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THE PLACE OF ETHICAL POSSIBILITY: LANGUAGE AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD IN HEIDEGGER’S
EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC

Dean W. Lauer

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Ph.D in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
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for
William L. Lauer
†
(in memoriam)

* *

* * *

"We would like only, for once,
to get to just where we are already."
{Poetry, Language, Thought}

* *

* *

"To understand Dasein means understanding how to
go about being-there, Dasein; it means being able to
be-there. Understanding ourselves from out of this
most extreme possibility of Dasein means acting."
{Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics: World,
Finitude, Solitude}

* *

-MARTIN HEIDEGGER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface x

One: Philosophy Disjointed from the Lived World 1
I. 1. The Hermeneutical Situation 1
I. 2. The Intellectual Situation 4
I. 3. The Political Situation 10
I. 4. The Influence of Language on the Situation in General 17
I. 5. Being Open to Every Situation: Affectivity and Language 27

Two: The Crisis of Language 46
II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology, A. Manifestness 47
II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology, B. Gathering 52
II. 2. Praxis Vs Theoria, A. Die Zuhandheit 57
II. 2. Praxis Vs Theoria, B. Die Vorhandenheit 62
II. 3. Referential Totality in General 68
II. 4. Care and Zeitlichkeit 80
II. 5. Zeitlichkeit and the Logos 88

Three: Hermeneutics 93
III. 1. Truth: A-letheia and Wahrheit 94
III. 2. Structuralism as Preparation for the Hermeneutical Contention 105
III. 3. Hermeneutics and “The Resistance to Theory” 111
III. 4. Apophansis and the Hermeneutical ‘as’ 131
III. 5. Formale Anzeige: Implication of an Ethical Situation 139

Four: Deconstruction of Subjectivity 145
IV. 1. The Subject 146
IV. 2. In-der-Welt-sein 155
IV. 3. Missetn 161
IV. 4. Sein zum Tode 165
IV. 5. Dasein’s Peculiar Unity 169
IV. 6. Selfhood and Decision 177

Five: Ethical indications and Uses of Language 191
V. 1. Assertion 191
V. 2. Rhetoric 198
V. 3. Voice of the Friend 210
V. 4. Literature 218
V. 5. Voice of Conscience 230

VI. Conclusion: The Language of Being 248

Bibliography 267
ABBREVIATIONS FOR IN TEXT CITATIONS

Frequently used abbreviations throughout the manuscript appear in boldface immediately below. Otherwise, references are to the volume number of Heidegger's "collected works" (Gesamtausgabe = G); page number follows volume number. German pagination appears first within the in-text citations; pages of the translation appear after the slash (/).


vii


Works not cited with the Gesamtausgabe numbers:


PREFACE

This thesis proposes to show an implicit correlation between the way we understand the world and the possibility for ethical conduct primarily in Heidegger’s early work.\(^1\) Clearly, this is not a very controversial proposition. Who would argue that conduct is not conditioned by understanding? We might recall Gandhi’s call for a “golden rule of conduct” that is informed by an understanding of “mutual toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall see Truth in fragments and from different angles of vision.”\(^2\) The character of action, a great leader such as Gandhi keenly saw, is preceded by a like-minded character of understanding. But if this were all the thesis had to say, it would not be saying anything much or new. That understanding in general moots the possibility for ethical conduct, however, for Heidegger, already is saying quite a bit, perhaps too much at this point.\(^3\) It may be saying too much here because the language, the very terms, of the proposition assumes that Heidegger himself had something to say about 1) an understanding that might be ethically oriented and 2) that he had an interest in practical conduct that might be founded in prior understanding. Heidegger, after all, is the philosopher who himself once

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\(^1\)Theodore Kiesel more precisely divides Heidegger’s scholarship into four distinct periods: the “young” Heidegger - up to 1919, “early” Heidegger - 1919 to 1929, “later” Heidegger - the thirties into the fifties, and finally an “old” Heidegger - late fifties onward into his more autobiographical material. See Kiesel’s *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), xiii.


\(^3\)Næss reserves the phrase “the possibility of ethics” when referring to Heidegger’s works. This seems quite apt since it neither commits Heidegger to an ethics nor excludes the secondary reading of an ethics. See Part Three, “Heidegger,” of his *Moderne filosofer* (Stockholm Sverige: Almqvist och Wilksell/Gerbers Förlag AB, 1956).
denounced any ethics in *Sein und Zeit* (1927) and later proposed a "releasement" toward beings, hardly a statement of praxis or judicious engagement with the world.

Much of the first chapter is an attempt to answer the objection that social issues, practical life, personhood, what Heidegger calls Dasein (there-being, being-in-the-world), and the situation of time and place are not relevant to the reader of Heidegger. It is an effort to show some evidence that Heidegger was not, and not ever, proposing a theoretical philosophy based in concepts that are abstract, a-temporal and, therefore, non-normative (or at least non-ethical). Heidegger's philosophy is concretely oriented to the historical situation that is the abode wherein one lives. And insofar as Heidegger's thought is concerned with the concrete lived world, it already has a degree of practical relevance. Yet, Heideggerian neologisms and other 'jargon' have led some to speculate that his philosophy is so academic and abstract that it could not possibly have much practical to say about this world, here and now. Actually, Heidegger's dialogue with the social/political situation shows that he was intensely interested in things like university reform and even awakening a new awareness, one more poetic and critical as opposed to that of the everyday. In any case, Heidegger's writing and actions, especially in the 1920s and early 30s, show that there is a margin for choosing ethical possibilities in his thought, even if in retrospect, as was Heidegger's case, the wrong possibilities are chosen. Ethical possibilities, nonetheless, can be made an issue for hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger, thus, has an interest in the possibility of ethical action, praxis, and this means that the thesis is not assuming too much, i.e., to speak about the possibility of ethics in Heidegger's thought is not an implausible speech.

Still, there is more to the proposition that understanding qualifies the possibility for ethical action. There is more here for the reason that the whole statement may become a matter of
semantics depending on how one defines understanding and the possibility for ethical action. In
detail, Heidegger discusses the meaning of “understanding.” Understanding is, properly, a
technical word for Heidegger, that is, shorthand for the way Dasein projects its conceptions about
being and time, about the nature of things and about temporality, into every situation. The way I
have been using the word ‘understanding’ above does not refer to Heidegger’s technical
redefinition. Understanding for these purposes only refers to its common use as the sensible
apprehension of something. I understand Checkov’s Uncle Vanya because I have comprehended
it, it makes sense to me. This kind of understanding for Heidegger is given through language. In
Chapter II, I try to show the relationship of language to this colloquial sense of understanding.
Through Heidegger’s examination of the way we encounter the world, through the structure of
equipmentality, the apprehension of beings (the way we understand beings) becomes inflected by
the character of seeing the world as a set of useful entities. Seeing beings as useful (“ready-to-
hand”), or in their “deficient” mode as useless (“present-at-hand”), I try to show, is like all
apprehension qualified primordially by language because language (the logos) is what originally
makes things present. This chapter, therefore, moves in the general direction of defining, or at
least elucidating, what the colloquial concept of understanding means for Heidegger and moves to
show that it is not divisible from language.

Chapter III confronts the question of Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutic’ method of phenomenology
and calls into question the term ‘method’ itself. As opposed to other schemes of understanding the
world, structuralism is the main example here; the enterprise of hermeneutics intends to counter
systematic interpretation. A radical element arises in hermeneutics’ repudiation of modernity’s
partiality for level, precise, and defined determinations in interpretation. Instead of following a
guiding thread to interpretation, such as a structural explanation for the arrangement of phenomena, or trying to eliminate all non-quantifiable elements such as mood, temporality, etc., hermeneutics rejects meta-narratives while at the same time embracing the non-quantifiable features given in experience. These features cloud absolute interpretations with indications that resist full definition and allow the noise of the "factual," situated and temporal, actuality of the concrete world to be counted in the interpretation. Heidegger himself, it should be noted, seems to have built in such features into his own work so as, perhaps, to call loud attention to the "differentiated," "non-objectifiable and non-masterable" nature of the way he conceives interpretation. Th.C.W. Oudemans actually cautions the reader of "the formal resistance that Heidegger herself presents to interpreting his work." Having said this here, with Chapter III the influence of language on the disclosure, and thus apprehension (interpretive understanding), of the world is made thematic. Moreover, the notion of "formal indication" anticipates the ontologically ethical character of hermeneutic phenomenology to be explained in greater detail later.

In Chapter IV, I undertake the subject of the self and explain that Heidegger has a 'deconstructed' sense of subjectivity. The self is deconstructed from the indubitable point of view known as the 'I' (Descartes) back into the structure of the unity of the self, or Dasein, in the existentials of language, affectivity, and understanding. This entire unity is subtended by the 'fact'

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of life that death is a certainty and this ‘fact,’ in turn, opens the possibility for reorienting alternative ways of being in the world. What Heidegger calls being-toward-death has the ability to undermine our daily preconceptions with the concrete thought of my finitude. Finitude indicates a limited, incalculable, and even nonimperial property at the site of Dasein’s grasp of death. It, thus, offers possibilities that might counter the model of socio-technical relations that dominate the present world view. The existential of language is reintegrated to suggest that it is language that carries the formative role in uninscribing the everyday (death-oblivious) attitude back to the realization of finitude and the corresponding finite possibilities given therein.

The finite possibilities alluded to are now explored as possibilities of ethical action in Chapter V where I undertake the question of language use directly. The emphasis now shifts to the word ‘possibility.’ In the chapter, I try to show that different registers of language contain different possibilities for ethical action. Using the notion of “formal indication” as something beneficial to ethical possibilities, I cover a range of language uses from propositional language (poor in indication for its exactitude) through to the “voice of conscience” (rich in indication for its suggestiveness). ‘Possibility,’ for ethical action, is the operative term in this chapter since possibilities are disclosed in lesser and greater degrees according to the fecundity of the language register. In any case, the main point is to demonstrate that language does have a decisive bearing on the possibility for action, specifically ethical action. Although, Heidegger does not have much to say directly about ethics, I hope to explain in the conclusion that the protoethical tenor of his thought is a point of departure for further study. I explain the protoethical and how ethical action might be enacted, once more, through attending to Heidegger’s fertile understanding of language.
In the end, the ethical character of action, or lack thereof, is shown to be in keeping with the word, that is with the valence, and the mirror of language.

A few comments about the conventions in this manuscript. The reader may note that this overview does not contain a full literature summary of secondary material in the area. This would be quite lengthy as there is so much published regarding Heidegger and ethics and Heidegger and language. With the exception of Peg Birmingham, John van Buran and Krzysztof Ziarek not too much is available concerning Heidegger’s conception of language as it prepares the possibility for ethics. Although, these fine authors cover specific sub-topics in their articles, I do not think any of these authors have investigated language to the extent that I have as it informs the philosophical situation, the lived-world, its determination in hermeneutics, its relation to selfhood, and its relation to experience as articulated in different forms of language. For the purposes of properly problematising the issue, I should note that Birmingham nicely points out the ethical implications of Erwiderung (SZ §69a); van Buran makes the relationship of ‘formally indicative’ language clear to ethics; and Ziarek points out the significance of Dasein’s always already structure of dialogical “being-with” as an anticipation of ethics. None of these authors, nor any other for that matter, have placed the issue of language at the centre of a possibility for ethics in Heidegger’s existential analytic. This means that the problem I am trying to thematise is the problem of how language can constitute the possibility of acting ethically for being-in-the-world, Dasein. I propose that this problem can be resolved by attention to the formative role of language in respect to Dasein’s potentiality for being-in-the-world authentically. For further other literature in the field, please refer to the bibliography. As well, there is ample footnoting running in the text below that alerts the reader to relevant secondary material.
Additionally, all citations have been directly transcribed; excluding the usual conventions, no extra italicizing has been added, unless (of course) done so in the original or translation. So many italicised words seem both to minimise their specialness when authors use them in citations and to unnecessarily clutter and disrupt the visual continuity of the page. To avoid this, the frequently used term “Dasein” has been left in ordinary type. All in-text citations are Heidegger’s. For abbreviations refer to the list of Heidegger’s works above. Regarding the translation and use of Sein, I have chosen to use simply ‘being’ (to signify ontological being) and ‘beings’ or sometimes ‘entities’ or even ‘things’ to signify ontic or phenomenal, experiential beings = “das Seinde.” As opposed to the common ‘Being,’ which mimics the German lexical practice of capitalizing nouns, ‘being’ does not lend itself so easily to being interpreted as a meta-concept. This is something it seems clear that Heidegger would want to avoid.\(^6\) Later, for instance, Heidegger uses Seyn to escape the trappings of historically and theologically conceived Being.\(^7\) As a practical note, I would like to suggest that Heidegger’s entire body of work can be read consistently with regard to some themes, and some not.\(^8\) The theme of language, however, is one

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\(^8\)Many interpreters oppose delimiting Heidegger research to the compartments of each period. The scholars are impressive: Inwood, Richardson, Schürmann, and Heidegger himself to name a few. Reiner Schürmann’s short essay “How to Read Heidegger” (see Bib.) is especially astute. In it, he notes that Heidegger suggested in one of his seminars at Le Thor that the "meaning of being" to which his early writings attend can better be understood through his later writing concerning the "truth of being" and
such matter that can be read with a relatively high degree of continuation. In the 1950s "[t]he word is logos" (OWL 80). During the 1930s "words" were to be correlated with "speech, discourse" (IM 57). And in the 1920s discourse was "the basic signification of the logos" (SZ 32/55). For the logos, discourse, word(s), and even "call" and "voice," I have used almost interchangeably the term 'language,' though in most cases it is fairly obvious that the logos signifies a more primordial and ontological use than other terms for 'language' (GM 468-9/323 cf. SZ 161/203).

In sum, Heidegger's concept of understanding is situated in language and, insofar as language is a matter of interpretation, understanding is a matter of interpretation defined more precisely as hermeneutic (Ch. III). The middle term in this hypothetical syllogism is language. As such, Heidegger observes, "[understanding, wisdom] is determined as a mode of [having] logos" (S 65 44). I wish to show that if language is conceived temporally, heterogeneously, provisionally, and nonobjectively, it is announced in understanding as itself characterised with what might be called proto-ethical traits.

better still through his latest writing addressing the "topology of being." More recently, Michael Inwood has chimed in. After cataloguing definitions for his A Heidegger Dictionary he wrote that "the sharp 'about turn!' that the word Kehre suggests is barely discernible in Heidegger's thought or language" (8). Most persuasively, perhaps, it was Heidegger's wish and advice that his thought be understood as a whole integrated piece rather than fragmented (see the "Vorwort" Heidegger wrote to Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought). The fine essays written by Mark Basil Tanzer also argue convincingly for unbroken continuity in Heidegger's life work, esp. "Heidegger on Being's Oldest Name: 'To Chreont'" and "Heidegger on the Origin of the Political." Also see Walsh's article "The Healing Word: Language, Thinking, and Being in the Earlier and Later Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. See the bibliography for more precise references.

9a"Language" as Sonya Sikka writes, "is primordially the logos, the way being is articulated, structured, put together, gathered up and jointed, and secondarily human speech, occurring as a response to the speaking of being." From her Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 62.
Finally, I am grateful for the ongoing support and superb advice of Professor Bernhard Radloff. My work has also benefited from conversations with Denis Dumas, Algis Mickunas, Arne Næss, A. (Omid) Payrow-Shabani, Sonya Sikka, and Einar Øverenget. I have received financial assistance from University of Ottawa and grants from the Royal Norwegian Embassy (Canada) and the US-Norway Fulbright Foundation, as well as my patient family.
ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to show a relevant correlation between Heidegger’s conception of language, as rooted in the *logos*, and the possibility for ethical action. That language is the primary mode of disclosure for Dasein suggests that the character of language will inflect the disclosure, and so the constitution of the world, according to the shape and way we use language. In short, the character of the world disclosed will be coloured by the language of disclosure. Thus, possibilities for ethical acting, insofar as we live in a world primordially constituted by language, arise in language and remain there with its users.

As is well known, Heidegger does not address the issue of ethical possibilities directly. Therefore, this is an interpretive, though as I contend an entirely plausible, reading of Heidegger’s works mainly before and around *Sein und Zeit*. The interpretation suggests that there are language-based ethical possibilities implicit in his philosophy.
Hermeneutic phenomenology is a task that sets itself to interpret factual Dasein, to interpret historical, situated being (cf. G63 14, SZ 436/487). And since the thesis is addressing ethics, it seems only prudent to address the concrete situation in which Heidegger was writing, an approach apparently endorsed by Heidegger (cf. G 56-7 206, SZ 231/274). The living-situation, Heidegger proposes, is informed by an attunement to language (cf. OWL 30). Dasein is acquainted with every situation through language because "essence and being express themselves in language" (IM 53). After all, with "the 'hermeneutic' of the logos [language] - it becomes increasingly possible to grasp the problem of Being in a more radical fashion" (SZ 25/47). The 'hermeneutic of language' is a retrieval of the present by way of its rich temporally indebted tradition, which can, in turn, explicate the "original motive-giving situation from which the basic experiences of philosophy originate" (G 9 3). That the situation disclosed is bound to language and that language or "[d]iscourse in itself is temporal" means that the situation is also tied up with the cultural-historical site of the interpreter (SZ 349/400). Hence, the motivation for ethical indications in Heidegger's work arose out of a reaction to the predominating discourse at this time. The character of the predominating discourse forms the basis for the hermeneutical situation.

I. 1. The Hermeneutical Situation: Brief Overview.

1 Or as Kisiel puts it, "[hermeneutic p]henomenology wants to find the origin of factic life." See his The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 117.
"The task of an existential analytic of Dasein," writes Heidegger, "has been delineated in advance, as regards both its possibility and necessity, in Dasein's ontical [worldly, actual] constitution" (SZ 12/33). Interpreting Heidegger's existential analytic must incorporate the ontical (situational) influence of the times.

The end of the First World War left Germany and the rest of Europe in physical and spiritual ruin. The war and its aftermath, evidently, left a conspicuous impression on the young Heidegger. It was a war that started in the Balkans and spread with new technological efficiency to become the planet's first world war. This war saw the mobilization of individuals and nations into the machine of struggle and combat within a relatively short period of time. It was something that could only have happened with the help of a newly industrialized Europe. Information could be disseminated en masse and people and production could be assembled into a unitary force for the defence of a greater cause. While the cause was one, ostensibly, of either freedom or German hegemony and primitivism, the result of the Great War was increased technological organization, imported industrialization, and further estrangement from one's local milieu (IM). And Germany was especially victimized by the new unfamiliar industrialization, as was noted oddly enough by Russell. The quickening of industrial and technological discovery had vast social and scientific implications. Thanks to this industrial and technological

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2Cf. Leopold Ziegler, Der europäische Geist (Darmstadt, 1929).

3George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 75.


5"The somewhat insane and frantic character of German industrialism and the policies it inspired is due to its foreign origin and sudden advent."

innovation, the sciences, for example, were more and more being conceived in terms of a myopic analysis of facts gathered and reconfigured to support a particular theory or Lebensphilosophie. Husserl expressed this tendency in *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1935). According to Husserl, European science was fast becoming obsessed with function and efficiency. The implications of this new way of life and its meaning and relationship to the people who lived it were not being considered. Not only was life being detached, or so it seemed, from its traditional practices but so were theoretical endeavours like the hard sciences of physics and biology from nature and life. Chemistry and physics, for instance, started to focus on perceptually impossible areas, from subatomic particles to invisible cosmic forces. Observable reality, it could have appeared, was losing its lustre for generating scientific significance. Evidently, the vast space between natural wonder, that had driven knowledge, and theoretical science, created a vacuum of sorts for the meaning of science in general. The pervasive and simultaneous alienation of the sciences from their own meaning lead to a crisis or malaise in European culture.⁶ The main instigating factor in the demise of the European cultural spirit Husserl named “positivism.”⁷ To quote Merleau-Ponty, “positivism of this kind is the antithesis of Husserl’s thought.”⁸ For Heidegger, and Husserl, the hermeneutical situation on the social as well as academic fronts was apparently one of a distancing of the living world from the questions that motivate inquiry, in short, a withdrawal of the animating force of life, perhaps of being in

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general (cf., BzP §169). The hermeneutical situation itself suggested that the “distress of the destitution of beings,” must have been the point of departure for Heidegger’s “reflection on the history of being.”

 Thus, Heidegger’s philosophy and its social implications are indebted to this time of ontological upheaval in European traditions. Addressing the social situation in a thesis concerning an ontological investigation into social action and acting socially (or the possibility of acting ethically) seems prudent. As Heidegger himself wrote at the beginning of his 1927 lecture course, “the ontological investigation which we are now conducting is determined by its historical situation and, therewith, by certain possibilities of approaching beings” (GP 30-1/22). Yet the investigation, Heidegger immediately adds, is not fully determined by the historical situation since it is subject to ‘deconstruction’ (cf. Ch. IV) and ‘critical review’ (cf. Ch. V, 5).

I. 2. The Intellectual Situation

The rise of the Vienna Circle, coupled with a general suspicion of grand metaphysical schemes, the likes of which could be politically misappropriated, contributed to a turn toward analytic positivism.\(^9\) Positivism and modernity in general, at this time, according Jonathan Culler, represented the predilection to interpret the “logos in a way which is ontologically inadequate.”\(^11\)

For Heidegger this meant that the logos gets interpreted in the narrow or metaphysical sense as objectifying language that in turn objectifies the entities that it “points out” (SZ 160/203). The turn towards positivism in modernity also meant that the work of influential philosophers of metaphysics such as Hegel could be dismissed by some as simply as a “mistake” in the history of

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logical reasoning without regard to their greater importance and legacy in the philosophical-spiritual realm.\textsuperscript{12} Under the aegis of positivism, to speak of philosophy and spirituality together is a mistake in categories of thought. European philosophy in the early twentieth century had to make a decision: either align itself with the branch of the sciences that analyses the observed world, as the English-speaking world was doing, or choose a path that would underline “live-experience,” not controlled, observed experience, i.e., experience conceived in the past-tense (BzP §63). Analytic philosophy sought to vigorously expunge any remotely spiritual or mystic interpretations of life, to the extent that philosophy was not in the business of weighing the existential enigma of life. Analytic philosophy appealed to the hard facts of observed and recorded sense data. With its skeletal method of deducing truth, clarifying meaning, and overall lack of ornament in its discourse, analytic or English-style philosophy seemed to have been robbed of what Fichte had called the “inspiration and energy needed to grasp” the driving living and social issues in philosophy.\textsuperscript{13} In short, philosophy, as Heidegger saw it, had lost its “vital impetus”.\textsuperscript{14}

Whatever the case, philosophy, some felt, was losing its inspiration to a sterile intellectualism. This, in turn, initiated an attack on intellectualism, in many cases, by intellectuals; oddly enough, the attack represented not the anti-intellectualism per se of, for example, Hitler’s book burning Gestapo or Pol Pot’s extermination of the literate, but a critique of the modern tendency to objectively interpret the world according to a guiding method. In

\textsuperscript{12}Bertrand Russell \textit{A History of Western Philosophy} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 746.


\textsuperscript{14}From Heidegger’s \textit{Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie} (1919); quoted in Kisiel’s \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time}, 53.
objectively interpreting the world according to a methodology, Heidegger suggests that intellectualism basically erodes the natural and organic character in which all entities are genuinely encountered. Methodological interpretation is a force applied to entities by man, which essentially switches the mode of disclosure from that which is most usual (circumspection) to that which is deficient (pure availability). This shift in the mode of disclosure towards the purely available renders entities no longer dependant on their internal makeup and unfolding but dependant on man for their significance. Additionally, this interpretation of the world of entities essentially blocks the entity's manifold ability to show itself in unique ways and to show itself in possibilities according to its inner nature. Think of the forestry industry whose business it is to turn the woods into raw material. The business of wood pulping and lumber directs our comportment and our subsequent interpretation of the woods understood as a tract of resources for available consumption. The Norway spruce that provides shelter for the sparrow is as suitable as softwood as the ancient coastal redwood. The inner particularity of the tree and its place in the ecology of the woods is obscured in favour of the singular significance granted by the forestry industry: a reserve of commercial material. The disclosure of the tree is circumscribed by the determination or phenomenal interpretation of the tree as available commercial material thereby blocking the possibility for other manifold disclosures (as logos) that might reveal the specificity of the tree or an organic truth about the nature of the tree in the forest. In this case, the regime of the pulp and lumber industry is a guiding thread that facilitates the interpretation of the forest at the expense of other possibilities native to the forest itself.

Using Heidegger’s language, to give an entity a greater ability to show itself means to release it from the narrow determination given to it by technological Dasein (cf. DT 58-90). In
contrast to interpreting the world via a prevailing discourse or regime, one might, as Ralph Waldo Emerson writes, keep a "most poetical sense in mind. We mean the integrity of impression made by manifold natural objects. It is this which distinguishes the stick of timber of the woodcutter from the tree of the poet."15 The poet, unlike the lumberman allows a plurality of significance to come to word. The poet also does not readily objectify things by designating an exclusive and objective meaning (cf. SZ 162/205, BzP §70, QCT 22,132, DT 67). Heidegger actually reserves the discourse of poetry for "the release of new possibilities of the being of Dasein" to be "set free" (PGZ 375-6/272). In contrast, intellectualism of this time tended to predetermine entities in unison with the Zeitgeist of modern science, a time that stretches at least from Galileo to Bohr (cf. QCT 169). 16 It appealed to the observation of things, supposedly without preconceptions, with the aim of determining their availability and function. 17 Dasein's technologically based propensity to determine the significance of entities in advance of their


16For the sake of clarity, I will use the term 'modern' as the epoch that begins around 1600, which is where Ortega places it. The 'modern' is then associated and linked with the work of Galileo, Descartes, Huygens - with the mechanical interpretation of the universe. Before that, the corporeal world had generally been believed to be an amechanical entity, its ultimate essence being constituted by spiritual powers of more or less arbitrary and uncontrollable nature; whereas the world as pure mechanism is the machine of machines {299}.

17Trish Glazebrook notes that Heidegger specifically sees the aim of science from Newton to Bohr to be fundamentally the same. For Heidegger, nature is confined in modern science to its interpretation as a coherence of forces calculable in advance. Not only Newtonian physics, but also quantum mechanics pursues its object as such a calculable coherence of forces . . . Accordingly, he recognizes no essential difference between Newtonian and quantum physics. If modern science is, as Heidegger argues, essentially technological, then quantum physics is nothing different, but rather an intensification of that essential identity.
own, particular unfolding shifts the ontological status of the entity from its own specificity to an object dependent on Dasein for significance. This determination of entities on the part of Dasein robs beings of their genuine affinity with being that grants peculiarity and individuality to entities and, thereby, moves entities out of the propriety of sitet disclosure, truth. The act of predetermination, writes David Durst, “denies beings their truth, i.e., the labyrinth of their own inner possibility hidden in the present, or with Heidegger more simply, being.” Yet at the same time, Mark Basil Tanzer points out, Dasein’s dependence on and necessary relationship with being prevents it from wholly defining an entity’s existence. Therefore, intellectualism, Heidegger wants to say, is immediately threatened because its programme suggests that it can fully interpret entities in the mind (intellect) without reference to being and the site of emergence (the earth) (cf. G61 310, PLT 42-8).

With intellectual positivism, the European philosophy was rejecting thought inspired by non-quantifiable things like values and nature. In its place, philosophy developed as thought critical of itself, rather than as a discourse on practical conventions oriented towards the lived-world (Lebenswelt). Philosophy was, evidently, becoming conceived as an academic study and unavailing intellectualism accountable only to itself and pure thought. This kind of intellectualism was thought to be vain by Nazi historian Gerhard Lehmann, who, for example,
was familiar with German philosophy of the time, wrote in 1943 that "[a]n abysmal intellectualism foams in glistening bubbles and accelerates the ideological disintegration of the nation;" and this resulted directly in "a process of spiritual dissolution in the last decades before the [Second World] war."\(^{20}\) According to thinkers in this camp (which included those from the political right and left), intellectualism of the time also presented a withdrawal from philosophy integrated with the world and social situation.\(^{21}\) Conservative thinkers in Germany such as Lehmann detested the residual splintering of society resulting from intellectual analysis. The extreme conservatives, leery of political and cultural atomization within the nation, later sought to systematically unify academic study under a singular ideology. For them, promoting a corrective turn in philosophy went hand-in-hand with a new ideological order for the German political system of the thirties; this would, for instance, rekindle and, in many cases, fabricate myths regarding racial beauty, heroism, sovereignty, geographical uniqueness, nature, and Volkish romanticism.\(^{22}\) Inasmuch as Heidegger was against the marginalization of philosophy and, perhaps, the fragmenting of society due to technological specializations, he was aligned with Lehmann and others, but this seems irrelevant to their cause for Nazi racist values, which, of


Sluga himself describes German anxiety over the positivist philosophy of the time. “Positivism and a flat realism gained a stranglehold at the broadest levels of German Society. One could speak here of a fall of the German spirit” \(^{112}\).

\(^{21}\)Heidegger agreed with this critique of academic philosophy. But that he shared these sentiments with some politicians does not necessarily put him in sync with ideologues such as Lehmann. For example, Silvio Vietta’s book *Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik* (1989) suggests that Heidegger’s reaction to the disengagement of philosophy from the greater social sphere initiated a philosophical rejection of the Nazi party itself through Heidegger’s critique of National Socialism as yet one more instance of the technological domination of the earth.

course, should be considered odious.

I. 3. The Political Situation

Spengler’s *Decline of the West* captured much of the sentiment of the time that was suspicious of cosmopolitan, or “megapolitan” (*großstädtisch*) life, and its associated high-mindedness.23 Heidegger cites Spengler as one of the strongest influences of the time. Spengler warned of “a decline of life in and through . . . technology, economy, in world trade, and in the entire reorganization of existence symbolized by the city” (GM 105/70). In Sonya Sikka’s reading, Spengler also prophesied an abandoning of being through the calculation of ‘causality’ over ‘destiny.’ This was inaugurated in modernity’s “overcoming of ‘space’ over ‘time,’” of the categories of dead nature - the nature of metaphysics as well as of physics - over those of lived history, of life itself.24 The industrial economy of post-World War I Europe stimulated emigration from the metropolitan centres and this only added to the disenfranchisement of the rural Prussian-Germanic culture. Equally, the steady change in demographics launched a backlash among extreme and moderate conservatives against these forces that were de-emphasising traditional communities. One thinks, for illustration, of the Slesvig Danes whose ancestral livelihood was that of dairy farming on the lower Jutland peninsula in far northern Germany. During the Weimar period, many relocated to Hamburg for factory and industrial

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23Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959). In Spengler’s *Man and Technology*, the author warns of [a]n artificial world [that] penetrates and poisons the natural one. Civilization has itself become a machine that does or wants to do everything mechanistically. One now only thinks in terms of ‘horsepower.’ One no longer sees a waterfall without transforming it into the thought of electric power. One does not see land full of pasturing herds without thinking of the evaluation of their meat-stock, no beautiful handiwork of the native inhabitant without the wish to replace it by a modern technical procedure {cf.QCT296-7.}


export work. As a result, the Slesvig Dane minority in the region was effectively deracinated, and as an ethnically distinct group they lost political voice. Today, Europe has lost altogether the languages of Polabian, Dalmatian, and Mozarabic to modernization.25

The disruption of traditional life and community was justified by both the liberals and the far left. The new and imported economic systems represented by these twin factions organized populations into strategic units for efficient production. As a moderate conservative of the time, Heidegger’s nostalgia for pastoral life is clear in lectures like “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935) and “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954). George Steiner situates Heidegger’s misgiving over the urbanization and cosmopolitanization of Europe as a widespread worry.

Heidegger’s invocation of the tenebrous strengths that man must draw from the veins of ethnic diversity, his contempt for the mercantile, can be exactly paralleled in the vision of D.H. Lawrence and the vocabulary of [Ernst] Jünger or Gottfried Benn. . . [H]e is in perfect accord with a range of intuitions and doctrines that extend from Yeats . . . all the way to Ortega y Gasset (an earlier admirer) and F.R. Leavis’s wheelwright shop.26

For conservative thinkers, no autochthonous dwelling could properly take place in the centres of New York and Moscow since these cities were presumed to be conglomeration of peoples for the purposes of a capitalist order or spurious communalism. Though Europe was urbanizing, neither could the Americas, albeit magnificently endowed with land, offer an alternative to industrializing Europe.27

25Furthermore, “Canada’s 53 native tongues are rapidly disappearing. The former Soviet Union, with its policy of ‘Russification,’ all but wiped out many of its indigenous languages.” Eileen Moore Quinn, “Can This Language be Saved?,” Cultural Survival Quarterly (Summer 2001), 9.

26George Steiner Martin Heidegger (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 149.

27These sentiments remain today but the context has changed. They are no longer ‘conservatives’ but have become radicals against globalization. Cf. “Less Languages, Less Thought,” and “Endangered Languages, Endangered Lives,” Cultural Survival Quarterly (Summer 2000 & Summer 2001 - respectively).
Heidegger evidently believed (falsely) that Germany might have a calling or “a vocation (Bestimmung) to stand as a counterforce” to the nihilism and oblivion of being as manifested both by the powers of America and Russia (cf. IM).\textsuperscript{28} Ideology, especially as represented by both these powers, Heidegger formulated, thrusts itself over and above the lived-world by exercising an extreme and obsessive force of theoretical reason to cull the world of experience and praxis.

Aristotle’s discussion of praxis arises in the context of ‘practical wisdom’ (phronesis).

Genuine praxis means action and action that is done according to an end that is wise.

Art . . . and making [poiesis] are different kinds of thing[s]. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for a man. For while making has an end other than itself, action [praxis] cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general.\textsuperscript{29}

Action, praxis, is an occasion of practical wisdom when it is accompanied by a sole purpose of a wise end. The ancient concept of praxis was transcribed, according to Heidegger, into a self-making (poiesis) and accomplished by technē (cf. BzP §61).\textsuperscript{30} This archaic sense of praxis as well as individual action and responsibility was increasingly concealed by an overwhelming ideology or worldview that was manifest in the discourse of global economic systems.

Language, discourse, deserves attention in any ethical or social enterprise because it delivers a sense of propriety to its speakers. “Language,” writes Fried, “bears a shared understanding of Being in the destiny of a Volk. For this reason, for Heidegger, it is a symptom

\textsuperscript{28}Gregory Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 166.


\textsuperscript{30}Technē is defined by Heidegger as “know-how in dealing with things” (P 191, cf. S §28, PLT 59).
of the crisis of modernity and the fulfilment of nihilism that language has been reduced to . . . something so indifferent that historical languages might be shoved aside in favor of artificial constructs such as Esperanto and programming protocols.”

31 The reduction of indicative, fertile language by economic technologies abroad threatened to dislodge the given “in-itself of the streaming experiencing of life” that is rounded out in the effulgent and historical languages of native speakers. 32 In addition, the techno–instrumental view of language as a metaphysical construct continued to supplant the old Greek sense of the logos. The logos stood for beings, as what is gathered together (cf. IM 108, GA 65 266ff, OWL). As well, it meant simply what is apophantic, that is, what “shows (phainei) forth (apo)” (GA 27 19, cf. GM 441/305, NII 76/niv 40).33 In either case, the logos pertained to what is there, manifest to Dasein. According to Heidegger, when the idea, as in ideology, becomes overbearing the heterogeneous disclosures of the lógos get occluded, stultified in their ability to bring forth a novel, manifest world pregnant with possibilities into being (IM 131). The world that is announced in consciousness under the idea is entangled with certain expectations about how things should be rather than simply how they would be without the predetermination of a governing idea. An entity sighted under the guise of the idea loses its specific sitedness native to the pre-theoretical and heterogeneous space of its disclosure and takes on the look and character of an ideal disclosure. “It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea” (GP §11). In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), Heidegger unearths the Greek sense of the idiot as the one guided by ideas alone (180-1). The ideological view (doxa), he claims, can become

31G. Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, 161.

32Quoted and translated in Kisiel’s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time, 54.

33For more of the definition of the see logos Chapter 2.1.A & 2.1.B.
ossified into an absolute orthodoxy. The orthodoxy then can uproot local custom and practice with its blanket commands and application. The subordination of the social and environmental practices effectively eliminates the experiential-perceptual curb that physical reality has on unbounded idealization. Such heedless idealizing of a single “outward aspect (eidos)” is the hallmark of metaphysics (P 94). Heidegger terms the outlook of a group of people who uncritically take over a view (doxa) not only metaphysical, and “machinating,” but also “idia phronesis.” (BzP §67). Those who blindly accept “idia phronesis,” Heidegger hints, are idiotic because they have been saturated by one idea or view to the point of stupidity.

In Heidegger’s time, intellectualism could not inform a way of life and concrete living because it was consumed with ideas and intellectual speculation. In order to transgress ideological hubris, intellectualism needed to be deconstructed and rebuilt as “an authentic

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34 View’or ‘look’ (Aussehen) is linguistically related to ‘idea’ (ide天真: to see). When one has an idea, one has a view. Etymologically, they presuppose one another. Strictly speaking then an ‘ideological view’ would be a pleonasm.


35 Peg E. Birmingham, Logos and the Place of the Other, Research in Phenomenology, 20 (1990), 34-56.

36 Vico proposes this move away from theoretical/intellectual study in his epistemology of Poetic Wisdom. Following Vico, the only knowledge genuinely accessible to humans is that which we have created: culture, art, government, etc.

But in the thick of night darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have spent all their energies to study the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men made it, men could come to know.

confrontation with the history which we ourselves ‘are’” (G9 5, cf. SZ §74). Accordingly, intellectualism was seen as a form of empty and endless abstracting from which no aesthetic or political dynamism could arise that might affirm this first-hand, experienced, non-conceptualized world. As Gottfried Benn wrote, “[i]ntellectualism means: finding no other way out of the world except to turn the world into concepts, to cleanse the world and oneself by means of concepts.” According to Benn’s definition, there is nothing illogical or dishonest about intellectualism, yet it is nonetheless problematic. Intellectualism is formulated as a matter of pedagogical irreverence for the lived-world, perceptual experience (Erfahrung), because it is not answerable to anything but itself. It is sheer speculation sundered from its historical and contextual setting. Speculation of this sort makes it difficult even to talk about concrete existence simply because language is now in a state of abstraction and diremption from life itself. Neither can speculative thought make sense of the belief expressed by author Ernst Jünger that “language is founded on a trust in life.” To this end, speculative thought cannot assist in providing grounds for the tasks of daily living, taking action or even in choosing values. With its pure reflectiveness, such thought, Alfred Weber observed in 1935, becomes divorced from what is practical altogether: “[t]oday no one assumes that the intellectual-formal categories [i.e., rational conceptions, formulations, and representations], which are inadequate for explaining

37 Quoted from Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time, 138


39 Concerning ‘Erfahrung’ versus ‘Erlebnis’ see G 92, SZ 119/155, NI 95/nii I45, QCT 134, BzP §§77ff, 254, 274, FD 69/88. Also see my discussion in Chapter II.

being and becoming, could say anything about the essence and emergence of values as rules for our actions, or about the meaning of the world. What Weber, like Benn, is pointing to is the pronounced worry that philosophy will lose its numinous ‘geistig’ character within the tradition and become an accountant of the Wissenschaften, not actually a contributing member. In 1949, the English philosopher Gilbert Ryle suggested that philosophy, indeed, should resign itself to such a role. Ryle in his The Concept of Mind demonstrates this: “[t]he philosophical arguments which constitute this book are not intended to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge that we already possess.” The anti-intellectualist faction must have suspected that intellectualism was encouraging a marginalization of philosophy from lived experience. Rather, that marginalization, Heidegger proposed, was itself unfolding from the timely rhetoric of the period, from the “speculative-hermeneutic experience of language” (P 24).

Contrary to Ryle, Heidegger was looking to rekindle a new, pertinent and historical zest for philosophy and society in general. To move towards these ends, he stated in 1920 that philosophy must distance itself from its affinity for reflective indulgence. Instead, it should refocus on the immanent, local “meaning within the historico-spiritual (geistesgeschichtlichen) situation” (G 59 9). Here, perhaps, Heidegger wished to “return to the genuine origins of the


42Later, Quine made this recommendation more famously in his From a Logical Point of View (1953); Rorty, from a different (pragmatic) perspective follows in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979).

intellectual life” and find its “motivational context.” Recognition of the historico-spiritual situation would, seemingly, be the commencement for the integration of philosophical and practical existence. Spiritual here refers to the attunement of Dasein to the world and the earth, in which it lives. Though Heidegger is keenly aware that the term, “Geist” is etymologically related to that of ghost, for its meta-conceptual implications he uses the word with some trepidation. This spiritual retrieval is Heidegger’s shorthand for announcing the historical magnitude that is always present but no longer seen. The spiritual, consequently, gets understood as an attunement to the past where the past becomes a beacon that provides insight into the present yet nonetheless does not uncritically repeat the past. The specific spirituality of the past, in fact, is something that “in no way means we should or could go back” to (PLT 160). The ghosts or spirits of yesterday are simply meant to ignite a dialogue with the past through the language of today. “‘Spirit’ . . . exists as the primordial temporalizing” (SZ 436/486). Inasmuch as past is implicated in spirit as ghost (in “Geist”), spirit may awaken an attunement to temporality, specifically history, that indicates a nonobjective appropriation of the present. This nonobjective appropriation indicated in the world spirit could re-inscribe the present under different and multiple points of view from which a genuine critic of the tradition and the current situation might arise.

I. 4. The Influence of Language on the Situation in General

While this appreciation of the bonds between present and past might be attributed to traditionalism or a backward looking philosophy, Heidegger’s thought resists such conservatism. It is, in fact, equally oriented towards the future (cf. PGZ ,SZ §§47-53, G 49 50, BzP §§248-50).

44Quoted from Kisiel. The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 61.

At this early point in the thesis, we are trying to assert the indelible mark of language on our being and on our choices. And since language emerges from the past, the mark of language is, indeed, coloured with the historical burden of past speakers. Heidegger’s interpretation of the situation in Weimar Germany was an appropriation and also rejection of the tradition, which was, as we will see, informed by language. The hermeneutical task, and this is always a task of language (*logos*), “starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes such existence possible” (SZ 435-6/486).

Language is, perhaps, the centrepiece of this facticity because it discloses facticity in the first place. Thus, the integrity of hermeneutics forbids the conscious rejection of an attunement transmitted by ancestral speakers that remain in current living-situations. Every situation is, then, handed down, to be either embraced or rejected, as linguistic phenomenon. “When we go to the well, when we go through the woods, we are always already going through the word ‘well,’ through the word ‘woods,’ even if we do not speak the words and even if we do not think of anything relating to language” (PLT 132). For Heidegger, like Vico, every word contains a vestige of an historical record. It also contains a reference and sentiment that enliven the situation and brings beings to consciousness. In the simplest and broadest of phases, “*lógos* [language] is the mode of access to beings” (S 529/366). Thus, the preceding sub-chapter addressed the historical situation as Heidegger saw it through a review of the way that the situation is appropriated. The appropriation is an event opened, cleared, so to speak, in language.

Language always already leaves its mark on every situation. The mark is coloured by

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46Cf. “The word facticity is derived from the Latin *factum*. *Factum* refers to human activity and production Factum is an artifact of human practice. Following this usage, Giambattista Vico formulated the axiom *verum factum*; the true is the made.” - Eric Sean Nelson, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,” *Existentia* 11/3-4 (2001), 325. Also see my footnote in Chapter III, sec. 3.
both an historical aspect as well as a ‘look,’ attitude, or mood. Heidegger visualizes the primordial comprehension of beings as arising in an open space where language and being interact. It is a space where Dasein properly belongs (cf. SZ 307/355, GP 425-6/300, G49 34, BC §17). Within the openness, Dasein and language become aligned or ‘attuned’ with each other. This attunement, which informs a situation, arrives through the historical language of a people, though it is not exclusive to ‘a’ people. The Swiss philosopher and contemporary of Heidegger’s Jean Gebser describes the importance of language (words) to one’s spiritual/mythical heritage. “Every word, after all, is not only a concept or fixed equivalent in writing; it is also an image and thus mythical, a sound and thus magic, a root and thus archaic, and thus, by virtue of this root, still present from origin” (cf. PLT 24).\textsuperscript{47} Notice also that Gebser is describing the hermeneutical project as a deconstruction of meaning through time (cf. S §1b). And, as always, “Hermeneutik ist Destruktion” (G 63 105). Words have meaning because of the way they are used today, but that use has been continuously conditioned by the historical uses of words. The historical use-development of words has been a spiritual development inasmuch as ancient images and sounds have been incorporated into words, which still resonate today. In other words, the ghosts or spirits (Geister) of past institutions and practices are inherited in a people’s language and this is why Heidegger was interested in the sovereignty of a people and their language.\textsuperscript{48}

As a point of departure, Vico illustrates the vital relation of native-based etymologies as

\textsuperscript{47}Gebser, \textit{The Ever-Present Origin}, 123.

\textsuperscript{48}van Buran cites Heidegger: “the independent ownmost value of each nation, each age, and each historical appearance in any sense.” The “goal of progress is also no longer abstract, rational happiness and virtue, but rather ‘each nation has the center of its happiness in itself, just as each ball its center of gravity’”[Herder] (G 56-7 132-4). John van Buran, \textit{The Young Heidegger}, 345.
opposed to foreign ones.

The tablet lies near the plough and far from the rudder, to signify the origin of native languages, which were first formed each in its own land, where the founders of the nations, scattered and dispersed through the great forest of the earth, finally came together by chance and ceased their bestial wandering . . . [T]he origins of native words may be distinguished from those that are unquestionably of foreign origin. The difference is that the native etymologies are histories of institutions signified by words in the natural order of ideas. First the woods, then cultivated fields and huts, next little houses and villages, thence cities, finally academies and philosophers: this is the order of all progress from the first origins. Foreign etymologies, on the other hand, are mere stories of words taken by one language from another.\(^{59}\)

This alleged purity of historical contiguity is why for Vico like Heidegger, German remains “an historical language.”\(^{50}\) The ghosts of our past cannot be remembered if “their sense-genetic motives of origin in our intellectual history” are not understood as the phenomena of our “environing world” (G 93).

“For along with German the Greek language is (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages” (IM 57).

The past is genuinely taken into the present when the past reveals itself through the phenomena of lived-experience, through the realization that the past directly conditions the present. As Heidegger spoke in his *Sophistes* (1924), “[t]his past, to which our lectures are seeking access is nothing detached from us, lying far away. On the contrary, we are this past itself . . . Precisely in what we no longer see, in what has become an everyday matter, something is at work that was


Allegedly, German retains clear vestiges of its linguistic and so generally historical tradition. Incidentally, Vico, like Heidegger, hypothesizes that the German language is one of the privileged living languages because of its largely unmixed vocabulary.

It may serve a model to other scholars of other languages in investigating their origin to the great profit of the republic of letters. Certainly in the German language, for instance, which is a mother language (because foreign nations never entered that country to rule over it), the roots are monosyllabic. And that nouns sprang up before verbs is proved by this eternal property: that there is no statement that does not begin with a noun, expressed or understood, which governs it (ibid. 152).

\(^{50}\) Ibid. p. 153.

once the object of the greatest spiritual exertions ever undertaken in Western history” (10/7). Hence, the spiritual refers to the historical and should not be read as a kind of mysticism. It means conducting the hermeneutical project with faithfulness to the entire, living factual situation of interpretation. And Heidegger said as much in a 1922 essay, “[t]he situation of the interpretation, of the understanding appropriation of the past, is always the situation of the living present” (PIA 358). Conservative author Friedrich G. Juenger echoed this ten years later: “The past and present are vitally connected in a way that contemporary clock-time does not easily manifest . . . Clock-time is lifeless time, tempus mortuum”\footnote{Friedrich Georg Juenger, The Failure of Technology, Intro. by Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, (Chicago: Gateway, 1956). N.b. the first sentence quoted is from page 48 while the second is from page 45.}

Philosophy as Heidegger communicates it, then, is radically different from the competing positivism of the time. Theoretical abstraction and reflection needed to be countered with thought that could inform decision and action, thought attuned to the historical, factual and living existence of a community and of a person. Merleau-Ponty echoed this perspective. Like Heidegger, he observed “[a]nalytic reflection knows nothing of . . . the world.”\footnote{Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, xii.} To be sure, theorizing and reflexion are not wrong, but neither can they contribute to actions based on more genuine philosophical indications. Recalling Kierkegaard, Heidegger is inclined to believe that general intellectualism impedes the possibility for practical action. “Reflection”, wrote Kierkegaard, “is not evil; but the reflective condition and the deadlock which it involves, by transforming the capacity for action into a means of escape from action, is both corrupt and
dangerous, and leads in the end to a retrograde movement." The retrograde motion translates in Heideggerian language to an inauthenticity, to a real inability to act decisively (BzP §§43-4). Action is impeded by a critical investment in the status of theory; intellectualism and reflection take the perceptual, material world and invest it in an abstraction or a representation of that world. The investment, underlines Gilbert Larochelle, "can not be attributed only strategically, that is to say . . . not only if its significance and utility do not take on purpose under the condition of a specifically intimated meaning. Its impact and status therefore come from the orders of abstract reflection." This kind of reflective thought, though not normative in any way, effectively freezes praxis out of the local situation by moving the centre of human performance from the lived-world to the reflective one. The vital, hermeneutical situation, the condition for decisive choice, in this way, gets blocked, "neutralized" (SZ 112/147, cf. PIA 358). Such a reduction of the concrete situation, notes Edward Casey who is paraphrasing Heidegger, serves to counteract "properties ascribed to things by ancient and early modern philosophers: properties encompassing holding, sustaining, gathering, situating (‘situation’ for Leibniz does not really situate; it merely positions in a nexus of relations)." The hermeneutical situation, in this way, gets represented as only a formal, esoteric problem that is a philosophical dead end, "an empty program," which does not answer to concrete existence (S 12/8).


55Gilbert Larochelle, "Theories of Post-modernity and the Rhetorical Turn." Epistemologia 16 (1993), 16.

56The loss of the factual situation, he continues, "in turn means a loss not only of concrete particularity of place but also of the abstract absoluteness of infinite space - and the dissolution of both in the positional relativity of sites." From Edward S. Casey’s The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997), 183.
in the twenties were indeed mired in a deadlock, unable to formulate their own vision.\textsuperscript{57} It appears that Heidegger wanted to reclaim the philosophical and social situation of the time by reforming the university as a way to educate the nation. Heidegger’s zeal to revitalize the university was not at all just an administrative exercise. It was part of his philosophical life-project from early on. Observe that as a student of Heidegger’s, Hannah Arendt and many others sang the praises of the young \textit{Privatdozent} in Freiburg. Apparently a rumour surfaced throughout Germany of a lecturer who considered philosophy “not simply an academic matter . . . The rumour said quite simply: Thinking has come alive again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are made to speak, and it turns out that they produce things altogether different than it had been presumed that they said. There is a teacher; one can perhaps learn thinking.”\textsuperscript{58} Heidegger sought to enact philosophy and provoke the student toward an “inner understanding.” “[T]he authentic task of a lecture course in philosophy at a university is to lead you to an inner understanding of the scientific questioning within your respective fields. Only in this way is the question of science and life brought to a decision” (S 10/7). In this way, Heidegger in Marburg and, then later, in Freiburg, saw philosophy as disengaged from the lived world and looked to reestablish and provoke its fraternity with other faculties of the university and of the state. The way Heidegger proposed to awaken understanding and new questioning was to make language a “theme” for interpretation precisely for the reason that language “has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness” (SZ 160/203). Therefore if

\textsuperscript{57}Of course, this foreshadows his (in)famous claim in \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}. “This Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in a great pincers, squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other” (37).

\textsuperscript{58}Hannah Arendt, “For Martin Heidegger’s Eightieth Birthday,” \textit{Martin Heidegger and National Socialism}, p. 209.
understanding is established in disclosedness (and it is), then new and even critical understanding or questioning needs to be retrieved in the nexus of language (disclosedness).

Heidegger’s own use of language was perhaps an attempt to wrest a new disclosedness for his students in the classroom by engaging them directly. To reanimate the spirit of questioning that motivates philosophical inquiry, as Arendt testifies, discourse must speak to students and make connexions across disciplines. As Heidegger notes, rather than awakening an interest in questioning and thinking, those dull, disenchanting entry level logic courses often squash philosophical interests and drain philosophy of its “strength and vitality” (GM 14/11). As late as 1928, Heidegger railed against teaching philosophy in this insipid way. “This logic stalwart taught by philosophy professors does not speak to its students. It is not only dry as dust; it leaves the student perplexed in the end. He finds no connection between this logic and his own academic study . . . It leaves the student outside philosophy, when it does not actually drive him from it” (MAL 5/5). Philosophy and logic need to be incorporated into the university as well as society in general. According to Heidegger, philosophy taught as high theory alone is a kind of intellectual indulgence that alienates people from their natural existence in the world because it has no pertinence in real life. Philosophy is not a privileged species of academia that concerns a small minority of intellectuals. “Philosophy concerns everyone” (GM 22/15). “The task now is to release it from petrifaction” (MAL 8/6). It needs to be released and intertwined with the lives that people live, lives not just of reason but also of sentiment, imagination, and celebration. In his Habilitationsschrift of 1916, long before the Führer arrived in Bavaria, he warned that “philosophy as a rationalistic construction cut off from life is powerless” (G 1 410). Philosophy must return to “the more profound spiritual content of life and art” (D 3).

With a certain resonance of Husserl, Heidegger proclaims “[p]hilosophy has a meaning
only as human activity” (GM 28 19). All along Heidegger had thought that philosophy should emerge as a body of “resources for interpreting the meaning of the experienceable” (G 1 410). The new learning and historico-critical understandings generated through the disclosedness of discourse within the university would permeate everyday life challenge as, perhaps, an alternative to increasing homogeneity. As time was to show, Heidegger’s hope for a renaissance of academic and cultural expansion was dashed in favour of Nazi metaphysical values of purity and obedience. Yet as Steiner reports, Heidegger’s eventual disenchantment with the Nazis was answered in kind; National Socialist acolytes “such as Ernst Krieck, now denounce Heidegger as an obscurantist whose worldview is, despite momentary appearances, the very opposite of the Führer’s.”59 Hence the circumstance arose where those reforms that Heidegger sought would have undoubtably been severely compromised by the changed complexion and downright depravity of the Nazi regime. Of course, Heidegger’s own words stand as the best evidence that his Nazi affiliation was regrettable. Speaking in not the least jejune words, he denounced that affiliation as the “greatest act of stupidity” (die grösste Dummheit) of my life.”60

The forces in a situation combining European disenchantment with the United States and the Soviet Union, German subjugation after WWI, the movement of aesthetic romanticism, and the trend towards philosophical marginalization and so on, must be understood as contributing to discourse in which Heidegger was caught up and to which he was responding. To read some of Heidegger’s work from the early and middle thirties is to recite a vocabulary that is, in some cases, similar to the Nazi rhetoric of the time. Frederick Olafson cautions, however, that since Heidegger’s philosophy is not consistent with any contemporary political ideals at his time “there

59George Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 117.

is every reason to think that they [his words] are politically neutral."\textsuperscript{61} Heidegger is asserting the primacy of "the situation of the living present" and this is something that cannot be asserted by a disingenuous academic language (PIA 358). Rather, the primacy of the present needs to be affirmed by way of the social-political discourse in order to engage the listener in the current situation even if that discourse is used against the social-political situation eventually as a critique. As a faithful hermeneuticist, Heidegger begins with the language of the present situation because this language necessarily informs other situations, and languages and situations have informed it. This is the circular problem of the hermeneutical situation; language informs a situation only to have the situation inform language. Dasein always has language and so always has some situation and vice versa (cf. SZ 134/173). Thus, the hermeneutical situation is "that which is to be interpreted [and] put itself into words" thereby rendering that which is there "disclosed" (SZ 314-5/362). Understanding is disclosed hermeneutically: the situation guides language and language guides the situation. "Anyone can easily see that we are moving in a circle" (PLT 18). This circle is hermeneutics (cf. PIA 385-60, SZ 7-8/27-8, 15-6/35-7, §63). The putting into words, hermeneutical interpretation, in turn allows possibilities in existential Dasein to become clarified, which permits the auspice for authentically choosing or rejecting between the options disclosed.\textsuperscript{62}

The situation of the living present is Heidegger's existentiell everydayness that has caught the nation, the university, and individual in its attitude and outlook. The philosophical context then surfaces as intertwined with the socio-political situation, "the hermeneutical

\textsuperscript{61}Frederick A. Olafson, "Heidegger's Thought and Nazism," \textit{Inquiry} 43, 279

\textsuperscript{62}As Fried writes, "[hermeneutical] interpretation describes how the understanding works out existentially the possibilities for Being that Dasein has projected in its practical activities." From his \textit{Heidegger's Polemos}, 52.
situation (to which every interpretation is relative)” (PIA 358). This portentous situation is disclosed as an event opened up within the energy, so to speak, of language (SZ §7C).  

