FAMILY REUNIFICATION
AND THE TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY

Reviewed Major Research Paper in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts in Globalization and International Development at the University of Ottawa.

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Final Version: August 29, 2014
Abstract

In an age of increased global flows and knowledge sharing across borders, is state migration policy restricting opportunities and causing harm by grounding people, often away from their families, to one particular state or region? Discussion of family reunification in countries of net immigration such as Canada, Australia, and the EU nations often pits state interests against individual rights, including the right to the family. But are states and transnational families necessarily at odds, and if so, then does this always need to be the case? This research paper first identifies a series of state goals which, at first glance, appear to be divergent from the mobility of families. However, the paper then describes opportunities to align these state interests with individual rights, notably the right to the family. The result is a 12-part framework, in table form, that for the first time analyzes and demonstrates how existing state goals – that are currently used to justify the restriction of family reunification – could in fact best be enhanced through an increase in family reunification, within a reimagined citizenship regime that gives freedom to and gains from transnational families’ agency and resilience.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Question: Reimagining Family Reunification and Mobility

In an age of increased global flows and knowledge sharing across borders, is state migration policy restricting opportunities and causing harm by grounding people, often away from their families, to one particular state or region? Public discussion of family reunification in countries of net immigration such as Canada, Australia, and the EU nations often pits state interests against individual rights, including the right to the family. But are states and transnational families necessarily at odds, and if so, then does this always need to be the case?

This research paper offers a meta-analysis – rather than the existing case studies or anecdotal strategies that abound – to identify hitherto little-noticed opportunities for states to encourage and benefit from transnational families’ agency and resilience. Studies of diasporas (which have yet to intersect strongly with family reunification literature) suggest that the gains generated from the freer flow of people between states include new trade and investment opportunities, as well as more intangible but still important social and cultural ties generated via ongoing family relationships – all of which serve to support cross-state influence.

This paper first identifies a series of state goals in which the goals of states appear to be divergent from the mobility of families, and then considers opportunities to align state interests with individual rights (notably the right to the family). In sum, this Major Research Paper (MRP) analyzes how existing state goals – that are currently used to justify the restriction of family reunification – could in fact best be enhanced through an increase in family reunification, within a reimagined citizenship regime that gives freedom to and gains from agency and resilience.
1.2 Terminology: Transnational Families and Reunification

For the purposes of this paper, “citizenship-granting states” are states of net migration – that is, states that accept more immigrants relative to the number of native-born citizens who leave – who also grant citizenship rights to migrants. According to UN figures, in 2013, half of all international migrants lived in just 10 countries: the US, the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and Spain (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013). Of these, all but Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have systems that grant citizenship to a large proportion of immigrants (Ruhs, 2013).

“Transnational families” are geographically separated, with one or more members located across borders. There may be many iterations of a transnational family, from marriage partners seeking to unite in a new country, to a parent leaving behind children with family members to family clans located across a variety of countries (Kennedy & Roudometof, 2002). While some legal frameworks recognize an expanded family network that includes grown children, parents, adult siblings as well as nieces and nephews, most migration regimes deliberately use the restrictive “nuclear” definition, i.e. spouse and children under the age of 18 (IOM, 2004).

“Country of origin” is the country from which one or more members of a transnational family migrate. It is important to note this country is not necessarily the country of birth, as many transnational families may have lived in multiple countries prior to their arrival in the citizenship-granting state. A limitation of this perspective is that the majority of migration statistics only track the country of birth and country of permanent residence; this ignores important multi-sited nuances of the transnational family. Specifically, in contrast to the unchanging categories of
“countries of birth, origin, and permanent residence”, transnational families often have plural definitions of home (‘multi-locationality’) (Brah, 1996), and identity (Wong, 2002).

“Agency” and “Resilience” are two related themes that underpin the examination of transnational families within this paper. Resilience refers to the capacity to adapt and cope successfully with adversity or risks.” (Anleu Hernández & García-Moreno, 2014, p.5). Meanwhile, agency is defined as the ability to make choices and is linked with power structures – meaning there is the ability to choose, and also to choose otherwise (Hoang, 2011). In some circumstances, transnational families may have limited agency to determine their mobility patterns but are often able to demonstrate resilience in the face of these limits. These notions of how people adapt and cope to adverse events such as family separation are key concepts within this paper.

Transnational families and even individual members often overlap multiple migration categories and binaries (i.e. high-skilled/low-skilled, temporary/permanent, refugee/labour), depending on the time and situation (Pécoud, 2013). Indeed, transnational families need not be restricted to migration – they can also include born citizens who marry third-party nationals as well as the next generation progeny of migrants who retain close ties with their families abroad (Kofman, 2004). My arguments focus on those families who migrate through legal channels regulated by the state; under existing migration regimes this favours highly skilled migrants (Ruhs, 2013).

1.3 Method, Sources, and Limitations

As the research question suggests, I sought to develop a framework to assess existing state-level barriers to transnational family mobility. This “generalizable framework” (Moat, Lavis, & Abelson, 2013) was intended to be transferable and useful to generate policy recommendations
and also to support further research in the field. It would also allow exploration across disparate fields of study, methods, and locales (Greenhalgh et al., 2005).

I used grounded theory to critically analyze and synthesize discourses emerging from the existing body of academic and grey literature on family reunification and transnational families. Grounded theory uses both inductive and deductive thinking to code, categorize and finally group common themes into a framework (Savin-Baden, 2013); in the case of this research, the coded material included secondary sources from law, social work, and mobility (human geography) studies, as well as humanitarian and policy papers.

Much of the relatively limited body of academic work focusing on family reunification uses case studies to explore social and political realities; this fits well within the grounded theory approach, which often concentrates on finding commonalities among existing case studies (Finfgeld-Connett, 2010). I began my document search using course readings, and expanded my search using online academic databases to search for topics relating to terms such as “family reunification”, “family sponsorship” and “transnational families”. In the course of my readings, I further expanded my search to better understand diasporas, labour migration, and migration control. This included expanding my research to grey literature produced by states, Think Tanks. In all, I identified over 250 documents, reviewed over 180 documents, and include 125 of those sources in the bibliography below. The stages of my research, and the outcomes of the grounded theory approach to studying family reunification, are described further in the section below.

Using a multi-dimensional framework that consists of critical policy analysis, document analysis and synthesis, and regular audits of research, I examined the small but substantial literature that currently exists on family reunification. Moat et al (2013) suggest that systematic reviews are particularly important for exploring the contexts and issues of polarizing issues in producing useful research for future policy (Moat, Lavis, & Abelson, 2013). Compared to
existing state-based case studies – which according to Schiller (2010: 128) replicate a “methodological nationalism” in their narrow focus – a meta-analysis can offer a new way of addressing the interrelated policy cues of countries, and can generate new insights from the contradictions that exist within the current literature – as discussed in the literature review that follows.

Given the aims and scope of the research, as well as the inherent limitations of a page-limited Major Research Paper, some of the important aspects I was unable to explore in detail include: (1) the gendered aspects of family reunification policy: evidence indicates women are more adversely affected by current and historic state policies than men, in terms of their freedom of mobility, career opportunities, and even marital and parent-child relations; (2) the implications of the research for lower skilled migrants; (3) the influence and impact of policies promoting “temporary” migration; (4) the involvement of non-state actors, such as employers or migrants, in policymaking; and (5) the potential effect of increased mobility on citizen rights and democracy. While all of these subjects were given consideration in the research process, they could not be included in the final paper, and remain as “recommendations for future research”.

Ethics

The research did not involve human subjects and therefore did not require clearance by the University Ethics Review Board.

1.4 Theoretical Framework: Rescaling and Re-Siting Citizenship Debates

The following pages relate, using four figures as well as the table in the Appendix, the gradual process of developing a theoretical framework, through which to respond to the research question, “How can family reunification policies and citizenship be reimagined in order to benefit both states and transnational families, and what policies and actions can facilitate this new vision?”
In following the iterative (re)categorization process of grounded theory, I initially
categorized the multidisciplinary studies that intersected with ‘family reunification’ as occupying
seven inter-related “discursive continuums” at the state level: economic-financial, social
(including health), legal, attitudinal, political, citizenship and ‘choice’ (please see Figure 1 on the
following page). I used this to understand the imperatives of the state, as well as the impact of
reunification – or conversely, separation – on individual families. As a part of this iterative
process, I developed a number of frameworks to be used to understand the question at hand before
arriving at the 12-point framework that is detailed in Chapters 2 and 3. In the following section, I
will describe this process in more detail using a review and critique of migration-related literature
with a focus on family reunification.

