Peter Keneth Heron
AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

Ph.D. (Philosophy)
GRADE / DEGREE

Department of Philosophy
FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

“Another Sort of Intelligibility” Heidegger’s Project of Be-ing and the Phenomenology of Feeling

TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Mathieu Marion
DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS EXAMINERS

Daniel Dahlström (absent)  Daniel Tanguay

Denis Dumas

Sonia Sikka

Gary W. Slater
Le Doyen de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
‘ANOTHER SORT OF INTELLIGIBILITY’

HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT OF BE-ING AND
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF FEELING

Peter Heron, B.A., M.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor or Philosophy

University of Ottawa
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:
L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires soient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to my committee members, Denis Dumas, Daniel Tanguay, and Sonia Sikka of the University of Ottawa, for reading, commenting on, and questioning the thesis at various stages.

Special thanks to the external reader, Dan Dahlstrom of Boston University, and to Steven Crowell of Rice University, for recognition of the merit, and comprehension of many of the implications, of the central thesis of this work.

Warm thanks to my thesis supervisor, Mathieu Marion of the Université de Québec à Montréal, who always encouraged me to pursue my own path and occasionally fortified me with Chaumes cheese, fine wine and arctic char, as well as stimulating music and conversation, throughout the entire, long process.

Thanks to Quentin Smith for having written a brilliant work of phenomenology and for inspiring friendship, questing discussion, and luminous correspondence, long ago.

And, finally, thanks to Beverley Shaw, who, among many other things, simply allowed the work to happen.
ABSTRACT

‘Another Sort of Intelligibility’

Heidegger’s Project of Be-ing and the Phenomenology of Feeling

In this thesis, I develop a critical dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s projection of the meaning of be-ing (Sein), from the hermeneutically developing standpoint of a phenomenology of feeling (taking my cue from Quentin Smith’s early work in phenomenology). I wish to open up a path toward a new and more balanced interpretation of be-ing-here (Dasein), particularly at the disclosive level of felt meaning and at the ontological level of temporality. With this, the possibility of a metaphysics and ontology of be-ing itself becomes possible.

In Part One, I give an interpretive reading of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time. After an introductory chapter, I shift to the question of primordiality of interpretation, as Heidegger himself poses it, at the beginning of the second Division of Being and Time. I point out that, beyond the well-known ‘holistic’ and ‘authenticity’ requirements (for which I provide intensive readings), there is the less well-known ‘phenomenological’ requirement, viz., that an interpretation be drawn from a “basic experience”. In analyzing Heidegger’s version of this basic experience, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, we come up against the possibilities of deeper primordialities, both of interpretation and experience. I point out that we could take up a deeper-reaching phenomenology of felt disclosure as a possible path to resolve Heidegger’s impasse in his turn to be-ing itself.

In Part Two, I give a detailed exposition of the new phenomenology of feeling, of Quentin Smith’s The Felt Meanings of the World. This under-appreciated work develops a phenomenological methodology that is free of Heidegger’s existential and projective bias. It opens out the inner structure of felt meaning in a way that allows for more accurate description and conceptualization of the phenomena of feeling than has hitherto been achieved. This, further, opens up the possibility of a metaphysics of feeling, which can be interpreted within the context of Heidegger’s original intention toward the meaning of be-ing and in explicit contradistinction to his ‘project’ of be-ing.

In Part Three, I elaborate Heidegger’s own phenomenology of dis-position (an ignored aspect of his work), and develop it, particularly as regards the temporal analysis. Here I make several observations and criticisms of Heidegger’s temporal analysis (another quite ignored though crucial aspect of his thinking), which have far-reaching effect as to the validity of his overall existential projection of be-ing. The ‘prejudice’ of the imperatives of existence becomes particularly visible in the consequent distortions of the factual be-ing of be-ing-here and of its temporal structure.

The thesis concludes with the phenomenologico-temporal analyses of some key moods, using both Smith and Heidegger’s concepts, with the intention of opening up a concrete direction for a phenomenological interpretation of be-ing itself.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION: The Violence of Projection and Releasement into Dis-position</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Statement of intent in broad outline</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Preamble through the problematic of the hermeneutic projection of be-ing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) The violence of projection</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) Releasement into disposition</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE: PRIMORDIALITY OF INTERPRETATION AND BASIC EXPERIENCE IN HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER I. Introduction to the Project of Being and Time: Everyday Be-ing-Here</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Heidegger’s Introductions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Heidegger’s philosophical project: the question of be-ing</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Outlines of the ontological analysis: the temporal interpretation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) Methodological considerations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Destructuring the history of ontology</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The phenomenological method</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The preparatory fundamental analysis of be-ing-here: everyday be-ing-in-the-world</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Existence and mineness</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Factical be-ing-in and falling</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) The world and its worldhood</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Worldly beings: pragmataic, extant, natural</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Be-ing for the sake of significance: the worldhood of the world</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER II. The Primordiality Requirement: Uncanny Be-ing-Here</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The primordiality requirement: holism, authenticity, and basic experience</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Indication of a deeper primordiality</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER III. The Holistic Requirement: Anticipatory Be-ing-towards-Death as the Existential-Ontological Projection of Be-ing-a-Whole</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The problem of existential wholeness</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Detour through the death of others</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ontology of life, death, existence</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Death by falling</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Anticipation 76
10. Projective breakdown 78
11. Five analytic items of anticipation and its genuine disclosure in anxiety 81
12. The possibility of choosing one's be-ing-here as a whole and regaining the world 83
13. The possibility of letting-go of the project 86

CHAPTER IV. The Authenticity Requirement: Resolute Conscience as the Existentiell/Ontic Attestation of My Own Be-ing-a-Whole 88

14. Methodological consideration 88
15. The factual call of conscience 92
16. The existential tendency of interpretation and its factual problem 96
17. The existential hearing – understanding – the call 100
   i) “Guilty!” 102
      a) The nullity of factual thrownness 104
      b) The nullity of existential projection 105
      c) Falling 106
   ii) The experience of guilt: ‘willing to have a conscience’ 106
18. Resoluteness 110
   i) The existential structure of willing-to-have-a-conscience 112
   ii) The existential structure (Care-structure) of resolute be-ing-in-the-world 114
      a) Authentic modification 114
      b) Freedom 116
      c) The Situation 120

CHAPTER V. The Phenomenological Requirement: Anticipatorily Resolute Self-Be-ing as the Basic Experience of the Authentic Possibility-of-Be-ing-a-Whole 122

19. The problem of the ‘essential connection’ 122
20. Inauthentic resoluteness? 126
21. Anticipatory resoluteness and Self-constancy 129
22. The primordial truth of existence and Self-certainty 133

CHAPTER VI. Deeper Primordialities: Temporality, Historicity, Birth, Dis-position 140

23. The deeper primordiality 140
24. Primordial be-ing-in-the-truth (dis-position) and certainty 142
25. Heidegger’s “brief digression” in the Grundprobleme: the pre-conceptual ‘understanding’ of be-ing and Heidegger’s impasse 147
26. A potential breakthrough: Crowell’s “another sort of intelligibility” 153
PART TWO: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF FEELING:
QUENTIN SMITH’S THE FELT MEANINGS OF THE WORLD

CHAPTER VII. Introduction to Smith’s Philosophical Orientation 157

27. The spiritual orientation of the work 157
28. The metaphysics of reason vs. the metaphysics of feeling 162
29. The method of appreciative knowing 166

CHAPTER VIII. The Phenomenology Of Feeling 171

30. Feeling-flows and the sensuously felt regions of the world 172
   i) Feeling sensations of the ‘I that feels’ 172
   ii) Feeling tonalities of the world 177
   iii) The ‘great sensuous metaphysical regions of the world’ and their sources 182
31. Feeling-awarenesses and the world as important 185
   i) Feeling-awarenesses of importances distinguished from ‘the feeling of … 187
   ii) Perceiving and thinking as feeling-awarenesses 190
      a) Perceiving 191
      b) Thinking 194
   iii) The degeneration of feeling and the origin of the fact/value distinction 196
32. The intuitive feeling-awarenesses: moods and affects 203
   i) Moods 203
      a) The constant characters of moods 205
      b) The exceptional character of moods: global contemplation 208
   ii) The epistemological-metaphysical problem posed by moods 212
   iii) Affects 213
      a) Similarities and differences of affects from moods 214
      b) Solving the problem posed by moods: the veridicality of global… 216

PART THREE: EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER’S
PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSES OF DIS-
POSITION

Introduction 223

CHAPTER IX. The Structure of the Disclosedness Of Dis-position 225

33. Dis-position as a mode of disclosure 225
34. What moods disclose 228
   i) Thrownness - the burden and the enigma of the ‘whence and whither’ 229
      a) Burdensomeness 229
      b) Facticity 232
      c) The moodal ‘How’ 236
   ii) ‘The whole’: existential, ontic, ontologic wholes 238
iii) World-parts: ‘preoccupation’ with beings

α) Excursus on the mood/affect distinction

iv) The “ways of mattering” (and falling)

β) Dis-positional mattering, projective significance, felt meaning

35. The structure of dis-position

i) The before-which (das Wovor)

ii) The mood itself

iii) The about-which (das Worum)

CHAPTER X. The Temporality of Dis-position

36. Introduction

i) Envisioning revisions of Heidegger’s temporal theory

ii) The justification of the interpretive ‘presupposition’ of the idea of existence by the ‘ontological content’ of thrownness (SZ §63)

iii) Preamble to Heidegger’s temporal analysis of disclosedness

37. The temporal analysis of authentic care (anticipatory resoluteness)

i) Be-ing-toward-death and the future

ii) Be-ing-guilty and been-ness

γ) Excursus on primordial been-ness and authentic been-ness

δ) Recognitions of the past in recent Heideggerian scholarship

iii) Situational be-ing and making-present (enpresenting)

iv) The unity of the ecstases and historicality

38. The temporality of disclosedness

i) The temporality of understanding

a) Understanding’s futural ‘be-ing ahead of itself’

b) Understanding’s present ‘be-ing-amidst’

c) Understanding’s past ‘be-ing already in’

ii) The temporality of discourse and falling

39. The temporality of dis-position

i) The temporality of fear

ii) The temporality of anxiety

40. Authentic historicality

CONCLUSIONS: The Hermeneutical Situation of Another Sort of Intelligibility

i) Results and conclusions

ii) Transition toward the phenomenological and metaphysical analysis of felt meaning

Bibliography
ABBREVIATIONS
(See the bibliography for full references)

All references to Martin Heidegger's work and to Quentin Smith's work, in my text, will omit their names and publications dates, and give one of the following abbreviated forms of the title of the work. All other authors will be referred to by name and publication date.

Works by Martin Heidegger

BP - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
   - BT - Being and Time, Macquarrie & Robinson translators
   - H - Sein und Zeit, 16th edition, 1986

CT - The Concept of Time

Dilthey - Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for Historical Worldview (in Supplements)

DT - Discourse on Thinking

ER - The Essence of Reasons. T. Malick, translator
   - VWG - Vom Wesen des Grundes. German text included in Malick's ER
   - EG - The Essence of Ground; translated by W. McNeill (in Pathmarks)

FCM - The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude

GA - Gesamtausgabe

HCT - History of the Concept of Time

IM - Introduction to Metaphysics

Indication - "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle — an Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922)", pg. 121 (in Supplements). This is the 'lost manuscript', not the course of the same name (at least the same auf deutsch).

LH - Letter on Humanism

MFL - Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

Ont - Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity

P - Pathmarks

PIA - Phenomenological Investigations of Aristotle. This is the 1922 lecture course.

PLT - Poetry, Language, Thought

S - Supplements

TDP - Towards the Definition of Philosophy

WM - What is Metaphysics?; translated by Crick and Hull in Existence and Being.
   - WM in P - What is Metaphysics?; translated by D. Krell (in Pathmarks)

Works by Quentin Smith

FM - The Felt Meanings of the World

HTM - On Heidegger's Theory of Moods
“The ascent will be betrayed to Gravity. But the rocket engine, the deep cry of combustion that jars the soul, promises escape. The victim, in bondage to falling, rises on a promise, a prophecy, of Escape...”

Thomas Pynchon [Gravity's Rainbow, p. 885]

“The entire ambiguity of the philosophy of transcendence consists in presupposing the affectivity of understanding, a presupposition which does not merely presuppose the essence of affectivity but which, by reducing it to that of the understanding itself and confusing it therewith, denies it.”

Michel Henry [The Essence of Manifestation [p.598-9]

“It is of the essence of phenomenological investigations that they cannot be reviewed summarily but must in each case be rehearsed and repeated anew.”

Martin Heidegger [HCT, 26]
INTRODUCTION

The Violence of Projection and Releasement
into Dis-position

i. Statement of intent in broad outline

In this thesis, I develop a critical dialogue with Heidegger’s projection of the meaning of be-ing (Sein), from the hermeneutically developing standpoint of a phenomenology of feeling (principally that of Quentin Smith). I wish, initially, to open up a path toward a new and more balanced interpretation of be-ing-here (Dasein), particularly at the disclosive level of felt meaning and at the ontological level of temporality – both core aspects of the Heideggerian enterprise. With this, not only does a re-visioning of the analysis of what it means to be here become possible but so, also, it becomes possible to envisage a metaphysics and temporal ontology of be-ing itself – the point at which Heidegger’s project broke down.

If Heidegger’s work can be seen as a critique of a traditional, underlying ‘logical prejudice’ regarding truth, (viz., that truth is essentially about judgments or assertions or propositions and the states of affairs they represent) and a replacement of this prejudice with a more original or primordial form of truth – that of the authentic disclosedness of be-ing-here [see Dahlstrom, 2001, esp. 219-229] – then, I would suggest, the prejudice lives on, albeit in altered form, in the projective prejudice that holds sway within Heidegger’s modes of be-ing-here’s disclosedness. Similarly, if the ontological presupposition to the logical prejudice is the sheer actualized presence of beings, “constantly on hand or on display”
[ibid., 219-20], then I would suggest that a parallel ontological presupposition holds sway, supporting Heidegger’s projective prejudice: that is, Heidegger’s insistence on be-ing-here’s mode of be-ing of existence, as the focal point of his fundamental ontology. This presupposition is reflected, further, in Heidegger’s temporal analysis, as an insistence – in contradistinction to the tradition’s ‘presential’ temporal prejudice – on the priority of the future (and of existential historicality) within be-ing-here’s temporality.

In short, in his fundamental philosophical project, Heidegger maintains a projective, existential and futural prejudice which, ultimately (to put it perhaps too succinctly), “has the effect of disabling rather than enabling genuine discourse and thinking” [ibid., xvi] about both be-ing-here as a whole and be-ing itself. This is a core plank of the thesis of this work.

I begin, then, in Part One, with an interpretive reading – not a summary – of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time. That is, I give a reading of both the ontological project, in the sense of the ‘theme of inquiry’ of Being and Time, and also the project, as the disclosive ‘act of projection’ in Being and Time. In a sense, these – theme and act – are the same thing, as the theme of Being and Time, the be-ing of be-ing-here, is ‘existence’ (oriented toward its possible wholeness and authenticity) and the act or disclosive phenomenon of ‘projection’ is the core of the specific mode of disclosure (understanding) which ‘belongs to’ existence. Furthermore, modes of be-ing of be-ing-here (such as existence, facticity, and falling) are intimately bound up with modes of disclosure (such as understanding, dis-position, and discourse), so intimately, indeed, that they are almost indistinguishable – at least, they can be made ‘transparent’ to one another (as is, in fact, the

---

1 As Dahlstrom says regarding the ‘logical prejudice’ [Dahlstrom, 2001, xvi].
goal of Heidegger's interpretation). Be-ing-here is the disclosedness of itself and, as such, of be-
ing.

Thus, for example, to exist (i.e., to be here in the mode of be-ing one's futural dimension) is to projectively disclose; uncovering how and what kind of projective disclosure manifests existence most authentically, holistically, and primordially is the concrete goal of Heidegger's existential investigation. My focus, then, on "Heidegger's project in Being and Time" enacts the very hermeneutic reflexivity characteristic of Heidegger's own notion of be-ing-here as existence.

Or again, to factically be (i.e., to be one's having-been-and-still-be-ing-here, one's 'beening' i.e., to be here in the mode of be-ing one's 'past' dimension) is to disclose factically, that is — at least, in Heidegger's conflated sense of to exist factically — to have already projected and be already situated in the 'thrownness' of that project — this is a main aspect and focus of Heidegger's 'historical' analysis.

However — and this goes toward the heart of my critique — as opposed, not only to 1) the standard 'pro-positional' truth, but also in distinction from 2) the projective understanding of existence and, more specifically, as opposed to 3) the notion of factual disclosure as the disclosure of thrownness, i.e., as authentic existence's coming back to oneself futurally, in the authentic repetition of one's thrown, historical be-ing-here — as opposed to all this, factical disclosure is the disclosure of dis-position: i.e., the disclosure of moods and affects.

One must ask, then: Is it really the case, as Heidegger has it, that moods and affects disclose projective existence, in its thrown or 'past' form? and disclose this as something futural? Or is this not rather an egregious and inappropriate imposition of the 'about-which' of projective disclosure, a prejudicial presupposition that obscures the idiosyncratic 'matter',
about which dis-positions disclose, viz., felt meanings, what it means to factically – not existentially – be-here at all? Granted, moods and affects can disclose existence or factual existence, as evidenced by Heidegger's profound analysis of angst. But, I ask, is this not rather a modification of a more primordial dis-positional disclosure and disclosiveness of factual be-ing-here? Is there not something ignored, not only in Heidegger's analysis of angst, but also in his analysis of the structure of dis-position per se?

In this work, I emphasize that to be, factically, is a mode of be-ing-here distinct from, even if interrelated to, that of existence and its thrownness. Further, facticity's mode of disclosure, moods and affects – feelings, broadly – are also distinct from the disclosiveness of projection and thus from the scope of a fundamentally existential interpretation of be-ing-here. It must be emphasized that this is not, as Heidegger and his defenders would be prone to object, an 'anthropologization' of ontological structures of be-ing-here but a reworking of that ontology. 'Dis-positions' are essentially disclosive of factual be-ing and be-ing-here – not of thrown, projective be-ing-here (i.e., not of existential be-ing, even in its 'past' or 'historical' form). I show that the factual be-ing of be-ing-here is not only, as generally presented in Heidegger's analysis, the ineluctable and burdensome been-ness of factual existing, to be, in 'repetition', taken over and taken up in an authentic project of Self-be-ing – but also, and more essentially, the inexplicable giftedness of be-ing and be-ing-here at all, dis-posing us in appreciative disclosures of felt meaning.

It is a main focus of this thesis, then, to work out the ambiguity or, perhaps better, multivalence of facticity. I wish to emphasize the non-existential and relatively independent mode of be-ing-here of facticity, together with facticity's own relatively independent mode of disclosure – the moods and affects of dis-position (Befindlichkeit). The scope and the
interpretive structure of Heidegger's own phenomenological analysis of moods – an admirable work in itself, though one quite routinely ignored in Heideggerian literature – is unfortunately, so I argue, compromised and truncated by overriding and inappropriate existential and projective imperatives.

I present, therefore, in *Part Two*, the 'phenomenology of feeling' of current American philosopher Quentin Smith, a phenomenology that is free of Heidegger's existential and projective bias. I choose Smith's work – specifically *The Felt Meanings of the World* (1986) – because it is both a brilliant and under-appreciated work of original phenomenology, which develops a phenomenological methodology that opens out the inner structure of felt meaning in a way that allows him to pursue a metaphysics of feeling. That is, Smith has metaphysical and ontological goals, similar to Heidegger's (in fact, Heidegger's work was, perhaps, the most influential on Smith's early philosophical development), which allows one to see possibilities for re-interpreting the Heideggerian project. The combination of a thorough and comprehensive phenomenology, metaphysical depth, originality, and lack of recognition by the phenomenological community, makes Smith's work ripe for fruitful interpretation.

Though it would be a worthy and ultimately necessary task to work through Smith's *metaphysics* and to bring it into dialogue with Heidegger's, I can only here *prepare* such a task by showing some of the benefits, for the Heideggerian analysis of be-ing-here and the 'project' (better: 'venture') of be-ing, of an unrestricted phenomenology of feeling. There are a host of feelings revelatory of various constitutional aspects of (in Heidegger's terms) be-ing-here and meanings of be-ing itself. For example, been-ness (or the having-been of be-ing-here) discloses as *wonder* at the mysteriousness of having come into be-ing from non-be-ing; and been-ness elicits a present which emerges into the *stupefaction* of our factual be-ing...
at all, also revealed, dynamically, in the affect of joy.\footnote{These are not quite precisely how Smith would articulate these felt meaning.} These affects attune to felt meanings which are ‘there’, before the ‘burden’ of projective existence, there, as disclosive of the sheer, positive fact of be-ing at all. Though I will refrain from actual phenomenological investigations of my own, in this thesis, I will set up the hermeneutic situation, vis-à-vis Heidegger, within which such a phenomenology will resonate most vibrantly.

In Part Three, then, I return to Heidegger and engage in an exposition and critique of his phenomenology of dis-positional disclosure, focusing especially on the temporal analysis of such disclosure. Here, at the deepest level of Heideggerian analysis, we find evidence confirming my general thesis that Heidegger’s existential and projective prejudices distort his articulation of the phenomena – and the structure of the phenomena – and I suggest some alternative possibilities, based upon the overall reworking of facticity presented in this work.

More specifically, Heidegger’s priority of existence is echoed in his priority of the future temporal ecstasy within the equiprimordial, tripartite, ecstatic structure of the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of be-ing-here. However, if factual be-ing-here is given priority – or, at least, a true equiprimordiality which would preserve the idiosyncratic peculiarities of the factual disclosure – this would, presumably (at least, initially) – indicate a priority or true equiprimordiality of ‘been-ness’, the ‘past’ ecstatic mode of temporal be-ing-here. Indeed, in Heidegger’s temporal analysis, we come across various distortions of be-ing-here’s primordial temporality, based upon Heidegger’s emphasis on authentic temporality, which is the temporality of authentic existence. These distortions make, for example, an articulation of the structural phenomenon of birth impossible, despite Heidegger’s overture toward birth in his momentary consideration of ‘be-ing-toward-the-beginning’, a consideration which is
immediately compromised and subsumed by the primarily existential-futural considerations of be-ing-here’s historicality. I claim that the primordial phenomenon of a sustained be-ing-from-birth – not some post facto be-ing-toward it – structures our factual be-ing and its dispositional disclosures\(^3\) – if not Heidegger’s project of authentic existence. This be-ing-from-birth is the proper basis for the primordial factual-temporal phenomenon.

Been-ness is seen to essentially be, therefore, not only not the pastness of a historical be-ing-here, in the standard sense of a past which lingers on in our memory and our artifacts (the past of a ‘narrative’ or derivatively ‘hermeneutic’ sense of time\(^4\)), but it is also not, primordially, the ineluctable and present pastness of existence, as manifested in a possible, authentic historicality of thrown, yet repeated and retrieved, existence. Primordial been-ness is something else: perhaps the primordial abyss prior to all present or past ground and futural horizon: it awakens the insuperable facticity of be-ing here at all – not just ‘existing’ – from which we arise.

It is, therefore, questionable whether this temporality or aspect of the temporality of be-ing-here is to be comprehended within the ecstatic-horizontal schema of Heidegger’s temporality at all. The latter temporality itself already has the structure of a projection: one throws oneself forth, outside oneself, upon a horizon within which one has understood oneself and beyond which one may gain a more authentic self-understanding. The horizon is the beginning of the world and one is both ‘in’ and beyond the world. However, there is no futural horizon at all structuring the disclosures of factual be-ing-here and no ground awaiting the abyss of the past. The been-ness of felt meanings is that region of the

\(^3\) - in the same way as be-ing-toward-death structures existence and projective understanding.

'Encompassing', which, preceding us, forever behind view, gives us, and gives us something which we can, also – should projective meaning and the play of language be seen as enhancing already appreciated felt meaning – establish as ground and project forth upon and beyond the horizon. This horizon, though, should now be seen as one which turns us around, yet again, in circles spinning around the perpetually calm, equanimous center of abysmal being-here, the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth"\(^5\), in renewed appreciation of the ever stunning fact of being at all.

ii. *Preamble through the problematic of the hermeneutic projection of being (SZ ¶63)*

Just after the culmination of the existential analytic (of the authentic ability-to-be-here-as-a-whole: *anticipatory resoluteness*) and just before the temporal (and historical) analysis in *Being and Time*, Heidegger pauses for an important set of methodological considerations. I would like to introduce some characteristics my topic *vis-à-vis* some of these considerations, here at this stopping place in *Being and Time*.

At this point (¶63) – the transition from the existential analysis to the temporal analysis – one could say that Heidegger, engaged in an "explicit and genuine actualizing of the tendency toward interpretation that belongs to the basic movements of life" – as he characterizes the purpose of thinking in [S, 121] – has brought being-here into view as "a monument that evokes thinking", such that it "forces the present back into itself in order to intensify its questionability" [*ibid.*, 113]. Heidegger has finally reached *primordiality of interpretation*, at least within the scope of the initial interpretive projection or 'formal

indication’ of existence. This he has done by achieving transparency in the hermeneutical situation, a transparency of the hermeneutical ‘object’ (be-ing-here) with the interpretive projection itself (existence). Heidegger has achieved this by the fulfillment of the ‘primordiality requirements’ of interpretation. These requirements are those of authenticity, i.e., the uniqueness of my own be-ing-here; totality (or holism), i.e., be-ing-a-whole; and existentiellity or phenomenological-existential concreteness, i.e., the grounding of the interpretation in a basic experience of be-ing-here.

The initial task of Heidegger’s investigation was to, without methodological clarity, “go forth” [H303] into the phenomena; that is, pre-conceptually (pre-ontologically) project — though with an ontologically “appropriate foresight” [“angemessenen Vorblick”; H303]... — the ontological structure of the ‘object’ under investigation. This means, in effect, that we pre-thematically project the be-ing of be-ing-here, viz., existence, i.e., that we engage in an ontic-existentiell (though, importantly, not necessarily thereby ‘fallen’ or ‘everyday’) projection of existentiality, with a view toward explicit ontological conception.

We, in any case, have a kind of ‘natural aptitude’ for such projection: be-ing-here is a being, which is ontologically; that is, its very way of be-ing, itself, relates to be-ing itself (as its own be-ing). A conceptually articulate ontology is the goal but the way to get there begins with the concrete facts, the ‘lived ontology’ of existing. This latter is what Heidegger, early on in his philosophical career, called the “factual life experience” of be-ing-here, which is oriented toward the “core phenomenon of the historical” viz., the “enactment [of the] historical situation” [PRL 7, 22, and 62, respectively] or ‘actualization-history’ (Vollzugsgeschichte).6

---

6 As opposed to the explicit and conceptual ‘object historical’ - see [Kisiel, 1993, p.508]. Even earlier (1919), Heidegger uses the word ‘Erlebnis’ for this basic experiential level, as a “living-toward-something” [TDP, 57].
Now, in existing, one ‘projects forth’ ‘understandingly’, in a kind of non-thematic ‘positing’ or pro-posing. The structure and ‘movement’ of projection brings this being, be-ing-here – indeed, by virtue of our ‘facticity’: it has already brought it – outside itself, transcending itself. Be-ing-here transcends not only into beings and the world but could be said to, most proximally, already ‘descend’ into be-ing\(^7\) . . . and also, thereby, into the specific kind of be-ing-in-and-with beings, characteristic of be-ing-in-the-world. The dynamic of the ontological structure of transcendence is what makes possible a relatedness to beings: we are in and with beings inasmuch as we understand them as this or that, based on our pre-ontic (i.e., ‘ontological’; here meant as ‘concerning be-ing’) and pre-conceptual (pre-ontological – ‘ontological’ meant as an explicit, conceptual discipline\(^8\)) understanding of be-ing itself. That is, even in be-ing-here’s ‘ontic’ or intraworldly understanding (of beings), be-ing itself – so the idea goes – has already been projected (and thereby ‘understood’, if not explicitly comprehended); be-ing is that whereby we can understand beings as such.

In fact, one who exists must be essentially ‘homeless’ among beings – even if as be-ing-in-the-world, we are, essentially, already ‘outside’ not only of ourselves but of the world of beings. No matter how familiar and ‘at home’ we appear to be there, we are, particularly, outside of the secured and accustomed human home (even if only in an avoidant manner). Not that we cannot, within limits, truly and creatively ground our be-ing in the world...

Be-ing-here, then, as thrown existence, is, in its be-ing, already transcendentally projected into the uncannily ‘other’ realm of be-ing itself. It is just this very relation to an

\(^7\) “Descends” i.e., be-ing-here has already transcended into be-ing, and so, here and now, can step back or ‘descend’ into that openness that already is. This ‘descendence’ is a step back into the nearness of be-ing at the heart of be-ing-here, rather than an ascending forth and beyond oneself into the alien distances afar.

\(^8\) Jacquette’s distinction between ontology as a discipline and ontology as a domain is useful here [Jacquette, 2002, 2, passim].
‘other’ that constitutes the fact and possibility of the selfhood of be-ing-here: a kind of ‘pre-reflective cogito’, as Sartre rightly observes, accompanies and constitutes all forms of ‘consciousness’ of otherness; and vice-versa. This transcendental projection, though, is no explicitly ontological project: the roots of all ontology, including existential ontology, trace back into the “ontic fundament” [H436] of an existentiell projection of be-ing by be-ing-here.9 Yet, despite the lack of ontological clarity, despite not yet having the concept of be-ing to hand, we nonetheless throw ourselves forth, i.e., project into be-ing.

Heidegger’s method begins, then, by pre-conceptually duplicating factual existence’s own ‘thrown’, pre-conceptual, ontological projection; that is, he, with the open-endedness and inexplicitness of a ‘formal-indicative’ ‘pre-cept’10, repeats our factual-existential projectedness or ‘thrownness’. This is done with an open view (as is an essential part of these ‘notions’) toward an “original evidence-situation” [PIA, 28], which will allow for an explicit conceptualization of the facts of our existential projection. That is, the initial move allegedly duplicates the fact of thrown existence, with a guiding, fore-running concept of the be-ing of be-ing-here: existence; with which we are to pursue our interpretative analysis (the Daseinanalytik), with a view toward an ultimate, essential, and culminating experience of being-here as existence (which turns out to be anticipatory resoluteness, the ‘original evidence-situation’); which will confirm, to the degree that it does, or disconfirm, to the degree that is not thorough enough, the formal conceptual adequacy of the interpretation.11

---

9 The ‘ontic fundament’ — meaning be-ing-here’s existentiell and ‘lived experience’ of be-ing, rather than our conceptual-ontological project of be-ing.
10 Rather than ‘formally objective’ concept; cf., [TDF, 98]. Cf., [Kiesel, 1993, 55].
11 The ‘formal indicative’ concept (or pre-cepts or ‘presuppositions’) “lets the interpreted itself directly come into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as this being, it has that state of be-ing it has been disclosed as having, in the formally indicative projection.” [H314-315].
We may be concerned to know how one is to recognize the adequacy of an interpretation. What are the criteria for the interpreted phenomenon "deciding of its own accord" [H315] whether its interpretation is accurate or not? But I want, here, to focus on something more basic and preliminary: What about the ontologically 'appropriate foresight', which initially provides the guiding interpretive or 'formally indicative' concept - viz., the "idea of existence" - which guides us as that which we see in advance" [H311, my italics] throughout the interpretation? How do we achieve the foresight for such an 'idea'? And is this foresight of 'ideas'? Or does it see, primordially, something else? The 'idea of existence', as we had seen from the very beginning of the preparatory analysis of be-ing-here (§9) in Being and Time, is that which we have 'presupposed' as our formal indication of the field to be actually taken up in our inquiry. 'Existentiality' has been "had", "seen", and "grasped in advance"\(^{12}\), and by now - well into the second Division of Being and Time - it has been "concretely worked out" and "made definite" in the interpretation [H311]: be-ing-here's authentic possibility-to-be-a-whole, anticipatory resoluteness, has been "put into" [ibid.] this guiding concept and the phenomenal content has filled out the concept's formal structure with fulfilling intuitions and articulations. This has impelled us forward in concrete interpretation - that is to say, be-ing-here has been primordially guided by and concretely interpreted as existence. It has been a richly fecund manner of interpretation.

But now, this initial task complete, and "before laying bare the meaning of the be-ing of a being which has been revealed in its basic phenomenal content" [H303, my italics] (to wit, of be-ing-here) and in order to 'impel us forward the more keenly', Heidegger wishes to explicitly clarify the methodological situation. His initial projection has only begged the

\(^{12}\) That is, by a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception which guides an interpretation.
question: What is the source of the appropriate fore-sight? "Where does the idea [of existence] get its justification?" [H313].

For Heidegger, phenomenological "grasping and explicating..." – that is, phenomenological conceptualization – "...is itself 'originary' and 'intuitive'" in its own way, and should be distinguished from "the naivete of a haphazard, 'immediate', and unreflective 'beholding'" [H37] – that is, distinguished from Heidegger’s notion of the ‘intuition and conceptualization of extant beings’, which he sees as a part of the fateful cognitive apparatus of the forgetfulness of be-ing. Precisely what Heidegger's own originary and intuitive 'way' of conceiving, what this 'hermeneutical intuition'\(^\text{13}\) is, though, is not, at this point in Being and Time, positively determined. Is it the same or yet different again from whatever 'intuition' may be involved in the initial, perhaps 'primordial', foresight into the phenomena – into be-ing itself – which can develop an appropriate formally indicative guiding concept? What, we may ask, is the visionary or experiential ground, out of which formally indicative concepts arise? What is the pre-theoretical, pre-worldly "primal something",\(^\text{14}\) experienced in the "founding experience" [S, 128], which may be intensified by authentic philosophical conceptualizing (as opposed to the "de-vivification" which occurs in normal conceptual objectification) – but which must be 'there' in the first place? And how do we primordially attune to it?

iii. The violence of projection

Because of another ontological-existential co-constitutive moment of be-ing-here, 'falling', which "covers up" and "closes off" potentially authentic be-ing-here by diverting it

---

\(^{13}\) as Heidegger calls it in 1919. Cf. [TDP, 98-99].

\(^{14}\) cf, the "KNS-Schema" referred to in [Kisiel, 1993, esp. 21-23]; and [TDS, esp. Part 2.1].
into the existential vagueness of common sense, be-ing-here’s very own be-ing demands that, in our attempts to grasp the primordial be-ing of be-ing-here, we practice a kind of violence upon common sense and standard notions. Existence – as authentic projection – is a radical countermovement to the falling of care.\textsuperscript{15} We must “capture” be-ing-here’s be-ing in spite of its own tendency to cover-up, and we must “wrest” it from the obscurity of the half-truths of everyday understanding [H311] and the sedimentations of tradition.

Heidegger indicates, though, that, apart from this violence against common sense, which the juxtaposition of the ‘downward plunge’ of falling and the steady-stance, countermovement of resolute existence compels, interpretation is violent in another sense. This violence stems from the fact that the existential ‘faculty’ or mode of disclosure of understanding, upon which interpretation rests, has the structure of a projection [H311-12].\textsuperscript{16}

What is violent in projection? Is there violence inherent in the very ‘structure’ of projection?

We have already seen a potential violence in the transcendental impetus of projection: be-ing-here is essentially homeless within beings because of its transcendental nature, that is, its projectedness into be-ing. There can be a sense of violence toward beings in the surpassing toward or returning from be-ing, for ontological transcendence is a ‘not’ to beings. Moreover, projection has an ecstatic-horizontal structure. Is there violence somehow inherent in this schema? Perhaps projection is violent in that it has an arbitrary character and so forces its interpretation upon the phenomena. This would seem, though, to be the fate only

\textsuperscript{15} See especially [S, 118-120] for this formulation.
\textsuperscript{16} “While this characteristic [vìz., ‘doing violence’] is indeed specially distinctive of the ontology of be-ing-here, it properly belongs to any interpretation because the understanding which develops in interpretation has the structure of a projection.” [H311-12]
of certain projections, inadequate ones, whereas we are seeking the violent nature of projection *per se*.

Aside from these possibilities, the point may be that projection *alone* is inadequate, unguided, perhaps 'blind' and therefore violent in its trial and error interpretations. Thus arises the question, again, as to what guides and regulates projection *per se*? [H312]. What 'evidence' grounds the project? What justifies the idea of existence? Heidegger has mentioned that there is, indeed, despite his early prohibition of such a thing, a "factual ideal" [H310] underlying the ontological interpretation of be-ing-here's existence. Then, what gives this 'ideal'? Perhaps a creative will (-to-power), the power of projection itself? But before we question the nature of this factual ideal, perhaps we must understand more about the nature of projection itself.

Heidegger is not, in *Being and Time*, particularly informative about the nature of either projection itself or its violence – except that any understanding projection, *Entwurf*, is a 'throwing forth' of something (upon a 'horizon' which contextualizes it meaningfully). Circumspective concern, for example, throws beings forth into their usability and serviceability; science throws beings forth upon an objectifying thematization, it pro-jects objects which 'throw themselves back against' the project [cf. H36317]; existentiell projection pre-thematically throws be-ing-here into its possibilities, into its possible be-ing (existence), as does existential-ontological projection, though in an explicit, thematic, articulative manner; in our having-been-projected, we find ourselves as having already been thrown and abandoned into our worldly situation. Conceivably, this 'throwing forth' is the core of projective 'violence'.

---

17 - similar to the movement of Gadamer's 'speculative essence of language' (Cf., Gadamer, 1975, Three, 3,b-c).
Meanwhile, we can at least see that projection is a throwing forth of something in order to yield something, to understand something as something...as something else or something more or something other or even as that something itself.

Existential (as opposed to ontic, not as opposed to existentiell) understanding or projection is a double projection in the sense that be-ing-here a) throws itself forth in and as it b) throws forth horizons of meaning within which, upon which, and beyond which it, itself, is to be understood. Further, as we have remarked, existential understanding already exists as thrown be-ing-here (this is, in Heidegger's view, be-ing-here's facticity: having been thrown), and this self-understanding usually takes place within a fallen interpretive horizon of intraworldly, everyday, common sense and mundanity. Fallen understanding must be taken hold of, in a freely and freshly chosen self-projection upon some higher ground (the highest ground: the horizon), in order to emerge authentically beyond the horizon as authentically self-understood, transcendentally grounded, be-ing-here. In existential understanding, be-ing-here is, itself, explicitly projected upon its own projected horizon of meaning, in order to obtain existentiell transparency and be-ing, and existential-ontological conceptuality, i.e., to be conceptualized in the structure of its be-ing [H312]. This means, existence is to be understood as itself, in its own be-ing, authentically and ontologically interpreted.

In the existential project, then, be-ing-here is thrown forth upon its projected [conceptual] horizon, its transcendental ground of be-ing — not the existentially null thrown

---

18 Existential projection is multiple in another sense: in self-projection (upon the for-the-sake-of-which), world (significance) is also projected upon [eg., H145]; as are intraworldly beings and be-ing itself...
19 "Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of be-ing) is veritatis transcendentalis" [H38]. Whatever is transcendental is what brings one beyond ground and the beings of the ground — so the project of a 'transcendental ground' can already be seen as problematic. Heidegger half sees this and half insists on grounding transcendence nonetheless. The project is decisively rejected and this rejection, this 'turning around of the path', becomes an "authentic transformation" [PRL, 8; mutatis mutandis] ...here we are touching on the
ground of its fallen or factual be-ing – in order to conceptually articulate the meaning of its be-ing and of be-ing itself. The project would, according to its structure, bring be-ing-here to a self-transparency or congruence of ground and horizon which, due to the very projective nature of the existence of be-ing-here, would, presumably, result in a self-realizing, transformative, ecstatic transcendence to be-ing itself, in which be-ing-here’s own horizons (meanings) become the ground of further ecstatic and transcendental projection, beyond all horizon: the convulsive, existential Moment which throws, transports, be-ing-here beyond the horizon into be-ing itself...

The project would throw one forth beyond the horizon, were it successful as a project. But the aberration of existential projection is that it decisively fails as projection, is rebuffed by death, and must, in order to be authentic, conscientiously maintain itself in a sustained ontological guilt. Is the failure, we may ask, partly due to, or symptomatic of, the violence of the project? Does a violent uprooting lie at the core of existential understanding, as the project of transcendental-horizontal grounding, an uprooting which aspires to belie its finitude? Due to its inevitable internal failure, owing to the very nullity of projection itself – which we shall soon go into in full detail – Heidegger will later seek releasement, as a part of his later transcendental ‘step back’ and ‘turn’ of thought.

In the brilliant and provocative work, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of the violence of “thinking projection”, along with other ‘abilities’ such as poetizing, building, ruling – “powers” which be-ing-here “must take upon itself” [IM, 156]. He depicts the violence of these possibilities as a “taming and ordering of powers”, the very powers

hermeneutical circle in its creative or, perhaps, ‘sublative’ sense: “factual life...turning around on its path...through an authentic transformation [of] cognition qua cognition” [PRL, 8].
which constitute “man’s”20 very potentiality for be-ing (i.e., our existence). Man is essentially violent, in himself, and it is by virtue of his power over the beings of the world, his techné, that he attains selfhood. It is “by virtue of [these powers that] beings open up as such” and be-ing-here stands into its own be-ing, becomes fully here, as creative, historical be-ing “amidst beings” [ibid., 157] in the world.

However, ultimately, it is our having been banished into the essential homelessness and uncanniness of transcendence, by our acute awareness of death, that man is seen as projected out beyond the rhythms of life and is, thereby, “fundamentally violent” [ibid., 150]. Then man’s existential impotence constitutes or motivates the existential violence of projection, which impels him to – heroically and tragically – “use power against the overpowering” [ibid.], i.e., against be-ing itself, in the struggle and venture for the truth of be-ing. This power is doomed to shatter – though with creative brilliance, historical destiny, and the greatness of the disastrous affirmation and redemption of tragedy.

However, particularly in light of those global disasters inflicted upon the living beings of this earth, in the name of whatever great project and vainglorious venture of power, the essential reality of which, in fact, is one of horrendous and irredeemable suffering and decidedly not ‘greatness’, we may be justified in having doubts about this fateful existential project and response to the facts of our finitude. It is not just the calamitous mundane failures which inevitably accompany such grand destinies but the ravaged state these ventures leaves the human spirit in. Despite the powerful pathos of such a characterization of human be-ing, it is fair to ask: Is this heroic and disastrous violence reflective and constitutive of the essence of be-ing-here, i.e., be-ing-here as a whole? Need all disclosures of be-ing-here be structured

20 It is perhaps fitting to retain the gender inherent in Heidegger’s language here.
a priori by the violence of a ‘thinking projection’? Or is this violence not rather a result of an undue transformation of our be-ing-here into existence, that is, into merely one aspect of our full be-ing?

iv. Releasement into disposition

Whether the pre-ontological ‘standing-in be-ing’ should indeed be articulated as a projection into be-ing is something we shall question here. This questioning comes from an insight somewhat equivalent to Heidegger’s implied self-critique in Conversations on a Country Path, where he indicates that the proper attitude of resoluteness – i.e., of authentic existence – is, as an openness to ‘Being’ (or to “that-which regions”21), not the ‘willing of a horizon’ of “transcendental-horizontal re-presenting” [DT, 63], but releasement (Gelassenheit) from such willing:

Releasement is indeed the release of oneself from transcendental representation and so a relinquishing of the willing of a horizon. Such relinquishing no longer stems from willing except that the occasion for releasing oneself to belonging to that-which-regions requires a trace of willing. This trace, however, vanishes while releasing oneself and is completely extinguished in releasement. [DT, 79-80].22

Perhaps our ‘having already projected’ is how one sees our standing in be-ing only looking back from the standpoint of existence. Perhaps, though, it is not a pre-ontological projection that discloses be-ing itself (via its horizon) but an other mode of disclosure altogether, one corresponding to an other aspect of the be-ing of be-ing-here than existence.

---

21 I will not enter, here, into the problematic of the distinction between ‘Being’ and ‘das Gegend’, das Gegnet, das Ereignis, and so on.
What mode of disclosure does one release into, from transcendentational projection? The ‘later Heidegger’ wishes to still maintain the viability of ‘thinking’, albeit a transformed notion of thinking which blends what are traditionally considered other ‘faculties’ within its original style. And, to be sure, it appears to be something of an anachronism to bring Heidegger’s earlier notions of be-ing-here and disclosiveness into play in context of his meditative (besinnliches) ‘Denken’. Nonetheless it is fair to do so, if only in order to make some sense of the transformation which takes place in Heidegger’s thinking, without necessarily becoming a converted devotee of der Meister von Messkirch – that is, without being a dogmatic Heideggerian who sees Heidegger’s earlier thinking only in context of the later Denken, as profound and original as the latter may be. More importantly for our purposes here, I want to indicate a mode of disclosure more primordial than that of ‘projection’, one which lies at the basis of both traditional and Heideggerian notions of willing and thinking, and corresponds to or arises from another ontological aspect of be-ing-here than existence.

What mode of disclosure, then, does one release into? Heidegger indicates that “authentic releasement may come about without necessarily being preceded by such being-released-from horizontal transcendence” [DT, 73; my italics]. That is, be-ing-here, in its being, is already released, “originally belongs to” [ibid.] and is “determined...through the other-than-itself” [ibid, 74]. Be-ing-here is released “in his be-ing, insofar as he is appropriated initially to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself” [ibid.]. The ‘here’ of be-ing-here is the ‘here’ of be-ing. As a manner of thinking, this steadfast indwelling [ibid., 81] is a ‘waiting’ for the true appropriation of our mere initial already-appropriatedness [ibid., 75]. Nevertheless, this prior belonging [ibid., 82-3] – “of which we
really cannot think…because the nature of thinking begins there” — is thereby “prior to thought” [ibid.].

Furthermore, inasmuch as what is ‘noble’ is not only “what has origins” but what also “abides in the origins of its nature” [ibid., 82], this original belonging and abiding releasement to (what we will here call) be-ing, should be, by noble-minded philosophers, especially attended to. Moreover, ‘human nature’, as a dwelling in the “place of that-which-regions” [ibid., 83], the da of da-Sein, is the happening of truth. What kind of ‘truing’ disclosure, then, is this original and prior releasement to or of (the truth of) be-ing?

Let us end these, by now, rhetorical questions with an examination of that mode of disclosure and that mode of be-ing which is, in fact, prior to existential projection: dispositional attunement of factual be-ing-here and be-ing itself. But before we pursue these analyses at a decisive level, we need to summarize the introductory context of Heidegger’s Being and Time.
PART ONE

PRIMORDIALITY OF INTERPRETATION AND BASIC EXPERIENCE IN HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME
CHAPTER I. Introduction to the Project of Being and Time: 
Everyday Be-ing-here

In this chapter, I wish to lay out the main lines of Heidegger's philosophical project, and introduce his terminology and key concepts. I will do this largely by summarizing Heidegger's own introductory analysis and the first chapters of Part One of Being and Time, though in a looser, less formal manner than Heidegger's own exposition.\(^{23}\) I will be offering a minimum of explicit interpretation, here, as my goal is simply to open up the discussion which will follow, broach the parameters of the project, and familiarize us with the notoriously difficult Heideggerian terminology.

The discussion will not be altogether void of interest to those already schooled in Heidegger's thought, however, as my reading will inevitably select and focus on those aspects of Heidegger's project which are of particular interest to my theme and leave out other aspects which, important as they may be in other regards, have little bearing on my topic. I will, for example focus on Heidegger's initial use of the concepts of 'existence' and 'facticity', in Being and Time, but, relatively, ignore that of 'falling' and altogether ignore Heidegger's chapter on be-ing-with and the 'they'. Further, as Heidegger's own analysis begins to obtain ontological rigour, in the explicit introductory analyses of be-ing-in (1.5) and Care (1.6), the themes mature into those that I wish to take up in the rest of my Part One, concerning, not preliminary and preparatory considerations of everyday be-ing-here's, but

\(^{23}\) As I declare from the start that I am, in these first two sections, summarizing Heidegger's text (Being and Time, Introductions and chapter I.1-3) and somewhat slavishly following his text here, I will refrain from continually giving the obvious references.
those of extraordinary and uncanny be-ing—here’s *primordiality* of interpretation. This introduction to *Being and Time*, then, will leave off at the end of what I consider Heidegger’s own introductory material in a broad sense, that is, after Heidegger’s analysis of the worldhood of the world (I.3)

§1. Heidegger’s Introductions

i) *The philosophical project: the question of be-ing*

What does it mean to be at all? *Being and Time* asks after the meaning of be-ing (*Sein*) itself.\(^{24}\)

But Heidegger realizes that the very question is itself obscure and that it is therefore necessary to *reawaken* (an early reference to the effect of the ‘call of conscience’) and *concretely work out* (the implied task of ‘understanding the call’) the sense of the *question* of the meaning of be-ing – before answering it. This means, aside from the formal working out of the question in an explicit ontological mode of inquiry, that the being (*das Seiend*)\(^{25}\) who

---

\(^{24}\) I will use the hyphenated ‘be-ing’ for *Sein* and other constructions based on *Sein*, in order to *emphasize* the verbal and purely unrestricted *ontological phenomenon*, the very be-ing, itself (of anything which is) – If something is, what does this ‘is’ mean? What is this nonsensory, unreal predicate, which is no particular being but which any being must assume in order to be? I am using this verbally accentuated translation, be-ing, as opposed to the more ‘substantive’ translations or reading, which emphasize the sense of essence or the generality of ‘Being’ (*also a part of the sense of Sein*) or ‘being’ (which I reserve for *das Seiendes* - see note 2). Linguistically, the German word *Sein* is a substantive formed from the infinitive *sein*, ‘to be’, prefaced by a definite, neutral article (*das*); (the) be-ing. We, in English, form our verbal substantives from the present participle (being), the participle itself being formed directly from the root infinitive, ‘be’, by adding the suffix ‘-ing’, which expresses the continuing action of the verb therefore, with ‘be-ing’, I am explicitly preserving the infinitive in the nominal form. This also serves to underscore the importance of the relationship of meaning between the German infinitive, *Sein*, and participle, *seiend*.

\(^{25}\) *Ein Seiendes* = ‘something which is’, *i.e.*, *a being*. This also is a substantive, this time formed, in German, from the present participle, (*sei-end*, be-ing). Macquarrie and Robinson use ‘entity’, having reserved ‘being’ for the participle, *seiend*, from which the substantive, *Seiendes*, derives. Again, I want to keep accentuating the concrete ontological element, here, and so find ‘entity’ too abstract.
questions – ourselves, Dasein, be-ing-here – is to be questioned, portrayed, and analyzed as to its way of be-ing.

So then: What does it mean to be here at all? This is, now, the question – not what does it mean to be ‘there’ at all for that would make us think, what are those beings ‘over there’, around us, in our environment; or who are they, those others, and what are they doing there…? – and, with this orientation, I my self, need not be included, except, perhaps, by association.

But the question of what it means to be here directly and immediately implicates me, as I am the be-ing (and the being) who is here, and, especially, as I am the being who, here and now, in this lived moment, is asking the question. It may turn out, perhaps, that we are, indeed, here ‘at one remove’ from ourselves, be-ing ‘there’, at a distance from ourselves, as in the very asking of such a question, ‘what does it mean to be here?’ – in such a case, however, this can only be meaningful if we are, nonetheless, here as be-ing ‘there’, remote from ourselves, for ourselves. We are, ontically (i.e., as a being) and existentially (i.e., as this particular kind of being: be-ing-here or existence) so close to be-ing-here that we are it [H15], even if as a possibility (existence), even if alienated and mundane, even if ecstatic, even if the understanding therein implied is far from being ontologically near and clear.

---

26 Though the word da (of Da-sein) is perhaps predominantly used in the sense of ‘da: dorf’, i.e., there, it is also used as ‘da: hier’, here, as in such expressions as da bin ich, ‘here I am’. Magda King aptly states the translator of Being and Time’s situation well in the following: The Da of Dasein “can best be expressed by ‘there’ in Division One, whose main theme is Da-sein in his worldish [weltlich, ‘worldly’] existence, in which he finds himself ‘there’ among the things of his world. Division Two, on the contrary, takes owned [eigentlich, authentic] existence for its main theme…In this context, the Da can be more appropriately expressed by ‘here’ ” [King 2001, 133]. I will use “be-ing-here” throughout. See Dahlstrom [2001, xxiii-xxv] for astute considerations of the nuances of translating Dasein and his good reasons for settling on being-here.
Be-ing-here is distinguished amongst beings in that it is emphatically ‘here’... that is, disclosed to and for itself (and, ultimately, for be-ing itself). Be-ing-here is a self-relating being, one whose very be-ing is ‘an issue’ for it.

Being self-disclosed means being self-understanding. Be-ing-here ‘understands’ itself (its be-ing), and in an initially inexplicit, vague, and average manner.\(^27\) Ontically, be-ing-here ‘is ontological(ly)’, in that, as a being and in its very be-ing, it has a relationship to that be-ing, and this relationship is, essentially, one of self-understanding. And it is-ontological pre-ontologically; that is, its basic self-understanding is a non-theoretical, pre-conceptual one, specifically, one of ‘familiarity’... after all, it is oneself which is the ‘object’ of understanding, here. ‘Be-ing ontological’ means actively be-ing one’s self-understanding.

As self-understanding, be-ing-here is thus ‘disclosed’ or open to itself. Its openness is its be-ing ‘there’ or ‘here’ for itself. This means that, in an important sense, be-ing-here ‘has’ its be-ing for itself ‘to be’... this be-ing which it has and which it is to be is its ‘existence’, something be-ing-here can be; that is, existence, the be-ing which one has to be, is always possible be-ing (even or especially when ‘actual’). The possibility is for be-ing-here to be itself, to win itself, to have its be-ing as its own Self, by resolutely taking hold, in authentic self-understanding – or to not be itself, to lose itself, to neglect and fall away from itself in anonymous and dissolve self-dispersal, and so to be itself in inauthentic self-understanding.

The ontology – developed understanding of what it means to be (here) – which Heidegger calls ‘fundamental’ is declared to be the ontology of existence: fundamental ontology is an ‘existential analytic’, an analysis of the possible be-ing which be-ing-here has

\(^27\) ‘Vague’ and ‘inexplicit’ are not synonymous with ‘average’.
to be. This foundation is not that of the preliminary analysis of mundane be-ing-here, but that of be-ing-here itself, as a whole, in foundational preparation for the ontology of be-ing itself.

Therefore the term ‘existence’ means the be-ing which be-ing-here has to be, which it can be, its possible be-ing. And because of this, be-ing-here, inasmuch as its be-ing ‘is’ existence, can be articulated as be-ing-possible. This ‘possibility’ is neither mere logical possibility nor extant contingency but, as the ‘can be’ indicates, possibility as potentiality and capability – be-ing-here’s possibilities are what it is able to be, i.e., abilities. 28 Be-ing-here, open to itself, existing as self-understanding, is an ability-to-be (itself), or, at least, a capability-of-be-ing (for we do not necessarily possess the proper know-how). 29 Existence, as the possible be-ing which be-ing-here has to be and can be, is not merely possible but is projected as possible, i.e., possibilized, made possible, by the capability to realize it. It is a possibility we are able and more or less competent to perform.

The possibility of be-ing, which existence is, i.e., the be-ing which be-ing-here ‘has’ to be, is, therefore, immediately referred back to be-ing-here’s ‘factual’ ability to become that possibility, back to the factically projecting possibilizing of ability, one’s already having

28 As originally pointed out by Richard Schmitt in [Schmitt, 1969, p.178ff] and worked out by Guignon [1983], Dreyfuss [1991], and Blattner [1999, p.34ff]. Thus Seinsmogen gets translated in their work as ‘ability to be’ instead of Macquarrie and Robinson’s ‘potentiality-for-Being’.
29 Continuing the nuances of Seinsmogen: ‘capability’ includes both the active (ability: power or competence) and the passive sense of the “ability to undergo or be affected” by something, a being “open to the influence or effect” of something [quotes from the Random House Dictionary, 1973, New York: Random House]. This latter sense includes the ‘co-efficient of resistance’ which the ‘world’ may have for the exercise of our pure abilities – for we do not possess possibility itself, even if we ‘have’ it, in the at-hand way we already possess our mundane abilities (even if unused), i.e., as competencies. For everyday factual existing, we may be more or less competent and foresee all possibilities with the man-of-the-world know-how of common sense; but we ultimately must face our extra-ordinary, uttermost possibility-to-be (which defines our very be-ing and so, retroactively, our everyday be-ing) with no ability to be it whatsoever. Therefore, since I am concerned with the essential sense of the terms in my translations, ‘ability-to-be’ is ultimately unacceptable, even if helpful in indicating the active sense of be-ing-here’s possibilities. This is equivalent to restraining the pragmatist reading of Heidegger. Blattner has seen the shortcomings of this reading but nonetheless somewhat contributes to it with his use of ‘ability-to-be’ and his explicit decision to ignore the passive undertone of ‘capable’ and ‘able’ - see [Blattner, 1999, p.34, note 6]. I will generally use ‘possibility-of-be-ing’ for Seinsmogen, as it implies some capability, without assuming pure ability.
projected possibilities and actually being able to project possibilities. In this sense, then, the (factual) self who understands makes the (existential) self, who is to be understood, possible and this factual understanding is an active ability to understand.

So be-ing-here’s possibilities are not mere indifferent ones but possibilities which only arise as a correlate to someone’s projecting them as possibilities. They are differentiated in that they immediately imply someone’s enabling them; they are possessed possibilities, possessed by some active ‘agent’ who is able to effectuate them, make them happen.

To fully comprehend the be-ing of existence, however, one must already have a comprehension of be-ing itself at one’s disposal [H13]. Be-ing-here is a kind of being which has its be-ing to be: existence, possible be-ing. Existence is a kind of be-ing and so needs the general concept of be-ing itself to be worked out before one can comprehend, ontologically and specifically, what or how existence is.

Be-ing-here is also, essentially and equiprimordially, and, “as constitutive for its understanding of existence”, here in a world. Thereby, according to Heidegger, we ‘understand’ the be-ing of (all) other (non-existential and non-Daseinal) kinds of beings of the world, that they are and that they are so. Thereby, also, as it turns out, we understand existence itself via the ‘world’, in some manner.

ii) Outlines of the ontological analysis: the temporal interpretation

In fact, proximally and usually, we have an ontological tendency to understand existence in terms of the ‘world’: “the way the world is understood is...reflected back ontologically upon the way in which be-ing-here itself gets interpreted” [H16]. The

30 ‘Factual’ — about which, more, later.
existential analysis of be-ing-here is to begin with this average, everyday, worldly self-interpretation, pointing out, in a preparatory way, its essential structures. As incomplete and provisional as this may be, it is a starting point which gains initial access to the be-ing of being-here, providing the ground for a disclosure of the horizon of meaning from which to interpret this be-ing (Division One of *Being and Time*).

The meaning of the be-ing of be-ing-here will be shown to be *temporality* (*Zeitlichkeit*). This meaning will lead to a *repetition* of the existential analytic "on a higher and authentically ontological basis" [H17] – that is, to the temporal analytic of be-ing-here of *Being and Time*’s Division Two. This ‘repetition’ itself enacts the very temporality – the “circling back of the movement of recovery” [Wood, 1989, p.154] – which is the basis of the interpretation.

Temporality will, also, in its turn, provide the ground for the horizon from which to answer the leading question as to the meaning of be-ing itself. The temporality of be-ing-here will provide the ground for the meaning-horizon of Time (*Temporalität*), that upon which and from which be-ing *itself* will become intelligible (the would-be Division Three [of Part One] of *Being and Time*).31

Time [*Zeit*] needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of be-ing, and *in terms of temporality* [*Zeitlichkeit*] as the be-ing of be-ing-here, which understands be-ing [H17; my emphasis].

Be-ing-here’s ontology is, therefore, fundamental not only in that it is a preliminary starting point, but, also and essentially, in that its temporal analysis conditions the understanding of be-

---

31 Following Macquarrie and Robinson, I will translate *Zeitlichkeit* as ‘temporality’ and *Temporalität* as ‘Temporality’. For *Zeitlichkeit*, some translators have used such constructions as “timeliness”, ‘timeishness’, based on the descriptive sense of the verb *zeitigen*, to mature, ripen — these connotations should be borne in mind.
ing itself; that is, temporality (Zeitlichkeit) makes possible and conditions the range of possible Temporal [Temporal] determinations.

Therefore, what time and temporality themselves are must be clarified. Suffice to say, at this point, that temporality is not ‘being-in-time’, nor a temporality which, akin to the strategy of negative theology, would privatively have a non-temporality or a supra-temporality at its foundation.

iii) Methodological considerations

A thorough discussion of Heidegger’s methodology would be a monumental task, requiring comment on, investigation into, and analysis of such themes as the following: the interpretation of the affect of thaumazein, astonishment; Aristotle’s notion of ‘movement’ and life; the notion of ‘formal indication’ and deformalization; Heidegger’s critique and transformation of intuition and of Husserl generally; the goal of philosophy as phenomenology; the descriptive character of phenomenology; the phenomenon of be-ing and the ontological difference; hermeneutical phenomenology; de(con)struction, reduction, construction; the temporality of method; metontology; the temporal idealism/realism debate; and, certainly, yet other themes. This is beyond the scope or thematic requirements of this thesis. We shall here, therefore, in keeping with the introductory goals of this section, simply summarize Heidegger’s initial indication of phenomenology in ¶7 of Being and Time.

a) Destructuring the history of ontology

Temporality is the ground of be-ing-here’s elemental historicality, its ‘happening’ (geschehen – ‘historizing’), which is itself the basis of actual world-history. The inquiry into
be-ing is itself characterized by the essential historicality of the inquirer and the inquiry itself thus 'has a history' which, according to the authentic imperatives of our own historicality, we must take hold of and 'make our own'. As we have already hinted, be-ing-here 'is' (also) its past and tradition; and its possibilities (its existence, by which it "historizes out of the future" [H20]) are circumscribed by the transmission or dispensation of tradition.

If existence is the be-ing that be-ing-here has to be, then facticity is the be-ing be-ing-here has been, the be-ing it already was and is as having been it, and the ground from which the future existential horizons are sought.

If be-ing-here’s futural possibilities, as existence, are abilities to be, this is because the sort of possibility appropriate to be-ing-here is factically circumscribed possibility – it is factual be-ing-here who actively 'has' the possibility of existence, the possibility to be, and has it in the manner of already having-been and be-ing it, possibilizing it, enabling it. Be-ing-here already was past possibilities and already is ‘thrown’ into the current ones.

So, while it may be slightly inaccurate to call be-ing-here’s possibilities ‘abilities’, this is only because the different moments which constitute be-ing-here’s be-ing have slightly different manners of articulating possibility. For be-ing-here as existence, possibility is the modality of its be-ing; for facticity, possibility is ability and potentiality, the ability to actualize existence, even if, for the most part, this actualization is ‘realized’ by fleeing it. For factical existence (be-ing-here), then, possibility is both the modality of sheer possibility and the ability to determine and actualize possibilities which I have been already thrown into and am actively pressing toward.

However, facticity, like existentiality, is a mode of disclosure or openness onto being-here, even if one which turns out to be, according to Heidegger, for the most part a
closing off of existence. Just as existence can be an opening up of facticity but, generally, is a fleeting from it, so too facticity can be a giving of definite possibilities but, generally, is a closing off of existence as a falling into the rigid, hackneyed actualities of tradition.

Akin to be-ing-here's tendency to fall back upon its world in self-interpretation is its tendency to fall prey to tradition, preventing existence from taking hold of its facticity, and making it forget that its obvious self-evidence was once drawn from "primordial sources". "Hardened tradition must be loosened up" [H22], and this means, for ontology, that the ontological tradition must be destructured, "until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of be-ing" [ibid.].

When this is done, the temporality at the core of each interpretation will show itself. Specifically, beings (the fundamental orientation of ancient ontology) will be shown to be understood in terms of their 'presence'. Heidegger's own notion of the temporality of be-ing-here will be put forward in explicit contradistinction to this ontology of presence. As Heidegger never quite made it to the explicit Temporal ontology of be-ing itself — despite his later articulations and evocations of the presence of be-ing — we can only surmise that the sense of presence of be-ing itself is to be distinct from the traditional 'extant' presence of beings.\textsuperscript{32}

b) The phenomenological method

Heidegger begins his discussion of 'phenomenology' by showing how the very subject matter of the investigation seems to demand a specific type of method — one must develop a method from out of the exigencies of the question one asks and from out of the nature of the

\textsuperscript{32} Extant = \textit{vorhanden}, before the hand; as opposed to, for example, handy = \textit{zuhanden}, ready-to-hand.
'things themselves' that one investigates. This means here that the method must facilitate the answering of the question of the meaning of be-ing and it must do so by allowing particular beings to stand out in the full transparency of their be-ing. Phenomenology is precisely the method suited to this purpose. Heidegger analyses the two Greek components of the word *phenomenology* — *phainomenon* and *logos* — and then puts them together to show the essential meaning of phenomenology to be transcendental ontological hermeneutics — that is, interpretation which ‘explains’ through description which somehow both wrests the truth from be-ing yet ‘lets’ be-ing show itself.

1. In the analysis of *phenomenon*, Heidegger distinguishes several different ways in which something can ‘show’ or manifest itself, all of these ways being derivative of the essential way of showing which ‘phenomenon’ presents. A phenomenon is *that which shows-itself-in-itself*, the totality of what ‘lies in the light of day’, *i.e.*, beings as such (*i.e.*, in their be-ing). The word ‘phenomenon’ is derived from “phaino, to bring to the light of day”, which itself is derived from “pha, like phos, the light, that which is bright...that wherein something can become manifest” [H28]. We can immediately see that, if phenomena are beings, then ‘that wherein’ they become manifest, the light, will be be-ing itself.33

Something can show itself from itself in other ways than as phenomena. Something can show *itself*, and show itself *from itself*, in various ways; but these various ways are nonetheless “dependent on the kind of access we have to it” [ibid]. So, for example, a semblance (*Schein*) is the ‘showing-itself of something as something which in itself it is not’ — it “makes a pretension

---

33 This ‘image’ will be important especially for Heidegger’s later thinking (cf. *The End of Philosophy*) but also as early as in 1927 [BP, 20b, ff.]...and, likely, earlier.
of showing itself” [H29], yet does show itself but as something which it is not. In this way, we see that semblance is a privative modification of phenomenon.

Phenomenon and semblance are then distinguished from appearance (Erscheinung). Appearance is a showing-itself of something which “in showing itself indicates something else which does not show itself” [H29]. The former aspect is the phenomenon of appearance, i.e., the showing-itself: something shows itself and as thus showing itself announces something else...which does not show itself. Thus appearance means

the announcing-itself of something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. [H29]

This not-showing-itself is not that of semblance or deception but rather of something referred to, as by a symbol or symptom, by something which does show itself. Appearance, as the appearance ‘of something’ means the not-showing itself of that something – the something that is referred to or ‘announced’.

What is important here is to realize that this not-showing-itself of the announced is based on a showing-itself of that which does the announcing, i.e., on ‘phenomenon’.

Heidegger also speaks of ‘mere’ appearance – such as is the case for that which does the announcing when what it announces “is essentially never manifest” [H30], and the manifest ‘announcer’ “keeps this very thing veiled in itself” [ibid], such as in Kant’s phenomenon/noumenon distinction. However, for Heidegger, that which is prior to the ‘phenomena’ (taken in Kant’s sense) and which shows itself unthematically, can be brought to a thematic showing (cf., H31). It appears, however, that Heidegger is speaking here not of the ‘thing-in-itself’ but rather of the a priori forms of intuition: space and time.
We have seen the different types of ways in which things become manifest and of their dependence on the primordial showing-itself of *phenomenon: the showing-itself-in-itself*. It is primarily this, which phenomenology will study. But what about the other component of ‘phenomenology’, the *logos*?

2. *Logos* is normally translated as ‘reason’ but Heidegger opens up its definition into a broader ‘linguistic’ sphere by translating *logos* by *discourse* (*Rede*). Discourse means “*deloun*, to make manifest what one is talking about” [H32]; or *phainesthai*, “to let something be seen” and to let it be seen *apo*, from the very thing itself, by pointing it out (*apophansis*) for oneself or others [H32]. The ‘synthetic’ quality of *logos* depends on the apophantical character: the discourse lets something be seen *together* with something else – this means “letting it be seen *as* something” [H33].

What is important here is that discourse, *as* a letting-something-be-seen, is therefore either *true* or *false*. Heidegger introduces his concept of *aletheia*: something *as seen* is something *un-hidden* or *un-covered* (or unconcealed), *i.e.*, something taken out of a previous hiddenness – this dis-coveredness is the *truth* of something. Correspondingly, the *covering-up* of something, the “putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off *as* something which it is *not*” [*ibid*], is the being-*false* of something. Heidegger here leaves alone the status of the original ‘hiddenness’ or ‘concealment’ as regards truth.

It is the synthetic as-structure – the letting something be seen *as* something – that makes for the possibility of falsehood. Here, this as-structure is attributed to our mode of access to the ‘things’. Heidegger does not explicitly say so here but it would appear that what is false within discourse is precisely the deception of semblance: that type of showing which passes itself off
as something it is not, which is therefore a covering-up of what truly is. It would therefore follow, analogically, that, just as semblance is dependent on a positive showing-itself, *ie.*, phenomenon, so would a being-false depend on a previous being-true. That is, the covering-up of falsehood/semblance must cover something that has been un-covered previously. For it is hard to see what would be meant by a covering-up of an original concealment that had never been unconcealed. *Be-ing-in*-untruth, however, non-discoursively, is another matter.