I. 5. Being Open to Every Situation: Affectivity and Language  

The living present is an entire situation, communicated through a practice of rich indications bestowed by an oral and written tradition. The whole of the situation communicates not just information but also a state of being. In so doing, language can be responsible for the onset of a general change of situation. The use of language and its appropriation modifies the tenor of a situation, if it does not thoroughly alter it. Further, Dasein participates in the occurrence of language and can discriminate in its selection of language uses. The authentic appropriation of language involves an active participation of Dasein within the nexus of the temporal fertile situation. The participation arises as an event of appropriation (Ereignis) wherein the event is forged out of conscious decisions to elevate one form of speech over another.63 It is language then that is burdened with the responsibility for passing on the ethical subject matter of its speakers’ history because, in fact, it is inside language that primordial distinctions are made. Language contains and retains past events that are spoken again as contingencies for me here today. To cite John Macquarrie, “it is through hearing of the Word [of language] that the possibilities contained in these events are real possibilities of decision for me now.”64 Possibilities are opened up according to one’s openness, in response to the reception of the differentiating manifold of language and being. These possibilities are true differentiated

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63 Event of appropriation’ is Sikka’s translation ("The Philosophical Bases of Heidegger’s Politics: A Response to Wolin,” 243) of the important term Ereignis, which seems most fitting. But there are many others; see my review on the translation of Heidegger’s Beiträge in De Philosophia 16/1 (Spring-Summer 2000), 130-2.

possibilities because they are disclosed in a heterogeneous (plural) manner. Truth is multifaceted and opened in the happening of language (logos). Contrary to his critics, Heidegger's thought is welcoming to diversity in as much as it attempts to follow the disclosure of truth through language into multiple possibilities.65

Authentic Dasein is attuned to the open such that its factual possibilities become a hermeneutically enriched actuality (cf. SZ §62). The proper space for the being of Dasein is this open (Offen). In more sweeping and, perhaps, enigmatic terms, “[t]he globe of Being . . . is the Open” (PLT 124). The open is the publicly (Öffentlich) encountered sphere wherein Dasein appropriates its possibilities as the compound entity it is: Da-(there-) -sein (-being). Dasein’s essential compound nature means that its authentic state resists unalloyed, pure homogeneity. To be sensitive to the open, to diverse presencing, is the challenge of Dasein’s being. Consequently, if to be open to this varied presencing is a mode of being authentic and being authentic is an orientation towards truth, then translator Michael Baur is entirely correct in defining truth “as a heterogeneous process of unconcealment” (PIA “intro.” 355). Truth is disclosed as an “intimacy with which opponents belong to each other” in the openness (PLT 63).

Yet, can praxis or poiesis as expressions of worldly interaction be founded in the openness? This is exactly where the founding makes itself known. The openness is the primal area wherein one is affected in some way. It precedes analytic, so-called dispassionate thought by giving to thought, by impressing upon it, an uncomplicated trace of affectivity. It is uncomplicated because it is entirely and unavoidably inherent in our most basic state of being as being-in-the-world and situationally bound to the voices of one’s own interest. In Sein und Zeit,

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Heidegger begins a long sub-treatise on affectivity (§§29-30). Affectivity "is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned [Stimmung, das Gestimmtheit]" (134/172). Affectivity (Befindlichkeit), as Heidegger wants to highlight, is a mode of how one finds oneself. Though one may find oneself always in different 'states-of-mind,' one always, indeed, has some sort of 'state-of-mind." Therefore, no objective position can claim to be neutral or without a bias of affectivity and so no objective position with regard to any interpretation is possible. This affectivity, co-tuned by language and (pre-)understanding, modifies the openness that pertains to worldly action (§§30, 32-3).

In "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" (1919), Heidegger criticises Karl Jaspers for ignoring the hermeneutical fact that psychological principles are necessarily derived from a philosophical interpretation of lived-experience (P 2). Heidegger insists that "we are never free of moods" or any other disposition (SZ 136/173). As long as lived-experience sets the background for one's interpretation, as long as one does not live as if in a vacuum, psychological principles will be conditioned by the interpretation of concrete life. Principles, and knowledge in general, are established from the interpretation of phenomena. "In order to establish something about knowledge, about the various acts of lived-experience, etc., one must understand how these phenomena appear" (S 9/6). These principles and knowledge are conditioned by hermeneutics. Heidegger cautions Jaspers that the science of mental health has already been circumscribed by the dynamism of hermeneutical life. Moreover, the dynamism itself arrives with the attitude and

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"Translators Macquarrie and Robinson use "state-of-mind" for Befindlichkeit (SZ 172n 2). This is inadequate because it conveys a strong sense of psychic condition. Heidegger explicitly rejects a psychological reading of Befindlichkeit: "state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] is very remote from anything like coming across a psychical condition (ibid. 136/175). Joan Stambaugh's translates Befindlichkeit with 'attunement.' That seems sensible except that 'attunement' should probably be left for the literal translation of Heidegger's related term 'Gestimmtheit.'"
perspective with which one comports oneself to entities or to a situation (cf. SZ/23n. 1). This hermeneutically fundamental situation also means that how one comports and holds \((Verhalten)\) oneself toward things conditions how the things stand \((Verstehen)\) with one, i.e. how one understands. The ‘moodiness’ or particular ‘way-of-being,’ to take a term from cognitive psychology, determines a bearing in which a comportment positions Dasein for understanding. It is the "bearing \([Verhältnis]\) that originally and always comes to prevail as a comportment \([Verhalten]\)" (P 141, cf. 149). By implication then, "[u]nderstanding always has its mood" (SZ 143/18). Affectivity and moods are perforce associated with interpretation.

Affectivity and mood \((Stimmung)\) somehow ‘tune’ our understanding of the world. Heidegger calls this an ‘attunement’ \((Gestimmtheit)\) (P 372n.12). “Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of an affectivity” (SZ 137/176-altered). In short, the openness wherein entities ('ontic manifestations') present themselves arrives with an attunement to an affective dimension of every Dasein. To repeat, “[o]ntic manifestation, however, occurs in our finding ourselves \([Sichbefinden]\), in accordance with our attunement and drives” within the openness (P 103). If these ontic manifestations, things in the world, are encountered in plural interpretations according to how one finds oneself within the situation then these interpretations suggest an authentic behaviour of interpreting with respect to things encountered. This interpreting gets tagged as authentic because it respects the nature of the disclosure of the thing, which reflects the heterogeneous nature of being in general. As Inwood importantly writes, “Heidegger agrees that being is heterogeneous: we cannot give a single, unequivocal account of what it is to be” and so authentic interpretation would echo this.⁶⁷

Heidegger’s elliptical terms throughout his existential analytic regarding how entities

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presence categorically frustrate efforts to reduce them to an empirically manageable heuristic for psychology or epistemology. The inscription of this philosophy into such nebulous terms means that examination of ‘being-in as such’ cannot be translated into a regime or algorithm that defines manifest entities (SZ §§28-38). The mood of melancholia, for instance, cannot be understood as a set of causal chemical relations or order of integers representing brain waves. It could be better understood as the interaction of mood and world that informs a general unhappiness within the openness where phenomena come to word. Mood and affectivity give factual life its robust complexity thereby articulating the complexity of being itself. This complexity, Heidegger further writes, “sustains the philosophical hermeneutic itself . . . which can never be completely eradicated” (PIA 371). Heidegger’s circumlocution to describe this overall complexity deflects technological appropriation of the site of presencing, or openness, by leaving some portion of his language opaque to total comprehension.\(^{68}\) Heidegger’s philosophy, thus, leaves the reader wilfully unable to eradicate ambiguity. Thus, the absorption of his examination of affectivity and attunement into the hard sciences would be dishonest, were it not already impossible.

Heidegger’s oblique language is also an attempt to fend off the metaphysics of worldviews and epistemological ideas in appropriating his philosophy. Liberalism, communism, and later especially Nazism held tenaciously to certain epistemological ideas about how economies and states should function. Heidegger’s style and language must be seen as an effort to elude the “spurious tradition” of epistemological, and hence political, ideals (P 3). By fashioning a terminology that bypasses total explication, the words prevent one from appropriating this thought to serve political hubris. Heidegger’s language constitutes built in detours, so to speak, around all-encompassing accounts of the knowledge of the world. Not only

\(^{68}\)Cf. Oudemans, “Reading Heidegger Against the Grain,” 35.

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does Heidegger obviously employ a particular variety of language, he also explicitly calls attention to the connection of language to knowledge and understanding.

We can make clear the connection of discourse [language] with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself - hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say that we have not ‘understood.’ Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic. Listening to ... is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open (SZ 163/206).

Understanding and, hence, knowledge is permanently engraved, speaking metaphorically, with the signature of language (or discourse). Additionally, Heidegger is unequivocal that it is language, or in this case listening to language, that provides a path or a space for being-open. In being-open, Dasein accomplishes its task to be the being that makes beings present, that ‘lights them up’ (G 61 61, cf. SZ §28). It achieves its “openness to the world [Weltoffenheit]” (SZ 137/176). In being-open (Offensein), Dasein freely encounters entities that are manifest (offenbar) to it. Evidently, language contributes significantly to the composition of this openness

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69a The existential-ontological foundation language is discourse or talk [Rede]” [SZ161tr203].

70 Gebser traces a highly edifying retrieval of the Proto-Indo European ‘mirror’ roots *regh and *leg. Borrowing from the etymological dictionaries of A. Ernout & A. Meillet (1932), Friedrich Kluge (1934), and Hermann Menge-Güthling (1910), he finds *regh to mean “movement in a straight line;” and *leg means “light.” From *regh, come words like rekha (Old Indian): stroke, line; arché (Greek): beginning, origin; rex (Latin): regent, monarch; rectus (Latin): straight, true; regula (Latin): rule; rechnen (German): to reckon, to calculate; Reich (German): domain; rektig (Norwegian): right, correct. The other root, *leg, evolved to leukos (Greek): luminescent, bright; létur (Icelandic) and Licht (German): light; lógos (Greek): language; lexis (Greek): speech; lēgo (Latin): collect, read, gather.


What is interesting here is that the two Proto-Indo European stems developed in a way that is consistent with Heidegger’s criticism of the modern understanding of truth versus the ancient Greek understanding of truth. In other words, these etymologies add a degree of empirical truth to Heidegger’s claims. The modern conception of truth as correctness seems to follow the former, *regh, while the ancient one as openness and disclosure seems to highlight the latter. *leg.
of Dasein since “language itself has Dasein as its kind of being” (PGZ 373/270, cf. SZ §34, GM §§72, 74).

Figuratively, Dasein is the “lumen naturale” of beings (SZ 133/171, 170/214). Dasein “opens up (eröffnet)” the world by standing in the clearing or openness of being (G 61 304).

“Dasein is its disclosedness” (SZ 133/171). Still, if the clearing is attended by language, then the clearing is cleared, opened and lit up by language simultaneously with the participation of Dasein (IM 171). Ergo, “Dasein, language and world stand in an intrinsic interconnectedness” (GM 442/306). Jumping forward to the 1950s in “The Nature of Language,” Heidegger reiterates that the manifest disclosures, which constitute what is called the ‘world’ within the open region, arrive in a linguistic way. Etymologically, he notes, “[t]o say,’ related to the Old Norse ‘saga,’ means to show: to make appear, to set free, that is to offer and extend what we call World, lighting and concealing it. This lighting and hiding proffer of the world the essential being of Saying” (OWL 93). This picture of language is, obviously, radically unlike any grammatical or syntactic conception (GP 296/208). Language, here what Heidegger calls ‘saying,’ is the force that brings entities to appearance and also conceals them. This is, in fact, the being of language. In the same collection (On the Way to Language, 1959), the author can then repeatedly claim that “language is the house of being.” That proclamation makes sense from the standpoint that beings come to presence in the open, cleared region. They presence in language; they exist and live, so to speak, as we do in houses, only the house of being per se is language. Language lights up the beings that make up the world by presenting Dasein with a clear, free space in which Dasein can ‘tune’ its comportment to being in general.\footnote{Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought.}

Language, herewith, provides the house, shelter or
security for creating, experimenting and acting in a way compatible with being free for possibilities and, hence, diversity.

Though Heidegger championed this disclosive power and ability to claim beings under the sheltering house of being in later works, he offered clear intimations earlier, if not in such bold terms. Heidegger wrote in *Sein und Zeit* “that language has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness” (160/203, cf. PIA 362). “Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance” (PLT 73, cf. P 59). Whether Heidegger is more illustrative as in later works, or more analytical as in earlier works, in the whole course of Heidegger’s thought, Dasein and language converge at the site of the open. Site, or “place,” “is the possibility of the correct appurtenance of a being” (S 109/75). The site of the open in Heidegger’s time was dominated by the situation of crisis, crisis in the monetary system, crisis in German identity, crisis in the “spiritual world” as threatened by the “scientific . . . atmosphere” (IM 53). Further, that the site of the open was dominated by crisis means, since the open region is founded in language, that the situation is announced as a crisis of language. Attention to the open betrays an attention to the appearing of beings in general, given, as always, in language. Therefore, the mention of the social, cultural (factual) situation at the same time is a mention of the use of language in general. And if the situation in Germany was one of diminishing viewpoints and declining creativity, then language was in danger of being “no longer the poetic house of Being, but rather a lexical warehouse for beings.”

Language (‘poetic’ or ‘lexical’), as described in more detail Chapter II, is the founding trace of the situation, the world itself. As such, for its consummate fidelity to the open wherein beings appear and disappear,

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72 Fried, *Heidegger’s Polemos*, 162.
Heidegger names language "not a collection of words for denoting individual familiar things, but the original resonance of the truth of the world" (NI 364/nii104f, cf. S §3b, SZ §44, GP §17a, GM §72a, P153-4, SA 152/126, PLT 184).

"Language is a primal phenomenon" by virtue of its participation in the open region (P 57). It participates, of course, with Dasein (cf. SZ §34, GM §§72, 74). This has to be the case since only "[m]an is said to have language by nature" (PLT 189, cf. SZ §34). Thus, "man is world-forming" (GM 397/274). Yet at the same time, "mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein" (SZ 136/175). Heidegger makes explicit that the structural make-up of Dasein is affectivity, language, and the 'projection' of intelligibility (which he characterizes as 'understanding') (ibid. §§28-34b).73 In any case, all three of these existentials constituting Dasein always structure Dasein and, in fact, arrive prior to immediate awareness (cf. ibid.145/184-5). That means that every Dasein enters any given situation preconditioned by one of the existentials. So before Dasein even consciously encounters things, it has already made a projection (Entwurf) onto the encounter. It has projected or coloured the encounter with the existentials. Dasein projects itself, as the sum total of its existential constitution, into the situation. By doing so, Dasein projects itself into the situation as its own possibility (SZ 145/185). Dasein unmistakably marks the situation in its own existential peculiarity for projecting. This is why Heidegger's philosophy is necessarily hermeneutic. By projecting itself, its threefold structure, it invariably arrives in any situation with the presuppositions of its own structural unity (also see Ch. IV). In more pedestrian terms, one can never go to the bargaining table as an objective arbitrator; Dasein is inevitably affected with its presuppositions (PIA 358). The hermeneutical situation then arises

73 The projection of significance will be addressed in Chapter II more thoroughly.
as "the totality of these 'presuppositions'" (SZ 232/275). And since every situation involves presuppositions, then every situation is also hermeneutical. Consequently, the situation in which Heidegger was writing was circumscribed by the 'totality of these presuppositions.' Heidegger's ill-fated desire for university reform, cast in relief of the factual situation, coincidentally demonstrates that hermeneutics allows for and actually encourages, not mere repetition of the situation, but for a multiplicity of critical and practical responses, 'reforms' to the given situation. Hermeneutic phenomenology is fully capable and warranted in introducing protoethical suggestions that might move life out of stale theory and return a "vital impetus" to the situation.\textsuperscript{74} Hermeneutic phenomenology is justified in introducing this insofar as it provides a path for acting more authentically, which would bring acting within the province of the heterogeneous character of being. Furthermore, being authentic, writes Heidegger, "brings existence into the Situation and discloses the authentic 'there'" (ibid 347/398). The 'there' is given as an instance of disclosure, the \textit{logos}, and so primordially language is allied with the situation. Dasein's "openness to the world" (\textit{Weltffenheit}) is enacted in language and the mood there given (SZ 137/176-altered, cf. BzP 304/214). Language is the key existential in the hermeneutical situation regarding the possibility of ethics for the reason that language orients moods and founds world disclosure. One can seize on language, then, as decisive in responding to the situation in general and the question of Volk in particular. "Through language, the Volk remains a \textit{polis}. But for Heidegger, language is not an ontic condition of belonging, as would be race, religion, legal requirements for enfranchisement, or the like, but rather the ontological condition for a polemical [critical] task in a historical destiny."\textsuperscript{75} Heidegger's conception of language, accordingly, allows

\textsuperscript{74} Translated in Kisiel's \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger's Being & Time}, 53.

\textsuperscript{75} Fried, \textit{Heidegger's Polemos}, 162.
for both the specification of disclosure and the criticism or reform of that disclosure as it is interpreted and appropriated by factically situated Dasein. Heidegger’s emphasis on practical involvements especially in *Sein und Zeit* should likely be seen as affirming the possibility of critically, ethically engaging the situation.

Any possibility of ethics arises, of course, in Dasein’s linguistically given understanding, and understanding is always projection (GP §20b). This is why Heidegger claims that “we already live in an understanding of being” long before he has even raised the question of being proper (SZ 5/23). Projection is a primordial or ‘original action’ (*Urhandlung*) that initiates a situation, and this engages Dasein in a world. The presuppositions are also brought to the primal open area where the presencing of beings originates. The significance of language and affectivity, as components of the presuppositions, now finds its proper recognition. Affectivity illuminates the weightiness of language. If I feel uneasy and brooding after reading Hemingway, it is because Hemingway’s words have left me with this sentiment. Language and affectivity sway Dasein to the extent that it cannot in any metaphysical sense objectively comprehend entities or situations it encounters. Why? Because “interpretedness of the world is factically that interpretedness within which life itself stands” (PIA 354). Any interpretation is laden with the projections of the living situation. That living situation can be unique and individualizing (authentic) or homogeneous and generic (inauthentic). Hemingway’s “Up in Michigan” affects me because it speaks to my own personal experience. The mood I walk away with from this short story I inevitably project onto my world until another mood arises. In short, language always inspires a mood which accompanies an understanding. The understanding in combination with the lingering mood then form the world and create a situation from where another projection can begin when fresh beings come to manifestation. Every understanding is already an
interpretation; not only understanding but "[e]ven a description is already 'interpretation'" (BzP 166/115). Here again is the "manifest circularity" of hermeneutics (SZ 7/27). Though the hermeneutical circle cannot be broken, its character is divisive. Dasein relentlessly contests the manifesting of beings with its preconceptions or 'fore-conceptions.' "Language is a primal phenomenon" that founds the openness only to have the openness contested by Dasein's projections (P 57). Dasein's understanding is never thorough or complete since entities resist total disclosure by way of "an unexplained self-refusal" on the part of being (PLT 34). Heidegger claims that this "lack of totality" leaves Dasein perpetually uneasy in the sense that "there is constantly something still to be settled [eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit]" (SZ 236/297). Yet, it is language that chiefly articulates the disclosure (SZ §68d). Language opens up Dasein's understanding but also to some extent leaves it closed off. As a result, the disclosure and concealing granted by language in the open area are received and contested by Dasein as a specific understanding of that entity, not of a universal, a totality; interpretations are always subject to future revision. The kind, degree, and indications given by language can substantially influence the affectivity of Dasein within the openness so as to actually prearrange, in the wide sense, Dasein's decisions in a living situation.

The historical content ('historicity'/'historicality') inherent in the phenomena of language implies that the disclosures articulated are expressly driven by a common but loose narrative among like speakers. That "language is historical" suggests that understanding and interpretation are relative to a situation's culture, ritual, art, science, economy, and history - to its facticity (OWL 133). It suggests that its facticity is always present as a residue or supplement of language; it also suggests its reverse: 'all history is language.' That all history is composed, in ample terms, as a story, a saga, is evident in Heidegger's retrieval of the Erschlossenheit
(disclosedness) given to and appropriated by Dasein in the open area, an area that, as stated, is also a public area. This open area is designated as the site of the emergence of beings (cf. SZ §§28, 75, GM §8b). The site of the emergence of beings in hermeneutics is not an ideal or Platonic experience in which one receives the original and undisputed essence of beings. The presencing of beings is always incomplete, “still outstanding [Ausstand]” and debatable (SZ 242/286). Heidegger’s site of emergence is agonal, idiosyncratic, and political. The Greeks knew this, for “polis is the site of history (Geschichtsstätte), the There in which, from which and for which history happens” (IM 128). “By its very nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it” (SZ 133/171). Once again, what is crucial to the site of history, to the ‘there,’ is its primordiality in language since it is there that “the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes manifest” (GM 41/27). In synopsis, “Being is determined by accessibility in logos [language]” (S 82/57). Language, which Dasein always carries with it, characterizes our attitude and the site of emergence, which is the site of history and the polis.

The language of economic and political ideologies to the east and west was a rigorously ideological disclosure that gained hegemony over popular sentiment and so over the site of the emergence of beings after World War I (G 54). This aggression on the part of ideologues and demagogues over the open nature of the comportment of Dasein and the polis effectively warps the openness where beings are disclosed. Even under ideological deformation, the openness remains open as a site of emergence in principle. However, the openness in the broader sense of ‘free, open, and uncoerced’ becomes suppressed. The entities opened up, as it were, under an ideological regime conform to a singular, ordered, appearance (P 220-1). Philosophy under the spell of a supreme idea cannot be enacted. This automatically instigates a diminution of philosophical praxis in a politically zealous society. The Nazi regime was to become, of course,
an extreme manifestation of nihilism with its ideological dogma and, hence, resistance to the
‘free, open, and uncoerced.’ The waning of philosophical praxis, which Heidegger must have
observed before National Socialist rule and then during it, becomes systemic because the
openness as free and open, wherein praxis is founded, becomes covered over (restricted) by the
long shadow of the idea. This scenario is expressly why philosophy, according to Heidegger,
must leave the chambers of philosophy faculties and become active. It must be practised so that
it does not end up repeating the bland and counterfeit decorum of inauthentic life. Heidegger felt
philosophy needed praxis, needed to be enacted, to gain full legitimacy. Again, “[p]hilosophy
has a meaning only as human activity” (GM 28/19). Philosophy has to be at the vanguard of
openness, embracing the situation if only to then criticize it or propose alternatives.

It is the openness presumably that governs the allotment and articulation of the beings that
come to presence. The manifest originates in the openness and is stamped with the character of
the temporality of the moment of disclosure. The ‘there’ is a moment in which being is
illuminated (erleuchtet) and cleared (gelichtet) (SZ 133/171). The ‘there’ of being-there is, as
well, a thoroughly historical happening because the ‘there’ (openness) appropriates the situation
in every case. The ‘there’ means that one’s facticity “‘already antecedently’ lies at the ground” of
a situation (GP 461/324). “The resolute taking over of one’s factual ‘there’, signifies, at the
same time, that the Situation is one which has been resolved upon” (SZ 382/434). The previous
situation (projected as facticity) attenuates the possibility for arbitrary or purely voluntaristic
presencing of entities because that accompanying facticity “has ‘already beforehand’ been

76 As Michael Zimmerman has pointed out, a society needs free and democratic values, often
associated with the liberals and modernity that Heidegger disliked, to find this philosophical praxis to
being with. See his article “The Ontological Decline of the West,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s
projected,” stipulated apart from Dasein’s will (GP 462/324). The openness and knowledge in general then are hermeneutical. There has been an interpretation of the situation and through this the factual “foundations of [the situation] have become obvious” (S 10/7, cf. PIA 364). It makes obvious the perfunctory ‘fore-having’ (Vorhabe) presupposed by interpretation (G 61 3, cf. 187, SZ 232/275). The presuppositions imply that “[t]o understand means . . . to repeat primordially that which is understood in terms of its own situation and for that situation” (PIA 360). That modern science, historiobiology, and in general intellectualism failed to account for the undeniable facticity of a given situation is evident in the way they often repeat, and sometimes polemically repeat, worldviews; “historioiology, like any science, is, as a way of being for Dasein, factically ‘dependent’ at any time on the ‘prevailing worldview’ (SZ 392/444-altered, cf. GM §4). The interpretation that tries to avoid blindly duplicating worldviews is hermeneutical especially because it exposes the situation’s “rootedness in factual life” and brings it to presence for consideration (PIA 386). Such understanding is a way of clarifying the situation not by affirming the obvious but by disclosing the previously hidden, which is to say that it is an authentic interpretation (Auslegung) (cf. G 63 11).

Since interpretation is plainly historical, it must also be an art of understanding that moves in the matrix of language. Language is Dasein’s world for the reason that it is always there with Dasein, coextensive with its world (cf. GM §§74-5). Language gets writ large as correlated to the Da (there) that, when authentic, heterogeneously informs Dasein of beings, of its world. Since it is language that discloses, Gadamer names it our “horizon of understanding.”

In *Truth and Method* (1960), Gadamer develops the practical implications for understanding as a

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77 Regarding voluntarism and decisionism further see my Chapter IV.

78 Cf. Sonya Sikka, *Forms of Transcendence*, 256.
given because “understanding always includes application.” For Gadamer, understanding involves application because understanding is an action; it is an action inasmuch as it is the act of interpreting, hence the relation of understanding to praxis. Concurrently, the subject matter of understanding “can scarcely be separated from language.” For Gadamer, understanding has its locus as a “linguistically schematized experience.” It, further, is an experience that presupposes application, lived-process, praxis: “language must be thought of as a special and unique life process since, in a linguistic communication, ‘world’ is disclosed.” The world is also a horizon of understanding that has arisen as a “fusion of horizons.” Gadamer’s explicitly names language as the non-metaphysical author of the ‘world’ wherein understanding is forged. In fact, one’s use of and encounters with language (which for Heidegger occur in the open region) actually foreordain an understanding. Language is our “horizon of understanding” and, therefore, our point of departure for acting in the world, as well as the departure point to make that action ethical insofar as it might respect the manifold possibilities within the ‘horizon’ as they reflect, for Heidegger, being’s pluralistic, nonobjective nature.

Gadamer is mentioned here because he more lucid than Heidegger. Nevertheless, Heidegger indicated nearly as much regarding language and the formation of world disclosures.

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80 Ibid., 387.

81 Ibid., 446-7.

82 Mahatma Gandhi’s conception of different “angles of vision” that inform a tolerant understanding could be read as a predecessor to Gadamer “horizon of understanding.” The two concepts seem so similar that Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence and tolerance could be, perhaps, without much difficulty be translated into Gadamer’s hermeneutics given that they both recognize the diversity of ‘visions’ and ‘understanding’ that arise with each interpreter. Cf. Arne Næss’ Gandhi and Group Conflict, 23-9.
World formation occurs for Heidegger as well in language, more specifically in the play (Spiel) of language. In 1929 he pronounces that the “Dasein in man forms (bildet) the world” in a threefold sense of producing it, picturing it, and entirely constituting it; when “we speak of world-forming in this threefold sense, is that playing with language? Certainly” (GM 414/285, cf. ZS 105/105). Furthermore, language, especially poetry, is a creative force bequeathed with the ability to project and to invent (dichten) possibilities (cf. PLT 89-142). “Language itself is creation (Dichtung) in the essential sense” (PLT 74-altered, cf. EHP). Clearly, language is the prerequisite for understanding, for world-formation. Our world is specified by an orientation to understanding in terms of language that is embedded with practical, theoretical, political, and generally historical excess that deliver a determined grasp of the way things are. But as I will discuss further, in Chapter V, that grasp need not be an uncritical repetition and appropriation of the past. For now, language simply is the ‘horizon’ that brings our heritage and present situation into the continuity of lived-experience. Language with its historical and affective nuance both creates a world and elaborates its understanding but, as we shall see this, understanding is never permanent but non-metaphysical, interpretive, and political.

Because language is world-formative, Gadamer, following von Humboldt, rightly maintains that “language has no independent life apart from the world . . . [And] that language is originarily human means at the same time man’s being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic.” 83 The linguistic phenomenon is then a phenomenon of world, “the manifestness of beings as such and as a whole” (GM 420/290, cf. PLT 15-87). The political impact of language, for example, is formidable insofar as language creates the world and affects our worldview (and the view

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constituted by language is always a worldview). Worldviews are effected in language. Not only
does language affect and so inflect worldviews historically, it also imparts mood-based
inscriptions, as mentioned above. In a telling sentence, Heidegger observes “that all
understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding (Sichbefinden) which belongs to
understanding itself” (GP 398/281, cf. SZ §29ff). This understanding is, to review, a matter of
how one finds oneself within an historical language situation. The primacy and decisive
pregnancy of language are, in the end, why Heidegger ascribes to language “a privileged
constitutive function” over the other two existentials of affectivity and understanding (SZ
349/400).

Sarcastically Heidegger bemoans the philosophical situation in the early twenties. The
rise of positivism accordingly meant that the timeless thought of questions like those of ancient
philosophy may no longer be studied with high reverence since they are “obviously too primitive
and too self-evident for such a lofty science as contemporary philosophy and since our
epistemology is much more advanced and takes Plato to be beating his brains over trivialities” (S
278/192). The “original motive-giving situation from which the basic experiences of philosophy.originate” came to life for Heidegger as a hermeneutical issue (G 9 3). The living, environing,
biological world of the here and now, palpable and spiritual, was losing its relation to vibrant
thought. Hence, what now can we say about Heidegger’s attempt to elucidate this situation, that
is to make philosophy applicable to the living world? We can say that there is nothing objective
or absolute in his description; it is entirely and conspicuously revealed as contingency of that
horizon of understanding, which is to say that it is a contingency of language. Heidegger wants
to show how the “uniqueness of acts is amalgamated into a living unity with the universality and
subsistence of meaning” (G 1 410). If we reread, in the literal sense, the situation as a crisis of
how the situation is to be interpreted, it comes to understanding as a linguistic situation; better, it has simply come to word.
CHAPTER TWO: THE CRISIS OF LANGUAGE

II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology, A. Manifestness
II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology, B. Gathering
II. 2. Praxis Vs Theoria, A. Die Zuhandheit
II. 2. Praxis Vs Theoria, B. Die Vorhandenheit
II. 3. Referential Totality in General
II. 4. Care and Zeitlichkeit
II. 5. Zeitlichkeit and the Logos

Here we attempt to address the question of language directly.¹ To understand more technically
the relationship of language to ethics we need to understand what language means for Heidegger
and why it’s a source of such great interest for him. According to Heidegger, language discloses
reality, our world as we know it. But he claims that language has metamorphosed from its
‘originary’ way of disclosing reality to us.² The metamorphosis Heidegger speaks of is in terms
of a tarnishing or fading away of a mystery within language that, in turn, he believes bespeaks
new possibilities for the reality in which we are caught up. Hence, to understand we need to
retrieve the ancient understanding of language for Heidegger, follow its historical permutations,
interpret what these permutations mean for Heidegger, and finally close with the philosophical

¹A vast literature, of course, precedes Heidegger concerning the role of language in thought stretching at
least from Plato’s Cratylos on into Goethe’s Faust, which was known to Heidegger (SZ 197n. V/242n.
V).

²The word ursprünglich (‘originary’) should be made more clear here. Heidegger, as I read him, is
employing the term in a straightforward, practical sense. Originary simply means that which is more
original, i.e., closer to its origin. Yet, origin does not necessarily refer back in time. I am the author of
the text that I am now writing and its origin is contemporaneous with me, the author, i.e., the present.
Authenticity is ‘originary’ in that unique ownership is claimed individually by the author and this is not
necessarily a phenomenon of the past either. To be originary and authentic by definition means to
appropriate one’s own situational possibilities. Heidegger’s example of the Black Forest farm in
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking” as a place for dwelling with the “earth and heaven, divinities and
mortals” (in short, as authentic and originary) does not mean that we should all emulate the Black Forest
farmer; in fact, the farm example “in no way means we should or could go back” to this life (PLT 160).
Why? Because this would not be originary for us, that is unless we are Black Forest farmers to begin
with; its origin would not be within us but outside of us, so we would just be coping another way of life,
and hence living not our life but someone else’s; this would actually be inauthenticity in a nutshell.
importance of language regarding the question of truth and ethics.

II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology. A. Manifestness

Toward the beginning of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger discusses the method of investigation he is going to undertake in his opus in Section Seven entitled "Die phänomenologische Methode der Untersuchung." The purpose here is for him to justify his own particular phenomenological approach to the study of being. In other words, the method outlined here is the philosophical basis of the claims to be made later in the text. The method we will examine is distinctively hermeneutical as opposed to, say, Husserl’s transcendental one because, in fact, "[t]he hermeneutic is phenomenological" (PIA 369). The method is in Richardson’s words "through phenomenology to thought."

Heidegger reminds us that the crucial term ‘phenomenology’ is really a compound word that has two components: ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos.’ Evidently, in Ancient Greece a phenomenon was said to arise simply as that which shows itself. “[T]he ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest (Offenbar).” Phenomena, then, are the beings that we encounter naturally as just the things that make up the world. Phenomena are “beings as... .” The phenomena exist not because I can prove they exist, but they exist always already as the fact of my existence. The obvious actuality of phenomena means that beings exist to constitute

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3Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought.

4 For a more detailed retrieval of these words see Steiner’s Martin Heidegger, 48. For an account of the word ‘phenomenology’ dating back to 1764, see Herbert Spiegelberg’s The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (Den Hague: Nijhof, 1960), I:11-23.

5 For more on the method of phenomenology see O §14, PGZ §9, S §1a, SZ §7, GP§5.
my relationship to the world. Husserl’s brilliant addendum to the Cartesian problem of subjectivity circumvents the ‘problem of the external world’ by simply dispensing with the problem. World in phenomenology is the given of beings that are encountered. As Frederic Jameson underscores, “[f]or phenomenology, the technical term world designates the ultimate frame or Gestalt, the overall organizational category or ultimate perceptual horizon, within which empirical, inner-worldly experience takes place.” In order to even begin Cartesian questioning of the world, the world has already asserted itself in my consciousness. Things are already in my consciousness regardless of whether I can prove their universal actuality. With this, the actuality of the external world moves away from its centre stage of importance. The early “reduction” in Husserlian phenomenology puts the things ‘out there’ in brackets, “suspends” them. Everything exists insofar as my consciousness is here right now to recognise it. “Everything existing for me must derive its existential sense exclusively from myself, my sphere of consciousness.” Everything outside my immediate consciousness must be rigorously discarded; it must be excluded, with what Husserl called “restraint” (epoché), from any existential significance. The absolute certainty of the entire external world in some metaphysical or noumenal way dissolves because, really, the external world was never a ‘problem’ to begin with. Native peoples in the North perhaps could not prove the existence of the Aurora Borealis, and perhaps neither can we, but the phenomenon of it is undeniable for anyone one who has ever

6 To quote Husserl from 1929, “objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness.” From his Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. D. Cairns (Den Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 65.


8 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 150.
seen it. We can be sure of how we experience something in consciousness, regardless of whether it is real in some objective sense. So if the phenomena indicate reality, we cannot then use that reality to prove the phenomena. Reality and phenomena arrive in consciousness in the same moment. My experience and phenomena are at the same time the incarnation of my consciousness. This study of phenomena, then, is actually a study of consciousness, a study of life, a study of the reality (i.e., phenomena) in which we are immersed, in which we are already caught up. For Heidegger as well as Husserl, the central concern of their philosophical investigations is the investigation of the way phenomena presence in consciousness, but equally as they presence in the whole of in experience, in the lived world (Lebenswelt). Neither teacher nor student can yet be separated at this critical meeting point. To quote Merleau-Ponty, “the whole of Sein und Zeit springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the ‘natürlicher Weltbegriff’ or ‘Lebenswelt’ which Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified as the central concern of phenomenology.”9 The Lebenswelt that is constituted by phenomena, however, must be announced in consciousness. This announcement is language or discourse.

Phenomenology is a discourse on phenomena and there is much to be said about the way that phenomena show themselves. Heidegger’s analysis of the way phenomena show themselves, arguably, represents his most original contribution to the practice of German philosophy. Heidegger’s investigation here begins as a retrieval of the Greek word for language. This is the best place to start, for according to Heidegger, the Greeks’ “daily life revolved around

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language” (S 3/9) in a way our time has lost. The Greek word for language and discourse is, roughly, logos.\textsuperscript{10} In fact, “the logos is the essential foundation of language” (IM 167). The logos emerged as a philosophical concept with Heraclitus’ enigmatic scripts wherein it was used in different ways. In the first Fragments it means just the way we encounter the world. Then Heraclitus suggests that it also accounts for an underlying unity of the world order (Fragment 51). In other Fragments such as 30-1 and 90 he seems to support this second meaning where it refers to “measure” and “proportion.” The common translation of “rational discourse” for logos is what Heidegger will take issue with.

Heidegger notes that the usual translations of the logos are “reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground or relationship.”\textsuperscript{11} As such, the logos has been interpreted as a manifold concept and no one interpretation is of it justified in the strict etymological sense. The logos, according to SZ, means simply to make manifest or let be seen (§7b). It points something out and so lets it be seen. It is a “making manifest in the sense of letting something be seen by pointing it out.” It is a prior concept to reason, judgment, etc. because all of these common translations do not adequately explain logos but are reducible to its elementary meaning of letting something be seen. Judgment, definition, and so on are not at all inappropriate translations; they are just ontologically shallow with respect to the early fecund meaning of the logos. It is the logos that makes their existence as concepts possible in the first place. “The logos gives

\textsuperscript{10}SZ §7B. While Heidegger noted that “the Greeks had no specific word for language, he finds, however, that “[t]he basic signification of logos is ‘discourse [Rede].’” Heidegger’s preferred translation of logos arises out of his etymological derivation of logos in a verb meaning “to talk, to hold discourse.” According to Heidegger it also is understood distantly as ‘to cognise, to be aware of, to know.’

\textsuperscript{11}“... Vernunft, Urteil, Begriff, Definition, Grund, Verhältnis” (SZ §7b).
something to be understood (GM 443/306). The *logos* is, in sum, *apophantic*, meaning it displays, shows, or makes manifest. As *apophantic* it literally shows forth, i.e., shows (*phainet*) forth (*apo*) to a radiant self-manifestation (*sich zum Scheinen bringen*). Phenomenology then is understood not purely as a discourse about phenomena but the discourse that, in fact, makes the phenomena manifest; it’s a method of disclosing entities. Hence the critical importance of the *logos* for the ontologist: if being is given as phenomenon, then what discloses the phenomenon also discloses being. This is the *logos* (MAL §IV). This has to be the case because the *logos* is, itself, a discourse or *Rede* that makes things manifest (SZ §34). To undertake the task of first philosophy, the discourse on being, entails ontology needs to be phenomenological. To quote Heidegger in his approving reading of Aristotle, “Being is determined by [its] accessibility in *logos*” (S 80/55). And “*logos* is still fundamental for the final conception of Being. Even Aristotle, although he overcomes [Platonic] dialectic, still remains oriented toward *logos* in his entire questioning of Being. This state of affairs is today what we call formal ontology and is taken up into it . . . *logos* remains the guiding line” (S 206/142). Drawing from Aristotle, phenomenology and ontology for Heidegger, then, go hand in hand in the same research; both deal with the study of being, the former with the how, the latter with the what.  

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12 Even later, Hiedegger, does not depart from this central, original claim of discourse, or language in general as making visible, and it can be seen in the German verb ‘*sagen*’: “showing and allowing to be seen, the meaning of the meaning of the old German word *sagan*, to say” (OWL 142).

13 Also, Heidegger earlier wrote that “philosophy is in principle ontology [*prinzipiell Ontologie]*” (PIA 369). Now the syllogism can be put together: if philosophy is ontology and ontology is phenomenological, then philosophy is phenomenological.

14 For further discussion on this definition of *logos* see: Logic and the Question of truth (G 21), S §§3A, 26, 29B, 32B, 37, 47A, 54, 58A, 59, 67. PGZ- “Rede und Sprache” sec., SZ§§, 7B 33, 44, KPM§§ 7, 11 - and the entire third part of the book, SG - first section, GM§§ 69B, 72, BzP.
II. 1. The Logos and Phenomenology. B. Gathering

There is another later interpretation given to the logos. In the early thirties, Heidegger began speaking more often of a gathering (Versammlung) function that lies at the essence of language. Later, the 1944 lecture course on Heraclitus (VA 207-229) articulated more clearly Heidegger’s elliptical discussions about the gathering nature of the logos that he began speaking about a decade earlier. The material from the early thirties until approximately 1944 constitutes, roughly, the second interpretation of the logos. With his second interpretation of the logos, Heidegger again stresses its power ‘to-lay-down,’ ‘to-lay-bare,’ and even of a “letting-lie-forth-in-collectedness” (VA 208-11). It is, in general, a “ground (Grund), letting [things] lie before [us] (vorliegenlassen) (ID 54f/57, cf. VA 220,227). This is also the function of discourse, which Heidegger clearly acknowledged earlier as “binding and linking together,” “a letting-something-be-seen” (SZ 33/56). Heidegger, however, wants to study the logos more etymologically. Specifically in the etymology, it means ‘to discourse’ and this discourse is the origin of the logos. Heidegger translates the Ancient Greek word for discourse into archaic German as “Legein.” He used this word in SZ when he tried to formulate phenomenology in its most radical sense as “to lay out in the open” (§7C). He takes up the subject of Legein again in the thirties and now distantly relates it to the Germanic verb “lesen.” Lesen, says Heidegger, retains this ancient meaning of both “to speak” and “to lay bare,” but it also means “to gather, collect, read” (IM 124). In any case, the subject here is still the logos; its genesis in the Ancient Greek word for

§281, and NII/nii, niv.

15For discussion on this interpretation see the following texts: IM, “Logos (Heraklit, Fig. 50), VA 207-229, OWL, PLT.
discourse through to *lesen* (to gather, read?) highlights its fundamental influence in Heidegger’s
development of a philosophical vocabulary. The *logos* remains the central focus. Now,
however, in its later incarnations, it is a concept sufficiently broad to encompass all these
meanings: the gathering, the discourse (*Rede*), the manifest, and (finally) the ground.

The fact that Heidegger changes the emphasis of his interpretation of the *logos* bothers
many philosophical purists. ‘A great thinker shouldn’t be changing his mind . . .’ But I would
like to suggest that the later interpretation is not a real change of mind as much as it is a more
studied, mature elaboration on his first etymologies in the twenties. It seems reasonable to
believe that the more Heidegger’s career developed the more he would return to expand thought
worked out earlier. His discovery, stretched connexion, or even fabrication of the relation of
*lesen* to *Legein* is not so much an issue if it is consistent with his former notion of *logos*. It is
consistent, as I will show. As noted above, the aim of phenomenology is to explicitly show forth,
to make manifest. But to show forth what? Make what manifest? Beings, entities, the world,
etc. To be sure, “phenomenology [is] grounded in the question of being” (PGZ 183/135). The
question of being and beings (the world) is a question of the *logos*. “[T]hus it is that our problem
of the world, where world initially signifies the manifestness of beings as such as a whole, finds
itself led back through the intrinsic clarification of this structure to the problem of the *logos*”
(GM 418/288-9). The manifestness given by the *logos* is nothing manifest itself, i.e., the thing,
the entity, so that the *logos* is also “the primal gathering principle” that “holds [things] together”
(IM 134). The thing (phenomenon) is a result, according to the etymology, of the *logos*

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16 Some consider Heidegger’s etymologies both dubious and convenient. See my footnote in Ch.
Three, Sec. 3.
somehow pulling the entity into a perceptual order, gathering it into a manifest presence. In his lecture “Das Ding” (1950), Heidegger retrieves the Old High German word dinc, what today we call ein Ding (a thing); it meant, apparently ‘a gathering’ or a gathering of such into being or primal unity (cf. ID 67/69). Regarding other Germanic languages, there is evidence that this is a worthy etymology. The etymology is more apparent if we look to the fringes of Northern Europe.\textsuperscript{17} Though closely related linguistically to Norway and more centrally located, Sweden has a riksdag (parliament). Norway, however, has retained a more curious word for parliament. The Norwegian parliament, or meeting area of the polis (to return to the Greek), is called the storting, stor- meaning ‘great,’ ‘mass’ and ting, of course, ‘thing.’\textsuperscript{18} Still more isolated yet, Iceland has quite a few words of interest. Icelandic is a Germanic language whose structure and vocabulary has not changed substantially in over a thousand years.\textsuperscript{19} The present day Icelanders call their parliament, which, incidentally, is the oldest democratic parliament in the world, the alþingi, al- here is interpreted as ‘all,’ ‘altogether’ and þingi again as ‘thing.’\textsuperscript{20} The ancient gathering place of the parliament, now a national park, is called Pingvollr, Pingvollr as ‘thing,’ vollr means ‘field.’

\textsuperscript{17} On this note, also see John Llewelyn’s discussion of the naming of the ancient Scottish town of Dingwall in his fine book The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others (London: MacMillian Academic and Professional LTD), 1991.

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Storbritania (Great Britain), storgate (main street), ñ starkne (to gather, harden, coagulate) etc.


\textsuperscript{20} The “p” is Icelandic shorthand for what in Old English was called a ‘thorn.” Basically the “þ” stands in for the ‘th’ sound of the first consonant of the ‘thorn.’ We can see this letter in many everyday Icelandic words such as the common name Christian name Þór (Thor).
What to make of this business of parliaments, gatherings, and things? It seems historically credible that a thing, in these cases the being an entity of the polis, arises out of a gathering together \((\text{logos})\) of what was previously set-apart, not yet together and so not yet visible.\(^1\) The occurrence of a thing corresponds unambiguously with the conscious recognition of it. When Dasein intends or posits, exercises its volition, as it were, the existence of something in conjunction with the \(\text{logos}\) of the thing crystallises into being.\(^2\) As soon as I am confronted with any phenomenon, it is parallel with the fact that the phenomenon is immediately visible and capable of being. In other words, things (phenomena) are collections, collections brought into existence by the \(\text{logos}\). The phenomenon and the recognition of it for all meaningful descriptions arrive at the same moment. The \(\text{logos}\), especially following Heidegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus, is “namely the collectedness of the essent itself” (IM 129). It is Dasein’s use of the \(\text{logos}\) that somehow forces entities into appearance by bringing them into a whole so that they conspicuously “lie-forth-in-collectedness” (VA 212). Hence, the creation and unrestricted

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\(^{1}\) Cf. Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, 160-2.  
\(^{2}\) Dasein’s voluntarism is highly subject to debate. However, since we are here focusing on the Heidegger of the Kehre, I believe that Heidegger offers us a mixed degree of free will. His literature of this period has not forsaken the voluntaristic attitude of the earlier works. For example, one of Heidegger’s most disguised references to voluntarism is named the forgetfulness-of-being (\(\text{Seinsvergessenheit}\)). This is something that man has done since the time of Plato (SZ §1). Man has failed to pay attention to being and has, thus, been wandering in and out of oblivion. In later writings, Heidegger reverses the causal order and relieves man of his responsibility for his continual proclivity to slide into oblivion. Now Heidegger is speaking of the abandonment-by-being itself (\(\text{Seinsverlassenheit}\)). With this reversal, being apparently withdraws itself from manifold presencing. The withdrawal (\(\text{Entzug, -} \text{-lethé}\)) is a failing to appear (\(\text{Ausbleiben}\)) of being. The abandonment-by-being implies the denial or refusal (\(\text{Verweigerung}\)) of the “unconcealing (\(\text{Entbergung}\)) of being as such” (NII 357ff/niv.217f). However, the point is illustrated, the transition from voluntarism to, roughly, pacifism is always laced with some understanding of both dispositions. So the moment of world/thing formation (see esp. “Origin of the Work of Art”) is a matter of participation during the Kehre by both the \(\text{logos}\) and Dasein.
gathering of entities into existence are what, according to Heidegger, Heraclitus saw as the logos. Yet the logos alone is not itself language. “All by itself the logos does not make language” (IM 273). The logos must be cultivated and coordinated into a Gestalt (morphē, distinct shape of form). The Gestalt is an intelligibility or context circumscribed by a clear limit (peras).  

Dasein, as the being most imbued with the logos, forges its language by coordinating its finite, limited situation to the overwhelming gathering of the logos. By directing its where and when, its “there” (Da-), to the logos, Dasein can then find world significance (Bedeutsamkeit). And, by giving definition to the unrestricted gathering of the logos, man acquires recognition of its environment. The logos thus gathers entities into existence and man gives shape and names those entities as beings of its world. It can define beings in its world. Though Dasein cannot generate beings ex nihilo, it can bring into existence that which its own situated existence can speak about or that which has roots in its current and past vocabulary, as it were. I cannot contribute anything meaningful about Italian unless I know the language, and nobody can create, say, an artificial heart without first being well schooled in the discourse of anatomy and medical prostheses. It takes a certain familiarity with a subject to be able to contribute to its discourse. So Dasein gives significance, in the sense of a delimited interpretation, to the logos by fitting form to the gathering based upon its own situational being.  

In sum, what is gathered together

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23 Hiedegger’s discussion on paras in “On the Essence and Concept of physis” is relevant: “The limit is always what limits, defines, gives footing and stability, that by which and in which something begins and is. Whatever becomes present and absent without limit has of and by itself no presencing, and devolves into instability” (P 206).

24 Situational being, being-in-the-world, is an involvement in “relationships [that] are bound up with one another as a predetermined totality; they are what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call “significance.” This is what makes up the structure of the world – the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. Dasein, in its
becomes an entity of significance for Dasein with respect to its environment. Again, this is part of Husserl’s flat of phenomenology: philosophical knowledge cannot be abstracted from its source in the Lebenswelt or lived-world. With approval, Heidegger writes, “[w]e shall see that our comportments, lived experiences taken in the broadest sense, are through and through expressed experiences . . . I simply live in them without regarding them thematically (PGZ 64/48). Likewise, Heidegger is concerned with the departure from the lived, practical world. Philosophizing, which passes over fundamental experience of the lived-world by thematising life is an invitation to metaphysics.

II. 3. Praxis Vs Theoria. A. Die Zuhandenheit

What happened to transform this highly philosophical meaning of the logos as gathering and discourse into its modern rather scientific connotation as (symbolic) logic? Or in Greek terms, how did the praxis of the logos become transformed into metaphysics and theory (theoria)?

The Greeks, most notably Aristotle perhaps, defined man as the animal rationale, a living being with reason (cf. SZ 48/74, GM 443/306, BzP §276). Here, man is the living being that not only

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familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement . . . “ (SZ 87/120).

25 It is true, also, that Heidegger is consistently wary of the concept of an ‘experience’ (Erfahrung), but this is because it intimates a personal, psychic ‘I.’ One is just not naturally aware of oneself by one’s experiences but in what one “does, uses, expects, avoids” (SZ 119/155, cf. QCT 134, BzP §§77ff, 254,274.).

26 Heidegger is endorsing a view of life as lived experience. This borrows much from Husserl and it is not surprising that material on lived experience is found in the idiosyncratically titled Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. According to Theodore Kisiel, it is “the most detailed exegesis of Husserl’s phenomenology we shall ever get from Heidegger. From Kisiel’s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time, 65.

27 That logic is itself directly relevant to the logos see “the logos is surely the principal theme of logic” (GM 418/288).
has access to the *logos*, but the *logos* is the ground of man himself (MAL 137/138). It precedes him and qualifies his existence. Man is perforce a being of the *logos*. Yet, here as well, man is conceived as the being that has a particular ordering discretion as to how it conceives entities. Man expects entities to be familiar and for them to appear in a regular way. That being, man, reasons and calculates entities in an imaginative way and forces the entities into a sustained or stable framework. From there, one can act in a usual and reliable manner. The framework means that man, the rational animal, does a lot of looking around (*Umsicht*) its environment and is regularly circumspect, curious as to what the immediate surroundings can provide for him (SZ §15). Our ontical trajectory is to use *technē* on entities and, thereby, render them useful. It is a kind of first nature in our dealings, or following Heidegger, "*technē* is by no means speculation but instead guides the dealing with a thing in an orientation toward ‘for which’ and an ‘in order to’" (S 40/28). Dasein is the being whose primary mode of encounter is one of function and of use (*technē*). Dasein, the user, can appreciate, plan, use, and reckon up the beings in its world to a specific end. Dasein is the being with reason that calculates and divides its world into functional components for various purposes, for the nonspecific "in-order-to..." When entities are conceived as functional pieces toward specific ends, they are presumed to be tools for use to an end might be accomplished. Heidegger says that tools stand within the reference

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28 As Mark Basil Tanzer observes, the human being is, in essence, the using being. "Dasein’s immediate experience is of entities that are both useful and misusable, both responsive and resistant [to *technē*]. Its immediate mode of engagement with useful things is an attempt to properly use them, to hold itself within the useful thing’s range of possible uses, i.e., to become the consummate user of the useful." In his "Heidegger on the Origin of the Political," *Existentialia* 10 (2000), 33.

29 Cf. things “subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’ (*Um-zu*). And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is *circumspection*” (SZ 69/98).
structure of ‘the in order to’ and as such tools as useful imply that they are used in order to
[achieve something]. Tools are said to be ready-to-hand (Zuhandene) as articles of use rather
than as ‘neutral’ beings. This is the basic comportment of our being-in-the-world. When this
comportment prevails, when entities are viewed in terms of being ready-to-hand, things are seen
as Zeug (stuff, equipment, tools, gear, or paraphernalia).\(^{30}\) Zeug is encountered within a
particular context of use such that Dasein is already familiar with Zeug, i.e., as within the
structure of the in-order-to, with what it is to be used for. Hence, Zeug “is encountered always
within an equipmental contexture” (GP 414/292). Dasein is already familiar with the purposes of
Zeug because “[t]he structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined
by references or assignments” (SZ 74/105). Furthermore, Dasein has an ineluctable tendency to
presage and prefigure the assignments and significance of Zeug before they have been fixed in
any scientific way. This basic feature of Dasein means that it interprets its milieu as Zeug
according to Dasein’s familiarity with its environment. Hence, Zeug is always context-
dependent. Encountering entities in terms of being ready-to-hand means finding oneself in an
environment where the meanings of things are already assigned unconsciously according to a
usage at the same moment that one becomes conscious of where one is. Given this, our
comportment toward the ready-to-hand is always taken for granted because our first instinct is to
use entities. Only when an entity is encountered as un-useful, where its primary character of use

\(^{30}\) Zeug “is not only equipment for writing or sewing; it includes everything we make use of
domestically or in public life. In this broad ontological sense bridges, streets, and street lamps,
are also items of equipment. We call the whole of these beings handy [ready-to-hand]” (GP
414/292).

Nota Bene, I leave the term ‘Zeug’ untranslated since there does not seem to exist
any direct translation.
has broken down does the integrity of the entity become strangely conspicuous. The un-useful entity or broken tool dumbfounds the user because it brings to the fore what has all along been operative: the context that guides all references (cf. PGZ §23b, SZ §16). In a breakdown, the entity becomes drained of its significance and, hence, gains a kind of independence from Dasein. It loses its dependence on Dasein as the entity that grants significance to beings. When Dasein stands powerless in front of the broken tool, it does so because it cannot use the thing in a way that it wants and, so, can lend it no determinate significance. In ontological terms, the being of the entity asserts its dominance over Dasein since Dasein fails to assign it any other value than useless. The insignificant entity disclosed in the breakdown as useless is an affront to Dasein’s mission to wield power over beings.31

Usage, closely related to technē, is an ontical way of being as well as an ontological means of disclosure (IM 159). The use of entities by Dasein is carried out with technē. Technē, brings beings to manifest themselves because it is structurally associated with the logos.32 Usage then is the general disposition that Dasein has toward entities, whereas technē signals the

31 N.b., above, I have loosely followed Mark Basil Tanzer’s sound interpretation of significance and insignificance with regard to Dasein’s ability and inability to maintain a general context of use. His reading of Heidegger on technē is nicely summed up on page 37.

Although Being needs human technē, and thus is dependent upon, or dominated by, Dasein’s thing constituting power, Being is just as fundamentally beyond the power of technē, and thus is independent of, or dominant over, Dasein’s thing-constituting power. And herein lies Dasein’s receptivity, its submission to Being; holding things in an impenetrable insignificance. Being asserts its own thing-constituting power in the face of human technē. Therefore, just as the human being’s active dimension [technē]corresponds with Being’s receptivity, so the human being’s receptive is correlated with an active assertiveness possessed by Being.


32 In An Introduction to Metaphysics, 1935, Heidegger likens technē with thinking (165); he then later equates thinking to logos (169).
an antagonistic enactment of Dasein’s faculty of use that reveals entities as what they are at any given moment. The context or field of significance of usefulness is the primary mode of revealing entities. Thus, and this is important, it is not solely Dasein that determines the significance of beings; the field of significance, and insignificance, from which entities arise determines beings in tandem according to Dasein’s ability to hold them in a state of usefulness. Dasein is held radically in check from wielding unlimited power over things because of being’s necessary character of recalcitrance. Dasein can use beings but it cannot, under normal circumstances, use them out of context or even create beings. The context, or field of significance, which carries assignments of usefulness, is established by Dasein, but the context established is never by definition one of total a-contextual significance. Any specific entity is always saved from arbitrary significance by its equipmental context. Dasein forever fails to achieve dominance over an entity by assigning significance at will because the situation always first determines meaningfulness. In this way, Dasein is precluded from unrestrictedly exercising its volition in an attempt to fully dominate the situation. It is, therefore, dishonest to ascribe an overwhelming voluntarism to Dasein since Dasein cannot tailor the situation to its specific will in any kind of unrestricted way. Dasein is structurally inhibited from acting in a brazen or voluntaristic fashion. It cannot be pernicious to its context or situation, nor could it ever simply

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33 As Tanzer writes,

Usage (technē) is a mode of making entities possible, which must obey certain restrictions. As subject to restrictions, making entities possible is not equivalent to creating, or producing, entities. Making possible by usage is distinct from production because if Dasein [alone] were the creator of beings, then it would have power to arbitrarily determine the significance that makes a thing what it is. For a thing’s creator need not obey significance that makes a thing what it is, but rather determines that significance. Creation, unlike usage is an unrestricted mode of making entities possible.”

From his “Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name, 85.
elect out of it. Far from being just voluntaristic, Dasein must also assume a mildness in the open encounter with entities. Dasein does, indeed, attempt to dominate entities but it also must, by necessity, submit to them. Dasein is at every point limited to its context of significance, which it projects into every encounter. One is always already caught up in a context when something is given in its usage structure, i.e., as ready-to-hand (cf. SZ 86/118). "The specific thisness of a piece of equipment, its individuation, if we take the word in this completely formal sense, is... in each instance its equipmental character and equipmental contexture" (GP 414-5/292). The context a fortiori determines the character of the equipment, of those beings that are ready-to-hand. The purposes of Zeug and the environment of Zeug cannot be immediately distinguished (cf. SZ §14, NI 546/nii 77f.).

