Insecurity as Imagination:
Securitization and Reproduction of Knowledge about Insecurity
The United States and Iraq (January 2002 – March 2003)

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Dedicated to my parents, my wife Soheila, Kayvohn and Mehran
Abstract

This dissertation is a political sociology of production of knowledge about insecurity that focuses on the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 as its empirical study. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology and the insights of Critical Discourse Analysis, it analyzes the media coverage of Iraq in order to identify ‘actors with the capacity to make statements’ and their contributions to the process of securitization.

In addition to its analysis of agency, it offers a theorization of time in security and securitization. By analyzing evidence (intelligence), it explores the question of ‘acceptance of audience’ in Securitization Theory. Contextualizing securitization in a broader social space, this project argues that securitization can be understood as the double movement of soft and hard securitizations that respectively refer to reproduction of language and construction of existential threat.

Keywords: Securitization, soft securitization, hard securitization, time, war in Iraq, Critical Discourse Analysis, intelligence.
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Introduction

Before September 11, 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that day never comes. (President Bush, State of the Union address, in New York Times, January 29, 2003: 1)

This dissertation examines President George W. Bush’s imagined insecurity and how it transformed the identity of Iraq (Saddam Hussein) from a contained threat into an existential threat – to the security of the United States. Considering insecurity and threats as social constructions, from a theory of knowledge perspective, this dissertation analyzes the field of power in which Iraq was constructed as a social reality. Such ‘new thinking’ about security as a social construction has become possible through broader metatheoretical developments in International Relations that challenged the objectivist account of security (Smith 1999).

This dissertation builds upon the idea that, as with other social products, security is relational, constructed and inter-subjective, and it needs to be understood in its socio-historical context (Salter 2008, Balzacq 2011, Stritzel 2012). The dissertation aligns itself with critical approaches that challenge unexamined assumptions governing security studies (Huysmans 2006). Pursuing the idea of ‘cross-fertilization’ among critical approaches (c.a.s.e 2006), it contributes to the
understanding of securitization in the Securitization Theory (ST) by employing sociological perspectives and the insights of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

The construction of security has been a major intellectual preoccupation of alternative approaches. Perhaps the most influential, and contentious, theorization of this question has been offered by the Copenhagen School, which understands security as a sign and ‘securitization’ as a speech act (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). In the case of the war on Iraq, Securitization Theory (ST) describes securitization as the pronouncement of Iraq as an existential threat by President Bush (Hughes 2007).

I agree with ST that security is a social construction. However, I present the process of securitization as a double movement that includes both the construction of existential threat (the utterance of ‘security’) and the reproduction of security. ST marks a major milestone in the study of security both by challenging the myth of the objectivity of security and by provoking theoretical and ethical discussions about securitization (McSweeney 1996, Huysmans 1999, Aradau 2004). Many proponents of this theory argue that certain ethical questions concerning ST are out of its research program (Taureck 2006).

This dissertation concentrates its analysis on three particular elements in the structure of ST: 1) “intersubjective construction of existential threat”; 2) acceptance of the audience; and 3) securitization as a speech act (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 25-26). To do so, I have chosen to examine the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003 as my empirical study. I employ the insight of Bourdieusian sociology and CDA to analyze pre-war media coverage of Iraq from January 2002 to March 2003.
Adopting a relational ontology, informed by the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, I argue that the construction of existential threat, acceptance of the audience and securitization as a speech act are interrelated to such an extent that we cannot study one element isolated from the others. More explicitly, the intersubjective construction of threat, negotiation about a securitizing move, transference of a message from the securitizing actor to the audience, conditions of success or failure of the move and re-production of language need to be understood as the constitutive elements, and products, of the same process. All these elements overlap and intersect each other to the extent that we cannot understand them separately.

Considering the intersubjective construction of existential threat, and acceptance of the audience, I specifically argue that the construction of threat takes place in the social space including politicians, experts (professionals) and journalists. Regarding the acceptance of the audience, I examine the discourse created by journalists as sites in which the securitizing actor’s message is re-produced and mediated to the broader audience. More importantly, I examine the construction of intelligence, as evidence, by intelligence professionals and the provision of proof by the securitizing actor as important conditions of success for the securitizing act.

With regard to the third element, securitization as a speech act, although I believe it may encapsulate certain important moment(s) in the process of securitization, by reducing the process of securitization to a moment, and security to a fixed and static label, it does not correspond to the social character of the construction of existential threat and acceptance of the audience. ST perceives language (security) as a structuring structure, meaning that it shapes the identity of the object without being influenced by its social environment. However, I argue that language (security) is at the same time a social product which is reproduced mainly by the fields of politicians, experts and journalists. Therefore, with the notion double movement, I suggest
securitization studies may colligate an examination of the reproduction of security along with the study of the construction of existential threat.

As I argue in Chapter Two, my pursuit of the *moment* took me through different discourses that directly or indirectly impacted the identity of Iraq, and Saddam Hussein in particular. Each of those discourses, from different perspectives, revealed multiple *moments* in the forms of ruptures, breaks and additions in the discourse as well as the engagement and disengagement of different actors. The case of Iraq shows that the security act is a process of constituting three distinct, but at the same time interrelated, identities: language (insecurity), threat and the object to be defended. Thus, any changes in any of these identities transform the other two identities.

This notion of moment directed this dissertation towards an analysis of time in securitization. As I argue in Chapter Two, ST’s conception of language and Carl Schmitt’s ideas do not allow theorization of time. Time has remained an under-theorized question in securitization. Nonetheless, time shapes the being of security; therefore, a temporal analysis of the process of securitization ought to be a necessary component of understanding the process of securitization. Such analysis may include an examination of the temporal context(s), the constitution of time and urgency and how different actors engage in the process of securitization.

**Context**

New thinking in security studies is an academic reaction to the discontent with the narrow conception of security in security (strategic) studies and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War (Booth 1997, Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Smith 1999). Buzan’s seminal work, *People, State and Fear* (1983), broadened the security agenda to include, in addition to the traditional military sector, the political, economic, societal and ecological sectors. Although these sectors do not fall under the narrow definition of conventional security (strategic) studies, they could threaten the
survival of different communities, nations and even the entire planet. Such a situation resulted in the debates about widening the field in order to study new threats.

This dissatisfaction about the narrow conception of security was stimulated by the rise of economic and environmental agendas in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of organized crime during the 1990s (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 2). On the one side, referring to the urgency of new sources of threats, wideners argued for including non-military forms of threats (Mathews 1989, Buzan 1991). On the other side, proponents of the traditionalist approach disputed wideners’ argument for different reasons. Stephen Walt, for instance, was concerned about the intellectual coherence of the field (Walt 1991), while some others (Gray 1994) reminded colleagues and politicians of the enduring primacy of military security and that ‘military power is trumps in politics.’ From a different perspective, Daniel Deudney raised concern about the counterproductive military mindset within the conventional approaches that securitization imposes on non-military issues such as environmental problems (Deudney 1990).

ST was a response to the concerns about broadening and coherence of the field of security studies. This theory intended to, from a constructivist perspective, address the widening of the field and, at the same time, consider the concerns about its coherence. ST understands security as a “special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 23). A public issue becomes securitized when it is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (1998: 23-24, added italics). Therefore, securitization is a self-referential practice, for it is in this practice that issues

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1 Perhaps this understanding of the transformation of security studies in terms of environmental changes is an influence of the positivistic conception of the world in which changes ‘out there’ transform assumptions and the definition of security ‘in here,’ i.e in the mind of the analyst. I believe some important developments in security studies, especially the emergence of critical security studies, more than environmental changes, are due to the use of new modes of thinking (epistemologies and ontology) in IR. In this regard see Ken Booth (1997).
become security issues. Within this framework security is understood as “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (ibid: 25).

According to ST, this subjective account of security can never be replaced by an objective measure, for the ‘security quality is supplied by politics’ (ibid: 32). Buzan and collaborators elaborate on this process by recognizing three components or steps including: “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (1998: 26). They call this process a *speech act*. “It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act” (ibid: 26). Thus, the main component of this process, upon which other components are built, is the designation of existential threat. Other components, such as acceptance of the audience, are, to a large extent, the consequences of this component. Although security as ‘speech act’ opens the concept for an infinite range of issues, this openness is limited by *internal* (linguistic-grammar) and *external* (contextual and social) factors.

ST has been criticized from sociological (McSweeney 1996), ethical (Erikson 1999) and linguistic perspectives (Balzacq 2005). Michael Williams (2003) questions the issue of medium in this theory. This dissertation analyzes the *moment* of securitization and the subsequent ‘negotiation’ between the securitizing actor and the audience. This analysis includes an examination of the participating actors, the medium of the negotiation and the reproduction of language in this process.

Focusing on the linguistic aspect of ST, Balzacq argues that “the assumption of a speech act approach ultimately reduces security to a *conventional procedure* such as marriage or betting in
which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005: 172, original italics). He, instead, suggests that “securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (2005: 172). Balzacq is correct that language practices should be understood in their social context and that this context should be expanded at the moment of, and after, the occurrence of the securitization act. However, in contrast to the arguments of ST and Balzacq that take ‘securitizer’ and ‘speaker’ as given, I want to offer a more comprehensive theorization of this situation in order to include all parties in the process of securitization, among them the audience. I argue that concepts, such as ‘securitizing actor’ and ‘speaker,’ reduce the complex field(s) of actors to a single entity. A more comprehensive theorization of this situation is necessary to better reflect its complexity, understand the conditions of the success or failure of a securitizing move and rid ST of its narrow understanding of language.

Securitization could be better understood through analysis of the language practices of certain social fields that are engaged in the production of the language of insecurity. Therefore, a major contribution of this project, by examining the engaged actors, is a sociological theorization of the speaker and audience in the process of securitization. The production of language is a comprehensive social practice that includes both the speaker and the audience. However, the symbolic power that shapes this process has been distributed extremely unequally between different participating actors. In the case of the war on Iraq for instance, certain expert opinions about military action against Iraq could not influence President Clinton’s strategy on Iraq.

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2 In Chapter Two I argue that such analysis should include an examination of security, the threat and the referent object prior to the speech act.
However, after those experts joined the Bush administration their opinion dramatically transform the identity of Iraq.  

Considering Balzacq’s observation, a major problem with ST is its theorization of language that understands language as a neutral means of communication. In contrast to this account of language, different thinkers (Foucault 1972, Derrida 1978, Said 1978, Foucault and Gordon 1980, Fairclough 1989, Bourdieu and Thompson 1991, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Teubert 2010), from different perspectives, understand the very constitution of language as a political process which is shaped by power relations and examined how power relations are sustained by language. Thus, what has been viewed by ST as an internal condition for a successful securitization speech act is already political – for language is a social phenomenon, not something external to the social (see Campbell 1992).

Pierre Bourdieu presents a satisfactory analysis of this problem. He argues: “[…] grammaticality is not necessary and sufficient condition of the production of meaning, as Chomsky (1967) might lead us to believe by overlooking the fact that language is made not for linguistic analysis but to be spoken and to be spoken á propos” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 142). He continues that “linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power through which relations of force between the speakers and their respective groups are actualized in a transfigured form (1992: 142, original italics).

ST’s narrow understanding of language has attracted criticism from other perspectives. Michael Williams praises ST for demonstrating the affinities between Carl Schmitt’s classical realist thoughts and the constructivist approach in IR. Nevertheless, he criticizes ST’s narrow

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3 I touch upon this issue from different perspectives in chapters 1, 4 and 5.
Theorization of medium. Williams argues, “As political communication becomes increasingly entwined with the production and transmission of visual images, the processes of securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institutional linkages, that cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone” (Williams 2003: 512). Considering this insight of the medium theory that new modes of communication transform a communicative environment including social organizations, ideas, ways of thinking and modes of cognition (Deibert 1997: 33), a theory ‘closely tied to speech’ may not be able to address security in a world of televisual communication (Williams 2003: 524).

An important observation of Williams is that a securitization research agenda must also account for the ways in which these acts are mediated through communications institutions (“the media”) that are organizationally distinct from the site of securitization, that are bound up with competing logics (commercialization, market share, audience attraction), and yet that are central to the securitizing act. (2003: 527-528)

Although this observation can expand the site of securitization in order to incorporate the field of journalists in the theorization of securitization, Williams’ critique is restricted to the material conditions of securitization. Indeed, the importance of a new medium is not only that it offers a new means of conveying meaning but also that it reorders the social structure and power relations that produce this meaning. Language as a social phenomenon includes all means of the conveyance of meaning. Considering the necessities and realities of contemporary society, the theorization of media in ST is a legitimate concern; however, it cannot be addressed through the existing understanding of language in either ST or Williams’ argument.

I argue that the media is not external to discursive practice or merely a medium to ‘convey’ the meaning produced by the securitizing actor to the audience. Rather, I understand media as the
site in which the communication between the securitizing actor and other social actors takes place. Indeed, journalists, as the gatekeepers of this field, decide who can engage in this debate and in what capacity. Therefore, such a theorization of media in securitization studies, as material conditions of communication or an innocent conveyor of the message, is misleading. Journalists do not merely transfer a message from one actor to others; rather, they reproduce meaning by reduction and addition, as well as interpretation of the securitization speech act.

**The Field of Journalists**

Journalists and mass media, and their relationship with other actors, have been important preoccupations of media studies. The state-media relationship, in particular, constitutes a major debate in this field. O’Heffernan observes that “security policy-makers perceive the media and government in terms of a co-evolutionary mutual exploitation model which sees a significant element of policy-making involved in using and influencing the media” (1994: 233). From the perspective of policy-makers, media today is seen “as part of the policy process, and [...] the government has become and must remain part of the media process” (ibid: 233 _original italics_).

In war or a state of emergency, peacetime rules are suspended and the state expects media compliance (Carruthers 2000: 11).

In spite of the restrictive situation of wartime, as Baudrillard writes, “[t]he media promote the war, the war promotes the media, and the advertising competes with the war” (Baudrillard 1995: 31). In the American context, Marvin Kalb argues “[w]hen America goes to war, so too does the press, wrapped in the flag no less proudly than the troops themselves” (Kalb 1994: 3). However, at some other times, it is difficult for political elites to catch the media’s and public’s attention (Mueller 1994: 134).
Journalists show special interest in securitizing moves, particularly when there is a high possibility of armed conflict. Security and the news, the way they are understood by political elites and journalists, have in common the notion of exceptionality. Perhaps it is this sense of exceptionalism that makes securitizing moves attractive to journalists, editors and writers. The more an occurrence looks exceptional, dramatic, bloody and controversial, the more newsworthy it is, and the better its chance of coverage by the media.

There is a consensus about the existence of a strong relationship between the fields of political actors and journalists, but its quality is controversial. Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (2002), on the one hand, emphasizes the ability of the political and economic elite to influence, through co-opted experts, the ideological output of the media. The notion of the ‘CNN effect’ (Livingston 1997), on the other hand, argues that media influence security policy-making (Robinson 2002, Balabanova 2007).

The propaganda model, however illuminating, reduces the media to a mere instrument of certain forces external to the field of journalists (see Herman and Chomsky 2002: 2). Some variants of manufacturing consent, such as the ‘executive’ and ‘elite’ versions (see Robinson 2002: 13), however, have tried to open some room for media to act independently from dominant interests. From the executive view, overall media coverage conforms to the agendas and frames of government officials in the executive branch of government (Entman 1989). Adopting a broader understanding of elites, the elite view argues that news media coverage conforms to the interests of elites whether inside or outside government (Bennett 1990). In his examination of the American war on Vietnam, Daniel Hallin argues that mass media tend to be more prone to following than leading, and news, confined in the boundaries of official political debates, is a dependent variable of elites’ relations (Hallin 1986).
From a different perspective, “For many journalists, policy-makers, and scholars, there really is little doubt that media profoundly affect the foreign policy process” (Livingston 1997: 1). From this view, media can accelerate, impede or influence agenda setting (1997: 2). An examination of the framing of the behavior of American soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison shows that the contest between political elites, i.e. the Bush Administration, and journalists over the framing of a single event is a dynamic process in which either actor could gain primacy at different stages. However, political elites are more likely to eventually take control of an event-driven process of news making (Bennett, Lawrence et al. 2006).

**The Field of Security Experts**

Knowledge about insecurity, as Didier Bigo (2008) has observed, is to a great extent produced by a heterogeneous field of policing, military and intelligence professionals. As mentioned earlier, the propaganda model observes that co-opted experts along with journalists shape public opinion (Herman and Chomsky 2002). With regard to the war on Iraq in particular, hidden behind the appearance of *objectivity*, the Pentagon deployed “military analysts” to present authoritative judgments about national security problems as part of the campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration’s wartime performance (Barstow 2008).

By conducting ‘systematic and scientific’ production of knowledge about security, academics, researchers and certain professionals/bureaucrats have exerted their authority in the construction of insecurity and the process of security policy making. Considering the *objectivity* of expert opinion, technicalization has become a technique of influencing the negotiation, even bypassing public debate, in the process of securitization. More importantly, the scientific (social science) field plays an important role in the overall reproduction of the habitus of the field by training newcomers and making security comprehensible for other actors.
International Relations in general, and security studies in particular, have evolved closely in relation to political and bureaucratic needs (Hoffmann 1977, Smith 2002). The close relationship between politicians, bureaucrats/professionals and social scientists, by determining the main questions of this field, especially after WWII, has shaped security studies and how we understand security. Lyons and Morton have examined the creation of the link between the military sector and foreign policy; the creation of different academic institutes and programs for the study of security; and the immigration of former politicians and high ranking bureaucrats to such institutes to write and teach about security (Lyons and Morton 1965: 41, see also Bock and Berkowitz 1966).

A subfield of experts, known as think tanks – building upon expert authority – actively participates in agenda setting and influencing the process of policy making (Rich 2004). They are heavily referenced by media and consulted by different government branches, especially different Senate committees, as experts (Abelson 2006). Therefore, security experts must be studied as important elements in what Richard Smoke has called the “military-industrial-legislative-scientific-educational-commercial-labor complex (Smoke 1975: 264).

In contrast to the common sense that the more knowledgeable the government is, the better decisions it will make, John Gunnell believes that this knowledge provides certain policies with legitimacy, rather than helping to make better policies (Gunnell 1983/1984). Considering ‘the cult of experts,’ Lyons and Morton argue that “the resort to expert advice is useful as a political manoeuvre to allay public fears, to lift the issue above partisan debate […] In this way the president can inject a national perspective into the public debate without committing himself to a position (1965: 42).
The U.S. Congress, as well, uses experts in reviewing policies (ibid: 44). Many non-profit, non-governmental organizations, such as the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), were created to coordinate or produce knowledge about security. Such measures have created cohesive intellectual communities, including academicians and public officials, that produce knowledge about security around different issues (see ibid: 45). With regard to IR, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, Büger and Gadinger argue that internal questions, such as its relevance, can be addressed by “treating IR as a scientific practice that is closely tied to its social environment” (2007: 90). Within this environment the interaction between “disciplinary neighbors, administrators, publishers, funding agencies, politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, and so on’ is more prominent” (2007: 105).

By developing ‘scientific,’ ‘statistical’ and ‘mathematical’ solutions, security experts have played an important role in creating certainty in the process of national security decision making. For instance, ‘system analysis,’ developed by RAND, claimed to represent “an approach to, or way of looking at, complex problems of choice under uncertainty, such as those associated with national security” (Quade in ibid, 128). As I argue in Chapter Three, intelligence experts contributed to the securitization of Iraq in their pursuit of certain administrative regulations by creating a sense of certainty regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Scientific and professional understandings of security present value-free, objective models of security. Gray observes that, on the one hand, strategic (military) decision making is deeply related to political values, because “the task of strategy is to relate military power to political purpose. Strategic studies a matter of ‘how to do it?’ study” (Gray 1982: 6-8), everything else in this
process is political. On the other hand, he noticed the influence of certain Cold War assumptions, such as of the nature of international political rivalry and the importance of military power, even military nuclear power, in thinking about security (ibid: 5).

What should be studied as security is a political question (see Buzan 1983, Walt 1991). Despite concerns about the coherence of the field, Ken Booth and Steve Smith expressed their discontent with the domination of strategic studies over the perception of security (Booth 1997, Smith 1999). Considering the question of the coherence of the field, Buzan understands security as “a particular type of politics defined by reference to existential threats and calls for emergency action in any sector” (Buzan 1997: 5). Thus, what initially seems to be a metatheoretical debate, that is, the recognition of an object as a referent of security, has dramatic political consequences (Deudney 1990, Huysmans 2006).

Orientation
The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze ‘complex, diffuse and messy’ relations that all together reproduce the language of insecurity and construct existential threat. By extending the process of securitization into time and space, this dissertation offers a temporally informed analysis of the social space in which securitization takes place. With regard to the construction of existential threat, I have found insightful Mark Salter’s (2008) and Didier Bigo’s (2008) examinations of the overall formation of insecurity without reducing different actors of this field to ‘important’ actors.

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4 However, I believe the question of strategy, as an important element of the process of securitization, is indeed an important political question. In Chapter Four, I argue that the question of ‘How to do it?’ plays an important role in creating legitimacy for certain solutions.
5 I have examined the power of assumptions in Chapter Three in professional intelligence assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
6 Chapter Two examines security from a time perspective. It addresses some of the political implications of the construction of urgency and emergency.
7 John Law (2004: 2) describes social issues as ‘complex, diffuse and messy.’
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of *dispositif*, Salter argues that the ‘*dispositif* of security’ “defines the objects of security. It defines what might be governed in the name of security, or what might be defined as security” (2008: 248). In its Foucauldian sense, “*dispositif* is not mechanistic as structure, an apparatus, or a network per se, but rather a constellation of institutions, practices, and beliefs that create the conditions of possibility within a particular field. It is a capability for governance, or the disposition of a field towards a mode of governance” (ibid, 248).

The *dispositif* of security analyzes the routine production of new forms of normalizations, but its concentration on ‘subjectification’ prevents it from paying attention to the transformation of security itself. It seems that, in order to focus on normalization, subjectification and government, the ‘*dispositif* of security’ applies security as fixed and pre-constructed conditions to its subject. As I argue throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapter Four, each security act includes a reproduction of security in itself that needs to be understood through analysis of the dynamics and politics within the *dispositif* of security.

Inspired by Bourdieu’s notion of field, the ‘field of professionals of the management of unease,’ articulated by Didier Bigo (2008), is a political sociology of international relations that questions certain commonsensical ideas about security, such as the dichotomy of inside (police) versus outside (military), notions of the police and army as zealous servants of the state, the separation of the military from the social world and the devaluation of intermediary institutions.

Nevertheless, by focusing on the practices of certain professionals, mostly bureaucrats, and disregarding other important actors, such as political elites and social scientists, it offers a very narrow understanding of the production of fear and insecurity.
This field perspective allows Bigo to understand policing activities as the product of a variety of actors, such as the police, military, intelligence services, immigration bodies, etc. It enables IR, and security studies in particular, to analyze the social world behind the veil of the state. The notion of field disperses actors over social space and, at the same time, reunites them in terms of their common product. This social space, considering its product can be defined within a nation-state; in Bigo’s analysis the above-mentioned field transcends national boundaries. Field is a critical tool to break through limits of political imagination constituted by traditional ways of thinking about security, among them, the inside/outside separation, borders of academic knowledge and politics of knowledge production.

The dispositif of security and the field of management of unease offer helpful tools and hints for analysis of securitization. Besides, different theories of media studies have examined news/policy-making as a social practice of actors from different fields. IR and security studies are aware of the mutual influence of security making and the study of security. Considering this situation between the fields of the political, scientific and journalistic, I argue that analysis of security should incorporate an examination of the sum of these relations in the process of securitization.

This research is inspired by Bourdieu’s sociology. Bourdieu has developed a relational, spatial and temporal approach that breaks free from different forms of dualism, among them agent and structure, in the study of the social. The “thinking tools” (Leander 2008) of field and habitus enables the researcher to analyze the social problem, usually the social product in his/her terms, across time and space and, by incorporating different conventionally opposing elements, create a less “messy” (Law 2004) account of the social.
Bourdieu’s sociology is combined with individual empirical cases. He consciously and intentionally avoids generalization and emphasizes the particularity of individual cases. In this sociology, methodology is tailored to meet the analytical requirements of an individual problem. Therefore, Bourdieu offers a perspective and a way of understanding and analyzing the social (Bigo 2011).  

**Methodology**

This dissertation draws on ST, which builds upon the speech-act theory developed by John Austin (1975). ST examines securitization as the emergence of a new identity in language. Therefore, in order to examine ST, one needs to examine data provided by different forms of texts. Discourse analysis, as a method of analyzing the social world created by language, has been deployed by IR scholars since the 1980s. Among them, DerDerian and Shapiro (1989), Purvis and Hunt (1993), Campbell (1992), Milliken (Milliken 1999), Hansen (2006), and Salter (2008) employed discourse analytic approaches to analyze data from publications, correspondence, transcripts, policy documents and visuals (see Salter and Mutlu 2012: 113).

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8 As Bourdieu introduces them, fields are constituted in a process of differentiation or autonomization in social space. We can see this autonomy, however relative, in the fields of the political, journalistic and experts. Fields have their own irreducible fundamental laws that are often tautologies; for instance, business is business. “Thus, we have social universes which a fundamental law, a *nomos* which is independent from the laws of other universes, which evaluates what is done in them, the stakes at play, according to principles and criteria that are irreducible to those of other universes” (Bourdieu 1998).

The idea of field provides a research tool to examine (in)security, for instance, as a social product. Field is a spatial metaphor that directs the research in his analysis of the actors, structures and process of (in)security production. Field helps to better understand being as a relational matter (Bourdieu 1998). Field can be perceived “as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96-97). These positions “statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field, these position-takings being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field” (Bourdieu 2005: 30).

Bourdieu introduces field as a social universe, a microcosm that brings together agents and institutions engaged in the production of a certain social product. Each field has its own *nomos* and laws of functioning relatively autonomously within the social macrocosm, and, at the same time, it is caught up in the laws of this bigger universe (2005: 32-33). In each field there is internal struggle, politics, for “the imposition of the dominant principle of vision and division” (2005: 39). In the exterior, fields compete with each other for the imposition of such principles on each other and other social actors through the constitution of reality and definition of the social world (see 2005: 36-37).
I specifically employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) throughout this dissertation. CDA enables us to better understand the process of securitization by analyzing language as the most common form of social knowledge (e.g. Fairclough 1989, Fowler 1991). It especially helps this dissertation to address certain problems of ST arising from speech act theory. Like Allan Bell, I utilize CDA more as a perspective, than a school or methodology, that helps us to understand the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging power relations and sociopolitical dominance. Besides, CDA shows a special interest in media text as an important discursive site for the manifestation of sociopolitical structures and trends (1995: 24-25).

This project examines the process of constructing Iraq as an existential threat prior to the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Iraq lingered as a threat in American security discourse from 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to 2002 when it was transformed into an existential threat. From the perspective of this dissertation, Iraq offers an invaluable case of securitization based on imagination – or perhaps fabrication – that engaged actors across social space. The gradual transformation of Iraq from 2002-2003 offers a prolonged moment of the pronouncement of Iraq as an existential threat and allows us to better understand the politics of securitization.

In order to analyze and expand the notion of ‘securitizing actor,’ I have chosen to analyze the contributions of actors with different capacities in the securitization process without reducing the existence of actors to certain actors. Considering the necessities of doing research about language and personal interests, this dissertation analyzes media coverage of Iraq for the period from President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address, in which he called Iraq a member of the ‘axis of evil,’ to the outbreak of war on Iraq in March 2003. However, as I challenge my chosen beginning for this process in Chapter One, considering different elements in the identity
of ‘Iraq’ as an existential threat, from different perspectives, one can identify multiple beginnings for the process of securitizing Iraq.

I regard media coverage of Iraq as the site of securitization. A retrospective analysis of the above-mentioned period shows the evolution of a specific framing of Iraq that necessitated military action as the appropriate solution for the problem. My search for articles with ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’ in the headlines in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* in Factiva created a collection of 99 and 151 respectively. Although the use of Factiva greatly facilitates the selection of news articles, the articles in this database lack the graphical organization, such as the lay-out, non-verbal properties and photographs, of the print edition of the dailies. This shortcoming restricts this research to the analysis of the written text of the news coverage.

The headline is the most important element in the news. Considering its importance, it has been examined from semiotic, linguistic, cognitive and psychological perspectives. Editors exercise their psychological power over their readers through headlines (Winship and Allport 1943). Winship and Allport argue that through headlines editors create the picture of the world-scene for their readers (1943: 205). Headlines, Allport and Lepkin argue, “create the first mood and impression which subtly dominate the reader as he peruses a news article” (1943: 212).

From a semiotic perspective, “The function of the linguistic syntagms of headlines is to draw the attention of the reader to the topic of each news story, and through the connotations of the linguistic signs to propose some of the social codes appropriate for understanding it” (Bignell 2002: 92). Therefore, the headline does not merely offer a summary of the news article and draw attention but it shapes the subjectivity of the audience towards the news. Teun van Dijk has conducted extensive research about the function of the headline from a Critical Discourse
Analysis perspective. He argues that “the category of Headline in a news discourse […] has a fixed form and position in news items in the press. At the same time, this Headline has a very specific thematic function: it usually expresses the most important topic of the news item” (1985: 69). All elements of news reports do not possess the same weight; “the highest proposition of the thematic structure is expressed in the headline” (van Dijk 1989: 209).

Headlines have important cognitive and textual functions (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, van Dijk 1991) and play the most important role in the framing of the news event. They summarize the report and express the main topic (van Dijk 1991: 50). Further, the headline shapes the mind of the reader insofar as how to read and understand the story. Among many possible readings of the news story, the headline information is “used to activate the relevant knowledge in memory the reader needs to understand the news report” (1991: 50).

The juxtaposition of Iraq (problem) and war (solution) in headlines shows how journalists received and reproduced this framing of problem-solution. In the relevant news articles, authors examined the positions of different social actors as well as concerns and interests about the problem. The very fact of this juxtaposition may be seen as having normalized this link between Iraq and war. “The selection and textual prominence of topics results from the routines of news-making which embody the criteria of journalistic decisions about the newsworthiness of events” (van Dijk 1991: 71).

This dissertation, however, is not an analysis of headlines; rather, it seeks to analyze what was being said under specific framings (headlines) of Iraq. It posits that those news articles will lead us to identify actors who had the capacity to produce statements on Iraq and how it should be

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9 See Bigo 2008: 23.
dealt with. It considers the headline as representing the site in which the securitization of Iraq took place. In other words, this dissertation tries to analyze the social space that journalists created through a particular framing of Iraq and war. I used NVIVO to code the collected articles. It produced about 300 nodes for the *New York Times* and 445 nodes for the *Washington Post*. The nodes represent individual actors and organizations (agency) and themes and concepts (discourse). The table below shows a specific categorization of the produced nodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside:</td>
<td>Saddam Hussein; 9/11; axis of evil, weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; dictatorship; human rights (violation); temporality; evidence (intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Bush; administration members; members of Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heads of governments; foreign ministers; international organizations (UN; UN Security Council; UN inspectors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State professionals: military commanders; intelligence officers; university professors; former officials; think tanks; retired military; religious leaders</td>
<td>Containment; deterrence; multilateralism; military action; self-defense (just war); preemption; unilateralism; regime change; democracy; war plans and strategies; costs and consequences of war; oil; anti-war movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Journalists</strong></td>
<td>They shaped the space for other actors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The below pictures show the distribution of the news coverage of the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* among the first 30 nodes.
The 99 news articles in the *New York Times* were produced by 63 authors. 16 of these authors coauthored 26 articles with other authors. In the *Washington Post*, the 151 articles were authored by 70 writers. Among them, 30 staff writers coauthored 79 articles with colleagues.

Approximately a quarter of the selected articles in the *New York Times* are coauthored, while about half of the news reports in the *Washington Post* are co-authored articles. Another difference in the authorship of the articles is that the number of the selected articles in the *New York Times* authored by university professors, former state officials and experts is more than in the *Washington Post*, in which articles are mainly produced by staff writers.
Attuning to Mess

In my initial proposal, I planned to examine the problem of the securitizing actor in ST through an analysis of the contributions of the three distinct fields of politics, experts and journalists to the process of securitizing Iraq (diagram 1). Further, by studying the media discourse on Iraq, I intended to examine the reproduction of language in this process.

Diagram 1: Social fields and securitization

10 I borrowed this term from Vicki Squir, see Squire 2012.
However, ‘attuning to mess’, I made two major submissions (Squire 2012). First, I adjusted my understandings of the engaged fields as separate entities and the weight of field in influencing individual actors’ contributions to the securitization process. Affiliation with a specific field (capacity) constructs only one layer of an individual’s identity (relations) and interests. Therefore, however important, reducing the contribution of a complex identity into field affiliations may reproduce simplicity in new ways. More importantly, contrasting the mentioned fields, as separate entities, could have reproduced ontological individualism and the problem of measuring independence and influence in this dissertation in different ways.

Therefore, I decided to concentrate on three important elements of the process of securitization: time and constitution of urgency; construction of evidence; and reproduction of language. I suggest that concentration on the production of certain products in the process of securitization can help to better understand those relations. In my examination of the mentioned products, however, I have considered the capacity based on which an actor may engage in the process of their production.

Second, my attempt to justify the selection of January 2002 – the pronouncement of Iraq as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ – as the beginning of the process of securitizing Iraq directed this dissertation towards a temporally informed analysis of securitization. I noticed that, considering the multiplicity of Iraq’s identities, one cannot identify one single beginning (moment) of this process. Dealing with the question of the multiplicity of the identities of threats, Chapter One challenges the notion of moment in ST.
**Structure of the Dissertation**

Chapter One challenges the *moment* of the utterance of security in ST. Considering important elements, such as (in)security, the object of security, and existential threat as well as the multiplicity of this identity, we may see several beginnings for the process of securitization.

Chapter Two examines the construction of existential threat from a time perspective. In contrast to the decisionist approach of ST, this chapter makes sense of security and securitization through an analysis of their temporal components, such as speed and urgency. Considering time as the ontology of security, and a defining dimension of the process of securitization, I believe the argument of this chapter offers an important insight to distinguish securitization from other social processes.

Chapter Three examines the production of evidence, in the form of intelligence, about Iraq. It extensively examines the relations between the fields of the political, journalistic and experts (intelligence professionals) and their perceptions of intelligence. Considering the notion of ‘intelligence failure,’ which blames the war on Iraq on the intelligence community, it is very important to know how the capacity of intelligence professionals can influence the process of securitization.

In Chapter Four, I examine how the transformation of the securitizing actor’s understanding of (in)security resulted in the securitization of Iraq. It opens new avenues to incorporate an examination of political thought and ideologies of different kinds in securitization studies. It also examines how the constitution of certain elements, such as solution and enemy, shape the overall product of this process.
Although I consider the contribution of different actors, politicians, experts and journalists throughout the dissertation, given the extensive coverage of the Bush administration and the fact that other participating actors acknowledged that entity as the main driving force behind securitizing Iraq, Chapter Five examines President Bush and his aides and how they contributed to this process.

This dissertation makes valuable contributions to securitization studies. Taking media as the site of securitization, it allows a theorization of broad social relations in securitization, which helps develop a more comprehensive and complex understanding of the securitizing actor. The dissertation brings the two relatively ignored issues of time and evidence to securitization studies. It examines time as the ontology of problem-solution and looks at how time strategies shape the process of securitization. It examines the construction of evidence, as a form of objective knowledge produced by intelligence professionals. By challenging its objectivity, it brings evidence back into politics.

Taking language as a social product, this dissertation offers a new understanding of securitization as a double movement. It argues that, in addition to the utterance of security, securitization entails the reproduction of security. In other words, every securitization move reproduces security and offers a different understanding of security. I believe the insight this dissertation gives into securitization studies will help to better understand securitization as it happens.
Chapter One: The Beginning

The Initial Mystery that attends any journey is: how did the traveler reach his starting point in the first place? (Louise Bogan, Journey Around My Room)

I turned to Don Rumsfeld. “Mr. Secretary,” I said, “for the peace of the world and the benefit and freedom of the Iraqi people, I hereby give the order to execute Operations Iraqi Freedom. May God bless the troops.” Tommy snapped a salute. “Mr. President,” he said, “may God bless America. (Bush 2010: 197).

Bush and the Beginning

It is how President Bush recalls the beginning of his war with Iraq on March 19, 2003. That war and its implications have attracted a lot of attention; however, this chapter seeks to explore the initial mystery of this beginning, that is to say, ‘how President Bush reached this starting point in the first place.’ More precisely, it is in search of another beginning(s) to which ’Bush's declaration of war was an end – the beginning(s) of a process in which this ‘grave danger,’ in Bush’s terms, was constituted as such, and for which this war was presented as the only solution in hand.

From a theoretical perspective, ST argues that at the moment of uttering the speech act a certain issue is transformed to a matter of security. This chapter seeks to examine this moment. Through a retrospective analysis of the period leading to the U.S. war in Iraq, this chapter questions the notions of *moment* and *the* beginning in the process of the securitization of Iraq. In their place, it argues for the multiplicity of – the identity of – security; in other words, this chapter contends for
the presence of multiple interrelated discourses and the multiplicity of beginnings in the securitization process.

In his memoir, Bush himself mentions, “*For more than a year, I had tried to address the threat from Saddam Hussein without war*” (Bush 2010: 197, added italics). Then he enumerates his efforts from building an international coalition and obtaining a United Nations Security Council resolution for disarming Saddam Hussein, to reaching out to the Arab world to encourage Saddam and his sons into exile, and finally giving him and his sons a final forty-eight hours to avoid war, both of which Saddam rejected. “The dictator rejected every opportunity,” Bush continues, and he then concludes, “The only logical conclusion was that he had something to hide, something so important that he was willing to go to war for it” (ibid.: 197).

However, in his speech on March 17, 2003, two days before beginning the war, Bush had presented a different account of that beginning when he said, “*For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war*” (March 17, 2003, added *italics*). From this view, the beginning was when the Iraqi regime “pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991” (ibid). President Bush’s narrative not only identifies the beginning of this process but also explicates why the war was the only means in hand. He mentioned world engagement in “12 years of diplomacy”, the adoption of “more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council” and dispatching “hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq” (ibid.). In spite of all those efforts, Bush argued that “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continue to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised” (ibid.).

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Bush’s account of the beginning aligns his decision, i.e. the end, with all the actions related to Iraq over the decade leading up to the war in 2003. In other words, Bush established unity and imposes homogeneity on a wide variety of actions towards Iraq taken by different national and international actors in a 12-year period, from 1990 to 2002. By aligning his decision to invade Iraq with all the efforts of this period, Bush presented his decision as the logical conclusion of this process. However, as I will discuss shortly in this chapter, and in the following chapters, the American discourse on the question of Iraq contained competing narratives and did not stay the same over this 12-year period.

One has to be skeptical about Bush’s narratives of the beginning of the war, especially given their political consequences. By emphasizing continuity and unity in the discourse of Iraq, he intended to downplay the existence of competing narratives. Aligning his decision with the efforts of previous administrations and different international actors, especially the United Nations, may be interpreted as an attempt to depoliticize this decision and present it as inevitable. From a different perspective, however, one can argue that Iraq’s identity in American foreign and security policy changed in 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. From August 1990 on, Iraq was recognized as an enemy in the American security discourse. The state enmity was then renewed in different instances during the 1990s.

Nevertheless, Iraq was not a top priority. John Kelly, a Washington Post columnist, drew an analogy between Saddam Hussein and a ‘splinter’ in an attempt to explain to children Hussein’s lingering status as an enemy in American security discourse.\(^\text{12}\) This analogy presents Hussein as

\[^{12}\text{Imagine you have a splinter in your hand. It’s in there pretty deep and it really bothers you. However, it doesn’t actually hurt right now. You can see it, and part of you thinks that if you don’t take it out, the splinter may get infected, causing real problems. You decide to take it out. Then again, this doesn’t look like one of those splinters that slides out easily when you grab it with tweezers. It seems like the kind you have to gouge out, with a needle or a}\

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a threat that is not a top priority. As Bob Woodward describes the atmosphere of January 2000, during the transition from Clinton to Bush, “Saddam was not yet a top priority” but a problem that could be contained (Woodward 2004: 19). According to Woodward, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, believed that “the new administration would soon see the reality about Iraq. They would not find much, if any, support among other countries in the region or the world for strong action against Saddam, which would mean going it alone in any large-scale attack” (ibid.: 19).

9/11 Effect: Post-9/11 Mindset
Perhaps it was due to this enmity and ‘ongoing combat operations’ that “Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein’s regime might have had a hand in it” (States 2004). Donald Rumsfeld, according to the 9/11 Commission, “said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time – not only Bin Ladin” (ibid.: 335). Condoleezza Rice said that “[…] the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David” (ibid.: 335). She recalled that a Defense Department paper for the meeting identified three “priority targets for initial actions” for the war on terrorism: “al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq.” “It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction” (ibid.: 335). However, Colin Powell recalled that it was Paul Wolfowitz – not Donald Rumsfeld – who argued that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with (ibid.: 335).

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pin. Maybe if you just leave it there, you think, it will dissolve or fall out on its own. No use making things worse. Saddam Hussein is the splinter, right? Right” (Washington Post, September 5, 2002: C14).

13 According to Richard Clarke, President Bush had asked him to “See if Saddam did this […] See if he’s linked in any way” (in 9/11 Commission Report 2004: 334). A memo, “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks”, sent to Condoleezza Rice’s office from Clarke’s office declared that he had found no “compelling case” that Iraq had planned or participated in the attacks (ibid: 334).
Bush gives an account of the discussion of different plans in the meeting at Camp David. With regard to Iraq, he writes, “At one point, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz suggested that we consider confronting Iraq” (ibid). The idea was supported by Rumsfeld: “Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism”. However Powell, according to Bush “cautioned against it”. Powell said, “We would lose the UN, the Islamic countries, and NATO. If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now, because we don’t have linkage to this event.” George Tenet allegedly supported Powell, saying, “Don’t hit now. It would be a mistake […] The first target needs to be al Qaeda” (Bush 2010: 166). Bush explains that Dick Cheney understood the threat of Saddam Hussein and that it should be addressed; however, Cheney cautioned, “now it is not a good time to do it, […] We would lose our momentum. Right now people have to choose between the United States and the bad guys” (ibid: 167).

Although the administration found no links between Saddam Hussein and the attacks of September 11, 9/11 constitutes a beginning for the question of Iraq. The 9/11 attacks essentially gave birth to the Bush doctrine. Indeed, Dick Cheney observes that the contours of the Bush Doctrine began to emerge during a teleconference with the National Security Council on the afternoon of September 11, 2001 (Cheney 2011: 17). However, Bush has identified September 16, 2001, after the war cabinet meeting at Camp David, as a ‘defining decision point’ in his presidency when he decided to choose the most aggressive way of dealing with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He argues that he had to change terrorists’ ‘paper tiger’ image of the United States and tries to outline the necessities of making a decision in a new era that began on September 11, 2001(see ibid.: 167).
Dick Cheney later put forward the notion of pre- and post-9/11 mind-sets to explain this transformation. In his memoir, he mentioned former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal urging the administration not to attack Iraq. Scowcroft mentioned that Saddam Hussein was a menace and had weapons of mass destruction, but that he thought it “unlikely” that Saddam would make them available to terrorists. Instead, he suggested that the Bush administration rely on the Security Council and inspections (ibid.). Cheney argues, “As I read Brent’s piece, I found myself thinking that it reflected a pre-9/11 mind-set, the world view of a time before we had seen the devastation that terrorists armed with hijacked airplanes could cause. We had to do everything possible to be sure that they never got their hands on weapons that could kill millions” (ibid.: 346). Responding to Scowcroft’s opinion about Cheney’s transformation, Cheney argues, “In reality, what had happened was that after an attack on the homeland that had killed three thousand people, the world had changed. We were at war against terrorist enemies who could not be negotiated with, deterred, or contained, and who never surrender” (ibid.: 347).

Further, the notion of the ‘war on terror’ redefined weapons of mass destruction in relation to international terrorism. Within this new framework, Iraq was redefined due to its link with the problem of weapons of mass destruction. Considering the notion of state sponsors of terrorism, especially of al Qaeda, the link between Iraq and the discourse of terrorism signifies another beginning for the securitization process. Thus, from this view, the announcement of “the war against terrorism” constitutes the public beginning of the process that ended with the invasion of Iraq. This process began with President Bush’s address to the nation on the evening of September 11, 2001 when he declared: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”
Although Bush did not explicitly mention Iraq as an existential threat to the security of the United States in that speech, he created a category under which “those who harbor” terrorists, and cooperate with them, are recognized as threats. A few days later, in his September 20, 2001 speech to a joint session of Congress, President Bush announced that he would use any means, including “every necessary weapon of war,” to destroy and defeat the global terror network – including both terrorists and those who harbor them. However, he again did not mention Iraq as an element of this network. Notwithstanding the fact that neither Iraq nor the Iraqi regime was explicitly and publicly declared an existential threat to the security of the United States, as events unfolded, the ‘war on terror’ as a general discourse transformed the identity of Iraq from a contained threat to an existential one. By transforming the perceptions of threat and security, the ‘war on terror’ was intended to constitute a rupture with the past, a new beginning, in the American security discourse that would make possible the depiction of Iraq as an existential threat.

**Axis of Evil**

It was in his State of the Union speech, on January 29, 2002, that Bush first publicly identified Iraq as a threat within his ‘war on terror.’ The speech, in addition to vividly depicting an atmosphere of panic and anger, also expanded and promoted the discourse of the ‘war on terror.’ Bush presented an account of new threats, and his decisions, in an emotionally charged context. He mentioned that in the four-month period between September 11, 2001 and January 29, 2002, the United States had “comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan’s terrorist camps, saved a people from starvation and freed a country from brutal oppression.”
Bush’s management of emotions, particularly anger and hatred, with regard to the 9/11 attacks requires a separate analysis of how, by deepening the sense of enmity, he transformed the mere existence of an enemy into an existential threat. Speaking to Shannon Spann, a woman who lost her husband in Afghanistan, Bush said, “Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies’ hatred in videos where they laugh about the loss of innocent life.”

Bush argued, “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning” (ibid.). By this he meant that, as with most of the 9/11 hijackers who were trained in camps in Afghanistan, “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking bombs, set to go off without warning” (ibid.). To tackle this dangerous environment, President Bush set “two great objectives” to be pursued patiently and persistently by the United States. The first objective was to target terrorists directly by shutting down their camps, disrupting their plans and bringing them to justice. The second objective concerned the control of weapons of mass destruction. Bush announced, “We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (ibid., added italics). Bush presented terrorism as a global threat requiring global action. However, he warned nations “timid in the face of terror” that if they would not act, “America will.”

Bush’s second goal was “… to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.” He specifically mentioned the three states of North Korea, Iran and Iraq. However, he tried to distinguish their regimes from their populations by representing the people as the victims of the regimes: “North Korea is a regime
arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom”. The president elaborated more on the Iraqi regime than those of North Korea and Iran. He stated

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

In his address, President Bush constituted a new order for the post-9/11 world. The new world order is comprised of a duality. On the one side there is a global coalition created and led by America that is determined to act against the omnipresent threats of terrorism – and intervene in, and act on behalf of, governments that are “timid in the face of terror.” On the other side are “States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and their terrorist allies [that] constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”

The thread that links subjects of the axis of evil is their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; as Bush said, “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave threat and growing danger.” Although in American security discourse, especially after the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regional adversary states has been understood as a major threat to the security of the U.S., terrorism transformed traditional concerns about proliferation and readjusted the U.S. focus on certain states that “could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.” Bush continued, “They could attack our allies or attempt to black mail the United States.”
Though an important moment, the introduction of Iraq to the ‘war on terror’ through the ‘axis of evil’ was not enough in itself to constitute a securitizing move against Iraq or the other two ‘axis.’ Nevertheless, the ‘axis of evil’ created a framework for the definition of the environment from which existential threats would arise.

