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Economic Attitudes of Members in the Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian Church

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Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies of the University of Ottawa in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Religious Studies

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CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter I. Introduction

Chapter II. Methodology and Theories

1. Theories
2. Major Scientific Methods
3. Methodological Limitation

Chapter III. Historical Particularity

1. Traditional Economic Ethics
2. Growth Ideology as Theology
3. Source of Globalization
4. The IMF Crisis and Korean Protestantism

Chapter IV. Conceptual Continuity

1. Materialism
2. Commercial Christianity
3. Political Economy
Chapter V. Behavioral Discontinuity

1. Small-sized Collectivism
2. Family-oriented Membership
3. Christian Fellowship

Chapter VI. Conclusion

References

Appendices

I. Participant Consent Form
II. Questionnaire
III. Interview Script
Preface

My academic interest was and is in the problem of the interplay between religion and economy. Based purely on this academic interest, I visited the Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian Church (OSPC) established in 2004 and became its member. I decided to be baptized at this church, which I had intentionally delayed for a long time. During the survey of the OSPC members, I came to have a serious interest in the community of Korean immigrants that did not attract much attention in terms of the sociology of religion. After that, the subject of my Master thesis was going toward the relationship among religion, economy, and globalization. This thesis is just a beginning for deepening my understanding of the issue.

I hope that this thesis may contribute to a better understanding of Korean immigrants in Canada, and I heartily appreciate the participation of the OSPC members in the survey. Further, I greatly owed the completion of this thesis to my wife and Dr. Peter Beyer. I thank all of them once again.
I. Introduction

This dissertation deals with economic attitudes of Korean immigrants who attend the Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian Church (OSPC). The problem of economic attitudes in religious traditions was and is always a complex and sensitive issue because the problem, for believers, is closely connected with the construction of their identity, and so it involves more than a simple economic reality. Economic attitudes of believers have a double-faced aspect. On the one hand, they feel the pressure to distinguish the economic as secular from the religious as sacred, and on the other hand feel the necessity to integrate harmoniously the two domains.

In this context, the goal of this thesis is to explain how recent Korean immigrants in the OSPC think about various religious-economic issues in their lives as well as why they think about that way. And, as the reaction is both a cognitive and behavioral process which consists of separation and integration of the secular and the sacred under a new economic circumstance, each process in their attitudes should be understood separately. Basically, with regard to religious-economic issues involved in the survey, the OSPC members followed a cognitive tradition of Korean Protestantism, whereas their religious practices developed differently from it. Ultimately, it can be argued that their understanding of the relationship between religion and economy is changeable, and the transformation of their religiosity contributes to the construction of their
identity in Canada.

The OSPC is the smallest and newest church among three Korean ethnic churches in Ottawa. The church was established by just three families, a pastor and his family in August, 2004. All three families except for the pastor's family transferred from the Ottawa Korean Community Church (OKCC) to the Ottawa Korean Methodist Church (OKMC) in Kanata as soon as the OKMC was separated from the OKCC. And again, they determined to establish a new church because of the inside conflict among the OKMC members about how to deal with their pastor's scandal. They asked the Korean Presbyterian Church in America (KPCA), to which the present pastor belonged, to dispatch a minister for them. Among three ministry candidates sent by the KPCA, they elected the present pastor, and at the same time the KPCA promised partial financial support for the OSPC for the first three years. Since its establishment, the OSPC was recruited by new immigrants and young people, and thereby had different features from the OKCC and the OKMC. In this context, this thesis also pays attention to some economic attitudes of the OSPC members who show different features from members of the existing Korean ethnic churches.

In terms of methodology, when we try to understand economic attitudes of Protestants like the OSPC members, two major assumptions in the sociology of religion which deal with this problem have to be considered in advance. The first is that there is a type of economic attitude intrinsic in religions, which can't be reduced to other non-religious variables. If a
researcher, like Weber, argues that Protestants are more positive to economic growth than Catholics, his argument is based on this assumption. Since the debates of Weber's thesis (Green 1959), the problem of how religion is related to economy has been one of the most important themes in the sociology of religion. Many empirical and comparative cultural surveys by anthropologists, sociologists, and economists have criticized Weber's methodology as partly arbitrary and western-centered, especially as concerns his understanding of relationship between religion and economy in Asian societies (Finn 1983; Robertson 1987; Berger 1988; Swatos 1992). However, Weber's works stimulated other sociologists of religion to look at other aspects beyond a direct causality between religion and economy. In my opinion, the true value of Weber's works is in proving the fact that economic, or material, institutions can never be separated from a religious, or spiritual, belief system.

The second assumption is that economic attitudes of religious people are not intrinsic, but very flexible and adaptable. The fact that a religion has a specific economic attitude which is different from other religions does not guarantee that all members, who belong to the religion, have a similar tendency. If a researcher argues that Korean Protestants are more positive to usury than Canadian Protestants, he can not entirely explain a difference of the two by means of something intrinsic in Protestantism. The flexibility or adaptability of religious people toward economic issues can stem from religion itself, or non-religious variables.
My research is obviously based on the second assumption. Though the thesis is a starting point of this research, the goal of this thesis seems closer to the understanding of the “transformative potential” of religion. It refers to the “capacity to legitimize, in religious or ideological terms, the development of new motivations, activities, and institutions which were not encompassed by their original impulses and views” (Eisenstadt 1968). Given that new Christian immigrants like the OSPC members desperately need a new social identity beyond their traditional self-consciousness, the relationship between religion and economy which they think about in Canada may be very different from that in Korea. The concept of transformative potential is useful in considering the interplay of religion and economy in the transformative process of their identity. That isn’t to deny the existence of some economic attitudes intrinsic in Protestantism which Weber argued a century ago. However, although the intrinsic variable is admitted, Korean Protestantism developed a different economic ethics from the original Protestantism, and further, Korean Protestantism in Canada is likely to develop an economic ethic which is different from Protestantism in Korea.

For Korean Protestant immigrants, the concept of ethos which Max Weber concisely showed in *The Protestantism Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism can’t be reduced to* a constant and consistent ‘spirit’ as it was understood by him. It is because economic attitudes of the OSPC members involve various factors stemming from the historical conditions of Korean modernization rather than just from Protestantism itself. With
regard to the historical peculiarity of Korean Protestantism in the process of economic modernization, I will take a closer look at this question in chapter III.

In chapter IV, based on the results of questionnaires and interviews, I analyze how respondents basically reacted to a few religious-economic issues, such as materialism, Christian commercialism, tax policy of religious activities, and Third World poverty. While their attitudes toward materialism and Christian commercialism are rooted in a monistic worldview of Korean tradition and the teleology of Christianity, I want to ascribe their attitudes toward political-economic issues to a specific self-consciousness of Korean Protestantism in a process of modernization. And, in order to evaluate a transformative potential of Korean Protestantism, the results of the survey concerned with these issues were compared with three demographic variables: ages, the length of Christian membership, and the length of residence in Canada. The comparison is about differences between old immigrants and new ones. But, though the difference is seemingly influenced by three demographic variables, entirely connected with the length of time, it may reflect a part of social self-identity which can not be explained just by an individual religiosity. In a sense, the difference is a proof of the transformative potential which Korean Protestantism still has in Canada. In addition, the fact itself that recent immigrants’ economic attitudes are conceptually closer to Korean Protestantism can be also used as a theoretical basis for analyzing the transformation of their religious behavior after
immigration.

A few religious practices of the OSPC members which can hardly be observed in their pre-immigration churches are discussed in Chapter V. Most of them have a religious background based on big cities, such as Seoul, Suwon, and Incheon, all of which have more than one million inhabitants. But, their religious practices in Ottawa, the fourth biggest city in Canada, are very different in various ways from Korean Protestantism in metropolises. How are they different? Why? They favored small-sized collectivism, family-oriented membership, and Christian fellowship for sharing information. These features in the OSPC are basically related to its members' self-consciousness that they are economic weaker in a new society. In addition, the Korean Protestantism which has been a religion of the economic ruling class in Korea, now serves for those who regard themselves as economically weak in Canada.

In sum, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to find this transformative potential of Korean Protestantism in Canada and its various practical aspects by means of analyzing economic attitudes of the OSPC members. That could come from Protestantism itself, or Korean Protestantism, or Korean Protestantism in Canada, or all of them.
II. Methodology

1. Theories

There were many theoretical attempts to understand the relationship between religion and economy from Weber's thesis to rational choice theory. Among these, Lenski's study, *The Religious Factor* (1963), greatly inspired many sociologists of religion who were interested in religion and socioeconomic achievement (Ricco 1979:200). The major meaning of Lenski's study lies in testing positively that religious affiliation can be a determinant for attaining social status, facilitating social mobility, or completing higher education in North America. The influence of this empirical study on the relationship between religious affiliation and economic behaviors is noticeable, for instance, in Greeley (1969), Goldstein (1969), Featherman (1971), Finke and Stark (1992), and Wuthnow (1994; 1997). These studies were interested in reinterpreting the economic meanings of religious affiliation in contemporary circumstance.

Although I was much inspired by the issues raised in these studies, the problem of economic attitudes of the OSPC members to be discussed in this thesis isn't whether religious affiliation is an important variable for explaining the variance of socioeconomic achievement. Above all, the OSPC members are recent Korean immigrants who were not treated in the existing studies concerned with the relationship between religious
affiliation and socioeconomic achievement. Basically, they have a more religiously complex background than European Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish immigrants who have been dominated by a relatively consistent religious tradition. In Korean history, Buddhism and Confucianism kept their position as a central meaning system for a millennium and for five hundred years respectively. While Korean Confucianism thoroughly persecuted other religions as a kind of superstition, Korean Buddhism syncretized easily with folk religions such as shamanism, Taoism, and Confucian patriotism. However, Korean Protestantism developed on the basis of both Confucian exclusivism and Buddhist inclusivism. Though the OSPC members belong to a Presbyterian church, they don’t justify their economic motivation and achievement on the ground of Calvinism.

In this context, the problem of ‘religious affiliation’ shouldn’t be understood in the same way as the existing studies. For the OSPC members, that is like a very complex mosaic which consists of many traditions. An economic attitude is not simply affiliated with a religious tradition. Economic attitudes of the OSPC need to be understood as a result of inter-religions affiliation. For example, Confucian Korean Protestants may have a stronger motivation of material success than Buddhist or shamanistic Korean Protestants.

The next thing to be mentioned are theories about the immigrant church. According to Hurh and Kim’s (1990), the major points in theories about the immigrant church in North America can be summarized by these four theoretical propositions:
Proposition 1: Religion becomes a way of life.

Proposition 2: Religion brings existential meaning, social belonging, and psychological comfort.

Proposition 3: Religion is tied to mental health.

Proposition 4: Religion either promotes or slows mobility and assimilation.

These propositions effectively focus on the functional influence of religion on Korean immigrants, based on Durkheim’s or Weber’s approach to religion. However, such propositions seem to neglect how and why religion among recent Korean immigrants like the OSPC members is something more dynamic than before. If economic attitudes of the OSPC members are based on a different religious experience from the previous Korean immigrants, their understanding of the interplay between religion and economy needs to be explained differently. The most important disadvantage of these functional propositions is that they don’t consider the possibility of an essential transformation of religion itself. In order to understand better economic attitudes of the OSPC members, we need to focus on some voluntary motivations intrinsic in their religiosity. Korean Protestantism doesn’t provide them with a type of economic attitudes unilaterally. Korean Protestantism in Canada is a part of a transformed religiosity which enables to create their new social identity. Therefore, the understanding of essence of Korean Protestantism in Canada is more important in this thesis.
2. Major Scientific Methods

According to William H. Swatos' understanding of Weber's methodology, the goal of religious studies is not to seek "the essence of religion" but "to study the conditions and effects of a particular type of social action" (1992:2-3). This implies that the starting point of sociology of religion basically lies not in an understanding of religion itself, but in society as it is. Swatos considered Weber's analyses of religion in a twofold aspect: (1) the dimension of social relationship, which involves the meaning of relationships of the leadership and the laity of a religious group to a concealed being, and (2) the ethical dimension, which Weber sees as peculiarly manifested in the problems of theodicy and soteriology (1992:7-11).

