Manufacturing Urgency: Development Perspectives on Violence Against Women

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates discourses of anti-violence strategies in the context of international development. While violence against women is, of course, an urgent problem, this dissertation explores how the urgency to end violence against women is socially, culturally, economically, and politically constructed. I consider the manufacturing of urgency in three case studies of contemporary anti-violence initiatives: i) American foreign policy including what has been branded as “The Hillary Doctrine” and proposed International Violence Against Women Act; ii) the World Bank’s report entitled The Cost of Violence; and iii) the United Nation’s UNiTE To End Violence Against Women and Say NO campaigns. In doing so, I argue that World Bank, the United Nations, and American foreign policies are too often technocratic, narrow, depoliticized, and are executed in an urgent manner in the interest of neoliberal economic growth, security concerns, and “feel good” aid at the expense of more holistic, effective and accountable responses to global violence against women.
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Table of Contents

Figure List........................................................................................................ p. vi
Legend........................................................................................................... p. vii
Introduction.................................................................................................. p. 1

Chapter 1:
The Development and In/Security Nexus: The Hillary Doctrine and the
International Violence Against Women Act................................................... p. 46

Chapter 2:
Violence, Disability, and Productivity:
The World Bank’s The Cost of Violence......................................................... p. 111

Chapter 3:
Affective Politics: The United Nations and Say(ing) NO
to Violence Against Women ........................................................................... p. 176

Conclusion.................................................................................................... p. 243

References................................................................................................... p. 267
Figures

Figure 1: UNiTE worldwide map……………………………………….. p. 206

Figure 2: Say NO acid attack victim…………………………………….. p. 231
**Legend**

AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

EPZ- Export Processing Zone

GAD - Gender and Development

HIV- Human Immunodeficiency Virus

H1N1- strain of influenza known popularly as “swine flu”

IMF- International Monetary Fund

I-VAWA- International Violence Against Women Act

LGBT- Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender

MIC- Military Industrial Complex

MNC- Multinational Corporation

NGO- Non-Governmental Organization

PIC- Prison Industrial Complex

PNG- Papua New Guinea

PREM- Poverty Reduction and Economic Management

QDDR- Quadrennial Development and Defence Review

SAPs- Structural Adjustment Programs

SIFF- Save India Family Foundation

UN- United Nations

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

VAW- Violence against Women

WAD- Women and Development

WID- Women in Development
Introduction

According to United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, violence against women (VAW) must end if the Third World is to develop and modernize.\(^1\) In an official address to women’s rights advocates during a trip to Papua New Guinea (PNG), Clinton claimed: “No country in the 21st century can advance when half its population is left behind” (Yahoo News, 2010).\(^2\) Hillary Clinton’s claim that violence must end “now” is only one example of many that reflect the creation of a sense of urgency – what I will argue is a manufacturing of urgency – around eradicating violence against women in the development industry.\(^3\) While violence against women has consistently been on the agenda of feminists working transnationally, major knowledge-makers, and agenda setters in the development industry have only recently taken up the issue as a central concern. In this dissertation, I argue that the creation of urgency around violence against

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\(^1\) Although there are problems with the use of the term “Third World,” I have chosen to use it in this dissertation for a number of reasons. Following Chandra Mohanty’s (2003) conceptualization of the term, I agree that “Third World” suggests a quick brush stroke erasure of the multiple and differentiating characteristics of political, economic and cultural differences within and between countries that make up this space. I also agree with Mohanty that using “North/South” or “developed/developing” as an alternative lacks the explanatory power to theorize about colonial legacies and neo-colonial processes (Mohanty, 2003, p. 227). Here, I use the term to mark the ongoing discursive and material construction of the Third World in order to point out the ways in which these spaces are understood and represented as “Third World” regardless of changes to terminology.

\(^2\) Clinton made these comments in November 2010 on visit to PNG that marked the first for a Secretary of State in the last 12 years (US News, 2010). Clinton’s visit to PNG to speak about human rights issues also marked the unveiling of a U.S. and ExxonMobil-partnered $15 billion gas project due to begin in 2014 (Yahoo News, 2010; Reuters, 2011). The U.S. is simultaneously partnering with ExxonMobil for a mentoring project aimed to “end the culture of violence against women and girls in Papua New Guinea” (Yahoo News, 2010). According to Hilary Clinton, maintaining U.S. power over global competitors such as China requires that the nation capitalize on both opening new markets to the global economy through infrastructure investments and promoting a human rights agenda. Speaking against a Republican proposed budget cut of 16 percent to U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance spending, Clinton “put aside the moral, humanitarian do-good side” and spoke “straight Realpolitik,” claiming that such a cut to spending would mean U.S. strategic interests and global influence would falter (Reuters, 2011).

\(^3\) In The Power of Development, Jonathan Crush (1995) claims that discourses of development are established and circulated within and through a knowledge/power nexus that is often called the “development industry” (5). Following Crush, I use the term to denote how “development discourse is constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical” (6).
women in the development industry generates narrow understandings of violence against women that obscure the complexities of the issue transnationally. I also maintain that urgency requires swift solutions that foreclose alternative possibilities for organization against violence, and instead produces strategies that reflect the status quo.

The urgency with which development experts communicate new global anti-violence strategies is curious. For survivors of violence and advocates, the time has always been “now” to eradicate global practices of violence. For feminists working at the transnational level, global violence against women has always an issue of concern. For example, during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985) violence against women was continuously on conference agendas. However, it was rarely highlighted as the most important or urgent concern. 4 Almost twenty years later, violence against women emerged as the “priority issue” of the UN Commission for the Status of Women (Commission for the Status of Women, 2013). What has changed in twenty years? While violence against women has surely manifested in various new and insidious forms since 1985, gendered violence itself has not become more important. VAW has always been an important issue for survivors, feminist activists, and concerned academics. Why has VAW come to matter in recent years for these particular institutions?

When communicated as an urgent development concern, the issue of violence against women has engaged some of the most important actors in the development field. The United Nations Secretary-General supported an “in-depth study on all forms of violence against women” published in 2006, and the UN has released its most

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4 According to Joachim (2007), it was not until feminists made connections between VAW and the already established and popular development discourses of the 1990s—namely human rights and economic development—that anti-violence initiatives in development policy and programs were secured. Feminists working with the development industry both externally and internally set the global agenda by communicating the importance of the issue as it connects to other development concerns.
comprehensive global campaign to end violence against women—*UNiTE To End Violence Against Women* (UN, 2006; UN, 2012). The World Bank, an organization known for its primary interest in economic growth, has also published new research on the cost of violence against women on the economy (World Bank, 2009). The United States (US) has been adamant on making violence against women central to its foreign aid policy with Hillary Clinton acting as Secretary of State (2009-2013). USAID and the State Department of Defence now collectively communicate the urgency to end violence against women as a national security concern (QDDR, 2010).

Violence against women has come to matter to development institutions because the issue is now connected to the most important development objectives of the day. According to scholar Meredith Turshen, development concerns too often reflect the “flavour of the day” but do not necessarily lead to increased budgets and resources (Turshen, personal communication, 2012). Regardless of the monetary investments or tangible outcomes in new “flavours,” it remains important to understand the implications of circulating discourses of urgency around these “flavours of the day.” Discursive practices of “making urgent” development “flavours of the day” both reflect and shape how problems are understood and what solutions can be imagined. Whether VAW is just a “flavour of the day” or will remain a calculated interest of development experts and actors, representations of VAW at the height of its urgency must be both mapped and critically analyzed and their effects traced.

At the height of urgency, discourses help to manufacture a sense of temporal significance to an issue, and it is this moment that allows one to see the processes behind the project of “making urgent.” To this end, this dissertation asks: *How has violence
against women recently become an urgent concern for the development industry? What are the implications of the development community establishing discourses of urgency, and subsequently, urgent responses to this complex global issue? My investigation into representations of VAW at the height of its urgency in development discourses is not only concerned with what is said about VAW on a global scale, but also how a sense of urgency is constructed by development experts, and to what end and what effects. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how urgency is socially, culturally, economically, and politically constructed. Urgency to end violence against women can reflect the reality of the issue as a pressing concern, but urgency is also a discursive and affective production. Urgency does not merely exist, but is rather designated. In fact, the line drawn between urgent and non-urgent issues is drawn and re-drawn in various contexts. For women who experience violence transnationally, this manufactured sense of urgency is insufficient.

Focusing on recent anti-violence against women policies, conference proceedings, campaigns, media, and pieces of legislation, this dissertation explores the representations of violence against women as urgent, and the urgent anti-violence strategies imagined by the development industry. In particular, it outlines three case studies of development organizations and actors where VAW is a current and central concern: i) United States foreign policy under the direction of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the proposed International Violence Against Women Act; ii) the World Bank report entitled The Cost of Violence; and iii) the United Nation’s UNiTE To End Violence and complementary Say NO campaigns. Using both discursive analysis of documents and interviews with development experts, this dissertation works toward decolonizing and critically evaluating representations of VAW (Mohanty, 2003). In other words, it aims to unravel
the historical, political, and cultural constructions of definitions, and solutions to, global violence against women. Using transnational feminism as a theoretical frame and methodological entry point, this dissertation maps the power of development discourses at “scattered” hegemonic locations which establish interconnected fields of knowledge about violence against women (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994). By focusing on sites of knowledge production, my analysis reveals the ways in which a sense of urgency around violence against women obscures the complexities of the issue globally and forecloses possibilities to solve the issue of violence against women beyond what is offered by the development industry. Through a discursive analysis of three sites of expertise on VAW, I argue that the development community’s adoption of this seemingly good-natured feminist objective is too often technocratic, narrow, and depoliticized. The development industry also prescribes solutions that reflect the interests of neoliberal economic growth, security concerns, and “feel good” aid at the expense of more holistic and accountable responses to global violence against women. Decolonizing the project of “making urgent” reveals the ways in which a concern for violence against women in the development industry is embedded within oppressive structures of power. In particular, this study investigates how neoliberal, imperial, and neo-colonial development outcomes of anti-violence strategies are obscured by a seemingly moral and innocent call to end violence against women globally. Moreover, the need for top-down models for “doing development” are secured by development actors “making urgent” global violence against women and taking the lead as experts to a so-called development “problem.” It is in the interest of development experts to lead the charge on the issue of violence against women because revealing complexities of violence against women as a systemic global
issue that interlocks with systems of gendered, racial, classed, ableist, and heterosexist/homophobic power and other relations of rule would question development itself as a moral and political project. Additionally, alternative struggles against violence against women that simultaneously take aim at processes of global economic restructuring are obscured and disavowed by the functioning of the development industry as an “expert” on the issue.

**Urgency**

By using the term urgency, I want to suggest that there is an immediate, prompt, instantaneous, and often sudden, interest in ending violence against women “now” among powerful actors in the development industry. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (2012) defines urgency as “importance requiring swift action; an earnest and persistent quality; insistence.” According to popular organizational leadership theorist John Knotter (2008), “any effort to make a change of any magnitude” begins with a “sense of urgency” (p. 23). In his popular book *A Sense of Urgency*, Knotter (2008) argues that one must create urgency to encourage people to move toward a new direction. He claims that the opposition to a “true sense of urgency” is both complacency and false urgency (Knotter, 2008, p. x). For Knotter, complacency only requires the status quo to be reproduced, and a false sense of urgency can mean that real solutions to real problems cannot be found. This sense of urgency is frantic, and uncoordinated, anxiety producing, and dysfunctional. In contrast, a real true sense of urgency focuses only on critical issues. Urgency, both perceived and manufactured, is integral to what is communicated about the global world we live in “now.” It is Knotter’s conception of *created* urgency, or what I call “manufactured urgency,” that is most pertinent to my research.

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5 For Knotter (2008), the business world has changed under globalization, where there are new and always changing urgencies related to competition in a liberalized economy, and under turbulent political crises.
In communication studies and cultural studies, theorists have investigated conceptions of urgency, especially in relation to global health. For example, Penelope Ironstone-Catterall (2011) has argued that the constructions of risk and uncertainty have affective dimensions and circulate discursively in relation to HIV/AIDS. Ironstone-Catterall analyzes the communication of risk in everyday life. Focusing on industrial meat production and consumption, social hygiene related to contagions such as influenza, and the popularity of worst-case scenario guidelines, Ironstone-Caterall’s work suggests there is much at stake in understanding how a sense of urgency circulates within risk communication.

In *The Republic of Therapy* (2010) anthropologist and medical practitioner Vinh-Kim Nguyen takes on the idea of urgency within the context of triage decisions being made in West Africa in the face of scarce access to retroviral therapies. Nguyen argues that the moral and political economy of “triage” creates possibilities for the practice of affective testimonials of seropositivity and immediate need in the context of prioritizing medical care. Using the term “therapeutic citizenship,” Nguyen suggests that confessional technologies were central to staying alive because they were often deployed to communicate people’s most urgent need for medical care. Triage patients often created a sense of urgency with personal testimony and their performances of the most “needy” subject for humanitarian intervention.

Studies of organizational culture, medical triage, and risk communication are akin to theories of urgency in that they reveal the ways in which the immediacy or mounting pressure of concerns is manufactured. Discourses of risk, immediate need, and pressing change are laborious rhetorical processes in both their creation and their circulation in policy, popular culture, and medical institutions. They are also affective in nature. That is, they both make sensory impact on bodies, and create modalities of knowledge about particular issues. Urgency is not individually
created or sustained, but rather exists in its circulation between bodies and signs. In the language of affect and emotion theory, urgency can be understood as the capturing of affect related to risk, anxiety, tension, need, or immediacy as a sense or a feeling that can be described or coded as “urgent” (Massumi, 2002; Ahmed, 2004). Urgency can also be understood through its discursive circulation. For example, narratives regarding risk of infection or contagions are communicated as urgent through public health announcements that ask the populace to stay alert, to wash their hands, to receive antiviral shot, or medical attention before they become infected. Infection is often communicated as imminent, and the action, or reaction, to a potential contagion is communicated as pressing. While not all issues and concerns are distinctively and explicitly described as urgent, narratives of urgency can be produced through the discursive circulation of an issue as urgent by other standards or means. For example, the urgency with which one might need a vaccination may not be immediately related to one’s own health, but rather the spread of a virus.

Unsurprisingly, in order to communicate the importance of working to end violence against women, the issue is often described popularly and in scholarly writing as “epidemic in proportion” or as a “global pandemic.” Not only does the language of pandemic and epidemic imply the urgency of the issue, it is also discursively prescriptive. As Chemaly (2011) writes:

Violence against women is a global pandemic? Like H1N1? Like in Contagion? No way. *Think of your instinctive response to the idea of a worldwide bio-terror -- that's what your response should be to the normalized level of violence against women around the world* (n.p., emphasis my own).

The grammar of urgency is prescriptive in that it requires *swift solutions*. Under the mounting pressure of a pandemic, one must think quickly, respond instantly, and act immediately to an issue that is *already* out of control.
In “urgent” moments and under mounting pressure, critically thinking about how urgency is produced and sustained, and also mapping ideas about race, gender, class, sexuality, and disability communicated in circulating discourses of urgency, is of utmost importance. As Treichler (1999) argues in *How to Have Theory in an Epidemic*, scholars must “think carefully about ideas in the midst of a crisis” (1). She writes:

[We must] use our intelligence and critical faculties to consider theoretical problems, develop policy, and articulate long term social needs even as we acknowledge the urgency of the AIDS crisis and try to satisfy its relentless demand for immediate action (p. 1, emphasis my own).

In her work on HIV/AIDS, Treichler (1999) maintains that there is a parallel “epidemic” that is worthy of study. She maintains that the circulation of default representations and hegemonic discursive devices to explain the HIV/AIDS epidemic has created over two decades long “epidemic of signification” (p.11). Analyzing both text and images, she maintains that scholars and advocates must trace the cultural evolution of HIV/AIDS to make sense of the represented reality of the pandemic, and the articulation of one’s experience of it. Similar to the HIV/AIDS crisis, the global “epidemic” of violence against women has a parallel “epidemic of signification.” While the crisis of violence against women globally demands immediate action, it is also important to trace the cultural production of its urgency, and critically analyze the representations of violence against women at the level of the transnational.

Expanding on Treichler’s (1999) cultural studies analysis, this dissertation is concerned with thinking through how we understand global violence against women as urgent through its signification, and investigates what ideas about gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability are communicated through discourses of urgency established by experts in the development industry. Understanding how urgency function reveals the ways in which global systems of oppression are not undone, but rather reinforced, by the development industry in their
manufactured attempt at eliminating violence against women. Importantly, the development industry secures a sense of urgency around violence against women by also requiring development expertise, and thus structures of uneven global power produced by development itself, while ignoring the ways in which women’s organizations are already successful mobilizing around the issue transnationally.

**Theoretical Framework**

My work builds on a sophisticated body of transnational feminist theory. Drawing on Grewal and Kaplan’s (1994) and Nagar and Swarr’s (2010) conceptions of transnational feminism, my dissertation explores the relationship of representations of violence against women to “scattered hegemonies,” or the interconnected webs of various transnational patriarchal and economic dominations that affect, and are affected by, the reality of women’s lives. As Grewal and Kaplan (1994) outline, tracing the interconnections between “scattered hegemonies,” including global economic structures, patriarchal nationalisms, “authentic” forms of “tradition,” and structures of domination is central to the field of transnational feminist inquiry. Borrowing from transnational feminist theories built by Jacqui Alexander (2010) and Chandra Mohanty (2003; 2010) in particular, my dissertation grapples with questions of power and representation. Using transnational feminism as a theoretical point of entry, I am particularly cautious of reading development discourse as hegemonic. In response, I aim to trace the asymmetrical power relations that constitute the development industry’s representative powers and practices. I understand transnational feminist theory to be a complex and necessary intervention into the way in which Western feminisms are unable to thoroughly
understand new arrangements of power under globalization, or “global economic restructuring” as Marchand and Runyan (2011) re-define the term.

As Nagar and Swarr (2010) point out, transnational feminist theory has grown out of two interconnected dialogues in the field of feminist studies. It has both been employed by those seeking to question globalization, neoliberalism, and social justice issues, and has been used in debates since the 1980s regarding the issues of voice, authority, identity, and representation in regard to the production of knowledge across borders. Transnational feminism is often misunderstood as a subfield of feminist theory with shared values, meaning, ideas, and languages (Nagar and Swarr, 2010, p. 3). Instead, transnational feminism is a diverse field of study in which theorists have intervened differently into a variety of questions pertaining to “global feminism” and a field of inquiry with porous boundaries and no single coherent position. Transnational feminism is an unstable field that is critical of its own definitions and practices. Such self-critique is both necessarily reflexive and politically useful in working toward cross-border solidarities while remaining accountable to asymmetrical “national and transitional processes that are mutually, although unevenly imbricated” (Alexander, 2005, p. 183).

In this dissertation, I borrow from transnational feminist theories that problematize forms of Western feminism that led to the oppression and exploitation of women globally. Scholars Grewal and Kaplan (1994) claim that feminist post-modernism has done little to enhance feminist understanding of new global economic structures. Yet, far from dismissing post-modern theory all together, transnational feminism borrows its deconstruction of essentialisms from post-modern thought. Many transnational feminists also borrow their understanding of culture as “produced, circulated, received, and even
commodified” from post-modern thinking (p. 5). However, the authors challenge post-modernism’s inattention to race and racism, and the ways in which Eurocentrism (embedded in post-modernism) allows for both the collapsing of historical differences, and erases the inherent unevenness in the circulation of global capital. Post-modern theory’s reliance on center/periphery models to describe the circulation of global culture and capital is problematic. That is, most post-modern feminist scholarship assumes that culture and capital flows unilaterally, from North to South, West to East, or developed to developing. In fact, transnational feminists maintain that the overuse of binaries in leftist theories is replicated in many feminist works. The use of colonized/colonizer, dominated/dominator, center/periphery, local/global cannot adequately address global power relations with respect to new imperialisms and overarching globalization. Rather than use a binary model to trace globalization, transnational feminism maps the lines of culture and capital that cut across various and differently located oppressions to understand systems of power. Importantly, transnational feminism is highly indebted to post-colonial scholarship in its criticism of Western representations. However, transnational feminism also challenges post-colonial theory for its bypassing or displacing of current racial, economic and political dominations by situating colonialism in the past. By refusing the “post” of post-colonialism, transnational feminism aims to provide a necessary critique of neo-colonialism and ongoing imperialist practices.

In practice, transnational feminism is conceptualized as an alternative to “global feminism” which has come to dominate Western feminist interventions into issues related to globalization (Desai, 2005; Mohanty, 2003). Since most Western feminist discourses either rely on a universalizing model of human rights, or a cultural relativist approach,
transnational feminists propose a new feminist vision of scholarship and practice which addresses women’s relationships to multiple patriarchies and economic hegemonies. In *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*, Chandra Mohanty (2003) sets out a framework for transnational feminism as a project of discursive “decolonization” in the name of cross-border solidarity. In particular, Mohanty (2003) challenges the way in which Third World women have historically been represented in Western feminist scholarship as similarly oppressed. This way of making women visible is ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppression globally. For Mohanty, “communities of resistance” are created through the ongoing discursive de-colonization of Western feminist discourses. Similarly, for Nagar and Swarr (2010) transnational feminism is a three-pronged project:

[Transnational feminism is] an intersectional set of understandings, tools, and practices that can (a) attend to racialized, classed, masculinized, and heteronormative logics and practices of globalization and capitalist patriarchies, and the multiple ways that they (re)structure colonial and neo-colonial relations of domination and subordination; (b) grapple with the complex and contradictory ways in which these process both inform and are shaped by a range of subjectivities and understandings of individual and collective agency; and (c) interweave critiques, actions, and self-reflexivity so as to resist prior predictions of what might constitute feminist politics in a given space and time (p. 5, emphasis my own).

It is transnational feminism’s attention to race, class, gender, sexuality, ableism, and functioning within processes of “scattered hegemonies” (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994, p. 17) that specifically informs my research. Rather than conceptualize grand theories of hegemonic domination, I use transnational feminist theory to compare various interconnected, overlapping, contradictory, and differently manifested oppressions and structures of subordination simultaneously as I also attend to the ways in which violence
against women are made differently urgent in distinct, but interconnected, development discourses.

It is important to note that while transnational feminist theory emerged out of theories from women of colour feminisms, Third World feminisms, multicultural feminisms, and international feminisms, different deployments of transnational feminism both continue and depart from critical feminist political legacies and intellectual histories. Keeping this in mind, my theoretical framework borrows from theories of transnational feminism while remaining strongly connected to Canadian critical race feminism. In particular, my work is grounded by Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of an interlocking analysis.\(^6\) Razack argues that feminist analyses that focus on the intersections of matrices of power often ignore how systems of domination require and secure one another. That is, race, gender, class, sexuality, and disability, situated within projects of neo-colonization, imperialism, and/or transnational neoliberal capitalism, not only intersect to produce women’s subjectivities, but also operate together as inextricable systems of oppression. While Grewal and Kaplan’s (1994) term “scattered hegemonies” suggests that women’s subjectivities are produced through multiple and intersecting global powers, I am specifically concerned with mapping “the lines cutting across them” in order to understand how “scattered hegemonies” interlock and secure one another (p. 13). In particular, it is my concern with how development discourses of eradicating violence against women secures a sense of urgency for development expertise, and even development itself that led me to analyse the ways in which discourses of violence against

\(^6\) My research is also influenced by Canadian critical race feminist work on violence against women, especially Yasmin Jiwan’s (2006) work on violence against immigrant women and women of colour in Canada. I agree with Jiwan who writes that violence against women must be defined in ways that “encapsulate the complex dynamics of interlocking forms of oppression” (3).
women interlock with global systemic hierarchies of race, gender, class, sexuality, and
disability as well as structural oppressions, including uneven global systems of economic
restructuring, military conquests, and neo-colonial occupations, and donor-structured
development operations that refuse global solidarity and cross-border feminist
organizing. It is for this reason that I situate my research as contributing to transnational
critical race and ant-capitalist feminism.

While transnational feminist theory pays attention to the ways in which
development expertise flows from North-to-South my research is also framed by post-
development thinking. In particular, my dissertation begins from the understanding that
the development industry functions to secure the unidirectional flow of ideas, resources,
and mobilizations from experts to development subject or clients, even as Third World
people are considered “partners.” Borrowing from post-development and feminist
development scholars, I understand the requirement for expertise on issues of
development such as poverty, hunger, HIV/AIDS, and gender equality to be the
industry’s central axis of control. While the term “partnership” has become part of the
development lexicon, it remains a “buzzword” with little substantive meaning (Cornwall
& Eade, 2010). For development, “partnership” is imposed and relies on a history of
colonial rule and a neo-colonial mastery of knowledge and resources that secures the
need for development assistance. Not only do these powerful institutions define the issues
of development but they also provide the solutions and the resources. As post-
development scholar Arturo Escobar (1995) reveals in *Encountering Development: The
Making of the Third World*, the problematization of what is understood to be the
“problem” of poverty and the “clientalization” of subjects for development interventions
relies on the production of knowledge about both the cause and the solution to what is conceptualized as development issues.

The production of the ongoing need for development funding and expertise cannot be overstated. As critical development, post-development, and post-colonial scholars maintain, the production of development knowledge is an essential site of study (Kapoor, 2008; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1995). In particular, the “cultural assumptions, power implications, and hegemonic politics of development discourse” and the production of knowledge for development is an important site of investigation (Kapoor, 2008: xiii). In the Postcolonial Politics of Development, Ilan Kapoor (2008) defines “development discourse” as “the dominant representations and institutional practices that structure the relationship between the West and the Third World” (p. xv). Kapoor (2008) claims that discourse is always bound up within institutions, and thus development discourse is both about issues of representation, but also how discursive frameworks are materialized through institutional policy making and programming (p. xv). In The Power of Development, Jonathon Crush (1995) claims “development discourse is constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical” (p. 6). Discourses of development are established and circulated within and through a knowledge/power nexus that is often called the “development industry.” (Crush, 1995, p. 5).

My research is influenced by post-development theory because it emerged alongside the integration of feminist and cultural studies into the development field, and was contingent on the “cultural” or “textual” turn in the social sciences. Once reliant on modernization theory, some development scholars turned away from economic models
and growth narratives to focus on “the conventions of writing and presentations by which Western disciplines and institutions “make sense” of the world” (Crush, 1995, p. 5). Central to my research, the integration of post-modern, post-colonial, and feminist thought into development fuels a critique of development expertise as objectivity, and my concern with claims to truth and representations (Crush, 1995, p. 5). Borrowing from Escobar’s (1995) Foucauldian and Deleuzian mapping of power and knowledge in development discourses, I maintain that the circulation of representations, descriptors, categories, languages and claims to truth are about “disciplining difference” (Munck, 1999, p. 205). That is, I follow Escobar’s argument that development has not vastly improved the living conditions of people in the Third World. Rather, those considered “undeveloped” have been re-colonized by development and its discourses. Drawing on post-colonial scholar Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), Homi Bhabha’s (1984) definition of colonial discourse, and feminist Chandra Mohanty’s (1991) critiques of the representation of Third World women, Escobar’s post-development theory outlines how development representations are discursive dominations over “Others” that have real, material consequences. Escobar provides a powerful challenge to the “discovery” of poverty, the “developmentalization” or “clientalization” of women and environmental issues, and the mythical tales of economic growth and overpopulation. For post-development theorists, development, both as text and practice, is inherently problematic. Regardless of the changing languages, strategies and practices of development (i.e. modernization, gender inclusive, rights based, participatory or sustainable), development discourse must be decolonized. That is to say, post-development theorists argue that their work is a necessary “form of criticism or deconstructive practice” (Saunders, 2002, p. 205).
Put bluntly, there are not alternative development strategies, but *only alternatives to development*.

In this dissertation, I hold together transnational feminism, post-development theory, and critical race scholarship in order to intersectionally investigate development discourses of violence against women. In seeking to understand how violence against women has become an urgent concern for the development industry, I use tenets of post-development scholarship to map the circulation of representations, grammars, and logics that secure the need for development itself while simultaneously creating and sustaining difference and inequality. Paying specific attention to the ways in which discourses of violence against women are gendered, racialized, classed, sexualized, and ableist, I use critical race feminism to wrestle with processes and relations of domination and control that *interlock* to inform and shape a range of subjectivities and discourses. Using transnational feminism as praxis, my research aims to provide discursive critiques of development discourses in the name of critically informed and reflexive future feminist coalition building across borders to end global violence against women in all of its manifestations.

**Methodology**

*Transnational Feminism*

In addition to using transnational feminism as a theoretical point of entry, my research methodology is shaped by transnational feminist thought. The research questions that fuel this research are both geo-politically broad and interdisciplinary, and thus, require both a flexible scope and broad set of data. Investigating how discourses of development aid in manufacturing urgency around the issue of violence against women
led me to transnational feminism methodology. I conceptualize transnational feminism as a methodological approach through Grewal and Kaplan’s (1994) notion of “scattered hegemonies.” Using transnational feminism as methodology requires researchers to investigate different manifestations of women’s oppressions in order to understand the “lines cutting across them” (p. 13). Thus, my dissertation uses various primary sources within the frame of this study in order to examine the interconnected webs of various transnational patriarchal and economic dominations that influence how violence against women and its solutions are represented within development discourses.

Indebted to Minoo Moallem’s (2005) conception of a “transnational methodology,” in this dissertation I analyze a wide range of “discursive and visual cultural productions that circulate nationally and transnationally” (Moallem, 2005, p. 26). In order to understand the constructions of violence against women as urgent in development discourses, my dissertation investigates international and national development documents and policies, legislations, popular imagery in campaigns and media releases. This methodological approach enabled me to analyze “historical, discursive and cultural productions at both the macro and micro levels to bring the past and present, the global and local, and the national and transnational into the same frame of reference” (Moallem, 2005, p. 25). That is, the scope of my archive is transnational, but it is also limited by my methodological decision to focus on circulating discourses produced by three sites where violence against women is considered a development concern: the United Nations, the World Bank, and American foreign policy.

Importantly, a transnational methodology has allowed me to “assemble” cultural texts with interviews in a non-linear and interdisciplinary fashion. Following the
methodological approach set out by Jasbir Puar in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, my research objectives required the assemblage of “varied and often disjunctive primary sources” (Puar, 2007, p. xv). By assembling various cultural texts in a transnational frame, I discursively analyze the narratives of violence against women established within the development industry and also investigate what Puar (2007) calls “the unexpected, the unplanned irruptions, the lines of flight” (xv).

While unreferenced, Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) conception of the “rhizome” undoubtedly inspired Puar’s (2007) conceptualization of an “assemblage.” In *A Thousand Plateaus*, originally published in 1998, Deleuze and Guattari describe a typical writing method as a “root” as singular points are plotted in a fixed and linear order. In a rhizomatic method, by contrast, any point can connect to any other and “must be” (p. 7). Even the “lines of flight” ultimately lead back to the rhizome. Thus, there cannot be any dualism or binary logic because all lines tie back into one another. Ultimately, a rhizomatic method is best described as a mapping. According to Deleuze and Guattari, a map “is open and connectable in all of its dimensions,” and always open to modification and has multiple entryways (p. 13-14). Such practices of mapping are central to transnational feminist praxis.

For transnational feminists, assemblages (Puar, 2007), cartographies (Mohanty, 2003), topographies (Katz, 2001) and even kaleidoscopes (Shohat, 2004) are used to describe research methodologies that resemble Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) rhizomatic method. Using a transnational feminist frame, I have assembled various cultural texts

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with concern for interlocking lines that connect “scattered hegemonies,” rather than seek out singular points or binary positions (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994). In investigating development discourses of VAW, I follow multiple historical and contemporary narratives in various different, and often disjunctive, directions theoretically and thematically, and analyze them in the same frame of reference in order to emphasize linked ideas, communicative strategies, cultural productions, and transnational discursive systems which allow for, and help to produce, the idea that violence against women is an urgent concern for development and that the development industry has the solutions. I am particularly interested in the different manifestations of urgency discourses with regard to ending violence against women. Discourses such as anti-violence against women narratives may look similar across a variety of texts, but they engage different arguments and carry different meanings depending on context and location, and thus, will have distinct material affects (McRuer, 2007, p. 11; Dingo, 2012, p. 19).

*Foucauldian Discourse Analysis*

In attempting to understand the discursive construction and circulation of anti-VAW discourses in the development industry, I employ a Foucauldian discourse analysis as a method to investigate the utilization and circulation of concepts and images (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). For Foucault, the connection between knowledge and power is essential to the definition of discourse. Knowledge is not only socially constructed, but also governs. Foucault (1972) defines discourse as “practices that

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on victimized notions of place or locality under globalization, but instead excavate geo-political layers that produce particular places in order to reveal intersections of domination and resistance at other scales of analysis. Katz argues that feminists must follow “contour lines” that connect subjects to understand “social relations of power and production.” In Shohat’s (2004) article entitled “Area Studies, Gender Studies and the Cartographies of Knowledge,” she argues that a transnational feminist approach is concerned with “cartographies of knowledge” which maps genders, sexualities, races, classes, nations and even continents in relation dialogically as “interwoven and relationalist” (Shohat, 2002, p. 70).
systemically form the objects from which they speak” (p. 49). In other words, the power to create and circulate knowledge, such as expertise in the field of development, is also about one’s power to limit what is possible to speak about and act upon. The production and circulation of knowledge governs how society thinks, speaks and, writes about certain subjects. According to Mill (2004), discourses are produced both through the subjugation of subjects, and “the process through which subjects as constituted as subjugated” (19). As “regimes of truth” circulate as uninterrupted or dominant ways of knowing, alternative or “subjugated” knowledge is often disavowed or exists at the margins of knowledge making practices. Yet, discourse understood as an effect of power also conceptualizes subjugated and alternative knowledge, including silences, as potentially disruptive. Hegemonic discourses do not exist in isolation, nor does anything exist outside of discourse. As regimes of “truth” are produced and sustained by systems of power, they are always already failing, and thus must be re-created, re-produced and re-presented. It is from this site of power that “truth” governs. Importantly, I conceptualize urgency as a discourse that must be re-made and re-presented to remain discursively and affectively powerful. It is also from this site of historical, political, and social construction of ideas and representations that change or ruptures of power can take place. It is the instability and open-endedness of discourse that is of interest to feminist questions about the operations of power and the possibilities for negotiation and resistance.

Mapping discourses of VAW within the field of development requires both Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology. In the Power of Development (1995), Watts claims that understanding development discourses requires that hegemonic ideas, images,
and tropes be traced historically through Foucauldian archaeology. In order to both understand discursive constructions of violence against women in development discourses, I use the Foucauldian method of archaeology to trace how violence against women historically emerges as a development issue in discursive practices within the field. In particular, I connect contemporary discourse to histories of anti-violence strategies and gender analyses and the UN and World Bank. Tracing the discursive structures of gender and development issues historically is important to this project insofar as the historical emergence of violence against women as a development concern reflects what is said, and can be said, about this issue within the development industry. I also use the Foucauldian method of genealogy to map inventions and reinventions of tropes and signifiers that create and re-create violence against women as a development “problem.” In particular, I am concerned with the conditions under which violence against women emerges as an urgent “problem” of development. In representations of violence against women and anti-violence strategies, old languages are re-presented in new ways—namely discourses of national security, economic growth, and “feel-good” empowerment narratives. As such, I focus on the concept of urgency to map the ways in which violence against women is problematized as a development concern temporally. It is only through this two-pronged project that I understand the power of development discourse to “make urgent” the issue of violence against women. Using a Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology, my research traces the historical emergence and maps the contemporary reoccurrence of discursive devices, or the inventions and reinventions of development thinking, that define and describe the “problem” of VAW and its solutions. Importantly, this Foucauldian approach allows my research to question the definitions of,
and solutions to, violence against women that are provided by the development industry and simultaneously map the possibilities for anti-violence organizing that are foreclosed through discursive governance of what can and cannot be said about this “development problem.”

**Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis**

For feminist critical discourse (FCDA) analysts, it is essential to trace gender ideologies through discursive structures. Critical discourse analysis is a field of methodological study that is interested in all forms of social injustice and inequality. However, Lazar (2008) claims that a feminist critical discourse analysis is essential to articulate a particular feminist politic (p. 3). Lazar (2008) describes FCDA as being necessary since other forms of oppression are not as complex and pervasive as patriarchy, although she does call for an intersectional approach to FCDA (p. 3).

While it is important to name a feminist politic within the broader field of critical discourse, I depart from Lazar’s (2008) conception of feminist critical discourse analysis where she suggests that patriarchy is the most important ideology to trace. Importantly, both my transnational feminist framework and my work’s indebtedness to critical race feminist theory leads me to suggest that a feminist critical discourse analysis is most useful when deeply intersectional. That is, FCDA should ideally map power relations and ideologies of gender as it interlocks with race, class, sexuality, and disability paying attention to patriarchy as one of many forms of oppression that affect women’s lives. It is important to note that Lazar (2008) correctly suggests that FCDA must pay attention to difference, and refuses the assumption of the universality of “women’s issues,” yet her conceptualization of FCDA relies on a gender binary even while attempting to unravel
the ways in which gender ideologies assign asymmetrical meanings of “male” and “female” to bodies. Lazar (2008) focus on women, in particular, distracts from her assertion that FCDA can be used to uncover the discursive and material workings of ideologies around femininities and masculinities. Central to FCDA should be a conceptualization of a feminist politic that deconstructs rather than reproduces gender-binary thinking that excludes the realities of gender variance and transsexual/transgender experiences by virtue of heteronormative and binary logics. FCDA should also map the intersections of (hetero)sexism, racism, classism, and ableism in discursive practices across space and place, in addition to paying close attention to gender relations.

From Lazar’s (2008) conceptualization of FCDA, I borrow the idea that power relations are produced and are reflected in discourse, particularly in representations of gendered social practices. My research uses FCDA to conceptualize the method of discourse analysis to be a critically oriented praxis. As Lazar (2008) maintains, gender ideologies are hegemonic, but they are also contestable (p. 8). Significantly, discursive analyses can reveal the non-natural and non-normative functioning of gender ideologies and present analytical space to disrupt (hetero)sexist, racist, classist and ableist languages and representations.

*Post-Development and Post-Colonial Discourse Theory*

My dissertation also employs discursive analyses developed by post-colonial and post-development scholarship. Borrowing from Foucault, post-development theorist Arturo Escobar (1995), maintains that “development discourse” circulates as a “regime of truth,” while other sets of knowledge are silenced. For Escobar, hegemonic development discourse both subjugates other sets of knowledge, and produced subjugated subjects
through the “developmentalization” or “clientalization” of the Third World. In post-colonial theory, Edward Said (1978) claims that discursive power lies within the repetition, circulation and inter-textual referencing of certain sets of knowledge.

Using post-colonial and post-development discourse analysis, I investigate the way in which development discourses on VAW become ideologically authoritative. Mirroring the post-colonial scholarship of Kapoor (2008), in this dissertation I use discourse analysis of images, talk, and texts to:

Probe development’s relative amnesia about (neo)colonialism; its deep seated loyalties to notions of scientific progress and universal economic prescriptions, and its belief in disinterested knowledge and “pure” gestures (e.g. objective policy making, uncontaminated foreign aid, transparent participations and gender neutrality) (p. xv).

Using a transnational feminist methodology, I focus on a variety of texts in order to highlight the way in which both similar narratives and seemingly distinct “lines of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) collide, overlap, and interlock to structure the recurring frames that development institutions use to privilege particular interpretations and promote specific approaches to ending VAW. I investigate texts and talk to understand the ways in which particular tropes, images, signifiers, and narratives are central in expert knowledge, as well as map the sets of knowledge that are sidelined in the process.

Importantly, I consider the implications of discursive construction of violence against women, and the urgency in which this issue must be eliminated, to reveal the political (im)possibilities for working toward ending global violence against women. I not only consider how violence against women is communicated as urgent, but also investigate how discourses of urgency frame solutions to the issue of global violence against women and disavow alternative strategies.
Case Studies

While my research is wide-ranging in focus, the parameters of my research are structured around a specific conceptualization of “development discourse” (Escobar, 1995; Kapoor, 2006). I understand development discourse to be comprised of dominant representational and institutional practices of transnational actors in the field (Kapoor, 2006, p. xv). While discourses of development are fractured, and contested from both the inside and the outside of the industry, I am interested in the knowledge produced about VAW from international institutions and powerful actors in the field. Specifically, my project is aimed at decolonizing hegemonic discourses of development by providing an analysis of the way in which the development industry communicates knowledge about women’s subjectivities, practices of violence, as well as the solutions to both underdevelopment and gender inequality. While many other international campaigns to end VAW would provide interesting material through which to understand how women’s issues are made visible on the international stage, my research scope is limited to the ways in which combatting VAW is promoted in and through development assistance to the Third World. That is, my research focuses on international and national development institutions that offer assistance in the form of knowledge and expertise, donor relations, and foreign aid.

Using a case study approach, I have chosen three organizations and actors as sites of study for their particular roles as agenda-setters, knowledge-makers, and influential donors of foreign aid: US foreign policy, the World Bank, and the United Nations. I have

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8 Here I use the term underdevelopment borrowing from Walter Rodney’s (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. While development scholars often use the term “undeveloped,” I want to highlight the project of actively underdeveloping nations by means of colonialism, economic restructuring, uneven global capitalism, and neoliberal development models.
chosen these key development institutions and actors as cases of study because of their different mandates, institutional inner-workings, membership, and levels of operation. I have collected documents, images, media, and interviews associated with these three cases. Using transnational feminism as a methodology, my research traces narratives of gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability across multiple scales and sites.

This method provides an opportunity for intensive analysis of details associated with single cases. In many ways, I treat my sites of study as individual cases. In fact, each chapter can stand on its own as a deep and concentrated analysis of specificity in particular sites of the development industry. Yet, my aim in assembling three case studies is to think about the larger contexts in which these three cases exist. As defined by Miles and Huberman (1994) a case can be defined as “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (25). Instead of focus on the circumscribed context, sociologist John Gerring (2004) maintains that case studies focus on the specific in order to point to phenomena larger than the case itself. Assembling three cases that all very different in terms of the sites, scales, topics, and concepts, and a theoretical archive that ranges from studies of security, crip theory and disability to affect theory, I employ case study as a method following Gerring’s (2004) conceptualization. In resisting the employment of case studies research as a way to build singular and specific analyses in one site, my aim in building and connecting three case studies, and by reading them “sideways” following Puar (2007) is to provide an archive that allows for generalizability. Using three case studies in this way, I build a complex theory of urgency that allows me to expose larger and more broad functions of development discourses, specifically how women’s rights are harnessed to a variety of development projects. In many ways, my assemblage of
three cases as an archive speaks more to my developing a theory of manufacturing urgency than it does to building individual case studies on their own.

My first site of study focuses on recent US foreign policy. Specifically, I focus on the ways in which Hillary Clinton acting as Secretary of State centralized violence against women as a security and development concern for the country during her tenure. In particular, I investigate circulating discourses about violence against women emerging from the US as nation with powerful and influential bilateral development aid programs and global power in framing discourses of development. Hillary Clinton, acting as Secretary of State, of course, is not a traditional development actor in the way that I conceptualize the United Nations and World Bank in this dissertation. However, as security concerns become incorporated, if not come to dominate, the development industry, sites of critical development inquiry are also shifting. As Duffield (2007) notes, there is a new moral logic that connects development and security in the “post-9/11” era.9 As development is understood to reduce poverty, and thus instability, it is a project that also aims to improve security (p. 2). US foreign relations in the “post-9/11” period is forfuelled by concern with its own security as much, or more so, than it has focused on rebuilding the strength of the US as a global power at the international level. Seemingly counter-intuitive, foreign aid has become focused on “home.” As Duffield (2007) maintains, development is more concerned with techniques of securing the Western way of life, than interventions for improving other lives abroad (p. 2). Given development’s focus on security issues, and a security focus on development, it is unsurprising that US

9 I use the term “post-9/11” here to denote the way in which the “pre” and “post” 9/11 period are discursively demarcated and imagined as separated by the event of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. Using “post-9/11” troubles this imagining and calls for a contextual account of simultaneously linked and disjunctive systems of power present along a historical continuum of the “pre” and “post” 9/11 period.
Secretary of State Office works closely with both USAID and the Department of Defence. In this dissertation, I investigate the focus on violence against women at this site to understand how the issue is problematized as an urgent development and security concern.

My second site of study is the World Bank. As Bedford (2009) points out, there are methodological hurdles associated with studying the World Bank as an institution (p. xxv). Due to the complexity and size of the organization, researchers can rarely confirm or deny almost any hypothesis about the Bank (Miller-Adams, 1999, p. xi). In terms of gender analyses, researchers and evaluators from within the institution itself have experienced difficulty in ascertaining the affects of gender policy trajectories on lending and investments. According to Harrison (2001), the Bank has trouble sticking to its own convictions for more than a presidential term (p. 529). For Bedford (2009) researchers of the World Bank constantly worry that their results will be invalid one month after completing a project because of the constant turbulence within the organization. However, investigating the World Bank’s role as a producer of knowledge and powerful framers of development policy remains crucial. Citing Schoenpflug (2006), Bedford argues, “What the Bank says about gender matters, because its policy discourses help legitimize specific ways of perceiving reality and exclude others” (p. xxv). Borrowing from Escobar (1995), Bedford suggests that policies are productive instruments that result in concrete practices of thinking and acting (p. xxiv). While research and policy texts may not be the determining factor for the lending practices of the World Bank or the practices of World Bank employees “on the ground,” they remain knowledge-producing mechanisms that both help to “make-meaning” of gender issues in wider development
circles and, at the very least, reflect the institutional narratives that communicates the World Bank’s mandate to itself and its membership. In other words, policy and research documents outline World Bank ideologies and policy practices to internal employees, many of whom enact loans, grants and develop programs of assistance in Third World countries (Bedford, 2009, p. xxvii).

Given the complexity of the organization, I have chosen to investigate discourses of violence against women within a World Bank report entitled *The Cost of Violence* published in 2009. I contextualize my analysis of this report within investigations of both historical World Bank funded research and policy reports on women’s empowerment and gender equality, and feminist and critical economist accounts of the World Bank’s track record on women’s issues. While I do not attempt to make grand claims about the World Bank’s *actual* investment in the issue of violence against women, I read the report as an attempt to manufacture urgency around the issue by gender advocates within the World Bank, and as representative of gender ideologies currently circulating at the organization.

For my third site of study, I have chosen the United Nations as a site of inquiry because, in the field of gender and development, it has historically been an “agenda-setter” and continues to set the trajectory of gender equality strategies in the development industry (Joachim, 2007). According to Joachim (2007) and Desai (2005), the United Nations has been the site for which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and feminist activists have mobilized around the issue of violence against women. In Joachim’s (2007) extensive study of the UN, she considers the relationship between the mobilization of NGOs and other activists and the agenda of the UN and reveals the way in which the “proper framing” of issues by external and internal mobilizers has shaped the
organization’s agenda. Given the history of mobilizing around violence against women at the UN, I have chosen this organization as a site to study the current agenda-setting behaviour of the organization. Of course, the United Nations is a complicated site of study given the organization’s sheer size and the multiplicity of internal agendas, concerns, and divisions. Thus, my dissertation specifically focuses on the UN Secretary-General’s campaign entitled *UNiTE to End Violence Against Women* and complementary *Say NO* campaign. I am particularly interested in the framing of the issue of violence against women in the *UNiTE to End Violence Against Women* and *Say NO* campaigns. As an agenda-setter, the UN not only reflects the trajectories of the organization on gender issues, but also reflects internal and external pressures by feminist mobilizations (Joachim, 2007; Razavi and Miller, 1998). While violence against women is a major area of focus for United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which is now incorporated within the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women’s empowerment (UN Women), the fact that the *UNiTE* campaign is housed within the Secretary-General’s office suggests the urgency around the issue at the highest level. Drawing on a long history of feminist and anti-violence mobilization at the UN, I investigate discursive practices around framing violence against women as a central UN concern.

*Interviews*

In order to avoid “discursive determinism,” I complement my discourse analysis of text with analysis of interviews with gender and development experts (Mosse, 2005, p. 15). Recognizing that a singular focus on documents would be insufficient to answer my research questions, I use discourse analyses of interviews with development practitioners
to better understand the intentions behind creating and circulating narratives of urgency, and to thoroughly investigate urgent responses to violence against women as a development concern. This multi-method approach is necessary in order to overcome methodological obstacles associated with research on development organizations and actors (Bedford, 2009, p. xxv). While I maintain that visual and textual representations of violence against women is a highly influential factor in the conceptualization of development interventions into VAW, it is equally important to recognize relations between text and practice. Although I maintain that development documents “spell out the common sense of the development community” (Williams, 1995, p. 175), and ultimately shape practices of thinking and acting, I am also aware that the “burden of proof” is on critical scholars to map the links and breaks between texts and development outcomes (Bedford, 2009, p. xxviii).