II. 2. Praxis Vs. Theoria. B. Die Vorhandenheit

Entities however, can also be taken as bare existence at hand, artificially removed, as it were, from any particular or necessary context. Mere extant entities are taken as "nothing else than [existing matter]" which Heidegger defines as that which is just on exhibition, as extant, the present-at-hand (Vorhandene) (SZ 34/58). Entities that are present-at-hand make no demand on us to use them as such and such. They are just available, and the availability is neutral with respect to any function or context of usefulness. Entities are seen in their unrestricted availability. Matter presences in a universal context that lacks specificity. The context becomes a multi-dimensional coordinate system specific only in terms of the numerical position within the geometry (cf. SZ §76). Entities are so available within the universal context because their particular context has been lost. This signals the "absorption of place into position... what counts is the internal relationship between the positions of terms, not the character or quality of
the space in which the terms and their positions inhere." The defining qualities that determine shape, character and restricted definition of things in the ready-to-hand world are absent in the purely relational nexus as the concrete thing becomes an empty placeholder or variable in the arithmetic of the present-at-hand. In short, the present-at-hand appears as de-contextualised from the ready-to-hand. As such, the present-at-hand is an ancillary or deficient mode of the ready-to-hand (SZ §16). It is as if the ready-to-hand has been artificially stripped of its first way-of-being. The present-at-hand is unfamiliar or de-familiarised; it is not a presence rich in any specific significance. Moreover, the present-to-hand, as a secondary or deficient mode of the ready-to-hand, has lost its appropriate context structure that gives it practical and limited, clearly intelligible significance. The house and the garden have a specific reference for me and where I live; they are ready-to-hand for my use as features of my home and are an important part of my lived-world. The house, in its rich significance to my life, is an intuitively known, specific place that is finely wrought in my understanding of my life. This recalls Gaston Bachelard’s exegesis of the philosophical concept of space wherein “[t]he house acquires the physical and moral energy of a human body. It braces itself to receive the downpour” and “‘clings’ to its inhabitant[s].” For Bachelard, the house is a place of intimate values and particular reception for those who dwell in the house. But, as Heidegger suggests, when the house and garden are conceived as property and premises, depleted of their worldly and intimate significance, they fail

34Casey, The Fate of Place, 182.

35Heidegger writes that the phenomena of the present-at-hand occur as not distinct from the ready-to-hand but as something conceived only in clear relation o the ready-to-hand. It is seen as “Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand, or simply as “un-ready-to-hand” (SZ 73/103).

to be of practical significance for me because they are ideas abstracted from the concrete and ready-to-hand (GP 153/109). The property and the premises have no specific context; rather they assume every context and so can be interchanged in various contexts. They are neutral with respect to any given observer. In fact, the property and premises phenomenologically prescind the specific or local site of my historical reference. That my house was partly built by my grandparents and that there is a shady birch tree in the rear of the garden is of no relevance whatsoever to the concept of property and premises. The concept and the abstraction it represents dominate the specifics of my house and my garden. These specifics for me are overwhelmed in vague insignificance, itself to be replaced by a different, more conceptual understanding of my home as real estate. The present-at-hand erases the field of significance, leaving behind only the formal structures of experience to be reintegrated into a different, perhaps more hypothetical context. Initially, however, the present-at-hand is there in the beyond, i.e., as un-sited, of our circumspection or apprehension of a context. “[I]t is in the ‘there’ before anyone has observed or ascertained it. It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities” (SZ 75/105). In sum, the present-at-hand appears from the ready-to-hand, but the present-at-hand has been purged of its local context (or world) and, thus, is baldly available, at-hand for study and theoretical speculation before being reincorporated into a new contextual field 37. It implies that the present-at-hand is theoretical because it has been shorn of its first and proper context (becomes context-independent), it can

37 This is in contrast to the ready-to-hand which is never “grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme” (SZ 69/99).
never fully be part of my personal lived-world in a phenomenological sense. Theoretical understanding lies in the suppression or forgetting of the referential totality in which I live. Recall that in the first chapter, to be part of the world meant encountering entities with the fore-structure of understanding, but the present-at-hand denies the fore-structure and hence cannot be an object of circumspection or *praxis* in this organic world here.\(^{38}\) It resides not in the immediate phenomenological world but in the postulated metaphysical one. All experience demands involvement in a praxis, but the experience dominated by the present-at-hand is one that does not have an end within its own, local environment; the experience is one initially of general de-familiarisation. The experience is out of the ordinary since it no longer has a point of contact within Dasein’s everyday context of use. This is why the present-at-hand is not equiprimordial with the ready-to-hand, because it must be postulated or speculated out of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger says the secondary characteristic of the present-at-hand is a “levelling of the primordial” sort such that the present-at-hand actually covers-up the ready-to-hand character of an entity by disturbing the contextual character of the ready-to-hand (SZ 158/201, cf. 74/105). Again, the present-at-hand is not understood ontically as house and garden but, rather, is conceived as context-independent, the same way that legal theory, residential planning, and civil engineering can mutually share in the abstraction of property and premises. As speculative and theoretical, the present-at-hand can also be considered metaphysical because it is postulated beyond the immediate, physical world. The present-at-hand drags the ready-to-hand into an alien, un-experienced, and theoretical world. In this way, the present-at-hand provides a concept

\(^{38}\) Recall: “All interpretation operates in the fore-structure (*Vor-struktur*)” (SZ 154/194, cf. 86/117, 151/192).
of the ready-to-hand and as a concept it has become un-sited, i.e., loses its historical and environmental specificity. But at the same time, the theoretical gains ontological legitimacy in relief or contrast to the ‘real’ world of usage and sited disclosure (think of Plato’s one true world of the Forms). By contesting the other disclosures, the theoretical, itself, claims an event of disclosure, albeit a simulated one. As Baudrillard observes, “[t]he status of theory can only be that of a challenge to the real . . . Theory cannot content itself with description and analysis, it must produce an event in the universe that it describes.”

Thus, it can then be studied, “inspected,” and made generally available for convenient access because it is no longer attached to the immediately familiar world. The ready-to-hand has, as Heidegger describes it, been brought to “a standstill,” put in a state of objective presence (Präsenz). The theoretical is, then, established with a supernatural mandate (Auftrag) of examining the natural world. In brief, the transition from the handy (Zuhandene), made apparent through circumspection, to what is there on-hand (Vorhandene), made apparent through sheer inspection, is achieved as an event that de-contextualises entities from the first, real world, in an attempt to generally explain those entities (cf. PGZ 265/195). But in trying to explain entities, the realm of theory presents a challenge to the first world of the handy by inscribing those entities in the theoretical world, by artificially transferring those entities into a controlled environment for examination.

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40 When circumspection comes under the sway of the theoretical attitude, the comportment of the ready-to-hand is transformed into the comportment of the present-at-hand. The latter comportment implies the habits of “‘inspecting,’ checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the ‘operations’ [‘Betrieb’] which are now at a standstill . . . . [This] demands manipulations of the grossest kind” (SZ 358/409, cf. QCT 3-35, 155-182).

41 Thomas A. Fay summarises the theoretical mandate well, in Heidegger’s view, modern science’s urge for experimentation and consequent claim of dealing only with things that are indubitable facts because established by experiment is, in reality, a result
longer dependant on its context but rather faces a “set up” by “being controlled in advance by calculation” (QCT 121). In such an environment, an entity is suspended of its referential totality and placed under “restriction” so that it may be probed and audited, as it were (SZ 155/197). The essence of the theoretical experience is that of being controlled. Hence, the definitive theoretical experience is the laboratory experiment: a thoroughly controlled experience.

Of skipping over the facts to begin with. Rather than let the beings manifest themselves to thought, they are submitted to an interrogation in which the type of answer which will be received is determined in advance by the conditions laid down in the questioning to which they are subjected. The essence of modern science is that it is a controlled experience.

II. 3. Referential Totality in General

The assimilation of entities into the theoretical world recasts the "look" (as discussed in the Parmenides lecture) of the ready-to-hand world of circumspection and site (cf. S §7, SZ 236-413). The ready-to-hand takes on a guise of sorts with the conjecture and guesswork of theory. Revisiting Chapter I, praxis is the faculty of action that has no fulfillment outside itself, but, at the same time, it is a faculty ontologically rooted in language. To repeat, Dasein is "a being which has language (logos), which addresses and discusses its world – a world initially there for it in dealings it goes about in its praxis" (O 27/23). The logos which allows one to go about making sense of the world that is given is equiprimordially related to praxis. This has to be the case because as the world is disclosed, it also discloses a significance and praxis includes significance in its end. To be sure, "determinations of [all] beings are grasped ... with regard to how these beings stand with respect to the logos" (GM 418/289). This is, as always, part of Heidegger's phenomenological method, i.e., descriptive with regard to the showing of appearances (cf. SZ §7A). If the phenomena are to be understood in terms of 'what lies forth,' then the phenomena must be understood as features of the logos (ibid. §7B). Insofar as praxis is practical action, it is an interaction with phenomena (cf. IM 58). By implication, the phenomena (given as world), derivative from logos, equally set the conditions for the interpretation of one's environment. In sum, the referential totality of disclosure set out ahead of interpretation is delivered over and handed down by language.

42 Significance is allotted according to the organization of the logos (cf. IM 133).
43 "Our world is, in one sense, that which is constituted through our practices, with objects of such forms of existence as, for example, materials, implements, money, calculations, pictures, etc.; and in another sense it is our very practices." From Jakob Meloe's, "The agent and His World," in Praxeology: An Anthology, ed. Gunnar Skirbekk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), 14
To reconsider, for the moment, that discourse (Rede) is only one component of Dasein’s structural composition might suggest that the other two, understanding and affectivity, are not being given enough relevance.44 Not at all. Actually, all three structural components are fully relevant to Dasein’s unity. The claim being advanced here is just to say that the logos, and therefore discourse or language, arrives at the moment of world constitution. And Heidegger has said as much: if “the essence of man is world-forming, then this expresses the fact that . . . logos, language, and world stand in an intrinsic connectedness” (GM 442/306, cf. 468/323).45 If that is the case, and it is clear that it is, then implications for praxis become more transparent. The comportment of concernful dealings (praxis) must be interpreted and, thus, developed in concert with the phenomenologically given world or referential totality. The logos at the root of phenomenology is, thus, to be associated with the modality of praxis for these purposes but also with all the existentials in general.46 Praxis, in Aristotle’s words, arises “in social life and the interchange of words and deeds”47. Heidegger’s contribution to the understanding of the history

44 Heidegger outlines Dasein’s structural composition in Part one of SZ; see §29 for affectivity (Befindlichkeit), §31 for understanding (Verstehen), and §34 for language or discourse (Rede).

45 Cf. “When the “there” has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) is constituted by understanding, affectivity (Befindlichkeit), and falling (Verfallen); and this disclosedness becomes Articulated by (durch) discourse (Rede)” (SZ 349/400, altered); or, differently, “language is given along with man – and this so certainly that, even turning it around, one can say that along with language man is first given. Language and man determine each other, mutually” (BzP §276).


of *praxis* is to underline this kinship of act and speech (G 56 80). That SZ demonstrated that *praxis* belongs to circumspection (hammer in the tool shed, etc.) is also evidence that *praxis* is intimately related to language. It is always the fore-structure that is embedded with the historical record of a language that accompanies and guides praxis (SZ §65).

Disclosing or revealing, originally understood as the *logos*, the ‘there,’ can, itself be expressed (ontically) in forms of action. Witness, for example, the case of production and technology Heidegger discusses in his later essays. “The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing” (QCT 12). In this case, the comportment of theory and production wants, roughly, to study the essence of beings in order to make them more available for a future use in an unrestricted way. “’Apophantical’ discourse,” in this way, Stanley Corngold observes, “issuing from the language of assertions, knows only the mood of theory . . . But this mood is marked by its desire to be without mood [objective].”48 The interest in removing the element of mood in disclosure implies a leveling off of the heterogeneous, mood sensitive disclosure of the situation that is the condition for praxis. As Heidegger writes, “the possibility of ‘theory’ will be due to the *absence* of *praxis*” (SZ 357/409). Whereas entities that are ready-to-hand are there for use in local, practical and restricted circumstances, entities that are present-at-hand appear theoretically without practical reference and so without a clear praxis. Unlike praxis, theory does not have its end contained within the individual dealing. Under the guiding thread of theory, the moment of disclosure sets the existential conditions for a particular interpretation of an entity that informs

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action of a theoretical-productive sort. And that moment of disclosure forms or "determines the arrangement of the matter [or entity]. Even more, it prescribes in each case the kind and selection" that defines entities in advance (PLT 28). If that moment of disclosure determines an entity as alien to its environment (as mere presence-at-hand), the entity is robbed of its "contextural interconnection"; it is understood as an appearance (Erscheinung) (GP 294/207). The appearance is probably more of a mere appearance (blosse Erscheinung), meaning that it functions in the announcing (Meldende) of a false appearance. The mere appearance acts as a kind of decoy that shows nothing in particular. "Appearing shows in a not-showing-itself [Sich-nicht-zeigen]" (SZ 29/52). It does not really show itself because it has lost its context of significance.\(^4^9\) The interwoven signs and references that support and place an entity in a world have been, to various extents, dislodged from their matrix of significations. The appearing, then, does not show a being as significant, i.e., dependant on its world, but it makes available an image of the being that has been de-worlded and ultimately voided of praxis. Mere appearing, then, follows as a result of the fragmenting or disbanding of the circumspective referential totality. Entities are transformed from lived and encountered things into representations of what the entities were, are, and could be. The representations deny praxis since they are not ends in themselves but are devices (calculations) for an indeterminate telos.\(^5^0\)

\(^4^9\) Recall that a sign (Zeichen) "is an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together the worldly character of the world . . . announces itself" (SZ 80/110).

\(^5^0\) "To represent [Vorstellen] means . . . to set something before oneself and to make secure what has been set in place, as something set in place. This making secure must be a calculating, for calculability alone guarantees being certain in advance, and firmly and constantly, of that which is to be represented" (QCT149).
Heidegger believes that since Aristotle, being has come under the yoke of theoretical-productive action, implicating a diminishing of praxis. Aristotle’s distinction between production (poiesis) and praxis, which is a restricted way of doing that has the end in its own action, is a fruitful one for Heidegger (cf. SZ §15). “Being,” in modernity for Heidegger, “means Being-produced and, as something produced, it means something which is significant relative to some tendency of dealings; it means being available” (PIA 376). Throughout post-Antiquity, claims Heidegger, the theoretical-productive action has gained an upper hand over against praxis. Now the original interplay of the two forms of action is just a formal relation stripped of its content. They “were fixed for the first time in Greek ontology and later faded out and became formalised, that is, became part of the tradition and are now handled like well-worn coins” (GP 152/108). In other words, being present-at-hand means a theoretical-productive comportment is already in place. It is in place and exchangeable with the ready-to-hand, meaning that the two forms of apprehension still exist formally but have been standardised in a selfsame manner.

Praxis and theory have distinct meanings for us but it is also possible to speak of things like theoretical praxis because their original definitions have become cloudy and now almost interchangeable (SZ 357-8/409). The tendency to insert theory in the place of praxis itself

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52 Einer Øverenget makes this point well in his Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 208.
contributes to the demise of praxis.\textsuperscript{53} The pursuit of propositional logic, what Heidegger calls "traditional logic," is a theoretical endeavor that, for example, has no clear praxis.\textsuperscript{54} Propositional logic, after all, is deeply theoretical since it is "based in the ontology of the present-at-hand" (SZ 165/209). According to the pre-Aristotelian understanding of the logos, propositional logic was not the primary definition for the logos.\textsuperscript{55} As discussed earlier, the logos meant disclosure of phenomena which itself was an event of truth. The rise of propositional logic, however, apparently gained dominance over the interpretation of the logos in that the prevailing of the originary presencing of beings became circumscribed in terms of validity (SZ 357/408, P 136-54). According to Heidegger, when truth gets primarily conceived as a function of a theoretical assertion, the understanding of pre-Aristotelian truth gets lost (SZ §§7b, 69b). As discussed, the logos had meant originary disclosure of entities through personal, individual engagement in the natural world. Heidegger's confrontation with the post-Socratic Greek period ultimately leads to the conclusion that "propositional logic at the same time guided all reflections directed at explication of logos in the broader sense, as language, and, insofar as it did so, the whole science of language as well as, in a broader sense, the entire philosophy of language, took their orientation from propositional logic. All our grammatical categories and even all of

\textsuperscript{53} "[T]he theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis (SZ 357/409).

\textsuperscript{54} William Richardson, "Heidegger and the Origin of Language," \textit{International Philosophical Quarterly} 2 (Summer 1962), 405.

\textsuperscript{55} The elucidation of logos was for the Greeks a basic task and, moreover, one in which they made progress only with great difficulty and very slowly and in which in a certain sense they got stuck at one point, if this point can be called Aristotelian logic in the traditional sense, the logic handed down to us. Insofar as the Greeks ultimately developed a doctrine of logos in a theoretical direction, they took the primary phenomenon of logos to be the proposition, the theoretical assertion . . . . (S 252/174).
contemporary scientific grammar . . . are essentially determined by this theoretical logic” (S 253/175). The new logos implies that truth as correspondence gets solidified in the discourse of logical propositions and so loses access to living problems. The logos is now generated in a universal binary language that is intelligible within an abstract differential system of propositions. The differential system functions on an indexing of variables that are labelled according to a binary system, i.e., as plus/minus or true/false (see Ch. III, 2 below). Truth conceived in this kind of abstractness, this kind of logistical patterning means that now “the essence of truth gives up its fundamental trait of unhiddeness” (P 176). This is why Plato’s definitive formulation of language in the “Cratylus” reduces the logos further to a “relational ordering.”

Propositional logic has apparently gained a hegemony that now subordinates other disclosures of the logos. It has established a metaphysical criterion of what can be said to truly be, that is, genuinely, to lie forth in disclosure in accord with what it can verify. In other words, a method is established that determines entities in advance of their disclosure within the referential totality. Heidegger sought to shake logic, conceived as the science of the logos, “to its foundations”; “because traditional logic, as a science of thought processes, vaunts itself as the supreme and authoritative norm for all determinations of Being, this claim must [now] be examined in its origins and relentlessly reviewed in terms of an original conception of the


57 Propositional logic is antithetical to praxis in that it deals with the formal categories of beings, the beings themselves are not investigated. In not dealing with the physical world per se it is metaphysical. “The subject-matter of metaphysics is what lies “beyond” beings – where and how it does so is not stated” (MAL 33/24).
essence of language." Logic as a scientific determination of being "sketches out in advance the manner in which" entities become known (cf. QCT 118). The environing world now gets rethought in the terms of analytic constructions that reflect the method of deductive logic. Of course, propositional logic is an invaluable instrument of rationality and criticism and Heidegger is not criticizing the enterprise of logic. He is only criticizing the absorption of the deductive (reductive) method into other areas of social life, which is a result of the exclusion of other forms of interpreting the logos. (MAL §IV). The transformation of the logos into propositional logic decisively shaped the future of rigorous study because rigour, in turn, is determined by its fidelity to logical coherence, i.e., no longer in attending to new disclosures of being. "This binding adherence [Bindung] is the rigor of research" in its logical imperative (QCT 118). And why should, argued Heidegger, rigour be conceived in logico-mathematical terms? "Mathematical knowledge is no more rigorous than philological-historical knowledge. It merely has the character of 'exactness,' which does not coincide with rigor" (P 83). The maturation of 'rigorous' studies and the rise of the university continued to solidify the conception of the old logos into logic. By invoking logic, serious study is accomplished in its adherence to the celerity and purity of logic (O §5). Moreover, it is this exactness provided by mathematical logic that, as Gadamer notes, supplants the robustness of the word: "it is not the word but number that is the real paradigm of the noetic: number, whose name is 'exactitude.'" The clarity of definition

58 Cited and translated in Richardson's "Heidegger and the Origin of Language," 405-6.

59 Cf. logic is "a science of logos, of statements which determine something as something" (MAL 22, cf. S 253/174).

60 Gadamer, Truth and Method. Second, 412.
given by such exactness in mathematical logic means that, though the content of a proposition may be nonsense or irrelevant, the assertion (logos) is now, at least in principle and method, ideal. This is why Heidegger can state “that logos is identical here with eidos” (S 505/350).

That the ideal claims definitive access to beings, that is, that beings are conceived under the yoke of what has been theoretically posited, implies that the logos is no longer “established first of all in terms of ‘thinghood’ (Sachheit) but rather in terms of a guiding model (SZ 35/59). The logos here contracts its disclosure so that what is evident falls into line with the idea.

Insofar as it is... the object of an independent, observing or grasping, the being is claimed according to its appearance (eidos). The observing [kind of] grasping is explicated in claiming and discussing [discourse]. The “what” of the object, i.e., the “what” which is claimed (logos), and the object’s appearance (eidos) are the same in a certain way. (PIA 376).

The logos situates and informs a praxis, or lack thereof, insofar as Dasein has an instrumental relation with the logos to know its world. When the logos is taken as disclosing appearances (eidos), that is, disclosures deprived of their rich textural significances, the appearances come to stand as uniform and enduring. This means that the question of truth, insofar as it is a question of disclosure (cf. P 148-54), need no longer be asked. The disclosure of the appearance is constantly unconcealed and apparent so there is no question to ask. As well, the pluralistic disclosures of truth inherent in the word a-letheia undergo a “narrowing of content” that, in turn, assimilates the disclosure into a uniformity (SZ 155/197). A-letheia becomes radically perverted into the single concept of correctness, the ideal of an unchanging truth (veritas).61 As Bernhard

61 Cf. that “truth is consists in the correctness of statements is thought to need no further special proof. Even where an effort is made – with a conspicuous lack of success – to explain how correctness is to occur, it is already presupposed as being the essence of truth. Likewise, material truth always signifies the consonance of something at hand with the “rational” concept of its essence” (P 139). Also see S §3, SZ §7B, GP §16C, MAL §§2, 9, GM §8C, BzP §§230-1.
Radloff notes, "[v]eritas signifies the undisclosed and as such expresses an experience of being which is the ‘exact opposite of the Greek aletheia as unconcealment." The question of being, thus, naturally is relegated to a similar fate of ‘narrowing’ because, as Heidegger notes, “[t]he question of truth and the question of being are directly intertwined” (MAL 49/40).

A crucial turning point for the question of being and, indeed, humanity crystallises at the blurry intersection of theory and praxis. When an object is claimed in terms of its ‘whatness,’ the logos instigates an eidos that asserts a theoretical control over the hermeneutical situation by likening it to a more exact statistical model. As such, the comportment of taking entities as present-at-hand, as just “staring at them” (theoria) perforce deforms praxis. In fact, because it disregards the proper context of an entity, that is, does not take into account the surrounding entities, the theoretical is deeply anti-phenomenological and even anti-hermeneutical. To ask the question of the meaning of being, for example, in a non-concrete or abstract way denies the factual, finite character of existence to begin with. The question needs to be put in a hermeneutic way, with respect to one’s own life situation, which in turn affirms life (existence) in the whole process of understanding. “The empowering living through of life experience [Erleben des Erlebens] that carries itself along with it, is the hermeneutic intuition, which understands . . . “ (G 56-7 117). ‘Hermeneutic intuition’ arises simply as the given of the situation; it not something first posited by consciousness and then incorporated as theory. The theory behind propositional logic, to return to this theme, could be seen as aggravating the

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63 Quoted and translated in Fried’s Heidegger’s Polemos, 51.
dissimilarity between first-hand experience and hypothetical experience. Logic conceived this way is modeled on theory. It is theory that forces the ‘experienceable as such’ into distortion - be it the life-world (Husserl), perception (Merleau-Ponty), or pre-thematic being-in-the-world (Heidegger).

It is precisely the theoretical attitude that dislocates entities from their proper context and formally shifts them into a uniform, homogenous space for observation. When entities are conceived as unhinged from their original sited place, the dynamics of beings change radically. Heidegger observes that “the releasing [of entities] from such environmental confinement belongs to the way one’s understanding has been modified, and it becomes at the same time a delimitation [Umgrenzung] of the ‘realm’ [Region] of the present-at-hand” (SZ 362/413). The theoretical conception subdends the ready-to-hand world of usefulness by draining the significance attached to those useful things.

The disruption of context, the dislocation from a field of significance, is no pernicious scheme on the part of Dasein to corrupt some natural accordance of entities to their environment.

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65 Heidegger uses the term ‘experienceable as such’ in reference to *praxis* in “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation” (1922). Evidently, the term later fell out of favour with him, perhaps because it might connote a kind of subjectivity associated with *Erlebnis*. I think it is quite clear that Heidegger is using the term ‘experienceable as such’ in way that that would be likened to *Erfahrung*. “The term *Erfahrung* . . . connotes discovery and learning, and also suffering and undergoing” (QCT 116, trans. comments).

66 As Heidegger writes,

place becomes a spatio-temporal ‘world-point’ [*Weltpunkt*], which is in no way distinguished from any other. This implies not only that the multiplicity of places [*Platzmännigfaltigkeit*] of equipment ready-to-hand within the confines of the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity of positions [*Stellenmännigfaltigkeit*], but that the entities of the environment are altogether released from such confinement [entschränkt]. The aggregate [All] of the present-at-hand becomes the theme.” (SZ 362-3/413, cf. BzP §§61, 63-4, 70-1, 260, 274, QCT 136-72).
On the contrary, Dasein's appropriation of the logos means that, from this perspective, it has a kind of continuum character: effulgent, historical disclosure (which has been likened to praxis and discourse, Rede) at one end, and "the theoretical attitude" (which "would lie in the disappearance of praxis") at the other (SZ 357/409). This character is reflected directly in Dasein's instrumental relation to the logos. The logos is receptive to Dasein's appropriation of it to the extent that the logos needs Dasein to bring it to manifestation (IM 174). Remarkably, and contemporaneously, Dasein "submits" itself to the logos by letting the manifest come to word through Dasein's connection to being (SZ 87/121). Dasein and the logos are committed to one another. They stand in mutual receptive dimensions that interact in concert. As the logos is receptive to Dasein's need (Not) to appropriate it, it (the logos) is equally resistant to the tendency of Dasein to overwhelm the logos and present a total, exploited significance. This reciprocal receptivity, and also antagonism, on the part of Dasein and the logos "brings [beings] to manifestation" (IM 150).

Despite this somewhat esoteric consideration of the instrumental relationship of Dasein and the logos, the disclosures given here individuate praxis from theory in a concrete way. Praxis and theory as behavioural comportments, for lack of a better term, give definition to human action, in the interstice of the Dasein - logos encounter, even evidently if the "boundaries" of those comportments are still unclear to the interpreter (SZ 358/409). The critical role of language to the question of truth is again evident. And, as noted earlier, the question of truth is also the question of being in general (cf. MAL 49/40). Truth, as disclosure, "appears first of all in speaking with one another, in . . . [discourse] (Rede)" (S 17/12). This plainly implies that speech, language, is the mode of gaining access to truth. Truth is not arrived at through the
calculations involved in theoricising; this kind of truth “becomes circumscribed by means of its results” and functions on the model of exactness (QCT 124). Heidegger proposes another, more primordial, kind of truth that is evident within the practical action of speaking and discoursing.

II. 4. Care and Zeitlichkeit

Yet the logos itself is manifested and appropriated in a different way, according to something more primordial than either the praxis or poiesis. The praxis - poiesis axis is a representation of the temporalised and de-temporalised recognition of beings.67 Although this axis is constitutive of Dasein’s involvement (Bewandtnis) in its world, it can also represent the range of Dasein’s existential possibilities as care (Sorge, cura) (PGZ §31e, SZ §65). And with care, at last, the basic mode of Dasein’s being is disclosed: “Dasein’s basic mode of being is that its very being is an issue. This basic mode of being is conceived as care [Sorge]” (G21 225, cf. SZ §18). In short, “[c]are is the term for the being of Dasein pure and simple” (PGZ 406/294, cf. §31, SZ §§41, 64, 79, GP §21b). In order to better understand care, however, its intimate correlation with time needs to be outlined.

Fundamentally decisive for the interpretation of phenomena in the structure of care is the concept of time. Still, “our problem does not deal with the usual isolated philosophical speculation about time that always aims in some way toward other philosophical problems” (MAL 245/197). The issue of time must be characterised not in terms of clock-time as, say, reporting that the “future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the

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67 That temporality determines the nature of being’s use is just what Heidegger will conclude regarding the meaning of being in general. “Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality, the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered” (SZ 19/40).
Present” (SZ 350/401, cf. 333/382, GP §19). Time in respect of care must be understood as temporality (Zeitlichkeit), as “the horizon from which we understand being” (GP 324/228, cf. PGZ §28, SZ §65).⁶⁸ That horizon is another word for the temporal unity of the three simple tenses of time: past (having-been), present (being-alongside), and future (being-ahead-of-itself) (SZ§65).⁶⁹ This horizon of temporal unity is attributed to Husserl: “[t]hat which Husserl still calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time itself . . . Temporality in its temporalizing is the primarily self-unifying unity of expecting, retaining, and making-present” (MAL 364/204).⁷⁰ Heidegger, though, is clear on emphasizing that the horizon as unity, then, needs to be put in relief against common conceptions of time (Temporalität). Temporalität is not co-determinative with Dasein’s understanding of time as a unifying, world disclosing structure.⁷¹ In a phrase, time “temporalises itself” (MAL 255/198). The temporalizing process is “what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care” (SZ 324/371, cf. GP

⁶⁸ As Petra Jaeger, editor, makes clear, “‘time’ means ‘temporality of Dasein’” (PGZ/321).

⁶⁹ Heidegger calls these components of the horizon the ecstatics (Ekstasen). “We therefore call the phenomena of the future [Zukunft], the character of having been [Gewesenheit], and the Present [Gegenwart], the “ecstatics” of temporality [Zeitlichkeit]” (SZ 329/377, cf. 193/249). On the same page, Macquarrie and Robinson add the following note of interest, “the root-meaning of the word ‘ecstasy’ [GRK] . . . is ‘standing outside’. Used generally in Greek for ‘removal’ or ‘displacement’ of something, it came to be applied to states-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] which we would now call ‘ecstatic’. Heidegger usually keeps the basic root-meaning in mind, but he also is keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word ‘existence’.

⁷⁰ Heidegger’s analysis of temporality must owe a profound debt Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness (1905-1910). Heidegger edited and published this as a book in 1928.

⁷¹ Heidegger recommends other classical texts: Aristotle’s Physics Δ, 10-14; Plotinus’ Enneades III, 7; Augustine’s Confessions, Book XI; Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: “The Transcendental Ästhetic,” “Transcendental Deduction,” “Schematism,” “Analytic of Principles,” and the “Doctrine of Antinomies”; Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit; all of Bergson’s works, and Husserl’s Ideas, Book One (MAL 256/198-9).
§21b). Hence, insomuch as Heidegger is the philosopher who defined man as the being of care and care is brought about by temporality, Richardson’s claim that temporality is Heidegger’s most original contribution to philosophy seems justified.72

How then does temporality, in fact, go about articulating the structural character of care? The question needs to be addressed by way of a further dismantling of primordial Dasein. Unfortunately, even Heidegger suggests that the temporality – care relationship to the primordial ontology of Dasein, though fruitful, is complicated.73 So to begin simply, care is Dasein’s basic identity and constitution (cf. GP 443/312, PIA 359-364, PGZ §31, SZ §41). It is “the ontological constitution of Dasein’s Self-constancy” (SZ 323/370). This means that the care structure is ontologically prior to the comportments of praxis and theory as well as the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand because care is what allows for these involvements; it is not itself these involvements. “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [“Vor”] every ‘factual attitude’ [“Verhaltung”] and ‘situation’ [“Lage”] of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them” (SZ 193/238). As such, the action Dasein takes whether practical or purely theoretical must be understood in terms of the care structure. So Dasein’s means of making its way around the world is through care and care, evidently, comes into expression through the dynamic coordination of temporality to being in which Dasein, itself, is an actor. In Heidegger’s words, “Dasein qua time temporalises its being” by assuming its role as a being of time and of being (PGZ 442/319). The coordination of being (Sein) to time (Da), in

72 Temporality is “the most original element in Heidegger’s thought.” Richardson, Heidegger, 85.

73 “In working out the temporality of Dasein . . . we shall be getting for the first time a relentless insight into the complications of a primordial ontology of Dasein” (SZ 333/382).
fact, is Da-sein (BzP §171).

To unfold this coordination of being to temporality (Zeitlichkeit), Heidegger notes that "if temporality makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution, then temporality must be the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and hence of the projection of being upon time" (GP 397/280). And to unfold this, the essence of temporality needs to be understood as a process that continually projects Dasein’s ontological propensities into a unity, which, incidentally, is care (SZ §45). Those propensities consist in the simple tenses of time (named ‘ectases’). These simple tenses translate into the three temporal states of disclosedness (aletheia). Richardson reports them this way: “existentiality (the anticipatory drive-toward-Being), facticity (already-thrown-forth-and-still-to-be-achieved), [and] fallenness (referentially dependent on and dragged toward other beings). All of these elements are rendered possible by There-being’s temporality.”74 Together, temporality is the active coordination of the care structure (existentiality, facticity, fallenness) and its ecstatic horizon (future, past, present) to being by Dasein. Temporality is achieved as an ontological name for the Dasein’s ineluctable way of existence. It comes neither in advance of nor antecedent to care, rather it is a translation of care from phenomena into the transcendent structure of Dasein itself, which is time. So Heidegger is not equivocating when he claims repeatedly that Dasein is the being that essentially cares about being insofar as “Being is itself an issue” (PGZ §27, cf. SZ §§41, 64, 79, GP §21b); even though at the same time he claims that “temporality constitutes the basic constitution of the being we call the Dasein” (GP 453/318, cf. SZ §67). Care and temporality occur as mutually defining because one cannot be explained without other. In direct terms, “temporality reveals

74 Richardson, Heidegger, 87
itself as the meaning of authentic care (*eigentlichen Sorge*) (SZ 326/374). They form a hermeneutic circle with respect to their understanding; the interpretation can only begin when we are familiar with temporality and care together, which, claims Heidegger, we always already are (GM 275/187). After all, it is through temporality and care that the world is disclosed, that Dasein itself as being-in-the-world is disclosed. Hence, the way the phenomena of the world and worldhood, which vary in their many ontical characteristics (i.e., ready-to-hand, praxis, etc.), come to emerge is as a phenomenon of Dasein, the being of care, and its temporality. The phenomenon of world and comportments of Dasein are, finally, disclosed as “specifically temporal problematic[s] of worldhood” (SZ 335/384).

Clearly, that temporality and care cannot exist apart and their compulsory association suggests, perhaps, a founding and elusive character that always marks authentic being. Care is the authentic condition of the presencing of phenomena for Dasein since it is care that describes Dasein’s temporal structure in the most fitting way. Care sets the condition defined by the temporal ectases and “[t]his alone is the authentic phenomenon” (PGZ 420/304). Authentic it may be, but the care structure remains enigmatic since it defies the categorical understanding of time as Temporalität. Yet the enigma is only a result of the usual quantification of time conceptualised as atomic elements of succession and nothing more than this (cf. SZ 350/401, GP §19). Like authentic disclosure, care is constantly withdrawing (-*lethe*) itself from disclosure (a-

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75 While care is the unity of the temporal structure (*Zeitlichkeit*), it can also be written as “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in” (PGZ §31). Note the copious hyphens seem to lend themselves a sense movement within time. Furthermore, the hyphens stand as an indication to the reader that the words are a whole unit and cannot be broken down into smaller components. ‘Being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in’ is a unitary phenomenon of time and it is expressed in a compound way such that it resists being broken down into elements like past, present, and future.
letheia), thereby frustrating quantification and conceptualisation.\textsuperscript{76} The emergence and inexplicable withdrawal from disclosure cannot be objectified and broken down into smaller units; care's signature is always the trace of what has been left and yet is still to come, temporalised with regard to Dasein's appropriation of the logos.

Yet, the withdrawal (-lethe) taken only as withdrawal is not anything. Not because it is a null point but because it cannot be represented. The withdrawal is posited as oblivion rather than itself as the sheltering movement of truth.\textsuperscript{77} The temporality within the movement of truth that blocks and uncovers is the same temporality that inflects language to the extent that language is a movement toward and retreat from withdrawal. Language is the possibility for the coming to presence of being (Unverborgenheit) and its movement away from presence (Verborgenheit).\textsuperscript{78} Heidegger deems poetry to show this movement best: to "poeticise means: to allow the pure appeal of coming-into-presence, as such, to reach one, even if only and precisely as the coming-into-presence of withdrawal and denial" (WHN 265, cf. P 61-2).

\textsuperscript{76} Care is never manifest in total transparency because Dasein can never gain absolute significance over beings. Hence, Dasein can never be in a god-like state of omniscience such that care attends to everything because Dasein, by definition, is an incomplete or "failed" project. Part of the human condition is being limited by one's inability to care and lend full significance over the sum of one's involvements. Cf. Tanzer "Heidegger on the Origin of the Political," 30-34f.

\textsuperscript{77} "At issue is the -lethē of aletheia. The peculiarity of the oblivion (-lethē; Verborgenheit) at the heart of truth (aletheia; Unverborgenheit), understood as the realm of unconcealment, is that the oblivion itself conceals itself. The -lethē, oblivion, is the movement of withdrawal from unconcealment . . . Withdrawal is inherent in the happening of truth." Bernhard Radloff. "Das Gestell and L'écriture: The Discourse of Expropriation in Heidegger and Derrida." Heidegger Studies 5 (1989), 25.

\textsuperscript{78} "[t]he fundamental meaning of [discourse] is 'taking out of concealment,' revealing [Entbergen]. Revealing, 'taking from concealment,' is the happening which occurs in the logos. In the logos the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes manifest" (GM 41/27). But a paragraph later Heidegger approvingly quotes Heraclitus, "'[t]he prevailing of things has in itself a striving to conceal itself.'"
Returning to care and temporality for the moment, if Dasein is the being of care and care is defined in terms of temporality, then "being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time" (GP 389/274). So the above deconstruction of time is necessary in order to more primordially understand the Seinsfrage, and, specifically the question here within the Seinsfrage: the relation of language to the possibility of ethics. That relation must now be retrieved as a reconstruction of the question in light of the essential problematic of being, i.e., of temporality (see Introduction). Anything remotely related to ethics such as authenticity and inauthenticity (surely a connection that Heidegger in the twenties would have disliked) must be elucidated through the optic of temporality.\textsuperscript{79} Nevertheless, this thesis is not attempting to make an equation between authenticity and ethics. It is offering an interpretation of resolute Dasein as a being, when conditioned by authentic discourse, that acts in a manner accountable to its ownmost potentiality for being a whole, for being that being that sincerely cares about beings (cf. Ch. IV below).

Again, "[t]he totality of Being-in-the-world as structural whole has revealed itself as care" (SZ 231/274, cf. PIA 361, PGZ §31). As noted earlier, the whole of care is elucidated in terms of the temporal ecstases. Temporality is then a restatement of care (Dasein’s ontic inevitability) into Dasein’s ontological structure, the ecstasies of time. The importance of temporality for Dasein’s praxis is well highlighted by Øverenget:

existence has a temporal structure in being an activity (because the term ‘activity’ implies something temporal \textit{qua} dynamic), but given the fact that it has its fulfillment within

\textsuperscript{79} Cf. "our considerations hitherto, our task has been to interpret the \textit{primordial whole} of factual Dasein with regard to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic existing, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner \textit{in terms of its very basis}. Temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care" (SZ 436/486)
itself, a coherent temporal description cannot place the ‘product’ of the action after the action itself – and, conversely, you can only make an appeal to a non-sequential temporality of this kind if you are describing an activity that has no fulfillment outside itself.\textsuperscript{80}

The unity of the ecstases of time, temporality, which is also Dasein’s structural whole revealed in authenticity, means that when Dasein takes action (praxis) it does so in a way that is coherent with its ownmost potentiality for being itself described as conscience (Gewissen) (PGZ §35, SZ §57). “The call of conscience [Ruf des Gewissens] – that is, conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis [Grunde] of its Being, is care [Sorge]” (SZ 278-9/322-3). And conscience can only be realised when temporality is taken in its whole so that Dasein realises its finitude. This is genuine temporality because “temporality in the authentic sense is finite” (GP 386/273). Hence, insofar as Dasein acts with an end in mind (a finite rather than an indefinite goal), its action is in the scope of praxis. It pays heed to the limited and sited disclosure within the happening of being. The conscience of Dasein resists acting with unrestricted impunity; it must act in accord with the disclosure understood as finite and be answerable to its ownmost temporary existence. Finite Dasein cannot consciously act with cavalier insolence to beings. Such responsibility, abstract as it may seem, is rooted in Dasein’s conscious appreciation of its temporality (Zeitlichkeit). The entity that is consciously oriented forward toward its own death is temporally situated in authenticity. “The being, in which Dasein can be its wholeness authentically as being-ahead-of-itself, is time” (PGZ 441/319).\textsuperscript{81} Thus, it is

\textsuperscript{80} Einar Øverenget “Heidegger and Arendt: Against the Imperialism of Privacy.” Philosophy Today (Winter 1995), 443.

\textsuperscript{81} To review, what is being described here is Dasein’s essential care structure that is nothing other than the sum of its temporality: “that which makes possible the being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in, which makes possible the being of care” (PGZ 442/320).
with recognition of time, or temporality, as the unity of care that Dasein is receptive to its own finitude. From the point of finitude, then, it acts with praxis, insofar as it conforms to limited acting upon beings (i.e., of circumspection) rather than attempting to produce, or reproduce, beings (i.e., in terms of ideation). To act carelessly, then, as Sikka notes, means behaving “in such a manner [that] represents failure to heed the voice of conscience, which always directs to a definite, and therefore finite vocation, and it is then a failure to act in accord with the logos of physis [being].” Contrarily, acting with authentic care means not manipulating beings in the service of production or exploiting their internal limit. It means action is taken with regard to how it is done, not in an indiscriminate manner that disregards the particular sited disclosure and fabricates direct results. “These dealing,” writes Heidegger, “are praxis: conducting [Behandeln] of one’s own self in the How of dealings which are not productive, but rather are simply actional [Handeln]” (PIA 381).

II. 5. Zeitlichkeit and the logos

The site of disclosure, the space of authentic and inauthentic possibility, is given by the logos. The previous terms of praxis and poiesis (production) were located and founded upon the space of the coming into presence of beings. Now we see that the disclosure of those beings in the interstice of withdrawal and emergence is given by the logos (cf. S §26, SZ §7b, GM §69b). It is

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82 In short, the comportment of approaching the world, circumspection (assoc. with praxis, use, readiness-to-hand) and ideation (assoc. with poiesis, theory, investigation, and presence-at-hand) are a matter of how the logos shows forth entities. Circumspection and ideation are two variations on seeing what the logos shows forth. Note that Sicht, at the stem of Um-sicht, means to ‘sight’ (SZ §32). As well, Ideen comes from the Greek idein, ‘to see,’ as does ‘theoretical’ (from GRK thea, ‘view, spectacle’) (N.II223f./n.iv167f, cf. .S 349ff./341, P 222ff/261ff).

83 S. Sikka, “Heidegger’s Concept of Volk,” The Philosophical Forum 26/2 (Winter 1994), 120.
with the primacy of Dasein’s primordial acquaintance with withdrawal and emergence that
Heidegger’s focus upon a certain distress of language (Sprachnot) throughout his work can be
articulated. Our epoch, unlike the Ancient Greek one, is not characterised by language and
confined to its ground (LM 55-9). “Our epoch is unbounded, it is not limited by a word which
could give it ground.” These days, the issue of language surfaces, more often than not, as a
question of morphology, syntax, semantics, and generally as just matter that needs to be clarified.
Today, language is not in crisis (Noi). To the contrary, it is being superseded by a technological
organization that levels language to an instrument of communication for everyone (das Man);
regardless of the particular language, as an instrument of communication it is being reformed and
perfected to procure better communicative efficiency. Still, language is not so much disclosive
as it is burdensome, regrettably riddled with ambiguity, surplus meanings (Derrida), and overall
imprecision. For us, it is a noisy channel of communication and until it can be replaced with
something more economical we are stuck with it (see Ch. Three, III below).

In view of this, the relationship of language to a grounds for ethics seems irrelevant, if not
altogether misguided. After all, if this second-rate way of communicating leaves us inescapably
with frequent inaccurate meanings and doubt, then any basis of ethics lying therein should, by
default, be equally riddled with sloppiness. Not necessarily. As we have observed, Heidegger is

84 T. Oudemans, “Echoes From the Abyss?,” 71.

85 Heidegger’s point is that language is not experienced for itself. There is no distress, no need to
attend to the disclosive nature of language. Instead, language just gets used without being permitted
to speak of itself. As he writes, “at whatever time and in whatever way we speak a language,
language itself never has the floor” (OWL 58).
sure that language is there not just as a tool for encoding thoughts for communication.\footnote{Cf. John Locke, \textit{Essays Concerning Human Understanding} (1690), Book III, was one of the first to introduce such a highly functionalist view of language.} The current age needs to reassess its relationship to language for it is within the being of language that we have the thoughts to articulate our being: "the being of language becomes the language of being" (OW L 72). Language is our portal to being open to the world and temporality is our way of being-[open]-in-the-world. As Heidegger, writes "temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the 'there' [openness] (SZ 365/416). Language is the openness that brings thought into being and temporality is the horizon that introduces language into openness. Temporality is the horizon where language exists while giving dynamism and possibility to the horizon. In this way, language becomes 'the horizon of possibilities' for existence (Gadamer). Having possibilities should, then, be seen as a most fundamental point of departure for ethics insofar as acting assumes choice between wise and unwise possibilities. Because of the narrow constraints that circumscribe theoretical language, by disallowing fertile indications, it precludes a diversity of possibilities, thus, hindering the grounds of ethics to begin with. Language, under the theoretical attitude, dims the openness and so dims Dasein's potentiality for actually being-there (cf.GM 425-6/294, PLT 190).

Since language is the openness, not just our access (channel) to it, attention to the openness implies a linguistic need (Sprachnot) to appropriate the possibilities within the openness. Those possibilities are historically and temporally rich in significations. Being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode) as being aware of the future means incorporating the past so that one may act in a way that is consistent with one's potential for being a whole. Through tending
to language, the open space of temporal disclosure, I can behave in a way that both reflects my historical facticity and anticipates my finite potential for being myself (SZ §62). In this way, I can have a conversation with the future in respect of the past and this conversation is constituent of my conscience. “Dasein is historical in itself insofar as it is its possibility. In being futural, Dasein is its past, coming back to it in its How. The way of coming back is, among others, conscience” (BzP §25). In essence, conscience arrives thorough language or discourse. The series of syllogisms that allows us to move from language to circumspection to praxis to care to temporality to conscience is directly permitted by Heidegger, or so I believe, in his statement “conscience discourses” (SZ 273/318). Conscience, as one ground for ethics, is disclosed by authentic disclosure, disclosure that itself is temporal, historically sited, textually fertile, and resistant to exploitation or greater disclosure. The language of conscience is by nature elliptical, calling out for individual Dasein to interpret it according to its own factual situation and ownmost potential for being a whole integrated being.

By fully integrating my temporality, realizing the manifold issue of care, I can appropriate language not in a way of mouthing vacuous syllables, but in a lively dynamism that gives expression and form to my being. It alone informs my being and gives me access to a possibility for understanding. “Within any prevailing language in which Dasein itself is with its history every age and generation has its own language and specific possibility for understanding” (PGZ 374/271). That language yields understanding on its own suggests that the particularities of language might then condition the possibilities of understanding ethically. The de-temporalised logos which is conceptualised as propositional logic, does not easily lend itself to an understanding that would engage Dasein in praxis. Praxis, and in actuality, any grounds for
ethics, apparently needs a language context sufficiently sensitive enough to offer possibilities other than the theoretical tendency to subordinate beings to a standing reserve. Language needs to be temporally founded so that it can affect Dasein's own transcendent, temporal (care) structure and shape its authentic possibility for being itself. Language, or discourse, that enriches the interpretive moment, that illuminates the non-objective and provisional, succeeds (as the next chapter attempts to show) in creating a more positive possibility for ethics.
CHAPTER THREE: HERMENEUTICS

III. 1. Truth: A-letheia and Wahrheit
III. 2. Structuralism as Preparation for the Hermeneutical Contention
III. 3. Hermeneutics and “The Resistance to Theory”
III. 4. Apophansis and the Hermeneutical ‘as’
III. 5. Formale Anzeige: Implication of an Ethical Situation

The first chapter was an attempt to situate the philosophical climate in Germany in the twenties and thirties as alienated from the historically lived world. The second chapter sought to place alienation as a crisis within the temporal character of language (logos). Now the temporal character of language implies that the moment of decision, necessary to animate the historically lived world, unfolds as an interpretation of the meaning of being in general. This interpretation presupposes hermeneutics which demands at the same time an examination of language itself since “[l]anguage defines the hermeneutic relation” (OWL30).

The analysis of being and language is called hermeneutics, i.e., “[t]he logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of hermeneutics through which the authentic meaning of being . . . [is] made known to Dasein’s understanding of being. The phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutic” (SZ 37/62). The phenomenology of Dasein is always hermeneutic for the reason that Heidegger believes that language is never unquestionable or positivistic (cf. G 21 12). Language is the ground for the hermeneutical situation in general (cf. OWL 29). The hermeneutical situation must be explicated for, as Gunnar Skirbekk correctly observes, “[i]n order to act ethically, we certainly have to know what the situation is.”

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93
ethics, intimates the relation of hermeneutics (the interpretive nature of language) to the unfolding of the situation to which every ethical decision will be relative. Thus, to continue on this theme of language as an anticipation or possibility for a ground of ethics, this chapter will address the peculiar traits of language as they inform understanding and prompt a critical, ethical decision in a situation. Two of those traits specified by Heidegger are the hermeneutical ‘as’ and the formale Anzeige. Their importance springs from the author’s deconstruction of the usual notion of truth that has been the guiding thread for structuralist interpretations of language in the twentieth century.

III. 1. Truth: A-leathia and Wahrheit

Heidegger credits much of Husserl’s pioneering philosophy to its desire to encourage a new way of thinking by developing a new starting point for nothing less than Western thought (SD 87/79). The “crisis” of European sciences, the baselessness of research, as Husserl conceived it, was, to repeat Elisabeth Ströker, “a crisis that presented itself as nothing less than a crisis of the Western world as a whole.” If Husserl could phenomenologically reduce an entity to its content, if he could isolate “the nature of the content, in its ideal essence,” he could then have a firm basis by which inquiry could be concretely rooted so that science could start anew. This motivation to begin philosophy anew, Ströker cites as a unique move out of the realm of theory into that of praxis. Husserl’s epistemology might determine the

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4"Philosophy for Husserl was no longer solely the pure living-out of a theoretical interest, but had become as well a life-shaping and world-changing praxis."- Ströker, Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, 177.
beginning for this praxis through phenomenological reductions. With this, Heidegger
exclaims that Husserl has “thought the grand tradition of Western philosophy to end” (PGZ
30/24). In brief, Heidegger praises Husserl’s revolutionary understanding of truth for its
dynamical character and relation to intentionality (SZ §7c). Yet Heidegger is clearly of the
opinion that Husserl was too timid in his grasp of truth. Daniel Dahlstrom observes that in
Heidegger’s opinion, “Husserl also construes truth as a state of affairs, the correlate of an
objectifying act of judgment, as if truth were, indeed, something on hand.”5 Though Husserl
made the radical initial charge that truth is relative to the inexplicable givenness of the
phenomenological observer, he retreated to a version of it that could be codified by the a
priori necessity of presence (O §14). This, supposedly, returned truth to the regime of
presence that has prevailed since Plato (GM 23/16). Husserlian truth, hence, points to “the
same type of being as the proposition, namely, the ideal being. We have returned on a
curious path back to the point of departure. The proposition as a member of the relation is
found in the intuitive truth of identity, identity itself in turn as fact [Sachverhalt] has the kind
of being of a proposition or relation within a proposition: ideal being” (G 21 113).
Heidegger, then, maintains without further credit to his mentor that Husserl is, like the rest of
Western philosophy, entangled in the metaphysics of objective presence (SZ 69b). It is with
the criticism of Husserl’s theory of truth that Heidegger takes a hermeneutic turn away from
transcendental phenomenology.

Heidegger observes that “[t]he a [of α-letheia] is an α-pritive” (S 15/10). For the
Latin ‘in’ and the Germanic ‘un’ are agnations of the Greek α- prefix. That aletheia means,

5D.O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 125.
for Heidegger, unconcealing, directly implies that \(-leth\) means concealing or hiding (\textit{bergen}).

"The Greeks thus implicitly understand something negative in the innermost essence of truth" (GM 43/29). In sum, the word for truth contains both its affirmation and negation. Of course, many words have this ambivalent construction. For an important philosophical term like truth, however, to be constructed this way is telling. Truth is founded on an equivocal conjunction of unconcealing (\textit{a-letheia}) and concealing (\textit{-leth}). Linguistically, the concept of truth (dis-closure), then, is dependent on its conceptual counterpart, hiddenness. The two are historically bonded together through their opposition (cf. GP 307/215, GM 40-1/26-7).

The morphological construction of \textit{a-letheia} is important in two ways. First, truth in this ancient sense was something that took effort. To genuinely grasp the presence of something implies a duty to clear away (\textit{a-}) in order to gain access to beings. That clearing away initiates a fundamental disencumbering of thought from the daily attitude of \textit{das Man}. Truth, then, is understood as something that must be fought for, at least mentally, and won.

"This privative expression indicates that the Greeks had some understanding of the fact that the uncoveredness (\textit{Entdeckheit}) of the world must be wrested, that it is initially and for the most part not available" (S 14/11, cf. GP §18a). By analysis, criticism, and intellectual struggle, truth must apparently be "stolen" or "torn" from concealment (GM §8). This is done authentically by respecting ""truth" as a heterogeneous process of un concealment."\(^6\)

"The ontological 'truth' of existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth" (SZ 316/364). Now Wahrheit can become \textit{a-letheia} through a revolution, a

revolution not in the sense of something unprecedented but in the sense of a selective
recrudescence of the factually incorporated past. As such, it is inherently submitted to
critical review (Erwiderung) and questioning (PGZ 33/26). Hence profound questioning of
any sort, and Heidegger’s Seinsfrage in particular, is an inquest ultimately into truth.

Heidegger’s claim that the search for truth is an active participation on the part of Dasein to
uncover, to dis-close and reveal, is closely related to the second significant aspect of the
construction of a-letheia. Because truth must authentically be achieved by ‘wresting’ it from
hiddenness, truth rightfully conserves an element of its concealed determination. This is why
Heidegger can mysteriously claim that “un-truth . . . is most proper to the essence of truth . . .
[and even] concealment . . . is older than every openness” (P 148). Unconcealment is rooted
in concealment (SZ §44b). Truth itself is not a moment of total disclosure, by its
morphological composition it cannot be, otherwise it would be pure negation (a-) an “utterly
vacuous determination” (GM 424/292). Truth, in this way, always obstructs the possibility of
a fully transparent definition; Dasein always fails to make beings universally disclosable (cf.
PGZ §44, SZ §46). A-letheia genuinely discloses and brings novel phenomena into
consciousness but it fails, despite Dasein’s exhaustive and concerted energy, to make
phenomena completely transparent and available (cf. SZ §§28, 48). Entities resist transparent
disclosure insofar as there is always a vestige of concealing (un-truth) remaining in the
disclosure (truth). Hence in 1933, “concealment,” writes Heidegger, “belongs to the nature
of truth as unconcealedness. Truth, in its nature, is untruth” (PLT 54). Dasein can never
disentangle the braided antagonism of truth and un-truth because they “belong together” (ID
64, 133f). It is part of the Dasein’s fate of being a failed project, unable to achieve its
primordial aims (cf. PGZ §33, SZ §§28,46).

So within unconcealing there is this vestige of concealing. Heidegger understands
this retrieval of truth as negative insofar as it deflects and prevents any kind of thorough transparency. In “On the Essence of Truth” (1930), he calls this negative aspect a “non-essence” and at the same time he betrays a positive estimation of its role in the happening of truth. Truth proper occurs as an event that cannot be radically manipulated or circumscribed by Dasein’s trajectory to dominate beings. Dasein’s insubordination to being, its attempt to completely define entities, can never achieve superiority over beings. The fact that Dasein is ontologically precluded from totally disclosing beings, from unchecked exploitation, is the tangible remainder of the conflicting (non)essence of truth; the inner movements of which Heidegger admits are a mystery. “The proper non-essence of truth is the mystery” (P 148). That which is concealed, named the essence of unconcealing, is the conflicting nature of truth. Truth, as a mystery (Geheimnis), may signal an unfamiliar moment, one that stirs an uncanniness for its lack of place (Unheimliche) (cf. SZ §40, IM 123, NII 394/niv 284). This moment only finds its authentic truth in thought that one “enowns” and lives within the familiar site of intelligibility where language has brought manifold significance into presence in a provocative way. Now “[t]he totality-of-significations of intelligibility is put into words” (SZ 163/204).

Husserl’s great achievement for Heidegger was his deconstruction of truth which, at least ostensibly, apprehends truth as intuitive rather than as propositional in character (PGZ 67-8/49-51). This so elegantly disqualified what Dahlstrom calls the standard “bogus difficulty of trying to explain the union of some kind of self-contained psychological reality

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7Cf. Tanzer, “Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name.”

