Anton Agafonov
AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A (Political Science)
GRADE / DEGREE

School of Political Studies
FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

Western “Security Community” and Russia: Mutual Construction of Insecurities
TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Alexandra Gheciu
DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

Jessica Allina-Pisano                       Costanza Musu

Gary W. Slater
Le Doyen de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
WESTERN “SECURITY COMMUNITY” and RUSSIA: Mutual Construction of Insecurities

POL 7989 Master’s Thesis

Anton Agafonov
Political Science MA Programme
University of Ottawa

Prof. Alexandra Gheciu
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Ottawa
Thesis Supervisor

July 2010

© Anton Agafonov, Ottawa, Canada, 2010
NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.
# Contents

1. Problématique and the Research Question 2

2. Theoretical Framework 11

3. Research Methodology 27

4. Construction of Self/Other in NATO Official Discourse 31
   4.1. First “Genealogic” Sampling of 1988-1991 31
   4.3. Third “Genealogic” Sampling of 2005-2008 56
   4.4. Summary 66

5. Construction of Self/Other in Russian Official Discourse 70
   5.1. First “Genealogic” Sampling of 1988-1991 71
   5.2. Second “Genealogic” Sampling of 1991-2005 75
   5.3. Third “Genealogic” Sampling of 2005-2008 85
   5.4. Summary 101

6. Conclusion 104

7. References 106
   7.1. Primary Sources Cited 109

8. List of Acronyms 115
1. Problématique and the Research Question

The present research is intended to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics and causes of the present state of relations between Russia and the more or less collectively-acting West. These relations have regressed to the point that some observers have labelled them as the continuation of the Cold War. The solidarity of the West and its collective action have had different manifestations: despite the variance of national positions, the old Cold War allies and their new followers have generally been successful in developing a collective position vis-à-vis Russia on a variety of issues and at a variety of inclusive and exclusive forums during the past two decades. Such collective actions not only exacerbate a sense of exclusion present within Russia, but also sustain its image of an isolated “not-like-everyone-else” state among external audiences.

Regardless of the epistemological standpoint, it is possible to argue that despite the disappearance of ideological rifts and the tremendous changes in the international order that occurred in the late 1980s-early 1990s and initial enthusiasm about fast integration with the West, Russia still remains outside of the Western community of nations, however the latter is defined in “physical institutional terms” (i.e. EU, NATO) or “meta-physical” (i.e. Europe, common European political, economic and social space “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”). It is possible to argue that Russia’s failed inclusion into the European “civilizational and cultural space,” which became evident on both sides of the divide during the past two decades as shown by the reinvigorated debates over identities and histories, or by visas-regulated and therefore controlled humanitarian links, remained at least as much of a concern for the Russian political class as the persistent barriers to the economic cooperation and political and military issues. The exclusion of Russia from this “civilizational space” is often a key argument in discursive reasoning of failed political and economic integration. Even more striking is the fact that the political, economic and
social integration, similar to successful “rehabilitation” of the Axis countries in the aftermath of WWII, has not taken place despite the absolutely dominant role of Russia in dismantling the authoritarian regime not only domestically, but also dislodging even more repressive or equally authoritarian regimes in the FSU republics and East European nations. In spite of significant support for the restoration of their statehood provided by the Russian political class, a significant part of liberal intellectuals, as well as by wider population, the emerged national regimes have employed staunch anti-Russian rhetoric promoting historical narratives of Russia’s primordial propensity to aggressive international behaviour. Moreover, during the following decades the relations between the increasingly solidary West on the one hand and Russia on the other were continuously worsening. The dynamics was further exacerbated by the positions of the former Warsaw Pact allies and several national FSU elites with nationalist agendas who either have found their way into the Western (Transatlantic) community faster or were actively seeking such admission as a declared “civilizational choice.”

From the late 1980s up until the recent time, the general tendency of the relations between Russia and the West has demonstrated negative dynamics, starting from the initial strong optimism about the future integration, to growing discursive conflicts and culminating with a direct Russia’s military engagement at its borders while a unified solidary West and neighbours vociferously condemned its actions, irrespective of how legitimate those were,¹ and severed formally institutionalized ties for a protracted period of time. The unified Western coalition

¹ The independent EU Fact Finding Mission established that a Georgian “sustained artillery attack” on the town of Tskhinvali triggered the full-scale hostilities with Russian forces (http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html). The Mission’s mandate to “investigate the origins” of the conflict may be regarded as a logical trap, since the origins of any conflict can be interpreted in a variety of ways by interested stakeholders. Using the logic of “investigating the origins of war,” for example, can be instrumental in re-narrating Nazi Germany’s role in starting WWII and placing responsibility with the Allies or any other party that could be implicated in the fall of the Weimar Republic. In any conflict, especially in that causing civilian casualties (for example, due to night shelling of sleeping people with MLRSs that are clearly not a high-precision weapon system, as was the case in South Ossetia), the party “first to fire a shot” represents a much more clear-cut definition of the aggressor.
engaging Russia is a recurrent pattern in the Russian and European history that is too recognizable by both the political classes and the wider public, and could not but produce domestic and international repercussions (Waltz 2000: 22).

These developments have allowed some proponents of the realist tradition to claim that the Cold War has never ceased and is being continued under a different set of variables and capabilities. Their empirical evidence suggests that many attributes of the polarized world afflicted by the “balance-of-power” logic have been essentially resurrected, and the initial optimism about the “end of history” has disappeared.

The neo-liberal institutionalist approach seems to be insufficient in explaining the failure of creating a common “greater European cultural and humanitarian space” exceeding the institutional framework of the EU or NATO. Nor does it fully explain the generally negative dynamics of the Russia-West relations during the past two decades, despite Russia’s growing and relatively strong functional participation in both inclusive international mechanisms (e.g. OSCE, PACE) and exclusive ones (e.g. NATO), as well as cooperation at the non-state level (cf. Keohane et al. 1995). It is possible to suggest that “othering” is the key to the explaining the negative dynamics, which neo-liberal institutionalists tend not to focus on.

Scholars representing the constructivist school, stressing the social construction of knowledge, and political interest, identities, norms, values as its derivatives, in my view, furnish a better explanation of how the decades’ (if not centuries’) old pattern of relations has been sustained despite the multitude of political developments with global repercussions that changed both the global and domestic politics. This argument can be substantiated by the growing role of the discursive in the domain of international relations. Discourses can produce and reproduce a particular reality in the international relations rendering certain political options possible or impossible at both international and domestic levels. The discourses of “othering” or
“integration” represent an obvious practical value and may be instrumental in explaining dynamics of international relations.

For example, as applied to the Russian-Western relations, it is quite evident that the ideological conflicts of the Cold War period have been largely replaced by discursive clashes over identities and histories between Russia and the West involving recourse to such vague terms as “cultural and civilizational choice,” or “Europeanness.” National historiographies often serve as tools employed in debates over state (national) and collective identities, which suggests that history is often more of a political instrument, rather than a science. Histories, just like current political developments (or a very recent history) are often “known as they were narrated, not as they were in reality.” Outcomes of such “virtual space wars” resulting in “virtual and declaratory” victories or debacles are quite comparable to those caused by real wars: tangible spatial and cultural lines of separation akin to the Berlin Wall. In short, discourses, historicized narratives and mythologies associated with national identities and histories have become as strong a weapon for attaining domestic and international political objectives as “hard power” capabilities.

National discourses on Russia are abundant with examples of broadcasting historical narratives varying from the statements expressing the historical resentments of the East-European and Baltic leadership to the statements of the US and West European political and expert community. The promotion of particular historical narratives by national professional and foreign policy communities can be considered instrumental in achieving goals that pragmatic interests dictate. For example, the timing of re-emergence of debates over histories and identities

---

2 The recent example thereto is drawing historical parallels of Russia’s “aggression” against Georgia and Soviet suppression of uprisings in the Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Condoleezza Rice’s 2008 statement on Russo-Georgian conflict http://www.bild.de/BILD/news/bild-english/world-news/2008/08/14/condoleezza-rice/gives-russia-ominous-warning-over-georgia.html##; also a 2009 statement by several Republicans linking the NMD to the history of Russo-Polish relations (in Russian) http://echo.msk.ru/news/620886-echo.phtml).
triggered by the nationalistic elites in the FSU was clearly linked to the need of statehood legitimization and national identity construction by dismantling common identity with Russia and (re-)producing a "civilizational divide" portraying themselves as "front line" defenders of civilized and democratic Europe (West) facing the aggressive non-democratic and uncivilized Outside.

The logic of citing historical narratives of "othering" in foreign policy-making is extremely dubious and almost always counter-productive in international relations. It exemplifies the very dynamics of how discourses of "othering" based on narrated historical resentments and memories tangibly shape international politics by sustaining "othering" and making inclusion or improvement of bilateral relations unacceptable. In these narratives, prior historical events are often used to predict and project future behaviour of an actor along the primordial "they have always been like this, and will always be" paradigm. Applying this logic, practically all historically significant nations that can be accused of various crimes under the international law, including multiple acts of genocide, pose existential threat to one another. Reference to historical path dependencies advances the idea of primordial propensity of the Other to a certain type of international behaviour, which comes close to racist agendas (see Campbell 1998a citing Butler on "defiling" the Otherness below). Therefore, it is possible to suggest that references to histories in the process of discursive construction of the Other promotes largely an essentialist "othering" treating Other's historical record as an indicator of its inherent primordial features that remain fixed and unchanged.

The discourse samples selected for this paper may suggest that the explicit broadcasting of historical resentment narratives representing an essentialist construction of the Other is much less likely to occur in the discourse of international organizations where various national
positions are blended and smoothed to produce a diplomatically more neutral narrative, than in the discourse of national governments and epistemic communities.

At the level of the general public, being the key target audience for an official discourse, where speakers do not bear responsibility of governance, face little personal risks, and have far fewer incentives for self-restraint in their narratives, the essentialist view of the Other, often combined with chauvinistic nationalism and aggressive racism, is much likelier to be manifested in a discourse of "othering." Thus it is possible to suggest the presence of a "continuum" of a top-down increase, from the international level down to individual level, in the presence of essentialist views of the Other and the discursive "othering" drawing on primordial attributes. Apparently, this phenomenon of assigning essentialist features to the Other perceived as a threat and denying it features shared by the Self a rooted in human psychology that urges for clear, stable and incontestable delineations between the Self and Other, in a somewhat similar way like states strive to attain clear, fixed and incontestable borders separating them from other states.

The political elites play a paramount role in promoting or quelling down these pre-existing narratives depending on contingency of political interests, with great chances for successful and rapid change of the popular mood, or conserving and reproducing these narratives

3 Public forums and discussion groups allowing speakers to conceal their true identity provide ample examples thereto.

4 The discursive practice of reproducing historical resentments bears only negative consequences for bilateral relations and practically is never advanced as "hegemonic knowledge," or even actively suppressed, with respect to friendly regimes. For example, the historical narratives about extremely troubled Polish-Ukrainian relations dating back to the XVII c., if not earlier, were increasingly muted, the anti-Russian Ukrainian establishment was supported in all disputes with Russia, and joint initiatives like the 2012 European Football Championship to be held in Poland and Ukraine (alluding to earlier events held in culturally and politically close Belgium/Netherlands and Switzerland/Austria) were advanced to symbolically demonstrate the closeness of the two nations and reconcile the historical resentments. The change of the Polish public attitude towards Ukrainians was swift and dramatic, which demonstrates how fluid, changing and prone to external influence a public opinion can be. The website of the Odessa Office of the American Business Centre (http://www.odessa-abc.com/article/181) cites an article containing the following figures: "The splash of Poles' sympathies towards Ukraine and Ukrainians was explosive and somehow unexpected against the backdrop of the complex problems of a common historical past. The hostile attitude of Poles towards Ukrainians was the result of the dramatic history of Ukrainian - Polish relations. As public opinion polls
that fix and sustain essentialist understandings of the Other as primordially alien and inherently hostile.

In both Russia and the West, the promotion of “othering” at the levels of national elites, professional and expert communities, mainstream and non-mainstream mass media and popular culture (e.g. newspapers and magazines, movies, TV documentaries, international sport events etc.) represents the same continuous and coherent “not like us” discourse despite of the variance of topics and contexts of application. Target audiences get inevitably exposed to promoted narratives: for example, professional and epistemic communities are exposed through access to primary sources, whereas domestic and foreign populations outside of the professional and epistemic communities (or “grassroots”) who may not have direct interest in an issue can be engaged through popular culture. The process of the meanings diffusion aims at making the target audience accept the promoted narrative as “common sense truth” by engaging, hailing and valorizing extant social stereotypical knowledge that helps the advanced mythology to attain credibility.\(^5\) The impact of promoted mythologies on wider public (or the grassroots level), both

conducted prior to the events during the Orange Revolution testified, 50% of Polish citizens had a negative attitude towards Ukraine, while 12% though positively and 38% were neutral. [...] Of particular importance was the change in the hostility of Poles towards Ukrainians: in 2003 every second respondent alluded to such a change (51%) and by the end of 2004 every third Polish citizen had assumed such an attitude. On the whole in the period 1993 - 2004 the level of Polish hostility towards Ukraine reduced by half. Optimism as to the future of good neighborly relations between Ukrainians and Poles increased notably - 81% of Polish citizens supported the possibility of the gradual improvement in Ukrainian and Polish relations. According to the 2005 poll on perspectives of positive development of Polish relations with foreign countries Ukraine received the fourth place having 34.4% being inferior to Germany (44.1%), the USA (38.3%) and Great Britain (35.4%) and leaving France (28.5%) behind."

\(^5\) The examples are abundant in both Western and Russian discourses. Below are a couple of random examples from English-language sources, where Russia is consistently narrated as Other. In the midst of continued construction of a new tangible “wall” in Europe and the conflict involving Russia, Ukraine and the West, the CIA World Factbook’s countries information page was designed to explicitly show the divide that cuts Russia off from Europe: the classification places Russia into Central Asia together with five other obviously Asian toponyms ending in “-stan” and symbolically separates it from Belarus and Ukraine (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/region/region_cas.html). This visual representation is symbolic and may not be attributed to the mere effort of easing the classification as the textual description for Russia is phrased to suggest its Asian identity, and attributing European identity exclusively to Ukraine contrary to historical evidence (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html). Deliberately or not, this symbolic
domestically and internationally, is of a great importance to the present research since the process of national (state) or collective identity construction by its definition involves the grassroots level and cannot be limited only to the effects produced on professional and epistemic communities.

Both in Russia and in the West, the intersubjective understandings of the Self and the Other have been successfully attached, enlisting grassroots’ support for the domestic and foreign policies advanced by the respective elites. For example, public polls in Russia show a dramatic change of attitudes towards the West in general and growth of anti-American sentiments in particular, which is an almost complete back-slide from the popular opinions of the 60s-80s when ideological rifts were immeasurably deeper. The anti-American and anti-Western popular sentiments increased with the growing popularity and public support of the Russian leadership in the 2000s who spoke “the right language” and effectively controlled the “public space” to make their criticism of Western policies and reasoning of own agendas far more convincing to the domestic audience than alternative narratives, including criticism of domestic non-democratic practices, promoted from within and from without. According to the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) polls and Levada Centre polls cited by Pouliot (2007):

description is not only a visual representation of the mythology of Russia’s non-Europeanness and of a physical border of Europe, but also draws a wedge between the three nations that boast of the closest ethnic, cultural and historical heritage out of all European nations. Amb. D. Smith’s Briefing at JINSA (http://www.jinsa.org/node/669) is an example of unsupported claims and biases depicting simplistic Manichean dichotomy of “evil” Russia attacking a “democracy” (Georgia). Another example would be politicization of sport, or narratively attaching primordial qualities to the entire nation based on behaviour of a non-representative group in the mass media. Readers’ comments to such publications are especially telling and demonstrate how successful the “meaning attachment” was (e.g. a Yahoo front-page article “Low Blow from Russian Media in Wake of Olympic Woes,” in which the author drawing upon national sentiments invited a peculiar anti-Russian response in the comments posted by the readers that shifted the discussion away from the sport event itself to the Cold war history and chauvinistic and derogatory statements conveying an essentialist view of the Other. A similar misrepresentation instrumental to invoke nationalist and anti-Russian sentiment can be found in a National Review publication (http://article.nationalreview.com/425702/whining-russians/george-weigel), where the discussion of a sport event slides to invoking the Cold War history and making extreme generalizations about the Russian public life.

It is suggested that contrary to a widely-present belief that the quasi-censorship was the primary factor behind the Putin and Medvedev Administration’s capacity to be more convincing, it has been their skill in addressing the audience that outplayed West’s and domestic opposition’s counter-narratives. In comparison, the late-Communist
Indeed, polls recently conducted in Russia, the USA, and European states all tend to show that there is no meaningful sense of we-ness among transatlantic and Russian populations. A good way to assess Western peoples’ identification with Russia is through the ‘thermometer of nations’ from PIPA. In the 2002 poll report, at a time when Russian-Atlantic relations were the warmest ever, Russians obtained a ‘cool’ feeling from Europeans (47 degrees) and a barely ‘warm’ – indeed, lukewarm – one from Americans (55 degrees). These results are a far cry from the considerably warmer feelings that Europeans had for Americans and vice versa (PIPA, 2002: 8). Just as significant is the fact that political turmoil in Russia was considered ‘an extremely important threat’ by 14% of Europeans and 27% of Americans. Levada Center supplies telling data on that matter. In a 2006 poll, Russians believed that their country should come closer to Europe and the USA in proportions of barely 24% and 8% respectively. In comparison, the ‘near abroad’ and China obtained 39% and 13%. Strikingly, 15% of Russians perceived the most important threats to Russia to be the USA and NATO, and 46% judged that any collaboration with NATO goes against the country’s interest.

The present paper attempts to show how these new divides have been artificially constructed, and how specific meanings are attached through discursive practices that sustain a construct rendering integration or inclusion as non-viable options.

The sustaining of a constructed Inside/Outside divide by the “productive power” of the discursive means of identity construction may provide explanations of how and, possibly, why the exclusion occurs where the realist and neo-liberal schools may be unable to since they treat socially-constructed knowledge as “exogenously given by structure and process” (Adler 2005: 100; Wendt 1999: 336). There seems to be no convincing rationalist systemic (non-reductionist) explanation offered (cf. Waltz 1979) as to why political, economic and social integration of post-WWII Germany into common European space was successfully implemented in contrast to the failed integration of the post-Soviet Russia.
2. Theoretical Framework

The security studies as a field and the security-associated discourse represent possibly the best research material to establish the dynamics of “othering” and to analyze the inclusion/exclusion of a state into a formal coalition or an informal community of the “like-minded.” To limit the scope of the research and define what Russia’s inclusion/exclusion into the Western community means, the paper will focus on the concept of Karl Deutsch’s “pluralistic security community” dominated by the Western states, which can also be referred to as the Western (Transatlantic) “security community.” Joining this community does not necessarily imply formal admission into the NATO or EU or another institutional representation of the West. The integration into these institutional representations of the meta-physical concept of the West or Europe arguably contains a set of structural variables, such as certain macro-economic benchmarks or compatibility of the military capabilities that would ensure physical integration, etc., as well as Russia’s willingness to join. Instead, the present paper will investigate Russia’s exclusion from the West-dominated “security community.” The presence/absence of repetitive discursive securitizations, defined as deliberate transformation of events involving the Other into a security issue for the Self, and linguistic oppositions denoting the Self/Other dichotomy will serve as indicators of the presence and reproduction of an exclusion construction vis-à-vis the Other. Members of a particular “security community” have no incentives for engaging in securitization discourse vis-à-vis one another or at least strongly restrain acts of securitization, whereas securitizations are widely deployed with respect to the Outside.

The North Atlantic (or Western) states embody, according to the constructivists, Kantian liberal ideal of “perpetual peace,” also dubbed as “democratic peace,” or Deutsch’s “pluralistic security community.” The members of this community have experienced “cognitive evolution of practice” preventing them from going to war despite the occurrence of disputes (Wendt 1999,
Mostly sharing state-centric assumption with realists and even engaging in the argument about power balancing (cf. Waever et al. 2003: 73-74), they also admit the existence of anarchy. However, unlike the neorealist proposition of states’ unrestrained self-interest, several prominent constructivists suggest that the anarchy has evolutionary stages starting form the Hobbesian world, changing to Lockean, and culminating in the Kantian culture of anarchy (Wendt, 1999: 246-307; Weaver et al., 2003: 78, 499-500). In fact, the constructivist’s ontology suggests that the social reality is “constructed by humans” and therefore can be altered (re-constructed), thus evolving from one type of culture of international relations to another.

The possibility of such evolution of international system and attaining the Kantian “perpetual peace” is linked to “the interaction of state agents [through which] the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed” (Wendt 1999: 316). A central role in the possibility of such transformation belongs to the social construction of identities, values, and interest formulation, which are “endogenous to interaction and thus a dependent variable in process,” contrary to the rationalists’ treatment of those as exogenously given (Wendt 1999: 336; also Adler 2005: 100).

As applied to the present research, the theories suggest that the membership in a security community is defined by its constituent states’ practicing the “democratic peace” drawing upon

---

7 This discursive construction of the NATO’s relation to democratic development came under significant criticism suggesting that NATO exports neither stability nor democracy both in the Cold War and post-Cold war contexts: “Although both the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and the 1997 Madrid Declaration state that democracy is a prerequisite for membership, neither says anything about states that revert to autocracy being ejected from NATO or even sanctioned [...] Proponents of NATO enlargement argue that it will help spread democracy in Eastern Europe. The experience of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods demonstrates, however, that NATO enlargement has not and will not have a significant impact on the survival of democracy. During the Cold War, some states flipped between democracy and autocracy with no effect on their status within NATO” (Reiter 2001: 53, 67). A similar idea was expressed earlier by Brown (1999), “The alliance's leaders contend that bringing in central and east European states will promote stability and democracy in the region, but none of the leading candidates for NATO membership has internal stability problems; indeed, this is a condition for membership. [...] In any event, NATO, which is fundamentally a military organization, is not well equipped to help new members promote political stability, advance democratic reform, and address ethnic problems” (206).
Kantian liberal values accompanied by mutual recognition of this membership. The community constituents must have “internalized” common norms and identity, which ensures their mutual recognition as “like-minded” (i.e. “mutual identity and loyalty (‘we-ness’) among states” (Adler 2005: 5-6, 189-190), and fosters self-restraint or Bourdieu’s “[denial] of interested action” by individual agents as the principal norm of behaviour within a “pluralistic security community” (Wendt 1999: 246-307, 345-363; Williams 2007: 43, 55). Obviously, Russia does not fall into this definition of the Transatlantic security community, and West’s relations with it, as with the Outside, resemble the pattern of the Lockean culture of anarchy characterized by “rivalry within some rules” (Wendt 1999: 247, Waever et al. 2003: 499). This shows that the recognition of ‘we-ness’ is absent.

