as Canada’s ‘toolbox’ of intervention options, in this dissertation instrument choice is considered to be part of the implementation process.
Literature on problem definition and agenda-setting explore pre-decision policymaking techniques that result in some public issues and policy alternatives gaining relatively more governmental attention than others (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Dery, 1984, 2000; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Kingdon, 2003; Stone, 2002). Despite the multitude of social problems that exist in the world, only a small fraction become prominent and form the dominant topic of political and social discourse (Stone, 1989, 2002). A theory that views social problems as mere reflections of objective conditions cannot explain why some conditions are defined as problems that command a great deal of societal attention, whereas others, equally harmful or dangerous, are not (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Problem definition encompasses the causes, components and consequences of the issue at hand (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). Based on problem definition, policy actors may agree or disagree as to the perceived necessity of response (Hart et al, 1993). Some events appear on the agenda almost immediately, and are referred to as focusing events.\(^{10}\)

Focusing-events are defined as sudden and relatively uncommon occurrences, with a great potential for harm (Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Schneider, 1995). They require almost immediate mobilization and problem-solving in order to address issues that arise as a result. Kingdon (2003) argues that focusing events facilitate the opening of windows of opportunity through the coupling of problem, policy and process streams. Generally, both policy makers and the public learn of focusing events virtually simultaneously. The extent of focusing events is understood by considering

\(^{10}\) Since some focusing events receive more attention than others (see Cobb & Elder, 1983), Birkland (1997) prefers to use the term 'potential' focusing event, highlighting the fact that a focusing event is variable along a range of possible attributes. Events that may cause greater harm as a byproduct, that affect a large number of people, or that may cause interest groups and policy entrepreneurs to take action, are only potential focusing events until they gain focal attention.
the ‘arenas’ where social problem definition evolves. Arenas are the ‘environments’ where social problems compete for attention and grow, and where their success (or size, or scope) is measured by the amount of attention devoted to them (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Different arenas have different carrying capacities, each of which can be indexed by various measures\textsuperscript{11}. Arenas include amongst others, the executive and legislative branches of government, the news media, political campaign organizations, social action groups, the public arena, and direct mail solicitations.

Representation of the focusing event through media outlets affects policy decisions (Birkland & Lawerence, 2009). Framing theory, as used in media and communications studies, is based on the belief that the way in which an issue is characterized influences how an audience understands it (Chong & Druckman, 2007). It is the “selective exposure of information to an audience”, whereby particular attributes are emphasized and others are subdued (Soroka et al, 2013, p. 207). Framing techniques inevitably direct individuals to “focus on [certain] considerations when constructing their opinions,” causing them to dismiss others (Druckman, 2001, p. 1042). If individuals and the media define a situation as a crisis, it is crisis in its consequences (Birkland & Lawrence, 2009; Crelinsten, 1994). For example, Birkland (1997, 1998) explains that images of cleaning the Exxon spill were futile, since there was no way that the effects of the disaster could be changed by the cleaning efforts. The images, however, worked to ease public anger against the event.

\textsuperscript{11} For example, a carrying capacity index for newspapers and magazines could be column inches, while minutes of airtime could determine the same for television and radio news (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Carrying capacities exist not only at the institutional level, but also the individual level. Individuals have limited resources that they may allocate, such as time and money. They are also limited by the amount of compassion they are able to afford to different social issues.
In implementation, the way in which problems are defined greatly influences successive rounds of policy-making decisions (Stringer & Richardson, 1980; Weiss, 1989). Problem definition stipulates the objectives to be pursued; forms the contours of the resultant policy for addressing a given problem (McClain, 1993); and “in a variety of ways, ‘structures’ the implementation process” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983, p. 20). Problem definition has a bearing on which solutions are considered effective and feasible, who participates in the decision process, how policies are implemented, and by which criteria policies are assessed (Dery, 1984; Weiss, 1989).

To understand how implementation evolved in either case-study, meso-foundational analysis appreciates that the details specific to the actual events are important. Analysis includes exploration of problem-definition dynamics, administrative processes in operation at that time, and media coverage. Micro-foundational delves deeper into understanding how problem definition affects human action through the application of the logic of appropriateness framework, a variant of sociological institutionalism (March & Olsen, 1998).

### 3.3. Micro-Foundational Analysis

In *The Role of Knowledge in the Policy Process*, Radaelli (1995) conceives a ‘knowledge perspective’ to highlight the impact of knowledge on the policy process. Taking from literature on evaluation, epistemic communities, diffusion paradigms, agenda-setting and policy learning, he understands the policy process to be shaped by different types of knowledge and the power of the actors that posses that knowledge. In some cases, such as in the area of monetary policy, knowledge may be conceived as
information possessed by economic experts, but in other cases, such as when there are controversies, knowledge gains access into the policy process as an argument. This becomes particularly important in areas where there are barriers to objective conditions determining outputs, such as in humanitarian assistance.

In Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework for response to natural disasters abroad, there is a distinction made between the role of bureaucratic actors and political actors (see Figure 3.4 for researcher’s interpretation). At disaster onset, bureaucratic actors process accounts of developments in the affected region, conduct needs-assessment analyses, and consult with bilateral actors in order to develop recommendations for Canadian humanitarian assistance. These recommendations are then provided to Whole-of-Government Ministers (WoG Ministers)12 for discussion and final approval. Given that bureaucratic actors are required to process information from the disaster-affected region and partners, and to provide recommendations for Canadian intervention to WoG Ministers based on their technical expertise, the role of bureaucratic actors in the policy process is of particular concern in this dissertation.

12 In this dissertation, reference to Whole-of-Government Ministers, or WoG Ministers, refers to the Prime Minister and the relevant Ministers involved in Canada’s responses to natural disasters abroad, namely the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defence and Minister of International Cooperation.
The structure of the Whole-of-Government Framework reflects the politics/administration dichotomy, what is known as “the most vivid and well understood image of how things should work in government” (Aucoin & Savoie, 2009, p. 98). The taskforce is made of bureaucratic actors, which corresponds to the administrative arm of the dichotomy, and the political arm consists of the WoG Ministers. The dotted line between PCO and Political Actors in the diagram represents the advisory role of PCO; its representatives are permanent members of the taskforce.

The politics/administration dichotomy assumes that ministers, as the elected political executives, govern through policy as decision-makers, yet they rely on the expertise and nonpartisanship of the public service bureaucracy to conduct administration (Demir & Nayhan, 2008; Dobuzinskis, 1997; Hood, 2005; Weller, 2001). Public servants are to conduct activities and make decisions that are apolitical and void of any particular policy agenda. Through the concept of neutrality, administrator decisions are argued to be ethical choices embedded in a changing web of political and
bureaucratic constraints (Yang & Holzer, 2005). The politics/administration dichotomy also illustrates a division of labor and authority between elected and administrative officials through a policy/operations divide: politicians are the rulers, and the administrators are labourers (Jacobson, 2006). Given this divide, elected political actors have been considered to act as a filter for public service advice and research (Grube, 2013). According to some studies however, this is not always the case in practice.

Public value theory suggests that “rather than mere ciphers operating at the whim of political masters,” public servants actively negotiate and shepherd policy (Grube, 2013, p. 5; Moore, 1995). Democratic accountability is increased by the ‘frank and fearless’ resolve of public administrators (Weller, 2001; Riccucci, 2010). In fact, in Canada it has been argued that through public speeches, key bureaucratic leaders in Canada, particularly the Clerk of the Privy Council Office, have adopted an independent public face in a number of instances (Grube, 2013; Lindquist & Rasmussen, 2012). In Michaud’s (2002) study on decision-making in Canada’s defence policy, he shows that policy actors are found in concentric circles; they are able to exert particular influence from decision to decision according to their proximity to the policy at stake. Similar to the concept of ‘action channels’ by Allison (1969), these circles allow researchers to identify who, by virtue of their status, can propose a policy, amend it, and veto it.

Since bureaucratic actors are often the experts, understanding the role of bureaucratic actors as the possessors of knowledge becomes ever more important. Commenting on the role of the bureaucracy in international policy, Nossal et al (2011) states, “a bureaucracy’s functions include the provision of policy information and
advice to elected leaders, and therein lies a source of potent influence over the shaping of policy decisions” (p. 277). According to Nossal et al (2011), “Expertise, access to information, and the ability to draw on the accumulated organization ‘wisdom’ of the executive departments makes the bureaucracy an obvious source of advice for the minister who, having defined an end, must seek the means to achieve it” (p. 254). Thus, while civil servants may not make policy, they do have significant control in influencing policy. After all, their understanding and behaviour contributes to how a problem is defined in a specific case. At the micro-foundational level, through an actor-centred approach this dissertation studies the actions of bureaucratic actors as the gatekeepers of the Whole-of-Government Framework in order to make sense of the differential response. In particular, it applies the logic of appropriateness for understanding agency.

The logic of appropriateness is one of the most prominent and effective models for understanding human action due to its relevance and proven empirical applicability, and because it has been found to have greater explanatory power than expected utility models (Messick, 1999). The pursuit of purpose is associated with “identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 951). An individual’s logic of appropriateness bears on the way they perceive a problem that they are faced with, and consequently influences their actions moving forward. In their research on democratic citizenship, March & Simon (1993) explore ‘recognition’ to emphasize the cognitive process of pairing problem-solving action correctly to a problem situation. They argue that based on experience, expert knowledge and/or intuition, one matches identities, situations,
and behavioral rules, and forms an internalized prescription for what is the most suitable action in a specific circumstance.

In their theory of logic of appropriateness, March and Olsen (1989, 2004) highlight that human action is governed by institutional rules for what is proper behaviour for oneself, in any given time. How one acts is based on three aspects (Goldmann, 2005; March, 1994; March and Olsen, 1989, 2004):

1) What one may perceive to be the most suitable action in a specific circumstance (situational recognition)
2) How one understands their identity
3) Rules and norms that shape human behavior.

In other words, all actors seek to fulfill the obligations and duties encapsulated in all three aspects: a role, an identity, and membership in a community. Acting appropriately is to proceed according to the “institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understanding of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good” (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 4). Thus, “the more typical a new setting or experience is of an existing event prototype, the more likely it is to lead the perceiver to a confident conclusion regarding the nature of the situation,” (Weber et al, 2004, p. 282). Rules are followed because they are perceived to have normative validity and be adequate for the task at hand (Olsen, 2008); awareness of oneself contributes to the impact of an individual’s lived experiences in the policy process. This consciousness is a social construction that is further developed by interaction with other actors. When faced with a situation a person poses the following question to herself or himself: What kind of a situation is this? What kind of a person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this? (March & Olsen, 1989, 2004).
The logic of appropriateness, however, is only one perspective on human action. March & Olsen (2004) argue that the logic of appropriateness can be contrasted with preference-based consequential logic (or the logic of consequentialism) where actors calculate individual expected utility, such as career advancement. In this case, actors evaluate their alternatives in terms of consequences for their preferences based on rational choice. The logic of appropriateness is distinct from rational choice models precisely due to its emphasis on decision-making as a rule-driven exercise, such that utility maximization is considered to be only one of many possible decision rules that may apply in a given decision (Weber et al, 2004).

In this dissertation, these two types of logic are not assessed in relation to one another, since they arguably represent different outlooks (Goldmann, 2005). While they are not mutually exclusive, they are “sufficiently distinct to be viewed as separate explanatory devices” (March & Olsen, 1988, p. 952–953). Appropriateness and consequential frameworks are two ways of “telling stories about politics” (March and Olsen 1996, p. 248), and scholars conducting research using these logics conceive of politics as following one of these logics (Goldmann, 2005); a shift from one logic to the other is a shift in one’s research agenda since different topics for research are invited (March & Olsen, 1996). Especially in social dilemmas, the logic of appropriateness is suggested to have greater explanatory power than expected utility models (Messick, 1999; Weber et al, 2004). As an explicitly social model, it is able to account for behavior that occurs outside the conditions most favourable to rational choice models (Jones, 2002). Conditions for rational choice models have been found to be inaccurate descriptive models of human behavior that are not empirically sustainable.
While these behavioral mechanisms are encoded both by individuals and collectivities through individual inferences (March and Olsen, 2004), research has shown that rules of appropriateness are reflexive (Habermas, 1998). Informal structures evolve as lessons are learned through experience, and as individuals interact with others: rules of logic are not constructed or maintained by the individual alone, but rather are “both maintained and changed through contact with others and exposure to experiences and information” (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 13). Thus, in trying to understand the effects of informal structures on decision-making, there must be a focus on how individual decision-makers relate their role to other actors in the policy process due to socially defined role prototypes (March, 1994). This understanding is shared by discursive institutionalism as it takes into account the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse (Schmidt, 2008).

The logic of appropriateness is suitable for exploring the role of discursive interactions on problem definition and subsequent decision-making. From a policy coordination perspective, it has been found that common logics across organizations result in environments more conducive to coordination without a need for authority (Gupta et al, 1994): and with less disruption of organizational routines (Peters, 1998). In applying the logic of appropriateness to decision-making in the European Union (EU), Egeberg (1999) explored how the identity of representatives from specific departments affected the collaborative setting. He found that when members of governments from different departments come together, their identity in the logic of
appropriateness is not of the departments, but more of the country they are from when they join the EU setting.

Through discursive interactions, people who hold different opinions and interpretations learn and refine their ideas as they share them with others (Schmidt, 2008). Thus, bureaucratic and political actors challenge one another’s ideas by drawing on existing cultural and ideological symbols. In this sense, the logic of appropriateness frame is particularly relevant in understanding policy coordination and implementation (Peters, 1998; Yanow, 1996). In fact, Yanow argues that implementation is directed by the broader social phenomena of the example of communication of meaning, where the judgments and varying interpretations of actors involved in the policy process affect implementation. As they pertain to bureaucratic actors, these dynamics are analyzed at the micro-foundational level.

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This chapter has articulated the theoretical framework used to guide analysis in this study. Constructed by integrating different theories and lines of investigation, the theoretical framework argues that decision-making is best understood through concurrent analysis of macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-foundational levels, thereby appreciating the role of formal and informal structures, context, and agency, when trying to understand decision-making. Without this multi-level approach, important interactions between decision-making determinants would be dismissed. In a way then, this theoretical framework attempts to expand the understanding of decision-making as something as best understood through methodological pluralism. Figure 3.5 provides a graphic representation of the framework, mapping how the
different stages of the policy process relate directly to the different levels of analysis employed in this dissertation.

**Figure 3.5: Conceptual Framework: Multi-Level Analysis of Decision-Making**

There is complementarity between the different levels. Inherent macro-institutional factors constrain the nature of meso-contextual parameters that are relevant in a given implementation scenario. For example, when deciding on disaster-relief strategies in a particular country, policy actors likely refer to previous bilateral relationships to develop an understanding of expected interest in intervention by the Government of Canada. Similarly, macro-institutional and meso-contextual variables inform micro-foundational processes. After all, the logic of appropriateness recognizes the importance of history in shaping the rules and routines that structure behavior (March & Olsen, 1989). By considering meso and micro determinants of decision-making, one can understand what bureaucratic actors deem as constituting appropriate action in any given implementation scenario. In acknowledging “multiple levels of
reality” (Hollingsworth, 2000, p. 600) to uncover explanations for why Canada reacted to the 2010 natural disasters in the way that it did, the research problem is addressed more comprehensively, and multiple decision-making determinants are explored. As will become apparent throughout this study, this theoretical framework forms the foundation of the methodology adopted, as well as the analysis of research findings. Chapter 4 details how data analysis is undertaken.
Chapter 4.0. Research Methodology

The research methodology adopted in this study is a neo-positivist comparative case-study design. Through interviews and document analysis, the purpose of data-analysis is to develop a narrative of the decision-making process, and to highlight factors that led to Canada’s disaster-relief responses in 2010. This chapter explains the dissertation’s epistemological orientation, the research design, and its data generation and analysis approaches.

4.1. Epistemological Orientation

Epistemological orientations can be considered to fall on a continuum between positivism and interpretivism (Ricucci, 2010; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). This research is best described as neo-positivist in nature. While positivist researchers consider their findings to be objective, post-positivists consider that observation is fallible, with an inherent margin of error; all observations are imperfect and subject to inaccuracies (Cohen & Rogers, 2003; Fischer, 2003). Neo-positivism, which finds itself somewhere in the middle, relaxes the assumptions of positivism, including that the physical world is knowable in its entirety, yet assumes that reality is not governed by causal laws, but rather probabilistic ones (della Porta & Keating, 2008). Shading into interpretivism, neo-positivism and post-positivism are critical of the separation of values and facts in policy analysis (Fischer, 2003). While it is recognized that scientific expertise can influence the politics of policy making, values influence that science, especially in decision-making scenarios (della Porta & Keating, 2008; Fisher, 2003).
The epistemological orientation of a study influences the research methodology adopted in the investigation (McNabb, 2010). While quantitative research is generally interested in whether and to what extent variance in x causes variance in y, qualitative research is about how and why x plays a role in causing y; and what process connects x and y (Ricucci, 2010). Due to its use of ‘thick description’, qualitative research presents a perspective on complexity and contextuality that quantitative analysis cannot (Luton, 2010, p. 10). Thick descriptions bring the reader into the context being described, and facilitate analysis of emergent and unfolding interconnected phenomena (Erlandson et al, 1993, p. 33). Neo-positivism has typically been based in qualitative traditions and through abductive techniques. Abduction has characteristics of both induction and deduction, while adding the important element of understanding (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). It is especially useful in situations with complexity and uncertainty.

The macro-institutional, meso-contextual, and micro-foundational levels as understood in the theoretical framework are complementary from an epistemological perspective. Both historical institutionalism at the macro-level and sociological institutionalism through the logic of appropriateness at the micro-level, appreciate probabilistic relationships between occurrences. In historical institutionalism, the past generally influences the future through a path dependent trajectory, while in sociological institutionalism rules and norms guide the decisions of actors. Both these orientations acknowledge the role of institutions in affecting human action and behaviour. Rather than being products of calculated decisions, actions are embedded in
institutional structures of rules, norms, expectations and traditions that form one’s preferences (Mule, 1999).

Case study research is one example of a neo-positivist research design, and is the approach adopted in this study. It places emphasis on empirical data collection, where researchers “use multiple levels of data analysis for rigour, employ computer programs to assist in their analysis, [and] encourage the use of validity approaches” (Creswell, 2007, pp. 20). The following sections explain the research design, and how data generation and analysis are conducted.

4.2. Research Design

Case studies have been found to be well suited for answering ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions, such as those posed in this dissertation (Yin, 2003). Case studies are also well suited to exploring complex, context-dependant phenomena, especially when trying to trace a process across more than one unit (Gerring, 2004). They are also useful when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). As a result of their nature and utility, case studies are used to test existing theories as well as to develop new theories (MacNabb, 2010; Yin, 2003). They can also be used to develop causal explanations of social phenomenon (Schwandt, 1997). Once a researcher identifies a specific circumstance to investigate, and proceeds to identify the characteristics of the event in the social environment, the researcher can begin to discern potential causes of the consequence of interest (McNabb, 2010). Therefore, case studies are particularly well suited for trying to understand the broad spectrum of factors shaping the decision-making process.
McNabb (2010) explains that there are three types of multi-case studies: comparative, longitudinal and interpretive. Comparative studies are used primarily to compare the application of a certain case activity against the way the same activity is carried out in another case, primarily to draw lessons or to identify best practices. Longitudinal studies are geared at exposing changes in conditions or events in a few cases, in order to direct as much attention as possible on to some aspect of experience over a certain period of time. Interpretive multi-case studies are focused on developing greater understanding of an issue or phenomenon of interest through a collection of cases. In focusing attention on trying to understand the dynamics of the decision-making process in two disaster-relief scenarios, the comparative approach is deemed most suitable.

This research therefore follows a comparative multi-case study design. Some advise that multi-case research designs should cover between four to ten individual cases, since it is believed that fewer than four cases usually do not provide the researcher enough variability and generalisability in the study question for meaningful results (Stake, 2013). The use of two cases in this dissertation, however, is a natural extension of the original research problem, i.e., an empirical question about wanting to understand why Canada seemed to make two seemingly different decisions while applying the same policy framework to comparable focusing events. While a single case may provide greater understanding of the experience studied, it cannot serve an inferential role, nor should it be used for testing hypotheses. Two cases, on the contrary, offer more clarification on the social experience, and augment one another in expounding on the dynamics of a particular phenomenon. Charles Tilly urged that
theoretical propositions should be based not on “large N statistical analysis” but on “relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories” (Tilly, 1997, p. 48).

4.3. Data Gathering Sources

As stated in the introductory chapter, the research questions of this dissertation are as follows:

What explains the varied scope and configuration of Canada’s disaster-relief decisions following the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?

What influenced the actions of bureaucratic and political actors when implementing Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework?

How did problem definition influence the implementation process during Canada’s response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?

The descriptive aspect of this dissertation is methodologically straightforward. It entails identifying factors that influenced the implementation process, with a particular focus on case-specific problem definition. While collecting data on exact processes is difficult, this is accomplished through examination of relevant published materials, documents, media analysis and interviews.

Data gathering and analysis is shaped directly by the adopted theoretical framework. As articulated in the theoretical framework, different aspects of a problem are considered at each of the three levels - macro, meso and micro. Investigation at only one level is insufficient to explain why Canada responded differently to the 2010 disasters. Rather, each of the three levels must be considered in order to gain a holistic understanding of decision-making. The objective of data gathering is to collect
sufficient information to report on how the disasters were defined; and how this consequently shaped the decisions made by the Government of Canada.

Data was gathered through four primary means: (1) publicly available information; (2) documents retrieved through Access to Information & Privacy requests (ATIP Requests)\(^\text{13}\); (3) media coverage; and (4) interviews. These are detailed below:

\(1\) Publicly Available Information

Publicly available documents consist of both government and non-government sources. From within government, they include statements from all WoG Ministers regarding the natural disasters following their onset; media statements from all departments involved in the disaster-relief efforts; Prime Minister photos of the day; Hansard parliamentary debates; and notes from Standing Committee meetings. DFAIT, DND and CIDA websites reporting on Canada’s disaster-relief mechanisms and past disaster-relief decisions, and relevant Auditor General reports, are also included in this category. Non-governmental secondary sources comprise of media reports, opinion polls, opinion pieces, and studies in grey literature.

\(2\) ATIP Requests

Information requested and received through ATIP requests include documentation on lessons learned, internal memos, and assessment reports pertaining to relief operations for the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and flooding in Pakistan. Reports

\(^{13}\) Through the Access to Information Act, Canadian citizens, individuals and corporations in Canada can request access to any record under the control of a federal government institution by filing an ATIP Request (TBCS, 2013).
on lessons-learned from disaster-relief operations that involved DND/CF between 1998 to 2010 were also obtained. Furthermore, permission was granted to view hard copy folders of the 2010 Haiti and Pakistan disaster-relief interventions in the archives of DFAIT's Stabilization and Relief Taskforce (START). The principal investigator spent four full days in DFAIT to read through and analyze the records, which included: situation reports distributed to the whole-of-government community; assessment reports prepared by the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST); email correspondence between civil servants involved in the disaster-relief efforts; and Taskforce meeting notes. A number of documents were also provided by interviewees. These included Canada’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) outlining Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework; DFAIT’s official After Action Review for its engagement in Haiti; the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Contingency Plan; and Stabilization and Relief Taskforce (START) training materials.

(3) Media Coverage

Data gathered for media analysis included both television and newspaper coverage from January 12 to February 12, 2010 for the earthquake in Haiti; and July 21 to October 3, 2010 for the flooding in Pakistan. These durations correspond to disaster onset to end of the Matching Fund periods for both disasters (as described in Chapter Six, Meso-Contextual Analysis). These durations were selected in order to provide consistency in analysis, especially given the fact that two different types of disasters are being compared, i.e., sudden-onset versus slow-onset. Television coverage was obtained from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and print coverage was
obtained through the search engine Factiva. Both English and French media coverage was obtained.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Television is a Canadian broadcast television network that is owned by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). It is the national English-language public broadcaster, headquartered in Toronto, Ontario. CBC Television is available through over-the-air television stations across Canada. Two separate CBC archive searches were conducted for both natural disasters with the help of the CBC Media Librarian. English media searches were conducted for holdings across Canada, with the following parameters: “Haiti + earthquake*” and “Pakistan + flood*”. The wildcard ‘*’ was used to capture words that include letters in the same sequence. For example, “flood*” would search for ‘floods’, ‘flooding’, ‘flooded’, and ‘floodwaters’. French media searches were conducted with the following parameters: “Haïti + tremblement*” and “Pakistan + inondation*”.

The data received from the Media Technician did not include stock coverage (raw coverage, as received from agencies such as Reuters). News features that did not mention the natural disasters specifically were deleted prior to data analysis. For longer television programs which featured multiple stories, the total time was divided equally by the number of stories aired; and the number of stories covering either of the disasters was summed in order to calculate the total airtime per show. The data that was received was transferred to Excel in order to calculate television coverage per day, and to generate graphs for total coverage over time.

English newspaper coverage includes analysis of the three most widely read newspapers in the country: Toronto Star; Globe & Mail; and National Post. The search
engine Factiva was used, with the following parameters for English media coverage: “Haiti and earthquake*” and “Pakistan and flood*”. For French media coverage, La Presse Canadienne and Le Journal de Montréal were analyzed, given that they are the most widely read French language newspapers. The following parameters were used: “Haïti and tremblement*” and “Pakistan and inondation*”. Information used from the generated reports includes the headlines, the text of the articles, and the respective locations in the newspaper. Images associated with articles are not archived and were therefore not analyzed.

Given the language-barrier of the principal investigator, only quantitative analysis for French media coverage was conducted (see Limitations for more details). The gap this creates is addressed by information contained in media reports internal to DFAIT, which were accessed through the Media Relations Offices, and are summarized in the analysis section of this dissertation. The reports provide print media analysis of over 40 English and French dailies across Canada. “Media Analysis – Coverage of Canadian involvement in Haiti” surveys print media for the period between January 13 and February 1, 2010. “Canadian Print Media analysis / Canada’s Response to the Floods in Pakistan” surveys print media for the period August 2 to August 26, 2010.

(4) Interviews

30 semi-structured interviews were conducted between June 2011 to April 2012. The majority of respondents were individuals from across the Canadian federal government involved in the provision of Canada’s disaster-relief interventions. Interviews were also conducted with opposition Members of Parliament (MPs),
diplomatic personnel, and managers in Canadian non-governmental organizations who were active during the response to either or both of the 2010 natural disasters. Interviews lasted on average between an hour to an hour and a half, and were all audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Semi-structured interviews are intended to “purposefully pursue understanding (information and meaning) using predetermined questions, improvisational probes and responsive follow-up questions” (Luton, 2010, p. 23). Respondents were encouraged to speak freely and to raise topics that came to mind, but were also prompted to discuss certain issues in order to guide the discussion. Detail about the make-up of participants and how they were recruited are provided in the following sub-sections. A total of 30 interviews were conducted. The principal investigator stopped conducting further interviews when it was deemed that sufficient information was gathered for the intended purposes, and when insight from the interviews was becoming repetitive.

(4.1) Ethics and Recruitment

Prior to beginning the interview process, ethics approval was obtained from the University of Ottawa’s Office of Research Ethics and Integrity. In addition to completion of required forms, the principal investigator was required to detail how interview participants would be recruited; provide the informed consent form that would be used; disclose measures that would be undertaken to protect the safety of gathered material; and prove that the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents would be maintained. The Research Ethics Board granted approval for the research to proceed on June 2011, after which interviews commenced.
In order to obtain information about well-defined and specific events, the most appropriate sampling procedures are those that identify key actors who have had the greatest involvement with the processes of interest (Tansey, 2007). Maxwell (2005) refers to a process of purposeful selection to accomplish this. Rather than random selection, researchers select people or organizations that can best address the research questions, while at the same time ensuring that there is sufficient diversity so that interviewees are not selected in a way that would invariably lead to confirmation of a predetermined tendency or hypothesis. This strategy, in addition to the snowball process whereby each interviewee was asked to recommend others for inclusion in the study, was used in deciding on which respondents to approach.

In the initial contact, the purpose and nature of the study was shared. This consisted of an email detailing the major themes of the research, requesting an interview, and outlining questions that the respondent would likely be expected to address given their role. Potential respondents were informed that their participation was wholly voluntary, and that it would take approximately one hour. They were also informed that the principal investigator would be able to travel to them to conduct the interview, or alternatively, if they were in another city/country, a telephone or videoconference could be conducted. After participants gave their consent, a time and place for the meeting was arranged.

Prior to the start of in-person interviews, the principal investigator shared the detailed Letter of Consent describing the study and their role (see Appendix B). Respondents were required to carefully read and sign the form in advance of the interview. In the form, participants indicated whether the principal investigator would
be able to use their department and general position in the research findings, and to indicate whether they consented to being quoted directly or paraphrased. Where interviews were conducted by phone/Skype, the Letter of Consent was emailed to the participants prior to the interview, and respondents were asked to sign, scan and send the form back to the principal investigator ahead of the meeting. All participants were assured that their confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained, and that their contributions would not be directly attributed to them in the final dissertation.