What Heidegger does point out is that *logical* truth (the truth of *logos* as apophantical discourse) is *not the primary locus of truth*. The synthetic as-structure of *logos* appears to impurify *this* type of truth by opening up the possibility of falsity, thus throwing the whole realm into uncertainty or doubt. Sheer sensory perception (*aisthesis*) is more primordially true than the *logos*. Pure *noein* ('intuition'), "the perception of the simplest determinate ways of being which a being can possess" [H33], is what is most primordially true, for it purely un-covers and can never cover up – it can never be false! If it *is* false, it is not, by definition, an intuition. It would appear from this that *noien* is the direct perception of phenomena in their be-ing – that is, of beings as they show themselves in themselves and from themselves, without any impurifying as-structure or synthetic linguistic structure abstracting from the pure presentation. However, a thorough discussion of these passages, in full context of Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks, would show that this notion of intuition is simply that at the basis of the perception of be-ing which Heidegger means, ultimately, to criticize.

In any case: inasmuch as the logos can be false, it can also be true; in this possibility, obviously, lies its value as a method and for Heidegger's conception of phenomenology.
3. By synthesizing the two elements of ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’, we obtain the full conception of phenomenology: apophainesthai ta phainomena – “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” [H34]. This means the direct exhibiting or demonstrating of the ‘objects’ of phenomenology and this occurs through ‘description’, for it is phenomenological description and ‘formally indicative’ concept formation,34 which is adequate articulation of the ‘things themselves’, before any supposed ‘rational’ conceptualization. [H35].

What it is that phenomenology is to exhibit ‘in a distinctive sense’ is something that is primordially hidden but which belongs to every showing-itself – it is the be-ing of beings, the ‘light’ itself wherein beings show themselves ... this is to become the phenomenon of phenomenology [H35]. In every showing-itself, every apprehension of a being as such (i.e., in its be-ing), be-ing itself is in some way indicated. It appears that Heidegger means that if a being shows itself in itself (i.e., in its be-ing), if it is a phenomenon par excellence, then be-ing would appear to be, at first, a kind of appearance – for be-ing is that which is referred to by every phenomenon inasmuch as it is a phenomenon. Beings, as phenomena, may not have a referential structure in the sense of referring to other beings, as appearances might do. But, as phenomena, beings do refer to be-ing itself and thus, in a sense, announce be-ing itself, as something bright announces light itself. Be-ing itself is appearance in the sense of ‘the announced’, not in the sense of ‘the announcer’. What Heidegger wishes to do in Being and Time is to bring be-ing itself to show itself, i.e., as a phenomenon. Be-ing, in fact, “demands that it become a phenomenon” [ibid].

34 cf., Heidegger’s Phenomenological Interpretation in Connection with Aristotle (1922) in P, 111-146.
But this, emphatically, does not mean that be-ing demands to become a being – ‘phenomenon’ and ‘being’ are not absolutely synonymous. For be-ing is to become a phenomenon “in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing [eigensten Sachgehalt]” [H35]. Whether this is actually possible is a matter of debate⁵⁵ – it is, perhaps the most profoundly problematic aspect of the entire enterprise in Being and Time. Though there seems to be an element of an attempt to force be-ing into a phenomenal disclosure, an attempt that would inevitably break the essentially finite boundaries of ‘phenomenality’, there appears to be, with equal or greater measure, an attempt to open and expand the boundaries of language and experience, of our very conception of what can be a phenomenon, in order to include ‘transcendental knowledge’ within language – in order to speak be-ing. Be-ing is to be seen as “the transcendens pure and simple … Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of be-ing) is veritatris transcendentalis” [H38]. Thus is phenomenology also “universal phenomenological ontology” [ibid.].

Heidegger says that the showing-itself of be-ing “is not just any showing itself”, and he adds, “nor is it some such thing as appearing” [H35]. However, given all of what he has just put forward about types of self-showings, it seems to be rather difficult but to see be-ing, initially at least, as some kind of appearance, which Heidegger wishes to bring to phenomenal disclosure. It would appear that Heidegger is guarding against some of the traditional ‘cliches’ of ‘appearance’, such as the idea of the ‘noumenon’ standing ‘behind’ even the self-showing of the be-ing of beings, something ‘behind’ which “does not appear” [H36]. “On the other hand,” says Heidegger, “what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden” [ibid].

⁵⁵ cf. Sartre’s Introduction to Being and Nothingness, section II: “The Phenomenon of Being and the Being of Phenomena”
Perhaps the distinction between the structures of appearance and the hiddenness of the be-ing, which is nonetheless disclosed in the showing of every phenomenon, is best understood somewhat as follows: in every appearance, as an appearance 'of' something, there is a positive and explicit reference to something else, probably necessarily to some other being; whereas phenomena, beings as such, i.e., in their be-ing, have an immediate 'reference' to be-ing itself—a reference which is negative in that it is not toward any being; and inexplicit in that it is non-directional and amorphous. Here lies the problem of the 'ontological difference' which will concern Heidegger so much in his writings immediately after Being and Time.\(^{36}\)

Heidegger distinguishes three types of 'hiddenness' or 'covered-up-ness' (as Verdecktheit has been translated [BT, 60]). A phenomenon can be as yet undiscovered altogether; or buried-over after an initial disclosure; or disguised, as in semblance—it in which case, also, it has been previously un-covered.

It would seem, though, that be-ing itself is hidden in a yet more original way, if its initial disclosure through phenomena (beings) is as amorphous and uncanny as, structurally, it appears to be. But Heidegger implies that be-ing has manifested itself, that it always does in some sense, but that it did so in a relatively pure way to the Greeks of antiquity, and has since fallen into a relatively explicit covering-up and deterioration. Further, this 'degeneration' (cf. H360) has been, however, a 'necessary' one, a 'natural' fall after a primordial revelation. It is because of the hardening of the traditional acceptance of be-ing's 'fall', or man's 'fall' into 'forgetfulness of be-ing', that be-ing must now "first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology" [H36]. How this 'wresting' is to be reconciled with 'letting-be', though, remains difficult to

\(^{36}\) See What is Metaphysics, On the Essence of Truth, The Essence of Reasons, etc.
understand. The structural connection between ‘wrestling’, ‘letting-show’, description, and ‘interpretation’ (hermeneuein) have not been made clear in these Introductions.

§2. The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of be-ing-here

i) Existence and mineness

As we have already seen and as Heidegger emphasizes again at the beginning of the preparatory analytic, we are each, ourselves, the being to be analyzed. Our be-ing is something we are towards, something ‘mine’ or each one’s own. It is ‘in issue’, something we ‘are about...’ (es geht um...). It is an issue which is essentially yet to be determined, such that the essence of be-ing-here, what it is, lies in its existence, i.e., its possible be-ing, the being it ‘has’ to be and towards which it at all times comports as an ability to be (Seinsmogen).

This seems to be somewhat forgetful of the be-ing from which I move toward my possible be-ing, i.e., facticity. Does this be-ing not make up any part of my essence? Or is it somehow subsumed within the interpretation of existentiality? But how, if it is equiprimordial? By the imperatives of ‘authenticity”? But how would such existentiell imperatives cut into the ontology of be-ing-here? We shall see that this question and implied critique cuts deeply into the validity of Heidegger’s interpretation; it will be seen as problematic with particular clarity in the temporal interpretation of be-ing-here.

In any case, that be-ing-here’s essence is its existence, means, further, that the characteristics we shall analyze as constitutive of be-ing-here – be-ing-in-the-world, being-with, the ‘They’ etc. – are not ‘state characteristics’ or extant properties and of some occurrent (vorhanden), factual subject. Rather, as existential characteristics, these
characteristics are “possible ways for it to be” [H42], ‘ability-characteristics’,\(^{37}\) which define “who” be-ing-here is. These essential existential traits are ‘existentialia’, appropriate to be-ing-here (as existence) rather than ‘categories’ (which are applicable to the “what” of beings other than be-ing-here).

That be-ing-here is its own possibility of be-ing means that it has it as a momentous and active possibility: be-ing-here can “choose’ itself and win itself” by projecting itself upon its ownmost be-ing, that is, be its be-ing authentically; or “it can also lose itself” in the neglect and dispersion, the bad faith project, of inauthenticity [H42]. Though these two modalities of be-ing possible appear to be radically exclusionary, either/or, they are something like the obverse of each other. Noticeably lacking is an alternative of non-projectively assuming one’s factual be-ing by releasement from the project altogether, and acquiescence in the disclosure of what is primordially given.

We should begin, according to Heidegger, without preconceptions as to the content of existence – that is, hold no ‘factual existential ideal’ over the interpretation. Therefore, we should begin with the undifferentiated, everyday character that be-ing-here usually has and is. Average everyday existence is a mode of existence, which will be shown to be, essentially, a deeply concealed fleeing from, and forgetfulness of, one’s possible be-ing. But this must show itself from the phenomena themselves, not be read into it from outside the phenomena. Thus, we see, in Heidegger’s portrayal and analysis of the everyday manner of be-ing-in the world, ways of be-ing-here such as ‘idle talk’, ‘curiosity’, and ‘ambiguity’, which explicitly

---

\(^{37}\) Using William Blattner’s terminology [Blattner 1999, 34ff]. Blattner articulates clearly the notion that all ‘state-characteristics’ of be-ing-here are actually ‘ability-characteristics’, by supporting the “existentiality thesis” with an “ability thesis” and a “duality thesis”. See [Blattner 1999, 32-42].
reveal, by their covertness, this fleeing structure. We, however, need not pursue this further here.

ii) Factual be-ing-in and falling

Existence, mineness, authenticity/inauthenticity, etc., are ontological characteristics which must be understood upon the basis of the a priori whole of be-ing-here’s be-ing as be-ing-in-the-world. The first division of Being and Time is essentially a portrayal of everyday be-ing-in-the-world by analysis of its constitutive moments: ‘be-ing-in’, the ‘in-the-world’, and the ‘who’ of be-ing-in-the-world. Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes the wholeness and integrated character of this a priori structural depiction of be-ing-here, but maintains that, for purposes of provisional analysis, the a priori whole can be diremed into its elements. He thus analyses the worldhood of the world; then who be-ing-in-the-world is in the average everyday mode; then the inhood of being-in. However, the initial focus – and our focus – and the overall orientation is toward ‘inhood’, what is meant by be-ing-here’s be-ing-in.

Heidegger’s initial phenomenological characterizations usually begin from a ‘formal indication’ which then ‘deformalizes’, or takes on ‘substance’, by an initial destructuring of our traditional ‘present-at-hand’ or ‘be-ing occurrent’ or ‘extant’, ‘thingly’ bias, which ‘disguises and conceals’. Even though this moment is, in fact, explicitly structured into Heidegger’s phenomenological method, we shall often bypass it and go straight to the ‘positive’ description of the phenomena or only briefly use the inappropriate be-ing-occurent as contrast. With the initial characterization of be-ing-here as existence, we already have a ground from which to steadily reject the intrusive actuality of objective, extant
ontology and its language, and focus our depictions of the existentialia as ways of being possible.

Be-ing-here can ("with some right and within certain limits" [H55]), however, be considered as merely extant – as science does and, in fact, all previous ontology has done. Be-ing-here, as a being, can be considered as innerworldly, ‘within the world’ as a thing in a world-space, under the category of ‘insideness’.

This, however, is to simply disregard the fundamental existential structure of be-ing-here. Etymology shows a connection between ‘bin’ ("am") and ‘bet’ ("dwelling in", in a sense akin to the French chez) and a derivation of ‘in’ from ‘innan’, dwelling, inhabiting (cognate with the English ‘inn’). The ‘in-hood’ of be-ing-in has the sense of an involved inhabiting, dwelling, residing, in a familiar and absorbed manner, in, with, and amidst the beings of the world. This be-ing-in is only possible for beings such as be-ing-here who, essentially, exist and exist in a world (the existential sense of which is still to be specified). Therefore beings both non-existant and existentially ‘worldless’ – purely extant beings – do not have the feature of inhood. Be-ing-in is an absorbed, canny, dwelling at home amidst the beings within the world of one’s concern. It is because of this familiar be-ing-amidst that be-ing-here has the tendency to interpret itself just like the beings it is amidst – that is, in a fallen manner.

In contrast to the existentially untutored and inappropriate manner of considering be-ing-here as occurrent or thingly inside an extant world and, one would think, in contrast to

---

38 We will not use Macquarrie and Robinson’s “Being alongside” for “Sein bet”, as it has the unwanted extant spatial sense of ‘being next to’ something rather than the desired meaningful immersion, the dwelling, cannyly, ‘at home’ (chez, en français) with something. As “absorbed dwelling at home” is cumbersome, I will often use (Blattner’s) “being amidst”. Also, though the term “involvement” will later be used specifically for innerworldly beings, it is appropriate here, as description of be-ing-here’s be-ing-in, as it is specifically concerned with these involvements.
the fallen manner of be-ing-in, there is "a certain way of be-ing-occurent which is be-ing-
here's own" [H55]: facticity. This way of 'be-ing-occurent' is different from that of
innerworldly, existentially worldless, extant beings in that it belongs to the beings who exist,
i.e., to beings with the kind of be-ing of possible be-ing-here. While not itself being a part of
be-ing-here's existentiality and while not being of the same kind of be-ing as existence,
facticity nonetheless pertains only to existential beings. This means, as we pointed out
earlier, that facticity is not the be-ing that be-ing-here 'has' to be, but is, rather, the be-ing be-
ing-here already has been and from which it aspires to be, to exist. That is, factual be-ing-
here is the basis or ground, the be-ing-already-in, from which existence arises.

Facticity and existence are two fundamental manners of be-ing which be-ing-here is,
each in their own specific ontological manner and with an equiprimordiality which, naturally,
raises the question of their internal relations each to the other, and the manner of be-ing of
their unity.

It will be a central point in this thesis to work out, clarify, critique, and transform the
notion of facticity. While facticity and existentiality are two different modes of be-ing-here's
be-ing, Heidegger's notion of facticity, by the imperatives of the formal indication of
existence and those of existential authenticity, will be subsumed, as much as is possible,
within existentiality. This leads to a tendency to interpret facticity as a kind of existentiality
and, therefore, to disclosive, ontological, and temporal distortions of the factual disclosure of
phenomena and our understanding of the structure of be-ing-here.

The analysis came to facticity through descriptions of inhood, which showed be-ing-
here's specific manner of be-ing-in (the world) as distinct from any category of 'thingly' or
extant, spatial 'insideness'. It was remarked that be-ing-here's be-ing is also distinct from
such thingly categorization, though it can, with a certain degree of justification, be so regarded. And be-ing-here has its own manner of thingly be-ing, i.e., facticity. Be-ing-here’s way of be-ing thingly, its facticity as be-ing-already in the world, is an absorbed dwelling amidst the beings of the world, an involved inhabiting. This may strike us, later, when all the modes of be-ing of be-ing-here and their corresponding modes of disclosure have been worked out, to be an inappropriate characterization of facticity. For it is more akin to the falling mode of be-ing and it bears only a vague resemblance to the structure or phenomena of dis-position or mood (the mode of disclosure fitting to facticity).

Furthermore, factical be-ing-here, via its multiple ways of be-ing-in (using, attending, questioning, etc., i.e., all ‘comportments’ whatsoever), implicates be-ing-here in a certain dispersed worldliness, its self being bound up, “in its ‘destiny’” [H56], with the beings it encounters and concerns itself with in its own world. On account of this,

be-ing-in-the-world gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those beings which it itself is not but which it encounters ‘within’ its world [H58].

Perhaps it is by virtue of the factical be-ing’s being already in the world that one thereby supposes this means fallen amidst beings. But, essentially, one’s ‘already there-ness’ is an ontological phenomenon, quite apart from being already there, absorbed amidst beings. We will develop all this later.

‘Having’ an environment and ‘knowing’ the world are both founded modes of be-ing-in (the world). Inasmuch as both these descriptions of our relationship to/with the world are based on a presupposition of an ontologically worldless subject which may then, in addition and externally, be related to a world, be-ing-here’s specific be-ing-in has been overlooked. Factically-existentially, however, we are already concernfully involved with beings in a
world around us, which *can, therefore*, be discovered in the explicitness of having an environment and knowing the world.

*Sein bei der Welt*, absorbed, dwelling at home (in the world), is *fascinated* by the world. This fascinating content can only be taken up, according to Heidegger, when, in a deficient mode of concern (such as confronting the broken tool), one stands back and merely ‘tarries alongside’ these beings in the world, just looking at the, now, ‘objects’ of one’s former concern, beings which now can be observed purely in the way they look (*eidos*) and articulated as to their observable characteristics and relations. That is to say, be-ing-in (the world) can be modified to become ‘knowing’ the world.

In traditional ontology, this is the moment of the mere presence of beings, their showing up, ‘there’, for no particular mundane purpose. Contained in this is the possible intuition of sheer be-ing itself, presence itself, outside of any practical context and inside of a metaphysics of transcendental *rational* meaning.

However, this last is hardly Heidegger’s ontological orientation. What appears primary, even *ontologically* – not just preliminarily or methodologically primary – is concernful be-ing-in and the world which shows itself in one’s absorbed and involved be-ing at home with it. Be-ing-here is, as concerned be-ing-in, always already ‘outside’ itself (as ‘subject’) ‘in’ the world and the world is always already ‘inside’ of be-ing-here’s sphere of be-ing, as be-ing-in-the-world. Thus, knowing, in the sense of relatively independent subjective and objective spheres confronting one another in extant relationship, is founded upon this primordial be-ing-in as a modification of its be-ing-towards an already discovered world.
iii) *The world and its worldhood*

a) *Worldly beings: pragmatic, extant and natural*

Heidegger says that "if be-ing-in-the-world is a kind of be-ing which is essentially befitting to be-ing-here, then to understand be-ing-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of be-ing" [H86]. Equally, if understanding of be-ing-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of be-ing-here's understanding of be-ing, then understanding the world does too. And if understanding the world belongs to be-ing-here, then understanding the *worldhood* of the world is a possibility which can be developed ontologically.

In the existential analysis, the 'world' is not to be understood in its 'real' sense as the totality of extant beings occurrent within the world; nor as separate possible totalities of those beings (the mathematician's world of numbers, the biologist's world of living beings, *etc.*)

Rather the 'world', in its "pre-ontological *existentiell* signification" – that is, its lived, experiential sense as a structure of existence – is "*that 'wherein' a factical be-ing-here as such can be said to 'live'" [H65; my italics], that "'wherein' be-ing-here as a being already was" [H76] – the overall *meaning context* within which be-ing-here exists and has existed. And the 'world', in its *existential* sense, is the 'worldhood' of the world in its *a priori* ontological-existential character of the world *as such*. Be-ing-here's is 'worldly' in that it is be-ing-in-the-world.

'World' is "*that 'wherein' a factical be-ing-here as such can be said to 'live'"...this may suggest that 'world' pertains particularly to the *factical* be-ing of be-ing-here, as opposed to its existential be-ing. This supposition is confirmed in the connection which facticity has to the third ontological determinant of be-ing-here, *falling*, *i.e.*, the be-ing-here
which *has* its be-ing *to be* (existence) and *has been* (facticity) also *is* (as it has been), in the mode of being utterly — and predominantly inauthentically — *immersed amidst the beings of the world*. Falling is an *ontological*-existential tendency toward *existentiell*, inauthentic be-ing-here, a be-ing which, when conjoined with our everydayness (how we are "proximally and for the most part", i.e., fallen into the world), results in a be-ing-here which has been, factically, primarily worldly in an inauthentic manner — this, as initially contrasted with the implied *Self*-be-ing of authentic *existence*, the be-ing I *can* be and have, constantly, *to be*. As we shall see, however, authentic existence is hardly worldless and, furthermore, authentic facticity does disclose, indeed, as worldless!

The analysis seeks the worldhood of be-ing-here’s proximate, everyday world, the environment (not the one we ‘have’, but the one we are already ‘in’) by interpretively going through the innerworldly beings we encounter: the *pragmata* (‘handy beings’, tools — the *zuhanden*).

In a kind of pragmatist reading of Aristotle’s four causes, Heidegger carries out a phenomenology of our everyday be-ing and going about in the world. Everyday action is the *praxis*, the ‘dealing’ of our circumspective concern. The *everyday* world of be-ing-here is the ‘environment’ (*die Umwelt*, world-around). We deal with the innerworldly beings we encounter, the tools and equipment which are handy and ready-to-hand (the *pragmata*), which we use and manipulate, in-order-to accomplish the tasks of our work. The ‘end-product’ (*entelecheia*, ‘final cause’) or ‘work’ of this dealing is that towards-which or for-which each act aims; this product then itself points beyond itself toward another end. The *pragmata* are themselves usable *for* something (‘formal cause’) by *somebody* (‘agent’ or ‘efficient cause’) and for *this* work (‘final cause’). Also discovered along with the work are
other beings with be-ing-here's kind of be-ing: the work co-discloses one's domestic world and public world of be-ing-with.

Dealing with *pragma* is also a using of something ('material cause'), materials which, of themselves, refer to natural beings. These, despite their being 'in' our (be-ing-here's) world, nonetheless independently 'produce' themselves; they have, as Aristotle would say, "within themselves a principle of movement and rest".\(^{39}\) Within Heidegger's pragmatic context, we discover nature along with the use of natural beings, in the tools and materials of our work environment [H70].\(^40\) Even the 'romantic' notion of Nature, says Heidegger -- perhaps problematically\(^41\) -- is to be understood in terms of be-ing-here's sense of 'world' [H65]. In a different manner again, nature shows up for be-ing-here as the known nature of science, i.e., as extant (vorhanden) nature, only in a kind of deprivation/modification of be-ing-in-the-world [H65].

However, Heidegger confuses things here when he contrasts the denuded, extant modification of *pragma* with the everyday, pragmatic discovery of nature. The former, in depriving the *pragma* of 'world', "penetrates beyond the *pragma* of our concern" [H71] and discovers the pure presential character of worldless nature.\(^42\) The latter, mundane use of *pragma* and simultaneous discovery of their natural material basis, improbably takes on, in this contrast, the connotations of the romantic view of nature, of

the Nature which 'stirs and strives', which assails and assaults us and enthralls us as landscape...the flowers of the hedgerow...the 'springhead in the dale' [H70].

---

39 Aristotle, *Physics* II.1; 192b 13-14; Richard Hope translator; 1961. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
40 H70: "As the 'environment' is discovered, the 'Nature' thus discovered is encountered too".
41 See Bruce Foltz's excellent discussion of Heidegger's notion of 'nature' in [Foltz, 1995].
42 In this quite graphic language, we have an existentiell experience of the 'factuality' of innerworldly beings.
Heidegger’s waxing poetic here sounds quite like the romantic’s perception of the “power of Nature” [H70]. Yet it is hardly the case that, in our mundane use of *pragmata* and simultaneous discovery of nature, we encounter nature like this. Even if the mundane discovery of nature may have a certain muted receptivity to nature’s power and independence, nature is more often bound into and lost in the functionality of our dealings. As Heidegger, says, Nature is encountered as “having some definite direction” [H71] vis-à-vis be-ing-here’s concern: darkness is taken account of through a public lighting system; the light of the sun is encountered and taken account of via the clock, etc. Heidegger, in defending against the standard extant reductions, emphasizes the relative primordiality of the notion of nature inherent in *pragmata* and our pragmatic be-ing-in-the-world. But he overplays nature’s pragmatic revelation. The direct experience or ‘discovery’ of nature, as in romanticism, indeed requires some kind of modification of everyday, pragmatic be-ing-in-the-world, albeit certainly a different one from the modification which yields the extant nature which the scientist studies.

Non-existential, innerworldly beings are ontologically-categorically defined as *pragmata* and their kind of be-ing is thus *pragmata-ic*, ‘readiness-to-hand’, handiness (*Zuhandenheit*). Be-ing ‘pragmatic’ or handy is their way of be-ing “in themselves” [H71]. This is so, according to Heidegger, even if “only on the ground of something extant ‘is there’ anything handy” [H71].

---

43 Of course, certain mundane acts and uses of nature encounter nature more primordially than others, e.g., sailing or farming or woodwork or many outdoor sports activities. Nonetheless, nature is still, here, encountered within the horizon of ‘world’ and our significances, perhaps as a pleasing aesthetic backdrop, and it requires an alteration of that manner of being or ‘mode of consciousness’ to experience nature ‘itself’, i.e., in the sense of the romantic’s enthrallment.

44 “Even the sky stands at my immediate disposal, for telling time, for example” [Kisiel, 1993, p.290].
Handiness is the way in which beings as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically. Yet something handy (Zuhandenes) ‘is there’ only on the ground of something extant (Vorhandenem). But does it follow – granting this thesis for the nonce – that handiness (Zuhandenheit) is ontologically founded upon extantness (Vorhandenheit)? [H71]

According to Heidegger, here, the fact that ‘there is’ something handy only on the ground of something extant, does not necessarily imply that pragmatic beings are ontologically founded upon extant beings. But, then, we are here in an apparent contradiction, which will need resolving at some point. It is analogous to the ambiguity surrounding the phenomenon of ‘nature’ and its relation to pragma – nature is supposedly founded upon the world-structure of be-ing-here, despite an apparent independence, otherness, and primordiality and despite its being the material ground of pragma.

The solution to the apparent contradiction comes when one applies the ‘ontological difference’ to the statements. Heidegger is speaking about the be-ing of (innerworldly) beings (the pragma), their way of be-ing, which, as handy be-ing, expresses their ontological structure, their specific ‘be-ing-in-itself’ – as contrasted with the way of be-ing of occurrent or extant be-ing, to which it is not reducible. This – that pragmatic beings are not ontologically founded upon extant beings – is an initially startling, though phenomenologically apt observation of the essence of those beings we find in the field of mundane action – that is of the innerworldly pragma of be-ing-in-the-world.

If one then says that those beings, themselves (the pragma, the handy beings: the Zuhandenen), which have the ontological structure of handy be-ing, ‘are there’ only on the ground of something extant, of occurrent beings (the Vorhandenem), this says nothing about the ontological relation (transcendental founding) between kinds of be-ing. But it does say something about the ontic relation (ontic founding or causality) between kinds of beings:
Heidegger shows himself to be an ontic (roughly, 'empirical') 'realist', at this point. The fact that *pragmata are extant* is grounded upon the fact that there are extant *beings* at all.

But Heidegger is leaving open, for the nonce, the question of ontological ('transcendental') 'realism/idealism'. It does not follow, necessarily – and Heidegger shows himself to likely be in disagreement with the proposition that "handiness (Zuhandenheit, the quality of *be-ing*-handy) is *ontologically* founded upon extantness" (*Vorhandenheit*, the quality of *be-ing*-extant) [H71.]. Rather, as the analytic of *be-ing*-here progresses, we see that the reverse is the case: the *be-ing* of the extant is a modification of the *be-ing* of *pragmata*, which, themselves, are founded upon *be-ing-here*’s *be-ing.\(^{45}\)

However there is an even more primordial encountering of beings, which has the potential of undercutting both pragmatic and extant *be-ing*. Heidegger responds to the possible objection that, that which gets taken as pragmatic, *i.e.*, as something with an in-built sign structure, "must first have become accessible in itself and been apprehended *before* the sign gets established" [H81], by, to some degree, admitting the point. But, he says, "the question remains as to how beings are discovered in this previous encountering" [*ibid.*]. Heidegger answers this latter question, however, with the surmise that they are

*pragmata* which have not been understood...with which we have not known 'how to begin'...[and which are] veiled from the purview of circumspection [H81]

and the assurance that these circumspectively undiscovered beings are not to be interpreted as "bare Thinghood" [*ibid.*]. These beings are *pre-circumspectively encountered*, not in the deficient modes of the missing or the obstinacy of the broken tool, which lead to the

---

45 The same solution, *mutatis mutandis*, can be given to the problems raised by the passages on H183, H212, H226, H230, etc., which imply a realism/idealism debate.
emergence of the extant. But to call these ‘pragmata’ is a rather precipitate insinuation, if they are not yet, in fact, understood nor circumspectively sighted. While we may be bewildered and not know ‘how to begin’ with these beings, thus treating them as incipient pragmata, they may, indeed, also ‘be discovered’ as having simply nothing to do with our dealings. Let us leave open the question of what this ‘previous encountering’, this mode of access to pre-circumspectively encountered beings, is.

b) Be-ing for the sake of significance: the worldhood of the world

The world itself is not an innerworldly being, yet only by virtue of the world can the pragmata show themselves. This means that the ‘world’ is intimately involved in the disclosive (or discovery) structure of pragmata. Disclosive be-ing-here, understands itself and so understands, even if indirectly and ‘pre-ontologically’, the world, which is a part of its own be-ing as be-ing-in-the-world.

In certain cases of mundane dealing, the world itself is “lit up” for be-ing-here, along with intraworldly beings [H72]. When, for example, our circumspective concern encounters unusable or missing or hindering pragmata, the latter become (respectively) conspicuous or obtrusive or obstinate. In their ‘just lying there’, at least until one repairs the deficient situation, pragmata momentarily lose their character as pragmata, lose their handy be-ing, and are or can be seen non-circumspectively as merely extant. However this extantness is “still bound up in the pragmata” [H74]. The latter’s ‘handiness’…

… does not simply vanish, but takes its farewell, as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable [or the obtrusiveness of the missing, etc]. Handiness [the be-ing of pragmata] still shows itself, and it is precisely here that the worldly character of the handy shows itself too [H74; my emphasis].
The world shows itself in the world-deprivation of innerworldly beings [H75], in their emerging as merely extant and no more. But the world is not the extantness of innerworldly beings – it is also ‘lit up’, along with these beings (either or both handy and extant), as the contextual whole of all the functional meaning assignments (those in-order-to) which the handy beings, as inherently ‘serviceable’, bear. When these assignments (which make up the structure of be-ing of the pragmata [H74]) are interrupted, we are referred to what the task is for, that wherein our concern has already been dwelling, i.e., the world which we as be-ing-in dwell in, in our absorbed involvement amidst innerworldy beings. This is the referential totality, that towards-which or for-which all the assignments of innerworldly beings refer and the ‘end’ from which (as the entelecheia of Aristotle) they proceed.

Also, in dealing with particular pragmata, such as signs, we are, by following the indication of the sign and still within circumspective concern, explicitly brought to survey the world around and to, spatially (in the appropriate kind of spatiality of be-ing-here), orient our already directed be-ing thereto. Insodoing, signs make a particular handy being (the sign) conspicuous thereby, again, “explicitly rais[ing] a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of pragmata announces itself” [H80]. This worldly character had hitherto been the inconspicuous, if somehow familiar, background context of the particular dealing, already ‘there’ and non-thematically discovered [H83].

The serviceability and usability, which constitute pragmata, indicate an involvement the latter have, which itself refers these beings to that in which and for which they have an involvement and to ‘the whom’ by which they have been ‘freed’ for such involvement. The proximate for-which can itself take on an involvement in a higher order for-which but
ultimately this series of ‘for-which’ refers to a totality of involvements which no longer refers to pragmatic possibility. Rather it now refers to and springs from a possibility of be-ing-here’s be-ing, for-the-sake-of-which the teleological sequences of the pragma have been freed up (‘let be’) to be of service, i.e., to be involved.

Be-ing-here’s be-ing is be-ing-in-the-world. Pragma are freed, discovered, and involved only on the basis of a totality of involvements – the world. It is the world (understood, crucially, as a constitutive item of be-ing-here’s own be-ing, as “possible-significance” [H, 144]), which is that possibility of be-ing-here’s be-ing for the sake of which be-ing-here assigns itself to various intramundane ‘in-order-to’ or mundane tasks. The world is the realm of the self’s own self-expression.

The world has, itself, already been discovered – rather, disclosed⁴⁶ – beforehand and thus rests in a certain pre-ontological intelligibility (‘understandability’: Verständlichkeit) – that of ‘familiarity’ or ‘acquaintance’. Having already freed or already let something be involved indicates an ontological relationship to the world [H85] and the sense of a “having-been which continues to be” [Kisiel, 1993, 392] – the “perfect tense a priori” [H85], characterizes the very factual be-ing of be-ing-here.

This possibility, for-the-sake-of-which pragma are discovered and used, as be-ing-here’s possibility of be-ing-in-the-world, i.e., as an understanding possibility-of-be-ing, is the world itself, towards which be-ing-in is always directed: “That ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding ..., for which one lets beings be encountered ..., is the phenomenon of the world” [H86].

⁴⁶ The world is not something innerworldly and so is not properly referred to as something ‘discovered’ or ‘involved’; and it is a part of be-ing-here’s be-ing and so is properly referred to as something ‘disclosed’.
The structure of this world, its worldhood, which guides the assigning of be-ing-in to all the signifying relationships of worldly involvements (the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which, towards-which, etc), is significance (Bedeutsamkeit) Be-ing-in is, in its ontological structure, for the sake of significance; that is, be-ing-in is -in-the-world. For its own sake, be-ing-here is and assigns itself (and has been and has assigned and submitted itself) to the world, which is a constitutive item of its own be-ing and the field of its own action.

This concludes our introduction to the Heideggerian world. Let us look, now, at the quest for primordiality of interpretation and be-ing.
CHAPTER II. *The Primordiality Requirement: Uncanny Be-ing-here*

§3. The primordiality requirement: holism, authenticity, and basic experience

In Division One of *Being and Time*, beginning with our everyday manner of be-ing-here, Heidegger analyzed the parts of the structural whole of our be-ing-in-the-world – that is ‘be-ing-in’s disclosedness and ‘the-world’ as the significant contextual whole of our involvements with intraworldly beings and Other caring beings. The fragmented whole was unified by the structural whole of disclosedness, *viz.*, Care, and this be-ing of be-ing-here was made distinct from that of other beings (handy and extant: *zu- and vor-handen*) and Reality.

Heidegger took ‘existence’ – one element of Care – as the interpretive “clue” (H231) which “formally indicates” the ‘essence’ of be-ing-here, thereby emphasizing be-ing-here’s ‘understanding’ and ‘possibility-of-be-ing’, its be-ing-an-issue for itself. Also pointed out – however, comparatively ‘incidentally’ – was the “equiprimordial connection” [*ibid.*] existence has to the other constitutive elements of be-ing-here, *viz.*, facticity and falling.

In seeking the meaning of be-ing itself – the overall goal of the investigation – Heidegger’s ‘prior’ task is to “lay bare the horizon within which something like be-ing in general becomes intelligible (*verständlich*)”, that is, to “clarify the possibility of any understanding of be-ing at all” [H231, my emphasis]. The prior task, then, is the *phenomenologically transcendental* – that is, *hermeneutical* – task of laying open a possible
contextual ‘space of meaning’, an encompassing background horizon upon which and within which the projected ‘object’, be-ing, can show itself. This means that understanding itself is to be made understandable before be-ing itself can be made intelligible. ‘Understanding’, as explicit (though not, thereby, conceptual) or ‘formally indicative’ self-understanding, interprets itself, the interpretation serving in an investigative ontological inquiry; that is, understanding moves deeper into its own questionableness. This understanding is an essential, i.e., a priori constitutive item – that is, an existential category or structure of the be-ing of be-ing-here, that being which (better: who) understands be-ing. Clarification of this understanding is what, in effect, the first two divisions of Part One – i.e., the published portion of Being and Time – purport to achieve.

Heidegger now asks, at the beginning of Division Two, whether, in Division One, this understanding has been “radically clarified”. His answer is that it cannot have become so unless be-ing-here has been interpreted primordially (or ‘originally’: ursprünglich). He then lays out three conditions for the primordiality of existential ontological interpretation:

1. First (though in no particular order), the holistic requirement: existence itself must be given and grasped as a whole. This will be achieved in Heidegger’s analysis of be-ing-toward-death, wherein projective existence attains its ‘end’ and wholeness.

We may suppose, too, that the ‘understanding’, the existentiality of be-ing-here, ought, presumably, to itself be clarified in terms of the more basic phenomenon of be-ing-here’s complete ontological structure. That is, be-ing-here – not just ‘existence’ – as a whole

---

47 To use Steven Galt Crowell’s apt phrase; cf., his Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning [Crowell, 2001].
48 “Insight into existence itself can be gained through that kind of actualizing in which facticity is rendered questionable” – [Indication, 121].
must be ‘had’, seen, and conceived (the fore-structures of interpretation) in advance. This
‘formal indication’ is not to be left as a piecemeal totality, as in the characterization of Care
hitherto (= ahead-of-itself [existence]-be-ing-already-in-the-world [facticity] as be-ing-
alongside-beings-within-the-world [falling]). Rather, Care is to be articulated in terms of the
unity of its structural items, a unity which the next level of interpretation must achieve. This
unity would include facticity, falling (and, in some sense, discourse) all of which are, with
‘existence’ (understanding), equiprimordial aspects of be-ing-here’s be-ing. Each of these
constitutive items – should they in fact be equiprimordial – should thereby contribute
‘equally’ to the overall disclosive intelligibility of that be-ing and thus, ultimately, to the
intelligibility of be-ing itself.

In fact, for the holistic requirement, we will look toward mood primarily, for it is an
essential feature of moods (factual disclosure) to disclose be-ing-here as a whole [H137].
Therefore, the “basic experience” of be-ing-here [H232] – about which, more, later – from
which the interpretation proceeds, must include the disclosedness and disclosure, the
experienced phenomena of the disclosive modalities, in and with those of existential and
existentiell understanding – and this, presumably, in some kind of unified manner.

Heidegger, however, due to his stated ‘prejudice’ (as Gadamer might say) or
interpretive ‘clue’ – his formal indication of ‘existence’ – is more concerned with a basic
‘experience’ of existential understanding and intelligibility, and the factual and worldly
consequences of such understanding, than with an equiprimordial disclosure of be-ing-here
or with the ‘unprejudiced’ disclosure of these latter two constitutive items (facticity, falling).
He frames the question of be-ing-a-whole, then (in II.1), in terms of the problem faced by
existence itself, in its own essentially incomplete character, as open-ended potentiality ‘ahead
of itself': how, he asks, can one expect a holistic interpretation of be-ing-here when its existence/understanding appears to be essentially opposed to be-ing a whole, such that there is always 'something still outstanding'?

2. The second primordiality requirement is the authenticity requirement: a primordial interpretation of be-ing-here must interpret the existential potentiality-for-be-ing not only in its inauthentic or undifferentiated mode [H232] – as Division One’s depiction of be-ing-here’s ordinary, average, everyday state achieved – but also in its extra-ordinary and uncanny state, i.e., its authentic possibility of be-ing its ownmost self (II.2). Authenticity will be worked out as a function of the basic ‘mineness’ conditioning disclosedness or ‘be-ing-in’ as such, and it will be seen as a recovery of self from its lostness ‘in the world’, a countermovement to essential falling: “Existence means a potentiality-for-be-ing – but also one which is authentic” [H233]. Thus, Heidegger asks, what gives be-ing-here authenticity and how is this attested?

Authenticity and inauthenticity are modalities of the rising and falling, the basic movement of be-ing-here as Care, such that – 'proximally for the most part' and seemingly structurally – authenticity is paired off with existence and inauthenticity with thrownness and falling. The quest for authenticity is a quest for and of existence. Factual disclosure – dis-position (Befindlichkeit) – plays into this quest in an adjunct manner, even if one which modifies the quest importantly.

However, I would suggest that a proper phenomenology of dis-position would show that the disclosure of mood is, in itself, neither inauthentic nor authentic but fundamentally

---

49 “The basic sense of the movement of factual life is caring” [Indication, 115], the ‘first phenomenal characteristic’ of which is intentionality [ibid., 122].
50 Dis-position is the disclosure of the thrown project - i.e., a kind of project or understanding.
indifferent (dis-positional) to, and 'dis-possessed of',\textsuperscript{51} these possibilities (though certainly not indifferent to the 'matters', the felt meanings themselves, which it discloses). Nevertheless, moods can, as they do in the existential analysis, play a role and resonate with either modality and thereby help illustrate both existence and falling disclosures.

But we should keep in mind that the authenticity and totality of existence being sought in Heidegger's analysis is primarily an existential affair and, as such, not necessarily representative of the whole and equiprimordial disclosedness of be-ing-here as such, nor with the idiosyncratic orientation and scope of disclosure of other disclosive modalities. Therefore, the primordiality of interpretation sought for in \textit{Being and Time} will be a primordiality of existence as such – but not necessarily of be-ing-here as such.

3. The \textit{third} requirement for primordiality of interpretation is what I will call the \textit{phenomenological} requirement. Prior to actualizing the interpretation itself,

\begin{quote}
(the 'hermeneutical situation') needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand, both in a \textit{basic experience} of the 'object' to be disclosed, and in terms of such an experience. [H232, my emphasis]
\end{quote}

This means, most straightforwardly, that the basic concepts of the interpretation are to be drawn from a \textit{basic experience} (\textit{Grundeeahrung}), that is, "made secure in conformity with the phenomena" [H232, my emphasis]. That is, the 'fore-structures' of interpretation (having, sight, conception), if they are to give an adequate formal indication, one which is conducive to the interpretive task of "the working-out and appropriation of an understanding" [275, H231] of its 'object', must emerge \textit{both in and in terms of a "basic experience"} of the phenomena. The phenomena, here, the 'object' of the interpretation, are the essential structures of \textit{factually existing} be-ing-here itself. One thing we can conclude, then, is that, at

\textsuperscript{51} cf., Michel Haar [1993b, xxvii].
least in some sense, it is possible to ‘experience’ essential phenomena. We see, here, the transformed Husserlian legacy of ‘intuition’.

Further, we can envisage that, for Heidegger, the existential interpretation is itself to be, at least a part of, the basic experience of be-ing-here, as an “actualizing of the tendency toward interpretation that belongs to the basic movement of life” [Indication, 121]. The interpretation is to draw, in its basic concept formation and subsequent analyses, from the experience of this ‘tendency’ – i.e., from the projection of meaning. The preliminary ‘object’ of the inquiry – the existential-ontological structure ‘understanding’, which we live in and through existentially (i.e., which we ‘experience’) – must give itself to and be appropriated by itself in an existentially explicit manner; that is, be interpreted. Understanding must develop itself to existential self-disclosure, in the essentially pre-reflective and pre-objectifying manner of interpretive transparency. The ‘object’ of this investigation is the same as the ‘subject’ investigating and so the ‘give and take’, the giving and the appropriating, of interpretation is to allow this phenomenon to emerge transparent to itself. This echoes the spirit of Heidegger’s early 1920’s lectures’ interest in the possibility of philosophy itself, where Heidegger says, for example, regarding the ‘situation categories’ that make both ‘factual life’ (Heidegger’s early term for be-ing-here) and philosophy possible, that a philosophical inquiry becomes a binding interpretation when it has become a living one, that is, [when] the actualization of philosophical knowledge in its point of departure, initial conceptualization, and method is so rigorous that it can by itself bring to fruition [zeitigen] the vitalization of the object’s genuinely binding force upon us [GA 61:166].

52 GA 61; translated by Richard Rojcewicz as Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle; 2001, Indiana. This is the 1922 lecture course; I have, however, reworked the translation, here (with the help of Crowell’s translation of the same passage in [Crowell, 2001, 139].
I. Primordiality of Interpretation and Basic Experience

A rigorous method 'lets' the object give yield... Ultimately, it is this very vital temporalization (zeitigung: 'ripening', maturation) that is itself the fundamental meaning of both philosophical inquiry and the 'object' of this initial inquiry, of understanding and the be-ing who understands. Existence, in bringing itself to fruition is, ultimately, a compelling and timely possibilizing of be-ing.

However, it bears mentioning, once again, particularly here, that self-understanding and self-interpretation, as transparent as they may be, are only some of the essential structures of be-ing-here. Therefore, the experience which grounds the interpretation in its basis, were we to be seeking the whole of be-ing-here, would have to include the existentiell or factical phenomena of the other existentials or, as we might call them instead, facticals.

Combining the three requirements for primordiality of interpretation, Heidegger denies primordiality to the interpretation thus far. He is, accordingly, asking: What basic experience of self-understanding unifies be-ing-here into an authentically existing whole, in which and from which we can develop a hermeneutically transparent situation, from which an actual interpretation of authentic be-ing-here as a whole can be achieved? Can rigorous existential projection, of itself, disclose authentic be-ing-here as a whole?

The full answer to this question will take most of the first three chapters of Division Two of Be-ing and Time. Previewing what we shall soon be immersed in, be-ing-here can exist as a whole in the anxious anticipation of be-ing-toward-death; and be-ing-here can exist authentically in the anxious resoluteness of conscience. The 'basic experience' from which existential interpretation gains unity and authenticity, that is, primordiality, is anxious anticipatory resoluteness — that is, conscience as be-ing-toward-death, resoluteness as
anticipation, disposed and disclosed anxiously. This phenomenon provides Heidegger with a basis for the yet more primordial *temporal* ontological analysis of be-ing-here.

§4. *Indication of a deeper primordiality*

When anticipatory resoluteness is articulated in terms of the structures of the disclosedness of Care, the authentic *temporal* character of be-ing-here’s structures shows itself. This temporality of Care also reveals be-ing-here’s *everydayness* — the subject of the preparatory fundamental analysis hitherto — as *a mode of temporality*. Everydayness thereby requires a reinterpretation (an interpretive ‘taking again’ [*Wiederholen*] or ‘repetition’) from the new ground and vantage point, *i.e.*, *in terms of temporality* (II.IV). This re-interpretation serves as a confirmation of the interpretive potency of be-ing-here’s temporality. Indeed, this repetition is oriented to a yet deeper temporality and deeper primordiality, that of be-ing-here’s *historicality*, the holistic ‘stretchedness’ of the movement ‘between’ the ‘ends’ of birth and death [H373]. In short, if the existential phenomenon of be-ing-toward-death offers a sort of wholeness, the factual phenomena of be-ing-here’s birth and historizing are to offer an even “more primordial insight into the temporalization structure of temporality” [H333] and a more comprehensive wholeness of be-ing-here’s be-ing. This understanding of be-ing-here’s be-ing will be ‘more primordial than the projection of its authentic existence’ [H372].

We thus see Heidegger’s analysis exemplifying an ever-deepening circle of transcendental grounding. The temporal roots, so to speak, of be-ing-here dig deeper down, burying themselves into more obscure and more primaeval soil of the earth, thereby
nourishing the growth of the interpretation as it stretches itself up and outward, transparently opening itself deeper into the light and blue sky of disclosure and be-ing...so to speak. At least, the deeper into the ‘ground’ the interpretation goes, the broader its scope, and the more comprehensive and all-encompassing the horizons of interpretation.

With authentic historicality, the existential-temporal analysis reaches its authentic apogee (II.V). The subsequent analyses (the rest of II.V and II.VI) of inauthentic historicality and world-history, time-reckoning, public time, world-time, intratemporality (“within-temperness”), and the ordinary conception of time, serve largely as a basis for Heidegger’s critique of the tradition, particularly Hegel. These analyses, aside from being interesting in themselves and raising some important theoretical questions regarding temporal realism vs. temporal idealism, would here only serve to put into relief Heidegger’s articulation of being-here’s primordial or original and authentic temporalizing. I will, rather, focus on the latter, the positive development of Heidegger’s existentiell-existential interplay, as he focuses, intensifies, and sharpens the existential-temporal illumination of the be-ing of uncanny be-ing-here.

However, it should be borne in mind that these analyses also represent Heidegger’s hesitant movement towards the core of his ontological project of the Temporal analysis of being itself. Heidegger is developing this temporality, not only in contradistinction to the ‘ordinary’ conception of time nor purely for its own sake but within the context of the question of the meaning of be-ing itself. Previewing the structure of Division Two of Being and Time, and regarding its Chapter 6, the final chapter of the book, Heidegger says, “Care

---

53 I have paraphrased this virtual quotation simply because I have taken it somewhat out of context. The phrase, though, is Heidegger’s and does indeed mean what it suggests.

54 See William Blattner’s excellent work, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism [Blattner, 1999].
must use ‘time’ and therefore must reckon with ‘time’”; out of such time-reckoning “arises the ordinary everyday understanding of time” which, itself, “evolves into the traditional conception of time” [H235]. However,

The clarification of the origin of the ‘time’ ‘in which’ intraworldly beings are encountered, time as intratemporality, opens up an essential temporalizing possibility of temporality. Therewith the understanding prepares for itself a yet more primordial temporalization of temporality. In this is grounded the understanding of be-ing, which is constitutive for the be-ing of be-ing-here. The projection of the meaning of be-ing at all [überhaupt] can be accomplished within the horizon of time. [H235, my emphases] 55

Famously, however, Heidegger ends the published portion of Being and Time with the questions “Is there a way which leads from primordial time (ursprüngliche Zeit, i.e., Zeitlichkeit) to the meaning of Be-ing? Does time (Zeit) itself manifest itself as the horizon of Be-ing?” [H437] – rather than with the answer that it can and how it can. Nonetheless, the above indented quotation indicates that clarification of the origin of intraworldly time, within which beings are encountered, ‘opens up’ be-ing-here’s ‘essential temporalizing possibility’ of a ‘yet more primordial temporalization of temporality’, viz., Temporalität, within which be-ing itself may be disclosed (i.e., the grounding projection of the meaning of be-ing ‘at all’). Heidegger appears, then, to be pointing toward an originary happening of be-ing-here, which allows both be-ing itself and worldly be-ings to happen, in their respective ways. It appears that the answer to the question of the meaning of be-ing is meant to include and be articulated on the basis of an extra-ordinary, ‘ecstatic’, simultaneous, temporal projection of be-ing itself (Temporalität) (perhaps both genitives operant here) and be-ings of the world by the self-projection of be-ing-here’s primordial temporality (Zeitlichkeit) upon its own temporal horizon. This dynamic is the same ‘place’ or ‘region’ or ‘event’ that Heidegger later

55 be-ing ‘at all’: überhaupt – sometimes, but also sometimes misleadingly, translated as ‘in general’.
speaks of in the mythical terms of ‘the fourfold’. It is the movement at the ecstatic horizon, the temporal-ontological nexus, that deadly open place of transcendental grounding, where earth and sky meet and mortals divine the god-like, in the happening of world-creative, historical transcendence.

However, we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us, in the following, engage in a hermeneutic of Heidegger’s pursuit of the authentic temporal be-ing of be-ing-here, as being-here moves toward an openness to be-ing itself. That is, in this chapter, we shall engage in an exegesis of Part Two of *Being and Time*, structuring the interpretation along the lines of the primordiality requirements of interpretation.

The ‘fore-having’ of our interpretation will emerge in the course of the interpretation itself, in the phenomena themselves, and it will underscore tensions within the Heideggerian architectonic. This fore-having is nothing else than what we have in advance of any interpretation and that which the interpretation returns to, again and again, in order to ground its conceptualization: the ‘basic experience’, the givenness of factual ‘dis-position’ which lies in advance of every attempt at understanding and which guides the latter. We shall suggest that *this* fore-having, rather than that of ‘existence’, would give us a more balanced view of the be-ing of be-ing-here. Further, as freed from existential constraints and as developed in a phenomenology of feeling, this fore-having can develop a possibility of pushing through the attempt at a disclosure, even an ‘understanding’, of be-ing itself, *i.e.*, Heidegger’s own aborted project.

There are enough correspondences between the Heideggerian project and the present endeavour for there to be a very fruitful ‘fusion of horizons’ and a happening of the ‘effective-historical’ consciousness that belongs to authentic hermeneutical experience. Yet,
just as Gadamer's 'metaphysics of the beautiful' stands apart from the truth of speculative-historical, hermeneutical understanding, so the *phenomenology* of feeling, too, steps outside the parameters of understanding and, to use Gadamer's phrase, radically "disturbs the horizon" [Gadamer, 1975, 442], leading us, perhaps, beyond the hermeneutic standpoint itself. But let us get on with the interpretation.
CHAPTER III. *The Holistic Requirement: Anticipatory Be-ing-towards-death as the Existential-ontological Projection of Be-ing-a-whole*

§5. *The problem of existential wholeness*

As noted, Heidegger’s project in the second half of the published part of *Being and Time* seeks primordiality of interpretation: that is, the interpretation must be and conform to a *basic experience* of be-ing-here as an *authentically existing* (self-understanding) *whole*. Heidegger focuses explicitly on the ‘holism’ and ‘authenticity’ requirements of primordiality, the ‘basic experience’ apparently being a function of the fulfillment of such requirements in the various existentiell attestations these requirements demand and draw from. In this section, we shall focus on the *holistic* requirement.

How, as we have already asked, can one expect a holistic interpretation of be-ing-here when its existence, as open-ended potentiality ‘ahead of itself’, appears to be essentially opposed to be-ing-a-whole?

The ‘ahead-of-itself’, ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’, ‘be-ing towards its possibility-of-be-ing’ characters of be-ing-here’s existence imply that there is ‘something still outstanding’ which had not yet become actual in be-ing-here’s be-ing; in turn implying, therefore, a lack of existential totality or wholeness. We remember, also, that ‘existence’, though an essential designation of, and interpretive clue to, be-ing-here’s be-ing, is only ‘part’ of the overall whole or be-ing of be-ing-here. Heidegger does not himself emphasize this here – quite the contrary – but it is important to bear in mind in the overall categorizing procedure regarding
be-ing-here. There are existentials – categories of be-ing-here – which might better be termed ‘factuals’, essential characters articulating facticity, or aspects of be-ing-here other than existential. Even though Heidegger pursues the question of wholeness within the circumscribed sphere of existentiality, it will be shown, during the course of the analysis, that it is only via recourse to other essential aspects that be-ing there’s wholeness can, in fact, be grasped.

Again, then: can existence’s lack of totality be overcome? Heidegger points out that, should be-ing-here ever ontically overcome its ‘outstanding’ character, gainsay its incompleteness, fully realize its potentiality and actually reach its ‘end’, thereby gaining its totality, this would signify the “utter loss of Be-ing-in-the-world” [H236, my emphasis] as a being; that is, its perishing. In a word, then, should be-ing-here ever in fact become whole, it would be dead. Absurdly, then, in order to be a whole, be-ing-here would have to no longer be. Heidegger, as we shall see, wants to show that the absurdity of this formulation requires a new ontological conception.

Be-ing-here’s very be-ing, then, signifies the impossibility of experiencing one’s own death and also of “experiencing be-ing-here ontically as a whole” [H236]. However, what this shows is that we have hitherto been “inadvertently positing be-ing-here” – as well as the ‘not yet’ and ‘ahead’ characters of its be-ing – “as something present-at-hand [extant, on-hand, vorhanden]” [H237] which, upon reaching its ‘end’ and becoming its ‘not yet’, is no longer (is ‘no-longer-be-ing-here’) present-at-hand. This inappropriate conception is to be

---

56 Ontically, here, signifies ‘in the manner of or pertaining to beings’ of either a vor- or zuhanden (extant or handy) character; but not, properly, be-ing-here.
put in sharp contrast with the appropriate existential ontology, in which be-ing-here, upon appropriately reaching its ‘end’ and becoming its ‘not yet’, precisely is itself, i.e., exists.

§6. Detour through the death of others

However, before articulating this properly, Heidegger suggests that, since we cannot experience our own death, perhaps we could comprehend be-ing-no-longer-in-the-world by observing the death of others. Here we view the “remarkable phenomenon” of “the changeover of a being from be-ing-here’s kind of be-ing (or life) to no-longer-be-ing-here” [H238]. This is also described as the transition, the tearing away, from one kind of be-ing, be-ing-in-the-world, to another, be-ing present-at-hand as the be-ing-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of a corporeal thing which has been ‘in’-the-world and is now gone-out-of-the-world [ibid.] – i.e., the startling transition of a living being into a corpse.

But it is precisely the loss of be-ing, as such, which, according to Heidegger, we do not experience directly in our experience of the death of another: someone’s death is exclusively their own or, as Heidegger puts it, “death is in each case ‘mine’” [H240], non-substitutable, non-representable, and non-deputizable by another. Thus, experiencing the death of others is, for the purposes of fundamental ontology, a dead-end. ‘Mineness’ is ontologically constitutive for the sought-after existential-ontological understanding of death. This means, also, that be-ing-here’s wholeness must be conceived via mineness and existence, i.e., as an existential phenomenon.

Though one may well argue that we can quite poignantly experience the wrenching existential loss, as such, in the death of another whom one is very close to (and not just the loss of that being as a friend, wife, lover, or family member), the point could still be made
that this loss is nonetheless at one remove and not equivalent to that experienced by the perishing individual him or herself. Though Heidegger does not articulate the precise ontology of love, existential closeness, and ‘empathy’, it would appear that, even if he had, this would not impugn his point here.

§7. Ontology of life, death, existence

Before proceeding with the existential conception of death, it is interesting to note that Heidegger understands ‘life’ somewhat ambiguously in these sections. On one hand, we have seen that Heidegger says, at one point, that life is the kind of be-ing of be-ing here. On the other hand, be-ing here’s dying is not to be understood as the perishing of a living being [H240] (which, itself, is not to be understood as a mere physiological/biological/medical “exitus” [H241, 247], i.e., a piecemeal present-at-hand transition]. The going-out-of-the-world of be-ing here’s dying is not the same as that of a life’s perishing. The ontology of be-ing here is not only distinguished from but is superordinate to that of life [H247]. It would appear that life has an ontological status which is, in a sense, in between that of be-ing here and be-ing present-at-hand. Life may be akin to be-ing here but there is all the difference between Lebensphilosophie and existential-ontological analysis at stake here. Essentially the problem is that ‘life’ ‘is’ extant be-ing adjunctly dynamized to approximate the proper ‘motion’ of be-ing here. This extantness

57 Similarly, twenty years later, in the Letter on Humanism: “Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living creatures [because they are] most closely related to us [but] separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss” [LH, 206].
58 [H238]. It is possible, in the context of the passage, to interpret Heidegger as referring to, exclusively, the being here of an Other as ‘life’...as opposed to ‘my’ own be-ing here which requires an existential interpretation. But it is an unlikely interpretation and it is unclear what such an interpretation would entail.
(presence-at-hand-ness) is, however, a false ontological basis, which the abyss of death and be-ing-here’s proper pure possibility attest to.

We encounter this kinship and difference again in the provisional analogy between the ripening of a fruit and be-ing-here’s be-ing toward its ‘end’: “be-ing-here must, as itself, become – that is to say, be – what it is not yet” [H243]. Similarly, a fruit, a living be-ing, is a kind of being “to whose kind of be-ing becoming belongs” [H243, my emphasis]. A fruit brings itself, of its own accord, toward its fulfillment in ripeness – its ‘not yet’ belongs to its very be-ing “and is by no means pieced on as something not yet present-at-hand” [H243].

Rather than orienting our understanding of be-ing-here’s ‘coming-to-an-end’ in terms of the ontological and temporal assumptions of atomistic and discrete present-at-hand be-ing, Heidegger’s hyphenation is meant, as ever, to capture the dynamic – or perhaps, more appropriately, the ‘phasis’ – of the internal movement of this phenomenon. This suggests, again, at least a similarity with the be-ing of ‘ripening’, and an articulation based on the fore-having of existence rather than present-at-hand ontological and temporal assumptions.

That which is still outstanding in be-ing-here’s be-ing, that which is ‘not yet’, is to be existentially conceived as essentially belonging to be-ing-here, such that be-ing-here, as existing, is already its ‘not yet’. This is to say that be-ing-here is be-ing-toward-the-end.

---

59 Similarly, Aristotle describes beings of phasis or ‘nature’ as having their source of movement and telos within themselves; cf., [Aristotle, Physics, Beta, 1,3].

60 This, in contradistinction to Blattner’s interpretation [Blattner, 1999, 102-112], wherein be-ing-here’s being its not-yet is turned into its not being its not-yet! Even when Blattner gets clear that the future is the be-ing-toward, itself, i.e., not that which one is toward [p.111], his emphasis is rather on be-ing-here’s not attaining what it is toward. This, also, gets the issue backwards, as the meaning of the ‘towards’ is that, that which one is towards already is, in the being-towards it. In Part Three, I will discuss this more.
The very ‘is’ of existing is already underway toward its ‘end’ and precisely as such already ‘has’ its end.\footnote{This ‘already’ is not meant to refer us to facticity or thrownness but to the very structure of the (futural) existential dynamic itself. That is, it is not an ‘already been’ but an ‘already to be’}

The appropriate statement pertaining to be-ing-here in its be-ing would be sum moribundus ["I am in dying"] …insofar as I am, I am moribundus. The MORIBUNDUS first gives the SUM its sense. [HCT, 31]

That is, I am existentially-temporally finite. As something we are underway toward, death ‘is’ already. This is not to say, absurdly, that one has already died, be-ing-here is already “be-ing-at-an-end”, or that one has in any way ‘overtaken’ death – rather, it is to say that, existential-ontologically, “death is a way to be” [H245, my emphasis] as existing, as being towards-death. The ‘is’ of existing is already out beyond itself, ‘ecstatic’, fundamentally encountering the non-be-ing beyond its discrete present and the non-be-ing of its absence in death. The ontology of ‘becoming’ would appear to be similar.\footnote{Perhaps the purest expression of Heideggerian existential ontology and metaphysics (all obvious differences aside, and despite Heidegger’s distancing of himself from Rilke in the 1946 What are Poets For?), comes in R.M. Rilke’s Duino Elegies and the Sonnets to Orpheus and in his attempts in letters to articulate the realm from which these poems come: “Two inmost experiences were decisive for their production: the determination constantly maturing in me to keep life open towards death and, on the other hand, the intellectual necessity of instating the transformations of love differently in this wider whole than was possible in the narrower orbit of life (which simply excluded death as the Other)” (letter to von Escher, Dec. 22, 1923). Heidegger, perhaps, missed out on the love part of the ‘transformations of love’. Rilke says again: “Affirmation of life AND death appears as one in the ‘Elegies’. To admit the one without the other is…a limitation that in the end excludes all infinity. Death is the side of life that is turned away from us: we must try to achieve the fullest consciousness of our existence, which is at home in the two unseparated realms, inexhaustibly nourished by both…” (letter to Hulewicz, Nov. 13, 1925). To be fair to Heidegger, however, we would have to interpret his surprisingly}

§8. Death by falling

Usually ("proximally and for the most part"), however, be-ing-here indulges its self-occluding tendencies and manifests itself so as to avoid and fall away from such an existing, temporalizing, and dying. And here is where, for Heidegger, the natural analogy breaks
down: the fruit fulfills itself in the be-ing of ripeness but be-ing-here for the most part “ends in unfulfillment ... disintegrated ... used up” [H244]. As Heidegger says, “even ‘unfulfilled’ be-ing-here ends” [ibid.] and, before that ending, thwarts its own maturation. As a result, in this sense, be-ing-here ‘has’ its end as something to be, not only ontologically, but existentially, as a potentiality which it can become in an authentic manner. For the most part, one is fallen away from such possibility and avoids having it; however, one can exist one’s death authentically or one can remain existentially impotent in inauthentically avoiding this ‘ownmost’ possibility – one has this choice, buried within the neglect and avoidance of inauthentic everydayness.

Heidegger’s preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of be-ing-toward-death in terms of Care⁶³ reveals be-ing-toward-death proximally to be an anxious flight away from its ownmost possibility of be-ing-toward and taking over its own death. Be-ing-toward-death shows itself in existence as be-ing-here’s ownmost, uttermost, non-relational, ineluctable (unüberholbare), and most concrete possibility-of-be-ing. Factically, be-ing-here has already been thrown into this possibility and this is manifest in the basic mood (Grundbefindlichkeit) of angst/anxiety. “Be-ing-here is dying as long as it exists” (H251); but we usually die by falling, that is, by fleeing in the face of death into our tranquilizing everyday concerns, alienating worldly absorption, and fugitive, idle-talking, be-ing-with-one-another.⁶⁴

‘negative’ or stringent response to Rilke in his What are Poet For? in [PLT, 89-142], one of the few contemporary poets he cherished.

⁶³ That is, in terms of the “ahead-of-itself [existence] be-ing-already-in (the world) [facticity] as be-ing-alongside-intraworldly-beings [falling]”.

⁶⁴ The parallel between idle talk putting death off as some not-yet actual event in the future, and present-at-hand ontology’s structurally similar now-time, should not be missed.
In fleeing, however, the uncanny call of be-ing-here's be-ing nonetheless announces itself [H252]. Furthermore, even if, 'factically'\(^6\), authenticity is an existential modification of inauthenticity, ontologically "inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity" [H259]\(^6\) If fallen be-ing-here is an "evasion which conceals" [H255], nonetheless, the evasion as an evasion intimates, even if only negatively, its contrary; that is, it reveals a certainty about death which we are existentially turned toward. The concealing, as a concealing, reveals and, similarly, the 'superficial superiority and untroubled indifference of everydayness', as an indifferent caring, anxiously discloses death. In effect, fallen everydayness is — at least, for existential analysis, i.e., ontologically, if not 'factically' for the most part — a privative mode of authentic uncanniness.\(^6\) In be-ing-toward-death, even if in denial, uncanny be-ing-here achieves wholeness: its 'end', "its uttermost 'not-yet' has already been included" in its very be-ing [H259]. With this, one of the criteria of primordiality of interpretation has been achieved, if only negatively.

§9. Anticipation

But what does this mean in positive terms? The interpretation must project an authentic possibility of be-ing towards death and the wholeness positively achieved in this authenticity. Contrasting with inauthentic be-ing-towards-death, authentic be-ing-towards-

---

\(^6\) Heidegger frequently and unfortunately uses the expression 'factically' to indicate the 'proximally and for the most part' of fallen be-ing-here.

\(^6\) Despite the ambiguity, not to say contradiction, generated by Heidegger's conflicting pronouncements on the foundedness of these two existential modalities, we can make use of this statement for purposes of presentation here.

\(^6\) Though, ultimately, we may prefer to classify this initial 'stage' of authenticity as 'authentic everydayness', reserving 'authentic uncanniness' for the project of creative grounding which can emerge from authenticity's appropriation of, and rejoinder to, its factual possibilities. Authentic uncanniness has within itself the further possibility of 'spiritual uncanniness' — what a metaphysics of feeling is about.
death can not evade, nor cover up, nor explain away with common sense this ownmost possibility [H260]. Therefore we will be on the lookout for be-ing-here's turning toward and reticently disclosing this possibility.

In characterizing be-ing-towards-death as a distinct possibility, Heidegger wants first to emphasize the pure possibility aspect. As we have seen, death, as an existential possibility, is not a possibility of something to-be-actualized – which would “annihilate the possibility of the possible by making it available to us” [H261] – but a possibility of be-ing-here's very being. That is, death is neither a possibility that is itself 'to hand' nor is it of 'to hand' beings nor is it a projected goal – it is nothing within the pragmatic schema of means and ends ('involvements' 'in-order-to...') of our everyday, productive and expectant concern – rather, it is a possibility of existence itself.

Authentic be-ing-towards-death increases the pure possibility aspect of death in the 'clairvoyant' anticipation (Vorlaufen) of death: outstripping all mundane, realizable possibilities, be-ing-here ‘runs ahead’ to, and ‘walks before’ (the literal meaning of vorlaufen), its own ‘uttermost possibility’, “right under the eyes of death” [H382], as a self on the brink of the void – a situation which Heidegger characterizes as “the possibility of the measureless impossibility of any existence at all” [H262]. As existential, death signifies the certainty of “the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself toward anything” [ibid.].

Certainly released from all necessity, releasing this possibility from any striving to actualize it allows the purity of its ‘possibility-character’ to be ‘set free’ as pure existing being-here, penetrated to its core by non-be-ing, existing in the twilight of its uncanny be-ing.

---

68 I have amalgamated two closely related phrases, here.
Existence is no longer disguised as a substantially actual ego 'with' possibilities at hand but, in the certainty of its impossibility, it is unveiled as the pure possibilizing of self-be-ing — "that is to say", as Heidegger says, "the possibility of authentic (eigentlich) existence" [H263]. The possibility of non-be-ing reveals the be-ing of be-ing-here as its own (eigen) possibility, in an essential modal sense, regardless of any specific content or teleology of the possibility — existence is the fount of possibility itself.\(^{69}\)

As anticipation of death, be-ing-toward-death is pure existential self-disclosure. We have seen that this disclosure is projective: be-ing-here projects itself, and so understands itself, upon its uttermost and ownmost (eigenst) possibility-of-be-ing, and so exists authentically.

§10. Projective breakdown

But let us look a little closer at this projection. An understanding be-ing-here, as projection, projects itself, as an intention, from something, upon something and toward something; that is, 1) it projects from itself as a series of self, other, or worldly intentions, 2) upon a circumscribed horizon of understanding, i.e., upon the meaning of that which is to be understood. This horizon illuminates and defines the projected being with its possibilities of signification and provides context for this being's discovery or disclosure, its truth. Furthermore, 3) the project casts forth towards that being (or be-ing itself) which lies 'beyond the horizon,' as potentially understood and available being.\(^{70}\) If the meaning elucidates or

\(^{69}\) See William Desmond's section on 'the possibilizing of possibility' [Desmond, 1995, 335ff.]. This account, as much of this book, works through some key aspects of Heideggerian concepts in an original manner that often captures the Heideggerian point within a new working-through of the phenomena.

\(^{70}\) cf. [BP, §12a], where the understanding of be-ing of 'productive comportment' involves a directedness towards the finished, 'understood' product, which comes into its own self, its 'being-in-itself', via and in conformity with the intentional-productive comportment.
renders transparent (uncovers or discloses: ‘fulfills’) the projected-intended being, the latter emerges beyond the horizon, as understood and grounded, and so, as now available for further projection.\textsuperscript{71}

Whether and how the meaning elucidates the being that has been projected is not something the projection itself decides. Analogously, the call of conscience (as we shall soon see more clearly), as an attestation, is neither, initially, existentially projected nor positionally posited and understood by me. Rather the call of conscience, as immediate self-finding [H271], is essentially factual and dis-positional disclosure; and the hearing of the call — the understanding — ‘seizes upon’ (begreift - Begriff=concept) what is thus disclosed. Similarly, it is the phenomenological moment of the hermeneutical process — the fulfilling or enactment of the projected intention by an appropriate non-projective, experiential disclosure of the being\textsuperscript{72} — which shows whether the projection is factically grounded in the phenomena or not. The be-ing who projects also emerges (or can emerge) in truth, ‘beyond the horizon’ in an ever fuller, deeper, richer, more comprehensively disclosed world, its own be-ing-in-the-world either more elucidated or transparent or both, after having transcended another of countless horizons of meaning.

