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Abstract

This study examines how rhetoric was used to socially construct a torture sustaining reality in the United States after the September 11th terrorist attacks, by both print journalists and President George W. Bush's Administration. After the 9/11 attacks terrorism received wide attention from the media and public. As a result of these attacks, the United States began the "war on terror" and invaded Afghanistan and later Iraq. During these invasions allegations of torture by the American military began to emerge.

This study carries out a content analysis of claims about terrorism and responses to allegations of torture. This analysis is guided by the contextual social constructionist approach of Joel Best (1990) and Stanley Cohen's (2001) study of "denials". The contextual social constructionist approach of Best (1990) is the theoretical departure point for a sample drawn from the New York Times as well as a sample drawn from the Internet website for the Whitehouse during George W. Bush's tenure as President. A final sample drawn from the same Whitehouse website will be engaged through an amalgamation of Best's (1990) contextual social constructionist approach and Cohen's (2001) study of "denials".

This study reveals that the construction of terrorism as a social problem aided the maintenance of a torture sustaining reality. This study further explains how rationalizations are used by a liberal government to maintain a torture sustaining reality through the use of rhetoric and denials. In addition, this study shows that a torture sustaining reality is supported through the mobilization of language that dehumanizes (the process of othering) those who stand in opposition to it. As well, this study demonstrates how the concepts of risk and moral panic also help to explain how this
torture sustaining reality is maintained in a liberal state. Furthermore, this study also investigates the claim-making process. In pursuing these areas, the study illustrates how denials are rhetorically composed, or in other words what language is used and how it is used to form denials. More specifically, this study reveals how the rhetoric of denial is formed and shifts to support a torture sustaining reality during a claims-making episode.

Secondly, claims-making about terrorism does not always follow the “typical” path of most claim-making about social problems. Claims-making about terrorism sometimes involves the “Rhetoric of Rectitude” and the “Rhetoric of Rationality”, which can be intertwined to help predicate a torture sustaining reality, or may predominantly rely upon the “Rhetoric of Rectitude”. Finally, this study alerts us to very paradoxical nature that freedom occupies in this world, and how easily the notion of freedom may be championed to justify atrocities.
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Introduction

1. Background

On September 11th, 2001 two planes crashed into and destroyed the World Trade Centre buildings in New York killing almost 3000 people. This event, often referred to as the 9/11 attacks, will be remembered for years to come. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States declared a “war on terror”, and as a result led an invasion of Afghanistan in early 2001 and later Iraq in 2003 and now currently occupies both countries.

After the occupation of these countries, allegations of torture by American forces began to surface. These allegations of torture by American forces arguably first reached the public via a 60 Minutes expose on abuse in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by American soldiers shown on April 28, 2004, although abuses were suspected to have occurred much earlier in the “war on terror”. Numerous images of the capturers “posing” with the “tortured” detainees were shown. The abuses varied from psychological to various levels of physical abuse ranging from hoodings, beatings, attacks by dogs, sodomy, to killings etc. (Harbury, 2005; “Out of Sight”, 2004; Rangel, 2006; Seidman, 2005).

As a result, since 9/11 the issue of torture by American forces has received wide media coverage and public concern. Recently, on April 22, 2009, a full report by the Senate Armed Services Committee entitled, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, was declassified. This report shows that regardless of claims by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration that the United States does not torture, and when it does occur that these are just “a few bad apples,” that torture historically, and up until the recent American election, was a facet of the American military: “The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited
information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees” (Committee on Armed Services, 2008, p. xii). Despite the revealing results of this report (which notably does not investigate the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret prisons), newly elected President Obama’s National Intelligence Director Dennis C. Blair in a private memo noted that, “High value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used and provided a deeper understanding of Al Qaida organization that was attacking this country” (Baker, 2009, para. 2). Hence, the significance of this issue seemingly still looms over the world.

2. Public Reaction

According to Weiss (2006), after the immediate shock subsided the torture scandal was largely absent from both media and public discussion, with a significant portion of the American public approving a degree of torture (p. 134; “Out of Sight”, 2004; Bennet, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006; Jackson, 2007; Altheide, 2007). Concurrently, Bennett et al., (2006) in their study of how torture was presented by the American media found that “. . . even at the height of the Abu Ghraib story, the most prominent categorization by far was “abuse”, with “torture” barely appearing in the news coverage” (Bennet et al., p. 474; Seidman, 2005; McCoy, 2005; Altheide, 2007). While Greenberg (2006) compliments this by noting that even with numerous pictures, reports (both governmental and non-governmental), and research conducted on the abuse at Abu Ghraib, the American public is seemingly indifferent to any discussion or debate about the issue of torture. Thus, it is not overly unexpected to find that a poll by the Christian Science Monitor in November of 2001 found that one in three Americans thought the
torture of terrorist subjects was justified (in Luban, 2007). By 2002 a report from the Gallup Poll Monthly, which used a national telephone survey of 1011 randomly chosen adults with a 95% confidence interval, found that three in four Americans felt that the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay was acceptable. A later poll in (2004) found that "...45 percent of the [American] population now supports torture, given the proper conditions" (Norris, Rockmore, & Margolis, 2004, pp. 257-258). Meanwhile, an oft cited Newsweek article, reported that 44 percent of Americans feel torture is occasionally justified in order to secure information, with 51 percent saying it is never justified, and 58 percent contending that if a terrorist attack was removed it is justified (Thomas et al., 2005). By 2005 an ABC/Washington Post poll found that 35 percent thought torture was appropriate in certain situations, and another 46 percent thought that abuse just less than torture was appropriate. A poll from The Gallup Organization, which used 1006 adults in a national and randomized telephone survey with a 95% confidence interval, found that 74% of Americans believed the United States had used torture in Iraq and other countries, with 38% believing that torture was justified if the suspects had information regarding more terrorist attacks. Another poll in 2005 conducted by AP-Ipsos found that 38 percent of Americans thought torture was acceptable if it meant that it would provide such things as useful information, while 26 percent thought it could only be rarely justified.

Meanwhile, a CBS poll found that 57 percent of Americans did not want any more photos of Abu Ghraib shown, and 49 percent thought that the media had discussed the issue enough (Jackson, 2007; Hannah, 2006). Thus, one can conclude with relative safety that relatively large segments of the American public during the period of 2001 until at least 2006 believed that torture is an appropriate response to terrorist attacks, or at best a
justifiable cost if it prevents further terrorist attacks. As McCoy (2005) puts it, “After September 11, the U.S. media created a public consensus for torture” (p. 209), and so in sum, it would seem that the American public is “. . . willing to allow anything that promises to avoid the pain of terrorist attacks” (Weiss, 2006, p. 136). Perhaps more significantly here is that these polls alert us that public opinion supporting torture shows that a “torture sustaining reality” had “taken hold” (Jackson, 2007, p. 361).

Linked closely to the acceptance of torture is the public’s acceptance that the threat of terrorism on American soil is legitimate and likely: “The vox populi is enlisted as a front-line agent in the crusade against the designated evil. Members of the public are relied upon to express contempt for the folk devils and support for the rule enforcers” (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 330). Woods (2007) notes that for numerous decades the Gallup Poll has asked Americans what they thought was the most serious problem facing the country. In 2001 respondents placed terrorism as a key concern, with 46 percent saying this in October of 2001 and almost 50 percent agreeing by 2006. A Gallup Poll in 2004 found that 61 percent of Americans thought that terrorists would attack any locale in the United States, while only 31 percent thought they would attack only larger urban areas (Victor, 2006). Meanwhile, another Gallop Poll in 2004, after the American election, found that only 41 percent of Americans thought an attack was likely. Victor (2006) attributes this difference due to Bush’s usage of fear of terrorism, finding that after the election in 2004, 33 percent of Americans thought terrorism was their “greatest concern”, with 79 percent of the voters for Bush believing terrorism and national security were “concerns”. This fear of terrorism will be shown to be a major factor, which was
used to support the Bush Administration’s usage of torture and the broader torture sustaining reality.

Also, the dismissal of torture by the American public can be seen to be reflected in how the population feels regarding restrictions on civil liberties. If restrictions to the civil liberties of the host can receive support, then it is not a far jump to also consider accepting the curtailment of the “others” freedoms and human rights. In other words, if one believes that it is justifiable to restrict one’s civil liberties, then it is conceivable that the restriction of civil liberties of “others” are palatable if not requisite. Victor (2006) notes that a national survey in 2004 found that a third of Americans are willing to remove basic civil liberties of others: 40 percent thought being critical of the government should be prohibited; 33 percent thought the media should also be restricted from transmitting inflammatory comments about the government either as anti-war protests or individual criticisms; and two-thirds thought that detainment by law enforcement officials of suspected terrorists could be indefinite. Crelinsten (2005a) finds that, “It is ironic that public opinion in the host country can only too readily turn against refugees rather than the regime responsible for their plight” (p. 76). Correspondingly, Ulrich and Cohrs (2007) note, “...there is evidence to suggest that such events [terrorist attacks] in fact did shift public opinion toward increased support of government authorities, harsh policies, and system-justifying ideologies” (p. 117).

3. Theoretical Departure

9/11, as many scholars have found, presents a situation that is both topical for media and researchers alike (Deflem, 2004; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Kellner, 2004; Woods, 2007). Turk (2004), a prominent terrorism researcher, writes that “Probably the most
significant contribution of sociological thinking to our understanding of terrorism is the realization that it is a social construction” (p. 271; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004). In short, “Regardless of the lack of consensus in what constitutes terrorism, the definition and imagery put forth by the media and politi is real in its consequences; a socially constructed label that defines someone or something (folk-devils/evil-doers) as a threat to our values and interests” (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 331).

Terrorism, then, as a socially constructed phenomenon, is dependent upon the media and state for its creation and diffusion (Zulaika & Douglas 1996, in Altheide, 2006a, p. 432). Thus, as constructionists assert, social problems are collectively defined and rise and fall in a marketplace of ideas (Best, 1990; Blumer, 1971; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). From the constructionists’ departure point, conditions are best analyzed not as stable objective realities, but as phenomena that are interpreted differently in terms of the values and vested interests of various claimants. According to Best (1989b), “... our sense of what is or is not a social problem is a product, something that has been produced or constructed through social activities. In this view, social problems are not conditions; conditions are merely the subjects of claims” (p. 6). In regards to terrorism, McMillian (2004) similarly notes that terrorism is highly subjective; however, seemingly few alternatives to explain the attacks were presented (p. 390-391). Thus, for a constructionist, the “war or terror” is but one of a multitude of social ills from which to choose to focus attention, and the point becomes not so much what started this campaign, or even whether the threat is an objective reality, but how this threat in particular has
been given prominence when faced with other arguably equal or more pressing social problems. Mythen and Walklate (2006b) note,

Whilst the deaths of those who suffered in 9/11 were both shocking and horrific, there is a need to maintain perspective and to situate this tragedy alongside other global disasters. As a result of the 2003 earthquake in Bam in Iran, 43,200 people were killed, 30,000 injured and up to 75,600 left homeless. Since US troops invaded Iraq in 2003, over [68,347-74,753] people have been killed. (p. 390; Chermak and Gruenewald; Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Ryan, 2004).

4. The Use of Torture in a Liberal State

Many would agree that the tenets of a liberal state would be directly opposed to the sanctioning of torture (Blakeley, 2007; Cohen, 2005a; Crelinsten, 2003; Ericson, 2005; Hannah, 2006; Jackson, 2007; Luban, 2007; Ramsay, 2006; Welch, 2003; Weiss, 2006). Liberal states typically espouse that all humans should be treated respectfully even in times of war: ". . . the public discourse of liberal states is generally one of opposition to torture, on the basis that liberal norms, enshrined in domestic and international law, prohibit it use” (Blakeley, 2007, pp. 374-375). Consequently, how has the use of torture by the United States been able to occur given the context of a liberal state, which should preclude even contemplating the use of torture?

Hindess (2001a, 2001b) forcefully shows that liberal tenets are not only based on more than the assumption of freedom, but also on the assumption of unfreedom. What Hindess (2001a) critically notes is that the tenets of a liberal society are twofold: on one hand, liberalism exalts the virtue of freedom and the defense of it, while at the same time it equally exalts the view that freedom is inextricably intertwined with authoritarian rule in order to maintain this “freedom”. In other words, freedom is dialectically interwoven
with the notion that freedom may, in order to be maintained, necessitate restriction.

Thus, the paradox of freedom and unfreedom arises:

... liberal political thought, from its earliest beginnings, has acknowledged that it may be necessary to employ authoritarian means in the government of those, who for whatever reason, are not regarded as presently capable of conducting themselves on a suitably autonomous fashion. (Hindess, 2001a, pp. 366-367)

For Hindess (2001b) there are three possibilities for this unfreedom to manifest for populations deemed incapable of acting autonomously: first, “Hopeless Cases”, are those subjects who are deemed wholly incapable of “evolution” to the level of the free liberal state; second, “The Subjects of Improvement”, are those subjects who are deemed partially capable of evolution but requiring aid from the liberal state; and third, “The Ethos of Welfare”, are those subjects deemed to require assistance with such things as education etc. in order to evolve to the liberal state’s level. For Hindess (2001b) the role of experts in deciding which of these three courses of action transpires is paramount.

Thus, considering the use of torture by liberal states, Hindess would ask how does a liberal regime govern the ungovernable, the unpredictable, the incomprehensible - those deemed incapable of autonomous action? Reliance on torture can be understood in Hindess’s terms, then, by how the United States views terrorists in general and terrorists of Middle Eastern nationality in particular. In Hindess and Helliwell’s (2002) look at liberalism and the government of subject peoples, they forcefully argue that liberalism is bifurcated. It not only purports the “rule of uniformity” but also a “hierarchical form of rule” where necessary (p. 143). Thus, in their findings, subject peoples are not only swept under the false rug of uniformity, but more importantly are sometimes subjected to strict authoritarian rule (As such, the problem lies more in how liberal regimes fail to
recognize their cultural elitism, then in how they impose the rule of uniformity).

Thereby, these ungovernable subject peoples create an uncertainty [that] legitimizes the introduction of technologies that seek to transform the relationship between present and future. Examples include, self defense, domestic surveillance of the entire population, tighter control of aviation, collection of personal and biometric data, new military and satellite-aided technologies, and [torture] . . . . (Kessler & Werner, 2008, p. 295).

Following this, Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster (2008) note, “Stereotypes of the ‘other’ and imaginaries of the Islamic terrorist are insidiously reactivated within the framework of risk” (p. 151; Marvasti, 2005). Thus, with this in mind, the usage of torture in these cases is less disagreeable because of the view that terrorists are not and cannot become autonomous actors: “. . . anxiety, then, arises from the belief that they may, at any moment, be confronted by the irrational and therefore unpredictable conduct of numerous others” (p. 373). What this further alerts us to is that the unpredictability of terrorism allows for a liberal regime to support a culture of torture as a means of imposing social order where no forms of “autonomous social orders” exist (p. 372). In short, the use of torture is less disagreeable with liberal tenets as it appears on the surface, but seemingly completely a part of it. In essence, the unpredictability or incalculableness of terrorism is functional in the sense that it provides for the justification torture.

Meanwhile, researchers and various human rights organizations concur that torture, conducted in various countries including Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, at various British and U.S. sectors in Iraq, and at other secret CIA ‘black sites’ in various countries (see Cole, 2006), and performed by both state actors and actors under the employ of the state (referred to as PMFs or private military
The Social Construction of a Torture Sustaining Reality

firms; Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005), has been a feature in the “war on terror” (Amnesty International, 2007; Blakeley, 2007; Cohen & Corrado, 2005; Cohen, 2005b; Danner, 2004; Gordon, 2006; Greenberg & Dratel, 2005; Hannah, 2006; Harbury, 2005; Hooks & Mosher, 2005; Brody, 2004; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009a/2009b; Khan, 2005; Mooney & Young, 2005).5 Bellamy (2006) goes as far as saying, “It is . . . clear that torture has become a core tactic in the war on terror” (p. 147).

Crelinsten (2005a) forcefully writes, “Torture thrives because those in power and those who execute their power within state bureaucracies, the military, the police and, ultimately, the media and the education system, condition people to believe things, to think in certain ways and hence to act towards others in certain ways” (p. 79). Amnesty International (2007) uses the following for a definition of torture:

Torture is defined in the UN Convention against Torture as the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering for purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, or punishing, intimidating or coercing someone. The term is applied to those forms of ill-treatment that are particularly severe and are deliberate. (“Torture and Ill-treatment”, 2007, “What is Torture” section, para., 1-2)6

In conclusion, liberal states have particular reasons for adopting the use of torture and particular ways of denying and justifying its use. This study will help to elucidate how particular constructions of terrorism can be used in order to allow for a torture sustaining reality to be maintained.

5. Explanation of Study

This thesis is an examination of how rhetoric is used to rationalize action (committing atrocities). I am examining this theme by principally engaging the work of Joel Best (1990) who looked at how rhetoric was used by claimants to construct missing children as a social problem, and Stanley Cohen (2001) who looked at how various
denials are used to support torture. This study specifically examines how the United States government under the Bush Administration accounted for torture during the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. The principle question driving this work is how can we account for the rationalizations a democratic regime uses to justify or condone the atrocities it commits? In other words, how do particular types of denials and rhetoric work to allow for a liberal state to justify the use of torture?

In order to analyze a liberal state’s rationalization of acts of torture I will conduct a media analysis. This media analysis will look at both print and Internet media discourse. My analysis will be divided into three basic samples. Each sample analysis will constitute a Chapter of my thesis and will reflect a sub-theme, which in total will help to elucidate my main theme, which is how rhetoric is used to allow for a torture sustaining reality.

6. Plan of Thesis

In Chapter One, I will explore the theoretical approaches of both Best (1990) and Cohen (1990). This Chapter will delineate the contextual social constructionist approach of Best (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) usage of denial theory. Best’s (1990) contextual social constructionist approach will be engaged in order to help demonstrate how terrorism was framed as a social problem, while Cohen’s (2001) denial theory will be engaged to help show how allegations of torture were responded to. As a further component, Chapter One will discuss the concept of “othering”. As well, Chapter One will discuss the relation of the above theoretical notions of Best (1990) and Cohen (2001) to the concepts of moral panics, social problems, and risk.
In Chapter Two, I will define the methodological orientation of this thesis. The methodological approach of this study is based in the rhetorical analysis of Best (1990) who looked at how claimants utilize various rhetorical arguments to have their claims gain prominence in the marketplace of claims. As a result, this study through engaging Best’s (1990) model of the claims-making process will utilize a discourse analysis stemming from his model. Chapter Two will also establish the relevance of Best’s (1990) perspectives regarding the claims-making process for the current study. Best’s (1990) analysis is relevant for this study because it will help to demonstrate which and how claims were used to define terrorism as a social problem, and in turn will help to explain how these claims ultimately helped to support a torture sustaining reality.

In Chapter Three, I examine a sample of print claims regarding terrorism made in the New York Times (this sample will cover the period from the onset of the attacks to the invasion of Afghanistan from September 11th, 2001 to October 8th, 2001). This will demonstrate how the press defined terrorism during the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks on the World Trade Centre. This analysis is grounded in a contextualist social constructionist form of analysis employed by Best (1990) who primarily focused his study on the rhetoric used in claims-making about missing children. Best (1990) viewed claims-making as a rhetorical process, and so rhetoric can be used to analyze how a social problem comes to be defined. Best’s (1990) social constructionist orientation focused on how rhetoric is used by claimants to form arguments and thereby rationalizations. He specifically looked at how various types of rhetoric constituents such as grounds, warrants, and conclusion statements form arguments, and thus serve to construct particular points of view and courses of action regarding a given social
problem. In conjunction with identifying which of Best's (1990) *grounds*, *warrants*, and *conclusions* were dominant in the discourse of terrorism, thus serving as a comparison for how social problems are rhetorically developed, this study will also indicate and develop any of these argument constituents which are new. In other words, this study will help to show which argument constituents are consistent with Best's (1990) findings and which forms are novel.

As well, Best's (1990) study, which outlined the process of *typification*, was primarily concerned with how victims are depicted; this analysis also examines how the press in the New York Times *typified* not only the victims but also the terrorists. This *typifying* othering of the terrorist is equally important in the creation of terrorism as a threat because it helps to establish the threat (and what it is not) and the target of the response to it. *Typifying* a problem, therefore, focuses the readers' attention as to what the problem is, the particular facets of the problem, and what elements are not parts of the problem. Thus, this study will more specifically delve and build upon an understanding of the process of *typification* and its relation to the othering of the terrorist. In sum, Chapter Three will analyze claims made in the New York Times demonstrating how various *grounds*, *warrants*, and *conclusion statements* in these claims help to define terrorism as a social problem for the United States. Specifically, this analysis will demonstrate how the New York Times depicts terrorism as a threat to the United States.

Chapter Four is comprised of an analysis of a sample of Internet claims regarding terrorism made on the United States Government's website by President George W. Bush and various members of his Administration. The analysis of claims by the Bush Administration, which builds upon Best's (1990) model of the claims-making process,
will look specifically at the rhetoric these state actors use to form their views about terrorism. This analysis will examine the degree to which new warrants were used. For instance, Best (1990) identified the warrant of "Blameless Victims", which pointed out that children cannot be blamed when victimized, and "The Value of Children" which pointed out that children are invaluable; in contrast, claimants in this sample emphasized the blameworthiness of the perpetrator and their valueless. Thus, this study will contribute to the theoretical process of how claims change and are used, and in turn will increase our existing social knowledge regarding this area.

As well, Best's (1990) study, focusing on missing children, held that claim-makers arguments typically shift over time from the "Rhetoric of Rectitude" to the "Rhetoric of Rationality":

The rhetoric of morality or rectitude . . . tends to be adopted by relatively inexperienced claims-makers during the early stages of social problem construction. . . . The rhetoric of rectitude is more likely to be directed either toward the already converted — who share the crusaders' values — or toward those who are openly hostile. . . . The rhetoric of rationality [is preferred] by . . . experienced insider claims-makers, representing pressure groups' positions on well-established social problems. (Best, 1989b, pp. 43-44)

This Chapter will determine whether claims hold both the rhetoric of rectitude and rationality equally or if one type of rhetoric is more prominently featured, and how these concepts participate in the justification of torture. Finally, this analysis will demonstrate how state actors including President George W. Bush constructed terrorism as a threat to the United States.

Chapter Five is comprised of an analysis of a sample of Internet claims by President Bush and various members of his Administration in response to accusations of torture conducted by the American armed forces. This analysis will mainly engage
Cohen's (2001) use of denial theory that looks at how various actors rationalize atrocities. Cohen (2001) looked at various kinds of denials including literal, interpretive, and implicatory denials (which can be further sub-divided). A component to Cohen’s (2001) orientation is his focus on how dehumanization of the victim allows for and condones the use of torture. However, this was not a primary concern of Cohen’s (2001), and subsequently my analysis will delve more deeply into how this element relates to the broader picture of a torture sustaining reality. As such, I will explore how the Bush Administration’s dehumanizing or othering of terrorists helped to promote the use of torture by its armed forces. As Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, & Van Munster (2008) point out, “... security practices have been exposed as ‘othering’, boundary-drawing and violent. The specification of the enemy is the very condition of possibility for the deployment of security” (p. 151).

Best’s (1990) study is a useful augmentation to Cohen’s (2001) schema. Claims here used the grounds that the enemy is inhuman(e), and thus not only do accusations and facts of torture become more palatable, but so too do denials that torture has occurred. In other words, torture can be more readily rationalized and administered and later put under the rug if the foci of the act is defined as being at the periphery of being human. In particular, a component of this Chapter will focus on how terrorists are typified in these claims. As a further departure point, Best’s (1990) usage of grounds, warrants, and conclusion statements to form arguments will also be engaged to help delineate the rationalizations of torture; for instance, the grounds used through the othering of “terrorists”, specifically Saddam Hussein, form the basis upon which the warrants, “Americans are freedom fighters”, “Americans are supporters of human rights
legislation”, “America is an open society”, serve the denial conclusion that torture did not occur or was at worst minimal and justified. In sum, by combining Best’s (1990) rhetorical analysis model and Cohen’s (2001) concepts of denial, this Chapter will provide a relatively unique way in which to examine how the rhetoric of denial is formed and used in response to allegations of torture in a liberal state.

As well, Cohen’s (2001) study, while acknowledging that “Literal”, “Interpretive”, and “Implicatory” denials are often employed in conjunction with each other, and to some extent occur in a particular order, did not fully develop the specific processes through which official denials transpire in a democratic regime, nor which denials are more prominently featured, nor explicitly how these denials shift during a claims-making episode. For instance, Cohen (2001) identifies seven forms of denial: “Denial of knowledge”, “Denial of responsibility”, “Denial of injury”, “Denial of the victim”, “Condemnation of the condemners”, “Appeal to higher loyalties”, and “Moral indifference”. However, he does not completely elaborate upon which denials are more typical of democratic regimes, and, in particular, which denials are typically represented prior to or after an atrocity becomes public. In sum, this analysis will demonstrate how President George W. Bush and his Administration responded to accusations of torture, and in so doing constructed their denials, through engaging and building upon the theoretical concepts of Cohen (2001) and Best (1990).

Chapter Six will present the discussion and conclusions of this study.

7. Concluding Comments

As such, this thesis will provide a greater understanding of the specific mechanisms and processes through which rhetoric is used to construct a torture sustaining
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reality. This study will thereby help explain how rhetoric is used to form social problems. By demonstrating how the typification of the threat of terrorism as a social problem, and the dehumanizing of the terrorists, occurred, through the discourse of the media and state actors, this study will show how a culture of torture was able to take hold and gain a significant degree of acceptance. In other words, this study will demonstrate that even from within a liberal state torture can not only be permitted but also justified as consistent with the liberal state’s underpinnings when found with particular kinds of opponents. In conjunction, this study will also show how this torture sustaining reality was also reflected in the world and maintained through persistent denials by President Bush and members of his Administration that atrocities had actually occurred. Moreover, in Best’s (1990) terms, this study will demonstrate that the threat of terrorism along with the othering of terrorists served as the grounds, for the warrant that “Rights and Freedoms” were being devalued, for the conclusion that torture was justifiably denied in order to secure safety, intelligence, peace, and human rights.

In conclusion, this study builds on the work of both Best (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) in the following ways: Best (1990) focused on the development of a more “typical” social problem, that of child abuse, while this analysis is examining claims about the social problem of terrorism and its relationship to torture which occurred before and during an invasion and a war. Moreover, the data in this study has more breadth in the sense that it concerns claimants, which was not the primary focus of Best (1990). Cohen’s (2001) focus was relatively broad, if not encyclopedic on one hand, as it did not delve too deeply into certain data, but also narrow on the other hand, in that its focus was not mainly in examining denial of atrocities by current democratic regimes but on past
authoritative regimes. Finally, Chapter Five of this study combines the approaches of both Best (1990) and Cohen (2001) demonstrating a novel way to examine the rhetoric used in denials. Consequently, this study’s data provides for an ideal way to build upon the concepts of both Best (1990) and Cohen (2001) respectively.
Chapter One

Theoretical Orientation and Objectives

In order to address the theoretical concerns of this study I will primarily engage Best’s (1990) contextual social constructionist approach and rhetorical analysis model as well as Cohen’s (2001) study of denials. Best’s (1990) model will be mainly used to examine the rhetoric of claims-making about terrorism while Cohen’s (2001) study along with Best’s (1990) will be used to examine the rhetoric of denial. In turn, both these approaches will help to explain how torture is rationalized and thus how a torture sustaining reality unfolds and is maintained. Cohen’s (1980) conception of the “folk-devil” as it pertains to the process of othering (Schaulbe et al., 2000) will also further help to explain how a torture sustaining reality is established. In addition, I will briefly engage Beck’s (1992; 1999; 2002; Mythen & Walklate, 2006b) concept of risk as it pertains to the maintenance of terrorism as a threat and the condoning of torture. In sum, this study will impart a further understanding of how rhetoric is used to justify and maintain a torture sustaining reality.


1. Theorizing a Contextual Social Constructionist Approach

Social constructionism is a broad perspective that has a number of different theoretical departure points (Lindgren, 2005). Two main types of social constructionism,
however, may be defined: strict constructionism and contextual constructionism. The main difference is that the former does not attempt to evaluate claims, maintaining a highly relativistic stance that all claims are equally relevant so therefore any evaluation is illogical, while the latter, contextual constructionism, does (Best, 1989b). For contextual social constructionists, social problem creation is dependent upon context. Context refers to the social milieu in which problems emerge, or fail to emerge (Best in Holstein & Miller, 1993). Contextual social constructionists, then, do not look at social problems in a social vacuum but in their social setting.

Contextualists, like Best (1990), while acknowledging the relative nature of social data, conclude that this data can be, and in many cases should be, evaluated because social harms can be very real: “[T]here is an objective reality to social problems. There are structures that induce material or psychic suffering for certain segments of the population” (Eitzen in Miler & Holstein, 1993, p. 8). Moreover, contextual social constructionists acknowledge that their studies are constructions in themselves, and attempts to achieve theoretical purity by advocating a position of neutrality like strict constructionists propose, is deemed to be not only untenable but unrealistic (Schneider, Best in Holstein & Miller, 1993). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) assert that if we are not able to evaluate claims then it becomes difficult to determine if conditions defined as social problems are problematic: “If we insist that we have no right to determine the nature of the threat posed by certain conditions, such questions are not problematic – indeed, they are not even possible” (p. 152). Contextual social constructionism is therefore capable of solving the solipsism (in the sense that strict constructionism premises itself on the belief that all social phenomena are relative and so all social
phenomena have no intrinsic value), of strict constructionism by assuming that there is indeed a reality outside of language and other focus of symbolic depictions. To frame this dilemma in terms of this study, the threat of terrorism is not merely a social construct for, if anything, the deaths of 9/11 show that organized "political" violence kills; likewise, one can similarly analogize the use of torture. In short, strict constructionism's position on social problems relegates itself inapplicable to the very social problems it wants to understand (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994a).8

For Best (1989b), constructionists focus on three primary areas of social problems: claims, claims-makers, and the claims-making process. Best (1990) writes, “Some sociologists argue that social problems should be understood as concerns, rather than conditions” (p.10), for social constructionists social problems are “the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions” (Spector & Kitsuse in Schneider & Kitsuse, 1984, p. viii). Meanwhile, claims can be defined as, "... a demand that one party makes upon another" (Spector & Kitsuse in Best, 1990, p. 41). Claims-makers, those who make the claims, try to persuade their audience that their claims are correct: “Typically, they [claims-makers] want to convince others that X is a problem, that Y offers a solution to that problem, or that a policy Z should be adopted to bring that solution to bear” (Best, 1987, p. 102).

Thus, claims-making is a rhetorical activity. How some claims succeed in the marketplace of public issues at particular times and places and others do not constitutes the process of claims-making. In order to typify a social problem, claims-makers must first reach an audience – and eventually convince them if they want their claims to succeed. Ritzer (1992) writes that,
Typification takes many forms. When we label something (for example, a man, a dog) we are engaging in typification. More generally, any time we are using language, we are typifying; indeed Schutz calls language the 'typifying medium par excellence'. Language can be thought of as a 'treasure house' of typologies that we use to make sense of the social world. (p. 237)

If claims-makers want to convince their audience to use one set of typologies over another, then claims-making is intrinsically intertwined with rhetoric: "... social problems are socially constructed; people make claims arguing that particular conditions are social problems, and others respond to those claims" (Best, 1990, p.11). Trying to persuade an audience may cause a claims-maker to employ one type of rhetoric over another. As such, claims-makers are often more concerned with the viability than the validity of their claims. Validity can be considered a direct consequence of viability: "Viability is evident when participants give credibility to claims and definitions, when they treat them as valid" (Schneider, 1985, p. 224). Consequently, the study of rhetoric used by various claims-makers, across various mediums, to make their claims viable is an important concern for those studying the social construction of social problems. Thus, rhetoric, under Best's (1990) usage may be defined as "... the study of persuasion..." (p. 17).

Central to the rise and fall in the "social problems marketplace" is the typification of a problem. For Best (1989b) "Typification is an integral part of social problems construction. Claims-makers inevitably characterize problems in particular ways: They emphasize some aspects and not others, they promote specific orientations, and they focus on particular causes and advocate particular solutions" (p. 9). Changing typifications point out changing characteristics in a social problem's history and changing conditions: "Typifications change, often in response to changes in the larger society."
Changing typifications are important because different images emphasize different features of a problem and suggest different solutions” (Best, 1990, p. 4). Taking conditions for granted is not then a part of the constructionism framework but rather a part of objectivism (Best, 1990). Constructionists are generally more aware that both citizens and scientists play key roles in constructing social problems: “The constructionist recognizes, however, that the resulting account of the situation will be a narrative that reflects and portrays not only the voices of those being researched but also the voice, experience, and background of the researcher” (Turnbull, 2002, p. 321).

Also key to the constructionist enterprise is the role of experts in social problem definition (Best, 1990; Leroux & Petrunik, 1989). Typically claims emerge from “... experts or people with special knowledge about some social condition” (Best, 1989a, p. 260). By using a variety of experts, claim-makers can further their cause by providing arguments from authority. If the authority or alleged expert claims X is real and harmful then it follows that non-experts or laypersons should accept that X is a problem. Experts thereby draw credence to claims increasing their viability.

Thus, a contextual social constructionist approach asks: What rhetorical devices constitute the process of claims-making? And do these rhetorical devices present any patterns or change over time? For the study at hand, a contextual social constructionist approach will help to explain how the process of claims-making about terrorism have been typified by claimants. More specifically, this theoretical approach will allow a better understanding of the rhetorical process of how claims regarding terrorism are formed and come to reach a broader acceptance, and moreover, as a result, this study will help us to understand the process of typification more fully. This study will also help us
to understand the relationship between various rhetorical devices and the language of denial.

2. The Language of Denial

Matza and Sykes (1957) seminal paper *Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency*, outlines their view that delinquents rationalize and thereby neutralize their delinquency by means of various denials. For Matza and Sykes (1957) the locus of delinquency is not that the delinquents adopt a new set of moral codes in opposition to societal ones, but rather that they use various denials in order to conform to society:

"Disapproval flowing from internalized norms and conforming others in the social environment is neutralized, turned back, or deflected in advance" (pp. 666-667). Thus, the delinquent employs "techniques of neutralization" in order to justify and rationalize behavior: first, "The denial of responsibility" where the delinquent diffuses responsibility by attaching its locus to society; second, "The denial of injury" where the delinquent attempts to show that a behavior is acceptable because the level of harm was minimal; third, "The denial of the victim" where the delinquent attempts to blame the victim; fourth, "the condemnation of the condemners" where the delinquent tries to assign locus of deviance in others thus lowering his/her culpability; and fifthly, "The appeal to higher loyalties" where the delinquent weighs the needs of his/her social groups as paramount to those of the society (pp. 667-669).

Building from this work, Cohen (2001; 1993) in his study on atrocities, such as humans rights violations of torture, finds that the denials outlined by Matza and Sykes (1957) are also used by the perpetrators, at either a personal, official, or cultural level, in order to defend their actions. However, Cohen (2001) augments Matza and Sykes's
(1957) list with two more types of denials: first "Denial of knowledge" where perpetrators purport they did not know what others associated with them had done; and second, "Moral indifference" where perpetrators act in an uninvolved state because they deem their acts to be moral (pp. 78-93).

For Cohen (2001; 1993) "... statements of denial are assertions that something did not happen, does not exist, is not true, or is not known about" (p. 3). There are four essential questions in which to guide a study of denial of atrocities: first, "what is the 'content of denial'?" (literal, interpretive, or implicatory); second, is the denial "personal, official, or cultural"; third, is the denial "contemporary or historical"; and fourth, "who is the agent of denial (victim, perpetrator, or bystander)" (Bickford, 2002, p. 1055). In Cohen's (2001) usage, there are three ways in which to interpret denial: first, one can conclude that the denial is true; second, one may conclude that the denial is lie; or third, one may conclude that the denial operates in a grey zone somewhere in between "... repressed, obfuscated, or distorted by the individual or society" (Bickford, 2002, p. 1055).

