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Democracy, Duplicity and Dimona:
The United States of America, Israel and the Globe since 1949

By Jacob Peter Hogan

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the MA degree in name of program

Department of History
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Abstract

Democracy, Duplicity and Dimona: the United States of America, Israel and the Globe since 1949

Jacob Peter Hogan

Dr. Galen Perras

2010

The thesis examines Western complicity in covertly aiding, concealing and covering up Israel’s nuclear weapons program and the implications that process had on the Soviet Union and Egypt during the Cold War. At the circumvention of the democratic process, Dimona’s history is defined by shadowy scientism, obsequious journalism, secretive bureaucracies, clandestine corporatism and great power imperialism. In late October 1956 Israel acquired from France an atomic weapons reactor, with construction beginning in the Negev desert at Dimona during late 1957 or early 1958. During the ensuing years Israel received heavy water from Norway and Great Britain and uranium from Gabon, Argentina and South Africa. The atomic project was covertly funded by private Jewish donations from Canada, London, Paris and Wall Street. As early as 1958 factions within the State Department, Atomic Energy Commission and CIA factions were cognizant of Dimona’s existence yet the bureaucracy chose to remain silent. When Dimona was unveiled by the media in December 1960, the White House salaciously denied possessing any foreknowledge of the reactor’s nature, status or origins. The CIA-controlled and Jewish-dominated U.S. media obsequiously followed the state script by informing the public that Dimona was dedicated towards peaceful ends. During the 1960s the U.S. conducted pre-arranged tours of the facility, provided Israel with uranium and missiles to guard the reactor, covered up Israel’s nuclear ambitions following China’s first atomic test in October 1964, and refused to pressure Israel to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even though Dimona was the
key catalyst of the conflict, the U.S. also suppressed Israel’s nuclear program from emerging as the defining subject of the Six Day War. Armed with intelligence deriving from Israeli sources, in early 1966 the Kremlin began utilizing Cairo as a proxy mouth piece to rhetorically denounce Israel’s atomic agenda as Soviet relations with Egypt and the Arabs grew more intimate. In a failed attempt to destroy the reactor, the U.S.S.R. instigated the Six Day War crisis by fabricating false intelligence concerning Israeli troop concentrations and overflying the reactor with its most advanced plane in late May 1967.
Acknowledgements

"If you wish to understand the world, try to decipher Israel and if you wish to understand Israel, examine the world within which you live."1

Speaking to the people of New York State in Federalist No. 1, a lawyer and the first Secretary of the Treasury warned that the “fate of an empire” hinged on the deliberation “on a new constitution for the United States of America.”2 Alexander Hamilton added that those who “advocate” for the “truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.” Avraham Burg, a former speaker of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), World Zionist Organization (WZO) head and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) paratrooper, has likewise contended that “the truth suffers because it is surrounded by lies.”3 In a world in which credibility, perception and the suit and tie often supersede reality, however, the largest enemy of the truth is the myth rather than the lie.

I am a bit of a shut in. Serious people have to be. On my most humbling days I spend at least two to three hours reading the news online, including Forbes, whose website begins with a historic “thought of the day,” usually from a white male.4 The first one I read derived from John Adams: “The jaws of power are always open to devour.” The most striking, however, which best encapsulates my thesis supervisor, came from Michelangelo, who argued that “genius is eternal patience.” Thank you so much Dr. Perras. All mistakes and biases in this thesis belong to me.

You were crucial in bringing primary material from the British National Archives into my thesis, discovering the book which has allowed a revisionist perspective of the U.S.S.R.’s role in

3 Burg, *The Holocaust is Over*, p. 87.
Israel’s nuclear history to be pursued and introducing me to George Orwell’s fantastic essay “Politics and the English Language.”  Without your conciliatory words, I would have been unable to receive grant money to research at John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries, where I spent one week in Boston, Massachusetts, and two weeks in Austin, Texas, respectively.

Alongside time spent at the Canadian Library and Archives, I also spent a week each at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the National Archives and Records Administration, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and George Washington National Security Archive (GWNSA) in Washington. I would like to thank my father and best friend for financing these trips and everything else. Keep buying gold and silver. This thesis is dedicated to him and my sister, who has worked in Hollywood and currently has a show playing on YTV Wednesday and Friday nights, That’s So Weird. Only you two will understand me when I state that it is truly “only after we have lost everything that we are free to do anything.” Finally, thank you Mary Anne for everything you have done for our family over this past decade. I can not wait to read Tolstoy’s War and Peace. Following the mantra of a member of Yale’s Skull and Bones, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), U.S. Ambassador to China and the United Nations, Vice-

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President and President, my goal is to inspire others in this postmodern “new world order” that the “worthy” search for the “big idea” is needed now more ever.\textsuperscript{8}

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### Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>United States Arms Control and Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>United States Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPAC</td>
<td>American Israel Public Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDEL</td>
<td>Dwight David Eisenhower Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>DH</td>
<td><em>Diplomatic History</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWNSA</td>
<td>George Washington National Security Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEC</td>
<td>Israel Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Israeli Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAEIC</td>
<td>Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFKL</td>
<td>John F. Kennedy Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td><em>Jerusalem Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBJL</td>
<td>Lyndon Baines Johnson Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PFIAB</td>
<td>President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNIE</td>
<td>Special National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIB</td>
<td>United States Intelligence Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZO</td>
<td>World Zionist Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Edward Said once commented that T.S. Eliot’s “central idea” was to use poetry to show that “how we formulate or represent the past shapes our understanding and views of the present.” Memory is more important than history because the latter feloniously serves only those in power who wish to control it. The West’s 60-year complicity in the creation and cover-up of Israel’s nuclear weapons program is proof that “there are a lot of people who lie and get away with it.” In Munich on February 7, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was given a chance to prove his own words. Mentioning U.S. concerns about “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq and Iran, an anonymous Palestinian inquired why the U.S. remained “silent” about Israel when it had “more atomic weapons in the region than any other country.” Replying that since Israel is a “democracy” surrounded by hostile neighbors that would like to place it into “the sea,” Rumsfeld “opined” that over several “decades” Israel has ensured itself that it would not be driven into “the sea.” Surprisingly, few scholars have cared to concern themselves with how Israel’s atomic history has affected its relationship with the U.S.

Exemplified best in a 1998 debate conducted within *Diplomatic History*, Israel’s nuclear program has transcended the debate about when the U.S.-Israeli relationship became “special.” University of Iowa historian David Shoenbaum identified that successive and anonymous U.S. administrations have “ultimately averted their eyes from Israeli nuclear developments…” His contention that during Allen Dulles’ tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961) the Central Intelligence Agency’s relationship towards Israel was “coolly neutral, if not overtly anti-

Israel” was as naïve, uninformed and misleading as his argument that “democracies do not live on geopolitics alone.” Despite recognizing the covert role played by the Agency’s James Jesus Angleton in the bilateral relationship, Shoenbaum was unable to juxtapose the “legendary” spook’s rightful place in Israel’s nuclear history. Israeli journalists Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, contending that Angleton, as head of the Agency’s Israeli Desk, “either did not care about...the nuclear program or even looked the other way,” emphasized that it was only in the “twilight” of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency in December 1960 that the U.S. discovered Israel’s nuclear reactor in the Negev desert. Still, Dimona is largely absent from narratives stressing that Israel and the U.S. have always possessed a special bond and those purporting that this unique rapport was cemented only after the Six Day War of June 1967.

University of Hebrew professor Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov’s only mention of Dimona was in passing as he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol “apparently gave assurances that

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the ... nuclear reactor was devoted to peaceful ends...” sometime during the 1960s. The post-1967 “special” school is also supported by Ohio State historian Peter Hahn. Although tacitly critiquing Bar-Siman-Tov for not dismissing the “U.S.-Israeli conflict over nuclear weaponry in the 1960s,” Hahn glossed over how the U.S. “failed” to promote its “non-proliferation objectives” in the Near East during the “1960s.” He briefly mused that Andrew and Leslie Cockburn’s Dangerous Liaison (1991) and Seymour Hersh’s The Samson Option (1991) both contended “with a tone of censure” that U.S. and Israeli intelligence services had collaborated to bring Israel a nuclear weapons reactor. By refusing to elaborate upon their work, he also dismissed the possibility that elements within Washington were complicit in aiding and abetting Dimona, an assertion seconded by historian Douglas Little who has contended that while “Israel has always held a special place in the U.S. imagination.”

In his contribution to Michael Hogan’s America in the World (1991), Little reduced the U.S.-Israeli atomic history to a sentence, arguing that “despite what” the Pulitzer Prize winning

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7 All of Hahn’s primary sources for his DH analysis extended from January 30, 1961, to June 3, 1964, effectively omitting any real mention of U.S. policy towards Dimona during Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency. This theme is prevalent in his other work. In a one paragraph analysis in the 2006 edited The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World of the Globalization of the Cold War, a recycled cut and past selection from his 2001 book Caught in the Middle East, he contended that it was only in the “twilight” of Ike’s presidency when the U.S. intelligence community (IC) “confirmed” that Israel was building a “reactor of producing weapons-grade plutonium,” while emphasizing that Washington was “unequivocally” against nuclear proliferation. In his 2005 Crisis and Crossfire Hahn mentioned Dimona once in passing, arguing erroneously that President Lyndon Johnson had “vigorously promoted nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Months after the DH roundtable debate, Hahn published an article focused on his archival work in the Israeli Archives also omitting any comment on the atomic subject. Peter Hahn, “Special Relationships,” DH 22, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 266, 269, 269n17; Ibid., “The View from Jerusalem: Revelations about U.S. Diplomacy from the Archives of Israel,” DH, 22, 4, (Fall 1998); 509-532; Ibid, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (London: the University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 264; Ibid, “The U.S. and Israel in the Eisenhower Era: The ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited” in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2006), p. 234; Ibid, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), p. 49.

Hersh “says,” the U.S. has always “consistently opposed” the “acquisition” of a Jewish bomb.9

In a 1993 journal article recycled again in his 2004 American Orientalism, Little maintained that “by late 1960” President Eisenhower “feared” that Israel “might utilize” Dimona to “develop atomic weapons.” But since he was leaving power in January 1961, however, Ike left JFK “to do all the talking with Ben-Gurion.”10 University of Tel Aviv political scientist Abraham Ben Zvi, who has averred that seeds of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship were planted during the summer of 1958 before blooming after 1967, omitted Dimona entirely from his 1993 The U.S. and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship. In his 1998 Decade of Transition he was more forthcoming, emphasizing that despite Dimona’s unveiling in December 1960 the Eisenhower administration was still “anxious to leave office with a clean state.” Since the President had no time to direct and dictate “a coherent coercive strategy,” the “lame duck” White House simply decided to “avoid a direct confrontation with” Israel by looking “the other way…”11

Rather than representing the defining and dominant issue of the how “special” debate, Dimona has been largely dismissed, downplayed and denied by the generalized historiography focused on the 60-year Israel-U.S. relationship. 12 In an book praised by Foreign Affairs, a journal published by the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as a “very rich account” and by the NYT Book Review as “the most sophisticated and nuanced” study of the

9 Little has also aloofly argued that “over the years” the CIA and Mossad have “developed an excellent working relationship” but only provided a brief analysis of these ties starting in the 1980s. Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” DH 28, 5 (November 2004), pp. 692-693.
12 The only exception would be Oxford international relations professor Avi Shlaim’s The Iron Wall. It touched upon how Israel convinced France in the lead up to the Suez War of October 1956 to provide it with a 24 megawatt reactor. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), pp. 175, 176, 187, 204-210, 215-216, 221-223, 298.
Arab-Zionist conflict, historian Benny Morris mentioned Israel’s nuclear weapons program just once in *Righteous Victims* (1999). In *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (1985), political scientist Steven Spiegel briefly mentioned the issue twice. Stressing that the U.S. discovered Dimona “in late 1960,” he argued only in his footnotes that the reactor was a “concern” for the U.S. under Kennedy and Johnson and “ignored” by President Richard Nixon until after the October 1973 war. The most recent contemporary examination of the U.S.-Israeli relationship also failed to thoroughly address Israel’s atomic history. University of Chicago and Harvard political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt only examined Dimona in the post-Eisenhower context, contending aloofly that during “the early 1960s” the U.S. “clearly wanted to restrain Israel’s nuclear ambitions.” The overall failure of the U.S.-Israeli scholarship to incorporate the atomic issue into its general analysis is a reflection of the shortcoming and omissions present in the specialized Dimona historiography.

The first monograph focused on Dimona, Fuad Jabber’s *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, was published in London in 1971. At the time a doctoral student at UCLA carrying both U.S. and Lebanese citizenship, Jabber produced a largely theoretical and technical study, derived from

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the *NYT* and *Jerusalem Post (JP)* sources, which touched upon the “brief history of the origins” of Israel’s nuclear program. He noted that in 1952-53 Israel began networking with the French and Norwegian scientific communities and that the French-built reactor at Dimona was a “by-product” of the Suez War.\(^7\) Beginning with the canonized argument that Dimona’s “disclosure” to the U.S. occurred only in December 1960, Jabber also made three other key points.\(^8\) In an erroneous judgment disseminated by many others in the scholarship, he maintained that Israel had still “not... built” a chemical separation plant, the necessary component for enriching

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\(^7\) Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 10-11, 15-24

radioactive material and bomb making. Nonetheless, he still floated the idea that a Jewish bomb would serve Israeli-U.S. interests as it would be an “appropriate and credible deterrent” against an Arab desire to wipe “Israel from the world’s map.”

Jabber’s implicit support for an Israeli program was echoed again in a more explicit trial balloon in the fall 1972 by J. Bowyer Bell, a Senior Associate at Columbia’s Institute of War of Peace. A former member of the Hudson Institute and Harvard University, Bell declared that Israel needed “in a dangerous and unsure world” an “ultimate weapon” to aide in its “David-vs.-Goliath” struggle. Admitting that the subject had received little “comment” outside the Near East, Bell revealed that in 1966 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser had made a deal with Moscow enabling “the sale of atomic weapons” to Cairo. Although this contention was inaccurate, in 1973 Tel Aviv University political scientist Yair Evron stipulated that Soviet “Marshall Grechko” had traveled to Cairo in December 1965 in order to “increase Soviet influence in Egypt and deter Israel from ‘going nuclear.’” But like the rest of the scholarship, Evron was unwilling to explore Soviet-Egyptian relations vis-à-vis Dimona any further, qualifying that it was “unlikely” that Grechko was in a position to provide Nasser with a Soviet atomic guarantee. Evron briefly generalized that Dimona failed to make Arab “priorities” and Cairo “made no mention of the issue” prior to the Six Day War.

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19 This incorrect judgment that Israel was without a chemical separation facility is also perpetuated in the following. Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case,” p. 111; Steven Rosen, “Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1, 3 (Spring 1976), p. 27; Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, p. 77; Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (London: The John Hopkins Press, 1978), p. 18.

20 Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 77, 133, 146-147.


23 Building on his 1991 generalization that Moscow has always accepted “the ambiguity of Israel’s nuclear situation,” three years later Evron reemphasized stated that it can be “safely posited” that the Egypt “perceived” the chances of an Israeli bomb prior to June 1967 war, a conflict which had “no connection to the nuclear issue.” Evron, “Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case,” in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation Methodological and Policy Implications,
received increased scholarly attention with the first real analyses of France’s crucial role in the atomic project.

In her 1974 doctoral dissertation Columbia’s Sylvia Crosbie examined how Israel, lead by physicist Dr. Ernst Bergmann and Shimon Peres, began making ties in the early 1950s with France’s scientific community, a process that culminated sometime in “1956” when France agreed to provide Israel with a reactor. Although unsure if the reactor possessed a “chemical separation plant,” she correctly noted that this infrastructure, if it existed, would have had to been built by France.24 She also illuminated how France’s involvement in the Algerian Revolutionary War, beginning in 1954, helped to form what Israeli historian Simha Flapan contended in July 1974 was a “common enemy” in Nasser. Flapan correctly identified that in the days before the start of the Suez War in late October 1956 France agreed to provide Israel a 24 megawatt (MW) reactor, but his contention that the Israeli cabinet “approved” Ben Gurion’s proposal to build the reactor in “1957” was wrong.25 His statement that Egypt “refused to discuss… Israel’s nuclear option” beginning in 1966 also fails to square with the record.26

In 1974-1975 Israel’s nuclear weapons program was once again portrayed as necessary for its survival. In the October 1974 edition of Foreign Affairs George Quester emphasized that an Israeli bomb would never allow the Arabs to drive Israel “into the sea,” adding speciously that “rumors” existed of an Egyptian bomb in the future.27 Later in the year Evron stipulated that an Israeli bomb “would doom all Arab hope of defeating her,” while including the familiar trope

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27 George Quester, “Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?” Foreign Affairs, 53 (October 1974), pp. 82-83.
that Dimona was not uncovered by the U.S. until "the end of 1960." John Hopkins professor Robert Tucker called for U.S. to embrace Israel’s nuclear weapons program while admitting that the world had become "much more dangerous since" Zionism’s "early days..." Thanking historian Walter Laqueur for his consultation, Tucker argued in Commentary that Israel perceived its nuclear option as "a form of insurance against Israel’s desertion" by the U.S. to be used as a "polite form of blackmail..." In the same year Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen published Nuclear Threat in the Middle East. Describing Dimona as cloaked “in mystery,” they were the first to argue that Israel was “stockpiling” an atomic arsenal with a completed chemical separation plant. This bold contention was buttressed by several media stories in 1975-1976, precipitating Dimona to be misrepresented again in the apologetic scholarship.

Pranger and Tahtinen were denounced as having a “pro-Arab” bias by Robert Harkavy in his 1977 Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust, which professed that Israel did not make the

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29 This perception of U.S. abandonment of Israel was highlighted on November 10, 1975, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) decreed Zionism a racist ideology. In July 1976 Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz stated that U.S. policy towards Israel was “weakening” due to its oil interests in the Near East. He also added that there was “no longer” any doubts that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and warned that if the “intolerable moral pressures” continued then there could also be “no doubt” that the “only democracy in the Middle East” then could “unleash them” if facing its own destruction. This “suicide rather than surrender” Samson mind-frame is also mentioned in a 1972 Journal of Palestine Studies article. Norman Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary 62, 1 (July 1976), pp. 23-24, 29, 31; Robert W. Tucker, “Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?” Commentary, 60, 5 (1975), pp. 29, 34, 40-41; A.B. Zahlan, “The Science and Technology Gap in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Journal of Palestine Studies (Spring 1972), p. 42.
decision to build a chemical separation capacity until after the Six Day War.\textsuperscript{31} Harkavy also denounced a story written by former \textit{NYT} reporter Tad Szulc, whom he nonetheless characterized as possessing “impeccable credentials,” professing that claims that elements within the “pro-Israel” CIA had provided “overt assistance” to Israel’s nuclear program following the Suez Crisis as “bizarre.”\textsuperscript{32} Following Harkavy’s analysis, few in the scholarship have examined the Szulc thesis and none have pursued how the U.S. media has approached and reported on Dimona.\textsuperscript{33} Two major events – a highly probable detonation of an Israeli nuclear device in the Indian Ocean near South Africa on September 22, 1979,\textsuperscript{34} and Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s

\textsuperscript{31} In a March 1978 \textit{International Studies Quarterly} piece in which he thanked Evron, Aronson, Rosen and Tucker for their consultancy, Notre Dame political scientist Alan Dowty also critiqued Pranger’s and Tahiten’s finding that Israel “had developed nuclear weapons” as based on “unconfirmed…judgments” by professing that there was no “concrete evidence” of such a claim. He also foolishly speculated that since the French-Israeli atomic agreements were still secret, he naively assumed that Paris could have implemented its own safeguards. Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli Case,” pp. 79, 81, 81n3, 109.

\textsuperscript{32} Harkavy’s study was part of monograph series edited by historian Robert Schulzinger. Harkavy, \textit{Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust}, pp. 13-14, 127.

\textsuperscript{33} As a doctoral student in international relations at USC, Peter Pry revealed that Szulc had professed that Angleton had helped provide assistance towards Israel nuclear weapons program in 1957 and 1958. A future employee of the CIA, Pry agreed with Harkavy’s analysis, maintaining that “most accounts of the origins of Israel’s nuclear arsenal” either correctly omit or give “short shrift” to Sulzc’s allegations. The only other scholar to touch upon the issue has been St. John’s professor Honore Catudal, a former research assistant to Eleanor Dulles. In a 1991 monograph read over first by McGeorge Bundy, he reemphasized that the CIA had denied the Szule allegation. Peter Pry, \textit{Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal} (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 9- 10; Peter Pry, \textit{War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink} (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), p. 341; Honore M. Catudal, \textit{Israel’s Nuclear Weaponry: A New Arms Race in the Middle East} (London: Grey Seal, 1991), pp. 6, 26n9.

\textsuperscript{34} In February 1980 the \textit{Washington Post (WP)} revealed that Raviv, then a CBS radio news reporter, was only the second Israeli foreign correspondent to have his press credentials revoked when he traveled to Rome to announce that Israel could have detonated the bomb off the South African coast with the approval and help of Pieter Willem Botha’s government. Raviv’s sources for his report were Israeli journalists, Eli Teicher and Ami Dor-On, who in 1980 had their manuscript \textit{None Will Survive: the Story of the Israeli A-Bomb} banned by the Israeli censor and threatened with 15 years in jail if they revealed any of its contents. The U.S. reaction was more nuanced and subtle. In the aftermath of the apparent explosion an interagency study was conducted under the auspices of DCI Stansfield Turner, who political scientist Jeffrey Richelson has argued believed that Israel was responsible for the test. After a heavily censored December 1979 interagency report came to this same conclusion, President Carter set up a private committee to find the truth. Shortly after the DCI report was conducted, Richard Garwin, a University of Chicago and IBM physicist, longtime adviser to the CIA, and future Senior CFR science and technology Fellow, was asked to travel to Langley with Steve Lukaski, a former director of the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, in January 1980 where they laid the groundwork for an ad hoc group to be chaired by Jack Ruinia, a former MIT physicist. On May 23, 1980, Ruina’s group submitted their final report, concluding that while a “nuclear origin” could not be ruled out it was more likely that the “signal” detected was caused by a “small meteoroid” hitting the satellite. William Claiborne, “Israel Penalizes Reporter for Violating Censorship,” \textit{WP}, February 25, 1980, p. A7; James Adams, \textit{The Unnatural Alliance} (New York: Quartet Books, 1984), p. 1985; Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case,” \textit{Israel Affairs}, 12, 3 (July 2006), pp. 531-532; Jeffrey Richelson,
French-built nuclear facility at Osiraq on June 7, 1981 \(^{35}\) - helped to place a renewed scholarly emphasis on Israel’s nuclear weapons program by the early 1980s.

In the only monograph focused on the Paris’ crucial place in Israel’s atomic history, a year later French journalist Pierre Péan published *Les Deux Bombes*. The book, outlining how Paris and Jerusalem in October 1957 secretly agreed to provide the latter with a nuclear reactor, was controversial. The general administrator of the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) during the 1950s, Pierre Guillaumat, tried to block its publication. This increased willingness to discuss and debate Dimona was exemplified in the first Israeli account of the nation’s nuclear program. Despite his contradictory analysis of U.S. policy – arguing that Washington was both “firmly opposed to Israeli nuclear nuclearization” while admitting it also failed to gain an “Israel promise not to produce nuclear weapons”- political scientist Shai Feldman’s *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (1982) was still influential. His declaration that Israel should establish an “explicit nuclear deterrence” set the tone for many of the essays published in Louis Rene Beres’ edited *Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy* (1986).\(^{36}\)

Starting with the editor, most of the book’s contributors did not accept Feldman’s call for Israeli atomic transparency. Beres, who received his Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton, argued that since Israel’s “commitment to self-preservation” exceeded that of its neighbors, it was possible that if faced with “the end of the Third Temple” Israel could empty its

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35 The Israeli strike was conducted by eight U.S.-built F-15 jets. A Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Orisa,” *Nonproliferation Review*, 12, 2 (July 2005), pp. 357, 363.

atomic "disposal." He even suggested that the "morality" of such a decision could be debated.

Harkavy questioned Feldman's call for an open Israeli doctrine, emphasizing that Israel's nuclear arsenal was the "moral...equivalent to a knife wielded by a scrawny man in a menacing neighborhood." 37 Political scientist Stephen Cimbala avowed that an open Israeli nuclear posture would produce negative implications, while adding that the U.S. and Soviet atomic arsenals during the 1967 and 1973 wars, with particular emphasis on the latter, helped bring "both conflicts to a conclusion." With the exception of Hebrew University Gerald Steinberg's observation that the Soviets had threatened nuclear war in 1956 to "dislodge Israel from the Sinai" during the Suez Crisis, there was little analysis of Moscow's policies toward Israel in the overall monograph. The best essay was provided by philosopher Avner Cohen. Noting Albert Einstein's 1946 observation that the atomic age has "changed everything save our models of thinking," he understood how Israel's clandestine atomic program has caused problems for "its democratic system" as the nation's military censor had effectively neutered the issue in the press, intelligentsia and Knesset. 38 Over a month after the book hit the press on August 23, 1986, the world was introduced to Mordechai Vanunu, a Moroccan-born Jew.

Over a week after the Mossad had drugged, beat and kidnapped Vanunu in Rome on October 5, 1986, the London Sunday Times published a three page expose on Dimona. Vanunu, who had worked at Dimona's Machon 2 facility from November 1976 to October 1985, ended the debate over whether Israel possessed a chemical separation plant. Machon 2 was unveiled to


contain a secret underground facility used to enrich radioactive material to build 100 nuclear weapons over the previous 20 years. Dr. Theodore Taylor, a protégé of Robert Oppenheimer, and Dr. Frank Barnaby, a nuclear physicist who had helped Great Britain to develop the bomb during the 1950s, verified Vanunu’s story and the 50 plus pictures he had snapped of the facility. The Vanunu revelations forced the scholarship to focus less on whether Israel possessed the nuclear bomb and increasingly on the domestic and foreign tropes of Dimona’s history.39

In late 1987 Wisconsin law professor Gary Milhollin touched upon how the U.S. and Norway had provided Israel with heavy water during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1991 three scholarly books were published focused on Israel’s nuclear origins, Honoré Catudal’s Israel’s Nuclear Weaponry, Shlomo Aronson’s The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, and Hersh’s The Samson Option. The best of these three was Hersh’s, thanks to its yeoman probing of the crucial roles played by Dr. Bergmann and a longtime U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Walworth Barbour, in Dimona’s history. Alongside a brief analysis exposing the New York elements which had secretly funded the project, Hersh used interviews with former CIA officials to contend that the CIA and White House were aware of Dimona’s existence via U-2 flights as early as 1958 but chose to do nothing. In 1996 Israeli scholars Ariel Levité and Emily Landau provided the first extensive analysis focused on the Arab perceptions

and policies towards Dimona prior to the Six Day War.\textsuperscript{40} Two years later the seminal account of
the historiography was published.

In the first Dimona narrative based on archival material, Avner Cohen’s \textit{Israel and the Bomb} certainly caused a stir within Israel. After the book was published in 1998 Cohen, who
received veiled threats and phone calls from the Israeli Defense Ministry, refrained from
returning to Israel until 2002 where upon he was investigated by Israeli police. In response to the
book some papers belonging to Levi Eshkol focused on the nuclear issue were taken from
Eshkol’s surviving widow by Israeli authorities. The U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) also censored many documents focused on the subject during Lyndon
Johnson’s presidency.\textsuperscript{41} By tracing Dimona’s beginning back to the Israel’s early existence,
identifying the key bureaucrats and technocrats who drove and debated the program in the
shadows, and unearthing the transformative September 1969 accord between Richard Nixon and
Prime Minister Golda Meir, Cohen represents the seminal authority within the historiography.

Bilateral narratives devoid of an internationalist trope have defined the most recent
Dimona scholarship. Drawing from French and Hebrew sources, University of Ben Gurion
historian Binyamin Pinkus demonstrated in a 2002 article in \textit{Israel Studies} how the French-
University, Zaki Shalom, produced the archival-based \textit{Israel’s Nuclear Option}. Other than a
brief blurb in his introduction, Shalom omitted any mention of how Dimona was approached by
the Eisenhower administration in a study focused on the atomic policies of the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations toward Israel. Shedding new light on how Dimona was secretly
financed by a global Jewish consortium and how the Mossad conspired to ensure Egypt was

\textsuperscript{40} Levité, Ariel and Emily Landau. “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967,” \textit{Israel Studies} 1, 1
(Spring 1996), pp. 34-53.
\textsuperscript{41} Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case,” pp. 538-539.
unable to build its own deterrent power, a year later Israeli journalist Michael Karpin published *The Bomb in the Basement.* But as with Cohen’s *Israel and the Bomb,* none of these accounts analyzed the major shortcoming and weaknesses of the historiography.

The thesis examines Western complicity in covertly aiding, concealing and covering up Israel’s nuclear weapons program and its Cold War implications on the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. A revisionist narrative can only emerge after identifying and addressing the historiography’s three unexplored and unexplained realms. Firstly, I will refute the mendacious myth that the U.S. had no foreknowledge about Dimona before December 1960 and that it remained uninformed about the Israel’s atomic project’s origins, nature and intentions during the ensuing decade. In following Alexis De Tocqueville’s observation that the “press” represents the great “democratic instrument of freedom,” a second revisionist angle will be a critique of the U.S. media’s coverage of Dimona. By incorporating 319 newspaper stories, including 226 *NYT* contributions, I will purport that the subservient U.S press has intentionally and consistently suppressed, deceived and confused the U.S. public about Dimona since Eisenhower’s final days in office. Finally, the study will conceptualize an internationalist framework by probing how the Soviet Union, utilizing Egypt and Syria as puppet proxies, instigated the Six Day War crisis in an attempt to provide the context to eliminate Dimona, a reactor whose origins lie in four different continents.

Chapter one will demonstrate that the West’s complicity in Dimona began years before the facility was publicly unveiled in December 1960. In September 1948 Israel’s David Ben Gurion proudly envisioned that the “intellectual” diffusion precipitated by the global Jewish

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43 The majority of these articles were found courtesy of the underappreciated and underused online University of Ottawa ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. Via the internet, I also accessed primary documentation from 17 volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, the George Washington National Security Archive, the American Presidency Project and C-SPAN.
Diaspora would enable Israel to “blossom” under the “genius of science.” From 1949 until his leave of absence in December 1953, he cultivated key individuals within academia and the military to quietly establish Israel’s atomic knowledge base and make first contacts with the other national scientific communities. Proving that alliances are driven by expediency rather than principle, after the Algerian War of Independence commenced in 1954, France turned to Israel for intelligence about Nasser and Egypt’s role in supporting the Algerian revolutionaries. Beginning in September 1955 and picking up again in May and June 1956, Ben Gurion delegated Shimon Peres and other shadowy figures to network in Paris to convince the French government to provide atomic assistance to Israel. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in late July, bilateral relations drew closer in late September with a deal providing Israel with a nuclear reactor. This accord was cemented by Peres a month later when France, Britain and Israel conspired to wage war against Egypt in late October 1956. After French Prime Minister Guy Mollet began reconsidering the secret accord, Peres convinced Mollet’s successor, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, to keep this pledge. In late 1957 or early 1958 French firms began clandestinely building the reactor in the Negev desert at Dimona. Despite the façade of mild French opposition following Charles De Gaulle’s ascent to power in late 1958, the status quo proceeded unabated into the 1960s.

The opening chapter will also reveal the crucial scientific and financial communities which helped construct and finance Dimona. While Peres was the catalyst in acquiring the reactor, Dr. Ernst Bergmann was the guiding force in acquiring heavy water. After years of networking, in the summer of 1958, Bergmann utilized contacts in Norway to broker a three-way deal in which London provided Israel with 20 tons of Norwegian heavy water in 1959-1960. How Israel paid for its nuclear weapons program echoes Immanuel Wallerstein’s theorem that

capitalism has always been a global “affair” transcending the decadent nation state. The greatest U.S. support to Israel’s nuclear weapons program came first from Wall Street rather than Washington. In October 1958 Ben Gurion met with lawyer Abraham Feinberg in order to devise a covert financial campaign to finance the project. Working directly with Peres, Feinberg attracted capital from the globe’s richest and most influential Jews. Israel’s public committed little of their own money to build the most expensive project in their nation’s history and was neither consulted nor informed of the state’s atomic agenda.

In refuting William Quandt’s generalization that Near East policy is “usually set” by the President and the Secretary of State, I will argue in chapter two that U.S. policy towards Dimona during the Eisenhower administration was instead driven by “faceless bureaucrats,” Wall Street lawyers, brilliant scientists, and troubleshooting diplomats. Political scientist Garry Clifford has envisioned bureaucracies as complex and “compartmentalized” machines often producing unintended and unpredictable results, shattering the orthodox perception of the state as a unitary and rational actor. Machiavelli has contended that one can determinate a leader’s “character” by examining the “sort” of people surrounding them. Sun Tzu placed importance on observing the “doorkeepers...” of power. In perceiving the CIA as a rogue state within a state, the Company provided atomic assistance to Israel and covered up the reactor’s true intentions as the U.S.’s most powerful, persuasive, and secret bureaucracy. I will contend that deep factions

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45 Ole Holsti, “Theories of International Relations,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, p. 66.
within the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and CIA knew of Dimona’s existence by early 1958 but choose to remain silent until the reactor was partially unveiled by the \textit{NYT} and \textit{Washington Post (WP)} in December 1960. Following the White House’s carefully screened message, the U.S. media deceived the public by downplaying, denying and dismissing the likelihood of an Israel bomb as an unrealistic and bizarre rumor.

Chapter three will analyze and interpret the implications of Dimona on Israel’s domestic political scene and its Cold War adversaries from 1961 to 1969. During the early part of the decade, despite his declining power, Ben Gurion was still able to shape the nation’s atomic policy and took steps to implicitly demonstrate Israel’s new strategic deterrent through Peres and demonstrations of technological innovation. Prior to his June 1963 resignation he was also able, although not as completely, to manage how the issue was presented in the national security apparatus, Knesset and the media. Levi Eshkol, Ben Gurion’s successor, possessed some knowledge of the project when he assumed office and even had the nuclear issue used against him by powerful forces in the lead up to the 1965 election campaign. At a time when Moscow and Cairo began criticizing Israel on Dimona, following Eshkol’s electoral victory the Knesset and media began to investigate the subject more closely. Neither institution, however, were aware that Israel already possessed the bomb just prior to the Six Day War. Following Eshkol’s February 1969 death, Golda Meir cemented her predecessor’s policy by refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, a decision quietly supported by Washington.

Chapter three will also contend that following Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 Moscow’s strove to eliminate Dimona before the reactor could produce a usable atomic weapon. This analysis will lean on Isabella Ginor’s and Gideon Remez’s \textit{Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviet’s Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War} (2007), a lucid journalistic perspective of the
U.S.S.R.'s perceptions and policies changed towards Dimona during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{50} Embracing the idiom that the "role of intelligence services" represents the "missing dimension of international history,"\textsuperscript{51} beginning in December 1965 influential Soviet sympathizers within Israel began informing the Kremlin that Israel's peaceful atomic proclamations were dishonest. The Kremlin subsequently strengthened ties with the Arab world, culminating in a November 1966 KGB deal with Egyptian intelligence to work together in any future military confrontation with Israel. Utilizing Nasser as a rhetorical mouthpiece throughout 1966-1967, the Soviets engineered a fabricated crisis involving Syria on May 12, 1967, to prod Israel into launching a preemptive strike against the Arabs in order to give Moscow a pretext to eliminate the Dimona reactor.

After demonstrating that Eisenhower intentionally suppressed, manipulated, and censored intelligence on Dimona, de Tocqueville's mantra that "once put in motion" the "machine" will often progress "self-guided" can be employed to study U.S. policy towards Israel during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{52} Chapter four will highlight the taciturn U.S. support during the Kennedy years from the U.S. national security apparatus at the expense of a political motivated President. During this period the U.S. conducted its first two pre-arranged and contrived visits to the Negev desert in May 1961 and August 1962, and decided to provide Israel the Hawk missile in August 1962 and heavy water in July 1963. How the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) negotiations of 1963 with Moscow conveniently provided the context for the only serious criticism of Israel's nuclear program from Washington will also be deconstructed. In chapter five the thesis will examine Dimona's place during Lyndon Johnson's presidency vis-à-vis the Gilpatric Committee, which

\textsuperscript{50} Fluent in Russian, Ginor is a research fellow at the Harry Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University and Remez a former journalist and IDF paratrooper during the Six Day War.
\textsuperscript{51} Scott Lucas and Alistair Morey, "The Hidden 'Alliance': The CIA and MI6 before and the Suez," \textit{Intelligence and National Security}, 15, 2 (Summer 2000), p. 95.
examined nuclear proliferation after China’s first atomic test in October 1964, the March 10, 1965, U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, the Six Day War of June 1967, and the NPT of July 1, 1968. Both chapters four and five will outline how through the 1960s the U.S. media refused to cover Dimona on a consistent and honest basis while promoting the fantasy that the reactor was still peaceful and the falsehood that Egypt was working on the bomb. The media failed to grasp that during these years U.S. policy continued to be driven by unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats, scientists, lawyers and private individuals. America’s 16th President was sometimes wrong. Some “citizens” always manage to escape “history.”

Lawyer Clark Clifford was wrong. It is the President who is the “chameleon” who changes his “personality” according to the “Government” rather than vice-versa. Presidents need not to make new friends; they just have to keep their old ones. In a revealing diatribe attributed to FDR, Presidents are selected rather than elected. Since Ike, JFK, LBJ and Richard Nixon all took a detached and dismissive approach towards Dimona, U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona illuminates historian Carroll Quigley’s trans-partisan dictum that the Democratic and Republican parties are “almost identical” factions of the Wall Street Party. Power is organized and disseminated by capital, technology and geography before ideology. Progandized and militarized from California and Silicon Valley since World War II, Washington is controlled from first and foremost New York, and then Connecticut, Chicago, and lastly Massachusetts.

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56 Quigley has averred that the “idea” of two political machines present conflicting “ideals and policies,” such as the nihilistic, redundant and simplistic “right” versus “left” or conservative against liberal controlled paradigms, is a “foolish” perception perpetuated and defended by “doctrinaire and academic thinkers.” The uniformed and credulous, like the naïve supporters of President Barack Obama, who believe than an election can allow the “rascals” to be thrown “out” are unaware that there have been few “profound or extensive shifts” in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: MacMillan Company, 1966), pp. 1247-1248.
When a Texan occupies the White House the system switches almost completely to auto-pilot.  

The U.S., the most powerful state since Rome, represents the most sophisticated, opaque, confusing and elephantine power system in history. A former Canadian diplomat, poet, and Berkley professor has contended that the U.S. possesses both a “regular history” and a “deep history.” Even though the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship already straddles this pendulum, I will contend that Washington’s approach to Dimona deserves placement in Peter Dale Scott’s latter category. De Tocqueville averred that while the U.S. was covered “with a layer of democracy” it also possessed a hidden oligarchy of “old aristocratic colors” through a strategic class of “merchants, lawyers” and “physicians.” He added that he knew of “no other country where the love of money has taken a stronger hold.” Comprised of an “ unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics,” Theodore Roosevelt warned in 1912 as the Progressive Party’s Presidential candidate that an “invisible government” existed in the U.S. “enthroned” above and beyond the “ostensible government.” Our world is much more complicated and esoteric than most of us think. Our journey beings with how Israel began the process of providing itself with what President Harry Truman paradoxically described as both the “greatest” and “worst thing” ever invented by “organized science in history.”

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57 Over 80 percent of the U.S. Jewish population, roughly 2 to 4 percent of the nation’s total population, are located in just nine states- California, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey and Florida. These states currently hold 202 of the 535 Electoral College’s delegates. Goldberg, Jewish Power, pp. 33-34, 57  
59 De Tocqueville, Democracy and America, pp. 50, 56.  
Israel’s sagacious founding father had a vivid imagination. According to Shimon Peres, his shining protégé, David Ben Gurion was blessed with “earthly realism” and “sky-scraping vision.” His ability to think big and delegate smartly enabled Israel to obtain the bomb. In March 1948 the Haganah, forerunner of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), created the Science Corps HEMED (its Hebrew acronym). In August Ernst Bergmann became head scientific adviser to the Defense Minister. Two months later Ben Gurion announced that the “intellectual” diffusion which had accompanied the Jewish Diaspora would allow “capital” and the “genius of science” to “blossom” in Israel. In 1949 Giulio Racah of the Hebrew University’s selected six Israeli students to study physics abroad. Another key figure was General Israel Dostrovsky who led a geological mission of the Negev desert for HEMED from 1949-1951.

Israel’s first atomic contacts with France also occurred in 1949. In March French scientist Moshe Sordin secretly met Ben Gurion, admitting later that the Prime Minister was

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62 James Madison defined factionalism as a cabal of citizens, whether a majority or minority, united and inspired by a universal “interest” unfavorable to the “permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” He warned that “causes of faction cannot be removed” only their effects controlled. Admitting that “enlightened” leaders will “not always be at the helm,” Hamilton concurred that a government which operates “out of sight” usually does not “act in the people’s interest.” De Tocqueville mused that when the state is divided into many hostile “factions” the interests of the “majority is often overlooked.” See Federalist Numbers 10, 27, 51. Wills ed., The Federalist Papers, pp. 43, 45, 132, 262; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 296.


65 Bergmann met Chaim Weizmann in London in 1938. Acting on Albert Einstein’s advice, Weizmann selected Bergmann to direct the Daniel Sieff Research Institute, funded by the Sieff family. Israeli journalist Michael Karpin has pointed out that after Bergmann’s wife died of cancer in 1937, he re-married Weizmann’s secretary, which ended ties with Weizmann. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 35; Peres, From These Men, p. 125.


67 Amos de Shalit and Igal Talmi went to Zurich, Uri Haber-Schaim studied at the University of Chicago under Enrico Fermi, Gvirol Goldring went to London’s Imperial College, whereas Israel Pelah attended Amsterdam University. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 26; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 48.

68 Dostrovsky, holding a doctorate in physical chemistry from London’s University, founded the isotopes departments at the Sieff Institute and HEMED C in 1948. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 21, 25.

extremely “interested in the atom.” In July 1951 Jean-Francis Perrin, High Commissioner of the Commisariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA), surveyed Dostrovsky’s heavy water research. Binyamin Pinkus, a historian at Ben Gurion University, has contended that the Israelis were informed that Perrin’s trip was only an innocent “cultural exchange.” According to journalist Pierre Péan, the Israelis were the only foreigners permitted to “move unrestricted” throughout France’s scientific community in the late 1940s. Ironically, the Israelis more easily discussed atomic issues with the French than amongst themselves.

In July 1951 the Chaim Weizmann-Bergmann feud climaxed when the former informed the latter that his Institute duties were finished. Thirteen days later, Ben Gurion appointed Bergman as scientific adviser to the Defense Ministry and HEMED, proposing a new division focused on long term national research. Ben Gurion yearned for Munya Mardor to manage the new ministry but realized that he would need to be co-opted. In January 1952 Mardor relented but only after gaining control of R&D prioritization at the new Research and Infrastructure Division. EMET, meaning “truth,” was created without a troublesome paper trail. Working with Bergmann, Mardor placed all HEMED laboratories under EMET’s jurisdiction. Scientists from the Hebrew University and the Technion were reorganized into Machons (institutes). Sometime in 1952 the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), headed by Bergmann, was created as a

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73 Bergmann continued researching at Haifa’s Institute of Technology (Technion) and Jerusalem’s Hebrew University, but was banned from the Weizmann Institute’s premises. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 29.
74 In October 1945 Munya met Ben Gurion after he had stolen a truck from a British army outpost outside Belsen, Germany, and then sailed with it to Palestine. The truck carried Jews immigrating to Palestine as Mardor was part of the “Ha-Mossad l’Aliyah Bet,” or the “Institute for Illegal Immigration.” In 1951 the Mossad, Israel’s equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was founded. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 10-11, 31.
Defense Ministry subsidiary. Alongside Dostrovsky and Racah, the IAEC included Shmuel Sambursky, Saul Cohen, Franz Ohlendorf and Ya’acov Dori. Avner Cohen has contended that the IAEC’s autonomy was “only a veneer” as Bergmann utilized Machon 4 to obtain loftier goals, outlined in a 1952 meeting: “First, the reactor… then… research.” Amos de Shalit and Uri Haber-Schaim criticized this choice as they envisioned the IAEC as strictly an academic institution. The intermediary in the Ben Gurion-Bergmann relationship was the new Deputy-Director General of the Defense Ministry, Shimon Peres.

Political changes within Israel in 1953 overshadowed its important atomic discoveries. Sometime in 1952-53 Dostrovsky developed a new formula to enrich water with deuterium to produce heavy water, a precondition for atomic reactors, and invented a cheaper method of separating uranium from phosphate deposits. These breakthroughs did not prevent a physically drained Ben Gurion from taking a three month leave in July 1953. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett became interim Prime Minister, while Pinhas Lavon was elevated to Defense Minister. Following the IDF’s October 15 reprisal raid on the Jordanian village of Qibya, Ben Gurion returned. Ben Gurion resigned on December 7, 1953, thus propelling Sharett and Lavon back to

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75 Translating from Mardor’s Hebrew account Rafael, Cohen has argued that Mardor viewed EMET’s creation as a “long-term” project, dedicated to creating “weapons” capable of preserving Israel’s “security” and “existence.” Cohen has professed that the IAEC was “quietly” created in June 1952. This assertion has been supported by Jabber, who has contended that the decision was not made public until a November 1954 Bergmann radio address. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 15, 31, 38, 45; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 42; Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), pp. 18-19.

76 After threatening to resign, Haber-Shaim was asked by Bergmann in early 1953 to study at Saclay. When he refused, he was fired and could not find work in Israel. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 36-37, 39, 358 n45.

77 In 1946 Peres, along with Moshe Dayan, was a youth delegate of the Labor Party to the Zionist Congress in Vienna. The next year Peres was recruited into the Haganah by Levi Eshkol, although he never donned a military uniform. In 1949 he became the Ministry of Defense’s Attaché in New York, while also studying at New York University and the Harvard Business School. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 43-44; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 18; William Claiborne, “Boy Wonder,” Washington Post (WP), September 24, 1984, p. A26.

78 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 32.

their old interim positions but not before Peres was promoted to Director General of the Defense Ministry and Moshe Dayan became IDF Chief of Staff.  

Beginning with his first visit to the facility with Bergman and Mardor in early 1954, Lavon advocated that EMET would divert resources from conventional defense and academic research. On January 20, 1954, he instructed Peres to transfer Machon 4’s Physics Department to the Weizmann Institute. Within three months the Department of Nuclear Physics was created with the deal’s architect, de Shalit, in charge. Mardor, who had not been consulted, was upset as the decision deprived the IAEC of the physicists which he and Bergmann had been training for the past two years. These internal setbacks and divisions, however, were offset by Israel’s growing ties with France’s atomic community in 1954.

This groundwork had been laid by Colonel Yuval Ne’eman, Israel’s Paris Military Attaché, who began networking with Bergmann in September 1953. In late 1953 France’s atomic centers at Saclay and Chatillon became open to Zvi Lipkin, Israel Pelah and de Shalit. After speaking with Dostrovsky on March 15, 1954, Bergmann told Ben Gurion that these discoveries now enabled Israel to sell nuclear products abroad. Although the exact date is disputed, Cohen has averred that in early 1954 the IAEC sold Dostrovsky’s patents to the CEA for 60 million francs. Bergmann’s tireless salesmanship continued. Conscious that Norway had been providing France heavy water since 1940, on May 10, 1954, he asked Gunnar Randers

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80 A day after Ben-Gurion resigned, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower announced his Atoms for Peace plan before the United Nations, which proposed the dissemination of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.
84 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 32, 356n23.
85 Péné and Pinkus have contended that the agreement was finalized in 1953. According to Cohen, Bertrand Goldschmidt, a member of the Rothschild family by marriage and CEA’s chemistry director, argued that he was told by the CEA’s general administrator, Pierre Guillaumat, that Israel was “serious” about the transaction. Péné Les Deux Bombes, pp. 65-66; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 105, 115.
86 Peres has divulged that chain-smoking IAEC head was seldom “relaxed” or “tired” as he put in eighteen hour work days. Peres, From These Men, p. 125.
if the Norwegian Atomic Energy Commission “would be interested” in building Israel a
“uranium factory…” Norway rejected the offer as the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiative rendered
Dostrovsky’s patents obsolete. This setback was compounded by an internal debate which surfaced a month later after the Atoms for Peace plan offered Israel a reactor of its own.

Hebrew University historian Gabriel Sheffer has argued that Sharett twice commented in his diary in June 1954 that “atomic” concerns should not be raised with Eric Johnson, the U.S. envoy sent to the region to discuss a water sharing program. Only if Johnson raised the “matter ad res” would Sharett have “no objection” discussing the subject but Israel, naturally, would “offer no concessions.” Drawing from Sharett’s diary of June 18, Cohen has stressed that the response to the offer divided the IAEC along its usual lines.”

Confused over the control of atomic policy, on June 28 Sharett wrote that Ben Gurion had told him that it made “sense” to place authority in “the prime minister’s office.” During the summer Franco-Israeli relations strengthened when the French military invited Dayan to Paris. In July two nameless French professors and a CEA member also toured the Weizmann Institute.

These events were overshadowed by an Israeli espionage failure. In early July 1954 Cairo

89 Sambursky, representing academia, projected a “cautious” policy focused on theoretical research, while Bergmann prioritized the need to acquire uranium in “a few years…” Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 34.
90 There is no mention of Prime Minister Sharett’s nuclear policy by Shlaim and Ya’acov bar-Siman-Tov in their respective analyses of Ben Gurion and Sharett. This is odd, since both sourced heavily from Sharett’s diary, edited and released by Moshe’s son, Yaakov, in 1978. Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben Gurion and Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies 24, 3 (July 1983), pp. 330-356; Avi Shlaim, “Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs: Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 1953-1956,” Middle East Journal 37, 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 180-201; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 34.
91 A month later Peres and Air Minister Diomede Catroux, with the blessing of Premier Pierre Mendès-France, agreed to sell Israel Ouragan and Mystère II fighters, with an option on another twelve Mystère IV’s and AMX tanks. This deal was kept secret until April 1956. Zaki Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 6; Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance, p. 42; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 116.
and London announced their intentions to withdraw British troops from the Suez Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{92} Seeking to derail this accord, Israeli intelligence, headed by Colonel Binyamin Gilvi, activated a sleeper cell in Egypt. On July 2 bombs struck U.S.-built libraries in Cairo. Three weeks later, three cell members were caught detonating false flag bombs in theatres showing Western films. Givli claimed that Lavon had given him orders to act, while Lavon blamed the fiasco on a pernicious faction of army officers.\textsuperscript{93} Six years would pass before the truth finally emerged. In the meantime, according to Sheffer, the “Mishap” precipitated a “tremendous crisis” upon a “beleaguered” Sharett, who in the aftermath began to follow “nuclear” issues more closely.\textsuperscript{94} In August Lavon briefed Sharett about the successful negotiations of Dostrovsky’s patents with Paris and London only to have French Defense Minister Jules Moch inadvertently disclose the deal in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November. On November 16 Sharett informed the Knesset (Parliament), while the next day the French dailies, \textit{Le Figaro} and \textit{Le Monde}, reported on the CEA and the Weizmann Institute collaboration.\textsuperscript{95}

All the publicity was for naught as neither France nor the U.K. used the IAEC patents.\textsuperscript{96} These atomic revelations, however, aided Ben-Gurion’s return to power. On December 16, 1954, in an executive session with the Mapai leadership, Ben Gurion proposed fully pursuing the “development of science.”\textsuperscript{97} With the “Mishap” still rousing public opinion, on January 2, 1955, Sharett appointed Judge Yitzhak Olshan and Ya’acov Dori, an IAEC member, to find the truth. The commission, however, produced no verdict, further damaging the government’s credibility.

\textsuperscript{92} This agreement was officially signed on October 19, 1954. Shlaim, \textit{The Iron Wall}, p. xxii.


\textsuperscript{94} Sheffer, \textit{Moshe Sharett}, p. 753.


\textsuperscript{96} Sheffer has stated that Sharett was “personally involved” in the talks with France and Britain about atomic cooperation. Sometime in August 1954 Lavon briefed Sharret about the “successful conclusion” of these deals. Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 34; Sheffer, \textit{Moshe Sharett}, p. 753.

\textsuperscript{97} Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 34.
On February 2, Lavon resigned and Ben Gurion became the new Defense Minister nineteen days later. On February 28 the IDF launched Operation Black Arrow into the Gaza Strip, leading with Egypt’s President Gamal Nasser to launch daily fedayeen raids into Israel. Ultimately, it was Nasser who indirectly prompted France and Israel in a security alliance.