Approaching religion in both dimensions mentioned by Swatos seems to be very useful to analyze pattern of behavior and thought of the OSPC members to be discussed in this thesis. They wanted religion to be not only the basis of their social relationship, but also an ethical system of meaning which enables their material lifestyle to be imbued with a sacred end. When the phenomena that can be defined as 'religious' are approached in both dimensions of social relationship and an ethical system of meaning, economic attitudes of the OSPC members can be explained more clearly in the context of sociology of religion. For the analysis of this subculture, I relied on the following research methods.
Historical approach

In order to understand a religious background of economic attitudes of members of the Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian Church (OSPC), we need to investigate economic ethics of both Calvinism and Korean traditional society diachronically. As a religious understanding of economic realities was and is a frequently and seriously discussed problem throughout all Christian history, historical studies have to go back to the era before the Reformation. Moreover, the Korean immigrants examined in this research are never free from the traditional economic ethics of Korean society, which consists of social ethics of Confucianism and Buddhism. For this reason, the historical approach is very appropriate in this thesis.

Cross-cultural Comparative Study

As members of the OSPC are immigrants who have moved from the East to the West, their economic attitudes can’t be comprehended only in the framework of a single culture. However, one culture can be a basis for understanding the other culture. For them, their economic situation in Canada forces them to construct a new cultural system of thought and a style of social action which they have never experienced in Korean culture. Their experience of social adaptation to new economic realities can be understood better when both Korean and Canadian circumstances are considered together. And so, a cross-cultural study will contribute to a better comprehension about the transformation of their economic attitudes in the process of immigration, or about the relationship between
such transformation and their identity.

Religious-economic attitudes, whether they are traditional or revolutionary, naturally want to enjoy a cultural justification in the society that they belong to, just as language or art does. In this sense, the cross-cultural approach to religion is in many ways similar to the study of language. Let me quote Oosten’s description:

Each language can be considered as an independent design of the world. First of all the student of language has to learn a particular language. Once he has a thorough knowledge of it he can attempt to translate it into his own language and to examine its structure in his own terminology. He should be aware that the terminology he uses is not an objective scientific apparatus that transcends the limits of all cultures (Oosten 1985:234-235).

After all, a sociologist of religion is in a position not to judge the logic of such a cultural justification, but only to interpret the relation between the logic of the justification and social actions by his own terminology. In particular, although members of the OSPC belong to Protestantism which was transferred from the West to Korea a hundred years ago, their religious identity is very different from the Canadian Protestant. A cross-cultural study will be able to show how their religious justification of economic issues changed after the immigration.

*Empirical research*

Interviews and a survey questionnaire were conducted from 12 August 2005 to 12 December 2005 under the title ‘Economic Attitudes of Korean
Immigrants in Ottawa'. The fourteen participants all were members of the Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian Church (OSPC). In addition to that survey, I participated in and observed almost all activities such as mass, fellowship meetings, and bible study since the establishment of the OSPC in August 2004. The reasons that members of the church were chosen as the object of research are as follows:

First, among three churches for Korean immigrants in Ottawa, it is the only Presbyterian church, a major successor of Calvinism, whose importance was emphasized by Weber because of its soteriology and work ethic. Second, as the Presbyterian churches in Korea occupy the biggest share in a total membership of Korean Protestantism, it may be that the economic attitudes of the OSPC members are a relatively good sample to guess those of Korean Protestant immigrants more generally. Third, as I could observe more directly the birth and growth of the church, and had more chances to discuss with the members about various religious issues, I could comprehend their economic attitudes in some depth.

3. Methodological Limitation

It seems important to point out the following constraints with regard to the methodology:

First, all the OSPC members have a background of Korean Protestantism which syncretized with traditional economic ethics of
Confucianism, Buddhism or folk religions. Though it is admitted that their economic attitudes have been influenced mainly by the social thoughts of Protestantism, their attitudes are based not on Western Protestantism, but on Korean Protestantism. In this sense, the historical nature of Korean Protestantism is evidently an important variable for a better understanding of economic attitudes of the OSPC members, but the problem of Korean Protestantism itself should be considered with their experience of immigration, as another important variable. Among many variables that could have an influence on them, I paid attention to such variables as the historical nature of Korean Protestantism, the experience of immigration, the length of church membership, and age. It is noteworthy that I hardly made use of other important variables like educational level, the wealth, or family background. Therefore, this limitation in using variables should be acknowledged in estimating the theoretical validity of the conclusion in this paper.

Second, due to the short history of the OSPC, its membership consists of relatively younger people like undergraduate students who are subject to the limited scope of economic activities. And, as their economic attitudes are more likely to change as time passes, the survey on them needs to be understood to reflect just their temporary tendency.

Third, I have difficulty in generalizing any result of this research because the scale of its sample is too small. Although fourteen participants in the survey amount to a third of the whole OSPC membership, it should also be admitted that the small number of the
participants prevents meaningful generalization to Canadian Korean Protestantism in general.
III. Historical Particularity

In this chapter I intend to explain how the process of modernization in Korea has been acknowledged by general Korean Protestants. Given that the OSPC members are relatively recent immigrants, it is to be expected that their historical consciousness of Korean modernization would play an important role in determining their attitudes toward major socio-economic issues like usury, materialism, or commercialism. And so, let me explain several aspects of such historical consciousness of general Korean Protestants, including the OSPC members. They are as follows: (1) continuity with traditional economic ethics, (2) growth ideology as theology, (3) source of globalization, and (4) the IMF crisis. These features will serve to explain the historical particularity which is inherent in Korean Protestantism.

1. Continuity with Traditional Economic Ethics

In the process of economic modernization, Korean Protestantism developed an economic logic of justification different from traditional religions. It regarded itself as a new spiritual motivation for modernization, and therefore emphasized the degree to which Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shamanism were inadequate and anachronistic as failed economic ethics. Nonetheless, in spite of the effort of Korean Protestantism to distinguish itself from the previously
dominant economic ethics, its understanding of economy is closely connected with the attitudes of traditional religions.

Firstly, Korean Protestantism has not assumed a dualistic relationship between religion and economy, as was the case in Western Protestantism since Calvinism. All economic activities were regarded as natural, but as trivial and secondary in both Confucianism and Buddhism. Especially under the Confucian system of meaning, a strict hierarchial order existed among Sa (士, gentleman), Nong (農, farmer), Gong (工, manufacturer), and Sang (商, merchant). This order was harmonious with the providence of Heaven. Sa enjoyed the highest social status among the four layers, while Sang had the lowest. In principle, people who belonged to Gong and Sang couldn’t become bureaucrats in the old Korean kingdoms, though they had higher status than slaves. The most important way by which Sa classes ruled other classes economically was through money-lending or tenancy. And, public pawnshops managed by Korean Confucian regimes functioned as financial institutions for Nong, Gong, and Sang classes.

However, in Confucian thought, the economic relationship among the classes was understood not as exploitative, but as mutually profitable. The interests of the state take precedence over that of the Sa classes, which in turn took precedence over that of the Nong, Gong, and Sang classes. As the order of priority in their economic relationship was considered to be dictated by the providence of Heaven, doubting the order of priority was to ignore the providence of Heaven. Conversely, the social duty of Sa classes was to rule other classes peacefully, and in
doing so they came to know and practice the will of Heaven. Placing their own interest within the frame of the order of priority is a basic proposition of Korean Confucianism in understanding the relationship between religion and economy.

In the case of Mahayana Buddhism, which became another important religious tradition in China, Korea, and Japan, the concept of self-interest is also not contradictory with altruism because even a religious self-realization of the Bodhisattva starts from a motivation for self-interest, and it is not until after self-realization or enlightenment that it can be used for the salvation of all people (大野信三 1992:120). In this light, pursuing economic interest through working is only one of many means toward altruistic salvation. The endless pursuit of economic profit is naturally in vain, but the pursuit of economic interest itself is encouraged as part of the natural path to salvation.

Historically, most Korean Buddhist temples have been engaged in a kind of usury, called Bo (寶) or Gae (契), as a means of their financing. Bo was an official financial institution of a temple, but Gae was a voluntary and private organization among monks. Whereas the former was utilized by the temples in Korean old kingdoms, Silla (A.D. 662–980) and Koryo (A.D. 982–1392), where Buddhism was an official religion of the kingdoms, the latter was created during the Choson Dynasty (A.D. 1392–1919) when Buddhism was seriously persecuted by Confucian bureaucrats. Another main source of temple income was also loans and tenancy. Their religious grounding is through the doctrine of stupa’s belongings (塔物).
That means money and properties which are offered by lay people to stupas or statues in temples. According to this doctrine, as the offered stupa’s belongings must be utilized as actively as possible for the salvation of mankind, instead of simply being stored, temples or monks should think of them as material capital to be actually managed and continuously increased (Lee 1993:16-17).

In Korean Buddhist thought, economic activities of both laymen and monks are justified only by the end of religious salvation, self-realization and altruistic salvation. Economic activities are not separated from religious life. In short, the status of economy in Korean Buddhism, like Confucianism, was meaningful only within the hierarchy of the whole religious order. And so, economic motivation was always subject to religious motivation.

These religious traditions about the relationship between religion and economy led Korean Protestantism to accept more easily the hierarchial inseparability of the two areas, in a way that was quite different from the Western Protestantism. Although the acceptance of such hierarchial inseparability by Korean Protestantism does not mean that it interpreted the relationship of the two in the same logic as Confucianism or Mahayana Buddhism, its adaptation to these two major religious traditions was one of the important reasons for the rapid growth of the Christian church in Korea (Adams 2002:65).

In the light of this historical analysis, the earliest four Korean Protestants, who in 1876 were baptized by John McIntyre, a Scottish
missionary, were ginseng traders across the border between Korea and China (Kim 2003:77-79). Such members of the merchant class, who possessed strong economic power at that time, established the early Protestant churches in Korea and they became religious leaders in major denominations like the Presbyterian and the Methodist. Why did not they become main followers of new religious movements like *Donghak* (東學), *Daijonggyo* (大倧敎), and *Jungsangyo* (甑山敎)? These new religious movements which were organized in Korea at the close of the nineteenth century involved as revolutionary social thoughts as Protestantism in terms of Confucian worldview.

From the beginning of Chosun Dynasty, people in the north-western provinces of Korea had been marginalized and neglected socially because of their anti-governmental tendency. The *Sang* classes were people who most desperately wanted to remove status order designed by Confucianism because they could not enjoy social status suitable for their economic power. Under Confucian thought, however, trading and producing was a mean occupation, and the true *Sa* or gentleman must enjoy reading books, composing poems, being good at calligraphy and music. Especially in economic life, the true *Sa* or gentleman must be generous, but not ascetic or stingy. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, when Protestantism was introduced in Korea, as the persecution and exploitation of Confucian bureaucrats against other classes became more pervasive and serious, all the class except the *Sa* looked forward to a new ruling ideology of society. However, new religious movements,
which mixed many kinds of religious traditions ranging from Buddhism and Confucianism to Taoism and folk religions, did not develop any sort of asceticism. Actually their main followers were the Nong classes or farmers and slaves. It is therefore logical that the merchants and handicraftsmen classes were more attracted to asceticism in Protestantism. In this sense, the anti-Confucianism of Sang classes and asceticism of Protestantism may be understood a Korean example of Weber’s notion of ‘elective affinity’. The choice of Protestantism by Sang classes, instead of new religious movements in those days, was a ‘historical accident’.