In other words, the security communities become possible only through the collective identity formation, shared norms and understandings. A state cannot gain membership in it without having adopted common values and norms and without already-members to confirm that and acknowledge the state as a “like-minded:” the applicants must “have learned and internalized the [common] norms, [and not simply be] making instrumental choices (Adler 2005: 190). Williams (2007) supports this idea by indicating the admission to the security community of democratic peace is based on “the process of recognition and respect that run more deeply than being simply a question of how one liberal-democratic state recognizes another” (47).  

---

8 Klein (2008) presents an example that shows how self-restraint in the economic development realm was exercised with respect to post-WWII Germany, but not to post-Soviet Russia: “In a move that would have been unthinkable in Russia in the 1990s or Iraq under US occupation, the US government infuriated its own corporate sector by imposing a moratorium on foreign investment so that war-battered German companies would not be forced to compete before they had recovered. “The feeling was that letting foreign companies come in at that point would have been like piracy,” [said] Carolyn Eisenberg, author of an acclaimed history of the Marshall Plan” (251-252).

9 Waltz (2000) suggested that in order to be recognized by others as “like-minded” it may not be enough to be a “democracy,” rather a state needs to be a democracy of “the right kind” as acknowledged by other states for the “democratic peace thesis” to operate (7). This argument may be construed as the binary opposition “democracy/non-democracy being a disguise for more fundamental primordial markers of Self/Other (cf. Neumann 1998) where
A significant group of constructivists draw the collective identity, values, norms, understandings, and interests for a community from the Kantian disciplined subjectivity at the individual level. Wendt (1999: 160), Adler (2005) and Pouliot (2007: 612) point to the intersubjective meanings and dynamics that form common understandings, values, and identity that lie in the core of the security community of democratic peace. Though Williams (2007) mentions “intersubjective ideas that were shared by international decision-makers [that were] subsequently reproduced by realist theorists [in constructing the balance-of-power paradigm]” (ix), he also tends to see that democratic peace draws on Kantian disciplined subjects (47), which brings the construction’s origin to the grassroots level. To point out how elites reproduced domestic norms in their behaviour, Williams (2007) quotes Risse-Kappen,

Decision makers in democratic polities who have been socialized in the norms governing liberal states are likely to communicate their intentions in the international realm by referring to these very norms. When they encounter fellow democrats, a collective understanding of these norms, can be readily established, providing a common basis for further communication of peaceful intentions […].

(45)

These theoretical propositions essentially link the membership in a “pluralistic security community” and the democratic peace theory as its “derivative” to the collective grassroots norms, values, and understandings forming a common liberal-democratic identity that ensures self-restraint among the security community members and thereby prevents violent resolution of conflicts.10

granted Russia the status of “democracy of the right kind” is completely contingent on the West’s willingness to do so and can be used as political leverage in relations with Russia and in intra-community relations.

10 The constructed nature of the “democratic peace theory” or “thesis” was demonstrated by Waltz (2000) citing historical examples of formally democratic states ready to wage a war against each other. The history, however, provides very limited number of such cases, which helps sustain the construction as true. Apart from the empirical inconsistencies, including the inclusion of authoritarian, but friendly, regimes into the Western security community, the theoretical validity of the theory is also dubious as it may exaggerate the correlations between the intersubjective relations in a given society and the domestic political culture and the state’s international behaviour, as well as the link between the culture of personal freedoms and intersubjective liberal norms, and democracy as a form of power.
This being said, the fundamental question pertaining to the present research is *how knowledge is produced*, which can be further disaggregated into *who* and *how* attaches meanings to otherwise meaningless phenomena and events (or how a particular meaning triumphs over competing meanings assigned to a phenomenon), develops, diffuses, reproduces and sustains norms, values, intersubjective perceptions, collective understandings and identities. Knowledge lies in the core of identities as cognitive means to define Self/Other, or Outside/Inside. The production of shared identities bears a practical and applied value in both domestic and international dimensions: it plays a key role in consolidation of national states defined as “invented and imagined communities” (Anderson 1983), and in possibility/impossibility of inclusion/exclusion into a Deutsch’s “pluralistic security community” (Wendt 1999: 345-363; Adler 2005: 5-6; Williams 2007). Thus the question of *how knowledge is produced* can be substituted with the question of *how (common) identities (or “cultural and civilizational we-ness”) are produced*, as applied to the present research.

Wendt (1999) offers a rationalist explanation of how collective identities are formed:

distribution: a non-democratic polity does not necessarily exclude the presence of personal freedoms and associated intersubjective norms, and vice versa, a democratic polity does not necessarily stipulate the presence of the liberal intersubjective norms as shown by examples of Russia and Ukraine, where the regime differences may be attributed not to a different type of (inter-)subjectivity of the two peoples, but rather to a different interplay of structural causes (different external and domestic pressures, available resources) and agency (personality and volition of the leadership, etc.). The vagueness and lack of universally accepted term of “democracy,” especially in the context of blurring distinguishing lines between democratic and authoritarian regimes (Agamben 2005), provides ample capacities for its instrumental application. In formal terms, Russia is a democracy as the voters genuinely vote for the United Russia party and its leadership. This confines the definition of democracy to the extent authorities control domestic mass media and the public space in general. On this account, the empirical evidence suggests that the difference between Russia and the West is not so striking as often believed. The assessments of democracy indices by NGOs are also dubious. For example, Freedom House (2000) (that miraculously came to occupy a “hegemonic” position of an ultimate judge of which state is democratic and which is not) “never provide[s] a clear set of coding rules and thus offer[s] no basis for a real dialogue about how cases were coded,” and does not make its disaggregate data available, “[which] ensures that a scholarly, public debate about issues of measurement is virtually impossible. In the end, the aggregate data offered by Freedom House has to be accepted largely on faith” (Munck et al. 2002: 19-21). Methodological issues with the indices of democracy calculated by other NGOs also “have not tackled the challenge of measurement very well” (Munck et al. 2002: 21). The historical evidence also provides a number of cases where the status of “democracy” was granted to authoritarian states as an instrumental policy choice.
Identities are formed in two ways: through *natural selection* (survival of the fittest, those who fail to adapt are replaced, egoists will defeat altruists, but in the future it may not be an important factor in the evolution of state identities) or *cultural selection* (transmitting behavioural determinants from one individual to another, from one generation to the next through the two mechanisms of social learning and imitation).

This explanation using “four causal mechanisms or ‘master variables’” seems to be taking identities, though endogenous to the political interest formulation, as a pre-existing phenomenon (e.g. his “homogeneity” variable) and developed primarily at the intersubjective and grassroots level (Wendt 1999: 345-363).

The present research takes the post-modernist “power-knowledge” concept as the basis, which may provide a better insight into understanding of who and how formulates and produces knowledge by attaching desired meanings. Foucault’s proposition that power produces knowledge and his genealogy of “regimes of truth” questions Wendtian concept of intrinsic nature of identities, specifically that of the democratic identity (Campbell 1998b: 279). The same research agenda “into the relationships between knowledge and power in the social construction of security relations” was proposed by Barnett and Adler (as cited in Williams: 2007: 54). Social and collective knowledge directly relates to identities, norms, and values, which are collective phenomena *per se*. According to the constructivist argument, security communities of the Kantian democratic peace are social constructs, and the same can be said with reference to constructing the Other imagined within the Lockean or Hobbesian culture.

A significant amount of constructivist and post-structuralist literature points to the sovereign power as the key actor in controlling the social space, and “[producing] and disciplining of subjects” (Ashley 1987: 409-411; also Foucault 1982: 781). Essentially, this creates the basis for acknowledging that identities are situational, changeable, multiple, and subject to construction (Brubaker at al. 2004).
Using the cases of the US, South Africa and Brazil, Anthony Marx (1996) demonstrated how the state evoked different levels of resistance mobilization and affected consolidation of the nation-state through institutionalization or non-institutionalization of racial segregation in these countries in contrast to the objective degree of violence. These findings demonstrate the leading role of the state elites in constructing identities.

According to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and the changed ways of producing subjects, adopted by the modern Western state, a new form of “pastoral power” has been developing to change its normative objective of domination to that of “salvation of the flock” (Foucault 1982: 782-783). Relying on bio-power means of knowing the psychology of people as individuals and in a community, knowing “the inside of people’s minds, [their] souls, [and their] innermost secrets,” this form of domination “implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it” justifying own existence by “[preparedness] to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of [all]” (Foucault 1982: 782-783). Campbell (1998a) uses Foucault’s idea that “wars are no longer waged in the name of the sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone” (201). As it will be demonstrated further on, Russia clearly falls into the category of the “Western state” in a sense that the state has exercised same “pastoral power,” often in a messianic form, using the same semi-totalitarian power techniques of knowledge production and subjugation as the Western states have. Both in Russia and the West, the sovereign power is the key actor in attaching meanings that help produce, reproduce and sustain desired constructions of Inside/Outside and Self/Other that render certain policy options acceptable or unacceptable.

According to Klein (2007), political elites have even greater power to modify and sustain the identities of target audiences and mobilize them as their perceived interests dictate. To that end, they may employ an almost identical set of totalitarian practices of “de-patterning” the
mentality of entire populations under the conditions of a cataclysmic change, occurring by itself or deliberately provoked, while “the window of opportunity” permits (256), in order to construct and modify identities, norms, values, and understandings.\textsuperscript{11}

It is obvious that the artificial attachment of a meaning may not necessarily succeed in becoming hegemonic, and “power-knowledge” link may fail, which suggests the presence of structure/agency variables necessitating foundational approaches advanced by rationalists. To be accepted, the discourse must not only come from a source that possesses the capability of generating meanings (or “innovating”), politically selecting, diffusing, institutionalizing (Adler 2005: 3-4, 75-77), and repetitively reproducing these, but also from the sources that are authoritative and legitimate.

The capacity of the sovereign power to attach meanings using textual linguistic means include

\begin{quote}
strategies, techniques, and rituals of power by which multiple themes, concepts, narratives and practices are excluded, silenced, dispersed, recombined, or given new or reverse emphases, thereby to privilege some elements over others, impose boundaries, and discipline practices in a manner producing just this normalized division of practical space.
\textsuperscript{18} (Ashley 1987: 409-411)
\end{quote}

Weldes (1996) points to the “asymmetric capacity [of different sovereign powers] to define and be defined” (372), both domestically and internationally;\textsuperscript{12} however, the sovereign power seems to be best positioned than any other entity with respect to necessary capabilities and legitimizing authority to attach meanings and produce knowledge. It can produce hegemonic meanings

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{11} Though Klein (2007) mostly analyzes the empirical evidence of implanting neo-liberal economic policies in countries in transition, the same dynamics of norms and values modification can be applied to social and political processes (for example, swift and radical changes in public opinion occurring under conditions of major upheaval affecting the lives of wide social strata, as the cases of the FSU nations have demonstrated).
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{12} This capacity may not be simply limited to real capabilities (e.g. infrastructure) or structural constraints (e.g. common use of the language of discourse). It also includes the role of political agency in mobilization the population (e.g. personal charisma of the leadership, etc.).
\end{flushleft}
through “recombining extant cultural materials, and [...] repeating successful combinations [that create what seems as] an accurate description of reality” to engage “common sense” knowledge already present within a society, and to “exclude or silence” competing discourses, thereby promoting a desired “regime of truth” and rendering alternative (undesired) options and policies unacceptable (Milliken 1999: 230, 236, 239, 243; Weldes 1999: 154-155).

The repetition of successful discursive combinations of “extant cultural material” constitutes the Foucauldian notion of “genealogy” as applied to knowledge. This concept may show not only the historical development the “regimes of truth” and the reciprocally supportive relationship between power and knowledge (Ashley 1987: 409-411), but also continuity and stability of certain imageries.

As applied to the constructions of identities and discursive representations of the Self and Other, the genealogic approach may reveal long history of these imageries and their stability throughout the history, which is substantiated by the trend of “historicization and politicization of identity” by state agents (Campbell 1998a: 218-219). The “historicization” in fact constitutes recourse to the social “extant cultural material” (Milliken 1999: 239) comprised of pre-existent stereotypization drawing on (quasi-) historical knowledge, which embeds essentialist primordial understanding of the Self and the Other that may remain largely fixed and unchanged for centuries:

13 The most remarkable recent sovereigns’ technique of establishing a “regime of truth” and rendering alternative narratives “subjugated knowledge” is institutionalizing preferred “truths” and making competing narratives and symbols de-legitimized or even making these a criminal offence. Thus anyone who makes reference to “subjugated knowledge” is subjected to legal punishment or de-legitimized by attaching the image of a “yet another Holocaust-denier.” The examples thereof broadly range to include fixing historical truths (e.g. disputes over acts of genocide, arguments over who is European and who is not, motions in the Latvian and Lithuanian Parliaments to introduce criminal liability for denying the fact of the Soviet occupation, and reciprocate Russian Duma’s motion with reference to denial of the USSR’s role in defeating Nazism), ousting cultural, historic and linguistic heritage and symbols (e.g. dismantling monuments, prohibition to wear Soviet WWII decorations in several Baltic states, limiting the use of or ousting non-official languages despite population’s bilingualism and broad use of non-official languages in everyday life), fixing preferred geographical names (e.g. the English Channel vs. La Manche or North-Western Passage vs. Canadian North-Western passage, dispute over the toponym of “Macedonia,” etc.).
[...] Jen Bartelson (1995) traces the contemporary discourse of sovereignty in international political theory as a formation intact since the Renaissance. The result is to bind a rather long history [...] to a continuation of the same discursive structure and logic of difference, with the effect that despite surface changes, International Relations becomes a quasi-eternal recurrence. Discourses constitutive of state practices have [...] been analyzed as being basically continuous for several centuries or more in their oppositional structures and modes of productivity. David Campbell, for example, argues that US identity constructions from the 17th and 18th centuries are ‘oddly similar’ in ‘structural logic and modes of representation’ to the Cold War, indeed, that the Cold War is ‘another episode in the on-going production and reproduction of American identity.’

(Milliken 1999: 246; also Campbell 1998a)

Neumann (1996) scrutinizing the “genealogy” of the Russian intellectuals’ debate about Russia’s European identity showed how the state effectively controlled the public space to shape discursive and non-discursive practices to ensure that the state’s vision of Russia as the “true Europe” and the West as the “false Europe” was continuously reproduced (25-26, 40, 76, 100, 117-118, 194). The widely spread mythological tradition as part of the “extant cultural material” has continuously narrated the collective West as “technocratic and materialistic” that is inherently hostile to “messianic and spiritual” Russia. The historically-developed and reproduced imagery of Russia as the protector of status quo internationally (e.g. support of the anciens régimes against the 19th revolutionary movements in Europe) falls into the state-promoted hegemonic knowledge of the “true Europe” and “false Europe” dichotomy (Neumann 1996: 20-21, 25-26, 32, 40, 45, 76, 83, 170, 194). The genealogy of historical narratives about “reciprocating” nature of the Russian responses that follow the West’s persisting actions to disrupt an earlier status quo sustains the imagery of Russia as isolated and being on the defensive. This “regime of truth” helps attach the meaning of threat to the West’s collective actions and reproduces a too-familiar imagery of exclusion and the “external threat” easily internalized by the domestic audience.14

14 The narratives of the collective Western hostility towards Russia and persistent attempts to exclude it since at least the 13th c. are widely present in the traditional historiography and popular culture. The narratives are supported by compelling historical evidence presented by multiple military invasions coming from the West varying from clashes with the Teutonic Order and Swedish Kingdom in the 13th c. to the invasion of Napoleon’s “all-European” force, the
The Western mythologies about the Self and Russia also represent particular and rather stable “regimes of truth” that have remained remarkably fixed despite the heterogeneity of contexts they were applied in:

[...] Iver Neumann’s (1998) study of Russia as an object in European identity formation illustrates that although the qualities and attributes given [to] Russia in European discourse have varied somewhat, such variation is secondary to enduring core oppositions rendering Russia an enemy ‘other’ of Europe.

(Milliken 1999: 246)

Thus the genealogy of the Self/Other representation in the Russian and Western discourses invokes historical knowledge present in the “extant cultural material.” The historical and cultural heritage represents fixed and essentialist attributes. Therefore, it is possible to argue that if these attributes are used to differentiate between the Self and the Other, the discourse of “othering” attains primordial essentialist nature suggesting that the Other is unlikely to change and become “like us.”

Crimean War, and the two World Wars. Part of the same tradition is the narrative about the West’s failure to appreciate Russia’s role and sacrifices unchangeably interpreted as the West’s spiritual inferiority manifested in its ingratitude and mercantilism. These interpretations are especially evident in the philosophy of (Neo-)Eurasianism that argues about primordial incompatibility between the Eurasian Mainland (Continent) culture based on principles of spiritual relations with land that determined peaceful mentality of farmers, and the Atlanticist Rimland (Sea) culture characterized by Viking-pirate-raider mentality that determines the strive for incessant conquest and appropriation of others’ property by force. For example, prince N. Trubetskoy (1920), an early Eurasianist, proposed that Europe is a “Romano-Germanic chauvinistic project” based on technological superiority (including military) that posed a quintessential threat of colonization to the rest of the world, and “against which Slavs, Asians and Africans” ought to unite (as cited in Neumann 1996: 112-114). Later, such internationalism, in contrast to the Western colonialism, racism and nazism, was constructed as a Russian primordial trait ensuing from the traditional Slavic collectivism and determining inherent pre-disposition to the acceptance of the Communist ideals. At present, this dichotomy is often reduced to portrayal of the Anglo-Saxon nations (especially the US and UK) as primordially hostile and aggressive Others to Russia and the continental European countries.

15 This “extant cultural material” engaged in the discourse of differentiating the Self from the Other clearly runs along essentialist and primordial terms that do not concern with the form of governance as such but rather with intersubjective understating of the value of personal freedoms that eventually produces a certain form of governance. These understandings of the individual freedom are largely fixed and historically stable. There is a noticeable continuity of construction of individualism derived from Tacitus’ ethnographic description of Germanic tribes of the 1st c. AD to the 1215 Magna Carta provisions, which produced parliamentarism and personal freedoms in the contexts when democracy in a modern form was non-existent, and the present intersubjective values that produce modern democratic forms of governance. The extant stereotypical generalized knowledge of Russia’s historical development distinguishes it from that of Western Europe: personal freedoms were first to be sacrificed, both willingly and unwillingly, in favour of collective freedom (i.e. sovereign independence). Thus “historicized” “extant cultural materials” ultimately converge to essentialist distinction between inherent individualism of the West and inherent collectivism of the East.
An extreme case of essentialist “othering” is Butler’s concept of “defiling otherness” as a form of self-identification (as cited in Campbell 1998a: 9). The idea of “defiling” suggests that it is not enough to defeat the “otherness,” it is also necessary to attach such a meaning so that no lingering idea of “we-ness” could remain, and thereby permanently fix desired hegemonic knowledge about Inside/Outside. However, its operation is very similar to primordial “othering:” attaching the attributes to the Other that would serve as clear, indisputable and incontestable delineation criteria distinguishing the Other from the Self. “Defiling otherness” may be regarded as a bio-political means of sustaining identities to bring cohesion and unity within due to its psychological effect of clear distinguishing criteria that are extremely difficult to contest and reverse, which fixes the impossibility of developing a sense of “we-ness.”

To become hegemonic, the knowledge must come from a source acknowledged as legitimate and authoritative. The political elites can be broadly defined as “communities of practice” including “epistemic communities,” “security communities,” “communities of discourse,” etc. (Adler 2005: 15). They are best positioned to be acknowledged as authoritative and legitimate source and become “authorized speakers” (Milliken 1999: 226, 242) due to their daily practical professional activities and capability to speak “the right language”- the scientific language (or rather quasi-scientific) that is often “amalgamated with the social knowledge” and therefore may not necessarily be objective (Adler 2005: 17). The amalgamation with social knowledge essentially means that pre-existing historical stereotypes and resentments inevitably become part of the quasi-scientific knowledge. This embeddedness of social knowledge and cultural material into an official discourse adds credibility to a narrative by engaging extant fixed

---

16 This issue may be better addressed by human psychology studies, but the empirical evidence of strongly pronounced primordial “othering” often accompanied by “defiling” and “negation of difference” (Campbell 1998a), provided by popular culture, suggests that these constitute a raw psychological response of humans in situations when their sense of Self-identification is challenged or threatened.
social “common sense” understandings. The engagement of extant social knowledge and common sense is an indispensable bio-political “pastoral” governmentality technique of promoting a narrative into hegemonic knowledge. Such a technique engages normative high-moral and bio-political grounds that are likely to be accepted by target audiences and justify political practices. If a narrative fails to resonate with existing social understandings, it is likely to remain “subjugated” regardless of the level of authoritativeness of the source promoting it.  

Thus the hegemonic discourse (re)produces “the common sense(s) of societies” or a “truth” (Milliken 1999: 237), and “articulated by the elites produces policy practices” (Milliken 1999: 240). Repeated reproduction of certain discourses and narratives helps sustain them until policy objectives change. Speaking from an authoritative institutionalized source and using quasi-scientific knowledge and stereotypic understandings, they have an opportunity to choose the timing to effectively deploy a discourse or narrative. The timing of deploying a discourse exactly when its instrumentalization can have the greatest impact shows that the elites choose it to accompany their practices.

Speaking through a “collective voice” in an institutionalized authoritative setting of an inclusive (e.g. OSCE, PACE) or an exclusive organization (NATO) contributes to the legitimacy of a hegemonic discursive construction creating the imagery of “many like-minded” countering “isolated rogues.” Such a Manichean construction, in line with Derridian binary oppositions- a

---

17 See below the example of juxtaposition of two “truths” where the re-narration NATO’s as the reconciler of France and Germany (M. Woerner (1991) as cited in Williams 2007: 72-73) or as a tool to prevent the Europe’s “own notorious past of wars and power balancing” (Weaver et al. 2003: 380-381, 384-385, 389-392, 403-404; also Williams 2007: 57, 70) failed to become hegemonic as opposed to understanding of NATO as a mechanism to counter Soviet “residual” military threat and later Russia’s “re-assertiveness” and “resurgent neo-imperialism.”

18 The recent history has provided ample examples when dormant topics and previously widely accepted truths were invoked and revised. For example, the WWII memories in the FSU states and the history of the 1930s terrible famine in Ukraine occurred exactly when there was interest and opportunity to instrumentalize these events in pursuit of political agendas. The same occurred with questioning the reliability of Gazprom in connection to the Russo-Ukrainian relations, the topic that had not been questioned during the Cold War, etc.
linguistic means of structuring discourses (Milliken 1999: 229), may easily transcend into the category of “common sense truths.” This construction is also buttressed by the fact that the collective action helps mask national and therefore selfish, pragmatic, and rationalist motives, thus attaching a moral symbolic value to the discourse and the practices it helps produce. The “collective voice” helps construct desired intersubjective understandings by speaking on behalf of “the entire civilized world” with normative political objectives, instead of voicing the concerns of few allied powerful nations. As a result, the imagery of a divide between the powerful and the rest is successfully avoided.