8Note that enowning (Ereignis) is not just the focus of the Beiträge but a consistent issue in Heidegger’s work beginning with G 56-7s 3-5.
with the ontologically distinct, ideal being." In other words, the problem of the external world is thematically repudiated by the self-evident givenness of experience. While deeply indebted to Husserl, Heidegger singles out the ancient Greek word *a-letheia* as particularly important in rethinking the concept of truth (SZ 38/62). In saluting Husserl's formative role in his own philosophy, Heidegger recalls that thanks to his *Investigations* "I experienced - at first more directed by premonition than from justified insight - this one thing: What takes place for the phenomenology of acts as the-self-announcement of phenomena is thought . . . as *Aletheia*, as the unhiddenness of what is present, its disclosure, its self-display" (SD 87/79). For Heidegger, Husserl evidently reticulates this 'self-announcement' back into the metaphysics of truth. Heidegger ambitiously, then, charges that "Husserl misunderstood his own work" inasmuch as he neglected to see that "the so-called logical comportments of thinking or objective theoretical knowing represent only a particular and narrow sphere within the domain of intentionality;" Heidegger locates truth for Husserl in the "realm of absolute being" or "promised land" of "transcendental consciousness." For Heidegger, *a-letheia* will unremittingly call into question the usual concept of truth by thinking the concept of truth backwards. Thus, Heidegger's redefinition of truth is truly revolutionary, not in the sense of overthrowing the modern concept of truth but rather in letting truth revolve to its beginning where it emerges as disclosing and restricting, circular in its hermeneutic

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dispensation. This is why Heidegger claims “understanding must have understood what is to
be interpreted” in the first place (SZ 73/104, cf. §33).

Hermeneutics is the method of disclosure that attempts to allow the word of language
to surface in its appropriate voice. It entails that hermeneutics be conceived as a discourse on
the being as manifested in discourse (notice the somewhat circular definition). In other
words, attention to the beings disclosed is attention to the way they presence within the nexus
of discourse. This attention is phenomenology, the discourse of the presencing of beings
(PGZ §28, GP §§1-6). Hermeneutic phenomenology allows this presencing to be taken ‘as’
something within the nexus of discourse (ZS 189/144-5). Discourse proper is an unveiling of
the world as such and such. “The character of [discourse] is indeed to speak of something as
something” (S 180/124). Discourse can describe an entity while also being unable to fully
articulate its essence. In fact, all discourse can attempt is to characterise something in its
representation of it. It cannot, and so neither can phenomenology as a whole, completely or
definitively name the essence of something. (GM §6b). The inability of phenomenology to
fix lasting conclusions is Heidegger’s implicit reply to philosophical system building that
needs indubitable cornerstones for its structure. Discourse is not exactly a cornerstone of
truth, but it does somehow underwrite it by providing a necessary condition for truth.

Nevertheless, discourse is not itself a sufficient condition for truth; truth requires affectivity
and understanding. Truth gets put into words, becomes manifest, when the three existentials
find their continuity as being-in-the-world, whose cardinal existential is discourse (cf. PGZ
§28d, SZ 349/400, OWL). Heidegger’s analysis of truth, thus, involves a destructive re-
inscription of the concept; destructive since it dismantles the concept of truth as correctness,
re-inscriptive because it entrusts discourse with disclosure. By showcasing new disclosures
as they arise in discourse, truth is made explicit, “is put into words” (SZ 160/204).
Moreover, Husserl’s phenomenological reductions find their limit in language “since language must be utilised within the suspension itself.”

In an analysis of Husserl’s vocabulary in Heidegger’s early work, Einar Øverenget places the former’s theory of wholes and parts at the base of the latter’s fundamental-ontological project. Øverenget makes the claim that Heidegger’s concrete understanding of Dasein already supposes the unitary phenomenon of a self, being-in-the-world as a whole. There is little risk here since Heidegger says almost as much. Dasein is ostensibly a singular entity, I. “The question of the “who” answers itself in terms of the “I” itself, the ‘subject,’ the ‘Self’” (SZ 114/150, cf. 181/225-6). Øverenget’s greater claim, oddly, arises from this uncontroversial contention of Dasein’s unity. The unity, he maintains, is a restatement of Husserl’s conception of wholes and parts. In other words, Heidegger’s psychology of the self is derived directly from Husserl. But what could this perchance have to do with the greater question of language’s relation to ethics? Apparently, the constitution of the self is inferred from wholes and parts much as is the being of the world.

Husserl’s Third Investigation of the Logical Investigations makes the epistemic distinction between parts (Teilen) and wholes (Ganzen). A whole is a self-evident unitary phenomenon, while parts compose the phenomenon. There are two kinds of parts: independent parts which Husserl designates as “pieces,” and those he designates as dependent parts or moments (Momente). Moments, like Heidegger’s appropriation of the term for the three existentials (Rede, Befindlichkeit, and Verstehen), cannot be conceived apart from the

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12 Ströker, Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, 20.


whole, just as the existentials must be attached to a Dasein to make sense (SZ §§29-34). Pieces make plain sense even when divorced from the whole. Moments are ontological abstractions that cannot be made sense of independently. For Heidegger, understanding is a moment of Dasein’s constitution, but it does not make sense to speak of an understanding unless it is someone’s, or some group’s understanding. Whereas for Husserl, moments are logical instances of what are known without cognition; they are a priori. There is this peculiar “unreflective self-understanding, which phenomenology calls Evidenz, the experience of truth” within the moment, Kierkegaard’s øyeblikk.15 Meanwhile, pieces, conversely, are ontic particulars, tangible parts that can stand alone; they are known through perception, a posteriori.

What does Øverenget’s archeology of these terms imply for Heidegger’s hermeneutical structure in the exegesis of the text? First of all and in harmony with the structuralists, the world does emerge, metaphorically, as a text rather than a fixed set of entities. Phenomena, for Husserl, are compounds of these irreducible instants of epistemic certainty. This thrust to find the essence (eidos) of the ‘things themselves’ locates Husserl’s technique squarely as ‘transcendental phenomenology.’ The world is pieced together in consciousness out of the above-named essentials. But the world that appears in consciousness can be objectively known to me because its contents have undergone a thorough scientific, transcendental reduction (epoché).16 With Husserl’s method one can safely make definitions and proclaim facts of nature and science. Because a transcendental understanding is possible, one can, as Schleiermacher maintained, know the intentions of an


16 Ströker, Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, 60, 97.
author and also gain an objective picture of phenomena in general. In transcendental interpretation we can achieve even greater clarity than the author of the intended message. For the purposes of better understanding, "[w]e must seek to bring into consciousness much that could remain unconscious" for the author. Since for Husserl, as well as Schleiermacher, meaning is intentionally generated by the author and identical with the 'mental object' the author had in mind, the focus of this kind of transcendental hermeneutics is to clear the channel of communication in order to uncover the true, accurate meaning. Because Spenser intended the Faerie Queene to be an allegorical poem, we today can read it with this in mind and grasp it the way it was meant to be understood. This theory of understanding is now essentially the position advanced in the American hermeneutics of E.D. Hirsch. This method of hermeneutics aims at radical, inter-subjective knowledge or transcendental knowledge. In contradistinction, Heidegger offers no formal method but ontological clues from "the 'hermeneutic' of the logos" (SZ 25/47).

From Schleiermacher (and later from Wilhelm Dilthey), Heidegger appropriates the 'hermeneutic circle,' which states in Husserlian terms that a part cannot be understood without some understanding of the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without reference to its parts (SZ 152/194). The circle has implications as well for all inquiry, since from this reasoning philosophy proper is this conscious circular movement (GM §45a). As soon as we question something, something else has already been posited. As Gunnar

Skirbekk puts it, "there is a reflective shuttling back and forth, a hermeneutic circle, since looking in between the 'custom-built' [ideal] version of an activity and what 'really goes on' is simply not on the cards." Further, questions about an activity or situation always have "presupposed' something which only the answer can bring" (SZ 7/27). The whole and the part as well as the question and the answer cannot be separated; they move in the same circle and are circumscribed by the same situation. In Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, the realization that a text is bound up in the circle of current understanding meant attempting to return to the situation at the time the author was writing. Visualizing oneself in the author’s shoes, so to speak, and getting caught up in the “web” of its nuances was the best approximation of the meaning and intention that the reader could garner from the text.21 Heidegger accepts this circle in which understanding moves but he systematically prohibits the reader, Dasein, from returning to another situation to imagine what the author intended. Dasein is always In-der-Welt-sein, which means this world here and now (cf. PGZ §§18-21, SZ §43, GM §64, IM 18). It is impossible for Dasein as being-in-the-world to believably opt out of its own concrete situation for an imagined one. First and foremost, “[m]an lives in his surrounding world, which is disclosed only within certain limits” (S 13/9, cf. SZ §12). This starkly means that the world experienced as a place where one lives, in turn, is the skeleton key for understanding. Heidegger adopts Kierkegaard’s wisdom, “’[l]ife can be interpreted only after it has been lived’” (O 16/13). Lived experience establishes limits to cognition through which understanding is affirmed. Understanding is, in fact, defined by the


boundaries and the definitions of experience. Those limits are indeed certain, and they cannot be artificially expanded through imagination. “World belongs to a relational structure [which grants] . . . our historiographical references” (P 121). While hermeneutics will disclose the previously hidden and articulate the constitution of the world, for Heidegger, this does not implicate a necessary finality to the interpretation. Hermeneutics prescribes that no disclosure be exhaustive or irrevocable (cf. O 13/10). In this way, hermeneutics respects the withdrawal (‘mystery’) in disclosure that prevents (conceals) full disclosure. As such, “the hermeneutical process must focus on what emerges from the darkness that precedes words and plunges back into concealment [withdrawal].”  

Thus, the interpretation given in hermeneutics is always open for revision and new considerations since it is based on something that cannot be wholly explicitated (the withdrawal) to begin with. One can, then, interpret according to history but at the same time answer to history and revise understandings to the current situation since no final or domineering interpretation has been handed down. Our temporal situation, writes Kisiel “admits of no absolute and once-and-for-all norm. As each situation is new, we must think anew and act anew.”  

The new situation coupled with the variability of the withdrawal of disclosure suggests that one could make a “critical reply” to history and current opinions, thereby opening the door to ethical possibilities (SZ §74).  

III. 2. Structuralism as Preparation for the Hermeneutical Contention

Contemporary criticism of literature conceives the concept of “text” as not the written word alone, but as an analogy for world disclosure. It makes the Heideggerian claim that the “quest

\[22\] Stanley Corngold, “Sein und Zeit,” 199.

\[23\] Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time, 298.

\[24\] See my Chapter V, 5 concerning the “critical reply.”
for the natural conception of the world is set in motion by suggestion from language.”

Literary criticism labels language “text” because it gathers together the symbolic existence of
phenomena. The world has the phenomenal existence of a text but it is no more certain or
absolute than the word; thus, the world can be understood by analogy with the text. As
Heidegger was completing his Habilitationsschrift, Ferdinand de Saussure was showing that
language operated according to a system and that this system is entirely differential. It is
necessarily differential because its purpose is the production of meaning (what he calls a
‘sign’) by relating the signifier (signifié) to the signified (signifiand). For de Saussure, then,
the relation of the signifier and the signified comprises the unity of meaning, but the
production of meaning is at its base differential, forever unable to settle on an undivided
significance of the sign. Because the production of meaning is not founded on immediate
experience, the sign emerges as an arbitrary and hollow. Meaning, however, is not
differential but whole and singular, as Husserl underlined. Meaning implies that something
that has a relatively certain signification for me be understood in a singular way. For
meaning to be clear, it must be comprehended in a definite, unambiguous way. The word
“match” has many meanings; it can mean a pair, a fire-starter, a contest, etc., and all these
meanings can be comparatively clear for me so long as I understand the context of any of
these at any one time. So language must be a unitary happening in that it produces a collected
meaning, by parsing other meanings from the intended one. In the case of the match as a tool
for starting fire, a small stick of wood with sulphur at the end of it that is made for the

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Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 42.

26“I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the
67.
purpose of igniting a flame, the one word match gives me this whole signification. But it is perforce differential and separating. For a word to work, that is to give a singular meaning, it must keep other significations out. "I need a match for this candle" makes no sense if I let the other significations of 'match' enter in and complicate the meaning. Of course, in the odd case such as a pun, the confusing of two meanings, the failure to exclude a meaning, for the same word is intentional; nevertheless, even those two meanings for the same word have been isolated from other meanings. Language, then for Saussure, is both singularly representing and differentiating.

In Heidegger’s Europe of the twenties, positivism, as noted in the first chapter, had its correlate in linguistics, specifically structural linguistics. De Saussure’s attention to the composition of meaning as signifying something and not something else, as representing and differentiating, suggested that the analytic study of language might be a paradigm for the analysis of its speakers. Structural anthropology arose as an application of linguistic principles to cultural practice. Structuralism likened reality to a representational system generated in the existential nexus of language.\textsuperscript{27} In other words, the internal mechanism of language might be able to unfold the social, scientific and cultural phenomena (Heidegger’s ‘facticity’) that compose any given community.\textsuperscript{28} The structure of language might be transcribed into the language of culture, science, art, and religion. Or, in the words of Frederic Jameson, structuralism ventures “to rethink everything once again in terms of

\textsuperscript{27}A fine statement of this position can be found throughout Claude Lévi-Strauss’ \textit{Structural Anthropology} (trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Schoepf, Basic Books, 1963). Lévi-Strauss asserts that by using the structure of language as a guide, the anthropologist might be able to assess cultural discontinuities and reduce them “to invariants, which is the goal of structural analysis” (295).

linguistics.”²⁹ Many different schools emerged in Continental Europe to expand this idea. Evidently, there was considerable dialogue between philosophers, sociologists, and linguists, and Husserl, even more than Saussure, was named as an inspiration for many. To the Copenhagen Circle’s Leibnizian, Viggo Brøndal, structuralism meant taking “a closer look at the rational connections inside the object being studied;” further, those positive connexions “that make up the system cannot possibly be considered simple derivations of structural correlations or oppositions... The study of real categories, whether as the content or basis of systems, will not be any less important than that of the formal structure. Husserl’s penetrating meditations on phenomenology will in this case be a source of inspiration for every logician of language.”³⁰ Structuralism, indeed, mirrored Husserl’s rigour and desire to get to the essence of things.³¹ While dealing primarily with linguistics, structuralism sought to find a lowest common denominator for linguistic elements, a sort of eidetic reduction of the word to determine its structural signification. Structuralism’s concentration on clarifying the internal signifying function of language meant for Louis Hjelslev that the “description [of language] shall be free of contradiction (self-consistent), exhaustive, and as simple as possible”; “necessarily empirical and necessarily deductive;” and that this description would evolve as a “metalanguage.”³² Structuralism departed from Husserl with such calls for metaconcepts and metalanguages but its foundation had been established. Like Husserl’s


stated desire to reinvent science upon solid indisputable phenomena, structuralism looked to
describe mankind on the basis of the structural relevance common to all languages. For
Hjemslev, the structural relevance was conceived to be a blueprint or master code for the
uncovering of objective truths in social, and perhaps physical experience. Structuralism
would achieve its goal of unearthing these patterns with reference to the basic laws of
language. As Claude Lévi-Strauss noted simply, "structural linguistics aims at discovering
general laws." And those laws could be elaborated as the laws of cultural structure in
general. The ‘general laws’ of Lévi-Strauss, or Hjemslev’s ‘metalanguage,’ modified
Saussure’s claim of the representing and differentiating function of language (basically its
sign function) by reducing its elements to a simple function of positive and negative, to an
essential binary code. The binary code was conceived as a kind of analogue record
underlying the linguistic thought process of an individual, the individual’s culture, and the
culture’s products. According to the structuralists, it is a proto-process or original law
inscribed into the essence of humanity; all this apparently is derivative from de Saussure’s
sign oriented linguistics.

In her exemplary preamble to Jacques Derrida’s postmodern or ‘post-structural’ Of
Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak credits de Saussure’s early semiotic work as the
quintessence of structuralism. He analysed the text as an arrangement of representation or

33Structuralism was also an interdisciplinary method as well as a positivistic assertion about
how things are known. Even Niels Bohr’s experimental physics vouchsafed this structuralist claim
that “the traditional differences of [human culture] in many ways resemble the different equivalent
modes in which physical experience can be described” ("Natural Philosophy and Human Culture,
Nature, CXLIII (1939), 9).

34C. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 32.

35"The binary opposition within the Saussurian sign is in a sense paradigmatic of the
Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), lviii.
identity (wholeness) and difference (nonidentity) whose production of meaning through the
signifier and the signified is the sign. De Saussure is the paradigmatic semiologist in the
sense that words are signs, or representations, of an intended meaning, rather than certain
references to mutually shared objects of discourse. The signs constantly defer meaning, as
opposed to laying claim to a finality, for the reason that the “bond between the signifier and
the signified is [always] arbitrary.” This has to be the case since signs are representations,
not direct presentations of phenomena. As Northrop Frye observed, signs have an
“autonomous verbal structure.” From this there develops a kind of mise en abîme between
the signifier and the signified that exposes the precarious footing in the relationship of words
to things. The precarious footing is allayed in the way that the differentiating nature of words
or signs is ignored and identity is constituted by coherence in ordinary usage. Remember that
Heidegger said also that signs are part of the structure of use or “equipment” (SZ 77/107).
Yet, because of its competing wholeness and differentiating character, a language (an

Note also that Derrida prefers the term ‘deconstruction’ to ‘post-modern.’ However, for
these purposes I believe that he can designated as post-modernist. I believe that Derrida fits safely
within Jean-François Lyotard’s definition of post-modernity as “incredulity of meta-narratives.” See
his report on the status of Québec universities, The Post-Modern Condition. Cf. Larochelle’s
definition of post-modernism (on p. 20 of his “Theories of Post-modernism and the Rhetorical Turn”) as “the disintegration of foundations.”

Cf. Umberto Eco’s textbook definition of a sign is “everything that, on the grounds of a
previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else” - A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1976), 16.

Cf. Donald G. Marshall, “The Ontology of the Literary Sign: Notes toward a Heideggerian
Revision of Semiology,” in Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern
Literary Hermeneutics, ed. William V. Spanos (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press,
1976), 271-81.

F. de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics, p.67.

Frye and modern linguistics essentially reject the doctrine of ‘Cratylism’ put forth in Plato’s
Cratylus. That doctrine moots the idea that there is a real, existential (versus merely conventional)
relation between words and the things to which they refer, cf. p.73.
interrelated set of signs) fails to render absolute meaning; the signifier and the signified can never equal the selfsame sign in my mind as it does in your mind. The sign is a mediated unit; not a transcendental mark of communication, but the destitution of it. 40 Contrary to the usual conception of language that placed the sign and its referent in a direct relation, de Saussure’s linguistics undermined any such correspondence. Words signify entities but there is no essential correspondence between the two. This means that Saussure has a coherence theory of language since a language makes sense only when words and things cohere to one another consistently. From this, language itself is said to be a knowable structure and that structure is said to be binary. Structuralism’s point of departure took entities in general to be what has already been signified in language as a “phonic complex through the intermediary of the word;” it is a heavily linguistic view of reality that Julia Kristeva traces directly from Saussure to Husserl. 41 She acknowledges Husserl’s contribution to structuralism’s founding because of the former’s search for irreducible elements as a means for investigation and methodology. 42

III. 3. Hermeneutics and “The Resistance to Theory”

Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, however, departs radically from the structured meaning descending from Husserl and de Saussure. Beginning with Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was the doctrine of “the art of understanding [Kunst(lehre) des Verstehens]” that could be perfected and realised (O 13/10). Husserl’s transcendental

40 Larochelle, “Theories of Post-modernity and the Rhetorical Turn,” 19.


42 The possibility for irreducible truths Dahlstrom attributes to Husserl’s “unexamined assumption that truth is the presence of a state of affairs.” See his Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 177.
phenomenology and de Saussure’s linguistic neo-pragmatism affirmed Schleiermacher’s contention insofar as it provided the ontological framework to support the possibility of certain interpretations. Meanwhile, and in review, de Saussure retains an ambiguous role since his analysis of language is structural and hence practical on one hand, though on the other that analysis leads to incomplete and ephemeral conclusions regarding the meaning of linguistic utterances due to his claim that language also and consistently differentiates. Perhaps this is why Kristeva designates Husserl as the inspiration for structuralism.

Structuralism is not just a method but a strategy for interpretation and thematizing the practicable world. Clearly, Husserl did not have linguistic structuralism in mind when he articulated his phenomenology. Still, Heidegger’s repudiation of Husserl’s transcendentalism seems to preempt the possibility of a systematic revelation of the world in structural analysis. Heidegger’s thought is able to oppose structuralism even before it becomes formalised as a science by the fact that hermeneutics is situationally interpretive rather than categorically interpretive according to a fixed and fast law. For with hermeneutics there can be no “freestanding” assertions detached from a context (S 25/18). Moreover, Heidegger’s formulation of sign and referent grounds hermeneutics in being-in-the-world, which is to say that it grounds it in direct experience and not in a theory of the structure of experience (SZ§17).

For example, Heidegger locates the definition of a sign in its referent: ready-to-hand experience or circumspective understanding in general. On reconsideration, however, circumspective understanding and signs give rise to one another in circular explication. “A sign is not a thing which stands to another thing in the relation of indicating; it is rather an

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45Cf. F. de Saussure, *A Course in General Linguistics*, ("In language there are only differences," 117).
item of equipment which explicitly raises the totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself" (SZ 79-80/110). Since the character of Dasein is this inclination for ‘looking-around’ (Umsicht), the circumspectiveness occurs through the usage structure, the facility of signs. As a being of care, Dasein is being-toward its environment and the only way that care can orient itself, i.e. in being-toward, is by means of signs (cf. PGZ 226/168, SZ §17). Further, of course, signs do not mean anything if the structure of care, which is articulated in one way in circumspection, is not already there to actually, and at the same moment, familiarise the signs as something “encumbered with” significance, or usage (SZ §43). Having said this, a semiotic theory of meaning cannot be ascribed to Heidegger because signs are not purely arbitrary but ‘encumbered with’ the environing world. Still, the dependence on signs for circumspection and also circumspection’s need for signs force interpretations to be based on a kind of loose circularity. In this way, hermeneutics is then the return to “the factual experience of life” made more clear and handy through attention to signs (P 8). Since Heidegger claims that “[s]igns always indicate [zeigen] primarily ‘wherein’ one lives,” it is then signs that disclose the worldly nature of the world. Hermeneutics proper, thus, is the interpretation of the world with express notice to signs [Zeichen] because it is through the sign that something becomes “pointed out” (Aufzeigens) (G 21 154, 133f).

By repudiating the transcendental interpretations of being in general, Heidegger casts aside the notion that knowledge might be grounded in something external to the experiential-hermeneutical circle. There is a proto-aspect, at least, of post-modernity here since there can be no superlative reference, meta-language, and no meta-concept; nor is there a pure act (Thomas Aquinas), absolute concept (Hegel), will to power (Nietzsche) to give legitimation to explanation (cf. IM 17). A “sign is always what it indicates” but the indication, for
Heidegger, is temporal (diachronic) and cannot be unambiguously whole, or fully determined.¹⁴ Dasein cannot dominate being and therefore fails to render beings completely transparent, neither is it able to attribute total significance to entities. Signs are members of the circumspective world of practical experience and, as such, they subscribe to limitations on their significance. They are what they are by virtue of their tangible limits. Contrary to de Saussure, signs cannot be arbitrary for the reason that the immediate world of concern already has circumscribed, practical limits as well as uses. Where it otherwise, Dasein would not be able to misuse things in its ready-to-hand world, which it obviously does (cf. SZ §16). Thus, there is a "recalcitrance to the ready-to-hand [which] shows that its usefulness is predetermined and so is [there already] without Dasein."¹⁵ Dasein, as a being unable to achieve itself as in full significance giving being, simply cannot give a random determination to an entity. I cannot do this because, again, Dasein is at base fallible, imperfect in its abilities. Thus, the cosmic inability of Dasein to put a final, perfect name on an entity, to find the ephemeral 'crimson word' for any entity means that every name, every interpretation is open to revision. Try as it may, Dasein remains distressed by its failing to master a transcendental appreciation of being. Importantly, this ineluctable unsuccessfulness of Dasein to realise itself as an overpowering force over beings bespeaks an ontologically

¹⁴Christina Lafont disagrees here. She portrays Heidegger as an author who implicitly holds a "theory of indirect reference." This essentially means that names are synonymous with descriptions and Heidegger does hold this to the extent that language could be de-temporalised (WHD39tr). At this point, she can claim that Heidegger is a philosopher of "objective experience," an epistemological implication of holding a theory of indirect reference. However, this is a mistaken reading given the fact that Heidegger explicitly and repeatedly specifies the contemporaneous interweaving of being and time in practical, lived-experience (PGZ §§32-6, SZ §§67-83). De-temporalised time is to temporality what the present-at-hand to handiness, namely derivative See her book Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (Graham Harmon trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 179-248f.

antiauthoritarian, tolerant stance native to Dasein. However, Dasein’s weakness in the face of being has led to the charge of detrimental quietism wherein human history is shaped by a “mysterious dispensation of fate.” But Tanzer has finely pointed out that the accusations of quietism and even capricious determinism (Farías, Greene, Theunissen, Tugendhat, et al) omit the greater issue: “Heidegger does not conceive the Dasein/being relation as asymmetrical. Being does not dictate the course of world-history to an impotent humanity; rather, being and Dasein, both possessing the structure of usage, play equally efficacious roles in the constitution of history.” The fact that hermeneutics rejects a guiding narrative or methodology and that this is grounded in Heidegger’s analytic study of being suggests that Heidegger’s thought is itself founded in a primordial as well as ethical explication of being, especially with regard to this issue of balance in the Dasein-being relationship.

Hermeneutics is inherently an ethical enterprise because it returns Dasein from a viewpoint outside of the lived world back to the situation at-hand. Hermeneutics, as Heidegger conceives it, rejects theoretical knowledge (episteme) and instead advocates moral, practical wisdom (phronesis). As Gadamer observes, then, hermeneutics is inherently ethical because it is a temporal knowledge that preserves the sanctity of the situation at-hand. In Aristotelean language, Gadamer claims that “[t]he purpose of his knowledge [the hermeneuticist’s] is to

46 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?” An Introduction to Political Philosophy, (Detroit: Wayne State, 1989), 23. Cf. similar positions held by Jürgen Habermas, Tom Rockmore, and Richard Wolin.

47 [qt. cont.] The power of being does not destroy human autonomy, but allows humanity to actively fashion its world, although this autonomy is restricted by being’s own active, autonomous dimension. Political engagement, then, is not mere arrogance from the Heideggerian point of view, and though Heidegger was no great friend to democracy, his thought does not call for quietistic self-subordination to higher authority. Tanzer, “Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name,” 96.
govern his action.”48 This situationally based ethics means that actions are governed by the temporally specific interpretation of beings. In this way, ethics becomes inspired by the possible discovery of the necessarily heterogeneous truth of the phenomenological situation and, therefore, the presence of being. Being is presence (Anwesenheit) in the sense that it includes the most precious recognition of truth, a-letheia.49 “Outward evidence for this [hermeneutic truth] (though of course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of being . . . which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, ‘presence’ [“Anwesenheit”]” (SZ 25/47). The ontologico-temporal understanding of being returns the theory of being to lived experience (Erlebnis) wherein Dasein is the being living-through (erleben) the unity of the historically prompted moment (PGZ 442/320). This essentially restores understanding to the context of life and its ‘togetherness of relations’ (Zusammenhang), the site, as we know, of being-in-the-world. Thus, hermeneutics denies the immutability of presence that accompanies fixed interpretations because of its recognition of the site of disclosure and withdrawal, or a-letheia (G 21 159, cf. PLT 75).

Against Derrida, Heidegger is not beholden to the “metaphysics of presence.”50 Being is not presence. Instead “being signifies presence” and the signifying, for Heidegger, always calls for an individual, hermeneutical interpretation (SZ 152-4/194-5, ZS 183/140) Again

48Gadamer, Truth and Method, 314. Also see Gadamer’s The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, / P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, VI.

49Note bene, Anwesenheit is to be distinguished from Gegenwart and especially Präsenz. Anwesenheit has the vested sense of residence or dwelling as in “what is one’s own, one’s substance, property” (GP 153/108-9, IM 50). Gegenwart is present temporality (Temporalität), as in the time being now (G 21 192, SZ §65). Präsenz from the Latin praesentia means objectness (Ob-jeckt), brute opposition, that covers over, opposes, or obstructs disclosure (Anwesenheit) and time (Gegenwart) (G 21 193f).

this signification takes place as a result of Dasein’s inability to make being present in a unilateral way. Dasein is damned, so to speak, not to be able to give permanent definition to being or make it unrestrictedly available. But the damning is also a blessing since being cannot be arbitrarily made present and only signified and that means that being and beings are always open to interpretation and revisiting.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, the coming-into-presence of beings (\textit{a-letheia}), which occurs in signification, is actually a realm of freedom because it is a space that is deeply hermeneutic and so radically sheltered from an authority or sovereign will. This experience of uncoerced apprehension of being within the space of heterogeneous disclosure founds the reference of Heidegger’s redefinition of freedom as “engagement in the disclosure of beings as such” (P 145). With approbation, then, Heidegger relates signs to truth (revealing): “establishing a sign can, above all, reveal” (SZ 80/111).

In some ways it would seem that Heidegger’s conception of truth is interlaced with a systematics of signification. In other words, the experience of the world at-hand might be supervenient to representation such that presence (\textit{Anwesenheit}) actually becomes expropriated. This is actually Derrida’s position, as for him the text (the sign) constitutes the system of references “which always already governs perception.”\textsuperscript{52} Borrowing Bakhtin’s generous definition of the text as “any coherent complex of signs,” the sign points to, indicates, or represents the text (the world). The question of truth for Derrida shifts from disclosure (Heidegger) to simulated disclosure (representation). According to Radloff, “[i]nasmuch as Derrida binds the question of truth to the present, the presence of the signified, ‘truth’ becomes derivative of the circuitous movement of a present constituted in

\textsuperscript{51}Peg. E. Birmingham, “Logos and the Place of the Other,” \textit{Research in Phenomenology}, 34-54.

repetition. It is a derivative of re-presentation.”53 Hence, for Derrida, representation has
greater efficacy than presence. Yet this looks to be counterintuitive given that the text cannot
break out of its own redundancy of sign multiplication and world simulation, false disclosure.
After all, is there not something overelaborate in contending that “systems of signs influence
perception, but the world does not?”54 As James L. Marsh notes, the proposition that
espouses Derridian representational theory, “all is fiction,” instantly precipitates the contrary:
“all is real.”55 And this undoubtedly elicits a fiction as a criterion for the legitimation of
fiction. While Heidegger promotes the epistemic importance of signs, they do not themselves
displace the world or its lustre. Signs are indications of a situation that give suggestions as to
how to interpret the situation generally. They do not alone constitute the world. A sign
confers significance in that it is primarily something of the category of the “in-order-to,” “an
item of equipment,” for orienting one’s being-in-the-world (SZ 78/109). But the world does
not consist entirely of signs, otherwise signs would have no individual value, no distinction,
no necessity, and no connexion to the world. Thus, “the indicating sign is grounded in a
particular circumstance” rather than in a self-contained sign matrix (PGZ 282/207). Signs
indicate, “light up,” the circumstance but fail themselves to create the circumstance (SZ
75/105). The orientation given by the sign “is grounded in the structure of reference” (PGZ
280/205). The reference structure is part of being-in-the-world (cf. SZ 77/107). Signs, given
for the purpose of bringing into concrescence the circumspective totality, at the same time


54Robert Scholes, Textual Power: Literary Theory and the Teaching of English (New Haven:

Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1989), 345. Also see his “Praxis and Ultimate Reality: Intellectual,
Moral and Religious Conversation as a Radical Political Conversation,” Ultimate Reality and
Meaning (1990), 222-40.
raise the reference structure to the fore in the question of Dasein’s identity. They bring Dasein’s ownmost reference structure into consciousness as ‘the who’ that the historical being itself is. Signs disclose the enironing world, the useful world, and the uniqueness of Dasein.\(^{56}\) This fundamental character of the sign is, in other words, a description of truth. Signs present “references and referential connections [as] . . . primarily meaning” (PGZ 286/209). Inasmuch as signs function for meaning in the realm of disclosure they are signatures of truth (G 54 54). But the discourse of truth for Heidegger is not a meta-language (Hjemslev) or a product of the inversion of reality into representation (Barthes, Derrida). This (de)constructive complexity never arises as a question. Reality, or phenomena as perceived for Heidegger, come to word immediately as robust and genuine entities of the world in original encounters of being. As well, Dasein cannot once and for all dominate the realm of being by gaining direct access to it. Dasein, rather, genuinely encounters being through being’s significations and signs that are derivative of concrete experience. However, these signs are no secondary, counterfeit representation but effulgent beings. There is no noumenal existence, no perfect forms beyond phenomenological experience, no traditional transcendentalism as “of Kant, Husserl, and idealism” (ZS 194). Signs, the hallmark of truth, abide in the immediate milieu of being-in-the-world. A sign “always remains completely within Being-in-the-world which is ‘immediate’” (SZ 81/112). Signs, and the reference structure in broad terms, remain fastened to the world, to practical experience, and do not ostensibly mediate perception apart from interpretation, which, in a characteristically circular manner, directs the fore-structure upon perception (MAL 269).

Deconstruction offers just the opposite: the sign nexus is a system of relations ‘which

\(^{56}\)M. B. Tanzer, “Heidegger on Realism and Idealism,” 101.
always already governs perception.' This moves the locus of events out of being-in-the-world to the theatre, to the representational stage, of the sign. Deconstruction is truly a theoretical view in this respect given that direct experience is essentially not possible. To quote Alex Callinicos' reading of Derrida, '[w]ords, as we have seen, no longer signify by virtue of their referring to objects . . . Meaning is now autonomous, produced through the interrelations of signifiers.'\(^{57}\) The displacement of direct experience into the system of mediated experience of the text suggests that there is an "autonomy of the signifier" from at-hand encounters.\(^{58}\) Timothy Clark now paints this displacement as deconstruction's confusion of the history of metaphysics:

it is necessary to recognise that the semiotic concept of 'the signifier' is inextricably bound up with the Cartesian notion of representation . . . For instance, assertions of the 'autonomy of the signifier' involve a dichotomy of the material and the ideal, the argument being that the former (in the shape of certain phonemes or graphemes) often determines the latter. This emphasis of the 'the free play of the signifier' remains however, a form of positivism, since the issue of the materiality and causal efficacy of the 'signifier' itself, and its supposed opposition to the signified, is not raised or considered.\(^{59}\)

In other words, deconstruction's stated semiotic displacement of the signifier (free play) from perception redirects the problematic back to Cartesian metaphysics. Notwithstanding, for Heidegger, signs do not govern perception but rather make the world an issue within perception. This resolves the metaphysical problem of dualism because signifiers are genuine entities always already in the world. Their special status makes them no more real, just more

\(^{57}\) A. T. Callinicos, \textit{Against Postmodernism} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 75


significant and so the world in general is raised to a certain level of "concern" (Besorgen) through them (SZ 57/83). "A covered railway platform takes the weather, stormy weather, into account. Public lighting, a simple street-lamp, takes darkness, the specific change to the absence of daylight and the sun, into account . . . public clocks constantly take into account the particular constellation in the world-system, the 'position' of the sun in relation to the earth" (PGZ 269-70/198). World and nature are made a concern by virtue of their phenomenal reality as they presence in the reference structure. Heidegger can deign to allow two things here: signs are neither anterior nor posterior to perception nor do they intercede in perception; and signs function to inscribe an orientation to perceptual experience, to give a sense of "worldhood" (SZ 82/114). This latter claim is not entirely compatible with the first claim when Heidegger asserts that there is this "double direction" of the world toward meaning and also of signs toward the world (PGZ 257-8/190). Still, what this in effect indicates, I believe, is that the phenomenal world includes things mediated to an extent by signs, via the reference structure, insofar as the phenomenal world is a sign (sun is the sign of light). As well, a sign is a self-existent, phenomenal entity itself for the disclosure of Dasein. In other words, sign phenomena exist as useful entities, significant to the extent that they are interpreted as ready-to-hand, i.e. in the reference structure. Dasein is the being of disclosure and the beings it discloses are actual beings of the world as interpreted in the reference structure (cf. GP 100/71, SZ §67). Dasein interprets those beings within the orientation given by the reference structure, signs, words, etc. and these are grounded in the phenomenal world. Through signs, the world is "lit up" (SZ 75/105). Against the idea of a 'free floating signifier' (de Saussure, semiotics) and infinite text ('Il n'y a pas de hors-textes,' Derrida), Heidegger insists that there is "an essential connection of the phenomenon with what we designate as meaning in the sense of the meaning of words, inasmuch as the phenomenon
possesses just such an intrinsic connection with verbal meaning, discourse” (PGZ 275/202). Words and signs are not unhinged from the phenomenal world but are unavoidably “tied” to it (SZ 192/236). Language is, thus, part of the practical world.  

Signs, words, and discourse in general are not arbitrary in their referents but have a relation to the world because Dasein is a fortiori being-in-the-world. Signs have a factual priority, which implies “fitting to the situation” where one lives (G 56-7 4). Though the “sign cannot detach itself” from its referent in the world, it can become perverted, ill-manufactured, as it were (SZ §17, cf, PGZ 272/200). The intended disassociation of the sign or word from its referent initiates an objectification of one’s being-in-the-world towards a virtual presence-at-hand. As this occurs, a shift of emphasis from the ready-to-hand into the present-at-hand signals a de-worlding of the world, with the separation of the sign from its referent. This misinterpretation of the phenomenon of reference accordingly means that the “reality of nature is constituted in these functional relations expressed, for example, by a set of differential equations of mathematical physics” (PGZ 273/201). A transcription of the historical world, for example, into the empty structure of mathematical physics instigates a statistical and calculable presence (G 61 102-9). The possibility that an artificial type of language could be created to signify the world of nature means that, indeed, the physical world would become expressed in the significance of a theory regarding physics. But this still does not mean that such a new language could capture the whole of nature or its physical forces. In principle, no language can capture the whole of nature (physis) or being. A claim to an abstract and theoretical discourse that could signify being as such would be especially dishonest. Under the theoretical attitude, the world arrives (already) “fore-sighted” and

circum-sighted (um-sichtig) but no less deficient than that of everyday discourse (GP §11).

Contemporaneously, in the theoretical humanities, specifically the language of deconstruction as devised in order to explicate the text undermines the earthy emotive experience of reading in favour of a strategic redistribution of significance to availability, to a generic presence-at-hand. This presence-at-hand isolates the sign from its referential context and effectively robs the sign of its characteristic use. Even Wittgenstein agrees here: "[e]very sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In use it is alive."\(^{61}\) But Heidegger, unlike Wittgenstein, has his sight set high in his desire to reform the university; the reign of Weberian, abstract rationalisation in the arts and sciences must be mitigated by the "with-worldly decision in a definite situation" (G61 36).\(^{62}\) The fragmenting of significance from lived-experience to thematic explanations of that experience arises through the mediation of present-at-hand objectification. Again, this is not, however, to say that signs cannot mediate perception. Dasein "tends to live away from itself" through the mediation of signs in its everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) (PGZ 210/156). Signs duplicate the sign system to abstract and thus displace the reality of the lived-world. The displacement relation of signs in reality by abstraction imbricates authentic lived-experience and introduces a diminished attunement to phenomena. This displacement "belongs in the context of the phenomenon interpreted there.


\(^{62}\)Gunnar Skirbekk expands Weber’s critique of the rational-scientific society. "Rational management and ideological concord are in the driving seat. The sciences tell us the way things are, and how the various means available are more or less suited for the attainment of this or that objective. Yet the ends in view, the values served, are beyond the scope of science - final justification is not a scientific issue, and values are chosen, not factually established. Decisionism is the watchword here, not rational consensus based on argumentation. Value questions are decided by the largest vote, not by the strongest argument, and it is in its free elections and representative political institutions that the various stands on value find a voice." See Skirbekk’s "Praxeological Reflections,” 123.
by the term ‘falling’ (Verfallen)” and inauthenticity (ZS 181/137, cf. SZ §38). Falling
develops through attention to das Man, ‘the they,’ which constantly directs Dasein not just
away from itself but also away from “belonging to enowning” its own experience (BzP
82/57). “Experiences (Erlebnisse) are Er-eignisse, insofar as they live off what is one’s own
(aus dem Eigenen leben) and life lives only thus” (G 56-7 75). The falling “which belongs to
everydayness” diminishes the centrality of distinctive experience, expropriates it, and replaces
it with vulgar familiarity and depersonalization (SZ §38). For example, Karlheinz
Stockhausen speaks of these experiences of displacement and alienation and, specifically of
authentic Erfahrung over Erlebnis through pseudo-ethnographic television63: “[t]hose
‘researchers’ who probe the most concealed corners of human society, armed with tape-deck,
camera and notebook, themselves disturb the way of life they wish to ‘investigate’ and ‘report
on’ in a distressing way - and this is especially true of film and television crews. Ultimately,
even the most primordial and once thoroughly religious events are slowly reduced to
banality.”64 Stockhausen underlines how the technology of the camera and recording
equipment expropriates the temporal events of a culture by dishonouring the specificity of
sign relations to historically and religiously inspired experiences. In brief, a discontinuity
occurs that breaks the lived experience, leaving fragmented, analysable parts (structures) that
have been purged of their worldly individuality. This deconstruction of a foreign culture
generates raw data and features of universality that can easily be incorporated into theories of
culture. Such metaphysical approaches to culture thoroughly reduce what the anthropologist
Vincent Crapanzano calls the “plurivocity, the cacophony, the baroque quality, if you will of


124
social reality" to data banks of information. The transcription of a conversation with two
native speakers of an otherwise unwritten language levels the temporal multiplicity of the
dialogue to "discontinuous digital moments" that puts the event of speech into the present-at-
hand. In all, the insurmountable problem posed by ethnographic research is this
commutation of Erfahrung into Erlebnis, the re-inscription of one reality into another by
means of sign substitution. This sign substitution can legitimately occur only if there exists
this anti-phenomenological currency among signs.

Ethnography illustrates the inadequacy of abstracting factual life from lived
experience by showcasing the contrast in the respective reference structures. The question of
the world, of nature specifically, disintegrates because the textual systematics of the sign are
conceived as superjacent to the phenomenal world. According to Radloff, this is "the essence
of language in the technological epoch: it is the system of discourse which expropriates the
identity of the entity in favour of its availability for show (for play)." This expropriation
dissimulates the original character of the thing by disintegrating its unity and making it a kind
of raw material for thought to manipulate and represent (P 183-230). Such offence against
the integrity of a phenomenon for interpretation, be it a work of literature, the waves of the
ocean, or a conversation with a stranger, is always guided by an abstraction or idea (IM 182-

65Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa (New York: Random House,
1986), xiii - xiv.


67For a practical example of sign, language, commutation and its effect of one's experience
and, ultimately, psychological make-up see the excellent article by John B. Haviland, "I got my own
word: 'Languages, Identity and Autobiography in North Queensland," Proceedings of the annual

68B. Radloff, "Das Gestell and L'écriture," 27

125
In “The Resistance to Theory,” Paul de Man ventures a pugnacious disavowal of the wholesale subscription to the concept of representation. In this essay, de Man takes aim at the enterprise of criticism and theory, or what he calls “controlled reflection.” Theory is a conception of things insofar as the things agree with a Leitmotif or guiding methodology. Moreover, de Man finds that theory does not determine the status of things afterwards in contemplation, a posteriori; it “determines an a priori conception of . . . the thing itself.” In other words, the substance of the theory, its particular hegemonic bent, colours the perception of things by spreading a conceptual film, as it were, over lived experience. Theory, in short, procures an attunement to variations of presence-at-hand. At this point, de Man suggests that literary theory’s inability (and so Dasein’s inability) to explain the text in conclusive terms means that there is this peculiar ‘resistance to theory.’ Textual strategies, no matter how sophisticated, leave “a residue of indetermination that has to be, but cannot be, resolved by grammatical means, however, extensively conceived.” Literature is de Man’s choice for reference, but his subject is much larger since it involves a re-conceptualization of the task of understanding. In short, understanding (knowledge in general) maintains itself as a product of a transcription of a methodology into the text. “To the modern mind,” Heidegger bitterly writes, “whose ideas about everything are punched out in the presses of technical-scientific calculation, the object of knowledge is part of the method” (OWL 91). Methods become

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70 Ibid., 333.

71 Ibid., 334.

72 Ibid., 343.
strategies for vanquishing uncertainty left over in hermeneutic interpretation.73 Though de Man is no friend to hermeneutics, his consideration of the role that theory plays in uncovering the phenomenal field affirms Heidegger’s diffidence in the same area. To put it differently, postulated preconceptions arise more conspicuously in the work of art, especially the literary form. Instead of elucidating the matter, the preconceptions complicate it and return it to greater obscurity. Hence, the methodological interpretation tries to avoid such indefinite interpretations. This implies that methodologies emphasise the α-, full, single disclosure, of α-letheia, truth, at the expense of other heterogeneous manifestations of disclosure. Methodologies, de Man contends, implicate a thin or disingenuous sense of truth.

William Paulson describes the scattering, undecidability effect of literature as a “noisy channel.”74 While semiotic models function on the ability of a coherent message to be both produced and received by two communicators, works of literature stifle the channel of communication by introducing “noise.”75 At one end of the spectrum are the efficient transmissions based on logic, mathematics, computer programmes, and simple, direct speech. At the other end are the disorderly messages contained in humour, innuendo, literature, and poetry. According to Paulson, de Man locates the resistance to theory within the phenomenal


75Umberto Eco in A Theory of Semiotics diagrammes the semiotic process of communication as follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>noise</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>source→transmitter→signal→channel→signal→receiver→message→destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>code</td>
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</tbody>
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space of this latter end. Because de Man turns his attention to literature, "[t]he most subtle resistance to theory thus resides in the most sophisticated of the literary theories that are committed to the resolution of textual uncertainties through grammatical or hermeneutic models." P. de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," 344.

It is the mandate of theoretical models to eliminate noise, distraction, and supplementary input within the channel of communication while moving towards an ever more immaculate and economic interpretation of the message. The problem though, as pointed out repeatedly in literary criticism, is that when at last "[f]aced with the ineluctable necessity to come to a decision, no grammatical or logical analysis can help us out."77 No one sentence can ever definitively summarise the Faerie Queen. While it is not only literature that contains noise, and evidently all communication has noise, literary works demonstrate noise more obviously and confront the reader with the question of what is the authentic meaning here - what does the work mean to me? Thematic approaches that hand down answers to such questions ignore the particularity specified in the existential-temporal space of the reader, which is to say that they strip the reader of a distinct identity (cf. G 61 102-9).

Significance, then, in authentic measure enters the equation, regardless of the text (literary or context in general), for interpretation as irreducible to the organizing features of enveloping theories. Hermeneutic interpretation means "[s]ignificance is constituted by the connections between context, goals, means, and ultimate ends that are required for human action."78 This, in turn, means that hermeneutic interpretation might be elastic enough to finesse its way out of the restrictive definition of a method as a strategy for the enterprise of scientific reduction.

76W. Paulson, The Noise of Culture, 84.

77P. de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," 344.

78P. Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 142
Heidegger would like to see hermeneutics as just this way, “original,” indicative, and non-axiomatic. Hermeneutics is the recognition of the projection of understanding onto things, which is not necessarily a radical idea but still an often unobserved one. Hermeneutic phenomenology is “the practice of phenomenology [that] discloses the ‘hermeneutical situation’” as opposed to transcendental phenomenology that tried to disclose the ‘things themselves.’ Although, hermeneutic phenomenology in contrast to a method like structuralism, asserts a sort of self-awareness that tries to uncover the practice of interpretation (Auslegung) (cf. G 63 11).

At last, instead of lamenting the opacity evinced by de Man, who accuses the text of “systematic disarticulating,” or by Heidegger, who relates Dasein’s absolute failure at “knowing it all,” these negatives can, in fact, be turned into positives (SZ 178/222). In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger celebrates the primacy of art’s oppositional value to interpretation. Art contests fixed interpretations by consistently offering new unveilings of the work of art that counter previous established ones. This is “the riddle of art” (PLT 79).

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81 Theodore Adorno, Hans-Georg Gadamer (“The Relevance of the Beautiful”) and Herbert Marcuse, among others, have taken Heidegger’s sentiment regarding art and its inherent frictional quality in respect of social conventions, that is, its dissonance from everydayness, as itself a virtue. That art is a ‘making strange (ostranienie),’ to borrow the Russian Formalists’ wording, means that art by its own nature withstands attempts to standardise or normalise its form; it resists incorporation into a hegemony or world-view. Against the Marxist idea of art as portraying an instructive political theme (Brecht, Lukács), genuine art already indicates a multiplicity of perspectives, many of which will contest the everyday attitude or ideological presumptions. As Adorno writes, “art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique in itself, rather than complying with exiting norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful,’ it criticises society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it.” From his *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 225-6.
Through endemic subterfuge, art manifestly frustrates "a timelessly valid interpretation" (BzP §277). Art's 'systematic disarticulation,' to borrow de Man's term, is not a liability but its transcendental aspect. Art is actually "the setting-into-work of truth" insofar as it is an ongoing reinterpretation of the received veracity through new appropriations of the simultaneous disclosure and withdrawal (PLT 74). This ongoing 'setting-into-work' opposes the mimetic interpretation of art for the reason that the work of art is a live creation (Dichtung) of new meaning and understanding, not a matter of representation.\(^8^2\) Whereas art thwarts the repetition of theoretical models and disrupts prevailing worldviews, systems of interpretation (methodologies) that attempt to answer the question of art furnish a discrete stratagem by not allowing the entire disclosure of the work to come in being. Systems of interpretation "are also totalizing (and potentially totalitarian) since the structures and functions they expose do not lead to the knowledge of any entity (such as a language), but rather they are an unreliable process of knowledge production that prevents all entities, including linguistic entities, from coming into discourse."\(^8^3\) A systematic interpretation defiles the being of the work, often reducing it to simple binarism. "True and false," as Marcuse notes, "right and wrong, pain and pleasure, calm and violence becomes aesthetic categories within the framework of the ōœuvre."\(^8^4\) The work of art's subversion of "a certain conception of beings as what is objectively representable" implies that art both has a disclosive power that brings novel understandings and, at the same time, an insuperable withdrawal from disclosure (BzP §277). Nevertheless, art's memorable feature is its world-disclosing faculty. "The setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and extraordinary

\(^{8^2}\)On art as representation see Plato's Republic, Book VII.

\(^{8^3}\)P. de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," 347. Nb this is the -lethe, withdrawal, of a-letheia.

\(^{8^4}\)H. Marcuse, Counter-revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 99.
and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe as such” (PLT 75). Art, then, is not the sign of truth but rather the event of *aletheia*. Art is, as Taminiaux writes, “the deepest truth, the interplay of unconcealment and concealment.”

To repeat, truth is not to be conceptualised as a significance granted from outside of being-in-the-world. “On the contrary, what is primary is being in the world, that is, concerned understanding and being in the context of meanings . . . meanings are to be understood on the basis of significance and this in turn means only on the basis of being-in-the-world” (PGZ 287-8/210). Art highlights the Crapanzano’s ‘plurivocity’ and ‘baroque quality’ of authentic being-in-the-world by calling for the implicit appeal to experience that every interpretation demands. To that extent, the work of art stands as a symbol, an indication of something. In Heidegger’s words, “it is an allegory . . . The work is a symbol,” but it is also allegorical and symbolic far beyond any semiotic claim (PLT 20). Art is, indeed, symbolic, but its point of reference is not a repetition of other signs; rather, it is the transcendental moment of truth (*aletheia*), which, in turn, awakens concrete and real possibilities.

### III. 4. Apophansis and the Hemeneutical ‘as.’

In 1928, Heidegger engages Aristotle and Kant on the discussion that being is not a real predicate (cf. GP §§7-8, GM §72).

With this engagement, Heidegger opens up the question of methodological interpretation versus hemeneutical interpretation. Heidegger finds the former to be correlative with the copula (*Kopula*) while the latter correlates with the more

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ancient hermeneutical as (Als).

By way of his study of the copula (the conjugated verb 'to be' in Indo-European languages), Heidegger observes that the 'is' of propositional sentences can neither adequately name things, nor independently ascribe meaning. The copula "is not an independent meaning such as the naming of something. Rather in its meaningful function as such, the meaning of being and 'is' is already related to something that is" (GM 471/325). The copula links two beings together but it cannot substitute one being for another, nor can it stand alone. "The 'is' behaves as if it were an expression of being" (GP 300/211). The 'is,' however, is no expression of being and it is not an attribute of being. The 'is' denotes a synthetic quality to a statement by acting essentially as a "bond" (SZ 160/202). 'The snow is white' combines the noun (and definite article) with the predicate through the verb 'to be,' but the 'is' does not express itself as an attribute of the snow. Rather, it operates as a link for snow with white. For Heidegger, "'is' means synthesis, connectedness, unity... The 'is' does not mean... some matter or thing" (GM 471/325). Nevertheless, the copula is more regularly taken to be not the connecting of two things but the determination by something or equation of something with something else. This is why Heidegger claims that, "[t]ruth (Wahrheit) is always a true proposition" (GP 267/188). The historical transition to propositional logic is now heralded in the assertion character of the 'is,' also called the "apophantic as (Als)" (SZ §7b).

The role of the 'is' of 'to be' as copula was thematised or at least partially so by the interpretations of Aristotle, Kant, and especially Hobbes (GP §§7, 16a,b). The copula functions as it does in propositions because it presupposes a profound understanding of existence, of being, on the part of Dasein. "Yes, we can only use 'is' and 'was' and suchlike

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132
words, and express what we mean in them, because we already understand being in beings before any expression and any assertions” (G 31 41). In other words, our phenomenological experience is an experience of truth, a-letheia, first-hand that provides for the possibility of validity and values, not vice versa. The validity character of the proposition implies that there must be an immutable and necessary element applied to the ‘is’ in order to establish the valid (objective truth) character demanded of the sound proposition. Heidegger, however, is putting the propositional character, derived from the ‘is’ of assertion, of the logos under erasure to examine the question of truth in general. This implies that logic is subject to reconsideration and this is why Heidegger maintains that “logic itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more originary questioning” (P 92). It is a dis-integration of propositional logic due to a shallow concept of truth (agreement), which is based on an ontologically deeper sense of truth (disclosure). Propositional logic, thus, fragments, since it is not self-sufficient, but rather ontologically dependant on disclosure (aletheia).

As mentioned, Heidegger disagrees with the established conception of truth because he contends it is superficial; truth is founded on the movement of un concealing and concealing, not on a “true assertion” (GP 286/201, cf. G 21 128, SZ §44, P 136-82). When truth is conceived as correctness, the ‘is’ of an assertion becomes posited as a copula by equating one concept with another. This value oriented performative function of the copula effaces the existential refulgence constituted by the ‘is’ (SZ 160/202). It does so by conceiving the copula in the limited role as a binding agent. There then arises a “connection between truth and the copula” (GP 256/180). The “mountain is present as . . . “ implies a metaphysics of representation (Vorstellung) (ZS 207/162). Finally, truth conceived through the copula arrives as “correctness (Richtigkeit)” (P 138, cf. SZ §44a). This image of truth as what is correct is decisive in the history of metaphysics because it fixes a-letheia to a concept
of permanence and stability. The internal movement of concealing and un concealing within
*a-letheia becomes retarded, if not disabled. Truth loses its dynamic quality and gains a
reliable perseverance in the face of variability. This relative stability becomes transcribed in
the language of science as objectivity or objective validity.

Basic propositional logic functions on the immutable values of true and false. To this,
Heidegger wants to add that the mechanics of truth functional logic are themselves founded
on an anterior perception of truth. In his deconstruction of truth, Heidegger finds that the
"[p]roposition (Satz) is not the place of truth; truth is the place of proposition" (G 21 135).
How could truth precede its existence and demonstration in the proposition? Partly, because
truth is an interpretation which is always circular, as previously noted. Yet, it is mostly that
truth can precede the proposition for the reason that Heidegger has redefined truth in terms of
the Greeks. For the Greeks truth means: "to take out of concealment, uncovering, unveiling"
(GP 307/215). This is the pre-modern view of truth that expresses disclosedness as
knowledge of beings. Knowledge is formulated through the proposition. The proposition
uses the copula to conceive truth as "the accordance of a statement (logos) with matter" (P
141). "Knowledge which has grasped beings expresses itself and settles itself in a
proposition, an assertion. We call such an assertion truth" (S 14/10). Assertion, thus, is
derivative of "apophansis" or the "apophantic 'as' (Alis)" (BT §7b, G 27 19, NII 76/niv 40).
"Finally [the] assertion has been accepted from ancient times as the primary and authentic
'locus' of truth" (SZ 154/196). This truth (Wahrheit) expressed in an assertion, however, can
only come to pass if there are things upon which an assertion can make a claim. The prior
truth to the assertion is the fact that phenomena appear in physical experience. Truth
primordially is unconcealedness (Unverborgenheit) and disclosedness (Erschlossenheit). For
this ancient sense of meaning the "Greeks have a characteristic expression for truth:
aletheia” (SZ 15/10). Aletheia means unconcealed (SZ §7B). The refiguring of truth from the pre-Socratic aletheia to the present conception of it as correctness marks the determining moment in the history of metaphysics. To retrieve aletheia means reconsidering entirely the notion of truth (BzP §236). Now Heidegger puts the synthetic concept of the ‘is’ under review as correctness is de-emphasised. Heidegger disallows the reliable synthesis function of the ‘is’ since it cannot primordially provide a “standard for interpretation (Auslegung),” for the reason that the ‘is’ does not first mean agreement (SZ 160/202). The act of interpretation originally relocates the performative goal from uniform correctness (the clear channel) back to the transcendent space of disclosure (the noisy channel). “If we translate aletheia as ‘unconcealment’ rather than ‘truth’ (Wahrheit), this translation is not merely ‘more literal;’ it contains a directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it back to the still incomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings” (P 144). Rethinking truth in terms of aletheia demonstrates that it is not a concept limited to propositions, thoughts, and judgments. Rather, it is a primary feature of reality as I perceive beings and my world. It is a direct affirmation of perceptual experience, which Heidegger called at one time Entdecktheit (disclosedness), of things within the world given as

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There is etymological reason to believe that Heidegger’s word retrievals are correct (see my footnotes in Chapter I, 5 and Chapter II, 1). Paul Friedländer, however, assails Heidegger’s translation of aletheia as well as Heidegger’s claim that Plato fundamentally redirected the meaning of the word (Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, trans. H. Meyerhoff (New York and London: Bollingin/Pantheon, 1958), 221-29). Friedländer’s claim that Heidegger misreads aletheia or concocts a phony meaning may be accurate. Were Heidegger’s retrieval of the meaning of aletheia inaccurate, it is not altogether clear, however, how damaging it would be to the Seinsfrage. Hermeneutic phenomenology seeks first “[t]he sole possibility of the ground of questioning,” not an ideal correspondence (Wahrheit) (PGZ 184-5/136). Heidegger’s name for the word truth belongs to this ‘sole possibility for the ground of questioning.’ If that name does not correspond with Friedländer’s definition, it does not disqualify Heidegger’s use of the word but rather it points to Heidegger’s greater claim regarding the necessary relevance of un concealing to ontology. And for Heidegger, it is always ontology that precedes epistemology. Cf. Arthur W.H. Adkins, “Heidegger and Language,” Philosophy 37 (1962), 229-37 and Heidegger’s Zur Sache des Denkens, 75ff.
the hermeneutical ‘as.’ (PGZ §28). The fact that entities exist and that I experience them to be such and such (apophantic ‘as’) underscores the antecedent claim that there have been these disclosures of beings (hermeneutical ‘as’) even though beings exist outside of Dasein’s field of immediate perception (SZ 75/105). In other words, truth is the basis for existential perception of any kind since it is simply disclosure (entdecken) for Dasein, “there with it from the very beginning” (PGZ 350/253). Truth is not a privileged concept that is weighed and validated in experiments and proofs. Truth occurs simply through encountering and this is where the determination of being first arises (S §3a). Heidegger’s emphasis on the hermeneutical situation to which every interpretation is relative then is consistent with his meaning of truth (PIA 358). Truth is what is encountered through the logos (discourse) of Dasein. Hermeneutics is, in sum, the practice of the destruction of the usual concept of truth contemporaneous with its re-inscription into temporally bound discourse, for in “the logos an entity is manifest” (SZ 159/201) originally as the hermeneutical ‘as.’ Not until the entity is thematised in thought can it be defined as such and such.