In sum, Cohen (2001) contends that denial occurs because People, organizations, governments or whole societies are presented with information that is too disturbing, threatening or anomalous to be fully absorbed or openly acknowledged. This information is therefore somehow repressed, disavowed, pushed aside or reinterpreted. Or else the information 'registers' well enough, but its implications – cognitive, emotional or moral – are evaded, neutralized or rationalized away. (p. 1)

Cohen (2001) outlines three processes, which are often used in conjunction when official denial is produced: first, "literal denial" where atrocities such as torture once discovered are out-and-out denied; second, "interpretive denial" where atrocities are not denied but framed in alternate ways; and, third; "implicatory denial" where atrocities are rationalized based on utilitarianistic grounds (Welch, 2003, p. 11). Interpretive denial by
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officials often uses “euphemism” (softening vocabularies), “legalism” (legal defenses), “denial of responsibility” (blaming the victim) and/or “isolation” (the event is rare and unusual). Implicatory denial by officials often uses “righteousness” (laws are not universal or do not apply to us because we have higher standards), “necessity” (we had no choice), “denial of the victim” (they deserve it), “contextualization and uniqueness” (you don’t understand our point of view because you weren’t there), and “advantageous comparisons” (look what they did) (Cohen, 2001, pp. 103-112). Thus, the cognitive uses of denial we utilize as “... excuses, justifications, rationalizations or neutralizations, do assert that the event did not happen. They seek to negotiate or impose a different construction of the event from what might appear the case” (Cohen, 1993, p. 110).

Hence, Cohen’s terminology is relevant to the present study because as Welch (2003) writes, “Cohen’s paradigm offers additional concepts in analyzing the concept of official rhetoric. ... More to the point, those forms of denial contribute to persistent human rights violations” (p. 11). In essence, denial serves as a form of rhetoric, in that by denying actions either “literally, interpretively, or implicatorily” actions and/or inactions paradoxically allow the employment and maintenance of torture in what Jackson (2007) refers to as a “... torture sustaining reality” (353; Crelinsten, 2005a, 2003). Rhetorically speaking, claimants (offenders or bystanders) utilize various accounts, “... a wide category of speech”, to defend their actions (Cohen, 2001, p. 58): “[Accounts] easily become rhetorical devices which, if routinely honoured by others, allow people to actually see themselves in terms of them” (p. 63). Cohen (2001) distinguishes between two types of accounts: excuses and justifications. In the former the
actor accepts his/her culpability but denies the level of harm and in the latter the actor
denies full culpability but acknowledges that a wrong was committed.

Unlike closed societies, the subtleties of denial are paramount in liberal
democracies because such open societies are precluded on foundations of human rights
(Cohen, 2001). Liberal societies, then, deny such things as torture by maintaining
multiple realities whereby atrocities are denied to the public but perpetrated by the state.
Paradoxically, perpetrators of torture not only maintain several realities but also maintain
several realities that are seemingly wholly incongruent. The torture reality becomes one
that predicates action and the inaction of those in the regime thereby further allowing the
maintenance of the torture reality. In short, the torture reality becomes one that is both
“determined” and “determining” (Crelinsten, 2003; Morgan, 2000; Welch, 2003). For a
torture reality to be sustained, however, more than just the denial of participants in torture
is necessary. Society at large must deny this reality whether they are cognizant or not.
Bystanders\(^{10}\) to torture thus play an integral role to the maintenance of this reality: “This
passivity or silent acquiescence on the part of the larger society allows the construct to
spread into more and more spheres of political and social life until it is anchored in law,
custom, and discourse . . .” (Crelinsten, 2005a, p. 74; Cohen, 2001; Welch, 2003).
Moreover, this collective passivity by society helps to determine what is acceptable and
what is unacceptable. As Crelinsten (2003) alerts us to, “‘denial’ in its myriad facets
underscores the diverse ways in which individuals not directly involved in perpetrating
torture actively select what they perceive and what they refuse to acknowledge” (p.
303)\(^{11}\).
Thus, Cohen’s (2001) denial approach leads to certain types of questions. For instance, how do the various forms of denials described previously apply to the study at hand? And how do these denials help to form rhetorical strategies for denial in the process of claims-making about torture? Thus, by engaging Cohen’s (2001) usage of denial this study will help to clarify the process of how denial claims regarding torture are constituted, what shifts in denials take place during this process, and how they serve a rhetorical purpose. Furthermore, by engaging Cohen (2001), this study will help to explain how the broader torture sustaining reality is maintained. Moreover, Cohen’s (2001) work primarily dealt with denials in the context of authoritarian regimes, and as a consequence denials of atrocities that take place in the context of democratic regimes were not completely explored.

3. The Language of Othering

For the constructionist, as outlined earlier, the typification of social problems plays an integral part in the reification of the social problem. In the case of claims-making about the threat of terror and of the terrorist, scholars have noted that typification plays a central role in the construction of a dichotomy between the “Evil” terrorist – the “Other/Them” – and the “Good/Us” where the West is seen as “rational, justified, focused, responsive, defensive, generating security and modernity” and the Other is seen as “irrational, hysterical, wanton, provocation, offensive, inspiring terror, anti-modernity” (Mooney & Young, 2005, p. 113; Altheide, 2007; Campbell, 2001; Flibbert, 2006; Graham, Keenan, & Dowd, 2004; Jamieson & McEvoy 2005; Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004; Kellner, 2002, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004, McMillan, 2004; Troyer, 2001). This “Good vs. Evil/ Us vs. Them” binarism was, in existing studies, seen as being typical in
claims by state actors, and more typically represented in both media reports and the
speeches of President Bush and his Administration (Ryan, 2004; Altheide, 2007).

The use of this binarism can readily be seen through Schwalbe et al. (2000)
delineation of “othering”:

... the process whereby a dominant group defined into existence an inferior
group. This process entails the invention of categories and of ideas about what
marks people as belonging to these categories. From an interactionist perspective,
othering is a form of collective identity work aimed at creating and/or reproducing
inequality. (p. 422; Beck, 2002; Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005).13

Similarly, Jamison and McEvoy (2005) refer to othering as “... the outright denial of the
person’s existence” (p. 518). The significance of the dehumanization of the enemy is
paramount to the eventual normalization of torture as an accepted means in which to
render the threat of terrorism, and its progenitor the terrorist, ineffectual. In other words,
without dehumanizing the terrorist the likelihood of a torture sustaining reality is not only
lessoned, but also the perceived threat of terrorism will also not be seen to be lessoned
because if the terrorist is seen as acting within accepted parameters of normality then it
would follow that anyone can be a terrorist and therefore the threat is expounded.

Furthermore, dehumanization allows for the justification of torture because the victim is
getting what they deserve (Crelinsten, 2005a). More critically put, “Group cohesion is
maintained by the creation of this common enemy: an out-group complete with social
pariahs, traitors, infidels, and barbarians. This in-out, us-them split is one of the prime
vehicles for legitimizing moral transgressions towards outsiders within the eyes of
insiders” (p. 74).

Perhaps there is no more powerful way to dehumanize the other than by painting
him or her as “Evil”. The invocation of “Evil” serves paradoxically to allow the moral
transgressor – the terrorist other – to be transgressed by any means including torture: “... the rhetorical use of evil facilitates the very behavior it condemns” (Anderson, 2006a, p. 719). Some researchers point out that George W. Bush and his Administration invoked evil in numerous speeches, and in so doing constructed the attackers and their supposed sympathizers such as Iraq and the “Axis of Evil” as being inhuman and without reproach. The rhetoric of evil serves to help rationalize the irrational, for how could humans attack and kill the innocent? In Lazar and Lazar’s (2004) study they found that Bush’s speeches served to other the terrorist as inhuman in four ways. First, terrorists were depicted as being prone to aggressive behavior. Second, terrorists were depicted as lacking in common morality. Third, terrorist’s nature was seen as “nefarious”. Fourth, terrorists were depicted as barbaric or “uncivilized” (pp. 234-235).

However, it should be noted, that the invocation of evil is considerably different than rationalizing terrible acts as insane. Insanity allows moral transgressions to be deemed to be still within the realm of humanity while evil is anything but. This absolutist de-relativization of the term has two additional more seemingly innocuous effects. First, this dehumanization, because it typifies the terrorists as tantamount to evil, disallows a counter voice to the “war on terror”. If the terrorist is evil then there is no point in even discussing or acknowledging the terrorist’s perspective. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, it disallows any self-reflection by Americans of their place in world relations, which may have contributed to the attacks (Anderson, 2006a; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; McSwite, 2006; Norris et al., 2004). If the terrorist is evil, then not only is any terrorist attack meritless, but also due to this, any response to the attackers requires little analysis of how it is perceived globally.
The reification of evil disallows its clearly socially constructed nature, for if someone is not evil the power of the term is gone: “When the term evil is brought into discourse, the situation has been moved into the real. There is nothing left to talk about . . . All that is left is to act” (McSwite, 2006, p. 736; Graham, et al., 2004). As Norris et al. (2004) notes, “This makes the use of the rhetoric of evil extremely problematic for those who would otherwise resist the Bush administration’s Manichean impulses” (p. 252).

Interestingly, *euphemistic* language is often used to justify the action of those who transgress the purported moral transgressors. In the case of torture in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, the Bush Administration and the media *euphemistically referred* to torture as prisoner abuse: “By separating the evildoer from the ranks of humanity, it also separates him or her from humanity’s protections and taboos” (Anderson, 2006a, p. 726; McSwite, 2006). As such, the usage of evil has a huge rhetorical advantage; on one hand, the actions of the other are seen as inexcusable and inhumane, and on the other hand, inhuman actions against the other are seen as justifiable: “Those who destroy evil are not only excused they are glorified” (p. 726; Graham et al., 2004). In short, the invocation and *typification* of others as evil allows for and condones a torture sustaining reality: “assignations, secret tribunals, and denials of human rights are all excused when dealing with evil” (p. 727; McSwite, 2006)18.

In the case of torture “There is considerable . . . literature on the mechanisms through which the victims of conflict may become dehumanized, rendered “face-less” and placed beyond legal or other protective frameworks” (Jamieson & McVoy, 2005, p. 514). Jamieson and McVoy (2005) find three ways that othering is used to placate and
permit torture: First, “territoriality” where those to be tortured are held off state grounds where the state has access to torture them either by using state actors or actors within the jurisdiction where combatants are being held. Second, Jamieson and McVoy (2005) identify “outsourcing” where potential torture victims are sent to states which sanction the use of torture; and third, “judicial othering” where othering through legal discourse is used to define individuals or groups as being exempt from normal rules of law (for example, defining them as unlawful combatants), and thus subject to torture (pp. 515-519). Congruently, as Beck (2002) writes in his conception of a world risk society, “Powerful governments and states . . . defin[e] who is their terrorist enemy. Terrorist enemy images are deteriorialized, de-nationalized and flexible state constructions that legitimize the global intervention of military powers as ‘self-defense’” (p. 44). More poignantly put, “. . . before the perpetrators could acquire power over the victims’ lives, they had to acquire power over their definition” (Bauman in Jamieson & McVoy, 2005, p. 515).

Thus, in sum, building from the above, two key questions emerge: how is the language of “othering” used by claims-makers to formulate their rhetoric and views of the terrorist and the greater threat of terrorism? Furthermore, how does this language help to buttress a torture sustaining reality?

4. Moral Panics, Othering, and Social Problems

Jock Young first used the concept of “moral panic”; however, the development and application of the concept is more strongly associated with the work of Stanley Cohen (1980) and Erich Goode (1994a/1994b; Thompson, 1998; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004). According to Cohen (1980) a moral panic happens when:
A condition, episode, person or group emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes visible. Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Some times the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal or social policy or even in the way society conceives itself. (p. 9)

Thus, A key component of a moral panic is the “threat”, the “other”, or as Cohen (1980) refers the “folk devil” – “visible reminders of what should not be” (p. 10). Goode (1994a) writes that “folk devils”, “... are deviants; they are engaged in wrongdoing; their actions are harmful to society; they are selfish and evil; they must be stopped, their actions neutralized” (p. 29). According to Victor (1998), “A moral panic often gives rise to social movements [or provides for the maintenance of existing ones] aimed at eliminating the threatening deviants¹⁹ and may generate moral crusades and political struggles over use of the law to suppress the dangerous deviants” (p. 543). The invocation of the “devil/other” serves to juxtapose the “deviant” to that of the “normal”²⁰. By defining deviants, claims-makers not only draw attention to the problem and its putative cause, but also define what the given society considers as normal thereby reinforcing the status-quo: “Enunciating the ‘enemy’ is pivotal to defining, establishing and maintaining a moral order, for the enemy is the one who violates ‘our’ values” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 227).

In this sense, “folk devils” function to reify the ‘collective consciousness’²¹. (Goode, 1994b, p.169). “Folk devil” creation serves the vested interests of both the primary claims-makers, who want the acknowledgement and removal of this moral
dilemma, and the secondary claims-makers who want a sensational topic in order to sell their product. As Troyer (2001) notes, "[m]ore importantly, counterterrorism takes as its fearful object a subject category primarily created and maintained by state agents whose avowed purpose is to combat it, as the discourse on terrorism reveals" (para. 11). Ellis and DeKeseredy (1996) find that the media has a vested interest in sensationalism because it sells: not only does crime sell in general, but a moral panic, and its product, the "folk devil" in particular, are useful for the media business for the growth and prolongation of sales.

In sum, the rhetorical advantages of "folk-devilizing" or "othering" played a key role in the Bush Administration’s maintenance of office and the maintenance of status quo power relations (Campbell, 2001; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004; Troyer, 2001; Victor, 2006). In a sense, counterterrorism provides a legitimating force for a state’s power because states are given complete "... provenance of legitimate violence" Troyer, 2001, para. 19). Similarly put, "[t]he production and reproduction of such pieties are an important discursive practice insofar as they serve to re-establish order and meaning by reinforcing State hegemony" (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 335). Therefore, in a general sense, claims-makers can be viewed as having interests served in that the "folk devil" serves as an oppositional force (Us vs. Them) strengthening social cohesion and maintaining the status quo. Interestingly, this increased solidarity from othering can be seen to increase not only the social cohesion of the society doing the othering but also the social cohesion of the society being othered: "Attempting to reduce risk by extinguishing variety may actually increase it" (Douglas, 1982, p. 197).
Another element in Cohen’s (1980) definition is the media. As with “regular” social problems, the media play a key role in the dissemination of the panic. It is the journalists that alert and act as a catalyst for raising concern. In depicting the “folk devil” the journalists construct its boundaries. These depictions are often exaggerated stereotypes of deviants, whether imaginary or not. In creating a moral panic, the workers such as journalists make rhetorical choices. In short, “The media is likely to be the single most influential actor in the orchestration and promulgation of a moral panic” (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 329). It should be noted that while it is not the objective nor within the parameters of this study to examine the structuralist components of the media in relation to the maintenance of torture sustaining realities (because this study is an examination of the rhetoric used by such claimants and others), the media do play a role in this regards.

While social problems and moral panics are both collectively defined, they are not totally mutually exclusive categories, and instead they sometimes overlap. However, there are definable demarcations between the two. Some social problems may have “folk devils” while others may not; moral panics, however, always have “folk devils”. The term “panic” also necessarily implies an overblown construction, and a social problem may or may not carry this implication. Furthermore, in a moral panic there are significant changes in concern, while in a social problem concern may or may not fluctuate (Goode, 1994a).

As with “regular” social problems, experts also play a crucial role in creating moral panics, for example, Welch, Fenwick and Roberts (1997) note that statements by politicians serve as primary definers of crime and contain the most ideologically charged
points of view. Best (1989b) writes, “These *primary claims-makers* want change –
greater public awareness of the condition, new social policies, and so forth” (p. 260).

Welch et al. find that (1997) by exaggerating claims about crime, state managers, because
of their position of authority which gives their claims credence, serve to validate the
crime thus adding to the importance and continuation of the moral panic.

For a contextual social constructionist,

> Regardless of the lack of consensus in what constitutes terrorism, the definition and imagery put forth by the media and politicians is real in its consequences; a socially constructed label that defines someone or something (folk-devils/evil-doers) as a threat to our values or interests. (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 331).

A number of social scientists have determined that the reaction to the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 by the United States constitutes a moral panic (Kappeler & Kappeler,
2004; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004; Victor, 2006; Welch, 2007; 2006). Furthermore, these
authors concur that this moral panic allowed for the creation and maintenance of a
“torture sustaining reality”: “… claiming to fight a war for humanity denies one’s
enemies their humanity, leaving them open to torture and even extermination” (Norris et
al., 2004, p. 249).

In conclusion, it is not the intention of this study to engage the full moral panic
theory as this would entail a detailed and involved examination of the available data in
order to determine if it meets the parameters of a moral panic which while interesting is
neither the objective, within the time-frame, nor within the scope of this study. The
concept of the folk-devil, however, is useful in helping to explain how torture sustaining
realities take hold in a liberal state specifically in regards to the process of othering and in
regards to components of the sample which focused on morality. Also, the concept of
moral panic when engaged with the concept of risk it is also useful in helping to explain
how a torture sustaining reality takes hold. Thus, it is not the purpose of this study to
determine the presence or extent of a moral panic.

5. The Language of Risk

In the straightforward sense, risk refers to the danger or harm that is to be
avoided. In Beck’s conception of world risk citizens become circumspect of other actors
and this helps to increase the level of perceived risk:

The perception of terrorist threats replaces active trust with active mistrust. It
therefore undermines the trust in fellow citizens, foreigners and governments all
over the world. Since the dissolutions of trust multiplies risks, the terrorist threat
triggers self-multiplication of risks by de-bounding risk perceptions and fantasies.
(Beck, 2002, p. 44; Mythen & Walklate, 2005b).

This implies that “individual risk” is being supplanted by “systemic risk” where terrorism
and terrorists present a risk that by their nature are difficult to define and seemingly
without boundaries. It is not an attempt here by referring to Beck’s (2002) conception of
risk to lesson the notion that risk, as Douglas (1982, 1990) puts it, is a “collective
construct”. The point to be drawn here is that the risk promulgated from terrorism
increases the perception that this type of risk is boundless and uncontrollable.

For Beck (2002) it is in this state, the movement from “individual risk” to “systemic risk”
a state of “uncontrollable risk”\textsuperscript{25} becomes possible. This “uncontrollable risk”, which by
its nature presents an immeasurable harm, promotes the maintenance and furthering of
state power: “It is the very transnational and hybrid character of the latter [terrorists]
representation that ultimately reinforces the hegemony of already powerful states” (Beck,
2002, p. 44). In relation to this, Mythen and Walklate (2006b) report that the obvious
inability to predict the risk of terrorism has allowed political elites to spread highly
inaccurate claims that support violence by the state. Moreover, what Beck (2002;
Ericson, 2005) also interestingly finds is that with the state's inability to control this
‘new’ risk means of surveillance are also extended thereby paradoxically creating a
situation of security versus freedom. In other words, states that have, or are perceived to
be based on, openness now have to confront this openness given the security measures
that terrorism provokes.

In addition, by using range claims the media and the state depict terrorism as
“epidemic” and thus uncontrollable. Claims of terrorism by the media and the state, in
this case the United States media and the Bush Administration depict the range in terms
of how much terrorism affects or will affect the American populous (where anyone is a
potential victim). As well, the range of the problem is world in scope, and as such the
use range claims serves to typify terrorism as uncontrollable and international:

Terrorism is one of the most powerful contemporary constructions of a social
threat. Unlike many other moral panics associated with crime, terrorism has been
constructed in a global rather than a national political framework in ways that stir
highly selected global ideologies. (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004, p. 179)

However, whose ideology becomes selected when responding to terrorist threats? In this
case, as Beck finds (2002), Americanization is the solution offered where states either
learn American cultural values such as openness and democracy or have them forced
upon them. Furthermore, range was also used by claimants, specifically Bush, to not
only extend the social problem of terrorism internationally, terrorism is everyone’s
problem, but to also extend who the terrorist could be:

... at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology ... even weak states
and small groups could attain a catastrophic power ... and we will oppose them
with all our power. Deterrence ... means nothing ... Containment is not possible
... the only path to safety is the path of action ... our security will require all
Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action
In this way, the terrorist was so loosely defined that if anyone could be a victim then anyone could be a terrorist (even child abusers were linked to terrorists): “The quest to eliminate fear leads to a hyper-state of vigilance against the evildoers, whoever they may be” (Larabee, 2003, p. 21).

Interestingly, while no nation can ever be completely secure, by relating terrorism to uncertainty an increased sense of risk and increased sense of responsibility ends up being placed on the individual (which is historically consistent with the neo-liberal rationale). It is, thus, up to the individual to find the terrorist. This notion was idealized in the Terrorism Information and Prevention System where citizenry from postal workers to the cable man were expected to “monitor” their customers for “suspicious activity” – in other words, terrorist activity (Monahan, 2006; Ericson, 2005). Monahan (2006) critically asserts that these individuals “only recourse lies in individualized efforts to absorb the asymmetrical ‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ meted out to them” (p. 104), and not to place blame on the government.

The principle questions to draw from this discussion, then, are how does the perception of risk allow for the promotion of a torture sustaining reality? And does the construction of terrorism as an unprecedented threat further the curtailment of civil liberties?

It should be noted here, that while it may appear that engaging Beck’s use of Risk is not akin to a constructionist enterprise, it is not, however, wholly incongruent. First, the constructionist approach this study engages is in the realist camp, that of Best (1990) and his contextual social constructionist approach, which somewhat bridges the stricter constructionist approach and the objectivist approach. Secondly, Beck’s (1992) use of
risk is appropriate here because this study does not engage his full usage nor does it
engage his use of risk as a primary tool of the analysis. Thirdly, by employing risk
theorists with more constructionist leanings, such as Ericson (2005) and Monahan (2006),
this concern can be seen to be mitigated.

6. Where Denial meets Othering and Risk

In the “war on terror”, both denial and othering worked simultaneously to support
one another by denying the terrorist other humanity and by denying that torture had
occurred. Matza and Sykes (1957) note that “To deny the existence of the victim, then,
by transforming him into a person deserving injury is an extreme form of a phenomenon
. . . the delinquent’s recognition of appropriate and inappropriate targets for his
delinquent act” (p. 668). Douglas (1990) furthers this notion, “The modern risk concept,
parsed now as danger, is invoked to protect individuals against encroachments of others”
(p. 7). Applying these notions to the case of torture, we can say that by dehumanizing the
terrorist other, thus relegating the other an “appropriate target”, the United States as the
“delinquent”, was able to condone the use of torture. Moreover, “. . . it is possible that a
diminished awareness of the victim plays an important part in determining whether or not
this process [committing the crime] is set in motion” (668). In relation to risk, “[Denial]
contributes to a view of the world as uncertain and threatening, thus reinforcing both the
tendency to sinister attribution error and the need for uncertainty avoidance, as well as
the apparent need for hypervigilance” (Ramet, 2007, p. 44). Monahan (2006) finds that it
is this very uncertainty and insecurity that allows for the employment of torture along
with a host of other repressions such as indefinite detention and various forms of
surveillance. A report by Homeland Security and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, both concluded that the terrorist risk was indefinable and as such where, when, and on whom attacks would occur was completely impossible to predict (Woods, 2007). In reality, their finding is both objectively true (terrorist attacks by their nature are hard to predict), and self-servingly true because it rationalizes the justification of the expansion of the both bodies via the establishment of an unmanageable risk: “There is perpetual tension between the modernist desire for greater certainty through knowledge of risk, and the entrepreneurial desire for uncertainty as an engine of enterprise” (Ericson, 2005, p. 659; Spence, 2005). Douglas (1990) takes this notion a step further by arguing culture in general, and American culture in particular, require risk in order to be maintained: “… culture needs a common forensic vocabulary with which to hold persons accountable and further that risk is a word that admirably serves the forensic needs of the new global culture” (p. 1). Thus, the divisionary nature of “Us vs. Them” can be seen to be even more pronounced.

7. Summary of Theoretical Concerns

The central research question this study will elaborate on is the following: how is rhetoric used to maintain a torture sustaining reality? This theme will be explored via several related sub-themes: First, the threat of terrorism will be explored through engaging Best’s (1989) contextual social constructionist approach. This will involve an examination of the rhetoric used in various claims in order to depict how claimants typified terrorism and terrorists. The results of which will be presented in Chapter Three (which discusses the rhetoric used in print claims from the New York Times) and Chapter Four (which discusses the rhetoric used in Internet claims by George W. Bush and members of his administration on the United States Government’s website). Second, in
Chapter Five, Cohen's (2001) usage of denial theory as it pertains to justifications for atrocities, as well as Best's (1990) rhetorical work, will be engaged in order to explore how George W. Bush and his Administration responded to claims that the American forces had committed atrocities. Third, in order to explore how claimants "othered" the terrorists, the language used to typify terrorists in the aforementioned claims by George W. Bush and members of his Administration will be examined in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Fourth, Chapter Six, the discussion and conclusion, of this study will briefly explore how the concepts of moral panic and risk are related to the maintenance of a torture sustaining reality in a liberal state.
Chapter Two

Methodological Orientation

1. Relevance of Social Constructionism

As was noted in Chapter One, while there has been an ongoing debate as to the superiority of an idealist, realist, or objectivist approach, there appears to be more relevance offered for engaging in a more realist approach of Best (1990). Relevance can be seen in this approach given that Best's (1990) approach acknowledges that social problems, while not only being social constructed, often have a very real effect too.

Second, relevance can be seen in the contextual constructionist approach of Best (1990) because it is not as narrow as the strict approach. The strict constructionist approach, due to its epistemological stance that the researcher cannot and should not evaluate claims is “... scientifically limiting..." (Lindgren, 2005, p. 15), and thus theoretically limited: “The implications of strict constructionism push the analyst well beyond that boundary [the boundary of over-subjectivising social situations], into a contextless region where claims-making may only be examined in the abstract” (Best in Holstein & Miller, 1993, p. 143). Pierre Bourdieu (1988) summarizes the dilemma of theoretical purity or neutrality:

When faced with the challenge of studying a world to which we are linked by all sorts of specific investments, inextricably intellectual and ‘temporal’, our first automatic thought is to escape; our concern to escape any suspicion of prejudice leads us to attempt to negate ourselves as ‘biased’ or ‘informed’ subjects automatically suspected of using the weapons of science in the pursuit of personal interests, to abolish the self even as knowing subject, by resorting to the most impersonal and automatic procedures, those, at least in this perspective (which is that of ‘normal science’), which are the least questionable. ... There is no escaping the work of constructing the object, and the responsibility that this entails. There is no object that does not imply a viewpoint, even if it is an object produced with the intention of abolishing one’s viewpoint.... (p. 6; translated by Peter Collie, 1988)
At a minimum, the strict constructionist approach limits the types of questions one can ask. It fails to acknowledge an objective component of social problems, nor does it readily acknowledge that constructionist studies are constructions in themselves (Best, 1989b). Consequently, it can be said that a contextual social constructionist approach to the study of social problems is highly relevant because it overcomes some of the weakness of either a stricter constructionist or an objectivist approach. As well, this approach is relevant to the study of terrorism as a social problem because "... few criminologists and criminal justice experts have looked at the role of news media in terrorism" (Ross, 2007, p. 220). In more general terms, some would even argue that there is a lack of terrorism research and a lack in criminological focus; although this opinion is subject to challenge (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Hamm, 2005). This viewpoint, however, is also echoed by Barak (1991), Deflem (2004) and Rothe and Friedrichs (2005) "... they [students] have seriously neglected the political crimes committed by the state" (p. 6), and "Until the events of September 11th, only very few scholarly studies of terrorism had been conducted from a distinctly sociological viewpoint ..." (p. 2).

With regards to torture studies, a number of scholars have pointed out some research areas of concern: "Specifically, there has to date been a serious dearth of research into the role of public political discourse in constructing and sustaining the conditions necessary for the acceptance and normalization of torture across military and wider society" (Jackson, 2007, p. 354; Greenberg, 2006). Furthermore,

... a focus on discourse of policy elites is crucial for understanding the torture scandal for two primary reasons: first, discourses set the logic and possibilities of policy formulation; and second, they create the wider legitimacy and social consensus that is required to enact policy – they permit the construction of 'a torture sustaining reality' (Jackson, 2007, p. 355)
Contextual social constructionist concerns, then, lie in the language that claims-makers use to characterize their views. Turnbull (2002) notes that “Discourse as rhetoric refers to the conventions and structures that are used to frame the world, achieve certain efforts, and build ‘favoured realities’” (p. 322). Hence, contextual social constructionists, like strict constructionists, are mainly interested in how phenomena are interpreted. However, they are also interested in how features of particular conditions are related to concerns about the conditions, because without understanding the links between the two we have partial explanations.

Finally, it should be noted that while it appears that the realist approach offered by Best (1990) may have a superior theoretical basis to that of a strictly idealist or objectivist approach, it is not the purpose, given the subject of this study (media analysis which does not provide a basis in this case to substantiate whether this approach is more preferable), nor within the scope of this study to expound which theoretical stance is more appropriate. As such, it is not within the confines of this study to answer this question given the data that was examined, time-frame, and the objective of the study at hand.

Subsequent to the above, the information needs of this paper follow from the information needs of social constructionism (and consequently the questions which arise from a social constructionist study); this in turn somewhat restricts what information may be gathered and how. My analysis involves the collection of data from two different media: 1) print, comprised of newspaper and 2) Internet, comprised of webpages. To answer questions pertaining to the claims, claims-makers, and the claims-making process, a discourse analysis of media is appropriate for several reasons. Best
(1989) argues, “News media coverage helps make claims-making competitive. By reporting claims, the media bring an issue to general public attention, generating concern about the problem and support for the claims-makers’ cause” (Best, 1989a, p. 260; Ericson, 1991). As the media are important to the claims-making process, a content analysis of the discourse can answer questions about the claims and the claims-makers (Best, 1990). Furthermore, a discourse analysis focuses on particular time-periods and so is able to elucidate how interest in a putative problem emerges and fades. According to Goode (1994), contextual social constructionism allows us, “... to understand how society works, to understand society’s central social processes and mechanisms, to see where we have come from and where we are going” (p. 63). By looking at texts from a specified period of time, a discourse analysis is able to interpret what has happened through exposing trends in hopes of explaining what future occurrences of the situation and other situations may look like. For the purposes of this study the following definition of discourse will be employed:

... dialogue is the primary condition of discourse: all speech and writing is social. Discourses differ with the kinds of institutions and social practices in which they take shape and with the positions of those who speak and those whom they address. Thus a discourse is not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted with a social context continues is existence. (MacDonnell in Mills, 1997, p. 11)

While Mills (1997) examines a variety of definitions of discourse with differing theoretical slants and biases, this definition is of particular validity for this study because of its relevance to the constructionist paradigm in general and specifically because it situates discourse as being part of a broader context and not something separated from its cultural context.

2. Collecting Information
In order to answer my theoretical concerns, I will carry out a manifest and latent content analyses of journalists' claims in print media and state actors' claims in Internet media. This is a justified course of action for several reasons. A content analysis "is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text. These inferences are about the sender(s) of the message, the message itself, or the audience of the message" (Weber, 1985, p. 9). A manifest content analysis delineates the "surface structure" of claims, while the latent content analysis delineates the "deep structural meaning" of the claims (Berg, 1998, p. 226). The manifest analysis of this paper will demonstrate the quantifiable elements of the given texts (frequency distributions and proportions), while the latent analysis will discern the qualitative elements (analysis of rhetoric).

3. Latent and Manifest Content Analysis

My latent content analysis employs Toulmin's (1958) grounds, warrants, and conclusions argument analysis, because as Best (1987) demonstrates, Toulmin's (1958) analysis is highly relevant for social constructionism:

Claims-making about social problems is a persuasive activity, subject to rhetorical analysis. ... claims-makers inevitably hope to persuade. Typically, they want to convince others that X is a problem, that Y offers a solution to that problem, or that a policy of Z should be adopted to bring about that solution to bear. (Best, 1987, p. 101)

Although, this type of analysis, as Best (1987) points out, is under used by constructionists:

... rhetoric is central, not peripheral, to claims-making. Claims-makers intend to persuade, and they try to make their claims as persuasive as possible. Claims-making inevitably involves selecting from available arguments, placing the arguments chosen in some sequence, and giving some arguments particular emphasis. (Best, 1987, p. 115)
Best (1987) defines grounds as, "... the basic facts which serve as the foundation for the discussion which follows" (p. 104). Three types of grounds are definitions, typifying examples, and numeric estimates. Two types of definitions are domain statements and orientation statements. Domain statements define the domain or scope of the problem and in the case of 'new' social problems they are often vague. This inclusiveness allows the definers of the social problem more room in which to develop and extend the problem thereby constituting an important rhetorical choice. Another type of definition is an orientation statement. Orientation statements orientate or point out to the reader what type of social problem they are dealing with. Together the orientation and domain of a definition point out what the problem is and thus how it is to be perceived and acted upon (Best, 1990).

Typifying examples help to define the problem by depicting individual, (whether victim or offender) cases of the phenomena in order to personalize the claim. These typifying examples often take the form of 'grabbers'. Grabbers may be atrocity or non-atrocity. Atrocity grabbers are particularly effective because they point to the less appealing 'horrific' elements of the problem. By using grabbers, claims are more persuasive and thus have a rhetorical advantage (Best, 1990). For Example, in Best's (1990) study some grabbers focused on "Stranger abductions" which were an atypical type of child abduction. By focusing upon this extreme example claims-makers were able to gain a rhetorical advantage, and able to persuade politicians and the public that this indeed was a social problem which needed urgent attention.

Another major ground used by claims-makers is numeric estimates. Numeric estimates may be either incidence, growth, or range estimates. Incidence estimates point
out the occurrences of the problem. The implications of this are that the more an event happens the more serious it is. By establishing how many people are affected by a problem claims-makers can logically argue that the issue requires attention. *Growth estimates* imply the obvious, a problem is growing. These estimates imply that the problem requires immediate attention because the problem is increasing. Specific words such as “epidemic” are often used to help support the growth of the problem. *Range* claims serve the function of stratifying the problem. That is, it makes the problem appear to permeate the social structure. For instance, in Best’s (1990) study about claims made about missing children by various actors including child advocates and the media, claims were often accompanied by noting that the victims could be from any social group (ethnic non-ethnic) and live anywhere (urban or rural). By using a *range* claim claims-makers point out that problem permeates a social structure, implying the logical necessity that the problem is in the vested interests of all society to take specific forms of action against it (Best, 1990).

*Warrants* are, “... statements which justify drawing conclusions from the grounds. ... Thus, for an argument to be persuasive, the individual to be persuaded must ordinarily belong to a field (a specific social unit), which deems the warrant valid” (Best, 1987, 108). *Warrants* can be considered to be either explicit or implicit. Claims-makers will employ either or both to best serve their claim. However, it is often the case that implicit *warrants* are more persuasive than explicit *warrants* because they do not occupy the reader’s direct attention and consequently they are not readily detected, thereby subconsciously linking the *ground* to its *conclusion* affirming the claim.
Best (1990) found several types of warrants in his study: "The Value of Children, Blameless Victims, Associated Evils, Deficient Policies, Historical Continuity, and Rights and Freedoms. Warrants are often not mutually exclusive categories and claims-making frequently combines several warrants. "The Value of Children" warrant refers to children as being "sentimentally priceless" implying that any other opinion of them is wrong and that everything must be done to help them. "The Blameless Victims" warrant implies that: children, in context with adults, are innocent and as such not responsible for their actions or the actions of others towards them. The "Associated Evils" warrant implies that other social problems are linked with the problem under depiction. This serves to not only broaden the scope of the depicted problem with established problems, but also to validate the "new" problem. The "Deficient Policies" warrant implies that the problem has not been dealt with because the current policies do not work. This type of warrant also serves to point out the need to solve the problem. The "Historical Continuity" warrant advocates that the problem was dealt with in the past so it must be dealt with in the present and future. The "Rights and Freedoms" warrant in Best's (1990) study was used to imply that the victims' Rights and Freedoms were being impinged. For example, this warrant was used in Best's (1990) study when claims-makers argued that the "rights" of the victims or children in this case were being ignored or violated. In addition, claims-makers emphasized that a child's "freedoms" were impinged upon when they were abducted. For other social problems, this warrant was used by libertarian groups to suggest, for example, that the First Amendment was being violated (Best, 1990).
Finally, Best (1987) defines conclusions as, "... actions to alleviate or eradicate the social problem" (p. 112). Best found four types of conclusions: "Awareness, Prevention, Social Control Policies, and Other Objectives". "Awareness" conclusions, often used to depict "new" social problems, are used to make the public aware of the problem. Besides this they can also be used to generate action towards the problem. For instance, in Best's (1990) study this type of conclusion was used in an attempt to rally the public to not only become aware of the problem but to help to fight it as well. The "Prevention" conclusion is used to point out that something must be done in order to intervene in the problem and halt it. The "Social Control Policies" conclusion emphasizes that new social control policies must be created because the old ones do not work. In Best's (1990) study claimants advocated that police forces, for example, should become more centralized and start searching for missing children as soon as they are reported as missing. The "Other Objectives" conclusion pointed out that new research into the problem needed to be done in order to better define its boundaries. This conclusion may also point out that the problem extends to other areas (Best, 1990). For instance, claimants pushed for such things as more meticulous screening of people who work with children and extending the statute of limitations on crimes relating to child sexual abuse. In sum, "Claims-makers seek to justify their conclusions by presenting grounds – evidence about the seriousness of the problem. Warrants are rhetorical devices that connect the conclusions to the grounds" (Baumann in Best, 1989b, p. 60).