Interviewing Method

Using semi-structured questions (found in Appendix A), I interviewed 10 individuals who work in the field of gender and development. By employing a snowball interviewing technique, I recruited participants through my social and professional network, and the networks of others by email, phone, and by word of mouth primarily in Ottawa (the national capital of Canada) and Washington D.C. (the national capital of the United States). An Ethics certificate, copy of the consent form, and recruitment texts can be found in Appendix B. Through in person and phone interviews I was able to connect with individuals working on the issue of violence against women in their positions as gender and development scholars, consultants, activists, and practitioners in the two major North American hubs for development work. Focusing on multiple levels of
analysis, I interviewed individuals working at the activist or advocacy level, individuals working on anti-violence programming in national non-governmental and governmental organizations, and those working in transnational development organizations who could speak to international policy, programming and campaigns. More specifically, I recruited English-speaking women currently working in the anti-violence or development field, and feminist scholars and activists who attended any of the United Nations conferences between 1975 and 1995. I interviewed individuals who directly work or have worked with anti-violence policy and programming focused on international development, and those that could speak to early conversations around violence against women when it was first recognized on the international stage as early as the 1970s. In particular, I spoke to individuals directly working with the research reports, campaigns, and legislations that make up my archive of study. I interviewed one individual at the White Ribbon Campaign who is working closely with United Nations on the UNiTE To End Violence Against Women campaign. I also interviewed one gender policy expert at the World Bank, and two members of a World Bank “watch dog” organization called Gender Action. I interviewed two individuals from Amnesty International USA that are currently advocating for the passage of the United States International Violence Against Women Act. I also interviewed one gender and development expert at the Canadian International Development Agency, and 4 gender and development consultants and academics. In some cases, those who I interviewed allowed their full names and job descriptions to be used in this dissertation while others requested that I use only their job titles.

Interviewing “Femocrats”
As Miller and Razavi’s (1998) work on “femocrats” in development institutions reveals, feminists mobilize both *outside and inside* the constraints of institutions. Using the phrase “missionaries and mandarins” Miller and Razavi (1998) suggest that feminists “on the inside” work for transformative change, but also have to deal with the regulations imposed on them (p. vii). Those they consider “missionaries” are those who work for transformative change from within institutions and “mandarins” who work to adapt to the constraints of a regulatory bureaucracy found in large development organizations. Gender experts who speak the language of institutions often shape descriptions and solutions to women’s inequalities from within and outside development institutions. In order to understand how a sense of urgency is manufactured around the issue of violence against women, I interviewed those that could be considered “femocrats” in the development industry. In particular, I interviewed those that I consider to be gender and development “experts” in terms of their positions within development institutions, the academy, or their positions as advocates and consultants from well-known and often well-funded organizations such as Amnesty International USA. My interviews focused on how campaigns, policies, legislations, and research texts on the issue of violence against women are created and disseminated in order to better understand how feminists working inside and outside development institutions understood the urgency of violence against women as a real global problem and also the “epidemic of signification” of violence against women as a development concern (Treichler, 1997).

*Interviewing Reflexivity and Positionality*

The importance of “praxis” to transnational feminist research cannot be understated. Nagar and Swarr (2010) borrow Paulo Freire’s (1970) conceptualization of
liberation as “praxis” whereby the relational process of reflection and action are embedded in both theory and method so that their scholarship is presented as an irrefutably political processes aimed at social change. Challenging the politics of authenticity, translation, and mediation, Nagar and Swarr emphasize accountability in their work (p. 2). Nagar and Swarr are particularly interested in questions of Western feminists representing others. Like other transnational feminist theorists, maybe most famously Chandra Mohanty (2003), the politics of representations are a central concern to my research. As my project is aimed at “decolonizing” representations in development discourses, I am acutely aware of my own practices of representation. While I have interviewed “experts” in the field of development with considerable representative power in their own right, my research remains dedicated to transnational feminist praxis as a tool of representational accountability for feminist scholarship more generally.

According to Nagar and Swarr (2011), in addition to feminist scholars such as Harding (1993) and Heisse-Bieber (2007), situating one’s own research ability effectively attunes the researcher to their own power and privilege on the basis of race, gender, class, sexuality, and ability. Thus, essential to my feminist interviewing practice and analyses of this talk as discursive text, I acknowledge the power relations present in my research related to my own power and privilege within interlocking systems of power. As part of my transnational feminist praxis, I recognize the influence of my privilege as a white, able-bodied, and educated young woman. I am also aware that my assumptions and interests have deeply affected the interview questions I asked as well as the way I have interpreted the interviews I conducted. While I conducted interviews with (visibly) white women, some with more class power than myself, and considerable expertise in issues of
gender and development, I recognize that my position as a researcher brings with it the power of representation and interpretation. I understand that “facts” do not exist prior to meaning-making process involving both the interviewer and interviewee. I am also accountable to the ways in which my interviewing method as practice of feminist research is more interested in collecting stories of women’s experiences as a reflection of their own reality, rather than offering claims to objectivity or the ability to replicate my research.

Keeping in mind feminist critiques of masculinist and positivist research practices, my discursive analysis of interviews does not claim to uncover the reality of gender experts’ experiences as fact. Instead, I analyze how discursive formations appear in the talk of those I interviewed. I do not understand interviewing practices to reveal objective truth, but rather to demonstrate how discourses operate in and through power (Foucault, 1980). Following Potter et al. (1990), I understand meaning to be created in and through discursive structures, not simply reflected by them. In practice, those whom I interviewed, and I as an interviewer, were influenced by dominant narrative themes related to development and gender equality discourses. For example, my use of development jargon in the interviewing process allowed me to gain access as an “insider.” Given that I knew the language of gender and development and could speak academically about the history of development scholarship, literature, campaigns, and activism around violence against women in this field, I was quickly accepted as a colleague or associate. As a white woman interviewing other (visibly) white women, I

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10 I did not collect information on those I researched in regard to their racialization. Due to the fact that I conducted phone interviews, I cannot say that I only interviewed white women. With those I interviewed face-to-face, our collective whiteness created the conditions in which our collective and accumulated race privilege set the stage for our discussions, and without doubt, shaped our conversations.
was also a racial “insider” and this allowed me to gain access to information on the basis of my personal privilege, and systems of white supremacy that “gate-keep” sites of knowledge, and thus power. As woman and a student researcher, my interviewees were often “motherly” or explicitly instructive as “experts” shared with me the scholarship and research they thought would be most important to my work. This positionality also led to “sisterhood” relations where my gender was read as something we held in common.\textsuperscript{11}

Importantly, this helped build my review of literature and also helped me to gain access to their sophisticated networks and communities of gender and development experts without which I would not have access. However, my critical approach to “doing” development and “doing” transnational feminist work was often explicitly included in the interview process and did, in some cases, create a barrier between myself and the interviewees, who might become wary of my true “sisterhood” potential. In some cases, my interviews were very rushed and short, and those directly working on particular campaigns, legislations, and policies were especially hesitant and cautious in answering my critical questions. Unsurprisingly, those mobilizing around the anti-violence strategies that make up my archive have the most to lose from critical engagements with these texts.

Key to exercises in power is the interpretation of talk and texts. Thus, it is important to note that my discursive analysis of the interviews I conducted is influenced by my choice of actors and institutions to study, and the way in which I have selected when “the story” begins. By integrating interviews in my analysis of documents and

\textsuperscript{11} According to Mohanty (2003) and Naples and Desai (2002), transnational feminist organizing and development work has been dramatically and negatively affected by the assumption of common experiences among women on the basis of an assumed universal category of “women.” Global sisterhood, or the assumption that women across the globe are sisters under patriarchy, is too often assumed when working across borders of difference.
cultural texts, I collected and analyzed material that spoke back to hegemonic conceptualizations of VAW in order to map subjugated knowledge of VAW, and also trace the ways in which these alternative discourses may mark external resistances and/or internal contradictions. Thus, my research objective and assumptions about the kinds of resistances, contradictions, or silences in knowledge I might find by interviewing “femocrats” deeply shaped my analysis, and shaped the ways in which I have included the information I collected via interviews. According to DeVault and Gross (2006) reflecting on the power of interpretation, selection, representation, and control over research products is essential in the practice of accountability. Importantly, feminist scholarship should reflect on what kinds of interpretations are made, and what concepts, assumptions, and rules are drawn into one’s interpretation. Furthermore, deciding what gets used and what does not in the final research report is a powerful and privileged action. To this end, I recognize that I have included select quotes from interviews where those being interviewed spoke about issues relevant to my research questions. I have interpreted answers to my interview questions as either relevant or irrelevant through my own biases and assumptions about what is important. Significantly, I include interview data from those working closely with the development texts that my dissertation works to discursively analyze. That is, the interviews I have chosen to include serve to develop my thesis. I realize that this has left potentially important information out of my research and has undoubtedly created silences around information that I have not recognized as important. Thus, my interpretation of these conversations are arranged in ways that reflect and often re-inscribe dominant meaning-making practices, as well as my own theoretical lens and anti-violence activist underpinning.
In order to “enact accountability,” Nagar and Swarr (2010) emphasize the importance of sharing their interview transcripts and finished academic products with multiple audiences, including those they interviewed. To this end, I have shared interview transcripts with those I interviewed upon request, and have included only identifying information and quotations from respondents that were approved by my interviewees.

**Violence Against Women: A Note on Terminology**

In this dissertation I employ the term “violence against women” instead of domestic violence, intimate partner violence, partner abuse, or gender-based violence for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the term violence against women is used overwhelming in literature, campaigns, and policy discourses by development institutions. Following the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, most development institutions, including those that I focus on in this dissertation, use the term violence against women. According to the Declaration, United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women defines violence against women as:

> any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public life or in private life (UN, 1993).

I use the term violence against women to remain consistent with the texts I investigate, and the most popular term in the field of development. However, I do not use the term with the same assumptions that do many development institutions, and my definition of VAW is more expansive than the UN Declaration on the issue.

Concerned with the definition of violence against women in development discourses, I interviewed former and current “femocrats” about meaning-making
practices around the term. According to Eva Rathgeber, a consultant for development organizations, violence against women is often used as a “watered-down” and “mechanistic” term, with the exception of UN Women who have a more sophisticated understanding of the issue (Rathgeber, personal communication, 2012). Mirroring this view, Jane Parpart claims that violence against women is a term that is used “technically in order to request monies from hostile audiences” and requires a promise of plausible solutions which requires a less complex and nuanced definition of the issue (Parpart, personal communication, 2012). In her extensive work with the UN and WHO Meredith Turshen found that violence against women was narrowly defined. She recalled that collecting information about violence against women meant collecting statistics to gain attention of funders with little to no attention paid to “violent economies” and too much interest in sexual violence as only “war time violence” at the expense of intersectional, historical, and transnational account of the “continuums” of violence that affect women disproportionately (Turshen, personal communication, 2012).

According to these interviews, VAW is a term that circulates with little concern or attention to feminist debates about the use of “woman” as a universalizing category of analysis. Women are too often assumed to be equally vulnerable to violence at the hands of men by virtue of their sex (and sometimes gender), and solutions to VAW are found in “global sisterhood” (Mohanty, 2003). In development discourses, violence against violence is a term that circulates with an assumption that cisgender women experience violence at the hands of cisgender men, and as individuals. Most often, violence against women is reduced to physical harm to the female body, especially in terms of sexual violence, such as rape. Of course, violence against women is often perpetuated by men
and does often result in harm to the body, but violence against women as a term used in development discourses does little to connect the issue of violence against women to systemic, state-sponsored, and institutionalized violence. According to Parpart, development organizations have yet to practice a nuanced analysis of gender that is reflected by how the development industry deals with VAW. While they may speak feminist language of “masculinities” and “femininities,” gender continues to be mapped onto sexed bodies in heteronormative and cisgendered ways. She suggests that “gender experts” in many development organizations actually “have little understanding of the functions of gender, and pay no attention to intersectionality or performativity” (Parpart, in person communication, 2012). In practice, this means that development organizations are concerned only with women’s well-being.

I suggest that violence against women as a concept circulates in development discourses as a cisgender term that excludes transgender, transsexual, and genderqueer individuals who experience both patriarchal violence for failing to live up to gender norms and the violence of being overwhelmingly ignored by or shunned from anti-violence against women initiatives. Even in critical and feminist development scholarship, transgender, transsexual and queer bodies are rarely represented or included, although scholarship by Bedford (2009) and Lind (2009) are exceptions.

While I use violence against women in this dissertation to remain consistent with the term as used by development organizations, I do so unfaithfully. I instead employ the definition of violence against women as established by critical race scholars including Andrea Smith (2005) and the INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence Collective (2006). I understand practices of violence to be intimately linked with and sustained by
other axioms of dominations including institutional racism, homophobia/transphobia, classism, ableism, and (neo)colonialism(s) (hooks 2000; Razack 2004; INCITE! 2006). INCITE! (2006) argues that the definition of violence against women must be broadened to include:

Attacks on immigrants rights, Indian treaty rights, the proliferation of prisons, militarism, attacks on the reproductive rights of women of color, medical experimentation on communities of color, homophobia/heterosexism and hate crimes against lesbians of colour, economic neo-colonialism, and institutional racism (INCITE!, 2006, p. 2).

Such a definition of VAW is highly nuanced and sophisticated. However, I would expand this definition to specifically and explicitly include the impact of the development project on women. While development may be included within the phrase “economic neo-colonialism,” I would argue that the development industry, specifically the “developmentalization” of women and gender issues, is a process of ongoing discursive and material re-colonization that must be challenged as violence. According to Patricia Hill Collins (1998), “Definitions of violence lie not in acts themselves but in how groups controlling positions of authority conceptualize such acts” (p. 922, emphasis my own).

As Jiwani (2006) points out, institutions communicate information about violence in ways that obscure the interlocking structures of power that maintain hierarchies and inequalities of race, gender, class, sexuality and disability. Thus, a definition of violence against women must consider the violence of discursive recolonization within the development industry. It is this definition of violence against women that informs my investigation of the representations of this issue in development discourses.
Dissertation Outline

In the first chapter, I consider the urgency of anti-violence against women strategies embedded in the “development and in/security” nexus (Duffield, 2010). In the “post-9/11” era, women’s issues including violence against women have become central in American foreign aid and policy objectives. I investigate the implications of state actors including Hillary Clinton as the Secretary of State communicating the importance of ending violence against women as a means to eradicate national security threats, such as terrorism through development aid. Focusing on discourses of urgency around ending the “culture of violence against women,” as phrased by Clinton, this chapter investigates the possible passing of the International Violence Against Women Act that would center anti-violence strategies in US foreign policy. Assembling a multiplicity of texts to analyze interconnections of security, development, and anti-violence initiatives, this chapter takes seriously the impact of urgent “post-9/11” responses to security and development as a global strategy to end violence against women.

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I investigate the World Bank’s production of knowledge regarding both disability and violence against women. Arguing that ending violence against women is a pressing concern for development, gender advocates at the World Bank use a measurement called disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) to measure the economic costs of violence against women in The Cost of Violence (2009). In this chapter I use crip theory (McRuer, 2006) to investigate the framing of violence against women as an issue of ability, empowerment, and productivity. Given the World Bank’s historical emphasis on women’s empowerment through economic engagements, I consider the repercussions of promoting workplace empowerment opportunities with little attention paid to economic violence as a consequence of manufacturing urgency around the issue of violence against women.
In the first two chapters I focus on how violence against women is represented, and in the third I switch gears slightly to investigate how anti-violence against women strategies are felt, or manufactured to be felt, as urgent. In other words, in the third and final chapter of my dissertation, I investigate affective discourses of urgency. Focusing on the UN’s *UNiTE to End Violence Against Women* and *Say NO* campaigns, I explore the possibilities for certain “political feelings” and the foreclosed possibilities for others (Gould, 2009). I investigate how the urgency of “now” in regard to eliminating violence against women is affectively communicated, and how these affective capacities operate to influence how people feel about and act upon global violence against women.

In this dissertation, I consider both the discursive and affective nature of urgency. As Knotter (2008) points out, a sense of urgency must be created. By investigating how the UN, World Bank, and US foreign policy-makers communicate the importance of ending violence against women, I reveal how the issue is connected to what I consider to be the most important development “flavours of the decade:” national security, neoliberal economic growth, and “feel-good” aid. These development concerns fuel a sense of urgency around violence against women at the expense of suitable strategies to end violent practices. I argue that a sense of urgency around global violence against women obscures a more nuanced understanding of violence against women. Moreover, even as development experts borrow from the languages, concepts, and strategies developed by feminists, and as campaigns, policies, and legislations open possibilities for swiftness in the creation of responses to the issue, I maintain that there are important political possibilities to eradicate violence against women globally that are foreclosed by a *manufactured* sense of urgency.
Chapter 1:
The Development and In/Security Nexus:
The Hillary Doctrine and the International Violence Against Women Act

According to the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, women and girls will be at the center of all future US foreign policy objectives (Clinton 2010; Iannotti 2011; Tzemach Lemmon, 2011). Claiming that the United States’ international interests and security depended on the extension of women’s equality across the globe, Clinton over and again committed to promoting women’s rights during her tenure. As the most travelled Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton took her message about the importance of women’s rights across the world. Clinton was the most-traveled Secretary of State in history, visiting 112 countries during her four-year tenure and crossing 956,733 miles, which is enough to span the globe more than 38 times (Davidson, 2013). Branding Clinton’s promotion of women’s rights on the road “The Hillary Doctrine,” journalist Gayle Tzemach Lemmon of Newsweek (2011) named the Secretary of State “the advocate in chief for women worldwide” (n.p., emphasis my own). The Hillary Doctrine can be understood as a particular brand of US state-feminism focused on women’s rights around the world. Calling violence against women, in particular, a very real and urgent problem Hillary Clinton stated:

Give women equal rights, and entire nations are more stable and secure. Deny women equal rights, and the instability of nations is almost certain. The subjugation of women is, therefore, a threat to the common security of our world and to the national security of our country (TED blog, 2010, n.p.).

Sticking to a similar script from her 2010 speaking engagement, Clinton told Newsweek in 2011 that:
[women’s rights] is a big deal for American values and for American foreign policy and our interests, but it is also *a big deal for our security where women are disempowered and dehumanized, you are more likely to see not just antidemocratic forces, but extremism that leads to security challenges for us* (Tzemach Lemmon, 2011, n.p., emphasis my own).

*The Hillary Doctrine* maintains that global violence against women is a pressing national security issue by suggesting that a nation’s instability is causally related to both underdevelopment and gender inequality. Moreover, countries where violence against women is rampant are understood as fragile states and thus the breeding grounds for terrorism. In this chapter, I consider the framing violence against women as an issue of development and security and also outline the implications of securitizing the issue.

During the tenure of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2009-2013), women’s rights were placed at the forefront of US foreign policy. To be sure, in 2010, the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) was released in an effort to make a sweeping reform of the US State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to encourage offices for development and security to work more closely in the future. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the QDDR maintains that alienation, marginalization and resentment caused by underdevelopment are risks to US security that can be mitigated through development. The QDDR claims that changing negative attitudes about the US around the world will be central to new foreign relations, which include “softer” politics such as promoting women’s rights (QDDR, 2010, p. i). In the report, violence against women is presented as *the* gender issue to be tackled by future development and security trajectories. Also in 2010, a proposed legislation entitled the International Violence Against Women Act (I-VAWA) was first deliberated in Congress.
Amnesty International (2010), Women Thrive WorldWide (2010), and a coalition of 200 women’s organizations support the passing of the I-VAWA. Upon its first introduction to the 111th Congress, one-third of the House and the Senate co-sponsored the bill. The US Senate Foreign Relations committee also approved the bill. According to an interview with a Women’s Program Associate at Amnesty International USA, the I-VAWA is set to be re-introduced in the 113th Congress and is expected to have considerable bi-partisan support in both the House and Senate. The appointment of John Kerry to succeed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State also suggests that the bill will pass, given his leadership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for four years and his long-time support of the bill (Women’s Program Associate, personal communication, 2013).

In the I-VAWA, ending violence against women is tied to strategies for making foreign aid more efficient, and strengthening global security by reducing social tensions. Thus, like The Hillary Doctrine, the I-VAWA links development with security in the name of women’s rights. While the I-VAWA and The Hillary Doctrine are separate agendas, they are discursively similar. That is, both The Hillary Doctrine and the I-VAWA position women’s rights and violence against women as national security issues. Both the I-VAWA and The Hillary Doctrine communicate the urgency of ending violence against women globally as an issue that will protect the US from external threat. Additionally, the I-VAWA and The Hillary Doctrine both link security issues to the need for development assistance in places with high rates of violence against women.

According to Senator Benjamin Cardin, an original co-sponsor of I-VAWA, “one of the most effective forces for defeating extremism is female safety… Violence against women
undermines the effectiveness of existing US investments in global development and stability” (Aroon, 2010). Violence against women is considered an urgent concern in the I-VAWA since eliminating the issue will make foreign aid more efficient and will help to strengthen security by reducing social tensions (Amnesty International, 2010).

In the context of a recent emphasis on centering women and girls within the US foreign policy objectives, I analyze how violence against women is manufactured politically as an urgent concern. Assembling critical race, security studies, and feminist anti-imperial literature, as well as media texts and legislation, I read *The Hillary Doctrine* and the I-VAWA “sideways” (Puar, 2007, p. 117). That is, reading the I-VAWA alongside articulations of anti-violence rhetoric emerging from several sites in the US, this chapter assembles a multiplicity of texts to analyze interconnections of security, development, and anti-violence initiatives. As the US is currently captivated with “doing” development and “doing” security in the name of women’s rights, I place security and development literature alongside discourses of *The Hillary Doctrine* and I-VAWA in order to investigate the impacts of security and development discourses on emergent strategies to eliminate violence against women.

In particular, I expand upon Duffield’s (2010) conceptualization of the “development and security nexus” in order to analyze the intertwining of US foreign aid and *insecurity* in the case of the I-VAWA, and *The Hillary Doctrine* more generally. By analyzing the International Violence Against Women Act in connection with the circulation of *The Hillary Doctrine*, I unravel how a concern for women’s rights links development and in/security in US foreign policy priorities. When presented as a security and development issue, ending global violence against women invites securitized
and militarized strategies and interventions and ignores how these same organizations are inherently violent. By analysing *The Hillary Doctrine* approach toward VAW as a criminal issue, and not cultural concern, I consider the ways in which American strategies to end VAW globally are informed by domestic criminalization of VAW. By analyzing I-VAWA alongside the domestic Violence Against Women Act, I make the connection between the discipline and punishment of communities of colour at home and management of Third World bodies abroad. I maintain that the criminalization of VAW at home informs the securitization of VAW abroad, and fails to actually protect women from violence. I suggest that I-VAWA’s monetary investment in police, military, and peacekeeping to prevent and respond to gendered violence abroad marks an increasingly militarized response to violence against women emerging in the US. In the “post-9/11” era, violence against women is manufactured as an urgent concern politically by linking it with issues of security and development. *This creation of urgency around VAW creates a context in which failed responses to VAW are further expanded and intensified at the expense of more suitable anti-violence initiatives that respond to interpersonal, state-sponsored, and imperial violence simultaneously.*

**Feminist Mobilizations at the State Level**

Importantly, both *The Hillary Doctrine* and the I-VAWA mark the tenacity and power of human rights and feminist organizations, and individuals within the US government who genuinely care about women’s well being globally. In interviews with gender advocates from Amnesty International USA, I found that women were working extremely effectively under tight constraints, and with inspiring hopefulness that state feminism embodied by Hillary Clinton and legislations like the I-VAWA would have
positive impacts globally. Thus, it is a very difficult task to critically analyze such innovative approaches to ending violence against women, especially those that are developed by advocates working “on the ground” for women’s rights. Surely, ending violence globally is a priority for all feminists and anti-violence advocates. To this end, I want to attest to the urgency of ending violence against women transnationally. My analysis should not be read as an all-embracing disapproval of “state-feminism” embodied by Hillary Clinton or legislating global anti-violence against women strategies. However, I am interested in illustrating the ways in which The Hillary Doctrine and the I-VAWA are embedded within the development and in/security nexus and have the potential to be used as a tool to justify global interventions on the grounds of US national security. I am concerned with the ways in which The Hillary Doctrine and the I-VAWA maintain systems of imperial domination at the expense of more complex and nuanced strategies to end violence against women globally.

Outline

In the first section of this chapter, I explore feminist and queer scholarship on war, focusing especially on the concepts of security and in/security developed in reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. Weaving in analyses of The Hillary Doctrine, I consider the ways in which women’s issues are connected to “post-9/11” in/security and war. In particular, I use the work of queer scholars on “pinkwashing” to suggest that the call to eliminate violence against women globally is a “genderwashing” mechanism, whereby the gender inequalities at “home” are obscured by highlighting and targeting those abroad.
In the second section, I outline foundational literature on security and development. I expand Duffield’s (2010) conceptualization of the “development and security nexus” in order to understand the intertwining of US foreign aid and security interests. I consider the biopolitical and necropolitical nature of what I call the “development and in/security nexus” as a frame with which to understand how violence against women is used to shore up support for international intervention into spaces marked as underdeveloped, and thus, demarcated as breeding grounds for terrorism. For example, in analyzing the US’s inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR, 2010), I unravel the intertwining of development and in/security, and the increasing focus on women’s issues.

Returning to The Hillary Doctrine in section three, I consider how the ubiquitous phrase “it’s not cultural; it’s criminal” spoken by Hillary Clinton all over the world about violence against women has been used to bypass feminist and critical race debates surrounding how to intervene into women’s issues abroad. Focusing on domestic responses to VAW that center the criminal justice system, I interrogate “best practices” that are exported by the US. In this section I provide context for the proposed International Violence Against Women Act within The Hillary Doctrine, by outlining domestic anti-violence strategies. In particular, I consider the implication of criminalized responses to violence against women to understand the connection between marking VAW as criminal and the reliance on militarized responses.

In the final section of this chapter, I thoroughly analyze the potential implications of passing I-VAWA. In particular, I consider whether the investments in police, military and peacekeepers are appropriate in the prevention and response to gendered violence.
By investigating the human rights abuses committed by US forces in Iraq and sexual abuses within their own ranks, I interrogate how US political interests are pursued at the expense of suitable anti-violence initiatives, and thus, reveal the way in which an urgent concern for violence against women is highly manufactured. I suggest that by linking VAW to underdevelopment and security issues such as terrorism, the increased attention paid to women’s rights marks “genderwashing” of American foreign interests.

**Feminism and War: Anti-imperialist Dialogues in the Field.**

Since the US war on Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, feminist theorizing about women and war has increased dramatically. In fact, the way in which feminist values and women’s rights were used to justify the war on terror has literally dragged feminism into the fold of security and war in the “post-911” era. Of course, it is not only since the 9/11 attacks that feminists have been thinking about gender and conflict. While the deployment of feminism in the Afghanistan war is often understood as an exceptional case, Puar (2007) reveals how the manufacturing of “eventness” of 9/11 is operationalized to obscure similar and constitutive histories. A temporal project of urgency surrounding September 11, 2001 has facilitated the perception of 9/11 as merely a moment, or “flashpoint” and viewed in visual and discursive “snapshots” that ultimately “blinds the past even as it spotlights the present” (p. xviii). As Watson (2011) asserts, the “era-sizing” of “pre” and “post” 9/11 both “recolonize[es] history and manufactur[es] terror” (I). Such conceptions of temporality are especially important to the study of so-called “post-9/11” security initiatives. According to Malinda Smith (2010), both popular discourse and scholarly literature overwhelmingly refer to “pre” and

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“post” 9/11. She argues that its repetition and circulation function to “bring into being a perception of a radical historical discontinuity, a watershed between a known past and an unknown future” (p. 3). In fact, the hegemony of 9/11 event-ness has meant that critical analysis of the September 11, 2001 attacks too often begin with the “moment” of 9/11 and trace the trajectory of wars and invasions that follow.

Rather than trace the “event” of 9/11 to newly emerging security and development initiatives in the name of women’s rights, this chapter begins from the premise that the event-ness of September 11, 2001 has obscured the ways in which other wars, imperialisms, apartheid, and colonialism have used feminist, queer, liberal language and rights to justify intervention. This chapter, then, is palimpsestic in that it aims to re-trace the erased or obscured histories and present of the development and security discourses. Thus, my response to anti-violence initiatives emerging in the popularly demarcated “post-9/11” period should not be read as an urgent or expedient response to an exceptional problematic, but rather the continuation of feminist theorizing and activism on the subject.

*Feminists Respond to War and (In)security*

As Mohanty, Pratt, and Riley (2008) point out, the war on terror is not a new war, but a differently militarized mobilization of old racialized and gendered logics and lexicons. They state:

> What becomes immediately apparent is that US militarization has meant a new mobilization of historically embedded colonial practice and rhetorics of male superiority and white supremacy; of female vulnerability, inadequacy, and inferiority; and of subjugation of oppressed masculinities of men of color (p. 3).

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13 For example, see Abu-Lughod (2002), Puar (2007) and the edited collection by Mohanty, Pratt, and Riley (2008) on feminism and war.
A plethora of feminist research has emerged on the “civilizing” and “saving” mission of the war on terror, often expanding on Spivak’s (1988) famous phrase regarding “white men saving brown women from brown men” which originally spoke to the mobilization of gendered and raced language during British colonial occupation of India.\(^{14}\) Undoubtedly, orientalist grammars have historically demarcated the “colour line” during conflict.\(^{15}\) In current Canadian critical race feminism, Sherene Razack’s (2008) *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics* has emerged as a key intervention into understanding representations of Muslim men as dangerous, and Muslim women as imperiled in the “post-9/11” period. Concerned with the “culturalization of racism” that has disproportionately targeted Muslim and Arab men and women in the “post-9/11” period, Razack claims that white, liberal feminists are too often heralded as experts on cultural difference, liberation, and civility (p. 85). Arguing that “modern” women functioned as the more progressive sisters of “backward” women, imperialist Western feminism has become central war rhetoric. From Yasmin Jiwani’s (2009) examination of how Afghan women become “worthy victims” of US aid only when unveiled and modernized, to Abu Lughod’s (2002) response to the unveiling of Muslim women as a “saving” tactic, it has become clear to critical race feminists that this “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1993) is being fought on the bodies of women.

Of course, debates about modernity are regularly debated on women’s bodies. For Chatterjee (1993) post-colonial nationalist disputes about modernity and tradition in India

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\(^{14}\) See for example, Razack (2008), Abu-Lughod (2002) and Bhattacharyya (2008).

\(^{15}\) Razack (2004) suggests that Du Bois’s (1903) concept of the “color line” is particularly useful for understanding racial hierarchies (p. 4, 9). Focusing on peacekeeping initiatives in Somalia, Razack claims that Canadians know themselves as fair, rational, and saviors through being on the right (read white) side of the colour line. As Hage (1998) suggest, whiteness is a regime of accumulation so that even when peacekeepers are people of colour, the global “color line” come to know themselves through imperialism.
were focused on women’s role as the protector of culture, and thus they were often read by colonizers as the signifiers of “backwardness.” Moreover, as Medya Yegenoglu’s (1998) feminist reading of Said’s (1979) *Orientalism* reveals, making women’s bodies visible has always been central to colonial terrorization and control. In regard to colonialism, territory was often feminized, where both women and land are perceived as in need of protection often against dangerous men they need to be saved from, even while being violated (McClintock, 1995; Peterson, 2007). However, Indigenous women were not slated for protection, but instead are routinely violated under colonial regimes (Smith, 2005). Thus, a concern for some women’s rights is not specifically a “post-9/11” security issue, although it is presented as such. The history of saving and civilizing “backward” countries has habitually relied on women’s bodies as yardsticks to gauge modernity (Razack, 2008)

**Queering (In)security**

As queer theorists, in particular, entered the dialogue on the war on terror, it became clear that justifying invasion depends on not only saving imperilled women, but now also relies on the recuperation of homonormativity at home (Duggan, 2004). The feminization and sexualization of racialized men is now understood as an intersectional layer of sexual, raced, and gendered mobilizations in war on terror discourses (Puar, 2007; 2004). According to Puar (2007), the war on terror has relied on the production and specifically “perverse” queer bodies against “properly” queer subjects. As homonationalists, or (white) queer patriots, are swept up into the US’s national imaginary, Muslim sexualities are further orientalised. What Jiwani (2006) has called a “doubling discourse,” Puar describes as the simultaneous deployment of Membe’s (2003)
necropolitics and Foucault’s biopolitics (2003) where Arab/Muslim terrorists are understood as both sexually excessive and repressive, emasculated and monstrous, and are ultimately slated for death as a US national “sexual exceptionalism” allows homonormative citizens to be folded into a politics of life (p. xxv).

Given the interconnected workings of gender and sexual exceptionalism in the “post-9/11” moment, it is unsurprising that, The Hillary Doctrine has extended its concern for women’s rights and also set out to promote “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights” globally. In official remarks for the Recognition of International Human Rights Day, Hillary Clinton (2011) made an explicit connection between ending violence against women globally, and the United States’ promotion of LGBT rights abroad. The Secretary of State claimed that, like violence against women, discrimination and violence against LGBT individuals would not be tolerated, and the United States was prepared to put forward $3 million dollars in the form of a new Global Equality Fund in an effort to make gay rights central in foreign policy objectives (Clinton, 2011). Such an announcement from the level of the Office of the Secretary of State marks a significant success in queer activism and yet, I maintain that Clinton’s announcement problematically relied on narratives of “backwardness” and “culturally violent” practices to defend the US’s new contribution to a global fund. Using the examples of “honour killings, widow burning, and female genital mutilation,” Clinton (2011) compared “traditional” practices of violence against women to violence against LGBT individuals based on customs and religion. Using a “common sense” approach to communicating the (supposed) exceptionalism of US queer tolerance (only when regulated and managed), Clinton explicitly used gender exceptional language to make
sense of new foreign policy objectives. Pointing to the need to target particularly “hostile” nations, Clinton congratulated the US on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” a move to allow gay individuals to serve openly in the military, even as gay marriage continues to be illegal in most states, and while there continues to be widespread homophobia and transphobia across the nation.

Using the term “pinkwashing,” Puar (2007) claims that these types of sexual exceptionalist discourses function in various powerful ways. Two vectors of such power are the way in which the US and Israel, in particular, are able to transcend the violence of empire, and are able to “gloss over its own policing of the boundaries of acceptable gender, racial and class formations” (p. 8-9). Using the example of both Islam and Palestine as the “Orientalist wet dream” of sexual exceptionalism, Puar argues that Israel’s modernity is reaffirmed when its occupation of Palestine is obscured by its “ascendancy” in LGBT rights (p. 14). When Israel comes to stand in for the most progressive and safe space for queers in the Middle East, in opposition to Palestine in particular, the state’s human rights abuses in the form of homophobic violence toward its own citizens, as well as those it occupies, are glossed over and even justified.

Borrowing from Puar’s (2007) work on queer in/security, I use the term “genderwashing” to denote the way feminist and liberal concerns for equality and women’s rights are harnessed for imperial projects. Here, “genderwashing” signifies the function of discourses to obscure gender inequalities at home by highlighting and targeting those abroad as urgent concerns. The connection made between LGBT rights and women’s rights in The Hillary Doctrine points to the ways in which the US positions itself as an authority for condemning human right abuses globally so that a moral
superiority discourse has become ascendant (Grewal, 2005, p. 150). The association between LGBT rights and women’s rights in *The Hillary Doctrine* reveals ways in which the US positions itself as an authority for condemning human right abuses globally so that a *common sense* moral superiority discourse has become ascendant (Grewal, 2005, p. 150). In the “post-9/11” period, both “genderwashing” and “pinkwashing” are implemented, and sometimes simultaneously mobilized, in militarized and securitized responses to the events of 9/11, with Arab and Muslim people, failed states, and undeveloped nations most disproportionately targeted as the perpetrators of human rights abuses against women and LGBT individuals. The designation of patriarchal cultures as both other and abroad in *The Hillary Doctrine* “produces a geopolitical mapping of neoliberal power relations in the guise of cultures of sexual expression and repression” and elides more critical analysis of the way in which economic and political justice is interconnected with identity politics and violence (Puar, 2007, p. 29).

As a function of gender and sexual exceptionalism, the temporality of notions of “backwardness” and “tradition” in opposition to modernity and progress in Clinton’s (2011) speech functions as a “frenzied mode of emergency,” whereby the urgency to spread human rights is manufactured on the grounds of moral superiority (Puar, 2007, p. 9, emphasis my own). As this chapter demonstrates, modes of emergency allows for the re-articulations of global gender, sexual, and racial logics, and also permits “genderwashing” to be mobilized at these “urgent” moments.

*Feminism, US Security and Violence Against Women*

Given that the official “war on terror” was launched over a decade ago, it is unsurprising that gender and race logics of US imperialism are both similarly mobilized,
and yet have also changed course. As Stuart Hall (1990) asserts, new representations of racialized groups always bear the traces of past articulations. While discourses of saving Muslim women through “unveiling” no longer takes precedence in the popular media as they once did in relation to war, what Cynthia Enloe (2007) has described as the militarization of “everyday life” has meant that war objectives and discourses are widely integrated into national and local narratives.

One of the most concerning discourses that has remained in the so-called “post” war period, is that of national security. While US and Canadian troops slowly disengage from Iraqi and Afghanistan respectively, security forces and development experts remain to make the transition “smoother.” The urgency with which the US surveils, militarizes, and protects its borders from threats has not decreased, but in fact has increased. According to Magnet (2011), there is a new multi-billion dollar industry forming around technological interventions that aim to objectively read and code bodies in order to contain perceived threats. Both at home and abroad the US is determined to defend itself in the name of national security. From borders to bodies, security remains a primary agenda in the “post-9/11” era.

I suggest that Clinton’s quest to end global violence against women on the grounds of security marks a re-presentation of “genderwashing” discourses already circulating in rhetoric around the war on terror at home and abroad. Here, “genderwashing” functions to disavow the failure of the US to “save” Afghan women (Abu Lughod, 2002; Razack, 2008; Jiwani, 2009), and feminist research which reveals that Iraq women are actually worse off economically, socially and politically then before the US invasion which aimed to empower them (Zangana, 2007). Despite these failures,
Clinton, as the unofficial United States ambassador for women and girls, has made it clear that the country will continue on the trajectory begun in the war on terror, albeit through development and security.

**In/Security and Development: A “New” Nexus of Power**

According to international relations and political science specialists, the post Cold War period produced a variety of new definitions of security. Human *in/security* has become a point of focus for international actors, including development institutions, in the wake of what some scholars have called “the new wars” (Parpart 2010; Hettne 2010). In the field of Western political science, the study of security and securitization is ideologically fragmented. For example, the Copenhagen School of security studies argues that security threats are either collective or social, and that they must be articulated as such. Grounding the definition of security within speech, proponents of the school’s “securitization” model rely primarily on J.L. Austin’s speech act theory, and thus define security problems by their successful articulation in language (Hansen, 2000).

For feminists, the Copenhagen School misplaces gender insecurity issues within the arena of social issues, rather than collective threats. Taking the school to task, Hansen (2000) is critical of how gendered violence is read as an individual issue because it ignores how women are frequently targeted on the basis of their association to women as a group. Problematically, Hansen’s argument relies on both the common victimization of women as a group irrespective of difference and context and remains loyal to the notion that a successful securitization strategy is necessarily a state-based response. Using the example of “honour killings” in Pakistan, Hansen maintains that a successful securitization of violence against women would involve an international threat to be issued against the
Pakistani government and that economic, political and/or military sanctions should follow (p. 295). Relying on state protection, and international regimes of governance and discipline, such feminist critiques of the Copenhagen School ignore how those in charge of security are often those imposing insecurity on women, be it the military, police, or private security forces. When insecurity is understood as the imposition of fear and want (Hansen, 2000), the only possible response is to protect and empower, which development and security approaches embrace wholly. Certainly, Hansen (2000) is not alone in her call for state-based responses to insecurity. According to Smith (2011), systemic and structural powers ensure feminist cannot imagine non-state alternatives to eliminate violence.

Of course, scholars in the field of Feminist Security Studies and Feminist International Relations (IR) conceptualize security and securitization in various and sophisticated ways. For example, Ann Tickner (1992) was one of the first to argue that international relations issues were profoundly gendered and called for studies of human security instead of only state-based analyses. Feminist IR scholars such as Tickner (1992), Sjoberg (2010), Peterson (2007), Cohn (1987), Enloe (1989, 2007), to name a few, have defined and broadened the definition of security and insecurity in their approaches to analyzing gendered experiences of war, occupation, imperialism, and militarization.

Informed by feminist IR and feminist security studies, my conceptualization of security and in/security builds on Duffield’s (2010) approach to thinking about human security and the intersections of development with security studies. By focusing on security and development as a nexus, or a “constellation of institutions, practices, and
beliefs,” Duffeild (2010) claims that securitization can be best understood through the ways that discourse, ideology, and praxis circulate among and between an assemblage of stakeholders (p. 56). According to Duffield’s theory of the development and security nexus, the move from solely economistic conceptions of development to more “people centered” approaches in the 1990s was coupled with a new understanding of security as being about interpersonal social relations, rather than only political relations between states (p. 55). Creating a strong nexus of development and security, Duffield claims that a biopolitical management of life through the discourse of security emerged as central in development aid. While development and security have become popularly understood as mutually constitutive, Duffield argues that neither can be delivered without understanding the importance of the “containment of the human manifestations of underdevelopment” (p. 63). Both geopolitical control of migration, especially the containment of Third World bodies and the governing of individual bodies to be self-reliant and to individually manage the risks associated with underdevelopment are representative of a “new spatial configuration” of the development and security nexus (p. 63).16 In other words, the excess of underdevelopment, or that which leaks from its containment, poses a security concern.

While popularized in the Cold War era, within the “post-9/11” period new ideas about security proliferated once again. For some development scholars, the use of foreign aid expertise and funds has been wrongfully diverted from poverty-reduction strategies to

16 For Marchand, (2008) people migrate for a variety of reasons related to underdevelopment such as poverty, lack of secure employment opportunities, and violence. In her work on Mexican migrants to the US and Canada, she claims that insecurity must be understood as part of the process of migration for those who attempt to permeate borders as well as those who are working to secure them. For Marchand (2008) the “migration and insecurities nexus” would better reflect these issues, which current migration and security studies does not allow for. It is from Marchand’s use of “insecurities” that I have developed the term “development and in/securities nexus.”
“post-9/11” security tactics. For others, the nexus in which security and development discourse circulates has provided unbridled support for new foreign relations (Parpart, 2010; Hettne, 2010). Hettne (2010) argues that development rationales are informed by “perceived ‘security arrangements’” (p. 32). According to Parpart (2010):

The association of underdevelopment with a high risk of conflict (and insecurity) has provided a renewed purpose for development agencies, whose role in addressing global under-development has become in many ways a new form of riot control, offering solace to those who blame current conflicts on poverty and globalization (p. 88).

While the extent to which energy and money are diverted from traditional development initiatives toward purely security-based projects can be debated, it is clear that in the discursive realm security and development have become inextricably intertwined (Hettne, 2010). As Hettne (2010) asserts, “Indeed, in current policy, the ‘inextricable links’ between security and development are repeated like a mantra, and encompass vast arrays of problems and policy goals” (p. 34). That is, development and security are coupled discursively, often emerging together in “post-9/11” agendas that seek to make urgent the connection between “doing” development and protecting against security threats.

The connection between development and security is not only present in US foreign policy discourses. In the UN’s Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), Kofi Annan claimed that development and security were major priorities. In the Executive Summary of the meeting, the UN asserted:

Development has to be the first line of defense for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States’ capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure (p. 2, emphasis my own).
Citing biological security (in regard to HIV/AIDS), organized terrorism, and inter-state conflict as well as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the UN expert panel claimed that a “UN for the 21st Century” would necessarily include a more tenacious focus on both security and development (UN, 2004, p. 5).

_Necropolitics in the Development and Security Nexus_

While Duffield’s focus on biopolitical management of the Third World is important here, it is necessary to also understand the functioning of necropolitics within the development and in/securities nexus. For Mbembe (2003), necropower produces geopolitical, temporal, and spatial relations whereby people are daily confronted with the possibility of death. Indebted to Agamben’s (1998) theory of the state of exception, necropower relies upon the suspension of the guarantees of social order and law so that violence can operate in the service of civilization. Mbembe asserts that during colonization, colonies could be ruled through absolute lawlessness by regimes because of the racialized denial of a common bond between “the conqueror and the native” (p. 24). In the eyes of the conqueror, the division between life and “savage life” or another form of “animal life” relied on racial logics. For example, in regard to “post-9/11” Islamophobia in Canada, Sherene Razack uses Du Bois (1903) notion of the “color line” to theorize the divide between those with “the right to have rights” from those living in “camps” in order to describe the establishment of “post-9/11” security certificates which justify the incarceration of perceived security threats without evidence (Agamben, 1998). Focusing on both the apartheid of South Africa and the occupation of Palestine, Mbembe (2003) argues that in the state of exception, or camp, people live in a liminal space between life and death. In other words, people occupy a place of the living dead, or the
decaying living and the slowly dying. He writes:

In our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead (p. 40).

According to Berlant (2007), slow-death, in particular, can be understood as the ongoing, the getting by, the living on, and includes those “populations marked out for wearing out” (p. 760). That is, structural inequalities make it such that those slowly dying are not intensifying the death drive, but rather doing the “ordinary work of living on” under conditions in which they are faced with the indifference of death (p. 761). Responding to the way in which Foucault’s biopower (2003) relies upon the privatization of death in the quest to optimize life, Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics conceptualizes power of the sovereign to lie within the capacity to decide who matters and who does not.

Absorbed with birth rates, health and education statistics, labour and living, development concerns itself with biopolitical management. Yet, we can understand necropolitics as essential to the practice of development in that the economic models, and neoliberal economic restructuring that aims to manage life, as Mbembe (2003) suggests, is also nonchalant about death even as global managers deploy the technologies that ensure its becoming. That is, while development explicitly focuses on life in quality and quantity, it creates and supports the Third World as a geopolitical and spatially marked death-world. One may have to look no farther than the devastating consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and other forms of neoliberal prescriptions that have resulted in intensification of poverty, the lack of access to private healthcare in the midst of a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic, food insecurity and famine, and patterns of precarious employment to understand the way in which development biopoliticality and
necropoliticality fold into one another.

According to Duffield (2010), the Chronic Poverty Research Center has maintained that after more than fifty years of development efforts, approximately one third of humanity continues to live in chronic poverty (p. 61). For Duffield’s thesis, it is less important to ask why poverty endures, but rather focus on how poverty is discovered and re-discovered, and is operationalized in order to maintain the spatialization of global life-chance divide. He writes:

From communism to terrorism, through its marginalizing effects and its ability to foster resentment and alienation among common folk, poverty has been monotonously rediscovered as a recruiting ground for the moving feast of strategic threats that constantly menaces the liberal order (p. 61).

For Duffield (2010), the security and development nexus is about the containment of the global poor and the excesses of underdevelopment, rather than about “reducing the life-chance divide between the developed and underdeveloped world” (p. 57). In other words, development and security as biopolitical and necopolitical management are about maintaining and policing the division between those who are deserving and those who are not. Reminiscent of Ferguson’s (2005) notion of decomposed modernity, the Third World is rarely asked to catch up to the First, or join, but rather is habitually shunned from its borders and denied economic, political and social inclusion into the “modern” world.

The excess of underdevelopment, or the risks associated with underdevelopment that cannot be recuperated, are understood as security threats for development experts. As Razack (2008) argues, there is a racial logic to pre-emptive securitization. That is, the assumption that violence is likely to erupt in fragile states or underdeveloped spaces relies on a racial grammar that distinguishes between “us” and those who are not like
“us.” Wars depend on raced and gendered logics (Peterson, 2007). Research conducted by scholars such as Anne McClintock (1995), Edward Said (1979), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), reveals that such logics were foundational to colonial ideologies that represented the colonies as weak, passive, disorderly, hypersexual, irrational, politically and economically incompetent, and lacking self-control. In current wars, imperialisms and interventions, the rationality of the West is posited against unruly, feminized, sexualized and primitive others (Peterson, 2007, p. 6). In security discourses, preventing violence is conceived of as a positive, masculine, and rational reaction to the irrational and unpredictable ways of othered bodies, and relies on ideas about the “essence” of cultures that threaten “us” (p. 31). According to the global life-chance divide, the security of those deserving outweighs those who do not, further entrenching the functioning of necropower in development and in/securities. As the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ongoing occupation of Palestine reveal, those slated for life and death are often distinguished by the security concerns of First World powers.