Heidegger distinguishes between the apophantic ‘as’ and the hermeneutical ‘as.’ The apophantic ‘as’ is the familiar as of assertions that provides the “letting-be-seen of beings” in terms of predicates; whereas the hermeneutical ‘as’ lets the proximity of the world of concern come to bear on the lived experience of dealing with our implacement in a situation (GP 312/219, cf. SZ §33). The ‘as’ of assertions points out things in isolation as endowed with certain objective traits, while the hermeneutical ‘as’ raises the totality of things in a context or situation. Assertions, as noted, assert some thing, that is they are characterised by what “shows [phainei] forth [apo]” (G 17 19, cf. SZ §7, GM 441/305, NII 76/niv 40). The assertion posits and makes a claim about something and this, ultimately, is an assertion about being or what is. Everything said with the apophantical ‘as’ approximates the logical strength
of the ‘is.’ The difference between the ‘is’ (copula) and the apophantical ‘as’ is the ontological primordiality of the latter. The apophantical ‘as’ occurs as the condition of the copula. Through the elaboration of the apophantical ‘as’ into the assertional ‘is’ the connective quality of the ‘as’ becomes equated as predicative function of the ‘is.’ At least for Hobbes, Heidegger claims, that “[t]he ‘is’ does not simply connect words, but concentrates its meaning on one and the same being. The copula is no mere connecting of words, but intervenes in the meaning of the words of an assertion, organises them around one thing, makes them connected in this deeper sense” (GP §16b, cf. GM 477/329). This intervention at the same time reconfigures the founding of disclosure for Heidegger, and thus the character of the world. In other words, the way one sees the world and, indeed, the concrete situation is given through the lens of language, specifically, here, the condition of the copula. The assertional or apophantic ‘is’ sets the basis for beings to be viewed in terms of predicates (G 65 280). When beings are viewed in terms of predicates, conceptualised as ‘such and such,’ the likelihood of thinking in terms of fixed, static definitions becomes solidified; it is a “determination of knowing as ‘theoretical’” (P 240). The knowing of existential significance (Bedeutsamkeit) falls into a statistical significance (Bedeutung) (cf. GP 369-74/261-4). In this way, assertions trumpet, not the being of direct-experience, but the “theoretical elaboration of the object” through the structural character of the apophantic ‘as’ (G1 288). This is essentially a reduction of experience to prevailing suppositions which is in direct conflict with one’s own hermeneutic experience of language. But since it is a reduction, it is a reduction from something anterior: the hermeneutical ‘as.’ The reduction narrows the margin of disclosures and, thus, defuses the scope of competing truths in favour of an overbearing paradigm. The reduction of the hermeneutical ‘as’ suggests an increase in “thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually [as] overbearing [thinking]”
If the temporal experience, the event of the world, becomes de-temporalised or de-worlded, exorcised of its authenticity through the lens of the apophantic ‘as,’ it should be no surprise that Heidegger treats the other ‘as,’ the hermeneutical ‘as,’ favourably. Though the ‘as’ can yield the character of an assertion, it “need not necessarily be also taken apart [auseinander zu legen] by making an assertion which definitively characterises it” (SZ 149/189). In other words, the ‘as’ can give “an interpretation” that reveals correlations relative to the environing world (PGZ 256-7/189). It can, as well, give a “formal characterization” that discloses the world without prohibitively interfering with it (GM 423/293). An interpretation introduces a primitive, unformed, understanding. It suggests a subjunctive, differential character to a claim rather than an assertive or magisterial one. “In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it, but when something within-the-world is encountered . . . this involvement is one which gets laid out by interpretation” (SZ 150/190-1). An interpretation in this sense, as openly encountered and non-definitive, Heidegger attributes to the hermeneutical ‘as.’ This ‘as’ of interpretation “provides crucial orientation points for all problems of hermeneutics” (PGZ 356/258). For this reason, “[t]he phenomenon of the ‘as’- structure is manifestly not to be broken up ‘into pieces’” (SZ 151/192). With such dedication to the unity of the proposition or entity to be interpreted, Heidegger’s critical assessment of methodological interpretation (i.e., Hegelianism, structuralism, and other ‘-isms’) can be clearly anticipated (ZS 136/105). A technique of explanation that gainsays the resilient, hermeneutical ‘as’- structure of originary interpretation, that rejects the insignificance accorded by being or the significance bestowed by being-in-the-world, is an effort to “still the stream” of Dasein’s organic balance; it aims to “destroy” that balance and
corrupt its flow of experiences. The pre-theoretical, hermeneutical ‘as’ contains a possibility denied by the apophantic ‘as.’ The latter can exhibit signs (Zeichen) only because the former has disclosed earlier signs, indications (Anzeichen), and those earlier signs initially show “how our understanding must first twist free from our ordinary conceptions of beings and properly transform us” (GM 428/296). The language of the hermeneutical ‘as’ therefore has this distinctly proto-ethical aspect. This aspect arises because the hermeneutical ‘as’ is precisely not the propositional ‘is.’ The hermeneutical ‘as’ is only a formally indicative likening that remains open to new likenings since it can never fix a transcendental definition, but only raise the issue of definition within a concrete situation to begin with. No hegemonic viewpoint (ideology) can come to stand as it does with the ‘as’ of assertions. The hermeneutical ‘as’ provides instead a “probing ‘having’ of formal-indicative definition . . . which never fully determines or defines its object. This in fact is its formality, providing only the ‘on-set’ of determination, seeking, promising beginnings . . . to prefigure ‘the’ way, only to be recast to point to a new way.” Thus, the notable ethical, or more rightly, proto-ethical aspect of the hermeneutical ‘as’ is its subjunctive-type, and suggestive, qualities that impede commanding viewpoints from reigning supreme.

III. 5. Formale Anzeige: Implication of an Ethical Situation

In sum, that Heidegger contends assertions are “rooted in a more originary truth (unconcealment), in the pre-predicative manifestation of beings” is interesting for the question of ethics (P 103). For Heidegger, “phenomenology is the science of the Being of beings,”

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89Quoted from J. van Buran’s Young Heidegger, 320.


original questioning begins with phenomenological experience (SZ 37/61). That experience while unexpurgated and primordial is not a-linguistic. In fact, the source of the significance of phenomena, of the world, is to be understood as linguistic. Charles Guignon, interestingly, cites Heidegger claiming just this: “what is the source of the most primordial level of intelligibility? Heidegger says it is ‘discursiveness’ of ‘speech’ (‘Rede’).”\(^7\)

According to Heidegger, language arising from the hermeneutical, pre-theoretical as-structure can give suggestions that prevent one from “falling uncritically into a specific conception of existence.”\(^2\) Creative and literary language might provide formal (formale) indications (Anzeigen) against inauthentic being-in-the-world. This language might indicate “precisely the decisive task of grasping the relation [of the hermeneutical ‘as’] in terms of its proper dimension, instead of levelling down this dimension” (GM 425/293). In other words, it might indicate or bespeak in a formal but inexplicit, unfulfilled, ways “to implement a possibility of being (Seinskönne)” myself (PGZ 431/312). That the indication is formal means that its character is to be filled out and interpreted by me, a factual Dasein (GM 404-5/279). Ergo, “[t]he hermeneutics of factual,” to quote Nelson, “is the self-explication of facticity that is not identical to itself insofar as it is not facticity but its indication.”\(^3\) The formal indication calls on and asks for participation on the part of Dasein to construct a unique interpretation of its temporal being-in-the-world, not merely a restatement of it. Fiats and global directives are internally alien to the formale Anzeige as would be the language of a dictator or Führer. “It lies in the sense of the [indicative] definition that it lets possibilities

\(^7\)C. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, ), 111. Cf. SZ§28.

\(^2\)Heidegger quoted from from van Buran’s “The Ethics of the Formale Anzeige in Heidegger,” 165.

remain (*offen lässt*), but just as much gives the directive to ‘look’ precisely toward the one coming into question at the particular time . . . The definition is essentially as task . . . The indication stresses precisely that it should remain open for other contexts of life to be able to temporalise their approach to philosophy and enactment” (G 61 66-7); and Heidegger elsewhere affirms the importance of the existential possibility of formal indication specifically for the reason that it “can never [and thank God never] be freed from the [factual possibilities of life]” (G 21 414).”74 The formal indication, to use Paulson’s term, contains a surplus of ‘noise’ since it fails to bring a definitive conception to mind. Furthermore, a definitive conception must arise after the “sketching out” (*Auszeichnung*) given through the hermeneutical ‘as’ in the pre-theoretical (G 61 41). Concepts given in formal indication do “not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only . . . [give] an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone who seeks to understand it is called upon by” her factual situation to fill in the sketch given in the indication. Formal indication, hence, allows conceptions to come into focus in a provisional, creative way due to the fact that the given context of interpretation is allowed to enact the understanding process, concretise the situation. The situation, by virtue of the formal indication, becomes more real, more relevant to decisions always at work in the understanding process, and this elevates the ethical possibilities disclosed in formally indicative situation.

The formal indication, as such, is vague and ‘noisy’ but it is not arbitrary. Formal indications are within the category of signs which are always fastened to the environing world (SZ 77/108). Hence, the formal indication by definition is not methodologically sound. It is not even a method because it is formal, systematically immature. Moreover, since it is not a

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74Quoted again from van Buran’s “Ethics of the *Formale Anzeige,*” 166-7.
method, which is a taught procedure or course of action, it is equally accessible to anyone
who is sensitive to formal indications. Simply with respect to one’s context, the formal
indication given in language means “that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by
this conceptual context to undertake a transformation of themselves into their Dasein. “But
as soon as one takes,” cautions Heidegger, “concepts without reference to their indicative
character, like a scientific concept according to the conception of ordinary understanding,
then philosophical questioning [in general] gets laid astray” (GM 430/297). Hence, the
philosophical, and so existential, significance for Heidegger of formal indication is both its
primordial untaught character (as opposed to methodologies) and its ability to reorient and
guide Dasein to its individuality with respect to the sited-temporal context. Formal
indication, thus, shares the basic trait of art’s baroque resistance to being objectified. The
incomplete picture given in the formal sign, its signature property of noise within the channel
of communication, obstructs the ability of methods, ideas, and worldviews from incontestably
incorporating these premature signs (Anzeichen) into a hegemony because the ambiguity
consistently calls on the individual Dasein to interpret in a local context (SZ 78/108).

Like literature for de Man, indicative language for Heidegger poses a categorical
resistance to theory. Indicative language of poetry and literature demonstrate this resistance
to theory through highlighting the withdrawal, the hiddenness which is at the heart of
disclosure (genuine truth) and herewith occults what Barthes calls the “dogmatic discourse”
of the “ultimate signified.”75 The -lethe within a-letheia remains conspicuous and evident

75 “Dogmatic discourse is based on a signified, and tends to valorise language through the
existence of the ultimate signified . . . But from the moment discourse lets itself be stopped
when it comes up against an ultimate[ ] signified, it becomes dogmatic. Terrorist discourse has
aggressive characteristics one may or may not approve of, but it remains within the signifier: it
manipulates language as a more or less ludic deployment of signifiers.”
against all Dasein’s attempts to eliminate, abstract, or thematise it. Indicative language exemplifies the fact that Dasein cannot get around the fact that it is “always incomplete” (PGZ 425/308, cf. SZ §46). That incompleteness, however, is ethically beneficial to Dasein in that it is forced at some point to account for itself through realizing its mortality. That Dasein’s safety in numbers, its membership in das Man, is a club it is always eventually tossed out of implies that Dasein must answer to its primordial lack when confronted with its bare, empty individuality. Herewith, only individual Dasein can honestly account for its actions in the disclosure of its denuded identity. The ethical moment, then, arises in a breakdown of the usual way of being as the breakdown discloses the fact that responsibility must be individually accounted for. For this reason, Marcuse is uneasy about politically inspired art. For him, art that reiterates dogma just affirms some ideology and becomes a vehicle of advertizing more than of creativity. Real art is art that embraces beings and the brings into being the previously unseen, a-letheia (cf. IM 159). As Marcuse writes, “[i]n its autonomy art both protests . . . and at the same time transcends . . . Thereby art subverts the dominant consciousness, the ordinary experience.”

Marcuse, like Heidegger, conceives the sovereignty of art, that is its inexplicableness or hiddenness, which separates it from the at-hand world to be its virtue or countervailing force against machination and planetary ideologies that (cf. BzP §61). It prevents and opposes “[t]he supreme idea” from becoming “the model of models” (IM 197). In short, then, non-objectifying communication of the formal indication as evinced in, for example, the arts of literature and poetry let what van Buran calls Dasein’s “ontological humility and openness” come to expression.

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67van Buran, “The Ethics of the Formale Anzeige,” p. 158.
"formally indicative" can be elucidated as "distinct from all scientific concepts" and methodological protocols, the character of Dasein's "death" (Ch. IV, 4) specifically, and selfhood in general (GM 425/293-4)

Heidegger's germinating thoughts here on non-objectifying language, formal indication, indicates to the reader a form, some form, of ethics that lies with the valence of the self and its discourse (Rede). The form of such an ethics will become more clear, though not clear-cut since it would not longer be indicative, in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER FOUR: DECONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY

IV. 1. The "Subject"
IV. 2. In-der-Welt-sein
IV. 3. Mitsein
IV. 4. Sein zum Tode
IV. 5. Dasein's Peculiar Unity
IV. 6. Selfhood and Decision

Until now, the historical situation seems to have been the dominant thread to Heidegger’s hermeneutical practice. But Heidegger cautions that the historical context should not become the governing concept in the pursuit of hermeneutical understanding. Such a governing concept could, of course, risk becoming a metaphysical concept, a super-narrative or imperial ideology. “It is for this reason that there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of being and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of being, destruction - a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the sources from which they were drawn” (GP 31/22-3). Heidegger counters the tradition by offering to “de-construct” [‘Ab-bauen’]" the historical situation as “piled on top” of the hermeneutical understanding of being (G 15 337).¹

If the first chapter was an effort to situate Dasein in its outward, life situation, this chapter is an attempt to account for that orientation through the inner structure of Dasein that determines its life situation as a whole. But to speak of Dasein’s life situation as a whole is already a nontraditional, deconstructed way of referring to the ‘I’ or Cartesian subject (cf. PGZ §26, SZ §19). Now the question of the subject, Dasein proper, arises out of the rigour of the existential

¹Quoted and translated in Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary, 183.
analytic itself to examine the character of existence and the understanding of being in general.

The contention here is that language informs Dasein of its life situation as a whole since language is already an existential component of Dasein. Language, in fact, instigates a re-conceptualization of the subject into a self known as “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) (SZ 53/78). While the communal and political situation of Chapter I lent itself to the discussion of language since, of course, language is how we primarily communicate, the significance of language to the constitution of subjectivity may be less clear. Yet Heidegger places language as the anterior term to Aristotle’s definition of man as rational animal (cf. PZG 363-5/264). If reason, at the very least is a judgement between true (Wahrheit) and false then for Heidegger even “the place of true and false is only in such living beings as make use of speech” (GP 270/190, cf. GM §64, BzP §193). Language is the theatre, so to speak, where Dasein acts, exists and encounters the world. But what kind of existence and encounters are unique to Dasein? In brief, what is Dasein? This question initiates, for Heidegger, the deconstruction of subjectivity. The deconstruction, though radical, does not destroy selfhood, nor does it abolish agency. This is important for ethics since it means that there is still an agent of some sort left intact. The structural nature of this agent, Dasein, must now be described in accordance with the existential analytic. Thus, the deconstruction of subjectivity must at the same time be an interpretation of the agent, a hermeneutical exegesis of the agent of the situation: Dasein.

IV.1. The “Subject”

Heidegger raises the issue of subjectivity at first only to redefine the subject in terms compatible with his hermeneutic phenomenology. Since hermeneutic phenomenology is an interpretation of what is given, phenomena, with respect to facticity, historical context, the subject gets subjected
in part to the situation. However, Heidegger is not ready to concede the total loss of 
subjectivity. He, in fact, needs to retain the subject in some sense or risk losing Dasein to either 
strict determinism or freewheeling decisionism, where, in either case, Dasein would be absolved 
of ethical responsibility. In the secondary literature, critics have lined up accusing Heidegger of 
both strict determinism and freewheeling decisionism. Yet Heidegger told a group of 
psychology students in Lenzerheide, "[t]o be subject to the claim [Anspruch] of presence 
[Anwesenheit] is the greatest claim that a human being makes; this is ethics" (ZS 273/217 altered, 
cf. P241-71). And if Heidegger wants to retain a possibility for ethics this means that he must 
have an agent with some degree of free-will, and if this is the case, if we take Heidegger at his 
word, it means both sets of Heidegger's critics in this area are mistaken.

Heidegger also famously reveals the ready-to-hand way in which entities are usually 
disclosed to Dasein. The fact that one enters a situation with a toolshed sort of mentality is a 
measure of projection, specifically the projection of usefulness. The world is usually a priori

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2Subjekt comes from the Latin subjectum, meaning 'what is thrown under.' Subjekt differs little 

3The critics of determinism are Jürgen Habermas (The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
Frederick Lawrence trans., Cambridge: MIT, 1987), Tom Rockmore (On Heidegger's Nazism and 
Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California, 1992), Leo Strauss ("Philosophy as Rigorous Science 
and Political Philosophy," Studies in Platonic Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983 : 29- 
37), and Richard Wolin (The Politics of Being, New York: Columbia, 1990); the main decisionistic 
Karsten Harries ("Heidegger as a Political Thinker," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed, Michael 
Murray, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), Christian Graf von Krackow (Die Entscheidung, 
Stuttgart: Enke, 1958), Karl Löwith (My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, trans. Elizabeth King, 
Chicago: University of Illinois, 1994), and Alexander Schwan (Politische Philosophie im Denken 

4Cf. Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, (Cambridge: 
coloured by the character of use; one assumes that the situation, the local world, is there to offer something for 'the in-order-to' or equipmentality. The search for the ideal tool is, as it were, the object of the basic ready-to-hand encounter indigenous to Dasein. Tools, further, are reliant on Dasein for significance as 'the world out there' does not determine the usefulness of something. "Any series of practical references terminates in Dasein itself as the ultimate purpose of its purposeful activities, as that for whom the useful possesses usefulness. While ready-to-hand entities refer beyond themselves to the environing world, the environing world is anchored in Dasein." Only Dasein can assign use and importance to entities in its interpretation.

This projective nature of Dasein's interpretation might preliminarily imply a Cartesian sense of ego-hood wherein the ego has its primal tendency in "providing" an "extreme... definition" of the interpretation of entities (SZ 98/130). Fortunately, perhaps, Dasein cannot legislate its will over entities in an unrestricted way and make them universally useful. On the contrary, Dasein is constantly frustrated in its ready-to-hand world against establishing total, 'extreme' use (definition) over entities. By the fact that Dasein itself fails to make entities arbitrarily determined, Dasein is not the only source of meaning for the world. This is a point of confrontation that Heidegger moots with Descartes insofar as the cogito ergo sum formulation implies that the subject is alone constitutive for its own being. In Heidegger's return to the toolshed, he reports that we encounter our environment in terms of Zeug or equipment. Here, Dasein is able to project its understanding of its situation while at the same time taking its cue to be a user of entities from the ontologically useful character of the world of entities. Yet, not everything is useful; a broken hammer, for example, Heidegger observes, is not useful and so

5Tanzer, "Heidegger on Realism and Idealism," 99
presents itself in a distinct “obtrusiveness” (SZ 73/103). Not being useful means that things obtrude into the regular circumspective world and present themselves as simply “the extant as what is present” (GP 153/109). An inflexible limit of the thing presents itself as the thing that it is, not as Dasein might like.

Heidegger has a most interesting discussion of ‘limits’ that occurs in a reading of a portion of Aristotle’s Physics (B). Heidegger contends that the limit (Grenze) of a thing is not to be understood as a negative principle but a positive one. With a limit a thing is circumscribed, determined as what it is. The limit of A is B; therefore A is determined as what it is by virtue of not being commutable with B. A becomes a concrete “reality as it is in fact” by virtue that it is not, that is cannot be, something else. A limit actually brings a being into existence because it sets out a frontier between the entity and its breach with not being what it is.

In Greek thought, what comes to be and passes away is what is sometimes present, sometimes absent - without limit. But peras in Greek philosophy is not ‘limit’ in the sense of the outer boundary, the point where something ends. The limit is always what limits, defines, gives footing and stability, that by which and in which something begins and is. Whatever becomes present and absent without limit has of and by itself no presencing, and it devolves into instability (P 206).

Limit gives definition and form to an entity. For “what comes up and becomes intrinsically stable <Ständig> encounters, freely and spontaneously the necessity of limit, peras . . . Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself, to limit itself” (IM 60). The limit draws the boundary and frontier against non-being, thereby allowing a being to come to stand according to its internal particularity (cf. P 206). The entity accomplishes a “sense of fulfilment <Vollendung> through abiding by its own limit” (IM 60). A limit establishes the factual

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phenomena of the world by allowing entities to come into being, by allotting a place for
disclosure. In fact, inasmuch as we are thrown into the world, placed into it, the world has
already been established by the inherent limit of the disclosure proper. "To lack limit," writes
Casey therefore, "is to lack place... The estate of place, its real estate, is a power of limit, and is
realised in the polis as 'the place of history' by the actions of poets and statesmen, warriors and
priests, activists and thinkers." Further, Heidegger finds a limit to be an internal safeguard on a
thing by maintaining its identity and preventing it from degenerating into non-being. That
without limit, the infinite, is not evident as a determined, individual entity. In fact, it seems it
may be nothing at all. Evidently, the limit of a thing gives an entity specificity and stability to
asseverate its uniqueness, to make a claim to its nonpareil being. A limit, thus, is not a defect or
deficiency in a being. "On the contrary, it is the being's restricting of itself to its confines, its
self-containment, hence the Being of the being by which it is what it is in distinction from what is
not being. For a being to come to stand on its own, then, means for it to establish a frontier for
itself." Hence, a limit is not just an end but a beginning of a thing that comes to stand on its
own internal order of change and form. Decisive limits mean opposition on the part of being to

7Casey, The Fate of Place, 262. Casey mentions that a meditation on place might be conceived
as an early moment in ethical praxis. Ethos, insofar as it respects the limit of things, implies that
violating limits expropriates and destroys the propriety of place. War is one such destruction of place
with its crimes against the limits of human dignity. The torture chamber, then, is unbounded by custom
(ethos) and is some hideous, "radical anti-place" (xiii).

8Richardson, Heidegger, 265.

9Heidegger is still following Aristotle. From the 1939 lecture course he is now in the middle of
Book B of the Physics.

Consequently, in one way phusis is spoken of as follows: it is what primarily and antecedently
underlies each single thing as 'the order-able' for beings that have in themselves the origin and
ordering of movedness and thus change. But in the other way, [phasis is addressed] as placing
into the form, i.e., as the appearance, (namely, that) which shows itself for our addressing (XII,
Dasein’s appropriation and, especially misappropriation of beings.

Heidegger even seems to hint at the misappropriation of being, of using beings unwisely, which would be a violating of the organic limit that fixes the thing as what it is. Using beings unwisely or exploiting their usefulness means transforming the being into something that has a different significance than it would otherwise have. Dasein is, of course, the being that is predestined to attempt to give its own sense and interpretation to entities (cf. SZ §18). But in extending interpretation too far, in manufacturing significance not intrinsically there, Dasein can destabilise a being by transgressing the natural limit of the being. This somehow deforms the being and relocates it within the phenomenal field. By not respecting the intrinsic limit of a being the presencing gets “distorted into a mere ‘looks like,’ ‘mere appearance,’ instead of being maintained in undistortedness (a-leatheia)” (P 206). This sounds abstract and it is, which is the point. Precisely because the form of an entity can be abstracted, this means that the internal limit of the thing becomes plastic and distorted by Dasein’s attempts to give things a complete (‘extreme’) ‘definition.’ The thing’s ultimate resistance, withdrawal from transcendent definition is countered by Dasein’s overtures to examine the entity from the point of view of abstract, objective analysis as is found in present-at-hand disclosures, disclosures themselves circumscribed by a metaphysical, objectifying discourse. Remember, Heidegger redefines truth as the play of revealing and concealing evident in the word a-leitheia, “[l]he most primordial phenomenon of truth” (SZ 220/263). When the limit of something becomes deformed, unconcealing, the a- privative aspect, gains the upper hand by diminishing the withdrawal, the -

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193a 28-31. Nb this is Heidegger’s translation from Pathmarks on page 208. It differs significantly from those more standard translations such as those of Apostle, Hardie, and Gaye).
lethe, that sustains the integrity of the thing itself. The withdrawal that shelters the definition and limit of the entity, the same withdrawal the safeguards the moment of truth of the being, is impeded in favour of an attempt to produce total disclosure and, therefore, total availability. This impetus toward availability, incidently, is the heart of the technological attitude. "Heidegger calls the essence of technology," explains Radloff, "[that] which manifests itself in the expropriation and functionalization of entities as regulated by the economics of availability and disposability." Thus, the truth of beings under conditions of technological manipulation is an exaggeration of present-at-hand disclosures of entities. Dasein's techo-idealistic advances initiate a destabilisation of the entity proper by not rightly allowing the withdrawal to make its claim on the entity. The natural entity then degenerates through lack of form. This is why Heidegger asserts that "[t]hat which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands, has form, morphē (IM 60). Limit implies form; limit means a localised existence that comes to stand in a particular, non-commutable specificity (cf. QB 58). Yet, the overwhelming desire on the part of Dasein, the user, to make things widely available for use, to exploit the present-at-hand disclosure of entities debases the limit of phusis (being, nature) (cf. GM §8d, IM 14-5, BzP §§44, 155). The debasing of beings by expropriating their limit recalls Dasein's ontological predilection to make the world an ideal space of work, only this time through the "deficient" disclosure of the present-at-hand (cf. SZ §18). This is represented in scientific-technical thinking since it radically excludes the temporal features native to ready-to-hand disclosures.

10 Radloff, "The Value of Availability in Literary Studies," 146.
11 Cf. "However, the self-placing into appearance - and therefore phusis as well - is spoken in two ways, for 'privation' [withdrawal] is something like appearance." Aristotle, Physics B, 193 b18-20. Nb this is Heidegger's translation from Pathmarks, 225.
This scientific-technical thinking can then cross over into the physical realm of nature. Genetic engineering, for example, technologically abstracts the internal nucleic code (understood as the biological limit) of a crop, modifies it, distorts it, and returns it to the plant. But the plant is now no longer the delimited plant it was, but a multi-specifiable living form capable of carrying different significations. "This essentially technological mode of thinking which is representational and hence calculative is not confined, therefore, to the scientific realm" but may be enacted, as it were, in the world of living beings, including Dasein.\textsuperscript{12}

In Heidegger's discourse on limits, he suggests that Dasein can go too far in making things objectively present for the purpose of a theoretical experiment and, therefore, forces an inequity between Dasein and being. The relationship falls out of balance as Dasein responds to being with ill-measure so as to exploit beings through getting at their very essence as defined and delineated by their internal limits. The harmony of Sein (being) with the Da (there, logos) becomes expropriated in favour of the technologically encoded discourse of availability. It represents a "being out of joint (\textit{aus der Fuge sein})" or a "disjunction (\textit{Un-Fuge})" with being in general (G5 354-5). Fortunately, perhaps, Dasein is the failed project that can never achieve its ideal ends.\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger quotes Hölderlin: "But where danger is, grows / The saving power also" (QCT 34). Hölderlin's voice here, again in Heidegger's corpus, seems to reassure the reader that Dasein can never abolish the reality of the concrete, finite world, and vice versa.

The limit of an entity, hence, opposes Dasein's endeavour to defile the entity's essential


\textsuperscript{13}Cf. Richardson, \textit{Heidegger}, 274.
definition and truth (revealing and withdrawal). Limits establish the entity as real, recalcitrant to Dasein’s overtures to redetermine it. Though, this is not to say that limits cannot be varied or altered. In this way, Paul de Man’s ‘resistance to theory’ is unwittingly an affirmation of Heidegger’s analysis of limits; a given entity cannot be used arbitrarily and neither can any intended meaning be elicited from the text. *In-der-Welt-sein*, therefore, exists still as factically important to the identity of Dasein from the point of view that the factual world isolates a set of possibilities given to Dasein.\(^{14}\) These possibilities are founded in the situation of Dasein’s existence, which is an historical limit. Thus, the natural limits inherent in the being of things acquaint Dasein with its possibilities for being-in-the-world as a set of possibilities delimited by the restricted, non-hegemonic nature of things as they are given. The integration of Dasein’s temporal specificity, facticity (or its historical limit) with the natural limit of the structure usage suggests a balanced, more harmonious and careful character of being-in-the-world, i.e., one that acts with judicious reference to the form and limit of things.

According to Heidegger, the object (*Gegenstand*) stands opposed to the subject’s attempts to incorporate all entities, by modifying their limits, into its orientation of use (BzP §148). It has been “‘there’ before anyone has observed or ascertained it;” and this constitutes “a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers” (SZ 75/105). The present-at-hand entity interrupts the average attitude of circumspection and bluntly reminds one that Dasein is not the consummate user of things it would like to be. Thus, the given structure of the world, i.e., as a set of entities endowed with specific limits, already combats Dasein’s interest in fashioning the

\(^{14}\)As Vogel keenly distinguishes, “[t]hough the past conditions the range of one’s possibilities, it is up to Dasein to make these possibilities explicit and incorporate them into its existence.” From his *The Fragile ‘We’*, 52.
world according to its own references and projections alone. In short, all ready-to-hand entities have this present-at-hand measure that is disclosed when the entity breaks, when it fails to be useful, and therefore, becomes insignificant. When the ready-to-hand thing becomes revealed as present-at-hand, a paradigm shift takes place that reveals a break in the referential context, a limit to use, that is beyond decision or control vested in Dasein. At the same time, it is obvious that Dasein does exercise control in its usual referential context. This means that Dasein is neither impotent, 'determined,' since it exercises a degree of control in its usual ready-to-hand world, and nor does it yield unchecked control since it is always eventually foiled by breakdowns revealed in present-at-hand disclosures.

Heidegger's controversial effort to 'deconstruct' the traditionally conceived subject through his understanding of involvement with entities means that Dasein is not the indubitable ego that is self-founded, an ego which in Pöggeler's words demands a "supreme being as the basis of all beings[,] . . . which is not to be questioned."¹⁵ Heidegger's sense of self is not a metaphysical or authority figure that alone determines the definition of entities and the significance or usefulness of things. Yet this is not to claim that Heidegger is proposing a rejection of the self of action and responsibility. Being-in-the-world has, in fact, a concrete self that must be considered as the locus of individual decision as it is based in the limited and concrete possibilities of worldly experiences (life) (PGZ §26).

IV. 2. In-der-Welt-sein

Heidegger's rejection of the appropriateness of the traditionally conceived subject serves as a

point of departure for the reinterpretation of subjectivity (cf. SZ §64). "Only with the aid of a radical interpretation of the subject can an untruthful subjectivism be avoided and equally blind a realism" (GP 237-8/167, cf. SZ §§43a,b). A radical interpretation of the subject, for Heidegger, aims at deconstructing the Cartesian notion of reality based on the subject itself. For "the elucidation of the reality [Realität] of the real is based upon seeing Dasein itself in its basic constitution" as being-in-the-world (PGZ 305/222). The problematic element in specifying human being as being-in-the-world is the nature of subjectivity as isolated from the world. In other words, the precise boundary of the subject from its world as being-in-the-world cannot be defined in absolute terms. As Heidegger observes, "Descartes does not doubt because he is a skeptic; rather, he must become a doubter because he posits the mathematical as the absolute ground and seeks for all knowledge a foundation that will be in accord with it. It is a question not only of finding a fundamental law for the realm of nature, but finding the very first and highest basic principle for the Being of nature" (BW 301-2). In short, the reduction of being-in-the-world to human being, subjectivity, is a by-product of the modern worldview and its projection of logistical preconceptions. Heidegger, thus, is taking issue with the concept of the indubitable subject as it is posited in conjunction with the mathematical concept of precision and self-identity. For Descartes, the soul or subject becomes pure thought and reason, while the body

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17"What about beings before There-being discovers [them]?? one might reasonably ask. "The question cannot be asked, as long as one restricts oneself to the focus of sheer phenomenology," which prescribes a 'there-being.'" Richardson, Heidegger, 44.
becomes mere matter.\textsuperscript{18} Beings, like nature, get consigned to empty matter that no longer contains the Aristotelean principle of rational organization (archê), nor have they any proper conatus (telos). The human subject, being the bearer of reason, gets mathematically defined in opposition to its environment (that which is incapable of reason). For Heidegger, then, Descartes falls victim to the fallacy of the false dichotomy; either the subject (self) is the diametrical inverse of matter (entities) or there is no subject, no sense of self that can really be known. Cartesian subjectivity arrives at the indubitable, impenetrable ego by eliminating the factical and environmental manifold that for the individual, as indeed Kant showed, is constitutive for being a sentient, thinking individual. By ignoring the situational givenness of existence, Heidegger associates the a-temporal ‘I’ with “fancies” and “popular conceptions” that seek generally, albeit unintentionally, “to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures [mathematics, certainty, etc.] in terms of the things themselves” (SZ 153/195). Included in these ‘things’ is, centrally, the concept of the incontrovertible ‘I’ whose factical situation has been thoroughly emptied of its character and therefore real possibility. The ‘I’ now becomes determined through the algorithm of the logico-mathematical fore-structure of modern interpretation. Concrete facticity, which individualises and accounts for uniqueness, temporality, and specificity, gets forfeited through the celerity of ego-centred methodological interpretation.

Facticity, in brief and as noted, is defined by the ‘facts’ about who one is and from where one comes. Dasein carries these facts about it in daily life as a feature of who it is. All understanding is thus influenced in various degrees by the historical forces that leave their

\textsuperscript{18}See Chapter 4 -“Descartes and Hyperseparation”- of Val Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993).
residue, so to speak, within the interpreter. They facilitate and make things “easy” for circumspective Dasein (PIA 359). Dasein is never “untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted” (SZ 169/213). Dasein also cannot get around the situation, the narrative, regarding the historical specificity of previous understandings. This is why, for example, Heidegger insists on reading Plato through Aristotle (cf. S 11-12/8). To read Plato without respect to the following main figure in Greek philosophy would be not just skipping over such a central figure but would represent a disingenuous attempt to understand without clarifying the understanding with respect to what is already known whether one is aware of it or not. Plato will never be the same since Aristotle came along just as the woman known as my aunt cannot be known in the same way to me without my mother; the past precedes my current understanding. Facticity is accordingly inseparable from the phenomenon of having been “thrown” (Geworfen) into the world (GP 239/168). Facticity means that my choices and my personality are not necessarily determined but that they have been circumscribed by my cultural, linguistic, and genetic situational conditions. “Existentiality,” in short, “is determined (bestimmt) always by facticity” (SZ 192/236(altered)). “That ‘pure I’, ” concludes Heidegger, “is just an empty accompaniment, it does not help us grasp experiences, it is unsuited to the role of the self [Dasein]” (G 58 247).19

Facticity, while constitutive for Dasein does not fully define Dasein. Dasein is actually contemporaneous with its facticity. To quote Dreyfus, “precisely because Dasein’s way of being makes facticity possible, it can never be defined only by its facticity.”20 When Heidegger

19Quoted and translated in Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary. 103.

counsels, “Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world, its own self is reflected back to it from things” he is suggesting that there is more to Dasein than its exclusively factual world (GP 227/159). The “question of the ‘who’ answers itself in terms of the ‘I’ itself, the ‘subject,’ the ‘Self’” not strictly in terms of the world (SZ 114/150, PGZ 325/237). Dasein’s own identity is always its “practical identity” in that is involved in day-to-day affairs and practical interests. 21 Heidegger’s sense of subjectivity unfolds not as thrownness, the givenness of facticity, but according to it. 22 To quote Heidegger from 1919-20, the phenomenological subject, the self, arrises in “the living process of gaining and losing familiarity with the concrete lived life itself […] means: the living situation becomes intelligible” (G 58 165). 23 In other words, subjectivity, for Heidegger, is deconstructed, put under erasure inasmuch as “the ontological concept of the subject [cogito] characterises not the Selfhood of the ‘I’ qua Self, but the sameness and constancy [Beständigkeit] of something that is always present-at-hand” (SZ 319/367). With the Cartesian sense of ego, Heidegger wishes to deconstruct this ego, break it of its metaphysical unity into its thrown involvements and practical interests in those involvements.

Though Heidegger’s interpretation of subjectivity is radical and destructive, it does not

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22 It is important to note that Heidegger does not brazenly dismiss modern subjectivity but arrives at his position through the course of the existential analytic designated as hermeneutic phenomenology. See Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World,” in E. Saarinen et al., eds, Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 370-6. Heidegger’s critique is largely against modernity’s assertion of subjectivity as a-historical, impersonal, and “rootless;” Standish, Beyond the Self, 137.

23 Translated in Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary, 104.
abolish the subject in the sense of a performative agent. Clearly selfhood survives in some respects (GP 415-6/293). This fourth subsection, “Sein zum Tode,” in fact, shows that Heidegger proclaims an undeniable sense of individual agency when Dasein is confronted with its death. Being-toward-death retrieves some sense of selfhood from the postmodern dissolution of the subject (Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, Baudrillard et al.). Heidegger is able to rescue the self from the subject and this, at least, provides an agent of action (responsiveness), and possibly ethical action (responsibility). Heidegger attributes this sense of self to the phenomenological givenness of being a person. That givenness is evident as “a single primordially unitary phenomenon” (SZ 181/226). “This unitary phenomenon [the self],” Heidegger writes, “has a measure of primacy . . . but this does not imply that this unitary phenomenon appears prior to the whole [of relations] in an independent sense.” To the self, the breakdown situation discloses not a lack of unity but a failure to make the world significant, worldly relations appear fractured and useless. Yet, what if the unitary phenomenon of Dasein itself were to appear fractured or were at least to come into question? Since Dasein understands itself though its world, the breakdown of the world implicates the suggestion of a breakdown of Dasein. Such a breakdown is philosophically interesting in that it initiates a breaking down (deconstruction) of the unitary of phenomenon that is Dasein. Instead of Dasein seeing itself as a productive and useful member of its world, just as it sees other things in the world as productive and useful, the ontological breakdown of Dasein’s identity puts it in “estrangement” with itself, just as the ontic breakdown of things estranges

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24 As Jean Gebser cautions, for instance, “[t]he supersession of the subject-object dichotomy is not the same as their loss.” - Gebser, The Ever-Present Origin, 386.

25 Quoted from Øverenget’s, Seeing the Self, 234.
things in their usual relations (PGZ 437/316). This is not to say that Dasein sees itself in the same way it sees entities of use. It does not. It merely highlights the formidable influence that the world, and situation, exert on Dasein’s ontic involvements and ontological sense of self. In other words, an ontic breakdown can be ontologised as a breakdown of Dasein.

IV. 3. Mitsein

Being-in-the-world is being in the world with other people and it is important that Heidegger dedicates a portion of Sein und Zeit to the discussion of others because any “possibility of ethics,” to speak broadly and vaguely, should recognise the autonomy and reality of other people. Heidegger is clear on the fact that others co-constitute the world: “the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitsein]” (SZ 118/155).26

The ‘who’ of Dasein is disclosed through the world.27 Being-in-the-world is disclosed specifically with the mediated self-reflection of the world. The involvement with the ready-to-hand is a definite facet of the world for Dasein and here, in fact in the ready-to-hand mode, others are always specifically implicated. “In explicating the environing world of the craftsman, the phenomenon of the public world appeared . . . there are others for whom the work is [produced]”

26 Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are remarkably similar in their phenomenological exegesis of the world and others. See Merleau-Ponty’s interesting discussion on être pour autrui in his Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1962), Part II, Ch., “Other Selves and the Human World.”

27 As Richardson clearly puts it, “There-being [Dasein] is not an isolated being, existing in complete separation from all other There-beings. It is in-the-world with other There-beings. It is by reason of this with-being, too, that there-being is what it is. For the same reason, the World is always a with-world;” from: Heidegger, 59.
Thus, Dasein’s de facto everyday being unmistakeably points to other Daseine in the world wherein one “dwells” (cf. PLT 147, SZ 117/153, PGZ 327-335/237-243). Whether there are others physically present or not then becomes less important since the very structure of use indicates the public character of action wherein Dasein lives. Dasein is this public being. As Øverenget writes, the “who” of human beings is disclosed through action, and action takes place in the public space. The ‘who’ of Dasein is here typically disclosed in everyday public action. The action takes place publicly, with others in mind, regardless of whether or not they are present. Thus, there is a very “fluid boundary between the public and one’s own being-in-the-world” and the two worlds are practically the same in everyday life (PGZ 326-7/237). Consequently, Mitsein (being-with) and even Middasein (being-with-others) include within their structures being by one’s self (cf. SZ 118/155).

Heidegger’s discussion of Mitsein and Middasein is a necessary constituent for an investigation of ethics but it is not itself sufficient for an ethics. Actually, there is ostensible

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28 Roland Barthes has an interesting contribution regarding the work related world and registers of language. The comportment of the craftsman, specifically the woodcutter, he claims, arises through the common space that arises in dialogue with others who are the recipient of the work. Barthes explores the relationship between language and mood in, perhaps, a more explicit way than Heidegger. See Barthes’ Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag (Oxford: Fontana Pocket Readers, Fontana/Collins, 1983), 100.

29 Dasein’s way of being-in consists in dwelling or residing, that is, being ‘alongside’ (bei) the world as if it were at home there. No wonder that Heidegger considers such residing to contain echoes of taking care (as in collo: ‘I take care’) and cherishing (as in diligo: ‘I cherish’). Each of these expressions bears on place, especially on home-place, conjuring up a dense and suggestive sense of implacement as in-dwelling.” Casey, The Fate of Place, 246.

30 Cf. Tanzer, “Heidegger on Realism and Idealism,” 105.


32 Frederick Olafson notably suggests Mitsein is the necessary and sufficient condition for ethics in Sein und Zeit. Olafson, however, ignores the fact that Heidegger gives comparatively little space to Mitsein in the text. Far more troublesome, however, is his desire to derive moral principles out of the
rationale to be quite concerned about the involvements that Dasein is tied to through Mitsein when Heidegger turns to the subject of das Man. Heidegger associates the publicness of Dasein with das Man. As mentioned in Chapter II, das Man is the thoroughly inauthentic creature incarnated as a kind of composite of public life. Das Man is responsible for the retreat of individuality and the levelling of distinctiveness native to each person (cf. G 63 7). Thanks to Das Man truth, disclosure, get mishandled and “the act of disclosing (Erschliessen) [changes] into an act of closing off (Verschliessen)” (SZ 169/213). Das Man is then interpreted negatively insofar as its public face is the hallmark of inauthenticity. Understanding becomes a truncated operation for the individual Dasein of das Man since it arrives as already doled out by the public and this results in a “lapse of interpretation and so of the disclosedness of Dasein” (PGZ 378/273). In this very way, Dasein “becomes simply one of the crowd - it loses itself.”

“[t]he core of the operative context (Wirkungszusammenhang), its primary element or cell, is the individual,” the individual tends to become absorbed by that context, so much so that the individual Dasein risks being embodied as just anybody in the social field. It hazards being

structure of being-with. He charges that his “thesis will be that our Mitsein yields not only a deontological principal . . . but an axiological one as well” (from: Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein,” 70). I find Olafson’s reading to be a weak one. Herman Philipse’s review of Olafson’s book seems adroit. The book he writes “is a variety of foundationalism, and it belongs to the tradition of liberal humanist moral theory, which Heidegger rejected in all phases of his career” (from his “Heidegger and Ethics,” review of Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, by Frederick Olafson, in Inquiry 42, 441). In fact, seven years later Heidegger explicitly rejects moral oughts because they refer one’s own lived-experience away from one’s self to mass “ideas” and “prototypes” (IM 196-9). For the reason that Heidegger is uncomfortable with moral oughts, I am not advocating a principled ethics in Heidegger’s existential analytic. Heidegger’s ontology is more honestly read with regards to ethics as a prolegomena. Lawerence Vogel shares basically the same opinion as well in his Fragile We.

33Richardson, Heidegger, 71.

34Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 134

163
overwhelmed by the social field, becoming anybody (das Man) in the field. As this happens, Dasein surrenders its sovereignty such that “[i]t is 'they' (das Man) who factically live the [Dasein’s] individual life” (PIA 366). The docile capitulation of Dasein to its factual involvements invites, perhaps, not just being-inauthentic, but worse, a rejection of an attempt to establish its balance with being and so a rejection of the ontological possibility of being responsive, responsible toward being. Still, this is not to propose that the Dasein who is the opposite, domineering in its involvements, would be the paradigm of authenticity. Far from it, since this kind of existence is that of the decisionist, the tyrant, or Führer, someone who is radically out of balance with herself and being.³⁵ This improper comportment is dubbed by Nicholson “psychological autism.” Such a comportment, rather Sikka writes, “means being out of sorts with being, refusal to accord with being, where this discordance is the source of human discord.”³⁶ The Dasein-being relationship is such that Dasein and being act in antagonism.

Being needs Dasein and its language to differentiate and collect beings into appearance; coincidently Dasein, whose “ground” is the logos, needs being to confront it. This implies that to relinquish one’s responsibility to being is a kind of ontological injustice. To misunderstand one’s “bond with being (dikē)” intimates an injustice on the part of Dasein to claim itself (IM 167). Thus, to be inauthentic is to be an individual that has been seduced, so to speak, by the ease of generally living away from one’s self. It means living in the narrow, frame of mind as someone unable or unwilling to accept difference, that is what is different from public opinion.

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³⁶Sikka, “Heidegger’s Concept of Volk,” 120
To refuse responsibility, to be deeply assimilated into the public without heed to the self, this is worse; it is to live the life not of inauthenticity; but to live the life of anonymity, of not anyone but of "nobody" (PIA 366). That, conceivably, means essentially not living at all.

The deconstruction of subjectivity, hence, allows for an assessment of life if life is understood in terms of being-in-the-world-with-others, rather than being an isolated subject. That means that the relationship afforded by Dasein in its conversation with being (dike) discloses the possibilities of responding and acting in accordance with being, especially as it is encountered in others. The ontological priority of language and its various registers in this relationship, and thus to the possibilities of responding and acting, is examined in Chapter V.

IV. 4. Sein zum Tode

Since the turn to inauthenticity and anonymous life was related to the narrowing (inauthenticity) and closing-off (anonymity) of the space of disclosure, it is not surprising that the move to authenticity implies a broadening or opening of disclosure.37 Further, the breakdown situation disclosed the problematic nature of objective, certain interpretations of the world. In fact, the breakdowns reveal that no tool or context of relations is ever fully or permanently determined. The interpretation of the world is always threatening to be rewritten after a specific breakdown. As Dasein breaks down, its sense of subjectivity is likewise revised in terms that reflect its situational involvements. Dasein would prefer not to have these breakdowns, ontic or ontological, since it reveals its constitutional lack or inability to wrest a conclusive interpretation. Hence, Dasein finds itself to be incomplete. For "[a]s long as Dasein is, there is in every case

37 Corinne Painter and Thomas Sheehan, "Choosing One's Fate: A Re-Reading of Sein und Zeit §74," Research in Phenomenology 29 (1999), 66.
something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be" (SZ 233/276). This is, again, part
of Dasein’s nature not to achieve itself, to be a failed project, always menaced by the disaster of
failure (cf. IM 161). Dasein’s realization of its incompleteness and lack in achieving itself
occurs through a break with its usual orientation toward das Man (cf. SZ 75/105-6). Dasein is
forced to endure these breaks because it is itself a broken phenomenon; it is Da-sein, neither
completely whole (-Sein) nor wholly there (da-). The reality of this fact of congenital deficiency,
evidently, is Dasein’s source of anxiety from which derives its authenticity and realism (cf. PGZ
§34b, SZ §§54-60f).

To be clear, the source of anxiety is this breakdown situation. During a failure or
breakdown, one realises that the significance of the world and the control one has in it are in
jeopardy. If “the world is encountered in the character of significance (Bedeutsamkeit)” then
with the lack of significance Dasein will find itself in an alien and uncanny (Unheimlichkeit)
state-of-being (Befindlichkeit) (PIA 363). One’s state-of-being becomes inescapably anxious.
“The utter insignificance which,” Heidegger reports, “makes itself known in the ‘nothing and
nowhere,’ does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are
of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-
world, the world in its bare worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself” (SZ 187/231). In anxiety
Dasein loses its grip on the world as the world becomes bare and insignificant because it comes
to the realization that it is incomplete and will “always [be] incomplete . . . so long as it is” (PGZ
425/308). Still more worrisome, perhaps, is the incontrovertible reality that one day I will not be
at all. The incomprehensibility of the fact that I will cease to exist coupled with the absolute

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38 Tanzer, “Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name,” 93.
necessity that this will happen is the prise realization that robs me of my everydayness. Because of this, the usual orientation in life is to escape this horrifying reality. Dying essentially gets palmed off as an issue to be discharged as if one could continue on once the issue is dealt with. Though it does not solve the issue, it is often sufficient to rehearse a voice of something like “one of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us” (SZ 253/297). In this voice, Heidegger purposefully employs the third person since it gives death further distance as it declines to deal with me, the I, but rather just with the nameless ‘one.’ It is always ‘someone’ who dies because everybody dies, but not me and not now. Yet this is cavalier in respect of my necessary fate. As well, it is a kind of living in bad faith (Sartre), or living inauthentically, since it is precisely everybody who never dies; the public has always existed and will continue existing. If I try to come to grips with death by making it a theme, an idea, or an issue in my life (as say a hospice worker), this would still only be a projection of my interest, not the unsurpassable reality of death’s necessity for me. My death may be mourned or welcomed by others but nobody else will die my death. “That is to say: no one can relieve the other of his dying . . . More precisely, every Dasein insofar as it is, has already taken this way of being upon itself. Death is in each instance and in its own time my own death; it belongs to me insofar as I am” (PGZ 428-9/310).

39 As Hector-Neri Castañeda observes, the problem is that “there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I.” Thus, to say that one will die does not ostensibly mean that my existence will cease. See his The Phenomeno-logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness, ed. James Hart and Tomis Kapitan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 7, 8f.

For the reason that death is so intimate, so incommutable, Dasein contracts an attack of nerves in the face of death. “Being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode) is taken as evasion in the face of death” (SZ 255/299). The evasion is manifested as a flight “towards the absorption in the world,” towards the comfort of the public, das Man, that never dies (PIA 364). Though an attack of nerves can happen anywhere, it is not surprising that Heidegger relates that it “frequently” takes place in being alone since being alone ontically is more often cause for loneliness (PGZ 400/289). Dasein, however, need not be alone to feel isolated just as it need not be with others to feel accompanied by others.\textsuperscript{41} Heidegger then claims that Dasein is both absorbed in its environment through its dealings and is a radically limited self that is not at all reducible to its environment. It is part of Dasein’s ontological constitution to carry the structure of being-with-others and solitariness with it at all times (cf. SZ 186-9/231-3). Though, to repeat, Dasein is more often engaged with the former structure due to its ontological propensity to avoid its own self. Nevertheless, Dasein is always itself as being-with-others and (simultaneously) being-alone.

This returns the discussion to the self proper. In being-towards-death, the self is disclosed in unequivocal reality. The résumé of the retrieval of the self from das Man looks this way. Das Man was connected with its world of involvements, in the ontic world. In this world, Heidegger showed how a breakdown in the ready-to-hand context, the broken hammer for example, leads to a breakup of the referential field. Unusable entities came to be understood as

\textsuperscript{41}Being-with-others “is thus that it is ontologically always [in] a communication (Mitteilung), even though in the ontic dimension of a particular individual comportment there may be no one around to see. It is for the same reason that, when, by attend-ing to others, There-being lets-be-seen the project which it shares with others, this attend-ing is a mode of logos” (Richardson, Heidegger, 68).
insignificant, disclosed in the present-at-hand construction of the world. In the Second Part of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger ontologises the referential context (cf. PGZ §§32-6, GP §§19-22).

Instead of having involvements with things, we have involvements with people; instead of things breaking, and the vacuity of reality entering in, we have people breaking down (psychologically) and the meaninglessness of existence cascading forth (ZS 39/31). The unalterability and "dread of death," from which existential breakdowns were derived, are to be correlated with the self's understanding of the existential reality of one's own terminal, limited life (PGZ 403/291).

Therefore, Dasein is both a being whose trajectory is always towards accomplishing its ends while, and invariably, being frustrated by the refractoriness of its own limit (death) and that of things (insignificance).

### IV. 5. Dasein's Peculiar Unity

Heidegger claims that Dasein is to be understood authentically as that being whose identity is marked indelibly by the reality of death. Given Dasein's character as a being that is finite and, therefore, in essence concrete, worldly, and alive in this world, the interpretation of Dasein's identity must follow according to its factual givenness as being-in-the-world of involvements.

What is significant to Dasein in its everyday concern are ontic matters that, as mentioned, relate to that of use (the ready-to-hand world), or not (the present-at-hand), or that of being with others (*Mitsein*). Dasein is a unity in terms of its existential moments (affectivity, language, understanding) that are the foundation of care. Dasein's existential moments or ontological

\[ \text{42See Kisiel's discussion of ontological limits ("limit situations") in The Genesis of Being and Time, 139-43.} \]

\[ \text{43Regarding the technical moments, see my discussion in Chapter III, 1. Also see E. Øverenget, "The Presence of Husserl's Theory of Wholes and Parts in Heidegger's Phenomenology," 171-198.} \]
characteristics found the basis for being a whole. "Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole...[T]his structure has been elucidated phenomenally as a whole, and also in its constitutive moments (konstitutiven Momenten), though always on this basis" (SZ 180/225 altered). Dasein phenomenologically perceives its own self as its "reference to the world" before it becomes consciously aware of its constitution (ZS 69/54). Dasein’s structural unity is not "reached by building it up out of its elements" (SZ 181/226). The unity arrives already constituted; were it the other way around the unity would not develop. It would be piecemeal and fragmented. Heidegger suggests that this does sometimes happen and he links it to a "privation" of unity: “not being [psychologically] healthy, being sick” (ZS 59/47).

When Heidegger ontologises the ontic world, the nature of Dasein’s involvements and concerns gets characterised as ‘care’ (Sorge). If that care is realised in concert with one’s understanding of personal finitude, the essential attribute of care is constituted authentically. Dasein is then identified as a self whose being is care. “Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-one’s-Self - that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s being as care. In terms of care, the constancy [Ständigkeit] of the Self, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified" (SZ 322/369). Thus, Heidegger’s deconstruction of the subjective ‘I’ devolves to the self, which he characterises as just “our ‘natural’ point of departure [for] Dasein’s everyday interpretation,” and then into the “unity” of the structural whole of Dasein fundamentally understood as ‘care’ (SZ §64).

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44Cf. Øverenget, Seeing the Self, 232.

Dasein’s unity is interesting for two reasons. First, that there is this putative unity or self means that responsibility and decision for action (praxis) get referred to a specific unity, a Dasein. Heidegger is clear on this. Authentic Dasein, a unity to be sure, "signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking-action" (SZ 294/341). Secondly, if Dasein is a unity, then it is a unity of what? Its lone existential moments? No, the unity is and is actualised as the existential, intercalated moments in the transcendental horizon of time. Time is the force behind the enacting of the transcendental moments named as care. Dasein is always "temporally particular," a being enacted by the vitality of "historicity and temporality" (PGZ 205-6/153). If Dasein is a finite being from "which Dasein gets its definite character," according to the explicating of being-toward death, then its temporal limit inscribes the identity of Dasein (SZ 241/285). In fact, it is time that is the reactive element in establishing selfhood insofar as it puts the existentials into motion. Time lets the existentials move and determines their specificity (unity) according their own "particular while" as established in the structure of care in general (PGZ 206/154). Conceived this way, the self is not the Cartesian ego or even the Kantian 'I' that is "the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together" but rather a co-determination of the existentials as activated in the medium of time, which together is called 'care' (SZ 319/367).