Thus, the fundamental units of analysis for this research are the ground, warrant, and conclusion statements: the claims. As previously defined in Chapter One, a claim can be considered "... a demand that one party makes upon another" (Spector & Kitsuse
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in Best 1990, p. 41). For this study entire articles for the print component of sample and entire speeches for the Internet component of the sample were isolated to analyze. This means that many articles and speeches will contain more than one claim, and a claim’s parts, the ground, warrants and conclusion statements (the criterion for how these articles were selected will be explained later in this Chapter). Due to the above factor, it should be noted here that the usage of the concept claim does not equate to the usage of the term article.

In order to depict a coherent social situation, each sample was read until a commonality of ground, warrant, and conclusion statements was reached; that is to say, until saturation had been attained. At this stage the articles were re-read using the given ground, warrant, and conclusion statements in order to determine the frequency of each. This is a standard qualitative procedure referred to as the “constant comparative method” developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 101-117). Basically, this approach tries to ensure that no units under analysis are missed, by re-checking the data against the given findings to determine if any were missed or any new findings present themselves. Furthermore, Glasner and Strauss (1967) write, “We wish to suggest a third approach to the analysis of qualitative data – one that combines, by an analytic procedure of constant comparison, the explicit coding procedure of the first approach and the style of theory development of the second” (p. 102). In addition, they point out that if an analyst wants only to test a given hypothesis based on qualitative data he or she must first find, code, and analyze all the data that is relevant to the question at hand:

If the analyst wishes to convert qualitative data into crudely quantifiable form so that he can provisionally test a hypothesis, he codes the data first and then analyzes it. He [or she] makes an effort to code ‘all relevant data [that] can be brought to bear on a point,’ and then systematically assembles, assesses and
analyses these data in a fashion that will 'constitute proof for a given proposition'. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 101)

However, if the analyst wants to produce theoretical understanding then he or she must use a more dialectical approach where data is coded and then analyzed and re-coded simultaneously thereby allowing theoretical notions to emerge.

If the analyst wishes only to generate theoretical ideas -- new categories and their properties, hypotheses and interrelated hypotheses -- he [or she] cannot be confined to the practice of coding first and then analyzing the data since, in generating theory, he [or she] is constantly redesigning and reintegrating his [or her] theoretical notions as he [or she] reviews his [or her] material. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 101)

As such, for this study, data will be analyzed not in a "linear" process but in an inductive fashion in order to provide a better understanding of how claimants not only depicted the threat of terrorism and othered the terrorists but also rationalized a torture sustaining reality. In order to answer this overarching question as to how a torture sustaining reality existed, Best's (1990) rhetorical model of the claims-making process (see Table 1 below) was engaged in order to expose the latent and manifest content elements of my sample of data and thereby allow theoretical ideas to emerge.

Table 1: Best's (1990) Model of the Claims-making Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grounds (Facts)</th>
<th>Warrants (Values)</th>
<th>Conclusions (Actions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Definitions</td>
<td>I. Value of Children</td>
<td>I. Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Domain</td>
<td>II. Blameless Victims</td>
<td>II. Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Orientation</td>
<td>III. Associated Evils</td>
<td>III. Social Control Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Typifying examples</td>
<td>IV. Deficient Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Numeric estimates</td>
<td>V. Historical Continuity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Incidence</td>
<td>VI. Rights and Freedoms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant examples, accompanying each type of ground, warrant, and conclusion statement from Table 1 above will be presented according to their availability. As well, any new variants will also be presented.
However, an important distinction must be made in how data was approached in this study. While it is aforementioned that the methodology of this study in part stems from the classic work of Glasner and Strauss (1967), in the sense of their notion of the "constant comparative method", it should be noted that this study does engage already established theoretical concepts and categories; and consequently, in this sense, is not purely grounded. Although it should be noted that even Glasner and Strauss (1967) were aware that theoretical categories were not going to easily emerge in a tabula rasa fashion: “Of course, the researcher does not approach reality as a tabula rasa. He must have a perspective that will help him see relevant data and abstract significant categories from his scrutiny of the data” (p. 3). They further write that, “… an empirically grounded theory combines concepts and hypotheses which have emerged from the data with ‘some existing ones that are clearly useful’” (p. 46). In their work Glasner and Strauss (1967) referred to this notion as “theoretical sensitivity” of the researcher. This “theoretical sensitivity” seemingly implies that one cannot work in a theoretical vacuum when approaching data (Kelle, 2005, para. 8). In a later work by Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998), where they attempt to clarify how theoretical understandings emerge from data, this concept of “theoretical sensitivity” is further explained, as is the difficulties of trying to engage data a priori of established theoretical concepts. As such, it appears that there can be two readings of Glasner and Strauss’s original work: One, which strongly implies the researcher taking a purely inductivist approach, and another which mitigates this ideal with the “theoretical sensitivity” of the researcher (Kelle, 2005). As Kelle (2005) further points out there is a difficulty with a purely inductivist approach: “The declared purpose to let codes emerge from the data then leads to an enduring proliferation of the number of
coding categories which makes the whole process insurmountable” (para. 6). This study, then, while stemming from the original ideas of the Glasner and Strauss (1967) more closely aligns with the clarification work on grounded theory by Strauss and Corbin (1990; 2008). Consequently, this study takes into account, as Kelle (2005) writes of Strauss and Crobin’s work (1990), “... that any empirical investigation needs an explicit or implicit theoretical framework which helps to identify categories in the data and relate them in meaningful ways” (para. 16).

In essence, then, it is not the attempt of this study to replicate the strongly inductivist approach outlined earlier by Glasner and Sruass (1967), but to engage the approach offered by Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998). For Strauss and Corbin (1998) a key for a good researcher is to allow outside materials to “enhance” and not “constrain” the researcher: “Familiarity with relevant literature can enhance sensitivity to subtle nuances in data, just as it can block creativity” (p. 49). Thus, it should also be clarified here that this study is not trying to “force” categories to emerge through engaging in the concepts of Best (1990) and Cohen (2001), but is in fact being mindful of the research that has been conducted and how this research is useful in understanding how torture sustaining realities take hold. In short, this study is not held to the theoretical concepts of either Best (1990) or Cohen (2001) because it is not only engaging these theorists’ concepts but also allows for new categories to emerge as the data allows. Thus, this study not only confirms and disconfirms the concepts and categories offered by Best (1990) and Cohen (2001), but is also searching for new categories to emerge, replacing or adding to what has been done, and so while deviating from a strict interpretation of Glasner and Strauss’s (1967) work is grounded in this sense. In sum, Kelle (2005) commenting on the
battle over whether grounded theory can allow for the usage of pre-existing concepts

notes that,

... the insight must be stressed that any scientific discovery requires the integration of previous knowledge and new empirical observations and that researchers always have to draw on previous theoretical knowledge which provides categorical frameworks necessary for the interpretation, description and explanation of the empirical world. (para. 51).

4. Defining Print Claims

According to Troyer (1984) the use of newspapers is appropriate for many reasons. For instance, newspapers allow the social scientist to view a specific time period and thereby see how issues rise and fall:

... newspapers of any time period become important because they are a forum for such activities. Schawtz and Leiko (1977) have described newspapers as 'thermometers' for the rise of social problems... . (Troyer in Schneider & Kitsuse, 1984, p. 73)

Thus, examining claims made in newspapers allows social scientists a tangible window into the claims-making process.

The sample for the print (newspaper) media analysis constituted all the New York Times (NYT) newspaper articles from September 11th, 2001 to October 8th, 2001 in the United States. I selected the initial date of September 11th, 2001 because it is on this date the terrorist attacks occurred. I selected the closing date of October 8th, 2001 because this is the day after the United States began the invasion in Afghanistan, and thus one can say that by this point the threat of terrorism had been framed by the media and political elites and seemingly sanctioned by the public.

While it might appear useful to use a longer range of dates, arguably it is not in this given study because a shorter period readily reflects the particular theoretical objectives of this study. As well, Woods's (2007) eight-year study of terrorism risk from
1997 to 2005, found that claims about the risk of terrorism dramatically increased in the New York Times after 9/11 but quickly decreased after 2002. Furthermore, the selected range is relevant because the date the “invasion” of Afghanistan began was October 7, 2001. October 8th will be used rather than the 7th to ensure all relevant claims to this period are included. Furthermore, this date is appropriate given that the invasion marked the point that the “war on terror” really began, which implies that claims during the aftermath of 9/11 are the most responsive. Somewhat similarly, McMillan (2004) in his study examined NYT articles in the 72-hour period after the 9/11 attacks because this period reflects a direct focus on the response to the attacks. However, the later date will be used because this study’s requirements are more interested in the rhetoric used by NYT in shaping the threat of terrorism early on, and so it is more pertinent to use October 8th as a cutoff because as mentioned this was when the actual “war” began and so shows how the “threat” was reacted to. Moreover, the questions for this study have more to do with how processes shifted over time. Also, similarly Klocke (2004) in his study examined NYT claims in the two-week period after 9/11: “The first two weeks after a crisis are crucial for establishing framing parameters for state rhetoric” (p. 47; p. 50). In addition, this range is further justified because in Ryan’s (2004) study he utilized the same period because this is when the United States responded militarily. The attempt here, then, is to examine the issue from its emergence.

I selected the NYT because it is considered to be “... the elite U.S. newspaper ...” (Gonzenbach, 1996, p. 31). Winter and Eyal (1981; Klocke, 2004) found that the NYT, like other elite daily newspapers, creates a trickle down effect where news information flows from the dominant papers to other papers. Thus, while it would appear to be useful
to examine more than one elite American Newspaper, the NYT is justified because unlike other American paper it is considered is a primary articulator of American views (Winter and Eyal, 1981). Similarly, in Woods (2007) study he specifically utilized the NYT and the Washington Post because they have a prominent voice in national decisions. While Woods (2007) also found in his study that the relationship between proximity of a newspaper to the 9/11 attacks and the level of risk reported was seemingly negligible As well, in Ryan’s (2004) study of the editorials of ten of the largest American newspapers in this same period, the claims mainly expressed that military action was the best option to fight terrorism. Thus, one can draw the conclusion that in framing this topic most newspapers presented basically mirror images of one another. Finally, another reason for selecting the NYT is because this problem took place on American soil.

The databases from which the print (newspaper) sample of claims were drawn from were ProQuest Historical Newspapers and Academic OneFile, which covers material in the selected period. In order to determine which claims will be in the universe, a topic search on the ProQuest database and Academic OneFile was carried out. The following words and word combinations were used on the ProQuest and Academic OneFile database to obtain the claims: “terror*, hijacker*, war, threat*, fear*, ground zero, Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, anthrax, biological, chemical, and twin towers”. These words were searched using the advanced search that allowed the sample to be drawn from any of the above words contained in the title of the article. As well, various pluralized and non-pluralized word combinations were searched via the“*” which allows for truncation of terms in this database.

5. Defining Internet Claims
To analyze the rhetoric of state actors, specifically President George W. Bush in constructing the terrorist threat, and to help elucidate how the "other" and the "victim" was constructed, the website "http://www.whitehouse.gov" was conducted in 2008. This website provided access to the President’s speeches via a search engine available at "http://www.whitehouse.gov/query.html?ql=a&qt=&charset=iso-8859-1&col=colpics". Via this search engine, documents could be searched by document types, which include "Appointment, Declaration, Determination, Executive Order, Nomination, Notification, Proclamation, and Speeches and Remarks". For this component of the study, various speeches located via the "Speeches and Remarks" section by the President were used. This is a justifiable course because

President’s . . . represent the symbolic voice of a nation and are more intensely looked to for direction during times of national crisis and war. The speeches of George W. Bush represent not only the ideology of the nation’s leader but are . . . one of the primary collaborative attempts to define the official state story of 9-11 and the subsequent War on Terrorism. (Klocke, 2004, pp. 31-32)

As well, in Woods’s (2007) and Ryan’s (2004) studies of claims in American newspapers they both concur that elite sources were highly relied upon by journalists:

"The dominance of official, particularly executive branch, sources is even more pronounced in national security stories than for the news as a whole" (Bennett in Woods, 2007, pp. 6-7). The search terms used here include: "evil and terrorist". The dates for this search included a broader sample size from September 11th, 2001 to September 12th, 2002. The justification for this is that it parallels and goes beyond the NYT sample and so is relevant in this respect, and also this sample marks the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, as pointed out in the NYT sample justification, Woods (2007) showed that in regards to newspapers, claims regarding the threat of terrorism waned
after 2002. This sample is inclusive from September 11th, 2001 to October 8th, 2001; however, purposive sampling was conducted from October 9th, 2001 to September 12th, 2002. Purposive sampling was employed in order to limit the sample size due to both the copious amount of material and time constraints, and in order obtain the claims that directly reflect the topic. In order to conduct this sample the above search engine was not used. The website “http://www.whitehouse.gov” was used because it allows the user to search for “news by date”, “including speeches and remarks”, to be searched at “http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/” thus ensuring inclusiveness and more easily facilitating the purposive component of the sample. As such, this sample is relevant to my objectives because it shows how rhetoric used by the President and members of his Administration helped to define the problem of terrorism in the United States.

In order to demonstrate how torture was justified by the state a secondary search of the above search engine was also conducted. The sample here includes a purposive sampling of claims made between December 12, 2001 and February 14, 2008 that was also limited to “speeches and remarks”. As such, this sample is relevant to my objectives because it will show how President George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to accusations of torture and thus the language of denial used by these actors. It will also illuminate how the othering of the enemy served in these denials.

This search, carried out in 2008, utilized the terms “detainee, detention, torture, waterboarding, prisoner abuse, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraiib, interrogation, rendition, torture memos, and blackwater”. These words had to be combined in various ways to achieve inclusiveness. It should be noted that the search engine discussed above does not allow
for Boolean searches, and thus various words and word combinations and searches were conducted in order to determine which combinations represented the most claims, so as to have an inclusive sample as possible. Also, in order to truncate searches the exact term had to be applied. In other words, to search for “terrorist” would not necessarily deliver claims with the word “terrorists”; this search would have to be conducted separately.

In sum, the NYT articles (Sample A) was used to examine the construction of terrorism as a threat in conjunction with various speeches by Geroge W. Bush and his administration attained from http://www.whitehouse.gov (Sample B), while the Internet WebPages, from the same location were used to examine the construction of the justification for torture (Sample C).

6. Methodological Justifications & Limitations:

In regards to understanding how the threat of terrorism has been constructed, a rhetorical analysis is both relevant and useful because rhetoric is at the very basis of how the media presents terrorism. The language the media uses shape and “... construct an interpretive scheme within which reports about terror and reactions to it become culturally meaningful. These presentations construct social realities based on subtextual moral and ideological assumptions that need exposure” (Ben-Yehuda, 2005, p. 36). Also, arguments regarding terrorism are significant because they not only show how we respond to human suffering, but also how we commit human suffering (Giroux in Altheide, 2006b). Moreover, Crelinsten (2005b) points out that both the media and scholars work in tandem to permit torture and provide for its acceptance once it is made public. Thus, regarding claims-making about torture,

... elite discourse is crucial for understanding how torture comes to be practiced because discourses set the logic and parameters of policy formulation and create
the wider social legitimacy that is required to enact policy, thereby facilitating the construction of a broader torture sustaining reality. (Jackson, 2007, p. 353)

Hence, a rhetorical analysis of claims is an important concern for an understanding of a social problem because the foci of analysis shifts from a single social condition to a comparative focused one by examining and explaining similarities in participants’ discursive practices (Ibarra and Kitsuse in Holstein & Miller, 1993). As Best (1987) notes, theoretical understanding of both the topic under study and varying other topics can be gained through an analysis of rhetoric, which compares various claims-making campaigns. In turn, in a sense, this study not only builds upon Best’s (1990) “Patterns of Rhetorical Work” but also provides a comparative analysis.

It should be noted that there were a number of limitations of this study. Through engaging Best (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) concepts and categories it was sometimes difficult to determine whether data always fit within a certain category. For instance, sometimes Best’s (1990) categories could be interpreted to apply in several ways or in some ways not associated with his typology. This occasionally occurred, for example, with his usage of warrants. Some warrants such as his “Rights and Freedoms” warrant and “Historical Continuity” warrant sometimes overlapped or could be applied in a manner not delineated by Best (1990). Or, for instance, titles can be seen to be orientation statements, which Best (1990) did not find. Other interpretive difficulties occurred when certain elements of Best’s (1990) categories applied in more than one area of each claim. This happened because as discussed earlier, an entire article was the unit under analysis, which often meant that grounds, warrants, and/or conclusions occurred more than once in a given article, which was also reflected in the frequency counts associated with each category. This meant that the total amount of grounds, warrants,
and *conclusions*, exceeded the total number of articles analyzed. In general, some of these interpretive difficulties are a direct reflection of the subjective nature of this study. Thus, it should be noted that interpretive bias is a factor when coding data and thus affects the conclusions drawn from such data; in turn, as was alerted in Chapter One, all descriptions must be understood as social constructions in themselves: “Qualitative researchers who investigate a different form of social life always bring together with them their own lenses and conceptual networks” (Kelle, 2005, para. 5). It should also be noted that the following Chapters, Three, Four and Five, which discuss the data used, more specifically note how the data was interpreted when it appeared to fit more than one category or presented a novel application to that of Best (1990) or Cohen (2001). Finally, it should be noted that the onset of Chapters Three, Four and Five, include a brief introduction which includes some methodological points that clarify some limitations regarding such things as the databases employed, and how, for instance, Best (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) concepts and categories were amalgamated for the analysis concerned. This was done at the beginning of these Chapters to avoid any obfuscation had these opening sections been explained in the methodology section proper.
Chapter Three: Analysis of Print Claims

Rhetoric Used in the New York Times Regarding Terrorism

In this section I address how print journalists have framed the social problem of terrorism, specifically with the elite American newspaper the New York Times. More specifically, this Chapter explores how the threat of terrorism was depicted in the New York Times, and thus how the process of typification was carried out within this sample. Chapter Three is also concerned with how terrorists and victims were portrayed and othered, as this pertains to how the threat of terrorism was constructed.

In order to investigate these concerns, a total of 374 articles from the New York Times addressing the threat of terrorism were gathered. These articles cover the time-span from September 11, 2001 to October 8, 2001. The two databases Proquest and Academic OneFile (Gale) facilitated the information needs as outlined in Chapter Two. The Proquest database was utilized in order to analyze the pictorial construction of terrorism, while the Gale database was employed in order to analyze the textual content of the construction of terrorism. It should be noted that the Gale database does not offer all of the articles in the selected time period in full-text; however, it was chosen over the Proquest database for this component of the sample because it, unlike the Proquest database which while offering greater inclusivity in the sense that it offers the full-text for every page, imports files more efficiently. In the Proquest database front-page headlines often acted in an umbrella like fashion in that they often contained many stories underneath which related to it; however, the Proquest database did not always find these stories or note them as being separate when imported. The Gale database, however, allowed all the articles under the page headline to be located. The Gale database, though,
did not show the pictures with the text, nor did it show page headlines like the Proquest. Thus, when both databases are combined the Proquest for its page headlines, and photographs, and the Gale database for its ease of use and accuracy, the sample is a more coherent reflection of the social situation at hand.

While all the articles in this sample will be analyzed to discern which claims are present, claims are not being presented in a claim-by-claim manner due to clarity, time, and space; consequently, in order to depict the content of this sample in an efficient manner, the most common and/or novel grounds, warrants, and conclusions will be presented with accompanying examples to illustrate overall claim content. In short, it is the intent of this analysis to identify the generic features. Furthermore, as a result, there will be only one example of each feature presented unless there is a novel or interesting case. In addition, throughout this Chapter various counts of these features will be taken. These counts indicate the frequency of each ground, warrant, and conclusion statement; as well, as indicating such features as the frequency of pictures and article placing. These manifest elements are thereby able to demonstrate the frequency of these generic features and as such help to show which devices were more prominently featured in the construction of terrorism as a social problem. As a result, these counts will help to explain which devices were used the most and therefore which devices served the greatest rhetorical benefit. In addition, as was outlined in Chapter Two with Best's (1990) "Model of the Claims-making Process" (Table 1), data in this Chapter will be presented in accordance with Best's (1990) model, and also because this facilitates the information requirements pointed out in Chapter Two, and thus the particular theoretical
objectives of Chapter One. As such, this discussion will begin with the grounds, and will be followed by a discussion of the warrants and conclusions.

**Grounds**

1. Orientation Statements

Best's (1990) rhetorical analysis, as discussed in Chapter Two, points out that claims-makers' definitions try to orientate the reader towards a problem through what he refers to as "Orientation Statements", which basically explain what kind of problem is at hand. With newspaper claims the title, subtitle, or title within the article, can be seen as an orientation statement. Titles may orientate the reader in a number of different ways often combining several methods. For instance, they may point out *incidence, growth, range* or may act as "grabbers" and notably are not always mutually exclusive. As such, for example, titles may both be representative of *numeric estimates* and *orientation statements*. With this said, it might appear more useful to include *numeric estimates* that occur in titles in the section proper, but titles can be seen to occupy an important immediacy for the reader and therefore provide more of an orientation, and so any *numeric estimates* within the titles will be included as part of the discussion on *orientation statements*.

It can be discerned from the titles in this sample that many articles orientate the reader by pointing out either explicitly or implicitly that terrorists attacked the United States. In this sample of the 374 articles, 175 implicitly pointed to terrorism and/or terrorists as a problem, while 199 titles explicitly referred to terrorism as a problem, and the remaining 36 were neither implicit nor explicit (while this number is greatly reduced if one takes into account accompanying pictures and adjacent articles which relegate all
of these stories as having an implicit reference to terrorism as a problem; see the
discussion on pictorial elements of claims). Several examples of implicit titles include
“The War Against America: An Unfathomable Attack” (September 12, 2001, p. A26),
“The Threats” (October 1, 2001, p. B5), and “U.S. Pursued Secret Effort to Catch or Kill
bin Laden” (September 30, 2001, p. A1) all of which appeared not as article titles but as
page headlines. Notably none of these titles directly refer to terrorism as being a problem.
An example of a more direct page headlining title is “A Day of Terror: Aftershocks Far
and Wide” which appeared on September 12, 2001 on page A16, explicitly implies that
terrorists attacked and caused problems. As mentioned above, this title also combines a
form of a numeric estimate in that it also notes the range of the problem in the subtitle.
The phrase “Far and Wide” implies that the problem has range because it notes how the
aftermath of the attacks affected not only the locus of them but the rest of the nation and
world at large as well. As well, this phrase is not concrete and so can be seen to further
the range by providing no parameters. Another example occurred in the first article of
the sample on September 12, 2001 where the title on the front-page read “Hijacked Jets
Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror” (Kleinfeld, 2001, p. A1). This
title orientates the reader that there is a problem and the problem is terrorism. As well, the
Pentagon building occupies a special place for most Americans in that they feel it is one
of security, so by noting that even the Pentagon was attacked the readers are more drawn
to be concerned about terrorism. Another notable feature of this title is the use of the
words “terror”, “terrorist”, and “terrorism” which would be a common feature of many
article titles and subtitles. In fact, these words appeared in 147 article titles. Meanwhile,
the word “war” appeared in 36 titles; the words “network”, “group”, and “web” appeared
in 10 article titles; and the word “attack(s)” appeared in 161 titles. These words can be seen to help orientate the reader to see the what of the problem, that an attack occurred, it is terrorism, and it is a war. For instance, a title appearing on September 12 says “The War Against America”, while another title on September 18, 2001 says “After a War Starts at Home, the Guard Prepares to Take it Abroad”. In these cases, the word “war” carries it own long history of connotation and thereby can help to frame ones views. It can be seen that the past associations of “war” re-alerts the reader to their previously held views on war but now link it with terrorism. Thus, the usage of certain words in the titles also performs an important rhetorical function. As well, the words “terror”, “terrorist”, and “terrorism” similarly help to provide a sensational element attracting the reader’s attention and thus provide an important rhetorical device. Words such as “Hijackers” (appearing in 10 article titles), “bin Laden” (appearing in 17 article titles), “Terrorists” (appearing in 100 article titles), and “Taliban” (appearing in 7 article titles) also pointed out the who of the problem. This rhetorical choice meant that the attackers were not shown as political fighters but as terrorists. In short, word selection in the titles implies that this social problem is one which invokes terror and fear and is conducted by terrorists. Most titles in this sample did not specifically name the terrorists involved. While it is likely that they were unknown early on it still can been see as a rhetorical choice because if the problem were named more specifically then its scope would become more narrow; thus implying that the problem is not as inclusive and not as bad. In other words, the intangibleness of using words like “terror attacks” help to leave the reader feeling that the problem is undeterminable and therefore perceptively larger than it may actually be.
Within the titles, as mentioned previously, there were also *numeric estimates* used. Specifically there were 68 *incidence estimates*, 56 *range estimates*, and 55 *growth estimates* used. In this sample, *incidence estimates*, did not always stress specific amounts numerically; instead they focused on broader ranges. As such, in some cases *incidence* was presented as being more inclusive, and thus perceptually larger, through the use of words such as “thousands” in the title, which provides no firm indication of degree. For example, a page headlining title on September 13, 2001 read “Stunned Rescuers Comb Attack Sites, but Thousands are Presumed Dead” (p. A1). While it is likely that in the aftermath of the attacks an exact figure would be impossible to determine, the phrase “Thousands are Presumed Dead” still can be seen to have the rhetorical effect of broadening the victim base and thus the harm of the threat too. In other page headlining titles the word “net” is used which provides no degree: “Bush freezes assets inked to terror net” (September 25, 2001, p. A1). Similarly, another *incidence estimate* the title reads, “Bin laden’s network” (September 30, 2001, p. B4), while one other reads “Web of Terrorism” (Frantz, September 23, 2001, p. A1). This type of *incidence estimate* can be rhetorically advantageous because of the word “network”. This culturally laden word connotes a vagueness of amount with a negative connotation. Hence, the use of the words such as “net”, “network”, and “web” denote that the problem is more widespread then it is localized. It also points out that those who create the problem, terrorists, are organized. As Jenkins (1998) study of online pornography demonstrates, this language can perform a specific rhetorical function; specifically, this language carries, along with alerting readers to the problem, a cultural baggage. Other incidence estimates were more exacting; for example on September 19,
2001 an explicit title read, “19 Countries vow to Seize Bank Assets of Terrorists” (Kahn, 2001, p. B4). This adds *incidence* by noting how many terrorists were caught, as well as pointing to the potential growth of the problem by implicitly implying that there are more assets of terrorists in which to find. In sum, *incidence estimates* in the titles specifically focused on the victims and arrests and were sometimes vague. For instance, “U. S. set to Widen Financial Assault; Freeing Assets of More Groups Suspected of Terror Link” (Miller & Blumenthal, 2001, p. 18). Not only does this title use vague wording such as “assets”, which implies *incidence*, but it also implies *growth* of the problem by using the word “more”. In a similar title invoking *incidence* “More Suspects Detained in Search for Attack Answers” (Moss, 2001, p. B3). Here *incidence* and *growth* are indicated by the word “suspects” which noticeably does not denote how many while growth is indicated implicitly by suggesting a vague incidence. *Growth estimates* were of several varieties, including those suggesting that terrorism was growing because terrorists could use new resources for terrorism such as biological or chemical weapons; those suggesting that terrorism was growing because it was the continuation of an older problem; those suggesting the threat of terrorism was growing because it was a new problem; those suggesting terrorism was growing because there are new areas for terrorists to attack such as financial markets and the Internet; and those suggesting terrorism was growing because it is a global problem (which also alludes to range). Two typical article titles, which depict growth due to new resources terrorists could use in their attacks, include a title on September 26, 2001 that read “The Specter of Biological Terror” (p. A18), while another title on October 7, 2001 read “Fears of Anthrax and Smallpox” (p. 168). An example that the threat of terrorism is growing because it is part of older problem can be
seen in a title which appeared on September 20, 2001 and read “The War on Terror is not new” (Ferguson, 2001, p. A31), while an example that the threat of terrorism is growing because it is a new problem appears in a title on September 23, 2001: “Forget the Past: It’s a War unlike any Other” (Kifner, 2001, p. WK8). One example of threat of terrorism growing appears on October 4, 2001 and reads “Securing the Lines of a Wired Nation” (Schwatz, 2001, p. D1), while an example of the threat of terrorism growing globally can be seen in the this title “Fighting Terrorism on the Global Front” (Annan, 2001, September 12, p. A35). In sum, growth estimates used in the titles helped to frame the terrorism as being a problem that not only faces the United States but also the world. These growth estimates also helped to establish that the threat is growing because terrorists may use many types of resources for attacks and also attack many different areas. Finally, range estimates were also used to establish the threat of terrorism as permeating the social structure. 125 titles appeared with the page headlining title “A Nation Challenged”, which implicitly notes that America itself is facing a problem with terrorism that affects the entire American society. For example two typical page headlining titles read “A Nation Challenged: The campaign against terrorism” (October 2, 2001, p. B5), and “A Nation Challenged: Following Terrorism’s Murky Trail” (September 23, 2001, B4). Both these titles suggest that fighting terrorism is unclear “murky” and that it is also a “campaign” which carries the connotation of being a social problem with depth. Other range estimates concluded that the threat of terrorism was one that affected the world; for example, one page headlining title on September 30, 2001 read, “An act of Terror Reshapes the Globe” (Wines, 2001, p. WK1) which also points to growth. Meanwhile, another title can be seen to suggest that because terrorists were able
to live openly without being discovered that anyone could therefore be a terrorist and consequently terrorists could be everywhere in society: “U.S. says Hijackers Lived in Open with Deadly Secret” (September 14, 2001, p. A1). In short, range estimates used in the title to orientate the reader can be viewed as playing an effective role in establishing the scope of the threat of terrorism. As well, it can be determined that titles provide an important orientation to a social problem definition not only because they point the reader to an article and its potential content but also because a reader may not even have to read the article to be orientated to the problem. Thus, as titles do not always state the articles content explicitly, a reader who consequently does not read an entire article may draw incorrect assumptions about the “problem” based on the title.

In sum, the usage of titles as orientation statements helped to define the content of the article, and so served to alert the reader to the potential content of it whether the article was read or not. In this sample, titles very specifically served to define what kind of social problem terrorism is; namely, that of being one for Americans which is growing and posses a significant threat. Like titles, article placing also can be seen to serve to orientate the reader to an article in the sense that depending upon where an article is placed a claims viability may be enhanced. As well, whether or not an article contains a picture can also be seen to orientate the reader to the content of the article. As such, the next section will discuss these two features.

2. Article Placing and Pictorial Orientation

Another facet of orientation that is used to define a social problem is the placing and pictorial representations included with claims. Because the pictorial part of this sample was drawn from the Proquest database which shows the entire New York Times
newspaper in a day-to-day view this component of the sample is completely inclusive because no search terms were required (which typically limit results and thus inclusivity) to search the database; hence each newspaper for the time period was searched in entirety. However, because the textual component was drawn from the Gale database which is limited by key word searching, and because as aforementioned does not contain all the articles in full-text, there are many more pictures than align with articles. As such, some of the pictures do not coincide with an article in the textual sample. As well, due to aforementioned limitations of the databases a count which includes how many pictures are on each front-page was unable to be included. In the 374 articles included in the sample, a total of 79 articles appeared on front-pages with 37 articles appearing on the main front-page while another 42 appeared on section front-pages. Pictures also accompanied many articles. In this sample a total of 936 pictures accompanied articles (diagrams were also included in this count. Diagrams included such things as maps of countries, timelines, and other types of charts such as poll results). Some articles were accompanied by more than one picture, and pictures with more than one element were counted more than once. For example, some articles had 19 headshots of terrorist suspects, which was not counted as one picture but as 19. Notably, most of the articles which appeared on front-pages were also accompanied by pictures. As well, almost all the pictures in this sample contained captions, which depicted what was happening in the picture. This is an important element because it allows the reader to ignore reading an article in its entirety and glance through the pictures and captions. This in turn allows readers to form opinions based on little of the articles information.
Therefore, these factors can be seen as important rhetorical device, assuming that articles appearing on the front-page (or on a subsequent section front-page), or articles accompanied by pictures (with or without captions) are more appealing to the reader. As a result, these claims are more advantageous for claims-makers in convincing readers of their points: "Claims also are made through visual images. Remember that claims are those things that seek to persuade – and pictures can persuade. Indeed, in the social problems game, a picture can be worth a thousand words" (Loseke, 1999, p. 26).

Another rhetorical advantage of using pictures in claims-making can be gained when they appear in color as opposed to black and white. The implication here is that color pictures are more appealing to the reader, thus rendering the claim more viable than would a black and white picture. In my sample, I was unable to determine which pictures appeared in color due to the chosen database. However, it should be noted that, the rhetoric of claims involving pictures and front-page placing can be considered as qualitatively different from those claims appearing within the newspaper without pictures. In sum, claims accompanied by pictures perform a twofold task: first, readers are drawn to the picture because pictorial cognition is immediate, and as a result readers may be more likely to read the article; second, as a consequence of the instantaneousness of pictorial cognition, the picture orientates the reader to the content of the article prior to reading. As oft said, "A picture is worth a thousand words", and consequently pictures allow the reader to form immediate conclusions unlike a textual claim which typically moves from ground, to warrant to conclusion. Thus, when looking at pictures readers can draw instantaneous conclusions, and so pictures add an important rhetorical dimension to the transference and acceptance of a claim. Loseke (1999) writes, “Such claims construct social
problems through visual images. Because typifications of social problems are 'pictures in our heads,' claims using visual images put these pictures directly into our heads” (p. 26).

Notably, one picture may have more than one conclusion. For instance, a picture on October 4, 2001 showed a long line of vehicles waiting at the Canadian border to enter the United States with a caption that said "Trucks were Backed up Yesterday about six miles, or 45 Minutes, near the Ambassador Bridge which links Windsor, Ontario and Detroit". The conclusion here is twofold by alerting viewers to the long line up it points out the conclusion that business is being affected and that there must also be a threat of further terrorism because security has to check each vehicle.

As well, the placing of articles on front-pages can be seen to function as an orientation statement in Best's model, as these pages are usually read first. A rhetorical advantage is also gained through the claim being placed on a front-page because, as discussed previously, titles provide an important orientation for the reader, and these titles more so because they are located where reader attention is usually keyed. Through combining pictures and front-page placing claims are also made more visible and thereby more viable. Not surprisingly, titles located on front-pages with pictures were usually more sensational than those from within the newspaper. In some of these titles sensational or "grabber" type words such as "Net", "Destroy", "Terror", "Panic", "Attack", or "Jolted" were used. For example, several such titles include, "Bush and top Aides Proclaim Policy of 'ending' States that back Terror: Local Airports shut after an Arrest" (Bumiller & Perlez, September 14, 2001, p. A1), with two page headlining titles noting "Wall St. Reopens six days after Shutdown; Stocks Slide 7% but Investors Resist Panic" (September 18, 2001, p. A1), and "Bush tries to Steady Economy Jolted by
Attack” (September 23, 2001, p. A1). Is essence, “... current constructions have not simply replaced prior ones; new constructions contain the seeds of previous images...” (Loseke, 1999, p. 262).

In sum, it can be said that article placing, and whether an article contains pictures, plays an important role in the perception of a social problem. The next section will further discuss the role pictures can play in how a social problem is perceived.

