Third-Party Requirements in Track Two: The Theory-Practice Gap within the African Context

API 6999 - Final
Kristel Gbodossou – 6547748
03/26/2014
Table of Contents

Executive Summary 3
Introduction 4

Section I: Defining Track Two, Theory & Third-Party Requirements 6
Relevance 6
Origins: John Burton 7
Definition 8
  Difference from formal mediation 9
  Problem-Solving Workshop 10
  Relationship with Track One: Transfer, Complementarity, Institutionalization 11
Issues in Theory 12
Question of Culture 14

Third-Party Requirements 15
  Identity 15
  Expertise 17
  External Status 18

Section II: Case Studies - Illustration of the Theory-Practice Gap 20
South Africa 20
Biafra 29
Liberia 31

Erroneous Assumptions 33
  Absence of barriers to entry 33
  Expertise in conflict resolution 34
  Repository of trust as a status 34

Section III: Characteristics of reviewed unconventional third-party interventions 35
Proximity to Track 1.5 35
Timeline of Conflicts 36

Conclusion 37
Bibliography 38
Annex 41
Executive Summary

The following research paper, at a broad level, addresses theory-practice gaps specific to third-party requirements established in Track Two. More specifically based on the analysis of selected African conflicts, this paper posits that third-party criteria stem from a number of erroneous assumptions, specifically: (1) the absence of barriers to entry; (2) expertise as a pre-requisite to conflict resolution and; (3) the acquisition of trust based on status. Further, the analysis of case studies indicates that adherence to prescribed guidelines may, at times, either impede the occurrence of Track Two interventions or be detrimental to their outcomes. Such departure from theory suggests that prescribed criteria should be reviewed in order to reflect the successful interventions of unorthodox facilitators, and more importantly, to insure the applicability and legitimacy of Track Two theory.
Introduction

Beyond its assimilation with unofficial processes, Track Two diplomacy is more specifically defined as a niche within a broader framework of formal and informal approaches to conflict resolution. Within this larger peace process,\(^1\) which includes actors ranging from governments (Track One), to businesses, to private citizens, Track Two is essentially a form of professional consultation\(^2\) for parties involved in protracted, identity-based conflicts. Second Track initiatives were initially conceived in the mid-60s\(^3\) and have since been used as unofficial methods of intervention in Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian and European conflicts, amongst others. While the efficiency of Track Two is hard to assess – rapprochement between conflicting parties is often intangible and achieved over the long-term – the growing usage of the approach throughout the last fifty years indicates a certain level of success, if not interest by both facilitators and conflicting parties.\(^4\)

Despite sustained interest, Track Two remains a marginalized approach in part because of the lack of empirical assessment characterizing the field.\(^5\) Theory-practice discrepancies, specifically relating to third-party criteria regarding the identity, expertise and status of practitioners, are at the basis of this research paper. While they are to be expected in the context of idiosyncratic conflicts, persistent discrepancies demonstrated in African case studies are such that they cast doubt on the credibility of theory established for facilitators. More specifically, the analysis of selected conflicts suggests that prescribed criteria are based on the following

---

1. Saunders, 1996
2. As per Fisher’s description (Fisher 2002: 62)
3. While various scholars, such as Doob, Kelman, Azar, infused workshops with their own academic background, the approach fundamentally remained the same. (Fisher, 2002)
4. The growing interest and usage of Track Two since its creation is outlined in most of the literature used for this research paper, including Rouhana 1995: 1; Davies & Kaufman 2002: 4
5. Underlined in most of the literature from Saunders, Kelman, Fisher, and more particularly Rouhana, 1995
erroneous assumptions; (1) the absence of barriers to entry; (2) expertise as a pre-requisite to conflicts resolution and; (3) the acquisition of trust based on status.

Observed conflicts demonstrate that the fundamental objectives of Track Two interventions may, at times, exclusively be reached with the assistance of unorthodox third parties. That is, adherence to guidelines prescribed in theory may either impede the overall occurrence of Track Two interventions or potentially be detrimental to their outcomes. This research paper posits that such departure from practice, given the central role occupied by facilitators, invalidates the applicability of Track Two theory. This issue of credibility is of significant relevance when accounting for general interest in the approach and the desire, by its practitioners, to witness a more systematic usage of Track Two initiatives along with official diplomacy.⁶

The reason emphasis is put on third parties in this paper is twofold. First, the starkest discrepancy between theory and practice, as witnessed in case studies and in the available literature, lies in third-party requirements. As will be observed in subsequent sections, established criteria often appear to be based on subjective factors and cannot be clearly correlated with Track Two objectives. Secondly, due to their undeniably central role in Track Two, third party criteria represent good markers in signaling erroneous assumptions in theory.

In order to address the research topic, the first section of the paper will be dedicated to further defining Track Two diplomacy and its key concepts. As its definition is at times broad and transient in the available literature, this will allow us to narrow the scope of this paper. Case studies will then be presented in the second segment in order to provide an anchor for the subsequent assessment of the theory-practice gap. From this, what we consider to be key

---

⁶ Jones 2008; Kelman 2002
characteristics of interventions by unconventional third parties will be drawn out in the last section.

I. Defining Track Two, Theory & Third-Party Requirements

Track Two Diplomacy: Origins, Relevance & Definition

As alluded to in the introduction, peacemaking is a process which is much broader and inclusive than official diplomacy – reflecting changes in the nature of international conflicts. Taking the end of the Second World War as a marker, aggregate conflicts have both increased in frequency – even when accounting for the sharp decrease after the Cold War – and fundamentally changed in nature. Specifically, the proportion of interstate conflicts considerably diminished over a 56-year period, while internal conflicts have grown to represent an overwhelming proportion of occurrences (figure 1). The majority of conflict-resolution scholars and former practitioners consider government-to-government official diplomacy to be ill-equipped to deal with these new forms of conflicts, mainly rooted in social and identity-based tensions.\footnote{Underlined in most literature used for this research paper, particularly Diamond & McDonald 1996; McDonald 2004; Saunders 1996} Formal negotiation, mediation, or arbitration efforts cannot, on their own, provide the basis for the long-term resolution of identity-based conflicts. As argued by Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State, “human beings do not negotiate about their identities, fears, suspicions, anger, historic grievances, security, dignity, honor, justice, rejection, or acceptance” (Saunders 1996: 420). In fact, these social-psychological factors form the basis of the approach used in Track Two diplomacy.
John Burton

While the expression was introduced in 1982\(^8\) by Joseph Montville, a US diplomat, the essence of the practice as it is known today was conceived by John Burton in the mid-60s.\(^9\) A scholar with extensive experience as a former Australian diplomat, Burton advocated a larger framework than official diplomacy for conflict resolution, stressing the importance of intangible, “needs-based” factors. He was able to successfully demonstrate his viewpoint during tensions opposing Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Along with a limited number of colleagues, Burton formed a third-party panel and was able to secure participation from a small group of representatives from the three conflicting parties for an intense 5-day meeting followed by punctual sessions over a 6-month period.\(^10\) Unlike traditional tools of diplomacy, discussions were not prescriptive and did not focus on material issues, but rather centered on the conception each party had of the conflict. Apprehensions, misunderstandings and other intangible factors were therefore addressed, but with a clear objective to ultimately find or create mutually satisfactory solutions to the conflict. Ideas produced during the process were eventually transferred into official diplomacy as they became part of the 1966 Manila Peace Agreement.\(^11\) A key point to remember, and which will be referred to in this paper, is that the success of Burton’s initiative was largely based on his ability to transfer the outcome of his discussions to the official track – from a social-psychological approach to tangible settlements.