As the existential moments are brought into candesence, so to speak, through temporality, then there is indeed a persuasive, silver moment where decision, and thus responsibility, enters the movement of Dasein’s unity. It is a moment (Augenblick) that can, perhaps, encourage Dasein’s potentiality for being-a-whole, collected and authentic human being. In other words,

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46 Regarding the term 'Augenblick' see Peg Birmingham’s keen explicating in her “The Time of the Political," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14/2-15/1 (1991), 27-8. Also see my explication below.
Dasein’s experience of itself, its unity, might be explained by recourse to its existential moments within the unity of temporality. Kisiel suggests that the self’s experience of unity can become authentic when it is temporalised in the existential moment of logos. When effulgent temporalisation takes effect, the logos, specifically rhetoric (cf. Ch. V, 2), fully unfolds the hermeneutical situation. In other words, if the temporal nature of the world is retained in its dynamic character as the nexus or polis for enacting one’s authentic sense of self and this temporal character remains dynamic, not levelled off, then the situation given in experience is hermeneutical, interpreted with respect to the multiple indications given in the existential of language. As such, the existential moment of language is the point of departure for phronesis. Speaking (discourse) is “the cultivated power of situational insight, a kind of phronesis, of being able to see/hear/feel, in a temporally particular situation of action, what speaks for the matter at issue, ‘je nach dem.’”47 Kisiel finds normative possibilities in the deconstructed unity of Dasein’s existentials. He can find these normative indications at the level of structural moments even though Heidegger says that Sein und Zeit cannot be interpreted in any political sense since he is writing an analytic of Dasein, not an analytic of its structural moments.48 Heidegger’s topic is Dasein’s unity, not the temporally susceptible moments per se. Yet it is only through the exploration of these moments that Dasein’s unity and experience can be brought to word. As noted, though the three existentials are equiprimordial, they are not necessarily equal importance.


48Dreyfus is one of the few commentators who pretty much agrees with Heidegger. Though Dreyfus believes that Sein und Zeit can be a starting point for ethics, he claims as well that text is politically neutral. See Dreyfus’ Being-in-the-World, 361, n.65.
Language (discourse) has primacy (S §16b, SZ 349/400, GM §72a, BzP §281).\(^49\) In the existential moment of language, for example, we discover the different moods of experience; the experience of reading Hemingway is different from that of reading Lorca. Do not these interpretations imply different moods and, therefore, different experiences? As Standish has eloquently put it “[i]n language there is the possibility that we can sound the depths of our experience.”\(^50\) Language, hence, is the end point in this deconstruction of subjectivity. That language sounds the depths of experience suggests that subjectivity arises as a construct and one that is artificial with respect to the unity understood as the self in time, care. To put it differently, subjectivity as theoretically secured in the metaphysics of identity presupposes the possibility of experience to come to word in care. Does not the thought of the ‘I,’ me as subject, already assume a manifold of experience that could be attributed to the ‘I’ and does not that experience re-found itself in a ‘subject’ only after it has been disclosed in the temporal unity of care? The temporal unity of care is the deconstructed sense of the subject insofar as it is the existential ground for the expression of language to encounter being. The construct of the subject is in this sense a metaphysical reformulation of primordially understood language, discourse, logos.

“Discourse,” at the same time writes Heidegger, in itself is temporal” and this has, finally, clear implications for a potentiality for acting; Dasein’s basic existentiell possibilities, authenticity and inauthenticity are founded upon temporality” (SZ 349-50/400-1). Thus, discourse (language) insofar as it is rooted in temporality is the possibility for acting inauthentically and authentically.


\(^{50}\)Standish, Beyond the Self, 154.
This possibility, in fact, is undertaken in temporally indicative language that includes phronesis as a condition for praxis. "For the object of phronesis is praxis . . . and therefore is a discussing" (S §21). The possibility of acting well, in this way, is language held in the 'language user.'

In review, Dasein’s unity can be described through its existential moments as they are gathered in time. If the temporality is maintained according to the fertile indications of lived experience, as opposed to the sterility of theoretical analysis, then the interpretation of the situation is understood in the historicity and also futurity of time. Dasein’s immersion in temporally robust language encourages the consideration and reconsideration of actions in light of their implications over time. As such, Dasein’s unity, then, retains this ethical moment since the future stands as an uncompleted juncture, as the possibility of acting well.51 “Therefore,” as de Miranda observes, “the action which constitutes Being is also an intentional movement towards an ethical future. In that sense, the self constitutes itself not only as another person [as in Mitdasein], but as a person invested in an ethical task.”52 That this ethical task must be appropriated by each individual Dasein and enacted, is an issue to be further explored in moral philosophy. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s existential analytic and deconstruction of subjectivity from the ego through to care and temporality to discourse does provide for and, indeed, announce the possibility of acting ethically.

Yet Dasein’s potentiality for acting ethically further needs to be distinguished from its

51 At the least, the future puts me "in a position where my existence can be an issue for me, a position from which the question that is usually suppressed - 'Who am I to be?' - comes to the fore." Vogel, The Fragile We, 77.

unity. Its unity is the temporal integration of the structural moments. “This . . . unified phenomenon we designate as temporality (Zeitlichkeit)” (SZ 326/374 altered). Yet while Heidegger takes this unity as given in Dasein, save for psychological illness, potentiality for acting ethically is far from given. Importantly, the self is constituted over time in the movement of the being - Dasein relationship. The proto-ethical implication of language (logos) becomes more clear now. Language conceived broadly as the logos, as the language of being, articulates being-in-the-world and, therefore, the ability to act ethically. This anticipates Chapter V where, for example, I will try to show that whether Dasein is resolute or not, different types of linguistic registers or what Joel Sherzer calls “grammatical categories” are accountable for providing “speakers with conscious or unconscious decisions, choices, ways of expressing meaning” and these are “actualized in discourse.” 53 This may be seen as philosophically curious but it is practically interesting as well. 54

The potentiality for decision and acting, that is acting as the real author of one’s acts, is associated with authenticity that is disclosed through anxiety and being-towards-death (SZ §39). 55 Thus, Heidegger has to provide a way in which potentiality for acting can be attested


54 The relevance of language to the project of selfhood and choosing the way in which we act, or to the project of praxis in general, may be lost in the convoluted prose of Heidegger’s Daseinanalytik. In a highly remarkable study of autobiography and personal decision, John Haviland records the language-based influence on an aboriginal man’s life-experience. See his ethnography, “‘That was the Last Time I saw Them, and No More’: Voices through Time in Australian Aboriginal Autobiography,”; there he demonstrates the empirical effects of language on the personal narrative and decision-making process. See Haviland’s ethnography in American Ethnologist 18/2 (May 1991), 331-62.

55 Vogel explains it this way, “[a]uthenticity lays down the conditions that make phronesis possible but it does not establish a single, universal standard or principle for proper conduct . . . Decision is not a matter of conforming to abstract rules but of insight into what is demanded by the historical
without recourse to stock normative language, which would not be appropriate to Dasein’s unity. Again normative language is not appropriate to Dasein’s unity because Heidegger is conducting an analysis of Dasein’s unity which “is the ontological foundation of these [existential] moments” that are temporalised, not the reverse.\textsuperscript{56} Through temporality, the first existential of language is actualised, so to speak, and in language then there exists the possibility of change, improvement, and prudence; “this requires logos,” for prudential action (S152/104). In the deconstruction of subjectivity, language, retroactively grounds the self inasmuch as it allows for the attribution of action to a ‘subject,’ the actor. Since Dasein is the being that has logos, its acts are constituted distinctively by language as language brings to disclosure the conditions of acting which include mood, historicity, belonging and friendship (see Ch. V) to name a few. In other words, if, as Heidegger finds, “the logos in the broadest sense, as discourse and language, as the distinction of man, evidently has to do with the . . . formation of world,” then the participation, ethical or otherwise, by Dasein in the world is discovered in language (GM 468-9/323). One’s sense of self, selfhood, further, is a non-metaphysical echo of the call of language as it belongs to being. “Selfhood first springs forth . . . as enowment of belonging to the call” of language as the original resonance of the engagement with being (BzP 68/47). A sense of self, therefore agency, is here reserved for the possibility for responsibility regarding actions as they are suggested in language.

Quite possibly, then, there may be room for a discussion of proper action not explicitly with reference to what Dasein (in its putative unity) ‘should do’ but as founded in the existential situation when one has looked death in the eye.” \textit{The Fragile We,} 54.

\textsuperscript{56}Overenget, \textit{Seeing the Self}, 236
of discourse. This is, in fact, very possible! For the valence of deed is exercised in the concrete existential moment of discourse. The peculiar thing about Dasein’s unity is, then, its protoethical stance (as it is temporalised and oriented towards the future) that admits no usual normative language (since its unity is an ontological fact) but only descriptions based on the situation of this unity. That situation, however, very surely allows and introduces the “moment of (decision)” wherein Dasein attests its own (eigen) possibility. This possibility is permitted on the basis that “[t]he situation is the ‘there’ which is disclosed in resoluteness - the ‘there’ as which the existent entity is there” (SZ 299/346). Recalling that Dasein is Da,-, there, and that this thereeness (also ‘world’ or ‘situation’) is constituted by an “intrinsic interconnectedness” with logos, language,” the possibility for acting resolutely and for that action to be ascribed to an actor is found in the unity of Dasein’s existentials or selfhood, specifically language (GM 442-3/306).

IV. 6. Selfhood and Decision

Despite Heidegger’s suspicion of normative language, he introduces this kind of language in a “speculative investigation carried out in” the Second Part of Sein und Zeit. He now seeks to apply the concepts from the First Part of the book to the existentiell (ontic) possibility of Dasein itself. Yet Heidegger uses this normative type of language not to describe Dasein’s unity (Part


58Cf. Øverenget, Seeing the Self, 258. Still, Øverenget agrees with others that while Sein und Zeit contains normative sounding language, it is not to be interpreted as a moral work. See also J. Glenn Gray, “Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death,” The Personalist 46 (1965), 447; William Richardson, “Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom,” Theological Studies 28 (1967), 296; Frederick Elliston, “Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Social Existence,” in Heidegger’s Existential Analytic, ed. Frederick Elliston (New York: Mouton, 1978), 68; Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 361, n.65; and Vogel, The Fragile ‘We,’ 84;
One) but to explicate its existential ability to be a whole (Seinkönnen) (cf. SZ 250/294). He uses this language to describe Dasein’s practical action in a situation, and this situation is also a disclosedness, rather than to explain Dasein’s existential constitution. In order for Heidegger to follow through on his earlier critique of philosophy as isolated from the lived-world, from the situation (Chapter I here), he, in fact, must offer an account of phenomenological Dasein in its environing world. In other words, the claim that authentic Dasein is solitary and outside its situation must be amiss.\textsuperscript{59} The central and controversial claim in the latter half of Sein und Zeit is, I believe, Dasein’s capacity for Entschlossenheit (resolve, resoluteness).\textsuperscript{60} Through the lens of this capacity, Heidegger’s other phenomenological concepts of the self will become more clear. In fact, it is by way of being-resolute that the authentic, temporal nature of being-in-the-world is enacted in concrete life. If Dasein “is the temporal particularity of an I which is this being [the self],” then the way into the question of subjectivity needs to be rewritten in terms of the temporality relevant to Dasein’s being as the being of care (PGZ 325/236). Now “the Selfhood of Dasein gets sharpened to the question of the existential ‘connection’ between care and Selfhood” as it is spelled out in being-resolute (SZ 318/366).


Heidegger reports that this resolve or resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is "our name for the authentic existence" of Dasein (GP 406/287). It, further, "is a distinctive mode Dasein's disclosedness" that arises from one's being anxious (SZ 297/343). Anxiety, recall, emerges from insignificance, from the failure of Dasein to interpret entities significantly. This mood (attunement, Stimmung) of anxiety confronts Dasein with the reality of its own finitude and, ultimately, insignificance and non-being, death (PGZ §33, SZ §48). "It is about Non-being that There-being [Dasein] is anxious."\(^{61}\) The inexplicable possibility, which is in fact a frightening eventuality, of my non-being draws my identity here and now into the starkest of terms. Death is this "end and totality; these are ways in which Dasein gets a definite character [ontically and] ontologically" (SZ 241/285). Being-toward-death then drastically concentrates my-self by alerting my awareness to my finite existence. The consciousness of selfhood and its finite existence applied in a single auto-reflexive meditation (i.e. the epiphany: I am me!) is a disclosure, a profound personal truth.\(^{62}\) This disclosure is also the beginning of the appropriation of the self. As Heidegger writes, "the origin of the self is own-hood [Eigen-tum]" as differentiated from being through the logos (BzP319tr224). This intimate disclosure of the self then serves as the existential point of access to authentic and decisive action.\(^{63}\) From the horizon of this intimate disclosure, "Dasein understands itself from its own most peculiar can-be," and

\(^{61}\)Richardson, Heidegger, 72.


this 'peculiar can-be' Heidegger calls "resoluteness" (GP 407/287). 64

There is more to resoluteness. According to Heidegger, it involves not just a privy realization that occurs from understanding one's own ontological limits, it involves an active wanting to be resolute. More accurately, this desire to be resolute coincides with "wanting-to-have-a-conscience" (Gewissenhabenwollen) (PGZ §35, SZ §54). This unwieldy term with all its normative connotations, Heidegger maintains, only makes sense in relation to Dasein's grasp of the unity of the existentials in a moment of time, specifically the existential of discourse. Wanting-to-have-conscience is possible only though hearing "the voice of conscience [Stimme des Gewissens]" (SZ 268/313). Conscience reaches Dasein, or more aptly, is enacted when one is ready to hear (the word, logos), accept, and take responsibility for living inauthentically, for squandering one's 'peculiar can-be,' to live heroically in the face of death. This is why Heidegger reports that with "the choice of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, I have at the same time chosen to have become guilty" (PGZ 441/319-altered). Later Heidegger refers to the voice of conscience as a call (Ruf). Again, Heidegger is clear that this source of proto-normativity is linguistic: "[c]alling is a mode of discourse" (SZ269tr314). Though the discourse need not be actually auditory, often it can be only heard in the metaphoric sense. It calls not from being-in-the-world with others, but from within oneself. Yet it is important to remember that since the self is constituted ontically as well as ontologically through being-in-the-world, the call can only be interpreted as something relevant to being-in-the-world. Mental traces and residue of being-

64Heidegger's 'peculiar can-be' sounds much like Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Besinnung.' For Dilthey 'Besinnung' meant creatively authoring one's self in respect of the possibilities handed down to one from the local environment. Concerning Besinnung in Dilthey, see David Carr, Time, Narrative and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
in-the-world and being-with-others direct the call toward Dasein in its world. The call delivers Dasein from its intense inwardness back to its world where it can then be resolute. For to be resolute already includes the world and it includes action (praxis) (cf. G 59 81). The way the call of conscience is attested in resolve, in fact, "directs [Dasein] itself back to its thrownness" (SZ 291/337). After all, to be resolved in one's mind after hearing the call means to be resolved about something. It means, in short, to commit to a decision to act according to the limit of one's situation.\textsuperscript{65} In Øverenget's commentary, "resoluteness is not the choice of a deliberating subject situated outside the possibilities of which it must choose to actualise ... [I]t is a \textit{praxis} in which the guiding sight of everyday activity itself is properly seen."\textsuperscript{66} Resoluteness implies conscience and a kind of conscience that is directed toward acting prudently. "\textit{Phronesis}," Heidegger wants to make clear, "is not an ethics [in per se;] ... it is what can be when it is a view of a concrete action and decision" (S 57-8/40). "When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' ... as regards the Situation which has been disclosed" (SZ 328/376). Resoluteness, thus, is the authentic temporal moment of care wherein Dasein is most attuned to language (the 'there,' disclosure) in the primordial sense as it interacts with being. Specifically, the call of conscience is at once heard in resoluteness, which in turn triggers resolve for the situation as it is authentically apprehended. Conscience apprehension is underwritten by the structure of language in that language already implies talking and listening, communicating in the sense of communing, and being open in the sense of "the possibility of talking something through" (PGZ 365/264). In hearing the call of

\textsuperscript{65}Cf. Vogel, \textit{The Fragile We}, 58

\textsuperscript{66}Øverenget, \textit{Seeing the Self}, 269.
conscience, authentic Dasein apparently resolves to act in a way that is compatible and balanced with its attunement to being as informed by originary language. “Dasein,” writes Sikka, “in being resolute, binds itself to the categorical voice of a private conscience which is somehow attuned to being.” 67 This attunement, scripted as a voice of the logos, when properly heard, is deferential to the ‘noise’ or multiplicity of interpretations within language. Such as attunement suggests that the enactment of any interpretation needs to be done prudently with respect to other possible interpretations. Authentic interpretation is then enacted in the living situation as phronesis, the first possibility, perhaps, in the existential analytic of acting ethically.

If this is the language of ethical discourse for Heidegger, it may be disappointing. The discourse on resoluteness sounds compelling, but does it have any substance? But when Dasein is authentic what is it is resolved to do? This non-specific content of resolve chafed Heidegger’s students as well; dryly, one quipped, “I am resolved, only towards what I don’t know,” since of course, the call of conscience that precedes Dasein has no message, no content. 68 Yet it is conscience that alerts us to the point where we are compelled to care about the call. And this seems precisely to be what the call is about: care (SZ §64). As Part One of Sein und Zeit ended with the ontological dénouement of care (Sorge), so ends Part Two, only here care has been temporalised according to Dasein’s historical life-situation. It now seems that to hand down categorical rules for acting well that disregard one’s life-situation would be dishonest if we

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accept Heidegger’s formulations. It would be dishonest for Heidegger because the rules would violate the implicit trust that Dasein is a temporal-situational being, not a generic being capable of accommodating rules and principles accorded to everyone else. Thus, the call of conscience is obscure and necessarily so in order to permit the call to be interpreted by the individual, sited Dasein, rather, than Dasein as something a-temporal, present-at-hand. “In abstaining from giving the call of conscience an ‘as-what’ - which is what everyday [inauthentic] discourse does, Dasein avoids treating care as something present-at-hand.”

Care is occulted from being read as present-at-hand by virtue of the thoroughly authentic yet inexplicable discourse of the call of conscience. Moreover, this is consistent with what Heidegger already understood by formal indication. Not surprisingly, authenticity is announced in formally indicative language. The self and its authentic acting are not touched by the theoretical elaboration of what one’s existence should be. This is a “misinterpretive digression relative to the sense of existence, it [the self] can be grasped as a determinative way of being, as a determinative sense of ‘is’ . . . that is not genuinely had in theoretical intending, but rather had in the enactment [Vollzug] of ‘am,’ a mode of being ‘In.’ The being of the self thus understood [authentically], means, formally indicated, existence” (G 9 29). That formally indicated existence asks Dasein to live its own life with respect to its sited, factual being-in-the-world. When resolute, being-in-the-world is aware of its “Being-toward-the-end” of existence as summoned by “the call of conscience,” which is at the

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70Overenget, Seeing the self, 267.
same time a being directed toward concretely living life in the world (SZ 317/365). Formally indicated existence implies being resolute because it throws Dasein into the situation as an active player in the construction of the world since the character is indeed only indicated, given ‘as’ such and such rather than defined as ‘is.’ Indication means that phenomena as given “indicates precisely the decisive task of grasping the relation [of the ‘as’] in terms of its proper dimension, instead of levelling down this dimension” (GM 425/293). Phenomena, once again, are circumscribed according to the measure of the logos and if the logos is given in terms of a formal indication in language then the phenomena can be appropriated authentically with regard to possibility and so phronesis.

Language now is implicated not just in the call (Ruf) and the voice (Stimme) of conscience but it is actually the pre-articulated term for the call and the voice which themselves have not come to full articulation since they are still reticent, have “nothing to tell” (SZ 273/318). Krysztof Ziarek explains that the apparent nothingness of this language is a sort of “proto-language, one that works prior to and beyond the order of signification.”72 This language, to be sure, is significant. However, its signification is ostensibly unfocussed and unspecified. It is a language that reorients our everyday care relations by virtue of its strangely provocative “reticence” (Verschwiegenheit) (SZ §56). The reticence or muteness rescripts everyday care in respect of one’s own existence and hermeneutical site. This nothingness contained in the discourse has the ability to “undermine” irresolute, average life (IM 23). It calls into question techno-scientific language and reveals it as “deformed into an instrument of reportage and calculable information . . . like a manipulable object, to which our thinking must conform” (P

60. The character of both the call and voice are only formal and give only an indication as to how to be resolute; there is no content per se. In explicating the concepts of conscience and guilt “philosophy is the formally indicated corrective to the ontical” everyday and inauthentic existence (PT 19). Oddly, then, it is the lack of objectively definitive information given in the discourse of conscience that salvages authenticity from an inauspicious life destined only to imitate das Man. With the introduction of formally indicative language into one’s apprehension, Dasein must now choose its interpretation instead of following a standard model because, really, there is no model. There is no model that can tell me how to decide in respect of the uniqueness of my historical, individual, authentically hermeneutical, existence. To be sure, there are models that can orient my decision, but there are none that can make the decision for me and take responsibility for that decision. Authentically speaking, only I can make my decision and I can only make that decision when I have taken into ownership the formally indicative language given in the voice of conscience (SZ §54).

Heidegger plays off the similarity of the words resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), decisiveness (Entscheidenheit) and disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) that is lost in translation. “Resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness . . . and we have interpreted disclosedness existentially as the primordial truth” (SZ 297/343). In effect, Heidegger is conflating the meanings of these words according to their etymological kinship to suggest that one actually implies the other. Resolve and disclosedness then are anciently linked in truth,


74As Inwood discovers in the German [s]chliessen means ‘to close, shut, fasten, etc.’ and also ‘to infer’ i.e. to join in thought to what
authentic disclosure. This disclosure is generated in the formal indication of conscience, which is linguistic in the primordial sense, for “[L]ogos is the mode of access to beings” (S 529/366). This new, more authentic, linguistic, understanding allows one to be decisive and resolute. For now Heidegger says that Dasein’s relation with language “stands in the closest connection” to decision (Entscheidung) (IM 174). Evidently, this formal and indicative language affects and effects decisiveness on part of Dasein because it is part of Dasein’s own existential temporality.\textsuperscript{75} More specifically, it permits clarity in thought so that through the tangle of everyday temporal experience, one can see resolutely. Heidegger calls this robust temporal juncture the Augenblick or ‘moment of (vision).\textsuperscript{76} The Augenblick is the signature event of resoluteness because it provides Dasein the ability to assess its situation as there disclosed. “The moment of decision,” in fact, “arises out of the situation. The situation is the historical reality that has reached the crisis stage and calls for decision.”\textsuperscript{77} Resoluteness activates the situation by thrusting Dasein back from itself to its life-situation. “When resolute, Dasein has brought itself directly back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of

\textsuperscript{75}The link between temporality and language is distinctive for Heidegger. As Gábor Frege writes, “Heidegger deems that by the appearance of language an ontological event of man took place, whereby he came to be able to find the inexhaustible source of the image of his own temporality.” From “Heidegger and Homer. The Second Step: The Logos of the Golden Age,” Existentialia 11 (2001), 304.

\textsuperscript{76}Heidegger presumably is appropriating Kierkegaard’s equivalent term øjeblíkk. See especially Kierkegaard’s Concept of Dread (1844).

\textsuperscript{77}Cf. Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 173.
(vision)’ as regards the situation (Situation) which has been disclosed (erschlossene)” (SZ 328/376 altered). Conscience and Augenblick force Dasein back from its self to act in a way that is consistent with, perhaps, the Aristotelean notion of acting in a balanced manner (phronesis). Heidegger here subscribes to Aristotle’s insight that what “phronesis discloses is the [practical good]” (S 138/95). The situation of insight is derived from the reception of language. Hence, the situation is fertile for Dasein’s existential possibilities and the possibility of acting well if the language therein tends to be nonobjective.

Instead of the Second Part of Sein und Zeit being read as a retreat into the solitary reach of individual Dasein, the retreat to the self turns out to be temporary. The temporary retreat galvanises Dasein with the existential reality of one’s own finite and indivisible character and returns Dasein to its world, to its situation, with resolve and remands Dasein, as it were, to act, based on its temporal-historical site of being. Moreover, Dasein can be resolute not just in terms of its Augenblick but also, as Heidegger later observed, in terms of its Augenblicksstätte, or site of the moment of (vision); this site is, at last, the grounding of truth and being (cf. BzP 323/227, 384/262). Thus, ‘resolution discloses the Situation’ in terms of one’s (ontical) location and the site in terms of ontological (limit) issues. Being and truth come together because they are united in the movement of time (temporality) and space (there) as set into motion by the formal discourse of conscience. Again, resoluteness fails to be that of just a disjointed phenomenon of

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78Cf. For “Aristotle, phronesis is knowledge which constitutes the horizon in which praxis can succeed as eupraxia and human living, which is, in sum, a praxis, can be realised as living well (eu zên). And just as with Aristotle, phronesis always implies knowledge of kairos so conscience, with Heidegger, is always referred to the Augenblick.” From Franco Volpi’s “Dasein as Praxis,” 119.

an individual Dasein, but returns Dasein as an authentic, robust member of its heard and spoken (there) world. “Resoluteness, which we have characterised with regard to its temporal meaning, represents an authentic disclosedness of Dasein - a disclosedness which constitutes an entity of such a kind that in existing, it can be its very ‘there’” (SZ 335/384). Dasein can be, attempt to achieve its ‘peculiar can-be,’ by resolute owning of its situation. Because Dasein must be understood in terms of its ownness, its I am, truth will be fully grasped in the name of its ownership of itself and its sited existence. The ownership of its being-in-the-world underwrites Dasein’s genuine existence by holding it accountable, responsible for acting honestly and living well. Thus, to approach one’s own ‘peculiar can-be,’ to strive for greater possibilities, is to approach ethical life.80

We have noted that living well in one’s situation seems to have Greek, especially Aristotelian, overtones of living a balanced and situated life.81 “For Aristotle,” to quote Robert Bernasconi, “it is not a rule but the situation itself which seems to make the demand on someone to act in a specific way. And that means that everything depends on one’s ability to see the situation . . . Heidegger’s most striking innovation is his interest in the temporality of this seeing or aisthesis which is in concrete relation to the moment (Augenblick).” (cf. G 61 259-60).82 The

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80 As Tanzer concludes, Heidegger “demands that we continually strive to achieve ourselves, to be moral, and that we recognise that our practical vocation is never complete;” Quoted from his “Heidegger on Freedom and Practical Judgment,” 355.


innovation surfaces in Heidegger’s attention to temporality as that feature of the situation which makes being and beings an issue to Dasein. To act in honesty and equanimity suggests appreciating the ontological difference between being and beings at the time of the situation and making a choice based on the deliberation over this difference (cf. BzP §44). Praxis, thus, returns from the remains of subjectivity since it involves action based on ends that have been carefully wrought in the consideration of both beings and being (GP 185-209/131-47). The pursuit of living in a way that is balanced, which attempts to achieve practical significance for entities while obeying the restrictions (limits) on their significance, is Dasein’s authentic and practical path of achieving its ‘peculiar can-be.’ The achievement of its ‘can-be’ also has Aristotelian resonances of potentiality being actualised. Heidegger’s major revision of Aristotle is, consequently, is to suspend the ‘agreement’ conception of truth in order to establish a more ontologically profound one from which authentic decisions are anchored. For Heidegger, truth emerges not as an evolving metaphysical concept but as realised in disclosure. In all, it means that phenomenology must deal with concrete phenomena, that which is there unconcealed, a-letheia. Phenomenology, thus, as it is hermeneutically applied, with respect to the situation, can provide an authentic countermeasure to concealment. This countermeasure might be rewritten as enlightenment against the concealment; the first moment of acting wisely. To quote Kisiel, “phronesis understood as interpretive insight into a concrete situation of action, coupled with resolute decision, and truth [is] ... a countermovement to concealment.” And Heidegger insists that “phronesis is carried out ... in speech” (S 144/99). The unity of phronesis and logos means that acting wisely is a matter of finding insight into a non-metaphysical significance of language as it comes to expression through me and my actions in the concrete situation. The

189
deconstruction of subjectivity, then, is understood as insight into the question of the self with the goal of retrieving the possibility for the question of prudent action.

Nevertheless, while it seems that the existential analytic has ethical, albeit nebulous, implications, it should not be taken as a work of ethics. Ten years after *Sein und Zeit* was published, Heidegger warned again of a “danger of misinterpreting *Being and Time* in this direction, i.e., ‘existentiell-anthropologically’ . . . from the perspective of moral resolve” (BzP 87/60-1). Although, Heidegger’s admonishes the reader against taking his magnum opus as a work of ethics. This in no way means that it cannot interpreted as rich in ethical indications. As Chapter III, section 5, entitled “Formale Anzeige,” tried to show, Heidegger does indeed have a dim view of ethical theories and systems but he fully endorses ethical thinking (and action) if it is ‘indicative,’ non-objectifying, local, and appropriates the situation to individual. In this respect, Chapter V will attempt to draw on the threads of ethics indicated in language with respect to Dasein’s deconstructed sense of subjectivity (as neither decisionist nor determinist). The question to be asked, then, is what can language (including the hermeneutical situation) as joined with this particular subjectivity, imply for decisions? While heeding Heidegger’s caution above concerning morality in the modern sense as system and rules, the *possibility* of ethics, I contend, emerges at the site of authentic decision which has been determined in language.
CHAPTER FIVE: ETHICAL INDICATIONS AND USES OF LANGUAGE

V. 1. Assertion
V. 2. Rhetoric
V. 3. Voice of the Friend
V. 4. Literature
V. 5. Voice of Conscience

The relationship of language to ethics in Heidegger’s existential analytic has been approached in several terms or several factors. Those terms include the disassociation of philosophy from the lived-world, a dissociation that arose from the rejection of heterogenous forms of discourse; the crisis of language, which concertised and validated analytic formulations of lived experience; the hermeneutical situation, which brought different uses of language into focus (i.e., different interpretations); and the deconstruction of subjectivity, which showed that ethics is possible through the dialogical self (being-with structure) that was left intact. Finally, the approach of language to ethics must become more concrete through the registers of language. As a matter of fact, the broad conception of language (logos) patterns different modalities of being and so founds the site of decisions and, therefore, the possibility of ethics through different forms of discourse.

V. 1. Assertion

In Chapter II, Heidegger’s discussion of assertoric language was considered in some detail. Here, I would like to mention the kinship between assertoric, or analytic discourse, and systematic ethics.

According to Heidegger, assertions are produced as a derivative mode of interpretation.

This, as noted, was the result of taking the ‘as’ structure of interpretation (Chapter III) as
predicating and binding. Assertions essentially conceive the primordial or hermeneutic ‘as’ to be the ‘is’ or copula (Kopula) that generates the possibility for a truth functional statement. The copula, derivative of the hermeneutic ‘as,’ also is the prerequisite for theories of judgment. “The ‘as’-structure, the prior apprehending of something as something . . . is the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity of the logos” (GM 456/314-5). But judgments conceived by way the copula are bound to analytic formalisations of the statement based on the modern idea of truth as agreement, i.e., correspondence. From this perspective, truth as disclosure (a-letheia) becomes passed over in favour of the logical and veridical strength of the proposition. In Heidegger’s words, “[t]he judgment gets dissolved logistically into a system in which things are ‘co-ordinated’ with one another; it becomes the object of a ‘calculus’; it does not become a theme for ontological Interpretation” (SZ 159/202). Heidegger additionally attributes this rejection of ontological interpretation (hermeneutics) to an archetypical reconceptualisation of the logos from disclosure and gathering into logic, theory, and system (cf. P 194). “As oriented in this way, i.e., as taking the theoretical proposition for its exemplary foundation, propositional logic at the same guided all reflections directed at the explication of the logos in the broader sense, as language” (S 253/175). The rejection of the ontological interpretation of the logos for logical systematics prepares a reduction of the referential, indicative context to the logical proposition. The present-at-hand arises then from the elevation of propositional calculus over the ready-to-hand circumspective totality and results in a disengagement of thought from the lived-world.1 “The propositional function,” as Robert Hanna notes, “does not belong to the everyday

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1As Hubert Dreyfus notices, “present-at-hand objects can be made intelligible as privative (i.e., decontextualised) modes of equipment” that are not immediately derived of the environing, lived-world. See his “Heidegger’s History of the Being of Equipment” in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. Hubert
world any longer, but rather is appended to it” (cf. IM 102). Thought as propositional logos becomes supervenient to everyday concerns. The relative autonomy of this thought is an observance of the syntactical economy of system as dirempted from the greater disclosure within the lived, indicative world. In other words, the concrete lived-world becomes ‘appended’ to (intellectual) thought. Judgments within the system at once get automatically rethought in the calculus of propositions. The transition of the logos from disclosive to logical language refers interpretation to calculation based on accordance solely to a prefigured system. In this practice, judgments now are not based on the situation but alternately become matter of method that follows an a priori, a-situational programme (cf. G 59 72).

Heidegger’s commentary on judgments, at times, occurs in tandem with his critique of neo-Kantian value theory (Geltungstheorie) (G5 63-85). Though Heidegger’s debt to the neo-Kantians runs deep (especially to Emil Lask and Paul Natrop), his criticism of them has become famous. In brief, Heidegger censures the value theorists for de-ontologising judgments and thereby making them an issue for logical and epistemological matters. Value gets interpreted as rational validity and this means that judgments get their affirmations according to their agreement inside the logical, epistemological schema. Following this, truth then becomes a value predicated on the agreement of the a priori schema and the proposition in question (cf. BW 228). As Heidegger sees it, a “principle thought is fixed as the judgment’s content . . . This


being-judged is identified with that to which the judgment refers” (GP 207-8/202). Judging already acknowledges truth as agreement before the judging even takes place. Thus, ‘valid’ knowledge will always recognise truth (agreement) as the highest value. “Since the act of judging indicates acknowledgement of the truth of a proposition and because truth is a value, thus knowledge taken as the sum of the total acts of judgment is correlated to value.”

Heidegger’s criticism is, to continue, that knowledge gained through the value theorists’ epistemology is self-affirming insofar as what applies to the judgment is also constitutive for knowledge (cf. IM 198). The only objective reference in determining truth is value, which has been calculated in advance. Value has priority according to the axiomatic character of the principles of the system of value worked out ahead of judgment (cf. GM §73). As Joanne Hodge writes, judgment based on principles and “axioms are determined in advance of any determination with respect to the domain of objects. They are metatheoretical adopted by convention, not in response to any evidence about a domain of objects.”

The emphasis on system and agreement that legislates value theory, hence, is anti-phenomenological since it disregards the elemental disclosure within perception. Instead of concentrating on the disclosure proper, value theory looks to describe the necessary conditions for truth (Wahrheit). Reason, obligatory in judging agreement, becomes the constant or norm in determining truth. As Windelband wrote “the norm of reason is not our invention or illusion [or phenomenon], but

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5Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 59
rather a value which is grounded in the ultimate depths of the reality of the world.” Objectivity, then, is not a matter of pheomenological experience from which one interprets, judges, and takes a stand regarding the object character of the given world. Objectivity gets fastened to an unchanging idea of objects and assigns permanent values of how things should be, as opposed to how objects actually are in experience. Heidegger can then conclude, “objectivity takes the form of value” (P 265).

Heidegger’s rebuke of value theory, as such, is very much related to his formulation of propositional truth as “assertion (judgment)” where “the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement [Übereinstimmung]’ of the judgment” (SZ 214/257). This truth (as agreement), in turn, becomes value since it is tantamount to knowledge. “And since the object of knowing is a value, truth is a value” (SZ 7/26). The assertion now “constitutes the character of being-true” (GP 307-215). In short, assertions or propositions circumscribe the nature of truth since they have already named truth (agreement) as value antecedently.

Whereas Heidegger readily admits the disclosive properties of assertions, at the same time, he calls into question the a priori structure of the disclosure (cf. SZ §33). That structure prefigures the disclosure by excluding the ordinary indicative traits of language. As Thomas Fay writes, “ordinary language is inexact and filled with exceptions and hence does not furnish the guarantee of exactness in usage required [for judgment calculations].” Calculated judgments of this order refer to methodological systems which require a uniform and homogeneous language that prescind uneven elements such as mood and temporality from language. The disclosure

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6From Kisiel’s, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 85 (522n26).

7Fay, “Heidegger,” 455.
given in this levelled and purified language is itself characterised as levelled-down and sterile, sanitised, as it were, of daily, worldly qualities. This disclosure, thus, retains little or no relation to Dasein’s affective, hermeneutical situation. The consequences of these disclosures are a reintegration of the brief moment of truth, understood as disclosure proper, back into the uncritical milieu of das Man, an attitude that itself is given beforehand (cf. G 21 131, G22 25, SZ 33/56-7).

The ethical implications, or lack thereof, for assertoric language become more clear as it is now evident that this language aims at standardising and streamlining the greater effulgence of words because it seeks to reduce words a kind of absolute certainty. In brief, the reduction in the heterogeneous nature of language fixes a reduction or homogenisation of the heterogeneous nature of truth disclosures. That assertions or propositions place a “restriction [Einschränkung]” on what becomes manifest in the disclosure suggests a “narrowing” of the range of truth, specifically to truth conceived as agreement (SZ §33). Ethics as an issue for Dasein becomes dissolved or, at least, subjected to the field of propositional facts and present-at-hand objects, which like the cerebral, intellectual, world of “[m]athematics does not have to concern itself with concrete existence”(S 141/97). 8 Hanna illustrates this occurrence as a divestment of the concrete world of entities into a theoretical, ‘deworlded’ economy of logical syntax (cf. PLT 48). “The propositional function,” he writes, “thus becomes a merely ‘syntactical’ sign, a single string of

8When ethics becomes dissolved or subjected to value based propositional logic, ethics may remain as a hypothetical issue but its originary character has been lost and the Dasein-being relationship falls out of balance. Now “ethics is in reality a form of subjectification which, by assigning a value to Being, transforms such Being into the object of human evaluation. Ethics appears thus as a manifestation of hybris from the side of the subject, whereas the object - Being- becomes only a corollary, a functional and nondetermining counterpart of the subject.” From Silvia Benso, “On the Way to an Ontological Ethics: Ethical Suggestions in Reading Heidegger,” Research in Phenomenology, 161

196
symbols which remains to be logically interpreted . . . It is a syntactical unit which is purely present-at-hand."9 If ethics relates to the world of phronesis, and Heidegger agrees here with Aristotle, then a world of experientially barren theoretical units represents a dearth of ethical possibilities (S §20). Hence, the transformation of phenomenological entities into the methodological - syntactical nexus effectively deletes the indicated, temporal moment of ethically charged disclosure that reflects lived experience. Dasein's culmination in Sein und Zeit as the being of care cannot arise as a question.

Thus, insofar as assertoric, propositional language attempts to purge itself of elements of what de Man calls 'noise,' lived experience, care, and other so-called subjective matters, what can be told about this kind of discourse? Plainly, there is little even distantly concerned with the lived-world and, thus, nearly nothing directly to do with a sincere care for others or originary ethics. The formalised language of propositions and assertions renders the objects of judgment present-at-hand, "metaphysical," and, thus, defamiliarises the temporal, situational moment that founds authentic and unique decisions for that individual (GM 469/323).10 Assertions seek only methodologically sterile formulations from which certain, necessary judgments can be made so that the "realization of values" may come to dominate the hermeneutical situation (IM 198). Further, the possibility for review of these judgments remains outside the methodological - syntactical system that has already prescribed the a priori rules for deduction. The values then are constantly reaffirmed since they are products of the same theoretical abstraction, uncritically repeated, as it were (compare SZ §74). Lived-experience essentially withers under the weight of

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9R. Hanna, "On the Sublimity of Logic," 278.
10Cf. Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 201.
the abstraction afforded by such theoretical apparatuses. Beings taken “in terms of calculation” and likewise become objectified as present-at-hand (PLT 190). “The being of beings becomes identical with objectivity” (GP 285/201) Thus, the open, heterogeneous character of things gets flattened out, so to speak. To quote Heidegger, “the Being of Things has to be rounded out” when judgments are made based on the present-at-hand logic of assertions (SZ 99/132, cf. 293/339). Systematic value theory holds, Heidegger claims, that the “true assertion equals objectivity” (GP §16) This objectivity displaces judgment from the local situation to the universal, present-at-handness of timeless assertions and spells the demise of the factically privative, ethical moment of disclosure.11

5.II. Rhetoric

Inasmuch as Heidegger’s critique of assertoric language calls into question its range of disclosedness, related to the lived-world, his understanding of rhetoric shows that public, political discourse underwrites the possibility for greater disclosedness and the possibility of public action. As the discourse of assertions attempted to cleanse language of its excess meaning, to purge it of its ‘noise,’ rhetoric, in contrast, exalts the fact that nonspecialised language is inhabited by an inner “strife” of surplus and sometimes contradictory messages (BzP §276).12 Language, in fact, is closely related to a-letheia in that language is a primary mode of


12Gregory Fried has a superb study of Heidegger’s appropriation of the Ancient Greek word polemos and its appearance though out Heidegger’s texts as “strife” (PLT, BzP), “set-apart” (IM), and
disclosure (cf. GM 43-4/29, PLT 72, SA 152/126). Like *a-letheia*, language both discloses and conceals. It is Dasein’s means of access to the world; it is the “Articulation of intelligibility” (SZ 161/203-4). Yet it is also “inhabited by the lie” (G 17 35). The ‘lie’ indicates the eccentric, oppositional character or “mystery” in language that resists complete formalization in propositional logic (P 151). It is that element in language that refuses to be “set up” as present-at-hand because it relentlessly withdraws (the -*lethe*) from determinable significance (PLT 43). The refusal of language to entirely show itself is not a dead-end in the moment of discourse; it does not bring the practicality of language to an abrupt terminus from which this ‘lie’ now discredits the whole enterprise of speech. Rather, this refusal of language to show itself, this ‘lie,’ is the point of departure for the public, persuasive discourse.

Heidegger approvingly cites Plato: “[discourse] . . . concerns human existence itself” (S 319/221, cf. PLT 73). The lived-world, the one that we care about, is one sustained and animated by discourse and in this sense discourse (*Rede*) can be heard as rhetoric. The world and situation come into relief in the forum of rhetoric. As Alan Scult observes, “rhetoric represents our capacity to ‘see’ our situatedness in the world (our hermeneutical situation, our Dasein) as a set of language possibilities that constitute the raw materials out of which we construct our everyday life with one another.”\(^{13}\) Rhetoric enunciates an intelligibility of the communal situation. This intelligibility is concretised through the existential of affectivity in discourse.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\)Scult, “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as Ontology,” 150.

\(^{14}\)According to Hubert Dreyfus, rhetoric that is affective can also be thought in terms of its ability to resonate and touch what bothers the public. “If your rhetoric works - if people take up your vocabulary and your story - it means that you are speaking for the interest of people about something that
intelligibility of Being-in-the-world - an intelligibility which goes with affectivity - expresses itself as discourse (SZ 161/202 altered). That being-in-the-world arises in discourse suggests that practical action in that world will come to fruition through language. This means "that rhetoric is one significant and specific way of the disclosure and transformation of Dasein."\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, Heidegger credits rhetoric for just such practical action.\textsuperscript{16} He states that "rhetoric belongs in the same field of the theory of logos in the largest sense" (S 351/243). This is meant positively because it is the logos that gives Dasein the possibility of its life (cf. G 58 231, S 340/235, GM §72). The shared, lived-world is announced in rhetoric since rhetoric perforce needs the dynamic of a community that includes a speaker and listeners (cf. S 339/235).

Rhetoric, then, belongs not to the aseptic language of assertions but to being-in-the-world-with-others and the living of social life. A reversal of orientation is provided by rhetoric instead of the theoretical orientation afforded by propositional language, a theoretical orientation that, writes Sheehan, "sucks the blood out of the richly textured Umwelt, in which one primarily exists and carries out practical tasks."\textsuperscript{17} The affective language of rhetoric returns Dasein to its own environing world. If rhetoric belongs to life, to being-in-the-world, then this manner of discourse is removed from the a-temporal presence of the logical proposition and emphasises the terrestrial

\textsuperscript{15}Bernhard Radloff, "Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric," \textit{Existentialia} 11 (2001), 447.


actuality of living in the world with other beings. In other words, as opposed to the logical assertion that persists in the isolation of pure thought, rhetoric explicitly infers that there are other "Daseins with us" in the world (SZ 120/156). Being-with (Mitsein) is, thus, the condition of rhetoric.\(^{18}\) Rhetoric forces Dasein to reckon its life in the community of others.

That rhetoric unambiguously recognises the community in which Dasein lives is Heidegger's favourable assessment of the role rhetoric plays in creating an open, public space (Öffentlichkeit). Of course, rhetoric can be understood in the pejorative sense as cautiously diplomatic or hedging speech, i.e., "the rhetoric from the political party 'x' is equivocal . . . ." Heidegger, however, reserves a different possibility for rhetoric.

Although, rhetoric can amplify the voice of das Man and Gerede, it can also inspire a new openness not available in the present context. The orator must engage her audience by appealing to the public's sensibilities as circumscribed by the factual and temporal conditions that underlie every community of listeners. The logos as explored in rhetoric makes possible the actualisation of the community of auditors.

Moreover, Heidegger agrees with Aristotle that rhetoric "makes it possible to institute a genuine investigation into the logos itself" (S 339/234). Recall that Heidegger conceives logos as that which gathers together the set-apart (polemos) into a community (IM 171). As well, he also recognises the logos as primordial discourse, the discourse of being.\(^ {19}\) The penetration of the logos by the positive structure of rhetoric sets into motion an evaluation of the language of the polis in hermeneutical terms. Indeed, Heidegger praises Aristotle's Rhetoric for being the "first

\(^{18}\) Cf. Radloff, "Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric," 445

\(^{19}\) Cf. Richardson, "Heidegger and the Origin of Language," 409.
systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of ‘being-with-one-another’” (SZ 138/130).

Heidegger juxtaposes this with Plato’s view on rhetoric. In the *Gorgias*, Plato conceives rhetoric as sophistry which attempts to guide the *polis* based on what is temporary and nonsubstantive. Rhetoric, for Plato, means “it inculcates an opinion” and so falls to the lower half of the Divided Line.20 “It is a know-how that is not oriented toward any substantive content but instead aims at a purely extrinsic, or, as we say, ‘technical,’ procedure” (S 309/215). Aristotle, on the contrary, finds rhetoric to be a formative path for the entry into the question of everyday being-in-the-world (cf. SZ §29). For the reason that “it pertains to the sense of everyday Dasein . . . [rhetoric] receives its independent justification” as a mode of speech relevant to practical existence (S 339/234). Since rhetoric has as its aim understanding, bringing about a different openness of the public, Kisiel suggests that rhetoric can be understood in a “protopractical” sense; it “depicts a speech community, a being-with that is at once a speaking with, with the basic goal of coming to an understanding agreement with one-another . . . communication and the accord that brings into the public sphere.”21 But in the sense that the public needs to be awakened and inspired for rhetoric to be effective, it must solicit Dasein’s circumstantial attunement. The language of rhetoric must interest Dasein in an existential and primordial way. According to Heidegger, rhetoric achieves just this by appealing to the existential of *Befindlichkeit* so as to orient an attunement (cf. BzP §6). Because rhetoric addresses “the . . . [soul] of the auditor,” it is likewise imbued with a sentiment or *Befindlichkeit* that affects the whole psyche of the listener (S

20*Gorgias*, 453a2. N.b this is Heidegger’s translation (S 308/214). Others differ such as the W.D. Woodhead translation which states that rhetoric is “a creator of persuasion.”

339/235). Again, *Befindlichkeit* is "the binding (originating in the grip of facticity) of factically actualised bindingness [Verbindlichkeit]" that marries Dasein to the world through the bond of mood (G 61 170).22 The orator "must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright" (SZ 138/178). "Attunement," as Radloff writes, "in the first instance signifies the sitedness and historically specific thrownness of Dasein."23 Insofar as rhetoric is an essential point of entry into the structure of *Befindlichkeit*, the mood generated by the orator must appeal to Dasein’s thrownness and practical involvements (praxis). Hence, rhetoric emerges as a possibility that opposes the a-temporal, de-worlded proposition that is requisite for the planned, "methodical [Planmäßig]" nature of calculation (cf. BzP §274). Rhetoric is the "art of moving human passions through speech," not the suppression of those passions.24 As Aristotle acknowledges, rhetoric has a kind of therapeutic effect as it brings latent moods and desires, as it were, in flush with the heterogeneous character of the world. This character implicates authenticity in Dasein’s disclosesness and attunements. Rhetoric recognises the world as not only rational and logical but also as inflected by affects. New attunements can emerge from moods that are provoked with the use of rhetoric. A new attunedness (Gestimmttheit) can accomplish the base for the polis to act and act in the right way (cf. SZ 138/178).

Rhetoric is, then, not only the coordination of discourse with attunement, it is actually the call of the logos to assemble the community (cf. IM 171). In this way, the polis is given, as the

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site of the ontological disclosure (truth) of the *logos*. In fact, truth (*aletheia*) is equiprimordial with the *logos*. The world that is given as disclosure is intimately united with the *logos* (language). To quote Heidegger, "*logos, language, and world* stand in an intrinsic interconnectedness" (GM 442/306).

Interestingly, Heidegger now uses this cardinal interaction of language and world to assail rhetoric used for the purposes of cynical persuasion. When rhetoric is detached from experience, it, like any other mode of discourse, permits distortion and misrepresentation. And when rhetoric is guided by speech writers and political insiders removed from the factual situation, it may become the tool of manipulation and conformity. If rhetoric "is carried out *in isolation*" from the community interests, it is "possible for one's view of things becomes distorted" and this type of rhetoric "has precisely the property of disseminating presumed knowledge in a repetition that has no relation to the things spoken of" (S 340/235). In other words, rhetoric that announces empty platitudes and political gossip reveals itself as the public form of the individual babble of *das Man*. Conversely, the rightful orator, i.e., someone directly and concretely attuned to the listeners, is immersed in the situation. It is someone who can call the listeners because of her own factual involvements with others in the world. The orator is a keen speaker, but if the speech is directed to the diverse space of human interest then this discourse will be an authentic, edifying one. In sum, the genuine orator is good with language because she is attuned to the site of disclosure, the *polis*, and, thus, can call the auditors to listen.

Yet the *polis* itself, as the ontological condition of a world, is equally founded as a response to the call of the *logos*, and *logos* to the need to establish itself by having listeners hear

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that call. After all, if the logos is conceived as traditional language, then this assumes the existence both of a speaker/writer and a listener/reader. Dialogue, which must be considered part of the structure of language and, indeed the structure of the world, presupposes the sender and receiver of messages. These two members of the simplest ontic communicative situation first form the most basic unit of the polis. In light of this consideration of the founding of the polis, truth next becomes revealed in concert with the logos in a space that is sited and historical (cf. SZ §75). “Unconcealment [truth] occurs only when it is achieved by . . . the work of the word [logos] in thought, the work of the polis as the historical place in which all this is grounded and preserved” (IM 197). The polis, as the existential site of truth, implies that the orator’s appeal to the polis will be genuinely relevant only if the speech is one that is capable of disclosing new possibilities, something not already known by the listeners. Rhetoric, which is one viable instantiation of the logos, is charged with specifically addressing, maintaining, and guiding the polis. It can inform “Dasein’s mood [and this] brings it face to face with the thrownness of its ‘that it is there’” (SZ 265/310). Further, authentic rhetoric, that is rhetoric developed in a manner that is attuned to the site of the community of listeners, contains the hope of positive actualisations of the spoken word. “If rhetoric develops in this manner then we must in fact say that it can be a directing of the soul . . . a directing of the life of others by means of speaking with

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26Cf. The lógos implies “a belonging hearing, namely, a hearing (hören) that belongs (gehören)” to a group of listeners, a basic community. Krzysztof Ziarek, “Semiosis of Listening: The Other in Heidegger’s Writings on Hölderlin and Celan’s ‘The Meridian,’” Research in Phenomenology 24 (1994), 123.

27In the Politics, Aristotle credits speech conditions as “being-with-one-another (association, communion) [that] cultivates a household and a city” (1253a 18). Quoted from Kisiel’s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 294.
them and to them. Thereby the positive foundations of rhetoric are elaborated” (S 336-7/233). The talented orator, one in tune with the polis, will be able to direct life in proper way by helping to inform the existential mood of the listener which, in turn, yields the possibility of exposing new disclosures, truths. This is, at last, the object of rhetoric: to make room for the contingency of new truths. Insofar as rhetoric is aimed at the polis, the aim of rhetoric will be truth, unconcealing. This is the aim of rhetoric because the polis is marked fundamentally by unconcealing. The polis is the centre, notes Véronique Fóti, inscribed by the movement of unconcealing “The polis, according to Heidegger, is a gathering pole (polos, Pol) of the happening of manifestation, thought as pelein or ‘arising into un-concealment.’”  

In other words, the polis is the centre housed and sheltered, so to speak, for the movement of unconcealing in the logos, specifically, here, rhetoric. This ‘arising into un-concealment’ is co-articulated by affectivity (as well as understanding and discourse) in its openness to the disclosive situation, and thereby awakens a deeper listening (cf. SZ §28). Like Aristotle in the Rhetoric, Heidegger, as Kisiel writes, conceives public speech as placing “the listener and listening (harkening and obeying), on the side of pathos and suggests that without it [discourse] simply could not be.”  

Inasmuch as affects are requisite for discourse and discourse is constitutive of truth, then affects are indispensable for authentic discourse. Rhetoric can arise as genuine a form of praxis if it enacts the existential of affectivity for concrete disclosure of the logos. As Radloff writes, “[g]iven that the where-for of rhetoric is truth-finding; and that this


29Keisel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 297

206
implicates a turn in mood no less than in understanding; then this turn is already the actualization (Vollzug) of the self, and the condition of insight . . . and of 'action' in the narrow sense.'

The apogee of rhetoric is, thus, the coordination of the communal working out of affectivity and understanding by way of discourse. In other words, if for individual Dasein '[a]ffectivity and understanding are characterised equiprimordially by discourse' then the communal illustration of affectivity and understanding can be characterised by rhetoric (SZ 133/172 altered).

In review, rhetoric is a manifestation of the logos very different from the phenomenon of assertions that are also based in the logos. Assertions, which accentuate the concept of the copula, have the function of being able to analytically "connect something together," i.e., the subject and predicate (GM 463/319). The proposition focussed on eliminating as much as possible the variable 'noise' of situation and mood. Rhetoric, however, must reject the sterile formulations of the assertion since the polis is moved precisely according to the situational reception of the speaker's message. By focusing on the polis, rhetoric arouses a forum through which the community may become actualised in a common praxis. The proper community, in Husserl's words, gives rise to "a consciousness of the communal goal of the common good to be pursued." The polis, moreover, is inherently political and, hence, founds the mutual experience (Mitsein) of the community, which includes a shared factual totality and shared mood. "The task of rhetoric," finally, "would be to disclose the existential possibilities open to Mitsein as given by

\[30\] Radloff, "Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric," 446.

\[31\] In Analecta Husserliana, 27s53, but quoted from Philip R. Buckley's "Husserl's Notion of Authentic Community," American Catholic philosophical Quarterly 66/2 (1992), 220.
the tradition (the ethos) which it is thrown."\textsuperscript{32} Rhetoric does not undertake to dispose of thronwness, facticity and mood as does the assertion; instead, rhetoric cultivates these and tries to enrich this ‘noise’ in an effort to reach the public understanding.\textsuperscript{33} Unlike the language of the assertion, with rhetoric “[l]anguage has functions other than theoretical demonstration. It petitions and requests, solicits and refuses, questions and answers, commands and warns in imperative and peremptory tones. The world is always a discursive space functioning in a multitude of practical ways that precede and underlie theoretical assertorics and demonstration.”\textsuperscript{34} With this understanding, rhetoric is something quite positive for Heidegger since it preserves the ontological, interpretative character of being-in-the-world and, by implication, being-in-a-community.\textsuperscript{35} Rhetoric in the proper sense cannot be an ideological campaign for some utopia (i.e., a Third Reich) for the reason that rhetoric is topographical in its nature, not abstract and without situation.\textsuperscript{36} “Rhetoric,” says Heidegger, “is nothing other than

\textsuperscript{32} Radloff, “Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric,” 449.

\textsuperscript{33} James Crosswhite challenges the logical view that arguments can be put forward to the public which are emotionally neutral. Reason, he charges, is bound up with emotion especially in the public sphere and he credits Heidegger’s understanding of mood as occurs in his discussion of rhetoric as recognizing this. See Crosswhite’s “Mood in Argumentation: Heidegger and the Exordium,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (1989), 28-42.

\textsuperscript{34} Keisel, “Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger’s Protopractical Ontology,” 187.

\textsuperscript{35} Eric Ramsey analyses Aristotle’s use of topos (place) with Heidegger’s sense of everyday-being-in-the-world-with-others and proposes that the two can be interpreted through a common understanding of rhetoric. See his “Listening to Heidegger on Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26/4 (1993), 266-76.

\textsuperscript{36} Inasmuch as rhetoric is directed to the factically sited polis, it denies utopian expectations. “Remember,” John Ralston Saul cautions, “utopia is a word coined by Thomas More in 1516 from two Greek words: no + place. To live within ideology, with utopian expectations, is to live in no place, to live in limbo. To live nowhere.” From John Ralston Saul’s The Unconscious Civilization (Concord, ON: Anansi, 1995), 28.
the interpretation of concrete Dasein, the hermeneutic of Dasein itself.”37 Again, rhetoric achieves this unique distinction as ‘the hermeneutic of Dasein itself’ thanks to its celebration of mood as a means of access to interpreting and simultaneously contesting the mood-neutral expressions of logical propositions.38 The mood generating, attunement seeking, discourse of rhetoric coincides with the moodful affections of living in the everyday world. Recall that for Heidegger everyday truth is disclosed as mood for “we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery [logos] of the world to ‘bare mood’” (SZ 138/177). Truth and Dasein, truth and the world are bound up with mood and inasmuch as rhetoric bares the stamp of mood in discourse, rhetoric is a genuine mode of disclosure.