Nonetheless, the worldview of the early Protestant merchants was not rooted in the dualism of religion and economy. The best evidence that the early Korean Protestant merchants understood the relationship between religion and economy hierarchically is the logic of their resistance against the economic imperialism of Japan. Since the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the early Korean Protestants, who were mainly the Sang or Gong classes, used religious organizations and teaching in order to accumulate national capital and to sell more national commodities (Kang 1999:12-36). Through such ascetic movements as the MusanJangryo-Woondong (物産奨励運動) in 1922, an anti-alcohol and anti-smoking campaign, or a savings campaign, they tried to resist the exploitation of the economic imperialists. They believed that economic situations should be controlled and overcome by religious

\[1\] This movement was for encouraging the production and consumption of national goods, and established by national capitalists at a Protestant church in Pyungyang.
ethics and thereby economic values could serve the interest of their
religion as well as the national interest. From this hierarchical viewpoint,
religion and economy can not and should not be separate. After all, the
hierarchical inseparability between the two areas in Korean Protestantism
is a reflection of the monistic worldview inherent in Confucianism,
Buddhism, and Shamanism, as already mentioned. Although the early
Korean Protestants accepted Protestantism expressly in order to
overcome the limitation of traditional Korean religions like Confucianism
or Buddhism, their economic worldview was not greatly different from a
traditional monism, which understood religion and economy within a
hierarchical order. This ambivalence is a peculiarity of Korean
Protestantism. While its social and political doctrines were rigidly
severed from traditional religions, but the way it understands the
relationship between economy and religion was handed down from them.
Although asceticism in Protestantism was useful in enhancing religious
value of the jobs in which the Sang and Gong classes were engaged, and
in criticizing the empty life style and political philosophy of the Sa
classes. Based on the religious justification of their jobs, they could
challenge to Confucian social order. This elective affinity between
asceticism and anti-Confucianism does not apply to economic worldviews
of both Protestantism and the Sang and Gong classes. Therefore, Korean
Protestants were ascetic and anti-Confucian, but they favored the
monistic relationship between economy and religion.

Secondly, the authoritarian leadership in Korean Protestantism played
an important role in creating the economic attitudes of Korean
Protestants. As Korean Protestantism has developed by way of individual
churches, not major denominations, the personal attitude of church
leaders could influence the economic attitudes of their church members
more strongly. Especially in a process of national resistance against the
Japanese imperialism, Korean Protestants were exposed to various
economic instructions and interpretations ranging from leftist Christian
socialism to right-wing Christian nationalism. The representative
illustration of the ideological conflict within early Korean Protestantism
was the Shinganhoi (新幹會)² event in 1927 (Kang 1999: 51–70), in which
Christian nationalists, Christian socialists and communists struggled for
hegemony. Although the most important problem that the early Korean
Protestants confronted was to resist economic doctrines of both the
Japanese imperialists and the communists, they could not find a
consistent and unified position that integrates the different opinions of
many churches leaders under the name of Korean Protestantism. With
regard to the hegemony of the Shinganhoi, there were many debates
among major Korean Protestant leaders. Some argued that the economic
doctrines of the communists could be compatible with the Christian
worldview in the interest of national independence; others were skeptical
of compromise with the communists (Kang 1999:98). Actually, there was
no clear distinction between communism and socialism.

² This political organization, which was toward a united national party, increased its
membership rapidly since its establishment because socialists, nationalist, and
communists together participated in it by the influence of the first coalition of the
National and the Communist Party in China in 1924.
Owing to the emergence of authoritarian leadership with a nationalistic historical view, Korean Protestantism could not separate its religious ideal from an independent development of national economy. In addition, the inconsistency of economic attitudes within Korean Protestantism became evident even more by its denominational divisions, caused mainly by the different historical views of church pastors. Naturally, such denominational divisions made it easier for church members to accept the different economic attitudes of their pastors, albeit thereby making it more difficultly to understand economic issues in a consistent and unified Korean Protestant way.

Another interesting thing is that most religious leaders of early Korean Protestantism were themselves products of a system of authoritarian Neo-Confucian education. Accordingly, they transmitted to students a very authoritarian interpretation of the Bible (Adams 2002:86). Moreover, the authoritarian tradition of Neo-Confucianism fit in quite well with the theological conservatism of the early missionaries who had been Methodists or Presbyterians. Besides, in the light of Confucian culture, pastors or missionaries were regarded as spiritual leaders or gurus, whose instructions should not be doubted by laymen or students. One of the most famous Confucian phrases, 君師父一體\(^3\), seems very appropriate for describing their social status after the annexation by Japan. As spiritual leaders or gurus belonged to the word Saa (師) in that phrase,

\(^3\) Its literal meaning is that king(君), guru (師), and parent (父) are the same. Namely, it says that they all should be respected with equal importance in terms of an individual relationship.
the economic attitudes of the early Korean Protestant leaders were transmitted and taught very effectively to general laymen through the authoritarian leadership of the Neo-Confucian tradition.

2. Growth Ideology as Theology

For Korean Protestants, growth or development meant something more than for Western Protestants. Historically, Protestantism in Korea experienced a rapid quantitative expansion after the 1945 liberation from Japan, while intervening in the local distribution of international aid goods which were the most important material resource during the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1947. During and after the Korean War, the Protestant denominations which had ties with the churches in the U.S. attracted Koreans by providing a tremendous amount of material relief (Park 2003:44). The kind of aid materials varied greatly from tents, food, medicine, and clothes to money. For Koreans in those days, the Protestant community functioned as a means of economic survival and implied a symbolic route toward material blessing.

On the other hand, the first President Syngman Rhee who ruled from 1948 to 1960 played a major role in developing a pro-Christian social and political atmosphere in Korean modernization. Above all, Rhee himself was a church-elder, and Vice-president Ham Taeyong was a minister. According to Park's book, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, Christians accounted for 25 percent of the first National Assembly and
occupied some 40 percent of political leadership positions during his rule, although Christians constituted less than 10 percent of the South Korean population and Buddhists were the majority of the whole population (2003:174). Newspapers and magazines of the Protestant community even likened Rhee to Moses, and Yi Kibung, Rhee’s running mate, to Joshua in support of Rhee’s election campaign (Park 2003:179).

While Rhee’s dictatorial regime contributed to the political growth of the Protestant community, the third President, Chung-hee Park, who ruled from 1963 to 1979, had a heavy influence on Korean Protestants’ economic conservatism. Especially since the beginning of the 5-year Plans for Economic Development in 1965, an ideology of material growth has become an indisputable priority in all fields of society. During the era of material growth, the Yoido Full Gospel Church became the largest church in the world and a symbolic model of blessing to both conservative and liberal Christians. Chung-hee Park was a political dictator, but an economic savior for all of them.

Doo-Hwan Chun and Tae-woo Roh, Park’s successors, also tried to gain an image of economic savior to compensate for the political weakness of their military regimes. They repeatedly succeeded in keeping inflation stable throughout their rule, even though their military regimes persecuted major antigovernment Christian activists like Sokhon Ham, Ikhwan Mun, Chaejun Kim, Tonghwan Mun, and Byungmu Ahn. Just as Chun and Roh emphasized a qualitative maturity of Korean economy, so Korean Protestantism tried to overcome the theological conflicts
caused by quantitative growth through a political compromise among Christian organizations like the KNCC (Korean National Council of Churches) and the KCCC (Korean Council of Christian Churches). Both liberal and conservative church leaders began to issue a unified political message or theological position, instead of criticizing each other.

Since the economic movements for independence in the 1920s, the issue of growth has been a constant priority for Korean Protestantism, almost as if it were the only content in Christian theology. Material growth was not only political and economic, but also religious to Korean Protestants. For them, material growth meant independence in the era of Japanese rule, survival during the U.S. occupation, political power during the Rhee’s regime, quantitative blessing during Park’s, and qualitative maturity in the 1980s. A church without material growth was not expected to be beneficial to spiritual growth. Naturally, this kind of growth ideology caused the Protestant community to be much less interested in the problem of the distribution of social resources. Christians who complained about the inter-church or intra-church institutional inequality were very often considered as Palgaingii (communists), even within the Protestant community. Called “heretics” within Korean Protestantism, they have created minjung theology (民衆神學), a Korean version of liberation theology, which was popular among young anti-governmental pastors in the era of the military regimes.

Growth theology in Korean Protestantism is a typical model of interpretation for understanding the relationship between religion and
economy in the process of modernization. That is a reflection of self-consciousness or self-identity which modernization imposed on Korean Protestantism. Through the growth theology, Korean Protestantism could prevent major side effects of modernization—for example, political and social insecurity, conflict between traditional values and Western values, and economic inequality—from impairing its self-identity as a unified social idea (Kim 2002). However, the more important point here is that Korean Protestantism adhered to the theology of growth, whether material or spiritual, and interpreted the meaning of growth in various ways depending on its social circumstances.

3. Source of Globalization

For a better understanding of the relationship between religion and economy in Korean Protestantism, the meaning of globalization needs to be explained from a historical perspective. As the introduction of Protestantism at the end of the 19th century was accomplished in the context of destruction of the Confucian world order, Protestantism in Korea was always understood as a symbol of modern world order.

The concept of equality in Protestantism was revolutionary in that it denied the Confucian world order of vertical relations without the possibility of an equality of status among individuals, societies, and nations. The Confucian world order was based on the different obligations which stemmed from the essentially unequal but natural
relations, whereas the worldview of Protestantism is rooted in a reciprocal equality of universal brotherhood. It was largely through the worldview of Protestantism that Korea could recognize itself as a sovereign state which was no longer a subject of China.

Just as Protestantism enabled Korean people to recognize their identity in the world order of imperialism, so it also functioned as a cognitive means for explaining the superiority of capitalism in the era of the Cold War. Throughout the dictatorial period from Rhee to Roh, Korean Protestants were always official spokesmen for defending or justifying the capitalistic world order. For them, the capitalistic world order was infallible and imbued with the ascetic economic ethics of Protestantism. They believed that the capitalistic world order resonated with the nature of Protestantism. Actually, during the Cold War, Korean Protestantism was the most important vehicle for importing and implanting the ascetic economic ethics of the Western Protestantism into Korean society.

After the collapse of the communist bloc and the establishment of the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1989, Korean Protestants engaged in economic romanticism which comprehended the issue of globalization as the internationalization of local regulations and laws. In spite of many national debates about the WTO system, Korean Protestantism saw such debates as an economic conflict among local interest groups and did not heed cultural meanings inherent in the WTO system, market opening, or the innovation of communication technology. As globalization or internationalization began to draw social attention through President
Roh's northern diplomacy late in the 1980s, Korean people were accustomed to attributing globalization to a part of political and economic problem.

In this context, globalization to Korean Protestantism meant no more than a physical reduction of time and space, and so the technological advantages of globalization were expected to contribute to global growth of Korean Protestantism itself. For example, Korea became the country which has the secondly largest number of Protestant missionaries across the world. This competitive dispatch of Korean missionaries all over the world is one of the most important projects to Korean Protestant denominations because a globalizing world is another stage to prove the validity of their growth theology at the global level. Implanting Korean growth theology in a globalizing world has been attempted in the same way that Western Protestantism taught Korean people modernity a century ago. For Korean Protestants in those days, there did not exist "runaway world," as A. Giddens named the post-modern world (2000), because global society was regarded a very orderly entity that can properly be managed and controlled by its major components like nation states, international institutions, and transnational corporations.