However, a few years later, Bob Woodward told a different story of the creation of the ‘axis of evil.’ He argues that after 9/11, Michael Gerson, Bush’s speech writer, “believed the administration had what he called a “plastic, teachable moment” – an occasion to educate and explain. The world had changed. The president had to tell the country and the world what was going on, what he intended” (2004: 85, added *italics*). Further, “The president had said he wanted an ambitious speech. He would set out the new rules of the game and the direction he was heading in foreign policy” (ibid, 85). Therefore, Gerson came up with the idea of ‘axis of evil.’ The preliminary idea was to connect Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Since the administration was already in the process of war planning against Iraq at that time, Rice and Hadley worried that “signaling out Iraq as the embodiment of the “axis of evil” connection between WMD and terrorism would appear a declaration of war” (ibid: 86). “So,” Woodward writes, “she [Rice] and Hadley suggested adding other countries. North Korea and Iran were the clear candidates because both supported terrorism and pursued weapons of mass destruction” (ibid: 86) According to Woodward, Bush liked the idea, for “He too worried that it would suggest imminent action, and favored adding other nations such as North Korea. Also Syria, with whom the United States had diplomatic relations, but that got nowhere with Rice and Hadley” (ibid: 89).

Different members of the administration revealed later that, planning for a military attack on Iraq had begun soon after September 11, 2001. Dick Cheney, for instance, mentions, “The president
and I spoke about Iraq privately in the weeks following 9/11. I was aware that Secretary
Rumsfeld had set up a process to review all Department of Defense war plans, and I suggested to
the president that it would be useful to make certain that Rumsfeld had assigned priority to
planning for possible military action against Saddam Hussein” (2011: 330). He even adds that he
also had suggested to delegate the planning to the US CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida under
General Tommy Frank, for it was “much less likely to leak” than planning in Washington. In his
memoir, Cheney mentions that on December 28, 2001, the National Security Council including
himself, Bush, Rumsfeld, Frank, Powell, Rice and Tenet, discussed the plan that Frank had
prepared for Iraq in a secure videoconference.

A Framework for Action
Following the introduction of the ‘axis of evil,’ Bush continued to warn about the catastrophic
price of *indifference*. The gravity of the ‘axis of evil’ constituted the *inevitability* dimension;
however, Bush continued to elaborate upon the *urgency* of action in order to induce his
securitization project. Thus, he stated, “We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not
wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with
the world’s most destructive weapons.”

The ‘axis of evil,’ in a traditional sense, may be understood as a prophecy to cope with fear of
uncertainty. With the power of assumptions, it realizes the future in the present and transforms
prevention into simply action. From this perspective, the inception of the ‘war on terror’ was the
actual beginning. As Bush said, “Our war on terror is well begun, but is only begun”. Although
the introduction of the ‘axis of evil’ can be seen as a continuance of the ‘war on terror,’’ its very
creation constitutes new beginnings – especially for the newly included items. Security is
understood in terms of its reproduction; as Bush continued, “We can’t stop short. If we stopped now, leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked, our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.”

President Bush’s State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, although perhaps not a classic example of a securitization move, was, nevertheless, a major step in reproducing the language of insecurity in new terms. Specifically, it presented new understandings of threat, inevitability, urgency and action. It presented a standard framework that could define individual cases of insecurity for the coming years. Bush’s speech could be seen as an official beginning of the process of dealing with Iraq as an existential threat. However, based on the media coverage of Iraq, no one could confidently predict which of the three axis would be the first target of military action, if any.

**Agency and the Beginning**

So far I have examined President Bush as the authority who determined the beginnings, including both the beginning of the war and the process that led to the war. Indeed, as the president and the commander in chief, he claimed such authority. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sought sweeping war power authority for the president. According to a memo prepared by John C. Yoo, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, “The President has constitutional power not only to retaliate against any person, organization, or State suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States, but also against foreign States suspected of harboring or supporting such organizations” (2001: original italics). The memo continued, “The President may deploy military force preemptively against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can be
linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11” (ibid., original italics).

Notwithstanding this interpretation of the constitutional authority of the president, the Bush administration tried to obtain a congressional resolution. Therefore, engaging Congress in this process may be seen as a beginning in terms of expanding the agency of securitization.

I take the example of Congress to argue that the engagement of different actors could constitute relevant beginnings. From this view, President Bush himself – with the 2000 election and formation of his administration – is a beginning. Therefore, the Bush administration as the site in which the ‘war on terror’ and ‘axis of evil’ took shape constitutes an important beginning for the securitization process. However, even in unity, each actor may have a different perception of the beginning. For instance, as it was mentioned above, only a few days after September 11, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz argued that Iraq should ultimately be dealt with “as the source of the terrorist problem” (Powell in States 2004: 335). Powell, on the other hand, believed that “Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with […] And he saw this as one way of using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem” (in ibid: 335). Although President Bush, as well as Dick Cheney, apparently did not buy Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld’s argument about Iraq, they later began to adhere to the idea.

Different actors may carry different narratives and contribute different elements to the language of insecurity. Their engagement in the question gives new identity to the problem at hand.

Different actors also have authoritative claims over, and carry certain elements of, the discourse. This situation was particularly salient in the case of certain members of the Bush administration, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and John Bolton. Saddam Hussein was perceived as a threat to the security of the United States and its allies years before 2002; however, the gravity of this threat was never constant, and it was not perceived in
the same way by different actors in the U.S. foreign and security discourse. Along with others at the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), on January 26, 1998, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and John Bolton wrote a letter to then President Bill Clinton stating that his policy towards Iraq was not succeeding “and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War” (PNAC 1998). They suggested that Clinton, in his approaching State of the Union Address, take the opportunity “to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat.” Clinton was then urged to “seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. The strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor” (ibid, added italics).

The PNAC letter contained several arguments about Saddam Hussein and his regime that re-emerged in 2002. Its authors argued that the policy of “containment” with regard to Hussein was not effective any longer. Further, they questioned the reliability of international cooperation in containing Iraq and, by making reference to certain events, they contended, “We can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspection” (ibid). Considering this situation, they argued they could not ensure that Saddam was not producing weapons of mass destruction. Drawing on past experiences, they continued that even if Iraq allows UN inspections, “it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production.” The authors of the letter assumed that Saddam was pursuing covert plans for producing weapons of mass destruction and systems of delivery.
Therefore, by arguing against the efficiency of the UN inspections, they targeted the very foundation of the alternative way, other than the use of force, of dealing with Iraq. They argued that uncertainty over Iraq’s WMD program “will have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East.” More importantly, they wrote, it “hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat” (ibid.).

The authors of the letter believed that the policy of containing Saddam, in order to succeed, required three important elements: a steadfast coalition of partners, effective UN inspection and Saddam’s cooperation. In light of their arguments that the policy of containment did not meet its basic conditions, and given the gravity of Saddam’s threat, they argued that “The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction.” They urged President Clinton to consider near-term military action and implement “a strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power” including “a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts.”

Although this letter can be seen as a result of resentment against the United States’ allies and international measures concerning Iraq, it demonstrates an instrumentalist approach towards the UN and what was the existing international law in dealing with Iraq. It goes on to conclude that “We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf.” However, the authors argued, any resistance in the UN could not create any obstacle to achieving that goal: “In any case,
American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.”

By putting forward two important notions of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘preemption,’’ this letter constitutes another beginning in the discourse about Iraq. The authors of the letter urged President Clinton “to take the necessary steps, including military steps” against Iraq, while Iraq had not taken any military measures against the United States since their ceasefire in 1991. In fact, according to the authors, Saddam constituted an existential threat based on two assumptions: first, that Iraq had a program of weapons of mass destruction; second, that Iraq could develop systems of delivery to attack the U.S. or its allies in the region. However, it was not the certainty, but the uncertainty about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program that necessitated the destruction of this program in their eyes. Building upon this uncertainty, these experts urged Clinton to use military force against Iraq as a preemptive measure regardless of “the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy,” for “the danger of failing to do so are far greater” (ibid.).

The election of President George W. Bush in 2000 allowed some of the authors of the above-mentioned letter to occupy important positions in U.S. security policy making. For a good number of Bush administration members, Saddam Hussein was already recognized as a threat to the security of the United States. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ led to, along with other issues, a reconstitution of Iraq as an existential threat. As opposed to the dominant discourse of the above-mentioned letter that constituted Iraq’s threat around weapons of mass destruction, the discourse of the war on terror reconstituted Saddam Hussein in light of terrorism.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, or, more precisely, the Bush administration’s interpretation of 9/11, facilitated a reconstitution of Saddam Hussein as an existential threat. In general, 9/11 impacted the U.S. securitization apparatus in terms of its threshold of vulnerability and othering. Regarding weapons of mass destruction, for instance, in contrast to the traditional framework of proliferation, in which Saddam Hussein was feared to possess a sophisticated delivery system capable of directly threatening the United States, under post-9/11 conditions, a limited, even primitive, weapons of mass destruction program was perceived as sufficiently threatening to constitute an existential threat to U.S. security. Innovative use of non-conventional means of deliveries, such as human bodies and commercial aircrafts, as employed in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, could substitute a sophisticated system of delivery in attacking the United States.

Sharp dualities (alterity) eradicated traditional nuances and contrasts among identities and created polar identities. It, in turn, impacted tolerance and made the administration refuse to stand for ‘splinters’ any longer. This new logic was evident in President Bush’s statement on September 11, 2001: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” In his memoirs, Dick Cheney describes the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as a new kind of war. He continues, “We had to find terrorists so we could take down their networks. We had to stop others from supporting them. And we needed to place high priority on identifying networks and states that were trafficking in weapons of mass destruction so that we could shut down their efforts and prevent terrorists from acquiring those weapons. Terrible as 9/11 had been, the next attack, if it involved nuclear or biological weapons, would be exponentially worse” (2011: 330). Thus, the commencement of the ‘war on terror’ did not merely increase the gravity of Hussein’s threat but also reconstituted this threat with new
logic. This indeed shows the irrelevance of ‘evidence’ with regard to the question of Iraq – specifically in terms of whether it had participated whatsoever in the attacks of September 11, 2001. The ‘war on terror,’ by establishing new relations between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, transformed the identity of Saddam Hussein – from a containable threat (splinter) to an existential threat.\(^{14}\)

Considering this situation, preventing the next attack became the main concern of the Bush administration. Describing the early days of the formation of the ‘war on terror,’ Dick Cheney explains how the National Security Council, including himself, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, “were embarking on a fundamentally new policy” (Cheney 2011). He argues, “We were not simply going to go after the individuals or cells of terrorist responsible for 9/11. We are going to bring down their networks and go after the organizations, nations and people who lent them support” (ibid: 332). Cheney explains that in the afternoon meeting of the National Security Council on September 15, 2001, he had stressed that

> preventing the next attack had to be our top priority … We had to do everything we could to keep those who would harm us from arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction… We also had to realize that defending the homeland would require going on the offense. Relying on defense was insufficient. The terrorists had to break through our defense only one time to have devastating consequences. We needed to go after them where they lived in order to prevent attacks before they were launched. (ibid: 333-334)

A similar view was offered by Paul Wolfowitz, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, in the cabinet meeting of September 13, 2001. He described 9/11 as an overnight shift in terrorism as “a law enforcement problem” to a “national security problem” (Wolfowitz 2003). He argued

\(^{14}\) However, a conspiracy theory of this situation may argue that the target was already located; it was the discourse that was tailored to fit the target.
Throughout the '80s and '90s it was sort of, I've never found quite the right words because necessary evil doesn't describe it, but a sort of an evil that you could manage but you couldn't eliminate. And I think what September 11th to me said was this is just the beginning of what these bastards can do if they start getting access to so-called modern weapons, and that it's not something you can live with any longer. So there needs to be a campaign, a strategy, a long-term effort, to root out these networks and to get governments out of the business of supporting them. (ibid.)

He acknowledged that, considering Hussein’s history of weapons of mass destruction, and that he was “the only international figure other than Osama bin Laden who praised the attacks of September 11th,” Iraq became a focus of the ‘war on terror.’ Wolfowitz recalled that the Bush administration had a long discussion “about what place if any Iraq should have in a counterterrorist strategy. On the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when. There seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement was whether it should be in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first” (ibid., added italics).

The ‘war on terror,’ therefore, transformed threat management: from containment to elimination and from defense to preemption. Following his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein, due to his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism, was one of the foci of the Intelligence Community. Further, open sources, such as media coverage of Iraq, had created a negative image of Saddam Hussein based on his weapons of mass destruction program, violation of human rights and mass murdering of Iraqi citizens (e.g.Harle 2000: 99-102). After 9/11, the administration revisited Iraq in light of al Qaeda.¹⁵ Any direct link between Hussein and al

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¹⁵ As mentioned earlier, Richard Clarke was ordered by Bush to investigate if Saddam Hussein participated in the attacks of September 11. According Michael Scheuer, a CIA officer, “Tenet, to his credit, had us go back 10 years in the agency’s records and look and see what we knew about Iraq and al Qaeda. And I was available at the time and I led the effort. And we went back 20 years. We examined about 20,000 documents, probably something along the line of 75,000 pages of information.” However, he added, “There was no connection between Iraq and Saddam” (in Bush’s War).
Qaeda and 9/11 could have facilitated Bush’s securitization. However, even without that link, the administration tried to get Americans to reexamine Saddam Hussein through the lens of 9/11. For instance, Dick Cheney argues, “After 9/11 no American president could responsibly ignore the steady stream of reporting we were getting about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. We had experienced an unprecedented attack on our homeland. Three thousand Americans, going about their everyday lives, had been killed” (Cheney 2011: 330 added italics). Cheney’s evaluation, indeed, highlights that there was a transformation in the American discourse of insecurity, rather than in Iraq’s behavior. In other words, it is not the object of insecurity that determines its status but a sudden transformation in the discourse of insecurity which transforms the identity of that object.

However, September 11, 2001 and the initiation of the ‘war on terror’ as a beginning was, in the discourse of the administration – iterated by the president, vice president, national security advisor, and deputy defense secretary – embedded in two already existing discourses of WMD and preemption. Elaborating on the gravity of the link between Iraq and terrorism, Cheney says:

> The President and I were determined to do all we could to prevent another attack, and our resolution was made stronger by the awareness that a future attack could be even more devastating. The terrorists of 9/11 were armed with airplane tickets and box cutters. The next wave might bring chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. (ibid: 330)

**Weapons of Mass Destruction and Iraq**
The discourse on the Iraqi regime and its use of chemical weapons goes back to the 1980s when Iraq obtained and used such weapons in its war with Iran and against civilians both in Iran and Iraq. In the late 1980s, the Reagan administration began to focus on the proliferation of chemical weapons; however, they were reluctant to deal seriously with the Iraqi regime’s use of chemical weapons. It was on September 8, 1988, that the U.S. announced it was convinced that Iraq had
used poison gas against Kurdish guerrillas (*New York Times*, September 9, 1988). The then U.S. Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, had warned Iraq’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in a private meeting that Iraqi use of chemical weapons would impact their relations. A few days later, on September 12, the U.S. and several of its allies, such as Britain, West Germany and Japan, asked the Secretary General of the United Nations to dispatch an investigation team to Iraq in order to determine whether the Iraqi armed forces used poison gas against Kurdish guerrillas (*New York Times*, September 13, 1988).

Earlier, on August 23, 1988, the United Nations inspectors had confirmed that Iraq had used poison gas against Iranian civilians in early August. The investigation of UN inspectors proved the use of chemical weapons against Iran in 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988. However, on the Iraqi side, the then Iraq Defense Minister, Adnan Khair Allah, announced that Iraq “reserved the right to use chemical weapons if it felt that circumstances warranted it” (*New York Times*, September 16, 1988). In spite of numerous evidence of the Iraqi regime’s use of chemical weapons, the State Department opposed the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq. Testifying on the bill in the House of Representatives, A. Peter Burleigh, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, said, “We cannot support this legislation because we do not believe sanctions now would bring us closer to the objective of ending chemical weapons use by Iraq” (*New York Times*, September 8, 1988).

In his election campaign for the White House in 1989, George H. W. Bush declared that “Ridding the world of chemical weapons […] would be a topmost priority of his Presidency” (*New York Times*, January 12, 1989). Despite its possession and production of chemical weapons, the United States encouraged all states to respect the 1925 Geneva Convention that banned the use of such weapons and apparently tried to establish a new tougher treaty banning
those weapons (New York Times, January 7, 1989). International law did not ban the possession of such weapons. In his speech to the General Assembly in 1989, President Bush “promised to eliminate all American chemical arms within a decade if a treaty banning such weapons all over the world was signed” (New York Times, September 26, 1989).16

However, the US government’s response to suspected possessors of chemical weapons was arbitrary and selective. For instance, the administration and American media largely ignored the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein against Iranian troops and Iranian and Iraqi civilians, while they became very preoccupied about Libya. The Reagan administration, in its last months in the White House, carefully observed the construction of a pharmaceutical company in a desert location in Libya that was protected by antiaircraft defense. At the time, the US was pursuing a diplomatic campaign “backed by the threat of force” to prevent Libya from producing chemical weapons (New York Times, January 5, 1989). It even resulted in a limited military encounter between the US Air Force and the Libyans on the Mediterranean on January 4, 1989.

Chemical Weapons and Terrorism: Libya
A striking similarity between the securitization of Libya in 1989 by the Reagan administration and that of Iraq in 2002-2003 is the link between terrorism and the discourse of chemical weapons. In 1989, at the five-day Paris conference on chemical weapons, the then U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz warned, without mentioning any specific country, that “there are no insurmountable technical obstacles that would prevent terrorist groups from using chemical

16 The discourse of chemical weapons in its early stages is reminiscent of the Cold War. In fact, “Moscow and Washington had already moved much closer in their negotiating positions on chemical arms before the worst horrors of chemical use became evident in the Iran-Iraq war” (New York Times, January 12, 1989). Due to many reasons, such as inexpensiveness of the required technology, the proliferation of chemical weapons became a serious global concern. According to intelligence in 1988-89, the number of countries possessing chemical weapons had increased from five states in the 1960s to about 20 states – eight in NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 12 in the third world (New York Times, January 7, 1989).
weapons” (*New York Times*, January 8, 1989). He continued, “Some governments which have been known to sponsor terrorism now have sizable chemical weapons capabilities” (ibid.).

However, Western media, especially in Europe, criticized President Reagan for being fixated on Colonel Qaddafi and not considering other countries, such as Syria, with links to terrorist groups (ibid). The American discourse, including the media, portrayed Libya, but no other possessors of chemical weapons, as an actor that constituted an existential threat: “There's probably no more dangerous possessor of chemical weapons than Libya, which has long supported terrorism and picked fights with its neighbors” (*New York Times*, January 5, 1989, added italics). From this view, Qaddafi’s military capability with chemical weapons could have threatened a large portion of the Middle East and North Africa (ibid). In his July 21, 1989 editorial in the New York Times, A.M. Rosenthal put Qaddafi and his chemical weapons program in the context of terrorism (*New York Times*, July 21, 1989). However, in Rosenthal’s list of terrorist nations, along with Libya there were some familiar names including Iraq, Iran and Syria (*New York Times*, May 12, 1989).

Therefore, although it was Iraq that broke the global taboo and used chemical weapons, “as a routine battlefield weapon” in Gary G. Sick’s words (in Pear 1989), the then administration focused on Libya as the symbol of the proliferation of such weapons in the Third World. It seems Libya’s link with terrorism played an important role in this process.17 Therefore, the link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ was not a new invention but a reproduction of this link in the context of 9/11. Perhaps the attacks of September 11 reproduced this link under new conditions of possibility, similar to the 1980s, when the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein and a new generation of surface to

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17 Libya’s proximity to Europe was an important element in estimating its threat. However, the Reagan administration’s discourse on Libya highlighted Libya’s link with terrorism.
surface missiles capable of carrying chemical warheads transformed Third World possessors of such weapons into major threats to the United States and its allies.  

In early 1990, some actors tried to attract attention to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Among them, A.M. Rosenthal’s “We Are Warned” was a call by American media to prevent mass murder by the Iraqi dictator. Comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, who wanted to “wipe out the Jews and then rule the world,” Rosenthal warned about Hussein’s statement that he would “annihilate “half of Israel” with missile-delivered chemical weapons if Israel “tries to do anything” against Iraq, now only a few years from the nuclear bomb” (Rosenthal 1990). He continued, “Please, no delusion about timing. If already he intends to use missile and chemical weapons, against Israel as he did against Iran and his own Kurdish population, Saddam Hussein will not wait passively until Israel attacks” (ibid). While Rosenthal blames great powers, from the United States to Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, Germany, Italy and Japan for their greed and selling missiles, chemical bombs and nuclear technology to Hussein, he encourages them to stop Hussein.

However, two major developments dramatically transformed the identity of Iraq with regard to weapons of mass destruction: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the Chemical Convention of 1992. Following the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (April 1991). It mandated that

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18 In the escalation of the discourse on weapons of mass destruction, along with other elements such as the decline of the bipolar system, one may consider the agency of this transformation. The elevation of a threat favors certain social actors at the cost of some others. In this case in particular, in his presidential campaign, following the path of the Reagan administration, George H. W. Bush put Iraq in a list with Syria, Libya and Iran as countries that were working “to develop the capacity to produce chemical arms and to acquire and possibly produce missiles” (New York Times, August 3, 1988). By constituting these countries, and their missile and chemical programs, as a major threat to the security of the US, George Bush, with his experience in foreign and security policy, presented himself as the competent president who could deal with such threats.
Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities. (U.N. Security Council Resolution 687)

To ensure the implementation of this resolution, UN inspectors began extensive inspections of Iraqi facilities. In 1992, the international regime on chemical weapons advanced through the adoption of the Convention on Chemical Weapons that prohibited the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and urged their destruction.

The discourse on chemical weapons has its roots in the Cold War. Compared with the threat of nuclear weapons, it occupied a marginal position in the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, in the 1980s it began to take its place in the discourse of insecurity especially by observing that certain regional threats arising from the Third World, among them Libya, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Although the threat of proliferation was at times juxtaposed with international terrorism, this connection was not theorized during the 1990s. The discourse on chemical weapons and terrorism demonstrated an attempt to differentiate enemies in light of the new developments in the U.S.-Soviet Union relations. The transformation in the discourse of threat and enemy declassed the enemy from a state in possession of sophisticated technology and massive military power to a group of developing countries with histories of aggression and links with terrorism that, by seeking chemical weapons, posed a serious threat for the United States and its allies. In other words, the discourse of chemical weapons allowed the proliferation of enemies and the emergence of certain petty dictators as enemies of the United States.
A Third World perspective, however, makes sense of these transformations and the emergence of the ‘new world order’ very differently. Ali Mazrui (1994), for instance, has examined – although in different terms – how this shift in the discourse of enemy and threat has dramatically transformed the identity of the Third World. Although the decline of the Cold War could have put an end to those conflicts in the Third World that were lengthened by both Eastern and Western material contributions and manipulation, the Third World became the ‘other’ in the new order. According to Mazrui, by ending inter-white rivalries in the Third World, the decline of the Cold War resulted in a retribalization and the emergence of global apartheid (1994).

Mazrui argues that the Western anti-communist ideology has been replaced with racism and anti-Islamism which constitute two threats: Blacks and Muslims. As to Blacks, he observes that the end of Marxism-Leninism revived race in world politics. However, in regard to Muslims, the ideology of anti-communism has been replaced with the ideology of anti-Islamism. Mazrui believes that although “Western anti-Islamic tendencies were ameliorated by the indisputable superiority in technological and military held by the West” and “the West’s need for Muslim allies in its confrontation with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact” (1994: 523), three elements in the last quarter of the 20th century shifted this situation. The first element, according to Mazrui, is that, on the one hand, some people “in the Muslim world learned that those who are militarily weak have one strategy of last resort against the mighty – terrorism” (1994: 523). On the other hand, “as the fear of communism receded in the late 1980s, however, the West felt freer to be tough about terrorism from the Muslim world” (1994: 524). The second element in Mazrui’s analysis denotes the containment of the Muslims under non-proliferation. In his words, “Second, if terrorism becomes the weapons of the militarily weak, nuclear weapons are for the technologically sophisticated” (1994: 524). The third element in Mazrui’s understanding of the
Western anxiety about Islam “was the importance of Muslim oil for Western industry” (ibid.). Therefore, in the new world order, he concludes, “It is almost certain that Muslims became the frontline military victims of the new world order while Blacks became the frontline economic victims of this emerging global apartheid” (1994: 524).

That shift could be seen in George H. W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of 1991 and later in Dick Cheney’s Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Cheney 1993). The senior President Bush anticipated that as the tension with the Soviets continued to ease, the United States “will face more ambiguous – but still serious – challenges” (Bush 1991). According to Cheney’s document, the U.S. “national strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional challenges and opportunities” (1993: 1). The overall shift from ‘containment’ to the ‘new Regional Defense Strategy’ was justified by means of that shift in America’s security environment.

However, as Bush senior mentioned in his September 11, 1990 speech, ‘towards a new world order’, to congress, post-cold war era offered some unique opportunities. Among them, “no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression” (in New York Times, September 12, 1990). This new world order, according to Bush, is “a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony” (ibid.). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided American leaders with proof that “there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying
power” (Bush 1990). On a separate occasion, Bush senior rejected the idea of the U.S. “with the world’s policeman responsibility for solving all the world’s problems,” but he assured the world that the United States would “remain the country to whom others turn when in distress” (ibid).

Although the discourse of the ‘new world order,’ at first glance, puts a great deal of emphasis on collective security and international cooperation, especially in the UN system, in dealing with security threats (Bush 1991; Cheney 1993), it is in reality built upon unilateralism. Drawing on the United States’ intervention in Kuwait, Cheney argues that

American leadership must include mobilizing the world community to share the danger and risk. But the failure of others to bear their burden would not excuse us. In the end, we are answerable to our own interests and our own conscience -- to our ideals and to history -- for what we do with the power we have. In the 1990s, as for much of this century, there is no substitute for American leadership. Our responsibility, even in a new era, is pivotal and inescapable. (1993)

In this new order, it is the U.S. that defines multilateralism as well as its limits, with the option to decide to unilaterally pursue its interests when needed. Cheney’s document elaborates on the American leadership, multilateralism and implicit unilateralism in the U.S. security discourse in the ‘new world order.’ As Cheney simply puts it, “It is the intent of the new Regional Defense Strategy to enable the United States to lead in shaping an uncertain future to as to preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains” (1993: 1). Although collective measures would be preferred, the United States must be ready to act independently when a collective measure is not ‘timely,’ is ‘sluggish or inadequate’ or at times when an international mechanism is blocked by countries with different interests from those of the United States (1993: 1, 4).

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19 It is interesting that Iraq, as an individual case, has been used to make general claims about the ‘world’ both in Bush senior’s ‘New World Order’ (1990) and in Bush junior’s ‘axis of evil’ (2001). Perhaps an ‘enemy’ can help get rid of uncertainty. Some thinkers, such as Kristol & Kagan (1996) and William Bennett (2000), argue that, in order to have a vision in its foreign policy, the United States has to define some threats.
the discourse of the ‘new world order,’ collective security and multilateralism have no ontological status without American leadership and participation. Therefore, its leadership is not just an element of multilateralism; according to the Defense Strategy for the 1990s, “effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it” (1993: 4). Therefore, it is the United States that defines threats and how to deal with them.

The discourse of the ‘new world order’ reflects, albeit to different extents, four philosophies of United States foreign policies categorized by Walter Russell Mead (2002) as Jacksonian, Wilsonian, Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian frameworks. National security strategists in the 1990s defined United States national security in globalist terms and planned to use global institutions, such as the UN, to achieve their goals. However, they were extremely nationalistic by putting heavy emphasis on a strong military with the capability of conducting unilateral operations across the globe. Thus, drawing upon Mead’s categorizations, this discourse is globalist-nationalist. It is indeed very difficult to distinguish between U.S. national security threats and global threats as they are perceived by the US. This discourse is Jacksonian in its emphasis on a strong military and the capability of unilateral action, while it is simultaneously Wilsonian due to its emphasis on collective security and international institutions. However, it is the Jacksonian stream that shapes the definition of Wilsonian terms. The final product of this discourse is the globalization of American security discourse and the production of world insecurities as they are understood by the United States. This is precisely what American political elites mean by American leadership: the leadership that shapes the discourse and knowledge of insecurity.

The ‘war on terror’ is indebted to this ‘new world order’ for introducing many of its elements, such as the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, in its focus
on regional adversary and non-state actors. Further, it began to develop a framework, including weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and regional adversaries, for the management of uncertainty and identification (construction) of enemies. From this view, therefore, the ‘war on terror’ may be seen as a new version of the ‘new world order.’

**Axis of Rogue/Evil States**
Parallel to the ‘new world order,’ the United Nations developed an extensive anti-terrorism regime. After two decades of ambivalence, by adopting Resolution 731 against Libya in 1992, the United Nations Security Council recognized international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. That resolution constituted a shift in the UN’s approach concerning international terrorism from investigating root causes of causes of terrorism to the elimination of international terrorism. Responding to individual terrorist attacks, such as the Lockerbie (PanAm) in-flight bombing and the bomb attacks against the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, and adopting certain general rules and regulations regarding terrorism (Council 1999)(e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1377), the Security Council developed a significant body of mandatory regulations for dealing with international terrorism as a threat that “endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and security of all states” (Security Council Resolution 1269). Nevertheless, dealing with international terrorism remained a matter of law enforcement.

A major source of threat in the ‘new world order’ is hostile regional states. Bush senior (1990), Clinton (1996) and Bush junior (2002), identified certain adversary states, such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea in their national security strategies. Indeed, George W. Bush’s notion of the ‘axis of
evil’ may be viewed as a reproduction of ‘rogue states.’ Evil states did not possess sophisticated conventional military technology to threaten ‘global security;’ however, in the ‘new world order’ ‘minor disturbers’ are no longer tolerated. On the one hand, U.S. National Security Strategy (1998) identified certain objective categories, such as “weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime,” which, by transcending national borders, became global concerns. On the other hand, transformations in the discourse of weapons of mass destruction, from banning the use of such weapons to banning their production and possession, and in the discourse of anti-terrorism, from considering terrorism as a mostly rational act to eliminating terrorism, dramatically expanded those discourses. Therefore, regional powers are identified as a global threat, in particular, due to their disregard of non-proliferation obligations and sponsoring terrorism.

However, from the perspective of the ‘new world order,’ the United States should not wait for the threat to gather strength. The Defense Strategy for the 1990s warned, “We must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape an uncertain future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values” (Cheney 1993: 1-2). In order to preserve America’s position it suggested “to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States” and to promote collective security (ibid: 3). With regard to proactively shaping this environment, Cheney urged “to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United

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20 Bob Woodward explains that, while writing Bush’s State of the Union speech of 2002, Michael Gerson did not find the term ‘rogue state’ suitable. “By tradition, dangerous countries had been called “rogue states.” Gerson thought this was too benign and understated the problem, as if they drank too much. “Axis of evil” seemed to echo President Ronald Reagan’s provocative declaration in 1983 that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire,” a phrase that set the tone for the Cold War showdown in the 1980s as Reagan asserted that there was no moral equivalence between totalitarian Soviet Russia and the United States” (Woodward 2004: 89).
States and our allies” (ibid.). Shaping this environment also requires actors “to help preclude conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and to limit violence should conflict occur” (ibid.).

By eliminating the distinction between present and future, this preoccupation with shaping the future transforms the regional into the global. In other words, regional ‘minor disturbers’ from the very first moment of emergence are considered global threats, and they thus require immediate action. The Defense Strategy for the 1990s suggested a set of measures such as encouraging the spread of democracy; countering terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats to domestic order; and creating “limits on the spread of military significant technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them” (ibid: 3).

As to the Middle East in particular, it advised that

> We must be prepared to act decisively in the Middle East/Persian Gulf regions as we did in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm if our vital interests there are threatened anew. We also must be prepared to counter the terrorism, insurgency, and subversion that adversaries may use to threaten governments supportive of U.S. security interests. (1993: 23)

Understanding the securitization of Iraq in terms of the reproduction of age-old continuities should not imply constancy. Rather, I insist that, as with any other individual cases, the securitization of Iraq is particular, which itself constitutes important beginnings in the American security discourse. Certain continuities in that discourse, such as the universality of American principles, date back to the Declaration of Independence and the very first moment of American engagement with the world (Bennett 2000; Campbell 1992). However, here I seek to examine those continuities and ruptures that may have transformed Iraq into an existential threat – which in turn reproduced that discourse. The ‘new world order,’ particularly its teaching and assumptions, made possible certain interpretations of September 11, 2001 and the emergence of
the ‘war on terror.’ Indeed, the ‘war on terror’ reproduced the ‘new world order’ in two distinct ways. First, it elaborated upon and consolidated the ‘new world order’ triad of weapons of mass destruction-international terrorism-hostile states. Second, it increased the sensitivity of the security apparatus by lowering the threshold of ‘indifference’ and emphasizing ‘decisiveness,’ which, by consolidating prevention and preemption as methods of dealing with such threats, necessitated ‘action.’

The attacks of September 11, 2001 did not reject prophecies of the ‘new world order’ discourse. Indeed, different elements of the ‘war on terror’ existed in the discourse of the ‘new world order,’ especially in the notion of ‘rogue states.’ Rather, the 9/11 attacks were used to support the position of the president’s favored circle of aides and advisers who promoted the notion of ‘rogue states’ to ‘axis of evil.’ For a long time, that circle of actors had complained about the Clinton administration’s security policies. With regard to Iraq in particular, some of them, such as (Wolfowitz 2000; Perle 2000) criticized Clinton’s ‘appeasement’ towards Iraq.

The neo-conservative milieu in American politics criticized the state of indifference, confusion and inaction in the U.S. and its foreign policy during Clinton’s presidency. They (e.g. Kristol and Kagan 1996), lamenting for Reagan’s legacy, hoped for Neo-Reaganite foreign policy under which the U.S. would enact ‘benevolent global hegemony.’ From this view, “The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world” (ibid: 20).

In the neo-Conservative discourse, dealing “effectively with rogue states and minor disturbers of the international order” is a prerequisite of U.S. security policy (Wolfowitz 2000: 334).
According to Paul Wolfowitz, “This not only protects the rest of the world from their depredations, but deprives a future great-power challenger of potential allies. A country determined to mount a major attack on the status quo would find in a country like Iraq a willing ally and a source of leverage against the U.S. and its allies” (ibid: 334). Concentrating on Iraq, Richard Perle, accusing President Clinton of acting against the spirit of the Iraq Liberation Act, argues that the pillars of Clinton’s containment policy, i.e. the sanctions and UN inspections, are inefficient. He concludes, “The Clinton administration policy toward Iraq, which leaves Saddam in place while claiming to have him “contained,” is bound to fail” (Perle 2000: 100).

In contrast to the Clinton administration, Perle understands Iraq as an urgent threat, arguing that “The problem of Saddam Hussein and his regime cannot be allowed to linger indefinitely in the state of resignation into which the administration now seems to have descended” (ibid.). Perle emphasizes, “Time is not on our side” (ibid: 105). Considering this situation, he warns, “If we do not develop a strategy for removing Saddam now, we may be unable to do so later. Once he is in possession of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, our options will have narrowed considerably” (ibid: 106). With the Clinton administration leaving office, Perle suggests, “If the next administration is to protect America’s interests in the Gulf and help bring about the conditions for long-term stability in the region, it must formulate a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime” (ibid: 107). Wolfowitz presents a similar understanding of the situation and the role of the next administration because, as he puts it, “The Clinton administration’s tendency to temporize rather than go for the jugular, although understandable in many circumstances, has had the effect of piling up future problems” (2000: 334).
A shadow of Iraq, as it was presented in the discourse of the ‘war on terror,’ including the outline of relevant policies, existed in American security discourse before 2001. Iraq in the ‘war on terror’ was not a creation anew but more of a matter of mobilization, perhaps even prioritization, in the American security discourse. This process is not understandable without an examination of the authority that facilitated this reproduction. The carriers of the discourse of ‘bringing down Saddam’ occupied a marginal position in the American political field prior to 2001. Although they adhered to a strong policy and the use of force against the Iraqi regime, they were not in the position to implement their solutions. In the American field of the political, this role is assigned to the President.

According to William Bennett, “The key institution, the critical nexus of practice and principle in the case of the United States is, and has been since the first days of the republic, the presidency” (2000: 295). The carriers of the shadow of Iraq waited for a president who was able to “rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it” (Wilson in Bennett 2000: 296, original italics) – something they did not see in Bill Clinton. The president interprets the national thought and “A President whom it [America] trusts can not only lead it, but form it to his own views” (Wilson in Bennett 2000: 296, original italics). From this view, therefore, the president would need be dedicated to this objective and determined to persuade Americans of the threat of Iraq. “However, before they can persuade, presidents must formulate and develop their policies, gather and analyze immense amounts of information, adapt their strategies and policies to a rapidly changing political environment, and surround themselves with advisers and advisory systems capable of dealing with all of these difficult tasks effectively” (Preston 2000: 5).

Therefore, although, according to the Constitution, it is the president who sets out the “state of

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21 However, one may change Bennett’s nexus of “practice and principle” to practice and the interpretation of principles.
the Union” and nation’s priorities, as Thomas Preston’s empirical study of American presidents shows, the presidency, including the president, is inclusive of presidential advisers and assistants.

As Preston argues, various presidents, of course with different degrees of involvement in and control over the process of policy formulation due to interest or experience, have relied heavily on an inner circle of experts and advisers (2000: 14-19). The election of George W. Bush in 2000 allowed the neo-conservative milieu to occupy important positions of influence to shape the presidency with a particular understanding of Iraq that was then dramatized after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Therefore, considering the field of foreign and security policy of the U.S., the beginning of the new presidency, by transforming a marginal perception of Iraq to the dominant understanding of Iraq, may be observed as a beginning for the process of securitization. However, in this case no significant ruptures in the discourse on Iraq were seen until after September 11, 2001.

Media and the Beginning
In his article in September 2002, Dana Milbank realized a shift in the dominant debates in the media from the headlines about “a lethargic economy, a depressed stock market and corporate misdeeds” to the news about Iraq and policy disagreements among Bush advisers. This change, Milbank argued, shifted the debate almost entirely from domestic problems to preparations for military action against Iraq (Washington Post, September 16, 2002).

September 2002 may be considered the start of the Bush administration’s public campaign on Iraq. The campaign began after President Bush promised, on September 4, 2002, that he would seek congressional approval for military action against Iraq. He also announced that he would make his case against Saddam Hussein in a speech in the United Nations (see Allen and DeYoung 2002). In the meantime, the administration began to disseminate ‘intelligence’ and
‘evidence’ about Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction both through intelligence leaks (*New York Times*, September 8, 2002) and the publication of “A Decade of Deception and Defiance” by the White House on September 12, 2002.22

Bush’s speech in the United Nations was followed by another speech on October 7, 2002 in Cincinnati where he made his case against Iraq to the American public.23 In that speech he tried to elaborate on his position on Iraq:

Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action – why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror. These are all issues we’ve discussed broadly and fully within my administration. And tonight, I want to share those discussions with you. (*New York Times*, October 8, 2002: 12)

With the construction of the ‘axis of evil,’ at this stage, the securitization of Iraq seems to have been an act of prioritizing the jobs of an already existing list. From this perspective, one may view the securitization of Iraq as a two-phase project: first, the introduction of the ‘axis of evil’ as a general framework for future securitization moves and second, the prioritization of threats that falling under this general framework. In other words, the introduction of the ‘axis of evil,’ animated certain threats;24 the second step was to prioritize which one of them should be addressed first. From a different view, the first step was the constitution of inevitability while the second step sought to constitute urgency. Interestingly, the first step was left almost unchallenged. In other words, most actors viewed the threats as Bush presented them. However,

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22 I will discuss the question of evidence and intelligence in chapter four.
23 As early as August 2002, some experts, such as Harold Hongju Koh, a professor of international law at Yale Law School and a former assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration, expected the president “[…] to show leadership and make his case to the elected representatives.” Koh argued, “This argument [that the president does not need congressional approval for the use of force against Iraq] may permit them to get us into war, but it won’t give them the political support at home and abroad to sustain that effort” (in Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, *Washington Post*, August 26, 2002: A01).
24 This animation was not due to the fact that Bush named few cases under this framework. It was not even due to the fact that the ‘axis of evil’ may have been designed to introduce Iraq as a security concern. Rather, it was due to the fact that this framework, like an ideology, created its own space and presents a different world.
he faced more resistance with regard to his constitution of urgency and, to some extent, prioritization – i.e. why Iraq and not North Korea or Iran.

Bush’s October speech was intended to garner support for his draft resolution in Congress. Discussing Iraq from the view of the ‘war on terror’ and ‘axis of evil,’ debates in Congress were restricted to marginal questions about means – not the hard question of whether the United States had to confront Iraq at all (see VandeHei and Eilperin 2002: A01). Despite public protests and demonstrations against war with Iraq around the United States, perhaps that congressional approval can be considered the end of public debate about confronting Iraq.

In December 2002, some observers expected that January would be a decisive month for the war with Iraq. Among them, Walter Pincus and Karen DeYoung reported that according to ‘officials’

   The Bush administration has set the last week in January as the make-or-break point in the long standoff with Iraq, and is increasingly confident that by then it will have marshaled the evidence to convince the U.N. Security Council that Iraq is in violation of a U.N. resolution passed last month and to call for the use of force” (Washington Post, December 19, 2002)

January 2003 marked another significant surge in the number of articles in both the New York Times and the Washington Post that focused on the question of Iraq. By the end of the month, on January 28, 2003, President Bush’s State of the Union address was only a few words short of a declaration of war with Iraq.

The following diagrams demonstrate the monthly distribution of the number of articles containing the keywords ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’ in the headline.

**Figure 1, 2: Monthly distribution of articles containing the keywords ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’**

**New York Times articles containing ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’**

**Washington Post Articles containing ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’**

**Figure 3, 4: Monthly distribution of articles with the keywords ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’ in the headline**

**New York Times**

Coverage of 'Iraq' and 'War' (in headlines)

**Washington Post**

Coverage of 'Iraq' and 'War' in headlines
In the examined period, the New York Times and the Washington Post published 99 and 151 articles respectively with ‘Iraq’ and ‘war’ in the headlines. Although with some variations, both newspapers demonstrated the surge of attention in their coverage of Iraq by an increase in the number of articles focusing on the problem in September 2002 and January 2003.

However, even with this extensive coverage of the Bush administration waging war on Iraq, ‘Where did it begin?’ remained an important question about Iraq. In his article titled “U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past; Opponents of War Wonder When, How Policy Was Set,” Glen Kessler tried to examine this question (*Washington Post*, January 12, 2003). He argued that it began as a ‘footnote.’ According to Kessler, “On Sept. 17, 2001, six days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush signed a 21/2-page document marked "TOP SECRET" that outlined the plan for going to war in Afghanistan as part of a global campaign against terrorism. Almost as a *footnote*, the document also directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq, senior administration officials said” (ibid., added *italics*).

Perhaps Kessler’s article is a sign that many actors, even several months after the beginning of the public campaign on Iraq, were still amazed at where the idea came from. Based on interviews with more than 20 participants, Kessler argued that for nine months Iraq was the central focus of the Bush administration in its war on terrorism “without producing a rich paper trail or record of key meetings and events leading to a formal decision to act against President Saddam Hussein […] Instead, participants said, the decision to confront Hussein at this time emerged in an ad hoc fashion” (ibid.).
Although the administration tried hard to protect its ‘Polo Step’ advantage and prepare everything before it revealed its plans for Iraq, this period included a few signs in the media that hinted of a strong action against Saddam Hussein. Among them, the notion of the ‘axis of evil’ put Iraq at the center of attention. However, it would take a few years, with the benefit of hindsight, until we knew that Iraq was the only member of the ‘axis of evil.’ Another major hint was given by President Bush when he told a British reporter, “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go. That’s about all I’m willing to share with you” (in Kessler 2003: A01). However, the Guardian was quick to take that hint as “the clearest sign yet that the US is preparing for military action against Iraq” (Guardian, April 5, 2002).25

The spring of 2002, according to Kessler, included some other major developments regarding Iraq. As he argued, “Serious military planning also began in earnest in the spring” (Washington Post, January 12, 2003: A01). Further, as another sign, Kessler mentioned that in a meeting in July 2002, Condoleezza Rice, in response to Richard Hass, State Department Director of Policy Planning, asking “whether they should talk about the pros and cons of confronting Iraq,” said, “The president has made a decision” (in ibid).

However, Kessler observed that the idea of “Saddam Must Go” is not a new idea. He referred to a ‘small group’ of senior officials, focused in the Pentagon and vice president’s office, that had been advocating a confrontation with Saddam Hussein. He also mentioned that the December 1 issue of the Weekly Standard headlined its cover “Saddam Must Go: A How-to Guide.” Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad authored two of the articles in the issue, arguing that “We will have to confront him sooner or later – and sooner would be better” (ibid).

25 Retrieved from the Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/05/iraq.usa1
It seems that the Polo Step was a crucial technique in overcoming potential resistance towards
the use of force against Iraq. Cheney was extremely concerned about potential leaks in the
process of planning war and advised the President and General Tommy Frank to be cautious
about it (Cheney 2011). The administration was very careful not to ruin its advantage of
surprising other actors. As Kessler argued: “By the time the policy was set, opponents were left
arguing over the tactics – such as whether to go to the United Nations – without clearly
understanding how the decision was reached in the first place. “It simply snuck up on us,” a
senior State Department official said” (ibid).

Examination of New York Times and Washington Post coverage of ‘war’ and ‘Iraq’ in article
content and headlines from January 2002 to March 2003 shows a surge in the number of articles
in September 2002. Although the Washington Post’s coverage shows a decline in November and
December, the New York Times’ coverage increased slightly.

Both newspapers showed a significant surge in the number of articles containing ‘war’ and ‘Iraq’
both in the article content and the headlines in September 2002 and January. If the number of
news articles about ‘war’ and ‘Iraq’ can be considered an indicator of the location of the problem
in social space, September 2002 was the beginning of Iraq becoming a ‘public problem.’
However, the types of issues discussed in the articles transformed over this period. While articles
early in this period tried to make sense of the threat of Iraq, as the war drew closer, tactics,
technicalities and implications of the war occupied more space in the coverage.

Media analysis of the coverage of Iraq shows that the construction of Iraq, or more precisely of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, became possible through the mobilization of different elements from
various discourses – some of which were not directly linked with traditional understandings of (in)security, threat and vulnerability.

I suggest that the analogy of the river and its drainage basin may be used to demonstrate the multiplicity of interrelated discourses and beginnings in the discourse on Iraq. An analysis of the securitization of the Iraqi regime may begin with a study of each of the multiple streams that contributed to the discourse on Iraq. Further, it may choose to begin randomly with any transformation or rupture in each of those streams. Each of those streams has its story and history. They coexisted together, while at the same time they were in competition to better their position in the existing hierarchy(ies).

![Figure 5 Drainage basin of interrelated discourses on Iraq](image)

**Past and Future**

By making reference to the speech act, ST may seem to focus on an examination of the moment of utterance of a speech act as the moment of securitization. However, at the same time, it suggests that the security act ought to be grasped as a process. Therefore, the task is “[…] to
understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 26).

My pursuit of the ‘moment’ dragged me through different discourses that directly or indirectly impacted the identity of Iraq, and Saddam Hussein in particular. Each of those discourses, from different perspectives, revealed multiple beginnings in the forms of ruptures, breaks and additions in the discourse and the engagement and disengagement of different actors. This review of the Bush administration’s case on Iraq shows that the security act is a process of constituting three distinct, but at the same time interrelated, identities: (in)security, threat, and the object to be defended or secured. Thus, any changes in either of these identities transform the other two identities. Although the ST has discussed the broadening and widening of security, it fails to examine how this new understanding of security impacts securitization. Further, it restricts the construction of ‘a shared understanding’ to the problem of threat.