Rhetoric, as a distinct specification of language, moves a large step closer to initiating an ethical consideration, an Augenblick, within the interpretation of being-in-the-world.39 It opens the possibility for ethical consideration expressly because it is a language charged with affective, normative provisions that connect with the hermeneutical situation and specifically the affects or pathos of factual Dasein. “Since,” as Radloff asks, “the character of the speaker would be formed by his experiences, and these inscribe a certain . . . ethos, could it be that the two are founded in the fundamental unity of the attuned understanding of Dasein?”40 This is entirely plausible as Heidegger reminds us that ethics derives from the ethos. “Ethos means abode, dwelling place” (P 269). Thus, rhetoric, that register of language that addresses the situational

37Heidegger’s words from 1924. Quoted in Scult’s “Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Ontology,” 148.


39Cf. Rhetoric, as Kiesel (following the Sophistes) finds, authorises the introduction of phronesis into the hermeneutical situation. See Kiesel’s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 296-300.

40Radloff, “Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric,” 443.
bonds of the community, is indirectly a mode of *ethos*, or *phronesis* at the very least. The establishment of the community and its proper sense of ethics is founded in rhetoric specifically and language in general. “Language,” to quote Sikka, “builds and establishes the historical being of a community; it ‘opens’ that being.” In sum, it is the ability of the speaker to appeal to the openness of the *polis* that is elementary in being an able guide the community. And insofar as the speaker’s language can reach the affects of the *polis*, an *ethos* has already been stated. The “aim of arousing specific [sentiment] presupposes a knowledge of the *ethos* of the audience.” Rhetoric with its clear link to affectivity, makes a legitimate claim on the community’s sense of ethics since rhetoric, as a mode of discourse, is an “intelligibility of Being-in-the-world - an intelligibility which goes with an affectivity” (SZ 161/204 altered). Therefore, the question of communal acting in way that is compatible with an *ethos*, or some sense of an “originary ethics (*ursprüngliche Ethik)*,” lands squarely with language, specifically here with rhetoric (P 271).

V.3. Voice of the Friend

Heidegger mentions only one sentence in *Sein und Zeit* about a friend. It arises in reference to the his analysis of hearing (*hören*). He writes, “hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - as in hearing the voice of a friend whom every Dasein carries with it (- *Hören der Stimme des Freunden, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt*)” (163/206). The interesting nature of this quotation is that it, of course, directly names a ‘friend’ as the voice that Dasein carries with it and also that it occurs within what is considered to be an examination of an aspect of authenticity; the phrase ‘ownmost potentiality-

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41Sikka, “Heidegger’s Concept of Volk,” 110.

42Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric,” 443.
for-being (sein eigenstes Seinskönne) is practically interchangeable with 'authenticity' (282/327-8).\textsuperscript{43}

Considering the aspect of the friend first, the obvious normative connotations are apparent. Yet, they bear mentioning for their importance. For if Heidegger implicitly offers a 'possibility of ethics' in the existential analytic, as proposed, then the character of this ethics seems, in part, to be based on the reciprocal relationship one has with a friend. This 'possibility of ethics' is founded on, not surprisingly, Dasein's lived-world and practical involvements, especially, perhaps, reciprocal involvements with friends. Insofar as a friend is constitutive of the greater relation of friendship, this umbrella concept could be a predecessor to Heidegger's later celebrated notion of Gelassenheit as a way of letting the other be. Nor, perhaps, is it surprising that Heidegger begins his Gelassenheit by addressing, among others, "Friends, and Neighbors" (DT 43)! More relevant, however, is the use of the word 'friend' itself and the ill-defined yet indicative definition there given. Derrida's point of departure regarding the friend in Sein und Zeit is illuminating.

The friend does not appear, has the visibility of no determined figure or face, has no subjective, personal, sexual status; one cannot even decide if the friend is living or dead. When I say that the friend is named, that still is too much, for it has no proper name; the friend calls perhaps, but is not then called, and nothing permits one to suppose that the friend is singular even if the common noun that designates it, 'the voice of the friend,' is grammatically singular. 'The voice of the friend' seems rather to confer on it a kind of oneness that does not exclude plurality. A friend is always a friend. This friend is always the friend.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43}Cf. Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, 22-5.

Derrida reports here of no specific friend, not the embodied friend that you and I know. Heidegger's friend is ostensibly an unspecified person, i.e., may be living or not, may be female, etc. Derrida's accurate description of Heidegger's 'voice of the friend,' is actually not just a friendly voice but a hermeneutically rich one. The character of the voice has such an unspecified valence and yet is so intimate that it evidently admits a brilliant clarity of intimacy with this unspecifiable valence. The 'voice of the friend,' in this respect, appears analogously to truth where a-letheia itself combines aspects of clarity (disclosure) and unspecifiable valence (withdrawal). Now let the unspecifiable valence - the nonspecific 'voice of the friend' - be thought as a kind of noise within the channel of communication between Dasein and its other (the friend) that it carries with it. This noise, which prevents total disclosure of the voice, acts as an inscription native to the communication with the friend and lets the friend, in turn, be who it is and not conclusively, objectively defined (interpreted) by Dasein. The primordial indistinctness of the friend's voice, its essential noise, withdraws from full compliance and disclosure to Dasein. The nature of this peculiar voice means that there must be this "heeding," "obeying," and "listening" that establishes the situation of the formal structure for friendship, to let the friend be the friend (PGZ 367/266). In short, with the 'voice of the friend,' Dasein responds in its own voice of letting the friend be the friend or other as is prescribed by the terms of being a friend. The friend, understood as the first inner self-differentiation of being by the logos (language, voice) in thought, alerts Dasein to its fundamental alterity. Since the voice is that of a friend, not that of 'anyone,' or even an enemy, the voice is surcharged with an ethical notice. The voice asks Dasein to respond to its alterity with the norm of friendship. The voice of being in general can be heard in the self-differentiation being announced as voice. "This voice or
word,” notes Sikka, “is the principle by which beings are structured or articulated, and so in and through which being ‘speaks’ itself, evokes the response of Dasein as thought and speech.”

When the voice or word is heard in the register of the friend, Dasein’s response to the friend is friendly, marked by respect and care for the other (Fürsorge), which is the norm for friendship.

In the ‘voice of the friend,’ Dasein grasps its proto-ethical base in its daily activities because Dasein hears the friend. The ‘voice’ of the friend is operative because in hearing the friend Dasein gains at the same time a sense of belonging that accompanies the relationship. The ‘voice’ of the friend, further, engenders a sense that one belongs (hörig) in the realm of disclosure designated as friendly, if one has been open to hearing (hören) the voice in the first place. If belonging is a prerequisite for caring, or at least, reason for caring to begin with (as in belonging to the neighbourhood is a reason for caring about the neighbourhood), then belonging is an early moment of caring and this has been introduced by the ‘voice’ of the friend, language generally. Once again, this proto-ethical moment, if it may be called such, has been completely circumscribed by the “coming-to-word (zu Wort kommen)” as sited in the ‘voice of the friend’ (SZ 161/204).

To repeat, this proto-ethical base that has come to word and so produced a new understanding has done so because the ‘voice of the friend’ has affectively reached Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for being. The understanding of the ‘voice of the friend’ is not a thin or hollow understanding as might be a categorical fact or piece of statistical data, neither of which

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45Sikka, Forms of Transcendence, 67.

46Krysztof Ziarek adds the ethically relevant term “responsibility” to Fürsorge. See his “Semiosis of Listening,” 121.
are affectively well integrated into care for “being-with-one-another” in concrete reality (G 21 225, cf. SZ §26). And this basic being-with is provided for first of all through language, discourse. “In discourse Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared” (SZ 162/205). Understanding acquired in being-with is one that is deeply hermeneutical insofar as it has been handed over and projected from the situational affects of how one finds oneself and, as always, “[l]anguage defines the hermeneutic relation” (OWL 30). “Understanding,” notes Philip Buckely, “is never empty, there is always something upon which projective understanding is based, and this something is given or found in Befindlichkeit.” R. Philip Buckely, Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), 174.

Moreover, given that the ‘voice of the friend’ affectively moves Dasein because it appeals to the way Dasein finds itself in its situation, Dasein’s sense of practical, and therefore, proto-ethical involvements get highlighted. Thus, while the ‘voice of the friend’ does not perhaps directly negotiate ethical action, it does lay groundwork toward this by bringing about an authentic “listening to one another [Aufeinanderhören]” and, in turn, a primordial belonging, mindful being-in-the-world-with-others (cf. SZ 163/206). Listening already includes others in the structure of being-with as a dialogue needs both speaker and listener which itself suggests a proto-ethical comportment of willingness to listen and participate in being-there with the other. “Being-with,” hence, “has the structure of belonging [Zugehörigkeit] to the other . . . a co-enactment of concern” (PGZ 367/266). “That is,” agrees Ziarek, “although such thinking does not constitute ethics yet, it opens the possibility of ethics in the first place.” Ziarek, “Semiosis of Listening,” 119.

ethically, by making the association with *ethos* definitive. In *Heraklit*, he writes "within any conduct [Verhältnis] *ethos* is that behavior [Haltung] which regards this abode among beings"; ethics are what "tries to understand how in this abode [the] human being behaves towards beings (G 55 214)."\(^{49}\) The standing of the friend among beings, presumably, then is a consideration in how to behave with an eye to other beings.

The other, or second, noun in the phrase ‘voice of the friend’ to be examined is this word ‘voice,’ which clearly designates something linguistic. To begin with, the very appearance of that short passage in *Sein und Zeit* on the ‘voice of the friend’ is as interesting as it is consistent in its location within the text. It occurs in Section 34: “Being-there and Discourse. Language.” Heidegger is committed to the necessity of affectivity to the co-discovery of the world (cf. PGZ §28a, SZ §29). Derrida echoes this regarding the understanding given by the ‘voice of the friend.’ “It is essentially marked, like everything found at the opening of Dasein, by a certain *Stimmung* and by *Befindlichkeit.*”\(^{50}\) In different words, that the ‘voice of the friend’ is only intelligible by virtue of the voice’s hermeneutic, affectively saturated “factual life-experience (*faktische Lebenserfahrung*)” implies that the voice must be heard in conjunction with Dasein’s practical life for the voice to be persuasive. It must occur in an organic, historically situated way such that the voice coincides with Dasein so seamlessly that it belongs with Dasein, as if before we heard the voice, we were “already with” the friend (SZ 164/207). The voice that communicates to Dasein is the voice that brings it into communion, into belonging, with the other. Heidegger makes this relationship between hearing the voice and belonging explicit. He

\(^{49}\)Quoted from and translated in Benso’s, “On the Way to Ontological Ethics,” 162.

\(^{50}\)Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 175.
names listening (*hören*) as imperative for the faculty of being-with (*Mitsein*). Listening apparently now ordains the indigenous structure of belonging which every Dasein carries with it. “This capacity to listen to the other with whom one is, or to oneself who is [already] in the mode of discoursing” already means that one has chosen to belong to the situation by being open to listening (PGZ 366/265, cf. VA 215). Listening, then, implicates the structure of discourse inasmuch as it calls for an attunement to wanting, proto-ethically perhaps, to respect the voice of the other. Heidegger, by introducing first language and its corollary listening, which brings one to one’s ‘ownmost potentiality-for-being,’ then throws this authenticity back into the public domain to suggest that authentic belonging is understood in the sense of listening to others as friends. The listening becomes a belonging in the way that one who listens to and understands a discourse pledges oneself to understand to begin with, to genuinely listen, as one listens and pledges oneself in steadfastness to a friend. Listening signifies being-open to others. “Listening to . . . is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others [*für den Anderen*]” (SZ 163/206). Listening also intimates the possibility of being-open as fundamentally being-open to the other as other, or friend. Yet the structure of listening is such that it need not occur as ontically being-with; listening can occur as it does in care for others (*für den Anderen*) who not are actually there. As Ziarek keenly observes, “listening introduces a turn or a fold into *Mitsein*, to such an extent that being-with happens no longer simply as being with others, but becomes being for others.”51 This being for others is the signature mode of ethical behaviour because it seeks authentically to care for the other in a way that does not violate the otherness of the other (cf. G 21 223, SZ §26, DT). The overture of the ‘voice of the friend’ gives Dasein the possibility

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to listen to and be-open to others. This distinctly ethical voice, says Silvia Benso, bypasses 
metaphysical ethics that appeal to ideals. "The ethical register of discourse comes to designate a 
relation between human being and Being which is no longer metaphysical."\textsuperscript{52} The ethical register 
of the 'voice of the friend' lets others be in their own space by rejecting a metaphysical structure, 
of say an ideal citizen or model comrade, and instead opens the doors to a plurality of diversities, 
to, perhaps, what Charles Taylor calls "deep diversity."\textsuperscript{53}

This 'voice of the friend,' with its ringing clarity and still odd unrecognition, that Dasein 
carries with it, as noted, has been likened to the eccentric character of truth, if it is not the 
metonymic sign of it. What if truth as the event of disclosure were shaped by friendship? Ethics 
would find its voice in the shape of the other, in a register that treats the friend, or friendship, as 
the figure of truth. Heidegger, it seems, approved of this likening of truth. "\textit{Die Gestalt dieser 
Wahrheit ist die Freundschaft}" (G 52 165). Amazingly, Heidegger moves the irretrievably 
normative term of friendship into the range of truth. Truth and friendship are able to crystallise in 
the moment of language, specifically the voice. This voice anticipates the language of being 
itself that constitutes both the self and friend. "In fact," writes Ziarek, "as we turn toward the 
language of being, we are already turned toward others, we can listen to the saying of language as 
we already listen to others. The occurring of being, which lets every being come into its own,

\textsuperscript{52}Benso, "On the Way to an Ontological Ethics," 166

\textsuperscript{53}Cf. C. Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," in his \textit{Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on 
Canadian Federalism and Nationalism} (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993), 
155-186. "Deep diversity" would, as Clifford Geertz warmly recognises, encourage "ways of thinking 
that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and 
singularities" of others.; see his \textit{Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics} 
*das Ereignis*, bears the stamp of friendship. Listening to the ‘voice of the friend,’ with its ethical register of friendship, thereby authenticates the relationship of the other to Dasein in that Dasein is the being that is there for the other (friend). Thus, whereas rhetoric is public listening as a preparatory being-with of being-for-others in general, the ‘voice of the friend’ anticipates caring for others as friends in specific. Only because we care for others in this way can the ‘voice of the conscience’ call Dasein into its proper and practical conduct. Yet it is not only the ‘voice of the friend’ that provokes authentic care; this voice is heard in literary works as well.

### V.4. Literature

If the ‘voice of the friend’ brings Dasein within the proximity of thinking of others as friends, literature, at least some aspects of literature, could be thought as strengthening the phenomenal presence of these friends in consciousness. Although the formal structure of friendship appeared as both a kind of intimate familiarity and an unmistakable otherness, the task of literature arises as a way to make the otherness of the friend better understood.

According to Heidegger, beings-in-the-world of any sort, including the friend, must be “jointly understood . . . via things” (GP 410/289). With respect to the discussion underway, the ‘voice of the friend’ cannot be intelligible as an ideal friend that voices fiats of care and responsibility, nor can it be understood as a disembodied voice that hands down axioms for right conduct. The friend’s voice must be contextualised and situated for it to be hermeneutically fruitful for Dasein’s practical engagements. Interpretation must be contextualised and sited so

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54 Ziarek, “Semiosis of Listening.” 128. He continues, “for Heidegger language unfolds as a conversation, in which truth reveals itself only in the shape of friendship, the sense of responsibility for the disclosure of any being is already affected by the openness of language toward others. As language lets everything emerge, it also already turns itself toward and listens to others” (129).
that “our existential Interpretation is not mere fabrication” or artificial in construction (SZ 197/242). Interpretation avoids ‘mere fabrication’ if it is factically sited in the world. Literature can do an excellent job in illustrating the world and in factically situating the ‘voice of the friend’ that Dasein carries with it. In Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927), Heidegger quotes Rainer Maria Rilke at length to demonstrate the power the written word has in creating a world (Sec.15f).55 Rilke describes the austere conditions of a neighbourhood that no longer properly exists; it is in the process of being torn down. The remains, however, for Rilke, are not simply rubble or, for Heidegger, even present-at-hand matter. There is life teeming within these remains. The wall of one house breathes the vitality of the time wherein its family lived. “The tenacious life of these rooms refused to let itself be trampled down; it was there it clung to the nails . . . You could see it in the paint, which had changed slowly year by year.” Rilke records what the city councilor and the construction developer that partake in demolition of these houses may have never seen. The poet ignites this otherwise inert material by unlocking its hidden passion and significance. He sees the pain, the regret, the care and the joy as well as the stains of the concrete existence of those that lived in the house. The tarnished wall visibly marks the historical life of the house and its inhabitants. “There stood the noondays and the illnesses, and expirings and the smoke of years and the sweat that breaks out under the armpits and makes clothes heavy, and the stale breath of the mouths and the fusel-oil smell of fermenting feet. . . .”

It plainly does not matter if Rilke’s phenomenological exegesis of the walls of this house is correct, if anyone there ever had stale breath or stinking feet. What is important is the world

55Heidegger quotes Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge (1910) and the translation into English used by Hofstadter is by M.D. Herter Norton (New York: Norton, 1949), 46f, under the title Notebooks of the Malte Laurids Brigge.
that is opened up by the poet is a world rich in daily, mundane life, but life that is nevertheless real. It does not matter that the inhabitants of the house were not especially noteworthy or famous. The ‘other’ is not usually a movie star or statesperson. The ‘other’ is the prosaic one who sweats, grieves, celebrates, and lives her life. This life is factically embodied, hermeneutically real. Rilke situates the ‘other’ as a thoroughly lively, concrete person who has lived within the walls of the house. Literature, thus, makes something as uninteresting as building rubble marvellously intriguing. It makes the ordinary (geheuer) phenomena of life, and life itself, extraordinary (un-geheuer) because “at bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extraordinary” (PLT 54). And why should it be otherwise? Certainly, every ‘ordinary’ life is extraordinary to somebody. Similarly, literature brings to light the banal features of the other and makes them personally relevant. The insight of literary discourse on experience and creativity (Dichtung), its ability to fashion a poetic or affective experience, says Heidegger, allows Dasein to experience a familiarity with the other even when the other is not “in immediately tangible proximity” (GP 410/289). “Language itself is poetry in the essential sense” in that it creates the difference between language and being and so provides the ontological forum for being with others to begin with (PLT 74). Literature, as an instance of poetry, further provides such a forum for the vivid expression of the other, thought as the friend, to come to bear on one’s facetiously lived existence inasmuch as it solicits the participation of the reader to create the terms for the recognition and identification of oneself with the other to understand the work, to forge a mutual understanding.

Saliently, Heidegger calls on a literary work in Sein und Zeit as well to illustrate the depth of the forgotten but primordially critical comprehension of existence, specifically death, that is
native to every Dasein. However, death is, perhaps, the signifying feature of existence in the sense that being alive at same time means the eventuality of death. Death marks existence by being the privation of existence, the binary opposite of existing, therefore, implying existing. Language, Heidegger suggests, and specifically poetic language, brings existence into being and makes it an issue. As well, poetry can make existing, "Being-in-the-world ... an issue for itself" in respect of death by somehow attuning Dasein to its own finite possibilities and making those possibilities a genuine question for how one should live (143/182). "In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's affectivity can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to the disclosing of existence" (162/205 altered). Here 'poetical' discourse is named precisely as the force that founds the disclosing of existence. Existence here is co-disclosed as a set of finite (real) possibilities and it could be assumed that this existence is authentic since "[h]igher than actuality stands possibility" (38/63, cf. 317/365). Because "[u]nderstanding always has its mood" or affectivity, the literary form of discourse will more honestly inform understanding and so being-in-the-world as a situational issue in a way that its possibilities might, thus, be given as closer it its existence (143/182).\textsuperscript{56} Heidegger seems to indicate this as he associates 'poetical' discourse with, say, an existential possibility that can 'become an aim in itself.' In other words, poetical discourse may yield possibilities real enough to be enacted and enacted for their own sake. Possibilities that are co-disclosed with existence in this way certainly recall the Aristotelian sense of action that seeks its goal within itself, praxis. Literary, 'poetical' discourse now might be rethought as possibly the originary moment of praxis!

\textsuperscript{56}Kisiel explains that for Heidegger, Aristotle too found the situation and its accompanying moods were important for disclosing "authentic understanding," wisdom (cf.S§19). See Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 242.
But if poetry makes existence (and its possibilities) an issue, it simultaneously makes death an issue. At the centre of the existential analytic, Heidegger refers the reader to Leo Tolstoy’s “The Death of Ivan Ilyitch” with the purpose of moving the reader to a more intense level of consciousness of death which, perhaps, the dry prose of his academic treatise cannot provide (254/298n. 12). Heidegger suggests that an analytic, theoretical understanding of the philosophical problem of death is insufficient. What Ziarek names “the life-context of theory: the everyday,” from which Sein und Zeit derived, must be reintroduced into the philosophical situation in order that one may partake in the anticipation death in a robust and integrated way. Literature introduces, consequently, the added extraordinariness of dying to the otherwise cerebral concept of finitude. In doing so, it offers the possibility of a reorientation. Ultimately, it is a reorientation not toward the concept of death, but a reorientation toward oneself and, hence, the other since Dasein itself is constituted “by engagements with what is other,” which is also properly being-toward-death (§25, cf. PGZ §33, GM 8/5-6).\(^{57}\) Derrida designates this reorientation as a new ‘opening.’ In the importance of understanding the rich implications of dying, Derrida writes, “the relation with the other and the relation with death are one and the same opening.”\(^{58}\) Heidegger calls on literature as the bearer of the enriched understanding of death and its properly implicated understanding of others conceived as those who are dying or will die. Ivan Ilyitch’s miserable decline at the end of his life not only characterises the finitude of the other, it introduces a new “rigor of thinking” that permits “the world-disclosive function of language” to strike the reader with the ‘opening’ of the other, an ‘opening,’ perhaps not permitted

\(^{57}\) Also, K. Ziarek’s “The Ethos of Everydayness,” 391.

\(^{58}\) Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 187.
a medical-scientific discourse on death as disease (cf. P 271). The literary work opens the affective dimension of living life as sentient, reflective being-in-the-world.

Hyginus’ “Fable of Cura” is another literary illustration used by Heidegger to attest the significance of the literary form on general understanding. In this case, Heidegger applies literature as phenomenology to highlight the original self-interpretation of Dasein named as “care” (Sorge) (SZ 196/241). Though Heidegger reports that it is in “Augustinian anthropology” that he first came across the “phenomenon of care,” he declines to support his case with citations from the great Christian scholar (PGZ 417-19/302). Instead, he quotes an obscure fable that he unearthed sometime during his voluminous research. Heidegger, in fact, at the end of the first half of Sein und Zeit calls on the “Fable of Cura” for “Confirmation of the Existential Interpretation of Dasein as Care in terms of Dasein’s Pre-ontological Way of Interpreting Itself” (§42). Again, Heidegger does not draw on anthropological or psychological studies to illustrate or confirm his arguments. For the conclusion that care is the being of Dasein, he does not cite historical examples or any sort of empirical evidence at all. For ‘confirmation,’ for proof, to use a metaphysical word, Heidegger can appeal to no more elevated an example than the written (literary) word. Indeed, Heidegger’s later discourses on Celan, Goethe, George, Hamsun, Hölderlin, and Trakl and others elaborate further the importance of literature to ‘opening’ new possibilities of understanding the other (cf. PLT, IM, OWL). For this, Ziarek fittingly concludes,


60Cf. Also the “Fable of Cura” in Konrad Brudach, “Faust und die Sorge,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte I (1923), 41f.

61Also see Stanley Corngold’s discussion of the Fable in his “Sein und Zeit,” 100-1f.
"poetic language becomes for Heidegger indissociably linked to others."

Does not the poetic word, and literature in general, present the other in such a way that it might more likely be mistreated or violated since the other appears as a fictional, unreal composition of someone's imagination? In other words, might the ambiguity and invention in literary form dilute the force of the other as experienced actually in being-in-the-world-with-others (Miteinandersein)? Apparently not. The benefaction of literature, and really all art ("[a]rt . . . is poetry"), is its solicitude and ability to draw the interpreter into the fold of its being, to draw the reader from herself into the stand of the other (PLT 74, cf. 72). It breaks down the egopoarity (Descartes) and inter-subjectivity (Husserl, Habermas) by affecting a mood in Dasein according to the work of art before it. Like anxiety, an affectivity opened up by art has the capacity of "letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-being be lit up" (SZ 343/393). Dasein must deal with the way it finds itself since its being is always an issue with which it is concerned. Care is "Dasein's basic constitution" (GP 443/312). This in turn, means that Dasein is compelled to deal with its being as affected by art, and specifically literature, because the work of art appeals to, 'solicits,' Dasein's care, which is the very fabric of its existence (SZ §64). Therefore, the affective virtue of the literary work unwittingly obliges Dasein to reconcile its being to the mood-based situation at-hand. Here, Corngold observes correctly that inasmuch as 'Heidegger attributes to mood a power to disclose the tonality of Dasein's being-in-the-world . . . [h]e perceives with considerable originality that the poetic character of language could be the

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measure with which language realises the possibilities of disclosure reserved for mood. These possibilities open a forum for the authentic appropriation of Dasein's being as care. Therefore, mood as it is disclosed and opened up in literature, in this case, is the primary signification of care. Mood discloses care. Care as announced in an affective reading reorients Dasein to be "intimately involved in its being-in-the-world" (PGZ 406/293). The interpretive element that guides Dasein to authentic self-interpretation is provoked in the affective, formally indicative nature of literature. Literature calls of the reader to an active participation in the construction of understanding and, consequently, in its essence puts being into question. "If literature," writes Paul de Man, "rested at ease within its own self-definition, it could be studied according to methods that are scientific rather than historical. We are obliged to confine ourselves to history when this is no longer the case, when the entity steadily puts its own ontological status into question." The nature of literature, as such, ultimately puts forward a philosophical question: what is the being of the entity? Since it only asks the question and does not answer it, literature uniquely gives indications regarding the question, indications that might be appropriated as new truths (disclosures) or even call into doubt historical norms and suggest ethical indications. As van Buran notes, novel truths and their accompanying ethical indications, become more distinct with the use of "literary devices [such] as pseudonyms, epigrams, anecdotes, thought-experiments, the subjunctive, aproria, and irony." In short, the other given in the indications of

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64 de Man, Blindness and Insight (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 32.

65 van Buran, "The Ethics of the Formale Anzeige in Heidegger," 159.
literature, may be an ostensibly immaterial other, but its ontological force consists in redirecting existence toward possibilities that are thoroughly real. This redirection increases the potential for praxis or ethical action since it inflects action with the difference, alterity, made present in the heterogeneous nature of the literary form. Literature portends a faculty of displacement from the usual uncritical attitude of everyday Dasein that can be productively incorporated into a praxis. It bears a momentum, Ziarek writes, that can be “carried over into praxis in order to remain within the power-free disposition . . . of acting, perceiving, [and] knowing, to maintain the non-violent praxis.”

Simply, the literary work liberates ethics from the reservoir of words and propositions by moving ethics closer to practical life, praxis.

Why then is ethical possibility so fertile in literature? Literature more overtly demands interpretation in that its messages are usually not straightforward. It contains “differential relations” with a more overstated “complex range of disclosures” than the usual conventions of language. Interpretation, of which literature demands, does not so much make objective meanings visible; rather, interpreting in the literary or ‘poetical’ form tends to open new attunements, indications of meaning, to be individually appropriated. The reader then needs to participate in the creation of meaning, one needs to engage in a dialogue that re-inscribes “the terms of the authentic disclosedness (‘truth’) of historical existence” of each Dasein (SZ 397/449). “Literature,” writes Corngold, “thus becomes the vehicle of a possible authenticity” since it raises the question of how to interpret, which is the basis for the question of how we

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should act. The sense of ethics that evolves as a maturation of the existential-hermeneutical process is, of course, not a principled ethics. It is a destructive re-inscription of an historical tradition in order to prepare more ontologically momentous conditions of action. This action would be rescripted through the formal indications in the literary work that repel “the tendency to take the indicated principles or categories to be free-floating structures, essences, or a Kantian [system].” Kristeva describes how ethics has been reshuffled in the contemporary discourse of deconstruction and re-inscription. “Ethics used to be a coercive, customary manner of ensuring the cohesiveness of a particular group through repetition of a code - a more or less accepted dialogue. Now, however, the issue of ethics crops up wherever a code (mores, social contract) must be shattered . . . before being put back together again.” To put it differently, through formal indication, the literary work, which highlights the social code, calls into question the practicality and probity of otherwise routine, coded conduct. The literary work accomplishes this only again to offer the possibility of re-inscribing and enacting a new praxis, which is the same aim Heidegger allowed in his own re-invention of philosophy. Heidegger’s affection for the


70Julia Kristeva, “The Ethics of Linguistics,” translated by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon Roudiez, in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press), 24. I should also note that deconstruction seems unavoidably theoretical and abstract, so I see Heidegger’s fundamental project, the Seinsfrage, as generally opposed to this line of thought. Of course, there are similarities too. Perhaps the question of ethics is one such similarity.

71“Independent enactment of formal indications,” as van Buran writes, “means that the rough indicative sketch of Heidegger’s new beginning [for philosophy] is itself subject to the destructive repetition of constant beginning and reinscription” (cf. G 61 56). From his “Ethics of the Formale Anzeige in Heidegger,” 167.
literary above the traditionally philosophical leads him to claim that the "tragedies of Sophocles, provided such a comparison is possible, preserve the ethos in their sayings more primordially than Aristotle's lectures on 'ethics'" (P 269, cf. G 63 20). Presumably, those tragedies "put into question the very practices of conceptualizing and regulating the everyday" more fundamentally and effectively than analytic treatises on ethics.\(^7\) The emotive myths of the Greek gods articulated the 'regulation' of the everyday more primordially, perhaps, than laws of the state (cf. BzP §155). As well, the dynamic narrative of the Judeo-Christian tradition with its struggles of good versus evil has done excellent service in preconditioning social and legal rules for behaviour. In our day, the power of Hollywood drama, for example, seems strikingly efficient in standardizing and inculcating a code of accepted conduct on Western society, regrettably more so than Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.\(^7\)

All the same, Heidegger does not only wish to emphasise the force of ethics in the affective, dramatic, and literary milieu, but, he also expressly insists that the authentic hermeneutical destruction, which puts routine conduct under erasure, be reconstructed so as to make an influence on the greater social praxis (cf. G 63 20). "Real understanding [hermeneutics] never proves itself in rote-saying [uncritical reading], but only in the force of carrying understanding over into genuine action, into objective achievement" (GM 434/300 altered). Literature, read with an eye to factically situating one's own existence, finally draws the reader into a new intelligibility by signalling, indicating, an affective understanding that solicits the reader to participate in experience of alterity that is the binary reverse of the uniformity and

\(^7\)Heidegger is surely in agreement with F.W. Nietzsche here. See Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*.

\(^7\)Cf. Ziarek, "The Ethos of Everydayness," 394.

228
everydayness. Interpreting literature is a process of understanding that asks the reader to grasp the text and see something new, as something different, that was not there before. As Heidegger writes in his introduction to that long quotation by Rilke, “[f]or others who before it were blind, the world first becomes visible by what is thus spoken” (GP 244/172, cf. PLT 73). Through its indications, literature precipitates thinking that pulls the reader out of her usual comportment and asks the reader to participate in the vicinity of the other. Moreover, Ziarek finely observes, “although such thinking does not constitute ethics yet, it opens the possibility of ethics in the first place” (cf. P 271).74 Indeed, this is not ethics per se, but it is worthy perhaps of further ethical inquiry; the provocative nature of literature inherently puts into question social conventions and, so, calls for a more thoughtful understanding of the usual social code.

Literature bears the possibility of an of engagement with principled ethics by giving rise to a voice that needs to be heard. The text forms a “dialogue [Zwiesprache]” with the reader wherein the nature of the work is at issue.75 The dialogue means that a participation, a give and take, between the reader and text emerges.76 As any arbitrator of conflict will agree, dialogue is necessary for coming to agreement. The dialogue of literature, derivative of the logos, is an early moment in the discourse of justice that includes respect, agreement, and rights. Accordingly, there is, at least minimally, some virtue in dialogue. Dialogue prescribes listening to (heeding) and interpreting the work as well as ‘the voice of the friend’ (cf. S 403-6/279-81). This same

75Quoted in Hodge’s Heidegger and Ethics, 116.
prescription is required of the work of literature. To quote Frank Schalow, “dialogue is a reciprocal engagement in the truth by which both parties let something be seen. The participants avoid ‘one-sidedness’ by attending to the issue itself.” 77 Furthermore, and through the dialogical engagement with literature, new options for executing and rethinking the social code and mores become viable as dialogue translates existing conventions into a personal, historical and existential issue for me. In the work of art, specifically the literary work, “knowledge and representation become radically transformed . . .” 78 This transformation intimates an authentic “projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being” in its most proper way since the tentative nature of potentiality, like indication, is of proto-importance on the way to ethics (SZ 336/385). It is a transformation which is to be read as “in itself originary ethics” (P 271).

V. 5. Voice of Conscience

If literature solicits the reader and draws out an authentic experience of the other in the process of reading, then this is still incomplete with regard to the internal mechanics of how authenticity constitutes the possibility of originary ethics. Heidegger extensively comments on Dasein’s obsequious regard for das Man through its primary mode of being absorbed in the everyday world (cf. SZ §27). As noted, this natural absorption in the world constantly puts Dasein on the


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in the work of art. The ordinary forms of power relations that define each historical moment are thrust open and a different set of vectors that determine the valency of social praxis, of how we act, know, value, and perceive, come into play. As Heidegger suggests, action, representation, and knowledge are all altered, given a different momentum, a momentum that no longer realises grasping and controlling forms of action and knowledge.

threshold of losing its particular identity to das Man. This happens so much so that “[t]he who of everdayness,” for Dasein, “is the ‘Anyone’ [das ‘Man’]” (PGZ 336/244, cf. SZ §27). How can Dasein of das Man, as a characteristically irresponsible member of the general public, become a responsible and authentic citizen of its community? Protected as Dasein is in the security of acting according to popular opinion, becoming authentic, and sensitive to individual ethical questions, is not easy. Yet Heidegger holds that Dasein can reach its own potentiality-for-being, in authenticity. Being-toward-death drives Dasein from its inauthentic everydayness to itself. “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there [Nicht -mehr-dasein-könnens]” (SZ 250/294). Heidegger’s understanding of conscience provides a skeleton key, so to speak, to the realm of ethics and responsibility proper. Once again, this is a realm where the consciousness of death does not freeze Dasein’s ability to interpret its existence, as if caught in a cul-de-sac of nihilism. On the contrary, it is hermeneutically productive in that it brings Dasein “into an appropriate relationship of being to the characters of possibility” for its existence (PGZ 440/318). Being-toward-death, in turn, locates Dasein as a “Being towards a possibility - indeed, towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself” (SZ 261/305). In respect of the absolute certainty of my dying, my self-assessment and identity puts the existential phenomenon of thrownness in reverse. Instead of being-in-the-world being co-determined as Da-sein, there-being, the ‘there,’ or thrownness of being into a situation, gets dissimulated. The factual generalities that situate my existence temporarily dissolve as the bare and terminal peculiarity of my existence overwhelms the worldly attributes attached to my being.
Being-toward-death intensifies Dasein’s awareness of, first, its own being (as finite) and, later, its own being-in-the-world. Dasein, next, actualises its distinctive understanding of itself through an authentic choosing of itself; this occurs as praxis (action), authentically being-in-the-world by recognizing one’s potentiality (-for-being). Heidegger calls the phenomena of this peculiar self-awareness, and its choosing, being resolute (Entschlossenheit) (cf. GP 406-8/287). “I am absolutely resolute in having chosen myself” (PGZ 440/318-9).79 This being resolute by choosing one’s self is constitutive of the phenomenon of authenticity. “In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-being” (SZ 268/313). Heidegger reports that the choice of one’s self, to affirm one’s ownness and particularity, is an awakening of the conscience which Dasein has always carried with it. The choice to be resolute “is nothing other than wanting-to-have-a-conscience” (PGZ 441/319 altered).

Choosing to be resolute, however, means already being receptive to the possibility of having a conscience. Becoming resolute, though, is not a matter of simply choosing to be resolute as one chooses to go walk the dogs. Evidently, one cannot really choose to become resolute unless one has already understood and made the choice to be resolute, just as one cannot be conscientious in one’s conduct unless one has asked oneself to be aware of this conscience, as it were, wanted-to-have-a-conscience. This circularity is intentional since understanding the

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79 Note the following prominent authors have read resoluteness to be highly negative with respect to an understanding of otherness: Emmanuel Levinas (“Is Ontology Fundamental?” Philosophy Today 33 (1989), 121-8), Karl Löwith (Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995)), and Michael Theunissen (The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber translated by Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984)).
choice to be resolute, like all authentic understanding, is hermeneutical and so circular.\textsuperscript{80} All the same, this is not to say that being resolute is something elite or inaccessible. In fact, the concept of resolve (\textit{Entschlossenheit}) is quite egalitarian as every Dasein is called to become resolute, hence, authentic. Everyday Dasein, however, never hears being asked; it fails to hear the call. The call to be oneself, which is the call to be resolute, is prepared in the call of conscience and reaches the Dasein that is disposed to listening, given that listening ancestrally belongs to the call. Resolute Dasein understands the call because it actually belongs to and speaks the same primordial language of being as the call itself. Conscience is not a psychologically based faculty in the mind but a pre-linguistic call, a ‘call of conscience’ (\textit{Gewissensruf}). “If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a \textit{call [Ruf]}. Calling is a mode of \textit{discourse}. The call of conscience has the character of an \textit{appeal [Anruf]} to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of \textit{summoning [Aufrufts]} it to its ownmost Being-guilty” (SZ 269/314). This ‘call of conscience’ reveals that conscience arises in an ostensibly worldless but nevertheless linguistic-character and that character continues to mark the basic complexion and resonance of conscience as it is attested in Heidegger’s \textit{Daseinanalyik}. Conscience, however, is not a moralistic announcement of the public norms. It, rather like the voice of the friend, “corresponds [to] a possible hearing” (SZ 270/31). Hearing the other is an implicit means of introducing the concept of alterity and, thus, the possibility of ethics. Hearing implies that another speaks and that the other is recognised.\textsuperscript{81} Notably, conscience, one of


\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Harvey, “Intersubjectivity, Intimacy, and Selfhood,” 351.
Heidegger’s rare and inescapably normative words, turns up as a ‘mode of discourse.’

By the definition of discourse as needing both a sender and receiver, for example, Marjorie Grene’s criticism of Heidegger’s conception of resoluteness as “ruthless independence” is incompatible with the dialogical nature of discourse.¹²¹ Discourse is an activity that presupposes others. Of course, I could be in discourse with myself as in a conversation that I have with myself about my own death; for certainly, it is death that genuinely isolates my existence as a determined set of possibilities (cf. PGZ 438-9/317-8). But this discourse I have with myself is still not at all monological; if it were, it would be a kind of privy language unable to be related and this clearly is not the case. Though no one can experience my anxiety about my death and the occasional call of conscience that I experience as this particular factual Dasein, others can understand the discourse that underwrites the moment of conscience. The discourse of conscience is not a form of relativism wherein conscience is defined subjectively. It is the voice of being that is defined objectively and this is exactly what gives conscience its significance to being-in-the-world authentically, consciously and ethically. The saying ‘listen to your conscience’ is something to which everyone can relate. Hamlet’s “To Be or Not to Be” soliloquy is, in Heideggerian parlance, a verbalization of the call of conscience. The prince responds to the call with resoluteness by realizing his own potentiality for being, by trying to reconcile the injustice against himself as well as his abode (ethos), the state of Denmark. Conscience is relative insofar as it demands individual, local and situational interpretation but it seems to be universal in that it contains a built in sense of responsibility, a desire for justice however it might

be articulated (cf. SZ §58).

Conscience, far from isolating Dasein from others, actually returns Dasein to its world. It "calls Dasein forth to its possibilities" as being-in-the-world (SZ 274/319). The anxiety and guilt that Dasein experiences in the throes of existentiell interpretation are now transformed and enacted in resolute action. In being attested, the phenomenon of conscience is manifest as being resolute in action. The internal phenomenon of conscience is externalised as the phenomenon of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). The sequence wherein Dasein first hears the call of conscience and then responds (resolves) to it shifts the culminating movement of authenticity back to being-in-the-world-with-others where conscience is attested. "Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the current factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of action" (GP 407/287). Resoluteness transcribes conscience into civic deed by attesting Dasein's interpretation of the call in practical activities. Civic deed means that the interiority of Sein-zum-Tode and its accompanying call of conscience has moved into the public, political (civic) realm, to be accomplished as the enactment of discourse (and the call) in practical action (deed). Now, discourse and action, hearing the call and responding to it go together in authentic Dasein. "To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking action" (SZ 294/341). The call of conscience and its attestation in resoluteness, then, constitutes the preliminary authentic ontological concept of care for others as others. Yet why should conscience and resoluteness signal authentic practical action and care for others? Care for the other, answers Vogel, calls the other "to his existential guilt: to his responsibility for affirming his situation as his own and taking hold of his possibilities."³³ In care for the other, authenticity is realised

³³Vogel, The Fragile We, 83.
because the movement of conscience and resoluteness is distinguished by the spirit of personal interpretation and appropriation as opposed to the dispirited and uncritical characters of das Man. In better understanding the phenomenon of guilt, a propitious understanding of the concept of authenticity and its relationship to discourse enacts existential "possibilities of access and modes of interpretation of beings [that] are themselves diverse, varying in different historical circumstances" (GP 30/22).

By way of discourse, specifically the call of conscience, Dasein becomes mindful that it is a guilty being. "Dasein is eo ipso guilty" (PGZ 441/319). It is guilty presumptively for the knowledge of what it has or has not done, but this may already be presuming too much. This after-knowledge (Ge-wissen), this reflection on deeds is not a particular unease over some particular deed. Rather, it is a critical review of all of one's deeds or more accurately of one's existence as a whole. Such critical disposition toward one's very existence is not necessarily circumstantial, but something "sketched out in [the being of] Dasein beforehand" (SZ 281/326). As Hoffman writes, "my mere existence is discovered as making me guilty."84 This guilt, seemingly, is a result of Dasein's existential thrownness into the world as a being that can never accomplish its entire potential (cf. IM 161). Dasein's inevitable failure in its projects reveals its lack of essence. Were Dasein endowed with some essence or some fundamental quality, it would then be able to achieve, to master some aspect of its existence that reflects its essence, but Dasein never is the complete master or constituting agent of anything. Dasein, therefore, will always be a failed project and as such it has its basis in lack, nothing. Anxiety of this fundamental nothingness

connects the nothing exposed in the range of guilt to the nothing and nonexistence represented by death. "This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience - this reticent [Verschwiegenheit] self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety - we call 'resoluteness' [Entschlossenheit]" (SZ 296-7/343). To write this another way, Heidegger finds both the related terms of conscience and resoluteness to be authentic forms of disclosure and that these disclosures have been authenticated, as it were, in the existential realization of Dasein’s nothingness, a nothingness whose mood is anxiety.

Mood, specifically anxiety, when it is heard in a state of being-resolute, then, with discourse co-discloses authenticity. And how is mood itself communicated, how does affectivity primordially reach Dasein? In a word, discourse. Conscience is a mode of calling and “the call is a mode of discourse." In Heidegger’s words, “conscience discourses” (SZ 273/318). Furthermore, the discourse of conscience is a specialised one, a specialised call, not just because it is charged with mood but because it is silent. If talking (Gerede) reveals a deficiency before authenticity and praxis, then silence unveils the opposite (G 61 71). Because the call of conscience, which is silent, has nothing to say, no content to transmit, the call indicates “the intelligibility of the projection upon the ‘ground’ of Dasein’s Being. Therefore, it discloses nothing." It discloses emptiness, highly indicative of course in an existential sense, but objectively speaking it is nothing. This nothing, to repeat, is Dasein’s source of anxiety. The call discloses the anxiety that reflects the nothing, the groundlessness, of Dasein’s being. The

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86Birmingham, “Logos and the Place of the Other,” 38.
call of conscience could be, thus, seen as inherently in harmony with a multiplicity of possible ways of being as it echoes Dasein's own lack of ground and lack of intrinsic narrative for one particular way of being. Anxiety over the nothing at the essence of Dasein can be transformed when resolute into respect for other beings insofar as there is no single ground or meta-narrative from which to declare a judgment that could not be revisited. In fact, this lack at the essence of Dasein requires that decisions and judgments constantly be revisited in light of the current situation. The worry and elementary doubt internal to anxiety are themselves calls to a kind of existential skepticism about my life, behaviour, and actions. It makes previously thought norms and patterns of conduct appear, at least momentarily, provisional and subject to question. The situation as a whole comes under the review of conscience.

The call of conscience delivers Dasein to its own particular potentiality-for-being by stating that this affective call be factically interpreted. The call of conscience is, thus, the original hermeneutic voice that demands to be interpreted by each particular, situated, Dasein. There is, apparently, nothing that could be calculated to determine a categorical or even general message within the call. On the contrary, the call of conscience is an effulgent, incalculable possibility in the spectrum of interpretation. Basically, the call is loaded with 'noise' that resists standardization or narrowing to a singular definition and thereby inspires individual or wide-ranging interpretations. The call cannot be thematised as such and such, nor is it a burden that can be shared or disbursed among others. The call is mine and only I can interpret it in light of my historically given and, therefore, limited choices as found in my factical existence. Resoluteness, hence, only authentically evolves when I have appropriated the call of conscience in a provisory interpretation as the call fits with my historical and factical givenness overlaid on
the reality of the empty character of the ground of my existence. The resolve gained from this fresh and original interpretation enacts the authenticity made in real choosing. Authentic choosing is accordingly marked by the heterogeneous diversity announced in the ‘noise’ of the call itself, a ‘noise’ that must be tolerant of all features within the call that together, mutually deaden one another in order that the call maintain its equilibrium of outward silence. This authentic choosing, which seems to be a tacit recognition of multiplicity of worldviews, in someway liberates Dasein from the hegemony of everydayness that represses every Dasein’s essential uniqueness. In other words, resolute Dasein returns to the world as one who has been freed from the clamps of everyday conformity.\footnote{Heidegger calls this choosing to be resolute a process of ‘freeing’ Dasein for its itself and for its world.\footnote{Vogel describes this liberating process as one that incorporates the other and allows “the other to question and reflect upon the hypothesising interpretations of the pale public world in such a way that he is freed to interpret the meaning of his existence for himself.” This freeing of Dasein for itself and others is derivative of the movement of resoluteness heralded in the call of conscience. Based on the indicative and enigmatic nature of great works of literature, such as Hamlet, literature is an exemplary way of advancing the freeing of oneself for diverse interpretations and proto-ethical praxis. Literature and creative uses of language articulate “emotions and ways of feeling [that] in fact have the possibility of uncovering Dasein itself in its particular being” (PGZ 353-4/256). Poetry and literature are, thus, the written form of language that leads to this freeing; rhetoric.}}

\footnote{The resolute return to one’s thowness,” write Painter and Sheehan, “entails freeing up for oneself those inherited possibilities, although not necessarily as inherited.” From their, “Choosing One’s Fate,” 65.}

\footnote{Cf. Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos, 51.}

239
would be its political spoken form; and, the call of conscience would be its silent and undiluted form.

Given the character of the call of conscience as founded in discourse, and given that this call measures the potentiality for being resolute and making choices, it is not surprising that the choices made by resolute Dasein reflect a concern for others: “Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let Others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates” (SZ 298/344). Contra Marjorie Grene, resolute Dasein through and through incorporates the other. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of Others. This is Heidegger’s deliberate and clear affirmation of not only the existence of others but also the heedful appreciation and care for others (Fürsorge). As Birmingham correctly observes, now “authentic Dasein can no longer understand the other as part of the undifferentiated [das Man]. Here the relation to the other is one of freedom - that is, through the call, the other is grasped as who he or she is, freed to take up his or her potentiality-for-Being.” It, additionally, is a preemptive refutation of those who would claim his philosophy to be rooted in radical individualism. These words are later similarly repeated for emphasis in case anyone missed

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89Peg Birmingham, Joanna Hodge, Silvia Benso, Arne Näss, Frederick Olafson, Bernhard Radloff, Frank Schalow, Lawrence Vogel, Egil A. Wyller, and Krzysztof Ziarek disagree with Grene and others likeminded with her. Also see the bibliography.


240
them in Sein und Zeit. "Only by coming into its own is Dasein sufficiently enabled truly to
shoulder solicitude 'for the other'" (BzP §45). Vogel highlights the origin of the other and its
potential in the 'mineness' of the moment of being-resolute, of coming into one's own.

"Heidegger suggests that one can only appreciate others in their potential for authenticity, and so
as really other than oneself, when one affirms that one's own existence is one's own and so really
other than 'the Others.'"92 The retreat to oneself does not elevate Dasein above its being-with-
others in an ontologically superior way, as some have interpreted, or more likely misinterpreted,
Nietzsche's 'Übermensch.' The withdrawal to the self instead puts Dasein in sober contact with
the essential, empty being-in-the-world that inhabits the core of every Dasein and as such
galvanises Dasein's ability to listen to its own conscience, which is properly the conscience of
the other as well. The call of conscience as a proto-linguistic manifestation allows Dasein to
understand others only if it can listen correspondingly to the call. "Conscience," underlines
Frank Schalow, "calls Dasein back from its falling in the 'they.'" Language's development as a
call, however, presupposes the precise tonality which disposes Dasein to listen . . . In heeding the
call of conscience, Dasein testifies to its readiness to reciprocate for the possibilities granted as
care."93 The call of conscience heard in listening prepares Dasein to be its possibility as the
being that cares for others, which shares in listening to the same voice that speaks the same

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92Vogel, The Fragile We, 81.

93Frank Schalow, "Language and the Social Roots of Conscience: Heidegger's Less Traveled
language that (like the ‘voice of the friend’) every Dasein carries with it. Dasein can become the ‘conscience’ of others, can participate in a veritable bond with the other, when it is itself resolute because it has heard the call to be itself, which is also the call of the other. “When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another” (SZ 298/344). Resolute Dasein, then, is a way of being for Dasein that is authentically disclosive. It is authentic in that it reflects Dasein’s own (eigen) fidelity to its being, and it is disclosive since it reveals an original way of caring for others as appropriated authentically in belonging and, hence, having heard the call.
The call of conscience when rightly heard is disclosure itself. The call is, as Crowe finds, “disclosure-as-discourse.” He summarises “disclosure-as-discourse is revealed in its disclosive power by hearing (das Hören) and keeping silent (das Schweigen) (G 61 71).”

Within the call of conscience, ‘disclosure-as-discourse’ (externalised as resoluteness), Heidegger offers the possibility of responding to the prevailing disclosure (discourse). Recollect that Heidegger conceives the prevailing discourse as dominated by specific worldviews (i.e., the computational, logistic discourse outlined in Chapter II) to the exclusion of other modes of language use and that this precipitated the retreat of philosophy from the lived-world (Chapter I). Authentic (resolute) Dasein has the ability to reply to the prevailing discourse with a philosophically robust discourse charged with a tentative, differentiated, and non-objectifyable character. This discourse is also heterogeneous and rich in possibility due to its originally groundless nature, and it is, by definition, authentic as it is announced in the being-resolute of the call of conscience. Authenticity is then implicated with the ethical character of being diverse,

54Crowe, “Resoluteness in the Middle Voice,” 231.
local (anti-imperial), provisional, and dialogical as these attributes are found in the discourse of conscience. The discourse claimed within the space of conscience is a fortiori an open and diverse one because the call is a discourse that announces genuine alterity. It is a discourse that "brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside . . . and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others" (SZ 298/344). To echo Birmingham, this "authentic discourse is the discourse of a differentiated space in which the distinctive selves of both Dasein and the other are able to appear . . . [It] is the discourse of difference that brings into being, through the emancipatory solicitude of the other, a place that allows, not merely otherness, but distinctness: the Other." The discourse of resoluteness, which is the discourse of conscience, is also the discourse of authenticity whose signature is otherness. If this discourse of otherness is now returned to what Heidegger claims is the homogeneous discourse of the West, the discourse of otherness at once arises in conflict with everyday discourse. The call of conscience that has disclosed the multifarious character of being conflicts with the deracinated, monological discourse of das Man and provides an alternative to the discourse of the latter.

Finally, Heidegger provides for the possibility of a corrective to the generic discourse of everydayness by proposing that Dasein make an authentic response to this prevailing discourse of monotony and conformity. He calls this authentic response an Erwiderung; it emerges during his discussion of historicity. By virtue of the factical givenness of one's hermeneutical situation, the temporality of that situation is historically structured by prior understanding. Heidegger's faithfulness to phenomenology is that an authentic grasp of the hermeneutical situation be realised as an understanding of the temporality within experience and, therefore, the multiplicity

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95Birmingham, "Logos and the Place of the Other," 39.
given in experience. Being-resolute means understanding the multiple temporal presencings as a repetition of the possibilities of existence that have been handed down by history. "The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the *repetition* [Wiederholung] of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. *Repeating is handing down* [Überlieferung] *explicitly* - that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (SZ 385/437). This repetition of the past, which is always occurring, now becomes decisive for Dasein because when resolute Dasein sees its situation and the past not as part of a predestined narrative, but rather as a limited set of possibilities from which it can actualise its potentiality. Dasein performs an "interpretive construction (*auslegender Aufbau*)" of its life-situation from its possibilities given as resolute (G 43 279). Dasein can choose from among its possibilities as given by history and this serves as an ostensible ground for its decisions. As Vogel writes, this ground as history dispels the existentialist charge of nihilism directed against Heidegger's work. "Fundamental ontology combats the existentialist version of nihilism - that we live in sheer groundlessness - by articulating the . . . historical situation to which we belong: the always prior basis of our projects."96 By choosing itself from its set of possibilities as finely circumscribed by historicity, Dasein can both redeem itself from nihilistic existence and affirm its interactive being-in-the-world with decisions that move Dasein in an ethical direction.

That resolute Dasein attends to the historically given may suggest a kind of predetermination wherein Dasein's possibilities for choice are so historically saturated that the choice offers little or no margin to depart from strict determinism. Heidegger replies that though

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96 Vogel, The Fragile We," 59.
the possibilities repeated by resolute Dasein are historically conditioned, the choices are not necessarily determined. He writes, "repetition does not let itself be persuaded (überreden) of something by what is 'past,' just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a critical reply (Erwiderung) to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there" (SZ 386/437-8 altered). In other words, far from being unconditionally accepted, the past can, and in fact must, with resolute Dasein, be put into a dialogue with the present. The past needs to be projected as possibility onto the present factual reality and only in this way can the past be appropriated critically and "repeated anew" (PGZ 33/26). But if the past is the ground of appropriating the present in authentic decisions, what are the grounds for the way in which the past is repeated, echoed, 'anew'? There is no ground in the epistemological foundationalist sense. But there is ground for appropriating the past if the ground is thought in the language of the call of conscience, or even the formal indication of literature. This language, again, in both the call of conscience and literature prescribes a "groundless" sense of openness to possibility ("futurity") and interpretation that stays provisional. This does not lead to decisionistic actions, nor can the past as a general concept alone justify decisions. Birmingham attempts to discredit decisionist readings of Heidegger when she explains that the "notion of Erwiderung, itself is rooted in the temporality of the moment

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97Macquarrie and Robinson translate Erwiderung as "reciprocative rejoinder." Stambaugh uses just "responds." Peg Birmingham prefers "critical reply." Critical reply seems most appropriate. See her excellent article "Logos and the Place of the Other." Johannes Fritsche, however, repudiates Birmingham's interpretation and translation here on the basis of the term's grammatical case in the structure of the sentence. He seems to derive more meaning from the grammar of the sentence than the words in it and, therefore, his argument against Birmingham seems flimsy. See his Historical Destiny and National Socialism Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

(Augenblick), allows for the possibility of thinking something like a ‘critical mimesis’ in Being and Time, or more precisely, it allows for a rethinking mimesis as displacement and disruption.\textsuperscript{99} This ‘critical mimesis’ combines Heidegger’s repetition along with a “disavowal (Widerruf)” of the past as might be faithfully repeated (SZ 386/438). Resolute Dasein critically reviews the past as handed down to it at the site of this disavowal (Augenblicksstätte).\textsuperscript{100} The critical appropriation of the past, in sum, “arises from resolutely understanding oneself, and it refuses to let the past dominate the present in the sense of coming back as what was formerly actual.”\textsuperscript{101} This resolute understanding of oneself allows for what Birmingham calls a ‘critical mimesis’ to come to actuality and introduces an ethical modality to the decision. Resolute understanding is the creative reflection on the call of conscience, which, remember, is a dialogue.

The discourse of conscience was disclosed as a proto-ethical inscription in the nature of Dasein’s being. Richardson does his best to describe this proto-ethical language of being within Dasein’s being. Heidegger, he writes, “conceives his question about Being (and about man only insofar as man has a built-in comprehension of Being) as far more radical than any question about the ‘oughtness’ of human acts.”\textsuperscript{102} The choices made, thus, by resolute Dasein are neither predetermined from straightforward historical taking over of the past, nor are they arbitrary since

\textsuperscript{99}Peg Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 14/2-15/1 (1991), 25.

\textsuperscript{100}Vogel explains the self-critical choosing of resolute Dasein such that “authenticity would seem to encourage a self-critical skepticism: a recognition that since no resolution is absolutely warranted, one’s own assertions should remain tentative and open to objections.” From his The Fragile We, 67.

\textsuperscript{101}Painter and Sheehan, “Choosing One’s Fate,” 68.