On October 31, 1954, Front de libération nationale (FLN) was born in Algeria, with a revolutionary message to throw off French colonialism by force and internationalized diplomacy. The following day, All Saints Day in France, seven French deaths occurred in roughly thirty attacks nationally. Still only months after its brutal defeat at Diem Bien Phu, France was keen to gain any intelligence about Egypt’s role in the war and immediately turned to Israel. Through Colonel Joseph Nahmias, Israel’s new Military Attaché in Paris, Peres was met with George Elgozy, a Jewish advisor to Prime Minister Edgar Faure, in April 1955 at Faure’s residence. Despite these talks the French arms embargo, a consequence of the May 25, 1950, Tripartite Declaration, remained in place. While Peres was laying the seeds of a strategic accord with

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99 Shlaim, ‘Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs,” p. 188.
100 Political scientist Zaki Shalom of the Ben Gurion University has argued that Ben Gurion always feared the emergence of a “magnetic” leader, with gravitas similar to Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, capable of uniting the Arab world against Israel. Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Options, p. 2.
102 Throughout 1954-55 Nahmias, behind the back of the Foreign Ministry and Israel’s Ambassador in Paris, Jacob Tzur, met with French officials in the attempt to obtain arms. Only Dayan and Peres knew this as Ben Gurion kept the Cabinet in the dark. In May 1955 Nahmias attended a party with French military officers who had served in Algeria where Karpin has argued that the idea of a Franco-Israeli alliance against Nasser first surfaced. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 57-60.
103 According to Shlomo Slonim of the Hebrew University, the U.S.-British-French declaration aimed “to restrain the arms race and to accord recognition, if not actual guarantees, to” the region’s “borders or armistice lines.” The Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) was set up to oversee and coordinate arms sales to the region. Slonim, “Origins of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East,” Middle Eastern Studies 23, 2 (Spring 1987), p. 143; Zach Levey, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 4, 1 (March 2001), p. 38.
France, in an April 24 Cabinet meeting Ben Gurion professed that “atomic research” would heighten Israel’s self-reliance. Implicitly utilizing the Holocaust experience, Ben Gurion announced on May 14 that “History is not determined by statements, but by deeds. Our future does not depend on what the gentiles say but on what the Jews do.”

In May 1955 the U.S. and Israel began talks about the peaceful pursuit of civil atomic energy. Six days after the tentative deal was constructed, on May 18 Sharett wrote that he “found no fault” in the agreement as it did not impede Israel from “contacting other powers” as long as the reactor’s only “purpose” was for “research.” In a meeting with Bergmann and Ben Gurion later in the month, Sharett declared that the reactor “would be too small for (plutonium) production. On July 12 the U.S. agreed to provide Israel with a small research reactor.” The Mapai leadership did not want any infighting going into the July 20 general election.

From August 8-20, 1955, the first Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva. Twenty-five hundred representatives attended, including Bergmann, Dostrovsky, de Shalit, Racah, Cohen, Lipkin and Pelah. After the conference Bergmann urged for Israel to obtain heavy water devoid of “U.S. control,” adding that in the “future” Israel would “have to rely on” itself. On August 28 de Shalit informed Mardor that he did not believe the U.S. would believe that Israel “would” not use the atom “for military purposes…” Understanding his powerlessness, he would leave the issue to “individuals wiser” to decide. He concluded that it

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104 Cohen has described this sentiment as the “motto” of Israel’s nuclear program. Following the Independence Day address, Bergmann conscripted the brightest scientists for the bomb program to Saclay and the Chatillon. Ya’acov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben Gurion and Sharett,” p. 331; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 42-43, 359n4.

105 Sheffer has argued that after convincing the Cabinet to endorse the accord Sharett’s contribution to the issue came to a “culmination” during a period of “wide consensus” on the issue. Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 113; Sharett, Moshe Sharett, p. 852.

106 Hebrew University political scientist Peter Medding has emphasized that the 1955 election marked a significant “turning point,” as Mapai lost five of its 45 seats in the 120 seat Knesset. Shlaim has purported that another three months passed before Ben Gurion confronted the Knesset with a working coalition government. During this period Sharett remained Prime Minister but his power was “rendered intolerable” by a “militant defense minister.” Peter Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 99, 239-241; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 136-138.
was inconceivable that Israel could ever contemplate using such an “ unearthly weapon.”

The seeds of the Israeli-Franco strategic alliance were planted the next month. On September 12, 1955, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, thus blocking Israel’s port at Eilat. Fifteen days later Egypt announced a $250 million arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Later in the month Abel Thomas suggested to Peres the need form a bilateral Franco-Israeli relationship devoid of the “diplomatic formalities.” When Peres responded that had no qualms about keeping Sharett and Tzur in the dark, he was then quickly ushered to the home of the Interior Minister who held jurisdiction over Algeria. There Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury declared that Adolf Hitler and Nasser were both enamored with their own evil voices. Within months all three men would obtain greater political voices of their own.

On November 2 Ben Gurion returned as Prime Minister, demoting Sharett to Foreign Minister. That same night the IDF eliminated an Egyptian position in al-Sabha, but an IDF plan to capture the Straits of Tiran was rejected by the Cabinet. Peres has professed that this desire was attributed to Ben Gurion’s contention that the Negev representing the “potential” for Israel’s “future.” Whether the perspicacious old man had linked together the atom and desert by late 1955 is vexing. On August 26, 1955, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles announced the Alpha Plan at New York’s CFR, a scheme to provide a land link between Egypt and

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108 Egypt obtained 120 MIG 115 jet fighters, 50 IL-28 bombers, 20 IL-12 transports, 200 T-34 tanks and 200 armored cars. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 48, 360 n25.
109 Thomas, a gentile officer in the Free French forces in World War II, lost his brother Pierre at Dora-Buchenwald. Years later he declared that he became interwoven with “Israel’s fate from the moment” of his brother’s death. After the war he placed himself under the tutelage of Bourgès-Maunoury, a member of the Radical Socialist Party. Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 12, 58-62.
110 The new coalition, 80 seats, 16 larger than the previous government, was distributed between five parties: Mapai (45), Mizrahi-Hapo’el Hamizrachi or NRP (10), Ahдут Ha’avodah (10), Mapam (9) and the Progressives (5). The enlarged Cabinet played to Ben Gurion’s advantage because Mapai, unaffected by a veto threat, controlled all the important ministries. Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, pp. 40, 239-241.
112 Peres, From These Men, p. 39.
Jordan. Peter Hahn has argued that the U.S.-inspired peace plan was rendered “stillborn” by Israel’s refusal to concede any of the Negev. According to Neil Caplan, in a “heated” talk on November 21, 1955, Sharrett informed Dulles on November 21, 1955, that it was unfair for Israel to cede any of the Negev since it had not built any “roads” there, an honest statement at the time. Within two years, however, this infrastructure was being secretly built at Dimona, 36 KM southeast of Beersheba. Had Ben Gurion surrendered to Arab territorial demands, Israel would have obviated the future home of its atomic weapons reactor.

This development coincided with political upheaval in Paris to precipitate Israel’s atomic alignment with France. In November 1955, the same month France sold to Israel 100 light tanks, Socialist Guy Mollet was elected Prime Minister, replacing Faure on February 1, 1956. Mollet’s ascendancy brought Bourges-Maunoury to the head of the Defense Ministry, with Thomas close by. Crobie has argued that during this period technocrats and bureaucrats “moved” the French Fourth Republic until its May 1958 collapse. As Cabinet solidarity was

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113 This plan was leaked to the Israelis in the spring of 1955 after Israeli officials in Washington had got some U.S. officials “very drunk.” This helped doom the covert campaign of Connecticut millionaire, future Treasury Secretary (1957-1961), and close friend of Eisenhower, Robert Anderson, who from December 1955 to March 1956 separately met with Nasser and Ben Gurion in a failed attempt to find a panacea. Hahn, “The View from Jerusalem,” p. 524.

114 Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, p. 184

115 On April 7, 1955, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi had informed the British that Nasser had declared that Israel’s southern boundary “should be Beer(s)heba.” On January 23, 1956, Ben Gurion informed Anderson and the CIA’s James Jesus Angleton that there would be no peace if Israel was forced to “give up territory…” The Arab demands for the desert territory back to the promise of Count Folke Bernadotte’s plan which awarded them the Negev in accordance with the U.N. Partition plan of November 29, 1947. Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956, Volume Four (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 109, 147-48, 190, 231.


117 Crobie has argued that Thomas appealed directly to “special interests” and “unorthodox diplomacy.” The position possessed an incredible amount of shadow power, entrusted with making “ad hoc policy decisions on the run.” Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 284; Crobie, A Tacit Alliance, pp. 38-39.
“nonexistent,” power coalitions avoided “contentious issues” to remain in power. Divided by factionalism and traditional rivalries, the French executive and legislature were in constantly in flux, enabling “widespread freedom of action at various levels of the bureaucracy.” By late spring factional elements in Paris were now able to independently conduct their own foreign policy with Peres who was acting without the consent of Israel’s Foreign Office.118

On May 22 Tsur informed Jerusalem that the Algerian war had increased pro-Jewish sentiment in “wide circles in France;” a pure byproduct of “desperation.”119 This anxiety was displayed later that month when Peres first learned of the “serious possibility” of a joint Anglo-French attack against Nasser. At a meeting in Paris, the French Defense Minister asked Peres “how much time... would” it take Israel “to cross the Sinai Peninsula and reach Suez?” Peres quickly answered “probably... five to seven days.”120 Tired of being left out of the loop, Sharett resigned on June 19, 1956, and was replaced by Labor Minister Golda Meir.121 Three days later Dayan and Peres met with Louis Mangin, Director of the Defense Minister’s Office. Golan has argued that the Israelis were surprised when Mangin “softly” asked Peres “Are you prepared to sign?” After penning the document, Nahmias murmured to Peres, “Are you mad? You don’t have any authority.” The deal, which excluded each nation’s Foreign Office, was endorsed by Ben Gurion, who declared it was a “risky venture” but then so was Israel’s “very existence.”122

In July 1956 Bergmann penned to Peres for Israel to build two reactors simultaneously. The smaller research reactor would be built near the Weizmann Institute or in Nachal Soreq; the

118 Crosbie has pointed out that most French naval officers and interior officials were “violently” opposed and considered “friends” to Israel. The archives of the Israeli and French Defense Ministries remained closed to the public. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance, pp. 36-39, 50; Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, p. 164n3.
119 Zach Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, p. 70.
120 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 74.
121 Sheffer has mused that “some Israeli politicians” asserted that Sharett’s dismissal resulted from his opposition to the emerging Israeli-French nuclear co-operation. As the decade progressed, he became increasingly “unhappy” over the trajectory of the program. Sheffer, Moshe Sharett, p. 952.
122 Israel also received 72 Mystere jets worth $70-80 million. Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, p. 70; Golan, Shimon Peres, pp. 45-46.
larger one, geared for military use, would be constructed in the Negev. If “all these paths” were followed, Bergmann was “confident that” Israel would achieve its obvious “goal.” This comment drew criticism from de Shalitt, who argued that a 10-MW reactor would violate its July 1955 agreement with the U.S. He urged patience at a time when events were proceeding at a train’s pace. On July 27, 1956, a day after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal; Peres informed Nahmias and Bourgès-Maunoury that Israel was “prepared” to participate in a military strike against Egypt. In another decision which agitated Tsur, in early August Peres convinced Ben Gurion to send Shalhavet Freier to Paris to acquire a nuclear reactor.

The exact nature of the atomic agreements decided upon in September 1956 remains contested. Pinkus has stipulated that on September 13 both Bergmann and Peres asked the CEA about obtaining a “nuclear capability” with “weapons production.” During this meeting “a small reactor was...never mentioned;” rather, Israel would get a 24 MW reactor. Goldschmidt has revealed that “from the outset it was understood that it would be three times the size.” These negotiations continued from September 17-22 at Saint Germaine. Goldschmidt’s estimate runs against the arguments of Cohen and Péan stipulating that the agreement only provided a 10 MW reactor to Israel. The lack of clarity is attributed to the more immediate issues being discussed as the month ended. On September 30 Pineau, Thomas, Meir, Dayan and Peres convened at Mangin’s home where Pineau announced he was “convinced” of the need to “use force against

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123 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 77.
124 Nahmias later declared that Peres should have been “hanged” for giving such assurances “without prior authorization.” Shimon Peres, Battling For Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 106-107.
125 While Freier was the Science Attaché in Paris he clandestinely served as Peres’s atomic delegate in an office autonomous from the Israeli Embassy. He was ordered not to discuss with anyone, especially Tsur, his activities. Freier informed Cohen that were many “things” concerning the nuclear project that “he was the only person to know” about. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 22, 53-54, 352 n9, 366 n44.
127 Goldschmidt has speculated that the accord was reached on September 17, while Golan and Shlaim have concluded it occurred four days later. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 54; Péan, Les Deux Bombes, p. 82; Golan, Shimon Peres, p. 49; Avi Shlaim, “The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot,” International Affairs 73, 3 (1997), p. 523; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 119-120.
Egypt” even though London “had not reached the same conclusion.”

Peres and Thomas met again on October 20, with Pinkus arguing that the atomic accord’s key tenants were formulated during the discussion. Two days later Ben Gurion, Dayan and Peres met outside Paris at Sèvres. In his memoirs Peres revealed that on October 24 he asked Ben Gurion to leave the room so he could meet alone with Mollet and Bourgès-Maunoury. At this time France agreed to build Israel a nuclear reactor. Karpin has contended that the agreement, which originally provided Israel with a 10 MW reactor, had no troublesome paper trail. The oral accord was concluded in the conference’s waning moments, without British input, after the three nations had agreed that Israel would attack Egypt on October 29. With the exception of Crosbie, Péan, Golan, Peres and Shlaim, the nuclear dimension to the Suez crisis has been omitted by the scholarship dealing with the war’s causes and consequences.

According to French archival material, on October 25 Mollet “decided…to instruct the

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129 Peres, *Battling for Peace*, p. 113.
130 Péan and Cohen also asserted that the deal did not initially cover a “Dimona-type reactor,” but a “small reactor” to be constructed at Rishon Le-Zion near the Weizmann Institute.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 54-55; Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, pp. 82-83; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 88.
131 Cohen argued that the deal “was an implicit incentive…not a condition” for Israeli participation in the Franco-British war scheme. Shlaim has contended in the Russian-published *International Affairs* that Israel did not join the plot “in order to get a French reactor” but it did demonstrate how Paris was desperate “to go to war at any price…” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 54; Shlaim, “The Protocol of Sèvres,” pp. 524 & 530.
CEA” to meet the “Israeli requests” and provide them “a nuclear capability.” On the same day that Anglo-French forces landed at Port Said, the plan changed when Soviet Premier Nicholas Bulganin told Israel to withdraw from the Sinai “before it” was “too late” on November 5. Peres has expressed that these “veiled threats” of nuclear blackmail forced him and Meir back to Paris two days later. Stating that France “could not shoot down Soviet missiles, Pineau proposed providing nuclear assistance to Israel in exchange for a Sinai withdrawal.” In talks with Thomas and Bourgès-Maunoury, Peres, suggested that Israel create “its own retaliation force.”

On December 12, 1956, France and Israel signed a technical agreement providing the latter with an atomic reactor, known then as EL 102, to be built at Richonel-Zion. But since the contract did not include the indispensable chemical separation facility, Cohen has argued that Peres convinced Ben Gurion to construct a 40 MW reactor at Dimona. Israel also made private contacts with the Saint-Gobain firm, which handled plutonium separation construction, but these talks stumbled when the French Prime Minister began to have some second thoughts. Describing the October 25, 1956, Cabinet decision as “limited,” Emile Noël, the director of Mollet’s office, informed Pineau on May 5, 1957, that any Israeli plutonium production would be “totally unacceptable” and “have unfortunate consequences.” The Prime Minister’s efforts were in vain as his premiership ended sixteen days later.

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133 The French deal brightened Ben Gurion’s expectations. On November 2 he wrote in the Hebrew publication Hadoar that what “Einstein, Oppenheimer and Teller” had accomplished for the U.S “could also be done... in Israel...” Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 12 & 354n19; Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” p. 121.
134 Moscow also removed its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and cut off oil shipments to Israel. William J. Jorden, “Moscow Aroused,” NYT, November 6, 1956, p. 1; Uri Bialer, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1963 (Oxford: St. Anthony’s College, 1999), p. 249.
136 Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, p. 7; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 64.
138 Pinkus has argued that the Mollet Ministry was also the longest and “friendliest” of the fourteen Fourth Republic governments towards Israel. The incoming Prime Minister was also a “reliable friend” and since Bourgès-Maunoury’s party had only won 240 out of a possible 577 seats in the National Assembly, the Prime Minister was dependent on Socialist support. Pineau remained Foreign Minister and Mollet continued to pull “strings” as the party leader. Pinkus, “Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue,” pp. 125-126.
Realizing that the ongoing French Parliamentary recess provided only transitory relief, during a Mapai Committee meeting on June 27, 1957, Ben Gurion ominously suggested that Israel use the “interregnum” to “finalize certain matters.” Two days later he wrote vaguely that France was “ready to help us.”

On July 10-11 Peres, Bergmann and Meir met with Pineau and Mollet. Four days later Pineau informed Mollet that Israel now wanted a chemical separation plant, adding that Paris would find itself in a “special political” hotspot if this information became public knowledge. After this exchange Paris refused to sign off on the IAEC and Saint Gobain agreement, with Bourgès-Maunoury announcing to Pineau that he now “opposed” providing Israel “…a plutonium plant.” Israel now had to employ some diplomatic charm.

On September 30 Peres assured Pineau that Israel’s nuclear “purpose” was only “for scientific and research development.” According to Golan, Pineau then summoned his secretary to type it out the agreement. After she left the room, Pineau destroyed all the copies except for the original that he and Peres had signed. Peres then drove to the Hotel Matignon to interrupt Bourgès-Maunoury’s final Cabinet meeting and asked an aide to the Prime Minister, “a good friend” and probably Thomas, “to slip a note to his boss.” Maunoury halted the meeting to inform Peres that he would “put matters right before relinquishing office.” Returning to the meeting, he pushed through the agreement the very night he was voted out of power.

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139 The remaining portion of the entry has been censored, an action which Pinkus has “undoubtedly” attributed to its relevance to “nuclear matters.” Ibid., pp. 126, 136-137 n79.

140 Cohen has contended that following the talks Golda Meir expressed her opposition to the atomic deal, claiming that Peres’ idea was “unrealistic” and “unorthodox.” Peres has divulged that Meir critiqued the program only because she “instinctively opposed anything to do with him.” On July 14 Tsur wrote a six page memo focused on Meir’s recent trip to Paris omitting the atomic subject. He added that there was discussion concerning EURATOM matters, a subject which Pineau orally reported to Bourgès-Maunoury. Thirteen days later the International Atomic Energy Agency, an outgrowth of the Atoms for Peace initiative, was created. According to Article II of its statute, the IAEA was opposed to any “assistance” dedicated to “military” ends. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 58, 364n9; Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 74, 91; Peres, Battling for Peace, pp. 117-119.

day he arrived at his office at nine a.m. and *signed* the document “after a sleepless night...” On October 2 the technical agreement was signed by Arthur Ben-Natan, Peres and Guillaumat.

The political accord, stipulating that the SIECC would provide Israel with a reprocessing facility, was finalized by Maunoury, Pineau, Peres and Ben-Natan a day later. Still classified today, the Paris Agreements listed the reactor’s power at 24 MW. On October 30 Pineau and Tzur exchanged a set of unpublished letters declaring that France could veto the $75 million dollar deal if Israel pursued the bomb. Construction at Dimona soon commenced within months.

Israel’s scientific community was skeptical about Bergmann’s ability to meet the engineering challenge in building Dimona. Excepting Bergmann, on February 17, 1958, the entire IEAC, which had not met since 1956, collectively resigned for reasons still disputed by the scholarship. To avoid further criticism and to circumvent the IAEC and EMET hierarchies,

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143 The IAEC was referred as the “client” because the CEA signed the deal directly with Saint Gobain whose role was concealed by its subsidiary, the Société Industrielle d’Etudes at de Constructions Chimiques (SIECC). There was no paper trail leading back to the IEAC as the deal’s cost was hidden from the French Parliamentary budget. Cohen has revealed that several issues about the deal were not written out, but rather agreed upon via “oral understandings between individuals.” *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 59.
144 This estimate is likely too conservative. Seymour Hersh has argued that the reactor’s power capacity could be “two-to-three times” the capacity of 24 MW. Remi Carle, the CEA’s chief project envoy, told Cohen that the reactor was 40 MW, an estimate supported by an April 1961 CIA estimate. Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 93-95; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 59, 364-65 n19; CIA Franco-Israeli Collaboration, April 6, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel Subjects, Ben Gurion Visit, The Arab-Israeli Situation (4/6/61), Box 119A, *John F. Kennedy Library* (JFKL).
145 Péan and Cohen have speculated that the Dimona construction began “sometime in late 1957 or early 1958,” while Karpin has declared that it occurred by the “end of 1957.” Hersh has emphasized that groundbreaking began “in early 1958” after “hundreds” of French scientists and engineers began entering Beersheba in “late 1957.” A separate suburb was built to house them. The task of building the reactor was left to thousands of Moroccan and Algerian Jews, while European Jews served as technical and bureaucratic managers. Péan, *Les Deux Bombes*, p. 103; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 68; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 95; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 60-61; Levey, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” p. 44.
146 Jabber has argued that the event was “sparked” by the choice to build Dimona for “military uses...” while Shlomo Aronson of the Hebrew University has contended instead that the normal bureaucratic issues of allocation of finances and personal disagreements explain why. Cohen has speculated that the resignation, led by Racah, Sambursky, and Ohledorf, was “over procedure, not substance,” admitting that “uncertainty” still exists if all the signatories actually signed their own names to the original letter. Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 33-34; Shlomo Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapon in the Middle East* (Albany: State University Press, 1992), p. 310n7; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 71 & 368-369n84.
Peres hired Mans Pratt to lead the construction, answering solely to Peres and Ben Gurion. After a leave of absence in early 1957, Mardor returned to the EMET in early 1958 to find “new projects” were quickly emerging. Weeks after Cairo and Damascus formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), Ben Gurion announced to a Mapai gathering on March 4, 1958, that peace was based on “power and security.” On June 3 EMET was reorganized into RAFAEL and removed from the Defense Ministry to avoid a paper trail.

While Peres was pursuing French assistance, in August 1956 Bergmann asked Randers about purchasing 10 tons of heavy water. Though Randers replied negatively, he suggested that something could be arranged in the future. In August 1957 Randers informed NORATOM that Israel again desired heavy water. Norway’s commercial ties with the Arabs, however, made Oslo reluctant to agree. To overcome this problem a three-way deal was proposed: Israel would buy NORATOM heavy water sold two years earlier to Britain without safeguards. But when the Norwegian Foreign Ministry insisted on heavy water control, Bergmann protested in July 1958 that the request violated Israel’s “sovereignty.” Compromising, Randers concluded that if the U.S. agreed to the deal, so would Norway. Without mentioning the proposed sale, he asked the State Department’s Special Assistant on Atomic Energy, Philip Farley, whether the U.S. would consider Israel’s building of a 40-MW reactor as “ominous.” Farley answered only that the sale

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147 Peres has admitted that Pratt was both “crazy... genius,” while Karpin characterized him as a “shadowy figure.” Peres, Battling for Peace, pp. 118-119; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 264.
148 According to Mardor, who was named its head, RAFAEL’s goal was to produce “powerful... deterrent weapons that Israel could not purchase elsewhere.” RAFAEL was the Hebrew acronym for the Armaments Development Authority. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 69, 354n20; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 111.
150 Cohen has argued that given Randers’ “technological background,” it was “inconceivable” that he was not aware that Israel’s “true purpose” was to produce the bomb. Randers and Bergmann were very close and spoke to each other in German. The Holocaust also played a key factor in the sale. Prior to the 1940 Nazi invasion there had been 1,800 Jews in Norway and within two years 769 had been deported to Auschwitz. Only 25 returned. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 61-62, 365n28; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 143.
presented an opportunity to implement IAEA safeguards for the facility.\(^{151}\)

On December 12, 1958, Randers informed Bergmann that Norway’s Foreign Office was still “jittery about” providing heavy water to Israel. As the Norwegians refused to budge, Bergmann relented. On February 25, 1959, Chaim Yahil, Israel’s Minister in Oslo, and Harlvard Lange, Norway's Foreign Minister, agreed the heavy water would not be utilized “for any military purpose.”\(^{152}\) Norway had inspection rights but once IAEA regulations were in place, this national responsibility would fall to the supranational bureaucracy.\(^{153}\) Norway then asked Britain to return to Norway the 25 tons of heavy water it had purchased in 1956.\(^{154}\)

The British were quick to respond. On August 29, 1958, Britain’s Tel Aviv Embassy contended that Finance Minister Levi Eshkol had recently mused that Israel was “...setting up an atomic power plant.” Recognizing that “money” was still required, the document divulged that the construction of such a facility “would be ideal for the Negev.”\(^{155}\) In 2005 the BBC’s Michael Crick disclosed that in September 1958 the Atomic Energy Office’s D.E.H Peirson had

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\(^{152}\) Thirteen days before this deal was signed, the U.S. agreed to share atomic energy with EURATOM, of which Norway was a member. EURATOM was created on March 25, 1957, by the Treaty of Rome. EURATOM’s first president was France’s Louis Armand. Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 62; \textit{Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States}, p. 12.

\(^{153}\) Barnaby has argued that Norway only held one “inspection” in April 1961, conducted by Supreme Court lawyer Jen Hauge, who believed that Dimona was only dedicated to peaceful purposes. The Israeli-Norwegian agreement was not publicized until 1970. Frank Barnaby, \textit{The Invisible Bomb} (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 70-71.

\(^{154}\) The first British intelligence of Israel’s nuclear aspirations came seven months before the Sèvres deal. On March 27, 1956, Reginald Michael Hadow, head of the Foreign Office News Department, reported that an anonymous Syrian official had informed him that Damascus was “very worried about atomic developments in Israel.” A week later, a British document contended that France and Israel had publicly concluded a deal “of a fairly extensive nature” in atomic energy for “peaceful purposes only.” Crosbie has argued that there was no written record of British decisions at Sèvres and no knowledge of France’s nuclear assistance due to London’s explicit “insistence of not being informed.” “Britain Names News Aide as Ambassador to Israel,” \textit{NYT}, July 29, 1965, p. 2. British National Archives (BNA), Foreign Office Records 371/121822, R.M. Hadow “Israel and the Atomic Bomb,” March 27, 1956 VR 124; BNA, Foreign Office Records, 371/121822 Minute by D.V. Bendall, April 5, 1956; Crosbie, \textit{A Tacit Alliance}, pp. 67 & 75.

\(^{155}\) This document referred to a January 31, 1958, British internal letter highlighting the “probable erection....of a nuclear power station in Israel.” BNA, Foreign Office Records 371/134351, M. Wenner to General Division, Board of Trade, August 29, 1958.
informed R.A. Thompson that London would be “overzealous” to “insist on safeguards” in any Israeli deal. Three days later the Foreign Ministry’s Donald Cape had told Peirson “NOT” to “mention this” to the U.S.\footnote{In 1959 and 1960 two 10 ton heavy water allotments were shipped to Israel from U.K ports.\footnote{The reason why Cape did not want the U.S. to know is because two months earlier London and Washington had formulated an Agreement on Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. In 1958 Britain received U.S. assistance on anti-missile warheads and fractional kiloton warheads, while a May 1959 amendment provided Britain with enriched uranium. The July 1958 agreement, which required the U.S. Congress to amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, assumed that Britain would not provide atomic assistance to anyone else. When Cape was questioned on the matter he mused that the deal was completed because “nobody suspected the Israelis hoped to manufacture nuclear weapons.” Via the Freedom of Information Act, the BBC’s Meiron Jones has argued that Cape’s own declassified letters from March 1959 demonstrate the opposite. At this time Israel pulled out of deal to buy uranium from South Africa because Pretoria demanded safeguards. Meirion Jones, “Britain’s Dirty Secret,” New Statesman, March 13, 2006, p. 18; Michael Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” BBC 2 Newsnight, August 3, 2005, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm}; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 83-97.} Crick’s intrepid journalism drew a quick response. Lord Gilmour, a former Conservative Defense Minister, described the revelation as “quite extraordinary,” while former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara responded that he was jolted that the U.S. had not been informed.\footnote{The BBC and Daily Telegraph have argued that the deal totaled £1.5 million pounds. There was a definite attempt to cover up the transaction as the deal was presented as one directly between Norway and Israel, omitting Britain’s role. An October 9, 1958 Foreign Office document played down Israel’s nuclear weapon aspirations, quoting a recent Bergmann radio announcement that it was not “worth while to build an atomic power state in Israel before 1965...” In 2006 Jones divulged that in November 1959 London also exported a small amount of uranium-235 to Israel. Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” BBC 2 Newsnight, August 3, 2005; “UK helped Israel get nuclear bomb,” BBC, August 4, 2005, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4743987.stm}; Ben Fulton, “Britain Secretly Sent Vital Nuclear Bomb Ingredient to Israel,” Daily Telegraph, August 4, 2005, \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1495474/Britain-secretly-sold-vital-nuclear-bomb-ingredient-to-Israel.html}.} Fantastically, Prime Minister Harold MacMillan and his Cabinet remained totally ignorant of the deal, giving credence to the warning that historians must be vigilant in adjudicating “how much of the buck that stops with the president has already been spent by the

\footnote{Since the atomic files only began to be declassified in 2005, there is no mention of the heavy water deal or the French-Israel atomic deal at Sevres in McNamara’s Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, nor in any of the following. Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Richie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962 (New York: Leicster University Press, 1996); Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship; Johnathan Spyer, “An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 8, 4 (June 2004), pp. 80-102; Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, ed Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008); Michael Crick, “How Britain helped Israel get the Bomb,” BBC 2 Newsnight, August 3, 2005; “Former Minister Lord Gilmour Dies,” BBC, September 21, 2007, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7007648.stm}.}
bureaucracy.” Like most selfish, insouciant and short-sighted civil servants, Gilmour concluded that Cape, Pierson and Thompson just wanted to earn “a little bit of money.”

Alexander Hamilton argued that “money” represents the most “vital principle of the body politic.” There is nothing that governments argue over more than “the payment of it.” The question of how Dimona would be financed represented the primary cause of dissent within Israel. Peres divulged that Finance Minister Eshkol and Commerce Minister Pinhas Sapir expressed a “profound lack of enthusiasm,” while David Hacohen, a leading Mapai loyalist, mused that the project would be “so expensive” that Israel would “be left without bread…” Ben Gurion understood that if he asked the Knesset to fund the entire project, Parliament would gain oversight responsibilities which could threaten the project’s secrecy. As capital needed to be raised “on the side,” Peres constructed a “discreet fund-raising operation.” Influential globalist “friends” quickly emerged, the most important being lawyer Abraham Feinberg, a legend of Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue.

159 Reinforcing the Allison-Zelikow model of where one stands is a reflection of where they sit, Clifford has proposed that when a Prime Minister or President is insulated rather than informed there is “no single maker of foreign policy.” Most officials usually can not be controlled by their theoretical superiors because they have access to the resources able to prevent meaningful recourse. De Tocqueville observed that blind “patriotism” is a banal extension “individual egoism.” Proving that men “living in democracies” do “things pretty near alike,” ambition drives most to be “weak” to temptation and aim to enlarge their “house” over their “mind.” Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” pp. 93- 95; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 447, 516, 787, 289, 766-767.


161 Refer to Federalist numbers 7, 21 and 30. Willis, The Federalist Papers, pp. 31, 143, 102.

162 In 1946 Feinberg oversaw the Haganah’s illegal immigration in Europe, where he met Mardor and Freier. In June 1946 he was imprisoned by the British on allegations of transmitting military intelligence. He was with Weizmann when the U.N. partitioned Palestine on November 29, 1947, and chaired the U.S. Weizmann Institute of Science Committee for 40 years. In 1948 he raised $400,000 for President Truman’s successful re-election campaign and following his victory Truman declared that without “Abe” he could not “have been elected.” In late 1952, Feinberg, Clark Clifford, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Averell Harriman were selected to raise money to build the Truman Library. On September 18, 1954, he was elected Board President of Brandeis University and a year later President of the Israel Bond Drive (IBO), helping him win B’nai B’rith’s man of the year in 1960. Eric Page, “Abraham Feinberg, 90, Philanthropist for Israel,” NYT, December 7, 1998, p. B10; “Crum Backs Haganah,” NYT, October 17, 1947, p.11; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 132-135; Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 70-73; “Cabinet to Direct Jewish Fund Drive,” NYT, January 3, 1950, p. 8; “Truman Library Seeks $1, 500, 000,” NYT, December 21, 1952 p. 40; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 95; “New Yorker Will Head Trustees at Brandeis University,” NYT, September 19, 1954, p. 121; “Israeli Bond Unit Elects
On October 31, 1958, Ben Gurion revealed in his diary that he had informed Feinberg that Baron Edmund de Rothschild had offered “two proposals,” while Issac Wolfson had already contributed $5 million. Feinberg responded that $25 million was needed to begin.  

Ben Gurion then asked for the founding list of the Sonneborn Institute, some 18 North American Jewish millionaires. Alongside Feinberg and founder, Rudolf Sonneborn, Canadian members included Samuel Zacks, President of the Canadian Zionist Organization, Samuel Bronfman, President of the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the Bloomfield brothers. The finances were in the reliable hands of Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury during FDR’s entire presidency, while the Sieff and Rothschild families also gave from their deep pockets.

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163 Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 70.
164 Karpin has argued that Ben Gurion received the list from Henry Montor, executive director of the United Palestine Appeal, in summer 1945. Along with Ben Gurion, everyone on the list was invited to Sonneborn’s lavish New York home on July 1, 1945, where, after eight hours of discussion, they provided him with millions of dollars. According to biographer Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion described in his journal that this “Zionist meeting” was the best he “ever had in the U.S.” The Institute paid for the purchase of the Exodus ship, which failed in 1947 to carry 4,500 Jewish Holocaust survivors from Europe to Palestine by the British. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 70; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 26-27, 363n10. Wolfgang Saxon, “Rudolf Sonneborn Dies at 87,” *NYT*, June 4, 1986, p. D26; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion: A Biography* (New York: Delacorte, 1978), pp. 126-127


166 In a March 8, 1960, letter to Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter revealed that since 1948 private American Jewry had donated “something like” $1 billion to Israel on top of the $715 million that Congress had provided during this period. Herter also mused that through “various foreign sources” Israel had been obtaining nearly $350 million in aid annually. Feinberg’s integral role in funding Dimona certainly dispels the contention made by historian Isaac Alters, who makes no reference to Dimona is his account which ends after the Suez Crisis, that Ben Gurion was “hard pressed to find people as influential” as Feinberg during a Republican White House. In a reference to Feinberg’s campaign, Shoenbaum has contended that Ben Gurion received “private contributions in New York and elsewhere to” fund Dimona. There is no mention of Feinberg’s campaign in A.F.K Organski’s *The $36 Billion Bargain*, I.L. Kenen’s *Israel Defense Line*, or Edward Tivnan’s *The Lobby*. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 137; Memorandum for the President, “Subject: Eisenhower’s Appointment on 10 March at 11:00 a.m., David Ben-Gurion of Israel,” 8 March 1960, Israel (1), International Series, Box 32, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), *Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL)*; Isaac Alters, *Eisenhower*
Gauging the duration and scope of Feinberg's corporatist campaign remains difficult. Cohen has contended that the donations "lasted many years," whereas Karpin has argued they ended in 1960. According to Peres, the campaign raised $40 million. The program's actual cost also remains disputed. During a December 19, 1960, NSC meeting, President Eisenhower estimated the costs ranged from $100-200 million dollars, while future Dimona dissident, Eliezer Livenh, put it at $300 million. A December 22, 1960, JP story estimated the cost to be $130 million. Arnon Dar, a student of de Shalit, informed Cohen that during a meeting Peres had deliberately "missed" one zero, citing the cost at IL 30 million ($17.5 million U.S.). When de Shalit attempted to correct the error, Peres kicked him underneath the table. It is difficult to know if Ben Gurion was ever informed of the reactor's actual cost.

Dimona was completely absent from Israel's November 3, 1959, campaign and election.

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167 Historian Michael Hogan has defined corporatism as "the organizational dimension of decision making" focused "on the role of functional elites rather than the governing classes." Feinberg's financial campaign evades historian John Lewis Gaddis' major critiques of the corporatist theory, beginning with the caveat that the period under examination did not occur in the 1920s, late 1940s or early 1950s. Secondly, since the subject being discussed is nuclear proliferation, it obviously involves the global balance of power. Next, Gaddis has failed to recognize that individuals, like governments, also commit acts for moral reasons, such as "U.S. support for Israel at the expense of its relations with the Arab world ..." Michael Hogan, "Corporatism," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, pp. 138-139, 147-148; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View," Diplomatic History 10, 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 357-361.


169 This number is supported by Karpin and Hersh. Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 119; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 136; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 67.

170 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 19, 1960, January 12, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

171 This number is supported by Karpin and Hersh. Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 119; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 136; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 67.

172 In 1958 Ben Gurion penned in his diary that he appropriated $5 million (15% of the budget) to Mifalei Pituach (Developments Project), Dimona's administrative code name. Reporter Gideon Thomas has divulged that the capital came via cashier's checks to the Bank of Israel in Tel Aviv to dodge the nation's foreign exchange controls. In August 1962 the NYT revealed that the Israeli State Controller, Dr. Ernst Nebenzahl, had complained that Dimona's costs had been withheld from the Knesset since 1958. Hebrew University historian Uri Bailer has avowed that there exists a large documentation gap in the Israeli Finance Ministry from 1948-1956. He briefly raised Dimona only in the final paragraph of a 2002 Israel Studies article. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 71,367-68n66; Gordon Thomas, Gideon's Spies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 92-93; Uri Bailer, "Top Hat, Tuxedo and the Cannons," pp. 2, 68-69; "Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld," NYT, August 1, 1962, p. 3;
This deceptive strategic help further solidify Ben Gurion’s strong authority. Following all of
the important Cabinet positions, Mapai’s Knesset representation enlarged from 40 seats to 47.

Following the election Ben Gurion did face some mild internal opposition on Dimona. Meir
questioned the trustworthiness of French support and the wisdom of keeping the reactor secret
from the U.S. In January 1960 Eshkol quietly advocated for an open debate on Dimona within
the Mapai party. Aside from the February heavy water deal with Norway, the first British
heavy water delivery in June, and these private Cabinet criticisms, domestic politics pushed
Dimona to the backburner in 1959 and early 1960. It did not stay there for very long.

On June 1, 1958, Charles de Gaulle became the last Prime Minister of the Fourth
Republic. Six months later nearly 80 percent of France voted to make him President of the Fifth
Republic. In his memoirs de Gaulle claimed that he turned his attention to the “irregular” atomic
“dealings … between Tel Aviv and Paris” which had “permanently placed Israelis at all levels” of
the French government since Suez. He ended his two sentence analysis with a lie, claiming that
he “brought to an end” French assistance in building the “factory near Beersheba.”

While the excavation work at Dimona had begun a few months before June 1958, the CEA’s role in the
Negev continued after de Gaulle came to power. Karpin has argued this transpired because
Energy and Science Minister Jacques Soustelle, an open “supporter” of Israel, refused to inform
de Gaulle about all the details of the French-Israeli atomic understanding.

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173 Perhaps if more Israeli citizens had of read Yigal Allon’s Hebrew A Curtain of Sand, released in 1959, they
would have learned about their nuclear aspirations. According to Aronson, Allon, a famous general of the 1948-
1949 War, produced the “first open… antinuclear treatise in Israeli history.” Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and
Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, p. 23.

174 The 86 seat coalition Cabinet, the largest to that point, was also comprised of NRP (12), Ahdut Ha’avodah (7),
and the Progressives (6). “Ben Gurion Gains 6 Knesset Seats,” NYT, November 5, 1959, p. 9; Medding, The
Founding of Israeli Democracy, pp. 239-242; “5 Party Cabinet Named in Israel,” NYT, December 17, 1959, p. 5.

175 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 72 & 384n1.


177 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 73; Pään, Les Deux Bombes, p. 127.

178 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 168-170;
inaction bout Dimona during his first eighteen months in office was also attributed to a dire economy, the Algerian war and developing France’s own nuclear option. Personnel changes in Paris and Tel Aviv, however, threatened to jeopardize the French-Israeli atomic alliance.

In early June 1958 Maurice Couve de Murville was elevated to Foreign Minister. Known to be cool towards Israel, the former French Ambassador in Cairo removed Ambassador Pierre Gilbert from Tel Aviv on November 20, 1959. This decision occurred months after Saint Gobain had began supervising the chemical reprocessing plant’s construction, being built adjacently underground to the reactor. Following France’s first nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara on February 13, 1960, Soustelle resigned his post, prompting Perrin to inform a “furious” de Gaulle in April that French corporate assistance to Dimona continued despite his orders. Nearly two months passed before de Murville informed Walter Eitan, Israel’s new Ambassador in Paris, that France now required Israel to eventually open the facility to international supervision and to publicly declare its peaceful intentions. The French Foreign Minister notified Meir that Paris was prepared “to stop all nuclear links,” including uranium and “return all” of the “money” if this did not transpire.

In early June Guillaumat told Peres in Paris that the “project” could not be “kept secret anymore.” According to Bar-Zohar, an “anxious” Ben Gurion went to Paris to meet with de Gaulle. Cohen has contended that Dimona “was hardly mentioned” during the sit-down, while Shalom has argued that Ben Gurion declared that Israel “had no intention of producing a nuclear weapon...” Three days later Ben Gurion and de Gaulle met again where and, according to

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179 In the NYT article covering the change, Gilbert was described as Israel’s “best friend in the world.” “Popular French Envoy Gets Israeli Farewell,” NYT, November 21, 1959, p. 9; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 73.
182 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 74; Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, p. 8; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 69.
Cohen, Ben Gurion promised Dimona was dedicated to peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{183} Hersh has contended that de Gaulle then emphasized that, “I think you exaggerate ...the danger facing you.”\textsuperscript{184} On November 10 Peres convinced de Murville to drop France’s international inspection request on Dimona. In return, Ben Gurion would state publicly Israel’s peaceful nuclear intentions. Shalom has avowed that France agreed to suspend its political involvement after a “period of a few months,” but allowed its firms to fulfill their contractual obligations.\textsuperscript{185}

In the latter half of 1960 evidence emerged that the documents which had indicted Lavon for the July 1954 fiasco had been forged. When Ben-Gurion refused to exonerate Lavon, the latter, before a secret Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee session, lambasted Peres and Dayan for framing him, information which leaked to the press in late September.\textsuperscript{186} On December 25 a committee of seven Cabinet Ministers, created by Eshkol and chaired by Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen, exonerated Lavon from any wrongdoing, with Meir and Eshkol voting to absolve Lavon. On January 31 Ben Gurion briefly resigned, arguing that that delay was due to “a certain serious matter,” code for Dimona, after surviving a Knesset no-confidence vote which had allowed him to stay in power until summer elections.\textsuperscript{187}

With Ben-Gurion’s leadership under fire by Lavon, a series of foreign newspaper stories

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteno{183} Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 74-75.
\footnoteno{184} Bar-Zohar, \textit{Ben-Gurion}, pp. 268-270; Hersh, \textit{The Samson Option}, p. 69.
\footnoteno{185} According to Hersh, Saint Gobain delayed its work on the underground processing plant until 1962, when another firm came to finish that job, staying until 1966. Cohen has purported that Saint Gobain worked until the reactor went critical in late 1963. In 1963 SIECC returned to finish the chemical reprocessing plant, leaving only in June 1965. The unwillingness of the French firms to stop construction, even after De Gaulle’s instructions, proves Rumsfeld’s words that “there are times that corporations do things they should not do,...” Hersh, \textit{The Samson Option}, pp. 69-70; Golan, Shimon Peres, pp. 95-96; Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 75; “McKinney Grills Rumsfeld,” \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoofzAhAoU} (8:57).
\footnoteno{186} “Israel Reopens Inquiry,” \textit{NYT}, September 27, 1960, p. 21.
\end{footnotes}
finally revealed Dimona to the world. On December 21 Ben Gurion was forced to publicly discuss the nation’s nuclear program in the only direct statement about Dimona ever made by an Israeli Prime Minister to this day. Ben Gurion told the Knesset announced that “the development of the Negev” was solely for “research in problems of arid zone and desert flora...” The reactor’s completion was still “three or four years” and dedicated only “for peaceful purposes.” Anything to the contrary was “...a deliberate or unconscious untruth.” The media’s subservient role meant that Ben Gurion’s words were never challenged as the press produced only three stories on the issue, all written at least three weeks after the speech. Unlike the Israeli public reaction to the Lavon affair, there was no letter forthcoming from the credulous and compartmentalized intelligentsia demanding the same honesty about Dimona.

Ben Gurion’s leadership style enabled him to build Dimona without a Cabinet decision, which theoretically superseded his power. Within the Cabinet, only Meir, Eshkol, Sapir and

188 On December 16 Chapman Pincher asserted in the British Daily Express that “Israel May be Making an A-Bomb.” Two days Chalmers Roberts contended in the WP Israel had been “secretly” developing a reactor, which could produce a weapon in “perhaps five years.” The story purported that a nameless British official had recently declared that Israel had “neither the means nor the intention” of building the bomb. Threatening to “radically” alter the Arab-Israeli conflict, this information had come as a “surprise to” Washington. Champan Pincher, “Israel May be Making an A-Bomb,” Daily Express, December 16, 1960, p. 2; Chalmers Roberts, “U.S. officials state nuclear reactor developed secretly by Israel,” WP, December 18, 1960, p. A1.

189 The pages in Ben Gurion’s diary covering this period are missing as are many pertinent documents in the Israeli State Archives for this period. Incoming Telegram from Reid to the Secretary of State, December 21, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

190 Following Israel’s independence, Ben Gurion crudely described journalists as “mercenaries of the pen.” As Israel has no written constitution, the nation has no freedom of the press guarantee equivalent to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Knesset has left in place the British Mandate Press Ordinance and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations Acts of 1933 and 1945. The archaic legislation requires that all newspapers be licensed by the state and that all papers, periodicals, and books be submitted to a military censor for publication approval. In 1998 the Knesset passed the Freedom of Information Law, allowing citizens to access government and public documents. Paragraph 14A, however, stipulates that no information concerning the Mossad, General Defense Service (Shabak), military intelligence, and atomic energy can be declassified. Hillel Nossek and Yehiel Limor, “Fifty Years in a ‘Marriage of Convenience’” Communication Law and Policy 6, 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 10-11, 16-18.

191 In late December, 50 Israeli intellectuals, led by philosopher Martin Buber, warned that there was no “graver danger” to democracy than an “attitude of impatience with criticism and contempt for opponents.” In late January Ben Gurion responded that he held a deep respect for the “rule of law...” Lawrence Fellows, “Israelis Get Plea to End Disputes,” NYT, December 30, 1960, p. 4; “Ben Gurion Quits Over Lavon Case,” NYT, February 1, 1961, p. 1.

192 Political scientist Avner Yaniv has argued that until the end of the 1960’s Israel’s democracy was personality driven and paternalistic, with the ruling Mapai party described by critics as “Bolshevik.” Burg has contended that in the 1950s Israelis looked to Ben Gurion as “a ram before the herd” and it was only through the passage of time that
the longest serving Mossad head Isser Harel (1952-1963) were aware of the project.\footnote{There is only one example that Dimona was ever raised by a Cabinet member of an opposition party. On February 2, 1958, just weeks after Dimona’s construction began, Pinhas Rosen, a member of the Progressive Party, argued that if Israel “ever decided” to create “an atomic energy for purposes of war” he was unsure of its implications. The Prime Minister sharply responded that the Justice Minister should “not repeat” his “remark.” Rosen’s remarks came after the U.S.S.R. proposed a nuclear free Near East, including Israel, in response to an U.S. announcement to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles to Turkey. Unaware that Ben Gurion had decided to pursue a weapons program, Rosen contended that Israel was “not engaged in this today,” but understood that Israel “was capable of it.” Such a policy would be “dangerous,” and only encourage Moscow to “want to eradicate” Israel. Ben Gurion wisely understood that the “same” forces which worked in Israel’s favor in the U.S. operated in the “opposite direction” in the U.S.S.R. Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 29, 54, 222-223n3and 4.} During Dimona’s construction Knesset members and the media were banned from the site. Every atomic decision was made Ben Gurion and Peres; nothing was ever written down and the word “bomb” was never explicitly uttered. These draconian apparently fooled Israel’s enemies for the Arabs apparently knew nothing about Dimona until before the Western media.\footnote{Shaym Bhatia, a foreign correspondent, contended that in 1959 an Egyptian physicist working at the Argonne nuclear center in the U.S., Dr. Eizzat Abdel, noticed two Israeli scientists at the facility. He wrote home but no one in Cairo seemed to care. Salim Yaqub, an international relations professor at the University of Chicago, only raised the issue in last paragraph of his Containing Arab Nationalism, reducing the contents of Nasser’s December 23 speech to three sentences. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 406n1; Shaym Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 54; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 266-267.}

The Arab reaction tended to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. On December 20, 1960, Mohammad Haikal argued in \textit{Al Ahram} that if Israel obtained the bomb then Egypt would have to follow suit.\footnote{Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967,” Israel Studies 1, 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 39 & 56n8.} Three days later Nasser announced at Port Said that only if it was strongly “established that Israel” was pursing a “bomb” would it mean the “beginning of war.” By December 29 Haikal had changed his tone, dismissing Dimona now as a farce intended to frighten the Arabs. A December 30, 1960, telegraph from Canada’s Embassy in Beirut argued the Lebanese press was “hesitant” to “admit” that Israel “could...produce the bomb” but “urged”
the Arabs to the issue “seriously.” This was unaccomplished as the Arabs generally denied the emerging danger. In early January 1961 Jordan’s Prime Minister, Bahjat Talhun, informed the U.S. Embassy in Amman that “he was not particularly concerned” while a Syrian representative viewed Dimona solely “as a canard, designed to... frighten the Arabs.”

Moscow had obtained intelligence on Israel’s nuclear plans prior to December 1960 yet was unable or unwilling to put the pieces together. In June 1960 Kurt Sitte, a German working at Technion, was revealed to have spied for Moscow on IEAC’s activities since 1955. In private communications, however, Moscow revealed its concern with Dimona. Following Nasser’s Port Said speech, the Soviet Embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv were informed that Israel was “not far from” obtaining the bomb, which could “trigger a serious conflict...” Despite the deterioration of Israeli-Soviet relations, however, Moscow was still unready to publicly confront Dimona or provide Egypt with a matching deterrent. Save from bombing Israel, however, there was not much the Soviets could do without help from the U.S. As the ensuing chapter will demonstrate, such assistance from a complicit and willfully ignorant Washington was not forthcoming.


197 In early February the Arab League discussed Dimona in Baghdad from January 30 to February 4, 1961, with particular focus on French assistance to Israel. Flapan has stated that the Arabs failed to publish any documents of these discussions. Levite and Landau, “Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture,” pp. 40, 54 n6; BNA, FO, 371/149586, Memorandum from P. V. O’Regan to Amman, Washington and Cairo, undated, PVOR 30/12; “Arabs to Meet on Threat of Israeli A-Work,” WP, December 28, 1960, p. A4; Flapan, Nuclear Power in the Middle East: The Critical Years,” New Outlook, 17, 8 (October 1974), pp. 34.

198 Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 33-34.

199 On December 20 Philip Farley informed Tel Aviv, London and Paris that “Radio MOSCOW” was broadcasting that the U.S. was “aiding” Israel’s “nuclear...program.” There is no mention of the Soviet reaction toward Dimona in December 1960 in Hebrew University political scientist Galia Golan’s Soviet Policies in the Middle East, Bar-Siman-Tov’s Israel, the Superpower, and War in the Middle East nor Yosef Govrin’s Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967. Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Farley to U.S Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, Paris and London, December 20, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. Gideon and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 32, 34-35, 225n28.
Chapter Two: Eisenhower's Bureaucratic Charade

Responding to Washington's apparent inability to uncover Dimona before the NYT or WP did, on December 13, 1960, the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) asked the Joint Atomic Energy Inter-Agency Committee (JAEIC) to prepare a “detailed post-mortem report on why the intelligence community (IC) did not recognize” this reality much “earlier.” Eleven days after President Eisenhower left the White House, a 17 page report, *Post Mortem on Special National Intelligence Estimates*, outlining the litany of missed opportunities to uncover Dimona, was delivered to President John F. Kennedy upon “his explicit request.” The report purported that the IC naively assumed that Israel “could not” achieve a nuclear program without “outside aid” as such assistance, if provided, would have been “known.” Thus, there was a “tendency” to give Israel the benefit of the doubt and to “discount rumors…in the nuclear weapons area.”