Figure 1: The Aspects of the Migrant Experience
The drawback of the above framework was that it did not easily incorporate diasporas, financial flows, international education, motivations for migration, and the impact of migration on countries of origin and the family left behind. Figure 2 therefore reflects my second attempt to synthesize the seven “discursive continuums”, (adding “culture” as the eighth), with three “layers” of actors. Again, in keeping with grounded theory, these three “layers” emerged from the literature: (1) the individual families and their agency and resilience (Carling, Menjívar, & Schmalzbauer, 2012; D’Aoust, 2013; Lutz & Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2012); (2) citizenship-granting states and their laws and policies (Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Gálvez, 2013; Ruhs, 2013; Schrover, 2009); and finally, (3) the bi-lateral dynamics that exist between host and origin countries, as well as the international frameworks and systems that currently govern migration (Baizán, Beauchemin, & González-Ferrer, 2014; Benhabib, 2013; Golash-Boza & Menjívar, 2012; Kennedy & Roudometof, 2002; Kent, 2012). Figure 2 helped to better synthesize transnational contexts and flows (Nguyen-Akbar, 2014; Soon, 2012), and multiple actors when examining transnational families and barriers to their mobility. Yet in taking this approach, and in focusing on transnationalism rather than statism, further research proved that even Figure 2 was insufficient. Specifically, I required an approach that could consider multiple sites and policy layers beyond simply the host destination and origin (i.e. the bilateral approach reflected in Figure 2). This need for a focus on transnationalism – and specifically for scales of the global and local – instead of only the scale of the state, was further highlighted by Figure 3, which I found among
grey literature produced by the Government of Canada.

Figure 2: Aspects of the Migrant Experience, From Host Country to Country of Origin
Figure 3, identified by a Canadian federal government researcher, illustrates how mobility is managed internationally and multilaterally, and how this results in fairly rigid migration categorizations, notably the four at the bottom of the Figure: (1) high-skilled labor migration and tourism; (2) low-skilled labor migration; (3) refugees and asylum seekers; and (4) clandestine or irregular migration. Yet the Figure does little to reimagine how these categorizations could be transcended. In reality (as mentioned in Section 1.2), transnational family members shift between these categories depending on the time and circumstance (Pécoud, 2013).

Thus, the four bottom categories fail to match the reality of transnational families, and

\[
\text{Traditional Understanding of the Policy Regimes for Migration}
\]

Figure 3: Policy Regimes for Managing the Migrant Experience (Kent, 2012)

instead force a new reality to match the worldview of state-centric analysis. While the state remains a key actor in the regulation and management of migration for family reunification
(Hatton, 2011; Ruhs, 2013), “methodological nationalism” can result in “analytical blind spots” and limit understanding of migration (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002a) p. 307). For instance, another “blind spot” of state-centric analysis is the tension within migration literature between individual rights (as codified in international law) and state policies (codified in state law). On closer examination, as will be shown in this Major Research Paper, this tension is not always warranted, particularly for transnational families – who transcend a state-centric approach (Bacigalupe & Cámara, 2012).

Focusing on the state, therefore, has limitations. While it has given – and continues to give – rise to a valuable literature on migration, it restricts our ability to imagine or reimagine the future: “There is a politics to scale, and whether we engage it or abandon it can have important repercussions for social action – for how best to link social movements, for identifying cracks in perceived ‘armours’, and for highlighting social alternatives” (Marston, Jones III, & Woodward, 2005). With this in mind, I compiled Figure 4. Going beyond traditional notions of only one source and destination country, Figure 4 instead reflects an extended process that includes both migratory and non-migrant family members in a variety of locales (Cabraal & Singh, 2013).

Going beyond traditional notions of only one source and destination country, Figure 4 instead reflects an extended process that includes both migratory and non-migrant family members in a variety of locales (Cabraal & Singh, 2013). Because many transnational families occupy multiple localities, they are also affected by the supranational, national, and federal mobility management policies of the countries they choose to occupy (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014). In the conclusion to this MRP, I will argue that rigid methods of mobility management for families can ultimately act against state goals and impede progress for other state goals.
### Layers of Family Migration Policy and Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer / Site</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Application to family and mobility discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational</strong></td>
<td>The &quot;globe-spanning processes&quot; of migration include inter-related flows, networks, layers, locations, and actors spanning and transgressing the boundaries that separate political entities (Schiller, 2010; Leitner, 2004).</td>
<td>Studying complex, inter-related processes of migration and individuals who live in multiple localities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td>Global, multilateral, or supranational governance mechanisms of migration, including human rights and refugee regimes, labour organizations and financial institutions (Desiderio &amp; Weinar, 2014; IOM, 2004).</td>
<td>Tracks global &quot;flows&quot; and &quot;stocks&quot; of migrants and links to financial flows such as remittances within geopolitical realm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral</strong></td>
<td>Specific bilateral agreements or push-pull economic factors governing movement (Clemens, 2014b; McGregor, Siegel, Ragab, &amp; Juzwiak, 2014).</td>
<td>Used to map specific bilateral agreements, labour migration, and development impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-Centered</strong></td>
<td>The state sets the social contract, laws and policies. It occupies a physical space and is the institutional nexus for citizenship, social welfare and democratic rights - national borders provide the boundary of society. (Mattelart, 2009; Schiller, 2005; Schiller, 2010; Wimmer &amp; Glick Schiller, 2002b).</td>
<td>Mapping impact of migrants on state or broad state policies on migrants within multiple institutions - education, training, integration, health, social inclusion, foreign affairs, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subnational/ Federal</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Immigration Federalism&quot; involves multiple levels of government (federated states, municipalities, etc.) in &quot;immigration matters&quot;(Baglay &amp; Nakache, 2013; Desiderio &amp; Weinar, 2014).</td>
<td>Track the federated design of policies relating to immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local</strong></td>
<td>The localit(y/ies) where migrants reside and consider home (Schiller, 2010).</td>
<td>Maps territorial location(s), local interactions, and local authorities. Often municipal sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual (Family/Household)</strong></td>
<td>The social, financial, economic, cultural, ideological, health factors of migration on the household / family (Baizán et al., 2014; Clemens &amp; Ogden, 2014; Huijsmans, 2014).</td>
<td>Maps migration impacts on the family unit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: Layers of Family Migration Policy and Analysis*
While the framework in Figure 4 is useful to advance beyond a singular scale of analysis – that of the state – the Figure nevertheless does not express the lived reality of many transnational families, a reality of both resilience and disempowerment. If without the resources necessary to stay in contact by travelling, or if awaiting residency or work permits (in processes that impose strict requirements for the number of days necessary to be on host state soil), then families suffer separation for significant stretches of time. Figure 4, while listing alternatives to a state-centric analysis, still insufficiently addresses this reality of resilience and disempowerment. As I neared the completion of my literature review, I realized that polarized discourses were in fact ignoring potential opportunities to align the mobility of transnational families with the goals of the state.

I therefore developed a multi-layered 12-part framework (see Appendix) containing a concise listing of state goals cited to restrict human mobility that runs as follows: (1) a strong state, (2) the welfare system, (3) economic gain, (4) international development, (5) integration, and (6) family values. By creating a framework centered around state goals, I could empirically examine the state barriers to mobility (described in Chapter 2), create a counterpart (six-part) framework showing how those goals could align with transnational family mobility (Chapter 3), and outline the opportunities that could come from their alignment (Chapter 4). Each of the framework’s 12 parts is explained in the following chapters.
Chapter 2: State Concerns Regarding the Transnational Family: A Six-Part Framework

2.1 Introduction

How have state goals and family migration been conceived so strongly within popular discourse as being in opposition in recent times? Among the few citizenship-granting states in the world (as defined in the previous Chapter), all have begun to implement increasingly restrictive laws related to migration, and increasingly conservative for naturalized citizens (Honohan, 2009). Families are subjected to restrictive policies, including minimum residency periods for sponsoring family members, “optional” DNA testing, and rigorous medical testing for those seeking reunification (Murdock, 2008). Burdens of proof lie heavy on families, who are often required to defend and provide proof of the continuous reinforcement of family ties over time and space, which may be difficult due to the enforced residency periods of states (Groenendijk, 2006).