Within two weeks of the interview, participants were emailed a password protected verbatim transcript of the interview for their review. Only one respondent chose to provide feedback to the original transcript by adding a few details to the answers transcribed previously. All other transcripts were used as prepared initially. The principle investigator did not hear from 6 of the respondents once transcripts were sent to them. Based on the consent form, these respondents are not quoted directly.

(4.2) Demographic Breakdown of Participants

A total of 30 respondents were interviewed, 24 of whom were bureaucrats working for one of the federal level departments involved during the 2010 relief efforts. Of the 24 respondents, 9 were involved in Canada's responses to both Haiti and Pakistan; 9 were only involved in relief efforts in Haiti; and 3 were involved only in Pakistan. The remaining 3 bureaucrats were not directly involved in Canadian relief efforts in 2010, but were, at the time of the interview, holding positions relevant to Canada's responses to natural disasters abroad.
Bureaucrats interviewed included actors from: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT); Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF); Privy Council Office; Department of Finance; Natural Resources Canada; Canadian Public Health Agency; and representatives from the Canadian Embassy in Haiti in January 2010 as well as the High Commission in Pakistan. Interviews were conducted with personnel across various grades and levels, from Director General to Program Officers, and Colonels to Generals.

Some respondents were involved in a number of capacities during the relief efforts. For example, while a respondent may have served as a Director in START at disaster-onset, they may have later formed part of the ISST. Some respondents were also involved in different capacities for different relief-efforts. Table 4.1 depicts the roles of respondents in the three international departments (DFAIT, CIDA, DND), and the breakdown of their involvement during the relief efforts. Each box represents one individual.

**Table 4.1: Functional Roles of DFAIT, DND & CIDA Respondents**

**Legend:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involved in Haiti Disaster-Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in Pakistan Disaster-Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in both Haiti &amp; Pakistan Disaster-Relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To reiterate, given the nature of their position, an individual working in DFAIT, DND or CIDA could have held different functional roles at different times during a single disaster-relief intervention. They could also hold either the same or different functional roles in the other disaster-relief intervention.

Of the 30 respondents, 6 were not bureaucrats. Two were opposition Members of Parliament who were critical of Canada’s relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan and made efforts to improve the wrongs that they perceived. Three were employees of Canadian non-governmental organizations, and 1 was a representative from the Pakistan High Commission in Canada. Given that the focus of this research is directly on problem definition and decision-making in federal government, these interviews were deemed useful for background information but not directly relevant to answering the research questions at hand. Interviews with WoG Ministers and other dignitaries holding office during the 2010 natural disasters were requested, but were not granted. Moreover, in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>DFAIT (6 respondents)</th>
<th>DND (6 respondents)</th>
<th>CIDA (5 respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director-General &amp; Higher Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISST</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
light of the snowball technique adopted in identifying potential interviewees, respondents were often unable to recommend political staff to interview since they themselves were unsure whom to recommend. Given these circumstances, the meetings with the three individuals from the Privy Council Office as well as staff in the Canada missions in Haiti and Pakistan provide useful insight in this regard.

Direct quotations are only used from interviews conducted with the 24 bureaucratic actors. Interviewees are identified with letters, e.g., Interviewee A, Interviewee B, Interviewee C, etc. in order to maintain their anonymity, but also to ensure the diversity of the interview sources used in the analysis chapters. Letters were assigned to respondents randomly. Where identifying a respondent with their assigned letter would compromise their anonymity, “identification conflict” is used.

Adding to the diagram (Figure 3.1) presented in the Chapter 3.0. Theoretical Framework, Figure 4.1 below highlights which data gathering sources are used for the corresponding level of analysis. Using multiple forms of empirical data facilitates understanding of factors that are integral in shaping the outcome of decisions from different angles. As articulated by Creswell (2007), the more complex and all encompassing the narrative, the better the qualitative study.
4.4. Data Analysis

Given the multi-level conceptual framework adopted in this study, data gathering and analysis at each level is aimed at explicating certain decision-making determinants. The following section describes this process at each level of the theoretical framework.

(1) Macro-Institutional

Levitt & March (1988) assume that organizational actions are history-dependent, since routines are based on interpretations of the past more than anticipations of the future (see also Lindblom, 1959). In other words, organizations learn by encoding inferences from history, into routines that guide behavior. They note that “routines are independent of the individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving considerable turnover in individual actors” (Levitt & March, 1998, p. 320). This relates directly to the overarching role of path dependency as a macro-institutional factor in shaping decision-making. Constitutive rules and repertoires, which prescribe
appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations, cause organizations to be relatively invariant over time (Olsen, 2007).

Using publicly available information; documents obtained through the ATIP requests; and knowledge gained from interviews, this section explains the evolution of the Whole-of-Government Framework and how it has become Canada’s existing policy approach for response to natural disasters abroad. Analysis also includes a macro-institutional understanding of Canada’s relationship with both Haiti and Pakistan over a sustained period.

(2) Meso-Contextual

Analysis of meso-contextual variables affecting decision-making is discussed in two parts: procedural analysis and media analysis. While DFAIT has a webpage providing an overview of how Canada responds to natural disasters abroad (see FATDC, 2013), there is no publicly available information on the actual details or operating procedures that govern the whole-of-government effort. Under the procedural analysis section, gathered documents and interview transcripts are used to outline the Whole-of-Government Framework.

Next, decision-making processes for Canada’s responses to both 2010 natural disasters are reconstructed through the method of narrative process-tracing (George & Bennet, 2005). Process-tracing is an in-depth explanation of the procedures adopted in decision-making by mapping how initial conditions are translated into outcomes. George & McKeown (1985) explain that process-tracing uncovers:

- what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occurs; the effect of
various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour (p. 35)

The process-tracing method is especially useful in this particular study because the cases do not constitute a controlled comparison. In employing the narrative process-tracing approach, the researcher attempts to identify processes that often occur independently but then converge, and to identify variables across different processes that lead to an observed outcome when they interact (George & Bennet, 2005). Decision-making processes are examined both by seeing variations between the two cases, but also by examining in detail the internal sequences at play within each specific case.

Information for the development of the process maps came primarily from interviews. Through direct and focused questioning in the semi-structured interview style, researchers can “reconstruct political episodes on the basis of the testimony of respondents, stitching together various accounts to form a broader picture of a complex phenomenon” (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). In order to obtain information about the implementation process, interviewees were each asked three questions at the start of the interview:

- How did you first find out about the disaster and its severity?
- Can you describe what happened when you first heard about the natural disaster? Who spoke to you? Who did you speak to?
- What processes were you involved in?

Given the number of interviews, most accounts were verified by the testaments of other interviewees. Furthermore, analysis of situation reports and meeting notes aided with the development of the detailed narrative. The meso-contextual section concludes with the development of a Disaster-Relief Analytical Grid to help explain decision-
making in these cases, and how different actors understood case-specific problem definition.

The second stage of investigation at the meso-contextual level constitutes a detailed analysis of media coverage at the onset of both disasters and during implementation. Media coverage is reviewed both to ascertain whether it had a causative effect on the implementation process, and to understand the type of problem framing made available to the public. The latter was deemed useful in order to gauge the degree to which public opinion may have influenced government decisions.

In order to calculate airtime for CBC television coverage for each day in the analyzed time frames, raw data received from CBC was analyzed using Excel. After copying and pasting the content into Excel, the following formulas were used to isolate date and coverage duration:

\[
\text{date: } = \text{IF}(\text{AND}(1<\text{FIND}("2010",A1,1),6>\text{FIND}("2010",A1,1)),A1,\text{iserror})
\]

\[
\text{coverage: } = \text{IF}(1=\text{FIND}("TV ",A10,1),A10,\text{iserror})
\]

The formulas sort through the raw data to identify rows that have the date or the word “TV” in them. Matches are copied into their respective columns. Where there are no matches in a particular row, Excel inputs "ERROR" instead. All "ERROR" messages were deleted, as facilitated by the creation of filters. Information was then copied as "values" in a new tab. Line graphs were generated once the duration of television coverage per day was calculated.

(3) Micro-Foundational

The logic of appropriateness is used to gain an understanding of case-specific
problem-definition from the perspective of bureaucratic actors. The interview guide featured questions based on the logic of appropriateness, which would be useful in explaining the ways in which the respondents’ awareness of themselves contributes to the production of their lived experiences in the policy process. Table 4.2 presents the questions that March & Olsen (2004) attribute to the logic of appropriateness framework, and the probing questions used in the interview guide to better understand the role that situational recognition, identity, as well as rules and norms play in implementation. Although the logic of appropriateness divides actions into three distinct categories for analytical purposes, in practice these categories are not mutually exclusive. Analysis of interview transcripts in this dissertation moves beyond these separate categories, and holistically assesses the role of the micro-foundational factors in affecting disaster-relief decision-making.

Table 4.2. Interview Questions Inspired by the Logic of Appropriateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>Explanation of Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of situation is this?</td>
<td>Situational Recognition Actions are based on similarity and congruence to situations that the actor may have faced in the past. Actors will ask themselves about the most suitable action in a specific circumstance and their role in that circumstance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How have you been involved in Canadian humanitarian assistance over time? What position did you hold during Canada's disaster-relief intervention in Haiti/Pakistan? What obstacles do you attribute to the implementation of Canada's disaster-relief policy framework?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of a person am I?</td>
<td>Identity Actions are based on an internalized acceptance of obligations and duties. It analyzes how a person understands their identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How did you influence Canada's disaster-relief decisions? How would you describe your role/your department role vis-à-vis the WoG Ministers? How do you understand your</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?</td>
<td><strong>Rules and Norms</strong>&lt;br&gt;Actors behave in accordance with appropriate procedures ingrained in a culture, and through routine (e.g., prescriptions embedded in constitutions, laws, institution-specific rules or professional norms). A focus on rules and norms analyzes behavioural implications of matching rules to a particular situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you describe the decision-making process that you were involved in and are aware of?</td>
<td>Can you describe the decision-making process that you were involved in and are aware of?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What factors influence how Canada responds to a natural disaster abroad?</td>
<td>What factors influence how Canada responds to a natural disaster abroad?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What factors affect problem definition?</td>
<td>What factors affect problem definition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why is it important that Canada contributes to disaster-relief efforts?</td>
<td>Why is it important that Canada contributes to disaster-relief efforts?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the logic of appropriateness framework was used to develop the interview guide, analysis of the transcripts commenced through an abductive approach that required a reflective analysis. In this study, all interview transcripts were read and coded using a line-by-line open coding technique. Open coding is the process of data reduction where data is broken down and examined (Hallberg, 2006). This was followed by focused selective coding where emerging concepts were identified, categorized and compared. This analysis was then linked back to the logic of appropriateness framework.

Given that analysis at the micro-foundational level was used to understand case-specific problem-definition from the perspective of bureaucratic actors, the 24 of the 30 interviews with bureaucratic actors were analyzed in-depth. All other interviews were used as background information. The qualitative software programme, NVivo9, was
used to analyze the interview transcripts with bureaucratic actors. Each respondent was categorized according to the following attributes:

- Gender: Female, Male
- Department: DFAIT, DND, CIDA, PCO, Other
- Organizational Position: Director-General & Higher, Senior Manager Programme Officer
- Functional Position: Taskforce only; Taskforce + ISST; Taskforce + Liaison Officer; Taskforce + Liaison Officer + ISST

While reading the interview transcripts, the principal investigator coded passages through an abductive approach. Passages were initially coded to nodes such as “need”, “problem definition”, “political push”, “Canadian values”, “disempowerment”, “past response”, “disempowered”, etc. These needs were then linked to broader themes related to the categories in the logic of appropriateness framework, e.g. identity, rules & norms, situational recognition.

A number of coding matrices were developed. Nodes for “Individual Roles” and “Department Roles” were subjected to a matrix query, with rows corresponding to the functional roles of respondents. Nodes for “Problem Definition” and “Need” were put through a matrix query with rows corresponding to departments (see Table 4.3). These matrices helped identify similarities and differences in remarks of respondents depending on their positions, roles and home departments. Informal rules and norms that impact Canada’s policy output were ascertained by combining findings from the process-mapping exercise and document analysis. Nvivo9 was also used to sort and organize data by disaggregating events that were happening simultaneously. This was necessary for the development of the process maps.
Table 4.3: Coding Matrices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Position</th>
<th>Individual Roles</th>
<th>Departmental Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce + ISST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce + Liaison Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce + Liaison Office + ISST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Problem Definition</th>
<th>Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded boxes represent aggregated coded passages from interview transcripts that were analyzed.

4.5. Limitations

There are a few methodological considerations and limitations that should be noted. Given that this is not a quantitative study, a deterministic relationship among the variables of interest must not be assumed. In fact, due to the descriptive nature of qualitative research, some find an inherent flaw in qualitative attempts to explore causation (Creswell, 2009). In response, there is more than one type of causality in social science – physical and logical (Mohr, 1993). Whereas physical causation is the reaction between a force and motion, such as the reaction between reason and a responding behaviour, logical causation follows a “conditional response model”, where the ability of one action to cause another is dependent on another external action (McNabb, 2010, p. 13). Discovering the external action, which is often unknown or unexpected, is difficult; yet the exploratory and descriptive nature of case studies
enables researchers to make inferences about the relationship (Gerring, 2004). The multi-level analysis offered in the theoretical framework aids in this pursuit.

Another limitation is with respect to the nature of the study itself. The research methodology articulated herein has been shaped by the theoretical framework. While this form of research enables researchers to approach the data with an informed understanding, it inevitably causes the researcher to have a strong bias towards expected findings. Researchers might be more likely to find evidence that is supportive, rather than non-supportive, of the theoretical framework they are applying (Cresswell, 2009; Maxewell 2005). Furthermore, an overemphasis on theory can blind researchers to contextual aspects of the phenomenon that they may not have considered previously. While acknowledged, this concern is addressed in part by the multi-level approach of the theoretical framework applied in the study. Through a macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-foundational approach, the aim of the study is to understand decision-making influences from various angles. Given the open-coding technique used in the analysis of interviews at the micro-foundational level, through an abductive approach, analytic themes were able to emerge from the gathered data. Findings from this exploratory phase were then linked back to the logic of appropriateness framework.

With respect to data gathering techniques, interviews are not without flaw (Maxwell, 2005). During the data-gathering period, some interviews took place up to two years after the onset of the disasters. Individuals are not equally articulate and perceptive when sense-making, and the time elapsed is likely to have affected the recollection of events (Creswell, 2007; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2006). Interviews,
after all, provide indirect information that is filtered through the views of interviewees. Some respondents might have taken cues from probing questions during the interview. Being informed about the two cases being used in the study prior to the interview may have resulted in respondents providing comments that they thought the primary researcher was looking for. Two precautions were taken in order to address these weaknesses in interviews.

Firstly, a sample size of 30 participants with actors involved in many different capacities meant that there was a significant number of interviews to confirm any inferred research findings. Secondly, interview findings were augmented through other methods. Document-analysis and media-content analysis were included in the research methodology in order to triangulate data and to provide more solid support for any conclusions reached. Reliance on interviews alone would have left the primary researcher open to self-report bias (Maxwell, 2005).

Furthermore, while media analysis included television and print coverage in both English and French, findings from French media were limited to quantitative analysis. The principal investigator has limited French language familiarity, limiting her ability to conduct the same degree of content analysis as that conducted for English media. In order to address this limitation, internal DFAIT media analysis reports following both natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan were obtained and summarized. These reports were generated through an analysis of over 40 English and French print dailies, and include a comparison of content and quantity of coverage following the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in both language newspapers. While these reports survey only print coverage, and survey different newspapers and different time ranges
than the content analysis conducted in this study, the reports provide useful commentary to augment the primary findings in this dissertation. It should also be noted that one purpose of the media analysis in this dissertation was to assess whether media coverage has a causative effect on government actions. Given the detailed process mapping exercises and link to findings from the qualitative study of English media, content analysis of French media is likely not to drastically change the dissertation findings in any way. Rather, content analysis of French media is expected to reinforce the findings.

Finally, qualitative researchers are systematically required to reflect on their role in the inquiry, and to be sensitive to how their personal biography may shape the study (Creswell, 2007). Introspection on the part of the researcher is necessary in order to acknowledge biases, values, and interests that can necessarily colour the research pursuit. Ultimately, “the person-self becomes inseparable from the researcher-self”, and recognizing this represents honesty and openness in research (Cresswell, 2007, p. 182). Once again, the research design itself is aimed at addressing these validity issues. The use of two case studies as opposed to one limits problematic generalizations made about the decision-making process. Furthermore, in order to address self-report bias (Maxwell, 2005), interview respondents were encouraged to share their views through open-ended questions. The research methodology also encourages triangulation of data; especially with respect to process-tracing, wherever a situation can be examined through overlapping sources, there can be reasonable confidence in the resulting account.
Inspired by the theoretical framework, the research methodology used to guide data analysis in this dissertation employs different approaches at the macro-institutional, meso-contextual, and micro-foundational levels in order to provide a holistic understanding of Canada's decision-making following the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan. Through a comparative case-study design, information on both cases was gathered through interviews and ATIP requests. Using accounts of administrative processes once the Whole-of-Government Framework was activated and the aid of NVivo9, a narrative of administrative processes following the 2010 natural disasters is developed. The following section presents results of the dissertation, categorized according to the different levels of analysis outlined in the multi-level conceptual framework.
Chapter 5.0. Macro-Institutional Data Analysis

The objective of analysis in the macro-institutional level is to understand Canada’s disaster-relief responses by focusing on those formal and informal institutions that exist, and to explore whether the path that lead to their institutionalization helps to explain Canada’s varying 2010 responses. In particular, analysis in this chapter focuses on Canada’s international development tradition over time and specifically the evolution towards the current Whole-of-Government Framework. Canada’s bilateral relationship with both countries of focus is also explored. While these macro-institutional explanations provide strong background information, macro-institutional findings are considered inconclusive in and of themselves. Especially in light of the counter-examples with respect to previous interventions in Haiti and Pakistan that are provided in this chapter, additional analysis is required to explain why Canada’s 2010 disaster-relief efforts and response to the earthquake in Haiti differed to that of the flooding in Pakistan.

5.1. The Evolution of Canada’s Disaster-Relief Measures

Canadian contribution to foreign aid began in 1950 when it joined the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, as a post cold-war anti-communism security strategy (Morrison, 1998). Canada believed it should contribute fifty millions dollars yearly as, it was argued, this would contribute to halting communism in Asia. Cold War calculations in the allocation of Canadian aid continued in the 1960s and 1970s, as exemplified in Canada’s efforts during the Indochinese wars
(Levant, 1986). It was also at this time that there was a slow transformation of “what had started out as a foreign policy pursued for essentially foreign policy goals...into a foreign policy pursued for essentially domestic political/electoral goals” (Nossal, 2013, p. 31; see also Black, 2009). In 1960, Canada created an External Aid Office, which in 1968 became the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA has been the primary federal body responsible for administering the majority of Canada’s Official Development Assistance budget, until its merger with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in 2013 (see Footnote 3).

At its inception, CIDA was a relatively independent organization. The Deputy Minister, who was responsible directly to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was given the title President (Pratt, 1998). This gave the organization a sense of importance, and also independence (Rawkins, 1994). The initial set-up mandated that neither administrative decisions nor policy advice to the Secretary of State for External Affairs could be overruled by External Affairs officials, no matter how senior they were. Thus, “once the president of CIDA had convinced ‘its’ minister of the necessity of any policy, that policy would be unlikely to be successfully challenged at Cabinet” (Pratt, 1998, p. 2). In 1996, however, it was announced that the Minister of International Cooperation would head CIDA. It has been argued that this contributed to an alignment of Canada’s development objectives with those of domestic foreign policy (Morrison, 1998; Pratt, 2007).

Although afforded the same title, the Minister of International Cooperation is junior to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Affairs is ultimately responsible for all aspects of Canadian foreign policy, including aid. Parliament formally establishes
the powers, duties and functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as “including international trade and commerce and international development” (Department of Justice, 2011). Prior to the DFAIT/CIDA merger, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to have “control and supervision of the Canadian International Development Agency,” where even if a Minister for International Cooperation “may be appointed,” her or his role is “to assist the (DFAIT) Minister in carrying out the (DFAIT) Minister’s responsibilities relating to the conduct of Canada’s international relations” (Department of Justice, 2011). Both DFAIT and CIDA have therefore worked closely on development and humanitarian interventions, including disaster-relief, with DFAIT having ultimate administrative authority.

Initially, international disaster-relief decisions were handled through ad hoc interdepartmental collaboration between CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) programme, the Government of Canada’s main channel for the provision of non-food emergency humanitarian assistance, and DFAIT’s Human Rights, Humanitarian Affairs, and International Women’s Equality (AGH) Division (DFAIT, 2005). It is contended that the appointment of Lloyd Axworthy as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996 began the era of securitization of aid in Canada, especially through his personal commitment to banning landmines (Pratt, 2007). That year, the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces (DND/CF) developed the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), officially affixing the military to Canada’s toolbox for disaster-relief in cases where civilian capabilities on their own are considered to be insufficient. Following this trajectory, aid and peace building were linked in the 1990s, and given the events of September 2001 there is now a markedly noticeable merging of aid with
counter-insurgency efforts, as exemplified in Canada’s role in Afghanistan (Baranyi & Paducel, 2012).

The Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy (DPKPol) is the branch within DND that coordinates the use of military assets in humanitarian operations. DART was originally designed as a rapidly deployable stabilization tool, able to provide specific medical, water purification, engineering, logistical, and security services for 40-60 days after the onset of a disaster (DND, 2012). The DART was deployed during Operation Central (1998) in Honduras in response to Hurricane Mitch and Operation Torrent (1998) in response to the earthquake in Turkey. After these two interventions, the Privy Council Office (PCO) mandated DFAIT to coordinate the Natural Disaster Taskforce (Patrick & Brown, 2007). This is in line with the OECD suggestion that given its position, role and mandate, foreign affairs is best placed at headquarters to take on the lead coordinating role of whole-of-government efforts in the host country (OECD, 2006). The mandate led to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to streamline disaster-relief processes.

DART was also deployed during Operation Structure (2004) in Sri Lanka, in response to the earthquake/tsunami of the Indian Ocean basin. During this time, the Government of Canada established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START)\(^\text{14}\), to increase response time and effectiveness, and to improve coordination

\(^{14}\) Established in 2006, START is the DFAIT branch that is designed to help answer the growing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises. It also administers the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) which was established in 2005 to “provide financial and programming resources to facilitate timely, effective and accountable conflict prevention, crisis response, peace operations, civilian protection, and stabilization interventions in fragile states” (DFAIT, 2011, Online). Currently almost a 60-person team, START is made up of four divisions. The Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group (IRH) is the division of focus in the current chapter. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs Division (IRG) provides guidance, direction and horizontal
among government bureaucracies (DFAIT, 2005; Geddes, 2010). Following the Canadian response to the Indian Ocean basin earthquake/tsunami, a departmental report provided a recommendation to “strengthen and integrate with the stabilization and reconstruction taskforce the departmental crisis response unit (AGH) to ensure sufficient capacity during major, prolonged international crises” (DFAIT, 2005, online). Crisis response and management capacities were strengthened and consolidated in a standalone group taken from the AGH, now known as the Humanitarian and Disaster Response Group (IRH), housed within START. START-IRH is responsible for coordinating Canada’s responses to international disasters abroad, as well as for the development of Canadian policy on international humanitarian affairs. It is also involved in coordinating with the military in joint disaster-relief efforts. Since its inception, START has worked with DND for the deployment of DART during Operation Plateau (2005) in Pakistan in response to the Muzaffarabad earthquake, and Operation Hestia (2010), the response to the Haiti earthquake (DND, 2012).

Following each Canadian disaster-relief response that includes the deployment of DART, as well as ones which did not include DART deployment, such as the 2003 response to the Bam earthquake in Iran and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DFAIT engages in a robust After Action Review process where independent consultants are contracted to critique the Canadian disaster-relief response. With each After Action Review, lessons are learned and established processes are redefined and streamlined.

coordination along geographic and thematic lines. The Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy Division (IRP) develops and coordinates policy in WoG Ministers-mandated countries of focus, primarily in fragile states and in the areas of conflict management, and international peacekeeping/peacebuilding initiatives. The Coordination and Deployment Division (IRC) coordinates all business processes and reporting for START, as well as is responsible for whole-of-government expert civilian deployments (for a history and further details, see DFAIT, 2011).
Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), entitled *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, placed interdepartmental collaboration at the heart of Canada’s development and humanitarian interventions abroad (DFAIT, 2005b). This is in line with international trends that recognize the interconnectedness between political, security, governance, and development dimensions of global efforts. The United Nations (UN) introduced the integrated approach and integrated missions (see for instance de Coning, 2008), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; see Jakobsen, 2008) and the European Union (see Gross, 2008) refer to similar models as the comprehensive approach. Several governments have also worked towards improving interdepartmental collaboration for their international operations by developing their own national models (OECD, 2006); Australia and the United Kingdom refer to ‘joined-up government’ (Wilkins, 2002; Fitz-Gerald, 2004).

In 2005, Canada’s effort was known as the “3D” approach. It emphasized that defence, diplomatic, and development mandates are to be jointly addressed in Canada’s involvement in failed and fragile states, citing it as the ideal strategy for “supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems” (DFAIT 2005b, p. 20). This approach saw most advancement in Canada’s participation in the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan. In an attempt to bridge a gap between the security aspect of Operation Enduring Freedom and wider reconstruction and stabilization needs in the country, Canadian Forces (CF) in Kandahar province saw the introduction of quick impact projects (QIPs), where military personnel would engage in short-term and small-scale “hearts and minds” efforts (Baker, 2007). While the mission in Afghanistan was found to be much less about the development of its people than for
domestic gains in the areas of security, investment, and prestige in the international arena (see Senlis Council, 2007), CIDA programming in Afghanistan ballooned from roughly CAD 10-20 million in humanitarian aid prior to 2001, to CAD 280 million in 2008-09 (Black & den Heyer, 2010). Being the largest bilateral programme in Canadian history, the agency also created a separate Afghanistan Taskforce within CIDA to handle its role as part of a broader whole-of-government effort. A CIDA vice-president led this taskforce; this was the first time that such a high-ranking official has led a country programme.

These developments also resulted in increased attention and funding for START, inevitably increasing interest by political actors for Canada’s responses to natural disasters abroad. With the shift from a Liberal to a Conservative government in early 2006, the interdepartmental 3-D approach was given new branding and became known as the ‘whole-of-government’ approach (Hrychuk 2009; Travers & Owen 2008). One respondent explained that aspects of the Whole-of-Government Framework have been used elsewhere in the foreign ministry:

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15 ‘Whole-of-government’ is one of the most increasingly popular terms used to described applied collaborative efforts. Some argue that whole-of-government initiatives were introduced as a reaction to the negative effects of New Public Management (NPM) reforms that emphasize market-models of public administration through decentralization, ‘siloization’, and single-purpose organizations (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Pollitt, 2003). The Government of Canada (GoC) applies a whole-of-government framework with respect to the organization of thirteen broad societal cornerstones in its four spending areas: Economic, Social, International and Government Affairs (TBS, 2011). These cornerstones are meant to enable federal organizations to align their program activities, both financial and non-financial, to a set of high-level outcome areas which are also used for reporting to Parliament on country progress. At the provincial level, whole-of-government approaches are readily used for health promotion; “if improving the overall health of the population is a policy goal, then this becomes not just the responsibility of health ministries, but the responsibility of all government departments that can influence the population’s health,” explains one report (OHPE, 2011). Canada’s handling of the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver was also referred to as a whole-of-government approach, seeing significant horizontal collaboration with forty-six federal departments, agencies and crown corporations working together alongside the province for planning and service delivery requirements (GoC, 2010).
...a lot of discussion we did on the natural disaster side ended up getting picked up for [sic] and adapted for how the government dealt with a number of other things, whether that was terrorist kidnappings, whether that was how we then dealt with other kinds of complex emergencies, like the Lebanon crisis, how they did the After Action Reviews, and the role that foreign affairs played throughout that time as being the platform for whole of government (Interviewee U).

While these events highlight the high-profile nature of the work of START, they also reflect the strong emphasis placed on military involvement in development and humanitarian interventions in Canada. This is reflective of an overall leaning towards strengthening the Canadian Forces by the Government of Canada.