From 1952-1959 Washington had received “numerous reports” that France was aiding Israel to pursue “nuclear weapons” as part of a bilateral agreement “since 1953.” The IC had obtained details of the Franco-Israeli “collaboration” by “early…1957” but this information was not circulated to the highest levels. Had this occurred, then Israel’s atomic “intentions” could have been uncovered “one or perhaps two years earlier,” possibly in 1958 or 1959. From “early 1960” onwards other pieces of undigested information suggested that France was assisting Israel but this data was never “formally disseminated.” The SDECE’s FBI and CIA liaison in Washington, Phillip Thyraud de Vosjoli (1951-1963), said nothing about France’s complicity in


\[202\] “*Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.*"
Dimona. According to journalist Tom Mangold, although de Vosjoli’s CIA contacts were supposed to be routed through the Agency’s “Fourth Desk,” his “special relationship” with Mr. Angleton allowed him to obviate protocol.  

The Post-Mortem also disclosed that on May 25, 1959, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tel Aviv had reported that the April 26 resignation of General Daniel Tolkowsky, head of the Defense Ministry’s Development Authority, stemmed from his opposition to Peres’s atomic policy. But as the Attaché “was unable to confirm” this report’s validity, “no action was taken.” The Post-Mortem also failed to divulge Britain’s intermediary role in the Israeli-Norwegian heavy water deal. Coincidently, in early December 1960 the U.S learned that Norway had provided Israel with heavy water via a British source. Still, this revelation did not comprise the first U.S. knowledge of Norway’s involvement. On June 5, 1959, a Norwegian Foreign Ministry official had “advised” the AEC that Oslo had concluded a heavy water deal with Israel which falsely “included safeguards and inspection.” In July 1959, the same month Israel received its first heavy water shipment from Britain, the U.S. Embassy in Oslo streamlined this information to the AEC and State Department. Conveniently, this knowledge was not disseminated to the rest of the IC until December 1960.

To assert that Washington was oblivious to Dimona’s existence while elements in Paris, London, Oslo and New York were assisting and financing Israel’s atomic aspirations is difficult to believe. Yet this myth has been perpetuated a distinguished array of established scholars who  

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204 The Peres-Tolkowsky debate was illuminated in an April 10, 1959, memorandum from the British Embassy in Tel Aviv to London. The document, discovered by Aronson, reveals that Tolkowsky had argued that it would be “foolish for Israel to try and get an atomic bomb” since it would only encourage the U.S.S.R. to “arm the Arabs.” Aronson has contended that the telegraph was also sent to the U.S. “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60;” Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp. 66-67 & 312n21.

205 “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
have asserted that the U.S. was unaware of Dimona’s origins, nature, or status prior to “late 1960” or even “early 1961.” Unfortunately, the scholarship, blindly embracing Dr. Paul Wolfowitz’s mantra that in the intelligence world “surprise happens so often that it’s surprising that we’re still surprised by it,” has credulously accepted the Post-Mortem’s conclusion that all clues were unintentionally “lost in the bureaucratic shuffle.”

According to AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss (1953-1958), Eisenhower’s December 8, 1953, UN Atoms for Peace speech yearned to “accelerate the application of peaceful uses of the atom everywhere.” In April 1954 in Los Angeles Strauss compared the UN oration to the Gettysburg Address, delivered by the first and “great” Republican President. Noting that Ike’s speech contained just 3,000 words, Strauss emphasized that the proposal would not be “another move in the chess game of world politics,” place naïve “trust where...trust could not be” given or be able “to turn deserts into lush meadows...” His place in the historiography—whether he was clueless, careless or complicit—needs to be ironed out.

Following the Atoms for Peace address, Israel was the second nation to express interest

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206 The West Point Commencement speech was given on June 6, 2001. “Wolfowitz chilling speech,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcxI5wpDueE (4:44); “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”


210 During a 1962 interview for the Eisenhower Library, Strauss admitted only that they had met Ben Gurion a few times “at the White House.” He blamed the Arab-Israeli dispute on “external irritants like the Egyptian dictator,” arguing that the peace process would be piecemeal, as “those of us who are alive today may never live to see it.” In the end, however, the “situation” would inevitably “iron” itself “out” somehow. Oral History Interview with Lewis Strauss #2 of 3, February 14, 1962, Columbia Oral History Project, pp. 103-105, DDEL.
with the AEC in signing a bilateral accord. Negotiations started on May 13, 1955, in Washington between Morehead Patterson, Abba Eban, Israel’s U.S. Ambassador, and the Mossad’s Reuven Shiloah. On June 3 Strauss and Eban agreed that the AEC would transmit no more than six kilograms of U-235 with an enrichment level no higher than 20%. The corporatist framework also enabled “private” firms to “deal directly with private individuals in the other country.” The agreement was finalized on July 12, 1955. Foreshadowing future events, a month later at the before mentioned Geneva Conference the U.S. missed a golden chance to uncover Israel’s hidden nuclear motives. Meeting with Patterson on August 16, Bergmann asked whether Israel would have “to turn over the plutonium” to the AEC “for reprocessing.” Defensively stating “that he had no idea what the answer would be,” Patterson questioned if “Israel had considered the political impact on the Arab world” of “producing plutonium.” Bergmann responded that since the amount was so small “it could not have possible military implications.” According to an Israeli document with two pages missing, four days later Bergmann asked Strauss for “a real reactor” and “plutonium.” Answering that Israel “could not do anything” involved with “the slightest quantities of plutonium,” Strauss then suggested

212 Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Bilateral Agreements for the Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” May 13, 1955, RG 59, State Late Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.
213 Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Government of the USA and the Government of Israel,” June 3, 1955, 108-F-3 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL.
215 Jabber has unveiled that two weeks after the Bergmann and Patterson meeting the AEC provided Israel with 45 volumes on nuclear theory on August 31. This development precipitated the first NYT story in the Dimona historiography, a one sentence anonymous blurb written from Tel Aviv. Over the next five years 45 Israelis were trained at U.S. nuclear facilities at Oak Ridge and Argonne National Laboratory. Department of State, Memo of Conversation, August 18, 1955, RG 59, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA; Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 25-26; “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Library,” NYT, September 1, 1955, p. 3.
the proposal be delivered “to the AEC via the embassy by the end of September.”

During the ensuing five months all U.S.-Israeli nuclear dialogue ceased at the AEC and State. Nonetheless, on January 10, 1956, Israel was added to the Third Category List of the CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIA/OSI). Three months later, Bergmann inquired to the AEC about “training opportunities” for Israeli “specialists and operators” in the fields of “metallurgy” and “reactor components.” This request drew “reservations” from Thomas Jones as certain aspects in this field were still “classified.” Disseminated to the AEC and U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, the anonymously written document optimistically ended by stressing that “it was thought that some assistance might be found.”

Eight days later the two sides met again, with the Israelis explaining that they expected to receive bids from U.S. firms on reactors within the next “five or six weeks.” When Bergmann asked about obtaining some U-235 for experimental purposes, Foggy Bottom’s Harold Beneledorf professed that this request would not pose “any special problems” as long as the material was “used for peaceful purposes.” The AEC agreed to confer “with its lawyers” to

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216 In the fall of 1966 Strauss got Bergmann a two month-appointment as a guest fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton where Strauss had been a member since World War II. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 45

217 Richelson has asserted this cohort “contained the least important intelligence targets, but not apparently out of a specific concern with its nuclear activities.” Even though Israel was excluded, the IC’s interest in the atomic activities of the “pariah states” began in September 30, 1956, when the CIA/OSI produced a study focused on Asian and African nations. As late as May 24, 1960, Israel was still located in the 2nd Category, a cohort of nations consisting of nations conducting “Non-Bloc nuclear energy research and development …and the use of such materials for weapons and other purposes…” Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, pp. 247 & 605 n45; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 81; “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”

218 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” April 11, 1956, RG 59, State Lot Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.

219 De Tocqueville understood that lawyers represent the only “aristocratic element” of U.S. society because they handle “special information” and serve as “arbiters between the citizens.” With a proclivity to consistently interrupt, utilize hypothetical red herrings and consistently aim to reverse priorities, most lawyers, like “most...men,” are driven by private ends and the myopic “advantages of the moment.” In his denouncement of Foggy Bottom’s “law-office atmosphere,” Kennan warned that a “legalistic-moralistic” foreign policy “approach” could turn the U.S into a “puppet state....” Following the biography is ideology adage, historian John Prados has emphasized that the connection between lawyers “and spycraft is often overlooked.” The current DCI, Leon Panetta, attended Santa Clara Law School (1965-1969) before heading to Wall Street, while the President (Harvard, 1989-1991), who taught Constitutional law for ten years, Vice-President (Syracuse, 1965-1968) and Secretary of State (Yale, 1969-1973) are all lawyers. More than half of the current Senate attended law school. Harvard law school graduate Ralph Nader
ascertain whether Israel’s uranium “fabrication” would “pose any legal problems.”

On July 17, 1956, Bergmann asked Strauss about purchasing 10 tons of heavy water. The AEC lawyers must have done their job because a report, written a month later by Farley, now perceived the request as an ominous signal that Israel was “contemplating the construction of a second reactor...”

According to Cohen, on September 14 the AEC and State notified Israel that while its requests would be granted, they needed to “take place under” a new bilateral agreement with “a more rigorous safeguards” system. These signs of increased U.S. doubt, coupled with pending deal at Sèvres, explain why Israel dropped its request for a 10-MW reactor. This Israeli policy change was accompanied by a slight personnel shift. On December 4, Dr. Ephraim Lahav, who had no knowledge of Peres’s atomic diplomacy in Paris, rather than Eban informed the AEC that Israel this choice was attributed to “indecision regarding” the reactor final site location.

On January 25, 1957, the AEC proclaimed that Ben-Gurion had been informed that “certain types of reactors... planned by Israel, had excessive plutonium production capabilities ...” This more skeptical AEC and State policy during the midst of the Suez Crisis, did not deter Israel even though it dropped its heavy water request in early 1957. As U.S. government officials asked too many questions, Ben Gurion turned to the private sector. Sanitized sections


221 Department of State, Memorandum, Farley to the Acting Secretary of State, August 16, 1956, RG 59, State Lot files, Lot57D688, Box 417, USNA.
223 AEC, Memorandum of Conversation, “Implementation of Atomic Energy Program with Israel,” January 25, 1957, RG 59, State Lot Files, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.
from Ben Gurion’s diary from May 11 and July 11, 1957, indicate that he discussed “how to set up a national nuclear energy program” with the Nobel Prize winning physicist I.I. Rabi, a former member of AEC's General Advisory Committee (GAC) from December 1946 to October 1956 and its Chairman since October 1952. Cohen has emphasized that Ben-Gurion “made a point to meet” with Rabi, Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller, who also served on the AEC/GAC from August 13, 1956, to October 26, 1956, whenever they visited Israel. A half year passed before a new Israeli request was submitted to the AEC by the New York based American Machines and Foundry (AMF) Company in December 1957.

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224 Considering their close personal relationship and Rabi’s close ties to Israel, there is little chance that the President was oblivious of Rabi’s trip to see Ben Gurion or the possibility of him covertly aiding and advising Israel’s nuclear program. In 1937 Rabi became a chemistry professor at Columbia and was granted leave in 1940 to work at MIT on the development of radar and the Manhattan Project. After Ike became Columbia’s President in 1948 he and Rabi developed a close bond. Yale historian Daniel Kelves has pointed out that Rabi enjoyed “considerable power as a quiet insider” with Eisenhower. In 1953 alone he spent 120 days advising the administration. He was integral in convincing Secretary of State Dulles to call for the creation of an international atomic energy committee before the UNGA on September 23, 1954. Due to his participation within the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization during the post War years, after the UN passed resolution 810 (IX) on December 4, 1954, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold formed an advisory committee with Rabi as the U.S. delegate. Following the U.S.S.R.’s Sputnik launch on October 4, 1957, Rabi, who was officially out of government when he visited Israel, was named chairman of the Science Advisory Committee and later served on the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) under MIT’s James Killian Jr from 1958 to 1960. In a clear conflict of interest Rabi, who physics Professor John S. Rigden has pointed out was “profoundly Jewish” due to his orthodox Brooklyn upbringing, began increasing his ties with Israel during his PSAC tenure. In 1959 he was appointed a Board of Governors member of Israel’s Weizmann Institute. John Shaw, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Israel, asserted in a November 22, 1960, memo that Rabi’s name surfaced in a meeting between Bergmann and U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid, when the former “commented very favorably” on a September meeting he had with then AEC Chairman John McCone at the IAEA’s Fourth General Conference in Vienna. Bergmann also told Reid that he had informed McCone that Rabi was “highly respected by...other delegations.” Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 353 n10; John S. Rigden, *Rabi: Scientist and Citizen* (Basic Books: New York, 1987), pp. 211-21, 236-250. Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 51; “Isidor Isaac Rabi: The Nobel Prize in Physics 1944,” http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/physics/laureates/1944/rabi-bio.html; “I.I. Rabi,” http://www.columbia.edu/cu/alumni/Magazine/Summer2001/Rabi.html; Richard T. Sylves, *The Nuclear Oracles: A Political History of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1977* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987), pp. 22-23, 33, 57, 107, 110; Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1978), pp. 376-377; Memo of Conversation, “Subject: Comments of Professor Bergmann on the Fourth IAEA General Conference,” November 22, 1960, RES&D 1-2- Testing- August- December 1960 Folder #2 (1), Box 4, John A. McCone Papers, 1958-1961, DDEL.


On March 19, 1958, the IAEC and the AMF signed an agreement stipulating that a 1-MW pool reactor, to be built at Nachal Soreq, would be online by June 1960. During these discussions the AEC’s Carl Jones asked Lahav whether Israel was still planned to build a 10-MW reactor. Lahav responded that “no firm decision had been taken” as such a choice would be predicated upon “money, manpower, and uranium.” Unfortunately, other than Jones, no one else in the AEC or State interpreted this shift in Israeli as a mask for clandestine activity. These talks transpired just as Arthur Lundahl and Dino Brugioni of the CIA’s Photo-Intelligence Division (CIA/PIC) began briefing Strauss about U-2 photos revealing Israeli construction of a second reactor in the Negev. In “early 1958” Lundahl and Brugioni began briefing Strauss and “a few AEC aides” on this subject. Brugioni admitted that he met with Strauss regularly but found him uninterested. Confessing to Hersh that he “never knew” what the AEC “was thinking,” Brugioni added a “fervor” existed “among New York Jews” to always “protect Israel.” On April 1, 1958, Israel’s nuclear capacity was pegged by the AEC as in the “research stage.”

Strauss’ AEC tenure officially ended on June 30 yet John McCone only officially took over until July 14. For a fortnight then the AEC was technically leaderless during a vital time

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227 Memorandum of Conversation, Carl Jones, AEC, and Dr. Ephraim Lahav, March 19, 1958, RG 59, Lot 57D688, Box 417, USNA.
228 Hersh has averred that Lundahl relayed all nuclear intelligence to the White House and then, “unless directed otherwise,” to Strauss and a “few AEC officials.” One can speculate that these “officials” could have included Rabi and/or Teller, whom both held close ties with each other and with Strauss and Eugene Wigner since 1939. Although he served after the U-2 flights began under Strauss, Wigner was also a member of the AEC/GAC from September 22, 1952 to January 24, 1957, and December 3, 1959 to May 1, 1964. Strauss, Rabi, Teller and Wigner had also all known each other since 1939 and were the four main catalysts behind the Manhattan Project. On Eisenhower’s final day as President, on January 18, 1961, the CIA reported that no one should be surprised that Israel was attempting to build the bomb, simply because “almost every nuclear scientist” who had worked on the Manhattan Project was Jewish. Bass, Support Any Friend, 95, 295n53; Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising form the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 5-11; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 54-55 & 90-91; Sylves, The Nuclear Oracles, pp. 22-23.
229 Status of Agreements for Cooperation, April 1, 1958, AEC 1958 (3), Box 4, Administrative Series, Anne Whitman File, DDEL.
230 Although now officially a private citizen, Strauss still led the U.S. delegation at the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, a gathering of 69 nations, 9 supranational institutions and 6000
in U.S. policy regarding Dimona. On July 1 the CIA produced NIE 100-2-58 which touched upon the “fourth” country nuclear proliferation problem. Strauss participated in the Intelligence Advisory Committee behind the NIE, but McCone probably had no access to this document as it was conveniently disseminated 13 days before he became Chairman and one day after Strauss had vacated. There is also no proof that Strauss relayed any knowledge to McCone. As Algie Wells, the AEC’s Director of International Affairs (AEC/DIA) in mid-1958, noted to Hersh: “Why would Strauss have told McCone? ...They both had colossal egos.”

Determining exactly when McCone became aware of Dimona is difficult to ascertain as nearly 40% of his AEC papers remain locked in the Eisenhower Library’s vault.232 If McCone was oblivious about Dimona when he became Chairman, the amendments that he helped to implement to the July 1955 accord in 1959 and 1960 should have enlightened him.233

As late as June 30, 1959, the AEC/DIA still placed Israel’s atomic “scope of research” capacity in the “research” category, a level below the capabilities of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Peru and Venezuela.234 Then, on July 29, 1959, McCone informed Ike that the AEC now wanted to sell Israel ten (originally six) kilos of uranium, possessing an increased enrichment of 90% (originally 20%). The amendment allowed for the transfer of “specific nuclear materials, including U-235, U-233, and plutonium,” based on the confusing language of “an as-may-be-agreed basis.” Five days later Ike proclaimed that this change was

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231 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 92.
233 In October 1960 the JAEIC revealed that sometime in “1956” the AEC increased the amount of uranium provided in its bilateral agreements, “for certain applications,” from six to twelve kilograms. The enrichment level also increased from 20 to 90%. What “certain applications” entailed on a country by country basis was left unresolved. “Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the U.S.: Report to the JAEIC,” p. 8.
234 “Status of Agreements for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy as of June 30, 1959,” Nuclear Non-Proliferation-5014, Incoming FOIA Documents, Box 6, GWNSA.
“designed to” to prevent anything from being “diverted to non-peaceful purposes.” On August 20 the amendment was signed by the AEC and disseminated to Foggy Bottom.235

One month later the U.S. was again busy amending the July 1955 accord set to expire on July 11, 1960. On June 4 McCone asked Ike to extend the deal for an additional two years, asserting that it would not be “an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.” The two year renewal also provided both sides with “sufficient time” to reach an accord with the IAEA regarding the “administration of safeguards for the reactor...” The proposed amendment was signed by Robert Winfree (State), Robert Slawson (AEC) and Lahav.236 Five days later Ike gave his blessing.237 McCone’s decision to approve the amendments represents an unspoken policy of encouragement for Israel’s atomic agenda. Understanding what Strauss and McCone knew about Dimona and, more importantly, when they knew it, is the key.

This bureaucratic theme also encapsulates the HUMINT intelligence, information derived from human sources, collected on Dimona by the CIA and Angleton. As a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Rome during World War II, the Yale lawyer had acquired life-long assets while helping Jews escape the Holocaust. Ian Black and Benny Morris have contended that during this time Angleton met Reuven Shiloah, a future Mossad head (1951-1952) and his deputy, Teddy Kolleck, the future Jerusalem Mayor (1965-1993). He also developed a friendship with Meir de Shalit while the latter was posted in Washington.238

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235 On March 4, 1960, the NYT indicated that the nuclear fuel for Nachal had arrived in Haifa. The one sentence page 11 anonymous story asserted that 6,500 grams of uranium, enriched at 90%, had “been lent” by the AEC “…for peaceful purposes.” Letter to Eisenhowe from McCone, July 30, 1959, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL; Letter to McCone from Eisenhowe, August 3, 1959, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL; “Israel Gets U.S. Atom Fuel,” NYT, March 4, 1960, p. 11.
236 Letter to Eisenhowe from McCone, June 4, 1960, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL.
237 Letter to McCon from Eisenhowe, June 9, 1960, 108-F-2 (13), Box 534, Central Files Official File, DDEL.
238 Prior to operating in Italy, Shiloah and Kolleck worked with the OSS in the U.S., Britain and Turkey. Following Israel’s creation, Meir, the elder brother of Amos, became the main liaison between the CIA and the Israeli government and helped to bring Soviet and Eastern European immigrants to Israel. Angleton and Deshalit ran the “rat lines” which provided the West in the early postwar years with important knowledge of the U.S.S.R. During the
Angleton’s fondness for the Jewish underground derived from two factors. First, he felt a moral duty to support a Jewish state; as Kolleck affirmed, Angleton “saw in Israel a true ally” when such sentiment was “rare...” Boston Globe reporters Jeff McConnell and Richard Higgins have argued that Angleton’s efforts in Rome gave “him a special stature among Israelis for years to come.” Secondly, he viewed Eastern European Jewish emigrants as a Kremlin ploy to spy on the U.S., a fear exemplified by the 1951 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg trial.

To improve ties with the CIA, Israel needed to convince Angleton that it was firmly aligned with the U.S. in its struggle with the U.S.S.R. This process began in early 1951 when Angleton received the “Israeli account” which was separated from the CIA’s Near East Desk. Serving as the Israeli intelligence liaison, Angleton’s closest friends worked for the Mossad.

Prior to his first visit to the U.S. after Israel’s creation, Ben Gurion had been asked by Shiloah to inquire about intelligence sharing between the Mossad and CIA. Speaking to DCI Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Director Allen Dulles and President Truman in May 1951, Ben Gurion had stated that Israel was “very interested” in a strategic agreement with the CIA. A month later Shiloah traveled to the U.S. to finalize the secret details with Bedell Smith, Dulles, and Angleton. By year’s end Shiloah had informed the CIA that Israel was carefully screening Jewish immigrants during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Angleton and Meir met two to three times a week at the Israeli liaison’s house on Massachusetts Avenue. Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 144-145; Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, pp. 63-65; Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 74.


241 In 1985 Harel asserted that during the early Cold War it was vital for Israel to “create a positive image” due to Jewish communists like Harry Gold, David Greenglass and British physicist Klaus Fuchs spying in the U.S. during the late 1950s. Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, p. 170; Goldberg, Jewish Power, p. 118.

242 Ben-Gurion met Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s World War II Chief of Staff, for the first time when Ike had visited Holocaust survivors in German refugee camps. Carved in stone on the exterior wall of the Washington Holocaust Museum are the following words from Ike describing his experience of a Nazi concentration camp: “The things I saw beggar description…” Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1999), p. 64; Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, pp. 76-77.
from the Communist bloc. In 1954 Mossad Chief Harel had presented the new DCI, Allen Dulles, with a Persian-Jewish plaque engraved with the unforgettable Psalms 121:4: “The Guardian of Israel neither slumbers nor sleeps.” On December 20, 1954, the paramount bureaucratic insider took charge of the Israeli account and became CI Chief, powerful positions Angleton held for the next 20 years.

The secret Mossad-CIA pact stipulated that they would share strategic intelligence, refrain from spying on each other, and exchange liaison officers in their respective embassies. Angleton sent underlings to Tel Aviv to evaluate the danger of Soviet penetration, while Israel began using its immigrants to supply information about Soviet activities and allowing its own operatives to be used by the CIA as agents and informants. Black and Morris have professed these contacts gave Israel “an invaluable asset in its dealings” with “the legendary ... Angleton.” “We knew much more” than the U.S., Harel recalled, boasting that Israel “had a more accurate picture- than anyone else,” while de Shalit contended that the “fanatical” Angleton began to warm up when “he began to get to know people in Israel.” Israel’s role in helping the CIA to uncover Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 26, 1956, to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, the famous denunciation of Joseph Stalin, cemented future U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation. The translated contents of the speech remained unknown to the CIA for nearly two months until Angleton personally delivered it to the DCI on April 17. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Tim Weiner has stressed Angleton’s role in obtaining the speech made him “the CIA’s one man liaison” with Israel; effectively blurring U.S. “perceptions for decade to

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243 Raviv and Melman, Every Spy a Prince, p. 78.
244 Black and Morris, Israel's Secret Wars, p. 170.
245 Yale historian Robin Winks has avowed that by 1954 the CIA was “a relatively entrenched bureaucracy,” with Angleton a “strong minded man surrounded by like-minded men.” With the exception of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, no other senior beltway official held the same job for a longer period. Robin Winks, Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), p. 411.
246 Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, pp. 136 & 169.
come.” The Suez War proved to be an even larger moment in Angleton’s career.

A serious debate existed within the CIA during October 1956 over whether Israel would attack Egypt. Reporter John Ranelagh has contended that on October 26, three days before the tripartite strike, the G-2 Army unit in Washington received a low-grade message from its Tel Aviv Attaché warning of a forthcoming attack. Robert Amory, a CIA analyst (1952-1962), told Ranelagh that the message indicated that “an attack” was coming “Monday morning” as Israel had ordered up “double amputees.” Asked about the rising tensions that same day by Dulles, Angleton found Amory’s guesswork “alarming,” professing that after talks with “friends” he was sure that Israel was “certainly not” planning an “attack.” Weiner has averred that DCI’s “undiying gratitude” towards Angleton allowed Israel to hypnotize “Dulles and Angleton with disinformation…” Hahn has emphasized that although Ike publicly opposed the using force, some Israeli officials “interpreted signals” from the DCI indicating that war against Egypt would not weaken U.S. interests. Amory later professed that he had pleaded with Dulles to either trust him or to put his faith in a “co-opted Israeli agent!”

Journalist David Martin has argued that the misanthropic Angleton believed “history was conspiracy.” A July 12, 1976, NYT story asserted that in the “wake of Suez” in 1957-58 Angleton sent nuclear scientists to Dimona to help Israel develop “atomic weapons.” Based on an August 1975 Penthouse article written by Tad Szulc, a former NYT correspondent, the NYT

251 Hahn, “The View from Jerusalem,” p. 523.
253 Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, p. 215.
piece stressed that one of these men was a British-born physicist who possessed “special and esoteric ties to the CIA.” Szulc contended that U.S. assistance was a quid pro quo for an Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai. The allegation was also categorically denied by the CIA, unsurprising considering its inimical history with the reporter. Despite subsequent denials provided by Harkavy and Pry mentioned in the introduction, Wolf Blitzer, a former AIPAC employee, did not refute Szulc’s allegation that Angleton had “secretly aided Israel with technical information during the late 1950s.” Instead, he praised Szulc as a “respected foreign

254 If Angleton executed such a policy, it is not a surprise considering his bureaucratic tendencies, the CIA’s internal subculture and Eisenhower’s governing style. Mangold has argued that Angleton discreetly constructed “an alternative CIA” where he set his own “rules, beyond peer review or executive supervision.” In a December 9, 1961, letter to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DCI Dulles admitted that certain “Agency” factions possessed “virtual autonomous functions” fully capable of independent organizational action. This blind eyed delegation was a trademark of Ike, who, other than perhaps Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, gave the CIA more free reign to operate than any other President. Describing the presidency as an “ephemeral” position, political scientist Fred Greenstein has argued that Ike once told Time-Life President Henry Luce that the elephantine U.S. national security bureaucracy had become “too big, too complex, and too persuasive...for one individual to pretend to direct...” Historian Tor Egil Førland has contended that Ike’s bureaucratic underlings sometimes choose to pursue their own agenda and ignored the “president’s wishes.” Dovetailing nicely into Dahl’s long-time argument that the U.S. is really “polyarchy” or “oligarchic republic,” one of the weaknesses of Ike’s “hidden hand” was that it precipitated a system of “many hidden hands” which could “turn policy in directions unintended by the commander in chief himself.” Informed by Representative Paul Findley (R-Illinois) that few in Congress know how much money the CIA receives and “none” how it is spent, historian Arthur Schlesinger has argued that Ike possessed a sharp “instinct” but did “nothing” to regulate the “secrecy system.” The CIA’s Richard Bissell had doubts whether Eisenhower “was fully knowledgeable about what his administration was doing and whether he was in control of it.” Gaddis has observed that Ike failed to monitor decisions closely with “original intent” and instead employed a “curious unwillingness to grasp the reigns of power at all levels.” There is something unsettling in the statement that “bureaucracies” can not “be trusted to monitor themselves...” Mangold, Cold Warrior, p. 306; Memorandum from DCI Dulles to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, “Subject 6th Report to the President by the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 9, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/60 08.htm (Document 83); Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), pp. 3, 5, 9, 57, 81, 87, 92; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 158; Tor Egil Førland, “Selling Firearms to the Indians,” DH 15, 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 222-224; Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, pp. 304; 327; Richard Bissell and John Lewis, Reflections of a Cold Warrior (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 114; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 263; “Article Says Israel Got C.I.A. Atomic Aid,” NYT, July 12, 1976, p. 11.


256 Szulc’s most famous NYT article, published on April 8, 1961, was entitled “Cuban Intrigue Boiling in Miami as Castro Foes Step up Efforts.” The previous day Szulc had written a piece which indicated that anti-Castro forces had been training in Florida and Guatemala, with CIA guidance and financing, in preparation for an invasion. The NYT, however, refused to publish the CIA related sections. The Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred ten days later. In his obituary, Daniel Lewis asserted that CIA files identified Szulc as “anti-agency” and “under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent.” Daniel Lewis, “Tad Szulc, 74, Dies,” NYT, May 22, 2001, p. C17.
affairs writer.”

Cohen has asserted that one of the reasons Dimona kept its reactor secret from the U.S. was because Israel “may also have had friends in high places...who might have helped to suppress the early information.” One of these individuals was Angleton who “jealously” guarded the Israeli desk and “did not share sensitive information with other agencies, and also withheld much of it from other CIA factions.”

Gauging how much Angleton knew about Dimona is difficult to determine. Stephen Millet, Angleton’s primary aide during the 1950s, admitted that the U.S. had problems collecting quality human intelligence in Israel because “its people” were “more tightly knit” than the U.S. Israeli scrutiny of U.S. officials was smothering. In 1956 telephone bugs were discovered in the U.S. Military Attaché’s office. Stephen Koczak, a former officer assigned to Tel Aviv, asserted that Donald John Sanne, the CIA’s Station Chief in Israel (1953-1956), informed his successor, Harold Williams, that their U.S. Embassy phones were also bugged. All Embassy contacts with Israel’s government and citizens were channeled through a “special liaison office” in Israel’s Foreign Ministry. Those who disobeyed protocol were followed. Sanne, Williams, and Koczak were all kept under surveillance during their tenures in country. As the only official able to circumvent Tel Aviv’s tight diplomatic hierarchy, Angleton, according to Hersh, utilized his “close personal ties with the de Shalit family and others” to learn about Dimona.

Considering Angleton’s relationship with Israel’s IC since 1951, the dearth of U.S. human information on Dimona during the 1950s is unacceptable. Angleton did not have to make new allies. He just had to keep his old ones, namely the DCI which, according to a 1963 Soviet

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258 Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 84.
260 Basing his source on an anonymous “senior official,” Hersh professed that Angleton’s first report on Dimona was filed in the late 1950s without being disseminated to the powerful Frank Wisner’s Directorate of Operations, the body theoretically responsible for clandestine actions. Hersh, *The Samson Option*, pp. 145-147, 162.
document, represents the “most important figure” after the President in organizing U.S. foreign policy. Angleton never disclosed his informants, not even to Dulles, meaning this paperless trail died with him. Yale historian Sherman Kent, a former head of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE), correctly professed that in the CIA “valuable employees” were often relieved while those “of a lesser...competence” soldiered “on.” The CIA’s HUMINT on Dimona needs to be compared and contrasted with its technical data on the subject.

The historiography of the U-2 missions over Dimona is difficult to decipher. Historian Norman Polmar has contended that on March 11, 1959, two IAF fighters failed to intercept an “unidentified aircraft.” He did not explain why the U-2, the tightest kept secret of Ike’s presidency, was spying on Israel, only stating that it “overflew Haifa and turned south” before overflying the Gaza Strip. The CIA’s Donald Pedlow and Gregory Welzenbach have concluded that “early 1959” saw the U-2 fly “over Middle East countries,” a tacit reference to

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261 This statement was made by V. Cherynavskiy, a Russian expert in international affairs, sometime in 1963. A Pamphlet about the Chief of US Intelligence, John McConne State Publishing House for Political Literature, Moscow, 1963, NSF, Departments and Agencies, CIA General (1963 and undated), Box 271, JFKL.


263 The U-2 made its first flight over the U.S.S.R. on July 1, 1956. Its first flight over the Near East originated from Wiesbaden, West Germany, and landed in Adana, Turkey, on August 29, 1956. The U-2 pictures revealed that Israel possessed 60 Mystère fighters rather than the 24 planes Paris claimed. Two years later the U-2 was back in action after Iraq’s monarchy was overthrown and Chamoun’s Lebanese regime was threatened by a nationalist revolt on July 14-15, 1958. For every flight, Dulles would first give the “important job of” selecting targets to James Reber. For every flight Brugioni and James Cunningham would calculate the necessary logistics. When the flight plan was completed it was given to Reber to be presented to Ike for approval. Brugioni purported that often U. Alexis Johnson would “look at the memo and make appropriate comments representing the Department of State’s view” until he was named Ambassador to Thailand in January 1958. There is no mention whether anyone filled Johnson’s role after Herter became Secretary of State on April 22, 1959. After Ike approved the mission Reber’s memo would be given to Dulles, “who would forward it to his brother.” In September 1956 the U.S. established the Detachment B base at Adana, later renamed Incirlik. For nearly four years Adana was the springboard for U-2 flights over the Near East and Dimona. Bissell omitted any mention of the U-2 flights over Dimona, but he purported vaguely that “operations over the Middle East were less carefully allocated by the president than those over the Soviet bloc.” Bissell and Lewis, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, pp. 120-121.

the March 11 flight over Dimona.\textsuperscript{265} Although Chris Pocock omitted this flight in \textit{Dragon Lady}, he has argued that there were “less than...a dozen” sorties “in 1959” and no penetrations until April 1960 when two U-2s overflew “the secret nuclear research facility.”\textsuperscript{266} These two flights were the only sorties which could have photographed Dimona in 1960. After the Soviets downed Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 on May 1, all flights were halted until late October.\textsuperscript{267}

The U-2 flights which uncovered that Israel was constructing a second reactor in the Negev began in early 1958. As a photo interpreter, Brugioni witnessed activity at an IAF facility south of Beersheba where a large fence in a barren area a dozen miles from Dimona was being assembled. “We spotted it right away,” Brugioni told Hersh, rhetorically adding, “What the hell was that big of a plant...doing there in the middle of the desert?” He regularly briefed Strauss on U-2 intelligence but “I never knew what he was thinking ...I’d get the reaction ‘that’s all right.’” More importantly, these briefings commenced before Strauss resigned on June 30, 1958, proving that the Dimona flights had started months before. Brugioni added that in “early 1958” Israel began digging and pouring cement into heavy foundations: “Whenever you build something nuclear you build it thick and deep. They were pouring a hell of a lot of concrete.” Israel constructed two separate sites, the second one containing the chemical reprocessing plant. Fake plastic trees were also planted in the desert to hinder photo opportunities of the facility.\textsuperscript{268}

The Negev drama was matched by political theatre in Washington. Brugioni maintained that while Dulles occasionally inquired about the “Jewish information,” he would say “his office would call later and tell me to forget it.” “We saw it going up,” he remarked, but the redundant response from on high was “‘this isn’t going to be disseminated, is it?’” Brugioni admitted that he

\textsuperscript{267} Polmar, \textit{Spyplane}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{268} Hersh, \textit{The Samson Option}, pp. 52-58 & 90.
could never decipher "whether the White House wanted Israel to have the bomb or not." He informed Cohen that when he discussed Dimona with Dulles, "probably in the summer or fall of 1958," he was barred from inspecting any "sensitive human intelligence material" by Amory's office. Lundahl, head of CIA/PIC, was responsible for delivering the U-2 photos to the White House in "late 1958 or early 1959." No written notes from his briefings can be found; this was no accident as "Ike didn't want any notes-period." Brugioni told Cohen that Lundahl once returned "in early 1958" from a briefing with Ike and Strauss and confessed that Ike "did not say a word." He also recollected to Hersh that "nobody came back to" him "ever, on Israel."

David Henry Thoreau penned that "if you really wish to do anything, resign your office." The "revolution is accomplished" only after "the subject has refused alliance." Folk singer Tom Lehrer's prudent analysis of "bureaucratic politics" explains why Brugioni and Lundahl did not resign in defiance of the CIA's Alice in Wonderland Dimona policy. In a July 1965 song about a Nazi rocket scientist, Lehrer mused: "Once the rockets are up/ Who cares where they come down?/ That's not my department!/ Said Wernher von Braun." Careerism usually trumps pragmatism. Yale political scientist Robert Dahl has honestly intoned that "most

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269 Ibid, pp. 53-58.
271 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 53.
272 Cohen has been reluctant to consider that the U.S. deliberately manipulated intelligence to cover-up Dimona. Like his own analysis on this crucial caveat, he described Ike's record on Dimona as "mixed and inconsistent," arguing that the U-2 photos were "inconclusive" even though once the pertinent intelligence was streamlined with all "governmental agencies" the White House was "forceful in drawing the line." Contradicting himself pages later, he asserted that Ike's failure to act set a bipartisan "precedent" for subsequent administrations to organize and prioritize policy toward Dimona "...as a special case." Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 84, 97.
273 Both Dulles brothers and Bissell joined Ike for the briefings. Bissell has argued that Ike was a "cautious man" who never made a "direct decision in meetings about the U-2 at which" he present. Instead, Eisenhower would "deliberate in private, probably in consultation" with the Secretary of State and his decisions would be transmitted usually by" General Andrew Goodpaster, who was the White House Staff Secretary and liaison with the CIA for the U-2 flights. Bissell has stressed that the "need to know doctrine" meant that Lundahl's "colleagues and superiors," with the exception of Amory, "were unaware of his activities." Bissell and Lewis, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, pp. 114 & 105; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 83; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 55.
people are egoists, not altruists.” Self-censorship breeds conformity but not responsibility. Brugioni confessed that one needed to “be careful” with Israeli information if you valued your “career” and he quickly “read the tea leaves.” Lundahl admitted that he reported all he knew to his “masters... on the mountain.” The intelligence process is not democratic, although some believe it “ought to be.” Behaving anonymously rather than assertively ensures self-preservation and growth in any bureaucracy.

Kent has argued that it is difficult to build trust between intelligence producers and consumers even when the reside in “the same... building....” A conservative estimate can be made that six CIA officials - Dulles, Bissell, Lundahl, Brugioni, Amory and Angleton - knew that Israel was pursuing a clandestine weapons program. Ensuring that U-2 intelligence remained segregated in this group was a deliberate policy executed by Ike and Dulles. The DCI often repeated the truism of his uncle Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, that “it isn’t a lie to withhold information from a person to whom it is not entitled.” If some secrets are fully streamlined then the “main regional units” would “not have adequate enthusiasm” to carry on the innocuous “scissors-and-paste” roles of their “clerical” jobs. 

As commander of the Normandy invasion and coiner of the phrase, “military-industrial complex,” Ike arguably possessed more intelligence and military knowledge than any President

277 Kent has argued when policymakers have set the course, “the consumer” has “no more to guide him than the indications of the tea leaf and the crystal ball.” Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 205; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 53, 55, 58. Ibid., p. 55.
278 No End in Sight (2007) Written and directed by Charles Ferguson.
279 Brugioni and Lundahl could not leak Dimona to the press without the fear of being fired without just cause, due process or compensation. A 1974 commission lead by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller concluded that the National Security Act gave the DCI unlimited and “unreviewable... discharge power.” U.S. Congress, Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities with the U.S.: Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, June 1975. Refer to Chapter 7; http://www.aarcibrary.org/publib/content_s/contents_church.htm;
280 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, pp. 167, 81, 54.
281 Winks, Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, p. 382.
282 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 142.
before or since. He also knew how to engineer plausible deniability. No one in his White House explicitly declared that Israel should be allowed to pursue the bomb and nothing existed on paper. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Goodpaster informed Hersh that the Ben-Gurion-Ike exchanges were “very close held.” While the U.S. was concerned about “Dimona,” he could not recall a “specific exchange about a nuclear umbrella.” The intelligence apparatus can only be controlled via an orally interlocking and compartmentalized system where the control of the paper flow must be undeniable.

Subsumed within the ONE, the Board of Nation Estimates (BNE), with Kent as its Chairman, was responsible for examining the military capacities and intentions of foreign nations. The first NIE on “fourth country” nuclear proliferation was produced on June 18, 1957. Its analysis was inaccurate. It predicted that by 1967 “up to 10” nations could develop a nuclear weapon potential “using only native resources.” Compared to Japan, India, and East Germany, Israel possessed “fewer of the requirements for a successful program and would require major foreign assistance to produce...weapons within” a decade. Three paragraphs later the report stressed that “Israel would almost certainly attempt to achieve” the bomb if it could obtain fissionable material and the necessary financing. Composed months after the first U2 had

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284 Historian John Ferris has asserted that given “Washington’s rule of politics by publicity, the more widely a document is circulated, the more likely it is to be disclosed.” The U-2 operation was the only part of the CIA that had its own communications office and operational cable traffic. All overseas cable traffic went straight to Bissell and no one saw copies without his permission. The CIA’s monthly progress reports for the U-2 were “only about five pages.” De Tocqueville elegantly averred that the U.S. “public administration” prefers to transmit ideas orally and the small portion which is “committed to writing is wafted away forever...” Bissell and Lewis, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, pp. 99 & 105; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 243; John Ferris, “Coming in from the Cold War: the Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945-1990,” In *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press: 1994), p. 568; Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 129.

over flown Dimona, on July 1, 1958, the BNE produced another estimate, NIE 100-2-58\textsuperscript{286} Although the NIE only viewed Israel's program in the "moderate stage," interestingly, paragraph 90 stressed that the bomb might soon be produced by a "totally irresponsible government." Offering Israel as the only example, the NIE warned that if a country "for special reasons deeply involved in a controversy of worldwide significance" acquired the bomb it would "be more likely to lead a general conflagration."\textsuperscript{287} On September 15 the CIA/OSI moved Israel to the Third Category Priority on its watchdog list where it conspicuously remained for the remainder of Ike's presidency.\textsuperscript{288}

When analyzing NIEs 100-6-57 and 100-2-58, one must account for the biases of their authors. Kent, who signed both documents, has argued that the "history of intelligence" has always been an internal battle between "the defenders and detractors of the Jewish national home in Palestine."\textsuperscript{289} One defender was Angleton who, Mangold has deduced, possessed "remarkable access" to Kent.\textsuperscript{290} Polmar has contended that Kent was kept in the dark about the U-2 secret by the CIA's Office of Security as the CIA viewed U-2 intelligence as far too sensitive to be used even in classified publications.\textsuperscript{291} The primitive "dry bones"\textsuperscript{292} analysis apparent in these two NIEs was a consequence of Kent being deliberately kept out of the loop.

\textsuperscript{286}According to political scientist Lock Johnson, on average, NIE's usually take three to seven months to produce. Based on the three to seven month estimate, therefore, the U.S. IC began to put the pieces together for NIE 100-2-58 anywhere from late December 1957 to March 1958, roughly the same time Dimona's construction was initiated and the U-2 first began overflying the facility. Lock Johnson, "Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, 23, 3 (June 2008), p. 342.

\textsuperscript{287}Through the FOIA this estimate was declassified in May 2004. DCI, NIE100-2-58, "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences," July 1, 1958, GWNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-3a.pdf.

\textsuperscript{288}"Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60."

\textsuperscript{289}Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{290}Another defender was Harold Linder, a BNE member during the 1950s. Powers was told by a former BNE member that Linder was "a brilliant guy," but "we were always a little concerned about his objectivity when it came to a paper on Israel." Mangold, Cold Warrior, p. 68; Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 321n36.

\textsuperscript{291}Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 372n25; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{292}Ray Cline, a member of Kent's staff, has asserted that NIEs "are the dry bones...attempts by many hundreds of people to express themselves in ways which were circulating in Washington at that time." In the final analysis an
Following the downing of Powers’ U-2, the U.S. debated whether the CIA should retain responsibility for the flights. On July 7, 1960, the CIA produced a heavily excised professing that “overflights” had been conducted in “the Middle East…when special circumstances have justified.” The report contended that there were presently “no pressing requirement for continuing flights over neutral areas,” a veiled reference to Israel.\textsuperscript{293} The BNE’s September 20 NIE 100-4-60 concluded that only West Germany, Sweden, Japan, and India “could initiate such programs...”\textsuperscript{294} All references to Israel in paragraphs 36 and 48 remain classified. Before examining Foggy Bottom’s policy of inaction concerning Dimona in the four months following NIE 100-4-60, an investigation of its prior policy on the subject is required.

Three sets of evidence indicate that John F. Dulles knew about Dimona prior to his death on May 24, 1959. First, other than maybe the direct Strauss-Ike correspondences, Dulles had access to all pertinent State and AEC documents on the subject. Secondly, he had helped his brother Allen to craft all NIEs and knew about the U-2 flights as Lundahl had briefed both “brothers.”\textsuperscript{295} The Post-Mortem contended that sometime in “1956” State “levied” upon Tel Aviv to include “specific sections on the atomic energy developments” in its future reports. When the U.S. Embassy approached Bergmann on March 3, 1958, he falsely responded that “no formal decision on nuclear power had yet been taken. Twenty-four days later the CIA/OSI requested “detailed information” concerning Israel’s “uranium and heavy water production.” On April 15 Bergmann flip-flopped, exclaiming now that “the decision to build a power reactor had

\textsuperscript{295} Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 57.
already been taken,” adding another and another “five to seven” years were needed before a
“reactor could be put into operation.” Nine days after NIE 100-2-58’s publication, the Post-
Mortem declared that these “requirements” were “served almost verbatim” to a “perturbed”
Bergmann by a nameless Second Secretary. 296

What, if anything, that Dulles passed on to his successor, Christian Herter, before the
latter became Secretary of State on April 22, 1959, is difficult to establish. 297 His appointment
occurred nearly a month after a U-2 piloted by Powers had over flown Dimona and been pursued
by Israeli fighters. Whether Herter as Assistant Secretary was briefed about this sortie or any of
the flights over Dimona since 1958 is unknown but seems unlikely. 298 Hersh and Bissell, while
proclaiming that Lundahl regularly briefed Dulles on U-2 intelligence, both have failed to
mention whether this process continued during Herter’s tenure. There is also no evidence that he
had access to the relevant NIEs on Dimona. Herter once declared that working under Dulles
made him a “number two-man in a one-man” production.” 299 From the start of Herter’s tenure,
Foggy Bottom missed several opportunities to uncover and confront Israel over Dimona.

Personnel changes at the highest diplomatic levels helped precipitate this failure.

296 The SNIE indicated that during the spring of 1958 “it was assumed wrongly” by the IC “that the experimental
reactor referred to was the small” research reactor,” at Nahal. “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
297 Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Call of Senators Regarding Aid to Israel,” April 22, 1959, FRUS, 1958-
298 Two days before the U-2 overflew on Dimona, Herter was listed as the “Acting Secretary” in a meeting with
Foreign Minister Meir and Eban. This label was also placed on him on April 9, three weeks before he took over
Foggy Bottom and six days after Dulles submitted his resignation. Given his own long relationship with the DCI,
however, Herter could have easily found out about Dimona if he was inquisitive enough. From 1947 to 1948 Allen
Dulles worked as a senior staffer on the House Select Committee on Foreign under the Chairmanship Herter (R-
Massachusetts). Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israel’s Request for Assistance with its Jordan Water
Development Project,” March 9,1959, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 149-150; Memorandum from Eric A.
Johnson to the Acting Secretary of State, April 9, 1959, Ibid, pp. 151-152; Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to
the Department of State, April 17, 1959, Ibid, pp. 163-165; Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and
299 Press Secretary James Hagerty asserted that Ike had “an easier working relationship” with Herter than with
Dulles because the former was “a little less arbitrary in his beliefs.” Historian Michael Beschloss has pointed out
that when Herter came to visit the Oval Office, Goodpaster and John Eisenhower felt confident enough to take
notes, a practice which “never” transpired under Dulles. Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 242-246.
According to a withdrawal sheet at the JFK Library, on January 1, 1959, Ben Gurion sent Ike a still classified eleven page latter. One can speculate that this document foreshadowed the changes that followed in Washington and Tel Aviv.\(^{300}\) On March 12, 1959, one day after a U-2 flew over Dimona, Foggy Bottom announced that the 33 year old Ogden Reid would replace the seasoned Edward Lawson as Ambassador in Tel Aviv.\(^{301}\) On June 11 William Rountree informed Reid that Israel represented “a very special place in U.S. international relations.” Reid responded that it would be his “intention to represent” U.S. interest “first” even though he was aware of the “pressure” which could “be brought on” by Israeli “friends.”\(^{302}\) Conveniently, on May 7, 1959, Ambassador Eban informed his hosts in Washington that his tenure was drawing “to a close.”\(^{303}\) Upon returning home, Eban revealed that Dimona represented for Israel “an enormous alligator stranded on dry land.”\(^{304}\) His successor was Avraham Harman who had served in the WZO since

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\(^{300}\) The eleven page letter was attached to a two page letter that DCI Dulles wrote for Kennedy on May 27, 1961, focused on Israel’s nuclear program. Three days later JFK met with Ben Gurion at the Waldorf, where Dimona was discussed for the first time at the highest level. This memo is also still classified. JFK Document Control Record, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, JFKL.

\(^{301}\) Eisenhower retained only five career diplomats from the previous White House, including Edward B. Lawson, Minister to Iceland, and Monnet Davis, Ambassador to Israel. When Davis died in late December 1953, his successor was Lawson, a Foreign Service member since 1939. After graduating from Yale in 1949, Reid joined the New York Herald Tribune in 1950 and in May 1953 was named its President and European Editor. Historian Robert Griffith has argued that the “Reid family” was one of the many influential public relations groups who supported Ike during his path to the Presidency. From 1963 to 1974 he served as a New York Congressman as both a Republican and Democrat, serving as ranking member on the House Foreign Relations Committee. “Executive is named to high Navy Post,” NYT, June 2, 1951, p. 20; “Envoy to Israel Named,” NYT, April 2, 1954, p. 8; “Envoy to Israel Confirmed,” NYT, April 10, 1954, p. 6; “New Envoy of U.S. Arrives in Tel Aviv,” NYT, November 3, 1954, p. 6. Robert Griffith, “Dwight Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” American Historical Review 87, 1 (February 1982), pp. 98-100. Biographic Sketch of Ogden Reid, Israel (2) (March-August 1960), International Series, Box 8, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, DDEL; Biographic Sketch, January 30, 1961, NSF Countries, Israel General (1/61), Box 118, JFKL; Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), p. xxi.

\(^{302}\) Interviewed for the Eisenhower Library days after the Six Day War’s conclusion, Reid affirmed that Ike was “sympathetic toward Israel.” He generalized that Ike “was deeply concerned to nuclear non-proliferation” and strived “to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities by other non-nuclear countries.” Which nations constituted “non-nuclear countries” was left unsaid. Memorandum of the Record, “Subject: Mr. William M. Rountree’s Briefing of Ambassador Ogden Reid, June 11, 1959,” undated, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 182-184; Oral interview of June 14, 1967, with Reid, conducted by John Luter, DDEL, pp. 3, 12, 13, 15, 18.


\(^{304}\) Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 119.
On September 2, 1959, less than a fortnight after the first amendment to the July 1955 accord, Harman arrived in Washington, meeting Ike twelve days later.

Thanks to these personnel changes, Ike and Ben-Gurion ensured that Dimona would not re-emerge until March 1960. Mentioned earlier, on March 4 the NYT article revealed that 6,500 grams of uranium had “been lent” by the U.S. to Israel “…for peaceful purposes.” The Post-Mortem noted that during the month Bergmann declared Israel needed five years before it could “erect a nuclear power station.” On March 20 the NYT reported that Moscow had warned “that if the U.S. gave nuclear weapons to its allies Russia would do the same.” The U.S. responded to the story that it would do “no such thing.” None of these issues were discussed during Ben-Gurion’s private trip the U.S. that month, including his talk with Ike on March 10. In a possible implicit reference to Dimona, Ike, claiming there could be no security in a “terrible” era of “nuclear weapons,” “doubted” that Moscow “would give nuclear weapons” to Cairo. The President also mused that Ben-Gurion would discuss “some other matters” with the DCI.