![Security Act: Saddam Hussein's regime as an existential threat](image)

Figure 1 Security Act: Saddam Hussein’s regime as an existential threat
The case of Iraq shows that the examination of the “processes of constructing a shared understanding” must include not only the constitution of threat, but also (in)security and the object to be secured. Indeed, it shows how a different interpretation of security and vulnerability transformed the identity of the threat (Saddam Hussein’s regime). Rather, I suggest that securitization needs to be understood within the relationship between (in)security, vulnerability and threat.

Besides, negotiation between the securitizer and the audience ought to be understood with regard to the complexity of the relations between elements of the security act. Examination of the case of Iraq shows that the agency of securitization began its process with a production of certain understandings of (in)security and vulnerability. At the same time, securitizing agent prepared its plans for the use of force. In other words, the Bush administration first shaped a specific framework for (in)security and vulnerability through the ‘war on terror’ and ‘axis of evil.’ From the perspective of knowledge production, this could constitute the beginning of viewing the world in a specific way. However, the observer may not be able to realize if it was the beginning for a particular case of securitization. The beginning of the process is identified by its final product; the constitution of the beginning remains to be a matter of retrospective reproduction of the past. This analysis of beginning(s), the tendency of the agency of securitizing Iraq to detemporalize the discourse on Iraq, and the necessity of making distinction between the process(es) that maintain Iraq as a threat and the process that intends to securitize Iraq require a more comprehensive analysis of time and temporality in securitization.
Chapter Two: Time and Securitization

Introduction
In this chapter, I examine time and temporality in the process of securitizing Iraq. This analysis begins with the question of ‘why 2002?’ Because Iraq was a lingering problem in US foreign and security policy during the 1990s, it is important to raise questions about the temporality of the war in Iraq. The Bush administration’s preparation for that war offers a slow motion and controversial case for examination of temporality and securitization. I present the debate about ‘time running out’ and ‘more time’ as a pivotal issue in the constitution of existential threat in which I argue that the conception of time is an essential element.

Although ST (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998) has briefly touched upon the notion of time, this theory’s conception of language does not allow a satisfactory theorization of time in the process of securitization. Besides, by emphasizing the influence of Carl Schmitt on this theory and reducing this theory to a decisionist perception of sovereignty, critics of this theory neglected other important aspects of securitization, such as time, missing from this theory. Time has remained as an under-theorized problem in securitization and in International Relations in general. Critical security studies’ emphasis on temporality is limited to the critique of an atemporal understanding of security that neglects a satisfactory theorization of time in the process of securitization. Drawing on the literature on the sociology of time, I try to analyze
temporality in the context of securitization and how it shaped the identity of, and policy options for dealing with, the Iraqi regime as an existential threat.

**The re-Emergence of Iraq**

In summer 2002 Iraq began to be presented as a threat to the security of the United States. The elevation of Iraq from a foreign policy problem to an existential threat was expressed and justified in temporal terms, such as “time is not on the side of the United States” (Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld quoted in Ricks 2002); “Time is running out” (Bush quoted in Preston 2003); “time is running short” (in Filkins and Schmitt 2003); “Time is on Saddam’s side not ours. I’d rather be safe than sorry” (Richard Land quoted in Broadway 2002); “time is running out” (Condoleezza Rice quoted in Milbank and Balz 2003); “… clearly, time is running out” (Colin Powell quoted in Slevin 2003); “Blair has closely supported President Bush’s position that time is running out on the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, and that a military strike to end his rule should not be delayed” (*Washington Post*, February 5, 2003).

President Bush, his aids and other like-minded leaders deployed the *tightness* of time as a critical indicator to demonstrate the gravity of the issue at stake. In the discourse of security, this extreme *time scarcity* has to be dealt with by taking *extraordinary* measures, such as use of force, that fall outside of normal politics. However, the securitizing actor’s temporal evaluation of the problem may be contested by the desecuritizing forces. Indeed, the Bush administration’s and its allies’ notions of ‘tightness of time’ and urgency were questioned domestically by American politicians and activists. They were challenged internationally by the foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany, especially through the UN Security Council, which announced that “more time is needed for inspections that are working” (*New York Times*, March 6, 2003).

Within the UN system, in early March 2003, Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector,
reported that Iraq’s cooperation with inspectors improved markedly in the previous month and added that he “would welcome” *more time* to do his work. With inspectors back in Iraq only three months, he said, “It seems to me it would be a rather short time to close the door” (in DeYoung and Lynch 2003).

I argue that time shapes the being of security; therefore, a temporal analysis of the process of securitization ought to be a necessary component of understanding the process of securitization. Such analysis may include an examination of the temporal context(s), the constitution of time and urgency, and how different actors engage in the process of securitization. In this chapter, I try to, from a time perspective, approach the problem of Iraq and its transformation into an existential threat in 2002. In doing so, I first examine ST from a time perspective and how the notion of time is theorized in this theory. Then, by presenting a review of some of the main issues in the study of time, I try to identify some areas in need of more attention for temporally informed analyses of securitization.

In 2002, President Bush and some of his aids, such as his Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, took every opportunity to elaborate on what they argued was the imminent threat of Iraq. Rumsfeld was an authoritative actor that played an important role in this process. Defending the administration’s policy towards Iraq, Rumsfeld, in his statements before the Committee on Armed Services in September 2002, mentioned that “There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction … But no terrorist state poses a greater or more *immediate* threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq” (Rumsfeld 2002, added *italics*). To substantiate this claim, Rumsfeld continued that Saddam Hussein
ordered the use of chemical weapons against his own people … His regime invaded two of its neighbors and launched ballistic missiles at four of its neighbors. He plays host to terrorist networks, assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former President of the United States. He has executed members of his cabinet … His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in northern Iraq … His regime on an almost daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircrafts as they fulfill the U.N. mission with respect to Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons … and stockpiles of chemical weapons… His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles … His regime has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence effort […]. (Statements in the hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, September 10, 2002)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, neither of the allegations against Iraq materialized nor did their gravity dramatically change in 2002 to ‘objectively’ justify the transformation of Iraq into an existential threat to the security of the United States. Previous administrations were aware of the Iraqi regime’s activities. Indeed, some members of the Bush administration, such as Rumsfeld himself, were aware that the United States supported the Iraqi regime to commit some of its wrongdoings, such as its invasion of Iran. However, the identity of the Iraqi regime began to gradually transform into a threat that required immediate action by the United States and the international community in 2002.

The Bush administration built its case against Iraq upon three major allegations: the weapons of mass destruction program, links with terrorism and violations of human rights. Although none of these allegations were new, the Bush administration began to view them differently after September 2001. This transformation in the constitution of threat by the administration was expressed by Rumsfeld in his statement before the Committee on Armed Services on September 10, 2002:
Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information that the government had before September 11th to the volumes of information the government has today about Iraqi’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility towards the United States and then factor in our country’s demonstrated vulnerability after September 11th, the case the President made should be clear. If more time passes and the attacks we are concerned about were to come to pass, we would not want to have ignored those warning signs and then be required to explain why we failed to protect our fellow citizens. (Statements in the hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, September 10, 2002, added *italics*)

In Rumsfeld’s words, with “the volumes of information” about Iraq’s long list of threatening activities, the Bush administration believed that Iraq had crossed the threshold for becoming an existential threat. Rumsfeld’s statement signifies a crucial change in the American security discourse that is the focus of this chapter. It is not only the ‘scraps’ or ‘volumes’ of information but also the temporal conditions under which such information is interpreted that shapes the process of securitization. Rumsfeld’s statement shows a temporal shift in the American security discourse that is recognized by a fault line: September 11, 2001.

9/11 was habitually employed by the Bush administration to dishearten its opposition. Considering the immense impact of 9/11 on American society, any link between 9/11 and the ensuing securitizing moves was capable of disarming desecuritizing forces. In that sense, 9/11 acted as a fault line in the American security discourse between the age of feeling confidently safe and the era of feeling vulnerable against the threat of terrorism. 9/11 transformed the American security discourse in the way it considered events, actions, movements etc. as existential threats that it would not have regarded as significant threats before 9/11. In other

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26 Such information and its quality proved to be one of the most important questions during the process of the securitization of Iraq – which the administration managed to leave unanswered by means of its institutional authority over the production and use of intelligence. I will discuss this issue in the following chapter.
words, Rumsfeld’s reference to 9/11 signifies a novel mode of securitization that would not have taken place if 9/11 had not occurred.

The threat of Iraq was presented as a consequence of a reexamination of a lingering threat to American security that took place alongside a total reappraisal of social life in light of 9/11. This reappraisal of insecurity, materialized in multiple securitizing moves, transformed the identity of many actions and objects such as financial transactions and commercial airplanes, and it constituted novel thresholds for the transformation of a threat to an existential threat. Thus, theorization of insecurity ought to be temporally informed in order to grasp the social space in which the process of securitization takes place and how this process itself impacts that space – which is sometimes demonstrated in new pre- or post- terms.

However, there are multiple temporal accounts of the process of the securitization of Iraq. Some popular representations of the Iraq war, and the ‘war on terror’, argue that the Bush administration, especially its neo-conservative elements such as Cheney, Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, merely used 9/11 to legitimize the securitization and subsequent invasion of Iraq. According to this view, as it has been put forward and supported by some behind the scenes accounts of Iraq by former members of the Bush administration such as Richard Clarke (2004) and Paul O’Neill (in Suskind 2004), the administration was planning to invade Iraq before the attacks of 9/11. Bob Woodward (2004: 18) claims that in January 2001, a few days before Bush’s first inauguration, Cheney sought to make Iraq “topic A” of the administration, and he asked William S. Cohen to present “a serious discussion about Iraq and different options” to Bush. Woodward also mentions some meetings and activities within the Bush administration regarding the review of the case of Iraq from January to September 2001; however, the administration did not announce any significant policy change towards Iraq during this period.
Some others, such as James Mann (2004), believe that one has to go back to the Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush administrations to better understand the formation of the inner circle of the Bush administration, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice, as the driving force behind the securitization of Iraq. Given the persistence of neo-conservative elements of the Bush administration and their importunate demands for regime change in Iraq on the previous administration, it is not strange that the problem of Iraq would be ‘topic A’ of the Bush administration. Indeed, some key actors of the Bush administration, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, and John Bolton, demanded in a January 26, 1998 letter to President Clinton (PNAC 1998) that the President consider necessary measures, including the use of force, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Simultaneously, by initiating, and lobbying for, the Iraq Act in 1998, they tried to create a legal obligation for the Clinton administration to escalate its measures against the Iraqi regime. However, from January to September 2001, the above-mentioned people conducted a low-profile campaign within the administration. Thus, the practice of the Bush administration in this case directs this research towards the notion of waiting time, which requires a temporal analysis of this process.

Each of the aforementioned understandings of 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ and the securitization of Iraq has temporal connotations that require detailed analyses. In other words, understanding the securitization of Iraq as a matter natural consequence of the formulation of the ‘war on terror’ or as a mere abuse of post-9/11 conditions, by reducing 9/11 to a matter of waiting for a proper time to invade Iraq, offer very different understandings of time and securitization. As is obvious, this change in the sequence of threat-response, by shaping the being of the securitizing act, has important ethical implications that require careful analyses. More importantly, as I will argue in
this chapter, debates between securitizing and desecuritizing forces about urgency and the
selection of solutions for the problem from a list of measures ranging from short and sharp war
to long-term, time-consuming negotiations are as polarized as the debate between the
securitizing actor and proponents of conspiracy theory. Therefore, security studies in general and
the analysis of the preparation for the war in 2003 in particular require a temporally informed
analysis of securitization.

**Securitization Theory and Time**

ST argues that any public issue can be located in a spectrum ranging from non-politicized to
politicized and, ultimately, to securitized (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 23-24). The placement of
issues on this spectrum is open and varies from state to state and across time (ibid: 24). To take
Buzan and the other collaborators’ example, while many states, such as the UK and the
Netherlands, do not securitize culture, others, such as Iran, do (ibid: 24). Interestingly, the
securitization of culture in Iran is not a permanent feature of Iranian society. Rather, it is a recent
event that took place under certain socio-political conditions following the 1979 Revolution.

Iraq demonstrates a similar pattern in United States foreign and security policy. Since the early
1980s, Iraq’s location on the spectrum of non-politicized to securitized has been changing.
During the 1980s, Iraq was regarded as a tactical friend and used as a means to contain the
revolutionary regime in Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan administration provided the
Iraqi Army with intelligence on Iran. According to Patrick Tyler, “A covert American program
during the Reagan administration provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance at a time
when American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical
weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war” (Tyler 2002). The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait was a turning point in US-Iraq relations that transformed Iraq into an existential threat
and resulted in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. After the ceasefire in 1991, Iraq never returned to its pre-war location on the spectrum; however, it was perceived as a threat that could be contained through diplomatic means such as economic sanctions, UN inspections and limited use of force. Iraq’s situation in American discourse began to change after September 11, 2001 when the Bush administration conducted a total reconsideration of Iraq that transformed the identity of Iraq as a contained threat into an existential threat requiring immediate action.

Therefore, a major contribution of securitization theory is its theorization of this rather commonsensical understanding that nothing in security and securitization is natural and that insecurities are not atemporal. “The answer to what makes something an international security issue”, ST argues “can be found in the traditional military-security understanding of security” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 21). From this perspective, security is about ‘survival’ and signifies a situation in which an ‘existential threat’ threatens the existence of a referent object (ibid: 21). Thus, the notion of existential threat is the criterion that constitutes a border, however blurred, between the political and security zones of the spectrum. ST argues that an “emergency condition” has been institutionalized in the term ‘security’, which justifies a right “to use whatever means are necessary” to block a threatening development (ibid: 21). Existential threat is defined in relation to the particular character of the referent object (ibid: 21). ST puts forward two major concepts, existential threat and emergency measures, that are defined in terms of the referent object and normal politics. Thus, security is “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (ibid: 23).

A significant problem with ST occurs in its theorization of ‘existential threat’ and ‘emergency measure’ in regard to normal politics. This problem has been regarded by critics of this theory,
such as Jef Huysmans (1998) and Michael Williams (2003). They argue that this theory has been inspired by Carl Schmitt’s political realism. Huysmans (1998) argues that this theory has been influenced by a Schmittian conception of the political as the constitution of enemy and friend. Raising ethical questions about securitization as a technique to manage the excess of freedom, Huysmans (1998, Huysmans 2006) argues in favor of desecuritization. Michael Williams, however, scrutinizes this theory from a Schmittian perception of sovereignty. However, neither Huysmans nor Williams go beyond the identification of the influence of Schmitt’s notions of the political and sovereignty on this theory.

By disturbing the stability of the object, ST introduces a limited sense of temporality to the study of security in that the identity of an object may change as political to security, or vice versa, over time. However, beyond this, it fails to theorize temporality in the process of securitization. There are some important questions that require a temporal analysis of this process. For instance, this theory and its critics have failed to discern any difference in time between the political and security zones. They, rather, assume that normal politics and a state of exception differ only in terms of the rules of decision making and types of engaged actors.

**Speech Act and Time**
The absence of a satisfactory theorization of time in this theory is mainly due to its linguistic orientation that does not allow a proper theorization of time in the process of securitization. A major problem that arises directly from this linguistic perspective is the suppression of temporality in speech act. Temporality, Paul Hopper argues, “… poses the same problem for linguistics as has beset other human sciences: in making this abstraction, linguistics must hypostasize as ‘language’ the very dimension that most lends itself to conceptualization as a stable, atemporal entity” (Hopper 1992: 23). Hopper identifies a tradition in linguistics from
Saussure to Derrida that argues the foundation of our knowledge and language is linked to time and that language is a situated performance. In terms of temporality, the Speech Act Theory, from this perspective, is viewed as disregarding this situatedness of language (1992: 225). For language to be appropriately contextualized, Hopper suggests the Wittgensteinian concept of ongoing ‘language games’ and argues that “the study of language should thus focus primarily on the social and, inevitably, political scene of its creation and only secondarily on the ways in which these scenes become interiorized in the individual’s psychology” (1992: 231).

As mentioned earlier, in spite of its shortcomings, the Theory of Securitization, by questioning the naturalness of the political or security attributes of an object, does introduce temporality to the study of security. Furthermore, it tries to consciously theorize security as an open concept whose meaning lies in its usage (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 24). Drawing on Ole Weaver’s textual analysis of security, the Theory of Securitization suggests that “something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority” (1998: 24, added italics). When something is presented as an existential threat, that is, when it goes beyond the political logic of weighing things against each other or even “upset[s] the entire process of weighing as such”, it allows the actor “to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game” (1998: 24). In other words, the constitution of an existential threat requires, at the least, a rescheduling of priorities. In Securitization Theory’s terms, “… the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency enough to have substantial political effects” (1998: 25).

Drawing on the literature on time, I want to examine the social situation of securitization and the constitution of insecurity in the process of securitization. A temporal analysis of securitization
can help answer some important questions about securitization, among them: why a specific securitizing move can succeed under specific temporal conditions and not at other times; how a specific – temporal – representation of threat shapes the identity of the object at stake and determines the success or failure of the process; how temporality shapes the identity of actors engaged in the process; and, most importantly, how time can help us better understand the politics of securitization and distinguish security from normal politics.

**Time and Temporality**

Here I briefly examine the notions of field and *habitus* from a time perspective. Bourdieu’s theorization of field, as a relational matter that includes constant competition between actors, requires careful consideration of time in the examination of field. However, a simultaneous consideration of practice and *habitus* implies relativity of time in the same field. While *habitus* is “a *durably* installed generative principle of regulated improvisations” (Bourdieu 1977: 78, added *italics*) that produces practices, practice reproduces the objective conditions that generate *habitus*. Thus, *habitus* and practice are temporal things, albeit each with different velocity. As I will discuss, a careful consideration of time is an essential requirement in the study of practice.

Time has been a subject of study for a variety of different academic disciplines, such as physics, philosophy and sociology. Emile Durkheim, in 1912, laid the theoretical basis of time in sociology and, based on the assumption that society and social facts are not reducible to the sum of individual consciousness, argued that the category of time is neither an a priori faculty of mind nor natural, but sociologically grounded (see Zerubavel 1976, Bergmann 1992: 83). Although time is at the center of social enquiry, and it is recognized as a “basic category of human existence”, we tend to take it for granted (Harvey 1989: 201). Interestingly, some of the most important trends and phenomena of our age, such as the globalization of production,
modernity, etc. are only comprehensible in temporal terms (e.g. Harvey 1989, Giddens 1990, Castells 1996). Time and time reckoning are social constructions. Even our understanding of time is temporal; however, the globalization of Newtonian temporality has presented time as a natural matter and reduced the problem of time to its measurement (see Adam 1990).

An important problem in the study of time is the co-constitutive relation between time and space. Giddens argues that in the pre-modern world, time reckoning was tied to place, and the question of ‘when’ was almost connected with the question of ‘where’ (1990: 17). Even with the separation of space from place, time is still connected with space. The conditions of post-modernity, from Harvey’s view, need to be understood through “time-space compression” (1989: 240). From a different perspective, Manuel Castells understands the rise of network society as “[…] a social organization aiming at the supersession of space and the annihilation of time” (1996: 502). In contrast to Giddens who argues, “Time was still connected with space (and place) until the uniformity of time measurement by mechanical clock was matched by uniformity in the social organization of time”; I believe time still is connected with space. In fact, Giddens’s distinction between space and place is a useful technique to make a distinction between the social time of social space and the universal calendar as a global convention for measuring time.27

Thus, in the study of practice, one needs to make a distinction between the time of social space, as the locus of practice, and universal standard time, which is reified in clock time. Bourdieu identifies a spectrum in sociology in relation to temporality that ranges from objectivism and the elimination of time to phenomenology, which is more attentive to the temporality of the

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27 The case of Iraq, indeed, shows a strong relationship between time and space. Iraq’s geography and hot climate restricted potential military operations to certain months of the year. These limitations impacted war planning and the Bush administration’s overall timetable for its war on Iraq.
experience, to practice that is temporally structured. He believes that “To restore practice to its practical truth, we must therefore reintroduce time into the theoretical representation of a practice which, being temporally structured, is intrinsically defined by its tempo” (1977: 8). However, time has remained an under-theorized problem in social enquiry and social research tend to become temporally lost. As Bergman has argued, “Many authors lose themselves entirely in the momentum of their subject by making philosophical, anthropological and everyday observations without even beginning to achieve conceptual precision and a categorization of time within a sociological theory” (1992: 82). “The result,” as Giddens has correctly observed, is that “time is identified with social change” (1979: 198, original italics). However, as he argues, the exclusion of time from social analysis is impossible because both change and stability only become meaningful over time (ibid).

This temporal disorientation and bewilderment in International Relations has been materialized in scientific (positivist) theorizations of world politics wherein the atemporal claims based on human nature and the fundamentalism of power politics are replaced by scientific claims of positivist realism. The product of this pursuit of the timeless, as Richard Ashley observes

\[\ldots\] is a positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, subordinates all practice to an interest in control, bows to the ideal of a social power beyond responsibility, and thereby deprives political interaction of those practical capacities which make social learning and creative change possible. What emerges is an ideology that anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics. (1984: 228)

Beyond considering the lapse of time in social activity (Giddens 1979: 199), i.e. the question of the duration of practice, as well as time as a condition of social activity and the question of timing, time ought to be examined as a constituent element of the social, an element that can help
we distinguish infinite practices from each other. From this view, temporality is not merely the context of the social but “… an inherent constituent of any social act, and its significant role in social life can by no means be ignored” (Zerubavel 1976: 87). From social time perspective, time is not an a priori faculty of mind or a natural derivative; rather, as Durkheim argues, time “is socially grounded, having originated from, and bearing on, social life” (1976: 87).

Securitization as a social practice in general and the securitization of Iraq in 2003 in particular are not exceptions. By conducting a brief review of the literature about time, I try to present a framework for studying different aspects of time and temporality and how they shapes the process of securitization. I elaborate, in particular, on time as ontology; time as perspective; time as strategy; time reckoning; and time and agency-structure. Although I recognize the potential complications and deficiencies of these categorizations, I believe this is a necessary step in the analysis of time in the process of securitization.

Time as Ontology
Bourdieu tries to bring back time by making the distinction between social practice and certain social practices, such as scientific practices, that suppress or remove time from the study of social practice. From his perspective, while time is a constituent element of practice, science tries to, remove temporality from analysis by transforming strategies to rules. He argues that

To substitute strategy for the rule is to reintroduce time, with its rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility. Science has a time which is not that of practice. For the analyst, time no longer counts: not only because – as has often been repeated since Max Weber – arriving post festum, he cannot be in any uncertainty as to what may happen, but also because he has the time to totalize, i.e. to overcome the effect of time. Scientific practice is so “detemporalized” that it tends to exclude even the idea of what it excludes: because science is possible only in a relation to time which is opposed to that of practice, it tends to ignore time and, in doing so, to reify practices. (Bourdieu 1977: 9, original italics)
This inherent assertion of atemporality in science is materialized in the detemporalization of practice and generalization of the results of enquiry throughout time. As Bourdieu argues, practice unfolds in time (1977: 9). Furthermore, a temporal analysis of practice has to be able to examine temporality within a specific practice. In fact, temporality is sometimes the only criterion that can distinguish a social product from other social products. In this regard, Bourdieu uses the example of gifting in the cycle of reciprocity in order to examine temporality in the constitution of practice. He argues that “In every society it may be observed that, if it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be deferred and different, because the immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal” (Bourdieu 1977: 5, original italics).

Bourdieu argues that this particular temporality is important in distinguishing gift exchange from swapping, in which the exchange takes place in the same instant, and lending, in which the moment of the return of the loan is already guaranteed, thus already accomplished, by a juridical act (1977: 5). The interval between the gift and counter-gift is such a necessary element in the constitution of gift-exchange that someone’s haste to reciprocate the gift may be interpreted not as a counter-gift but as an insult. Therefore, it is this degree of timing that constitutes the meaning of the practice, differentiating counter-gifting from the mechanical act of exchange.

In Bourdieu’s sociology, time can be viewed as having multiple impacts on the constitution of social being. While the notion of practice is adjusted to analyze the moment, the sequence of actions and reactions, intervals and schedules, the notion of habitus has been designed to put this moment in a broader temporal context. Habitus has essentially been theorized to show the influence of a broader temporal context on what is taking place and the influence of what is taking place over longer period of time. In other words, practice and habitus are both temporal categories. “Endeavouring to reconstitute the units most homogenous from the point of view of
the conditions of production of habitus, i.e., with respect to the elementary conditions of existence and the resultant conditionings, one can construct a space whose three fundamental dimensions are defined by volume of capital, composition of capital, and change in these two properties over time (manifested by past and potential trajectory in social space)” (Bourdieu 1984: 114). This temporality also exists in the notion of capital. Bourdieu identifies three types of capital: economic, cultural and social, with the emphasis on the former two. He interjects time in his analysis of the possession of capital by the agency of social practice. From this perspective, Bourdieu examines how capital is distributed among higher and lower classes and the fractions among them while considering the notion of mobility.

Thus, social practice should be understood as temporally conditioned process that unfolds over time and results in certain temporal outcomes. However, it is not to imply that ‘time’ exists outside of social space. Indeed, time itself is a social product which is produced in the same process. As Werner Bergmann argues

In the present phase of every action – in which the action is stopped and reflection begins – not only is the present constituted together with its time horizons, but the personal identity of the actor is on the one hand constituted over time, and on the other hand, through interaction of the actors’ perspectives and above all through acceptance of the perspective of the ‘generalized other’, the construction of a common social time becomes possible. (1992: 83-84)

Therefore, time and action ought to be understood in their co-constitutional relations. As Alfred Schuetz (1960 in Bergmann 1992: 84) argues, “… an action first gains meaning when, as a unit of internal time consciousness, it is lifted reflexively out of the stream of experience and integrated with the total context of experience.” Bergmann continues that “In this situation prior contexts of meaning also determine present experience and future expectation, so that a temporally-structured reality arises” (1992: 84).
On the one hand, meaning and experience are temporally constituted. From this view, social space in Bourdieu’s sociology must have a temporal dimension. For actors to engage in the production of social product, they need to have a common time consciousness that includes both their field and its broader social space. Theorized under time parallelism, this time consciousness is an essential element of social relations and intersubjectivity. In other words, “intersubjectivity is grounded in common time consciousness” (1992: 84). On the other hand, time, as a mainstay of social life, is embedded and constituted in social relations which themselves are temporally conditioned. Whether they are categorized as static or dynamic or known as synchrony and diachrony, time is a component of social relations (see Giddens 1979: 198). Therefore, there is no single clock for all social activities. It is the social product itself that determines its temporal aspect. The actors engaged in the process of this constitution may voluntarily adopt temporal necessities of the process or a social field, or some actors within the specific field(s) may create and/or impose this awareness on actors.28

The relativity of social time, its particularity and necessities, on the one hand, allows time reckoning. On the other hand, it opens a new ground to make distinction between different social practices in terms of their temporality and temporal particularities. From this perspective, one can challenge the reduction of normalcy and urgency to rules and decisions in security studies. For instance, the laws and rules governing fire trucks or ambulances, rather than being inherent to these objects, are in place to satisfy the necessities of urgency. In a similar vein, with regard to velocity, a fire truck driver drives differently when responding to an emergency than when s/he drives back to the station. Thus, the momentum and velocity of the process is an essential component of the state of emergency. Indeed, many of the rules and laws, or, perhaps more

28 I will investigate the issue of adoption or imposition of this temporal awareness shortly in the section on timetables and schedules.
importantly, the absence of some, such as bypassing or ignoring public debate, that govern urgency and the state of exception create such momentum in this process. The decisionist approach to sovereignty fails to theorize time in its conception of the state of exception.

Tracing time in social practices becomes a more challenging task when dealing with less dynamic situations. Indeed, certain social practices are designed to conceal time and temporal transformations. Among them, language is a site where time is concealed in signs and grammar. Apart from many nouns, verbs and adverbs that particularly deal with time and temporality, linguistic signs to a certain degree are temporally conditioned. Different signs and words do have different temporal weight and strength. Therefore, the use of different terms by different social actors, by imposing a certain pace and velocity, is intended to shape the product of the process. The politics of language ought to deal with the management of this temporality.\(^{29}\) In regard to securitization in particular, the constitution of this velocity is of crucial importance in the success or failure of the process. The securitizing actor cannot merely rely on ‘breaking free of rules’ without paying due attention to the momentum of the process. This momentum is constituted along with the notion of time scarcity, which was a fundamental concern that shaped the debate about Iraq. However, contrary to the idea of the ‘ultimate scarcity of time’ (Bella in Bergmann 1992: 108), as with time itself, time scarcity is constituted through the process. In other words, time is not scarce in itself, but it has to be understood in regard to the conditions of scarcity (see Lumann in Bergmann 1992: 108).

Indeed a crucial component of existential threat is the notion of urgency that requires immediate action. As the Theory of Securitization remarks on this, “The distinguished feature of

\(^{29}\) For an analysis of representations of future in political discourse and their functions see Patricia Dunmire’s book, ‘Projecting the Future through Political Discourse.’
securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”)” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 26, added italics). Thus, for a threat to transform into an existential threat, the process of securitization has to set the conditions of time scarcity and necessity of immediate action. This immediacy is not something that impacts the decision about the referent object, but it shapes the entire securitization process. It is this momentum and speed of the process that distinguishes securitization from a normal policy making process. It is this notion of time scarcity, materialized in urgency, that justifies the adoption of exceptional measures. Time scarcity is directly related to the state of exception and allows the securitizing actor to impose its schedule on the process of securitization.

However, immediacy and urgency tend to penetrate through normal politics under a different temporal guise. In the absence of existential threat as its extreme manifestation, time scarcity continues to impact social life through the notion of time saving. Time saving is an essential component of security discourse especially under normal politics. It demonstrates impacts similar to urgency and tends to instigate similar political consequences, though in less noticeable ways. Security discourse is never void of imagined threats of different forms. In the absence of existential threats, security actors are preoccupied with the identification as well as calculation of risks and making ‘emergency response plans’, emergency management plans, and ensuring emergency preparedness for imagined emergencies. On the military level, the army is preoccupied with military exercises and maneuvers under different operation conditions. From a temporal perspective, such measures seek to shorten the interval between the emergence of an existential threat and the adoption of emergency measures.

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30 Time scarcity denotes a situation, a basic temporal condition, of social life. This notion is directly related to the quantification and commodification of time. Time saving, however, is a solution for this situation. As with money and labor, time saving can be understood as both present-oriented, in its concern about the optimum use of time, and future-oriented, in its preoccupation with investment and the saving of time for future purposes. This section is more directed by the latter understanding of time saving.
imagined existential threat and a proper reaction. The preoccupation with ‘efficiency’ ‘in time reaction’ and with matching the speed of events has been the main rhetoric behind the obsessive desires of security actors, such as police and intelligence agencies, especially since 9/11.\(^1\)

Time, and the notion of time saving in particular, deeply shapes the being of security actors and the architecture of the security sector. Permanent armies, for instance, are products of complex social and political processes (Tilly, Evans et al. 1985). In traditional approaches of IR, a strong military serves as the foundation of the notion of balance of power that deters military attacks by other states. At the same time, it is an asset for a state to conduct ‘coercive diplomacy’ to, as with war in Clausewitz’s theory, compel its enemies to submit to its will. This synchrony of military power and diplomacy and the invention of coercive diplomacy have been realized in official strategies such as ‘Big Stick Ideology’. This perception of military power as a means of diplomacy is prevalent in realist IR and security studies (see e.g. Walt 1991, Morgenthau and Thompson 1993).

However, I argue that a satisfactory understanding of the being of military power and its location on the spectrum of ‘deterrence-coercive diplomacy-war’ requires a temporal analysis. In its most basic function, i.e. deterring attacks by other states, a permanent army, and later a standing army, can be understood as a modern solution for managing the problem of time scarcity in national defense and security. By reducing the interval between attack and proper response, a permanent army delimits the scope of potential existential threats. It is not the mere potential capability of a permanent army that prevents an enemy’s attack but the capability of a *timely* response that has

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\(^1\) The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) itself was a response to the question of coordination and ‘readiness’ that accelerates the evolution of the preexisting ‘surveillance assemblage’ theorized by Haggerty and Ericson (2000). A brief review of the discourse of the DHS, such as ‘Preparedness’, ‘READY’ and ‘Response’ (either in quotes or not capitalized), reveals its deep concern about the problem of time. The notion of ‘coordination’ aims at the management of time in responding to emergencies.
preventive value. From a temporal perspective, the military is observed as a time saving measure that institutionalizes permanent readiness in order to deal with emergencies. Time, and the management of time scarcity, shapes the structure of the military as well as its different elements and forms, such as reserve forces versus standing forces.

Every single military measure is intended to create temporal advantage over the enemy or to neutralize the enemy’s temporal advantage. This has been put forward eloquently by Carl von Clausewitz under the notion of surprise. He introduces surprise as a fundamental requirement to attain superiority, arguing that surprising the enemy “… lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings, for without it superiority at the decisive point is really not conceivable” (1950: 142). As he continues, “Surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception, only in very different degrees, according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances” (ibid: 142). This fundamental preoccupation with time has deeply shaped major military strategies from ‘Blitzkrieg’ in WWII to ‘First Strike Capability’ in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War era and ‘shock and awe’ in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In surprise, Clausewitz recognizes two factors: ‘secrecy’ and ‘rapidity’ (ibid: 142). Nearly all military technological innovations have targeted the improvement of surprise and/or neutralizing potential surprises from the enemy’s side. Different military practices, such as military exercises and maneuvers, war games, action plans, emergency plans, defense strategies, etc. can be analyzed as time management measures. The concerns about and necessities of ‘rapid reaction’ and ‘rapid dominance’, in its assertive form, turn the adoption of time saving measures into a routine aspect of normal politics.
From a different perspective, the use of military force in achieving certain foreign policy goals may be understood in terms of time. Military force is commonsensically believed to create desirable effects for national security and foreign policy in a shorter span of time compared to non-military means of statecraft, such as economic sanctions. While economic sanctions require a long period of time to weaken the military power of an adversary, the use of military force may result in the desired effects in a much shorter period of time. Therefore, the very fact of adopting a means or a combination of means to deal with a particular security threat is directly influenced by actors’ perception of time and time scarcity. This issue may be seen in the debates between the Bush administration, arguing for the use of force against Saddam Hussein, and other actors, especially in the United Nations Security Council, favoring continued inspections and other diplomatic means for disarming the Iraqi regime. Balla (1978 in Bergmann 1992: 109) argues that time scarcity remains ubiquitous and permanent. Given the fact that time itself is a construction of its social conditions, the perception of time scarcity, however ubiquitous and permanent, is conditioned by its social conditions. Thus, time scarcity and time saving are in a co-constitutional relation that makes the preoccupation with time saving and struggling with time scarcity a never ending endeavor.

**Time Perspectives**
Perceptions of time are influenced by time orientations. Individual actors, and social fields as well, do not all hold the same understanding of time and future; however, time orientation deeply shapes their practice. Allen Jack Edward (2002: 118-120), in his review of different empirical researches on individuals’ time orientation, argues that time orientation is an important driving force behind all individual decisions, from stress management to work behavior, sexual activities, leisure, finance, attitudes towards conflict resolutions and consumer decisions. In
contrast to the focus of psychological studies on time orientation, sociology has been interested in “… the relationship between temporal perspectives and social roles, social classes, certain other social groups, specific cultural and social types, social planning and so on” (Bergmann 1992: 85). In this regard, due to “its importance for social action and decision making” (1992: 86), sociology has devoted itself to the future orientation of time. Among them, “LeShan’s study showed that the social classes’ ‘collective-ego-space-time’ differs with regard to the extent of the future perspective, tolerance of frustration and behavioral orientation: lower-class children tend to be present-oriented and have a shorter time horizon than more future-oriented middle-class children” (1992:86).

In their studies, Koenig et al. (1981: 123) found that social class is directly related to future time orientation. They argue that the American middle class places a positive value in ‘thinking of the future’ and considers it a virtue (ibid: 123), while “[...] lower class people have less power, control, and determination regarding their fate and that, as a defense mechanism, they avoid thinking about the future” (ibid: 125-127). Chebat and Ven Venkatesan (1993) have examined the attitudes of English and French Canadians toward time. They conclude that “In general, linguistic culture seems to mold time orientation more than social class does; however the basic idea of the Marxian hypothesis is supported: control over time is more important to the middle and upper middle class than to the working class”.

Other studies have tried to examine the influence of culture and language on time perception. Robert J. Graham, from a Whorfian linguistic perspective32, argues that time perception is culturally embedded. He defines three distinct time perception models including linear separable,  

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32 Whorf elaborates on the relation between language and perception. He held that “languages embody not only a way of speaking about the world: they embody a model of that world. The idea is that one’s native language sets up a series of categories that act as a kind of grid through which one perceives the world, and constrains the way in which one can categorize and conceptualize different phenomena” (Graham 1981: 338).
circular-traditional and procedural-traditional, which he calls Anglo (European-American), Latino and Indian respectively (Graham 1981). In the linear-separable model, time is seen as linear and separable into various discrete compartments (1981: 336). He argues that

People who share this perception think of time as a road or ribbon that stretches from the past into the future, and along which one progresses. The past is old … and time spent in the past cannot be recovered. The future is new in that it represents a different set of situations for which one can prepare. It is also thought that time properly spent now will put one in a much better position in the future, and this better future state forms the basic idea of progress. (1981: 336)

With regard to circular-traditional model, he argues that “time is perceived as circular in which the same event is repeated in a certain cyclical pattern” (ibid). The circular-traditional model arises from traditional cultures in which time is regulated, and life is organized, by natural cycles. In this model the conception of time does not stretch into a new future; rather, “people expect a future that is exactly like the past. This future offers no particular promise, and is neither to be anticipated with joy nor feared” (ibid: 336). In contrast to the linear-separable model, this time perception is present oriented. The last model in Graham’s study is procedural-traditional, or ‘Indian’. In this model, “the amount of time spent on an activity is irrelevant, as activities are procedure-driven rather than time-driven. That is, the important variable in any activity is that it be done correctly, i.e., following the right procedure, rather than that it be done ‘on time’” (ibid: 337, added italics). Comparing these three models, Graham argues that “… no one time is universally shared. This would mean that perception of time is a part of an individual’s culture and, like other parts of culture, it has an important influence on the individual’s world view and subsequent behavior” (ibid: 338).

Time perspective is not merely a choice of individuals or collectivities. It is rather an important element that shapes actors’ identities and their rationality. Therefore, a satisfactory
understanding of the process of securitization requires an examination of its temporal context. For instance, securitization, understood as “breaking free of rules” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 26), is more likely to be grasped by the linear-separable than the procedural-traditional model. Further, it tends to be more result-driven than procedure oriented. However, considering the complexity and multiplicity of the process, every process of securitization may demonstrate a specific combination of different temporal models. Perhaps the most important consequence of a future-oriented time perspective on practices of security is its direct influence on the constitution of insecurity. Uncertainty is a thread that links future with insecurity. In this situation, planning turns out to be the modern solution for managing the uncertainty of future insecurities. The fact that time saving is an inherently future-oriented practice together with the need for continued planning for the optimum functioning of time saving entities put the problem of future and its inherent uncertainty at the top of security agendas.

Security Planning
The problem of future arises from a future-oriented and linear-separable perception of time. From this view, ‘open future’ is the main source of anxiety. However, endeavors to manage the fear of uncertainty and openness of the future are not limited to the modern era. Ancient social institutions, such as religion, also have authoritative claims over predicting (closing) the future. Religion constitutes a future that entices individuals into bearing the hardship of performing religious duties. Indeed, the power of religion originates, to a great extent, from its constitution of future and its treatment of the anxiety created by this future. This transcendental-future, which is constituted, and simultaneously closed, by religion (e.g. Boyd and Zimbardo 1997), was challenged and opened by science in the modern era. Interestingly, a scientific critic of the

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33 With regard to the case of Iraq, the Bush administration promoted the state of exception (creating certain results); at the same time, it tried to pursue certain rituals by seeking the approval of Congress and of the U.N. Security Council (procedure).
transcendental-future of religion begins with a critique of the genesis (beginning). Thus, religion’s constitution of future is not evaluated in isolation, but as an element of a broader construction of time, a linear path, that begins with an origin and extends into a distant future. In other words, although religion and science hold similar understandings of time, they delimit and close their respective futures in different ways.

The problem of future is always a present problem. Regardless of their exactitude, religious or scientific constitutions of future seek to shape the rationality of the present. Thus, predictions of the future are not innocent statements (predictions) about something in the distant future; in fact, the present can be no more present than a future and its corresponding anxieties that shape actors’ rationality. Thus, the competition between religion and science is primarily over the constitution of this rationality and the order of the present. While religion’s transcendental-future is secured by seeking God’s satisfaction, science’s secular future, delimited by death, is secured through insurance and investment. In spite of a long, and ongoing, competition between science and religion over the nature of future, neither science nor religion has been able to completely dominate the business of defining and closing the future.\textsuperscript{34} The present state of this competition, in fact, points to blurred boundaries, and a mutual penetration, between scientific and religious discourses on time. However, in a secular society, a widely accepted division of labor suggests that while religion continues to shape individuals’ future, science is more suited to the public that wants to project the future.

Thus, the management of the openness and uncertainty of the future is a main force behind human strategies. “Up to now, sociologists have concentrated on the strategies of utopianism,

\textsuperscript{34} In fact, some experts have observed an emerging interest in the investigation of the possibility of existence beyond life space as new alternatives to transcendental future (Lee 2009).
planning, social policy and revolution” (Bergmann 1992: 90). Each of these strategies suggests a specific sense of time and temporality. While revolution connotes rapid and drastic changes, planning evokes a controlled, well-thought-out, and relatively slow, process of transforming the future. Utopianism seeks to create the conditions of absolute certainty about the future. It is perceived as creating the future rather than waiting for the future to unfold (see ibid.: 90-91) – as other strategies do.  

From a different perspective, planning aligns itself with a scientific understanding of future, while other strategies, such as utopianism, are undermined as ideological and unrealistic. In practice, however, these strategies are not pure as such; rather, they demonstrate hyphenated identities. For instance, most revolutions have been inspired by utopian ideas about social life. A similar situation has been observed by James Scott in regard to a scientific projection of future when social engineering plans of “high modernism” (Scott 1998) seek to create utopian societies. The desire to shape the future is directly influenced by the power to do so. Science and its offshoot, technology, are crucially important in the escalation of the desire to shape the future to a sense of empowerment to do so. The proliferation of science, with its inherent claim of certainty (see Bourdieu 1977), strengthens the resolve to plan for shaping the future. Kaufmann observed that “the norm of securing the future has achieved the status of a central idea or value in our society, one followed more and more by technology, law, policy and insurance. This great appreciation of security results from, or presupposes, development of modern awareness of an

35 This obsession with shaping the future is at the core of Bush’s argument (the Bush Doctrine) about Iraq in particular regarding his preemptive action. This present future is at the core of preemption and preemptive strike. Preemption and ‘The Terminator’ share the desire of time travel. However, in contrast to ‘The Terminator’ that travels from the future to the past in order to shape its original present, which is our future, preemption is a travel from the present to the future followed by action in the present in order to shape the future. Nevertheless, regardless of the direction of their travel in time, the actual action takes place in the present – the rest is all imagination. However, one can argue that there is no place for the future in the Bush Doctrine. It realizes the future in the present, thus diminishing the line between present and future and dissolving the future in the present. Acting in the present is therefore automatically considered acting in the future.
open future, for which the ‘future’ becomes ‘insecurity itself’” (1970: 174-175 in Bergmann 1992: 91, added Italics). Security planning is an attempt to harness the openness and uncertainty of the future. Therefore, “In order to find security nevertheless, the future must lose its insecure, and thus free, dimension: in the ‘idea of security, the issue is always the destruction of the temporality of the future’” (Kaufmann, 1970:174 in ibid: 92).

The gravity of open future is multiplied when ‘survival’ in an ‘anarchical’ environment is at stake. Security plans, such as national security and defense strategies, are actors’ attempts to defuturize the future by removing its uncertainties. They attempt to make known the unknown future by delimiting its possibilities. Still, these efforts, however psychologically pacifying, have always encountered surprises. Actors’ tolerance of such surprises deeply shapes the depth and width of closing the future. Security and defense planning range from preparation for a number of foreseen threats to zero insecurity tolerance and security utopianism. Perceptions of the future, and its threats, deeply shape actors’ perception of insecurity and the type(s) of securitization processes with which they may engage. Every perception of future, as well as its threat environment, makes known certain threats and thus sets the conditions of the possibility for the occurrence of certain securitization moves. More importantly, these perceptions act as epistemological filters that identify certain social practices as ‘threat’, their prioritization and, the threshold that they transform into existential threats. While, for instance, preparatory measures are predicted for matters of legitimate self-defense, security utopianism does not wait for security threats to unfold, but rather opts for preemption. Bush’s National Security Strategy for 2002 demonstrates such an obsessive reaction to the openness of the future when it declares that

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action
to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (Bush 2002: 15, added italics)

This perception of ‘future-as-insecurity’ goes beyond closing the future and delimiting its potential threat; it defuturizes the future by eliminating the boundary between future and present. It, indeed, imposes a certainty on future, as if a specific act will occur in the future which in turn disturbs the established sequence of offensive-defensive by putting defensive action, in Chomsky’s words, “aggression” (2003), before an (imagined) offensive action. In such circumstances, ‘waiting’ for the traditional sequence to take place becomes a source of threat.

Waiting Time
From a time perspective, securitization can be considered as a practice seeking to impose a specific rhythm on social life. Every rhythm constitutes and transforms daily life and the social order in its own way. In his study of fieldwork in Kabylia, Bourdieu examines how abruptly and completely daily life is transformed under the rhythms of wet and work seasons. He observes that “Everything, without exception, in the activities of the men, the women, and the children, is abruptly altered by the adoption of a new rhythm […]” (1977: 159). Every rhythm constitutes a self-referential social order whose being is temporal in two distinct, yet interrelated, ways. First, rhythm is temporally constituted; it is not permanent. It will transform into a different order. Second, it has temporal materializations. While the former version of temporality evokes transformation and substitution of the social order, the latter contends that social orders are practiced and reproduced through temporal means.

Thus, the normal has a temporal aspect by which social actors can make sense of haste or sluggishness. Bourdieu has observed this temporal aspect in his study of Kabylia: “Doing one’s duty as a man means conforming to the social order, and this is fundamentally a question of
respecting rhythms, keeping pace, not falling out of line” (1977: 161). However, this notion of pace and conformity in many important social practices, securitization in particular, is much more complex and contested than the question of conforming to and keeping up with the pace of ‘natural’ cycles, such as seasons. Every process of securitization is not only a reproduction of social (security) time, rhythm and pace, but also the very constitution of the credibility and capacity of the securitizing actor with regard to his/her ability to act in conformity with these temporal necessities that are constantly contested by desecuritizing actors.

This constitution of security time, pace and credibility can be seen in Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address. He, first, presented a brief report of the state of national security and how he successfully managed the situation. Then, he added

We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. Our war on terror is well begun, but it has only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch – yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch. (Bush 2002, added *italics*)

Bush explicitly stated that he would define the rhythm and pace of this process. Indeed, for a securitizing move to succeed, the securitizing actor has to be *the* actor who defines time and can influence the schedule of other actors that are engaged in the process of securitization. Perhaps from a more skeptical perspective, one could say that the securitizing actor may pretend to be merely matching the rhythm of the problem at stake. However, in spite of the determination in his words, Bush had to *wait* in order to convince more actors to *synchronize* with his ‘watch’ and accommodate as many *schedules* as possible within the limits of the *policy window* provided to him by the events of 9/11.
The notion of time waiting is directly related to the question of synchronization in the process of securitization. ‘Time waiting’ can be used to clarify three components of the process of securitizing Iraq: waiting for the right moment to promote Iraq to a security problem; waiting to synchronize major actors; and waiting or not waiting as a, or perhaps the, major debate between the securitizing actor(s) and desecuritizing forces.