4. The IMF Crisis and Korean Protestantism

The IMF crisis in 1997 was based on the Korean misunderstanding of globalization. For Koreans as a whole, including Korean Protestants,
globalization before the IMF crisis meant nothing other than 'economic liberalization or deregulation'. Many destructive results of the crisis forced Korean Protestants to reinterpret the meaning of globalization because it could not be explained by the previous economic optimism of Korean Protestantism. Through the structural adjustment program of the IMF, Korean Protestants have also realized the new level of integration in global capitalism which is more organic and dynamic than the capitalistic world order in the era of the Cold War.

In terms of Korean Protestantism, the IMF crisis also suggested how growth theology should change in the era of globalization. The previous growth theology which was absorbed in the development and expansion of the self was not available at the global level. Integration at the global level made it impossible to separate the self from the other. The IMF crisis showed symbolically that the global ego could survive only in a mutual relation with the other and further growth theology based on the concept of local ego should reconstruct its identity through constant communication with the other.

With regard to this point, let me quote the interview with Mr. Hong:

"I survived even the IMF crisis and finally became president of my company. However, as I know very well an inefficient bureaucracy of the Korean government, I don’t believe that Korean governmental policies are for the benefit of all people. And so, I don’t regret my decision of immigration."

In this brief response about the IMF crisis, the interesting thing is that
he no longer considers the governmental economic policies to be efficient and fair, even if he has been a faithful Protestant for twenty years. All members of his family strived for religious piety in their daily life and seemed to be a typical Christian family in Korea. However, his disbelief in the economic policies of Korean government would hardly have been expected in such a typical Christian family before the IMF crisis. As mentioned above, most Korean Protestants were always supporters and beneficiaries of governmental economic policy throughout its history.

In this context, Mr. Hong’s disbelief means more than a simple complaint about economic policy. It reflects disbelief in Korean society itself based on growth ideology. His disbelief is eventually to deny his previous local ego and at the same time to admit the necessity of a new ego which will not confuse itself even in global communication and connection with others. In his consciousness, globalization is no longer based on "society" as a bounded system. Rather it is the intensification of social relations in which local transformation is through a dialectical process as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space (Giddens 1990:64).

Most pro-governmental and pro-Western denominations like the Presbyterian churches or the Methodists, which have a dominant power in Korean Protestantism, prevented their members from looking at these dynamic aspects of globalization. Therefore, the IMF crisis became a turning point for Korean Protestants to understand the problem of
globalization in a new way.

#Chart 1:


After the IMF crisis, one of the most remarkable social changes was that Korean people became even more interested in immigration to such countries as the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all of which have a relatively stable society. Chart 1 shows the steeply increasing trend of Korean emigration to Canada since the 1997 crisis.

The major causes of their emigration also seem to be different from those before the IMF crisis. Before the IMF crisis emigration mainly took place under condition of high economic growth in Korea. The Korean emigrants at that time spent most of their time working, even though they expected a better quality of life in Canada. But recent Korean

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4 Source: The Korean National Statistical Office.  
http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin/sws_999.cgi
immigrants, like the OSPC members who experienced the IMF crisis, seem to have realized that their life could be destroyed by huge social force irrespective of their economic efforts and attitudes. Now they know that economic growth by itself can not assure a comfortable life in the future.

The IMF crisis in Korea was obvious evidence of the failure of the growth ideology which had been the only dominant pattern of thought in Korean modernization. The finding in Chart 1 should not be interpreted as a simple causality, namely that the economic crisis caused a sudden increase of Korean immigrants to Canada. Rather the IMF crisis destroyed the long standing faith in growth ideology which Korean social institutions had taken for granted. Korean Protestantism as a social institution was no exception, either. In this context, recent Korean immigrants in Canada form a group that is looking for a more credible social ideology which will justify the material richness of their life even in global society.

 Eleven in fourteen OPSC interviewees said that they were relatively richer in Korea, but their immigration was a rational decision. All of them were Korean Protestants who had been raised in the context of economic optimism of Korean Protestantism, which resulted in an uncritical support of growth ideology. For them, therefore, “immigration is an enormously disruptive and disorienting experience, and so it also presents itself with a special opportunity to reshape and transform people (Kim 2002:199).” Through the IMF crisis they realized that their understanding of
globalization was wrong. They now seek a new identity in another experience of globalization through immigration.
IV. Conceptual Continuity with Korean Protestantism

On the basis of historical particularities inherent in the economic attitudes of Korean Protestantism, the OSPC members' orientation toward materialism and commercialism should also be discussed in detail because materialism and commercialism are still the most prevailing patterns of consumption in a globalized economy. The OSPC members, whether pastor, deacons, or lay members, must pursue their religious ideal in the context of the secular pressures of the global economy. Much cross-cultural and empirical research on materialism shows how this differs from country to country or from age to age (Schaefer, Hermans and Parker 2004; Clark and Micken 2002; Ger & Belk 1996). Some researchers associate it with self-doubt and insecurity, social conformity, and self-esteem that is contingent on external accomplishments and praise (Belk 1984; Prelinger 1959; Dixon and Street 1975). Historically, the idea that possessions contribute to the enhancement and maintenance of a positive self-identity can be traced to William James' *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). As concerns, it is evident that possessions can also play an important role in the self-identity.

However, these studies commonly have failed to stress that materialism is closely connected with a religious worldview because materialism itself is a product of culture. In order to reach a better understanding of materialism in the self-identity of the OSPC members, we have to return again to the religious teachings which speak to the relationship between
the material and the spiritual. Therefore, the starting point for understanding the OSPC members’ attitude toward materialism is their religious worldview and tradition.

1. Materialism

Although we do not yet have a single definition of materialism, it has mostly been defined mainly as a problem of personal tendency or trait. Here, I would also like to follow Richins and Dawson, who defines materialism as a personal value stressing the importance of owning material possessions. They divide it into three parts: centrality (possessions play a central role in life), happiness (possessions linked to well-being) and success (success judged by possession) (Richins and Dawson 1992). This broad definition seems adequate for measuring the importance of material values in the economic thought of each individual because the purpose of this research is not to examine materialism itself. Among many questions with regard to materialism in the survey, the following one deserves special attention:

Interview Question: The Bible says, “You cannot serve both God and Money (Matthew 6:24).” How can religious salvation be compatible with economic success?

All respondents answered unanimously that the two fields were never contradictory. With regard to how can the religious be harmonious with
the economic in this world, a 25-year old student explained:

Economic success is secondary, but faith is primary. If your faith is sound, economic success will follow it. It is because the rich and faithful Christians will conduct a rational consumption by diminishing luxurious or lavish expenditure.

However, Mr. Hong, father of the student, showed a different viewpoint from his son:

As salvation is accomplished by Jesus, it is spiritual, and material things are necessary for our body under God's admission. Therefore, they are not contradictory. The spiritual is located on a different dimension from the material and so the former has nothing to do with the latter.

Mr. Hong and his son represent two patterns of thought about materialism, which are representative of all other answers collected in the survey. Twelve of fourteen respondents expressed the same pattern of thought as the son, whereas Mr. Hong had just one supporter for his viewpoint. Let me analyze in detail their respective positions about the relationship between the religious (or God) and the economic (or Money), or between the spiritual and the material.

Twelve respondents, including Mr. Hong's son, look at the relationship basically in terms of a hierarchial order. In this hierarchial cosmic order, the material should be subject to the spiritual, and the spiritual is an object to be served by the material. Therefore, the spiritual is an end, but the material is a means to the end. They coexist as the relationship of ends and means in a hierarchial structure of cosmic order. They are
therefore in a vertically reciprocal relation without denying each other.

On the other hand, according to Mr. Hong's position, as the two areas are essentially in different dimensions, they necessarily need a different kind of cognitive logic. The material can not appropriately be recognized and understood by the logic of a spiritual dimension, and vice versa. Nonetheless, both of them are useful for each other in a dialectical relationship. As the material itself is not bad or evil, human beings should follow the material cognitive logic when they think about the material world. The bad thing is when the logic of the material intervenes in the spiritual area. Likewise, people have only to obey the logic appropriate to the spiritual world in their thinking about the spiritual world. The material area can serve the spiritual one, but this is not intentional or designed, but accidental or unexpected. Thus, although the two are seemingly irrelevant to each other, the whole society dialectically and unknowingly improves only if each domain is faithful to its own cognitive logic.

These patterns of thought show respectively the monism in Korean traditional religions and the dualism in the Western thought. For example, interpreting results of a survey about the relationship between religion and economic behavior, Wuthnow argued in his book, *God and Mammon in America*:

American culture is especially indebted to its religious heritage for the capacity to distinguish the spiritual from the material. Whether it is a fairly orthodox rendition of the tradition, a decidedly secularized version,
or an introspective alternative, religious tradition supplies a valued conception of the spiritual that can serve as a conceptual alternative to a more negatively evaluated image of materialism (1994:175).

Focus in this quotation is on the religious basis for the Western understanding of materialism. Let me further quote Wuthnow's explanation about such religious basis of Western materialism:

In the story of the fall of Adam and Eve, Eden represent a kind of spiritual state in which direct communion with God is possible, work is unnecessary, and death absent, whereas the world outside of Eden is characterized by distance from God and the necessity of work. Other Hebrew writings, such as the story of the golden calf or of the angel's visit to Sodom, draw the contrast with even greater clarity.....Christianity also carried forward the basic distinction between spirituality and the material, especially in Jesus' teachings about serving God and Mammon or rendering unto Caesar what it was and unto God what was God's (1994:158).

His assertion leads us to the conclusion that this legacy of Christianity underlies the Western cognition of materialism as a social evil like corruption, indulgence, or addiction. The conceptual separation of the two domains and a negative image of the material are all considered to originate from the Christian tradition. Especially, the drastic separation of the two spheres in our language has derived in part from the prophetic notice of the idolatrous lures of the material: "You cannot serve God and mammon" is quoted from Jesus (Marty 1995:249). The Bible involves both ascetics, world-denying, otherworldly, and purely
spiritual impulses and the countertexts about loving the created order, tending the earthly garden, seeking the welfare of the human city, being stewards, and enjoying material goods. And these always suggest that the material world is the scene of spiritual striving (Marty 1995:249). Within the biblical tradition, materialism can be interpreted as an independent value system.

Meanwhile, materialism is not the material itself because it means an extreme adherence to material values. Such adherence is the destruction of the separated and balanced relationship between the two domains as well as the intervention of one in the other. In this sense, the negative image of the material domain is based on the possibility that possession of materials can easily change into an adherence to the material. This dualistic logic seems similar to Mr. Hong’s attitude.

On the other hand, compared with the Western dualism suggested by Wuthnow, the relationship between the spiritual and the material for Mr. Hong’s son is based on a monistic logic in which the material should ultimately serve the spiritual. The material does not symbolize evil here. It is just something to be complemented by the spiritual and essential. As the relationship of the two domains belongs to a hierarchial order, it is unlike the contrasting composition of the two domains in the Western dualism. The material and the spiritual in his thought are always ready to be united within the hierarchial order. His attitude toward the material is therefore more closely concerned with a Korean traditional monism that contradicts the dualism of Western Christianity.
Additionally, the important thing to be distinguished in this dissertation is the difference between the material and materialism. As mentioned, 'the material' here is a general term that includes both the tangible and the intangible, forming the opposite of the spiritual. Meanwhile, materialism is an orientation which views material goods and money as being important for personal happiness and success. In this context, it is only through understanding the relationship between the spiritual and the material in their thought that respondents' attitudes toward materialism can be understood.