In May 2008, while Stephen Harper was Prime Minister of a Conservative minority government, the Canada First Defence Strategy, a new vision for DND and the CF was introduced. Through an investment plan worth almost CAD 490 billion over two decades, the primary purpose of the strategy is to reform the CF, upgrading the national military forces to 21st century standards. It was created to "strengthen national sovereignty and security and also to bolster the ability to defend democratic values and interests abroad" (Clep, 2011, p. 98). In this same spirit of change, between September 2009-December 2009, the CF engaged in an exercise to review its natural disaster response role. While DART operational procedures were first outlined in Contingency Plan Griffon, they were soon changed and reflected in the new Contingency Plan Reconnaissance. Contingency Plan Griffon saw the DART as a tool that would be useful in relief phases of an emergency, and would engage the entire DART unit whenever deployed. In the new Contingency Plan Reconnaissance, however, DART is seen as a scalable tool, and additional military assets can also be deployed as part of DND/CF involvement for humanitarian assistance. This includes the use of C17 military aircrafts for strategic airlift. One DND respondent explains:
Previous Canadian Forces’ response was limited to the DART - the DART is DART is DART. So you had 250 people going out the door. This new plan says that you can have parts of the DART, a modularized DART, or the DART can be expanded depending on the needs on the ground. So that’s the basic change - it was a change in mentality, a change of function. First we had strategic airlift come on line in the form of the C17s. The C17 actually gave us the possibility to move further, faster (Interviewee W).

Over the past decade, Canada has also been undergoing non-military policy transformations to make its aid efforts more effective, and to increase accountability to Canadians. In 2003 Canada attended the meeting convened by the Government of Sweden to discuss good humanitarian donorship, during which the GHD principles were agreed (GHD, 2013). When it signed the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Canada committed itself to multilateral aid coordination efforts to accelerate development progress (OECD, 2005). In 2005, CIDA implemented a project to ensure that by 2010, two-thirds of its country-to-country resources would be concentrated in 25 developing countries, favouring development efforts that are more sustainable and long-term (CIDA, 2005). And, in 2009, Canada brought into law the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Accountability Act, Act c-293, requiring Canada to ensure that perspectives of the poor in recipient countries are taken into consideration when developing its projects. Canada also became a signatory of the Hyogo Framework in 2005, a United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards before 2015 (DFAIT, 2005).

Given the sheer number of natural disasters that occur every year, however, Canada cannot conduct relief efforts in every case. Based on its international
agreements, Canada can only fund relief to countries that are identified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as eligible recipients of ODA. Furthermore, Canada traditionally offers aid in countries where there is a clear intention for a concerted international aid effort, indicated by the establishment of consolidated humanitarian appeals by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (FATDC, 2013). Interviewees have alluded to three general criteria that officials use to determine whether Canada will engage in a particular disaster-relief effort: i) a request from the affected country; ii) the nature of the needs that exist on the ground; and iii) whether Canada as a country has a particular added value to bring to bear. As advertised on the DFAIT website, there are four main objectives of Canadian humanitarian action (FATDC, 2013). These are:

- To meet the needs of survivors on the ground (i.e., to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity during and after conflict and natural disasters);
- To ensure a coherent, coordinated and timely response to humanitarian crises abroad, consistent with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship;
- To ensure consistency with [Canadian] international legal obligations and principles; and,
- To support effective longer-term disaster risk reduction efforts.

In addition to meeting the needs of the affected country, however, responses to natural disasters abroad are also undertaken to meet the needs of affected Canadians. Figure 5.1 is a slide from 2013 training material offered on the Whole-of-Government Framework, which shows that Canada is also driven to respond when its own citizens are affected. There were upwards of six thousand Canadians in Haiti at the time of the earthquake. While one can deduce that this served as a major incentive for a robust response in Haiti, this perception would be speculative without further evidence. The
following section discusses the motivations of humanitarian response as understood from the perspective of Government of Canada values of humanitarianism.

**Figure 5.1: START-IRH Training Slide on rationale behind Canada’s disaster-relief interventions:**

- Foreign policy principles/international humanitarian obligations.
- Respond to consular needs of Canadians in distress.

### 5.2. Canadian Values and Responses to Natural Disasters

Canada’s previous International Policy Statement (IPS), *Canada in the World*, outlined three foreign policy pillars: 1) promoting prosperity, 2) protecting Canada’s security within a stable world, and 3) projecting the desire of Canadians to help the less fortunate (DFAIT, 1995). It explains that international assistance is “one of the clearest expressions of Canadian values and culture – of Canadians’ desire to help the less fortunate and of their strong sense of social justice – and an effective means of sharing these values with the rest of the world” (DFAIT, 1995, p. 40). Furthermore, Act c-293 explains that Canada’s development assistance abroad should be “consistent with Canadian values”, in which are included “values of global citizenship, equity and
environmental sustainability” (House of Commons, 2007). What these official documents highlight is a level of altruism found within Canadian identity.

Following from the rhetoric of the 1995 IPS, Nossal (2003) explains that “after almost a decade of being told by their government that one of the primary aims of Canadian foreign policy was to project ‘Canadian values’ abroad, Canadians, it would seem, had grown so accustomed to the idea that they no longer questioned it” (Nossal, 2003). These sentiments were reflected in the interviews conducted in this study, as shown in Table 5.1 which highlights comments made by respondents in answer to the question: Why is it important that Canada gets involved in providing disaster-relief assistance?

Table 5.1: Responses to: “Why is it important that Canada gets involved in providing disaster-relief assistance?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Comments on Why Canada Engages in Disaster-Relief</th>
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<td>• Really, you have asked that question? It’s not obvious?...You are a Canadian you know why. We do this because Canadians expect us to be there, and I say this and it’s almost like I’m stating the obvious - Canadians expect us to be there. Do all Canadians expect us to be there? Well, certainly the vocal ones do. And I think it is just part of our nature. I really truly think - I know this sounds so, not stereotypical, but it’s just -- I think Canadians expect us to give. [CIDA, Interviewee Q]</td>
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<td>• We’re Canadians. As simple as that. We are Canada, and Canada is a very benevolent country. It is a well-established G8 country. Very rich culturally, economically and capability-wise, and as part of our responsibilities as a great global citizen - we have, it’s part of our Canadian identity, to help others out and that is absolutely historic. [PCO, Interviewee T]</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ultimately it’s because people are suffering. And I think it’s always been in the Canadian psyche that whenever people suffer in the world there is that -- and that goes back to Lester B. Pearson. [DND, Interviewee G]</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Foreign aid and our humanitarian response of our international assistance is borne out of benevolence, but it’s also borne out of a sense of responsibility. So it’s not that we have to do this, it’s that we want to do it, right? That’s where it starts. [PCO, Interviewee X]</td>
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I think it is part of the Canadian nature to do that thing, and in that sense our government is just reflecting what the Canadians would like us to do. [DFAIT, Interviewee M]

I think, Canada has an image of a country that is a very caring country, we have never, we have a reputation that really, a solid reputation. Canadians are known to be very generous people, very caring people, that sort of thing. [CIDA, Interviewee N]

Well, I think saving lives and easing suffering - I think that's still a big motivator. I think there is still a -- the residue of Canada's tradition of multilateralism. I think it still informs our -- the size of our response. [CIDA, Interviewee P]

I think it reaches to that principle of humanity that is the value of Canadians, but it's the value of human beings as a whole to want to help people that are in need through no fault of their own. [CIDA, Interviewee Y]

These comments reflect the overwhelming sentiment amongst respondents that Canada is driven to provide humanitarian assistance because it is inherent in the psyche of Canadians; essentially, they are describing an informal institution.

A number of respondents mentioned that it is the nature of the efforts, namely responses to natural disasters, that makes the Whole-of-Government Framework successful. If the Framework was to respond to another type of crisis, they explain, its ability to facilitate collaboration across government might not be the same. “When you are working for natural disasters, there is no blame...[...] At that time no one is blaming the victims for being in a building that collapsed”, said one respondent from DFAIT (Interviewee E).

A number of studies have explored the implications of the rhetoric of values and foreign policy (see Howell, 2005; Munton & Keating, 2001; Nossal, 2003; Pratt, 2001). While shared Canadian values is part of the explanation of why Canada chooses to respond to humanitarian crises in the first place, it does not shed light on why the responses to the 2010 natural disasters were different in scope and magnitude. Here too, a macro-institutional perspective alone is found to be insufficient to address the
5.3. Canada’s Relationship with Haiti and Pakistan

For a few years, Haiti was the highest recipient of Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), the official financing contributed by OECD member countries with the main objective of promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries (CIDA, 2011). Canada and Haiti share a rich history of diplomatic relations, and Canada has spearheaded numerous development, security and political operations in that country. Canada’s deep engagement in Haiti falls within Canada’s priorities for the Americas and focuses on prosperity, security, and democratic governance. Similarly, Canada has provided socio-economic development assistance to Pakistan for more than forty years (GOC, 2008).

In 2001, there were approximately 82,000 Canadians of Haitian origin, and it is estimated that by 2007 this number had risen to 100,000, with a strong concentration in Quebec (Statistics Canada, 2007). Some scholars have attributed Canada’s development history in Haiti to this strong Haitian concentration in Quebec (Shamsie, 2008; Thede, 2008). The concentration of Canadian-Haitians in Quebec led to a strong provincial lobby, and contributed to the Quebec government donating CAD 3 million for relief efforts from its own funds (CBC News, 2010). Canada’s former Governor General, Michaëlle Jean, is also of Haitian origin and was in office at the time of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. One DFAIT respondent explained:
The Haitian diaspora is not the biggest diaspora [in Canada], but it is an old diaspora – since the 60s. A lot of Haitian immigrants in the 60s were intellectuals and professors who had a lot of visibility in Canada...everyone [ie. Canadians] knows someone who knows a Haitian for sure (Interviewee R).

Moreover, explaining the significance of Haiti to Canada, Baranyi & Paducel (2012) write, “one cannot underestimate the influence of the thousands of other Canadians (especially Quebecois) who have passed through Haiti over the past twenty years – as diplomats, peacekeepers, visiting members of Parliament, NGO staff, investors, or journalists – and exerted low-profile pressure to keep Canada engaged in the country” (p. 125).

In February 2004, Haiti suffered a governance crisis that led to a US-French-Canadian military intervention in the country, which resulted in removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power. Since this intervention, Canada has redoubled its engagement in the country. Following the 2006 elections in Haiti, Canada made a $555 million commitment to the country (GOC, 2011). CIDA developed a country programme, the Haiti Action Plan, aligning it with the Haiti Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy; and through START, Canada also runs a number of security programs in the country. Baranyi and Paducel (2012) argue that with these initiatives, “the Harper government underscored Canada’s intent to remain a major international actor in Haiti” (p. 116), and contend that the robust earthquake relief efforts followed as a natural extension of this support.

In contrast, Canada does not share similar historical ties with Pakistan. With more than 300,000 Canadian-Pakistanis across the country, Pakistan is among Canada’s top ten sources of immigrants, although there is no reported significant concentration in any particular part of the country (GOC, 2012). CIDA programming in Pakistan has
focused on education, healthcare, gender equality and governance, and with the CAD 140 million aid it received in 2009-2010, it was the sixth highest recipient of Canada’s international assistance from all channels, (CIDA, 2011). Canada-Pakistan relations are primarily in the area of trade, investment, regional security and counter-terrorism. During the 1971 East Pakistan crisis, Pilkington (2011) explains that despite reported atrocities, Canada took a neutral position in order to maintain the important relationship it had with Islamabad, particularly its partnership in Pakistan’s nuclear power programme. Today Pakistan is seen as “an important ally for Canada in the global fight against terrorism”, especially in enhancing security in the region (GOC, 2012). With respect to Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan following the 2001 US-led war in the country, one of Canada’s six priorities is border security in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, in the hope that it will “help promote economic development, stability, and security in the border region” (GOC, 2011b).

While Canada’s relationship with either country of focus is important, from a foreign policy point of view, however, the relationships are vastly different. Aside from upholding Canadian interests in either country, the overall nature of Canada-Haiti relations is centred on the development of Haiti, whereas Pakistan is seen as a strategic ally. Given the identified differences, one might deduce that these macro-institutional factors explain Canada’s disaster-relief behaviour in 2010.

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16 After the partition of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was comprised of two wings: West Pakistan, modern-day Pakistan, and East Pakistan, modern-day Bangladesh. On 25 March 1971, and for nine months thereafter, the military dictator of West Pakistan launched a brutal campaign of massacre and repression in the East. In response, India sided with East Pakistan and engaged in a brutal war that culminated with East Pakistan achieving independence as Bangladesh (Pilkington, 2011).
5.4. Counter-Examples: Canada’s ‘Inconsistencies’ in Disaster-Relief

According to respondents, START-IRH and CIDA-IHA respond to anywhere between 45-65 natural disasters every year. Most of these concern aid provided by way of financial contributions to international appeals, or the funding of Canadian partners engaging in disaster-relief efforts. Figure 5.2 is a slide from START’s 2013 “Government of Canada Response to Natural Disasters Abroad” Training Program. It highlights Canada’s natural disaster interventions between 2004-2012.

**Figure 5.2: START Training Material on Recent Responses to Natural Disasters Abroad**

The asterisked natural disasters in Figure 5.2 exemplify that Canada’s most substantial disaster-relief interventions are those that have seen the deployment of
Canadian military assets and assessment teams. Interestingly, there have been cases in the past where DART has not been deployed when natural disasters have hit Haiti, but have been deployed to Pakistan in response to natural disasters there.

In 2008 four separate hurricanes - Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike – led to the deaths of more than 800 people in Haiti, destroyed about 60 per cent of the country’s harvest, rendered cities desolate and uninhabitable, and impacted the lives and livelihoods of up to 800,000 people, all within the span of 30 days (CIDA, 2008; The Telegraph, 2010). That year, Canada responded by contributing 15.8% of all humanitarian aid from OECD-DAC donors to Haiti, ranking it second only to the United States. Canada did not send DART, however, despite media reports and speculation that it would (CBC News, 2008), and despite having deployed DART to Honduras in response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998.

In fact, while Canada was willing to respond fervently to the January 12 2010 earthquake, one DFAIT respondent explained the vastly different position adopted by the Government of Canada only one year later when Haiti was going through political turmoil. He explains:

I do know that there are discrepancies in reaction. Great for Haiti to have managed that sympathy [during the earthquake], but it is there to lose and it can – and it did. We did send political actors [in 2010] so you garnered a lot of support, super. But when a year later there were political troubles there - that sympathy was easily lost. [Interviewee R]

This ‘change of heart’ was reflective of the nature of troubles faced by Haiti – a shift from a humanitarian crisis to a political one. However, START, which houses IRH, is responsible for Canada’s responses to all humanitarian crises, including complex emergencies such that faced by Haiti in 2011. While Canada continued to provide
development aid at the same level in 2011-2012, this example confirms that Canada’s responses to humanitarian crises in Haiti are not always consistent.

Similarly, on October 8, 2005, northern Pakistan was hit with a catastrophic earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale (The World Bank, 2013). The official death toll according to the government of Pakistan was 75,000 people. Canada responded quickly with about CAD 130 million for relief and reconstruction efforts, contributing 10.4% of all humanitarian aid from DAC donors to Pakistan that year. In response to that natural disaster, it was decided that Canada’s disaster-relief should include the deployment of DART (DND, 2012). Policy decisions are not consistent over time, and this counter-example is another indication that reliance on macro-institutional explanatory variables for implementation decisions is not sufficient. While they provide context, they are not predictive determinants of decision-making.

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When analyzing Canada’s disaster-relief decisions from a macro-institutional perspective, one should commence with questions about where the roots of its humanitarian tradition are and the nature of the country’s bilateral relationship with either of the countries of focus. As highlighted in the review of media reports and studies in grey-literature in the Introduction, interpretations of Canada’s varied responses to the 2010 natural disasters very often refer to macro-institutional explanatory variables. The highlighted counter-examples clearly demonstrate that over the years Canada’s treatment of natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan has not been consistent in terms of magnitude and scope. This is not to dismiss the importance of
the macro-perspective. Without an understanding of the values of humanitarianism that Canada purports to possess, or its relationship with either country over a period, it would be unclear why Canada offered humanitarian assistance in response to the natural disasters in the first place. Aside from setting the context, a substantive answer as to what determined the scope and configuration of disaster-relief offered by Canada in response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan cannot be obtained from macro-institutional analysis. Meso-contextual and micro-foundational analyses complement these findings, and provide a perspective into the role of agency in decision-making, that the macro-level does not explore.

The following section assesses meso-contextual determinants of decision-making in an attempt to unravel situational influences that may better elucidate Canada’s variable approaches to, and treatment of, the 2010 natural disasters.
Chapter 6.0. Meso-Contextual Analysis (Process-tracing)

In developing strategic frameworks, policy makers attempt to foresee logical sequential steps that are likely to occur once implementation begins. These form part of the formal institutional framework in which bureaucratic and political actors must function. These formal structures affect where discourse matters by establishing who talks to whom about what, where, and when (Schmidt, 2011). Policy frameworks dictate the nature of discursive interactions and the possible courses of action available to policy actors tasked with making and carrying out implementation decisions. Through the experience gained from on-the-job training, actors become familiar with the processes that must be applied once that framework is implemented.

In addressing the research question, the meso-contextual level attempts to uncover the complexity of day-to-day decision-making processes that unfold during implementation. The current chapter explains factors that led to Canada’s 2010 disaster-relief strategies in Haiti and Pakistan, through the use of empirically substantiated descriptions of the decision-making process. Using the “detailed-narrative” process-tracing method (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 210), this chapter discusses the disaster-relief outcomes in light of processes that both converge and interact.

The chapter begins by presenting an overview of Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework for response to natural disasters abroad. The chapter then makes the following arguments:
While there is a formal policy framework in place for response to natural disasters, certain decisions are taken without adherence to stipulated guidelines. Canada's responses to natural disasters abroad should be understood as a series of simultaneous and interdependent “tracks.” That these tracks are rooted in the functional and departmental responsibilities of policy actors.

The chapter concludes by presenting an analytical grid to help explain Canada's disaster-relief decision-making from a meso-contextual perspective.


Canada has a structured framework to guide its involvement in disaster-relief efforts abroad (FATDC, 2013). Within hours of a country facing a catastrophic natural disaster and its request for international assistance, Canada’s Stabilization and Relief Taskforce (START) activates the Interdepartmental Taskforce on Natural Disasters Abroad. Through a whole-of-government approach, DFAIT works hand-in-hand with representatives from CIDA and DND, amongst others, to develop and execute Canada's disaster-relief strategy. The taskforce is designed to ensure that Canada’s response is swift, efficient and coordinated.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), of which DFAIT is the custodian, is a working document that forms the foundational reference for responding to international natural disasters. First developed after Canada’s experience in response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the procedures and references are continually revised and strengthened as lessons are learned through successive interventions. The SOPs “are designed to streamline standard actions in response to a major crisis and to anticipate
turnover in staff amongst the various stakeholder units and organizations” (DFAIT 2005, Online). Amongst others, the SOPs include pre-assigned individuals required to carry out specific tasks; reporting templates; authority structures; and details of the step-by-step processes to be undertaken. START-IRH runs training programs every summer in order to ensure that staff within DFAIT’s divisions, and in departments across government, are aware of their responsibilities in the event that an international natural disaster response is required.

According to the SOPs, individuals in START-IRH, CIDA-IHA and DND-DPKPol continually (24/7) monitor natural disasters abroad, receiving automatic alerts through monitoring systems (e.g., United States Seismic Geology Survey) on their smart-phones when a country faces a quick-onset natural disaster. When a natural disaster hits, mission staff (representatives in the Canadian Embassy or High Commission in the affected country) is contacted; and DFAIT is required to call a meeting of the Interdepartmental Taskforce on Natural Disasters Abroad (Taskforce) if deemed necessary. Depending on the nature of the disaster, a number of departments can be invited. These may include Public Health Agency, Public Safety, Natural Resources Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to name a few, and almost always the Department of Finance. Like DFAIT, CIDA and DND, PCO is also permanently part of the taskforce. To feed into and augment reports out of Ottawa, mission staff also provides regular reports to START-IRH and CIDA-IHA regarding the evolving situation.

START-IRH serves as the lead coordinator of the Whole-of-Government Framework. As reflected through the interviews, there is an overwhelming consensus
amongst taskforce members, regardless of which department they are from, that the objective of the whole-of-government effort is to uphold the humanitarian ideals of responding based on the needs on the ground. Members from the participating departments have a clear and common understanding that their objective is to collaborate so as to ensure that Canadian aid is delivered to those affected in the most efficient way.

Once taskforce meetings convene, department personnel share information that they have on the situation on the ground, and present information on resources that their respective departments can bring to bear. Ideas on what the Canadian response could possibly look like are discussed, and by the end of the first taskforce meeting, the skeleton of the Canadian response is already taking shape. The taskforce also serves as a forum to address any coordination and logistics issues in executing decisions, especially with respect to flight scheduling, visas and diplomatic matters that may arise. Augmenting the taskforce preparations, DFAIT, CIDA and DND senior management also hold their own meetings to address issues of contention between departments before appearing at the interdepartmental taskforce table.

Collaborative efforts are recognized for their ability to address inter-organizational conflict by requiring stakeholders to develop a unified strategy on how to decide on the issues that brought them together (Ansell & Gash 2007; Vigoda & Gilboa 2002). One way to enable this is to ensure that all stakeholders share the same base set of information. The regular preparation and distribution of Situation Reports (sitreps) is one means by which to ensure that all stakeholders have the same information on developments. Situation Reports outline important information
regarding the evolving situation in the disaster affected country; include updated assessment of the needs; and record the steps taken by the host government and international actors in response to the event. An update is also provided on Canada’s consular effort; interventions; announcements made by the Prime Minister and WoG Ministers; and statements from the Government of Canada that can be used when addressing media representatives.

Another mechanism in public administration literature that promotes interdepartmental collaboration is the standardization of decision-making processes (Peters, 2005). One means that Canada has available to assist in developing recommendations for consideration by WoG Ministers is the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST). This small team, with a minimum of four members, is Canada’s interdepartmental reconnaissance and assessment capability. The ISST must include one representative each from START-IRH and CIDA-IHA, and two DND/CF personnel. If deemed beneficial, representatives from other departments may be called in to participate. Through collaboration with the host government, the local embassy, and international humanitarian actors present on the ground, the ISST is the first unit to provide relief recommendations for the taskforce to deliberate on.

The SOPs list Canada’s ‘toolbox’ of intervention options that the taskforce can consider when formulating their recommendations. These include cash contributions, deployment of pre-identified Canadian technical experts, and distribution of relief stocks. The SOPs require that the ISST should recommend the use of military assets before these can be officially deployed by the Government of Canada, and it is required to make such a recommendation within 72 hours of arriving in the disaster-affected
country. ISST personnel use a Calibration Table when making their recommendations. Aimed at limiting subjectivity, the table proposes possible recommendations depending on the nature of the disaster and the extent of damage caused. While not an exact science, the Calibration Table is an attempt to standardize Canada’s relief efforts based on the facts and situation on the ground. Similarly, when developing initial recommendations, ISST and taskforce members also assess Canada’s global burden share based on the UN and consolidated flash appeals. Maintaining burden share is an attempt to ensure that Canada’s contribution remains within a pre-identified and agreed range, relative to the contribution of other donors. ISST recommendations are discussed at the taskforce meetings before being provided to WoG Ministers and the Prime Minister for final decision. The deployment of DART requires approval by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, for responding to natural disasters abroad, ministers can make a request to access the Crisis Pool. Canada’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is administered by START to support the country’s response to international crises (OECD, 2006). Announced in the 2005/06 Budget, a part of the GPSF is the Crisis Pool, which is a sum of money capped at CAD 400 million, for international aid and stabilization efforts that exceed approved departmental budgets17.

17 The August 2012 Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) on the Government of Canada Matching Mechanisms in Response to Catastrophic Humanitarian Crises Abroad, saw Cabinet approval for the allocation of an additional CAD 50 million to CIDA and an additional CAD 10 million to DFAIT in 2012-13, and an annual allocation of CAD 100 million to CIDA and CAD 20 million to DFAIT in 2013-14 and on-going. These allocations fall within the Crisis Pool Quick Release Mechanisms. The official justification is as follows: “It is expected that these changes to the Crisis Pool Quick Release Mechanisms will allow CIDA and DFAIT to respond to crises more quickly, without having to delay funding decisions through the Estimates process, which can take many months after the crisis has occurred. This will lead to better financial planning within departments and will remove the risk of failing to gain access to Crisis Pool funds in a timely manner” (Access to Information request, email communication, 2014).
The Crisis Pool is jointly managed by DFAIT and CIDA, in consultation with the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). Upon the agreement of DFAIT, CIDA, Finance, PCO and TBS that an event constitutes a major crisis requiring extraordinary contribution from the GoC; that the crisis has required a multilateral response; and that there are insufficient resources to provide an adequate Canadian response in IHA or START, the Ministers of International Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, with a letter of concurrence from the Minister of Finance and consensus of the central agencies, write to the Prime Minister (or write a Memorandum to Cabinet) requesting approval to access Crisis pool funds. Where DND assets are to be used in the initiative, such as through the deployment of DART, the funds required by the military are used as part of a wider Crisis Pool allocation. This also requires approval of the Minister of Defence. Final release of Crisis Pool funds must be authorized by the Treasury Board, upon receipt of approval from the Prime Minister or Cabinet.

After making contributions to aid efforts from their own reference budgets, DFAIT and CIDA ministers can request to access the Crisis Pool for funds over CAD 10 million. This resource pool is locked, in order to ensure that the rest of the development system is not affected when Canada mobilizes a large-scale relief effort. While access to Crisis Pool funds is generally limited to specific supply cycles, in exceptional circumstances there is an amount set aside which can be released very quickly upon receiving the appropriate approvals, regardless of where the request falls within the fiscal calendar (see footnote 17). The responsibility of the Department of Finance at this time is to play an oversight and challenge role to ensure due diligence,
requiring that proper monitoring and accountability frameworks be put in place so that allocated funds are eventually spent as intended, with accurate account-keeping. This joint structure for accessing Crisis Pool funds ensures that financial accountability is shared amongst all primary stakeholders in the whole-of-government effort.

Civil society can directly shape the magnitude of the Canadian response through the WoG Ministers decision to set-up a Matching Fund. First introduced during the involvement in the 2004 Indian Ocean basin earthquake/tsunami, Canada has established a Matching Fund mechanism whereby it commits to matching dollar-for-dollar, the donations that the Canadian public makes to eligible charities participating in international natural disaster-relief efforts.

Through the Policy Action Group on Emergency Response (PAGER), the Government of Canada also has a noteworthy relationship with its NGO community. PAGER is an informal forum of the Canadian Red Cross and NGOs which are most operational in responding to humanitarian emergencies internationally (Buchanan-Smith & Folster, 2002). CIDA-IHA and START-IRH members participate in PAGER meetings as non-voting members. Soon after a catastrophic natural disaster hits, PAGER convenes teleconference calls, and its participants engage in information sharing with CIDA and DFAIT representatives. Discussions focus on the evolving situation on the ground; obtaining updates on what the respective partners are planning to do to address the disaster; and on seeking opportunities for coordination of efforts. Active since 1999, this is a relatively rare example of sustained cooperation between CIDA, DFAIT and the NGO sector.
To summarize the formal structure of the Whole-of-Government Framework as understood through the data gathered by the principal investigator, Table 6.1 highlights specific functional and departmental roles and responsibilities applicable during implementation:

**Table 6.1. Summary of Functional and Departmental Roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional and Departmental Roles and Responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As the humanitarian experts who have been involved with Canada’s responses to natural disasters abroad for a while, ISST members define the policy problem with a focus on the humanitarian needs on the ground. Needs are ascertained by independent assessment; information received from disaster-affected country, including the Canadian embassy in the country; and information received from trusted humanitarian actors. These include international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Red Cross, and Canadian partners (PAGER). ISST representatives are required to recommend how Canada can best match needs in the disaster-affected region to Canadian capabilities. There is a clear attempt to ensure that “the aid that we do provide is needs-based and not supply driven,” as explained by one ISST representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIDA-IHA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents from CIDA have an overwhelming consensus that their responsibility is to uphold the global principles of humanitarianism that Canada is party to. This is accomplished through funding Canadian NGO partners and international development organizations. One CIDA respondent explains, “We implement the response on the humanitarian side through the organizations that we work through. That’s our role. I don’t think it’s really beyond that”. The responsibility of CIDA is to ensure that those organizations that are funded are most appropriate, and that they deliver. CIDA officials also recognize that responses to humanitarian crises are dependent on receiving a clear request for assistance from the disaster-affected country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>START-IRH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As the coordinator of the whole-of-government effort, START is responsible for coordinating the entire spectrum of Canada’s activities stemming from the natural disaster. One DFAIT representative explains: We’re looking at what the needs might be writ large. We’re looking at all the consular, emergency management issues as well. The role of the taskforce is to unfold a Canadian response not just to threats that might impact upon Canada or threats to Canadians in that country, but what is required to ensure that we can respond to the needs of people who have been affected by the disaster. In its humanitarian response, START-IRH assesses contributions by other international actors. Furthermore, it considers the ongoing programming and bilateral relations with the affected country when developing recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DND-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives from DND consider themselves to play a support function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Canada’s responses to natural disasters abroad. Under the coordination of DFAIT, and working directly with the Head of Mission, they execute Government of Canada decisions regarding consular and humanitarian needs. As explained by DND respondents, military involvement is only suitable when it is considered to be the last resort and is only to continue “until the moment you can find a partner to hand them off to” (Interviewee J). Military involvement in humanitarian operations is dependent on the security situation in the affected region, and on the availability of required CF assets. Through its media-embedding programs, DND ensures that the Canadian public is abreast of DND contributions.