3. Pictorial Constructions

A total of 936 pictures were gathered in this sample. In order to avoid analyzing the pictures out of context, the articles were read in conjunction with the picture. The pictures in the articles were then divided into seven categories based on the depiction(s) in the picture(s): 1) State Managers, 2) Private Citizens, 3) 9/11 Attacks, 4) Diagrams/Maps/Polls, 5) Hijackers/Terrorists/Taliban/Suspects/Bin Laden, 6) Afghanistan People, and 7) Pakistan People. These seven categories can be further subdivided based on the actors and depictions shown in each. This can be seen in Table 2 below. It should be noted that these groupings are not always mutually exclusive because if a picture contained more than one description it might fall into more than one category in the counts. For instance, emergency workers may have shared a picture with firefighters or a picture of the smoking Twin Towers may have also contained shocked onlookers thus meaning there would be more than one count for this picture. As well, some pictures in the categories Afghanistan People and Pakistan People were included because, while they did not directly refer to terrorism per se, they did help in the construction of the terrorist other. Also, some categories such as Dead/Dying or Missing were often based on a single page in the New York Times that displayed numerous
victims thus generating high counts in these areas. Finally, Best's (1990) model is used to examine the rhetoric of print; it is not wholly applicable for examining the pictures included with some of the claims. Although, according to Loseke (1999), "While these images are more difficult to analyze than verbal claims, such images are increasingly important because they are primary content of television" (p. 26). However, almost all of the pictures contain captions and other written components, which can be analyzed with Best's model. As such, Table 2 below points out that pictures, while not only a common element of many articles, also played an important role in the construction of terrorism as a social problem. As can be seen in Table 2, "Private Citizens" were the most commonly depicted grouping of pictures; this can be seen to point out that the problem of terrorism and terrorists is one for everyone. As well, these pictures had numerous depictions of victims thus serving to juxtapose the terrorist to the "innocent" blameless victim. In this grouping "Private Citizens" were shown dying, missing, or praying all of which can be viewed to alert the reader that terrorism is indeed a significant social problem. Meanwhile, another heavily depicted category of pictures were those of the terrorists which also can be seen to have helped frame the binarism of "Us" versus "Them".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Pictures Divided By Category (Total = 936)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Managers</strong> = 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians = 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President George W. Bush = 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Personnel/Equipment = 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Agents = 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Workers/Fire Fighters = 47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Pictures Divided By Category (Total = 936)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying Supplies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead/Dying</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praying/Memorials/Vigils</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleeing/Evacuating</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shocked</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned/Patriotic</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Americans</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses/Business people</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Attacks</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin Towers Destruction</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon Destruction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subway Destruction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Embassy Afghanistan/Nairobi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Systems/Security</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagrams/Maps/Polls</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijackers/Terrorists/Taliban/Suspects/Bin laden</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan People</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-American Protestors</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As some of these pictures do not pertain to the *direct* construction of terrorism or terrorists as a social problem the content was not analyzed; however, as pictures in general provide a rhetorical advantage in drawing reader attention to the given claim, all the pictures in this sample indirectly function to construct terrorism as a social problem.
through capturing reader attention to the text of the article. For example, several of the pictures from the “State Managers” (September 25, 2001, p. A1; 24 p. B2; 14, p. A16; 13, p. A16) category only show facial pictures of politicians; these pictures depict nothing in regards to the problem of terrorism per se, and thereby add little to the construction of the issue in this view; although, they do serve to draw reader’s attention to the article, by showing prominent politicians. By showing a prominent politician, the reader is more inclined to read the article (argument from authority), and moreover, is orientated to the problem prior to reading. In a similar way pictures of the American armed forces and other law enforcement agents were also included because they too indirectly suggest that terrorism is a problem because it requires this type of personnel, which are not normally needed. For example, a picture appeared on September 14, 2001 showing several national guardsmen in full chemical hazard gear including masks, thus suggesting that there is a chemical or biological threat associated with the terrorist attacks (p. A3). In a later occurrence of the same kind of picture the caption reads, “Marines at Camp Penleton at Oceanside, Calif., took part in exercises yesterday to protect themselves in nuclear, biological and chemical warfare” (October 3, 2001, p. B2). In another picture on September 17, 2001 depicted law enforcement officers posted at the stock exchange, which also suggests that there is a new type of social problem that happened after the attacks (p. C1).

In sum, pictures served to frame the terrorism as an important social problem for all Americans. As was pointed out in this section, pictures also contained numerous depictions of victims; due to this, and because of how victims were portrayed, these
depictions played an important role in how terrorism came to be defined as a significant threat. The next section will more deeply explore this facet.

4. The Portrayal of Victims

As mentioned previously, pictures allow for conclusion to be formed in a kind of one-step fashion. In Table 2 the grouping “Private Citizens” allows several conclusions about terrorism and terrorists to be made. When Americans were depicted buying supplies, which in these cases were gas masks, the conclusion is that the threat of terrorism remains. When Americans were shown falling from buildings or dying in other ways after the attacks the implicit conclusion here is that terrorism is a threat and particularly one that can kill. Meanwhile, when Americans are shown shocked, at memorials for the fallen, or praying the conclusion can be seen to be that the terrorist attacks were unprovoked and Americans are blameless, while also implicitly showing that terrorism is a threat. The “Fleeing/Evacuating” citizens grouping can be see to show the conclusion that terrorism is a direct threat. Also, some pictures included in the fleeing counts showed streets, and stadiums, shopping malls, and beaches with very few people on them or as empty. This type of picture also points to the conclusion that there is a continued threat and the conclusion that Americans are all alone which also reinforces and heightens the threat. Furthermore, it also points to the conclusion that terrorism hurts business, which was also supported in various other pictures showing people out of work. Finally, looking at the groupings in Table 1 “State Mangers” and “Private Citizens” together the conclusion can be drawn that terrorism is a threat and a concern of everyone from a child to the President. The following section will present
some of the common pictures for the groupings in Table 2 that coincide with the conclusion stated above.

For many people the pictures of the Twin Towers in flames, fleeing citizens, and a man jumping from one of the blazing Towers (September 12, 2001, pp. A1-A3, A6-A8), are easily remembered, and they can be seen to serve as a convincing argument that there is a legitimate threat from terrorism and perhaps more importantly that terrorism takes lives. In fact, the caption for the falling man reads, “A person falls head first after jumping from the north tower of the World Trade Centre. It was a horrific sight that was repeated in the moments after the planes struck the towers” (September 12, 2001 p. A7).

In another example, eighth grade children are shown praying, while in another picture on the same page two people stand shocked with their hands on their mouths and neck (September 12, 2001, p. A6). Meanwhile pictures of the 9/11 victims are shown crying, injured, staring open mouthed in shock (September 24, 2001, p. B8). In fact, a theme, which was repeated many times, was a page entitled: “The Victims” or “The Missing” (2001, September 21, p. B15; 24, p. B11; 26, p. B11; 27, p. B11; October, 1, p. B11; 2, p. B9; 3, B11; 4 p. B11, 6, B11; 8, p. B11). This recurring page posted headshots and brief stories about the missing or dead person (the captions with these stories can be considered as typifying examples and so will be discussed in this section). Other victims were shown in hospital beds and with rows of gurneys with intravenous tubes in their arms lying unconscious (2001, September 12, p. A8, A10). Many pictures showed victims of the attacks fleeing from the scene or in other types of evacuations. For example, one caption says “Thousands fled Manhattan by foot over the Queensboro bridge and other bridges to Brooklyn” (September 12, 2001, pp. A11; 13, E2); thus
illustrating an *incidence* to the situation as well as showing numerous frightened looking people crossing a bridge. Other pictures show empty stadiums and beaches and malls (2001, September 13, pp. A13, C9; 17, pp. C17; 20, p. B3). Another shows an empty airport hotel and notes, “As ticket areas like terminal A at Newark International Airport remained ghostly, New York’s hotels were reeling, with occupancy rates falling drastically” (September 19, 2001, p. A1).

As well the grouping “Transportation System/Security”, also depicts the victims of terrorism. This grouping points to the *conclusion* that terrorism is a threat, and that the threat will continue after the initial attacks. For instance, one picture shows people being scanned going through airport security and notes in the caption, “Security was tight yesterday at Oakland International Airport in Oakland California, even after it was announced that all flights had been cancelled” (September 12, 2001, p. A17). While another picture shows a police officer checking cars at an international airport (September 19, 2001, p. B3). A further picture states in the caption “…many travelers are avoiding flying since the attacks on the World Trade Centre” (p. C4). Finally, another pictures caption points out that “New security Clogs U.S. Borders” (September 20, 2001, pp. C1, C6).

Perhaps the most compelling way victims were *typified* was in the pictures of memorial services and candle light vigils. The pictures can be seen as referring to the *conclusion* that terrorism is a threat and also it destroy the American way of life. These pictures often showed victims holding hands with stoic and saddened faces (September 12, 2001, p. A23). As well, children were sometimes used in these pictures, which as noted before add another rhetorical dimension the claim. In one case, a child was shown
with flowers at a memorial sight with the caption “Chelsea Sullivan, 3, with her father, Robert Sullivan, added to an impromptu memorial yesterday in Union Square at 14th Street” (September 13, 2001, p. A2). Other pictures in this grouping showed a memorial outside a hospital on its wall showing pictures of missing people (September 14, 2001, p. A8). In another picture thousands of citizen were shown in a memorial praying (2001, September 15, p. A13; 19, p. B7; 25, p. B11). While another example show a group of people holding hands with the caption stating “Mourners gather at a memorial service in Central Park yesterday for hundreds of employees for Cantor Fitzgerald who were killed in the attacks in the World Trade Centre” (October 2, 2001, p. B1).

Victims were not simply private citizens though. Even pictures of the firefighters and other emergency workers showed many examples of them as victims. For instance, one picture shows people looking out the windows of the World Trade Centre as the building burns and smokes and has a caption which says, “Possibly thousands of people were working in the north tower of the World Trade Centre, the first tower struck by a hijacked airplane yesterday morning. With more than 100 firefighters unaccounted for...” (September 12, 2001, p. A12). Thus, this not only brings frightful images of those trapped inside the buildings, but also shows that even the firefighters were having problems thereby increasing the threat. A similar type of picture of shows a firefighter sitting down holding his head with his hands and the caption notes, “The rescue effort was complicated for firefighters yesterday, who as they searched through the rubble were also seeking 350 colleagues. Roughly three dozen fire companies were missing in action” (September 13, 2001, p. A11). As for emergency workers, one picture caption noted “Rescue workers and medical personnel continued their efforts in the middle of a vast,
nightmarish landscape on West Street yesterday. Many bodies and boy parts were unearthed, and two people were rescued” (September 13, 2001, p. A8). In this caption the words “nightmarish” and the reference to body parts helps the reader to conclude that even those who help are affected by the terrorism.

In sum victims were depicted as buying supplies, dying, praying, fleeing, being injured, shocked, concerned or dead, all of which can be seen to conclude that Americans are innocent, blameless, and threatened by terrorism. Moreover, the “Private Citizens” grouping taken in conjunction with the “Emergency Workers” grouping point to the notion that all citizens should be concerned about terrorism because all citizens are affected. The next section will explore how the other was depicted in these pictures as this facet helped to define who caused the problem, and as a result further helped to define the threat of terrorism for America.

5. The Portrayal of the Other

The portrayals of Muslims (both Pakistani, Afghan, and Palestinian) and the attackers of 9/11 also point to certain conclusions. This was done with the use of regular pictures and with diagrams, maps, and polls. In general, pictures of the attackers and those suspected as terrorists of the attacks can also serve to imprint into the readers mind just who the other is. In sum, these types of pictures taken as a whole concluded what a terrorist is, who the terrorists are, and where the terrorist resides, and therefore what terrorism itself is composed of.

In one picture on September 12, 2001 with the caption “The Arabs”, shows a group of children jumping, shouting, and clapping their hands celebrating the attacks (p. A22). Furthermore, the fact that this picture predominantly contains children provides
another nuance. Children, as Best (1990) has shown, are often considered pure and innocent, but in this picture they are seen praising the deaths of Americans; thus, one could draw the conclusion that terrorism can corrupt even the innocent and that no one is safe from it— even children. In another similar picture from September 23, 2001 with children, the caption reads “Young Protestors”, while depicting several young Pakistan children holding toy machine guns in the air protesting a possible American attack of Afghanistan (p. B3; October, 2001, p. B4). This picture also notes where the children are from, and so can also be seen to suggest the range of the terrorist threat is in other countries other than Afghanistan. In a more dramatic article a picture shows some Palestinian boys throwing stones at checkpoint in Israel and one of them is quoted as saying, “I am willing to go and explode myself” (September 20, 2001, p. A3). Meanwhile another depiction shows a young boy in a prayer group and notes, “A young man led sympathizers of Osama bin Laden on prayer” (September 21, 2001, p. B3).

Thus, this claim, while noting the above conclusion that even the young can be terrorists, also implicitly implies Osama bin Laden has been defined as a key terrorist, so there is no need to tell the reader because everyone knows. Moreover, by noting that these people were at prayer another element to the typification of the other can be seen to be added, for even at prayer, considered by many Westerners a time of peace, some Muslims are thinking of terrorism. The connection of prayer and terrorism while not as explicit can also be seen in a picture showing children and adults praying with a caption noting, “Calm prevailed yesterday as Friday Prayers at a mosque in Dshanbe, Tajikistan. Some Islamic clerics described attacks on the West as legitimate” (September 21, 2001, p. B4).
Meanwhile other articles point to the same conclusion by showing pictures of anti-American protesters, all of which are shown to be Muslim. For instance, on September 27, 2001 a caption showing a destroyed former U.S. embassy in Afghanistan says “Thousands of Afghan protestors turned a march to the abandoned American embassy in Kabul into a frenzied attack yesterday” (p. A1). Other protestors are shown with pictures of bin Laden (September 29, 2001, p. B6). In another depiction of anti-American protest and sentiment, three pictures are shown with the captions “Arab-American and anti-Israel graffiti in Karachi, Pakistan, a giant city whirling in contradictions”, “Mustafa Karnal Uddin, an auto repairman in Karchi, says holy wars are Allah’s final means to ensure justice”, and “In Karachi, Pakistan, a vender this weekend sold posters of America’s prime terror suspect, Osama bin Laden” (September 30, 2001, p. B6).

Later pictures not only connected bin Laden and Afghan and Pakistan people to terrorism, but also to other terrorist networks: namely, Al Qaeda. On October 7, 2001 six pictures showing bin Laden and other suspected terrorists with various with a bolded headline saying “The Network”, noted:

Al Qaeda has trained thousands of militants at camps in Afghanistan ad placed them in as many as 50 countries Western officials say that the network controls communications facilities and warehouses and that it profits from the drug trade in Afghanistan. The declassified British document asserted that Al Qaeda has ‘a close and mutually dependent alliance’ with the governing Taliban and the will and resources to carry out further atrocities.

While another caption on the same page reported, “Officials say Al Qaeda uses a web of charities, companies, and credit card and food stamp fraud to raise money and move it around the globe” (p. B2). This claim also introduces an element of range by noting other terrorists groups and by noting that they are financed globally; therefore, helping to
yield the *conclusion* that not only are terrorists usually Muslim but also that terrorism is complex, widespread, and organized and moreover that future threats are likely.

In general, pictures and captions with terrorists were evenly spread throughout the sample. A majority of the pictures of the other (see Table 2 "Hijackers/ Terrorists/ Taliban/Suspects/ Bin laden = 115"), along with their captions, were typically presented as non-white, male, Muslim, often with unkempt hairstyles, beards, and moustaches and wearing turbans (2001, September 16 p.18; 15, p. A2; 14, p. A4; 18, p. B3; 20, p. B2, B4; 22 p. B4; 23, p. B4; 27, p. B4).

Hence, by looking at these pictures an image of the terrorist other and the victim starts to emerge. Interestingly, while some pictures depict non-terrorist others (various pictures of Afghan citizens for example) in a solemn light, they also show them as victims of the terrorists too. This is not to say that all pictures are one-sided in their depiction; however, certain *conclusions* can be formed even in these seemingly innocuous pictures. For example, Afghans are usually shown as poor and looking downtrodden, with women wearing the hijab (viewed by some North Americans as a being underpinned in patriarchy), and in general looking with blank unsmiling stares (2001, September, 23, p. B3; 26, p. B4, B5; 27, B1). In one picture, showing the poverty of the region, a small boy is seen in the background of a desolate looking area while another boy holds a bowl on his head from which he sells yogurt (September 25, 2001, p. B3). In another depiction a caption reads, "With drought and the fear of war causing many people to flee Afghanistan, aid officials say a disaster could develop" (September 30, 2001, p. A1; B7). This not only points out the poverty of the people, but also that they leave when a fight occurs – unlike the American victims who stay and fight – a
seemingly “un-American” and thus “abnormal” response. Similarly, in another picture Pakistani police officers kick and beat protestors who oppose the U.S. (September 21, 2001, p. A1). While this may seem to show support for the American forces and ideals on the surface, it also shows the brutality of the region, for if even law enforcement agents can brazenly beat and kick prostrated citizens in public then the conclusion forms of what can be expected from anyone in the region? Thus, in this manner poverty is connected with terrorists and terrorism. This can be seen in the following caption: “Nanni Rahman and Saleem Majidull, who belong to Pakistan’s upper class, discussing the country’s situation. The vast numbers of poor are more militantly religious ad more sympathetic to the Taliban” (October 1, 2001, p. B4). This allows the range of the problem to also be expanded by the use of the word “vast”.

It can be concluded, then, that even when the other is painted as not being a terrorist or supporter they are painted as being the victims of the other which implicitly link them to those depicted as terrorists. In other words, some of the pictures of 9/11 victims are shown as being patriotic, resilient, or praying – “normal” reactions to pain and suffering if not even noble in the patriotic pictures. For instance, in one picture an American women whilst mourning prominently holds a teddy bear with a United States flag on its arm, while many other pictures show American flags in various patriotic type poses (September 13, 2001, p. A24; 14, p. A15). Meanwhile victims of the terrorists in Afghanistan and other related regions are often depicted as having “given up” (or even when in prayer seemingly concocting terrorist acts). In this sense then, the terrorist, and the non-terrorist Afghanistan and Pakistan citizen are painted with the same brush that of being the other – the terrorist. Thus, in this way even their stance as victims faces
dehumanization. In sum, American victims are generally shown reacting to terrorism with resilience, patriotism, and hard work; while the other, even those depicted innocently, are seen as dealing with their struggle (that of the Taliban regime and terrorist in their region) in a more condoning light because of their “abnormal” reactions such as fleeing and appearing to “give up”. This further allows the conclusion to be drawn that anyone from these regions can be a potential terrorist.

A sensationalized choice of words in the pictures captions also helped to paint the other and legitimize the threat of terrorism. For instance, one picture on September 29, 2001 is accompanied by several captions one of which reads “Officials have sketched the outlines of a shadowy network led by Mr. bin Laden, but many of the blanks have yet to be filled” (p. B3). This passage points out with use of the words “shadowy” and “network” and unfilled “blanks” that the other is tricky, connected, and hidden – a threat to be reckoned with. In another on September 29, 2001 it depicts a protestor holding a poster of President George W. Bush with an inscription saying “Wanted Commander of Crusade”, while the caption under the picture says “Several thousand demonstrators gathered as appeals for Muslim solidarity fire passions to defend Afghanistan” (p. B7). In conjunction with this, a picture directly underneath shows numerous Indonesian Muslim protestors. Thus, this claim while serving to point out the potential problem of terrorism also alerts readers to another nation that may attack. Another picture on October 2, 2001 shows young students in a Pakistan school with the caption saying “A new generation Taliban students at the Jamia Haqqania Madrassah, a Muslim religious school in Pakistan’s Northern Frontier Province near Afghanistan. Some of the schools send students to fight for the Taliban” (p. A1). This claim suggests that terrorists are
being generated in more than one school and that they are organized. As well, it points out that even children can be terrorists while also affirming that the other is Muslim.

Meanwhile, other pictures from this grouping serve to expand the domain of the problem by depicting other problems for the United States besides the threat of terrorism. For instance, one picture showing a forlorn looking Afghan woman from October 3, 2001 has the caption “Women waited on Monday for food to be distributed at a refugee camp in Northern Afghanistan, an area controlled by the Northern Alliance” (p. B6). In a similar way the range of the threat is expanded to include new threats due to terrorism in a claim made on October 4, 2001 (p. G1). In this claim a large picture of a grenade dwarfs several smaller pictures of a cell phone, laptop, water faucet, the White House, a car, a safe, and an electrical outlet. The caption notes, “Two networks in particular – the telecommunications system and Internet – provide the connection through which many public agencies, utilities and crucial industries operate and communicate. An effective cyberdefense is essential, experts say, to protect functions ranging from emergency services to oil production” (p. G1). Thus, this claim alerts readers to the far reaching effects and problems terrorism can create by expanding the scope of the problem to include much more than attacks on people and buildings through the use of planes. In another example on September 30, 2001 the claim shows several graphs showing how spending and hotel occupancy has decreased as a result of the attacks: “From markets to the bedside table: Americans lost sleep, curtailed investments and other spending and began to study up on terror” (p. WK4).

The use of bar charts and graphs and other types of diagrams is another important rhetorical choice because like a picture it allows readers to almost immediately assess
information without actually having to read an entire story. Many charts also served in
the typification of the other and the expansion of the terrorist threat. A chart featured on
October 2, 2001 shows a chart examining the likelihood of chemical and biological
attacks noting that out of the 10 chemical and biological weapons assessed, 7 are said to
be likely used in future attacks. The chart also depicts the lethality of effects and ease of
production (p. F2). Thus, this claim alerts the reader to the far ranging types of resources
terrorists can use and how many of them can be easily produced, thus also increasing the
perception of the problem. Another diagram shows a historical timeline of terrorist car
bombings and other airplane hijacking instances with the caption reading, “the Worst
Previous Terrorist Attacks” thus suggesting that terrorism is a fact of life and that
Muslims are usually the culprits. While another picture in the form of a map shows the
Taliban’s strongholds with the caption reporting that “Afghanistan is a vast and
forbidding country, swept by deserts, mountains and a terrain so harsh that arable land
often stretches no more that a few feet on each side of a riverbed. Its history is equally
unforgiving” (October 2, 2001, p. B2). This claim can be seen to conclude that the fight
against terrorism in Afghanistan will not be easy and the history of the other, like the
region they reside in, is equally harsh. In another diagram entitled “Diversity and
Complexity in the Muslim World” (October 7, 2001, p. 55), a globe is shown in 3D
format, with the areas of the world where Muslims reside, their population amounts, and
their GDP per capita. These numbers suggest incidence by implicitly implying that all of
these people because of their low GDP’s are possibly terrorists. It also indicates
incidence by showing the total populations of Muslims, which also implicitly points out
how large the problem of terrorism can become. Moreover, this also serves to broaden
the scope of the problem by indicating it is not just a problem created in Afghanistan or Pakistan. A caption for this diagram illustrates these conclusions, “From its origin in what is now Saudi Arabia, Islam has spread throughout the world, and is now as ethically diverse as it is geographically broad. Many governments are faced with increasingly radical, and violent, Islamic elements” (p. 55). In a more direct diagram, that helps to further other the terrorists, shows 23 pictures outlining the hijackers connected to a larger picture of Osama bin Laden. Some of the pictures are empty which may allow the conclusion to be made that the pictures for these terrorist are not even known, and therefore the threat still looms.

In sum, portrayals of the other further served to construct the threat of terrorism for America. The next section will discuss some of the other types of pictures found in this sample.

6. Other Portrayals

The grouping the “9/11 attacks”, is perhaps the most forceful in drawing the conclusion of the consequences and costs of terrorism for American society. In fact, while other pictures waned in this sample with the beginning of the sample holding a majority of pictures, pictures of the destruction of the World Trade Centre permeated the sample. These pictures are in a way the most jarring to the mind because the World Trade Centre was such an American landmark. As such, these pictures readily point to the conclusion that terrorism is a major threat to the American way of life.

In sum, pictures provide an excellent vehicle for claims-makers; they transmit claims faster than print and they draw attention to the article, which in turn will be more likely to be read further exposing the audience to claims. The pictures analyzed in this
sample helped to further construct terrorism as a social problem. As a side effect of this construction or perhaps as corollary of it, the pictures of the other and non-other, the American victim, generally appeared in sharp contrast: The “normal” American citizen juxtaposed to the “abnormal Muslim terrorist”. The paramount danger of this construction lies not only in the fact that this binarism translates complex concerns and issues of the other, whether legitimate or not, into being simple, direct, and meaningless but also sets into motion an inordinate power balance between the “other” and “us”. Moreover, these constructions are not only interesting in what they depict, but also in what they fail to depict. No pictures of Afghanistan people appeared with them acting in “normal” ways such as going to work, playing with their children, or shopping. Even though some pictures portrayed Afghanistan and other Muslims in the region as poor, and therefore unable to change their plights, these pictures can still be seen to relegate the Afghan citizen and Muslims in the region to a typification of being somehow deserving of this fate due to their responses to their situations. In short, what is not shown is as important as what is.

7. Domain Statements

Several different types of grounds emerged in the articles regarding terrorism that include those found by Best (1990) already discussed. Many of the articles contained more than one type of ground statement, and many of the ground statements included a mixture of range, incidence, and growth estimates. All of the articles referred to terrorism in some way. As discussed previously, domain statements help to establish what the problem is. This is commonly done with an inclusive definition of the problem that allows more people to agree with the issue at hand (Best, 1990). In the case of
terrorism, however, this did not happen. Perhaps this was because of the nature of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In essence, because the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were so prominently featured in print, on television, and on the Internet, there was no need to be inclusive, for everyone accepted that this was a problem. Thus, claims about terrorism already implicitly accepted terrorism as a problem and a definition in the traditional sense was not required; consequently, the question really became not whether terrorism was a problem, but what kind of problem it was for America, and who was causing the problem. In this sample domain statements tended to avoid defining terrorism in the explicit sense, and instead focused on other features of the phenomenon. Out of the 444 total number of grounds that appeared in this sample, 31 pointed out that “Terrorism is a new Social Problem”, 49 pointed out that “Terrorism is an International Problem”, and 117 noted “Terrorism is hard to Defeat”. While these grounds appeared in no order throughout the sample, they will be presented in the order shown above. As well, unless otherwise noted, one example will be used to show the grounds content.

The first type of ground, “Terrorism is a new Social Problem”, tried to define terrorism in part as a new social problem, this was mainly in terms of how one should react to it. An explicit example of this ground can be seen in the following:

And the truth is, this will be a war like none other our nation has faced. Indeed, it is easier to describe what lies ahead by talking about what it is not rather than what it is. This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. (Rumsfeld, September 27, 2001, p. A25)

The second type of ground “Terrorism is an International Problem” tried to define terrorism as being a world or international problem. While conceivably this ground could
be considered as a *range* estimate in Best’s (1990) model, they were included as *domain statements* because they help to define the problem. This type of *ground* stressed that terrorism affected not only the United States, but also other regions of the world.

Focusing the claim on other countries where terrorism occurred principally did this. An explicit example of this *ground* can be seen in the following:

To be realistic -- and successful -- in fighting terrorism, the United States will have to rely on intensive diplomatic pressure, severe economic sanctions and united international support to deal with some of the nations that support terrorist activities. (“War Without Illusions”, September 15, 2001, p. A22).

The third type of *ground* “Terrorism is hard to Defeat”, tried to define terrorism as being a difficult problem in which to overcome. An explicit example of this *ground* can be seen in the following:

Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network and others will require a global crackdown, including an end to laws in tax haven countries that allow secret bank accounts, the Senate Banking Committee was told today. ‘Cutting off terrorist finance is like cutting the heads of the hydra,’ Mr. Winer said. ‘Every time we chop off one head, more will grow back in place. To survive we must kill the entire beast and that means more than a single bin Laden or any part of his related terrorist finance networks.’ (Johnson, September 20, 2001, p. B6).

Also, some *grounds* in this grouping pointed out that terrorism is difficult to overcome because the Muslim religion facilitates terrorism, and the region is full of divisions, poverty, and conflict. An examples illustrating this includes the following:

“Kill America! Kill America!” was a favored chant at the demonstrations. But in Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Quetta and other cities, the verbal onslaught was reserved and predictable. But however temperate today’s protests, Pakistan remains at the edge of civil unrest. Indeed, this is a place near many brinks. It is a nuclear-armed nation forever near a fight to the death with its nuclear-armed nemesis, India. The population, at 140 million, is the seventh largest in the world, but most of the people are dismally poor and growing dismally poorer. (Bearak, September 22, 2001, p. B3).

As well, in this grouping some *grounds* emphasized that terrorism was hard to defeat because the terrorists were evil, calculating, and cowardly. These claims were found
Throughout the sample, and were often very similar, with the most provocative language often being used immediately after the attacks. This was probably the result of two factors, the President and his staff were often quoted and/or the devastation and shock of the attacks was so fresh in the minds of the writers that it left little sympathy for the attackers. They often focused on atrocity stories which helped to personalize, and thus were rhetorically advantageous for the claim. An example of the terrorist being described as evil includes the following:

What we know of these terrorists is that they were evil, educated and suicidal. That is a combination I have never seen before in a large group of people. People who are evil and educated don’t tend to be suicidal (they get other people to kill themselves). People who are evil and suicidal don’t tend to be educated. (Friedman, 2001, September 25, p. A29)

Reference was also made to the President George W. Bush as can be seen in the following example:

Tonight, he looked tense and drawn, as he declared that “today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts,” Mr. Bush said. “I have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. (Bush in Bumiller, September 12, 2001, p. A1)

Reference to the terrorist as evil was also made implicit as can be seen in this example:

But the attacks have changed our perception of the malevolence and determination of today’s terrorists. The suicidal zealotry of the men who flew airliners into buildings, their willingness to prepare for years, their desire for mass casualties and their deep-seated hatred of Americans leave little doubt that they would escalate to even more dreadful weapons if they could. (“The Specter of Biological”, September 26, 2001, p. A22)

Other examples in this grouping stressed the calculating and cunning of the terrorist; some of this element of which can be seen in the above examples as well. One example includes the following:
The moral: Invaders can also win by cunning, deception and their adversaries’ complacency and trust. We are chilled as we learn more about how the Middle East terrorists mad with murder breached our walls and lived brazenly among us for years, mocking our hospitality, exploiting our freedoms. Training at our flight schools and at Gold’s Gym; casing Logan Airport; loudly warning that ‘America’s going to see bloodshed’ while spending up to $300 apiece on lap dancers and drinks at a Daytona Beach strip club, where they left behind a copy of the Koran. (Dowd, September 19, 2001, p. A27)

An examples which referred to the terrorists as cowardly includes the following:

‘Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts,’ Mr. Bush said. Then he concluded: ‘The resolve of our great nation is being tested. But make no mistake: we will show the world that we will pass this test. God bless’. (Bush in Bumiller, September 12, 2001, p. A1)

In sum, the grounds indicated in this section all help to establish the basic facts that terrorism is a key social problem, which is both novel and difficult to overcome, which was also related to the nature of the problem as being international and the nature of the terrorists as being “evil”. The next section will discuss how typifying examples were used as grounds too further indicate that terrorism is a threat.

8. Typifying Examples

Terrorism was typified through a variety of grounds. There were a total of 68 atrocity depictions in this sample. This number is conceivably much larger, however, because atrocity stories were only counted once even when there were several atrocities described in the same story. This approach is justified because it was felt that readers seeing several such similar stories would have an equal propensity to be affected whether they read several of the stories or only one. Typifying examples also played an important role in establishing a claims acceptance. As Best (1990) finds, these types of examples have a rhetorical advantage in that, “By focusing on events in the lives of specific individuals, these stories make it easier to identify with the people affected by the problem. Horrific examples give a sense of the problem’s frightening, harmful
dimensions" (p. 28). In this sample, a recurring page in the New York Times displayed numerous such examples (September 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 2001; October 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2001, p. B11). This page often ran with the page headline “The Victims”, “The Missing” or “The Missing and the Dead”. These titles, thus, also help to draw the readers’ attention. As well, pictures usually accompanied these stores providing a further personalized dimension. These stories were basically all the same in these sections as well as in the regular pages of the New York Times. An example includes the following:

‘John R. Cruz: Plans for a Wedding’. John R. Cruz wasn’t one of those guys who proposes marriage to his girlfriend, forks over the ring, then waits to be informed when and where to attend the wedding. He had proposed to his bride, Susan Fereira, only two weeks before the disaster, when they had both flown out to California for a wedding. So, the whole weekend before the terrorist attack, the loverbirds took delight in discussing complex details. (“The Missing”, September 2001, 25, p. B11)

As well, terrorists were also typified in atrocity tales, as were descriptions of the hijackings (“Second Plane”, September 13, 2001, p. A20). One example includes the following, which describes what some of the hijackers were supposed to read on their last night before they hijacked the planes:

‘The Last Night’ When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, ‘Allahu Akbar,’ because this strikes fear in the hearts of the nonbelievers. God said: “Strike above the neck, and strike at all of their extremities.” Know that the gardens of paradise are waiting for you in all their beauty, and the women of paradise are waiting, calling out, “Come hither, friend of God.” They have dressed in their most beautiful clothing. . . . If you slaughter, do not cause the discomfort of those you are killing, because this is one of the practices of the prophet, peace be upon him. (“Notes Found After”, September 29, 2001, p. B3)

In sum, typifying examples serve to personalize claims and therefore can be seen to increase a claim’s viability. These grounds, therefore, helped to point out who the victims were and as a result effectively pointed out that terrorism is a major social
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problem for Americans. Moreover, as a variety of victims' stories were portrayed, these stories also helped to point out that terrorism is a problem for all Americans. The next section will discuss the grounds that use numeric estimates.

9. Numeric Estimates

Claims also utilized a variety of numeric estimates about terrorism. In general these claims followed Best's (1990) model; however, as aforementioned, titles were also used to show numeric estimates. This can be seen as a rhetorical advantage because it allows the reader to only see the titles information without having to read the article; thus potentially increasing the speed and transmission of claims. In this sample a total of 179 numeric estimates were used, with 126 incidence, 23 growth, and 30 range estimates. It should be noted that while many stories had more than one numeric estimate, counts reflect only a count of one numeric estimate type per story. Thus, the number of numeric estimates included here is much smaller than what would appear if this is taken into account. It should also be noted that certain incidence estimates, for example, were often used with particular conclusions. For instance, the incidence estimates reflecting a sagging economy always referred the conclusion that “Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy”. Typically, more than one of these types of incidence estimates were used with the given story, and consequently it was decided that these incidence estimates would be counted once seeing that many reflected the same kind of estimate. The following sections will discuss the numeric estimates used in this sample.