**Development and In/Security**

In order to incorporate both necropolitics and biopolitics into conceptions of development and security, it is more useful to think of the nexus as *development and in/securities nexus* to draw attention to the ways in which *insecurity is not only the motive for securitization, but also the outcome of its proliferation*. Here, I do not merely invert the binary of security/insecurity, but rather use the concept of the development and in/securities nexus to account for the complexities among and between the proliferation of security measures and the imposition of insecurity. Importantly, such a rearticulation of security and development discourses disallows the characterization of insecurity to be
The imposition of want and fear, and the response to be protection and empowerment. Insecurity and security cannot be understood as antagonistic where the latter is understood as able to solve the former. Instead, a development and in/securities nexus positions protection (read security) and empowerment (read development) as equally implicated in the imposition of both insecurity and security.

*Development and In/Security in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*

I suggest that *The Hillary Doctrine* reflects the development and in/security nexus, and is one of many ways in which a focus on global violence against women is now central to the US government. During the tenure of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton women’s rights were placed at the forefront of US foreign Policy. In 2010, the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) was released in an effort to make a sweeping reform of the US State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Supported by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the report is said to be an effort to “get the most of every dollar from its investors” (QDDR, 2010: Foreword). Comparing development and foreign relations to any other business venture, the QDDR begins:

> Somewhere in the world today, a jeep winds its way through a remote region of a developing country. Inside are a State Department diplomat with deep knowledge of the area’s different ethnic groups and a USAID development expert with long experience helping communities lift themselves out of poverty. They are on their way to talk with local councils about a range of projects—a new water filtration system, new ways to elevate the role of women in the community, and so on—that could make life better for thousands of people while improving local attitudes toward the United States (QDDR, 2010, p. i, emphasis my own).

Merging development goals and American interests, the QDDR is an effort to make a sweeping reform of the US State Department and the Unites States Agency for
International Development (USAID). The QDDR follows in the footsteps of four quadrennial defence reviews published in 1997, 2001, 2006 and February 2010 by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security that aim to improve resource efficiency. Pointing to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s focus on “smart power,” or the interlacing of hard military power with soft economic, development, and technological power, she “stress[ed] the need to elevate civilian power alongside military power as equal pillars of US foreign policy” (p. ii; Calabresi, 2011).

Of particular interest, the QDDR announced the expansion of the International Security Affairs by establishing a new Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and working with Congress to establish a Bureau for Counterterrorism. As a pre-emptive defence against security threats, development and diplomacy are ushered in to improve the US’s reputation around the world. As the QDDR states: “For the United States, development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative—as central to our foreign policy as diplomacy and defense” (p. ix). Under the advice of the QDDR review, the State Department will work under the guidance of the National Security Department staff to respond to security crises while the USAID will focus on humanitarian crises (p. xiii). I suggest that the nexus of development and in/security, including the QDDR, positions an assemblage of institutions as needing to respond to the excess of underdevelopment. The nexus emerges as a response to the leakage of poverty and conflict caused by uneven global economic globalization.

In the US’s *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (2010), the alienation, marginalization and resentment caused by underdevelopment are conceptualized as risks to the US’s security, which can be mitigated through
development. As the introduction to QDDR Executive Summary suggests, changing negative attitudes about the US is central to new foreign relations (i). Development is presented as a moral approach to diplomacy efforts. As Duffield (2010) reminds us, it was not the “war on terror” that was the first to aim at the “hearts and minds” of “hateful” Muslim terrorists through development initiatives, but the British in newly independent Malaya in 1951 who first coined the term (p. 60). Following this legacy, we must understand Hillary Clinton’s “soft” power as not a new concept, but rather a re-presentation of old colonial logics.

*Violence Against Women, Security and Development*

In the QDDR (2010), poverty is re-discovered as a security threat. Importantly, gender inequality is also discovered as an archetypal excess of underdevelopment that leads to conflict. Where violence against women is rampant, states are understood to be fragile and prone to conflict. The QDDR report maintains that intervening in gender inequality issues is indispensable to secure interests abroad and at home. Given the leadership of Hillary Clinton, the focus on women and girls in the report is not surprising, and yet, I maintain that the centrality of women functions in an important way in the nexus of development and in/security. The claim that gender inequality is both a development and national security issue is easily understood when communicated as an issue that both fuels conflict and halts economic growth. Quoting President Obama’s National Security Strategy, the QDDR claims, “Countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity. When those rights and opportunities are denied, countries lag behind” (p. 23). As I will explore in chapter 2, urgency to end violence against women is also constructed through economic
discourses. For now, it is important to flag the ways in which security and economic growth narratives are coupled, suggesting that these two development objectives can be used simultaneously. Encouraging gender to be mainstreamed into all areas of development and diplomacy at the State Department and USAID, the “status of the world’s women” is presented as not only a matter of morality, but of national security as well (p. 23).

For the sake of peace and prosperity, American foreign relations have relied heavily upon women’s equality as a “common sense” approach to “doing” security and development. As a well known, and under criticized, objective of development, “gender” is a heavily circulated buzzword in the development community. According to Cornwall and Eade (2010), buzzwords in development discourses sustain the “model, myths, and passions” of development praxis, “sprinkled liberally” in funding proposals, promotional material, and policy (p. 1-2). While some buzzwords dip in and out of fashion in the development lexicon, gender has remained an important language component since the 1980s. Smyth (2010) argues that instead of feminist languages and concepts, often introduced through external activism, most development institutions adopted the term “gender” in the 1980s as a depoliticized and catch-all term to denote the focus on women and empowerment as a human rights and social development objective. It is necessary to flag the use of “gender” and women’s rights as discursive manoeuvres in the QDDR (2010) report. In development discourse, gender is “common sense” in that it circulates and is used to make sense of the development and in/security nexus. Indebted to Stuart Hall’s (1990) work on the media, Jiwani (2006) claims that institutions often use “common sense” knowledge, or an historical archive of circulating ideologies, to explain
new phenomena through dominant ways of knowing. In development discourse, gender functions as a narrative that “makes sense.” Communicated as a moral imperative of development, a social aspect to growth schemes, gender functions as “common sense” knowledge in that it does not dislodge development expertise or models of assistance. Gender functions as a “common sense” approach and a moral interlocutor between “doing” development for the sake of the poor globally, and “doing” security for the security of those at home.

The nexus of development and in/security requires a bonding. That is, to communicate the importance of both development and national security in US foreign relations it requires an adhesive agent to communicate its dual and simultaneous importance. Violence against women emerges as the urgent motive to support the new direction of US foreign relations. Ending violence against women is an innocent and “do-good” deed. As I explore in chapter 3, “feel-good” concerns also manufacture urgency to eliminate violence against women. Importantly, since gender equality functions uncontroversial, it becomes moral glue that attaches the issue of underdevelopment to the security-based imperative to intervene. The linking of security and development through anti-violence against women discourses marks a “genderwashing” in the way that the US exports its imagined gender equality to other spaces targeted for their poor gender relations. Communicated as an issue of moral importance, the US both positions itself as threatened by the leakage of gender inequality into US borders, as if the issue does not exist there already, and benevolent actor willing to intervene in the name of both security and development.

In *The Hillary Doctrine*, violence against women has taken precedence as the
gender issue to be tackled by future development and security trajectories. In the
development and in/security nexus, The Hillary Doctrine functions to reinforce the US’s
simultaneously benevolent and securitized interest in gender inequality. Violence against
women, in particular, is operationalized by The Hillary Doctrine as a symbol of the
manifestation of women’s inequality in underdeveloped nations and is communicated as
an urgent concern for US foreign policy. While VAW “makes sense” in both security
and development terms to experts in their fields respectively, Clinton has responded pre-
emptively to concerns about Western imperialist feminism and Eurocentrism, as well as
thoroughly developed arguments about cultural relativism and universalism, in regard to
women’s rights globally. Claiming that violence against women is never cultural, and
always criminal, Clinton’s development and security focus has effectively paved an
inroad into an otherwise stalemate in the debate.

“It’s not cultural; it’s criminal”

Despite claiming that there is a “culture of violence against women” in Papua
New Guinea in 2010 (US News, 2010) and that there is “traditional” foundation for
“female genital mutilation/cutting” among other violent practices (Clinton, 2012),
Clinton has also asserted that VAW is not a cultural issue, but a criminal one. Clinton
originally used the phrase “it’s not cultural; it’s criminal” in 2009 at a United Nations
Security Council meeting in regard to security issues related to sexual violence in conflict
(Clinton, 2009). In 2011, Clinton used the same phrase in regard to the beating of female
Egyptian protesters in the “post-revolution” state (Telegraph, 2011). Additionally, in
2011 Clinton used the phrase to communicate the importance of working to end both
violence against women and LGBT individuals globally (Clinton, 2011). In The Hillary
In anti-violence theory focused at the level of the transnational, the debate between universalism and cultural relativism is well known. This debate is often disputed on the bodies of women, where manifestations of gender inequality are often marked as culturally based (Abu Lughod, 2002; Razack, 2008). Women’s bodies are often used as a tool of measurement to locate nations within or outside modernity, where “traditional” practices such as veiling are understood as oppressive to women in contrast to their modern and uncovered “sisters” in the West. Moreover, centering on violent practices, especially exoticized, fetishized, and culturalized violence such as “female genital mutilation/cutting, honour killings, and dowry murders,” proponents of women’s rights as human rights focus their criticism on cultural relativists who argue for the autonomy and sovereignty of communities to shape their own social relations based in localized cultural traditions. In feminist and development theory, questions of how, when, and if to intervene into women’s issues are controversial.

**Cultural Relativism vs. Universalism**

Emerging alongside a human rights paradigm in the development mainstream, debates about cultural relativism and universalisms has preoccupied the field of feminist studies (Nussbaum & Glover, 1995; Kapoor, 2008; Mohanty, 2003; Spivak, 2004). According to Kapoor (2008), development proponents of universalisms argue for the
general application of Western laws on the basis of a universal “essence” or global “human nature.” Human rights, in particular, are drafted by transnational elites that imagine themselves to be producing laws and not culture, but rely on a particular tradition of law and a political history that relied on granting rights to property owners and thus denying rights to women, people of colour, and property-less men (Kapoor, 2008, p. 34; see also Patemen, 1988; Mills, 1997). While rights have been extended in the contemporary period, human rights are based in a system of state sovereignty under which non-citizens (refugees, “illegal” immigrants, temporary guest-workers) are not recognized (Kapoor, 2008, p. 34-5). One significant criticism of the universalist position is that it locates the West as the site of progress, and dismisses local culture as always already “backward” and patriarchal.

In response to cultural relativists, critical universalist Martha Nussbaum argues for a socially constructed view of transnational laws, including human rights treaties. In *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities* (1995), Nussbaum suggests that cultural relativist positions are too focused on difference, and place feminists in a position that disallows both concern and calls for justice in the name of poor women. Arguing that it is “impossible to deny that traditions perpetrate injustice against women in many fundamental ways,” Nussbaum is also concerned with the “morally retrograde” judgments against cultural traditions (p. 1). She suggests that the impasse between universalism and cultural relativism is most problematic. She writes:

To say that a practice is all right wherever local tradition endorses it as right and good is to risk erring by withholding critical judgment where real evil and real oppression are surely present. To avoid the whole issue because the matter of proper judgment is so fiendishly difficult is tempting, but perhaps the worst option of all (p. 2).
Erring on the side of universalism, while adopting a critical approach, Nussbaum is concerned with the customs that intensify Third World women’s experiences of extreme poverty (3). While Nussbaum may be well intentioned in her concern for poor women, she utilizes “authentic” stories of Third World women to shore up what she claims is the best possible theory to suit her purpose as a “morally outraged top-drawer activist” interested in international intervention (Spivak, 2004, p. 566). Suggesting that Nussbaum is merely “bringing the other into the self,” Spivak is critical of the way in which Nussbaum discovers her philosophical argument for universalism on the bodies of the Indian women she interviewed (p. 566).

While feminists criticize universalisms, those concerned with Western cultural imperialism too often rely on cultural relativism as an antidote. Communities in the Third World are either cast as culturally contrasted with the West or fundamentally similar, although requiring education to catch up to First World standards on the treatment of women. Concerned with the way in which universal sameness and cultural difference have both been wielded in the colonial and imperialist dialogues and projects, Narayan (2000) suggests that cultural relativism is a dangerous tool. For example, when a community claims that violent practices are a “cultural issue” or based on “traditional” gender relations, anti-violence organizing becomes nearly impossible for the women most affected by the practices. The issue also becomes untouchable for those working against violence externally. Moreover, cultural essentialist claims about gender inequalities are often used by Western feminists and imperial powers to mark others as essentially different (Narayan, 2000, p. 104; see also Razack, 2008; Lughod, 2002).

Additionally, claims to authentic cultures, traditions, and values emerging from within
communities as distinct from the West are frequently wielded to defend against Western intervention, and are as dangerous as universalisms for women. According to Narayan (2000):

Many versions of relativism rely on a picture of “cultures” that I previously criticized as culturally essentialist, a picture in which cultures appear neatly, prediscursively, individuated from each other; in which the insistence of “Difference” that accompanies that “production” of distinct “cultures” appears unproblematic; and the central or constitutive components of a “culture” are assumed to be “unchanging givens” (p. 95).

Furthermore, Kapoor (2008) claims that cultural relativist arguments are just as caught up in the same traditional-modernity dualism as universalism by only inverting the good/bad binary between natural law and communitarian rights (p. 34). Both Kapoor and Narayan suggest that feminists and development scholars should interrogate narratives of cultural difference as well as universalist claims. In particular, Narayan calls on feminists to consider the empirical accuracy, political utility, and dangerous nature of any generalizable argument about women’s inequality or standardized solutions (p. 97).

Criminalization as a Universalism

Hillary Clinton’s claim that violence is not cultural, but criminal marks a robust effort to move beyond (or around) the debate about cultural relativism and universalism. While The Hillary Doctrine both operationalizes human rights discourse and argues that there is a “culture of violence” in underdeveloped nations, the suggestion that violence against women is a crime offers a new set of ideologies and strategies for development and in/security interventions. Moving away from a dialogue about culture in particular, Clinton’s effort to address violence against women is communicated through a distinctive universalism. According to Christie (2000), crime is not a natural occurring act but a creation of meaning associated with certain acts. Both national and international
law are constructions of supposedly agreed upon ideas around law and lawlessness that are based on a European historical archive of philosophical theory. The standardization of agreed upon crimes, and the required responses to crime, is positioned as a universally accepted idea, even though, as Schissel and Brooks (2008) maintain “definitions of and prohibitions for crime change over time and across social groups as societies, with little consensus around just what criminal behaviour is” (p. 6). Criminal law is not “culture free.” Claiming to only see crime in the midst of culture is what Macklin (2002) calls “looking at culture through the lens of law” (p. 88). Significantly, crime and culture “do not occupy different conceptual spaces” (Macklin, 2002: 97). By suggesting that crime, or the criminalization of certain behaviours and actions, is a concept that “we” can agree upon, *The Hillary Doctrine* not only sets out an innovative justification for intervention in the name of security, but also assumes chaos and lawlessness in the places marked as negligent in regard to criminalizing violence against women. It also directly links responses in emergencies at home to responses to urgent issues abroad. Understanding violence as criminal invokes the idea that “911” must be called. In the “post-9/11” era, calling on “9/11” creates a sense of emergency that requires an urgent response. Importantly, this manufacturing of urgency through criminalized discourses relies upon failed strategies in the US, and disavows alternative and non-state strategies to eliminate violence against women.

*Criminalizing Violence Against Women in the US*

As feminist criminologists, prison abolitionists, and anti-violence activists have exposed, the criminalization of violence against women has failed systemically in the United States (Smith, 2005; INCITE, 2006; Davis, 2005). In penal abolition literature,
scholars and activists including Angela Davis (2003) argue that it is too often taken for
granted that someone who commits a crime will be incarcerated. For many anti-violence
advocates, the assumption that incarcerating individuals who commit crimes against
women will actually reduce gendered violence is unfounded. In fact, penal abolition
scholars argue that the criminalization of violence against women further entrenches
systems of oppression including racism, sexism, and classism that contribute to violence
against women. While the anti-violence movement in the US began by correlating
violence to gender inequality and systemic patriarchy, the criminalization of VAW
imposed gender-neutral legal language and individualistic responses such as the
incarceration of perpetrators (INCITE, 2006; Erwin, 2006). Although alternative
approaches to anti-violence exist, as do resistances to the criminal system, the
overwhelming emphasis on “best practice” approaches to be exported by the US is
centered on law enforcement and penal system reform (Erwin, 2006).

In the US, the domestic Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) outlines the
federal response to violence against women. VAWA, originally introduced in 1994, is
included within the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (otherwise known
as the Crime Bill). Lobbied for by over 1000 organizations beginning in the 1990s,
VAWA of 1994 was a landmark federal legislation recognizing the public and political
nature of violence against women. It primarily addressed physical and sexual assault of
women in public (including stalking), at home, and in the courts. Importantly, a
requirement of the VAWA was the education of the courts and law enforcement
agencies, as well as the inclusion of women and their advocates in policy
implementation. It also included a national study of domestic and sexual violence to
gather statistical information (Meyer-Emerick, 2001, p. 4-5).

Motivated by electoral support, members of Congress and Senators were
originally driven by political circumstances external to the legislation (Brooks, 1997, p.
81), and continue to be committed to the legislation or its amendments through their
constituents support. While women’s organizations were invited to the table in the
early 1990s when the drafting of this legislation began, significant trade-offs were made
while negotiating with the state. For Brooks, negotiating with the state meant that anti-
vioence mobilizations occurred around the Crime Bill and compromised some feminist
intentions for the VAWA. During its many stages in Congress, the original VAWA was
ultimately incorporated into the Crime Bill. For feminists supporting the VAWA from
the outside, issues surrounding the death penalty and sentencing requirements in the
Crime Bill were problematic. As Brooks (1997) argues, “by associating domestic
violence against women with other criminal acts the state can ignore the many other
roots of this violence” (p. 79). In the House, the bill included a separate provision to
allow death row inmates to make an appeal on the basis of a racially discriminatory
sentence, known as the Racial Justice Act (Brooks, 1997, p. 75). Moreover, the House
bill included a ban on assault weapons. Republicans opposed both provisions. The Racial
Justice Act and assault weapon ban were the cause of heated debate in Congress in 1994.

17 According to Brook’s (1997) thorough research on VAWA, the debates around the bill being
consolidated by into a crime bill, the removal of the Racial Justice Act, and the inclusion of a civil rights
provision were divisive for Democrats and Republicans. In 2012, the inclusion of rights for immigrant
women, Indigenous women, and victims of same sex violence in intimate partner relationships was the
subject of major debate before it eventually passed in 2013. Debates around VAWA, especially in regard
to who should be protected and the appropriate responses to violence, have been embedded in larger concerns
over issues of race, class, sexuality, and citizenship and both members of Congress and Senators have
historically voted in line with their party’s ideology, regardless of its affect on women.
In 1994, the VAWA passed with $33 billion devoted to crime measures, which included $1.62 billion for the VAWA. According to Brooks (1997), a majority of the allocation of the VAWA was provided to law enforcement training, mandatory arrest programs, and women’s shelters (p. 76-77). The Crime Bill also included a Civil Rights Remedy for victims that can prove that they experience violence motivated by their gender. It also included a ban on semiautomatic assault weapons but completely eliminated the Racial Justice Act. Brooks (1997) argues that feminists lobbying for the VAWA were forced to choose between race and gender justice, and implicitly endorsed the removal of the Racial Justice Act. She claims:

Domestic violence and racial justice issues became competing policies rather than complementary ones, thus exemplifying the frequent inability of the state to address women’s and feminists’ multiple allegiances and identities… by ignoring the specificity of women’s circumstances, the Act itself creates gaps through which many women will fall (p. 80).

The VAWA was reauthorized in 2000, 2005, and again in 2013. Most recently in 2012 and 2013, the act became a partisan legislation with the inclusion of protections for same-sex partnerships and both “legal” and “illegal” immigrants creating tensions among Republicans and Democrats (Stahl, 2012).

According to INCITE (2006), working with the state, rather than against it, has meant that approaches toward eradicating violence are often shaped by state and federal funding (p.1). Since federal funding is tied to the VAWA, the reliance on the criminal justice system has had a number of unintended consequences for the anti-violence movement, including the vulnerability of survivors to violence at the hands of both abusers and law enforcement. The INCITE collective (2006) maintains that the criminalization of VAW has not been successful in the US. For example, mandatory
arrest policies, that ensure both abuser and victim are apprehended, have not helped to
decrease the number of batterers who kill their partners, although it has led to a decrease
in the numbers of abused women who kill their abuser in self-defense (p. 223). INCITE argues that this provision actually protects the abuser rather than the victim of violence. Moreover, Ritchie (2006), in agreement with the Audre Lorde Project, asserts that law enforcement agencies and courts “enforce societies raced, gendered, and class structures, conventional notions of ‘morality,’ and social norms established by dominant groups” (p. 142). Thus, individuals who transgress these boundaries in conduct, existence, or expression are surveilled, harassed, willfully ignored, or punished. Ritchie (2006) maintains that the fear of police violence due to institutionalized racism, and inappropriate responses to a violent situation by law enforcement, such as mandatory arrest policies, has left women of colour, indigenous women, poor women, queer women, women with disabilities and immigrant women particularly vulnerable (151).

Connecting the “war on crime,” the “war on drugs,” and the “war on terror,” Ritchie reveals the way in which “tough on crime” legislations, like the Crime Bill passed alongside VAWA in 1994, have negatively affected the most in need of protection. For example, while the VAWA in 1994 and 2000 introduced visas for battered immigrant women, many women were not made aware of the Act’s provision or were unable to meet eligibility criteria that relied on evidence of abuse (INCITE, 2006, p. 300). Erwin (2006) claims that immigrant women may apply for immigrant status without a husband if she can prove abuse. Yet, for non-status immigrants, filing a police report to prove abuse is inherently dangerous. Under mandatory arrest policies, immigrant women could find themselves vulnerable to deportation. The protections for immigrant women
continue to be troublesome for survivors and anti-violence advocates, as the heated debate in 2012-2013 reveals (Stahl, 2012).

Importantly, anti-violence organizations such as INCITE (2013) and the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (2013) in the US have paved the way to non-state and non-criminalized responses to violence. INCITE is a national collective of activists who work towards “violence directed at communities,” including police violence, war, and colonialism and “violence within communities” such as rape and domestic violence. Importantly, INCITE (2013) has “developed community-based alternative responses to addressing domestic and sexual violence so that survivors are not forced to rely on police and prisons.” By creating a sense of urgency around violence against women as a security threat, the ways in which states impose insecurity on people is obscured. Additionally, both critiques from activists and survivors, and community-based responses to VAW are actively ignored.

*Exporting Best Practice Approaches*

As criminalized responses to violence against women are exported in foreign policy provisions and development projects abroad, it is necessary to consider the ways in which “best practice” approaches have failed domestically. Given the emphasis on criminalizing violence against women by Hillary Clinton, the impact of domestic measures to eradicate violence must be considered thoroughly. At the level of US foreign relations, Erwin (2006) claims that there is a perplexing mixing of international human rights discourses and “best practice” approaches which privilege legal reforms and individualistic discourses. In the US, the legal system, law enforcement, and police protection has been the predominant response to the problem of violence against women.
From mandatory arrest policies that place both parties under arrest in police responses to “domestic issues,” to obligatory batterer intervention counseling that is supervised by a parole officer, these policies increase surveillance measures. Such “best practice” approaches are heavily reliant on the criminal legal system (INCITE, 2006; Erwin, 2006). At home, human rights discourses have rarely been integrated into mainstream anti-violence initiatives, even while they are promoted abroad. As a US federally mandated legislation, VAWA represents the current best practice approach for ending violence against women. While it is not clear that all US informed strategies are being exported in current development projects that focus on violence against women, it is clear that penal reform and law enforcement measures are understood to be “best practice” approaches (Erwin, 2006). Under the pressure of urgency, already established responses to violence against women will be exported, even when they are failed strategies. A mode of emergency created by discourses of security disallows alternative strategies to take shape.

*The Global Prison and Military Industrial Complex*

Critical scholars have maintained that the criminalization of violence against women has intensified the surveillance and incarceration of poor communities and communities of colour (INCITE, 2006, p. 223-4). While criminal responses to violence are successful in terms of holding individuals culpable for their crimes, they have failed the most marginalized members of society. Since the VAWA legislation has been successfully used as a “tough on crime” policy it has functioned to bolster the prison industrial complex (PIC). According to Davis’ (2003) work on the PIC, the exportation of criminal justice responses by the US is consistent with the expansion and relations
between the PIC and the military industrial complex (MIC). Calling the MIC and PIC “symbiotic” Davis (2003) suggests that both military and domestic prisons share the same technologies of punishment, as well as mutually support and promote one another (88). Pointing to the connections between the prison and military industrial complexes globally, Christie (2000) and Davis (2003; 2005) maintain that the global economy depends on prisoners for a range of profit-driven activities, from medical experimentation to manufacturing labourers. Davis (2005) claims that prisons, both domestic and military, are conceived of as answers to the problems that capitalism creates and cannot solve (p. 72-73). Pointing to human rights violations at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay along with the proliferation of detention centers and military prisons in the war on terror, Davis (2005) warns of the racist ideologies institutionalized in US domestic and exported penal systems in the targeting of security threats. 

*Given the framing of eradicating violence against women as a security objective, it is necessary to consider the ways in which US police forces and the military are connected.*

According to Hill, Berger and Zanetti (2007), security studies and criminology have too long been divided by disciplinary boundaries and have thus habitually misunderstood the connection between paramilitary policing at home and abroad. Paramilitary police are those that receive quasi-military training, equipment and, philosophy (p. 306). Military training of foreign police and the increasing militarization of police at home have meant that racialized and other marginalized individuals, including the unemployed and political dissident, are targeted as “the enemy” (Hill et al., 2007, p. 304). Military methods bolster state protectionism at the expense of the rights of citizens. Militarized police tactics also depend on a type of “warrior culture” that equates
combat readiness with law enforcement, and causes citizens to be less inclined to report crimes (Hill et al., 2007, p. 305). In Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the US military has trained police services that were used to enforce political suppression or used for coups d’état (Hill et al., 2007, p. 308). Guided by US political and economic investments, the training for foreign police have “plugged a security gap” in peacekeeping, military, and humanitarian interventions with little signs of slowing down. Of the 7,160 police personnel deployed in UN peace-support mission at the end of 2005, almost half were paramilitary police officers. Known for working outside the normal frameworks of accountability and for using excessive force, the training of foreign police by the military, is concerning (p. 312-313).

**Implications for Criminalizing VAW**

For communities of colour at home, criminalizing violence against women has meant vulnerability to and state-sponsored violence. For Third World bodies abroad, I suggest that the exportation of US best practices will inevitably be ingrained with ideologies already present in the US system, including sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia. Since criminal justice responses further entrench already existing inequalities, exporting “best practices” in an expedient manner that already fail marginalized communities in the US will have detrimental impact globally. As Narayan (2000) reminds feminists, it is important to consider the empirical accuracy, political utility, and dangerous nature of any generalizable strategy in regard to women’s issues thoroughly (p. 97).

Exporting “best practices” means the imposition of failed approaches toward eliminating violence against women, and the further criminalization and securitization of
racialized others who are always already understood as irrationally violent and dangerous. Moreover, the exportation of US “best practices” may involve the restructuring of community, customary, and state responses to violence against women that are already established. For Erwin (2006), the “best practice” approaches that the US has exported focus too heavily on first generation human rights issues, such as legal reform, and often ignore second level human rights such as employment, housing, and community development (p. 200). For example, police training offered by the US is a “top-down” approach that ignores the grassroots mobilization of women’s organizations. In an interview with an international training coordinator, Erwin (2006) found that approaches to criminal justice reform failed when an agenda was imposed on the local community (p. 202). Thus, while criminalizing violence against women surely communicates the lack of tolerance for the practice to communities, conceptualizing violence against women as a crime is too standardized a solution to successfully function transnationally.

Hillary Clinton’s statement “it's not cultural; it's criminal” is important insofar as it moves away from narratives that culturalize and exoticize violence against Third World women (Narayan, 1997). However, the standardization of a criminal justice approach is equally dangerous. When Hillary Clinton asserts that VAW is not cultural, but criminal, the systemic nature of violence against women in its various manifestations is instead understood to be individualistic in nature. In this definition, violence against women is narrowed down to conflicts in interpersonal gender relations and ignores how violent practices are perpetuated and sustained by geo-political relations, imperialism, uneven globalization, immigration and displacement, the securitization of borders,
occupations and ongoing colonization, and state sanctioned and militarized violence. A criminological approach to violence against women disallows such an expansive definition of violence against women and does not provide appropriate strategies to oppose it.

Moreover, Clinton’s statement revealing or “discovering” the criminal nature of violence against women in the Third World assumes a correlation between earlier forms of organizing against VAW in North America to what is happening in “backward” Third World communities today. Pointing to the need to criminalize violence, or take seriously violence against women, The Hillary Doctrine represents the Third World as lagging behind. Not only is solving this “backwardness” considered to be a development project, of which the US has expertise to share, but it is also understood to be a security concern. As Hillary Clinton aims to amp up interventions into violence against women around the globe, the assumption that without the US as role model Third World countries will be left to chaos and lawlessness continues to rely on a racial grammar that posits the West as superior, rational, and orderly in contrast to irrational and dangerous others who threaten the country’s security.

In Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism, Narayan (1997) demonstrates through comparison between the anti-violence movement in India and North America that the two movements do not share a similar history, and while the focus of their campaigns, strategies and mobilizations have differed, Indian women have mobilized for gender justice alongside North American women historically. Focusing their attention on violent practices such as dowry murders and police rape of poor women in custody in the 1970s, Narayan reveals that Indian women paved a very
different path than that of the feminist shelter movement in North America. Focusing on
efforts to publicize the issue of violence against women, as well as change property and
inheritance law, Indian women have long been organizing around the issue (Narayan,
1997, p. 94-5). Thus, the imposition of US-based criminal approaches to anti-violence
strategies may be entirely misplaced when exported.

Within *The Hillary Doctrine*, the claim that violence is not cultural, but criminal
relies upon “best practice” approaches to anti-violence developed in the United States.
Contingent on anti-violence strategies that have failed, even as they are successful in
expanding the prison and military industrial complex, US criminal approaches center
security of the populace as having primary importance over the insecurity of others. As a
development and in/security issue, violence against women has gained increasing
attention as an urgent concern. In this context, the proposed International Violence
Against Women Act can be read as the expansion and solidification of exporting “best
practices” in eradicating violence against women.

**International Violence Against Women Act**

In the context of *The Hillary Doctrine* circulating in the United States, it comes
as no surprise that a piece of legislation entitled the International Violence Against
Women Act has emerged. If passed by the US Congress, the I-VAWA would effectively
center the issue of violence against women in all US foreign relations. According to
Amnesty International USA (2010), the I-VAWA is a concerted effort to create a
comprehensive effort to eliminate VAW internationally. The I-VAWA “contains best
practice provisions for preventing and responding to violence” developed by Amnesty
International USA, Family Violence Prevention Fund, and Women Thrive Worldwide in
conjunction with 150 other US organizations and 40 international experts (Amnesty, 2010). In 2013, the I-VAWA will be reintroduced in the 113th Congress.\textsuperscript{18} According to Christina Finch, Policy and Advocacy Director for Women's Human Rights at Amnesty International USA, the I-VAWA presents the most “comprehensive and holistic” response to VAW at the international level (Finch, personal communication, 2012).

Given the establishment of the United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally in 2012, it is clear that the Obama administration is supportive of the message of I-VAWA since they both identify violence against women as a national security concern, and a foreign policy priority. Proponents suggest that the door has been opened to the passing of the I-VAWA in the near future with this new policy on VAW strategies. For the champions of the I-VAWA, such as Amnesty International USA, this new global strategy marks an important step in the right direction. Yet, some also argue that it is not a long-term plan for ending global violence against women because “this global strategy could potentially be overturned by future administration unless codified by law” (Women’s Program Associate, personal communication, 2013). Thus, legislating a US response to global violence against women is considered to be a crucial step for Amnesty International USA.

In a press release, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and current Secretary of State Senator John Kerry claimed:

\begin{quote}
The bill will protect women everywhere, and it turns out that championing these values is also an extremely effective and cost-efficient to advance America’s foreign assistance goals and strengthen our national security (Amnesty, 2011).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} The I-VAWA was reintroduced at the 112th Congress but did not pass due to time constraints and the inability of bi-partisan negotiation and cooperation in Congress on this subject and other issues, including the domestic Violence Against Women Act.
Certainly, arguments made about the urgency to end violence against women as a cost-efficient measure is not new. As I explore in chapter 2 of this dissertation, the World Bank also makes the argument that ending violence against women is an efficient use of resources toward other ends. The I-VAWA has also surfaced within a larger nexus of institutional, discursive, and ideological arrangements that privileges the securitization of violence against women above all else. It also emerges within discourses of urgency that present violence against women as a pressing concern for security. In a press release by the US Senate Committee for Foreign Relations (2010) for the I-VAWA subtitled “Strengthening National Security by Ending Violence Against Women,” Representative Duleahunt claimed that countries with the worst track record on violence against women were breeding grounds for terrorism, and that it was necessary for the national security of the US to be a global leader in ending violent practices. By this logic, if violence against women is not eliminated, terrorists are sure to strike the US. Senator Collins added that he had “long been concerned about the treatment of women and girls all over the world, especially in Afghanistan.” Furthermore, Senator Poe claimed that it was essential that the US not only lead by example, but educate other countries on how to fight violence against women (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010).

In 2012, there were two major co-sponsors for the bill, Jane Schakosky and Ted Poe. According to his website, Poe is a conservative Congressmen who unwaveringly supports the state of Israel, and is behind the National Guard Border Enforcement Act, which would require the Secretary of Defense to deploy 10,000 National Guard troops to the US/Mexico and US/Canada borders to maintain control. He has also promoted the National Defense (SEND) Act which would equip border guards with surplus defense
weaponry from Iraq, and has promoted various anti-abortion bills including the “No Tax-payers’ Money for Abortions Act” (Poe, 2012). Given Poe’s support of the I-VAWA, it is clear that he has a very narrow definition of violence against women, and does not consider anti-reproductive health laws, occupation, or border securitization, and anti-immigration as practices of violence that affect women’s autonomy, empowerment, and human rights.

In an interview with the *Houston Chronicle* (2010) regarding his work on the International Violence Against Women Act, Poe asserted: “We have to teach women that it is not culturally acceptable for men to abuse them, and that it is not acceptable to resolve conflict with violence…. The women are so beat down culturally, they assume they are property” (n.p.). Citing Iran and the Taliban as the worst abusers of women, Poe uses his 30 years as a criminal judge and prosecutor to reflect on the importance of the bill. In the interview he stated:

Poe: After 22 years on the bench, I’ve seen it all. I remember I had a Middle Eastern man in my courtroom who actually said, ‘In my culture, it’s OK to beat her up.’ That’s exactly what he said. He said it was OK in his culture. He needed someone to teach him that it is not acceptable in anyone’s culture to abuse a woman.

Q: And did you teach him?

Poe: Oh, yeah (laughing).

Responding to a case of violence against a woman in Houston, Poe stated, “I say get a rope” (*Houston Chronicle*, 2010, n.p.). Importantly, such comments undeniably reference lynching. Given the connections critical race scholars have made between the history of lynching in the US and the torture of Abu Ghraib, such statements should be
taken seriously. Given the questionable motivations of co-sponsor Poe for supporting the I-VAWA, especially that which clearly targets other cultures as “backward” and exceptionally gender inequitable, it is troubling that Amnesty International USA has declared their unwavering support of the bill.

According to an interview with Christina Finch from Amnesty International USA, I-VAWA has not received much critical attention (Christina Finch, personal communication, 2012). However, I found that men’s rights groups oppose the bill. For example, men’s rights groups in the United States have targeted the I-VAWA as a feminist bill, and have argued that the I-VAWA ignores research that claims that women are more likely than men to instigate partner violence and argues that men, and not women, are ignored in development programs (Rogers 2010). Additionally, the Save Indian Family Foundation (SIFF, 2010), also a men’s rights group, have met staff from the US Senate and House about anti-male laws in India. Specifically, SIFF claims that India laws protect women in the case of divorce, and treat men like “ATM machines” where there is a dowry involved (SIFF, 2010). They suggest that misandry is alive and well in India, that feminists and other powerful women including union activists and politicians discriminate against men. They also claim that UNICEF, United Nations, USAID, and OXFAM are “organisations [that] strongly believe in unscientific feminist

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19 Sherene Razack (2005) argues that the torture at Abu Ghraib can be understood as racialized sexual violence as a tool to evict Iraqi men from humanity through violence committed against their masculinity. She suggests that Abu Ghraib should not be understood as an exceptional event, but rather as racialized and sexualized violence connected to the castration of black men in historical lynching practices in the US. For Razack, lynching is about maintaining the “color line.” Poe’s use of a lynching reference to respond to men’s violence against women should be read along this historical continuum of racialized and sexualized violence.
theories and they have no concerns for the conditions of millions of men, especially poor men in this country” (n.p.). Of course, the I-VAWA could unquestionably have a variety of unintended implications on local legal proceedings on cases of violence against women, including in the case of divorce. However, the concerns of misogynist men’s rights groups are not concerns for the well being of women.

In a different vein entirely, the concerns about the I-VAWA raised in anti-violence and feminist communities focus on the US’s track record of promoting women’s rights globally. In a commentary in the Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice, Thompson (2008) responded to an earlier version of the International Violence Against Women Act by questioning whether the I-VAWA “is just another way that the US government could craft justifications for interventions into foreign countries’ politics with potentially harmful consequences for women” (p.1). While Thompson cautiously reads the I-VAWA as a potentially positive response to heavy and harsh criticism for the US’s “liberation” of Iraq and Afghan women, I suggest that the I-VAWA can also be read as a new foreign policy discourse on the same continuum of “war on terror” rhetoric. Under the Obama administration, which has thus far focused on “softer” development and security approaches and not war, I-VAWA may be a response to the Bush-era, but not a response that actively pays attention to women’s well being globally. In the unprecedented address by former First Lady Laura Bush in 2001, the liberation of Afghan women from Islamic fundamentalism was centralized as a tool to tame the dangerous powers of terrorist men. In the I-VAWA, and the discourse surrounding its promotion, gender inequality is re-presented as connected to fundamentalism and extremism. Again, women’s rights are used to “civilize to save” others. In the I-VAWA,
violence against women is said to exist as a broader and more insidious scale in nations understood to be fragile or underdeveloped, and VAW is utilized as signifier to geopolitically mark the breeding grounds of terrorism. Instead of enacting a new war, development and security approaches are the most recent targets of “genderwashing” schemes. Given the emphasis on security concerns within the I-VAWA, risks and threats will be met with military, policing, and security services and securitization and militarization will likely be the primary response to the problem of global violence against women.

While arguably over cited in critical feminist literature on the “war on terror” (given that there are many more organizations in Afghanistan that receive little Western feminist attention), it bears repeating that criticisms from organizations such as the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA, 2013) will once again be ignored if I-VAWA passes. Even if I-VAWA marks a new way of “softly” intervening, intervention remains an issue. “Saving” women in countries marked by high incidents of violence against women, and thus eliminating terrorism to use the US’s logic, remains the focus of I-VAWA. Importantly, RAWA and other organizations “on the ground” in Afghanistan, among other countries, are simultaneously organizing against violence within their communities, and violence committed against their communities by imperial powers. Discourses of urgency ensure that criticisms around intervention and imperial violence go unheard, even while the US seems to be responding to critiques of the “hard” power of war.

Significantly, only “eligible” countries will be subject to the I-VAWA if passed. Given the development and security focus of I-VAWA, the act defines eligibility based
on the most current World Development Report published by the World Bank at the time of passing. Countries classified as high-income will not be subject to the US’s new foreign policy (p. 6). According to the strategy, 5 to 20 countries that have “severe levels of violence against women” will be eligible according to the extent to which “violence against women and girls in each country is negatively affecting the achievement of United States development and security goals” (p. 17, emphasis my own).

The passing of the bill would establish a new Office for Global Women’s Issues within the Secretary of State Department and the Ambassador-at-Large who would coordinate and advise on activities, policies, and funding women’s programs for the Department of State and direct US foreign policy to integrate women’s issues, especially responding to violence against women. Additionally the Ambassador would coordinate with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. I-VAWA allocates $10,000,000 for each fiscal year between 2011 and 2015 to the development and management of this office (p. 12). An Office for Women’s Global Development housed at USAID would also be established by I-VAWA and allocated $15,000,000 each fiscal year between 2011 and 2015 (p. 15). I-VAWA legislates that the Secretary of State and the Ambassador-at–Large for the Office of Global Women’s Issues will be responsible for identifying “a critical outbreak of violence against women” and advise appropriate responses (p. 42). Mirroring the priorities of the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR, 2010), I-VAWA would legislate the integration of security and development at the federal level, with a focus on the issue of violence against women, in particular.
Under the title of “Strategy, Policy and Programs” in the 2010 version of the I-VAWA, the bill outlines the objectives which include ensuring the accountability of the US in ending violence against women internationally, and enhancing US training of foreign military, police forces, and judicial offices on responding to violence against women (I-VAWA, 2010, p. 2). However, the I-VAWA also makes sure to include privately contracted military personnel who will also be required to respond to violence against women internationally (p. 6). I-VAWA outlines a holistic approach to responding to violence against women including awareness campaigns, working with men and boys, micro-economic opportunities, and centers criminal and legal protections. However, the I-VAWA outlines the training of police, prosecutors, lawyers, corrections officers, judges, and traditional authorities of “appropriate authority” as key responders to incidences of violence against women (p. 21-22).

Under a separate section devoted to military and police training, in particular, the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense are established as the directors of both military and police responses to violence against women. While other policy and programs have funding caps, as much money as deemed necessary is allotted to military and police training. The vague provision of funds for military and police anti-violence initiatives suggests that security strategies will be given primary importance, especially since eligible countries must correspond to US security interests (p. 17).

Of course, the I-VAWA is not a completely failed attempt to deal with the issue of violence against women globally. However, the bill is inextricably entrenched in the nexus of development in/security nexus to the point that it allows for the “genderwashing” of imperial relations. While I-VAWA has not been studied extensively,
Thompson (2008) provides an analysis of the bill using criteria outlined by Haifa Zangana (2007) in *City of Widows: An Iraqi Woman's Account of War and Resistance*. Thompson evaluates the first version of I-VAWA by: 1) how it may decrease or increase local NGO dependency on USAID; 2) if it prioritizes the “indoctrination of democracy” rather than meeting women’s needs; 3) if it divorces political diplomacy from women’s rights; and 4) if it addresses the role of the United States in perpetrating international violence against women. While I believe that these four sets of criteria are not the only ways in which I-VAWA must be analyzed, it is worth outlining them here and also providing a critical response to Thompson’s foundational work on this topic, specifically related to the I-VAWA’s support for militarized responses to violence against women.

Thompson (2008) is very critical of the I-VAWA as a bill that does little more than reproduce failed attempts at “saving” women in the war on terror. However, she also outlines the positive potentials for the bill. According to Thompson, the I-VAWA would funnel millions of dollars into NGOs and international organizations for their work in ending violence against women. Thompson argues that the I-VAWA should be applauded for its focus on women’s needs, rather than lofty empowerment and democracy initiatives, including training police and the judicial system to better respond to violence. However, I suggest that top-down reforms of legal systems may not actually reflect women’s needs, nor does the I-VAWA take into consideration what kind of organizing is already happening “on the ground” by women’s organizations.

Thompson (2008) also maintains that it is important to acknowledge the way the United States is complicit in violence against women internationally. However, in my analysis of the I-VAWA, I found that statements about accountability are both swift and
vague. The I-VAWA (2010) does include a section to enhance a “zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations” (p. 50). While Thompson (2008) considers the acknowledgement that “American personnel and service people can and do perpetrate violence against women abroad” a step in the right direction (p. 16), the bill does not legislate an explicitly zero-tolerance policy for abuse by civilian police, paramilitary police, and other law authorities trained by American personnel, or contracted private police services. Moreover, while there is an awareness of the necessity to hold individual UN peacekeepers and military personnel accountable for perpetrating acts of violence, I-VAWA continues to rely on foreign humanitarian and military personnel to respond when women and girls allege that they have experienced violence, even at the hands of military, peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. Such anti-violence strategies ignore the ways in which those who are supposed to protect women from violence often also impose insecurity when victims seek judicial justice.

Given the high incidence of violence against women experienced by female military and peacekeeping personnel, as well as violence perpetrated against civilians abroad, it is curious that the I-VAWA entrusts these institutions to prevent violence and protect women and girls. Given the record of human rights abuses perpetrated by US military, and its associated personnel, it is clear that this institution will not be successful at delivering an anti-violence message overseas. In order to thoroughly analyze the I-VAWA, it is important to make the connection between the bill’s promotion of militarized responses to violence against women abroad, and the pervasiveness of violence, including gendered violence, within the US military.

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20 see for example Allison, 2007; Savage & Bumiller, 2012; Puar, 2007.
Violence Against Women and the Military

The military is an inherently violent institution. Trained for war, soldiers are combatants and fighters, and they symbolize the sovereignty and security of nation-states. For masculinities theorists, the military is understood to produce a certain type of “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). A singular hegemonic militarized masculinity does not exist globally. Yet, certain qualities of masculinity are promoted through military and militarized institutions all over the world. In her work on militarized masculinities, Whitworth (2005) cites Major R.W.J. Wenek in 1984 as stating:

The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units (p. 91, emphasis my own).

“Premised on violence and aggression, institutional unity and hierarchy, ‘aggressive heterosexism and homophobia,’ as well as misogyny and racism,” the creation of soldiers involves the trained embodiment and performance of ideal militarized masculine qualities (Whitworth, 2005, p. 3, 91).

As Parpart (2010) argues, “the business of explaining and managing international security” is a very masculinist affair (p. 86). Problematically, international relations experts regularly ignore gender, and studies of masculinities, in particular, are often sidestepped in analyses of conflict, and the practices and spaces of violence. Investigating masculinities performed by men in the military, peacekeeping operations, and guerilla forces, feminist theorists have revealed the way in which violence against women is overwhelming in recent conflicts. According to Allison (2007), in the former Yugoslavia, over 20,000 women were raped during conflict in 1993 (p. 84). The United
Nations estimating that somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 women were raped during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Alison, 2007, p. 87). The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, 2009) reports that sexual assault perpetrated by US military personnel against both fellow troops and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan rose by 8 percent in 2008 to 2,923. Of reported attacks, 63 percent were rape or aggravated assault. Given the fear, stigma, and trauma associated with reporting, this statistic is believed to be lower than the actual number of violent acts committed by the US military in Iraq. Such staggering statistics of rape in war suggests that violence against women, perpetuated by all sides, is central to war acts.21

While the I-VAWA would establish the training of US military, contractors, and peacekeepers, it is doubtful that military personnel trained for combat would easily transition into anti-violence prevention and response. In fact, it is unclear how the US has come to promote military personnel as the best fit for the job. When military officers are trained for combat and are then responsible for “softer” jobs, it is often challenging for soldiers and civilians alike. As Razack (2005) demonstrates in her work on the “Somalia Affair,” there is a clear connection between racism and peacekeeping, which suggest that violence inherent to all militarized missions of war, peace building, and civilizing missions must be read intersectionally.

According to Wallace’s (2010) research on the implications of using US armed forces as nation-builders in post-conflict Afghan and Iraq, the “mismatch between military resources and government expectations” are the result of using trained “warriors” as diplomats (p. 114). Moreover, Blakeley (2006) maintains that the training

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that the US military does receive on human rights for its own troops has been ineffective. After a massacre of Iraqis by US troops in Haditha in 2005, which killed 24 civilian Iraqis including women and children (Savage & Bumiller, 2012), US forces were obliged to take a course in battlefield ethics (Blakeley, 2006, p. 1140). From the torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib (Razack, 2008; Puar, 2007), to American marines urinating on dead Afghan bodies and laughing, and the use of waterboarding and other torture of alleged terrorists held at Guantánamo (McGreal, 2012), it is clear that human rights training, where it exists, has done little to transform military personnel actions on the ground.