**Waiting for the Right Moment**

In his detailed analysis of pre-decision processes in the U.S. federal government, John Kingdon (2003) developed a temporally informed approach that tries to take into account the influences of policy entrepreneurs within and outside government on the process of agenda-setting. He tries to understand “What makes people in and around government attend, at any given time, to some subjects and not to others” (2003: 1). Kingdon employs *window* and *streams* as metaphors to theorize time and the social environment of the policy making process. The policy window denotes the right time to promote a problem in the government’s agenda; it “[…] is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problem” (ibid: 165). Kingdon argues that “[…] windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happening in the political stream” (ibid: 20). However, they do not stay open forever but only for a short period of time during which they will either be seized upon by policy entrepreneurs or missed (ibid: 166). Policy windows can be seized upon when the three streams of problems, policies and politics come together and synchronize with an open window.

The problem stream refers to the perceptions of public problems that require government action. In Kingdon’s view, such problems often come to the attention of governmental decision makers through some systematic indicators, bound in the political world, employed by governmental and
non-governmental actors (ibid: 90-91). The policy stream consists of policy experts and specialists, in and outside of government, in a given policy area (ibid: 117). The third stream in Kingdon’s approach, the political stream, “is composed of such factors as swings of national mood, administration or legislative turnover, and interest group pressure campaign” (ibid: 20). Kingdon argues that “The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely when policy windows – opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems – are open” (ibid: 20).

Kingdon’s analysis presents an (ontologically) individualist understanding of problems, solutions and actors, while these three elements can only be perceived through their co-constitutional relations with each other, and in their competition with multiple problem-solution-actor triangles over winning the monopoly on the agenda-setting process. In other words, each triangle represents a number of actors with a specific framing of the problem that increases the likelihood of certain decisions in the process of agenda-setting. Further, Kingdon understands time as something external to this situation. Problems and events do not innocently open windows, but they are interpreted by policy entrepreneurs as such. In other words, the creation of a window is not external to the competition between agenda-setting triangles. In fact, sometimes it is a novel interpretation of an old problem that can open a policy window.

In his State of the Union address in 2002, Bush introduced a problem stream, known as the ‘war on terror’, that dominated United States national security and foreign policy. After a brief report of the state of national security, Bush continued that “our war against terror is only beginning” (Bush 2002). Then he presented Iraq, due to its hostility towards America and support of terrorism (ibid), as a problem to be addressed within the framework of the ‘war on terror’. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, Iraq was a lingering problem in United States national security and foreign policy during the 1990s. There was a policy stream consisting of experts and analysts of Iraq that carried a discourse arguing for the use of force and regime change in Iraq. Although they were successful in ratifying the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 in Congress, on the whole their attempts, such as the January 26, 1998 letter from 18 affiliates of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) urging President Clinton to implement a strategy, including the use of force, for removing Saddam’s regime from power (PNAC 1998), failed to create a meaningful impact on the Clinton administration’s policy towards Iraq.

The desired window for this the policy of regime change was opened in two stages. The first stage was the election of George W. Bush as President in 2000. 15 out of the 18 signatories of the 1998 letter were officially engaged in the Bush campaign in 2000 and/or later joined his administration. Among those 15 individuals, 12 of them occupied important positions in the Bush national security and defense team. Given the fact that it is the President and his top appointees who eventually decide what issue will be on the agenda (see Kingdon 2003), the 2000 election put this policy stream in a position of authority. Those who did not officially join the administration, such as William Kristol, were equally important in initiating the second stage of promoting Iraq in the United States national security agenda after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Seven signatories of the 1998 PNAC letter joined William Kristol in sending another letter, this time to President Bush, on September 20, 2001. Kristol’s letter constitutes an exemplary instance of taking the opportunity to create a policy window through a policy stream in order to deal with an old problem. Indeed, Kristol’s letter, which was signed by 40 other individuals including journalists, security experts, scholars and some members of the Bush administration, represents a
policy stream that, by reconstructing Iraq in a new discourse, sought to elevate Iraq to a national security problem. Beginning with praise for Bush’s “admirable commitment to “lead the world to victory” in the war against terrorism”, the letter supports the administration’s discourse on the ‘war on terror’. As for Iraq, in particular, the letter builds upon the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ to try to represent Saddam Hussein as a problem of terrorism. The letter supports Bush’s idea of the ‘war on terror’ and a “broad and sustained campaign” against “terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them” (PNAC 2001). Repeating Colin Powell’s description of Saddam Hussein as “one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth”, the letter suggests that “It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States” (PNAC 2001). However, it does not leave this statement as a hint for further examination, but instead continues

But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism. (PNAC 2001)

Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 were never proven to have any link with Iraq, they were used in neoconservative policy stream to promote Iraq as a problem in the ‘war on terror’. Although the Bush administration elevated Iraq to a national security threat to be addressed immediately, it did not choose to support the Iraqi opposition, as the letter suggested.

**Timetables and Schedules**
Eviatar Zerubavel (1976) offered a framework for the study of social time that tries to analyze time in its relativity. *Time reckoning, timetable* and *schedules* are three fundamental elements of Zerubavel’s framework. Time reckoning consists of temporal reference points and time measurement as the fundamental structural dimensions of social time. “A standard time-
orientation, consisting of standard units of duration and a standard system of time-reference is a basic prerequisite for the participation in the social world” (1976: 88, original italics). The timetable can roughly be observed as the time habitus that is the temporal standardization of social behavior through provision of tempo, sequence, duration and so on. Schedule is the most dynamic element of this framework and relates to individual practices of synchronization and control of time.

As with social time in general, security does not have a natural temporal reference point. Security time, and its different subfields, are constructed and organized by a myriad of pre- and post- terms, such as Pre-WWII, post-WWII, Post-Cold War and, in the case of Iraq in particular, pre- and post- 9/11. As I argued in the previous chapter, the temporal reference point(s) are constituted within the relevant discourse. Security time indicators, on the one hand, represent general values of the field of insecurity. They, on the other hand, determine the ontology of what is being measured (Bergmann 1992: 99). The time indicator ‘post-Westphalia’, for instance, signifies the establishment of the nation-state and the notion of sovereignty as the main value of this era. President Bush’s administration, through its constitution of ‘9/11’, imposed a new rhythm on both socio-political life in the United States and global politics in general.

Considering the tremendous differences between the post-9/11 rhythm, as practiced by politicians, journalists and experts, and that of the pre-9/11, post-Cold War period, 9/11 soon became the temporal reference point in the security time-reckoning system. As mentioned in the previous chapter, President Bush and his administration took the opportunity on various occasions to elaborate upon 9/11 as a time changing moment in the American security discourse. 9/11 has been vastly interpreted as a time-reckoning symbol constituting a fault line between pre- and post- 9/11. The resulting new rhythm soon became a global one due to the fact that the Bush
administration had to deal with the terrorist attacks that had been planned in different countries and exercised by citizens of different states, and that international organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO, became engaged with the problem as well. More importantly, by way of the global coverage of live footage from 9/11 and subsequent American reactions, the media played a crucial role in the segregation of the new rhythm from the old one, the standardization of the American calendar and the globalization of the American time-reckoning system.

Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ defines a new era that “begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there” (Bush, September 20, 2001). Bush identified the beginning of this era, but he left it open-ended. This was not because the ‘war on terror’ may have been purposely designed with no specific ending – as Bush declared, “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (ibid) – but because there was no way of knowing when the 9/11 time-reckoning would be replaced by a new time-reckoning system. However, it is clear that the Bush administration, in its presentation of the ‘war on terror’, could, to a great extent, influence the *habitus* of the field of insecurity and devise a new pace, norms and rules that defined the new rhythm of the social.

An examination of the ‘war on terror’ is necessary to understand how post-9/11 temporal conditions influence the being and conditions of the possibility for future securitization moves. By suppressing potential alternative understandings of 9/11, for instance, the perception of 9/11 as a law enforcement problem (e.g. Chomsky 2002), the ‘war on terror’ sets the conditions for specific types of securitization moves. Moreover, by dissolving the post-cold-war time structure, the ‘war on terror’ created a new set of possibilities, a unique opportunity for the Bush administration, to redefine the entire field of insecurity on its own terms. However, as the new
order established its normal, the dizziness of the situation of ‘shock and awe’ has gradually faded away.

Individual securitization moves can be understood as the attempts of securitizing actors seeking to influence other actors’ schedules. While rhythms constitute the broad temporal context of securitization, the notion of schedule deals with the dynamics and politics of individual securitization moves. From this view, a securitizing actor ought to either impose his schedule or negotiate his schedule with all actors in order to create its desired schedule. As I will argue in the following chapters, an American procedure-driven securitization move, entailing the use of force, must be constituted as a collective action having congressional support and preferably the support of the United Nations as well. However, before reaching that point, the problem of schedule ought to be addressed within the Bush administration. Indeed, from a time perspective, one of the crucial elements in the success of administration’s securitizing move was the exclusion of the planning of the administration’s schedule and timetable from public debate.

Therefore, in order to plan for the war, President Bush needed to negotiate his schedules with multiple schedules within the administration, including the military, as well as with Congress, allies and the United Nations Security Council. Each of these actors has its own schedule, with its specific flexibilities, limits and constraints that could influence this process in different ways. Roth (1963Bergmann 1992: 104), in a different context, argues that bargaining for a timetable is a dialectical process that has to integrate the reactions and expectations of opposing parties into the process. However, demonstrating unlimited patience to accommodate other actors’ schedules can slow down the speed and momentum of the process of securitization, ultimately killing the securitizing move by reducing it to a matter of normal foreign policy making. Therefore, the
securitizing actor needs to demonstrate his move as a time-driven rather than procedure-driven act.

When dealing with an enemy, sticking to established procedures can be fatal for the securitization move. The Bush administration built its case against Iraq upon the idea that Iraq was pursuing a covert military nuclear program. On the one hand, the administration had to prevent Iraq from reaching the irreversible point of the production of its nuclear explosive. On the other hand, in order to reach that point, Iraq had to carefully schedule its program to ensure that it reached that point in time, i.e. before the American invasion. Both parties simultaneously pursued a time strategy to buy time that was interpreted by the opposing party as killing time. Therefore, the same style of time management can be interpreted differently by the various parties to the conflict. 36

The specificity of an individual securitization process lies in the politics of inclusion and exclusion of the actors and in the synchronization – of timetables and schedules. In fact, as an important social capital, the authority for influencing social time is not distributed equally within social fields. As Zerubavel argues, “A sociological characterization of the designers of timetables and those who are legitimately authorized to schedule parts of others’ time for them is essential (1976: 91). Therefore, an important question about the securitizing actor is the scope of his authority and ability to influence other actors’ schedules in the process of securitization. In chapter five I investigate this securitizing actor’s authority and ability to decide when who is in and who is out shapes the social space in which securitization takes place. The process of securitizing Iraq began with a small group of Bush aides. After the group completed its planning

36 A similar situation can be observed in the ongoing dispute between Iran and the United States and its allies. Both parties are said to be buying time; Iran through negotiations and the other party through the imposition of economic sanctions and trying to slow down the pace of Iran’s nuclear advancement. However, the United States and its allies, Israel in particular, will consider the use of force if these measures fail to work as such.
of a timetable and schedule, it decided to engage Congress and the United Nations Security Council – although not to the extent that either could destroy the group’s timetable.  

Length of the War
Talk of war became prevalent in the media as early as Bush’s public campaign on the threat of Iraq began in September 2002. Media coverage of this period shows that the discussion about certain features of war took place parallel to the discussion of its possibility – to the extent that it seemed the media was disclosing war plans to the enemy. Then, as the actual invasion of Iraq drew nearer, the media began to cover war plans in significant detail. Headlines, such as “War plan for Iraq calls for big force and quick strikes” (Sanger, Schmitt et al. 2002), “War Plan for Iraq Largely in Place; Quick, Simultaneous Attacks on Ground and From Air Envisioned” (Ricks 2003) and “Myers Depicts War on Two Fronts; Joint Chiefs Head Says Short Conflict is Goal” (Ricks 2003) disseminated this promise of war planners that the war in Iraq would be short and quick. In a breakfast meeting with reporters on March 4, 2003, General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that “the United States aims for a short conflict that minimizes civilian casualties…” (2003: A15). In order to execute the war “as quickly as possible”, Myers said, “The best way to do that is to have such a shock on the system that the Iraqi regime would have to assume early on that the end is inevitable” (ibid). Some headlines,

37 In this case there was only one timetable. The outside parties had to align themselves with this timetable if they wanted to stay relevant to the process. However, one may argue that the securitization of Iraq was possible the other way around, i.e. by making the case to the United Nations and waiting for the Security Council to deal with Iraq as a security issue. In that case, it would not have been Bush’s timetable that dominated the process but that of the United Nations. Indeed, by making the case to the Security Council, the Bush administration tried to present the situation as such. But it turned out to be an instrumental use of the United Nations proven by the fact that when encountered with opposition in the Security Council, the Bush administration withdrew its case and acted through its ‘coalition of the willing’.

38 Perhaps a Washington Post Q&A for children about a possible war with Iraq is a good example of this situation. The following was the answer provided to the question of “Isn’t an invasion supposed to be […] a surprise?”: “That’s one of the strange things about all of this. Lots of people are talking about a war – politicians, generals, journalists – but no one knows when, or even if, it’s going to happen” (Kelly 2002: C14).
such as “Oil Prices Drop on Iraq Hopes; Traders Think Fast War Could Leave Wells Intact” (Behr 2003), however, reflected how audiences received the promise of a quick war in Iraq.

It was mainly high ranking generals, such as General Myers, that explained their war plans and how the war would be executed in Iraq. However, the talk of war plans cannot be reduced to a technical military question. While the Bush administration was apparently trying to deal with the problem through diplomatic means, publicizing war plans raises important questions – not only about the sincerity of diplomatic efforts but about the connection between diplomacy and war plans as well. From a realist perspective, this parallelism of diplomatic means and war plans is reminiscent of coercive diplomacy and ‘big stick policy’ with its simultaneous emphasis on military power and diplomacy. This ideology, that is believed to have been reproduced by different American presidents from James Monroe to Theodore Roosevelt in American foreign policy under different circumstances in different terms, prescribes that threatening with military means will increase the chance of success in peaceful diplomatic solutions. Therefore, the talk of military power is perceived as a necessary component of a diplomatic solution that genuinely strives for peace. With this ideology deeply embedded in American security discourse, in an ongoing situation it is difficult to estimate whether war planning activities are genuine or only intended to support diplomatic activities.

While proponents of ‘big stick policy’ may argue for the benefits of the support of force for diplomacy, from a time perspective, this parallelism of war planning and diplomacy, by engaging different calendars and timetables, may impose significant restrictions for genuine peaceful solutions. For instance, given the climate of Iraq, war planners had to consider Iraq’s long and hot summer in their plans. Therefore, from a military perspective, the best timing to fight a war was in the winter or early spring. At the same time, in late February 2002, against the American,
British and Spanish resolution in the Security Council, France, Russia and Germany (also through the Security Council) proposed an alternative plan that extended weapons inspection into the summer (see Kessler and Lynch 2003). One can argue that the Bush administration’s timetable for a peaceful solution, or even for obtaining a Security Council resolution in support of military action, was seriously restricted by the necessities of the military timetable for war.

However, from a different perspective, publicizing such previews of a potential war with Iraq, despite persisting questions about its legitimacy, may be understood as a sign of the Bush administration’s resoluteness in imposing its schedule on other actors and presenting the war as inevitable. A few months prior to the invasion of Iraq, it was not only U.S. allies in the region, such as Egypt, that began to prepare for what President Hosni Mubarak called “an inevitable conflict” (MacFarquhar 2003), but also Saddam Hussein. Hussein’s “abandonment of appeals for a more conciliatory approach” towards American problems with Iraq was interpreted by Washington Post correspondent, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, as a sign “that he may have concluded, given the recent announcement of U.S. troops movements to the Persian Gulf region, that another war with the United States has become inevitable” (2003: A01). Such a perception of inevitability may encourage some actors to strive for relevance. Therefore, presentations of detailed plans of war go beyond the idea of influencing the enemy’s behavior; rather, it may be seen as a technique to manage the social space in which securitization takes place. This technique was deployed by the Bush administration to manage friends, allies and hostile states.

More importantly, by focusing on certain characteristics, such as ‘shortness’, war plan previews played an important role in presenting a more desirable view of the use of force – versus peaceful means. An analysis of the notions of ‘quickness’ and ‘shortness’, as constitutive elements of a potential war in Iraq, can direct us to a better understanding of time strategies in
the process of securitization. Such attributes for a war in Iraq were, indeed, highlighted to influence different political, ethical and moral evaluations of the war in order to alleviate resistance against the use of force in Iraq. More specifically, the idea of a ‘short war’, by presenting the war as a desirable choice in light of the interests of different actors engaged in the process, functioned to overcome resistance against the use of force and allow the Bush administration to control the negative consequences of the war.

Along with the notions of ‘short’ and ‘quick’, ‘precision’ was deployed to describe a possible war in Iraq. Although the notion of precision, at first glance, is important for the role it plays in the sanitization of war; it also has important time implications. The simultaneous use of precision and speed may neutralize unintended consequences of speed, such as the intensity of war and high number of casualties. However, from a military perspective these two are twin indicators of military capability of conducting a quick war with low costs and casualties.39 Besides, from a different perspective, precision proved to be an important element of the war on Iraq; “Because the United States wants to help transform Iraq quickly into a liberated nation, the air campaign would be carried out to avoid the major destruction of the gulf war” (Sanger, Schmitt et al. 2002). Therefore, this neatly planned war even included a quick post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

The advancements of military technologies, by increasing speed and precision, have directly contributed to the desirability of the use of force. However, my argument concentrates specifically on the temporal effects of such advancements that reproduce the desirability of war in new terms. The fate of a securitizing move depends not only on the constitution of a

39 On different occasions military officials tried to show how much the Army’s capabilities had increased since the first Persian Gulf War, which marked a quick, pleasant victory for the United States and its allies. For instance, “Only 9 percent of the weapons dropped in the gulf war were precision-guided; this time, the figure would be well in excess of 60 percent, allowing more effective bombing with fewer total aircraft, officials say” (Sanger and Schmitt 2002).
compelling security threat but also on the successful presentation of the efficacy of its solution. As I will argue in chapter five, Saddam Hussein was extremely demonized to the point that he had no significant support within the international community. No actors argued that Hussein was allowed to have weapons of mass destruction or the he ruled Iraq democratically. Rather, the international community’s major questions were about the speed of the process of disarming Hussein, the sequence and length of each step and the types of measures involved.

Only a ‘short and quick’ would match a specific constitution of Iraq that required military action. These attributes promoted a favorable presentation of the war that downplayed concerns about both the use of force and the very constitution of Iraq as an immediate threat. War, as the solution, was constituted simultaneously with the construction of Iraq as an existential threat. ‘Short war’ as an essential component of the securitizing actor’s ‘problem-solution’ package, which competed with other problem-solution packages that mainly proposed non-military solutions for the question of Iraq. As early as November 2002, after several war-planning meetings with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the commander of American forces in the Persian Gulf, General Tommy Franks, President Bush decided to carry out the war with a large number of troops (2002: 1). New York Times journalists described the situation: “[…] as the United Nations weapons inspectors prepare to fly to Iraq, the American military is moving into a new phase of positioning logistical forces that military officials say are significant indicators of a movement toward war” (ibid). The Bush administration’s practice on Iraq does not show a linear escalation of Iraq; rather, it shows two ‘problem-solution’ packages competing for distinct constructions of Iraq. Thus, the simultaneous construction of threat and its proper solution(s) are constitutive elements of a successful securitizing move.
Simultaneously, the implementation of this ‘problem-solution’ can be viewed as a means of managing time. In a speech to Americans in October 2002, elaborating upon his position on Iraq, President Bush mentioned that “The time for denying and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must disarm or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him” (*New York Times*, October 8, 2002). This determination was repeated in a radio speech, on November 9, 2002, in which Bush said, “Iraq can be certain that the old game of cheat-and-retreat, tolerated at other times, will no longer be tolerated” (Sanger, Schmitt et al. 2002).

President Bush contrasted two solutions for the question of Iraq, one of which was fast and decisive, and the other sluggish and uncertain. He argued that “After 11 years during which we've tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon” (*New York Times*, 2002).
October 8, 2002). Thus, Bush demanded that the U.N. Security Council set out “tough immediate requirements”, or he would build a coalition to do so.

However, within the UN Security Council, this contrast between a long and uncertain process and decisive, short and certain action was challenged by some actors, such as the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin. He argued that UN pressure on Iraq was showing “real progress” (Slevin and Lynch 2003). Warning against “premature military action”, de Villepin said, “No one can assert today that the path of war will be shorter than that of the inspections […] No one can claim either that it might lead to a safer, more just and more stable world” (ibid).

Responding to the same concern of ‘a safer world’, some actors considered war from a different view. From this view, the question of war is not a matter of right and wrong but a problem of costs and benefits. Nicholas D. Kristof’s article (2003) in the New York Times is an exemplar representative of the perspective that reduces war to a matter of cost-benefit analysis. Making a distinction between “lofty principles” and “on-the-ground dangers”, he argued that “There’s no moral tenet that makes me oppose invasion. If we were confident that we could oust Saddam with minimal casualties and quickly establish a democratic Iraq, then that would be fine – and such a happy scenario is conceivable. But it’s a mistake to invade countries based on best-case scenarios” (ibid: 21, added italics).

In October 2002, the U.S. Army began to prepare for a possible military action by deploying headquarters staffs to Kuwait and Qatar. “Defense officials said the deployment order will help shorten the time required to mount an invasion of Iraq should president Bush decide to attack” (Graham 2002). From a military perspective, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney
said, “I am very confident that with rapid dominance, we will take down Saddam very quickly
[…] Clearly, the air war – since we are 10 times more effective in the air than we were in Desert
Storm 1 – will be a shorter war, particularly with the simultaneity of ground forces” (Loeb 2003).

Such expert opinions sold the war as a desirable choice. In another news article, in March 2003,
the Washington Post reported that “After more than a year of intense work, the Bush
administration’s plan for an assault on Iraq is essentially in place and is based on an unusual
approach that envisions simultaneous air and ground operations combining the U.S. advantages
in firepower, speed and precision, according to several people familiar with the strategy” (2003:
A01, added italics). General Myers’s presentation of the war, in his breakfast meeting with
reporters, as “a short conflict that minimizes civilian casualties, and […] might end before there
is a battle for Baghdad” (Ricks 2003), was in line with the efforts of the Bush administration to
present this war as preferable to a lengthy diplomatic process.

Thus, although the discussion about the length of the war was not presented as an ethical
dilemma, such as the conduct of the war materialized in the notion of ‘precision’, because of its
role in persuading the audience and garnering support for war, it had important ethical
consequences. The talk of war by different actors brought up the experience of Vietnam in
different ways. Among anti-war activists, Vietnam War veterans and anti-Vietnam War activists
joined together to oppose the Bush administration’s talk of war and the idea of a war in Iraq.

Indeed, the Vietnam War is a time reckoning point in the American security discourse. The size
of anti-war protests and the engagement of young people in American foreign policy were
compared to the Vietnam War period. The talk of war by the Bush administration was received
as a possible attempt to prepare for an undeclared war, as had occurred with Vietnam (e.g.

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40 For the news coverage of the protests see New York Times, October 7, 2002 and December 1, 2002.
Marquis 2002). Moreover, Vietnam War symbols, such as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, were used by anti-war protesters (Clemetson 2002) and President Bush (Sanger and Bumiller 2002) to warn people about the emergence of another painful experience and instigate patriotism, respectively.

The Vietnam legacy, more than anything else, is reminiscent of a long war with thousands of casualties. The construction of a ‘short’ and ‘quick’ war was meant to nullify the effects of anti-war activists’ warnings that the President would mire the nation in a long war in Iraq. Media coverage of the Iraq War, a few weeks prior to the outbreak of war, similarly implied hope for a short war in Iraq. For instance, some news articles investigated how the deployment of troops from military towns around the U.S. deeply impacted local businesses that relied on the military staff. News articles reporting on these types of situations gave the impression that communities hoped that the Iraq mission would be ‘a short one’ (Sanchez 2003).

However, a more significant endorsement for the war came from Wall Street. Wall Street indexes reacted positively to the course of events in March 2003, a few days before the invasion of Iraq. An interesting interpretation of this market growth was offered by Alex Berenson in his article in the *New York Times* that argued, “Investors appeared to be responding to progress toward war and the rising hope that the conflict would be brief” (Berenson 2003: 1, added *italics*). Berenson observed that this optimism is a result of “The last gulf war [that] resulted in a quick, decisive victory for the United States, lower oil prices and a strong rally in stocks. Investors appear to believe that even if this war is not quite as successful, it will be better than seemingly endless wrangling over whether to continue inspections for weapons of mass destruction” (ibid, added *italics*). Berenson weighed the benefits of a quick solution, i.e. a *brief*
war, against a long diplomatic process for the question of Iraq and argued that market forces preferred a decisive action to a long process.

To support his argument, Berenson relied on the words of an equity strategist at J.P. Morgan Private Bank: “What Wall Street really fears is uncertainty” (ibid). The interesting point in this argument is that war is interpreted as producing certainty while a diplomatic solution is understood as ‘endless wrangling’. However, Berenson failed to explain how a war, even if “it is not quite successful”, can create certainty. This argument, reflecting the general feelings of Wall Street, in fact, prefers the path of war to a diplomatic solution. The war is even interpreted as an element that would result in more growth in the market. However, some people in Wall Street, such as William H. Gross from Pacific Investment Management, believed that with a quick war, “If the war goes well, and if the economy catches a bit, it won’t be strong, and six months later we’ll be back in the same slow-growth soup that we are right now”, eventually resulting in higher interest and inflation rates (ibid).

In another article in the financial section, on the same day, Peter Behr interpreted the drop in oil prices in the same manner. In his article, “Oil Prices Drop on Iraq Hopes; Traders Think Fast War Could Leave Wells Intact”, he argued “Oil prices fell slightly yesterday on traders’ cautious expectations for a quick U.S. military triumph in Iraq that would leave most of that country’s oil production intact” (Behr 2003: E01, added italics). From a different perspective, some American industries, such as the telecommunications equipment industry, were hoping for a “quick Iraq war” followed by an American-led reconstruction of the country (Romero 2003).

Within the American government, the idea of a short war seemed to alleviate concerns about the costs of the war. A few months before the war, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office and
the House Budget Committee concluded that “a short, decisive war involving the deployment of 250,000 U.S. troops could cost between $44 billion and $60 billion” while “A protracted war, by contrast, could cost upward of $100 billion” (Dobbs 2002). Hence, the design of a short war was an important factor in garnering support in Congress, especially among those members who were particularly concerned about the costs of the war.

The planning of a short war was a crucial element of the Bush administration’s policy to garner support from allies. Charles Grant, from the Centre for European Research, remarked on this problem with regard to Bush’s closest ally, Tony Blair, “If there’s not second resolution and the war is anything other than short, sharp and bloodless, he’ll be in serious trouble” (Cowell 2003: 1, added italics). American allies in the Middle East had the same problems. Most of Iraq’s neighbors seemed to be prepared to support a military campaign in Iraq provided that it was perceived as enforcing United Nations’ demands. Along with other conditions, such as the U.S. commitment to control the situation after the occupation of Iraq, American allies also wanted to confident that an American military campaign would “be short and carried out with the fewest civilian casualties” (Gordon and MacFarquhar 2002).

However, some requirements of the optimum plan for a short war were not achieved due to resistance from allies in the Middle East. American officials unsuccessfully tried to convince Turkey to grant them a base for a northern front “because it would make any war shorter and less costly in casualties” (Filkins 2003). The lack of optimum cooperation from some allies, including Saudi Arabia, impacted the war plans for Iraq. It forced war planners to plan for “[…] the quick capture of land within Iraq, which would be used as bases to funnel American forces deeper into the country” (Sanger, Schmitt et al. 2002). More importantly, it was believed that a
quick war in Iraq could help the Bush administration to effectively manage its damaged relations with its traditional allies that did not support the use of force against Iraq.

Planning a ‘short’ and ‘quick’ war may be understood as an essential element in the success of the Bush administration’s securitizing move. In order to present war as the desirable solution, they needed to consider important limits, such as oil reserves, as well as the interests of other actors in the securitization process. Since the administration had already considered this time element in its planning of the war, its planning ought to be understood in the broader context of the *habitus* of security making. For military commanders, notions of ‘short’ and ‘quick’ signify their professional capability and competence. To a broader audience, these notions are reminiscent of important values of modern society such as efficiency, certainty and decisiveness. In its public campaign on Iraq, the Bush administration presented its best picture of the war. This best picture may also be understood in comparison to a ‘protracted war’, which was the worst-case scenario. As Dana Milbank argued, “In the worst-case scenario, a protracted, messy war and rebuilding in Iraq lead to mass U.S. and Iraqi civilian casualties, more terrorism at home, an oil crisis, radicalization of the Middle East and the fall of friendly governments, and an isolated and disliked United States whose alliances -- even highly valued free-trade arrangements -- disintegrate” (Milbank 2003).

Eventually, this long race between the securitizing actor and resistance forces bore fruit and the Bush administration was able to convince different actors that its short war, rather than a diplomatic solution, could better serve their interests. As Bromvich observed, “From half a year of proselytizing on the necessity of preemptive war, most Americans came to favor the war in Iraq, provided the fighting could be *short and the losses low*” (2003: 8, added *italics*). However, in the beginning of the war, “Mr. Bush sought to tamp down expectations of a quick victory with
few casualties by warning that the battles in the days ahead ‘could be longer and more difficult than some predict’” (Sanger and Burns 2003). Ari Fliescher also “cautioned that ‘Americans ought to be prepared for loss of life’”. He noted that while the White House sought “as precise, short a conflict as possible”, the unknowns […] were numerous” (ibid).

Time has remained an undertheorized question in security studies. Although ST itself disputes naturalness and atemporality of insecurity, its use of speech act results in an understanding of ‘security’ as an atemporal sign. This chapter argued for a temporally informed analysis of security that by situating securitization in its social context prevents us from reifying securitization. On a practical level, it helps observers to identify securitization from other forms of social practices by means of their different tempos.
Chapter Three: Intelligence

Introduction
Presenting the escalation of Iraq in September 2002, as an apolitical move, Dick Cheney explained on a radio show, “What’s happening, of course, is we’re getting additional information that, in fact, [Hussein] is reconstituting his biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs and that’s what really precipitates the concern now” (in Milbank 2002, added *italics*).

I believe four major developments signified the beginning of this campaign. First, the president hosted a group of congressional leaders in order to present his case on Iraq. They were given a classified briefing by Donald Rumsfeld supporting the president’s case. The president’s promise to seek congressional approval was followed by the second development, that was an ‘intelligence leak’ (Gordon and Miller 2002) asserting that Iraq continued to pursue nuclear weapons by buying aluminum tubes for its uranium enrichment program. Third, later, on September 12, 2002, the White House published “A Decade of Deception and Defiance” (Bush 2002). According to that document, it served “as a background paper for President George W. Bush’s September 12th speech to the United Nations General Assembly.” The fourth event was President Bush presented his case on Iraq to the United Nations.

I argue that those four developments were deeply engaged with the question of evidence/intelligence; they were either related to intelligence or supported by intelligence. The administration tried to present its case on Iraq as an inevitable response to new developments and
the growing threat of Saddam Hussein. Seeking to persuade a vast audience, among them Congress and foreign allies, that it was time to go to war, as Dana Priest and Joy Warrick observed, Bush administration officials indicated that their strongest case rested on evidence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program and its efforts to develop ballistic missiles to launch them beyond its borders (Priest and Warrick 2002).

Similarly, in London, “Prime Minister Tony Blair announced this conviction that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, is ready to use them against other nations, and soon will have nukes as well” (Kinsley 2002). However, as Kinsley observed, both Bush and Blair were reluctant to elaborate on what they knew about Iraq. According to Kinsley, when President Bush was asked by a reporter why Blair offered ‘no evidence,’ Bush answered, “To protect sources” (in ibid.). Kinsley argued that “Much of what our leaders know about Iraq’s military capacities and intentions can’t be revealed. So how is a citizen of a democracy supposed to decide the most important question any nation must decide: Should we go to war?” (ibid.).

As the story of Iraq shows, telling the story of insecurity does not go totally unchallenged; rather, it is very likely to face challenges from the audience – especially those with authoritative claims over that process: ‘What is your evidence? Where is you proof?’ The likelihood of success for an individual case of securitization depends greatly on presenting itself as an, or perhaps the, inevitable response to such evidence or proof. The securitizing actor may mobilize different narratives to cope with the challenge of evidence. However, no narrative has the authoritative power of the spooks – that puts, or maintains, the securitizing actor in a privileged social position higher than other actors: ‘We know something about this problem that you don’t know; and we

41 I think it is difficult to imagine a consensus among different social actors over the ‘the-ness’ of this the. Although the securitizing actor presents his solution as the solution to the problem, there might be other actors who perceive that solution as one solution among others. Eventually, the is constituted as a result of inevitability.
can’t disclose it to you!’ The term intelligence itself can arouse curiosity and catch the attention of other actors, especially journalists, in regard to the problem at stake.

Evidence was a major element in the constitution of Iraq. The examined media coverage of Iraq shows that the audience, including journalists, expected the Bush administration, as the securitizing actor, to provide them with the required evidence to substantiate its claims about Iraq. The demand for ‘concrete evidence’ was an important site of resistance against the securitization of Iraq. Debates about evidence continued even after the invasion of Iraq in some cases, such as Joseph C. Wilson’s op-ed in the New York Times (Wilson 2003) in which he argued that President Bush, in his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, misinterpreted the intelligence on the Iraqi regime’s attempt to purchase uranium from Niger. Wilson’s arguments and the subsequent Plamegate affair in July 2003 raised serious questions about the credibility of the evidence and its use for substantiating the threat of Iraq due to its development and possession of weapons of mass destruction.

A commonsensical approach to evidence in securitization perceives evidence as a form of objective and less political, or even apolitical, knowledge that is, preferably, produced outside of the process of securitization. Evidence supports securitization best when it is perceived as inducing that process. In other words, evidence, as some form of (objective) knowledge, may be deployed to constitute the inevitability of certain actions, among them securitization. However, intelligence itself may or may not trigger securitization. Media coverage of Iraq showed that

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42 Intelligence in the media does not necessarily imply secrecy; it simply refers to some facts and information produced by other sources. However, by naming it ‘intelligence,’ certain actors avoid giving such proof to their audience. For instance, Warren Hoge (2002) examined Tony Blair’s claim that a “massive amount” of new intelligence suggested the weakening of Saddam Hussein’s regime. After quoting Blair, who said, “They are rattled, they are weakening, we are getting a massive amount of intelligence out of there now as to what is happening in Iraq and that is why we have to keep up the pressure every inch of the way,” Hoge added, “Mr. Blair did not elaborate on the intelligence indicating that Mr. Hussein’s power has been shaken” (ibid.).
social actors, among them journalists, experts and some members of Congress, begged the Bush administration for that kind of knowledge.

However, the administration was well suited with a great deal of latitude to escape this demand. Perhaps the administration’s very act of labeling such evidence ‘intelligence,’ which connotes a notion of secrecy, entitled the administration to avoid disclosing that information to other actors. From this view, intelligence is the property of the state and the president identifies him/herself as the person in charge of this property. In such a situation, other actors have no choice but to ‘trust’ the president’s judgment about the question of evidence.43 Therefore, the fascinating point about ‘intelligence’ is that while it was the mainstay of the Bush administration’s case against Iraq, the administration did not feel obliged to ‘disclose’ it.44 In other words, by the intelligization of evidence, the administration attempted to take away the necessity of evidence from the debate on Iraq.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that the administration totally ignored the question of evidence. Rather, I believe the administration’s practice on Iraq offers an invaluable case for the politics of substantiation and evidence in securitization. It shows some possibilities as to how the securitizing actor may be able to manage the dearth, or even the absence, of evidence – by producing an excess of knowledge in some other ways45 as well as transforming commonsense

43 Some actors expressed their discontent about this situation. Among them, for instance, Scott Ritter, the ex-Marine and former U.N. arms inspector, in his Veterans Day talk at the University of Maryland described Congress as “uninformed” and said, “It’s like going to a doctor who says you have a brain tumor and that he needs to chop off your head so he can dig it out. You say, ‘Wait, that’s kind of extreme. May I see the X-rays?’ And the doctor says, ‘Don’t worry about X-rays. Just trust me on this’” (in Milloy 2002).
44 As Kinsley argues, when citizens asking for that intelligence, “The official government answer is “Don’t worry your pretty little heads about it” (ibid).
45 For instance, as George Tenet described intelligence estimates about ‘Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction’ in 2002, “They never said there was an “imminent” threat. Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policymakers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests” (Tenet 2004). In the absence of ‘evidence’ on Iraq’s weapons of mass
understandings of intelligence. However, in contrast to rest of this project, due to the special character of ‘intelligence,’ this chapter considers secondary sources, hindsight and postmortem analyses of evidence in the securitization of Iraq. I believe an examination of pre-war intelligence is necessary to better understand how the agency of intelligence is located in the broader space of security making, the *habitus* of the fields of intelligence professionals and their relations with policymakers. However, in contrast to such analyses of pre-war intelligence, an examination of the practice of the intelligence community *as it happened* will remain at the center of my attention.

**Intelligence and the War with Iraq**

Intelligence was a very controversial aspect of the 2003 war with Iraq. There is a vast literature about the so-called Iraq ‘intelligence failure’ that investigates the role of intelligence in this case. However, as I discuss below, the use of ‘failure’ to describe the contribution of the intelligence community to the securitization of Iraq has significant political consequences for understanding this particular case and the role of intelligence in securitization in general. With regard to the case of Iraq, in particular, this notion of ‘failure’ has been deployed to extenuate the complexity of the agency of securitization to the intelligence community and, subsequently, blame the failure of politics on the absence of ‘correct’ intelligence. The notion of failure, moreover, builds upon the ideal type of intelligence and intelligence production. It tries to measure how much the intelligence community deviated from its ideals in that process. In their pathological examination of the problem, different investigators and authors, from different perspectives, observed certain problems in the processing of intelligence about Iraq; among them, cognitive problems (Heuer 2005, Jervis 2006), “analytical shortcomings” (Silberman and Robb 2004) and ‘shoddy analysis’

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destruction, the vilification of Saddam Hussein and especially his use of chemical weapons in the past, constituting conditions of possibility that he still may have pursued production of such weapons, filled that gap.
Postmortem analyses of the Iraq intelligence failure are entangled with different interests in the production and consumption of intelligence. On the one hand, various reports, such as that of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), argue that the intelligence and intelligence production were faulty and politicized. On the other hand, some intelligence professionals, such as Melvin Goodman and W. Patrick Lang, defended the intelligence community by claiming that intelligence analysts were pressured by influential members of the Bush administration, among them Dick Cheney and his chief of staff, Scooter Libby, to produce favorable reports and intelligence estimates on Iraq. Further, the establishment of the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense by Donald Rumsfeld, headed by Douglas Feith, has been evaluated as a means of bypassing the CIA. Reducing the war with Iraq to a matter of intelligence failure, indeed, has been warmly welcomed by the broader agency of securitizing Iraq. In the United States, “Democrats could shield themselves from the unfortunate consequences of supporting the war by blaming intelligence, but doing so would also shield the Bush administration by treating it as the innocent victim of intelligence incompetence” (Jervis 2006: 6). However, this would not

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46 Some articles in the news coverage of the examined period realized the gaps in the phase of gathering intelligence about Iraq. Among them, for instance, see Richard S. Leghorn’s argument on the necessity of certain types of intelligence to support disarmament (New York Times, November 17, 2002). His argument will be discussed later in this chapter.

47 For instance, “To some in the CIA, it looked like the vice president himself was determined to control the content of the NIE. Both Cheney and Scooter Libby had made about 10 trips to CIA headquarters, where they personally questioned analysts” (in Kirk, M. et al 2008). W. Patrick Lang, a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer, also mentions that “Many, many of them [CIA officers] have told me they were pressured. And there are a lot of ways. Pressure takes a lot of forms (in ibid. transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/etc/script.html).
make Democrats stop blaming the administration for the faulty and ‘politiciazed’ intelligence.
Intelligence failure, as well as politicization or manipulation of intelligence shows the extent of
the influence of intelligence and its authority in securitization.

**Intelligence: Policymaking and Public Campaign**
In a simplified picture, the relationship between intelligence and policy may range from
‘intelligence instigating policy,’ which assumes intelligence before policy, to ‘tying intelligence
to policy,’ which describes a situation in which intelligence is used to justify a policy. An
extreme understanding of the former may assume policy makers as *tabula rasa*, with no prior
knowledge of the problem at stake, whose perception is shaped by relevant intelligence. From
this view, problems are brought to policy makers, and intelligence, as a form of future-oriented
knowledge, has a crucial role in foretelling policy problems, especially those of security matters.
As mentioned above, the Bush administration tried to present the problem of Iraq as such.
However, after the coalition forces failed to find the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, as the most prominent figures of this war, in separate
statements mentioned that they would have invaded Iraq anyway, if they had known the ‘truth’
about Hussein’s WMD program. Despite the disclosure of the ‘truth’ about Iraq, they repeated
that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant who pursued weapons of mass destruction and that sanctions
and inspections could only slow down that process. Nevertheless, the Bush administration and
other supporters of war were at times not shy about ‘shifting the blame’ to the intelligence
community for its failure. Such statements indicate the existence of a strong preference or belief
that was impermeable to other forms of knowledge, including intelligence. In such a situation, intelligence is only deployed to support certain policies.\(^48\)

Even if intelligence was indeed not necessary to convince President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to use force against Iraq or to satisfy their biases about the question of Iraq, ‘intelligence’ was necessary in order to support their case. In other words, ‘intelligence’ impacted the overall agency of securitization and especially those who required strong reasons for the use of force. As Jervis (2006: 7) has observed,

> Intelligence might have strongly contributed to the policy even if Bush and Blair are accurately describing their own preferences because the reluctance of many members of the Labour Party, Democrats, and perhaps Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was overcome only by the belief that the Iraqi dictator had growing WMD capability.

As Jervis also argues, intelligence is consumed by different actors in different ways.\(^49\) This heterogeneity of the interests of consumers along with the heterogeneity of the intelligence community, as I argue later, adds to the complexity of intelligence-policy relations. This situation becomes even more complex when one considers the various types of intelligence and the process of producing intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identifies five types of intelligence in its operations: current; estimative; warning; research; and scientific and technical. Among them, ‘warning,’ by drawing policymakers’ attention to new priorities, is more likely than the others to trigger a process of securitization. Intelligence agencies in many cases respond to the needs of policymakers for intelligence in five steps: planning and direction;

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\(^{48}\) This pessimistic perception of Saddam Hussein was apparently prevalent among political actors and the intelligence community. The problem of preexisting biases resistant to new knowledge was diagnosed as one of the main problems of pre-Iraq war intelligence. This situation has been described by Jervis as ‘cognitive dissonance,’ in that actors tried to justify their ‘foolish policy’ by highlighting the weight of certain factors. As Sielberman observes, certain biases about Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction deeply influenced the production of intelligence about Iraq.

\(^{49}\) The primary job of the intelligence community is “to provide intelligence for the National Command Authority – that is, the president, the cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff – and for the Congress” (Johnson 1989: 38).
collection; processing; analysis and production; and dissemination. Therefore, the priorities of intelligence agencies are usually set by policymakers. However, Arthur Hulnick (2006) argues that the idea of a ‘cycle’ and its clear-cut steps fail to capture the complexity of processing intelligence. He, instead, argues for more complex relations between actors, flow of information, and coincidence among steps.

Therefore, in the examination of intelligence and policy one should consider this complexity of relations between different spatial positions at certain moments within and among these two distinct fields of actors. However, this distinction may be disturbed by policy makers through other means of producing required knowledge/evidence for their decisions. In the case of Iraq in particular, the Bush administration, and particularly Donald Rumsfeld, neutralized the intelligence community to a great extent by establishing the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense. Although different policy makers may produce or obtain their required information from different sources, in the context of American politics, production of ‘intelligence’ rests within the authority of the ‘Intelligence Community.’

Despite this institutional distinction, considering such complex relations, obscure boundaries of intelligence and other forms of knowledge in policy making, the processes of producing intelligence and making policies penetrate each other’s space in different ways. While priorities make the intelligence community focus on certain areas at the cost of ignoring some others, intelligence may influence the process of policy making by prompting the adoption of certain policies at the cost of abandoning some other alternatives. The Bush administration, by using such spaces of in-between as ‘Team B’ and the Office of Special Plans, began to produce semi-intelligence to

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50 Such distinction is recognized by the Government of the United States. See Inspector General of the United States (Defense 2007).
support its case against Saddam Hussein. Before addressing such issues, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the practice of journalists with regard to intelligence and policy.

**The Intelligence and National Intelligence Estimate**

**Alternative Intelligence**

Evidence was generated in/for the Bush administration in two separate ways: official assessments of the Intelligence Community and ‘alternative’ intelligence assessments. In September 2002, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith established “a non-Intelligence Community source of intelligence analysis”\(^{51}\) headed by Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Levin 2004). \(^{52}\)

Upon the request of Senator Levin in September 2005, the Office of Inspector General in the Department of Defense reviewed the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy including the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group and Policy Support Office. The Office of Inspector General, in its February 9, 2007 report, concluded that “The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers” (Defense 2007: ii). However, the Review does not evaluate those actions as illegal or

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\(^{51}\) The Office of Under Secretary of Defense introduced this entity, and its purpose, as “[…] response to tasking by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who in July 2002 directed his Special Assistant in his front office and two staff members in OUSD(P) to critique IC [Intelligence Community] reporting on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. The result was a draft briefing on how those contacts might be viewed if one did not assume \textit{a priori} that secular Baathists and Islamic extremists would never cooperate” (OUSD(P) 2007: 4). However, OUSD(P) replaced that assumption with its own assumption that since Iraq and al-Qaeda are both enemies of the U.S. they \textit{must} cooperate (see Mitchell 2006: 155). Ryan also argues that the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was followed by the CIA in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, “designed an ‘hypothesis-based analysis’ which started with a preferred scenario and then found data that might support that. In effect, it was a worst-case scenario presented as a probability” (2006).

\(^{52}\) Some senior CIA officers and members of the intelligence community believe that Dick Cheney distrusted the CIA for “They had been wrong about the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iranian revolution, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, and more” (Kirk, Gilmore \textit{et al} 2006). Further, the CIA did not support Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction (see ibid., and Kirk, Gilmore \textit{et al} 2004).
Unauthorized, but “[...] inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community [...] As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide “the most accurate analysis of intelligence” to senior decision-makers” (ibid.).

In its response to the draft of Inspector General’s report, although the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not recognize its activities as producing intelligence, in practice it became the source of intelligence for the administration. As Senator Carl Levin observed

Although Administration officials cited classified intelligence in support of their statements about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, their statements did not accurately reflect the intelligence assessment provided in classified reports to the Executive Branch and Congress by the IC. Administration officials were apparently using intelligence analyses that originated outside of the IC. Those intelligence analyses claiming a close relationship were produced by the office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and presented to high level Administration officials. Vice President Cheney specifically stated that the Feith analysis was the “best source of information” (2004: 5-6)

In practice, especially regarding the alleged relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, the administration relied on this ‘alternative intelligence’ produced outside of the Intelligence Community. Gordon R. Mitchell (2006) described the provision of this misleading intelligence as “Team B Intelligence Coup.” Mitchell seeks the origin of the Iraq intelligence failure in a

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53 The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense commented on the draft of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DoD) in January 2007. Among other comments, it disputes the notions of ‘intelligence’ and ‘inappropriate.’ It argues that “The report’s interpretation of the definition of “Intelligence Activities” found in the relevant DoD directive is wrong. By its definition, that term on its face applies only to intelligence agencies, not to policy offices” (p. 5). It argues that the Review ‘stretched’ the definition of ‘intelligence activities’ to include ‘policy offices.’ Thus, the Office denied that it engaged itself in the production of intelligence about the Iraq-al Qaeda connection (see p. 5).