Following Burton’s success, many scholars have contributed to the development of what was then referred to as “controlled communication”.\(^12\) More specifically, the field has mainly been

---

\(^8\) Introduced in the 1981-82 issue of *Foreign Policy*, McDonald 2002: 52
\(^9\) Fisher, 2002
\(^10\) Ibid, p.65
\(^11\) Ibid, p.65
\(^12\) Ibid, p.65
enriched by the work of social psychologists, political scientists, and former Track One officials, amongst others.\textsuperscript{13} The approach has since been used in attempts to resolve various identity-based, protracted conflicts (table 1).

**Definition**

The description of Burton’s initiative provides a good account of what Track Two essentially consists of up to this day. It is specifically defined as “small group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners.” (Rouhana 2000 : 294)\textsuperscript{14}

Much broader definitions exist in the literature; while some scholars – albeit specializing in multi-track diplomacy – have broken down unofficial processes into nine tracks and describe Track Two as referenced above,\textsuperscript{15} others consider the quasi-totality of unofficial peace initiatives to represent Track Two. The objective is not to imply that one perception is more valuable than the other, but rather to narrow down the scope of this paper. Further, the vast majority of the literature consulted for this research converges towards the former, narrower definition, based on Burton’s initiative. A more specific terminology used to describe the process nowadays – Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) – will be used in the following pages along with “Track Two”.\textsuperscript{16} The next key points assist in further defining the approach.

\textsuperscript{13} In reference to H. Kelman, L. Doob (social psychologist), J. McDonald, H. Saunders (Track One), E. Azar N. Rouhana (political scientists) – Fisher 2002; Jones 2008
\textsuperscript{14} Citing Fisher’s definition, also referred in Saunders, 2000
\textsuperscript{15} Diamond & McDonald, 1996
\textsuperscript{16} Various terms have been used to describe the field, including controlled communication, third-party consultation, dialogue facilitation. (Fisher 1993, 2002)
Difference from formal mediation

While Interactive Conflict Resolution is occasionally referred to as mediation or pre-negotiation in the available literature, the latter terms are generally used in their broadest definitions. Mediation, within the Track Two context, is not conceptualized as a process in which bargaining, incentives, or penalties are used to reach specific objectives and lead to formal negotiations or settlements. Track Two does not adopt directive or coercive strategies. It is rather assimilated to a form of facilitation based on social-psychological premises. This implies that emotions and subjective elements that would normally be circumvented in dominant forms of mediation are accepted as part of the Track Two process. Without oversimplifying and suggesting that emotions or subjectivity are goals in themselves – problem-solving workshops have specific targets and directions as will be specified in this section – the acknowledgement of misperceptions, attitudes and needs represents a significant part of the process.

Another point of distinction is that the objectives of ICR tend to materialize, when they can be assessed, in the very long term. Although bringing conflicting parties to the formal negotiating table represents a successful outcome, as was the case with Burton in Southeast Asia, being able to gather conflicting parties for discussion may occasionally be considered a significant success in itself. Track Two is therefore a much broader, longer, and at times intangible process in comparison to mediation.

---

17 Bercovitch & Jackson 2001: 61; Saunders 1996; Crocker & al., 2003
18 Crocker, Sampson et al. 2003: 20-23; Spangler 2003
19 In reference to structuralist vs. social-psychological paradigms of mediation (Crocker & al. 2003: 20-23)
20 Spangler 2003
21 This applies to what is referred to as “hard” Track Two, which has a narrower focus on transfer and bringing parties to the negotiating table.
The Problem-Solving Workshop

The problem-solving workshop is described as “the fullest, paradigmatic application” of Track Two. It is the field’s main tool of intervention and adopts a framework which has been designed for effective facilitation. At a broad level, workshops essentially consist in a series of meetings gathering a limited number of participants from conflicting parties, who most importantly have influence over their respective policymakers. Neutral premises are prescribed for the gatherings, which usually take place in countries foreign to those in conflict, and in academic settings or other impartial locations.

The agenda and structure characterizing workshops are consistent with the social-psychological goals of the meetings. That is, minimal interventions from third-parties and removal from substantive issues are prescribed to insure productive discussions between participants. Agendas therefore remain flexible and occasional interventions are usually meant for clarifications in interpretation. Interactions characterizing problem-solving workshops have been grouped into the three following categories:

1. intrapsychic, referring to one’s own feelings/psychological wounds;
2. interpersonal, focusing on interaction with other participants and the deconstruction of stereotypes;
3. intergroup, putting emphasis on conflict dynamics.

Most workshops, however, tend to emphasize the third form of interactions, conflict dynamics, while still acknowledging the exchanges focusing on more intangible aspects of conflict.

---

22 Kelman 2005: 167
23 Rouhana 2000: 298
24 Rouhana, 2000
**Relationship with Track One: Transfer, Complementarity and Institutionalization**

The interaction between Track One and Two is another element essential in defining the field. Although it represents a parcel of the peace process, Track Two holds a privileged but complex connection with official diplomacy.

First, while Track Two is defined by its informality and non-committal nature, one of its fundamental objectives, beyond rapprochement, is the transposition of modified perceptions occurring in workshops into the official track – from participants to policymakers. Transfer is a complex process, which occurs over the long term and which is also subjected to specific challenges.

An equally complicated aspect is the integration of both tracks. That is, the best way to optimize the usage of each approach, either simultaneously or sequentially, appears to be a science in itself. Some scholars advocate the usage of Track Two before, during, and after the formal process – as long as it is conducted separately and assists in either catalyzing formal negotiations or sustaining a formal agreement once it has been endorsed. Others believe, however, that their combination should be simultaneous or sequential based on specific periods in the conflict cycle. One clear point is that Track Two, even when defended by its strongest advocates, is not positioned as a substitute to official diplomacy. The stream generally goes from Track Two to Track One – unofficial diplomacy remains a complement or catalyst for the official process.