As applied to the present research, the presence of securitization discourses serve as the indicator that the parties securitizing against each other are not part of the same security community. The securitization discourses are governed by the same rules and perform the same generic functions as other discursive practices: they are “systems of signification” constructing social realities by attaching meanings to otherwise meaningless material objects using predominantly linguistic means and structured by Derridian binary oppositions; they (re)produce the social world through “operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action;” and “authorized speakers” must select and reproduce successful combinations that would not evoke resistance of the target audiences and eventually become hegemonic knowledge (“the play of practice”) (Milliken 1999: 228-230).

With agents authorized to “speak security” and the employed specific symbolic power expressed through language and knowledge (Williams 2007: 66) being identical to those in the mechanism of hegemonic knowledge production, the primary distinctive feature of the securitization discourse is confined to a Foucauldian governmentality technique of invoking a biologically powerful sense of fear that may be used to justify exceptional policies if required.
Analyzing the interrelation between identity and foreign policy, Campbell (1998a) showed how particular representations of history and "evangelism of fear" and securitization were regularly instrumentalized by the elites, including the bio-political means of invocation of "danger" and "negation of difference" for the state identity construction (8, 61-62) hinging on the strongest biological and psychological imperatives of a need for safety/security and ability to define the Self. Depending on the political needs the elites may change discourse to construct another mythology: the security is constantly "re-written" by the elites (Campbell 1998a: 133-158). He makes a statement critical to the present research that "danger is not an objective condition [...] it does not exist independently of those to whom it may become a threat [and anything can be constructed] as a risk (Campbell 1998a: 1-2). This argument can be juxtaposed to Weaver's argument of the role of elites in (de)securitization:

when, why and how do elites label issues and developments as 'security problems'? when, why and how do they succeed and fail respectively? What attempts are made by other groups to press securitization on the agenda? And what are the cases of attempts to keep issues off the security agenda, to move below the security threshold or even to de-securitize issues that have become securitized?

and Mearsheimer's argument "that even if one accepts the claims concerning the 'constructed' nature of political reality, one is still left with the question of why specific discourses prevail over others and how this is accomplished" (as cited in Williams 2007: 90). Therefore, it is possible to suggest that the "play of practice" may explain why certain events trigger acts of securitization and others, even more serious, do not (cf. Campbell 1998a: 147).

The impact of discourses on and the extent to which desired meanings become internalized by target audiences at the grassroots level can be measured by public polls. For example, it is possible to argue that today's Russian political establishment's efforts to control the domestic audience's exposure to competing narratives from within and from the outside coupled
with a much more sophisticated skill on the part of the political agency has helped supplant the Western hegemonic discourse with own “hegemonic knowledge” as applied to the domestic audiences: the counter-narratives originating from both inside and outside are marginalized and rendered unworthy, instead of earlier banning practices that backfired by turning “subjugated” knowledge into “hegemonic.”

The impact on foreign audiences, however, is structurally...

---

In early 2000s, the Putin Administration introduced the National Information Security Doctrine and gradually regained state control over the major mass media outlets (three national TV channels, in particular) previously owned by top oligarchs who had been using those to pursue personal political ends. Counter-narratives, however, are still available on other national channels and through unfettered access to foreign mass media outlets. Apparently, the control of the mainstream mass media plays a critical role in the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” continuously receiving domestic approval rating of 70-80% confirmed by independent experts (Levinson 2009 http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russian-public-opinion-and-the-georgia-war# fn1; RIA Novosti 20.08.2008 http://www.rian.ru/society/20080820/150531736.html). But as mentioned above, it may not be the most important factor: the present Russian political establishment has clearly out-skilled its late-Soviet and post-Soviet predecessors in mobilizing the public support. Moreover, the present political regime seems to have significantly marginalized the West’s competing narratives whose impact on the domestic Russian audience has decreased dramatically as compared even to the 1960s-80s despite much greater accessibility of the Western narratives now than during the late Communist period. The success is especially evident in the 2008 poll in Russia following the Ossetian War that reflects significant public mobilization behind the government agenda and its limited impact on deconstruction of Europeanness, with EU polling better than others. The Western collective and fast condemnation was constructed as an immoral and flagrant application of “double standards” to the value of human lives, in which ‘non-European’ US and its ‘unEuropean-behaving’ “client-states” were playing the leading role, as opposed to more balanced positions of ‘truly European’ France, Italy and Germany. Russia’s actions were constructed as a legitimate and justified behaviour any European self-respecting state would embark on to protect unarmed civilians, the majority of whom were Russian citizens. The construction became especially hegemonic after gruesome details of the Georgian attack and its preparation, including foreign arms supplies, were promulgated. This construction ensured public mobilization in Russia behind its leadership engaging the familiar imagery of a “unified hostile West,” but had relatively limited negative consequences for the construction of the Russia’s European identity. The polls of Levada Analytical Centre conducted in 46 regions of Russia in September 2008 showed that the popular attitudes to the EU, the US, Ukraine and Georgia have hit the historically lowest point, but the EU still polled better. The negative attitude to the US, Georgia, Ukraine and the EU were expressed by 67%, 75%, 53% and 39% respectively, and they were viewed positively by 23%, 17%, 37% and 45% respectively (Vek 2008 (in Russian) http://www.wek.ru/news/politic/238354/index.shtml). The EU still received a more favourable attitude than any of the parties involved with almost a quarter of respondents blaming the US for the conflict (VCIOM 28.08.2008 http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/10563.html?no_cache=1&cHash=c6659e4fc8; also Levada Polls 2000-2008 (in Russian) http://www.levada.ru/interrelations3.html), and half of all Russians believing big Western countries were hostile to Russia's interests (VCIOM 28.08.2008 http://wciom.com/archives/thematic-archive/info-material/single/10588.html?no_cache=1&cHash=ca23096149). The 1996 and 1999 Russian polls focusing on the NATO expansion and its operation in Yugoslavia also featured dramatic worsening of public attitudes to NATO as the West’s institutional embodiment as a result of deployed securitization discourse: in the 1996 public poll, “32% believed that the NATO expansion would be bad to Russia, and in spring 1997, of the 22 percent of respondents who were well-informed about the issue, 62% believed that the expansion would harm Russia” (Light et al. 2000: 80); in the 1999 pole, “66% of Russians believed that NATO represented a direct threat to Russia” (Light et al. 2000: 80). The interviews of September 1999 demonstrated that that the opinion was broadly upheld by the foreign policy professionals and the general public who, regardless of their political preferences, “condemned NATO's air strikes against Serbia, [and] disapproved of NATO expansion” (Light et al. 2000: 80). It is also worth noticing the connotational difference between the “harm” in the 1996 poll and the “direct threat” in the 1999 one.
constrained: the capabilities for producing hegemonic knowledge with respect to the nature of international events and roles played by stakeholders are significantly shifted in favour of the West due to its greater material capabilities to broadcast desired meanings both domestically and internationally. Knowledge produced in languages that are not “commonly spoken by North Americans or West Europeans” becomes “subjugated” (Milliken 1999: 244). As a result, the Russian political establishment has made efforts to recover from “subjugated” position in relation to the western audiences by launching Russia Today, an English-language news channel broadcasting worldwide.\(^{20}\)

3. Research Methodology

To analyze the discursive practices of exclusion/inclusion and identity construction, and their impact on the grassroots level as the key target audience, the research design uses the constructivist theorization. Within the broad camp of constructivism, the paper employs the post-positivist approach of discourse analysis.

The scope of the research is limited to the analysis of the NATO discourse on the one side, and the discourse of the key representatives of the executive branch of the RF Government on the other, that accompanied the “fundamental turning point” events for the recent West-Russia relations (cf. Croft 2002: 110; Baranovsky 2000: 443; RF MFA 2003b): the period preceding the demise of the USSR; the first round of NATO eastward enlargement to include Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary; the Kosovo crisis; the NATO enlargement to include the

\(^{20}\) Apparently, the same rationale was pursued by the initiative to establish a body to assess the status of democracy in the US in response to Freedom House’s negative reports on Russia constructed as interference into Russia’s domestic politics and an attempt to subvert its sovereignty by the example of “coloured” revolutions in the FSU states.
Baltic states; the planned NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, the Ossetian war and NMD deployment plans.21

The selection of discourses of “authorized speakers” is determined by the following factors. NATO represents the most “visible” and “productive” institutional representation of the “collective and solidary West from which Russia is excluded.” This “visibility” stems from the central role this organization played in the above-mentioned events that have dramatically affected the Russia-West relations. As a collective Western organization where differing national positions are blended to work out a collective stance, it is constructed to possess normative and symbolic value to represent the Western “security community” of Kantian democratic peace (cf. Williams 2007) serving as a model of the “entire civilized world.” Its “productivity” is defined by the impact of its discourse. As a collective exclusive security institution, NATO has retained the greatest capacity to “speak security” and generate opponents’ responses thanks to its military capabilities. The significance of the NATO discourse is especially noticeable in the Russian media space where other possible representations of the West were visibly gaining much less attention and were not as strongly securitized against (cf. Light et al. 2000: 81; also RF President 2004c). In short, the choice of the NATO discourse for this research was determined by the paramount role it plays in the Russian official discourse: NATO occupies the place of a principal emulation or simulacrum of the “collective West from which Russia is excluded.” As the Russian discourse demonstrates, NATO is not viewed as an independently acting entity; rather it is treated as a key institutional agent currently employed by the collective West (i.e. Western or Transatlantic “security community”). Thus the discourse on NATO and international developments involving it inevitably implies the fundamental theme of relations with the West.

21 As it will be further demonstrated, the US NMD deployment plans were effectively linked to the NATO-Russia relations by the Russian and NATO securitization discourses.
The selection of the Russia’s executive power as principal “authorized speakers” (Milliken 1999: 226, 242) is dictated by the principal role it has played in formulation and implementation of domestic and international policies as compared to the legislative branch. Statements by the Russian executive branch leadership have also been most “visible” and “productive” as compared to other speakers in terms of their relevance to the mentioned events and impact on both the domestic and Western audiences, including the wider public at the grassroots level.

The selection of specific texts depended on their relevance to the aforementioned political developments that have had fundamental impact on the Russia-West relations and their significance for the overall strategy and policy options of the stakeholders. The research design in which one of the analyzed discourses comes from a collectively-acting coalition necessitates that the expressed collective position be treated as that of all members and specific national positions be disregarded unless they are explicitly stated in the same document.

Using the analysis of the Russian and NATO discourses, the paper will try to demonstrate the increasingly significant role of the discursive in the dynamics of “othering” that sustains a specific Self/Other identity construction, which renders the option of inclusion unacceptable.

Such an approach is instrumental in explaining how certain meanings are developed and attached to define the Self and Other to be diffused among the political elites and professional “epistemic communities” down to the grassroots level through popular culture in various textual and linguistic forms (e.g. movies, mass media narratives, symbolic and visual representations etc.). Official discourses serve as mechanisms of attaching and diffusing particular meanings to produce particular knowledge to be internalized by target audiences.

To answer the other fundamental question of how meanings are attached, the post-structuralist scholars offer post-positivist epistemology and methodology. “Textual strategies,”
discourses, and symbolic meanings expressed through linguistic means lie in the core of the post-structuralist method (Hansen 2006: 2). The approach to analyzing “textual strategies” in the textually constructed social world, as proposed by Derrida (1976), suggests “deconstruction” of textual interplays to reveal how “common sense” concepts are artificially constructed. The artificial construction of these concepts can be exposed using the Derridian linguistic binary opposites (e.g. good/evil, civilized/barbaric) in which one notion is privileged over the other. The discourse samples will be deconstructed to reveal binary oppositions designating the Self and the Other as particular types. The presence of such Manichean dichotomous designations effectively sustaining the Self/Other divide will signify a discourse of “othering,” not of integration.

Milliken’s (1999) methodological framework will be employed to analyze the content and connotations of the selected instances of discourse: the predicate and metaphorical analysis will be engaged to scrutinize the discourses as “systems of signification;” articulation “of discursive objects and relations out of ‘extant cultural material’ [constituting common sense knowledge] within a particular society” and interpellation method to analyze the discourse productivity; and the deconstruction and juxtaposition methods, as well knowledge subjugation and discourse genealogy, will be employed to address “the play of practice” (Milliken 1999: 231-248).22

These approaches are necessary to expose explicit and implicit meanings conveyed in the discourses, as well as the interactions of the official discourses with the extant social knowledge. The implicit meanings are an indispensable part of any diplomatic discourse where straightforward explicit designations of the Other may not be possible.

The Foucauldian genealogic approach is used to demonstrate the persistence and continuity of reproduction of particular constructions of “othering” that make certain policy options possible and others impossible throughout the timeframe covered by the present research.

22 More detailed explanations of these methods as applied to specific discourse instances are provided in Section 4.
4. Construction of Self/Other in NATO Official Discourse

As indicated earlier, this paper argues that the construction of the Self in relation to the implicit or explicit construction of the Other by means of the hegemonic discourse legitimizes the exclusion of the Other by rendering its inclusion unacceptable. The Self/Other construction is represented by Derridian binary language oppositions in which one notion in the pair is privileged over the other.

The genealogy of the NATO official discourse shows that the binary opposition “democracy/non-democracy” denoting the connotation of “civilized/barbaric” (or “progressive/counter-civilizational”), and therefore “non-aggressive/aggressive” has been hegemonic ever since the inception of the organization. The 1949 Founding Act Preamble stated the alliance’s objective as “[safeguarding] the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded upon principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO 1949 preamble as quoted in Williams 2007: 72). The same symbolic construction of Inside/Outside appears in the 1988 Brussels Declaration, “[the] Alliance is a voluntary association of free and democratic equals, united by common interests and values” (§§ 1-4 as quoted in Williams 2007: 71). The discourse samplings from the subsequent genealogic periods demonstrate the persistence of these binary oppositions.


The NATO official discourse representing the first “genealogic” sampling as defined by the scope of the present research covers the late-Soviet period of 1988 - 1991, which is needed to compare the discursive construction of “othering” with later stages.

In the official NATO communiqués of 1988-1991, the Self, whose definition also defines what the Other is (or rather “is not”), was narrated as the principle provider of stability in Europe
whose democratic values ensured the alliance’s strength and played a key role in triggering geopolitical changes underway:

From the inception of NATO, Western democratic values have provided the basis for the strength and unity of an Alliance which has preserved peace in Europe and which has played a major role in laying the foundations for the fundamental changes now taking place. We are ready to build upon the achievements of the past 40 years, to seize the opportunities created by a new and changing Europe, to take on new challenges and to define the objectives NATO will pursue [...] In our discussions we noted that NATO is and will remain a principal source of stability in Europe

(NATO 09 May-10 May 1989),

and also

the Alliance, founded on the strength and cohesion of the trans-Atlantic partnership, will continue to serve as the cornerstone of our security, peace and freedom. They also underlined that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance’s strategy for the prevention of war, which is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces.


This construction of the Self links strength through unity to the shared democratic values creating the privileged notion of “democracy” in the binary opposition. Further deconstruction may reveal that “democracy” is equalled to “peace,” and the continuity of the alliance and its unity becomes a condition for life. Consistent with the predicative analysis that “focuses on [...] verbs, adverbs and adjectives [attached to a noun and constructing it] as a particular sort of thing, with particular feature and capacities” (Milliken 1999: 232), the wording of “a major role,” “fundamental changes,” and “the principal source” suggests the leading role the alliance had played and downscales the role of the Other claiming the continuous success of “the past 40 years” entirely for itself. It may be regarded as an early attempt to construct hegemonic portrayal of the alliance as the Victor over the Other, which later became broadly present in the national discourses. In the later national discourses, the constructions of declaring the victory and claiming it for the Self played a key role in securing a “common sense” understanding that the defeated Other cannot be treated on equal terms with the Self: after the victory is achieved, previous status quo is no longer
valid. The metaphoric analysis that focuses “on conventional ways of conceptualizing one
domain in terms of the another as structuring possibilities for human reasoning” (Milliken 1999:
235) constructs the imagery of the alliance, strong through its unity and serving a high normative
aim to preserve peace, as “Knights of the Round Table” or the “entire civilized world” fighting
against oppression. The metaphorical meaning of “cornerstone” accompanied by “foreseeable
future” places the alliance into a permanent key element, or the metaphorical “basement,” of the
security system without which it would collapse.

Identical discursive construction of the Self was continuously reproduced crystallizing the
connection between democratic values resulting in peace, stability and prosperity, and pointing to
the alliance’s permanence as having no alternatives:

By keeping the peace for the past four decades it has enabled our peoples to prosper in
freedom, and democratic values to serve as an inspiration for other societies. In the midst
of change and uncertainty, the Alliance remains a reliable guarantor of peace. It will
provide an indispensable foundation of stability, security and co-operation for the Europe
of the future [...] For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy
of deterrence for the prevention of war, based upon both nuclear and conventional forces.
(NATO 14 Dec.-15 Dec. 1989)

Such phrasing serves the same function as interpellation: it invites the reader to assume the role
of the decision-maker to invoke “common sense” understanding that prudence has to be exercised
and the mechanism that worked reliably before needs no alternative.

In an effort to bolster its role in emerging new Europe, NATO also embarked on
constructing itself as the vehicle of economic integration, an unusual function for a military
organization, which equalled cooperation with NATO to integration into the international
economic system:

Our political approach in support for positive change must be multifaceted and dynamic,
seeking to encourage political pluralism, free flow of information, and cooperative action
in dealing with common problems. [...] Consistent with our broad security concerns, we
intend to encourage expanding economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries, in
a differentiated approach, commensurate with the progress of their economic and political reforms and as a means of further strengthening these positive changes. Such relations -based on commercially sound terms, mutual interest and reciprocity - will pave the way to an increased integration of these countries into the international economic system, which we support.

(NATO 14 Dec.-15 Dec. 1989)

However, the discourse on common democratic values constituting the privileged notion in the principle binary opposition “democracy=peace/ non-democracy=war” remained dominant throughout the specified period, where the inclusion meant being acknowledged as a state ensuring “political and economic liberty” and “personal freedoms” (cf. NATO 05 Jul. – 06 Jul. 1990):

NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged

(NATO 06 Jun. – 07 Jun. 1991),

and also

The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity

(NATO 08 Nov. 1991).

In the paragraphs above, the Self is rendered not only as the provider of security and freedom, but also of economic prosperity. The invocation of the UN Charter supports legitimacy of the claims and de-legitimizes objections to the alliances objectives and practices.

A specific designation of the Other does not have to be explicit: any isolated party that disputes or opposes the alliance attains the imagery of an adversary to the declared collective normative objectives of the alliance uniting the most advanced and civilized as promoted by the
hegemonic knowledge, and easily slips into the “subjugated” status of the hostile Other representing the opposition to “peace” and “life.” The method of articulation, which “means the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of ‘cultural raw materials’ and ‘linguistic resources’ that already make sense within a particular society” (Weldes 1999: 154; Milliken 1999: 239), suggests that pre-existing social knowledge will unambiguously point to the difference between, for example, democratic Finland, Sweden, or Switzerland as non-members, and any of the then-existing non-democratic Warsaw Pact nations. Thus in most of the documents in this sampling, the USSR is recognized as part of Europe, when the need to “enhance stability in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” is referred to (NATO 02 Mar. - 03 Mar. 1988). The NATO discourse of the period explicitly admits the leading role of the USSR in the development of the new world order and unified Europe and reiterates its Europeanness in a somewhat different wording:

> We stand at the threshold of a new era in which the democratic values which are at the heart of our Alliance and part of the European heritage are increasingly shared throughout the continent. [...] Impetus for positive change and unprecedented margin for action in Eastern Europe resulting from Soviet reforms [...] 

(NATO 14 Dec.-15 Dec. 1989)

Such acknowledgment of the Soviet role and contribution to making “just and free Europe” points to the recognition of internal dynamics of positive change within the Other that may eventually evolve into a “like-minded” state. For example, with Germany’s unification and subsequent unified Germany admission to NATO in the background, the NATO discourse reiterated Russia’s Europeanness and as an indispensable part of the European continent and security:

> [We] express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy. In this spirit, we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and cooperation. True and enduring
security in Europe will be best assured through mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the legitimate security interests of all states.

However, this narrative of Russia (then-USSR) as a potential “like-minded” member of the security community was also juxtaposed to “another truth” of other NATO statements that downgraded its role and importance. For example, in Secretary-General Manfred Woerner’s 1991 statement, the discursive portrayal of the NATO’s historical role and mission was shifted to “reconcile[ing] France and Germany” as opposed to countering the Soviet threat (as cited in Williams 2007: 72-73).

The method of juxtaposition, which is used within a discourse to show that “[a particular] ‘truth’ fails to acknowledge or address [the reality in its entirety]” without necessarily trying to set “the right story” but rather being an example of making instrumental choices within an official discourse (Milliken 1999: 243) also may reproduce “othering.” Though it does not necessarily “subjugate” a particular truth or promotes a particular “hegemonic” counter-narrative, the ambivalence conveyed by such a narrative leaves the choice of the “truth” for the audience by engaging the “extant cultural materials” or the social pre-existing hegemonic stereotypical historically-developed knowledge. For example, in the case of juxtaposing the “truth” about NATO’s raison-d’être as reconciling France and Germany as opposed to countering the Soviet military threat may not have been accepted and remained “subjugated” exactly because of the “extant cultural material” of knowing Germany as undeniably historically (primordially) European, fully-integrated into the modern Europe, and continuously constructed as peaceful not only by Germans, but also by its Transatlantic allies, impeded the acceptance of that “truth” as hegemonic; in contrast, the narrative of NATO whose major role is to counter Soviet “residual” military power (i.e. dynamic “othering”) overlapping with the extant pre-existing historically
developed social understandings of the Soviet (later Russia’s) role in Europe (i.e. relatively fixed essentialist “othering”), reaffirmed by later national official narratives about Russia’s “resurgent neo-imperialism” were likely to remain “hegemonic knowledge” effectively relegating other narratives to the status of “subjugated” despite the level of authoritativeness of the source promoting these (i.e. high-level NATO officials themselves or national dignitaries).