54 As I quoted above, the Inspector General of the DoD realized this “variance.” However, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense responded, “But the senior decision-makers briefed on this work (one of whom was the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] himself) did not need to be told that it varied in some respects from IC analysis; that was inescapably obvious” (2007: 5). However, as Levin observed, “the IC never had the opportunity to defend its analysis, nor point out problems with Department of Defense’s “alternative” view of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship when it was presented to the policymakers at the White House” (Levin 2004: 24).
1976 Team B exercise and the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report on ballistic missile threats. Beyond the problems of the intelligence community, he argues that this failure “[…] involved subversion of the competitive intelligence analysis process, where unofficial intelligence boutiques “stovepipe” misleading intelligence assessments directly to policy-makers and undercut intelligence community input that ran counter to the White House’s preconceived preventive war of choice against Iraq” (ibid: 144). He argues that these ‘peripheral shops,’ largely independent of the official intelligence community structure, are the locus of the Iraq intelligence failure. “One such boutique was the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), a Pentagon cell established shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The PCTEG was formed after White House political leaders rejected official intelligence community threat assessments of Iraq as too conservative” (2006: 145).

This alternative intelligence analysis by the Department of Defense, as Levin argues, “[…] neatly fit the Administration’s desire to build a strong case for an invasion of Iraq” while the Intelligence Community was skeptical about the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda (2004: 6). Mitchell understands the establishment of the Iraqi intelligence cell within the Department of Defense as a measure put forward by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith to tailor intelligence to policy (2006: 152). This cell adopted an ‘alarmist methodology’ in producing intelligence and criticized intelligence analysts for their juridical understanding of evidence (ibid: 155). A number of administration members relied on the evidence produced by this office and publicly commented on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship.

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55 Mitchell presents a story of the creation of Team B. In 1975 George H. W. Bush, the newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence approved a novel study of the Soviet Union strategy. In this study a team of insider analysts, Team A, were provided with classified intelligence data and had to participate in a debate with a team of outsiders, Team B, that had to conduct an independent assessment of the problem by using the same data set. During the debate, Team A and Team B reached very different conclusions regarding intensity, scope and likelihood of the threat. “Specifically, in formulating its predictions Team B looked beyond “hard” evidence of Soviet military capabilities and focused more on “soft” evidence derived from perceptions regarding Soviet intentions” (2006: 148).
Dick Cheney, for instance, said in an interview that he could not make a “specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11,” but he stated that intelligence reports after September 11 have documented “a number of contacts over the years” (Allen 2002). Considering that the Intelligence Community was skeptical about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship and found no evidence supporting the claim, Carl Levin believed that the administration’s opinion on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship was shaped by this alternative intelligence produced by Douglas Feith’s office (see Levin 2004).

The practice of this inner circle can be described best as cuckoo intelligence production. This group of actors could nest in the intelligence community, although not officially an entity of the Intelligence Community, and generate intelligence-like products and analyses about Saddam Hussein, his weapons of mass destruction and connections with terrorism. The PCTEG, including the same people as the 1976 Team B and 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, adopted the same methodology and approach in the production of intelligence analysis. However, this time, “…unlike 1976, they were firmly entrenched in the corridors of power. Control over the levers of White House bureaucracy enabled Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to embed a Team B intelligence exercise – a stealth coup staged by one arm of the government against the other” (Mitchell 2006: 153).

**Intelligence Community**

In order to understand intelligence as a social product, one needs to recognize the Intelligence Community as the field in which intelligence is produced. The structure of this field also impacts...

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56 American media, apparently independently, promoted the administration’s claim about the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. For instance, ABC News’ Prime Time broadcasted an interview with Parisoula Lampsos, who alleged she was Hussein’s mistress for 30 years and that “the Iraqi president met twice with bin Laden and in 1996 gave him money” (Kirk, Gilmore et al 2004). The role of media was particularly important in this regard because later in front of the 9/11 Commission, Dick Cheney admitted, “We have never been able to prove that there was a connection there on 9/11.” Although they implied that relationship, the media favored the administration’s claim by repeating it from a different source.
its relations with other actors. For instance, while in the United States intelligence leaders are publicly known, in the United Kingdom heads of MI5 and MI6 were concealed until the 1990s (Hewitt and Lucas 2009: 106). The fact that “[…] we know more about the American intelligence community than almost any other,” Richard Aldrich argues, “is commonly assumed to reflect a written constitution that provides journalists wishing to write about intelligence with a remarkable degree of formal protection” (2009: 18). Besides, “In contrast to most other national communities, where the senior figures tend to be intelligence officers with a lifetime of service, in the United States, political figures are often appointed at the top” (2009: 18). This situation, Aldrich argues, results in more competition and more ‘turf-fights’ between intelligence agencies over the budget. As a side effect of this situation, “The press has often been the happy beneficiary of these Beltway Battles that have spilled onto the front pages of American newspapers. Inter-agency rivalry is a frequent cause of intelligence agencies briefing against each other” (ibid: 18).

Complexity is another important element in the architecture of the American Intelligence Community. While the term ‘community’ implies a sense of coherence, Michael A. Turner argues that “The distinguishing characteristics of the U.S. intelligence community are decentralization and fragmentation, with only a degree of cohesion” (Turner 2005: 16-17). In addition to legal reasons, Turner (2005: 17) argues that political concerns about a ‘central secret police’ and “a cultural preference for competition as a method of control” have contributed to this decentralization and fragmentation. Therefore, Turner believes that this situation makes interagency cooperation and communication very difficult.

Despite public, military and FBI opposition to establishing a central civilian organization, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 that resulted in the creation of the CIA.
However, considering its limited jurisdiction, “Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones asserts that the CIA may have been the politicians’ easiest option, in that it was the CIA’s very susceptibility to democratic debate that gave it its legitimacy and helped it to be effective politically – an agency imprisoned by democracy and subject to public debate” (in Turner 2005: 21).

However, despite its importance, this research has to put aside the question of such relations in favor of a concentration on the notions of the objectivity and authority of intelligence as the product of this field.57 Due to a shroud of secrecy that conceals the operations of this field from public eyes, we are usually unable to examine the functioning of this field during the process of securitization. However, intelligence itself is deployed as a rather innocent ‘object’ to support certain claims and justify certain decisions in the process of securitization. Therefore, a more urgent and feasible task is to challenge the ‘objectivity’ of intelligence as a form of knowledge about the problem at stake. Therefore, in this section I try to present an account of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), as ‘the most authoritative product’ of the American Intelligence Community, from the perspective of intelligence professionals.

Engaging the Department of Defense to intelligence business did not completely solve the Bush administration’s dependence on the Intelligence Community. The administration turned to the CIA when it was asked by Congress to provide them with an NIE on Iraq. Senator Bob Graham, a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence (2001-03), says that while the government prepares NIEs for significant activities, less important than getting ready for a war, the administration had not conducted such an examination of Iraq (in Kirk, Gilmore et al. 2008).

According to John Brennan, Deputy Executive Director of the CIA (2001-03), the White House

57 Among other sources, some of which are used in this chapter, two PBS documentaries, Bush’s War and The Dark Side (Kirk, Gilmore et al 2008; Kirk, Gilmore et al 2006) examined the question of Iraq in the context of the ‘war on terror’ with special attention on the production of intelligence. They elaborate on some relationships within and outside of the Intelligence Community and how they influenced the functioning of this field.
did not want an NIE on the problem because “[…] they didn’t want to allow any venting of whatever opposition there was to what they wanted to be the conventional wisdom on weapons of mass destruction” (in ibid). However, in order to garner congressional support, the administration had to get the CIA to create this report on Iraq.  

Ludwell Lee Montague (1971 [release 1992]) seeks the origins of the NIE in the events of WWII and the need for the centralization of all information in possession of the government, as well as for enhancing coordination within the American intelligence community. With regard to institutional developments that led to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, Montague mentions the role of external elements, such as the British experience of the Joint Intelligence Committee, in order to establish effective communication between different intelligence authorities. At the same time, those developments show some irritation among intelligence professionals. Montague says, “One can readily imagine how professional Army, Navy, and Foreign Service officers reacted to the idea that a lot of johny-come-lately professors would be telling the President what to think about political and strategic matters” (ibid). Thus, the NIE can be observed as a measure to create an authoritative voice for the intelligence community and establish a hierarchy of knowledge, especially about international and security matters, in the process of policy making. According to the CIA, “A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the

58 Although the Intelligence Community prepared the NIE on Iraq upon the request of the Senate, in an interview with Mother Jones in November 2004, Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, mentioned that “As early as the spring of 2002, the White House had called CIA representatives down to begin preparing what would be a public document to make the case that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, weapons that could be used on an immediate basis and therefore required pre-emptive action to eliminate” (Graham 2004).

59 By ‘johny-come-lately professors,’ Montague may be referring, especially, to advisers in the National Security Council. This comment shows a sense of competition between the intelligence community and the academic community. These two communities share similar goals of producing and sharing knowledge. Eventually, both communities strive to apply that knowledge. This similarity, or perhaps overlap, reveals itself in the form of cooperative, competitive and conflictive relationships.
most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence.”

As noted earlier, in order to better understand the overall products of the Intelligence Community, it is necessary to understand relations among actors within this Community and their relations with other social actors outside of this field. However, due to the scope of this project, as well as the limits of open sources, this chapter concentrates on an epistemological examination of intelligence and how it, as a type of knowledge, can influence the process of securitization. Montague’s genealogy of NIE shows an evolution in the meaning of intelligence as something ‘factual’ to an ‘estimative’ matter. However, he argues

Indeed, public comment shows that, even today [1971], most laymen regard us only as gatherers of information. The Press, which is itself a primitive intelligence organization, shows almost no comprehension of the function of estimating the meaning of the information gathered, apart from the expression of personal opinion by individual columnists whose “authority” varies with their personal prestige. (ibid)

Montague criticizes the narrow understanding of intelligence held by certain intelligence bodies, such as the Office of Naval Intelligence, as “Just the facts, man!” He continues that “Navy doctrine strongly held that it was not a function of Intelligence to estimate the meaning of the facts” (ibid). Intelligence gradually expanded to include analysis and interpretation of such facts as well as the estimation of intentions of actors, in addition to gathering facts.

Therefore, contrary to the common understanding of intelligence as ‘facts,’ as Montague argues, intelligence, the NIE in particular, is intended to give meaning to collected facts about a specific concern. The estimative nature, in turn, raises the problem of the accuracy of the NIE.

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Considering the ‘estimative’ character of the NIE, the problem of accuracy remains to be judged after the time span covered by the NIE has passed. However, Abbot E. Smith (1994) offers a more complex understanding of the accuracy of NIE. He argues that even in the future, one may not be able to check the accuracy of today’s estimate. He writes

[… ] we estimate that if the United States undertakes a given course of action the response of other countries will be such and such; but the United States never undertakes that action, and we never know whether we were right or wrong. There are of course a great number of “contingency” estimates, in sentences beginning: “if such and such happens, then so and so will probably follow.” But the contingency never occurs, and the estimate can never be objectively checked. (Smith 1994)

Adding to the complexity of accuracy, Smith mentions elements, such as the difficulty of distinguishing “between statements of estimate and statements of fact”; subtleties of language, such as the use of ‘possible’ and ‘probable’; and the fact that NIEs are “something more than collections of discrete statements” (ibid.). He adds, “[…] a great many convey their message by the context, or rather by the total text” (ibid). More importantly, he argues that

Sophisticated estimating indeed ought almost always to be something more than bald prediction. The course of events is seldom inevitable or foreordained, even though hindsight often makes it look that way. A good paper on a complicated subject should describe the trends and forces at work, identify the contingent factors or variables which might affect developments, and present a few alternative possibilities for the future, usually with some judgment as to the relative likelihood of one or another outcome. (ibid)

It seems that intelligence professionals are aware of the variable quality of their estimates; however, consumers of NIEs show a different understanding of this product. As W. Patrick Lang, a former Defense Intelligence Agency Officer, observes in the case of Iraq, “The National Intelligence Estimate becomes the truth accepted by the United States government” (in Kirk, Gilmore et al. 2008). Therefore, considering this crucial authority of intelligence, the Bush
administration found that a favorable NIE on Iraq could facilitate the establishment of legitimacy for the use of force in Iraq. Among the members of the administration, Dick Cheney and Scooter Libby followed the preparation of this report.

Due to the secrecy of the process of producing the NIE on Iraq, it is not possible for this research to assess the pressure by the Bush administration on the CIA and how it influenced that document. Although a favorable NIE could facilitate the administration’s business in Congress, regardless of the results, the NIE itself was not the ultimate goal. As mentioned earlier, the NIE is not a bald prediction; therefore, considering all possibilities, under normal conditions, it could not nullify the possibility, or even the probability, of an Iraqi program for weapons of mass destruction. As Smith observed in regard to the accuracy of the NIE, “What it comes to is this: a complete, objective, statistical audit of the validity of NIE’s [sic] is impossible, and even if it were possible it would provide not just verdict on how “good” these papers have been. Like the Bible, the corpus of estimates is voluminous and uneven in quality, and almost any proposition can be defended by citation from it” (Smith 1994, original italics).

Considering the complex construction of the NIE, different actors may develop different understandings of the document. John E. McLaughlin, former Vice Chairman for Estimates of the National Intelligence Council, observes a significant gap regarding the expectations between producers and consumers of NIEs. This gap is influenced, among other elements, by consumers’ understanding of predictive and future-oriented characteristics of the NIE and its claims about certainty and the reduction of uncertainty. McLaughlin argues that “Estimates are also unique in that they focus more consistently on future trend than most intelligence analysis and, in doing so, they strive to reduce the uncertainties for our policymakers on the most contentious issues facing them” (1996). He continues
We struggle constantly, for example, to balance the harried policymaker’s demand for brevity against our temptation to lay out all the evidence to support our often controversial judgment […] At the same time, we must balance the reader’s desire for clarity in judgment against the need to note the uncertainties, gaps, qualifiers, and alternative outcomes. (ibid)

Perhaps McLaughlin’s most fascinating observation is the existence of an epistemological difference between producers and consumers of NIEs. While consumers of the NIE intend to suppress public debate about the issue at stake and conclude a sense of certainty from the NIE, McLaughlin presents a very different understanding of the NIE. In his remarks before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1996, he said

When I was a very junior analyst some years ago, the country’s most senior practitioner of Estimates responded to my query about the purpose of the business by noting simply that it was about all to “raise the level of debate about the future”. His point was that controversy about Estimates is not necessarily bad, that intelligence Estimates (because they deal with the future) must never be portrayed as the last word or “revealed wisdom,” and that policymakers and intelligence analysts ultimately benefit from the very thorough airing of the issue. (ibid, added italics)

In contrast to this understanding of the future, and uncertainty of estimates, the administration, used the NIE to create a sense of certainty about the future regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In other words, certain administrative processes were used by the administration to close the future and its uncertainties and, at the same time, avoid public debate about the problem.

The National Intelligence Estimate October 2002
Sen. Bob Graham, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee (2001-2003), indicates that the Committee ordered George Tenet to prepare an estimate on Iraq. He claims that the Committee said, “This is the most important decision that we, as members of Congress, and that
the people of America are likely to make in the foreseeable future. We want to have the best understanding of what it is we’re about to get involved with” (in Kirk, Gilmore et al. 2008).

Following the order of the Committee, the CIA presented its “NIE-16HC October 2002: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”. As indicated in the title, the NIE judged that “[…] Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade” (CIA 2002: 5).

Among the judgments of this NIE, two claims are crucially important. They are

1. Most agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interests in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors – as well as Iraq’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools – provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.) (p. 6)

2. A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of “pure uranium” (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement. […] We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium and/or yellowcake from these sources [Niger, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo]. (p. 25)

Although in his “Statement on the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD,” George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence, tried to belittle the importance of the assertions of the 2002 NIE, ose assertions and downplay their weight in shaping the overall intelligence

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61 Also see Graham and Nussbaum 2004.
estimate on Iraq, it seems that they heavily influenced the NIE and, more importantly, Bush’s campaign on Iraq.

Regarding their influence on the NIE, as the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) explained its reservations about the question of the aluminum tubes

In INR’s view Iraq’s efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. (p. 9, added italics)

Therefore, it is obvious that at the time the NIE was being prepared, INR observed that the question of the tubes was a crucial element shaping the NIE. Regarding the acquisition of Uranium, the NIE mentioned that Iraq already possessed about “550 metric tons of yellowcake and low enriched uranium at Tuwaitha which is inspected annually by the IAEA” (National Intelligence 2002: 25). However, with regard to Iraq’s nuclear weapon in particular, the NIE estimated that “If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year” (ibid: 5, added italics), but “Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009 […]” (ibid: 6). Therefore, inserting a foreign source of Uranium dramatically increased the level of urgency of the problem.

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62 George Tenet tried to highlight these issues in his statement. In two bullet points, he explained. “• We note yet again that uranium acquisition was not part of this judgment. Despite all the focus in the media, it was not one of the six elements upon which the judgment was based. Why not? Because Iraq already had significant quantities of uranium. • Also it is noteworthy that although DOE assessed that the tubes probably were not part of Iraq’s nuclear program, DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway. Obviously, the tubes were not central to DOE’s view on reconstitution” (Tenet 2003, original italics).
Perhaps the major claim of the NIE of October 2002 regarding Iraq’s nuclear weapon program was the notion of ‘reconstitution.’ During the 1990s and early 2000s, the American intelligence community believed that although Iraq had retained the foundation for a nuclear program, it was not reconstituting its nuclear program (see SSCI 2004: 84-85). As indicated in its title, ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ the 2002 NIE signified a shift from that position. It concluded that “Baghdad began reconstituting its nuclear program shortly after the departure of UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998” (ibid: 85). Therefore, Iraq’s purchase of aluminum tubes and a foreign source of fissile material were the major elements that supported the notions of ‘reconstitution’ and ‘urgency’ in Iraq’s nuclear program, thus necessitating urgent action.

More importantly, of the many elements of the NIE, these two particularly controversial items made their way to the administration’s (public) campaign about Iraq. In Bush’s State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, in particular, he said

Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. […] The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

The SSCI’s meticulous examination of the 2002 NIE, and the question of the aluminum tubes in particular, shows that in spite of reasonable doubt about the use of those aluminum tubes in Iraq’s enrichment program, the opinions of INR and the DOE were marginalized in the NIE. Although there was not a consensus in the Intelligence Community, the CIA’s and DIA’s assessments of the tubes shaped the 2002 NIE on Iraq. More importantly, the Bush administration’s presentation of intelligence on Iraq did not reflect the existing debate in the intelligence community about the tubes. Rather, by making reference to intelligence and expert
opinion, it tried to garner support for its securitizing move. As it has been noted by the SSCI, the intelligence leak in the New York Times of September 13, 2002 suffered from the same problem: it never reflected the debate within the Intelligence Community on the issue.\footnote{The SSCI’s 2004 report on the 2002 NIE observed that “A September 13, 2002 New York Times article which discussed the IC debate about the aluminum tubes, noted that an administration official said, “… the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the CIA assessments.” The [redacted] contractors told Committee staff, however, that before September 16, 2002, they had not seen any of the intelligence data on the Iraqi tubes. DOE officials, including the Director of the Oak Ridge Field Intelligence Element, told Committee staff that the vast majority of scientists and nuclear experts at the DOE and the National Labs did not agree with the CIA’s analysis” (SSCI 2004: 94).}

**Pre-Iraq War Intelligence: Post-mortem Analysis**

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) began a formal review of U.S. intelligence on Iraq. In its report, “The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessment on Iraq” (July 9, 2004), it concluded that ‘the major key judgments in the NIE’ about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program “… either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting provided to the Committee” (2004: 14). The SSCI observed that the intelligence community had suffered from an ‘analytic bias,’ “a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.” It added

This “group think” dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs. This presumption was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and group think were not utilized. (2004: 18)

The committee regarded this issue as a chronic problem among intelligence analysts to overcome this analytic bias, that is, “to resist the tendency to see what they would expect to see in the intelligence reporting” (ibid: 18). In the case of Iraq in particular, the committee found that “... intelligence analysts, in many cases based their analysis more on their expectations than on an objective evaluation of the information in the intelligence reporting” (ibid: 18). The committee
suggested that the roots of this bias were in Iraq’s practice of hiding its WMD program in the 1980s and Iraq’s repeated lied about its WMD program.

The SSCI observed that “The Intelligence Community did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainty behind the judgments in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate” (2004: 16, added italics). The SSCI argued that a key failure of the intelligence community was “[…] to explain the details of the reporting and the uncertainties of both the reliability of some key sources and of intelligence judgment” (ibid: 16). It indicated that the intelligence community did not describe ‘the gaps in intelligence knowledge’ to policymakers. It argued, “Accurately and clearly describing the gaps in intelligence knowledge is not only important for policymakers to fully understand the basis for and gaps in analytic assessment, but is essential for policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches to make informed decisions about how and where to allocate Intelligence Community resources to fill those gaps” (ibid: 17).

In addition to analytical problems, the SSCI commented on the quality of intelligence collection. It observed that “… the Community had no sources collecting against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after 1998” (ibid.) Its report argued that “Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel” (ibid: 24). In several instances, it blamed the management for the intelligence failure prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Among these observations, it argued that “The Intelligence Community is not a level playing field when it comes to the competition of ideas in intelligence analysis” (ibid: 27). It criticized the CIA, in particular its management, which “… in several instances, abused its unique position in the Intelligence Community,
particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the Intelligence Community’s prewar analysis concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs” (ibid: 27).

Drawing on insights from the psychology of intelligence analysis, Richards J. Heuer (2005) evaluated the SSCI report. Heuer makes sense of the problem of intelligence failure in terms of ‘human cognitive limitations.’ Although Heuer agrees with the SSCI’s conclusion about the CIA’s failure to express the ‘degree of certainty and uncertainty’ in its conclusion, he disputes the committee’s conclusions about intelligence analysis and its assumptions. His first finding is that “occasional intelligence surprise is inevitable.”64 Thus, Heuer adds, “The SSCI and some other policymakers and members of the public need to adjust their expectations about what intelligence analysis can do” (ibid: 76). In other words, in contrast to policymakers’ expectation of an objective prediction of the future, intelligence analyses are not guaranteed to be more objective than other statements about the subject.

Heuer rejects the SSCI’s argument about the influence of assumptions. Specifically, he rejects the possibility of intelligence analysis without assumptions. He writes

> Most of the analytical problems identified by the Committee result from cognitive limitations that are inherent in intelligence analysis. When dealing with incomplete and ambiguous information, analysts do not start with a blank mind. They start with certain assumptions – often about foreign capabilities and intent – that have been developed through education, training, and experience. These assumptions inevitably form a mindset that influences what information the analyst sees and what information is judged reliable and relevant. The authors of the SSCI failed to recognize this. (ibid: 76)

Heuer correctly argues that no intelligence analysis is possible without assumptions and a certain mindset. It is the existence of such assumptions that shape the very identity of intelligence

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64 Mahnken (2005: 24), in a similar vein, argues that “… in truth, it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of being surprised because of the difficulty of shifting accurate “signals” of an impending attach from the sea of inaccurate or irrelevant “noise.”
information. Intelligence analysis, as with other forms of knowledge, is built upon assumption. Thus, an intelligence analysis free of assumptions would be a distorted view of intelligence.

John N. L. Morrison (2011) has examined the case of the UK and how cultural bias impacted the intelligence cycle, leading to an intelligence failure in regard to both Afghanistan and Iraq. He argues that this endemic problem, in the forms of mirror-imaging, transferred judgment and preservation, damaged the overall influence of the British intelligence community in ‘the wider strategic culture.’ Carole A. Foryst tries to explain two major failures of the American intelligence community, i.e. “September 11th, 2001 and the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction affair,” as the results of “using outmoded assumption based on Cold War realities to understand a rapidly changing world’ and the lack of “overarching strategic vision” (2009: 396). David Hannay (2009) understands the Iraq intelligence failure leading to the 2003 war as the third in a series of Iraq intelligence failures. He argues that failing to predict Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and to spot how extensive and advanced his biological and nuclear program was, among other lessons, led to an important conclusion about Iraq “that neither the intelligence agencies of the Western World nor the UN inspectors would again allow themselves to be hoodwinked into underestimating Iraq’s determination and capacity to develop these weapons” (2009: 14).

However, in addition to his defense of this intelligence failure, Hannay seeks to ‘re-establish and strengthen’ the credibility of the intelligence community; he believes, considering the secrecy governing similar weapons of mass destruction programs and patchy intelligence in hand, that failure should not dishearten the intelligence community from developing imagination and interpretation (see Hannay 2009: 19-20).

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65 Mahnken seeks the ‘roots’ of Iraq’s intelligence failure in the 1991 Iraq war. It was only after the war that intelligence agencies were able to disclose the magnitude of Iraq’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs. He argues that the introduction to the 2002 NIE reveals the influence of such lessons from the case of Iraq in the face of Iraq’s effort to deny information (2005: 30-31). Thus, “Memories of past underestimations can lead to overestimation the next time around, and vice versa” (ibid.: 31).
As Mahnken argues, Sherman Kent saw “intelligence analysis as a manifestation of the scientific method. Analysts generally approach a problem as if they are solving a puzzle: They take individual “pieces” of information and fit them into a “framework” until a “picture” appears. However – and here’s the real problem with the actual practice of intelligence analysis – these framework are frequently built on a latticework of often implicit assumptions and biases. Moreover, analysts tend to operate on mere intuition much more than they would like to admit” (Mahnken 2005: 38).

Therefore, as with other forms of knowledge, intelligence is not possible without assumptions and mindsets. The role of mindset in the production of intelligence is, indeed, crucially important. Because, as Heuer argued, “intelligence analysts are commonly working with incomplete, ambiguous, and often contradictory information, the analyst’s own preconceptions, or mindset, are likely to have a greater impact on the analytical product than in other fields where analysts are working with less ambiguous and less discordant information” (2005: 84-85). Intelligence deals with serious cognitive and analytical deficiencies; however, as Morrison argues, “[…] the main blame attaches to the politicians who misused and abused intelligence to justify their purely political decisions to undertake aggression against a sovereign state” (2011: 509).

Some intelligence professionals, such as Melvin Goodman and W. Patrick Lang, blamed the Bush administration for influencing professional procedures resulting in the NIE. Others, such as Bob Graham (2004), evaluate the intelligence handed over before the war neither as an “intelligence failure” nor as a “consequence of political pressure from the administration.”

66 An important observation of Heuer is the inherent cognitive problems of post-mortem analysis of intelligence performance. Conceptualized as ‘hindsight bias,’ he argues that “Post-mortem analyses of intelligence performance are inevitably affected by hindsight bias that creates an illusion that past events were more predictable than was in fact the case” (p. 88).
Rather, he argues that “[…] it was the willingness of the intelligence agencies to be co-opted for political reasons.” Both arguments, however, imply that the intelligence on Iraq was an exceptional case in the practice of intelligence professionals.

**Milestones in the Media Coverage of the War**

**Intelligence and Journalists**
Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller’s article in the *New York Times* (2002) is a prime example of the contribution of the intelligence community to the Bush administration’s public campaign. Inspired by ‘American intelligence officials,’ it investigates different aspects of Hussein’s nuclear and chemical program. The authors reported that “In the past 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which American officials believe were intended as components of centrifuge to enrich uranium.” Gordon and Miller tried to keep distance from ‘hard-liners’ and their rush to war by mentioning ‘critics’ arguments that there was no rush to take military action. However, they argued, “Still, Mr. Hussein’s dogged insistence on pursuing his nuclear ambitions, along with defectors described in interviews as Iraq’s push to improve and expand Baghdad’s chemical and biological arsenals, have brought Iraq and the United States to the brink of war” (ibid.).

An intelligence leak may be a sign of different interests within or outside of the Intelligence Community. They may be planned to create desirable consequences. With regard to the case of Iraq, the above-mentioned intelligence leak supported the administration’s case on Iraq that relied heavily on intelligence and was presented as if it was necessitated by intelligence. In different instances, such as Gordon and Miller’s article, by ‘citing the sensitivity of intelligence,’ the administration implied that its evidence would have been convincing had they been able to
disclose all they knew about Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program. Bob Graham, however, presents a very different understanding of this situation. He says

> When we got into the hearings on that issue in the August/September period of 2002, we were aware that what the intelligence community was telling us privately was not the same as what they were telling the American people publicly; that conditions and limitations that were being given in a closed session were eliminated in the public documents. Comments on Saddam Hussein’s actual willingness to use weapons of mass destruction – assuming he had them – were much more restricted in private briefings than what the administration was releasing to the American people. (Graham 2004)

Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh examined the invasion of Iraq, along with early estimates of the Soviet threat and the escalation of the Vietnam War, as a case of “threat inflation.” From his perspective, this situation occurs when the information presented publicly diverges from the information that the administration holds privately (2007: 555). Mitchell observes that “While the elaborate classification laws designed to protect confidential “sources and methods” of intelligence gathering often make it difficult for citizens to participate in public debates on the credibility of specific intelligence sources, it may be easier to enter public dialogue at the level of intelligence analysis” (2006: 163, original italics). Therefore, because journalists are not suited to examine the quality of alleged intelligence, they tend to become the vehicle of certain actors to create the desired image of insecurity. Cavanaugh’s examination of past cases of threat inflation casts doubt on the efficacy of American institutions in preventing similar cases. He argues that, “Given strong enough trigger events and the presence of some degree of elite and popular consensus, secrecy, and the president’s commanding position over the security bureaucracies provide significant opportunities to engage in threat inflation” (2007: 582).

It is not uncommon for journalists to engage with intelligence. Journalists and intelligence professionals both are engaged in the production of knowledge. From an intelligence perspective,
Montague (1971) observes the press as a “primitive intelligence organization.” Likewise, from a journalistic perspective, Nick Davies (2009) indicates significant similarities between journalists’ activities and the profession of an intelligence officer in regard to their methods, such as in locating sources, collecting information, interception and analysis. As with Davies, Richard Aldrich (2009) argues that journalists and intelligence professionals are similar in their operating methods, especially in collecting and analyzing information.

Aldrich draws upon different experts including William Casey, the former Director of Central Intelligence, who argues that journalists and intelligence professionals have “much in common.” Casey argues that both professions “[…] work at the collection and accurate presentation of information that is intended to lead to informed judgments” (in 2009: 21). Media and intelligence both share an interest in the ‘projection of fear.’ As for the CIA in particular, Hewitt and Lucas argue that the creation of the CIA was part of an unprecedented ‘national security state’ (2009: 108). The CIA did not have a secure place in American politics; therefore, it has thrived on the perpetual reproduction of fear. “If the populace ever believed that it was secure, the rationale for protectors such as the CIA might disappear” (ibid.: 108).

Despite similarities, such as seeking to ‘uncover what is hidden,’ working on deadlines and guarding their sources, David Omand argues that “The relationship between journalist and spook is never more tangled than when the former writes about the latter, and adopts their investigative practices, or the latter tries to exploit the access of the former” (2012: 37). They are also similar in regard to protecting their sources.

As Dover and Goodman argue, “The knowledge that is produced by intelligence agencies and by the media is commonly assumed to be certain and thus fits into the category of ‘known knowns’, 
but in reality intelligence work and investigative journalism are often working at the level of known unknowns – that is trying to piece together knowledge on that which is obscured and mysterious” (2009: 1). Despite similarities, their products are, supposedly, quite different in openness and secrecy and, subsequently, their intended consumers. Although the connection between secrecy and intelligence, as Shulsky (2002: 171) argues, “is central to most of what distinguishes intelligence from other intellectual activities,” it cannot be considered the only element that distinguishes intelligence from other types of information/analyses.

Considering the stage of collection in the intelligence cycle, open-source intelligence is an integral part of collecting intelligence. Media provides intelligence professionals with a significant amount of open source intelligence especially from closed countries, such as Iraq prior to the invasion of Iraq. As Lowenthal (2004: 274) has observed, about twenty percent of intelligence about the Soviet Union was collected from open sources. Goodman has investigated the relations between the BBC and the British intelligence community and how the BBC contributed to intelligence operation through ‘defensive monitoring’ of the enemy during WWII. The role of the BBC was not limited to collecting open source intelligence for the British intelligence community; it continued and expanded its coverage with ‘offensive propagandist’ operations in Germany and other places during the Cold War.

Due to such similarities, it was not uncommon in the history of both the CIA and MI6 to have journalists on their payrolls or employ intelligence officers in the guise of journalists for intelligence operations. Aldrich writes, “Arguably, the intelligence agencies of the United States have always enjoyed a remarkably close relationship with the press, which in part explains the peculiar transparency of the American intelligence community” (2009: 18). However, media-intelligence relations can become disturbed because media is perhaps the most effective check on
the accountability of the intelligence community. Intelligence officials have to protect intelligence against any leaks to journalists. Thus, ‘the right to information’ legislation and the social condition of implementing this right has dramatically influenced media-intelligence relations. Examining historical cases, such as the Cold War, post-Cold War 1990s and 9/11, Aldrich observes a trend towards more transparency after the Cold War that turned to secrecy with 9/11.

It is very simplistic to reduce media-intelligence relations to the notion of journalists following the path of intelligence professionals. On the complexity of the ‘relationship(s)’ between media and intelligence, Hewitt and Lucas (2009: 106) argue that “There is the adversarial relationship; there is the dependent relationship; there is the manipulative relationship; there is the supportive relationship; there is the laudatory relationship.” Perhaps, along with other elements, it is the type of the problem at stake that influences the quality of this relationship. For instance, as it has been observed in BBC-MI6 relations, when dealing with an external enemy, such relations tend to be more supportive than adversarial. As Dover and Goodman observe in the case of Iraq:

The use of intelligence materials to justify the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has heralded another development in the relationship between intelligence, the media and the general public. The presence of US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN in February 2003, presenting the case against Iraq, premised on what we know to be faulty intelligence, gave the viewing public a sense of ownership over these materials. (2009: 3)

In the past few decades, intelligence communities have increasingly engaged in public relations and established and developed media relations. After the events of September 11, 2001 in particular, intelligence has become a routine element and practice of daily life. Especially in news media, intelligence-led operations have occupied a significant portion of the news coverage.

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67 For two different understandings of these new intelligence-media relations see Nick Davies (2009) and Mansfield (2009).
of the ‘war on terror’ – what has been described by Alderich as “the prolific press coverage of the intelligence services since 9/11” (2009: 13). However, as observed by Bob Graham, such media coverage of intelligence lacks the ‘conditions and limitations’ of intelligence. Indeed, American media was not sufficiently equipped to critically examine the administration’s intelligence claims on Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Despite some concerns that journalists tend to co-opt, officials’ authoritative claim over intelligence places them in a highly privileged location to shape people’s understanding of the problem at stake.

What transforms the final product of the intelligence community into (secret) intelligence is the fact that open source intelligence is only one among many other, some of them secret, sources. However, it seems that considering the intended consumer of intelligence may help to better understand the notion of secrecy in intelligence. Alan Breakspear defines intelligence as “… a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change, which may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat” (2013: 692). From this view, it is the role of intelligence in the government’s operation that makes intelligence, as the knowledge that shapes certain policies, a secret matter. Perhaps from a Foucauldian perspective of disciplinary power, and the panopticon, absolute transparency in the ‘knowns’ and ‘unknowns’ of government destroys the government’s capabilities of managing threats. From this view, therefore, it is the intended consumer of information that specifies its quality.

**How much did they know about Iraq?**

Intelligence was used by Bush and his administration to support claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Hussein’s link with international terrorism and the timing and urgency of the problem. As mentioned above, Bush’s offensive in Congress began with a “classified briefing”
by Donald Rumsfeld for 18 congressional leaders on September 4, 2002 (Allen and DeYoung 2002). Later, in his prime time speech about Iraq on October 7, 2002, Bush relied heavily on intelligence. He said, “We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He’s ordered chemical attacks on Iran and on more than 40 villages in his own country” (in New York Times, October 8, 2002: 12). Then he made reference to photos and documents to substantiate the existence of such weapons in Iraq and argue that Saddam Hussein, as a person who had used such weapons in the past, was seeking to recover his inventory of those weapons. “And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons” (ibid.). In another reference to intelligence, President Bush mentioned, “We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these U.A.V.’s [sic] for missions targeting the United States” (ibid.).

President Bush then employed intelligence as proof of Saddam Hussein’s links with terrorists. He declared, “And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace. We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy […] We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade […] We’ve learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after Sept. 11, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America” (ibid., added italics).

In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, Bush used the word ‘intelligence’ 10 times. Except a case in which he mentioned that “Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the
scientists inspectors are supposed to interview” – which itself was based on his alleged intelligence – the other nine cases were about the intelligence community and intelligence sources that provided evidence against Saddam Hussein:

Since September the 11th, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked more closely than ever to track and disrupt the terrorists. The FBI is improving its ability to analyze intelligence, and is transforming to meet new threats […]

Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the material to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands […]

U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them […]

Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. […] The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving. […]

From intelligence sources, we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are working on hiding documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves […]

Intelligence sources indicate that Saddam Hussein has ordered that scientists who cooperate with U.N. inspectors in disarming Iraq will be killed, along with their families […]

And this Congress and the American people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own. (in Washington Post, January 28, 2003)

Intelligence was deployed for the support of Bush’s core argument about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and his links with international terrorism, in particular al Qaeda.

We Don’t Know How Much we Know
In mid-September 2002, on Rush Limbaugh’s radio show, Dick Cheney presented the escalation of conflict with Iraq as a response to “additional information” they received that Saddam Hussein
“is reconstituting his biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs and that’s what really precipitates the concern now” (in Milbank 2002). While responding to the refrain of Bush’s critics and their demand of evidence, he mentioned, “We don’t have all the evidence […] We have 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent. We don’t know how much. We know we have part of the picture. And that part of the picture tells us that he is, in fact, actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons” (in Allen 2002).

President Bush, in his speech on October 7, 2002, tried to address this problem in a slightly different way. President Bush acknowledged the absence of knowledge about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program. He said, “Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don’t know and that’s the problem” (in New York Times, October 8, 2002: 12). However, referring to previous reports about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, according to “information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer,” he argued that “despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue” (ibid.). He continued, “The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his nuclear mujahedeen, his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of his nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons” (Bush in ibid.).

Perhaps Condoleezza Rice’s comment on evidence, on CNN’s Late Edition in September 2002, may help to better understand why the administration, although not confident about its alleged intelligence, insisted that they had to confront Saddam Hussein. She explained, “The president thinks it’s better to do this sooner rather than later […] I don’t think anyone wants to wait for the
100 percent surety that [Hussein] has a weapon of mass destruction that can reach the United States, because the only time we may be 100 percent sure is when something lands on our territory” (in Allen 2002).

Considering the notion of evidence from the two perspectives of self-defense and pre-emptive strike may help to better understand the difference between the Bush administration’s position and that of the nations opposed to war in the Security Council. It is from the perspective of self-defense that one needs ‘hard proof’ in order to substantiate the legitimacy of the use of force. From a pre-emptive approach there is no such evidence; the purpose of such a strike is, indeed, to prevent the emergence of such evidence. As President Bush indicated in his speech on October 7, 2002:

Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact they would be eager, to use biological or chemical or a nuclear weapons. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud (in New York Times, 8 October 2002: 12).

Thus, from the perspective of pre-emption, the administration could never wait to present such evidence required by other actors, and as they declared on different occasions, they had no intention to wait for ‘100 percent surety’ in order to provide others with that evidence.

**Was it convincing?**

As critics of Bush and Blair argued, what they released as evidence contained mostly ‘familiar materials’ about Iraq. If all actors have access to the same intelligence, why then is it not convincing to everyone in the same way? In order to better understand the role that intelligence can play in securitization, one should expand the study of intelligence to examine its ‘conditions of consumption.’ The practice of the Bush administration in the case of Iraq showed that the subjectivity of intelligence is not restricted to the process of its production. Indeed, we need to
distinguish between intelligence as a subjective matter and the subjectivity of intelligence, as well as how intelligence is understood and deployed in the process of policy making.

Kevin Russell (2004: 147) has examined the language that is used to “describe intelligence estimates as objective reflection of available evidence” and how in the case of Iraq, it led to “a misunderstanding of the role of intelligence” in supporting decisions to go to war in Iraq. Russell understands intelligence as a judgment that is itself the end, while in examining the speeches by Colin Powell to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003 and Tony Blair’s speech to the House of Commons on March 18, 2003, he realized “the interplay between evidentiary analysis and decision that lies at the heart of the intelligence process” (ibid: 147).

The analysis of media coverage of the securitization of Iraq supports Russell’s argument. Indeed, not only the securitizing actor but also other actors, such as journalists and the audience, understand intelligence as such. Perhaps the most critical position in the examined literature about President Bush’s reference to intelligence on Hussein’s regime was taken by a journalist in President Bush’s news conference on March 6, 2003, when he asked

Mr. President, you have, and your top advisers, notably Secretary of State Powell, have repeatedly said that we have shared with our allies all the current up-to-date intelligence information that proves the imminence of the threat we face from Saddam Hussein and that they have been sharing their intelligence with us. If all these nations, all of them our normal allies, have access to the same intelligence information, why is it that they are reluctant to think that the threat is so real, so imminent, that we need to move to the brink of war now? (New York Times, March 7, 2003: 12)

This question arises from a commonsensical evidentiary perception of intelligence in security policy making that understands intelligence as an object that, by influencing different actors in the same way, can itself justify the use of force. More importantly, from this perspective,
intelligence creates the same perception of threat among different actors, in this case American allies and the members of the UN Security Council.

In his response to this question, President Bush said, “…we do share a lot of intelligence with nations which may or may not agree with us in the Security Council as to how to deal with Saddam Hussein and his threat.” Besides, he interpreted the volume of participants, 90 countries, engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom to chase down terrorists as a sign of this dominant perception of the threat of terrorism. Indeed, the very inclusion of Iraq in the ‘war on terror’ became possible with the support of certain ‘intelligence’ about the link between Iraq and terrorism, especially al Qaeda. However, even according to some supporters of the use of military force against Iraq, such as Philip Bobbitt (2003: 19), the Central Intelligence Agency felt that “for the moment, Saddam Hussein is unlikely to conduct terrorist attacks against America.”

The interesting point in Bush’s argument is that he did not comment on the intelligence itself; rather, he tried to elaborate upon the conditions in which any intelligence on Iraq may be interpreted. He mentioned, “Sept. 11 changed the strategic thinking, at least as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country” (in New York Times, March 7, 2003, added italics). He specifically said that it changed the perception that you “could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, and that oceans would protect us from this type of terror.” Then he continued, “[…] Sept. 11 should say to the American people that we’re now a battlefield, that weapons of mass

68 In spite of such challenges, Bush confidently used intelligence to substantiate his claims about Iraq. In his televised speech on March 17, 2003, in which he gave a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, he mentioned that “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people” (Transcript from CNN, March 17, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/spri.irq.bush.transcript/).

69 Interestingly, Bobbitt’s argument tried to neutralize the absence of evidence against Iraq and potential arguments regarding the absence of evidence. Regardless of the existence of evidence, he argued that America would be better off in the future if they invaded Iraq in 2003 (Bobbitt 2003).
destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home. And so therefore I think the threat is real.” Nicolaus Mills describes this intellectual context as “9/11 culture.” He identifies “the “9/11 culture” as a key factor – as important as the Bush administration’s machinations – driving the US to invade Iraq in 2003” (Mills 2009: 15). The 9/11 culture fostered a ‘sense of vulnerability’ characterized by “a concern as to whether the US was doing enough to protect itself” (ibid.).

Thus, it was not the intelligence per se, but a set of temporal and spatial conditions that made possible certain understandings of that intelligence which justified the use of force against Hussein’s regime. In other words, it was certain interpretations of intelligence, not the object of intelligence, that generated specific consequences. Therefore, this situation disturbs the notion of the absolute antecedence of intelligence to decision making in the evidentiary understanding of intelligence – in a different way from the arguments tying intelligence to policy – by complicating the direct link with intelligence as an innocent object in the process of policy making. In other words, the mere existence of intelligence may not guarantee specific outcomes, for the same intelligence may be deployed by different actors to justify different plans and decisions. However, this epistemological/cognitive understanding of the relationship between intelligence and decision does not reject the Bush administration’s attempts to tie intelligence to policy and even produce ‘faulty intelligence’ to substantiate its decisions.

This argument may help better understand the dispute between the United States and some nations in the Security Council, among them France, that opposed the use of force against Iraq. After his fierce indictment of Saddam Hussein in his State of the Union speech, Bush added, “Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraq’s – Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorists
groups” (in Washington Post, January 28, 2003). Following that announcement, as Julia Preston (2003: 1) reported, many Council members, including France, said they would welcome Powell’s presentation and “[…] diplomats said privately that they were hoping he would present evidence convincing enough to break the impasse.” However, she observed that “The raised expectations and new emphasis on the evidence seemed only to strengthen the pressure on Mr. Powell; it remained unclear whether evidence that had convinced Washington would persuade skeptics at the United Nations” (ibid). For instance, while Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, hoped Powell’s intelligence “would help create “better conditions” for United Nations weapon inspectors to carry on their work,” American diplomats, according to Julia Preston, “made it clear that Mr. Powell did not intend to facilitate the inspections but rather to show why they were not working” (2003: 1).

Loch K. Johnson, from a different perspective, has examined the relationship between intelligence analysts and decision makers. He observes a breakdown in communication due to inadequate relationships between policy departments and intelligence agencies. There is a chronic lack of synchronization between these two fields in different phases of the intelligence cycle. With regard to the dissemination phase in particular, he observes that “Policymakers may choose to manipulate intelligence to fit their own political views or ideological predispositions – distortion by politicization” (Johnson 2006: 120-121). Although there is low risk of delivering “intelligence to please” policy makers, Johnson argues that politicization is more common on the consumer side. This politicization may occur by distorting intelligence, cherry-picking snippets of supporting information and intelligence or even ignoring contrary intelligence (see ibid: 121).

70 Johnson observes that intelligence officers may deliver “intelligence to please”; however, he argues that a lack of strong professional ethics are not a common problem (2006: 121).
The common ideal type of understanding of intelligence and policy perceives intelligence analysis and policy making as two distinct sequential operations in a linear production line. Considering Johnson’s argument about policy makers’ politicization of intelligence, and Ryan’s notion of assumption-based intelligence, the practice of the Bush administration presents a strong case to dispute this ideal type distinction between intelligence and policy. Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz were two important figures of the Bush administration that adhered to hypothesis-based intelligence. Defending this method, according to Maria Ryan

Wolfowitz argued that the hypothesis-based approach allowed policymakers to contend with uncertainty. Policymakers must have access to the evidence on which intelligence analysts base their conclusions so as to be able to make their own judgments and look for possibilities that analysts might not have considered and put the facts together in a way that analysts might not have thought of. Policymakers themselves had to be the analysts of last resort: ‘intelligence production should be driven by the policy process’. He argued that analysts see intelligence estimates as ‘tools’ to help in the development of a policy, rather than ‘weapons’ to determine the final outcome of the debate. ‘Analysts must always remember that their job is to inform the policymaker’s decision, not to try to supplant it, regardless of how strongly they feel about the issue.’ If an analyst produced an assessment that undercut an established policy, they must tread carefully and understand policymakers’ commitment to the success of their policy. (2006: 5-6)

One should not confuse Wolfowitz’s politicization of evidence with bringing evidence back to political debate. Indeed, hypothesis-based methodology is an obsessive reaction to fear of uncertainty that justifies the establishment of a policymaker’s totalitarianism, which does not stand any opposition – even from ‘professional’ analysts. The ultimate goal in this approach is the creation of certainty, however false it is, and closing – not predicting – the future. Therefore, while in the fact-based intelligence model politicization, and stovepiping, signify a major anomaly, in the hypothesis-based model politicization of intelligence becomes the normal.
Intelligence for Disarmament vs. Argument for Regime Change
In his article in November 2002, Richard S. Leghorn, a former commander for planning air and satellite surveillance and disarmament, tried to elaborate upon the importance of intelligence in disarmament and made some suggestions for improving the intelligence on Iraq in order to break the impasse in the Security Council. He argued, “The precedent for this type of approach was established in the cold war, when air and then satellite surveillance became the foundation of military deterrence […] The information gained through surveillance was central to stabilizing the cold-war arm race (2002: 11). Leghorn suggested that such strategies could shape the basis to achieve the Security Council’s objectives concerning disarmament and avoiding the heavy costs of invasion. He observed that the absence of intelligence was the major problem, especially in the United Nations, in dealing with Iraq.