These matters began to emerge three months later. On June 9, 1960, the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv “reported rumors that the French were collaborating with” Israel to build an “atomic …project near Beersheba.” Israel responded that that it was building “a textile plant” and later a

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305 Harman studied at the London School of Economics (LSE) and served in the WZO from 1937 to 1940 in London and South Africa before working with the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem on media issues for eight years. He worked in Israel’s Ottawa Embassy from 1950 to 1952 before moving to New York to serve as director of the Office of Information. After being replaced by Itzhak Rabin in February 1968, he became President of Hebrew University for the next fifteen years. Biography of Avraham Harman, NSF, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, (6/1-3/64), Box 143, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL); Seth King, “Israel Nominates new Envoy to U.S,” NYT, May 30, 1959, p. 5; Marvin Howe, “Avraham Harman is Dead at 77,” NYT, February 25, 1992, p. D22.
308 “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
310 Conversation between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and the President, March 10, 1960, Israel (2) (March-August 1960), International Series, Box 8, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-1961, DDEL.
“metallurgical research installation.” On August 2 the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv “reported the possible construction of an Israeli...reactor with French assistance.” Despite this warning, Herter informed Ike that the U.S. “traditional” policy of deterring a Near East arms race had “proven successful.” Herter vaguely warned Ben Gurion on August 4 that some were talking about “a nuclear race among the Great Powers,” while emphasizing that in the “Near East a similar, albeit non-nuclear, stalemate had not developed.” Nothing was further from the truth. On August 9 the U.S. Army Attaché in Israel acquired some “excellent” photos of the Negev “installation” but he “did not identify the facility or appreciate its significance.” After an anonymous AEC “member’s request,” the JAEIC “discussed” Dimona on August 15 and “requested” its members not to disclose any information until the “next meeting.” On September 2 the CIA/OSI prepared a report “on the status of the Israeli nuclear...program,” but this was “not disseminated” to the JAEIC for its meeting six days later. On September 19 the CIA/OSI constructed another Dimona “follow-up” report, although a month passed before this analysis was telexed to U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Paris.

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312 “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
314 Personal and Confidential Letter from Secretary of State Christian Herter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, August 4, 1960, (Chronological File) August 1960 (2), Box 9, Christian A. Herter Papers, 1957-61, DDEL.
315 Twenty-five days after the U.S. Army Attaché in Israel took photographs of Dimona, 200 of these images arrived in Washington although the pictures were not “made available” to the “atomic intelligence elements” until December 8. On November 9 the U.S. Air Force asked its office in Israel to take pictures of the “Beersheba site,” but it took another week for the Attaché to obtain these pictures. His report and images, however, were not received until December 1 and were not disseminated for another 26 days. Only a “single copy” was processed via CIA channels on December 5 and made available to Congress. “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
316 On October 8, 1960, the JAEIC produced an exhaustive one-thousand plus page report which asserted that the “holds harmless” July 12, 1955, agreement stipulated that “no classified information” would “be exchanged” between Israel and the U.S. In regards to its “future plans” in atomic energy, Israel only yearned to “place emphasis on nuclear research and training rather than power development.” “Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the U.S.” pp. 675-677; “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
317 “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60.”
One day after the CIA/OSI produced its second Dimona inquiry in a week NIE 100-4-60 was disseminated on September 20. All sections concerning Israel remain redacted, an important caveat forgotten by the historiography.\(^{318}\) Historian John Lewis Gaddis has agreed optimistically that the censoring of government documents, "although bureaucratically...easy" to accomplish, unfairly creates a perception of "things imagined" being "more sinister" than in reality.\(^{319}\) Ray McGovern, who delivered the President’s Daily Brief to Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, has admitted that his 27 years in the CIA taught him about the government’s “unlimited potential for screwing up.” He also wisely and courageously pointed out that there are always “other explanations out there” for so-called intelligence failures. The censorship of the Dimona related sections of NIE 100-4-60 sent a message for everyone to continue to “go along to get along” with power’s prevailing wisdom.\(^{320}\) Firmly in place since early 1958, the reticent U.S. policy of “ignorance,” inaction and indifference toward Dimona would be accentuated rather than abbreviated in Ike’s final four months in office.\(^{321}\)

Had Dimona been publicly exposed in late 1960, this revelation might have ignited three landmines for the outgoing White House, beginning in the field of arms diplomacy. While IAEA

\(^{318}\) Other than Cohen, only Hahn has argued, albeit briefly, that in September 1960 the U.S. IC “confirmed” that Israel was secretly building at Dimona a reactor “capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.” Hahn did not mention NIE 100-4-60 as a source for his one-sentence analysis since the document was only declassified in October 2004. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, p. 264.

\(^{319}\) Gaddis falls into the coincidence theorist or “no-fault camp” which assumes that intelligence mistakes are “unavoidable;” the only question is their importance and nature. Ferris has also warned intelligence historians not to mistake the “size of the surviving documentation for significance.” Those who assert that individuals, guided by factional interests, are capable of circumventing the system foolishly ignore the broader historical context. John L. Gaddis, “Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins,” *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 209-212; Ferris, “American Intelligence, 1945-1990,” pp. 572, 578, 593.


negotiations were ongoing in Vienna, on September 9 the State Department created the U.S. Disarmament Administration to coordinate policies for arms control. On October 13 the USDA was put to work when the First Committee of the UNGA discussed the prevention of nuclear proliferation and testing. The negotiations lasted until December 20, a day after Dimona was first reported in the *NYT*.

This was also a sensitive time in U.S.-Arab relations as Nasser was set to address the UNGA. The only meeting between Nasser and a U.S. President occurred at the Waldorf Hotel in New York on September 25. Dimona was obviously absent from the conversation, but Ike informed Nasser that “war” had evolved into a dangerous “dimension after Hiroshima.” One day after the discussion, the first televised presidential debate between Vice-President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy took place in Chicago.

Dimona’s complete absence from the 1960 campaign demonstrates Sheldon Wolin’s contention of how easily democracy can “be managed without appearing to be suppressed.”

The election’s victor intentionally suppressed Dimona during the campaign. In a televised October 21 address, JFK only mentioned Egypt and China as nations which could soon develop a bomb. In a December 6 meeting with Ike, Herter and Clark Clifford, however, JFK predicated that Israel would possess enough plutonium “available for weapons” by 1963, a “highly distressing” possibility. Herter warned JFK that if the Arabs became aware of Dimona’s purpose the implications could be “explosive.”

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323 Never a fan of international conventions, Ben-Gurion declared on September 11 that “he had no intention of attending” the UNGA alongside Nasser. “Ben-Gurion Plans no Visit to the U.N.” *NYT*, September 12, 1960, p. 6.
324 Ike’s failure to inform the UAR of Dimona’s existence was proof of the U.S. inability to treat the Arab world, according to Nasser, with “dignity.” Memorandum of Conversation, “Waldorf Towers Hotel,” September 26, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII*, pp. 600-607.
325 Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated*, p. 47.
327 All of JFK’s Dimona comments were omitted from historian Robert Dalleck’s one-paragraph recollection of the meeting. Israel is mentioned just four times in Dalleck’s JFK biography. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting in Cabinet Room with the President and President-elect Kennedy, 11:00 AM, Tuesday, December 6, 1960, Memos-
as unconditional support for Israel, neither party feels the need to elaborate upon it. In regards to Dimona, there was much going on that the public did not know.

Thirty-six days after Foggy Bottom’s October 19 request for further information on French-Israeli nuclear “participation” was answered. On November 24 the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Amory Houghton, informed the AEC that France was “not collaborating” with Israel “in the construction of a nuclear power plant.” Two days later, however, he wrote again to Herter indicating that he had received an “urgent and secret” message from Henry Gomberg focused on Israel’s “nuclear power reactor.” Gomberg, whose name is excised from the memo, emphasized to Houghton that he had been silenced by the U.S. Embassy “in...Tel Aviv” from discussing the subject openly and honestly. Describing Ben Gurion as a “personal friend,” the University of Michigan professor revealed that in three weeks Israel would publicly announce the “Beersheba” project to the world. Five days later in Washington Gomberg declared to Farley that he was “convinced” that a “Marcoule type reactor” was being assembled in the Negev.

Another week passed before the U.S. confronted these allegations in a December 8 NSC meeting, whose protocol has nearly a page and a half excised. Reminding everyone that the U.S. had always “insisted on inspection,” Herter “wondered” aloud “whether Israel would be willing to apply safeguards to its nuclear facilities” since the U.S. had not helped build Dimona. The next five lines of the transcript have been censored. Money was probably being discussed as

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328 As early as August 1950 an American Zionist Council (AZC) had announced that “support” for Israel had “always been bipartisanship.” Pointing to the 1950 Douglas-Taft bill, which provided aid to Israel, the AZC pointed out that the legislation was sponsored by the strongest “Eisenhower Republicans,” including Congressman Herter. The Attitude of the Major Candidates and Political Parties on Israel and the Near East, August 7, 1950, General Files 122 Israel (1), Box 817, Central Files, DDEL; Goldberg, Jewish Power, p. 53.


Under Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Scribner, asserted that the “expensive” reactor was being financed by “Jewish charitable organizations.” Responsible for overseeing the Internal Revenue Service, Scribner admitted great “difficulties” in tracking these funds.332 Another three lines have been censored, but Dulles then gave credence to the Szulc thesis, by declaring in a Freudian slip that “the U.S. might have provided Israel with some kind of reactor.” After three more censored sentences, the DCI admitted that Israel had obtained “the necessary material from abroad” to be able “to build and operate a nuclear facility.”333

The following day the Secretary of State finally asked his counterparts in Paris, London and Tel Aviv what was being built in the Negev. The long day began with Herter informing U.S. Embassies in the aforementioned cities that after showing Harman photos of the “installation,” he had commented that the facility was “10 times” larger than originally envisioned. The next three lines of the memo are excised, but Herter exclaimed “an obvious inconsistency” existed concerning the reactor’s cost, notably an expenditure of “$80 million” which had never been “mentioned” before. Harman ignorantly denied any “knowledge,” but promised to relay these points to Ben-Gurion “and request urgent advice.”334 At 5:50 p.m. Herter telephoned the French Embassy’s Claude Lebel to declare that “since 1958” Israel had been constructing a reactor in the Negev. Dimona’s cost now ranged from anywhere from 40 to 80 million dollars.”335 At 10:00 p.m. he telegraphed an eyes only Farley-drafted message to Tel Aviv, London and Paris re-

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332 “Fred Scribner Jr., 86, Treasury Aide to Eisenhower,” NYT January 8, 1994, p. 30; 469th Meeting of the NSC, December 8, 1960, NSC Series, Box 13, Anne Whitman File, DDEL.
333 That same day the CIA produced SNIE 100-8-60, Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability, which remains classified. Only its post-mortem has been declassified. “469th Meeting of NSC, December 8, 1960, NSC Series, Box 13, Anne Whitman File, DDEL; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, pp. 252, 606n65.
335 Telephone Log of Secretary of State and Israeli Ambassador, December 9, 1960, GWNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/06-01.htm
emphasizing that this was “the first” the U.S. “had heard of such” a “large research reactor.”

Over the next week Dimona surfaced just once in the U.S. primary documentation, during U.S.-French-British talks in Paris on December 14-15. The subject did not surface during the lower-level negotiations conducted by the third most powerful person at Foggy Bottom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, France’s Charles Lucet and Britain’s Frederick Hoyner-Millar. On the second day of talks de Murville hosted a dinner for Herter and the British Foreign Secretary where they discussed “Laos, the Congo, East-West relations and Latin America.”

In an eyes only telegram to Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, however, the Secretary emphasized that de Murville had told him privately that Dimona, a “replica” of Marcoule, was a culmination of a “very secret agreement reached between Israel and France shortly after Suez.” On the last day of NATO ministerial meetings, on December 18, Merchant met with Home and de Murville to discuss Algeria and Laos.

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336 One day after Harman confessed to Herter that he would inquire about Dimona, he attended an elaborate Chicago dinner, financed by Feinberg’s IBO, to honor Harry Truman as the “Man of the Century.” Others in the audience included former New York Governor Averell Harriman, General Omar Bradley and James McDonald, the first U.S. Ambassador to Israel. “Israel Bond Unit Honors Truman,” NYT, December 11, 1960, p. X20; State Department Telegram to the Embassy in Israel, December 9, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 393-94.

337 It is impossible that Merchant was unaware of Dimona’s existence considering his deep place within the IC. According to the GWNSA’s 40 year chronology of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in December 1960 Merchant, along with Dulles, James Gray, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and James Douglas, Acting Secretary of Defense, were permanent members of “NSC 5412/2 Special Group.” The “Special Group” was charged with reviewing and approving CIA black operations - assassinations, coup d’êats, election rigging, propaganda and psychological warfare- viewed as too sensitive for the USIB to handle. The origins of this deep faction, essentially a NSC subcommittee, stem back to March 15, 1954, when Ike approved NSC 5412 giving the DCI responsibility, along with State and Defense representatives, for covert operations. On December 28, 1955, NSC 5412/2 was passed giving representation to four members: the Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense, DCI and the President, who was represented by the NSC. It was only after 1959 that “Special Group” meetings were held on a weekly meeting. “Bay of Pigs: 40 Years after Chronology,” GWNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html; “Note on U.S. Covert Actions,” FRUS, 1964-1968, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001) Western Europe, Volume XII; http://www.state.gov/r/pha/frus/johnsonl/b/xii/2961.htm; David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government: The CIA and U.S. Intelligence (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 263.


339 De Murville believed that the “money came from” U.S. sources, whereas Herter viewed as a combination of U.S. “government or private aid.” Eyes only Dillon from Herter, December 16, 1960, Dulles-Herter Series, Christian Herter, December 1960 (1), Box 12, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

340 Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting with the President and President-elect Kennedy, 11:00 AM, Tuesday, December 6, 1960, Memos-Staff-re Change of Administration (2), Presidential Transitional Series, Box, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Editorial Note, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume VII, Part II, p. 430.
The Paris forum was not well timed to introduce Dimona to the world even though the 
*Daily Express* and *WP* released stories on the subject during the conference. Control over the 
source providing the first in-depth Dimona narrative was paramount if the White House desired 
to gauge, influence, and ultimately hide Israel’s atomic ambitions. With one exception of one 
bBrief blurb, no critique of the U.S. media’s December 1960 coverage of Dimona has been 
conducted by the historiography.\(^341\) Considering Ferris’ reminder that “intelligence leaks better 
than it disseminates” and Ike’s dismissive view of the press, this is quite surprising.\(^342\)

On December 19, 1960, a highly probable CIA asset unveiled Dimona in the *NYT’s* front 
page.\(^343\) Informing Hersh that the story had been “handed” to him “on a platter,” John Finney 
admitted that Arthur Krock had informed him to “call” McCone if he wanted a new scoop. 
Importantly, McCone leaked just enough information to “plant a story” but not enough to 
provide the public a complete picture.\(^344\) In his NBC *Meet the Press* appearance with Krock, 
McCone disclosed that all information was still “unofficial” but never mentioned the word 
“secret.” When asked if Israel had been “supplied” assistance from “one of the nuclear powers,” 
McCone “replied that he did not know.” Finney weakly argued that the U.S. was still uncertain 

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\(^341\) In a sarcastic tone, Shoenbaum has jabbed that Finney’s December 19, 1960 story represented the “first among” 
\(^342\) Greenstein has averred that Ike often surprised his staff them by raising “information” that they had missed in the 
“morning news.” Eisenhower was the first President to employ a Press Secretary, Jim Hagerty, who had previously 
worked for New York Governor Thomas Dewy. As Hagerty was vetting Ike once for a press conference, the latter 
mused: “Don’t worry, Jim, if that question comes up, I’ll just confuse them.” Ferris, “American Intelligence,” p. 
\(^343\) There are three pieces of evidence that indicate that Finney represented one of the 10 *NYT* reporters which *WP* 
journalist Carl Bernstein revealed in *Rolling Stone* in 1977 who worked undercover for the CIA from 1950 and 1966 
in Operation Mockingbird. Due to his service in the U.S. Navy during World War II, tenure at Yale after the war - 
the most closely associated university with the spook world (Skull and Bones) - where he was editor of the Yale 
Daily News and stint as the *United Press’* Pentagon correspondent, Finney was an establishment man. He was 
recruited to the *NYT* in 1957 by James Reston, a confirmed CIA asset, working closely under him on leading 
national security issues such as nuclear proliferation and the Vietnam War. Bernstein, who broke the Watergate 
scandal with the better known Bob Woodward, has argued that from 1952 to 1977 400 U.S. journalists worked 
\(^344\) Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 71.
of “Israel’s intentions,” admitted that France was “assisting” and warned that Dimona “might drive” Cairo closer to Moscow “for arms…” The story ended by revealing that “some high” U.S. “officials” had suggested placing the “reactor” under the IAEA inspections.\footnote{John Finney, “U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential,” \textit{NYT}, December 19, 1960, p. 1.} Also in the \textit{WP} and \textit{NYT} the same day, Bergmann announced these stories were “flattering…but untrue…,” even though it was revealed that Israel could possess the bomb in “three to five years.” The press even promoted this development, as another anonymous \textit{WP} story informed the public that the U.S should allow the “free and democratic” Jewish state to gain the bomb.\footnote{Warren Komberg, “Israeli Reactor ‘Not Revealed to Us,’ Says McCone,” “\textit{WP}, December 19, 1960, p. A7; “The Secret Reactor,” \textit{WP}, December 20, 1960, p. A14; Israel Denies Report,” \textit{NYT}, December 19, 1960, p. 8.}

This subservient journalism provided the catalyst for a meeting the same day between Ike, Herter, Farley, Gates, Dulles, McCone, Goodpaster, Hagerty and Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson. Proclaiming that Dimona’s existence was “beginning to leak to the press,” Herter proposed misleading the public that reactor was intended for “peaceful purposes” to counter this perception. McCone disagreed, arguing correctly that Israel was building a chemical separation plant “financed from U.S. support.” The subject of capital broke Ike’s insulated approach to the issue. Speaking for the first and only time on the record, the President declared that “evidence now” demonstrated that Dimona’s cost ranged from “$100 to $200 million dollars.” Since Israel had voted for the safeguards clause at Vienna in September, Ike was “confident” that Israel would “permit such inspections.” His final statement of the meeting perfectly encapsulated U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Dimona since early 1958: there was “no official information.”\footnote{Anderson also stated in the document, circulated only to the rest of the IC on January 12, 1961, that “Jewish charities” were “sending money out without control,” placing into “question as to whether these contributions” qualified “as tax-deductible.” Anderson’s successor at the Treasury Department was Dillon (1961-1965), who had served as U.S. Ambassador in Paris (1953-1957) while the French-Israel atomic partnership was forged. Memorandum of Conference with the President December 19, 1960, January 12, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, \textit{DDEL}.}

The \textit{NYT}’s uncritical coverage of Dimona continued the next day. Finney downplayed the
issue's importance, presenting the reactor as merely a "diplomatically embarrassing incident" that the outgoing White House was unwilling to "challenge." When exactly the U.S. first learned of Dimona was left unresolved as this information had only reached Washington "recently" via "unofficial reports." The *NYT* also published two shorter wire pieces that same busy day. The first article from Jerusalem relayed that the IAEC professed that Israel was "not engaged in the production of atomic weapons." The other story emphasized that France had denied it was "aiding Israel in a nuclear program for military purposes." This disinformation campaign coincided with UNGA Resolution 1576, calling "upon all Governments" to thwart "the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons." Also on this day Harman relayed to Farley that Dimona was intended to promote "agricultural, medical and other scientific purposes," with the latter erroneously alleging that Dimona's construction had begun "one year ago." When Harman responded about the "need to say something to the press," Farley concurred that he could

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350 By examining two other non-nuclear December 20 *NYT* articles, one can contextualize how Dimona paradoxically strengthened U.S.-Israeli relations. On page 29 an anonymous article reported that the Export-Import Bank would provide $2.6 million in U.S. and local currency to Israel for the "modernizing" of Israel's Lod International Airport. Another authorless article, declared that the night before Governor Nelson Rockefeller had informed 18,000 witnesses at Madison Square Garden that Israel had help stop the "advance of totalitarianism." The Governor proclaimed that the $465 million in global transactions represented "the most powerful singled instrument in the economic development in Israel." "U.S. Loans Aid Israeli Airport," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.29; "Israel Bonds Praised," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.9; "Peaceful Aims Assured," *NYT*, December 20, 1960, p.15.  
352 This was not an honest mistake. Farley committed this error again later in the day when he wrote an "eyes only telegram" to Tel Aviv, Paris and London declaring that Dimona's construction began only in late 1959, "one year ago." Farley contended that the U.S. had made the statements inquiring about Dimona "as a result" to "unfortunate volume of press leaks" and a "radio MOSCOW" allegation that the U.S. was "aiding" Israel's "nuclear weapons program." In a conversation with a member of the Canadian Embassy the next day, Farley promised that the U.S. would not accept any Israeli "cover story" or "window dressing" concerning Dimona. Farley's ignominious behavior provides a perfect example of a loyal "lightening rod," which Greenstein has argued were those faceless and nameless bureaucrats delegated with executing Ike's well concealed Cold War policies. Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program," December 20, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp.396-399; Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Farley to U.S. Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, Paris and London, December 20, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, *DDEL*; Memorandum from Washington to London, Paris and Geneva, "Subject: Atomic Developments in Israel," December 21, 1960, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC; Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, pp.87-88.
understand if Israel did “not wish to open” Dimona “during the construction period.” With no Dimona media stories on December 21, Ben Gurion had the stage to himself to deceitfully declare Israel’s peaceful atomic purposes. Later that same day Herter told Reid that the U.S. desired a “full and frank account” of Israeli atomic activities. Without transparency these “suspicions” could not be “laid to rest,” resulting in serious “repercussions in the Near East.” To quell speculation, Israel should “permit” a “qualified scientist, preferably an IAEA designee, to visit” Dimona. The U.S., however, should not “initiate” the request but hope that Israel would “extend” an “invitation at” an “early date.” In a second eyes only telegram to Reid, Herter revealed that Harman was unhappy over the “large amount” of Dimona press coverage.

In a December 22 telegram sent to 35 U.S. Embassies, Herter expressed confidence that Dimona did “not represent cause for special concern.” Future U.S. policy should aim to create a “stilling atmosphere” on the subject. Helping create this perception was a proposed oral statement to the media, cleared by Dulles, McConne and Ike, advocating that U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona dovetailed with its policy of “consistently” opposing proliferation globally. This message must have also been sent to the WP given two obsequious stories published in the paper the next day. On December 23 Lincoln White, Foggy Bottom’s press spokesman since 1948, publicly announced Herter’s words that Dimona that did “not represent cause for special concern...” The WP also quoted an “authorized” source as describing rumors that Israel was...
pursuing a bomb as simply “ridiculous.” In the first sentence of his front page chronicle, the
NYT’s Jewish Alvin Schuster credulously argued that Dimona did “not represent a cause for
special concern,” recalling de Tocqueville’s warning that the press produces more “evil” than it
cures. The story ended by re-emphasizing that the U.S. opposed nuclear proliferation, setting
the table for Krock on page eighteen.

The four-time Pulitzer winner began by asserting that Dimona’s secrecy was “so deep
that U.S. intelligence was led to believe the installation was a textile plant.” Wisely warning that
Dimona “could spark new hostilities in the Near East,” he stated that the U.S. expected the
reactor to be made “accessible” to the IAEA. In a rare example of independent journalism, Krock
revealed that Dimon’s financial campaign had begun in September 1957 when Leon Keyserling
had issued a report focused on Israel’s experimentation with heavy water. In light of the obvious
Franco-Israeli “deception,” Ben Gurion now had a perfect opportunity to place Dimona under
safeguards thus aiding in the “pursuit of world peace.”

If propaganda is not on the offensive, then it is on the defensive. To paraphrase Joseph
Goebbels, the press acts as an accessible keyboard for the state to play whatever it desires. This
theme is evident in the NYT’s manipulative coverage of Nasser’s December 23, 1960, speech at
Port Said. An anonymous wire story written from Cairo printed the next day denounced Nasser
for describing NATO as an “alliance for enslavement” before an Arab crowd yelling “Death to

358 De Toqueville’s media analysis is obviously outdated since it was formulated before the internet, Time Warner
(NYT, CNN), General Electric (NBC, CNBC), Disney (ABC), Viacom (CBS) and Rupert Murdoch (FOX). Writing in
the early 1830s, decades before the NYT became the most influential paper in the country, he contended that the U.S.
had “no metropolis” and “no central control over the expression of opinion...” Using Dimona as a case study, his
generalization that even when the press is muzzled “the tongue of the public speaker will still make itself heard”
fails to hold weight. Some of his insights remain relevant, pointing out that papers are “historical remains” and the
most important “democratic instrument of freedom.” They are usually, however, still “three-quarters” filled with
advertisements and “trivial anecdotes,” helping explains why “freedom of opinion does not exist in America.” De
Israel.”

A December 24 telegram sent from Cairo to Foggy Bottom, however, revealed that the Arab crowd made no such statement, an assertion supported by Levite and Landau.

After passing on Ike’s Christmas card, Reid reassured Ben Gurion on December 24 the U.S. did not “want to...exaggerate” the nuclear “issue” any more than that was necessary. Since China could soon develop the bomb, however, Reid emphasized that safeguards needed to be universal anywhere plutonium was produced. Professing some “mild irritation,” Ben Gurion exclaimed that he was “very sorry that he had not been able to tell” Ike about Dimona during his March visit. Nonetheless, Dimona “had to be kept secret.” In a rare moment of honesty, he demanded more help from Washington, London and Paris. A cash donation of “four to five million” would suffice. After Reid inquired about a scientist taking a “look,” Ben Gurion changed the subject, warning that Nasser would soon “attack.”

An undated outgoing Foggy Bottom telegraph, drafted by Merchant, provides some clarity about how the U.S. approached Dimona following December 24. The document contended that the U.S. utilize the ongoing Lavon-inspired “Cabinet crisis” as an excuse to deter its questioning even though it did not consider Ben-Gurion’s “statements” on Dimona to be “satisfactory.” Merchant hoped that Harman, now back in Israel, would soon return with a “complete set of answers.” He also wanted Reid to understand that his task was to explain to Ben Gurion that the “tinder box” had been precipitated by a lack of “candor.” Reid was also

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362 Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Reid to Herter, December 24, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.
363 Since Harman left on December 24, this document could have been written as early as Christmas Day. Although neither the U.S. primary documentation nor the press explain why Harman left during such a crucial period, a January 11, 1961, memorandum from Margaret Meagher, Canada’s Ambassador in Tel Aviv, revealed that Harman chose to attend the WZO Congress in Israel rather than face the heat in Washington. Department of State Outgoing Telegram, No Date, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Department of External Affairs, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program,” January 11, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC.
requested to inquire whether the “IAEA or other friendly quarters” would be allowed to visit the reactor, and if Israel would “categorically” announce it had no plans for producing nuclear weapons. This proposal, however, contradicted an added political message, emphasizing that the U.S. “would not welcome” another “round of alarmist publicity.”

The NYT’s Christmas and Boxing Day coverage of Israel’s nuclear weapons program was non-confrontational and nuanced. The second week of the media’s Dimona coverage began with an anonymous blurb concluding that any fears about Dimona “were greatly exaggerated.” This uncritical narrative was compounded by a William Laurence story which argued a chemical separation plant was “beyond” the financial capabilities of a “small nation such as Israel” and thus any talk about a Jewish bomb was “meaningless.” A December 26 AP wire story carried by both the NYT and WP revealed that Senator Frank Moss (D-Utah) suggested that a UN “team to inspect Dimona,” adding that an atomic Near East would be a “serious mistake.” On the same day Henry Luce’s Time, yet another CIA mouthpiece, argued that “the word” was that Israel “was still a considerable way from producing an atom bomb.” The WP’s Drew Pearson, who had worked closely with the OSS during World War II, contended that Dimona could “tip” the Near East balance in favor of the U.S.

The subject re-emerged in a December 28 article by a confirmed CIA asset and the NYT’s

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364 Department of State Outgoing Telegram, No Date, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.
368 It was Pearson who unveiled to the U.S. public via the radio on February 3, 1946, that a Soviet spy ring operating in Ottawa led by Igor Gouzenko had been stealing atomic secrets from the West. Herken has pointed out that neither Pearson’s diary nor collected papers reveal his source for the information, an indication that it probably came from the government. Herken, The Winning Weapon, pp. 129, 362n38; “Member of the Club,” Time, December 26, 1960, p. 18; Drew Pearson, “A-Reactor Where Abraham Trod,” WP, December 26, 1960, p. B25; Prados, Safe for Democracy, p. 48; Winks, Cloak & Gown, pp. 212-213.
lead foreign correspondent. C.L. Sulzberger, whose Jewish family has owned or co-owned the paper since 1896, confirmed that recent rumors indicating that Israel “intended to manufacture fissionable material for arms” had been “denied.” That same day Reid sent an eyes only telegram to Herter indicating that if international concern increased the U.S. should ask “known scientists, preferably from the U.S.” to visit Dimona. Any future “inspection,” however, should not reveal the French “firms providing assistance.” The telegraph’s final four to five lines are censored. Building on the political theme of the December 21 memo to Reid, three days passed before Merchant informed Tel Aviv that all efforts need be directed toward creating a “stilling atmosphere” to prevent another “round of alarmist publicity.” Reid was reminded that the U.S. needed to know whether Israel would “categorically” declare that it had “no plans for producing nuclear weapons” and “permit...friendly” scientists “to visit the new reactor.”

The U.S. badly yearned to keep Dimona under the rug until Ike had left office. A nameless January 1, 1961, White House report revealed that on December 19 the Pentagon had

Bernstein pointed out that “Cy” was one of the CIA’s most valuable “known” assets, who loved to cooperate with the spooks. When questioned on the subject, Sulzberger downplayed the relationship as “totally informal,” while admitting that he played golf with McConne when he became DCI under JFK, and got along “well” with Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner, the latter being chiefly responsible for setting up Operation Mockingbird in the early 1950s. Bernstein revealed that the NYT’s publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, also held “especially close” ties with Dulles and even signed a secrecy agreement with the Company. Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” http://carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php.

Dimona then disappeared from the WP and another fifteen days passed before the NYT produced another story on the subject, the last of Ike’s presidency. An anonymous January 12 piece revealed that the previous day Harman, who had finally returned to Washington after an 18 day hiatus in Israel, had declared that Dimona was “dedicated exclusively to peaceful uses.” The next day a UPI wire story in the NYT revealed that any of Reid’s Dimona concerns had evaporated as he was now championing Israel’s “national purpose.” On December 18 he delivered a check to Israel for $506,000 from a “media guarantee” three days after the NYT revealed that private donations to the IBO in 1960 had totaled a $51.9 million. C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs,” NYT, December 28, 1960, p. 26; “Israel Renews Reactor Pledge,” NYT, January 12, 1961, p. 4; “Israeli Sense of Purpose Hailed,” NYT, January 13, 1961, p. 4; Reid Presents Fund to Israel,” NYT, January 19, 1961, p. 14; “Israel Bond Sale Put at $51,965,300,” NYT, January 15, 1961, p. 65; “Israel Planners Seek 437 Million,” NYT, January 16, 1961, p. 13.

Eyes only telegram from Tel Aviv for the Secretary of State (590), December 28, 1960, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

This memo is the last document in the below cited FRUS volume. To access the pertinent Dimona documents in January 1961 one has to examine the FRUS documents under JFK, located at a different website. In 1989 William Slany, then the Historian of the State Department, warned that the “compartmentalization of information” has made “the identification and assembly” of the “historical documentary record increasingly formidable.” Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, December 31, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 399-400; Ferris, “American Intelligence,” p. 567.
implemented a “Public Affairs Guidance” campaign aimed at Israel’s “Nuclear Reactor.” Under explicit executive orders, any official statement pertaining to Dimona for the “the public, our allies, or the Congress” had to be cleared first by Foggy Bottom. An Eisenhower Library withdrawal sheet reveals that Ike also met with Herter, Farley, Gates and Anderson on January 1. On January 5 Reid sent a still classified 13 page memo to Foggy Bottom. Sensitivity was now needed as Congress was beginning to ask questions, albeit, quietly and far too late.

On January 9 Senators Albert Gore, James Fulbright and Bourke Hickenlooper met with Farley and Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones. The Senators admitted they had promised Foggy Bottom “that there would be no publicity regarding” the “informal meeting.” Gore “closely” questioned all the talk of textile plants, while Hickenlooper proclaimed that Israel “had lied.” Bothered by the “secrecy factor,” Fulbright wondered that “if Israel had nothing to hide” then “why did they hide it?” Jumping to Israel’s defense, Jones declared that the “Arabs” would do nothing more than “talk,” while assuring everyone that plutonium production was still “three of four years.” It would be away foolish to “brand Israel as a villain...” so prematurely.

On Ike’s last full day in the White House, Under Secretary of State William Macomber Jr.

374 One day later Herter sent an “eyes only” telegram to Houghton warning him “to avoid publicity” about “French-Israeli” cooperation, while admitting that Dimona could precipitate an Arab “preventive” strike against Israel. Telegram 626 from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, January 5, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994) Near East, Volume XVII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17702.htm (document 1); Eyes only Memorandum from Herter to the U.S Ambassador in France, January 6, 1961, Israel (3) (October 1960-January 1961), International Series, Box 32, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.
375 Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) was on JAEIC, while Gore (D-Tennessee) was the Chairman of the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright (D-Arkansas). With the same result, another 15 years passed before the Senate again attempted to inquire about Dimona. Led by the Jewish Senators Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) and Jacob Javits (R-New York), 13 Senators were banned from visiting the reactor during a trip to Israel in November 1976. “13 Senators in Israel to Study Atom Programs,” NYT, November 8, 1976, p. 6; “Israel Bars U.S. Senators From A-Site,” WP, November 9, 1976, p. A1.
delivered an illuminating telegraph to the JAEIC thanking Congress for “avoiding comment” on the subject. Utilizing a realist script, he argued that “extended public speculation” would not “advance” its long-term “interests.” Thus, the U.S. should pursue “persistent but quiet diplomatic approaches.”  

The ever-changing regional dynamics during the era also why the U.S. supported covertly aided and intentionally turned a blind eye towards Dimona. Context is king. During the late 1950s concomitant strategic and cultural events strengthened the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Following the Rumsfeld-inspired dictum that “weakness is provocative; strength deters,” in an increasingly anti-U.S. Arab world, Israel had evolved into a U.S. strategic asset by 1960. Soon after the UAR’s creation in February 1958 Secretary Dulles declared that Nasser “whipped up Pan-Arabism much as Hitler whipped up Pan-Germanism.” With Chamoun’s regime verging on precipice, the Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958. On August 1, 1958 Dulles informed Ben Gurion that the U.S. held “that Israel should be in a position to deter...aggression” and “was prepared” to “examine the military implications of this problem with an open mind.” In September 1958 Leon Uris’s novel Exodus was released, helping to usher in the tough Jewish cultural narrative. Portraying Arabs as smiling goats, the novel is a romanticized trope of Israel’s birth, with protagonist Ari Ben Canaan as the ship’s captain. The book was turned into a Hollywood movie in 1960, 

377 The GWNSA has avowed that this document represented the “official record” on Dimona which Ike “passed on to JFK. An attached letter revealed that the U.S. had “been assured categorically” that Israel had “no plans” to build the bomb. The fabrication that Dimona’s “construction” began only in late 1959 was also passed onto Congress. On the subject of “international safeguards,” the memo did not “propose to open Dimona to international inspection.” Summary of Additional Recent Information on Israeli Atomic Energy Program, January 17, 1961, Ibid (document 3); Letter from Assistant Secretary of State to the Executive Director of the JAEIC, January 19, 1961, GWNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/10-01.htm. 
378 Why We Fight (2005). 
379 Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, p. 74. 
380 In 1959 the U.S began providing Israel with $100 million over the next two years. Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, p. 59; Little, American Orientalism, p. 94. 
381 Boston College historian Paul Breines has argued that the novel, which has since sold 20 million copies, helped dispel the “sneaky lawyer” Jewish stereotype by replacing it with the “full blown myth of the superhuman.” The book was even criticized by the real-life captain of Exodus, Yehiel Aronowicz, who admitted that the account was
opening in New York days before Dimona was unveiled on December 15, 1960. The movie added a new angle, with Nazis advising the Arabs on how to deal with “their Jewish problem.” Politics is everything and everything is connected. Cultural space is never neutral. The Exodus magic show effectively distracted and mesmerized the public from critically examining the fraudulent news spewing from the NYT and WP. In the following decade Israel would find it much easier to suppress domestic Dimona dissent than external criticism espousing from an increasingly unilateral and militant U.S.S.R.


383 The anti-Arab narrative which runs through Western movies was articulated in Hollywood’s best picture of 2005: “You wanna know what the business community thinks of you? We think a hundred years ago you were living out here in tents in the desert, chopping each others heads off and that’s exactly where you are going to be in another hundred.” This bias is not a coincidence. In an article declaring that “dumb America” is oblivious to the reality that “Jews totally run Hollywood...the news media, Wall Street” and “the government,” L.A. Times’ reporter Joel Stein revealed that the CEO of Disney (Robert Iger), President of News Corp. (Peter Chernin), Paramount Chairman (Brad Grey), Sony Pictures Chairman (Brad Grey), Sony Pictures Chairman (Michael Lyton), Warner Brother Chairman (Barry Meyer), CBS Chief Executive (Jeff Zucker) are all Jewish. Joel Stein, “How Jewish is Hollywood?” L.A. Times, December 19, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-stein19-2008-dec19,0,4677183.column; Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters, p. 161; Syriana (2005) Written and Directed by Stephen Gagan. http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=27867441856345673# (2:08:03).
Chapter Three: Censorship, Personnel Changes and the Communists

After winning a crucial Knesset confidence vote in late January 1961, the septuagenarian Ben Gurion was the guiding force in evicting Lavon as the Histadrut's Secretary-General in early February. The Prime Minister's reputation, however, within MAPAI and Knesset circles soon plummeted and he could not form a coalition Cabinet by early March. The August election reigned paramount on the political horizon. While Ben Gurion's domestic influence was reduced following the Lavon affair, he remained relatively unchallenged on foreign affairs until his resignation of June 16, 1963. Cohen has contended that in early 1961 there was still "no desire" within Israel to "openly" debate Dimona, a privilege enabling Ben Gurion to gauge foreign views on the subject without domestic interference.

In mid-February London's Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Francis Rundall, asked Dr. Haim Yahil, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, about Dimona's status. Responding orally, Yahil declared that Israel's atomic arrangement with France would remain secret and there would be no IAEA inspections of the reactor. In regards to "future plutonium" production, Yahil answered that this possibility "should be expected," but added evasively that all previous Israeli statements on the issue were "conditional and temporary." According to Shalom, Ben Gurion, who had scripted Yahil's reply, utilized the exchange to "launch a trial balloon" to measure U.S. attitudes on Dimona. Since the MacMillan government refused to offer any response, Ben Gurion probably deduced that the new White House was also unconcerned.

386 Cohen has added that a fight over Dimona, either domestically or internationally, needed to be "avoided at all costs" until the reactor was fully operational. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 143 & 141.
387 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, pp. 120-121.
According to Shalom, on May 29, a day before Ben-Gurion traveled to the Waldorf Hotel to meet with Kennedy, he visited Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Shalom has argued that “near the end of the conversation” Ben Gurion brought up Dimona, revealing that two U.S. scientists who had recently visited the facility and had found nothing out of the ordinary.\(^{388}\) He added that Israel was “likely” to build a separation plant capable of producing plutonium, although any amount would “be very limited.”\(^{389}\) If one examines the primary material sourced by Shalom, however, his paraphrased analysis was disingenuous. The Canadian Archives reveal that the two leaders instead met on May 25 and 26. The documents prove that Diefenbaker raised the issue when he ruminated that there was a “genuine” Arab “fear of” an Israeli bomb. Mentioning that two U.S. scientists had “inspected” the facility the previous week, Ben Gurion responded that Israel had “…set up a small pilot separation plant” which could produce 300 grams of plutonium annually. Apparently satisfied, Diefenbaker did not raise Dimona again.\(^{390}\) Ben Gurion likely left Ottawa believing that his meeting with JFK would be a cake walk.

Perceptions indicate that this is exactly what occurred. According to the NYT, after leaving New York, Ben Gurion traveled to London and Paris. Returning home “in an exuberant mood on June 8, he announced that his “expectations” for the trip had been “exceeded.”\(^{391}\) Ben Gurion utilized this diplomatic breathing space to consolidate domestically. A fortnight before Egypt celebrated its Revolution Day, Peres, Ben Gurion and Mardor witnessed the launching of the Shavit 2 weather rocket on July 5. According to Karpin, the London Times argued the next

\(^{388}\) Dalleck has pointed out that from May 16-18 Kennedy visited Diefenbaker in Ottawa. A detailed examination of the first U.S. visit to Dimona on May 20 and the subsequent JFK-Ben-Gurion meeting will be covered later. Dallek, An Unfinished Life, pp. 388-389.

\(^{389}\) Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 24-25.


\(^{391}\) “Ben-Gurion is Home; Calls Trip Fruitful,” NYT, June 9, 1961, p. 16.
day that the Near East's "strategic situation...would never be the same" if Israel developed a missile delivery system.\textsuperscript{392} Some in the Knesset cried that stunt was a shallow attempt to win voters, a reminder of Dahl's judgment that politics is just "bribery of the electorate by politicians."\textsuperscript{393} Two days before the election, the \textit{NYT} reported that the rocket launch, plus his New York talk with JFK, had boosted Ben Gurion's "badly" tarnished "personal popularity."\textsuperscript{394}

The Prime Minister described the August 15 election result, Mapai dropped six seats, as tantamount to a "national disaster."\textsuperscript{395} On October 10 MAPI joined in a collation with Achdut Ha'Avoda after legislative limits were theoretically placed on Ben Gurion's ability to unilaterally act in foreign policy. Since some in Achdut Ha'Avoda were upset that the rocket launch had transpired without a Cabinet vote, the new accord warned that the "development of new weapons" must be raised first in the Defense Ministerial Committee.\textsuperscript{396} Three weeks later, after eleven weeks of electioneering, a sixty-eight seat government was formed.\textsuperscript{397}

With the election out of the way, Ben Gurion now had to deal with Dimona in the international arena. On November 18 the UN voted 60-16 in favor of a proposed test ban treaty, with the U.S. and all other nuclear powers, except the USSR, voting against. There was also a 57-0 vote in favor of creating an African nuclear free zone with Israel, the U.S., Britain, and France abstaining.\textsuperscript{398} Possibly responding to the UN vote, the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee announced that "all nations" pursue a nuclear testing "moratorium" eight

\textsuperscript{392} Karpin, \textit{The Bomb in the Basement}, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{393} Dahl, \textit{A Preface to Democratic Theory}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{394} Lawrence Fellows, "Israeli Campaign Limps to a Close," \textit{NYT}, August 13, 1961, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{396} Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, pp. 148, 386n38.
\textsuperscript{397} The Cabinet coalition had the following breakdown: Mapai (42), NRP (12), Ahdut Ha'avodah (8), Po'alei Agudat Israel (2). From 1961 to 1965 Mapai held 11 Cabinet positions, including the most vital posts: Premiership, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Labor and Education. Medding, \textit{The Founding of Israeli Democracy}, pp. 242, 100, 91; Lawrence Fellows, "Israelis to Form 4-Party Coalition," \textit{NYT}, November 1, 1961, p. 9.
days later. By early 1962 the Parliament and press finally began to critically examine their nation’s atomic policy.

On January 12, 1962, Eliezer Livneh argued in *Ha’aretz* that it would be calamitous if the Near East was nuclearized. In early March Livneh and a small group of influential citizens signed a petition urging Israel not to pursue the bomb. Later in the month a Livneh-sponsored conference focused on nuclear weapons was cancelled by the Defense Ministry. Despite the intimidation, the atomic issue was mentioned in two *Ha’aretz* stories published on March 27 and April 15. Around this time Amos de Shalit briefed the Knesset on atomic issues for the first time. Facing increased pressure, Meir professed to the Parliament on June 25 that Israel desired to “reduce nuclear” proliferation and opposed all “double standards…”

With the assistance of WZO President Nahum Goldman, in late July Livneh founded the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East, alongside Buber, Stein, Ollendorf, Leibowitz and Yair Evron. Cohen has dismissed the group as a mere “footnote in history”

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402 A day before the conference was cancelled an anonymous *WP* story stated that Israel had already proposed a “totalitarian” law allowing the state to close down any publication “found guilty of publishing two libelous statements in the course of two years.” The *WP* relayed on July 5, 1962, that Livneh’s conference had been silenced by Peres. “Gagging the Press,” *WP*, March 12, 1962, p. A16. Alvin Rosenfeld, “Intellectuals Seek Bar to Israel A-Arms Output,” *WP*, July 5, 1962, p. A14.
405 From Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Subject: Foreign Minister’s Policy Statement in the Knesset,” August 2, 1962, RG 25, Volume 7608, File 11312-40 P.T. 2.2, LAC.
because it used pacifist language such as “deterrent weapons” and “regional denuclearization.” Other than the Communist Party, no other party possessed the fortitude to challenge Ben Gurion on Dimona. According to Shalom, the “broad” fear of the perceived Arab threat made the nation’s press and intelligentsia reluctant to cause a “public debate.”

Nasser also helped to keep Dimona on Ben Gurion’s agenda. Nearly one year after Shavit II’s launch, on July 21, 1962, Egypt tested its own rocket program. The next day the WP reported that one missile had been fired towards Israel’s “atomic reactor.” When questioned if the rockets could “deliver atomic warheads,” Nasser laconically declared “No, we are against that.” Egypt’s actions during the month were confusing. If Nasser had wanted to target Dimona, then he should have singled out Israel when he denounced nuclear proliferation at a July 9 non-aligned nations meeting. Later in the month Haikal announced that “the U.A.R. would never allow Israel to achieve atomic supremacy.”

Cohen has averred that Egypt’s missile firings provided the impetus for Israel to publicly announce its desire to pursue the bomb in the fall of 1962. On August 13 Yediot Acronot reported that recent Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee hearings had centered on the need to possess “weapons of deterrence.” Ben Gurion told the Knesset nine days later that Dimona

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406 Scientists Call for Regional Denuclearization” (Hebrew), Ha’aretz, July 25, 1962. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 145-146, 386n22-23.
407 Formed in 1923, during the 1950s, roughly a third of the Maki’s 4000 party members were Arab. From 1954-1955 the party possessed seven Knesset seats after merging with Moshe Sneh’s Socialist Party. Sneh later joined Maki by late 1965. Meddling, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, pp. 53-54.
408 Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 47, 170-171.
would "serve the needs of science, agriculture, and industry." By 1962 that two conflicting military doctrines had emerged on Dimona. The technological approach, supported by Dayan and Peres, advocated that only a nuclear arsenal could secure Israel. A conventionalist school, represented by Allon and Israel Gallili, a former Haganah chief of staff, contended that an Israeli bomb could result in Soviet military action against Israel. On August 24 Peres indefinitely declared that "deterrent weapons" would prevent Israel’s enemies from making the "wrong conclusions." In mid-September, with Egypt intervening in Yemen’s civil war, he lambasted those who supported a test ban treaty as naïve and weak on security issues.

According to a Canadian document, on November 9, 1962, Jerusalem and Pretoria reached a deal providing the former with ten metric tons of uranium. This secretive arrangement transpired while Peres was informing the public of Dimona’s future policy. In late 1962 Peres stipulated in the IDF published Ma’archot that if Israel obtained “an unpredictable power… the Arabs would react vehemently,” possibly via a “pre-emptive war.” On December 28, 1962, a day after Meir and JFK met at Harriman’s Palm Beach home, Peres contended in the Jewish Observer that the Cuban Missile Crisis had demonstrated that it would be “silly” for anyone to be talking about an “independent” Israeli bomb. He then contradicted himself, admitting that the memories of the Holocaust and current politics meant that Israel should

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415 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 144, 147-150, 385n19.
416 On September 19, 1962, Yemen’s Imam Ahmad died. His successor and son, al-Badr, was then overthrown a week later by pro-Nasser officers. By mid-November 8,000 Egyptian troops were in Yemen supporting the new President Abdallah Sallal. On December 19 the U.S. recognized the new regime in Taiz. Ibid., p. 386n20; Ethan Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage,” p. 443; McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, pp. 177-178.
417 The report, which Shalom has contended “undoubtedly” reached the U.S, stipulated that Israel would not use the material for military purposes. The Canadian memo also revealed that Ottawa had been told by Israel and South Africa that the IAEA would be informed about the deal. There is no evidence that this occurred. Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa) to Vienna, “Subject: South African Sale of Uranium to Israel,” January 23, 1963, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC; Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, p. 80.
418 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 150-151.
"consider" a "sophisticated deterrent" to preserve its "security and survival." 419

In early 1963 the Knesset’s Finance Committee established an ad-hoc subcommittee to oversee Dimona’s financial aspects. 420 This committee’s creation could have been a response to the Defense Ministry’s December 9, 1962, announcement to create a “special company.” According to a January 22, 1963, telegraph from the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv, this autonomous body, which reported only to the State Controller, would raise money and serve as “a special parliamentary authority” on “peaceful” atomic issues. Since this development created an “acrimonious” fight, the ad-hoc committee’s creation seems to have been the result of a compromise between the executive and legislative branches. 421 Drawing from four coalition members and three opposition members, a similar subcommittee, the Committee of Seven, was formed in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. 422 Despite the illusion of transparency, Dimona was never raised in the Cabinet or by these two sub-committees. There was also another issue, indirectly linked to Dimona, which no one wished not to touch.

Israeli officials viewed Cairo’s rocket firings and Nasser’s intervention in Yemen with

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419 Burg has smartly observed that Peres, currently the President of Israel, still remains “an artist in proving one thing and its opposite” all in the same “sentence.” Oral History Interview with Ambassador Walworth Barbour by Sheldon M. Stern, May 22, 1981, JFK Oral History Project, p. 18, JFKL; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp.149, 387n41; Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp. 78-79; Burg, The Holocaust is Over, p. 171.

420 On August 1, 1962, the NYT had reported that Israel’s State Controller, Dr. Ernst Nebenzahl, had recently “complained” that the true “estimates” of Dimona’s cost were being “withheld from the Knesset.” The grievance, was not been published in the press until Dr. Moshe Sneh, the leader of the Communist Party, raised the issue during the budget debate. In early January 1963 the WP reported that Israel was projected to spend roughly $212.8 million U.S. or 23% of its 1964 budget on national security needs. The article admitted that the language of the defense bill was “designed to camouflage exact defense appropriations, which are kept secret.” “Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld,” NYT, August 1, 1962, p. 3; “Israel Budget Defense-Heavy,” WP, January 1, 1963, p. A14; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 147, 386n35; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, February 8, 1968, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos (1 of 2), Volume VIII (12-67-2/68), Box 140, LBJL.


422 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 147, 386n35.
unease. Even though Egypt’s atomic reactor could not produce enriched uranium, the Mossad was determined to “block all Egyptian attempts to obtain the bomb.” Beginning in 1959 Egypt began recruiting hundreds of European scientists, including Wolfgang Pilz, a former colleague of Werner van Braun. On October 23, 1962, Dr. Otto Joklik, an Austrian nuclear scientist, informed Israel that Egypt was attempting to produce a “Hiroshima” bomb via project “Cleopatra.” In late November Pilz’s secretary was blinded when she opened a letter bomb. In February 1963 Hans Kleinwachter, head of a Stuttgart missile factory, survived an assassination attempt.

As the Mossad could no longer operate without impunity, in March 1963 Harel was fired by Ben Gurion. In a March 20 Knesset address, Meir demanded that Cairo and Bonn end its weapons collaboration. Ten of Israel’s eleven parties, except the Communists, backed Meir.

The Communist decision to abstain was followed by a Soviet inquiry into Israel’s nuclear program two weeks later. After a discussion with Meir Amit, Harel’s successor, concerning a proposed Mediterranean atomic-free zone, on March 30 the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Tel

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423 In 1955 the U.S.S.R. erected a 2 MW research reactor near Cairo. A June 27, 1961, telegraph sent from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo to Ottawa revealed that Egypt had pressed Moscow for a 100 MW reactor but the Soviets were “unwilling...” to provide one. Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 202; Numbered Letter from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo (R.A.D Ford) to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), “Subject: Scientific Progress in the U.A.R.,” June 27, 1961, RG 25, Volume 7882, File 14003-J-8-1-40, LAC.


425 Two years passed before Pilz told his side of the story. In a January 9, 1965, *NYT* piece, Pilz naively professed that he was only a scientist who had “nothing to do with politics.” Emphasizing that Israel had “disclaimed” all allegations, the story revealed that the German scientists working for the UAR were guarded by bodyguards, had their mail checked and kept their addresses and phone numbers secret. Israel’s radical means did justify the ends: in July 1965 Pilz and all the other senior scientists quit the project. Carl Buchalla, “German Rocket Expert in U.A.R. Tells of Fear of Israeli Reprisal,” *NYT*, January 9, 1965, p. 1; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, pp. 207-208; Hendrick Smith, “Leader of German Rocket Team Reported to Have Left U.A.R.,” *NYT*, July 9, 1965, p. 7; Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement*, p. 207.