The “extant cultural material” played the same role in juxtaposition of “truths” about the Soviet Union and Russia’s Europeanness: historically, Russia’s Europeanness is known as ambivalent, which imagery is often reproduced in the national discourses by either granting or completely denying it that status. As it was suggested above, discursive construction of “othering” increasingly attains essentialist features of a primordially inherently alien and hostile Other the closer it gets to the national and grassroots level, as opposed to a more dynamic Kantian conceptualization of the Other as potentially changeable that is likelier to be employed by international multilateral diplomatic bodies where national agendas and various points of view are blended into a collective and more balanced position. Thus, implemented with the use of linguistic syntactical means, the juxtaposition of “truths” (or varying narratives from one instance of discourse to another) about the role of the USSR (later Russia) vis-à-vis NATO and Russia’s relation to Europe was a factor in the construction of “othering” and rendering inclusion impossible. The juxtaposition of “truths” worked by devolving it to the audiences’ pre-existing historically-developed knowledge to choose the “true story” while the social hegemonic understandings of the audiences remained largely unmodified and unaltered.

For example, the narrative of recognizing the Soviet Union’s Europeanness was increasingly juxtaposed with another narrative syntactically separating the USSR from other East European states. The 1990 London Declaration employed a slightly different narrative of representing the Other:
Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny.

(NATO 05 Jul. – 06 Jul. 1990)

In this statement, the predicative and syntactical analysis points to the connotational separation between the Central and East European nations and the USSR that are placed in different sentences, and “long journey” suggesting a much longer perspective of becoming “like us” as opposed to the processes of “liberating” already underway. The narrative points to the positive dynamics within the Other manifested by “a process of growing ‘we-ness’ underway,” but a crucial part of it is linguistically-constructed distinction separating the USSR and other East European countries where the process of “becoming like us” has different properties, different time-frames (i.e. some candidates are more advanced than others) and different chances for eventual success of the transition. The same imagery was reproduced by the discourse of “[Soviet Union and the republics’] difficult transition to democracy and a market economy” that constructed the possibility of integration less likely as opposed to a more successful transition of the Central and East European nations (NATO 07 Jun.-08 Jun. 1990a; NATO 19 Dec. 1991), whereas the success of the transition and reforms was pre-requisite for the inclusion:

We agree on the crucial importance of the political and economic reforms underway in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The continued progress of these states towards becoming democratic and economically prosperous partners cooperating with us will be an important element in the future security and stability of Europe. The historic changes already underway and the prospects for further positive developments have not removed all grounds for concern about the stability and security of Europe.

(NATO 07 Jun.-08 Jun. 1990a)

As it will be demonstrated further, the genealogy of the NATO discourse demonstrates an inconsistent application of the narrative about Russia’s relation to Europe by either placing it among other CEE nations or distinguishing it from them as a separate case during the first period
of the sampling, and its instrumental application at later stages, linking Russia’s response to the NATO expansion and its policies in the FSU as indicative of its status as a democracy and a European state (Williams 2007: 73, 80, 86). The statuses of a European/ Western state and a democracy pre-constructed as synonymous in the social hegemonic understanding are directly related to the primary binary opposition of “democracy/non-democracy.” Therefore the invocation of this opposition for constructing the Other, though suggesting the possibility of the positive change dynamics in the Other, constitutes recourse to the “extant cultural material” of knowing Russia as historically authoritarian and anti-democratic, and therefore unEuropean, thereby embedding the essentialist view of the Other into the construction of exclusion.

The idea of preserving life itself and the common good, as well as widely-accepted high normative raisons-d’être of safeguarding individual and collective freedoms, ensuring economic prosperity under the aegis of the international law, falls into the concept of Foucauldian governmentality and “pastoral” power characterized by deep knowledge of the “inside of people’s minds, [their] souls, [and their] innermost secrets” both individually and as a community (Foucault 1977: 783). Engaging, cultivating and “recombining” social “extant cultural material” (Milliken 1999: 239), which facilitates the transcendence of a promoted “regime of truth” into the category of intersubjective “common sense” understanding to become “hegemonic knowledge” can be regarded as the exercise of Foucauldian bio-political technique of producing subjects. The explicit binary opposition of “democracy/ non-democracy” denotes a normative position that the Other has the ability and duty to evolve into a like-minded liberal community, and Russia’s failure to act in such a manner justifies its exclusion from the Western security community until Russia changes the course of action. At the same time, this binary opposition employs extant social knowledge, which inevitably embeds pre-existing historically developed stereotypical understandings of Russia as traditionally “authoritarian” and mostly “unEuropean,” and
therefore, implicitly reproduces the essentialist view of Russia as inherently alien Other among the target audiences. The construction of the Other as opposing, failing to accept, or only partially having accepted, these normative goals renders the option of inclusion impossible even without explicit designation of the Other as “authoritarian,” “un European,” etc.

A similar logic of implicit portraying Russia as a threat is present in the discursive securitizations unambiguously pointing to the Other where the extant social knowledge of its military conventional and WMD capability and historical record of suppressing progressive social movements, dating back to the its support of ancien régime and counter-developmental status quo in Europe, allows the target audiences unambiguously guess the “true source” of the threat even when the discourse does not mention it explicitly. For example, the later discourse on the WMD threats and the need for missile defence to counter those is likely to invoke the imagery of hostile Russia rather than Iran because of the pre-existing widely-dispersed social knowledge of Russia’s WMD capability and overlap with the pre-existing or current national discourses (e.g. Polish and the US national discourses following General Nogovitsyn’s and D. Rogozin’s statements (see Aljazeera News Agency 2008)). Though national positions within NATO on the Russian military threat obviously vary before they are blended into a collective position, the genealogy of the securitizations and security discourses on WMD in particular engages and reproduces a socially-known imagery of the Cold war nuclear standoff where Russia (USSR) was the Other, which later was reproduced by the NMD Third Site debates.

The official NATO communiqués of 1988-1991 invoked a range of security concerns varying from conventional and the WMD capabilities to the pace of military production and R&D: the Soviet military presence in former Warsaw Pact countries “at a level far in excess of its needs for self defence,” the misbalance in conventional forces created by the Warsaw Pact’s superiority and its forward-deployed capability for a surprise-attack and the need for the CFE
Treaty (NATO 02 Mar. - 03 Mar. 1988; also NATO 07 Jun.-08 Jun. 1990a; NATO 05 Jul. – 06 Jul. 1990; NATO 06 Dec.-07 Dec. 1990; NATO 08 Nov. 1991), the Soviet Union’s “numerical superiority in short-range nuclear missile forces” and its WMD capability (NATO 09 May-10 May 1989; also NATO 17 Oct.-18 Oct. 1991; NATO 07 Nov.-08 Nov. 1991), “[Soviet Union’s maintaining] the pace of its military production” (NATO 08 Jun. – 09 Jun. 1989), “the continuing momentum of Soviet nuclear force modernization,” and “the expansion of the Soviet Union’s substantial capabilities to provide space-based support to its terrestrial military forces, […] as well as its ability, unmatched by the West, to conduct anti-satellite operations” (NATO 24 Oct.-25 Oct. 1989), and later the safety and reliability of Soviet storage of the WMD (NATO 17 Oct.-18 Oct. 1991; NATO 19 Dec. 1991). These constructions employ the articulation method that engages social “common sense” understanding that despite the dynamics of positive change the threat that had been present for decades and centuries would not disappear in the foreseeable future. Thus the imagery of the hostile Other is sustained by combining the dynamic “othering” with the embedded essentialist view that helps the narrative to attain “hegemony.” Such combined narrative also buttresses the stereotypical and persisting representation of the Other despite the “juxtaposed truth” about the change: instead of dismantling that hegemonic social understanding of the Other, it implies that whatever the changes are they are unlikely to alter the essence and scope of the threats as the previous decades and centuries have demonstrated. The discursive repetition of the “residual” or “potential” security threats, especially if they are “unmatched by the West,” preserved ample opportunities for securitization where the progress in the relations was contingent upon further concessions:

At the same time, the period of transition which Europe has now entered entails uncertainty and potential instability. Even with the successful conclusion of the current arms control negotiations and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will retain very substantial nuclear and conventional military
capabilities. These factors must be taken into account as we address our long-term security requirements in the light of the current positive developments.

(NATO 09 May-10 May 1989),

and

But our defence requirements are determined by realities, and the realities of the Warsaw Pact's military capabilities are such that we must maintain an adequate defence and deterrent posture as a pre-requisite not only for peace and stability but also for the further progress in East-West relations that we seek.


The “[recognized] continuing capability of the forces of the Warsaw Pact for offensive military action” (NATO 24 Oct.- 25 Oct. 1989) performed the role addressed by the interpellation and articulation methods inviting the audience to exercise “prudence” and face “reality,” which appeals to the common sense knowledge that “one can never be too careful,” and “better to be safe than sorry.” The predicate “adequate” attaches the same “common sense” meaning to the Self’s action as prudent and calculated in the basis of objective realities.

The potentiality and uncertainty of “new challenges” and “unforeseeable consequences of instabilities that might emerge” represent inexhaustible opportunities for securitization aimed at justifying the persistence of the alliance, expansion of its role, and “subjugation” of alternative narratives about the need for a more inclusive all-European security system under a different institutional framework:

We shall ensure the viability and credibility of these forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements. [...] the Alliance must reinteintify its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe. In doing so, it must take up new challenges. Our task therefore is to use actively and creatively the potential of our Alliance in the pursuit of political change within stability

(NATO 14 Dec.-15 Dec. 1989),

and also

The risks that Allies now face in Europe arise principally not from the likelihood of deliberate aggression against Allied territory, but rather as unforeseeable consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of rapid and widespread political, social and economic transformation. Even in a non-adversarial relationship prudence requires NATO
to counterbalance residual Soviet military capabilities, and risks to Alliance security can also arise from instability in East and Central Europe and from elsewhere. We are determined to maintain sufficient military strength to guarantee our common security.

(NATO 06 Dec.-07 Dec. 1990)

In the abstract above, the construction explicitly mentions “transformation” of the Other and “non-adversarial relationship,” which clearly points to a positive dynamics within the Other. At the same time, in the paragraph a “truth” that aggression is no longer probable, is juxtaposed to “another truth” of unforeseeable threats probability. The invocation of the “common sense” knowledge of “necessary prudence” in this phrasing is represented by the textual constructs of “the viability and credibility of these forces at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements,” “an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces, at the lowest levels consistent with our security needs,” and “maintain sufficient military strength to guarantee our common security” (NATO 07 Jun.-08 Jun. 1990a; also NATO 06 Dec.-07 Dec. 1990) that imply sound, well-grounded, and calculated approach, despite that such an approach may hardly be possible for threats that are “unforeseeable.” A “truth” about the positive change of the Other is juxtaposed to securitization against it that not only engages the embedded social pre-existing understanding of the Other as a threat, but also securitizes against potential future unspecified threats it may pose. This articulation not only fails to dismantle the hegemonic social essentialist understanding of the Other, it buttresses the image of a fixed threat posed by the Other, and “subjugates” the “juxtaposed” truth about its positive dynamics.

The 1990 London Declaration phrasing that “no one [...] can be sure of the future” employed to justify the need “to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades” represents a powerful hegemonic “evangelism of fear” narrative that constructs fear without explicitly naming the source of the threat reiterating the mythology of “unforeseeable threats” (NATO 05 Jul. – 06 Jul. 1990). However, as indicated earlier, it is
possible to argue that the “extant cultural material” of knowing Other as a particular type and accompanying national discourses reproducing that imagery allow the audience to unmistakably pinpoint the implied target of “othering.” Thus the dynamic representation of the Other is combined with an embedded essentialist view of it. The persistent bio-political narrative of “unforeseeable future threats” juxtaposed to the discourse of change invites the audience to make a “common sense” biological choice in favour of prudence (=fear) with regards to the threats that the Other will continue to pose in the foreseeable future (=fixed threat) despite its internal changes underway. Essentially, such phrasing implies that the dynamics of change is secondary to the persistent essentialist status of ‘hostile’ Other (cf. Neumann 1998 and Milliken 1999: 246).

Despite the acknowledgment of the positive changes in the Soviet-West relations, the securitization based on a juxtaposed “truth” of the Soviet “residual” military capability effectively sustained the construction of exclusion by pointing to the threat that, though diminished, had not been eliminated and was persisting:

The historic changes already underway and the prospects for further positive developments have not removed all grounds for concern about the stability and security of Europe. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is continuing to modernise and which have implications for our defence.

(NATO 07 Jun.-08 Jun. 1990a)

The Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept was more explicit than the 1990 London declaration in specifying the source of potential threats and pointed to “the ‘danger’ of a possible reconstitution of Soviet/Russian military force over the next couple of years” (Croft 2002: 105) that is juxtaposed to “another truth” of new geopolitical situation and renders it ambivalent:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however,
lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved. [...] Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.

(NATO 07 Nov. – 08 Nov. 1991)

The invocation of the “strategic balance” language, also employed in the 1991 Rome Declaration, indicates that the Cold War “balance of power” paradigm continued to be sustained in the hegemonic discourse and was conferred the status of a “common sense” truth through the recourse to “prudence [requiring the alliance] to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks” (NATO 08 Nov. 1991). The text conveys a dynamic view of the Other, but does not depart from the implicit meaning that the change of the Other has not affected its status of a threat posed by its present military capability. It securitizes against potential chaos in the USSR, as opposed to implicit meaning of order and peace attached to the Self, as well as against the potential Soviet military build-up capability. The discourse of “potentiality of threats” coming from an explicitly-named source sustains the imagery of a fixed threat as it proposes that the Other’s status may persist in the future whose timeframe is indefinite. The juxtaposition of the two “truths” leaves it for target audiences to decide which is closer to reality and therefore engages both bio-political imperatives and the extant social historically-developed knowledge prone to essentialist “othering.”
4.2. Second “Genealogic” Sampling of 1991-2005

The second “genealogical” stage, conditionally defined between the emergence of the post-Soviet Russia in 1991 and the growing tensions starting around 2005, includes the two rounds of the NATO eastward expansion, with the Kosovo crisis bridging the two events.

The construction of the Self along widely-accepted high normative lines as the provider of security and stability, and as the key mechanism of political and economic integration, persisted in the NATO discourse throughout the defined period. For example, the 1995 Study on NATO enlargement reiterated the clichés, including “legitimizing” recourse to the international law:

The aim of an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security, without recreating dividing lines. NATO views security as a broad concept embracing political and economic, as well as defence, components. […] NATO enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter […] Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines.

(NATO 03 Sep. 1995)

The “shared democratic values” continued to be narrated as the principal feature that safeguards against conflicts among the members of the “security community.” Predicate “shared” underscores the metaphoric meaning of “the entire civilized world.” This metaphoric allusion persists in the NATO discourse in various wording, and is denoted by the use of pronouns “we” and “our:”

Bound by our common vision embodied in the Washington Treaty, we commit ourselves to transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners. We are steadfast in our commitment to the transatlantic link; to NATO’s fundamental security tasks including collective defence.

(NATO 21 Nov. 2002)

The culture of democratic values as an attribute of the Self is linked to peaceful international behaviour and economic prosperity. The privileged notion of “democracy” equalling peace and prosperity as the attribute of the Self was repeated in most major documents:

Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area […] a just and lasting order of peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy.
The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance.

(NATO 08 July 1997)

The NATO documents make reference to the international law provisions (e.g. OSCE principles in the abstract above) to construct the Self as the legitimate actor, which implies a challenge to the legitimacy of the alliance’s adversaries. The 1999 Statement on Kosovo puts the concept explicitly stating that the Other is illegitimate in terms in of international law, threatens democracy, prosperity and peace, will so remain until the Other, a de-humanized and de-personified “war machine,” assumes the attributes inherent to the Self:

Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. [...] As long as Belgrade fails to meet the legitimate demands of the international community and continues to inflict immense human suffering, Alliance air operations against the Yugoslav war machine will continue. [...] The objective of a free, prosperous, open and economically integrated Southeast Europe cannot be fully assured until the FRY embarks upon the transition to democracy. Accordingly, we express our support for the objective of a democratic FRY [...] It is our aim to make stability in Southeast Europe a priority of our transatlantic agenda.

(NATO 23 Apr. 1999a)

The illegitimacy and “othering” is propagated not only to the explicitly named Other (in this text Belgrade) but to any party allied to it. The extant social knowledge of historically close ties between Russia and Serbia as well as wide public awareness of Moscow’s declared support of Serbia and vociferous protests against the NATO operation sustained the imagery of Russia’s unchanged and wrongful approach to international relations building these on primordial essentialist assumptions and fixed geopolitical interests, as opposed to the normative objective of promoting democracy and freedom, and therefore peace and stability, in Europe. That imagery was sustained by the extant historical knowledge and discourse at the national level: a number of Western observers linked Russia’s efforts to “preserv[ing] its great-power status [...] trough
‘residual imperialism’” or to “its obsession with a ‘mystic pan-Slavic mission’” (Stepanova 1999) based on racial affinity and unchanged geopolitical perceptions. The attachment of this meaning invoking extant social stereotypical and historical knowledge is instrumental in promoting the idea of unchanged non-progressive nature of Russia’s policies, which contributes to rendering its image of Europe’s hostile Other as hegemonic knowledge and to “subjugating” the “juxtaposed truth” of its internal change.

The same binary opposition of “democracy = peace” as opposed to “non-democracy = war” is present in the other major NATO documents. The persistent repetition of this opposition based on pre-existent social understandings of cultural “we-ness” also contributes to its transcendence into “hegemonic knowledge” and a “common sense truth.”

The 1999 Washington Declaration, just like the 2002 Prague Declaration, also makes reference to the international law (i.e. UN Charter) to construct the Self as law-abiding:

We […] declare for a new century our mutual commitment to defend our people, our territory and our liberty, founded on democracy, human rights and the rule of law […] We affirm our commitment to promote peace, stability and freedom […] We pay tribute to the men and women who have served our Alliance and who have advanced the cause of freedom. To honour them and to build a better future, we will contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies - a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld; where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable […] We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations […] We remain determined to stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war and conquer territory.

(NATO 23 Apr. 1999b),

and “we commit ourselves […] to our shared democratic values; and to the United Nations Charter” (NATO 21 Nov. 2002). Both texts emphasize the “we-ness” using predicate “shared” and “democracy” as the marker of the “like-minded” distinguishing them from the Outside. The 1999 declaration text is more explicit in its connotational consistence with the Foucauldian “pastoral” power mentioning the effort to defend “future,” and explicitly linking “democracy” to
"peace." It also names the attributes that the Other is characterized by, which reiterates the metaphorical dichotomy of the Good fighting the Evil: the “democratic and peaceful” Self defending future and life versus “non-democratic and aggressive” Other bringing death. The binary opposition of “democracy=life/ non-democracy=death” that the text uses to sustain the “othering” engages the audiences’ stereotypical knowledge based in historical narratives of “Russia’s traditional totalitarianism suppressing human rights.” Thus, in the binary opposition, the dynamic definition of the Other is combined with the embedded idea of inherent incompatibility of the Other with these norms. The emotional phrasing of the passage renders non-members whose “men and women” have not served the Alliance as not “[advancing] the cause of freedom,” not to mention the parties that declared their disagreement with the alliance’s actions and policies. However, as indicated earlier, the “extant cultural material” of knowing objects’ particular historically-developed attributes helps the audience unmistakably differentiate, along essentialist terms, between Russia as a non-member and, for example, Switzerland as another non-member.

Under such widely-accepted normative objectives that form a “common sense” truth, counter-narratives about the alliance’s goals are relegated to the “subjugated knowledge” status. Drawing on audience’s extant “common sense” knowledge considerably increases the chances of a narrative to become “hegemonic;” otherwise, it may become “subjugated” in relation to a competing narrative: equalling the alliance’s polices aligned with absolute normative imperatives of protecting freedom and life is very likely to become hegemonic knowledge if the extant social cultural conceptualization of the Other perceives it as a threat due to its record of authoritarianism and adversarial relations. The same technique was applied to external objections to the NATO expansion as soon as that agenda was declared in the 1994 Brussels Declaration in which the alliance “‘expect[ed] and […] welcome[d] NATO expansion” (NATO 11 Jan. 1994). In the
subsequent NATO discourse, the expansion was constructed as a project having a widely-accepted normative value of building a Europe “without dividing lines” (NATO 11 Jan. 1994; NATO 03 Sep. 1995), “undivided Europe” (NATO 08 July 1997; NATO 21 Nov. 2002) or in an older and more often used wording of “a Europe whole and free” (NATO 05 Jul. – 06 Jul. 1990; NATO 06 Jun.–07 Jun. 1991; NATO 11 Jan. 1994; NATO 23 Apr. 1999a; NATO 21 Nov. 2002; NATO 03 Apr. 2008). For example, the 2002 Prague Declaration, announcing the next stage of the alliance’s eastward expansion, contained the dictum that had been and would be reproduced: “The accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help achieve our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common values” (NATO 21 Nov. 2002). The articulation of “a Europe whole and free,” in fact, represents more than a highly normative value of the integrating new democracies and expanding the area of the Kantian peace. It also invokes a historical allusion to Europe’s divided past troubled by rivalries and bloodshed. Drawing on pre-existing social knowledge or the “extant cultural material,” the discourse engages the audiences’ “common sense,” which facilitates its acceptance as the hegemonic knowledge and “subjugation” of objectors’ reasoning.

A noticeable change in the discursive portrayal of the Self at this “genealogical” stage is a greater emphasis on “Europeanness” as the attribute of the membership, which “increase[ed] delineation of security within civilizational terms tied to NATO” (Williams 2007: 82-83):

We have agreed [...] to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries. [...] We reaffirm that the Alliance [...] remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

(NATO 11 Jan. 1994)
As indicated earlier, by attributing certain features to the Self, the Other is implicitly or explicitly stripped of those. Hence, Russia’s objections to the NATO expansion were not only securitized against as representing the threat of neo-imperialistic resurgence but also “were constructed [by the West] as symbolic to of Russia’s identity” and as “a challenge to its “Europeanness” (Williams 2007: 79, 86). Thus, as the subsequent NATO discourse related to the alliance’s expansion demonstrates, the Other was increasingly excluded as “‘unEuropean’, that is uncivilized, or proto-imperialist” (Williams 2007: 80, 86, 90-91).

The singling out of predicate “European” attached to “democracies” or mentioning the EU candidacy or membership as related to the inclusion were reiterated in the subsequent NATO discourse accompanying the issue of the alliance’s eastward expansion:

NATO’s policy is to build effective cooperation through its outreach activities, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with free nations which share the values of the Alliance, including members of the European Union as well as candidates for EU membership […] the Alliance will involve invited countries, […] The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. […] No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

(NATO 08 July 1997),

and also

Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.

(NATO23 April 1999b; also NATO 21 Nov. 2002 and NATO 03 Apr. 2008)

The discursive construction of Russia in these NATO documents departs from the formula of “Soviet Union (Russia) and other East European nations” and separates Russia and Ukraine as cases of their own from the Central and East European countries and other FSU nations by outlining policies towards them in different paragraphs:
We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. [...] The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic [...] We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries [Russia and Ukraine] and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

(NATO 11 Jan. 1994)

The same signifying of Russia as a separate case from other European nations was reiterated in the 1997 Madrid declaration and 1999 Washington declaration. For example, the latter stated:

Working together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.