Therefore, he recommended that member nations be authorized to conduct air inspection by reconnaissance aircraft and make the results available to the United Nations inspection teams. He argued that “This increased intelligence transparency would substantially buttress the Security
Council resolution” and that “A program of intelligence transparency and surgical air strike to take out weapons of mass destruction is more likely to win broad international support than immediate invasion. Of course, this option could always be followed by full-scale military attack should regime change become the only way to disarm Iraq, or if Iraq initiates any offensive action” (ibid.).

Leghorn’s argument shows that, from a professional perspective, the intelligence provided by the administration suffered from a deficit of diversity and exactitude. For that intelligence to have become more credible to other actors, it would have needed to be gathered and analyzed simultaneously by means of different methods in accordance with certain professional standards. With regard to the question of exactitude, that is particularly relevant to the matter of deploying intelligence for particular purposes; Leghorn believed that the collected information was not sufficiently sophisticated to be deployed in disarmament.

The administration shaped its policy, at least publicly, based on this incomplete, perhaps non-existent, intelligence on Iraq. Reacting to Iraq’s declaration concerning the release of 12,200 pages of documents on December 7, 2002, John Negroponte, the United States representative to the United Nations, called the declaration “an insult to our intelligence and indeed an insult to this Council” (quoted in Weisman and Preston 2002). As Weisman and Preston argued, Iraq’s declaration was interpreted as an early vindication of the administration’s strategy to allow Hussein to show that he would not give up his ‘secret weapons’ peacefully (ibid). However, at the same time, they observed that the American objection to the declaration increased the pressure

71 Different actors have different perceptions of accepted standards for intelligence gathering. For instance, in December 2002, the administration suggested that “The United States could provide highly sensitive intelligence information, and possibly help from agents inside Iraq to spirit cooperating scientists out of the country along with the families. Mr. Blix has expressed reservations about such interviews, especially if they are conducted outside the country, saying that he would not go along with "abductions"” (Weisman and Preston 2002: 1).
on the United States “to share with the inspectors secret intelligence about Iraq’s arms programs that the administration so far has withheld from the inspectors in order to use for its denunciation of Mr. Hussein” (ibid.). Despite Negroponte’s pledge to the Council and inspectors that “Washington would open the flow of intelligence data” (ibid.), there was not any sign of the administration having done so.

The disagreement on evidence, or perhaps its absence, put the Security Council in a dilemma. For instance, Richard Stevenson and David Sanger argued that the pressure in the Security Council against the United States was about ‘concrete evidence’ (2003: 1). That disagreement was about evidence and the means of obtaining such evidence. While other nations in the Security Council encouraged the United States to “secure the blessing” of the Council for the war, the Bush administration announced that “it could decide in favor of military action even if weapons inspectors do not turn up concrete new evidence against Saddam Hussein” (ibid.).

Paradoxically, the administration officials, on the one hand, said that “[…] the onus is on Mr. Hussein to show that he is complying with the United Nations resolutions” (ibid.),72 on the other hand, they neither accepted Saddam Hussein’s proofs nor became satisfied with U.N. inspectors’ evaluation of the problem. Donald Rumsfeld, for instance, said in a news conference that “the Iraqi government has proved very skilled in denial and deception tactics” (in ibid.). Considering such skills, Rumsfeld argued that “inspections are inherently ineffective when the host country is uncooperative” (ibid.). Although, according to Stevenson and Sanger, Rumsfeld asserted that “American intelligence analysts have concluded that Iraq has produced chemical and biological weapons, and is actively pursuing development of nuclear weapons,” as they noted, “Mr.

Rumsfeld declined to provide specific evidence and warned, as he and other administration officials have since Sept. 11, 2001, that awaiting firm proof that a terrorist group or rogue nation possesses weapons of mass destruction could prove cataclysmic” (ibid.). It seems that Saddam Hussein and his regime were not entitled to contribute to the process of producing any evidence to defend themselves. Therefore, it was not even the evidence but the evidence dilemma on disarmament that necessitated regime change in Iraq.

**Links with Terrorism**
The administration followed a similar path in establishing the alleged link between Saddam Hussein and international terrorism, in particular al Qaeda. Indeed, that link, speculative itself, could support the administration’s speculation of an unconventional attack on the United States. In the absence of any meaningful link between Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda, some experts, such as Daniel Benjamin, former director of counterterrorism for the National Security Council, argued that “secular Iraq and fundamentalist al Qaeda are natural rivals, not co-conspirators” (quoted in Von Drehle 2002). There were also others, such as retired Air Force Lt. General Thomas McInerney, who argued in a Senate hearing that “The same gaps in intelligence gathering that make it hard to know whether Hussein deals with al Qaeda make it dangerous to assume he doesn’t” (in ibid.).

McInerney, then, recommended, “We must remove threats such as those [posed by] Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups” (in ibid.). In Congress, as was the case with Tom DeLay, House Majority Whip, many of the “House’s most respected military and intelligence experts” were of the opinion that “The war on terrorism will be fought here at home unless we summon the will to confront evil before it attacks” and “Only regime change can remove the danger from Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. Only by taking them out of his hands and
destroying them can we be certain that terror weapons won’t wind up in the hands of terrorists” (quoted in VandeHei and Eilperin 2002). In lieu of evidence, that is, in the absence of ‘evidence,’ Porter Goss, a Republican representative from Florida, chairman of the intelligence committee and a former CIA operative, said, “I can attest to the evilness of Saddam Hussein” (in ibid).

In this situation of an ‘intelligence gap,’ conditions of possibility replace the specificity of the threat. In other words, the vilification of Saddam Hussein filled what was the existing intelligence gap. Bush’s case against Saddam Hussein’s regime had a core and a periphery. Its core included Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and his links with international terrorism, and its periphery included a cruel dictatorship that stood against all democratic values and ruthlessly violated human rights. However, it was this periphery that constituted the conditions of possibility for a chemical or nuclear terrorist attack. Indeed, it was not the core problem but the periphery that defined the identity of Saddam Hussein’s regime – and other members of the ‘axis of evil.’ It seems this periphery constituted major premises and assumptions of the intelligence community in interpreting any piece of information, and any gap in the information, about Iraq.

The Bush administration’s politics of evidence show a complicated and multifaceted practice. It deployed different techniques, among them producing intelligence and semi-intelligence – by taking advantage of in-between spaces between the Intelligence Community (intelligence) and the administration (policy); propagating raw and unfounded information as intelligence (stovepiping); replacing intelligence with conditions of possibility; taking advantage of cognitive and epistemological traps; and tying intelligence to policy in order to manage the problem of

73 For instance, see his State of the Union addresses 2002 and 2003, his speech in early October 2002 and his administration’s draft resolution to Congress.
evidence in the case of Iraq. It presented subjective estimative assessments of Iraq, built upon different _ifs_ and assumptions, to its audience as objective ‘facts’ about the problem. Further, the administration’s practice shows that the definition of a temporal line, in addition to an analytical line, in the process of producing such evidence (truth) and policy, and adequacy of evidence, are political decisions.

Although all legal and administrative laws and regulations regarding intelligence analysis constitute conventional borders and boundaries between evidence and policy, the politics of evidence in the case of Iraq shows the temporality and flexibility of those boundaries and how the constitution of truth about the subject is subject to perpetual re-politicization. Perhaps it was indeed eventually the absence, and not the existence, of intelligence that elevated Iraq to the level of an existential threat. The absence of evidence, especially with regard to the link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the supply of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, was eloquently described by Donald Rumsfeld in February 2002 when he said “there are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say there are things that, we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know, we don’t know.”

This chapter explored the role of intelligence in the process of securitization. Although intelligence professionals consider their product as subjective and estimative, consumers of intelligence tend to accept it as ‘objective’ evidence. The intelligence community suffers from various epistemological, cognitive, psychological and organizational limits and restrictions that influence quality of intelligence. As Mahnken argued, “[…] if the September 11 and Iraq failures can teach us anything, it is that we need to lower our expectations of what intelligence analysis can and cannot do” (2005: 41). Such an omniscient understanding of the U.S. Intelligence
Community not only misled American actors but also the enemy.\textsuperscript{74} Perhaps the major lesson is to be more skeptical about, and challenge, any truth claim including intelligence. After all, you cannot know under what assumptions it has been produced – and you may never know.

\textsuperscript{74} From a psychological and cognitive approach, Charles A. Duefler and Stephen Benedict Dyson argue that this fictional presentation of the CIA and ‘overestimating the omniscience of U.S. intelligence,’ indeed, misled Saddam Hussein in his decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 for he could not imagine that the lack of reaction from the U.S., rather than indifference, could be due to ignorance or indecision (2011: 85-86). Again, after 9/11, this ‘assumption of the all-knowing United States’ made Hussein think that the U.S. knew that he had no connection with al Qaeda (ibid.: 86).
Chapter Four: Making Space

The news coverage of Iraq contained several discussions on different aspects of the use of force. Based on their final contributions, one can reduce all those discussions to two major debates: the inevitability of the use of force and the benefits and costs of military action. With regard to the question of inevitability in particular, I argue that two distinct discourses of ‘containment’ and ‘elimination’ competed with each other in order to shape decisions about Iraq. Despite their differences, those two discourses shared one important assumption: ‘Saddam is a threat.’

In the tradition of ‘just war,’ the use of force is ‘strictly defensive’.\(^{75}\) In the absence of an immediate provocation from Iraq, and with available alternatives to war, some people, such as Jimmy Carter (2003), argued that the imminent war on Iraq would be a violation of just war. Some other people, such as Richard Cizik, vice president for governmental affairs of the National Association of Evangelicals, argued, “This isn’t preemption but another step in responding to the continuum of terrorism, of evil doers” (in Broadway 2002).\(^{76}\)

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\(^{75}\) This chapter is not going to discuss the notion of just war or evaluate the justness of the war on Iraq. Some authors have examined this notion in relation to the ‘war on terror’; some, such as Elshtain (2003), presented it as a burden on the securitizing actor, while some others, such as Smit (2005), tried to present a more diverse view of the question.

\(^{76}\) Bill Broadway’s article (Broadway 2002) showed important gaps and variations among religious leaders. Jimmy Carter’s assessment of religious supporters of the war on Iraq shows that such ‘just-ification’ originates from certain religious views: “This [just war] is an almost universal conviction of religious leaders, with the most notable exception of a few spokesmen of the Southern Baptist Convention who are greatly influenced by their commitment to Israel based on eschatological, or final days, theology” (Carter 2003).
war perceives ‘justness’ in terms of a linear sequential order of offence and defense. In general, it perceives the use of force as the measure of last resort after all other alternative measures are exhausted. In other words, it assumes that the justness of war is constituted by its location in the linear sequential deployment and exhaustion of peaceful means for dealing with a problem.

Among those actors who considered military action the measure of last resort, the emphasis on the successive activation of solutions shaped an opposition which was called “the not-yet camp” by former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake (see Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, February 3, 2003: A20). From this perspective, which was shared by a broad range of actors “from the far right to the far left” (see ibid), certain notions, such as ‘timing’ and ‘measure of last resort,’ are deployed to evaluate the legitimacy of the war. It is only the exhaustion of all means that can elevate the problem to the next level and eventually justify military action. Thus, talking war before all measures are exhausted is considered ‘premature.’ Carl Hulse’s article, titled “Top Democrats Say a War Against Iraq is Premature” (New York Times, March 7, 2003), is an example of this position towards the use of force. Hulse’s lead emphasizes the notion of ‘rush’ in this process:

The two Democratic leaders of Congress said today that it would be premature for the United States to initiate armed conflict with Iraq, with Senator Tom Daschle accusing President Bush of “rushing to war” without exhausting other remedies. As Hulse indicated, neither Tom Daschle nor Nancy Pelosi was “… unequivocally opposed to military action in Iraq but [they argued] that the United States needed to give diplomatic solutions more time.” Indeed, they, Nancy Pelosi in particular, wanted to clarify that their position was not an outright peace lover’s rejection of war. Recalling her support of action in Serbia during the Clinton administration, she said, “I am not against the use of force per se […] It is just a timing question” (ibid, added italics). Daschle voiced a similar belief: “[…] we have
not yet reached that point” (ibid). From this perspective, the requirements of a legitimate war, such as “a unanimous vote of the U.N.” (Pelosi in ibid), could have been met as time went by.

**Topology of Solutions**

In contrast to this understanding of linear-sequential and clear-cut solutions embodied in the ‘just war’ tradition, I argue that there were two major competing ‘problem-solution’ framings of Iraq from the beginning of this process of securitization.  

Perhaps this perception that we tend to view the process of securitization in terms of the linear succession of different solutions is due to the fact that we reproduce the past by reducing the complexity of social space into the dominant discourse of the time, which subsequently conceals the presence of other competing alternatives. Even when the use of force is justified by means of ‘lastness,’ one can think of alternatives – if the framing of the problem allows.

Michael Walzer has disputed the notion of ‘lastness.’ He argues, “In fact, war isn’t the last resort, for “lastness” is a metaphysical condition, which is never actually reached in real life: it is always possible to do something else, or do it again, before doing whatever it is that comes last” (Walzer 2004: 155). As Walzer continues, this notion of lastness “is cautionary – but this caution is necessary: look hard for alternatives before you “let loose the dogs of war”” (ibid: 155). Therefore, within the ‘just war’ tradition, neither the morality nor inevitability of war are absolute; rather, they are politically conditioned. In other words, they are matters of choice, costs and benefits analysis and practicality. With regard to peaceful solutions versus the use of force, Michael Walzer observed that there was not such a clear-cut linear juxtaposition of solutions to

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77 For instance, before the beginning of Bush’s public campaign on Iraq in September 2002, Thomas E. Ricks evaluated the arguments of the proponents and opponents of the use of force against Iraq. He argued, “Some think the military’s concerns will put the brakes on those advocating a direct confrontation with Hussein, while others say the president has been so clear about his determination to remove the Iraqi president from power that he cannot back down.”
the problem of Iraq. He argued that a ‘little war’ was already going on against Iraq. By that little war he meant the ‘no fly zone’ enforced by American and British forces in the Southern and Northern parts of Iraq. Criticizing the French and their claim that force is a “last resort,” he argued that

[… ] they are denying that the little war is going on. And, indeed, France is not participating in it in any significant way. The little war is almost entirely the work of American and British forces; the opponents of the big war have not been prepared to join or support or even acknowledge the work that the little war requires. (Walzer 2003)

While he criticized the opponents of war for not offering a viable alternative to war, at the same time he scolded President Bush for having no “exit strategy, no contingency plans to stop the march [to war]. Our leaders have created a situation where only any failure to fight would count as a victory for Saddam Hussein and Jacques Chirac” (ibid.). As an alternative, he suggested, “Mr. Bush could stop the American march toward the big war if he challenged the French (and the Germans and Russians) to join the little war. The result would not be a victory for Mr. Hussein or Mr. Chirac, and it would ensure that the Iraqi regime would get weaker over time.”

I argue that these two parallel universes were materialized in the discourses of ‘containment’ and ‘preemption.’ While the former perceived Iraq and Saddam Hussein as a “familiar … traditional” case that could be deterred and contained, the latter understood Iraq in a rather revolutionary way that had to be dealt with through military action. In order to connect these two universes, different actors suggested different combinations of force, inspections and sanctions. Among them, Morton H. Halperin proposed what he called ‘containment-plus’ including a policy of tougher weapons inspections and a more effective embargo on trade with Iraq. Halperin assured Congress that “[t]his strategy ‘if pursued vigorously … will, in fact, succeed in

78 Brent Scowcroft quoted in Von Drehle 2002.
preventing Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to terrorist
groups”” (in Von Drehle 2002).

From a different perspective, Richard S. Leghorn, a colonel, suggested an alternative to this “all-
or-nothing approach of immediate war” that from his view “would risk the unwarranted loss of
American and Iraqi lives and increased terrorism” and other damages such as “an enormous
refugee problem; the destruction of Iraq’s economic assets and infrastructure; the potential
destabilization of other governments in the region; and a costly postwar occupation […]”
(Leghorn 2002). Leghorn’s alternative enforcement included three elements: an extended
country-wide no-fly zone that would have given inspection flights full access to all areas; an
aerial surveillance system comprised of satellite information and inspection by reconnaissance
aircraft at any altitude; and the Security Council’s authorization for “precision aerial strikes” by
the United States and other nations against identified targets if they were not destroyed
voluntarily by Iraq (ibid).

Certainty and Uncertainty
The administration showed that, under certain conditions, it was willing to slightly adjust its
schedule on Iraq. For instance, as Dick Cheney mentions in his memoire, “There was no legal
obligation for us to pursue a resolution, but there were some in the United States and many more
in Europe who felt it would legitimize military action, and a resolution would also speak to their
concerns. The president told the prime minister [Blaire] he would go forward with a resolution”
(2011: 349). However, with regard to the administration’s attempt to obtain the second Security
Council resolution, he adds, “Colin Powell, Condi Rice, Don Rumsfeld, and I were all in
agreement that this was a mistake” (ibid: 355). Considering the French foreign minister’s
position against military action, Cheney thought that it would be “very hard” to get the second
resolution and “failing to get it would give our critics a chance to say we were acting alone […]” (ibid: 355). Besides, Cheney thought that “going to the UN again would make us look *hesitant and uncertain*, but Blair saw a second resolution as a political necessity for him at home” (ibid: 355, added *italics*).

The administration’s discourse on Iraq, therefore, had certain limits in accommodating alternative approaches. A disregard of those limits would transform it into a dysfunctional discourse with no constitutive power for constructing its threat-solution. Cheney realized the importance of such limits, in his meeting with the director of the CIA Iraqi Operation Group (IOG), when he talked about the necessity of rebuilding trust between the United States and the Iraqi people after their uprising in the early 1990s. Cheney writes

> [...] the IOG director said that it is difficult with our *“bifurcated strategy”* – working through the United Nations for sanctions and inspections while simultaneously pursuing regime change. His point was well taken, but the dual-track policy was intentional. The best way to get Saddam to come into compliance with UN demands was to convince him we would use force if he didn’t comply. I understood that international meetings, resolutions, and negotiations might convey uncertainty about our willingness to use military force, but for now there was no alternative. (ibid: 332, added *italics*)

This competition between the discourses of containment and preemption can be better understood by analyzing their relevant actors in the Bush administration. Indeed, the administration was an important site of competition between these two approaches. In his analysis of Colin Powell’s relinquishment of his anti-war position in the administration, Steven Weisman observed that, considering the military buildup at the border of Iraq, American troops “cannot wait a couple of more months without losing some of their fighting edge” (Weisman 2003). He viewed the turn in Powell’s position and his call for a cutoff in negotiations over a UN Security Council resolution as a result of this situation and losing patience with both Iraq and the
French. He explained, “The hangup at the Security Council is over whether the inspections should be allowed to continue into the late spring or summer. Administration officials concede that if they let the process go on for that long, a solid majority of votes might well be lined up in the Council.” However, as he quoted a State Department official, they did not have ‘that much time.’ “It’s not because warmongers are ready to march. It’s because it would be self-defeating to let Iraq off the hook by even two or three weeks, when you know they will just squirm out of their obligations again” (ibid).

Staying undecided between ‘options on the table’ implies a hesitant securitizing actor and creates a state of uncertainty and unease for all actors as well as the audience, from the Iraqis suffering from ‘perpetual sanctions’ to the people trading on Wall Street. In such circumstances, even the securitizing actor’s choice to use force may be a relief for the audience. Reporting on the emergence of a positive trend in stocks a few days before the outbreak of the war, Alex Berenson (Berenson 2003) asserted that “After months of uncertainty, investors reacted with relief yesterday to the news that the White House had dropped its sputtering diplomatic efforts and appeared to be preparing for war with Iraq.” He argued that, although investors were not looking forward to a war, according to ‘strategists and money managers,’ “the news stripped away the cloud of doubt that has hung over stocks since the Iraqi dispute deepened last fall …” According to an equity strategist at J. P. Morgan Private Bank, “What Wall Street really fears is uncertainty … What today’s events seem to be pointing to is a reduction in uncertainty, even if the outcome of that is not necessarily a good thing” (ibid).

**Costs and Benefits**
About ten days before the outbreak of war on Iraq, Dana Milbank wrote, “In the coming weeks, all signs indicate, President Bush will launch the first war without direct provocation in the
nation’s history” (Milbank 2003). Considering the great consequences of invading Iraq, Milbank argued that “It is the largest of gambles – except that Bush, in rhetoric and in temperament, sees it not as a gamble but as a historical inevitability” (ibid). By analyzing interviews of Bush’s close friends, he examined “Bush’s personality and worldview” as the roots of this ‘confidence.’

Drawing on Craig Stapleton, Bush’s close friend and his ambassador to the Czech Republic, he wrote, “Bush has come to view his leadership of post-9/11 America as a matter of fate, or of God’s will. He has said the country is “called to defend our nation and to lead the world to peace,” and he often says the mission is to extend liberty, God’s gift to every human being in the world” (ibid). Perhaps this personal character and religious conviction encouraged Bush to embrace, in Milbank’s words, “the most sweeping foreign policy proposal his most hawkish advisers had developed – a vision of American supremacy and preemption of emerging threats – and that policy leads inexorably to Iraq, and beyond” (ibid). 79

However, other actors, from different perspectives, warned about the costs, consequences and repercussions of invading Iraq. These included its direct costs of up to $200 billion; up to $1 trillion costs on the U.S. economy; 80 soaring oil prices; the humanitarian costs and flight of people from the war; the disintegration of Iraq and establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Kurdistan; and, finally, the risk of a messy protracted war in Iraq. In the early stages of Bush’s campaign on Iraq in September 2002, “Al Gore questioned whether the administration has either

79 In his memoir, when talking about important decisions, among them the beginning of the ‘war on terror,’ President Bush tries to highlight this religious dimension of his character (see Bush 2010).
80 Costs and economic consequences were a source of concern even for American supporters of invading Iraq (e.g. see Roig-Franzia and Davenport 2003). Direct and indirect economic costs may be seen as an important element that conditions political support for war. According to the last estimates made by the Pentagon before the outbreak of war, the cost of war on Iraq was expected to be “as much as $95 billion for a combat phase and immediate aftermath. The long-term expense of occupying and rebuilding Iraq and providing postwar humanitarian relief to as many as 2 million refugees was estimated to increase up to $300 billion (Allen 2003). However, as Allen mentions, a few weeks before that, Rumsfeld had provided an estimate of less than $50 billion.
a plan or the stamina to stay in Iraq long enough after a war to assure stability and warned that it could come to resemble the situation today in Afghanistan, with far greater consequences” (Balz 2002).

In December 2002, in his response to the media about the split between the civilian and military leadership over the planning of a potential war on Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz assured that the Secretary of Defense and Gen. Tommy Franks had been pushing others to consider all possibilities in their planning, and “Every significant aspect of the military planning has been the subject of intense discussion among Rumsfeld, Franks, Gen. Richard B. Myers and the president (Wolfowitz 2002). More importantly, he belittled the risks and consequences of invading Iraq as less than those of inaction. With regard to the costs of the war, in particular, he argued that

No course open to the United States is free of risk. The question is how to weigh the risks of action against the risk of inaction and to be fully aware of both. One risk that is often exaggerated is the risk of what might happen in Iraq after the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime. It is hard to believe the liberation of the talented people of one of the most important Arab countries in the world from the grip of one of the world’s worst tyrants will not be an opportunity for Americans and Arabs and other people of goodwill to begin to move forward on the task that the president has described as “building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.” (ibid, added italics)

Later, in late February 2003, Paul Wolfowitz defended the benefits of the use of force against Iraq in a congressional testimony. He argued that the removal of the Iraqi regime would positively impact the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further, according to Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, he estimated that

the U.S. cost of Iraqi “containment” during 12 years of U.N. sanctions, weapons inspections and continued U.S. air patrols over the country at “slightly over $30 billion,” [...] the price had been “far more than money.” Sustained U.S. bombing of Iraq over those years, and the stationing of U.S. forces “in the holy land of Saudi Arabia,” were “part of the containment policy that has been Osama bin
Laden’s principal recruiting device, even more than the other grievances he cites […] (DeYoung and Pincus 2003)

Paul Wolfowitz was not alone in considering such benefits for invading Iraq. Kenneth Adelman, a former Reagan administration official and member of the Pentagon Advisory Board, believed that the Iraq war would “transform the region towards peace and decency” (in Milbank 2003). In fact, Dana Milbank argued, “One reason for Bush’s confidence under pressure is the unshakable belief of his advisers that this scenario [a quick and successful overthrow of Hussein and rebuilding of a democratic Iraq that spreads peace through the Middle East] is likely” (ibid).

Outside of the Bush administration, in the examined media coverage of Iraq, one can find some ‘experts’ who also depicted such a liberating picture of military action on Iraq. Among them, Philip Bobbitt, a Law professor at the University of Texas, supported the use of force not only as an economic means of dealing with Saddam Hussein but also as a humane way of tackling the question of Iraq. He argued

> Whether they admit it or not, those who favor containment are asking for an ever more expensive United States armed presence in the region, as well as perpetual sanctions that crush innocent Iraqis even further. This is because without troops on his borders, Saddam Hussein would not admit inspectors, and without sanctions he could quickly replace whatever outlawed weapons we are lucky enough to find and destroy. (Bobbitt 2003: 19)

More importantly, he questioned the benefits of the mere implication of the threat of American military force along with other means of dealing with Iraq. He believed that

> It is also misguided to believe that the threat of our overwhelming military force is enough to deter Saddam Hussein from aggression indefinitely. Were Iraq to get weapons of mass destruction, it would be able to deter us from interfering in any plans it had to broaden its control in the Persian Gulf region. (ibid)
Considering theoretical arguments about the notion of ‘lastness’ and the statements of Bush’s advisers and other like-minded experts, one can conclude that the use of force is neither in theory nor in practice the measure of last resort, but a choice that is presented as ‘necessary’ by the securitizing actor. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, as I argued in chapter three, there were, at least, two – competing – framings of the problem simultaneously taking place. More importantly, military build-up in its early stages was presented as a means of promoting the efficiency of peaceful solutions. However, at a certain point, with a strong military that could ‘win’ that war, military action became inevitable. Although this notion of inevitability may be presented as certain conditions, outside of the process of securitization – that compel the actor to take certain, perhaps undesired, actions – inevitability is indeed a key product of this process itself. On the one hand, the securitizing actor constitutes conditions of inevitability in his reproduction of security. On the other hand, he constitutes threat in terms of action – not inaction. In other words, inevitability has to be understood in terms of determinism – and not fatalism.81

Therefore, the determinism of inevitability requires action. In fact, in contrast to the determinism inherent in the linear perception of the justness of war, the Bush administration emphasized agency and choice in the form of preemption. From this view, the question of force is observed as a choice which may be made before something has transformed into a ‘tremendous’ threat beyond the power of the securitizing actor. This preemptive approach, in fact, is so action-oriented that it stands in the future and looks back to the present in order to constitute its conditions of present inevitability. As Condoleezza Rice put it, “History is littered with cases of

81 The constitution of inevitability never intends to justify resignation; rather, it is meant to justify certain action(s). In order to better understand the role of agency, I rely on the distinction made by Daniel Dennett between ‘fatalism’ and ‘determinism.’ He argues that “Fatalism is the idea that something’s going to happen no matter what you do. Determinism is the idea that what you do depends. What happens depends on what you do, what you do depends on what you know, what you know depends on what you’re caused to know, and so forth – but still, what you do matters. There’s a big difference between that and fatalism. Fatalism is determinism with you left out” (in Baily 2003).
inaction that led to very grave consequences for the world […] We just have to look back and ask how many dictators who ended up being a tremendous global threat and killing thousands and, indeed, millions of people, should we have stopped in their tracks”82 (in Kessler 2002).

**Shaping Space: Management of Discursive Elements**

Along with this ‘Terminator’ style presentation of the Bush administration, as soldiers sent back in time from the future to deal with the future’s inevitability (necessity) in the past, one can observe the significant militarization of American security discourse and expansion in the campaign for military action. Although, at first glance, one can see several familiar elements of American security discourse, such as the dictator, evil, democracy, force, liberation etc., in the construction of Iraq, those elements were in fact deployed innovatively by the Bush administration. At the same time, some elements, such as ‘negotiation,’ were absent from the administration’s discourse on Iraq. In other words, a specific construction of Iraq became possible by activating certain elements at the expense of neutralizing some others. Therefore, it can be argued that securitization does not merely take place; rather, it makes place. That is, every securitizing move occurs through activating desirable elements and deactivating or silencing undesirable elements. It is indeed this process of simultaneous rise and decline, the expansion and contraction, of discursive elements that brings about a different understanding of insecurity which in turn – at the same time – makes possible certain securitization(s).83

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82 Philip Bobbitt made a similar argument about Bush’s policy on Iraq. He described questions about the regime change in Iraq, such as “[…] is it really a good idea to press ahead with regime change? Aren’t we better off now than we would be if we invade Iraq and risk setting off a dreadful response?” as neither ‘logical’ nor ‘helpful.’ To be rid of this, what he called, “Parmenides Fallacy,” he suggested that we must ask, “Will we better off in the future if we invade Iraq or if we do not invade?” (Bobbitt 2003)

83 This emphasis on simultaneity, between the activation and deactivation of discursive elements and the reproduction of insecurity and threat, in the process of securitization may encourage a more comprehensive examination of securitization by considering different sites that are not traditionally considered part of securitizing agency. Only for the sake of analysis, however it may seem to be a linear presentation, one can place them in a line: new understanding of insecurity → new understanding of threat → constitution of existential threat (securitization).
The securitization of Iraq, precisely Saddam Hussein’s regime, entailed such practice of activating and deactivating discursive elements. It began with establishing a link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and, subsequently, connecting those elements with Saddam Hussein as a cruel dictator. The construction of the narrative of ‘terrorism-weapons of mass destruction- Saddam Hussein’ as an immediate existential threat took place, simultaneously, with deactivating ‘deterrence’ and ‘containment’ in favor of activating ‘pre-emption’ in the American security discourse. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy (Bush 2002) demonstrated that discursive transformation and its implications for the management of this security environment.

The 2002 NSS observed a “profound transformation” in the American security environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. It indicated that “[t]he nature of the Cold War threat required the United States […] to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction” (ibid: 13). This observation of a past enemy and how it was managed was followed by the Bush administration’s account of new threats. According to this document, the new environment was signified by the emergence of “deadly challenges … from rogue states and terrorists.” It claimed

None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union […], the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous. (ibid: 13, added italics)

The 2002 NSS further elaborated on the nature of ‘rogue states’ as those who “brutalize their own people […] display no regard for international law […] are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction […] sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and
hate the United States and everything for which it stands” (ibid: 14). From this perspective, the transformation of the United States’ security environment began with the emergence of this new threat. However, as the NSS indicated, “It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat” (ibid: 15). Perhaps the main mandate of the NSS for 2002 was to elaborate on the administration’s plan to manage that long expected threat. Perhaps the most significant consequence of this transformation was a reevaluation of deterrence. As the 2002 NSS argues

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. (ibid: 15, added italics)

This speculative perception of threat dramatically expanded the space of insecurity from traditional notions of the physical attack and ‘first strike’ to the question of motivations, and from possessing weapons of mass destruction to the determination to obtain such weapons. However, the NSS for 2002 can be seen as the final stage of a gradual transition from deterrence to pre-emption that began in the 1990s.

This obsessive preoccupation with shaping the future, or perhaps it would be better to say standing in the future and changing the present, can be seen in the ‘Defense Strategy for the 1990s,’ which observed that preserving “an unprecedented opportunity” provided by the demise of ‘Soviet Communism’ required certain preventive actions on the regional level. As that document argued

[…] we [America and its allies] can work to shape the future environment in ways that would help preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also help to preclude the emergence of a
hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past. (Cheney 1993)

This nascent desire of shaping the future, or more precisely extending a desirable status quo into the future, in the form of preoccupation with prevention in the ‘Defense Strategy for the 1990s,’ was elevated to the level of urgency and compulsion that required preemption in the NSS for 2002.

As with Bush’s ‘axis of evil,’ the NSS for 2002, by concentrating on the conjunction of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, presented a general account of the United States’ security environment. Although it identified the triad of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and evil states the grave threat to the security of the United States and its allies, there was no mechanism of automaticity to elevate individual cases on the agenda. Therefore, the main question within this framework is why Iraq, and not Iran, North Korea or even Libya?
Some observers, such as Michael Gordon, a *New York Times* correspondent, realized the problem in the grouping of these states as ‘axis of evil.’ Analyzing President Bush’s speech on January 29, 2003, Gordon touched on the problem of coherence in this ‘axis’ that groups together nations that are not allies and have little in common (Gordon 2003). Drawing on ‘critics,’ he understood this concept as a manifestation of inconsistency in Bush’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, he raised the question of why, if ‘rogue states’ are such a danger, “was it [the Bush administration] moving against Iraq and not Iran, which has stronger ties with terrorist groups and is also trying to develop nuclear weapons […] And why is Washington so patient with North Korea, which has a track record of selling missiles?” (ibid)

Although it seemed that in his march to war against Iraq President Bush tried to gradually distance himself from the idea of the ‘axis of evil,’ he could not ignore the question of ‘Why Iraq?’ As Gordon observed, Bush “suggested that Iran was going through a period of internal ferment and possibly change. Regarding North Korea, he stressed that the United States wanted to work with its allies to achieve a peaceful solution” (in ibid). However, as for Iraq Bush indicated that “Washington was prepared to act even in the face of allied objections and without explicit Security Council approval” (in ibid).

**Double Movement**
Securitizing Iraq, including creating the conjunction of ‘terrorism – weapons of mass destruction’ and constructing Iraq as an existential threat, can be better understood as a double movement in the process of securitization. This double movement included two distinct processes of the reproduction of security and construction of threat, which took place parallel to each other. From a different view, particularly with regard to the level of potential resistance from the audience, one may call these two processes soft and hard securitization respectively.
Symbolizing a significant change in security space and a transformation in the conditions of possibility, soft securitization seeks to reinterpret security and create a new understanding of the security environment. Soft securitization is apparently not preoccupied with specific individual cases; however, it may take individual cases as signs and symptoms of any underlying trends, or it may use them to elaborate on a broader security environment. It acts as an intellectual framework that tries to get minds fixed on certain issues with great attention, while hard securitization takes place within the relevant frameworks of soft securitization(s). Hard securitization deals specifically with the production of existential threats that require immediate action for dealing with a specific case.  

An important development that shaped post-9/11 security space was the theorization of international terrorism with weapons of mass destruction as the main global threat. This soft securitization was received by the audience with almost no significant resistance. It provides a framework within which important questions regarding individual cases of hard securitizations are reduced to questions of consistency and priority. Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s terminology (Kuhn 1970), soft securitization provides a paradigm that determines what questions should be asked about individual security problems and how to deal with them. When established, this framework reduces important questions about individual cases to identification and prioritization.

It is important to note that the criticism of the Bush administration’s securitization of Iraq did not transcend discursive boundaries established by the administration’s soft securitization of

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84 As we later learned, such soft securitization as ‘axis of evil’ was indeed planned to disguise itself as such. Soft securitization may be understood as a form of securitization that requires a certain level of attention but not immediate action.

85 As an example, see Naumann 2003.
‘terrorism – weapons of mass destruction – rogue states.’ Ron Suskind’s conversation with a senior advisor to Bush reveals that the administration was fully aware of its power in creating such a ‘reality’ in the entire security space. According to Suskind

The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." (Suskind 2004)

Given this situation, the debate about Iraq remained within the ‘reality’ that, to a great extent, owed its existence to the Bush administration. Therefore, even disputing the administration’s securitization of Iraq can be evaluated as the participation of other actors in reproducing administration’s attempts shaping security space.

**Why Iraq?**
After this general perception of security was constituted, the next step was to identify individual cases and decide ‘who’s in’ – and ‘who’s out.’ In a televised speech on October 7, 2002, President Bush tried to deal with the question of “[…] why Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons” (in *New York Times*, October 8, 2002: 12). He argued that “While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people” (ibid). To this introduction of Saddam Hussein, he added Saddam’s past invasions and “unrelenting hostility towards the United States” (ibid). He continued, “By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. As
a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N. has said, the fundamental problem with Iraq
remains the nature of the regime itself. Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted
to weapons of mass destruction” (ibid, added italics).

Similar questions were brought up by journalists to Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice.
Comparing Iraq with North Korea, Rumsfeld said, they “are both repressive dictatorships,” but
Iraq “is unique” (quoted in Shanker 2003). He continued

   No other living dictator has shown the same deadly combination of capability and intent, of aggression against its neighbors, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the use of chemical weapons against his own people as well as against his neighbors, oppression of his own people, support of terrorism, and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors, and to the United States, as Iraq. (ibid)

Thus, from Rumsfeld’s view, “diplomacy might yet resolve the nuclear standoff with North Korea,” but, he warned, “[…] in the case of Iraq, all of the options – except the use of force – were nearly exhausted” (ibid).

Although the Bush administration tried to present North Korea as a case that could be managed through peaceful means, surprisingly, in October 2002 negotiations with James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, not only did North Korea not bother to deny its ‘secret nuclear program,’ “[…] they informed Kelly that North Korea was “entitled to have nuclear weapons’’” (Mann 2004: 354). Although “the Bush administration at first kept it secret,” within less than two weeks North Korea’s admission of its nuclear program leaked out (ibid: 345).

This surprising development became the source of trouble, not in the sense that it could provoke a confrontation with North Korea, but, more importantly, by raising suspicion about Bush’s case against Iraq. While the Bush administration was in the midst of contemplating a war with Iraq
due to the suspicion that Iraq was continuing its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Bush ignored the problem of North Korea with its more advanced nuclear program. Nevertheless, administration officials, including Donald Rumsfeld, insisted that they hoped for a ‘peaceful resolution’ for North Korea. In an address to the Reserve Officers Association in Washington D.C., Rumsfeld said, “North Korea is a threat to be sure, but it’s a different kind of threat, one that, for now at least, can be handled through diplomacy and differently” (Shanker 2003).

Saddam’s Iraq and North Korea did share such attributes as ‘dictatorship.’ Besides, both countries pursued weapons of mass destruction programs. However, in contrast to the case of Iraq, the discourse on North Korea lacked an emphasis on terrorism. In his article, ‘Bush Enlarges Case For War by Linking Iraq With Terrorists,’ Michael R. Gordon noted, “The allegation that Iraq is conspiring with terrorists seemed tailored to address the question of why it is important to act now” (Gordon 2003).

Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002 may be viewed as his soft securitization in which he introduced the ‘axis of evil’ including rogue states, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In that stage, he recognized a broad context of insecurity with a few individual cases as potential threats. On the other hand, his 2003 State of the Union address constituted his hard securitization, which, based on his soft securitization, presented Iraq as an existential threat that required immediate (military) action. As he argued

Before Sept. 11, 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that day never comes.
How was Iraq dealt with?
According to a Bush aide, Mike Allen and Jim VandeHei reported that President Bush privately told a selected group of “congressional hawks” gathered in the White House that “any military action [on Iraq] “will be fast, furious and we will win’” (Allen and VandeHei 2002). A few days later, in his televised speech on October 7, 2002, President Bush, responding to the critics who said the war on Iraq may derail the ‘war on terror,’ countered, “Terrorist cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both and the United States military is capable of confronting both” (in New York Times, October 8, 2002: 12, added italics). He also warned about the grave consequences of inaction and said, “I’m not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein. Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events” (ibid, added italics).87

President Bush wanted to show that the war on Iraq was a necessary and successful action. Perhaps Bush’s hint of ‘winning’ a quick war throws light on some aspects of confronting Iraq. Thus, one may ask, does the likelihood of success of the solution presented by the securitizing actor determine the success of the move itself? From a moral perspective, ‘would the Bush administration have considered military action if it had found victory difficult – if not unlikely?’

Considering the co-constitutional relationship between the problem and the solution, one may

86 Such criticism of the war on Iraq, that it would derail the ‘war on terror,’ shows that the audience had indeed accepted Bush’s framing of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and his ensuing ‘war on terror.’ In the media coverage of the examined period, no actor disputed Bush’s framing of the problem.
87 If it was an objective of the administration’s invasion of Iraq to prevent these fears from coming to fruition, it seems that they failed to fulfill it. Hugh Gusteron, in his analysis of North Korean leaders’ behavior, argues that, among other elements, the experience of Iraq has been crucial. “According to this theory,” he writes, “North Korea’s leaders calculated that it was impossible to implement an agreement with the Bush administration and that their best path to security lay, instead, in securing a nuclear weapons capability with which to deter the United States from doing to North Korea what it had done to Iraq” (Gusteron 2008: 33).
ask ‘does the availability of military force, for a successful military action, encourage a certain framing of the problem?’

The case of Iraq shows that the desirability of certain solutions resulted in the marginalization of some others and facilitated the promotion of a specific framing of the problem. The Bush administration’s plan of regime change through military action, by removing other options from the table, pursued a certain constitution of inevitability that would necessarily lead to military confrontation. For instance, in September 2002, Rice, responding to arguments regarding a Security Council resolution on Iraq, said, “Let’s be very clear that the absence of resolutions is not the problem […] Nobody is going to negotiate anything with this regime” (in Allen, Washington Post, September 9, 2002: A01).

Perhaps a brief review of the status and importance of ‘negotiation’ in the American security and foreign policy toolbox may help to better understand this situation. The NSS for 2002 observed that none of the contemporary threats of rogue states and terrorism “rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union” (NSS 2002: 13). Perhaps the following passage from NSC-68 can show the gravity of the threat posed by the Soviet Union as it was perceived in the beginning of the 1950s.

[… ] the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.
(Council 1950: 4, added italics)
Despite such extreme othering and obvious enmity, perhaps due to “ever-present possibility of annihilation”, NSC-68 concluded, “We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force” (ibid: 11). Thus, in order to deal with the threat of the Soviet Union, it distinguished four possible courses of action: “continuation of current policies […] ; Isolation […] ; War; and […] A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world […]” (ibid: 44). NSC-68 reserved an important role for ‘negotiation’ and recommended that “Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action” – despite the fact that it observed several disadvantages for the free world in negotiating with the Soviet Union (ibid: 44). More importantly, considering the problem between the free world and the Soviet Union as a matter of two different world views and identities, it observed, “Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas (ibid: 11).

Therefore, while the United States was trying to contain the Soviet Union, it, especially its military power, was simultaneously restrained by the Soviet Union. As the threat of catastrophic military confrontation in the Cold War vanished, American foreign policy has become increasingly militarized. This transformation marks one of the major shifts from the discourse of deterrence and containment to the discourse of preemption. Possessing the most powerful army in the world may in itself justify this transformation. As Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) argues, the Pentagon’s sanitized wars of “precision-guided munitions,” “smaller forces and fewer causalities” and the capability to fight more cheaply and cleanly have turned war into a more desirable tool of foreign policy. Nevertheless, Bacevich seeks other reasons for this transformation, the reasons justifying such a massive army, in people and institutions outside of the military. In particular, he has examined this transformation as a result of the influence of neo-
conservatism and Christian Evangelicalism on American foreign and security policy. He identifies a trend that emerged in the 1960s, to which only Jimmy Carter’s responses to the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were exceptions. Bacevich believes, however, that this lapse was compensated by President Ronald Reagan who immersed his administration in military imageries.

As with Bacevich, Murray Friedman (2005) argues that this neoconservative movement was sufficiently strong to revolutionize American politics. Bacevich believes that neoconservative thinkers, such as Norman Podhoretz, argued for a larger military and the use of force in situations that were not purely defensive. Whenever a crisis emerged, “As always, Americans faced a choice that was as stark as it was clear-cut. As always, neoconservatives saw the way out: through war, the United States might save the world” (Bacevich 2005). Bacevich identifies the shift from the Commentary magazine to the Weekly Standard in 1995 as the emergence of a new generation of neoconservatives that changed the focus of neoconservatism from ideas to policies. He argues that this generation of neoconservatives “[…] showed themselves to be the most perceptive of all of Woodrow Wilson’s disciples. For the real Wilson (in contrast to either the idealized or the demonized Wilson) had also seen military power as an instrument for transforming the international system and cementing American primacy” (Bacevich 2005: 86).

In contrast to this perception of religion influencing politics, some others, such as Wood, argue that “Throughout history, religion has frequently served as the handmaiden of the state, and thereby has been made subservient to the political interests of the state” (Wood 1990: 7). Religion made some traditional contributions, such as ‘just war’ and ‘evil,’ to the question of war. Media coverage of Iraq shows a great disparity in the positions of members of the religious community towards war. While the opponents of war were very vocal and challenged its legitimacy from the perspective of just war, the proponents, such as Richard Cizik and Richard Land, respectively argued that Saddam Hussein was evil and no doubt possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Murray Friedman has examined the religious roots of neo-conservatism. He challenges the common sense assumption that Jewish intellectuals immigrated to the Right from the Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He believes there were strong links between Judaism and conservatism before the emergence of neo-conservatism.
Neoconservatism is not seen as the sole beginning of the militarization of American foreign policy and the ideology of transforming the world order. Chalmers Johnson seeks the origins of American militaristic tendencies in the late nineteenth century before and during the Spanish-American War of 1898 that set the modern path of American imperialism.\footnote{One can even go further back in history and find some elements of this discourse in the 19th century’s notion of ‘manifest destiny.’ Perhaps neo-conservatism may be seen as a reproduction of that discourse in the form of a spatial extension of that discourse in the presence of a strong military that can act globally.} In his examination of this phenomenon, Johnson seeks the ‘intellectual foundations’ of both American imperialism and contemporary ideologies of ‘exporting democracy’ in the policies of Woodrow Wilson. Johnson argues that

[…]Wilson strongly believed in the exceptionalism of the United States and its destiny to bring about the ‘ultimate peace of the world.’ He did not see America’s external activities in terms of realist perspectives or a need to sustain a global balance of power. He believed instead that peace depends on the spread of democracy and that the United States had an obligation to extend its principles and democratic practices throughout the world. (Johnson 2004: 47)

Johnson finds the two world wars particularly important in the evolution of American imperialism. He argues, “If World War I generated the ideological basis for American imperialism, World War II unleashed its growing militarism. It was then, as retired Marine Colonel James Donovan has written, that the “American martial spirit grew to prominence”” (2004: 52).

After World War II, this trend reached its climax during the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Later in the 1990s, this ideology reinvigorated itself and shaped George W. Bush’s foreign policy in the 2000s. According to Bacevich’s analysis, this “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence” is based on five convictions that together form the foundation of this generation of neoconservative thinking about American statecraft: First, “the
certainty that American global dominion is, in fact, benign and that other nations necessarily see it as such;” second, global order is shaped around American power – not on notions such as collective security and the United Nations; third, “nothing works like force;” fourth, sustain and enhance American military supremacy and capability of fighting in multiple fronts and, fifth, hostility towards realism (deficit of ideals) and excess of caution⁹⁰ (Bacevich 2005).

With regard to the use of force as the focus of this section, in contrast to the ideologies of containment and deterrence, which were even supported by neoconservatives such as Norman Podhoretz, younger neoconservatives believe that force should actually be deployed. As Bacevich puts it, “The operative principle was not to husband power but to put it to work – to take a proactive approach. “Military strength alone will not avail,” cautioned [Robert] Kagan, “if we do not use it actively to maintain a world order which both supports and rests upon American hegemony”” (2005: 85). Therefore, from this view, “the purpose of the Defense Department was no longer to defend the United States or to deter would-be aggressors but to transform the international order by transforming its constituent parts” (2005: 85). Thus, the American army transforms into, in Michael Ledeen’s terms, “the best democracy program ever invented” (in ibid: 85).