---

25 Crocker & al., 2003
26 Saunders, 1996
27 Crocker et al., 2003
28 Underlined in the majority of the literature used for this research paper including Davies & Kaufman 2002:5
The potential synergy between the two tracks has led practitioners to advocate the institutionalization of the field; that is, the establishment of training, norms and financing methods, amongst other elements, which would encourage the systematic usage of Track Two where prescribed.\(^{29}\) While some scholars point to attempts at structural changes, notably in the United States,\(^{30}\) very few have benefited from sustained support from government officials.\(^{31}\)

This resistance or unresponsiveness from governments – who either perceive Track Two as potentially damaging\(^{32}\) to the official process or who are not committed to long-term investments in the field,\(^{33}\) are partly attributable to the lack of punctual, measurable results\(^{34}\) but also to the absence of an exhaustive theory specific to the field. While some practitioners argue that Track Two cannot be subjected to a stringent theoretical model, this paper posits that theory should at a minimum be revisited in order to provide a point of reference in view of the institutionalization of the field. In other words, it is doubtful that an increased acceptance and usage of Track Two can be done without a corresponding expansion or adjustment in current theory.

**Issues in Theory: Art vs. Science**

More specifically, the theoretical foundation specific to Track Two appears to be limited to (1) third-party requirements – which themselves lie on uncertain grounds as will be seen in this segment – and; (2) the Problem-Solving Workshop model of intervention, which will be used to assess third-party requirements in the next section. This does not suggest that Track Two is a heuristic process; often defined as an interdisciplinary field, the methodologies and analyses used

\(^{29}\) McDonald 2004; Jones 2008  
\(^{30}\) McDonald, 2004  
\(^{31}\) McDonald 2004; Jones 2008  
\(^{32}\) McDonald 2004  
\(^{33}\) Jones, 2008  
\(^{34}\) Ibid
in Track Two interventions are generally rooted in social psychology, psychiatry or political science. Extensive preparation and dedication from scholar-practitioners have also led to significant contributions to the peace process, as demonstrated with the South African case as will be illustrated in later sections. ICR should not, therefore, be caricatured as a “free-for-all” as done by some. Scholars do converge in admitting, however, to the absence of a stand-alone, exhaustive theory dedicated to unofficial Track Two interventions going beyond third-party requirements and the problem-solving workshop.

This is not considered to be a problem for everyone. On general terms, Track Two literature is characterized by a division between scholars considering Interactive Conflict Resolution to be an art – revealing idiosyncrasies that cannot be controlled for in a model – and those advocating more rigorous schemes for intervention. Taking into account practitioners’ desire to witness a more systematic usage of Track Two and the resistance they face from governments, we lean towards the second viewpoint. This does not mean, however, that we adhere to established criteria – which appear to be somewhat unrealistic as will be seen with case studies – but simply that more consideration should be dedicated to establishing requirements that can be applied in a broader range of contexts typical to conflicts. A stronger theoretical basis would contribute to making Track Two outcomes more measurable for funders – by establishing markers of assessment beyond the ultimate, long-term objective of transfer – and also more convincing from an academic perspective. The double-marginality characterizing Track Two – meaning it is

---

35 Fisher 2002  
36 Rouhana 1995: 261  
37 Rouhana 1995, 2000  
38 Expression used by Rouhana 2000: 328
considered to be somewhat an eccentric approach by both academia and Track One officials – suggests benefits from the consolidation of theory.

Undoubtedly, differences between theory and practice are inevitable – idiosyncrasies cannot be avoided in various cultural contexts and conditions leading to conflict. The discrepancy between the presented theory – specifically third-party requirements within the framework of this paper – and practice is so marked, however, that it renders the applicability of theory somewhat obsolete.

**Question of Culture**

Before presenting third-party requirements in the next section, it should be specified that this paper is not challenging the applicability of third-party prerequisites, and more broadly Track Two theory, based on cultural factors. The latter will not be underlying erroneous assumptions outlined in the last segment of this research paper. While focusing on the applicability of Track Two theory in Africa could, a priori, implicitly allude to culture, it is not the case for multiple reasons – the most important being that Track Two theory, despite its shortcomings, appears to be somewhat successfully “acultural”.\(^{39}\) That is, while theory is based on Western premises, culture did not appear to impede the applicability of Track Two – as theorized with third-party requirements – in various conflicts as demonstrated with Middle-Eastern or Southeast-Asian cases for example (table 1).\(^{40}\) Second, as it is often suggested in ICR literature, many initiatives, some of which may still be ongoing, go undocumented to preserve confidentiality – cases displaying standard theoretical application may therefore eventually be made public. Lastly,

---

\(^{39}\) Avruch & Black, 1991

\(^{40}\) In references to countries listed in Table 1, it should be noted that Doob’s initiative in the Horn of Africa was considered to be more or less successful by participants (Fisher 2002: 66-67) – the case study was therefore disregarded within the framework of this paper
drawing any form of unique, culture-based conclusions from three countries displaying differing historical and cultural backgrounds would be irrelevant.

Limiting the scope of this paper to African cases, however, does not lower the relevance of conclusions which will be drawn. The three cases explored – South Africa, Liberia and Biafra – are not less valuable, on any account, than others and do indicate that alternatives to the proposed model exist and are, at times, unavoidable. We may also infer, on the basis that we cannot underline characteristics of conflicts that are unique to Africa, that similar third-party discrepancies occur in various countries, rendering our conclusions relevant on a larger scale.

Third-Party Requirements: Identity, Expertise & Impartiality

“One of the leading academic definitions of interactive conflict resolution reads “small group, problem-solving discussion between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third-party of social scientists-practitioners [emphasis added].” As often happens, the definition depends partly on the experience and needs of the definer. That is understandable.” (Saunders 2000: 258)

Identity as Scholar-Practitioners

Saunders’ take on the above definition is a fair account of the state of theory on third-party requirements. More specifically referring to the identity prescribed for Track Two practitioners, the criterion tends to be a reflection of the education and experience of scholars 41 establishing the basis of theory rather than take foundation on more tangible elements. That is, a significant proportion of scholars, with few exceptions,42 rightfully or wrongfully assume traits considered essential to the integrity the Track Two process – such as credibility and impartiality – to be

41 Social psychologists, political scientists, former officials turned academic, psychologists (Fisher 1983; Rouhana 1995)
42 Saunders 2000; Rouhana 1995, 2000
inherent to scholar-practitioners.\textsuperscript{43} This does not suggest, on any account, that scholar-practitioners are less valuable than other potential facilitators – they could, in fact, be the best suited to carry out Track Two interventions. Such criterion, however, should not be part of ICR theory without demonstrated foundations.

Pragmatic considerations of quality-control may be at the source of this particular requirement.\textsuperscript{44} While the concept of ICR was initially introduced about fifty years ago with Burton, Track Two remains a niche with relatively limited theory and practice. Over a 25-year period, the number of documented ICR initiatives was more than ten times lower than traditional methods of intervention such as mediation.\textsuperscript{45} Issues of successful, professional representation therefore gain importance when taking into consideration the difficulties in obtaining sustained funding, defining training and obtaining overall recognition for the field\textsuperscript{46} – challenges which are still relevant to this day.\textsuperscript{47} It is therefore understandable, in that respect, that scholar-practitioners would be resistant to initiatives from a wider spectrum of third parties.