However, in this case — the authentic, holistic disclosure of be-ing-here — be-ing-here projects itself towards its very own be-ing, as something it would understand and actualize ...but it does so only by projecting itself upon its own death. The meaning is the horizon that

\textsuperscript{71} See [BP, §20a, 277] for Heidegger's own version of the structure of projection. It is similar: “Projection contains two things, First, that upon which be-ing-here projects itself is a possibility-of-be-ing its own self...Secondly, this projection upon something is always a projecting of...itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this possibility-of-be-ing. ... The projection is the way in which I am the possibility. ... Understanding as be-ing-here’s self-projection is be-ing-here’s fundamental mode of happening [geschehen: historizing]. As we may also say, it is the authentic meaning of action. [BP, 277; following Hofstadter].

\textsuperscript{72} The disclosure being either intuitive (for natural or mathematical beings), practical or productive (for ‘tools’), or dis-positional (for be-ing-here and be-ing itself).
grounds the projection, that upon which and that through which we achieve understanding of that being (the self as such and as a whole) which is intended by the projection.

But death gives us nothing to understand, thwarts the directionality of the intention, and disables the project itself. The movement towards the ‘end’ recoils back upon itself: the horizon strikes back upon the projection itself, confronting and obliterating it with the unrealizable nothing beyond all projection. Our movement of transcendence is suddenly and abruptly stopped, shocked by the impossibility of further projection or of completing this projection. The projective movement itself, having outstripped all particular worldly projects, in order to gain the ‘world’ itself in its intended full being-in-the-world, finds itself projecting into and recoiling from nothing. The projection’s ‘fulfillment’ is rather a being shattered upon and shattered by, the horizon of ultimate and impending nothingness. That which makes meaningful does not carry out its function, does not carry the project over to the understood being, towards which it strives, beyond the horizon; nor does it just show, as in thetic knowledge, that the project’s meaning is merely mistaken and empty.

Rather, the project itself is confounded, dumbstruck, rejected. In running ahead to the limit, be-ing-here is thrown back upon itself, its projective, appropriative ventures into the beyond decisively shunned, virtually reprimanded, by the void, its very self as existing, denied, extinguished. The nothing of death, projected for the appropriation of understanding of be-ing-here itself, as a whole, obliterates the horizon of understanding and strikes back upon the very intentional kernel of the project itself, examinating it. One projects towards oneself understandingly yet this projection obfuscates understanding itself, breaks down the projection, and throws it back upon itself as nullified. Projection strikes out into pure anxiety.
It would appear, then, that we could rule out projective understanding itself as a potential bounty of primordiality of interpretation. For that matter, existence, as a fundamental dimension of be-ing-here’s be-ing, could be ruled out as disclosive of the totality and authenticity of be-ing-here. However, the authentic existential response to death, of Being and Time, involves a reassertion of projection in a fundamentally altered form: in the form of resolute, finite, self-creating choice. In fact, as we shall see, it is upon this ‘experience’ of existential guilt, the sheer nullity of projection itself, that primordiality of interpretation is to be grounded.

Heidegger’s response, that of existence repeating itself authentically, separated from inauthentic falling by a mere veil which harbours an abyss, is certainly a possible and profound one. However, it is not the only possible response to projective breakdown and, due to its built-in failure, perhaps not the best one. The factual aspect of the disclosure, anxiety, needs to be developed on its own terms.

Let us, though, conclude the analysis of the anticipation of death and the holistic requirement, before going in depth into the phenomena of the authenticity requirement.

§11. Five analytic items of anticipation and its genuine disclosure in anxiety

Heidegger now analyzes five interrelated items of anticipation, i.e., of authentic be-ing-towards-death. As 1) one’s ‘ownmost’ possible be-ing, be-ing-here’s very be-ing, “wrenched away from the ‘they,’” is at issue [H263]. As 2) a ‘non-relational’ possibility, be-ing-here is radically individuated: all our concern with mundane pursuits and solicitude with

---

73 Authenticity “changes nothing in the factual circumstances of one’s life...What is changed is the how of the movement of one’s life” [Indication, 120]. This ‘how’ of the movement, as shown later in context of Aristotle’s interpretation of beings [ibid., 128], is the be-ing of be-ing-here.
Others fail us, indicating that death must be taken over alone. As 3) a possibility 'not to be outstripped' or 'ineluctable', anticipatory be-ing-here is liberated from its lostness and gives itself up to that which it cannot avoid, so that it must confront and can accept it. As 4) a certain possibility, be-ing-here can maintain itself in the authentic truth of its be-ing. And as 5) constantly possible yet indefinite as to its when, death is a constant threat arising in the very be-ing of existence.

I will add, as a distinct sixth item of anticipation, one which Heidegger weaves into the 'indeterminateness' of the threat. This threat is related to, if not quite identical with, that which comes from the structural disclosure of the thrownness of be-ing-here's enigmatic 'that it is...' The indefiniteness of the threat of death, disclosed in anticipation, discloses itself genuinely as 6) the basic mood of anxiety, in which 'be-ing-here finds itself face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence [H266].\textsuperscript{74}

Thus we can see how this other mode of disclosure – mood or dis-position – is, if initially in something of an adjunct way, pressed into service to help round out the authentic, existential understanding-project. Anticipation is a projection, a be-ing-towards death, yet it is a "genuine disclosure" [H265] as the dis-positional disclosure of anxiety. Heidegger says "the basic self-finding [Grundbefindlichkeit: ground-dis-position] of anxiety belongs to the self-understanding of be-ing-here" [H266, my italics]. But this self-understanding itself occurs in the most fundamental and genuine way in the disclosure of mood – not in projection per se – such that "be-ing-toward-death is essentially anxiety" [ibid.].

\textsuperscript{74} As this is a disclosure of the 'nothing', it may not be quite identical to the disclosure of the pure 'that it is' nor of the latter's enigma, which is disclosed in pure thrownness. But 'the nothing' has shifting significances, including that of 'the world', so we need not pronounce on this too decisively here.
Though this gives an exalted place to the mode of disclosure of dis-position, i.e., to moods, it also structures the disclosure of mood itself as an understanding and as having significance for the existential project. What, we may ask, if the disclosure of mood is not, essentially an 'understanding'? What if anxiety does not have the structure of a projection? Could anxiety, perhaps, be disclosive of other meanings than existential ones? Or, if not anxiety, could other moods be disclosive of other meanings than existential ones, and therefore, perhaps, more fundamentally disclosive of be-ing-here as a whole (not just existence) or even of be-ing itself?

These analytic items of anticipation will be repeated again later in the analysis of anticipatory resoluteness.

§12. The possibility of choosing one's be-ing-here as a whole and regaining the world

We have seen that anticipation frees be-ing-here from lostness in 'they-self' be-ing and its worldly possibilities: "death shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached" [H264]. So far, this positively indicates that be-ing-here is now free for authentic 'own-self' be-ing, the pure possibility of its own existence. This possibility is nothing other – at least, initially – than the pure existential-ontological possibility of be-ing-toward-death itself. This means a confrontation with death in the solitude of one's own being, in which one accepts, gives oneself up to, and takes over death's certainty, thereby living in the anxious truth of an existence which is factically disclosed.

But this is not to be the whole story of be-ing towards-death; it may be fruitful to think of it as a 'moment' within the overall dynamic movement of authenticity. We will not
find, here, that any ‘transcendental’ possibilities emerge for be-ing-here; nor can be-ing-here unearth any deeper possibility of self-be-ing; nor are any worldly possibilities any longer meaningful. However, Heidegger qualifies the trans-mundane solitude of the self and thereby opens up a further positive dimension or second ‘moment’ of authentic be-ing-towards-death. Concern and solicitude – essentially fallen be-ing-in ‘in the world’ – are essential structures of be-ing-here, conditioning any and all existence. Therefore, if be-ing-in can go ‘out of this world’ via the certainty of its ownmost, non-relational death, it can only, as an authentically existing Self, come back to this world:

Be-ing-here is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful be-ing-alongside and solicitous be-ing-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost possibility-of-be-ing rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. [H263].

What this means is that

One is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. [H264].

And, furthermore, that

Since anticipation...discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that [uttermost] possibility, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of be-ing-here in advance in an existentiell manner, i.e.,...existing as a whole possibility-of-be-ing. [H264].

Therefore, it is world, in our concernful dealings with intraworldly beings and solicitous be-ing-with-Others, which functions as an essential conditioning factor of be-ing-here’s be-ing-in, and which is to be authentically appropriated by the liberated be-ing-here, appropriated as be-ing-here’s or be-ing-in’s own. All the mundane possibilities bypassed in anticipation’s running ahead to its uttermost possibility of death are now properly disclosed for choice within the context of be-ing-here as a possible whole. That is, if it is possible to ‘take’ the whole of be-ing-here in advance – meaning, it would appear, to take over, to
choose one’s be-ing as a whole – then all the factual, worldly possibilities that lie in advance of that all-encompassing choice are also disclosed and can now be ‘chosen’ and made existentially meaningful – not simply ‘adopted’ as my own but taken over and taken up in light of the overarching existential choice of be-ing-here as a whole. In anticipation, one is freed for one’s ownmost, finite, worldly possibilities and this is only possible on the basis of be-ing-here’s choosing and existing itself as a whole.

We can see from this that authentic Self-be-ing has several distinguishable aspects which can fruitfully, if provisionally, be seen as ‘moments’ in an overall process. Heidegger, however, with his multi-dimensional holism, integrates and condenses these moments. His method, or the effect of his method, is one of comprehensive condensation of structurally related, reflexive meanings. These meanings are ever more ‘primordially’ projected and grounded – that is, holistically, authentically, and experientially – until the projecting self itself is thrown ecstatically upon the existential horizon, in the anxious finitude of projection itself, and disclosed in the most basic way. As we shall see, this is, ultimately, a temporal disclosure.

In terms of ‘moments’, however, we can discern the following: be-ing-towards-death, first, reveals its inconspicuous, average, self-be-ing as being-immersed in the world; second, it awakens the lost, authentic self; third, it retrieves this authentic self; fourth, it becomes this authentic self in choice. In this, there is a process or movement of loss of world/gain of own self (be-ing-in)/regain of world as the self’s own realm of authentic Care.\footnote{Care, here, meant in its ‘normal’ or ontic meaning, as well as Heidegger’s ontological sense. Perhaps the most immediately accessible experience of the deep ontic sense of this regain of Care, for many, is the intimate re-connection with one’s world awakened by the birth of one’s own child.}
This be-ing-here, opens up a world anew, exists be-ing in a world. For the Heidegger of Being and Time, this is a possibility of rejoining the world in a manner distinct from inauthentic falling back into the world, a manner we shall describe and analyze in the next sections. However, falling asserts itself as inevitable as well. While distinguishable from the structural feature of ‘world’, falling or inauthentic be-ing-in-the-world parallels and conditions any authentic ‘rejoinder’ to and regain of world. If momentarily obliterated, falling, too, rises from its own ashes within authenticity.

§13. The possibility of letting-go of the project

Existential possibility, in and of itself, runs up against its own finitude, the sheer fact and certainty of im-possibility. And this impossibility is a relatedness of possibility (existence) to something beyond itself, that is, it is a co-disclosure of ineluctable facticity in the pure ontological condition of death. However, Heidegger’s sustained existential response serves the function of bending existence back upon itself in an anxious thrownness and nullity, coupled with an intensified need of transparent, mundane, and, ultimately, creative choice, will, and resolution in the vacuum of freedom.

This reassertion of the values of existence is Heidegger response, rather than a valedictory ‘letting go’ of existence/understanding and a ‘letting be’ of the factual for its own disclosure, on its own terms. This latter ‘releasement’ would be the opening to factual, dis-positional, ‘mood-al’ appreciation, and a liberation of such disclosure from the compromised ‘function’ of (self)-findedness (Befindlichkeit), which merely supports (even in the abysmal way of angst) the imperatives of the existential project.
Death not only obliterates the ‘I’ of the mundane, inauthentic self, but also the ‘I’ of authenticity and its dwelling, even its temples and artworks. Be-ing-toward-death awakens the Self to its fact of be-ing, at all, here and now, in this moment, for all time, in direct collision with utter oblivion, in the uncanniness of dynamic happening, outside and beyond all projects.

There would appear to remain a possibility that possibilizing existence experience its own, unowned, yet, for all that, not inauthentic facticity, outside of all projection. This facticity need not be reducible to the fallen present-at-hand ontological schema Heidegger wishes to undermine and which he is prone to relegate the factuality of facticity. Factual disclosure is the basic dis-positional experience of the be-ing as such and at all of be-ing-here, even as a projective existence, and of the be-ing of anything which, in any way, can be said ‘to be’: the ever-stunning fact that ‘I am’, they are, there is, anything at all, and that there is not rather nothing – which is disclosed most directly in such affects as joy, astonishment, and awe. The uniqueness of be-ing-here as a uniqueness over-against all other be-ings disappears and emerges again as the uniqueness of be-ing at all, in and with all other be-ings, my specificity and situation, my unique ‘here’, returned to from beyond the horizon of projective (essentially ‘rationalist’) metaphysics.

This is one avenue to be-ing itself, one way of getting there, through the same though individually unique be-ing of any, each, and all beings.
CHAPTER IV. The Authenticity Requirement: 
Resolute Conscience as the Existentiell/ontic Attestation 
of my own Be-ing-a-whole

§14. Methodological consideration

Methodologically, according to Heidegger, his investigation has only projected this authentic be-ing-toward-death and be-ing-a-whole as an ontological or existential, that is, a priori possibility. That is, despite the appearance of the phenomena being that of concrete ‘lived’ experience, they (could) have been only structurally constructed, as a kind of existential-theoretical project. What is needed, so Heidegger states at the end of II.1, is a factual, existentiell attestation (Bezeugung) i.e., an ontic, phenomenal testimony of such existential projection: specifically, an attestation of an authentic be-ing-a-whole. To attest something is to bear witness to something which has been posited, and so to ‘prove’ the genuineness of this something, to authenticate it, by witnessing or experiencing or acting it, i.e., by disclosing it existentially. So, authentic be-ing-a-whole, the ownmost possibility of be-ing, is to be disclosed, not just in an existential projection but, more concretely, in some kind of ‘factual experience’ of that projection – such as, one would think, a dis-positional disclosure may give. That is, we need to ground the project in the concrete phenomena of ‘lived experience’, ground ontology ‘ontic-existentielly’.76

76 I use the terms ‘factual experience’ and ‘lived experience’ for the purpose of elucidating Heidegger’s term ‘existentiell’, despite Heidegger’s misgivings regarding the ontological appropriateness of either of these words. We can grant Heidegger the ontological inappropriateness of these terms yet retain their philosophical lineage and descriptive evocativeness as adequate grounds for their usage. How, otherwise, could one express the meaning of ‘existentiell’, without simply repeating Heideggerian terminology as an inscrutable ‘jargon’? As Heidegger himself says, in 1922, “The confusing plurivocity of the word ‘life’ and its usages should not be a
This comes, after the analysis of be-ing-toward-death, as something of a surprise, especially as the factual phenomenon of anxiety, as genuine disclosure of the existentially projected phenomena, appeared as 'testimony' enough.

In any case, the phenomena of conscience and resoluteness – which we would now investigate from II.2 – would appear to provide us with the initial phenomenal attestation we now seek (of authentic being-a-whole). However, according to Heidegger's methodological directives, even then, the question will still arise (in II.3) as to whether this attestation of an authentic being-a-whole has an "essential connection" [H267] with the ontologically projected anticipation of death of II.1. Is the attestation dealing with the same phenomena as had been projected? Heidegger claims that such attested phenomena would or could still have only been "deduced existentially" and the authentic totality we seek to ground on a phenomenal basis will have, then, remained only an existential project [H301]. Perhaps the initial 'attestation' is more of a schematic adaptation of the existential concepts to the possible existentiell attestation.

Heidegger's point, then, would appear to be that this analysis of be-ing-toward-death might well be 'existentially deduced' or conceptually derived from the formal indications or fore-having, the initial conceptual characterization of the existential-ontological situation – rather than, as befits a formally-indicative concept, phenomenologically sighted and articulated 'according to a basic experience of the object'. As we recall, one of the requirements of primordiality of interpretation is the phenomenological one, that the

---

reason for simply casting it aside" – [Indication, 114]. And, as we have just underscored, the 'phenomenological requirement' calls for a 'basic experience' of its 'object'.
Interpretation conforms to the existentiell, ‘experienced’ phenomena. Therefore the need of another attestation arises, one showing the *internal* connection between the *existential* phenomena (of II.1, the projected being-towards-death and being-a-whole, *i.e.*, anticipation) and the *existentiell* phenomena (of II.2, the attesting conscience and resoluteness). This will be the ‘essential connection’ in the existentiell phenomena of *anticipatory resoluteness* (II.3) and *this* is what grounds the project securely in the phenomena.

At that point, at the height of the articulation of the existentiell phenomena, and at the fulfillment of all three conditions of the primordiality requirement [H311], it becomes necessary, via what David Wood calls the “*structural condensation* of the existential analytic” [Wood, 1989, 173], to deepen the analysis by another series of structural, hermeneutic-methodological considerations. This will lead to the essential move in the interpretation: the move to *temporality* as the ontological meaning of be-ing-here...

Wood continues, “the structural condensation of Care, achieved via the primordial disclosure of *angst*, prepares the way for *the absorption of that structure into a dimension that precedes all structure* and representation, namely temporality” [*ibid.*, my italics]. That is to say, the dis-positional disclosure (of anxiety) *fulfills* the developed formal-indicative concepts of the interpretation (the ‘ideas’ of ‘existence’, ‘be-ing-in-the-world’, and ‘Care’), and thereby, in a structural-interpretive manner that is similar to Hegel’s dialectical *aufheben* (all obvious differences aside), *transforms* the interpretation to a deeper level. This ‘deeper level’ has shown itself as the *abyssmal* uncanniness of the *angst* disclosure and it is, itself, the de-structuring of structure into the void. However, for the committed hermeneuticist, this

---

77 As in *Indication*, Heidegger asks “Was the sense of being [*i.e.*, be-ing] Aristotle employed to define the being of human life drawn in a genuine manner from a simple, founding experience of this object?” [127]. It is this “founding experience in which this object was initially given” [128] that is “the original motivational source of these explications” [124], *i.e.*, of Aristotle’s *Physics*, and which Heidegger wishes to deconstruct to.
opens new ground in the new formal indication of temporality. The self-circling projective-horizontal sweep begins another interpretation anew.

It only remains to ask whether this is now still possible. Has not the die been cast, only to sink, unripping, into the silently drowning pond? Should the temporal interpretation run agroundon barren, desert reefs, is it because the ecstatic horizontal projective schema has been retained, despite having already been dislodged into the abyss by the uncanny undoing of be-ing-toward-death? If temporality is, as Wood is presenting it, pre-structural, then what kind of ground and structure, if any, is now required by the interpretation? Is not the ecstatic-horizontal temporal schema essentially that of projection, which we have already seen break down at the holistic limits of be-ing-here’s be-ing. Structure is meaning-projection; the abyss is a different kind of meaning; yet it appears to initially lead to grounding the ecstatics upon existential horizons in transcendental-temporal grounding.78

This grounding is problematic, though, for the abyss of be-ing-here is itself a disclosure from an other realm of meaning than projective, structural, and grounding interpretation. By its own measurelessness, the dis-positional disclosure of angst opens an other dimension of interpretation, one not bound by projection or by existence but by the exigencies of ‘languifying’ the immediately disclosed felt appreciations of be-ing and be-ing-here. We shall return to this when we consider Quentin Smith’s phenomenology of feeling (Part Two, A). But let us proceed with Heidegger’s analysis.

78 cf., Heidegger’s The Essence of Ground - which, however, explicitly avoids developing the problematic of temporality. [VWG, 108, n.60].
§15. The factual call of conscience

Heidegger has, as we have seen in the previous chapter, satisfied the holistic requirement for primordiality of interpretation of existence. Our present goal, all methodological reservations aside, is to lay out Heidegger’s initial attempt at ‘attestation’, the existentiell authentication of existentially projected, authentic be-ing-here as a whole. It appears that the authenticity requirement coincides with a renewed hermeneutical-methodological need of ‘attestation’. The attestation would satisfy the authenticity requirement and, in ‘making secure’ or grounding the formal indication, it would also initially appear to satisfy the phenomenological requirement – though, as we have just noted, the latter will still be problematic, and lead to a further development and intensification of the investigation.

This attestation of be-ing-here as a whole is, further, to arise from be-ing-here’s own be-ing and so be given to be-ing-here and given to understand [H267, 270], i.e., given to the be-ing-here’s understanding self to understand. Be-ing-here is a disclosing, factically exists as a clearing of tripartite disclosure. The giving disclosure is that of ‘self-findedess’ (Befindlichkeit), i.e., dis-position, and such disclosure is given to the understanding disclosure, which is thereby given something ‘upon which’ to project, and so, to self-disclose understandingly. This giving is the happening of authentic disclosedness itself, the opening of the openness of the ‘there’ of ‘there-be-ing’, (Da-sein). In terms of be-ing-in-the-world, we are dealing with be-ing-in as such, the self of the self-world complex, which opens itself out onto the world, thereby composing be-ing-here’s full self-be-ing. That is to say, be-ing-here, disclosedness as such and as a whole, is to give itself to understand(ing), and so, be here in the transparency of its own factual self-projection.
But proximally and usually, as we have seen, be-ing-here discloses its self *in terms of* the world (of its thrown concern), *i.e.*, inauthentically. ‘It’ flees and covers up its own flight from its anxiety-provoking, ownmost possibility by immersing itself, with ‘their’ help, in its concern, solicitude, and curiosity, thereby being absorbed in and by the world. We have also seen that the possibility of be-ing-towards-death turns out, in effect, to be the extreme possibility of be-ing one’s own *self*. Before the *positive* ‘moments’ of this be-ing (the ‘retrieving’ and ‘becoming’ one’s own self), however, is the moment of the *awakening* of the lost authentic self. Be-ing-here must be able to *find itself*, “without mediation” [H271], in its lostness and to find itself *as* something – rather, *someone* – who is *guilty* of having “failed to hear its own self, in listening away to the they-self” [H271], and so, has become or remained the no-one of they-self be-ing. Authentic ‘be-ing-one’s-Self’ is, then, to be “accomplished by *making up for not choosing*” [H268], that is, by ‘admitting guilt’ and responding appropriately.

Be-ing-here is awakened from its fallen, inauthentic self-neglect, ‘called out’ by *itself*, by the soundless and uncanny conviction of *conscience*. As an immediate self-finding (*Befindlichkeit*, dis-position), the ‘call of conscience’ must either be or be essentially linked to some mood – indeed, we might say that, as a mode of discourse, the ‘call’ of conscience ‘speaks’ through the dumbfounded silence of the key-mood of anxiety. Despite the reticence of the *existentiell call of conscience*, the understanding of existential analysis can articulate the “facticity of the calling” [H275]. The rejoining “existentiality of the hearing” [*ibid.*] – in which the ‘making up for not choosing’ is resolved in ‘*choosing to choose*’ one’s self [cf.,
H268, 287],\(^{79}\) in a pure act of will and freedom, which is the core of projective understanding — will be discussed in §15 and §16.\(^{80}\)

‘What’ — rather, ‘Who’ — is called is ‘be-ing-in’ \textit{as such}, that is, the \textit{self} is called to disclosure. The self is called in its lost immersion in ‘the-world’: it is ‘called out’, as in ‘caught out’ being something it ‘should’ not be and being made to account for it. The they-self collapses, indeed, the self’s worldly identity and the world itself is passed over, “pushed into insignificance” [H273] in the self’s headlong rush to the defining limits of its be-ing, its own horizon. The call says ‘nothing’ that the they-self can recognize in its idle-talk discourse; it calls “from beyond me and over me” [H275], with a silent and “alien voice” [H277], which reticently summons me to my own self.

That this call calls from ‘beyond’ me does not signify that some other being, such as God, calls me; rather it signifies simply that the call is “not explicitly performed by me” [H276], that is, it is neither existentially projected nor positionally understood and posited, by me. \textit{Rather, the call of conscience is a dispossessing, factical, dis-positional disclosure.} As factical disclosure, we are properly speaking of a dis-positional disclosure, that of mood. The call comes from (the self of) be-ing-here’s own \textit{uncanniness} (\textit{Unheimlichkeit}), its be-ing ‘not at home’ — the “\textit{basic kind of Be-ing-in-the-world}” [H277] and authentic counter-concept to inauthentic ‘everydayness’ — an uncanniness which is disclosed, factically, in the basic, self-finding, dis-position of anxiety. The caller is the ownmost self of be-ing-here in its alien,

\(^{79}\) “At every moment be-ing-here can comport itself in such a way that it chooses between itself and the world...When be-ing-here has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice. To have chosen to choose means, however, to be resolved.” [S, 168]. Heidegger here indicates that a real choice must first be the choice to choose and that this is what resoluteness is: an act of pure freedom. Furthermore, if one in fact chooses, one thereby chooses self over world, \textit{i.e.}, chooses authentically to be, \textit{i.e.}, to be a \textit{self} (...if, nonetheless or ‘all the more’, in a world).

\(^{80}\) One could say that these, the call and the hearing, are \textit{Heidegger’s ‘moments’ of the interpretation of conscience.}
uncanny facticity – which, for Heidegger, means my existence as thrown, revealed as "the bare 'that-it-is' in the 'nothing' of the world" [H276]. Heidegger says,

Yet each be-ing-here always exists factically. It is not a free-floating self-projection [entwerfen]; but it is determined by thrownness as a fact of the being which it is... As something thrown [geworfen], be-ing-here has been thrown into existence. [H276, first italics mine].

Note that Heidegger is not speaking, here, only about existential-ontological, i.e., theoretical projection. He is speaking of projection per se. Be-ing-here always exists factically and this means that projection itself is not 'free-floating' but is determined and grounded by thrownness, that is, as a past projectedness. Equivalently, understanding is conditioned by dis-position (which itself, however, is, as disclosive of thrownness, only seen as a kind of understanding, and one which is 'inauthentic' or, at least, not-yet-authentic).

Heidegger emphasizes facticity's disclosure of the pure 'that it is', despite the rational obscurity of this be-ing: be-ing-here reveals itself as, in fact, beyond the reach of any understanding of 'why' 'it' is [H276]. At one and the same time – leading one to surmise a connection – the call comes from beyond my worldly be-ing, beyond projective, understanding disclosure, and beyond rational grounding. It comes, rather, from my uncanny self, factically disclosed, in the abysmal mood of anxiety.

This soundless summons into "the very depths of uncanniness" [H276], into the silent, anxious, bare be-ing-here in the face of the 'nothing' of the world, is the call of conscience. Be-ing-here is called by its own uncanny self to step outside its be-ing at home in the everyday world, and to step into the alien 'other' side of its be-ing, the night of its radically individualized and forsaken abandonment to its own abysmal be-ing. As called and attuned by anxious conscience, be-ing-here is able, only now, to existentially project itself upon its ownmost possibility. As Heidegger says,
The call which has been attuned by anxiety is what first and foremost makes it possible for be-ing-here to project itself upon its ownmost possibility-of-be-ing. [H277, mine].

We see, here, for Heidegger, both that projection itself must be factically grounded and attuned, and that the attunement of mood is seen to be primarily important inasmuch as it serves and is defined by the existential project.

Conscience, as it is a sheer, primordial disclosure of disclosedness itself, is further specified as the call of Care, the unified whole of disclosedness. Be-ing-here, in the silent discourse of the call of conscience, is summoned out of its fallenness into the ‘they’ (be-ing-alongside-intraworldly-beings) by its anxious, uncanny facticity (be-ing-already-in-the-world) to its ownmost existential possibility (be-ing-ahead-of-itself). Be-ing-here has been called, awakened in “abrupt arousal” [H271], as if from a dream and delusion, to the stark fact of its be-ing and to the guilt of not having authentically been itself.

§16. The existential tendency of interpretation and its factual problem

However, this ‘pure’ ‘that it is’, nonetheless, is seen by Heidegger as the factual being of existence – not facticity itself but thrownness, i.e., facticity existentialized. This is a being without why yet reposing in the weight of this question and the lack of an answer, a fact of be-ing as thrown (geworfen), i.e., already projected.

This means, on the one hand, that facticity is conceived as already, in itself, existentialized in be-ing-here: facticity is thrownness, a kind of projection. And, on the other hand, as already projected, thrown existence is portrayed as inauthentic inasmuch as it reposes in a projection which, in the unruffled common sense of tradition, assumes an adequate and obvious, dis-owned, ‘objective’ answer to the existentially posed ‘why’
question. This assumption means that the be-ing-here in question has not really asked the question; and so not opened itself to the pure possibility of the future; and so, not freed itself for projection in its 'ownmost' sense; and so, not allowed itself to exist. This points a clear path toward authenticity. Inauthentic factical existence is a failed and unowned existentiality which must break out of its lostness, exist at the extreme edge of existence in the naked facticity of its unanswered question, and sink into the abyss of its unanswerability – yet take over and take up this bald denial into its own answer in a free projection. It remains a question of answering, despite its unanswerability, the question 'why', of existing and projecting authentically – not of pursuing the stunning fact of be-ing at all in its uncanny, attunement and disclosure...

The word 'thrown(ess)', Geworfenheit, one of Heidegger's neologisms, derives from the past form of 'to project', (Ent)werfen. This indicates Heidegger's continued commitment to the existential project as the guideline of interpretation, here, even in factical disclosure. Factual disclosure is of value, here, for its bearing on the existential project. The uncanny disclosure of factual be-ing's 'that it is' discloses, then, not only be-ing-here's 'that it is' but also its 'and has to be' (as it is and as it can be).

Though, again, it is admirable how deeply factual/dis-positional disclosure plays a role in the overall existential analytic, it remains questionable whether such disclosure is given its own due, as disclosure of factual be-ing-here (and, ultimately, be-ing itself), outside of the existential context of Heidegger's interpretive framework. For, in point of fact, factual disclosure, of itself, discloses the pure fact 'that it is' simpliciter – without any appended existential 'and has to be'.
Thrownness is at times confused with fallen existence...as if the factual disclosure of mood and affect, and the past dimension itself is, of itself, inauthentic.\footnote{This can be seen in the characterization of be-ing-here's guilt – if be-ing-here could completely resolve its facticity into its existence, project its past into its future without remainder, it could absolve itself of guilt. See §17.i.a below} This confusion is, perhaps, a function of the characterization of our facticity as existential, (the subsumption of facticity by existence) \textit{i.e.}, as \textit{past} projection, \textit{i.e.}, \textit{thrown} existence. If existence has already been projected, before its own choice, then that 'thrown' existence was not authored or appropriated by a free self and so is not owned – and so, the current disclosure of this past projectedness via mood would be, by nature, a disclosure of an inauthentic, fallen existence.

Even if the \textit{disclosure} itself, \textit{i.e.}, dis-positional revealing \textit{itself} could be said to be 'beyond' or 'other' than the authentic/inauthentic dichotomy – that is, if the dis-position is not itself any kind of projection – nevertheless, \textit{what} it reveals ('the \textit{disclosed}') \textit{is}, in Heidegger's schema, a projection, \textit{i.e.}, existence as already projected.

This will lead us to question on two fronts:

1) Whether the 'what' or 'towards-which' of the disclosure, 'the disclosed', \textit{i.e.}, existence (past, present, or futural) is, in fact, what is revealed in dis-positional disclosure; \textit{If so}, whether it is \textit{past} existence which is disclosed and, \textit{if so}, whether it must, by definition of its be-ing past, be inauthentic; \textit{if not}, whether the disclosed is not essentially a disclosure of another fundamental aspect of be-ing-here, \textit{viz.}, a facticity of another sort than thrownness or already projected existence (not to mention different from the already-there factuality of the extant).

2) Whether dis-positional disclosure \textit{itself} – the 'act' of disclosing dis-positionally – is essentially a non-projective disclosure. \textit{If so}, whether the structure of meaning of dis-
positional disclosure, since it is not an 'understanding' disclosure, is, therefore, other than the projective-horizontal structure of existential understanding; if not, where and on what grounds has it been decided that dis-positional disclosure must, of itself, be projective?

As we see that facticity is, itself, bent to the needs of existential disclosure, we can expect that a structurally similar orienting of 'mood' to 'understanding' is in order... Here lies the core of our disagreement with Heidegger's interpretive schema regarding moods and the essence of dis-positional phenomena, a disagreement which has significance for the entire Heideggerian philosophical enterprise, from his initial interpretive tendency toward existence, his resulting characterization of facticity as thrownness, to his shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics. Heidegger becomes unphenomenological precisely at the point where a phenomenology is essentially needed, i.e., in the interpretation of mood's disclosure. In Heidegger, mood is immediately oriented to 'understanding' and projective existence; it discloses as already having been 'mediated' or contextualized by projection — thus not as itself. The be-ing that mood will reveal, the meanings ('matters') that will be appreciated, have already been determined as existential by the understanding of the facticity of what discloses, and what is disclosed, as thrownness, as a 'past projection' or projectedness. The 'pure' that-it-is of facticity and the essence of moods as appreciations of, broadly, 'felt meanings', rather than revealers of thrown existence, are what are closed off by Heidegger's interpretation. But it is this path we wish to pursue and explore as it runs out of the thicket of rationalist metaphysics in its Heideggerian form, into the true uncanny and vast expanse of be-ing itself, appreciated in the metaphysics of feeling.
§17. The existential hearing — understanding — the call (Guilt and ‘willing to have a conscience’)

However, let us continue Heidegger’s analysis of conscience. Inauthentic self-be-ing is a way of be-ing in one’s possibilities that relieves one of the burden of taking hold of these possibilities and explicitly choosing them and from among them. A be-ing-here exists anonymously, immersed amidst other beings, superficially dispersed over average and everyday concerns and submitted to the constant barrage of a narrow range of meanings, within the constraints of a shrunken horizon — he/she exists, in short, inauthentically — until one’s conscience modifies this ‘they-self’ existentially, so that it is brought back to the possible be-ing of extraordinary and uncanny, authentic self be-ing.

As we have just seen, the call of conscience is primarily factual and dis-positional disclosure of ‘be-ing-in’ as such — that is, a self-finding, attuned disclosure. The call comes from be-ing-here’s ownmost self in its uncanny facticity, existence as thrown... As called and attuned by anxious conscience, be-ing-here is able, only now, to project itself upon its ownmost possibility — but only if, or as, one authentically hears the call and understands what is given in its appeal. This understanding is an equiprimordial, complementary, and fulfilling ‘act-moment’ of conscience: “Only from an understanding of the appeal and together with such an understanding does the full experience of conscience (volle Gewissenserlebnis) let itself be grasped” [H279]. Heidegger now shows how the Self retrieves and becomes itself.

We may first notice, as Heidegger unfolds the full and ‘proper’ dimension of authenticity, that we shift from the factual attunement of the awakening call — and the ‘hearing’ implicit in such attunement as such — to a hearing which is the ‘understanding’ of
the call. That is, we shift "from the facticity of the calling" to "the existentiality of the hearing" [H275] – rather than to any facticity of hearing. This existential hearing is based on and ensues from, what the call, via attunement, "gives one to understand" [H279]. The shift is a movement from attuned self-finding and the implied appreciative listening to the disclosed meaning (uncanny be-ing-here) inherent in this attunement, to a self-understanding projection upon this factual be-ing as possible existence.

From the point of view of a 'phenomenology of feeling', one can observe two things here: one, the proper non-projective hearing to the call and its particular modes of attuned listening are being passed over and, two, we can also see that, now, retroactively, this factual be-ing is projected as being already actual 'guilty', thrown existence. As we have seen, Heidegger presents and understands factual be-ing as thrown and, as such, already projected and either lost in a fallen inauthenticity or drowned in abysmal anxiety. In terms of the 'moments' of authenticity I articulated earlier, the newly awakened self might now 'retrieve' and 'be-come' itself through understanding, enable and empower its wholeness in be-ing toward death. This process, which involves a 'taking hold' or 'seizing upon', and explicit (though existentiell) projection of this uttermost [factual] possibility, is what is meant by the authentic understanding or 'hearing' of the call.

Be-ing-here is called forth from the careless factual neglect of its uncanniness, and called back to the vigilant Care of its possible, authentic uncanniness. As the call of Care,

---

82 Here I use the term 'authentic uncanniness' to distinguish the 'whither' of the call from its 'whence', inauthentic everydayness, a kind of 'inauthentic uncanniness' inasmuch as it is an avoidant and suppressive neglect of uncanniness [see H280]. I will later be developing a somewhat semantically different notion of authentic uncanniness to refer to a possibility inherent within 'authentic everydayness', the latter term being one which I will use to characterize Heidegger's full notion of authenticity in Being and Time ("Authentic existence...is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon" [H279]). It is a central part of my task in this thesis to free up this possibility of an attunement to authentic uncanniness from its domination by the formal indication of authentic mundane existence (ie, authentic everydayness).
conscience summons be-ing-here *out of* its lost *fallenness* into the ‘they’ (Be-ing-alongside-intraworldy-beings) *by* calling its anxious, uncanny, thrown *facticity* (Be-ing-already-in-the-world) *to* its ownmost *existential* possibility (Be-ing-ahead-of-itself). The ‘whence’, that realm ‘from which’ the call calls to fallen be-ing-here, *i.e.*, the “uncanniness of thrown individuation” [H280] is also called and disclosed, and disclosed as the ‘whither’, a possibility of be-ing “that has been currently individualized and which belongs to that temporally particular be-ing-here” (“*als das jeweilig vereinzelte des jeweiliges Dasein*”) [ibid]. That is, the region or dimension of be-ing, in which a thrown individual (as opposed to a thrown they-self) ‘dwells’ — the uncanny ‘world’ — is *also* disclosed, *along with* the factual individual and the temporal particularity of his/her existential situation.\(^8\) The uncanny itself is disclosed as that which, in our making up for its having been neglected, we are called *back to* as our *forgotten* possibility whither authentic self-be-ing lies... We disclose as be-ing-in our current existing situation, as thrown into this temporally particular, individuated set of circumstances, in all its extraordinary uncanniness and pure possibility. What, then, belongs to the existential conditions of *understanding the call*?

i) “*Guilty!*”

What factual existence ‘gives us to understand’ in the uncanny call of anxious conscience — in “the hearing which understands the call undisguisedly in the sense it has itself intended” [H296] — is that we are inescapably factically and *existentially guilty* — or, as Heidegger exclaims it: “Guilty!” Heidegger’s method is to ontologically formalize the

\(^8\) As in *The Concept of Time* (1924), be-ing-here is thrown back by death upon its ‘still be-ing-here’, in an everyday world submerged in uncanniness. See [CT, 13].
concept of guilt via a formal indication which effects the ‘dropping out’ (*ausfallen*) [H283] of in-appropriate everyday and traditional notions, thereby setting in motion the process of ‘deformalization’ of the concept, which allows a ‘basic experience’ of the phenomena themselves to attest or concretely enact the formal concept. He goes to great lengths to distinguish this existential guilt from everyday, moral, psychological, and theological notions of guilt but we shall only focus on its positive determination.

Existential guilt means that “insofar as any be-ing-here factically exists, it is also guilty”, *i.e.*, that guilt “lies in be-ing-here’s be-ing as such” [H281]. Heidegger, as in the analysis of death, distinguishes the character of the ‘not’ in be-ing-here’s guilt from the character of ‘lack’ or the “not-Be-ing present-at-hand of something which ought to be” [H283]. The ‘not’ is more fundamental than the ‘lack’. He, further, articulates the ‘having responsibility for’ character of guilt as a ‘be-ing the basis for [or ground of]…’ (*Grundsein für*...). Thus he defines

...the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty’! as “Be-ing-the-ground of a be-ing which has been defined by a ‘not’” – that is to say, as “be-ing-the-ground-of-a-nullity” (*Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit*) [H283].

Much as authentic death is in death’s being internalized into life itself and in our be-ing-toward it, guilty ‘be-ing the basis/ground’ has its own *internal* nullity and does not acquire the ‘not’, on some occasion, by relation to something extant or to itself as an ‘object’.

Heidegger proceeds to elucidate this ontological nihility of be-ing-here by displaying its structural nullity in each aspect of the tripartite composition of the be-ing of be-ing-here, *i.e.*, Care, *viz.*, the nullity of thrownness, projection, and falling.
a) *The nullity of factical thrownness*

Understanding the call of conscience means understanding be-ing guilty, i.e., be-ing the ground of a nullity. What does this mean? Be-ing-here is a being which has been thrown into and submitted to definite possibilities of be-ing and thrown into be-ing the ground or basis of these possibilities – despite its not having brought itself into these possibilities by itself, not having created them by its own power. Moreover, be-ing-here can never bring itself into its possibilities ‘from the ground up’ – it can “never get that ground into its power” [H284]. Yet, “although it has not laid the ground itself, it reposes in its weight”, this ‘weight’ dis-posing as a structural burdensome quality in its moods [*ibid.*] The weight of the expectation (and impending doom) of projective grounding power is the burden of thrown facticity itself, and it inscribes itself into the very structure of mood, as be-ing-the-ground of whatever possibilities. It is not so much the content of the possibilities themselves that is burdensome, nor even simply having possibilities at all, but the ‘responsibility’ demanded by the necessity of be-ing-the-ground, that is burdensome.

Heidegger expresses this in the following condensed and obscure passage:

[Be-ing-here] is released out of the ground, not through itself but to itself, in order to be as this ground. Be-ing-here is not of itself the ground of its be-ing, inasmuch as this ground originates from its projection, but well is it, as SelF-be-ing, the be-ing of grounds. This ground is always only the ground of a being whose be-ing has to take over be-ing-the-ground. [H285, mine] 85

Our factical be-ing the ground is null in itself, permeated with a ‘not’, because of the thrown character of that ground. Existential projection – the locus, for Heidegger, of authentic SelF-

84 “As a being, be-ing-here is thrown, not brought by itself into its ‘here’ ” [H284].
85 [Be-ing-here] has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself so as to be as this basis. Be-ing-here is not itself the basis of its be-ing, inasmuch as this basis first arises from its own projection; rather, as be-ing-its-SelF, it is the be-ing of its basis. This basis is never anything but the basis for an entity whose Being has to take over Being-a-basis. [H285, following Macquarrie/Robinson].
be-ing – "never comes back behind its thrownness" [H284], can never, despite whatever freedom of projection, dig into and uproot itself from the factual ground of its thrownness, its already-having-been projected. As such, projection towards horizons of meaning has been grounded in thrownness as the nullity of unfreedom. In a clear sense, then, we have already been thrown for a loss.

b) The nullity of existential projection

Nevertheless, as the being which it factically is, i.e., a thrown ‘that it is’ which ‘has-to-be’, it is existentially incumbent upon be-ing-here to accept the ‘need’ to take over the unfreedom of its thrown be-ing-a-null-ground and take it up [aufzunehmen...H287] into its own free projection of grounds – to the extent this is possible or, perhaps, even if it is transparently impossible. “Be-ing-here is its ground existently” [H285]. This means that be-ing-here understands/projects itself as a possibility, as a ‘potentiality for be-ing’, a “freedom for grounds”\(^{86}\) which, as such, “always stands in one possibility or another” [ibid.]. That is, the projection of ground is always specific; one is here and now involved in these temporally particular possibilities. However, this leads to the essential nullity of projection itself, for in the very act of projecting upon any one possibility, be-ing-here...

...constantly is not other possibilities [...]. Freedom...is only in the choice of one possibility – that is, in tolerating one’s having not chosen the others. [H285].

This nullity in the very structure of projection turns out to be the nullity of freedom itself – understood as projective-existential freedom. I am free to choose this, only if I forego the rest...

\(^{86}\) "freedom for grounds" - as Heidegger characterizes our 'transcendence' in On the Essence of Ground.
c) The nullity of falling

All Heidegger indicates regarding the third aspect of be-ing-here’s disclosedness, falling, is that the double factual-existential nullity of thrownness and projection is the ground or, better, abyss of “the nullity of inauthentic be-ing-here in its falling” [H285]. As a movement of falling away from its Self, losing itself into the ‘world’ [H175], be-ing-here is a turbulent, ‘downward plunge’ “into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness” [H179]. This manifests the nullity of the ineluctable ‘throw’ which our be-ing-here exists and ‘has to be’.

The conclusion we are thus led to is that be-ing-here’s very be-ing, “Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through” [H179]. That is, “be-ing guilty constitutes the be-ing that we name ‘Care’ ” [H286]. As the thrown ground of existential grounding, Care is the “null ground of a nullity” – which is the previously given definition of existential guilt. That is, be-ing-here, as such, is guilty (be-ing-the-basis-of a nullity): ‘already there’ as unfree, radically impotent in its limited, possible freedom, and constantly falling into and out of its own abysses.87

ii) The experience of guilt: ‘willing to have a conscience’

Heidegger has established the existential condition for the possibility of an authentic, factual-existentiell understanding of the appeal of conscience as be-ing-here’s essential and ontological guilt: be-ing-here is-guilty, is “guilty in the very ground of its be-ing” [H286] and

87 In a key passage for any discussion of Heidegger’s ‘ethics’, Heidegger says that “This essential be-ing guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the ‘morally' good and evil, that is, for morality in general” [H286].
thereby able to incur specific culpability and debts as well as be-guilty in either an authentic or inauthentic mode. The existential analysis of what is given to be understood by the call of conscience articulates the meaning of this guilt as be-ing the “null ground of its null projection” [H287]. Then “what kind of experience speaks for this primordial be-ing-guilty?” [H286].

We can bear in mind that, for Heidegger, an at testing experience is an experience which grounds a projection of and in an interpretation – it is a hermeneutical experience. The phenomenon of conscience in Chapter II.2 is itself meant, as a whole, as an experiential at testing and authenticating of the existential projection of be-ing-a-whole of chapter II.1. 88

Now, within the attesting experience which conscience is, is a hermeneutical cycle of projections and dis-positions, which further analyze, project and attest in ‘repetitions’ which clarify, condense, compress, resonate (fulfill, enact, bring to fruition) and transform the interpretation. The ‘primordiality requirement’ for interpretation is not just specific to this particular analysis, the existential analysis, but, in its demand for a holistic, authentic, and fundamental experience, it seeks to enact and articulate its own essential ground and structure as an interpretation. As a rule of hermeneutics itself, interpretation itself seeks primordiality, just as does existence itself.

We have just projected, as a part of the interpretive experience, an existential ground – be-ing guilty – for the phenomena of conscience, a projective ground (which, looking back, should mirror and elucidate the structure of the previous series of projections, i.e., those of be-ing-a-whole, which this entire attestation of conscience [i.e., II.2] is itself intended to

88 "The existential interpretation of conscience must exhibit an attestation - one which is in be-ing-here itself - of be-ing-here’s ownmost possibility-of-be-ing.” [H295].
factually ground). Looking forward, we are now seeking, then, a factual (existentiell) ground in experience\(^{89}\) that would display and attest the projected existential-ontological structures of be-ing-guilty. This existentiell ground discloses as an existentiell understanding of be-ing guilty, understanding the ‘facticity of the appeal’, by be-ing the null ground of a null projection – that is, by be-ing the factual abyss of all projection. Indirectly, this existentiell ground would also ground and attest the projection of be-ing-a-whole.

What, then, is this experience of be-ing-guilty?

One hears, i.e., understands the appeal (Anruf) of the call (Ruf) of conscience by answering its summons (Aufruf), not by “taking cognizance of a Fact” [H287]: we are summoned to the guilty be-ing we already are and “must only be ‘guilty’ authentically” [ibid.], i.e., ‘become what we are’. The appeal comes from our very be-ing and summons us to be that be-ing in its ontological nullity. To be guilty authentically is, effectively, to “take over, in existing, even that thrown be-ing which it is”, “to understand this thrownness as the null ground which it has to take up into existence” [H287]. One is called forth to “seize upon” [H291] the possibility of bringing oneself back to one’s Self from one’s fallen lostness in the world.

We have seen that this authentic ‘take over’ cannot ‘get behind’ thrownness in an absolute act of freedom, so the taking over ‘even of that thrownness itself’ can never amount to a complete sublation of it. As Dastur says, “It is this non-mastery of oneself…that constitutes the nullity of Dasein” [Dastur 1998, 32]. Be-ing-here must, rather, in order to ‘be authentic’, be rife with its own finitude, and ‘take over’ accordingly.

---

\(^{89}\) I.e., an ‘ontic ground’ – inasmuch as be-ing-here is ‘a being’ – for the ‘ontological ground’. It should be remembered that ‘a being’, however, need not imply ‘extant’ (vorrhalten) connotations or reductions. It is precisely the variability of kinds of beings, which leads one to wonder what is meant by be-ing (at least this is one of the sources for the question).
How one is to be one's guilt authentically, then, is by "projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty" [H287]. Projection is the locus of authenticity, that is, existential-futural projection, not the thrown-past projection of our factically fallen, null ground. In such an understanding projection, one "becomes free for the call" [H287], enters a state of "readiness" for be-ing-guilty which Heidegger characterizes as "willing to have a conscience" [H288].

Willing to have a conscience is, further, equivalent to willing to be oneself in that, in this projection upon one's ownmost guilt, be-ing-here chooses its Self, "lets its ownmost Self take action in itself" [H288], that is, it enacts its freedom, within the constraints of the various nullities of its finitude.

This Self-choice enacts its guilty be-ing in a responsive taking over – choosing – of its own already given nullity. That is, it 'takes possession' of itself in a choice which recognizes its own essential finitude, in that the choice is more of an acknowledgement of and acquiescence in an ineluctable given than a 'free' willing of one option over another, from a range of options externally confronting a subject.

---

90 'Existential' is here contrasted with facticity (thrownness), not with 'existentiell'.
91 "Gewissen-haben-wollen", 'wanting...' (as in Macquarrie & Robinson) or 'willing' to have a conscience. Raffoul & Pettigrew translate this as the "will to have a conscience" [in Dastur, 1998]. Dastur adds, "...the will being understood here as the fact of being ready to be called" [Dastur 1998, 32].
92 What Derrida, in Of Spirit, says regarding language in the later Heidegger parallels this structure of choice in conscience: "Language is already there, in advance ... This advance is, before any contact, a sort of promise of originary alliance to which we must have in some sense already acquiesced, already said yes, given a pledge ... This promise, this reply which is produced a priori in the form of acquiescence, this commitment of language towards language, this giving of language by language and to language is what Heidegger at this point regularly names Zusage <promise, assent>" [p.129]. Derrida continues with an astute portrayal of the phenomenon of this "pre-originary pledge", "an event of which the memory (mémoire) comes before any particular recollection (souvenir)" [p.130], exhibiting aptly much of Heidegger's extraordinary temporality. [Derrida 1989, 129-35]. We shall later develop the notion of acquiescence in conjunction with that of freedom's sacrifice in Heidegger's crucial work, What is Metaphysics?
93 "One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness [which, as we shall soon see, is the structural whole of willing-to-have-a-conscience] if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them." [H298].
What confirms this choice in its finitude and its conviction is the willing projection of be-ing-here’s own guilt toward the future (‘readiness for be-ing guilty’), for the choice does nothing, and is not meant to do anything, to eliminate the essential nullity of be-ing-here’s be-ing. Rather, it submits to this existential nullity and, within this disillusioned acquiescence, attains to whatever freedom and recompense it can. This sober openness to futural guilt is, in fact, what makes the choice authentic – no longer in inauthentic flight – and what shows Self-understanding: being willing to be guilty, to have a conscience.

In willing to have a conscience – the experience of “understanding one’s ownmost and constant be-ing-guilty” [H292] – one frees oneself up for and understands the call of conscience, thereby attesting, in face-to-face disclosure of self with uncanny Self, to the existential indication of conscience which had been projected. As such, hearing the call authentically “discloses nothing... with which we can concern ourselves”, gives no “‘practical’ injunctions” [H294], yet it nonetheless “bring[s] oneself into a factual taking action” [ibid.] in one’s ownmost possibility, the temporally particular possibility-of-be-ing a Self.

§18. Resoluteness

Heidegger now asks: what existential structure is implied by the experience of an authentic hearing of the call, of “willing to have a conscience”? Having shown the existential condition (be-ing guilty) for the possibility of the existentiell understanding of conscience; and analyzed be-ing guilty’s existential meaning (be-ing the null ground of a null projection); and then, having exhibited the existentiell, attesting experience of this understanding
(willing-to-have-a-conscience) – Heidegger now wants to work out the implied existential structure of such authentic understanding.

Once again, we can see the interpretive movement bending back upon itself, encompassing itself, in order to throw itself forward again, forward, deeper into both existential and existentiell origins. As Heidegger says,

the more primordial existential interpretation also discloses possibilities of more primordial existentiell understanding, so long as ontological conceptualization doesn’t let itself get cut off from ontical experience. [H295].

This is the main function of Heidegger’s ‘formally indicative’ concepts – that they are essentially related to possible content, and ground themselves in concrete interpretation. Also, as we have just seen, primordial existentiell experience offers deeper possibilities of existential interpretation. This indication, of more primordial possibilities of experience generated by the ensuing series of existential analyses, forecasts the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness, which will, in its turn, allow for the most primordial existential interpretation, the temporal one.

At present, however, we are to focus on the existential structure of the experience of that authentic understanding of conscience we have called ‘willing-to-have-a-conscience’, the “letting itself take action in itself of the ownmost Self” [H295], which attests be-ing-here’s authentic be-ing-guilty. Heidegger engages in two structural analyses: first, of willing-to-have-a-conscience as a way of disclosing (be-ing-in as such); then, of ‘resoluteness’ as a way of be-ing-in-the-world.
i) The existential structure of the disclosure of willing-to-have-a-conscience

As a way in which 'be-ing-here' is disclosed, willing-to-have-a-conscience must illustrate the "essential moments" (Wesensmomente – H296) or "constitutive items" of the 'here' [or 'there'; the 'da' of 'da-Sein'], i.e., be-ing-in as such, viz., understanding, dis-position, and discourse.⁹⁴ It is the depiction of these structures, which is sought for as the 'existential structure' of willing-to-have-a-conscience.

Willing-to-have-a-conscience has already been articulated as an understanding of one's ownmost be-ing-guilty and Heidegger now simply emphasizes the active "existing in this possibility" [H295] of existentiell projection upon one's uncanny and guilty individuation. The mood which "co-responds to", "genuinely discloses", and "phenomenally confirms" this uncanniness is, of course, the "anxiety of conscience" which, when articulated in context of willing-to-have-a-conscience, becomes a "readiness for anxiety" [H296].⁹⁵ The primordial discourse of the call of conscience, the "soundlessness of uncanniness" calls being-here "back into the stillness of itself" [H296] and being-here understands this, in willing-to-have-a-conscience, as a call to become silent (still zu werdendes), and reticent (or discreet – verschwiegene). Thus

The disclosedness of being-here in willing-to-have-a-conscience is thus constituted through the dis-position of anxiety, the understanding's self-

---

⁹⁴ It has often been commented that there is a disparity and imbalance in the analysis here (and elsewhere) for the tripartite structure of being-here is, at one time, existence (projection)/facticity (thrownness)/falling and, at another time, understanding (projection)/dis-position (attunement, mood)/discourse. Falling and discourse do not correspond. This is a complex matter to untangle but a key to it may be that the previous triad articulates the being-of being-here or being-in-the-world, whereas the latter triad articulates the essential moments of disclosedness (be-ing-in - i.e., a partial structure of the whole of being-in-the-world.)

⁹⁵ Note the similarity of 'readiness for anxiety' with the earlier mentioned 'readiness for being guilty'. This 'readiness' must respond to the 'impending...' or 'be-ing toward...' sense of the future which manifests in both of these authentic projections. In the 1943 Postscript to What is Metaphysics, Heidegger makes the connection of this 'readiness' to the courage required to endure the "horrors of the abyss" [WM, 354]. This courage i) transforms the nullity of freedom into freedom's sacrifice; ii) "guarantees the most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of be-ing" [WM, 355] and iii) "stands in secret union with the serenity and gentleness of creative longing" [WM, 343]. We shall return to this essential movement in the uncanny later.
projection upon one’s ownmost be-ing-guilty, and discourse as reticence. This
distinctive, authentic disclosedness, attested in be-ing-here itself by its
conscience – the reticent, ready-for-anxiety, self-projection upon one’s
ownmost be-ing guilty – we name ‘resoluteness’ [H296-7].

Resoluteness or resolvedness is, essentially, a reticent, anxious be-ing-guilty. The
term is not to have the closed and determined sense we normally associate with the word but
is rather, as the context indicates, an unlocking, a being resolved in ‘openness’ (Ent-
schlossenheit – un-closed-ness), in the openness of a sober, transparent, dis-illusioned be-
ing-in-the-truth. The word bears structural and etymological similarities to both the dis-
closed-ness (Er-schlossenheit) of the ‘there’ (the ‘Clearing’, of ‘there-be-ing’ [da-Sein]), of
which resoluteness, is the particular excellence; and to Heidegger’s translation of the Greek
a-letheia or truth, i.e., un-concealed-ness (Un-verborgen-heit). These similarities are crucial
for Heidegger and attest to the power and ever-increasing philosophical condensation of his
hermeneutics. In Being and Time, Heidegger hardly mentions a-letheia yet, having now made
etymological-philosophical associations between resoluteness and disclosedness and having
already, earlier in Being and Time, pointed out the connection between be-ing-here’s
disclosedness and truth, he can now make the case that “in resoluteness we have now arrived
at that truth of be-ing-here...” [H297, italics mine].

Not only have we arrived at the truth of be-ing-here – we have always already been
there – but we have arrived (to continue the last passage...) at “that truth of be-ing-here
which is most primordial because it is authentic” [H297, my italics]. As disclosed, be-ing-
here is ‘in the truth’ – and so, as disclosed, be-ing-here already was ‘in the truth’, even if
inauthentically. That is to say, inauthenticity is a fundamental modality of ‘be-ing in the
truth’, i.e., of be-ing disclosed. Until the call and understanding of conscience, then, be-ing-
here has been-in-the-truth/disclosed inauthentically and derivatively. Though this
inauthenticity is not a function of its be-ing-past (or ‘having-been’, ‘beenness’) – or need not be – for Heidegger, facticity bears the weight of ‘the inauthentic (the ‘burden’ manifested in mood), especially in its guise as thrown, ‘past projection’. Now, however, we arrive back at the most primordial truth of disclosedness, which, in be-ing-in-the-truth authentically, discloses as the originary (primordial-ursprünglich) openness of resolute self-transparency.

ii) The existential structure (Care-structure) of resolute be-ing-in-the-world

a) Authentic modification

Heidegger articulates this primordial truth or disclosedness through another structural analysis, this time of resolute ‘be-ing-in-the-world’, which, as we have seen, consists of the equiprimordially disclosed elements of the “world, be-ing-in, and the Self” [H299] (plus, implicitly, the structures of be-ing-in just mentioned, be-ing-with, with the implication of the intraworldly beings which are discovered along with the world).

All of these elements have always already been disclosed on the basis of be-ing-here’s thrownness – that is, on the null ground and unfreedom of the thrown projective disclosure, which Heidegger, in a rare ontic specification, particularizes as be-ing-here’s nearest and constant possibilities toward “shelter, sustenance, and livelihood” (des Unterkommens, des Unterhalts, des Fortkommens), for the sake of which the significance of the world and the involvements of intraworldly beings are disclosed [H297].96 Further (and distinct), these thrown and everyday projections have been “guided by [be-ing-here’s]

---

96 It is rare that Heidegger spells out the content of our thrown possibilities but in this passage he does. Food and shelter and work-activity are the basics which we proximally and usually – and necessarily – pursue.
concernful lostness in the they" [ibid.] – that is by falling.\textsuperscript{97} Thus, not only has our be-ing in our possibilities been thrown but it has ‘taken a fall’ and been ‘thrown for a loss’, misguided in the inauthentic distortions of the public world.\textsuperscript{98}

Into this breach comes the authentic disclosure of the call and hearing of conscience, i.e., resoluteness, “authentic be-ing one’s Self” [H298], the primordial truth of be-ing-here, which modifies, with equal primordiality both the way in which the world is discovered ... and the way in which the be-ing-here-with of Others is disclosed. [H297, my emphasis].\textsuperscript{99}

Resoluteness modifies the modality (the ‘way’, the ‘how’) of ‘concernful lostness in the ‘they’’. Further, as a modification of disclosedness as such, resoluteness modifies thrownness or thrown projection itself, and falling itself (along with the other ‘essential moments’ or ‘acts’ of disclosure). In resolute disclosure, concern and solicitude are modified in character – they are modified in that they are appropriated, made authentic – a modification which amounts to a transformative modalization. Concern and solicitude are not of themselves inauthentic or ‘mere’ mundane ways of be-ing-here, ‘transcended’, in authenticity, to some “free-floating” ego-ideal or spirit, of an ideal, transcendental Ego. Rather they are, now in resoluteness, defined and disclosed in terms of authentic be-ing-in-the-world with-Others. Resoluteness, in this sense, is an authentic version of everydayness or, perhaps better, an uncanny be-ing-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{97} “To be-ing-here’s state of be-ing belongs falling. Proximally and usually be-ing-here is lost in its ‘world’” [H221-2].

\textsuperscript{98} It is instructive that inauthenticity is fundamentally composed of these two distinct elements, thrownness and fallenness (‘lostness in the they’ or ‘publicness’)...leaving authenticity, then, to be essentially an existential phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{99} Actually this passage says nothing auf deutsch about ‘the way’ but, as a modification alters the mode of something, i.e., the manner, the way of something (rather than the ‘substance’ or the ‘content’), M&R, likely for reasons of clarity, use this term.

\textsuperscript{100} Concern, solicitude are way of be-ing-in-the-world. Inauthentic and authentic are ways of be-ing these ways of be-ing-in-the-world.
What this means is that concern and solicitude are now expressed in light of one’s ownmost, self-chosen be-ing-here, which has “freed itself for its world” [H298, my italics]: be-ing-here has both freed itself for its world and freed itself for its world. Concern and solicitude are now possibilities of that freedom, of be-ing-in, i.e., manners in which freedom discloses its world as its self (and vice-versa). Authentic, resolute disclosure, as self-liberated, “brings the Self right into the temporal particularity [Jeweiligkeit] of its concernful be-ing alongside...and solicitous be-ing-with...” [H298].  

This does not mean that intraworldly beings and Other be-ings-here are present objects for a free ‘for-itself’ or an atomistic ego’s empirical self-expression or purposive production. Quite the contrary: in resolute solicitude, for example, which “leaps forth and liberates” [H298], others are now ‘given space’ within the openness of resolute be-ing-here; in one’s Self-be-ing, one is transparently ‘ecstatic’, outside oneself, in the open space of an a priori commonality, and others are thereby invited in, to be themselves, that is, to be here authentically and freely. In this way, resolute be-ing-here “can become the conscience of others” and there can be authentic be-ing-with one another [H298].

b) Freedom

The emphasis in resoluteness is on freedom (though Heidegger is here rather reticent, compared to Sartre, on explicit formulations of the paradoxes of freedom itself) but a freedom that immediately submits, opens itself, opens itself out to its world. It opens – in its first ‘moment’, so to speak – onto its own freed domain of Self, of possibility pure. Yet, in so

---

101 Macquarrie and Robinson, 344: “Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful be-ing-alongside...” The notorious jeweilige can be translated by “current” but sometimes needs to have the poignancy of its temporal sense accentuated.
doing, in its second ‘moment’, freedom acquiesces to its essential nullity and ‘ex-static’ essence, its own ‘throwing itself outside itself’ in self-abandonment to the world. But this self-nihilation is not nothing and brings something (or, as Sartre would say, brings precisely ‘nothing’) with it.

Freedom – the Self – is for the world...but not in the manner of falling back into ‘their’ world, which, rather, is the closing off of freedom. Though freedom, despite its authentic resolve, will fall back into the world, that is a different (though, no doubt, related) issue from the initial inner conditions of freedom itself, i.e., freedom-from (their world) enters an abyss which must, in its very internal structure as an act, express itself as freedom-for (Self-world). This rising into the open abyss, this transcendence, must ground itself. Freedom, in its very act, ‘nihilates’ itself immediately, gives itself up and gives itself over to world – but freely, in choosing to choose – and thereby, authentically, as a self-grounding appropriation of that world. This appropriation, by and for the nullity of freedom’s own self-abandonment and internal self-negation, frees the world from its inauthentic, fallen givenness, and transforms it into a ground of possibility. If resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically; if resoluteness is freedom and if untruth is inauthentic worldly be-ing; then freedom appropriates ‘the world’ authentically.

But is this freedom anything more than a nullity that is now officially mine? Can this nullity be anything more than an anxious and guilty impotence? As thrown, be-ing-here is the nullity of unfreedom, be-ing the null ground of a null projection; the double factual-existential nullity of thrownness and projection is the ground of “the nullity of inauthentic be-ing-here in its falling” [H285]. As authentic and resolute, be-ing-here appears to void upon itself and collapse back into worldly be-ing, whose distinction is simply that it is now
my world. There does not seem to be much allure in so pallid a freedom – not that there necessarily ‘should’ be.

The self-nihilation or internal self-negation that characterizes freedom is indeed resoluteness as the “reticent, ready-for-anxiety, self-projection upon one’s ownmost be-ing guilty” [H296-7], the sober and dis-illusioned self-transparency we have already dwelled on. Though, in Being and Time, Heidegger only plants the seed for an elaboration of the ensuing possible ‘moments’ of the overall movement of resoluteness, an indication, now, of its possible dynamic may be helpful.

There is more to it: the authentic modification of thrownness opens the uncanny new ‘ground’, the abyss of freedom, which transforms, by its own internal and archetypal nullity, the nullity of thrownness and falling - and so, too, that of projection. One can see, in this, the possibility of interpreting this authentic freedom/resoluteness as a disclosure of possibility as such: “to be possibility itself” […]Indication, VIII; 168]. This would correspond to a liberation of the structure of understanding-projection, of existing itself, from the constraints of its inauthenticity. As seen, Heidegger has presented inauthenticity as the erratic sway of thrownness (facticity) and lostness (falling), to which understanding falls prey. The authentic modification achieved by resoluteness revises each of these structures and so liberates projection (existence) as the – at least, momentarily – unburdened focus of this new-found authenticity:

Resoluteness ‘exists’ only as an understanding-self-projection of a resolution. But upon what does be-ing-here resolve in resoluteness? For what is it to resolve itself? Only the resolution itself can give the answer. [H298] 102

102 In passing: Macquarrie and Robinson mistake “erschliesst” for “entschliesst”, in the second sentence, here, and even misquote the German and so mistranslate this passage (perhaps the error was in an early edition of SZ?)
That is, there is no 'external' basis or 'ground' (or, more pointedly, 'reason') – as formerly, if inauthentically, provided by thrownness – upon which and for which to resolve. Only the projection itself, with no support, can provide a ground and a horizon. Though this is a liberation, a becoming free, it turns into the terror of the abyss – yet a revolution is underway. Freedom is a self-grounding appropriation of the world. By the nullity of freedom's own self-abandonment and internal self-negation – in the abysmal moment of nothing but pure will, in which be-ing-here chooses to choose – resolute be-ing-here frees the world from its inauthentic, fallen givenness, and appropriates it by transforming it into a ground of possibility. If freedom is, by its own essentially abysmal character, essentially creative, then resolute freedom authentically and creatively appropriates 'the world'. Projective resolution is itself to create ground out of its own essential nullity, its freedom and possibility. How is it to do that? So long as it chooses resolutely, it cannot avoid doing so.

Possibility itself is the core of freedom and resoluteness, the creative core, which may – which will – 'fall' back into the world but as a power of freedom which grounds out of its own abyss, a transformative power which creates its situation by making authentic possibilities out of the merely given possibilities, “handing down to oneself...the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as thus come down [H383].

These possibilities become those of hermeneutic Self-'realization' or the 'fulfillment' of authentic intention rather than the Self-frustration of mere they-self-fulfillment. However, this may be precipitate here, as the creative essence of this freedom is not itself explicitly articulated in Heidegger's text.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} This positive dimension of freedom develops in the works just after Being and Time, from the work on the schemas of Kant's productive imagination (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics), through What is Metaphysics?, The Essence of Ground, etc., and throughout the work of the 1930's (see, for example, Introduction to Metaphysics and the first volume of Nietzsche, not to mention Heidegger's Nazi speeches...).
c) The Situation

To continue with Heidegger’s own analysis: resoluteness “is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of the current factical possibility” [jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeit [H298]], which is “grasped in such a manner as is possible for it as its ownmost possibility-of-be-ing in the ‘they’ [H299]. That is to say, “resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically” [ibid.], opens a space up within the fallen world for authentic Self-be-ing. If resoluteness, in its Self-transparency (that is, its authentic truth), understands that it remains “dependent upon the ‘they’ and its world” [ibid.] (that is, its untruth or inauthentic truth) – be-ing-here “maintains itself in truth and in untruth with equal primordiality” [H298] – this only means that ‘world’ is that ‘wherein’ a Self acts and actualizes itself in its self-expression as a freedom-for…

That is to say, resolute be-ing-here discloses ‘the situation’:

[T]he situation is only through, and in, resoluteness. The temporally particular (jeweilig) factical involvement-character of the circumstances discloses itself to the Self only when… one has resolved upon the ‘there’, as which that Self, in existing, has to be. [H300; my italics]

The ‘current factical involvement-character’, the temporal particularity and meaning of one’s worldly concern and solicitude, opens itself only to a be-ing-here who has resolved itself transparently and thus momentously cleared and opened out its ‘here’ (Da) – ‘this’-here, now, in its very be-ing-here – for the clear vision of the exigencies of one’s world. The situation is this very ‘here’-ness of be-ing-in-the-world itself, in the pureness of its possibility. “In fact”, says Kisiel,

the best English translation of Dasein itself is the ‘human situation,’ provided that one retains the full temporally distributed particularity of the indexicals, ‘here, now, mine,’ that it is meant to convey. [Kisiel, 1993, 423].