American military power is at the core of neoconservative ideology; neoconservatism and military supremacy mutually promote each other. Neoconservatism is a great supporter of military supremacy, and at the same time, military supremacy helps neoconservatism reach its

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⁹⁰ It is not strange that famous realists, such as George Kennan, could not make sense of the Bush administration’s discourse on Iraq. “The apparently imminent use of American armed forces to drive Saddam Hussein from power, from what I know of our government’s state of preparedness for such an involvement, seems to me well out of proportion to the dangers involved. I have seen no evidence that we have any realistic plans for dealing with the great state of confusion in Iraqi affairs which would presumably follow even after the successful elimination of the dictator. … I, of course, am not well informed. But I fear that any attempt on our part to confront that latent situation by military means alone could easily serve to aggravate it rather than alleviate it” (in Mayer 2002).
objectives. This military supremacy liberates policy making from its traditional restraints and procedures while also sidelining other alternatives, such as negotiation. As Bacevich argues, “Indeed far from being a scourge for humankind, war itself – even, or perhaps especially, preventive war – became in neoconservative eyes an efficacious means to serve idealistic ends” (ibid: 85). Since the problem of Iraq deals with the ‘nature of the regime,’ more time does not solve it; thus, war and regime change should be the choice. The next step is to make the use of force a desirable option.

**Personification of the Enemy**

Despite all disagreements, collisions and contestations on the problem of Iraq, perhaps all actors present in the media coverage of Iraq did agree that Saddam was a bad, or rather evil, person. While more than 11% of the *Washington Post*’s coverage of Iraq and about 13% of the *New York Times*’ coverage dealt directly with Saddam Hussein, no single item in the selected news articles depicted a positive image of Saddam Hussein. Besides, with this significant presence in the news coverage of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was not an equal actor among others. He was talked about but as a passive actor who was barely able to react.

The construction of Saddam Hussein established a crucial element in the discourse of the war on Iraq. In the context of the ‘war on terror’ Saddam Hussein acted as a nodal point that connected important elements of that discourse. Unlike most American wars, the war on Iraq did not involve a construction of people-categories; rather, it concentrated on one person, i.e. Saddam Hussein as the enemy. Saddam Hussein was indeed a major facilitator of the war on Iraq. While securitizing actors in most cases struggle to personify the enemy, in the case of Iraq, it deployed

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91 Some people categories, such as the Iraqis and the Kurds, were constructed as victims. However, they were used to detach Saddam Hussein (victimizer) from the Iraqis (victims). This technique helped the securitizing agency, the Bush administration in particular, to avoid the implications of constructing a collectivity as enemy. Besides, as I will argue later in this chapter, this distinction was directly linked with the construction of the war as liberating the Iraqis. For the construction of people-categories see Coy and Voerle’s (2000).
Saddam Hussein to represent all the undesired. As early as August 2002, Christopher Marquis observed that President Bush had successfully vilified Saddam Hussein in the public mind. He argued that “personifying the enemy and declaring him evil is a well-established tactic for rallying public opinion” (Marquis 2002). In reducing the problem of Iraq to Saddam Hussein, and in the personification of the enemy, President Bush relied heavily on metaphors such as ‘evil’, ‘dictator’ and ‘Hitler,’ and he utilized WWI and WWII stories to show how this enemy had to be dealt with.

**Saddam as Evil**

In his October 7, 2002 speech to Americans, President Bush located Saddam Hussein in the broader context of his ‘war on terror’ by mentioning that “Terrorist cells and outlaw regimes [Iraq, Iran and North Korea] building weapons of mass destruction are different faces of the same evil” (in *New York Times*, October 8, 2002: 12).

Dana Milbank tried to make sense of the course of events that led to the war by analyzing the personal character of George W. Bush (Milbank 2003). According to “some historians and strategists,” Milbank wrote, “the true explanation is deep in Bush’s psyche, and that confidence in his momentous decision is consistent with his character, which draws sharp lines between good and evil, black and white” (ibid). Milbank believed such distinctions were encouraged by Bush’s religious beliefs. He argued that “Bush implies but does not directly assert that he is doing God’s work.” According to “those close to Bush,” Milbank continued, Bush took comfort from “prayer, but not policy.” Those who shared Bush’s religious beliefs assumed that “Bush believes he is divinely inspired.” Jim Cody, a Christian broadcaster in Tennessee, said, “It seems...
as if he is on an agenda from God … The Scriptures say God is the one who appoints leaders. If he truly knows God, that would give him a special anointing” (in ibid).

Bush’s practice resonated with the perspective of a religious community believing in the metaphysical and moral dualism of good and evil. Within the religious authority, evangelicals embraced Bush policy as “Assault on Evil” (Broadway 2002). Richard Cizik, from the National Association of Evangelicals, albeit as a measure of last resort, endorsed the Bush administration policy of overthrowing the “evil” Hussein regime (in Broadway 2003). In a fatwa for jihad against Saddam Hussein, though within the framework of Christianity, Cizik stated that confronting Saddam Hussein would reproduce ‘faith.’ Earlier, in September 2002, he had argued, “That faith includes a stated belief in Jesus Christ and the existence of “evil” in the form of people like Hussein” (in Broadway 2002). Given that the paradox of faith is permanently in need of evil, the personification of the enemy as evil seems to be an effective technique to mobilize support from the religious community – which tends to view the other as some form of evil.

In the administration, President Bush was not alone in speaking this discourse. Among his aides, Condoleezza Rice, for instance, in making a moral argument for regime change, argued, “This is an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his population, his neighbors and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, on all of us” (in Kessler 2002). The evil metaphor was used by Colin Powell to justify the use of the military against Iraq. In Davos, Switzerland, he said that “There comes a time when soft power of talking with evil will not work – where unfortunately, hard power is the only thing that works” (in Slevin 2003).
In congressional debates on the Iraq war resolution, the evil metaphor was deployed regularly by the members. Tom Delay, House Majority Whip, said, “The war on terrorism will be fought here at home unless we summon the will to confront evil before it attacks … Only regime change can remove the danger from Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction” (VandeHei and Eilperin 2002, added *italics*). In a similar statement, Porter Goss, Chairman of the Intelligence Committee and a former CIA operative, said, “I can attest to the evilness of Saddam Hussein” (in ibid.). This metaphor also had its proponents among ‘experts.’ For instance, Brent Scowcroft, in arguing for the urgency of the problem of Iraq compared to the case of Iran as a supporter of terrorism, said, “… Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor” (Von Drehle 2002).

Among critics of the Bush administration, some actors, such as Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, comfortably used the same metaphors to identify Saddam Hussein. However, she encouraged the President to review his schedule and the timing of dealing with Iraq. She argued, “Saddam Hussein is a serial liar, a bully and a threat to peace. He has used chemical weapons, and he yearns to impress an Arab world that despises him by building a deliverable nuclear bomb” (Albright 2002). Yet, she continued that however evil Saddam Hussein may have been, the administration needed to prioritize dealing with terrorism.

Fighting evil is not merely a religious commitment but a main component of American identity as a ‘liberating force.’ After his visit to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on November 11, 2002, President Bush said, “Our nation is committed to freedom for ourselves and for others […] we and our allies have fought evil regimes and left in their place self-governing and prosperous nations” (in Sanger and Bumiller 2002). Reporting on Bush’s visit, David Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller interpreted Bush’s remark as part of a White House public relations strategy to “cast
the United States not as a conqueror, but as a liberating force that would rid the Iraqi people of a dictator” (ibid).

**Saddam as Dictator**

‘Dictator’ was another recurrent attribute in the discourse about Saddam Hussein. In contrast to the notion of ‘evil’ with its metaphysical origins, ‘dictator,’ as a secular construction, was more comfortably used by certain actors, such as journalists and experts, to describe Saddam Hussein and his government. In his speech on October 7, 2002, President Bush said, “We agree that *Iraqi dictator* must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons” (added *italics*). In the same speech, he contended, according to a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N., that the “fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime itself” and continued, “Saddam Hussein is a *homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction*” (added *italics*). At another point in the speech, he mentioned, “As Americans we want peace, we work and sacrifice for peace. But there can be no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of a *ruthless and aggressive dictator*” (added *italics*). He described “the dictator of Iraq” as a “student of Stalin” that used “murder as a tool of terror and control within his own cabinet, within his own army and even within his own family.” And finally, Bush demanded that Congress send a “message to the dictator in Iraq that his only chance – his only choice – is full compliance. And the time remaining for that choice is limited.”

President Bush deployed the term dictator on other occasions to introduce Saddam Hussein. For instance, in November 2002, after visiting the Vietnam Memorial, Bush, in a speech at Arlington National Cemetery in which he described the United States as liberator not conqueror, said, “We will not permit a dictator who has used weapons of mass destruction to threaten America with
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons [...] The dictator of Iraq will fully disarm, or the United States will lead a coalition and disarm him” (Sanger and Bumiller 2002).

President Bush employed the term to discredit Saddam Hussein. He depicted him as a dictator who was a liar and absolutely untrustworthy. In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003 (in Washington Post, January 29, 2003: A01), Bush described the dictator as a “liar” and “absolutely untrustworthy,” and he continued, “The dictator of Iraq is not disarming, he is deceiving.” A few weeks before the invasion of Iraq, pressing the UN Security Council, President Bush warned the Council, “This is a defining moment for the U.N. Security Council” and added, “If the Security Council were to allow a dictator to lie and deceive, the Security Council will be weakened” (Stevenson 2003).

Dictatorship was a common attribute shared by the members of ‘axis of evil.’ As I quoted Rumsfeld earlier in this chapter, this criterion was applied to the administration’s prioritization of threats. President Bush used ‘dictator’ as a name, rather than an adjective, for Saddam Hussein. In March 2003, a few days before the outbreak of war, he mentioned, “Iraqi’s dictator has made a public show of producing and destroying a few missiles, missiles that violate the restrictions set out more than 10 years ago” (in New York Times, March 7, 2003: 12). Bush continued that he would not “leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons” (ibid).

Dictatorship, in the American security discourse, seems to be one of the general ingredients of an enemy-making recipe – with its optimum solution: ‘regime change.’ This notion of ‘dictator’ put the Bush administration and the people of Iraq on the same front against the same enemy. It helped make the distinction between Iraqis and Saddam Hussein and transformed the war into ‘liberation.’ In his 2003 State of the Union speech, addressing Iraqis, President Bush said, “Your
enemy is not surrounding your country – your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation” (in Washington Post, January 29, 2003).\textsuperscript{93} Eliminating weapons of mass destruction and liberating Iraqis from a “dangerous dictator” were the two pillars of peace envisioned by President Bush. Separating the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein, in a news conference in early March 2003 President Bush mentioned that “In the event of conflict, America also accepts our responsibility to protect innocent lives in every way possible. We will bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people. We will help that nation to build a just government after decades of brutal dictatorship” (in New York Times, March 7, 2003: 12).

Considering Hussein’s dictatorial, some experts, such as Reuel Marc Gerecht, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, were doubtful whether his fall would destabilize Iraq (2002: 27). That liberating war was expected to change the face of the Middle East. Peter Slevin evaluated President Bush’s speech on February 26, 2003 as “… designed to showcase the administration’s belief that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s overthrow would be a significant step toward broad democratic change in the Arab world” (Slevin 2003). From this view, the war in Iraq was presented as a “battle for the future of the Muslim world” (ibid). Paul Wolfowitz argued, “If, when Iraq is liberated, it can come up with a representative government that treats its people decently, I think it can have significant effects throughout the Middle East” (in ibid.).

\textsuperscript{93} It seems that this ‘dictatorship-liberation’ link has become the ritual of war making regardless of the goal(s) of the war. As Eric Davis, in his examination of the ‘myths and realities’ of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, has observed, “The obverse of the myth of Iraqi military might and the Saddam-Hitler analogy is the notion that the Persian Gulf War was fought to liberate Kuwait. The United States constantly emphasized terms such as legitimate rule, democracy, and the right to self-determination during the crisis” (Davies, 1993: 268). However, rule by the al-Sabah family by no means met the criteria of democratic rule.

In the media coverage of Iraq, this dictator-liberation connect was deployed sometimes quite randomly. For instance, covering public opinion about the impacts of the loss of the space shuttle Columbia, Jeffrey Gettleman quoted a Republican political consultant who said that “[…] this Columbia tragedy puts things in perspective about how life is precious, which should make us more encouraged to go to Iraq, remove this dictator and improve the lot of the lives of the people of that country” (New York Times, February 3, 2003: 21).
However, in the selected coverage of the *New York Times*, Shibley Telhami, by mentioning ‘vital aims’ such as fighting terrorism, securing oil supplies and protecting the lives of American soldiers, argued that “the spread of democracy will again take a back seat to our national priorities” (Telhami 2002). He casted doubt on the success of using force to democratize Iraq and warned that ‘an antidemocratic dictator’ may be ousted successfully by the use of force but democracy cannot be established.94

Journalists also referred to Saddam as a dictator and to his rule as dictatorial (Chivers 2003). In the *Washington Post*, John Kelly relied on President Bush’s statement that “the leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, is a dangerous man who is eager to get his hands on terrible weapons, if he hasn’t already” (Kelly 2002). Kelly described Saddam Hussein as a dictator “who rules by force, scaring or killing opponents,” and in another place he quoted President Bush’s warning that “Saddam Hussein is a serious threat. He is a significant problem and something the country must deal with” (ibid). Kelly argued, “Most people think that Iraq would be a better country […] without Hussein,” however, he noted that the White House was more worried about “what Hussein might do to the United States and our friends” (ibid).

**Saddam as Hitler**

‘Evil’ and ‘dictator’ relate to certain layers and elements in American security discourse and speak to certain interests. While ‘evil’ helps reproduce religious Puritan elements, ‘dictator’

94 Some anti-war activists, such as Scott Ritter, an ex-marine and former UN arms inspector, disputed the administration’s rhetoric on Iraq’s dictatorship. He argued that the US works with dictators in other regions, such as Africa, to provide Americans with a more comfortable life (in Milloy, *Washington Post*, November 13, 2002: B01). Ritter believed that the main reason for the war was that the United States wanted to control Mideast oil. As a matter of fact, in its campaign on Iraq the administration, especially with regard to its military operations, enjoyed generous support from the Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Among them, Qatar hosted the US Central Command in the region. Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt examined the military buildup in the region with a focus on Qatar (*New York Times*, September, 12, 2002: 23). In addition to Qatar, Bahrain hosted the Navy’s headquarters, the fifth fleet, in the region. Both Qatar and Bahrain, although US allies, could by no means be considered democratic countries.
reproduces the democratic ‘us’ versus undemocratic ‘them.’ It seems what David Campbell calls “the iconic quality of America,” that is, the “intertwined filaments of secularism and spirituality,” can be vividly observed in the case of Iraq. Sacvan Bercovitch observes that “Only in the United States has nationalism carried with it the Christian meaning of sacred. Only America, of all national designations, has assumed the combined force of eschatology and chauvinism” (in Campbell 1992: 225). However, in contrast to Bercovitch, Campbell believes that “America is not exceptional” in this combination, “but America is an intensification of this structural quality” (1992: 133). These two processes of insecurity making and identity making seem to take place in relation to each other. As Campbell argues

While an evangelism of fear has been cardinal for the constitution of many states’ identities, the apocalyptic mode – in which a discourse of danger functions as providence and foretells a threat that prompts renewal – has been conspicuous in the catalogue of American statecraft. Accordingly, an array of individuals, groups, beliefs, and behaviors have occupied the position of the antichrist, and have been inscribed with one or more terms from the panoply of tropes of otherness found in American experience. (ibid: 133)

As to the case of Iraq, the alliance of Saddam Hussein and terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction would create such an apocalypse.95

Hitler was a master analogy96 in the ‘panoply of tropes’ that constructed the identity of Saddam Hussein. By engaging allies around the world and with the will to influence the United Nations Security Council, Bush’s campaign on Iraq transcended American experience and became a global campaign. ‘Hitler’ served as a thread that could connect different local securitization

95 See his apocalyptic warning in the beginning of the introduction to this dissertation.
96 Scott Macdonald describes Hitler as a master analogy. He argues that “some events are so dominant, important and life-changing that they deeply influence anyone old enough to be aware of them. Such historical event or series of events often become master analogies. […] For decades after the event, policy makers draw lessons from the master analogy and apply those lessons to a broad range of crises (Macdonald 2000: 204).
moves, its chapter in the United Kingdom in particular.\textsuperscript{97} Further, by drawing on historical lessons, the use of such metaphors and analogies plays a crucial role in the definition of the problem and the development of appropriate solutions. Therefore, their application, by implying certain solutions, involves important moral implications.\textsuperscript{98}

This ‘Hitler’ analogy that prevailed in American discourse on Iraq assumes that “[…] Saddam came from a dangerous but rare breed of tyrants and that ousting him in conjunction with minimal democratic reforms would \textit{eliminate} the threat and start a favorable political chain reaction in the Middle East” (Flibbert 2004: 83, added \textit{italics}).

\textbf{Personification as a Technique}

From a psychological perspective, personification of the enemy helps the securitizing actor to externalize fear and hate towards the enemy.\textsuperscript{99} Further, by dehumanizing the enemy, personification of enemy alleviates moral and ethical concerns about the securitizing move, in particular the use of force.\textsuperscript{100} Saddam Hussein was deployed by the Bush administration to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{97} In his tour of Europe in May 2002, President Bush used the analogies of Hitler and Stalin while making reference to the threat of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden (see Milbank, \textit{Washington Post}, May 24, 2002: A28). Those are analogies that both Americans and Europeans know well.
\item \textsuperscript{98} For instance, by drawing on President Bush and Prime Minister Margret Thatcher, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Scott Macdonald shows how the power of ‘the 1930s’ analogy had lingered into the 1990s (see Macdonald 2000).
\item \textsuperscript{99} From a psychological perspective of battling your inner enemy, “your own narcissism” for instance, Lorne Lander (2004) offers a set of instructions that begins with identifying the enemy: a narcissistic pattern. Before creating and implementing a battle plan, he recommends to ‘personify the enemy’: “Create an imaginary figure, or choose one from literature or from your dreams, who embodies the narcissistic qualities you’re going to strive to conquer in yourself” (ibid: 289). He argues, “The main goal in this step is to disidentify from your own narcissistic habits. If you think that your narcissism is you, then battling it will degenerate into a form of self-hatred. […] it’s best to choose a clearly negative figure to counter this unhealthy tendency” (ibid). As an example for his case, Lander writes, “Tibetan practitioners often think of evil dictators, thieves, or demons.” Then, he advises his readers to “Be creative in coming up with your own personification. And once you’ve done so, strongly remind yourself that he or she is not you!” (ibid)
\item \textsuperscript{100} Andrew Fiala argues that the personification of the enemy as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein gives a name to our cause and safely allows us to kill thousands of nameless soldiers and civilians in pursuit of the evil ones. He argues, “We must not be deceived: Osama and Saddam are themselves abstractions, created by the government and media” (2004: 125).
\end{itemize}
connect all points with negative connotations (threats) including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, violations of human rights and the absence of democracy (dictatorship).

Management of the creation of fear and hate and directing these emotions towards the enemy are required to justify the use of force. Examining high school students’ hatred towards the Nazis during World War II, Glicksberg argued that

In war the question of hate is by no means academic in nature. On it depends the kind of psychological as well as military warfare we wage. Once soldiers as well as civilians and students are convinced that the enemy is a bloody beast of prey, then it becomes a sacred duty to track him down to his lair and kill him without mercy. (Glicksberg 1945: 19)
However, he warned about negative implications of creating hate insofar as this hate campaign may escalate to the point that the ‘self’ is encouraged to commit the same atrocities as the ‘other’ enemy.

**Deployment and Dissemination**
Saddam Hussein was presented to Americans as ‘Hitler’ a few days after his invasion of Kuwait. ‘Saddam as Hitler’ lingered well into the 1990s and early 2000s. As Steve Yetiv observed, “Following British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, who compared Saddam to Hitler on the day of the invasion, Bush did the same on August 8 in revisiting the 1930s and the disastrous Western policy of appeasing Hitler (Yetiv 2002: 146). On another occasion, in his analysis of American foreign policy making, Yetiv argued that “[t]he presidency is the perfect pulpit from which to construct reality because the president has great influence over the media, the public agenda, and the symbols of rhetoric” (Yetiv 2011: 86).

Responding to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, President George H. W. Bush described the *situation* by saying that “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein” (Bush 1990). He, then, elaborated upon his *decision*: “[…] we’ve made our stand not simply to protect resources or real estate but to protect the freedom of nations. We’re making good on longstanding assurances to protect and defend our friends who have the courage to stand up to evil and are asking for our help.” He went on to warn about the consequence of *inaction*. Referring to Hitler, President Bush senior said, “A half a century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should and could have been stopped. We’re not about to make that same mistake twice” (ibid.).

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101 An interesting point is that President Bush never mentioned Hitler in his speech, which shows that the audience, American or otherwise, is able to recall that ‘aggressor’ and our ‘mistake’ in ‘appeasing’ him.
Manheim argues that knowledge exists to guide what he calls ‘strategic political communication’ and that an increasing number of governments appreciate such knowledge (Manheim 1994: 136-137). To that he adds, “Typically, governments with special needs or problems or with generally negative images in the United States are the most likely to engage in strategic communication, but strategies are available for, and employed by, those with positive images as well” (1994: 137). He describes the ‘Gulf Conflict’ as a ‘battle of images’ between Saddam Hussein and the Bush administration to manage the range of politically acceptable solutions for themselves and their adversary. For the Bush administration, as he observes

[…] the principal objective was to shape the debate to maximize its freedom of action and to build support for a military response. This was achieved through image management (e.g., Saddam Hussein as “Hitler”), but also through news management, as with the media pools and the Home Town News Program, both calculated to minimize the importance of potentially critical national reporters (1994: 137).

This precedence of the President, Lance Bennett argues, shapes the debate about the problem. Regarding the first Persian Gulf War, Dorman and Livingston argue that “In the absence of an alternative, a majority of the public latched onto the analogy very early in the conflict. According to a survey conducted on August 9 and 10 for the New York Times, 60 percent of the public ‘accepted Mr. Bush’s comparison of Saddam Hussein of Iraq to Hitler’” (Dorman and Livingston 1994: 72). Such analogies and images seem to be more influential when they offer a negative image to their audience. Jarol Manheim, drawing on Hill and Knowlton’s focus group data, argues that American public support for the use of force was not a result of sympathy for Kuwait but antipathy toward Saddam Hussein (Manheim 1994).

A fascinating point observed by Marjorie Williams was that this striking transformation in the image of Saddam Hussein, from a person “with whom the United States has sided for most of the
past decade” to a “fiend in human form,” took place in only a few days (in Dorman and Livingston 1994: 72). However, Ted Galen Carpenter raises the following question with regard to that portrayal of Saddam as Hitler and of ‘Iraq as the new Nazi Germany’

If Saddam was really such an odious character bent on achieving regional hegemony, the obvious questions were, why had the Bush administration been oblivious to that danger before August 1990, and why had it instead – along with its predecessor – pursued a consistent policy of building up Iraqi military power? (Carpenter 1995: 191)

As Dorman and Livingston observed, although the image of ‘Saddam as Hitler’ was challenged on occasion, it simply overwhelmed the alternatives (Dorman and Livingston 1994). Further, the officials were in a position to influence the overall output of the media by repeating this image in press releases. Although the extent of this influence is debatable, David Wilcox argues, “What is clear however is the attempt by official sources to provide the linkage and the subsequent repetition or compatibility of aims in newspaper articles” (Willcox 2006). In the selected news articles examined for this project, Saddam Hussein as evil, as a dictator and as Hitler were deployed repeatedly by different administration members including President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, as well as members of Congress, such as Porter Goss, in their presentation of Saddam Hussein. Journalists could not rid themselves of such images and analogies deployed by the administration for the presentation of Saddam Hussein. It seems this was not only because of the issue of primacy but also perhaps because such images were the mainstay of the discourse of the administration and their constitution of the enemy. Besides, journalists themselves find such images helpful in making sense of the problem for their readers.

Press dependence on official sources, in particular the administration, and the administration’s supremacy over other news sources are reproduced in media coverage of individual problems.
W. Lance Bennett has examined “the dilemmas of power and accountability that results from press dependence on official sources that offers spin instead of transparent information about their activities and motives” (2010: 105). In other words, this dependence of the press maintains a privileged position for government officials over other social actors. This privileged position influences the quality of information made available to the public. With respect to the case of Iraq in particular, as Bennett et al have observed, the Bush administration’s poorly documented stories about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which were contradicted by UN inspectors’ reports, shaped the headlines of leading newspapers, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post (Bennett, G. et al. 2007). Although both dailies later apologized for letting administration sources dominate their stories, in their examination of the Abu Ghraib scandal, Bennett and his collaborators realized that the administration’s framing of the story again dominated the news coverage (Bennett, Lawrence et al. 2006).

The pulpit of presidency is not used only to coin such analogies but also to determine their expiration date. Despite all the propaganda around ‘Saddam as Hitler,’ as Eric Davis observes in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “The cruelest irony of all is that, once the Persian Gulf War ended, all of the Bush administration’s references to Saddam as Hitler ceased as quickly as they had begun” (1993: 268). The abandonment of the ‘Saddam as Hitler’ analogy severely impacted, among others, the uprising of the Kurdish and Shia communities in Iraq. With the sudden decline of the ‘Saddam as Hitler’ narrative, Saddam Hussein was given a free hand to suppress those movements in Iraq. That sudden turn in George H. W. Bush’s image of Saddam Hussein created an unpleasant image of the United States as an unreliable ally among the Iraqi opposition. As C. J. Chivers, in his report from Kurdistan in December 2002, has mentioned,
“[...] Kurds also remember engagements with the United States that ended in what they consider betrayal” (Chivers 2002).

Policy Implications
Drawing on Murray Edelman, Dorman and Livingston argue that the definition stage shapes the entire process of dealing with the problem at stake. “Human relations, identities, responsibilities, and ‘what is necessary,’ are all established in the definition process” (Dorman and Livingston 1994: 73). Each metaphor and analogy, by considering certain explanations and solutions, eliminate some others. As Paul Joseph argues about President George H. W. Bush’s comparison of Saddam Hussein to Hitler, “The use of the Hitler analogy locked the administration into a strategy of applying the “lesson” of Munich – we must avoid appeasement and we must respond to aggression” (1993: 91). From a different perspective, Yetiv offers a similar understanding of the use of the Hitler analogy. He argues that Saddam Hussein as Hitler delimited the number of alternatives that could be deployed against Saddam Hussein. “If Saddam was constructed as Hitler-like and Iraq as a great threat, then Bush had no choice but to be tough. That meant that some alternatives would not be given full consideration and that war at some point would become preferable” (Yetiv 2011: 86).

The deployment of analogies, in addition to delimiting policy choices, influences the agency of policy making. In their examination of the senior President Bush’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kunkel and Taylor interpret the adoption of the ‘Hussein-Hitler analogy’ by Bush in the early days of the ‘Gulf War’ as “immaturity” because it “drove subsequent policy formation” (Kunkel and Taylor 1995: 135). They argue that “Once locked into that Phase I security value stance, the concept of appeasement became so powerful that it blocked any possibility of

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102 Dick Cheney mentions this story and the question of trust in his memoir where he talks about the administration’s plans to deploy the Iraqi opposition against Saddam Hussein (see Cheney 2011: 332).
dialogue with Hussein as well as any discussion of other issues in the Middle East” (1995: 135).  

**Action versus Appeasement**

Indeed, the Bush administration was aware of the consequences of its deployed metaphors and analogies. When the enemy is likened to Hitler, it has to be treated as such. Recalling Germany’s Nazi past, in his speech to the German Parliament on May 23, 2002, President Bush asked for their support for fighting against the “new totalitarian threat” of terrorism, and he warned that “like the threats of another era, this threat cannot be appeased” (in Milbank 2002). In the UK, Prime Minister Blair used the Hitler analogy to reject ‘appeasement.’ He argued that “A majority of decent and well-meaning people said there was no need to confront Hitler and that those who did were war-mongers […] When people decided not to confront fascism, they were doing the popular thing, they were doing it for good reasons and they were good people […] but they made the wrong decision.”  

This link between the identity of a threat and its suitable solution(s) in the Hitler analogy was elaborated by Robert Kagan in his critique of the Clinton administration’s policy towards Saddam Hussein. The Clinton administration tried to manage Saddam Hussein through limited use of force, but drawing on the rise of Hitler, Kagan argued that neither diplomatic means nor limited use of force were sufficient to keep Saddam ‘in the box.’ He instead argued

> It is true, moreover, for superpowers as well as for dictators that nothing succeeds like success. A successful intervention in Iraq would revolutionize the strategic situation in the Middle East, in ways both tangible and intangible, and all to the benefit of American interests. Continued failure to take such action against Saddam will progressively erode our strategic position and will put the world on

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103 Under Phase I leadership they recognized the autocratic style of leadership that “makes all decisions; demands obedience and, defends territory” (ibid: 133).
notice as the 21st century begins that the Americans, like the French and British of the 1930s, have lost their nerve. (Kagan 1998)

Making reference to the ‘lessons of 1930s’ was used as a technique to discredit negotiation and compromise on the problem. Ripsman and Levy argue that “The ‘lessons of the 1930s,’ based on British and French appeasement of Germany, have profoundly influenced U.S. security policy for a half century. Presidents have invoked these lessons in decisions for war in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003, and in presidential campaigns” (2008: 148). Appeasement, which is widely believed to seek a lasting peace through concession to the enemy, seems to function as an expletive in American security and foreign policy discourse. In realist literature of world politics the lessons of the 1930s are used to show the failure of appeasement policy. Neville Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement marks a typical failure in policies inspired by ‘good motives.’ “Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable and to bring untold miseries to millions of people” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993: 6). However, Ripsman and Levy argue that such a negative presentation of ‘appeasement’ is constructed by the political opposition and academia. They, instead, argue that “Appeasement can also be used to reduce tensions with one adversary to conserve resources for use against a second, more threatening, adversary; to separate an adversary from potential allies; to redirect an adversary’s hostility toward another target; or to buy time to build up strength for deterrence or defense against the adversary” (2008; 150).

Some journalists, such as Robert Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., deployed the Hitler analogy in order to discredit and discourage the resistance against the war on Iraq. Referring to what he described as the “sympathetic treatment that so many world leaders accorded Saddam Hussein, especially at the United Nations,” he mentioned that
an expected thought occurs: Can Adolf Hitler’s reputation, too, be rescued? … In France, fully a third of the populace is pulling for him [Saddam] in his war with the “Anglo-Americans.” Who are these Frenchmen? Possibly they are the descendants of those who collaborated with the Nazis. Has anyone polled them on their present assessment of Hitler? How about polling them on Hitler if he were engaged in war with the Anglo-Americans? Such a poll might mark the beginning of Adolf’s comeback in world opinion. (in Heath 2009: 156)

Some religious authorities, such as Ted Haggard, the senior pastor at New Life Church, used the Hitler analogy to justify certain solutions for the problem of Iraq. According to Bill Broadway (Broadway 2003: B09), Haggard “[…] called a regime change in Iraq inevitable and said Saddam Hussein is “more illogical and random than Hitler was.” If it takes military action to get rid of the dictator, so be it, Haggard said. But he prefers what he believes to be a more powerful weapon: prayer.”

Beyond diagnostic functions, WWII analogies, David Bruce MacDonald observes, signify how the enemy can be transformed. He argues that

Analogies like the Enemy Transformation helped policy-makers conceptualize what a post-invasion Iraq could look like, drawing on idealized perceptions of occupied West Germany and Japan. Yet, more importantly, analogies performed an advocacy function, convincing Congress, the media, and the public, that the only option in the face of such a morally evil regime was its replacement by a democratic alternative. (2009: xiii).

The case of Iraq began with this assumption that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he had to go.105 The Bush administration deployed ‘evil,’ ‘dictator,’ ‘Hitler’ and lessons of WWII to

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105 In early October 2002, Senator Carl M. Levin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, expected that the administration’s proposed resolution on Iraq would pass easily because, in addition to Democrats’ desire to get the issue behind them, there was an agreement on Capitol Hill that Hussein had to be dealt with. Levin said, “We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East” (in Von Drehle, Washington Post, October 7, 2002: A01). The Bush administration built its policy upon such an image of Hussein. Paul O’Neill, Bush’s Secretary of Treasury, said that “From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and needed to go” http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-sought-way-to-invade-iraq/ (Retrieved October 22, 2013).
constitute the identity of the enemy in the war on Iraq. Understanding this enemy and its constitution are essential elements of the process of securitization and the construction of threat. Through this analysis one can understand how the “immeasurable costs” of war are justified against its “immeasurable benefits” (Bush in *New York Times*, March 7, 2003: 12). It is with the deployment of such analogies as dictator that one may understand war not as a matter of invasion, violence and occupation but as means of liberation. Therefore, America “has sent the best of her young men around the world, not to conquer, but to liberate; not to terrorize, but to help.”106 It is indeed such a presentation of an ugly enemy that makes war so beautiful to people and encourages them to enthusiastically participate in war in different ways.

Beyond ST’s understanding of securitization as speech act, this chapter approached language as a social product. By the notion of double movement, it analyzed securitization in the broader social context of reproduction of language. It disaggregated securitization to soft and hard securitizations that respectively refer to reproduction of language (security) and construction of existential threat. It showed how different analogies shape solutions and policy choices in the process of securitization.

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Chapter Five: Securitizing Actor(s)

The Bush Administration

News coverage of Iraq from January 2002 to March 2003 concentrated heavily on the ‘Bush administration’. About 22% of Washington Post news coverage was allocated, directly or indirectly, to the administration. This coverage of the administration included news about statements made, or measures adopted, by different members of the administration and other actors’ references to this entity.

This extensive coverage shows that the media perceived the Bush administration as the main driving force behind the question of Iraq. Considering Iraq a problem of foreign policy, journalists presented the administration as the authority that speaks for the United States.¹⁰⁷ Further, journalists were aware of Bush’s potential arguments surrounding the use of force against Iraq and that the president was not obliged to obtain approval from Congress.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Among many other cases, an article titled “As U.S. Pursues a Verbal War Against Iraq, Other Nations Raise Their Voices” (New York Times, September 1, 2002: 16) by Elaine Sciolino, is one example. Beginning with the phrase “As the Bush administration ratchets up its verbal war against Iraq […]”, Sciolino writes of the administration to mean the United States throughout the article.

¹⁰⁸ In their August 26, 2002 article, Mile Allen and Juliet Eilperin argued that “Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote”, but that the administration nonetheless sought to obtain congressional approval as a demonstration of political support. By then Allen and Eilperin knew that White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and his deputy, Timothy E. Flanigan, were developing the administration’s legal position on Iraq. They quoted ‘officials’ that “… Gonzales told Bush earlier this month that he would not be legally bound to obtain approval for action against Iraq.
Therefore, the potential engagement of Congress, as well as its level of engagement, was left to the discretion of the administration. With regard to the term ‘administration’ in particular, it, on the one hand, depicts President Bush and his aides as a whole that works together to produce certain products. On the other hand, it is sometimes chosen to show the vagueness of this entity in order to emphasize the notion of secrecy and the absence of public information about politics within this agency that what individuals influence most the process of decision-making. In other cases, ‘administration’ is simply employed as a journalistic technique to make reference to an anonymous news source within or outside the executive branch.

In the media coverage of Iraq, in most instances, considering the subject of discussion, the reference to the ‘administration’ may be followed by certain names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Coverage of the Administration (Constitutional authority and appointment)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dick Cheney; Donald Rumsfeld; Colin Powell;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tom Ridge; Spencer Abraham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Tenet; Condoleezza Rice; Ari Fleischer; Alberto Gonzales;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Flanigan; Dan Bartlett, Karl Rove; Andrew H. Card; Paul Wolfowitz;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Lindsey; Mitchel Daniel; Zalmay Khalilzad; Richard Armitage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Myers; Tommy Frank</td>
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Table 1 News coverage of the Bush administration

Based on their constitutional authority and appointment, Table 1 divides the members of the Bush administration into three groups consisting of cabinet members, advisors and other officials and appointees. It should be noted that in the news, they were sometimes identified by their spatial links. That is to say, administration members were also categorized by their White House, State Department or Pentagon affiliation.

In making this case, officials point first to the Constitution’s designation of the president as commander-in-chief” (Washington Post, August 26, 2002, A01).
Despite the administration’s perceived wholeness, the media, in its coverage of the ‘administration’, was aware of incoherence and breaks in the ‘administration’. Among them, the most important was the contrast made by journalists between proponents and opponents (perhaps fewer proponents) of the use of force against Iraq. Thomas E. Ricks, for instance, tried to analyze the administration’s position on the question of how to topple Saddam Hussein. According “to several people involved in the closely held discussions”, he noted, “Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are pushing most forcefully for aggressively confronting Hussein, arguing that he presents a serious threat and that time is not on the side of the United States” (2002: A01). On the other hand, “Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and CIA Director George J. Tenet are asking skeptical questions about a military campaign, especially about the aftermath of what most in the administration assume would be a fairly swift victory” (ibid).

Indeed, one can see that this contrast between Secretary of State Colin Powell, on the one hand, and Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on the other hand, continued to exist through December 2002. Steven R. Weisman and Julia Preston (2002: 1) introduced Colin Powell as the “most reluctant of those around Mr. Bush to go to war” and as “the administration’s principal advocate for seeking United Nations support before military force is used”. Glenn Kessler, in his article in the Washington Post (2003: A01) titled “Moderate
Powell Turns Hawkish On War With Iraq”, wrote that Colin L. Powell was “long perceived as the Bush administration’s most prominent moderate on Iraq” and “the leading advocate for bringing the issue to the United Nations to reach a peaceful resolution”. However, he argued that Powell “has turned hawkish in the past week” due to the French public’s opposition to military action and “President Bush’s growing belief that neither inspectors nor Saddam Hussein appear capable of disarming Iraq” (ibid.). Around that time, in his examination of President Bush’s State of the Union speech, Michael R. Gordon (2003: 1) traced some lines in the speech, such as the link between Saddam Hussein and terrorism, to what he calls ‘administration hard-liners’. He argued that “Administration hard-liners have long been suspicious that there are hidden links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist groups, relations Iraq could exploit to attach the United States while masking its responsibility” (ibid) – implying that not all members of the administration held the same opinion.109

This contrast between administration members, however, diminished as the march towards war gathered pace. Steven R. Weisman’s article on Colin Powell (2003: 11) is another example that examines differences in the administration. Weisman examines what was perhaps the last ‘turning point’ in Powell’s development from a ‘skeptic’ to an ‘advocate’ of a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein with an evaluation very similar to that of Glenn Kessler. Weisman mentions that “Shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Mr. Powell told friends that he would not be stampeded by the administration’s hawks into a war against Iraq, and certainly not a war that did not have international support” (ibid). He then added, “Now after months of diplomacy and inconclusive inspections in Iraq, aides say Mr. Powell is prepared to call for a cutoff in

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109 This contrast between members of the administration can perhaps be utilized to support for the argument that different representations of, and solutions for, the problem do not necessarily occur in a linear succession. Rather, their emergence and position depend very much on the spatial position of social actors engaged in their reproduction.
negotiations over a United Nations Security Council resolution, not simply because he understands the danger of troops sitting in the desert but also because he has lost patience with both Iraq and the French” (ibid).

Within the administration, President Bush and his aides occupied about 18% and 14% of the selected news coverage in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* respectively. Dana Milbank, in his article in the *Washington Post* (2003: A01), examined President Bush’s position on an expected war against Iraq. He argued that both supporters and opponents of invading Iraq agreed on the gravity of its consequences. He believed that “The repercussions of the war are likely to define not just the Bush presidency, but also the U.S. role in the world and even the course of domestic policy for years to come” (ibid). Milbank argued, “It is the largest of gambles – except that Bush, in rhetoric and in temperament, sees it not as a gamble but as a historical inevitability. As he has upped the ante in Iraq by linking the war to the future of the United Nations, NATO and American leadership in the world, he appears confident and serene in the face of bitter worldwide protest” (ibid.).

By interviewing Bush’s friends, Milbank tried to make sense of this serenity in Bush’s personality and worldview. According to those close to Bush, “… the Sept. 11 attacks gave [Bush] not just new meaning to his presidency but a new purpose to his life” (ibid). As a result, Milbank argued, “Bush has come to view his leadership of post-9/11 America as a matter of fate, or of God’s will” (ibid).\(^{110}\) In addition to Bush’s religious personality and ideas were seen as a

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\(^{110}\) Some commentators, such as Dick Meyer of CBS NEWS, disputed such explanations linking Bush’s religious convictions to a potential war in Iraq. Based on his examination of Bush’s speeches and interviews, Meyer did not believe that Bush is “a guy who thinks he’s God’s personal agent”. He argued that religion, especially talking about religion, is not unique to President Bush or to the discourse surrounding a potential war with Iraq. Rather, Meyer argued, “All presidents talk about God, especially in times of war or big trouble, not just George Bush”. He observed the influence of “a slice of normally tolerant “elitist” that has a visceral dislike and mistrust of Bush’s kind of Christianity, or at least it’s [sic] public expression”. However, considering the number of profiles and essays on
ground to break free from the norms and rules of secular politics, especially foreign policy; journalists noticed a ‘secular’ political ideology, “a vision of American supremacy and preemption of emerging threats”, promoted by Bush’s “most hawkish advisers”. Perhaps it is this religio-political certainty and confidence that rendered the war in Iraq possible. As Timothy Garton Ash (2003: 33) observed, “There is something rather new: America feels so confident of its own military power and moral rightness that it will march into the most explosive region in the world with just one effective ally (two if you count Australia”).

To Bush’s personal views and convictions one should add the influence of his aides. However, not all members of the Bush administration contributed equally to the construction of Iraq. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, for example, appeared in the discourse on Iraq to comment on marginal issues, such as the potential increase in the possibility of terrorist activities following the invasion of Iraq and the impacts of the war on energy markets. Overall news coverage of the Iraq war was heavily dominated by three senior members of the administration: Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. Their names appeared 67, 44 and 7 times respectively in the New York Times in the examined period. The corresponding numbers from the Washington Post’s coverage of the Iraq war are 105, 36 and 27 respectively.

Bush that were coming out, he believed that “‘Bush and God’ is the storyline the White House is happy to push.” [http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500159_162-544023.html] “Jeeeee-Hawd! Bush’s War Cry?” Retrieved November 12, 2013).

One should also consider the geography of such statements. For instance, Bush’s remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention in Nashville, Tennessee on February 1, 2003, is one of his most quoted speeches with regard to his religious convictions and the war in Iraq. Although it is interesting that he expressed his religious opinions so comfortably in public, given the audience, it is not strange to speak with a religious tone in front of that crowd. Some others, such as Nabers and Patman, argue that “By referencing nature and God, Bush tries to render political operations of power invisible” (2010: 75).

As Daadler and Lindsay argue, “Journalists, psychologists, and talk-show pundits debated how Bush’s faith influenced his conduct of the war on terrorism, if it did at all. The true connection in the end was probably unknowable, perhaps even to Bush himself” (2003: 89).
Donald Rumsfeld
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was presented by the media as the most hawkish supporter of the Iraq war in the Bush administration. Indeed, he is known as the person who urged the administration to utilize American might for shaping the post-cold-war world. Elaborating on Rumsfeld’s perspective, Timothy Garton Ash conceptualized this recalcitrant unilateralism and militant liberalism, which provided the administration with a moral basis for its invasion of Iraq, as ‘Rumsfeldian vision’. He argued

The Rumsfeldian idea – if the idea is not too dignified a word – is that American might is right. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sees the United States as a City on a Hill. As the hyperpower of the free, it must strike back at international terrorism, the new international communism. It may end up spreading democracy to places like Iraq, and thus make the world a better place. If some allies want to come along to help, that’s fine. If not, you work around them. (Garton Ash 2003)

Rumsfeld was also perhaps the most outspoken person in the Bush administration with regard to the question of Iraq. Based on media coverage of Rumsfeld, he played an important role in coping with resistance within the Pentagon, the administration and the government at large regarding the use of force against Iraq. In late July 2002, Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the situation with Saddam Hussein would not improve (Ricks 2002). He said that “Over time, the economic sanctions weaken, the diplomatic efforts seems to get a little tired, the progress that he’s been able to make in proliferating the terrorist states all across the globe is a serious one” (ibid). Rumsfeld took every opportunity to promote such a perception and escalate the problem of Iraq, particularly by using such incidents as the enforcement of a no-fly zone by coalition forces over Iraqi airspace (see, for instance, Schmitt, (2002: 18)).

Thomas Ricks observed some degree of opposition from senior army commanders with regard to the war with Iraq; however, he quoted a ‘senior administration official’ who said that “the
military has limited influence in this administration” (2002: A01). On a number of occasions, Rumsfeld was the person who outlined the administration’s case for Iraq, especially with regard to Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and its connections with terrorism. Moreover, he evaluated different disarmament solutions from inspection to regime change. More importantly, he was the person who drew a line between the diplomatic phase and the use of force in dealing with the question of Iraq (see ibid: 10). Rumsfeld attempted to answer some of the important questions raised in the media about the administration’s securitizing move, such as the uniqueness of Iraq within the axis of evil and why it had to be treated differently (see ibid).\textsuperscript{111} Rumsfeld’s opinion on ‘evidence’, especially the notion of burden of proof, was crucial in the administration’s reasoning against Iraq.\textsuperscript{112} He defended the administration’s way of dealing with Iraq, claiming that it will have disciplinary consequences on other nations and could deter them from pursuing weapons of mass destruction (see ibid). Further, he drew a rosy post-invasion picture of Iraq as a free and democratic nation (ibid).

Donald Rumsfeld freely expressed his unilateralist ideas that the United States would not need allies in this journey. His provocative ideas, especially about the United Nations and America’s allies, trespassed on Colin Powell’s territory. In a news conference in January 2003, Rumsfeld dismissed calls to withhold military action in favor of inspections. According to Stevenson and Sanger, he “[…] turned up the pressure on the United Nations, saying that failure to support action against Iraq would leave the organization without credibility and at risk of collapsing, as

\textsuperscript{111} The following passage from his news conference on January 20, 2003 presents a summary of the administration’s case against Iraq. “No other living dictator has shown the same deadly combination of capability and intent, of aggression against its neighbors, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the use of chemical weapons against his own people as well as against his neighbors, oppression of his own people, support of terrorism, and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors, and to the United States, as Iraq” (Shanker 2003).

\textsuperscript{112} His statement in a news conference on January 20, 2003 is interesting in this regard. He said, “The United Nations resolution did not put the burden of proof on the United States or the United Nations to prove that Iraq has these weapons, […] The U.N. resolution put the burden directly on Iraq to prove that it is disarming and that it does not have these weapons or if does, it is willing to give them up” (Shanker 2003).
the League of Nations effectively did in the 1930s” (2003: 1). U.S. allies did not avail themselves of a much better position than the United Nations in the Rumsfeldian vision. A few weeks before the war began, Steven R. Weisman argued that Colin Powell was convinced that war may be the best option (2003: 11). Nevertheless, he was furious at Donald Rumsfeld for making diplomacy difficult by “hurling insults at France and Germany” and saying that “the war could be waged without Britain …” (ibid).

Donald Rumsfeld was the mainstay of a circle which concentrated on the planning of the war with Iraq. As early as September 2002, journalists knew that Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks were meeting President Bush to plan the war in Iraq (e.g. Gordon and Schmitt 2002). Glenn Kessler (2003) believed that “Serious military planning also began in earnest in the spring. Every three or four weeks, Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command, would travel to the White House to give Bush a private briefing on the war planning for Iraq.” Further, within the administration, along with Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld acted as a node that linked the president with a number of bureaucrats/experts in the Department of Defense, among them Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, the head of the Defense Policy Board.