427 Ginor and Remez have contended that Harel was opposed to Dimona “in its entirety” and even argued for scrapping the project, while Black and Morris have contended that Harel and Peres were “bitter enemies.” This turf war emerged after Peres created LAKAM in 1960 to gather secret scientific and technological intelligence, perceived by Harel as a threat to his authority. The head of Aman during the early 1960s, Meir Amit, who replaced Harel as Mossad chief, had welcomed LAKAM’s creation, a caveat which widened the Harel-Peres dispute. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: The USSR’s Motive for Instigating the Six Day War,” *Israel Studies* 11, 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 96-97; Black and Morris, *Israel’s Secret Wars*, pp. 417-418.
Aviv, A.S. Likhachev, informed Moscow that Israel was “concerned not by atomic weapons…” On May 20, 1963, the Soviets officially issued their proposal. The scholarship’s view of the Israeli response remains understudied. In his own words, Shalom has vaguely mused that in “early June” Israel answered that it supported “reducing...nuclear proliferation,” while “emphatically” professing that it “possessed no nuclear weapons.” Yosef Govrin, the first Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow during the Six Day War, has argued a less conciliatory response transpired on May 30, stressing that the Arab world supposedly presented Israel with a “direct threat…” A Canadian message sent from Tel Aviv to Ottawa on June 11 indicates that the Israeli letter had been sent four days earlier. The memo, however, did not include a copy of the “full text” even though the Embassy was “given” a copy. Based on all available evidence, including its omission from all U.S. sources, the Israeli response probably remains classified everywhere. Whatever the memo entailed, it placated the Soviets at a time when they were nearing a deal on a Partial Test Ban Treaty with the U.S. Nearly five months after the PTBT was signed, Khrushchev made no mention of Dimona in a December 31, 1963, note sent to Israel advocating that nations pursue “peaceful methods in settling territorial conflicts.” More importantly, this letter was addressed to a new Israeli Prime Minister.

On June 16, 1963, Ben Gurion resigned his office, announcing publicly that he needed to attend to “personal needs.” Although U.S rhetoric towards Dimona was climaxing, the

428 Govrin has stressed that the Soviet proposal was linked to the recent entry of U.S. nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear missiles into the Mediterranean and the possibility of West Germany being allowed to acquire nuclear missiles. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, p. 52; Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, p. 266.
429 Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 43-44.
430 Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, p. 266.
scholarship has generally contended that domestic considerations ultimately forced Ben Gurion to step down.\textsuperscript{434} With Ben Gurion’s approval, on June 22 Mapai unanimously selected Eshkol as Prime Minister\textsuperscript{435}. Less than 48 hours later, Eshkol lauded Ben Gurion “as one of our people’s greatest visionaries” in the Knesset. Dimona was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{436} During the first few months Eshkol continued to pass atomic information through Ben Gurion and Peres remained on as Deputy Minister of Defense.\textsuperscript{437} Still, Eshkol was never able to fully escape Ben Gurion’s shadow. Mardor penned on June 27 that the old man’s exit had “left many question marks.”\textsuperscript{438} Ben-Gurion’s removal precipitated increased domestic and international attention on Dimona. On August 7, 1963, the Knesset rejected a motion brought forward by Mosh Sneh of the Communists and Israel Barzelai of Mapam supporting the Soviet proposal to establish an atomic-free zone.\textsuperscript{439} Nine days later Livneh purported in \textit{Yediot Achronot} that there was “not one gram of seriousness” to Israel’s approach to this subject under its last “pacifist” Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{440} On February 24, 1964, British philosopher Bertrand Russell urged the Arabs and Israelis to embrace “nuclear supervision.”\textsuperscript{441} Less than a fortnight later, Meir, while in London, 

\textsuperscript{434} Aronson has contended that his growing isolation within Mapai, a desire to reform the nation’s multi-party system and Israel’s growing “co-operation” with West Germany all attributed to Ben Gurion’s downfall. Cohen has generally supported this line, although he has admitted that the conditions surrounding the resignation remain aberrant. Drawing from Ben Gurion’s diary, he has admitted that Ben Gurion told the Cabinet that he “must” resign and that “no state problem or event caused it.” Bar Zohar has speculated that the 76 year old Ben Gurion’s deteriorating physical and mental capabilities, including paranoia and memory loss, contributed. Cohen, however, has hinted that Sapir, Israel Gaili, and Ne’eman have all indicated that U.S pressure on Dimona played a “part” in the decision. This contention is supported by Shalom, who has admitted that it is “hard to determine” how much a factor “Dimona” played in the resignation. Aronson, \textit{The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East}, p. 78; Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 135; Shalom, \textit{Israel’s Nuclear Option}, pp. 52-53.


\textsuperscript{437} Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 220.


\textsuperscript{439} “Israelis Reject Bid on Atom-Free Zone,” \textit{NYT}, August 8, 1963, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{440} Shalom, \textit{Israel’s Nuclear Option}, pp. 50 & 188n14.

\textsuperscript{441} “Arms Curb and A-Controls Urged on Israel and Arabs,” \textit{NYT}, February 25, 1964, p. 8.
denied that Israel was attempting to obtain the bomb. Nothing was further from reality.

Based on a British primary source, Shalom has contended that in the spring of 1964 Ottawa informed the U.K and “most probably” the U.S. that Argentina had agreed to deliver 80-100 tons of uranium to Israel. No inspection or safeguard clauses were included in the accord. Soon after his visit to the U.S., Eshkol traveled to Paris where, on July 1, he told the press that Israel would not be the “first” to “introduce … nuclear weapons in the region.” He added that such a weapon “would be” too “expensive,” which would violate Jewish “spiritual principles.”

Eshkol should have known that his decision in May 1964 to invite Lavon back into Mapai would incite the retired Ben-Gurion. Seeing his chance to replace Eshkol, in October Ben Gurion submitted to the Attorney General a request for a new inquiry into the Lavaon scandal. He also cast the only negative vote when Mapai and Ahдут Ahдут Avoda agreed to align for the 1965 election. Using a Ben Gurion tactic, Eshkol resigned on December 14, 1964. Four days later Mapai endorsed Eshkol by stating that it would form a new Cabinet with Adhut Ahдут Avoda, the NRP, and Poelei Agudat Israel. On December 23, a day after the new British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had seconded the Soviet proposal for a Near East atomic-free zone, the Knesset voted 59-36 to support Eshkol’s return to power.

Operating discreetly, Ben Gurion attempted to use Dimona to bring down Eshkol. Weeks after the U.S. had conducted a set of vital Dimona-related meetings in Israel, on March 15, 1965, the NYT unveiled that Eshkol had “quietly permitted” U.S. “engineers” to “inspect” Dimona

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443 This report also speculated that Israel could produce a nuclear weapon within twenty months. Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, p. 80; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 179.
444 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 404n38.
445 One month later Dayan resigned as Agriculture of Minister. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 220.
447 Wilson, who had replaced the Conservative Sir Alec-Douglas Home one month earlier, drew criticism for his comments. Conservative MP Frederick Burden informed Wilson that Israel was a “small isolated country” which “should” be allowed to “protect” itself. W. Granger Blair, “Eshkol Restored to Post in Israel,” NYT, December 23, 1964, p. 2; Sydney Grusson, “Wilson Proposes Nuclear-Fee Zone in Mideast,” NYT, December 23, 1964, p. 2.
about a month ago." This disclosure undermined Eshkol as it added to the perception that he was weak on Dimona. Attacking Eshkol to a degree never matched during Ben Gurion’s reign, the domestic press claimed this news threatened Israel’s sovereignty and security. Oblivious that the U.S. had conducted two visits during Ben Gurion’s tenure, the next day Ha’aretz chastised Eshkol for allowing the visits against the advice of “senior advisors.” On May 9, 1965, Ben Gurion argued in Davar that Eshkol “was no longer qualified to lead the nation.” Eleven days later Peres resigned as Deputy Defense Minister. On May 22 the NYT asserted that a “political donnybrook” was transpiring in Israel with no indication that Mapai would win the upcoming election. In a 179 to 103 vote on June 4, Mapai leadership chose Eshkol to represent the party in the election. Twenty-five days later Ben Gurion, who always pursued his myopic self-interest, shocked everyone by creating the Israel Workers’ List Party (Rafi). According to Golan, “solely out of loyalty to Ben Gurion,” Peres also jumped ship to join the new party.

Cohen has argued that the bitterest election in Israeli history represented the only campaign in which Dimona was brought into the public discourse. Four days after Heikal had announced that Israel planned to test a nuclear bomb “soon,” Ha’aretz produced an article on

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450 In late July 1965 Eshkol informed the NYT that while Ben Gurion was making life “more complicated” for him, he was confident that the Israeli people would not “attracted by the cult of personality.” Avi Dinstein, who worked under Eshkol at the Treasury Ministry, informed Karpin that only those close to Eshkol knew how the comments affected him, to the point where “it even may” have even led to his “death.” James Feron, “Eshkol Saddened by Ben-Gurion’s Bid for Power,” NYT, July 29, 1965, p. 2; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, pp. 266-267.
453 Cohen has argued that by the summer of 1965 the supercilious Ben Gurion “was no longer interested in party politics” but wanted to bring down “Eshkol altogether.” Aronson has contended that the unenthusiastic Peres did not think that Rafi would find much electoral success but understood that without his “old mentor” he would be “left to the mercy” to his many Mapai enemies. Dayan also came to the same conclusion. Golan, Shimon Peres, pp.128, 130; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 220-221.
August 25, 1965, entitled “Is Israel Capable of Producing an Atomic Bomb.” According to Aronson, the atomic issue was introduced into the “ugly” campaign by Peres as a major dividing issue between Rafi and Mapai “even it was never spelled out in public.” Rafi, known by insiders as the “atomic party,” was packaged as a reforming force that sought scientific and technological innovation, while denouncing Mapai as weak on national security. Ben Gurion’s rhetoric “went nowhere” because the confused electorate “had no idea what its leaders were talking about…” In the November 4 vote Mapai gained 43 seats while Rafi won only ten. Following his defeat, Ben Gurion possessed little desire to attend Knesset debates and votes as Rafi’s leader.

Four days before Eshkol formed a fresh coalition Cabinet, the NYT leaked a pending French-Israeli missile deal on January 7, 1966. This story was likely prompted by the first MD-620 test, a failure, conducted fifteen days earlier. The Finney piece again played to the critical trope that Eshkol was compromising on Dimona, a perception which the Prime Minister had hoped to shatter after his electoral victory. Beginning with personnel changes in the first half of 1966 and simultaneous shifts in how Dimona was presented in the press and Parliament, Eshkol began to aggrandize power within the embedded atomic bureaucracy. In fact, beginning in early 1964, the Prime Minister had been efficaciously changing Israel’s nuclear infrastructure. At this time Yitzhak Rabin, representing the Allon-inspired conventionalist school, replaced the pro-technology Zvi Zur as IDF Chief of Staff. Following the election, Dinstein, who had no

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454 This was the only Israeli newspaper article which examined Dimona during the 1965 campaign. “Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon,” NYT, August 21, 1965, p. 2; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 222.
455 Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, p. 324n44.
456 In late August 1966 a new Knesset was built and financed by the Rothschilds. Golan, Shimon Peres, p. 132; James Feron, “New Knesset Dedicated in Israel,” NYT, August 31, 1966, p. 16.
458 In the two days after the Finney story, anonymous officials in the French and Israeli Foreign Ministries stressed that the allegations were “without foundation.” Rather than missiles, the two nations had been working on “technical cooperation.” Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 232; “French Deny Israel is Buying Missiles,” NYT, January 8, 1966, p. 5; “Israel also Denies Report She Bought French Missiles,” NYT, January 9, 1966, p. 15.
military experience, succeeded Peres at the Ministry of Defense. He quickly discovered that
Peres’ byzantine divide-and-rule approach had left the atomic infrastructure in chaos. There was
no chain of command, no allocation of resources and nothing was written down.\textsuperscript{459} Peres’
fragmented bureaucracy, an interwoven group of ad-hoc agencies reporting only to him, made it
difficult for Dinstein to communicate with Dimona. To find a panacea, the reactor’s supervisor,
Mannes Pratt, was replaced by Yossef Tulipman. Along with his increased marginalization, a key
factor in Bergmann’s decision to resign as IAEC chief on April 1, 1966,\textsuperscript{460} was Pratt’s decision
to ban him from Dimona. Eshkol seized this crisis to create a new IEAC to oversee the entire
hierarchy, entrenching all power in his hands. After Ne’eman was first offered the job,
Dostrovsky eventually replaced Bergmann.\textsuperscript{461}

Some were not unwilling to embrace the institutional changes. Cohen has contended that
the fiercest turf war, stemming from late December 1965 to late April 1966, involved Eshkol’s
and Dinstein’s attempt to reorganize RAFAEL. The idea rattled Mardor who yearned to conserve
his autonomous shadow power position. Adamant that the status quo be preserved, he utilized his
ties with various scientists, politicians and military officers to campaign for his cause. Roughly a
month after a second successful MD-620 test, on April 2, 1966, Eshkol met with Dinstein and
Mardor. At this time Dinstein proposed removing “key professional” units from RAFAEL and
placing them in a new scientific administration. Eshkol, however, announced two weeks later

\textsuperscript{459} Dinstein later informed Cohen that “everything was small and personal.” Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, pp. 222-227.
\textsuperscript{460} The Israeli public had no idea about the internal turf war leading to Bergmann’s ouster. Since the issue was not
discussed in the Cabinet or the Committee of Seven, it was easy to dismiss solely as a personal dispute between
Eshkol and Bergmann in the press. Another three weeks passed before \textit{Ha’aretz} commented on the professor’s
termination. In a May 14, 1966, \textit{NYT} story, Bergmann coyly informed the \textit{NYT} that it was “very important to
understand that . . . there are no two atomic energies.” Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 230, 403n42; Feron, “Israelis
\textsuperscript{461} Cohen has argued that Eshkol’s and Dinstein’s reforms did not democratize Dimona, although Eshkol’s regime
was “less autocratic than Ben Gurion.” Their respective atomic policies were “not that different from each other” as
that Mardor would remain at RAFAEL, with the officialdom retaining all its independence in all
R&D matters.\footnote{Based on “foreign sources,” Karpin has professed that RAFAEL’s budget doubled and hundreds of new workers were hired thereafter. Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, pp. 230 & 232; Karpin, \textit{The Bomb in the Basement}, p. 266.} Taking a page from Abraham Lincoln’s playbook, having slyly co-opted a man
used to answering only to Ben Gurion and Peres, Eshkol understood that one destroys an
adversary by making him an ally.

According to Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev, in “early 1966” the Prime
Minister briefed the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Dimona.\footnote{Tom Segev, \textit{1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East} (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2007), p. 164.} This
exposure tacitly increased the Israeli media’s coverage of the nation’s nuclear program. Since the
handful of journalists conscious about Dimona were forbidden to publish their information, they
criticism from the Israeli domestic press. On March 7, 1966, the \textit{NYT} reported that some of
Israel’s most important editors had recently met with Eban to ask if the state “could relax its ban
on discussion of the…nuclear issue.”\footnote{James Feron, “Atom-News Ban End Urged in Israel,” \textit{NYT}, March 7, 1966, p. 11.} A day after the \textit{WP} professed that that “a-weapons” were
“near for Israel,” Eshkol assured the Knesset on May 18 that “Israel had no atomic arms.” Nasser
and the press were only foolishly “drawing attention” to non-existent “nuclear weapons” in the
“develop,” to tacitly hint that the perceived Arab strength served as a pretext for Israel’s nuclear
development. Unlike Ben Gurion’s December 1960 Knesset address, Eshkol omitted Dimona’s
supposed scientific benefits or “peaceful purposes.”\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, pp. 233-234.}
to go away so easily.

A week after the *NYT* had disclosed that the U.S. had conducted another Dimona “inspection” one month earlier, a serious debate emerged in a July 5, 1966, inter-governmental meeting. Yohan Beder of the Gahal Party argued that the *NYT*’s “serious” leaks were providing “details” to Israel’s “enemies.” Informing his colleagues of the need to maintain good relations with the U.S., Eshkol responded that “an invitation” was “necessary from time to time.” Some did not accept this answer. The Communist Party’s Meir Vilner advocated that an Israeli bomb would be a “deadly poison” and proposed denuclearizing the Near East. Referring to a recent international conference focused on the subject, Peres responded that there was “unfortunately” no way to limit proliferation because the “big powers” could not agree “among themselves.” Blaming the Knesset for its “daily leaks to the press...,” he questioned why Israel should “reassure Nasser” of its “nuclear intentions.” This subtle critique was repeated a day later when Peres wrote in *Ha’aretz* that it was fine for Israel to “reassure friends privately” about Dimona but “another thing to reassure Nasser in the Knesset.” This internal debate over Dimona was largely placed in the background during the second half of 1966.

Cohen has contended that by late 1966 Dimona’s infrastructure was nearing completion, while Pean has speculated that the reactor was producing enough plutonium to construct a bomb by late 1966 or early 1967. By early November 1966 Israel’s nuclear program had reached a watershed moment. Mardor has asserted in his autobiography that on November 2 a test with

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468 This conference, entitled the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, which was held from June 23-26, 1966, in Toronto, was attended by Peres. Sponsored by Columbia University and the Institute for Strategic Studies, Jabber has argued that “contrary” to Peres’ allegations the conference indeed called for a “serious effort” to “negotiate a Nuclear Free Zone” in the Near East. Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 41.

469 The fact that Dimona was so widely discussed during this meeting upset Eshkol, forcing the Prime Minister to move the “sensitive matter” to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. Jabber, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 38-41.

470 According to Segev, four days later a large *Ha’aretz* advertisement griped about the possible “introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 404n52; Segev, 1967, p. 164.

471 Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 230; Pean, *Les Deux Bombs*, p. 120.
“special significance” was conducted.\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 232.} This success was offset by a December 14 accident at Dimona which killed a technician, forcing the plant to shut down for three months. Eshkol’s visit to the facility earlier in the month was reported in the \textit{JP} on February 3, 1967.\footnote{Based on a \textit{Ma'ariv} report, in September 1994 the \textit{WP} pointed out that Abraham Gofer, 22, had been the employee killed. Only after these stories did the IAEC confirm the accident. Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, pp. 239 & 405n65-66; Carlyle Murphy, “Israel Says ’66 Mishap Killed 1 at Nuclear Site,” \textit{WP}, September 16, 1994, p. A34.} Six days later Walworth Barbour, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, pointed out this story represented the first Israeli press report to ever explicitly usher the word “Dimona.”\footnote{Airgram Telegram from Barbour to Department of State, “Subject: Dimona Nuclear Research Center,” February 10, 1967, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume VI (12/66-7/67) Box 140, \textit{LBJL}.}

Mardor has argued that on May 27, 1967, technicians and scientists were “assembling and testing the weapons system.” Although he did not explicitly mention what they were assembling, he wrote that they all “fully recognized the enormous, perhaps fateful, value” of their actions. In an interview with Myer Feldman, who served under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Cohen was informed that Israel had “two improvised” bombs before June 1967.\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Israel and the Bomb}, p. 173.} In his memoirs, Peres, a private citizen by 1967, argued that through Dayan, who had replaced Eshkol as Defense Minister on June 1, he presented “a certain proposal” that would have “deterred the Arabs and prevented the war.” For “reasons of state security,” Peres did not go into any more detail but one can easily deduce that this suggestion was a nuclear test.\footnote{Peres, \textit{Battling for Peace}, p. 145.}

Cohen has argued that Eshkol had adamantly apposed any nuclear test at any time, even though those around him, especially Bergmann before his resignation, pushed for it. Segev and Cohen have argued that an atomic test could have set “history on a different course” by creating “shock waves with unanticipated consequences.” Despite his own analysis, Cohen has argued the
Six-Day War had "no-direct atomic dimension." By examining Soviet positions vis-à-vis Dimona in the three years leading up to the war, the orthodox narrative advocated by Francis Fukuyama, that Soviet warnings "to intervene" in the Six Day War were all "bluffs," will be refuted. Had Israel tested a bomb in 1967, it could have provided a catalyst for World War III.

The U.S.S.R.'s policies vis-à-vis Dimona during the 1960s constitutes a fresh, exciting, and irascible debate within the historiography. Ginor's and Remez's trailblazing argument that Moscow, beginning in late 1965, deliberately engineered a series of events to goad Israel into a pre-emptive conventional strike to provide the Soviets with a pretext to destroy Dimona in a subsequent air strike is a convincing one. David Murphy, the CIA's former head of Soviet operations, argued on the book's cover that its contents touched upon a subject previously "ignored by Western historians." Odd Arne Westad, director of Cold War Studies at the LSE, professed that the "revisionist" book would "stand out..." Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv (July 2001-July 2005), described Ginor's and Remez's narrative as "provocative." Another Republican appointed Ambassador (1985-1988), Thomas Pickering, likewise has argued that the "fascinating" book demonstrates that Moscow's "role now appears to be much...more intensive..."

The scholarly reviews of the book have been polarizing. In the fall of 2007 the first review was published in *Foreign Affairs*. Lawrence Freedman, a professor of War Studies at King's College, contended the "revisionist" monograph had done much to unveil the "murky" role that Moscow "played" during the period prior to June 1967. Soviet anxiety about Israel's

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477 In an interview with Dinsetin, Cohen was told that Eshkol used to rhetorically ask the IAEC head: "Do you think that the world would sit and applaud us for our achievement?" Segev, 1967, p. 327; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 237, 275-276.

478 At the time Fukuyama was working within the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and the Rand Corporation. Francis Fukuyama, "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threat in the Middle East," *ORBIS*, 25, 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 576, 581-582;
“imminent” nuclear threat and foolish confidence in Arab military capabilities precipitated Moscow’s plan to destroy Dimona.\(^{479}\) This finding was supported by Mark Katz, a professor of Government at George Mason University. Despite being initially “highly skeptical” of the “bold” thesis, Katz became convinced even before finishing the book, due to their utilization of new Soviet documents, that Ginor and Remez had indeed “got it right.”\(^{480}\)

The reviews composed by Israeli scholars are less conciliatory and concise. In a May 16, 2007, *JP* story, historian Michael Oren avowed that he had not found “any documentary evidence to support” Ginor’s and Remez’s thesis. Although he failed to specify when he went or what he examined, Israel’s current U.S. Ambassador professed that he had found that “not a lot has been declassified” at the Kremlin archives.\(^{481}\) In March 2008 Amnon Sella, a former visiting professor at Oxford and Georgetown, dismissed the book as “…propaganda.”\(^{482}\) Six months later, Israeli political scientist Galia Golan described the book as “dubious,” warning that it would be viewed as “authoritative” in conspiracy “circles.” It took her two pages to introduce the book as she spent most of the review engaging in self-applause.\(^{483}\) By omitting all of the above cited reviews even though they were all published before her piece, she encouraged future likeminded scholarship.\(^{484}\)

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\(^{480}\) Similar to the Cuban Missile Crises, Afghanistan in 1978, Chechnya in 1994 and Georgia since 2003, Katz has generalized that Moscow’s actions prior to the Six Day War assumed that it was capable of controlling “the outcome of the crises that it initiated.” Mark N. Katz, “Review,” *Middle East Journal*, 62, 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 178-179.


\(^{484}\) The failure to encourage or acknowledge a counter perspective within *Diplomatic History* must also be placed on the shoulders of the journal’s editor-in-chief, Robert Schulzinger, who could have always included another review. Shulzinger is also a member of Foggy Bottom’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation and the CIA’s Historical Review Panel. “OAH Distinguished Lectureship Program 2008-2009: Robert D. Shulzinger,” [www.oah.org/activities/lectureship/2008/lecturer.php?id=259](http://www.oah.org/activities/lectureship/2008/lecturer.php?id=259).
Foxbats over Dimona and saw no “reason for altering the conclusions” of his co-edit book.485

Rather than simply denouncing Ginor’s and Remez’s work as conspiratorial, scholars should address the book’s major flaw: the chronological gap in Soviet attitudes towards Dimona from December 1960 to late December 1965. Aside from the 1963 Soviet proposal to denuclearize the Mediterranean basin, little is known about Soviet opinions toward Dimona during Khrushchev’s tenure. The Ottawa archives have provided a brief glimpse. On July 19, 1961, Canada’s High Commission in London reported that Moscow might be supplying Cairo with information that Britain was “helping Israel to develop atomic weapons.” Ginor and Remez have argued that Ivan Dedyula, a former KGB agent in Tel Aviv, informed them that by late 1962 he had been ordered “to ascertain...the work for creating atomic arms in Israel.”486

In 1964 the U.S.S.R.’s Near East policy was attacked by Jews in New York and Moscow. On January 26 the Free Sons of Israel demonstrated near the Soviet Union’s UN mission against Soviet discrimination against Russian Jews. Days after UPI revealed that Meir had “denied that Israel was producing nuclear weapons,” Kremlin officials accused Israeli diplomats for distributing “Zionist literature” in Moscow’s Central Synagogue.487 Less than a week after the NYT stated on May 5 that Egypt and Israel were both unable to “produce a nuclear weapon,” Khrushchev visited Cairo. This trip could have laid the groundwork for Arab leaders to meet in

Alexandria in late August. Based on an Al Ahram piece, the WP revealed on August 28 that a group of unnamed Arab leaders had gathered to discuss "Israel's potential use of atomic energy" for "military purposes." The NYT reported the next day that Moscow's Jewish synagogue was placed off limits to Israeli diplomats for three months. By early September, however, relations warmed as Soviet property in Jerusalem was sold to Israel under favorable terms, effectively ending Moscow's economic boycott of Israel in place since Suez.

These improved bilateral relations were short-lived. On October 16, 1964, Khrushchev lost power to Aleksei Kosygin in a radical sea change which altered Moscow's Near East policy. In response to rumors about a pending West German-Israeli arms deal, on November 25, 1964, Izvestia published a pugnacious cartoon showing a Nazi general, his sleeve covered in blood, handing a weapon to an Israeli soldier which had been "tested and fired at Auschwitz." Maurice Eisendrath, head of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, argued in the NYT that this drawing represented "the first...anti-Jewish material to appear since" Khrushchev's ouster. One day later at New York's Commodore Hotel, the National Committee for Israel implored the U.S.S.R. to pursue a Jeffersonian "bill of rights" for Soviet Jews.

While London seconded Moscow's proposal for a nuclear-free Near East and the U.S. press reported that Israeli assassins were facing espionage charges in Egypt, relations between

489 This Arab meeting refutes the generalization made by Cohen that Dimona represented an issue of "secondary importance" in the broader Arab-Israeli dispute prior to mid-1965. Similarly, Karpin has argued that prior to mid-1965 Egypt was "completely oblivious to Israel's nuclear plans." In a 2002 interview, Haikal stated that Cairo "never imagined that Israel was building a bomb...until the end of 1965." Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 254-255; Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 201; "Arabs Study Israel A-Arms Potential," WP, August 29, 1964, p. B5.
491 An October 26 CIA report described Nasser's initial reaction to the news was that dismiss it as "imperialist propaganda." The CIA cable, stating that Nasser had "never appeared so depressed and unhappy," argued that he viewed Khrushchev's "dismissal" as "worse than Suez." CIA Intelligence Cable, "Subject: Nasir's Reactor to Khrushchev's Ouster," October 26, 1964, NSF, UAR, Cables 2 of 2, Volume II (6/64-12/64), Box 159, LBJL.
Moscow and Jerusalem deteriorated further in early 1965. Two weeks after the NYT announced another U.S. “inspection” of Dimona had transpired, Meir vilified a recent Soviet arms sale to Nasser in the Knesset as an a contradiction to Moscow’s issuances of “peace” on March 28. On May 22 the NYT relayed that Isvestia had reported that Yosef Tekoah, Israel’s Ambassador in Moscow, had attacked “the human dignity and religious feelings” of Russian Jews everywhere by calling one member of an Odessa synagogue a “Fascist.” During the month a Syrian envoy also visited Moscow, thus marking the start of Damascus’s role as the “central pivot” in Moscow’s Near East policy.

In late August Haikal, via the NYT, announced that Israel possessed a clear “atomic lead on her Arab neighbors” due to an oral deal concluded with France in 1956. Thanks to an estimated investment of $700 million, Al-Ahram’s editor announced that an Israeli bomb was possible “in a few years.” Since Nasser apparently cared little about Dimona until summer 1965, one can speculate that this monetary estimate, the highest denomination ever attributed to Dimona, was provided to Cairo from Moscow. A month later Tekoah was replaced by Katriel Katz in Moscow. Then on October 6 Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Hasem Nuseibeh, informed U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Amman had received “intelligence” indicating that

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494  Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, p. 274.
496  Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, p. 276.
497  He also cautioned that Israel would not find it “necessary to test” as such a catalyzing event could “turn the world against” the Jewish state. “Cairo Editor Says Israel Plans to Test Nuclear Device Soon,” NYT, August 21, 1965, p. 2. 
“Israel had already attained the capability to produce a nuclear bomb.” 499 Weeks before Israel’s election, Heikal wrote a story, reprinted on October 15, 1965, in Ma’ariv, warning that the Arabs could “not with wait” to acknowledge and confront the Israeli “atomic menace.”500 Weeks after the Israeli election, Maki submitted questions to the Kremlin asking for Moscow’s input into its future party platforms. On November 19 Maki’s M. Suslov and the New Communist List’s B. Ponamarev traveled to Moscow. Govrin has argued during these talks Soslov announced that if Israel obtained the bomb it would “cause a national disaster” and foster deep “enmity” towards the nation.501 This meeting may have precipitated a curious conversation three weeks later in Israel. According to Soviet documents, on December 13, 1965, Sneh, now a Maki leader, informed the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Dimitri Chuvakhin, that he had been told by an advisor of Eshkol, “Gariel,” that Israel intended to produce a bomb.502

Ginor and Remez have emphasized that “Gariel” was the Russian transliteration of the Hebrew name Har’el, or Isser Harel, who on September 15 became a Special Adviser on intelligence and special operations to Eshkol.503 In his 1987 Hebrew account Soviet Espionage, Harel argued that Sneh was a political dissident rather than a Soviet asset even though he was placed under surveillance by Israel. This conclusion cannot be trusted, however, because Soviet documents have revealed that Sneh, as Secretary General of the League for Friendship with the USSR, had helped Moscow to funnel money to its agents operating in Israel. Israel Beer, a

499 Rusk coyly responded that he was “surprised” that Nuseibeh believed this “information” to be “reliable” and that the U.S. “would look into the matter. October 6, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, LRIL.
500 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 257 & 409n48.
501 Govrin, Israeli - Soviet Relations, pp. 84-85.
502 Ginor has argued that Sneh viewed Eshkol’s government as “potentially more open to rapprochement with the USSR than” Ben Gurion had been. Isabella Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative: New Evidence and Methodological Issues,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 12, 3 (September 2008), p. 26.
503 Beginning in 1962, Harel, who as head of the Haganah in 1946 had saved Sneh from being arrested by the British, served as an informal conduit with Moscow. Little has been published of Harel’s work as Eshkol’s aide. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 91, 122n17, 96-97; Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative,” p. 26.
former colleague of Sneh, was even exposed by Harel himself to be a Soviet spy. Since the ruthless Harel had opposed Dimona since the early 1950s, it is difficult to determine whether his move to employ Sneh was a deliberate strategy, implemented with Eshkol’s knowledge to deter the Soviets, or a move by himself alone to expose the project for selfish reasons. Analogous to Angleton at the CIA, Harel was equipped to conduct his own alternative foreign policy. Regardless, by late 1965 the Soviets had learned that a window of opportunity still existed to prevent Israel from developing the bomb.

Eshkol, who spoke fluent Russian and had three brothers living in the U.S.S.R., was aware that Israeli-Soviet relations were quite bad by early 1966. In what Govrin has professed “were the friendliest words...ever...expressed by any” Israeli Prime Minister about the Soviets, on January 12 Eshkol informed the Knesset that since Israel did not “participate in...the Cold War” there should be a “greater... understanding” between the U.S.S.R. and Israel. The Soviets did not buy it. A week later, on Eban’s first day as Foreign Minister, Chuvakhin stated that Moscow was very “concerned about the rumors” indicating the possibility of an Israeli “atomic bomb...” Eban “vehemently” denied the allegation. In the following month, one in which the U.S.S.R. engineered a coup elevating the Ba’ath Party to power in Damascus, Moscow’s new policies vis-à-vis Dimona began to be announced and enacted.

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505 A biography of Eshkol at the Johnson Library has revealed that Eshkol kept “in ...close contact” with his brothers. Biography of Levi Eshkol, NSF, Country File, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book (1/7-8/68) Box 144, LBJL.
506 Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, pp. 84-85.
507 Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 102.
508 According to Govrin, from the Ba’ath Party’s rise to power on February 23, 1966, to June 1967 the Soviets were set on “sending frequent and severe warnings aimed at deterring Israel from undertaking military action against Syria.” Golan has contended that after the coup Damascus allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization to launch attacks from its territory and conducted a “vociferous propaganda campaign” against the Jewish state. Ro’i has professed that Syria became more confrontational in inter-Arab politics by pressuring Nasser to adopt “an ever-more extremist stance.” Pointing out that the coup elevated Hafaez al-Assad, a Soviet Air Academy graduate, to Defense Minister, Golan and Remez have argued that “Moscow’s intensified action on the nuclear issue,” and its move to cement its influence over Syria were two “facets of the same...strategy.” Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, pp. 93-94; Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 8, 1
On February 4, 1966, the *NYT* professed that the previous December Andrei Grechko, First Deputy of the Soviet Defense Ministry, had “promised” Nasser “a guarantee of nuclear protection” if Israel obtained the bomb. Although Moscow was unwilling to provide the bomb, Grechko pledged the Soviets were prepared “to use their own nuclear arms...to safeguard” Cairo. On the same day *Yedi'ot Aharonot* disclosed that the Soviets were “displaying great interest in the development of Israeli nuclear science.” Nine days later a Soviet document argued that if Israel embarked “on the road of creating its own atomic bomb, as stated by Gariel,” it would result in terrible “consequences.” On February 21 the *NYT* relayed that Nasser had informed the Iraqi press that if Israel developed the bomb, the “only answer” would be a “preventive war.” A Soviet document two days later averred that if “Gariel’s” comments reflected Israel’s “real” atomic “intentions,” then Israeli “honesty” was in doubt.

On October 24, 1966, Ambassador Katz contended that beginning in March there had been a “deliberate political change for the worse” in Soviet attitudes toward Israel. On March 15 Chuvakhin asked Israel to join a “declaration” aimed at removing the “nuclear arms” from the

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510* Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 102.

511* Perhaps on instructions from Moscow, Cairo was unwilling to discuss Dimona with the U.S. On February 23, the same day that the NSC’s Robert Komer informed LBJ that the U.S. was “surprised at Nasser’s fears that Israel was going nuclear,” Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt’s National Assembly, met with Johnson. Interestingly, it was LBJ who raised Dimona, arguing that the U.S. was not “as alarmist as” Cairo on this subject but assured him that the U.S. was “watching the situation very closely.” Sadat never followed up on the issue and allowed the conversation to move to another subject. On the same day Sadat met also with Rusk, where he was told that the U.S. could “see advantages” to a Near East nuclear free zone being advocated by Moscow. Sadat replied that the UAR “suspected” that Israel had turned down all attempts to establish safeguards at Dimona and ended the conversation by coolly stating “very good.” Memorandum for LBJ from Komer, February 23, 1966, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 2, 1 of 3, Box 6, LB/L; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S-U.A.R. Relations,” February 23, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/about_state/history/vol_eviii/za/html (Document 274); Editorial Note, *Ibid*: (Document 281); Hendrick Smith, “Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser,” *NYT*, February 21, 1966, p. 8; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 261-262 &265.

512* Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 98.

513* Ibid., p. 108.
region. A week later Kosygin espoused in Cairo that “forces” in the Near East may soon obtain
“nuclear arms.”\textsuperscript{514} Israel was not oblivious to these announcements. On March 30 a top secret
and unsigned Prime Minister’s Office Document pointed out that certain Maki “comrades” had
recently talked about the “indications” given by Eshkol and Eban of the “sincere intentions to
seek a way for nuclear demilitarization.”\textsuperscript{515}

In April and May 1966 Cairo’s rhetoric towards Dimona increased as Moscow
strengthened relations with Damascus. On April 17 Nasser announced that Israel’s was
attempting to produce an “atomic” bomb, forcing Eban to reply that Israel had not initiated “the
introduction of” any “new arms...” in the region.\textsuperscript{516} From April 18-24 a Syrian delegation visited
Moscow and on May 8 Nasser told the \textit{BBC} that he was “of course” concerned about Dimona.\textsuperscript{517}
A day before Eshkol Knesset speech, Kosygin averred in Cairo that the failure to “achieve
nuclear disarmament” ensured that no Arab nation could “consider itself safe and secure” on
May 17.\textsuperscript{518} Moscow was also learning that Washington wanted nothing to do with Dimona.\textsuperscript{519} On
May 26 Anatoliy Dobyrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in U.S. Ambassador was told by Rusk that
Israel was “not planning to make nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{520}

\textsuperscript{514} Although it is not clear if the atomic issue was discussed, on March 11 Katz met with Soviet President Nikolai
\textsuperscript{515} The document also uncovered that Sneh had recently met with Eshkol. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the
Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 95 & 106-108.
\textsuperscript{516} “Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear-Armed Israel,” \textit{NYT}, April 18, 1966, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{517} During this Syrian visit the Soviet press argued that the “Palestinian tragedy” was the result of the “colonialist
policies on part of the Zionists...striving to dominate...and subvert Arab unity.” On May 18 the \textit{WP} reported that
the Soviets had provided Syria with $150 million. Govrin, \textit{Israeli-Soviet Relations}, p. 277; Ro’I, “Soviet Policy
toward the Six Day War,” p. 4; “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” \textit{NYT}, May 9, 1966, p. 8; Drew Pearson, “A-
\textsuperscript{518} “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” \textit{NYT}, May 9, 1966, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{519} Two days later the \textit{NYT} reported that the U.S. had agreed to provide Israel with 48 A-4 Skyhawks, a lightweight
\textsuperscript{520} The U.S. must have understood that Soviet policy in the Near East was changing. In a report without any
reference to Dimona, two days later the CIA argued that Cairo and Moscow could “be moving toward a period of
closer cooperation...” In a 1992 conference held in Rosslyn, Virginia, focused on the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Six
Day War, Richard Helms vaguely mused that Meir had sent him a 1966 “document” focused on “Israel’s concern”
that Moscow could be possibly taking over the area.” When exactly this letter was sent is unknown as Helms could
Israel was by now quite aware of the shift in Moscow’s posture. On June 1 Eshkol’s top Soviet advisor, Shaul Avigur, told the Prime Minister that the “sharp Soviet offensive on Israel in the press” had left him “amazed and perplexed.” Over a month later, on August 13, David Gavish, Second Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow, was expelled for thirteen months for espionage offenses. By November 1966 Moscow was beginning to plan for war against Israel, a war which would attempt to destroy Dimona in the process.

On November 22, over five years after the UAR’s dissolution, Damascus and Cairo signed a defense pact. That same day General Adb al-Hakim Amer, Egypt’s second most powerful figure, and Salah Naser, the head of Egyptian intelligence, arrived in Moscow for four days of talks. Ginor and Remez have argued that Amer concocted a plan with Grechko to deploy Egyptian troops into the Sinai prior to any war with Israel. The plan, codenamed “Conqueror,” was modeled on the KGB’s motto: “shield and sword.” These talks must have been monitored by the Mossad. On November 27 Amit suggested that Eshkol “deactivate” Dimona and promote peace talks. The Prime Minister refused. For the next two months the Soviets and Arabs were silent on Dimona until Nasser called for an Arab Summit to “confront Israel before” it obtained nuclear weapons.

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521 Over a week later the Soviets established direct air flights between Moscow and Beirut. On July 12 the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiki visited Moscow, and a fortnight later the Iraqi Prime Minister followed suit. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 67, 58; Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, p. 284.


523 Segev has argued that Amit urged that Israel stop its nuclear program in exchange for Nasser to stop compiling conventional arms. In early 1966 Amit proposed to Eshkol that he could travel to Cairo pursue back-channel negotiations with a “senior figure” but Eshkol was again unwilling. Amit later argued that Israel had missed “a historic opportunity” for peace. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 43 & 228n30; Segev, 1967, p. 166.
“atomic weapons” on February 3, 1967. Two days later, in the final public denouncement of Dimona prior to the Six Day War, Nasser warned the British Observer that if Israel developed the “bomb,” then “war” could ensue. On March 26 Nasser informed a Beirut paper that Israel could be destroyed “in twelve days” if the Arabs were united. Preparing for any eventualities, in late February or early March the Soviet nuclear submarine K-172 sailed to Syria. In late March Gromyko visited Cairo, demonstrating that Moscow’s relations with Cairo were being formulated by the Politburo. One week after Gromyko had visited Israel, the IAF downed seven Soviet-made Syrian fighters over the Sea of Galilee.

On May 12 the Soviets announced to Egypt that that Israel was massing 10-12 brigades on its northern border with Syria for an attack. On May 16 Nasser requested that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), deployed following the Suez Crisis, be removed from the Egyptian-Israeli border. Most of the UNEF had departed by May 21. Despite scholarly disagreements, Richard Parker, who served as a political counselor to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo during June 1967, has argued that Moscow warned Egypt three separate times during the day. The next

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525 Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 76.
528 Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 111, 127n13; Ibid, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 79
529 Historian Ernest Dawn has admitted that “what really happened” during Gromyko’s visit is unknown, while Ro’i has contended there is no “evidence” to what stimulated these secret talks. This is because Soviet policy makers were more draconian than their U.S. and Israeli colleagues. Ginor and Remez have argued that Anatoly Chernyayev, a former Soviet Presidential Aide, argued to them that since Stalin the Politburo had understood “it was forbidden to record anything.” A number of the FSB’s Central Archival papers focused on the Six Day War were destroyed in 1978, a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Parker, *The Six Day War*, p. 58; Yaacov Ro’i “Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with Egypt and Syria,” pp. 4-5; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, pp. 51, 230n6; Ginor, “The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative,” p. 19.
530 Parker, who also served as a U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, Algeria, and Lebanon, has argued that the fabricated Soviet intelligence was given on May 12 “at a very high level in Moscow,” at a “lower level in Cairo” and to Ahmad Hassan al-Feki, the Egyptian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, by Dimitri Pojidaev, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. The warning was also given to Sadat, in Moscow at the time, by Vladimir Semyenov on the same day. Salah Bassiouny, a member office of the Soviet Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in Cairo during the war, has argued that it “was not customary for the Soviet Ambassador to deliver such reports to the foreign ministry” since it had “never happened before.” Bassiouny added that KGB’s Cairo liaison also delivered the report to Egyptian intelligence director Salah Nasr, but is unsure whether it was delivered before or after the meeting in the Ministry of Affairs.
day Nasser placed his army on a full state of emergency and Chief of Staff General Fawzi traveled to Damascus to coordinate planning. The Soviet warning was an erroneous farce. When Eshkol invited Ambassador Chuvakhin to view firsthand the alleged Israeli buildup, the latter coyly replied, "I am not here to observe facts in Israel." While the historiography agrees that the false warning was key in precipitating the war, few have attempted to examine the Soviet intentions behind it. Tahsin Basheer, who in June 1967 was part of Egypt's UN mission, has argued that little is known about the Soviet "double game," while Cohen has speculated that the report may have acted as a "pretext for another policy object."

For the first time since the U-2, foreign aircraft overflew and photographed Dimona on May 17. The reconnaissance mission was laconically reported for the first time by Bar-Zohar in 1970, proclaiming that an Egyptian "MiG-21 equipped with Russian cameras made a surprise raid into Israeli territory and photography the region around Dimona." Israeli Mirages pursued
but were unable to intercept it. Bar-Zohar also never explicitly mentioned that Dimona was the location of Israel’s nuclear weapons program. In 1980 Michael Brecher repeated that there was a flyover “of... Dimona for a minute...,” as did political scientists Janis Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter. In more detail, Oren has contended that on 4:00 p.m. two MiG-21 jets sliced through Jordanian airspace and “swooped over the top-secret site.” According to Segev, following the flyover Eshkol informed Rabin that Dimona could be bombed, arguing that “you never can know what might happen.” With Allon advising that an attack “against Israeli nuclear installations” represented a *casus belli*, Israel called up its army reserves later that evening.

A day later Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, also a *casus belli* for Israel since Suez, on May 22. Shay has argued that Nasser informed the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo before he made the announcement, whereas Basheer has stipulated this never occurred. From May 25-28 Shams Badran, Egypt’s War Minister, met with Gromyko and Grechko in Moscow, while Kosygin flew to Cairo. The confusing and conflicting Soviet signals sent during these talks are interesting. Late on May 26 Chuvakin cabled Kosygin that it was “essential to find means to settle the conflict by non-military means.” Kosygin also informed Badran to avoid provoking

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537 Oren has added that even though Nasser did not cite Dimona as a “motive for his decisions,” Israel’s “fear of the reactor- rather than Egypt’s of it- was the greatest catalyst for the war.” Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), pp. 75-76.
539 Aronson has added that the collective refusal of Bar-Zohar, Brecher, Tanter, Stein and the rest of the scholarship to ignore the role of the “nuclear factor as...the master variable explaining the Six Day War” is a perfect example of the “ambiguity” surrounding Israel’s nuclear weapons program in the “academic research.” Aronson, *The Politics Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 325n52.
540 The previous day Eshkol had stated in a meeting that if Egypt acted “to stop Israeli shipping through the (Tiran) straits” then Dimona would soon be bombed thereafter. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 270.
any “war with Israel.” Accompanying Badran to the airport on May 28, however, Grechko informed him that if Israel attacked Egypt then the U.S.S.R. would “come in on your side,” adding that “Our fleet is in the Mediterranean … Do you fully understand what I mean?”

Soviets actions trumped their words. During the four-day Egyptian-Soviet talks in Moscow Dimona was again overflown by foreign aircraft. On May 26 Cohen has argued that only two Egyptian MiG 21 fighters were responsible for the surveillance while Oren has countered that four MiG-21s had taken part. Israeli jets were scrambled and Raytheon anti-aircraft missiles were fired but neither downed the planes. The revisionist work of Ginor and Remez has countered that while four aircraft did overfly Dimona on May 26, they were instead the high-performance MiG-25 Foxbat. Major General Alaksandr Vybornov has revealed that he flew two flights over Dimona, indicating that the Foxbat was also utilized on May 17. The Foxbat had a ceiling of 70,000 feet, one reason why Israeli fighters- which could only reach 55,000 feet- failed to intercept them. One of the pilots who pursued the enemy planes David Ivry, a

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543 Kornienko dismissed this comment as irrelevant since Grechko had only been appointed to Defense Minister in mid-April. Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” p. 112; Parker, The Six Day War, pp. 72-73; Ginor, “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-Up,” p. 37.


545 Since the crux of Ginor’s and Remez’s argument is proving that it was the MiG-25 and not MiG-21 which overflew Dimona, it is no surprise that this point has drawn the most criticism in the scholarship. Ro’i has argued that it is “extremely unproven” that Vybornov actually flew the MiG-25. Golan has professed that only a few prototype Foxbats had been built by 1967 and it was only in 1973 that they planes were sent to Egypt and Syria. Sella has also argued that the MiG-25 was only presented for the first time for the public in July 1967 and the first phase of testing was completed in November 1968. It was only after this point that the Soviets began to produce the plane in mass production, even though Sella has admitted that “theoretically…it is possible” that a few “archetypes available in 1967” were sent to Nasser “to make reconnaissance over Dimona.” None of these critiques address why Israeli pilots were unable to intercept the enemy planes or address the statement made by Russian Major General Vladimir A. Zolotaryov, who has argued that the Foxbat “was used in the late 1960s on the Egyptian-Israeli front as a reconnaissance aircraft.” An August 2007 JP story confirmed Ginor’s and Remez’s argument by revealing that, along with Vybornov, Russian Colonel A.S. Bezhevets also flew a MiG-25 renaissance flight over Dimona. The Pravada’s Colonel Viktor Baranets argued in the piece that it is now indisputable that Moscow “orchestrated” the June 1967 war and was “prepared for an invasion of Israel.” Yaacov Ro’i, “Introduction,” p. xxii-xxiii; Golan, “A (Dubious) Conspiracy of the 1967 War,” p. 672; Sella, “Review,” pp. 105-106; Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, p. 131; David Horowitz, “Russia Confirms Soviet Sorties over Dimona in ’67,” JP, August 23, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l18779146277&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.

546 Ginor and Remez have contended that these sorties were explicitly approved by the Soviet Ministry of Defense and it is “unlikely” the pilots knew what they were actually spying on “beyond the geographical coordinates.” Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 129-132; Ginor and Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” pp. 117 & 130n175.
future IAF commander, has since argued that there was “at least one plane” outperformed the Mirages, leaving them “unseen and unidentified.”

The surveillance flights certainly pushed Israel toward war. Segev has revealed that during a five hour Cabinet meeting also held on May 26, Rabin and Ezer Weizmann, the Chief of Operations, interrupted the discussion by announcing that “four Soviet-made Egyptian planes had infiltrated Israeli airspace” and photographed Dimona. Weizmann then speculated that “signs” deduced that Nasser was “planning to attack Dimona today.” Eshkol frustratingly responded that “Egyptian planes” were “photographing Dimona and we’re sitting here talking about Ben-Gurion.” Later in the day the IDF was deployed along the Egyptian border, expecting an attack to commence the following day. One June 5 the IAF launched a devastating preemptive strike on Egypt, ensuring victory in the war’s crucial opening hours.

Soviet plans to use war as a pretext to destroy Dimona failed because Moscow had foolishly overestimated Egypt’s strength to absorb the initial Israeli strike. Former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, the KGB’s Deputy Resident in Washington during the war, later mused that “no one in Moscow had any doubt” that the Arabs would defeat Israel. Since Nasser’s air force was destroyed in the early hours of June 5, the Soviets lost any cover for a Foxbat strike upon Dimona. Retired Air Force Commander Vasili Reshetnikov has since confessed that the Soviets “had to work under the colors of the Egyptian flag” to conceal their role. Nikolai Shashkhatov, commanding officer of the K-172 sub, added that he had received oral orders from Commander

547 Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, p. 129.
548 Oren, Six Days of War, p. 133.
549 Ben Gurion had days before criticized Eshkol as a “cheat and liar.” This pressure on Eshkol was a key reason why he stepped down as Defense Minister in favor of Dayan, a signal that the war hawks would get their way. Segev, 1967, pp. 15, 263-264; Oren, Six Days of War, p. 133.
550 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 272.
551 Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, p. 98.
Gorshko to launch its nuclear payload if the U.S. or Israel placed ground forces in Syria.\footnote{Ginor, "The Six Day War as a Soviet Initiative," pp. 23-24; Ginor and Remez, "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona," p. 111, 127n13; Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, pp. 79 & 148-152.} Incredibly, Israel’s swift victory possibly prevented a much more apocalyptic outcome.

Since 35 Soviet advisors stationed in Egypt died during the hostilities, the Six Day War was a definitive moment in the U.S.S.R.’s relations with Israel. While the IDF was capturing the Golan Heights, Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Israel on June 10.\footnote{Diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR were not renewed until October 18, 1991, months before Communism dissolved. Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations, pp. 156-157; Ginor, “The Russians Were Coming,” p. 47.} Following the war the Near East assumed new prominence in the Kremlin’s thinking. By the latter stages of the War of Attrition, from April to August 1970, 14,000 Soviet advisors were stationed in Egypt.\footnote{Drew Middleton, “14, 000 Russians Play Big Role in Egypt,” NYT, October 3, 1970, p. 7.} Soviet attitudes toward Dimona, however, had changed considerably. Understanding that it had lost its opportunity to destroy the reactor, Moscow accepted Israel’s nuclear program as a \textit{fait accompli}. It was only in December 1968 that Moscow’s London Ambassador informed Lord Sieff that Moscow was concerned that Israel had refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), initialed by the superpowers on July 1, 1968.\footnote{Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 108-109.} Luckily, Israel had dodged a major bullet in a war which forever altered the nation’s foreign policy and nuclear program.

In January 1968 RAFI merged with Mapai and Achdut Ha’avodah to form the modern day Labor Party. Israel’s victory also dissolved the Committee for Denuclearization of the Middle East, which had been ominously quiet since Ben Gurion’s resignation. Sensing the political winds, Livneh formed a new action group, the Movement for Greater Israel, which advocated that Israel annex the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. On June 2 Dayan replaced Dinstein with former Chief of Staff Avi Zur, who was asked to head a new committee, known only to a few Cabinet ministers, responsible for overseeing Dimona. In 1968 Eshkol gave
Zur the freedom to make decisions on atomic organization, coordination and security. Cohen has intoned that in the aftermath of June 1967 Israel’s atomic policy was driven and determined quietly by bureaucratic “custodians” like Zur, Freier, and Dostrovsky.  

The NPT was signed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Washington on July 1, 1968, without Israel. Following a slew of articles downplaying the chance of an Israeli bomb, Eshkol died of a heart attack on February 25, 1969, with Meir becoming Prime Minister on March 17. She refused to commit Israel to the NPT. Even after reports in early May speculating that Israel possessed five to six nuclear bombs, the Jewish state faced no U.S. pressure to sign the NPT.