Reiterating our point, however, there is no empirical rationale for this requirement. It is also suggested that scholars may not always be appropriately equipped to lead ICR due to a lack of institutionalization.\textsuperscript{48} Failure to recognize Track Two as a legitimate field with the ensuing funding and infrastructure implies that consultancy cannot become a full-time practice. Scholars therefore have to address their academic obligations in addition to the logistical burden imposed

\textsuperscript{43} Fisher 1983, Kelman 2000, 2002
\textsuperscript{44} Fisher, 1993
\textsuperscript{45}25 documented cases of Track Two vs. over 300 for mediation (Ibid, p. 130) – although there has been growth in the usage of Track Two interventions since publication of this data, we may confidently assume the gap has not been closed
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid
\textsuperscript{47} Jones 2008; Rouhana 2002
\textsuperscript{48} Fisher, 1993
by the lack of capacity in Track Two\textsuperscript{49} – this results in less time dedicated to actual consultation. A final point is that a parallel could be established between governments’ reticence toward Track Two and practitioners’ resistance to broader criteria for third parties. Echoing Saunders,\textsuperscript{50} just as conflict resolution cannot be limited to official diplomacy, ICR cannot be limited to punctual – albeit potentially long-term – interventions from scholar-practitioners. It is often necessary to operate with available resources and this goes beyond idiosyncrasies – case studies demonstrate that Track Two interventions may not occur at all if third parties are limited to scholar-practitioners.

**Expertise**

While expertise is the corollary of identity requirements, it is not as clearly circumscribed. That is, qualifications required to facilitate Track Two interventions are not detailed beyond a broad, all-inclusive ability to hold “moderate to considerable knowledge about the conflict and the parties in question, knowledge and expertise in conflict analysis, and human relations skills in interpersonal and cross-cultural communication and small-group processes.”(Fisher 2002: 62) It is, on the one hand, difficult to establish a clear correlation between those abilities and the identity of scholar-practitioners. While the credentials specific to scholar-practitioners – in social psychology, political science or psychiatry – undeniably contribute to the analysis of conflicts, they do not, in themselves, warrant the ability to facilitate interactions between conflicting parties. Corporations, members of religious associations, or civil society have been able to act as successful third parties based on other aptitudes as will be demonstrated in case

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid
\textsuperscript{50} Saunders, 1996
studies. Finally, the manner in which such extensive expertise could be acquired is left undefined; no clear training method has been established in the literature.

**External Status as Impartiality**

External status to the conflict – either in terms of personal involvement or in terms of national identity and background – is generally equated with impartiality. ⁵¹ To the extent that they do not display personal involvement or bias in a given conflict, third parties of cultural or national backgrounds similar to those involved in conflict are accepted, and even encouraged by scholars believing it may ease cross-cultural interpretation. ⁵² A combination of both foreign and culturally-familiar third parties is then prescribed in those situations. ⁵³ Others, however, posit that complete removal, and even moderate knowledge of the conflict are preferable. Fisher, for example, refers to a “scholar-practitioner whose background, attitudes and behavior engender impartiality” and advises that “the consultant should have moderate knowledge of the parties… thus [he/she] will not have predefined perceptions based on a high degree of knowledge of the parties”. ⁵⁴ While both viewpoints slightly vary, they clearly exclude the possibility of personal involvement or partiality on the part of a third party in conflict resolution. Although the requirement is intuitive, it has not been demonstrated that facilitators involved in given protracted conflicts would necessarily be detrimental to the process as will be demonstrated in case studies. This point is further reinforced in mediation literature. ⁵⁵ On the one hand, it is outlined that external third parties may be perceived as partial by conflicting groups despite their

---

⁵¹ Rouhana, Kelman, Fisher
⁵² Rouhana 1995; Rouhana & Kelman 1994; Jones 2008
⁵³ Rouhana & Kelman, 1994
⁵⁴ Fisher 1983: 302
⁵⁵ While Track Two should be distinguished from official mediation as previously indicated, the acceptance of Track Two facilitators in conflicts is posited to be based on the same criteria as mediators. (Maundi, Zartman et al. 2006:.8)
apparent neutrality – an image of impartiality may therefore be pursued by Track Two scholars in vain. More importantly, it is suggested that partial third parties may be more readily accepted in specific contexts and even lead to more perennial peace outcomes than neutral counterparts.

In fact, status of the third-party as a repository of trust – in reference to its trustworthiness and overall credibility – is not instantaneously achieved through its external status, expertise, or profession, but rather through sustained actions, built over the long term. Kelman, who paradoxically associates credibility, trustworthiness and authority with the identity of scholars, articulates this process very well:

“To serve as a repository of trust, of course, the third party must prove itself trustworthy. It must never violate confidentiality… It must not use the situation for extraneous purposes … It must be scrupulously even-handed; this does not imply that it is disinterested or neutral in all respects, nor does it deter the third party from empowering one or the other when it is suffering from a power deficiency in a given context. At all times, the third party must demonstrate integrity of the process” (Kelman 2005: 645)

This particular trait, which can be considered as overarching all others, will be the common denominator in case studies presented in the next section.

II. Case Studies - Illustration the Theory-Practice Gap

At the outset, the South African, Biafran, and Liberian case studies assist in emphasizing different aspects of our argument. As it is the closest iteration of Track Two theory, which involves the usage of the problem-solving workshop, the South African case is ideal in outlining

---

56 Hoglund & Svensson, 2008  
57 Maiese, 2005  
58 Svensson, 2009  
59 Expression specific to Track Two literature  
60 Kelman 2005: 642; Kelman 2002: 174  
61 Despite stressing the importance of third-party requirements, consulted literature generally emphasizes the importance of trust as a sine qua non condition to facilitation.
discrepancies in third-party requirements. The significant influence of Track Two meetings on negotiations ending apartheid also emphasizes the need to review theory. More attention will be dedicated to this case due to its comparative value and importance in the official process. While remaining case studies do not take place in this theoretical format, they nonetheless remain relevant in reiterating the questionable utility of third-party requirements, and more importantly in pointing to shortcomings in the applicability of Track Two theory on more general terms. That is, presented third parties demonstrate the ability to fulfill the fundamental role of Track Two practitioners without recourse to third-party requirements or to the problem-solving workshop. The absence of additional case studies in which this tool of intervention is used also suggests that theory may have become somewhat obsolete – at least in African cases. This, however, is stated with some reserve as the eventual publication of undocumented interventions may demonstrate the opposite.