10. Incidence Estimates

The following is an example of an incidence estimate, which was commonly featured to support the conclusion that “Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy”:
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The attacks on the twin towers of World Trade Center could cost insurers more than $5 billion, making the suspected terrorist attack on the 110-story skyscrapers the most costly man-made catastrophe ever, analysts said yesterday. (Sorkin & Romero, September 12, 2001, p. C6)

A variety of incidence estimates were also used to support the conclusion that “Terrorism is a Threat to America”. An example below explicitly points out inadequacies through incidence with supplies needed for the protection from biochemical terrorism:

‘That's the ultimate plan,’ Dr. Fauci, who will oversee testing of the vaccine, said. ‘Not just stop at 30 or 40 million doses, but to at least have the capability that if we need to vaccinate everybody, we can.’ (Stolberg, October 4, 2001, p. B7)

This incidence estimate points out problems with the amount of Islamic extremists:

The latest annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution identified 58,800 members of ‘foreign extremist organizations’ living in Germany. Of those, 31,450 were said to be Islamic extremists, most of them Turkish or Kurdish. Some 5.5 percent are Arab, and 1.7 percent are from Iran, according to the 2000 edition of the report. In Hamburg itself, a city of 1.7 million with some 80,000 Muslims, there are about 2,450 extremist foreigners, only 270 identified in the report as Iranian or Arab. (Erlanger, September 17, 2001, p. A4)

The most common incidence estimates described deaths, or missing people from the attacks. One explicit example includes the following:

Not with 218 people confirmed to be dead and 5,422 more who are gently described as missing. Not with the faces of those missing staring out from photographs on thousands of posters plastered everywhere. Not with a piece of Lower Manhattan fuming like an immense funeral pyre. (Barry, September 19, 2001, p. B8)

Incidence expressing arrests was also a common estimate used in this sample. One example includes the following:

The German government has frozen 214 bank accounts it believes are linked to terrorists as part of an effort by allies of the United States to comply with a request by the Bush administration, the Economics Ministry said today. According to the ministry, the frozen accounts total $3.7 million. (“Berlin Freezes Assets”, October 3, 2001, p. B5)

11. Growth Estimates

A variety of growth estimates were also used to indicate that terrorism is a
problem. *Growth estimates* unlike *incidence estimates* were not particularly connected with any one *conclusion*. *Growth estimates* by their nature do not appear explicitly. An implicit examples of a this estimate includes the following:

Investigators of that task force said they had been uneasy in recent months as they saw signs of stepped up activities by people linked to extremist groups. They said that they had seized more false passports than usual and that the people whose movements they monitored were traveling more. ("Nations Step up Efforts", 2001, September 15, p. A4)

### 12. Range Estimates

A variety of *range estimates* were also used in this sample. *Range estimates* like *growth estimates* were not attached to any particular *conclusion*. As well, as was noted in the "domain statements" discussion, potentially *grounds* about the international scope of terrorism could have been allocated to the *range estimates*; due to this, an example expressing how the range of terrorism permeates the social structure of the United States will first be presented followed by an example demonstrating how range permeates the international structure. The following *range estimate* depicts how the problem of terrorism is in particular an American one:

Warnings certainly dominated the agenda at this meeting. Government officials and private security industry executives, many of them retired intelligence, military and law enforcement officials, described many if not most features of the American landscape as vulnerable to terrorist attack. The country’s water and food supplies, transportation and energy grids, industrial complexes, even libraries and community centers, could become targets, they said. ‘Yes, there is the potential for chemical and biological attacks,’ President Bill Clinton’s defense secretary, William S. Cohen, told an audience today. (Dillon, October 4, 2001, p. A16)

The following example shows how the problem of terrorism extends internationally:

President Bush said this week that the network operates in 60 countries. But the harder truth, the intelligence officials said, is that no one knows how far Mr. bin Laden’s reach really extends. It is certain, however, that the organization’s influence goes beyond secretive terrorist cells. It has exported instability on a global basis by training and financing Islamic-oriented insurgency movements
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from the Philippines and Malaysia to Nigeria and Chechnya. (Frantz, 2001, September 23. p. 1)

13. Mixtures:

As was noted previously, articles containing numeric estimates often contain several types within. The following example below points out incidence and growth used in conjunction:

At least 11,000 terrorists have been trained in the past five years at camps operated by Osama bin laden across the border in Afghanistan, these officials say. Many have since been dispatched abroad to destinations unknown. (Frantz, September 23, 2001, p. 1)

In conclusion, numeric estimates in this sample pointed out that terrorism is a significant social problem. Furthermore, numeric estimates, are important grounds in that as Best (1990) has shown statistics are typically essential if claims-making activities are to be successful. The next section will discuss the warrants used in this sample.

Warrants

14. Preliminary Discussion

In Best’s (1990) rhetorical model, warrants play a key role linking grounds to conclusions, and he identifies six types. In my analysis, only two new warrants were found “The Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks” and warrant “Internet Facilitates Terrorism”, while most of the other warrants were used in alternate ways than by Best (1990). A total of 397 warrants were found; obviously this exceeds the total amount of articles analyzed, pointing out that some articles used one or more warrant statements. While many articles, which used more than one warrant, used warrants which supported each other, some articles used warrants which contradicted each other. An example of the former is in a claim, which concluded that “Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy”.
In this claim (Berke & Elder, 2001, September 16, p. 6), the warrant "Blameless Victims" was used in conjunction with the warrant "Possibility and Fear of more Attacks" to show that terrorism was hurting the economy. Thus, in using more than one warrant a rhetorical advantage is gained because the claim now appears more sound and can now appeal to a wider audience. Meanwhile, contradictory warrants were typically used when the focus of the claim (conclusion) was to point out an awareness of varying opinions. Typically this is found in claims about the political debate about whether to restrict freedoms in order to deal with terrorism in which warrants about "Rights and Freedoms" were juxtaposed to warrants about the "Possibility and Fear of Future Attacks" (Kennedy, September 16, 2001, WK11; Alvarez, September 25, 2001, p. A16). This can be seen to have an advantage over other claims because by drawing attention to other opinions about the issue and then demonstrating their "faults" the claims validity is more marked than a more straightforward claim composed of a single or like-minded warrants.

Another way journalists presented their claims within the sample was in using implicit warrants. Best (1990) writes, "... warrants are often implicit. Although an argument may advance in a thoroughly public fashion, with each step available for inspection, there are good reasons to gloss over warrants" (p. 32). Best (1990) finds that claims-makers usually use implicit warrants because they want their claim to appeal to the largest possible audience or 'field' as possible. An explicit warrant might not have this rhetorical advantage because once formalized the reader is left with little ambiguity in the interpretation of the claim and as such might be less likely to support the claim even if he/she might agree with the conclusion. Thus, implicit warrants allow claims-
makers to be more inclusive to their audiences' views, where explicit warrants might alienate some readers. For Best (1990), implicit warrants are a conscious rhetorical choice on the part of the claims-maker.

However, another possible reason journalists might use implicit warrants, not noted by Best, is because they do not have to formally invoke the warrant because the warrant is a "social fact"; that is, the warrant is a well established norm - it has been reified - of the audience and consequentially it does not need to be stated. Under Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social constructionist model, reality is defined through three ongoing processes: externalization, objectification, and internalization. In the externalization stage actors, define their world through actions, later this reality becomes objectified and actors view it as something independent to themselves, and finally, this reality is internalized and it socializes actors (McMullin & Marshall in Ryff & Marshall, 1999, p. 313). Applying this to implicit warrants, it could be argued that journalists unknowingly use implicit warrants because these warrants have already gone through the externalization process and have now been objectified - if not internalized. In a sense, then, implicit warrants may be less an insightful (or conscious) use of argumentation by the journalist to convince the audience, than a reflection of the already objectified reality in which the claim emerges. If the warrant has been reified, the journalist does not need to convince the audience of it, and consequently the warrant is not formalized. In this sample, implicit warrants were typically represented by the "Blameless Victims" warrant. This is not surprising because of the nature of the 9/11 attacks. In other words, there was little doubt for most Americans that anyone in the attacks was innocent. Thus, when warrants are used in these claims they are often not explicit because the audience
already feels strongly about the victims associated with the attacks. This allows the inference, that implicit warrants can point out well-established societal norms, and thereby insights about the actors concerned can be drawn.

In sum, Best (1990) and Berger and Luckmann (1966) differ in how they deal with human agency. For Best (1990) it appears that implicit warrants are more than likely to be consciously used by claims-makers, making agency paramount. For Berger and Luckmann (1966), however, actors consciously create reality, then objectify it, and then fall victim to it when they forget this; consequentially, implicit warrants in cases where they are not being externalized are more likely to be the product of structure and less due to agency.

Out of the total 397 warrants used: 54 used the “Rights and Freedoms” warrant, 99 used the “Blameless Victims” warrant, 165 used the “Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks” warrant, 14 used the “Historical Continuity” warrant, 9 used the “Internet Facilitates Terrorism” warrant, and 2 used the “Associated Evils” warrant. Notably, warrants are not always mutually exclusive, as there is occasional ambiguity between them. For instance, in claims focusing on terrorism, “Rights and Freedoms” and “The Blameless Victims” warrants were typically implicit. However, unless this was clear, only the warrant that was present was acknowledged. The next section will present examples of these warrants.

15. Rights and Freedoms

The first warrant “Rights and Freedoms”, was used in claims namely to express the conclusion that “Terrorism is a Threat to America”. For instance, in the examples that follow this warrant is used to justify suspending rights and freedoms in order to
thwart terrorism. This usage is unlike the typical usage of this warrant, as Best (1990) points out where “Rights and Freedoms” are normally invoked to argue for a conclusion to not remove liberties. An example of this warrant can be seen below:

Still, 74 percent of the respondents said they thought it would be necessary for Americans to give up some of their personal freedoms to make the country safe from terrorists. Eighty-six percent said they favored guards and metal detectors at public buildings and events. Sixty-nine percent said they would be willing to arrive three hours early for a domestic airline flight. (Berke & Elder, September 16, 2001, p. 6)

This warrant was also used to argue that in order to fight terrorism Americans should maintain their liberties because without maintaining them they appear like the terrorists. The following example illustrate this:

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, nothing is more important than ensuring that Americans are protected on our home soil. But in doing so, we must not let the symbolic need to do something in a time of fear lead us to sacrifice our constitutional commitments to freedom. (Cole, September 25, 2001, p. A29)

This warrant was also used frequently by President Bush to support his attack on terrorism. The following example shows this feature:

‘Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward,’ the president said. “And freedom will be defended.” He added that ‘the full resources of the federal government would help the victims of the attacks’. (Bush in Bumiller, September 12, 2001, p. A1)

In sum, the “Rights and Freedom” warrant pointed out that either American freedoms would have to be curtailed in order to maintain their freedoms or that their freedoms were under attack.

16. Blameless Victims

The next warrant “Blameless Victims” was somewhat difficult to discern because it was often very implicit. This warrant was often used with the conclusion that “Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy”. An example of this includes the following:
More than 100,000 New York City workers are likely to find themselves unemployed, at least temporarily, as a result of the World Trade Center disaster, according to government estimates released yesterday. (Pristin & Eaton, September 26, 2001, p. B8)

Typifying examples were also often used to illustrate this warrant in relation to the 9/11 attacks, for example:

Meanwhile, in another corner of Greenwich Village, Fern Strauss was having trouble getting it together. She is 50 years old, a vice president and senior paralegal at Smith Solomon Barney, and yet she could not seem to get dressed and out the door to be with her family in Queens for Rosh Hashana. Last Tuesday at this time, Ms. Strauss was at her desk on the 31st floor of 7 World Trade Center when the first tower was struck, causing what sounded to her like an electrical explosion. Within minutes she was fleeing from a building that would later collapse. Only afterward did she realize that some of the debris falling around her was body parts. 'I want to go to temple to enjoy the new year and to mourn with my family,’ she said, her voice trembling. (Barry, September 19 2001, p. B8)

In sum, the “Blameless Victims” warrant was often favored. This can be seen to reflect that indeed, while there were many victims of the terrorists attacks, this warrant was also rhetorically beneficial in that it was implicit and clearly was emotionally charged, thus making conclusions based on this warrant more viable.

17. Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks

The next warrant “Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks” was also noticeably implicit in this sample. Similarly, to the “Blameless Victims” warrant, it was likely so ingrained that explicitly stating it after the attacks would seem redundant. The “Possibility” component of this warrant refers to claims implying that there is a chance that future attacks might occur, while the “Fear” component of this warrant refers to claims implying that future attacks were likely because people were afraid. The following example shows how this warrant was used explicitly in claims about how consumer spending had decreased after the attacks. As well this example helps to illustrate the
“fear” component of this warrant:

But as Americans turned their attention back to watching football this afternoon, much of the country was unsettled. No matter how hard they try not to, no matter how steadfast they may consider themselves, millions of Americans fear retaliation. Even before the bombs burst all across Afghanistan, they were busy buying gas masks and antibiotics. Promising to take every precaution, Mr. Bush still made the remarkable concession that ‘many Americans feel fear today’.

(Apple, October 8, 2001, p. A1)

This next example can be been seen to point out the possibility of future attacks because it notes that one of the arrested people had a pilot’s identification and airline uniform thus suggesting that anyone else could do the same thing:

America has every right to strike back against its assailants, wherever they may be. But in doing so, Washington must be smart in selecting targets and cognizant of the political consequences that its military operations are likely to produce in the Islamic world. The outcome of the war on terrorism should be the eradication or at least the containment of terrorism, not the creation of a new wave of anti-American hostility. (“Calibrating the use of Force”, September 22, 2001, p. A24)

In sum, the “Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks” warrant pointed out that more terrorist attacks on the United States were likely. In addition, these warrants while usually implicit also helped to further establish the threat posed by terrorism.

18. Historical Continuity

The next warrant “Historical Continuity” was also used in an atypical fashion to Best’s (1990) study where the warrant was used to stress consistency with past policies in that claimants argued that if it was done in the past then it should be done now. While Best (1990) does note the possibility this warrant being used to advocate for a “…revolutionary break with the past” (p. 36), he finds that its usage is often employed when readers have little invested in past policies and as such they weigh little on their choices. However, with the attacks of 9/11, perhaps it is not so much that people are unconcerned with past policies but that the attacks pointed out to some that past policies did not work.
In this sample this *warrant* was used to demonstrate just this. An example of this *warrant* can be seen below:

Sept. 11 must not become a tombstone to the nation’s proud tradition of openness to foreign visitors. The terrorist attack exposed frightening weaknesses in immigration practices, as it did with airport security and intelligence-gathering. The best way to preserve the American people’s commitment to keeping their doors open to the world is to crack down on lax enforcement of the immigration laws, with a sense of urgency. ("Terrorism and Immigration", October 5, 2001, p. A22)

Another novel usage of this *warrant* notes the historical continuity of terrorism thus affirming the *conclusion* that “Terrorism is a Threat to America” because terrorist attacks have been occurring throughout history. An example of this include the following:

Afghanistan is a feudal society organized around many tribes and clans with a long history of mutual alliances, betrayal and strife. The one force uniting them over the centuries has been a common outside enemy -- in modern times the British and more recently the Soviet Union. The United States could easily find itself next in line. ("Nation-building in Afghanistan", September 27, 2001, p. A24)

As well, this *warrant* was also used in Best’s (1990) usage. One example can be seen below:

It is important to demonstrate to the world that America stands for justice in its response to the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. By sharing some of its evidence linking Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network Al Qaeda to those attacks with foreign leaders this week, the Bush administration has honored fundamental American values. ("Sharing the Evidence", October 3, 2001, p. A22).

In sum, the “Historical Continuity” *warrant* while sometimes used atypical to Best’s (1990) study, also pointed out a problem with past policies in dealing with terrorism.

19. The Internet Facilitates Terrorism
The next warrant “Internet Facilitates Terrorism” was used to show how changing technology of the computer and Internet allows terrorism to grow. An example of this warrant can be seen in the following:

According to a report last week by the Institute for Security Technology Studies, founded last year at Dartmouth, ‘U.S. retaliatory strikes for the tragic Sept. 11 events may result in cyberattacks against the American electronic infrastructure.’ While such attacks may amount to no more than familiar nuisances -- like hackers’ defacing Web pages or tying up sites by overwhelming them with traffic – ‘the potential exists for much more devastating cyberattacks’, the report said. (Schwatz, October 4, 2001, p. D1)

In sum, this warrant, while sparingly used, presents an interesting case in that it alerts readers to another area where terrorism can pose a threat.

20. Deficient Policies

The next warrant “Deficient Policies”, was also sometimes used differently than Best (1990). In Best’s (1990) study this warrant points out that current policies are incapable of dealing with a problem so new policies are needed. In this sample, some of the warrants asserted that current technology was deficient, and so as a consequence the conclusion “Terrorism is a Threat to America” was confirmed. One example of this can be seen below:

But the experts say the rapid growth of commercially available technologies is fast eroding the government’s edge. New computer power gives wide access to unbreakable or virtually unbreakable codes. Fiber-optic lines give off no electronic emanations that can be gathered. Even radio waves, the spy’s best friend, are evading capture as radios hop frequencies almost randomly to outwit eavesdroppers. The nation’s declining ability to listen surreptitiously to global communications may turn out to have been a major reason there was little or no warning of hijackers intent on turning commercial jets into flying bombs, security experts say. (Broad, September 20, 2001, p. B6)

This warrant was also used in a similar way to Best’s (1990) study. The following example illustrates this:
A debate has begun over whether the inconsistencies of American foreign policy, and the sheer weight of American dominance in the world, mean that resentment of the United States -- even, in extreme cases, hatred -- are inevitable. (Erlanger, September 22, 2001, p. B12)

In sum, the warrant "Deficient Policies" was both used similar to Best's (1990) findings as well as dissimilar; however, in both cases this warrant helped to promote the conclusion that terrorism is a threat.

21. Associated Evils

The final warrant used in this sample was the "Associated Evils" warrant. This warrant had very limited usage. In Best's (1990) model it was used to associate one problem with another problem in order to expand the domain of the problem at hand; thus giving the initial argument about the existence or importance of a problem credence. In this sample, it was used in a similar way. The example below notes that the United States may have to be more like Israel in order to be more secure if it does not take into account the consequences of attacking:

Israelis believe that any fight against terror will be long, as politically and socially divisive as it may be unifying. Some, perhaps more cynical than Ms. Chazan, argue that Americans cannot understand the measures necessary or the costs that will be incurred. . . . 'We understand it, because as Israelis, we live with our fundamentalists,' he said. (Bennet, September 22, 2001, p. A3)

In conclusion, warrants operate as a bridge between grounds and conclusions. Many warrants in this sample whether implicit or explicit generally aligned with those found by Best (1990). Not surprisingly, the most dominant warrant in this sample reflected a "Fear or Possibility of more Terrorists Attacks". This combined with the "Blameless Victims" served a clear rhetorical advantage in forming later conclusions that terrorism was a significant a threat. The next section will present the conclusions that were used in this sample.
Conclusions

22. Preliminary Discussion

In Best’s (1990) model, conclusions statements reflect the action or what the claimants want done about a particular issue. Best (1990) identified four types of conclusions made in claims-making about missing children: 1) Awareness, 2) Prevention, 3) Social Control Policies, and 4) Other Objectives. In this sample, conclusions were variants of only the first type. A total of 400 conclusion statements were isolated from the sample. As such, there are more conclusion statements than articles; thus pointing out that some articles emphasized more than one conclusion. In this sample, all of the conclusions dealt with “Awareness” of terrorism as a social problem, caused primarily by those of Middle Eastern descent, for Americans and the international community. This is most likely because terrorism while not a new issue per se, is seemingly a new issue for the United States given the prominence of the 9/11 attacks. Best (1990) found that the “Awareness” conclusion is typically used when claims-makers are dealing with a new social problem and want an interpretive change. However, this sample suggests more of a reactive response rather than an interpretive one. In this sample 5 types of “Awareness” conclusions were found: 279 conclusions pointed out that “Terrorism is a Threat to America”, 18 conclusions pointed out that “Terrorism is a Threat to the American way of Life”, 73 conclusions pointed out that “Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy”, 18 conclusions emphasized that “Terrorism is a Threat to Civil Liberties”, while the remaining 5 conclusion found that “Terrorism is an intolerable Threat”. The following sections will present these conclusions.

23. Terrorism is a Threat to America
The "Awareness" conclusion was the most common probably because the attacks of 9/11 was a relatively new phenomena for many Americans: there was no perceived warning for most; it was highly dramatic; it occurred at one of the major symbols of America; and it occurred in one its largest cities. This conclusion stressed two main elements. The first was that terrorism is a threat to the United States and the second was that terrorism is a threat to the world, implicitly implying a threat to America as well. This conclusion often used the grounds that "Terrorism is an International Problem" and "Terrorism is hard to Defeat", and "Terrorism is a new Social Problem". The following explicit example will illustrate this conclusion.

This is the end: the end of an era, the era of our invulnerability. We will recover physically and even psychologically, but nothing will ever be quite the same again. A barrier has been irrevocably breached: a barrier against the world outside. Until this week our enemies never seriously penetrated our continental shores. But in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the proud symbols of our global power and influence were violated. (Steel, September 14, 2001, p. A27)

Other conclusions in this grouping pointed out that terrorism was a threat to the world and therefore implicitly the United States as well. One example includes the following title:


Hence, this popular conclusion statement clearly points out that terrorism is indeed an important social problem for America and the world.

24. Terrorism is a Threat to the American way of Life

These conclusions emphasized that terrorism changes how Americans view themselves and the world. This conclusion was often based on the grounds that
"Terrorists are evil and calculating" and "Terrorism is hard to Defeat" and the warrants "Possibility or Fear of Future Attacks" and "Blameless Victims". One example of this can be seen below:

But without that sense of the tragic, America is indeed "innocent," facing each new test or crisis with a combination of abashed patriotism and that feisty spirit. Without a sense of the tragic, its citizens are naked, unprotected, eternally childlike. (Fleming, September 23, 2001, p. WK4)

In short, this conclusion also helps to establish the threat of terrorism for America by focusing on its threat to the how Americans live.

25. Terrorism is a Threat to the Economy

These conclusions point out that terrorism threatens the economy of both the United States and other nations. These conclusions solely used incidence estimates as their grounds, and chiefly utilized the warrants "Possibility of Fear of Future Attacks" and "Blameless Victims". One example which illustrates this conclusion include the following:

Gloom fell over America’s stock markets yesterday, as investors grew fearful that the economy was falling into a deeper recession in the wake of last Tuesday’s attack and might not recover until next spring at the earliest. (Berenson, September 21, 2001, p. C7)

In sum, this conclusion, which was the second most common found, helps to point out that the threat of terrorism causes more than deaths but also can effect the economy and thereby can be seen to help expand the domain of the social problem.

26. Terrorism is a Threat to Civil Liberties

This type of conclusion was used to show that because of the horrific nature of the 9/11 attacks, Americans would rather restrict civil liberties than be faced with future attacks. One example of this can be seen in the following:
I'm a black American, and I've been racially profiled all my life,' said Mr. Arnold, a 43-year-old security officer here, 'and it's wrong. 'But Mr. Arnold admits that he is engaging in some racial profiling himself these days, casting a wary eye on men who look to be of Middle Eastern descent. If he saw a small knot of such men boarding a plane, he said: 'I'd be nervous. It sickens me that I feel that way, but it's the real world'. (Verhovek, September 23, 2001, p. A1)

In essence, this conclusion pointed that the threat of terrorism requires civil liberties to be restricted.

27. Terrorism is an Intolerable Threat

This conclusion was used to show that Americans were not going to think of alternatives to responding to terrorism, with most concluding that a military response was unavoidable. An example of this can be seen in the following:

We will not tolerate such acts. We will expend every effort and devote all the necessary resources to bring the people responsible for these acts, these crimes, to justice. (Ashcroft in “Bush Aides speak out”, September 12, 2001, p. A4)

This final conclusion, which was infrequently used, was normally invoked when members of the Bush Administration were quoted. The next section will present the concluding comments of this Chapter.

28. Concluding Comments

This Chapter addressed how print journalists constructed the social problem of terrorism as a significant threat to the United States. As well, this Chapter addressed how the victim was juxtaposed to the enemy in claims in this sample, and consequently how othering took place within this sample. This was largely accomplished through various pictures or atrocity stories portraying or typifying victims and “terrorists” in the sample. In Best’s (1900) study he points out that changing typifications are important because it means that a social problem is being redefined and this points out changes in how the problem is viewed in society. Changing typifications also point out that the problem may
now be seen to require new solutions. However, in this sample, *typifications* did not change. The problem was basically framed the same way throughout the sample. This may suggest that the *typification* of terrorism as threat through the victims (innocent and blameless), and the enemy other (evil and calculating), did not require alterations. Perhaps this is a reflection of the "horrific" nature of 9/11, or, as was pointed out in Chapter One, perhaps this indicates a moral panic. These *typifications* helped to frame the dominant *conclusion* that in the period from September 11, 2001 to October 8, 2001 that terrorism was a major threat to the United States.

Articles in this sample also used a variety of *grounds* and *warrants*, to yield the *conclusion* that terrorism is a significant threat to America. While several novel *grounds* and *warrants* appeared in this sample, the data largely coincided with Best's (1990) rhetorical analysis model. Table 3 below summarizes the findings of this sample.

Notably, in *grounds* section of this table under "Orientation Statements" three new categories not used by Best (1990) emerged. As well, under the *warrants* section of the table the last two *warrants*, "The possibility or fear of future attacks" and "The Internet facilitates terrorism", were not part of Best's (1990) original model. Finally, it should be noted that several categories, for example, in the *conclusion* section of this table where all the *conclusions* focused on "Awareness" unlike Best's (1990) original model (see Table 2 in Chapter Two), which included three other categories, were absent in the sample.

<table>
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<th>Grounds (Facts)</th>
<th>Warrants (Values)</th>
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However, some important distinctions can be determined. In Best’s (1990) findings “Patterns of Rhetorical Work”, claims often shift over time, in the sense that in his findings claims typically move from the *rhetoric of rectitude* to the *rhetoric of rationality* (p. 43); however, in this sample, the two were intertwined and seemingly each was used to support the other in a dialectic fashion. The reason for this is seemingly twofold: first, it appears that claimants in this sample did not have to convince their audience what the problem was, nor who caused it, and as a result were speaking to the converted; second, it appears, as aforementioned, some researchers have found that the social problem of terrorism was constructed as a moral panic, and thus again the claimants audience were already in agreement that terrorism was a major threat to their safety. It might also be added, that the events of September 11, 2001 were shocking and did indeed cause massive human casualties, the effects of which are still ongoing. Therefore, simply reporting on the events of that day evokes an emotional response from most Americans. In sum, while Best’s (1990) model shows how a social problem is defined over a period of time, how it evolves from emergence to action, it does not readily explain social problems when they apparently emerge as moral panics. In this
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... sample, grounds, warrants and conclusion statements are intertwined, and appear largely haphazardly, possibly because there was no rhetorical advantage in presenting them otherwise as the audience is already in agreement with the claimants (which is also consistent with claims-making of a moral panic). In addition, to the apparent random placement of these statements, the social problem of terrorism was never truly given a direct definition, nor was the scope of the problem exactly defined. This also alerts one that the level of audience acceptance of the social problem is likely high. In turn, this also adds credence to the problem being framed as a moral panic. Perhaps, one of the reasons why claimants did not directly define the problem was because of the typifications, which described various victims of the attacks, specifically how they died, and were often accompanied by pictures so “real” that any arguments as to who the victims were, who the perpetrators were, and what could happen if the problem of terrorism was left unchecked, were unnecessary.

In conclusion, some of the issues raised here will be readdressed in the discussion and conclusion in Chapter Six. The next section, Chapter Four, will present a sample drawn from the Internet (White House Government website) reflecting how President George W. Bush and members of his Administration defined the social problem of terrorism.
Chapter Four: Analysis of Internet Claims

Rhetoric Used in “Speeches and Remarks” of President George W. Bush Regarding Terrorism

In Chapter Three I addressed how print journalists in the New York Times defined the social problem of terrorism. I concluded that terrorism had mainly been framed as a serious threat to the United States. Chapter Four builds upon Chapter Three, in the sense that it will help to explain how terrorism was framed as a social problem not by print journalists, but by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration on the government’s website. Chapter Four is also concerned with how terrorists and victims were portrayed and othered, as this directly influences how the threat of terrorism was constructed.

In order to investigate these concerns, a total of 81 webpages from the Whitehouse’s website http://www.whitehouse.gov addressing the threat of terrorism were gathered. These webpages cover the time-span from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2002. These webpages all involve President George W. Bush with the exception of one webpage from the Attorney General John Ashcroft, and several others which included Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and various other state actors along with various other Prime Ministers in conjunction with the President. As well, the content of these webpages was also represented in other media forms including the radio, online video (also featured on television) formats as well as print and in Spanish also; therefore, the claims in these webpages had a propensity to reach a much wider audience.

Webpages in this sample while all being analyzed are not being presented in a claim-by-claim manner due to clarity, time, and space; consequently, in order to depict
the content of this sample in an efficient manner, the most common and/or novel
grounds, warrants, and conclusions will be presented with accompanying examples to
illustrate overall claim content. In short, it is the intent of this analysis to identify the
generic features. Furthermore, as a result, there will be only one example of each feature
presented unless there is a novel or interesting case. In addition, in the same manner as
Chapter Three, throughout this Chapter various counts of these features will be taken.
These counts indicate the frequency of each ground, warrant, and conclusion statements.
These manifest elements are able to demonstrate the frequency of these generic features
and as such help to show which devices were more prominently featured in the
construction of terrorism as a social problem. As a result, these counts will help to
explain which devices were used the most, and therefore which devices served the
greatest rhetorical benefit. In addition, as was outlined in Chapter Two with Best’s
(1990) “Model of the Claims-making Process” (Table 1), data in this Chapter will be
presented in accordance with Best’s (1990) model and also because this facilitates the
information requirements pointed out in Chapter Two, and thus the particular theoretical
objectives of Chapter One. As such, this discussion will begin with the grounds, and will
be followed by a discussion of the warrants and conclusions.

1. Orientation/Domain Statements

As Best (1990) found in his study, “Definitions can both establish a topic’s
domain and offer an orientation toward that topic” (p. 26). In this sample, webpages can
be seen to utilize both of the above aspects. For instance, webpages regarding terrorism
focused on both noting the novelty of the 9/11 attacks and the novelty of the terrorists
who conducted the attacks, thereby pointing to the establishment of a new domain; while
other webpages focused on orientating the reader that the problem was one of war as opposed to other categories such as political crime. As such, both domain and orientation statements serve to define the problem of terrorism. As a result, these definitions will be analyzed in the same section.

In this sample, webpages never defined terrorism in any explicit or technical way. This can be seen as a rhetorical choice because by not defining terrorism the term remains as inclusive as possible and thus less open to being “pigeonholed”. In fact, in some of the “Speeches and Remarks” by President George W. Bush, any country which harbored terrorists were also considered terrorists which potentially exponentially increased the scope of the problem. Meanwhile, all the webpages in this sample provided the orientation that there is a problem, which concerns terrorism and terrorists in the United States and the world. For example, the following example illustrates this point:

Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. ("Statement by the President", September 11, 2001, para. 1)

These claims were often highly charged in comparison to those from the New York Times, which were not as one-sided in their depictions. While all of this sample noted that terrorism and terrorists were a problem, many focused to orientate the reader or viewer that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were acts of war, that terrorists were evil, and that this war and enemy were unlike any before: 61 webpages noted that terrorists are evil; 50 noted that terrorism (the September 11th attacks on the United States) is war; and 40 noted that terrorism represented a new kind of war with a new kind of enemy. It should be noted that many webpages defined the problem of terrorism in more than one
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way, and as a result there are more orientation and domain statements then there are webpages. As well, some of the grounds in this section, specifically the ground that terrorists are evil, could have been arguably included in the warrants section under the warrant "Blameless Victims/Blameful Terrorists" because it implicitly follows that if the terrorists are evil then the victims of their acts are without fault; however, it was felt these statements, with their normally early positioning in the webpages, and the fact that they acted in an implicit manner to affirm the blamelessness of the victims, more served to orientate the reader and so they were included here. A similar situation occurs with the ground that terrorism represents a new kind of war with terrorists representing a new kind of enemy. This ground could also conceivably be categorized with the warrant "Blameless Victims/ Blameful Terrorists", as it implicitly implies that if the enemy is somehow new then the victims could not have circumvented the attacks and are therefore faultless; however, it was again felt that this was a ground because it helped to define the what and who of terrorism, and thus orientating the audience to the problem at hand.

The 61 grounds in this sample that emphasized that the terrorists were evil often did so throughout a webpage. Due to this, one instance of a claim noting that terrorists are evil in an article received a count of one; thus this count is underrepresented in this view. As well, these claims were seen from the onset of the sample, with these grounds appearing throughout the sample with no significant fluctuation in frequency. A typical example of this ground includes the following:

No threat, no threat will prevent freedom-loving people from defending freedom. And make no mistake about it: This is good versus evil. These are evildoers. They have no justification for their actions. There’s no religious justification, there’s no political justification. The only motivation is evil. And the Prime Minister understands that, and the Japanese people, I think, understand that as well. ("International Campaign Against Terror", September 25, 2001, para. 20).
Notably, these examples all expound the fact that the terrorists are "evil". As noted in Chapter One evil carries with it a cultural baggage. To be labeled evil carries the connotation that you are inhuman and this carries the connotation that any action to fight this evil is morally justified. As well, many of these examples, and those not seen here, also contain reference to the victims. This immediacy of juxtaposition, and thus the immediacy of its conclusion, that terrorists are evil, is a significant rhetorical choice for rendering of the terrorist other. The formation of this binarism (Us vs. Them/ Evil vs. Good/ Civilized vs. Barbarian) does not even require thought when it is so explicitly pointed out.

As well, there were several webpages included in this sample that emphasized that terrorists have no values or morals. Due to the similarity of this with the *ground* that terrorists are evil, they were included in this count. An example showing the lack of values terrorists have and their juxtaposition to Americans include the following:

> The attack on our nation was also attack on the ideals that make us a nation. Our deepest national conviction is that every life is precious, because every life is the gift of a Creator who intended us to live in liberty and equality. More than anything else, this separates us from the enemy we fight. We value every life; our enemies value none -- not even the innocent, not even their own. And we seek the freedom and opportunity that give meaning and value to life. ("President’s Remarks", September 11, 2002, para. 6)

Another *ground*, which appeared 50 times in this sample, pointed out that America was fighting a war and not something else such as a brief or one-off terrorist attack. Thus, by only referring to the attacks, and the response to them as war, a rhetorical choice is being made. The term war, like many other terms in this sample,
carries many connotations: It points out that a response is legitimate by noting that they declared war on us; It points out that the response is likely to be drawn out and difficult; It points out that the nature of the conflict kills; Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it points out that there is an "Us vs. Them". Thus, the culturally laden term "war" also serves to other the terrorist by implicitly and explicitly noting there are sides in the battle. The notion that the attacks of September 11th represented a war was seen throughout this sample. Two examples of this ground includes the following:

The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack. ("Remarks by President", September 11, 2001, para. 2).

You see, we need to learn to set priorities in our government. And the number one priority is to protect America from attack, because we're at war. ("Anti-Terrorism Technology", July 22, 2002, para. 19)

Closely related to this ground, was the ground that America was fighting a new type of war facing a new type of enemy. By referencing the enemy and the conflict as being outside the "normal", claims suggesting that terrorism is a threat, and thus a significant social problem, become more viable. This also further others the terrorist because now the terrorist is some anomaly - an aberration to the normal foe one might experience in a normal campaign. The following typical example depicts this ground:

We’re facing a new kind of enemy, somebody so barbaric that they would fly airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. And, therefore, we have to be on alert in America. We’re a nation of law, a nation of civil rights. We’re also a nation under attack. No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft - fly U.S. aircraft into buildings full of innocent people - and show no remorse. This is a new kind of -- a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American people must be patient. I'm
going to be patient. ("Remarks by the President", September 16, 2001, paras. 16-17).

In sum, *domain* and *orientation statements* in this section pointed out that terrorists are evil and that the United States is involved in a new kind of war with a new kind of enemy. Often these *grounds* were used throughout the sample, which is probably related to the fact that the claimants wanted to frame the 9/11 attacks as acts of war so that going to war with Afghanistan and Iraq would be seen to be justified. As well, by characterizing the “war” as being new and difficult it further strengthened this justification. The next section will present the *numeric estimates* that were used in this sample.

2. Numeric Estimates

In this sample a variety of *numeric estimates* were used. A total of 80 *numeric estimates* were gathered, with 27 pointing out incidence, 23 pointing out growth, and 30 pointing out range. It should be noted that these *numeric estimates* were not always mutually exclusive, as many *incidence*, *growth* and *range* estimates were often depicted in the same webpage, nor did one type always appear in one webpage. As well, if one type of *numeric estimate* appeared several times in a given webpage then it was only counted once; as such, counts would be higher than appear if this factor was not applied.

In general, *numeric estimates* were used throughout the sample with no apparent correlation to a given *warrant* or *conclusion* probably because numeric estimates are generally always relevant to claims-making activities (Best, 1990) because statistics provide a rational for a claims *conclusion*. The following sections will present examples of these *numeric estimates*.

3. Incidence Estimates
In Best's (1990) model *incidence estimates* are just that estimates, while it sometimes occurred in this sample that actual numbers were given; however, these figures while not being an estimate, and thus not having the same rhetorical advantage of words like "thousands", do serve a similar purpose in that they give incidence to the issue and thus reflect that it is a serious social problem of some magnitude. For instance, some *incidence "estimates"* in this sample note actual arrests or the amount of troops being deployed. Both these types of figures, while not estimates per se, point to terrorism as being a problem that requires action. The following examples illustrate how *incidence estimates* were used in this sample. In the first example *incidence* is used to show the number of FBI agents that are needed to combat terrorism; notably, this example also uses the undefined word "thousands" which suggests the United States is also dealing with an undeterminable threat. The second example of *incidence* indicates a more straightforward usage of *incidence* by noting how many troops are needed to deal with the problem of terrorism. The third example shows *incidence* through noting the number of nations fighting terrorism, thus indicating that the threat of terrorism is significant. As well, this example indicates the scope of the problem noting how much money the "terrorists" had to use for their activities:

Thousands of FBI agents in all the field offices across the country, and in the international legate offices, assisted by personnel from other Department of Justice agencies, are cooperating in this investigation. ("Statement by the President", September 11, 2001, para. 8)

We are in the process of calling up as many as 35,000 such troops. They will serve in a number of essential roles. They will help maintain our air defenses so they can stay on high alert. They will check shipping in ports. They will help our military with airlift and logistics. They will provide military police. They will participate in engineering projects. They will help gather intelligence. And they will perform work as chaplains. ("Guard and Reserves", September 17, 2001, para. 5)
A total of 161 nations around the world have joined together to block more than $100 million of suspected terrorist assets. The United States also continues to work with our friends and allies around the world to round up individual terrorists, such as Abu Zubaydah, a top al Qaeda leader captured in Pakistan. From Spain to Singapore, our partners are breaking up terrorist cells and disrupting their plans. Altogether, more than 1,600 terrorists and their supporters have been arrested or detained in 95 foreign nations. ("Radio Address by the President", April 20, 2002, para. 7)

4. Growth Estimates

Growth estimates often appeared with range estimates as well as with incidence estimates in this sample. Growth, however, unlike incidence was mainly implicitly implied and was used to support the notion that terrorism and the war effort to combat it were growing (thus yielding the conclusion that terrorism is a threat). Several examples of growth estimates can be seen below. In the first example, growth is indicated by noting that terrorism has to be fought on a number of fronts, and that the weapons to fight terrorism are more than military. The second example indicates growth by using incidence to suggest there are more terrorists to be caught.