As the official policy, non-partisan advisors to the Prime Minister, PCO ensures that the Prime Minister and WoG Ministers are kept up to speed with developments regarding the situation in the disaster-affected region. PCO reports on taskforce developments, and provides policy guidance when recommendations for intervention are made. Both the PCO and the Department of Finance are directly interested in the financial costs of any humanitarian operation, especially if money from the Crisis Pool is requested. Members of both departments purport to play “the challenge function” to ensure that money is spent effectively.

The decision to deploy military assets to the affected country requires direct approval from the Prime Minister. Where the formal Memorandum to Cabinet letter is not used, a written letter to the Prime Minister from the Minister of National Defence, suffices. In order to access the Crisis Pool, the Treasury Board must agree that the crisis meets the guiding principles of the Crisis Pool. Once the Prime Minister’s or Cabinet approval is received, the Treasury Board approves the release of frozen funds into departmental reference levels.

The following section provides detailed process maps to trace Canada’s responses during disaster-relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan in 2010. This methodology is important for identifying both alignment and discrepancies between the stipulated SOPs and actual decision-making.

### 6.2. Process Maps: Chronology of Events

As articulated in the Methodology chapter, process-tracing helps explain how policy decisions come about by mapping the way in which initial conditions were translated into outcomes. The following process maps were developed using accounts provided by respondents of Canada’s responses to the 2010 natural disasters. The process maps were corroborated with documentation obtained from the Government
of Canada through ATIP requests. In reality, once the implementation process begins, multiple processes occur simultaneously. The process maps try to depict this by presenting chronological accounts of events from the perspective of different participating units, including amongst others, the Canadian mission in Haiti and Pakistan, START-IRH, CIDA-IHA, the taskforce, ISST/DART, and WoG Ministers.

Before presenting the process maps, it is necessary to understand differences in the domestic realities in Haiti and Pakistan immediately following disaster onset. In Haiti, especially in the hours and days in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, most international actors were able to provide assistance as they saw fit. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was directly affected, and its coordination capabilities were slow to start (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). The United States moved over 10,000 troops into Haiti within days of the earthquake, and given its control over the national airport, it privileged American assistance providers at the expense of other flights. On the contrary, soon after the flooding began in Pakistan, the Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) immediately coordinated disaster-relief efforts. Reports of the NDMA requesting UN and international assistance appeared in Situation Reports in Ottawa only after August 1, 2010. Before this time, the NDMA was using its own resources and capabilities to deal with the worsening situation; and was coordinating with NGOs and UN actors already in the country. Even after the Government of Pakistan made its formal request for assistance, donors had to contend with a strong federal coordinating body in Pakistan.

The process maps of the Canadian responses to the 2010 natural disasters are as follows:
Mission: The Earthquake Strikes | Head of Mission Contacts Ottawa |

At 4.53pm January 12, 2010, a 7.0 earthquake struck in Port-au-Prince Haiti. Having taken shelter under a doorframe for the duration of the 38-40 second ordeal, the Head of Mission (HOM), Ambassador Gilles Rivard, proceeded to ensure the safety of embassy personnel, and checked that the walls of the mission were undamaged and secure. With power generators still intact, the mission still had electricity. While communication lines were cut, the HOM headed to a meeting room in which he was aware that there were three cell phones available. One was working. The HOM was able to make a quick 2-minute call to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) in charge of the Americas at DFAIT in Ottawa. It was reported that no one was injured at the mission, but that it was likely that the situation was going to be “very very serious and that we would probably need very strong support very quickly” (Interviewee M). At that time, the ADM had already heard about the earthquake. Personnel at the mission were able to determine the security and safety of other staff that had left the building earlier in the day using walkie-talkie devices that mission staff are provided. Those with collapsed homes were invited to come to the mission for safety.

An hour later the HOM was able to make contact with Ottawa again via a satellite phone using a number provided in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)\(^\text{18}\). It was

\(^{18}\) When the HOM first made contact with Ottawa using the number in the SOPs, he was routed to an answering machine where he was required to leave a message. He was then called back. Following the
at this time that the mission was informed that the “situation was disastrous” with “thousands of people dead and thousands of buildings collapsed” (Interviewee M), and that the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) would be arriving the following day.

The next morning, the HOM was able to speak with the Minister of Foreign Affairs who exchanged words of support and reassured the HOM that any and all support required by the HOM would be provided. The HOM was also able to talk to DFAIT personnel in Ottawa more at length. His primary point of contact was Elissa Golberg, the then Director-General of START, and the lead chair of the whole-of-government effort. At 5.00pm on January 13, the HOM was able to call in on the interdepartmental taskforce meeting. Calls continued twice a day for almost 2-3 weeks.

The day following the earthquake, President Preval made a request for international assistance in disaster-relief efforts. The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) Preliminary Emergency Response appeal was released on January 13, requesting USD 10 million for relief efforts.

**START-IRH and CIDA-IHA: | Whole-of-Government Machine Set in Motion |**

Within minutes of the earthquake striking, personnel received automatic alerts through the United States Seismic Geology Survey on their smart-phones. One senior respondent explained:

I remember looking at my staff when we saw the depth. If I recall correctly, six kilometers, may be seven kilometers, deep. And, we see it happening just outside of Port-au-Prince. I remember looking at the Deputy Director for Natural

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Haiti After Action Review, this number is now a ‘Red Line’ where the caller is able to speak directly with an individual immediately.
Disasters Response and a number of other staff members - I was standing there and saying that the country had just been devastated. “We can expect that 3 to 400,000 people there had died. We need to move now. This is fully taskforce mode - there is no need to wait”. So we knew, and we knew within minutes. (Interviewee U)

At START, work was divided amongst the staff members. An email was sent to the whole-of-government community indicating that an emergency meeting would be taking place later that night in DFAIT. One person was assigned to get in touch with the Consular Emergency Operation Centre in DFAIT to get through to the mission to ascertain whether or not embassy staff was accounted for. The Director-General of START sent messages to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Geographic Programs, the ADM for International Security, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Director of IRH soon met with the Assistant Deputy Ministers, as well as the Deputy and Associate Deputy to inform them of what they should expect the sequence of events to look like within the next 6, 12, 24 and 72 hours, and “to get some guidance from them on how they would like to proceed” (Interviewee Y). It was decided that the ISST was to be sent as soon as possible. One DFAIT respondent explained:

We knew before the taskforce meeting that night that we would be sending an assessment team. We knew, so we didn’t wait for a taskforce for that - we were preparing for that as it was. The question was whether or not we were going to be able to land in Port-au-Prince immediately or would be going to Dominican Republic instead trying to get in over land. (Interviewee U)

In CIDA, IHA prepared and distributed a brief to update senior management about the developments. “We [didn’t] know yet what the exact needs [were] – we feared the worst, but we didn’t know...[often] the alert is based on some data, but then it’s revised sometime afterwards,” explained a senior manager at CIDA-IHA (Interviewee Y). Having been informed about the earthquake immediately, the Director-General of the
Haiti Program contacted the President’s office. News of the natural disaster had already arrived, and the office informed the Minister of International Cooperation. Discussions with START-IRH took place soon after. It was decided that a small interdepartmental meeting would be organized for key departments ahead of the taskforce meeting.

After having heard from the HOM, START-IRH personnel established that there was staff at the mission that could coordinate a number of issues, and that almost 5400 Canadians would require consular assistance. Credible sources reported that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters had collapsed as well as a major hotel where international staff was staying:

We were quite concerned for the ability for the international humanitarian system to ramp up immediately so we were immediately in conversations with the United Nations both in New York and in Geneva seeking information. [DFAIT] (Interviewee U)

Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a statement to the media in the House of Commons foyer at 7:30 p.m. on January 12. He assured that “Canada stands ready to provide consular assistance to Canadian citizens as required”, and that “we have close ties to Haiti, so we obviously stand ready to assist” (FATDC, January 13 2010, online). He noted that Haiti is the country’s second-largest development assistance recipient.

START-IRH and CIDA-IHA staff met ahead of the taskforce meeting. They began to lay the groundwork for decisions that needed to be taken by going through all known and available tools for humanitarian response. Options included: military assets, cash contributions to humanitarian agencies, relief supplies, deployment of experts to UN and other humanitarian agencies on the ground, and deployment of Red Cross assets.
At the Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy (DPKPol) the desk officer responsible for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response received an automatic alert on his phone regarding the earthquake that had just struck. He soon received a phone call from the acting Director General of START-IRH informing him of the taskforce meeting that would take place that night.

Coincidentally, when the earthquake struck, members of DND’s senior management were hosting a Dutch General Officer for dinner. In attendance was the Chief of Staff for Operations of the Canadian Army, the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), and members of the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS). One attendee described:

Everybody who would have a part to play in generating the DART and getting it out the door was actually having dinner when the earthquake happened. So, you know, all of our BlackBerry smartphones went off and a lot of the sort of initial coordination happened right then and there, which was kind of distracting for our guest, but it was useful for us because we could get the train moving in the right direction as rapidly as possible. (Interviewee J)

At 5.10pm, less than 20 minutes after the earthquake, the Commanding Officer of the CF Joint Headquarters based in Kingston, who was also the Commanding Officer of the DART, got an email from a Major General in Ottawa with only two words “Haiti earthquake”. Another email, this time from the higher headquarters, was sent to the DART Command at 6.30pm stating, “Be prepared to go.”

DND departmental meetings took place amongst senior management. The Chief of Defence staff decided, “yes the ISST is going to go, but what we are going to do, is we are going to deploy the ISST plus the Recce party [sic, reconnaissance] plus a seven man medical team” (Interviewee D). This way, “at least someone [would] be on the ground.
to start helping out even before anything was decided” (Interviewee D). It was ascertained that the Minister of Defence was “leaning forward” (Interviewee H). Internal memos obtained via the Access to Information Act verify this. The DART team knew that it should be prepared to move by 6.30am the next morning. Members from DND proceeded to DFAIT to attend the first taskforce meeting. Amongst others, in attendance were members of DPKPol, SJS, and DND Public Affairs representatives.

In response to the request by the President of Haiti for international assistance, on January 14 the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff issued a letter with “the authorization to deploy CF personnel to Haiti” (email). The disaster-relief effort was given the name Operation Hestia. The letter stated, “the CF will provide medical, humanitarian, security and engineering support”. An internal DND report sent at 11.30pm on 14 January, indicated that CEFCOM’s intent was to assist DFAIT in repatriating Canadians and that “further operational direction for aiding the Haitian population would follow the ISST mission analysis”. It also listed forces to be allocated to CEFCOM for Operation Hestia. These included:

- Army assets to include DART
- Air assets to include CC-130, CC-117, CC-150 strategic airlift, three CH-146, and one embarked HELAIRDET
- Navy Assets to include HMCS Halifax and HMCS Athabasca and MCC Command Element

The report also estimated that “1600 CF members will be involved in Op Hestia on location” (email communication).
**Taskforce: |The First Taskforce Meeting|**

The interdepartmental taskforce met at 8.30pm on January 12. In addition to the permanent members, all departments deemed relevant were invited to the taskforce meeting. Reports indicate that upward of 70 personnel were in attendance. Representatives from all employee grades, ranging from program officer/analyst levels to director general, attended initial taskforce meetings for the Haiti response. The chair of the taskforce meeting conducted “a tour de table, a circuit around the room” (Interviewee H). After it was decided that military aircraft would be used to send in relief supplies, one DND official explained: “I raised the point, ‘well if you are sending down aircraft, they better come home full’” (identification conflict). This was the start of the process to repatriate Canadians from Haiti.

After the meeting, senior management was briefed about the developments, including that the ISST would be launched. The first Situation Report (sitrep) was circulated at 1.41am the next morning.

**WoG Ministers: | Communicating with Canadians | Canada’s Commitment to Haiti |**

The Prime Minister (PM) received reports of the earthquake minutes after it struck. He asked that an official statement be released immediately. The PM extended sympathies on behalf of all Canadians and recognized that Canada is “home to a large community of Canadians of Haitian descent” (PM, 2010, online). His statement concluded with the following guarantee, “While officials are currently assessing the damage and the possibility of Canadians injured, Canada stands ready to provide any necessary assistance to the people of Haiti during this time of need”.
According to a statement made on Wednesday January 13 at 11.45am, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other “Cabinet colleagues” had met earlier to discuss “the devastating situation in Haiti”. At this time, the Minister of International Cooperation also announced an initial funding envelope for earthquake relief efforts for up to CAD 5 million. Haiti-born Governor General Michaëlle Jean also made an emotional appeal for the people of Haiti at this time (see GG, 2010). WoG Ministers were ready to provide robust and extensive aid to Haiti. One DND respondent explained:

I don’t know what happened in Ottawa. A three-star General [ranked above the Commanding Officer of the DART] was told by the Chief of Defence to “Go fast, go big”. That’s all that I was apprised of. Now, for the Chief of Defence Staff to say something like that I suspect he had discussions with the Minister [of Defence], the Prime Minister. I don’t know how they do that. I’m sure the Chief of Defence Staff wouldn’t launch forces to another country without permission from his political masters. (Interviewee H)

The PM put in a command for journalists to be deployed to Haiti immediately. On the second flight into Haiti from Canada, 18 journalists were on board.

On January 14 at 8.30am, the Minister of International Cooperation announced that a Matching Fund would be open, for up to CAD 50 million. This required access to the Crisis Pool. Rather than going through WoG Ministers Committees and a Memorandum to Cabinet being issued, the process was expedited. A representative from PCO explained:

Cabinet can often times just be the Prime Minister. In times of crisis we try to streamline processes as quickly as possible. So the three groups in the International Assistance Envelope (IAE) - Finance, CIDA, DFAIT - will write to the Prime Minister saying there’s a crisis. Here’s our proposed response, part of this proposed response is launching a matching mechanism or not. We’re also proposing that CIDA use this amount of their budget, that DFAIT use this amount of their budget...That gives them their policy cover to go forth in the program, and then to go over to the Treasury Board and say, “Here’s the letter signed by
the Prime Minister, let us access the crisis pool and give us the funds.” (Interviewee X)

On January 14, Minister MacKay was in Halifax to deploy the HMCS Athabaskan and Halifax. They were scheduled to arrive in Haiti in approximately 4 days with personnel, equipment and helicopters. On the morning of January 15, Ministers Cannon and MacKay held a press conference to provide an update on the situation. Minister Kent, Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas), welcomed evacuees at Montreal’s Pierre Elliott Trudeau airport that morning. Also on January 15, the PM met with members of the Haitian diaspora in Montreal and Minister Cannon proposed a Minister-Level teleconference with the Group of Friends of Haiti, like-minded countries interested in providing assistance to Haiti, to take place in the next 24-28 hours.

**ISST/DART:** [ISST Arrives in Haiti | Situational Assessment Begins |]

The START-IRH and CIDA-IHA representatives on the ISST headed to Canadian Forces Base Trenton at 3:30am on January 13. Once they met the Commanding Officer of DART, the ISST, the military reconnaissance, and a small medical team, made their way to Haiti. About the medical team, one official explained, “they were sort of seen as a prudent first step so that we were providing medical care from day one. We landed at about 4:30 p.m. in the afternoon the day after the earthquake in Haiti...actually it was just a little earlier than that. So [we landed] within 22 to 23 hours of the earthquake” (Interviewee U).

Some officers who were working in the mission met the team at the airport. 91 Canadians were evacuated to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic on a Canadian Forces air asset. The ISST knew that it had 72 hours to make recommendations to the
taskforce for what the Canadian response could possibly look like by assessing the situation on the ground, and linking it to Canadian capabilities for response outlined in the Whole-of-Government Framework (as noted earlier, also known as the ‘toolbox’ of response options). By the next morning, the medical team was fully functioning and was supporting “people who were obviously requiring medical assistance and life saving assistance” (Interviewee U) explained one respondent.

ISST officials had “almost no doubt” in their minds that the DART, the 205 personnel unit, would be deploying (Interviewee Y). It was a matter of deciding on the location. In the first ISST report, sent at 11.33 p.m. that night, a recommendation was made that the DART should deploy. While no location was suggested, a note was included:

Given the scope of the disaster and the overwhelming needs on the ground, it is also clear that certain additional military assets may continue to be advantageous as part of Canada’s overall response tool kit. While it is important that all options remain on the table, at this early stage the ISST has not undertaken sufficient analysis to recommend the deployment of further CF assets including naval vessels and additional CF forces. It is anticipated that the analysis will be complete over the next 24-48 hours. [ISST Report, January 13]

**Mission:** | Deciding on Location | News of More Military Assets from Ottawa |

According to the SOPs, the Head of Mission (HOM) is to agree on the disaster-relief recommendations suggested in the taskforce. Through consultation with the United Nations (UN) and other foreign officials in Port-au-Prince, it was noted that the United States, Brazil and France would be deploying approximately 9000 armed forces personnel immediately. In order to avoid overlap, and to allow Canada to make “significant impact” (Interviewee V) in the area it was serving, the HOM in consultation with the DART Commanding Officer, decided that a survey of surrounding cities should
The second ISST report was issued on January 14, 6.15pm. The report stated that the Port-au-Prince airport had reached full capacity, and that some planes, including a Canadian Hercules, were turned around by US military personnel who had taken over the airport. Due to the bottleneck and the inability of the airport to accept further flights, the report stated: “The HOM has strongly recommended that the GoC now pause for at least 24-36 hours before deploying further CF personnel and assets into Port-au-Prince,” a recommendation that was shared with DFAIT, PCO and DND.

The following day, the United Nations reported on the significant damage caused by the earthquake. The President and Prime Minister of Haiti confirmed that in addition to Port-au-Prince, there was considerable damage sustained by Jacmel and Léogâne (see Figure 6.1). According to one ISST respondent, they reported that, “Jacmel [is] cut off. The mountain passes, the roads through the mountain, [experienced] all kinds of avalanches, and we can’t get vehicles through to it, and they said I think (sic) that 30% of the town was destroyed” (Interviewee D). Three days following the earthquake, the HOM and the Commanding Officer made their way into Jacmel to conduct their assessment. They were the first aircraft in the city since the earthquake. Also on January 15, the UN Flash Appeal of USD 562 million was formally launched in New York.
After two full days of information gathering, the third and final ISST report, issued at 1.26am on January 16, recommended that the “DART deploy to the Jacmel region”. It also stated, “if the DART does deploy to Jacmel, the ISST further recommends that additional CF assets could be useful”. Further, recommendations for the deployment of Canadian relief supplies, technical experts, and assisting in...
international disaster victim identification (DVI) efforts, were made. While this was the official recommendation, one ISST representative explained:

In the meantime Canada had decided to send many more troops....there was really no doubt in my mind that the DART would deploy. But I did not know until maybe another 24 hours or so later, that Canada was sending 10 times more than [the DART] unit. (Interviewee D)

The ISST was informed by representatives from START-IRH that Brigadier-General LaRoche had been appointed the commander of the Canadian operation in Haiti, and that he would “be coming with an infantry battalion and engineers and all that” (Interviewee D). While the DART Commanding Officer was prepared to deploy to Jacmel, he could not do so until General LaRoche conducted his own reconnaissance and confirmed that that was the best place for the DART. On his reconnaissance, Brigadier-General LaRoche also decided that Canadian military assets would be deployed to Léogâne. Ambassador Rivard and Brigadier-General LaRoche hosted a media conference at 11.30am on January 18 at the mission. The January 20 sitrep reported the following:

The coastal town of Jacmel has been identified as a suitable staging ground for the DART operations. CF Infantry is deployed to Léogâne where they will clear roads to allow for humanitarian access; deployment of a CF field hospital to this area has been recommended and if approved, could be operational on 24 January (TBD) – 931 CF personnel are now present in Haiti.

The final configuration of military assets during Operation Hestia included the 2050 CF personnel being deployed in three locations in Haiti: the Joint Taskforce Headquarters in Port au Prince; the DART in Jacmel; and Brigade Van Doo’s in Léogâne. In addition, there were two Canadian Navy ships on the shores of both Jacmel and Léogâne, the latter of which included a field hospital. CF Air Command included the deployment of C-17s and six CH-146 Griffon helicopters for strategic airlift (DND 2011).
On January 14, media reports indicated that the French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for an international donor conference to help Haiti recover from the devastating earthquake. Reports indicated that he would be discussing the idea with U.S. President Barack Obama, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper (Estrada, 2010). According to one DFAIT respondent, there were a number of “informal conversations in political circles,” and “Canada was big enough to make it happen quickly and small enough to be agile” (Interviewee R), and it was decided that Canada would host the conference.

On January 17, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs chaired the Group of Friends tele-conference. It included ministers from Canada, the United States of America, France and Brazil and several Latin American countries. Discussions led to an international Ministerial conference held on January 25 in Montreal, where representatives from 11 countries, the European Union, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as well as international financial institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Inter-American Development Bank, were in attendance (FATDC, 2012). The conference laid the groundwork for the recovery and reconstruction efforts in Haiti. A representative from DFAIT explained:

Montreal was a daylong conversation on Haiti: how do we give space to the countries, to the NGOs, to the diaspora, to the Haitian government, and to the UN? The Chair statement [was delivered] which basically summarizes the main discussion, and that day’s chair statement was basically setting the stage for the donors conference in New York on March 31st. (Interviewee R)
The New York Donors Conference would be co-chaired by Canada, given that it launched the Ministerial conference, and would mark the transition towards the reconstruction efforts in Haiti.

On January 23, Minister of International Corporation Bev Oda announced the expansion of the Haiti Earthquake Relief Fund beyond the initial cap of CAD 50 million. She stated:

The extraordinary response of Canadians in the tragic aftermath of the Haiti earthquake has once again demonstrated [Canadian] compassion and generosity. The enormity of the devastation is unimaginable and donations have already exceeded $67 million. We will keep matching individual donations dollar for dollar. (FATDC, January 23 2010, online)

CAD 220 million was raised by the public for the Matching Fund between January 12 and February 12.

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This section has laid out the processes, deliberations and decision-making chronology that led to the configuration of Canada's disaster-relief strategy in response to the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti19. The following section does the same for Canada's response to the flooding in Pakistan that followed seven months later.

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19 It must be reiterated that the process maps were informed by the data gathered for this dissertation. Whereas geopolitical and other macro-level considerations may have affected the actual decisions taken by individuals such as the Prime Minister and Whole-of-Government Ministers, the principal researcher was unable to obtain this data. This is primarily due to the fact that meetings with relevant political actors were not granted, and because the bureaucrats interviewed are themselves not privy to this information. See more in the Methodology chapter.
Mission: Embassy in Transition | Flooding Worsens | Mission Considers DART |

The onset of the flooding was July 21, 2010. At that time, the High Commission of Canada in Pakistan (or ISBAD, short form for Islamabad, as referred to by the whole-of-government community) was undergoing a transition. The Chargé d'Affaires was replacing the previous High Commissioner, thereby holding the position of Head of Mission. The Head of Aid was preparing to leave during the first week of August, to be replaced by a new Head of Aid a few days later. Also, the First Secretary who had been following humanitarian issues at the High Commission was also scheduled to leave the position during the second week of August. As one respondent explained, there was “a void for about five weeks” (Interviewee A) at the Canadian Embassy in Pakistan.

Towards the end of July, ISBAD started to receive reports of flooding in the north of Pakistan. As it became apparent that the situation was getting progressively worse, personnel in ISBAD began to issue daily Situation Reports to START-IRH and CIDA-IHA. One respondent explained, “I cannot tell you the first day, but I do know that by, let’s say the 1st of August, they were coming out on a daily basis” (Interviewee A). Figure 6.2 highlights the areas in Pakistan affected by the flooding.
On August 1, via email, ISBAD informed Ottawa that “the NDMA [Pakistan Natural Disaster Management Authority] has now requested UN and international assistance” for flood relief efforts. On August 2, the IFRC issued a Preliminary Emergency Appeal of over USD 16 million “to assist 25,000 families for a period of nine months” (ReliefWeb, August 2 2010, online). The ISBAD sitrep to Ottawa that day recommended that Canada make an immediate contribution of humanitarian assistance. The report stated:

This assistance could be channeled through a range of organizations currently providing emergency assistance such as WFP (World Food Program),
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies and UN-Habitat, and through the UN-managed Pakistan Emergency Relief Fund, which supports international and local NGOs currently operating on the ground.

The report also included that “ISBAD does not recommend sending Ottawa-based staff for needs assessment purposes. There is no requirement for the DART or other CF contributions.” The following day, on August 3, ISBAD sent START-IRH an email with subject line “Donor Contributions as of August 3”, which listed financial contributions made by a number of major donor countries, including the United States of America, Britain, Australia, Switzerland, Japan, Norway, Italy, and the European Union.

While the NDMA had requested international assistance on August 1, the Government of Pakistan officially requested international assistance for aid efforts on August 4. This information was reported to START-IRH. The UN Pakistan Flash Appeal was announced on August 11, 2010 for a total of USD 459.7 million.

On August 13 the ISBAD Head of Mission and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mehmood Qureshi, had a substantive exchange on the impact of floods and Pakistan’s needs. The HOM received confirmation that the Government of Pakistan was not seeking the assistance of Canada DART at this time. However, on August 19, email exchange between ISBAD and START-IRH indicated that the “HOM is increasingly focused on getting the DART in situ”.

**START-IRH and CIDA-IHA: | Whole-of-Government Machine Set in Motion|

Reports of the escalating damage of the flooding in Pakistan started trickling in at the end of July from both ISBAD and international partners. The Director of START-IRH received an email (undated) from a Red Cross representative. It stated:
Lots of people are saying it’s worse than the 2005 [Muzaffarabad] earthquake (less deaths, but much larger scale destruction, loss of homes, livelihood, and massive displacement). The geographical area affected is massive, so even though the [Pakistan] army has significant disaster response capacity, it simply can’t respond to the scale of the needs. There are millions of humanitarians across Pakistan, so there is no shortage of organizations to respond, the trick however will be coordination and access (reaching those most in need). Lots of people are thought to be completely cut-off, without access to clean water, food or shelter.

START-IRH decided to begin processes outlined in the SOPs. The first sitrep to the whole-of-government community was issued on July 30. It described the escalating damage of the flooding, and noted that, “The Government of Pakistan has not required international assistance. The IFRC may issue an emergency appeal for assistance to the international community in the coming days”. Sitreps indicate, “DFAIT communications [had] received a total of 5 media calls since 2 August concerning possible Canadian contributions to the flooding in Pakistan”. Once the IFRC Appeal was issued on August 3, the Minister of International Cooperation announced a contribution totaling CAD 2 million as an initial response to the floods in Pakistan. CAD 750,000 would go towards the Appeal and CAD 1.25 million to the World Food Program.

The August 9 sitrep indicated: “CBC and CTV reporters are expected to travel to Islamabad in the coming days, which could raise the profile of the crisis in Canada”. That same day, START-IRH convened the first meeting of the whole-of-government taskforce. The chair announced:

With the humanitarian situation worsening and the international response getting larger, we felt that it was important to bring together the Interdepartmental Taskforce on Natural Disasters Abroad. The government of Pakistan has called this disaster bigger than the 2005 Kashmir earthquake with up to 12 million people affected by the flooding. A UN appeal is expected to be released soon. Rains are expected to continue over the next few days and more destruction will be uncovered as isolated regions are eventually accessed.
Karachi is now experiencing significant rainfall as well. NATO has offered to provide logistical and transport support.

On August 11, the same day that the UN Pakistan Flash Appeal was issued, DFAIT included as part of its sitrep that media reports claimed the Pakistan Consul General for Toronto, Sahebzada Khan, had requested Canada send DART (see Godfrey, 2010). Also on August 11, START management emailed START-IRH asking where Canada would be placed in donor ranking if it contributed CAD 25 million or CAD 33 million. The answer was that Canada would be 3rd or 4th with either contribution.

Shortly thereafter, the Diplomatic Mission of Pakistan in Canada requested further information pertaining to the DART from DFAIT. As a result, representatives from DFAIT’s South Asia Relations Branch and START-IRH met with the Pakistan Deputy High Commission on August 17, to walk through how Canada responds to natural disasters abroad. The report states that the Deputy High Commission “endeavored to feed this back into his headquarters quickly and promised to be in touch should a request be forthcoming”.