Beyond stressing different parts of the same argument, all case studies converge in outlining what we consider to be three faulty assumptions in Track Two theory – (1) the absence of barriers to entry; (2) expertise as a pre-requisite to conflict resolution and; (3) the acquisition of trust based on status rather than process – which will be elaborated at the end of this section.

**South Africa: Track Two initiatives from 1984-1989**

Claiming to provide a complete and accurate account of the events which led to Track Two initiatives in South Africa – and in other conflicts presented in this section – would be inappropriate. Such analysis, while significant, is outside the scope of this paper. A brief description providing an account of the context in which initiatives were undertaken is, however,
necessary in order to better assess the role of third parties – keeping in mind that we are unable to provide a detailed account of conflicts and the nuances they deserve.

**Background 1984-1989**

The beginning of official negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Afrikaner National Party (NP) in February 1990\(^{62}\) could have been perceived as inevitable. At a broad level, political, social, and economic conditions had reached a critical point following township uprisings, and the South African government had declared, in 1985,\(^{63}\) what appeared to be an unsustainable State of Emergency in an attempt to control socio-economic instability.\(^{64}\)

More specifically referring to each conflicting party, both the ANC and NP appeared to face precarious conditions. The African National Congress, which had adopted armed struggle in response to violent repression from the government, had been banned from South Africa since 1960 – its leaders were either jailed or in exile. The National Party had imposed censorship on any form of communication from the ANC and the party was widely perceived as both terrorist and communist by the white South African population, as well as a number of members of the international community. The nearing end of the Cold War also meant declining support from the Communist East Bloc.\(^{65}\) The party was therefore seeking to rehabilitate its image in order to be legitimized in its struggle for equality. The governing National Party, on its part, was facing foreign disinvestments and economic stagnation as a result of instability in the country. Increasing pressures to negotiate with the ANC came not only from members of the international community – particularly developing countries, the African Union, and Western Europe – who

\(^{62}\) Lieberfeld, 2002  
\(^{63}\) Lieberfeld, 2002  
\(^{64}\) In reference to quote from Niel Barnard (Lieberfeld, 2005)  
\(^{65}\) Lieberfeld 2005; 106-107
threatened economic sanctions, but also from its own business community, which was increasingly baring the material costs of the conflict and which, most importantly, perceived a transition to power sharing with the ANC as inevitable. Despite its censorship, repressive measures, and what some analysts described as an upper hand in the conflict, the possibility of negotiating with the ANC was therefore present in government, as articulated by Niel Barnard, then the director of the National Intelligence Services (NIS):

“There was a very deep feeling from 1986-1989, that we can still continue, but for how long? Would it be five years, ten years, fifteen years? The basic question was where would we be at the end of those ten, fifteen, or twenty years? Would we be in a situation… of the country just disintegrating? To negotiate in such a climate would be much more difficult than to negotiate in a situation of relative capacity economically, security-wise, and so forth” (Lieberfeld 2005:106-107)

**Track Two Initiatives & Third Parties**

**1984: Scholar-Practitioners**

The first attempt to gather ANC leaders and government officials was made in 1984, when a team of British and South African scholars had proposed the organization of problem-solving workshops reuniting both parties. Despite the ANC’s mandate to rehabilitate its image and gain support from a larger base of white South Africans, the intervention was declined by its leaders who perceived the initiative, despite its informal nature, as interference. Specifically, the presence of an agenda, and even the minimal structure characteristic of Track Two facilitation, was seen as a form of control over the content and timing of discussions. In fact, both the African National Congress and National Party were adamant in their desire to exclude (perceived) interference from their discussions. The strategy adopted towards any form of
intervention, official or not, by the ANC was to; (1) minimize the role of facilitators; (2) insure their interests corresponded to those of South Africans and; (3) initiate the process themselves.70 This approach is articulated in the following quote and reflected in the description of the remaining 1985 and 1987 initiatives:

“…we have to initiate and set the agenda, and not leave it to others to impose it on us… If negotiations come… we do not want to be prescribed to by forces whose interests do not coincide with the interests of our people.” (ANC committee member referring to an official process) (Lieberfeld 2005; 110)

Whether the workshops proposed by scholars would have been controlling will remain unknown. It is unlikely, however, that Track Two facilitators would have exerted excessive control over discussions as minimal interventions characterize the approach. Taking into account the ANC strategy, it is possible that the missing criterion was perceived distance from the conflict or simply wariness from being solicited by an unknown third party.

1985: Quaker

Another effort to gather ANC officials, this time with academics close to the government, was initiated by the ANC a year later. Oliver Tambo, who was then president of the political organization, had contacted a Quaker, H.W. van de Merwe, in order to organize a meeting in Zambia including influential Afrikaners. While all potential participants had agreed to attend discussions, the Afrikaner academics (Willie Esterhuysen and Sampie Terreblanche) had to turn down the offer due to pressures from the National Party who had been made aware of the meeting. Unlike the ANC, which was actively seeking to change perceptions,71 the NP, under P.W. Botha at the time, was opposed to any form of contact with the banned party.

70 Ibid
71 This does not imply the ANC was opened to formal negotiations, as the release of prisoners and recognition of the party as legitimate were pre-conditions. (Lieberfeld, 2005)
1985: Zambian President and Business Magazine Editor

The first initiative of significant importance, both in changing public perceptions and in triggering political shifts, took place in Zambia between business leaders and ANC officials. This meeting was singular in many respects. First, a significant proportion of participants were from the private sector. Gavin Relly, who was both the chairman of Anglo-American (a mining company and South Africa’s biggest conglomerate at the time) 72 and president of the South Africa Foundation (a pro-business lobby), had led a group of business executives and journalists to meet ANC leaders two months following the establishment of the State of Emergency. 73 The initiative reflected, on the one hand, a belief that the ANC would inevitably come to power, and on the other, economic pressures exerted on corporations due to the decline in foreign investments and unstable socio-political climate. 74 Since the ANC was depicted as a communist party by the NP, there was also fear that the nationalization of mining companies would take place as had been the case in Zambia, under Kenneth Kaunda, in the mid-70s. 75 Additionally, contrary to the confidentiality characterizing Track Two initiatives, the outcome of the meeting was largely publicized in two newspapers – Leadership S.A. and The Sunday Times – the latter being partly owned by Anglo-American. 76 The last particularity of the workshop resided in its facilitation. Hugh Murray, who was not a scholar-practitioner but rather the editor of Leadership S.A., was considered as essential in organizing the meeting 77 while Kenneth