According to Whitworth (2005), military personnel do not transition easily into “softer” roles, such as that of peacekeepers. In 1993, the murder of a Somali teenager and shooting of two Somali men by Canadian soldiers of the elite Airborne Regiment in Belet Huen during a peacekeeping operation reveals the misplacement of military officers as peace-builders. Given the socialization of individuals into “warriors,” the protector and peace-builder role is difficult for military personnel. Joining the army to soldier, soldiers in the Canadian Airborne Regiment thought that their peacekeeping mission would be “boring.” When the peacekeeping in Somalia was given a Chapter 7 designation by the UN (which allows for UN forces to enforce peace), soldiers were amped up about more active “peace-making” opportunities (p. 100-101). When the Airborne arrived in Belet Huen, it was clear that it was not a warzone, and Whitworth

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22 In 2012, the case against seven US Marines failed in the courts. According to the military court, finding evidence and witnesses was too difficult. Additionally, the Marines claimed that they believed themselves to be in danger following the chaos of a combat operation, known as a “fog-of-war” defense. According to quote from Stephen Saltzburg cited in the New York Times, the acquittal rate of military personnel for murder and manslaughter is more than twice as high as it is in civilian criminal cases (Savage & Bumiller, 2012).
suggests that when the soldiers were convinced they would “die for nothing,” their violence began (p. 101). Given the number of known racists and neo-Nazi members in the Airborne regiment it came as no surprise that part of their operation was termed “Operation Snatch Niggers,” and that soldiers thought of Somali men as lazy, ungrateful, backward homosexuals who deserved to be killed (Whitworth, 2005, p. 96 and p.103-104).

To be sure, soldiering requires violence. It is at the center of military operations. Whitworth (2005) argues that a change of mission cannot undo the ingrained training and socialization that goes in to creating a soldier. She writes: “the skills of war are often at odds with those required for peace operations” (p. 105). More generally, training military in human rights, peacekeeping, or in the case of the I-VAWA anti-violence training, will not be enough to undo the kind of violence that is inherent in military culture and the socialization of soldiers. As those that inflict violence and deploy technologies of death on others in the name of security, the military is not the place to invest in anti-violence strategies.

*Hiring Women in the US Military*

As part of an appropriate response to violence against women by peacekeepers and the military, the I-VAWA (2010) outlines the role women are to play in joining and leading forces internationally. As an objective, the I-VAWA proposes to legislate staffing goals for women military and police peacekeepers, as well as the deployment of civilian women to all levels of service in peacekeeping operations (I-VAWA, 2010, p. 39). As an anti-violence strategy, the employment of women may be an effort to neutralize military masculinities, to demonstrate and export gender equality in the US, or
to provide a “soft” face in “hard” times. According to Zillah Eisenstein (2004), female military officers are used to “humanize and democratize war-making” (p.16). Of course, women join the military (or other armed forces, including those state sanctioned and unsanctioned) for a variety of personal, political, and economic reasons. However, at the level of the symbolic, in the US, women are habitually used to signify the humanity and progressiveness of military actions (although represented differently along lines of race, class, and sexuality). As Eisenstein (2004) reveals in her book *Against Empire: Feminisms, Racism and the West*, “gender” operates to soften both acts of aggression, and foreign policy in the US. Eisenstein cites Nicholas Kristof of the *New York Times* as claiming that a female soldier is one of the best weapons of our time because “wom[e]n holding guns” make “Iraq soldiers squeamish” (p. 17). In Islamic countries in particular, Kristof believes that “foreign chauvinism” would work to the US’s benefit. Such statements both demonize all Muslim men as inherently misogynist as a group, and esteems the gender equity that is said to exist in the US and its military. According to Eisenstein (2004), Kristof suggests that co-ed units would help the US military look less like “rapists who will do harm to civilians” (p. 17). I maintain that such “genderwashing” would do little to change the masculinist culture of the institution. That is, hiring women soldiers as a gender equality initiative acts to obscure sexist violence within military ranks and racialized and sexualized violence during missions, but will do little to actually change cultures of racism and misogyny in military institutions. Given the horrific acts of physical and sexual violence perpetrated against civilians and colleagues by the US military and their associates, the objective to look less like “rapists” is predictable. Yet, due to the high incidents of violence perpetuated by US forces against its own female
soldiers, it is unclear that the introduction of more women into the military will solve the issue of violence against women at home or abroad.

As Eisenstein reveals, in 2003 over 50 women had come forward to speak publicly about their experiences of violence in the US Air Force (p. 19). According to former Congress member Jane Harman in the *Huffington Post* (2008) “Women serving in the US military are more likely to be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by enemy fire in Iraq.” She writes:

> In the case of sexual assault and rape, the enemy eats across the table at the mess hall, shares a vehicle on patrol, and bandages wounds inflicted on the battlefield. As the old Pogo cartoon says, *‘We have met the enemy and he is us’* (Harman, 2008, n.p., emphasis my own).

According to a documentary called *The Invisible War: The Battleground is in Your Barracks* (2012), an Oscar-nominated film by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering, there is systemic violence against women in the US military, which includes negligent investigations and explicit cover-ups of abuses against female military members. In the US, only 8 percent of sexual assaults are prosecuted in the military and only 2 percent result in convictions (Dick & Ziering, 2012). A Pentagon report released in 2013 estimates that as many as 26,000 military members were sexually assaulted in 2012, and thousands of victims are unwilling to report (CBC, 2013). Furthermore, an Air Force officer who headed a sexual assault prevention office was himself arrested on charges of “abusive sexual contact,” which both reveals the depth of the problem of violence against women in the military and throws into question the institution’s ability to promote anti-violence anywhere (Burns, 2013). As US foreign policy sets its sights on using military operations to eradicate violence against women in the name of security, it is essential that these stories of the *insecurity* of its female members, as well as those marginalized on the
grounds of gender performance, sexuality, race, and class are made invisible. As Puar (2007) asserts, gender exceptionalism at the international level requires a smoke and mirrors approach to self-representation by contrasting the self as benevolent with others who are perceived to be far worse abusers of women’s rights.

Investing in military, police, and peacekeepers to not only promote and model anti-violence strategies, but also to respond to anti-violence is a misplaced target of the International Violence Against Women Act. While creating legislation that would acknowledge that US military personnel commit acts of violence against women while abroad should be heralded, the police, military or peacekeepers are not the appropriate institutions to do the work of preventing and responding to gendered violence. Importantly, the I-VAWA emergences within the development in/securities nexus that communicates eliminating violence against women as an urgent concern. While ending VAW globally is urgent, it is manufactured as necessary through the “genderwashing” of security interests. Importantly, the I-VAWA does invest in local NGOs and international institutions that have experience in anti-violence initiatives. However, it explicitly centralizes US development and security interests by the way it sets out that the bill can only be used to intervene in certain “eligible” countries. It also suggests that police, military, and peacekeeping operations will be at the forefront of responding to violence against women internationally since intervention must correlate with security interests. Given that violence against women is represented as an emergency, emergency forces are offered as the key responders to the issue, which effectively obscures the ways in which these institutions are rooted in violence. In The Hillary Doctrine and I-VAWA
violence against women is narrowed down to interpersonal violence, and thus, violence directed at communities is disavowed.

Conclusion

Women’s rights are central to security discourses in US foreign policy in the “post-9/11” period. The issue of global violence against women, in particular, is presented as an urgent security issue. Underdeveloped nations are understood to have high rates of violence against women, are assumed to be terrorist breeding grounds, and thus pose a security threat to the US. Both *The Hillary Doctrine* and the proposed International Violence Against Women Act reveal how a concern for women’s rights marks a shift in “post-9/11” foreign policy objectives toward security and development. By linking security and development to a moral concern for women’s rights, actual American interests, including legislating imperial occupation and control in countries of interest, strategies to assert global hegemony, and the continued militarization and securitization are “genderwashed” in feminist languages.

In this chapter, I have assembled media text, legislation, and feminist literature on development, security, and violence in order to reveal the way in which violence against women is situated within the development and in/security nexus. I outlined feminist and queer scholarship on conflict, fleshing out the concepts of security and insecurity as they have been developed in “post-9/11” literature on women’s rights. Focusing on *The Hillary Doctrine* in particular, I revealed the way in which women’s rights have become central to security discourses in US foreign policy. I also used Duffield’s (2010) conceptualization of the development and security nexus to understand the way in which violence against women is situated as a moral and security imperative in US foreign
relations. Pointing to the US’s inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010) which emphasizes women’s rights, I argued that the intertwining of development and security interests has relied on a common sense notion of women’s rights as an urgent concern. In addition, I investigated the way in which The Hillary Doctrine uses the phrase “it’s not cultural; it’s criminal” to both pave a new inroad into the “cultural relativist versus universalism” debate which has been at an impasse, while also shoring up support for exporting criminal justice responses to violence against women. In interrogating the “best practices” that are exported by the US, I provided a context with which to understand the proposed International Violence Against Women Act. Specifically, I argued that the investments in police, military, and peacekeepers to prevent and respond to violence against women are misguided. Focusing on the US military’s human right abuses abroad, and the epidemic of rape and sexual assault within the institution, I argued that I-VAWA places primary importance on US foreign interests at the expense of appropriate anti-violence strategies.

Within the development and in/security nexus, the US’s urgent concern for violence against women is highly manufactured. By linking security and development to a concern for women’s rights, the foreign interests of the US are “gender-washed.” From The Hillary Doctrine to the proposed International Violence Against Women Act, gender issues are receiving far more attention at the level of foreign policy than ever before because they are linked to a “post-9/11” agenda. This agenda manufactures urgency around VAW and allows for failed responses to VAW to take precedence over more suitable anti-violence initiatives. While the promotion of women’s rights globally is important, if not essential, to eradicating the issue of violence against women, the I-
VAWA’s promotion of military, peacekeeping, and police training to respond to violence against women reveals the way in which US manufacturing urgency around VAW to conceal the fact that security interests are paramount, and will be sought at the expense of women’s well being. Consequently, strategies to eradicate violent practices rely on their suitability to established American security interests, and not their effectiveness in eliminating violence against women globally.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the urgency to eliminate violence against women is politically constructed. Urgency discourses allow for the securitization and militarization of responses to violence against women because they rely on already established strategies. Importantly, ending VAW “now” does not allow for the time to explore other possibilities. Additionally, by connecting violence against women to security, the issue is enveloped by modes of emergency that require emergency responses. As the US foreign policy discourses I have studied reveal, there is also an economic narrative associated with paying attention to the issue. As Secretary of State Senator John Kerry points out, the I-VAWA will not only “protect women everywhere” but it is also “cost-efficient” (Amnesty, 2011). In chapter 2, I turn to the ways in which economic language of efficiency and cost-benefit rhetoric builds discourses of urgency in the development industry.
Chapter 2:

Violence, Disability, and Productivity: The World Bank’s *The Cost of Violence*

According to the World Bank, violence against women is costly. Not only do abused women often find themselves in need of social services and health care, women are also less productive at work because of the violence they experience. In the report, the World Bank uses the disability-adjusted life year (DALYs) measurement to argue that disabilities, impairments, and trauma resulting from violence cause women to miss work and become less productive labourers.\(^{23}\) When injured, impaired, or disabled by violent acts, women are unable to live up to their productive potential. According to the World Bank, violence against women not only harms their personal economic prosperity, but also blocks national development (World Bank, 2009, p. iii). Thus, violence against women (VAW) is inefficient. Stunting productivity, and thus economic growth, violence against women is bad for development.

As the World Bank considers VAW to be costly for both women and national development, the organization has attempted to measure its harms. In *The Cost of Violence*, the World Bank (2009) uses the measurement “disability-adjusted life years” (DALYs) to quantify economic damages caused by violence against women. In 1993, the World Bank estimated that 9 million DALYs were lost globally as a result of sexual and domestic violence (p. 58).\(^{24}\) Originally used by the World Bank in 1993 a report on health and development, DALYs were designed by the World Health Organization (WHO) to

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\(^{23}\) In *The Cost of Violence* (2009), DALYs measure the cost if disability, disease, and impairment related to a person’s productive potential. The Bank differentiates between impairments and disability, with the former defined as a temporal injury, and the latter as a chronic illness. However, the disability rights community may define impairment and disability differently, and more politically. Here I use these terms as the World Bank has employed them.

\(^{24}\) Given the underreporting of violence against women due to a variety of structural and methodological barriers, this estimation may be low.
calculate the global burden of disability, impairment, and disease, and the effectiveness of health care interventions (World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 2009, World Health Organization, 2008). According to the World Health Organization (2008), DALYs can calculate the “burden” of disease for the state by measuring the gap between “current health status and an ideal situation where everyone lives into old age, free of disease and disability” (p. 3). At the World Bank, DALYs are used to measure the cost-benefit of interventions into health and social ills.

Given the historical emphasis on women’s economic empowerment at the World Bank, *The Cost of Violence* (2009) can be read as statistical evidence that violence against women is an urgent concern for development. In fact, communicating the issue of violence against women in economic terms is aimed at creating a sense of urgency around the issue for the World Bank. According to an interview with the author of “Valuing the impacts of domestic violence: a review by sector” in *The Cost of Violence*, Alys Williams, violence against women rarely catches the attention of the organization and those within the Bank who are interested in gender inequality issues have to be “opportunistic.” She suggests that in most cases, gender advocates within the World Bank cannot generate “stand-alone” gender projects, but instead create a sense of urgency around gender issues within other projects. Williams claims that gender enthusiasts “have to go where [they] are invited to go.” Since, as Williams suggests, “economists don’t believe what they cannot measure,” the urgency to eliminate violence against women has been manufactured by its quantification (Williams, personal communication, 2012).

Parpart confirms this argument, stating in an interview: “in the development business you have to convince people that [violence against women] is a problem that can and must be

solved” (Parpart, personal communication, 2012). In the chapter, I consider the ways in which economic language is used to manufacture urgency and the implications of such discourses on the well being of women. In particular, this chapter is concerned with how economic language is used to promote solutions to violence such as economic empowerment programs that do little more than reproduce status-quo gender work at the World Bank.

In this chapter, I argue that DALYs help to manufacture a sense of urgency around ending VAW by using economic language. Additionally, DALYs represent more than an intensified version of the organization’s work on gender. Measuring the cost of violence against women using DALYs establishes the World Bank’s requirement of Third World women to be “properly productive.” Expanding on Robert McRuer’s (2005) notion of “flexibility,” I use the terms overcoming, adjusting, and resiliency to argue that able-bodiedness is specifically required of racialized women globally. By exploring economic empowerment initiatives that focus on women’s work, this chapter investigates how communicating the urgency of violence against women within the World Bank both narrows the definition of violence and possible solutions to be taken seriously by economists I order to fit the mandate of the institution. I suggest that violence against women is manufactured as an urgent concern economically by linking anti-violence narratives with the expectation of racialized women to “overcome.” In other words, this chapter investigates the way in which racialized women are required to remain flexible in disabling conditions.

**Speaking the Language of Institutions**
When measured as an economic cost, there is an increased potential for the issue of violence against women to gain both traction and monetary investment from within the World Bank. Given its range of influence on member countries, and in the development industry more generally, the incorporation of any approach to eradicating violence against women is welcome by some gender experts. In fact, it is a very difficult task to critique innovative approaches to ending VAW, especially by “femocrats” working under constraints such as those at the World Bank. When made visible as an anti-violence tool, economic measurements such as DALYs appear to be uncontroversial to a range of actors, including economists. As Bedford (2009) argues in her critical work on gender and the World Bank, “one might as well be against puppies” (p. 208). Surely, ending violence globally is a priority for all feminists and anti-violence advocates. For women who have been injured or disabled by violent acts, the visibility of the issue on a global scale is especially important. For women that have missed workdays and lost income because of an impairment or disability caused by gendered violence, and for those who have made claims for services and rehabilitation in the wake of violence, it is clear that violence is associated with very real costs to quality of life.

My criticisms of the World Bank’s DALYs measurement is not meant to be read as all-embracing disapproval of the notion that violence against women incurs individual and economic costs. Instead, I target the Bank’s DALYs as a problematic representation of violence against women in order to illustrate the ways in which anti-violence strategies are narrowed, confined, and depoliticized by coupling the issue with mainstream development strategies. When communicated as urgent through economic language, the complexity of the issue is lost at the expense of swift solutions that are already in place at
the organization. By communicating the importance of violence against women as a development issue, the World Bank responds in ways that are critiqued by feminists as ultimately failing women. It is the manufacturing of VAW as an urgent development concern through discourses of economic growth that I am most concerned with here.

As an anti-violence advocate, I cannot consent to the World Bank producing much of the most influential knowledge about violent practices and how to eradicate them. While the actual investments in eradicating violence against women are underwhelming at the World Bank, the institution consistently circulates its “comparative advantage” in gender issues discursively (World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2006). 26 Yet, as my interview with Gender Action reveals, for all the research the World Bank does on gender, the organization does very little about it (Gender Action, personal communication, 2012). The organization has influence on the transnational level and the knowledge produced at the World Bank has real power (Gender Action, personal communication, 2012). As analysts of the organization have pointed out, the World Bank is predominantly known for being the “knowledge bank” above and beyond its actual banking practices, meaning that it generates powerful knowledge about development, and I argue, disability and violence against women (Bergeron, 2006; Kapoor, 2008).

In this chapter, I investigate the World Bank’s production of knowledge regarding both disability and violence against women. Placing The Cost of Violence (2009) at the centre, this chapter investigates the intersections of gender and disability in World Bank’s discourses on violence against women as a pressing concern. The use of DALYs enact

26 According to members of Gender Action, a “watch dog” organization I interviewed, the World Bank has three current projects, dealing explicitly with gender-based violence in post-earthquake Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Given that the World Bank’s overall project investments exceed 10 billion dollars a year, Gender Action claims that the World Bank’s actual interest in VAW in terms of monetary investments is a “drop in the bucket” (Gender Action, personal communication, 2012).
two interlocking discursive moves: 1) DALYs rely on a particularly racialized and ableist conception of life-worth based on a Third World person’s productive potential in the workforce; and 2) DALYs rely on an economistic framework that suggests that the only site of Third World women’s empowerment is found in the workplace. Given the economic opportunities available to Third World women, I take the World Bank to task for the way in which the organization promotes workplace empowerment opportunities for women. I argue that through the DALYs calculation, the World Bank situates violence against women, and its disabling effects, within an individualizing narrative. By focusing on empowering individual women through self-help and entrepreneurial engagements, I suggest that other forms of violence, including institutional, state, and economic violence and racialized violence, are made invisible by the way in which the World Bank measures economic cost of violence against women.

Outline

In the first section, I outline important literature in the fields of disability, crip studies, and post-colonial theory in order to situate this chapter within unfolding scholarly dialogues. I focus on the work of Robert McRuer (2006; 2010) to outline crip theory and disability theory’s engagement with post-colonial studies to set up the theoretical context of my research. In particular, I expand McRuer’s theory of flexibility and disability studies conceptualization of normalcy to provide a transnational “crip” reading of the World Bank’s DALYs.

In the second section, I provide an outline of gender work performed at the World Bank in order to provide a background to the way in which the organization has historically approached social development issues. Specifically, this section provides a
critical analysis of the World Bank’s neoliberal development models from a feminist standpoint, and outlines the organization’s historical promotion of women’s empowerment through “mainstreaming” gender into the work of the World Bank.

The third section explores the impact of the DALYs measurement on the Bank’s social development models in order to demonstrate the ways that violence against women is understood as an economic development issue. Wrestling with the representative grammars associated with the World Bank’s mathematical equation of DALYs, I borrow from the work of Robert McRuer (2005, 2010) to “crip” DALYs as they intersect with the Bank’s gender equity and anti-violence policy and programming. In particular, I take issue with the way in which narratives of adjustment, resiliency, and overcoming function in the World Bank’s neoliberal development agenda. I argue that measuring violence against women as a cost to the economy renders racialized women’s able-bodiedness compulsory and disability as a liability to the neoliberal state.

In the fourth section of this chapter, I consider how the ableist nature of DALYs relies on both flexible economic relations (Harvey, 1990) as well as flexible bodies that overcome (McRuer, 2006). The World Bank functions as “the normate” in the way that it is itself as flexible body, and through its disciplining of Third World bodies (Thompson, 1997). The World Bank’s apparent benevolence toward bodies that do not “fit” development schemes, including survivors of violence who cannot work due to disability or impairment, secures the success of neoliberal development schemes, and thus, is not an innocent response to VAW. To this end, I highlight how Third World women survivors of violence are expected to adjust, to be resilient, and be flexible under the pressure of Structural Adjustment Programs and in conditions of precarious employment in the
context of World Bank enforced neoliberal economic restructuring that requires their productive labour.

Arguing that the ways that the Bank attempts to solve the problem of violence against women is as important as the way it calculates its costs, in the fifth section of this chapter I use the examples of micro-credit, micro-enterprise, and export processing zones (EPZs) to examine how employment programs encouraged by World Bank are often disabling environments, and can also intensify women’s experiences of violence. Using the concept of racialized ableism, I outline how Third World women’s “potential productivity” is embedded in racist and ableist notions of cheap and flexible labour. I use the case of the maquiladoras in Mexico and micro-credit programming in order to illustrate the intersections between economic restructuring and VAW to suggest that DALYs cannot account for the complexity of VAW, nor can employment opportunities solve the issue of violence against women. Additionally, this section considers the implications of women’s inflexibility on neoliberal development models, and suggests that the World Bank’s “benevolence” in making the issue of violence against women an urgent concern for the organization should be met with suspicion.

To further reveal the links between “mainstreaming gender” and “mainstreaming disability” in the World Bank’s work on violence, in the last section I investigate how women are made to “fit” into market schemes, including the cosmetic-based “good for business” models championed by the Bank that teach women to be both flexible in their labour and pretty at the same time. Providing a crip reading of the Bank’s most championed approaches to women’s empowerment, I investigate the ways in which racialized ableism is central to economic empowerment models for Third World women.
Using cosmetic-based micro-entrepreneurial engagements as an example, I demonstrate the connections between how racialized bodies are understood as ideal for flexible cheap labour, the implications of racist beauty ideals on work-based empowerment, and the flexibility required of Third World women’s bodies in terms of their labour and productivity.

**Disability: Dialogues in the Field**

Feminist, post-colonial, and queer transnational theorists have recently embarked on stimulating dialogues intersecting with disability studies. At the crux of such conversations is the question of global disability – or the experience and representation of people with disabilities globally— as well as globalized disability. In particular, a special issue of *Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women’s and Gender Studies* (2007) entitled “Intersecting Gender and Disability Perspectives in Rethinking Postcolonial Identities” presented ground-breaking intersections between theories of disability, gender, and post-colonialism in theories of representation, discourse, and experience aimed at “(post)colonising disability.” Arguing for disability studies to think transnationally, the special issue published foundational scholarship on the possible intersections between post-colonial theory and disability, but also warned of the dangers in collapsing the complexities of each field. Specifically, Sherry (2007) warns that the rhetorical, metaphorical and symbolic connections between features of post-colonialism such as exile, diaspora, apartheid, and slavery, used to understand experiences of disability such as deafness, psychiatric illness and blindness are too often made in each discipline (p. 10). As Sherry states: “rather than simply bemoan disability as a symbol of the horrors of imperialism, a far more interesting approach is to unpack the power dynamics which link
the two experiences, both in practice and in rhetoric” (p. 16). While it is true that colonialism and imperialism are intimately connected to experiences of impairment, poverty, and disease, it is not enough to use disability as a symbol of the effects of occupation and control.

In response to this special issue, the *Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies* (2010) published a volume focused on “disabling post-colonialism.” Journal contributors expanded on the analysis of post-colonialism and disability in *Wagadu* to think through ways in which critical disability theories and decolonizing methodologies could intervene in post-colonial studies while also expanding the locational focus of disability studies, which has primarily been in the West.

Central to this conversation is Robert McRuer’s (2006) *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability*, in which he asks: “What do we talk about when we talk about global bodies” (p. 201)? In *Crip Theory* McRuer demonstrates how able-bodiedness, like heterosexuality, is compulsory. That is, it too masquerades as normal and natural. Borrowing from Adrienne Rich’s foundational essay *Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience* (1983), he argues that able-bodiedness is always in process: always being made and remade, and always already failing and being recouped. Using the concept of flexibility, McRuer argues that both heterosexuality and able-bodiedness have no natural origins, but have long histories of being manufactured (p. 8). The masquerade of abled-bodiedness requires flexibility. That is, bodies that are perceived as flexible are those that make it through crises, that are able to manage the crisis, or show they have managing potential. Highly flexible bodies are able to adapt and perform like the crisis never happened. Moreover, a flexible body does not draw too
much attention to the crisis, or the multiplicity of its effects. This would be to perform or act out inflexibility (p. 17). It is McRuer’s notion of flexibility that is central to my research. Significantly, I conceptualize urgency in a similar manner. That is, urgency can be instrumentally manufactured, but must always be remade and sustained.

While he poses an open invitation to crip globalization in *Crip Theory* (2006), McRuer (2010) begins to answer his own question about disability and global bodies. In an article entitled “Disability Nationalism in Crip Times” (2010) McRuer suggests that disability studies has yet to grasp possible interventions into global political and cultural issues. While he asserts that disability is already at work in queer projects, disability studies has much to learn from queer theory trajectories. Expanding on the remarkable work of Jasbir Puar (2007) in *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, McRuer argues that queer studies that recognize neoliberal management of heterosexuality/homosexuality and other queer subjectivities are most noteworthy.

Neoliberalism has always functioned in and through cultural and identity politics. Neoliberalism organizes material and political life by gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and I would argue disability, while obscuring the ways in which these organizing terms intersect (Duggan, 2004, p. 14). Predominantly, neoliberalism is understood in terms of economic policy and trade. Yet, neoliberalism has “cultural politics,” which includes turning global cultures into “market cultures” (Duggan, 2004, p. 12). In particular, personal responsibility and privatization are markers of the cultural politics of neoliberalism. The management of identities is central to neoliberal globalization, and thus understanding the configuration of disability globally is necessary.
Questions about the cultural politics of neoliberalism, including normalcy and flexibility, are poised as a call for further crip scholarship on people with disabilities globally.

Expanding on this trajectory, I ask: Which bodies matter to the World Bank and how do they come to matter? More specifically, how might investigating how the World Bank’s DALYs reveal why violence against women matters to the World Bank?

Gender and the World Bank

By beginning this chapter with an overview of the Bank’s history with gender and development theories and praxis, I situate my analysis of DALYs as an anti-violence tool within a sophisticated body of feminist literature on the World Bank.27 The World Bank has only recently deviated from a purely economic focus by integrating social development issues such as gender, sustainability, violence, conflict and crimes, as well as disability into their work. In addition to external pressure from other development institutions, feminist activists, and academics, Moser et al. (1999) claim that the Bank’s increased attention toward gender is also reflective of its core mandate changes (p. 11). During the 1990s the social cost of SAPs became a public relations minefield for the Bank with many feminists, in particular, pointing to increases in poverty, poor health outcomes and unemployment, especially among women in the adjusted Third World. For example, the “Fifty Years is Enough” campaign established by activists in 1994, and now a transnational network of grassroots organizations and activists, openly and vehemently criticize, the World Bank’s long history of “bankrolling disasters,” meaning its questionable megaprojects and neoliberal globalization schemes which have had devastating social, environmental and economic impacts (Fox and Brown, 1998: 4-5). In

27 See for example Bergeron, 2006; Kuiper and Barker, 2006; Bedford, 2009; Sanders, 2002; Marchand and Parpart, 1995; Moser, Tomqvist, & van Bronkhorst, 1999.
the 1990s, a human development approach took center stage at the World Bank and the question of gender became popularized due to the establishment of the Social Development group within the World Bank. In opposition to its other solely economic sectors, this group focuses on people centered development and poverty alleviation (Moser et al., 1999, p. vii).

According to feminist economists, the World Bank centered a social development agenda in the post-Washington Consensus era with a new gender approach at its core (Bedford, 2009; Kuiper & Barker, 2006). Former President James Wolfenson (1995) is understood to have influenced the reform of the Bank in response to heavy and harsh criticism of SAPs in which the organization played a key role. Known as the “renaissance banker,” Wolfenson was determined to improve the organization’s image under the watchful eye of activist organizations such as Women’s Eyes on the Bank (Bedford, 2009, p. 2; Weaver, 2010). While some World Bank critics have called Wolfenson’s approach to Bank reform “old wine in new bottles,” (Cling, Razafinfrakoto & Roubaud, 2003, p. 111) others have documented the positive impact of Wolfenson’s tenure on the gender agenda (Kuiper & Barker, 2006; Bergeron, 2006; Bedford, 2009; Weaver, 2010). According to Weaver (2010), Wolfenson’s appearance at the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 and the myriad reports and actions plans in preparation for the conference meant that gender inequities were being given more attention than they had ever before by the World Bank (p. 77). Importantly, Wolfenson made a commitment at Beijing to create a policy framework to mainstream gender in the World Bank (Barker and Kuiper, 2006, p. 1). While the Bank had established a sector for Women in Development (WID) almost 20 years earlier, the organization’s first policy report on
women was only published in the year prior to the 1995 UN Conference for Women in Beijing (Jahan, 1995, p. 24-25). Moving from WID to Gender and Development (GAD), and committing to gender mainstreaming in particular, the World Bank’s visibility at the Beijing Conference marked the start of a new development era for the organization.\footnote{The WID framework was established in the first half of the UN Decade for Women and Development, and argued for women’s integration into development. Ester Boserup’s (1970) foundational work \textit{Woman’s Role in Economic Development} marked the inauguration of the WID movement, arguing that women in Africa were bound to subsistence agriculture and informal work, while development had brought opportunities for men in formal employment. In the 1990s especially, feminist academics, policy makers and activists reassessed WID. In opposition to WID, Women and Development (WAD) emerged as Marxist feminist critique of modernization theory, drawing heavily from dependency theory in arguing that development is an inherently unequal capitalist project that has sustained previous colonial exploitative practices (Visvanathan, 1997: 19). When Gender and Development (GAD) emerged in the 1980s, proponents not only charged WID with privatising women’s empowerment, but also claimed that WAD privileged class issues and women’s productive capacity over and above gender relations. Instead, they sought to establish a framework that considered men and women’s gender issues in relation to development (Saunders, 2002, p. 8-9).}

Significantly, the Bank began to seek out the advice of critical outsiders and developed an External Gender Consultative Group.\footnote{Originally, fourteen individuals from national women’s groups, non-governmental organizations as well as academics sat on the External Gender Consultative Group at the World Bank (Weaver, 2010 p. 77). According to the World Bank’s Gender and Development website, there are now only seven individuals who sit on the EGG, many of whom are trained economists and come from the financial sector (World Bank, 2011c).} From a gender “lunch group” in the late 1970s, to the development of a Gender and Development Unit in the newly formed Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) network in 1995, it seemed that the Bank had heard its critics (Weaver, 2010, p. 77-78). The reforms to the organization meant that a gender-focused group was no longer marginalized on the outside of the organization (Bedford, 2009). While GAD Unit’s place in the PREM network gave the unit more authority, the group continues to have limited ability to influence other networks at the Bank, and this change has not translated into more influence over operations to date (Weaver, 2010, p. 78).
Yet, gender issues are central to the World Bank’s current rhetoric, especially with regard to their economic development mandate. As Bedford’s (2009) key work on discourses of “family” and “partnership” in World Bank demonstrates, Wolfenson was a key figure in centering gender terminology and feminist values in the post-Washington Consensus reform of the organization’s agenda. While the Bank’s megaprojects, austerity measures and persistent neoliberal development models were, and remain, highly criticized by development practitioners and activists, many feminists are cautiously supportive of the World Bank’s gender focus (Bergeron, 2006; Kuiper & Barker, 2006).

As feminist scholars point out, poor women’s voices became central to Bank reform rhetoric (Bergeron, 2006; Kuiper & Barker, 2006). They emphasize the way in which Wolfenson, in particular, used “human dramas” to tell tales of how the World Bank was committed to gender equality (Bedford, 2009, p. 7). Using a story of a young girl he met in Mali, Wolfenson (1995) pronounced the Bank’s vision of a “new and better world” including improving the lives of women and girls (Bedford, 2009, p. 1). Bedford notes that the Bank used carefully chosen stories and gender equality discourses to quiet critics. For example, when the Bank was met with backlash in an April 2000 protest against Bretton Woods Institutions, the organization’s gender staff was highly visible in the media response (2009, p. 8). Such feminized responses, often at the expense of actual engagement with feminist critique, are suspect. As I have explored in chapter 1, this use of women’s voices and feminist values marks a “genderwashing” of the institution’s work.

The focus on gender inequities and Third World women’s voices marks a major shift in the World Bank, and should be applauded. The World Bank has listened to its
critics and has incorporated some of the most sophisticated challenges to its development agenda. In particular, it responded to feminist criticisms of its technocratic and economistic approach to development. The Bank now emphasizes human rights, subaltern voices, empowerment, partnership, and bottom-up development. This marks a significant change in the organization’s discourses. Yet, given the broad range of feminist scholarship that is critical of the reform of the World Bank, it is fair to suggest that the extent to which the organization has fully incorporated feminist values in practice remains uncertain (Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Miller and Razavi, 1998).

To be sure, in 2001, the Bank published Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice which marked a decisive shift away from solely economistic approaches to an empowerment agenda. However, Bergeron (2006b) emphasizes a particularly feminist concern with the World Bank’s power in establishing and circulating gender and development discourses in general. She argues that the Bank as “knowledge bank” legitimates particular ways of perceiving reality while excluding others (see also Kapoor, 2006). Offering a critique of the Bank’s reform, Bergeron suggests that Engendering Development takes a multidisciplinary approach to gender and development in that it brings together economic and social development models. Yet, it does so without challenging their fundamental assumptions. As Bergeron (2006b) maintains, the Bank’s integration of cultural and social models must be contextualized within the broader development community’s “fascination with new theoretical innovations” in the field of economics (p. 127). Regarding more recent gender agendas, Eisenstein (2009) goes as far as to criticize the incorporation of feminist values into the work of major institutions such as the World Bank as a blatant co-optation of
“women’s energies into the project of corporate globalization” (p. ix). As I will explore in this chapter, conceptualizing women’ empowerment through narratives of productivity replaces feminist values with women-focused labour engagements to the benefit of profit-seeking corporations and development organization’s focus on cost-efficient investments.

*Labour, Neoliberalism, and Empowerment*

It is important that the World Bank’s incorporation of gender analyses be fully acknowledged. Given the power of the organization to produce knowledge on “best practice” approaches in the development field, their gender work has both expansive reach and influence. While the World Bank continues to promote economic growth as development, the policies emerging from policy-makers of the organization now take into consideration the social effects of interventions and are working more thoughtfully to consider gender equality issues. Although three Bank presidents have succeeded Wolfenson, gender remains on the World Bank’s agenda. Now, more than ever, gender issues are integrated into the principal mandate of the institution. While previous World Bank reforms made gender issues more visible, the World Bank now argues that women are the *key to development*. However, rather than include women as important aspects of their development agenda, the World Bank now recognizes that *women are the linchpins of economic growth*. For the World Bank, women are not full agents in their own lives, but rather can be molded into full agents of development if encouraged by the organization.

Following World Bank President Wolfenson, Robert B. Zoellick continued to be involved in gender agendas. Speaking in regard to the organization’s most recent Gender Action Plan (GAP) entitled *Gender Equality as Smart Economics* (a project which ran
from 2007 to 2010), Zoellick stated: “The empowerment of women is smart economics…studies show that investments in women yield large social and economic returns” (World Bank, 2011, p. n.p.). In an internal interview for the World Bank (2009b) Danny Leipziger, the Vice President for the PREM Network, claimed that in a conference in 2006 the Bank was asked to do a better job at mainstreaming gender. Leipziger claims that mainstreaming gender in all activities is not feasible all at once, so the Bank has chosen to focus on its economic sectors where it sees itself as having a comparative advantage. Unfortunately for women, the “buzz” around gender could quickly be replaced with more “trendy” development agendas (Smyth, 2010).

Gender remains central to the World Bank’s focus, for now. Quoting facts and statistics about women’s likelihood to repay micro-credit loans and reinvest in their families while praising their high productivity rates, Zoellick argued that investing in women was just good economics. The World Bank’s most recent GAP called for the empowerment of women through intensifying and scaling up gender mainstreaming in economic sectors. The organization argues that this new approach will “give gender issues more traction” (World Bank, 2006, p. 1). For the World Bank (2006), women’s empowerment “is about making markets work for women (at the policy level) and empowering women to compete in markets (at the agency level)” (p. 3, emphasis original). The GAP promotes market-based empowerment initiatives with measurable and quantifiable results (World Bank, 2006, p. 15).³⁰

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³⁰ The Bank regards the most recent GAP as an intensification plan for their gender mainstreaming framework that will allow the organization to become a global leader of women’s empowerment (World Bank, 2006, p. 2). The GAP matches funding for projects and research that include gender concerns in the sectors of labour, land and agriculture, private sector development and infrastructure. In the spring of 2009 the World Bank was funding 149 activities in 73 countries (World Bank, 2009b, p. 6). Beyond the concern
The World Bank (2006) claims that the focus on women’s empowerment at work is rational; women’s capacities overshadow current investment opportunities, and thus, not investing in women would be inefficient. According to the World Bank’s *World Development Report: Gender Equality and Development* (2012), the jobs accompanying growth, and thus development, such as the expansion of manufacturing and services activities are the most appropriate venues for investing in women citing evidence that “greater gender equality enhances economic efficiency and improves other development outcomes.” For the World Bank, reducing gender discrimination could increase worker productivity by 25-40 percent depending on the state of the labour sector at hand (p. 237).

Additionally, women’s empowerment has more wide reaching affects. The World Bank asserts: “In an economically integrated world, even modest improvements in the efficiency of use of resources can have significant effects, giving countries with less discrimination and more equality a competitive edge (World Bank, 2011, p. 238). Of course, not just the economy will benefit from gender equality; women themselves stand to gain from the World Bank’s economic plans. The Bank’s newest gender report argues that working women are empowered to make decisions in their households (p. 100).

Tapping into feminist theories of empowerment, the World Bank claims that agency can be understood as women taking advantage of economic opportunities (p.150, 237).

While the economistic focus of women’s empowerment has surged, the Bank continues to promote social development. Most interestingly, gender and development schemes have recently focused on questions of men and masculinity. Kate Bedford (2009) reveals that the Bank has recognized that empowering women in market-based

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of this short-term plan is “human capital” issues such as healthcare and education, as well as social and cultural issue that affect women’s access to markets.
activities requires the adjustment of heterosexual couple-hood. Bedford’s (2009) research demonstrates that because of criticism of the World Bank’s implementation of over one hundred SAPs and lack of attention to gender issues, the World Bank began to reformulate its approach to gender and development. Recognizing that women were experiencing a “double burden” under neoliberal adjustment, the World Bank began to focus on “adjusting” heterosexual couple-hood. Since women workers are considered the key to development, including men in gender interventions have helped women enter and stay in market-based activities.

As discussed above, the critical feminist literature on the World Bank’s gender work is both thorough and sophisticated. In the context of ongoing criticisms of the World Bank’s neoliberal policies and the incorporation of women’s empowerment into its fold, calculating the cost of violence through DALYs can be read as an extension of the reach of the organization into both gender issues and disability. In order to demonstrate the connection between disability and gender in the World Bank’s work, I now turn to The Cost of Violence.

**The Cost of Violence**

According to the World Bank, violence exacts a high cost on global development. In *The Cost of Violence* (2009), the World Bank maintains that countries dealing with conflict, or in post-conflict transitions, are only half the problem. High levels of violent crime, street violence, domestic violence, and other kinds of “common violence” have directly hampered poverty reduction efforts and have barred progress (World Bank, 2009: iii). According to the report, in over 60 countries over the last 10 years, violence has “directly reduced economic growth” (p. iii). While half the 60 countries have
experienced large-scale conflict, the other half of the countries noted are dealing with the effects of “common violence” such as domestic violence. While some “common violence” is causally connected to conflict, the Bank argues that countries with high levels of “common violence” are shown to be unstable over time. Significantly, this argument is reflective of the development and in/security nexus that I explored in chapter 1. The Bank considers the impact of conflict and war, but their focus on violence against women, in particular, is found within a chapter on domestic violence. 31 Considering the physical and psychic impact of violence, the World Bank defines domestic violence as acts that hinder women’s ability to work. The report uses the term domestic violence to describe the most common form of violence experienced by women.

*The Cost of Violence* (2009) begins from the assumption that individual productivity is essential to economic growth, and fully abled bodies are most productive. As a measurement tool, DALYs allow the World Bank to quantify the years of possible productivity lost due to incurred disabilities or injuries at the hands of violent perpetrators. Reflecting on the World Bank’s work on gender historically, the organization is most concerned with the household unit (Bedford, 2009). Since economic models of development habitually begin with the household unit, it is important to note the assumptions behind the measurement of violence. Using DALYs to measure domestic violence relies on the assumption of nuclear and heterosexual family units. Such assumptions ignore female-headed households, non-monogamous and same-sex units, and intergenerational family structures. They also ignore violence experienced by women

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31 In the World Bank’s (2009) *The Cost of Violence*, the Bank cites military spending, destruction of capital, investment, and capital flight, effects of civil wars, and “organized violence” including internal and external conflicts and terrorism as effecting development and growth. VAW is not explicitly attended to in this other section (p. 6-12).
outside of the household unit. Problematically, domestic violence is not linked to other forms of violence against women in the World Bank report, and there is no consideration of the ways in which women globally face different struggles in their experience of violence. While the Bank uses the term domestic violence, I continue to use the term “violence against women” for the purposes of consistency in this dissertation.

According to the World Bank, the number of disability-adjusted life years lost from domestic violence is larger that DALYs lost due to all forms of cancer and twice that lost by women as a result of automobile accidents (World Bank, 2009). Citing individual and macro-level expenses such as medical care, justice costs, as well as time and productivity lost as a result of injury, long-term trauma and suffering, as well as the costs associated with caring for survivors of violence, the Bank maintains that violence is inefficient for developing economies attempting to progress (p. 58, 62). The associations between costs to the economy and violence against women are not a new argument for the Bank. In 2001, the organization recognized that men’s violence against women and sexual aggression leads to negative outcomes for development. The World Bank asserts that men’s patriarchal power effectively decreases women’s productivity, causes absences from the workplace, and leads to an increase in homelessness. Furthermore, violence against women is seen as a cost on government expenditures since survivors of abuse often have an increased need for judicial and police services (World Bank, 2001, p. 77-79). Although unsaid, there is a marked contradiction between survivors’ needs and the priorities of contemporary neoliberal economic policies endorsed by the Bank. That is to say, increasing the need for social services conflicts with neoliberal policy prescriptions that call for drastic cuts in government spending.
Continuing on this policy course, Williams (2009) maintains that violence exacts a cost on individual women, families and communities, as well as the economy. In *The Cost of Violence* (2009), the World Bank claims that the disability-adjusted life years measurement is the most appropriate way to calculate the actual cost of violence on development. The DALY method estimates the burden of disease, accidents, and forms of violence. It is calculated “as the present value of the future years of disability-free life that are lost as a result of illness, injury, or premature death” (p. 81). In other words, each disease, impairment, death, disability or effect of violence is measured based on how many productive years are lost as a result, and is then weighed against age, demographic and work potential. For the organization, the cost-effectiveness of health interventions is difficult, but possible, to measure.

The DALY measurement was developed by the World Health Organization to quantify appropriate resource allocation for health care measures in order to extend and better human lives. The measurement has come under heavy and harsh criticism by health scholars who have called it “unethical.” Since DALYs calculate the cost of disease and disability, the use of the measurement has been criticized for being more interested in lowering the number of disability adjusted life years than controlling global disease. That is, increasing the number of high life quality years, and thus lowering the level of low quality life years, for individuals is perceived by critics to be more important than holistic health initiatives to organizations like the World Bank. Additionally, DALYs are criticized as a “normative judgement” which prioritizes the health of youth while masquerading as neutral (Anand and Hansan, 1997). Since DALYs consider young
people as having more productive years ahead of them than older people, scarce resources target to those at their peak in the market economy.

According to critical disability theorist Erevelles (2006), the World Bank uses DALYs to measure a person’s potential productivity, and thus, their possible contribution to economic growth. Each disease or disability is classified based on how many productive years are lost as a result of and is weighed against age and work potential. According to her work on the DALY measurement, Erevelles claims that the Bank cannot award severely disabled people medical care entitlements because they are considered to be “unproductive.” In fact, the World Bank suggests that people with disabilities are liabilities to the state. Even when public health interventions are considered cost-efficient, the organization relies on neoliberal self-help narratives in their work in disability. In the 1993 World Bank report that first introduced DALYs, the organization argued that governments should not pay for all health interventions that are measured as cost-effective because households would privately purchase cost-effective care when well informed about their choices. Such neoliberal prescriptions rely on perfect information and a competitive marketplace in which individuals are free to choose to invest in health interventions.

While the World Bank does not place a monetary value on human life, buried in economic jargon, statistics, and graphs, the organization measures quality of life, and defines it in economistic terms. To be sure, the Bank now calculates costs associated with violence against women as a quality of life issue. While most measurements of violence only include the economic costs associated with social and medical services, the Bank claims that DALYs are a more complete measurement. The Bank calculates DALYs lost
due to death by taking all cases of death from violence and grouping them by age, sex, and demographic region. By subtracting the age of premature death due to the incident of violence from the life expectancy for the age and demographic group, the Bank is able to measure the cost (World Bank, 2009, p. 81). The calculation of productive time lost due to disability, illness or impairment, caused by violence is more complicated than death. However, the World Bank only pays attention to disability in terms of its costs. The loss of quality of life due to an injury or disability is calculated by taking the average period of impairment (either to recovery or death) and multiplying this by a numerical weight assigned to the severity of the injury in comparison to death. Estimated death loss and disability loss are then combined, with an allowance added to discount the value of years lost as one ages (later years of life are valued progressively less because bodies are less productive when old) and for age weights (different values are assigned to lives lost at different ages since young bodies [peaking at 25] are more productive and thus economically valuable) (World Bank, 2009, p. 81).

According to an expert brief for the United Nations by Tanis Day, Katherine McKenna, and Audra Bowlus (2005), every effect of violence is costly. Effects of VAW are costly on services, but also on lost income and reduced profits. Like the World Bank, the researchers claim that measuring the economic costs of violence help us better understand the issue (p. 14). According to the researchers, economic measurements remove VAW debates from the realm of social issues and “locate it in the realm of concrete fact” (p. 14). It is true that economic measurements are more easily understood than complex social realities. Importantly, such evidence-based measurements can communicate the importance of VAW to economistic organizations and businesses that
may not otherwise pay attention to the issue. The very fact that researchers and policymakers have found a way to attract the attention of the World Bank marks a phenomenal success. Economic facts that make sense to the World Bank are essential to the incorporation of feminist interests into the organization’s work and reveal the ways in which urgency around the issue is manufactured.

In this way, DALYs present a complex puzzle for thinking about violence, and the outcomes of measuring violence. As many feminists have pointed out in a thorough body of work on the organization, the World Bank’s economistic and calculated development interventions are highly technocratic and often mismanaged. In such feminist conversations, DALYs may be considered as an intensified technocratic language of development. Yet, DALYs are more than just an expansion of well-known World Bank neoliberal development schemas. Disability adjusted life years represent the World Bank’s particularly ableist assumptions about the quality of human life. Wrestling with the organization’s mathematical equations and economistic models of disability, development and VAW is a feminist task. It is also a crip task. That is, an analysis of the way in which DALYs are used to quantify the cost of violence must consider the way in which disability is harnessed to the project of empowering women.

**Theorizing Disability and Development at the World Bank**

Disability matters to the World Bank. In an address at the first World Bank disability conference entitled “Disability and Inclusive Development: Sharing, Learning and Building Alliances” in 2004, Wolfenson emphasized the inclusion of people with disabilities into development by reminding that audience that “gender was an issue that was […] given a backward place until [the Bank] discovered that the key to development
was, in fact, women” (Dingo, 2007, p. 93). According to Wolfenson, people with disabilities, like women, are the keys to development. Without their inclusion, progress will be barred. While people with disabilities have not historically been understood as key development players, organizations such as the World Bank are insuring they are “mainstreamed” into development. To be sure, the institution appointed an advisor for disability issues in 2004. Under the presidency of James Wolfenson, disability was brought into the forefront of the Bank’s social development agenda. Such examples demonstrate the World Bank’s foray into “disability and development.” Following the popularization of “gender and development,” I use the term “disability and development” to describe the incorporation or inclusion of disabled subjects and disability issues into the fold of hegemonic development praxis.