**PCO and WoG Ministers:** | Canada Responds | More Requests for DART | ISST Deployed |

On July 31, representatives of the whole-of-government team from PCO received the START-IRH situation reports about the escalating state of affairs following the onset of Pakistan flooding. On August 3, the Minister of International Cooperation announced Canada’s first contribution of CAD 2 million. On August 10, the Minister of International Cooperation asked DFAIT “informally about departmental views on Matching Funds”.

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A request from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of International Cooperation, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, came in to PMO/PCO a few days later, for access to the Crisis Pool. On August 12 the Government of Canada announced that Canada would be providing $8 million from the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), managed by DFAIT-START, to help the Government of Pakistan procure urgently needed equipment. In addition, it was announced that bridging equipment would be provided immediately, while “other operational support, which could include tents and equipment for life-support, water purification and communications for police and other security forces will follow as needs are clarified” (FATDC, August 14 2010).

On August 14, Prime Minister Harper issued a statement to mark the 63rd Anniversary of Pakistan’s Independence, and extended sympathies to Pakistani-Canadians whose relatives or friends had been affected by the catastrophic flooding. On the same day, the Government of Canada announced that it would provide up to CAD 33 million in response to the urgent needs of flood-affected people in Pakistan. On August 19, Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurence Canon participated in the United Nations General Assembly’s Special Session on Pakistan Floods at the UN Headquarters in New York City. Minister Canon stated that:

Canada has a long-standing and valued friendship with Pakistan. We were one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Pakistan and have maintained a strong development partnership for over forty years. Canadians have been shaken by the images of devastation and inspired by the resolve and determination of the people of Pakistan to overcome this tragedy. (FATDC, August 19 2010)

The August 20 sitrep reported that the Government of Pakistan indicated that it would welcome foreign civilian and military medical assets. The report added, “the
preference is for mobile health units”. This request also corresponds to DFAIT email
communication received on August 20 from Minister Muhammad Saleem Bhounr in
Pakistan, which read:

We greatly appreciate support and assistance received from Canada in augmenting our national effort for flood relief in Pakistan. In this regard, Pakistan would welcome in principle, a Canadian DART to participate in relief activities. However, it is advised that the DART may avoid taking arms and ammunition with it. The Government of Pakistan would be responsible for the safety and security of DART personnel during their stay in Pakistan.

On August 22, the government announced the establishment of the Pakistan Floods Relief Fund. For every eligible donation by individual Canadians to Canadian registered charities between August 2 and September 12, Canada would contribute an equivalent amount to support continuing humanitarian assistance, early recovery, and reconstruction in Pakistan through projects undertaken by trusted humanitarian partners on the ground. On August 23, a joint recommendation from DFAIT and CIDA was made to the Prime Minister to increase the Canadian response to meet humanitarian need, including a proposal to address security needs identified by the Government of Pakistan.

Notes from the 12th taskforce meeting, held on August 26, indicate that media was reporting that the Pakistan High Commissioner indicated a formal request for the DART would be coming. The following day’s sitrep, issued August 27, indicated “a Canadian Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team is scheduled to arrive in Pakistan on 29 August for further assessment and to help outline options for any additional Canadian response”. According to a senior member of DFAIT, the media reports had triggered WoG Ministers to order the immediate deployment of the ISST.
According to a DND representative, once the whole-of-government process began, DART “was made available; they were put on higher notice for readiness to move; the airplane was pre-positioned. All our [DND] internal mechanisms kicked into gear as it would for any natural disaster, and big natural disaster” (Interviewee I). In an email dated August 8, START officials discussed the expectation that NATO would lean “far forward” to play a logistics-transportation role in terms of assisting the UN and other actors to bring relief stocks into the affected area. The email included this suggestion: “If this is the case we will want to explore with DND whether there are available assets in the region that could assist in this regard... The inevitable questions around who pays would need to be dealt with quickly”. Discussions took place between DFAIT and DND regarding this.

It was decided that Canada would engage in a program to supply Pakistan with temporary bridges to assist with the intensive infrastructure damage. An August 17 email exchange amongst DFAIT officials stated, “If bridges do end up being bought in UK...and if DND are unwilling to allow plane, then perhaps PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] could be used from London”. As per the suggestion, it was deemed more economically efficient for commercial charter to be used for this operation. On August 29, the DART Commanding Officer was included as part of the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team to Pakistan. The August 30 sitrep explained:

In a meeting with the ISST, General Nadeem Chair of the NDMA, outlined the Government of Pakistan’s key humanitarian priorities, including health, shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). According to the NDMA, a further 2.5 million emergency shelters are still required. Nadeem also highlighted the need to ensure that potable water reaches affected communities through the
distribution of cost-effective, low-tech options such as water purification tablets. Concerning health needs, Nadeem is opposed to establishing field hospitals.

In the end, it was decided that it was not required to deploy DART. Respondents cited the following reasons: the complications with having CF personnel unarmed, relying on the Pakistan military for protection; the ongoing war in Afghanistan in which Canada was providing armed forces; and the fact that DART capabilities were more suited for stationary rather than mobile units.

**WoG Ministers:** | Letter from the Opposition | Matching Fund Extended |

Although the Pakistan Fund was announced on August 22, “the money only trickled in”. On August 30, Member of Parliament Frank Valeriote of the Liberal Party wrote to the Minister of International Corporation providing explanations for the slower public reaction, such as the slow response of the Government of Canada to the disaster. A request was put forth for the extension of the Matching Fund. On September 12, 2010, Minister Baird, the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons at that time, announced on behalf of the Minister of International Cooperation, that the Government of Canada would extend the deadline for contributions to the Pakistan Flood Relief Fund to October 3, 2010. One senior CIDA official shared that this date was selected because it fell after the completion of the Holy Month of Ramadan in which Muslims are encouraged to be generous and donate money in charity, and because it was well into the start of the school year, “so that [students] had a chance for additional fundraising” (Interviewee Q).
This section has laid out the chronology of steps that led to Canada’s disaster-relief intervention in response to the summer 2010 flooding in Pakistan. The following section takes stock of both process-mapping exercises, and develops an analytical framework to understand decision-making when the Whole-of-Government Framework is applied.

6.3. Understanding Canada’s Disaster-Relief Decision-Making Tracks

Process maps provide a unique insight into the actions, triggers and decision-making processes that took place during the disaster-relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan. They offer a window into the different contextual realities that affected the behaviour and decisions of individuals and departments implicated in the Whole-of-Government Framework. Certain events that occurred - such as the dinner with DND senior officials when news of the earthquake first struck, and the lull at the Canadian High Commission in Pakistan at the beginning of August, are important realities that affected the implementation process. Would DART have begun preparation to deploy so soon after disaster onset if it was not for the impromptu dinner meeting between DND senior officials responsible for approving the mobilization of military resources? And, had the Head of Aid at the Canadian High Commission in Pakistan not been preparing to leave her post, would more attention have been paid to the evolving situation? Not only would these events have been unknown if it was not for the step-by-step drawing out of processes, but the process maps help researchers explore the extent to which these context-specific events shape policy output. The most important insight taken from this
exercise, however, is its ability to substantiate the power of WoG Ministers in shaping the implementation process.

By deconstructing and then reconstructing the data gathered through the process-tracing exercise, it can be deduced that there are a multitude of processes, or ‘tracks’, that take place simultaneously during implementation. These are identified as a result of the mandated functional and departmental roles, and given the chronology of events identified through the process mapping exercises. The tracks, and the departments and/or agencies most directly implicated by them, are listed below:

- Political Track: PMO/PCO
- Media Communications Track: DND
- Financial Track: PCO/TBS/Finance/DFAIT/CIDA
- Assessment Track: DFAIT/CIDA/DND
- Military Track: DND

To better understand what contributed to the variable Canadian responses to the 2010 natural disasters, these tracks must be individually assessed. Each track has interdependencies and contingent factors that affect its outcome. In acknowledging the existence of these tracks, it is clear that there is not one single ‘decision-making process’, but rather that there are a series of processes which together shape implementation and, ultimately, outcomes.

In terms of interdependencies, the process-tracing exercise has been useful in identifying the criticality of the political track in whole-of-government decision-making. While the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) require that the ISST make recommendations for the use of military assets based on needs-assessments prior to their consideration and approval by WoG Ministers, this protocol was not followed during earthquake relief efforts. The Minister of National Defence had already
authorized a number of CF assets and forces, even prior to the receipt of the ISST report. One clear example is that while the first ISST report was issued at 11.45pm on January 13 without a recommendation for the sending of the Navy, the Minister of Defence waved-off the Navy ship on January 14 anyway. The report states: “While it is important that all options remain on the table, at this early stage the ISST has not undertaken sufficient analysis to recommend the deployment of further CF assets including naval vessels and additional CF force”. Furthermore, according to documents received from the Access to Information request, the Prime Minister only formally authorized the deployment of the DART on January 18. On that day Prime Minister Stephen Harper wrote to the Minister of Defence stating, “Thank you for your letter of January 14 requesting authorization to deploy CF assets in response to the January 12 earthquake in Haiti. I am very pleased to authorize the deployment of additional CF resources as outlined in your letter.” This authorization came 4 days after the Navy had left Canadian shores, and while additional military staff were already en route to Haiti.

In addition to the protocol of the Whole-of-Government Framework not being followed, the Government of Canada also seemed to dismiss requests by political leaders in Haiti. The January 14 ISST report states that the Haitian Prime Minister requested that no further rescue teams be deployed on the ground in Haiti, primarily due to congestion at the airport and the overwhelming number of international personnel that had landed in the country. To reiterate this, the Head of Mission requested “a pause for at least 24-36 hours before deploying further CF personnel and assets into Port au Prince”. This, however, did not deter Canada from authorizing a far
greater number of military personnel than the traditional 205 DART unit. One DND representative shared:

[In the 24 hours following the earthquake] there was specific information that was passed on to the Canadian Forces [from senior officials]...they were told to plan a large-scale response. Now, what is a large-scale response for Canadian Forces? It’s bigger than the DART, and that’s just what we did. That was basically happening on the 13th. [...] When I came back into work on the 14th, the Canadian Forces had already an outline plan for about 2,000 including the ships and all the other units. (Interviewee V)

These examples prove that despite the existence of the Whole-of-Government Framework, political will can result in certain decisions being taken without adherence to stipulated guidelines. This clearly highlights the centrality of political imperatives in Canada’s international disaster-relief decisions. Similarly, as will be highlighted in the Chapter 8.0 on Micro-Foundational Analysis, Canada’s response to the flooding in Pakistan was also dictated by the political track. In this case, the political track’s lack of attention to the disaster quelled the ability of the Whole-of-Government Framework to mobilize fully.

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Process maps are important for trying to understand what determined the varied scope and configuration of disaster-relief offered by Canada from an administrative perspective. Without the numerous interviews required to trace the events from the vantage point of different departments and actors, it would not be clear how and why Canada responded the way in which it did. The following analytical grid, Table 6.2, describes the different tracks (political, media communications, financial, assessment and military) that are implicated in Canada’s Whole-of-Government responses, and summarizes how they are interconnected.
Table 6.2: Disaster-Relief Analytical Grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Track</th>
<th>Main Departments</th>
<th>Inter-Dependencies</th>
<th>Case-Specific Problem Definition</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Case-Specific Problem Definition</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Primary Concerns</td>
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<td>Contingent Conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>PMO/PCO (Prime Minister + Ministers)</td>
<td>Financial Track</td>
<td>- Public Expectation*</td>
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<td>- Public Interest*</td>
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<td>- International Action</td>
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<td>- Consular Needs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Visibility (domestic and international)*</td>
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<td>- Geopolitical ties</td>
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<td>Financial</td>
<td>PCO TBS Finance DFAIT CIDA</td>
<td>Political Track</td>
<td>- Availability of Funds</td>
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<td>- Fiscal calendar</td>
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<td>Media Communications</td>
<td>DND (+Ministers)</td>
<td>Political Track</td>
<td>- Public Expectation</td>
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<td>- Public Image*</td>
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<td>- Use of military assets</td>
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<td>Assessment</td>
<td>DFAIT CIDA DND</td>
<td>Political Track</td>
<td>- Needs</td>
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<td>- Capacity to meet needs</td>
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<td>- Ask from country</td>
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<td>- Collaboration with mission</td>
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<td>- International action</td>
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<td>- Needs assessments by partners</td>
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<td>- Bilateral programming</td>
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<td>- Consular needs</td>
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<td>Military</td>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Political Track</td>
<td>- Last resort</td>
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<td>- Political request</td>
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<td>- Security of personnel</td>
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<td>- Availability of assets</td>
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* Discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters

The analytical grid, which summarizes the findings from both process-tracing exercises, provides a unique insight into answering the first secondary research question: What influenced the actions of bureaucratic and political actors when implementing Canada's Whole-of-Government Framework? By transposing the functional and departmental roles highlighted in Table 6.1 with the process maps, the
grid provides a perspective on how different actors within a particular track define problems. As exemplified in the table, the Communications, Financial, Assessment, and Military tracks are all dependent on the Political track. And, as indicated by the double-headed black arrow, the Political track is interdependent with the Financial track. This is due to the practical and inevitable requirement of funds for relief interventions.

For each track, primary concerns and contingent conditions are presented. Primary concerns refer to those variables that individuals implicated in each track base their decisions on, while contingent conditions refer to those underlying factors which dictate the direction of the track. These last two columns are informed by the aggregation of findings from the data gathering and analysis conducted by the principal investigator. While they reflect findings for the cases of interest in this dissertation, the Analytical Grid can be used to better understand Canada’s disaster-relief interventions in other instances.

The following chapter undertakes additional meso-contextual analysis to further elaborate on this answer. It explores how Canadian media outlets defined the disasters, and how this may have affected the Government of Canada’s implementation decisions.
Chapter 7.0. Meso-Contextual Analysis (Media Analysis)

Political leadership is driven by public opinion; and public opinion is driven, in many ways, by the media (Martin, 2005). This chapter is a comparative analysis of Canadian television and newspaper coverage during the 2010 natural disasters. As explained through the process maps, following the onset of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the Canadian Prime Minister, Governor General and relevant ministers engaged in an active communications strategy to keep the public abreast of Canada’s disaster-relief response. Within three days of the earthquake, almost 20 press conferences were held and public statements were issued. On January 14, the Minister of Foreign Affairs met with the Haitian community in Montreal - one of several meetings that involved WoG Ministers and senior officials from the whole-of-government community engaging with the Haitian diaspora.

This level of engagement with the Canadian public or media did not follow the Pakistan response. The Prime Minister did not release a statement in respect of the escalating situation caused by the flooding. Rather, on August 13, Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued a statement to mark the 63rd anniversary of Pakistan’s independence, in which he extended sympathies to Pakistani-Canadians whose relatives or friends had been affected by the flooding (Harper, 2010). During the month following the issuance of the first situation report on the Pakistan floods, Ministers made only 10 press statements about the events.

In addition to differences in the number of public appearances for both natural disasters, the Government of Canada also engaged in an active communications
strategy during Canada’s efforts in Haiti. As highlighted through the process maps, the Prime Minister personally requested that 18 Canadian journalists deploy to Haiti on the second flight out of Canada. Information received from the ATIP requests, including situation reports and Ministerial briefing notes, show that as of January 25, only 13 days after the earthquake, 45 Canadian journalists were already on the ground in Haiti, all housed in the compound of the Canadian embassy.

Given the political climate in Canada at the time of the Haiti earthquake, some argue that the level of Canada’s engagement was a means to improve the Prime Minister’s decreasing public opinion polls ratings (Mason, 2011). Domestically, the political climate in Canada was volatile during the time that the earthquake struck. Prime Minister Stephen Harper had advised the Governor General to prorogue parliament on December 30, 2009. One justification for this decision was in order to keep parliament in recess for the duration of the XXI Olympic Winter Games to be held in Vancouver, British Columbia, in February 2010 (Brennan, 2010). It was also at this time that documents confirming the torture of Afghan prisoners of war by Canadian Forces, retrieved through the government’s Access to Information mechanisms, were unveiled. This led to a weakening of public support for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, and decreased approval ratings for the Conservative minority government (Mason, 2011). In response to the prorogation, demonstrations took place on January 23 in over 60 cities in Canada, as well as in at least four major cities in other countries. The protests attracted thousands of participants through the social networking site Facebook. The Conservative Party faced the threat of a Liberal-New Democratic Party (NDP) coalition government. The Government of Canada did not face similar pressures
during the Pakistan floods. Instead, the flooding took place during the summer, while Parliament was not in session.

Inevitably, Canada’s rapid response to the catastrophic earthquake shifted news media coverage away from domestic affairs, to the disaster-relief efforts. Canada would be able to showcase its leadership globally, and perhaps “regain the trust” of the Canadian public as described by one interview respondent (Interviewee R). Positive news coverage contributes to the political calculus of intervening (Martin, 2005). Political leadership is driven by public opinion; and invariably, the impact of media on Canada’s international development policies, especially with respect to coverage and attention to specific geographic areas, has already been established (Martin, 2005; Van Belle et al, 2004).

This section is a detailed analysis of television and newspaper coverage following Canada’s aid interventions in both cases. For consistency, the date-range chosen corresponds to the onset of the natural disasters to the end of the Matching Fund period (see Chapter 4: Methodology for more details). The following observations are made:

- The needs in the disaster-affected regions were not the primary focus of reporting in either Haiti or Pakistan media coverage
- Media coverage of both disasters varied primarily by quantity, and the degree to which the problem was framed as a ‘Canadian’ one
- Media coverage does not appear to have had a causative effect on the actions of the Government of Canada during the earthquake response, but it did seem to encourage action during Canada’s response to the flooding in Pakistan.
7.1. Overview of CBC Television and Newspaper Coverage

(1) CBC Television Coverage (English)

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) TV coverage across Canada from disaster onset to the end of the matching period aired 660 items for Haiti and 128 for Pakistan. Total airtime was 70 hours and 9 minutes, and 4 hours 48 minutes respectively. Figure 7.1 compares the airtime for both disasters during the assessed periods. Whereas coverage for the Haiti earthquake generally decreases over time, coverage of the flooding in Pakistan resembles a bell curve. These patterns confirm the nature of the disaster. For sudden onset natural disasters, like the earthquake, coverage is most intense when the earthquake first hits due to the unexpected nature of the event and the high mortality and damage inflicted immediately upon disaster onset (Mason, 2011). The television coverage of the Pakistan floods corresponds to the slow-onset nature of the natural disaster, where the severity of the flooding only became apparent over a sustained period.

Figure 7.1. Quantity of CBC English Television Coverage Following both 2010 Natural Disasters
CBC Toronto began airing reports of the earthquake less than an hour after the earthquake struck. On the two-hour show *Power and Politics with Evan Solomon*, which aired at 17.00, Evan Solomon announced breaking news that an earthquake had struck off the coast of Haiti. Further reports indicated that a “hospital had collapsed after the 7.2 magnitude earthquake, with a 5.9 magnitude aftershock”\(^{20}\). During the second hour of the show, the Power Panel discussed the possibility of sending DART to Haiti, noting the strain on armed forces in emergency situations because of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. At 19.00, another two-hour special segment of *Connect with Mark Kelly* reported on the evolving situation in Haiti live. The show featured interviews with meteorologists, members of civil society organizations, freelance reporters familiar

\(^{20}\) All direct quotations of television coverage are copied verbatim from the unmarked documents provided by the CBC Media Librarian. As a result, complete citations are not provided. Similarly, complete citations for newspapers articles quoted in this chapter are not provided. Rather, dates and the actual newspaper (Toronto Star, Globe & Mail, or National Post) for each directly quoted article are included in the text of the dissertation. This information is deemed sufficient to locate the articles if required.
with Haiti, and local citizens. There was also a live shot of Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon reacting to the earthquake in the parliamentary hallway.

Both Power and Politics with Evan Solomon and Connect with Mark Kelly had Haiti coverage running throughout their two-hour programs on January 13. On Power and Politics, Leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP) Jack Layton urged the Government of Canada to match donations to the relief effort in Haiti, and to expand the definition of ‘family’ such that loved ones could be approved to reunite in Canada. Quebec Liberal MP Denis Coderre and NDP Foreign Affairs Critic Paul Dewar also discussed the severity of the damage and encouraged the relief effort by Canada. Also on January 13, news segments airing clips of political actors and senior government officials included: Governor General Michaëlle Jean attending a meeting with PM Stephen Harper; Chief of Defence Walter Natynczyk and ministers discussing disaster-relief efforts for Haiti; and Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff responding to questions on aid to Haiti. Governor General Michaëlle Jean also gave an emotional press conference on January 13, a segment that aired for 13 minutes. Celebrity coverage included Haitian-born singer Wyclef Jean calling for action after the earthquake, with still images of the damage in Haiti playing during his message. Other celebrities featured included Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, Rihanna, Leonardo DiCaprio, Mariah Carey, and Kanye West commenting on the events.

News centres in other parts of the country also immediately reported on the situation in Haiti. It was reported that “102,430 Haitian-born people currently live in Canada, 90% of whom are in Quebec”, and that there were 6-thousand Canadians in Haiti at the time of the earthquake. Most segments personalized the crisis for
Canadians. At 18.00 on the day of the earthquake, CBC News Windsor reported that “Many people in Windsor Essex are worried tonight” fearing for their loved ones following “the worst earthquake ever to hit the region”. A telephone number for the Department of Foreign Affairs was provided for those seeking to find Canadian citizens in Haiti. Similar reports on people in Montreal, Calgary, Toronto and Ottawa, distressed due to their inability to contact loved ones in Haiti on the day of the earthquake, were also aired. Stories about individual Canadians unable to get through to their loved ones in Haiti continued to be aired over the following days. These included stories of concerned citizens in Winnipeg, Edmonton, Vancouver, Moncton, Saskatchewan, Glovertown and Yellowknife. Personal stories were also featured. These included stories about Pastor Larry Forsythe and his team from First Baptist Church in Leamington, Ontario, who just escaped the earthquake by a few minutes; and Canadian Jeff Bultcha of Chatham who changed his original shipment of soccer shoes for children in Haiti, to medical supplies and tents given the devastation caused by the earthquake. Other stories of Canadians quick to offer help to Haiti included coverage of NGOs, churches and individual citizens willing to offer support through their individual means. It was reported that eighty percent of Haiti’s population is Roman Catholic, and a number of stories covered local churches engaged in relief efforts.

Several reports focused on stories about the six-thousand Canadians in Haiti at the time of the quake. Three were confirmed dead on January 13. The National discussed “incredible stories of Canadians stuck under the rubble in Haiti using their cell phones to text to Canada or send messages to Facebook to be rescued”. Reports also highlighted that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had
confirmed two RCMP officers on mission there were still missing, including Superintendent Doug Coates. *Montreal Late Night News* at 22.55 on January 13 aired a 50 second segment that featured appearances by the Mayor of Montreal and the Montreal Police Chief. It was reported that 42 officers in the Montreal police force were on mission to train the Haitian National Police in Haiti during the time of the earthquake, and that attempts were being made to locate them. Vancouver late night reported that 17 British Colombia high school students had landed in Port-au Prince just three hours before the earthquake.

CBC network aired about 6½ hours of television coverage and a telethon on January 22. In an effort to boost donations to the cause, a celebrity-packed telethon was run in association with other television networks around the world. While much of the broadcast focused on this telethon, segments of popular CBC shows like *Power & Politics* also reported the protests of Canadian citizens against the prorogation of Parliament.

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The first coverage on the flooding in Pakistan aired at 23.00 on July 30. It was a short 10-second news segment that reported, “Monsoons in northern Pakistan have triggered some of the worst flooding in decades”. On July 31, *The National* reported on the escalating problem, highlighting that 800 people were killed, and that the United Nations estimates more than a million could be affected by the time the crisis would pass. The severity of the disaster was discussed more explicitly on August 3, with a report sharing the United Nations statement that, “The flood currently taking place in Pakistan is shaping up to be their worst in a hundred years”. Over the following days,
CBC news reported on the ever-increasing number of people affected. On August 9, it was reported that, “the United Nations said flooding in Pakistan is causing more suffering than the Tsunami and the Haiti earthquake combined. Close to 14 million people have been affected. At least 1600 killed”. Deepening of the crisis was announced on August 13, with reports of waterborne diseases and infections setting in; and the next day, on August 14, it was reported that 20 million people were without a home, and that a case of cholera had been confirmed. The following day, the UN Secretary General was reported as declaring Pakistan’s plight to be the worst he had ever seen.

Stories of the mobilization of support by Canadians began on August 1, with a report of the aid group Islamic Relief Canada collecting donations at the annual Muslim Fest. Over the following days there were further reports of local Pakistani communities collecting donations, and of worried people in Toronto, Montreal, Regina, and Calgary awaiting news about their loved ones in Pakistan. On August 13 it was reported that Global Medic volunteer paramedics were preparing to leave Toronto to work in Pakistan; and on August 16 there was coverage on Yellowknife’s Islamic Association fundraising for the aid-efforts. Reports of Canadians in Edmonton and Winnipeg rallying for support were also aired. On August 23, CBC reported on a fundraising initiative for Doctors without Borders, in which it emphasized, “The facility and all the food were donated by the owner, who is not Pakistani, but Indian”.

With a total of 45.51 minutes of news, the most extensive coverage on the flooding during the time period assessed, was on August 20. On this day, there was significant coverage of the Miss Pakistan World Pageant that took place in Brampton,
Ontario. Despite criticism that the pageant should not continue because of the flood emergency in Pakistan, the organizers claimed that there was a fundraising component to the event, and continued with the program. This story was covered in News at Five, Late Night News, and in the Connect with Mark Kelly show. Also on August 20 a major fundraising dinner in Windsor, with over 1000 attendees, was reported; and CAD 260,000 was pledged for donation. On August 22, CBC’s The National hosted Canada’s first Pakistani-born Senator, Salma Ataullahjan, who discussed her close ties to her homeland.

A number of stories discussed the discontent with the actions of the Pakistani Government, and the apparent hesitations for aid provision in Pakistan. On August 3, CBC reported on the criticisms against Pakistan President Asif Zardari for not cancelling his official Europe tour during that critical time, and the story continued until his return to the country on August 10. The first expressions of blame for the slow aid response on Islamaphobia were aired on August 25 during Power and Politics with Evan Solomon. And on August 26, the United States State Department was reported saying that it had credible evidence the Taliban was planning to attack foreigners delivering supplies to flood victims.

Reports of discontent with the Canadian response appeared on August 9, where the former president of the International Development and Relief Foundation discussed the politics behind the “low amount,” CAD 2 million, that was announced by the Minister of International Cooperation to help flood victims in Pakistan. Similar reports about “the controversy around the lack of donations from world governments and aid agencies for the flood stricken,” were aired on August 11. The August 17 Connect with
Mark Kelly show discussed “why the international community, including Canada, does not seem to care about the devastating floods in Pakistan”. The next day, on August 18, Saheb-zada Khan, a Consul General of Pakistan in Toronto, discussed Canada’s weak support for the flooding in Pakistan.

(2) CBC Television Coverage (French)

French CBC TV coverage across Canada from disaster onset to the end of the matching period aired 1109 items for Haiti and 114 for Pakistan. Total airtime was 107 hours and 4 minutes, and 4 hours 3 minutes respectively. Figure 7.2 compares the airtime for both disasters during the assessed periods. Coverage for both natural disasters follow the same pattern as the English coverage. Yet, total airtime and number of stories is almost double in French television coverage for the earthquake in Haiti. This can be explained by the concentration of Haitian diaspora communities in Canada, and the fact that they are primarily French speaking. Total coverage for the flooding in Pakistan is almost the same in both English and French coverage, with the peak occurring on the same day as in English coverage, namely August 20, the date of the Miss Pakistan World Pageant.
7.2. Overview of Print Media Coverage

(1) Domestic Newspaper Coverage (English)

Print media coverage analyzed consists of the three most widely read
newspapers in the country: Toronto Star; Globe & Mail; and National Post. Coverage of the Haiti earthquake in these newspapers was extensive. 433 stories appeared in the month following the earthquake in the assessed newspapers, with 58 front-page articles. In contrast, there were 99 articles discussing the flooding in Pakistan, only 10 of which were on the front-page.

On January 13, all assessed newspapers featured front-page articles highlighting the extent of damage caused by the earthquake. “Thousands missing, feared dead in 7.0 earthquake that leaves Port-au-Prince in ruins”; “Earthquake ‘catastrophe’ hits Haiti; Impoverished nation thrown into chaos as 7.0 quake hits densely populated capital, crushing presidential palace and a hospital; Officials and aid agencies scrambling to determine extent of devastation”; and “‘Catastrophe’ in Haiti; Massive earthquake brings chaos and death to impoverished Caribbean country” were the headlines in the, National Post, Globe & Mail and Toronto, Star respectively. The follow-up articles in all three papers focused on how Canadians were taking the news. The National Post used a quote from Governor General Michaëlle Jean’s statement, “I fear for its people”, as the title of one of the subsequent articles. Using a dramatic picture of destruction, the August 14 headline of the Globe & Mail read “‘Cries everywhere’ as Haitian-Canadians call home; Members of the Haitian community in Quebec, estimated at 130,000, devastated as news of destruction, chaos unfolds”. “Busy signal greets frantic Canadians,” proclaimed the Toronto Star. These follow-up stories highlighted the connection and closeness of Canadians to the situation in Haiti; and given the impact on the large Haitian diaspora in the country, the earthquake was immediately also presented as a heart-wrenching Canadian problem. Two days after the earthquake the
Globe & Mail featured an article with the headline “Canadians quick to show their generosity; From students’ lunch money in a small Ontario community to corporate cheques, donations to Haitian relief pour in”, indicating that the concern for Haiti touched a wide spectrum of Canadians, many of whom were obviously eager to help.