104 “As resolute, be-ing-here is already taking action [handeln]” [H300] before it “cognizes” or “represents” an extant ‘situation’
The world, which is my factual limit, becomes, now, the limit that defines my freedom in concrete acts, the field of action and contingency wherein I manifest myself. Heidegger underscores that only in resoluteness does the situation open up; that is, the authenticity of conscience has the positive yield of bringing be-ing-here right into a field of action wherein one can make good one’s Self-choice. We shall develop the notion of ‘situation’ further in the upcoming sections.
CHAPTER V. The Phenomenological Requirement: Anticipatorily Resolute Self-be-ing as the Basic Experience of the Authentic Possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole

§19. The problem of the 'essential connection'

We saw that the initial indication of the ontological possibility of authentic being-toward-death (in II.1) was merely the ontological possibility of an existentiell possibility, "a fantastical exaction" [H266], and that this needed to be deformed, concretized, and attested in an existentiell-ontic possibility (II.2). In the phenomena of conscience (willing-to-have-a-conscience), we achieved that existentiell attestation; and in resoluteness (the authentic care of be-ing-guilty: a reticent self-projection in which one is ready for anxiety), we have articulated the existential structure of this existentiell understanding. Therefore, we now have the sought-for authentic possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole, authentic care. That is, the authenticity and holistic requirements of primordial interpretation would appear to have been fulfilled.

Yet, surprisingly, Heidegger now says:

But even so, as an authentic possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole, the authentic being-toward-death which we have deduced existentially still remains a purely existential project for which be-ing-here's attestation is missing. [H301].

Was the existentiell attestation merely a formal deduction from the structures of existence? – another 'fantastical exaction' and 'mere' existential projection, lacking actual

---

105 Fantastische Zumutung: “Fantastical exaction”, otherwise translated as “phantasmagorical claim” and paraphrased as “fictitious possibility” [H309] or “impossible ideal” and “artificial construction” [Dastur 1998, 29-30].
attestation and phenomenal grounding? Without the latter, we can not proceed to the next level of ontological analysis, the articulation of the meaning of the be-ing of authentic care.

But perhaps it is not the existentiell attestation of conscience that is said to be an ‘existential deduction’. This latter refers back to the previous ‘fantastical exaction’, the existential projection of being-toward-death, which, without the existentiell attestation of conscience, would remain groundless. The phenomena of conscience are that grounding, the phenomenal attestation of what would otherwise remain a, perhaps, fantastical claim. Then Heidegger may now be saying that this attestation (and the analysis of its existential structure) may have articulated some possible or actual existentiell phenomena, but that it may not have attested, specifically, being-toward-death.

The point might be that the phenomena of conscience, which were intended as an attestation of being-toward-death – which, itself, was intended to provide us with a sense of the whole of be-ing-here – may not necessarily coincide with the phenomena of being-toward-death itself. At least, it may be that the inner phenomenal ‘connection’ between being-toward-death/anticipation and conscience/resoluteness may not have been exhibited, thereby leaving being-toward-death a “purely existential project for which be-ing-here’s attestation is missing” [H301]. What, then, can resolve this problem?

Be-ing-here’s authentic possibility-to-be-a-whole has been both projected existentially and attested in existentiell disclosure. Analyzing the projection, authentic being-toward-death, by which we are to gain authenticity and wholeness, is revealed as ‘anticipation’. Attesting the projection, the disclosure of the authentic ability to be a whole has been exhibited as a guilty be-ing willing-to-have-a-conscience – and this has been existentially interpreted as ‘resoluteness’ (the reticent, self-projection upon one’s ownmost
be-ing -guilty, which exacts anxiety). But now, as we have just seen, it appears there may be a discrepancy between the projection and the attestation. “What”, asks Heidegger, “can death and the ‘concrete situation’ of taking action have in common?” [H302]. Or, equivalently perhaps, “how are we to conceive the connection between willing-to-have-a-conscience and be-ing-here’s existentially projected, authentic possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole?” [H305].

It might initially appear that Heidegger is conflating levels of the analysis. It is the phenomena of conscience that are meant as the attestation of being-toward-death, not the structure of these phenomena. The existential structure (resoluteness) brings the overall analysis to another level, to a deeper elucidation of care. But it is not resoluteness but conscience, which is meant as the attestation. However, this is a weak objection: resoluteness, the existential structure, is simply the structure of that attesting conscience.

But perhaps this isn’t quite right either. Conscience is the attestation specifically of an authentic possibility-of-be-ing-one’s-Self [H268], the Self which must be awakened and brought back from its lostness in the ‘they’ – and so, not thereby necessarily an attestation of being-toward-death or simply an unqualified authentic possibility-of-be-ing. However these are all the same: anticipation, i.e., authentic being-toward-death, is also quintessentially “the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost possibility-of-be-ing, i.e., the possibility of authentic existence” [H263], i.e., the possibility of be-ing one’s own Self, i.e., conscience. And if the care structure of conscience is resoluteness, then the connections are made, we are dealing with the same phenomena.

So what, then, is the problem? Is it that, despite the phenomenal testimony of being-toward-death in conscience, the inner or intrinsic phenomenal connection between the existentially projected anticipatory being-toward-death and the phenomena of
conscience/resoluteness may not have been shown? Before the attestation in II.2, Heidegger mentions that the following problem will arise anew, even if we succeed in the attestation:

...whether the anticipation of death, which we have hitherto [II.2] projected only in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic possibility-of-be-ing [i.e., conscience, resoluteness] which has been attested. [267].

What is this "essential connection"? What is the connection between being-toward-death and willing-to-have-a-conscience or resolute be-ing in the situation? Was not the attestation, by definition, an attestation of something, namely being-toward-death? Or is the problem that, despite the formal indication (of being-toward-death), there is no certainty that the phenomena actually uncovered or disclosed (as conscience) correspond to that leading conceptual indication? What, we may ask, is the guarantee that the phenomena of conscience, despite their being drawn from the "roots of be-ing-here's be-ing" [H267] with the directness of a self-giving, indeed a Self-giving [ibid.], exhibit precisely anticipatory being-toward-death? Perhaps being-toward-death and willing-to-have-a-conscience are both authentic possibility-of-be-ing-one's-Self but are each different phenomena, such that the one neither attests to nor is even essentially related to the other. One could add the phenomena of angst to this list of potentially disparate phenomena.

Heidegger, however, has made enough of the connections between these phenomena and structures, so that, unless we get drawn away from the things themselves by abstraction or terminology, we can see that they, at least, 'hang together', even if untethered to the ground and with indistinct contours. The question is, What is the essential connection between death and the 'concrete situation' of conscientious 'taking action', between anticipation and resoluteness? The answer will be another 'attestation', "confirming and clarifying" the authentic possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole that we have been seeking to ground.
§20. Inauthentic resoluteness?

Pointing the way, Heidegger asks

"Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of be-ing, point forward to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility?" What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring itself into authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which just lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factual possibility-of-be-ing of be-ing-here...[i.e., anticipation of death]? [BT349, H302; latter italics mine]

From this we can see that it is possible that resoluteness, far from itself being authentic – as we may, with good reason, well have thought – can be inauthentic or, at least, not authentic, i.e., it can “project itself upon any random possibilities which just lie close” [ibid.]. At the very least, the latter projection would not be the optimum authenticity possible for be-ing-here. If, however, resoluteness can somehow be inauthentic, it can also be authentic and perhaps ‘authentically authentic’, attaining to an ‘ownmost authenticity’, in projecting “upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factual possibility-of-be-ing” [ibid.] – that is, upon the uttermost existential possibility of be-ing-toward-death. In fact, it appears that resoluteness ‘naturally’ tends toward authenticity, by projecting upon death, i.e., projecting as anticipatory resoluteness.

This is all somewhat problematic or confusing inasmuch as resoluteness appeared to be a phenomenon of authenticity to begin with. Furthermore, even the situation that springs from resolute be-ing-here – the resolute and authentic appropriation of untruth in Self-be-ing the temporal particularity of one’s worldly concern and solicitude – would appear to imply an authentic mundanity, an authentic be-ing-in-the-world. This would also imply that, in the situation, one does not – cannot – fall prey to “just any random possibilities” but instead engages in Self-motivated action in the field of one’s own essential concerns and with the
Others who are significant to one’s Self. Perhaps, though, Heidegger means to indicate, with these ‘random possibilities’, the inevitable Self-dispersion of falling, the ensnarement in the contingencies and Self-alienating complexities of worldly be-ing-here, which inescapably happen even to the most resolute be-ing-here.

But this sense of ‘authentic mundane’ does not appear to coincide with the authenticity required of resoluteness as anticipatory resoluteness. This latter rather pure existential-ontological ‘Situation’ – inasmuch as it is a hearkening back to the Situation of be-ing-toward-death – is not, of itself, any projection upon any mundane possibilities, even if it leads to such and even if it leads to such by its own nature as Self-choice. Let us recall the descriptions of conscience, before we articulated ‘the situation’: “the call discloses nothing...with which we can concern ourselves; for what it has in view is a be-ing which is ontologically quite different – namely, existence...” [H294, first italics mine]. Existence itself (meant both ontologically and disclosively), as resolute – as “the ownmost possibility which be-ing-here can present to itself” [ibid.] – is the authentic and most primordial truth of Self-transparent be-ing-here. Heidegger puts the situation succinctly in his 1925 essay on Dilthey:

At every moment be-ing-here can comport itself in such a way that it chooses between itself and the world. ... When be-ing-here has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice. To have chosen to choose means, however, to be resolved. [S, 168, my emphasis].

Be-ing-here chooses to choose; in Self-choice, one chooses choice itself, i.e., acts authentically freely, i.e., acts as a resolute Self. Be-ing-here projects itself – rather than world – even if the projection of itself expresses itself as world.

Further, be-ing-here projects itself from its own abysmal – non-worldly – resources, thereby modifying its own character as projection and becoming, now, a projection without ground, for no reason, anguishingly authentic, null, and free. As we have seen, projective
resolution is itself to create ground out of its own essential nullity, its freedom and pure possibility. Only then does the ‘current factual involvement-character’, the temporal particularity and meaning of one’s worldly concern and solicitude, pose itself, and it does so only to a be-ing-here who has resolved itself, its Self, transparently, and thus momentously cleared and opened out its ‘here’ for the possibility of be-ing-in-the-world. Only then does one’s abysmal Self-projection modify thrown and fallen everydayness.

That is, there are (at least) two essential moments in resoluteness, which we could name ‘authentic mundanity’ and ‘authentic Self-be-ing’ (or ‘authentic existence’). Perhaps, though, as Heidegger is now moving beyond, to a deeper ground of interpretation, and not only moving back to the Self-be-ing of be-ing-toward-death or to a resoluteness ‘before’ its worldly manifestation, it might be best to see this move as including and encapsulating the resoluteness of authentic mundanity within its deeper horizon of authentic Self-be-ing. All Heidegger’s interpretive efforts manifest the hermeneutic circle: they move forward by going beyond and returning back, to reinterpret or ground the thematic material from the vantage point of a new, more encompassing horizon. Heidegger is also, quite clearly, ‘synthesizing’\textsuperscript{106} the two elaborated moments of the primordiality requirement, viz., the anticipation of be-ing-toward-death (holism) and resoluteness of conscience (authenticity), into a deeper and more authentic whole of be-ing-here – into the basic experience from which the interpretation comes and from which it arose (the phenomenological requirement). Therefore, what I will refer to as ‘the Situation before the situation’, \textit{i.e.}, the existential Situation before the mundane situation of concern and solicitude – what Heidegger calls the

\textsuperscript{106} All differences from the Hegelian dialectic aside... However, it should be underscored, with Hegel in mind, that Heidegger’s interpretive enterprise is a finite and existentiell project and, due to the inherent nullity of projection, each interpretation is bound to have a factual residue – the world may not take so kindly to be-ing-in’s attempts at clarity (Bachelard/Sartre’s ‘co-efficient of adversity’).
‘authenticity of resoluteness’, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness beyond the ‘mere’ resoluteness of authentic mundanity – must be seen as encompassing all mundane Self-realizations.\(^{107}\)

Now, in anticipatory resoluteness, be-ing-here projects its mundane be-ing deeper into the Self itself, the world itself becoming a part of one’s own be-ing ...perhaps, now, in a projection of be-ing-in-the-world, as a whole Self, into be-ing itself? Is this the primordial experience of be-ing-here?

Let us, then, pursue the notion of anticipatory resoluteness in depth and attempt to clarify this existential Self-Situation before – and after – ‘the situation’. It is through the “Self-constancy\(^{108}\) of the existing Self” [H303] as ‘experienced’ in anticipatory resoluteness, that we will obtain a full – authentic, holistic, and experiential, i.e., primordial – clarification of care, the be-ing of be-ing-here. This will put us in a position to open the door to the temporal analysis, the analysis of the meaning of the be-ing of be-ing-here.

§21. Anticipatory resoluteness and Self-constancy

Let us return directly to Heidegger’s own analysis. Heidegger reminds us that we have been and should remain “guided by the idea of existence” [H302]. This now means that the interpretive task of finding the intrinsic connection between the existential projection of be-ing-toward-death and the existentiell attestation of conscience, which we now seek, is to project these existential phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities which have been delineated in them and ‘think these possibilities through to the end’ in an existential manner [H303].

---

\(^{107}\) Perhaps better: as having already encompassed them in anticipation. This is one of the reasons why Heidegger speaks of equanimity, one of the three key authentic moods of Being and Time (along with joy and angst). Equanimity is the mood which springs from resoluteness and, “in a moment-of-vision, looks at those situations...” [H345]. In a profound sense, despite one’s uncanny and clairvoyant immediacy to the world, one is, in anticipatory resoluteness, internally detached from ‘the game’ of world projects.

\(^{108}\) Selbst-standigkeit: ‘self-standingness’, self-stance, self-subsistence, constancy...
The formal indication of 'existence' is (despite the equiprimordiality of facticity) to remain the presupposition of the analysis. Thus we are now to 'project being-toward-death upon conscience', i.e., anticipation upon resoluteness, and think the experience of resolute be-ing-guilty (or, one might say, 'resolute conscientiousness', be-ing willing-to-have-a-conscience) in its essential finitude, with regard to its existential significance, its significance for the ontological analysis of be-ing-here as existence. Specifically, this means reinterpreting or 'repeating' the essence of anticipation (i.e., the running ahead of worldly possibilities to pure possibility itself, as it verges on and is released by the certainty of utter im-possibility) in light of the open resolve of be-ing-guilty. Further, we are to reinterpret the five interrelated items of anticipation (i.e., death as be-ing-here's ownmost, non-relational, ineluctable, certain yet indefinite [and anxious] possibility) in the same light. Most of these items do not change notably in this repetition; however, we shall focus on the kind of certainty or be-ing-in-the-truth and the mood of anxiety, which now "strives to exact resoluteness of itself" [H308], which anticipatory resoluteness testifies (next section).

Resoluteness, it is said (in §62), of itself already 'tends toward', 'brings itself into', and 'exact[s] of itself' its own authenticity. This in fact occurs by be-ing-here's be-ing-guilty undergoing an "existentiell modalization through being-toward-death" (anticipation) [H305], one that results in anticipatory resoluteness: resoluteness modalizes itself authentically. That is, the existentiell phenomena of conscience, existentially articulated as resoluteness, are now amenable to an internal modification by what was previously only existentially projected as being-toward-death, a modification which will bring out the implied existentiell attestation of being-toward-death.
As we have already seen, the existential analysis can “disclose possibilities for a more primordial existentiell understanding” [H295] – philosophy can lead to deeper experience of be-ing-here. One might say that projected being-toward-death is now to re-existentiellize its own existentiell attestation (conscience) by modifying conscience into a be-ing-guilty-towards-death, i.e., into anticipatory resoluteness, which is the full experience and attestation of being-toward-death itself and therefore of be-ing-here’s sought-for be-ing-a-whole. This modification is indeed a heightening and intensifying of resoluteness’ own internal tendency, an experiential modalization of itself, which possibilizes be-ing-here in the most definitive way. Be-ing-guilty deepens into the transparency of a more comprehensive (holistic), more intensely condensed, in a word, more primordial experience of groundlessness, the anxious and free be-ing-here of being-toward-death. What exactly does all this mean?

The key to unlocking anticipatory resoluteness – and to the further development of the existential analysis (toward the authentic Self of be-ing-here and its temporality) – is in the recognition of the constancy (Ständigkeit) of one’s be-ing-guilty. Resoluteness, as reflected in the state of ‘readiness’ for factual guilt that one holds oneself in as a willing-to-have-a-conscience, is a resolving upon be-ing-guilty as one’s be-ing per se. According to Heidegger, inasmuch as one is, one is guilty, and the full recognition of one’s essential and “prior be-ing-guilty” [H307] is only possible if be-ing-here is disclosed ‘right to the end’, i.e., if the whole of be-ing-here is gathered up – as it is in anticipation of death.

It would appear, then, that anticipatory resoluteness is the making explicit and transparent of resolute be-ing-guilty’s own already implied foundation.\(^\text{109}\) Resoluteness is such only upon the foundation of death-anticipation; however, it could, nonetheless, be

\(^{109}\) \textit{Unüberholbar} - i.e., “not to be outstripped” or overtaken: literally, ‘un-over-take-able’.
experientially, existentially, oblivious of this. To come into its own, i.e., to become authentically transparent in self-understanding, resolute be-ing-here projects explicitly upon its own death. That is, resoluteness (authentic be-ing-guilty) is, expressly, steadfast (be-ing-) toward-death, and resolute be-ing-here thereby understands the constancy of its be-ing-guilty and ‘takes over’ existentiell be-ing-guilty with the same holistic ‘constancy’ as the anticipation of death:

As anticipation of death, resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be...
[Resoluteness] harbours in itself authentic being-toward-death as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity. [H305, my italics]

Resolute be-ing-guilty is modalized, by anticipation of death, into be-ing that which it primordially tends to be, i.e., into its own authenticity: the recognition and maintaining of the constancy of be-ing-guilty, that is, anticipatory resoluteness.

Further, it is being-toward-death, one’s ownmost possibility-of-be-ing, which is the existential ground of the “utter nullity of be-ing-here” [H306], that nullity which lies at the basis of existentiell guilt (i.e., be-ing the null ground of a null projection which falls into the null anonymity of the world). This nullity of guilt, as an owing,\(^{111}\) is to be made up for (nachgeholt\(^{112}\)) in the conscientious choice which ‘takes it [guilty be-ing] over’ into authentic, resolute Self-be-ing. This is possible on the basis of the taking up and choosing of one’s be-ing-here as a whole, the opportunity which being-toward-death gives us. The ‘appropriation’ of death, to the degree it is possible in resolute anticipation,\(^{113}\) grounds be-

---

\(^{110}\) Though, of course, this making-explicit does not (yet) imply any theoretical-conceptual stance.\(^{111}\) cf., Magda King’s translation of Schuld as “owing” instead of “guilt” in ch. XI of [King, 2001].\(^{112}\) I am, here, referring to the passage on H268 which states that authentic be-ing-one’s-Self is accomplished by a choice which is a “making up for not choosing”\(^{113}\).\(^{113}\) Sartre thought of Heidegger’s notions regarding death as part of “the idealist attempt to recover death”, which is in bad faith to the “absurd character of death” [Sartre, 1966, 681-2] – a criticism which Heidegger apparently agreed with!
ing-guilty on its primordial source, the ontological constitution of be-ing-here. “Care harbours in itself both death and guilt equiprimordially” [H306].

Be-ing-guilty is the existentiell attestation of the existential projection of being-toward-death, and so, also, that of be-ing-a-whole. Conscience-resoluteness attests anticipation of death but without transparency and without the full enactment (or fulfillment (Vollziehung), maturation (Zeitigung)) of authenticity, until it is modified into anticipatory resoluteness. That is, resoluteness must itself become anticipatory in order to attest being-toward-death authentically; this it does, essentially, by recognizing, maintaining, and repeating the constancy of be-ing-guilty, which constancy is based upon the possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole that being-toward-death grants be-ing-here. Thus the projection of being-toward-death upon be-ing-guilty (or vice-versa) silhouettes be-ing-here, obtaining a transparency of projected ground and attesting horizon, which defines and encompasses being-here and brings it to stand in its primordial Self be-ing and truth.

§22. The primordial truth of existence: Self-certainty in the limit-Situation

Heidegger continues: “only in anticipatory resoluteness is the possibility-of-be-ing-guilty understood authentically and wholly – that is to say, primordially” [H306]. The attesting experience of anticipatory resoluteness, now articulated as an existentiell modification of be-ing-guilty which brings out the latter’s hidden ‘ground’ (the abyss of being-toward-death), experiences what is primordial in be-ing-here and allows be-ing-here’s

\[\text{[114] Through the understanding of this existentiell modification, we will “first reach a full existential understanding of anticipation itself” [H309].}\]
Self-interpretation to itself attain primordiality. With the articulation of anticipatory resoluteness, the primordiality requirement would appear to be, finally, satisfied.

However, we have already heard that "the primordial ontological ground for be-ing-here's existentiality is temporality" [H234] and that "temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in be-ing-here's authentic be-ing-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness" [H304]. How do we move, then, from the experience of anticipatory resoluteness and the interpretation of it given hereto — viz., anticipatory resoluteness as the recognition and maintaining of the constancy of be-ing-guilty — to its temporal interpretation?

For Heidegger, truth is 'un-concealed-ness' (a-lethe-ia), i.e., the revealedness (Ent-hüllt-heit)\(^{115}\) of be-ing and beings, e.g., be-ing-here's dis-closed-ness (Er-schlossen-heit), and beings' dis-covered-ness (Ent-deck-ung). As mentioned, resoluteness (Ent-schlossen-heit, 'un-closed-ness') brings us into the primordial truth of existence [H297]. This primordial truth becomes transparent as the unconcealment of the unified whole of be-ing-here, that is, of the Self. This primordial truth is a primordial disclosure or transparent open-standing in the clearing of be-ing-here itself, viz., be-ing-here, as the anticipatory resolve upon the certainty and existential guilt of death. Be-ing-here is revealed to itself in a transparent disclosedness — it is both the "revealing and be-ing-revealed" [H307]. Anticipatory resoluteness is "the ground of the primordial existentiell truth" [H316], which is Self-knowledge.\(^{116}\)

\(^{115}\) Or, even, apo-kalypsis, un-concealment, revelation.
\(^{116}\) The kind of sight of projective understanding, which sees existence, is transparency (Durchsichtigkeit), a term which "designates 'knowledge of the Self' " [H146].
It is this primordial existentiell truth that is the ‘basic experience’ from which the entire interpretation has unfolded and towards which it has been oriented from the beginning. Heidegger now asks, ‘what sort of certainty ‘appropriates’ this primordial existentiell truth of existence?’\textsuperscript{117} We may keep in mind, here, the questions: Is this appropriation of the truth, which the analysis now seeks, the same as the factical disclosure of, the be-ing in, this truth? And is the primordial truth of existence the same as the primordial truth of be-ing-here?

Heidegger describes the particular be-ing-certain of authentic resoluteness as a flexible holding-for-true, a non-rigid yet steadfast ‘maintaining oneself’ in the temporally particular (jeweilige) factical Situation, which resoluteness has opened up: i.e., factically given itself and existentially brought itself into, in its self-disclosure [H307]. This be-ing-certain is an uncalculating, primordially disclosive, ‘holding oneself open and free’ for the temporally particular or ‘current’, factically disclosed, situational possibility.

Heidegger is, no doubt, also referring, with this last clause, to the field of action of intramundane, if now authentic, possibilities – the ‘authentic mundanity’ of be-ing-here’s possible historical be-ing-in-the-world. He would, then, be describing the flexible vision and attunement to and of the ‘moment’ (Augenblick) of ‘phronetic’ action, which is open to and sees, with the uncanny foresight and precision of holistic vision, the dynamic variables of whatever factically disclosed, mundane situation one takes over from one’s thrownness and be-ing-in-the-world. In fact, Heidegger says, here, that anticipatory resoluteness “brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of ‘taking action’” [H310].\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{117} “The explicit appropriation of what has been disclosed or discovered is be-ing-certain [H307]. Be-ing-certain, gewiss-sein, already has connotations of ‘conscience’, Gewissens.

\textsuperscript{118} See William McNeill’s excellent overview and analysis of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle notions of phronesis and theorein in [McNeill, 1999], especially chapter 2 and 4.
Nevertheless, Heidegger is primarily referring to something else, something more primordial and foundational: the uttermost, authentic possibility and source of all possible mundane situations of be-ing-in-the-world, viz, “the primordial ‘limit-Situation’ of being-toward-death” [H349].\textsuperscript{119} This is a possibility and an act, certainly distinguishable from any action one may take ‘in the world’ – even if, as we have already emphasized, its own complete meaning is to eventuate in some kind of resolute, situational be-ing-in-the-world. Death is “that possibility of which [be-ing-here] can be utterly certain” [H308]. As we have seen, however, existential-ontologically speaking, death is not an extant possibility but the internal possibility and capability of being-toward-death – it is a possibility that defines our very existing and that we are already on the way to. In anticipatory running ahead to the certain possibility of death, one surpasses all particular worldly and realizable possibilities, surpassing toward death’s dis-abling, unrealizable, and Self-defining im-possibility. This impossibility summons and gives back the unique possibility, the pure possibility, of the whole of one’s be-ing, of be-ing-one’s-Self as a whole.

The ‘current’, factically disclosed possibility of the resolute limit-Situation which the certain impossibility of death gives us is that of be-ing the whole of one’s be-ing, authentically, i.e., the possibility of choosing to be – resolving upon – a unique and whole Self which stretches through one’s entire temporal span, anticipated unto death and taken over from birth. Here, be-ing-in, the very openness of the world, in choosing its Self,

\textsuperscript{119} Heidegger’s frequent lack of distinction on this point is the source of great confusion amongst his scholars, some of who wish to subsume being-toward-death into authentic be-ing-in-the-world. That there is a distinction between these two situations comes out clearly enough in the following: The inauthentic present must be “brought back from its lostness by a resolution, so that both the current Situation and therewith the primordial ‘limit-Situation’ of being-toward-death, will be disclosed as a moment of vision which has been held on to.” [H349, my italics].
establishes or founds (stiften) its own world. It is the be-ing in this possibility and the ‘taking over’ of one’s be-ing, which is the primordial ‘action’ of resoluteness and the self-certainty of be-ing-in-the-truth.

Thus, resolute be-ing-here steadfastly maintains itself in this temporally particular (jeweilige), factual limit-Situation, the very situation of finite be-ing-here at all. Accordingly, the be-ing-certain of anticipatory resoluteness is an uncalculating, primordial ‘holding oneself open and free’ for death and for the latter’s implications for be-ing-here at all and as a whole. Therefore, in the certainty of being-toward-death, resolute be-ing-here holds itself open and free constantly – from out of the holistic constancy of this gathered and unified Self-be-ing.

However, the openness and freedom of this be-ing-certain, rather than maintaining some kind of dogmatic and extant certainty, blind to the exigencies of the moment, signify a “holding oneself free for the possible, and factually necessary, taking back” of that resolved certainty. In fact, death teaches us that “be-ing-here must utterly take everything back” [H308], that be-ing-here per se is finite. This finitude is manifested in many ways; for example, in that the certain possibility of death remains indefinite as to its ‘when’ and ‘how’ and, further, in that, in inevitable falling, one’s resolve is dissolved in compromise and averageness. But most primordially in this regard, death throws free existence back upon one’s factual ‘been here’, one’s already having been here and still be-ing-here in the world, a thrownness, the facticity of which, one can never ‘get behind’ or uproot. This

---

120 cf., The Essence of Ground in [P, 127ff.].
121 “Sichfrehalten für seine mögliche [und je faktisch notwendige] Zurücknahme.”, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as: “holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back (a possibility which is factically necessary)” [H308].
122 See Heidegger’s 1924 The Concept of Time [CT].
means that whatever the world-creative existential choice that is made, it is a finite one, with
a residue of the infinitude of recalcitrant, unchosen facticity. Even if the choice is made from
‘beyond’ the world, ultimately – or, at least, in a complete and comprehensive sense – it is
significant within these temporally particular intramundane, interpersonal possibilities of the
moment at hand.

Thus, this constant possibility of ‘taking back’, rather than gainsaying resoluteness,
only deepens the resolve “to keep repeating itself” [H308], again and again and constantly, in
the steadfast choice of authentic, holistic Self-disclosure. In self-constancy, one gains a
foothold in the abyss, a stance or standing of Self-be-ing, in the face of constant existential
nullity. Self-certainty reaffirms itself in its very pure openness for anxious uncertainty, and
the Self gains wholeness in the face of the constant certainty of death and the self-
fragmentation and dispersal of falling. One exists, here and now, as a whole, constantly, from
beyond each moment and in and through each moment...

For Heidegger, the constancy and flexibility of this certainty in the face of certain
uncertainty undermines (untergraben; [H308]) one’s lostness in irresoluteness. It does so by
a constancy of “holding itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the ‘they’”
[H308]. Similarly (in structure) – but differently (in content), for anxiety’s ‘non-resolute’
character is not at all equivalent to the irresoluteness of they-Self-be-ing\(^{123}\) – in anticipation,
the “indeterminateness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety”, but in anticipatory
resoluteness, i.e., the authenticity of resoluteness, “this primordial anxiety strives to exact
resoluteness of itself” [ibid.]. Therefore, even though “irresoluteness is co-certain” and be-

\(^{123}\) “Anxiety only brings one into the mood for a possible resolution” [H344]. Heidegger is ambiguous on this,
though, sometimes stating the latter and other times stating that anxiety is the mood of resoluteness. We shall
discuss how it can be said that anxiety is not yet resolute in Part Three. If this is so, we might wonder what
mood accompanies resoluteness itself. See [Smith HTM, 12].
ing-here is "equiprimordially in the untruth" [ibid.], and, further, despite the anxiety of one's finitude and the compromise this make to one's certainty and resolve, there yet arises, *due to the imperative of existential authenticity* which drives the constancy and repetition of resoluteness, the possibility of an authentic, holistic Self-choice 'unto death', beyond the closures of everyday mundanity.

Thus anticipatory resoluteness shows itself to be the authenticity of resoluteness and the full sense of anticipation itself. It is the existentiell attestation of the existential-ontologically projected anticipation of death/guilt, which gives be-ing-here its truth and wholeness. The 'connection' we sought, between anticipation and resoluteness, has been shown to be an internal one, one which be-ing-here "exacts of itself" [H309] as the modalization of a resoluteness pregnant with anticipation. Anxious (and joyful, as we shall see) anticipatory resoluteness is the factual and existentiell *answer* to the question of the possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole [H309]. It is this 'ontic (existentiell) ground' which is the "factual ideal" [H310] of be-ing-here's ontological totality, be-ing-here's authentic possibility-of-be-ing-a-whole. In anticipatory resoluteness, be-ing-here "frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over be-ing-here's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments" [H310] — thereby be-ing-here becomes, authentically, its own Self.
CHAPTER VI. Deeper Primordialities: Temporality, Historicity, Birth, Dis-position

§23. The deeper primordiality

How, then, as we asked near the beginning of the previous section, do we move from anticipatory resoluteness to temporal interpretation?

In the foregoing, our descriptions of anticipatory resoluteness were rife with temporal connotations, many of them centering on the constancy of resolute be-ing. We spoke of the unique and whole Self which stretches through one's entire temporal span; of how resolute be-ing-here steadfastly maintains itself in its temporally particular situation; of the holistic constancy of gathered and unified Self-be-ing; of how death throws free existence back upon one's factual 'been here', one's already having been here and still be-ing-here in the world; of be-ing-here's resolve "to keep repeating itself" [H308], again and again and constantly, in the steadfast choice of authentic, holistic Self-disclosure; and of how one exists, here and now, as a whole, constantly, from beyond each moment and in and through each moment.

The next stage of Heidegger's analysis will focus explicitly on these temporal significations. We, at least initially, enter a new kind of primordiality with the temporal interpretation, one that is more primordial as an analysis -- not more primordial as an experience that serves as a foundation for ever-deepening spirals of interpretation. This is not to say that temporality is not experienced; rather, it has been experienced all along and now we are to uncover it explicitly from the interpreted phenomena of anticipatory resoluteness. That is, the temporal analysis will draw out the already implied temporality of this most
primordial experience, the truth of be-ing-here in its uncanniness (anticipatory resoluteness). Heidegger will then apply these insights in a reinterpretation (repetition) of everyday be-ing-in-the-world in its temporality.

However, after the interpretation of everyday temporality, Heidegger will once again (as we indicated in §2) question whether his interpretation has been “sufficiently primordial” [H372], asking whether “be-ing-here can be understood in a way that is more primordial than in the projection of its authentic existence” [ibid.] and whether ‘we have indeed brought the whole of be-ing-here into the fore-having’ of our interpretation [paraphrasing H372]. The primordiality being sought for here is, once again, an experiential one, one that has more than analytical merit, one that, indeed, has potential for a reworking of the analysis of be-ing-here as a whole. This is also, of course, a temporal primordiality that is being sought. Heidegger’s question, here, articulates the doubt that ‘the projection of authentic existence’ attains true primordiality and the doubt that existence, authentic or otherwise, presents the whole of be-ing-here.

What would this new primordiality be? Does not, muses Heidegger, the one-sidedness of the focus on be-ing-toward-death – the fact that be-ing-here has been interpreted “only in the way in which it exists ‘facing forward’” [H373] – i.e., existentially – suggest that “the other ‘end’...the ‘beginning’, the ‘birth’” [H373], ought also to be considered? Heidegger’s raising this question here signifies that the phenomenon of birth has not been adequately interpreted within the parameters of be-ing-here’s thrownness; nor, perhaps, within those of authenticity – that is, not within the broad parameters of existence. This is, at this late point in the analysis, a remarkable comment. Unfortunately, Heidegger somewhat glibly skips over this insight and continues:
Not only has be-ing-toward-the-beginning remained unnoticed; but so, too, and above all, has the way in which be-ing-here stretches along between birth and death. [H373].

The specific movement of the stretched self-stretching, we call the 'historizing' of be-ing-here. [H375].

With the analysis of the specific movement and persistence which belong to be-ing-here historizing, we come back to...the question of constancy of the Self, which we determined as the 'who' of be-ing-here. [H375].

With the analysis of be-ing-here's historizing, we shall gain "a more primordial insight into the temporalization-structure of temporality" itself [H332]. In Heidegger's analyses of be-ing-here's historizing, we will reach the summit of both peaks, of experiential and analytical primordiality, of Being and Time.

Before we pursue these analyses, however, let us question the primordiality of anticipatory resoluteness from another direction, one which we will find coincides with Heidegger's evocative suggestion regarding 'be-ing-toward-birth'.

§24. Primordial be-ing-in-the-truth (dis-position) and certainty

As we have mentioned, anticipatory resoluteness is the 'basic experience' and truth we have sought, that which grounds be-ing-here in the abyss of its be-ing. It is the articulation of this phenomenon that grounds the interpretation of be-ing-here primordially, that is, in the totality and authenticity of its 'object'. Furthermore, the basic mood of anxiety accompanies this truth of existence, at least to the point of the resolution itself.124 Surely, then – all considerations from the last section (§23) aside – we have now reached primordiality of interpretation, at least that primordiality possible under the guiding, original

124 We shall go more deeply into precisely what anxiety discloses in Part Two, B.
projection of existence. In §22, we described the kind of certainty, the holding-for-true, that appropriates this truth and we went into some detail in elucidating it.

Now – especially now that the doubts regarding the primordiality of the interpretation and the sufficiency of existence, as a formal indication for the truth of be-ing-here as a whole, have been expressed – we may ask: is existential and projective certainty\textsuperscript{125} itself the most primordial kind of truth? Or is not, perhaps, the factual be-ing in the truth already a more primordial truth than any 'holding for true' which 'appropriates' this truth?

Heidegger himself distinguishes, though ambiguously, between the primordial truth and the 'equiprimordial' be-ing-certain: “The primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial be-ing-certain” [H307]. This be-ing-certain is equiprimordial because it, along with the primordially revealed be-ing-in-the-truth belongs to the disclosedness (truth) of be-ing-here – just as projection belongs equiprimordially with mood (factual disclosure, \textit{i.e.}, dis-position) to be-ing-here’s disclosedness; and existence, with facticity, to be-ing-here’s be-ing. But while the be-ing-certain may be equiprimordial, it is brought on by the demand of “the primordial truth”. Heidegger says, “to any truth, there belongs a corresponding holding-for-true” [H307]. Obversely, then, any ‘holding-for-true’ responds to some (prior) truth. Again, I submit that this prior truth, which is existentially appropriated by a be-ing-certain or a holding-for-true, is disclosed by the primordial be-ing-in-the-truth of dis-position, \textit{i.e.}, of moods and affects.

One can still disclose the truth, without these existential (even if existentiell-experiential) modes or imperatives. Of course, we have also discussed the factual disclosure

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{i.e.}, the appropriation of the truth, \textit{i.e.}, the holding-for-true, \textit{i.e.}, the constant, resolute, be-ing-guilty which steadfastly maintains and repeats its choice, in which be-ing-here wins its Self.
of anxiety, which accompanies—though, ultimately, in a rather adjunct manner—the factual-existentiell disclosure of anticipatory resoluteness. This is a mood which accompanies the understanding projection; the latter of which—\textit{i.e.}, projection—is, of course, emphasized in the existential analysis.

But what about the factual disclosure of the truth, \textit{itself}. Such disclosure is the ‘immediate’ be-ing in the truth, be-ing \textit{already there} before any appropriation. This ‘already there-ness’ need not imply some past fact that has occurred and is done with—it can also imply \textit{something prior whose sway we are under}, as indeed is articulated in Heidegger’s notions of thrownness and ‘having-been’. But Heidegger’s interpretation, due to the sway of his formal indication of existence, also implies that the factual disclosure is of an ‘already there-ness’ that is itself the result of \textit{some prior projection of existence}. We have been thrown (projected), fall for a loss in the default of self in this thrownness, and are abandoned to the burden of it. This, therefore, is a projection that needs to be taken up afresh and made one’s own.

However, the ‘already there-ness’ under whose sway we are, in the disclosive mode of dis-position, is a factual aspect of disclosure to be articulated \textit{in its own right}. We are, in fact, under the sway of the fact of \textit{birth}, of the giftedness of origin, and this structures our dis-positions in a way more primordial than any ‘burdensomeness’ of existence. This is not, originally, a possibility to be appropriated but a fact to be appreciated—a fact we are already appreciating through our moods, if, proximally and usually, extremely indirectly. There is a range of moods and affects which can appreciate this primordial givenness, a giftedness which, as such, implies no indebtedness nor any ‘giver’ but which attunes us with its sheer and unaccountable positivity of the fact of be-ing. Heidegger does indeed provide us with a
phenomenology of dis-position, as we shall see in Part Three, and, after Being and Time, he broadens the range of dis-positions and attempts to find his way clear to the intense wonder and awe of the disclosure of be-ing itself— but his phenomenology in Being and Time remains, to the extent that it is possible, dominated by the parameters and imperatives of existentiality.

The primordial truth, then, is the immediate dis-positional disclosure or factual be-ing (-in-the-truth), an already appropriate be-ing-here, which existence may appropriate but which, of itself, discloses prior to any holding-for-true of existential appropriation.

Of course, I am not referring here to the ‘bad facticity’ of how we ‘proximally and usually’ exist. Factual be-ing-in-the-truth is not the inauthentic “closed off and covered up” fallenness, the “semblance and disguise” [H222], or the obscurity (lethe) of lostness and untruth, from which authenticity defends our existential integrity, by wresting the truth from such lostness, “snatching [us] out of [our] hiddenness” [ibid.]. The factual disclosure is not, of itself, that of thrown or fallen projection, the possible pathway of untruth (Parmenides) that calls for a “decision for the one rather than the other” [H223].

Rather we seek factual disclosure in and of itself, neither authentic nor inauthentic, neither existential nor fallen. What are the idiosyncratic structures of the disclosure of facticity, i.e., of mood (dis-position) before its ‘relation’ to projective understanding or the language that is based on such understanding? If Heidegger is seeking primordiality in basic experience, then what about a phenomenology of the various moods (and affects) which pertain to anticipatory resoluteness? or to be-ing-here at all?

Again, to some degree, Heidegger does provide us with such: he speaks of the anxiety of anticipatory resoluteness as one that ‘exacts resoluteness of itself’ and, in so doing,
resolves, in its steadfastness, into a kind of joy. *Co-disclosing* the possibility and choice of anticipatory resoluteness is the authentic dis-position of "unshakeable joy" in "becoming free from the entertaining 'incidents'" [H310] of one's lostness in the world. This joy 'goes along with' the "sober anxiety" of individualized be-ing-here and factically attests and fulfills the intention or existential 'formal indication' of becoming one's Self, free, despite immeasurable uncertainty, of the illusions, curiosities, and impostures of be-ing the no-one of they-self-be-ing. It remains a question for us, though, whether this — a projection of existence — is indeed what angst and joy disclose; or whether this is all they disclose; or whether there are other kinds of anxieties and joys which disclose other aspects of be-ing-here (not just its existential situation); or whether the interpretative framework which Heidegger has for moods is adequate to such disclosure; or whether it has not, itself, been bent to the needs of existential disclosure, at the expense of the disclosure of be-ing-here as a whole.

Upon mentioning the phenomenon of joy, Heidegger mentions the possibility of an analysis of basic moods (*Grundstimmungen*) — but backs off, as this 'anthropological' or 'world-view' stance would supposedly "transgress the limits" of a fundamental ontology [H310]. From the standpoint of a comprehensive phenomenology of moods, we can only regret the constrictions of a fundamental ontology, one which makes itself oblivious of the phenomena, due to the hermeneutical constrictions of its ontologized formal indication of existence. Later, we shall see that the mood of equanimity also plays a key role in revealing anticipatory resoluteness. But we shall see that be-ing-here is more than existence and the range of moods and affects is broader than those which co-disclose existence, even if it be authentic, holistic, resolute existence.
Heidegger’s doubts about 1) the primordiality of his interpretation of be-ing-here, and 2) the suitability of existence for disclosing the whole of be-ing-here; coupled with the momentary suggestion that 3) in order to gain wholeness and primordiality, we ought to consider the phenomenon of birth; and 4) the distinction between the primordial ‘be-ing in the truth’ and its correlated ‘holding-for-true’; together with the notion that 5) the primordial be-ing-in-the-truth is that of the factual dis-position of moods and affects\textsuperscript{126} – all this suggests a possible development of these themes beyond the confines of the Heideggerian existential project. Further, we can not only foresee modifying the Daseinanalytik in a fundamental way but, given that Heidegger reached an impasse in his original project of being, we can suggest that such a modification of the fundamental structures of the disclosure of be-ing-here may also open up the occluded pathway to be-ing itself. Let us see how the problematic of the explicit quest for be-ing itself unfolds in Heidegger’s a crucial text from 1927.

\section*{§25. Heidegger’s “brief digression” in the Grundprobleme: the pre-conceptual ‘understanding’ of be-ing and Heidegger’s impasse\textsuperscript{127}}

In Heidegger’s 1927 summer course, he develops his notion of temporality and, to some degree, that of the Temporality of be-ing itself. The final 70 pages of this work have still to be digested by philosophers and Heideggerian scholars alike, and they represent the fullest treatment of Heidegger’s core temporal projection of be-ing. I wish here, though, only to

\textsuperscript{126} Later we shall add the distinction between primordial temporality and authentic temporality to this list.

\textsuperscript{127} Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie [GP], The Basic Problems of Phenomenology [BP] lectures given immediately upon the publication of Being and Time, and contextualized as an attempt to rework the material of the now infamous Division III of Part One, viz., “Time and Being”, of Being and Time.
focus on the first half of one subsection (20b) as a way of developing our notion of the primacy of dis-position and of recognizing and opening a way out of Heidegger’s impasse.

Heidegger has distinguished a primordial, existentiell, pre-conceptual understanding of beings and of be-ing-here, from the conceptual grasp of be-ing that he seeks. The former is based on be-ing-here’s temporality and the latter is a modified, developed form of this temporality. But, further, the conceptual grasp of be-ing is itself based upon a pre-conceptual understanding of be-ing itself, implicit within existentiell pre-conceptual understanding. The existentiell pre-conceptual understanding is, essentially, self-understanding and is essentially projective in character. That is, it is an unveiling of oneself via the throwing forth of a possibility of oneself, a potentiality for dynamic be-ing-here. As Heidegger says,

understanding, as be-ing-here’s self-projection, is be-ing-here’s fundamental mode of happening [or historizing]... the authentic meaning of action. [BP, 277].

This existentiell projection (as a projection of be-ing-in-the-world) includes within it, equiprimordially, an understanding of world, fellow be-ing-heres, and intraworldly beings. Moreover, these are all understood indistinctly (“undivided and unarticulated” [BP, 280]), within a more general pre-conceptual understanding of be-ing itself, which, Heidegger assumes, must already be there. Thus Heidegger speaks of a “stratification of projections...inserted in front of one another” [BP, 280]. Now,

If we say that be-ing is understood in the existentiell understanding of be-ing-here,...then, in the understanding of be-ing, there is present a further projection: be-ing is understood only as, on its own part, it is projected upon something. What it is projected upon remains at first obscure. [BP, 280]

---

128 §20: Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität, (Grundprobleme: p. 395-400); 'temporality and Temporality', [BP, 279-282].
That is, the understanding of be-ing which is already present or implied in be-ing-here’s self-projection, must, as an understanding, have the structure of a projection: “be-ing must, in turn, be projected upon something” [ibid.]. More pointedly, be-ing must have already been projected upon something. Therefore, the problematic becomes one of the explicit, objectifying projection – i.e., conceptual grasping – of the previously pre-conceptual projection of be-ing:

[Objectification] has the function of explicitly projecting what is antecedently given upon that on which it has already been projected in pre-scientific experience or understanding...that upon which the understanding of be-ing, qua understanding, has already pre-conceptually projected be-ing must become unveiled in an explicit projection. [BP, 282; second italics mine]

All of this follows on the assumption that ‘understanding’ is projective ‘all the way down’, i.e., that the pre-conceptual ‘understanding’ of be-ing itself must, as an understanding of some sort, itself be projective in character; and, further, that what is ‘antecedently given’ must have been projected. It seems a natural assumption: if understanding is essentially projective, then the understanding of be-ing will also be projective. However, this is not phenomenology here, but an inference regarding the understanding of be-ing, made from the phenomenology of be-ing-here’s existentially self-understanding.

What is needed, however, is a phenomenology of the disclosure of be-ing itself, unfettered by existential imperatives and true, rather, to factual imperatives of the disclosure itself. Disclosure is not necessarily ‘understanding’, in the projective sense. As we have seen, if projection ‘fails’ in the disclosure of be-ing-here – if it remains in guilt and nullity even in its authenticity and resoluteness, if it insists on taking over the supposed burden of be-ing-here, existentially imposed on itself through its thrownness, the a priori nullity of its powers – we may especially suspect its adequacy to the challenge of disclosing be-ing itself. In fact,
we should also suspect its adequacy in regard to the interpretation of *be-ing-here*. In any case, if we do not insist, as Heidegger does, on the pre-conceptual, *pre-ontological* \(^{129}\) disclosure of *be-ing* being one of projective understanding, then we may suspect that this disclosure and its intelligibility are of another sort and of another structure than the ‘ecstatic-horizontal’ structure of projection and the existential temporality this is based on. The ramifications of this would be enormous. Let us narrow it down, here, to the following considerations.

Heidegger himself realizes, in the form of a necessary “brief digression”, that the understanding of *be-ing* is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for our ‘comportment toward beings’. That is, “the understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding” (as Hofstadter translates *Befindlichkeit*) [BP, 281]. This, however, is characterized as a disposed ‘*be-ing amidst beings*’. It is this disclosure, together with the projective understanding, that is sufficient to make possible the disclosure of *beings*. Thus we have a projection of *being* (or ‘world’), within which, via affective self-finding, beings can be disclosed. The distinction is that projection ‘discloses’ *be-ing itself* and affection, together with projection, discloses *beings* (including ourselves). How, though, does this affect the *be-ing* question?

If, we could ask, projection requires affection in order to be a sufficient condition of the disclosure of beings, does this not hold, *mutatis mutandis* for the ‘understanding’ or the intelligibility of *be-ing itself*? That is, must not projection be essentially complemented by affection, in order to reveal *be-ing itself*? Indeed, is it not possible that *be-ing* is disclosed *only* in affective disclosure?

\(^{129}\) As Heidegger states, the *pre-ontological* understanding does not mean ontic understanding; the latter is founded upon the former [BP, 281]. ‘Ontological’, here, has the connotation of ‘conceptually developed ontology’. What is ‘pre-ontological’, then, is ‘pre-conceptual’ and the *pre-ontological* disclosure is a pre-conceptual disclosure of *be-ing*. 
This is all compounded by the supposed fact that the affective, self-finding disclosure apparently "belongs to understanding itself" [BP, 281]. Unless, though, we articulate the idiosyncratic structures of Befindlichkeit, we would be in danger of expropriating its idiosyncratic disclosure into that of understanding. This would result in moods and affects taking on the structure of projection. They would become a form of projection of beings, pre-conceptual because inexplicit, essentially mundane, ontic disclosures, whose disclosedness refers, perhaps, to a past projectedness, a projection which has been. This is, essentially, Heidegger’s concept of thrownness, thrown projection, which supposedly characterises being-here’s facticity, its ‘that it is and has to be’.

However, even if affective self-findedness could be described as a past projectedness, this still wouldn’t touch the question of the meaning of be-ing itself, for, so far, affection seems only to reveal beings... except that Heidegger surreptitiously conflates the distinctions, here. Immediately after the ‘brief digression’ into be-ing-here’s affective self-finding and its effectiveness in revealing beings, Heidegger returns to the question of the ontological project of be-ing. Ontology is to make explicit the pre-ontological understanding of be-ing, an understanding that is not only “antecedently given” but that has already been projected in pre-scientific experience or understanding [BP, 282]. Though Heidegger does not explicitly state that he is now referring to moods and affects as revelatory of be-ing itself (not just beings), it would be hard to comprehend his ‘brief digression’ to the disclosure of affective self-finding, (made in order to “ward off a fatal misunderstanding” [BP, 281]), as meaningful otherwise. The implied result is that 1) moods and affects are or can be disclose
of be-ing itself, not just beings and that 2) moods and affects are disclosive of be-ing as past projections of it; they have the structure of understanding i.e., are a kind of projection. That is, as having already thrown forth a horizon, they are a part of the grounding project of be-ing-here.

We can accept the first result without accepting the second. Just as it is possible for affection to be fundamentally modified from a disclosure of beings to a disclosure of be-ing, so it can be fundamentally modified from a disclosure of past projectedness to a disclosure of present felt meaning. With typical Heideggerian thought-provoking ambiguity, while moods and affects are being given an extraordinary disclosive capacity – they can reveal be-ing itself! – nonetheless, if they are seen merely as temporal modes of projection, they are being robbed of their own particular and distinctive disclosive capacity as moods and affects. For moods and affects are not projections of any kind and they have an internal structure of their own, one appreciative of felt meanings, not projected ones. This needs to be brought out in a phenomenology of feeling freed from the constrictions of an existential framework. For it is the imperatives of the formal indication of ‘existence’ – only one aspect of the be-ing of being-here – that compel the interpretation of facticity as thrownness and so, of ‘affective self-finding’ as projections which have been; and so, also, of the future as having priority over the other ecstases; and so, even (as we shall see), of ‘be-ing-in’ as ‘ecstatic’. All these ‘prejudices’ need uprooting in an unfettered phenomenology of felt disclosure.

This would require a fundamental modification of the range and, also, the structure of moods, from the depiction in Being and Time. Moods are holistic disclosures that, also, in limiting and specifying our projections, preoccupy us with beings. But these are two very different aspects and speak of a complex internal structure, in need of clearer analysis.
§26. *A potential breakthrough: Crowell’s "another sort of intelligibility"

* A *propos* of his (and David Wood’s) notion of existential resolve and identity as “occupying a liminal space”, S. G. Crowell’s essay, “Authentic Historicality”¹³¹ appears on the verge of a breakthrough to a possible appreciation of a phenomenology of feeling, one which could have the appropriate ramifications for the ontology of be-ing-here, and perhaps open the way toward be-ing itself. Crowell has a clear vision of be-ing-here’s authentic historicality being, patently, *not* a ‘narrativist’ or ‘biographical’ or hermeneutic one, and he sees the necessity of developing the notion of authentic historicity (birth, death, and the constancy of the stretchedness ‘in between’) “in light of the authentic, non-sequential” temporality of be-ing-here’s self-conception [Crowell AH, 5]. This authenticity springs from the *breakdown* of all narrativity and all doing, these being constitutive of inauthentic historicity. As opposed to this, Crowell underscores Heidegger’s notion that the phenomena of birth and death and the constancy of the stretchedness ‘in between’, must “be understood from the ‘truth’ of existence, anticipatory resoluteness, which determines the meaning of authentic historicity” [*ibid.*, 7].

This is apt Heideggerian scholarship and provides keen insight: complementary to “death…as the ‘anticipated’, in anticipatory resoluteness”, birth, considered essentially (i.e., existentially) as *re-birth*, is “resolve, or choice, *itself*” [*ibid.*, 7], i.e., the ‘resoluteness’ of anticipatory resoluteness.

Crowell also develops deep insight into the central role which affective experience plays in authentic selfhood: “authentic self-understanding…is nothing but the articulation of

a specific affect: *Angst* ... which refuses absorption in the ongoing narrative” [*ibid.*, 6]. Affective meaning has its “own phenomenological texture, a meaning that is not so easily given a narrative interpretation” [*ibid.*] and is correlated with ‘what it means *to be*, not ‘what it means *to do*’ [*ibid.*, 6, 7]. Further, affective meaning is “another sort of intelligibility, one that speaks outside of history, in my body, in my feelings, and my attunement to the world as I find it now” [*ibid.*, 8].

This all represents an important recognition of the *independence of the factual disclosure* from its contributions to the narrativist or hermeneutic notion of self-identity – that is, *from the projective understanding* and *its* intelligibility. Crowell even specifically recognizes that the concept of thrownness should be understood as referring to “facticity as absolute opacity of existence, the *Undurchsichtigkeit* precisely of the ‘whence and the whither’” [*ibid.*, 7]. This is especially important, as the compulsion for grounding be-ing-here, despite the nullity of projection and existence as thrownness, is precisely what takes Heidegger’s analysis, and the hermeneutic-narrativist offshoot of Heidegger, astray – particularly in its transformation of facticity (disclosed by *moods*) into thrownness, *i.e.*, thrown *projection*.

However, the *factual* phenomenon of birth is, nonetheless, *even here*, usurped by an *existential* interpretation: as Heidegger says, be-ing-here’s “‘birth’ is caught up into its existence” [H391, BT443] – this means, for Crowell, that “birth itself, like death, becomes a *possibility* for Dasein...existential birth is always a *re-birth*” and the phenomenon of birth must “be understood *from the ‘truth’ of existence*” [Crowell, AH, 7].

With this, the important ontological role of birth in the structuring of a liberated facticity of be-ing-here (liberated from the tyranny of existence/understanding [projection]) is
compromised. Therewith a liberated notion of the disclosedness of *Befindlichkeit* or moods and affects is, once again, obscured. For birth is no possibility of existential projection but an unimpeachable *fact* of the *giftedness* of be-ing-here, a basis for the appreciative affects of joy, marvelling, astonishment and their attendant felt meanings. Birth need not be ‘taken up’ into existence, so much as allowed to release existence from its grounding compulsion, and to ‘open up’ the *appreciation* of the felt meanings of be-ing-here and be-ing itself.

For a fully worked out phenomenology of feeling, we can look to Quentin Smith’s *The Felt Meanings of the World*. This work inspires and underscores this thesis. Let us now see what this phenomenology of feeling shows us and then ponder how it could be incorporated into the Heideggerian ‘project’ in a constructive way.
PART TWO

QUENTIN SMITH’S
PHENOMENOLOGY OF FEELING
IN
THE FELT MEANINGS
OF THE WORLD
CHAPTER VII. Introduction to Smith’s Philosophical Orientation

§27. The spiritual orientation of the work

In Of Spirit, Jacques Derrida traces the use of the word “spirit” through Heidegger’s oeuvre and speaks of a ‘promise’, particularly in the late Heideggerian text (after 1958), of spiritual regeneration. This is characterized as a “coming back from night…towards a more matutinal dawn”, which happens from or as “a more originary essence of time”, wherein “the end…precedes the beginning” [Derrida, 1989, 91]. This promise “poses [projects?] nothing [it dis-poses, then] …it does not put forward, [rather] it speaks” [Ibid., 93] from before the beginning, from some place or time that is “origin-heterogeneous” [Ibid., 113]. It is a discourse which is “an affirmation … a yes before all opposition of yes and no” [Ibid., 94], an “affirmation anterior to any question” [Ibid.,131], “preceding it [questioning] without belonging to it” [Ibid., 94], from the realm of the “pre-archi-originary” [Ibid.,112]. Similar to the silent ‘call of conscience’ in Being and Time, as the “call of Being” [Ibid., 94], the discourse of this spiritual promise is anterior, in some sense, to language itself: “the promise has already taken place wherever language comes” [Ibid., 94]. The announcement of this ‘happening before the origin’ – “that”, says Derrida, “is the style of temporality or historiality [historicality: Geschichtlichkeit], that is a coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen” [Ibid., 94].
In the seven-page footnote\textsuperscript{132} that stems from this discussion, Derrida expands on some of these themes. Before questioning,

Language is already there, in advance...before any contract, a sort of promise of originary alliance to which we must have in some sense already acquiesced, already said yes, given a pledge [gage, en français]. [Ibid., 129].

Further, before the word is the ‘yes’ of the “wordless word” of the silent voice of Ereignis, speaking the “pre-originary pledge”, which is a “memory [that] comes before any particular recollection” [Ibid., 130]. The thought about the Ereignis, which is a “listening” and a letting-oneself-say and not a questioning” [Ibid., 134], “takes its bearings from this pre-verbal acquiescence which responds – engages – to the address [Zuspruch]” [Ibid., 135].

In a similar vein, and speaking specifically of mood or disposition (Stimmung/Befindlichkeit) as the mode of openness of this acquiescence to this silent address of Being, Michel Haar says,

...being disposed is interpreted as the first resonance in man of the Anspruch (demanding address) of being [Sein], the first hearing of its sending. Stimmung is understood as Entsprechung, that is, response and ‘correspondence’ to the Stimme (voice) of being. [Haar, 1992, 160]

So, before – that is, more primordial than – questioning, which is the hallmark of the early and middle Heidegger, is the discourse which can ‘question the question’ and so emerge beyond questioning into a deeper primordiality, into a listening which “tips over into the memory of a language, of an experience of language ‘older’ than it [questioning], always anterior and presupposed” [Haar, 1992, 129]. This ‘language’ ‘before the word’ is an acquiescence to something prior to language itself or, at least, acquiescence to a fount of language – the Entsprechung or attuned response to Being is, says Haar, a “speaking

\textsuperscript{132} Derrida, 1989; footnote 5 of Chapter IX; pgs. 129-136.
beginning with a silence in language” [Ibid., note 8, p.172]. This is similar, again, to the acquiescence to the verdict of the existential guilt and nullity of thrown projection in the ‘willing-to-have-a-conscience’ (resoluteness) of Being and Time. The similarity, though, belies the important difference being articulated here, which is the transformation of Heidegger’s thinking from the imperatives of ‘the question’ (fully at work in Being and Time) to those of an acquiescent listening and meditation upon ‘the gift’ of the Event. Resoluteness and releasement, though the one can, obviously, lead into the other, are fundamentally different orientations. But not only different: contrary to the tendency of Heidegger’s early interpretations, not only is acquiescence to the ‘constant presence’ of what is always ‘already there’, sheer be-ing, a more metaphysically profound attitude than the questioning attitude (even if the latter can provide us with the access of the former), it is also a more profound attitude than the acquiescence to the constant guilt, already there, of be-ing-here (even, too, if this latter can, also, provide us access to be-ing itself).

What I want to emphasize with all this is, first, the recognition, in the context of spiritual renewal, of a philosophical (not to say ‘reflective’) attitude or orientation with the structure of a receptive submission and acquiescence to something that one is already involved in or which is already, undeniably, ‘there’. Perhaps more accurately, this is acquiescence to something that one has already submitted to.\footnote{Though this isn’t necessarily Derrida’s own view, he appears to write of this aspect of Heidegger with a certain sympathy.} We should immediately be reminded, here, in the Heideggerian context, of Heidegger’s analysis of thrownness and \textit{Befindlichkeit}. I wish to emphasize this \textit{a priori} ‘receptivity’ for meaning (which is similar, structurally, to Kant’s non-sensible ‘feeling of respect’) and, with this receptivity, the
accompanying and inherent possibility of acquiescence growing into a positive ‘appreciation’ (whether of positive or negative realities). This, as opposed to the guilty and alienated nullity of our abandonment to ‘thrownness’ in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, and the explicit or muted violence of the struggle for freedom and truth which characterizes, each in their own way, both Heidegger and the essence of Western metaphysics in its, broadly, rationalist form.

Secondly, I want to point out the move beyond language, at least in its familiar sense, even if it takes, as it does in Heidegger, the form of a move to Language ‘itself’, the discourse which speaks in “the silent peal of stillness” [PLT, 207]. This move could rather be (as it indeed became, in a certain sense and to a degree, during Heidegger’s “metaphysical decade” [1927-37])\(^{134}\) a move into that other mode of disclosure (other to understanding and discourse), *Befindlichkeit* – ‘dis-position’, the mode of openness of moods and affectivity in general. Language may be the ‘house of Being’ but moods and affects attune to the uncanniness of be-ing itself.

Thirdly, I want to introduce the strange temporality we encounter in Heidegger, which we will be working towards transforming with our structural reinterpretation of the *Daseinanalytik*. The latter will be based on a reinterpretation of the modes of disclosure and the assertion of pre-eminence of the ‘dis-positional’ disclosure over projective and ‘discoursive’ disclosures. Heidegger’s renowned ‘priority of the future’, based on the existential significance of being-toward-death, provides us with the existential-temporal basis (*Zeltlichkeit*) for what unfolds in the *Temporale* ontology of be-ing itself, as what Derrida

\(^{134}\) The expression is S.G. Crowell’s: see [Crowell, 2001, 225]. See particularly Heidegger’s *What is Metaphysics, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* and *Introduction to Metaphysics*. 
calls, as we have seen, a kind of temporality wherein “the end...precedes the beginning” [Of Spirit, 91]. This may be crucial for understanding the temporal ontology of existence. It is questionable, though, whether it suffices for the full temporality of be-ing-here (factual existence or ‘care’) or whether it suffices, specifically, for the ‘happening’ (or however one wishes to characterize it) of Be-ing itself.

Quentin Smith views his own metaphysics of feeling in The Felt Meanings of the World as “a response to [the world-whole’s] unconditional demand to be mediately as well as immediately appreciated” [FM, 318] and as a necessary part of a ‘spiritual regeneration’ from the nihilism of our current spiritual-historical situation. Carrying out the ‘global summons’ is a response to the affect of global devotion and is sustained by that “freely repeatable experience” that “unifies all my global affects, moods, and strivings...the feeling of global resoluteness” [FM, 320]. This resoluteness is, much like Heidegger’s, a “willing-onto-death, a determination to fulfill the global mission or perish in the attempt” [FM, 321]. Though carrying out the global summons is ‘living for the whole’ and a way of “increasing its importance” [FM, 319], it is, says Smith, a response to a purposelessly existing world-whole (appreciated in global despair), a response and purpose which world-parts did not come into existence for but which we are “able to adopt once [we] do exist” [FM, 323].

Though we shall not be able to consider, in this work, all the metaphysical implications of Smith’s phenomenology of feeling, let us, nonetheless, get acquainted with its orientation, before we elaborate that phenomenology itself.
§28. The Metaphysics of Reason vs. The Metaphysics of Feeling

In Quentin Smith’s metaphysics of feeling, *The Felt Meanings of the World*, the author criticizes the metaphysical tradition for its assumption that only reasoning can discover a meaning of the world as a whole. Because in our time it has been shown that, even if such a meaning were not itself incoherent, we could anyway not possibly know it, the result of this rationalist metaphysical assumption inevitably leads to a nihilistic conclusion. Would it not, then, asks Smith, be more in tune with our spiritual salvation to realize that “the quest for such reasons is a degenerate form of spirituality” [FM, 319] and to “explore the possibility that there is another mode of access to a meaning of the world”? [FM, xv]. Smith’s book purports to show that feelings provide this access and that the world itself possesses a felt meaningfulness, indeed an array of felt meanings. Metaphysical truth and spiritual regeneration hinge upon our “inwardly adopting an appreciative rather than explanative relation to the world-whole” [FM, 319].

Smith establishes the above scenario in structural and historical detail, which we can only parse here. The *metaphysics of rational meaning* is structurally articulated in terms of the question “Why”: Why does the world exist? And why does the world have this nature? These questions are answered in terms of a “Because…” which constitutes a first reason (the uncaused cause *i.e.*, God), a series of intermediate teleological reasons, and the final reason (a purposeless purpose, *i.e.*, Goodness), which reverts back to the first reason. Smith charts a development of rational metaphysics, from Plato’s notion of the self-moved mover and our participation in the Idea of the Good, or contemplation of the divine (Aristotle), through numerous refinements and distinctions (such as that between essence and existence in Avicenna and its development in Leibniz and other thinkers), through Hume’s attacks on the
basic concepts of rational metaphysics and their re-establishment "along transcendental lines" [FM, 5] by Kant and Fichte, to the completion of the project of rational meaning in Hegel’s Absolute Idea and its self-conscious achievement in its own realization.

Smith then outlines the development of an epoch of rational meaninglessness, noted first in structural changes in poetry, fiction, music, painting, and science. In philosophy, this era starts with Schopenhauer and culminates in contemporary philosophical movements, both analytical and phenomenological. This era offers several cogent material and formal critiques of the basic concepts of first and final reasons. The formal criticisms focus "on the very assumption that reason is capable of demonstrating a rational meaning for the world" [FM, 10], essentially showing that even if arguments for rational meaning are valid in logical form, they would still "remain unverifiable and empty unless...grounded in an observation or intuition" – which is, in principle, impossible [ibid.]. From Wittgenstein’s notion that a reason for the world must lie beyond the world and is therefore unknowable and inexpressible, and Carnap’s reduction of all metaphysical statements to nonsense, to Heidegger’s veiled ‘whence and whither’ and Sartre’s nausea at the utter meaninglessness of sheer be-ing, it becomes clear that “there is no knowable reason that explains why the world exists and has the nature it does” [FM, 12]. This, then, is the nihilist conclusion of the rational quest.

But the thinkers from both the epoch of rational meaning and the epoch of rational meaninglessness share the same fundamental presupposition “that a meaning of the world can only be a rational meaning, such that if the world lacks a rational meaning, it can have no other meaning” [FM, 12]. Smith’s criticism of the Heidegger of 1927-1935 is pertinent here, for in some respects he [Heidegger] overcame the presuppositions of the rational metaphysical tradition more than any other philosopher. However, at
the very deepest level, Heidegger's 'overcoming' of the rational metaphysical tradition still remains within this tradition. It can be shown that although Heidegger characterized 'reasons' (Grundes) in a different way than did traditional metaphysicians, and although his manner of questing after or 'thinking' (Denken) about reasons is different, Heidegger still held the presupposition that metaphysics is at bottom an inquiry about reasons. [FM, 13].

That Heidegger holds that metaphysics is still an inquiry about reasons, Smith shows in a brief analysis of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, which, in asking the fundamental metaphysical question 'Why is there being (Seindes) at all and not rather nothing?', questions after the reason (Grund) for the Being (the be-ing: Sein) of being (Seiendes), that is, seeks to explain Being itself. Even the late Heidegger is thought to still think of Being in a context of reasons in that it is "a meditative thinking about Being as the reasonless (Ab-grund)" [FM, 329]. This last may appear to be a doubtful critique but if it seems strange to see Heidegger placed in the rationalist camp, this should rather indicate that a more radical and far-reaching notion of 'rationalist' than the standard one is being used here and that a very different notion of meaning is being appealed to.

The main tenet of rationalist metaphysics, then, is that metaphysics is properly a quest after a rational meaning for the whole of being, and reason is the faculty that will grasp this meaning, if it is grasppable at all. Reason, therefore, is taken to be the essence of man. This, then, obviously precludes the possibility that feeling has any essential metaphysical import. Smith charts the historical development of the rationalist view of feelings, which consists of a systematic disparagement of the cognitive import of feeling. This disparagement is exemplified in such as the following standard propositions:

Feelings are true inasmuch as they are rational (proceed as an effect of a rational cognition): such feelings are the 'higher feelings' or 'rational pleasures'.
Feelings possess no truth that is not possessed in a superior way by reason. Feelings not based on reason are ‘confused thoughts’ (Descartes), ‘inadequate ideas’ (Spinoza) or ‘confused perceptions’ (Leibniz), etc.

It is the nature and function of feeling to serve reason (cf. Aristotle’s ‘practical syllogism’) [from FM, 15-16].

Obviously the above view on feeling results from a perspective of reason. What, asks Smith, if we tried to understand feelings from their own perspective, in their own terms? If we do so, it will be seen that

they [feelings] relate, not to rational meaning, but to felt meanings, to the ways in which things are *important*. They are *appreciations* of things for being important. [FM, 19].