In his address, Wolfenson maintained that people with disabilities, like women, should also be “mainstreamed” into the work of the organization, especially in relation to development policies that bring Third World people with disabilities into the mainstream of the economy (Dingo, 2007, p. 95). To overcome their exclusion, people with disabilities would have to be made to “fit” development schemes. For critical disability studies scholars and activists, disabilities are too often characterized as needing to be overcome. Disability studies scholars maintain that overcoming narratives are most often coupled with rehabilitative narratives that rely on stories of personal tragedies overcome by heroism (Clare, 1999, p. 8) or technical intervention (McRuer, 2006). For scholars Tanya Titchkosky and Rod Michalko (2009), disabilities are popularly regarded as “stemming from function limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability” (p. 1). It is assumed that disabilities occur due to a terrible misfortune,
and at random. It is the way in which disability is hegemonically problematized as individual and requiring sympathy that is the crux of disability studies. Scholars and activists working within the social model of disability do not deny the problem of disability, but rather locate the problem “squarely within society” (Oliver, 1996, p. 32). For activists and critical theorists, institutional barriers that impose restrictions on non-normatively abled bodies cause disabilities. Disability theorist Rosemarie Garland Thompson (1997) writes: “The ways that bodies interact with the social engineered environment and conform to social expectation determine the varying degrees of disability or able-bodiedness” (p. 7). While physical impairments are physiological facts, it is the way in which assumptions about how one must interact with the world, and the socio-political meanings about such interactions, that are culturally understood as a disability (Thompson, 1997, p. 7).

The Normate

At the foundation of disability theory is a challenge to “normalcy.” Normalcy matters to the study of disability because so-called normal able-bodiedness is too often understood as the only legitimate way of being in the world and the only version of “the good life.” According to Thompson (1997) disability functions as the self-evident conceptual opposite of able bodiedness. In this way, legal, medical, political and cultural narratives produce disability as the opposite of normal (p. 6). Intersecting with gender, race, class and sexuality, disability is rendered the opposite of the normate in complex ways. Arguing that the disabilities on the margins constitute the center, Thompson claims that the normate are those who, by bodily and cultural capital (including gender, race, class and sexual supremacy), enter a position of authority and wield their power.
While little critical disability studies scholarship has focused on development discourse, Dingo (2007) maintains that the World Bank, among other large financial institutions, occupy the space and power of the normate. Conceptualizing global institutions and systems as bodies is not new. In fact, biological metaphors of the economy were highly popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Economist Adam Smith regarded the economy as a “social body” while Jean-Jacques Rousseau compared the economy to a living entity with different organs and functions (Bergeron, 2006, p. 8). Feminist economist Bergeron (2006) asserts that the economy was presented as a feminine unruly subject that must be controlled and disciplined, but later gave way to more mechanical metaphors of a masculinist machine-like system. Yet, biological metaphors continue to circulate. While neoliberal economics is often represented as self-regulating and rational machine, understanding how global bodies or institutions masquerade as normal, natural and neutral within this self-regulating machine is an important research trajectory for disability studies and other feminist projects. As Lisa Duggan (2004) points out, neoliberalism and its institutions function within and through gender, race, sexuality, nationality, and I argue disability, even as they act as an abstraction (p. xvi). That is, while the Bank may claim that its development interventions rely on objective information and policy-making, its neoliberal prescriptions and power on the international level are not normal or natural, but manufactured.

If we consider global bodies in disability studies, we can consider the World Bank to be the normate in that “the Bank, with its leadership and location in the United States, demonstrates its cultural and economic capital and … its body politic is well endowed with resources enabling its programs” (p. 98). While Dingo tends to problematically
collapse the complexities between disability and the Third World, as well as able-bodiedness and development, by using each as a metaphor for the other, I too understand the World Bank as the normate. The World Bank might be thought of as a global normate figure that functions as a significant representation of development’s impressive accumulation of power. Located in the United States, with all of its former presidents being white male American citizens, billions of dollars of annual funding, in-country offices across the globe, and its focus on economic productivity for development and growth, the World Bank functions as a normate figure. Wielding cultural and capital power attributed to the white-led, masculinist, heterosexist and ableist organization, the Bank’s position of the normate is equally buttressed by the racialized, impoverished Third World individuals it purports to help. The World Bank sets the standard of normalized and naturalized flexibility, requiring able-bodiedness of Third World women, but also in terms of neoliberal economic relations. The organization functions to normalize and naturalize neoliberal flexibility in terms of its own development agenda, including the promotion of obligatory trade policies, investment opportunities, and cutbacks in state spending. Thus, the Bank wields cultural and capital power in not only its banking arrangements with less powerful clients, but is a normalizing figure in the development industry. As a “knowledge bank” it is a cultural figure whose boundaries are shored up by the bodies marked as other (Kapoor, 2006, p. 28). That is, as the center of development policy, the World Bank marks itself as the self through marking Third World bodies as impoverished, backward, and needing help. Contextualized by a tenacious history of colonial representations of the other (McClintock, 1995), and more recent charity models in development discourse (Heron, 2007), the Bank functions as the
self or center, constitutively bordering the margins. As the normate, the Bank not only positions its institutional power and economic philosophies as normal, but also actively produces and maintains normalizing narratives of development praxis. At the macro and micro level, flexibility—overcoming, adjustment, and resiliency—are normalized, encouraged, and sometimes even required by the World Bank.

*Flexibility and Benevolence*

Crip theory provides a complex and nuanced theoretical lens with which to understand the World Bank as a normate body. In the context of development and its most hegemonic discourses, the World Bank emerges as a highly flexible body, or normate figure, which is benevolent and tolerant of those who need help “adjusting” and coping under the pressure of poverty. According to McRuer’s (2006) *Crip Theory*, flexibility is double-edged in its nature. He argues that a flexible body, such as a heteronormative able-bodied individual, has observed and learned from the lessons of the North American-based liberation movement, where McRuer situates his research. A heteronormative able body thrown into a crisis of opposition must perform as though a destabilization has not occurred, and instead demonstrate a “dutiful (and flexible) tolerance toward the minority groups constituted through these movements” (p. 18). The valuation of flexibility occurs within a climate of tolerance, where there is profit in flexibly complying and accommodating “diversity” (p. 18). Of course, the manufacturing of benevolence in development praxis is not new, yet continually needs to be revealed as it produced and maintains itself. As development theorist Barbara Heron (2007) demonstrates in *The Desire for Development*, the spatial representation of the globalized world is a “colonial continuity” (p. 38). That is, the discursive and material construction
of the “Third World,” “Global South,” or “developing world,” relies on a “fascination with racialized difference that [has] marked white engagement since the age of empire” (p. 34). This spatial imagining combined with the hierarchization of racial difference has produced a self-affirming obligation or “planetary consciousness” within the development industry to help (Heron, 2007, p. 38). Of course, former colonizing missions were also ripe with projects of self-construction, as McClintock (1995) among others have illustrated in their work.

In the context of development, the World Bank situates itself as benevolent transnational power with a “comparative advantage” in helping. Even as it self-constructs an identity as a global justice and humanitarian leader, its flexibility (read benevolence) must be managed against the backdrop of mounting critiques of its work. As McRuer (2006) notes that normate bodies learn from oppositional movement, so too has the World Bank learned from oppositional discourse, namely environmental and gender equity critiques (Weaver, 2010; Bedford 2009). In fact, the organization explicitly defines its tolerance in profitable terms, arguing most recently that women are “good for business” (World Bank, 2011, p. 238). In this way, the Bank’s flexibility occurs as an “epiphany” on the bodies that must flexibly comply (McRuer, 2006, p. 18).

The concept of overcoming, understood as flexibility, resiliency, and adjustment, is important to the study of the World Bank in that it underscores the importance of thinking through the way in which development, and the institutions who govern the field, function in and through conceptualization of disability and ability. Crippling development not only reveals the way in which normalizing narratives of ability are
central to the World Bank’s work, but also the way in which the concept of overcoming has a much broader impact on development itself.

**Overcoming Underdevelopment**

Like popular disability discourses, development is also popularly conceptualized as a project of “overcoming.” It is critical development, post-development studies and decolonizing methods that have revealed the way in which development discourses rely on an ideal of normalcy. In this case, the ideal is set by the “developed,” “Global North” or “First” world and the “developing,” “Global South” or “Third” world must “overcome” “be flexible” and “adjust” to “catch up.”

For many development theorists and practitioners, the development project began with US President Truman’s inaugural 1949 address in which he argued that Third World poverty would need to be addressed for the sake of global security, to fight communism, and offer the rest of the world a “fair deal” (Saunders, 2002, p. 1, Escobar, 1995, p. 3).

For other scholars, development has a much longer history. To truncate the colonial lineage of development is to disavow its long ideological history. The term “development” itself emerged in the English language in the 18th century alongside ideas of human evolution and progress, and then broke away from biological (and heavily racialized) notions of growth into “teleological views of history, science and progress in the West” (Watts, 1995, p. 47). The idea of development in the way it is popularly known in the field is a specifically Western concept since many non-Western languages have no equivalent term. For some critical development scholars, development is not only a Western idea, but it is also a concept that emerged as a mythical discourse about the superiority, or “normalcy,” of Western society and reflects how the West imagines itself
through spatialized and racialized hierarchal difference. In practice, the idea of countries being able to progress or “overcome” is used to justify interventions abroad, although the ability of countries to catch-up, mimic or join the “developed world” is highly debated (Ferguson, 2005).

As a popular keyword in foreign policy, the term “development” (re)emerged at a time when many countries of the Third World were formally decolonizing. Following World War II, the US was at the height of its power, and used its influence to promote progress through modernization practices. While various development theories have risen and fallen in popularity since the 1950s, it is important to note that hegemonic development models continue to rely on narratives of linear progress. Such linear development models were built on the assumption of Western cultural and economic superiority, and the necessity for Western intervention in order to teach Others how to overcome their poverty. As post-development theorists such as Arturo Escobar (1995) argue, the “problem” of Third World poverty was “discovered” through the “developmentalization” or “clientalization” through techno-representation, such as statistics, of the discursive and materially constructed Third World.

The problem of underdevelopment is often understood without historicization, politicization, and structural context by development “experts.” Similar to popular advocacy related to disability, there is a large “helping” industry in the field of development (Heron, 2007). Without collapsing the complexities between disability and development it is interesting to note the similarity between the way in which disability and underdevelopment are both characterized as stemming from unfortunate events and the responsibility of those affected to overcome, at times with help from those who are
better off. Heron (2007) terms this sentiment “the helping imperative.” As a former
development worker, Heron argues that the development enterprise is fuelled by the
conception that white, bourgeois Western people are enabled with knowledge that Others
are not. Such entitlements are coupled with an obligation to help those less fortunate
(Heron, 2007). Under neoliberalism, self-help is also imperative to both charity models of
disability and development. In particular, underdevelopment is to be overcome through
individualized responses rather than collective responses to global economic power
systems, historical, and present-day colonialisms and apartheids as well as new imperial
projects. When overcoming underdevelopment is conceptualized as requiring self-help,
women’s empowerment is understood as requiring individual liberation.

Empowerment and Flexible Labour

In order to provide a thorough crip reading of the World Bank’s *The Cost of
Violence* (2009), I consider the impact of DALYs on the definition of violence against
women, and the power of the discursive circulation of disability narratives in the field of
development. Equally important is my investigation into the ways in which DALYs are
used by the World Bank to emphasize market-based solutions to violence against women.
As a manifestation of gender inequality, violence against women is conceptualized as an
of Violence*, women are vulnerable to gendered violence because they lack economic
autonomy. When working, women are not only empowered but are also helping to shore
up national growth, and thus are supporting development. When disabled due to violence,
women are not empowered, and are not living up to their productive potential. Given that
DALYs help the Bank argue that violence against women is a cost on women’s
productivity at work, the organization’s reliance on economic empowerment requires critical analysis.

Bergeron (2006) maintains that the emphasis placed on women overcoming “traditional” roles and moving into the market economy is not new. In fact, throughout development discourse in the 1980s, development was imagined to take place in the public, rather than private, sphere of the household. Often the household, and women’s role in it, was presented as the counterpart to the modern, and also treated as an obstacle to modernization. According to Bergeron (2006):

The traditional sector was seen to be the cause of economic backwardness, something to be transformed through the development process… The Third World women were often portrayed as the most backward in her society, ‘ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic family oriented’ (Mohanty, 1991, p. 56), who could only be empowered by integration into the capitalist labour market (p. 22).

In many ways, the World Bank’s use of DALYs to measure violence against women pits the traditional against the modern. That is, by conceptualizing a lack of power within the “traditional” sphere of the domestic, and empowerment in the “modern” public sphere, I suggest that the World Bank positions women’s emancipation within this historical debate. Conceptualizing disabled and injured women as lacking the ability to work, the World Bank argues that the inability to become properly employed would block their ability to become empowered. While the organization uses DALYs to measure the cost of violence on the economy in terms of services provision for disability and injured women, it is also very clear that women must move from the domestic into the productive sphere for development, and empowerment, to occur.
The rejection of the traditional for the modern is a well-know idea in the development field. However, as both Bergeron (2006) and Bedford (2009) assert, the domestic is not completely rejected by growth-focused economists. Rather, the heterosexual and nuclear family is often used as a symbol of a national and transnational family of cohesion, shared values and goals as they relate to development. Bedford (2009) argues that in this family, the World Bank is surely the patriarch (p. 9-10). Power relations and conflict are often marginalized in this metaphor of the family (Bergeron, 2006, p. 23). At the World Bank, former President Wolfenson often spoke of ideological dissent as “gossip” that would break apart the World Bank family (Bedford, 2009, p. 10). Similarly, in development discourse, culture is used to point to dissent within the global family. It is “black sheep” national cultures that stagnate development, and not global power relations that create and sustain inequalities. For the sake of the family, the World Bank, as the patriarch, is set on a trajectory that is “good” for the whole unit.

Women’s bodies are particularly important to this imagined transnational family development. Historically, post-colonial nationalisms used women’s bodies as bearers of tradition associated with the historical and mythical nation before colonization. In resisting Western powers, Third World national elites encouraged the return to so-called traditional women’s roles. Chatterjee (1993) states that the focus of post-colonial nationalism on women’s traditional roles was simultaneously pursued alongside modernization and development. For post-colonial governments, state-led development was seen as a way of gaining support in newly sovereign countries while the return to “tradition” marked their resistance to imperial powers. In development discourse, the struggle between modernization and tradition continues to be debated on women’s bodies
(Bergeron, 2006, p. 19). Women are viewed as the bearers of both progress and tradition. In order to overcome tradition, viewed as stagnating development, development industry has emphasized women’s empowerment in the economic sphere. While feminists have criticized the development industry’s emphasis on economic empowerment initiatives for women, the World Bank’s gender and development praxis continues to endorse market-based empowerment initiatives. Left out of such gender and development policy schemes are questions about what type of labour opportunities are most available to Third World women in a flexible economy and how the World Bank continues to seek out cheap labour as an empowerment initiative for women even as it negatively affects their lives.

**Flexible Labour in the Global Economy**

David Harvey (1990) claims that following Fordism and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, global economic relations have entered an era termed a “‘flexible’ regime of accumulation” (p. 124). This era is marked by “flexible” labour: temporary, contract, mobile, and replaceable. Other scholars have dubbed this change a “new international division of labour” market by the cheap labour available in the former colonies, now Third World countries (Eisenstein, 2009, p. 25). According to feminists, the “flexible regime of accumulation” is highly gendered and racialized. As Bergeron (2006) notes, multinational corporations taking advantage of opportunities within economies entering the global marketplace established factories and other workplaces in the Third World ultimately preferring female workers (Desai, 2002, p. 16). The pressure to reorient national economies to manufacture for export and to house outsourced services has feminized the global labour force by increasing women’s exploitation as employees of choice in manufacturing sectors, and in low-paid service and informal
economies. In neoliberal terms, providing a “comparative advantage” in cheap labour provides employment and encourages economic growth. Revealing the pillars of global white supremacy that includes the provision of cheap labour by racialized bodies (Smith, 2010), the feminization of labour has relied on stereotypes of nimble-fingered, inherently docile and hard working Third World women to justify their suitability for repetitive and monotonous work (Bergeron, 2006, p. 130; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Eisenstein, 2009, p. 26; Erevelles, 2006, p. 27). Thus, the flexibilization of employment is both racialized and ablest, relying on conceptions of normal bodies in regard to productivity while also securing cheap labour on the bodies of racialized women. Moreover, the “feminization of employment” increased the number of racialized women within the global workforce and changed the conditions of work; namely the further flexibilization of labour. The valuation of flexibility has increased the availability of temporary, part-time, contract, mobile, replaceable, and home-based work. My analysis demonstrates that the feminization and flexibilization of labour requires able-bodiedness in disabling environments.

*Export Processing Zones*

The growth of export processing zones (EPZs) and the increase in service work for women in the Third World demonstrates the flexibilization and feminization of the workforce. According to Eisenstein (2009), EPZs grew in numbers from 79 in 25 countries in 1975 to more than 3,000 in 116 nations in 2002. In 2002, employment in these zones was estimated to be approximately 42 million. In many cases the increase in EPZs have come under World Bank and IMF sponsored austerity conditions such as structural adjustment programmes which force Third World economies to access foreign
direct investment with few protection measures. EPZs, which are characterized by their lack of trade barriers and unregulated working conditions, rely on a young, cheap, fairly uneducated labour force that is vulnerable to exploitation. In search of cheap labour, multinational corporations have obtained extensive profits from investing in EPZs.

Problematically, EPZs are known for the suppression of labour organizing and unsafe working conditions. Eisenstein (2009) suggests that there is a high turnover in such jobs because of disabilities caused by unsafe work and the preference for young, childless women. Under the corporeal pressures of monotonous and repetitive work along the global assembly line, the average worker lasts just five years in a garment factory before injuries force her to retire. Research into garment factories in South-East Asia and Latin America have documented muscular-skeletal disorders, eyesight injuries, stress and fatigue, skin complaints, and reproductive hazards. In electronic factories in India, workers have reported digestive diseases, hair loss, back pain and stress among other bodily injuries (Meekosha, 2011, p. 676). In 2013, a garment factory collapsed in Bangladesh, killing at least 1,127 and injuring hundreds of others. In the garment sector in Bangladesh, which employs mostly women, workers are all high risk of injury or death due to unsafe working conditions (Uddin, 2013).

Organizations working “on the ground” in Bangladesh organize against both violence in their communities and against their communities. According to the Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity (2013), in addition to injury and disability,

32 While women surely have been exploited by labour conditions in EPZs, they have also been active resisters. As both Aihwa Ong (1987) and Fernandez-Kelly (1983) discuss, Third World women engage in work stoppages, resist long hours without breaks, and use religious or cultural celebrations to refuse work and to organize workers in EPZs. Moreover, transnational networks of solidarity have emerged to pose a strong resistance to neoliberal policies and SAPs that have shaped labour conditions of EPZs (Desai, 2002, p. 18).
women are also at risk of physical and verbal abuse perpetrated by their employers. They actively connect the economic violence of global restructuring to violence against women, which the World Bank ignores by focusing on economic empowerment for women in these zones. Export-processing zones are complicated sites of economic empowerment for women. While they may provide women with income, and according to the World Bank more economic autonomy within the household, the World Bank’s models cannot account for violence associated with this site of labour. As the World Bank’s use of DALYs suggests, violence against women is a cost to economic growth. Yet, violent practices both within the actual workplace and in communities where there has been concentrated economic restructuring are ignored by the organization. In fact, the use of DALYs to manufacture urgency around the issue of violence against women means that possibilities for organizing against economic violence, as a manifestation of violence against women, is foreclosed.

One of the most well known EPZ is the Maquiladoras in Cuidad Juarez which, as both activists and scholars point out, has an extreme culture of femicide. In the context of thinking about anti-violence initiatives in development, exploring such a site of a global manufacturing system is essential. As the World Bank considers work as a place of empowerment for women, and as site that will ultimately make them less vulnerable to violence, one must consider the violence women experience at work. Where the DALY measurement places VAW as a practice experienced at home, and can be overcome through work, it is clear that violence against women is not confined to the private or “traditional” realm. As Staudt (2008) suggests, there are many lenses with which to analyse the violence in Cuidad Juarez. Located on the US/Mexico border, the
Maquiladoras are often analysed by international scholars as a site of global neoliberal reordering. Since the Mexican government’s Programa Industrial Fronterizo or Border Industrialization Program was established to facilitate foreign direct investment and global free-trade regimes to be globally competitive, and to develop, the city has become home to hundreds of factories employing more that 200,000 workers, over half of them women. Staudt (2008) argues that structural violence is experienced at the hands of “a global economy that has shrunk the real value of earnings in the export-processing economic development model that dominated in Juarez” (p. 7-8). On top of inadequate shelter, food, and wages, the fact that over 370 women have been murdered since 1993 has inflicted terror on the population (Staudt, 2008, p. x). While families of those missing, raped, and/or murdered in Juarez have rallied for justice, there has been little response nationally and internationally by governments, global institutions, and the development community. Theories of serial killers and drug cartels, are popular explanation among some scholars, and yet, violence within the home has simultaneously become commonplace suggesting a broader and more systemic cause of violence within the community where gender conflicts have been sparked by changing patterns of labour for meagre wages and are related to the securitization of the US/Mexico border (Staudt, 2008, p. 143). While Staudt is clear to separate domestic violence from what is understood as femicide, it may be more useful to conceive of both “types” of violent practices as interconnected.

Since DALYs calculate the burden of impairment and disease on women’s productivity, femicide in Ciudad Juarez may be partially understood through this measurement. Interpersonal violence has risen in areas where women are actively
employed in EPZs, DALYs would be able to quantify the productive years lost due to violence against women. However, I maintain that DALYs are not holistic enough to account for the violence of economic restructuring, displacement and disappearance of women, and insecurity at the border of US and Mexico where EPZs are built. Since DALYs define women’s empowerment at work, the calculation cannot account for the insidious acts of violence that occur in Ciudad Juarez.

Micro-Credit

Aside from employment in EPZ’s, the most flexible labour (read temporary, mobile, and replaceable), and the most available to Third World women, is micro-credit. Habitually considered the “cure-all” for under development (Isserles, 2003, p. 38) and women’s inequality, micro-credit has become a sort of “motherhood” development initiative (Parpart, 2002, p. 52). That is, micro-credit provides both participatory and empowering opportunities, two of the many new buzzwords of the gender and development lexicon (Smyth, 2010). Feminists and gender experts who promote micro-credit programming argue that providing small loans to groups, especially women, for generating micro-enterprises is a highly effective way to reach poor, marginalized women, to distribute messages of healthcare and education, and support widows and wives of abusive husbands (Prugal, 1999, p. 85). Proponents also argued that micro-credit programs increased women’s self-confidence and gave them more of a voice in decision making within the household. Giving poor young women credit could be a source of empowerment. According to Prugal (1999), initial micro-credit programming was laced with gendered instruction rules for women as housewives and mothers. Using rhetoric around motherhood and womanhood, micro-credit proponents argued that women were
more likely to repay loans and use money responsibly to support their families compared to men. According to Prugal (1999), motherhood was transformed from being understood as economically inactive to “breadwinning.” Women are understood as being caring in their use of household money. They are often cited as more likely than men to buy food, clothing, and other necessities for their children. The combination of motherhood and income earning, home and work, arose as necessary and desirable. Home-based work emerged as a way for women to help develop the nation while also not disturbing women’s domestic and reproductive duties (p. 75).

For Isserles (2003), micro-credit became popular at the height of neoliberal development models. Moreover, micro-credit emerged within the development industry as a women’s equality initiative that was compatible with neoliberal austerity measures. Founded upon ideologies of individual responsibilization, micro credit appeared to be a perfectly suited “pull up your boot straps” approach to overcoming underdevelopment. As ideas of efficiency, privatization, and self-initiative combined with scepticism of state-led development initiatives directed mainstream development thinking, micro-credit emerged as a successful market-based, entrepreneurial initiative. Additionally, the effects of SAPs such as privatization, devaluing currency, and the opening of markets to foreign direct investment limited employment opportunities within the formal sector and enlarged the informal sector (Isserles, 2003, p. 41). Critics of micro-credit programming have thoroughly illustrated the ways in which informal economic opportunities marked as “Band-Aid” approach to global economic power structures, often obscuring the ways in which global capital and power operate. Since individuals are accountable for making
their own labour opportunities, there is a sense that individuals are at fault for their impoverishment, and that they must be responsible for overcoming their own poverty.

Moreover, as women’s empowerment initiatives, micro-credit and small entrepreneurial engagements are often misplaced. As Rahman’s (1999) research suggests, women are often pressured to join loan groups by their husbands and other male family members. While women may gain credit, and income, through such programming, it remains unclear the extent to which resources are allocated equally within the home and how much decision-making power women gain. Since the World Bank’s measurement of the costs associated with VAW depend on the idea that work will empower women, and make them less vulnerable to violence through economic autonomy, the distribution of resources must be thoroughly considered. DALYs cannot account for violence associated with work-based empowerment measures since it relies on women’s productivity as the solution to violence, and the key to economic growth for development.

Not only do micro-credit initiatives assume the existence of heteronormative and nuclear households, but are based on, and rely upon, asymmetrical power relations such as peer discipline and gender binaries to control the repayment of loans. For example, while men are cast as “too difficult to work with,” women are portrayed as submissive and compliant. Moreover, the most marginalized women are understood by donors, and credit lenders, to be less reliable than those owning property or who have other family earning, especially those of an employed husband (Rahman, 1999). Aside from discursive and structural violence within micro-credit programming, violent practices within the home have also been reported by women accessing micro-credit where gender relations are disrupted by both labour and micro-credit programming obligations, such as time
spent at community meetings and high debt loads incurred by women who cannot repay (Rahman, 1999, p. 73, 76).

Since the World Bank’s DALYs measurement recognizes labour and productivity as the goal and positive outcome of anti-violence and empowerment initiatives, violence is considered an obstacle to economic growth. When gender relations are reorganized by women’s work, and violence against women increases, the World Bank has found innovative ways to protect their interests. Publishing research reports on men, and including men in gender project requirements “on the ground,” the Bank has emphasized the transformation of “bad” men into properly heterosexual, loving husbands and fathers, and equal domestic partners (Bedford, 2009). As I argue elsewhere, such policy and programming efforts rely on racialized narratives of Third World men as needing to be transformed from “dangerous” to “dad” and ignore non-normative family structures in the process (Mason, 2012). Instead of considering the ways in which micro-credit and small entrepreneurial programs fail women, the World Bank has attempted to make micro-reforms in interpersonal relations by centering men in their work as “partners” (Bedford, 2009).

In addition to the potential for increased incidence of interpersonal violence, workers in the informal economy face disabling environments caused by lack of protection from unemployment, the lack of health benefits, and wages below poverty level (Desai, 2002, p. 17). Since much of the labour occurs within the home, there are no regulations on women’s work conditions, including how many hours a day women work and how much time they are given for breaks. Such labour conditions reveal the way in which disabling working environments are ignored by gender policies (Desai, 2002, p.
When defined as interpersonal violence against individuals, the World Bank wilfully ignores the manifestations of violence against women in its varied forms.

As EPZs and micro-credit initiatives target women as employees, it is important to consider the profit seeking behaviours of multinational corporations who benefit from neoliberal development models. Since World Bank promoted austerity measures open underdeveloped economies to the competitive global economy, women’s labour is highly intertwined in the trajectories of transnational capital and neoliberal development. Third World women’s work must be understood as a complex space for empowerment. While individual women may find autonomy and power in their work and having personal income, the way in which racialized bodies are sought out as cheap and highly flexible remains suspect. As Turshen states, “violence against women is never seen as a consequence of neoliberalism” (Turshen, personal communication, 2012). When violence against women is conceptualized as interpersonal violence that inhibits women’s productivity at work, institutional, state, and economic violence are made invisible in the process.

Women’s Time: Adjustment and Labour

As feminist development experts Moser et al. (1999) maintain, the 1970s assumption that women needed to be brought into development relied on an “elastic” conceptualization of women’s time where women’s labour was understood as highly flexible (Moser et al., 1999, p. 7). SAPs and other austerity measures have negatively impacted women’s familial and work lives by relying on women’s adjusted time and many women successfully, if not painstakingly, have “adjusted.” SAPs intensify the trade-off between women’s producer and non-producer roles. In fact, Desai (2002) argues
that women are doing more non-producer work than before the rollout of SAPs. Due to neoliberal restructuring all over the world, including the West, women have become responsible for more care work on top of their precariously flexible employment. Women’s health deteriorates under austerity measures such as SAPs because of stress, reduced food consumption, and experiences of violence that often couples the re-balancing of gender roles within the home. Due to poor nutrition and vitamin deficiency, work-related accidents and environmental pollution, SAPs adversely affect mothers and their children—most especially by the feminization of the workforce and the privatization of healthcare in adjusted economies. Women are often subjected to poor working conditions that are potentially disabling, and without government-funded healthcare, women and their children must either pay for the high cost of private services or go unseen by medical professionals (Erevelles, 2006, p. 28). Thus, austerity measures are, by themselves, violent. However, in development discourse, violence against women is rarely conceptualized in this way.

While the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action emerging from the United Nations Conference on Women in 1995 asserted the importance of counting women’s reproductive labour as work, it is clear that international financial institutions continue to conceptualize women as non-workers. When the World Bank considers non-productive labour, it is men’s relationship to care work that is considered in need of transformation, rather than the economic empowerment models that require women to work in the “productive” sphere (Bedford, 2009, Mason, 2012).

Given how well many women perform flexibility, by adjusting to the “double” and “triple” burden of productive, reproductive, and community work (including health
care) under neoliberal austerity measures which have decreased if not eradicated the social safety net, it is no wonder that the Bank views women as the key to economic growth. That is, women are proving to be flexible. Of course, part of this flexibility of women is coupled with resistance tactics to neoliberal models of development.

Organizations such as Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) have been instrumental in unionizing informal workers, implementing work co-operatives, and providing support networks for women in India (Desai, 2002, p. 19; Mohanty 2003, p. 165). While excluded from the World Bank’s conception of empowerment, such collective organizing has been instrumental to challenging the economic vulnerability of self-employed women in India. Importantly, the ways in which SEWA collectively mobilizes against social, economic, and political disenfranchisement and exploitation is foreclosed as a possibility for transformative change, or a space for anti-violence organizing, by the World Bank. By challenging the flexibility of informal work relations,’ its resistances can be understood as inflexible. To recapitulate McRuer’s (2006) argument, flexibility is defined by a body that can survive moments of crisis either by managing the crisis, or showing that they have managing potential without ever making visible the specificities or realities of the crisis. To draw too much attention to the crisis would be to perform or act out inflexibility (p. 17). To resist neoliberal austerity, creating awareness and resisting flexible employment and the elastic conception of women’s time is to act out inflexibility, or to make visible the crisis of development.

According to the DALY measurement used by the World Bank, women who are impaired or disabled by various forms of violent practices or unfit work environments are also inflexible bodies. When women are not able to work, they are pathologized and
considered unable to “fit” into current market schemas and empowerment models, and thus needing to overcome. In The Cost of Violence, the World Bank (2009) asserts that leading a productive life is most valuable. In response to questions of violence against women, the Bank maintains that lost disability-adjusted life years are not only a cost on the economy but are a cost on women’s productivity. When women are unable to work, or work at their most productive potential, due to disability, impairments or illnesses caused by violence, the Bank suggests that their lives are of lesser quality. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that when experiencing violence one may be undergoing a lower quality of life. Problematically, all individuals disabled or otherwise impaired and unable to live up to their productive potential, as outlined by the Bank, are positioned within this category of low life quality.

In the World Bank’s conceptualization of disability, bodies that are not able to overcome their disability or impairment are considered to be inflexible. The Bank’s representation of normal corporeal functioning is about being flexible - being resilient, adjusting, and overcoming impairments, disability, and disease to move closer to the ideal set by the normate figure. Disability theorists argue that social, economic and political conditions constitute “disablement” as a deviation for the normal or ideal body (Clare, 1999). According to neoliberalism, to be disabled is to be a body that is, and cannot be, properly productive in the capitalist labour economy is not able to adjust and is not flexible. Disability theorists have powerfully demonstrated how the term “productivity” is not transhistorical, or neutral, language. Productivity is “very much dependant on a historical context, where the present demands of (global) capital on the ease in which multinational companies can extract maximum profits from its workers and
nation-states can extract low-wage and unpaid labour from its citizens” (Erevelles, 2006, p. 30). Productivity is also a highly racialized concept in this context. Third World subjects are understood to be “cheap” labour in the global economy. Understanding how the feminization of the global workforce can be attributed to (often Western) racist and patriarchal constructions of Third World women as “nimble-fingered” and docile which has culminated in the degradation and flexibilization of women’s employment through economic restructuring is essential to feminist challenges of the Bank’s promotion of economic empowerment models for women.

In the post-Washington Consensus era, optimally flexible bodies are those able to move forward from the crisis of SAPs and other failed development schemas. According to the World Bank’s newest gender report (2011b), women are exceeding expectations in labour and productivity, a key to economic development. The World Bank claims that women have successfully adjusted, making up the majority of manufacturing, retail and tourism, and communications services, but women earn less than men even though they work more (p. 18). Due to time spent on household labour and lack of regulations in the workplace that leave opportunities for gender discrimination, the gap between men and women’s earning and productivity is high (p. 20). The Bank also attributes income and productivity gaps between men and women to women’s lack of agency within the home. Arguing that domestic violence silences women, and disallows decision making on household spending, the organization argues that women must be given the chance to enter the economic sector to obtain greater power at home (p. 21). The Bank argues that the gender gap in productivity, earning, and thus agency, could be lessened if businesses realized the potential in investing in women.
Being Flexible and Pretty: “Women are Good for Business”

As I have already explored in this chapter, the World Bank promotes anti-violence interventions through economic opportunities for women. The organization argues that women would gain income and subsequently power within their households to make decisions, and would then be less vulnerable to violence by their male partners. When unable to work because of impairment, diseases, and disabilities due to violent practices, women are unproductive and inefficient for development, according to the DALY measurement. As the key to good business, economic growth, and national development strategies, violence against women must be solved in the Third World. In the 2012 World Development Report on gender, the World Bank makes “the business case for gender equality” (p. 238). Providing a case study of Belcorp operating in Peru and Hindustan Unilever in India, the World Bank attempts to demonstrate “how using innovative business models to invest in the female workforce can be good for business and bring “tangible change women women’s lives” (p. 238). Using a scheme popularized by the US cosmetic company Avon, Belcorp (also a cosmetic company) pays women to sell their product informally to their personal and professional networks. According to the World Bank, women are integral to the success of Belcorp since they make up over 80 percent of its workforce as sellers of their products. The company gives each of its 650,000 beauty consultants the opportunity to become entrepreneurs and other group activities to empower them. World Bank (2011b) asserts that Belcorp realized early on that “promoting women’s empowerment was a sound business strategy” (p. 238). Communicating how women are the key to “good economics” depends on understanding women’s empowerment as located in the public sphere.
According to the World Bank, Hindustan Unilever has increased its business by discovering a “comparative advantage” in employing women. According to the *World Development Report 2012*, the World Bank suggests that the liberalization of India’s economy and the opening up of markets to foreign multinational competitors such as Procter & Gamble has increased the pressure for Unilever to increase profits (p. 238). Given the valuation of flexibility of the global economy, multinational firms have sought flexible labour. Unable to reach small villages in India through a formal distribution channel, it began to invest in women micro-entrepreneurs who sold the product to their networks. Depending on 45,000 female workers, this system of informal distribution has helped the company tap into over 3 million homes in 135,000 villages in rural areas of India. Not only has this program empowered women through increased incomes, but also it is improving hygiene in rural India (World Bank, 2011b, p. 238).

Borrowing from the business models of US-based company Avon to employ women and empower them is not surprising given that the company has been involved in both a “Look Good, Feel Better” breast cancer campaign and a global anti-domestic violence campaign. In Canada, for example, women are encouraged to show their solidarity and support for women who have experience domestic violence by “show[ing] off” a necklace designed for the anti-violence initiative at Avon with all Canadian proceeds going to anti-violence organizations and to the UN Women (Avon, 2011). Moreover, it has also “found the power” in Third World women, and now invests in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Dolan and Scott, 2009: 207). Citing Susan Bordo’s (1993) *Unbearable Weight* and Noami Wolf’s (1991) *The Beauty Myth*, Dolan and Scott (2009), suggest that some feminists might question how a cosmetic beauty company
could empower women since feminist theory has often perceived cosmetics as both a cause and sign of women’s oppression. Instead, Rammamurthy (2003) argues that feminist research should focus on global commodity chains and the ways in which Third World subjects are interpellated in the activity of consumption. According to Rammamurthy (2003), women are not duped by multinational corporations selling goods, but rather feminists must understand that women’s production and consumption is always already situated in transnational complexity.

While critical scholars of beauty highlight thinness, make-up regimes, and biopolitical governmentality, here I take up the issue of racialized ableism as it relates to anti-violence interventions. While I have criticized DALYs for its ableist assumptions of proper productivity, I want to extend my critique to suggest that the ways in which Third World survivors of violence women are “rehabilitated,” made to “fit,” or recuperated by World Bank empowerment projects, framed by an ideal of corporeal modernity based on racist and ablest notion of normalcy. Especially important to the study of DALYs as a measurement of violence against women is the intersections of disability and empowerment in the way in which women’s survival of violence is heralded as empowerment in economistic and ableist terms. That is, when empowerment is sought in the economistic sphere, the production and consumption of beauty products related to an idealized or normate body must be understood within the broader objectives of the World Bank.

*Beauty, Disability and Colonial Continuities*

Rather than enter the debate about cosmetics as oppressive or liberating for women, it is important to ask more complex questions about “global feminism” and the
beauty industry, especially as cosmetics are currently being used to secure women’s employment and corporeal modernity transnationally. As Jennifer Fluri (2009) maintains, the impact of the beauty industry must be contextualized by political and economic systems. Arguing that “the body acts as the site for the imprinting of social constructions of gender, race, sex and sexuality as well as the countering of these gendered, social norms,” Fluri (2009) maintains that the definition of beauty, make-up, and even visibility of the body are harness to larger project, including the support for war on terror (p. 251). As Fluri’s (2009) case study on Beauty without Borders reveals, modernity and beauty regimes interlock intricately. I suggest that “corporeal modernity” also relies upon notions of disability and normalcy. For example, Vogue magazine and cosmetic company Estee Lauder, in partnership with Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan, an NGO working on issues of disability in the country, funds Beauty without Borders. Undoubtedly, the link between racism and ableism, written on the bodies of women, must be taken into account. Beauty myths not only rely on standards of unattainable and feminized beauty for women, but also are ableist. In the beauty industry, able-bodied normalcy intersects with gender, sexuality, race, and class to produce a particular ideal representation of normalcy.

As a World Bank attested “best practices” company, Hindustan Unilever manufactures and sells skin whitening cream in India, among other products. According to Nakano Glenn (2008), light skin for women is associated with (hetero)sexual desirability and operates as social capital. The production and marketing of lightening products is incorporated into the transnational flow of goods and capital. In particular, it is large multinational corporations who have become major players in the field, spending
huge sums of research and development of skin whitening, advertising their products, and marketing them to both mass and specialized markets. For example, Unilever’s skincare line *Ponds* provides cold creams in Europe and North America and whitening creams in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America (p. 296).

While the effects of globalization have surely increased the production and consumption of skin whitening, the promotion of “whiter” and “lighter” skin has a much longer and tenacious history. As Anne McClintock (1995) illustrates in *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* Victorian cleaning rituals were “peddled globally as a God-given sign of Britain’s evolutionary superiority, and soap was invested with magical, fetish powers” (p. 207). Not only does McClintock connect soap, cleanliness and whiteness to a “cult of domesticity” in Victorian women’s homes, but she also suggests that soap marketing communicates ideas of social value and racial hierarchies. With colonial expansion and the extrication of palm oil, coconut oil, and cottonseed oil from West Africa, New Guinea, Ceylon, Fiji, and Malaya, soap became central to women’s “proper” sanitation of the home. Soap was also marketed abroad as a civilizing technology, often portraying black bodies, in particular, as in need of cleansing. In Pears soap advertisements, for example, black and white boys were often pictured in a bathroom together where the black boy looked at water and soap as a foreign object and the white boy taught him to bathe (McClintonk, 1995, p. 213). Often, the racialized boy’s blackness was literally scrubbed off entirely leaving a whitened body as the intended outcome. Hygiene was integrally associated with whiteness, lightness, and superiority by colonial regimes and the commodity of soap became associated with imperial acts of benevolence. Representing Africans, in particular, as unhygienic, dirty and
undomesticated was used as a social disciplining technique at home and abroad, but also helped to violently enforce cultural and economic values that used blackness as a reflection of uncleanliness and racial inferiority and whiteness and lightness as a reflection of civility.

I maintain that the World Bank’s promotion of Hindustan Unilever as a “best practice” approach to women’s empowerment is a “colonial continuity” (Heron, 2007, p. 38). As foremost knowledge producer of development, it is significant that the World Bank emphasizes the expansion of hygiene to rural parts of India where supposedly people do not take part in proper rituals of cleansing (World Bank, 2012, p. 238). Moreover, the lack of attention paid to the practices of Unilever’s skin whitening systems and imposition of beauty standards, often Western influenced, to a multiplicity of cultures with their own beauty practices is highly connected to a “colonial continuity” of racialized ableism in the World Bank’s work. Hindustan Unilever’s Fair & Lovely products are some of their most popular in India where women are asked to be small entrepreneurs and sell products to their networks across the country. Interestingly, Unilever has launched the Fair & Lovely Foundation whose mission is to encourage economic empowerment of women across India. Using marketing campaigns that depict lighter skinned women as employed and desirable by men, the company depicts having dark skin as painful and depressing. Nakano Glenn (2008) suggests that Fair & Lovely is used to illustrate how “dark skin becomes a burden and handicap that can be overcome only by using the product being advertised” (p. 298, emphasis my own). While it is problematic to collapse race onto disability, the ways in which racism and ableism fold into each other is especially interesting here.
Given the ways in which the World Bank measures violence in relation to productivity and then promotes small entrepreneurship as a “best practice” empowerment model, relying on women’s flexible labour, it is important to articulate the ways in which racialized ableism supports the marketability of beauty products. Conceptions of “normalcy” are central to beauty practices where women with disabilities are often represented as undesirable and asexual, needing to be “fixed” or “cured” to be desirable, and are not depicted in popular beauty campaigns. Moreover, whiteness is central to international beauty campaigns with able bodied and white women the focus of most beauty images produced. Although the World Bank takes note of cultural beauty standards and social norms such as foot binding in China as a violent practice (World Bank, 2012, p. 174), the organization remains silent about the violence inflicted on racialized and disabled bodies through the promotion of skin whitening creams and other beauty products that promote a type of aesthetic normalcy. Nor do they consider the health impacts of skin whitening creams that include ingredients such as mercury, a poison that damages the nervous system (Saint Louis, 2010). Where the World Bank considers violence, social norms are considered to be cultural and local, and empowerment economical. Furthermore, the World Bank pays little attention to the empowerment or disempowerment of those women who manufacture beauty products in global factories, and even less attention is paid to the way in which women are asked to be both the producers and consumers in these economic growth schemes.

Worthy Victims: “Fitting” into Market Schemes

The representation of Third World women as a minor and sometimes irritating diversion from more urgent issues, to the agents of development marks a decisive shift in
the World Bank’s work. Moreover, the World Bank’s focus on bringing people with disabilities into the mainstream of development programming presents a new and complex problem for thinking about empowerment language and models. In this context, the Bank’s DALY measurement of violence and the promotion of economic opportunities must be understood within the evolution of gender rhetoric and policy within the organization.

Yasmin Jiwani (2010) argues that there is a tension between worthy victims and those who can be forgotten about. Using the notion of a “doubling discourse” to describe an ambiguity in the representational frameworks of Afghan women, Jiwani argues that representations of monolithically oppressed women lacking agency are often interchanged with depictions of women more involved and interactive toward the end of the decade following the events of 9/11. In a media studies analysis, Jiwani notes that Afghan women began to be represented as survivors rather than victims. Arguing that “capitalism turns the cultivation of potential Others as consumers,” she suggests that Afghan women could be recuperated through the Beauty without Borders initiative since Afghan women were being taught how to be more like “us,” though still a few decades behind, and were becoming consumers of beauty products (p. 68).

Like the Afghan women in Jiwani’s research, the World Bank’s promotion of Belcorp’s and Hindustan Unilever’s small enterprises for women’s empowerment is important to understand as a type of rehabilitative program, where women are not only asked to sell beauty products, but become the foremost consumers of these products. Women’s worthiness for intervention depends on their rehabilitative potential. That is, it is the survival, resiliency, or flexibility of women to survive violence, and its effects, are
heralded within and through their incorporation into “good business” opportunities, as the linchpin of economic development.

Here I use the term rehabilitation to conceptualize the way in which women are made to fit market-based strategies. Born out of post-World War I medical practices, rehabilitation was focus on the restoration of rank honour and “true function” of those disabled or impaired by acts of war (McRuer, 2006, p. 111). Discourses of rehabilitation outside the confines of disability have a long history of operation within the lives of people of colour. Offering the example of Roderick A. Ferguson’s *Aberrations in Black*, McRuer (2006) asserts that systemic inequities have often been understood through the logic of rehabilitation, focusing on black family life as signs of non-normativity and pathologies that must be overcome. As Barbadian feminist Eudine Barriteau maintains, the shift in development discourse from women to gender, and to men in particular, and coupled with depoliticization, has resulted in a “men at risk” narrative in Jamaica that has problematically pathologized racialized men and non-(hetero)normative family structures, which include the employment of breadwinning women in “pink collar” labour (Jackson and Pearson, 1998, p. 8).

According to DALYs measurement, people with disabilities, diseases, and impairments are in need of rehabilitation. Calculating the value of anti-violence interventions based on an individual’s productive potential is at the core of the World Bank’s rehabilitative logic. In fact, “mainstreaming” disability has been framed within a rehabilitative logic at the World Bank. As Dingo (2007) argues, the World Bank has often represented people with disabilities as requiring technical and technological interventions to make them better “fit” work places in order to take part in the
development of their national economy. Women and people with disabilities are perceived by the World Bank as requiring recuperation, and are only worthy victims if they can be integrated into capitalist production and consumption. Importantly, such narrow visions of anti-violence against women schemes foreclose other possibilities for anti-violence work. Importantly, by speaking the language of the institution, internal gender advocates work under the constraints of the mandate of the World Bank, and are therefore forced to find ways to solve violence against women through neoliberal economic policies. Whereas violence against women has not been a major concern of the economically focused organization historically, nor has disability, the use of DALYs by gender experts within the World Bank reveals rhetoric around violence against women must be economically focused for the World Bank to take it seriously. DALYs present violence against women as urgently needing focus because it is costly and dealing with the issue will be more cost-effective than not. Borrowing the language of the institution, gender advocates within the organization manufacture a sense of urgency around the issue. As I have demonstrated within this chapter, violence manifests within workplaces and is inextricably connected to global economic restructuring processes. Thus, empowerment through work will not solve violence against women in a neoliberal economy that relies on violence to function. Additionally, anti-violence initiative cannot be single-issue focused. Significantly, violence against women cannot be solved by manufacturing a sense of urgency around the issue using ableist measurements like DALYs.

Conclusion
As I have argued in this chapter, the DALY measurement organizes itself around the idea that disease, impairments, and disabilities must be overcome. The World Bank’s *The Cost of Violence* (2009) suggests that not only productivity is lost as a result of violence, but also that women’s work is the most important aspect of their empowerment. It is not just the World Bank’s quantification of VAW that is of concern. Importantly, DALYs provide a numerical justification for the utilization of women’s flexibility to obtain return on investments into economic development as women’s equality interventions. In this way, VAW becomes something that can be measured through economic formulas and interventions become solely associated with labour-based empowerment. While development organizations rarely use the terms feminist or feminism (Smyth, 2010, p. 145), it is clear that the World Bank has harnessed feminist language of rights, voice, participation, and empowerment to roll out technocratic and economistic frameworks to end violence against women while relying on discourses of adjustment and resiliency, or overcoming, to promote women’s inclusion into the labour economy. With a “pull yourself up by your boot-straps” neoliberal mentality, women are encouraged by the World Bank to survive, adjust, and cope with extreme global injustice through labour-based and entrepreneurial engagements.

In this chapter, I have assembled World Bank literature, various gender and development focused texts, as well as critical disability and feminist scholarship in order to demonstrate the ways in which calculating the cost of violence against women using the disability-adjusted life years measurement relies on both an ableist notion of life worth, as connected to the ideal productive body, and Third World women’s flexible labour relations. In making the connections between how the Bank has communicated the
cost of violence against women with its overwhelming emphasis on neoliberal
development models, I have argued that gender advocates within organization have
manufactured urgency in regard to eradicating violence against women in line with the
World Bank’s economic agenda, and the interests of transnational capital.