Restricting family reunification is not confined to the disenfranchised. As flows of wealth, skills, and education become global, a group of relatively privileged families – with greater access to global cultural and financial capital - has emerged with access to a transnational citizenship that includes easing of restrictions surrounding permanent settlement and family access (Karner, 2007). Yet even they still face restrictions, as do naturalized citizens seeking to unify across borders with spouses or even their own children (Antognini, 2013).

This Chapter identifies six state justifications for restrictions on human mobility and family reunification specifically: ensuring a strong state, the welfare system, economic gain, international development, integration, and family values. Each of the chapter’s six parts (corresponding to the six state goals) is further sub-divided into sub-discourses, or areas of
“infringement”, from the state perspective. For instance, in the “strong state” goal, human mobility is seen to infringe on “sovereignty”, “security” and even “demographic priorities”.

Hence, in the following six parts of this chapter, information is given on each sub-discourse or “area of infringement” individually. In addition, the sub-discourses under each particular state goal are brought together in a table that opens each of the chapter’s six parts. Of note here is that the tables often contain information beyond the narrative discussion. In the interest of brevity, if a single point-form note (and its referenced source) within a table sufficed to explain a given claim, refutation, or concept, then that point was not repeated within the narrative section of the paper. Conversely, points in the narrative sometimes go beyond the tables. The aim is for tables and narrative to be complementary, not exact mirrors, and for the tables to facilitate the formation of the 12-part framework in the Appendix.

**Part A1  A Strong State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Infringement</th>
<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1.1 Sovereignty and International Law</td>
<td>State has sovereign right to decide who enters; potential benefit to families of state-to-state or regional agreements, e.g. citizens within the European Union (Rytter, 2012; Strik, de Hart, &amp; Nissen, 2013).</td>
<td>Migrants have international human right to family (Bertozzi, 2007; United Nations, 1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1.2 National Security and Border Control</td>
<td>Misperception of migration as increasing crime and terrorism; fears also of “migrant floods” (Emery, 2010; Vallet &amp; David, 2012)</td>
<td>Some migrant households have ties to terrorist or criminal organizations (so do some citizens); little evidence reuniting with &quot;extended family&quot; leads to migrant floods (D’Aoust, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1.3 Demographic Priorities</td>
<td>State has right to create policies to select demographic preferences and restrict other forms of migration (Collacott, 2013; John, 2004; Johnson, 2013)</td>
<td>Families vary in demographic makeup, education levels, and work experience (Li, 2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A1.1 Sovereignty and International Law

In support of transnational families and family reunification, advocates often emphasize the right to family unity, protected in international human rights and humanitarian law (Bertozzi, 2007; Flynn, 2005). Advocates may feel that the best route for minimizing the harm of separation is through legal imperatives, and so analyses of issues relating to family reunification typically examine a specific legal case or cases (Baizán et al., 2014; Goldring, Berinstein, & Bernhard, 2009), or public or social health issues relating to separation (Åkesson, Carling, & Drotbohm, 2012; Madziva & Zontini, 2012).

This approach has important merits, but among its disadvantages is the response with which it has been met by states. Specifically, states assert they have sovereign “rights” to determine who crosses their borders, and “rights” to determine who can stay within them, for how long, and under what conditions (as permanent or temporary, permitted to work or not, eligible to apply for family reunification or not, etc.) (Rytter, 2012; Strik et al., 2013).

Despite government acknowledgements of human rights directives and law, most state policies contain “escape clauses” that allow them to retain the sovereign discretion on when to recognize the right to reunification (John, 2004), allowing them to avoid explicitly recognizing reunification as a human right, even in the cases of refugees (Daniel, 2005; Holland, 2011). For example, the UN treaty on The Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families has not yet received ratification by any “country of net immigration” (John, 2004, p. 7). No government wishes to “find itself shackled to enforceable standards of family reunification rights
that impede on the states sovereign right to control who enters and settled on its territory” (Groenendijk, 2006, p.10).

A1.2 National Security and Border Control

Unrestricted family reunification is viewed by some as potentially counter to the security and economic interests of a strong state; this view is linked to fears of so-called “chain migration” (Zentgraf & Chinchilla, 2012) or a drain on state resources by “citizens of convenience” (Park, 2013). Moreover, due to a commonly held misperception by policy makers that newly admitted immigrants may increase crime (Emery, 2010) or terrorism (Vallet & David, 2012), migration policies are increasingly constrained on “security grounds” (McCabe, 2011).

A1.3 Demographic Priorities

Some immigrants are considered less “desirable” than others (Lenard & Straehle, 2012), such as those deemed “lower-skilled”, from “poorer” regions, and fleeing areas of conflict or natural disaster (Honohan, 2009). Family reunification remains one of the few remaining legal avenues of permanent mobility for such “undesirables” (Cholewinski, 2002), although it too is usually confined to those with an immediate family member with permanent residency or citizenship (King & Skeldon, 2010). Excluding these individuals and groups from citizenship, while meeting the needs of aging populations and specific labour demands – industrial, agricultural, medical, etc. (UNDESA-OECD, 2013) – has been called the “policy-maker’s dilemma” (John, 2004) and is the subject of extensive and intricate immigrant selection and “testing” systems (Gaston & Nelson, 2013). This effectively enforces an “our country, our rules” approach that allows the greatest possible restriction of entry and settlement (Staver, 2008).
A1.4 Citizenship

Citizenship-granting countries are increasingly building “walls” around their borders (Vallet & David, 2012). While some of these walls are physical, such as in the United States and Spain, many exist as limitations on free movement through long-term residency periods, raised administrative barriers, and increasingly complex rules in determining who is eligible for citizenship (McCabe, 2011; Pogonyi, 2011). In an effort to limit “citizens of convenience” and even dual citizens (Pogonyi, 2011), states are seeking to limit citizenship to one or two generations (Park, 2013). Citizens must “earn” citizenship through territorial attachment, that is, long-term residency (Scachar, 2011).

Part A2 The Welfare System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Infringement</th>
<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2.1 Social Services</td>
<td>Immigrants/families take more in social assistance than they contribute in taxes (Bledsoe &amp; Papa, 2008; IOM, 2004)</td>
<td>Family sponsor must prove adequate income and housing (Strik et al., 2013; Zentgraf &amp; Chinchilla, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.2 Health Care</td>
<td>Family migrants with health issues exploit universal healthcare at the cost of the state and taxpayer (Collacott, 2013; Grady &amp; Grubel, 2011)</td>
<td>Family migrants use health care at similar rates to born citizens (VanderPlaat 2013, Ramos, &amp; Yoshida, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.3 Skills and Education</td>
<td>Family migrants are not adequately skilled and may require additional training or education (Groenendijk, 2006)</td>
<td>Family members vary in skills and education before and after arrival (DeShaw, 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A2.1 Social Services

Concerns revolve around the perceived burden of newcomers on social safety nets such as welfare or public housing (Bertozzi, 2007; Guiraudon, 2008). The equation used to assess this purported burden examines the income generated from the main earner of the family and
the resulting taxes (contributing to the state) as compared to the family use of public goods including school systems, health care, and social programs (taking from the state). Critics of liberal migration policies actively argue that family reunification migrants take a disproportionate share of benefits compared to their social and economic contributions (Grady & Grubel, 2011) and/or become a burden on taxpayers (Strik et al., 2013).

The work of Laferrière (2013) counters this perception through an in-depth examination of revenue assessments, suggesting that over time, family reunification has little cost to social welfare systems such as that of Canada. Minimum income levels, housing requirements, and “undertakings” for sponsors, as well as intensive pre-entry testing for sponsored individuals combine to serve both as formidable obstacles to family reunification, as well as powerful guarantees to states that incoming family members are nearly or entirely cost-free to the state (Groenendijk, 2006).

A2.2 Health

It is assumed in popular discourse and by some policy makers that immigrants who arrive through family reunification are more “needy” of health or other services (DeShaw, 2006). The forced separation of families, through the absence of family reunification becomes a drain on the family and related health services is a proven fact. The stress placed on families due to separation often creates issues with general productivity, health, and social ties; it can increase social vulnerability to negative elements such as gangs, early pregnancy, and the absence of vital health services, such as pre-natal care (Bertozzi, 2007; Falicov, 2007).