A number of articles highlighted Canada’s swift aid efforts in Haiti. Appearing in the Globe & Mail, a January 14 article stated, “Once slammed for sluggish response, Canada swiftly sends in the troops”. “Aid organizations are racing to Haiti with supplies,” discussed the numerous non-governmental organizations working arduously to support efforts in Haiti. “Clooney leads Haiti telethon” discussed the day-long television fundraiser that saw a number of celebrities appealing for public donations. Many features discussed other means of support, including “First responders heed Haiti’s call,” and “Texting emerging as a powerful force in the aftermath of the earthquake”. Any inefficiency in providing aid was attributed to the evolving situation on the ground, such as in one article with the headline, “Violence, chaos choke global aid effort; Mission shifts course from rescue to relief/ Aid workers stymied by bottlenecks and looting,” appearing on January 18 in the Globe & Mail.

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The first article on the Pakistan floods appeared on page A4 in the Toronto Star on July 31, with the heading “Pakistan floods claim hundreds of lives; 400,000 stranded in northwest as torrential rains swamp villages, wipe out scores of roads, bridges”. The article highlighted the severity of the situation, stating that it was the “deadliest such disaster to hit the region since 1929”. It reported that Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Information Minister for Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa Province saying, “We appeal to the
world community to help us. We need a lot of assistance.” A report appearing a few days later in the Toronto Star noted that the flooding constituted the “worst waters to strike country since 1929”.

The first front-page article on the Pakistan floods appeared on August 2 in the Globe & Mail, with the headline, “Entire villages disappear in Pakistan floods; More than 1,000 killed, a million displaced in crisis that has become political storm”. The Canadian position, as announced by Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon, was that, “We are monitoring the situation very closely and working with local authorities.” The article highlighted the country’s internal feuds over water infrastructure, referring to the affected areas as a “tribal war zone”. The 30,000 people stranded by the waters were described as suffering from snakebites, diarrhea and asthma; and Pakistan’s Information Ministry also confirmed a cholera outbreak in the Swat Valley. The National Post’s first mention of the flooding appeared on August 4, with a page A9 article titled “Karachi attack ’a trap to destabilize Pakistan’; Politician Slain”. The focus here was on riots in the capital, but the article began with the words, “As the worst monsoon rains in 80 years continue to ravage northwest Pakistan...”. This was the only mention of the floods in the article.

The August 8 headline of Toronto Star read, “Islamists offer aid as rains lash flooded Pakistan; Hardliners join global effort to step up aid as rain forecast threatens to deepen nation’s crisis”. The article states, “As the Prime Minister appealed for national solidarity, hard-line Islamists rushed to fill in the gaps in the government’s aid effort”. This article reflects a general shift in the type of coverage following the disaster, from covering the escalating damage to more political nuances of relief-efforts. For
example, the second National Post article, which was also the second front-page article in all three major papers, appeared on August 10 highlighting, “Zardari faces own Katrina; Flood water may wash away Pakistani President’s career.” The article equated events to those faced by President George W. Bush during the relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The next National Post story appeared a week later on August 17, and was introduced with a front-page headline reading, "Has Pakistan's terror and corruption image hindered flood aid?". On August 21 and August 22, two Toronto Star articles read, “Pakistan moves against militant-linked charities” and “Fearing corruption in Pakistan, donors offer up homespun flood aid efforts; Expat community in GTA turning to unusual, even tenuous, word-of-mouth methods to send money to flood-ravaged country rather than donate to major charities”. The focus of these articles was on skepticism with aid efforts.

The Globe & Mail's second feature on the floods, printed on August 10, highlighted the efforts of a local princess to help, mentioning also how the flooding simply added to the carnage inflicted by terrorist groups in the Swat Valley. The headline, appearing on page A11, read “A princess comes home to a people in need; As the Swat Valley deals with the ravages of the Taliban and now a devastating flood, Zebu Jilani helps rebuild”. The article centres on the princess’s aid efforts and her hospital that was greatly affected by the flooding. The next article, appearing on August 17, asks “Why Western Donors are Snubbing Pakistan after Opening their Wallets for Haitians”, again addressing issues which were peripheral to the immediate need faced in the affected region. Three days later, on 20 August, with, “Organizers criticized for running Pakistani pageant in wake of flood disaster,” the Globe & Mail's focus was again not on
the effects of the flooding, but rather on the controversial international Pakistan beauty pageant taking place in Toronto. All three papers covered this incident.

A number of articles discussed Canada’s slow response to the flooding in Pakistan, as compared to the flooding in Haiti. The reasons attributed to this difference have been discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1). The first article making this comparison was featured on August 17 in the Globe & Mail.

(2) Domestic Newspaper Coverage (French)

Print media coverage analyzed consists of the two most widely read French-language newspapers in the country: La Presse Canadienne and Le Journal de Montréal. 217 stories appeared in the month following the earthquake in the assessed newspapers. In contrast, there were 153 articles discussing the flooding in Pakistan. According to the DFAIT Media Analysis report for coverage of Canadian involvement in Haiti, French-language dailies were more critical of the way the Canadian government dealt with the earthquake than English dailies. Specifically, French-language coverage was critical of Canada’s immigration process for Haitian refugees and its treatment of the families of Quebec earthquake victims, where it was generally believed that immigration procedures should be relaxed to include a larger scope of relatives affected by the earthquake. Criticism of Quebec’s exclusion from the Ministerial Preparatory Conference was also included.

The Media Relations Office report also mentions that on January 20, 22 and 23, mentions of Minister Cannon in French-language articles either equaled or exceeded his mention in English-language articles, primarily due to the attention given by French-
language dailies to the Ministerial Preparatory Conference held in Montreal; the Quebec’s government individual aid efforts; and “as a result of strong ties between Quebec and Haiti” (Media Relations Office, 2010, p. 6). According to the report, the vast majority of commentary pieces were positive, applauding the aid commitments by the government. The Media Relations Office report for the flooding in Pakistan indicates that regional analysis shows Ontario had the greatest coverage (40%), the Prairies were second highest (27%), and that “Quebec dailies did not place as much importance on the issue”, with 17% of total coverage (Media Relations Office, 2010b, p.2). This difference is attributed to the high number of articles reporting on local fundraising efforts in the Prairies and Ontario.

7.3. Nature of Coverage: A Canadian Problem versus an Effort in Vain

There were explicit efforts by the Government of Canada to send journalists to Haiti to cover the evolving situation and Canada’s aid-efforts there. This inevitably contributed to the greater number of stories covering the earthquake, compared to the flooding. CBC News in particular had 14 times more airtime; and newspapers featured 4 times more articles on the earthquake (see Table 7.1).

Substantial news coverage triggered by a focusing event contributes to positive feedback, and increases enthusiasm for the case (Downs, 1972). An online survey conducted by Angus Reid (2010) where a representative sample of 1,000 Canadian adults were polled, found that 38% made a donation to help Haiti after the January earthquake but only 4% donated to help Pakistan after the floods. The same poll showed that whereas 38% of Canadians believed that donations to Haiti would be used
to help people, only 28% believed the same for the Pakistan contributions (Angus Reid, 2010). More than the numbers of articles, the content of media coverage provides critical insight into why this was the case.

Table 7.1. Comparative Table of News Coverage of both 2010 Natural Disasters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Haiti (Jan 12-Feb 12)</th>
<th>Pakistan (July 21-Oct 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Television Coverage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First CBC news coverage</td>
<td>January 12</td>
<td>January 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV segments/Shows</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total air-time (hh:mm:ss)</td>
<td>70:08:57</td>
<td>107:04:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newspaper Coverage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Newspaper Coverage</td>
<td>January 13</td>
<td>January 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page stories</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both television and newspaper coverage following the earthquake, Canada was pictured as immediately sharing the grief of Haitians. Many stories about Montreal’s concerned Canadians reflected the large Haitian diaspora in the city. Personal stories featured Canadians across the country sharing in the pain and mobilizing to contribute to the aid efforts. And with Christianity being one of Haiti’s primary religions, many segments showcased relief-efforts by churches and church-groups. On the other hand, stories of Canadians in distress over the events in Pakistan were comparatively fewer in number, and most featured fundraising initiatives originated from Muslim or Pakistan communities across Canada. Only a few stories reported on aid provided outside of these communities, such as the August 23
fundraising initiative for Doctors without Borders, in which it was emphasized that the main organizer was of Indian, not Pakistani, origin. With two fallen RCMP officers and the Governor General Michaëlle Jean being from Haiti, many more high profile officials were discussed in Canada’s coverage of the earthquake. There was, however, only one story of a Canadian political figure, Senator Salma Ataullahjan, who appeared on CBC’s *The National* to discuss her close ties to Pakistan.

A recent study on the coverage of Haiti’s earthquake indicated that on average, the CBC printed nine separate articles on Haiti per day; and that reports of Canada’s “gift” of foreign aid overshadowed information about the earthquake’s damage and suffering (Mason, 2011). Similarly, despite the flooding being described as being worse than the 2004 Tsunami and Haiti earthquake combined, the dire needs of the severely affected regions of Pakistan were not central to the coverage.

An analysis of the 10 front-page headlines covering the flooding in Pakistan reveals that only 3 focused specifically on the devastation itself. The remaining, on the other hand, discussed politics, aid pledges and the assistance offered by Canada and the global community. Many stories discussed impediments to effective aid provision, and speculated that fundamentalist groups would divert the relief contributions for their own benefit. The underlying message being conveyed was that the aid efforts were essentially in vain.

A number of television and newspaper discussions did compare the response to both disasters (see Section 1.1), and most concluded that Pakistan’s negative image profile, characterized by Islamaphobia, the Taliban and an ineffective government, were certainly central to the problem. Whereas only a handful of stories highlighted
difficult access as an impediment to distribute aid in Haiti, albeit a temporary one, the slow and undersized support for Pakistan was attributed to issues beyond the control of the international community. Pakistan’s image deficit, and the minimal media attention to the needs of the affected, invariably contributed to the substantially decreased donations.

7.4. Media and ‘Causative’ Effects

The media coverage of the earthquake suggests that Canada’s robust response can be attributed to the disaster being perceived as a ‘Canada-wide’ problem, as much as a Haitian one. This sense of it being ‘our problem’ was augmented by the knowledge that a large number of Canadians needed to be repatriated. As a consequence, Canadians across the country mobilized to help with aid efforts. The flooding in Pakistan, it would appear, seemed to have touched primarily the Muslim and Pakistani communities in Canada. This primary difference, both in perception and in effect, manifested itself in the nature of media reporting during both the 2010 disaster-relief responses.

While it is recognized that there are a multitude of reasons that shape government actions, this section substantiates the effect of media coverage on administrative processes. Figure 7.3 shows CBC news coverage in both French and English television for both disasters, as well as highlights select moments in the assessed period. As will be elaborated on below, given that the Government of Canada was proactive in its response to the Haiti, news coverage peaks at the same time or following major relief announcements. In contrast, announcements for relief efforts in
Pakistan lag after peaks in media coverage. Although media coverage is a single factor, mapping the quantity and nature of coverage when trying to understand government decision-making, is telling. In particular, it appears that media reporting of Haiti’s earthquake did not have a causative effect in shaping the magnitude of the Government of Canada’s response and ultimate involvement, while the opposite is true for Canada’s response to the Pakistan floods. These conclusions are explained below.

**Figure 7.3. Quantity of Combined English & French CBC Television Coverage Following both 2010 Natural Disasters**
As ascertained from the process-mapping exercise, whereas deploying the DART team to Haiti was discussed on television about 2 hours after disaster-onset, the actual mobilization of DART occurred almost immediately. Similarly, on January 13, NDP leader Jack Layton appeared on television at around noon, urging the Canadian government to match donations to the relief effort in Haiti. The process-mapping exercise suggests, however, that this was likely decided early on January 13 during discussions between WoG Ministers and the Prime Minister. These discussions were referred to as “informal caucuses” by one respondent (Interviewee X).

On the contrary, rather than being preemptive, the Government of Canada appears to have taken cues from the media during Pakistan relief efforts. On August 17, television broadcasts and newspapers began making comparisons between Canada’s immediate response to Haiti, and the slow effort in Pakistan. Before any Canadian aid was announced, reports indicated that there was an announcement of a USD 10 million contribution from the United States (Riaz Khan Associated Press, 2010). According to the generated graphs of media coverage (Figure 7.1), airtime for the flooding was highest between August 19-21, and it was on August 22, that the government announced the establishment of the Pakistan Floods Relief Fund. One representative from PCO explains this decision:

*When we sent up the note to the Prime Minister based on recommendation of CIDA and DFAIT and the Finance Minister to access the Crisis Pool, we did not have Matching Fund in mind at that time – we didn’t. The direction came back saying, ‘what about the Matching Funds?’ So that’s when we kicked in the process.* (Interviewee I)

Furthermore, notes from the 12th taskforce meeting, held on August 26, mention media reports of the Pakistan High Commissioner stating that a formal request for the DART
would be coming (see CBC News, 2010b). According to a senior member of DFAIT, these media reports triggered the WoG Ministers to order the immediate deployment of the ISST. The following day’s sitrep, issued August 27, states that “a Canadian Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team is scheduled to arrive in Pakistan on 29 August for further assessment, and to help outline options for any additional Canadian response”. This was the first time that deployment of the ISST appears to have been discussed during taskforce meetings, implying that a high-level immediate decision was made for its launch.

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Data analysis in this chapter has shown the degree to which television and newspaper coverage for the earthquake in Haiti far exceeded that of the flooding in Pakistan, and the stark differences in the nature of reporting on both disasters. It also highlights the fact that at the time of the earthquake, the political climate in Canada was not favourable to the government in power. Consequently, political opportunism appears to have manifested itself. There was an obvious incentive for political actors to engage in a robust relief effort, especially considering that this was now a ‘Canadian’ problem. The flooding, on the contrary, seemed to only affect a specific segment of the Canadian public, and it was only when media coverage criticized the sluggish response that the Canadian government increased its aid efforts.

The following chapter explores micro-foundational perspectives for further insight into why Canada responded to the 2010 natural disasters in the manner it did.
Chapter 8.0. Micro-Foundational Analysis

As outlined in the SOPs, Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework defines a general chronological sequence for processing information during implementation. It makes a distinction between the role of bureaucratic and political actors. At disaster onset, bureaucratic actors that comprise the taskforce gather accounts of developments in the affected region, consult with bilateral counterparts, and analyze on-the-ground needs. With this information, they develop recommendations for what they consider to be an appropriate disaster-relief intervention, and submit these to political actors, i.e., WoG Ministers, for discussion and final approval.

In order to better understand the processes occurring inside the black box of government decision-making, it is important to examine the manner in which bureaucratic actors, as knowledge-brokers serving the whole-of-government machinery, filter inputs into the process\textsuperscript{21}. As discussed previously, the definition of problems is affected by how these are interpreted when viewed through a frame of reference of reality based on the language and symbols held by actors (Dery, 2000; Stone, 2002). Symbols that are attached to policy issues provoke a multitude of responses, causing the various interested parties to perceive the problem differently. This affects how actors explain, articulate and even quantify the significance of the problem (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993, 1994). The goal of micro-foundational analysis in

\textsuperscript{21} The grades of representatives sitting on the taskforce vary depending on the nature of the disaster. For most whole-of-government efforts, the taskforce consists of Senior Managers/Directors from START-IRH, CIDA-IHA and DND-DPKPol. This was true for the flooding in Pakistan. These representatives form the core of the whole-of-government team, and are the technical experts, or knowledge-brokers, referred to herein. Most of these individuals would also form part of the ISST if it is deployed. The Haiti earthquake was an exceptional case, wherein ADM level officials attended taskforce meetings. While these individuals may have more decision-making authority, they are not necessarily experts in the field.
this study is to uncover factors that may shape how knowledge-brokers in the Whole-of-Government Framework, may define a case-specific problem.

Utilizing the logic of appropriateness framework, analysis explores how bureaucratic actors generally understand their role, particularly vis-à-vis political players. It also specifically explores how these actors interpreted the actions of WoG Ministers during implementation of the Whole-of-Government Framework in the two 2010 disaster-relief cases. Micro-foundational factors affecting implementation were identified through a thorough reading and analysis of interview transcripts. The chapter makes the following arguments:

- While bureaucratic actors in the taskforce share a common mental frame with respect to the objective of the whole-of-government effort, they recognize their role to be ultimately removed from decision-making
- Bureaucratic actors sensed that WoG Ministers adopted a proactive position in its response to the earthquake in Haiti, as opposed to a more reactive approach to the flooding in Pakistan
- There is concurrence amongst taskforce members that the state of politics at a particular time can shape the direction of implementation, rather than needs in the affected area
- The nature of recommendations made by taskforce members can be altered based on how they understand the willingness for action of WoG Ministers in any particular circumstance; and, their definition of 'need' is beyond a purely technical matching of needs on the ground to Canadian capabilities.

Providing an agent-centred focus, this chapter begins by exploring how individuals understand their roles and impact when acting as part of the whole-of-government community, and then focuses on how they understood the action of WoG Ministers in response to both disasters. The chapter concludes by describing the
informal rules and norms that affect the way in which bureaucratic actors define problems.

8.1. Understanding Individual Roles and Impact on the Taskforce

For this section, data analysis was aimed at uncovering how bureaucratic actors understand their individual role and impact when acting as part of the whole-of-government taskforce. In any collaborative venture, a multitude of stakeholders have to work together. While each concerned participant may come to the table with respective personal and organizational interests, in order to avoid one party seeking to impose its views on the group, or to transfer responsibility and accountability to another, what is required is a ‘policy glue’ (May et al, 2005). From an ideological perspective, it is apparent that meaningful coordination can only be achieved through developing a common mental frame among the participants in the process (May et al, 2005; Peters, 2005). A policy glue is an organizing idea that links a diverse set of policy components through a “common set of ideas or objectives that limit inconsistencies," thereby playing a unifying role in the broader policy sphere (May et al, 2005, p. 58). Participants must feel that they are gaining something, or at least not losing, through their cooperation, and that they are working together for some overarching greater cause. If executed optimally, collaboration can result in policy coherence.

Taskforce members share a common mental frame. There is overwhelming consensus from respondents involved in Canada’s international disaster-relief efforts that regardless of the department they are from, the objective of the Whole-of-Government Framework is to uphold humanitarian ideals when responding to the
needs on the ground in times of crisis. This is also reflected in lessons-learned reports and memos obtained through the ATIP requests. Members from the participating departments have a clear and common understanding that their objective is to collaborate in order to ensure that Canadian aid to those affected by the natural disaster is delivered expeditiously and with the best interests of the recipients in mind.

A number of respondents were of the opinion that collaboration in the Framework is facilitated because the objective of the effort is a response to major natural disasters; they explain that this may not be the case in other crisis situations. “When you are working with natural disasters, there is no blame...[...]. At that time no one is blaming the victims for being in a building that collapsed” (Interviewee E), said one respondent from DFAIT. The reality that a natural disaster affects innocent, unsuspecting victims, imbibes solidarity amongst taskforce members. In talking about collaboration amongst the three international departments, i.e., DFAIT, CIDA, DND, one respondent explained, “in a natural disaster the three actually can work very well together. Where it becomes a little bit clouded is in conflict” (Interviewee H). Similarly, a senior official at PCO stated, “in times of humanitarian response, all the egos, including DND’s, fall by the wayside and DND becomes a supporter...[...]. Where you see the rivalries is not in humanitarian assistance or disaster response; it’s in something like Afghanistan” (Interviewee I), referring to engagement in times of war. In addition to this common mental frame, as members of the taskforce, respondents also share the same understanding of their role vis-à-vis that of WoG Ministers.

Discussions with respondents reveal that regardless of which department taskforce members are from, they describe their functional responsibilities similarly,
using adjectives such as: “informing”; “reporting”; “information sharing”; “organizing”; “coordinating”; “executing”; and “programming”. They describe their day-to-day tasks as “reviewing proposals”, “answering technical questions” and “attending meetings”. There is a general consensus amongst respondents that bureaucratic actors are executors of the Whole-of-Government Framework. While they understand themselves to be technocrats offering “technical” expertise, they consider themselves to be insignificant when it comes to major decision-making processes. In order to substantiate this claim, Table 8.1 offers a tabulated snapshot of views expressed by respondents on their contribution to final policy output decisions.

Table 8.1. Respondent Comments on the Decision-Making During Implementation of the Framework

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<th>Respondents Comments on Decision-Making in Implementation</th>
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<td>I also realize that I'm just the pea on the ground that's making this happen; there is more at play in this than I can see, and someone a lot higher than me has made decisions that it is important to have the media there...So, whether I liked it or not, I realized that I'm a low man on the totem pole, and somebody has made this decision for a reason. And I'm in the military, so I just salute and carry on with my job. [DND, Interviewee E]</td>
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<td>I mean our job was to report what we saw, to make recommendations on the basis of need. I'm sure there are political calculations in everything; but they are certainly not shared with me, and they are not really determinative. I mean, you make recommendations and you say okay these are needs, this is what they have asked for, this is our traditional burden share, and at the end of the day I'm not elected to do anything; and that's kind of their job. [CIDA, Interviewee A]</td>
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<td>[Taskforce members] are seeking information that helps their boss’s understanding and sharing that up, and pushing it down; but the decision-making, the executive authority to do any engagement, is through the Government of Canada [DND, Interviewee B]</td>
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<td>When the ISST provides their advice, we have to say these are all the tools that we have in the Canadian toolbox. We recommend using this. And we recommend responding like this. They don’t have to agree. They can say we don’t really like Haiti. We are not interested. Or only send this, or we disagree, send everything and then we have to be able to say: “Well based on our needs analysis that’s not appropriate, this is appropriate”. So it’s that conversation. I mean in the end they generally win. That's the political imperative. [DFAIT, Interviewee E]</td>
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Our only involvement would be in putting facts such as - the minister wants to know what available options there are. [We say] “Here are the available options. Here is our toolkit”. That’s the level of input that we have because, I mean, remember our job as public servants is not to decide anything really. It is to make recommendations. We are not the decision makers, and we don’t necessarily have any insight actually. No. Period. We don’t have any insight into how the decisions are made because frankly that is not our job... I mean, generally speaking when we send up a recommendation, the Minister can decide whatever she wants. She decides. That’s the way the system works. [CIDA, Interviewee F]

Our job is to provide our best fact based advice up to the Ministers’ offices about why we’re proposing that the decision be made...and then they have to make the decision ultimately, whether they agree with us or not. [DFAIT, Interviewee K]

Now ultimately it’s not us who makes that decision. We provide those recommendations and those options back to Ottawa; and it triggers a discussion at the Director-General level and higher within the key departments. And recommendations go up. [DFAIT, Interviewee U]

And especially, I mean these big disasters that involve different departments, potentially the military. We have got individual departments involved, but some of the decisions would likely happen at the WoG Ministers level ultimately. And the PM of course - especially if you deploy military assets - would have to give his go ahead on deploying military assets overseas... and again in Haiti they went over what we thought that was possible, but that certainly again it’s...we are not there to make decisions. [CIDA, Interviewee Y]

While it is understood that the role of the taskforce is to provide the “most honest recommendations [based] on existing Canadian policy,” as described by a member of the ISST (identification conflict), it is apparent from these comments that taskforce members understand and accept that ultimate decision-making falls outside their remit. They also reflect sentiments that it is unlikely that this status quo would be affected.

When asked about how WoG Ministers decisions are made, one respondent from the Privy Council Office (PCO) explained, “How do I say this? You are barking up the wrong tree. There isn’t much in terms of processes that comes through the centre for disaster-relief nowadays...you are asking about things that don’t exist” (Interviewee T). Thus, while there are Cabinet Committees in the PCO tasked with managing and dealing
with issues pertaining to foreign aid policy, these mechanisms are not necessarily employed in disaster-relief settings. Another PCO respondent explained that given the immediacy of focusing events, rather than pursuing the full Memorandum to Cabinet process, if “there is a need beyond the need in the coffers” (Interviewee X), the Minister will simply write directly to the Prime Minister for final approval. This is how the Matching Fund schemes for both Haiti and Pakistan were launched. This was also the process followed when it was decided that military assets should be deployed to Haiti. It is thus obvious that major disaster-relief decisions can be, and are being, taken through informal caucuses involving the Prime Minister and relevant ministers.

Also reflecting on the distance between the taskforce and the actual decision taken, one high-ranking DND representative described the Framework as being “too junior” (Interviewee B). He explained that senior staff members within DFAIT, DND and CIDA are involved in multiple levels of discussions that do not necessarily factor in the taskforce’s ultimate recommendations. Nevertheless, these are the discussions that are most likely to shape the final decisions.

Analysis in this section has shown that although bureaucratic actors agree that the objective of humanitarian assistance is to respond to the needs of disaster-affected victims, the decision-making mechanisms of the Whole-of-Government Framework could interfere with this objective. While the best technical-based recommendations can be provided, the configuration of final disaster-relief packages lies in the hands of political actors. The following section explores how bureaucratic actors interpreted the actions of WoG Ministers during the 2010 disaster-relief interventions.
8.2. Understanding WoG Ministers’ Reaction to the 2010 Natural Disasters: Proactive and Reactive Trajectories

Respondents reveal that they saw a stark difference in the way in which WoG Ministers responded to both 2010 natural disasters. As will be shown in this section, the earthquake in Haiti was understood as being responded to by WoG Ministers proactively, while a more reactive approach was taken in response to the flooding in Pakistan. Understanding these subtleties is necessary in order to appreciate the informal rules and norms that affect actors operating within the Whole-of-Government Framework, and to better understand how bureaucratic actors define policy problems.

According to respondents involved in disaster-relief efforts in Haiti, it was apparent from very early on that the Government of Canada intended to provide a robust response. Most respondents implied that that they ‘just knew’ that the government would be forward leaning for this disaster. One DFAIT respondent explained:

My crude way of saying it was like the political level gave us carte blanch – sort of said go forth, and respond; and then we came up with okay this is how we think we should respond. There wasn’t sort of a to-ing and fro-ing about, “okay well you can do this”, or “not this”, or “we need to do more”, or “we need to do less”, or questions about why we are doing more....It was very much sort of -- kind of like, “here is your blank cheque, we will pay for it when you get back, just go!” It was the same thing with the CIDA supplies. Usually it’s like, “do we need to send this?”. Instead, it was like, “send everything that’s not winterized” - it was just open the floodgates; it will be used! (Interviewee E)

In contrast to this proactive ministerial response, one representative from DND described the reaction of WoG Ministers to the flooding in Pakistan as follows:

Pakistan was slow motion, and Pakistan was - it was almost like the government did not want us to go, and we ended up going to do the recce [reconnaissance] because there was pressure put for us to do...for the government to do something. It took a month before the decision was made
even to send the ISST...they had the meetings, and then “okay we are going to have another meeting in two days”, “oh no we are going to have a meeting in three days”, “oh, we are going to have a meeting next Friday”. So it was like there are -- it almost seems like they are having the meetings, but they are never going to make the decision to go. (Interviewee D)

Similarly, there is a stark contrast between how respondents interpreted the willingness to use military assets in either disaster scenario. Table 8.2 tabulates extracts from respondents’ comments on WoG Ministers approval for engaging the military in the two disaster scenarios.