In the first section, I outlined literature in the field of disability studies as it
intersects with post-colonial theory to provide context for my “crip” reading of the World
Bank’s anti-violence work. By providing a historical background of the World Bank’s
gender and development work, I introduced the DALY measurement as an expansion of a
well-known emphasis on empowering women in the market-sphere. By using the notion
of overcoming, I argued that women’s flexibility, resiliency and adjustments are central
to ongoing expansion of neoliberal development, where women’s empowerment is a
means to an end. I also argue that a “crip” reading of the World Bank’s anti-violence
initiatives would have to consider disability in the way the organization attempts to solve
the issue, in addition to how it calculated its cost. In thinking about the World Bank’s
“good for business” models, I further articulate the ways in which gender, race, and
disability interlock through the exploration of cosmetic-based entrepreneurial initiatives
that rely on women being both flexible, pretty, and white.

A thorough analysis of the World Bank’s use of DALYs to measure the cost of
violence against women reveals that regardless of how mathematically complex and
nuanced, it cannot account for all practices of violence. Moreover, justice for violent acts
requires more than labour market activities for women’s empowerment. Relying on
narratives of flexibility, the World Bank habitually locates the issue of violence, and its
disabling effects, within an individualizing narrative rather than consider the ways in
which violence and disability are systemically and structurally propagated. Using DALYs to measure violence against women as a cost on women’s productivity and the economy directly shapes the World Bank’s technocratic approaches to ending VAW. The World Bank’s manufactured concern with violence against women demonstrates their actual concern with the flexibility of racialized women, or their ability to overcome, adjust, remain resilient by gaining flexible employment in a neoliberal global economy where flexible labour is most valued. In other words, DALYs reveal that the World Bank requires racialized women to overcome gendered violence, adjust under neoliberal restructuring, and have resilient bodies in disabling conditions. At the intersections of disability, violence, and neoliberal development, global sexism, racism, and ableism secure one another. Thus, the way in which the World Bank continues to seek out racialized bodies for cheap and flexible labour, and as consumers of product sold by MNCs, as women’s empowerment remains suspect.

Problematically, the World Bank’s measurement of the cost of violence against women has little to add to innovative or holistic approaches to ending violence against women globally. DALYs calculate the cost of the loss of women’s productivity as a result of violence and measure the cost-effectiveness of interventions. DALYs do not measure the reduction in violence against women or the costs of violence to women’s lives and wellbeing beyond losses in productivity. The mathematical and economic complexity of the measurement suggests that DALYs not only obscure the complexities of global violence against women, but also secure the expertise of the World Bank at the expense of grassroots organizing against violence. While the World Bank seems to focus on women’s rights, but continues to focus on women’s responsibilities to the neoliberal
state. Thus, violence against women is an urgent concern for the World Bank insofar as women’s flexible labour, time, and bodies are understood to be “key” to economic growth.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the urgency to eliminate violence against women is constructed by gender advocates at World Bank using economic language. As my study of US foreign policy and World Bank demonstrate so far in this dissertation, discourses of urgency invoke already circulating languages, ideas, agendas, and strategies so that a concern for violence against women “make sense” to the target audience. Economic and political discourses are not neutral, but are instead, social and cultural constructs. Having investigated how violence against women has come to be communicated as a pressing concern for development, I now turn to the ways in which urgency is felt. In chapter 3, I investigate the affective politics of anti-violence campaigns in order to understand how emotional responses to gendered violence produce a sense of urgency around the issue.
Chapter 3:
Affective Politics: The United Nations and Say(ing) NO to Violence Against Women

While violence against women has long been a concern for feminist scholars and activists, the issue has only gained the full attention of the United Nations within the last two decades. The United Nations officially recognized violence against women as a human rights concern in 1993 with the Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women, but it was not until 2006 that the UN called for a comprehensive study of violence against women globally (UN, 2006). As its first comprehensive commitment to eliminating VAW, the UN launched the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign in 2008 (UN, 2012). UNiTE includes a database of resources, an internet-based knowledge-sharing center, the development of a group of men’s leaders, and the complementary Say NO advocacy and awareness campaign, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon explicitly supports the UNiTE initiative. The UNiTE campaign (2012) aims to enforce national laws on violence against women, implement national action plans, development data on the prevalence of VAW, address sexual violence in conflict, and increase public awareness and social mobilization by 2015. According to an interview with Todd Minerson, Director of the White Ribbon Campaign and participant in UNiTE’s Men’s Leaders project, the UNiTE initiative is the first global effort to both feature and coordinate global efforts to eliminate VAW by bringing “all stakeholders into a conversation about gender-based violence.” He suggests, “violence is not going away, and urgently needs to be addressed” (Minerson, personal communication, 2012). As an issue that crosses into many other development concerns, Minerson suggests that a coordinated global effort to eliminate VAW is a welcomed
UNiTE has drawn the attention of well-known activists such as Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu and the “father” of micro-credit enterprises Muhammad Yunus, as well as celebrities such as Charlize Theron and Nicole Kidman (UNiTE, 2012: n.p.). It is also building on social media platforms and aims to bring what is “happening on the ground” to the level of the global” which means it has to be presented in a way that is “palatable for the average person that does not understand how the UN systems works” (Minerson, personal communication, 2012).

Those who support the campaign claim that the time is now to end global violence against women. According to the UN’s Messenger of Peace, Charlize Theron: “We’re at a time where people just want to join together and cause change. People don't want to live like this any more” (UNiTE, 2012, n.p.). Echoing her remarks, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2011) stated: “More and more people are understanding that violence against women is everyone’s responsibility… we need to change attitudes.” For women who have experienced gendered violence, however, the time to end the practice has always been “now.” Unsurprisingly, women have been mobilizing internationally around the subject since the 1970s, and beginning in the early 1990s at the level of the UN. As I explored in chapter 2, the costs of violence against women are extremely high. However, the UNiTE campaign’s sense of urgency around the issue is highly manufactured.

In this chapter, I argue that urgency functions within the UNiTE campaign as what Gould (2009) has termed a “political feeling” (p. 3). The urgency of “now” in regard to eliminating violence against women operates in the circulation and accumulation of emotions that resonate and intensify in order to communicate how
important this issue is “now.” As a campaign that aims to communicate the urgency of eliminating VAW, the UNiTE initiative is meant to affect participants who will, in turn, express their emotion by taking action. Using stories of pain, trauma, and suffering as well as narratives of empowerment and agency, the campaign aims to make one feel, and then act on that feeling. Resembling other awareness campaigns, the initiative works to affect, and be affected, by its audience. By collecting stories of respondents who say “no” to VAW, the campaign can claim global reach, and its success is marked by way of the “political feelings” it instils in its audience (Gould, 2009).

The campaigns are focused on both awareness and social action, and function as a “one stop shop” for people who know little about global violence (Minerson, personal communication, 2012). The UNiTE campaign and the Say NO initiative could be analysed through a critical lens that would reveal the representational politics of the campaign. As the UN deploys images, text, and video to communicate the scope of the issue and the suitable responses to VAW, a discursive analysis of the campaign is important. While the representation of violence against women has been explored in sophisticated critical feminist literature, affect has yet to be studied in this context. In order to fill this gap, this chapter makes the “political feelings” of the UNiTE and Say NO campaign central (Gould, 2009, p. 3). I explore not only common and expected feelings related to a global anti-violence awareness and advocacy campaign such as overwhelmed-ness, desperation, and pity, but to also account for “lines of flight” that might be less predictable, including feelings of hope and empowerment, as well as account for the ways in some political feelings may be disallowed (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 7). That is, I am interested in not only what kinds of feelings are evoked by anti-
violence campaigns in the development context, but also what feelings are disavowed by the structure of a campaign. Expanding Gould’s (2009) ground-breaking work on the affective nature of ACT UP’s HIV/AIDS activism, I ask: what role do affects, feelings, and emotions play in generating and foreclosing political horizons? How are political feelings generated, cultivated, and contained by the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign? How do political feelings shape awareness campaigns and global advocacy efforts, as well as the bodies on which emotions “stick” (Ahmed, 2004)? By centering the UNiTE and Say NO campaign in the chapter, I aim to “feel” through the affective economy of the initiative, specifically paying attention to the ways in which calls to action orient participants toward particular political feelings (Ahmed, 2004b).

In the first section, I outline some of the most recent and renowned academic scholarship on affect theory. Taking into account the ways in which scholarship on affect has differently defined the term, and thus the scope of this academic study, I explore affect as a transdisciplinary theory. Following Hemmings’ (2005) criticism, I maintain that affect is not spontaneously generated but functions in line with systems of oppression, and I subsequently adopt Ahmed’s (2004) notion of affect, and her cultural theory of emotions. Indebted to Ahmed’s concept of affective economies, my analysis of political feelings in the UNiTE and Say NO campaign is aimed at understanding how emotions circulate between bodies, gain affective value in their repetition, and how they “stick” to bodies. Pairing questions of affect with those of representation, I outline the ways in which I consider affect theory to complement post-colonial and post-structural scholarship on development.
In the second section of this chapter, I suggest that development is an affective project. Exploring academic scholarship that points to the affective nature of contact with others through development, I argue that a white bourgeois subjectivity, built on feelings of benevolence and an imperative to help (Heron, 2007), describes the circulation of emotion in development. Using Live Aid as an example of a development campaign whose primary goal was to incite emotion through engagement with others, I consider the ways in which representations and discursive constructs generate affect in the development industry.

The third section explores the affective nature of representations of violence against women. While a sophisticated and thorough body of feminist literature has been published on the issues of representation of VAW in the Third World, I point to the lack of attention to affect as a gap in this literature. As a complement to the important work of post-colonial, transnational, Third World, and critical race feminist scholarship, I maintain the importance of considering how affective responses are evoked by the representations of VAW within the development industry.

As a site of anti-violence work, the UN provides a complicated archive for exploration. Feminists have been mobilizing around this issue of VAW at the UN officially since the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985). However, such mobilizations around women’s equality are far from straightforward. In the fourth section of this chapter I consider the outcomes of UN Conferences for Women as a context for understanding how the UN currently approaches the issue of VAW. Concerned with the political feelings that are permissible and those that are foreclosed in the UNiTE
campaign, I outline a brief history of anti-violence work at the UN, to situate UNiTE with an analysis of the forms of activism that have flourished and faltered at the organization.

The fifth section introduces the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign by centering “The Situation” overview (UN, 2012b) and the “UNiTE Worldwide” (UN, 2012c) interactive map found on the campaigns website. In this section, I consider that which is highlighted and magnified by the UNiTE campaign to understand how affective responses to VAW are generated through representation. Expanding Alhassan’s (2009) notion of “telescopic philanthropy,” I explore what it may mean to feel telescopically. Employing the idea of “telescopic feeling,” I analyze the political feelings that are both possible and foreclosed by representational frames, namely individual and benevolent responses to an issue “over there,” and how emotions associated with VAW “stick” to the bodies that are linked to the spaces targeted for intervention (Ahmed, 2003). In particular, I argue that telescopic feeling disallows participants to make broader and more complex connections between the West and the “Rest” by the way it frames the scope of possible avenues for feeling.

In the final section, I investigate the ways in which affect circulates in UNiTE’s Say NO campaign (UN, 2012d). Focused on ways that participants can “take action” to end violence against women, I consider the affective possibilities of saying “no” and donating for change. As the two most visible forms of taking action available to participants on the UNiTE website, I explore how participant’s emotions are evoked through their orientation to other bodies. Aligned with those who desire to help, I suggest that a collective body is generated by those who belong to a group of “do-good” donors, in contrast to a collective body that is understood as in need of aid. Generating feelings of
sympathy for victims, but also a sense of belonging and empowerment by way of taking action against violence, the “aboutness” of the campaign is centered on the agency of the participant (Ahmed, 2004, p. 21). By evoking a sense of inspiration and urgency through the emotionality of Say NO, these texts position the UN and the UNiTE participant as agents of change. Narratives of individual pain and suffering, in particular, obscure the complexities of violence against women, and also promote monetary donations as a solution to the issue. I argue that this campaign forecloses possibilities for other political feelings, including those that may lead to collective action and activism against global systems of oppression that secure women’s vulnerability to violence. A radical critique of development itself, the UN system, and global violence against women would align participants toward negative political feelings that may actually prohibit participants from donating to the UNiTE and adjoining Say NO campaign.

Affective Dialogues

According to Patricia Clough (2007), there has been an affective turn in cultural studies. That is, representational analyses, identity politics, and questions of rights are now accompanied by a focus on affect in a variety of disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields of scholarship (Puar, 2007, p. 205). Clough (2007) maintains that social scientists and humanities experts are challenged by war, trauma, torture, terrorism, and counterterrorism, and many are turning to affect as a new and necessary frame with which to understand the constitutive functioning of the political, economic, and social at this current moment. Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Baruch Spinoza, and Henri Bergson, in particular, scholarship on affect describes the bodily
capacity to affect and be affected.\textsuperscript{33} In other words, studies in affect analyze how individuals act, engage, or connect through the body. For Seigworth and Gregg (2010):

> Affect is found in those intensities that pass body to body (human, non-human, part-body and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, \textit{and} in the very passages or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves (p. 1, emphasis original).

Affect is not only concerned with the present, especially in bringing forth bodily experiences that are often disavowed, but also “sends thoughts to the future-to the bodily matter and bio-technologies of technoscientific experimentation” (Clough, 2007, p. 3). In this way, affect is an inventive transdisciplinary theory and method to understand a variety of scholarly preoccupations including, but not limited to, cultural and political inflected philosophy, studies of the non-human, robotics and bio informatics, practices of power on collective bodies, and discourses of emotion (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010, p. 6 - 8).

\textit{Affect and Emotions}

While affect refers to states of being, rather than to the expression or interpretation of emotions, the political and economic circulation of emotions is central to the field (Hemmings, 2005, p. 551). Affect refers to bodily sensations, and the term emotion can be understood as what is \textit{captured and coded} as feelings and responses. According to Massumi’s introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000) \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, affect is not an emotion or feeling. Feelings are personal and emotions are social, whereas affect is a pre-conscious experience of intensity (Massumi, 2000). Those interested in affect seek to describe or interpret intensities without making meaning of bodily capacities. Emotion or feelings, then, can be understood as “embodied meaning-

\textsuperscript{33} See for example Deleuze and Guattari (2004); Spinoza (1959); and Bergson (1913).
making” where affective responses are understood by comparison with past experiences, and emotions are projections of those feelings as communicative strategies with others (Wetherell, 2012, p. 3). Affective circulation, and its impressions, can be understood by tracing the way in which bodily capacities self-reflect, react, and loop back. As Tomkins (1963) asserts, the contagious nature of a yawn or smile demonstrates the way in which affect is transferred between bodies. That is, a smile is transferred to others, doubles back, and increases its original intensity and resonance. A smile is understood as happiness because of meaning-making practices around our affective capacities.

While affect theorists disagree on the definitions of and distinctions between affect, emotion, and feeling, here I use the term affect to denote a pre-conscious and pre-discursive bodily sensation such as an experience of the heart-pounding, becoming sweaty, or the sensation of one’s gut being “wrenched.” I use the terms emotion and feeling to describe the codification of affect, or the attachment of sensation to discourses, ideas, narratives, and meaning-making practices. I understand feelings to be constructed through past experiences, and thus are personal, but I also understand feelings as political. Thus, I also deviate from Massumi’s (2000) suggestion that only emotions are social. While I am particularly interested in the ways in which affect theory reveals the social and cultural construction of urgency in anti-violence campaign, I also understand both emotions and feelings to be social in the ways that we understand our emotions and feelings through discursive structures embedded in personal experience. I conceptualize both feelings and emotion to be the conscious making of meaning of bodily sensations that are informed by dominant signification, so that being “gut wrenched” is understood as a feeling of sadness, devastation, or guilt and projected through emotionality. Using
Gould’s (2009) conceptualization, I also think about the ways in which feelings are
politically generated and circulated.

While affect theorists have specifically attended to the ways in which affect
fastens to objects randomly, and without patterned attachments, Hemmings (2005) argues
that the most important affect theory emerging in the field is that which attends to social
frameworks of inequality. While not holding identities in place on a fixed map of
subjectivity, affect theory must consider how affective attachments “serve to satisfy
drives or social norms” (Hemmings, 2005, p. 559). Citing Frantz Fanon’s (2008,
originally published in 1952) and Audre Lorde’s (1984) descriptions of affective
responses to their blackness, Hemmings (2005) maintains that affective attachments can
be quite unsurprising. Fanon (2008) writes:

‘Look, a Negro!’ It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I
made a tight smile.
‘Look, a Negro!’ It was true. It amused me.
‘Look, a Negro!’ The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my
amusement.
‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened! Frightened! Frightened!’ Now they were
beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but
laughter had become impossible (p. 11-12).

Audre Lorde (1984) writes:

The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of
shopping bags, christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes the train’s
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snow suited body down.
On one side of me is a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat
staring at men. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down,
pulling mine with it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where my new blue
snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do
not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the seat between us… And suddenly
I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn’t want
to touch…. Something’s going on here I don’t understand, but I will never forget it.
Her eyes. The flared nostrils. The hate (p. 147-8).

Using the term “racial affect” to describe the way in which affective attachments are
driven by social oppression, Hemmings (2005) argues that affect theory must be couched in social meaning. Rather than understand affect as the intensities and sensations of random attachments, affect should be understood as bodily intensities that circulate in and through history and context, and as accumulations of sensations and vibrations that impress upon subjects and slide among and between different collective bodies. Racial affect can be understood as both the process of affecting (to engage or connect) and being affected by social hierarchies. Using the term “double consciousness” to describe affect, W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) writes: “the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of other, of measuring one’s social by the type of a word that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois, 1903, p. 8). I understand racial affect to generate certain emotions and political feelings in line with social inequalities and dominations. That is racial affect, or bodily vibrations and intensities, are captured and coded through discourses and material realities of exclusion, hierarchies of difference and they politically orient bodies toward feelings of hate and love.

Highlighting the way that Ahmed (2004) conceptualizes affect as placing bodies within special relation to one another along racially defined lines, in particular, Hemmings (2005) maintains that Ahmed’s Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004a) is one of the most important interventions in the field. Centering the “cultural politics” of emotion in her work, Ahmed (2004a) tracks how emotions circulate between bodies, how they “stick,” and which bodies they stick to, and why. Arguing that emotions are central to thought itself, even as they have been marginalized in academic scholarship in favour of rational and objective approaches to theorizing, Ahmed has successfully established a theory of affective economies (p. 4). While interested in affect, her focus on emotions, in
particular, is foundational to my understanding of the political economy of affect. Ahmed argues that emotions register the proximity of others and objects can take on affective value, especially in their circulation. She maintains that emotions impress upon the surface of individual and collective bodies in the space between bodies and signs. Claiming that emotions are neither solely private nor inwardly oriented, Ahmed asserts that emotions are social in that they shape the boundaries and surfaces of bodies. For example, using a lengthy citation for a white supremacist website, Ahmed (2004b) claims that hate and love, as circulating emotions between bodies and signs, impress upon the surface of collective bodies; in this case, the nation. According to Ahmed the subject (“the white nationalist, the average white man, the white housewife, the white working man, the white citizen, and the white Christian Farmer”) is presented as endangered by others in terms of security, wealth, and jobs (p. 117). Through hate, there is a passionate attachment to those worthy of love - those read as white. She writes: “Hate is economic; it circulates between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement” (119). For Ahmed, emotions work as a form of capital. That is, affect does not reside as intensity within a sign or body, but circulates accumulating affective value in its exchange. As a communicative display of affect, emotions are productive in meaning-making processes. Borrowing from Marx’s concept of “commodity fetishism,” emotions gain value in their exchange and circulation over time, and like commodities under capitalism, economies of affect ensure that the history of their production (labour and labour time) is obscured.

Affect and Representation

Critically engaging with debates coming out of the post-structural turn in cultural theory and feminist studies, affect theorists reject the notion that “critical thinking” must
always be about pointing out what is already known about identities, and locating them on a stable map where identities are conceptualized as fixed in place. As Puar (2007) maintains, the “affective turn” invites scholars to think about the body and identities in non-essentialist ways. That is, affect theory opens up possibilities to bring the body back into dialogue without mapping static identities onto bodies or making universal claims to experience based on how identity is read off the body. Significantly, some affect theorists argue for bringing the body into scholarship by claiming that “critical thinking” is too reduced to deconstructivist methods of revealing the ways that discursive representations are racist, (hetero)sexist, ableist, or classist. Those critical of post-structuralist thinking often encourage those interested in the discursive to bring back in what is invoked as “the material”: the body (Hemmings, 2005). In feminist theory, in particular, scholars have argued that post-structuralism over-emphasizes power relations to the extent that there is no hope for the emancipation of marginalized subjects. Regrettably, the importance of post-structural projects that both question representational politics and the “cultural work they do” is at times overly dismissed by critics (Treichler, 1999). In feminist, queer, and crip scholarship, important questions continue to be asked about representation and identity through a variety of theories and projects.34 Furthermore, as critical race and post-colonial theorists have aptly demonstrated, representational and identity politics have “material” realities in terms of the implications they pose for activism, policy, and solidarity work.35 I agree with Puar (2007), who suggests that affect theory can be used as a complement to, rather than a replacement of, post-structuralist theory and representational analyses (p. 212). My turn to affect theory in this chapter should not be

34 See for example McRuer (2012).
35 See for example Mohanty (2003).
read as a dismissal of discourse analysis. In fact, the first two chapters of this dissertation explore representational questions. However, my analysis of anti-violence campaigns requires an affective turn in this chapter because the texts I analyze require more than a representational analyses. I maintain that emotions saturate discourses. My analysis of the emotionality of text is concerned with how “emotion incites, shapes, and is generated by practices of meaning-making. This chapter focuses on campaigns, “invites scholarly attention to the affective dimensions of sense-making” (Gould, 2009, p.13).

For critical and post-development scholars, questions of representations of development are central to the field. Critical analyses of discourses of development are important contributions, especially given the vast amount of representations of Third World people and problems in scholarship, policy literature, and campaign materials produced and circulated by the development industry. Scholars such as Escobar (1995), Crush (1995), Kapoor (2006) and Mohanty (2003) demonstrate the need for understanding the power of development discourses. Here, my concern with affect does not replace my interest in discursive representations, but rather complements my focus on the discursive realm. In particular, a focus on affect adds a layer of complexity to the study of development discourses.

**Affect and Development**

The field of critical and post-development studies is ripe for the affective turn that has occurred in cultural, feminist, and queer studies. Scholars critical of the Enlightenment tradition within development studies have demonstrated how counter-discourses are complicit in what they seek to reject. Indebted to Derrida’s concept of “logocentrism,” Manzo (1991) demonstrates that even the most radical critiques of
development have a “disposition to impose hierarchy between places and subjects, a
nostalgia for origins, and a vantage point independent of interpretation” (Watts, 1995, p.
51). The inability of development theories to wholly critique the “development-as-
progress” narrative is known in the field as the “development impasse” (Munck, 1999, p.
197). In the 1990s, post-development theory became popular as it attempted to move
beyond the impasse by offering new scholarship on development as discourse. Arturo
Escobar’s (1995) post-structural, specifically Foucauldian approach to development
discourse marks the “cultural turn” of development theory, and effectively opened the
door for post-structuralist and post-colonial feminisms to enter the development debates
“beyond the impasse” (Crush, 1995, p. 57). However, as a methodological tactic,
discursive analyses in the development field are similarly limited in the ways in which
affect theory scholars have criticized feminist theory. Often confined by questions of
“good” and “bad” representations of “development subjects,” questions of rights, as well
as transgressive (anti-development) or liberatory (better development) imaginings,
affective theory might reveal the political, economic, and social circulations of emotions,
and engagements with development. In other words, such a turn in the field would center
the affective-ness of development, rather than its effectiveness. Specifically, for scholars
like myself who are concerned with the power of development “experts” to produce the
knowledge of, and solutions to, poverty, hunger, disease and especially violence against
women, affect provides a crucial accompaniment to post-colonial and post-structural
research.

In fact, post-development, critical development, and post-colonial theorists
theorize affect without naming it as a disciplinary field of study. Focusing on the desire
of development workers to “help,” Heron (2007) demonstrates that the motivations of (mostly white) women, in particular, to travel to the Third World in search of development projects is built upon emotions. While Heron is not concerned with affective economies within the development industry, her work reveals the ways in which affect and emotions come into play in development. Citing attachments to feelings of obligation, urgency, and even entitlement in her research with development workers, Heron reveals that the desire for development rests in individuals’ affective attachments to others. Borrowing from McClintock (1995) and Stoler (1995), Heron suggests that the desire to help was built into a bourgeois identity emerging in Europe in the 1800s especially, during which colonial regimes explored and conquered foreign territories. Arguing that bourgeois identity was enveloped by “a certain sensibility” that included sympathy, including a desire for recognition for benevolence and acts of charity toward those considered less fortunate and less advanced. Part and parcel of this bourgeois subjectivity was the affirmation of class relations, which not only justified and maintained exploitative labour relations locally and globally, but also justified spatialized social relations based on the racial difference of others (Heron, 2007, p. 28-30). Naming this bourgeois subjectivity a “colonial continuity,” Heron (2007) investigates the notions of charity and benevolence in white middle-class development workers’ subjectivity in the mid-1990s (p. 33). While unconcerned with affect per se, Heron’s (2007) research demonstrates the way in which development affectively orients the development worker toward those worthy of help and happiness, and, through attachments to feelings of compassion and empathy, how the collective body of the development industry is shaped by the circulation of emotions.
While unconcerned with development, Ahmed (2010) provides an analysis of the long history of affective relations and colonial contact. She argues that it is not just feelings related to pity and charity that motivated and justified colonial expansion, but also happiness. She cites an article in the *Monthly Review* (1813) by John Bruce, involved in the East India Trading Company, as claiming: “the happiness of the human race would thus be prodigiously augmented” by settler colonialism in India (p. 29, emphasis my own). The duty to be philanthropic was narrated through the expansion of happiness to the colonies. As a justification for colonialism and control, colonizers imagined themselves to be spreading happiness to those that lacked it due to “chaos” and poverty.

As Razack’s (2004) critical analysis of modern peacekeeping reveals, gratefulness of the “natives” is a required emotion in return.

Certainly, the infamous 1980 Live Aid concert in support of ending Ethiopian famine demonstrates the interplay of affect and emotions in the development industry. Organized by Bob Geldof and supported by musicians such as Paul McCartney, Mick Jagger, David Bowie, Queen, and Led Zeppelin, the event was televised from both London and Philadelphia. Throughout the concert, images of the famine appeared on large screens and viewers were encouraged to donate money (Geldof, 2012). According to Sankore (2005), graphic images of ailing racialized children are no more that “development pornography” that use shocking images to elicit an affective response.³⁶

³⁶ Sankore’s (2005) conception of “development pornography” relies on the stigmatization and demonization of porn and does not provide a nuanced analysis of the complexity of the industry and those who work in it. Causally relating the filming of sex to exploitation, the notion of development porn takes aim at both the industry of development and the industry of pornography. While I reject the anti-porn, anti-sex work framework that this term emerges from, I find it useful to point to voyeurism in development campaigns and the framing of representation of the Third World. I do not agree that one needs more shocking images to be affected or stimulated by watching porn, nor does producing “shocking” porn necessitate exploitation of parties involved. However, I do agree that there is a sense of audience fatigue around affective responses to poverty in charity models, and thus, Sankore’s work remains useful insofar as
While Sankore’s language is problematic, it is his allusion to affective economies that is most interesting. For Sankore, no picture could ever explain the tenacious history of “slavery, colonialism, mass murder, repression, looting, corruption, trade imbalances, and outrageous interests on dubious loans” in the Third World. Yet, such images circulate with affective currency within the development industry.

Images from development campaigns are cultural texts that circulate with affective value. Signalled by the emaciated black body with eyes that are either pestered by flies or on the verge of tears, the development subject is produced through a political economy of representations and emotions. That is, “clientalization” or “developmentalization” of Third World subjects, to use Escobar’s (1995) terms, is generated in and through affect. Affective attachments in development rely on the circulation of feelings made visible by the bodies upon which they “stick.” Using interchangeable Third World bodies, such frames of representation used in charity campaigns such as Live AID are too often used in the development industry. As post-structuralist, post-colonial and anti-racist scholarship reveals, such representations are problematic (Mohanty, 2003; Treichler, 1997; Narayan, 1997). More than racist representations, images of Third World bodies circulate to signal “our” collective sadness for others’ suffering.

As Ahmed (2004) argues, emotions circulate between bodies and signs and impress upon the surfaces of bodies. Emotions gain value in their circulation, and both adhere to historical associations of feelings and representations, while simultaneously obscuring the history of their production. As such, representations of others’ pain,

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it points to how development campaigns produce images and texts to provoke affective responses to “shocking” representations of decontextualized images of poor, diseased, sad, and starving children, for example.
trauma, hunger, and experiences of violence circulate in affective economies that value benevolence rather than accountability. That is, feelings of sympathy and returned gratitude are evoked through representations of others. Circulating widely in development communication materials, such representations evoke affective responses that bind together compassionate subjects, while simultaneously othering objects of pity, and ultimately ignoring historical contexts and causes of pain, trauma and suffering.

Emotions do different things to different subjects because they involve various orientations toward or away from objects (Ahmed, 2004). Cultural productions, such as those emerging out of Live Aid, reveal the way in which emotions get stuck on certain bodies. Ahmed (2004) argues that the “getting stuck” is dependent on “past histories of association that often “work” through concealment” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 13). As such, development subjects are made subjects by “our” pity, where their collective and unfortunate problems (read through images of pain, suffering, and trauma) are dependent on the concealment of histories of colonialism, uneven capitalism, effects of neoliberal globalization and imperialist projects. Unable to be explained through single stories and images, development campaign materials which rely on images of Third World individuals’ pain and trauma allow pity to “stick” to Third World bodies, creating the surface of a collective body of poor and needy individuals, while simultaneously and effectively demarcating the boundaries between “us” and ‘them.” Racial difference is read from their bodies as well as “endowed upon their bodies” (Puar, 2007, p. 169). That is, the images of poor and hungry Ethiopians in the context of famine, for example, are read as different and are thus always already different from “us.” As difference slides across bodies that resemble Ethiopians under famine, difference is endowed upon the
entire continent, if not the entire Third World.

In the case of violence against women, images of women who have experienced violence or are vulnerable to violence are used in development campaigns in a similar fashion as Ethiopians in Live Aid materials. Third World women’s bodies are read as always already different through their racialization and this difference slides between bodies that “look like” or “seem like” as vulnerable subjects (Puar, 2007, p. 187). In the same way, pity is “stuck” onto bodies that require the intervention, and benevolence and superiority is “stuck” into the bodies of those willing to act. Moreover, the bodies of perpetrators are “stuck” with feelings of fear or hate. Racial affects of such representations must be attended to, especially in the context of development discourses.

**Affect and Violence Against Women**

Why study the affective politics of anti-violence initiatives? The study of affect reveals the ways in which we move and are moved. Thus, studying affect and anti-VAW campaigns allows one to ask how representations of violence against women in campaigns are e/affective by how they make meaning emotionally, and also generate “political feelings” (Gould, 2009). Expanding on the “affective turn” in the social sciences, I use affect theory and studies in emotion to analyze how discursive manoeuvres such as stories of violence, images, and texts can express empowerment and pain, for example, and how crucial the emotionality of texts is to how we understand the issue of violence against women. As emotions move between bodies and signs, emotionality surrounding eliminating violence against women circulates in an affective economy. Importantly, affect economies produce some political and emotional possibilities, and also refuse others. That is, as emotions circulate, participants of
campaigns such as UNiTE and Say NO are oriented to particular political feelings, emotions, and actions. It also forecloses other possibilities for feeling because affective attachments are \textit{driven by and reflect social inequality and oppressions}. In this chapter, I maintain that as the UN targets global violence against women as an urgent concern, the orientation of participants to certain “political feelings” affects the outcome of global efforts to end violence against women.

Expressions of women’s experiences of violence are inherently affective. Stories of survivors’ experiences have long shaped the history of the feminist anti-violence movement. As an issue that pushed the demarcation of public/private boundaries, the sharing of experience was essential to the establishment of publicly recognized “facts” and statistics and helped in the international recognition of the issue and its eradication by making it feel “real” (Joachim, 2007). Stories of women’s experiences have helped to move people emotionally toward taking action. In development discourses, stories told to development workers and academics, including anthropologists, circulate widely in the development industry for a variety of purposes. Using the phrase “to bring the self into the other,” Spivak (2004, p. 556) is critical of the ways in which Third World women’s stories are manipulated to serve the interests of Western philosophy, including human rights and development theory. Moreover, her work has been highly critical of the ways in which women’s voices and agency are also obscured in Western academic texts.\textsuperscript{37} In her essay “Under Western Eyes Revisited,” Mohanty (2003) critically analyses the representations of development discourse and argues that women’s experiences are too often misrepresented as homogenous and simplified, without context and within the boundaries of Western saviour discourses. Mirroring this claim, Narayan (1997) argues

\textsuperscript{37} See for example Spivak (1998).
that stories of violence against women in the Third World, in particular, are turned into “quick-facts” of easily digestible categories of language such as “dowry murders” when they cross borders (p. 101). In establishing the urgency by which Third World women’s oppression must be eradicated, the complexity of the issue, as well as Third World women’s agency in their own empowerment, is routinely ignored or obscured.

In critical work on representations, feminist and critical race scholarship has long pointed to the material consequences of inappropriate representations, including the ways in which interventions are organized and deployed in the name of women’s rights around the world. Given the sophisticated literature on representations of violence against women in the Third World, affect theory can be understood as complementary to thinking about discursive renderings of violence against women within development discourses. In particular, affect theory opens up the possibility for inquiries that do not rely on the dichotomy of “good” and “bad” representations of others, but instead ask: what are the affective politics of representations? That is, by investigating the cultural work representations do, affect theory allows one to ask: what are the social, political, and economic relations of affect in development discourses where narratives of violence against women are invoked?

Given that the UNiTE campaign has emerged within the development industry as the most extensive global strategy to eliminate violence against women, the affective politics of this anti-violence campaign are particularly complex. In particular, the history of the UN as the location for women’s organizing against violence provides a fascinating site for a study of the affective politics of a global anti-violence campaign.

Providing Context: Violence Against Women at the United Nations
The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) is the most comprehensive human rights text regarding the issue to date, and marks a remarkable feat by feminist and anti-violence advocates to have the issue recognized at the international level. In the original Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) adopted by the UN General Assembly, there was not one reference to VAW. However, following the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985) and the Beijing conference (1995), VAW moved to center stage in the UN. Since this campaign arose from the Secretary-General’s office, the emergence of UNiTE to End Violence campaign suggests that VAW is now at the center of UN policy making. In order to understand the way in which violence against women has urgently emerged at the UN with the introduction of the UNiTE and Say NO campaigns, it is important to provide a historical context for mobilizations around this issue by international feminist activists.

Mexico

In 1975, the first UN Conference for Women was held in Mexico City. Reflecting Cold War politics, countries belonging to the United Nations sat divided in three blocs: the Western nations, the Southern countries belonging to the Group of Seventy-Seven (most formerly colonized), and the East (communist and other socialist countries). While the Western bloc pushed for development, the East argued for peace, and the South demanded a New International Economic Order (Joachim, 2007, p. 73-74). Most central to the discussion of women’s equality was the framing of how to make change in the lives of women. Equality through redistribution, or progress through development, were the two major competing frames with which inequality was understood (Joachim, 2007,
While violence against women was brought up as a major concern, especially for Third World women, the integration of women into development schemes was one of the most controversial subjects of the conference. To be sure, the UN’s *Report of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year* (1976) claimed the problem of underdevelopment was a result of “unsuitable internal structures,” including the lack of female integration into development, but also maintained that the problem of underdevelopment rested in the “profoundly unjust world economic system” including development structures (UN, 1976, p. 5). Importantly, the Group of Seventy-Seven argued for women’s inequality to be understood as inextricably linked to unequal global economic and political conditions stemming from colonialism and imperialism (Joachim, 207, p. 81-82). While women differed in terms of preferred solutions to women’s inequality, the report claimed that women came together under the banner of global sisterhood, recognizing that their differences were overshadowed by their experiences of sexism and that their awareness of patriarchy made them “natural allies in the struggle against any form of oppression, such as is practiced under colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination and apartheid, thereby constituting an enormous revolutionary potential for economic and social change in the world today” (UN, 1976, p. 3). The official report not only claimed that women should fight together against colonialism and neo-colonialism, but called on international co-operation to end “foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, and racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self determination” (UN, 1976, p. 13). Significantly, much of this history of the UN conferences is obscured or forgotten,
especially since executive summaries and action plans from the UN conferences do not include such revolutionary discourse.

In Mexico City, violence against women was officially framed as physical and emotional abuse, often perpetrated at the hands of men. While the Group of Seventy-Seven argued for the integration of structural and economic concerns into conversations of VAW, the objectives of the UN Decade for Women set at the Mexico conference followed structures of development, rather than redistribution, by calling for extended education in the Third World, the modernization of agriculture, and women’s involvement in development as solutions to women’s issues. According to the Group of Seventy-Seven, development and technical interventions would offer considerable possibilities for improving the well being of all people, but it was a New International Economic Order that would radically reshape women’s lives. According to the report’s appendix, participants from Albania asserted: “many parts of the Plan [of Action] did not adequately reflect the concerns of all the women of the world” and cited “the struggle for women's emancipation had to be waged first and foremost against colonialism, racism and apartheid” (UN, 1976, p. 44).

**Copenhagen**

During the second UN World Conference for Women in Copenhagen (1980), women met to review the targets of the first half of the Decade for Women and commit to a Plan of Action for the second half. The Copenhagen conference was arguably the most heated meeting within the UN Decade for Women. Development again took center stage at the conference as the solution to women’s inequality while Third World women continued to make the argument in favour of a New International Economic Order, and
maintained that international peace depended on the elimination of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, Zionism, and foreign occupation (UN, 1980). At Copenhagen the language of colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, and the recognition of the plight of Palestinian women, in particular, was blocked by Northern countries. Northern nations, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, asked that these issues be dealt with in more “appropriate forums” (Joachim, 2007, p. 85). Problematically, such opposition by Western powers to contextualizing women’s issues within global power structures of domination and exploitation meant that violence against women, among other issues, was left ahistoricized and disconnected from the global political economy. For example, violence against women was included in the report by citing participants’ calls for policy measures and research into the extent of the issue. Domestic violence, in particular, took center stage with the establishment of shelters and treatment options in member countries as an urgent recommendation (UN, 1980).38

*Nairobi*

The third women’s conference occurred in Nairobi (1985) and was aimed at reviewing the accomplishments of the UN Decade for Women. In order to avoid another politicized conference, US delegate Maureen Reagan (daughter of then-President Ronald Reagan) argued for a change in the decision-making rules through an amendment for “general agreement.” Margaret Kenyatta, daughter of the former President of Kenya and leader of the Nairobi conference, was interested in having a successful conference for fear of damaging Kenya’s international reputation and thus, became an unexpected ally of Reagan’s. When the United States threatened to walk out of the conference if the term

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38 As Narayan (1997) demonstrates, this call for more shelters for survivors of abuse across the world is a strategy that is based on assumptions of similar experiences of violence by women transnationally, and also disregards local and national economies, structural resources, culture, and the needs of women.
Zionism was used in the “Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,” Kenyatta offered to substitute the language to a more palatable phrase regarding the discrimination women face globally (Joachim, 2007, p. 94-95). According to the official report on the Nairobi conference, the US explicitly disagreed with not only the language of colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, and racism but also rejected the claim that Third World poverty stemmed from inequitable economic relations and foreign occupations (UN, 1986, p. 17). The US also voted against the inclusion of references to the failings of official development assistance, accumulating debt, and trade protectionism that negatively affected the economies of developing nations. Moreover, the US rejected any mention of apartheid, and the call for sanctions and liberation for South Africa and Palestine. With regard to Palestine, the US voted against a paragraph that condemned the oppressive practices of the Israeli state, especially in regard to its treatment of women, stating that it contained “tendentious and unnecessary elements into the Forward Looking Strategies document which have only a nominal connection with the unique concerns of women” (UN, 1985: n.p.).

The depoliticization of the conference proceedings also occurred through an overreliance on statistical data on women’s issues. Before the Nairobi conference, convenors conducted the World Survey on the Role of Women in Development and shared the results with participants. Themes of water, sanitation, education, industrialization, and trade were spoken about as technical issues in the Third World that required Western assistance. While the survey distribution, collection, and lack of aggregated statistics on women were methodologically problematic, the data successfully tilted the meeting away from questions of power and redistribution, and toward women’s
issues as they related to economic development (Pieta & Vickers, 1996, p. 10; Joachim, 2007, p. 95-96). Of course, not all women experienced the conference in this way. According to an interview with Eva Rathgeber, a Canadian development consultant, Nairobi was a very exciting conference, and there was a diversity of women who were all moving in the same direction.

At the UN women’s conference in Nairobi (1985), ending violence against women was a top priority on the official agenda, and more than 100 workshops at the adjoining non-governmental organization (NGO) forum were devoted to this issue. Joachim (2007) argues that although this was a major achievement for feminists, it meant that activists began to lose control over how the issue was defined by “experts” in the field (p. 116). Following the 1985 UN conference, the UN Branches for the Advancement of Women and for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs called an “expert meeting on domestic violence” in 1986. NGOs and other women’s organizations, with a few exceptions, were not participants but rather observers of “experts” such as criminologists, social scientists and lawyers from the First World. The primary aim of the meeting was to share information about violence against women since little was known about the previously invisible and “private” issue. Experts argued that without information about the numbers of women affected by violence, governments and international bodies were unlikely to take the issue seriously. Most problematically, but not unlike other feminist organizing at the time, the experience of North American women (primarily white) came in to stand for all women’s experiences of violence. At the first UN lead expert meeting, VAW was most popularly understood as an act of violence perpetrated by mentally ill men, the result of
alcohol abuse or stress, the result of a provocation, and the result of “backwardness” of the Third World (Joachim, 2007, p. 118). Furthermore, Western nations continued to promote development as a cure for all societal ills in the Third World, including violence against women. While experts were successful at making VAW visible as an important issue at the UN, its narrow framing was problematic. As transnational and Third World feminists including Mohanty (2003) and Narayan (1997) and anti-violence advocates including Smith (2005) and INCITE (2006) argue, and as I explored in chapter 1, the hyper-visibilization of people of colour as “backward” and the criminalization of VAW leads to both the misrepresentation of violence against women and the imposition of failed approaches to solving the issue.

Beijing

In 1995, the Beijing Declaration outlined the centrality of the prevention and elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls. In the report, violence against women is considered an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality, development, and peace. Where conflict and peace are mentioned, the terms racism, apartheid, and neo-colonialism are noticeably absent. Moreover, while violations of the human rights of women are accounted for, “murder, torture, systematic rape, forced pregnancy, and forced abortion” are disconnected from unequal global power relations, and names of occupying forces are undocumented (UN, 1995, p. 9). While sustainable development is heralded, a call for a New International Economic Order is not mentioned.

39 Although this is true of the conceptualizations of VAW at the Nairobi conference and subsequent expert meeting, such re-presentations of VAW continue to be prevalent, if not overwhelming, in current explanations. That is to say, the way in which VAW has been framed historically continues to resonate in current definitions. For example, North America continues to rely on the criminalization of men (especially men of colour) to combat the issue, which suggests that there is little connection made between the prison-industrial complex and the way in which mainstream anti-violence organizations mobilize against VAW (INCITE, 2006; Smith, 2005).
in the official report. It is unclear that Third World women ceased to call for a change to uneven global economic systems in this space. However, because the Beijing Declaration relies so heavily on depoliticized discourses of empowerment and human rights, the outcome of the conference is arguably the least politically charged text emerging from all the UN conferences on women.

According to Maxine Molyneux and Shahra Razavi (2006), the “‘Beijing conference’ was a landmark in policy terms, setting a global policy framework to advance gender equality” (p. iv). Both the “Plus 5” and “Plus 10” conferences that followed the Beijing conference affirmed policy, but did not set new agendas. Thus, the Beijing Declaration set the stage for international women’s equality mobilizations. Significantly, its legacy in terms of anti-violence agitation is that it has set the issue of violence against women within the context of development and human rights, and separate from radical calls from “Southern” voices to restructure the global political economy. Defining violence against women as an issue that could be eliminated through development, the collective and powerful voices of the Group of Seventy-Seven who called for an overhaul of existing structural relations were silenced or uninvited from this space, or both. According to Desai (2005), the mantra “Women’s rights are human rights” became “paradigmatic” in Beijing (p. 323). Arguing that human rights complement rather than conflict with neoliberalism, Desai (2005) asserts that the emergence of the “rights discourse” at Beijing as both a hegemonic language structure and influential ideology “coincided with the domination of the neo-liberal discourse” at the UN (p. 323). That is, as women’s rights were articulated as human rights, critiques of neoliberalism—the overwhelming global economy construct—fell to the wayside. This
change in discourse has had important implications for the agendas set with regard to women’s issues. According to Molyneux and Razavi (2002), most governments have fulfilled their trade treaties and obligations to the World Bank, for example, rather than their human rights agreements since Beijing. Noting that most Third World women participated in adjoining but separate forums, rather than the official Beijing forum, Desai (2005) argues that the UN is a sight for agenda setting, but is hardly a space for transnational feminist solidarity building. Claiming that Western participants, in particular, see the UN as a space to “aid” Third World women, Desai maintains that the UN may no longer be the appropriate space for Third World women’s political activism (p. 323), especially those agitating against violence at the intersections of women’s equality, neocolonialism, occupation, imperialism, and neoliberalism. Yet, it remains the key site for agenda setting given that feminist mobilizations against violence continue to occur at the UN.

From Beijing to UNiTE

Given the tenacious history of women’s activism at the United Nations, what does this mean for anti-violence work at the UN now? If Third World women have little access and power in the international organization, how are “their” problems being addressed? While the UN is a site that has drawn considerable academic and activist criticism of its membership, internal power relations, and the structure of its Security Council, it remains a central site for claims to international gender equality. According to Amartya Sen (2006):

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40 Born in the aftermath of the Second World War, the UN’s original mission of peace building soon became secondary to development, as countries in Africa and Asia were becoming independent from colonial rule. Reflected in the structure of the Security Council, including the veto power for the victors of
Even though the United Nations is often separated out these days for particular chastisement for being ineffective (or worse), the UN and the intellectual and political movements associated with it have contributed greatly to making our world a bit less nasty and more livable. And even though women had to fight to be heard and influence the making and working of this grand institution, the constructive impact of women’s ideas and leadership can be seen in nearly every field in which the UN has made significant contributions (p. xvii).

Regardless of criticism toward the institution, the UN has a global state-based membership, policy and monetary power, a foundation for a sizeable audience, and broad and sophisticated media and social media outreach. Reaching millions through disseminating information via the Internet, national strategies, and the policy adoptions of member states, as well as funding local advocacy and grassroots organizing, there may be no better place for an anti-violence initiative to be housed. Even as the UN as a site for women’s activism remains precarious, especially for Third World women who have historically struggled to gain meaningful access and power within the institution, it remains a crucial site for agenda-setting for the development industry and transnational feminist mobilizations. Thus, it continues to be a complex and important site to inquire about women’s issues, gender equality, and representations of Third World “problems.”

**UNiTE to End Violence Against Women: awareness campaigns and affect**

According to the UNiTE (2012) campaign, violence against women is a universally unjustifiable crime, but exists at every corner of the world. UNiTE maintains that it is persistent discrimination against women that lies at the root of the issue, and violence against women is unconfined to any culture, region, or country. Importantly, UNiTE outlines the campaign’s attentiveness to the intersections of ethnicity, caste, class, migrant or refugee status, age, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, disability or

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the Second World War and its ideology and language of development, the UN mirrors neo-colonial rule and uneven global power structures even as it promotes itself as an a political leader of global equality.
HIV status with women’s experiences of violence. Unexpectedly, the campaign material includes a discussion of violence against Indigenous women and police violence in custody—a global issue that is habitually obscured or ignored by mainstream anti-violence organizing and the development industry. While UNiTE considers the systemic and structural roots of violence, it problematically maintains that the primary manifestation of violence that women experience is men’s violence against their intimate partners. It does so by outlining “The Situation” of global violence against women (UN, 2012b).

Highlighting culturalized practices such as dowry murders, honour killings and female genital mutilation/cutting, violent practices that are overwhelmingly represented as exoticized practices of “backward” Third World cultures. The focus on these culturalized narratives does particular discursive work for the awareness campaign. Emphasizing the most “extreme” forms of violence against women, against the more “ordinary” and ongoing practices, UNiTE’s global “Situation” overview functions as a “colonialist stance” (Narayan, 1997, p. 59). That is, while the UNiTE campaign aims to bring all practices of violence into one global awareness campaign, it does so by presenting other women’s experiences as the most “extreme” or urgent cases. Aside from the inherent problem with focusing on issues of VAW that have historically been hyper-visibilized by Western feminists and development experts, the aim of the “global” campaign lacks the intersectionality or transnationality it claims. As I demonstrate in my

41 Unsurprisingly, race is not considered an important factor in the UNiTE’s intersectional analysis of violence against women globally. Critical race scholars developed intersectional theory, including Krenshaw (1995) who coined the term, which makes the campaign’s inattention to race a massive oversight. According to Kothari (2006) development discourses rarely include the term “race,” and development actively considers race “relatively unimportant in shaping inequalities, injustice and poverty.” Instead, other categories of social differentiation such as ethnicity, religion, and culture are perceived to the greatest significance (p. 2).
analysis of the map below, while the UNiTE campaign claims to be global in nature, the scope of the advocacy and awareness initiative is anything but global.