\textsuperscript{102}William Richardson, “Heidegger and the Quest for Freedom,” Theological Studies 28 (1967), 296

246
they are delimited by history and guided by the question of the propriety of being. Sikka claims that “the Kierkegaardian and, frankly, theological side of Heidegger’s description [of the call of conscience] suggests that Dasein, in being resolute, binds itself to the categorical voice of a private conscience which is somehow attuned to being, although it is not the ‘voice of God’ in any ordinary sense.”103 The propriety of being states that one acknowledge the “heeding,” “obeying,” and “listening” that mark the basic situation of the structure of friendship (PGZ 367/266). It states, again in Richardson’s words, that one ascribe in earnest to the “natural law” of a being’s being, to let beings be what they are.104 Dasein’s understanding of this ‘natural law’ points to care for the other, or, at the very least, suggests that Dasein not be responsible “for the Other’s becoming endangered in his existence, led astray, or even ruined” (SZ 282/327).

The call of conscience consequently calls for a self-differentiating response to being and time that denies pure repetition and submission to the dominion of uniformity of the status quo. The call asks Dasein to incorporate its past and repeat it in a new, different, and respectful way. Dasein, then, resolutely can make felicitous choices in light of the being of the other and its place in history. These choices have been derived from possibilities in discourse ranging from the desiccated character of assertions through to the effulgent voice of conscience.

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104 Richardson, “Heidegger and the Quest for Freedom,” 297.
SIX: CONCLUSION: THE LANGUAGE OF BEING

I have never been satisfied by words (Wort) without proceeding to things (Sache). My aim has been not only to build houses, but also to live in them.

- Jacob Grimm, 1848.

The significance of language in the occurrence of the world, the so-called “world’s worlding,” is profound as it stretches out from conscience through to assertions (PLT 45). Language, conceived as discourse (Rede) or logos, arises in tandem with the possibilities available in existence, if it does not actually qualify these possibilities. Language expresses the “world-character of experience” since it is the horizon of experience (possibility). In this sense, language is generated simultaneously in experience and in the perception of beings in general.

The primordial and ever-present character of language in the world suggests a language of being that underlies each individual register of language, just as it does each language user. This is, of course, a completely unprecedented kind of language that contains, when heard properly, possibilities for achieving care for others so as to “free” others, and this Heidegger calls “authentic care” (SZ 122/159). As noted earlier, these possibilities are heard when Dasein is resolute so that it is the “metaphysical ground of the possibility” that Dasein be “with others, for them and through them” (G 26 240). Authentic Dasein becomes actualised and attested as it “liberates” others and allows their real individuality to unfold (SZ 298/344). The language of being in general ascribes the possibilities for this proto-ethical posture toward the world, situation, and others. For if the possibilities of ethics and responsibility are founded in the

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1Citation translated by Kiesel in his The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 55.
2Citation translated by François Raffoul in “Otherness and Individuation in Heidegger,” 348.
resolve owning of the situation, then the site (ethos) is constructed, housed so to speak, in
language (cf. OWL 63, 135). This leads Richard Polt to reflect, "[p]erhaps when Heidegger says
that language is the house of being, he means it 'literally': Being abides in language as its
abode."3 Being lives in language and, therefore, it is in the abode (ethos) and metaphorical
horizon of language that the possibility for response, responsibility, and even ethics resides.

In the previous chapter, the subject of the critical reply (Erwiderung) was briefly
discussed. This critical reply arose from the existentiell, or ontic, awareness of the character of
being-in-the-world. In other words, the reply was spoken in response to an authentic grasp of the
temporal-historical situation at hand, a thoroughly hermeneutical acquisition. The reply, as
Birmingham interprets Heidegger, has the capacity to act as kind of ontological corrective to the
present situation by responding with the full faculties of resolve decision-making, which entails
wanting to be the conscience of beings or, said another way, wanting to let beings be free for
their own unique self-articulation. Appropriation of the past is understood as authentic in the
narrow sense when the appropriation actively takes hold of the situation by not blindly accepting,
but by prudently criticizing it, engaging it, and responding to it. "The response [reply]," observes
Birmingham, "to repeatable historical possibilities is one which disavows any notion of
continuity of identity with the past. Here a reference to the preposition 'wider' meaning
'contrary or against' is helpful in grasping Heidegger's sense of reply as Erwidert."4 "The
repeating of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is 'past,'
nor does it bind the 'Present' back to that which has already been" (SZ 385-6/437). Being-

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resolute, then, means taking responsibility for choosing among the possibilities being repeated; it means responding to them judiciously insofar as responding is voiced as a creative appropriation of the situation. “Man speaks in that he responds to language” given in the space of the ‘there’-situation (PLT 210). If ‘man’ responds authentically, the response is stamped with the character of strife, finitude, and criticism, as in a critical response. The possibility of ethics arises in the being-resolute appropriation of one’s history that is, and should, constantly be subject to review and new interpretation (cf. SZ §74). Erwiderung suggests a response, in which the strifely is inscribed; hence something like a retort or a rejoinder. This ‘retort,’ ‘rejoinder,’ or ‘critical response/reply’ is founded and “brought to word in the strife of concealment and unconcealment,” a-letheia in its most authentic sense. The understanding adjudicated in this genuine “site of resistance and displacement” is then remanded, so to speak, to the world of

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4One’s life history properly perceived, notes Haviland, unfolds according to a dialogical understanding of the self and agency. The perception and, therefore, interpretation of what it is to act in accord with one’s being authentic is always going to be somewhat relative for me, i.e., “equivocal, ambiguous, and interactive . . . [a] patchwork of conflicting versions, contested elements, themes, and morals.” In other words, one’s own life is to be understood authentically as revisable, non-dictatorial, and open. See his Introduction, “Will You Write Down My language?” in Old Man Fog and the Last of Aborigines of Barrow Point, by John B. Haviland with Roger Hart, illustrations by Tulo Gordon (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), xvi. Compare with Nicholson’s account of the inauthentic self as tyrannical, a kind of ‘psychological autism.’ Cf. Ch. III, 6.

6The larger citation reads this way.

Thus, a tradition, a past, a ‘history, in the ordinary sense is not something that is delivered over to Dasein, and to which Dasein simply belongs. Rather, the very possibility of a tradition is marked by a peculiar repetition, where Dasein, on the basis of its ownmost future, ‘goes back’ to a given situation, but in such a way that this situation is disclosed, illuminated in a new way, revealed as a unique historical possibility, and not repeated in the sense of a simple reiteration or a passive obedience . . . Rather Heidegger insists, the repetition is marked by a specific comportment of Erwiderung . . . Erwiderung suggests a response, yet a response in which the strifely is inscribed; hence something like a retort or a rejoinder.

Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger & the Political, 25.

7Radloff, “Heidegger’s Critique of Imperial Truth,” 52.
practical action, if the understanding is one based on a sense of ontological justice (dike) or being in accord with the letting be of beings (cf. IM 164). This understanding, insofar as it is an authentic understanding, can more easily become a praxis since it is non-theoretical and practically derived. “True understanding,” in which the critical reply must be included, facilitates “genuine action” and “objective achievement” in the lived-world (GM 434/300). Dasein’s authentic response (dike), critical reply to the situation, is only known as it is fixed in the nexus of language (logos) that ‘lights up’ being and makes it a question (cf. IM 164). Consequently, Heidegger reports of the “essential connection of the phenomenon” with “words” (PGZ 275/202, cf. GM 442/306). But this ‘essential connection’ underwrites the project of a critical reply insofar as the reply is understood as a dialogue (Zwiesprache) that Dasein engages in and with being. Finally, this dialogue allows for the conscious appropriation and review of being because it recognises the voice of alterity, the other (being in its difference), and provides the possibility for refashioning the situation according to “solicitude” that “liberates” the other and lets the other be itself (SZ 298/344). “The ethical moment,” writes Sikka, “is therefore included in this way of being, as it is in Gelassenheit.”9 Language is this “‘patterning’ of life” that allows the ethical moment to arise since the critical reply to the hemeneutical situation is one that is perpetually rewritten according to disclosures given as primordial language, the logos (SZ 163/206).

Language itself is a response to being in its manifold usage. While the language of propositional logic may be a less authentic response to being and the voice of conscience a more

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9Sikka, Form of Transcendence, 223.
authentic one, language as a whole, Heidegger holds, is a continuous dialogue with being (cf. PLT 190). The being - language relationship, thus, is founded on a primordial responsiveness between the dialogue's interlocutors. That responsiveness founds the being - language exchange also means, and this is important, that responsiveness lends responsibility to the essence of beings that are language users. The response to being is the responsibility of language and, hence, the beings that have language. Language is the response to being and the nature of this response is a self-differentiation, an allocation of being by language into beings (the ontological difference) (cf. GP §§8-15, GM §75). The formative role of language in the constitution of the phenomenon of beings, i.e., in the ontological difference, is impressive. Hence, the essence of language, or being of language, if this can be said, in this primordial sense takes on the character of a language of being. Furthermore, this allocation of being by language occurs "out of difference into the difference . . . by responding" in dialogue (PLT 204-9). Heidegger describes this dialogue as the opening of language to being in Sein und Zeit in terms of the way in which entities presence. Recall from Chapter II that discourse (logos) is not separable per se from phenomena. As such, phenomenology becomes a path for the investigation into the question of being and actually into the "things themselves [Sachen selbst]" (27/50). But the things themselves can only be ascertained by way of language in that "[i]ts speaking bids the difference" to which beings are given (PLT 210, cf. BzP §267).

In retrospect here, phenomenology emerged as perfectly suited to the task of recovering the question of being as it combined beings (phenomena) and that which allows the phenomena
to come to appearance (logos). Since the question of being is grounded in the logos of phenomena, Heidegger expressed the importance of the logos first to the question of being-in-the-world in direct terms; the "role of logos in factual existence, i.e., on that which [discourse], insofar as it is left to its own devices, presents . . . an ontological possibility of life itself. This is just what logos means in the term ['rational animal'] (the determination of man)” (S 340/235). Language, then, is what makes life, being-in-the-world, a possibility. Later, when Heidegger was more inclined to addresses the question of being in general (not only Dasein), he expressed the same commitment of the Seinsfrage to language. “Language itself has this character of Being” (G 39 66). Indeed, language is so originally connected with being to the extent that, as Daniela Vallega-Neu reports, “language originates in beyng, is of beyng, and occurs (sways) in beyng. Thus, in order to understand how language occurs, we need to understand how beyng occurs.”

For Dasein, the occurrence of being is pre-theoretically scripted as the happening and totality of relations and involvements in the world. The logos somehow gathers together the peculiarity of being into individual specificities. These units are the things, stuff, and entities of existence. Dasein naturally understands its being through specific measures of existence, through alterity and the existence of individual things. Dasein actually understands being ‘‘within’’ the

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10 “Breathtaking as it is,” writes Keisel pace Husserl, “that phenomenology could be regarded as a uniquely nontheoretical science it is but an implication of the epoche [reduction] taken to its limits of bracketing out all objective formations.” - T. Keisel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time, 58.

11Citation translated by Gregory Fried in Heidegger’s Polemos, 160.

grammar generated by the verb ‘to be.’” 13 As Heidegger’s tried to exhibit, the character of being is not determinate, and as such it needs to be hermeneutically appropriated, interpreted with respect to one’s situation. The whole question of the meaning of being is a question that needs at every moment to rethought in light of the present time and place, retrieved for me also as “being-in-the-world-with-others” (SZ 118/155). The interpretation of the question will present itself according to the interpretation of the moment though as ‘only one particular way’ or possibility delimited by ‘each moment [jeweils].’ This interpretation will be a kind of ‘critical reply’ that is tentative and unfinished because the nature of the question is constantly changing due to the fluid nature of time and place in the manifold of finite, local experience. 14 This interpretation will be understood as authentic because it has the “sober anxiety” of the finitude of death with the character of being provisional, remaining open to the ‘mystery’ and possibility within the finitude of death (i.e., the ontic sense of withdrawal at the heart of truth); with this authenticity, “which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free.” (SZ 358/310). This joy and freedom reserved for the possibility of being authentic must be re-inscribed into praxis in order to achieve phronesis and this seems to be the first step toward being-in-the-world ethically (cf. S §21). The character of being joyful and free, then, arises from formally indicative language since it indicates a nonobjectifying and, therefore, authentic way of appropriating and owning one’s being-in-the-world. “An example of an outstanding nonobjectifying thinking and speaking,” as pointed in out


14Brtingham notes, thus, the “notion of Erwider . . . [is] itself rooted in the temporality of the moment (Augenblick). From her, “The Time of the Political,” 25.
in Chapter V.4, "is poetry" (P 61). Moreover, language, in the comprehensive sense (not
confined to the lexicon of math and science), in the same way yields this formally indicative
character that "wishes to point to phenomena in extreme generality" and does so "without
prejudice and standpoint."\textsuperscript{15} Formally indicative language only gives broad significations as it
asks to be individually interpreted. Thus, Heidegger fondly cites Heraclitus. "The master, whose
Oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks out, nor does he conceal, but indicates sēmainei]" (G 39
127).\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, formal indication resists falling into viewpoints that prescribe necessary
interpretations and interpretations that cannot be reviewed, challenged, or contested. The
language of formal indication breaks the viewpoint, for example, of the undoubtable Cartesian
subject that initially puts the subject in the position outside of the world to interpret beings in
objective, "extreme . . . definition" (SZ 98/130). But in order to make these interpretations to
begin with, being needs language (logos) to make these articulations possible. To be able to even
ask the question of being, language and being, logos and physis, need to happen together, the so-
called 'happening of being' (BzP §276). Words and phenomena (beings) in the most primordial
sense are the same.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, when phenomena are articulated and disclosed, at the same
time, their "intelligibility is put into words" (SZ 160/204). Hence, logos and physis can be
incorporated into one word: phenomenology; the being of discourse, the language of being.

For Heidegger, things, as discussed in Chapter II, come to presence through the allotment,

\textsuperscript{15}Keisel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 55.

\textsuperscript{16}Translated in Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary, 197 (altered).

\textsuperscript{17}Cf. Richardson, "Heidegger and the Origin of Language," 409.
gathering, and self-differentiation of being through language (*logos*). The *logos* provides for the
presencing and opening of being by acting as the non-metaphysical site to let beings come into
being. This provokes Heidegger to write that “[n]o thing is where the word is lacking” (OWL
61).\(^\text{18}\) The *logos* (the word) brings beings to appearance. It, subsequently, lets beings be what
they are by in some way antagonising being to show beings, by allotting a space for the
nonobjective and agonal appurtenance of being as it is inflected and coloured by the character of
the disclosing language.\(^\text{19}\) This antagonism in the space or site of disclosure is a differentiation
(*polemos*) of beings from being thereby bringing the world, insofar as the world consists of
multiple things, into presence. “The ‘unity’ of the world,” writes Fried, “and Dasein’s being-in-the-world, rests in this ontological differentiation (*polemos*) and gathering (*logos*) of beings into
a whole within which Dasein finds itself open to and free for its Being.”\(^\text{20}\) And as Heidegger
adds largely, “[*polemos* and *logos* are the same] insofar as they are equally needed in the event
of being (IM 62). Being needs *polemos* and *logos* to let beings come to be phenomenologically.
Heidegger found evidence for this in Anaximander’s ancient word for being: *to chreion*
(“compelling need”) (BC 91). Being has this want and need for the *logos* to let being come to
word and be spoken (cf. SZ §7B).\(^\text{21}\) As Heidegger concludes, “Being speaks everywhere and

\(^{18}\) Heidegger is paraphrasing the line “Where word breaks off no thing may be” from Stefan
George’s poem “The Word” (1919), published in George’s collection *Das Neue Reich*.

\(^{19}\) Cf. Tanzer, “Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name,” 90-6.


\(^{21}\) Concerning Anaximander’s *to chreion* and its translation see Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the
“Heidegger on Being’s Oldest Name.”
always through all languages” (G 5 388). That being needs the logos means that the response of the logos to being is a kind of ontological obligation of the part of logos to bring being into existence, to shelter and house it according to the dispensation of its ontological difference as reflected in the polemos.

Being-in-the-world is then dependent on the logos to disclose the world and make being (phasis) “free,” manifest (SZ §74). “Freedom is to be free and open” for the disclosure of being by the logos and to be held in the free, open space for the claim of authenticity on being-in-the-world (ZS 272/217). Freedom is, also, being able to have real choice, to be able to choose among many different choices. In other words, freedom is living in a diverse, heterogeneous place, as given in authentic disclosure, as that space wherein one actually has a variety from which to choose. “Freedom . . . is only in the choice of one possibility - that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others” (SZ 285/331). In other words, being free is being able to chose one possibility from among many while, at the same time, tolerating the other possibilities that others have chosen. Yet, in order that there may be this free choosing, diverse and heterogeneous possibilities must have already been freed in authentic disclosure given in non-objectiying language. The complication in the freeing of beings for authentic, heterogeneous disclosure arises (as mentioned in Chapter II) when the disclosure is shown under the conditions of an ideal, truth functional discourse. This disclosure becomes standardised and reveals itself as true (Wahrheit), ‘unfallen’ and irrepachable, rather than as a fusion of true and errant vectors that unfold in free disclosure. “Because the true,” writes Radloff, “is understood as the unfallen, the errance [withdrawal] inherent in the open, free realm of unconcealment shows itself merely

22Citation translated in Françoise Dastur’s, “Language and Ereignis,” 362.

257
as error.”

When the disclosure of beings is not free, when the disclosure does not let entities be themselves, phenomena appear as generated for the greater system of functional relations according to a standard or method. Should the plurality of the essence of phenomena show itself not in accord with the conditions of disclosure, the phenomena get recorded as errors within the programme of disclosure. In short, disclosure under the idea of specific and dominant conceptions of being seem to drain the logos of its effulgent heterogeneous faculty for unconcealment, only to replace it, for instance, with a socio-technical language and a likewise disclosure (cf. G 27 185). “The rich significance,” of the concrete world with all its ‘errors’ and ‘noise,’ “is ignored in favor of the qualitatively determined forces and motions that are held to control and rule nature. The research program to study these forces and motions . . . [leaves] no place in ‘the remainder of things’ for the ‘concrete realities’ that prevail in everyday experience.”

The freedom of showing and withdrawing in the space of truth is undermined by the duress of metaphysical thought that demands presence at the expense of withdrawal. The withdrawal (¬-lethe), which intimates the ‘free’ realm in this way gets blocked, shows itself as an error or malfunction within the world conceptualised as a metaphysically defined system of relations. As such, the organic, autochthonous, nature of beings that appear in ‘the remainder of things’ (the life that clings to the walls in the rubble of a torn-down house), is elided due, first of all, to an idealised conceptualization of the logos. The task of recovering a practical or wise attunement to language, to undergoing ‘an experience with language,’ suggests that, though disclosures may be coopted by a dominate language form, a more suitable or thoughtful

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23 Radloff, “Heidegger’s Critique of Imperial Truth,” 58.

24 Casey, The Fate of Place, 181-2.
disclosure may be adapted for praxis by attention to the *logos* itself (cf. OWL 57). "The correct . . . no longer shows itself; it is thus concealed and must be uncovered [again] through *logos*. In this way, therefore, *phronesis* . . . is *aletheia* in service to praxis" (S 52-3/36-7-altered). Hence, Heidegger sees a retrieval of the inclusive sense of the *logos* as the first step in the reorientation of truth (*a-letheia*) toward praxis as *phronesis*. Being is primordially obliged to the *logos* for "letting something be seen," for its phenomenal existence, and so this (the *logos*) is the starting point for letting something be seen freely in its own rightful propriety (SZ 32/56). The effulgent, authentic sense of the *logos* can enact the conscience of beings by setting being free for presencing, granting it space and place for disclosure, if the *logos* is left free, independent of coercive discourse. "*Erschlossenheit*, which is translated by ‘disclosedness,’” Fried reminds us, "also implies a sense of freedom as a release of a thing for its possibilities . . . Heidegger sometimes speaks of truth as the ‘free realm’ (*das Freie*)."25 Like Dasein who can authentically be the conscience of others, the *logos* is the grace and portal, as it were, that allows the freeing of being to enter into truth (disclosure) and, therefore, presence in the world; things in the world are there by virtue of having been freed to be there by the *logos*. The place of ethical possibility, inasmuch as this possibility is one possibility among many, is a disclosure (*a-letheia*) that originates in language. "In this sense, *aletheia*, whose first form of execution is *logos*," is the true place of departure for ethical understanding (S 127/87).

The *logos*, in fact, seems to provide the place (the ‘there’), *ethos*, or again metaphorically, the house for beings wherein beings can abide for a while. "Thanks to features such as gathering [*logos*],” observes Casey, “place becomes for him the very scene of Being’s disclosure and of the

openness of the Open in which truth is unconcealed. In the end, place figures as the setting for the postmetaphysical event of Appropriation (*Ereignis*).”26 Being’s demand for a place and *ethos* (to be) invites the *logos* to found a site for the emergence of beings. Now, the “resolute return to one’s thrownness [place, situation] entails freeing up for oneself those inherited possibilities, although not necessarily as inherited.”27 As such, the *logos* re-inscribes being at a temporally bound and locally delimited place (*ethos*). The response of the *logos* to being is possibly ethically endowed from the standpoint that it is the *logos* that is responsive and responsible to being for allowing beings to be in the same way that it is Dasein that needs to be responsive and responsible to others in order to let others come into being, become ‘freed,’ for their own unique specificity. The language of being is, therefore, spoken as a language ontologically related to the possibilities of being free since it is, properly, a freeing of things for being.

In the homogeneously formulated world of logistical vernaculars, propositional logic, programming languages and such, the response of the *lógos* to being takes on less ethical significance; though, of course, this is not to dismiss the importance and value of endeavours like propositional logic. In my opinion, we need more logicians! But in the extreme predominance of logistical discourse over other forms of speech the *logos* loses its chance for a greater ethical tenor. The *logos* still responds to the demand of being to be appropriated and shown but the response declines to let being freely unfold itself in its own specificity according to the harbour granted by the *logos*. The response of the *logos* to being’s need, its demand, suggests that the response loses some of its character of responsiveness and language becomes more of a

26Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 244.

27 Painter and Sheehan, “Choosing One’s Fate,”65.

260
nonspecific conduit or delivery system, so to speak, for the appearance of being. It still and very ably brings beings into being but does so in a generic, restricted (i.e., not free), and de-temporalised way. The *logos* does not so much respond to being but directs beings to presence. It puts beings into presence according to the strict and precise nature of a de-temporalised algorithm of the *logos*. The quadratic equation, for example, forces the elimination of almost all temporality and diversity in its manner of displaying its language, similarly, though to a lesser extent, with the languages of the natural science such as chemistry. But, when this language is sociologically appropriated by das Man the disclosures lose their scientific specificity in the voice of the nonspecialist, yet they nonetheless retain the restricted character of a technical discourse. In this way, the logician or computer programmer is not at all a risk to the diversity of disclosures in the concrete world, yet their specialised discourse, indiscriminately appropriated and vacuously repeated does suggest a ‘levelling off’ in the apprehending and enacting of different forms and ways of being. The language of rhetoric and especially that of literature, however, does not announce beings as so ‘levelled’ or present on call in any situation. Literary language contains the temporality and historicity that allows the response of the *logos* to authenticate the coming-to-presence (and withdrawal) of beings at a specific site of disclosure. It, likewise, sanctions and admits a multiplicity of indications within its language and thereby shelters those diversified indications within the site of emergence. Indicative language, thus, has the import of moving everyday being-with to authentic being-with-others as an “‘explicitly’ shared” way of being free for others in their differences (SZ 161/205). “Being-with others now has the sense of a heterogeneous space, a differentiated temporality in which each is grasped in
his or her own specificity."²⁸

Heidegger’s understanding of today’s destitution of being is the commanding and, herewith, authoritative presence of the word as truth (veritas) at the site of emergence. Since Roman times, at least, “the commanding word remains the site of truth” and this systemically bars the subtle and indicative word from coming to presence in its own temporally specific way.²⁹ The emergence proper, then, is founded in the historical specificity of language as what has self-differentiated according to its own time and place. The necessity of examining the time and place, the hermeneutical situation, unfolds in respect of any possible ethical comportment as decisive inasmuch as the site of disclosure and emergence must be appropriated by Dasein in its local, specific place, rather than handed-down from afar. Ethos means individual place, abode, because it is in a temporally specific place that beings can unfold, become what they are among the pluralistic tolerance granted by the multiplicity of indications.

If ethics is to be relevant, if it is going to have something say about the here and now, it must be primarily concerned with the present situation. Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein is always already ‘there,’ implaced in a situation needs to be considered, at least partially, as a rejection of the idea that we could return to another time in another place. “In this respect,” Malpas observes, “there is never any more fundamental place to find than the one before us now. This locality, the one before us now, is as close to the ‘original’ and ‘originary’ place as is any

²⁸ Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 27.

²⁹ Radloff, “Heidegger’s Critique of Imperial Truth,” 56. N.b. The dominance of the site of emergence by the metaphysical strength of authoritative discourse, Radloff further writes, underlies “Heidegger’s argument regarding the imperial character of modern politics” and so the hermeneutical situation in which Heidegger was writing (57).
other. Similarly, there is no appearing that is more fundamental than the appearing we encounter in the everyday - there is no prior or more originary ‘appearing’ that lies behind it.”³⁰ In other words, the lived world is the world inhabited by us now among the phenomena, a world in which we are bound and so to various degrees accustomed. There is, and this should be duly noted, no escape to any other world. In this realization, authentic care arises almost instinctively, i.e., by habit of respect for the habitat and others in it. This narrow but potent sense of care for our place of life, abode (ethos), is ascribed with a desire to be ethical - to preserve the place, to critique (erwidern) and, thereby, wish to improve upon it, and, of course, to share it and not be alone. Concurrently, these rather uncontroversial ‘values of the ethos coincide quite seamlessly with the heterogeneous valances of the logos; for Heidegger retrieves the logos as according with specifically ethical indications. The gathering of the logos is articulated in the ethos as gathering, preserving, and sheltering. The ratio of the logos, so admired by Aristotle that he defined man as the rational animal, is inscribed in the care of the vox populi as an Erwiderung, a critical reply, a kind of ongoing critical reasoning native to moral philosophy (cf. GM §72). Communication, that is the founding want to be with others in a community and in communion, is also certainly a central feature of discourse or the logos wherein the world becomes “explicitly’ shared” (SZ 162/205). Again, the ethical possibility of being-in-the-world is mirrored in the ethical propriety of language and its possibilities.

Language, as the house of being, allows for an ethos insofar as the language, i.e., the house, lets the appropriation of the greater domicile be gentle (domesticated), provisional, and indicative. Ethos respects the finitude of beings, thereby denying the imperial, unlimited and

unrestricted of that which is found un-ethically, without finite place. Within the ethical space no
singular strand of being or ideology comes to dominance because, here, beings receive the
“inflection” of particularity and difference that marks beings with such factual qualities as
“person,” “number,” “voice,” and “mood,” and this restricts the tendency to ‘enframe’ the
disclosure under theoretical modes of becoming present (IM 65). With relief, Heidegger hails the
variety of things as they are marked in their existence by the situational and accidental character
of the site of disclosure; beings “can never (and thank God never) be freed from [their factual
possibilities].” (G 21 414).31 Further, phenomena are indelibly attached to the time and space of
the place. “That which becomes,” in other words, “is placed in this local ‘space’ and emerges
from it” (IM 66). The factual possibilities are granted here at the site of disclosure by the site’s
temporal and local nature. Hence, the robust distinctive features of the site of disclosure, in some
way, are genetically passed on the phenomena themselves. The guarding or the housing of the
site of disclosure, which is accomplished in indicative language, occults the expropriation and
homogenisation of beings in systematic thought. Beings can come to presence as the
heterogeneous beings they are rather than in correspondence to a guiding thread or global
framework that would distort the presencing. Heidegger, then, is very much in Husserl’s
phenomenological tradition as he, like his mentor, is proposing a way back ‘to the things
themselves,’ back to the things as they might appear without technological or even everyday (das
Man) interference.

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Might attention to language, specifically its indicative features, permit a less tenuous

31 Translated in van Buran’s “The Ethics of the Formale Anzeige in Heidegger,” 166.
relation to acting ethically? Perhaps the question is why would it not? This thesis is empirically conservative. Language exerts a decisive influence on thinking and, thus, acting. What happens in what we read and hear as well as write and say is eventually and always reflected, to some extent, in experience and experience, in turn, reflects back to the faculty of language. Such is the hermeneutic circle (PGZ 355-7/258). Language is so exhaustively bound to experience that Heidegger eventually claims that it animates and houses our existence. If the heterogeneous effulgence of language is appropriated critically with regard to the situation, i.e., appropriated hermeneutically, that is to say if attention is payed to the word of language, life can be changed and improved for the better. “If it is true that man finds the proper abode of his existence in language - whether his aware of it or not - then an experience we undergo with language will touch the innermost nexus of our existence. We who speak language may thereupon become transformed by such experiences, from one day to the next in the course of time” (OWL 57). The language of being is a self-differentiating speech that is spoken in many dialects such as assertions, rhetoric, literature, voice of the friend, and the voice of conscience to name just a few. All these forms of language initiate their own mode of disclosure in the becoming of being. Ethical possibilities reside in the heterogeneous, indicative qualities of language, language that has not been purged of its ‘noise,’ because, simply it offers alternatives and possibilities. Languages, or even metalanguages, circumscribed by theoretical-technical lexicon fail to offer possibilities and alternatives when widely appropriated that may allow resolute Dasein to choose in light of its conscience and its friendly want to let beings be as they are. Hence, in 1965, Heidegger wrote to Zygmunt Adamczewski about Adamczewski’s new book on his work. “I am not surprised that you have turned to ethical questions. But today they belong to the most
difficult-concerning fundamentals. The question of ethics in Heidegger's analytic is not an easy one, yet nor is it a surprise since it is implicit insofar as possibilities may be appropriated in the disclosure of beings. The place of ethical possibility, therefore, lies with language in the constitution of the world in Heidegger's existential analytic.

Biographies:


This well researched work does a fine job tracing the biographical influences on Heidegger's philosophy.


Pöggeler traces what he claims to be the strongest influences (Hegel, Hölderlin, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Cézanne, and Celan) on Heidegger's intellectual development. He claims that Heidegger's greatest contribution was making art and language central to the question of the meaning of being and the "secret" text *Beiträge zur Philosophie* highlights this contribution best.


This essay unveils letters of Heidegger's with Roman Catholic Priest, Father Krebs. It shows Heidegger's reluctance to the church and its theoretical doctrines. For this Heidegger moved toward the more 'hermeneutical' faith of his wife's Lutheranism. Sheehan seems to think that Heidegger went too far in actively interpreting when he switched to social matters during his political involvement in the thirties.

Book Reviews:


Taminiaux's thesis is that Heidegger privileges the theoretical gaze over practical involvements. Birmingham argues forcefully against this.


This is a little long and rambling for a book review. Nevertheless, the reviewer is correct; I think in suggesting that there are strong doubt's about the plausibility of Philipse new critique.

Lauer, Dean. Review of *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, by Martin Heidegger. Translated by P. Emad & K. Maly. *De Philosophia* (Spring-Summer 2000), 130-2.

Considerations on Ethics:


Heidegger’s engagement with Beaufret is well known. Since Beaufret’s initial interest in Heidegger concerned ethics, this book may be interesting. Most of the book, however, is French translations of Heidegger’s lectures on the Greeks. There is, unfortunately, little in Beaufret’s commentary that is pertinent to the question of ethics.


The author defends Heidegger’s critique of modern science by showing that the strength of Heidegger’s analysis of ontology, and specifically the structures of experience, in *Sein und Zeit* force a coherent denunciation of science based on this analysis. He explains this denunciation, in part, on the ‘change over’ from praxis to theory in modernity.


The author focuses on that line in the “Letter on Humanism” about the thinking that thinks truth is ‘originary ethics.’ Her appraisal of Heidegger’s middle and later writings is that he clearly offers a possibility of ethics through ontology.


Arendt contends that the realm of the ethical should be removed from political action. Birmingham clearly explains how Arendt could make such an outrageous claim and still be critical of totalitarianism. Birmingham shows how ethical missions in politics, regardless of their intent, tend to become evangelistic, crusading, and violent. She turns to Heidegger at points to support Arendt.

The author situates Heidegger's concern for the individual's relationship to the community as rooted in Husserl and his notion of "crisis" within Europe. A crisis establishes the concrete actuality of the lived-world as a formidable issue and at the same time draws one into the fray of the crisis by forcing practical action on behalf of those in the crisis. Buckley suggests that the practical action called for in a crisis is non-calculative and, thus, reserves the possibility for being authentically ethical.


This article is ground-breaking and elucidates the critical concept of formal indication, not yet addressed in the literature. It shows how formal indication thematically prohibits oppressive politics.


van Buran's opus includes biography, philosophical analysis, and new interpretations. His reading of Heidegger's concept of formal indication has, if he is right, the potential to dismiss all critics who charge that Heidegger's thought, at least early on, was fascistic. As well, the author's copious research is at all times evident.


The article confronts Heidegger with Levinas and Derrida. Derrida's reading of Heidegger is found to be more plausible; whereas Levinas appears not to have understood Heidegger's discourse on conscience.


Champagne follows Derrida's commentary on the politics of Heidegger and Paul de Man. He shows that Derrida rebukes the latter two for their political involvement but claims that there is reason to believe that there are ethical indications in their writings, specifically in situational type ethics.


This volume of essays assembles some of the biggest names in Heidegger studies such as Caputo, Föti, Ijsseling, and Richardson. Birmingham's entry, "Ever Respectfully Mine: Heidegger on Agency and Responsibility," is especially worth of reading as is van Buran's "The Young Heidegger, Aristotle, Ethics."

269

In order for there to be a possibility of ethics, some sense of selfhood needs to be maintained. The author does well in preparing the ground for the establishment of the self and the establishment of other in the world.


Derrida explication of Heidegger’s term “Geist” is novel. He concludes that Heidegger’s rectorship address capitalises on two evils: the sanctioning of nazism and the extolling of spirit as still a metaphysical concept.


This book addresses Heidegger criticism of value philosophy especially in Lotze and Scheler. However, the article on value philosophy by Ingo Farin (below) seems to be a more economical and a more pellucid overall treatment of Heidegger’s critique of the neo-Kantians.

———. “Heidegger on Schelling’s Concept of Freedom.”

The author examines Schelling’s notion of freedom and how Heidegger believes that there is a fundamental conflict between freedom and freedom developed from systematic philosophy.


Farin does an excellent job acquainting the reader with Windelband and Rickert and then does equally fine duty explicating Heidegger’s critique of the Neo-Kantians in his 1919 lecture course. The author goes on to explain how Kantian epistemology for Heidegger privileges thinking over the situational responsiveness.

Ferry, Luc and Alain Renault. “Université et système.” *Archives de philosophie* 42 (1979): 59-90.

Ferry and Renault investigate philosophical attempts at university reform. Their target is the bureaucratic rationalization of the university. They look to Fichte and well as von Humbolt and Schleiermacher and make references to Heidegger in their research to determine which reform ideas are practical and successful..


The Dreyfuses argue, via Heidegger, for a situational ethics and assert that friendship, community, and other “non-rationalized” ways-of-being cannot be institutionalised or rationalised (Habermas). Flyvbjerg, the interviewer, then suggests that institutions can set the conditions for embracing “non-rationalized” behaviour. The interview, at the end, contains a short discussion on rhetoric and the *Sittlichkeit* of the
German people. That *Sittlichkeit*, they assert, was awakened by rhetoric early in the thirties but was effectively shut down with the aid of fascist rhetoric later in the Nazi regime.


This book is a thorough and original study of the traces of political philosophy in *Sein und Zeit*. Fritsche has an extensive, and therefore rare, discussion of Heidegger’s use of the verb ‘erwidern;’ he disagrees there with Birmingham’s interpretation. The sub-chapters on Scheler and Tillich reveal new influences on Heidegger.


This very technical article does a credible job defending Heidegger against scientific apologists.


The author argues that the question of ethics is everywhere interlaced with the question of being. As well, she contends that the ethics inherent within Heidegger’s thought is that of local, situational decisions. Regrettably, the book is not as compelling as the title might lead the reader to believe.


This collection of essays contains material by such as authors as Caputo, Dreyfus, Kisiel, and Rorty. Richard Berstein’s article “From Hermeneutics to Praxis” deals with Gadamer but shows how hermeneutics is not really a methodology but the heir to the older tradition of practical philosophy, much of it based in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Alasdair MacIntyre’s article is interesting as well in that it deals with hermeneutics and its relation to Aristotelean ‘virtue ethics.’


Keller explicates the importance of the concrete and temporal composition of the world in the existential analytic. He charges that Heidegger’s conception of human experience is an implicit revision of Husserl’s internalism of intentionality as the working out of ideal, a-temporal structures according to one’s real, direct experience. Because temporality is the nature of intelligibility, Keller argues that temporal, factual Dasein is the bearer of responsibility for its worldly deeds.

Levinas, makes his famous critique of Heidegger’s conception (or more properly lack of conception) of the ‘other.’ Levinas claims that there is insufficient evidence to believe that authentic Dasein treats other Dasein’s in a genuinely neighbourly way.


Does the retreat to oneself in the moment of dread initiate an ethical moment as seems to be implied in Heidegger’s existentiell exploration in the second half of *Sein und Zeit*? Marx experiments with his own phenomenological experience of dread and anxiety and finds that the virtue of such an experience is the destruction of the mood of indifference, which is the prelude to decisive action.


This a very similar to paper to the one above (“Ethos and Morality”). Here, however, Marx also discusses the possibility of “healing” as a result of the phenomenological experience of dread. Compare to Walsh below.


This interesting and well organised article has a section of ‘formal indication.’


This volume contains many interesting articles by scholars such as Bernasconi, Brogan, Dreyfus, Haar, Haugeland, Schmidt, and Zimmerman. Bernasconi’s “Heidegger’s Destruction of Prinosis” is especially intriguing as he traces Aristotle’s influence on the sections on worldhood in *Sein und Zeit*.


Nicholson draws heavily on Heidegger to formulate his own philosophy that is sensitive to “the proportioning of the thinking of being” (272). Nicholson laments especially the ligature of research to thought in modernity and suggests a reconsideration of first philosophy in practical life. His prose are suffused with an elegant but modest style.


Olafson’s effort to find an ethics in *Sein und Zeit* is disappointing because his reading focusses on ‘being-with’ to the exclusion of other fecund indications in Heidegger’s text. There is reason to believe that Olafson actually distorts Heidegger’s opus by exaggerating the attention given to ‘being-with’ therein; this puts the author and
his work on shaky ground. Further, the author somehow reads Heidegger as a liberal and a modernist.


The authors here cover an important section of Sein und Zeit. Their reading is similar to Birmingham’s though not as probing or original.


Ostensibly the text is impressive, a 555 page volume and very well footnoted. Having said that the book has a major problem with the approach in that Philipse reads Heidegger as if he were reading Carnap. His conclusion, “Heidegger’s question of being should be rejected completely as it stands” (386), is predictable enough from his absurd introductory announcement that he is going to attempt a reconstruction of Sein und Zeit through linguistic analysis.


Prauss hold that Heidegger’s thought champions theory over praxis (Taminiaux contends the same). His contention is that deliberate action must follow deliberation (theory). This seems to miss the mark, however, since Heidegger would likely not contest this. Compare to Taylor below.


François Raffoul considers the question of otherness in Heidegger with the intention of dismissing Levinas’ criticism that Heidegger has no meaningful concept of this. Raffoul also shows that Fürsorge is only possible inasmuch as Heidegger denies authenticity the privilege of solipsism.


Radloff shows how the transformation of truth as a-letheia to truth as veritas grounds the possibility of political imperialism. If the imperial is thought as lacking proper limit, then a-letheia (disclosure and withdrawal) indeed reserves the ability to critique, limit, and withdraw imperialism.


This collection of essays is a much needed edition to the secondary literature. Heidegger has more in common with the idealists than otherwise thought argues Alfred Denker in “The Young Heidegger and Fichte.” Theodore Kisiel’s “Heidegger - Lask - Fichte” is a good one as well; he addresses the hermeneutical situation of philosophy in

273
Weimar Germany and offers Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Fichte as less idealist than many think.


The author addresses that interesting little section at the end of Einführung in die Metaphysik on being and the ought. He reviews Heidegger’s criticism of Scheler and Rickert and suggests that the point of departure for ethics must be “at the historical juncture” where being and there-being meet.


Schürmann addresses what he believes to be the inherently open and pluralistic nature of Heidegger’s thought even though Heidegger is not at all an author of politics. His book is a careful deconstruction of the question of being. He gives generous attention to the Greek concepts of arché, phusis, alētheia, logos, hen, and others.


The author argues that Heidegger provides an existential foundation for Kantian-type liberalism. Accordingly, that Dasein attempts a conscientious awareness of its authentic self means that it has a moral demand to respect the free being of others in its world.


The author takes issue with writers such as Löwith that find Heidegger’s work not just anti-normative but thoroughly decisionistic. She shows that Heidegger is anti-normative properly in the sense that he refuses to advocate or formulate any norms but, she proposes, this does not preclude his work from being interpreted in a way that might suggest a compatibility with a harmonious stance to being (an ontological ethics).


Sikka retrieves religious and mystical influences on Heidegger’s thought. The section on Meister Eckhart and Gelasseneheit is especially interesting regarding ethical possibilities.


Heidegger takes the Heraclitean concept of polemos to mean confrontation and political action. Sluga incorporates an assessment of Schmitt’s politics and contrasts him
to Heidegger. As for Heidegger, he concludes that there is indeed "an 'ethics' that shuns authoritative oughts and goods" in "favour of possibilities of living."


The author argues that possibility for action is conditioned by moods and desires. He distinguishes between logical possibility and practical possibility. He further argues that action and decision for Heidegger, is rooted in the Aristotelian and Kierkegaardian sense of practical possibility available in one's factual situation.

Tanzer, Mark Basil. "Heidegger on Being's Oldest Name: 'To Chreon.'" *Heidegger Studies* 15/6: 81-96

In "The Anaximander Fragment" Heidegger offers a translation of *To Chreon* as 'usage' or even 'neediness.' Tanzer unravels how the issue of usefulness decisively subtends Heidegger's philosophy and how it originally guides the relationship between Dasein and being. His close reading of *Sein und Zeit*’s sections regarding significance show a mutual antagonism and reciprocity in the relationship. As Tanzer points out, the fact that there is this fundamental equilibrium between Dasein and being implies an inherently balanced posture inscribed into the essence of Dasein.


Tanzer takes aim at critics who accuse Heidegger of both decisionism and quietism. By analyzing Heidegger discussion of Dasein’s achievability in *Sein und Zeit*, he spells out how Dasein can be neither totally passive nor fully active.


Taylor argues that Dasein is a being of practical action and that this action is prepared specifically by one’s background or factual situation. Compare with Prauss above.


Theunissen is one of a chorus of critics that from Löwith and Levinas to Jonas and Tugendhat that accuse Heidegger's concept of authenticity of being morally nihilistic because it apparently tends toward solipsism.


Tugendhat adds his voice in claiming that there is nothing in Heidegger's philosophy to prevent authoritarianism.

275

Vogel takes three approaches to Heidegger, “the existentialist,” “the historicist,” and “the cosmopolitan.” He settles on the last as the most fruitful. In any case, he does an excellent job describing what an ethically responsible Dasein would be according to Heidegger’s indications in *Sein und Zeit.*


This is a rather essential article in that Volpi digs deep to retrieve Aristotle from Heidegger, especially *Sein und Zeit.* The author shows how the Aristotelean concepts of *praxis, poiesis* and *theoria* underline Heidegger’s determinations of ‘readiness-to-hand’ and ‘presence-to-hand.’


This article argues against conventional wisdom that there is a Heidegger I and Heidegger II (Richardson’s formulation). He shows how language plays an equally efficacious function in the constitution of the world. Though in Heidegger’s later work, there are, admittedly, more normative traces relating to language.


Ziarek emphasises the proto-ethical significance of listening in *Sein und Zeit,* specifically in reference to the ‘voice of the friend.’ Thinking, he concludes, bears with it a sense of ontological responsibility insofar as the thinker must listen to the other and be responsive to this other.


Øverenget here asserts that Heidegger’s thought is pervaded by the Aristotelean concept of praxis. Philosophy is not a private, elite, affair; it is to be played out in the inter-personal, public space. He finds that Arendt draws this out of Heidegger’s philosophy more explicitly in her own work.

**Regarding Language**


The author establishes the necessary relation of ‘being-with’ to logos. In between, she underlines how the social (factual) forms of discourse in being-with-others informs an historical understanding of being. That understanding is held in check, or at least is
subject to review, by the “heterogeneous response (logos)” implicit in the analytic of
Dasein. As well, consideration is given to Heidegger’s conception of Erwiderung. She
also offers interpretations of “idia phronesis,” “polis,” “dokeo,” and “doxa” from
Einführung in die Metaphysik.

Brogan, Walter. “Plato’s Dialectical Soul: Heidegger on Plato’s Ambiguous Relationship to

Brogan analyses the portion of Heidegger’s Sophistes that deals with rhetoric. In
his ontological approach to the question of rhetoric, he argues that ontology is a
mediation on being and nonbeing and that this mediation is at the heart of the dialectic
which Plato, according to Heidegger, understood primitively as rhetoric.

Crowe, Benjamin D. “Resoluteness in the Middle Voice: On the Ethical Dimensions of

The author makes the linguistic point that Heidegger retrieves this indo-Germanic
middle voice, which inherently communicates in a subjunctive-type discourse, i.e., es
gibt, es gilt, es soll, es wertet, es weltet, etc.

to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics. Edited by Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale

Dahlstrom retrieves the Greek concept of logos and explains how it
metamorphosed into a theory of assertion (logic).

Dastur, Françoise. “Language and Ereignis.” In Reading Heidegger: Commorations. Edited by

Françoise Dastur’s article connects Heidegger’s analytical understanding of
language in Sein und Zeit to Heidegger’s latter preoccupation with Ereignis. As such, in
order for Ereignis to come about, she finds that we need to undergo an experience with
language in which we “renounce our usual understanding of the relation of word to thing
as a connection between two beings or two objects” (356).

Dreyfus, Hubert and S. Dreyfus. “What is Morality: A Phenomenological Account of the
Development of Ethical Expertise.” In Universalism and Communitarianism:
Contemporary Debates in Ethics. Edited by D. Rasmussen. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982.

The Dreyfus’ argue that Heidegger has an Aristotelian sense of the person who is
wise in practical affairs.

Fay, Thomas A. “Heidegger: The Origin and Development of Symbolic Logic.” Kant-Studien 69

The author traces the origin and development of logos from collectedness and
what is made manifest (vorliegenlassen) though to Kant’s conception of it as correctness.

This article situates von Humboldt’s theory of language as the “innere Spracheform” of its speakers. As such, von Humboldt taught that every language should be treated as a particular view of the world. But the relation of language to thought is a purely formal one. The author follows reactions to this view in Heidegger (and Cassirer). Compare with Gadamer’s discussion of von Humboldt in *Warheit und Methode*.


This essay makes the bold claim that “the very question of Being itself is an accident of the Indo-European family of languages.” It also suggests that the sovereignty of each individual language could be interpreted as a site or “house” for specificities of being.


This famous work likely explicates hermeneutics in a more clear fashion than anything Heidegger wrote. Part three of the volume deals specifically with language; there Gadamer argues against the technologization of language in modern scientific discourse. As well, he formulates language as the ‘horizon of understanding’ from which decisions are made.


This article like Fay’s (above) situates the transformation of logic into logistical thinking. The author makes this apparent through an analysis of equipmentality in *Sein und Zeit*.


The author does an clear, if simplified, explication of the Second Part of *Sein und Zeit*.


Heim believes there is an inner connection between ontology and Aristotelian rhetoric. The author uses the poetry of antiquity interpreted under Aristotle’s rhetoric to evaluate Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger is found to be inconsistent from this basis. It is still unclear to me at the end of the article what “ultimate rhetoric” is.


Heidegger’s concept of formal indication, is derived (according to van Buran) from Kierkegaard’s exercises in “indirect communication.” For this reason alone, it worth looking at Kierkegaard, especially this book and the section of “subjectivity.”


This article is very similar to the following entry. Kiesel, in this piece, however, seems to put more emphasis on the performative nature of rhetoric to underwrite an original lógos of a speech community. This original lógos seeks to explicate a mutual understanding and agreement thereby fomenting the basis for a community’s politics.


Kiesel draws on his vast knowledge of Heidegger’s work prior to *Sein und Zeit* to argue that Heidegger transposes Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, specifically the concepts of polis, pathos, ethos, and logos, into the structure for Dasein’s disclosedness. Kiesel hints that Heidegger may have had an interest in Aristotle during this turbulent time in Germany because Heidegger believed that Aristotle employed a trust in the fundamental political function that language exercises in the community.


This a reliable and well organised analysis of Heidegger’s later philosophy. His section of language is quite fruitful.


This book takes an argumentative reading of Heidegger’s conception of language as world-disclosive. The author draws on analytic philosophers such as Kripke, Putnam, and Quine to show that there are structural problems in Heidegger’s theory language. Unfortunately, Lafont has trouble reconciling the European tradition with the analytic, which, in turn leaves her claims against Heidegger lacking relevance to either tradition.

Larochelle both summarises and criticises the latest literature in social/literary theory. The thread of the argument, which is not always easy to follow, charges post-modernity with “a strategic reinvestment of the status of discourse” at the expense of experience (Erfahrung).


The author shows how religion and philosophy influence one another, specifically with regard to Heidegger’s engagement with Rudolf Bultmann. A subsection called “The Word and Sacraments” is particularly interesting because Macquarrie explains how language, words, might move us religiously and ethically.


The author suggests that praxis is a sufficient condition for the recovery of freedom that is forgotten, but not lost in Dasein. He pays particular attention to Heidegger’s verbal tenses.


Radloff shows how the rhetoric as a positive possibility of the lógos can awaken Dasein to concrete and authentic life. He demonstrates that this can be done by appealing to the existential of Rede (as manifest in rhetoric) which could “transform and refound” a new attunement and so introduce the possibility of re-orienting the polis toward ethos.


This dense article undertakes to show the different, but at times similar, fundamental conceptions that Heidegger and Derrida have regarding language and its technological expropriation.


The author makes an interesting study of expediency in literary uses of language. The fact that literature fails to be an efficient delivery system for a precise and standardised messages suggests that it blocks attempts to functionalise language and make messages and meaning wholly ‘available’ without being interpreted by and through the social field of the reader.


This original article uses rhetoric as a leitmotif for understanding Heidegger’s philosophy. He analyses Aristotle’s use of topos (place) with Heidegger’s sense of everyday-being-in-the-world and proposes that the two can be interpreted through a
common understanding of rhetoric. The article also claims that rhetoric lies at the foundation of Heidegger’s less analysed theory of communication.


The author provides a vast and ample argument that Hegel’s thought is hermeneutical and, in fact, similar to that of Schleiermacher. To illustrate his exposition he refers often to Heidegger and suggests that Heidegger’s hermeneutics may be in part indebted to Hegel.


This is clear and reliable explication of Heidegger views on language. Richardson pays special attention to the 1934 course entitled “Logik.”


The author covers a lot of ground as he tries to connect Heidegger’s “Messkirch’s Seventh Centennial” address to the Greek genre that recognises praise and blame through metaphor (‘epideictic’ discourse). Along the way, the author claims that this genre of discourse discloses the uncanny of the call of being and opposes the enframing of technology.


This reasonable and creative work attempts to develop an existentialist ethics. The author refers often to Heidegger (29-48f) and describes, famously, the ‘‘I-Am-Me’’ experience that derives from Heidegger’s discourse on the ‘call of conscience.’


Thomä reads Heidegger’s works as containing several distinct periods throughout his long career, which is in opposition to Pöggeler, Schürmann, Sheehan, Tanzer, and Heidegger himself. In the end, he is critical of Heidegger as he relies on Anglo-American writers to buttress his claims.


Ziarek proposes that Dasein is fully itself when it is in the midst of otherness, difference; being otherwise would mean conceiving the self as monological and Cartesian. Through dexterity and familiarity with the material, he then shows how this sense of otherness is obtainable in the “life-contexts” of literary works.
Related:


Bergmann shows convincingly how values cannot be extricated from lived-experience and that to pretend that the world is a composite of neutral facts (Vorhandenheit) is not an honest approach to philosophy.


Buckley describes authentic life for Husserl; it involves "activity in activity" rather than "activity in passivity" (the inauthentic). Basically Husserl's version of authenticity means critically appropriating (the 'active' dimension) the historical situation rather than simply accepting it (the 'passive' dimension). As well, 'activity in activity' seems to imply a liberated and open community.


Chatelet might be called an existential Marxist but he was influenced significantly by Heidegger. In this book, he provides an extended meditation on the pre-Socratic concept of the logos by way of a dialectical interpretation, an interpretation different than Heidegger's though nonetheless similar in its essential starting points of the polis and praxis.


Crosswhite the challenges the logical view that arguments can be put forward which are emotionally neutral. Reason is bound up with emotion and he credits Heidegger's understanding of mood for recognizing this.


This essay is a discussion on identity and dislocation of form, specifically in art. Derrida argues that art as poiesis unleashes a productive force that robs art of its distinctiveness. The 'restricted economy' of production systemically prevents the surplus of meaning to arise that is vital to the artistic form.


This seminal work has many Heideggerian influences including the concept of 'sous-rature.'


Derrida addresses Heidegger directly (cf. discussion on van Gogh) and indirectly (cf. material on restitution, debt, par-ergon) throughout the text.

282

Grassi criticises Heidegger for having an antiquated conception of humanism that is primarily anthropocentric. Humanism deserves the same consideration that Heidegger lends to rhetoric since he believes that humanism essentially deals with language and the word. He draws on select Italian humanists to support his claim concerning the nature of humanism.


The author argues is a style delightfully similar to Merleau-Ponty’s that perception is a matter of immanent intuition. There is no authentic perception of the sensuous world that is mediated. Latent in Lingis’ work is the claim that phenomenology has more credibility in explaining knowledge than does the Platonic and even post-modern claim that reality is representational.


This is a monumental collection of Luther’s critical and liturgical writings. The hermeneutical sense of what George Steiner calls “dialectical feedback” between the text and the reader is clearly evident as one sees Luther interpreting the Bible (his interpretations of the Psalms are especially fruitful) with respect to the everyday situation disconnected from the Holy Roman Empire.


This whole book is well done, but Mickunas’ article is best. He sees the rise of indiscriminate technology that began with the scientific method as now a threat to individual identity. The argument is this: if the scientific method excludes non-quantifiable properties and the self is, at least partly, composed of these non-quantifiable properties then the self must be excluded under fidelity to the scientific method.

Ricoeur's fine essay is ostensibly on B.F. Skinner but much of it deals with ethics and freedom. The author argues that freedom is a condition of ethics in a way that is similar to Heidegger's authenticity that is a condition for liberating solicitude.


This collection of essays deals with praxis and contemporary philosophy. The essays generally claim the primacy of praxis (action) in not just the practical aspects of philosophy but also in the epistemological ones. The pieces by Jakob Meløe and Kjell S. Johannessen use Heidegger as a point of departure for explaining praxis.


Though I do not think Taylor mentions Heidegger in this little book. Taylor does what seems to me to be an exemplary deciphering of what might be an ethics for the authentic life. He does give specific name to Kierkegaard and in this reference, perhaps, it is as close enough to Heidegger as we need.

Text Commentaries:


This is a critical collection of essays with really original material from Hans-Georg Gadamer, Th.C.W. Oudemans, István Fehér, Otto Pöggeler, and Jean Grondin. There is an article by Franco Volpi (as mentioned above) that is especially good.

Dahlstrom, Daniel O. Heidegger's Concept of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. This book examines in detail Heidegger's revolution of the concept of truth from Wahrheit back to διάθεσις. As well, it covers philosophical influences on Heidegger regarding the concept of truth with special attention to Husserl.


Dreyfus focuses almost exclusively on the first half of Sein und Zeit. His interpretation is, as he frequently mentions, Wittgensteinian and therefore offers nothing for one interested in ethical or even existentiell Dasein. However, the text is finely written and makes links from Heidegger to contemporary analytic thinkers like Davidson and Searle. His lucid analysis of equipmentality is now famous.


The book is self-explanatory and an invaluable quick reference for the Heidegger researcher.

This classic text is a good introduction to Heidegger’s thought and a reliable reference.


This 746 page tome is a valuable and venerable resource. The index is extensive and the table of contents is chronologically ordered by Heidegger’s publications making it an easy and quick to use reference. Heidegger wrote the Vorwort and so evidently approved of Richardson’s explications.


Since the *Beiträge* is one of Heidegger’s very densest texts, it make sense to consult a reference work that would assist us in pluming its depths. This is a work of collected essays by many of the doyens of Heidegger studies.


Stambaugh takes her points of departure in the article from the German and suggests the problems with the then current translation.


This book is not just a good introduction to Heidegger’s thought, it proposes a modest defence of Heidegger’s ontology from charges that it might somehow be stitched together with fascist threads.


Schürmann clearly and briefly explains why Heidegger’s corpus should be read backwards. “Instead of the unitary concept of ground, we have the ‘fourfold;’ instead of praise for firm will, detachment; instead of integration of the university into civil service, protest against technology and cybernetics; instead of a straightforward identification between Führer and right, anarchy” (p.6).


Tanzer attempts to show how the metaphysical debate on realism and idealism is not an issue in Heidegger’s existential ontology. Tanzer can dispel this debate for the reason that Heidegger’s analysis of the Dasein - being relationship is so fundamentally reciprocal that, by extension, the issue of realism and idealism becomes dissolved in favour a selfhood balanced between the two. Compare with Glazebrook’s essay above.

This book does a good and clear job of examining what Heidegger understands by subjectivity. It focuses especially on the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs and Sein und Zeit.


Øverenget again analyses subjectivity. In this work, however, he does an explication of Dasein’s unity (the three existentials as subtended by temporality). This is the best study I’ve seen on the topic of selfhood and Dasein. See, especially, the chapter on Unity.

Other Sources (Unannotated):


1953.