### Table 8.2. Perceptions of Taskforce Members on the Political Willingness for the use of Military

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<th>Respondent Comments on Earthquake in Haiti</th>
<th>Respondent Comments on Flooding in Pakistan</th>
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<td>I can tell you this, if an idea in government, in general, if the idea comes from the bottom and tries to get its way into the Prime Minister’s Office as a good idea, that's a process that can take weeks to months or years in some cases. If it comes from the Prime Minister and he wants to make something happen on the ground and it’s top-down driven -- it happens [clicks fingers] instantly. And it’s the preferred way for us in the Military. It's the preferred way for things to happen because it’s clear and unambiguous and we just get on with it. [DND, Interviewee J]</td>
<td>When the decision was made to send the ISST only, I started to question, why are we sending ISST only? I knew it meant we wouldn't send DART. [DND, Interviewee D]</td>
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<td>There was a decision made to go over on what we thought was -- not appropriate at the outset -- what we said was, “We certainly see the need for the DART, and then possibly other military assets being used”. But then there were decisions made to send additional military assets without our direct input type of thing. [CIDA, Interviewee Y]</td>
<td>We have trucks, we have water purification units, we have planes and soldiers who can go and do stuff. But, we are not going to take them off high readiness task without a clear desire from government that says that we need to do that... We are not looking to take forward leaning tactical actions on our own if it’s not already in the spirit or in the letter of direction from government. [DND, Interviewee B]</td>
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<td>Someone high, high, high up said “do something”. The Prime Minister. No one has said that; but Ottawa doesn’t react that fast without someone giving direction --There was absolutely no...you know normally it was: we get reports from the country; we get reports from the embassy or the mission in the country; we have a taskforce meeting; we talk about it for two or three, or four days; and then we put the recommendation forward; and then it happens. Now this one was move ‘now’, room to follow later. [DND, Interviewee D]</td>
<td>It is sociology. If you compare Haiti and Pakistan, what is the obstacle to have a response at the same level of another where there are a similar number of casualties? We [are] discussing political perception, the Minister’s perception...Do you want to, do you care? If you do care you can do quite a bit with not so much. [DFAIT, Interview R]</td>
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These comments clearly imply that particularly with respect to the use of military assets, WoG Ministers were perceived as being proactive in response to the earthquake in Haiti, and hesitant in responding to the flooding in Pakistan.

This understanding of WoG Ministers disposition to assist is supported by the chronology of events as evinced from the process maps. Meso-contextual analysis showed that guidelines in Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework were not followed to the letter during the Haiti relief efforts; and major decisions concerning Pakistan were influenced by external pressure. The deployment of the ISST and the extension of the Matching Fund for Pakistan were in response to media pressure and the letter from Opposition MP, Frank Valeriote, rather than through needs-based recommendations from the taskforce. According to respondents, if they were able to exert power on WoG Ministers during relief efforts in Pakistan, the response scope and configuration may have been different. Many bureaucratic respondents believe that ‘Canada could have done more’. When commenting on the recommendation that DART should not be sent to Pakistan, one member of the ISST said:

In my opinion the recommendation that I made for Pakistan is different than it would have been if I had made it two or three weeks earlier, because by the time we deployed, the Pakistan government had kind of sorted itself out. They weren’t in such a crisis. Sure there was 8, 9, 10 million people still flooded, but the government had had time to evaluate the situation, determine how they wanted to react, and by the time we deployed, my recommendation was that the DART should not be deployed. (identification conflict)

Similarly, one CIDA respondent argued, “Perhaps if the ISST had been sent out in the beginning, [Canada] would have been a lot more active” (Interviewee A).

Given that humanitarian assistance is time-dependent, delays in providing aid results in contributions having to be made to a different stage of the disaster-recovery
cycle (Haas, Kates & Bowden, 1977). As highlighted in the process map, it was on August 19, that the Pakistan Head of Mission expressed interest in having DART; and on August 23, a joint recommendation from DFAIT and CIDA was made to the Prime Minister to increase the Canadian response to address the escalating humanitarian needs in the affected areas. Alternate courses of action were thus possible. As noted by a respondent from the Department of Finance, the reactive stance of WoG Ministers was not related to finances. “There was a lot of funding given for the Haiti crisis. But what I can say is that it wasn’t -- I mean there was a strain, I don’t think that the strain in financial systems put in place was a major contributor to what we did in Pakistan” (Interviewee L).

These findings augment the argument raised in the meso-contextual chapter where process-tracing clearly indicated the centrality of the Political Track in shaping the scope and configuration of Canada’s international natural disaster responses. Analysis in the following sections takes the argument a step further by highlighting the extent of ‘control’ of political actors over bureaucratic actors, and how this affects policy output.

8.3. Informal Rules and Norms

The logic of appropriateness framework highlights that human action is governed by institutional rules for what is proper behaviour for oneself in any given time (March & Olsen, 1989, 2004). These institutional rules manifest themselves in different ways, each affecting the way in which actors behave. This section highlights the informal
rules and norms at play in the whole-of-government context, specifically for bureaucratic actors.

In explaining the slow and low-level of funding for the Pakistan Relief Fund, MP Frank Valeriote wrote that one reason, “may also include (and I believe it does) the fact that our Government did not present the more robust response to incentivize contributions it demonstrated with Haitian relief” (Valeriote, 2010, online). According to this opinion, WoG Ministers actions do have an impact on public interest for a cause. While some respondents explained that the decision-makers very rarely disregard the technical recommendations provided by the taskforce, analysis in this study shows that, just as suggested by Valeriote, the actions of WoG Ministers can affect bureaucratic actors as much as the public. The contents of circulated internal documents provide support for this argument.

While three out of five members of the ISST were involved in both disasters, there are apparent differences in the overall direction of their reports. The reports on Haiti are replete with recommendations on what Canada should do, while those concerning Pakistan place more emphasis on what other like-minded countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Japan and the United States of America, were doing. These latter reports are primarily concerned with what Canada should not do, rather than could do. Canada wanted to play a part, but its goal, apparently, was to meet its share of the burden, and not much more.

Furthermore, the WoG Ministers’ wavering interest in responding to the flooding in Pakistan may have inadvertently led to the ISST suggesting a smaller range of intervention alternatives. In respect of Pakistan, one ISST respondent explained, “I
didn’t get a lot of sense of any huge push politically. I think there was sort of...there were sensitivities; and it actually kind of came out a bit neutral”. Discussing military involvement in the relief efforts, an email from ISBAD to DFAIT on August 10, is particularly telling in this respect.

DND has also asked whether or not ISBAD requires additional support on the defence attaché side of the house...DND could consider an additional resource to assist you if this is something you require...This being said I sense a great reluctance from DND to get involved in this. They did not extend any support to this mission, including information and frankly, I do not find this acceptable. [emphasis added]

This email exchange makes it obvious that without the green light from WoG Ministers, DND may not have considered engaging itself fully in assessing where and how its services could be used to support the relief efforts. Another perspective on this issue, this time coming from a respondent on the Haiti ISST, is that, “the [assessment] report that was submitted was rubberstamping a decision that had already been made” (Interviewee D). These comments indicate that political actors have a recognized and acknowledged control over processes outlined in the Whole-of-Government Framework.

One notable example is the decision on where Canada was to locate its military aid assets in Haiti. The Canadian Governor General at the time of the earthquake, Michaëlle Jean, is of Haitian descent. She is from Jacmel, although some respondents assumed she is from Léogâne. Given that both Jacmel and Léogâne were cities that Canada provided military aid to, a number of speculations arose as to why either of these locations was selected by the Government. One DND senior official commented, “Why did we choose Léogâne? Well, a) it was the right thing to do; but b) because it is her [Michaëlle Jean’s] hometown. So political processes will always influence; and
social pressures can influence the outcome of planning” (Interviewee H). A senior DND respondent, however, made it clear that he had no idea where the Governor General was from when he made the recommendation. He explained, “some people will tell you that why we picked [Léogâne] is because that’s where the Governor General is from, which is just nonsense. We picked it because there’s an airfield there and it was chaos in the air field in Port-au-Prince” (Interviewee J). Another ISST representative said:

My recommendation for Jacmel had nothing to do with her being from there, because I did not know she was from there. My recommendation for going to Jacmel was (on) hearing the President and Prime Minister of Haiti saying Jacmel needs help, and there is nowhere else to go, okay (Interviewee D).

While this example does not show that political imperatives solely formulated the decision on where military bases would be located, it does demonstrate that there is an inherent expectation in the whole-of-government community that some decisions will inevitably not be made on the basis of needs-based analysis, but rather because they suit the interests of political masters. In fact, the ISST representative also added, “the fact that she was from there [Jacmel] came close to scuttling the DART from deploying to Jacmel. But calmer heads prevailed and they did allow [us] to deploy the DART to Jacmel”(Interviewee D). While in this case needs on the ground did prevail, this last comment implies that needs-based decisions can, in some cases, be disregarded in order to avoid accusations of political interference.

8.4. Problem-Definition for the Civil Servant

Analysis at the micro-foundational level has attempted to examine and explain the various ways in which bureaucratic actors perceive their roles during implementation.
The roles may be broadly categorized as: ‘technical experts’ and ‘executers of political will’.

Bureaucratic actors acknowledge the function of the taskforce as being a unit designated to respond to natural disasters abroad based on international humanitarian principles. When they are engaged in the implementation process, they understand that with due regard to Canadian capabilities, they are to develop recommendations that match needs in the disaster-affected regions. This constitutes the technical aspect of their role. It is clear from the perspective of bureaucratic actors, however, that there is an inherent, and informal, institutional acceptance that their role also constitutes the execution of political will even in situations and instances where bureaucratic actors, as the technical experts, believe it may be more appropriate for Canada to be engaged in a way that is different from the way in which political actors are inclined to respond. Essentially, there is an acceptance that the decisions of WoG Ministers can, and likely will, override the technical advice of the taskforce in these cases. This leaves bureaucratic actors feeling powerless in shaping major implementation decisions if it differs from the will of their political masters.

From the perspective of case-specific problem definition, it can be argued that for bureaucratic actors, the scope of ‘needs’ in a given disaster-relief effort, is larger

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22 In Canada’s Westminster system of Parliamentary democracy, bureaucratic actors are to provide neutral, nonpartisan, unbiased advice, and to loyally execute the decisions of their political masters – even if decisions run counter to the advice given: political actors, as the elected representatives, are the decision-makers, and bureaucratic actors are the administrators and executors of those decisions. When it comes to major policy decisions, such as deciding whether a country should be part of Canada’s list of priority aid recipients or what comprises Canada’s toolbox for disaster-relief interventions, political actors are, and rightly so, the decision-makers. When it comes to the implementation of said policies however, such as in deciding the configuration of Canada’s response to an international crisis, in order to comply with Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, these decisions ought to be based on objective and impartial considerations. This is where the role of bureaucratic actors as the technical experts is important, and where these actors can feel frustrated that their advice has gone unheeded in cases where decisions are made contrary to the needs on the ground.
than that which is defined solely through a technical lens. Instead, their perspective, and conception of needs, is also affected by their understanding of the WoG Ministers’ disposition to assist. As highlighted through the examples in this chapter, bureaucratic actors are likely to narrow or widen the range of options for consideration by WoG Ministers, based on their systematic reasoning of what is most likely in line with the existing or perceived WoG Ministers position on the issue at hand and the response required. When political actors took a proactive stance in reacting to the earthquake, taskforce members accepted that some decisions would in all likelihood be taken without the required assessment by the ISST as outlined in the Framework. Given the more muted political stance in reaction to the flooding in Pakistan, taskforce members seemingly refrained from pushing for additional aid to be provided.

Inspired by the logic of appropriateness framework, whereby it is recognized that decisions are made by matching situations to rules based on the identities of decision-makers (March & Olsen, 1989), micro-foundational analysis has shown how processes of self-awareness and recognition affect the actions of bureaucratic actors in the Whole-of-Government Framework. An institutional theory of action, such as the logic of appropriateness, highlights how rules influence, enable, and constrain decisions and actions of actors. Whereas rational conceptions of decision-taking expect the outcomes to be calculative decisions, the logic of appropriateness assumes that actors will take appropriate decisions. In the latter case, behaviour is legitimized in terms of it being compliant with expectations of that role.

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The goal of analysis at the micro-foundational level has been to explicate discourses that are embedded in institutions. The informal institutions highlighted in this chapter present a ‘logic’ (Dryzek, 1996) that constitutes a medium of power which both informs and influences the conduct of actors. Wildavsky (1997) popularized the phrase ‘speaking truth to power’ in the context of public administration. It discusses bureaucratic actors providing sound non-partisan advice to politicians, and quelling enthusiasm when politicians have proposals that from the outset are deemed ineffective from a technical standpoint (Prince, 2007; Wildavsky, 1997). Findings in this chapter show that this is inadvertently not the case in a disaster-relief setting. The Government of Canada adopted a proactive stance in its response to the earthquake in Haiti versus a reactive position in response to the flooding in Pakistan. Given that bureaucratic actors identify themselves as technical experts and executors of political will, it has shown that their recommendations and definition of humanitarian need may be affected by their perception of political disposition to assist.

The following chapter discusses the implications of findings from the dissertation, and proposes practical recommendations for mitigating the dominance of political will over humanitarian imperatives within the whole-of-government process.
Chapter 9.0. Discussion: A Way Forward for Canada’s Disaster Relief

The research endeavor began with a simple question:

What explains the varied scope and configuration of Canada’s disaster-relief decisions following the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?

In order to address this through a public administration institutional lens, an understanding of both formal and informal structures at play was required. This was determined based on the review of public administration literature on decision-making. A multi-level theoretical framework was developed in order to capture as many determinants of decision-making as possible; it is depicted as a series of concentric circles (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1. Understanding Decision-Making Through a Series of Concentric Circles
From a macro-institutional perspective, historically embedded formal and informal institutions can constrain the factors that are relevant at the meso-contextual level. For example, Canada implemented its disaster-relief efforts (analyzed at the meso-contextual level) in the manner it did, because as a country, it has strong nationally accepted values for involvement in international relief efforts. Similarly, the meso-contextual level identifies factors that, in turn, affect the behaviour of policy actors (analyzed at the micro-foundational level). Embedded in one another, macro-institutional and meso-contextual variables inform the micro-foundational processes at play during problem definition.

The Development Assistance Committee considers many aspects of Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework that facilitated the interdepartmental effort which led to Canada’s responses to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan to be a ‘best practice’ modus operandi (DAC, 2012). Its merits are essentially attributed to: structural and ideational coherence; joint interdepartmental decision-making; shared accountability; and, incorporation of civil-society (see Figure 9.2 for author’s depiction). Donor countries seeking to strengthen their disaster-relief mechanisms can benefit from incorporating these approaches into their systems.
While the objective of SOPs and mechanisms such as the ISST and Calibration Table is to achieve disaster-relief interventions that best match Canadian capabilities with needs on the ground, this is not always the case. Analysis at both the meso-contextual and micro-foundational levels has shown that informal structures, such as rules and norms, have a direct effect in shaping policy output in the Whole-of-Government Framework. Multi-level data analysis and the focus on case-specific problem definition have shown that final disaster-relief decisions are not necessarily compliant with recommendations of the taskforce. Furthermore, based on how bureaucratic actors perceive the behaviour of their political masters during implementation, technical assessments and recommendations may reflect what is
deemed to be most in line with the WoG Ministers’ disposition to assist. Reasons for this were explored in answering the second and third research questions:

**What influenced the actions of bureaucratic and political actors when implementing Canada’s Whole-of-Government Framework?**

**How did problem definition influence the implementation process during Canada’s response to the 2010 natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan?**

Data analysis showed that Canada’s responses to natural disasters abroad can be understood as a series of simultaneous and interdependent tracks (see Table 6.2), with the political machinery being the primary determinant shaping implementation. The 2005 decision to handle disaster-relief under the START umbrella certainly gave responding to natural disasters a high political profile and enhanced domestic recognition. In the case of Haiti’s earthquake, there were significant incentives to engage in a robust disaster-relief effort: the low opinion poll approval ratings that the Government of Canada was facing at the time; the anticipation of public expectation for involvement, especially given the large Haitian diaspora in Canada and consular needs; the country’s previous involvement in Haiti; and the ability for Canada to respond as it wished, given the conditions in Haiti. Contrarily in Pakistan, while over time the dire needs on the ground became increasingly apparent, humanitarian experts were unable to motivate the government to engage more actively. Rather, when the GoC did mobilize, its major decisions, such as deploying the ISST and launching and extending the Matching Fund, were triggered by external pressure, primarily from media reports.

This discussion chapter discusses the implications of these findings, and also presents suggestions through which Canada can further improve the Whole-of-Government Framework. In particular, it explores the relationship between media,
military and public opinion, and how this can have a negative effect on the quality of disaster-relief offered. It also discusses how the Government of Canada frames its disaster-relief efforts, and highlights areas that would likely lead to Canada providing more effective disaster-relief. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research in the field.

9.1. The Dynamic between Media, Military and Public Opinion

While Brown (2011) showed that the Government of Canada has a preoccupation with prestige and commercial self-interest in formulating its Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements, Canada’s response to both 2010 natural disasters shows that the primary motivation is likely to have been either to win public support, or to subdue criticisms directed at the government. This was especially reflected by cases in which news coverage had a causative effect on policy analysis government action, and is highlighted in the Communication Track in the Disaster-Relief Analytical Grid (see Figure 6.2). Canada’s preoccupation with communicating to Canadians on its humanitarian responses is apparent.

One respondent explained, “If a tree falls in the forest and nobody sees it or hears it fall, did it actually fall? So, a bunch of humanitarians show up in Haiti, and there is nobody there to record them, did they actually go?” (Interviewee J). This comment helps explain why the GoC leveraged its media capability by sending journalists into theatre, during its disaster-relief efforts in Haiti. A lot of money and resources were expended in its relief-efforts in Haiti, and Canadians needed to know. The Prime Minister’s online ‘Photo-of-the-Day’ feed had 15 pictures dedicated to Canada’s
response to the earthquake in Haiti, with 4 on January 25 from the Ministerial Preparatory Conference on Haiti, and 11 taken during his visit to Haiti on February 15. Furthermore, each situation report has ‘evergreen media lines,’ statements from the GoC that can be used when addressing media representatives on Canada’s position in disaster-efforts. According to one senior DND official, “75% of the discussions at those interdepartmentals [taskforce meetings] is about the public affairs policy. Make no mistake, it's about how are we messaging this to Canadians. ...The 25% is about the operation” (identification conflict).

Birkland (1997) explains that most bureaucratic and political actors believe that media coverage of dramatic events shape mass and elite opinion. Inevitably, Canada’s rapid response to the catastrophic earthquake shifted news media coverage away from domestic affairs, which have been shown to be turbulent at the time, to covering the disaster-relief efforts. Table 9.1 lists comments by respondents from DND about the decision to send journalists into theatre.

Table 9.1: DND Respondents’ Comments on Deployment of Media in Haiti

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<tr>
<th>DND Respondents on Deployment of Media to Haiti</th>
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<td>The priority suddenly, one of the priorities in that first airplane was to shoe horn a bunch of people from the press; so that they can get a first hand view of what was going on. And that's an interesting debate to have with people on whether that was necessary or not... That [request was] from the PM's office...clearly from a military standpoint there's no value added but we're not calling the shots, it's a humanitarian effort. And so although the assets belong to us, the priorities are jointly agreed on as to what goes on in these airplanes. (Interviewee J)</td>
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<td>Media was interesting because it's my understanding that it was a push from government, and not anyone else, to get media in. It caused initial friction on certain people - media coming in and displacing other critical stores or people that needed to get in. (Interviewee H)</td>
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<td>I think we had like - within a matter of hours (we had), I remember we had a picture in the Globe (like) a day after. The government said that we would go in, and it was one of our cargo aircrafts in Port-au-Prince with (like) a big Canadian maple leaf on it, right, unloading stuff. “Canada is in Haiti!” (Interviewee G)</td>
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As shown in Chapter 7 on Media Analysis, the number of journalists in Haiti contributed to almost fourteen times more news coverage of the Haiti earthquake, than the flooding in Pakistan. The nature of this coverage, essentially the portrayal of problems as shared Canadian issues, was a likely gauge of public interest in the GoC’s response, and likely to have affected WoG Ministers decisions on mobilizing. Responding on the basis of public interest is, however, not in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles.

As stated in the official training manual offered by START to the whole-of-government community, one of the objectives for Canada’s humanitarian endeavours is that its response should be in compliance with international obligations and GHD principles. In order to comply with GHD principles, donor countries are required to allocate resources on the basis of, and in proportion to, needs. They are also supposed to respond in ways that are fair, impartial and independent (see Hilhorst 2005; Walkers 2005). Moreover, Canada’s focus on media coverage also hampered the quality of its disaster-relief efforts.

The deployment of the 45 journalists in less than two weeks after disaster-onset was in itself problematic, negatively affecting some of the needs on the ground. The After Action Review states:

Assurances given by the journalists as to their self-sufficiency proved not to be of value, which is not surprising given the damage to physical infrastructure of the city and the absence of transportation. The result was that the journalists were not able to move from the Canadian Embassy compound…it should be noted that transporting the journalists meant that staff from headquarters assigned to the Embassy on TD [Temporary Duty] to reinforce and enhance local capacity were bumped from the flight.
Not only did the journalists strain the mission, they also delayed the arrival of important civilian personnel, and consequently the commencement of their work in Haiti. Military assets, however, had a definite media appeal, and were hence favoured.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) supported a 2008 study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), entitled *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*. The report showed that there is a tendency for political and diplomatic rationales for deployment of military assets to trump actual requirements on the ground (SIPRI, 2008). Through a system of message control as necessitated by the requirement of a Message Event Proposal (MEP; see Gecelovsky, 2013), Canada’s communications policy in international efforts prohibits civilian field staff from speaking directly to media without approval, although CF personnel do not have this prohibition. Utilization of military assets clearly gives exposure to the donor country’s ‘stamp’; and every military aircraft and soldiers’ uniform bears the national flag. These are inherently strong incentives for the deployment of military assets, and in turn constitute a particularly attractive political implementation option.

In contrast to the proactive media stance manifested during the earthquake relief efforts, the Pakistan mission was marred by Canada’s communications policy that restricts non-military officials from speaking to media representatives. To address this, on August 10, ISBAD formally requested to the GoC “a communication strategy on how to respond to requests for assistance” (email). The Chargé d’affaires in Pakistan was “provided with lines to be drawn upon when speaking with local media”. Less than a week later, on August 16, ISBAD increased its demand and requested, “blanket
approval to speak to Canadian media in Pakistan” (email). It was almost 4 weeks from disaster onset that this approval was ultimately granted. The time lag effectively reduced the sense of urgency on the part of the GoC to focus its attention on the escalating disaster. Moreover, as it became apparent that deployment of military assets into Pakistan was unfeasible, the Government did not have a type of similarly compelling incentive to launch a robust relief effort. The correlation between the deployment of military assets in humanitarian efforts, and the obvious visibility it affords through media coverage, raises a number of concerns with respect to the final disaster-relief intervention offered.

The key document which regulates the use of military assets in military intervention is ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster-Relief’, better known as the Oslo Guidelines (OCHA, 2007). The guidelines were developed in 1992 when over 180 delegates from 45 states and 25 organizations met to work on them, but these were amended in 2007. The contents are similar to the 2003 “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (also known as the MCDA Guidelines), which Canada participated in forming and evaluating (MCDA, 2003). The guidelines provide a normative and practical international framework for the use of military and civilian defence assets in natural disaster response. Both the Oslo and MCDA Guidelines specify that the use of military for providing humanitarian assistance should be a last resort, and only when deemed appropriate by experts. Furthermore, foreign military assets should be requested only when there is no comparable civilian alternative. Given the immediate and military-heavy response provided by countries
like the US and Brazil in response to the Haiti earthquake, it is clear that this principle was not upheld at an international scale. Canada’s use of its CF assets also followed suit.

The cost of military assets for Operation Hestia amounted to CAD 183,850,000, about 46% of the Government’s total response to the earthquake (DND, 2011). A pertinent question in respect of the finances and resources that Canada put into its military response, is whether this funding could have been more effectively used through other means. Various examples, specifically from the perspective of medical aid offered, the deployment of supplies, and the relative power of DND as compared to other government departments, suggest that alternate courses of action may have better served the needs in Haiti.

While the initial demand for earthquake related medical services immediately following onset were high, this quickly tapered off. On January 29, the first day of the Role 2 medical facility opening, 103 patients were attended to, but only 21 had conditions resulting directly from the earthquake. By the third day of operation, only 5% of the 234 patients seen had disaster related injuries. Since the Role 2 hospital in Léogâne opened on day 17 after disaster onset, it can be argued that it may not have succeeded in addressing immediate earthquake related needs, but rather longer term development objectives. In a recent Research and Development Report for Defence Canada, an expert on non-governmental organization said in respect of the CF medical team on the ground:

23 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assigns Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) a Role number to describe their functional capability to deliver a specific level of care. A Role 2 medical facility includes “the reception and sorting of patients as well as the ability to provide elements of damage control resuscitation and the treatment of casualties” (MEDEVAC, 2012, online).
They are in for the disaster. But what specifically are they in for? 'Yes, I know your hospital is going up. But who are you treating?'...‘Are you a primary care hospital? Are you a post-surgery hospital for amputees? What are you?’...‘How long are you staying? How long will that hospital be there? Is it a facility that I can bring complicated cases to?’...There were CF personnel that were doing rescue capacity early on...We had no idea who they were, where they were, where they were assigned, how it was coordinated (quoted in Thomson et al, 2010).

Another similar example concerns the deployment of the Navy.

The HMCS \textit{Halifax}, a Halifax-class frigate that has served in the Royal Canadian Navy since 1992, carried 250 sailors, as well as close to 200 Canadian soldiers tasked with undertaking a 5-week stay on the shore of Jacmel. While the commander stated that the fundamental mission was to provide “security and stability” in and around their assigned areas, the official explanation given by Prime Minister Harper was that “ships of the Atlantic fleet were immediately ordered to Haiti from Halifax, \textit{loaded with relief supplies}” (quoted in Maher, 2010, emphasis added). Differences in rationale aside, respondents have indicated that there was not as much relief aid as expected on the ships when they arrived on Haitian shores. It is argued that space was not utilized effectively because there were orders to “rapidly deploy” (Interviewee E), thereby not leaving enough time for maximizing the amount relief goals to be loaded onboard. While the use of Navy in this case did prove that Canada can deploy, and do so rapidly, one can question whether at that time the management of naval resources was in the best interest of the Haitian population (Maher, 2010).

The precedence given to military engagement resulted in situations where DND exerted authority over other entities in the whole-of-government effort. The Consular Affairs Branch (CFM) in DFAIT was given the responsibility of coordinating flights into
and out of Haiti, including assigning and prioritizing requests given the limited seats.

The CFM After Action Review states:

Despite the taskforce’s appointment, however, DND continued to have the final say in seat assignments, and when DND changed a flight assignment, this information was not always communicated to CFM. In addition, some OGDs [other government departments] went directly to DND to be assigned seats and they were accommodated, rather than being told to go through CFM. This led to frustration and confusion. (no page)

Especially in situations of dire humanitarian crises, such decisions are particularly critical and should necessarily be coordinated centrally. DND’s single-handed decision-making can be problematic, especially given the structural and cultural differences between military and civilian conceptions of development.

Development literature is laden with arguments that call into question the appropriateness of increased military involvement in humanitarian assistance. Amongst these is the proposition that military ‘culture’ cannot be reconciled with that of traditional development actors (see Pugh, 1998). Respondents highlighted that differences in DND’s culture from that of DFAIT and CIDA is in some ways an administrative challenge for civil-military coordination in relief efforts. Two specific differences that respondents noted are intra-departmental organizational structure and timeframe.

“DND very much works on three levels: strategic, operational and tactical; tactical being the people on the field, operational being CEFCOM which was running the operation, and then strategic which is DND HQ (Headquarters)” explained one respondent (Interviewee E). Not only are these three levels responsible for different aspects of the DND/CF effort, there is a degree of decentralization as one moves from
strategic, to operational, and then to tactical levels. Explaining the relationship between the strategic and tactical levels, one DND respondent explained:

We trust that people on the ground will make the right decision. We say here’s your left of arc, right of arc. Here’s your money. Here’s the kit you will play with. Here’s your mission and go on and do good. Come up with your own plan based on what you think - the best way to the requirement of the mission. (Interviewee H)

He also added “the public service is not quite the same”. Contrasting the more centralized structure within DFAIT, another DND respondent explained that START-Director Elissa Golberg had “her finger on everything” (Interviewee G). He elaborated:

Sometimes Elissa would ask specific things of people, like our senior official. We’d be like, well, why do you need to know that? Like, you know, Corporal Joe on the ground could answer that question, but not me as a General, not me as a Colonel, because we decentralize everything (Interviewee G).

Especially in cases where military personnel are supposed to collaborate with development officials, these structural differences could hamper collaboration between both entities.

Another stark difference in civil-military organization cultures is the perception of timeframe. A DFAIT representative explains:

We look at very different timelines, and that can sometimes cause - not confusion, but a different sort of challenge given (that) DND is looking at very, very short standpoint. And DFAIT is going to try and manage and coordinate the response, but (is) also looking forward. We’ve got diplomatic relations to think about, we’ve got bigger issues on that – so a more horizon level. And then you’ve got CIDA who is looking at it from three perspectives, humanitarian response, early recovery and long term development. (Interviewee E)

DND’s 40-60 day cut-off time could see it making decisions that are sub-optimal in respect of the inter-relationship between humanitarian operations and longer-term
development, especially in countries where Canada has a history of development projects\textsuperscript{24}.