A2.3 Skills and Education

Pre-entry tests are one mechanism used to screen individuals seeking family reunification. In addition to these tests’ stated purpose to ensure adequate skills and education for social and
labour integration, they are also used as a deterrent (Strik et al., 2013). Moreover, they function as a means of discriminating among immigrants on the basis of country of origin. In Europe, for instance, where pre-entry tests are frequently used, immigrants from countries that do not require a long-term visa (i.e. other citizenship-granting states) are exempted from testing.

While family reunification is indeed one of the few avenues for individuals with fewer recognised skills or degrees, those who opt to enter a country via family reunification are not necessarily any less skilled or educated than those who enter via so-called “economic” routes (DeShaw, 2006). Female migrants, for example, are more likely to select family reunification over other options (Huijsmans, 2014). Lastly, nearly all states limit services such as retraining and other skills- or education-related support, once an individual is offered remunerated employment. In an unrelated but equally important finding, immigrants who come via family reunification contribute only slightly less in taxes over their life-time than do workers born in that country or other categories of migrants (Laferrière, 2013).

**Part A3 Economic Gain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Infringement</th>
<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A3.1 Labour Market</td>
<td>Immigrants / families take “natives”’ jobs and drive down wages (World Bank, 2013)</td>
<td>Permanent residents seek employment income but not at expense of wages or jobs (temporary migration has different impacts on labour markets) (Ozden &amp; Wagner, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3.2 Economic Stability</td>
<td>Family class migrants not suited for the labour market, potentially destabilizing force (DeShaw, 2006)</td>
<td>Migrants do impact the labour market but successfully adapt to needs over time (Li, 2003; Laferrière, 2014); migrants’ human capital may be devalued (Guo, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3.3 Capital</td>
<td>Family class migrants lack human and social capital to be successful (Grady &amp; Grubel, 2011)</td>
<td>Family class migrants vary greatly in terms of access to capital; migration is often treated as a long-term household investment (Clemens &amp; Ogden, 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A3.1 Labour Market

In a system that measures the value of immigrants in the narrow terms of human capital and income (Li, 2003), family migrants are perceived as squeezing out potential applicants who could be contributing to the economy (Dirks, 2012; Li, 2003). Even when their economic contributions are acknowledged, those who immigrate through family reunification are accused of “taking” the jobs of local residents, displacing those workers or driving wages downward (Ozden & Wagner, 2014), particularly since the global economic downturn of 2008. The above-mentioned misperception of accompanying family members as “low-skilled” exacerbates this tension even further (DeShaw, 2006), as the idea then becomes that these members are in direct competition with youth and other vulnerable low-skilled citizens for a finite number of jobs. Such misperceptions stand in stark contrast to evidence that demonstrates how immigrants support job creation and help expand local labour markets (Ozden & Wagner, 2014).

A3.2 Economic Stability

Populations who perceive that newcomers are taking their jobs – or those of their children – are also much more likely to engage in xenophobic and protectionist practices that limit the earning potential of newcomers (Guo, 2013). Employers may cite a lack of “relevant” in-country work experience for not selecting newcomers who are high in human capital (Li, 2003). Potential labour productivity is also lost when employers and programs favour certain degrees or accreditations over others (Guo, 2013). As a result, many immigrants must retrain or find alternate forms of employment or self-employment – for example, the age-old story of the doctor driving a taxi cab.
A3.3 Capital

Concerns abound about a potential lack of investment in local economies; critics point to remittances, which constitute a major flow of capital across borders. This statement suffers from an error of omission: in reality, remittances do not come at the expense of local consumption (Telegdi, 2006). Furthermore, the flow of remittances often represents the long-term “Return on Investment” for extended families who have invested in education and provided other capital as a strategy for migration (Clemens & Ogden, 2014). Discourses that surround the economic potential of immigrants are flawed due to their exclusion of less quantifiable economic impacts such as social capital, innovation capacity, and the positive impacts of unpaid wage labour on the economy (Laferrière, 2013).

Part A4 International Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Infringement</th>
<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A4.1 Development Commitments</td>
<td>Suggested barrier: restrict / tax migration of skilled workers to prevent Brain Drain and enhance development issues (Collier 2014)</td>
<td>Skilled migrant households should not have imposed obligation to stay if compelled to migrate for other reasons (Clemens 2014, Oberman 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A4.1 Development Commitments

Migration and international development policy files are becoming increasingly linked. As migration flows are tracked, the number of people flowing from low-income nations has begun to alter the dynamics of the labour force of those nations through “brain drain” (Biondo & Lisi, 2013). Countries such as Haiti, Zambia and others are suffering from a lack of skilled workers to
maintain health and education services, to deleterious effect (Oberman 2013). Most citizenship-granting countries have highly developed aid portfolios and international development commitments that include projects that often require skilled workers (McGregor et al., 2014). High-skilled migration could then be considered to go against a citizenship-granting state’s goals for international development abroad, though not necessarily against its own economic needs for human capital.

As a result of this brain drain, some development thinkers have recommended caps or even a total stop of migration from these countries altogether. The argument is that by preventing skilled migrants from seeking opportunity elsewhere, they will instead begin to invest and develop the necessary institutions to spark economic and social development (Collier 2014). Clemens & Ogden (2014), suggest, however, that such restrictions would impose undue hardships on skilled workers and their families.

A4.2 Declining Humanitarian Agenda

Historically, many citizenship-granting states supported family migration, refugee resettlement, as well as aid. Now, however, states can perceive aid contributions as a substitute for their “humanitarian duty” to enable mobility. The humanitarian value of family reunification (and of providing a place of refuge), meanwhile, is being increasingly disregarded, in favour of so-called economic arguments, which sometimes – furthermore – thinly veil discriminatory ideologies (Laferriere, 2013; Li, 2003)
Part A5  Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A5.1 Allegiance</td>
<td>&quot;Multiculturalism has failed&quot; – perceived cultural incompatibility with host country, false allegiance to state. Successful integration is judged on the basis of conforming and assimilating to existing linguistic, social and cultural patterns. (Park, 2013; Siebold, 2010)</td>
<td>Families have fluid identities that include allegiance to a variety of state and non-state actors; different rates of social participation based on real and structural social barriers (Park, 2013; Li, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5.2 Spatial Integration and Separation</td>
<td>Immigrant &quot;ghettos&quot; do not promote integration (Li, 2003; Guiraudon, 2008)</td>
<td>Migrant households tend to settle in similar geographic due to social ties and support (Avenarius, 2012; Guiraudon, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5.3 Language</td>
<td>Migrants must have fluent knowledge of official language(s) for successful integration: pre-testing restricts migration at borders (Rytter 2012; Guo, 2012)</td>
<td>Family members may lack knowledge of the official language but can learn it (Finnie &amp; Mueller, 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A5.1 Allegiance

States emphasize the need for cultural and social integration and assimilation of newcomers (Malik, 2011; Money, 2004), through measures such as programs designed to entrench “successful” characteristics (e.g. hardworking, flexible) (Li, 2003; Pécoud, 2013), or by asking family reunification applicants to sign declarations committing to learning the local language and “values” of the new country (Rytter, 2012). Much of the work done around integration emphasizes that it is immigrants, and not the society or its institutions who are seen as needing to change (Li, 2003). This single-minded attention to “allegiance” likely results from increasing pressure to prioritise employment, safety, and social cohesion for citizens, before giving precedent to newcomers (John, 2004). Such pressures succeeded in constricting, for
example, the family reunification policies of countries like Canada and the United States, which at
times historically otherwise encouraged family reunification (Boyd & Vickers, 2000).

A5.2 Spatial Integration and Separation

Detractors of family reunification claim that “immigrant ghettos” (Li, 2003) burden the
“absorptive capacity” of existing mono-ethnic or pluralistic societies. As with similar such
criticisms, this statement runs contrary to evidence that immigrants are key drivers in the
processes that have brought success to many of the world’s metropolises (Schiller, 2010).