*Metaphysical* feelings, then, are appreciations of the way in which the world as a whole – or, simply, the “world-whole” – is important. Smith distinguishes these ‘extra-rational’ though “effable” metaphysical feelings right away from supra-rational, ineffable mystical feelings. We shall leave this, however, until later.

We can characterize a metaphysics of feeling, in an introductory manner, by some of its essential contrasts with the metaphysics of reason. For example, felt meanings answer the question as to how the world is *important* – not as to why it exists. Feelings are appreciative, not explanatory. That is, “if the world [in existing,] has the importance of being fulfilled, this is [not understood through reasoning but is] appreciated, specifically, in the mood of euphoria or the affect of joy” [FM, 20]. If the world exists-even-though-it-could-not-have-existed, this is appreciated as miraculous by the affect of astonishment, rather than as a fact one needs to seek a reason for (Leibniz, Heidegger). Furthermore, importances are not ‘values’ projected onto or even ‘intrinsically attached to’ neutral facts; rather if there are any ‘facts’, in the first place, they are a kind of importance. Moreover, the metaphysics of feeling does not transcend beyond the world to the ground of the world but beyond the *parts* of the
world to the world-whole itself. Metaphysical felt meanings are the way this world is important, as a whole, not the way this world pales in rational significance to a transcendental world of Ideas.

§29. The Method of Appreciative Knowing

Metaphysical feelings have their own kind of adequate expressibility and evidentiality and it is a major part of the metaphysics of feeling to establish the ‘method of appreciative knowing’. Smith offers his metaphysics of feeling not simply as an alternative approach, alongside rational metaphysics, but as the evidentially true standard of metaphysics, entailing a rejection of rationalist metaphysics notions as false. The entire book is a running discourse to this effect, at times focusing on explicit arguments which demonstrate the falseness of key rationalist concepts, presuppositions, and arguments and, at times, supplying a wealth of positive phenomenological evidence, which substantiates the fruitfulness of Smith’s own perspective – or, perhaps more accurately, which articulate that perspective in the first place. It will serve our purposes here, which are primarily expository, to put forward only Smith’s main arguments and orientation, while focusing on the actual phenomenology of feeling.

The claim to exclusive metaphysical truth for the metaphysics of feeling entails that there is a kind of knowing proper to feelings themselves. Smith offers a three-tiered appreciative method of metaphysical knowing, which develops an “organic synthesis” [FM, 27] of intuitions and verbal significations. This method puts in practice the fundamental insight, to be established during the course of the work, that all phenomena are important and that “every phenomenon is describable in both evocative and exact ways” [FM, 75].
At the first level of this appreciative method are the *immediate intuitive feelings*—moods and affects—which are direct feelings of the presence of a global importance, "without the intermediary of verbal significations, mental imagery, or any sort of discursive or inferential thought" [FM, 25]. These are immediate appreciations and can be seen as a kind of felt *evidence*, based on the principle, later established in detail, that if something appears in intuition to be the case, then, *in the absence of extrinsic grounds for believing otherwise*, it *is* the case (cf. Smith's 'principle of veridical seeming' [FM, 131ff. and §32.iii.b, here]). Absolute skepticism regarding intuition is self-voiding and incoherent, leaving only the potential 'contradiction' of conflicting intuitions. One of the aims of the metaphysics of feeling is to show, via astute articulation of the kinds of feelings and felt meanings, there are few if any such contradictions within feelings themselves.

The second level of methodological feelings is the first level of *linguistic* articulation: that of the *afterglowing reappreciation*. In the dissipation of the immediate presence of the global importance in direct intuitive appreciation, "there lingers an 'afterglow' of the feeling and of the appearance of the importance... as it appeared during the height of the feeling". I can "relive [it] in immediate memory" and "allow its vividly retained presence to evoke in me thought and linguistic formations that capture and articulate its nature" (as well, we may add, as evoking musical or visual images which do the same). These articulations are "vague in their sense but rich in connotations"—that is, poetic evocations which try to "capture the intuitively felt meanings as intuitively felt" [FM, 25]. For example, here is a part of Smith’s afterglowing reappreciation of the affect of *revering*:

---

135 This formalizes into method Heidegger's remark that, "in the lucid vision which supervenes while yet the experience is fresh in our memory" [WM, 337], we can articulate various aspects of the experience.
I am taking a walk late at night along the deserted streets of a suburb. I feel open to the silent grandeur of everything, of the whole world that stretches far beyond me and above me. I feel there to be a solemn and majestic aura that enfolds the rooftops, trees, and the gleaming stars. Soft tremors of reverence arise in me, and I stop and kneel before a fence; I fold my hands and rest them on the top railing. I look up, deep into the starry night. The stars shine in imperial splendour, and beyond them, there is everything else...The whole of all these things! Unspeakably august, supreme, surpassing all that I am, so greatly surpassing!... ...Before this unsurpassably great and imperial whole, I am almost a nothing, utterly subordinated in my reality as a dependent part of it. I bow my head in the hushed silence of reverence. [FM, 246-7]

One can see, in such descriptions, the spontaneous generation of 'ideas' from the 'things themselves' as revealed intuitively – proto-thoughts with an implicit conceptual content. Such reappreciative afterglows also gradually burn themselves out and a new kind of reappreciation can emerge, the second-level linguistic articulations, those of concentrative reappreciation, which make explicit the fascinating, implicit conceptual content of the 'rich connotations'. The unitary phenomenon experienced in intuitive appreciation and evoked in the afterglowing reappreciation can now be unpacked in its structural and conceptual content, in a detailed and precise way. The concentrative reappreciation preserves the givenness of the previous moments by basing its questioning and articulating upon them, integrating them into a higher level articulation.

For example, Smith shows that the above description of reverence leads to a complex articulation of the importance of supremacy, "the world's complex feature of being a maximally great and fulfilled superordinate" [FM, 249]. Some of this analysis, based on the reappreciative descriptions, is encapsulated in the following: The world-whole is independent of me and can happen without appearing to me; while I am dependent upon it. The world-
whole is superordinate to me, the greatest possible whole: it is maximally great.\textsuperscript{136} And the world-whole is an ontologically fulfilled whole in that it happens, exists. This, the fact that the world-whole is fulfilled in happening (purely appreciated in the affect of joy) is an essential ingredient to its supremacy – the world-whole must happen at all, so that it can also happen independently of me, the fact of which is (part of) what is purely appreciated in revering.

These last two stages of methodological feelings enter the sphere of language. Words, for Smith, have an essentially signifying importance: they "elicit appreciations of importances other than themselves" [FM, 73]. They do so between the extremes of evocativeness (suggestive, intimative, vague) and exactness (explicit, differentiating) – the same phenomena are signified by these, but signified in different manners. For example, the enchanted exclamation that "It's a beautiful day!" is referring to the same state of affairs – the beautiful day – as the more precise, though less suggestive, "The sun is shining in a cloudless blue sky and a warm breeze is blowing" [FM, 74]. In some cases – for example, for what Smith will call 'feeling-flows' (about which, more, later) – metaphorical language is the most precise language possible, for "in regard to feeling-flows, there are no literal articulations; there are only more or less exact metaphorical articulations" [FM, 75]. Furthermore, what is exact in a description of moods will be relatively inexact in a description of affects.

\textsuperscript{136} Smith's own self-critique (in personal communication and perhaps elsewhere) to the effect that, in \textit{Felt Meanings}, the world-whole is only the whole of this actual world and not of this world \textit{and} all the possible worlds which are not actual yet exist as possible \textit{and} all the impossible worlds (etc.?), leads one to wonder at the retroactive effect this may have on the metaphysics of feeling. Is such a state of affairs as the-actual-world-plus-the-possible-plus-the-impossible-worlds something one could ever possibly affectively or moodyly intuit? Or is it simply a rational construction which one could affectively respond to, as one can affectively respond to an Idea (perhaps along the lines of Husserlian intuition of essences...)?
Smith will show, in detail, how the ‘fall’ away from, and degeneration of, a possible metaphysics of feeling occurred and occurs when our concentrative reappreciation, “infatuated” with itself and its explications” and striving to become an “independent and self-sufficient source of truth” [FM, 94], flattens out reality into neutral contours and establishes a false fact/value dichotomy, denigrating the latter part of the distinction in its various manifestations. Smith sees this as a “withdrawing from reality and denying [of] the basic conditions of truth” [FM, 93]. We shall discuss this more after some of the basics of the phenomenology of feeling have been elucidated.

With this method and with a precise analysis and description of the internal characteristics of feeling, such as 1) the sensuous feelings of feeling-flows: the feeling sensations of the ‘I’ and feeling tonalities of the world, and 2) the feeling awareness of importances (sources of feeling flows), and 3) the distinction between moods and affects137 – with these analyses, Smith puts himself into the position of being able to articulate and structure the importances or felt meanings of the world-whole – that is, carry through a felt metaphysics. While we shall not here be concerned with the explicit development of Smith’s metaphysics, we shall, in the rest of this Part Two, focus on the development of Smith’s phenomenology of feeling with the intent of, then, in Part Three, examining Heidegger’s own phenomenology of dis-position, both for its own sake and in light of the possible modifications implied by Smith’s own phenomenology.

137 Moods and affects — the latter of which, with their focused character, enable us to precisely capture aspects of the appreciated importances, which the relatively unfocused character of moods leaves vague and unarticulated. (See §30). P. Goldie underscores the same point. Cf., [Goldie, 2000], especially chapter 6.
CHAPTER VIII. The Phenomenology of Feeling

It will be the task of the next three chapters to work out Smith’s basic phenomenology of feeling with a view to showing the way in which feelings themselves open out onto the metaphysical whole, the ‘world-whole’.

Traditionally (Husserl, Scheler, von Hildebrand, Heidegger, Strasser, et al), phenomenology seeks to articulate the internal constitution of ‘feeling acts’. That is, rather than explain them away psychologically or physiologically by their external ‘causes’ or announce an impossibility in construing the felt quality of a feeling, phenomenology seeks to interpret feelings as acts of awareness (or consciousness or disclosure) which have or refer to their own kind of ‘objects’ (or ‘matters’ or ‘meanings’) and have an expressible internal qualitative core or manner (the ‘how’) of intending these ‘objects’.¹³⁸ Smith’s phenomenology radicalizes these tendencies and, as we shall see, overturns their basic ‘epistemological’¹³⁹ presuppositions. This prepares the way for his breakthrough into a new metaphysical orientation.

For Smith,

Each concrete experience of feeling consists of a feeling-sensation and a feeling-awareness, and the correlated world-as-felt consists of a sensuously

---

¹³⁸ See Peter Goldie’s The Emotions (especially chapter 3) for a recent work in “Anglo-Saxon philosophy” [Goldie, 2000, 9] which maintains a unique felt intentionality and the importance of the uneliminable qualitative content of feeling itself, in his notion of ‘feeling-towards’.

¹³⁹ I put scarequotes around ‘epistemological’ because of its root term, episteme, referring to ‘thought’—whereas we are here engaged in what might be, using the Greek heritage, more aptly described as a ‘pathological’ revolution...except for that would also deserve scarequotes to ward off the (negative) psychological connotations.
felt aspect [i.e., a feeling tonality] and an important aspect that is apprehended in the feeling-awareness. [FM, 33, my emphases].

We shall see that it is through discovering the source of the feeling-tonalities of the world that we open upon the felt meanings of the world. But what exactly are these feeling-sensations correlated with feeling-tonalities, and feeling-awarenesses correlated with importances?

§30 Feeling-flows and the sensuously felt regions of the world

i) Feeling-sensations of the ‘I that feels’

Feeling-sensations (and feeling-tonalities, which will be described in the next section) are sensuous feelings. The traditional internal characterization of the sensation of feeling is rather meager: feelings are pleasurable or painful. Feelings, then, are more richly articulated by explaining them by reference to their external characteristics. Rather than the traditional external characterization of a feeling-sensation, i.e., as a “pleasurable or painful consequences of a [causal] reason” [FM, 36 - my emphasis], Smith seeks to articulate the determinations found within the qualititative feeling-sensations themselves, beyond the mere characterization of them as pleasurable or painful. Though we will not, as Smith does, go into detail about the history of the traditional lack of recognition of the internal characteristics of sensuous feelings and the world as sensuously felt, some of the essential and typical aspects of the tradition can be portrayed, as Smith portrays them, in order to give us some context for the interpretive innovations he brings into play.

First, Aristotle deals with affects (pathē) and not moods and this becomes paradigmatic for the tradition’s various ‘treatises on the passions’. We shall see later that
moods and affects are two different species of feeling, with different structures, different phenomenal content, and different possibilities for knowledge. For Aristotle, affects are internally distinguished as painful or pleasurable and further distinguished as expressions of soul. They are therefore recognized as distinct from the ‘functional’ pleasures or pains associated with the senses – but this internal distinction is not developed further. It is also not sufficient to distinguish the affects from one another. Rather Aristotle distinguishes them by three external factors. These factors are 1) the cause, 2) the people about whom the affect is felt, and 3) the states of mind or character which preconditions the affect.

Thus, though pity and envy are both feelings of pain, they are distinguished 1) by their causes: pity is “caused by the sight of a destructive or painful evil” [Aristotle, 2001, 1397], while envy is “caused by the sight of...riches, power, aristocratic birth” [Ibid., 1401]; 2) by their about-whom: pity is about someone who does not deserve the evil inflicted upon them, while envy is about our equals; and 3) by their pre-dispositions: pity is said to be felt by elderly or weak men [1], while envy is felt by those pre-disposed to small-mindedness and ambition (from Rhetoric II, 8 and 10).

Despite various mutations, and though the third factor is generally abandoned, these external factors remain paradigmatic for Western culture’s interpretation of feeling. The ‘about-whom’ becomes extended to include ‘objects’ in general and also becomes frequently identified with the cause, “so that affects are defined as related to only one external phenomenon, the objective cause” [FM, 37]. The feelings themselves may be recognized, as by Hume, as “simple” and indefinable – there are no possible “just definitions” of them. But, by default, as it were, this can also be turned so that the just definitions are, as in Spinoza, simply those external ‘causal objects’ to which the affect is related. Hume himself wants to
"explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes and effects" [Hume, 1978, 276]. Thereby the affects, rather than being unpacked for themselves, are absorbed into the structures of a causal explanation, one that can easily become one of pure physiological or material causality (as in William James [James, 1884] for example). The phenomenologists, though certainly more attentive to feelings as acts with their own intentionality, were, according to Smith, more concerned with the kinds of intentional acts of the feeling-awareness (ethical, aesthetic, magical, etc.,) which accompany feeling sensations, than with the quality, beyond the standard characteristics of pleasure/pain, of feeling-sensations themselves.

Now, Smith begins his innovations into the phenomenology of feeling by pointing out that “a further internal and typological character of feeling-sensations could have been found, their character of flowing in a certain direction and manner”[FM, 40]. We shall, momentarily, elucidate and exemplify the feeling flows of feeling-sensations but Smith continues, here, with the following concise preview to the course of his metaphysics of feeling:

The discovery of these feelings-flows could have led in turn to the recognition that there are sensuous features of the world correlating to these flowing feeling-sensations, such that the world has a sensuously felt reality of flowing in a certain direction and manner. And [this] could have led in its turn to the further discovery of the sources of the world-flows, the world importances or felt meanings. [FM, 40-1]

The world-flows, here, are the feeling-tonalities, which we shall discuss in the next section.

Feeling-sensations are some of the sensuous phenomena of the feeling ego, the “I that feels”. Smith distinguishes, negatively, the “I that feels” from concepts, from ‘awarenesses-of’, and from both a transcendental and an empirical ego. Positively, this ‘I’ is a “nonsensory ‘something’ (or rather ‘somebody’)” [FM, 41], given, in immediate reflexive awareness, as a
unitary someone who is aware of...feeling-sensations, for example. Smith’s emphasis, here, is that the ‘feeling I’ is not itself an ‘awareness of’ but is that someone who is aware of... The ‘feeling I’ is that personal unity irreducible to its experiences and yet not constitutive of them or its world – rather “the I that feels is a part of the world it experiences, an appreciative part” [FM, 42].

The ‘I that feels’ is a prescientific ‘I’ and the feeling-sensations he or she experiences are to be conceived by other than scientific or, as we might say, ‘ousiological’ categories, beginning with the traditional feeling quality of pleasure or pain. This quality can be more accurately described by the essential feature of the feeling-flow of feeling-sensations. Feeling flows are “feeling-tensions that animate and vitalize the perceptual existents they permeate” [FM, 49], such that the sensuous felt quality of pleasure or pain flows in a certain direction and manner. Smith develops this insight with concrete descriptions of various feeling sensations, showing that they can flow in numerous directions (upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, outwards, etc.) and combinations of directions. The manner of the flow requires that, should we articulate them – and understand them – we should have astute and ‘poetic’ descriptive abilities. The metaphorical language, “evoked by the reappreciated feeling-sensations themselves”, is essential and it would be inappropriate, here, to use conceptual language. [FM, 44].

Let us get a sense of what this means in concreto. The feeling-sensation of pride is described as “flowing upwards in the manner of an inflated rising” [FM, 44]; angry retaliation flows “forward in a violently attacking manner” [FM, 45]; hilarity “flows upwards in a manner of quick, staccato surges” [FM, 45]; joy flows upward and outward in a radiating manner [cf., FM, chapter IV]; fear “flows backwards in a shrinking and cringing
manner" [FM, 45]; anxiety is suspended flow, hovering over an inner abyss in a precarious and quavering manner [cf., FM, 45-6].

Such feeling-sensations "immediately 'adhere' to the 'I that feels'" [FM, 46]. Others, such as fatigue, immediately adhere to the whole of my body and only mediately to the feeling ego. Still other feeling-sensations, such as acute localized pain, adhere to a part of my body and so, also, only mediately to the nonsensory 'I that feels'. These latter feeling-sensations also flow and can be so described (though we will refrain...). Feeling-sensations are not, as William James would have it, mere physiological phenomena. Though there is a 'bodily consciousness' experienced in feeling, "the body does not" — as everyone who has read Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body is aware — "appear in this consciousness as a 'biological body'" [FM, 43]. Any attempt to translate the evocative terminology needed for description of feeling-sensations to literal physiology is "confusing biological and anatomical categories with categories of feeling" [ibid.] A pure physiological explanation of a worried person's contraction of his eyebrows would indicate nothing of the worry the person experiences. Smith characterizes the relation between feeling-flows and physiological 'disturbances' as follows:

The feeling flows are sensuous appearances presented to the 'I that feels' by the physiological disturbances...they are appearances wherein the physiological disturbances appear as qualitative feeling-sensations flowing in a certain direction and manner. [FM, 47].

In short, feeling sensations are the appearances of physiological phenomena, i.e., physical things as appearing and appearing as felt by the feeling ego. This appearing is not thereby 'reducible' to the physiology upon which it is based but signifies a new ontological-discursive realm of (appearing) phenomena — appearance opens up a new realm not comprehensible under the terms of its base.
With the extension of the quality of feeling-sensations into their feature of flowing in a certain manner and direction, we now have internal criteria to make the 'just definitions' of feeling-sensations which have, traditionally, been thought to be impossible. "Strictly speaking", fear, for example, is a "painful sensation of flowing backwards in a cringing manner" and joy is a pleasurable sensation that flows upwards and outwards in a radiating manner [FM, 48]. A possible typology of the internal nature of feeling qualities, based on the new interpretive apparatus, is, in itself, a phenomenological field of investigation, one which Smith cultivates with a yield of over a score of such descriptions. But its further significance is brought out in the implicit correlation of feeling-sensations with the feeling-flows of the world – the feeling-tonalities – through which we can approach the world in its importance.

ii) Feeling tonalities of the world

"The next step", says Smith, is to show that "the qualititative-flows of the I's feeling-sensations are correlated with qualitative-flows that permeate the world", the latter of which are "constitutive of feeling-tonalities." [FM, 48, my italics].

The world, says Smith, "is imbued with feeling-tonalities [only] when it is being apprehended by an I that feels" [ibid.] – and yet these tonalities are, indeed, tonalities of the world. Here Smith immediately makes an important point regarding the ontological and 'epistemological' status of this felt disclosure of the world as sensuously felt: though the feeling-tonalities are features the world possesses, they are "features the world possesses through being felt by the I" [ibid; my emphasis] – implying that if there were no 'feeling I', the world would not possess these features, i.e., that their ontological status is dependent on, if not reducible to, their being 'epistemological' (or 'pathological') phenomena. Though
these qualitative flows permeate and imbue *the world* – not my self, as do feeling-sensations – the feeling tonalities do not, it would appear, belong to the world *per se* but only when apprehended by the feeling ego. However, one could add that, since there are feeling I’s, one *can* say that these tonalities indeed belong to the actual world, even if not to all ‘possible worlds’, such as the one that would exist were there no conscious or feeling beings.

What are feeling-tonalities? Smith articulates the following characteristics. Feeling-tonalities are 1) non-natural flows which are 2) “feeling-tensions that animate and vitalize the perceptual existent they permeate”; 3) “sensuous characters of the existent”. They 4) “animate the entirety of the existent” and 5) can also animate the ‘background’ existents [FM, 49, 50].

Most importantly, feeling-tonalities also 6) *flow* and have a *direction and manner* in which they flow. These flows correspond to the sensation-flows – in fact, they “exactly correlate in their structure to the typological sensuous feelings that are adhering to my ‘I’” [FM, 50], *i.e.*, to the flowing feeling-sensations of the ‘I’. In fact, this is how, Smith remarks, we first can recognize them.

---

This is reminiscent, structurally, of the notorious Heideggerian conundrum regarding be-ing, be-ing-here, and beings, which initially appears as: be-ing does not belong to beings *per se* but only when understood by be-ing-here. Why? Because be-ing ‘is there’ only if be-ing-here is, but beings would continue to be regarding of whether be-ing-here exists. If be-ing-here is not, be-ing would not ‘be there’ though beings would be; therefore, one could conclude, be-ing is not essential to beings. However, upon closer analysis of the terms, one finds that Heidegger is playing off of ambiguities between Being and Truth (or appearance). This conundrum thus resolves to the less controversial view that: be-ing *is understood* only if the understanding of be-ing (*i.e.*, if be-ing-here) is; and beings are understood only if be-ing is understood. Or, the same: beings can only *appear* (“become accessible”) if be-ing ‘is there’, *i.e.*, already understood; be-ing ‘is there’ (*i.e.*, understood) only if be-ing-here is. The essential ontological point is that beings would continue to *be*, though utterly mute and inconceivably alien, even though they were *not understood*, whereas be-ing itself would not continue to be without being understood. Therefore, the sense of be-ing (not beings) is contingent upon being-understood whereas beings are not so contingent but their being-understood is contingent upon be-ing’s being-understood. The point which produces confusion is the notion that be-ing itself, which one would suppose to be the quintessentially ontological phenomenon or category becomes not so much an *ontological* as an *epistemological* or *apparential* category.
For example, in joy, I sensuously "flow upwards in a radiated manner", and the world's existents are also imbued with a "joyousness which springs out of them and gives them an 'uplifted' momentum" [FM, 50]. The following is Smith's description of the feeling-tonality of joy (an affect which will play a central role in the metaphysics of feeling and which we will use throughout [along with other affects] to exemplify each new facet of the phenomenology of feeling):

The trees and pond appear to be radiated upwards with this joyous vitality; the pond appears to be shimmering upwards, the trees appear to be almost springing out of the ground with a joyful momentum, and the branches seem to be reaching toward the heavens. Everything in my view is expanding and leaning upwards, radiating from itself a joyous energy. [FM, 50].

Joy and sadness (which flows downwards in a sinking manner) are similar in that their respective feeling-sensations and feeling-tonalities flow in the same or parallel direction and manner. But this isn't always the case. The correspondence can also be a reverse one, as in fear and repugnance (and others). In feeling fear, I have the sensation of cringing (manner) backwards (direction) from something in the world which flows "forwards towards me, in a looming and menacing manner" [FM, 51]. Only good taste makes me refrain from the example of repugnance. The feeling of awe is distinct, if not unique, in that it flows in all directions: its feeling-sensation flows "backwards and downwards in a shuddering manner" while its feeling-tonality flows "forwards and upwards... in the manner of towering above me and swelling over and dwarfing me" [FM, 52].

Smith notes that, despite the philosophical tradition not articulating feeling-tonalities, there is rich recognition and use made of them in the arts – obvious examples of which are the auditory feeling-tonalities of Beethoven or Bruckner, or the visual affects of van Gogh's paintings. Smith throughout exemplifies particular tonal flows with various artworks,
II. Quentin Smith's Phenomenology of Feeling in *The Felt Meanings of the World*

principally painting and music, representing the visual and auditory senses. There are also
gustatory, olfactory, and tactile feeling-flows; and flows in our imaginative and signitive
modes of awareness. We need not go into these in detail, as we likewise need not go into the
"nontypological" – that is, non-essential – "internal characteristics of sensuous feelings",
such as feeling-colours, feeling-weights, feeling-temperatures, etc., which, though they
enrich the full description of an affect, are "inessential characteristics" [FM, 53].

Smith credits Husserl with having recognized the phenomenon of feeling-tonalities of
the world but notes that Husserl did not understand its significance and did not develop his
insight. 141 The metaphysical significance of feeling-tonalities is that they

are the characters of sensuous feelings that refer to the felt meanings or
importances of the world. The feeling-flows of the world come to appearance
as flowing from sources in the world, and these sources are the world-importances. [FM, 56].

Thus, phenomenologically, following the flow of feeling-sensations leads us to the feeling-
tonalities and following their flow, in turn, brings us to their source in importances of the
world – this is why feeling-flow is an essential and 'typological' characteristic of the
phenomena of feeling. For the phenomena of the world to "flow downwards in a sinking
manner", as in depression, is for them to "flow downwards from somewhere, from a source"
[FM, 56] to which we are referred by the flow.

However, Smith points out – again making an 'epistemological' if not necessarily
immediately phenomenological point – that it is not this source (the importance of the world)
which imbues the world with the tonality but the response to this source by the feeling I,

141 Smith quotes (and translates) the following passage from Husserl (LU, 1913, V, 15b, p.394; [LI #5.§15b,
p574]): "...attaching to the presentation there is a pleasure-sensation, which at the same time is located and
appréhended as a feeling-excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject and also as an objective property:
the event appears as if it were bathed in a rosy gleam."
which does so. The situation is analogous to the linguistic situation wherein the felt realities are allowed to ‘speak for themselves’ by inspiring evocative metaphorical articulation – but it is the ‘linguistic I’, so to speak, that actually makes the linguistic response. In the present situation, the ‘feeling I’, in response to the important source’s “demand”, “paints” the tonality on the world’ and paints it “as [as if?] flowing from the importance” [FM, 56]. It would appear that this is a kind of ontologically creative act, for ‘the paint sticks’… In this sense, humans can be seen as enhancing the overall importance of the world.

It should be borne in mind that we do not appear to yet have any phenomenological evidence for this ‘epistemological’ position of Smith’s, viz., that it is the feeling I, not the world itself, that is the ‘source’ of the tonal flow. Rather, it would seem, we have evidence for the reverse conclusion. For, as Smith says, we experience the tonality as flowing from, i.e., emanating from the importance. What consideration overrides this, leading to the conclusion that it is actually we who paint the world with its felt tonalities?

Let us try to grasp this state of affairs better. ‘Flowing from a source’ requires

[1] the ‘I’ that bestows the tonality as flowing form a source and [2] the importance that so to speak ‘demands’ or ‘invites’ the I to appreciatively respond to the importance by imbuing the world with a tonality that flows from the importance. [FM, 56; my emphases].

It appears, then, that I, as my appreciative response to the importance that is the source of these feeling-flows, imbue the world with feeling-tonalities (as well as the feeling-sensations in myself) [FM, 56-7]. I am, perhaps, a ‘source’ as agent – but I am an agent as medium, responding to the world’s importance, which is the source for my ‘motivation’ to paint or imbue the world with tonality. One could say, then, that I am subject to the

---

142 cf., Husserl [LI #5,§15b, p574, continuing from the passage quoted in the previous footnote(7)): “The event thus pleasingly painted now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach...” .
importance but I am the non-constitutive and appreciative subject of the feeling-flows, if not, precisely, their 'source'. That is, if we can use these terms at all, I am a feeling-subject, one who is appreciatively subject to importances but also, as appreciative, subject of the sensual flows; this 'subject', though, is a responsive and participating 'source'. But here we are perhaps using the word 'source' ambiguously, conflating a causal sense (which is not meant in Smith's usage – as we shall see, explicitly when discussing moods), with the sense of being a fount of the flow of feeling-tonalities. Further, we are, perhaps, confounding matters with terms borrowed from the rationalist tradition and unforgivingly laden with its meanings.

In fact, Smith is saying that we are not to confuse the source of the tonal flow, i.e., the importance(s) of the world, with that which imbues the world with the tonal flow, i.e., the feeling I. That is, the source does not itself imbue but does so through the medium of the I; and the feeling I is not the source of the flow but, as we have seen, the appreciator subject to the source and responsive of the flow. The source does not imbue the world but rather emanates the flow, inspiring us to imbue the world. Unless appreciated by a feeling I, the emanation would not imbue the world and the world, while remaining important, would remain only potentially saturated with sensuous flow.

iii) The "great sensuous metaphysical regions of the world" and their sources

This implies, also, that there is another aspect of the 'feeling I', aside from the 'I that sensuously feels' and imbibes feeling flows. This distinct, if not detachable, aspect is that which is aware of the important sources of such flows, viz., feeling-awareness. Phenomenologically, the first appearance of feeling-awarenesses is in the recognition of the emanative character of the feeling-flows, that is, "the felt character of the tonalities as
flowing from a source" [FM, 57, my emphasis]. That is, the initial evidence for a feeling-awareness is in the recognition of the importance, which is not a sensuous flow, yet is somehow apprehended. The feeling-flows themselves are sensuous phenomena but their quality of ‘flowing from a source’ bespeaks a nonsensuous element within the sensuous itself, manifested sensuously as an emanation (from a source) and nonsensuously as the source itself. The nonsensuous awareness of the nonsensuous source is what we call the feeling-awareness.

Before we focus on feeling-awarenesses (see §5), however, there is more to appreciate in the sensuous realm. The sources, the importances of the world, emanate feeling-flows, which we sensuously experience, in our imbuing response, as the flows of the feeling-tonalities. Furthermore, we experience these flows as emanating with differing depth and breadth from these sources. That is, some feeling-tonalities flow from sources deep in the interior of the world and others from the shallow sensory surface of the world. And those that emanate from the whole of the interior or surface are broad emanations, while those flows that emanate from but a part of this interior or surface are narrow emanations. We shall not exemplify the four possibilities here (narrow and shallow, broad and shallow, narrow and deep, broad and deep) but rather focus particularly on the broad and deep world-emanations, for they are of metaphysical significance. Broad and deep world-emanations emanate flows, which

have their source in the whole interior of the world ...[and] emanate from deep within the whole sensible surface of the world. Such tonal flows are experienced in global moods and affects. [FM, 60].

Through the sensational and tonal flows of my ‘global moods and affects’, I am sensuously connected with the ‘metaphysical interior’ which emanates these flows. Specifically, in the
'global tonal flows', the sensuous flow of broad and deep world-emanations, I am "carried into the great sensuous metaphysical regions of the world", "radiating to the celestial peak" in global joy, "cast down to the nethermost region" in global despair, and "frozen in the motionless silence that obtains in the absolute center of the world" in global equanimity [FM, 61]. Somewhere in between these lie the tonal flows of awe, love, fear, serenity, and several other metaphysical feelings. It will become Smith's task to work out the flows and other characteristics of these feelings, and that to which these feelings relate and from which the flows emanate: the global interior, the importances of the world as a whole.

To exemplify this, let us look at Smith's portrayal of the mood of serene contemplation. These very beautiful descriptions take up close to a page but I will condense them in order to show the basic points. In this serene contemplation,

there is felt to emanate from far within the whole sensible surface of the sky, the field, the trees and the strollers, a profound calmness, an all-embracing serene feeling-flow that gently glides upwards. I contemplatively feel adrift in a vast ocean of serenity that diffuses through the whole surface of the world, and gently buoys and lifts everything upwards in one peaceful motion ... [FM, 60].

Smith emphasizes the metaphysical nature of our global felt sensuality and then indicates that the metaphysical sensuous regions also point toward a nonsensuous metaphysical reality.

[I am oriented] to the one inner reality that is behind the surface, the reality that cannot be perceived but is felt to be within the whole of what is disclosed to my senses ... [T]he source is rather the one inner identity possessed by the entire sensible surface ... I feel the intuitive presence of a vast whole that extends far beyond this whole sensible surface and that at the same time encompasses this surface and myself... [FM, 60].

\[143\] As a contemplation, this is a mood which has achieved a foreground, attentive awareness of what, usually, remains as a vague sensing of holistic background or horizontal significance. See §32 i. b.
This, again, is not a nonsensuous reality of reason but of feeling and importance — that is, a nonsensuous reality of felt meaning. By this alone, it is clear that feelings cannot be reduced to mere non-intentional sensuous states but must include some kind of awareness or ‘consciousness of...’ It is these felt meanings which compose the global interior, which encompass the sensuous surface, and which are the ‘regional sources’ of the sensuous global tonal flows. The various importances, which the world-whole has, emanate the various global flows we feel as feeling tonalities and feeling-sensations in our various metaphysical feelings. But sensuous feelings, even metaphysical ones, only make up part of the structure of any ‘feeling-act’ — they are always “conjoined with feeling-awarenesses of importances” [FM, 64]. What, then, are these important sources and the feeling-awarenesses which nonsensuously appreciate them?

§31. Feeling-awarenesses and the world as important

We have seen that feelings consist of sensuous feelings (tonal and sensational feeling-flows) and, accompanying these, feeling-awarenesses of the important sources of these sensuous feelings.

Importances, then, are seen as sources of feeling flows. Smith distinguishes between the feature of being-a-source-of-a-feeling-flow and the something that has this feature. Importances are the latter. That is, importances are the very something of which we are aware, not an attribute which some other unimportant thing may have, perhaps only in relation to ‘us’, perhaps as a value added onto the ‘neutral’ ‘thing’. Neither are they objectively real ‘value-facts’ (Scheler), existing alongside value-neutral facts — if only, perhaps, because, according to Smith, there are no value-neutral facts. With this, Smith
means to undercut the traditional fact/value dichotomy, which he sees as foundational in traditional metaphysics and its interpretation of feeling, including traditional phenomenology’s interpretations. Driving home this point, Smith declares that

_Each and every thing of which we are aware is the source of a feeling-flow, and thus every thing that appears to us appears as an importance._ There is nothing that appears to us as being absolutely unimportant and neutral. [FM, 65].

That is, relatively unimportant things, things which don’t ‘make a difference’ to me, are at least _noteworthy_, otherwise my awareness would not, either focally and attentively or horizontally and marginally, be engaged with it. Smith establishes this with analyses of profound boredom, despair, and indifference, in each case showing that, at the very least, the minimal noteworthiness of their objects supervenes over complete neutrality. Feeling indifference toward something, for example, has a “static, lifeless and inert” feeling-flow which is “basically directionless” though with a “slight downward orientation”, and this feeling flow manifests an appreciation of the “privative importance of lacking the kind of importance that makes a difference” [FM, 66]. That is, supposedly indifferent things are experienced as a positive _lack_. One could envisage an analysis of Sartre’s nausea along these lines as well – the utter meaninglessness of sheer be-ing itself certainly has a powerful emotional significance.

To show that importances are not merely some of the phenomena of the world but all of the phenomena, Smith attacks the fact/value distinction and distinguishes feeling-awarenesses and importances from the ‘feeling of values’ (§31.i, below). And to show that feeling is not just one ‘faculty’ among others but the core of consciousness itself, Smith interprets (in §31.ii) perception and thinking as kinds of feeling-awarenesses. This interpretation concludes with an overview of Smith’s analysis of the generation of the
rationalist world-view, in the degeneration of certain kinds of feeling (§31.iii). We will then be in position to phenomenologically engage at the most primordial level of feeling: the intuitive feelings of moods and affects (§32).

i) *Feeling-awarenesses of importances as distinguished from the 'feeling of values'*

Smith differentiates his orientation from the major representatives of both the analytic and phenomenological theories of the ‘feeling of values’, G. E. Moore and Max Scheler. In the case of Moore, feelings are reduced to the ethical sphere – whereas feelings, in Smith’s sense, though including ethical feelings, have a “far wider range” [FM, 69]. For example, a feeling of mysteriousness has no immediate reference to good/evil or approval/disapproval and a feeling of fear in the face of a hurricane refers to impersonal nature, a realm beyond or other to the human sphere of good and evil.

The case of Scheler is much more complex. In several respects, Scheler’s theory comes closer to Smith’s than almost any other but the difference Smith shows up in their theories is crucial. The difference is instructive as regards Smith’s fundamentally important thesis that “each appearing thing is important in that each and every one of its appearing features is a way in which the thing is important” [FM, 67], a thesis that, if true, *leaves no room for the supposed neutrality of supposed 'facts'*. Scheler, however, distinguishes *value-facts* from value-free physical, psychological, and mathematical facts. This could be seen as an advance over the notion of values as something subjectively ‘added on’ to neutral facts, for these value-facts are ontological rather than normative phenomena. They are “value properties of *things of value*” [FM, 69, my emphasis], as opposed to ‘thingly properties of
neutral things'. These value-facts are intuited in specific feeling acts, such as acts of preferring, of love and hate, etc.

However, Smith rejects both the supposed value-facts and the acts of feeling. This would appear strange, after what we have just understood about the nature of sensuous feelings and nonsensuous feeling-awarenesses. Are not ‘importances’ simply a terminological change from value-facts? And are not the nonsensuous feeling-awarenesses the same as Scheler’s intuitive feeling acts? Despite the apparent resemblance of these phenomena to Scheler’s notions, Smith holds that both the emotional intuition and the nonsensuous value-fact of beauty, supposedly enacted in addition to the experience of the sensuous properties exhibited in a sunset, for example, are fictions based on the standard fact/value dichotomy. The neutral facts, here, are supposed to be the sensuous, physical features of the sunset, which appear, in a sense, alongside the value-fact of nonsensuous beauty.

This might appear to make sense according to Smith’s schema of sensuous feelings and their phenomena and feeling-awarenesses and their phenomena. However, Smith’s criticism appears to arise from his recognition that, in Scheler’s schema, there is a demotion of the indwelling of the felt importance in the sensuous phenomena, that is, of feeling- tonalities. The real state of affairs, according to Smith, is that all these sensuous things, the streaming colours and cloud formations of the sunset, are beautiful, “not something I am nonsensuously intuited” [FM, 70], which devalues the sensuous phenomena.

The beauty at which I am looking is not something different from the glowing colors of the sunset that extend through the blue sky. Rather, it is they. There is no distinction here between neutral and sensuous features of the sunset (its colors) [on the one hand] and a nonsensuous value-property of beauty [on the other]. [FM, 70].
Smith's point would appear to be that there is a distinction between sensuous features and nonsensuous features (feeling-sensations and feeling-tonalities and importances) but that distinction is not tantamount to a fact/value one, one in which the sensuous features becomes neutralized or de-valued, and the nonsensuous feature – the importance – obtains the ontological status of a value-fact, juxtaposed alongside neutral facts. The distinction is tantamount, rather, to a sensuously 'embodied' importance (feeling-tonalities, appreciated in sensuous feelings), distinguished from the nonsensuous importance itself (appreciated in the feeling-awareness), both of which are important, or 'valuable' phenomena. The various colours of the sky of the sunset really are beautiful, and they manifest the importance of beauty itself within my local, sense environment. There can also be other 'instantiations' of the importance of 'Beauty', such as the 'nonsensuous beauty' of a mathematical equation. But this non-sensory phenomenon, too, is not something neutral: rather it, too, has a felt importance which emanates feeling-flows.

According to Smith, the presupposition common to both Scheler and Moore – indeed, to the whole tradition – is 'that the world is divided into value components and neutral components' [FM, 71]. Smith exemplifies this distinction in several other thinkers, notably in Whitehead, who uses Smith's key term, 'importance', but also in a dichotomized way. Heidegger's 'ways of mattering' (in mood), as opposed to the neutral determinations of the present-at-hand, are said also to be within this dichotomizing presupposition, as are his distinctions between understanding, mood, and discourse.

But the important point is that neither facts nor values exist (in this appreciative realm): all phenomena are important.
ii) *Perceiving and Thinking as feeling-awarenesses*

If the fact/value dichotomy is rendered inoperative, then either all phenomena are neither facts nor values, or all phenomena are neutral facts, or all phenomena are values. Since at least *some* phenomena are demonstrably values or ‘valuable’, this means, then, that *all* phenomena must be ‘valuable’. But since values are values, properly, only *within* the fact/value distinction, it is better to rename these ‘valuable’ phenomena – the felt meanings – *importances*. But if *all* phenomena are important, then ‘importance’ is not just a *feature* of phenomena – rather, the *phenomena themselves are importances*. For Smith,

the controversy about whether felt values are ‘projected upon’ or ‘intrinsicly attach to’ facts cannot be applied to the importances studied in the metaphysics of feeling. For if there are no facts, and only importances, then there is nothing upon which importances could be ‘projected’ or to which they could ‘intrinsicly attach’. [FM, 20].

That is, to repeat [FM, 65], *every thing that appears to us appears as an importance*. As we have seen in the section on the ‘method of appreciative knowing’, immediate intuitive feelings – moods and affects – are the direct experience of importances, which *can then be described in both evocative and exact ways* in the afterglowing and concentrative reappreciations, respectively. Smith amalgamates these insights into: *every thing that appears to us appears as an importance and can then be described in both evocative and exact ways.*

But what about our *perceptive* and *thinking* and *willing* and *imaginative* awarenesses? If it is feeling which is aware of importances and *everything* we are aware of is important, then feeling must be, or be the basis of, all our awarenesses of each and every thing. This is precisely what Smith shows with his analyses of perception and thinking as modes of feeling-awareness. As every thing that appears to us is an importance and an importance is a source
of a feeling-flow, *every thing of which we are aware is the source of a feeling-flow*. In the following, we shall exemplify this train of thought regarding perceived things and thought-about things – Smith shows that, they too, are sources of feeling-flows.

a) *Perception*

In the case of perception, Smith distinguishes ‘panoramic hues’ and ‘configured importances’.

*Panoramic hues* are “holistic and unitary impressions”, which are “display features”, the “ways in which our surroundings perceptually appear to be important *as a whole*” [FM, 79]. My whole present environment may be perceived as *eerie*, with each region and each thing within it contributing to this overall tenor. Panoramic hues contain within them hued regions, hued individual things and hued sense-qualities. Analogous to intuitive feelings, perceptions immediately apprehend things *within* importances and the *way of being important* is their hued characteristics. The hues are the way perceived things show themselves *as important*, as sources of feeling-flows, which are, as we have seen, both evocatively and exactly describable. “The auditory hue of eerieeness”, for example, “can be exactly analyzed into a certain pitch, timbre, and intensity, but these exactly determinable characteristics are not what explicitly appear to me...” [FM, 79].

Not only are the hues themselves not to be ‘reduced’ to their exactly determinable characteristics but the *things* which are hued, the ‘concrete things’ which we perceive, are not to be so reduced either. It is essential not to take *these* ‘things’ as the ‘exactly determinable characteristics’ – rather the concrete things which we perceive are *configured importances*. Thus the act of perception is, “in most cases”, an “appreciation of a hue importance and a
configured importance" [FM, 80]. It is "the suspiciously opening gate [which] displays itself to be creaking eerily" and I respond, affectively, to these configured importances as displayed in their sensory hues (the perceptual feeling-tonalities), by, for example, "fearfully cringing backward" (the perceptual feeling-sensation) [ibid.].

Smith observes (and this can serve as exemplary of hues of each of the senses, *mutatis mutandis*):

I hear the *eerie creaking of the gate, the lovely singing of the birds, the mournful droning of the foghorn.* I hear *important things,* and their emitted sounds are *the ways in which they appear to be important.* [FM, 79].

Thus, what explicitly appears are the perceived things *themselves* as imbued sources of feeling-flows, *not* some neutral thing presented by some non-feeling awareness, which can also be 'accompanied' by felt characteristics when perception is 'accompanied' by a feeling-act. This latter standard phenomenological scenario is one that Smith explicitly rejects:

To generalize this by saying that every act of presentation (*Vorstellung*) serves as a foundation for or is conjoined with a feeling-act [as, for example, Husserl], or that every concrete act of consciousness includes an affective awareness [as Scheler], or that every understanding has its mood [as Heidegger]...is to propound precisely the view *against which* my descriptions are directed, the view that feeling-awarenesses are not *identical with* every awareness but *co-exist with* non-feeling-awarenesses . . . [But] *There are no* nonfeeling awarenesses . . . There are *only* feeling-awarenesses and felt features. [FM, 86; my square brackets {as always}].

We shall do well to remember this as regards Heidegger: 'dis-position' ought not be thought of as merely accompanying 'understanding' – rather, dis-position discloses its 'objects' directly and discloses its *own* 'objects'.

The distinction between configured importances and hues corresponds to the traditional distinction between 'extended substances' (or 'material things' or 'primary qualities') and 'sense qualities' (secondary qualities). Smith's historical analysis, featuring
Galileo as the seminal early modern culprit, reveals how configured importances were misinterpreted as unimportant, neutral, mathematical objects, within a universe essentially mathematical in nature; while hues were reduced to features merely of our perceiving. There is much to this analysis and criticism that we must forego, including an exemplified explanation of the scientific, perceptual verification of theoretical constructions via a convenient, duplicitous substitution of important senses of terms for the theoretically constructed, neutral sense. The criticism concludes, “the concept of such [mathematical and scientifically constructed] ‘objects’ is in truth a theoretical construct that has no knowable referents” [FM, 83]; while, further, it is not my perceiving which is hued but the ‘object’ which is hued. That is, to use the earlier mentioned scenario, it is not my perceiving which is eerily creaking but the suspiciously opening gate which does so.

Smith emphasizes the difference between the configured importance – which is still an importance – and its hues, which, as “display features”, can vary and which are relational features of the configured importance, i.e., sensory features acquired in relation to this or that appreciative perceiver… – ‘in relation to…’ but not thereby, as we have seen, ‘reducible to…’. We recall the as yet unresolved epistemological enigma of feeling tonalities: they emanate from the importances of the world but they are ‘painted onto’ and imbue the world by the ‘feeling I’. Smith mentions a distinct but related issue, in context of Galileo’s undemonstrated presupposition that “configured importances are able to exist without displaying themselves to perceptual appreciators” [FM, 85]. This problem is that of the clarification of the importances of existence and appearance, “such that the importance of existence is independent of the importance of appearance” [ibid.]. This task is of central and structural significance for the metaphysics of feeling developed in Part 2 of The Felt
Meanings of the World. As we are here concerned primarily with Smith’s phenomenology, we can only indicate the metaphysical problematic, of the clarification of the relation between importances, appreciators, and apparential relational features, as a task to be resolved (if not here, then elsewhere).

b) Thinking

Thinking is portrayed as an awareness of either signified importances or important significations and thus, also, as a kind of feeling awareness. Signified importances are just the importances we have so far discussed, viz., the configured importances, feeling-flows, and global importances, which are signified in the afterglowing and concentrative, reappreciative ‘thinkings’. Not all importances are signified – as the immediately appreciated importances of moods and affects testify – but they all can become signified. That is to say, according to Smith, all importances can be both evocatively and exactly articulated. Afterglowing thinking focuses on the holistically felt importance (something’s beauty, eerieness, joyfulness, etc.) and attempts to articulate it as felt, while concentrative thinking focuses on the implicit, exact, and detailed nature of the “fascinatingly interesting content” [FM, 87].

‘Thinking-feelings’ can also appreciate important significations, that is, thoughts or “thought-about-phenomena’, in a derivative sense”, ‘at one remove’ from the phenomena themselves – as indicated grammatically by the word ‘important’ as the adjective, and the word ‘significations’ as the noun. In this case, we are not immediately concerned with the phenomena that are signified, so much as with the significations themselves, the phenomena as (already) mediated by imagination or thinking. For example, if we approach a piece of
music purely technically and mathematically or are concerned with the formal structure of an argument, regardless of whether it in fact refers to any reality whatsoever, we are concerning ourselves primarily with significations. But these significations are, themselves, important.

Significations are important in that they are illuminatingly true or misleadingly false, strikingly original or monotonously repetitious, agreeably easy or dismayingly difficult to comprehend, and so on. [FM, 87].

We respond to these important significations with feeling-flows of concentrated interest (perhaps a feeling-sensation of flowing forward and into the signified, in a penetrating manner, as the signified world flows both toward and then away from me in an opening, magnetizing manner) or excitement or boredom or dismay, as the case may be. Smith points out that, not only are ‘thinkings’ awarenesses of importances, but they are themselves importances, inasmuch as each occurrence of them, whether explicitly and attentively or marginally and unreflectively, modifies (“restructures or retinges” [FM, 88]) the current or retained feeling-flow. Smith remarks that this is indeed true of all awarenesses.

Once again, Smith enters into extensive analyses of mathematical and scientific thinking, developing the same basic criticism of the importance/neutral dichotomy governing the rationalist discourse, as exemplified in the following. Even though, for example,

significations formed in afterglowing and concentrative mathematical thinking-feelings signify mathematical importances that originally and holistically appear in intuitive ideative feelings..., [t]he mathematicians abstract from the intuitively felt holistic importance of the mathematical states of affairs, eliminate all evocative descriptions of these states of affairs and identify the states of affairs with their exactly analyzed nature. [FM, 88, 89].

What appear, in immediate intuitive experience of mathematical insight or scientific awareness, are important things, holistically appreciated. We experience astonishment at some mathematical paradox or even, simply, mild interest in a mathematical process – these important things evoke flows as a part of the very thinking process, the full thinking process
of concentrated awareness of intuitively given phenomena. Reprising his theory of ‘substitution’, and distinguishing his theory from phenomenalism, operationalism, and scientific realism, Smith shows that "scientific concepts as scientific concepts do not refer [to any reality]. It is the conceptions-of-importances into which the scientific concepts are translatable that refer" [FM, 91].

Though, again, it is beyond our range to extensively work through the arguments made here, Smith is, in effect, not only showing that all awarenesses are feeling-awarenesses and that the world is a world of importances, but he is also developing, from his newly elaborated 'cognitive pathology' (so to speak), the resulting implied critique of the standard philosophical orientation and world-picture.

iii) The degeneration of feeling and the origin of the fact/value distinction

But how, Smith asks, if all awarenesses are feeling-awarenesses, is it possible for the degenerate rationalist spirituality to emerge at all? This question and its answer has parallels to Heidegger's problematic of the origin of the present-at-hand and the origin of the ordinary, 'fallen' conception of time. Heidegger's later thinking develops this into a critique of modern technology and, though, Smith does not develop his thought in this direction, his tracing the underlying spiritual motivation involved in the 'degeneration' of feeling-awareness to the empty nihilism of contemporary rationality, somewhat echoes Heidegger (and others). Again, although much of the following is not essential to our purposes here, some indication of these themes is helpful to our grasping the orientation of Smith's innovations.

We indicated earlier (§27) that, "due to certain spiritual-theoretical motivations" [FM, 92] – namely freedom's self-infatuation, manifesting as the concentrative feelings striving to
become an “independent and self-sufficient source of truth” [FM, 94] – an “epistemic degeneration” [FM, 93] of the true cognitive role of concentrative feelings occurs precisely as rationalist spirituality. Smith analyzes in detail the various stages of this epistemological ‘fall’, which result in the universal application, both materially and formally, of the principle of sufficient reason, “the most general and fundamental principle of degenerated and intuition-transcending thinking” [FM, 100].

Smith sees three main stages of the degeneration of concentrative feelings: 1) “the elimination of evocative significations”, 2) “the practice of intuitive-transcending thinking”, and 3) “the stage of self-criticism” [FM, 104]. We shall not articulate these systematically, though they can be borne in mind as guiding themes of the following. Though it is peripheral to our immediate task of articulating, in a positive sense, a phenomenology of feeling, a brief synopsis of this epistemic error (which Smith elaborates for fifteen pages) can provide relief to, and sharpen, the positive orientation.144

Starting from the notion that “concentrative feeling possesses a freedom and creative power” [FM, 94] which is able to deny its positive and integrated dependence on intuitive and evocative reappreciative feelings, the ‘fall’ proceeds to purify itself, extract itself from that dependence, and cover its tracks. It does so by applying a strict dichotomization of reality into importance/neutral realms, degrading the former (as mere semblance) and essentially reducing it to the latter: “only exact significations are retained” [FM, 94]. Further, within this exact realm, purification is still required, which leads to a fact/value distinction within the neutered realm, for, even if our senses have been reduced to ‘inadequate

144 The reader should be warned that it would be imprudent to prematurely translate this thinking and this critique into standard terms, as if it were old arguments simply with a new, innovative language. Even if some of it may sound familiar, the critique is based on, not a rational framework, but a phenomenology of feeling with a fundamentally different orientation.
perceptions’ of an essentially mathematical and ideal world, we are still dependent upon them for our imperfect and merely general knowledge of that world. Thus the realm of the a priori must be opened up, in which “the desire to be able to formulate true significations that do not depend for their truth upon being related to something that is manifest in intuitive feelings” is satisfied by “pure thinking alone” [FM, 95].

With this, however, the degenerated concentrative feelings have “become blind to the criterion of the truth of the significations they form” [FM, 95], that is, blind to the fact that significations are significations of something, and therefore blind to the corresponding need to go beyond the signification to the signified, via intuitive feeling. Therefore, through “succumbing to ‘passionlessness’” [FM, 96], a fundamental spiritual error occurs and the fall into a prison of language secures its own closure and non-referentiality.

Smith goes into much more detail, particularly as to the development of the crucial rationalist notions of cause and effect and related subsidiary principles. His relations of enhancement and detraction, and magnetizing and gravitated importances are meant in context of explaining the origin of the degenerated notions of, respectively, the causal and teleological relations and structures of the world. However, they are also simply good phenomenology. For example, we intuit importances as magnetizing, “felt meanings that beckon or draw us toward themselves”, and that “emit felt lines of attraction that induce our body and surrounding phenomena to gravitate towards [them], and to thereby acquire a gravitated importance” [FM, 98]. Smith exemplifies this by showing how one’s body and the surrounding environment are experienced in reference to the pull of the importance of an endangered person’s call for help.
Smith articulates much more regarding the development of the essential principles of rational metaphysics, including: principles requiring complete causal series, the necessity of first (God) and final (purpose) causes, and the teleology between these; the material sense of the principle of sufficient reason and its formal, logical counterpart (in the realm of significations); the origin of ‘values’, as something defined within the fallen rationalist context (as consequences of reasons in their purposive development) and as existing alongside supposed value-neutral facts (neutral things with neutral properties), which, of course, elicit no sensuous feelings.

The ever-pressing need of precision inherent within the rationalist tradition eventually gives rise to a stage of rigorous self-criticism, which re-examines many of the fundamental assumptions of the emergent intuitive-transcending rationalist metaphysics, and finds them ill-formed. Such basic notions as “the idea that there must be a first cause of the world, …that this cause is a necessary existent, and that each thing in the world is a means to a purpose” [FM, 104] are shown to be based on faulty arguments, if they are not outright blind assumptions. With these criticisms (for example, by Hume), concentrative feelings recognize that the very desire to transcend intuitive feelings is suspect and this allows of a “partial regeneration” and “regaining of sight” for concentrative feelings [ibid.]. It is only a partial awakening because, for example,

the ‘intuitive feelings’ [which] the concentrative feelings are recognized to be dependent upon are ‘intuitive feelings’ in the truncated version conceived in the first stage of degeneration. [FM, 105].

That is, intuitive feelings are conceived as mere sensory perceptions or subjective passions, which remain “confused manifestations of the thing’s exact nature” [FM, 105] – thus retaining the hallmark of the tradition, the fact/value dichotomy. As a result of the
displacement of a rational center of values, nihilism ensues, as "values are conceived in a relativistic and anthropological manner" [FM, 105], as projections upon the neutral and value-less, 'brute fact' of nature. The resultant despair at the purposelessness of the world and the futility of searching for or creating such a purpose, however, is a meaningful experience for the phenomenologist and metaphysician of feeling: it reveals one (indirectly more than one) of the important ways in which the world presents itself to intuitive feeling.

At this point, Smith poses an alternative to "the completely deluded beliefs of the wholly degenerated feelings" [FM, 105] and to the partially deluded beliefs of nihilism and to the mere reversal of priority of epistemic positions (evocative thinking-feeling's "revenge" upon concentrative feelings, in the form of Heideggerian-Derridean 'poetic thinking' [FM, 107]). To overcome nihilism completely and to engage in a complete spiritual regeneration, one must abandon all forms of the importance/neutral dichotomy. This means, to recognize that every phenomenon 1) is "veridically describable in both evocative and exact ways" [FM, 105-6], and 2) is a source of sensuous feeling. It means, further, to 3) accept that the cardinal significations of fact, value, cause, effect, purpose, and means are empty, referenceless terms. These terms, both in point of fact and in definition, refer to nothing, as they are indeed significations of realities that are not the source of sensuous feelings and are, by nature, unintuitable: they are "solely exactly determinable" [FM, 106], with no redeeming intentionality or referentiality.

Nevertheless, if these terms are rehabilitated within the regenerated epistemology and metaphysics, they can be employed. Thus, for example,
former implicitly manifest aspects like fairness or generosity, whereas the latter implicitly manifest only such aspects as circularity or ellipticity. [FM, 106; my emphases].

As Smith has shown in the section on perception, the latter (factual characteristics) are importances, appreciated intuitively as, for example, “the harmonious circularity of a piece of pottery” [FM, 84]. Perhaps, blending vocabularies here, one could say that configured importances are ‘non-value importances’, whereas magnetizing importances are ‘value importances’.

In conclusion, Smith reiterates that the rationalist orientation arises “as an expression of one type of feeling, an epistemologically degenerate type” [FM, 107], viz., concentrative feelings, which have denied their essential nature by disassociating themselves from the intuitive feelings upon which they are based. The motivation for this disassociation is freedom’s self-infatuation or, more precisely, concentrative feelings striving to become an “independent and self-sufficient source of truth” [FM, 94] or, again, “thinking-feelings desire for maximum autonomy and self-sufficiency” [FM, 95]. This is a valuable insight of Smith’s, that lends itself to questioning and development.

Why, for example, did this development take place? What, more precisely, is this wayward desire for autonomy. As this desire is concerned with freedom, what is its relationship to ‘will’ – is this a ‘feeling-willing’, articulable by the phenomenology of feeling? What sensuous feeling-flows arise from this desire? What importance of the world or of the self is being attuned to here?

One can see easy correlation with a prevalent critique of ‘modernity’ or of the impulse toward the scientific method in seminal philosophers of science (such as, classically, Francis Bacon). Does Smith intend these? In any case, a critical view of the intractable lust
for ‘freedom’ – one which starts as an initially negative ‘freedom from...’, claims itself in self-affirmation of pure freedom, then develops into a powerfully aggressive ‘freedom for...’, further developing into a distinct, defiant, reckless, repressive, and vindictive ‘freedom over-against...’ – is at the core of the critiques of modernism (its capitalism and techno-science), the notion of the ‘spirit of revenge’, the counteracting development of eco-philosophy, and Smith’s own view of the origin of metaphysical rationalism generally. What are the relations between all these? What, we may ask, is the motivation for this freedom? Why would a feeling for ‘freedom’, especially after breaking the bonds of its servitude and establishing its own order and self-duty, overrule any feeling of (re-)integration into a greater whole? Unfortunately, this is not the place to expand on these themes – I wish merely to point out the kinship Smith’s orientation has with a possibility development of such themes.

The emergence and compartmentalization of our be-ing-in the world into separate faculties, with the rational gaining a kind of malicious, if illusory, predominance – at the expense of not only the import of the other ‘faculties’ but also of our holistic be-ing as selves – has its parallel, in Heidegger’s thinking (and despite his comparatively valiant efforts at re-integrating our modes of disclosure and our ways of be-ing), with the predominance of ‘understanding’ and the resolute persistence of ‘projective existence’. If we take Smith’s suggestion seriously, that the ‘rationalist’ orientation arises “as an expression of one type of feeling, an epistemologically degenerate type” [FM, 107], what does this imply for this priority within Heidegger’s analytic of be-ing-here?
§32. The intuitive feeling-awarenesses: moods and affects

We have, thus far, been focussing on feeling-awarenesses such as perceptual-feelings and thinking-feelings, and the reappreciations of intuitive feelings, particularly the second-order linguistic reappreciations, i.e., concentrative feelings. But what about the intuitive feelings themselves, in the immediacy of their appreciation? These are "the basis and reference point of the nonintuitive and reappreciative feeling-awarenesses" [FM, 109]. That is, we are asking now, what about moods and affects?

In this section, we shall describe the characteristics and differences between moods and affects, with special interest in metaphysical or 'global' intuitive feelings. We will also show how, from the phenomenology of these feelings, a metaphysical and methodological problem is both posed and potentially solved. Division i) of this section presents the phenomenology of moods, and division ii) that of affects.

i) Moods

Moods, though vaguely recognized in the philosophic tradition from Aristotle onwards, were expressly remarked and distinguished from affects by the phenomenologists, such as Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, von Hildebrand, Heidegger, Bollnow, Strasser, Sartre, and Solomon. The initial difference between moods and affects, which Smith points out, is the difference in origination:

Affects are consciously directed responses to the importance that elicits them, whether this eliciting importance be a part of the world or the world as a whole. But moods are not conscious responses to the phenomena that originate them; moods are diffuse feelings about everything in general, even though this felt "everything in general" is not necessarily, and does not appear as, what brought on the mood in the first place. [FM, 110; my emphases].
There are two points here: 1) moods are not conscious, directed acts but rather diffuse, feeling, responsive awarenesses and 2) moods do not refer specifically to this or that definite phenomenon but rather to ‘everything in general’, *i.e.*, the ‘world-whole’. Smith exemplifies these differences of specificity with the *affect* of grief – which comes over one even against one’s will, and is about a particular event – as distinct from the *mood* of melancholy, “a generalized feeling about the world” [FM, 110]. Other examples include the moods/affects of euphoria/joy, boredom/tedium, depression/despair, amazement/awe, and the well-known anxiety/fear distinction.

The ‘non-directedness’ of moods led von Hildebrand to conclude that moods are not intentional experiences and do not refer to anything beyond themselves.\(^{145}\) Strasser argued that, despite moods being non-intentional, they nevertheless (in Smith’s words), “have a pre-intentional and nonobjectifying awareness of the world as a whole” [FM, 112]. That is, they non-specifically refer to the no-thing which is ‘everything in general’, the *whole* of the *world itself*. Thus moods are intentional, in the phenomenological sense of referring but not in the more common connotation of intentional as ‘consciously directed’ (toward a particular object). Smith names this character of ‘reference to the whole of the world’ the *global* character of moods and, with the global character of moods, we have an avenue toward a metaphysics of feelings.

After describing the ‘constant’ global character of moods, Smith points to the ‘exceptional’ global character, *viz.*, the potential for all moods to achieve a *global*

\(^{145}\) Whereas affects are intentional and do refer, even if, traditionally, they are ‘founded’ upon other acts (Husserl’s ‘presentations’).
contemplative awareness. This awareness will itself pose a certain problem, which, as we shall see, will lead us to consider the structure of the disclosure of affects.

a) The constant characters of moods

Moods are a) sensuous awarenesses of ‘moody’ feeling-tonalities, feeling-flows which emanate from the whole interior of the world, accompanied by b) intuitive, unfocused, and extralogical, global awarenesses of the sources of these flows, viz., of the important world-whole (or, perhaps better: the importances of the world as a whole). “It is by virtue of our moody feelings,” says Smith, “that all of us are in daily contact with metaphysical meanings, and thereby are metaphysical beings in our innermost nature” [FM, 113].

As we have seen in §28.ii., the sensuous feeling-tonalities of the world have a depth and a breadth; Regarding depth, feeling-tonalities flow from sources, which are either deep within the world or are the sensuous surface of the world. Further, they flow either narrowly, from a part of the world, or broadly, from the whole of the world. Moodal feeling-tonalities flow from sources – i.e., importances – deep within the world as a whole.146

Importances are, says Smith, features of the world-whole, specifically those features that are sources of feeling-tonalities; the various moodal-tonalities flow from, and qualitatively correspond to, the various important features of the world-whole. For example,

As a moody tonality of anxiously suspended quavering begins to permeate everything in my surrounding, I begin to apprehend the world-whole as ominously important [...]. Likewise, an upwardly radiated euphoric tonality has its source in the global importance of fulfillment, and the hopelessly sunken tonality of depression flows from the emptiness of the world-whole. [FM, 113; my emphases].

146 Smith uses the word ‘moody’ as a general adjective for moods – I prefer ‘moodal’, simply because ‘moody’ already has a certain meaning, which connotes irascibility or temperamentality – which we do not want to convey here.
Here we see quite clearly the importance (italicized), which is the source of the descriptive, moodal, feeling-tonality, and the corresponding mood (underlined).

The first constant character of the moodal awareness of importances is its intuitive character. The intuitive character of moods signifies that the moodal awareness is immediate, "not mediated by words, concepts, or images" [FM, 114] — what Plessner characterized as a "distanceless coherence with the matter".147 This direct awareness of moods is omnidirectional — that is, it is not a specific unidirectional apprehension of some singled-out phenomenon but a sensing of a unified whole, an omni-presence. For the most part, this omnidirectional awareness is a vague, intuitive sensing of some background, some horizontal significance, which my attentive, foreground awareness marginalizes. Contrary to affects, which fill up all of one's 'attentional space', moods allow of a space to be opened up in the foreground for some explicit concern (e.g., playing cards or reading while depressed). However, in some moods (and it is possibility for all moods), the background, horizontal sensing becomes a foreground contemplating. We shall return to this shortly.

The second constant character Smith considers is the unfocused character of the moodal awareness. This is not simply the horizontal awareness we have just considered (for there are also unfocused, diffuse, foreground awarenesses, such as drunkenness, fatigue, etc.). Rather it is an indeterminacy that belongs to the positive essence of moods, as an awareness of "something unitary" [FM, 115]. This unitary whole which appears is not purely simple or undifferentiated but a 'whole-of-parts', a 'one-of-many'. Some of the parts of this whole appear individually, as do those of my immediate surroundings which my feeling-

tonality imbues, but most appear only “in the almost wholly indiscriminate form of ‘that which composes the whole’” [FM, 116], i.e., in the indistinctness of ‘everything else’. In moods, one is aware of the whole of ‘these things and the rest’ as determinate parts receding into the indeterminate background, the omnipresent whole which supercedes any and all the parts. Analogous to this appearance of the world-whole, the importances of the world-whole (which emanate the moodal feeling-tonalities that imbue the world-parts) also appear holistically, with no articulated, determinate character:

In serenity, for example, I am aware of a good and harmonious world-whole. But I am not aware of any specific way in which the world-whole is good and harmonious [...]. It is not the case, for example, that the world-whole appears harmonious in that it is a teleologically ordered network of means and ends, or in that everything is an expression of an élan vital, or...[etc.]. Rather, the world-whole appears harmonious in no determinate way. [FM, 116].

Thus, in moods, the world-whole appears as important in a somewhat determinate way: for example, in serenity, it appears to be ‘good and harmonious’ – but the importance itself, the being-good-and-harmonious, does not appear as further determined or even further determinable. It thus elicits a correspondingly unfocused, diffuse, holistic moodal appreciation of its unitary significance. As we shall soon see, this will contribute to the important ‘metaphysical problem’ Smith sees moods as posing and affects as solving. We can only initially point out here that this holistic diffusion is an integral part of moods and may have significant internal characteristics beyond that of opening up a space for more focused strivings or feelings.

The third constant character of moodal awareness is that it is an extralogical awareness. By this, Smith means that the moodal awareness is noninferential and that logical methods, a priori or inductive, are simply irrelevant to moods. [FM, 116]. One in a serene mood, for example, need not be aware of Aquinas’ deductive inference of ‘the being of
everything is good' from certain other conceived premises. Further, one could actually believe, "on inductive grounds", that the world is a "malevolent, strife-ridden" hell-hole, yet still experience a profound and self-sufficient sense of serenity at an undetermined sense of goodness and harmoniousness.\(^{148}\) The mood "is not an intuition of these inductive generalizations" [FM, 117] or \textit{a priori} truths, but of holistic and relatively inarticulate \textit{felt meaning}.

Thus moods are \textit{intuitive} (an immediate, omnidirectional, vague sensing), \textit{unfocused} (marginal, holistic, and indeterminate), \textit{extralogical} (noninferential) awarenesses of a unified, omnipresent whole (-of-parts), which forms the indeterminate, diffuse background or horizon of be-ing and meaning, a background to my more attentively focused foreground strivings...and affacts.

This ends the characterization of the constant characters of moods. We have already noted that the character of moods as background and horisontal sensings is not a truly \textit{constant} character, for \textit{moods can be modified into foreground, contemplative moods}. Let us proceed to the exceptional character of moods, which develops somewhat more focus in its contemplative character.

\textbf{b) The exceptional character of moods: global contemplation.}

Aside from the constant characteristics of moods, there is, additionally, an \textit{exceptional} character, which is always possible and rarely achieved: that of realizing the potential, within the mood itself, for global contemplation.

\(^{148}\) Dostoevsky’s characters often have such seemingly contradictory affective lives.
We have seen that moods generally open up an attentional space that is filled up by our mundane strivings. Moods thus, generally, provide a background attunement, a certain lingering context of intuitive felt meaning for the meanings we pursue in our everyday strivings. I can, though, step back from my active worldly dealings and let the mood project into and permeate them, as I mull these concerns over in mood-infused thinking and imaginative awarenesses. While this may be a mere, vain indulging or fantasizing, it may also be a deeper attunement to the significant feeling-context within which these strivings mean something to me.