On September 26, 1969, Meir met with Nixon and upon leaving the U.S. on October 2, stated that she was not returning with a “bag full” of gifts, but only that bilateral relations were predicated upon silence and “sensitivity.” Before studying the cementing September 1969 atomic agreement between the U.S and Israel, one must first examine policy formulated and enacted on this subject under Nixon and Meir’s two respective predecessors.

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557 Less than a week after the Six Day War ended, on June 14, the NYT reproduced a Canadian Press story entitled, “Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb.” Three days later Newsweek stipulated that Israel was “one year” away from a “nuclear deterrent.” Cohen has speculated that both of these stories were deliberately leaked by Eshkol himself. “Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb,” NYT, June 14, 1967, p. 16; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 279, 291, 415n9, 416n11.


561 In response to the stories, a nameless Foreign Ministry Official announced that Israel was “not an atomic power” and would “not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.” “Montreal Paper Asserts Israel Has Atomic Bombs,” NYT, May 8, 1969, p. 15; “Israel Denies a Report She Has 5 or 6 A-Bombs,” NYT, May 9, 1969, p. 9; “German Magazine Says Israelis Have A Bomb,” WP, May 9, 1969, p. A24.

Chapter Four: The Bureaucracy’s Record and JFK’s Rhetoric

Before becoming President, JFK was severely handled by the Jewish lobby. JFK later told journalist Charlie Bartlett that during the campaign he had attended a New York party where some influential Jews had “offered” money in return for letting them run his “Middle Eastern policy...for the next four years.” This meeting transpired sometime in early August 1960 when JFK was summoned to Feinberg’s Hotel Pierre apartment. Dewey Stone, key in helping JFK win his 1952 Senate seat, cultivated domestic questions, while B’nai B’rith President Philip Klutznick prepared foreign policy inquiries. Shoenbaum has argued that over for 90 minutes JFK experienced “heavy grilling” from the nation’s 30 most powerful Jews. They must have been the right ones for JFK was presented with a check for $500,000. On August 27 JFK announced before a Zionists of America delegation that the Democratic Party owed a “special obligation” to Israel even though that U.S. “friendship” was “not a partisan matter.”

All of this pandering was crucial in helping JFK carry New York by 384,000 votes, including an 800,000 advantage in Jewish precincts. His 9,000 vote margin of victory in Illinois was helped by a Jewish majority of 55,000 votes. As the “chief aim” of any first-term

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564 Kenen, who attended as AIPAC head, has argued that the meeting took place on August 4, while political scientist Steven Spiegel has speculated that it occurred four days later. Shoenbaum has argued that this meeting was organized by JFK’s top advisors, including Myer Feldman, a beltway lawyer before working for the Senate Banking Committee during the mid 1950s. In 1957 he joined Senator Kennedy’s staff as an aide for legislative affairs and during the 1960 campaign he operated the “Nixonpedia.” When JFK asked Feldman to serve as his de-facto Israeli liaison as Deputy Special Counsel, he honestly replied that he would give “biased advice.” Unflinchingly, JFK responded: “That’s exactly what I want you to do.” Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 57-58; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 101, Richard E. Mooney, “Kennedy Names Bell of Harvard as Budget Chief,” NYT, December 3, 1960, p. 1; Shoenbaum, The U.S. and the State of Israel, pp. 133-134; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, p. 55; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 96.
565 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 96; Kenen’s, Israel’s Defense Line, p. 155.
568 Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 53-55.
President is to obtain a second one,"569 Spiegel has averred that JFK’s thin electoral victory made him, whom historian Warren Bass has described as a “deeply political animal,” even “more dependent” on the Jewish lobby than his two predecessors.570 President JFK never threatened Israel with an ultimatum to abandon its weapons program even though he knew what Dimona’s true purpose was dedicated to. On January 19, 1961, Herter told JFK point blank that “Israel and India” could soon possess the bomb.571 The early involvement of an ex-Eisenhower hand demonstrated that U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona would not change in the new White House.

During a 45-minute meeting on January 31, Ogden Reid told JFK that the U.S. could “accept” that Dimona was “peaceful” and informed that any inspection of the reactor should be conducted in “secret.” Reid concluded that “few people in Israel” were privy to Dimona’s “true character.”572 At a time when the U.S. did not even have an Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Reid’s reluctance to reveal anything substantive to JFK carried over into an Eisenhower Library interview in which he vaguely revealed that he “had a long talk” with JFK on a “number of issues.”573 On February 3 G. Lewis Jones was told by Harman that as “soon as the publicity died down” Israel would “invite” a U.S. scientist to Dimona. 574 On February 11 Harman informed

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569 De Tocqueville warned that the re-election of the President, a “natural evil,” is a key factor in the “corruption and cabal” which permeates the U.S. system and questioned whether the Constitutional Convention made an error in “allowing the re-election” clause to enter the final document. De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 152-154.

570 Phillip Talbot, a former head of the Near East Division during the 1960s, was once told by JFK that the “trouble” with him was that he never had to get himself “elected to anything.” Oral History with Phillips Talbot conducted by Dennis J. O’Brien on December 5, 1964, For the Kennedy Oral History Interview Project, p. 5, JFKL; Bass, *Support Any Friend*, p. 94.

571 Reeves, *President Kennedy*, pp. 32-33.


573 Reid’s taciturn behavior with JFK could be attributed to a personal feud between him and JFK stemming back to Reid’s Senate confirmation. Kenen has argued that Fulbright had identified Reid as a “political appointee” and pledged to vote against his nomination as Foreign Relations Chairman. After some AIPAC lobbying, however, he was convinced to vote for Reid but Kennedy, also a Committee member, still voted against him. Oral interview of June 14, 1967, with Reid, conducted by John Luter, DDEL, pp. 12-13; Kenen, *Israel’s Defense Line*, pp. 141-142.

574 Jones admitted that he was “tipping” Israel “off,” while the report noted that this “off the record” conversation would not serve as a precedent for “future” U.S. policy. On the same day the State Department’s Executive Secretariat, Walter Stoessel, Jr., informed Goodpaster, who had been designated to work in the early months of the new administration to ensure a smooth transition, that Ben Gurion’s domestic problems represented one reason not
Jones that if Ben Gurion remained in power, one of his “first pieces of business” would be for the U.S. to “visit” the reactor. Based on a March 3 report approved by Farley, Rusk informed JFK on February 28 that Farley would choose the U.S. team once obtaining “the green light from Tel Aviv.” While JFK was busy placing a new Ambassador in Tel Aviv in early March, Dimona went away for the rest of the month.

On March 7 JFK announced that Walworth Barbour would replace Reid. Even though Fulbright decried the policy of consistently changing Ambassadors as “idiotic,” the Senate approved Barbour on May 11. On June 12 he presented his credentials in Tel Aviv, beginning a 12-year tenure transcending three Presidents. According to Hersh, Barbour transformed the Embassy into “a subsidiary” of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, proving that while Ambassadors may be on Foggy Bottom’s pay roll, they often owe their self-preservation to the President.


578 According to Hersh, only three Ambassadors in the State Department’s history have ever served longer in any one post: George Marsh (Italy, 1861-1882), Edwin Morgan (Brazil, 1912-1933) and Claude Bowers (Chile, 1939-1953). Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 159-160; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Hawks for Israel,” May 8, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xvii/17704.htm (document 43).

579 William Dale, who arrived in Tel Aviv 1964 as a Deputy Chief Mission Chief, was once told by Barbour that his job to “keep the Jews off the President’s back and to not listen to the “pipsqueaks” at Foggy Bottom, where Israel
Despite his self-aggrandizing approach, Barbour was well respected. In 1973 the NSC’s Robert Komer, a member of the CIA’s ONE during the 1950s, labeled him as “four star,” while Eban described him as “brilliantly incisive.” In 1975 Sulzberger pegged him as the “best” Ambassador the U.S. had ever had in Tel Aviv. During his tenure Barbour smartly did not draw much media attention to his actions. The decision to nominate a Republican demonstrated JFK’s desire for U.S.-Israeli relations to remain sacrosanct. A week after the nomination announcement, the Export-Import Bank provided Israel with a $25 million loan.

On April 6 the CIA speciously contended that France had “decided in 1959” to limit its assistance to “peaceful applications” to the 40 MW reactor at Dimona. The heavily excised report warned that Israel sought “uranium” from a blanked out nation, while “awaiting a shipment of Argentine uranium.” Four days later Harman communicated to Farley and Jones that the U.S. could “visit” Dimona during the week of May 15. Farley, who penned the memo,

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581 Following Barbour’s nomination, his name appears four times in the NYT and WP indexes during JFK’s presidency. During the Johnson administration he was mentioned 13 times in the NYT but only once in 1965 and 1966. The WP covered him four times but just twice before the Six Day War. During Nixon’s first five years in office he appeared 42 times in both papers. Hersh has divulged that Barbour “never spoke on the record” and was considered a “non-person” to Israeli journalists. These numbers can be tabulated by entering “Walworth Barbour” into the University of Ottawa Pro-Quest search for the relevant papers in the March 1961 to February 1973 timeline; C.L. Sulzberger, “The Price of Palestine Peace,” NYT, April 16, 1975, p. 38; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 159.


583 All of the sources for the report were also blacked out, a probable reference to U-2 intelligence and Angleton.

584 In his 1981 JFK Library interview, Barbour contended that it was “probably true” that Israel “zeroed in on France, South Africa, and Argentina” from 1961 to 1963 to obtain uranium for Dimona. Although the record is unclear, there is sufficient evidence that Israel received 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium from Argentina, a member of the IAEA Committee in charge of overseeing and implementing the agency’s inspection procedures, sometime during Kennedy’s final year in power. Over a year after Canada had informed Britain that Israel had purchased the uranium, on May 10, 1965, the Bureau Intelligence and Research (INR) informed Rusk that the uranium oxide provided to Israel “would last about twenty years.” History Interview with Ambassador Walworth Barbour by Sheldon M. Stern, May 22, 1981, for the Kennedy Library Oral History Project, p.2 JFKL; CIA Franco-
would “directly” inform Harman about the composition of the U.S. team. A week later and two days before the CIA’s bungled Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Feldman, Feinberg, and JFK discussed a future Presidential sit-down with Ben Gurion. A week later Feldman informed Rusk that the date was set for May 30. Four days later Foggy Bottom informed Tel Aviv that the AEC’s Ulysses Staebler and Jesse Croach would tour Dimona ten days before Ben Gurion and JFK met. On May 5 Farley implored the AEC to “handle the visit quietly” and not network with the U.S. Embassy during their stay in Israel.

Foreshadowing future trips, the first U.S. visit to Dimona on Saturday, May 20, was a conspicuous one. The U.S. team arrived on the Sabbath at 11:00 a.m. to find that the only personnel on site were “specifically involved” in the tour, including Mannes Pratt. Prevented from taking notes and pictures, the U.S. team was told by Pratt the lie that Dimona’s “ground...
"breaking" began in 1959. Five days later Staebler and Croach met with unknown State officials to discuss their findings. This talk was streamlined to historian and Special Assistant to the President on National Security, McGeorge Bundy, on May 26 by Lucius Battle, who professed that the U.S. team had found “no present evidence” of weapons. More importantly a “second visit” would be unnecessary for another year.

In his first Dimona-focused story in six months, Finney argued that if the “nuclear powers” did not agree to an atomic testing moratorium, it could force China, Israel and Sweden to produce their own bomb on May 21. Four days later Rusk informed JFK that if the Arabs decided that Dimona was “contrary to the interests of peace,” they could “appeal” to Moscow. The next day Feldman suggested to JFK that the U.S. require “similar visits at frequent intervals” in the future and “oppose” Israel’s proclivity for secrecy. The U.S., however, was unwilling to provide any example of transparency and DCI Dulles’ two-page May 27 letter to JFK about Dimona remains classified. The day before he met Ben Gurion, Bundy informed JFK that Israel had controlled U.S. policy about Dimona ever since the latter had agreed “not to announce” the

589 The GWNSA has pointed out that Staebler and Croach wrote two reports, one of which has since been lost. “Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. Pratt and Staff,” May 20, 1961, GWNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/first/13-01.htm.
590 Battle, a Special Assistant to Rusk and Stoessel, repeated the Farley-inspired lie that Dimona’s “ground breaking” began in 1959, while speciously adding that the facility’s cost was only $35 million. Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, May 26, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfxvii/17705.htm (document 45); Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government, p. 21.
591 On the same day the NYT revealed that Ben Gurion would privately meet with JFK in New York at month’s end. A week later the paper described Ben Gurion as a “remarkable leader of a remarkable nation.” Following its coverage from December 19, 1961, to January 11, 1961, the U.S. media never again devoted much attention towards Dimona. The press was more consumed with Adolf Eichmann, a former Nazi SS officer, kidnapped by Israel in Argentina on May 11, 1960. If one enters Eichmann’s name into the Pro Quest search engine, using the time period from his capture to his May 31, 1962, execution as the search scope, one will find 140 WP and 347 NYT articles with either “Eichmann” or “Nazi” in the byline. Over a two-year period this adds up to roughly 20 stories monthly. Finney, “Nuclear Test Debate Points Up the U.S. Dilemma,” NYT, May 21, 1961, p. E5; “Ben-Gurion is due to meet Kennedy,” NYT, May 21, 1961, p. 23; “Premier Ben Gurion’s Visit,” NYT, May 28, 1961, p. E8.
592 Memorandum for the President from Rusk, May 25, 1961, President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel Security (Ben-Gurion Visit), Box 119A, JFKL.
visit without the former’s “approval.” JFK’s objectives were to prod Israel to “release” the U.S. from this “commitment,” not to publicize its recent visit to Dimona and to gain Israeli permission to “inform Arab leaders…” about the results of the visit.  

According to Bar-Zohar, the Prime Minister was unnecessarily “tense” before his 4:45 pm meeting in Room 28A of the Waldorf. These fears must have been initially heightened when JFK immediately “plunged into” Dimona, announcing that he “was glad” the U.S. was able to “visit” the reactor. Alluding to the Arabs and the Soviets, JFK admitted more transparency was needed to convince other “nations…disturbed” that Dimona was not “peaceful…” were incorrect. Ben Gurion responded that Dimona was designed for desalinization purposes but added it “might” produce plutonium in “three or four years.” JFK’s inquiry that the U.S. could pass on the visit’s “findings” to the Arabs was met with “no objections.” Speaking in the first person to highlight the importance of their bilateral relationship, JFK added that it was in “our common interest that no country” conclude that Israel was developing the bomb.  

Unsurprisingly, Ben Gurion received a free pass at the Waldorf. Shalom has averred

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595 Feinberg informed Hersh that there “was no way” that Ben Gurion viewed Kennedy “as an equal” because he disrespected the younger generation. Harman, Talbot, Feldman, who took notes for the U.S. side, and Harman also attended the meeting. U.S. and Israeli flags also flew from the Park Avenue Hotel. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Conversation between Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion,” May 30, 1961, Ibid: (document 57); Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, p. 192; Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion, p. 273; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 111.


597 The scholarship has clumsily perceived the Waldorf meeting as the last significant Dimona related event of 1961 in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It is only in the aftermath the Cuban Missile Crisis, which Shalom has argued gave JFK the “prestige” to “intensively” confront Dimona, does the scholarship pick-up its examination. He added that one reason why JFK refused to pursue a “hard-line policy on Dimona” was because the White House viewed Israel’s political system on the “verge of collapse.” Ben Zvi has contended that it was only in the spring of 1963 the White House’s “low-key and unobtrusive” position toward Dimona was replaced by an “assertive and forceful” policy. According to Bass, in March 1963 JFK began to issue “icy warnings” towards Israel over Dimona. Cohen has argued that following the meeting an “ambiguous” accord was formulated which pushed Dimona to the back-burner for “almost” the next “two years.” In a chapter title, he has averred that in the spring of 1963 the U.S. and Israeli “battle over Dimona” began. Zaki Shalom, “Kennedy, Ben Gurion and the Dimona Project,” Israel Studies 1, 1 (Spring 1996), p. 3; Ben-Zvi, Decade and Transition, pp. 123-124; Bass, Support Any Friend, p. 189; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 111, 115.
that Ben Gurion's decision to “put all the cards on the table” derived from Ben Gurion’s talks with the British and Diefenbaker. JFK was calm throughout the meeting, refusing to ask about Israel’s future nuclear plans or to inquire why Ben Gurion’s tone had changed from his December Knesset address. During the 90-minute meeting, Dimona was discussed for at best 15 minutes as Ben Gurion also asked for the Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) anti-aircraft missile, with JFK responding that the U.S. was “reluctant” to provide the missile at this time.

While alone with Ben Gurion, JFK’s final words encapsulated the entire meeting and future U.S. policy on Dimona: “I know I was elected by the Jews of New York.” After the talk the Ben Gurion told his advisors that JFK appeared to be “…a politician.”

On June 1 Bowles informed London, Paris, Ottawa, the UN, and eight Arab capitals that Ben Gurion had ensured JFK that Dimona was “devoted solely to peaceful purposes.” The next day Talbot personally relayed this same trope to ten Arab Ambassadors in Washington. In a telegraph also sent to Farley in Vienna, Rusk informed Cairo on June 15 that the U.S. had recently visited Dimona and “found no evidence of weapons production…” Some were unwilling to buy the U.S. lies and for good reason. On June 23 Ottawa’s Embassy in Beirut reported that Foggy Bottom had informed its Arab-based Embassies to only “verbally” assure

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598 Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 26, 31.
600 In an interview with the JFK Library three years later, Ben Guiron reemphasized that JFK’s statements were “in keeping to American politics” as usual. Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion, pp. 273-274; Oral History Interview with David Ben Gurion conducted by E.A. Bayne, July 16, 1965, JFKL.
601 Outgoing Circular Telegram from the Department of State (Bowles), June 1, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118, JFKL.
603 Telegram from Rusk to the Embassy in the UAR, June 15, 1961, Ibid: (document 65).
their governments that Dimona was peaceful. On June 23 the U.S. Embassy in Beirut reported
that if Nasser became confident that Israel was “developing the bomb” he could try to “destroy”
Dimona. 604 Aside from a half-hearted U.S. effort to arrange a visit to Dimona by a neutral
scientist, for the rest of June and July Dimona disappeared from the primary documentation. 605

The subject was tacitly covered in the media following Israel’s Shavit II launch. The NYT
reported on July 6 that in addition to its “research” in missile technology Israel was also
“producing a nuclear reactor in the Negev.” 606 Further proof that Lebanon followed Dimona more
closely than any other Arab nation during the 1960s, the next day the WP reprinted a Beirut story
professing that Israel “might” soon equip its missiles with a “nuclear warhead.” 607 Without any
mention of Dimona in either piece, the month ended with two Sulzberger pieces focused on
Israel’s military situation. 608 The media’s disinterest in Dimona suited the Pentagon just fine.

On August 8 a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report focused on the “strategic” effects of an
Israeli nuclear capability to the Secretary of Defense. 609 The memorandum revealed that the
Pentagon, much as the CIA had done in the Eisenhower era, intended to sideline Foggy Bottom’s
ability to set Dimona policy during JFK’s White House. 610 JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer

604 Incoming Telegraph from McClintock to Rusk, June 23, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118,
JFKL; Secret Eyes Memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in Beirut to Embassies in Baghdad, Cairo and Tel
605 On June 30 Talbot informed France that the U.S. was interested in having a “neutral” official visit Dimona on
terms “palatable” to the Israelis. Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related
Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30,
LB&L; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Tel Aviv, June 22, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (6/61), Box 118,
JFKL.
607 Incredibly, four days later the NYT reported that the U.S. rewarded Israel for its missile launch, by giving it,
along with Argentina, $80,000 worth of civilian related atomic equipment. “Israel Rocket is ‘Lesson’ to Arab
608 C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Israel’s New Missile Diplomacy,” NYT, July 29, 1961, p. 18; C.L. Sulzberger,
609 Paper Prepared by the Joint Chief of Staff, JSCM-523-61, undated, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVII:
610 Further proof of Foggy Bottom’s marginalization can be found in an examination of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Committee of Principles. Beginning with the former, the ACDA was created
on September 26, 1961, when JFK signed House Resolution 9118 and announced that William Foster, a Republican
recommended the memo only “be sent to…State for comment” and six days later Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric requested Rusk to peruse the report’s “non-military points.” The heavily excised report, the first IC study focused on Dimona since the still classified SNIE 100-8-60 of December 9, 1960, emphasized that Israel would use the bomb to increasingly defer “concessions” to the Arabs. To prevent this from occurring, the U.S. needed to pursue all “official, quasi-official and private” means to prevent Israel from joining the atomic club.

In a letter cleared by Farley, on August 30 Rusk informed Gilpatric that the U.S was “satisfied” with its May 20 visit to Dimona. Even though Rusk concluded that the U.S would

consultant to John McCloy, would serve as Director. Farley was appointed as Deputy Director, a position he held until 1973 and in 1963 scientist Herbert Scoville, former head the CIA’s Research Division from 1955 to 1963, became Assistant Director. On January 2, 1961, political scientist Richard Neustadt wrote that JFK had a “superficial preference” for locating any arms control agency in the Executive Office “rather than in the Department of State.” McCloy, who was appointed as JFK’s Disarmament advisor in January 1961, confusingly argued that “the organization should be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, although distinct from” Foggy Bottom. Understanding the composition of the Committee of Principles, an executive inter-agency Cabinet level group created in the summer of 1958 to examine U.S. diplomatic positions at Geneva towards a test-ban treaty, is also crucial in understanding how Rusk was obfuscated from any policy making responsibility. Rusk was Foggy Bottom’s only members, alongside McNamara, Gilpatric, Leminizter, Dulles, Kom Leminizter, Bundy, McCloy, Foster, Adrian Fisher, a Deputy to McCloy, AEC Commissioner Glenn Seaborg, Arthur Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation for Nuclear Test Ban Talks, and Spurgeon Keeny, Office of Science and Technology. Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6007.htm (document 74); Minutes of Meeting, August 17, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995) Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume II: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/vii/50951.htm (document 56); “Remarks in New York City Upon Signing Bill Establishing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” September 26, 1961, APP, PPUS, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/; “Nixon Accepts with Praise Resignation of 2 Officials,” NYT, June 30, 1973, p. 40; Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 112. Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 235.

611 A graduate of Yale Law School, Gilpatric was named Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in April 1951. There he worked under General Hoyt Vandenburg who was integral in helping convince President Harry Truman to create the National Security Act and the CIA. Upon his nomination as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 1960, the NYT placed him in the trans-partisan category of “pragmatic” men who belonged neither to “left or right.” Alongside leading a major reorganization of the National Security Agency, Gilpatric was integral in creating the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in August 1961 and placing the National Reconnaissance Office under the Pentagon’s authority in March 1963. After Robert Kennedy, he was the highest ranking member of Operation Mongoose, the CIA’s covert war against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and convinced JFK to employ a naval blockade rather during the Cuban Missle Crisis as a member of the NSC’s Ex-Comm. Prados, Safe for Democracy, p. 34; Eric Pace, “Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric, Lawyer and Kennedy Aide, Dies at 89,” NYT, March 17, 1996, p. 41; “Roswell Gilpatric to Succeed Stuart in the Air Force Post,” WP, April 29, 1951, p. M1; Joseph Alsop, “Matter of Fact…,” NYT, December 28, 1960, p. A15; Letter from Gilpatric to Kennedy, August 21, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6008.htm (document 89); Editorial Note, Ibid: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6009.htm (document 109); Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missle Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 208.

pay “close attention” to the situation, Dimona disappeared until Battle revealed on September 15 that the U.S had “accepted at face value” that Dimona was peaceful. Contradicting this analysis, the CIA concluded on September 21 and October 5 that Israel could not produce “a weapon before 1966-1967,” a dangerous outcome which could push the Arabs towards “forceful action.”

In a heavily excised memo also cleared by Farley, a fortnight later the NEA’s Armin Meyer emphasized to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson the Farley-created lie that the U.S. had only uncovered Dimona in 1960. On November 22 Talbot advised Rusk that future U.S. policy should continue to “assure ourselves and others” about Dimona’s peaceful purposes.

The best way to for the U.S. accomplish this goal was avoidance. Talbot’s memo represents the last time Dimona can be found in the pertinent FRUS volume for the next four months. Ongoing UN negotiations to reduce nuclear proliferation and a lukewarm U.S. overture to Egypt explained Dimona’s disappearance. On December 4, 1961, UNGA Resolution 1665


615 This memo represents the last time Farley’s name can be found regarding U.S. policy vis-à-vis Dimona. According to the FRUS documentation, he stepped down as the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space in March 1962. He had served in this position since March 1958, roughly the same time when the U-2 began overflying Dimona. Eight days after penning this memo Meyer was nominated as Ambassador to Lebanon, after Robert McClintock, who had pushed in a March 1 memo sent to all major Near East capitals, Paris, London and Washington that IAEA “inspectors” should “check out the Beersheba reactor,” resigned on September 22. List of Names,” FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VI: http://www.state.gov/about _state/history/volume_vi/persons.html; Memorandum from Beirut to Rusk, March 1, 1961, NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/61-5/61), JFKL; “Lebanon Post Filled,” NYT, October 28, 1961, p. 87; Memorandum from Armin Meyer to Johnson, October 19, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfk/xvii/17708.htm (document 132).

616 Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, November 22, 1961, Ibid (document 143).
called on all nuclear powers to cease from "transmitting the information necessary" to build the bomb to non-nuclear states. In an idea which never was implemented, four days later Komer proposed a "rapprochement" with Nasser without antagonizing "Israel and its supporters...." Nonetheless, Dimona is still present within the JFK and LBJ Libraries. Foggy Bottom may have had more pressing priorities than Dimona but not the CIA.

In a heavily excised letter to Bundy, on January 5 Amory repeated the falsehood that Dimona's "ground breaking" had begun in "late 1959." Thirteen days later he asked Bundy to "prod" Foggy Bottom for another U.S. visit to Dimona. Dimona re-emerged within FRUS on March 29, 1962. In a defeatist tone, Foggy Bottom's William Crawford mused to the British Embassy in Washington that an IAEA inspection of Dimona was unfeasible, but revealed that the U.S. was considering "another secret visit ...." Dimona then disappeared again until Peres visited Washington from May 21-23.

According to Bill Bundy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Peres' trip was an "unofficial one," a key reason why it went unreported.

617 On January 10, 1962, Rusk suggested to JFK that Nasser visit the U.S. in April, an idea seconded by Bowles after meeting with Nasser in mid-February. After talking with Feldman, however, Komer informed Bundy that any visit would needlessly rile up "sensitive...Jewish feelings" in an election year. Irish Resolution 1665 (XVI): Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, Problem 3: Non Proliferation Agreements, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MLF, Box, LBJL. Memorandum from Komor to Bundy, December 8, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedygf/exvii/17710.htm (document 149); Memorandum from Rusk to JFK, January 10, 1962, Ibid (document 159); Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia (Bowles) to JFK and Rusk, February 21, 1962, NSF, UAR, Security 1962, Box 127, JFKL. Memorandum from Rusk to JFK, January 10, 1962, Ibid (document 159); Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia (Bowles) to JFK and Rusk, February 21, 1962, NSF, UAR, Security 1962, Box 127, JFKL; McGeorge Bundy/Carl Kaysen, February 13, 1962, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 2/62, Box 322, JFKL.

618 Seven days earlier Rusk had informed JFK that the U.S. was "pushing ahead on plans for" another "inspection" of Dimona. Rusk's inquiry was prodded by a February 2 story in London's Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, entitled "An Independent Deterrent for Israel." Memorandum from the Department of State to the British Embassy, "Subject: Israel's Nuclear Reactor," March 29, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedygf/xvii/17714.htm (document 227); Memorandum for the President, March 22, 1962, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 3/63-5/68, Box 322, JFKL.
in the media. On May 21 Bill’s younger brother had “asked” Peres about “nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” Peres responded to McGeorge that warned “if there were signs that others might move in this direction,” then Israel would have to reconsider “her own position.” This exchange represents the only time Dimona was discussed during Peres’ visit. In a meeting with McGeorge, Gilpatric and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Paul Nitze, Peres also contended that Israel needed the HAWK to provide a “convincing deterrent” to against an Egyptian “and/or” Syrian attack.

On June 22, the same day that the July 1955 U.S.-Israeli atomic agreement was extended by two years, Talbot informed Harman that the U.S. desired “another unpublicized visit” to Dimona. Since, however, the request was delivered by Talbot rather than Barbour or Rusk, its seriousness must be questioned. JFK was unwilling to pressure Israel on Dimona like had had done in early 1961. With Congressional elections five months away, JFK made no reference to Dimona in his June 13 letter to Ben Gurion. In July and early August the White House and media briefly touched upon Dimona while the U.S. was moving towards selling Israel the Hawk. On July 4 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara produced a report indicating that China would


be the next nation to acquire the bomb, with Israel pegged as the next most likely candidate. On July 9 Talbot made no mention of Dimona when he told Rusk that the HAWK would “reduce” Israel’s “vulnerability to air attack,” a point repeated a week later by Bill Bundy to James Grant. On July 29, a day after Al Ahram had argued that Egypt “would never allow” Israeli “atomic supremacy,” Dimona was absent from an inter-agency disarmament meeting attended by JFK. During the sit-down Nitze suggested that only China, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Australia and South Africa could develop the bomb in the next decade. Leaking that Israel desired the Hawk, on August 6 Sulzberger professed that even though neither Egypt nor Israel possessed an “atomic device.” The CIA asset assured the public that the U.S. was busy containing “excitable elements” in this field. This “quiet diplomacy” was predicated upon deception and disinformation.

A day after telling JFK that the HAWK should be sold to Israel, Rusk sophistically informed the Soviet Ambassador on August 8 that Egypt was “giving high priority to nuclear physics.” The seasoned Dobrynin, however, “objected” that Egypt would not be a “problem, unless perhaps Israel obtained nuclear weapons.” This rebuttal forced Rusk to quickly change the subject. On August 12 the NYT’s military editor, Hanson Baldwin, pointed out that Israel was

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629 Sulzberger’s piece was written five days after the *NYT* had reported that Dimona’s costs were kept hidden from the Knesset. C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs; German Brains and Arab Arms,” *NYT*, August 6, 1962, p. 24; “Israel Official Says Costs of Reactor Are Withheld,” *NYT*, August 1, 1962, p. 3.
only “believed” to be pursuing the bomb. In JFK’s letter to Ben Gurion three days later there was no mention of Dimona, revealing that Feldman would soon be sent “without publicity” to Israel to reach an “understanding” on the Hawk and the Arab refugee problem. Under the cover story that he was visiting the Weizmann Institute, three days later Feldman flew to Paris before arriving in Israel on August 18.

On August 19, described by Bass as “the birth of the U.S.-Israel alliance,” Feldman met with Ben Gurion, Meir and Kolleck. No written record of this discussion is available, but secondary sources have divulged what transpired during the three-hour meeting. In his JFK library interview, Feldman recollected that his hosts were left “ecstatic” after he told them that they would receive the HAWK. Ben Zvi, Bass and Shoenbaum have all contended that Feldman then expressed that Israel would participate in “good faith” in the Johnson Plan, even though it never did.

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632 In August 1961 JFK persuaded Joseph Johnson, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to head the Palestine Conciliation Commission. In early August 1962 Johnson submitted his plan to a skeptical JFK, proposing that Israel take back 100 000-150 000 refugees if the Arabs agreed to resettle the remaining numbers. Ben Zvi has contended JFK did not “seek to make the Hawk deal contingent upon” Israel’s acceptance of the plan. Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, pp. 112-113; Letter from JFK to Ben Gurion, August 15, 1962, FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26158.htm (document 21).

633 This façade worked perfectly. After Feldman ended his visit, Rusk informed U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Kuwait City, Baghdad and Amman that if they were queried on the purpose of the trip they were to reply that Feldman was sent to “discuss trade affairs” with the French and then traveled on his own discretion to Israel. On August 21, after a final six hour meeting with Meir, Feldman told some Jerusalem reporters that he did “not believe” they knew why he was “here.” This comment was reprinted the next day in Ma’ariv, while the NYT and WP both reprinted a Reuters’ story arguing that Feldman had assured Israel that there would be “no sacrifice of its interests.” Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 169, 171; Outgoing Circular Telegram from Rusk, August 22, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/21/62-8/31/62), Box 118, JFKL; “Ben Gurion Confers with Kennedy Aide,” NYT, August 22, 1962, p. 12; “Talks on Policy Held in Tel Aviv;” WP, August 22, 1962, p. A7.


636 After meeting with some influential New York and Boston Jews, Feldman stressed to JFK that the “faster” the U.S. walked away from the Johnson plan “the better.” He complied. Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, p. 116; Bass,
Gurion desired “to exclude” any and all weapons from the region. But fearing that the Arabs would be agitated and hoping to conceal Feldman’s mission, the White House blocked the HAWK sale story from reaching the press until September 27.

Whether or not the U.S. tied the Hawk sale to regular visits to Dimona has produced a nuanced yet incomplete debate within the historiography. In an analysis regurgitated by Douglas Little, Bundy contended in 1988 that “in return” for the Hawk Israel agreed to “permit regular” U.S. visits to Dimona. Feldman reminisced in his Kennedy Library interview that JFK had intoned to him before his trip that in exchange for the Hawks the U.S. should be granted “the right to inspect the reactor at Dimona.” During the meeting this condition was accepted by Israel before Ben Gurion assured Feldman that the U.S. need not be “concerned” with Dimona. In an interview with Hersh, Feldman argued that it would be “too strong” to suggest that another U.S. visit to Dimona was a “quid pro quo” in return for the Hawks.” In an allegation raised by no one else in the historiography, Hersh also suggested that Feldman was given a tour of Dimona during his trip. Based on Feldman’s own statements, Shoenbaum has averred that Israel pledged “not to develop nuclear weapons” after receiving the missile, although this tie-in was “disingenuous.”

Unacknowledged by Shoenbaum, however, is the reality that Feldman’s memory on the sale has


637 Eyes only Memorandum from Feldman for President, Rusk and Grant, August 19, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/17/62-2/20/62), Box 119, JFKL.

638 On September 14 Komer informed Bundy that there should be “no public comment” on the HAWK for another two weeks. A day before the story broke in the NYT, WP, AP and BBC. Assuming its role as public relations manipulator, Under Secretary of State George Ball assured Kaysen that Foggy Bottom would employ some “guidance” in an attempt to soften the blow of the “Times” expose. The next day Max Frankel reported on the NYT’s front page that Israel would be the first nation “outside the Western bloc” to receive the Hawk, while adding that there were no “political conditions attached to the sale...” Eyes only Memorandum from Feldman for President, Rusk and Grant, August 19, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/17/62-2/20/62), Box 118, JFKL; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, September 14, 1962, FRUS 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xviii/26168.htm (document 44); Outgoing Circular Telegram from the Department of State, September 14, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/6/1962-9/21/62), Box 119, JFKL; Telecom Message from Kaysen to Ball, September 26, 1962, The Personal Papers of George W. Ball, Israel (4/28/62-5/18/63), Box 5, JFKL; Max Frankel, “U.S. Will Supply Israel Missiles in Policy Change,” NYT, September 27, 1962, p.1.
changed over time. In a June 1968 NYT story he contended because Israel “already” had a reactor it did not need to “stop” developing nuclear weapons in return for the missiles.639

Conversely, Cohen has argued there is “no basis” that JFK provided the missiles in exchange for “regular U.S. visits” but admitted that Komer had told him that there was “always really one track” in U.S.-Israeli relations concerning “security” and the “atom.” Questioning Hersh’s analysis and dismissing Feldman and Komer as unreliable “contemporaneous sources,” Bass likewise has argued that linkage could have been transpired orally “but it is not in the documents.” Ben-Zvi argued in Decade of Transition that the sale was conducted as part of JFK’s “determined effort” to force Israel to agree to a “system of periodic inspection” but flip flopped four years later in his JFK and Israel by stating that Bundy had “mistakenly” averred that there was any “explicit linkage.” In his footnotes, however, he conceded that that it was “interesting” that the second U.S. visit to Dimona on September 26, 1962, transpired “approximately one month” after the sale.640 Nonetheless, both scholarly camps have clumsily presupposed that the U.S. was in a greater position of leverage to impose conditions on Israel because it was a superpower. Israel was able to quietly achieve linkage to benefit its most important national security interest. Washington and the U.S. media naively assumed that the Hawk would be employed to protect IAF bases. Ironically, once Israel received the missile in April 1965 it was instead deployed to protect Dimona’s airspace.641


641 During the first day of the Six Day War the HAWK brought down a wounded Israeli Mirage fighter which had strayed over Dimona’s airspace after losing all communication capabilities. On February 21, 1973, a Libyan Boeing 727 with 113 passengers was shot down during daylight hours by the IAF after straying over Dimona. Warren Unna, “U.S. to Sell Israel Hawk Missiles to Meet Arab’s Threat,” WP, September 27, 1962; Letter from Bundy to Grant, July 16, 1962, FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedy/viii/25415.htm (document 3); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israel’s Security and Other Problems,” February 16, 1961, Ibid;
On September 14 Foggy Bottom informed Harman that two AEC scientists already scheduled to tour Nachal in two weeks could also visit Dimona. Even though little is known about the visit, on October 31 Rusk informed Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Norway, France and Britain that on September 26 Israel had taken, “without prior warning,” the two touring AEC scientists to Dimona. Given a 40-minute tour, they found no “evidence of weapons production.” According to two *LBJ* Library documents, however, the U.S. team later concluded that their visit was “not entirely satisfactory.” Following the Cuban Missile Crisis and Congressional elections, Dimona disappeared entirely from the paper flow.

In preparation for the President’s upcoming meeting with Meir, Dimona was also absent from a December 5 memorandum from Komer to JFK, which admitted that despite its “special” bond with Israel the U.S. had “gotten nothing” for providing Israel the Hawk. JFK’s and Meir’s 70 minute meeting at Harriman’s Palm Beach home represented the only time Dimona was raised at the Presidential level in 1962. JFK expressed that the U.S. possessed a “special

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*642* Four days before the Foggy Bottom request, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, Ray Cline, messaged to the Jewish Walt Rostow, Chairman of Foggy Bottom’s Policy Planning Staff, that an Israeli bomb would have a “profound effect on Egypt.”*Memorandum for Bundy, “Subject: Second Visit by U.S. Scientists,” September 21, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/6/62-9/21/62), Box 119, *JFKL*.


*644* On December 27, the same day JFK and Meir met, Thomas Haycock, the only identified member of the U.S. team to visit Dimona, admitted that he was unsure while at the reactor whether he was a “guest” or carrying out an “inspection” of Dimona. *Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965-March 1966, Box 30, *LBIL*; Background of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBIL*; Memorandum from Talbot to Rodger P. Davies, “Subject: Second Inspection of Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” December 27, 1962, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBIL*.

*645* *Memorandum for the President, December 5, 1962, NSF, Countries, Israel General (12/22/62), Box 119, JFKL.*
relationship with Israel ... comparable only to” its relationship with Britain before conceding that the Johnson Plan was “gone.” In an example of double speak, JFK ended by emphasizing that the U.S. was “opposed to nuclear proliferation” but conceded that his “interest” was not to intervene into “into Israel’s affairs…” Meir responded there would be no “difficulty” on this subject before quickly changing the subject back to the Arab refugees.646

Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a catalyst, in early 1963 JFK and Khrushchev began to place non-proliferation as the defining superpower issue. In an attempt to establish a PTBT, in January 1963 alone Soviet and U.S. diplomats met ten times in Washington and New York.647 In a non-election year, this increased cooperation with Moscow conveniently allowed JFK to employ a lukewarm pressure campaign against Dimona. Shalom has argued that by early 1963 the U.S. began to perceive Dimona as a “global threat” which “transcended” its bilateral relationship with Israel.648 Before confronting Israel, however, JFK required two months of inter-agency diplomacy to get the bureaucratic house in order.

At Foggy Bottom’s expense, this transformation in U.S. policy towards Dimona was orchestrated at the highest levels of the CIA, Pentagon and NSC. The CIA concluded on January 23 that the Arabs would not possess the bomb for “many years to come.” On February 12 the Pentagon estimated that Israel, after China, would be the next nation to obtain the bomb, possibly as early as 1965-1966.649 Days later Komer asked the AEC to plan another Dimona “inspection” and to formulate a new “scheme” focused on how many U.S. trips would be needed annually to

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646 In an outgoing January 4 telegram to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Cairo and London, Under Secretary of State George Ball directly quoted the exchange between Meir and JFK on Dimona. Outgoing Circular Telegram from Ball, January 4, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (1/4/63-1/14/63), Box 119, JFKL: Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Meir,” December 27, 1962, FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedvjf/xviii/26200.htm (document 121);


648 Shalom has argued that by early 1963 the U.S. began to perceive Dimona as a “global threat” which “transcended” its bilateral relationship with Israel. Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, p. 38.

assure the reactor remained peaceful. Aware that Israel could produce the bomb "without testing," Kent and the BNE warned on March 6 that a Jewish bomb would precipitate "disunity" in an Arab world known for its "highly emotional outbursts." The real concern was that in the Cold War's zero sum game an Israeli bomb could convince the Arabs that their collective survival was dependent on "Soviet power."651

A day after JFK announced to reporters that by the 1970s "fifteen" to "twenty-five" countries could possess the bomb, Komer informed the President that the U.S. was "pushing ahead" for another Dimona "inspection" on March 22.652 On March 24 Brubeck reported that the mysterious Robert Webber, the U.S. Embassy's new Science Attaché, had informed him that it was unlikely Israel would agree to semi-annual inspections.653 Two days later Bundy called on

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650 Memorandum for the Record by Komer, February 15, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 #1, Box 30, LBJL.
653 Considering his military background, close dealings with the CIA, and conspicuous absence in the primary documentation, there is strong evidence that Webber was sent to Tel Aviv to ensure Israel could secretly develop the bomb without threatening U.S. public declarations to the contrary. After earning his doctorate in Physics from Yale, Webber served from 1949 to 1957 at the Naval Laboratory's cryogenics facility in Washington. Over the next three years he was stationed in London as deputy scientific director of the Office of Naval Research. During his time in Tel Aviv, Webber worked closely with John Hadden, the CIA's Station Chief in the U.S. Embassy, even though Foggy Bottom strictly forbid its Scientific Attachés from taking part in intelligence gathering. Strangely, even though he served in Tel Aviv until sometime in 1966 Webber's name is absent from the indexes and personnel lists in the pertinent JFK and LBJ FRUS volumes. The decision to send Webber to Tel Aviv was not the only change in U.S. policy during 1963. Sometime in the summer the U.S. Consulate in Haifa was closed, thus increasing Barbour's ability to independently implement policy from 71 Hayakron Street. Hersh has also pointed out that during the year Hadden was also replaced by Peter Jessup. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to Fulbright, November 20, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: http://www.state.gov/it/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfxv/6006.htm (document 68); Background information, Principle U.S. Officials, NSF, Israel, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book (1/7-8/68), Box, 144, LBJL; State Department Memorandum by William H. Brubeck, Executive Secretary, "Subject: Israel's Atomic Energy Program," March 24, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL; "List of Persons," FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/it/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfl/xviii/26405.htm; "Index," Ibid: http://www.state.gov/it/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjfl/xviii/25838.htm; "Persons," FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/it/ww/about_state/history/vol_xviii/persons.html; "Index R-Z," Ibid: http://www.state.gov/it/ww/about_state/history/vol_xviii/index4.html; "U.S. Will Study Asian Research," NYT, October 3, 1960, p. 33; "Robert T. Webber, 56," WP, April 10, 1977, p. 108; Ronald Doel and Allan Needell, "Science, Scientists and the CIA," in Eternal Vigilance?, p. 69; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 164-166.
the NEA’s James Grant to organize a working group to study the feasibility of an Israeli-
Egyptian arms limitation accord by early May. On March 27 Rusk informed Barbour that the
U.S. desired semi-annual visits to Dimona could “perhaps” transpire in May and November.
Barbour delivered Ben Gurion the message on April 2. The Prime Minister did not “demur” but
rather suggested the subject be discussed at their next meeting.

From April 2-4 Peres was in Washington to finalize the HAWK sale with Gilpatric, Nitze
and U. Alexis Johnson. On April 2 he and Feldman were walking in the White House when
they bumped into JFK. When the President immediately asked about Dimona, always quick on
his feet, Peres gave the answer that Israel still uses today: “...we will not introduce nuclear
weapons to the region, and we will not be the first.” Peres informed Cohen in 1991 that he did
“not want to lie” to JFK but could not reply truthfully either, so he had presented an improvised
half-truth instead. Peres’ words could have originally derived from an influential U.S. source.
On April 4 Ball informed Barbour that Johnson had told Peres that the U.S. “deeply opposed” the
“introduction of nuclear weapons” into the region. Proof of Orwell’s mantra that political
language is based on “making lies sound truthful,” Peres’ words were quickly accepted and

654 Other task force members included Henry Byroade, a former Ambassador to Egypt (March 1955- September
1956), William Polk, a member of the Policy Planning Staff, the INR’s Robert Elwood, Robert Strong and Rodger
Davies of the NEA and Francois Dickman, who handled Egyptian-Syrian issues. When the working group submitted
its final report on May 14 there was also one group member’s name blacked out, a probable CIA asset. NSAM 231
by Bundy, March 26, 1963, Ibid: (document 199); Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, May 14, 1963, Ibid:
(document 247); Memorandum for Bundy, “Subject: Arms Limitation in the Arab-Israel Area- Background Report
for NSAM No. 231,” NSF, Countries, Israel General (3/4/63-4/23/63) Box 119, JFKL.
656 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 118; Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and
Related Events, undated, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966,
Box 30, LBJL.
657 Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Israel, April 4, 1963, FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII:
www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/f/vxviii/26203.htm (document 206);
Atomic Scientists, 52, 3 (May-June 1996), p. 16.
659 Telegram from the Department of State (Ball) to the Embassy in Israel, April 4, 1964, FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume
regurgitated by Foggy Bottom.\textsuperscript{660} On April 12 Rusk announced to all Near Eastern nations that the U.S. opposed the “introduction of weapons of mass destruction …into the area.”\textsuperscript{661}

On the same day JFK told reporters that the U.S. supported the “security of both Israel and her neighbors” by attempting to “limit” the “region’s arms race,” the CIA concluded on May 8 that if Israel developed the bomb then Nasser could “turn to the USSR…”\textsuperscript{662} After two more U.S. requests to Israel for semi-annual inspections of Dimona, Grant’s task force reported on May 14 that if the “secrecy” could be “preserved,” a Presidential emissary could be soon sent to Egypt and then Israel to demonstrate U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{663} The report also provided the impetus for JFK personally pressure Israel on Dimona. Two days before Moscow proposed a Near East atomic-free zone, on May 18 JFK warned Ben Gurion that his May 8 pledge to Israel’s “security” could be “seriously jeopardized” if the U.S. learned that Israel was pursuing the bomb. Such a development could force Cairo into Moscow’s arms. In a sign the U.S. was backtracking, however, JFK declared that the U.S. now required “periodic” rather than semi-annual Dimona inspections.\textsuperscript{664} Nine days later Ben Gurion replied that “annual visits” could occur after Dimona’s “start-up time,” sometime later in the year or in early 1964.\textsuperscript{665}

On June 10 JFK delivered the best speech of his presidency before the graduating class of American University. JFK circumvented the bureaucracy by confining the speech’s

\textsuperscript{660} Orwell, “The Politics of the English Language,” pp. 146-147, 154.


\textsuperscript{664} Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Israel signed by Kennedy, May 28, Ibid: (document 252).

\textsuperscript{665} Letter from Ben-Gurion to JFK, May 27, 1963, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, JFKL.
preparation team to a trusted group comprised of Ted Sorensen, Schlesinger, Walt Rostow, Bundy and especially Kaysen. Rusk, McNamara and the JCS were not informed of the address until two days prior.\footnote{On July 22 Strauss phoned his AEC successor to intone his “unhappiness with the prospect of a limited test ban treaty.” On the same day McCon revealed to Rusk, Ball, Bundy, McNamara and Gilpatric that Teller also shared this opinion. Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Telephone Conversation Mr. Kaysen on 8 June,” June 8, 1963, \textit{FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/vii/50955.htm} (document 290); Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Special Meeting at state Dept- 21 July- re Test Ban Agreement,” July 22, 1963, \textit{Ibid: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/vii/50956.htm} (document 337).} Calling on the U.S. to work with the U.S.S.R. to establish a “treaty to outlaw nuclear tests,” Kennedy humbly concluded: “We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”\footnote{“Commencement Address at American University in Washington,” June 10, 1963, \textit{APP, PPUS.}} The “best” Presidential address since FDR reinvigorated the IC’s commitment to semi-annual visits to Dimona.\footnote{Khrushchev made this remark to Harriman on July 27 while he was negotiating towards the test ban treaty in Moscow. \textit{Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the State Department, July 27, 1963, \textit{FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/vii/50957.htm} (document 354).}} Two days later Brubeck informed Bundy that if Dimona was dedicated to building a bomb, then it would need to “discharge” its fuel every six months. It was imperative for the U.S. to visit Dimona before the summer’s completion, again in June 1964 and then every six months thereafter.\footnote{Memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, “Subject: Reply to Ben Gurion on Dimona Visits,” June 12, 1963, \textit{FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyj/xviii/26211.htm} (document 267).}

On Saturday, June 15, Barbour received an “eyes only” letter signed by JFK to be delivered the next day. Reminding Israel that U.S.-Israeli ties could be “seriously jeopardized” if it pursued the bomb, JFK sought another “visit” to Dimona in the next couple months with full U.S. access to “all areas.” The next visit would transpire in June 1964 and then in intervals of every six months thereafter.\footnote{Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, President’s Office Files, Israel Security (1961-1963), Box 119A, \textit{JFKL.}} Amazingly, due to Barbour’s indolence, Ben Gurion never received the message. Instead of presenting the letter on Sunday, the portly Ambassador decided to play golf instead! When he returned to deliver the letter, Ben Gurion had already resigned. Upon learning of the news, Barbour phoned Foggy Bottom and successfully advocated that the
letter not be presented until a new Prime Minister was in place.  

On the same day Barbour personally informed Nasser that McCloy would soon be sent to Cairo, JFK met with Komar, Bundy, McCon, Talbot, Grant, Foster and McCloy to discuss the upcoming U.S. Near East arms control initiative on June 15.  
McCloy was originally set to first visit Cairo in late-June and then Israel in mid-July. In their two hour June 27 meeting Nasser “repeated” several times that Egypt had “no intent or desire” to develop the bomb.  
Since Egypt only had a 2 MW reactor, two days later Nasser admitted that there was “nothing” for anyone “to inspect.” Since McCloy was unwilling to probe the issue, Ambassador Badeau then inquired what Nasser’s “attitudes would be if he learned” that if Dimona was for military purposes. Nasser replied that Cairo would have no “choice” but to launch a “protective war.”  

U.S. actions towards Dimona in early July were conspicuously contradictory. Nine days after Eshkol’s rise to power, JFK wrote to the new Prime Minister on July 5 letter that all future U.S. “visits” to Dimona- one before the summer’s end, another in June 1964 and then every six months thereafter- should “nearly” match “international standards.” In these visits the U.S. should be given access to “all areas” of Dimona, with JFK stating how “vital” Dimona was to the

671 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 384n81.  
674 Shalom has argued that on July 7 and 9 the JP and Ha’aretz touched upon the “growing” U.S. pressure on Dimona. Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 62, 190n49.
future of the globe. JFK was unable or unwilling to pass this message to the bureaucracy. Six
days later Bundy informed AEC head Glenn Seaborg, a Nobel Prize winning chemist and former
Berkley Chancellor, that he supported leasing Israel four tons of heavy water. Even though the
material was “not” destined “for” Dimona, the AEC sale represented another show of taciturn
support for Israel. A day earlier Komer had even suggested to Bundy that the heavy water not be
provided until “Dimona was buttoned up.” In late October the NYT revealed that the heavy water
had been shipped to the Technion in Haifa for “peaceful purposes only.”