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113 Earlier, in February 2002 in Munich, Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, reacted similarly to both Russia’s defense minister’s statement that “any actions taken by the states and international organizations against terrorists, including the use of force, should be based on norms and principles of international law” and China’s deputy foreign minister’s caution that “the American-led antiterrorism campaign should not be “arbitrarily” widened”. Wolfowitz responded, “I take strong exception to the view that we need a U.N. mandate to act […] We were attacked, and an attack on one is all the justification we need to take action to defend all of us”. He also said, “Our approach has been to aim at prevention and not merely punishment. We are at war. Self-defense requires prevention and sometimes pre-emption” (in Erlanger 2002)

114 See for instance, Sanger and Schmitt 2002.

Patrick J. Buchanan’s article (2003), was an attempt to explain the stampede to the war with Iraq by analyzing its agency. Buchanan identified a ‘clique’ in the White House and the Department of Defense, which included Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, that was pushing the United States towards the war. Alan Cooperman’s article in the Washington Post (2003: A10), however, framed Buchanan’s argument more as an ‘anti-Semitic’ accusation than a critique of United States foreign and security policy. Cooperman quoted different ‘Jewish’ figures, including Richard Perle, reacting to Buchanan’s article as ‘anti-Semitic’. Buchanan’s argument detached the war from its alleged causes. Contextualizing the problem as a matter of post-Cold-War politics, he argued that “these neoconservatives began casting about for a new crusade to give meaning to their lives” (ibid). He believed that “They seized on that horrific atrocity [of Sept. 11] to steer America’s rage into all-out war to destroy their despised enemies, the Arab and Islamic “rogue states” that have resisted U.S. hegemony and loathe Israel” (ibid).

Although Iraq was presented by the Bush administration as a problem within the ‘war on terror’, from Buchanan’s view, “The War Party’s plan [. . .] had been in preparation far in advance of 9/11. And when President Bush, after defeating the Taliban, was looking for a new front in the war on terror, they put their precooked meal in front to him. Bush dug into it” (Buchanan 2003).

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116 Cooperman enlarged the scope of Buchanan’s argument and extended it to the entire Jewish community with the title for the article: “Jewish Organizations Worried About Backlash for Iraq War; Groups Are Outraged Over Allegations of Warmongering”. In actuality, the article reflects the views of those who were accused of favoring Israel’s interests over the United States’ more than Buchanan’s argument.

117 Indeed, with regard to this ‘clique’, Buchanan relied on Stanley Hoffman who introduced this group as the ‘fourth power center’ in Washington clamoring for war. According to Hoffman, “[. . .] there is a loose collection of friends of Israel, who believe in the identity of interests between the Jewish state and the United States. [. . .] These analysts look on foreign policy through the lens of one dominant concern: Is it good or bad for Israel? Since that nation’s founding in 1948, these thinkers have never been in very good odor at the State Department, but now they are well ensconced in the Pentagon, around such strategists as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith” (in Buchanan 2003).
Professional Circles

Media analysis of the examined period shows that certain professional clusters within the administration contributed to the process of securitizing Iraq. Considering the various types of contribution, one can identify three distinct, yet interrelated, clusters: legal, financial and public relations. These clusters facilitated the operation of the war planning cluster.

The legal cluster included a group of legal advisors, among them White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and his deputy Timothy Flanigan. This cluster developed the White House legal position on Iraq and argued that the president was not legally bound to obtain the approval of Congress on the matter. However, in order to obtain political support and reduce the political costs of ignoring Congress, as well as “a variety of legal, policy and historical issues” (Fleischer quoted in Allen and Eilperin 2002), the administration chose to engage Congress in the issue. Another group of administration members, such as Bush’s top political adviser, Karl Rove, and chief of staff, Andrew J. Card, helped schedule the timing of the Iraq rollout and the engagement of Congress to obtain optimum results for both the Iraq case and the November (2002) midterm elections.

In September 2002, Bush’s economic adviser, Lawrence B. Lindsey, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal estimated the cost of war would be between $100 billion and $200 billion (Dobbs 2002).118 A few months later, in January 2003, “Donald H. Rumsfeld told reporters that the administration estimated the cost of a possible war at “under $50 billion” (in Allen 2003). However as Mike Allen reported, “[…] several officials said they are working with an estimate

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118 As Dobbs mentioned, the White House distanced itself from those figures. However, Dobbs’ reaction to this estimate is very illuminating. He argued, “If the war costs between $100 billion and $200 billion, it would still be relatively inexpensive in historical terms. Because of the growth in the U.S. economy, wars are getting cheaper, at least to the American consumer. In a $10 trillion economy, the cost of a second Gulf War would be between 1 percent and 2 percent of the nation's annual gross domestic product, compared with 12 percent for the Vietnam War, 15 percent for the Korean War and 130 percent for World War II” (Dobbs 2002, added italics).
of $80 billion just for the Pentagon, plus foreign aid and other expenses” (ibid). According to “officials”, Allen reported that “the Office of Management and Budget, which Daniels heads, has been working on war estimates for at least five months” (ibid). Allen mentioned a meeting between President Bush, Rumsfeld, and Mitchell E. Daniels in which they attempted to reduce the overall number (ibid). Considering the importance of ‘the costs of war’ in the debates, the numbers produced by this circle were crucial in garnering support for the war.

Although the administration as a whole was engaged in a public campaign, and its different members seized every opportunity to promote the administration’s agenda, some members, such as Communication Director of the White House Dan Bartlett and Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, played an especially important role in public presentation of the war. They, in particular, interpreted President Bush’s statements and explained them to other actors. They met journalists, either before or after important news conferences and speeches, such as the State of the Union address, adjusted public expectations and helped audiences to understand those speeches and statements by the president. They elaborated on the administration’s stance on different matters related to the question of Iraq and communicated the White House’s interpretations of

119 Mike Allen’s framing of the ‘costs of war’ is an interesting case of how the media favored the Bush administration’s discourse of ‘costs of war’. After detailing the length of time spent on estimating the costs, implying how meticulous such calculations were, he immediately continued, “The scenarios being considered include such specific provisions as rebuilding 2,500 Iraqi schools, if necessary” (Allen 2003, added italics). Also, “The long-term expense of occupying and rebuilding Iraq, as well as providing postwar humanitarian relief to as many as 2 million refugees would be added to those costs […]”. Further, when mentioning unknowable costs, referring to ‘military analysts’, he added “possible decontamination requirements if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launched chemical or biological weapons’. One of the reasons to blame for a potential increase in the costs of war was also ‘greedy’ allies in the region. As “administration officials said, […] other countries in the region are following Turkey’s lead and demanding more U.S. aid to cover their possible war-related costs” (ibid). One cannot think of a more positive presentation of the costs of that war; it ignored almost entirely the costs of weapons and ammunition and blamed ‘rebuilding’, ‘reconstruction’, and ‘humanitarian aid for refugees’ as the costs of war.  
120 For instance, prior to Present Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, Dan Bartlett presented it as “an opportunity to educate the public and the world about the threat that Saddam Hussein poses” (Milbank and Balz 2003) As reflected in Milbank and Balz’s reporting, Bartlett carefully described the situation, saying that while they were still in the diplomatic phase and people should not expect any declaration of war, they were entering the last phase (ibid) Prior to the speech, President Bush’s political adviser, Karl Rove, and Dan Bartlett “provided an afternoon briefing about the speech’s themes to more than 30 Republican lobbyists and activists in a conference room next to the White House” (Milbank and Allen 2003).
Iraq’s measures and activities. In addition to acting as spin-doctors, they also served as the front line of defense for President Bush and the administration against critics and opposition.

Restricting the analysis of agency to the names appearing in media coverage of Iraq may be misleading. Such misleading is not only due to methodological restrictions, in particular those regarding the examined sample of media discourse and the selected period, but also due to the fact that the process of ‘making’ Iraq was beyond public scrutiny. “[A]ccording to a review of administration decision-making based on interviews with more than 20 participants”, Glen Kessler argued

The previously undisclosed Iraq directive is characteristic of an internal decision-making process that has been obscured from public view. Over the next nine months [beginning in September 2001], the administration would make Iraq the central focus of its war on terrorism without producing a rich paper trail or record of key meetings and events leading to a formal decision to act against President Saddam Hussein. (2003: A01)

Kessler’s interviewees said that “[…] the decision to confront Hussein at this time emerged in an ad hoc fashion. Often, the process circumvented traditional policymaking channels as longtime advocates of ousting Hussein pushed Iraq to the top of the agenda by connecting their cause to the war on terrorism” (ibid, added italics).

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121 For instance, with regard to expanding the justification for war, in contrast to concentration on disarmament in the United Nations Security Council, Ari Fleischer said that “the administration’s goal was both “disarmament and regime change”” (in DeYoung and Pincus 2003). On an earlier occasion in February 2003, following the report of UN weapons inspectors to the Security Council, scoffing at the news, Ari Fleischer said, “If one would just want to make believe and pretend that Iraq is a democracy that would pass meaningful laws, it would be 12 years late, and 26,000 liters of anthrax short. It would be 12 years late and 38,000 liters of [botulinum toxin] short” (in Peter Slevin and Colum Lynch, Washington Post, February 16, 2003: A01).

122 On several occasions, for instance, Ari Fleischer reacted “angrily” to the “accusation of a “Wag the Dog” attempt by the administration – referring to the argument that Iraq was a phony war waged to distract public attention from some other issues, in this case, the election (Milbank 2002). He said that “Even the suggestion that the timing of something so serious could be done for political reason is reprehensible […] Iraq presents a serious problem, and it’s being dealt with seriously”(ibid). Drawing on the background of the problem in President Bush’s previous speeches, including his 2002 State of the Union address and a spring address at West Point, Dan Bartlett’s response to the questions about the problem of timing was that “This is not coming out of left field” (in ibid).
**Colin Powell and the Move**
In the media coverage of Iraq prior to the war, Colin Powell was introduced as the most important actor who was kept outside of the ‘internal battle’\(^{123}\) for the use of force against Iraq.  
In an interview in April 2002, President Bush said, “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go”.\(^{124}\) By early August 2002, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld had announced their position about regime change, saying that Hussein had to go. At that time, in the beginning of the debate about Iraq, the fate of the debate was uncertain due to “deep differences of opinion”. As Thomas E. Ricks observed, “Some think the military’s concerns will put the brakes on those advocating a direct confrontation with Hussein, while others say the president has been so clear about his determination to remove the Iraqi president from power that he cannot back down” (2002: A01).  
One may identify two distinct debates in the process of constituting Saddam Hussein’s regime as an existential threat and dealing with that threat as such. The first debate, which was kept ‘internal’ by a ‘small group within the administration’, was about the constitution of the ‘existential threat’. The main objective of this debate was to elevate the problem of Iraq to the top of the agenda and obtain a desirable ‘sovereign decision’ on the matter. Past media coverage of Iraq presents some hints and glimpses of this first debate. The debate was indeed concealed from other actors. However, its ideas had grown deep roots in the administration to the extent that, according to an administration official opposing such intense focus on Iraq, “[…] certain

\(^{123}\) Glenn Kessler’s description of this situation is helpful to better understand how a large number of moderate actors were kept in the dark about Iraq by a ‘small group’ of actors. He argues, “The decision to confront Iraq was in many ways a victory for a small group of conservatives who, at the start of the administration, found themselves outnumbered by more moderate voices in the military and the foreign policy bureaucracy. Their tough line on Iraq before Sept. 11, 2002, was embraced quickly by President Bush and Vice President Cheney after the attacks. But that shift was not communicated to opponents of military action until months later, when the internal battle was already decided” (Kessler 2003).

\(^{124}\) Kessler mentioned another instance showing that the Department of State was kept in ignorance of Bush’s determination to confront Iraq: “In July [2002], the State Department’s director of policy planning, Richard N. Haass, held a regular meeting with Rice and asked whether they should talk about the pros and cons of confronting Iraq. Don’t bother, Rice replied. The president has made a decision” (ibid, added *italics*).
people have grown theological about this [...] It’s almost a religion – that it will be the end of our society if we don’t take action now” (in Kessler, Washington Post, January 12, 2003: A01).

The first debate was followed by a debate about ‘tactics’. Although this second debate may have included the entire administration, it had limited scope. It was limited in the sense that it could not impact the main decision of the first debate, which was ‘Saddam needs to go’. As ‘an official’ described the administration’s debates about Iraq, “By many accounts, they did not deal with the hard question of whether there should be a confrontation with Iraq [...] Most of the internal debate in the administration has really been about tactics” (in ibid). With regard to the question of agency in particular, two major tactical questions of the second debates were whether they had to engage Congress and whether they should go through the United Nations Security Council.

It seems that Colin Powell was to some extent kept out of the first debate; however, he actively participated in the second debate. According to Glen Kessler, Powell was “skeptical of military action without the necessary diplomatic groundwork” (2003: A01). Therefore, as Powell mentioned in an interview in January 2003 in reference to a “defining conversation” with the president on August 5, 2002, Powell “argued the president to make an effort to win U.N. support for confrontation with Iraq” (in Kessler 2003). Powell convinced President Bush to accept “a

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125 Some examinations of the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq argue that certain actors in the administration did not consider Powell a ‘loyal’ team member. Pfiffner and Phythian, for instance, argue, “In the US, President Bush relied very heavily on Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for advice on war. Secretary of State Colin Powell was sidelined by the White House staff and seen as not being a loyal team member, despite his being the only person at high levels in the Bush administration to have combat experience, in addition to his career in the military (2008: 3). It seems this small group was so powerful that it shaped the administration’s policy on Iraq. Based on the statement of a senior official, Glenn Kessler argued “The issue got away from the president [...] He wasn’t controlling the tone or the direction” and was influenced by people who “painted him into a corner because Iraq was an albatross around their necks” (2003: A01).
last-chance effort by the United Nations to deploy weapons inspectors in Iraq but [Bush] would not agree to a prolonged process” (Allen 2002). Both Cheney and Rumsfeld on separate occasions took advantage of taking the case to the U.N. to prove the administration was not unilateralist (ibid).

Although Dick Cheney supported taking the case to the U.N., he considered ‘no use’ for inspections while Colin Powell saw “inspections as the first step” (Milbank 2002). The necessity of ‘regime change’ with regard to disarmament was another point of divergence between Powell and the rest of the administration. As David Von Drehl (2002: A01) observed, “No one in the mainstream believes that Hussein will disarm voluntarily, but some experts – including Secretary of State Colin Powell – entertain the possibility that he will if it his last hope of survival.”

Therefore, on the one hand, Powell did his best to encourage the U.N. Security Council to adopt a resolution which entailed the threat of the use of force in the event that Saddam Hussein failed to cooperate with U.N. inspectors. On the other hand, he tried to convince the administration “[…] to wait until the Jan. 27 inspectors' report before making the case for military action.

Powell counseled others the United States must not be perceived as rushing to judgment” (Patrick Clawson quoted in Kessler 2003).126 Although the administration agreed to wait, White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer said that “the United States will continue to be deliberative in this matter, but this was Saddam Hussein’s last chance” (in Pincus and DeYoung 2002).

Eventually, around mid-January that “dramatic change” occurred. While in early January Powell had been enthusiastic about inspections and suggested that the “[…] inspections regime was in

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126 Walter Pincus and Karen DeYoung’s article, titled “U.S. Sets Late January Decision on Iraq War” (Washington Post, December 19, 2002: A01) grasped this development. Citing officials, they reported, “The Bush administration has set the last week in January as the make-or-break point in the long standoff with Iraq, and is increasingly confident that by then it will have marshaled the evidence to convince the U.N. Security Council that Iraq is in violation of a U.N. resolution passed last month and to call for the use of force”.
its infancy”, after mid-January he flatly stated, “The question isn't how much longer do you need for inspections to work. Inspections will not work” (Kessler 2003). This sudden shift, according to Glenn Kessler, occurred after French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin used a U.N. news conference following a conference on terrorism “[…] to threaten to veto any imminent military action” (ibid).

One cannot evaluate Colin Powell’s faith in multilateralism or how much he was mindful of the political costs of confronting Iraq. However, based on media presentation of Powell and the administration, one may conclude that by fighting for distinction, Powell tried to stay relevant in the administration. His preference for multilateralism was his niche in the administration’s war making business with a president who had already made up his mind about Iraq. Perhaps Powell’s situation has been described best by retired Marines General, and Powell’s friend, Anthony Zinni: “Powell may feel "we're going down this road and he wants to keep steering this train […] The way to do that is not to be off to one side, but to be out front”” (in Kessler 2003). Therefore, compared to the president and his aides who flatly declared that the United States would attack Iraq with or without U.N. support – and foresaw no harm in assigning Powell to obtain such approval if possible – Powell played a marginal, however difficult, role in preparing for war on Iraq.

**Congress**

A poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News in August 2002 found that Americans wanted the president “to explain in far more detail what he plans to do in Iraq” and “to win the

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127 Glenn Kessler’s understanding of Powell and how he tried to reconcile his personal perspective with that of the president may help this discussion. Kessler argued that “Powell, a retired four-star general, has long kept up a careful balancing act on Iraq. Reflecting his years of experience in the military and in Washington, he has argued strenuously in internal debates that Washington must be seen as going the extra mile to avoid war. But he has also saluted smartly whenever the president resolves the debate and makes a decision, which is why he has managed to preserve his influence in an administration stocked with forceful advocates for confronting Iraq” (Kessler 2003: A01).
support of Congress and U.S. allies for whatever action he chooses to take” (Morin & Deane, Washington Post, August 13, 2002: A10). Within the administration, on the one hand, Bush’s lawyer concluded “he can launch an attack on Iraq without new approval from Congress, in part because they say permission remains in force from the 1991 resolution giving Bush’s father authority to wage war in the Persian Gulf”. Some administration members, on the other hand, argued that “the president should seek lawmakers’ backing anyway to build public support to avoid souring congressional relations” (Allen and Eilperin 2002).

In case of congressional engagement, the next debate would be about the scope of this engagement. More specifically, it needed to be decided whether the president should ‘consult lawmakers’ or whether he had to ‘request their approval’. According to some ‘officials’, even if Bush chose to approach Congress, “he still would be likely to assert that congressional consent was not legally necessary” (ibid). As a senior administration official involved in setting strategy mentioned, “We don’t want to be in the legal position of asking Congress to authorize the use of force when the president already has that full authority” (in ibid). As discussed earlier in this chapter, Bush’s legal advisors argued that the president, as the commander-in-chief, was not legally bound to obtain congressional approval for attacking Iraq. Another way of bypassing Congress was to frame Iraq within the ‘war on terror’ and rely on a September 14, 2001 resolution that endorsed the use of force against terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (see ibid).

Members of Congress reacted to Bush’s case on Iraq differently. Senate leaders including Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden

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128 The design of such polls, and the types of questions that they pose to participants, is interesting. They seek to discern the publics’ taste for war and discover their preferences on each element of the war making process – from the type of political support to the deployment of forces and conduct of military operations. Such surveys are tremendously helpful to a perceptive securitizing actor to customize their case.
and Robert C. Byrd maintained that “the president must come to Congress before making a massive commitment of troops to oust Hussein” (ibid). Others were more supportive of the Bush administration’s stance. House Majority Whip Tom Delay, for instance, said that he would “lead the effort to provide President Bush the unified support of the House of Representatives” (in ibid). Among Republicans, some members, such as House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde, urged Bush to seek ‘a formal war authorization’ “as a *demonstration of national unity*”129 (in Dewar 2002).

Eventually, on September 4, 2002, in his meeting with 18 congressional leaders in the White House, President Bush announced that he would seek approval from Congress before taking any military action for disarming Iraq and that he would seek the support of the U.N. Security Council (Allen and DeYoung 2002, Kelly 2002). In that meeting, “Donald H. Rumsfeld gave senators a classified briefing on Iraq, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell warned that Hussein might not be able to save himself by admitting weapons inspectors” (ibid). After that meeting, according to Allen and DeYoung, “House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) said he found it evident from Bush’s presentation that “military action is inevitable”, while especially with regard to Rumsfeld’s briefing, some senators, such as Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, said that they did not receive any new information (in ibid). Some others, such as Daschle and Henry Hyde, asked for more information from the administration.

In their coverage of the meeting on September 4, Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung briefly touched the notion of ‘decision’. They reported that “The president and several senior officials

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129 It is how exactly William S. Cohen who was a senator during Iraq-Kuwait crisis argued about a war power resolution. He described such a resolution as a resolution “for the sake of unity between the administration and the Congress, for the sake of the troops in the desert who deserved a government unified” (Bob Woodward’s *The Commanders*; in Allen and Elperin 2002: A01).
repeated that invasion is only one option among many and that no specific military plans are on the table” (ibid). According to a senior administration official, “When he says he has not decided, he means it, […] He wants to hear a debate and have the benefit of views from Congress and the international community” (ibid). Yet, in a meeting with a senior State Department official in July 2002, Condoleezza Rice had mentioned that “The president has made a decision” (see Kessler 2003). Considering this situation, the introduction of Iraq to the Congress as a ‘debate’ seems to have been a matter of respect. Indeed, at the meeting, “Bush gave each lawmaker a two-page letter in which he signaled his plan to ask for an extraordinarily broad mandate, which he described as “congressional support for U.S. action to do whatever is necessary to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime”” (Allen and DeYoung 2002). Beyond that, the administration began pressing Congress to “authorize military force within weeks” (Allen 2002).130

In the beginning, Democrats tried to elude this pressure. After a classified briefing by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and CIA Director George Tenet on September 10, 2002, congressional Democrats responded that Bush’s advisers failed “[…] to make a compelling case for quick military action against Iraq” (in VandeHei and Eilperin 2002). Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi said that she knew of “no information that the threat is so imminent from Iraq” that Congress could not wait until January (in ibid). Senator Richard J. Durbin said that “It would be a severe mistake for us to vote on Iraq with as little information as we have. This would be a rash and hasty decision” (in ibid). Senate Majority Whip Harry M. Reid, in a similar stance, advocated delaying the vote (ibid).

130 According to Mike Allen, “… the officials said Bush remains committed to a timetable so rapid he may ask Congress to authorize military force within weeks. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said Bush wants lawmakers to approve a resolution before their pre-election recess, which is scheduled for Oct. 4 but could slip a week or more. “The president thinks it’s better to do this sooner rather than later”” (2002: A09).
As Washington Post correspondents Jim VandeHei and Juliet Eilperin noted, Senate Majority Leader Daschle “left the door open to a possible vote in the next few weeks if Bush meets several criteria, including obtaining more international support for a military campaign and providing senators a more detailed explanation of how the war would be conducted and how Iraq would be rebuilt” (ibid). Even Republican leaders predicted that “Bush will have a difficult time winning support before the elections” (ibid). With regard to garnering international support, on the eve of Bush’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly, his supporters in Congress hoped that he would take the opportunity to lay out ‘a clear and compelling’ case to win global support, as he had the previous year for his ‘war on terror’. However, as VandeHei and Eilperin argued, several lawmakers believed that it was unlikely that Bush would reveal details to the United Nations to the level of the classified briefings he had held for lawmakers. According to a Republican leader, “If “top secret” information was not enough to sway Democrats and some Republicans here […], then Bush will have trouble winning over a skeptical international audience […]” (ibid).

Perhaps it was in light of such doubts that, after his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, on September 13, 2002, President Bush delinked his attempt in the U.N. to multilateralize his war from his request for congressional approval. Indeed, he deployed this initiative to press Democrat critics of a hasty war resolution. He said, “If I were running for office, I’m not sure how I’d explain to the American people – say, vote for me, and, oh, by the way, on a matter of national security, I think I’m going to wait for somebody else to act” (in Milbank 2002).

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131 As discussed in the previous chapter, a satisfactory war plan may help the securitizing actor to extinguish resistance against his move. As is obvious in Daschle’s conditions for an early vote, none of his criteria touched the ‘hard question’ about Iraq – that is, ‘why does the United States have to confront Iraq?’

132 Bush deployed this argument, as a justification for unilateralism, in order to neutralize the position of the U.N. in the question of Iraq. In his 2003 State of the Union address, he repeated a similar line: “The course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend
Milbank observed that “The president’s words closely followed those used by one of his top advisers in a briefing Thursday, indicating a coordinated White House strategy” (ibid). Such presentation of the critics of war was intended to discredit their opposition and discourage them from expressing their position towards Bush’s plans.

A large majority of Republicans and a small minority of Democrats in Congress, both including a large majority and a small minority, interpreted differently the Bush administration’s pressure to secure a resolution on Iraq before the mid-term elections. The Republicans, favoring Bush’s war campaign, were worried that the failure to get congressional approval would “[…] undermine Bush’s campaign to win international support because it adds to the appearance that the president is acting unilaterally133, even in his own country”134 (VandeHei and Eilperin 2002).

Most Republicans, including Thomas M. Davis, chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee, felt that Congress should adopt a resolution before the elections. As Davis argued, “People are going to want to know, before the elections, where their representatives stand, […] This could be the vote of the decade, so why wait?” (in ibid). In order to ‘act quickly’, some Republicans, including Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, asked Condoleezza Rice “to submit to Congress a specific war resolution the week of Sept. 23, so lawmakers can make changes and try to vote on it before adjournment, tentatively set for early

the freedom and security of the American people.”

133 One needs to make a distinction between two levels of unilateralism in American security politics. One level is ‘American Unilateralism’ that tends to build upon the notion of the ‘unity’ of the state. This notion of ‘unity’ and ‘speaking with one voice’ takes the issue to another level, which is ‘Presidential Unilateralism’. This unilateralism is strongly linked with the personification of sovereignty, especially with regard to war power. President Bush’s legal team strongly believed in ‘Presidential Unilateralism’. They assessed congressional approval as unnecessary before taking the case to Congress. After the resolution passed, responding to a legal case by John C. Bonifaz against the transfer of ‘war-making power’ to the president, the Justice Department in its brief stated, “Hundreds of years of congressional action support the President’s unilateral war making powers”. It continued that the president is authorized “to unilaterally use military force in defense of the United States’s [sic] national security interests” (in Michael Powell, Washington Post, 12 March 2003: A14).

134 “A top House leader […] who requested anonymity” said this to the authors. His request for anonymity was related to his comment that he did not find Bush’s case for war compelling, which he anticipated would make it difficult for Bush to convince Congress.
October” (ibid). Meanwhile, many Democrats, among them Daschle and Biden, expressed worries about the politicization of this problem.\textsuperscript{135} With regard to the question of timing, in particular, the Democrats were skeptical. Among them, Jim Jordan\textsuperscript{136}, director of the Democrats’ Senate campaign committee, argued that the ‘timing’ of presenting the Iraq case to Congress and the ensuing press for a resolution before the mid-term elections has been planned\textsuperscript{137} to favor the Republican campaign.\textsuperscript{138}

Eventually, and as was expected, Congress began debating the administration’s resolution on Iraq. Some Democrat leaders, such as Joseph I. Liberman, John Edwards and Richard A. Gephardt, strongly supported Bush’s proposed action, unilateral or otherwise, on Iraq (see Dan Balz, Washington Post, 24 September 2002: A01). Other representatives and senators raised questions about rushing to war without international support\textsuperscript{139} and the exhaustion of peaceful

\textsuperscript{135} With regard to the concerns of the ‘politicization’ of the question of Iraq and the broader ‘war on terror’, Democrats were highly suspicious that the Bush administration, and the Republicans in general, were ‘abusing’ matters of national security for political purposes. In addition to the problem of timing, Senate Majority Whip Harry Reid, in the Senate, accused the Republican National Committee of trying to raise money from the question of Iraq and the new Department of Homeland Security (see Allen and VandeHei2002: A01).

\textsuperscript{136} Jim Jordan argued, “It’s hard not to notice that the sudden urgency of war with Iraq has coincided precisely with the emergence of the corporate scandal story, with the flip in the congressional [poll] numbers and with the decline in the Republicans’ prospects for retaking the Senate majority […] It’s absolutely clear that the administration has timed the Iraq public relations campaign to influence the midterm elections … and to distract the voting public from a failing economy and an unpopular Republican domestic agenda” (in Dana Milbank, Washington Post, 16 September 2002: A01).

\textsuperscript{137} Some Democrats, however, had a more moderate understanding of this problem. They did not suggest that the threat of Iraq was a Bush invention or even an exaggeration. ‘A top aide of Daschle’, for instance, said that “it’s more of a fortuitous “diversion” from domestic matters. “[Bush]’s happy to keep the focus off the economy” (ibid). This again signifies that Congress, in general, did not question the ‘hard question’ but focused on the marginal questions regarding how to confront Saddam Hussein.

\textsuperscript{138} Presenting the question of Iraq to Congress before the election would diminish Democrats’ interests in domestic politics in the campaign. The Bush administration, however, rejected those accusations. As Ari Fleischer responded, “The Democrats, to their credit, asked the president to make his case. He's doing what they asked him to do” (in ibid).

\textsuperscript{139} Al Gore’s argument is worth noting. In a speech in late September, in addition to raising some concerns about Bush’s rush to war and the politicization of the problem, he said that “in this case it is the United States contemplating invading another nation, and that American taxpayers will have to shoulder the entire cost of the war” (Balz 2002: A01).
means before resorting to war\textsuperscript{140}. Further, some senators, such as Joseph Biden, asked for changes and “clear specifications” in the draft resolution sent by the administration. Apparently the draft resolution would have empowered Bush to restore “international security and peace in the region”, while Democrats limited the scope of the resolution to ‘Iraq’ – although Colin Powell mentioned that the “operating clause” dealt with Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction (Allen and VandeHei 2002).

David Von Drehle (2002: A01) observed that the resolution was “expected to pass easily, in part because leading Democrats want to get the issue of war behind them, and in part because there is widespread agreement on Capitol Hill that Hussein must be dealt with […] There is also general agreement that if it comes to war, the United States will win.”

However, he pointed out a graver problem in that Congress did not engage itself with the core question of the process of war making. As he argued, “But beyond this first level of agreement lie major disputes over important questions – about alternatives to war, the timing and, most of all, the outcomes. The debate in Congress is likely to \textit{distill} these disputes” (ibid, added italics).

According to Jim VandeHei and Juliet Eilperin’s description the atmosphere of the House of Representatives on the day of voting, it was very different from Von Drehle’s ‘expectation’:

A decade ago, Gephardt and nearly three-quarters of his fellow congressional Democrats objected to the U.S. deployment of troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Yesterday’s debate lacked the passion and unpredictability of the 1991 affair, when members sat late into night listening attentively to war of words. By contrast, the House chamber was largely empty most of yesterday; the arguments were familiar, the outcome certain, the conclusion anticlimactic (VandeHei and Eilperin 2002).

\textsuperscript{140} John F. Kerry initially took a strong position against the administration. However, he eventually backed unilateral action in the event that “it were proven that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that represented an imminent threat to the United States” (Balz 2003).
Perhaps Von Drehle was correct, based on Congress performance in 1990, to expect a more challenging debate. However, Congress in general did not approach the question of Iraq as a controversial issue, as he had expected. Even those who supported a more restrictive resolution were not concerned about the ‘hard question’. Among them, Democrat Representative John Spratt said, “This has not been an argument about ends, but about means […]. We all agree that Saddam Hussein is a menace and that Iraq should be stripped of its weapons of mass destruction, by armed forces if necessary” (in ibid). Perhaps, as Von Derhle quoted Senator John D. Rockefeller regarding the questions about the war with Iraq, “You don’t have all the answers and you never will have all the answers … It rests in the hands of the president of the United States” (Von Drehle 2002).

Subsequently, in October 2002, Congress adopted a joint resolution that authorized the use of force against Iraq (Congress 107, S. J. RES. 46). It drew upon earlier laws and resolutions on Iraq and took into consideration that “Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region”, continues “to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability”, seeks “nuclear weapons capability”, persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population”, demonstrates continuing hostility towards the United States, continues to aid international terrorism, and has “demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction”, as well as the fear that either Iraq or terrorists supported and equipped by Iraq may attack the United States. The resolution read: “The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (ibid.). By engaging in the securitizing move and reinforcing the discourse on Iraq, this resolution constituted a new beginning in the process. A major body of the discourse on Iraq has been produced by House representatives and senators. Congress, by recalling and reaffirming its previous measures on Iraq, mobilized and reproduced its discourse in order to authorize the use of force against Iraq.

As Jim VandeHei and Juliet Eilperin described, lawmakers “soundly defeated two attempts to restrict Bush’s option. One, by Republican House member Barbara Lee, would have urged the president to use diplomacy and work through the United Nations rather than launch a military strike. It failed 355 to 72. A second, sponsored by Spratt and Rep. James P. Moran (D-Va.), would have authorized U.S. military action only if it were sanctioned by the Security Council or by a second congressional vote later this year. It lost 270 to 155” (VandeHei and Eilperin 2002). Different congressmen and women rationalized their ‘aye’ vote in various ways. Most Republicans, and some Democrats, wholeheartedly supported the administration’s position on Iraq. Some others, such as Senator Thomas Daschle, who at first questioned the resolution, at the end supported the resolution, arguing that his shift in position was “because this resolution is improved, because I believe that Saddam Hussein represents a real threat, and because I believe it is important for America to speak with one voice at this crucial moment” (in ibid).

This congressional approval may be seen as the end of public debate, at least in terms of the role Congress would play, about the use of force against Iraq. We do not know, and perhaps we will never be able to know, why every single representative or senator supported the use of force against Iraq. That said, if the president did not need congressional approval to invade Iraq and if members of congress knew that the answer to many war-related questions would be that the
matter “rests in the hands of the president”, then the situation constitutes an exemplary ‘catch-
22’ case.\textsuperscript{141}

Catch-22 describes the situation of those actors, such as Colin Powell, many congressmen and
women and many journalists as well, who struggled for relevance.\textsuperscript{142} From this catch-22
perspective, ‘rally round the flag’ cannot be counted as proactive agency; rather, it may be better
understood as a matter of reactive/ passive agency that desperately struggled to maintain its
relevance in the overall production of its field. The administration argued that the president
would seek an unconditional congressional approval, not because he was legally bound to do so,
but for the sake of ‘unity’ between these two bodies. From a Bourdieusian field perspective, in
this case it was the president, a determined president who was determined to confront Iraq,
shaped the logic of the field. Those actors who decided to be part of the field supported the
president’s notion of ‘unity’\textsuperscript{143}; others risked their existence\textsuperscript{144}.

\textsuperscript{141}“Catch-22. Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can’t stop them from doing” (Joseph Heller 1961: 56).

\textsuperscript{142}Although not in the scope of this research, perhaps an examination of President Obama’s decision to seek
congressional approval for a potential intervention in Syria in 2013, following the use of chemical weapons in that
country, is helpful to better understand the Congress situation surrounding the resolution on Iraq. As Glenn
Greenwald wrote in the Guardian (Sunday 1 September 2013), “The president is celebrated for seeking a vote on his
latest war even as his aides make clear it has no binding effect”. With regard to the Iraq resolution of 2002 in
particular, Greenwald mentions that “George Bush, of course, sought Congressional approval for the war in Iraq
(though he did so only once it was clear that Congress would grant it: I vividly remember watching then-Senate
Foreign Relations Chairman Joe Biden practically begging the Bush White House to “allow” Congress to vote on
the attack while promising in advance that they would approve for it)” (Guardian, 1 September 2013

\textsuperscript{143}Perhaps Jay Leno’s joke on NBC following Barack Obama’s inauguration describes this situation best: “Nice to
have you all here. As you know, George Bush is no longer president, so there’ll be no monologue” (Laugh Lines,
November 10, 2013).

\textsuperscript{144}In their analysis of the House passing the Iraq war resolution, Jim VandeHei and Juliet Eilperin (2002: A01)
briefly touched upon the consequences of opposing the resolution for some representatives in the following
November elections. According to Democrat Representative Barney Frank, “The great majority of Democrats didn’t
support the Bush policy ideally […]. Some of them will feel compelled to do it politically.”
CONCLUSION

This dissertation engaged with multiple literatures from IR, Sociology, Linguistics and Media Studies, and it employed sociological perspectives and insights of CDA to analyze the process of securitizing Iraq in 2002-2003. It chose the media discourse of Iraq as the site of securitization. Despite all the politics involved in its production, media discourse offers one of the most comprehensive sites for the examination of securitization.\(^{145}\) On the one hand, the media discourse takes its readers back to the 1930s, WWII and the Cold War to learn from past experiences. On the other hand, it takes readers to the streets of Basra and villages of Kurdistan. The media discourse includes George W. Bush’s speeches and some ‘philosophical’ reflections of Donald Rumsfeld as well as the opinions of some American teenagers in a small town school about a potential military action on Iraq.

This research was not designed to answer the question of why Iraq was securitized or why and how much different actors contributed to that process. Rather, this dissertation and its methodology sought to analyze how different actors may contribute to the process of securitization. However, throughout the research, the dissertation adjusted its focus to analyze certain products, such as urgency, evidence and security (language), of the process of

\(^{145}\) Considering this comprehensiveness, it is difficult to notice what is missing from the media coverage of the problem. To this problem, one should add the *habitus* of journalists and the cognitive power of framing that shape the debate in a specific manner that brings in certain actors and casts out some others.
securitizing Iraq. The contribution of different actors to the process of securitization is extremely variable in light of many elements, among them the framing of the issue, time and the type of product. I believe concentration on certain products and byproducts in the process of securitization can reveal more relations and how they shape the overall product of this process.

With regard to war plans as byproducts of this process, for instance, although military professionals are their major creator, their production is influenced by political concerns about conducting a short war. At the same time, the military’s capability to conduct a short war and defeat the enemy shape the inevitability of war as a solution, which in turn impacts the framing of Iraq as a problem that has to be dealt with through military action.

In Chapter Three, I examined the question of evidence as the contribution of intelligence professionals to the process of securitization. Intelligence has been seen as a controversial aspect of the war on Iraq in 2003. The so-called Iraq intelligence failure, by reducing the securitizing agent to the Intelligence Community, blames the war on inaccurate intelligence. Intelligence professionals play an important role in foretelling security problems and drawing attention to certain issues. However, as I argued, at the same time, in addition to general psychological and cognitive problems of analysis, the production of such objective knowledge is especially influenced by certain assumptions, administrative rules and regulations and guidelines set by public officials for the collection of information and analysis.

Moreover, the Intelligence Community, especially in the United States, is diverse and heterogeneous. This heterogeneity multiplies the complexity of relations inside and outside of this field and increases the likelihood of competition and external penetration from other fields.
To this situation, I should add the production of semi-intelligence in the in-between spaces such as the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon.

Intelligence professionals acknowledge the estimative nature of their products, while politicians tend to take intelligence as *truth*. Given the estimative nature of intelligence and the fact that it is highly future-oriented, intelligence can be considered one of the important sites for *imagining insecurity*. Therefore, I suggest critical security studies should include an analysis of intelligence and the analytical assumptions in its agenda.

The intelligence on Iraq provides a fascinating case for challenging the existence of any Archimedean point of objectivity in the process of securitization. The fields of intelligence professionals, politicians and journalists mutually influence each other in the production and consumption of intelligence. In contrast to the evidentiary perception of evidence that believes intelligence influences the minds and decisions of different actors equally, consumers of intelligence, indeed, employ their own interpretation and understanding of intelligence in the process of securitization.

The case of intelligence, as an example of expert opinion, necessitates an analysis of the production of expert (professional) opinion and how it influences the process of securitization especially with regard to the question of framing the problem and negotiating with the audience. Such a product-based analysis of the process will, at the end, create a topology of insecurity at specific moments in the process of securitization.

The selected sample from the media discourse, except a few articles authored by professionals and former politicians, was mainly produced by journalists. By engaging with certain actors and debates, journalists play an important role in shaping social (security) space. As I examined in
the case of intelligence, journalists participate in the production of various products during the process of securitization in different ways. Overall, the social space of security and the securitization that the field of journalists demonstrates is dominated by two capacities: political and professional.

In securitizing Iraq, in the field of the political, President Bush and certain members of his administration were presented as the main driving force behind the securitization of Iraq. The President was seen as sovereign and was accepted by other actors as such. The president’s statements and ideas shaped the debate on Iraq. However, the news coverage of Iraq implies that, his ideas and decisions about Iraq were deeply influenced by a small clique of aides, including cabinet members and security professionals, as well as certain aspects of George W. Bush’s character. This clique established the core of the securitizing agent in the field of the political. Most members of this clique, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, as ‘security experts,’ had already argued for taking military action against Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The above mentioned clique carried the core argument about Iraq: ‘Saddam Hussein needs to go.’ With the impression that George W. Bush had already made his mind up on Iraq, other actors within the administration, most notably Colin Powell, and outside actors, such as Democrats, fought for relevance. Those actors were only able to influence tactics and other marginal questions about the implementation of the core argument. Despite disagreements, differences between administration members were not sufficiently deep to initiate resistance against Bush’s securitizing move (see Hallin 1986).
Although, considering its media coverage, September 2002 may be viewed as a beginning for the process of securitizing Iraq, a shadow of the Iraq that was presented by the Bush administration in the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ and outlines of relevant policies existed in the American security discourse before 2001. Nonetheless, the carriers of the discourse of ‘bringing down Saddam’ occupied a marginal position in the American political field prior to 2001. Because they suggested military action as the solution for the problem of Iraq with the capacity of experts, they had for the most part been located in the field of professionals.

Therefore, although certain actors adhered to a strong policy and the use of force against the Iraqi regime, even influencing Congress, they could not dominate the American security discourse. In the American field of the political, the president is recognized with the capacity to define national security strategy. Such an ambitious plan, as regime change required a president dedicated to this objective and determined to deal with the consequences of treating Iraq as an existential threat.

This situation disturbs the idea of the moment of uttering a speech act in ST and the beginning of the process of securitization. To this problem, one may add the multiplicity of the identity of the threat. I argued that there could be as many beginnings in the process of securitization as there were layers and elements that made the identity of Iraq an existential threat. The construction of Iraq was comprised of nodes, such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, dictatorship, human rights (abuses) and Saddam Hussein. Indeed, Saddam Hussein can be seen as a metaphor, a nodal point that connected all the elements that the Bush administration put forward in the construction of existential threat.
It is important to examine the transformation of the identity of threat in terms of changes in each of the constitutive elements of the threat and how they relate to each other. Nonetheless, the focus on the threat (Iraq) itself in the process of securitization, in order to identify the beginning of this process, may be misleading. Rather, I argue that in search of the beginning, we need to examine three elements: insecurity, the object to be defended and the threat. By insecurity, I mean the discourse which translates security to us. In our analysis of the object to be defended, in this case the United States, we may focus on the issue of vulnerability. Therefore, something may become an existential threat as a result of transformations in our understanding of insecurity and/or our sense of vulnerability. One can notice this discursive transformation in President Bush’s national security strategy and the construction of 9/11.

Despite the administration’s arguments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its links with terrorism, one cannot see any significant objective change in Iraq. Rather, the ‘war on terror’ transformed different constitutive elements of Iraq’s identity, among them weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. More importantly, the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ imposed new rules for the assemblage and prioritization of insecurities. Iraq under the ‘war on terror’ was not a creation anew but more of a reinterpretation of its identity from a new perspective. Moreover, the transformation of Iraq into an existential threat can also be understood as a consequence of the reevaluation of the vulnerability of the United States. Changes in America’s threshold of vulnerability and new rules of prioritization moved Iraq to the top of Bush’s security agenda.

Considering that a new understanding of insecurity and vulnerability elevated Iraq to the level of an existential threat, securitization should be understood as a double movement. This double movement includes two distinct, yet interrelated, processes of the reproduction of security and
construction of existential threat. From a different view, particularly with regard to the level of potential resistance from the audience, one may call them soft and hard securitization respectively.

This double movement is the solution put forward by this dissertation to the problem of language as given in speech act theory. Soft securitization signifies continued reproduction of what can be signified by the term security. It is apparently not preoccupied with specific individual cases. However, it may take individual cases as signs and symptoms of underlying trends and use them to elaborate on a broader security environment. Soft securitization provides an intellectual framework that fixes minds on certain issues with great attention, while hard securitization takes place within the relevant framework of soft securitization(s). Hard securitization deals specifically with the production of existential threat that requires immediate action for dealing with a specific case.¹⁴⁶

The idea of double movement helps make sense of security (language) as a social product that incorporates productions across social space. I believe this notion can help security studies theorize the emergence of ideologies, such as neoconservatism, and how they shape a new understanding of security and influence the process of securitization. Thus, drawing on its analysis of the 2003 war on Iraq, this dissertation argues that securitization may be defined as the simultaneous processes of producing a certain meaning of security and constructing existential threat from this new perspective. In other words, the constitution of existential threat does not

¹⁴⁶ As we later learned, such soft securitization as the ‘axis of evil’ was, indeed, planned to disguise itself as such. Soft securitization may be understood as a form of securitization that requires a certain level of attention but not immediate action. In addition to this, one may consider many sweeping generalizations, such as Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’, that while built upon an individual case, make general claims about all potential cases.
consist of merely naming something an existential threat. Rather, this labeling at the same time signifies a new understanding of security.

The examination of time in the construction of security is another major contribution of this dissertation to securitization studies. ST disputes the atemporality of insecurities. In its analysis of securitization, ST puts forward two major concepts, *existential threat* and *emergency measures*, that are defined in terms of the referent object and normal politics. Nonetheless, a Schmittian perception of politics dominates ST’s analysis of normal politics and emergency measures. Moreover, ST has been influenced by the atemporality of speech act theory. Due to this problem, ST is not able to grasp the situatedness of language. Indeed, ST’s detemporalization of securitization results in the reification of securitization, which prevents this theory from offering an understanding of securitization as a social practice – in which the securitizing actor, its audience, language and the relationships among them are temporally conditioned.

Considering the situatedness of language, language (security) and the way we use it are temporally conditioned. In other words, time shapes the ontology of security and the process of securitization. I argue that the notion of ‘time running out’ versus ‘more time’ established a major debate between the securitizing actor and the opposition forces in the securitization of Iraq. On the one hand, President Bush, his aides and other like-minded leaders deployed the *tightness* of time as a critical indicator to demonstrate the gravity of the issue at stake. On the other hand, desecuritizing forces argued for more time in order for peaceful measures to work. In the discourse of security, this extreme *time scarcity* has to be dealt with by taking *extraordinary* measures, such as the use of force, that fall outside of normal politics. From a time perspective,
securitization can be understood in terms of urgency and new rules of prioritization that require extraordinary measures.

A time analysis of securitization also helps to better understand the process of securitization itself. ST contends that something is identified as a security issue because it is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. The analysis of the case of Iraq from a time perspective shows that, in order to establish priority and urgency, the process of securitization, as the practice of constructing security, must be a demonstration of priority and urgency with specific pace and tempo.

Beyond the field of security, securitization needs to be understood through a broader culture of time management. Time orientation dramatically influences the culture of securitization. For instance, the more future-oriented a society, the higher the likelihood of securitization moves in the form of plans shaping the future. Further, time orientation influences the types of issues to be securitized as well as the types of conflicts.

The problem of time in the securitization of Iraq, and particularly in the war, is deeply connected to the question of space. Some occasions during the securitization process, especially taking the case to Congress and the UN Security Council, may imply that the securitization of Iraq was procedure-driven. However, at the end it turned out to be time-driven. Considering the window of opportunity for taking military action on Iraq, the Bush administration was able to adopt certain (safe) procedure-driven strategies in order to garner support for its move. However, as the deadline approached, the administration departed from its procedure-driven strategy of engaging the UN Security Council. Therefore, the construction of urgency in the process of securitization
is more likely undertaken by the adoption of time-driven strategies by securitizing agents and perhaps also by disregarding certain procedures of normal politics.

Time itself, as a social construction, is reproduced in the process of securitization. Every process of securitization involves not only the reproduction of social (security) time, rhythm and pace, but also the very constitution of the credibility and capacity of the securitizing actor with regard to his/her ability to act in conformity with these temporal necessities, which are constantly contested by desecuritizing actors. President Bush’s doctrine of preemption can be observed as a measure that presented a new definition of social (security) time. Time, in the form of open future, becomes the most important insecurity. Therefore, the management of insecurity is possible through the management of time. Taken to its extreme, the preoccupation with the future and its imagined uncertainties transforms into a rather prophetic demonstration of a closed future and the absolute certainty materialized in the doctrine of preemption.

Critical security studies, especially with its recent consideration of methodology and attention to more relational and product based analysis of security (Bigo 2008, Salter 2008), is sufficiently equipped to concentrate on products and byproducts of the process of securitization as well as their relationship with their broader social space. I believe simultaneous consideration of the three fields of the political, journalistic and professional can help us to better understand the different capacities engaged in the securitization process.
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