Figure 1: (UN, 2012c).

Focusing its attention on the locational space of the Global South, the UNiTE “Worldwide” (2012c) map highlights particular cases of violence even as it attempts to create awareness of the issue as global (see Figure 1). As my analysis of UNiTE “Worldwide” reveals, the map functions as neutral representation among other awareness-raising materials, and yet, cartographic projects must be problematized. According to Smith and Katz (1993), the purpose of mapping is to produce a scale representation of a space such that the representation is considered “accurate” for a particular purpose. Mapping is a particular political project that is too often deployed as a technical and objective practice. They write:

Mapping involves exploration, selection, definition, generalization, and translation of data, it assumes a range of social cum representational power, and as the military

42 Here, I use Global South and Global North instead of the discursive construct of the “Third World” and the “West” to mark the way in which actual practice of geographic mapping is essential to the affective economy of the UNiTE campaign.
histories of geography and cartography suggest, the power to map can be closely entwined with the power of conquest and social control (69).

Importantly, maps do not only define an area of inquiry, but may also give new form to a set of problems. Functioning as “absolute space,” spaces that read as high or extreme violence against women due to their colouring (in contrast to spaces that are not highlighted by colour) are mapped onto recognized locational coordinates divided by imposed nation-state boundaries and borderlands by the UNiTE campaign. The scaled representation of violence against women in the form of a map produces a specific form to the problem, and creates a spatialized dimension to what can be known and felt about the issue. In particular, the way in which the UNiTE “Worldwide” (UN, 2012c) map is highlighted is important to how the map as a representation circulates within discourses of the campaign. As a scaled representation, the scope of the UNiTE map is limited to countries that are both of concern to the UN, and the target of UN investments and interventions. Moreover, the interactive nature of the map gives participants a sense of control and mastery of the knowledge produced on anti-violence initiatives that “pop up” at the click of a mouse. Mastery and knowledge is offered to a participant in terms of the visible simplicity of a colour-coded map, but it is also felt as flesh-knowledge. That is, the map offers affective possibilities through evoking bodily intensities that are coded as emotions of control, understanding, excitement, and ease. Such affective and emotional reactions to the map are not neutral, but rather orient participants toward “political feelings” in the most basic sense of the term. On the UNiTE website, participants are encouraged to click on highlighted countries in order to learn more about how the UN is establishing anti-violence strategies in that context. The map not only generates the participant’s feelings of control, but also communicates to viewers of the map that the
UN is the primary agent of change. Thus, participants are invited to feel comfortable and even proud of the UN for taking control of, and fixing, a complex global problem.

While it is clear by the campaign’s situational overview that violence against women is global, it is the Global South that is highlighted and becomes the intended focus of the audience’s attention. As Canada and the US, for example, literally fade into the background on the map, Global South countries are made hyper-visible as the targets for intervention. Obscured from the view of UNiTE participants are Northern countries, which are not highlighted, and thus go unmarked as gender inequitable. As Mohanty (2003) maintains, the division between the “Western/Third World,” or “North/South,” “local/global” or “developed/underdeveloped” presents the world through divisions between oppositional and unconnected spaces that disallow points of connection and distance between women across numerous dimensions (p. 243). In particular, the experience of Indigenous women who are vulnerable to poverty and violence through the impacts of colonization of the so-called developed world are actively obscured by such representations.

In the study of international development communication, Alhassan (2009) uses the term “telescopic philanthropy” to explain the discursive and performative functions of savior discourses. In particular, Alhassan is concerned by how the Third World is made visible from afar. Citing Charles Dickens’ *Bleak House* (1853), Alhassan describes the way in which the character Mrs. Jellyby neglects both her house and children but is obsessed with projects designed to save Africans in the Congo. Ignoring problems “here” and obsessing about poverty “over there,” Alhassan understands Dickens’ use of the term “telescopic philanthropy” to denote the way in which development discourses magnify,
highlight, and focus attention on the Third World as a site for saving. While Alhassan’s interest is in representation and philanthropy, there is an affective capacity to telescopic philanthropy that is under-theorized.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2013), the term telescopic is defined as “relating to or made with a telescope.” Here, it is the relational aspect of telescopic philanthropy that is most significant. As Ahmed (2004) maintains, affect is relational. Sliding between bodies and signs and impressing upon the surfaces of bodies, affect is not contained within an object but moves between objects. In Alhassan’s (2009) conception of telescopic philanthropy, signs such as hunger and poverty which can be seen by (white) Western saviors by means of a telescope function to represent backwardness or lack of progress, and invites a charitable response. *Feeling through a telescope*, then, is an affective project between distant bodies and those signs, which intensify affective responses as it magnifies the line of sight. If, as Alhassan suggests, poverty is a sign of backwardness as seen from afar, through its magnification under a telescope, feeling telescopically can be described as the affective relations between the bodies that see and are seen, and the signs that not only signify, but also generate affect, emotions, and even “political feelings.”

Circulating as an object that can create and shape political feelings, their direction, how they move, and to whom they “stick,” the UNiTE Worldwide (2012b) map does affective work for the campaign. By augmenting participants’ focus on particular countries as problem areas, the UNiTE map not only frames the representation of global violence against women telescopically, but also narrows the possibilities of feeling through telescopic representation. Here, I use the term “telescopic feeling” to refer to the
political feelings that are possible in being affected and affecting from afar via a telescopic view. Limiting the scope of view, and thus the scope for feelings, telescopic feeling both relies on the associations between singular, or small signs, and a historical archive of identification of these signs, as well as what is obscured by the process of magnification, namely the productions of the line of sight. That is, the possibilities for affective response are shaped by what can be seen, and thus, felt by participants, as well as what goes unseen or is obscured by the frame of focus.

In the UNiTE campaign, the scope of the initiative is narrow. Limiting the frame and highlighting Global South countries as areas of concerns, a campaign participant is asked, or even obliged, to have affective attachments to particular countries, and demonstrate concern with specific practices of violence against women. As Hemmings (2003) suggests, affective attachments are not made at random, but are rather driven by social inequalities and discursive structures. The UNiTE campaign makes clear that the scope of the awareness and advocacy initiatives are directed to places historically marked as “over there.” While some participants of the UNiTE campaign may reside in the places marked as problem sites, the UNiTE campaign relies on an Orientalist conception of the “West and the Rest” by demarcating the boundaries between the “developed/undeveloped, civilized/uncivilized, modern/backward” world. By highlighting problem sites, the UNiTE Worldwide map encourages participants to “zoom in” on the emphasized continents that are positioned both as “afar,” as disconnected from the West (UN, 2012c). Disallowing connections between violence that occurs in the West and Third World, and obscuring violence committed, encouraged, or tacitly accepted by the West, the UNiTE map positions the Global South as the site of intervention and the
West as the intervener, regardless of the participant’s place of interaction with the campaign.

Global violence against women is an issue that may make one feel overwhelmed and confused by its various manifestations transnationally, by levels of violence and the way they intersect with other forms of oppression, as well as the colonial legacies and imperial present that violent practices are embedded within. However, by narrowing the frame of focus, the telescopic presentation of VAW prohibits the possibility of being immobilized by a sense of confusion in the UNiTE campaign. Instead, the transnational phenomenon of violence against women is made knowable, manageable, and fixable. Feeling telescopically, then, relies on the production of otherness or “over there-ness” in regard to violence against women to move people to act. As an issue that takes place “over there,” participants can feel in control, that the issue is manageable, that they have the power to fix the issue because they know about the subject. Moreover, they can trust that UN as an “expert” is already on its way to solving a complex problem by way of the map’s over-simplification.

The UNiTE campaign has been launched in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific. Through mobilizing participants passion to eliminate violence against women globally, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific emerge as the sites most in need of global anti-violence activism (UN, 2012c). As sites historically problematized as “backward” and poor (Escobar, 1995), the continents that the UNiTE campaign has chosen to target are associated with an enormous archive of knowledge produced by colonizers and development experts, and I suggest an archive of
feelings. While feelings do not appear in the object of the UNiTE map, feelings are generative through the way in which affect moves between the object of the map and violence against women as a sign that is often understood in the development community as a symptom of backwardness and a cause of underdevelopment (Carrillo, 1992). Feelings of sorrow, sympathy, outrage, grief, mastery of knowledge, and passion to take actions are combined and interlock with stereotypical and racist assumptions, savior discourses, and political feelings of charity and benevolence that are made available to participants through the ways countries are represented as the prime targets for intervention.

Moreover, the UNiTE Worldwide (2012c) map functions as an abstraction, but also a representation of absolute space that works to fix bodies in affective relation with UNiTE participants. The emphasis on the Global South, in both spatial terms and through the discursive practices of the campaign, positions Third World bodies in a particular place within an affective economy. The mapping of violence against women as UNiTE has allows some bodies to be read as the perpetrators of violent practices, and thus the target of our disdain or our sympathy. Importantly, some bodies are not represented on the map as perpetrators or victims, and thus are not explicitly intended to be targets for affective responses, although these bodies certainly gain importance in the circulation of affect. That is, the historical accumulation of affect, expressed through emotions such as sympathy and pity, shape not only the continents highlighted on the UNiTE map, but also the continents that are unmarked. Those countries that fade into the background of the UNiTE Worldwide map are effectively represented as gender equitable and disconnected from the violence of Global South countries. Importantly, they are not presented as the

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target aim for political feelings that are intended to move people to act against gendered violence.

For example, as outlined in the “Situation” overview, UNiTE describes “Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C)” as a major concern for the continent of Africa (UN, 2012b). Through the highlighting of Africa, as a space open for anti-violence intervention, UNiTE participants are encouraged to associate “traditional” or “extreme” practices of violence with the mapping of absolute space in which it is said to occur. As post-colonial, Third World, and critical race feminists have articulated in a thorough body of work on the representation of Third World women, oppressive practices such as violence are presented as similar, unchanging over time, culturally based, and manageable through saving women from the “dangerous brown men” who dominate them (Spivak, 1998; Mohanty, 2003, Narayan, 1997; Bhattacharyya, 2008). Highlighting Africa, and focusing on FGM/C in particular, may couple UNiTE participants’ feelings of confusion, pity, and sympathy for victims with outrage, and disdain for, or fear of, perpetrators of such acts. As the UNiTE “Worldwide” map positions the Third World as the site of intervention, it is racialized Third World men who become the objects of which emotions such as scorn or fear “stick” and slide between. According to Puar (2007), affect slides between bodies who look like or “seem [a]like” (p. 187). Borrowing from Ahmed’s (2004) theorization of Fanon’s (2008) account of racial affect, Puar understands fear to gain value in an affective economy in that it circulates between signifiers and bodies. Since emotions do not reside in bodies but instead move between them, subjects are bound together by affect, creating “pools of suspicious bodies” (Puar, 2007, p. 184). Emotions such as fear and hate slides between bodies, but gets stuck on
bodies that are historically associated with fear and hate. Here, affect is made meaningful through associating bodily intensities to emotional expressions, histories, and systems of power. In this anti-violence campaign, racialized men from the Global South are highlighted as perpetrators of violence by the construction of women from the Global South as its foremost victims. While not all Global South men perpetrate violence against women, fear and hate, as nonresidential emotions, can be materialized on any body that “could be” a perpetrator. As distinct from the visibly discerned “looks like,” the concept “seems like” gestures to the realm of affect (Puar, 2007, p. 187). Others are made fearsome through misrecognition. Importantly, those understood as “us” are not similarly feared or hated. In the UNiTE campaign, the colour-coded map functions to evoke nonresidential emotions that slide between imagined bodies that “seem like” one another. As contagious bodies to be feared, an entire populace with a similar profile can be targeted for intervention through misrecognition. As UNiTE makes clear by its Men’s Leaders project, it is men from the Global South who require leadership in ending practices of violence against women (UN 2012e). Importantly, such feelings are already known in that fear of racialized men’s violence is not a new concept, but rather floats as popular understanding. 44

Such representations not only collapse complex and changing practices of violence onto entire continents with many nations, and a multiplicity of cultures and religions, but also invites a particular type of political feeling. That is, the mapping of UNiTE Worldwide communicates to participants which sites of intervention are the most urgent, and also shapes which countries and which practices of violence against women

44 See for example Bhattacharyya (2008) on the popularization of representations of dangerous racialized men, especially in the “post-9/11 period.”
participants can feel passionately toward. As a space in which “extreme” forms of violence against women are understood to be practiced, political feelings of fear and pity are affective responses that become possible through telescopic feeling. By highlighting only targeted countries, UNiTE participants are foreclosed from the possibility of feeling accountable for the ways in which neo-colonization and global economic regimes, for example, have influenced or sustained such practices of violence, including economic violence, and the ways in which Westerners understand the issue. Instead, participants are encouraged to feel sympathy for victims without ever making connections between the “Global North/South,” “developed/underdeveloped,” or “Western/Third World,” and the complex manifestations of violence against women within and between nations.

While the UNiTE “Worldwide” (2012c) map itself does not contain affect, it appears within the UNiTE campaign as an affective sign. The mapping of the Global South resonates with intensity within the campaign because of its hegemonic circulation within discourse and practices of development. As Ahmed (2004b) maintains, affect circulates within an economy of accumulation where value is gained over time. She writes, “the more [emotions] circulate, the more affective they become” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 120). Obscuring the historical legacy of the creation and mapping of the Third World, the emotions generated and inextricably tied to colonization such as intrigue, fear, sympathy, and altruism, embedded in current development discourses and practices circulate with significant value within the UNiTE campaign. Moreover, given the historical archive of feelings associated with violence against women and the Third World, especially in regard to misogynist men and patriarchal cultures, the already accumulating disdain for racialized men as perpetrators of violence, and sympathy for
racialized women (when savable by white men and women) circulates with affective value. Imagined as absolute space, a map of continents such as Africa emerge within the UNiTE campaign as an objective form to a manageable set of problems, and invites participants not only to become aware of violent practices within the continent, but also to take action in particular ways, namely by making a donation.

Affective Possibilities: Say(ing) No and Donating for Change

According to the campaign’s website, UNiTE’s aim is to “galvanize action across the UN system to prevent and punish violence against women” (UN, 2012). In order to incite action, UNiTE provides a variety of action-oriented opportunities for participants at various levels, including governments, civil society, and individuals. One major component of UNiTE’s mandate is to involve men and boys in the elimination of violence against women. Following a decade of pursuing a “men and development” agenda among development institutions, UNiTE maintains the importance of including men in the often feminized work of “doing gender” in development. For UNiTE (2012e), men and boys are often raised to accept and perpetuate sexist behaviour. However, many men also feel uncomfortable with men’s violence against women, and seek emotional support from other men in order to intervene. As well as providing role models for men to stimulate passion for the elimination of violence against women, the desire to take action against violence is shored up by UNiTE’s Say NO campaign (UN 2012d).

According to the UNiTE’s website, Say NO is a “global platform for advocacy and action by individuals, governments, civil society and UN partners which initiates, supports and demonstrates local and national advocacy efforts towards ending violence against women and girls” (UN 2012d). Launched by UN Women in 2009, the Say NO campaign uses an
interactive website as well as social media to encourage participation from “people from all walks of life, online and on the ground” (UN, 2012 d). According to UNiTE, saying “no” to violence against women is vital. Citing hegemonic narratives of violence against women in development discourse, campaign material claims that violent practices not only harms families and communities, but also stunts development and undermines economic growth. Mirroring the UNiTE campaign, the Say NO website suggests that everyone has a role to play in ending the global pandemic of VAW and “the time to act together is NOW” (UN, 2012d). Both aiming to trigger and highlight actions taken against violence, the Say NO initiative aims to generate support by way of the number of participants and donations to the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women.

In order to take action by saying “no” and donating money, participants must feel the urgency with which the global pandemic of VAW must be eliminated. In order to affect participants to affect change, the Say NO campaign material does emotional work. For example, when a participant chooses to “Take Action” on the Say NO website, they are told: “We know you want to make a difference” (UN, 2012d, emphasis my own). Here, the word “want” orients participants toward action, and associated emotions such as desire, ambition, and aspiration “stick” to the bodies of those who long to help. This “want” may provide the conditions for a collective desire, and thus a collective identity of those who yearn to help. In contrast, others may be read as those who cannot help themselves or do not desire to make a difference. As an emotional text, the Say NO website invites participants to feel empowered as agents of change, and feel sorry for those who cannot help themselves. Figures of speech can generate affect, and the emotionality of text functions through both how texts move and are moving, and also
through the way in which emotions are named in texts. In placing importance on the ways in which the circulation of words can generate emotion, Ahmed (2004) argues that feelings shape different kinds of actions and orientations, such as taking action to end violence against women.

As a participant, there are many ways to take action in the Say NO campaign. Importantly, grassroots organizations have joined UNiTE, and specifically the Say NO campaign, to affect change “on the ground.” Organizations such as the Rainbow Women’s Network have used Say NO as a platform to support lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) women, female ex-prisoners and sex workers in Fiji who face violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation or stigma related to sex work (UN, 2012f). This important work should not be downplayed. In fact, the UNiTE platform may help to fund and support sophisticated strategies to end violence against women in communities around the world. According to an interview with Todd Minerson, the sheer size and bureaucracy of the UN structure can stifle the passion and commitment of individuals to do great work (Minerson, personal communication, 2012). Given the complex nature of the UN system and the issue of global violence against women, the UNiTE and Say No campaigns present a simplified representation of a problem that requires a nuanced approach. According to an interview with Jane Parpart, “nuances are difficult for organizations to deal with.” Although people within organizations know the complexities, they also know how to present an issue to the public (Parpart, personal communication, 2012). The problem of simplicity in practice is demonstrated by how the UN creates an extremely accessible action for participants. In the West, participants are asked to sign onto the campaign through a petition, and to
donate to the UN Trust Fund. Significantly, both actions can be taken online and require little to no collective action in person. In fact, the campaign affectively discourages collective feelings of agitation, anger, and outrage against collective structures, or uneasiness with the UN as the most appropriate organization to fund grassroots organizations. While grassroots mobilization is encouraged for participants in countries marked with high levels of violence, as the most visible forms of partaking in the initiative on the website, Western participants are only asked to become sympathetic enough to sign onto the campaign and donate to the UN. The ways in which VAW is constructed as urgent in the campaigns make the choice to click “no” immediately provides both a instant sense of relief for “doing something” about this issue, and also prompt “feel-good” emotions that come with saying “no.”

In her foundational work on social movements, Gould (2009) argues that the question of how and why people take political action can be answered through understanding the affective realm. Similarly, analyzing the affective politics of the Say NO campaign reveals the ways in which participants are encouraged to take action against violence. Focusing her work on social movements, Gould (2009) claims that the term “movement” gestures toward the realm of affect. Providing a case study of ACT UP, a direct action AIDS organization in the US, reveals the ways in which affect, being moved, and making movements involves bodily intensities, emotions, feelings, and passion. Analyzing how political feelings are generated, sustained, and altered in political action, Gould is concerned with how individual feelings become collective, or collectivized in social movements. Pointing to the importance of understanding how feelings shape political action, Gould’s case study of ACT UP reveals the ways in which
affective possibilities are shaped by activist strategies. For example, Gould questions the limitation of possibilities for grief and grieving the deaths experienced by queer communities at the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the US. As members of their communities died, participants of the direct action group were called on to feel anger and outrage against discriminatory healthcare and government policies, rather than sorrow or sadness. By taking direct action by means of protests, performances, and rallies, ACT UP participants’ political feelings were shaped, and sometimes foreclosed, by the movement’s trajectory or “political horizon” (Gould, 2009, p. 3).

Similarly, UNiTE’s use of the phrase “take action” signals affect. Borrowing Gould’s (2009) notion of “political feelings,” I suggest that the Say NO campaign and the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women relies on the use and circulation of emotion words, and the representation of objects as signs of feelings. The “political feelings” that are permissible and prohibited are constructed by the affective structure of the campaign.

*Signing on, Saying No*

As part of the two-fold UNiTE to End Violence Against Women awareness and advocacy campaign, the Say NO initiative is a social mobilization platform where participants are encouraged to add their names to the roster of those who have said “no” to VAW. According to the website:

Say NO records what individuals, organizations and governments worldwide are doing to end violence against women. Whether you volunteer at a shelter, donate, reach out to students or advocate for better policies – every action counts (UN 2012d).

*Say NO* claims that anywhere from “15 to 76 percent of women may be abused in their lifetime” (UN 2012d). Given the large percentage of women who may be affected in their
lifetime, Say NO maintains that the time is “NOW” to end violence against women. Spreading a feeling of urgency, the Say NO initiative requests that participant’s let UNiTE “count [them] in to make a difference.” According to the website, over 5,597,648 actions had been taken as of May 2013. Gesturing toward the affect realm, a “political horizon” is generated in and through the initiative’s emphasis on the desire to join, to feel a sense of belonging by being counted in, and feeling empowered to end violence against women “now.” Participants are told that their “voice matters,” and by signing onto the Say NO campaign their voices will be added to the 5 million who have already communicated to governments around the world that ending violence against women is an urgent priority (UN 2012d). Adding one’s name to “this powerful call to take action” is expressed through political feelings (UN 2012d). That is, participants are invited to feel desire and a sense of belonging and empowerment by adding their names to the Say NO petition.

While an emotional response to violence against women globally is invoked in other parts of the campaign, the Say NO petition centers on the participant’s experience of empowerment by joining the campaign. The language of empowerment operates through signs in the Say NO campaign, simultaneously conveying and concealing histories of power, and attaching power affectively to some bodies while bypassing others. As the Say NO campaign focuses on the emotions of the participants, those who are interpellated as the “you” who should desire to be counted in are most important to the initiative. Assuming that “you” should “want” to join the campaign via signing the petition, one is allowed to enter into a relationship with those that experience violence as an individual that feels desire to help, who seeks to be empowered by joining “this
powerful campaign,” (UN 2012d). As the UNiTE campaign outlines the Third World as the site of intervention (UN 2012c), signing onto the campaign functions as the entrance into a relationship with the other. It is this form of contact with both the objects and objectives of the campaign that solidifies the “political feelings” a participant can express in the campaign.

The focus on joining and belonging situates power within the hands of those who choose to Say NO and sign the petition. Thus, those who are rewarded for joining the campaign, rather than those who have survived violence, are allowed to feel empowered by the initiative. In the Cultural Politics of Emotions (2004), Ahmed uses an instructional letter inviting donations to end the pain caused by landmines to describe her use of the term “aboutness” (p. 21). Suggesting that development and humanitarian campaigns can ensure that participants are aligned with the other through differentiation, rather than through shared experience or interests by means of solidarity, Ahmed claims that “our” feelings remain the most important. The imperative to feel something for the Other is not “about” the feelings of pain experienced by victims of landmines, for example, but “about” our feelings “about their suffering, an “aboutness” that ensure[s] that they remain the object of ‘our feeling’” (p. 21, emphasis original). Thus, the affective politics of pain is as much, or more, about “our” feelings than the other’s pain. For Sherene Razack (2007) this “aboutness” can be described as “stealing the pain of others.” She argues that charitable sympathy produces a process of consumption that it is the antithesis to collective outrage for the rights of others. I will return to the ideas of political feelings and charitable consumption later in this chapter.
Comparable to the case of the anti-landmine campaign letter, I maintain that the “aboutness” of the Say NO petition centers on “our” empowerment and is about “our” desire to help, to belong, and our “want” to join the global collective of people saying “no” to violence. The “aboutness” of the campaign is not the experiences of violence that women around the world are vulnerable to, but rather the promise of empowerment in the act of saying “no.” Overcoming violence against women as a global epidemic, promised by the Say NO campaign, is a means by which the participant is empowered and can feel a sense of belonging with a collective body of those affected by the campaign.

The emotionality of empowerment and belonging are sticky attachments within this affective economy. As Ahmed (2004) maintains, the “stickiness” of affect, and the act of emotions “getting stuck” on bodies, including collective bodies, functions through the ways in which signs and objects, and their historical associations, often “work” through concealment. Ahmed claims that the stickiness of an object should not be understood as an object itself being sticky, but the accumulation of affect from that which the object touches. Signs become sticky through repetition, the welcome-ness of the sign, and the labour behind its repetition is concealed in the Say NO campaign. That is, if a word is habitually circulated within a set of discourses, its “use” becomes intrinsic and the history of its use and circulation is concealed. The language of joining, belonging, and being empowered, in particular, are sticky because of their affective value as emotional words that circulate routinely in development campaigns. Specifically, the use of language around empowerment in campaigns aiming to end poverty, suffering, and violence in the Third World are affectively sticky because the signs and objects of the Third World are regularly circulated within development discourses.
Empowerment is considered a “motherhood” term in development discourses (Parpart, Rai & Saudt, 2002). In gender and development circles, empowerment is an all embracing, and often depoliticized, discursive maneuver that has been used in support of a variety of practices and projects aimed to generate gender equity throughout the Third World. Empowerment is an expression emerging from liberal feminist agitation against representations and practices that assumed Third World women’s passiveness, but often appears without historical context, and thus circulates affective value. While the language of empowerment is often “stuck” to Third World women’s bodies, specifically women and girls who are historically represented as powerless or lacking power, in this case it is the participants of the Say NO campaign that are promised empowerment. That is not to say that the UNiTE campaign at large is not interested in Third World women’s empowerment as a means to overcome VAW, but rather that the Say NO initiative’s “aboutness” centers on the participants who say “no.”

To borrow Gould’s (2009) term, the “political horizon” of the Say NO campaign is shaped by the language that describes the emotionality around “taking action” (UN 2012d). In particular, the affective value of the language of empowerment, desire, and belonging in the campaign disallows anger, sadness, outrage, or grief about violent practices in their various manifestations, and instead focuses on the emotional benefits that can be attained by saying “no” to violence. Importantly, the participant is positioned as a Westerner by way of situating the subject as a benevolent and charitable helper of others. By aligning the participant who is asked to say “no” to violence as differentiated from others who experience violence and require the aid of those with the power to say no and affect change, the feeling of belonging is not shared. The campaign’s affective
strategies include how it generates a collective body of empowered individuals who belong through their desire to help others. In opposition, the bodies on which this affective strategy to empower are impressed upon through telescopic feelings. That is, a collective body of others “over there” is also generated in contrast to those who are “here” and empowered to belong.

Others enter an affective relationship with those who desire to belong and be empowered through representations of their pain. In particular, the elimination of Third World women’s experiences of pain and suffering is presented as causally linked to the support and empowerment of those who sign the Say NO petition or make a donation to the UN Trust Fund.

Affecting Pain: UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women

In addition to saying “no,” Say NO participants are encourage to donate to the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. By asking: “Won’t you help?” the campaign claims: “Every contribution is vital. Every dollar tells women and girls who experience violence that they are not forgotten.” (UN, 2012d). According to UN Women, the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women (2012) “is a testimony to the global consciousness that violence against women and girls is neither inevitable nor acceptable.” As a grant-making mechanism the UN Trust Fund supports the work of various organizations working to address violence against women and girls. Taking action by donating to the Fund orients UNiTE participants toward desiring to help in a similar way as the Say NO petition. Generating a collective body of those who desire to help, participants enter an affective relationship with those that are represented as in need of help. As an anti-violence initiative, the UNiTE and Say NO campaign relies on the
communication of Third World women’s experiences of pain, suffering and trauma. Using stories from women’s experiences of violence, the Say NO initiatives aims to affectively move participants to take action by donating to the UN Trust Fund.

Pain and physical suffering as an outcome of violent practices is often described as a bodily sensation. However, according to Ahmed (2004), pain that does damage to the skin’s surface also opens bodies up to others. Pain circulates in the public domain, not as a discursive concept, but as an “intensification” (p. 15). That is, how one experiences pain not only corresponds to damage to the body and psyche, but also involves meaning-making practices. Knowing pain as bodily sensation can only occur through association with other “feeling states” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 23). Differentiating pain from other feelings, expressing the sensation of pain, and recognizing pain in others is what Ahmed terms “intensification.” Using the surface of skin as an example, Ahmed claims that it is a shell for the body that acts as a container, but it is also where others can impress upon us, and thus, pain can change the surface of bodies. In other words, that which separates bodies also connects bodies to others. Ahmed (2004) writes: “pain is hence bound up in how we inhabit the world, how we live in relationship to the surfaces, bodies, and objects that make up our dwelling places” (p. 27). Understanding pain as a bodily sensation, but also an experience that places bodies in affective relation with others, Ahmed asks not “what is pain?” but rather “what does pain do?” (p. 27, emphasis original).

Here, I ask: what does pain do in the context of a global anti-violence campaign? In particular, I am interested in the ways in which pain, suffering, and trauma affect women who experience violence, but also how these experiences of violence and narratives of pain circulate in an affective economy. As a campaign that aims to move
participants to take action in the form of donations, the Say NO initiative relies on connections or attachments to be made to the survivors of violence that are highlighted by UNiTE in the form of storytelling. Individual women are asked to tell their stories of pain, and also the ways that they have overcome pain. To be touched, or moved, in a certain way by this telescopic encounter with others requires an affective response to pain. In the context of development, affective economies of pain are political. The expression of pain through emotion or emotional words and images gain value in their circulation and repetition in an economy that relies on donations. The alignment of participants toward donorship rather than solidarity is a significant outcome of this campaign, and one that I will return to in this chapter. As narratives of pain open up bodies to an alignment with others who feel empathy or sympathy, single stories of suffering also conceal historical context and complex questions of the political, economic, and social aspects of violence against women in so far as a simple monetary donation is understood as a solution to VAW.

In the Cultural Politics of Emotions (2004), Ahmed asks: “How does pain enter politics?” (p. 20). Centering landmines in her discussion of the affect evoked in public discourses of pain, Ahmed studies a letter from Christian Aid to previous donors describing the pain caused by landmines. Arguing that a discursive manoeuvre of causality posits landmines as the cause of pain, and not the political and militarized relations in which landmines are manufactured and operationalized, relies on affective politics of empowerment, as much as it relies on the affective circulation of trauma. That is, Ahmed argues that the Christian Aid letter in question uses landmines to signify pain while also ensuring that notions of support and empowerment are linked to a donation.
Similar to the anti-landmine initiative, the Say NO campaign uses a variety of practices of violence against women to signify pain while ensuring that support is linked to the UN Trust Fund, and empowerment to those choosing to donate. Pain as a bodily sensation related to violence is expressed through women’s emotions and the use of emotional words. “Political feelings,” or that which participants are supposed to feel by the structure of the campaign, are attached to the stories told. Which stories are told, and that which goes untold, in the Say NO campaign reflect the way in which participants are asked to generate attachments to Third World women. Unsurprisingly, stories of violence against women that are often exoticized and culturalized in Western academic scholarship and development campaign materials take center stage within the Say NO campaign. Mirroring UNiTE’s “Situation” overview (UN, 2012b), the Say NO campaign uses “extreme” practices of violence against women to affect its participants.

In an article entitled “Cambodia: Reclaiming Life after Acid Attacks” (UN, 2011) UNiTE presents the story of Chhean who stood up to her sister’s husband in 2008 when he sold his two-year old daughter to a trafficking ring in order to purchase a motorbike. When Chhean threatened her brother-in-law with a lawsuit, he threw acid on her. It burned her face, eyes, shoulder, and left hand. Chhean, a widow and sole provider for her four children, is represented as an empowered woman who aimed to save her sister’s family from a violent man and experienced violence because she took action on her own. Her pain is represented through the impressions on her body left by the acid burning, as well as her somber facial expression as she sits in front of a sewing machine.
Through the action of sewing, Chhean is represented as empowered. Assumed to be able to find employment, even though she is physically scarred from the violent attack, Chhean can be understood to have overcome her pain through the support of the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. Through her emotional expression presented in Figure 2, as well as the emotional work of her story of pain and empowerment, Chhean’s narrative is aimed at moving participants to donate. In particular, her story is directly connected to the work of Acid Survivors Trust International, which is an organization that is sponsored by the UN Trust Fund. According to the story, Chhean and her sister are now active in their community working with survivors of acid attacks. UNiTE claims: “Despite the scars, Chhean and Ponleu continue to build their confidence as survivors and help those around them” (UN, 2011). Chhean and Ponleu are not only represented as disabled heroes that have overcome their physical impairments (Clare, 1999; McRuer, 2003), but their story also functions to evoke affective responses from participants.
UNiTE maintains that acid attacks are common and widespread in Cambodia and that most women “find themselves in the dark for adequate legal, medical and psychological support” (UN, 2011). With no information provided about the availability of acid as a tool to commit VAW, like guns in the US, participants are brought into this story of extreme pain and suffering through the way in which the UN Trust Fund is positioned as the lynchpin to ending violence against women in Cambodia. By placing participants in opposition to others who experience violence, and aligning them with those who desire to say “no,” campaign materials evoke feelings of empowerment through the way in which participants are asked to get involved with the UN. While Cambodian women, and local organizations, are represented as agents in the elimination of VAW, it is clear to participants that it is their donations that will allow the UN to support these women to become empowered. Being a part of this story as the primary agent of an anti-violence initiative shapes the way participants are located in the worlds created by the campaign.

In this story, participants belong to a world by their proximity to a collective body of donors who are empowered, and make donations telescopically to another world that is shaped affectively through pain and suffering. Agency is in the hands of donors through the work of the UN, which is presented as a trusted source for a trickle-down approach to gender equality in the development community. What is concealed through this UNiTE story is the historical debate surrounding the UN as a site for women’s organizing and activism, as well as the NGOization of grassroots mobilization that require structured funding regimes that limit the work that the organization can execute “on the ground” (Desai, 2004; Poster & Salime, 2002; Alvarez, 1999). The political horizon of feelings
that are allowed are structured by stories of pain and overcoming which evoke positivity, benevolence, and a feeling of pride that comes with taking action via donating. In the Say NO campaign, it is the donor’s actions that provide the necessary resources to eliminate violence. Such “do-good” feelings available to participants conceal the complex history and present processes of development from these distant places of pain and suffering.

Significantly, such stories of pain do emotional work at the expense of both nuanced representations of the issue and the active mobilization against violence against women in Bangladesh. As Chowdhury (2012) claims, the work of organizations such as Naripokkho, which have created the “conceptual and organizational groundwork for placing acid attacks on women and girls into the global landscape” and provide services for acid survivors, is buried in discourse of UN benevolence and self-congratulatory remarks about the work it has done (p. xvi). She argues that more than obscure the work on these organizations, the UN, among other actors, actually co-opt their work which has resulted in a re-writing of the history that has led to the public recognition of acid burning. I agree with Chowdhury (2012) in that I believe the focus on the UN and participants donations obscures organizing “on the ground.” I also suggest that the orientation toward donations, rather than solidarity with groups like Naripokkho, appropriates the historical legacy of women’s mobilizations against acid attacks in Bangladesh, and forecloses possibilities of tracing this history which would lead to very different anti-violence strategies at the global level.

Testimonies of pain do political work in the discursive and affective realm when they are placed alongside each other. In their circulation and repetition, similar stories of pain and empowerment gain affective value. Each singular story arouses feelings of pity
and sympathy. Such political feelings about cases of VAW are manageable if one just says “no.” They can be overcome if one donates. The Say NO campaign uses many stories of violence to encourage donations. Another story comes from a woman named Laura in an article entitled “Guatemala: Young Mayan Women Shape the Future” (UN, 2011b). Laura is a 24-year-old indigenous woman who lost her mother at an early age and had to leave school to take care of her eight siblings. Her father regularly used alcohol to cope and Laura was “his regular victim” (UN, 2011b). Laura is now an anti-violence advocate through a project implemented by Population Council Guatemala, which is a grantee of the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. According to the website “[Laura] wasn’t always this confident. But after over a decade of beatings, she made a decision to finally stand up for herself and create a different life, one of strength and dignity.” Leaving behind a lifetime of pain, Laura applied for an internship in gender empowerment programming and “it was the first time in her memory that she felt valued” (UN, 2011b). Citing civil war as the reason that indigenous communities are at risk of multiple forms of violence, Say NO states that 45 percent of Guatemalan women have suffered violence in their lifetime. Laura’s story stands in for all indigenous women in Guatemala (UN, 2011b). While civil war provides a context for the manifestation of violence against women in indigenous communities, the Spanish colonization of Guatemala, which included the imposition of Christianity and appropriation of land is not part of the story that is told. Potential donors are told that women and girls have never been visible as leaders within indigenous communities in Guatemala until the UN intervened and provided the resources to empower them. As Guatemalans are presented as making war against their own people, and oppressing
women and girls, Laura’s story unfolds as a narrative of pain and suffering that can be overcome with donations to the UN Trust Fund.

Significantly, stories like Laura’s in the campaign actively obscure Indigenous struggles transnationally. While the UN points to Indigenous women’s vulnerability to violence in US and Canada, it does not use stories of Indigenous women living in contexts of white-settler colonialism. Such stories of genocide, intergenerational abuse brought on by violence at residential schools, police brutality, the ongoing violence against missing and murdered Aboriginal women, and the apathy of governments would not garner currency in the affective economy of the *Say NO* campaign. In fact, the anger of Indigenous women and men working with organizations like Families of Sisters in Spirit (2013) in Canada and their calls for solidarity would radically reshape a global anti-violence campaign.

Similar to the story of Chhean, Laura is presented as empowered, but *only* by her work provided by the UN. Again, the primary agent of change is the donor who responds to the urgent call for help. Affective responses to Laura’s physical pain caused by her experience of violence conjure an emotional reaction from the potential donor. Such emotions are calmed and collected through an individual action of saying “no” and donating money, which effectively simplifies the complexity of VAW in Guatemala and globally.

In the *Say NO* campaign, pain does political work. The representation of pain functions to align donors with those who desire to help others who experience pain. While donors cannot feel the pain of others, they can be moved by the stories of survivors. Although it may be possible to present pain as a bodily sensation that survivors
of violence experience differently across the global, and thus have the shared interest of eliminating the practice of VAW in its various manifestations, the “political feelings” allowed in the Say NO initiative foreclose the possibilities for solidarity (Mohanty, 2003). Some bodies are situated as donors while others are situated as needing donations. As Ahmed (2004) maintains in regard to an anti-landmine campaign, the participant is elevated to a position of power of others as “the one who is ‘behind’ the possibility of overcoming pain” (p. 22). Additionally, caring for another’s pain in this way can reinforce systemic inequalities that are connected to the pain experienced by women. This includes the unequal political and economic relationship between the West and Third World that is secured by the structure of the UN and its processes of global governance. As Ahmed (2004) writes:

the West gives to others insofar as it is forgotten what the West has already taken in its very capacity to give in the first place…feelings of pain and suffering, which are in part effects of socio-economic relations of violence and poverty, are assumed to be alleviated by the very generosity that is enabled by such socio-economic relations. So the West takes, then gives, and in the moment of giving repeats as well as conceals the taking (p. 22, emphasis original).

As Desai (2005) maintains, the UN remains a site for aiding Third World women, but not a place for transnational feminist solidarity. Following the historical patterns of women’s organizing since the UN Decade for women, violence against women is not only narrowly understood in terms of men’s violence against women in the UNiTE campaign, but is disconnected from colonialism, imperialism, occupation and war. Similar to the Beijing Platform for Action, anti-violence and gender equality strategies are diluted of politics even as they are made at the epicenter of global economic and political power.

The “aboutness” of the UNiTE initiative remains focused on the feelings of the donor even while the focus on pain centers Third World women’s experiences. The call
for action through emotional response to stories of pain is about the donor’s political
feelings and the support that the UN can offer through voluntary contributions. Thus, the
Say NO campaign not only communicates that the UN is the obvious institution to do the
work of eliminating violence against women, but that the time is now. The urgency with
which participants are asked to say “no” and to donate positions the donor as object of
hope. The other may be the one to overcome violence, but the UNiTE participant is the
one that is empowered by taking action urgently. By ensuring participants immediately
feel pity, empathy, and charity through emotional short stories and quick-facts about
violence, participants are directed to say “no” and donate to the UN because they now
“understand the issue. This kind of “expert” information leads them to believe that they
can act quickly in order to respond to an urgent problem by saying “no” and donating
online. Alternative opportunities to support survivors of violence, such as solidarity
building between survivors across borders, are foreclosed by the orientation of
participants toward “political feelings” that can be urgently generated. Importantly, those
who want to help are positioned as having agency and power. Empowerment stories of
Third World women are about empowering Western donors to act through affectively
stimulating emotional responses. By aligning the participant with the UN as agents of
change who answer an urgent call to end VAW, the issue of violence against women is
not associated with sadness, anger, or collective outrage which could lead to different
anti-violence strategies and different outcomes. Instead, affective value is gained as an
expression of individual empowerment and hope by the way it is associated with the
individual donor’s decision to take action.
Importantly, political feelings such as collective outrage and the affective possibilities of working together in community and solidarity with women who have experienced violence are disallowed by the way that participants are oriented to individual acts of donating to the UN. Thus, the affective attachments invited by the UNiTE and Say NO campaign are not random but are rather aligned with social inequalities and oppressions, which include the overarching notion of top-down development, global NGO funding structures, and processes of exclusion and hierarchies of difference marked by the current era of neoliberal global economic restructuring that differentiate women by gender, race, class, sexuality, and ability. Campaigns such as the UNiTE and Say NO initiatives do not function on their own. Rather, they reflect larger systems of charitable strategies that employ affective strategies to orient participants toward certain “political feelings” and away from others. For example, in research that compares the outcomes of the work done by a fat-positive feminist activist group with the Dove’s “Real Beauty” campaign, Johnston and Taylor (2008) argue that while Dove has a wide reach and is thus relatively effective, it relies on “feminist consumerism [that] tends to obscure and minimize both structural and institutionalized gender inequalities that are difficult to resolve and that might cause negative emotional associations with brands” (p. 961). In contrast, grassroots fat activism does not ask women to buy self-esteem through cosmetic products, but joins fat people in a community who refuse both sizeism and consumerist beauty ideologies. What Johnson and Taylor’s (2008) research makes clear is the way in which affective and political possibilities for change are shaped by the structure of a campaign. Orienting women to purchase their way out of poor self-esteem, the Dove “Real Beauty” campaign simplifies the implications of beauty
ideologies and consumerism on the creation and maintenance of gender norms, racism, ableism, even as it attempts to suggest that women should accept who they are inside and out. Importantly, the political possibility to radically critique beauty ideologies may affect sales of Dove products.

Similar to the Dove “Real Beauty” campaign, the emotional investment of participants in anti-violence against women campaigns such as UNiTE and Say NO rely on the commodification of support. Complicating or radically critiquing violence against women as a manifestation of gender inequality, histories of colonialism, globalization-cum-imperialism, and economic restructuring could negatively affect the political purchase of participants in the UN system. It would also open up other affective possibilities, such as accountability and outrage, which would open up new possibilities for strategizing against violence globally. Donating to the cause would not be sufficient. Emotional investments in UNiTE and Say NO rely on participants to feel empowered and in control in order to donate. Complicating violence against women through radical critique would alter not only the structure of the campaign and its materials, but would offer participants alterative avenues to generate different political feelings. Charitable sympathy is a process of consumption. As Razack (2007) argues, consuming or “stealing” the pain of others is the antithesis of collective outrage, and such practices of empathetic purchasing cannot affectively align participants toward accountability or solidarity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that emotions circulated within an affective economy within the UNiTE to End Violence against Women and the adjoining Say NO campaigns.
Outlining the scholarship on affect, and centering work on the cultural politics of emotion (Ahmed, 2004) in particular, I considered the affective nature of development and of anti-violence initiatives within the development industry. I suggested that “political feelings” (Gould, 2009) are shaped by development discourses and representational practices. Within the context of the UNiTE campaign, I considered the emotionality of images and texts in order to understand how people are encouraged to be moved to take action. Borrowing from Ahmed’s (2004) conception of affective economies, in which she argues that affect gains value in its circulation and exchange, my analysis of political feelings in the UNiTE and Say NO campaign reveals how emotions circulate between bodies, how they gain affective value in their repetition, the favorableness of the sign, and how they “stick” to certain bodies. Expanding on Alhassan’s (2009) notion of “telescopic philanthropy” I employ the term “telescopic feeling” to demonstrate the limits of affective possibilities in participants’ understanding VAW in relation to the “Situation” overview (UN, 2012b) and UNiTE “Worldwide” (UN, 2012c) map. I maintain that a sense of “over there-ness” and “Other-ness” generates feelings of mastery and managerial confidence while simultaneously foreclosing the possibility for feelings of accountability and solidarity that may invite participants to make connections between the Global South and North. Focusing on the Say NO campaign, I investigate the ways in which participants are asked to “take action.” Using the Say NO petition and requests for donations to the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women, I argue that participants’ feelings of empowerment and belonging overshadow the reality of victims’ experiences of violence conceal important histories that make “taking action” through petitions and donations possible as a solution. Generating a sense of urgency through
narrowly focused, accessible, and relatively easy steps to “eliminate violence against women now,” the UNiTE and Say NO campaign functions as a practical and inspirational campaign to gain awareness of VAW and produce advocacy around the issue. However, through “telescopic feeling” and individual action-taking, the “aboutness” (Ahmed, 2004) of the campaign remains focused on participants’ own feelings of empowerment and control. Such urgent strategies to end VAW “now” not only obscure important histories and complexities of violence against women, including the complexities of feminists working within the UN system historically as reflected in conference proceedings from the UN Decade for Women, but also misdirect participants toward benevolent and individual actions, rather than collective or solidarity-based strategies as I have highlighted above, that could reveal the complexities of the violence and solutions to ending these practices globally.
Conclusion:

Violence against women is an urgent and global problem. Women around the world experience violence connected to various social, cultural, political, and economic practices. As urgent as the problem is, in the development industry there is an “epidemic of signification” that manufactures urgency around the issue (Treichler, 1997). That is, representations of violence against women construct the issue as a “problem” of development. According to this narrative, development is stagnated by violence against women and it blocks women becoming empowered. It is a global security issue because violence against women is causally connected to global violence, where places with extreme poverty and gender inequality are understood as breeding grounds for terrorism. Given the way in which violence against women has been presented as a major obstacle for development currently, my research reveals and unpacks the laborious discursive maneuvers led to the issue of violence against women to be understood as an urgent development problem.

My analysis of the discursive development apparatus focused on the construction of violence against women as a temporal problem. In other words, it focused on the temporality of “now” as the moment to end violence against women. In conceptualizing the call to end violence against women “now” as an urgent mode of representation, this dissertation deconstructed and decolonized the development industry’s concern with the issue. Thinking about the project of “making urgent,” or exploring the ways in which urgency is manufactured, allows me to see the workings of producing violence against women as a “problem” of development.

Discourses help to manufacture a sense of significance to an issue, and at the height of its urgency, one can see the laborious processes behind the project of “making urgent.” For development experts, violence against women matters vis-à-vis other development issues. While
violence experienced by women should matter by itself, experts in the development industry have paired the urgency of ending violence against women with the urgency of other development concerns. By representing violence against women as urgent in combination with other objectives, rather than attend to its actual urgency, development experts and institutions successfully collapse the complexities of violence against women transnationally in favour of swift solutions. This sense of urgency to combat violence against women globally both represents the issue as universally solvable with similar tactics and forecloses more radical strategies, including possible solutions that may exist outside the limits of the development industry.

In this dissertation, I explored three different ways in which violence against women has been problematized alongside other development interests: “post-9/11” national security concerns, neoliberal economic growth, and the cultural production of benevolent aid. Focusing on the World Bank, the United Nations, as well as American foreign policy, my sites of study were quite different in terms of their institutional affiliation, development objectives, ideologies, and anti-violence strategies. By pairing VAW, these institutions and actors offer different analysis of, and solutions to, violence against women but remain committed to the issue as a pressing concern for development. In fact, the ways in which they differ led me to use multiple methods and three distinctive theoretical models to analyze them. Using both discursive analysis of documents and interviews with development experts, this dissertation decolonized representations of VAW using theories of development and security, critical disability, and “crip” studies, and affect theory. Woven into a transnational feminism framework, this dissertation mapped the power of development discourses at seemingly “scattered” hegemonic locations in order to establish that there are interconnected regimes of knowledge about violence
against women in the development industry that secures its expertise on the issue and power to manufacture its urgency (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994; Foucault 1980). Decolonizing the project of “making urgent,” or analyzing representations of VAW in development discourses, revealed the ways in which a concern for violence against women in the development industry is embedded in global systems of domination including sexism, racism, classism, ableism, heterosexism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism.