The U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv let his opinion know that he did not like this increased
White House pressure on Dimona. On July 15 Barbour reminded Rusk that the U.S.-Israeli
relationship on Dimona dealt with “sensitive” information. The less that was stated “publicly” on
the subject the better it would be for Israel, the U.S., and their anonymous “friends” which had
financed and built the reactor. Two days later, Eshkol responded to JFK’s July 5 letter,
claiming that he was still “acquainting” himself “with all the details of the Dimona project.” In
an oral message passed through Barbour, Eshkol reminded JFK that Israel would pursue its
“sovereign” interest, which in the “distant future” could mean a decision to “…to embark on a
nuclear weapons program.” Barbour’s and Eshkol’s responses to JFK’s July 5 letter
effectively neutered the White House’s aggressive policy on Dimona. On July 19 Komer
informed JFK that the NSC suggested “holding up” on sending McCloy to Israel because Nasser
“didn’t buy our scheme.” He emphasized that Israel would not “give any nuclear promises”

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676 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 4, 1963, Ibid (document 289).
677 Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 131.
678 One of the final messages that Ike passed onto JFK was that one bureaucracy he would find it impossible to “run”
was “the AEC.” Memorandum for the Chairman of the AEC, July 11, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (7/1/63-
7/25/63), Box 119A, JFKL; Memorandum to Bundy from Komer, July 10, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General
(7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, JFKL; “U.S. Aiding Israel in Atom Research,” NYT, October 27, 1963, p. 8; Wise and
679 Telegraph from Barbour to Rusk, July 15, 1963, NSF, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, JFKL.
680 Telegraph from Barbour to Rusk, July 17, 1963, NSF, Israel General (7/1/63-7/25/63), Box 119A, JFKL.
unless the U.S. "literally" forced Israel to "back down" or provided the Jewish state with a security guarantee. Four days later Rusk admitted to JFK, that after traveling to Cairo, McCloy had been told by Barbour in Athens that he should not travel to Israel "at this time" since he had achieved "limited results" with Nasser.\(^{681}\)

By this time even JFK was having second thoughts about sending McCloy to Israel. In a July 23 meeting with Komer, Bundy, Nitze, McCone, Talbot, Badeau, Ball and McCloy, JFK failed to inform McCloy or anyone else of his July 5 letter to Eshkol. Although over 28 lines of the meeting are excised, JFK ended any chance of a future McCloy mission to Israel by stating that it was "best not to take any special action with respect to Israel right now."\(^{682}\) Since DCI McCone had vaguely reiterated to him that Israel had not done "very much on nuclear activity recently," he believed it was best for the "dialogue" to continue to transpire only between Barbour and Eshkol. Concerned over Nasser's statement that he would launch a "protective" war if he became convinced that Dimona was "manufacturing" the bomb, JFK questioned why he had not "stated this publicly earlier." Badeau responded that past U.S. guarantees to Cairo that Dimona was peaceful had "helped" in this regard.\(^{683}\) At a time when Harriman was negotiating towards a test ban treaty in Moscow, JFK's decision to cancel McCloy's trip to Israel was a missed chance for the U.S. to show Israel that its opposed proliferation everywhere.

Banning all atomic testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, the PTBT was


\(^{682}\) Cohen has contended that Ben Gurion's resignation also contributed to JFK's decision to cancel McCloy's trip to Israel. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 155-156.

initiated by Harriman, Gromyko and Lord Hailsham on July 25. During the period between its initializing and signing 11 days later, the media examined which nations could try to refrain from signing the accord. On July 27 the NYT's Max Frankel, who worked closely with Finney under Reston, argued that "lawyers and diplomats" would have to work to convince possible "holdouts" like China, France, Israel and Egypt to join. A day later the NYT's fatuously stated that it was "believed" that "a special program" was posed by both the UAR's and Israel's nuclear programs. On July 29 a nameless NYT story relayed that Nasser pledged to sign the treaty, while re-emphasizing that both the "UAR and Israel" had accused each other of trying "to develop nuclear weapons." Three days later another anonymous NYT piece revealed that Israel's decision to sign the treaty was "speeded" by Egypt's decision to do so first.

Following July 23 the subject of Dimona disappeared in the U.S. primary documentation until August 5, the same day the PTBT was signed. Arguing that Eshkol had "nothing to lose" by signing the accord, Barbour informed Rusk that Israel viewed the agreement to be a "first step towards a significant East-West détente." On August 8 Barbour placed the regional arms race in a "global" context, avowing to Eban that U.S. worries about Dimona derived "directly" from concerns connected to the atomic programs of China and India. Eban replied that JFK should not


688 "Israel will accede to Nuclear Treaty," _NYT_, August 1, 1963, p. 2.

689 Airgram from Barbour to the Department of State, "Subject: Israel Decides with Deliberate Speed to Join Test Ban Agreement," August 5, 1963, NSF, Robert W. Komar, Israel Nuclear Program 1963, Box 427, _JFKL_.


“expect a quick reply.” There was no further U.S.-Israel dialogue on Dimona from August 8 until Eshkol replied to JFK on August 19.

During this time the U.S. learned from France and the U.K. that it would be difficult for the White House to exert influence on Dimona. On August 14 the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen, relayed to Rusk that Israel was seeking uranium from Gabon, a former French colony. On the same day Grant was informed by John Killick, a British Embassy Counselor in Washington, that he had received “disturbing signs” that Israel would soon possess a “crude” bomb. In order to prevent this from occurring, Grant maintained that it was vital for the U.S. to convince Israel that such a development could force the Arabs to turn to the Soviets on a “Cuban type pattern.” Pointing to JFK’s re-election campaign, Killick wisely responded that despite the U.S. tough talk there would be no real “change” in its “view.”

Reminding JFK of his own words to Meir, Eshkol assured JFK on August 19 that he was “fully conscious” of their “special intimacy...” on Dimona. Another U.S. team could visit the “peaceful” reactor “toward the end of 1963.” Avoiding any definitive answer to JFK’s request for U.S. visits “at intervals of six months,” Eshkol averred that the visit schedule could be determined in the “future.” After fibbing that Dimona’s uranium was “fully controlled by Paris,”

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691 Shalom has generalized that following the signing of the PTBT Israel’s nuclear weapons program entered a period of “low prolife” for the remainder of JFK’s presidency. Shalom, *Israel’s Nuclear Option*, pp. 58-68.
692 In May 1965 an INR report which indicated that Israel was attempting to obtain uranium from Gabon. In February 1966 David McKillop, the Director of Western European Affairs, was informed by France’s Ambassador in Washington, Charles Lucet, that due to its opposition to “the production of atomic weapons” Paris had “some time ago” ensured Libreville cease “supplying nuclear raw material to Israel.” Memorandum of Conversation by David H. McKillop, Director of Western European Affairs, “Subject: Israeli Atomic Program,” February 21, 1966, NSF, Files of Robert Komter, Israel, Nuclear Energy Program, 1964-1965- March 1966, Box 30, *LBJL*.
Memorandum to Rusk from the State Department’s INR (Thomas L. Hughes), May 10, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komter, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, *LBJL*; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program; Security Guarantee,” August 14, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/63-9/30/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.
693 Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program; Security Guarantee,” August 14, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (9/63-9/30/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*; Outgoing Eyes only Telegram from Washington (Ball) to Paris, August 20, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (8/20/63/-8/22/63), Box 119A, *JFKL*.
he expressed his “deep satisfaction” in the PTBT signing. On the same day that Eshkol’s letter was sent, Barbour was informed by Director General of the Foreign Ministry Arieh Lavavi that that it was best for Nasser kept uninformed about Dimona to deter against any future “Egyptian adventures.” After being “orally” told by Eshkol that U.S. visits to Dimona after June 1964 would cause “no trouble,” Barbour informed Rusk on August 20 that “contrary” to Ben Gurion’s assurances, Israel wanted no Dimona “information” to “be passed on to Nasser…”

The rest of the bureaucracy was unwilling to challenge Israel on this point. On August 23 Komer informed JFK that even though Eshkol had failed to “meet” the “proposed schedule,” the NSC and Foggy Bottom still believed the U.S. should nonetheless “act as if he did.” On the same day Ball informed JFK that even though Eshkol’s “reply” was the best the U.S. could “hope” to get. As usual, Israel should be given “the benefit of the doubt,” by granting its wish that no information derived from U.S. “visits” to Dimona be passed onto Nasser. Reminding JFK that U.S. interests could not be “confined to the Near East alone,” however, Ball still warned that if the U.S. was unable to convince Egypt that Dimona was peaceful then it could encourage a pre-emptive “attack on Israel…” With the PTBT already signed, JFK was willing to forget his previous request for semi-annual inspections.

Even though Eshkol did not agree to “regular visits” but rather a single one in late 1963,

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694 On September 16 the WP only divulged that there had been a “secret exchange” of letters between Kennedy and Eshkol on a “most sensitive subject.” “Kennedy, Eshkol Exchange Notes,” WP, September 16, 1963, p. A15; Letter from Eshkol to JFK, August 19, 1963, President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel Security (1961-1963), JFKL.

695 Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Section 1 of 3, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.

696 Barbour also disclosed that it was “agreed” that the “press” not be “informed” in his meeting with Eshkol, whose office was now being directed by Kolleck. Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, August 20, 1963 NSF Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel (1961-1963), Box 427, JFKL.

697 Memorandum for President Kennedy from Komer, August 23, 1963, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL.

on August 26 JFK praised Eshkol for “generously agreeing” to this framework. JFK omitted any reference about informing Cairo about Dimona, while Rusk mused in an attached aside that the U.S. would “of course comply” with Israel’s demand that nothing “be passed on to Nasser.” Rusk added that Barbour should utilize Webber as a “contact” for arranging the “timing” of the “end-1963 visit.” Without referring to Dimona, on October 2 JFK wrote to Eshkol that he doubted a “more explicit” U.S. public guarantee would enhance Israel’s security any more than his May 8 declaration. Eshkol vaguely replied on November 4 that Israel would “not posses the necessary deterrent capacity” without obtaining “considerable help.”

Secret talks and the NYT consumed U.S. policy towards Israel in JFK’s final weeks in office. Dimona was absent on November 12-13 when Talbot, Komer, and a CIA agent met with IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Rabin and Deputy Director of Intelligence Yariv to discuss Egypt’s missile program. On November 16 Sulzberger revealed that Ben Gurion had informed him that Israel “may be experimenting with military atomics.” Three days later an Israeli Foreign Ministry official issued a “flat denial” of the story. In a story the next day, Sulzberger stated that Israel was “probably” trying to “fabricate” the bomb. Less than 48 hours later, in broad daylight, JFK was assassinated in Dallas.

JFK’s Dimona record in his final year in office has divided the historiography. Bass has

701 Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Part One of Two, November 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, Part Two of Two, November 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.
702 Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 183-184, 236.
703 C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs; The Little Old Man in the Desert,” NYT, November 16, 1963, p. 21; Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, November 19, 1963, NSF, Countries, Israel General (11/18/63-1/30/64), Box 119A, JFKL.
intoned that the U.S. and Israel were on a "collision course" over Dimona by late 1963, whereas Cohen has countered that JFK and Eshkol were simply falling "further down the path of nuclear opacity." The latter analysis is closer to the mark. Had JFK truly wanted to eradicate Dimona, he would have not have cancelled McCloy’s planned trip to Israel, he would have not provided the IAEC with the four tons of heavy water in July, and he would have not backtracked on his original language for "semi-annual" inspections. Most importantly, he would have obtained a written guarantee from Eshkol allowing the U.S. to reassure Nasser that Dimona was indeed peaceful. The PTBT negotiations conveniently presented JFK with a chance to utilize the rare superpower cooperation to personally pressure Israel in writing to disclose its nuclear intentions and open up Dimona to U.S. “visits.” JFK also needed to be perceived as tough on Dimona to convince Moscow, whose call for a Near East atomic zone in May 1963 cannot be overlooked. The fact that the U.S. pressure on Israel ended after the PTBT was signed, demonstrates his politicized approach to the issue. JFK must have perceived 1963 as the last time he could have pressured Israel on the subject without having to face adverse political implications in his re-election campaign on 1964, one which never materialized. According to Bundy, any “close” U.S. “concern” vis-à-vis Dimona effectively “ended with” the President’s “death” in Dallas. JFK’s Texan successor had other more pressing priorities than confronting Israel over Dimona.

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706 Bass has speciously envisioned that it is “hard to imagine” that JFK would have caved to Jewish domestic pressure and allowed an Israel to obtain the bomb is very naïve. This counter-factual assertion first neglects Feinberg and Feldman’s integral roles in arranging the first U.S. visit to Dimona and the JFK-Ben Gurion Waldorf meeting. Next, Bass is oblivious to the reality that Dimona largely disappeared in the election year of 1962, a year in which the U.S. covertly engineered the politically motivated Feldman-led HAWK sale to Israel. Cohen’s argument that a “confrontation” with Israel over Dimona would have been “less likely” under LBJ than JFK is a more safe analysis because the former was “less concerned” with nuclear proliferation than the latter. Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 189-190; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 174, 195-196.

707 Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 510.
Chapter Five: Dubious Denial, a Detached Democrat and Deep Diplomacy

Consumed with domestic concerns, Vietnam and his own political self-preservation, Lyndon B. Johnson was unconcerned about nuclear proliferation during his presidency. Historian Lewis Gould has described LBJ as “a political animal,” who understood that any personal and persistent pressure on Dimona could deny him victory in November 1964. LBJ’s grandmother had once informed her grandson: “Take care of the Jews, God’s chosen people…and help them any way you can.” He did not wait long to fulfill this sentiment. After JFK’s November 25 funeral, LBJ put his arm around Meir and enunciated that even though Israel had “lost a friend” he assured her that he too was “a friend.” By largely obviating himself from all Dimona policy in favor of the bureaucracy, LBJ ensured that his promise to Meir came to fruition.

In the month following JFK’s assassination, Foggy Bottom began pushing for another visit to Dimona as the facility approached its full capacity. In an eyes only December 24 message to Rusk, Barbour relayed that Israel preferred the next Dimona visit to commence on Saturday, January 11, when there would be few “workers on site.” Foggy Bottom’s efforts in arranging another Dimona visit were viewed as unimportant by the CIA and the new President. At LBJ’s

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708 On December 17 the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv stated that a “number of” Israeli papers had argued that LBJ might be more responsive to Israeli lobbying “with the 1964 elections approaching” than JFK. The report also indicated that Eban had commented in Davar that Johnson would probably not “let the State Department have a free hand in the Middle East.” Incoming Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv (Stephen Palmer Jr.) to the Department of State, “Subject: U.S.-Israel Relations after Kennedy: An Analysis of the Israeli Press,” December 17, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL; Lewis L. Gould, “Never a Deep Partisan: Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Party, 1963-1969,” in The Johnson Years, Volume III, ed Robert Divine (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994), p. 21.


710 LBJ also informed President Zalman Shazar, who also accompanied Meir, that U.S. support towards Israel “might be even greater.” Shazar made this comment when he visited the White House in August 1966, adding that he was “one of the first” foreign diplomats LBJ met with after the funeral. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Call on President Johnson by Shazar,” August 2, 1966, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967, Volume 12, Appendix R-R1, Box 21, LBJL; Golda Meir, My Life (London: Futura, 1978), pp. 259-261.

711 Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to U.S. Embassies in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Cairo, Syria and Britain, November 25, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL; Incoming Eyes Only Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, “Subject: Dimona Reactor,” December 24, 1963, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.
Texas ranch on December 27, McCone decided not to review the Dimona visit with LBJ until "a later agenda." McCone’s decision to downgrade Dimona was supported by the NSC and LBJ. In a December 30 message to Harriman, Komer stated that the U.S. had “temporarily...won” its “point” on the reactor. When LBJ cordially wrote Eshkol on January 2, 1964, Dimona omitted as he friendly suggested they meet “face to face in the not too distant future.”

Johnson’s decision to publicly meet with Eshkol made it easier for Israel to place debilitating preconditions on the planned U.S. visit to Dimona. On January 6 Rusk informed Barbour that Staebler, the ACDA’s Clyde McClelland and the AMF’s Richard Cook would visit Dimona later in the month. Rusk’s ability to set the visit’s ground rules was non-existent. In a meeting with LBJ on January 8, McCone beamed that he knew the U.S. was sending a “good” team to Dimona because of his “personal relationship with them.”

Providing further proof that LBJ was dictating the visit’s terms, the next day Barbour sent a telegraph to the White House warning that the US team should not apply for visas. On January 17 he instructed that the U.S. team, which had arrived a day earlier, should not meet with U.S. Embassy officials.

According to an undated and unsigned report, before their January 18 tour Staebler,

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716 Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, January 10, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBIL; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, “Subject: Dimona Reactor,” January 17, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBIL.
McClelland and Cook had an undocumented talk with Webber. Afterwards, they were accompanied to Dimona by Dr. Ephraim Katchalski, Eshkol’s Scientific Advisor. He, along with Pratt, accompanied the team for its tour. The U.S. was prevented from accessing “all parts of every building,” and curiously, parts of the facility had no power, forcing the U.S. team to utilize provided flashlights. Since many facets of the peaceful “site” remained “classified,” cameras were banned due to Israel’s fear that photos could “somehow fall into” Nasser’s “hands.” Pratt also professed that Dimona’s total cost was “about” $60 million, much lower than Ike’s December 19, 1960, estimate of $150-200 million.717

Twelve days after the visit, another unsigned report addressed to the USIB stipulated that Dimona was “operating at 15-20%” above its alleged capacity of 26 MW. The January 30 report ingenuously concluded that when Dimona “completed,” it was “quite likely” Dimona would be fully “declassified.”718 There is a good possibility that the CIA wrote the report. Less than 48 hours later the CIA’s Deputy Director General Marshall S. Carter, briefed LBJ on the visit. Two days later Carter, the CIA’s USIB delegate since McCone became DCI in November 1961, penned that while there was “little doubt” that Dimona was dedicated towards “research” Israel still could produce a “small” bomb in the “future” if so inclined.719

Two politically motivated speeches in early 1964 showed that the new White House would continue the U.S.’s six-year bipartisan policy of deception vis-à-vis Dimona. Strangely, any comment of U. Alexis Johnson’s January 20 speech at Manhattan’s Shorenham Hotel to the

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717 U.S. Inspection Team Report of Visit of Israeli Atomic Energy Installations, January 16-20, 1964, undated and unsigned, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL
718 Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence Board, “Subject: Report on U.S. Inspection Team to Dimona, Israel,” January 30, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL.
Conference on Arab Policy is absent from all of the month’s primary documentation. Finding his fingers in the most esoteric policy pies, U. Alexis stated that the U.S. was planning no “fundamental” changes towards the Near East, while emphasizing that future policies would be “put to the test” in the “coming months.” Delivered days after the Arab League had finished talks in Cairo focused on Yemen, the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute, and Egyptian relations with Syria and Jordan, the speech was a deliberate attempt to derail the goodwill which had emerged from the summit. The Arabs were still reacting to this speech when President Johnson delivered another rhetorical bombshell on February 6.

LBJ’s address to the Weizmann Institute of Science was meant solely to boost his re-election chances. His Waldorf audience, treated to a $250 plate dinner, included Feinberg, Harriman, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the NYT’s Board Chairman, and NYT President Arthur Ochs

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720 With the exception of Kenen, who has argued that the speech to the pro-Arab group demonstrated the U.S.’s “outrageous bias” towards the Arabs, the address has been unanalyzed by any other author. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, pp. 173-174.

721 Since he was Foggy Bottom’s member on the Special Group, Johnson enjoyed an incredible amount of shadow power during the 1960s. The subterranean faction’s Executive Secretary Peter Jessup, responsible for delivering all Committee briefs to LBJ and monitoring CIA covert operations for the NSC, mused to Bundy on May 19, 1964, the within the “Four Horsemen” Johnson was the “second most powerful man in Washington.” McCone and Johnson were not the only group members - which also included Gilpatrick’s lawyer replacement Cyrus Vance- who possessed knowledge of Dimona. Jessup had served as the CIA’s Station Chief in Tel Aviv during the early 1960s and again in the early 1970s. Directly due to the release of Wise’s and Ross’ The Invisible Government in early 1964 the Special Group’s name was changed to the “303 Committee” in June 1964. Memorandum from Bundy to LBJ, “Subject: Organization of National Security Staff,” August 2, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, (Washington: GPO, 2004), Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, Volume XXXIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32651.htm (document 155); Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, Ibid: (document 158); Memorandum from Jessup to Bundy, “Subject: Proposed Name Change for Special Group,” May 19, 1964, Ibid: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32652.htm (document 203); NSAM 303, June 2, 1964, Ibid: (document 204); Memorandum for the Deputy Director of CI, undated, Ibid, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/326 77.htm (document 254); Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 164-166.


724 Following Johnson’s speech, Cairo’s press retorted that the U.S. was not God’s exceptional “shadow on earth,” adding that Israel owed its existence to American-Jews who possessed access to the benevolent “door of the White House.” Jay Walz, “Arabs Deny U.S. is Neutral in Mideast Disputes,” NYT, January 23, 1964, p. 8.

725 This speech was missed by historian Robert Johnson, a former Humanities Chair at Tel Aviv University, when he contended that LBJ did not make his first “overtly political speech” until February 29, 1964. Robert David Johnson, All the Way with LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 13.
Sulzberger. LBJ announced that the U.S. and IAEA would utilize “man’s mastery of the atom” to provide Israel with another reactor to ensure the “tiny nation” could produce fresh water for the Negev. LBJ’s first public declaration on the Near East did not go unnoticed. Michel Abdul Jawed boomed in Beirut’s Al Nahar that “Johnson the Jew” had reconfirmed Arab fears of an Israeli “bomb,” adding that Israel was equal to the “51st” U.S. state.

In a theme repeated over the upcoming months, Komer’s Machiavellian doublespeak about how the U.S. should approach Dimona after LBJ’s Weizmann address was erratic. On February 19 he characterized Dimona as a “minor” issue, a day after asking LBJ to approach Eshkol about assuring Nasser that Dimona was “peaceful.” Describing the request as “not urgent,” Komer messaged Bundy five days later to recommend that LBJ employ “his name to ask” Israel to allay Nasser’s fears about Dimona. Unlike JFK, LBJ was unwilling to personally write Eshkol and instead delegated this job to Foggy Bottom. On February 27 Rusk informed Barbour to press Eshkol to allow the U.S. to placate Nasser about Dimona’s peaceful nature.

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728 On February 19 Komer explained to LBJ that U.S. relations with the “half-cocked” Arab world were in “deep trouble.” A week later the CIA’s ONE described asserted that the Arabs were even more “hyper-sensitive” about the possibility that Israel was receiving “special favors” from a White House “in an election years.” Describing all U.S. politicians as “pro-Israel until proven otherwise,” the Arabs were fearful that LBJ would represent the “Democratic” party rather than the “late” JFK, who they had generally perceived as “reasonably impartial.” Memorandum from Komer to Johnson, February 18, 1964, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 3 of 3, Box 6, LBJL; CIA/ONE Memorandum (Sherman Kent), “Subject: Storm Warning Up for US-Arab Relations,” February 25, 1964, NSF, NSAM 290—Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, Box 3, LBJL; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Johnson Speech Infuriates Arabs,” NYT, February 8, 1964, p. 1; “Arabs Assail Johnson on Water Plan,” WP, February 8, 1964, p. C34.
729 In order to keep “wishes and designs” from being “fully ascertained,” one needs to say and do one set of things “one day,” while doing the exact opposite the next.” Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 63-64.
730 After a conversation with Gazit a week earlier, Komer had supported the specious estimate that Dimona’s total cost was only $60 million. Memorandum for LBJ from Komer, February 18, 1964, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 3 of 3, Box 6, LBJL; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, February 19, 1964 NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume 1 (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL; Memorandum for Record with Minister Gazit, February 12, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.
732 Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, February 27, 1964, NSF, Country File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israeli Presidential Correspondence, Box 26, LBJL.
Unsurprisingly, Barbour told Rusk five days later that Eshkol believed that the best “deterrent” was to keep Nasser uniformed. When Barbour mused that this policy could precipitate an Egyptian “preventive war,” Eshkol responded that Israel was an extremely vulnerable “lamb among 12 or 13 wolves.”

Unable and unwilling to stop Israel, the U.S. instead informed Nasser that he would have to soon accept an Israeli bomb as a *fait accompli*. In a message cleared by U. Alexis, Rostow, Komer and Fisher, Rusk informed Badeau on February 29 that Israel “may” obtain the bomb in the “future…” Nasser’s reaction was nuanced. In a denying trope, he contended to Talbot on March 4 that Israel lacked the “resources” to acquire the bomb. In their last conversation together, however, after Talbot mentioned that the U.S. goal of placing IAEA safeguards on Dimona was “now at hand,” Nasser annoyingly chimed that he “got the point.”

A day after the Talbot-Nasser discussion, Komer asked LBJ for the third time to write Eshkol to gain permission for the U.S. to reassure Nasser on Dimona. Employing a defeatist approach lacking both confidence and conviction, Komer admitted that the U.S. “may not succeed” but should “try” anyway. This was all a politically focused President needed to

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734 Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Badeau, February 29, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

735 In late September 1964 McCloy reported that Nasser had strangely made “no comment” when he “conveyed...assurances” on Dimona’s peaceful nature after another trip to Cairo. McCloy, who was surely aware that in late August the *NYT* had announced that Arabs had met in Alexandria to discuss Israel’s nuclear program, commented that, unlike his visit in June 1963, he “thought” it was very “significant” that Nasser “did not mention” the threat of “pre-emptive war” if Cairo determined that Israel about to obtain the bomb. “Arabs Study Israel A-Arms Potential,” *WP*, August 29, 1964, p. B5; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: McCloy’s Impressions of His Meeting with President Nasser on September 28,” October 6, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1967*, Volume XVIII: [http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/j.html](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/j.html) (document 98); Incoming Telegram to Badeau to Rusk, Section Three of Four, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*; Incoming telegram from Badeau to Rusk, Section 4 of 4, March 4, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*.

736 Memorandum for Johnson from Komer, March 5, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, *LBJL*. 

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justify his non-response. A day after the WP revealed that Meir had “denied that Israel was producing nuclear weapons,” Komer informed Bundy on March 7 that LBJ and Feldman had agreed to invite Eshkol to Washington for June 1. Until this time “everything should be kept quiet,” an order which carried over into U.S. policy towards Dimona. On March 10, in a memo with had 9-10 lines of the text and two of three attachments censored, Komer informed Bundy that an atomic bomb, regardless its political “problems,” made “sense” for Israel.

The NSC, CIA and White House desire to classify all Dimona-related information struck at least one person in Foggy Bottom as a recipe for disaster. A day after the first Dimona-related news story of LBJ’s presidency, on April 15 Bill Polk warned that Nasser was “confused” by U.S. “tactics” thanks to the two “harsh” and “pro-Israel” Johnson speeches made at the start of “election year.” With incredible accuracy and foresight, Polk, whom Walt Rostow described as the Policy Planning Staff’s Near East “expert,” warned that Nasser might seek a “Cuba-type” deal with the Soviets. Unlike the Cuban crisis when geography had favored the U.S., in this situation the U.S. would “not have all the cards.” For this reason the U.S. should do everything to halt the “arms race before it reached the nuclear stage.” None were listening. The next day Eshkol wrote LBJ to express his “regret” that the U.S. could not reassure Nasser about Dimona. Rather than pushing LBJ to respond to the “negative reply,” Komer instead assured LBJ that an

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737 Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, March 7, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.
738 A March 26 five page CIA intelligence memorandum sent to Tel Aviv and a one page March 31 report sent from Cline to Bundy remain classified in the Johnson Library. Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, March 10, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israeli Security (Missile Development) and sale of Hawks, 1964-1965-March 1966, Box 132, LBJL; Document Withdrawal Sheet, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL.
739 In a Reuters wire story published in the WP, the Jewish Arye Wallenstein contended that Israel had prevented little to “trickle” out about Dimona, while emphasizing that the facility was dedicated to “industry, agriculture, health, science…” A week later a nameless NYT piece mused that the State Department and AEC were “still hopeful” that Israel could be “persuaded” to accept IAEA safeguards. Arye Wallenstein, “Israel Remains Silent on Negev Nuclear Plant,” WP, April 13, 1964, p. B6; “Israelis Balking at Atom Checks,” NYT, April 19, 1964, p. 5.
740 Memorandum for the President by Bill Polk, “Subject: Our Policy toward the UAR,” April 14, 1964 NSF, UAR, Memos 2 of 2, Volume I (11/63-5-64), Box 158, LBJL.
Israeli bomb was still “some years off” and advocated having the subject “full staffed out for
you.” The NSC concluded on April 28 that there was no evidence that “fortress” Israel was
“producing nuclear weapons.”

A day before Khrushchev arrived in Egypt, Rusk informed Badeau that it was “hard to
see how” the U.S. could stop Israel if it “chose to” pursue the bomb “alone” on May 9. As
someone who had served as a Professor, Dean and President of Cairo’s American University
from 1936 to 1953, Badeau’s close ties to Egypt surely made him feel uneasy about passing on
disinformation to Nasser concerning Dimona. On May 16 he resigned from his post and utilized
his final weeks in Cairo to air his grievances.

On May 28 Ball wrote to “caution” Badeau for informing Nasser on the “unilateral intelligence” resources of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., helping “undercut” U.S. positions at “Geneva” focused on implementing IAEA safeguards on Israel and Egypt. Since he remained in Cairo for another month, Ball’s message also served to remind JFK’s Ambassador to stay on message during Eshkol’s upcoming visit to U.S.

LBJ understood how the Electoral College system worked. Despite an oblivious media,

Eshkol’s travel schedule during his 12 day U.S. tour was carefully arranged. Aside from his 2.5

741 Letter from Eshkol to Johnson, April 15, 1964, NSF, Country File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israeli Presidential Correspondence, Box 26, LBJL; Memorandum for Johnson from Komer, April 16, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, LBJL.
742 NSC Standing Group Meeting of April 28, 1964, “Subject: Meeting Israeli Arms Requests (NSAM-290), NSF, NSAM 290—Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, Box 3, LBJL.
743 Eyes Only Telegram from Rusk to Badeau, May 9, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Memos & Misc., Volume I (12/63-3/64), Box 138, LBJL; “Soviet Premier Calls on Arabs to Unite Against Colonialism,” WP, May 11, 1964, p. A1;
746 Badeau conducted his “farewell” meeting with Nasser on June 7 and officially resigned on June 29. In the only coverage of the change, on July 9 the WP stated in a nameless story that Lucius Battle would replace Badeau, doing so sometime in September. Deputy Director Helms could have been referring to Badeau when he penned in October 1965 that he could only recall “one instance” when there existed a “difference of opinion” between an Ambassador and the White House during his tenure in government. Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR to the State Department, June 8, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1967, Volume XVIII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/histor y/vol_xviii/h.html (document 71); Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: U.S.-U.A.R. Relations,” June 29, 1964, Ibid: (document 74); “May Be Named,” WP, July 9, 1964, p. A17; Presented by Richard Helms, October 4, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlh/xxxi ii/32677.htm (document 237).
days in Washington, two days in Los Angeles and four days in New York, Eshkol spent a day in Philadelphia, toured NASA facilities at Cape Kennedy, visited Texas and received an honorary degree from Chicago's Roosevelt University. These five states represented 170 of the 270 Electoral College votes in 1964. Upon arriving in Philadelphia, the NYT reported that Eshkol's trip, the first public visit by an Israeli Prime Minister to the U.S., was just a part of the U.S.'s continued "support for Israel in the face of persistent Arab pressure." A day later the WP only admitted that there was always a "traditional scramble ... for the Jewish vote." In a sign that Moscow noticed the political pandering, the Soviet UN Ambassador, Nikolai Fedorenko, boycotted a June 4 UN-hosted Waldorf luncheon awarding Eshkol a key to the City.

On June 1 Eshkol flew by helicopter to the White House and was greeted with a 19-gun salute on the south lawn. Inside the Oval Office, Eshkol and LBJ were initially joined by Harman, Komer and Feldman. LBJ began by proclaiming that "as long" as he occupied the White House "Mr. Feldman," who drafted protocol for the U.S., would continue to serve as his "Prime Minister" on Israel. Turning to Dimona, Johnson espoused that if Israel public announcements were true, there was no reason "why" Eshkol could not "accept IAEA controls" and allow the U.S. to placate Egypt about Dimona. Assuring his guest that he was not being "naïve" about Nasser, LBJ expressed concern that Nasser could move "too far towards the Russians." Eshkol responded that Israel could not allow the "enemy" to be informed of

751 In New York Eshkol commented that Israel was content within its "present frontiers," while informing Feinberg and the IBO at the Waldorf that Israel was harvesting "the...fruits of" the "atomic age." Spiegel, "Israeli Premier Greeted by City," NYT, June 5, 1964, p. 36; "Israeli Expansionism is Denied by Eshkol," NYT, June 6, 1964, p. 3; Spiegel, "Eshkol Outlines Israel's Needs," June 7, 1964, p. 83.
Dimona’s “real situation.” Peres and Harriman then appeared just as LBJ and Eshkol had broadly concluded that there would be “mutual assistance” and sharing in “intelligence” realms.

Harriman chimed that this sounded like “an excellent idea,” and the President conceded “a good beginning” had been forged. Less is known about LBJ’s and Eshkol’s second meeting later in the day. There is no record of the meeting and for the first 10-15 minutes LBJ and Eshkol met privately before being joined by Feldman, Harriman, Talbot, Komer, Harman, Gazit, Peres, Kolleck and Yahil. In front of both delegations as the meeting was concluding, Komer asked LBJ if he had convinced Eshkol to allow the U.S. to reassure Nasser about Dimona and place the reactor under the IAEA. LBJ laconically responded, “No, there was no agreement on that.”

The two LBJ-Eshkol meetings covered little compared to the others discussions held between both sides. In a June 3 gathering including Barbour, Peres conceded to Talbot that, because of LBJ’s “strong feeling,” Eshkol agreed to allow Washington to pass on “information to Nasser.” But in a crucial “reservation,” there still could be “no mention of the U.S. visits to the installation.” On June 9 Peres and Seaborg agreed to allow the AEC, with “no objections” from State, to lease of 2500 kilograms of uranium to Israel’s Technion in late July. Two anonymous stories published in the final days of the Eshkol’s tour, indicated that the U.S. was interested in demonstrating to Eshkol’s domestic rivals that Israel would not surrender its

753 Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Johnson/Eshkol Exchange of Visits,” June 1, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, LBJL.
754 Shalom has contended Komer, wanting LBJ to take off the “kid gloves,” told Harman that Eshkol “was a better salesman” because he got “everything he wanted” without conceding an inch. Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option, pp. 191-192; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 205.
755 Reassurances to Nasser on Dimona Reactor, June 3, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL.
757 Sourcing from a June 9 Israeli document drafted by Gazit, Shalom has contended that sometime during the week, possibly before they intervened in the first LBJ-Eshkol meeting, Peres and Harriman met alone. Informing his guest that they were both “politicians,” Harriman declared that LBJ, with ambitions to remain in the White House “for
sovereignty over Dimona.\textsuperscript{758} Aside from the AEC’s decision to provide Israel more uranium, Dimona largely disappeared following Eshkol’s visit until events in Asia brought the issue back to the forefront in mid-August.\textsuperscript{759}

A week removed from the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, on August 14 the Committee of Principles declared that a Chinese atomic test would precipitate a “political and psychological” defeat for the U.S.\textsuperscript{760} This fear of a Chinese bomb illustrates that during the Cold War, especially before the Six Day War, South East Asia represented the paramount region of importance to U.S. interests; with the Near East region only a growing secondary concern. In May the ACDA argued that the Near East’s “urgent nuclear problems” paled in comparison to those presented by China.\textsuperscript{761} In the domino effect thinking prevalent in Washington at the time, Dimona emerged as a strategic counter to the inevitable paradigm shift in Asia resulting from a Chinese test. Another Committee of Principals study aloofly concluded on August 14 that the U.S. would “continue” to employ an “on going program” to deal with Dimona.\textsuperscript{762} Five days later the AEC extended its civil agreement with the IAEC into April 1965.\textsuperscript{763} Following China’s first atomic test on October 16, nuclear proliferation emerged as a major issue for the White House

\textsuperscript{758} One June 9 the \textit{NYT} reported that IAEA controls and safeguards would not be extended to Israel’s “experimental power reactor” being built with “French assistance in the Negev and two days later the paper of record mused that Eshkol had declared that Israel “must maintain deterrent military strength to discourage its enemies.” “Israel Will Accept Atom Control Shift,” \textit{NYT}, June 9, 1964, p. 6; “Eshkol Defends Deterrent,” \textit{NYT}, June 11, 1964, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{759} On July 7 the Air Force Attache in Tel Aviv informed the Pentagon that the “complete exodus” of French corporate employees and their families would be complete by July. Incoming Telegram from the U.S. Air Force Attache in Tel Aviv to the Pentagon, “Subject: Dimona Atomic Reactor,” July 7, 1964, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables, Volume II (4/64-8/64), Box 138, \textit{LBIL}.

\textsuperscript{760} Draft U.S. Position Paper Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 14, 1964, NSF, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principles, Volume I (1/15/64-1/15/65), Box 13, \textit{LBIL}.

\textsuperscript{761} ACDA, Draft U.S. Position Paper, “Subject: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement,” May 19, 1964, NSF, Subject File, Disarmament, Volume I, (1 of 2), Box 10, \textit{LBIL}.


\textsuperscript{763} Memorandum from Read to Bundy, “Subject: Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,” March 9, 1965, NSF, Subject File, Agreements for Cooperation, Volume I, Box 34, \textit{LBIL}. 
for the first time.

The NYT and IC responded on a classified case-by-case basis. Compared to Belgium, Canada, West Germany, India, Sweden and Switzerland, on October 18 Hanson Baldwin predicated that “most authorities” conceded that the chances Israel and Egypt could “perhaps” develop the bomb by decade’s end were much lower.\footnote{Hanson W. Baldwin, “China’s Bomb: Grave Problems Posed for West,” \textit{NYT}, October 18, 1964, E3.} Censoring all but one reference to Israel’s atomic weapons program, roughly seven pages in total, the CIA produced NIE 4-2-64 on October 21. Like Baldwin, the report concluded only that Israel, Sweden and now India could “perhaps” obtain the bomb by 1970.\footnote{DCI, NIE 4-2-64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons over the Next Decade,” October 21, 1964, \textit{FRUS}, 1964-1968, Volume X; \url{http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonb/x/9015.htm} (document 57).} On October 29 Talbot honestly admitted that Dimona did not constitute an “election issue.”\footnote{Memorandum from Talbot to Rodger P. Davies, “Subject: Dangers of Delaying Israel’s Request to Defer Dimona Inspection,” October 29, 1964, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, \textit{LBIL}.} A day later Rusk informed Barbour “not” to “raise” any request for another visit to Dimona until after LBJ’s campaign against Barry Goldwater.\footnote{Outgoing Telegram from Rusk To Barbour, October 30, 1964, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Israel, Cables (1 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, \textit{LBIL}.}

After his crushing electoral victory, LBJ possessed the political capital to act upon the small steps he had taken before the election to address nuclear proliferation. On October 29 Bundy had informed Ball that the White House sought “a higher level” examination of the subject free from the “interhouse machinery.” In short, public tax dollars would fund a private task force. After being informed that LBJ had mentioned Gilpatric to head the study, Ball responded that this would be an “excellent” pick.\footnote{Hal Brands, currently a Ph. D. candidate in history at Yale, has pointed out that Gilpatric was influential in shaping the group’s final report, while Dulles added “respectability and prestige.” Hal Brands, “Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy,” \textit{Journal of Cold War Studies}, 8, 2 (Spring 2006), p. 91n27; Editorial Note, \textit{FRUS}, 1964-1968, Volume XI; \url{http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/e. html} (document 49).} On November 23 LBJ wrote to Allen Dulles, fresh off his Warren Commission service, to ask him to help “reduce the danger of
nuclear war” by joining the Gilpatric Committee. The interests of Wall Street, state-guided scientists, big business and academia would be represented in the private faction. Alongside Dulles, other lawyers included McCloy and Arthur Dean. Harvard’s George Kistiakowsky and Berkley’s Herbert York comprised the group’s science and technology core, beside Hitler’s favorite capitalist, IBM Chairman Thomas Watson. Former NATO Supreme Commander Alfred Greuthner, Cornell President James Perkins and William Webster, President of the New England Electric System, rounded out the group. Many in the committee had an intimate knowledge of Dimona as DCI Dulles had admitted that factions of the IC had aided Dimona, while Gilpatric and McCloy were key players in the previous White House. Kistiakowsky, a Manhattan Project physicist, and York were also members of the ACDA’s General Advisory Group on Disarmament headed by McCloy, which included Rabi. Lawyers ask the wrong questions when they do not want the right answers.

The product is a reflection of the process and the personnel involved in it. At the expense of Foggy Bottom, the Committee was also given a staff responsible for researching and drafting pertinent documents. The Staff director was scientist Spurgeon Keeny Jr., a Committee of

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769 Letter from Johnson to Allen Dulles, November 23, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: Alternative Courses of Action, Appointment Letters and Responses, Box 4, LBJL.
770 Germany became the largest customer for IBM after Hitler’s rise to power. Utilizing punch cards, the forerunners for storing information before computers, the Nazis were able to run trains from the ghettos to the concentration camps with greater efficiency and speed. The inhuman brandings first placed on the inmates of Auschwitz (001), was an IBM code number. Edwin Black, Nazi Nexus: American’s Corporate Connections to Hitler’s Holocaust (Washington, D.C.: Dialog Press, 2009), pp. 129, 130, 134, 141-143, 159, 160.
771 Kistiakowsky could have had some knowledge of Dimona during his tenure as PSAC Chair under Ike beginning in the late 1959. Herken has pointed out that in early 1960 Bissell briefed him on the U-2 program but gave no indication about how detailed or how far back this briefing entailed. Herken, Cardinal Choices, pp. 118, 120.
772 On December 9 Rabbi attended the $350 a plate dinner for the 20th anniversary of the Weizmann Institute at the Americana Hotel. Other guests included the institution’s president, Sir Isaac Wolfson, a contributor to Feinberg’s financial campaign and Eban. Of the 80 members of the U.S. Weizmann Committee, headed by Feinberg, 50 were New York industrialists and businessmen. Philip H. Dougherty, “Israel Institute Hails its Builder,” NYT, December 10, 1964, p. 95; Memorandum from Rusk to LBJ, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XI: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/o.html (document 149); Doel and Needell, “Science, Scientists and the CIA,” p. 68.
Principles member and part of the NSC’s Science and Technology Office since 1958. Charles Johnson and lawyer Steven Rivkin also joined Keeny from the NSC. Special ACDA Assistant George Rathjens and the Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Murray accompanied Foggy Bottom’s sole member, Raymond Garthoff, to round out the staff. In a heavily censored document, Garthoff, who had previously worked in the CIA’s ONE (1957-1961) and Rand Corporation (1950-1957), predicted on page 17 of an undated paper that Israel could “detonate” a bomb within “two or three years.” To prevent this outcome the U.S. should give Israel a “formal security guarantee,” a suggestion tacitly supported by Gilpatric in a Rivkin-drafted paper dated December 15, which argued against any “explicit... guarantee.”

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773 Mentioned earlier, the Committee of Principles was created by Eisenhower sometime in July or August 1958 to prepare the U.S. for its first negotiations at Geneva focused on forging a test ban treaty. The Cabinet level group originally consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense, DCI, AEC head, and the President’s Science Advisor (PSAC). James Killian. Killian has revealed that while Farley advised Dulles and then Herter, he was helped by Keeny, who was of “great assistance” to him and later to Bundy at the NSC. In a letter to Rusk on December 1, 1965, Bundy revealed that Keeny, appointed in 1977 as Deputy Director of the ACDA, possessed an elaborate “circle of trusted colleagues in every department.” This gave him access to “tricky” intelligence sometimes even before the highest levels of the CIA and Pentagon. Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII: http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ho/frus/johns onlb/xxxiii/32651.htm (document 158); James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 108, 159-160.

774 “Marian Osterwies Is Married to Steven R. Rivkin, A Lawyer,” NYT, June 15, 1968, p. 27.

775 President’s Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (2 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, LBJL.

776 The government’s censorship and compartmentalization of information have been two techniques used to prevent a more lucid picture of the Committee’s work, whose documentation was mostly declassified in 1996. In its first meeting on December 1 nearly a quarter of a page focused on an “intelligence briefing” was blacked out. University of Texas historian Francis Gavin has revealed that some of the Committee’s files also located at the JFK Library. I did not know this when I traveled to Boston. In the interests of transparency and consistency, NARA should place the complete record in both the JFK and LBJ Libraries or solely in the latter. Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, p. 194; Problem 2: Background Paper on Factors White Could Influence National Decisions re: Garthoff), NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MLF, Box 1, LBJL; Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Minutes of Discussion, First Meeting, Room 303, Executive Meeting, December 1, 1964, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, LBJL; Francis Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security 29, 3 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 100, 109n27, 110,n28-31, 111n32-34, 112, n35-37, 113n38-39; Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, p. xii, xiii, 194.

777 On January 5 the U.S. and Israel planted the seeds for such a secret security agreement when Eban informed Rusk that a “high level-meeting” in March 1965 be arranged between both sides. Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, January 5, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, LBJL; Problem 2: Background Paper on Factors Which could Influence National Decisions re: Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons (Garthoff), NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, MFL, Box 1, LBJL; Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation by S.R. Rivkin, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume I, Box 5, LBJL; Brands, “Rethinking Nonproliferation,” pp. 95-96.
however, made no mention of Israel at the Committee’s December 13-14 meeting, also attended by Rostow. The former OSS member assured everyone that while Dimona did not threaten U.S. global “influence,” it still required “special handling.” In a report written for the Committee’s first meeting, Rostow had argued that Israel required a “reserve deterrent” in case of a “desperate confrontation with Cairo.” As usual, Foggy Bottom went along to get along. Joined by Ball, Garthoff, and Keeny, in Rusk’s only Committee appearance on January 7 he made no reference to Dimona in a meeting mainly focused on Asia and Europe.

The higher priority placed on halting nuclear proliferation elsewhere provided a convenient smokescreen for the U.S. hide Dimona’s existence. In an unsigned December 10 ACDA memorandum focused on the possibility of a NPT, the study dedicated three and a half pages to the nuclear programs of China, India and West Germany but just eleven lines towards Israel’s. In a section of NIE 4-2-1964, inadvertently declassified for the Committee, it was fraudulently argued that Israel’s program was “less advanced than India’s.” Another way the

778 Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Minutes of Nuclear Proliferation, Second Meeting, December 13-14, 1964, Executive Office Building, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2), Volume 1, Box 5, LBJL; Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government, p. 244.
779 A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation by W.W. Rostow, November 19, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, File Copy, First Meeting, December 1, 1964, Box, LBJL; Summary of Statement made Before Gilpatric Committee by Walt Rostow, December 13, 1964, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: Alternative Courses of Action, Briefing, Box 4, LBJL.
780 A day earlier Barbour informed Rusk that the U.S. would be allowed to visit again Dimona at month’s end, emphasizing that the U.S. team “should not...apply for Israeli visas.” One day before this was arranged, McNamara had briefed the Committee without any reference to Dimona. Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, January 6, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL; Minutes of Briefing by Secretary McNamara of Issues Related to Proliferation, January 5, 1965, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meeting, Box 9, LBJL; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee,” January 7, 1965, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9, LBJL.
781 The report also indicated that Israel “could probably be persuaded to the sign” any such “treaty.” Proof that the U.S. was covering up Dimona’s true intentions, on the same day a CORONA satellite photographed Dimona from the heavens in Appendix B. Background Paper on National Attitudes towards Adherence to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement, NSF; Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World, December 3, 1964, NSF, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NIE 4-2-64—Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade, Box 6, LBJL; “Declassified Corona Imagery of Dimona,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona_corona.htm.
782 Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World, December 3, 1964, NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NIE 4-2-64, Box 6, LBJL.
Committee ignored Dimona was the familiar strategy of perceiving the Near East Arms race to involve both Israel and Egypt. On December 7 Robert Murray warned on December 7 that Nasser, along with all the “Sukarnos and Ben Bellas” plaguing the globe, would soon possess the “capability of destroying tens of millions of American lives.”

Less than twenty-four hours after LBJ’s inaugural address, the entire Committee, along with Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, McCon, Foster, Ball and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, presented the final report to LBJ at 1:00 p.m. on January 21, 1965. The report, drafted mainly by Keeny, advocated that the U.S. “directly” engage those “individual nations” pursuing the bomb. Israel, however, was still defined as a “non-nuclear power.”

According to York, the “sour” LBJ only sarcastically thanked the Committee for “taking time off from the golf course.” More than anything else, he desired for the Committee to keep its findings quiet. Attached to the report was a Bundy-scripted note stating that no information was to be disseminated outside the Committee of Principles without the President’s “direct approval…”

The White House’s desire for secrecy foreshadowed its efforts to reach an executive agreement with Israel over Dimona. Following the fourth fruitless U.S. tour of Dimona on January 30, on February 10 Ball informed Barbour that Komer would soon be sent to Israel for a

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783 Gavin and Brands both failed to debunk this manufactured perception in their respective analysis. Beginning with the former who derived the funding for his article from the Johnson Library, Gavin utilized an anonymous JFK Library document to contend that Israel would be harshly treated “if they sought a nuclear capability.” In a more extensive yet inconsistent examination, Brands’ generalization that “proliferation anywhere” threatened “U.S. policy everywhere” did not apply to Israel. He admitted that all U.S. “efforts” to stop Israel from obtaining the bomb “were…half-hearted” and even cited Hersh to contend that the U.S. had in covertly “aided the Israeli program.” Gavin, “Blasts from the Past,” pp. 100, 110; Brands, “Rethinking Proliferation,” pp. 88-89, 109n91; Problems of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe Problem 2 written by Robert Murray, December 7, 1964, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chronological File (1 of 2) Volume I, Box 5, LBJL.


785 Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, Ibid: (document 64).


round of talks centered on the reactor. Ten days later the NYT reported that Eban had arrived in New York and would soon travel to Washington for unstated reasons. A day later LBJ wrote to Komem and Harriman, who would also make the trip, that if Israel agreed to a “written pledge” not to “develop nuclear weapons” he would not “insist on” implementing IAEA safeguards. With the purpose of their trip unknown to the media, Harriman and Komem arrived in Israel on February 25.

Without LBJ’s support, the attempts by Komem and Harriman to implement IAEA safeguards on Dimona went nowhere. When Harriman reminded Eshkol that he had said that Israel would accept IAEA safeguards, the latter retorted he “was just talking” before espousing that Nasser was “working” with “India on nuclear weapons.” Israel would only “foreswear the nuclear option” if it first join NATO or sign a publicized “security pact” with the U.S. In a meeting the same day with Eshkol, Meir, Rabin, Harriman, Komem and Bundy, Peres offered the familiar statement that “Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the

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788 Understanding who created Israel’s atomic policy, Ball also informed Tel Aviv that Komem did “not want to spend a lot of time” with the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Outgoing Telegram from Ball to Barbour, February 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 2), Volume III (9/64-2/65), Box 139, LBIL.

789 Although there is no documentation available of Eban’s talks with U.S. officials, on March 7 he informed NBC’s Meet the Press that there was “nothing secretive about” Dimona. AEC, Memorandum from Howard C. Brown, Jr., Assistant General Manager for Administration, to Charles Johnson, April 19, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komem, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBIL; “Eban Arrives for U.S. Visit,” NYT, February 20, 1965, p. 9.

790 Memorandum for Governor Harriman and Komem from Johnson, February 21, 1965, NSF, Country File, Memos & Misc. (2 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, LBIL.

791 On February 23 an anonymous NYT article contended that Harriman would travel to Israel to discuss only West Germany’s recent decision to cancel the rest of its secret tank deal to Israel. On the same day Barbour informed Rusk and the White House that the NYT’s Granger Blair had told him Reuters and the AP were carrying the story on Harriman’s “visit,” while pointing out that the AP was threatening to the sue Israel from preventing them from releasing the story. A day later Blair reported on Harriman’s mission to Israel without mentioning Dimona. “Harriman Going to Israel,” NYT, February 23, 1965, p. 7; Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, February 23, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables (2 of 3), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, LBIL; W. Granger Blair, “Harriman to See Israelis Today on Diplomatic Snarl in Mideast,” NYT, February 24, 1965, p. 4.

792 The text of this meeting was only disseminated to the rest of the U.S. government on March 1. Copies were sent to the White House, CIA and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv, Amman and Cairo, meaning that Rusk and Foggy Bottom were never directly informed of its content. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission- The Nuclear Question,” March 1, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, 1965-1968, Volume XII (2 of 2), Box 143, LBIL; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission- The Nuclear Question,” February 27, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, LBIL.
Middle East.” A day after Harriman left Israel, the NSC’s Hal Saunders informed Bundy on March 2 that Harriman believed that Israel possessed “no intent to go nuclear.” Realistically, this was the “best deal” the U.S. could hope to get at any time.

On March 10, 1965, Eshkol, Barbour and Komer signed the first written agreement between the U.S. and Israel focused on Dimona. The executive agreement formally turned Peres’ words into policy, proclamation that Israel would “not be the first” nation to “introduce nuclear weapons into” the Near East. Denying the obvious reality that Israel could utilize “combat aircraft” to deliver the bomb, the written accord hinted that Israel could soon be able to receive “U.S.” planes. In the future both states would maintain “full secrecy” until they jointly agreed on “how” to declassify information and “when” to do so. In a reticent reference to the Arabs and Soviets, any “premature publicity” could constitute “serious complications” for U.S.