(NATO 23 April 1999b)

In this text, endorsing highly normative value of “working together,” the division between “Allies and Partners,” and “Russia and Ukraine” constituting separate cases, is made explicit. Using the method of articulation, it is possible to suggest that the exclusion of the two was reproduced through the pre-existing historical stereotypical knowledge of Russia as an “ambivalently” European state with a centuries’ old culture of authoritarianism (cf. Neumann 1996 and Milliken 1999: 243). In other words, this narrative does not deconstruct the historically-derived image of Russia as Europe’s Other, but reproduces it as part of the hegemonic knowledge by signifying that Russia (and Ukraine) are separate cases. Thus the deconstruction of the above passages yields an essentialist binary opposition of “European/ non-European” that also combines the idea of internal dynamics of change within the Other with an embedded meaning of its inherent non-Europeanness present in the social hegemonic knowledge.

In an apparent effort to mitigate and dismiss Russia’s stated concerns of the enlargement, the 1995 Study on NATO enlargement re-invokes the earlier formula of Russia as “as a major European, international and nuclear power.” It does so in the context of alluding to Russia’s
regressive policies of dividing Europe by insisting on a Cold War rudimentary notion of "spheres of influence" (NATO 03 Sep. 1995). The text juxtaposes the status of Russia as “a major European power,” to the status of one of “the newly independent states,” which divorces it from other Central and East European members of the “security community” and places it into the category of states, future relations with whom are not positively defined and are contingent upon their behaviour. It is possible to suggest that “the Alliance” as a metaphoric representation of the “civilized and progressive world” and “Russia” whose status and future relations with are undetermined reproduces the construction of exclusion that admits internal dynamics of change, but suggests that it has not impacted on Russia’s status, and the likelihood for that status to change in the future is unclear:

[...] cooperation between the Alliance and Russia which we believe will enhance stability and security in Europe, as part of our broad approach to developing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Equally, we want to develop further our relations with all newly independent states, whose independence and democracy constitute an important factor of security and stability for Europe. [...]The text NATO and Russia have agreed to pursue a broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power. [...] NATO and Russia have initiated a dialogue, to be pursued in our newly established relationship beyond the PfP, on the future direction our relationship should take.

(NATO 03 Sep. 1995)

The text makes recourse to the Cold War history when Europe was divided into “opposing camps” as the reason of “lingering distrust.” This effectively enrols “extant cultural material” of knowing Russia as historically anti-democratic adversary wielding huge military capabilities, and largely remaining that type, which sustains the construction Russia as Europe’s traditional hostile Other as a strong foundation for the hegemonic knowledge. The attribute of “surprise” attached to the potential actions of the Other and indication of “strict compliance with international commitments and obligations” suggests that idea of the earlier experience of the opponent’s adverse behaviour, and therefore the probability that the other party may violate norms of the
international laws and bilateral commitments. This potentiality engages the common sense need for prudence that also fixes the imagery of the Other:

NATO-Russia relations should reflect Russia's significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, no "surprise" decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other. This relationship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict compliance with international commitments and obligations, such as those under the UN Charter, the OSCE, including the Code of Conduct and the CFE Treaty, and full respect for the sovereignty of other independent states. NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state, nor can the Alliance be subordinated to another European security institution.

(NATO 03 Sep. 1995)

The discourse accompanying the Kosovo crisis reiterated the implicit idea of Russia as an unreliable partner not performing its role and not honouring its commitments (i.e. "responsibility" as opposed to "right") under the international law. The narrative buttressed the "othering" and "subjugated" the accusations of NATO of violating the international law and the UN Charter by infringing the state sovereignty without prior UN SC approval:

Russia has a particular responsibility in the United Nations and an important role to play in the search for a solution to the conflict in Kosovo. Such a solution must be based on the conditions of the international community as laid out above [...] We want to work constructively with Russia, in the spirit of the Founding Act.

(NATO 23 April 1999a)

The securitization discourse continued to play a role in rendering exclusion the most viable and "common sense" approach of exercising prudence. The 1994 Brussels declaration juxtaposes the "truth" of the "new climate of cooperation" in Europe to "another truth" of newly emerged "causes of instability, tension and conflict" to demonstrate that the first "truth" fails to grasp the whole picture and does not acknowledge the true reality. The juxtaposition is aimed at creating the desired "regime of truth" to justify the alliance’s agenda:

We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War. However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance.
A similar idea was expressed at another “watershed” meeting that has had fundamental consequences for the West-Russia relations (RF MFA 2003b), the 2002 Prague Summit. Its declaration employed a bio-power technique of promoting the fear of “grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century:”

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century. [...] Examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence.

The predicates “grave” and “profound” used in connection with reference to the new millennium promote the imagery of new elevated threats that had not been experienced before. The predicate “appropriate” suggests prudent and calculated response to the “grave new threats,” which makes interpellation to the audience’s “common sense” understandings of necessary precautions.

The security discourse in these two documents puts emphasis on the WMD threats and the need for “a new NATO Missile Defence,” which with the exception of the proliferation threat, implicitly but unambiguously point to Russia as the object of the discourse. The pre-existing social knowledge holds that Russia has had the chemical and biological military capabilities as part of its Cold War WMD stockpile; besides, a “verification regime” is only possible with a state that already legitimately possesses the capability, as opposed to illicit acquisition of such weapons by a terrorist group or a “rogue” state-actor:

We attach crucial importance to [...] the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime; the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention; the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Today we initiated a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats, which we will continue to assess.

(NATO 21 Nov. 2002)

A successful promotion of “evangelism of fear” could have only been possible through articulation that would be grounded on extant social knowledge derived from the historical experience and that would implicitly, but unambiguously, point to the hostile Other that objectively was in possession of the capabilities that could potentially cause irreversible damage to the alliance, that is geographically close, has historical record of tensions affecting Europe, and that could be invoked into a certain international behaviour that would justify the securitization regardless of the true nature and causes of such behaviour.

4.3. Third “Genealogic” Sampling of 2005-2008

The third stage for the “genealogic” sampling of the official texts starts in about 2005 and includes the discourse accompanying the intertwined issues of the Third Site of the US NMD, NATO plans to include Ukraine and Georgia, and the August 2008 War in Ossetia. The reproduction of Russia as West’s hostile Other peaked during that period.

The hegemonic narration of the Self persisted along the same normative and “bio-power” lines of providing security, stability, democracy and freedom, a set of widely-accepted values. Abundant predicates like “common,” “collective,” “shared,” metaphorically signifying the “entire civilized world” represented by the alliance acting to build clichéd “Europe whole and free,” remained practically unchanged from the earlier period under analysis:

We reaffirmed our solidarity and cohesion and our commitment to the common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty. The principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental. A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of our Alliance and remains our most
important security task. We reiterate our faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. [...] The accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace [...] NATO's ongoing enlargement process has been an historic success in advancing stability and cooperation and bringing us closer to our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values. NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. (NATO 3 Apr. 2008)

Repetitive reference to the international legal instruments of the UN Charter, UN SC resolutions, and "fundamental OSCE principles" remained a pronounced feature of the NATO discourse throughout the period engaged to "subjugate" narratives of the West's violations of the international law (i.e. military action against FRY without UN SC approval, recognition of Kosovo independence counter to UN Resolution 1244 etc.) and to promote the legitimacy and justice of the alliance's policies and actions. The invocation of the "international law" narrative is especially evident in the discourse accompanying the August 2008 crisis in South Ossetia: "A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions" (NATO 19 Aug. 2008; also NATO 27 Aug. 2008; NATO 15 Sept. 2008; NATO 03 Dec. 2008). The genealogic persistence of this discourse despite the heterogeneity of the contexts it was employed contributes to its hegemony.

The construction of Russia as the hostile Other became explicit during this time frame, when securitization against its policies became evident in practically all major NATO texts. The deployed securitization discourse overshadowed the implicit construction of the Other along the binary opposition as "non-democratic" and therefore "counter-civilizational, unEuropean, aggressive" attained through hegemonic narration of the Self. The dominant construction of the Other rendering its exclusion as the only viable option explicitly pointed to Russia as a security threat drawing on its "illegitimate" and "irrational" objections and counter-actions to "legitimate"
and “rational” NATO actions and policies. These binary oppositions, however, can be further deconstructed as implicitly pointing to the principal pair of “democracy/ non-democracy:” democratic rule suggests rationality of decision-making based on discussions and disputes among legitimately-selected stakeholders employing legally-established procedures thereto; in contrast to it, non-democratic governance suggests a patrimonial decision-making process that is de-legitimized, since such form of governance lacks legitimate procedures, and is by far likelier to produce irrational decisions out of ruler’s personal whims as long as all stakeholders are excluded from participating, and therefore these decisions cannot grasp the true reality.

The securitization discourse employed the same set of bio-political mythologies capable of invoking fear among the audience. The security issues were constructed as arising from the continued issues with the CFE treaty and its unilateral suspension by Russia in April 2007 (NATO 08 Dec. 2005; NATO 03 Apr. 2008), as well as Russia’s objections to the Missile Defence deployment in Europe (NATO 03 Sep. 2007; NATO 03 Apr. 2008). In both cases, the narrative drew on extant social understandings developed through the previous historical experience, which would facilitate its becoming hegemonic “common sense” knowledge.

The validity of “grave” WMD challenges was supported by the imagery of “a new century brining new threats,” which is metaphorically comparable to expectations of the Armageddon at the turn of every millennium. The “evangelism of fear” as a bio-power tool uses psychological propensity to never discard the possibility of cataclysmic changes, and can resonate with audience’s common sense understandings. The securitization against “the full range of missile threats” and, in particular, against “short and medium range ballistic missiles” point primarily to Russia as the object securitized against, as it is the only party possessing the capabilities:

[...] Because in the 21st century, the importance of missile defence, and its relevance to the NATO Alliance, is bound to grow. [...] At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 we launched the Missile Defence Feasibility Study, in order to examine defence options
against the full range of missile threats. And we have launched a programme for the development, by 2010, of a capability to protect our deployed troops against short and medium range ballistic missiles. In other words, NATO has been moving and is moving in the right direction.

(NATO 03 Sept. 2007)

The texts singles out Russia as a separate case, using the binary opposition “our own member states/ Russia” that engages extant social historically-developed understanding of Russia as the Outside of the community, and points to the concerns about the missile defence deployment plans labelling them as retrograde baggage of the Cold War:

Whether in our own member countries or in Russia: too many people are still quick to dismiss missile defence as technically infeasible, militarily destabilising, and economically wasteful. Indeed, I can hardly think of any other issue in modern strategic thinking where Cold War dogmas are as persistent as in the area of missile defence. [...] I will say a bit more about Russia in a moment. But it is not just with a view towards Russia when I say that we have to move the debate to a more rational level. We simply cannot afford to approach our defence requirements of today and tomorrow with the mindset and terminology of yesterday. After all, missile defence goes to the heart of NATO’s collective defence obligation. It goes to the heart of Atlantic solidarity.

(NATO 03 Sept. 2007)

The image of irrational, retrograde and dogmatic thinking, which, according to Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, fails to grasp reality accurately, constitutes a “regime of truth” that is juxtaposed to “another truth” of explicitly expressed concerns both in Russia and in the member-states. The statement attaches a meaning of moral responsibility to developing the missile defence as it “goes to the heart of [...] collective defence obligation” (NATO 03 Sept. 2007). Dismissing obligations in favour of irrational dogmas is not simply labelled as erroneous but as ridiculous and immoral. The passage, starting with the opposition “our own member states/ Russia” and separating the arguments about the irrationality of their concerns (e.g. “I will say a bit more about Russia in a moment”), attaches the meaning to member-states’ objections as “behaving like Russia”, and therefore not like the Self.
The speaker proceeded to confirm that the debate over the US Third Site of the NMD had become part of the NATO-Russia relations. The wording, however, states that the NMD is a US project and downgrades NATO’s role in the issue:

Russia’s harsh criticism of the US plans has given the debate a NATO-Russia angle that I consider unproductive and unhelpful. We have been subjected to some very loud Russian rhetoric – including warnings to our Czech and Polish Allies that should have no place in today’s Europe. All this is distracting us from the key question – how to safeguard our security in an age of missile proliferation. And this is a question that poses itself for Russia just as urgently as it does for us. […] We are always ready to listen to the concerns that Russia may have over the proposed US Third Site in Europe. The United States has sought to address these concerns through a number of detailed senior-level briefings to the Russian government. And it has also made some specific proposals for cooperation with Russia. And NATO is also doing its share to ensure transparency, by hosting several discussions with detailed briefings in the NATO-Russia Council.

(NATO 03 Sept. 2007)

Predicates “harsh”, “unproductive,” “unhelpful” attach negative connotation to Russia’s actions as it is explicitly named in the beginning of the paragraph. These predicates signify that Russia does not share common values of being cooperative, peaceful (soft) and productive (progressive). The phrasing involves a powerful image of “allies” being threatened by a hostile party, which requires solidary action to defend them and all, pursuant to the declared core moral objective of the alliance. The speaker also questions Russia’s eligibility for the status of a European state pointing that its behaviour is unEuropean. The articulation of drawing the dividing line along the binary opposition of “European= friendly/ unEuropean=hostile” reproduces the historically developed and pre-existing image of Russia as Europe’s Other, thereby making an implicit historical allusion to Russia (or the Soviet Union) threatening the “free and democratic world.” This wording implies an essentialist view of the Other as it deploys a primordial opposition of “European/ unEuropean” and makes recourse to the “extant cultural material” of knowing Russia as ambivalently European. The invocation of the “cultural material” also means recourse to grassroots hegemonic knowledge that is more prone to primordial definition of Inside/Outside
than diplomatic texts would express. As indicated before, the invocation of historical resentments and pre-existing stereotypical social knowledge serves the function of interpellation that effectively facilitates the narrative to be accepted as a “common sense truth,” thus becoming “hegemonic knowledge” and establishing a desired “regime of truth.” The positive connotation of the US “specific proposals for cooperation,” as the primary party involved, and of “the share” of NATO efforts, portrayed only as auxiliary to the role of the US, form the privileged notion of “productive/helpful” as opposed to Russia’s behaviour of “unproductive/unhelpful.” “The age of missile proliferation” is a trope constituting a quintessential representation of “evangelism of fear.” The NATO discourse around the WMD threats reproduces the construction of Russia as a primary threat, despite stating that Russia is subject to the same threats as NATO and therefore its objections to the missile defence initiatives are irrational and run counter to “common sense” self-interest. Recourse to the WMD threats engages extant social knowledge that Russia is likely to be a factor due to its vast Cold War stockpile that may not be stored safely (e.g. discourse in the NATO documents around 1991 expressing concerns about the possibility of WMD proliferation due to unsafe storage). The following passage dismisses the legitimacy of Russia’s objections as dictated by domestic political developments, and points to the irrationality of Russia’s non-cooperative behaviour despite its implicit acknowledgement of “the existence of a potential missile threat,” which makes it “common sense” and justified to ignore the expressed concerns:

As of today, Russian rhetoric has not abated – we are, after all, in an election period. However, we are also receiving other, more pragmatic signals, such as President Putin’s offer to jointly operate a radar in Azerbaijan. [...] I believe it indicates three things: first, that Russia acknowledges the existence of a potential missile threat at its periphery; second, Russia is also looking at cooperative solutions; and third, that a pragmatic compromise on missile defence, based on common perceptions and common interests, can eventually be found.

(NATO 03 Sept 2007)
The narrative of the “new century bringing new threats” was reiterated at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to de-legitimize objections to NATO’s unilateral decision on further expansion. The concerns about NATO actions were constructed as posing a threat to stability and NATO’s capability to respond the existent and potential threats: “We met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen our ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats. […] We reiterate that decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself to make” (NATO 03 April 2008).

In that document, the discursive reproduction of “othering” was centered on Russia’s CFE treaty suspension and Russia’s persisting objections to the missile defense deployment in Europe. The declaration “urge[d] Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended” (NATO 03 April 2008), a phrase that can be deconstructed in binary terms as “correct actions of active cooperation/ wrong action of being uncooperative” or in predicate terms as “active/passive,” which attributes the Other features opposite to privileged qualities intrinsic to the Self. The passage on the US proposals related to the NATO Missile Defense can be deconstructed in a similar way:

NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability. […] We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

(NATO 03 April 2008)

The rhetoric of “deepening levels of cooperation” and mutuality of the threats is used to “subjugate” the counter-narratives as irrational and failing to meet the “common sense” norms of behaviour.

The issues around the CFE Treaty, referred to in the declaration as one of the “key security issues of mutual concern” (NATO 03 April 2008), were also used to create a textual
opposition of “NATO Allies collectively honouring the Treaty/ Russia unilaterally not honouring the Treaty:”

We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation has continued its unilateral “suspension” of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. This action does not contribute to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we urge the Russian Federation to resume its implementation. The current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We have offered a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues [...] We encourage Russian authorities to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

(NATO 03 April 2008)

The collective pronouns “we,” “us,” and “NATO CFE Allies” reproduces metaphorical allusion to the “entire civilized world” opposing an isolated adversary. The phrasing about the situation that “cannot last indefinitely” suggests metaphorical reference to a “mentor” exercising patience in regards to a “disruptive disciple,” which is very much in line with the idea of NATO assuming the role of “teacher” (Gheciu 2005; Williams 2007: 77, 80). The adversary’s position is delegitimized by predicates “unilateral” referring to Russia’s actions rendered “not in concert with the position of the progressive and civilized” on the one hand, and “constructive” and “forward-looking” as referred to the NATO Allies’ initiatives on the other. The encouragement “to work cooperatively” as deconstructed into an opposition of “desired future behaviour/ non-desired present behaviour” suggests that Russian authorities were not cooperative at the time of the discourse. These predicates render the opponent as prone to “surprise” actions without consulting other stakeholders and not willing to engage with other parties in good faith, which contrasts the modus operandi declaratively attributed to the Self. The word “suspension” placed inside inverted commas metaphorically means that actions or words of the opponent cannot be trusted as they do not mean the same as otherwise would if pronounced by a legitimate party. Such
articulation interpellates the audience into engaging common sense understanding that the one who cannot be trusted cannot be the Self, thereby reproducing “othering.” The same discursive (textual) technique was applied in statements referring to Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence, in which “independence” in inverted commas was not only meant to deny the legitimacy of the status per se, but also deny the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the speaker announcing it: “NATO Ministers reaffirmed their strict policy of non-recognition of the “independence” of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, and called once again on Russia to reverse its decision in this regard” (NATO 03 Dec. 2008).

The August 2008 war in South Ossetia took the discursive reproduction of Russia as West’s hostile Other to another level. The NATO’s pre-emptive condemnation of Russia’s actions and unequivocal support of Georgia whose status of relations with NATO was reaffirmed (cf. NATO 19 Aug. 2008; NATO 27 Aug. 2008; NATO 15 Sep. 2008; NATO 03 Dec. 2008) before the details of the Georgian attack were positively established by the fact-finding commission, engaged the audiences’ extant knowledge of the Cold War history to construct the conflict underway as identical to the Soviet suppression of social protest movements in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. This use of the “extant cultural material” of knowing Russia as historically non- or anti-democratic, which imagery was reproduced in the recent national discourses, facilitated fixing the imagery of “resurgent and aggressive” Other that had attacked “a valued and long-standing Partner of NATO” (NATO 19 Aug. 2008). The unanimous and unequivocal support of Georgia in the conflict engaged the social understating of “a peaceful democratic Ally” attacked by a “hostile authoritarian” Other with historically-proven record of and propensity to authoritarianism and aggressive international behaviour (cf. Neumann 1998; Milliken 1999: 243). Thus the discourse accompanying the August 2008 conflict reproduced “othering” of Russia along the opposition of “democracy/ non-democracy” in which the
essentialist view of the Other as culturally alien and inherently hostile is embedded. The promotion of the “evangelism of fear” achieved through the construction of the Other reinvigorated the discussions about the deployment the elements of the Third Site of the US NMD in Poland and Czech Republic days after the war.

The discourse makes special emphasis on Russia’s breaching the commitments under the international law and the “fundamental principles” of coexistence with other nations, as opposed to the Self’s honouring those as an attribute of any democratic state where the rule of law is a declared norm:

A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions. [...] Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration (NATO 19 Aug. 2008),

The NATO-Ukraine Commission condemned the decision by the Russian Federation to extend recognition to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia. Russia’s decision violates the many UN Security Council resolutions it has endorsed regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity, and is inconsistent with the fundamental OSCE principles (NATO 27 Aug. 2008), and also “Reaffirming NATO Allies’ support for Georgia’s full independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions” (NATO 03 Dec. 2008). Such articulation of making references to international legal instruments engages the audiences’ extant hegemonic knowledge that attributes the absence of the rule of law to authoritarian states in their domestic (e.g. violations of personal freedoms) and international behaviour (e.g. violation of other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity). This technique of creating a particular “regime of truth” and hegemonic knowledge about the reality works in a way similar to interpellation by making target audiences “accept the representations [of reality] as natural and accurate” (Milliken 1999: 239). Such discursive technique reproduces the principal
binary opposition of privileged “democracy/ rule of law/ peace/ Self” versus “authoritarianism/ violation of law/ war/ Other,” which fixes Russia’s “othering” and renders its inclusion unacceptable.

4.4. Summary

The NATO discourse representing the Self and the Other demonstrates a clear “genealogic” continuity of a set of narratives employed in heterogeneous contexts. The deconstruction of the NATO discourse points to a continuously reproduced binary opposition that hinges on the criterion “democracy/non-democracy” to distinguish the Inside and the Outside of the Western security community, which became especially evident after NATO had to be “re-narrated” as a political organization in the context of disappearing military threats in Europe (Williams 2007: 70-91).²³ The presence of the binary oppositions designating the Self and the Other as particular types indicates that the NATO discourse has been that of “othering” rendering Russia’s inclusion in the Western security community impossible.