For more discussion, let me take more the results of the questionnaire into account. They are summarized in Table 1. It examines the respondents' answers to questions about materialism in terms of age, length of residency in Canada, and length of Christian membership. A few interesting things are found with regard to their attitude toward materialism.

<Table 1> Attitudes toward Materialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q6. Do you agree that rich Christians are blessed by God in the way of material blessing, and therefore that their luxurious houses, expensive cars, and high consumption can also be justified on the basis of the Bible?</td>
<td>Yes: 8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No: 6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15. Do you think that rich people are happier than poor people?</td>
<td>Yes: 5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17. Do you think consumerism and materialism are compatible with what the Bible says?</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes: 5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No: 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(no response: 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.6</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q18. Do you think that money is a useful tool for building the kingdom of God in this world?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No: 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(no response: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Average | 28.9 | 3.28 | 15.1 |

Age: the average age of respondents. (the average of all respondents: 28.9)
Residence: the average number of years of residency in Canada. (the average of all respondents: 3.28)
Membership: the average years of Christian membership. (the average of all respondents: 15.1)

The first thing is that nobody consistently said yes or no to all four questions. This implies that all respondents fall between an extreme materialism and an ideal fundamentalism. Just as most Christians do, they accept some aspects of a materialistic lifestyle, but refuse to compromise with other aspects. This kind of inconsistent tendency can be explained by two possible reasons. One is the possibility that they do not have a clear religious standard for what the limits of materialism should be. Basically, as materialism is a matter of the extent to what people adhere to goods and money, it can be very difficult for them to discern whether their extent is in conformity with their religious faith or not. Another is the fact that they may feel a conceptual complexity of materialism which
can not be entirely explained by biblical teachings about stewardship. All respondents unanimously stated that they found these questions very embarrassing and difficult to answer. It seemed that they felt more comfortable when the stewardship doctrine was not analyzed by modern theories of ownership, because the teaching of stewardship ultimately teaches that everything is owned by the one who created it, not by persons who are taking care of it (Wuthnow 1997:77).

The next feature which Table 1 shows is that age, period of residency in Canada, and length of Christian membership are all factors in this survey. First of all, with regard to the respondents who show a negative attitude to material thought, they tend to be relatively younger, have been in Canada longer, and have the longer Christian membership. How can this finding be interpreted?

It is to be expected that longer Christian membership will make the Korean respondents on average more negative about materialism because they have longer exposure to Christian teaching and preaching which strongly warn against various kinds of material lifestyle. However, with regard to age and the period of residence in Canada, we can see an unexpected finding which has hardly been observed by other studies. I would like to attribute its cause to the particular condition that the less than 30-year old persons constitute more than 50 percent of the whole OSPC membership. And the relatively older members are also more recent immigrants than younger members. And so, it says that the recent older immigrants are more positive toward materialism than the previous
younger immigrants. After all, the older respondents who are more accustomed to Korean Protestantism can have a tendency to be more generous about materialism. This argument makes sense if one considers that Korean Protestantism has more earnestly been engaged in the Korean national goal of economic growth in the process of modernization. In addition, it seems that there is a minute difference in economic experience among respondents. The recent older immigrants experienced the larger scope of economic ups and downs in Korea, and after that experience they are more likely to regard material success or happiness as a means toward economic stability in their life, although they also acknowledge a religious duty to control their economic desire properly.

2. Commercial Christianity

If the issue of materialism is helpful for understanding the relationship between economy and religion in the aspect of demand, the problem of commercialism addresses the aspect of supply. As David R. Loy, a well-known Buddhist scholar, has noted, today the most attractive value system has become consumerism (2002:197). Materialism and commercialism can be described as different faces of the consumerism as a value system, which happens when the material drives the spiritual out of a world of human consciousness. And so areas which were previously regarded as spiritual are now understood materially.
Given that today Korean Christians can very easily access and observe commercialized church services even within the conservative Presbyterian churches, commercialism in Korean Protestantism seems one of many currents they confront in the unavoidable competition for survival in the religious marketplace. In this context, a survey on commercial Christianity enables us to understand the OSPC members' attitudes toward the supply-side of religious service if we consider commercialism as materialism of the supply-side. A few meaningful possibilities emerge from the results presented in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q7. Do you agree that a Christian church should be able to own or invest in secular companies, and thus earn profits from the running of those companies? (For example, the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Korea actually owns or manages about twenty secular business enterprises.)</td>
<td>Yes: 9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>13.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No: 5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8. Recently, several large churches in Korea allowed the leadership to be passed to the son or relative of the present pastor, similar to the way company ownership is sometimes inherited. Do you think that such succession of the pastorate to a son or relative is compatible with what</td>
<td>Yes: 5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No: 9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>16.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the Bible says?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q9. If your pastor wanted to manage the church in the same way as a secular business enterprise in order to increase church membership, how would you react?</th>
<th>Positively: 4</th>
<th>Negativly: 8 (no response: 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.75</td>
<td>25.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Average**

| | 28.9 | 3.28 |
| | 15.1 |

Age: the average age of respondents. (the average of all respondents: 28.9)

Residence: the average number of years of residency in Canada. (the average of all respondents: 3.28)

Membership: the average years of Christian membership. (the average of all respondents: 15.1)

Firstly, compared with attitudes toward materialism, the gap between positive and negative respondents in their average ages seems much bigger. This means that their age is a more influential variable to explain their attitude toward commercial Christianity. Again it suggests that older members are more generous about commercial Christianity because they are relatively more recent immigrants than younger members. For a longer time, they belonged to a Korean Protestantism which had actively utilized much more commercial growth strategies than Protestantism in Canada. Most Korean Protestants believe that the bigger a church is, the more it is blessed by God. However, this kind of belief has too often been utilized by Korean pastors who wanted to show off their talent to construct a huge church and to gather a large number of church members. They sought to show their church was competitive by making it bigger.
Of course, as this competition focused mainly on the increase in membership, Korean churches relied heavily on human relations among members (Sung-Ho Kim 2002).

For example, Rev. Yonggi Cho, establisher of the Yoido Full Gospel Church, built the church complex which can seat as many as 90,000 on Sundays (Adams 2002:161). The high-rise buildings of the church complex symbolized economic success and high social status which were very useful for attracting more people’s attention to his church. The 50,000 cell groups of the church function in the same way that a global company like Amway, a pyramidal membership structure, engages in multi-level marketing. Let me quote Adam’s description:

Most of the cell groups have fewer than 20 members; when they reach 20 members they then divide and a new cell group is formed. Cell groups meet weekly, usually on Thursday evening or Friday or Saturday morning. Between 10,000 and 11,000 new members come into the church each month. The vast majority of these join cell groups and the monthly statistics are then reported by the pastoral staff to the main church. In order to maintain such a large pastoral staff, as well as train leadership for the 50,000 cell groups, the Yoido Full Gospel Church operates a number of Bible schools (Adams 2002:166–167).

These are major strategies which almost all churches as well as Pentecostal ones have been using competitively in order to increase their membership. As the Yoido Full Gospel Church, the largest church in the world, proved in the huge scale of its membership which is more than 800,000, these competitive and aggressive strategies contributed to the
rapid growth of Korean Protestantism. Obviously, this management of cell groups is a part of religious entrepreneurship which depends on the arrival of the open religious economy, pluralism, and choice (Martin 2002:71; Bastian 2001). In this context, older respondents of the OSPC are more likely to accept commercial Christianity because they are more accustomed to seeing its effect in terms of quantitative growth.

Secondly, negative respondents toward commercial Christianity have a relatively longer residency in Canada and Christian membership, a pattern similar with their attitude toward materialism. Granted that Canadian Protestantism is less competitive and does not devote itself to quantitative growth in the same way, those who have lived in Canada for a longer time tend to have a stronger antipathy to such commercial strategies. Accordingly, respondents with longer Christian membership seem to feel that commercial strategies are the Mammon against which the Bible warns.

Eleven in fourteen respondents were negative about more than one question. Yet, ten respondents also said yes to more than one question in Table 2. In order to show their religious justification of commercialism, let me use some quotations:

(With regard to Q7) If secular enterprises which churches invest in or own are operated well in terms of morality and law, it is good. But, their goal should be on the basis of the Bible.

-- A 25-year old female who immigrated ten years ago

(With regard to Q7) I agree. If the profit of the enterprises is used for the
spreading of the Gospel and the enterprises can provide jobs for more people, they are a very desirable means to do God's work.

-- A 48-year old man who immigrated one year ago

(With regard to Q8) It is possible because there are some records concerned with the heredity of the pastorate in the Old Testament. The heredity is not always bad, and sometimes corresponds to God's will. Some Korean big churches today are also in a similar situation with the days in the Old Testament.

-- A 25-year old man who immigrated six years ago

(With regard to Q9) It is a good way. Just as means like advertisement or the incentive system are very effective in increasing the profit of an enterprise, so churches had better follow such ways for the sake of mission work.

-- A 21-year old student who immigrated a year ago

These are some of the ways respondents tried to justify commercial Christianity. The common logic that their justification relies on once again is that the end is more important than the means, and even a seemingly undesirable means can serve a desirable end. This attitude reveals a kind of psychological compromise. They apparently do not want to explain in detail why the compromise of ends and means should always be acceptable, who creates the compromise, or how it is created. They do not address the question of whether commercial Christianity damages transcendence of God or is indispensable for the glory of God. And the compromising attitude is once again confirmed by the fact that only four respondents said no to all the questions of Table 2.

In a sense, it seems that this attitude of the OSPC members originates in a teleological logic of Christian theology. According to this teleology, the
end of Christianity, the glory of God, can be achieved even by means of commercialism, and conversely the instrumental justification of commercialism is useful because its end is desirable. Commercialism as a means is justifiable only if its end is desirable even without taking the concrete contents of commercial Christianity into consideration. Under this teleology, one justifies the other. It is believed that the reason that churches invest in or own non-Christian enterprises is not money itself, but the religious ideal which can be realized by money. A 25-year old immigrant said, "Do you know the Eland company\textsuperscript{5}? That is the best example of how economy can serve the glory of God. I respect its owner and establisher." In his mind, there is no clear distinction between company selling religion and company toward religious ideal. It is probably because he believes that a sacred end can justify both of them.

Ironically, the very teleological attitude of some OSPC members seems similar to belief in "the Market as God whose features are omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent" (Cox 2002:127–132; Loy 2002). It is believed to be a spontaneous order, which can not be created artificially (Jang 2004:140–195). Since the Market never knows failure, the ideal of the Market can justify even temporary contradictions in markets. The temporary contradictions in small markets can be adjusted easily by the ultimate power of the great Market. In this sense, using commercial strategies in a religious market is not different from using religious belief in a commodity market. In any case, the religious justification of such

\textsuperscript{5} A Korean commercial company which is well known for the Christian ideals embodied in its establishment, management, and working conditions.
commercial activities may make it easier that "religion sells itself not only in the competitive church market but also in a general market of other cultural commodities that were trying in many cases to break free of religious disapproval rooted mainly in Protestant animosities" (Moore 1994:11). Selling religion these days accompanies belief in the Market as well as God itself. Serving both the Market and God is just an old tradition involved in Korean Protestantism.

3. Political Economy

The questionnaire and the interviews also involved a few political economic issues which the OSPC members would encounter in their daily life. Given that Korean Protestantism has actively been engaged in the political distribution of economic resources since its introduction, as mentioned in Chapter III, attitudes toward the political economic issues may be specific to this circumstance. How do they reflect it?