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793 The next day both the NYT and WP reported that Harriman and Komer’s discussions with Israeli officials had been clouded in a “news blackout.” Again the media erroneously portrayed the catalyst for the talks to derive from West German arms sale to Israel and Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River. “Harriman Continues Talks,” NYT, February 28, 1965, p. 3; Terence Lyons, “Harriman’s Israel Talks Kept Secret,” WP, February 28, 1965, p. A28; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Harriman Mission to Israel,” February 27, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, LBJL.


795 Nearly 33 years passed before the U.S. and Israel would again commit their atomic relationship to paper. Ha’aretz diplomatic correspondent Aluf Benn has argued that in an appendix to the 1998 Wye River Agreement Bill Clinton secretly promised in writing to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel’s nuclear capabilities would be maintained if it continued its policy of “ambiguity.” On February 22, 2000, IAEC head Gideon Frank and Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson signed a “letter of intent” whose mandate was to expand “cooperative technical activities to promote nonproliferation, arms control and regional security.” Foggy Bottom prepared a short press conference sometime in “early 2000,” announcing that the agreement solidified the “global goals” of both nations. Any questions about Dimona were replied unequivocally with “No comment.” Benn concluded that “no classified information” was exchanged between both sides even though that key U.S. envoy for the deal, Undersecretary of Energy John Gordon, had served as CIA Deputy Director from 1997 to 2000 under DCI George Tenet. Aluf Benn, “Quiet Cooperation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 57, 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 15-18; Aluf Benn, “A President’s Promise: Israel Can Keep Its Nukes,” Ha’aretz, March 14, 2000, http://www.serve.com/vanunu/nukes/20000314haaretz.html; Jeff Gerth, “New CIA Chief Picks Veteran Staff,” NYT, July 22, 1997, p. A12.

796 Schlesinger has described the executive agreement as “one of the mysteries of the constitutional order,” which is just one more way the President can secretly circumvent the Congress in the realm of foreign affairs. Unaware of this MOU, he concluded that the U.S. has provided an “indestructible commitment” to Israel without the pretense of a treaty, which is required under the Constitution to be advised and consented by the Senate, or an executive agreement. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, pp. 93, 199.
“relations with other states in the area.” Komer certainly understood the transformative nature of the MOU. In front of Eshkol, Meir, Harman and Barbour, he professed that Israel had just become a “very large nation in terms of oomph.” At a time in which the U.S. was now fully demonstrating its own oomph in Vietnam, Washington’s policy about reassuring the Arabs about Dimona was ending.

On April 6 Ball informed Battle that Egypt’s Ambassador’s in Washington, Mustafa Kamel, had asked Foggy Bottom for “details” on Dimona’s “potential for producing nuclear weapons.” Kamel was told that due to its “delicate” relationship with Israel, U.S. intelligence on this “subject” could not be disclosed to Cairo. In a two and a half hour conversation with Nasser on April 18, Talbot assured Nasser that the U.S. viewed proliferation as a “global problem” and was not pursuing a separate agenda “with Israel.” The message coming out of Tel Aviv was as equally dishonest. Under the signature of William Dale rather than Barbour, Webber fatuously contended on April 21 that Dimona, valued at $60 million estimate and still lacking a chemical separation plant, was still “firmly” dedicated to “peaceful purposes.”

On the same day Peres departed Mapai for Rafi, LBJ wrote to Eshkol on May 21 that the U.S. would not desire another Dimona tour until after Israel’s November election. Even

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797 Incoming Telegram from Barbour to Rusk, March 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Harriman Mission, 2 of 3, (2/65-3/65), Box 145, LBJL.
798 Memorandum of Conversation, March 10, 1965, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume IV (2/65-11/65), Box 139, LBJL.
799 Two days later Komer informed Bundy that the U.S. was winning its “battle with Nasser” and needed to “keep” the situation in the Near East “quiet” when it was already in “trouble in Vietnam.” Outgoing Telegram from Ball to Battle, “Subject: Background Paper for Talbot Conversation with UAR Officials,” April 6, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Cables 2 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, LBJL; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, April 20, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Memos 1 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, LBJL; Incoming Telegram from Battle to Rusk, April 18, 1965, NSF, Country File, UAR, Cables 1 of 2, Volume III (11/64-6/65), Box 159, LBJL.
800 Dale informed Cohen that Barbour had informed him that it was “time” for “the embassy to write such a report,” adding such an undertaking could not have been done without Barbour’s permission. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 395n59; Incoming Airgram from Charge d’Affaires, William Dale, to the State Department, “Subject: Current Status of the Dimona Reactor,” April 9, 1965, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, Israel, Dimona 1964 # 1, Box 30, LBJL.
801 A day before penning the letter LBJ met with Feinberg and was reminded that the U.S. should provide Israel with the A-4 Skyhawk planes in order increase Democratic chances during the 1966 elections. Fienberg, who a month
though he conceded that Dimona could precipitate a preemptive attack by Nasser or turn Egypt into a “Cuba” like proxy for Moscow, it was only after this time Israel should “consider” IAEA safeguards on Dimona. No one in the White House appeared bothered by the fact that it took Eshkol a month and a half to negatively respond to the request, with Komer noting to Bundy on May 26 that Dimona was only a “minor” concern. Until Robert Kennedy made his first major speech of his Senate career on June 23, Dimona disappeared entirely from the paper flow.

Based on inside knowledge, RFK professed that White House should utilize the Gilpatric Committee to implement a nuclear non-proliferation treaty before nations like “Israel and India” could develop the bomb, possibly within a “few months.” Invoking JFK’s name on several occasions, RFK declared that the “most vital issue” facing the globe was not Vietnam or Berlin but “nuclear proliferation.” Infuriated, LBJ informed Bundy that even if all the “peace lovers” joined “Bobby,” he would not allow the White House’s foreign policy to be shaped by RFK.

By virtue of naming the nation ahead of India, RFK’s declaration that Israel represented the next most likely nation to develop the bomb was ignored by the NYT. On the front page the next day, the paper omitted any reference to Israel even though it also reproduced the full text of RFK’s

earlier been awarded the first Coca-Cola franchise in Israel, was told by Komer that “secrecy” would be maintained in the future in all areas. Memorandum for Record by Komer, May 20, 1965, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 2 of 3, Box 6, LBIL; Thomas Buckley, “Coca-Cola Grants Israeli Franchise,” NYT, April 16, 1966, p. 1. Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, May 21, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XII: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/v.html (document 218).

On the same day the NYT relayed an anonymous Reuters wire story arguing that Israel was the next “most likely” nation to obtain nuclear weapons. “Aide Says Mexico is Able to Produce A-Bomb, but Won’t,” NYT, May 26, 1965, p. 18; Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, May 26, 1965, NSF, Komer Memos, Volume 1, 2 of 3, Box 6, LBIL.


Fearful that JFK’s younger brother would use New York as a springboard for a White House run in 1968, LBJ vigorously fought to keep RFK from being his running mate in 1964 and refused to allow Feldman to support RFK in his subsequent Senate contest with Keating. Johnson, All the Way with LBJ, p. 285; Gavin, “Blasts from the Past,” p. 130.

The media cover-up of Dimona included the nation’s most influential journal, published by the \textit{CFR},\footnote{Quigley has argued that the \textit{CFR}’s formation on July 29, 1921, in New York, led largely by Colonel Edward House, was based upon the British Royal Institute of International Affairs established two years earlier. The \textit{CFR}’s groundwork was laid in June 1918 when Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, had invited thirty individuals, mostly New York bankers and lawyers, to the Metropolitan Club in New York City. Quigley has contended that JP Morgan and the Rockefellers comprise the \textit{CFR}’s major original groups of influence in the oligarchic faction. During the Truman presidency the \textit{CFR} comprised 42\% of the administration, 40\% of the Eisenhower administration, 51\% of the Kennedy administration and 57\% of the Johnson administration. Every Secretary of State since 1944, with the exception of James Byrnes, has been a \textit{CFR} member still holds true today. Speaking at the \textit{CFR}’s new Washington office in July, Secretary of State Clinton admitted that the \textit{CFR} represents a “mothership” of advice for Foggy Bottom. For all confirmed \textit{CFR} members referenced in this thesis see Appendix C. Quigley, \textit{Tragedy and Hope}, pp. 131-132, 582, 952, 992; “Secretary Clinton on Foreign Policy,” C-SPAN, July 15, 2009, \url{http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/287728-1} (1:13:29); Schulzinger, \textit{The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs}, pp. 6, 8, 30; Wala, \textit{The Council on Foreign Relations}, pp. 217n, 237n48; Thomas R. Dye, “Oligarchic Tendencies in National Policy-Making: the Role of the Private Policy-Making Planning Organization,” \textit{The Journal of Politics} 40 (1978), pp. 311-316.} whose president from 1945 to 1975 was McCloy. In a manuscript approved by Keeny and Bundy, Foster, a McCloy protégé, argued in the July \textit{Foreign Affairs} edition that Israel understood that it would “be a mistake” to build a bomb. Providing the usual straw man that the Near East atomic race involved two nations, he professed that if either Israel or Egypt obtained the bomb, it would be “improbable” that the other would not attempt to follow suit.\footnote{Abba Eban, “Reality and Vision in the Middle East,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 629, 631.} In the same issue Eban slyly argued that “history” is not “woven by innocent hands,” while quoting T.S. Eliot, noting that “Human kind cannot bear very much reality.”\footnote{In 1992 Komer exclaimed that LBJ dedicated “twenty-times as much time” on the war in Indochina compared to Near East. \textit{Parker, The Six Day War}, p. 229.}

With Washington now committed in Vietnam, Dimona became a secondary concern for U.S. policymakers in the lead up to the Six Day War.\footnote{William Foster, “New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 43, 4 (July 1965), pp. 588-590.} Beginning with the March 10 MOU and ending with Foster’s \textit{Foreign Affairs} piece, by July 1965 the U.S. had accepted Dimona as a \textit{fait
accompli. The U.S.’s blind-eye acceptance of Dimona by mid-1965 dovetails with Remez’s and Ginor’s thesis that the Soviets began planning to eliminate the reactor in late 1965. Determining when the Soviets and the Egyptians finally grasped that the U.S. was not serious about stopping Israel’s nuclear program is difficult to pinpoint. Undoubtedly, the U.S. to remove Badeau from Cairo and to cease informing Nasser about Dimona must have helped speed up this process. The U.S. decision to replace UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson with Arthur Goldberg in July 1965 must have also been viewed with suspect. Goldberg accompanied Rusk on October 1 to meet with Gromyko in New York, with Rusk awkwardly stating that Dimona was “three months pregnant.” Assuring the Soviets that the U.S. was watching the situation “closely,” he added that he wished to privately talk with Gromyko about this issue some more. By the time of the Six Day War had emerged, the U.S. had conveniently forgotten this meeting.

The primary record focused on U.S. perceptions of Dimona and the U.S.S.R. before, during and after the conflict is difficult to decipher and decode. Days before Israel assembled its first bomb, on May 24 DCI Helms stated at a NSC meeting that he was “positive” there was “no nuclear weapons in” the Near East. Understanding that he was stepping on some big toes, JCS Chairman Wheeler chimed in that he was “skeptical” of the DCI’s assertion but

812 In a February 9, 1966, meeting with Harman, Komer and Foreign Minister Eban, LBJ announced that he saw “nothing” in the future which was going “to disturb” bilateral relations. Three days later the U.S. agreed to sell Israel 48 A-4 Skyhawk even though Komer had correctly observed in October 1965 that these bombers were “highly suitable for nuclear weapons delivery...” On April 2, 1966, April 22, 1967, and July 12, 1969 -all Saturdays- the U.S. again toured Dimona and found “no evidence” of a nuclear weapons program. Zach Levey, “The United States Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal,” DH, 28, 2 (April 2004), p. 272; Memorandum for the Record by Komer, October 18, 1965, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume 2, 3 of 3, Box 6, LBJL; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, February 26, 1966, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, LBJL; Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Meeting Between Secretary McNamara and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on Saturday, February 12, 1966,” Israel, Memos & Misc. (1 of 2), Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, LBJL; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 186, 331; Outgoing Telegram from Rusk to Barbour, June 2, 1966, NSF, Country File, Israel, Cables, Volume V (12/65-9/66) Box 139, LBJL; Memorandum for the President from Rostow, “Subject: Israeli Aid Package,” May 8, 1967, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12- June 19, 1967, Volume I, Tabs 21-30, Box 17, LBJL.

admitted he was “less... informed” on the subject. The U.S. desire to cover-up Dimona’s role in the pre-war crisis was best exemplified after the second Foxbat flights of May 26. On the same day at 11:10 a.m. Rostow informed LBJ that the reason “why” Israel was leaning towards a “preemptive attack” could be traced to a still classified telegram sent from the U.S. military Attaché in Tel Aviv to the Pentagon at 8:01 a.m. EDT. Ginor and Remez have argued that the message was sent “during or immediately” after the flight. Meeting at 1:30 p.m. with LBJ, Clifford, Helms, McNamara, Vance, Ball, Battle, Saunders, Rusk, Humphrey, Rostow and Joseph Sisco, Wheeler mused that there had “been two overflight incidents,” proof that the U.S. was aware of the May 21 over-flights as well. Less than six hours later LBJ made no mention of Dimona when he twice told Eban that Israel would “not be alone unless” it decided “to go it


815 According to Quandt, who served as a deputy under Saunders from 1972-1974 and 1976-1980, during the pre-conflict crisis Johnson conversed with Rostow “more frequently than...anyone else.” In a 1992 Middle East Journal article, Quandt completely omitted Dimona’s place in the pre-conflict crisis of the Six Day War. In his 2005 Peace Process, Quandt again omitted any reference to Dimona during the context of the conflict and pushed the fantasy that the U.S. relationship towards Dimona began during the mid 1960s rather than in reality a decade earlier, declaring that “...every president from Lyndon Johnson to Bill Clinton” has “tacitly accepted the existence” of a clandestine Israeli nuclear arsenal. In Decade of Decisions (1977), he only briefly mentioned that in 1969 President Nixon, State Department and Pentagon “were all concerned” that Israel had “already developed nuclear weapons.” Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 26, 1967, Ibid: (document 70); Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 6, 42, 437n56; Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkley: Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 80, 280, Ibid, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color was the Light?” Middle East Journal, 46, 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 198-228.

816 Although he made no mention of Dimona, the next day Barbour informed Washington that Israel had been “frightened” by the “four MIGS” which had evaded the IAF. Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the State Department, May 27, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28054.htm (document 82); Ginor and Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona, pp. 134, 249n50.

817 By virtue of chairing the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from 1963-1968 Clifford, who became Secretary of Defense in March 1968, probably knew more about Dimona than anyone else save Angleton and the Special Group. The PFIAB was created in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco on May 4, 1961, via Executive Order (EO) 10938, calling for “qualified persons from outside the government” to consult and advise the executive branch. Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXV: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyfxv/6008.htm (document 87).

alone” in the crisis. Following this meeting, Kent informed Helms that that Nasser was not following a “Soviet plan.”

On June 1 the Mossad’s Meir Amit met with Helms and Angleton. Due to Angleton’s probable inclusion in the document’s text, a five-page June 2 letter from the DCI to LBJ remains classified. On the same day the NSC’s Nathaniel Davis incorrectly deduced that “Gromyko’s trip” to Cairo in “late March” had “not” resulted in a Moscow-Cairo “attack plan” and that the Soviets had not fabricated “reports of a planned Israeli raid into Syria.” In a paradigm shift, however, Davis vaguely conceded that he “would not be surprised” if some of these “reports were at least partly true.” In the war’s aftermath, the U.S. went out its way to deny any role that Dimona and Moscow had played in the hostilities. In an undated FRUS report prepared for a Bundy-led NSC subcommittee found in between June 16 and 17, it was erroneously argued that no nation in the conflict possessed “nuclear weapons.” Unlike Suez, the Soviets failed to dictate any “indirect nuclear threats” in 1967. In the week after the war’s conclusion the media espoused the familiar trope that both Israel and Egypt were pursuing the bomb.

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819 The next day LBJ left for his Texas Ranch for four days without bringing any foreign policy advisors with him. Memorandum of Conversation, May 26, 1967, Ibid: (document 77); Quandt, Peace Process, p.437n48.


822 Memorandum from Nathaniel Davis to Rostow, “Subject: A Scenario of the Soviet Role,” June 2, 1967, NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967, Volume 8 Appendices N-0, Box 20, LBIL.


824 Not all in Washington were willing to buy the groupthink assertion that Moscow was a passive witness during the war. Arguing in the NYT on September 12, 1967, Richard Nolte, who had replaced Battle as U.S. Ambassador in Cairo in April 1967, professed that Moscow was responsible for “triggering” Nasser’s challenge to Israel. Hedrick Smith, “Ex-U.S. Envoy to Cairo Thinks Soviet Spurred Nasser Challenge to Israel,” NYT, September 12, 1967, p. 6; “Paper Submitted by the Control Group to the Special Committee of the NSC,” FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28062.htm (document 305).
Seven days after an anonymous NYT piece argued that Israel’s next “major...move was to” develop a nuclear bomb, the WP’s associate editor, Alfred Friendly, insinuated that Egypt was also pursuing “atomic weapons.” Friendly, who had held close government ties and would win the Pulitzer for his coverage of the war, falsely contended that Israeli officials, who admitted that they had “no evidence” to back their claim, had informed him that Egypt was seeking atomic help from “China, India, or both.”

Dimona did not emerge as a relevant issue during the June 23-25 superpower negotiations at Glassboro. When Rusk mentioned the U.S. desire to keep nuclear weapons “out of” the Near East, Gromyko replied only “with a nod.”

Due to Israel’s crushing victory, Hersh has argued that following the Six Day War Dimona “disappeared...as a significant issue” in the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. From mid-September to mid-October Barbour vacationed. He was out of town when Harvard professor Henry Kissinger visited Israel and informed Dale that he was “convinced” Israel was “making nuclear weapons.” Dale divulged to Hersh that Kissinger also bluntly warned: “I’ll have your

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829 As a doctoral student at Harvard during the mid 1950s Kissinger was introduced to many of the key individuals who would shape U.S. Dimona policy. While writing his dissertation, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957), from 1955 to 1957 Kissinger acted as a study director for a discussion group that met under the CFR’s sponsorship to consider the implications of nuclear power, which included Bedell Smith, Rabi, Gilpatric, McGeorge Bundy and Hanson Baldwin. Gregory Cleva, *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Bucknell University Press, 1989), pp. 119 & 228n2; Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs*, p. 19.
Edward Teller informed Cohen that following a trip to Israel in late 1966 or early 1967 he had also concluded that Israel possessed the bomb but would be "clever enough ...not to test." He did not believe Israel should be forced to give it up in order to join the NPT. No one disagreed. In 1978 Carl Duckett, who in 1968 was the CIA's Deputy Director of Science & Technology, testified that based upon Teller's information he had drafted a new NIE focused on Israel's updated atomic status in the spring of 1968. Duckett indicated that Helms had instructed him not to "publish" a final draft to LBJ and then forget the issue. Any leverage the U.S. possessed to compel Israel to sign the NPT was lost when the outgoing White House agreed to provide Israel with 50 F-4 Phantom's on November 25, 1968.

Since the NPT was only ratified by Senate in March 1969 and implemented a year later, the new White House could have still pressured Israel to join the NPT in early 1969. President Richard Nixon chose not to pursue this option. In a June 26 meeting National Security Advisor Kissinger advocated that Israeli NPT "adherence" was unnecessary and proposed that Israel and

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830 Hersh, _The Samson Option_, p. 169.
831 The media was unwilling to pressure Israel to sign the NPT and even denied its existence in LBJ’s final year in office. On May 5 Jewish historian Walter Laqueur omitted any reference to Dimona in a 10 page _NYT_ article. On July 9 Chalmers Roberts, who had written first U.S. story on Dimona, guessed that Israel was "expected to sign at some point." Walter Laqueur, "The Middle East is Potentially More Dangerous than Vietnam," _NYT_, May 5, 1968, p. SM34; Chalmers Roberts, "7 'Threshold' Nations Haven't Signed A-Pact," _WP_, July 9, 1968, p. A7; Cohen, _Israel and the Bomb_, pp. 297-298, 421n20, 421n21.
832 Hersh was also told by a "senior intelligence officer" that after June 1967 a "big change took place" within the CIA, with Israeli information becoming "untouchable." In an FRUS editorial note found between April 1 and April 4, 1968, it was revealed that this NIE has never "been found." In March 1978 Helms informed the NYT that he could deny that he gave this order to Duckett but still had "no recollection" of it. Editorial Note, _FRUS_, 1964-1968 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), Arab-Israeli Dispute, Volume XX: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2667.htm (document 130); Hersh, _The Samson Option_, p. 169; David Burnham, "C.I.A. Man Says Johnson Heard in 68 that Israel Had A-Bombs," _NYT_, March 2, 1978, p. 5; Richelson, "The Wizards of Langley," p. 90.
833 Three days after the NPT was signed, Dobrynin questioned Rostow on why Israel had refused to sign when Syria and Egypt had already done so. Rostow vaguely responded that the "matter was" still "under discussion." Telegram Rusk to the Embassy in the U.S.S.R. July 4, 1968, _FRUS_, 1964-1968, Volume XX: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2669.htm (document 207); Letter from Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin, November 25, 1968, NSF, Country File, Israel, Memos (1 of 4), Volume X (6/68-11/68), Box 142, _LBIL_.
the U.S. to continue to “hide” Dimona’s existence from the “public ....” On September 25 Meir and Nixon privately concluded that Israel would not have to sign the NPT in exchange for not testing nor publicly announcing existence. The agreement, which Cohen has argued represents the “cornerstone” for the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship... on the nuclear issue,” appears to have been made orally. Nixon and Meir were smart enough to commit nothing anything to paper. There was even no typed protocol of their discussions with Kissinger, Rabin and Secretary of State William Rogers, who was unaware that Israel already possessed the bomb. A day later Nixon informed White House reporters that “no decisions” centered on the talks would be announced at the current “time.” In the 40 years since, none have been. While receiving New York City’s Gold Medal of Honor four days later, Meir declared that Israel desired for “peace” with its “neighbors” and “for the entire world.”


837 One reason why Dimona disappeared during the Nixon White House was because U. Alexis Johnson served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1969 to 1973; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 133; Wolfgang Saxon, “U. Alexis Johnson Dies at 88,” NYT, March 27, 1997, B19.


Conclusion

Edmund Burke’s mantra that “digging into the foundations of the state is always a dangerous adventure” is an accurate one. A former professor of history at the University of Ottawa who refused to write reference letters for students aspiring towards Law School once told me that if I wanted to grasp the international system’s deeper and uglier aspects I should examine U.S. activities and actions towards the “State of Israel.” I had entered Professor Brian Villa’s office to discuss Operation Iraqi Freedom and unknowingly exited with the beginnings of my M.A. thesis. During this process I have discovered that sometimes the simplest questions can also be the most intense and important. “Who’s is in Charge?” “Are there conflicts of interest?” “Who advises?” At the circumvention of the democratic process, Dimona’s past is prologue narrative is defined by silent consensus, shadowy sciement, obsequious journalism, unelected privilege, secret bureaucracies, clandestine corporatism and great power imperialism. Beginning with the “President’s deep personal involvement” or lack thereof, the globe’s 60 year relationship with Dimona is best encapsulated through an illuminating 1968 document, drafted by Harold Saunders, outlining the “real lifeblood” of the “invisible system.”

Rather than the first among equals, the U.S. President is the first among elected equals. There is a distinction. Schlesinger’s argument that U.S. “democracy” must find a happy medium between the President being a “czar” or a “puppet” is flawed because it assumes that he or she cannot be both simultaneously. In this study the President emerges as an insulated role player

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840 Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 393.
843 Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 12.
rather than an informed key player who delegated rather than decided. Given the undeniable U-2
evidence, Ike knew of Dimona's existence by early 1958 but did nothing. When the reactor was
unveiled in late December 1960 he sought to cover-up the truth. JFK was unwilling to pressure
Ben Gurion about Israel's future atomic plans at their May 1961 Waldorf meeting and then
promised Meir in December 1962 that Dimona would not infringe on their "special relationship."
The only persistent and personal Presidential pressure came in the spring and summer of 1963 as
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were negotiating the PTBT. When the treaty was finalized, however, this
pressure ended. Following the March 10, 1965, MOU, which LBJ refused to link to any IAEA
safeguards, Dimona disappeared as a significant U.S. concern even during the Six Day War.
Nixon's refusal to pressure Israel to join the NPT cemented a decade old trans-partisan policy of
support of an Israeli project 20 years in the making.

Ben Gurion's "deep and personal involvement" was vital in enabling Israel to build and
finance Dimona without the knowledge of most in Israel's Cabinet, Knesset and press. His
personal diplomacy with De Gaulle in August 1960 and JFK in May 1961 ensured that the
former kept its pledge to build the reactor and that the latter did not interfere in this process.
When Dimona was unveiled in December 1960 no one questioned Ben Gurion's Knesset
declaration that the reactor was peaceful. In a tacit show of support for his policy, neither Eshkol
nor Meir altered the nation's ambiguous nuclear policy when they assumed power. Ben Gurion's
most important talent, however, was his ability to delegate responsibility.

Operating as the Defense Ministry's Director General, Shimon Peres was able to network
with Deputy Abel Thomas to forge the beginnings of the Franco-Israeli atomic alliance. He
convinced Prime Minister Mollet to provide reactor at Sèvres in October 1956 and when Paris
began to demur he pushed Prime Minister Bourgès-Maunoury to keep France's promise in
September 1957. Alongside managing the Israeli side of the globalist campaign to finance Dimona, he also coined the now familiar cliché that Israel “would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” in April 1963. The fact that he was only replaced by Eshkol after the November 1965 election demonstrated his esoteric place in the project. Days prior to the Six Day War he hinted at an atomic test, illuminating the incredible amount of shadow power he possessed even as a private citizen.

Exemplified best by Peres in Israel, the “invisible” government’s second vein is the “small number of men” positioned as “under secretaries and assistant secretaries” within the national security structure. In August 1956 Philip Farley had identified that Israel was considering building a second reactor and was informed by Norway in July 1958 that Israel desired a 40 MW reactor but did nothing to help the U.S. alter the status quo. After disseminating the falsehood that Dimona’s construction had commenced in late 1959, once the reactor was publicly unveiled in December 1960, Farley chose the first U.S. team to visit Dimona in May 1961. Foreshadowing all future visits, this tour found nothing incriminating. Following Farley’s departure in March 1962, the most important Foggy Bottom policymaker on Dimona became the other Johnson and the old crocodile. Serving as the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson could have provided Peres with the now familiar talking point on Israel’s nuclear doctrine. Alongside Dulles, McCone, Bundy, Gilpatric and a former CIA Station Chief in Tel Aviv, Johnson was privy to all covert and compartmentalized intelligence as a “Special Group” participant from May 1961 to July 1964. His January 20, 1964, Manhattan statement that there would be no “fundamental” changes to U.S. Near East policy was an implicit show of support for Israel’s atomic intentions. Chiefly responsible for negotiating the PTBT, his

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predecessor Averell Harriman, a former New York Governor, cultivated the basic framework of the transformative March 10, 1965 MOU signed by Eshkol, Komer and the Ambassador.\footnote{845}

Saunders warned that “foreign service” individuals with “policy axes to grind” need to be mitigated, while Helms once commented that Ambassadors possess a considerable degree of “veto” power on policy.\footnote{846} This is why Israel’s Ambassador in Paris, Jacob Tzur, was kept uninformed about Peres’ efforts to obtain a reactor in 1955 and 1956. Ambassadors who possess their own politics can be a problem, evident in John Badeau’s exit from Cairo in May 1964 in favor of Lucius Battle. A day after a U-2 overflew Dimona on March 11, 1959, the U.S. announced that Edward Lawson would be replaced with New York’s Ogden Reid ensured that no one in the U.S. Embassy would communicate back to Washington on what was being built in the Negev. Two months later Abba Eban, key in formulating the July 1955 civil atomic agreement, was replaced in Washington with the WZO’s Avraham Harman. When Dimona was publicly unveiled in December 1960, these changes ensured the plausible denial needed to buttress the statements of ignorance which ensued. Illuminated best in his refusal to deliver JFK’s strongly worded June 15, 1963, letter to Ben Gurion, Walworth Barbour largely conducted a unilateral agenda in Tel Aviv. A month later he reminded the U.S. that any further “publicity” on Dimona could injure “friends” everywhere. His refusal to explicitly mention Dimona during the pre-war crisis was integral in keeping the reactor from emerging as the Six Day War’s defining issue. None at Foggy Bottom, not even the Secretary of State, dared to cross him.

Due to his relationship with the DCI and knowledge of the U-2 flights, Secretary of State Dulles was surely aware of Dimona’s existence before his resignation on April 22, 1959. There

\footnote{845} Sutton, America’s Secret Establishment, p. 21.

is no evidence that Herter was provided the same information, giving him the necessary plausible
denial to announce that Dimona represented “no special concern” on December 22, 1960. His
successor was largely omitted from any policy making role in the 1960s and served mainly as a
propagandizing mouthpiece on the subject. While bowing to the Israel’s demand that no U.S.
intelligence passed onto Egypt focused on Dimona, Rusk was ignored by the Gilpatric
Committee and refused to adhere to Bill Polk’s prophetic April 1964 warning that Dimona could
force Cairo into a “Cuba-type” deal with Moscow. Since the U.S. had always secretly aided the
acquisition of an Israeli atomic stick there was no need for any diplomatic carrots.

Since World War II and the National Security Act of 1947 Foggy Bottom’s ability to
shape and implement foreign policy has been severely usurped. Since this time a “new nucleus…
key people responsible for specific areas and problems” has emerged.\textsuperscript{847} At the forefront has
been the rise of a shadowy “scientific-technological elite” which Ike had warned could gain
control over “public policy.”\textsuperscript{848} Especially in the realms of biology, nanotechnology, artificial
intelligence and the microchip, in the future power will be increasingly possessed and augmented
by nations and institutions with the most brilliant scientists rather than the bravest soldiers. MIT
mathematician Norbert Weiner, who refused to take funding from a valueless U.S. government,
professed in 1946 that scientists usually place themselves in the hands of the people they should
be “least inclined to trust.”\textsuperscript{849} In a Cold War defined by the aircraft carrier, spy satellite and
ICBM, “scientific internationalism” effectively eroded national sovereignty as scientists like

\textsuperscript{847} Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the NSC, March 15, 1968, \textit{FRUS, Volume XXXIII,} 1964-1968:
\textsuperscript{848} Richard Damms, “James Killian: the technological capabilities panel, and the emergence of President
Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961, APP, \textit{PPUS}.
\textsuperscript{849} Joseph Manzione, “The legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1965,”\textit{DH,} 24, 1
Rabi were quickly elevated to statesman and diplomats.\textsuperscript{850}

There is a strong probability that Rabbi, who visited Ben Gurion in 1957 to discuss atomic issues, was also privy to the U-2 information while working under Strauss. The amendments that McCone added to the July 1955 agreement in 1959 and 1960 accelerated this support. Apparently left uninformed about the U-2 flights and pertinent NIEs, McCone possessed the necessary plausible denial that allowed him to leak to the \textit{NYT} that Israel was building a research reactor in December 1960 while in charge of the AEC. Most of scientists who the visited Dimona during the 1960s for the pre-packaged and sometimes lightless tours were AEC employees, an amorphous agency responsible for providing Israel with uranium in July 1963 and 1964. The cryptic Dr. Robert Webber was installed as Science Attache in Tel Aviv in the spring of 1963. After privately meeting with the U.S. team before their January 1964 tour of Dimona, in which they were informed by Mannes Pratt that the reactor was valued at $60 million, Webber repeated this total when he declared on April 21, 1965 that Dimona was “firmly” dedicated to “peaceful purposes.” This theme was prevalent in the Gilpatric Committee’s final report, drafted mainly by Spurgeon Keeny, who also reviewed Foster’s July 1965 \textit{Foreign Affairs} piece. Sometime in late 1966 or early 1967 Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb and a member of the AEC/GAC during the late 1950s, visited Israel and was instrumental in convincing Washington not to force Israel to joint the NPT.

Employing the scientific-strategic class was crucial in Israel’s successful quest to obtain the bomb. In 1949 Ben Gurion secretly met with French scientist Moshe Sordin, paving the way for the CEA’s Jean-Francis Perrin to survey Israel Dostrovsky’s heavy water research two years later. In August 1955 Shalhavet Freier became Israel’s Science Attache in Paris, working

covertly with Peres to lay the seeds of the Israeli-Franco atomic relationship. Due to his embedded role in the project at RAFAEL, Eshkol determined it would be unwise to strip Munya Mardor of his authority during his reorganization in early 1966; instead, he provided him with more resources and autonomy. Conducted without the apparent knowledge of Prime Minister Macmillan, in 1959 and 1960 Israel received twenty tons of heavy water in a deal arranged by a Bergmann and a Norwegian astrophysicist. Often after the state has achieved its techno-political strategic objective scientists become expendable. After twelve years, Dr. Bergmann resigned from the IAEC in April 1966 after his ability to shape atomic policy waned during the decade. A private skeptic only, Dr. Amos de Shalit described the bomb as an “unearthly weapon,” while writing to “individuals wiser than him” back in Israel from Geneva in August 1955. In any war, scientists, like soldiers, will always be expendable. Even though Egypt had no equivalent reactor, Israel still assassinated German and Egyptian scientists working for Nasser in late 1962-1963, a policy which ultimately led to the dismissal of the Mossad’s Isser Harel.

Unintended consequences ensued from Harel’s firing within two years. Beginning in late 1965 Harel began informing Moscow that Dimona’s intentions were not peaceful. From this period onwards Harel, Moshe Sneh and the Israeli Communist Party kept the U.S.S.R. appraised about Dimona prior to June 1967. Moscow’s Dimona policy was implemented by a faceless bureaucrat and at the Ambassadorial level. Defense Ministry First Deputy Andre Grechko’s offer to Egypt of a Soviet nuclear umbrella in December 1965 signaled a more aggressive Soviet policy, culminating in the KGB’s November 1966 “Conqueror Plan.” Two days after four Foxbats overflew Dimona; Grechko reminded Egypt on May 28 that the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was prepared for anything. Nikolai Fedorenko’s decision to boycott a UN hosted event for Eshkol during his June 1964 U.S. tour and the Kremlin’s decision to ban Israeli diplomats from
Moscow’s Central Synagogue in August demonstrated that Soviet attitudes toward Israel had soured even before Khrushchev’s removal. Weeks after Haikal had railed against Dimona; in September 1965 Israel replaced Yosef Tekoah in Moscow with Katriel Katz. This desire to show the U.S.S.R. another angle was displayed by Eshkol in his rhetorical January 1966 Knesset overture towards Moscow. Ambassador Chuvakhin’s unwillingness to travel with Eshkol to view Syria’s alleged buildup on the Israeli border on May 12, 1967, is the best evidence that Moscow engineered the crisis to provide a pretext to destroy Dimona.

While a revisionist Soviet role has emerged in the scholarship, the Arab place in Dimona’s historiography has been pushed to the periphery. A better understanding of Soviet-Syrian relations from the Moscow-inspired coup in Damascus in February 1966 to the erroneous May 12, 1967, intelligence warning is needed. Beginning with the reactor’s partial unveiling in December 1960, Egypt’s approach to Dimona was centered upon denial and indifference. In a theme also present on the Soviet side, during the early 1960s there is scant evidence of Nasser’s policies towards Dimona prior to Haikal’s August 1965 announcement estimating that Dimona’s total cost at $700 million. There is ample evidence that the Soviets utilized Nasser as a proxy to air their increasing concerns about Dimona. In his first statement on the issue in six years, Nasser boomed on February 21, 1966, that an Israeli bomb could precipitate “preventive war” was made a fortnight after the NYT had revealed Grechko’s December 1965 Cairo mission. Nasser’s April 17, 1966, statement that Israel was building a bomb came a day before Kosygin announced in Cairo that regional “forces” could soon possess a nuclear deterrent. The Foxbat sorties over of May 17 and May 26, 1967, were also conducted falsely under the Egyptian flag.

Nasser’s personality and power are too often interchanged as being equivalent. He once honestly admitted to British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that his “importance” should not be
exaggerated as he was always just “reacting” to the superpowers. Due to Egypt’s tragic involvement in Yemen’s civil war and inability to produce or acquire its own bomb, Cairo allowed Moscow to try to solve the Dimona problem for itself. Alongside the Soviet-Arab relationship, the roles of Gabon, South Africa, Argentina, Norway, Canada, Britain, France and especially Wall Street underscore the transnational scope of Israel’s nuclear history.

Elitism may be irrefutable but it is still “outrageous.” Rest assured that anyone who says to not follow the money has already found it. The financiers are even more byzantine than the spooks. Truthdig.com editor Robert Sheer has pointed out that the “banking” syndicate is more secretive than even the Pentagon and CIA. The involvement of the Sonneborn Institute, the Rothschilds, Wolfsons and Sieffs in financing Dimona illuminates the NIC’s 2008 prediction that in the future “governments will no longer be kings” as “super-charged individuals” and supranational institutions push towards “global governance…” Feinberg’s crucial role in raising millions for Dimona demonstrates that if there is an ethno-centric view of U.S. foreign policy it is not from Washington yet rather its largest city, the most obvious home, according to former DCI Michael Hayden, for the IC’s “co-operating domestic entities.” New York interests were dominant in the outsourced Gilpatric Committee through the legal minds of Gilpatric, McCloy and Dulles, all of whom knew the truth about Dimona. There is now “no clear line” separating government and the private business in the intelligence game.

854 NIC, Global Trends 2025, p. xii, 1, 3, 81, 83.
atomic relationship began as a corporatist accord, with a former DCI acting as VP of New York’s AMF when the firm signed its deal with the IAEC in late 1957.

Secret bureaucracies usually follow their “own self-interest” too. One should not trust Wall Street lawyer Richard Helm’s claim that the CIA is not “a rogue elephant” which abides by “the laws” of the land.” After the threat of global nuclear war, the most important Cold War consequence has been the emergence, in Saunders’ own words, of the CIA as an “ivory tower” form of oligarchic “government.” At CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, on April 20, 2009, President Obama proclaimed that the Agency is the “indispensable tool” at the “tip” of the U.S. foreign affairs “spear.” In a thesis raised by Szulc and implicitly supported by Blitzer and DCI Dulles, Angleton probably sent a CIA team and nameless British-born physicist to Israel in 1957 to provide atomic assistance. Amazing things can happen from within the Company once conformity, compartmentalization and classification become their own awards. Before Congress in 1975 Angleton quipped that it was “inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government” must “comply with all the overt orders” of its masters.

The IC is an amorphous, entrepreneurial and organic power system. The NSC, the Principles Committee, USIB, PFIAB, and the “Special Group” represent the “interlocking directorates” capable of precipitating the “intra-governmental intrigue” which Kennan warned about. These black groups within black groups, capable of covert action without even the knowledge of the highest circles, are a consequence of the U.S. failure to adhere to Hamilton’s warning that “every...appointment” will always increase the likelihood of “cabal and

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intrigue." Rather than reducing the "dangers of factionalism," which Dahl has stressed was Madison’s underlining premise of the anti-libertarian Federalist Papers, big government instead has helped to mask cabal, corruption and "irresoluble conflict."\textsuperscript{862}

The CIA’s complicity in Dimona was also reflected in its "intelligence-producing side."\textsuperscript{863} Key NSC, State and Pentagon officials responsible for implementing Israel policy during the 1960s - Bill Bundy, Garthoff and especially Komer- all worked in the CIA’s ONE during the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{864} Once CIA, always CIA. Angleton’s knowledge and U-2 intelligence was kept from Kent and the BNE in its NIE 100-2-58 of July 1, 1958, which still stipulated that if Israel” obtained the bomb then it could precipitate a “general conflagration.” Dulles’ two page letter to JFK days before his Waldorf sit-down with Ben Gurion, and the CIA’s NIE’s and SNIE’s of September 20, 1960, December 8, 1960, and October 21, 1964, all remain classified. Considering the Orwellian atmosphere prevalent in the U.S. today, these documents likely will never be released.\textsuperscript{865} In the honest words from the individual who alone inspired me to become a

\textsuperscript{861} See Federalist 77. Wills, ed, The Federalist Papers, p. 399.
\textsuperscript{862} Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 167, 169.
\textsuperscript{864} Saunders, who authored the foreword for Parker’s The Six Day War, also worked for the CIA before joining the NSC during the Kennedy administration. His “invisible government” document, which described the CIA’s covert faction as “insidious,” was prepared for a presentation to be given to Career Company Trainees. Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, December 1, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32651.htm (document 158); Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders, March 15, 1968, Ibid http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxiii/32651.htm (document 180); Parker, ed., The Six Day War, pp. xi-xiii.
\textsuperscript{865} Two months after 9/11 President Bush issued Executive Order 13233 changing the Presidential Records Act of 1978, granting future President the right to classify any document, specifically any “confidential communicators” between the President, Vice-President and their unelected advisors. Shifting the burden from the state to the scholar to establish a “document need,” in March 2003 EO 13291 replaced the April 17, 1995, EO 129598 extending the waiting period for national security documents from 25 years to 28 years. All CIA documents now have to wait 50 years to be given to NARA. On Obama’s first full day in office he decided that he alone would decide which documents would be made available to NARA. EO 13489 stated that any “incumbent and former” President could “identify any” documents which they believed to constitute “executive privilege.” The only way NARA could challenge this order would be for the “incumbent President” to agree a “final court order” from the Attorney General. “Frank Costigliola and Thomas Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of the U.S. Foreign Relations: A Primer,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, pp. 32-33; Schulzinger, “Transparency, Secrecy and Citizenship,” DH, 25, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 170-171, 176.; “3- Executive Order 13489- Presidential Records,” January 21, 2009, APP, PPUS; http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive_orders.php.
historian, “a country that hides something is a country that is afraid of getting caught.”

On the cover of Cohen’s *Israel and the Bomb*, Segev commented that the book would “necessitate the rewriting of Israel’s entire history.” Due to Israel’s futile search for absolute security, however, this bold declaration has failed to materialize. In breaking Thomas Friedman’s mantra that transparency and accountability represent the “building blocks” of any democracy, there has always been a weakness in numbers and disclosure mentality in Israel. Uri Bailer has pointed out that for “complex” reasons Israel retained the British Mandate’s “secrecy” system following its creation. The nation’s “iron rule” 30-year declassification formula for primary documents does not apply to Dimona documents, national security Cabinet meetings have only been publicized up to 1958. The desire for classification on all sides guarantees that some words in Dimona’s history will probably never reach the public realm because they were never committed to paper. Former Soviet Deputy Foreign Vladimir Semyonov has promulgated that “the revolution is conducted not on paper, but rather in conversation, in things that are said on the telephone…” History transpires in conversation not citation: “do you ever listen to the sense of the law being written as it is spoken?” EMET’s January 1952 creation, RAFAEL’s June 1958 reorganization, the French-Israeli atomic agreements, Lundahl’s U-2 briefings to Ike, Feldman’s August 1962 trip to sell Israel the HAWK, and the Nixon-Meir understanding were all made orally outside the eyes of a democracy’s theoretical watchdogs.

Congressman Dr. Ron Paul has argued that a democracy exists when “the purpose of government is to protect the secrecy…of all individuals not the secrecy of government.”

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868 Uri Bialer, “Top Hat, Tuxedo and the Cannons,” pp. 1-2; Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 28
869 Ginor and Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona*, p. 51.
871 Ron Paul: Don’t Tread on Me,” [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGHuFtP8w8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGHuFtP8w8) (8:25).
is not a democracy but rather a "guardianship," which exists when rulers believe they are incapable of making "wise and virtuous" decisions under democratic restraints. Since Israel has no written constitution, Ben Gurion, Eshkol, and Meir all believed that the nuclear issue was too sensitive to be debated by any one in the Knesset, intelligentsia, and the press. Bypassed in the project's financing, Knesset members were banned from Dimona during its construction and received no information about Dimona until de Shalit began to do so in the spring of 1962. Even when the Finance and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees began to receive Dimona briefs in late 1962, they still possessed no influence in shaping policy. The Parliament faced no much public pressure to probe the executive for pursuing such a secretive policy. Freedom without responsibility is a terrible consequence of an excess of entitled individuality. Most people prefer to try to outdo those around them rather than question the decisions being made by those above them. Echoing Machiavelli’s observation that when the "state is in need of its citizens" few "can be found," the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East was an ineffectual group which failed to rally a public manipulated by a state-controlled media.

With the exception of Hersh, the U.S. media’s deceptive coverage of Dimona followed whatever the White House line. Chillingly, former DCI William Colby’s chilling statement that the CIA "owns everyone of any significance in the major media." Angleton alone operated a set of ten reporters to carry out "dangerous" CIA "assignments." During the height of the Exodus theatre, the CIA-controlled and Jewish-dominated media led by Finney, Sulzberger and Pearson misled and manipulated the U.S. public about Dimona when the story broke. Quoting directly from the state script, on December 23, 1960, the NYT’s Alvin Schuster relayed that the

872 Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapon, p. 17.
reactor was not “a cause for special concern.” During the 1960s the U.S. media downplayed
Israel’s nuclear ambitions, while fraudulently promoting that Nasser was pursuing the bomb.876

From August 1962 to July 1965, the NYT’s Hanson Baldwin and Max Frankel
propagandized that both Israel and Egypt were pursuing the bomb. In the week after the Six Day
War, probable CIA asset Alfred Friendly erroneously concluded in the WP that Egypt was
seeking Indian and Chinese atomic assistance. Anonymity also defined the media’s Dimona
coverage. On December 20 the WP advocated that the “free and democratic Israel” be allowed to
pursue the bomb. On December 26 Time, owned by a CIA asset, assured that Israel was still a
“considerable way from producing the bomb.” Four days after the PTBT had been initialed, a
nameless NYT article reemphasized that both the “UAR and Israel” were pursuing the bomb. The
CIA could have also been behind the nameless Dimona stories found in Operation Mockingbird
minions like Reuters, Newsweek, AP, and UPI.877

Similar to Kennan’s general observation on the bomb, the final record on Dimona is still
“not yet in.”878 On March 12, 1969, the NSC foreshadowed that an Israeli bomb would endanger
its own “future.”879 Since Israel already possesses at least 150 bombs, there is no reason why
Dimona should not be immediately mothballed. Melman has warned that the 50 year-old reactor
is now vulnerable to a “safety mishaps.”880 A Chernobyl type disaster at Dimona would place the
Marines and Special Forces hospital and “black site” fighter base the U.S. has located in the

876 The thesis incorporated 200 anonymously written pieces.
878 See Federalist 41. Willis, The Federalist Papers, p. 207; Kennan, American Diplomacy, vi.
879 Talking Points, March 12, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), National Security (NSC) Files,
880 Yossi Melman, “Israel and U.S. sign nuclear cooperation agreement,” Ha’aretz, April 14, 2008,
hasen/spages/1043824.html; Israel has at least 150 atomic weapons: Carter,” Reuters, May 26, 2008,
Negev in jeopardy. Still, Israel prefers egotistical denial before rational introspection as it pushes towards war with Iran over Tehran’s nuclear program.

There is still no credible evidence that Iran is actually pursuing the bomb. Historian Garreth Porter pointed out in late August 2009 that in November 2007 the IC had concluded that Iran, which began constructing “contingency centers” in preparation for a U.S. attack in early 2002, had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Iran has also allowed the IAEA to conduct inspections at its Arak and Natanz facilities and disclosed the existence of its Qom facility to the IAEA on September 21 four days before Obama and two historic allies accused Tehran of hiding the “covert” facility from the world at the G20. Scott Ritter, a former Marine and UN Iraq Weapons Inspector, argued soon after that Obama’s accusation that Iran was deceiving the world was “technically and legally wrong.” In denouncing a warmongering October 3 NYT story, Ritter declared on C-SPAN that Iran is a “threat to nobody.” The U.S. government and media are lying again. The business suit and shiny black shoes are a most clever cover. In this solipsistic age of instant emotional gratification history has become irrelevant. Ritter admitted that the U.S. people usually always forget their own “history.”

886 Appendix G, my longstanding computer screen background, was found at www.infowars.com.
The U.S. has done little to discourage or restrain Israel. According to *Ha'aretz*, a week after Obama's election victory a "well placed...source" close to the President-elect stated that the U.S. would provide Israel with a "nuclear umbrella" in case of an Iranian atomic attack. Following the election, the NIC's *Global Trends 2025* was released weeks later, warning that "a nuclear Iran would increase pressure for" the U.S. to give Israel a "security umbrella." A day before Obama and Netanyahu met for the first time at the White House, Cohen wrote on May 17, 2009, that the Meir-Nixon 1969 accord and Clinton's 1998 letter to Netanyahu are held in Israel as precedents to avoid linkage to its "silent nuclear monopoly." Following the Netanyahu-Obama meeting, the U.S. has provided subtle winks that it would turn a blind eye to Israeli military action. On October 8, 2009, Kissinger professed that he could "understand" the "legitimacy" in any future Israeli strike on Iran. Declaring to Harvard historian Niall Ferguson that leadership is proven through the "lonely road" of "moral courage," Kissinger cautioned that the "greatest danger" on this issue was "impatience." With a statue of Lincoln in the background, Obama muttered in his first press conference that he did not "want to speculate" when asked by Helen Thomas if he knew of any Near East nation possessing "nuclear weapons." Access is power and Israel's dedicated and reflexive Jewish supporters- Strauss, Rabi, Teller, Feldman, Feinberg, Rivkin, Rostow, Frankel and the Sulzbergers- have always had it where it matters. Its neighbors never will. As long as the "power

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889 NIC, *Global Trends 2025*, pp. 93.


of money” remains equated with free speech Israel will continue to dictate policy to the U.S.\textsuperscript{893} Politics rarely impedes or informs reality. Madison’s warning that a “bad cause seldom fails to betray itself” echoes Vanunu’s March 2007 revelation that Dimona could precipitate a nuclear war and “second Holocaust.”\textsuperscript{894} There will be no “new beginning” to U.S. foreign policy in the Near East.\textsuperscript{895} The end has no end. True freedom is found in the audacity to lose all hope.\textsuperscript{896} I close with the wise words of Kennan who opposed Truman’s decision to recognize Israel on May 14, 1948, as Foggy Bottom’s Policy Planning Chairman:

\begin{quote}
History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics... Whoever thinks the future is going to be easier than the past is certainly mad.\textsuperscript{897}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{893} “421-Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961, APP, \textit{PPUS}.
\textsuperscript{895} “Presidential Speech in Egypt,” June 4, 2009, C-SPAN, \url{http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/286821-1} (58:13).
\textsuperscript{896} \textit{Fight Club} (1999).
\textsuperscript{897} On Wednesday, May 12, Clifford, Secretary of State Marshall and Truman met in the White House to discuss Palestine’s future. The iconic General Marshall scolded Truman’s short-sighted approach, declaring that he could not understand “why Clifford” was attending the “foreign policy” meeting since he was a “domestic advisor.” Clifford, the principle author behind the National Security Act, argued that he “functioned” as a de-facto “National Security Advisor” under Truman, foreshadowing future policy debates between Foggy Bottom and the NSC-CIA-Pentagon-IC. Beginning with the above mentioned “Showdown in the White House,” Clifford included the following passage from Angleton’s favorite poet, T.S. Eliot, to open his first memoir chapter: “A people without history is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern of timeless moments.” Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, \textit{Counsel to the President} (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 3-14; Prados, \textit{Safe for Democracy}, pp. 33-34; Mangold, \textit{Cold Warrior}, p. 331; Kennan, \textit{American Diplomacy}, pp. 66, 73.
Appendix C- CFR Individual Membership

Dean Acheson  Graham T. Allison  Robert Anderson
George Ball   Richard Bissell    McGeorge Bundy
William Bundy Jimmy Carter      Ray Cline
Hillary Clinton Bill Clinton    Nathaniel Davis
Arthur Dean    Douglas Dillon    Allen Dulles
John F. Dulles Dwight Eisenhower Max Frankel
William C. Foster John Lewis Gaddis Raymond Goodpaster
Katherine Graham James P. Grant W. Averrell Harriman
Richard Helms  Christian Herter Amory Houghton
Paul Jabber    Charles Johnson  Spurgeon Keeny
Henry Kissinger Walter Laqueur John J. McCloy
Robert McNamara Drew Middleton Paul Nitze
Richard Neustadt Richard Nolte William Polk
William Quandt  I.I. Rabi       Ogden Reid
James Reston    Abraham Ribicoff Chalmers Roberts
Elihu Root      Walt Rostow     Eugene Rostow
Dean Rusk       David Sanger    Phillips Talbot
Raymond Tanter Cyril Vance    Stephen Walt
Robin Winks     Paul Wolfowitz

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