The explicitly articulated “democracy/non-democracy” marker has several important properties. First of all, its direct meaning suggests the dynamic non-essentialist view of the Other who is not only capable but also responsible for changing the Self in order to gain membership in the community. These non-essentialist meanings devolve the responsibility to become a “like-

²³ The tremendous geopolitical shifts of the late 80s early 90s and the disappearance of the military threats in Europe posed a significant challenge to the collective Transatlantic identity and the fate of the alliance (Clarke 1993, Kaiser 1996, McCalla 1996, Brown 1999, Hunter 1999, Black 1999, Croft et al. 2000 and Croft 2002). For it to survive, its role and objectives had to be “re-narrated” from a predominantly military alliance to “an organization whose essential identity and history is correctly understood as of cultural, or even civilizational, commonality centered around the shared democratic foundations of its members […] as the result of a deep, enduring and profound cultural commonality” (Williams 2007: 70-76). Williams (2007) suggests that, “The loss of the Soviet threat caused discursive uncertainty over its future, but the worry that future would be marked by return to Europe’s past conflicts; hence Waever’s statement that Europe’s others are not Russians or Islamic fundamentalism, but rather it’s own past” (70). Such discursive “re-articulation of the identity and history of the alliance” that began about 1990 through downgrading the role of Russia in formation of the new geopolitical reality in Europe (Williams 2007: 72) was also instrumental in sustain its exclusion.
minded” state entirely to Russia, at the same time retaining the right of recognition of its status entirely for the Self. They serve to indicate that Russia has chosen and continues to pursue a wrong course, and therefore is excluded.

This type of “othering” represents a highly normative idea of the positive change of the Other. At the same time, it invokes the arbitrary notion of “democracy” to define the Self and the Other in relation to it. The use of such a vague criterion that provides ample opportunities for its instrumental application helps constrain the opponent’s policy options by presenting it with legitimate roles, granting or refusing to grant the status, and ultimately selecting between inclusion and exclusion at own discretion (Williams 2007: 79, 80-83, 86, 90-91).24

Secondly, this binary opposition makes recourse to the “democratic peace theory” that links the international behaviour of a state to a specific prevailing intersubjectivity type and its domestic political culture. The continuously articulated link to the culture of democratic and liberal subjectivity, “itself becoming a powerful cultural narrative” (Williams 2007: 76), represents a construction invoking the Self/Other divide implicitly based on pre-existing primordial attributes of the Other, regardless of whether these are changeable or not. The link to culture ties the Self/Other divide not to a form of governance but to primordial cultural idiosyncrasies that, even if changeable, are much more enduring and cannot be changed in foreseeable future. As a result, the binary opposition reproduces essentialist “othering” along cultural lines.

24 The following can serve as an example to demonstrate that even “clearly” outlined NATO membership criteria can be instrumentally applied at discretion, not to mention a metaphysical and undefined status of the “like-minded.” At a 2009 University of Ottawa conference, a Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister expressed aggravation that a nation can formally qualify for obtaining the MAP by meeting its requirements from year to year and yet be unable to receive it indefinitely long.
Additionally, the “democratic peace theory” makes a claim at the possibility to project future behaviour of international actors, and equals the binary opposition of “democracy/non-democracy” to “aggressive/non-aggressive” respectively. This link between the present political culture within a state and its future international behaviour provides grounds for deployment of securitizations. As a result the explicit binary opposition present in the NATO official discourse attains a bio-political meaning in consistence with the Foucauldian concept of governmentality: “democracy=freedom” come to mean “life,” and “non-democracy=enslavement” come to mean “death.”

Thirdly, the “re-narration” of NATO has strived to portray the Self as a “cultural choice” indicative of the European identity also invoking the idea or primordial essentialist “othering” through the “amalgamation” with the “extant cultural material” present among domestic audiences: the international actor designated by the non-privileged notion of “non-democracy” attains the meaning of culturally and civilizationally alien (i.e. “unEuropean”, that is uncivilized, or proto-imperialist”). It should be noted that explicit designation of Russia as “European” in discourse of the “re-narrated” NATO has varied, which may also suggest instrumental application of the discourse.

Fourthly, as mentioned above, the NATO discourse inevitably comes into contact with national narratives and “extant cultural material” that includes social historically-developed knowledge about the Self and the Other. The success of the promoted “regime of truth” strongly depends on how well the selected binary oppositions designating the Self and the Other engage the social historically-developed knowledge about them.

The explicit binary opposition of “democracy= European= peaceful / non-democracy= unEuropean= hostile” conforms to the extant centuries-long social hegemonic knowledge of Russia as an ambivalently-European state with a long history of authoritarianism, and narratives
about Russia’s persistent inaptitude to the democratic governance and the current status of its
democratic development that are present in national, often more extreme, discourses. This
imagery resonates well with the intersubjective understandings of the Self-identification in
relation to the Other present in the “extant cultural material.” These understandings suggest that
personal freedoms and individual rights that are historically in the hub of the Self’s value system
do not occupy the same place in the Other’s.

As it was suggested above, the recourse to “extant cultural material” invokes historical
knowledge about the Self and the Other, which makes a discourse of “othering” attain essentialist
primordial features through citing inherent historically-developed distinguishing criteria between
the Self and the Other (i.e. “historicized” identity). As a result, the diplomatic language
effectively combines a dynamic view of the Other as potentially “like-minded” that can and
should evolve into a “like-minded” state, which is rooted in the Kantian categories, with the
essentialist fixed view of the Other as inherently hostile and culturally alien.

Thus the binary opposition sustaining the “othering” of Russia in the NATO discourse is a
peculiar mix of diplomatically-sensitive explicit and implicit meanings. In line with the
constructivist post-modernist conceptualization, such a combination of meanings, characterized
by the “embeddedness” of the extant social historicized knowledge and clear bio-political
imperatives, plays a key role in successful acceptance of the promoted “regime of truth” by
domestic target audiences. These rationales as well as the vaguely-defined notions within the
binary oppositions whose application may be arbitrary suggest instrumental deployment of
discourses by NATO.
5. Construction of Self/Other in Russian Official Discourse

The genealogy of the Russian official discourse during the three time periods, despite the initial integrationist discourse, also sustains the impossibility of integration into the Western “security community” on the current terms of having to assume the “apprentice” role within the current institutional framework of NATO (cf. Gheciu 2005; Williams 2007: 77, 80). At the same time, the discourse has effectively divorced this issue from the questions of Russia’s European identity and possibility of integration into the Western “security community” in a different institutional or non-institutional representation. As the discursive constructions suggest, the assumption of the role of “apprentice” represents a fundamental challenge to Russia’s European identity since it infringes the sovereignty and independence of its elite’s decisions (exclusive features of “truly” European and Western states): it undermines Russia’s traditional state identity claim about its role and place in the world and European history, including that of a “co-founder” of the emerged international order, which is bound to have implications for its future.

The analyzed texts can be deconstructed into the binary opposition of “fair/ unfair” used to designate the Self and the Other respectively. Conceptually, this opposition is similar to Neumann’s dichotomy of “true Europe” and “false Europe” that is inherently hostile and culturally alien to Russia. In Neumann’s opposition, the predicate “European” is central and undisputed, which suggests that this opposition does not draw divides across the “civilizational” lines; rather it is spiritual morality of behaviour that matters. The “fair” or “unfair” dichotomy, as leading respectively to the “good” or “evil” consequences or to the “pastoral” categories of “life” and “death” for all, reproduces the connotation of spirituality present in the Neumann’s opposition. It alludes at higher moral and spiritual grounds than pragmatic and vain immediate political interests, an idea that is closely related to the historically-developed deeply-rooted social knowledge of Russia as spiritually and morally superior European culture than the rest of the
West. Engaging this “extant cultural material” to promote desired meanings into the category of hegemonic knowledge to form a desired “regime of truth” is also widely used in the Russian official discourse.

Representing NATO as the “unfair” actor, the discourse challenges the idea that there is only one possible representation of the Western security community. It serves to promote the idea that a “fair” representation of the Western security community would offer a truly equal status to all members, and would not be dominated by any one party. This construction portrays NATO as an obsolete mechanism run from the outside of Europe and therefore ‘unEuropean.’ It challenges the cohesiveness of the Transatlantic unity and sustains the idea that the more European nations are subject to the US influence, the more dependent and non-sovereign they become losing the primary distinguishing features of “truly” European states and becoming emulations of states (i.e. “false” Europe of US “client-states”).


The first “genealogic” sampling of the Russian official discourse, just like in the case of the NATO discourse analysis, covers the late-Soviet period of 1988 - 1991, which is needed to compare the discursive construction with later stages.

The dramatic domestic changes were accompanied by the break of the official discourse genealogy of constructing the Self and the Other. The long history of portraying the West as the “external enemy” through continuous securitizations gave way to opposite narratives that had become “hegemonic knowledge” among intelligentsia even before the state started to promote it. The imagery of the Self was shaped by the persisting integrationist discourse of “return to Europe” as the historically and culturally defined civilizational choice and representation of the civilized world: Boris Pankin, Foreign Minister of the USSR between August 1991 and
December 1991 in his memoirs mentions the "obsession [...] with the idea of becoming a civilized state" (as cited in Williams 2007: 82). This provides evidence that the identity issues interwoven with the new role the Soviet Union was to play in world were addressed at very early stages and positively viewed the nation as part of the West and its "security community" based on cultural and historical heritage. Predicate of "return" to a normal state suggested that the earlier course had been deviant or constituted a misdemeanour, which metaphorically alludes to a Christian concept of a "sheep astray that needs to be brought back into the fold." This represents an implicit construction of the West as a superior entity to blend with.

In his 1988 statement, President Gorbachev also confirmed the prevailing course for the integration with the West by denouncing the idea of "excluding the Soviet Union from Europe by those who equate Europe with Western Europe [since] Russia’s trade, culture, history, political links have deep roots in history and he invoked common Christian heritage" (as cited in Williams 2007: 82):

Russia’s trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity [...] The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history.

(Gorbachev 1988 as cited in Neumann 1996: 162)

The invocation of a long historical record and the various functional links with Europe, including the reference to the common Christian background interpellates the audiences’ social knowledge and juxtaposes a syntactical enumeration of basic features to counter the narratives of "Russia as unEuropean" aimed at artificially excluding Russia from its natural place and role. This can be deconstructed into a binary opposition of "fair/ unfair," with the behaviour of those who encourage exclusion being unfair in the face of factual compelling evidence. Throughout the following two decades this opposition will be reproduced in the official discourse. The identity of Russia as "fair true Europe" would become hegemonic knowledge domestically and remain in a
“subjugated” position of “constant retreat” in the West resulted from Russia’s dependence on the Western recognition and the West’s refusal to grant it (Williams 2007: 82-83).

Earlier securitization discourse had to be muted as it could not co-exist along the fundamentally changed narration of the Self and the Other. The Soviet leadership expected to regain full-fledged membership in metaphysical Europe as a “civilizational choice,” and become an equal member of the Western “security community” within a new institutional framework. Gorbachev’s spokesman announced a new doctrine of non-interference into the affairs of former Warsaw Pact nations, and the securitization discourse against and construction of NATO representing the Western security community as “hostile Other” were muted: “Russia’s foreign policy makers seem to have expected NATO somehow to atrophy, and a new ‘comprehensive security’ structure to emerge” (Williams 2007: 82).

The most evident securitization against NATO related to the question of unified Germany’s accession to the alliance, when the Soviet leadership announced of unacceptability of such a development in April 1990 and then granted its agreement in June 1990, despite the initially prevailing position of “under no circumstances to agree to unified Germany’s accession to NATO” (Politburo May 1990 recommendation to Minister Shevarnadze as cited in Narinsky, my translation). The legacy of the “balance of power” paradigm is still present, but is significantly muted by reconciliatory phrasing. Shevarnadze’s insistence that unified Germany’s admission to NATO would change the balance of power in Europe and create geo-strategic perils contrasted with Gorbachev’s position of dependence on the West: “It should be understood that its is not easy for us to maintain the new course internationally and domestically. […] Without the West’s support there may be certain breakdown” (Gorbachev 1990 as cited in Narinsky, my translation). In February 1990, Minister Shevarnadze departed from the concept of creating a new inclusive all-European security structure stating that, “We have discussed the idea of
transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, so that these organizations could become guarantors of stability in view of the changes that have taken place in Europe” (Shevarnadze Feb. 1990, as cited in Narinsky, my translation). The phrasing represents the opposition of two notions having an equal status of stability guarantors and facing an equal need to change to meet the new conditions. The position was re-stated by President Gorbachev:

[...] The reunification of Germany must be implemented taking into account unacceptability of creating military-strategic misbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as inadmissibility of altering territorial borders; the Soviet Union is not to incur political, economic, or moral damages as a result of the reunification.

(Gorbachev Feb. 1990 as cited in Narinsky, my translation)

In the passage above, the rhetoric of “military-strategic” balance between the blocs remains, however, predicate “moral,” as well as the meaning of granting agreement to the reunification under the conditions of preserving the status quo (or equality), represents the privileged notion of “fairness” in the binary opposition.

The same idea of preserving “fairness” was reiterated in the April 1990 discussion between Gorbachev and de Maizière:

[the German reunification] highlights the need for faster establishment of new all-European security structures. [...] Secondly, we do not deem possible that the re-united Germany will be completely integrated into NATO. [...] Thirdly, we stand for the change in the nature of the Warsaw Pact and NATO’s activities in consistence with the developments that have taken place and are underway in Eastern Europe. [...] If the Soviet Union gets the perception that the German party demonstrates disrespect to the interests of the Soviet people, then the reaction will be harsh. There will serious complications.”

(Gorbachev Apr. 1990 as cited in Narinsky, my translation)

Predicates “serious” and “harsh,” as well as the connotation of “complications,” “disrespect,” and “perception,” suggest a serious warning against the slightest possibility of adverse effect to the Soviet interests. At the same time, it proposes a new normative value to the coexistence of the two alliances, and re-affirms acquiescence under the condition that these normative values are
applied. The idea of respect of another’s interests and inclusiveness of a new all-European security structure that draws upon new realities resonates with “common sense understanding” of fair treatment. It implies that the opposition to these normative and understandable demands should render the opposing party unfair.

The discourse of securitization against NATO distinguished between the US and NATO European allies. In his discussion with French President Mitterrand, Gorbachev pointed that, “The persistence with which the Americans insist on NATO’s relevancy and utility makes me wonder whether the US are planning to create a mechanism, institute, a kind of directorate to manage the global affairs” (Gorbachev 25 May 1990 as cited in Narinsky, my translation). The articulation of the US as an obstacle to the agreement and the securitization against the possible American total control of the European and global affairs use the “cultural material” present among French decision-makers (cf. Clarke 1993; Kaiser 1996; Croft et al. 2000: 503-510) and create an opposition of the “non-European US =obstacle =unfairly imposing its will on others =Other” versus “European = proponent =fair defender of independence= Us.” This construction also supports the generic binary opposition of “fair/ unfair,” and promotes the imagery of the US-led NATO as the Other simultaneously sustaining the construction of the Self as European.

5.2. Second “Genealogic” Sampling of 1991-2005

The next sampling for the “genealogic” discourse analysis covers the period roughly between 1991 and 2005 that featured the two rounds of NATO eastward expansion and the NATO military operation against Yugoslavia.

During Russia’s first post-Soviet administration, the construction of the Self and implicit construction of the Western security community remained essentially the same, if not more pro-integrationist on more inferior terms of Minister Kozyrev’s “returning to civilization” and
becoming an “apprentice of Europe” (as cited in Smith 1999: 482). Such construction of the Self and Other corresponded to the foreign policy agenda with respect to the first round of the NATO enlargement when President Yelstin “accepted with understanding [Polish President Walesa’s intention to join the alliance] […] aimed at furthering European integration, [that] would not be in conflict with the interests of other countries, including Russia” (Warsaw Voice 03.06.2009). However, after the NATO plans to continue expanding were promulgated, the construction of the Western security community represented by NATO and the construction of the Self changed dramatically. NATO increasingly became narrated as Russia’s hostile Other rendering the possibility of integration into that representation of the Western “security community” unfeasible.

In a 1994 speech in Budapest, Yeltsin indicated his concerns over the proposed expansion saying that “Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War and is now in danger of lunging into a Cold War peace” (as cited in Smith 1999: 491), which run counter to his idea that the “relations between [Russia] and NATO should be several degrees warmer than relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe” (as cited in Brzezinski 1994: 77). The articulation of the two phrases promotes the idea of which place for the Self is deemed legitimate and vests the responsibility for insufficient progress towards a better future, or even regress, in the Other. The subsequent statements by the representatives of the legislative and executive branches reiterated that the admission of the FSU Baltic states into NATO was “categorically unacceptable,” and threatened to review relations with the alliance naming the very voicing of the consideration as “dangerous” (Black 1999: 254-258). The construction explicitly portrayed the alliance as the violator of the status quo whose actions would trigger Russia’s justified reciprocating counter-action. This construction of the alliance, an institutional embodiment of the Western “security community,” repeated by Russian foreign policy professionals and military representing the entire political spectrum, from hardcore nationalists to pro-Western liberals (cf.
Baranovsky 2000: 448; Light et al. 2000: 80; RF MFA 2004a), was given greater intensity with the “red line” metaphor. The metaphor was reiterated by a number of decision-makers including Evgeny Primakov and presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko to signify that “there is a ‘red line’ that cannot be crossed [by NATO]” (as cited in Black 1999: 264-266). Following the subsequent developments caused by the US push towards the admission of the Baltic states, the NATO military exercise in the Baltic, and the ensuing Russian initiatives of WMD deployment in Kaliningrad, “the policy was raised to doctrinal level” when Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that “there is a red line [... which] goes along the border of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic States” (as cited in Black 1999: 266). The charges in the Russian official discourse were centered on breaching of the Founding Act and the US “ignoring Russia’s hopes for a ‘blocless’ European security system” (Black 1999: 264-266). Thus the discourse placed the responsibility for the negative developments with the US and NATO rendering them as “unfair” due to their breaking promises, as opposed to the Russian “fair” international behaviour in compliance with the earlier international commitments. The “red line” metaphor invokes a powerful extant social knowledge and culture based on historical narratives about the “external threat from the West to peaceful Russia,” which engages the imagery of a hostile Western coalition present in “extant cultural material.”

The discourse and securitizations about the NATO enlargement were focused on the US as the major driving force behind the process. The US was constructed as the driving force behind NATO as Russia’s “hostile Other” in contrast to Europe “redefined as “the good West” because of its perceived sensitivity towards Russia’s regional security concerns” (Smith 1999: 491). Thus the question of Russia’s European identity was effectively divorced from the notion of the Western security community institutionalized by NATO. The relations with the Western
security community became centered on relations with the US. In a December 1997 publication, Primakov stated

Initially, Russia’s policy was one of 'strategic partnership' with the United States [...] a structure in which one country (the US) led the others was gradually created. [...] This is not what Russia wants. We want equitable co-operation even though we realize that we are now weaker than the United States. I think we have secured such an objective [...] The world is becoming accustomed to the fact that we have our distinct identity. This is very important.

(as cited in Smith 1999: 491)

Predicate “equitable” points to a common sense understanding of “fairness” in relations and renders the existent “structure” of “strategic partnership” as “unfair.”

The discourse accompanying the Kosovo crisis also served to sustain the imagery of the Western security community represented by NATO and led by the US as “hostile” and “unfair” Other unilaterally violating international and humanitarian laws at own discretion. Representing Russia in the UN SC, S. Lavrov invoked the idea of NATO’s having violated the international and humanitarian legal provisions defined by the UN Charter and labelled NATO’s actions as “unilateral application of force” without prior UN SC consent and an act of “aggression” pursuant to the 1974 General Assembly’s definition that were violated by NATO acting as “the world’s policeman” (RF MFA 1999). The main idea of the US-led NATO’s violating the international laws was instrumental in constructing the image of the current representation of the Western security community as immoral and “unfair,” which rendered the Other’s claims about Russia’s own intrinsic features false and illegitimate:

We are far from justifying the violations of the international and humanitarian law, no matter which party is the perpetrator. However, fighting with violations of the law can only be carried out with clean hands, and only on a sturdy ground of the law. Otherwise, lawlessness will breed lawlessness. It is unthinkable that a national court in a civilized democratic would acquit illicit methods of fighting law violations. Attempts to apply different standards to the international law and ignore its basic norms and principles create a dangerous precedent that may bring about dramatic destabilization and chaos at the regional and global levels. If this most dangerous tendency is not checked, the virus of
unilateral unlawful approaches can spread not only to other regions, but also to other areas of international relations, apart from the issues of peace and security. (RF MFA 1999, my translation)

Predicates “civilized” and “democratic” that cannot be applied to states violating international laws “subjugate” the West-promoted “truths” and domestic opposition’s counter-narratives about the Self and the Other. By pointing to the “unfair” practice of applying “different standards” to the Self and Other, the Western claims are undermined. In other words, the phrasing interpellates the audience to engage its common sense and answer the question how the West’s claims about the Self and Russia can be trusted. The wording of “lawlessness,” “ignoring basic norms,” “unlawful,” and application of “double standards” constructs the West as unfair, and therefore as the Other. The construction allows a powerful securitization narrative to be deployed. Predicate “dangerous” used in combination with nouns “virus,” “chaos” and “destabilization” metaphorically alludes to uncontrollably spreading “pandemic” of unilateralism. The wording engages a bio-political technique of using medical terminology to sustain a desired “regime of truth” through metaphorically interpellating the audience’s “common sense” understanding that a doctor’s invasive action is needed to remedy the illness. Characteristic of governmentality and representing a typically modern Western form of domination (Foucault 1982), the reference to medicine not only constitutes an authoritative “scientific language,” but also directly links the binary opposition’s privileged notion of “fair” to the preservation of life.

Subsequently, at other “genealogical” stages of the discourse, the conflict around Kosovo, especially the issue of Kosovo’s independence recognition in violation of UN Resolution 1244 serving as an example of the “double standards” application, would remain the source for invoking the binary opposition of “fair/unfair” and rendering the “false” West and NATO as its agent as Russia’s Other (cf. RF MFA 2004d; RF MFA 2008b).
The new Administration sustained the opposition in its discourse by pointing to the West’s violations of international laws and sovereignty of other states and simultaneously muting explicit securitizations against the West by invoking the narrative of threats common to Russia and the West:

[...] the Cold War is in the past, but up until today we have to overcome its consequences [...] the attempts to infringe upon the rights of sovereign states under the guise of humanitarian operations [...]or interventions [...] the difficulties in attaining common understanding on regional and global threats still persist.

(RF President 2000)

The passage points to the West’s unfair international behaviour that uses the cover of normative principles in pursuance of pragmatic foreign policy objectives. The text attaches the meaning of “cheating” to the West’s actions, and interpellates the audience’s “common sense” that the West’s allegations about international developments and Russia’s domestic issues can be discarded as false, self-interested, and hostile. The persistence of the Cold War approaches that prevent from resolving common threats is constructed as the West’s fault.

The next 2001 Presidential Address to the Duma reiterates the idea of NATO’s violating the international law, and explicitly expresses the dichotomy of law-abiding “fair” Self and law-ignoring “unfair” West:

We are consistent also in our relations with NATO. These relations are regulated by the Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security that was signed in 1997. We think that this organisation often ignores the opinion of the international community and the provisions of international legal documents in its decision-making process, and this is the biggest problem. The future of our relations with NATO therefore depends on how closely the basic principles and norms of international law will be respected in questions of use of force and threat of the use of force. Our position is clear: the only organisation with the right to authorise the use of force in international relations is the United Nations Security Council.