But there is another potential, which, despite its similarity with this "moody mulling" (similar in that, in both cases, we 'let ourselves go' and 'give in' to the mood), is fundamentally different. This is the potential to achieve a foreground awareness of the world-whole, through a metaphysical or 'global' contemplation. This contemplation is not an attuning to the felt meanings of my mundane strivings nor those of the world as the context for my strivings; rather it is an attunement to the felt meaning of the world, as it appears in the mood itself, apart from all such striving.

In moodal mulling, I relax my active strivings only in order to return to them and brood over them, thereby immersing the pragmatic foreground awareness of my strivings into the background moodal context. Therewith, if I am no longer actively projecting and accomplishing my concerns, I am nonetheless engaging the felt significance as a passive projective horizon for that pragmatic foreground awareness/projection.

But in metaphysical contemplation, I drop my strivings altogether and, in 'giving in' to the mood and 'letting it be', I allow the background sensuous moodal feeling and awareness of importance to, as Smith aptly puts it, "emerge from the horizon and swell into
the foreground” [FM, 119]. I resist the “declination into mundanity that holds sway throughout virtually all human existence” [FM, 121] and its temptation to mundane the world-whole itself by mulling over its intramundane significance. I do not, on the other hand, drown into the “distinctionless unity” of the One, as, perhaps, in mystical affects [FM, 117]. Rather I “remain marginally aware of [...] individual world-parts” [FM, 119] and mundane strivings, and I “achieve a foreground awareness of the whole they help to compose” [FM, 118, my emphasis].

Smith describes this important modification of moods from the vantage-point of both contemplating the moodal feeling-tonality and the accompanying contemplation of the importance of the world-whole itself. It is only by “relaxing my concern”, “unfocusing my awareness” and “giving in” to my mood that I can let the mood’s feeling-tonalities pervade my awareness [FM, 118]. For example, in boredom, the “stagnant tonality of the whole seems to imbue the perceptual phenomena in my surroundings” [FM, 118], and my ‘panoramically hued environment’ shows itself as a “somber landscape” [FM, 119]. I can even ‘absent-mindedly’ engage in certain routine chores (e.g., washing the dishes) while immersed in the fully present, “vast monotonous whole” [FM, 119]. Nonetheless, I am aware that both my present, sensuous surroundings and the indiscriminate mass of ‘all the other things...’, and my marginal striving (should there be any) are mere parts partaking of that (boring) whole, which draws me beyond them into its dank, listless, fog. As Smith says, “I am singling out a few world-parts, but they are being appreciated primarily in regard to their
feature of *partaking of* the omnipresent whole" [FM, 119] in its insidiously boring
importance.149

That is, aside from my sensuous awareness of the boring feeling-tonality, I am
intuitively and omnidirectionally aware of the omnipresent whole, which is the *source* of the
feeling-flows I am sensuously immersed in. This whole is what is of primary, "boundless",
and "maximal" importance [FM, 120]. As I release my focused awareness into the vast and
omnipresent horizon, the world-whole emerges, from its usual "confinement to the horizon"
[FM, 121], into the foreground of my awareness and my moodal awareness itself graduates
from a horizontal sensing to a *non-projective yet foreground contemplating* of the
(monotonous) world-whole. If we think in terms of the projective-horizontal schema of
understanding, we must say that this is precisely what has been let go of, here, in the dis-
positional intuition, in order to let the encompassing horizon emerge into full and pervasive,
foreground presence.

---

149 Despite claiming that time "can never be a fact of our immediate experience" [252] and that "we have no
sense for empty time" [253], William James has this remarkable description of boredom:

"*Tedium, ennui, langeweile, boredom*...comes about whenever, from the relative emptiness of
content of a tract of time, we grow attentive to the passage of time itself...formidably aware of the
extent of mere time itself." (255) ...You engulf yourself into its bowels as into those of that
interminable first week of an ocean voyage...you attend closely to the mere feeling of the time *per
se*... The *odiousness* of the whole experience comes from its insipidity; for stimulation is the
indispensable requisite for pleasure in an experience and the feeling of bare time is the least
stimulating experience we can have. The sensation of tedium is *protest...against the entire
present.*” [James, 1963, 256].

He also adds:

"Meanwhile, the specious present, the intuited duration, stands permanent, like the rainbow on the
waterfall, with its own quality unchanged by the events that stream through it" [ibid., 257].
ii) The epistemological-metaphysical problem posed by moods

We have been describing and exemplifying moods and moodal contemplations with the example of a mood of boredom, which appreciates the monotonousness of the world-whole. But in other moods, the world appears as fulfilled or empty or mysterious or ominous, and so on. How can the world be meaningful in all these, seemingly, mutually exclusive ways? While one is in a particular mood, the world appears important in just that way. However, we experience many different moods and thus many different importances. It appears, upon reflection or in the ‘reapprciative moody thinking’, that these moods and importances clash and, even, contradict one another. “The givenness” of one mood, says Smith,

...is no different in character than the givenness felt in the incompatible mood [...] In both cases, there is a feeling of the intuitive presence of a certain global importance. [FM, 123].

Thus, if there is no other internal mark that epistemically differentiates one mood from another, then “these intuitions are unreliable and incoherent when considered in terms of themselves alone”[FM, 123].

Thus we arrive at the notorious problem of the evidentiality of intuitive givenness or the epistemic veridicality of moods. Smith suggests that we can avoid the conclusion that “moods must be deluded” [FM, 123] if we can find other internal or structural aspects of moods or importances, which can be used as criteria for distinguishing their epistemic veridicality or falsity. Self-givenness (intuition) in itself does not appear to guaranty objective evidentiality, even if it is subjectively unimpeachable. But the other constant characters of moods, though they distinguish mood from mood, do not distinguish veridicality or the truth of one mood over another. Perhaps a study of importances,
themselves, would show the necessary distinction, with results such that, for example, the world really is fulfilled and really is not empty, even though it deceptively appears to be the latter (or vice-versa). How, though – from what criterion – would we make such a distinction? The path Smith takes is one that remains true to a phenomenology of feeling:

The world-whole really has all the ways of being important it appears to have in moods, but it has them in different and nonclashing respects [FM, 124].

That is, the world isn’t only fulfilled (for example) in an unqualified way but fulfilled in this respect…; and it is, compatibly, empty in this other respect…, ominous in yet another respect, and so on. Thus the importances are to be unpacked and articulated beyond their holistic dimension.

But as moods, even the moodal contemplations, only give us the indeterminate, holistic sense of the importance, we cannot say, with their evidence only, how the given importances are qualified and articulated and in what respects, then, they may differ, be distinct from and, perhaps, complementary to one another. In fact, thus far, Smith’s way out of the ‘delusion’ is merely a suggestion. What is needed is something that will give us the further data needed for the articulation of the ‘different and non-clashing respects’ of the world’s importances. Fortunately our moodal thinking is aware of other intuitive appreciations: global affects.

iii) Affects

How do global affects solve the problem of the seeming, clashing incompatibility of the importances which moods disclose? Let us first look at some of the similarities and differences regarding these two major types of intuitive feelings.
a) **Similarities and differences of affects from moods**

Global affects are similar to moods in that they are intuitive awarenesses of importances, which are sources of feeling-flows: the feeling-flow of the mood of euphoria parallels that of the affect of joy, as does the flow of depression that of despair.

We have already (§32.iii.a.) noted the first difference, that of the difference in origination: affects are “consciously directed responses to the importance that elicits them” [FM, 110] whereas moods are not such. Moods are omnidirectional awarenesses of the omnipresent ‘everything in general’. That is, moods are unfocussed awarenesses of importances but not of the importance as that which engenders them and their feeling-flows, even if they are, in fact, so engendered: “I feel anxious or serene, but do not know from what” [FM, 125]. A mood is a sensuous awareness of an encompassing environment imbued with feeling-flows that emanate from an important world-whole, and it is an awareness of that importance itself.

But the moody flow is not experienced to be emanated by the whole ... The moody feeling-flows is emanated from the whole, but not emanated by it. [FM, 125].

Thus, in moods, there is a directional sense of the flow but it is not also a ‘causal’ one.\(^{150}\) This means that, in the world as it is felt, to be an important source of a feeling-flow does not necessarily imply being a cause of that flow.

Global affects, on the other hand, are awarenesses of the important world-whole as the source that, indeed, causes the affective flow: they are “made to flow” [FM, 125], awarenesses of being engendered by the importance of the world. And they are, correspondingly, captivated by this importance: “a single spellbinding presence occupies and

\(^{150}\) Or, in the language of felt meaning, not an ‘enhancing’ or ‘detracting’ relation.
rivets my attention” [FM, 126]. Moodal intuitions are not captivated by the whole; rather they marginally sense it. Moodal contemplations, too, are not captivated; rather I freely initiate them as a turning-toward the horizon. But affects grip us, unplanned, unwilled, even against our will. For example,

I look out my window and see a gloriously red sky; suddenly there emerges into presence the joyous fulfillment of the whole ... [Or] without warning, and without apparent connection to anything, the emptiness and futility of everything washes over me and casts me into the hopelessly sunken abyss of despair. Or I wake up in the middle of the night, startled at the miracle of the world. [FM, 126].

A second difference between moods and affects is that, in moods, we are always globally receptive, even if only marginally, whereas global affects are rare. These affects require an openness of a kind which counters the predominant mundanity of our concerns and capabilities and which counters, also, the degenerated spirituality of rational spirituality. In this latter regard (as briefly indicated in §2), Smith differentiates global affects from mystical affects, which are the emotive counterpart to rational spirituality, and from the godless existential affects, which accompany the nihilist of rational spirituality. We shall refer to this “negative account” [FM, 135] briefly at the end of this section. As regards the factors for the predominant mundanity of our condition, Smith points out that, even though some people have both the capacity and desire to experience global affects and may have freed themselves from much of the traditional fallenness of the rationalist metaphysical orientation, they retain a skeptical attitude toward these affects, which “closes them off from the omnipresent global importances” [FM, 128]. The need, then, to combat an undue

---

151 However, if the emergence of the horizon into the foreground is not a captivating experience, it is nonetheless a contemplatively compelling one...
skepticism gives more impetus to our search for the essential distinguishing factors for the veridicality of intuitive experience.

b) Solving the problem posed by moods: the veridicality of global affects

The third difference between moods and global affect is the essential one: "the aspects [of global importances] which are flow-engendering and captivating appear in affects but not in moods" [FM, 128]. That is, more of the structural constitution of global importances comes to appearance in global affects, and these constitutive aspects are, specifically, those aspects which account for the 'causal' source of the feeling-flows and the captivation of one's attention.

For example, in both the mood of boredom and the affect of tedium, we are aware of the monotonous importance of the world-whole. But in the mood, this monotonousness appears "in a vague and unarticulated way" [FM, 129], and the expression, "the world-whole is monotonous" is as exact a description of what appears as the mood allows; less exact descriptions would include evocative ones, such as "everything is muffled by a cosmic fog" [ibid.]. As we have seen, more precise reappreciative articulation of the structure or constitutive aspects of this monotonousness are not possible on the basis of moods.\(^{152}\)

However, the affect of tedium reveals the world-whole's importance "as articulated into structural aspects" [ibid.]: it is, in short, "monotonous in that there are no interesting sequences unfolding in the world qua whole... All processes [...] are features of this or that part of the world. [FM, 129]

---

\(^{152}\) However, I would suggest that another source of metaphysical knowledge could be the global speculations which derive from the global contemplations. These could, at least, be seen as the moodal equivalent of exact reappreciations. But the point here would still remain: the speculations, if true to the character of moods, would remain fixed upon the holistic sense of the importance, with little focus on the determinate sense of this holistic importance, and these speculations would remain unconfirmed.
The monotonous importance's exact explication is: "The world's physically, interpersonally, and ideationally processless character of 'being a whole' endures unchanged" — and it is this unchanged enduring which captivates me in a wearying way and "makes me flow backwards in a duller manner", in the affect of tedium [FM, 129].

It is by describing and explicating global affects that the precise respects in which the world-whole is important can be shown and shown to be different and compatible. How, one may ask, can the world be both monotonous and stupendous, that is, boring and amazing?\footnote{Smith admits that the use of 'amazement' for the mood paralleling the affect of 'awe' is "somewhat arbitrary" [FM, 130].} As we have just seen, the affect of tedium discloses the world-whole as "dull and monotonous in respect of the enduring unchanged [character] of its processless nature" [FM, 130]; whereas, in awe, "the world-whole is stupendous and immense in respect of its character as the greatest whole there is" [\textit{ibid.}]. The clash and contradiction between the moods and, correspondingly, between the importances disappears when the precise nature of the importances is unpacked from its holistic, moodal disclosure by the more focused affective disclosure and reappreciation. With this, the basis for the doubt about the veridicality of moods and affects is weakened and with the actual accomplishment of the task of "describing the affectively disclosed determinate nature of each global importance" [FM, 131] and showing the differences and the compatibility of these differences, this doubt would be dissolved.\footnote{Smith, in fact, achieves this in Part Two of \textit{Felt Meanings}... \textit{The Basic Felt Meanings of the World} — a development we can only incidentally touch on but that we must, regrettably, substantially forgo in this thesis.}

That is to say, if the intuitive feeling are non-clashing in their disclosure, and there are no external grounds for attributing contradiction or delusion, then "there is no justifiable
basis to doubt their veridicality” [FM, 131]. Smith develops this into a criterion of intuitional truth, in distinction from the criterion for significational truth (the latter criterion being the intuitions themselves which the significations putatively signify). For the criterion of intuional truth, Smith blends two aspects, the intrinsic and extrinsic criteria, into one formula. The intrinsic criterion of intuional truth is “how the feeling-awareness seems to the person who is experiencing it” [FM, 132]: that is, “if it seems to be a real intuition” – as all actual intuitions do – “then it is a real intuition” if there are no extrinsic grounds for believing otherwise [FM, 132]. This intrinsic criterion of intuional truth is an instance of Smith’s principle of intrinsically grounded belief, viz., that

if something seems to be the case, then (in the absence of extrinsic grounds for believing otherwise), the very fact that it seems to be the case is a ground for believing that it is the case. [FM, 132].

and this principle is itself based on the principle of veridical seeming, which states that

all seemings are intrinsically veridical seemings; that is, in the absence of overriding extrinsic ground, seeming are veridical. [FM, 132].

That is, ‘appearances can be deceiving’ – but there is no possible a priori reason to believe they are in themselves deceiving; appearances can also be truthful. It is true that if we took only the intrinsic criterion as the full criterion of intuional truth, we would believe all appearances to be veridical, i.e., we would have no standard to distinguish between truth and falsity or fantasy. Strictly speaking, only veridical intuitions are, in fact, intuitions. However, delusory intuitions also seem to be veridical: there is “no experienced difference” [FM, 131], both seem to be real intuitions. And so, according only to the intrinsic or internal criterion, we would have no way of distinguishing truth from delusion. We therefore append the second criterion, that of extrinsic grounds, to counterbalance the possible excesses of a blindly intuitive truth claim.
But Smith’s emphasis here is not so much on providing extrinsic grounds for deciding between intuitive claims to truth. In fact, he says, perhaps to the reader’s surprise, that “the only possible source of extrinsic grounds capable of overriding seeming global affective intuitions would be veridical mundane intuitions that clash with the seeming global intuitions.” It may have seemed that what Smith had set up was a situation in which the immediacy of intuitive global feelings were to be accepted as veridical, if other global intuitions did not clash with it; and this mutual compatibility of global affects was to be determined in the manner we have just shown, viz., by the specificity of global affects in their appreciation of the determinate respects in which importances, holistically appreciated in moods, compatibly differ from one another. The extrinsic grounds would be other intuitions which potentially clash (moods) but which, in the affective specificity and the linguistic reappreciations, can be shown to compatibly differ (or, at times, perhaps, to indeed clash). However, Smith offers up intuitions of another sort, veridical mundane ones, as the only possible source of extrinsically grounds capable of overriding the global intuitions.

However, again, the thrust of this account is not, in any case, on the appeal to extrinsic grounds as determinative of possibly delusory affective intuitions. Rather the emphasis is on the fact of the veridicality of intuitive experience itself, if free from contradicting external factors, whatever they may be. This is not done in order to set up some possible justification of theoretical presuppositions or biases, nor to allow the formation of quasi-intuitive propositions, nor to declare an ‘abandonment to feeling’. Quite the contrary.

---

155 Smith’s example: “if there were a seeming global intuition of the world-whole as being temporally finite, and if there were veridical mundane intuitions of world-parts that were temporally infinite”. [FM, 134].
But it is done primarily to restore a positive importance of the immediately given in feeling or, more precisely, to allow the given to speak, for the first time, with a voice of its own.

Smith doesn’t simply stipulate the principle of veridical seeming, viz., that ‘all seemings, in the absence of overriding extrinsical grounds, are intrinsically veridical seemings’. He demonstrates it to be true by showing that the belief in the skeptical principle that “all seemings to be are intrinsically deceptive” [FM, 133] is an “absolutely epistemically confused affect” [FM, 132] and in arguing against its incoherence. This confused affective belief is self-negating. If it seems to be true, then it is either a veridical seeming, in which case the belief is false; or it is self-deceptive, in which case it is, again, false. “The skeptical principle, then, cannot veridically seem to be true, and this implies that its denial, the principle of veridical seeming, is true.” [FM, 133]. Smith works out a similar and complementary argument against a reformulated version of the skeptical principle, viz., that ‘all seeming could be intrinsically deceptive’, which we need not pursue.

The conclusion of this refutation of skepticism is the affirmation of the principle of veridical seeming (all seemings, if not extrinsically contradicted, are intrinsically veridical) and its specific application to the nature of intuitional truth manifest in global intuitive feelings:

all feeling-awarenesses that seem to be intuitions are (in the absence of overriding extrinsic grounds) veridical seemings; that is they are what they seem to be, intuitions. [FM, 133].

In Part 2 of The Felt Meanings of the World, Smith will show that “there are many seeming global intuitions which are not overridden by mundane intuitions”, dispelling any basis for doubting the veridicality of these affects. This provides, therefore, a justified basis for the metaphysics of felt meaning.
At this point, however, Smith engages in a thorough differentiation of global affects from mystical, existential, essential, and nature affects. This is a “negative account”, which, despite its inherent fascinating quality, we shall only briefly summarize. Mystical feelings are supra-rational and ineffable, as opposed to the ‘extra-rational’ though “effable” metaphysical or global feelings. Mystical feelings fall within the rational/irrational dichotomy of rationalist metaphysics. They “paradoxically violate the laws of reason in order to relate immediately and positively to the ultimate meaning that reason relates to mediatelty and by the via negativa, [i.e.,] God” [FM, 18]. Existential affects (Sartre’s angoisse, for example) are about one’s own existence – one part of the whole, and therefore not about the metaphysical whole. Essential affects (Heidegger’s angst) are about the universal or a priori structure of something (i.e., be-ing-here), as opposed to the empirical or ontic whole – both of these wholes being parts of the world-whole, which global affects attune to. Nature affects are about the non-human world or the spatial-temporal totality – and thus only about one part of the world-whole – in despair at its ‘meaninglessness’ or awe at its ‘unmeaningness’.

This concludes our presentation of Smith’s phenomenology of feeling. Let us return, now, to the Heideggerian problematic. With Smith’s phenomenology of feeling and its metaphysical orientation in hand, let us examine Heidegger’s own phenomenology of moods (dis-position) with a view to reworking the structures and priorities of Heidegger’s analytic of be-ing-here, so that the guiding and ultimately grounding question of the meaning of be-ing can open up beyond the horizon of Heidegger’s project.
PART THREE

EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE
OF HEIDEGGER’S
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
AND
TEMPORAL ANALYSES
OF DIS-POSITION
Introduction

In 1981, while writing *The Felt Meanings of the World*, and after having written a dissertation and a dozen articles on various aspects of the theories of feeling of Husserl, Scheler, and Sartre, Quentin Smith published an article entitled, “On Heidegger’s Theory of Moods”.\(^{156}\) This article epitomizes the good scholarship of ‘internal criticism’ in that it meticulously and illuminatingly presents Heidegger’s theory of moods, points out the important and neglected fact that Heidegger included moods other than anxiety and fear as essential to the *Daseinanalytik*, further points out some inconsistencies and problematic areas in Heidegger’s analysis, and then uses Heidegger’s own analysis of the content and structure of moods to plausibly remove these inconsistencies and develop some new notions latent in Heidegger’s own theory. Smith refrains, at this point, from implementing his own maturing phenomenology of feeling and from developing the ‘existential anthropological’ analysis of the “varied range of mood”, which would be needed “to disclose the complete truth of being-in-the-world” [HTM, 231]. He achieves this latter, rather, in *The Felt Meanings of the World*, already begun at this time.

I will not, here, give an exhaustive analysis of Smith’s article but I shall use it as a useful guide for the structure or outline of this entire chapter. I will incorporate and expand many of Smith’s insights, while developing my own, vis-à-vis what we have learned in the last chapter, regarding Smith’s phenomenology of feeling. I mean here to apply some of the

insights of that phenomenology of feeling and develop a critical dialogue with Heidegger's own phenomenology of dis-position and its place in his ontological-metaphysical project as a whole.
CHAPTER IX. The Structure of the Disclosedness of Dis-position

§33. Dis-position as a mode of disclosure

Heidegger’s analysis of dis-position takes place at the core of the analysis of the third structural or constitutive moment – be-ing-in – of the initial indication of the be-ing of be-ing-here (Dasein) as be-ing-in-the-world. That is, after the analysis of ‘the world’ (Part One, Chapter III) and ‘the who’ of be-ing-in-the-world (Chapter IV), Heidegger focuses his analysis (in Chapter V) on ‘being-in’ as such, the ‘there’ or ‘here’ of be-ing-here. Being-in is essentially constituted by (projective) understanding (Verstehen), and dis-position or self-findedness (Befindlichkeit),\(^{157}\) and both understanding and dis-position are characterized by discourse or speech (Rede). We want, here, to develop that discourse which is appropriate to dis-position.

What Heidegger calls ‘mood’ (Stimmung) or ‘be-ing-attuned’ (Gestimmmtsein) is the ontical or ‘empirical’ disclosive phenomenon of the ontological or a priori phenomenal structure of affective or dis-positional, self-finding disclosure. While hermeneutics and deconstruction tend to emphasize language as the primary mode of disclosure, Heidegger’s overall emphasis in Being and Time is on the mode of disclosure of understanding (and the

\(^{157}\) Befindlichkeit: perhaps the most notoriously difficult word to translate of Heidegger’s terminology; variously translated as ‘state-of-mind’, ‘disposition’, ‘disposedness’, ‘affection’, ‘findedness’, ‘affective self-finding’, even ‘already-having-found-itself-there-ness’ [Richardson, 1963, 64]) – consisting of the phenomena of our moods (Stimmungen) and affects, our ‘be-ing attuned’ (Gestimmmtsein), as a voice (Stimme) is ‘tuned’ to the proper pitch or key.
mode of be-ing-here of existence). However, we are, in short, emphasizing dis-position (and the mode of be-ing-here of facticity).

Be-ing-in, which is a constitutive moment of be-ing-in-the-world, is, as I have just indicated, also a constitutive moment of the other, even more basic, characterization of our be-ing, as ‘be-ing-here’ (*Da-sein*): be-ing-in is the ‘there’ (*Da*) or, as I prefer, the very here-ness of be-ing-here. This here-be-ing is characterized as a disclosure or disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*); its way of be-ing is to be open for, and disclose, unveiling, or revelatory of, be-ing-here itself – that is, of both be-ing-in and the world (the emphasis on one or the other determining authenticity or inauthenticity). As indicated early in *Being and Time*, be-ing-here is that being which, in its very be-ing, is ‘aware’ of be-ing, that is, ‘it’ is disclosive of the fact that it is... Moods, then, are (with understanding) one of the two fundamental ways in which be-ing-here is and is-revealed: these ways of disclosure are ways of be-ing, and be-ing-here is a revealing: “Be-ing-here itself is this revealing and be-ing-revealed” [H307].

We are, says Heidegger, always in some mood or other, even if we do not deliberately attend to them. According to Heidegger, moods are, if equiprimordial with ‘understanding’, nonetheless a more primordial way of disclosing than the rational, observing, and thematizing cognition, which reveals the extant phenomena lying already there about us, before the use of the hand (*Vorhanden*). Heidegger says,

... the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition [*Erkennen*] reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods. [BT, 173; H134].

This would include the thematizing cognition of ‘intuition’ as well as the more explicit, theoretical acts of rational cognizing.
In fact, in Heidegger’s characterization of the three modes of grounding transcendence (in *The Essence of Ground*, Part Three), moods are, in some sense, *more primordial than, not just cognition, but projection itself*, i.e., understanding *per se*: be-ing-here has *already* gained ground, such that its projection of world is already disposed and permeated by our attuned immersion in, our absorption by and preoccupation with, beings—prior to any projection. Though this ‘priority’ is not meant in any chronological sense, as projection and mood are “simultaneous”, “belong[ing] to one temporality which they jointly institute” [ER, 109], the ‘already’ is meant to indicate *some sort* of temporal priority or ‘primordiality’ of attuned disclosedness, at the heart of projection. The problem is, though, as we shall see, that Heidegger will turn this prior affective or moodal disclosedness itself into another kind of projection: projectedness, past projection—thereby reabsorbing disposition within the understanding project and underscoring his oft-stated ‘priority of the future’ (future-understanding-existence).

Of course, it is yet *another* problem to have *any* sort of ontological priority, one over the other, within the supposed equiprimordiality of the ecstases. How these discrepancies, not to say contradictions, of priority and equiprimordiality are to be resolved is a difficult question, one that we shall be discussing throughout this thesis.

---

158 As existential psychotherapists know well, a priority of one or other ecstasis within any *particular* ontic or existentiell experience is precisely what makes for the variety of different modes of consciousness (or temporalizations) — but the question of their ontological or constitutive-structural priority is a more fundamental one.

A note on translation: Malick’s translation says “prior to projecting” [ER, 109] but a more literal translation simply says that the projection is already permeated and attuned (*durchstimmt*) by those beings which it surpasses in projection. Here is the whole passage: “Das Übersiegende und so sich Erhöhende muss als solches im Seienden sich befinden. Das Dasein wird als befändliches vom Seienden eingommen so, dass es dem Seienden zugehörig von ihm durchstimmt ist. Transzendenz heisst Welt-entwurf, so zwar, dass das Entwerfende vom Seienden, das es übersteigt, auch schon gestimmt durchwaltet ist.” [as reproduced in ER, 106-108].
In any case, even if ‘equiprimordial’ with understanding in its primal projective sense, moods are still, perhaps due to their immediacy and fulfilled quality, viewed as a more primordial disclosure. Again, Heidegger asserts,

Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’. [BT, 177; H138].

Moods should have, therefore, not only a different structure from that of projection, but their disclosure has a certain precedence. This is a fundamental insight and motivation of the phenomenology of feeling, the consequences of which we wish to develop in quasi-formal fashion in this thesis.

§34. What moods disclose

According to the Heidegger of Being and Time, there are three constitutive characteristics of dis-positional disclosure: 1) the disclosure of thrownness, 2) the disclosure of current be-ing-in-the-world as a whole, and 3) the disclosure of the ‘ways of mattering’ [cf., H136-7]. There is, in writings immediately after Being and Time, some amplification, clarification, and development of new aspects of moods, such that we can say that, overall for Heidegger, moods disclose the i) thrownness of be-ing-here; ii) the “whole” (the factical-existential whole of be-ing-in-the-world, the ontic whole of beings, and the ontological whole of be-ing); iii) our preoccupied immersion in beings; and iv) the ways of ‘mattering’ of these phenomena.

159 That Heidegger is not saying, with this, that moods are a primary disclosure only of ‘the world’, as distinct from be-ing-here or ‘be-ing-in’, should be obvious inasmuch as moods are, essentially, self-finding disclosures.
i) Thrownness – the burden and the enigma of the ‘whence and whither’

According to Heidegger, moods disclose be-ing-here in the manner of be-ing-here’s finding itself, and finding itself as thrown into its be-ing. Thrownness means, more specifically, finding oneself as projected into the i) burdensomeness, the ii) facticity, and the iii) moodal ‘how’ of be-ing-here.\textsuperscript{160} Let us, now, elucidate these characteristics.

a) Burdensomeness

Be-ing-here is revealed by moods as an enigmatic burden, particularly in the prevalent, “pallid…lack of mood” [BT, H134] of boredom or indifference but also, according to Heidegger, in the mood of elation or affect of joy, which, privatively, alleviate the burden. This burdensomeness implies not only that one has been ‘handed over’ to one’s be-ing, which one ‘is’ in the mode of existing, \textit{i.e.}, in the manner of ‘having’ it to be – but also that, as handed over, one \textit{has to be} it, in the sense of being \textit{beholden} to it, as a possible be-ing\textsuperscript{161} that we are somehow \textit{obliged} to be. Be-ing-here’s be-ing is, essentially, \textit{existence}: one \textit{exists}, from the ground up, upon the abyss and in the uncaught throw, the fall, and the guilt of the unanswered question… Even in the most everyday manner of existing,

the be-ing of be-ing-here can burst forth as a naked ‘that it is and has to be’. The pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ remain in darkness. [H134].

The ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ (akin to Aristotle’s ‘wherefrom’ and ‘wherefore’) of be-ing-here – what items, we may wonder, are these? Is the being which is ‘aware’ of be-ing (which ‘understands’ its own be-ing) and which is \textit{therefore} emphatically \textit{here} and here as

\textsuperscript{160} Cf., Smith, HTM §II,1.

\textsuperscript{161} Rather than the ‘be-ing before [previous to] possibility’ of \textit{vorhanden}, extant being [before-the-hand] or the ‘be-ing to be possibilized’ of \textit{zuhanden}, avail-able being [ready-to-hand]).
disclosive, also or thereby in question as to its origins and destiny? Are the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ structured into the very be-ing of be-ing-here, into its disclosivity as such? Or can there be a disclosive happening of be-ing-here which discloses outside of, or perhaps prior to and unstructured by, any ‘whence and whither’? We should, in the following, bear in mind that the ‘whence and the whither’ are clearly reminiscent of the ‘cause and purpose’ of rationalist metaphysics.

Rather than focusing on the disclosive aspect of the be-ing of be-ing-here, if we focus on the purely ontological aspect, we ask: are the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ structured into the very be-ing of be-ing-here, the ‘is-ing’ of its ‘that it is’? If so, how so? Is that what the existential critique of extant ontology is trying to show? The very ‘is’ of the being which exists is an ‘is-and-has-to-be’, an ‘is-to-be’ – and therein lie the structures of the ‘whence and whither’. Or are these aspects of the be-ing which be-ing-here ‘has’ (‘possesses’ as a possibility) and has to be, the ‘having’ being a secondary ontological structure, based on a primary be-ing?

Can one make a viable distinction between the factual ‘is’ and the existential ‘has to be’ of be-ing-here? Heidegger has done so – is that due to the ontologically warped structure of language? Is it meant to disappear when existence is properly understood? Or would that not rather be an unacceptable subversion of facticity, of the ‘that it is’? Does, then, the very be-ing which be-ing-here has, to be, consist of some sort of existential dynamic articulated by the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’? Or, again, are the ‘whence and whither’ aspects of the very is of the ‘that it is’ itself?

What, then, is the relation between the ‘is’ and the futural ‘to be’ of be-ing-here’s being? And then, what exactly is the relation between these and the whence and the whither?
And then, what would be the relation of these to the ‘rather than nothing’ of the ‘that it is at all, rather than nothing’ of the whole of beings?

We have been handed over to our be-ing, having been that be-ing (even if inauthentically) and to be that be-ing – and this be-ing is, according to Heidegger, both burdensome and enigmatic. We could, perhaps, in factual willing, ontic-existentially determine the ‘whither’, if not the ‘whence’; or we could, in scientific enlightenment, determine the ‘whither’, perhaps through a retroactive ontic determination of the ‘whence’, or vice-versa, or in some other manner of resolving or realizing the possibility of our be-ing. But, according to Heidegger, the whence and whither would remain, in the revelation of our sheer be-ing, a priori shrouded in mystery:

mood brings be-ing-here before the ‘that it is’ of its ‘there’, which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma [H136].

This a priori enigma of be-ing-here, simpliciter, would appear, then, to be beyond our horizon of grounding possibility. This would imply that the enigma of be-ing is, rather, an abyss for releasement from ‘the burden’ of the grounding project.

For the Heidegger of Being and Time, however, this is not the case for existence. As existence, be-ing-here (perhaps ontologically erring) swallows up (if, perhaps, choking on it) this sheer be-ing of be-ing-here into its ongoing (perhaps ontologically compulsive) projection of possible grounds (‘whences’ and ‘whithers’) for be-ing to be here – such that both be-ing-here and possibility, themselves, are revealed, by our moods, necessarily as burdensome.

Thus, the burdensomeness of be-ing-here, as revealed in moods, would not be an occasional or accidental ontic affair, although our moods would, ontically, reveal this (supposed) a priori truth about be-ing-here. But is this burdensomeness (and, therewith,
thrownness) an ontological truth about *be-ing-here* itself? Or is it rather a factically revealed truth about *existence* – that is, about merely *one aspect or constitutive moment of the be-ing of be-ing-here*, which then gets generalized onto be-ing-here as a whole? Or, again, is burdensomeness simply that hybrid, the ‘fallen truth’, which is the ontological way be-ing-here discloses itself ‘proximally and for the most part’, as *thrown, fallen existence*? If the latter, at least there is the possibility of resolution of – or, at least, reprieve from – the burden, in the extra-ordinary, ontological way of be-ing and self-disclosing of *authentic* be-ing-here (be-ing-uncanny). Perhaps in this sense, the whence and the whither are somehow resolved in choice and resolute action?

b) *Facticity*

Again, let us take up the question: What relationship to the be-ing of be-ing-here, to existence, and to be-ing itself, does the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ have? Is it an intrinsic one, pertaining to the very be-ing of (for example) be-ing-here? Or is it extrinsic, pertaining merely to its possibilities? But if be-ing-here *is* its possibilities, in its very be-ing, then are the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’, as pertaining to be-ing-here’s own possibilities, thereby intrinsic, *i.e.*, essential characters? Possible grounds would, then, pertain to the very ‘is’ of our be-ing, and our very be-ing would appropriately be characterized as existence – unless some other modality of be-ing-here (*i.e.*, facticity *itself*, not just thrown possibility or projectedness) not only fundamentally ‘modifies’ but distinctively *co-constitutes* it in some fashion.

Further, are the ‘whence’ and the ‘whither’ *essentially veiled*? Are our possibilities structurally and *a priori* doomed to ultimate teleological failure – or, at least, to enigma – in this existential quest? Is this the burden structured into our be-ing which moods, due to their
putative a priori structure as revelatory of thrownness, must reveal, qua moods? Moods
would, then, reveal the fundamental occlusion and closure of possibilities, that is, a certain
kind of finitude of possibility itself: the unimpeachable thrownness, lostness, and nullity, i.e.,
the burdensomeness of existence. It would appear that if the liberation of possibility from
actuality is complete, not only do we win through to possibility in its pure, creative essence
but, also, on the other, more Sartrean hand, to its a priori failure.

Nevertheless, Heidegger still feels constrained to distinguish between be-ing-here’s
fact of be-ing (the fact ‘that it is’) and the possible be-ing it ‘has’ to be. Could the question
or, indeed, the very existential structure itself of the ‘whence and the whither’ be only
appropriate for be-ing-here as possibility, i.e., as existence, what be-ing-here has as its futural
to-be (and had in the retroactive interpretation of existence as past, projected existence)? But
Heidegger says

"this ‘that it is’– is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself
all the more unveiledly" [174, H135, my emphasis].

Be-ing-here, the very is of our be-ing, is more fully and clearly revealed due to its
unfathomability, the lack of a ground or destiny.

But then, perhaps for even fuller revelation of that be-ing, one must, at that point, stop
fathoming for grounds (‘Stop making sense!’) – and appreciate this very be-ing itself. As
Heidegger would agree, the be-ing of be-ing-here does not consist solely of existence; be-
ing-here’s be-ing is also constituted by facticity. Heidegger may not agree, though, with our
notion that the facticity of be-ing-here does not consist solely or essentially in its thrownness,
i.e., “the facticity of its being delivered over” [H174]. But, from our point of view,
thrownness is only facticity existentialized (or existence facticalized). Facticity itself – if it is
a distinct (not to say ‘independent’) ‘moment’ of be-ing-here’s be-ing (even if essentially
related to existence, or *co*-constitutive of be-ing-here) and if is to be recognized as such, and particularly as its distinctive disclosure is more primordial than that of understanding – is *essentially* and *positively* constituted by something other than existence and projection. What the facticity of be-ing-here's be-ing is, is an essential question for the *nonexistential analytic of be-ing-here* and, due to factual be-ing-here being equiprimordially a *manner of disclosure*, essential, too, to the phenomenology of feeling (or dis-position).

Facticity is, therefore, most essentially, *not* to be characterized as revelatory of thrownness, *i.e.*, as thrown *existence*.\(^{162}\) But is there any way of characterizing facticity – that is, *be-ing-here's* specific way of be-ing a 'fact' – without existentializing it, on the one hand, and without reifying it back into extant ontology, on the other?

But are we not, presently, rather missing the entire point of the existential analysis by seeking to separate facticity from existence? Isn't be-ing-here *distinct* as a being by the fact of its *existence*? That existential projectedness beyond beings is not, Heidegger would insist, to be swallowed back up into the blind whole of extant being. Indeed, the entire 'applied scientific ontology'\(^{163}\) of the project of metontology – at least, as a project – vitiates such a notion, as metontology is to be a metaphysics of beings as a whole, *including be-ing-here*, but one, therefore, only carried out *on the basis of the results of fundamental ontology of be-ing-here*. It is not to be a "summary ontic" [MFL, 157], but one which makes room for the difference of the unique be-ing of that being that exists, *i.e.*, be-ing-here. If and how this can be achieved, however, remains an open question.\(^{164}\) But if the metontological project is to be

---

\(^{162}\) Just as existence *itself*, as possibility pure, has a positive essence, which is distinct from (even if related to) its thrown (*i.e.*, factual) character. That essence is its *projective* character.

\(^{163}\) The phrase, 'applied scientific ontology', is Jacquette's. See [Jacquette, 2002, Introduction].

\(^{164}\) The situation here is much as it was, structurally, for Sartre: once the nothingness which *is* human reality (being-for-itself) is on the scene, the reabsorption of that nothingness back into being-in-itself is impossible, *even (especially)* in the *project of being-in-and-for-itself*. The promise of the metontology project, from the
achieved, not only will the uniqueness of be-ing-here’s existence have to be taken into
consideration, but be-ing-here’s characteristic facticity, too, must be articulated and not only
in existential terms as be-ing-here’s thrownness.

How, then, are we to characterize facticity, be-ing-here’s way of being a fact?
Facticity is certainly not reducible to the form of extantness, derived from be-ing-handy, of
Heidegger’s analysis. Neither would we want to characterize be-ing-here’s facticity as the
pure factuality of the extantness of nature, which Heidegger’s entire philosophical project is
attempting to overturn – that is, the factuality of the in-itself, which devours be-ing-here,
denying its temporality, ontologically, altogether.¹⁶⁵

Be-ing-here’s facticity is, rather, the fact of the pure happening of the ‘is’ of its ‘that
it is...’ at all. This can be seen as a be-ing which issues pursuant upon be-ing-here’s already
having been – but a been-ness which essentially arises from the miraculousness of the
primordial ontological phenomenon of birth. The ‘is’ of ‘that it is’ can also be seen as a be-
ing that is drawn on by its futural to be – but a futural be-ing-forward, which follows the
shadow of its impending not ‘to be’ of death. This would give us a factual-existential
balance. But this giftedness of the ‘that it is’, which arises from be-ing-from-birth,
distinguishes factual be-ing, and, disclosively speaking, provides the unencumbered basis for
the disclosure of moods. There is a structure of disclosedness, in moods, akin to or reflective

¹⁶⁵ Sartrean point of view, may be seen as an act of intellectual bad faith on Heidegger’s part. Crowell would likely
agree with this characterization. See [Crowell, ch.12]. Perhaps, though, this need not be the case, if Heidegger
could include the unique ontology of be-ing-here within a greater metontological whole of beings, one which is,
of course, not reducible to vorhandensein or, as Wilber puts it, “flatlands ontology” (see his Sex, Ecology,
Freedom [Wilber, 1995, passim]). The temporal analytic was supposed to clear this up for us but, alas, not all
projects are successful (or, perhaps, more apt: all projects essentially fail).

¹⁶⁵ Though there is another notion of ‘nature’ in Heidegger, that of physis, this is not developed in his thinking
til later (in the 30’s). For perhaps the finest development of this notion within a context of a metaphysics of
Nature, see Bruce Foltz’s Inhabiting the Earth [Foltz, 1995]. It would be a worthwhile task to develop the
affinities between a metaphysics of Nature and a phenomenology of feeling.
of the factical-existential structure of what Heidegger calls ‘being-toward-birth’ – better expressed as be-ing-from-birth. The fact of our having been born is disclosively held over, holds sway, not into the burdensomeness of thrownness but into the giftedness of the present, happening moment.¹⁶⁶

This facticity is beyond or more primordial than the quest for grounds and its ultimate abyss. That is, moods need not express the burdensomeness of thrownness (existence); they can also (and more appropriately) express the miraculousness or the stunning quality of factical be-ing (facticity), or the gifted ‘bequestedness’ of factical existence (be-ing-here) – and doubtless many other ontological meanings (including those of be-ing itself). We can see some recognition of this in Heidegger’s portrayal of joy and equanimity, and not only the mood of angst, as authentic moods. We shall soon return to this.

c) The moodal ‘how’

The third aspect of the thrownness (after burdensomeness and facticity), which moods disclose, is be-ing-here’s disclosure of ‘how it is’. This ‘how’ has two essential modalities: be-ing-here, existing for the most part in everydayness, feels the “tranquilized assurance” of be-ing at home in its world [H188]; but, in the extraordinary mood of angst, be-ing-here “enters the existential mode of ‘not-be-ing-at-home’”, that is, it feels its own be-ing as uncanny in the “nothing and nowhere of the world” [H189]. Being and Time is divided accordingly, with its first Division devoted to description and analysis of everyday mundanity and the second Division to that of the extraordinary and disconcerting twilight of uncanny

¹⁶⁶ Or, as Smith will say in HTM, ‘into the fortunateness of giftedness’ which authentic joy discloses. [HTM, 227]. We shall return to this later.
be-ing-here. Presumably the missing third division of Being and Time would have shifted (or, at least, had the potential to shift) the focus away from be-ing-here to being-as-a-whole/be-ing itself (‘be-ing as such and as a whole’) and its corresponding ‘how(s)’.

These regions or moments of dis-positional how-be-ing (be-ing-at-home, be-ing-uncanny) correspond also to the different possible ‘hows’ of the authenticity/inauthenticity of the self-understanding and appropriation of existence: one either resolutely owns one’s existence by turning-toward, taking-hold, and be-ing it or one dissolutely loses it by turning away, neglecting and not existing, in the sense of not-be-ing-oneself or be-ing no-one (cf., H12). It is the ‘how’ of the be-ing-at-home of inauthentic everydayness which is the be-ing-lost of Self-neglect and, conversely, it is the be-ing-uncanny which corresponds to, if not quite the resolute taking-hold, at least the authentic turning-toward and possibility of taking hold, of one’s existence. Further, one could say that, within be-ing-uncanny resides the possibility of an authentic be-ing-at-home in the world (‘authentic everydayness’) – at least, a be-ing-at-home, which is not completely eroded by the inevitable alienation of falling.

Further yet, though not articulated here by Heidegger, authentic be-ing-uncanny offers the possibility of the ‘spiritual uncanniness’ of metaphysical existence. That is, in the moodal or affective uncanny, the ‘how’ of the whole of be-ing itself is revealed...

To summarize: the first of the three constitutional characteristics of dis-position is the disclosure of thownness, which, in turn, is comprised of three aspects, viz., burdensomeness, facticity, and the ‘how’ of the mood. We have seen that ‘burdensomeness’ assumes the ‘having’ of a ‘whence’ and a ‘whither’, which, despite their lack of content, are seen as structurally co-constitutive of the very be-ing of be-ing-here. We have criticized this as being only valid, if at all, for the existential but not for the factual be-ing of be-ing-here, nor for the
whole of be-ing-here itself. This releases the burden of be-ing here into the enigma and giftedness of be-ing (-here) at all. Correspondingly, this releases facticity from the ontological range of the existential grasp, that is, from the '...and has to be' of the 'that it is and has to be' of Heidegger's version of facticity. We are thereby able us to extract the notion of facticity, the pure 'that it is', as such and at all, from the existentialized facticity of Heidegger's notion of 'thrownness'. This further allows us to envisage i) a non-existential analytic of be-ing-here, ii) a reappreciation of the miraculous phenomenon of birth, and iii) a mode of access akin to and proper to these phenomena: moodal or dis-positional disclosure, rather than projection. With this, the 'how' of dis-positional be-ing-here – which for Heidegger is either that of either everydayness or uncanniness – opens up to the prospect of both an authentic be-ing-at-home or dwelling in the world and, deeper, a nonexistential, spiritual uncanniness of be-ing as such. With these guiding insights, let us proceed with our analysis of Heidegger's presentation of the disclosure of dis-position.

ii) 'The whole': existential, ontic, ontologic wholes

Heidegger's "second essential characteristic of dis-position" is the holistic source of dis-positional disclosure. There are three different, if interrelated, wholes which are revealed by moods, viz., the existential whole of be-ing-in-the-world (primarily be-ing-in), the ontic whole of beings (primarily world), and the ontological whole of be-ing itself. In Being and Time, the whole that is emphasized is that of be-ing-in-the-world [H137], upon which the other two wholes would be grounded.\(^{167}\) This existential whole is disclosed by such authentic

\(^{167}\) Though, of course, the ultimate grounding of be-ing-here, itself, would be upon be-ing itself. However, this is all irresolvably ambiguous territory, especially when one must also consider the metontological project...
moods as *angst*, joy, and equanimity. Inauthentic affects, such as fear, focus on specific and particular intramundane beings. As Smith points out,

> Although Heidegger himself does not say this, anxiety can be understood as a mood (in the narrower sense) and fear as an affect. Fear is a fear of a definite being within the world ..., whereas anxiety is not about this or that being within the world, but about be-ing-in-the-world as a whole. [FM, 111].

Whether it would follow, then, that all affects, in their mundane specificity, are thereby inauthentic, or whether affects are all mundanely specific, are questions not broached within the Heideggerian scheme. As we have seen in the Part Two, Smith would deny that affects must be mundane, as they have the possibility of explicitly focusing on the background, moodal whole. This is what, in fact, allows Smith to develop a metaphysics of feeling beyond the vague generalities of moodal disclosure.

Immediately after *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows ‘moods’, such as boredom and joy, to be attunements to the ontic totality, i.e., the whole of beings (*Seienden im Ganzen*), i.e., the world. The unique mood of *angst* is revelatory of what could be described (at least, for purposes of distinction) as the non-compositional ontological totality of the whole of be-ing itself, even if the latter only appears in the form of ‘the Nothing’, the nihilation of beings as such, insistent upon the ‘ontological difference’. We shall have more to say about the disclosures of the ontic and ontological wholes later.

In *Being and Time*, moods are not determined by any particular intraworldly being nor from ‘inside’ be-ing-here; rather they ‘overtake’ us, “arising out of be-ing-in-the-world

---

168 In short works such as *On The Essence of Truth, What is Metaphysics?, On The Essence of Ground*, and in longer works such as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, all delivered in the years 1929-30.

169 The phrases ‘ontic totality’ and ‘ontological totality’ are Smith’s; see his [HTM, 215-16]. The joy spoken of in BT, though it is portrayed in WM as supportive of the notion that we experience beings as a whole (as in boredom), is actually said to be revelatory of the be-ing-here of someone we love. Serenity, creative longing, and wonder are also mentioned in regard to the revelation of be-ing as such, though specifically how the analysis of these disclosures unfold would take us, here, beyond our immediate point.
as a way of such be-ing” [H136]. Moods, it is maintained, have always already disclosed such be-ing-in-the-world as a whole. That is, moods are holistically and ontologically disclosive, as opposed to disclosive of particular, ontic being. These characters of moods may remind us of the 'pre-intentional’ character that Strasser attributes to moods, i.e., that of revealing one’s being already and non-attentively immersed in the disclosure of one’s be-ing-here as a whole. Smith, as we have seen, calls this the ‘unfocused and global’ character of moods.

If intentionality implies a relationship to beings, then moods could be said, at least in this holistic capacity, to be non-intentional. But they do refer to ‘something’. That is, they refer, in a non-intentional and unfocused, receptive/appreciative manner, to the whole of being-here or be-ing-in-the-world itself. Though be-ing-here is a being, 'it' is, as we have seen, ontically distinguished in that it is ontologically, i.e., it exists, and is the ‘place’ (or time) for the revelation of the whole of be-ing. Moods reveal be-ing-here, an ontological being, as a whole, i.e., in its be-ing – showing this is one of the crucial tasks of the existential analytic, as manifested, existentially, in the core phenomenon of being-toward-death, and it is one of the prerequisites of primordiality of interpretation. Be-ing-here is, also, or perhaps as the site of be-ing's revelation, the openness, within which beings can show themselves as such, that is, at all and in their be-ing.

Thus, with the ontological disclosedness of be-ing-here, moods are disclosive in such a way as to provide the context within which beings may show themselves, “thereby making it possible to direct oneself [intentionally] to something”, i.e., to some particular being, in the first place [H137] – thus the ontological disclosure of moods is the a priori condition of
intentionality. Beings, then, would show themselves as parts of a pre-given whole, viz., the world, which is, itself, part of the greater whole of be-ing-in-the-world.\endnote{170}

Regarding the disclosure of the ontic totality (beings-in-totality), Heidegger maintains that, even if it is impossible, as Kant has shown, to comprehend the whole of being, we, nonetheless, "all the time" [WM, 333]

\textit{find ourselves} in the midst of being-in-totality (Seienden-im-ganz), wholly pervaded by it. The affective state in which we find ourselves ...discloses, according to the mood we are in [and in addition to our self-disclosedness], being-in-totality. [WM, 334].

This constant, non-projective, pre-projective, and non-positing, holistic disclosure of mood dis-poses us, attunes us to the background horizon of felt meaning of the world as a whole, within which our foreground, attentive, thetic and positing awarenesses and particular projects take place. This background horizon is "an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through" [FCOM, 67], attuning us to "the ‘how’ [of the whole] according to which one is in such and such a way" [\textit{ibid}.]\endnote{171}

As "the ground phenomenon of our be-ing-here" [WM, 334], moods are "the ‘presupposition’ for and ‘medium’ of thinking and acting" [FCOM, 68]. But, as we have seen in Smith’s phenomenology, they are also more than this and disclose, in their own right, other kinds of meaning than those with which thinking and action concern themselves.

As we have seen (§23), in \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, Heidegger, in his customary ambiguous manner, shows that our pre-conceptual ‘understanding’ of be-ing itself

\begin{footnotes}
\item[170] However, again we must mention, the ontic totality can also be seen as including, in a non-reductionist way, the being which is be-ing-in-the-world, viz., be-ing-here – such as in Heidegger’s project of metontology (see MFL). We cannot, here, unravel the complexities of this metaphysical-ontological conundrum but can indicate that it is important to understand the distinction between ontic, metontologic, and ontological (transcendental) before making the attempt – though success is not thereby guaranteed.
\item[171] A ‘how’ that may be determined, as we shall see, by one’s mundane projects or by ‘the whole’.
\end{footnotes}
must, in fact, be a dis-positional or moodal disclosure. It was also shown there (as we shall also now see in *The Essence of Ground*) that the disclosure of mood is necessary for the disclosure of beings at all. Let us examine the ontic aspect of moods.

In summary: moods are existentially, ontically, and ontologically holistic disclosures. We are particularly concerned with working towards and developing their ontological disclosive potential, as it is the ontological whole of be-ing as such which is the focus of ultimate metaphysical truth (though not exactly Heidegger’s metontology nor his later, disparaging notion of ‘metaphysics’). But, in provisional deference to Heidegger’s schema, we wish to develop be-ing-here’s ontology and disclosive ability as the point of departure for the disclosure of be-ing itself. This disclosure, however, is to be that of factual moods, not existential projects.

iii) *World-parts: ‘preoccupation’ with beings*

If moods are disclosive of ‘the whole’, they are, at the same time, according to Heidegger, that which limit projection (understanding) or reveal projection as limited, in a positive sense, by their specificity and factual definition. Moods place be-ing-here, *have already* placed be-ing-here, immediately in and *amidst* the world.172 That is, moods are (*also*) disclosures of ourselves as *already preoccupied* with and *absorbed* by the beings in the world.173 Heidegger writes:

---

172 *Amidst: inmitten* — in the midst of...— This, *as opposed to* the be-ing-amidst or “being-alongside” of be-ing-in, with which, in *Being and Time*, *Sein-bei* is translated and which corresponds, *not* to the ‘already-ness’ of the factual be-ing-in but to be-ing-here’s proximally *fallen* be-ing-in...though the distinction is, perhaps intentionally, frequently controverted or made ambiguous by Heidegger.

173 *‘eingenommen’*: Malick: “preoccupied with”; McNeill: “absorbed by” beings. Perhaps ‘taken up’ or ‘taken in’ (with/by beings) is even more literal. Unfortunately, as is the always the case, particularly with Heidegger, these different translations evoke different possible meanings, which, as thought-provoking as they may be, tend to obscure any possible unanimity of interpretation.
III. Exposition & Critique of Heidegger’s Phenomenological and Temporal Analyses of Dis-position

...projecting be-ing-here, as projecting, is already in the midst of such beings... That which surpasses and so raises itself up and beyond must, as such, find itself [sich befinden] in the midst of beings. As dis-posed [befindliches], be-ing-here becomes absorbed by beings, such that it belongs to beings and is permeated [durchstimmt] by them. [VWG, 61].

Clearly, this character of ‘absorption’ or ‘preoccupation with beings’ is to be distinguished from the character of moods as purely or exclusively holistic, ontological awarenesses (or, even, ‘moody contemplations’). It should also, on the other hand, be distinguished from the kind of absorption and preoccupation with beings which characterizes everyday and/or fallen worldly be-ing-in. Put loosely, it would appear, then, that moods, of themselves, simultaneously splinter off in two directions: one, expanding toward the whole in an appreciative letting-presentation of the whole itself; the other, a limiting be-ing-absorbed by and identified with world-parts, i.e., ‘belonging to beings’ in our preoccupation with them (and be-ing one of them...).

This identification with world-parts, could be seen, positively, as one’s being a part of the whole, in and with other parts, so that one is participating in that whole, with other like beings (like, in that they, also, are, at all – even if in a very different manner). As Heidegger says, we, in our dis-positional absorption by beings, ‘belong to beings’. This could – perhaps depending upon the mood – be taken in the positive sense I have just mentioned (participation in the whole, with all other beings) but it can also be taken in the more limiting sense of a restriction of be-ing-here’s primordial openness for be-ing, a congealing of one’s openness in the permeation and absorption by, and preoccupation with, beings. This latter sense inevitably has, in Heidegger, connotations of the occlusion of falling and is the tendency of Heidegger’s interpretation.
But it is to be borne in mind that we are speaking of \textit{facticity} here and the disclosure of dis-position or self-finderness, which is to be understood as just as distinct from fallenness as from existence. Thereby, the be-ing permeated by and ‘belonging’ to beings \textit{should} be seen in a different light than the grey everydayness of the fallen disclosure of be-ing ‘alongside’ beings. We \textit{belong} to beings in that, via moods, we \textit{participate} in the whole of beings \textit{with} them – even if this participation-with \textit{can}, indeed, obscure the whole that is being participated in.

\textit{Heidegger’s} main point in articulating the character of moodal ‘preoccupation’ with beings is to establish the positive limitation and \textit{grounding}, by mood, of what otherwise remains an abstract world-project: “Be-ing-here grounds world only insofar as it grounds itself in the midst of beings” \cite{VWG, 62}. Be-ing-here’s projection, of itself, overswings being-here itself and finds itself immersed in and permeated by beings: being-in is in-the-world. Inevitably, this limitation has its negative side, in that, if our projection is defined by our already being immersed in beings, with definite involved projects – for, as regards \textit{projection}, that is what preoccupation amounts to – we are thereby \textit{deprived} of certain other possibilities and projects. That is, ‘pure freedom’ is factically limited.\footnote{We may remember this as the ‘nullity of projection’ and the ‘nullity of freedom’(§17.i.b).}

In mereological terms (whole/parts relationship), our being thereby limited to a preoccupation with some beings, and not others, means that we are also limited to some beings \textit{and not the whole} of beings. Nonetheless, preoccupation “brings the ‘actually’ graspable possibilities of the world-projection toward be-ing-here as its world” \cite{VWG, 63}, and gives particularly situated be-ing-here concrete projects to realize as itself, as be-ing-in-
the-world, as a being who realizes the whole *through* its preoccupation with specific world-parts.

However, we can see, here, once again, with this concretization of the significance of moodal preoccupation, the dominance of the *projective* significance of a characteristic of moods, at the expense of the purely and idiosyncratically *moodal* significance. In fact, ‘preoccupation’ can itself be seen as distortion of the phenomenal facts. What is being made a supposed essential characteristic of the dis-positional disclosure is actually what Smith refers to as “moody mulling” (see FM, §17), an ‘impure’ form of moodal disclosure and also an ‘inauthentic’ one.

We saw that, proximally and usually, moods provide a background attunement or context of intuitive felt meaning for the meanings we pursue in our everyday strivings. We can step back from our active worldly projects and mull these concerns over in a mood-infused thinking and imagining – that is, we can be *preoccupied* with and absorbed by them under the sway of their moodal significance as *projects*. But this is to shunt the *proper* possibility, inherent in moods, *viz.*, one *can*, also, directly appreciate, in either moodal contemplation or in direct affective experience, the *holistic* importance which the mood discloses on the horizon beyond one’s mundane projection. Heidegger has instead taken the *projective significance of moods* and its implicit null aspect – *i.e.*, moods’ ‘preoccupied’ character – as having an *essential* importance, whereas it is an essentially accidental trait; and Heidegger has also ignored the *positive* mundane character of the identification with other beings (world-parts) as those others that *participate* with me *in the whole* disclosed by the mood.\(^{175}\)

\(^{175}\) - participating in either a harmonious or in a clashing manner.
This compounds the tendency to forgo the contemplative and affective possibilities inherent in the holistic characteristic of moodal awareness and solidifies the “declination into mundanity” [FM, 121], against which Heidegger’s own countermovement of authenticity strives. If, rather, the be-ing-amidst beings is experienced as a participation with them in the whole, then the orientation toward the whole, with other beings becomes dominant, and the contemplative and affective possibilities of moods is opened out upon. In this way, one is faithful to the actual givenness of moods and does not confuse this with one’s projective concerns.

α) Excursus on the mood/affect distinction

One can also view the situation as follows: as an unfocused, holistic, attunement to/by the whole (“in which we first immerse ourselves…”), moods are also an opening up of ‘space’, so to speak, for a possible attentive or attending and concernful ‘awareness of’ specific beings (“…which then attunes us through and through” [FCOM, 67] to our factically disposed mundane tasks).

More to Heidegger’s point: this latter, preoccupied quality of moods, though I have interpreted it as a kind of insinuation of mundane projection into the realm of mood, is opposed, not to the moodal disclosure, but to the understanding’s own ‘disclosure’ in its projection of possibilities—even as the projection of the world horizon’s own supposed internal but empty reference back to beings. Projection is depicted here as throwing forth a whole, which is, in itself, disclosively or factically empty, both in its holistic sense and in its ‘partial’, i.e., ontic sense. For Heidegger, projection, of itself, is insufficient to reveal beings
– it is, rather, the ‘findedness’ of moods, which discloses and dis-poses us to ourselves and to beings:

Indeed, it lies in the world-project of be-ing-here, that it always, in and through its surpassing, comes back to beings. The ‘for-the-sake-of’ [the ‘first’ way of grounding transcendence and the horizontal schema of the future ecstasis] which ‘throws forth’ in projecting, refers back to the whole of beings that can be unveiled within this world-horizon. ... But in the world-project, these beings are not yet in themselves manifest. They would remain concealed, if it were not for the fact that projecting be-ing-here, as projecting, is already in the midst of such being. [VWG, 61].

...That which surpasses and so raises itself up and beyond, must, as such, find itself [sich befinden] in the midst of beings As dis-posed [befindliches], be-ing-here becomes absorbed by beings, such that it belongs to beings and is permeated [durchstimmt] by them. [VWG, 61].

For Heidegger, moods reveal the ‘already projected-ness’ of projection, i.e., the throwness or ‘beeness’ of existence, existence as having been. Such projected existence is already immersed in and with beings, has already discovered beings and itself within beings, within the horizon of an already projected world: “projecting be-ing-here, as projecting [is] already in the midst of [beings]” [ibid.].

We can consider moods (as Smith does) as disclosive of the whole (whatever whole) in their own moodal manner and as opening up a space for a foreground contemplative or affective disclosure of that whole. Or we can (as Heidegger does in What is Metaphysics?, at least) consider moods as disclosive of the whole in a way that makes concrete the otherwise abstract and empty projection of the whole. Or, again, we can (as Heidegger does to a greater degree) consider moods as disclosive of the whole, which provides an important atmosphere for the simultaneous foreground disclosure of world-parts or beings, in our concrete, mundane, projective dealing with those beings and ourselves. Though this third way of

\[176\] Or, perhaps, because of its ‘emptiness’, it is better to characterize this as a projective positing, rather than ‘disclosure’. 
considering moods seems to emphasize our 'preoccupied' falling prey to beings (i.e., the fallenness of our be-ing amidst beings), for Heidegger, its main thrust is to, via mood, give ground and weight to projection: to "give be-ing-here subsistence and possibility in its very foundations" [FCOM, 67]. Finding ourselves dis-posed and preoccupied in the midst of beings, 'permeated' by them, the projection of "be-ing-here has obtained a footing in beings, or has gained 'ground'" [VWG, 62]. But this substantiality is also a constricting dead-weight and deprivation of the range of possible projects.

In summary, the factual, dis-positional 'preoccupation with' or 'permeation by' beings need not have the connotations of fallen 'being-amidst' beings but can be seen as a participation with other beings in the implied ontic whole. This participation is not the result of the 'ecstatic' overswing of existential projection but the antecedent basis and context of be-ing here in-the-world, that we find ourselves, dis-positionally, already in. 'Preoccupation' with beings is only Heidegger's misinterpretation and confusion of factual dis-posedness with the phenomenon of falling, what Smith calls 'moody mulling'. As we have seen, there remains, within the structure of moods, the possibility of a moodal contemplation and/or direct affective appreciation of the implied whole that these particular beings and ourselves are a part of. Furthermore, actual and authentic participation with other beings engages the whole in its parts. We need not, however, develop this here.

Important, though, for our grasp of the Heideggerian scheme of things, is the notion that the everyday, mundane preoccupation with beings is disclosed by mood as a revelation of be-ing-here's thrownness or past projectedness into the world. Furthermore, the whole that

---

177 As Malick translates: hat das Dasein im Seienden Boden genommen. McNeill provides "taken up a basis" for Malick's 'obtained a footing', i.e., the German "Boden genommen", though they both agree on the more literal rendering, "gained 'ground'".
is attuned to in dis-position is, despite whatever primordiality and uniqueness granted by
Heidegger to the dis-positional disclosure, a whole of projection, i.e., an already projected
whole. If understanding can ‘only’ project the whole emptily, mood can, in Heidegger’s
scheme, disclose that whole as fulfilled…and, further, as mattering in certain ways…

iv) The ‘ways of mattering’ (and falling)

The third essential character of dis-position, which Heidegger presents in Being and
Time – after the disclosures of 1) thrownness and of 2) the current (or ‘temporally particular’
[jeweilige]), holistic be-ing-in-the-world – is the disclosure of 3) the ‘ways of mattering’.
This character, says Heidegger, “contributes above all to a more penetrating understanding of
the worldhood of the world” [H137], that is, of the significance which structures the world.

To begin with, we can (as Smith does in [HTM, II.4]) characterize this disclosure of
the ways of mattering as somewhat similar to Scheler’s “awarenesses of the material or non-
formal values” [HTM, 218], i.e., of ‘value-objects’. We have already seen something of
Smith’s criticism of Scheler’s notion of value (§29) and needn’t repeat it here. Heidegger,
too, means to both develop and undercut Scheler’s ontological-epistemological premises and
ethical orientation, by rejecting both the notion of value and the ‘psychological’
characterization of be-ing-in as an ‘awareness-of’. We will retain the latter term, nonetheless,
provided it is clear no psychological or thetic connotation is intended. The important positive
point, however, is that feelings and their objects are not rendered as mere subjective
experience but as intentional (referring) awareneses of their own meaningful objects.

For Heidegger, be-ing-here is, every day, touched or affected (betroffen) by, for
example, the “unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character” [H137] of the pragmata one
uses — these are some of the (negative) ways in which the *pragma* matter to it. Circumspective be-ing-amidst intraworldly beings is not just a ‘looking around’ but is concerned and “has the character of being affected in some way” [ibid.]. Now, Heidegger has already shown, in discussing the worldhood of the world, that “the already disclosed world allows intraworldly beings to be encountered” [ibid.], i.e., in encountering *pragma* in our concernful dealings, we have already disclosed the world-whole. This ‘previous disclosure’ of the world has the character of a self-assignment and submission (*Angewiesenheit*) of being-in to the significance-context of the world — indeed, one has already so assigned and submitted oneself.\(^{178}\)

Thus, what is encountered only matters to us if there has been, not only a previous disclosure of world, but a previous disclosure of the world as something that matters and matters in particular ways, such as ‘threatening’ or ‘resistant’. These latter are the ‘ways of mattering’, which are revealed by the ‘previous disclosure’ of *dis-position*, via moods and affects. So Heidegger says:

* A *dis-position* implies, existentially, a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. [H137-8; Heidegger’s emphasis].

Again: we can encounter intraworldly beings only because of a previous disclosure of the world, the whole of beings; and we can encounter these beings as mattering to us only because of a previous disclosure of the world-whole as mattering in some way. This mattering, it is implied, then, is the disclosure of the *significance* of the world, the worldhood

\(^{178}\) See footnote 1 in BT, 121, re: *Angewiesenheit*. It is thought-provoking that this word is related to *Anwesenheit*, presence...
of the world structure of be-ing-in-the-world – which be-ing-in otherwise makes-possible, ‘possibilizes’, in understanding projection.

Now, this ‘previous disclosure’ of the world-whole as mattering in some way is that of dis-position. The ways of mattering can only show themselves to something which can be affected by the matter: the ‘threatening’ or the ‘fearsome’ can only matter to something which does not merely perceive but can fear and be in a state of fearing; the ‘joyous’ can only matter to something which can en-joy, i.e., be enjoying; and so on. That is, things can matter only if be-ing-here is structured a priori to allow things to matter and so can disclose them as mattering. Dis-position or ‘self-finding affection’ is this disclosive a priori of mattering, that ‘faculty’ or disclosive potentiality for actual experience of ‘felt meaning’; moods and affects are the ‘empirical’ disclosures of this a priori potentiality for experiencing the mattering or meaningfulness of beings within the world, including other be-ing-heres, and of the world itself. Be-ing-here’s be-ing is so structured with possible ways of being affected as to allow the intraworldly things we encounter to affect us in those ways. Succinctly summarizing this, Heidegger says,

...Be-ing-in as such has been existentially determined beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-world can ‘matter’ to it. ... The fact that this sort of thing can ‘matter’ to it is grounded in one’s dis-position; and as a dis-position it has already disclosed the world — as something by which it can be threatened, for instance. [BT, 176, H137].179

Thus, with the ways of mattering, we see not only into what is disclosed in dis-position but we also see more deeply into the structure of such disclosure itself. Dis-position is an ‘allowing to matter’: it has, already, allowed the world-whole to matter, by having

179 I have retained Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation here, only substituting my ‘dis-position’ for their ‘state-of-mind’.
submitted and assigned be-ing-in, itself, to a significant, mattering context – and so can now have particular intraworldly beings show up as mattering within that context.

β) Dis-positional mattering, projective significance, and felt meaning

Smith observes that Heidegger’s “ways of ‘mattering’ could have been interpreted as felt meanings” [FM, 24, my emphasis] – but, unfortunately they weren’t, as Heidegger was more concerned with interpreting the ‘indefinitely threatening’ matter of angst as “significant …because it enables the question about the reason for the Being of being to be raised” [FM, 24]. That is, rather than appreciating the matter as felt, it became, as usual, fodder for the Heideggerian version of the rationalist project. This criticism, though perhaps somewhat uncharitable, is essentially correct and can be supported here by underscoring Heidegger’s reluctance, in Being and Time, to explicitly state, unequivocally, that it is moods which are the ‘previous disclosure’ of the world-whole and – more importantly and less disputably – that this “certain [pre-ontological] intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]” [H86] is a uniquely dispositional or affective – not projective – ‘intelligibility’.