A5.3 Language

Whereas race no longer remains a legitimate means to limit migration, nevertheless certain
immigrant selection such as language measures remain inherently racialized. These measures may
take the form of explicit restrictions or (supposedly impartial) implicit “confirmation biases”, i.e.
that reward certain types of experience and knowledge over others (Guo, 2013), or that select for
certain kinds of cultural factors, on the claim that they are more conducive to “integration” and
“participation” than others – of which language is the most common restrictor (Boyd & Vickers,
2000). Of these various measures for reducing immigration from “less desirable” states, language
is perhaps the most commonplace (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014).

Part A6 Family Values

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A6.1 Family Values</td>
<td>Varying traditional understandings and practices of family are seemingly incompatible with accepted family law (Strik et al., 2013)</td>
<td>Family definitions are based in a cultural context and understanding that shifts over time – if not reinforced via other barriers (Baizán et al., 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| A6.2 Marriage         | Concerns around human trafficking and forced marriage (Ruffer, 2011) | Marriage to a member of country of origin or its diasporic community is due to a number of factors (Bertolani,
A6.3 "Bogus" Applicants

Preventing "bogus" applications for "gaming system" or human trafficking (D’Aoust, 2013).

Families who face barriers in together(ness) may engage in suspect behaviours within or outside new country to reunite

A6.1 Family Values

Family values are implicit within a state’s historical contexts and institutions. These values occupy a privileged space within policy directives, social services, social work, and in determining legal outcomes. Perceptions that certain cultures may promote gender inequality and exploitation can be both explicitly and implicitly discriminatory (Strik et al., 2013). Countries such as Denmark create strenuous citizenship requirements but explicitly exempt “certain countries” – other citizenship-granting states – from some or all requirements, including the citizenship test (Rytter, 2012). Other countries may, through laws and policies, implicitly privilege certain backgrounds and values. Barriers will prolong separation but persevering families will eventually come together. In the case of parents and children, however, this separation may have already caused long-term harm (Pratt et al. 2008).

A6.2 Marriage

Concern is often directed at how some members of concentrated ethnic communities choose to marry partners from their (or their parents’) country of origin (Bertolani, Rinaldini, & Tognetti Bordogna, 2013). Policymakers have sought to regulate this marriage migration in order to avert or prevent “mail order”, “forced” or “fake” marriages by creating minimum ages for marriage applicants, setting or raising necessary income levels, pre-screening incoming individuals, and in some cases, limiting definitions of long-term partnership to marriage (Strik et al., 2013).
Transnational families are therefore afforded less flexibility and self-determination than citizens marrying internally, in deciding whom they choose to love, and how they form their family bonds such as adoption and single parenthood (Boeles, 2001). Efforts to restrict reunification and to manage the formations of family are thus distinctly at odds with the formal protections of the family unit that are offered both domestically and in immigration policies (Laferrière, 2013; IOM, 2004).

A6.3 “Bogus” Applicants

States may find that their narrowing definitions of family in policy have the opposite of the intended effect. Families will revise internal structures in order to exploit opportunities presented via migration policies and laws in order to come together, even if this requires a redefinition of boundaries (Bertolani et al., 2013). Because marriage is one of the fastest routes for women to also access new labour markets, they tend to be the most affected by such restrictions (D’Aoust, 2013). Restrictions on incoming family members may also exacerbate traditional power relations within the family, as the limited rights accorded to the family members and resulting legal dependence on the “primary” immigrant reinforce traditional gender roles and relations (Bertolani et al., 2013). Hence, citizenship-granting states are unintentionally strengthening – via their policy applications – the same traditional roles, they see as so incompatible with their own purported values of gender equality and egalitarian power relations in families.

Are State Goals at Odds with Family Migration?

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the contradictions within and between layers of migration “management” that pose barriers to family reunification. Trade liberalization and new technologies have contributed to time-space compression (Harvey 1989, Massey 1994), creating a world where capital, information, and culture can flow instantaneously across borders. Despite
this shift, people – families in particular – are not able to flow with the same ease. This chapter
examines how six state goals are used to restrict the free flow of people, using the state as a unit
of analysis. This analysis does not necessarily account for the specific policy differences between
states, instead focusing on the common themes in laws, policies and popular discourses that exist
within the citizenship-granting states studied. The six main goals that are cited to restrict family
mobility include: ensuring a strong state, the welfare system, economic gain, international
development, integration, and family values. This analysis also considered the family realities
that that occur due to, in response to, or in opposition to popularly held assumptions about family
migrations.

But are such restrictions necessary to achieve these goals, and could they even perform
the opposite of their intended function, i.e. impede those goals? To answer this question, I
examined the opportunities that could arise in future from the free flow of families. Chapter 3
will revisit the framework laid out in Chapter 2, the state goals that are used to restrict family
mobility, and instead looks at how those same goals might be furthered by instead allowing and
encouraging family mobility.
Chapter 3: Aligning the State with the Family: Opportunities in Agency and Resilience

3.1 Introduction

To better understand opportunities to align individual agency and resilience with state goals, this chapter will examine how families can help to enhance the very goals used discursively by states and some policy makers to restrict them. Specifically, it will explore how freedom of movement for transnational families can help to strengthen states, support the economy of both sending and receiving countries, contribute to the welfare system, improve international development objectives, bolster full social integration, and support family values.

Part B1 Global Realities and Strengthening States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1.1 Stronger Global Ties</td>
<td>State benefits from diversity, mobilizes migrants and emigrants with ties to a variety of organizations (Downie, 2010; Wong, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1.2 Diplomatic Advantage</td>
<td>Soft power supports formal and informal influence on foreign agendas (Brender, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1.3 Attract and Retain Leaders</td>
<td>Increased eligibility for family reunification provides competitive advantage (Dessus, 2008; Simon, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1.4 Citizenship in a Transnational World</td>
<td>Renegotiating citizenship(s) to benefit increasing emigration as well as immigration (Koenig-Archipugi, 2012; The Economist, 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B1.1 Stronger Global Ties

Restrictive residency periods which bind people in one place create opportunity costs for people as well the state itself. By binding people to the territorial boundaries of the state, states force people to trade off on opportunities elsewhere. When people face the choice of all or
nothing, they must weigh a variety of factors – to lose out on opportunities elsewhere in order to stay, or to risk losses on their investments in the new state (e.g. the home, vehicles, social networks) in order to go (Clemens & Ogden, 2014).

In addition, the neo-liberal restructuring of the world has created an environment in which localities have come to compete globally (Schiller, 2010); in this competition for immigrants, family is a key attraction. As found in Canada, married immigrants tend to stay 25% longer than single immigrants, and 40% longer than divorced and widowed immigrants, rather than engaging in return or onward migration (Aydemir & Robinson, 2006). Immigrants are not bound or beholden to a country and short-term restrictions on mobility can have long-term impacts, whereas mobility in the short term can promote long-term residency, and more tax and social benefits for the state (Laferrière, 2013).

B1.2 Diplomatic Advantage

Transnational families and immigrants can increase state influence through “soft power” in formal and public diplomatic efforts, such as those aimed at foreign nationals (Brender, 2014). Soft power leverages the power of attraction to set the agenda, but may decline if there is a perception of illegitimacy (Nye, 2009). Transnational families are “constantly engaged in securing and cultivating links that go beyond the nation-state boundaries, as well as circulating capital and other resources among the networks” (Bertolani et al., 2013). In a world where the state with the most connections becomes the central player with the most power (by maintaining its importance through the ability to set the agenda and influence global outcomes), transnational families are important links for formal and informal diplomatic influence and exertion of state power.
B1.3 Attract and Retain Leaders

As mentioned in Section B1.1, easing mobility restrictions for families becomes a key facet of recruiting the most qualified students and workers in what is becoming a global labour market (Dessus, 2008). Freedom of mobility, access to the family, and international training/experience also help to attract, empower and retain those same immigrants as well as born citizens (Zentgraf & Chinchilla, 2012) (Simon, 2014).

As such opportunities increase and both citizens and international citizens meet and mingle across borders, instances of transnational marriage will inevitably increase. The resulting decision of where to settle will include due consideration of family access for one or both partners, whether through travel or the permanent migration of one or more family members. Those states that allow for increased mobility will have a distinct advantage in accessing and retaining the “best and brightest”.