72 Anglo-American was estimated to account for approximately 50% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
73 Lieberfeld 2002: 360
74 Ibid, p.361
75 Ibid, p. 360
76 Ibid
77 Shapiro 2012: 38
Kaunda, then president of Zambia, facilitated the discussions on his premises.\(^78\) While the meeting was informal and mainly aimed to address misperceptions, consistent with Track Two initiatives, the facilitation was partial. Specifically, Kaunda was an active supporter of the ANC (Zambia was home to the organization’s headquarters), advocated the application of economic sanctions towards South Africa\(^79\) and had also been at the helm of the country when the nationalization of mining companies, particularly the Zambian division of Anglo-American, had taken place in the mid-70s.\(^80\) Relly and Kaunda, however, benefited from a trusting relationship following Relly’s assistance with the organization of mediation efforts involving Kaunda a decade earlier.\(^81\) More importantly, the meeting most likely would not have taken place without the Zambian president’s facilitation. Communist members of the ANC regarded a meeting involving corporations negatively and perceived it as a form of distancing from their fundamental values. ANC president Oliver Tambo was however convinced by Kaunda to make the ANC participate in the discussions.\(^82\)

The minimum interventions of facilitators and more importantly the unstructured nature of the meeting\(^83\) perhaps allowed the participants to explore substantive issues more rapidly than would have been possible in a standard Track Two workshop. The economic approach which would be adopted by the ANC in case of power, the nationalization of corporations, the imposition of a moratorium on the ANC armed struggle, and the protection of the South African constitution were questions freely asked, mostly from Afrikaners to members of the ANC.\(^84\) While those

\(^{78}\) Lieberfeld 2002: 361
\(^{79}\) Good 1987: 507
\(^{80}\) Lieberfeld, 2002
\(^{81}\) Good, 1987
\(^{82}\) Lieberfeld 2002: 361
\(^{83}\) Lieberfeld 2002: 361
\(^{84}\) Ibid
tangible issues were addressed, it was clear to both groups that the discussions were purely informal, as stressed by Kaunda in the beginning of the workshop. In fact, notwithstanding the subject matters tackled during the meeting, the greatest takeaway for the Afrikaners appeared to be social and psychological redefinitions. Gavin Relly, the head of Anglo-American, had described the meeting as one the nicest days he had ever spent while Bloom, another businessman, specifically addressed the stereotypical image of the ANC in the following quote:

“a total lack of aggression, animosity or hostility towards us… the initial round of introductions was almost like a reunion… It is difficult to view the ANC group as hard-line Marxists or bloodthirsty terrorists who were interested in reducing South Africa to anarchy and seizing power with a hatred of white. Without in any way wishing to be seduced or hypnotized by the occasion, I believe that they are people with whom serious negotiations can be undertaken and with whom a certain amount of common ground could be found. I would unhesitatingly support any initiative to get the South African government and the ANC into contact with each other” (Lieberfeld 2002; 362)

While the National Party condoned the actions of the businessmen, the meeting was publicized and no actions were taken against either Gavin Relly or any other Afrikaner participants.

**Transfer to policymaking**

The publicized Zambian discussions most likely set a precedent and triggered a subsequent meeting between ANC leaders and members of the parliamentary opposition. The latter, who had been given an account of the previous meeting by two of the Afrikaner businessmen, travelled to Zambia only to come back with the same outcome of redefined perceptions. More tangibly, two participants of this new meeting – van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine – resigned from their positions in parliament to found the Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South Africa (Idasa). The organization had the specific objective of contributing to the end of the

---

85 Ibid, Shapiro 2012: 38
South African conflict and was dedicated to disseminating a factual portrait of the ANC and its objectives.\footnote{Lieberfeld, 2002}

\section*{1987-1989: Consolidated Goldfields}

The series of six meetings which gathered ANC leaders and Afrikaner academics with close ties to the government, from 1987 to the end of 1989, are directly correlated to the beginning of official negotiations between the ANC and the National Party in 1990.\footnote{Lieberfeld, 2005} Although the problem-solving workshop was used in gathering both parties, facilitation was not as prescribed in Track Two theory.

More specifically, Consolidated Goldfields, the second largest gold mining company in South Africa, was behind the organization and facilitation of the workshops. Michael Young, the public relations director and strategic advisor of the company, had been assigned to facilitate the Track Two process. Beyond representing the private sector, Consolidated Goldfields (Consgold), was atypical due to its perceived lack of impartiality. The company was British and maintained close ties to its government which, at the time, labeled the ANC as a terrorist organization and had refused to impose economic sanctions on the South African government.\footnote{Cull, 2013} Consgold’s interests, however, were closely linked to the future of the country – albeit from a purely pecuniary perspective – as the majority of its assets were in South Africa.\footnote{Lieberfeld, 2005} The future profitability of the corporation therefore hinged on the political, social and economic stability of South Africa. The strategy of the ANC which, towards the end of the Cold War, was witnessing...
a decline in support from the Communist East Bloc, may also have played a role in the acceptance of Michael Young as a third party. As the proximity of Consgold to its government implied reports to British Intelligence Services, leaders from the ANC considered the situation as an opportunity to change perceptions. Referring to the content of the workshops, a leader of the ANC advised:

“We are aware that Michael (Young) would have been discussing this (meeting) with British Intelligence… It couldn’t be otherwise. But for us there was no problem… It helped us to then get an understanding within the then British government that we are not all these “mad Russian agents” interested in armed seizure of power; we were serious about transformation.” (Lieberfeld 2005: 109-110)

Further than the strategy adopted by the ANC, Consgold’s persistence in attempting to gather both parties indicated its interest in resolving the conflict and most likely contributed to building trust on both sides. After an attempt to organize a meeting made by the company’s vice-chairman failed,\(^90\) Consgold reverted to the services of Fleur de Villiers – a political editor and consultant for Anglo-American – who recommended the organization of confidential, problem-solving workshops. Michael Young, on his part, had met both Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki a year before the Consgold workshops, in a meeting between ANC leaders and representatives of corporations with interests in South Africa. He was subsequently able to organize a meeting (although not Track Two) between ANC president Oliver Tambo and Linda Chalker, who was then the British minister of foreign affairs for Africa.\(^91\) From this point, Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki had asked Young to organize a meeting with influential Afrikaners.\(^92\) The meetings were therefore the request of the ANC, in accordance with their strategy, and resulted from Consgold persistence in building a trusting relationship with the party.

---

\(^90\) Ibid
\(^91\) Ibid
\(^92\) Ibid, p.109
Consistent with the desire of both parties, facilitation during the six workshops led by Consgold was characterized by minimal interventions. Young’s input usually related to specifications of points made by one of the parties, and he was not present during more informal activities.93

Minimal interventions from unorthodox third parties during the South African conflict do not remove their importance. Although their presence may have been in line with the agenda of the ANC, all intermediaries proved to be instrumental in materializing meetings between members of the ANC and white South Africans, ultimately contributing to official negotiations.