---

Heidegger, of course, does state this but he hedges the statement. For example, he says that “this prior disclosedness of the world belongs to be-ing-in and is partly constituted by one’s dis-position” [H137, my emphasis], implying, in this context, that circumspective concern, in its letting beings be encountered, also (and perhaps primarily) constitutes the prior disclosedness. But the action of concern is intramundane and so cannot disclose the world itself, i.e., the world-whole. Perhaps, then, Heidegger means to imply that understanding projection also or primarily constitutes this prior disclosedness. A prior projection is what allows beings to show up as this or that in our mundane contexts. Inasmuch as dis-position is characterized as thrown projection, this would be true, i.e., understanding in its past form of having already understood, would thereby constitute the prior disclosedness and this is what, in fact, in Heidegger’s schema, dis-positions are. But if this was Heidegger’s point, then he would not say that this prior disclosedness of the world is partly constituted by disposition but rather, since dis-position is nothing but past projectedness, it is fully constituted by it. Does Heidegger mean, then, that this prior disclosure of world is partly constituted by understanding’s proper futural possibilizing projection? As we have seen, this is, in itself, an empty projective intention and, in any case, hardly seems appropriate for a prior disclosedness… It would seem, then, that it would be most appropriate to designate this prior disclosedness of the world as being constituted wholly by dis-position, either in Heidegger’s sense as a past projection – or in the sense of dis-position liberated from the structural constraints of projection, which we are proposing here.
As we have seen (§25), this reluctance is echoed in Heidegger’s 1927 summer course, in typically ambiguous Heideggerian fashion. In Heidegger’s “brief digression” [BP, 281], it is implied but not explicitly stated, that the ‘pre-conceptual understanding of being’ (not just beings or, even, be-ing-here) is one of dis-position (or “affective self-finding” as Hofstadter translates it) – yet, again, this disclosedness is nonetheless supposed to be a projective one, i.e., a projection which has been. Thus, while giving dis-position an exalted and fundamental role, Heidegger robs the dis-positional disclosure of its idiosyncratic manner of disclosing its distinctive meanings or ‘matters’.

We may ask, then: Is the matter of dis-position the same phenomenon as the significance of projection? As the matter of dis-position, this significant world-whole may, one may suppose, have another structure or modality than the horizon of projective possibility; or it may, perhaps, be a ‘parallel’ affective disclosure of significance-worldhood. The immediate distinction is simply that the dis-positional disclosure of the ways of mattering is a ‘previous disclosure’ of the already important or meaningful world-whole – as opposed to the futural disclosure of world-projection, the possibilizing of significance. Heidegger wants to imply with this, however, that moods are simply the way past projections of world presently show themselves to us, overthrowing themselves as possibilities and overtaking us with the factical sway of their thrownness, their enduring ‘beeness’, as it were. The question is, then: Are moods the present revelation of a previously, projectively disclosed world? Or are they not rather the disclosive submissions to the world-whole as presently mattering, i.e., as possessing felt meaning in and of itself? If the latter, then this disclosure is a prior one in the sense that it is the already implied basis for other disclosures.

---

181 The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, §20.
occurring along with and encompassing them as their dis-positional ‘ground’, from which they draw meaning.

That is, if the ‘mattering’ of mood was recognized as disclosive of distinctively felt meanings, Heidegger could have developed more of the internal nature of feeling and developed a ‘mode of access’ to the world as felt. Instead, the ‘matter’ of moods, as the significance of the world, is a kind of wholeness of all projected mundane involvements, which, as a whole, surpasses them and thereby refers (back) to that for-the-sake-of-which (be-ing-in, the Self) they are involved, that which (or who) has projected the whole. Significance, the worldhood of the world, is “that wherein be-ing-here understands itself beforehand” [H86], “the ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding” [ibid.]. This ‘wherein’ is the meaning, and

meaning is the ‘upon-which’ [or horizon] of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible [verständlich, understandable] as something. [BT 193, H151].

Thus ‘significance’ is the projected meaning of the whole of beings. Even as the world-whole’s meaning, beyond our fallen and partial involvements and even, also, as that matter/meaning attuned to in moods, it remains a form of projected meaning. Indeed,

‘Meaning’ [i.e., ‘meaning’ per se] must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. [BT193, H151].

‘Meaning’ thereby belongs, for Heidegger, exclusively to the domain of projection. ‘Mattering’, then, must indeed be reduced to, or be a modification of, the projective meaning of significance.

---

182 Or the present disclosure of intraworldly beings
183 That the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is both the whole of be-ing-in and, as we shall see later, the schema for the world-horizon of the future ecstasis, strikes one as problematic.
Therefore, we conclude with Smith that the 'matter', and the ways of mattering which dis-position opens out upon, are interpreted by Heidegger within the proto-rationalist framework of projective understanding and are, thereby, not liberated as felt meanings in themselves. Not only that but near the end of §29 (Be-ing-here as dis-position), Heidegger qualifies the mattering disclosure as not only being a disclosive submission to the world as mattering to it in various ways but

it [dis-position] is itself the existential kind of be-ing in which be-ing-here constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' 'matter' to it in such a way that it, in a certain way, evades its very self. [H139].

That is, according to Heidegger, dis-position, in some essential manner, tends toward the inauthentic self-immersion in mundanity which constitutes falling, the self-evading falling into the world. With this, not only is the projective prejudice complete but the traditional maligning of feeling as inauthentic is thrown in for good measure.

In summary: the third of Heidegger's essential traits of dis-position is the 'ways of mattering', how beings disclose – or, more essentially, given the holistic aspect of moods, how the world as a whole discloses – as meaningful, by 'touching' or affecting us, mattering in some way. Things can matter only if be-ing-here is so structured a priori as to allow them to matter: dis-position is this disclosive a priori of mattering. The ways of 'mattering', as Smith observed, could have been interpreted as felt meanings, with an idiosyncratic mode of disclosure of its own. However, Heidegger, did not take the seemingly obvious next step of recognizing these as meanings in their own right and stayed within his own version of the what Smith sees as the traditional rationalist prejudice. That is, despite seeing the primordiality of the dis-positional disclosure, Heidegger nevertheless (mis)interprets them existentially and projectively. Dis-positions disclose the way beings, the world, be-ing-here
and be-ing itself are meaningful as felt. But in Heidegger’s analysis, there is a conflation of projective significance with dis-positional mattering. This confirms concretely my general criticism that Heidegger’s is under the spell of his existential guiding concept, to the point of it resulting in distortions of the actual phenomena – here, the felt meanings or matterings – he is considering.

§35. The structure of dis-position

Heidegger’s analysis of fear (§30: Fear as a Mode of Dis-position) brings out a structural analysis that can be generalized for all moods and affects. This will allow us to further articulate and distinguish the ‘moments’ that constitute moods. Heidegger depicts three structures, viz., the before-which, the mood or affect itself, and the about-which.

i) The before-which (das Wovor)

The ‘before-which’ – the phenomenal ‘object’ be-ing-here discloses or that ‘in the face of which’ any mood or affect stands – is, generally, some being, which matters in some definite way. In fear, one stands before (or rather shrinks back from) the fearsome, i.e., some being which matters in the way of fearsomeness or being threatening. To extend this to other moods or affects: in joy, one appreciates (to use Smith’s term) a joyful being, the joyousness or fortunateness [HTM, 227] of which matters (in, as Smith would further articulate, the further articulable way of being fulfilling). In awe, one is before some awesome phenomenon, something that matters in its awesomeness (e.g., in the way of being immense); and so on.
Thus we can see (as Smith notes [HTM, 220]) that there are two major aspects within the structure of the before-which: 1) the being(s) which are infused with affective meaning, e.g. the fearsome or joyful or awesome beings; and 2) the way of mattering or felt meaning itself, which ‘infuses’ the being, e.g. fearsomeness, joyousness, awesomeness. Together they make up that before-which we feel whatever we feel, viz., the fearsome, the joyous, or the awesome (Smith’s ‘importances’).

Heidegger’s analysis of fear marks several more features of ‘the threatening’ character of the fearsome, including its “detrimentality as a kind of involvement”; the target and range of this detrimentality; the (generally well-known) region the threat arises from; the ‘queerness’ or unknown element of that which threatens; its still remote yet imminent character as a striking which is coming close; the ‘radiating’ character of the threat; the uncertainty of the strike...and so on [H140-1]. Variations in these make for the different possible modifications of fear into alarm, dread, terror, etc. Perhaps it goes without saying, but the richness and perspicacity of Heidegger’s analysis is outstanding. These particular features of the before-which are tailored to the specific analysis of fear or the fear ‘family’ of affects and thus cannot be generalized, as a typology, across all moods and affects. Nonetheless, one could imagine that each feeling or family of feelings has something of a similar descriptive structure. This is what a comprehensive and detailed phenomenology of feeling could work out. Indeed, Smith’s own descriptions of moods and affects employs typological distinctions (feeling-flows, tonalities, importances) and non-typological characteristics (feeling-intensities, -color, -weight, -temperature), which do enable him to develop a comprehensive phenomenology of (metaphysical) feeling. The essential characters

---

184 — “the fearsome... in its fearsomeness” [BT, 179; H140].
make it possible for him to develop a foundational order of feelings based on the import of structurally articulated, metaphysical feeling.

ii) *The mood itself*

By the mood or affect ‘itself’, Heidegger is referring to, for example, the *fearing* as such, which discloses fearsomeness – the way of mattering or felt meaning itself – *a priori*. This fearing of fearsomeness allows us to discover, circumspectively, the fearsome being, before which we stand (or shrink back from). That is, it is only possible to discover something fearsome if be-ing-here is such that it *can* disclose felt meanings – in particular, here, fearsomeness is disclosed *in the fearing itself*. Fearing is, here, the *a priori* ‘subjective’ possibility of the disclosure of felt meaning (before-which I fear). It would appear to me that it is Smith’s great virtue to have, with his notion of feeling-flows (feeling-sensations and feeling-tonalities), articulated the internal structures of moods and affects themselves, far beyond what has been previously achieved. Heidegger, for example, externalizes some of these internal traits (such as the above-mentioned ‘queerness’, or the ‘radiating’ quality, etc.) onto the ‘object’ of fear (*i.e.*, the about-which).

We see that within the above notion of the before-which, there is a certain priority between its two elements: the felt meaning (way of mattering) is ‘prior’ to the particular being which we discover as infused with that meaning, and the priority rests in the structure of the feeling ‘subject’ (*so to speak*) *itself*:

Fearing...discovers it [the fearsome] beforehand in its fearsomeness. ... Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of dis-positional be-ing-in-the-world, *i.e.*, ‘fearfulness’, has already disclosed the world, such that out of it something like the fearsome can come close. [H141].
Dis-position discloses – has already disclosed – the world a priori and as a whole and as mattering in certain ways, allowing us to actually discover beings within the world as mattering here and now in these ways. It would seem, then, that it would be possible to disclose just the matter itself, i.e., the felt meaning – but Heidegger includes 'the world' within this disclosure of meaning. Remembering, though, that the worldhood of the world just is the significance – or dis-positionally equivalently, the matter or felt meaning – of the world, and not some cosmological totality, we should not be surprised at Heidegger’s inclusion of world within the dis-positional matter.

Smith summarizes by saying that,

The structure of the mood itself that can be abstracted from this description of fear itself is that the mood itself is the a priori disclosure of the before-which. It is the disclosure of the different ways in which the beings in the world can 'matter' to Dasein. [HTM, 221].

The mood itself is thus, simply, that which discloses the felt meanings (matters) of the world.

iii) The about-which (das Worum)

What be-ing-here fears about, in fear, for example, is be-ing-here itself. Be-ing-here, in fearing, is 'the threatened'. As Smith points out [HTM, 221], the about-which is correlated to the 'matter' (in the same manner, it would appear, as his feeling-sensations correlate to the feeling-tonalities of the world) before which we stand: in fear, something matters in being threatening (fearsomeness) and that about-which one fears, (the safety of) be-ing-here itself, is 'the threatened'; in joy, the fulfilling joyousness discloses be-ing-here, the about-which (or about-whom), as 'joyed' and fulfilled; in awe, awesomeness affects be-ing-here such that it is awed; and so on.
Heidegger also points out that, even in fearing about others, ultimately, it is be-ing-here itself who is threatened. As Smith remarks, in any case, “the being that the mood is about is always Dasein, whether this be the Dasein that has the mood or some other Dasein” [HTM, 221].

The before-which, the mood or affect itself, and the about-which constitute the structure of moods such that dis-position discloses a priori the world as mattering in some way, within which some being matters and affects, with its way of mattering, be-ing-here itself. Most notable, here, is Heidegger’s further articulation of the ‘matter’ of dis-position as that “before-which” one stands: e.g., the fearsome, the joyful, the awesome, etc., are what we can recognize as felt meanings, even if Heidegger is not inclined to think of them as meanings in their own right. Let us now consider Heidegger’s temporal analysis of dis-position.
CHAPTER X. The Temporality of Dis-position

§36. Introduction

i) Envisioning revisions of Heidegger’s temporal theory

Heidegger’s notion of temporality is the core of his ontology of be-ing-here and it is at this level of analysis, particularly in the move to the Temporality of be-ing itself, that his philosophical project faltered. The present work is attempting to move toward the possibility of working through that failed project by modifying the disclosive and ontological status of ‘projection’ itself and successfully developing a factual temporal ontology of be-ing-here and of be-ing itself. A part of this undertaking would include a revision of the temporality of be-ing-here, which may turn out to require revision of the notion of the basal character and priority of this temporality. In any case, the strategy toward a revised temporality works via a redistribution of the ‘weight’ of the disclosive structures of be-ing-here, viz., as suggested by Smith’s phenomenology and metaphysics of feeling, the assigning of a new and suitable priority to the disclosure of ‘dis-position’, at the expense of the Heideggerian priority of the ‘understanding’. The question of be-ing, as a question as to its meaning, would no longer imply a focus on the projective understanding of be-ing but would rather focus on the non-projective, dis-positional disclosure or appreciation of the felt meaning of be-ing.

As regards temporality, one immediate result of this freeing of dis-position is the renouncing of the general and structural priority of the future ecstasis for be-ing-here’s temporalizations. Further, maintaining Heidegger’s general schema, this new priority of dis-
position would imply a priority of beeness or having-been, viz, the past temporal dimension in the temporalization of be-ing-here.

However, it would be prudent to leave such affairs open: the shipwreck of the project and its futural priority may require a complete reworking of be-ing-here’s modes of disclosure and temporality; we need not abjectly take up whatever alternative first shows itself within the Heideggerian schema, particularly in light of the fact that the ecstasis of ‘been-ness’, in Heidegger, is that of the thrownness of past existence, not of facticity proper. The required transformation of be-ing-here is fundamental, affecting its total sense of be-ing here, both disclosively and temporally. As we are seeing in the present work, a phenomenology of feeling that develops outside the formal indication of an existential analysis of be-ing-here implies a retroactive reworking of the very notion of dis-position and of its relation to the other modes of disclosure of be-ing-here. Similarly, the temporal structure of dis-position, even if it were to remain that of been-ness, may require significant internal revision and would undoubtedly also require a reworking of the relationship between the different temporal ecstases. It may also be that different moods and affects temporalize differently, with no ecstasis given structural priority; furthermore, the different temporalizations may be ordered according to the felt meaning appreciated and not according to be-ing-here’s internal temporality. We must leave this all open for now.

Nonetheless, if we are to, initially, keep the structure of Heidegger’s temporal scheme (not the content, nor the order of priority of that structure), the giftedness of be-ing-from-birth may be seen as acquiring a new and perhaps foundational importance for be-ing-here’s disclosiveness and temporality. As we have seen, the uneliminable facticity of be-ing-here is not to be immediately subsumed into the null – or any – manner of the existential
response; rather, it is that which breaks the existential compulsion and allows be-ing-here truly to be open and released into its be-ing. Resolute be-ing-toward-birth ("be-ing-toward-the-beginning" [H373]) may be the way that existence realizes its thrownness and existential historicality; but be-ing-from-birth is the way factual be-ing-here structures or, rather, is structured in its be-ing and in its dis-positional openness. There, outside all horizons of possibility, and regardless of its possibilities for action in the world, the uneliminable facticity of be-ing-here at all, opens up the be-ing of that which it discloses and offers the possibility of a new fundamental ontology of be-ing-here and be-ing itself. The existential-ontological angst of being-toward-death, it should be added, must itself be reappropriated within this new disclosive basis.

ii) The justification of the interpretive 'presupposition' of the idea of existence by the 'ontological content' of thrownness (SZ ¶63)

For Heidegger, temporality is the primordial ontological basis for the interpretation of be-ing-here. After working through the primordiality requirements of holism (anticipation of be-ing-toward-death and be-ing-a-whole), authenticity (conscience and resoluteness), and phenomenological experientiality (anticipatory resoluteness), Heidegger (in ¶63) justifies the "presupposition" of the "idea of existence" by reflexively pointing to the "ontological content" of the very act of understanding/projection itself, which poses the question of be-ing in the first place. That is, in posing the question of be-ing – or in any act of understanding whatsoever – be-ing-here finds that, in being pre-ontologically ahead of itself, it has already
projected its existence\textsuperscript{185} – that is, be-ing-here already has some ontological understanding. That is to say, existence has been thrown, is already thrown, understanding, existence.

Be-ing-here is ‘ahead of itself’ in that it has already projected itself and in that its projects, now, unfolds into the future. The ‘remarkable relatedness back and forth’ of presupposition ("formal indication") and interpreted content, which characterizes the existential analysis, expresses the hermeneutically circular structure of be-ing-here’s existential be-ing. Indeed, “the circle...is nothing less than the ground-structure of Care” [H315]. This back-and-forth relatedness also betokens the movement of temporality.

It should be remarked that, in an important sense, then, the justification for the guiding ontological presupposition of existence and the priority thereby given existence, within the ontology of be-ing-here, is the fact of the presupposition itself, i.e., that we already work within some understanding – that is, the thrownness of existence, i.e., facticity! Even if facticity, then, were essentially nothing but the past form of existence, i.e., thrownness, its derivative status as a mere temporal modification of essentially futural existence would be suspect. But this temporal ‘modification’, as we have repeatedly observed, signifies another ontological mode, not only another existential mode, viz., it signifies facticity, not only thrownness. Facticity is, essentially, more than thrownness. This is confirmed in the fact that existence, on its own, cannot justify itself but must have recourse to the slightly alienated form of itself as thrownness, thereby implying another mode of the be-ing of be-ing-here, viz., facticity.

This means that the very interpretive presupposition of the formal ‘idea of existence’ is based upon and justified by the ‘ontological content’ of thrown existence or be-ing-here’s

\textsuperscript{185} – and, further, that this previous projection implies an even more primordial, prior projection of be-ing itself.
facticity. Existence is based on facticity. This may not appear too surprising; one could simply say that the relation is simply that of (factual) ground to (existential) horizon: all projects arise out of and are again grounded upon factual reality. It does appear a bit more remarkable when we realize that this means, disclosively, that all projection is based on disposition. Yet, as we have seen, Heidegger does say this often enough – only then, however, as if under existential compulsion, to reabsorb factual dis-positional disclosedness back into existential understanding-projection.

But what is particularly remarkable in ¶63 is that, if existence and understanding are justified, as foundational interpretive presuppositions, by their thrownness, then that thrownness assumes a powerful foundational role and one which, itself, must be justified outside of its role as a modification of existence. What, then, justifies thrownness? Heidegger might, in turning the circle, answer that existence justifies thrownness – that they are, like motivation and goal, equiprimordial and co-dependent ontological structures of be-ing-here. It is a major point of this work, however, to maintain that thrownness itself points to a facticity that outstrips any existentiality. That is to say, facticity is more than the burdensome fact of thrown existence and assumes an importance of its own, along with the phenomenology of its own disclosedness – that is, along with the phenomenology of disposition.

But let us return to – or, rather, explicitly begin – Heidegger’s temporal analysis of disclosedness as such, so that we may focus more specifically on the temporality of disposition.
iii) Preamble to Heidegger’s temporal analysis of disclosedness

At present, we wish to exhibit and consider Heidegger’s interpretation of the temporality of dis-position. As we have earlier noted, in Heidegger’s temporal-ontological-disclosive scheme, the ecstasis of the future is what structures and makes possible be-ing-here’s existence and understanding. The ecstasis of the present is what structures be-ing-here’s falling and the fallen or inauthentic version of discourse.\(^{186}\) It is the ecstasis of the ‘past’, that is, of been-ness or ‘having-been’, which makes possible (or, perhaps, ‘has made actual’) be-ing-here’s ontological mode of facticity and the mode of disclosure of dispositional ‘self-finding’. Though it is beyond the scope of the present work to work out the full significance and the necessary critical revision of the many aspects of Heidegger’s temporal theory, one of our main goals is to prepare the ‘ground’ necessary for such a task. Hitherto, exegetical scholarship (let alone critical scholarship) on Heidegger’s temporal analysis is sparing, to say the least. Therefore, a presentation of the main aspects of Heidegger’s temporal analysis of disclosedness, with a particular focus on the temporality of dis-position, is pertinent.

Heidegger arrives at the temporal standpoint after working through the primordiality requirements for interpretation and justifying the formal indication of existence by the hermeneutical and ontological circle. He then proceeds, in the rest of Division Two, Be-ing-here and Temporality, to work out several temporal analyses of be-ing-in-the-world. These analyses include those of the temporality of the authenticity, the everydayness, and the historicality of be-ing-here, of the transcendence of the world, the temporality of

\(^{186}\) Once again, the relation between falling and language is not as straightforward as that between existence and understanding or facticity and dis-position. Falling is not expressed any more essentially by language than by understanding or mood; nor is the present the temporal structure of discourse per se.
innerworldly beings and that of common world-time. We can only focus, here, on the ‘ecstatic’ temporality of be-ing-in’s disclosedness as such, which Heidegger articulates in the context of be-ing-here’s authenticity and historicality. The horizontal and worldly aspects of this temporality, though, essentially intertwined with ecstatic be-ing-in, and of fundamental importance in grounding the ecstasy and in the move to the temporality of be-ing itself, are here of subsidiary and supplementary importance (and, perhaps, of primary importance only for the existential temporality we are distinguishing ourselves from here).

The lead into these analyses is through the temporality of authentic Care. As we have seen, the be-ing of be-ing-here, viz., ‘Care’ – the “ahead-of-itself-be-ing-already-in-(the-world) as dwelling-amidst (innerworldly encountered beings)” [H192] – is unified in its rather unwieldy and disparate structure, by the authentic and holistic form it assumes in the self-constancy and certainty of anticipatory resoluteness. As Heidegger says,

Be-ing-here becomes ‘essentially’ itself in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. This mode of the authenticity of Care contains the primordial Self-constancy and totality of be-ing-here. [H323].

So, in seeking the meaning of Care, Heidegger is seeking the meaning of essential be-ing-here, that is, of the authentic, resolute be-ing-a-whole (be-ing-toward-death) of anticipatory resoluteness. And as a quest for the meaning of this authentic Care, Heidegger is asking about that wherein or in terms of which anticipatory resoluteness is understood as what it is, i.e., that horizon upon which anticipatory resoluteness is projected and which guides, underlies, and makes possible the transparency of the totality of what has been projected (i.e., of anticipatory resoluteness). That is, ‘meaning’ is a ‘transcendental’ or a priori ‘category’, an existential of be-ing-here and it correlates, as horizon, to the projection of understanding. We have already seen that ‘meaning’ itself is, for Heidegger, essentially an
affair of projective understanding, its ‘intelligibility’ being that of the understanding, even if in its thrown form.

§37. The temporal analysis of authentic Care (anticipatory resoluteness)

What, then, is the meaning of Care? I.e., What makes anticipatory resoluteness (authentic Care) possible? Heidegger’s answer is a tripartite temporal analysis which, as base, corresponds to the tripartite structure of (authentic) Care. That is, he works out what Blattner calls a ‘non-sequential temporal manifold’ [Blattner, 1999, p.102-5, ff.], which grounds the ‘ahead-of-itself’ (existence), the ‘already-in’ (facticity), and the ‘be-ing-amidst’ (falling) characters of Care. These characters manifest, in the authentic resoluteness of anticipatory resoluteness, as, respectively, be-ing-toward-death, be-ing-guilty, and taking-action in the current Situation.

i) Be-ing-toward-death and the future

Heidegger first characterizes anticipatory resoluteness in its essential aspect of anticipatorily be-ing-towards-death, i.e., as a be-ing ahead of itself in “be-ing-towards one’s ownmost, distinctive potentiality-to-be” [H325].

How, then, asks Heidegger, can be-ing-here come toward itself in its ownmost possibility? This is possible only if be-ing-here can come towards itself at all, that is, inasmuch as it ‘exists’ [H325].187 This distinctive “letting-itself-come-towards-itself is the primordial phenomenon of the future” [ibid.] (die Zu-kunft, the ‘coming-toward’). Ahead of

---

187 Adds Heidegger: this is possible inasmuch as be-ing-here “puts up with this possibility...as possibility” thus “letting itself come toward itself”, this ‘putting up with’ and ‘letting’ apparently implying that it exists (...that is, exists.” [H325, my emphases].
itself, be-ing-here’s be-ing is ‘an issue’ for itself, a potentiality-to-be a futural possibility, whether authentic or inauthentic, for-the-sake-of which it is. Both the anticipation of death, in authentic be-ing-toward-death and be-ing-a-whole, and the inauthentic, partial be-ing of turning away and fleeing from death (which is fugitively toward the future as an expecting or awaiting \([\text{Gewättigen}]\),\textsuperscript{188} are based on the possibility of coming-towards-oneself, at all, i.e., the ‘general’ futural character of be-ing-here’s existential be-ing \([\text{ibid.}]\). As Dastur says,

Anticipatory resoluteness, that is, the ‘authentic’ existence of Dasein toward its end (death), presupposes that Dasein is able (to the extent that it \textit{exists} in the mode of \textit{possibility} rather than \textit{is} in the mode of \textit{actuality}) \textit{to come} to itself in general. \([\text{Dastur, HQT, 35}]\).

The meaning, therefore, of authentic Care as anticipatory resoluteness, at least, in its essential aspect as be-ing-toward-death – that which makes it possible, as a gathered whole – is the futural dimension or ‘ecstasis’ of be-ing-here’s very be-ing. That is, the \textit{meaning} of that mode of be-ing-here that is ahead of itself, \textit{viz.}, existence, is the \textit{future}: “The primary meaning of existentiality is the future” \([\text{H327}]\).

Let us consider this futural dynamic further. In everyday “expecting a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am” \([\text{BP 265}]\). The directionality of this movement is \textit{not} a ‘coming back to’ my factual self (this directionality is reserved for authentic be-ing-past – see next section) from the possibility but a ‘going \textit{forth from}’ the \textit{factual self}, \textit{coming towards} the \textit{futural} self that I possibly \textit{am}, \textit{i.e.}, that I \textit{am} in the mode of possibility, \textit{i.e.}, that I \textit{exist}.\textsuperscript{189} Though Heidegger does say that the future underlies projective understanding “as a coming-toward-oneself out of that current possibility, as which be-ing-

\textsuperscript{188} Haar translates this \textit{Gewättigen} by “attentiveness”, meaning attentiveness to mundane concerns and how they will come out. \([\text{cf. Haar, 1993b, 35}]\).

\textsuperscript{189} Gelven: “The future is meaningful to one because one \textit{goes toward} the future” \([\text{Gelven, 1989, 178}]\).
here exists” [H336], this means that we come toward our futural selves out of the current, factual, possessibilizing projection toward it. That is, the possibilities (mundane or otherwise) that I project are possibilities that I am as my to be, in projecting toward and possibilizing them: “it [be-ing-here] is existentially that which, in its potentiality-to-be, it is not yet” [H145; BT, 185-6].¹⁹⁰ ‘Existential is-ing’ is positively existing the not-now of the not-yet, that is, being-toward it in the manner of a possibility.

William Blattner quotes the H145 passage, which says that be-ing-here or ‘Dasein is existentially what it is not yet’ but he turns it to mean that “Dasein is not yet what it is able to be” and “Dasein is not yet what it presses ahead into” i.e., be-ing-here is not yet its possibilities [Blattner, 1999, p.103]. However, this is the exact opposite of what Heidegger says and it maintains the very vorhanden ontology Heidegger is attempting to override, missing the important clue toward Heidegger’s new temporal ontology. From this fundamental error, Blattner works out an interesting interpretation of the temporality of existentiality and, to a degree, a defense of Heidegger’s non-standard use of temporal terms. But this error prejudices his whole discussion of be-ing-here’s temporality. Rather, ‘Dasein’ is its not yet, its to be: it is-to-be. Existentiality consists in be-ing futural, not in not being the future.

ii) Be-ing-guilty and been-ness

However, anticipatory resoluteness is not only be-ing-towards-death but also authentic be-ing-guilty, viz., “be-ing the [already] thrown ground [or basis] of nullity” [H325], or, more

¹⁹⁰ “…was es in seinem Seinkönnen noch nicht ist, ist es existenzial” [H145]: what it is not yet, in its potentiality-to-be, it is existentially.
specifically, be-ing-here’s maintaining Self-constancy and certainty in be-ing “the null ground of its null projection” [H288]. One exists this null ground by taking it over; and this taking over thrownness in futural projection signifies, temporally, taking up and be-ing authentically what one already was (presumably inauthentically, for Heidegger), that is, authentically be-ing one’s already guilty been-ness. But:

Taking over thrownness is, however, only possible in that futural be-ing-here can be its ownmost ‘as it already was’, that is, its ‘been’. Only in so far as be-ing-here is as I am-been, can it futurally come towards itself, such that it comes back. [H326; my underlining].

That is, only insofar as be-ing-here is-been, at all (and not just inauthentically, as it proximally and usually is), can it projectively take its thrownness up into authentic existence, or ‘come toward itself futurally’ – from its primordially past ‘been’, toward its authentic, futural be-ing (and non-be-ing) – ‘such that it can then come back’ to itself, i.e., to its unauthentic thrownness, projectively, in order to take it over and authentically be that been-ness.

Here, once again, it is essential to keep to the directionality of the comings and goings of this temporality, and therewith to note the difference between primordial been-ness and the potentially authentic been-ness. Primordial been-ness is the past or been-ness itself, which be-ing-here already is and arises forth from (toward the future); and potentially authentic been-ness is that which be-ing-here comes back to from the futural possible self that one has come toward in projection – it functions, in Heidegger, as thrownness, as the past to be appropriated in the authentic, futural project of ‘taking over’ one’s thrownness.

Thus been-ness becomes, in the authentic project, the movement back that allows the projective movement, the coming towards itself of existence, to come back (rather, be thrown back) to the nullity of one’s thrown facticity (that is, the nullity of one’s guilty, already-
having-projectedness coupled with one’s \textit{a priori} inability to ever master the ground of one’s projection), for the sake of ‘taking it up into existence’.

But, what is more important, ontologically, is that been-ness, revealed in dis-position, is the fact that be-ing-here “still is and \textit{already was}” [H328] – even if Heidegger tends to view this as an inauthentic been-ness, not yet taken over and made my own.\textsuperscript{191} Noting the distinction between the \textit{in}-authenticity of thrownness and the \textit{un-} or \textit{non-}authenticity of primordial been-ness is crucial.\textsuperscript{192} Been-ness already is as a ‘\textit{was there}’ \textit{prior} to any coming back to it; this is what makes up its ineluctable facticity and the basis of the essential nullity of the project, even as resolute. This \textit{factual} been-ness is only \textit{retroactively} projected as inauthentic – or authentic, for that matter – that is, as \textit{existential} been-ness, \textit{i.e.}, thrownness.

The meaning, then, of anticipatory resoluteness as be-ing-guilty – that which makes it possible in what it is – is the past dimension or ecstasis of be-ing-here’s be-ing: been-ness. That is, the meaning of that mode of be-ing-here, which is-already-there in the world, \textit{viz.}, facticity, is been-ness: “The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in been-ness” [H328].\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{191} as he, similarly, views anxiety (at times) as, even if perhaps authentic, \textit{not yet resolute} [\textit{e.g.}, H344].
\textsuperscript{192} Further, \textit{inauthentic} be-ing-past, as manifested in retaining or forgetting something, is also \textit{made possible} by primordial been-ness: be-ing-here itself is concomitantly retained in the retaining of something (some being) and this signifies that “it [be-ing-here] retains is own self in what it already \textit{has been}, \textit{i.e.}, “be-ing-here is precisely in fact what it was” [BP, 264].
\textsuperscript{193} The word ‘\textit{existential}’ is, particularly in light of my interpretive tendency, very much out of place here; but it should be remembered that Heidegger often uses it, in light of his guiding ‘formal indication’ for interpreting be-ing-here, to refer to be-ing-here \textit{as a whole}. Still, we would prefer to substitute ‘ontological’ for ‘existential’ in this passage.
\(\gamma\) Excursus on primordial been-ness and authentic been-ness (thrownness)

However, obviously not all is clear in this analysis. Heidegger's own analysis is so much in the grips of existentiality and authenticity, here, that he verges on characterizing the very be-ing — not just the authentic be-ing — of been-ness in terms of existential imperatives. Were this merely the rhetoric of the intensification of existence, characteristic of authenticity, it might be acceptable. However, this is ontology, here, and it takes an unnecessarily sharp eye to distinguish between Heidegger's authentic account and his purely ontological account of been-ness. Let us quote the H326 passage again:

Taking over thrownness is, however, only possible in that futural be-ing-here can be its ownmost 'as it already was', that is, its 'been'. Only in so far as be-ing-here is as I am-been, can it futurally come towards itself, such that it comes back. [H326].

This passage requires several readings and exceedingly meticulous ones at that. According to the first sentence, the act of taking over thrownness is, temporally speaking, futural be-ing-here 'be-ing its been-ness'; i.e., 'be-ing been-ness' is the temporal meaning of taking over thrownness; that is, be-ing is, here, equivalent to existential 'taking over' or appropriating (or, it is the temporal structure or expression of that).

However, it must be made clear that primordial been-ness does not arise with this existential take-over — only potentially authentic been-ness so arises. Been-ness is already there beforehand. The second sentence, in the H326 passage, appears to underscore my interpretation and Heidegger's own deepest ontological (not existential) intent: the fact of primordial been-ness makes it possible for futural be-ing-here to project itself, such that being-here comes back to itself, in order to take over its thrownness.

However, Heidegger continues this same passage:
As authentically futural, be-ing-here is authentically been. Anticipation of one’s most extreme and ownmost possibility is an understanding coming-back to one’s ownmost ‘been’. Be-ing-here can only authentically be been, insofar as it is futural. Been-ness arises, in a certain way, from the future. [H326].

It may be true that been-ness may arise from the future “in a certain way”, viz., in the way of authenticity, perhaps – but not in and of its own, primordial, way. It may be true that “be-ing-here can only authentically be been, insofar as it is futural” [H326] – but the emphasis is misplaced here: it should be on the “authentically”, not the “be”, unless one wishes to use the word ‘be’ with the existentiell and rhetorical appeal of an intensification of existence. That is, this passage does not say and should not imply (though it does so imply) that be-ing-here can only ontologically be-been (be as ‘having been’) insofar as it is futural; it says that it can been authentically only if it is futural.

As do most commentators, Dastur, when she summarizes these passages, misses this crucial difference, sublating been-ness itself into its potentially authentic form: “Dasein can only be its ‘past’ by returning to it in order to assume it on the basis of the future” [Dastur, HQT, 35]. As we shall soon see more clearly, be-ing-here can only be its ‘past’ authentically by so returning... but it, nonetheless is already its past, is-been already, prior to the returning and retrieving project of authenticity.

David Wood, too, when, commenting on these passages, says: “Having a past is one thing, but for one’s past to be part of one’s being, one must first exist, projectively – that is,

194 Alternately, one could interpret this passage as saying, as in the 1924 The Concept of Time, that, in be-ing-toward-death, be-ing-here anticipates its entire be-ing-here as having been, as bygone (Vorbei) or ‘be-ing-gone’, i.e., as been: ein vorlaufen...zu seinem Vorbei [CT, 12]. But then we are speaking of the phenomenon of the certain futural possibility of death, not the past dimension or ecstatic, the latter which is indicated in the present passage. In CT, the past dimension, which is still referred to by the traditional term die Vergangenheit is what, in realizing one’s certain futural gone-ness, one is thrown back upon as a “still be-ing-here”, that is, a having been which still is, despite the stupefying certainty of its futural non-be-ing. See I.V of my Temporality and the Dis-positional Abyss in Heidegger, 1999, (MA thesis, [Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario].
toward the future.” [Wood, 1989, p.214-5]. Similarly, Marion Heinz argues that, since the authentic future “first unambiguously discloses the be-ing of the been”, “authentic be-ing-been presupposes the authentic future” and that therefore, quoting Heidegger [H326], “been-ness arises from the future” [Heinz, 1982, 78]. These are plausible interpretations of Heidegger – in any case, it captures Heidegger’s own tendency. But Heidegger himself is more cautious, if more devious, and, indeed ambiguous in his formulations than his commentators are here. In any case, this notion of the authentic future somehow originating been-ness itself it is belied by the fact of the non-projective be-ing of been-ness.

While it may indeed be true that only temporal beings such as be-ing-here, which also temporalize a future ecstasy (and a present one), can temporalize a past ecstasy (as been-ness), this observation is making a different point – that of equiprimordiality – than the point of priority, which is insinuated in the above notion that been-ness itself arises from the (authentic) future. Authentic been-ness may indeed arise from the future; been-ness itself arises primordially and ‘indifferently’ as an ontologic-temporal ‘moment’ of the very be-ing of be-ing-here itself – it is, along with the future ‘itself’ and the present ‘itself’, that ontologic-temporal foundation, which makes possible the modalization into authentic and inauthentic temporalities. *The notion that been-ness itself ‘arises from the future’ issues from the existential and authentic imperatives of the projective prejudice and the priority given to the future in the Heideggerian temporal analysis generally.*

Heidegger’s analysis here, both of be-ing-guilty and of its temporal basis in been-ness, tends to leap over the actual phenomena, in subordinating the phenomena to the imperatives of existential interpretation. As we recall, the phenomenon of conscience consists of the “facticity of the calling” and the “existentiality of the hearing” [H275]. The
call tolls implacably as the silent voice of self-finding, attuned disclosure, *i.e.*, as the ‘authentic’ and uncanny, factual dis-position of angst. In the current analysis, this aspect of conscience is skipped over in order to proceed directly to the existential hearing/understanding of the call. We saw earlier (§15-17) that the factual attunement of the call is itself *heard* by an appreciative listening which is a ‘facticity of the hearing’, the *factual hearing of dis-position itself*. It is this listening that receives the giving of the call, and which then ‘gives us something to understand’; it, indeed, first “makes it possible for being-here to project itself upon its ownmost ability-to-be” [H277] in the ‘understanding’ response to the call. However, Heidegger’s entire emphasis, here in the section on temporality, is on the *existentiality* of the hearing, on the understanding’s *seizing upon* and *taking over* of one’s thrownness into existing – that is, the *existential* dimension of guilt and conscience. Once again, though the existential dimension may be of a certain significance, one must first give the factual dimension its due, particularly when we are speaking specifically of factual disclosure (the call, angst).

Paralleling this obscuration of facticity by existentiality in the phenomenon of being-guilty is, as we have shown, the obscuring of *been-ness itself* by that of potentially *authentic* been-ness. But, as Wood says, “the understanding of time as structured in various explicit ways does not in itself reek of authenticity or inauthenticity” [Wood, 1989, p.221]. This applies particularly to this case of the *modally indifferent* been-ness, which the ontology of be-ing-here must articulate, before its existentialization within the futural priorities of authenticity. The been-ness that makes possible the projective take-over of thrownness – *i.e.*, makes possible the futural project of coming towards oneself as coming back to oneself – *is not a been-ness we are towards but one we arise from*. Been-ness already was there before
any coming back to it possibilized it into potential existence. And it was there, neither as an inauthentic modality of existence nor even as any thrown project at all. 195

In this sense, then, be-ing-here’s temporality itself is essentially ‘modally indifferent’, i.e., in the sense that it is neither authentic nor inauthentic – as Blattner points out (after Haar, 1993b and others) against those (D. Dahlstrom [1995] in particular) who would make out this temporality to be itself authentic. That is, “Dasein can be authentically futural only insofar as it is futural at all” [Blattner, 1999, p.99]. Blattner has some difficulty, though, in equating this notion of temporality itself with ‘originary’ or ‘primordial’ temporality. The difficulty, though, lies mainly in ambiguities in Heidegger’s own text. But Blattner wishes to see the originary aspect as signifying ‘explanatorily originary’ whereas the sense of ‘originary’ in Heidegger’s text, while it may include an explanatory sense, indicates more of a primaeval ontological phenomenon, i.e., regarding be-ing, itself, rather than reasons of be-ing or be-ing as a reason. Originary temporality is the very be-ing of be-ing-here. This is not to side with Dahlstrom et al on this issue, though, for this primaevality need not be an ‘authentic’ one...which, of course, does not mean that it need be ‘inauthentic’.

What can be legitimately said, perhaps, is that authentic temporalizing truly realizes or temporalizes the underlying, undifferentiated, primordial temporality, but this authentic temporalization, as an act and with its futural priority, has a slightly different temporality than the primordial temporal be-ing it is ‘realizing’, effecting or modifying. As Haar says: “Resoluteness manifests the whole structure of Care, but does not make Careoriginarily

195 All differences aside, the situation is similar to Sartre’s notion of facticity, expressed as: “I am responsible for everything, in fact, except for my very responsibility, for I am not the foundation of my being” [Sartre, 1966, 710]. However, for Sartre, factical phenomena, such as “the phenomenon of birth never appears as a brute fact but always across a projective reconstruction of my for-itself”... Thus, in a certain sense, I choose being born” [ibid.]. So Sartre also re-existentializes this facticity in the thereby necessarily anguished freedom of the futile project.
possible” [Haar, 1993b, 34]. Resolute, authentic temporality is one of the ways in which original temporality “manifests itself” “intensifies” or “condenses the intrinsic structure of temporality” [ibid., 32, 31]. Haar thereby draws a distinction between temporality, as original and having the function of “enabling”, and temporality, as modified by the function of “discovery” or “revelation” [Ibid., 32]. Haar seeks out the originary future, past and present and develops perhaps the most philosophically interesting and textually astute interpretation of this problem, recognizing that “the [Heideggerian] analysis...tends to forget the relativity and original dependency of the authentic future” on original or primordial temporality. [ibid., 34].

From my point of view, I would preserve the modal indifference of primordial temporality, in order to free it from the orbit of authenticity/inauthenticity, as these are an affair of existence and not necessarily be-ing-here itself as a whole, nor factual be-ing, in particular. The temporality attuned to in dis-position, when suitably freed of its domination by existentiality/projection, of itself has no inherent modality of authenticity/inauthenticity.

Nor, for that matter, need moods necessarily be a self-finding. As Wood remarks: “...It can seem gratuitous to bring in one’s self, and one’s ‘having been’ self in particular..., as if there were not moods in which the self is not entirely left behind, or marginalized” [Wood 1989, 228].

This modal indifference – regarding authenticity and inauthenticity – of been-ness itself does not in any way imply that we are indifferent to our be-ing-here or our past be-ing-here. Quite the contrary. Been-ness is now freed up to temporalize and to disclose in its own, idiosyncratic manner, that is, purely, in dis-positional disclosure, i.e., in the caring for the important matter that is distinctive of the appreciative mode of openness, which characterizes
moods and affects. Rather than been-ness disclosing potential authenticity, it, when appreciated as an ontological fact of our be-ing-here, discloses the giftedness, proximally and usually obscured, of the pure facticity of having been, that is, the giftedness of 'be-ing-from-birth'. The 'back' of been-ness is beyond and prior to any coming-back – been-ness is rather always already there, 'behind our backs' – and doubly removed from the "coming-back futurally" [H343], which, as we shall see, characterizes the authentic temporality of anxiety. Been-ness is only re-cognized or re-presented in these returns.

That is to say, perhaps most existentiell-essentially, be-ing-toward-death throws being-here back upon its past be-ing, its "still be-ing-here" (as The Concept of Time puts it [CT, 13]) only inasmuch as that past is already there before the throw, as a fact, as something one can come back to. Been-ness is something that one can, perhaps, retroactively articulate as inauthentic and inappropriated and so, then, choose to encompass within an authentic and resolutely grounding project. Apart from, though, there being no necessity for this, even within freedom's own contingencies and inner compulsion, from the standpoint of facticity such a stance is to simply miss the point. In this sense, one can say that be-ing-futural authentically and resolutely (i.e., within the project of repetition) is possible only on the basis of a non-authentic been-ness. The latter is pre-projectively given in the dis-positional disclosure of moods and affects. Primordial been-ness makes authentic futurity (and authentic been-ness) possible for be-ing-here – though, perhaps – when the felt meanings are fully uncovered by the phenomenology of dis-position – not quite so necessary as previously thought.
δ) Recognitions of the past in recent Heideggerian scholarship

Let us look to some (more) recent indications, in the literature on Heidegger, of a recognition, however fleeting, of some notion of been-ness beyond the existentialized version of it. We have already, in the opening section of Part Two, discussed Jacques Derrida’s meditations on the later Heidegger’s ‘promise’ of spiritual regeneration, which is given in the “more originary essence of time” [Derrida, OS, 91] that includes “an affirmation anterior to any question” [ibid., 131], from the realm of the “pre-archi-originary” [ibid., 112]. This is a notion of a primordial past, beyond existential imperatives, an ‘already’ “to which we must have in some sense already acquiesced” [ibid., 129] and to which, if we wish to hear it, we must listen – as just indicated regarding the ‘facticity of the hearing’ of the call of conscience – without enframing in the potentialities of any authenticating questioning attitude. That is, this is a past that arises earlier than any futural projection.

We also, in the aforementioned section, mentioned that Michel Haar understands this listening as our be-ing attuned; that is, “being disposed is interpreted as the first resonance in man of the Anspruch” [Haar, 1992, 160]. Thus we have, in these two important interpreters of Heidegger, recognition of some notion of the past as a pre-projective, factual been-ness and the notion of feeling (or the moods and affects of dis-position) as the mode of openness to this realm. We have also just seen that Haar understands the distinction between resolute (authentic) and primordial temporality.

Otto Pöggeler develops a critique of Heidegger’s notion of been-ness or ‘having-been’ – by which he means what I have referred to as ‘authentic been-ness’, i.e., the thrownness that is to be taken up into authentic existence and that manifests as the ‘bringing
back to ‘repeatability’ which Heidegger sees as the essential, authentic moment or movement of been-ness. Pöggeler asks,

Isn’t the past deeper than ‘having-been’? In its passing the past is dissipated and, in departing, withdraws into itself; it is just on the basis of this self-withdrawal that it remains in altered forms and so can be ‘retrieved’. As the past, it is pure facticity for us. ... But *Being and Time* always connects facticity with existentiality, connects the ‘already’ together with the ‘ahead’ and so only takes ‘having been’ into account ... [however] it remains inappropriate to bring the past into an analysis of Dasein only as ‘having been’. [Pöggeler, 1997, 83].

“As the past,” says Pöggeler, “it is pure facticity for us” – rather than the facticity-to-be-existentialized by the futural project of retrieve. There is a past, which “withdraws into itself” and so preserves, in the face of existence, the recalcitrance of its own facticity. Perhaps Pöggeler is thinking along the lines of Sartre, here, underscoring a pure facticity of the past as ‘in itself’. But what I wish to draw from this is the notion of a facticity and a past that is ‘pure’, in that it, of itself, remains outside the scope of existentiality and futurality, and their either/or of authenticity/inauthenticity. I do this, not to break apart the interwoven dynamic of the whole of Care, but to preserve the integrity of one of its components (facticity), whose fact and disclosure has been usurped by another (existence).

David Wood intimates, if only in a phrase, the fact of such a ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ past: “one’s rootedness in the (absolute?) past of one’s nullity can be existentially manifested only on our relation to the future” [Wood, 1989, 214 – his own brackets]. Even if this past is to be drawn into the orbit of its ‘existential manifestation’ in a future, as a condition set upon any authentic anticipation, it is nonetheless an ‘absolute’ past, which can, then, perhaps be modified, though perhaps only to a degree, by authentic projection. It is this pre-existential

---

196 We will go into the notion of ‘repetition’ or ‘retrieval’ shortly.
facticity that is ‘purely’ disclosed in moods and affects, though, as Wood says, “Heidegger’s discussion of the temporality of mood…seems nonetheless to understand them as disclosive of a possibility of authentic selfhood” [Ibid. 228]. The phenomenology of feeling shows that moods and affects are, in themselves, free of their significance for the existential project and the primordial been-ness they disclose is what we originally arise from, or have arisen from, rather than come towards futurally or bring ourselves back to as something essentially futural.

Finally, as we have already shown in §23, S. G. Crowell,\(^{198}\) hints toward the notion of the sort of factual past, that I wish to underscore, in his interpretation of authentic historicality as, essentially, a “being true to oneself”, which does not reflect a narrative or hermeneutic “coherence of a life ‘between birth and death.’” That is, it is the historical “resolve itself” – not the subsequent ‘existing resolutely’, which [latter] will always be a ‘modification of everydayness,’ a form of narrative selfhood, practical coping in a particular historical role” [Crowell, AH, 8] – that forms the locus of authentic historicality. Dastur articulates the same, in distinguishing the “difference between history as a science or narrative (Historie) and the historical ‘reality’ itself, Geschichte” [Dastur, HQT, 44]. Crowell means to include, in this distinction, a similar distinction for the notion of ‘thrownness’. That is,

‘Thrownness’ does not signify the historical situation in the sense of one’s inherited possibilities for being – the roles, practices, and institutions that make up the current everyday world, or ‘heritage’ – but facticity as absolute opacity of existence, the Undurchsichtigkeit precisely of the ‘whence and the whither’ of ‘birth’ in the sense of origin”. [Crowell, AH, 7].

"Facticity as absolute opacity of existence ...of the ‘whence and the whither’ ... similar to Pöggeler’s ‘pure facticity’, Crowell’s notion is one which cannot be seen through (undurchsichtig) by any clairvoyant resolve.\textsuperscript{199}

To be sure, Crowell is distinguishing his notions of ‘thrownness as facticity’ and ‘resolve itself’ from a narrativist-hermeneutical sense of thrownness and a mundane ‘existing resolutely’ in order to re-existentialize that thrownness and resolve in a better notion of authenticity. That is, the existential imperatives are, indeed, still in place. So, for example, rather than free ‘birth’ from the grasp of existence, ‘birth’ is to be (quoting Heidegger):

caught up into existence.” Hence birth itself, like death, becomes a possibility for Dasein...as a coming back from (existential) death, existential birth is always a rebirth...an ever-present possibility of conversion. [Crowell, AH, 7].\textsuperscript{200}

Here, birth is fully existentialized and identified with the movement of coming back to itself, that is, with the notion of authentic been-ness, which we have been trying to free the past from, so that we might underscore the primordial factual been-ness that is or is based upon be-ing-from-birth.

Nonetheless, Crowell is presenting a notion of authenticity and resoluteness that is grounded on a recognition of an increased sense of the facticity of the ontological (not historical) past and an increased sense of the significance of the phenomenon of birth (even if a thoroughly existentialized version). The confirmation, that Crowell is moving in the same constellation of ideas as we are here, comes when he affirms that this ‘being true to oneself’ of authenticity “is primarily a matter of feeling”, the “dense textures of meaning” which

\textsuperscript{199} If be-ing-here’s existential truth is transparency, then the fact of opacity must be the equiprimordial ‘un-truth’ of be-ing-here’s be-ing, which Heidegger expands on in writings just after Being and Time (cf., The Essence of Truth).

\textsuperscript{200} I am not quite sure what this notion of conversion signifies; ‘rebirth’ is not necessarily ‘conversion’. The issue is not necessary, though, for my point.
constitute “another sort of intelligibility” [Crowell, AH, 8]. *These* meanings are, as Thomä puts it, “not as easily incorporated into [one’s] narrative self-ascription as are the things [one] does” [Thomä, 1998, 236]. That is, felt meanings are not as easily – and perhaps not even necessarily – incorporated into the projective teleology of the faded echoes of rationalist metaphysics, which sound in the hermeneutic notions of ‘emplotment’ and ‘narrative identity’. Crowell may not call for an expanded phenomenology of feeling and for a revised articulation of be-ing-here’s temporality, but his instinct appears at least compatible with this.

iii) *Situational be-ing-amidst and making-present (enpresenting)*

Let us resume Heidegger’s answer to the question ‘what is the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness?’, *i.e.*, ‘what makes authentic Care possible?’ Anticipatory resoluteness not only reveals futural be-ing-toward-death and the been-ness of be-ing-guilty, but it also discloses the temporally particular (*jeweilige*), current *situation* of be-ing-here, *now*, such that one is actively engaged with and, practically and concernfully, dwelling ‘alongside’ or amidst the intraworldly beings of one’s environment (the *pragmata* and other be-ing-heres). As Heidegger puts it elsewhere, we not only ‘find’ ourselves amidst beings, pervaded by them in our ‘preoccupied’, dis-positional absorption, but we ‘comport’ ourselves

---

201 *Cf.* Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative” and “Narrative Identity”, in [Ricoeur, 1991] for summaries of these notions, which are worked out in detail in *Time and Narrative* [Ricoeur, 1984-88].

202 In his work, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, Crowell states, “If the ‘primary discovery of the world’ is by way of ‘bare mood’, we do not have the basis for an inquiry, but precisely the reverse: ‘The whence and the whither’ of our being in the midst of what is ‘remain in darkness’ (GA 2:183, 179/177, 173).” This appears to give a negative evaluation of the prospects of a phenomenology of feeling — but Crowell is here speaking, specifically, of Heidegger’s 1928 *metontological* inquiry. A revised notion of dis-position and a phenomenology of feeling may not remove the darkness of the whence and the whither, and so may not contribute to that metontological project. It will, though, appreciate that darkness and show the felt meaning of that enigma.
intentionally or "behave toward beings" and thereby "make the manifestation of beings possible" [VWG, 112]. In seeking, now, the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness' active possibilizing of beings, we are asking, 'what makes "the transcendental possibility of intentional behaviour" possible?' [ibid.].

According to Heidegger, here in Being and Time, resolute be-ing 'in' the world, i.e., resolute taking-action lets one encounter the environmental presence (Anwesenheit) of intraworldly beings and it does so "only by making these beings present" [H326], i.e., enpresenting them. 203 Therefore,

Only as the Present [Gegenwart] in the sense of making-present [gegenwärtigen] can resoluteness be what it is: the undisguised letting itself be encountered by that which it grasps in taking action. [BT, 374; H326; my emphasis].

In the ontological pragmatism which Heidegger displays regarding ontic truth, one lets oneself be encountered by present beings by grasping them, making them present. In short, we encounter beings (pragmata and extant) by allowing them the possibility of be-ing present within the a priori openness of our mundanely engaged intention, the concern of our enpresentingly, temporalizing be-ing-here. The theoretical discovery of extant beings, Heidegger has shown, is a founded modification of this primordial, practical ontic discovery [cf., §69b].

That is to say, the meaning of (i.e., the horizon which makes possible) anticipatory resoluteness as the pragmatic be-ing-amidst beings, which lets beings 'touch' us as present within our striving, is be-ing-here's present temporal dimension as making-present. That is,

---

203 Importantly, this 'making-present' or 'enpresenting', gegen-wärigen, is, literally, a 'waiting-towards', which is correlated with the inauthentic 'awaiting' (gewärigen) of the future — this will help, later, to distinguish it from the "resolute rapture" of the moment-of-vision of the authentic present.
the meaning of that mode of be-ing-here that dwells amidst beings, viz., falling — even as resolute — is the present as enpresenting: "falling ... is primarily grounded in making-present" [H328].

It is not our intention to go into the obscurities and multiple ambiguities of Heidegger's formulation here. Aside from the precarious terminology and the difficulties of translation, many of these obscurities arise from the fundamental ambiguity of the distinction between, on the one hand, the primordial action of the limit-Situation of anticipatory resoluteness, with its authentic Present of the 'moment-of-vision' (Augenblick) — and, on the other hand, the practical field of action of the 'authentic mundanity', of resolute fallenness (one might say), which is characteristic of be-ing here's possible world-historical be-ing-in-the-world, and which arises from anticipatory resoluteness.\textsuperscript{204} As important as these themes are, in themselves and in understanding Heidegger, they are not our focus.

\textsuperscript{204} We have discussed this distinction in the third subsection of the Primordiality Requirement. What I mean by 'authentic mundanity' or 'mundane authenticity' is the possibility of living authentically in the world of one's choices, projects, and roles — at least, insofar as this is possible within the limits of inevitable falling. This could be thought to be an 'inauthentic resoluteness' because, as we also discussed in the above-mentioned section, before resoluteness attains its own authenticity in anticipatory resoluteness, it could, perhaps, be said to be in an, comparatively, inauthentic state.

As we have seen, this distinction is recognized and articulated by Crowell, in his own way, when he distinguishes the authentic historicality of anticipatory resoluteness (the resolve itself), from the inauthentic historicality of the narrativist modification of everydayness (resolute existing) [Crowell, AH, op.cit.].

However, it would be injudicious to call resoluteness inauthentic at all: willing-to-have-a-consciousness is authentic, just not 'as authentic as it could be'. Equally, resolute be-ing-in-the-world should not be viewed as inauthentic, just not as authentic as the resolute be-ing-in-the-world of anticipatory resoluteness. The latter may be termed 'spiritual authenticity' for the possibilities it opens up of a deeper immersion in the uncanniness of ecstatic be-ing-here. Heidegger, however, would likely object and, in fact, we find the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness, itself, to be just as mundane as ever (at least in maintaining the inauthentic present). However, a resolve which opens us deeper into the uncanniness of the 'moment' itself, freed of the imperatives of authenticity or flight or worldly projection, may well merit the term 'spiritual'.

Perhaps paradoxically, the authentic present, i.e., the moment-of-vision (or momentary vision or visionary moment) only appears on the scene in Heidegger, when the authentic temporality of the uncanny disclosedness of be-ing-in is complemented by that of the everyday temporalizing of the world's transcendence, in the full temporalizing of be-ing-here's authentic historicity. However, Heidegger's notions of authentic/inauthentic are rife with foundational paradox (or, at least, ambiguity).
It is important to at least remark, though, that although Heidegger is speaking specifically of anticipatory resoluteness (i.e., resoluteness’ own authenticity) and, occasionally (if ambiguously) of ‘primordial’ temporality ‘itself’, he only sees fit, here, merely to discuss the inauthentic, fallen present of making-present or enpresenting, and ignore the authentic present of the moment-of-vision. The only mention of the moment-of-vision in this section appears to contradict what has otherwise been said. Heidegger states that making-present (which will later be shown to be the inauthentic present) expresses resolute and, even, anticipatorily resolute be-ing-here. He then states that,

*making-present*, in which *falling...is primarily grounded, remains, in the mode of primordial temporality, included in the future and in been-ness.* [H328].205

The making-present, which grounds falling, is interwoven with the future and been-ness in *primordial* temporality, the temporality which has been revealed through anticipatory resoluteness — just as falling is grounded in existence and facticity. Yet immediately thereupon, Heidegger adds that,

Resolute be-ing-here has brought itself *back out of fallenness*, and has done so in order to be more *authentically ‘there’* in the ‘moment of vision’ of the disclosed Situation. [H328, first two emphases mine].

Thus the present of resoluteness is *not* the present of fallenness, *i.e.*, enpresenting, as Heidegger had just finished claiming in his temporal analysis, but is rather the present of authentic be-ing-here, *i.e.*, the ‘moment-of-vision’. Regardless of what, exactly, the moment-of-vision is, it seems it is aligned with resoluteness and anticipatory resoluteness, rather than the inauthentic present of enpresenting being so aligned. Thus we have here in Heidegger’s

205 Similarly, in *VWG*, after showing that neither (futural) projection nor (‘beeing’) dis-position include an actual ‘comportment’ to beings, Heidegger says, “Yet both — in their unity as characterized — make
account of temporality, as is perhaps fitting, the same ambiguity with which the entire
Daseinanalytik is rife: How deeply does falling cut into authenticity? Is there such a thing as
authentic mundanity? Is all authenticity compromised by falling? Are the positive worldly
possibilities offered be-ing-here in the moment-of-vision doomed to entrap resolute be-ing-
here in the inevitable downward plunge of falling? Are there any possibilities which are not
sullied by inevitable falling? The fact that the resolute present appears to be both fallen
enrepresenting and the moment-of-vision does not bode well for our being able to clarify,
within the Heideggerian context, answers to these questions. Fortunately, they are not of
central concern to our project.

iv) The unity of the ecstases and historicality

It is the unity of the three temporal dimensions that make up the temporality that
structures and makes possible authentic Care as a whole. Heidegger says that “temporality
temporalizes itself in an ever-current unity of future, past [been-ness], and present” [BP,
266]. He expresses this unity of anticipatory resoluteness as follows:

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself enrepresentingly into
the Situation. Been-ness springs from the future in such a way that the future
which is-been (better, the been-ing future) releases the present from itself.
This phenomenon, unified in the manner of a beening-enrepresenting future, we
name temporality... Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic
Care. [H326].

Be-ing-here’s ‘coming back to itself futurally’ is the movement of its (authentic) been-ness,
the futural appropriation of the past, which elicits an (inauthentic) present. This relatively

\[\text{[enrepresenting] intentionality transcendentally possible\]}, \text{ in such a way that they \text{"co-temporalize\" a third way of} ‘grounding’ [VWG, 112], grounding be-ing-here by grounding beings in the world.\]

\[\text{206 One can't help but wonder what temporal sense this \text{"ever-current-ness\" has.} \]

\[\text{207 A present which is the enrepresenting of beings other than be-ing-heres (or be-ing-here(s) as an \text{"other\" mode} of itself).} \]
obscure, skeletal, temporal formulation (based upon be-ing-here’s authenticity – except for its present…) is subsequently filled out and transformed, in the multiple, interpretive ‘repetitions’ of the temporal analysis, i.e., by concrete temporal analyses of inauthentic everydayness and of be-ing-here’s historicality. The theme of Selfhood led, in the analysis of anticipatory resoluteness, to considerations of the Self-constancy of be-ing-here but, in the considerations of inauthentic temporality, be-ing-here’s dispersal and inconstancy come to the fore again. The “temporal interpretation of Self-constancy and non-Self-constancy” is to give us “a more primordial insight into the temporalization-structure of temporality, which reveals itself as the historicality of be-ing-here” [H332], i.e., Heidegger wishes to articulate the historical structure of temporality.

We cannot provide a thorough reading of all of this material, fascinating as it is; nor is it immediately necessary to our task. Let us, however, read the parallel passage to the above formulation, the climactic passage of the entire existential analysis, which articulates the unity of be-ing-here’s authentic and historical be-ing in full. Heidegger says,

*Only a being, that is essentially futural in its be-ing, so that it, free for its death, can let itself, in shattering upon death, be thrown back upon its factual ‘here’ – that is, only a being that, as futural, equiprimordially is being, can, by handing down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be visionary in the moment for its time*. [H385; all emphases Heidegger’s].

I will, later, interpret this important passage by bringing in other pertinent text from the same section (§74, *The Basic Constitution of Historicality*), particularly the penultimate, climactic passage from the previous page (last paragraph, H384). For now, we must note that the

---

208 — or "...be in the moment-of-vision ...", as Macquarrie and Robinson have it: “augenblicklich sein”. Perhaps “see into the moment” is even closer in meaning, particularly after the notion of be-ing-here’s truth as ‘transparency’ and the notions of “clear vision” or “clairvoyance”, which the previous [H384] passage contains.
moment-of-vision has been brought into its rightful place within the "authentic temporality" of "authenticity historicality" [H385], thereby making the unity of authentic temporality more coherent. What instigates this change?

Between the interpretation of the uncanny, authentic temporality of anticipatory resoluteness [¶65] and that of authentic historicality [¶74], Heidegger has interpreted the everyday temporality of be-ing-here's inauthentic disclosedness and differentiated authentic temporalizing from it [¶68]. In the analysis of everyday temporalizing, as if flowing naturally from be-ing-here's inauthentic temporalizing, the problem of the temporality of the 'transcendence of the world', i.e., the world's 'transcendence', is broached [¶69c]. Here Heidegger shows ecstatic be-ing-in's own ontological need of other beings in order to be itself, to be the ground or 'motive' from which the horizon, i.e., the 'whither' of the ecstasy - i.e., the world - eventuates, as the completion of the very be-ing and Self of be-ing-here, i.e., as be-ing-in-the-world.²⁰⁹ Each temporal ecstasis of be-ing-in has its own worldly horizon; in fact, the very structure of the 'ecstases' of finite temporality is conditioned by horizons, which thereby serve as grounding power.²¹⁰ The horizons correspond to their ecstases, forming an ecstatic-horizontal unity; the horizons are that 'upon which' be-ing-here grounds itself as be-ing-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, each ecstasis has its own 'schema'.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ "In existing, it [be-ing-here] has been thrown and as thrown, it has been delivered over to beings, which it needs in order to be able to be as it is - namely, for the sake of itself" [H365]. The 'for-the-sake-of' [das Umwillen] and the 'in-order-to' [das Um-zu] are, in fact, the horizontal schemas of the future and present ecstases, respectively. The horizon for the ecstasis of been-ness is that 'before which' [das Vorw] it has been thrown [See H365]. The 'before-which is, as we may recall, a part of the structure of moods. What the connection between these horizontal schemas and the structural analysis of dis-position is would be a subject for further thought.

²¹⁰ If one imaginatively thinks of a horizon as that within which we move, that above or beyond which we momentarily transcend in 'rapture', and that to which we 'return' and upon which we ground the ecstasy, we will be aided in comprehending Heidegger's notion.

²¹¹ Heidegger's 'schematism' serves a parallel function to Kant's, in that, as Wood says, Heidegger "show how it is possible (and sketches the possibility in principle) to see temporality not merely as a subjective condition but as constitutive of the world itself" [Wood, DT, 234].
which directs it towards a horizon, upon which it grounds itself, as be-ing-in-the-world.\footnote{Cf., Part III, "The Essence of Ground", of VWG. Heidegger, however, explicitly avoids the temporality of grounding in this work [VWG, 120].}

Though ecstatic-horizontal temporality is the very core of Heidegger’s notion of the temporality of be-ing-here, and the basis from which the question of the Temporality of being itself was to be broached, we cannot go more deeply into its structure here. We can, however, observe that the bridge – of beings – between be-ing-in and the world, between the temporal ecstases and their horizons, also serves as the main juncture between the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness and that of authentic historicity. It is likely that one can similarly develop a bridge between the inauthentic and fallen present of anticipatory resoluteness and the moment-of-vision inherent in authentic historicity. This, though, once again, is not our task.

Let us exhibit the analyses of be-ing-in’s temporality, before returning again to authentic historicity. We shall, then, finally concentrate on the temporality of dis-position. These analyses will display more of the same existential or projective prejudices, particularly in the phenomenological analysis of anxiety. With the concretion of these prejudices at the deepest ontological level regarding be-ing-here, \textit{i.e.} in the temporality of disclosure and in the most \textit{primordial disclosure}, \textit{i.e.}, that of dis-position, we can open our view to the possibility of reworking the temporality of be-ing-here more appropriately and of doing so

\footnote{Perhaps more accurately, the horizon is that \textit{through which} one grounds one’s ecstatic be-ing \textit{upon} the Earth. The Earth (Greek \textit{phasis}), as emerges more acutely for Heidegger in the mid-1930’s, is “the emerging and rising in itself and in all things...that upon which and in which man bases his dwelling” \cite{The Origin of the Artwork, p.42}. It is, further, a self-secluding facticity which “shatters every [world-projective] attempt to penetrate into it” - yet nonetheless responds to the truth-intention of the artwork (\textit{ibid}, 47, \textit{passim}) by letting the “simple \textit{factum est}” \textit{i.e.}, the “\textit{that it is}” of createdness”, stand forth [\textit{ibid}, 65]. A full interpretation of this material would have to also include an analysis of the brilliant work, \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics} (also 1935) - we must, unfortunately, forego this here. Nonetheless, it can be noted that Earth, as a synonym for the facticity of be-ing itself would bring another dimension into play in temporal analysis.}
from the more primordial basis of a de-existentialized phenomenology of dis-position or felt disclosure.

§38. The temporaity of disclosedness

After the presentation of temporality through the eyes of authenticity, viz., anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger "confirms the temporal interpretation of Care by demonstrating the temporality of concernful be-ing-in-the-world" [H372]. That is, after the portrayal of the admittedly mixed temporality of indifferent temporality itself (indifferent, that is, to either authenticity or inauthenticity) — otherwise known as original or primordial temporality — and that of the extraordinary and uncanny temporality of anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger devotes himself to the temporality of ‘everydayness’, be-ing-here’s “average way of existing” and “living unto the day” [H370], which, ‘proximally and usually’, temporalizes inauthentic, they-self be-ing-here. These analyses include the temporality of everyday be-ing-in or disclosedness in general (of understanding, dis-position, discourse, and of falling), and of everyday be-ing-in-the-world (including concern with pragmata, theoretical discovery of extant beings, the temporal problem the world’s transcendence, and everyday be-ing-here’s spatiality).

Unfortunately, according to Heidegger, after all these analyses, we remain in an inadequate conceptual situation for determining the temporality of “this bewildering phenomenon” [H371] of everydayness. Moreover, the “stretching itself along ‘temporally’ in the sequence of those days”, i.e., “everyday ‘historizing’” [H371] and, further, the phenomenon of time-reckoning, must be incorporated into the full notion of be-ing-here’s temporality. This prompts Heidegger to quest after a deeper, more primordial interpretation
of be-ing-a-whole, one which is to bring into play be-ing-here’s birth, in order, also, to conceive the ‘stretchedness’ between birth and death of be-ing-here’s happening (geschehen), i.e., its authentic historicality. Despite this being the apogee of Heidegger’s analysis of be-ing-here and of immense interest, historicality is not our primary focus.

However, the phenomenon and structural significance of ‘birth’ itself – not just ‘birth’ as one of the poles or ends of be-ing-here’s historicality – is what is important in comprehending the temporality of been-ness, the ecstasy behind the disclosures of dis-position. Thus, despite Heidegger’s own negative evaluation of his interpretation of the temporality of everydayness, we shall summarize the analyses of the everyday temporality of disclosedness, in order to especially concentrate on the temporality of that mode of disclosure of special interest to us, viz., dis-position.