Firstly, attitudes toward tax policy of government which has a serious financial deficit need to be analyzed because most of the OSPC members experienced the IMF crisis in Korea. With regard to Q10 (If the government were to try to reduce a serious deficit situation by eliminating or weakening the tax-exempt status of religious organizations, would you be against its policy?) in the questionnaire, six respondents were against the policy, but eight respondents supported it. The common logic for the former side is that religious practice is beyond
simple economics because it is never profitable. A 21-year old student said concisely,

"I am against it. The church isn't generally a place for profit-making, and religion is an essential area which is indispensable for human spiritual life."

The interesting thing is that while the average age of those six respondents is 32.1 years, the average length of their Christian membership is 19.5 years. This is relatively longer than the average of all participants. By contrast positive respondents are an average 26.7 years and 11.6 years in church membership.

The reason that the length of Christian membership plays an important role in evaluating the governmental tax policy described in Q10 is because the OSPC members have belonged to Korean Protestantism for most of the period of their membership, but not to Canadian Protestantism. The older respondents are, the more is this the case since they all immigrated recently. Historically, as mentioned in Chapter III, the assumed separation of religion and politics has been foreign in the context of Korean Protestantism, compared with the situation in Canada or in the United States (Jung Ha Kim 2002:192). Mainstream Korean Protestantism has always sought after a socially special status in the economic dimension as well as in the political one. It tried to be a spiritual source for economic modernization and globalization, and at the same time a realistic political power to protect Korea from communism. Whenever economic reality like a governmental budget deficit or political
idea like communism passed through the prism of mainstream Korean Protestantism, it claimed special status as a transcendental existence beyond a narrow-minded interest. Of course, the conservatives tried its best to spread the gospel more effectively by means of avoiding conflict with the government (Sung-Ho Kim 2002: 32).

From their perspective, Christian organizations are not subject to the same rights and duties as other members of society. Since they believed that Korean Protestantism had a calling on the national dimension, its activities should not be constrained by a financial deficit of the government. This way of thinking, in which the interests of religion and the whole nation are the same, is familiar to most Korean Protestants. Identifying the interest of religion with that of the whole nation was also historically a common belief in Korean Buddhism as well as Confucianism.

By contrast, the eight respondents who accepted the governmental policy outlined in Q10 are relatively young members of the OSPC. Their common opinion was that churches should make sacrifices for such national difficulties before anybody else. According to them, it is natural that churches, as members of society, fulfill their social responsibility by means of sharing the financial burden of the nation. The social status of the churches is considered to be equal to that of any other member of society. As young members of the OSPC are freer from the influence of Korean Protestantism, this result in Q10 does not seem different greatly from attitudes toward materialism or commercialism.

Question 12 shows how respondents also demonstrated the
conservative viewpoint of Korean Protestantism about the political economy of the Third World. With regard to Q12 in which respondents might choose more than one answer, thirteen of total twenty-two marks were put on 'political corruption' (seven), 'laziness of people' (two), and 'absence of powerful religion' (four). Three among five respondents who marked on 'exploitation by rich countries' did not choose other answers, while two of the five respondents chose both 'exploitation by rich countries' and 'political corruption'. One mark was on 'lack of national resources', and other three on 'others'. This result suggests that most respondents think of the poverty of the Third World not as an inter-social problem, but as intra-social one. In addition, only two respondents showed a relatively balanced position, whereas other respondents would not see the poverty of the Third World in both inter-social and intra-social dimension.

However, all the respondents were learning about the economic environment from information sources like magazines, newspapers, television, and the internet (No.13 in Questionnaire). This means that most of the OSPC members tend to understand the poverty of the Third World according to the viewpoint of Western mass media. Most information sources which they favor are from Korean mass media, which literally translate articles of major Western presses like Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, or Agence France-Presse. It does not seem that they need any other information source than Korean ones with regard to the Third World. This tendency
is not different from a traditional perspective from which the mainstream Korean Protestantism has seen the world economy since the Liberation in 1945.

As Korean Protestantism has always been worried about the threat of the northern communists, it could never accept the same meaning of salvation that *Minjung* theology or liberation theology claimed (Park 2003:197). It believed that Communism and *Minjung* theology shared a political ideal: to free people from poverty. Actually, any members of the OSPC aren't from Korean churches in which the *Minjung* theology is strong. The term *Minjung* is a Korean word that refers to the oppressed and suffering people, which corresponds to 'the poor' in the Bible. And so, the OSPC members of middle-class background in Korea don't have a favorable impression of the fourfold *han* (恨)\(^6\) that is inherent in *Minjung* theology. This fourfold *han* refers to the invasion and oppression by foreign powers, authoritarian domestic political structures, the oppression of women due to the Neo-Confucian social structures, and economic exploitation in ancient times by slavery and in modern times by large business conglomerates (Adams 2002:155). According to the theology of Byungmu Ahn, one of the leading *Minjung* theologians, any attempt to separate Jesus from the *Minjung* – to make one the subject and the other the object – is a false Western dualism (Adams 2002:155).

The respondents' conservative tendency toward the structure of global economy was expressed outstandingly during the in-depth interview.

\(^6\) This means a mixed feeling of sorrow and regret which is unique to Koreans and is accumulated historically from generation to generation.
Eleven of all interviewees tried to defend the economic effectiveness of neo-liberalism which focuses on the principle of free competition for endless growth of global economy (Interview Script No.9). A common ground of their argument is that economic growth at the global level can naturally increase the interest of all members of global society. This is a global version of growth ideology in Korean Protestantism.

Conclusively, the way most respondents acknowledge the issue of political economy at the global level seems closer to the economic worldview of the mainstream Korean Protestantism which tried to follow the tradition of Western conservative theology. Within their thought, the problem of structure which national or global economy involves was almost unnoticed. As a whole, respondents are accustomed to allowing their religion a special social status and responsibility in a local dimension, while their religion is not given a transcendental status and duty in global economy. This suggests that the OSPC members take the combination of Korean Protestantism with local patriotism for granted, but that they have difficulty in understanding how to apply the combination to the structural problem of global economy like the poverty of the Third World.
V. Behavioral Discontinuity

Through immigration, all Korean immigrants confront a new economic order which is very different from that of their homeland. The encounter with new economic circumstances causes them to have different expectations of the immigrant church in Canada, and at the same time forces their religious behaviors to fit in with their new social status. The major cause of this transformation of their religious behavior in the new society is a feeling of relative demotion of their social status in Canada after immigration, even if it is still the case that middle-class Koreans have access to and the resources for immigration (Hurh and Kim 1990:29). The Korean Christian immigrants who experience this relative dispossession after immigration are also exposed to a new economic structure in Canadian society, which regards them as consumers with a relatively high economic risk because of the low average of their present income and credit. In this context, Korean Protestants in Canada can not build a new social identity on the basis of the stable middle-class economic status that they had in Korea. One of the important things in establishing this new identity is the way that they as Protestants understand the new economic structure surrounding them. This chapter deals with the transformed pattern of their religious participation and tries to track the economic attitudes inherent in this transformed religious participation. This is expressed as small-sized collectivism, as family-oriented membership, and is a Christian fellowship for sharing
information. In addition, as these transformed religious practices are caused by the change of their social and economic status, they are bound to involve different economic attitudes as well.

1. Small-sized Collectivism

The moment immigrants arrive in a new country, they are ready to learn how the society recognizes them. But this socialization through the learning often accompanies a feeling of existential alienation from the new society. As they are given a relatively low social status and low economic credit, new Korean immigrants in Canada also realize that Canadian society classifies them as group which needs to pay by cash more frequently, even if Canada has already become a society based on credit economy. The high ratio of cash payment accelerates the exhaustion of their landing fund and at the same time diminishes the amount they can invest in training for getting a job. Given that most new Korean immigrants have much difficulty in getting a full-time job at the beginning of immigration, the psychological pressure which this depletion of their money without enough new income imposes on them is understandably very heavy and profound.

Under this circumstance, their new social status prompts the immigrants to have a stronger motivation for social adaptation and to break off the psychological continuity with their pre-immigration society. But this motivation should not simply be reduced to their economic desires in
Canada, because they know well that this low credit rating and income level will not change in a brief time. Instead, the immigrants try to focus on the spiritual meaning of their lives under the new economic situation. The fact that they themselves are conscious of their weaker social status is an experimental basis for understanding their religious behavior in Canada. Put differently, such adaptive motivation under new economic circumstances can be reflected in their religious practices, as well as in the pattern of their Christian fellowship, the extent of their satisfaction with Christian membership, or in self-realization within Christianity. That is the reason why I would like to pay attention to the functional importance of their religious practices as the OSPC members try to adapt themselves to Canadian society.

One of the most interesting results in the survey of the OSPC members is that ten respondents in fourteen prefer a relatively small-sized church whose membership is less than 300 persons. This is a very strange phenomenon compared with the Korean tendency of preferring bigger churches. Why does this difference happen? Why did they choose the OSPC, a very small-sized church, instead of the Ottawa Korean Community Church (OKCC) where more than 300 persons gather every Sunday, or the Ottawa Korean Methodist Church in Kanata (OKMC) whose members are said to be religiously more passionate? In order to illustrate some possible reasons, let me explain Mrs. Kong's settlement process, which shows well the collective cooperation with Mr. Hong.

Given that both of them completed Master's degrees in Korea, they
were intellectually well-equipped to appreciate the practical value of information about Korean ethnic churches in Ottawa in terms of their social status. Both seemed very sensible and proud in all ways of their lives, especially in economic activities. Since her arrival, Mrs. Kong's biggest trouble was to find a cosigner for renting an old townhouse. She was very surprised at the fact that $50,000 in her bank account was not helpful in improving her economic credit. Finally, she was forced to ask a very impudent favor of Mr. Hong whom she had met at the OSPC, but he was willing to help her just because she was a Korean Christian immigrant like himself.

This kind of collective brotherhood can never be expected within Protestant churches in Korea because big Korean churches, which Mr. Hong and Mrs. Kong participated in the city of Suwon or Seoul, had already become individualized urban Christian communities a few decades ago. Solving the lack of individual credit through collective cooperation is very rare in Korea and in Canada, especially among members of an urban Christian community, although a security system like guarantor or voucher is very common in Korea. Since the Korean courts hardly ever approve a bankruptcy application for individuals, all persons who stand surety for an individual or company are actually apt to burden the financially unlimited responsibility if the debtor should be trapped in insolvency. Besides, it is almost impossible for a new member to find a cosigner within Presbyterian churches, which are the most conservative in Korean Protestantism.
Just as Mr. Hong was glad to get more information about Canadian social realities by means of the Christian fellowship, so was Mrs. Kong glad to have chosen the collectivism of the small-sized OSPC when she realized that the collectivism among the church members was very useful for overcoming her low economic credit and that the OSPC was the best place to provide her family with collective cooperation.

One of the most important reasons that the OSPC can be a relatively better place for collective cooperation among immigrants is its personal composition. Since all OSPC members except for pastor’s family have been resident in Canada less than ten years, there is hardly a generation conflict between new and old immigrants within the OSPC. However, both the OKCC and the OKMC have serious difficulty in offering new immigrants the economic collectivism mentioned above because their membership and operation rely overwhelmingly on old immigrants. According to the OSPC pastor, half of the OKCC membership is old immigrants, and a fourth is Korean diplomats, international students, and their families. The rest are new immigrants who arrived recently. All seven elders and most deacons of the OKCC are old immigrants and the OKCC itself does not have any supporting program for new immigrants and temporary visitors. Rather, in a church based on old immigrants, new immigrants are considered to be the persons who should be watched so that they do not have to undergo the hard days of immigration which old immigrants experienced. And so, many cell groups of the OKCC are divided on the basis of age, while cell groups of the OSPC are based on
gender. In this sense, the OKCC can not be an alternative to those who want more intimate and cooperative relationship among church members. On the other hand, the OKMC in Kanata is a little far from the Ottawa, and its members consist mainly of families of the employees of information technology companies in the area. When the OKMC members were separated from the OKCC in 2001, they wanted to avoid the generation conflict between new and old immigrants which was mainly caused by the fundamentalist and authoritarian tendency of old OKCC members. Although the church enjoyed a steady increase of membership after its establishment, it suffered from a sexual scandal when its pastor was expelled because of his adultery with a female member. In the process of handling the scandal, many families gave up their membership and some of them gathered to establish the OSPC.