**Biafran War: Quakers**

The Biafran War, initiated in 1967, could not be halted before the defeat of Biafran troops in 1970, leading to the death of more than two million citizens.94 Quakers, who acted as unofficial facilitators between warring parties, are deemed to have eased post-war relations by changing misperceptions in conflicting factions.95

**Background**

Political instability and ethnic tensions were ongoing concerns in Nigeria following its independence in 1960. The three sub-regions dividing the country since colonization – the north, east (Biafra), and west – were each characterized by different ethnic groups, resources, and development levels. Due to prevailing inequalities, conflict quickly arose despite the creation of a coalition government. Electoral boycotts, and more particularly discussions of secession from Biafra, therefore defined the first years of sovereignty. Such conditions led to two successive military coups in 1966, ultimately resulting in the creation of the central Federal Military

---

93 Ibid, p.111
94 Rothchild, 1997
95 Ibid
Government (FMG), and Biafra. Disputes between the government and state escalated to the point of reaching civil war in 1967, notwithstanding previous efforts of conflict resolution.

**International Context**

While the Federal Military Government was considered to have an upper hand in the conflict based on its military and financial means, Biafra relied on lower resources and more importantly did not have sufficient food supplies. The international scrutiny resulting from the conflict and its imbalance led to different responses from the international community. Although many countries supported Biafra in view of the humanitarian crisis it was facing, others, based on political and economic considerations, publicly supported the central government. In fact, international interventions, by way of military or financial support, generally exacerbated the conflict;

The Organization for African Unity\textsuperscript{96} publicly supported the central government by fear of witnessing similar conflicts in newly independent states, Western countries supported Biafra by sending food and money, a minority of countries (five) had officially recognized Biafra while others, albeit exceptions, simultaneously furnished weapons to the FMG and sent food to Biafra.

The contentious international context meant that external facilitators, as impartial as they may have been, were invariably perceived by one side or the other as biased. In fact, merely recognizing Biafra as a legitimate party for official or unofficial negotiations was considered negatively by the central government. Official and unofficial attempts of facilitation by the Vatican, World Council of Churches, All African Conference of Churches, Commonwealth Secretariat and OAU all failed or were rejected by both parties – either because of their

\textsuperscript{96} Now replaced by the African Union
recognition of Nigeria as one country or of Biafra as a legitimate entity for negotiations. Barriers to entry therefore stood, not because of the unorthodoxy of some of the would-be facilitators, but because of public positions which had been taken in their country or organization.

**Third Party**

Quakers were unorthodox facilitators as they represented a Christian Movement, lacked of expertise in conflict management, and displayed personal involvement based on their longstanding presence in Nigeria. Referring to their role, they were never able to gather the conflicting parties within the format of a problem-solving workshop, but were trusted enough by both groups to act as communication channels throughout the conflict.

Due to their extended presence in Nigeria and involvement in various political ambits, the movement came to be respected and trusted over the years by both central government and Biafran officials. Quakers therefore had access to the leaders of both factions – gen Gowon and Ojukwu – and contributed to (1) deconstructing stereotypes and misperceptions by merely giving a factual account of the conditions afflicting both sides during the war and (2) maintaining informal negotiations by conveying proposals from one side to the other. These activities are deemed to have contributed to more peaceful relations following the end of the war in 1970.97

**Liberia: Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)**

The last case study refers to the unorthodox facilitative role played by WIPNET during the second civil war which affected Liberia from 1999 to 2003.

97 Rothchild, 1997
Background

Political instability and ethnic tensions triggered Liberia’s first civil war, which occurred from 1989 to 1997. The ceasefire and disarmament agreement reached in 1997 was short lived and tensions re-escalated to a second civil war from 1999 to 2003 – at which time Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front faced two rebel groups; the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)

WIPNET is the most atypical facilitator of the three case studies as it represents a grassroots movement of women uniting against war. WIPNET leaders were not experts in conflict resolution, had a great level of personal involvement as they directly suffered the consequences of the war and did not benefit from the structure or financial resources characterizing facilitators previously presented.

The group initiated its activities and gained public exposure during the first civil war in 1991 by organizing public demonstrations for peace. Activities undertaken during the second civil war consisted, amongst others, of public multi-confessional prayers. WIPNET’s most notable accomplishment in terms of facilitation consisted in arranging meetings between Charles Taylor and LURD rebel leaders.98 The organization is also known to have put pressure – perhaps mostly symbolically – on the concerned parties by blocking the exit of an official mediation venue in Ghana until an agreement was reached in 2003.99

---

98 Bekoe & Parajon 2007; Zanker 2013
99 Zanker, 2013
Erroneous Assumptions

All case studies have demonstrated, South Africa in particular, that the fundamental role of Track Two practitioners may, at times, exclusively be fulfilled by unorthodox third parties. Specifically referring to the fundamental functions of facilitators as defined in theory and described below,\textsuperscript{100} Kenneth Kaunda and Hugh Murray, Michael Young, Nigerian Quakers and Liberian women were all able to fulfill, albeit at a broad level, the following criteria without adhering to third-party requirements:

(1) inducing mutual positive motivation for problem-solving
(2) improving the openness and accuracy of communication
(3) diagnosing the issues and processes of the conflict
(4) regulating the interaction among the participants

Beyond the suitability of unorthodox facilitators, what this paper posits is that adherence to third-party requirements of identity, expertise, and external status, could have potentially prevented the facilitation of the presented conflicts due to the following assumptions.

Absence of barriers to entry

The Nigerian and South African cases in particular have demonstrated that external third parties may be actively rejected from facilitation. External status, in this context, is not referring to the identity or background of the third party, but rather to direct interests in the outcome of the conflict. Consequently, Zambian (President Kaunda) and British (Consgold) third parties were not accepted as facilitators in South Africa because of their foreign identities, but rather because of their respective political and financial interests in witnessing the end of ongoing tensions between the ANC and National Party. International contentions about the course of the Biafran

\textsuperscript{100} Fisher 1983: 304
War also meant that conflicting parties were more likely to turn to local Quakers than external organizations for indirect consultation. Track Two theory may simply not be put into practice if external third parties are prescribed.

**Expertise as a pre-requisite to conflict resolution**

As outlined in the first section of the research paper, the type of expertise required for conflict resolution is not clearly defined. While the objective is not to argue that expertise should not be part of third-party requirements, a review of the case studies suggests that it does not appear to be a determining factor in accepting facilitators – trust and prior exposure appeared to be more important factors as will be explained below. It should be underlined, however, that both Kenneth Kaunda and Michael Young, in the case of South Africa, had had prior, experience in the organization or facilitation of meetings. Their “expertise”, however, appeared to be the result of prior experiences rather than specialized, theoretical acquisition.

**Attribution of trust based on status**

As demonstrated in all case studies, the prescribed identity, expertise, and external status of facilitators have little impact over their acceptance from conflicting parties. The credibility and trust granted to a third party rather hinges on the persistence and long-term commitment demonstrated from potential facilitators. This was made apparent with the ANC’s refusal to accept South African and British scholar-practitioners in 1984, on the basis that they were to control the substance of the meetings. The fact that Track Two is defined by minimal interventions, as was desired by the ANC and National Party, indicated that the scholars were not perceived as fully trustworthy despite their identity. Trust is rather a long-term process, as was demonstrated with the Quakers, who had long been established in Nigeria; Kenneth Kaunda, who had been a strong advocate of the ANC and; Michael Young, who despite a previously
failed attempts by Consgold, had been able to build trust with Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki during two previous meetings.