As all these actions make clear, our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan. Some victories will be won outside of public view, in tragedies avoided and threats eliminated. Other victories will be clear to all. Our weapons are military and diplomatic, financial and legal. And in this struggle, our greatest advantages are the patience and resolve of the American people. ("Radio Address of the President", September 29, 2001, paras. 12-13)

I say "the first 22" because our war is not just against 22 individuals. Our war is against networks and groups, people who coddle them, people who try to hide them, people who fund them. This is our calling. This is the calling of the United States of America, the most free nation in the world. A nation built on fundamental values that rejects hate, rejects violence, rejects murderers, rejects evil. And we will not tire. We will not relent. It is not only important for the homeland security of America that we succeed, it is equally as important for generations of Americans who have yet be born. ("President Unveils", October 10, 2001, para. 12)
5. Range Estimates

In this sample, range estimates were mainly expressed through noting how different countries were fighting terrorism, and also by noting how the problem of terrorism was spreading across the social structure of American society. Words such as "global" or "network" also can be seen to express the notion that terrorism is wide ranging and thus affecting many nations. An example below illustrates a range estimate:

Al Qaeda operates in more than 60 nations, including some in Central and Eastern Europe. These terrorist groups seek to destabilize entire nations and regions. They are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilization itself. ("President Bush", November 6, 2001, para. 6)

6. Typifying Examples

Typifying examples in this sample mainly depicted stories about those who survived or died in the 9/11 attacks. These examples were primarily seen in early webpages about terrorism, while some typifying examples did extend throughout the entire sample. In this sample there were a total of 22 typifying examples used. One typical example includes the following:

On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America in a series of despicable acts of war. They hijacked four passenger jets, crashed two of them into the World Trade Center's twin towers and a third into the Headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense at the Pentagon, causing great loss of life and tremendous damage. The fourth plane crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside, killing all on board but falling well short of its intended target apparently because of the heroic efforts of passengers on board. This carnage, which caused the collapse of both Trade Center towers and the destruction of part of the Pentagon, killed more than 250 airplane passengers and thousands more on the ground. ("National Day of Prayer", September 13, 2001, para. 1)

This typifying example is of interest because it does not depict American victims but points out that terrorism is a more global problem and that victims are not just Americans:
When an 18-year-old Palestinian girl is induced to blow herself up, and in the process kills a 17-year-old Israeli girl, the future, itself, is dying -- the future of the Palestinian people and the future of the Israeli people. We mourn the dead, and we mourn the damage done to the hope of peace, the hope of Israel’s and the Israelis’ desire for a Jewish state at peace with its neighbors; the hope of the Palestinian people to build their own independent state. Terror must be stopped. No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death. (“President to Send Secretary”, April 4, 2002, paras. 4-5)

As can be seen in the above examples these grounds often refer to victims of the terrorists, but also occasionally they refer to the people who live in the Middle East as being victims of their respective regimes. These typifying examples could have also fell under the warrant “Blameless Victims/Blameworthy Terrorists” as they all implicitly imply that the suffering from terrorists is not the fault of the victim; however, they are clearly typifying examples due to their personalized story accounts. Notably, typifying examples can also be seen to serve to other the terrorists as they too juxtapose the victims and the terrorists reasserting the “Us vs. Them” dichotomy. Typifying examples are an important rhetorical choice because they help to solidify conclusions because of their personalized nature. In this sample, they all served to point out the terrorists destroyed American lives and threatened America. This is further expounded by using examples of how the terrorists treat their own people.

In sum, grounds in this sample typified terrorists as evil and amoral while victims were depicted as good and moral. Terrorism was typified as an act of war, with terrorists being depicted as being enemies without parallel, while victims were seen as being wholly without fault. The next section will address how warrants were used in this sample.

7. Warrants
In this sample a variety of warrants were also used. Many of these warrants were similar to Best's (1990) usage however a number of them deviated. There were a total of 169 warrants used in this sample: 74 emphasized the warrant “Blameless Victims/Blameful Terrorists”; 68 emphasized the warrant “Rights and Freedoms are under Attack”; 11 emphasized the warrant “Rights and Freedoms Should be Restricted”; 7 emphasized the warrant “Historical Continuity”; and 9 emphasized the warrant “Deficient Policies”. Two of Best’s (1990) warrants “The Value of Children” and “Associated Evils” were not used in this sample, while his original warrants “Blameless Victims” and “Rights and Freedoms” were both modified for this sample. As well, obviously, there were more warrants in this sample than there were claims, so some claims had more than one warrant. Also, warrants in this sample were always mutually supportive of the given conclusion.

In Best’s (1990) usage of warrants he found that warrants are often implicit because if the warrant is explicit and unaccepted by the audience the conclusion is often also not accepted: “Thus, for an argument to be persuasive, the individual to be persuaded must ordinarily belong to a field that deems the warrant valid” (p. 32). In this sample, while many of the warrants were implicit, a majority were explicit. This can be seen to suggest that the field the audience belonged to seemingly accept the warrant. Perhaps, this was due to the nature of the event; the September 11th attacks which was a highly publicized and highly emotional issue. As well, the warrant, which was often implicit, “Blameless Victims/Blameful Terrorists”, due to its nature (who would try to understand someone who flies a plane into a tower full of people?), can be seen to be almost explicit in the minds of the audience after the numerous depictions and broadcasts of the attacks.
in the news; hence, in this sense almost all of the warrants were explicit as there was no need to state what everyone knew. Furthermore, another possibility might be less to do with the nature of the event being typified and more to do with who was doing the typifying. In this situation, the claims were almost solely from the President who occupies probably the most important post in the nation, and consequently, warrants made from Presidents are perhaps more explicit, less because that is the rhetorical choice and more because they have the position to readily transmit claims. More importantly, this would also suggest that the conclusions these warrants were trying to support were also more likely to be accepted given that warrants occupy an especially crucial role in the acceptance of claims: “… concluding that something must be done demands that one person accept some warrant that the problem deserves attention” (Best, 1990, pp. 31-32). Moreover, as Best (1990) points out “While it is relatively easy to debate the merits of ground statements, it is more difficult to defend a warrant that one’s audience refuses to validate” (p. 32). In other words, warrants that are more implicit usually have a rhetorical advantage over explicit warrants because they allow the claimant to gloss over a potentially unacceptable field. Furthermore, as these warrants are mostly explicit, it would suggest that the claimant knows the warrant is widely held to be valid and therefore the claimant does not need to mask the warrants to convince the audience of the claims conclusions.

One warrant “Blameless Victims/Blameful Terrorists” used in this sample is different to Best’s (1990) application. In his model this warrant was used to primarily note that victims were blameless; however, in this sample this warrant also expressed the
implicit notion that terrorists were blameful which implies that the victims must be blameless. The following example will show this point:

Nor is our war against global terrorism a war against the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan people are victims of oppression and misrule of the Taliban regime. There are few places on earth that face greater misery. One out of every four children dies before the age of five, in Afghanistan. It is estimated that one in every three children in Afghanistan is an orphan; almost half suffer from chronic malnutrition; millions face the threat of starvation. The situation is so bad, so bad, that we read about three year old children in Afghanistan who weigh less than the average newborn in America. We’re trying to get food to starving Afghans. In contrast, the Taliban regime, those who house the evildoers, has harnessed international aid -- harassed international aid workers, and chased them out of their country. (“President asks American”, October 12, 2001, paras. 21-22)

Of note, examples of this warrant were often laden with other warrants such as those referring to “Rights and Freedoms” and also various incidence and range estimates as well as the conclusion that terrorism is a threat to America. This warrant also appeared throughout the example, but largely after the invasion of Afghanistan, October 8th, 2001, which would appear to reflect that the Bush Administration was trying to bolster the argument for the invasion and build the foundation for further anti-terrorist attacks (for instance, North Korea and Iraq became the focus, with Iraq having been invaded and still occupied by American armed forces to this day, “President Delivers State”, January 29, 2002, paras 18-21). Thus, it would appear that these warrants serve a rhetorical purpose. As well, the use of this warrant further typified the terrorists as being “evil” in the sense that they would even hurt their own people and moreover even children (which are viewed as being completely blameless). As such, it furthers the othering of the terrorists and furthers the binarism of “Us vs. Them” mentality. They starve their people, they withhold aid, they kill women and children and are then happy;
while *we* feed our people and succor human rights. The following two examples depict
the blameless victims *warrant* in this sample:

Today America has experienced one of the greatest tragedies ever witnessed on our soil. These heinous acts of violence are an assault on the security of our nation. They are an assault on the security and the freedom of every American citizen. ("Press Briefing by Attorney General", September 11, 2001, para. 2).

We’re joined today by families who have lost loved ones in the great acts of evil. As you draw on faith and personal strength to cope with your grief, I hope you’ll also find comfort in the knowledge that your nation stands with you and prays for you. We mourn those whom we’ve lost, and we face the future together. ("President Bush Signs", January 23, 2002, para. 1).

These examples are also largely implicit which was a common feature for this *warrant*. The use of this *warrant* can be seen to alert the audience to the notion that this *warrant* was so cognitively entrenched for Americans after the attacks that there was often no need to be explicit with it. This also points out that there is probably a greater likelihood that *conclusions* based on this *warrant* are more apt to be accepted.

Another *warrant* that appeared 68 times in this sample, "Rights and Freedoms are Under Attack", was used to expound the notion that American liberties were being attacked by terrorism. This *warrant* was used numerous times throughout the entire span of this sample. Below is one typical example of this *warrant*:

Our nation faces a threat to our freedoms, and the stakes could not be higher. We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill -- kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We’ve seen that type of hate before -- and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it. This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims. ("President Discusses War", November 8, 2001, paras. 9-10)
The extensive usage of the “Rights and Freedoms Under Attack” warrant is perhaps not surprising given what Best (1990) points out that Americans will often use this warrant to defend various freedoms; for example, the freedom to have abortion. Although in this usage, it is employed to support the notion that terrorism threatens freedoms which likely has much broader based acceptance then the above more typical example of abortion rights, because by using freedom in this general way the warrant is more easily accepted by many if not all Americans who can be seen to all value freedom in some way. As such, in this understanding, not only are, for example, freedoms such as abortion rights being attacked by terrorism, but all freedoms are being attacked. Thus, this serves the rhetorical advantage of being inclusive; thus allowing the audience to more willingly accept the conclusions this warrant purports.

Another related warrant that appeared 11 times, also deviated from Best’s (1990) schema is that “Rights and Freedoms Should be Restricted”, which noted that in order to keep freedoms some freedoms would have to be curtailed (more specifically, the freedom to information). The “Rights and Freedoms Should be Restricted” warrant did not often appear probably due to it having a less universal application, and thus less of a rhetorical advantage then the previous warrant. The following example will depict the “Rights and Freedoms Should be Restricted” warrant:

First, let me condition the press this way. Any sources and methods of intelligence will remain guarded and secret. My administration will not talk about how we gather intelligence, if we gather intelligence and what the intelligence says. That’s for the protection of the American people. It is important as we battle this enemy to conduct ourselves that way. (“President Pledges Assistance”, September 13, 2001, para. 31)

In this example, President George W. Bush is referring to restricting the rights and freedoms of “terrorists” when he refers to needing “necessary tools”:
But we’re at war, a war we’re going to win. And in order to win the war, we must make sure that the law enforcement men and women have got the tools necessary, within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy. (“President: FBI”, September 25, 2001, paras. 14-15)

Also, counted in this sample was the warrant that stressed that the rights and freedoms of those under the terrorist regimes were unfairly restricted, and so also under attack. Notably, some of these examples also fall under the ground that terrorists are evil and the warrant “Blameless Victims”. The following example shows this point:

And I want you to tell your youngsters, your children and your grandchildren, that when this great nation went into Afghanistan, we didn’t go to conquer anybody, we went in to liberate. We went in to liberate people from the clutches of the most barbaric regime in history. (Applause.) This great nation and our friends and allies not only upheld an important doctrine, but as a result of our action, many young girls go to school for the first time in Afghanistan. (“President Focuses on Economy”, September 5, 2002, para. 32)

Another warrant used in this sample “Historical Continuity” was used to point out the value that America’s past fighting “evil” should be continued with the present war fighting the evils of terrorism. The two examples below depict this point:

What happened at Pearl Harbor was the start of a long and terrible war for America. Yet, out of that surprise attack grew a steadfast resolve that made America freedom’s defender. And that mission -- our great calling -- continues to this hour, as the brave men and women of our military fight the forces of terror in Afghanistan and around the world. (“President: We’re Fighting”, December 7, 2001, para. 3)

History has called each of us to defend America. That’s what’s happened. History has called us into action in a time of great peril. The struggles against Naziism and communism helped to define the 20th century. The war on terror will be the defining conflict of the 21st century. (“Anti-Terrorism Technology”, July 22, 2002, para. 37)

The last warrant also sparingly used in this sample “Deficient Policies”, emphasized that the resources and the departments to fight terrorism were lacking and had to be improved. The following example shows this warrant:
Our security will require the best intelligence, to reveal threats hidden in caves and growing in laboratories. Our security will require modernizing domestic agencies such as the FBI, so they’re prepared to act, and act quickly, against danger. Our security will require transforming the military you will lead -- a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. (“President Bush Delivers”, June 1, 2002, para. 20)

In sum, warrants in this sample were used either alone or more often in conjunction with one another to support the conclusions which will be shown in the next section. These warrants all helped to typify both the victims and the terrorist other. Namely, they generally purported a typification of diametric opposites, where victims were good and just and terrorist others were evil and unjust. The next section will present the conclusions of this sample.

8. Conclusions

While Best’s (1990) model found several types of conclusions, “Awareness”, Prevention”, “Social Control Polices” and “other Objectives”, this sample only noted the latter two types. Again, this is probably a reflection of the nature of the attacks and also the nature of the claimant’s position. “Awareness” conclusions are typically used to bring awareness of an emerging or unrecognized social problem while the “Prevention” conclusion in this sample was relatively underutilized in comparison to the “Awareness” conclusion. In this sample, a total of 150 conclusion statements were gathered. These conclusions were not mutually exclusive and consequently some webpages had more than one conclusion. There were a total of 125 “Awareness” conclusions that pointed out that terrorisms was a threat to American and/or the world. This conclusion was not divided into two because often the conclusion referred to both American and the World as being threatened from terrorism. As well, if the world is threatened it is implicit that America is also threatened, and conversely too. The remaining 25 conclusions fell into
the category of "Prevention" as they pointed out that fighting terrorism required war.

The following example will show this first conclusion. This example more specifically reflect how terrorism threatens America:

I think America needs to know that we in government are on alert; that we recognize life around the White House or around the Congress is not normal, or is not the way it used to be, because we're very aware that people have conducted an act of war on our country; and that all of us urge our fellow Americans to go back to work and to work hard, but we must be on alert. Our government is working hard to make sure that we run down every lead, every opportunity, to find someone who would want to hurt any American. ("Remarks by the President", September 19, 2001, para. 7)

The following example shows the conclusion that terrorism is a threat to America and the world:

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded -- with sympathy and with support. ("Address to a joint Session" September 20, 2001, para. 35).

These conclusions both implicitly and explicitly point to terrorism as a threat to America and the world. They also, notably, sometimes use range to implicitly show this by noting where the terrorists are and which nations are fighting terrorism.

The final conclusion pointed out that in order to combat terrorism war is required.

The following example demonstrates this conclusion:

. . . but there's no question about it, this act will not stand; we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will get them running and we'll bring them to justice. We will not only deal with those who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and house them. Make no mistake about it: underneath our tears is the strong determination of America to win this war. ("President Urges Readiness", September 15, 2001, para. 3)
This conclusion specifically alerts the audience that the only way to fight terrorism is through action, which implicitly implies war. Discussion and/or other political recourse are deemed to be ineffective because as the grounds note, terrorist are evil, amoral, and novel enemies. The final section of this Chapter will present the concluding comments.

9. Concluding Comments: Moral Panics and the Rhetoric of Rectitude and Rationality

This Chapter addressed how President George W. Bush and members of his Administration constructed the threat of terrorism as a social problem on the White House website. These Internet claims by the President and his Administration clearly point out that terrorism was framed as key social problem for United States. In fact, many claims point out that this social problem is a war. While this sample reflected Best’s (1990) rhetorical analysis model, there were some deviations. As aforementioned in this Chapter some of the grounds and warrant statements were not part of Best’s (1990) schema. For example, the warrants “Blameless Victims” from Best’s (1990) original model was modified to include “Blameful terrorists” while similar modifications occurred to Best’s (1990) original warrant “Rights and Freedoms” (see Table 4 on page 138). Table 4 on page 138 summarizes the findings of this sample. As this table shows, many of the original categories which Best (1990) found were also noted in this sample, while the differences in this sample were largely attributable to the absence of categories from Best’s (1990) model. For example, in the “Conclusions” section of this sample two of Best’s (1990) original conclusions “Social Control Policies” and “Other Objectives” were absent.
Table 4: Summary of Findings for Sample 2

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<thead>
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<th>Grounds (Facts)</th>
<th>Warrants (Values)</th>
<th>Conclusions (Actions)</th>
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<td>I. Definitions</td>
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<td>Victims/Blameful terrorists</td>
<td>A. Terrorism is a threat to America/world</td>
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<td>1. Terrorists are evil</td>
<td>II. Rights and Freedoms are under attack</td>
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Another deviation occurred with Best’s (1990) model. In his work on the “Patterns in Rhetorical Work” (Best, 1990, p. 43), and aforementioned in the introduction, he found that less experienced claims-makers usually start with the *rhetoric of rectitude* or morality seeking interpretation and move toward the *rhetoric of rationality* seeking action in their claims as their experience increases. In this sample, the *rhetoric of rectitude* predominated the entire sample. This can be explained in several ways. First, it is likely that the vast coverage and the horrific depictions of the destruction of the World Trade Centre buildings meant that this issue was particularly value saturated for many Americans, and this imagery-laden experience carried great inertia, thus allowing the President to focus on morality in his claims. It is also possible that these claims were so value built because of who transmitted the claims (Best, 1989b, Welch, Fenwick, & Roberts, 1997). The President is a primary definer and in this role serves as a moral entrepreneur: “...state managers not only confirm crime as a problem but add a heightened sense of anxiety and urgency to an emerging moral panic” (Welch, et al., 1997, p. 11). As well, as mentioned in the Introduction, the attacks represented a state of
unpredictability for many. As Clarke (2003) so nicely summarizes “Like millions of others, I watched the events of that lovely morning unfold on television. When the South Tower fell for a few seconds I could not see it collapsing. My blindness wasn’t because of smoke and dust. It was cognitive blindness” (p. 1).

Similarly, related to the feeling of “cognitive blindness” is the notion of panic. As outlined in Chapter One, moral panics contain two essential elements an elevated sense of fear, and someone to direct that fear upon – the folk devil, the terrorist, the other. A third feature to add to this mix is that of the “the folk-angel” the victim. When the victim is represented in opposition to the terrorist, as was in the vast majority of the claims in the sample, the notion of “Us vs. Them” becomes all the more palpable: “Stereotyping furnishes both a reflection and a means of political conflict” (Turk, 1982, p. 71). Or as Christie (1986) says “Ideal victims need – and create – ideal offenders. The two are interdependent. … The more ideal a victim is, the more ideal becomes the offender. The more ideal the offender, the more ideal is the victim” (in Fattah, p.25). What Christie (1986) also alerts us to is the notion that the “ideal victim” and “ideal offender” appear as opposites. This can be seen to serve a rhetorical purpose because if the terrorist and the victims are seen to share common features and characteristics then the likelihood of a claims conclusion being accepted is decreased: “Offenders that merge with the victims make for bad offender, just as victims that merge with offenders make for bad victims” (in Fattah, p. 25). Christie (1986) furthers this idea “The ideal offender differs from the victim. He is, morally speaking, black against the white victim. He is a dangerous man coming from far away. He is a human being close to not being one” (in Fattah, p. 26). Hence, the extreme language of these claims, as seen in the examples throughout this
Chapter, paints a vivid picture of the terrorist – the black – to the victim – the white. All of these features can easily be seen to be present in this sample, and as a result it is not startling that *warrants* were much more explicit than implicit. It is also perhaps not that unexpected that many scholars have noted that there was a vacuum of debate regarding the issue of going to war over the terrorist attacks.

As well, the language of these claims can also be seen to serve another important rhetorical function. It provides the audience, on the one hand, with *warrants* which they can more easily disagree with then would they if they were represented as wholly rational, but on the other hand, it puts the audience in a position where they can not easily refute the *warrants*, not because they are irrational or circumspect, but because they are so value charged that disagreement would equate with being considered “un-American” or “unpatriotic”: “Direct and vicarious experiences with one another, other people, and other situations generate the criteria by which distinctions are drawn, expectations are formed, and judgments are reached” (Turk, 1982, p. 71). By using the *warrant* of “Rights and Freedoms” then, the President gained a rhetorically valuable stance; as such, throughout this sample the claims use *warrants* which promote the claim that freedom is at risk, and freedoms will be altered if nothing is done to fight terrorism – even civilization itself it is charged will change. The claims are never framed to suggest that the attacks could have been politically motivated – or even that they are motivated by anything other than reprehension for freedom and the American way of life and pure ascription to evil (as noted, in Chapter One, the invocation of evil and the disallowance of other depictions, even as insane, allows for a wide variety of actions to be taken out
against those deemed as such). By doing this, the claims face one of two likely possibilities either falling flat or being increasingly seen as cogent arguments.

The next section, Chapter Five, will also present a sample drawn from the Internet (White House Government website), reflecting how President George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to allegations of torture. Chapter Five will thereby build upon Chapters Three and Four in the sense it will demonstrate how the framing of terrorism as a significant threat to the United States, the dehumanizing of the terrorist other, and the moralistic language of the President all participated in supporting a torture sustaining reality.
Chapter Five: Analysis of Internet Claims

Rhetoric Used in “Speeches and Remarks” of President George W. Bush Regarding Allegations of Torture

In Chapters Three and Four I examined how the rhetoric in claims made by print journalists in the New York Times and Internet claims made by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration served to construct terrorism as a significant social problem facing the United States. Furthermore, Chapters Three and Four helped to establish how claimants folk-devilizing the terrorist other also participated in establishing this threat. Working from this as the basis, Chapter Five will demonstrate how President George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to allegations of torture. Consequently, in this section I address how George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to claims, made by various actors including members from the press that American armed forces committed atrocities such as torture during his Presidency (as well, as those claims made by the President or his staff without prompting from other actors). In addition, Chapter Five addresses how and what rhetorical devices were used to respond to these allegations of torture. This section also further explores the issue of how the terrorists were othered in these claims.

In order to investigate these concerns, a total of 117 webpages from the Whitehouse’s website http://www.whitehouse.gov addressing claims about torture were gathered, including those that were in response to allegations of torture by President George W. Bush and his Administration. These webpages cover the time-span from December 12, 2001 to February 14, 2008. These webpages mainly involve President George W. Bush along with other Bush Administration members including Vice
President Dick Cheney, and National Security Advisors Condoleezza Rice and Steve Hadley, as well as various press briefings from White House Press Secretaries Scott McClellan, Dana Perino, Tony Snow, Scott Stanzel, and Tony Fratto. This sample was divided into two sub-samples based on webpage content. As noted above, while all these webpages referred to torture in some way, not all were in response to allegations of torture by American armed forces. As such, they were divided based on this. The first sub-sample includes 23 webpages which refer to other regimes committing acts of torture, while the second sub-sample contains 94 webpages where President George W. Bush and members of his Administration respond to allegations of torture by American military personal. Also included in this sample is 1 fact sheet dealing with information garnished from interrogations. Notably, because of this webpage’s content, it will not be included in any latent analysis. In addition, there was 1 webpage with White House Counsel judge Alberto Gonzales, Department of Defense General Counsel William Hayes, Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell’ Orto, and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence General Keith Alexander.

The sub-sample that refers to other regimes committing atrocities will be used to demonstrate how certain actors, specifically Saddam Hussein and his regime, were othered (hereafter sub-sample one), while the remaining sub-sample will be used to illustrate how allegations of torture were responded to during George W. Bush’s Presidency (hereafter sub-sample two). It should be noted that for sub-sample one there were a total of 89 webpages gathered. However, after reading these webpages it became clear that depictions of the other were largely similar and/or repeated throughout the sample. This was also a reflection of the claimant, in this sample George W. Bush, who
repeated a very similar refrain throughout his speeches and remarks. Consequently, a purposive sample was taken from the total sample in which to analyze. Also, within the total sample there was a preponderance of claims about Saddam Hussein before and during the war in Iraq in 2003. As a result, a sample was drawn from this period (2002-2004). As for, sub-sample two, it should be noted that there were some examples of various actors such as Saddam Hussein being othered, but it was felt that the unit under analysis, that is the response to the allegations of torture, was the main focus, and consequently any othering which occurred in this sub-sample was not included in the manifest or latent analysis of the first sub-sample. In short, while some of the claims had elements of othering, those that referred only to the response to allegations of torture by President George W. Bush and his Administration were grouped together. Furthermore, many of webpages referring to a response to allegations of torture had no component of othering within them and or were “Q and A” sessions by the President or his staff with the press, and as result only provide a response to allegations of torture. This discussion will now begin with an analysis of sub-sample one used to depict how Saddam Hussein was portrayed.

1. Portrayals of the Other: Saddam Hussein the Ultimate “Other”

As previously seen in Chapters Three and Four, othering played a key role in the identification of the enemy and their relationship to the threat of terrorism. In this sample, Saddam Hussein was particularly singled out as the ultimate other; that is, the locus of “evil” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Leudar et al., 2004). Not surprisingly this happened before, during, and after the war in Iraq. For obvious reasons a larger amount of depictions about Saddam Hussein occurred before and during the invasion. For the
purposes of this section the *typification* of the victims in these webpages will not be analyzed as there was no difference in how they were depicted from Chapter Three and Four. The victims, including both Americans and those within the regimes, as was seen before, ranged from children to women to other “innocents” who were decidedly downtrodden, poor, educationally repressed, and faced being brutalized and tortured at the hands of the terrorists. For instance, one common depiction can be seen below:

America is beginning to realize that the dreams of the terrorists and the Taliban were a waking nightmare for Afghan women and their children. The Taliban murdered teenagers for laughing in the presence of soldiers. They jailed children as young as 10 years old, and tortured them for supposed crimes of their parents. (“President Signs Afghan Women and Children Relief Act”, December 2001, paras. 7-9)

In addition, as Hall notes in Young (2005) “Only when there is ‘an other’ can you know who you are” (p. 152). Hence, by further defining how the other was portrayed in this discussion the “victim” is in turn defined in opposition.

The language used to *typify* Saddam Hussein was unequivocally one-dimensional, in the sense that it was wholly negatively one-sided. Again, this is probably because the claim came directly from the primary claimant President George W. Bush. Typical language used to describe and thereby *typify* Saddam Hussein included the following: “dictator, mass-murderer, brutal, cruel, dangerous, tyrant, deceptive, killer, and, torturer”. The example below will demonstrate a typical *typification* of Saddam Hussein:

... and we must not underestimate the desperation of whatever forces remain loyal to the dictator. We know full well the nature of the enemy we are dealing with. Servants of the regime have used hospitals, schools, an mosques for military operations. They have tortured and executed prisoners of war. They have forced women and children to serve as human shields. They have transported death squads in ambulances, fought in civilian clothes, feigned surrender and opened fire on our forces, and shot civilians who welcomed coalition troops. (“Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops”, 2003, para. 14)
In fact, in most of this sample Saddam was usually characterized as a torturer. First, this point is of interest because as will be shown in the next section President George W. Bush and members of his Administration when questioned about Americans committing atrocities such as torture almost always responded *euphemistically* (See Chapter One) Second, this highly charged language is characteristically moral in nature. It suggests, without room, that Saddam and his regime are amoral and evil. For "Enunciating the 'enemy' is pivotal to defining, establishing and maintaining a moral order, for the enemy is one who violates 'our' values" (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 227). Moreover, "Such classifying and such naming not only are ways to make others do what one wants but also to get them to be what one wants. To describe a membership category is to attribute a moral character to its incumbents" (Brown, 1993, p. 659). Third, the use of this language further creates a binarism (pointed out in Chapter One, Three, Four). It is this last feature, that of duality, which can be considered the most dangerous:

First, 'their' beliefs and visions are 'radical' and fanatical, antithetical to liberalism, and connote intolerance and irrationality. Second, there is a lumping together of 'their' beliefs with historically well-known ideologies of oppression. The lack of differentiation makes this an 'efficient rhetorical ploy to emphasize how bad the Others are'. Third, enemies are depicted as driven by power . . . Whereas the values of America . . . have been de-politicized and made to appear non-ideological – with 'freedom' as a shorthand for universal values of humanity – the enemies' values have been deliberately politicized and ideologized. (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 230)

This duality is so dangerous because in its overly simplistic description of the other the door for atrocities can swing open. Mooney and Young (2005) concur that essentialism distorts the similarity in how violence is used and further provides "A justification for violence on the part of counterterrorism, even though this may be wildly disproportionate
and mis-targeted; and a rationale for military and/or economic intervention that evokes Western modernity as delivering democracy, rationality and the rule of law” (p. 114).

In this sample, then, Saddam Hussein, was typified as an enemy like no other. He was portrayed as ruthless, evil, without morals, and therefore inhuman. One typical example, which illustrates how Saddam Hussein was typified include the following:

The dictator who is assembling the world’s most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages – leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained -- by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. (“President Delivers ‘State of the Union’”, January 28, 2003)

In conclusion, it is not the intention here to suggest that Saddam Hussein and his regime are “saints”, but to further point out, as has been shown, that these typifications of the other serve to paint many who have not committed such acts with the same brush. In essence, the constant and consistent othering of “terrorists” and their various leaders and regimes served to help legitimize campaigns against the enemy, and deligitimize a strong voice against such campaigns. As Mooney and Young (2005) write, “... to the extent that dehumanization allow the actor to render the other as outside, or at the periphery of humanity, it permits violence. None of this leads immediately to violence, but it sets up it precursor” (p. 119). Thus, the typification, both early on and throughout, of characters in the “war on terror” such as Suddam Hussein can be viewed to serve as a platform upon which to build and later condone atrocities:

To do evil, to act with excessive violence toward other human beings, a discourse must be developed that allows for the moral release of the perpetuators from the normal human values that deeply eschew interpersonal violence. We have seen hoe the process of essentialization of the other can give rise to a dehumanization that permits violence. (p. 114)
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The next section will discuss sub-sample two, which will explore how President George W. Bush and members of his administration responded to accusations of torture.

The Rhetoric of Denial

2. Grounds

In order to analyze sub-sample two an amalgamation of Best’s (1990) “Model of the Claims-making Process” (see Chapter Two) and Cohen’s Denial (see Chapter One) concepts will be engaged. Notably, in this conception Best’s (1990) conclusions category has been supplanted with Cohen’s (2001) denial terminology, while the grounds and the warrants used here are more representative of Best’s (1990) usage (see Table 5 below). Of interest too, Cohen’s (2001) usage of “Necessity” did not have the sub-category of information as seen in Table 5. After analyzing the data from this sample this form of “Necessity” emerged. In addition, the combination of both theorists is relevant as they both deal with how rhetoric is used in socially constructing phenomenon, in this particular modification the rhetoric of denial, and consequently by employing both it will help to answer the central question of this Chapter. Consequently, Table 5 illustrates how these two theoretical approaches can be amalgamated. Best’s (1990) usage of grounds (facts) and warrants (values) can be used to rationalize Cohen’s (2001) usage of denials (actions) where they represent the conclusions in Best’s (1990) Model. Thus, Table 5 can be seen to demonstrate how rhetoric is formed when denials are made. In other words, the combination of Best (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) theoretical concepts and approaches will allow a unique way to understand how rhetoric is used in the formation of denials concerning atrocities. Through this combination the rhetorical relationships between a denial and its basis, the grounds, and the values behind the denial, the warrants, which
link to form the denial or conclusion can be understood. Thus, in essence, Table 5, represents a relatively new way in which to study the rhetoric behind how atrocities are rationalized in a liberal state.

**Table 5: The Rhetoric of Denial**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grounds</th>
<th>Warrants</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Orientation Statements  
1. Terrorism is a threat  
2. Terrorists are inhuman  
3. This is war  
4. Implicit | 1. Rights and freedoms  
2. Historical Continuity  
3. Deficient Policies  
4. Implicit | 1. Literal Denial  
2. Interpretive Denial  
A. Euphemism  
B. Legalism  
C. Denial of Responsibility  
D. Isolation  
1. Spatial Isolation  
2. Self-correction  
3. Implicatory Denial  
A. Righteousness  
B. Necessity  
1. Information  
C. Denial of Victim  
D. Contextualization  
E. Advantageous Comparisons |

Webpages in this sample while all being analyzed are not being presented in a claim-by-claim manner due to clarity, time, and space; consequently, in order to depict the content of this sample in an efficient manner, the most common and/or novel grounds, warrants, and conclusions will be presented with accompanying examples to illustrate overall claim content. In short, it is the intent of this analysis to identify the generic features. Furthermore, as a result, there will be only one example of each feature presented unless there is a novel or interesting case. In addition, in the same manner as Chapter Three and Four, throughout Chapter Five various counts of these features will be taken. These counts indicate the frequency of each ground, warrant, and conclusion statements. These manifest elements are able to demonstrate the frequency of these
generic features and as such help to show which devices were more prominently featured in the denials regarding allegations of torture. As a result, these counts will help to explain which devices were used the most, and therefore which devices served the greatest rhetorical benefit. In addition, as was outlined in Chapter Two with Best’s (1990) “Model of the Claims-making Process” (Table 1), data in this Chapter will be presented in accordance with Best’s (1990) model and also because this facilitates the information requirements pointed out in Chapter Two, and thus the particular theoretical objectives of Chapter One. This discussion will begin with the sub-sample two (used to illustrate the response to allegations of torture). Moreover, in accordance to Table 5, this discussion will begin with the *grounds*, and will be followed by a discussion of the *warrants* and *conclusions*.

In this sample, a total of 105 *grounds* were found, with 39 *grounds* noting terrorism is a threat, 24 *grounds* noted terrorists were somehow inhuman, and 42 *grounds* noting that the United States was at war. It should be noted, that there are likely less *grounds* because some claims were short and only responded to an allegation of torture (they were included in the sample because they are relevant to the core question of this Chapter). Furthermore, in this sample, *grounds* noting that terrorism is a threat to the United States represented the main *conclusion statement* in Chapters Three and Four. On surface this may appear odd; however, given the subject of this sample, and the claims-makers involved, President George W. Bush and his Administration, it is not. Because as the primary claims-makers who supported a military response based on a threat whether perceived or not, of terrorism, it is not altogether unexpected to see that these claims use the threat of terrorism not as a *conclusion* but as a *ground*. In short, they were already
convinced that the threat of terrorism was a social fact and they worked from this basis, so there was no need to argue the position that there was a threat as a conclusion as the United States was already at war.