For the OSPC members who want a small-size church, the generation conflict of the OKCC and the moral hazard of the OKMC are regarded as very important in keeping their religious life in Canada. Actually, the three families which established the OSPC had been members of the OKCC, and Mr. Hong's family and most young members also decided to become a member of the OSPC after his family had first attended the OKCC. Unlike other members, Mrs. Kong's family already had much information about three Korean churches in Ottawa before her arrival.

The results of the questionnaire reveal the OSPC members' collective tendency, which regards Christian brotherhood as important.

Question 5: If you were to buy a car, and if all other conditions (model, price, etc.)
were the same, would you favour

(1) A Christian (C) or a non-Christian dealer (NC)?
(2) A white non-Christian (WNC) or an Asian non-Christian (ANC) dealer?
(3) A white Christian (WC) or an Asian non-Christian dealer?
(4) A white non-Christian or an Asian Christian (AC) dealer?

As can be seen in question 5–1 and 5–4 of Table 3, all respondents preferred Christian car dealers. Furthermore, although seven persons in ten favored Asian dealers in question 5–2 in which a religious variable did not intervene, the same number of respondents in question 5–3 in which a religious variable was considered preferred white Christian dealers to Asian non-Christians. This result says that the religious (Christian) brotherhood explains some economic activities of the OSPC members better than their ethnic homogeneity.

<Table 3> Christian Brotherhood

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<th>AC</th>
<th>WC</th>
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The collectivism within the OSPC can therefore be regarded as a
practical behavior to make up for the lack of individual credit which is imposed on them by the new economic context in which they find themselves. And it is more efficient and easier for a small community to supplement its weak economic status. The small scale of the OSPC and the doctrine of Christian brotherhood functions very effectively in improving the social adaptation of its new members. Through the collective attainment of social credit to the extent that each member needs it in the new society, they can trust each other better and be trusted by the new society. They can share a great deal of the social risk with other members who are involved in the collective relationship.

This kind of religious collectivism in the OSPC is different not only from the national collectivism of Korean culture, but also from the ideological collectivism of conservative Korean Protestantism. The collective tendency in the OSPC obviously implies not continuity with the pre-immigration situation, but rather discontinuity with regard to present Korean Protestantism. This discontinuity in the behavioral dimension is a feature of Korean Protestantism in Canada, whereas their attitude toward materialism and commercialism reflects the theological tradition of Korean Protestantism.

2. Family-oriented Membership

The OSPC was based on the family-oriented membership from its establishment. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the first
three families of the OSPC had transferred from the OKCC to the OKMC, and then later established the OSPC. It seems that the founding families changed and kept their church membership for the sake of a whole family. Although all of them are over twenty years old, all interviewees take it for granted that church membership is a family matter, not an individual one. Why? And what is the relationship between economic attitude and their family-oriented religiosity?

According to the existing theories on Korean immigrant churches which exclusively focus on the relationship between religiousness and ethnicity (Kim 2002; Hurh & Kim 1990), the family-oriented tendency is to be explained mainly by the traditional patriarchal culture of Confucianism. However, it does not appear that this explanation is based on data from contemporary Korean society where the family system itself is rapidly disintegrating in parallel with a steep increase of divorce rates and a steady decrease in marriage rates. In addition, as all the OSPC members are from the Korean middle class who lived the individualized culture of the metropolis, it seems very anachronistic to ascribe their family-oriented religiosity to Confucian patriarchy. Moreover, the ratio of professed Confucians among the whole Korean population is less than 1%.

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7 While the number of marriages per 1000 persons was 9.2 in 1970, the number in 2004 was 6.4. And the number of divorces per 1000 persons was 2.9 in 2004, whereas the number in 1970 was only 0.4 (Source: The Korea National Statistical Office. http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgibin/sws_999.cgi).

In my opinion, the family-oriented religiosity of the OSPC members needs to be understood as a feature of a Korean ethnic church whose members consist mainly of the Korean middle class. Before emigration, no member of the OSPC belonged to the upper-class in terms of their job and income. According to the report of the World Bank, World Development Indicator 2005, Gross Net Income (GNI) per person is U$ 30,000 in Canada and U$ 18,000 in Korea. This kind of index means more than a simple statistical number for Korean middle-class immigrants because they know well that the gap of the indices can make their social adaptation more difficult at the beginning of Canadian life. Actually, nine in 14 respondents said that they were not satisfied with their or their family’s present income in Canada.

In this light, the family-oriented religiosity of the OSPC immigrants should be seen as connected with a relative and absolute decrease in their economic status, which makes them conscious of themselves as socially weaker and as a minority. However, as an economic unit a family is usually more viable than an individual. A family is an economically more effective unit because it can produce more efficiency than an individual by the division of labor among its members. Through an economy of scale, a family’s cost of living become less than that of an individual. Owing to these economic advantages, whoever wants to get out of the family has to pay a very high opportunity cost. Young members of the OSPC offer a good example about that. Their life in Canada is very dependent on their parents, especially financially, even though they are
over 20 years. Parents with more than 20-year old sons or daughters also do not want their sons or daughters to be independent, and so they are willing to pay tuition fees and pocket money for their sons or daughters who are students of universities or colleges. Therefore, the family-oriented religiousness of the OSPC members basically stands on the concept of family as an economic community. Keeping their church membership as a family affair is very necessary for enhancing the function of the family as an economic community.

Next, the family acts as a shelter for facing the psychological fear which occurs in the process of adaptation to new economic and social circumstances. In the interview, most respondents continuously expressed a concern about their or their family’s economic instability. Twelve of the respondents said that they had been relatively richer in Korea than in Canada. A woman deacon of the OSPC said to me that the biggest mistake in her life was immigration and that she always felt sorry for her husband because she had persuaded him to immigrate to Canada. In spite of this regret, however, she said, “I realized the importance of the family once again after their six-year life in Canada.” Of course, this psychological adherence to family is very common to almost all immigrants, but for her family its ultimate cause is obviously a difficulty in economic adaptation.

This difficulty also seems to stimulate a kind of homing instinct and causes more frequent mobility within Canada. One of interesting things that I found in interview is that most respondents, including the family of
the woman just cited, wanted to move into the city of Vancouver. They said commonly that Vancouver is a more comfortable place for Korean immigrants to live in, has warmer climate, and is by the sea. As a young woman member from Vancouver said, the cost of flight from Seoul to Vancouver is half the cost of a flight from Seoul to Toronto. According to her explanation, raw fishes as well as Korean commodities are cheaper in Vancouver than in Ottawa or in Toronto. Besides, Vancouver was also considered an ideal place for getting a better job or a better marriage partner because respondents thought that richer Koreans immigrated into the city. Her husband said:

"Koreans in Vancouver are richer than in Toronto. And so I would like to do business in Vancouver because Koreans in the city have a much stronger purchasing force."

Actually, a young couple of the OSPC decided to move to Vancouver after a five-year residence in Ottawa, and they were proud to get a job there. In short, the OSPC members believe that in Vancouver they would be psychologically and geographically closer to Korea than in Ottawa, Toronto, or Montreal. For them, Ottawa is too far away from their homeland and too strange. In this sense, the family-oriented membership of the OSPC is an expression of the increasing psychological fear which comes out of an economically difficult adaptation after immigration.

In sum, the family-oriented membership of OSPC members shows that it is based on the actual function of the family as an economic community, as psychological compensation for economic dissatisfaction, and as a unit
of economic mobility. However, these are some features which are hardly found in Korean Protestantism today.

3. Christian fellowship

Like other Korean immigrant churches in America, the OSPC also functions as a field of communication. And this function of the church is understandable in that church itself originally means a community in which believers express their faith both tangibly and intangibly. And so, all churches as faith communities provide a field of communication for their members. But the meaning of Christian fellowship in the OSPC is very different from that in Korean Protestantism, although it is regarded as important in any Christian community. What is different?

According to my observation and participation, the first difference is the way that their fellowship is carried out. While Christian fellowship in Korea mainly relies on sub-group activities and personal friendships outside the church, the OSPC members want to limit their fellowship to worship services. Christians in Korea try to keep a broad and intimate relation with members of their church, but the OSPC members tend to see each other only after worship service every Sunday. Though they need more information about almost all matters that they confront in daily life, they hesitate to ask for such information in a personal meeting because they think that their private problems can easily be exposed to other members of church. This tendency seems more remarkable to
older members than to younger members because older members prefer the family-oriented membership. The reason that many OSPC members protect the privacy of their family from other members is that their fellowship is maintained in the specific status in which most of them desperately need economic cooperation like the small-sized collectivism. In spite of the fact that the OSPC members expect the collective cooperation, such cooperation is focused just on the economic aspect.

This seems different from a circumstance of general churches in Korea where pastors or elders actively try to intervene in solving private family troubles of their members by means of consulting, advices, or collective prayer. All the OSPC members to whom I talked did not want such kind of help from their church. Why?

One of its reasons is expressed in a golden rule that all Korean immigrants have heard even before immigration: Be careful of your tongue because Korean immigrants greatly enjoy talking about other Koreans. This rule teaches that immigrants should guard against each other. They should not ask each other about any private matters like job, health, the location of hometown, educational level, and so on. It reflects a psychological tension and distrust among members of a closed Korean immigrant community. Most Korean immigrants, including the OSPC members, tend to begin their immigrant life with the negative perspective of Korean immigrant community.

The next reason that makes the OSPC members' fellowship formal and limited is partly due to the high possibility of mobility among Korean
immigrants. Since most of the OSPC members are those who have no regular job in Canada, they are willing to move for the sake of finding work. And so, although they all voluntarily chose a small community like the OSPC, it is natural that they do not feel the necessity to develop the fellowship with other members toward a more intimate brotherhood.

In addition to the temporariness of the OSPC membership, another reason for them to be satisfied with a limited fellowship is frequent schisms within Korean ethnic churches in America (Kim Jung-ha 2002:197–98). As mentioned, the OSPC itself is a product of such schism, and its members are always worried about the possibility of such schismatic tendencies. In particular, after the schism, it is very difficult to expect good relationship among the separated members. It is this concern that makes their fellowship more passive and formal.

The second feature is the contents of information which is communicated in the Christian fellowship of the OSPC. As the pastor of the OSPC correctly points out, “every Korean immigrant church is as good as the Korean immigrant association of each district.” New immigrants, like the family of Mr. Hong and Mrs. Kong, know well that church is the center of Korean immigrants’ life. Considering that the OSPC members are mainly self-employed merchants, students, or jobless, Christian fellowship is not a part of worship service, but a process of learning about Canadian mainstream society led by white people. Although various issues such as national politics, education, cultural identity as well as economic circumstances are frequently mentioned in
their conversation and the pastor's sermon, they commonly want to express their personal experience about immigrant life. Through the fellowship, they pay attention to almost all things that other members have experienced directly in new society.