(RF President 2001)
The dichotomy constructs NATO, the current institutional representation of the Western security community, as hostile Other rendering integration with it impossible. At the same time, the discourse challenges the very notion of a cohesive and coherent Western community (or the “West”), reproducing the imagery of the “good West= true Europe” vs. “bad West= false Europe.” In the same text, the narrative about the “unfair” NATO contrasts the explicit idea of integration with Europe, “[...] Our efforts to build up a partnership with the European Union will become even more important. Integration with Europe is one of the key areas of our foreign policy” (RF Presidential Address 2001). The juxtaposition of these ideas served to articulate the difference between Europe (i.e. the “good West”) and the US-led NATO (i.e. “the bad West) that embodies the “false” Western security community. The distinction between Europe and the US-led NATO was reiterated more clearly in the next Annual address:

I believe it necessary to once more clearly state our priorities in Europe. Here our consistent position and numerous steps towards integration with Europe are clear. We will continue active work with the European Union to form a single economic space. [...] Our major goal in foreign policy is to ensure strategic stability in the world. To do this, we are participating in the creation of a new system of security, we maintain constant dialogue with the United States, and work on changing the quality of our relations with NATO.

(RF President 2002)

The issues of European integration and cooperation in the security areas are syntactically separated by placing them in different paragraphs and sentences, whereas the US and NATO are in the same sentence.

The securitizations against the US-led NATO were quite muted in the presidential addresses. For example, the 2003 and 2004 texts make no mention of NATO. Instead, these speeches narrated security threats as identical to those faced by the Western security community: the international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts and drug trafficking (cf. RF President 2003 and 2004a). The discourse on integration with Europe was again syntactically separated from that cooperation with other international actors, such as the US, China, India and
Japan, by placing them in a certain order of priority and into different sentences to distinguish more important relations with Europe from the relations with the US or the US-led Western community. The ideas of “growing closer and becoming truly integrated into Europe” as a “historical choice” (RF Presidential Address 2003) and that “the expansion of the European Union should not just bring us closer geographically, but also economically and spiritually” (RF President 2004a) were reiterated. Predicates “historical” and “spiritual” appeal to the “extant cultural material” of the domestic audience about Russia’s role of a major actor in the European and world politics bearing a messianic role of “true Europe” (cf. Neumann 1996: 20-21, 45, 83, 170). Such articulation was used to sustain the attached meaning to the Self as “fair” and “true Europe.” This engaging of the extant social knowledge based on pre-existing narratives and myths played a key role in sustaining the “regime of truth” based on the “fair/unfair” opposition and in subjugating counter-narratives.

The counter-NATO discourse rendering the current institutional representation of the Western security community as the Other, with which integration was unfeasible despite the rhetoric of “partnership” was articulated by the professional foreign affairs community, with the official position being “calmly negative attitude” to the alliance’s expansion (RF MFA 2003b; cf. RF MFA 2003a; RF MFA 2004c). The securitization discourse against NATO invoked the threats posed by the alliance’s approaching the Russian borders, elements of the NATO contingency planning, and the stalled CFE ratification by the NATO members (cf. RF MFA 2003a; also RF MFA 2003b). The insignificant military infrastructure deployment in the Baltic states was discursively used to exemplify the legacy of the Cold War and the incredibility of the NATO reasoning for deploying four F-16s to fight “airborne terrorists” (RF MFA 2004b). Such an exposure of mythologized threats posed by Russia interpellated the audience into the acceptance of the NATO’s imagery as the “cheater.” The “common sense” imperative is to
dismiss the cheater’s narratives as “false,” thereby the subjugation of the cheater’s discourse is achieved.

The implicit labelling of the US-led NATO as “cheater” was reiterated in a number of texts related to the violation of the earlier promises by NATO and national member-governments never to engage in military alliances adversarial to Russia (cf. RF MFA 2004e; also RF President 2007a). That narrative overlapped with the pre-existing discourse about the US breaking its promise not to expand the “NATO jurisdiction and presence by an inch in the eastward direction” (J. Baker in a 1990 discussion with Gorbachev and Shevarnadze as cited in Narinsky, my translation). The idea of cheating has a commonly-accepted connotation of unfair behaviour. As applied to the NATO’s international behaviour, its invocation renders the alliance as the Other with whom integration is impossible.

The same primary opposition that designates the Self and the Other was used in a 2003 article of A. Kelin, Deputy Director of All-European Cooperation, the RF Foreign Affairs Ministry:

The attempts to initiate constructive relations with the alliance in the early 1990s yielded no result. During that time, the alliance became more transparent in its military affairs, [...] but no substantive interaction with it was possible. The perception of NATO by the Russian society still was determined by negative factors: strengthening of the war machine through the inclusion of new members, approaching to the Russian borders, fundamental unwillingness to comply with conventional norms of the international law. All of these invoked the notion of “hostility” and was nurtured by unwillingness of the conservative part of the NATO leadership to build relations with Russia on a truly equitable basis.

(RF MFA 2003b, my translation)

The paragraph places the responsibility for the lack of progress in relations with the NATO and outlines a number of security concerns that engage the extant social historical knowledge of the external enemies approaching Russia’s western borders (cf. Neumann 1996: 112-114; Waltz 2000: 22), which has historically pre-empted invasions carried out by coalitions of Western
states. This articulation using the "extant cultural material" of knowing the collectively-acting West as historically hostile (see footnote on Eurasianism) interpellates the audience into accepting a "common sense" understating of the NATO's hostility confirmed by its refusal to reciprocate Russia's friendly actions. The speaker proceeds to more explicit designation of NATO's agenda as "unfair" by stating its violations of the international law and pointing to its denial of equitable relations with Russia. The meaning of predicate "equitable" is almost synonymous to "fair," which suggests the persistence of the binary opposition "fair/unfair." These claims render the "juxtaposed truth" about minor positive changes (i.e. greater transparency in military affairs) "subjugated" as opposed to the main idea that the relations with NATO had become worse as a result of the NATO's actions.

The same text makes a clear distinction between the Western security community institutionalized by the US-led NATO and positions of its European members:

It is worth noting that Washington chose the 2002 NATO Prague Summit as a watershed meeting at which it would be possible [...] to put the squeeze on the allies into adopting the alliance to new realities in a practical form. Accordingly, the Americans commenced working with each European NATO member state exerting significant pressure on their leaders and political circles. The work was carried out under the slogan "now or never." And the Europeans gave in …"

(RF MFA 2003b, my translation)

The text divorces the actions of the "subjugated" Europeans who succumbed to the external pressure (i.e. subjected to "unfair" treatment) from the actions of NATO and the US leading the alliance, thereby promoting the imagery of the Other without having to abandon the narrative of closer integration with Europe.

The text also points to NATO's unilateral force application circumventing the outlined internationally-accepted procedure thereto to attribute the meaning of "unfair" as the distinctive feature of the hostile Other:
[The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit] circumvents the necessity to obtain a UN mandate [for the use of force], which allowed NATO to substantiate and justify the 1999 bombings of Yugoslavia, for example. [...] Though the UN SC is mentioned the documents [adopted at the Prague Summit], the necessity for its mandate to sanction military operations is no longer provided for.

(RF MFA 2003b, my translation)

The paragraph constitutes an act of securitization against the alliance’s unilateral application of force at will and invokes extant social and cultural knowledge based on pre-existing historical narratives about the possibility that the Western coalition may undertake similar actions against Russia under a certain contingency. The invocation of the extant cultural knowledge about the Other and the imagery of threat help sustain the hegemonic status of this discourse as part of the promoted “regime of truth.”

5.3. Third “Genealogic” Sampling of 2005-2008

The third “genealogical” sampling of the Russian official discourse roughly covers the period between 2005 and 2008 that includes such important and interwoven events as “coloured” revolutions in the FSU and articulated NATO aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, the missile defence deployment plans, and the August 2008 crisis in the Caucasus, all of which were presented as a security threat posed by the Western US-led coalition. The articulation employed the “extant cultural material” by invoking the historically-developed imagery of the unified West as Russia’s hostile Other.

The “coloured” revolutions in the FSU, the missile defence, the continued CFE disputes, and the War in Ossetia as the culmination caused the deployment of discursive constructions and securitizations that sharply re-narrated the Self and the Western security community represented by the US-led NATO as Russia’s hostile Other, which allowed professional and academic community to explicitly point to the continuation of the Cold War.
The most striking feature of the re-narration the Self is that though the discourse about the European identity was retained, the idea of Europeanness was divorced from both the inclusion into the Western security community in the extant institutional form, as well from the extant institutional representation of Europe in the form of the EU. The construction of the Self as “true” Europe = “fair” as opposed to the Other portrayed as “false” Europe = ”unfair” persisted, with the difference that the “authorized speakers” employed the discourse that not only more aggressively promoted the mythology of “fairness” in the international behaviour, but also successfully “played on the ground” of the West’s counter-narrative. They were able to engage the West’s construction hinging on the binary opposition of “democracy = freedom = peace = life” as opposed to “non-democracy = subjugation = war = death,” and re-narrate it in a way that would confirm Russia’s Europeanness and the legitimacy of its position in contrast to West’s “unfairness” and illegitimacy of its claims.

The “coloured” revolutions triggered the re-narration of the Self as a “sovereign democracy,” a term attributed to V. Surkov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, who used it for the first time in February 2006, and that was reiterated later by President Putin and other prominent political figures. Surkov defined the “sovereign democracy” as

> a society's political life where the political powers, their authorities and decisions are decided and controlled by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and fairness by all citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the people that formed it.

(Surkov 2006, Wiki translation)

The definition articulates the extant knowledge of the audience about the West and hijacks the predicates characteristic of the West, such as “material welfare,” “freedom”, and “fairness” of social equality and justice, to be attributed to the vision of Russia. As pointed earlier, the invocation of extant social knowledge facilitates the transformation of a new discursive construction into hegemonic knowledge and buttresses a promoted “regime of truth.”
The attribute “sovereign” as applied to democracy, according to Surkov, is also an indispensable part of the ontological status of a Western state:

It is not difficult at all to respond to the argument of a loud-mouthed faction of “intellectuals” for whom the sun rises in the West. It would suffice it to remind them that the sovereign democracy is not a home-grown idea. On the contrary, it is a notion that is widely spread and accepted by practitioners of politics: “A successful transformation of newly independent states into sovereign democracies is the core element of the European security (W. Christopher, US Secretary of State, 1994); [...] our [European] Union preserves [its] essence [...] of a federation of sovereign democracies” (R. Prodi, European Commission Chairman, 2004). [...] Marginalized coalitions of former bureaucrats, acting Nazis, and runaway oligarchs, encouraged by visiting diplomats and simplistic idea that the abroad will help them, can make attempts to destroy, but will never succeed in subduing the society, for which sovereignty is a civil value. Russia should say what it does, but not do what they say, and be in the position of co-author of the European civilization, not a simple average grassroots representative

(Surkov 2006, my translation)

The text not only “defiles” the pro-Western opposition by suggesting that their claim about themselves as “intellectuals” untrue and metaphorically dismissing their epistemology as nonsense, it also renders them the West’s “fifth column” comprised of marginalized supporters of outlawed oligarchs and incompetent (“former”) bureaucrats. The articulation draws on the extant social negative imagery of the oligarchs-looters and bureaucrats-corruptionists, and puts them in the same row with Nazis and “visiting diplomats” who encourage their activities. The text unambiguously points to Western diplomats, and using the extant social hegemonic truth and pre-existing historical knowledge, renders the West’s international policies and support of the political opposition in Russia as both “unfair” violation of Russia’s sovereignty, hostile, and morally illegitimate. The text proceeds to further powerful securitization against the domestic and Western external enemies threatening Russia’s sovereignty engaging the extant historical knowledge of multiple foreign (Western) invasions and the resultant historically-developed cultural understanding that “sovereignty” for the Russian society is the primary value that overshadows all others. The invocation of this historically-developed identity represents an
exercise of the Foucauldian bio-political “pastoral” power that equals the threat to sovereignty to the threat to life, whereas countering this threat means protecting life. Another important peculiarity of this ideological manifesto of the entire second Putin’s term and the following Medvedev Administration is its explicit equating the attribute of “sovereign” to “European” and declaring which relationship with Europe and the West Russia should strive for. The text makes a reservation that “support of sovereignty [is to be carried out] without damage to democracy and [Russia is to be] open without loss of identity” and that “not falling out of Europe and holding to the West are significant elements of constructing of Russia” (Surkov 2006) to dismiss counter-narratives that the mythology of the “external threat” is used to curtail democracy.

Thus the “coloured” revolutions were constructed as not only the loss of sovereignty by the FSU states, but also as their loss of Europeanness, since the construction implied that succumbing to external control meant becoming a colony and the extant social understanding suggests that such a status is ontologically “unEuropean:” historically, a European state is a metropolis that colonized non-Europeans. This meaning attached to the “coloured” revolutions became hegemonic knowledge suggesting that possible similar developments in Russia would destroy its European identity, which also provided a “productive” object for securitization:

Of course, not every nation achieves real sovereignty. Many countries do not set it as a priority, traditionally subsisting under the patronage of other nations and changing their patrons from time to time. Multiplication of entertaining “revolutions” and democracies governed from the outside, though seemingly artificial, in reality is quite natural for such counties.

(Surkov 2006, my translation)

The text metaphorically presents the states where the “coloured” revolutions occurred and that are run by foreign interest as self-prostituting, and explicitly “defiles” them by pointing to the primordial nature of such behaviour on their part, which is an absolute opposite to Russia’s identity. The degrading predicate “entertaining” attached to “revolutions” in inverted commas
implies that such countries cannot be equal with other Western nations: metaphorically, they are theatre figureheads following the will of the master, and therefore, they fall out of the “égalité, fraternité, liberté” paradigm quintessential to the European identity value system, and thus cannot be regarded as European.

In contrast to the West’s “unjust” interference, Russia’s involvement, in the FSU nations in particular, was construed as justified (“fair”). The constructs promoted in the official texts clearly reproduce the binary opposition “fair/unfair:”

[Russia is condemned] for some unclear interference into the Ukrainian domestic politics. But the initiators of such interference should be searched for in the West, which is demonstrated by the reaction of many politicians in Europe and the US to the Ukrainian crisis. Even before the [presidential] elections, they declared that the West would not recognize the results of the elections should a candidate not supported by them win. When they did not like the results, the elections were immediately declared “invalid” and the necessity to review the results were announced. Some European politicians made declarations that ‘Ukraine must be with the West,’ which are dictated by the logic of the Cold War.

(RF MFA 2005, my translation)

The text explicitly constructs the West’s policies as biased and therefore “unfair” and lays the fault for the continuity of the Cold War legacy with the Western politicians. The Russian involvement was portrayed as legitimate due to the cultural, historic, economic, and geographical structural causes:

For us, the CIS space is not a “chess board” for playing geopolitical games. It is our civilizational habitat common to all peoples living here that preserves our historical and spiritual heritage. Our geography and economic interdependence provide tangible competitive advantages to all CIS nations. And international imperatives of globalization are present here as much as in other regions of the world. The most important thing is that nobody hinders the process by creating artificial barriers out of selfish interests.

(RF MFA 2008a, my translation)

In the text above, “civilizational habitat” metaphorically represents a common historically-developed home, also determined by the geographical proximity, for the nations who share not only material but also spiritual interests and identity, which renders the foreign interference as
immoral (predicate “selfish”) and equals it to an attempt to destroy others’ identity and spiritual values. The mentioning of the structural causes for the integration and portraying them within a larger global trend of globalization creates the imagery of a justified process with a highly positive normative objective, whereas the self-interested counter-action to destroy it represents injustice. The opposition reproduces the extant cultural perceptions of “selfish materialistic West” for whom fates and spiritual values of other peoples are a game (metaphorically represented by the “chess board”) in pursuance of egoistic materialistic objectives, in contrast to “altruistic spiritual Russia.” Thus the “regime of truth” is over again sustained by the re-articulation of pre-existing historically-developed stereotypical representations of the Self/ Other.

Minister Lavrov repeated the same discursive construction of the Self and the Other in his December 2008 statement mentioning the West’s “unfair” misrepresentation of the historically structured interdependence between Russia and the FSU states (i.e. “sphere of influence” trope), and pointing to the NATO and EU projects that “make decisions affecting other nations without consulting them, including Russia” and their employing the “sphere of influence” logic “insisting on special, privileged interests of the EU in [the Balkans ignoring the position of Serbia]” (RF MFA 2008c). These repetitive constructions use the extant cultural knowledge and pre-existing historical perceptions and, as a result, facilitate attaching the hegemonic meaning of the “unfair” and hostile Other to the West in the current institutional representation practicing the politics of “double standards.”

The US-led “false” West as the likely beneficiary from the developments in the FSU was discursively constructed as the driving force behind the “coloured” revolutions and an obvious target to securitize against: potential similar developments, if not prevented, could occur in Russia, destroy its sovereignty and European identity, and relegate it to a semi-colony status. The discussion of the situation in Ukraine at the ministerial level within the institutional framework of
the NATO-Russia Council, the subsequent “coloured” regimes’ NATO aspirations, the NATO’s reaction to Russia’s war against Georgia’s “coloured” regime, and the use of the conflict to speed up the deployment of the integrated missile defense provided ample opportunities for creating a “common sense” understanding of a logical continuity from the “coloured” regimes gaining power, followed by their states’ NATO aspirations, and finally a direct military conflict with NATO’s anti-Russian involvement and further isolation of Russia (cf. RF MFA 2004e; RF MFA 2006; Rogozin as cited by Aljazeera New Agency 2008; RF MFA 2008e).

The official discourse sustained the course of avoidance the deconstruction of the European identity. Prior to the War in Ossetia, the securitization against the NATO expansion contrasted with the position on the EU enlargement. The “common sense” construction of the negative attitude toward the military bloc expansion was opposed to a favourable attitude towards the enlargement of a political and socio-economic institutional representation of Europe, even if Ukraine is included and Russia is not:

Russia is creating the Single Economic Space in a large part of the former Soviet Union while at the same time building a common economic space with the European Union. Russia believes that building this common economic space with the EU is in the interests of both Russia and the EU countries and that this will harmonise economic ties. These projects are not in contradiction with the possibility of new members joining the EU, including Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin said he considers that if Ukraine were to join the EU this would be a positive factor that, unlike NATO expansion, would help strengthen the system of international relations.

(RF President 2004b)

The construct uses the normative position of developing economic relations with the EU as a peaceful (non-military) institution in contrast to NATO. Predicates “positive,” “harmonize,” “common,” “strengthen” attach a positive connotation to Ukraine’s possible bid for the EU membership in contrast to its joining a military bloc, which invokes the extant historically-developed imagery of the “external enemy” approaching the Western borders. This dichotomous
attitude to a peaceful political and socio-economic Western institution on the one hand, and a Western military institution on the other, reproduces the construction of “fairness” due to its “common sense” idea that a peaceful organization, even an exclusive one, poses no direct threat to Russia’s sovereignty. However, at the later stages the discourse of integration into Europe was also divorced from the extant institutional framework of the EU, just like from NATO as the institutional representation of the Western security community: the EU was constructed as an “unfair” institution applying “double standards” to the Self and Russia, particular with respect to the rights of the Russophone population in the Baltic states and the denial of Schengen visas to representatives of the Russian civil society (cf. RF President 2005; RF MFA 2008f; RF MFA 2008c).

The discourse of integration into Europe persisted throughout the entire period. The official texts point to Russia’s common centuries-old historical and cultural heritage with the rest of Europe including “the reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging parliamentarism, municipal and judiciary [powers], and the establishment of similar legal systems,” “[moving] together toward recognizing and extending human rights, toward universal and equal suffrage, toward understanding the need to look after the weak and the impoverished, toward women's emancipation, and other social gains” (RF President 2005), “joint work on implementing the concept of the common spaces [as] an important part of the development of Europe as a whole” (RF President 2006). These explicit references to primordial commonality demonstrated by common history, values, and mutually enriching relations serve as a “juxtaposed truth” to “subjugate” another knowledge that

[There are] teachers (both kind and strict) who attempt at teaching a disruptive student lessons of varying complexity. And those, for whom Russia is a belated European. And those, for whom it is a strategic partner and a potential ally. […] All influential European nations (including Russia) have controversial opinions of one another.

(Surkov 2006, my translation)
In the 2007 Munich Speech, representing another discourse sample of paramount importance, President Putin reiterated the European choice, and employed the narrative characteristic of the Western hegemonic discourse:

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family,

(RF President 2007a),

and discursively separated the “true” interests of Europe from the interests of the existing institutional representation of the Western security community in the form of the US-led NATO:

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

(RF President 2007a)

Using the extant social knowledge that links the missile defense deployment to the US capability constituting the core of it and the mechanism of NATO involved in the discussions and implementation, the initiative was unambiguously tied to the US and NATO acting to the detriment of both Russia and “true” European interests (cf. RF President 2007b). In the former passage, mentioning the primary Western values of “democracy,” “freedom,” and “openness” as articulated by the Western elites in conjunction with “big European family” suggests the idea of primordial commonality and equality of Russia with other members of the “family.” The text explicitly points to the leading role of Russia in fostering the new world order and the new Europe, which implies that its role of a co-founder and the equitable position with other major Western majors represent a “fair” status, and the US-led NATO’s attempts to exclude it from Europe are “unfair” and contradict “true” European interests.
The speech buttressed the construction of the West’s “unfairness” by the securitizations that equal the Other’s unfair and illegitimate behaviour to the threat of life, which constitutes a bio-political governmentality technique.

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. I understood [my colleague, the Italian Defence Minister] that the use of force can only be legitimate when. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. [...] The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. (RF President 2007a)

The text explicitly points to the illegitimacy of the application of military force if not sanctioned by the UN, and reiterates earlier securitizations against NATO’s approaching military infrastructure, military bases, and the missile defense deployment. Drawing upon the historical cultural knowledge and overlapping with extant widely-spread narratives, such phrasing invokes the audience to accept the construction of NATO as a potential aggressor and an existential threat. The text indicates that Russia’s constructive position on the CFE is countered by the “bad West= false Europe’s” actions and failure to reciprocate in due manner, which also sustains the dichotomy of “fair/unfair:”

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. [...] But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all. (RF President 2007a)

and also

We have carried out considerable troop reductions. We no longer have any groups in the northwest of army or corps size. Practically all types of heavy arms have been withdrawn from the European part of the country. We are essentially the only country facing so-called ‘flank restrictions’ in the south and north. Even when the situation flared up in Chechnya, Russia continued to observe its commitments under this treaty and coordinated its action with its partners. But what about our partners? They have not even ratified the
adapted treaty, citing the Istanbul Agreements providing for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Trans-Dniester.