*Grounds* in this sample often appeared with no frequent connection to their warrants and conclusions. Many of these grounds were also implicit. This was probably because the War in Afghanistan and Iraq were already underway when the denials occurred; hence, it was well established that the grounds of the situation, the United States was at war, which was also related to the belief, (also seen in the public reaction, see Introduction), that terrorism was a threat to the United States. Therefore, the grounds of these claims can be viewed as a type of orientation towards the claim. In Best’s (1990) study of claims-making grounds were not used in an implicit sense, typically this was reserved for warrants. As such, this sample provides a notable difference. In addition, the grounds in this sample did not use numerical estimates. This is probably a reflection that when making denials about atrocities one does not want to inflate numbers as it serves little rhetorical advantage when you are trying to obfuscate or out-and-out deny atrocities. However, there were a few instances when a response to an allegation of torture contained numerical information. For instance, when questioned about how many people were waterboarded, the response noted how few; therefore, not emphasizing the problems extent, as seen with Best (1990), but de-emphasizing it. These, however, were not included in any latent counts as there were so few of these in the entire sample. It should be noted that some numerical information similar to that just described can be seen in some of the data presented later in this section.
In addition, another *ground*, which was represented either implicitly or explicitly, was that the enemy was inhuman. This othered enemy served as an important *ground* for denial conclusions in that through the dehumanization of the enemy rationalizations for torture were more easily promoted. This was typically represented with the "Implicatory Denial" which as Cohen (2001) explains admits wrongdoing but does so on utilitarian basis, or the "Intepretive Denial" which also admits something happened. As such, it is not shocking to see this *ground* linked to this *conclusion*, as once an enemy is deemed to be somehow sub-human that committing atrocities for the greater good becomes more easily accepted, condoned, and denied. For example, often when the President was interviewed or gave a speech he referenced the inhuman nature of the terrorists, specifically Saddam Hussein. However, claims with the inhuman *ground* also typically contained one or more other *grounds*, while the "Implicatory Denial", which is used more as a form of rationalization of an atrocity was always associated with the inhuman *ground*. The following example illustrates a typical *ground* used in this sample to point out that terrorism is a threat to the United States:

Our priorities, however, remain the same: the protection of our country, the security of our troops, and the spread of freedom throughout the world. Like other generations of Americans, we have accepted a difficult and historic task. ("President Bush Reaffirms Commitments in Iraq", May 10, 2004, para. 4)

The following example shows how terrorists were depicted as being somehow inhuman:

Under Saddam’s brutal regime, the Iraqi people lived lives of fear and desperation. Innocent civilians were executed in public squares, they were massacred and piled into mass graves. Saddam’s regime denied people food and medicine while building elaborate palaces from which to rule with an iron hand. Saddam sponsored terrorism; he pursued and used weapons of mass destruction; he fired at U.S. and British air crews patrolling the no-fly zones; he defied more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions. ("President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror", April 10, 2006, para. 6)
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The following three examples indicate the ground that the United States is at war:

And I just want to remind you that we are a nation at war. We are also a nation of laws. And our most important responsibility is the safety and security off the American people. (Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan”, May 17, 2004, para. 20)

In speaking to the Senate, I urged them to get this legislation to my desk as soon as possible. Senator First and Senator McConnell committed to that end. The American people need to know we’re working together to win this war on terror. Our most important responsibility is to protect the American people from further attack. (“President Meets with Republican Senate Conference, September 28, 2006, para. 3)

To win a war like this you need good intelligence – information that helps us figure out the movements of the enemy, the extent of their operations, the location of their cells, the plans they’re making, the methods they use, and the targets they plan to strike. Information like this is hardest to obtain. But its worth the efforts in terms of the plots that are averted and the lives that have been saved. (“Vice President’s Remarks at the Conservative”, February 7, 2007, para. 28)

Notably, there was sometimes more than one type of ground used in each webpage (see April 30, 2004, para. 10 above which points out both the threat of terrorism and the inhuman nature of the enemy). As well, some of these grounds noted above include other elements such as warrant statements (see May 17, 2004, para. 20 above which uses the ground that the United States is at war as well as the warrant “Historical Continuity” where it notes that America will be lawful in this war). Also, some of these grounds include conclusions too (see February 7, 2007, para. 28 above which points out the “Interpretive Denial” conclusion “Necessity” and the grounds that there is a threat from terrorism and that the United States is at war). Furthermore, grounds, in this sample, as noted, were often implicit and in some cases where a claim was only response to a denial non-existent. In general, these grounds, which were earlier conclusions, can be seen, because of their often implicit nature, to indicate just how entrenched the view in America was that terrorism was an ongoing threat after 9/11. In sum, the implicitness of
these grounds points out that there was often no need to directly orientate the reader to the problem because it was already ingrained into the collective conscience. The next section will discuss the warrants of this sample.

3. Warrants

In this sample there were a total of 113 warrants, with 57 expressing the warrant “Historical Continuity”, 50 expressing the warrant “Rights and Freedoms”, and 6 expressing the warrant “Deficient Policies”. As noted with the grounds, conceivably there would have been more warrants in this sample but some of the webpages only expressed a denial. Of interest is the fact that this sample only has three different kinds of warrants. This is likely because of the nature of the webpage itself, which was a response to allegations of torture, and the fact that these webpages were direct from the primary claims-makers to the audience without a secondary claims-maker to modify the claim as seen with claims from the New York Times in Chapter Three. This allowed President George W. Bush and members of his Administration to be more selective in how they presented their information. Basically, this meant that they were able to choose the most relevant and rhetorically useful warrants when making their positions.

Arguably, there is nothing held more sacred to the American populace than their views on rights and freedoms, this American ideal is thereby easily reflected by employing the “Right and Freedoms”, warrant. It also true then that anyone who tries to “mess” with this highly patriotic ideal is in an untenable position. It also logically follows that the next warrant to be used would the “Historical Continuity” warrant, as it was used in this sample to note that America has just laws from the past and will preserve its sense of justice by using its laws in the present: “Using historical continuity to justify future
actions is usually a conservative warrant. Emphasizing consistency with past policies – or with the founder’s intent – may be especially useful when claimants address bureaucracies or institutions” (Best, 1990, p. 36). It is also seemingly useful when those doing the addressing are the representatives of the State. The third warrant may seem to offset the first two more typical warrants of this sample, and in particular the “Historical Continuity” warrant; however, it was used in this sample to indicate that laws such as the Geneva Convention were infringing on American laws or that laws were not clear enough (“Press Briefing by Dana Perino”, October 4, 2007; “Executive Order: Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3”, July 20, 2007). As such, the warrants these have a clear rhetorical benefit for the claims-makers.

Below is an example of the “Rights and Freedoms” warrant:

But I also want to remind people that those few people who did that do not reflect the nature of the men and women we’ve sent overseas. That’s not the way the people are, that’s not their character, that are serving our nation in the cause of freedom. And there will be an investigation. I think – they’ll be taken care of. (“President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White House”, April 30, 2004, para. 20)

One example of the “Historical Continuity” warrant includes the following:

At the same time, the Administration is committed to treating all detainees held by the United States in a manner consistent with our Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations, which reflect the values we hold dear. U.S. law and policy already prohibit torture. Our policy has also been not to use cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, at home or abroad. This legislation now makes that a matter of statute for practices abroad. It also requires that the Defense Department’s treatment of detainees be codified in the U.S. Army Field Manual. (“President’s Statement on the Department of Defense”, December 30, 2005, para. 2)

One example of the “Deficient Policies” warrant includes the following:

Let me finish. And so I am looking at the legalities involved with the Geneva Convention. In either case, however I make my decision, these detainees will be well-treated. We are not going to call them prisoners of war, in either case. (“President Meets with Afghan Interim”, January 28, 2002, para. 54)
Clearly these warrants expressed above pull at the locus of the American heart and thereby allow for an easier acceptance of the conclusions. The next section will discuss the conclusions of this sample.

4. Conclusions

In this sample there were 179 total conclusions, with 89 “Interpretive Denial” conclusions, 50 “Implicatory Denial” conclusions, and 40 “Literal Denial” conclusions. As aforementioned, these conclusions are not part of Best’s (1990) analysis; however, they are relevant to these particular claims as they express the type of denial, which was being expressed, or in other words the conclusion being expressed. Obviously, there are more conclusions than there are webpages. This is a reflection of the fact that there was often more than one type of denial used in each webpage. This was not unexpected as Cohen (2001) writes “Sometimes, [denials] appear in a visible sequence . . . more often they appear simultaneously, even within the same one-page press release” (Cohen, 2001, p. 103). Furthermore, by using more than one type of denial in each claim provides a rhetorical advantage to the claimants. For example, the denial below occurred in a response to questioning regarding who was briefed on secret memos regarding how to legally proceed with “torture”, as well as trying to determine what techniques could be used. This example emphasizes “Necessity”, “Literal Denial”, and “Legalism”:

They need to be cloaked in the classified system so that we can keep that information private so that we’re not signaling to our enemies exactly what or techniques are.

No matter what they will do to us, we will not torture them.

As I said yesterday, I am not saying that reasonable people couldn’t look at something and disagree when it comes to legal opinion. But the legal opinion of the United States is that we do not torture. The statutes have been interpreted, the committees have been briefed. And I believe that the members that have been
briefed are satisfied that the policy of the United States, and the practices, do not constitute torture.

I don’t know. These are held in a classified setting. They’re classified for a reason. And I – so I don’t know what they are shown. (“Press Briefing by Dana Perino”, October 5, 2007, para.17)

Several other mixtures of denial conclusions can be seen below:

This denial emphasizes “Self Correction” and “Advantageous Comparisons”:

You know, last time -- I think it was in Denmark we talked about Abu Ghraib, if I’m not mistaken. I told the people in Denmark on your soil that it was a disgusting event. It soiled our soul. It’s not what America stands for. I also – I’m not sure I put it this way, but I understand humans make mistakes, but there needs to be accountability. And since then, those involved with the Abu Ghraib have been brought to justice. And that’s what happens in transparent societies -- which, by the way, stood in stark contrast to the society that Saddam Hussein ran, where there was no justice, where there was no transparency, where people weren’t given a chance to take their case in front of an impartial court. But that’s what’s happened here in America. (“President Bush and Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark”, June 9, 2006, para. 59)

This denial emphasizes “Necessity” and “Literal Denial”:

And we have maintained that we have protected this country in a way that does not involve torture. Q But there’s a difference between cruelty and torture, is my understanding. The cruelty, by definition, is imposition of severe physical and mental pain or suffering, which is different from torture, which is -- Ms. Pereno: I’m not commenting on any type of techniques or anything else that is sued in order to help get us information in order to prevent terrorists attacks on this country. I’m just not going to do it. (“Press Briefing by Dana Perino”, June 25, 2007, para. 25)

This denial emphasizes “Legalism” and “Literal denial”:

But he had done everything within the corners of the law to make sure we prevent another terrorist attack on this country, which is what we have done in this administration. I am not going to comment on any specific alleged techniques. It is not appropriate for me to do so. And to do so would provide the enemy with more information for how to train against these techniques. . . . but I will reiterate to you once again we do not torture. We want to make sure to keep this country safe. (Press Briefing by Dana Perino”, October 4, 2007, para. 6)
As such, by mixing denials a rhetorical benefit is gained in that if one form of
denial is not accepted than another might be. If an out-and-out denial like a literal
denial is not acceptable than an “in-between” interpretive one might be. Also, in this sample,
there appears to be no strong connection between which types of denials were associated
together, while there is a connection between when certain denials are more likely to
appear. The next section will discuss the use of “Interpretive Denials” in this sample.

5. Interpretive Denials

“Interpretive Denials” dominated this sample. There are likely several reasons for
their frequent occurrence. Firstly, “Interpretive Denials” operate in a grey zone; that is,
they allow for culpability but try to lessen the effect by saying that the facts have
alternate meanings or need redefinition (Cohen, 2001). This type of denial can be seen to
serve a specific rhetorical function in that it allows both those asking the questions and
those making the claim of denial to gain credence. Those asking the questions get a
partial acceptance of guilt, while those answering the question are allowed to disassociate
themselves, and perhaps the public at large, from the atrocity. Furthermore, it is also not
surprising that this was the dominate response to allegations of torture in this sample
because it would appear that for a democratic regime this response is the most acceptable.
A “Literal Denial” might be deemed to be an attempt to stonewall and thus too strong and
unreasonable while an “Implicatory Denial” is also too strong in the sense that it would
be seen to be unapologetic. In addition, this type of denial, while seen throughout the
sample, dominated the period when pictures of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib prison
became public. Arguably, for a democratic regime like the United States there would be
little rhetorical advantage in employing either a “Literal” or “Implicatory” denial at this
point without being joined to the more agreeable "Interpretive Denial". As Cohen (2001) points out of partial acknowledgement "... most countries with a democratic image to maintain have to go some way in this direction. They cannot indefinitely sustain strategies of ignoring allegations completely, crude denial, ideological justification or aggressive counter-attack" (Cohen, 2001, p. 113). In essence, it might be easier for a totalitarian regime to out-and-out deny an atrocity because they have the means of censure at their disposal.

The most common types of "Interpretive Denials" in this sample were those used to express "Isolation" from the atrocity (specifically the Abu Ghraib scandal). Two types of "Isolation" occurred: "Spatial Isolation" which occurred 24 times throughout the sample and "Self Correction" which occurred 29 times. These denials were almost always used in conjunction with one another. This is also not surprising because both these forms of denial serve the claimant rhetorically in that on one hand the atrocity is claimed to be a rare event and on the other it is claimed that it will be corrected so that it does not reoccur. Both these standpoints can be viewed as essential to a democratic regime because you are saying, "this is not us" and "don't worry our system will correct it" which are part of an open liberal state. An example of "Spatial Isolation" can be seen below:

But I also want the people to understand here and around the world that 99.9 percent of our troops are honorable, decent people who are serving our country under difficult conditions, and I'm proud of them. I'm proud of the United States military. ("Press Conference of the President", June 14, 2006, para. 40)

This denial was made in response to question about Blackwater, an independent military contractor:
I have not talked to the President about it, but checking into it, obviously he said he was concerned. He was glad that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Prime Minister Maliki to express the deep regret for the innocent loss of life. He wants there to be an investigation, an open, transparent, clear investigation. And that would fit into this commission of joint inquiry. ("Press Briefing by Dana Perino", September 19, 2007, para. 2)

This denial was in response to a question regarding the fact the United States government admitted it had used waterboarding on terrorist suspects:

I think General Hayden in his testimony yesterday limited it to the three terrorist suspects that he mentioned. To my knowledge, and according to the testimony in front of Congress of General Hayden, that’s as I understand it. ("Press Briefing by Tony Fratto", February 2, 2008, para. 2-3)

A common example of “Self-correction” includes the following:

Well, first of all, it’s absurd to say America is abandoning our values. No question Abu Ghraib was a disgrace for our country. But I think people ought to take a look at what happened afterwards -- and those who are responsible for that disgraceful behavior have been held to account, have been tried, have been, in some cases, dismissed from our military. ("Interview of the President by Sabine Christiansen of ARD German Television", May 7, 2006, para. 57)

Thus, both “Spatial Isolation” and “Self-correction” allow the claimants to placate questions about further atrocities happening, and also importantly serve to render those that have happened in a more forgiving light.

Another type of denial, which appeared in 18 times in this sub-sample was “Euphemism”. The use of *euphemistic* language allows the claims-maker to soften the level of concern and thereby disassociate from the atrocity at hand. In essence, it serves to use language whose connotation is more acceptable and carries less negative meaning and cultural baggage. There were a number of words or phrases in this sample which were used to *euphemistically* refer to torture. Some of these words include “prisoner abuse, those practices, humiliating acts, abuses, mistreatment, appalling acts, and enhanced interrogation techniques”. In most cases *euphemistic* language was used when
President George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to allegations of torture. Two examples of *euphemistic* language include the following examples:

The American people were horrified by the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. These acts were wrong. They were inconsistent with our policies and our values as a Nation. I have directed a full accounting for the abuse of the Abu Ghraib detainees, and investigations are underway to review detention operations in Iraq and elsewhere. (“President’s Statement on the U.N. International Day in Support of Victims of Torture” June 26, 2004, para. 4)

What I have said is that any change in the enhanced interrogation techniques that may be used will follow the process that I outlined, which includes a legal review and notification of Congress. (“Press Briefing by Tony Fratto”, February 6, 2008, para. 31)

In short, by using *euphemistic* language to respond to allegations of torture respondents can more easily dismiss what actually occurred, and in this sense reinterpret the atrocity as something less atrocious. *Euphemisms* were rarely used in “Literal Denials” in the sample, which instead used the term torture. This probably indicates that with a “Literal Denial”, something which you are saying did not happen, it is easier to use the actual term you are being accused of; however, when there is evidence of something else, such as pictures from Abu Ghraib, then it is more rhetorically sound to use *euphemistic* language to reinterpret what actually happened.

Another type of denial in the sample was “Legalism”. “Legalism” allows the claimant to argue that there are legal defenses to what happened, which again serves to reinterpret the atrocity. In this sample there were 18 examples of “legalism”. Below is one example of this form of denial:

First of all, I don’t talk about secret programs, covert programs, covert activities. Part of a successful war on terror is for the United States of America to be able to conduct operations, all aimed to protect the American people, covertly. However, I can tell you two things: one, that we abide by the law of the United States; we do not torture. And two, we will try to do everything we can to protect us within the law. We’re facing an enemy that would like to hit America again, and the American people expect us to, within our laws, do everything we can to protect.
them. And that's exactly what the United States is doing. We do not render to countries that torture. That has been our policy, and that policy will remain the same. ("President Meets with World Health Organization Director-General", December 6, 2006, para. 23)

One of the fundamental questions that the American people have got to know is that in order to protect America, if we capture somebody who may have data about whether or not he's going to -- he is ordering an attack or there's an impending attack or there's a threat, we need to know that. And the techniques we use by highly trained professionals are within the law. ("President Bush Previews War on Terror Speech", November 1, 2007, para. 12)

In conclusion, the examples of "Legalism" noted above, often with the refrain "we work within or abide by the law", point out that atrocities can be reinterpreted by reaffirming one's allegiance to laws against such atrocities. However, the "legalism" defenses noted above, and throughout this sample, seemingly point out what Cohen (2001) refers to as "Magical Legalism" where "...an allegation could not possibly be correct because the action is illegal" (p. 108). This tautological defense allowed President George W. Bush and his Administration to deflect and redefine allegations of torture by its Armed Forces. Amnesty International (2007) points out of the "Legalism" denial that "...the administration did not accept that international legal provisions were binding on the United States, but rather the United States would treat detainees humanely only as a matter of policy -- polices which of course were subject to change" (p. 577). This can clearly be seen with the issue of waterboarding, which was not declared as illegal until the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, and up to a year after the act some members of the Administration still maintained that waterboarding was acceptable if it yielded intelligence (Amnesty International, 2007). The next section will discuss "Literal Denials".

6. Literal Denials
“Literal Denials” allow for no room to argue. Simply put, they altogether deny that any atrocity has occurred. Interestingly, this type of denial was more frequently used after the Abu Ghraib scandal had “died” down. Apparently, the pictures that were made public of the incident disallowed this type of denial to be the main one used. However, even using “literal denials” when there is less “evidence” of an atrocity may seem to go against the tenets of a liberal state because this form of denial leaves no room for debate and discussion which most liberal regimes espouse to believe in. Cohen (2001) finds though that, “For different reasons, more democratic societies may also practice literal denial. Indeed, governments paying strong formal allegiance to human rights values prefer to contest allegations at the literal, factual level” (p. 104). In essence, a democratic state such as the United States probably used this form of denial because it is known for its support of human rights. Thus, to seem to support anything else, “Interpretive” or “Implicatory” would seem to destroy this notion. Hence, it is not surprising to find “Literal Denials” in this sample. Often these denials take a refrain similar to “Magical Legalism” previously noted: “Torture is strictly forbidden in our country; we have ratified the convention Against Torture; therefore what we are doing could not be torture” (p. 108). An example of this form of denial can be seen below:

Let me make very clear the position of my government and our country. We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being. (“President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister of Hungary”, June 22, 2004, para. 20)

In short, then, “Literal Denials” while seemingly the denial of choice of a totalitarian regime, can be seen to serve a liberal state as well. It must also be said, that the previously noted warrants, and more specifically the “Rights and Freedoms” warrant
which espouses the notion that “we are fighting for freedom and human rights”, almost require a “Literal Denial” because to argue you fight for human rights and then acknowledge an atrocities is a weakened position (although as mentioned before conclusions were sometimes used simultaneously). The next section will discuss “Implicatory Denials”.

7. Implicatory Denials

With “Implicatory Denials” atrocities are rationalized away. Thus, there is an inherent type of justification built into this form of denial. With this sample one form of “Implicatory Denial” dominated: “Necessity”. While there were also “Advantageous Comparisons” and “Contextualization” denials. The “Necessity” denial likely dominated the sample because it strictly referred to a need for information, a common reason given for committing atrocities. As well, it became known that the United States had used waterboarding (“Press Briefing by Tony Snow”, October 17, 2006; “President Bush Previews War on Terror Speech”, November 1, 2007; “Press Briefing by Tony Fratto”, February 6, 2008) at secret detention centers outside the United States (“President Discusses Creation of Military Commission”, September 6, 2006), which some consider tantamount to torture. Thus, when faced with this it seems that an “Implicatory” denial was necessary because it not only provides some admission to the atrocity but also masks its nature in necessity for prevention. In this case, the necessity of preventing further terrorist attacks. It was also emphasized in some of these webpages that those conducting the interrogations were “professionals”, and that these detainees were unlike others because they were euphemistically referred to as “high-value detainees”, which was a further attempt to mitigate the situation. This can be seen in the following example. On
February 14, 2008 President Bush was asked, "The Senate, yesterday passed a bill outlawing waterboarding. You, I believe, have said that you will veto that bill. Does that not send the wrong signal to the rest of the world?" ("Interview of the President by Matt Frei", para. 45). The President responded,

No, look, that's not the reason I'm vetoing the bill. The reason I'm vetoing the bill -- first of all, we have said that whatever we do is for legal -- will be legal. Secondly, they are imposing a set of standards on our intelligence communities in terms of interrogating prisoners that our people will think will be ineffective.

And to the critics, I ask them this: When we, within the law, interrogate, and get information that protects ourselves and possibly others, and other nations, to prevent attacks, which attack would they have hoped that we wouldn't have prevented? And so the United States will act within the law, and we'll make sure our professionals have the tools necessary to do their job within the law.

Now, I recognize some say that these terrorists really aren't that big a threat to the United States anymore. I fully disagree. And I think the President must give these professionals, within the law, the necessary tools to protect us.

No, there's great concern about -- and I can understand this -- that these people be given rights, but they're not willing to grant the same rights to others. They'll murder, but you got to understand, they're getting rights. I'm comfortable with the decisions we've made, and I'm comfortable with recognizing this is still a dangerous world.

The "Necessity" denial appeared 33 times. In Cohen's (2001) study this denial was used to point out that there is no other choice because the threat is too great. The usage here while similar, was used to point out that information was so crucial that "abuses" were necessary. This is seemingly a difference between a democratic and an authoritarian regime's usage. For the authoritarian regime it seems this denial is used more as a matter of survival. The following is an example of the "Necessity" denial:

Now, you can get into a debate about what shocks the conscience and what is cruel and inhuman. And to some extent, I suppose that's in the eye of the beholder. But I believe and we think it's important to remember that we are in a war against a group of individuals, a terrorist organization, that did, in fact, slaughter 3,000 innocent Americans on 9/11, that it's important for us to be able to have effective interrogation of these people when we capture them. And the
debate is over the extent to which we're going to have legislation that restricts or limits that capability. ("Interview of the Vice President by ABC News", December 18, 2005, para. 43)

This "Necessity" denial occurred when a Press Secretary responded to why the Whitehouse did not support the House's ban on restricting certain interrogation techniques:

... the CIA's program, in contrast, authorizes a set of alternative interrogation procedures for gathering information from some of the most hardened terrorists in on-battlefield settings, in a carefully controlled setting by highly trained officials. ("Press Briefing by Scott Stanzel", December 14, 2007, para 3; "Press Briefing by Dana Perino", October 4, 2007, para. 4; "Fact Sheet: Bringing Terrorists to Justice", September 6, 2006).

In sum, "Necessity" denials in this sample strictly referred to a need to acquire information from terrorist suspects. Allegations of torture, as can be seen in the above examples, were dismissed based on the need to prevent future attacks.

The next type of "Implicatory Denial, "Advantageous Comparisons" were used 11 times in this sample. Interestingly, both "Spatial Isolation" and "Self-correction" denials were almost always found to reference the enemy as being somehow worse which is an "Advantageous Comparison". Thus, by comparing the atrocity to the enemy's atrocities, and noting that the atrocity frequently happens or is much worse when the enemy commits it, and also noting that they do not try to correct their mistakes, a rhetorical advantage is gained by the claimants. One common example of an "Advantageous Comparison" can be seen below:

That's the difference between the United States and some countries in the world that systematically engage in torture. When we find abuses or atrocities like that, we show the world that people are held accountable. ("Press Briefing by Scott McClellan", February 16, 2006, para. 2)
Hence, "Advantageous Comparisons" allow the claimant to admit blame, but to also show that those they committed the atrocities against are worse. "Advantageous Comparisons" are further bolstered by being associated with "Spatial Isolation" and "Self-correction" denials.

The final "Implicatory Denial" used was "Contextualization". "Contextualization" allows allegations of torture to be lessened based on a claim that the audience or those making the allegation do not understand the origins and the surrounding issues to the atrocity in question. One example of "Contextualization" can be seen below:

There is no allegation -- well, there may be an allegation -- there's no evidence that we're treating them outside the spirit of the Geneva Convention. And for those who say we are, they just don't know what they're talking about. ("President Meets with Afghan Interim", January 28, 2002, para. 53)

In sum, "Contextualization" serves to allow the claimant to decrease their culpability for an atrocity through rationalizing that the context of the atrocity has not been properly understood and as a result the atrocity is not as serious as it appears.

8. Concluding Comments

This Chapter addressed how the President George W. Bush and members of his Administration responded to allegations of torture. While the types of denials used in this Chapter confirm what Cohen (2001) has already discovered, in the sense that no new types of denials were found, this study is more able to demonstrate how these denials come to be rhetorically formed through the combination of Best (1990) and Cohen (2001) theoretical approaches. Thus, a major insight of this Chapter lies in how the language constituents of grounds and warrants help form the basis for later denials of atrocities. While Cohen (2001) established the connection between dehumanizing the enemy and
the later rationalization of an atrocity he did not overtly establish the connection between these two areas. In this sense, while this Chapter noted that the dehumanization of the terrorist other as evil and inhuman served as a ground for the later denial conclusion which Cohen (2001) also asserted, it also adds the relationship of the warrant or value to this relationship. As Best (1990) has shown warrants play an extremely important role in how arguments are formed. For Best (1990) warrants are particularly important because while grounds or the basic facts can be argued, the warrants must be accepted in order for the conclusion to be: “Disputes about grounds need not damage conclusions” (p. 31). As such, warrants play an essential role between the ground and the conclusion: “...concluding that something must be done demands that one accept some warrant that the problem deserves attention” (p. 32). Thus, how did President George W. Bush and members of his Administration use warrants in responding to allegations of torture? And what warrants are pivotal in responding to allegations of torture for a liberal state?

To answer these concerns it is first necessary to note the grounds, which formed the basis or facts of the claim in this sample. In this study, “Literal”, “Interpretive”, and “Implicatory” denials were linked together by establishment of threat of terrorism as a ground and the terrorists or other as the locus of the dilemma. “Enunciating the ‘enemy’ is pivotal to defining, establishing and maintaining a moral order, for the enemy is one who violates ‘our’ values” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 227). Thus, by focusing on dehumanizing the terrorist other, responses to allegations of torture (here denial conclusions), require warrants which are not only readily acceptable but also morally charged in order to bridge the ground to the denial, and thereby allow the torture sustaining reality to take hold. This was achieved in this study with the close linking of
The warrants “Rights and Freedoms” and “Historical Continuity”, which notably are highly consistent with the tenets of a liberal state:

The enemy [being] depicted not only as uncaring about human life, but as positively delighting in the loss of lives. By contrast, America is seen to cherish the sanctity of life and to defend lives everywhere. America is further shown to be circumspect about killing even in war.35 (p, 233)

Thus, with the terrorist viewed and defined as evil, along with George W. Bush and his Administration’s appeal to freedom, an allowance for atrocities was created. As Lazar and Lazar (2004) further note “[freedom] . . . emerges as the defining, fundamental concept manly vis-à-vis expressions of opposition to it. One way this is achieved is through the lexicalization of ‘enemy’ and its juxtaposition with ‘our’ values (p. 227). Thus, it seems that for a liberal state, specifically one that espouses to epitomize freedom, to condone torture a warrant that involves either freedom or the historical continuance of freedom must be used. As well, this study also points out that these two warrants “Rights and Freedoms” and “Historical Continuity” dominated this sample, whether the denial was “Literal”, “Interpretive” or “Implicatory”. This further implies that for a liberal state such as the United States to rationalize torture very select and historically entrenched values need to be engaged. Moreover, this alerts us that in a liberal state warrants are extremely important when denying allegations of torture, for in Best’s (1990) study he found that warrants were often implicit because it was rhetorically beneficial; however, in this Chapter, which concerns claims-making associated with denials, warrants were typically explicit. This may indicate that in a liberal state when dealing with responding to allegations of torture it is more rhetorically beneficial to use a well established and historically relevant warrants.
Furthermore, another finding of this Chapter is that it provides more explanation as to how atrocities are denied or rationalized in a liberal state; while notably Cohen (2001) did provide some reasoning behind how atrocities are rationalized in a democratic regime and which denials are likely to be used, he did not fully explain how these denials operate or shift over time during a claims-making period. Responses to allegations of torture by the President and his Administration point out that these allegations were denied literally, interpretively, and implicatorily. “Literal Denials” were mainly employed by President Bush and his Administration later in claims, specifically after the Abu Ghraib scandal waned down (although in a sense it never did as it was just less referred to after the incident); “Interpretive Denials”, the most dominate denial used, were employed mainly surrounding the Abu Ghraib scandal; “Implicatory Denials” were largely engaged during and after the Abu Ghraib scandal and onwards; while all three forms of denials were used in various conjunctions throughout the sample.

As such, it appears that the use of one denial over another, while they were sometimes used simultaneously, is related to whether or not an atrocity is revealed to the public. Thus, it appears that for democratic regimes such as the United States, “Literal Denials” would be more typically used if there was no public “evidence” that atrocities had occurred, as this type of denial is more suited for a liberal state which promotes the notion of human rights and freedoms. While if faced with “evidence” of atrocities, which the public is aware of, the United States, resorted to “Interpretive Denials” which masks guilt through redefinition. This redefinition was largely accomplished by noting how these events are rare and can be easily corrected: “Isolation”. Thus, it is clear that key rhetorical choices were being made. Meanwhile, “Implicatory Denials” were mainly
advocated through usage of “Necessity” denials, which were all centered around the need for information in order to thwart terrorists. It is likely that the “Implicatory” denial was relied upon because it became known that the United States had used waterboarding, which is considered to be a form of torture by some. Thus, President George W. Bush and his Administration, were somewhat “forced” to admit they had committed and atrocity, the realm of “Implicatory Denials”, and as a result rationalized the issue based on a “Necessity” for information. Another finding of this Chapter was the need for information, which was not a directly featured part of Cohen’s (2001) use of “Necessity”. The need for information can be seen as an important feature in the denials of a liberal state when employing an “Implicatory Denial” because as many other scholars (Beck, 1992, 2002) have noted modern society can be characterized as one fraught with the concern over risk. This risk, as will be further discussed in Chapter Six, can be seen to promote a society that is obsessed with a need for information in order to alleviate concerns over threats to security. As such, the role of information as a rationalization for an atrocity has key importance for a liberal state, and as a consequence may be seen as a key difference between how atrocities are rationalized between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Notably, “Denial of Responsibility”, “Righteousness”, and “Denial of the Victim”, were not represented in this sample. This may imply that these forms of denials are not consistent with a liberal state and/or not rhetorically beneficial at the time.

The next section, Chapter Six, will present the discussion and conclusion of this thesis.
Chapter Six: Discussion & Conclusion

The final Chapter of this thesis will provide an overview of the major findings of this study. This will entail framing the findings in terms of the theoretical themes outlined in Chapter One, as well as situating these themes with the data from Chapters Three, Four, and Five. This will also involve illustrating how these themes relate to a torture sustaining reality. In addition, this section will discuss whether atrocities can ever be prevented, which are the practical implications of this study. As well, this section will discuss some goals for future research. The concluding section of this Chapter will summarize the major themes of this study, confirm which elements of Best’s (1990) and Cohen’s (2001) studies were supported, as well as point out how the findings of this study build upon their respective theoretical approaches. This Chapter will now begin with a discussion over-viewing the major findings of this thesis.

1. Major Findings

The results of this study indicate that terrorism was socially constructed as a significant social problem in the United States after 9/11. Notably, the threat of terrorism was a prominent feature in all samples in this study. This fear of terrorism was also expressed through various public opinion polls during the time period under study. Early grounds in the first two samples (Chapters Three and Four) emphasized the nature of the conflict as war, and in particular a new kind of war with a new kind of enemy. The rhetorical benefit of these grounds is that if the problem is “new” a “new paradigm” is required in order to combat it, and more importantly this “new paradigm” may be “one that may involve jettisoning ‘old’ restrictions” (Jackson, 2007, p. 356). While the focus of this war was seen to be the terrorist who was evil:
Wartime propaganda routinely transforms enemies into evil, inhuman abstractions (Keen, 1998). Because the enemy is evil, war is justified. . . . Of course, this transformation requires little effort when the enemy is a social problem; in such cases the enemy is already an inhuman abstraction, generally agreed to be evil (Best, 1999, p. 146).

In conjunction with this, numeric estimates were used to emphasize that the extent of the problem was large or had potential to increase. Grounds were typically linked to warrants of “Rights and Freedoms”, “Blameless Victims”, and/or “Blameful Terrorists”. Conclusions in these two samples largely focused on awareness that terrorism is indeed a significant threat to America. Meanwhile, the social construction of terrorism as a social problem in the United States after 9/11 can be viewed to have participated in the creation of a torture sustaining reality: “. . . discourses set the logic and possibilities of policy formulation; and second, they create the wider legitimacy and social consensus that is required to enact policy – they permit the construction of ‘a torture sustaining reality’” (Jackson, 2007, p, 355). Consequently, in the last sample, in Chapter Five, the main grounds operating were that terrorism was a threat to America as well as that terrorists were inhuman, and that America was at a war, as noted in Chapters Three and Four. These grounds, again linked with the “Rights and Freedom” warrant, can be seen to have served as the basis for later denial of atrocities by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration. In addition, by focusing claims on war in all these samples as a response, a justification for self-defense is gained.

This reality was also further maintained through usage the “Rhetoric of Rectitude” and the “Rhetoric of Rationality”. Best (1990) found that claimants often start with the “Rhetoric of Rectitude” and then switch to the “Rhetoric of Rationality”. As aforementioned with the “Rhetoric of Rectitude”, when claimants use this rhetoric
their claims usually focus on those who already accept the claimants values or on those who are strongly against them, while claimants who use the “Rhetoric of Rationality” usually focus their claims on the ‘logicalness’ or ‘efficacy’ of what they want. Both forms of rhetoric operated seemingly simultaneously in claims-making about terrorism in the New York Times claims. This in effect demonstrates the level of acceptance that terrorism was a significant social problem by the American public for the “Rhetoric of Rectitude” is typically used to preach to the already converted. It also, reflects the fact that the claims in the New York Times were less charged than those from the Internet samples.

However, the “Rhetoric of Rectitude” was more prominently featured in the Internet claims about how the threat terrorism was constructed. This is an important distinction for three reasons. First, in the Internet samples the primary claims-makers were President George W. Bush and members of his Administration who had the opportunity to speak directly to their audience. Second, the primary claimant, George W. Bush, while not an academic expert, can be considered as an expert in the sense that he was the elected President: “Americans in general believe in research and science and we therefore tend to believe claims made by scientists and others displaying lofty academic credentials” (Loseke, 1999, p. 35). What Loseke (1999) is alerting the reader to is that there is a “hierarchy of credibility” with claims. The reason why one claim is accepted over another is partially dependent upon this hierarchy, which in turn is dependent upon the relationship of the expert in the hierarchy (pp. 34-35). In a way, the President of America is at the top of this hierarchy. Petrunik and Leroux (1989) extend this notion, “Experts not only provide a special discourse, including vocabularies of goals, values,
interests and motives, with which to discuss claims but also make use of particular forms of rhetoric” (p. 180). Furthermore, Petrunik and Leroux (1989) find that by appealing to current paradigms claimants are able to increase the validity of claims: “The use of rhetoric to justify one’s own views and persuade others to follow a particular course of action can be effective when tied to general rubrics or ways of classifying reality which have already been legitimated” (p. 180). In this case, President George W. Bush’s claims appealed to the core American value of freedom, which can be considered well established and legitimized American rhetoric. Third, and most importantly, the basis of these claims in morality of freedom helped to contribute to the torture sustaining reality. By making claims morally based, specifically around “Rights and Freedoms”, it becomes harder to disagree without appearing to disagree with a core American value. It was this reliance on morality that the terrorist was further depicted as the other – the moral deviant extreme.