III. Characteristics of Reviewed Case Studies

The objective of the research paper is not to imply that unconventional third parties are superior to those prescribed. Rather, observed case studies point to notable departures from the established Track Two theory. The following points, which in our view are common to some of the presented facilitation attempts, may provide more insight as to potential conditions favoring the adoption of unorthodox third parties.

Proximity to Track 1.5

The 1985 initiative between ANC leaders and Afrikaner businessmen, as well as the 1987 meeting between ANC leaders and Afrikaner academics, may be perceived as Track 1.5 as participants directly part of the official party in conflict attended the meetings in their private capacities. The fact that ANC leaders such as Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma – who would each eventually become presidents of South Africa – attended the meetings most likely increased the risk of losing control over the content of unofficial discussions. Knowledge that conversations were being conveyed to intelligence services, both in England and more importantly in South Africa,\textsuperscript{101} meant that unofficial conversations bared great implications for ANC members. The presence of unorthodox, familiar third parties chosen by the ANC was most likely perceived to lower this risk.

\textsuperscript{101} Willie Esterhuyse had advised members of the ANC that he had to provide an account of meetings to the National Intelligence Services (NIS)
Timeline of conflicts

This partly alludes to ripeness\textsuperscript{102} in the South African conflict. Although the government estimated that tensions were sufficiently suppressed to avoid negotiations and maintain control of the country in the medium term,\textsuperscript{103} prevailing socio-economic conditions suggested otherwise. To this point, the 1985 Zambian meeting between businessmen and ANC leaders occurred only two months after the national State of Emergency had been declared, and shortly after Anglo-American, the country’s biggest corporation, had suffered damages to its infrastructure following demonstrations.\textsuperscript{104} The number of Track Two initiatives solicited by the ANC within the 1984-89 period also indicates that potential facilitators had to be available within a relatively short-term period – this may explain why third parties were not external, but rather readily available to organize meetings. This issue becomes more relevant when acknowledging the challenges faced by Track Two practitioners in getting sufficient support for the swift organization of workshops. This concern is well articulated by official mediation practitioners who face a similar challenge, albeit to a lesser extent than Track Two facilitators. The following abstract simultaneously refers to trust building, touched upon in the previous section:

“several interviewees said that the ultimate ability of the mediation to make progress is dependent on factors outside its control, such as the outcome of an election or leadership struggle. Sometimes, long periods are spent “spinning wheels” and waiting for the “stars to align”. But one has to stick with it. Useful background work is done, and credibility is built up for the moment when progress is possible. This calls, once again, for flexibility but also for long-term commitment. “These processes can take years, sometimes decades, and you cannot stop and start; you have to be there through thick and thin. Effectiveness at this sort of work requires the development of a high degree of trust and you cannot win that if the parties in the dispute feel that you are not in for the long haul.”(Jones 2013: 9-10)

\textsuperscript{102} In reference to the optimal point of intervention in conflict (Zartman, 2003)
\textsuperscript{103} In reference to the quote from the NIS director
\textsuperscript{104} Anglo-American
Conclusion

The identity, expertise, and external status of third parties have not been clearly correlated to the fundamental objectives of Track Two diplomacy in the available literature. That is, the identity of facilitators as scholar-practitioners specializing in conflict resolution, and external to a given conflict, has not been empirically shown to systematically lead to better outcomes than would be achieved under different criteria. The objective of the paper is not to suggest that one type of facilitator is superior to another, but rather to suggest that more inclusive criteria should be integrated in theory in order to more accurately reflect practice. To this point, the observation of given case studies suggests that complete adherence to third-party requirements may, at times, prevent the application of Track Two initiatives. The presence of barriers to entry, and the importance of building trust over expertise or status, indicate, in our view, that theory should be revised in order to recognize the legitimacy of a broader range of facilitators. We have attempted to articulate this viewpoint through the presentation of three case studies, the most relevant being South Africa as it is the closest iteration of the problem-solving workshop model of intervention. This increased its value in specifically outlining departures from third-party requirements. The remaining case studies of Nigeria and Liberia, on their part, illustrated the contribution of unorthodox third parties in settings outside the problem-solving workshop. Their value therefore lied in indicating that Track Two initiatives could also be effective outside this prescribed format.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


McDonald, J., “Guidelines for Newcomers to Track Two Diplomacy”. The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Occasional Paper 2, November 1993

McDonald, J., “The Track not Taken.” The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Occasional Paper 13, February 2004


Source: Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg 2003: 4
(top and bottom layers (going up to 2002) respectively reflect the evolution of internal and interstate conflicts over 1945-2002 period)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study, Year, Duration</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Third Party</th>
<th>Reported Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burton (1969)</td>
<td>Malaysia/Indonesia/ Singapore</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Contribution to settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965, 10 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton (1969)</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Return to negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966, 5 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969, 2 weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen et al. (1977)</td>
<td>Israelis/Palestinians</td>
<td>American and Canadian social scientists</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doob &amp; Foltz (1973)</td>
<td>Catholics/Protestants Northern Ireland</td>
<td>American social scientists and trainers</td>
<td>Increased understanding; Plans for joint projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971, 10 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelman (1986)</td>
<td>Israelis/Palestinians</td>
<td>American social psychologist</td>
<td>Influence on political dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelman &amp; Cohen (1979)</td>
<td>India/Pakistan/ Bangladesh</td>
<td>American and Canadian social psychologists</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher (1980)</td>
<td>India/Pakistan</td>
<td>Canadian social psychologist</td>
<td>Improved attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azar (1990)</td>
<td>Britain/Argentina</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Increased understanding; Principles for settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84/85, 4/4/3 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azar (1990)</td>
<td>Lebanese Communities</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Principles for united Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/84, 4/4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julius (1991)</td>
<td>Israeli/ Egyptian/ Palestinians</td>
<td>American psychiatrists and social scientists</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–84, 5 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azar (1990)</td>
<td>Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Measures for reducing tension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985, 3 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doob (1987)</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>American social psychologist</td>
<td>Terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985, weekly meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chasin &amp; Herzog (1988)</td>
<td>Soviets/Americans/ Others</td>
<td>American psychiatrists and trainers</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88, 1/1 day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prio (1988)</td>
<td>Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans, Others</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prio (1989)</td>
<td>Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans, Others</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Policy recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher (1991)</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Increased understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990, 2 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher (1992)</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Mixed team of social scientists</td>
<td>Peacebuilding initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991, 4 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fisher 1993: 126