(RF President 2007b)

Both texts interpellate the audience by inviting it to answer the rhetorical questions using “common sense” based on the information provided, and to accept the idea that the West’s actions are unjust and unfair.

Finally, the 2007 Munich speech implicitly accuses the West of failure to keep its promises and attached the meaning of “liar” to the NATO:

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. [...] And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees?

(RF President 2007a)

The speaker poses a rhetoric question to the audience thereby interpellating it to agree on a common sense idea that a party failing to keep its promises is a liar and cannot be a legitimate actor in politics. Predicate “obvious” also points to a common sense understanding that NATO’s current rhetoric does not merit any trust, which was also buttressed by pre-existing narratives exposing the NATO’s earlier violations of own commitments. Thus the 2007 Munich Speech and other major samples of the official discourse reproduced the reality along the binary opposition of “Russia= fair=life / West= unfair= death” and effectively, by engaging extant historically-developed cultural representations of the Self and Other, promoted domestically the “regime of truth” of the impossibility of Russia’s joining the Western security community under the existing institutional framework of the US-led NATO. At the same time, the discourse preserved the
possibility of integration into the European space and security community under a different “fair” institutional setting.

The August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia raised the discourse to a higher pitch, without changing its essence in representation of the Self and the Other along the binary opposition of “fair/unfair.” The direct military conflict and the ensuing bloodshed provided the most convincing context for the deployment of the bio-political “life and death” link as applied to the binary opposition: the “unfair” Western policies led to death, “fair” Russia’s policies protected life.

The “bad” US-led West acting through the mechanism of NATO was constructed as “unfair” due to its employing an immoral practice of “double standards” in application of the international laws and attaching different values to human lives. For example, Russia’s UN representative V. Churkin countered the US accusations by questioning the legitimacy of using force in Iraq, US threatening other UN members, violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign state in the Kosovo case, NATO’s disrespect to UN resolutions, and indiscriminate use of force during the NATO bombings of the civil infrastructure in Yugoslavia (RF MFA 2008b; also RF MFA 2008g).

The discursive construction of the Self and the Other was based on narratives about the stakeholders’ contrasting international behaviour falling into the dichotomous binary opposition:

All these years, Russia ignored the provocations putting every effort to furthering the reconciliation process and to the search of compromises. As it was stated by President Medvedev, Russia irrevocable based its position on Georgia’s territorial integrity, despite the factors that impeded such a solution.

(RF MFA 2008h, my translation)

The articulation invokes the idea of Russia’s acting in compliance with the international laws despite the odds, which is a “just” and “fair” position, as opposed to the NATO’s “unfair”
position of verbal and material support provided to the aggressor, including continued new arms
supplies and restoration of Georgia’s military infrastructure (RF MFA 2008h, my translation):
“The cynicism and hypocrisy of those who cover the back [of Saakashvili] is beyond any limits.
[...] Practically all states that are supplying weapons to Georgia are NATO members” (RF MFA
2008h, my translation). The phrasing renders NATO not simply unjust, but immoral and evil,
which are the common sense attributes of the hostile Other.

The US and NATO led by it were the primary objects in the construction of the Other
stuck in the Cold War balance of power paradigm with a more muted “othering” of the NATO
European members. The discourse pointed to the US-led NATO playing the central role in the
evolution of the conflict, and being a threat to the world and regional stability:

The spectre of the “Great Game” is haunting the Caucasus. If the US and their allies
ultimately choose to pursue neither their national interests, nor the interests of the
Georgian people, but the interests of Saakashvili’s regime [...] it will be a mistake of
historical proportions. [...] Relations between Russia and NATO are going through the
long-expected moment of truth. NATO was the party that raised the stakes. It seems that
the alliance again needs “frontline sates” for justifying own importance in the new
context. It is not we who subject the present architecture of European security to test. Its
systemic defects are obvious, including above all NATO-centrism, which by definition
negates the creation of a truly universal mechanism of collective security in the Euro-
Atlantic area. I am certain that Europe is perfectly well aware of this. It has been Europe,
taught by its own historical experience and having gone through national catastrophes,
that has come closer than others to reformulating the meaning of its existence in a truly
global, collectivist vein, when all global issues are seen as one’s own. National egoism
does not work anymore. [...]The problems facing the historical West are most acutely
manifest on the other side of the Atlantic, first of all because it is there that the load of a
policy based on instincts and prejudices of the past has proved the heaviest. But in a
cardinaily changed, globalizing world everyone will have to rearticulate their mission.
Western Europe has actually done so, its majority refusing to share the Americans’
staking on military force.

(RF MFA 2008a)

The narrative of the contrast between the US position of the “national egoism” and the attitudes
of the West Europeans acting in “a truly global, collectivist vein” is explicitly expressed in the
text. The US is narrated as a potential aggressor prone to the use of force out of own irrational
understanding (based on “prejudices” and “instincts”) of the new conditions. The initial phrase of the paragraph alludes to Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto metaphorically representing the US and its clients as new revolutionaries posing a major threat to the stability in Europe.

In a statement of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO was explicitly portrayed not only as a Cold War artefact, but also as an immoral and unfair actor of the world politics:

We consider that, in today’s conditions, its visit to Tbilisi was inopportune and inconsistent with the interests of stabilizing the situation in the region. The decisions taken at the end of the visit have borne out that Cold War reflexes had again worked in NATO on the “Self-Other” principle. Instead of drawing serious conclusions regarding Mikhail Saakashvili’s failed attempt to resolve the long-standing conflict by force, NATO has once again demonstrated its support for the disinformation campaign launched by him and made advances in terms of restoration of the military potential of the country. [...] After the Tbilisi meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer went at the Georgian authorities’ prompting to Gori. The anti-Russian tilt of this action is obvious. It’s a pity that to obtain a more objective picture of the early August events his program did not include a calling at Tskhinval, where he could have seen firsthand the tragic consequences of the night’s shelling of civilians by the Georgian army.

(RF MFA 2008d)

NATO is accused of deceiving the world community by playing a role in a “disinformation campaign,” which is behaviour of an unfair party. The narrative that the NATO Head visited a Georgian site and not an Ossetian one creates the imagery that human casualties have different value based on pragmatic political interest clearly indicating the “Self/Other” divide. The use of the notion of “reflexes,” just like “prejudices” and “instincts” in the earlier textual sample, suggests backwardness and inability to exercise “civilized behaviour” commonly defined as the ability to self-restrain and control immediate reactions. Thus the discourse “defiled” the US-led NATO as uncivilized and immoral, and constructed it as unjust and hostile Other, thereby subjugating counter-narratives as illegitimate and false.

In contrast, the Self was narrated within the privileged notion of “fair and “just” in the binary opposition as the party whose actions were in compliance with the international laws and standards of behaviour:
Russia has returned to the world stage as a responsible state which can defend its citizens. If anyone was mistaken on this score, then our resolute actions to force Georgia to peace and the recognition, compelled by circumstances, of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should have dispelled any such doubts. Through its response to the Georgian aggression, Russia has set a kind of standard for reaction, which fully complies with international law, including the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and our concrete obligations regarding the settlement of this conflict. The actions of Russia to force Georgia to peace have become a model example of moderateness, as they pursued no aims other than those prompted by the need to provide effective guarantees of the non-resumption of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. [...] We will never agree with legal nihilism in world affairs, with an attitude towards international law as a "draft pole" and as the "fate of the weak" or with any attempts to "cut corners" to the detriment of international legality, which is the embodiment of the moral principle in relations among states. Indeed, international law is our ideology in international affairs. [...] Firmly based on international law and the Constitution and laws of Russia, we are going to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, to support the interests of Russian business and to develop privileged relations with Russia's friends in various regions.

(RF MFA 2008a)

Predicates "responsible," "defend," and "example of moderateness" have normative connotation featuring behaviour of a civilized and European state. By denying the "legal nihilism," deception through "cutting corners," and manipulating the laws, which are the Other's attributes, the discourse constructs Russia as a "fair" provider of justice in defense of the "weak." These discursive constructions draw on extant social understandings of what fair/ unfair, European/ unEuropean and civilized/ uncivilized behaviour is, which allows the promoted meaning of the Self as "fair," and therefore "spiritually and morally superior" or "true European," to become hegemonic and subjugate counter-narratives coming for the "unfair," morally and spiritually inferior" "false European" or "non-European" Other. The phrase "protect the life and dignity of our citizens" in the final sentence of the paragraph above reproduces the normative goal of domination characteristic of a post-modern Western state in line with the Foucauldian governmentality objective of protecting life. Essentially, this renders the dichotomy of "fair/unfair" into the bio-political "life/death" opposition.
The text invokes social historical knowledge, providing a powerful tool for establishing a “regime of truth,” to reproduce the hegemonic understanding that the threat and wars have historically come from the outside, and Russia’s actions only responded to the aggressions of external enemies, which constitutes “just” and “common sense” behaviour:

[...] “it has been the most sworn enemies of Russia that have contributed best to the development of its greatness.” It is hard to argue with this last point if you recall who started the wars that ended with Russian forces’ entry into Paris in 1814 and into Berlin in 1945. [...] So there is no way we can get away from the fundamental theme “Russia and the West.” We have in fact shared all the tragedies of Europe in the 20th century, when the continent’s western part used to set the tone in European civilization. Now, with the end of the Cold War, truly collective decisions are possible in the Euro-Atlantic area, but which are unthinkable without the equal participation of Russia.

(RF MFA 2008a)

Predicates “shared” and “collective” point to the common historical and cultural heritage with Europe. The text suggests that Russia’s equal participation in the Euro-Atlantic area is not simply a desired or expected position, but is also “fair” and necessary for protecting life since “the continent’s western part [that set] the tone in European civilization” in the 20th century failed to prevent the tragedies and continues to fail as the recent developments have demonstrated.

An identical narrative of Russia’s acting in response to the Other’s aggressive and unfriendly activities were reiterated in the 2008 Presidential Address. The securitizations against the missile defence and NATO’s encircling Russia were articulated to engage the extant cultural and historical knowledge, which facilitated the promotion of the desired “regime of truth:”

The conflict in the Caucasus was used as a pretext for NATO naval vessels to enter the Black Sea and then to speed up the imposition of an American missile defence system on Europe. This situation forces Russia to take measures in response. [...] Incidentally, the settlement of the South Ossetia crisis demonstrated that it’s possible to find solutions with Europe. We will deepen our relations with Europe in the field of security. I am sure that they have a good future. [...] It is the construction of a global missile defence system, the installation of military bases around Russia, the unbridled expansion of NATO and other similar ‘presents’ for Russia – we therefore have every reason to believe that they are simply testing our strength. [...] The reaction to the events of August 8th and Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia once again showed that
we live in a world of double standards. We proceeded responsibly and did so in the interests of restoring international law and justice.

(RF President 2008)

The text divorces the meanings of NATO and the US from the notion of “Europe.” Predicates “NATO” and “American” are applied to the objects of securitization where “Europe” mentioned as a “passive” geographic location with a neutral connotation. The speaker proceeds to the idea that an “active” Europe is capable to find solution without external involvement (i.e. “it’s possible to find solutions with Europe”), which contrasts with the US and NATO’s failure to prevent and settle conflicts in Europe, as suggested by earlier narratives forming extant hegemonic knowledge. This narrative attaches a different meaning to Europe on the one hand, and the US and NATO on the other. The text reiterates the idea of integration into Europe linked to “a good future.” The implied US-led NATO’s responsibility for applying double standards reproduces the meaning of “unfairness” in contrast to Russia’s “just” actions of self-defence that reciprocate the Other’s aggressive behaviour, which serves as re-articulation of the primary language opposition.

5.4. Summary

The deconstruction of the Russian official discourse reveals the genealogically recurrent use of the binary opposition of “fair (just)/ unfair (unjust)” designating the Self and the Other respectively, which also points to the “othering” nature of the discourse.

The explicit meaning of this binary opposition also suggests the presence of dynamic “othering.” The integration with the “unfair” Other is not possible, but it remains a viable option should the Other change its international behaviour.
Just like in the case of the NATO discourse, the binary opposition conveys a number of implicit meanings that project specific international behaviour and make recourse to primordial cultural attributes differentiating the Self from the Other. These implicit meanings are also attached by engaging the “extant cultural material” and social historical knowledge about the Self and the Other widely present among the domestic audience: “a highly moral and messianic Russia’s international behaviour often to the detriment to own national interests and domestic policies is contrasted with the self-interest mercurialism and immorality of the West that fails to appreciate the sacrifices.” The oppositions also invoke widely present historical knowledge of the “external threat” constituted by major foreign invasions mostly by the Western coalitions (cf. Neumann 1996; see footnote on Eurasianism). The genealogy of these historical narratives is centuries-long and dates back much farther than the two decades to which the present research is limited. Thus the binary oppositions present in the Russian official discourse link the “unfair” Other to aggressive international behaviour, which is substantiated by the social historical knowledge. Such linkage attributes a bio-political meaning in consistence with the Foucauldian concept of governmentality equalling “unfair” Other to “death” and the “fair” Self to “life,” which serves as a strong foundation for deploying securitizations and promoting the desired meanings to the status of hegemonic.

The implicit meanings of the “fair (just)/ unfair (unjust)” correlate with Neumann’s “true Europe/ false Europe” opposition, which also denotes essentialist primordial “othering.” As the analysis of the Russian official discourse has demonstrated, the explicit opposition of “fair (just)/ unfair (unjust)” can be construed as “sovereign= independent= European/ client= dependent= unEuropean.”

The imagery of “fair” attached to the Self is supported by the “reciprocating” nature of the Russian securitization responses that are constructed as following the NATO’s persisting actions
to disrupt an earlier status quo. Events like the NATO expansion are discursively constructed to promote the imagery of NATO as the active actor on the offensive, and of Russia as the responding actor on the defensive. This imagery attaches the meaning of threat to the Western collective action, and reproduces the too-familiar imagery of exclusion and presence of the “external enemy” among the domestic audience.

At the same time, the construction of the Self as “true Europe” and numerous explicit iterations of the integrationist discourse vis-à-vis the West and Europe under a different institutional framework, suggests that the Russian official discourse explicitly represents dynamic “othering.” The Russian discourse divorces the unfeasibility of the integration into the current institutional representation of the Western “security community” from the questions of Russia’s European identity, and sustains the construction along the myth about the threat to sovereignty equalling to the threat to “Europeanness.” In other words, the discourse separates the issues of strained relations with the present institutional representations of the West in general and Europe in particular from the issues of Russia’s historical role and place in “metaphysical” Europe, thereby trying to avoid the deconstruction of Russia’s European identity.

A peculiar feature of the Russian discourse is that notions of the “West” and “Europe” are interchangeably used in the context of possible integration: integration into the West means integration into Europe. At the same time, in the discursive constructions of “othering,” these two notions are separated, with the “West” receiving a negative connotation in contrast to “Europe.” Moreover, the cohesiveness of each of these notions is challenged. As a result, it is neither the “metaphysical” West nor Europe that is designated as inherently hostile and culturally alien Other. Rather, it is the “collective West that excludes Russia and acts unilaterally” that is Russia’s traditional hostile Other. The “collective West” can be conceptualized as the metaphorical Western “security community” of which NATO is currently the principal physical
institutional representation. Being an exclusive military and political organization, it fits perfectly into the image of “the collective West that excludes Russia and acts unilaterally” that constitutes Russia’s “unjust” hostile Other.

In the Russian official discourse, the role of NATO as a simulacrum or emulation of “the collective West that excludes Russia and acts unilaterally” is very pronounced: even when NATO is an explicitly named object, speakers do not treat it as an independently acting entity, and shift to the idea that NATO’s behaviour is indicative of the status of relations with the collective and solidary West or Transatlantic community (i.e. Western “security community”) or with the “disaggregated” West where the US and Europe are constructed as separate entities.

The Russian official discourse also demonstrates obvious signs of instrumental deployment. Among the principal examples thereto are the invocations of threats common to Russia and the West, periodical muting of particular narratives and securitizations, including those directed at NATO, as necessitated by international and domestic developments and political agendas, and the deployment of the Eurasianist discourse.

6. Conclusion

The analysis of the official NATO and Russia discourses demonstrates that the parties have effectively and successfully promoted desired “regimes of truths” about the Self, the Other, and the relations between the Self and the Other. In the case of the NATO discourse, the promoted regime of truth renders Russia’s inclusion in the Western security community impossible. In the case of the Russian discourse, the integration into the Western “security community” in the current institutional representation of NATO is also rendered unfeasible. The success of the both “regimes of truths” is determined by their wide public acceptance, as public polls testify.
The analysis has revealed several shared Foucauldian bio-political governmentality features used in both discourses, which may point to an increasingly similar ontological status of the Russian and Western forms of domination despite the growth of adversarial relations. Among the principal governmentality techniques employed by both parties are the invocation of “extant cultural material” of historically-developed mythologies defining the Self and the Other, and the engagement of bio-political imperatives through the acts of securitizations. The use of these techniques may be viewed as instrumental in producing knowledge and promoting meanings into the status of hegemonic, which ensures the successful acceptance of desired “regimes of truths” by target audiences.

The Derridian binary oppositions differentiating the Self from the Other as particular types are present in both Russian and NATO discourse, and serve as indicators of the discourse of “othering.” These linguistic means effectively invoke the “extant cultural materials” consisting of historically-developed, relatively fixed Self/Other identifications. Through continuous and persistent application, as demonstrated with the Foucauldian genealogic approach, their explicit and implicit meanings come into contact with the extant social knowledge to sustain the promoted “regimes of truth.”

The employed binary oppositions combine a dynamic non-essentialist view of the Other with an essentialist fixed “othering” embedded in them. The bio-political rationale of such “embeddedness” of the essentialist “othering” into a diplomatically-smoothed normative view of the Other lies in the psychological effect of establishing clear, finite, stable, and incontestable distinctions between the Self and the Other. These essentialist meanings draw upon extant social historical knowledge of knowing the Self and the Other as particular types, where identity divides run along cultural and civilizational lines. These linguistic oppositions are also linked to a specific historically-known pattern of international behaviour of the Self and the Other. Hence,
the textual oppositions have a bio-political meaning of “peace/ war” or “life/ death,” which provides fertile grounds for deployment of securitizations. The securitizations almost invariably accompany the construction of the Self and the Other in the analyzed discourses, and engage the historicized “extant cultural materials” of essentialist and fixed knowing of the Other as a “potential aggressor” and the Self as the “protector of peace.”

The selection of the binary oppositions and the patterns of deploying securitizations may suggest instrumental application of the discourses by both parties. Their capacity to successfully engage the “extant cultural material” plays a key role in internalization of the promoted meanings by the target audiences as common sense knowledge, and therefore, in the success of the promoted “regimes of truth.”

The findings of this research may also suggest that if the parties ever embark on promoting “regimes of truth” that render inclusion and integration as viable options, they will likely have to engage the “extant cultural material” present among the respective audiences in order to render the promoted meanings hegemonic. However, in that case, they will have to select and draw upon a different set of essentialist mythologies about each other that may be present in the social historicized knowledge – on those that mute historical divides, celebrate common cultural heritage, and securitize against common threats.

7. References


### 7.1. Primary Sources Cited


NATO (03 Sep. 2007) "NATO and Missile Defence" Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the AIAA Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition. Retrieved on March 22, 2010 at 11:12 from the NATO Official Website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_8467.htm?selectedLocale=en


RF MFA (2004b) Interview of the official representative of the RF MFA A.Yakovenko to RIA Novosti on pending visit of NATO Secretary General to Moscow. Retrieved on March 24, 2010 at 21:05 from the RF Foreign Affairs Ministry Website (in Russian): http://www.mid.ru/bl.nsf/483b39647d9c20cc3256def0051fa1f/313964a4e965f651c3256e660040dd21?OpenDocument


Master's Thesis

Anton Agafonov

http://www.mid.ru/NS_Publ.nsf/cb8e241d18a8904ec3256fc7002ddc0e/86685cbb486e9418c3256f02e002c6f09?OpenDocument

http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/e1e31b7c684d2dd843256e2c002a4eb8/c4b89e234c85da8ce325715a00229695?OpenDocument


RF MFA (2008b) Transcript of comments by RF Permanent Representative at the UN V. Churkin at the UN SC session on situation in Georgia following the statements of the UN SC members, New York, 28 August 2008 Retrieved on March 5, 2010 at 17:56 from the RF Foreign Affairs Ministry website (in Russian):
http://www.mid.ru/NS-dmo.nsf/cfabe4e8ed2f8ad7432569ff003cd1c0/432569f10031eb93c32574b50045d286?OpenDocument


RF MFA (2008d) Response by the Russian MFA Information and Press Department to a Media Question about the Outcome of the Visit to Georgia by the North Atlantic Council. Retrieved on March 12, 2010 at 17:52 from the RF Foreign Affairs Ministry website:

http://www.mid.ru/Ns-dvbr.nsf/58954e9b2d194fed432569ea00360f06/432569d800226387c3257519005507a1?OpenDocument

RF MFA (2008f) Deputy Minister A. Grusko’s interview on the relations between Russia and the EU to the Voice of Russia National Radio Network, November 2008. Retrieved in February 27, 2010 at 16:57 from the RF Foreign Affairs Ministry website (in Russian):
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/76bbf733e3936d4543256999005bcbb7/c5664066fd63c267c32574f70044c9ee?OpenDocument

http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/3E52FF15ABEB5A08C32574C90026E89B

http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRootrus/docs/off_news/270808/newru3.htm

http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2000/07/08/0000_type70029type82912_70658.shtml

http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2001/04/03/0000_type70029type82912_70660.shtml

http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2002/04/18/0000_type70029type82912_70662.shtml

http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2003/05/16/0000_type70029type82912_44692.shtml

http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml

RF President. (2004b) Russia takes a negative view of NATO expansion but has always seen the European Union's enlargement as a positive process. Statement of December 10, 2004. Retrieved on March 25 at 12:33 from the Presidential Web-portal:

RF President. (2004c) Russia takes a negative view of NATO expansion but has always seen the European Union's enlargement as a positive process. Statement of December 10, 2004. Retrieved on March 25 at 12:33 from the Presidential Web-portal:

http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml


Warsaw Voice (03.06.2009) Poland Joins NATO. Retrieved on February 14, 2010 at 15:00 from the Warsaw Voice Website: http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/20415/

8. List of Acronyms

CEE Central and East European states
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
EU European Union
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSU Former Soviet Union states
MAP Membership Action Plan
MLRS Multiple Launch Missile System
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>National missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPA</td>
<td>Program on International Policy Attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF MFA</td>
<td>Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCIOM</td>
<td>All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>