In this dissertation, I used three case studies to investigate how urgency to end violence against women is manufactured in the development industry: 1) Unites States foreign policy under the direction of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the proposed US International Violence Against Women Act; 2) World Bank published report entitled The Cost of Violence; and 3) the United Nation’s UNiTE To End Violence and complementary Say NO campaigns.

Making National Security Urgent: The Hillary Doctrine and the International Violence Against Women Act

In 2009, Hillary Clinton was appointed US Secretary of State in the US. In the first five months of her tenure, Clinton mentioned “women” 450 times in official speeches leading popular commentators to name her a “state feminist” and call her brand of feminist foreign policy “The Hillary Doctrine” (McKelvey 2013; Bunting, 2011; Tzemach Lemmon, 2012). For Clinton, women’s rights and violence against women are foreign policy concerns. They are also national security issues. In The Hillary Doctrine, violence against women is defined as an issue that is rampant in failed and fragile states and is causally related to terrorism. According to Clinton, countries that are stable and secure have less violence against women, and ending violence against women will help countries become more stable and secure, and thus less threatening. Citing American values of freedom, democracy, and women’s rights, The Hillary
Doctrine makes VAW an urgent concern for the US to combat pre-emptively. Complementing The Hillary Doctrine, the proposed US International Violence Against Women Act also connects violence against women to the issue of national security. Embedded in the “development and in/security” nexus, the proposed International Violence Against Women Act pairs development aid through the US Agency for International Development with foreign policy objectives of the US Department of State (Duffield, 2010; IVAWA, 2010). The I-VAW, if passed, would not only place anti-violence strategies at the forefront of American foreign policy, but would legislate the US’s responsibility to respond to violence against women globally. Coupling development with national security interests, both The Hillary Doctrine and the I-VAWA situates violence against women alongside moral and urgent American development and security interests.

In the “post-9/11” period, the focus on violence against women marks a shift in national security objectives to women’s issues. The “genderwashing” of intervention-cum-imperialism continue to include discourses of saving women in the “post-9/11” period but they now appear in the nexus of development and in/security. The development and in/security nexus can be understood as the global biopolitical and necropolitical management of who is deserving and those who are not, according to racial logic. That is, the excess of development, or the risks associated with underdevelopment that cannot be recuperated by the development industry, are understood as security threats. As neoliberal economic restructuring fails to aid underdeveloped countries and further entrenches poverty, there is growing dissatisfaction with American hegemony and US development assistance. Aware of its global reputation, especially in the “post-9/11” period, the US constructs violence against women as an urgent concern to serve its own national security interests. Contextualizing The Hillary Doctrine and the I-VAWA within the “post-9/11”
period allows one to see how the concern with violence against women is highly 
manufactured. As demonstrated by the US’s Quadrennial Defense and Development 
Review (QDDR, 2010), the US aims to take a “softer” approach to foreign policy in the 
future, following controversial wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. By linking ongoing 
security issues and development objectives to a morally based concern for women’s rights, 
actual American interests, including legislating imperial occupation and control in countries 
of interest, strategies to assert global hegemony, and the continued militarization and 
securitization, are “genderwashed” in feminist languages. Building off of Puar’s (2007) 
conceptualization of pinkwashing, I use “genderwashing” to describe the kinds of 
discourses and political projects that are designated as “gender focused” but have other 
motivations or intended results. I show that “genderwashing” is essential in the “post-9/11” 
framing of women’s rights as ongoing national security concerns. Of course, feminists in 
the “post-9/11” context have been doing the work of unraveling the ways in which women’s 
rights are harnessed to new projects of empire, but the term “genderwash” allows scholars 
and activists to specifically point out the ways in which gender is now mainstreamed into 
US foreign policy.

To be sure, the I-VAWA explicitly states that a country’s record on violence 
against women will determine if it will be affected by the act. However, the country’s 
potential threat against US national security is also taken into consideration. The US will 
only, then, intervene if these two eligibility requirements are met. Moreover, IVAWA 
explicitly outlines the role of the military in preventing and responding to violence 
against women. Given the history of human rights abuses by military forces abroad, the 
military is not well suited for anti-violence work. In fact, given the epidemic of sexual
violence against women within the military’s ranks, it is clear that the US military is in no way capable of responding to gendered violence anywhere. Since there is significant violence against women within the American military’s ranks, one cannot expect the military to protect women anywhere around the world.

The promotion of women’s rights globally is important, if not essential, to eradicating the issue of violence against women and The Hillary Doctrine marks an outstanding success because it put feminist agendas at the level of state policy. Additionally, the lobbying power behind IVAWA is remarkable and feminist activism at the state level in the US is commendable. However, the way in which violence against women has been made urgent within the development and in/security nexus means that critiques of the military, US interventions and occupations, humanitarian responses and Western responsibilities to “save,” “teach,” and spread “expertise” on freedom and democracy are foreclosed. Thus, the very possibility of eradicating violence against women globally is prohibited by the further entrenchment of institutional power and global economic dominations made possible by development and in/security agendas, including US military power and top-down development models which place the US and other Western nations at the reins of knowledge production.

Making Neoliberal Growth Urgent: The World Bank’s The Cost of Violence

For the World Bank, combating violence against women is urgent because it is costly. In the World Bank’s The Cost of Violence (2009) a measurement called disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) is used to measure the economic costs of violence against women. Speaking the language of the institution, gender advocates manufacture a sense of urgency around the issue so that the economistic organization will take notice. According to the World Bank, women who
are employed have economic autonomy, and thus, empowerment for women is inherently connected to the public sphere. When injured, impaired, or disabled by violence, women not only lack empowerment opportunities, but they are also unable to live up to their productive potential.

I used critical disability studies and crip theory (McRuer, 2006) to argue that the way in which the World Bank calculates the cost of violence against women relies on ableist notions of ability and productivity. Disability comes to matter to the World Bank through its interest in including more marginalized identities into its work. The organization has recently extended its “gender mainstreaming” strategies to mainstreaming people with disabilities into the core mandate of the organization. For people with disabilities, like women, “fitting” into the World Bank’s development schemes means being included in the economic sphere. To overcome their exclusion, people with disabilities would have to be made to “fit” development schemes. When living productive lives by contributing to economic growth, people with disabilities are fully mainstreamed. When people with disabilities are unable to live up to their productive potential as measured by DALYs, the Bank values their quality of life as less than able-bodied individuals who are fully integrated into the capitalist market. In fact, DALYs are used to calculate cost-benefit health investments and, using this measurement, World Bank cannot support people with disabilities who are not normatively “productive.”

By maintaining that women are empowered in the public sphere, and by equating women’s potential to their productivity at work, the World Bank reduces violence that causes disabilities to economic costs of lost work and the social services needed to support survivors. Using the term “overcoming” as an umbrella term to denote flexibility, adjustment, and resilience, I demonstrate that the DALY calculation relies on ableist and neoliberal conceptions of
“overcoming” violence at the expense of more nuanced understandings of violence against women. Employing the term racialized ableism, this chapter works at the intersections of critical race, crip, and disability studies in new and important ways. As I demonstrate in this dissertation, racialized women provide a “comparative advantage” in cheap labour globally. That is, the racialization and feminization of flexible labour relies on stereotypes of nimble-fingered, inherently docile, and hard-working “Third World” women. While there is a sophisticated body of literature on this issue in feminist, globalization, and development literature, my research adds questions of compulsory able-bodiedness to this field of study by arguing that able-bodiedness, or the performance of flexibility, is specifically required of racialized Third World women globally in disabling contexts. Future work on women and labour in the development industry could be enhanced by thinking about the intersections of gender, race, and disability.

I argue that the DALY measurement reveals how racialized women are required to be able-bodied by the World Bank. The DALY measurement does not consider ableist notions of productivity or the calculation of quality of life based on normative notions of productivity as violent. By relying on women’s flexibility or ability to overcome violence to return to work for economic growth, the World Bank conveniently ignores the ways in which women experience violence at work.

Specifically, the World Bank’s definition of violence against women does not include violence experienced in sites of so-called empowerment, such as micro-credit enterprises and in manufacturing jobs where women are often employed. Under neoliberal prescriptions that call for the privatization of social services, and in liberalized economies where unregulated working conditions are common, the claim that violence against women is costly on the state is unsurprising. Women who require health and social services and who are not “properly
productive” are considered burdens. Moreover, the neoliberal mentality of the World Bank requires women to survive, adjust and cope with injustices and violence brought about through labour-based engagements.

Problematically, the World Bank does not take into consideration the ways in which labour-based empowerment strategies are inherently violent. Using the example of the World Bank’s promotion of micro-enterprises for women’s empowerment, I demonstrate that selling the beauty products of multinational corporations to rural women is an appropriation of women’s empowerment since it relies of the flexibility of their labour (including low wages, unregulated working conditions, and insecure income) in addition to ideologies of “racialized ableism.” By supporting corporations that sell skin-lightening cream, for example, which both demonstrates the violence of global white supremacy and is itself a health hazard, the World Bank not only calculates the cost of violence in ableist terms, but also then provides ableist “solutions” to violence against women. These definitions of, and solutions to, violence against women as a urgent and costly concern suit neoliberal economic schemes, but do not enhance women’s empowerment or well being, nor does it actually help to eliminate violence against women globally.

Making Charity Urgent: The UNiTE To End Violence and Say NO campaigns

In this dissertation, I argued that the development industry makes violence against women urgent through discursive constructions that represent the issue as a costly problem and a security issue. I demonstrated that combatting global violence against women is also made urgent through a sense of urgency. Urgency is not only communicated discursively as a rational reaction to a pressing problem, but the development industry also provides a venue for emotional or affective responses to the issue. To demonstrate this, I analyze the United Nations’ UNiTE to
*End Violence Against Women* (2012a) and *Say NO* (2012b) campaigns. I argue that urgency is a political feeling that makes certain ways of responding to violence against women possible while also foreclosing other opportunities to radically strategize against violence against women. Borrowing the term “political feeling” from Gould (2009), I suggested that the UNiTE and *Say NO* campaigns are aimed at affecting participants who will express the affectiveness of the campaigns through emotions such as pity, sympathy and ultimately, empowerment by taking action and by donating.

The ways in which the campaigns orient participants’ expression of affect reflect the political possibilities for feeling. Affect is not freely generated, but reflects and maintains systems of oppression. The expressions of affect are both social and political, and circulate within an economy of affect wherein emotions gain affective value (Ahmed, 2004a). Development, as a project, is couched in an affective economy where a white bourgeois Western subjectivity is formed by how emotions such as pity and sympathy “stick” to Other bodies who are understood to need help. In the development context, anti-violence campaigns also invoke feelings of pity and sadness, and the affective value of such emotions is increased through their repetition and circulation.

In the *UNiTE to End Violence against Women* campaign, “The Situation” overview provides an interesting site to inquire about the affective nature of the campaign. Specifically, UNiTE provides an interactive map on its website that is supposed to illustrate violence against women worldwide, and yet only highlights “problem” areas consisting of the entire continents of Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. Western nations, in contrast, go unmarked and are thus not represented as target sites for intervention. This map is affective in a number of ways. Firstly, participants are
asked to express political feelings—to emote and take action—in response to the countries “worldwide” which are highlighted by UNiTE. Expanding Alhassan’s (2009) notion of “telescopic philanthropy,” I suggested that one is asked to feel telescopically. That is, participants are oriented toward emotionally individualized and benevolent responses to an issue “over there.” The idea of “feeling telescopically” is a contribution to affect theory and to studies of development discourses and humanitarian cause-marketing. My affective analysis of development and the conceptualization of “telescopic feeling” reveals the way in which encounters with the Other is not just about distancing, but also about bringing some things into the field of vision while obscuring or ignoring everything outside this field of vision. A telescopic feeling is not just about what can be known via sightlines and frames of development campaigns. It is also about what can be felt; the bodily intensity of mastery, and the working of distance/connection that allows for pity, charity, benevolence that emerge at the expense of justice, accountability, or solidarity. I argue that not only do emotions such as sympathy and pity for women who experience “extreme” violence stick to racialized Others in the development industry, only spaces as constructed as containing the major perpetrators of violence are highlighted. As my analysis of the UNiTE “worldwide” map reveals, mapping is a highly racialized project by hyper-visibilizing Third World men as perpetrators. It provides a simplistic representation of a complex global issue that allows participants to feel confidence in their newfound expertise and mastery. The map orients participants toward telescopic feeling and thus disallows participants from making broader and more complex connections between violence in these highlighted spaces, and Western countries that literally fade into the background of the online map. This mapping of
violence against women is affective in that it orients participants toward “political feelings” about an issue that is represented as a Third World problem.

In the complementary Say NO campaign, participants are explicitly and affectively asked to “take action” to end violence against women. By saying “no” and donating to the UN, participants are made to feel benevolent and charitable in the face of violence against women as a tragic problem of the Third World. Aligned with those who desire to help and in contrast to those who need help, a collective body of “do-good” donors is generated on the bodies of women’s stories of violence. That is, Third World women’s stories of violence, which are centered in the Say NO campaign, are situated as a catalyst for affective responses and political feelings. These stories in their visibility, circulation, and repetition gain affective currency and generating feelings of sympathy for victims, but also a sense of belonging and empowerment for those who choose to “take action.” The “aboutness” of the campaign, to use Ahmed’s (2004a) term, is the agency of the participant and his/her alignment with other benevolent actors. By evoking a sense of urgency through the emotionality of the Say NO texts, participants and the UN itself are positioned as agents for change and obscuring the power of individual women and women’s organizations in the Third World to organize and resist violence outside of the UN system.

The orientation of participant to a sense of urgency to “help” Third World women individually through monetary donations forecloses possibilities for other political feelings, including collective action that may include radical critiques of the UN system, aid politics, and may reveal the intricacies of global systems of oppression which include Western complicity in the systemic nature of violence against women. Such “queer
political feelings” are prohibited by the campaigns since it would align participants
toward negative affective orientations that may prohibit participants from donating to the
UNiTE and adjoining Say NO campaign by creating a disjuncture between development
itself, and ending violence. Therefore, the urgency of which violence against women
must be eliminated is both generated and constrained by the UN’s orientation of
participants toward certain political feelings and away from others.

As demonstrated in chapter 3, urgency is socially and culturally constructed
through anti-violence campaigns. As I have demonstrated in my research on the World
Bank, urgency is economically constructed. Finally, I have shown in my work on US
foreign policy, urgency is politically produced. Thus, urgency is both made to be felt and
understood as connected to pressing global problems. Given the complexity of the term,
it is worth recapitulating the concept of urgency here.

**Urgency**

In this dissertation, I have explored both the discursive and affective nature of
urgency as it relates to violence against women. By investigating how the UN, World
Bank, and US foreign policy makers communicate the importance of ending violence
against women, I revealed how the issue is connected to what I consider to be some of the
most important development “flavours of the decade:” national security, neoliberal
economic growth, and feel-good aid. I suggested that the urgency of eliminating violence
against women is established in and through its connection to other development
objectives. *Rather than an end in itself, fighting violence against women matters to
development experts because it is understood as interlinked with other goals—some of
which directly contradict anti-violence strategies as I demonstrate in the dissertation.*
As urgency theorist Knotter (2008) maintains, a sense of urgency must be created. That is, urgency is a manufactured feeling about, or perception of, an issue. In my research, I found that development experts borrow from the languages, concepts, and strategies developed by feminists in their anti-violence campaigns, policies, and legislations to communicate the urgency of the issue. Pairing feminist and gender equality concerns with other development objectives opened up the possibility for communicating the temporal urgency of eliminating violence against women “now.”

Of course, it is not only violence against women that is communicated as an urgent development concern. In fact, inquiring into sites of urgency or where one sees a sense of urgency being created might reveal more about the underlying objectives of development experts and foreign policy makers than about the actual issues themselves. In other words, searching for urgency, or analyzing urgency as a discursive and affect manoeuvre, reveals the inner working or hidden workings in making a certain issue a “top priority.” For example, the focus on women’s rights in development, including “gender mainstreaming” strategies, has placed women’s issues at the forefront of knowledge production in academic scholarship and within development organizations. While women’s rights were rarely given a place at the table in development circles in the 1980s, one would be hard pressed to find an organization within the development industry that does not deal with gender issues (at least on paper) today. Whether a buzzword sprinkled into funding proposals or an issue taken seriously by development organizations, it is clear that gender issues are constructed as an urgent problem.

As a major contribution to critical theory, I offer the idea of manufacturing urgency in this dissertation to think about the ways in which policy, legislative, research,
and advocacy concerns in the development industry are produced affectively and discursively. While I connect this idea to violence against women in particular, manufacturing urgency can be used in other sites of inquiry. Given the emphasis on crisis, disaster, and emergency in mainstream “post-9/11” political discourses, and by scholars trying to make sense of the war on terror including Jasbir Puar (2007), the idea of manufacturing urgency allows one to ask: What follows an emergency moment? How do urgency discourses allow emergency or crisis moments to endure? That is, how can urgency discourses maintain affective drives toward reactionary and emergency politics? What decisions must be made “now”? How does urgency reproduce the status quo?

Under the mounting pressure of a “pandemic” of violence against women, for example, one must think quickly, respond instantly, and act immediately to an issue that is already out of control. Critically analysing the politics of urgency allows one to think about the ways in which modes of emergency are culturally, socially, politically, and economically produced.

In particular, the urgency to eliminate obesity and include LGBTQ rights in development policy and programs are two separate sites of study that would benefit from thinking through the construction of urgency as a political project. In academic literature, fat studies offers a particularly sophisticated analysis of urgency discourses. While authors such as Biltekoff (2007) do not position their work in relation to urgency discourses or affective relations of urgency, studies of the “obesity epidemic” trace the cultural production of urgency around the issue. Similar to Treichler’s (1999) concern with the epidemic of signification around HIV/AIDS, Biltekoff investigates the “cultural work performed” by anti-obesity campaigns, taking into account the way in which the
reformed Body Mass Index scale in the US effectively moved previously “normal” body weights of individuals to the levels of “overweight” and “obese.” Fat studies scholars reveal the way in which the urgency to “fight fat” is manufactured. In this case, studies of the epidemic of signification of “obesity” reveals the ways in which control and discipline of bodies and behaviours (especially those of poor people and people of colour in the US) builds a sense of urgency around the issue, while effacing structural, environmental, biological, economic, and political processes that leads to the problematizing of fatness and a national health crisis, and even as a crisis of national security (Blitekoff, 2007).

Studying the manufacturing of urgency around other issues reveals the way in which problematizing an issue as a pressing concern is socially, culturally, economically, and politically constructed. This does not mean that the issue is not, in fact, a real or urgent problem. Rather, studying urgency allows one to ask questions about the historical and cultural production of an urgent issue. For example, in the development industry, experts and academics have recently taken issue with discrimination against LGBT individuals globally. In 2013, the United Nations released a “Free and Equal” campaign that focuses on the human rights of LGBT people globally. This, of course, does not mean that queer discrimination is suddenly and unexpectedly an urgent issue for the development industry, or that there has been little historical or radical mobilization around the issue of sexuality and human rights transnationally on local, national, and international scales. Yet, the development industry has slowly begun to recognize LGBT
rights (queer rights intentionally left out here).\textsuperscript{45} Studies in “queer transnationalism” and queer theory of development are now highly popularized spaces that were previously and primarily concerned with gender and development, feminist political economy, and feminist international relations. For example, the \textit{International Feminist Journal of Politics} is now asking questions about queer conceptions of foreign policy, solidarity, development schemes and war (IFJP, 2013). Scholars such as Andrea Cornwall (2006), Amy Lind (2009), Kate Bedford (2010, 2009), Jolly (2010), and Laura Sjoberg (2012) are actively theorizing the connections between queer theory, LGBT rights, and international politics, governance, and development. The United Nations (2011b) has made LGBT rights a priority. In 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the US’s support of LGBT rights transnationally on International Human Rights Day. In 2012, World Bank staff met with LGBT activists around the world to discuss the ways in which its policies and programs may negatively affect queer people (Stewart, 2012).

While it is unclear that development experts are actively developing arguments about the urgency to end LGBT discrimination globally, this new “flavour of the day” may be communicated as “urgent” in the future. Since there seems to be an explicit move from advocates in and outside the development industry toward including LGBT rights in development frameworks, and because even the World Bank often responds to its critics, this change in scholarship and activism warrants further study. In the future, discourses of “sexuality mainstreaming” may join “gender mainstreaming” checklists and funding strategies at the World Bank, as may “disability mainstreaming” as I have explored in this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{45} While development experts are actively beginning to think about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights, development is not being queered. That is, queering development or thinking about queer justice is not a focus of development institutions at this time.
Concerned with the construction of urgency around the issue of LGBT rights transnationally, one might ask: Have LGBT rights become an urgent concern in the development community? What are the implications of developing urgent responses to this complex global issue? Similar to eliminating violence against women, eliminating discrimination and violence against queer people transnationally is not a simple task. In fact, any aim to “mainstream” issues related to identity including racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and ableism into development, and in an urgent manner, necessitates a thorough analysis of swift solutions and emergent strategies.

Certainly, LGBT rights are currently more controversial than violence against women in the West. This is not to suggest that rape culture, misogyny, or patriarchy does not exist in the West, but that regardless of the staggering numbers of women who experience violence daily in the “developed” world, national machineries generally defend anti-violence against women as a concept. The feel-good, moral obligations to “save” LGBTQ individuals may not be as universally seductive. Yet, as internal and external pressures and activist mobilizations continue around the issue, the development industry’s foreign aid practices, foreign policy relations, and funding procedures may be influenced.

In Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Jasbir Puar (2007) suggests that a “frenzied mode of emergency” is inherently a project of concealing and suppressing. For Puar, the normalization of reductions in civil liberalities in the “post-9/11” period is obscured by the creation of urgency around protecting US national security against all perceived internal and external threats. In creating a sense of urgency around national security, the US government gained an alibi to disavow its linkages to
war and illegal occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, economic interests in foreign oil reserves, and imperial interests more generally. For further study, “urgency” might be considered as an entry point into thinking about the cultural production of “frenzied modes of emergency,” responses to emergency and emergent issues, the way in which some problems become pressing concerns, and the communication of these urgent issues.

For example, the development industry’s concern with LGBTQ rights transnationally should be studied in ways that create linkages and map disjunctures between “capitalist recolonization” and the manufacturing of social, cultural, political, and economic problems as urgent concerns. That is, urgency or the “frenzied mode of emergency” as defined by Puar (2007) reflects the “global realignments and fluidity of capital [which has] led to further consolidations and exacerbation of capitalist relations of domination and exploitation” (Mohanty and Alexander, 1996, p. xvii). One of the major effects of “capitalist recolonization” is that feminist values have been used in the interests of capital accumulation (p. xv). According to feminist theorists such as Eisenstein (2009), Bergeron (2006), Smyth (2010), and Cornwall (2010), feminism and feminist values have often been incorporated, albeit in depoliticized modes, into neoliberal capitalist modalities. As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, the development industry’s concern for violence against women is aligned with neoliberal restructuring. For Duggan (2003), neoliberalism works in and through cultures and identity, suggesting that the incorporation of feminism and gender justice ideals is just how neoliberalism works. In terms of “mainstreaming” LGBT rights or disability rights within the development industry, the ways in which human rights, anti-oppressive, and social justice concerns are
incorporated into agendas pre-set by development experts remains suspect and requires rigorous and further study.

**Limitations**

While this dissertation does not seek to reveal all the ways in which gender inequality is tied to development projects and human rights logics, it does begin from the understanding that feminism, feminist values, and gender-sensitivity are both integrally and often disjunctively linked to the violence of global restructuring, which includes development and human rights interventions. I agree with Marchand and Runyan (2011) who write: “[global] restructuring is an open-ended process that creates myriad (re)interpretations and contradictions and counter-discourses and practices as activists and scholars continuously expose the politics of globalization-cum-imperialism and propose alternatives to it” (p. 21). Significantly, neoliberal globalization, or what Marchand and Runyan have decisively re-termed “global restructuring” is malleable to critique. That is, the pervasiveness of neoliberalism globally has required global managers, such as the World Bank, to listen to external and internal critiques and include previously marginalized voices into their work. That is, the urgent focus on gender in development and human rights is used to obscure the working of “globalization-cum-imperialism,” including the militarization and securitization of “post 9/11” femininities and masculinities (Marchand and Runyan, 2011, p. 16). While some feminist scholars have understood transitions toward gender-sensitive policy and programming within development institutions as a remarkable success, it also marks the “gender-washing” of neoliberal global restructuring.

Feminist activism, gender equality promoters, and development practitioners sensitive to gender issues and human rights work within the confines of global restructuring are thus
complicit in its processes, even as they seek to unfasten the structures of domination which effect the operations of sexism, racism, classism, and ableism in the realm of ideologies, subjectivities and bodies, and on the level of social relations. It is with this understanding of violence against women as intimately connected to the working of development and human rights embedded within, rather working against, processes of global restructuring that I frame my research. It cannot however be denied that the urgency created around women’s rights and gender issues opens up multiple avenues for feminist activism within the development industry. The limitations of this study are that my research focuses on policy, legislation, and campaign discourses and therefore not explicitly on the ways in which feminist activists and gender experts work diligently to create a sense of urgency around women’s issues in the first place. The ways in which development experts communicate the urgency of issues such as violence against women do reflect internal agendas and policy trajectories, as well as the global structural relations of development aid in its entirety, but I do not intend to ignore the fact that it is feminist activism which demands that organizations such as the World Bank pay attention to women’s rights. It is feminist activism that is behind the framing of violence against women as an issue worthy of the attention of development experts. According to interviews I conducted with development practitioners and gender and development experts, there are major disjunctures between the commitment of individuals working within institutions to end violence, and what is said about violence against women at the global level by development organizations. As Meredith Turshen points out, “not everything published is part of the real ‘on the ground’ work” (Turshen, personal communication, 2012). Therefore, studying the manufacturing of urgency from the perspective of feminist activists, femocrats, and advocates who work diligently to
pressure development organizations and foreign policy experts to take violence against women seriously remains an undone but nonetheless important task.

While I did not focus on the “on the ground” mobilizations of manufactured urgencies in the development industry, this dissertation does speak to policy concerns around adopting “flavours of the day” as a strategy to be heard. In my own anti-violence advocacy work, I have experienced the ways in which funding structures, election politics, trends in language, and the power of buzzwords can deeply shape feminist advocacy within organizations. In speaking to development practitioners for this dissertation, especially the gender advocate I spoke to at the World Bank, it became clear to me what was to be lost and gained in using economistic language required by economistic arms of the organization. While I maintain that counting, measuring, and costing violence against women manufactures urgency around an issue that is urgent entirely by itself, I understand that measuring in the age of austerity and global neoliberalism is both a survivalist and radical strategy. Yet, I remain concerned with calls to address complex issues through number crunching formulas. This dissertation, then, contributes to ongoing discussions in feminist anti-violence communities about the im/possibilities of working within the constraints of state-funded and private institutions. While I wish to attest and document the inventive strategies employed by gender advocated working within the development industry, this dissertation is also a cautionary account of the ways in which large and powerful organizations listen to feminist critiques, criticisms, and trends, social movements and then co-ops ideas and values for their own use. What feminist advocates and femocrats can accomplish within a manufactured sense of urgency around gender issues should be further studied. Research into this area might ask: What does access to the development mainstream entail? What will access to the mainstream bring, for whom, and at whose expense? Can the
development industry be redeemed through the mainstreaming of feminist values, including the focus on violence against women, especially when urgency is manufactured?

While I stand behind my criticisms of the way in which the World Bank, the UN, and US foreign policy makers define violence against women and strategize to solve this global issue, I understand that my research is limited by the fact that I have not studied the impact of the policies, legislations, and campaigns “on the ground.” For example, I am aware that the outcomes of the UNiTE to End Violence and Say NO campaigns may be increased funding for anti-violence organizations that may both desperately need these funds to function and do very progressive and important work. Alvarez’s (2009) and Poster and Salime’s (2005) research of funding challenges for non-governmental organizations in the development industry are two sophisticated examples of feminist research which link “on the ground” activism to funding practices, and also development discourses. In this dissertation, I focused specifically on development discourses because it is unclear how recent UN campaigns, US legislation, and World Bank research reports that are at the center of my research have impacted the “on the ground” work of women’s organizations in the short term. Yet, my discourse analysis of documents and interviews with femocrats reveals that speaking language that has political currency in the development industry, including evoking economic jargon, nationalistic and anti-terrorism discourses, or employing a charity frame, have consequences for the ways in which solutions to violence are imagined. As I demonstrated in this dissertation, economic solutions secure women’s responsibilities to state development above and beyond human rights concerns; securitized discourses can lead to militarized responses to violence against women that can mean the further insecurity of women; and feel-good strategies do little more than individualize both the problem and solution of violence against women at the expense of collective and radical
actions to eliminate structures of oppression which make women vulnerable to violence transnationally.

By focusing on development discourses, this dissertation revealed the neoliberal, imperial, and neo-colonial development outcomes of the manufacturing of urgency around the issue of global violence against women. I also demonstrated how these objectives are obscured by a seemingly moral, innocent, and rational call to end violence against women globally. The need for top-down models for “doing development” is secured by development actors “making urgent” global violence against women, and taking the lead as experts in a so-called development “problem.” That is, it is in the interest of development experts to lead the charge on the issue of violence against women because revealing complexities of violence against women as a systemic global issue that interlocks with systems of gendered, racial, classed, ableist, and heterosexist/homophobic power and other relations of rule would question development itself as a moral project. Additionally, the need for development to solve the issue of violence against women might be overshadowed by alternative struggles against violence against women that simultaneously take aim at processes of global economic restructuring. Manufacturing violence against women as an urgent concern obscures those complexities and forecloses those possibilities.
References


International Day of Zero Tolerance to Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/183458.htm


Say No- UNiTE to End Violence against Women. Retrieved from http://saynotoviolence.org/


Appendixes:

Appendix A

*Semi-structured Interview Questions*

Theme 1) UN Decade for Women

1. What is your current position in the women’s movement?

2. What UN Conference for Women did you attend, if any?

3. What was your position in the women’s movement during this time period (1975-1985, 1995)?

4. Reflecting on the Nairobi and Beijing conferences and their outcomes, what conversations framed the topic of violence against women (VAW)?

5. Reflecting on these conversations, how was violence against women defined?

6. How did differences among participants (race, class, age, ability, nationality, Third World/First World etc.) affect the way in which violence against women was discussed?

7. A) How was VAW generally framed as a development issue?
   B) Do you agree with this framing, or do you have a different perspective?

8. Was violence against women framed by a human rights narrative? If so, how?

9. Was violence against women framed by narratives of individual responsibility, women’s participation in development projects, and/or the cost of violence on Third World economies? If so, how?

10. A) Would you say that the framing of VAW in development discourse has stayed the same, changed slightly, or changed majorly since the Nairobi conference? How?
   B) Did the Beijing conference change the framing of violence?

Theme 2) UNiTE Campaign

1. What is your position with your organization?

2. How would you define violence against women?

3. How does your organization approach anti-violence policy and programming?

4. How did your organization come to support the UNiTE campaign?
5. What type(s) of policy/programming has (or will) your organization develop(d) under the UNiTE campaign?

6. What, if any, events or grassroots organizing has (or will) your organization execute(d)?

7. A) For your organization, what are the most important aspects of the UNiTE platform?  
B) What is the most important aspect of the UNiTE campaign for you personally?

8. A) Which practices of violence are of most concern to your organization?  
B) Which practices of violence are of most concern to you personally?

9. A) Do you feel that the UNiTE campaign reflects the most concerning practices of violence against women?  
B) Why would you describe these practices of VAW as most concerning?  
C) What do you feel is missing (if anything) from the UNiTE frame?

Theme 3) World Bank

1. Are you familiar with the World Bank’s current approach to violence against women?  
If so, how would you describe the Bank’s approach?

2. A) Have you noticed changes in the World Bank’s approach to VAW in the last two decades?  
B) Which ones?

3. Are you familiar with the term “disability adjusted life years” or DALYs? If so, how would you describe this Bank measurement?

4. The World Bank claims to have a comparative advantage in gender and development policy and programming, including combatting VAW. Do you agree? Why or why not?

5. The World Bank argues that VAW is inefficient and bad for development. A) What do you think of this argument?  
B) How useful do you believe this economic argument is to the broader anti-violence movement?

Theme 4) International Violence Against Women Act, Post-9/11 and Hillary Doctrine

1. How did your organization come to support the International Violence Against Women Act?

2. A) For your organization, what are the most important aspects of the International Violence Against Women Act?  
B) What is the most important aspect of the Act for you personally?
3. Would the International Violence Against Women Act help your organization achieve their anti-violence goals?

4. Do you have any reservations about the implementation of the International Violence Against Women Act?

5. A) For you personally, how have post-9/11 national security narratives shaped VAW interventions and strategies?
   B) What do you think of these changes, if you have noticed any?

6. What do you think of Hillary Clinton’s vocal promotion of ending VAW in the name of national security as the Secretary of State?

Wrap-up
1. Is there anything I have not asked you that you would want me to know?
2. Would there be anyone you recommend that I speak to?
Appendix B

Interview Consent Form

Title of the study: Manufacturing Urgency: Development Perspectives on Violence Against Women

Researchers: Supervisors:

Corinne Mason, Étudiante au doctorat Institut d'études des femmes

Dr. Kathryn Trevenen
Institut d'études des femmes

Dr. Stephen Brown
École d'études politiques

Invitation to Participate: I am invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Corinne Mason, PhD Candidate at the University of Ottawa and supervised by Dr. Kathryn Trevenen and Dr. Stephen Brown.

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study is to investigate how violence against women is understood as a development issue. The project will focus on the identification of violence against women as a development issue historically, and will explore more current anti-violence policy, programs and campaigns in the development field.

Participation:
My participation will consist essentially of one semi-structured interview that will last one to one-and-a-half hours unless I request a second interview due to time constraints. During the interview I will answer questions about various issues regarding of development and violence against women, which I feel comfortable answering. The interview has been scheduled at my convenience at a location I have chosen. I will also be asked to provide contact information for other feminist, anti-violence and development practitioners who may be interested in taking part in this study.

Risks: My participation in this study will entail that I reveal my name and work place information, or locate myself with the broader women's movement. However, if I so choose, some or all of my identifying information will be removed from interview transcripts and will not be revealed in the research results. If I so choose, I may review transcripts of my interview and remove any information that I perceive as identifying. I may stop the interview at anytime without repercussion.
Benefits: My participation in this study will contribute to a variety of knowledge fields including, but not limited to, academic conversations, development interventions and anti-violence organizing.

Confidentiality and anonymity: I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that the contents will be used only for the purposes of this study as an academic dissertation and that my confidentiality will be protected in all results sharing, including the publication of results. The researcher has assured me that confidentiality will not be breached if I request anonymity. Removing all names and other identifying information from transcripts will protect anonymity. I may review my interview transcript to ensure that my anonymity has not been breached.

By agreeing to participate in this research, I understand:

1) That the information will only be used for the purposes of any publication following from this research, that my name and/or title will only be explicitly used if I agree to it, and that my identity will be protected if requested.

☐ I am willing to be identified by my full name and title
☐ I am willing to be identified by this generic title only: ____________________________________________

☐ I am willing to be identified only as “attributable interview”
☐ I am unwilling to have my identity disclosed in any way

Conservation of data: The data will be collected through an audio recorder and transcribed electronically on the researcher’s password-protected personal computer. Once transcribed, audio files will be permanently deleted, and transcripts will be encrypted and burnt on to a CD to be stored in a safe at the University of Ottawa. Transcript files will also be kept on the researchers personal computer and in her back-up drive where they will be encrypted for safe storage.

Voluntary Participation: I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be permanently deleted from all electronic and digital devices. I have received a brief synopsis of the project, was able to ask additional questions about its objectives, and understand my role in it.

Acceptance: I, ____________ agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Corinne Mason PhD Candidate of the Institute of Women’s Studies at
the University of Ottawa which research is under the supervision of Dr. Kathryn Trevenen and Dr. Stephen Brown.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or her supervisors.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: (613) 562-5387
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature: Date:

Researcher's signature: Date:
Formulaire de consentement

Titre de l'étude: Fabrication Urgence: Perspectives de développement sur la violence contre les femmes

Chercheur: Corinne Mason, Étudiante au doctorat Institut d’études des femmes

Superviseurs: Dr. Kathryn Trevenen Institut d’études des femmes Dr. Stephen Brown École d’études politiques

Invitation à participer: Je suis invité(e) à participer à la recherche nommée ci haut qui est menée par Corinne Mason (Étudiante au doctorat), et supervisés par Dr. Kathryn Treven et Dr. Stephen Brown.

But de l’étude: Le but de l’étude est d’étudier comment la violence contre les femmes est perçue comme un problème de développement. Le projet se concentrera sur l’identification de la violence contre les femmes comme une question de développement historique, et d’explorer plus de courant anti-violence politique, de programmes et de campagnes dans le domaine du développement.

Participation: Ma participation consistera essentiellement en une entrevue semi-structurée menée en anglais qui va durer un à un et demi heures à moins que je demande une deuxième entrevue en raison de contraintes de temps. Pendant l’entrevue, je répondre aux questions sur diverses questions concernant le développement et la violence contre les femmes, que je l’aïse de répondre. L’entrevue a été programmée à ma convenance à un endroit que j’ai choisi. Je vais également être demandé de fournir des informations de contact pour d’autres féministes, les praticiens contre la violence et le développement qui pourraient être intéressés à prendre part à cette étude.

Risques: Ma participation à cette étude impliquera que je révéler mon nom et lieu de travail, ou moi-même localiser avec le mouvement des femmes de plus. Cependant, si je le souhaite, tout ou partie de mes informations d’identification sera retirée de transcriptions des entretiens et ne sera pas révélée dans les résultats de recherche. Si je le souhaite, je peux examiner les transcriptions de mon interview et de supprimer toute information que je perçois comme identifiant. J’ai peut s’arrêter à tout moment de l’entrevue sans répercussion.

Bienfaits: Ma participation à cette étude contribuera à une variété de domaines de connaissances, y compris, mais sans s’y limiter, les conversations académiques, les interventions de développement et de lutte contre la violence organisation.

Confidentialité et anonymat: J’ai reçu l’assurance du chercheur que les informations, je vais partager demeuront strictement confidentielles. Je comprends que le contenu sera utilisé uniquement pour les fins de cette étude comme une dissertation académique et que ma confidentialité sera protégée dans tous partager les résultats, y compris la publication des résultats. Le chercheur m’a assuré que la confidentialité ne sera pas violé si je demande.
l'anonymat. Suppression de tous les noms et autres renseignements d'identification à partir des transcriptions permettra de protéger l'anonymat. Je peux revoir ma transcription de l'interview pour s'assurer que mon anonymat n'a pas été violée.

En acceptant de participer à cette recherche, je comprends:

1) Que les informations ne seront utilisées que pour les fins de toute publication suivante de cette recherche, que mon nom et / ou le titre ne sera explicitement utilisé si j'accepte de lui, et que mon identité sera protégée si demandé.

☐ Je consens à être identifié par mon nom complet et mon titre
☐ Je consens à être identifié seulement par le titre générique suivant :

☐ Je consens à être identifié seulement comme « entrevue non attribuable »
☐ Je ne consens à être identifié d'aucune façon.

**Conservation des données:** Les données seront recueillies au moyen d'un enregistreur audio et transrites par voie électronique sur le mot de passe-protégée du chercheur ordinateur personnel. Une fois transcrits, les fichiers audio seront définitivement supprimés, et les transcriptions seront cryptées et gravé sur un CD pour être stocké dans un coffre-fort à l'Université d'Ottawa. Transcription des fichiers sera également conservé sur l'ordinateur personnel et des chercheurs dans son back-up d'entraînement où ils seront cryptés pour un stockage sûr.

**Participation volontaire:** Je suis sous aucune obligation d'y participer et si je choisis de participer, je peux retirer de l'étude à tout moment et / ou de refuser de répondre à vos questions, sans souffrir de conséquences négatives. Si je choisis de se retirer, toutes les données recueillies jusqu'à l'heure du retrait sera définitivement supprimé de tous les appareils électroniques et numériques. J'ai reçu un bref résumé du projet, a pu poser des questions supplémentaires sur ses objectifs, et à comprendre mon rôle dans lui.

**Acceptation:** Je suis sous aucune obligation d'y participer et si je choisis de participer, je peux retirer de l'étude à tout moment et / ou de refuser de répondre à vos questions, sans souffrir de conséquences négatives. Si je choisis de se retirer, toutes les données recueillies jusqu'à l'heure du retrait sera définitivement supprimé de tous les appareils électroniques et numériques. J'ai reçu un bref résumé du projet, a pu poser des questions supplémentaires sur ses objectifs, et à comprendre mon rôle dans lui.

Acceptation: Je, __________ accepter de participer à l'étude de recherche menée par Corinne ci-dessus Mason candidat au doctorat de l'Institut d'études des femmes à l'Université d'Ottawa, si dont la recherche est sous la supervision du Dr Kathryn Trevenen et le Dr Stephen Brown.

Si j'ai des questions au sujet de l'étude, je peux communiquer avec le chercheur ou ses superviseurs.
Pour tout renseignement sur les aspects éthiques de cette recherche, je peux m'adresser au Responsable de l'éthique en recherche, Université d'Ottawa, Pavillon Tabaret, 550, rue Cumberland, pièce 154, (613) 562-5387 ou ethics@uottawa.ca.

Il y a deux copies du formulaire de consentement, dont une copie que je peux garder.

Signature du participant:  *(Signature)*  Date:  *(Date)*

Signature du chercheur:  *(Signature)*  Date:  *(Date)*
Ethics Approval Notice
Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)
Role
Affiliation
Last Name
First Name
Trevenen
Supervisor
Social Sciences / Women's Studies

Corinne
Mason
Student Researcher
Social Sciences / Women's Studies
08-11-10

File Number:
Manufacturing Urgency: Development Perspectives on Violence Against Women

Title:
PhD Thesis

Type of Project:
Renewal Date (10/24/2012)
Expiry Date (10/23/2013)

Approval Type
Ia (Ia: Approval, Ib: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:
N/A
This is to confirm that the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board identified above, which operates in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and other applicable laws and regulations in Ontario, has examined and approved the application for ethical approval for the above named research project as of the Ethics Approval Date indicated for the period above and subject to the conditions listed the section above entitled “Special Conditions / Comments”. During the course of the study the protocol may not be modified without prior written approval from the REB except when necessary to remove subjects from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) pertain to only administrative or logistical components of the study (e.g. change of telephone number). Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes which increase the risk to participant(s), any changes which considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project and safety of the participant(s). Modifications to the project, information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment documentation, should be submitted to this office for approval using the “Modification to research project” form available at: http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html

Please submit an annual status report to the Protocol Officer four weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to either close the file or request a renewal of ethics approval. This document can be found at: http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Office at extension 5387 or by e-mail at: ethics@uOttawa.ca.

Signature:
Kim Thompson
Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research
For Barbara Graves, Chair of the Social Sciences and Humanities REB

550, rue Cumberland 550 Cumberland Street
Ottawa (Ontario) K1N 6N5 Canada Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5 Canada
(613) 562-5387 • Téléc./Fax (613) 562-5338
http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/index.html
http://www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie/index.html
Recruitment Text

Violence against women is a global phenomenon. Yet, violence against women is understood to be *development issue*. How did this come to be? What does this mean for designing interventions and organizing against violence around the world?

If you would like to participate in a study on violence against women and development, I would like to speak to you. My name is Corinne Mason. I am currently a PhD Candidate in the Institute of Women’s Studies at the University of Ottawa. I have a BA in Development Studies and have been working actively in the anti-violence movement for the past few years.

With this study, I hope to speak to individuals working in the anti-violence and/or development field, as well as with feminists who attended any of the United Nations conferences during the Decade for Women (1975-1985, 1995). I hope to interview participants about the anti-violence conferences and campaigns carried out by the United Nations, about World Bank policy, and post-9/11 anti-violence narratives.

The interview will last one to one-and-a-half hours and will be scheduled at your convenience, at a location of your choice. I am enclosing an information sheet that provides details on the project, including the object of my inquiry, sample interview questions I will be asking, and provisions to respect any confidentiality requirements you may have.

If you would like to participate, please contact me.

Information Sheet

Dear

I am a PhD Candidate at the University of Ottawa and am currently conducting research about development perspectives on violence against women. I am writing to inquire if you would consider being interviewed (in English) for the project on a voluntary basis.

I am enclosing an information sheet that provides details on the project, including the object of my inquiry, its intended results, sample interview questions I will be asking, and provisions to respect any confidentiality requirements you may have. The interview would normally last between 1 to 1.5 hours and would take place at a time and location convenient to you.
I would be more than pleased to answer any questions you may have on the research project or the conduct of the interview, if you so desire. Please feel free to contact me.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,
Corinne Mason

Title of the study: Manufacturing Urgency: Development Perspectives on Violence Against Women

Researcher:
Corinne Mason, PhD Candidate
Institute of Women's Studies
University of Ottawa

Supervisors:
Dr. Kathryn Trevenen
Institute of Women's Studies
University of Ottawa

Dr. Stephen Brown
School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa

Purpose

This project seeks to investigate development perspectives on violence against women. While violence against women is a global issue, it is also considered a development problem. In the development community, violence is often considered a barrier to progress. This project will focus on the identification of violence against women as a development issue at United Nations conferences on women, as well as more current anti-violence policy, programs and campaigns. Specifically, my research will inquire about the United Nations’ UNiTE campaign, the World Bank, and post-9/11 narratives regarding violence against women. The study aims to explore the way in which violence against women is most often represented development discourses and explore the ways in which anti-violence advocates organize around these issues.

This project seeks to answer the following questions: How is violence against women represented by development discourse? How was VAW framed when it emerged as a development concern during the UN Nairobi conference (1985)? How have VAW discourses in development changed since the end of the UN Decade for Women? What types of violence are (hyper)visible in development discourses? Which types of violence are invisible or obscured? Does the framing of VAW in development affect the way in which feminists and development practitioners imagine resistances?
This research will be included in my doctoral dissertation. It will form the basis of academic publications. I also intend to disseminate my findings at public events, such as academic workshops and conferences.

Sample interview questions:

- Reflecting on the Nairobi and Beijing conferences and their outcomes, what conversations framed the topic of violence against women (VAW)?
- For your organization, what are the most important aspects of the UNiTE platform?
- Do you feel that the UNiTE campaign reflects the most concerning practices of violence against women?
- The World Bank claims to have a comparative advantage in gender and development policy and programming, including combatting VAW. Do you agree? Why or why not?
- The World Bank argues that VAW is inefficient and bad for development. What do you think of this argument? How useful do you believe this economic argument is to the broader anti-violence movement?
- How have post-9/11 national security narratives shaped VAW interventions and strategies?
- What do you think of Hillary Clinton’s vocal promotion of ending VAW in the name of national security as the Secretary of State?

Commitment to research ethics

The researchers are fully committed to fully respecting your wishes regarding what and how information you provide is used. The following provisions will apply. We will ask for your written consent before commencing the interview.

Voluntary participation and control of information

- You may choose not to respond to specific questions.
- You may decide to withdraw from the project at any time. If you do, it is up to you to decide at that point whether any material already provided to the researchers can still be used for the purposes of the research. The researchers will destroy any specific data pertaining to your participation or all of it, according to your wishes.
- You may specify that the researchers obtain your approval prior to publication of any reference to the information you provide.

Confidentiality provisions

- The researchers will only use the information you provide for the purposes of disseminating the findings of this research project.
- Your name and/or title will only be explicitly used if you agree to it. Your identity will be protected if you request it. You may specify that you are to be identified by a
generic title of your choosing, such as “government official”, “development practitioner” or “anti-violence advocate.” You may also choose to be identified only as “unattributable interview” or not to be cited in any form. When making this decision, please keep in mind that we have not sought or obtained your employer’s permission to interview you.

- You may modify your confidentiality requirements at any time prior to the publication of findings by communicating with the researchers.
- You may designate certain specific responses to be quotable under circumstances to be specified by you or not to be referred to at all.
- No information you disclose will be used in interviews with other participants in such a way as to allow them to identify the source of information.

Conservation and protection of information

- The interview notes (including audio files) will be kept in the researcher’s supervisor’s locked office at the University of Ottawa, accessible only to them.
- The interview notes will be destroyed 5 years after the completion of the project.

For any question relative to the research or to withdraw your consent at any time, you can communicate with the researcher, Corinne Mason, by telephone or by email.

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact:

- Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada, tel.: 613-562-5387, email: ethics@uottawa.ca