There is a well-known joke among Korean immigrants: If two Chinese immigrants gather, they open a restaurant, and if two Japanese immigrants gather, they set up an enterprise; but if two Korean immigrants gather, they establish a church. This joke suggests properly that the church for the OSPC members functions as a comprehensive organization which is similar to the restaurant for the Chinese or the enterprise for the Japanese. Though three Korean immigrant churches in Ottawa all enjoy a steady increase of their membership, their quantitative progress means more than an increase in converted immigrants. Instead, the Korean churches need to be understood as a field of comprehensive information exchange. Therefore, the OSPC functions as a field of communication through which its members get reliable information as much as possible, all the while keeping their family problems as little exposed as possible.
VII. Conclusion

The economic attitudes of the OSPC members is a product of Korean Protestantism conceptually and at the same time an expression of the transformative potential inherent in Korean Protestantism behaviorally. Their understanding of the relationship between religion and economy has been analyzed in this dissertation through their responses to various religious-economic issues as exemplified in the survey questions. In their way of thinking, religion and economy are inseparable and related to each other hierarchically. Just as the relationship of the two in Buddhism and Confucianism was based on the logic of monism, so has Korean Protestantism emphasized a concomitance of spiritual salvation and material blessing. However, according to the doctrine of predestination in Western Calvinism, nobody knows who will ultimately be saved by God. And so the concept of the material in Calvinism is just a process of worldly blessing independent of ultimate salvation.

Unlike this dualism of Western Protestantism, Korean Protestantism developed its indigenized concept of the material. The logic of the OSPC members evidently showed an aspect of the conceptual indigenization of Korean Protestantism in that most of them regarded the material and the spiritual as, respectively, means and ends. With regard to materialism and commercial Christianity, a common logical ground underlying their responses is a type of monism which has been accepted and refined by the historically particular conditions of Korean Protestantism.
The monistic tendency in Korean Protestantism has first of all been influenced by the economic ethics of Buddhism and Confucianism, and secondly by the growth ideology which was a dominant paradigm of Korean modernization. Indeed, the value of the material as means has been overestimated and exaggerated in Korean Protestantism through the conceptual monopoly of growth ideology. The OSPC members' disinterest in the structural problems of global economy, such as Third World poverty, can be understood better in terms of this growth ideology. As growth ideology in Korean Protestantism teaches that failure in material growth is caused by a lack of spiritual force which guides the future of the nation, there is no room to admit the influence of exterior variables beyond the national economy. In short, OSPC members applied growth ideology to the global economy as well as the national one.

Unsurprisingly, the desire of Korean Protestantism to be the only spiritual force that can determine the future of the nation was more strongly expressed by the later immigrants who experienced Korean Protestantism for a longer time. The earlier immigrants among the OSPC members tended to regard their religion as a part of the whole society, but not as an arbitrator beyond it.

In behavioral aspect, this research has shown how the OSPC members reacted to the new economic circumstances of Canada which they confronted. First, they chose the smallest Korean Christian community in Ottawa. Although the OSPC is smaller than the other two Korean Protestant churches and the Korean Catholic church, it seems to its
members more useful for the purpose of collective cooperation, especially in terms of economic adaptation. Collectivism in the OSPC as a small community compensates for the psychological shrinking from alien economic realities and a demoted economic status. Second, their religious membership is kept as a family unit. Given that all the OSPC members came from big Korean cities with a population of more than one million, the family membership is also part of a transformed religiosity which can hardly be seen in Christian communities of Korean big cities. Basically, the family unit membership makes the social function of the family stronger, and through the strengthened function of the family system, religion contributes to forming their new identity in Canada. Third, their fellowship is comprehensive and at the same time formal. Since, as recent immigrants, they need more detailed information in almost all aspects of life, their communication in church fellowship focuses entirely on experienced and secular issues in Canada. Their fellowship does not, however, go beyond formal relationships, even if the OSPC is a very small community which can encourage greater intimacy among members. This is because the members already know too well and have heard enough about some of the disadvantages of Korean immigrant churches, like their frequent schisms, the temporariness of church membership, or gossiping among members.

Similarly, in conceptual aspect, this discontinuity with Korean Protestantism in their behavioral attitudes is also partly based on some peculiar historical experiences of Korean Protestantism. Their small-
sized collectivism, church membership in terms of the family unit, and the comprehensive exchange of information through fellowship are some of the aspects which are rarely observed within Christian communities in contemporary Korea. In a sense, these behavioral features seem a pre-modern and tribal pattern of attitudes, but they can also be seen as a post-modern pattern reporting the globalization experience of the OSPC members. Historically, Christianity was a way in which Korean Christians acknowledged themselves in a global society. Korean Protestantism as a source of globalization inspired them to believe that globalization was simply a natural process of liberalization and democratization in harmony with their religious ideal. After the IMF crisis in 1997, however, the concept of globalization became much more difficult and ambiguous even to Korean Protestants. This trial and error in experiencing the realistic process of globalization made the OSPC members take a more careful and defensive attitude toward the new economic circumstances of Canada.

In conclusion, with respect to economic attitudes of the OSPC members, the transformative potential of Korean Protestantism has been observed in the behavioral dimension more than in the conceptual one. Its major sources are, nonetheless, peculiar historical conditions of Korean Protestantism. Based on both conceptual continuity and behavioral discontinuity with Korean Protestantism, the religiosity of the OSPC members greatly serves the construction of their identity in new society. They also made use of religion in order to incorporate themselves into a
new society, just as Pentecostalists in Ghana used religion in order to produce Western goods as their commodities without fetishistic properties (Meyer 1999:171). As Wade Clark Roof expressed about the creativity within religion, “to overlook religion’s transforming force, in both personal and social life, is to lose sight of a fundamental feature of human quest, the hope that lies in an indeterminate and unrealized future (1999:296).”
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II. Korean References


Appendix

I. Participant Consent Form

Economic Attitudes of Korean Immigrants in Ottawa

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There are two copies of this form. Both copies must be signed and dated. One copy is for the records of the participant, the other copy is for the records and files of the researcher.

I am invited to participate in the research conducted by Kwang suk Yoo, a MA student in the Department of Classics and Religious Studies at the University of Ottawa. The project is under the supervision of Professor Peter Beyer of the same department. The purpose of the research is to investigate how Korean immigrants, attending the newly established Ottawa Sarang Presbyterian church, understand and react to economic problems and issues. There are potential benefits to participating. Participants may gain insight into how they relate economic questions to their religious faith and they will also be able to see how social scientific research is conducted.
My participation will consist of partaking in a personal interview with the researcher that will last for no more than one hour, answering questions about my opinions concerning economic. The interview has been scheduled for ________________ (Date and time of session). I will also fill out a questionnaire, which will also take no more than one hour. I understand that I may decline answering any of the items during the interview or on the questionnaire, if I choose so. I understand that the interview will be tape recorded and then transcribed, and that the interviewer may take detailed notes during the interview. I am further invited to participate in a follow-up interview with the researcher of no longer than one hour, should the researcher deem this necessary or should I wish to change any of my responses.

All information which I provide will be held in confidence and I will not be identified in any way in the MA thesis or in any of the publications or reports that may issue from the research. I understand that I may, without any adverse consequences, withdraw this consent at any time before the research results have been made public. I also understand that this project has been reviewed and has received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Grants and Ethics of the University of Ottawa. If I have any concerns or questions about ethical conduct or my rights as a participant in this study I may contact this office at Office of Research Grants and Ethics, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland, Room 159A, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada, e-mail: ethics@uottawa.ca  Phone: (613) 562-5841 or Fax: (613) 562-5318.

I ______________________ agree to participate in the research conducted by Kwangshuk Yoo, a MA student in the Department of Classics and Religious Studies at the University of Ottawa.

Participant’s Name: ____________________________ (please print)

Participant’s signature: ______________ Date: ______________

Researcher’s name: ____________________________ (please print)

Researcher’s signature: ______________ Date: ______________
II. Questionnaire

A.

1. Surname: ___________________ First name: ___________________

2. Sex: M ☐ , F ☐

3. Age: ________________

4. Occupation: ________________

5. Period of Stay in Canada: ___________ year(s)

6. Citizenship: ________________

7. How long have you been a Christian: ________________

B.

1. How often do you attend church service?

More than twice a week ☐, Once a week ☐, Twice a month ☐, Once a month ☐,

Others: ___________________________________________________________

2. How often do you pray?

Twice or more a day ☐, Once a day ☐, Once every few days ☐, Once a week ☐,

Others: ____________________________________________________________

3. Have you ever prayed for economic success, for example, for more income, a better house, a better car, a job with a higher salary, and the like? If so, were your prayers effective in bringing you what you asked for?
4. If you were an employee in a bank with a loan policy that imposed a very high interest rate on the poor and at the same time a very low rate on the rich, would you recommend a loan to someone who was poor and in financial difficulties?

5. If you were to buy a car, and if all other conditions (model, price, etc.) were the same, would you favour

   (5) A Christian or a non-Christian dealer?
   (6) A white non-Christian or an Asian non-Christian dealer?
   (7) A white Christian or an Asian non-Christian dealer?
   (8) A white non-Christian or an Asian Christian dealer?

   (1) ______________________
   (2) ______________________
   (3) ______________________
   (4) ______________________

6. Do you agree that rich Christians are blessed by God in the way of material blessing, and therefore that their luxurious houses, expensive cars, and high consumption can also be justified on the basis of the Bible?

7. Do you agree that a Christian church should be able to own or invest in secular companies, and thus earn profits from the running of those companies? (For example, the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Korea actually
owns or manages about twenty secular business enterprises.)

8. Recently, several large churches in Korea allowed the leadership to be passed to the son or relative of the present pastor, similar to the way company ownership is sometimes inherited. Do you think that such succession of the pastorate to a son or relative is compatible with what the Bible says?

9. If your pastor wanted to manage the church in the same way as a secular business enterprise in order to increase church membership, how would you react?

10. If the government were to try to reduce a serious deficit situation by eliminating or weakening the tax-exempt status of religious organizations, would you be against its policy?

11. In your opinion, how many member should a church ideally have?
   Less than 100 □,  Less than 300 □,  Less than 1000 □,  Less than 3000 □
   The more, the better □,

12. What do you think are the main causes of poverty in the Third World? (You may choose more than one answer.)
   political corruption □, laziness of people □, lack of natural resources □,
exploitation by rich countries □, absence of powerful religion □
others:__________________________________________

13. From what source(s) do you get most of your information about economic matters?
Magazines and newspaper □, Television □, Internet □, Friends and family □, Church sermons □,
others:__________________________________________

14. Would you participate in fund raising on the streets if your church asked you to do so?

15. Do you think that rich people are happier than poor people?

16. Have you ever consulted the Bible or your pastor to determine how to behave in economic matters?

17. Do you think consumerism and materialism are compatible with what the Bible says?

18. Do you think that money is a useful tool for building the kingdom of God in this world?

19. When you get your job, what is the most important element to be
considered?

20. Even after you have attained economic success, will you still work as hard as before? If so, why? If not, why not?

III. Interview Script

1. Are you satisfied with your present income in Canada?

2. Do you think that your family belongs to the middle class in Canada?

3. What was your largest area of monthly expenditure in both Korea and Canada?

4. The Bible says: “You cannot serve both God and Money” (Matthew 6:24). How can religious salvation be compatible with economic success?

5. Relatively speaking, was your family richer in Korea or in Canada?

6. Do you think there is a globally integrated capitalist economic system dominated by the U.S.A.? If so, what do you think about it?

7. Is your religious faith helpful or harmful to economic self-interest?
8. Do you think that speculation in the stock or foreign exchange markets is useful for the interest of all participants in the global economy?

9. Many people believe that endless economic growth will eventually bring about the exhaustion of natural resources at a global level. From a neo-liberal perspective, however, competition for economic growth is the most basic principle of a global economy. What do you think about these two ideas? How do you think Christians should react to the neo-liberal attitude?

10. Do you believe that God permits the relentless pursuit of our economic self-interest?