Aside from shifting focus and response away from one that primarily meets the needs of the disaster-affected region, it is also problematic when military action dominates media, since the public may then believe that it is the only way - and perhaps the best way - in which to address humanitarian emergencies. This adds pressure on subsequent disaster-relief interventions to increase the use of military facilities. A form of securitization of aid (see Brown, 2012; Pratt, 2007; Woods, 2005) thus manifests itself, in that the government may feel more inclined to favour a military response even when alternative means may be more appropriate, such as through making financial contributions to multilateral organizations. In fact, after touring the devastation in Haiti in mid-February 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper used the opportunity to “tout Canada's new preparedness and ability to act quickly”, focusing his statement specifically on the purchase of expensive C-17 aircraft, for which he was previously criticized (Canadian Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{24} In order to mitigate adverse affects of the cultural differences highlighted, Canada uses liaison officers. During Canada’s response to the earthquake, Stabilization and Humanitarian experts from both DFAIT and CIDA respectively, were deployed alongside the CF bases in each of Port au Prince, Jacmel and Léogâne. In addition to providing humanitarian advice to DND/CF, their role was to engage with local authorities, UN organizations, and NGO actors, aiding in succession planning. Physically co-locating political and development officers when CF personnel are deployed for humanitarian missions is said to provide a “comprehensive and integrated approach right from the beginning of [the] operation” (Golberg, 2011, online). A DFAIT Stabilization Expert explained, “On the ground, because people are working and living, breathing, eating, together; they consult a lot more, so I think a lot of those great ideas that may be not so great, got talked through a little bit more and explained a little bit more” (identification conflict). The Stabilization and Humanitarian experts deployed on the ground with military personnel are tasked with ensuring that once CF leave, there is no ‘gap’ that needs to be filled. Having members from different departments exchange personnel to this degree provided the sense that the three primary departments were working as a unified entity, with shared responsibility. Similarly in Ottawa, DFAIT and DND exchanged liaison officers, with the DFAIT liaison based at the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), the operating body of the armed forces. This connection was useful in dealing with important operational issues, including the issuance of security clearances, flight scheduling and planning, and ensuring that required resources were available and accessible.
In light of these examples, it is appropriate to ask how a balance can be struck between Canada providing a needs-based versus a supply-driven response by utilizing capabilities and assets at its disposal at a particular time. One proposition would be for Canada to reconsider its media communications policy. If civilian-staff in whole-of-government efforts are able to report on their involvement in humanitarian undertakings just as their CF counterparts are, interviewees wonder whether this may mitigate the preference that WoG Ministers have for military involvement from a public relations point of view.

9.2. Framing Canada’s Disaster-Relief Interventions

The manner in which the Government of Canada reacted in response to both 2010 disasters clearly shows that political actors were inspired, and motivated to act, in order to maintain positive public opinion. Canada’s disaster-relief machinery was activated when major consular needs during the Haiti earthquake became known; and when it was apparent that Canadians, especially amongst the Muslim community, were growing increasingly critical of the Government’s complacency to the flooding in Pakistan. In the latter case in particular, the Government of Canada was compelled into changing its course of action after the Canadian public and media increased their questioning of its response to the flooding (see Figure 7.3). The way in which the Government of Canada handled this criticism, namely issue-framing as will be elaborated below, is important to consider when it comes to improving the Framework.

During a news conference on August 23, the Government House Leader, John Baird, announced the launch of the Matching Fund for Pakistan. He also reportedly
“steered clear of any suggestions that politics [was] driving its response to the humanitarian crisis” (Taber, 2010). When reporters suggested that politics, and the perception that Pakistan’s inadequate crackdown on the Taliban within its borders had hampered aid relief, Baird said, “You know, I don’t think this is the time for those types of questions” (quoted in Taber, 2010, no page). He requested that instead Canadians should focus on the "human devastation". To quell comparisons with Canada’s response to the earthquake, Baird chose to highlight differences between sudden and slow onset natural disasters, saying "In the case of Haiti, upwards of 200,000, a quarter of a million people were killed in less than a minute, some three hours from Canada...Obviously, the flooding has been incredibly different. It has gotten progressively worse" (quoted in Taber, 2010, no page). Using an effective framing technique, Baird’s emphasis shifted the discussion away from one that criticized the Canadian government for its slow action, to one that placed the blame on a phenomenon over which it had no control. This was an effective framing technique. Bureaucratic actors are also engaged in similar approaches when making communications decisions.

An email exchange between a senior START official and DFAIT’s Media Communication Branch on August 24, about the possibility of deploying DART to Pakistan, is particularly evidential:

**START Representative:** We shouldn’t say they [Pakistan High Commission] have expressed reservations otherwise that becomes the story, and we do not want to go down that road.

**Media Representative:** They haven’t given us much choice. Is there something factually incorrect about the reservations?

**START Representative:** It’s not that it is factually incorrect, it is just not something that we believe we should be saying publically as we do not want that to be the media story, nor is it a determining factor in our decision at this stage.
to deploy the DART recce. That decision is based on our analysis of the needs which we have proposed to meet through civilian first responders who are on the ground and mobilizing. (retrieved through ATIP request)

The START official is encouraging the selective dissipation of information in order to avoid unwanted media attention. In order to raise the profile of the needs faced by victims of natural disasters abroad in the eyes of political actors, the taskforce may consider visiting how it frames the issues to political actors.

A number of studies have discussed the observation that charitable contributions to a large number of ‘statistical’ victims, is considerably less than that given to a single identified victim (Slovic, 2007 and Smith et al, 2013). Similarly, while ISST reports and ministerial briefings are very matter of fact, appeals to emotion in crisis settings can be very advantageous and effective for inciting action. Highlighting stories about individual victims, and the difference that Canadian aid can make to them and others in similar situations, may be a useful communication tool when corresponding with political actors.

Furthermore, highlighting opportunities for Canadian leadership internationally can also serve as an incentive for action. According to the Haiti After Action review, while leveraging media capabilities and the high number of press conferences organized ensured that the Canadian public was well informed about aid efforts, international media remained relatively unaware of the extent of Canadian engagement. The review stated:

Given the focus of international media on what was taking place in Haiti and on the experience of the local population and international responders, placing emphasis on Ottawa-centred communications and messages did not attract the attention of non-Canadian journalists. This is particularly unfortunate given the important role Canada played in two of the most seriously-affected communities
in Haiti – Léogâne and Jacmel – in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and the ongoing role Canada is playing in recovery and reconstruction (no page). While Canada was unsuccessful in reaching international media to the extent it would have liked, the appeal for leadership in the global arena is high. Offering aid in unique ways and in areas other donors are neglecting, is more likely to appeal to and attract international attention, and consequently be more favourable to political actors. This particular point is addressed in the next section on areas of further research for Canada’s responses to natural disasters.

9.3. Areas of Further Research

There is a small but slowly growing body of Canadian scholarship interested in issues surrounding Canadian responses to international natural disasters. Warner (2013) writes about the importance of reviewing Canada’s disaster assistance policies and advocates a shift from providing relief to resilience. In a relief framework, the objective is to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected populations. On the other hand, in a resilience framework, the focus is on longer-term development. By identifying vulnerabilities in affected areas and working towards addressing these during disaster-relief efforts, populations would likely be better prepared to deal with the next natural disaster to befall them. Given that “donor countries have an interest in ensuring that disaster recovery efforts and progress are not wasted, and that resources are spent in an effective way to reduce costs and loss of life in future” (Warner, 2013, p. 25).

25 A good example of Canadian leadership was its handling of the Montreal Conference. When the Government of Canada decided to lead the Friends of Haiti conference soon after the earthquake, one respondent explained that “the ministers’ offices sensed an opportunity for leadership – and an opportunity in a not too opportunistic way. There was a good opportunity yes, there was [also] a genuine desire to do something helpful and constructive” (Interviewee R).
the Whole-of-Government Framework should be critically reviewed to identify aspects and areas where Canadian expertise may manifest itself in more efficient, effective and impartial aid. This is especially important in timing in disaster settings.

Timing in humanitarian crises is critical, both from the perspective of saving lives, and in guiding the nature of aid efforts. As a crisis evolves, needs in the disaster-affected region change. If certain windows of opportunity are missed, the range of aid and relief options must be reconfigured. For example, search and rescue capabilities are generally useful, up to 48 hours after a disaster; and thereafter recovery interventions become more appropriate. Furthermore, following from Warner’s proposition, while Canadian military assets are supposed to complete their engagement and reach a hands-off status within a strictly imposed 40-60 day period, Canada should note that this short-term focus risks forestalling the longer-term implications of donor intervention; and also potentially inhibits other important relief alternatives from being considered.

While the ‘do no harm’ principle applies in international aid efforts, disasters can also present themselves as a window of opportunity. There is a fundamental

26 This recommendation is in line with long-standing criticism of CIDA. CIDA has long been criticized for employing the “diplomatic calling-card” (Morrison, 1998, p. 17), whereby a donor country provides aid to numerous countries and in diverse areas of development. Through this approach, it is believed, the more the numbers of countries assisted, the less chances there are for some of these to develop hostilities or disputes with Canada. In this respect, it has been argued that in the past, CIDA continually would become involved in new projects in new countries of interest, while merely scaling down and not closing existing projects (Martin, 2005). Trying to be “everything to everyone” (Freedman, 2000, p.13), results in largely sub-optimal aid that is “spread a mile wide and an inch thick” (Van Belle et al, 2004, 166). The 2005 Auditor General’s Report stated that having CIDA’s aid greatly dispersed, made it less effective than it could have been (Auditor General, 2009). The approach of identifying countries of focus and countries of modest presence is one way in which both CIDA and DFAIT are trying to address this criticism.

27 In many circumstances, the short-term relief efforts continue to be used much past their period of effectiveness. Even three years after the 2010 earthquake, thousands of people in Haiti continue to be housed in temporary camps (Warner, 2013). And, one ISST respondent explained that while Canada funded a project for temporary bridges in Pakistan, she expected full well that these bridges would likely be used “as if they are permanent” (Interviewee E).
connection between development and contingency planning: disasters hamper development, and proper development cannot be sustained without proper disaster-mitigation efforts. Disaster settings pose an ideal opportunity to advance a community, not to the status quo but rather to develop it further. Given the recent amalgamation of CIDA/DFAIT, formalizing a requirement to connect the meeting of humanitarian needs to longer-term development is a natural way forward.

From a more theoretical angle, another area of research is on exploring ways in which the pervasiveness of politics in humanitarian efforts can be reconciled with the idealist objectives of aid giving. Idealistically, principles of neutrality and impartiality are embodied in the accepted practices of humanitarian action, such that ethical and moral considerations in favour of aid recipients are to prevail (Macrae & Leader, 2001). In fact, disaster relief is often presented as one of the most apolitical forms of humanitarian intervention. Through the process mapping exercise and media analysis, this study has provided clear evidence for the influence of political imperatives on decision-making during disaster-relief interventions. While this is traditionally seen as a reality that should be mitigated based on principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, the area of future research proposed herein is to find ways in which to harness this political ‘interference’ for better humanitarian and development impact.

In his recent book, however, Brown (2012b) explains that the term ‘aid effectiveness’ is inaccurate since for Canada, the objectives of development programming have never been primarily about poverty reduction, but rather of donor interest. If gains for Canada as a donor country always prevail, effectiveness should be based on the degree to which this objective is met, rather than the content or results of
the programming. In order for true development objectives to prevail, Brown and Raddatz (2012) argue that there needs to be a lot more political will for this change to take place. The mission then becomes how to create political will and to get the government to be more responsive to popular voices.

Rather than exerting energy on combating what has been hailed as an axiomatic truth, namely that “everything is political” (Lockerd, 1994, p. 9), the proposed area of research is instead on appreciating the political space which humanitarian interventions open, and to leverage this space as an opportunity to better meet humanitarian and development objectives. The January 2010 Montreal conference is a case in point.

In Canada’s response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, one DFAIT interviewee explains “three months after the earthquake, a year, what [WoG Ministers] were remembering the most was the January 25 Ministerial Preparatory Conference,” not necessarily the details of Canada’s disaster-relief efforts (Interviewee R). This Montreal conference served as an avenue to showcase Canada’s competence as a donor country and enabled it to gain leadership recognition internationally. It also was designed to move the international community away from simply looking at the response as short-term, but to make Haiti’s overall development a priority, and led to the International Donors’ Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti on March 31 in New York (DFATD, 2010). This event, therefore, served to meet both political and humanitarian/development impacts in an effective way. Political actors also appreciated recognition through the media at this time. In DFAIT’s internal Media-Analysis on the coverage of Canadian involvement in Haiti, the fact that “Minister
Cannon garnered significant coverage when he announced a Ministerial Preparatory Conference would be held in Montreal” in their review of almost 40 media dailies, was appreciated as a notable peak for positive media attention (DFAIT, n.d., p. 3). The research question that is asked is: how can the political space that is created be used as an avenue to enhance development goals? Rather than seeing both realism and idealism as opposite sides on a spectrum, a theoretical model that conceptualizes both worldviews as encompassing one another is advocated.

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While the Whole-of-Government Framework is recognized by the OECD as being effective for coordinating efforts for responding to natural disasters abroad, data analysis in this study has shown that implementation is driven by political will more-so than needs in the affected region. This leads to a supply-driven rather than a needs-based response. While the matching of needs to Canadian capabilities is always going to be considered when developing a disaster-relief intervention, how well this is done from the perspective of responding to humanitarian ideals, is what is called into question. Bureaucratic actors have felt that they lack power in shaping strategic decision-making, and as such, recommendations may sometimes be adjusted in anticipation of what concerned politicians are more likely to approve.

Having civilian actors have the same access to media to speak about Canadian interventions, as their DND/CF counterparts, would likely divert attention away from a response being perceived as primarily military-based. Furthermore, framing a natural disaster as a Canadian problem and highlighting ways in which intervention would clearly demonstrate leadership internationally, is likely to raise the profile of that
specific crisis and invite more serious consideration by political actors. Areas of future research include ways in which to move Canada’s response from a relief to a resilience framework, and on ways to acknowledge the political space that is opened in humanitarian crises by bridging idealist and realist interests. This is especially plausible given the dependence of political actors on public opinion.
Chapter 10.0. Conclusion

When the Canadian response to the 2010 floods in Pakistan seemed slow and inadequate as compared to the magnitude of the event and extent of needs in the affected areas, there were inevitable questions and speculations as to why this was the case. It was hard not to make comparisons with Canada’s quick and robust response to the earthquake in Haiti that had struck only seven-months earlier. In attempting to explain these variable responses, commentators have highlighted various external factors linked to differences in the nature of the disasters, Canada’s relationship with both countries, and the respective domestic situations in the two countries. Looking inwards, this dissertation applies a public administration lens to the research question.

The Whole-of-Government Framework was implemented in response to both natural disasters. In line with principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, the Framework is aimed at promoting, and supporting, a Canadian relief effort that is fair and impartial, comprehensive and commensurate with needs on the ground. Combining in-depth interviews with bureaucratic actors, examination of government documents, and analysis of media coverage, the research pursuit was to identify and explain the influences that impacted the decisions of Canadian policy actors during implementation. More specifically, the research explored the role of case-specific problem definition in shaping Canada’s disaster-relief strategies in Haiti and Pakistan. Public administration scholars generally understand problem definition to be the first, and perhaps the most determining, stage of the policy process (Bardach, 1996; Deleon,
1994; Dery, 2000; Sabatier, 1980), making this angle of focus particularly pertinent to understanding the disaster-relief decision-making process in Canada.

Inspired by new institutionalism and public administration literature on decision-making, a multi-level theoretical framework was developed. Rather than focus research on one specific area, it was deemed that applying a holistic understanding of government action is more appropriate. The framework explored the manifestation of macro-institutional, meso-contextual and micro-foundational perspectives in affecting the nature of implementation. The macro-institutional level applied principles of historical institutionalism to understand broad decision-making determinants, such as Canada's history of humanitarian assistance, emergence of the Whole-of-Government Framework, and Canada's relationship with both Haiti and Pakistan over a sustained period. Taking due note that Canada responded less robustly to natural disasters in Pakistan than in the past in Haiti, macro-institutional explanations were deemed insufficient to explain Canada's behaviour in 2010.

Unraveling the complexity of case-specific problem definition, meso-contextual and micro-foundational analyses focused on the contexts surrounding responses to both natural disasters, and the role of the logic of appropriate action as understood by implicated bureaucratic actors. Based on detailed process maps of the responses, in-depth interviews, and ATIP documents, it was ascertained that political will is the primary determinant of implementation decisions.

In the case of Canada's response to the earthquake in Haiti, political actors were proactive, and at times bypassed guidelines in the Framework to implement aid in the way they saw fit. In parallel with a substantial military involvement, the Prime Minister
leveraged Canada’s media capability. This resulted in more extensive print and television coverage of the Haitian earthquake, as compared to the flooding in Pakistan. Based on their understanding of WoG Ministers action, the recommendations of taskforce members catered to this desire for increased action, even in cases which did not necessarily serve the best interests of people in the affected regions in Haiti.

On the contrary, WoG Ministers adopted a reactive stance to the flooding in Pakistan, and this consequently had an impact on the entire implementation process. Judging from the media-coverage, the flooding in Pakistan was not considered to be a ‘Canadian’ problem, as it was mainly the Pakistani and certain Muslim communities that were affected. This was distinctly in contrast to the earthquake in Haiti, when a wide diversity of people in Canadian society donated and mobilized. External pressure from media, civil-society and opposition parties eventually became the causative forces that compelled the Government of Canada to increase its efforts in Pakistan. On the other hand, given their understanding of the WoG Ministers reluctant disposition to assist, bureaucratic actors deemed it appropriate to limit the range of relief-options they recommended.

When these findings are looked at holistically, two important decision-making determinants emerge. Firstly, political will is driven by the desire to harness favourable public opinion. When sensing a connection between military involvement and positive news coverage, the Government of Canada deploys its military assets more robustly. Where Canada can only respond without utilizing military means, it tends to offer less financial support and resources to the relief effort. Secondly, while they understand that their role is to make recommendations based on needs on the ground,
bureaucratic actors feel disempowered in affecting decision-making, particularly when their opinions are not already in line with the will of WoG Ministers. Accordingly, their definition of need tends to expand to include expectations that may help assure WoG Ministers alacrity, which in turn can affect the nature and content of ‘technical’ recommendations that they provide. To balance the effect of political will in influencing implementation guidelines, these knowledge-brokers should formulate strategies that would communicate disasters in ways that would be more appealing to WoG Ministers. Over time, bureaucratic actors may feel more empowered, and consequently curtail the effects of informal institutions in interfering with objective recommendations. Canada can thus draw closer to becoming a donor country that consistently provides its aid in line with accepted humanitarian obligations.

This dissertation has explained Canada’s variable responses to the 2010 natural disasters by highlighting elements that either inform or influence political action through a focus on administrative mechanics. These elements are unclear and relatively unknown, and are likely to be missed when analysis is centred only on macro-level determinants. It has also provided a unique perspective on how bureaucratic actors understand appropriate action, and how this affects the implementation process. As a result of the interdepartmental collaboration inherent in the Whole-of-Government Framework, this study is particularly timely given the recent establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), an outcome of the merging of DFAIT and CIDA. There are a number of opportunities for research in the field as a result.
Prior to the merger, Goldfarb & Tapp (2006) highlighted that Canada’s institutional structure provides little incentive for collaboration across departments. They believed that having the Minister of International Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs reporting separately to parliament jeopardized important collaborative discussions. By highlighting that DND often works as an autonomous body, the institutional structure caused “each of the 3Ds [to] remain associated not so much with a fluid, boundary-spanning approach but with departmental ‘proprietorship’ with one of the Ds (DND with Defence, FAC with Diplomacy, and CIDA with Development)” (Cooper, 2005, pp. 2). The implications of this merger are therefore extremely pertinent from a humanitarian disaster-relief perspective. On November 8, 2013, typhoon Haiyan slammed into the Philippines, devastating the region and resulting in an international disaster appeal of almost USD 800 million. Canada engaged in a large-scale response, including the deployment of DART and the launching of a Matching Fund. Having highlighted the role of WoG Ministers in shaping disaster-relief responses, it will be interesting to observe how the CIDA/DFAIT merger affected administrative dynamics when responding to this catastrophic natural disaster, and others like it in the future.

Furthermore, the aid efforts for both 2010 natural disasters occurred while Stephen Harper was Prime Minister. Even in a minority government, Harper’s modus operandi has been referred to as “micromanaging domination of foreign policy” (Bow & Black, 2008, p. 21), and of being disinclined to “move beyond the perimeters of his own head for advice” (quoted in Cody, 2008, no page). This begs the question of whether the identified power of WoG Ministers in determining the speed and magnitude of
humanitarian responses is specific to Prime Minister Harper, or whether it holds true regardless of who is holding the seat of power, and to what party they belong.

The perspectives of public administration as an academic discipline have a lot to offer to the existing body of literature in the fields of International Relations and Development. This dissertation employed multiple methodological approaches, including developing detailed process maps to recreate for readers the unfolding of the implementation process. By providing insight into the chronology of events from the perspective of different implicated actors, this dissertation serves as a window for understanding the intricacies of government mechanics in the whole-of-government context. The comprehensive media content analysis of both print and television coverage enabled the transposing of events occurring inside government, with those happening outside. By recognizing the intricacies of how administrative processes are formulated in the day-to-day implementation of foreign policies, the decisions – even those that some may argue are to be ‘expected’ – have been explained in unexpected ways. It is through appreciating the undefined role of formal and informal institutions in affecting government humanitarian and development decisions, that there will hopefully be a change in the status quo, and ultimately a more fair and impartial tomorrow.
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Routledge.


Appendix A. Canada’s Response to Disasters in Haiti and Pakistan

The following table highlights Canada’s response to the disasters in both Haiti and Pakistan up to three months following their onset, as described on government websites (FATDC, 2012, 2012b). Dates are indicated only for those events for which that information was provided online (all dates are from 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster Onset</th>
<th>Haiti Disaster Relief</th>
<th>Pakistan Disaster Relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 12, 2010</td>
<td>July 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5 million for urgent humanitarian needs (January 13)</td>
<td>$2 million for the provision of emergency food, water, sanitation, shelter, non-food items and health services from CIDA (August 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60 million to the UN appeal to fund essential necessities and basic services provided on the ground by UN agencies</td>
<td>Canada increases its contribution to $33 million, of which $25 million is used for humanitarian assistance (August 14)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$11.5 million to support critical relief efforts by Canadian NGOs</td>
<td>$7.5 million additional in aid announced following visit to region by International Corporation Minister Bev Oda (September 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8.5 million to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (IFRC) appeal for the provision of humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>GOC relief flight carrying emergency relief supplies deployed to Islamabad International (August 17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti Earthquake Relief Fund – Canadians donated <strong>$220 million</strong> to eligible Canadian charitable organizations in support of Haiti, an amount that is matched dollar-for-dollar by the government</td>
<td>Pakistan Flood Relief Fund - Individual Canadians donated over $46.8 million to registered Canadian charities for Pakistan flood relief. Canada matches funds for total of <strong>$93.6</strong> (August 2 - October 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400 million additional - announced at UN International donors Conference (March 31)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td>ISST - sent at request of Minister of Foreign Affairs 20 hours within earthquake (January 13)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Operation Hestia - 2,046 Canadian Forces Personnel (soldiers, sailors and air force) deployed, including DART, CF field hospital, naval vessels and strategic airlift</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 expert personnel deployed from DFIG, CIDA, CIC, CBSA, CSC and the RCMP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Canadian humanitarian technical experts, including 10 Canadian medical staff deployed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian delegation composed of DFIG and CIDA senior officials participated in technical meeting on reconstruction in Haiti hosted by the Dominican Republic (March 15 to 17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomacy</strong></td>
<td>ISST - two Canadian Forces members deployed to Pakistan with counterparts from DFIG and CIDA (August 27)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Government of Canada hosted the Ministerial Preparatory Conference on Haiti in Montreal to establish a clear and common vision within the international community for the early recovery and longer-term reconstruction of Haiti (January 25)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of International Cooperation Bev Oda visits flood ravaged areas (Sept 14)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Stephen Harper travelled to Haiti (February 15 to 16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governor General of Canada visited the Republic of Haiti (March 8 to 10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada co-chaired and participated in the International Donors' Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti (March 31)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Letter of Consent

Consent Form

Title of the study
Canada’s Disaster Relief in Haiti and Pakistan: Ideas, Discourse & Institutions in Implementation Decision-Making

Researchers
Principal Researcher
Aida Mamuji
PhD Candidate
Public Administration, School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa

Supervisor
Dr. Eric Champagne
Professor
Public Administration, School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa

Invitation to Participate
I am invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Aida Mamuji (Principal Researcher) and Eric Champagne (Supervisor).

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to understand the process by which Canada decides on its disaster-relief interventions in cases of catastrophic international disasters abroad. In 2010, Canada responded to the earthquake in Haiti and the flooding in Pakistan. While Canada has a policy framework to address disaster-relief, the response to both disasters is considered to be quite different. This research asks what accounts for the variable disaster relief response by trying to understand the disaster relief decision-making process. Primarily a theoretical endeavour, it will accomplish this by exploring the spread of ideas as different actors interact with one another, and how this affects both formal and informal institutions. Through tracing ideas and interactions, it addresses this issue by exploring how either disaster was defined and how this consequently affected policy output.

Participation
My participation will consist of being interviewed by the Principal Investigator. The interview will last for a period of an hour to an hour and a half. If I am willing, and it is deemed useful, an additional interview may be arranged. The interview will take place at a date, time and location that is of my choosing. The interview will consist of open-ended questions. If I was directly involved in the
disaster relief decision-making process within government, I will be asked about the process that decisions were made and factors that affected decisions, and what my role was. If I was not directly involved in the disaster relief decision-making process I will be asked about my role in influencing or attempting to influence the government’s disaster relief intervention. The interviews will also give me an opportunity to share my views with regards to Canada’s disaster relief responses.

Interviews will be audio recorded. Within one week of an interview I will receive a transcript of the interview in email form. The document will be password protected with a password that is mutually decided between myself and the Principal Investigator during the interview day. I will be given an opportunity to review the transcript and provide feedback, and/or request for modifications. I will be given three weeks from receipt of the transcript to respond with my comments. If I do not respond to the Principal Investigator within three weeks, it will be assumed that I am in agreement with the accuracy of the transcript. If the Principal Investigator is unable to get a hold of me after the interview, I consent that the interview details may be referenced in the final dissertation although no direct quotes will be used.

I have the option of deciding whether to be directly quoted in any research and or reports published, or not.

**Risks**
My participation in this study is minimal risk. It will entail that I describe Canada’s decision-making process in cases of international disaster relief interventions or my role in influencing the government’s decisions, if applicable, in either the 2010 earthquake in Haiti or the 2010 flooding in Pakistan. I am assured by the researcher that every effort will be made to minimize any unexpected risks that may arise through a process of communication and mutual agreement between myself and the Principal Investigator as necessary.

**Benefits**
My participation in this study will contribute to public administration literature in the area of disaster relief and interdepartmental coordination, as well as in contributing to an empirical study that explores the role of ideas and interactions and its affect on policy outputs within institutional contexts. I will personally benefit by being able to share my input, and knowing that I have contributed to this advancement of knowledge.

**Confidentiality and anonymity**
I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that the contents will be used only to meet the objectives of the research and that my confidentiality will be protected. My name will not be used in any reports and publications. With regards to anonymity, while I have the option to remain anonymous in the study, I have the option to consent to the use of my job-title and name of the organization-agency/department for which I work. I understand that I may be indirectly identified through this information if I consent to its use. Use of my job-title and/or name of organization-agency/department will aid the researcher
in explaining the disaster relief decision-making process and the different factors that affect policy output.

**Conservation of data**
The data collected, including audio-recordings of interviews and interview transcripts, and any other hard copy/electronic data shared will be password-protected and secured in a locked office throughout the duration of the study. The conservation of data period will last for 5 years upon completion of the study. During this time all data will be stored in a locked office, in a locked cabinet, in the Supervisor’s office at the University of Ottawa premises. All electronic data will be stored in a password-protected memory stick in the cabinet. Upon completion of the conservation of data period, electronic material will be secure-deleted, and hard-copy documents will be shredded.

**Voluntary Participation**
I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be secure-deleted (for electronic data), and/or shredded (for hard-copy data).

**Acceptance**
I, *(Name of participant)*, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Aaida Mamuji of the Public Administration Department in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, whose research is under the supervision of Professor Eric Champagne from the same department.

*(Please check all that apply)*

- □ I agree to be identified by my job-title in any reports and publications
- □ I agree for the name of the organization/agency/department that I work to be referenced in any reports and publications

or

- □ I choose to remain anonymous in any reports or publications, and any input I provide will be referenced in very broad terms such that I am not directly identifiable to the best of the Principal Investigator’s ability.

*(Please select one)*

- □ I consent to statements from my interview being quoted in any reports and publication
- □ Statements from my interview will only be referenced and/or paraphrased in any report and publications, and will not be directly quoted.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: 613-562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature:  (Signature)   Date:  (Date)

Researcher’s signature:  (Signature)   Date:  (Date)