B1.4 Citizenship for a Transnational World

As the number of transnational families increases, so too do the instances of people holding multiple citizenships (The Economist, 2012). While long-term residency can and should be a sought-after outcome with a number of benefits, mandating it through policy and forced residency periods may exacerbate the costs of family separation. Forced residency periods may trigger unintended policy consequences due to the gradual breakdown of social ties in other countries, as well as due to opportunity costs from limited mobility abroad. Instead, cultivating changes in citizenship regimes geared towards transnational realities could help to build diasporic and transnational ties for the state (Erel, 2011; Koenig-Archipugi, 2012).
Part B2  Supporting the State: Health, Wealth and Belonging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B2.1 Preventing Social Harm</td>
<td>Extended family separation can be extremely harmful (Cholewinski, 2002; Groenendijk, 2006) – togetherness improves social outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2.2 Family Togetherness for Better Health Outcomes</td>
<td>People who are separated from families face increased stress and family togetherness promotes better health outcomes (Schapiro, Kools, Weiss, &amp; Brindis, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2.3 Unpaid (Family) Labour in Private Enterprises and Households</td>
<td>Reproductive labour increases productivity of working family members and supports small business goals (Laferrière, 2013; VanderPlaat, Ramos, &amp; Yoshida, 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B2.1 Improving Social Outcomes

The presence of the family in the receiving country means that the entire family can participate “culturally, economically and socially” within the new society, rather than a single individual feeling divided between their new (home) country and family in the country of origin (Murdock, 2008). This kind of full-family immigration was once the case in numerous citizenship-granting states, and presented great advantages (Zentgraf & Chinchilla, 2012). Integration is more successful in the presence of family members (Staver, 2008).

B2.2 Better Health

Individuals who immigrate together with their families tend to be stronger and more resilient; the family acts as a unit of support. The reverse is also true: increased social harm occurs as a result of prolonged and involuntary separation, which in turn can impact the settlement and integration of families (Golash-Boza & Menjívar, 2012; Suárez-Orozco, Hee Jin Bang, & Ha Yeon Kim, 2011; White, 2006). Societies with strong social welfare systems – most citizenship-granting states – bear the burden of this social harm through the more intensive care needed to
deal with these family breakdowns, and also through the external costs such as lost productivity. Reunification is an easy measure that promotes better health outcomes.

**B2.3 Unpaid (Family) Labour in Private Enterprises and Households**

Family labour is provided at low cost or for free in small family enterprises such as restaurants and shops, allowing those businesses to be more competitive and contribute more to the economy (Laferrière, 2013). Within households, meanwhile, aging parents and relatives often help perform unpaid labour that allows wage earners to be more productive.

**Part B3 The Social, Economic and Political Power of Diasporic Communities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B3.1 Economic Expansion</td>
<td>Immigrants can contribute to the expansion of economy and potentially the increase of wages (Ozden &amp; Wagner, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3.2 Social / Educational / Technological Transfers</td>
<td>Culture, goods and ideas flow back and forth through family networks and benefiting the state (Cabraal &amp; Singh, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3.3 Innovation, Productivity and Competitive Advantage</td>
<td>New modes of understanding issues encourages innovation in all sectors, increases productivity (Bacigalupe &amp; Cáمرا, 2012; Downie, 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B3.1 Economic Expansion**

Diasporic networks are growing in tandem with the rise of other networks. Not all transnational family networks form diasporic groups, but many choose to interact with the broader network of shared values, contexts and understandings that span borders. There is evidence that immigrants help to expand economies, and may even help to nominally raise wages (Ozden & Wagner, 2014). Diasporas are increasingly being lauded for their power to leverage investments, transfer knowledge, and build capacity for a variety of projects abroad (McGregor et al., 2014).
Diasporic groups help to generate flows to the country of origin, contributing to tourism, investment, trade and even creating geopolitical benefits (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014).

**B3.2 Social / Educational / Technological Transfers**

Migrants are heavy users and often first adopters of most mobile and communication technologies, which they use to communicate and interact with their separated families (Madianou & Miller, 2013). In addition to generating new consumer habits, tastes and designs (Blanchard, 2013), these networks quickly and simultaneously transmit “social remittances” in terms of ideas, technologies and educational opportunities (Baizán et al., 2014). They are also able to stimulate change in a variety of spheres, from family relations to gender relations (Blanchard, 2013).

**B3.3 Innovation, Productivity and Competitive Advantage**

In citizenship-granting states such as Canada, the labour market outcomes of first generation immigrant children and the children of immigrants outperform both their parents and the children of Canadian-born parents (Finnie & Mueller, 2010).

For immigrants who initially come alone, an increase in family members can help to increase social ties, particularly “loose ties”: the kind of networks that help people access new opportunities of investment, innovation and expertise (Downie, 2010). This can yield competitive advantages abroad and at home.

**Part B4 Family Reunification and Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B4.1 Remittances</td>
<td>Transfers facilitate development, and also support expansion of human capital – increasing potential pool of family members who would contribute to the economy (Clemens &amp; Ogden, 2014; Connor, Cohn, &amp; Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4.2 Family Investment</td>
<td>Legitimate mobility provides new alternatives to families in developing countries, reduces problematic migration practices (Bledsoe &amp; Papa, 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B4.1 Remittances

Instead of brain drain, migration and transnationalism have come to be treated as a three-part opportunity for developing countries: (1) frontier markets benefit from the investment that can be created via networks cultivated by migrants; (2) return migration can help support local investments; and (3) migration becomes an incentive for young people to improve their skills (World Bank, 2012). Remittances – including financial, social, educational, and creative transfers – provide further opportunities for education, training, and experience. Through remittances, therefore, migration and transnationalism foster more skilled workers, new markets for investment, and new global partners (Clemens, 2014b).

While some argue that remittances have a limited development effect because of their specificity to households with a member overseas (Clemens, 2014a), nevertheless, they drive a wider economy. Countries like Mexico are creating programs to appeal to their diasporas to take an active role in investing in things such as infrastructure, while innovative private enterprises are blooming to meet the needs and obligations of transnational migrants who wish to send money or goods to their families at ‘home’/ in the country of origin (Blanchard, 2013). Given that remittances exceed official development aid several times over (Clemens, 2014a), it is no surprise that transnational migrants are coming to be seen as development actors in their own right – but there are significant critiques in this field as well.

B4.2 Family Investment

New work on migration and development has come to suggest that many families see migration as an investment tool and a long-term financial strategy with long term pay offs due to higher wages and capital accumulation abroad. Migrants will invest in the often-high up-front costs of migration and human capital development in the hopes of reaping higher rewards and
return on investment based on the change in location (Clemens & Ogden, 2014). Individuals with freedom of mobility also represent an opportunity in development, as they have an intimate understanding of their new and old domains, and can act as intermediaries in new markets or as experts in the potential for development.

Part B5  Identity and Belonging in a Transnational World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B5.1 New Modes of Belonging and Allegiance</td>
<td>Redefining allegiance helps to ease identity pressures on later generations of transnational families; increases allegiance due to fairness and togetherness (Kapai, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5.2 Increased Civic Participation and Belonging</td>
<td>Geographic groups and family networks support faster integration and thus better labour outcomes (Erel, 2011; Telegdi, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5.3 Cultural Flows and Mutually Shifting Attitudes</td>
<td>Cultural flows shifting existing xenographic values, more value of multiple language sets (Bertolani et al., 2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B5.1  New Modes of Belonging and Allegiance

States who wish to share and perpetuate their values benefit from migration, as individuals tend to reflect the values of their state – freedom, democracy, tradition, conservatism, liberalism, etc. – at any given time (World Bank, 2012; Blanchard, 2013).

Transnational families – or families separated by borders – have unique characteristics and coping mechanisms for this separation, and their agency and resilience in this separation may be of use to the state. Moreover, bringing the family together does not end transnational processes – there is no beginning and end to correspond with family arrival, and links across the boundaries of nation-states are ongoing (Bertolani et al., 2013).
B5.2 Increased Civic Participation and Belonging

Some countries of origin actively encourage citizens to go abroad. Mexico and the Philippines, for example, have educational and training programs that cater to the labour markets of developing countries (Clemens, 2014b). As part of this project, these countries are starting to coordinate settlement and integration programs designed to ease the transition of migrants and their families (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014). Family and existing communities help to strengthen bonds, and help make new locations become homes. With such support, people are able to negotiate multiple senses of belonging and multiple understandings of home.