Coinciding with this, claims in all three samples, generally defined the victims and perpetrators in diametric opposite. The evil terrorist other was juxtaposed to the innocent freedom loving American. From atrocity “Grabbers” of victims in the New York Times, to the constant “evilification” of the other by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration, a binarism of “Us versus “Them” allowed a culture of denial regarding atrocities to be maintained (Lazar & Lazar, 2005). Thus, by socially constructing the terrorist other as the ultimate folk-devil and moral deviant, rationalizations for atrocities became more feasible if not desirable:

In the mix was an elusive, ill-defined and demonized enemy; shortcomings in intelligence-gathering; an official interpretation of the situation as new, unique and requiring special measures; and an apocalyptic picture painted by government
of a stark moral choice between ‘good and evil’ faced by society and wider civilization. (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 6)

In short, the other must be viewed as a wholly despicable and therefore objectified to the point of being inhuman before transgressions against the other can be permitted (Amnesty International, 2004). This “object treatment” took a variety of forms including, but not limited to, the “removal of religious items, the use of dogs, the use of female interrogators, forced nudity” (Amnesty International, 2004, pp. 31-34). As one victim alleges:

And then the policeman was opening my legs, with a bag over my head, and he sat down between my legs on his knees and I was looking at him under the bag and they wanted to do me because I saw him and he was opening his pants, so I started screaming loudly and the other policeman started hitting me with his feet on my neck and he put his feet on my head so I couldn’t scream... And one of the police he put part of his stick that he always carries inside my ass and I felt it going in about 2 centimeters, approximately. And I started screaming... . (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 37).

Furthermore, it was apparent that such actions were predicated on an understanding that such sexualized acts would highly offend Muslim culture. Another detainee alleges:

They stripped me of all my clothes, even my underwear. They gave me woman’s underwear that was rose colour with flowers in it and... out a bag over my face. One of them whispered in my ear, ‘today I am going to fuck you’, and he said this in Arabic... And they forced me to wear this underwear all the time, for 51 days. And most of the days I was wearing nothing else. (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 38)

These, accounts abound, but as was shown in this study were never acknowledged as torture but euphemistically with terms such as “extraordinary rendition”, ” enhanced interrogation techniques”, or “aggressive techniques” which served to further deligitmize and deny that atrocity like those noted above even occurred (Amnesty International, 2008, p. 597; Committee on Armed Services United State Senate, 2009, p. xix).
Othering also can be seen to have occurred on a legal basis. This was largely done through the redefinition of terrorist suspects. Through redefinition as not being prisoners of war, terrorist suspects were not afford the rights under the Geneva Conventions. As the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate (2009) found:

**Conclusion 1:** On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush made a written determination that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which would have afforded minimum standards for humane treatment, did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. Following the President's determination, techniques such as waterboarding, nudity, and stress positions, used in SERE training to simulate tactics used by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions, were authorized for use in interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.

**Conclusion 2:** Members of the President's Cabinet and other senior officials participated in meetings inside the White House in 2002 and 2003 where specific interrogation techniques were discussed. National Security Council Principals reviewed the CIA's interrogation program during that period. (p. xxvi)

Thus, by declaring the terrorist suspects as "unlawful combatants", "enemy combatants", or "unprivileged belligerents", atrocities were allowed to occur (Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, 2004, p. 81). Perhaps, the ultimate statement of this legal othering was in a declassified memo that stated, "Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment" (Memo in Amnesty International, 2004, p. 12). In short, as Cohen (2001) finds, "Many such legalistic moves are wonderfully plausible as long as common sense is suspended (p. 108).

In conclusion, by establishing terrorism as a serious threat conjoined with the "Rhetoric of Rectitude", championed by warrants of freedom, and the othering of the terrorists through discourse both in print and online, a culture of torture can be seen to have been maintained.
2. Allegations of Torture in a Liberal State

Best’s (1990) contextualist social constructionist approach can be viewed as operating between the realms of objectivity and subjectivity; consequently, this approach allows for prescriptive elements unlike a purely strict constructionist approach, which does not believe in the evaluation of claims. Cohen (2001) contends that “. . . our cumulative knowledge of recent and current atrocities is incomplete, uneven and unobjective” (p. 10). What, then, was the “reality”? It seems clear that if one acknowledges the reports from both the United States by the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, the Independent Panel to review DoD Dentention Operations (Schlesinger Report), and the Taguba Report (by Major General Antonio Taguba), and external bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, that torture by the hands of American military and Central Intelligence Agency occurred and was a feature of the “War on Terror”. Not only did some of these reports find that it was not “A few bad apples”37 as President George W. Bush and some of his Administration contended, but it appeared that torture at such facilities as Abu Ghraib were more of a systemic problem with historical origins (Amnesty International, 2004; Jackson, 2007). The Taguba Report (2004) found “That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility, numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees” (p. 16; Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, 2004). One perpetrator testified regarding her roles: “SPC Sabrina Harman, 372 MP Company, stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident where a detainee was
placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, ‘that her job was to keep detainees awake’” (Taguba Report, 2004, p. 18).

Once allegations that torture had occurred were prominently featured in the media, as was seen with the photographs from Abu Ghraib, President George W. Bush and his Administration denied that torture occurred through literal, interpretive, or implicatory denials in the official discourse. As shown in this study, once forced to “face the music” after the Abu Ghraib scandal “Interpretive Denials” became the denial of choice. Probably because as Cohen (2001) writes “Interpretive denials are not fully-fledged lies; they create an opaque moat between rhetoric and reality” (p. 108). Thus, by utilizing an “Interpretative Denial”, either by themselves or aligned with “Literal Denials” as was seen in this study, a formidable way to mitigate claims of an atrocity is gained. It is unlikely, as was found in this study that “Interpretive Denials” would have been favored over “Literal Denials” had there not been “evidence” that atrocities had occurred. “Interpretive Denials” noted that the acts were isolated spatially, and any discovered abuses would be self-corrected. Moreover, these acts were further interpreted away based on the fact that it was claimed these “abuses” only happened to “high-value” detainees. Ironically, when intelligence is used to justify atrocities and the public is made aware of the atrocities, intelligence is hidden and remains unclassified, and thus a full account of the atrocity is not given. Meanwhile, when atrocities were looked into, the multitude of investigations served to water down the findings and render the results less comprehensive. Furthermore, these investigations did not focus on a top-down examination of events. In sum, the usage of “Interpretive Denials” allowed the Bush Administration to in effect obfuscate the atrocities and reduce any culpability for them.
As a result of this, convictions after investigations were rare and few high ranking officials faced repercussions while Amnesty International (2007) reports that “... senior officials in the administration at a minimum created the conditions under which US military and civilian personnel could commit abusive interrogations with little fear of being subjected to disciplinary or criminal prosecution” (p. 568). So what does this then imply for a democratic regime such as the United States?

3. Risk, Panic, and Torture in a Liberal State

In the introduction the point was raised that torture seemingly undermines the tenets of a liberal state. However, it was also pointed out that liberal states often work paradoxically. In order to preserve freedom, freedom is restricted (Hindess, 2001a; Weiss, 2006). Hence, it is not always astonishing to see liberal regimes commit atrocities on the one hand and deny them on the other. The risk created through the uncertainty of terrorist attacks after 9/11 was seen by some to be a moral panic (see Chapter One), which placed a prominence on intelligence and security concerns (Beck, 2002; Monohan, 2006; Ardaui, Lobo-Guerrero, & Van Munster, 2008). As a moral panic then, the risk of terrorist threats becomes unprecedented and more uncontrollable and threatening: “The global ‘war on terror’ is described by US officials as a conflict of indeterminate but great length. It is a ‘war’ the end of which will presumably be determined ... There will be no single event to signal its conclusion” (Amnesty International, 2004, pp. 9-10). As Cohen and Corrado (2005) note, “In effect, state torture can escalate into a general state policy under the guise of national security” (p. 107).

As such, what can be done to combat this uncontrollable risk? From this study it is clear that the “Necessity” for information or intelligence, which informed many
denials, from detainees was seen to be the answer to thwarting further terrorist activity (Amnesty International, 2008; Luban, 2007). However, this in turn raises another question; namely, how was the need for information able to supplant human rights for torture?38

Those who consciously justify torture . . . rely on the philosophic argument of a lesser evil for a greater good. They reinforce this with an appeal to the doctrine of necessity . . . The usual justification posits a situation were the ‘good’ people and the ‘good’ values are being threatened by persons who do not respect the rules of the game’, but ruthless, barbaric, and illegal means to achieve their ‘evil’ ends. (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 14)

The “Necessity” argument for advocating, or denying the use of torture, can be understood in terms of risk and moral panic in the sense that the doctrine of risk advocates an attempt to control the unpredictability and uncertainty for which the moral panic on terrorism helped to create: “Stereotypes of the ‘other’ and imaginaries of the Islamic terrorist are insidiously reactivated within the framework of risk” (Aradau et al., 2008, p. 181). As Critcher (2009) posits “Moral panics, then, may reflect and reinforce this risk consciousness, of which they are an extreme but symptomatic example”, and moreover moral panics serve “. . . as extreme forms of risk discourses integral to the process of moral regulation” (p. 1140). It is this interest in “moral regulation” which helps to bridge the gap between the requirement for intelligence and the utilization of torture.

Thus, in order to escape the forces of unpredictability and uncertainty, intelligence becomes requisite in a liberal state. This need for information to fend off security concerns became a major feature in the war on terror as witnessed by some proposed and enacted programs after 9/11. Truck drivers to cable repairmen to postal workers were asked to spy on clients; meanwhile the FBI looked into public library users
online activity in the need to find information to quell the uncertainty. The point here is not that these programs took effect, or even had effect, but that they point out the prominence of information gathering in order to decrease perceived or actual security threats (Monahan, 2006). As Ericson (2005) in his review of O’Malley points out:

Liberal commitment to freedom entails two connected paradoxes. First, in struggling to configure the probable consequences of their action, entities require knowledge of risk and engage in risk assessment. Risk assessment is rarely based on perfect knowledge, and typically frays into uncertainty. Uncertainty frequently leads entities to hunker down, engage in risk avoidance, and limit the freedom of others in the name of security. The second and connected paradox, articulated most brilliantly by Isaiah Berlin (1969), is that liberalism must curtail freedom in order to promote conditions in which freedom can flourish. Liberal government is not only perpetually engaged in juggling risk and uncertainty for freedom, but also freedom and restriction for security. (Ericson, 2005, pp. 659-660).

In short, then, the need to control risk is the need for knowledge, and to control knowledge for freedom’s maintenance. This quest for knowledge can be seen as being directly related to committing and denying of atrocities by the Bush Administration; where securing freedom becomes supplanted by unfreedom. As Mythen and Walklate (2006a) note, “risk filters through a range of cultural practices... including work, relationships; food consumption, leisure activities, security [etc.]” (p. 124). Hence, it is not hard to conceive that the ultimate way to manage risk, given the placement of terrorism at the top of the risk hierarchy post 9/11 (Beck, 2002), is to condone, commit, and deny torture; by controlling the body, the risk from that body is also ostensibly controlled. However, another paradox presents itself. Terrorists create legitimate threats for the United States, and as a result the United States while trying to protect its citizens at the same time must not sacrifice the human rights of others (Amnesty International, 2004). Thus, the need for intelligence gathering in the “war on terror” in order to protect freedom oddly restricts freedom in the most inhuman ways it purports to protect.
4. Can Atrocities be Prevented?

Cohen (2001) poignantly points out in his study of denials about atrocities that simply knowing that atrocities happened or knowing that they are being denied often does little in way of preventing their reoccurrence. In fact, he seems to take the standpoint that their reoccurrence is almost guaranteed. Forces such as the denial through “partial acknowledgement” and individual responses of “compassion fatigue” serve to either make the individual unclear of the truth about an atrocity or so overexpose the individual that he or she is morally dead and so does not take action against it. This also, helps build what Cohen (2001) finds to be a “culture of denial” which like other cultures is rich in its history of action and inaction. This “culture of denial” thereby further serves to help deny and maintain atrocities such as torture in the collective consciousness. In short, for Cohen (2001) it would seem that “The exposure and denial of atrocities have become familiar rituals in media and public culture. This is what governments usually do; this is what Amnesty usually says” (p. 115). Thus, torture becomes normalized into the fabric of society. This grim picture seems to imply that torture is as enduring a feature of society as is any other aspect of culture. The debate then about what and how to react to atrocities is ostensibly the debate of agency and structure. Where does individual responsibility stop and societal responsibility quit? For Cohen (2001), however, forces such as “compassion fatigue” are not so inherently valid, for in his conception, while they may appear on the surface to be wholly valid excuses for why little seems to be accomplished, they are inaccurate depictions. For him it appears that the real forces include “media fatigue” and too many “demands” being placed upon the individual, where inaction is more a cause of being psychologically inundated with
requests rather than overexposure. Thus, the grim picture is not so grim: "wanting to do something" is, I believe, a universal human response" (p.195), and not wanting to do something for him is a product of the "global market" not of any real fatigue. Cohen (2001) contends it is not that people do not care, it is that a group of people perpetuate and commit atrocities while a small group opposes them, and the remainder, the majority, is too busy with "life" to do anything. In sum, for Cohen (2001): "The empirical problem is not to uncover yet more evidence of denial, but to discover the conditions under which information is acknowledged and acted upon. The political problem is how to create these conditions. . . . Let us look again at the consistent minority . . . who refuse to obey" (p. 249). How then can we investigate these conditions, which promote both agency and structure to action against such atrocities, and therefore end the apparent perpetual reoccurrence and denial of atrocities? Following from Cohen (2001), then, future research needs to be focused on this area. In essence, future research should try to understand the complex relationships between risk, moral discourse, liberalism, and rationales for committing atrocities by investigating how these forces are opposed, acknowledged, and dealt with. Future research could also examine the role ideology plays in supporting vested interests of the various actors in a torture sustaining reality. As well, research could examine comparisons between liberal states and the use of torture over various historical periods. Moreover, an attempt needs to be made to discern what motivates some people to act and not others. This study has pointed out that rhetoric plays a key role in how actions are justified; specifically, this study has pointed out that the dual and dialectically supporting language of denial and language of othering around the time of a major social disturbance such as the 9/11 attacks has resulted in high levels
of both public and official acceptance of atrocities in a liberal state. Meanwhile, the press and various independent organizations such as Amnesty International repeatedly inquired of President George W. Bush and members of his Administration about whether atrocities had been committed by American armed forces as well as the CIA. These questions were repeatedly denied and misdirected. What this points out is the lack of accountability: “All things considered, it is the absence of accountability featured in the new configuration of power that is a primary concern since it is within that orbit of impunity that the state and its operatives continue to engage in crimes and human rights abuses without fear of penalties” (Welch, 2007, p. 147).

5. Conclusion

The central question of this study was how rhetoric, is used to rationalize a torture sustaining reality in a democratic regime? In addition, this study questioned how the social construction of terrorism as a significant social problem and the othering of terrorists served to buttress this reality? Furthermore, this study questioned how the concepts of risk and moral panic relate to the maintenance of this torture sustaining reality?

Based on the findings of this study, the social construction of terrorism as a social problem, and one that posed a significant threat, if not a moral panic, to the United States, can be seen to have served as a basis upon which to rationalize a torture sustaining reality. Also, participating in this culture were the dehumanization of the terrorist other and the rhetoric of freedom and rights: “The attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 were defined in the news media and popular culture as an assault on American culture, if not civilization itself” (Altheide, 2007, p. 288). Atrocities were
rationalized away by the President George W. Bush and members of his Administration through various denials, specifically "Interpretive Denials". Denials can be seen to allow a liberal regime to maintain its belief that it espouses freedom while it removes freedoms from those who oppose it. This contradiction is seemingly a part of the Risk Society where there is a "... gulf between the world of quantifiable risk in which we think and act, and the world of non-quantifiable insecurities that we are creating" (Beck, 2002, p. 40). Working together with this paradox, and the acceptance of it, is the deconstruction of the reality which defies torture and replacement of it with a new torture sustaining reality based on "morality-defining narratives" by President George W. Bush and members of his Administration (Jackson, 2007, p. 359). Consequently what can be done to prevent a future where freedom is used to underpin atrocities and the very mechanisms such as international human rights conventions that are supposed to secure and prevent atrocities are used to deny they even happen? Amnesty International (2004) notes that, "The struggle against torture and ill-treatment by agents of the state requires absolute commitment and constant vigilance. It requires stringent adherence to safeguards. It demands a policy of zero tolerance" (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 2).

In sum, the data presented in Chapters Three, Four, and Five confirm that as Best (1990) has noted "... rhetoric is central, not peripheral, to claims-making" (p.41), and the same can be said of responses to allegations of torture in a liberal state. Secondly, the rhetoric of denial while confirming Cohen's (2001) and Best's concepts when combined with Best's (1990) "Model of Claims-making" moves beyond this yielding that essential to denials in a liberal state are oddly the use of explicit warrants championing the ideals of freedom and human rights in order rationalize torture. Thus, the amalgamation of
these approaches allows for an interesting way in which to examine the rhetorical basis of denials concerning atrocities. Linked closely to this is the use of dehumanizing language, a perception of risk, and panic, which serve to delegitimize the voice and humanity of terrorist other. Notably too, while denials are sometimes employed simultaneously as Cohen (2001) notes, this study alerts us that in a liberal state denials can shift when evidence of an atrocity is made public. It would appear that while denials operate simultaneously, “literal denials” may be the denial of choice until an atrocity comes to light and then “Interpretive denials”, specifically those of “Spatial Isolation” and Self-correction”, hold sway. While interestingly “Implicatory denials” operate to justify torture under the auspices of Necessity” of information to thwart the threat of terrorism.

In conclusion, then, unlike authoritarian regimes, democratic regimes typically must use complex forms of denial in order to subvert and detract attention from the atrocities they commit. Denials, while sometimes very simply literal, are often interpretive denials being complexly interwoven into discourse through moralistic language with historical roots40, which premise the claims in concern. The reliance on interpretive forms of denials by democratic regimes is perhaps not astonishing as interpretive denials allow for the complexity of the liberal state’s “freedom” versus “unfreedom” characteristics to be seemingly best reflected. Thus, this study alerts us that torture not only lies in the realm of authoritarian regimes but is also woven into the fabric of the democratic, and as this study has shown has and continues to be a concern.
Endnotes

1 While terrorism has been an issue for both parties prior to 9/11, it has certainly reached paramount concern post 9/11 with many terrorism researchers trying to make sense of this event (Bergesen & Han, 2005; Gibbs, 1989; Goodwin, 2006; Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Mythen & Walklate, 2006b; Rothe & Freidrichs, 2005; Schmid, Jongman, Stohl, & Horowitz, 2005; Turk, 2004; White, 2002). In fact, some researchers and state actors (Jackson, 2007; Kessler & Werner, 2008; Laqueur, 1999; Mythen & Walklate, 2006a; Turk, 2004; Weimann, 2006) have indicated that 9/11 constitutes a “new terrorism”. Jackson (2007) finds that the discourse of the political elites, specifically George W. Bush, in the United States typically presented the terrorist attacks as representative of a new kind of war requiring new kinds of actions in order to fight it. Meanwhile some scholars like Ruggiero (2003), while noting the historical nature of terrorism, also find that current terrorism “...is a relatively novel product of political developments” (p. 23), although Duyvesteyn (2004) and Ruggiero (2003) provide a convincing argument against this (see also Mythen & Walklate, 2008).

2 “Torture used to be incompatible with American values. Our bill of Rights forbid cruel and unusual punishment, and that has come to include all forms of corporal punishment except prison and death be methods purported to be painless. Americans and our government condemn states that torture. ... The Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture, Congress enacted antitorture legislation, and judicial opinions spoke of the “dastardly and totally inhuman act of torture”’” (Luban, 2007, p. 249).

3 “... this uncertainty legitimizes the introduction of technologies that seek to transform the relationship between present and future. Examples include, self defense, domestic surveillance of the entire population, tighter control of aviation, collection of personal and biometric data, new military and satellite-aided technologies, and [torture] ...” (Kessler & Werner, 2008, p. 295).

4 “Peoples who live their lives in ways that promote and depend on other capacities are seen not only as different but also, in certain respects, deficient. They are seen, in other words, either as less then fully human or as fully human but yet to acquire those capabilities” (Hindess, 2001a, p. 369).

5 Notably, Amnesty International (2007) finds that “... the abuses which took place in Abu Ghraib are not an aberration. They are part of a pattern where versions of interrogation techniques developed for use in Afghanistan and Guantánamo later emerged in Iraq. Such techniques include hooding, sensory deprivation, isolation and stress positions as well as techniques of humiliation, degradation and fear such as forced shaving, forced nakedness and the use of dogs for intimidation. The range of individuals and locations where torture and ill-treatment have been reported show that these allegations are not a few instances of an isolated problem. This is not surprising because, for around two years, the administration’s position was based on advice set out in secret legal memorandums from the Justice Department, restricting the definition of torture, and arguing that the President could authorise torture for reasons such as military necessity. The USA continues to take the position that detainees at Guantánamo and in Afghanistan are not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions. These policies, adopted at the highest levels of government, have undermined the USA’s compliance with the international prohibition on torture and ill-treatment. Moreover, torture and ill-treatment have been facilitated by the policy of detaining thousands in prolonged incommunicado or virtually incommunicado detention, some in secret detention facilities, without access to the outside world” (“Torture and Ill-treatment”, “What happened in Abu Ghraib” section, para. 1-2).

6 Amnesty International further (2007) adds “It is not possible to make a sharp distinction between torture and ill-treatment. But from a practical standpoint, any such distinction is not significant because all forms of torture and ill-treatment are absolutely prohibited under international law and it is not simply a matter of law. The universal legal prohibition is based on a universal philosophical consensus that torture and ill-treatment are repugnant, abhorrent, and immoral” (“Torture and Ill-treatment”, 2007, “What is Torture” section, para., 1-2; for other relevant laws and conventions on torture see also Greenberg & Dratol, 2005, Appendix C).
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7 This is not to purport that only the government and press are required to sustain or condone a culture of torture but that, besides this, denials by the Administration were also echoed by some members of the public (as seen in some public opinion polls). This echoing of denial furthers the maintenance of a culture of torture, and is essential to its maintenance in a democratic regime (Crenstien, 2005a; Cohen, 2005)

8 Similarly, Cohen (2001) in his rebuttal of post-modern theory’s relativistic stance notes that “You cannot appeal to the relativism of knowledge to turn ‘Holocaust assertion’ and ‘Holocaust denial’ into positions of equal currency . . . . These are not two ‘points of view’ – one position is simply a fanatic rejection of evidence and a refusal to abide by the rule of rationality” (in Hamm, 2002, 182).

9 One is clearly reminded of when the Abu Ghrabi scandal was revealed and soldiers were put on trial and used a similar denial. As Matza and Sykes (1957) noted “ . . . the delinquent may see himself as caught up in a dilemma that must be resolved, unfortunately at the cost of violating the law” and moreover, “. . . the most important point that deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected but because other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence” (p. 669).

10 In Cohen’s (2001) schema he denotes several kinds of bystanders: immediate, external, and states. Immediate bystanders are those directly involved in the atrocity such as the torturer, doctor, judges, guards etc.; external bystanders are those (society at large) who learn of the atrocity from secondary sources; and bystander states include nations who are cognizant of an atrocity committed by another state. Thus, working in conjunction with bystanders’ denial, the international community also helps to foster the torture reality. When international states support a state, which condones torture either economically, militarily or otherwise (such as staying silent to atrocities), they also “implicitly” accept the actions of said state (Crenstien, 2005a). What makes denial of torture more complex is that the various actors from the various bystanders to the broader international community reinforce each other and as a result reinforce the torture reality: “In the domestic war on terror, cultural denial is compounded further by official denial, producing threats to human rights” (Welch, 2003, p. 14).

11 In Cohen’s use, “. . . denials of crimes against humanity are not to be considered private states of mind. Rather they are deeply embedded in popular culture, banal language codes, and state-encouraged legitimations” (Hamm, 2002, p. 178).

12 “In its ability to simplify very complex issues, binarism is a useful hegemonic device. First it establishes as a political fact the existence of clear and specific threats, in this case represented by Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. The dualism, in fact, accommodates the fudging between these different kinds and degrees of threat, to constitute a largely undifferentiated enemy – an easy slippage from ‘they are different from us’ to ‘they are all the same’. Second, binarism allows the representation of ‘them’ and ‘us’ to sketched in clear, simple, and unidimensional lines, through strategic silences. In setting up the enemies as hyper-signifiers of all that is bad and immoral, the complex causes of the ‘others’ actions are left unsaid and unheard” (Lazar & Lazar, 2004, p. 239; 229). Brown (1993) concurs, “Thus classifications – such as true or false, good or bad, legal or criminal, sane or mad – also are definitions of personhood, hierarchies of value, and forms for power” (p. 659).

13 According to Schwalbe (2000) “othering” may be discernable by three types: “oppressive othering”; where the dominant group defines the inferior group based on moral or cognitive grounds; “implicit othering” where the dominant groups defines the inferior group based on the creation of a “virtual self” which serves to define elites and their views as more worthy than those of non-elites; and “defensive othering” which represents a reaction to the dominant group where inferior group members try to become part of the dominant group or differentiate themselves from other inferior members (Schwalbe et al., 2000, pp. 423-425).

14 According to Turk (1982), “Stereotyping furnishes both a reflection and a means of political conflict. Opponents are more sensitive to their respective faults than to their respective virtues. The more intense the struggle, the more negatively will salient, identifying characteristics of the opponents be evaluated. At
the extreme, the process of stereotyping eventuates in dehumanization: The enemy is judged to be so inhumanely evil or contemptible that anything maybe done to "it" without subjectively compromising one's own humanity and sense of morality" (p. 71).

15 For instance, In Bush's first speech about the 9/11 attacks he used the word "evil" to describe the terrorists five times (Keliner, 2002; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). For a more thorough discussion of how Bush's language helped to frame the "other" see Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil (2004). For an interesting discussion of the common generic features of Bush's discourse of war historically situated see Graham, et al., (2004).

16 Norris (2004) interestingly points out the question of innocence of those in the twin towers is never questioned and in so framing them as innocent or heroic so furthers the typification of the other.

17 "George W. Bush, whilst asserting the unequalled military power of the US, is clearly endangering the institutions upon which US mythology is based" (Graham et al., 2004, p. 215).

18 "In order to inflict torture, you must on some emotional level understand your victim to be subhuman and therefore not eligible to claim human rights" (Schulz in Norris, 2004, p. 252).

19 "In a moral panic, the reactions of the media, law enforcement, politicians, action groups, and the general public are out of proportion to the real and present danger a given threat poses to the society. In response to this exaggerated concern, 'folk devils' are created, deviant stereotypes identifying the enemy, the source of the threat, selfish, evil wrongdoers who are responsible for the trouble". (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994b, p. 156). Best (1989a) writes, "Claims about a new crime usually characterize -- or typify -- the offender, the victim, and the crime itself. Claims-makers describe offenders and victims as particular types of people ..." (33). The 'folk devils' in this case are the terrorists; more specifically Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Taliban etc.

20 "These processes of naming by which person form images of themselves as members of a certain group are reciprocal, collective and discursive. They are reciprocal in the sense that, in characterizing others as different, one also characterizes one's own group as different from it" (Brown, 1993, p. 660).

21 Durkheim (1893/1964) defines collective consciousness as "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society (which) forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience" (in Ritzer 1996: 85).

22 "The demonization of social and political others actively breeds a measure of docility in the political center. The discourse on terrorism is one that, like the discourse on subversion, works to make all radical visions and demands incomprehensible and so engages material and bodies in extremity. Its appearance marks a break separating a political culture that preserves a space for genuine opposition and one that rigorously undermines and persecutes such efforts. If radical political visions and opposition can be framed as really terrorism, citizens can be trained to instantly discount anything that constitutes a 'radical' departure from the norm" (Troyer, 2001, para. 23).

23 "The Bush administration deliberately ignored the Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and in fact condoned the use of torture" (Victor, 2006, p. 13).

24 Victor (1998) utilizing Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (1994) study of moral panics, finds five indicators of moral panics: "1) volatility, 2) hostility, 3) measurable concern, 4) consensus, and 5) disproportionality" (pp. 542-543). Volatility refers to an explosive reaction of interest in a new threat created by the "moral deviants". Hostility occurs when "moral deviants" are seen as offending core values and are consequently depicted as being "evil". Measureable concern refers to the ability of a threat's concern to be quantified. Consensus is attained when a large proportion of the populous regard the threat as valid and serious. Finally, disproportionality occurs when the concern over the deviant and the threat they represent is
significantly greater than the empirical reality. In fact, regardless of concern, the empirical reality of the threat may not even exist (Victor, 1998).

These indicators consequently suggest a number of moral panic theories. Accordingly, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) list six possible theories based on "... two dimensions: motives based on morality/ideology vs status/economic interests and levels of power, status, and wealth" (p. 159). While not dismissing the other three possibilities they emphasize the following three likely theories: 1) The Grassroots Model, 2) The Elite-Engineered Model, and 3) The Interest Group Theory (pp. 161-164).

According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b) "The grassroots model" purports that the public at large creates panics, while "The Elite Engineered Model" purports that a powerful but relatively small group intentionally creates a fear and panic in the public which they acknowledge as being largely unsubstantiated, and the "The Interest Group Theory" purports that panics are the result of campaigns initiated by "moral entrepreneurs" who want to impose particular rules. Moral entrepreneurs are, "... organizers, activists, do-gooders, movement advocates who push for a given cause" (Goode, 1994a, p. 20; Henshel, 1990).

25 "As soon as we speak in terms of 'risk', we are talking about calculating the incalculable, colonizing the future" (Beck, 2002, p. 40). "But what happens in world risk society is that we enter a world of uncontrollable risk. ..." (Beck, 2002, p. 41)

26 Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) assert, "If we insist that we have no right to determine the nature of the threat posed by certain conditions, such questions are not problematic — indeed, they are not even possible" (p. 152).

27 "... in contradistinction to positivists critics... this study demonstrate[s] the utility of reflectivist approaches for illuminating the role of ideational and discursive factors in policy analysis" (Jackson, 2007, p. 354). Thus, "When the empirical reality of these crime problems is measured, the actual number of people involved and the frequency of the behavior is often far less then the assertions of the claimmakers" (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004, p. 180). In essence, "The words we actually speak or write are not merely the products of an unlimited number of choices; rather, they are guided by our ideological understandings of the world. This does not mean that we do not have the ability to choose between words or to curtail comments. It does mean that the direction our conversation takes is influenced by the arrangement of ideologies we have learned" (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004, p. 188).

28 Blakeley (2007) furthers this, "... torture is under explored, and existing theories are inadequate for explaining its functions. Previous research has tended to focus on why individuals use torture or why authoritarian states have used it. A few scholars have assessed the uses if torture by liberal democracies..." (p. 373; Cohen, 1993; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2005).

29 In general a constructionist underpinned study in this domain is relevant because "... framing terrorism as a crime reinforces the idea that terrorism is a common problem that should be considered along side other common problems when allocating resources or considering the relevancy of civil rights issues. By focusing on the obvious connections between terrorism and crime, we may be able to not only contribute to a better understanding of terrorism, but also to help formulate more rational policies for combating it" (LaFree & Dugan, 2004, p. 71).

30 ... to the constructionist, the reality of social problems can be measured or manifested in some of the following ways: (I) organized, collective action or campaigns on the part of some of the members of a society to do something about, call attention to, protest, or change (or prevent change in) a given condition... (Mauss 1975, Best 1990: 2-3); (ii) the introduction of bills in legislatures to criminalize or otherwise deal with, the behavior and the individuals supposedly causing the condition (Becker 1963: 135ff, Gusfield 1963, 1981, Best 1990: 2-3); (iii) the ranking of a condition or an issue in the public's hierarchy of the most serious problems facing the country (Best, 1990: 2-3, 151-152, Goode 1993: 49-50); and (iv) public discussion of an issue in the media in the form of magazine and newspaper articles and television news stories, commentaries, documentaries, and dramas (Becker 1963: 141-43, Best 1990: 2-3, 87-111)" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 152).
Similarly, Henshel (1990) notes, “It is probably obvious that the mass media have become exceedingly important in defining social problems. The reason, of course, is that the public in its definitional role does not respond to reality but to its perception of that reality. The media play a central role in shaping the image of reality to which the public responds: mass communication provides visibility for potential issues” (Henshel, 1990, p. 57).

“The rhetoric of secondary claims in the media, shaped by the conventions and constraints of news work, deserves examination, since claims usually reach the largest share of the population through media coverage” (Best, 1989a, p. 260).

Of note, according to Downs’s (1972) “issue-attention cycle”, where he finds social problems move through 5 key stages: 1) “the pre-problem stage”, where the problem exists but has no public attention; 2) the stage of “alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm”, where the public becomes aware of problem and believes it can be solved; 3) the stage of “realizing the cost of significant progress” where the public realizes that solving the problem is difficult; 4) the stage of “gradual decline of intense public interest” where public interest subsides due to difficulty of solution; and 5) “the post-problem stage”, where the public is no longer interested in the problem and it receives little attention (p. 39-41). However, according to Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), natural history models of social problems such as Downs, are characteristically idealistic, even for reasons of clarification, because linear progression is rare as “... many problems exist simultaneously in several ‘stages’ of development ...” (p. 54). Thus, this approach ignores the relational characteristics of social problems, in that there are interactions between problems and consequently ‘stages’.

“Sociologists of deviance and critics of ideology have shown how naming is a form of social control. ... Such categories and their use as labels do not only describe a prevailing reality. They also constitute that social reality, insofar as societies are discursively enacted. Membership categories are not discovered as manifestations of predefined social reality, but as apprehended in and through the very process by which they are deployed” (Brown, 1993, pp. 558-559).

“Assigning identities in this way provides the basis for efforts by individuals within the Bush Administration to secure the right for US agencies to torture. The American upholders of freedom are deemed trustworthy to torture, on the grounds that it is a necessary action on the part of those fighting for freedom, justice and peace against the evil, murdering parasitical enemy” (Blakeley, 2007, p. 389).

“The image of New York’s Twin Towers struck by hijacked airlines on 11 of September 2001 has become an icon of crime against humanity. It is tragic that the response to atrocities of that day has resulted in its own iconography of torture, cruelty, and degradation” (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 1).

“... four months after the Abu Ghraib photographs came to light, the administration’s theory that the problem was restricted to Abu Ghraib and a few aberrant soldiers had been debunked. Indeed, on September 2004, eight retired US generals and admirals wrote to President Bush noting ‘no fewer than a hundred criminal, military, and administrative inquiries have been launched into apparently improper or unlawful US practices related to detention and interrogation. Given the range of individuals and locations involved in these reports, it is simply no longer possible to view allegations as a few instances of an isolated problem.’” (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 19)

“Of the 66 already substantiated cases of abuse, eight occurred at Guantanamo, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq. Only about one-third were related to interrogation, and two-thirds to other causes. There were five cases of detainee deaths as a result of abuse by U.S. personnel during interrogations. Many more died from natural causes and enemy mortar attacks. There were 23 cases of detainee deaths still under investigation; three on Afghanistan and 20 in Iraq” (Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, 2004, p. 13).
“Complex rationalizations concerning necessary interventions ad semantics on torture may be politically expedient, but, more important, they signal an effort to enroll citizens as active supporter of the ‘war on terror’” (Monahan, 2006, p. 98)

“The persistent use of the slogan ‘spreading freedom’ to characterize the American invasion of Iraq (and Afghanistan) is not a new political invention. Along with its companion mantra ‘making the world safe for democracy,’ efforts to ‘spread freedom’ by way of military force have been recycled from one historical period to the next: the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and adventures in Central America. Further deepening American denial is the belief that the USA is a reluctant interventionist and acts only out of a sense of moral duty to protect freedom”. (Welch, 2007, p. 144)
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