Heidegger’s analyses of the temporality of understanding and of dis-position are extensive, whereas those of discourse and falling (the latter of which, properly speaking, is, in any case, not a mode of disclosure but, with existence and facticity, a mode of be-ing-here’s be-ing) are relatively spare or redundant. We shall, therefore, primarily examine the temporality of understanding and then that of dis-position, only mentioning that of falling and discourse for the sake of completeness.

Heidegger introduces the analysis of the temporality of disclosedness by saying

Every understanding has its mood. Every dis-position is one which understands. The disposed understanding has the character of falling. The falling, attuned understanding articulates itself, with relation to its intelligibility, in discourse. [H335].

It is temporality which binds these modes of disclosure together into a unified whole. Let us, now, consider this temporal, unifying meaning of be-ing-here.
i) The temporality of understanding

The structure of the analysis of understanding echoes and develops the tripartite analysis of Care, which we worked through in context of the authentic temporality of anticipatory resoluteness. Understanding, despite being primarily 'ahead of itself' and properly futural, also temporalizes, in its own way, the present of 'be-ing-alongside' or 'dwelling amidst' (Sein-bei) and the 'past' of 'be-ing-already-in' (been-ness). Dis-position and discourse also have their own proper modes of triple-temporalization, which emphasize different ecstases. In fact, each mode of be-ing-in's disclosure temporalizes all three temporal dimensions (and that, both authentically and inauthentically) and it is the emphasis on whichever ecstasis that determines the particular type and meaning of the temporalization.

a) Understanding's futural be-ing-ahead-of-itself

The 'ahead-of-itself' trait of the Care-structure is the "formally undifferentiated term" for the futural ecstasis of the understanding [H337]. Heidegger defines understanding as one of the structures which constitutes the be-ing\textsuperscript{214} of the 'here' of be-ing-here, and – though he does not much develop this interesting notion – as the basis of "the different possibilities of sight".\textsuperscript{215}

\\[\textsuperscript{214}\] Normally, Heidegger characterizes understanding, dis-position, and discourse as constitutive of the disclosed-ness, not the be-ing of be-ing-here; but inasmuch as be-ing-here is its disclosedness and so existence (a way of be-ing) is understanding (a mode of disclosure), then one can say that understanding (co-constitutes the be-ing of be-ing-here, especially the be-ing of the 'here' (the 'site' of disclosure) itself.

\\[\textsuperscript{215}\] In his early (1922) attempt at indicating his hermeneutical situation, Heidegger develops a situation of interpretation which articulates "1) an initial position of looking...; 2)...a direction of looking...; and 3)...the scope of looking" [S, 112], interpretive structures which have their later parallel in Being and Time's 'fore-structures' of interpretation. Understanding is a kind of seeing (theorein) – perhaps this will make the temporality of authentic seeing as a 'moment-of-vision' more intelligible. However, Heidegger leaves the theme of sight and vision relatively undeveloped (though he does touch on it when speaking of the modification of everyday projection into the theoretical attitude).
Understanding is essentially ‘projection’ and projection is a throwing oneself into a possibility “for the sake of which be-ing-here exists” [H336]. ‘Indifferently’ (i.e., as regards authenticity or inauthenticity), be-ing-futural is a ‘coming toward oneself’ via one’s throwing oneself forth toward one’s projected possibility. We have seen that be-ing-here projects itself and authentically temporalizes itself, as a projection, as an anticipatory fore-running (vorlaufen), which allows oneself to come toward oneself in one’s ownmost possibility of being-a-whole in be-ing-toward-death. The nullity of the guilt of irresolute falling, as an owing, must be ‘made up for’ (nachgeholt) in the conscientious choice which ‘takes it over’ into authentic, resolute Self-be-ing – this is achieved by the taking up and choosing of one’s being here as a whole, responding to the opportunity which being-toward-death gives us.

Inauthentically, one comes-toward-onself only indirectly, through the world, as one awaits or expects a possibility of oneself in one’s mundane dealings, a possibility which one is concerned to actualize. We have already discussed these matters in some detail.

b) Understanding’s present dwelling-amidst

The ‘dwelling-amidst’ trait of the Care-structure is the formally undifferentiated term for the present ecstatic of the understanding. As co-determined by the Present ecstatic, being-here ‘dwells amidst’ beings understandably in a ‘waiting-toward’ (gegen-wart: the Present) that “corresponds to the inauthentic future (awaiting)” [H337].²¹⁶ Heidegger

²¹⁶ More classic Heideggerian ambiguity: this waiting-towards is supposed, for Heidegger, to be the Present itself, in its indifferent or undifferentiated character, including both the authentic and inauthentic modalities – but Heidegger hedges this with his pairing it with the inauthentic future. This is, however, a fortunate ambiguity (or lack of precision), as the moment-of-vision seems hardly capable of being articulated as a waiting-towards...
characterizes this as the inauthentic present of enpresenting (making-present), which we have discussed as the seemingly inappropriate Present of anticipatory resoluteness.

Corresponding to (even "in terms of" [H338]) the authentic future of understanding, however, is an authentic temporalization of the Present: the ‘moment-of-vision’ (das Augenblick, literally, the ‘glance of the eye’). Inasmuch as this is a way of be-ing-amidst beings, yet neither fallen nor inauthentic, we must refrain, in the moment-of-vision, from plunging into the rapture of its ecstasy, and keep it resolutely grounded within the schematized horizon of the world – while yet not forsaking its ecstatic character. The moment of vision has that peculiar status of being ‘in the world but not of the world’. This makes for a considerable intensity (not to mention potentiality for ambiguity) in this present ‘moment’.

Heidegger defines the moment-of-vision as a

resolute rapture of be-ing-here, but a rapture that is held, in the resoluteness, to the concernful possibilities and circumstances that are met in the Situation.

"...die entschlossene, aber in der Entschlossenheit gehaltene Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen begegnet" [H338].

The rapture (Enrückung) is resolutely held to the ground, kept within horizons, ‘tethered’, as Socrates would say. The ‘rapturous’ quality of this visionary moment, however, is its surpassing of be-ing-here’s lost, absorbed immersion in mundane concern. Heidegger calls

---

217 "...die entschlossene, aber in der Entschlossenheit gehaltene Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen begegnet" [H338].
218 I am referring to Plato’s Meno 98a, where (speaking of ‘true opinions’ but also of the divine inspiration of poets and statesmen [99c]), Socrates says: They run away from a man’s mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them [to the ground] by working out the reason [ground]...once they are tied down, they become knowledge". Guthrie translation, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E. Hamilton & H. Cairns, editors., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
219 In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger speaks brilliantly about feeling and of rapture (Rausch) as the foundational feeling of ‘ontological aesthetics’. Rapture is a “form-engendering force”, which “explodes the very subjectivity of the subject" [Nietzsche I, 123]. Heidegger speaks of “the essence of rapture and of beauty,
III. Exposition & Critique of Heidegger's Phenomenological and Temporal Analyses of Dis-position

this, affectively, the *joy* that "goes along with sober anxiety" in which we "become free from the entertaining 'accidents'" of mundane concern and curiosity [H310].

But this transcendence only goes so far, within the overarching temporal and ontological parameters of existential authenticity, so far as to immerse be-ing-here *back*, if not immediately amidst beings, yet into the pure *context of possible* concern, viz., into the *pure possibility of be-ing-in, itself*, as an authentic *possibility* for be-ing-in the *world*:

‘In momentary-vision’ nothing can occur, but, as the authentic present, it lets us *encounter for the first time* what, as ready- or before-the-hand, can be ‘in a time’ [H338]. (cf., “be visionary in the moment for ‘its time’”[H385]; “become clairvoyant [‘have a clear vision’] for the accidents of the disclosed Situation. [H384]).

‘Nothing can occur’ in the profound *equanimity* of this visionary Moment.\(^{220}\) But the temporally particular *possibilities*, in all their momentous newness, creative contingency, and lifelong significance, present themselves. These possibilities are what are possible, what *can* occur in ‘one’s time’, the gathered temporal dispensation of one’s ‘fate’. This time is the moment of vision into one’s historical be-ing as a whole, stretched throughout from birth through death. *Whence*, one may wonder, come those possibilities of one’s time? This is a question we will leave for later.

Inasmuch as this Situation is that of resolute be-ing-toward-death and its limit-Situation of potential be-ing-a-whole, the Situation, which arises within one’s vision into the moment, is both trans-mundane and *potentially* mundane, presenting the *possibilities* of be-ing-here as *a whole*. The temporal particularity and meaning of one’s self-Care and *worldly*

\(^{220}\) On equanimity: “This mood springs from resoluteness, which is momentarily visionary of [or *envisions* or ‘looks upon’...“augenblicklich ist”) the possible Situations of the disclosed possibility-for-be-ing-a-whole in the anticipation of death.” [H345]. We shall return to this important mood later.
concern and solicitude, now poses itself and it does so only to a be-ing here who has resolved itself, transparently, and thus momentously cleared and opened out its ‘here’ for the possibility of be-ing-in-the-world. Such is the authentic Present of the understanding.

c) Understanding’s past be-ing-already-in

The ‘be-ing-already-in’ trait of the Care-structure is the formally undifferentiated term for the ‘past’ ecstasis of the understanding. The undifferentiated ‘movement’ of the future as a ‘coming-towards (oneself)’ and the Present as a ‘waiting towards’ is complemented by that of the Past, i.e., been-ness, which, according to Heidegger’s existential view, is that of a ‘coming back (to oneself)’.

We have already pointed out that the notion of been-ness as a ‘coming back to oneself’ is rather one of authentic and existential temporality, not ‘indifferent’ temporality itself. We suggested that been-ness itself is, more accurately, an arising from the already there-ness of birth; and that such an ecstasis is what grounds our dis-positional moods and affects. This structural situation need not imply, however, that all moods and affects are, in their content, explicitly so grounded.

Corresponding to the inauthentic temporalizing of understanding as “an awaiting which makes present” [H338] is the inauthentic past as a forgetting. This is not an ontic forgetting of something but the existential forgetting of one’s ownmost self in mundane projection. Forgetting “backs away in the face of one’s ownmost been’” and “closes itself off from itself” [ibid.]. This forgetting of one’s Self is the basis of the everyday forgetting or retaining of beings in one’s mundane concerns, and is also the condition of the irresoluteness that characterizes everyday and inauthentic be-ing-here.
Juxtaposed against the understanding’s irresolute fleeing away from oneself is the *authentic* past temporalizing of *repetition* (*Wiederholung*, ‘taking again’). Temporalizing with the ‘coming toward itself’ of the authentic future of anticipatory resoluteness, the authentic been-ness of “coming back to one’s ownmost Self, in its thrown individuation” *makes it possible* to engage resolutely with one’s been-ness, *i.e.*, “resolutely take over the being that it already is” [H339]. This would seem to mean that authentic, past beeing makes *possible* the repetition, which is the resolute ‘taking over’ — but Heidegger also indicates that the repetition *is* the coming back to one’s thrown been *which* makes possible the resolute taking over of one’s past. This equivocation, however, can be worked out more clearly when we proceed to the temporality of dis-position, which focuses on authentic been-ness.

Thus, the temporality of understanding, which in its *indifferent* form is a ‘coming-towards (oneself) which come back (to itself) and waits-towards (beings)’, temporalizes *inauthentically* as an “awaiting which forgets and makes present” [H339], and *authentically* as an ‘anticipation which repeats in a moment of vision’ (or perhaps better, changing the order of the ecstases, an ‘anticipation which sees into the moment and repeats’).

ii. *The temporality of discourse and falling*

While Heidegger’s section on the temporality of discourse is almost entirely ‘vacuous’ (as Blattner points out), it would, in any case, not be relevant to our pursuits here. The temporality of falling details more of the making-present of they-Self be-ing, which, interesting as it is, also contributes nothing to the present investigations. Naturally, nothing is said regarding the authentic Present, *i.e.*, the moment-of-vision. We can, then, afford to, finally, move on to the temporality of dis-position.
§39. *The temporality of dis-position*

Heidegger’s main aim, as he underscores on a number of occasions, is fundamental ontology, not the provision of a comprehensive phenomenology of feeling, a task that he sees as one for a philosophical anthropology. Therefore, his insights in these analyses are bent to the purposes of the kind of ontology he has already formally indicated, *viz.*, existential ontology. Therewith, then, the *facticity* of be-ing-here and its disclosure in moods primarily serves to elucidate existence. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s phenomenology, here, is striking and original, and it behooves those of us who are not convinced of the validity of the existential underpinnings of ontology, and who have seen the metaphysical and ontological possibilities inherent in Smith’s work, to appropriate and develop Heidegger’s phenomenology beyond his own intentions.

What insights, then, can we gain from Heidegger’s own phenomenological interpretation of the disclosure and temporality of dis-position? Let us look closely at Heidegger’s analysis.

Rather than elaborating the analysis along the structural limbs of Care, as in that of the temporality of understanding, the analysis of the temporality of dis-position proceeds, after preliminary and foundational considerations, by first analyzing an inauthentic ‘mood’ (fear) and then an authentic one (anxiety). These analyses proceed first by considering these moods structurally, that is, by considering their before-which and about-which, and then bringing out the temporality these display.

Dis-position co-constitutes, with understanding (and discourse), the ‘here’ of be-ing-here’s disclosive be-ing. Just as understanding discloses our be-ing-here in and as projection,
dis-position, according to Heidegger, as a ‘finding oneself’ in the primordial ‘how one is’ of mood, discloses our be-ing-here as thrown, viz., one’s thrownness.

Be-ing-thrown’ means, existentially, finding oneself in one way or another. One’s dis-position is therefore grounded in thrownness. Mood represents the way in which I am primarily the being that has been thrown. [H340].

Mood is thus defined as the disclosure of thrownness which means, as we have already seen (and criticized; §34.i), one’s having been projected into the facticity (the ‘that it is…’) and the burdensomeness (the ‘…and has to be’) of be-ing-here, in the ‘how’ of be-ing-at-home or of be-ing-uncanny in one’s be-ing-here. These two modes of ‘how-be-ing’ correspond, respectively, to a ‘turning-away’ and a ‘turning toward’ one’s be-ing-here.

Either way, one is brought before one’s thrown ‘that-it-is’ and this, maintains Heidegger, “is only possible if be-ing-here’s be-ing, according to its meaning, constantly is-been” [or “is as having been”; H340], that is, if be-ing-here is in the mode of been-ness “Disposition temporalizes itself primarily in been-ness” [ibid.]; the other ecstases, which temporalize along with been-ness in moods, are modified by this primary ecstasis.

Now, the significance, for Heidegger, of the moodal primacy of been-ness is that “the existentially basic character of mood lies in a bringing-back-to…” [ibid.]. Mood is not itself been-ness but rather the disclosure of it and it discloses this past ecstasis as a ‘bringing back’; more specifically, as a bringing one’s self back to one’s thrownness. Let us look now at how the moods of fear (which we would rather classify as an affect) and anxiety display and concretize these structures and temporality of dis-position.
i) The temporality of fear

As we have seen, that before-which fear is fearful is something threatening, some fearsome extant or not-so-handly, intraworldly being. One circumspectively awaits and expects the arrival of some definite being which is to come, which is coming toward oneself from the future as one comes toward oneself in that futural possibility. As we have seen, awaiting signifies the inauthentic future. As such, then, fear is thus far indistinguishable from the inauthentic future of understanding.

Heidegger says that the “specific moodal character” [H341] which fear possesses, that which makes it distinctly a mood or a disclosure with an affective quality – rather than some circumspection or detached, theoretical ‘awareness of’ (i.e., some projection) – is shown by that about which it is fearing: one’s own, thrown, possible be-ing. The awaiting, of the futural before-which, “lets the threatening come back to” one’s “already ecstatically open”, thrown, concernful self [H341] – this is what I am afraid about. I am afraid ‘for myself’, about the possibility and ability-to-be that I have been and am, and the threat comes all the way back to me and touches me, affects me, makes me fearful. 221 Typically,

one backs away in bewilderment, and this kind of forgetting oneself is what constitutes the existential-temporal meaning of fear. [H341; BT392, my italics].

---

221 As mentioned earlier, in the section of the structure of mood, it would seem more appropriate here to say that it is the structural moment of the fearing itself, i.e., the be-ing-fearful which is the distinct and definitive aspect of moods – which Smith’s phenomenology has brought out into articulation. Heidegger seems, though, to characterize the mood itself as the a priori possibility of the disclosure of the felt meaning or ‘matter’, before which any mood stands. Given that, it is unfair to criticize, then, his application of this structure to the mood-affect of fear for not articulating the idiosyncratic qualities of actual fear itself. Nonetheless, my criticism thus becomes precisely that: Heidegger, while articulating the structure (of fearing itself), articulated it in an a priori way which is not informational for, and does not provide a useful basis for, the actual felt phenomena of an actual mood.
That is to say, the essential moment of fear is such that one is brought back to one's thrown self — "but in such a way that this thrownness just gets closed off" [H342], i.e., is 'forgotten'. This is the inauthentic been-ness of fear and been-ness is the ecstasy which predominates in the dis-positional disclosure.

This forgetting manifests itself in a "bewildered making-present", which clings to whatever it can, leaps about from this to that, "makes present a jumble of hovering possibilities" and "does not take hold of any definite possibility" [H342]. Obviously, taking-hold refers to a resolute appropriation of something appropriate, rather than a 'clinging' to something, anything.

Thus the temporality of fear is a 'forgetting which awaits and makes-present'. This is identical to the temporality of inauthentic understanding (an 'awaiting which forgets and makes-present'), except that the primary ecstasy is different. That is, the inauthentic affect is a 'forgetting, which...', while the inauthentic understanding is an 'awaiting, which...'.

The specific ecstatic unity, which makes fearing existentially possible, temporalizes itself primarily out of the forgetting so characterized, which, as a mode of been-ness, modifies, in their temporalization, the present and future which belong to it. [H342].

Heidegger, by focussing on the about-which structure of the mood and finding its underlying temporality to be that of been-ness, breaks out of the traditional interpretation of the feeling of fear as an expectation which (circumspectively, i.e., understandingly) stands or shrinks before a futural 'oncoming evil'. This standard interpretation orients itself to some being which one awaits, and also reduces the internal structure of the feeling itself to irrelevancy: in the standard interpretation, "anything else [beyond the futural before-which] which belongs to this phenomenon remains [merely] a 'feeling of pleasure or displeasure'" [H342]. It is precisely this internal structure of feeling that Heidegger is attempting to
articulate more fully, with his notion of the about-which, as it is in this structure that, according to Heidegger, the fearsome phenomenon (or that before-which I fear) actually touches and affects me.

Smith not only makes the point that the feeling has a deeper phenomenological content than being about myself but he also develops, with his notion of feeling-flows, apt internal descriptions of the feeling quality itself, i.e., of the 'feeling of pleasure or pain' itself, specific to each mood or affect itself (the third structural aspect of moods, the 'mood itself'). This is an improvement on Heidegger's own improvement of phenomenological description and analysis. But Heidegger's own aim, in doing this phenomenology, is temporal ontology: thus, the important point, here, for Heidegger, is that deeper description of the internal structure of moods points to the underlying predominant ecstatic of been-ness, which orients the other two ecstases. The forgetting temporalization of been-ness, which closes off one's thrown self, is the locus of meaning for understanding both the 'bewildered making-present' which ensues and also the impending (futural), threatening being which comes toward one and before which one shrinks.

ii) The temporality of anxiety

Anxiety, as an authentic mood (sometimes referred to as the authentic mood and the basic mood [Grundstimmung]), differs from fear substantially. For example, the 'how' of the disclosure is different: fear's 'how' of be-ing-here is, despite the break in be-ing-at-home in

---

222 This trait of the dis-positional disclosure must be qualified: if, by this about-which, Heidegger means that moods and affects affect us and are not merely contemplated nor possible pragmata, we would agree. However, it wouldn't be accurate to say that the meaningful content of all moods and affects are thereby, explicitly or implicitly, about our selves and our possibilities-for-be-ing. Importantly, the meaningful content, while affecting us, is not only meaningful in its affecting us; it is also meaningful about that before which we feel.
the-world, nonetheless an ‘at home’ in one’s worldly self or be-ing-in; anxiety’s own self is uncanny and alien. Further, not only is the before-which different but anxiety’s about-which, while being the same as that of fear, discloses its ‘object’ fundamentally differently. Moreover, and most important for our analysis, all three ecstases, as in authentic understanding, temporalize and thus disclose differently than fear.

The essential anxiety, which Heidegger analyzes, is occasioned by or is a disclosure of “thrown be-ing-toward-death” [H344, my emphasis]. This phrase suggests a difference from the understanding’s disclosure of anticipatory be-ing-toward-death. As an understanding disclosure, be-ing-toward-death is one in which be-ing-here comes toward itself, anticipatorily, as its ownmost possibility-of-be-ing. In the anxious, i.e., dis-positional disclosure – a far more primordial disclosure – it might be more precise to say that one’s anticipation has become clairvoyant and has previously brought death so close as to have already shattered one’s self: one is already there with oneself, one has died a priori, in the foreclosed life of pure be-ing-here. Heidegger does indicate something like this in the ultimate passage of Being and Time, which we have already quoted and to which we shall soon return: be-ing-here “lets itself be thrown back upon its factual ‘there’ by shattering itself against death” [BT, 395; H385]. However, let us rather look, now, to Heidegger’s analysis in ¶68b.

Formally, both that before-which and that about-which anxiety stands is the same: be-ing-here, be-ing-in-the-world itself. What does this in fact mean? For one, it means that “anxiety is pervaded by a peculiar kind of peace” [WM, 335] as opposed to the confusion of fear. Anxiety is “the possibility of that mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders” [H344]

---

223 Once again, Rilke comes to mind; cf., note 62 at the end of §7.
someone who is resolute; though, it is also pointed out that *anxiety, itself, is not resolution nor yet resolute*: “anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution”, though it also “mounts authentically only in a be-ing-here which is [already] resolute” *ibid.*. What more can the structures of the before-which and the about-which tell us?

In *fear*, one *turns away from oneself and turns toward the world*. As in the fleeing of falling, this turning-away is a ‘fugitive’ turning-toward oneself, such that “to be thus closed off is merely the privation of an openness [dis-closed-ness]”[H184].

In *anxiety*, one *turns toward oneself and away from intramundane beings*. That *before which* be-ing-here is anxious is *nothing* in the world and it thus poses an *indefinite* threat. There is definitely a threat but what it is, is uncertain – it thus looms all the more menacingly, as we sink into the depths of uncanny be-ing. What or who ‘I’ am, too – that which is threatened (that *about-which* I am anxious) – becomes indefinite. All these worldly beings, all *pragmata*, ‘things’, other people and myself as one of them, show up as having no pragmatic, involvement-character whatsoever, and as essentially irrelevant [H186]: “concernful awaiting [the inauthentic future] finds nothing”; “the world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance” and “anxiety is anxious before the nothing of the world” [H343].

This means, however, according to Heidegger that ‘the world’ *itself* – that is, the holistic structure of *possible* significance of the whole of beings – shows itself as that *before which* one is anxious.

The obstinacy of the intraworldly “nothing and nowhere” means phenomenally that *that before which one has anxiety is the world as such*. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere” does not signify that the world is absent but tells us that intraworldly beings are in themselves so utterly irrelevant that, on the basis of their *insignificance*, the world in its worldhood [significance] is all that still obtrudes itself. [H186-7].
But this holistic structure, the significance-contexture of *worldhood* itself, is part of *be-ing-here*’s be-ing as be-ing-in-the-world.

The “nothing” of handiness is grounded in the most primordial ‘something’ – in the *world*. Ontologically, however, the world belongs to be-ing-here’s be-ing as be-ing-in-the-world. If, therefore, the “nothing” – that is, the world as such – exhibits itself as that before which one has anxiety, this means that, that before which anxiety is anxious is be-ing-in-the-world itself. [H187].

The before-which of anxiety is the nothingness of beings, *i.e.*, world as such, *i.e.*, worldhood, *i.e.*, be-ing-in-the-world. Moreover, be-ing-in-the-world – be-ing-here *itself* – is disclosed, in anxiety, as *already having been* ‘here’, *not* as some futural possibility we await. Therefore the before-which of anxiety is 1) not constituted by some purely ontic being but by my own be-ing (be-ing-in-the-world); and 2) not constituted by the future but by been-ness (the been-ness of my be-ing-in-the-world). That is, the before-which is not constituted by some futural being, which I await, but by my own been-ness, which I already am: but this been-ness which constitutes my past be-ing is not that of pure facticity but *thrownness, i.e., past existence*. What we are anxious before – the possibility of the world, the significance of the world as such, which is a possibility for-the-sake-of be-ing-here itself – is disclosed in how we *have* factically realized its possibility, *i.e.*, as a *thrown possibility*. That is, the existentially possible significance is revealed *factically* – *i.e.*, dis-positionally – as one which is *and has been*. Proximally and usually, this ‘realized possibility’ has remained inauthentically realized in the turning away of fallen be-ing-in-the-world, *i.e.*, *authentically unrealized*. But this need not be the *only* way that thrown possibility is dis-positionally revealed.
Importantly, Heidegger distinguishes between moods, such as boredom and joy, which disclose the *whole-of-beings*-and-ourselves-amidst-them, and the mood of anxiety, which discloses *the nothing* which *nihilates*(nichtet) all these beings. This nihilation does not annihilate these beings but does annihilate their be-ing meaningful: nihilation is "the repelling gesture toward beings as a whole" [WM in P, 90], through which "all things, and we with them, sink into a sort of indifference" [WM, 336]. That is, in the emergence of the worldhood of the world (the *a priori* whole of the world *itself*, not the cumulative, ontic totality), all world-parts, including myself as one part of the whole, blench and blanch into meaningfulness. Therewith, "pure be-ing-here is all that remains" [*ibid.*], "naked be-ing-here as thrown into uncanniness" [H343]. The world itself emerges as a structure of be-ing-in-the-world, and, according to Heidegger, as a *possibility* of a be-ing-in who is brought *back* to itself...rather than, as we might have expected, as the *facticity* of be-ing-here itself, as the possibility which *has been*.

As we have seen, this 'bringing back to...' is, according to Heidegger, the very function of dis-position as a temporal disclosure, as, specifically, the disclosure of been-ness. It would be worthwhile to stay a moment with this 'bringing-back-to' and the 'fact' to which one is brought back, before characterizing the how of this bringing back and understanding it *as* something (*viz.*, a possibility of some kind)...but Heidegger does *not* stay with this disclosedness *per se*. His concern is to re-existentialize this factual disclosure.

Thus, although the nullity of that before-which one stands throws one back upon that about which one is anxious — *viz.*, be-ing-here as the "pure that-it-is of one's ownmost,

---

224 WM, 334-5. Heidegger's reference to joy, here, is very brief and, in fact, occasioned by the presence of the be-ing-here of someone we love. That is, a particular being can evoke the whole (of beings). This is different from the joy spoken of in *Being and Time*. We shall return to joy shortly.
individuated thrownness” [H343] – and though the about-which should, as in fear, be that which displays the ‘specific moodal character’ (as distinct from projection) of the disclosure – this impossibility of intramundane projection “signifies, however, that one is letting the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be be lit up” [H343, my italics], that is, another possibility of another projection, before which one stands... Further, one is turned toward one’s thrownness “as something possible which can be repeated”[ibid.]. And this means, says Heidegger, that we are brought back to our been-ness, our thrownness, “as something futural” [H343]! Once again, the existential imperative obscures the factical disclosure and, here, crucially.

Thus the very idiosyncratic temporal structure of moods, the groundedness in been-ness, immediately gets turned into a revelation of a futural possibility! In addition, this inscribing of futural possibility into factical been-ness is taken to be the very significance of been-ness itself, as disclosed in the key-mood of anxiety: repeatability (Wiederholbarkeit: taking-again-ness) is not just a new mode of futural temporalizing (though it appears to be that also) – it is supposed to be the ecstatical mode of been-ness itself, at least as revealed by the ‘key-mood’ of anxiety. Furthermore, it is no longer the bringing-back-to and bringing back to that about which anxiety is anxious, that is specially constitutive of the mood, here – rather, now repeatability “must come back as futural upon its thrown ‘here’”[H343, my emphases225] and so transform the about-which into a new before-which:

Bringing before repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of dis-position of the been-ness constituting anxiety. [H343, my underlining].

225 Macquarrie and Robinson translated this passage, rather elaborately as: “...must, in repeating, come back to its thrown ‘there’, but come back as something futural which comes toward”, translating the single word ‘zukünftiges’ with the phrase ‘something futural which comes toward’. Nonetheless, this phrases (not there in the text though indeed implied) help capture the full sense of the transformation of the directionality of the movement of the ‘bringing back’ of been-ness to that of the ‘coming- toward’ of futural be-ing (existence).
That is, bringing one’s thrown be-ing before the possibility of it being taken up in the resolve of a repetition, is put forward as the temporality of the been-ness of anxiety. This should dismay anyone who is expecting any revelation about the factual be-ing of our that-it-is *per se* to be achieved in the temporal analysis of dis-position, particularly of this ‘key-mood’ of anxiety. Heidegger has transformed this disclosure into one, which is significant and which is to be analyzed temporally, only with regard to the imperatives of existentiality and authenticity. Anxiety is a key-mood for Heidegger, not because it is a pure dis-positional disclosure, or because it discloses our factual be-ing in a direct manner as factual be-ing but rather because it is a mood which clarifies and simplifies the thrown *existential* situation. This would be acceptable — that is, the existential significance of moods is an important issue in its own right — except for the fact that the overbearing existential impetus *closes off* deeper insight into our factual be-ing and been-ness — that is, closes off possible insight into the ontology of factual be-ing-here itself and of a more balanced and integrated ontology of being-here as a whole...not to mention, that the avenue to be-ing itself is also thereby closed off.

To come back to Heidegger’s analysis: within this repeatability, the other ecstatic modes temporalize themselves. But, as we have just seen, in Heidegger’s anxiety, the future has already temporalized *within the very structure* of been-ness as repeatability: one’s thrown fact of be-ing is *to be* taken up in a resolution and made authentic by the ‘taking again’ of repetition. It therefore appears that, rather than anxiety’s been-ness modifying the temporalizing of the future, the future modifies, structurally and in silence, the very been-ness of anxiety, a been-ness which should be disclosing from its own factual resources.
The impression that Heidegger has inlaid the future ecstasy into that of been-ness is confirmed when we find no explicit and specific information on anxiety’s temporalizing of the future out of primordial been-ness. Heidegger does provide us with such for the Present ecstasy. Rather than the bewildered making-present of fear, “the Present of anxiety is held on to” [H344], so that it cannot get lost in mundane concern. Nevertheless, the Present of anxiety is not yet resolute and so not yet that of the moment-of-vision:

Anxiety only brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. Its Present holds the moment-of-vision at the ready.226 [H344].

Only upon the act of resolution, repetition, do we enter into resolute and truly authentic being-here and, so, into the moment-of-vision. And only therewith do we enter into being-here’s historicality and historical situation. Nonetheless, with the compulsion of repetition and existential authenticity, we foreclose on the ‘whiling’ in been-ness necessary for an appreciation of factual be-ing and the phenomenon of birth – the ‘that it is’ of createdness at all227 – and the liberation of appreciation itself – that is, dis-positional disclosedness itself – and its accompanying ‘felt meanings’. Let us, however, consider the phenomenon of be-ing-here’s historicality.

§40. Authentic Historicality

The notions of repetition and the moment-of-vision remain obscure until Heidegger amplifies them in context of that mode of temporality that articulates the structure of temporality itself, viz., authentic historicality. We have already (in §37.iv) alluded to historicality in context of be-ing-here self-constancy, which we have previously (§21-22)

226 Auf dem Sprung or ready to spring; at the spring or source...more of Heidegger’s evocative terminology.
227 — to borrow the phrase (again) from Heidegger’s The Origin of the Artwork, p.65.
shown to be the key to anticipatory resoluteness, the basic experience and truth of be-ing-here – at least, as existence. Historicality is to articulate, in the most primordial way, the authentic and resolute self-constancy of be-ing-here. This is not the goal of our investigations but, as it consummates Heidegger's existential analysis of be-ing-here, it is important to present it here, in order to further ground our own divergence of interpretation from Heidegger's.

How, then, does the analysis of historicality unfold? Let us pay close attention to Heidegger's text in laying out the interpretation.

After Heidegger's analyses of the everyday temporalizing of be-ing-here, he broaches the hitherto ignored question about how "in living unto its day, be-ing-here stretches itself along 'temporally' in the sequence of those days" [371]. To approach this issue, Heidegger (as we indicated in Chapter VI) questions the primordiality of the interpretation thus far, asking whether the whole of be-ing-here has been brought into the interpretation, and whether "be-ing-here can be understood in a way that is more primordial than in the projection of its authentic existence?" [H372].

Our answer – on the basis of the orientation or interpretative framework we are working with here, viz., that of the primordiality of non-existentiaL, non-projective, non-authentic factual being, being essential to any sense of the wholeness of be-ing-here – is that Heidegger's interpretation is not yet primordial, lacking a proper satisfaction of the holistic requirement of interpretation; and that, further, there is indeed a more primordial experience and intelligibility of be-ing-here than that of the projection of authentic existence.

Heidegger's own answer is a qualified rejection of the primordiality of his own interpretation. He observes:
But death is only the ‘end’ of be-ing-here; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which be-ing-here’s totality is closed round. The other ‘end’ is the ‘beginning’, the ‘birth’. Only that being which is ‘between’ birth and death presents the sought-for whole. Accordingly, the orientation of our analytic has so far remained ‘one-sided’, in spite of all its tendencies towards a consideration of existent be-ing-a-whole. [H373].

Heidegger concludes form this, that

Not only be-ing-toward-the-beginning but also, and above all, the stretched-ness of be-ing-here between birth and death, has remained unnoticed. [H373].

Nonetheless, according to Heidegger, temporality does give us the basis from which to understand these hitherto ignored phenomena. Whereas relatively little is said, from this point on, regarding the phenomenon of ‘birth’ itself – except within the existential and historical context – the entire chapter on historicality is to work out the phenomenon of the ‘stretchedness’ of the ‘between’. That is, “the ‘between’ which relates to birth and death already lies in the be-ing of be-ing-here” [H374] and

Factual be-ing-here exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of be-ing-toward-death. …Both the ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are. … … Thrownness and be-ing-toward-death…form a unity; and, in this unity, birth and death are ‘connected’ in a manner characteristic of be-ing-here. As care, be-ing-here is the ‘between’. [H374].

The specific movement in which be-ing-here is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its “historizing”. [H375].

This movement of historizing, though, remains “the movement of existence” [H375, my emphasis]. Though Heidegger is attempting to balance the scales here, he still, once again, only underscores his existential bias: the significance of the fact that be-ing-here, as ‘factual existence’, “exists as born” [H374], is that be-ing-here, therefore, is-to-be and ‘is

---

228 Geschehen – ‘happening’, the verbal form of Geschichtlichkeit (historicality).
229 Though, to be fair, Heidegger is with this simply contrasting be-ing-here’s be-ing with extant be-ing. Still he speaks of it as existence, as if existence represents the whole of be-ing-here itself.
toward death'; we, though, are rather interested, as regards the phenomenon of birth, in the fact that be-ing-here, as 'existential facticity', 'is as born' and therefore is-been and 'is from birth' – the significant difference being that we are seeking out facticity's way of be-ing, as determined by birth, not existence's way of be-ing, as perhaps qualified by being born (and facticity as such). For Heidegger, despite the overture to a balanced interpretation, the significance of birth is shown only when "'birth' is caught up into its [be-ing-here's] existence" [H391]. Once again, facticity is swallowed up, as much as possible, into existence and existential imperatives.

In any case, "the analysis of the specific movement and persistence which belongs to be-ing-here's historizing" brings us back to "the question of the constancy of the Self" and its "specific temporalizing of temporality" [H375]. Moreover, the analysis of historicality is to "merely reveal what already lies enveloped in the temporalizing of temporality" [H376].

Heidegger guiding question in the analysis of historicality is, "whence, in general, can be-ing-here draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself?" [H383]. Not from death, which "guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one's resoluteness" [ibid.]. Not from thrownness, it would initially appear, as "be-ing-here never comes back behind its thrownness" [ibid.]. Yet there is a 'handing down' of possibilities in authentic historizing. How does this work?

If we recall, temporality temporalizes inasmuch as "coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself enpresentingly into the Situation" [H326]. We have already heard Heidegger mention that "the interpretation of be-ing-here's historicality will prove to be, basically, just a more concrete working out of temporality" [[H382]. We noted that the full
presentation of temporality, as *authentic historicality*, is articulated by Heidegger in the following passage:

> Only a being, that is essentially futural in its be-ing, so that it, free for its death, can let itself, in shattering upon death, be thrown back upon its factual ‘here’ – that is, only a being that, as futural, equiprimordially is beeing, can, by handing down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be visionary in the moment for ‘its time’. [H385].

In the projective anticipation that “goes right under the eyes of death” [H383], be-ing-here is ultimately rebuffed, indeed shattered by the overpowering, disempowering, utter certitude of death – the ultimate possibility for be-ing-here, which turns out to be, as we have seen, the sheer impossibility of be-ing-here [H250]. Resolute, futural, historical be-ing-here i) ‘shatters itself against death; ii) is thereby thrown back upon the been-ness of its factual be-ing here; iii) somehow hands down to itself the possibility it inherits from its ‘tradition’ (rather, we note, than attunes to the sheer ontological facticity of its existing at all); that is, iv) ‘takes over its thrownness’, and thereby v) enters into the world-historical moment-of-vision.

But where do these possibilities come from? Be-ing-here, in the very Taoist “powerless *superior power...of its finite freedom*”230 *[ibid.], i.e., in taking over the ‘powerlessness of its abandonment to having chosen to choose’* [ibid.231] – i.e., in enacting its freedom – existentially digs into its facticity, mines it, extracts the golden ore of possibility, and explicitly hands this historical possibility down to itself [H385], from the living core of its been-ness, its heritage.

---

230 I have, with no damage to text or meaning, brought together three phrases from H384 and H385 [BT, 436] here.
231 Again, amalgamating three dense phrases.
This is not a taking over of something extant but a *creative* takeover. We are here at the moment of the ‘fusion of horizons’ and the enactment of the “highest type of hermeneutical experience... effective-historical consciousness” [cf., Gadamer, 1975, 324].

“That is, be-ing-here ‘hands down to itself the possibilities that have come down to it – *but not necessarily as having thus come down*. Rather, this ‘handing down’ is the *transformation* of tradition and it works as a free ‘reciprocative rejoinder’ [H386] to those possibilities. This rejoinder *chooses*, *i.e.*, creatively *takes over* “the powerlessness of abandonment” to its freedom [H384]. The rejoinder is the repetition: “*repeating is handing down explicitly* – that is, going back into the possibilities of the be-ing-here which has been” [H385] and appropriating thrownness authentically.

The steadiness or self-constancy of the stretchedness of be-ing-here as a whole is achieved in the resoluteness of repetition. Heidegger says

> The Self’s resoluteness ... is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along – the steadiness with which be-ing-here as fate ‘incorporates’ into its existence birth and death and their ‘between’, and holds them...so that, in such constancy, be-ing-here is indeed in a moment-of-vision for what is world-historical in its current Situation. [H391].

In the resolution of and constancy of repetition, be-ing-here steps into the moment-of-vision. Though Heidegger’s text is reticent in the extreme, it appears that be-ing in the historical moment-of-vision ‘sees into the Moment’ with the “clear vision”, indeed, phronetic *clairvoyance* “for the accidents of the disclosed Situation” [H384], of and for its epoch. There is indeed something visionary, even ‘occult’, in Heidegger’s characterization of this ‘moment’ of authentic Present. As a ‘historical’ phenomenon, the moment is the right and

---

232 The highest type of consciousness, aside from, perhaps, that belonging to the ‘metaphysics of the beautiful’ which Gadamer turns to in his own “ontological turn” [Gadamer, 1975, 434].

233 Paraphrasing H383, BT435.

234 *Erwiderung*, translated, contextually, by Macquarrie and Robinson as “reciprocative rejoinder” [BT, 438].
timely moment of action and, as an expression of the freedom of the ‘reciprocative rejoinder’, it is the creative act which grounds the vision. In freedom’s self-choice, existentiality mines its facticity/thrownness, hands the throw down to itself, as a possibility which it has “inherited yet chosen” [H384] In taking over this dispensation which is neither determined nor absolutely determinative, be-ing-here is also brought “into the simplicity of its fate” [H384]. Heidegger characterizes authentic historicality as one’s fate, and a generation’s destiny [H384-5]. It would not be farfetched, then, to suppose that be-ing-here, in the moment-of-vision, having chosen it, sees into the truth of one’s ‘generation’ and the ‘fate’ and ‘destiny’ of ‘its time’.

With these condensations of time and be-ing, we end our presentation of Heidegger’s notion of authentic historicality.

Though it is apart from my particular concerns, the following still ought to be observed: though Heidegger’s description of the resoluteness of authentic historicality appears to have existential appeal and pathos, and phenomenological astuteness, there appears to be no guarantee, even within the heart of freedom (as Sartre would agree), that the enactment of freedom, the choice made, the ‘vision’ into the moment, the assumption of fate and destiny, etc., have any more effective truth than any other appealing delusion. Certainly the multiple failures in Heidegger’s own life (the project of Being and Time, the support of the Nazis) speak of some compromise to, or lack of, grounding power, despite the resoluteness of the vision, the choice, and the act. But this would take us in a direction outside the concerns of my thesis.
CONCLUSIONS

The Hermeneutical Situation of
Another Sort of Intelligibility

i. Results and conclusions

Let us summarize the results obtained by our interpretative analysis. After an
introductory chapter, covering some of the relevant topics and terminology from Division
One of Being and Time, I shifted (in chapter II of Part One of my work) to the question of
primordiality of interpretation, as Heidegger himself poses it, at the beginning of the second
Division of Being and Time. Despite acknowledgement of the equiprimordiality of the
factual and falling modes of be-ing-here, Heidegger has remained within the parameters and
scope of the formal indication of existence, which is seen as the ‘essence’ of be-ing-here. The
primordiality of interpretation being sought pertains to the transparency of the interpretive,
projective understanding, itself (the mode of disclosure of existence) with the hermeneutic
and phenomenological ‘object’, existence.

I pointed out that, beyond the well-known ‘holistic’ requirement (projected in the
analysis of anticipatory be-ing-toward-death) and the ‘authenticity’ requirement (which
concretely attests the projection via the resoluteness of conscience) – for both of which I
provided intensive analyses (in chapters III and IV, respectively) – there is the less well-
known ‘phenomenological’ or ‘existentiell’ requirement, viz., that an interpretation be drawn
from a “basic experience of the object” (chapter V). This experience is, as Heidegger
articulates it in an important earlier work, a “simple founding experience” which is the “authentic motivational source of...ontology”\(^235\).

In analyzing Heidegger’s version of his ‘basic experience’, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness – an analysis too intensive to gloss – we came up against the possibility of deeper primordialities (chapter VI), both of interpretation and experience. Heidegger himself acknowledges that temporal analysis is the yet deeper interpretive vantage-point, ontologically, and he enacts that temporality in a repetition of the existential analysis along temporal lines (about which more, later). These repetitions further develop and intensify being-here’s be-ing.

However, Heidegger also, for a moment, recognizes that the analysis of be-ing-here has, thus far (to BT II.5), been one-sided and insufficiently holistic, in two ways: first, it has been directed only towards one ‘end’ of be-ing-here, viz., death, the ‘end’ that existence projects toward; while the other ‘end’, i.e., the beginning, i.e., birth, has been ignored. Second – though connected with the first point – Heidegger asks whether be-ing-here can be grasped in a more primordial way than in the projection of its authentic existence, implying (though Heidegger himself does not take this direction) that projective existence, even in its authenticity, is an insufficiently holistic stance toward be-ing-here. I took the interpretive position that the dis-posing of facticity is, at least, a truly equiprimordial disclosure of being-here, and perhaps a more primordial disclosure of be-ing-here and of be-ing itself, than projective existence.

\(^{235}\) The first quotation is from Being and Time [H222], the latter two from Heidegger’s 1922 manuscript on Aristotle, Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle – An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation [S, 127, and S, 128]. Similarly to Aristotle’s, this basic experience is of the “how of the be-ing-moved” [S, 126] of the ‘object’ being interpreted, this ‘how’ being the be-ing of the object, and being what we have in advance, in our forehaving, for the interpretation. The similarity ends there, though, as Aristotle’s object is different: it is beings, in their ‘how’ as produced beings; while Heidegger’s ‘object’ is our own be-ing-here, in the nullity of its be-ing, essentially stripped of such a productive telos.
I pointed out, further, that, *presumed by* the ‘holding-for-true’ of the existential and projective ‘certainty’ of anticipatory resoluteness, is the primordial *be-ing-in-the-truth* of *dis-positional disclosure*, that of *moods and affects*. Even if we grant ‘equiprimordial’ status for the existential, appropriating certainty, still the dis-positional *be-ing-in-the-truth* is *prior*, a felt ‘already-there-ness’ which need not be maligned as inauthentic and unappropriated, and which can be positively articulated as that ineffable priority under whose sway we are disposed. This, again, led me towards disentangling the giftedness of the fact and phenomenon of birth, of origin, from the burdensomeness of ‘thrownness’, *i.e.*, from Heidegger’s notion of facticity. We were thus enabled to broach the possibility of a phenomenology of ‘dis-position’ which is both free of existential presuppositions and entanglements and based on the primordial factual truth of *be-ing-here* as *be-ing-from-birth*.

We were given further motivation to pursue such a phenomenology by realizing that, in Heidegger’s “brief digression” in the *Grundprobleme*, the ‘pre-conceptual’ ‘understanding’ of *be-ing* itself (*i.e.*, not the ontic understanding, of circumspective concern) – *which is “antecedently given”* [BP, 282] and which is ‘there’ for explicit, ontological projection – *is actually the dis-positional disclosure of moods and affects*. As we have remarked, *this* so-called ‘understanding’ is, perhaps, better articulated as another sort of ‘intelligibility’, one belonging to feelings and felt meanings rather than projects and horizons.

Therefore, *in Part Two*, after giving some context of the spiritual orientation of Quentin Smith’s metaphysics of feeling (chapter VII), I gave (in chapter VIII) a detailed exposition of his phenomenology of feeling in *The Felt Meanings of the World*. Since Aristotle, feelings have been ‘explained’ by their ‘causes’ and ‘objects’, while the feeling-*quality* – the most unique and distinctive aspect of the phenomenon of feeling – has been
rather innocuously rendered as merely pleasurable or painful. In contradistinction to this, Smith’s work develops phenomenological methodology for opening out the inner structure of feelings and felt meaning. He criticizes the metaphysical tradition for its assumption that only reasoning (or, in my interpretation of Heidegger, what I see as a ‘rationalist’ remnant or, perhaps, root: projective understanding) can discover a meaning of the world as a whole. Smith shows how feelings provide this access and that the world itself possesses a felt meaningfulness. He articulates a three-tiered ‘appreciative method of metaphysical knowing’, which develops three different kinds of feeling (the intuitive, the afterglowing, and the concentrative) into an organic synthesis. Smith proceeds with a precise analysis and description of the internal characteristics of feeling, amplifying feeling-quality by the phenomenological notion of the ‘feeling-flow’ of the feeling-sensations of the ‘I’ and the correlated feeling-tonalities of the world. Feelings flow in certain, articulable directions and manners and these articulations provide us with the ‘just definitions’ of feelings themselves, which Hume, for example, thought to be impossible. Smith then analyzes the feeling awareness of the sources of the feeling-flows: these are the importances, which are the ‘felt meanings’ that feelings attune to. These feeling-awarenesses are, at the primordial intuitive level, moods and affects. Affects, with their focused character, enable us to precisely capture aspects of the appreciated importances, which the relatively unfocused, holistic character of moods leaves vague and unarticulated. With these phenomenological analyses, Smith puts himself into the position of being able to articulate and structure the importances or felt meanings of the world-whole – that is, carry through a metaphysics of feeling.

As pointed out in my Introduction, I have, in this thesis, had to refrain from both carrying out my own phenomenological investigations and therefore from explicitly joining
discussion with the metaphysics that Smith develops in *The Felt Meanings of the World* (and elsewhere, though in drastically altered style). My goal has been, rather, to set up a hermeneutic situation, vis-à-vis Heidegger, within which such a phenomenology and metaphysics can resonate most powerfully and 'effective-historically'. For this reason, I returned to Heidegger in Part Three.

I, then, in *Part Three*, elaborated Heidegger's own phenomenology of dis-position, and developed it particularly as regards the temporal analysis. As the analyses of Part Three gather most of the strands of the present interpretation into an essential discourse and critique of Heidegger, I will focus, in this conclusion, somewhat more extensively and with more acuity on these chapters.

In chapter IX, I display Heidegger's tripartite structural analysis of the disclosiveness of dis-position. The first of Heidegger's three constitutional characteristics is that moods are disclosive of *thrownness*, which, in turn, is comprised of three aspects, *viz.*, burdensomeness, facticity, and the 'how' of the mood. We saw that 'burdensomeness' assumes the 'having' of a 'whence' and a 'whither', which, despite their lack of content, are exhibited by Heidegger as structurally co-constitutive of the very be-ing of be-ing-here. I criticized this as being only valid, if at all, for the existential but not for the factual be-ing of be-ing-here, nor for the whole of be-ing-here itself. Such a recognition releases the burden of be-ing here into the enigma and giftedness of be-ing (here) at all. Correspondingly, it releases facticity from the ontological range of the existential grasp, that is, from the '...and has to be' of the 'that it is and has to be' of Heidegger's version of facticity (*viz.*, thrownness). We were thereby able us to extract the notion of facticity, the pure 'that it is', as such and at all, from the existentialized facticity of Heidegger's notion of 'thrownness'. This further allowed us to
envisage i) a non-existential analytic of be-ing-here, ii) a reappreciation of the miraculous phenomenon of birth, and iii) a mode of access akin to and proper to these phenomena: moodal or dis-positional disclosure, rather than projection. With this, the ‘how’ of dis-positional be-ing-here – which, for Heidegger, is either that of everydayness or uncanniness – opens up to the prospect of both an authentic be-ing-at-home or dwelling in the world and, deeper, a nonexistential, spiritual uncanniness of be-ing as such.

The second constitutive aspect of moods, according to Heidegger, is their holistic structure: moods are existentially (meaning the whole of be-ing-here), ontically (the whole of beings), and ontologically (the whole of be-ing itself) holistic disclosures. In provisional deference to Heidegger’s architectonic, in this work I am developing be-ing-here’s ontology and disclosive ability, as the point of departure for the disclosure of the ontological whole of be-ing itself. I have restricted and demoted the existential modality of be-ing-here’s be-ing, counterbalancing and, in fact, supplanting existence with factual be-ing-here and its mode of disclosure.

On the other hand, Heidegger also speaks of a factual, dis-positional ‘preoccupation with’ or ‘permeation by’ beings (i.e., by parts of the whole). I showed that this need not have the connotations of fallen ‘being-amidst’ beings but can be seen as a participation with other beings in the implied ontic whole. This participation is not the result of the ‘ecstatic’ overswing of existential projection but the antecedent basis and context of be-ing here in-the-world, that we find ourselves, dis-positionally, already in. ‘Preoccupation’ with beings is only Heidegger’s misinterpretation and confusion of factual dis-posedness with the phenomenon of falling – what Smith calls ‘moody mulling’. As we have seen from Smith’s work, there remains, within the structure of moods, the possibility of a moodal contemplation and/or
direct affective appreciation of the implied whole that these particular beings and ourselves are parts of. In any case, actual and authentic participation with other beings engages the whole in its parts.

The third of Heidegger’s essential traits of dis-position is the ‘ways of mattering’, how beings disclose or – more essentially, given the holistic aspect of moods – how the world as a whole discloses as meaningful, by ‘touching’ or affecting us, mattering in some way. Things can matter only if be-ing-here is so structured a priori as to allow them to matter: disposition is this disclosive a priori of mattering. Now, the ways of ‘mattering’, as Smith observed, could have been interpreted as felt meanings, corresponding to their own idiosyncratic mode of disclosure. In fact, Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of dis-position reveals the “before-which” as one of the constitutive items – e.g., the fearsome, the joyful, the awesome, etc. However, Heidegger, did not take the obvious next step of recognizing these as meanings in their own right, meanings which can be further and more precisely experienced and articulated. Instead, and despite seeing the primordiality of the dis-positional disclosure, Heidegger nevertheless (mis)interprets moods existentially and projectively. I have already shown, referring to Heidegger’s “brief digression” in the Grundprobleme, that the previous, pre-conceptual disclosure of be-ing should be recognized as another sort of intelligibility, other than that belonging to the kind of meaning belonging to projection, i.e., other than the ‘upon-which’ of a projection, in terms of which something becomes understandable. Dis-positions disclose the way beings, the world, be-ing-here and be-ing itself are meaningful as felt. But here, in Heidegger’s conflation of projective significance with dis-positional mattering, we have another confirmation of his being under the spell of his existential guiding concept, to the point of it resulting in distortions of the actual
phenomena – the felt meanings or matterings – that he is considering. We can conclude from this that though Heidegger’s phenomenology is good, his interpretative structure distorts the phenomenological data. This, in itself, calls for a renewed phenomenology, one which is not to be precipitately coerced into the explanatory structures of existence.

In chapter X, I made several observations and criticisms of Heidegger’s temporal analysis (still an underdeveloped though crucial aspect of his thinking), which have far-reaching effect as to the validity of his overall existential projection of be-ing. The ‘prejudice’ of the imperatives of existence becomes particularly visible in the consequent distortions of the factual be-ing of be-ing-here and its temporal structure of been-ness.

I began by pointing out that, in Heidegger’s pivotal section on method (§63), the justification for the ‘idea of existence’, i.e., for the formal indication of the entire ontology of be-ing-here, is the thrownness of existence (the past projectedness of futural, understanding projection – this temporal anomaly is what makes for an interpretive circle, which is not quite vicious). But, just as dis-position is more than a form of projection, be-ing-here’s facticity is more than its thrownness: the former ‘outstrips any existentiality’ which may be surreptitiously imputed to it through the concept of thrownness. Therefore, I recognized that the ‘past’ or ‘been-ness’ of facticity may be misinterpreted if seen only within the existential parameters of thrownness and its structural dependence on futural projection. With this new formal indication, I engaged with Heidegger’s temporal analyses of i) authentic care (anticipatory resoluteness), ii) disclosedness as such, and iii) the specific disclosedness of dis-position.

In the temporal analysis of the authentic care of anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger shows that anticipatory be-ing-toward-death is made possible by the coming-toward-oneself,
which characterizes the futural dimension of be-ing-here’s be-ing. In the projection of possibilities that I am as my to-be, I come toward my futural be-ing from my factical self: I am-futural in my be-ing-toward it; that is, most fundamentally, I exist (authentically as be-ing-toward-death) as futural.

Anticipatory resoluteness is also resolute be-ing-guilty, ‘be-ing the null ground of one’s null, thrown projection’, which one is, authentically, by taking over that ground and resolutely be-ing one’s guilty been-ness. I emphasize that this is only possible in that be-ing-here is-been at all, such that one can, then, projectively take up one’s thrownness by coming back to it and transforming it into authentic existence. Been-ness itself – the ‘still is and already was’ – is prior to the coming back. This priority is not a ‘chronological’ one of the proximal and usual inauthentic fallenness – but the ontological priority of been-ness itself. However, Heidegger’s own analysis is so much in the grips of existentiality and authenticity that he verges on characterizing the very be-ing – not just the authentic be-ing – of been-ness in terms of existential imperatives and relegating the pre-authentic been-ness of primordial, indifferent temporality, to inauthenticity. Were this merely the rhetoric of the intensification of existence which characterizes Heidegger’s entire discourse, it may, perhaps, be acceptable. However, it is clearly an unacceptable distortion when asserted in the developed thematizing of temporal ontology.

Thus, I make a clear distinction between the primordial been-ness of primordial temporality and the authentic been-ness of authentic temporality. Primordial been-ness does not arise with the appropriation motivated by authenticity, as a thrownness to be taken over. The been-ness that makes possible the projective take-over of thrownness – i.e., makes possible the futural project of authenticity, the coming towards oneself as coming back to
oneself — is not a been-ness we are towards but one we arise from. As regards authenticity and inauthenticity, it is a modally indifferent been-ness and temporality. This ‘indifference’ allows be-ing-here’s primordial temporality to be articulated and, particularly, the non-existentiality of factual been-ness to stand out. Furthermore, been-ness is now able to temporalize and disclose in its own appropriate manner, that is, purely, in dis-positional disclosure, i.e., in the caring for the important matter that is distinctive of the appreciative mode of openness, that characterizes moods and affects. Rather than been-ness disclosing potential authenticity, it, when appreciated as an ontological fact and structure of our be-ing-here, discloses the giftedness of the pure facticity of having been, that is, the giftedness of ‘be-ing-from-birth’.

Anticipatory resoluteness is also the temporally particular, current situation of be-ing-here, now, which is made possible by the present ecstasis. Heidegger’s analysis, perhaps in order to maintain a supposed concreteness, appears to conflate our mundane situation and making-present of beings with our existential situation of the ‘moment-of-vision’. Though this is an important matter in Heideggerian scholarship, it does not affect my problematic — so I will not go into it further here.

After these analyses of be-ing-here’s ‘extraordinary’ (i.e., authentic) temporality, Heidegger repeats the temporal analysis in a series of analyses of everyday temporality, with an orientation toward the quintessential temporal phenomenon of be-ing-here’s historicality. The analyses of the temporality of be-ing-here’s everyday disclosedness allowed us to, finally, focus on the temporality of dis-position.

First, the temporality of understanding: in its indifferent or primordial form, it is a projective ‘coming-towards (oneself) [futurally], which come back (to itself) [to its been-
ness] and waits-towards (beings) [presentially]'; understanding temporalizes inauthentically as an "awaiting [futural] which forgets [been-ness] and makes present [present]" [H339]; and authentically as an 'anticipation [future] which repeats [been-ness] in a moment of vision [present]' (or perhaps better, changing the order of the ecstases, an 'anticipation which sees into the moment and repeats'). The temporality of discourse is vacuous and that of falling is minimal and negligible for our purposes.

The temporality of dis-position proceeded through a structural analysis (considering the before-which and about-which) of the inauthentic affect of fear and then of the authentic (if not resolute) mood of anxiety. Just as understanding discloses our be-ing-here, as a coming-toward-itself, in and as projection, so dis-position discloses our be-ing-here, as a 'finding oneself' in the primordial 'how one is', as thrown into the facticity (the 'that it is...') and burdensomeness ('...and has to be') of be-ing-here. This is only possible insasmuch as be-ing-here 'is-been', i.e., is in the mode of been-ness.

But the existential significance of been-ness lies in its character as a 'bringing-back-to...' We, however, have been searching not for the existential character but for the uniquely factual character of been-ness and of moods. Nonetheless, for Heidegger, the significance of fear is its particular manner of bringing be-ing-here back to its thrown self. This is, specifically, a closing one's self off in forgetfulness, by a bewildered and frantic making-present of other beings, awaiting, in the avoidant, looming shadow of the fearsome: the temporality of fear is a 'forgetting which awaits and makes-present'.

Anxiety about death, as an authentic mood, temporalizes differently from fear. It is also a different disclosive phenomenon from the authentic understanding's anticipation of death, as it is the disclosure of thrown be-ing-toward-death, that is, how one is and has been
one’s existing. Anxiety brings one back not so much to the fact of one’s be-ing-here but to that fact as a possibility, both as a past possibility, proximally and usually inauthentically projected realized, and a current possibility, which can be authentically projected. That is, one is brought back to one’s thrown be-ing-here as something futural “which can be repeated” [H343]. Repeatability is thus seen as the ecstatic mode of the authentic been-ness that characterizes anxiety.

Once again, then, it is clear that existential imperatives have usurped the analysis, both of dis-position and of its temporality, been-ness. Heidegger has transformed the analysis of mood into one with importance only for the authentic existential project, and closed off the deeper and more indigenous insight into our factual be-ing and been-ness itself. For Heidegger, the future has already temporalized within the very structure of been-ness – just as projection has already been inscribed within the very structure of dis-position and existence within the very structure of facticity (as thrownness). These are the very distorting prejudices I set out to underscore in Heidegger’s project and analyses in Being and Time.

Finally, we saw that Heidegger’s analyses of everyday temporality are oriented toward be-ing-here’s historicality, as the ultimate existential-temporal basis for the turn toward be-ing itself. Heidegger wants to articulate the ‘stretchedness of the between’, that is the temporal span between birth and death, which is the temporal ‘happening’ or historizing of be-ing-here. This is in partial recognition of the ‘one-sidedness’ of the interpretation of being-here’s holism as founded on be-ing-toward-death. Unfortunately, however, we see the reference to birth, what Heidegger (still in the grips of existentiality) calls be-ing-toward-birth, become immediately subsumed within the basically existential historicality of be-ing-here. This is, once again, reflective of his precipitate existentializing of the phenomena, and it
results here in the phenomenon of birth being passed over. The possible structural connection of facticity with birth, the possible recognition of the structure of dis-position as being grounded on our being already in the sway of birth, the possible articulation of dis-position as a be-ing-from-birth (not some post-facto be-ing-toward-birth) – these interpretive possibilities are all foreclosed on by Heidegger’s overriding existential, projective, and futural prejudices.

With these analyses and insights, I believe my general, critical thesis to be confirmed. Most straightforwardly, that thesis is: The imperatives of Heidegger’s guiding, ‘formal indication’ of existence distort his analysis of be-ing-here, specifically by misinterpreting fundamentally non-existential phenomena and structures of phenomena, such as dispositional disclosure (moods and affects), factual be-ing, and the temporality of these phenomena (been-ness). I have shown this, in detail, to be the case.

ii. Transition toward the phenomenological and metaphysical analysis of felt meaning

We must wonder: whatever happened to the disclosure of that which one is ‘rescendently’ thrown back to, that which discloses not as a possibility for projective understanding but as the facticity of that about-which we are dis-posed and affected? Even were we to insist – which we are not doing here – upon existence as the be-ing of be-ing-here, and therefore upon the thrownness of that facticity (or facticity as thrownness) as what is disclosed in moods, still, then, we should then be considering the pastness or been-ness of existence, i.e., thrown possibility, i.e., the already realized forms of former possibility that past be-ing is and, now, discloses in our moods, before the precipitate re-existentializing of them into our new project. These actualized forms would not be, just by being past,
inauthentic by definition. Nor would they present as possibilities. There is something ineluctable in their past facticity, which speaks of something that perhaps should not only be viewed as a tragic nullity to our existence, freedom, and projection but, rather, should be accepted and appreciated, outright, as the given fact.

Even more to the point: despite the existential profundity of Heidegger’s interpretation, we can’t help but notice that the disclosure of facticity, here, is nothing but the disclosure of the heritage of thrown possibilities and that it, further, is not attuned to, dispositionally, but disclosed only in the resoluteness of prescient – if also anxious – freedom. Again, the element of pure facticity plays no part in the existential analysis of historicality, except to counterbalance ‘pure’ freedom with the weight of freedom’s heritage. The non-historical – because only counterbalanced by nothingness – i.e., the metaphysical – pure facticity of be-ing (here) at all, is nowhere to be found in Being and Time, except as the inappropriate ontological substratum of the extant beings of an existentially derivative, theoretical attitude. Perhaps this is appropriate for an analysis of historicality. But where, then, in Heidegger’s entire ontological project will we encounter this be-ing at all? I assert: dis-position is, essentially, trans-historical disclosure. It is the factual dis-positional disclosure that ‘transcends’ the projective grasp by recension to dis-positional appreciation of our already gifted be-ing (here). Dis-position can, obviously, be interpreted existential-historically; but it can, and should, also be interpreted factically and metaphysically.

As we recall, the mood of anxiety only brings be-ing-here into the possibility of authentic self-appropriation in resolute repetition. Existentially, in the act of self-founding freedom and appropriation of thrownness, in the act of the purest freedom that be-ing-here attains to, mood appears to be left behind. But, for Heidegger, all disclosure, even the
decisive existential act, is tripartite disclosure, a projection (understanding), accompanied by a mood or affect (dis-position), which acts as self and world expression (discourse). *What, then, if it is not anxiety, is the mood or affect which accompanies the act of resoluteness in authentic existential disclosure?* We have seen that Heidegger says that anxiety can ‘mount authentically’ [H344] in resolute be-ing-here. But that does not mean that anxiety is the mood which necessarily accompanies resoluteness.

We may also recall that Heidegger speaks, at a key juncture, of *joy*. Together with the sober anxiety, which brings us before our individualized possibility-of-be-ing, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it, be-ing-here becomes free from the ‘incidents’ with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself… [H310].

As Smith remarks, therefore, “it is odd that Heidegger is known as the ‘philosopher of anxiety’…not only by his critics, but also by those sympathetic to his thought” [HTM, 226].

The above reference to joy quite clearly places joy as the affect that works together with anxiety in the experience of anticipatory resoluteness. Inasmuch as anxiety brings us to the point of resoluteness, repetition, and the moment-of-vision, joy carries us into these.

But, if there is a sequence of essential affects here, we must include the mood of *equanimity*, which, appears in Heidegger’s text after the brief mention of various moods, at the end of the section of the temporality of dis-position. There, Heidegger says that equanimity, distinguished from the inauthentic mood of indifference,

springs from resoluteness, which, is momentarily visionary [or ‘momentously envisions’ or ‘looks upon in the moment-of-vision’: “augenblicklich ist”] of the possible Situations of the disclosed possibility-for-be-ing-a-whole in the anticipation of death.” [H345].

Equanimity *springs from resoluteness* and is therefore an authentic mood. In it, be-ing-here has already turned-toward its thrownness. Equanimity occurs in the moment-of-vision. It is the mood of the vision itself, which serenely and holistically, having resolved death into
one's full existing by "acceptance and affirmation of its necessity and inevitability" [Smith, HTM, 230], and having thereby obtained detachment and releasement from all 'worldly striving', envisions the possibilities for be-ing-a-whole that remain open to one.

Dahlstrom asks (though in a somewhat different context), would Heidegger...

...have been able to ground his existential analysis in love as well as in death? Indeed, should he have, as Scheler insisted? Would it have made a significant difference? (The implications are enormous whether this question is answered in the affirmative or the negative.) [Dahlstrom, 2001, 453].

The implication that there are a host of other moods and affects that can and indeed should be phenomenologically articulated is one that I wish to underscore with this thesis. Heidegger's account of dis-position may well be "overdetermined by fear and the basic disposedness of Angst" [ibid., 295], and, further, forced into an "economy of the relation between disposedness (thrownness) and fallenness" (ibid.). It is the task of a phenomenology of feeling to expand the range of the phenomenological problematic and disengage it from Heidegger's contamination of the discourse by both existential and fallen contexts.

Joy, for example, can be seen 'negatively', as the joy of being released from 'the entertaining incidentals' of the they-world. But it can also be seen 'positively' as a "be-ing-fulfilled" [HTM, 227] — this is how Smith articulates the 'how one is' that corresponds to joy's way of 'mattering'. The way of 'mattering' itself — what we have called, the felt meaning — is, according to Smith, that of fortunateness. Not only can be-ing-here be free from inauthenticity, but

the fortunateness of be-ing-here's authentic ability-to-be is fulfilling in that be-ing-here at bottom asks for nothing more than to be allowed to exist in the truth of its Being and to realize its own individual abilities [HTM, 227].
Smith, continuing his application of Heidegger's own interpretive scheme to the affect of joy, brings us to a realization which opens up the possibility of not only an existential ontology but a factical ontology of be-ing-here and of be-ing itself. That is, he recognizes that the 'how one is', viz., the be-ing-fulfilled by the fortunate 'matter', is a response to a transformed thrownness, in which the factical 'that it is' of thrownness is recognized outside the externally imposed context of the existential '...and has to be'. It is recognized as the fact of the "enigmatic that it is, rather than is not" [HTM, 227]. This purely ontological realization is fulfilling in that this be-ing at all "has the character of a gift" [ibid.].

Being "thrown into" its "There" best describes Dasein's "that it is, which the whence and whither concealed" as it is disclosed in pure anxiety. However, the "gift" of Dasein's "that it is" best describes this phenomenon as it is disclosed from the point of view of joy. [HTM, 227].

With this, and via a phenomenology of feeling, we enter into the possibility of considering the factical truth of be-ing itself, which, after all, was the goal of Being and Time itself. Moods and affects such as joy, love, reverence, awe, stupefaction, and equanimity, as well as despair, boredom, desolation, anxiety, and apathy all reveal something about the nature of be-ing itself, or the be-ing of the world-whole, or our be-ing in relation to the world as a whole. They are, properly, metaphysical feelings. We are now in a position to work through this metaphysical phenomenology and to do so with the help of, and in a re-visionary context of, Heidegger own phenomenological enterprise. But this work will be saved for another time.
Bibliography

Except for Heidegger's works, the order of listing is: books first, then articles, then works edited by the author.

1. Selected Works by Martin Heidegger (in chronological order, [more or less] according to composition)

   Includes (among other essays):
   i) Comments on Karl Jaspers's Psychology of Worldviews (1919/21) (1-38); trans: J. van Buren.
   Includes (among other essays):
   i) Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922) (111-146); trans: J. van Buren.
   Includes (among other essays):
   - Includes (among other essays):
   ii) Building Dwelling Thinking. (1951)
2. Selected Works by Quentin Smith:

Books:

Articles:

3. Other works:


Crowell, cont’d


_____ 1994. “Martin Heidegger’s One Path” In Reading Heidegger From the Start, Kisiel and van Buren, editors., pp.19-34.


Haar, cont’d


_____. 1884. ‘What is an Emotion?’ Mind 9, 188-205.


Bibliography


    _____. 1994. “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther” in Reading Heidegger From the Start, Kisiel and van Buren, editors., pp.159-74.