B5.3 Cultural Flows and Mutually Shifting Attitudes

By cultivating and supporting the practices of citizenship education within families and in society, the state can create a better sense of belonging as well as better labour market outcomes (Erel, 2011; Erel, 2013; Madianou & Miller, 2013). If existing policy barriers restrict against certain migrants or practices, these restrictions will deter some migrants. People will select opportunities to go elsewhere if they are discriminated against as potential “enemies of the state”. Creating barriers for imagined futures and worst-case scenarios can discourage feelings of connection (D’Aoust, 2013).

Part B6 Families Across Borders: New Modes of Togetherness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6.1 Family Values</td>
<td>Contributing to strong family units (Telegdi, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6.2 Marriage</td>
<td>State out of the bedroom, more favourable policies and roles that do not implicitly discriminate against women (D’Aoust, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6.3 Increasing Legitimate Migration</td>
<td>Families do not need to engage in fraudulent behaviors to achieve reunification (Bertolani et al., 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B6.1 Family Values

In the face of both temporary and prolonged separation, families have remained resilient though not unscarred. Parents who face extended physical separation from their children often remain in constant contact through cellphones and video streaming technology (Åkesson et al., 2012; Lingel, Naaman, & Boyd, 2014; Madianou & Miller, 2013). New modes of “techno-parenting” are emerging as a coping mechanism, but it has its costs. Parents become increasingly torn between two locations, feeling obliged to increase time spent caregiving and decision-making while also working to provide economic support to their children. Reunification offers the opportunity to offer parents more time and energy to focus on their in-country activities, and to strengthen family ties.

B6.2 Marriage

Restrictive migratory policies may encourage families to engage in marriage migration and semi-bogus marriages as means to navigate complex and technocratic regulations, whereas more liberal policies would encourage younger members to seek out partners with experiences more similar to their own, be they outside or within their diaspora community (D’Aoust, 2013). In other words, second and subsequent generations might not seek to marry abroad or even necessarily within their ascribed identity group if additional mobility were offered (Bertolani et al., 2013).

B6.3 Increasing Legitimate Migration

The benefits of family reunification are further augmented by alleviating the costs of keeping families separated (Murdock, 2008, p. 1528). Existing policies that restrict human mobility pose strong barriers to the potential gains of transnationalism, and instead impose costs related to family separation. While quantification of the costs of family separation is difficult,
these costs are undoubtedly present, affecting individuals, families, and society (Zentgraf & Chinchilla, 2012).

**Opportunities for the Transnational Family and the State**

Chapter 3 shows that transnational families can help strengthen states via “soft power”, diplomatic influence, and the ability to attract and retain global leaders. The Chapter then related findings that reunification increases productivity, and yields stronger families. In addition to strengthening states and economies, diasporic and transnational communities contribute to economic expansion, economic and social transfers, and innovation and productivity gains. Third, family reunification improves international development outcomes; fourth, it enhances integration; and finally, new modes of togetherness can help support both healthy families, on the one hand, and family values, on the other hand.

Hence, the six-part framework of Chapter 2 was inverted to demonstrate that not only are state and individual goals *not* at odds, but they even also can strengthen one another if freer mobility is accorded to transnational families. In sum, Chapter 3 describes the opportunities for the state inherent in individuals’ migration, as well as in the transnational family that lingers after migration. Chapter 3 recognizes the household, and indeed the extended family, as a “source of logistic, material and emotional support” (Blanchard, 2013) for the individuals who leave, and as the foundation for an ongoing and cross-generational network generated by transnational ties (Cabral & Singh, 2013; Voigt-Graf, 2004). To fully reap these rewards, however, the state must allow for additional mobility and flexibility in residency rights for transnational families.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

4.1 Summary

In this chapter, I return to the research question: How can family reunification policies and citizenship be reimagined in order to benefit both states and transnational families, and what policies and actions can facilitate this new vision?

My analysis has questioned the apparent tensions between state goals and individual mobility, and then ventured beyond to consider how the unique resilience and agency of transnational families can align with state goals to provide key opportunities to states and individuals in a globalized world.

The six goals described in Chapter 2 help to explain why citizenship-granting states have tightened border controls and restricted movement. They also explain the family realities that transnational families that may be in opposition to these areas of perceived infringement on the state. By looking at both the family and the state and expanding the analysis to the transnational arena, I was able to revisit the framework. Is the mobility of families actually at odds with the transnational state? Chapter 3 revisits the six-part framework to instead suggest that transnational families may be able to support the very state goals that are used to restrict their freedom to be together. Their transnational family practices create new and important opportunities for the state, and easing restrictions creates positive outcomes for both migrants to the receiving citizenship-granting state, and also to that countries already naturalized citizens.

4.2 Current Practice: States Choose Citizens

At present, states cagily guard their “right” to choose their future citizens and to limit the mobility of those without citizenship. As witnessed in the recent EU Parliamentary elections in 2014, wherein citizenship-granting states voted for anti-immigrant parties (Al Jazeera English,
2014), even the growing trend to multilateralism has served to promote a narrow, nationalist – almost xenophobic – agenda that runs counter to freedom of mobility. Yet such favouring of “sovereignty” (McCabe, 2011) over “migrant flows” (Lackzo & Appave, 2014; McGregor et al., 2014) loses sight of the phenomenon of transnationalism that occurs in spite of mobility restrictions: the exchange of culture and identity (Castells, 2009); the pluralism of “contemporaneous” (Marston et al., 2005) “sub-systems” (Appadurai, 2009) of socio-political and economic processes; and the mobile, multicultural populaces (Schiller, 2010).

Theoretically speaking, while the state remains an important unit of analysis in that it sets laws and policies (Mattelart, 2009), it is neither the sole unit of analysis that does so (as mentioned above, multilateral actors increasingly also set laws and policies) (McCabe, 2011), nor the sole exerter of “soft power” in terms of culture, values, ideals, and policies (McDowell, 2009). Networks of communication transcend the state, “above the state, below the state and between the state” (Slaughter, 2009). If the state does remain as a unit of analysis, it is more as a “site of understanding” (Cabraal & Singh, 2013), a perspective, or a vantage point, rather than the prevailing unit of analysis it once was in international relations and theory.

Rather than overriding the agency of transnational families, the state is one of numerous factors that families take into account in their decision-making. Transnational families often mirror the “hub and spoke” formations that characterize knowledge networks and organizational structures increasingly adopted globally. The choice today is left to states as to how they wish to either enable and harness these formations, or hinder them – and in doing so, hinder themselves as states in an interconnected, globalized world.
4.3 Future Practice: Citizens Choose States?

The right to reunification may become one of the most important factors in deciding on a country of residence in the near future. Citizenship-granting states who are encouraged to increase overall immigration levels due to aging populations and the need for eligible labour forces will benefit from the increased productivity yielded via a high skilled and younger workforce (Bledsoe & Papa, 2008; Boeles, 2001). Family reunification can be an important strategy used to balance aging demographics. The states that first adopt a cohesive policy agenda supporting increased mobility and togetherness will gain a considerable competitive advantage over later adopters, achieving increased global relevance and potentially stronger cohesion at home.

Until now, the notion of “choice” has been used against migrants: states absolve themselves of the obligation to respect the right to family unity, saying that individuals “chose” to leave behind their families when they chose to migrate (John, 2004). This false presumption has even been enforced by European courts, which claim, “The state has no obligation to respect the choice of persons to reside in a country and then authorize family reunion in its territory.” (Murdock, 2008, p. 1518).

But if present trends continue and competition rises for attracting and more importantly, retaining, renewed workforces, then the ability for individuals and transnational families to choose where they reside will become a source of empowerment. As key actors within the global processes that have contributed to neo-liberal globalization and the emergence of networked societies, transnational families and migrants will compete for their human and social capital, and so too will compete to be their place of residence. Providing potential immigrants (and transnational families) with more freedom of mobility would therefore allow states to offer an important incentive in recruiting and retaining citizens and workers.
Just as freedom of mobility can attract new citizens, that same freedom already enjoyed by
existing citizens can pose challenges to their countries of origin, as individuals seek work and
study opportunities overseas (Michalowski & Tran, 2008). Ultimately, however, the state most
likely to retain those highly valued individuals will be the one that respects the right to family
unity and the mobility needed to remain competitive on the global stage. Families are a key factor
for those considering their decisions to travel and migrate (Ruhs 2014); being located with family
will help to retain some individuals who do not wish to disrupt their children or partner’s
occupations. In contrast, if people are restricted in their mobility and separated from their family,
states stand to lose the investments they made in attracting or educating the workers in the first
place. Given the importance of family and freedom of movement to most cultures and people,
those states that choose to provide increased reunification rights and timely access to international
mobility will become increasingly competitive in retaining the world’s best and brightest –
including their own citizens.

One example of this challenge in retention is the current competition for international
students in tertiary education – primarily being fought between Canada, the US, Australia, and the
UK. These countries are creating paths to citizenship for such students – one indication that some
barriers to residence are easing. If indeed, as some predict (Simon, 2014), today’s competition for
international students is a harbinger of increased mobility for skilled workers, then just as
migrants will have an opportunity to decide where to reside, they will also have an opportunity to
decide when they will want to leave and where they will go – whether it is return migration or
moving onwards. In a world with increased mobility and togetherness, decision-making on
mobility may come to more closely resemble internal migration patterns.
The bottom line is that freedom of mobility for transnational families will become an asset not only for those families that choose to migrate, but also for those first states to offer this freedom. In a world of emerging economies, of globalized markets, and increasing competition for the global talent, the states who are first to set the bar high for a standard of mobility and freedom that suits the transnational family will become the states best able to retain and benefit from the assets those families and individuals may bring.
References


Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948).


### Appendix: Family Reunification and the Transnational Family: A 12-Part Framework (Table)

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<th>Section A: State Concerns Regarding Reunification</th>
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<td><strong>Opportunities in Reunification</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Part A1: A Strong State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opportunity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance / Sovereignty</td>
<td><strong>Potential Benefits to State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Stronger Global Ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State has sovereign right to decide who enters; potential benefit to families of state-to-state or regional agreements, e.g. citizens within the European Union (Ryutter, 2012; Strik et al., 2013). Misperception of migration as increasing crime and terrorism (Emery, 2010; Vallet &amp; David, 2012)</td>
<td>State benefits from diversity, mobilizes migrants and emigrants with ties to a variety of organizations (Downie, 2010; Wong, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Priorities</td>
<td>Diplomatic Advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State has right to create policies to select demographic preferences and restrict other forms of migration (Collacott, 2013; John, 2004; Johnson, 2013)</td>
<td>Soft power supports formal and informal influence on foreign agendas (Brender, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Attract and Retain Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant households must prove loyalty to state through minimum residency requirements (Scachar, 2011)</td>
<td>Increased eligibility for family reunification provides competitive advantage (Simon, 2014, Dessus, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part A2: The Welfare System</strong></td>
<td>Citizenship in a Transnational World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Renegotiating citizenship(s) to benefit increasing emigration as well as immigration (Koenig-Archibugi, 2012; The Economist, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/families take more in social assistance than they contribute in taxes (Bledsoe &amp; Papa, 2008; IOM, 2004)</td>
<td>Preventing Social Harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>Family, Togetherness for Better Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migrants with health issues exploit universal healthcare at the cost of the state and taxpayer (Collacott, 2013; Grady &amp; Grubel, 2011)</td>
<td>Family who are separated from families face increased stress and family togetherness promotes better health outcomes (Schapiro, Kools, Weiss, &amp; Brindis, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills and Human Capital</td>
<td>Unpaid (Family) Labour in Private Enterprises and Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migrants are not adequately skilled and may require additional training or education (Groenendijk, 2006)</td>
<td>Reproductive labour increases productivity of working family members and supports small business goals (Laferrière, 2013; VanderPlaat, Ramos, &amp; Yoshida, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family sponsor must prove adequate income and housing (Strik et al., 2013; Zentgraf &amp; Chinchilla, 2012)</td>
<td>Extended family separation can be extremely harmful (Cholewinski, 2002; Groenendijk, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members vary in skills and education before and after arrival (DeShaw, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Part A: State Concerns Regarding Reunification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Goals</th>
<th>Area of Infringement</th>
<th>State Barriers to Family Togetherness and Mobility</th>
<th>Family Realities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Gain</td>
<td>Labour Market</td>
<td>Immigrants / families take “natives” jobs and drive down wages (World Bank, 2013)</td>
<td>Permanent residents seek employment income but not at expense of wages or jobs (temporary migration has different impacts on labour markets) (Ozden &amp; Wagner, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Stability</td>
<td>Family class migrants not suited for the labour market, potentially destabilizing force (DeShaw, 2006)</td>
<td>Migrants do impact the labour market but successfully adapt to needs over time (Li, 2003; Laferrière, 2014); migrants’ human capital may be devalued (Guo, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Flight</td>
<td>Family class migrants lack human and social capital to be successful (Grady &amp; Grubel, 2011)</td>
<td>Family class migrants vary greatly in terms of access to capital; migration is often treated as a household investment (Clemens &amp; Ogden, 2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part B: Aligning the Transnational Family with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities in Reunification</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expansion</td>
<td>Immigrants can contribute to the expansion of economy and potentially the increase of wages (Ozden &amp; Wagner, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social / Educational / Technological Transfers</td>
<td>Culture, goods and ideas flow back and forth through family networks and benefiting the state (Cabraal &amp; Singh, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation, Productivity and Competitive Advantage</td>
<td>New modes of understanding issues encourages innovation in all sectors, increases productivity (Bacigalupe &amp; Câmara, 2012; Downie, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part A3: International Development

| Development Commitments | Suggested barrier: restrict / tax migration of skilled workers to prevent Brain Drain and enhance development issues (Collier 2014) | Skilled migrant households should not have imposed obligation to stay if compelled to migrate for other reasons (Clemens 2014, Oberman 2014) |

### Part B4: Family Reunification and Development

| Remittances | Transfers facilitate development, and also support expansion of human capital - increasing potential pool of family members who would contribute to the economy (Clemens & Ogden, 2014; Connor, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013) |
| Family Investment | Legitimate mobility provides new alternatives to families in developing countries, reduces problematic migration practices (Bledsoe & Papa, 2008) |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part A5: Integration</td>
<td>Allegiance</td>
<td>&quot;Multiculturalism has failed&quot; – perceived cultural incompatibility with host country, false allegiance to state. Successful integration is judged on the basis of conforming and assimilating to existing linguistic, social and cultural patterns. (Park, 2013; Siebold, 2010) Immigrant “ghettos” do not promote integration (Li, 2003; Guiraudon, 2008) Migrants must have fluent knowledge of official language(s) for successful integration: pre-testing restricts migration at borders (Ryter, 2012; Guo, 2012)</td>
<td>Families have fluid identities that include allegiance to a variety of state and non-state actors; different rates of social participation based on real and structural social barriers (Park, 2013; Li, 2003) Migrant households tend to settle in similar geographic due to social ties and support (Avenarius, 2012; Guiraudon, 2008) Family members may lack knowledge of the official language but can learn it (Finnie &amp; Mueller, 2010)</td>
<td>New Modes of Belonging and Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part A6: Family Values</td>
<td>Family Values</td>
<td>Varying traditional understandings and practices of family are seemingly incompatible with accepted family law (Strik et al., 2013)</td>
<td>Family definitions are based in a cultural context and understanding that shifts over time - if not reinforced via other barriers (Baizán et al., 2014) Marriage to a member of country of origin or its diasporic community is due to a number of factors (Bertolani, Rinaldini, &amp; Tognetti Bordogna, 2013) Families who face barriers in togetherness may engage in suspect behaviours within or outside to reuniite in new country</td>
<td>New Modes of Belonging and Allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Bogus” Applicants</td>
<td>Preventing &quot;bogus&quot; applications for &quot;gaming system&quot; or human trafficking (D’Aoust, 2013).</td>
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</table>

### Part B: Aligning the Transnational Family with the State

<table>
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<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Potential Benefits to State</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Modes of Belonging and Allegiance</td>
<td>Redefining allegiance helps to ease identity pressures on later generations of transnational families; increases allegiance due to fairness and togetherness (Kapai, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Civic Participation and Belonging</td>
<td>Geographic groups and family networks support faster integration and thus better labour outcomes (Erel, 2011; Telegdi, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Flows and Mutually Shifting Attitudes</td>
<td>Cultural flows shifting existing xenographic values, more value of multiple language sets (Bertolani et al., 2013).</td>
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<tr>
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