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National Crime Prevention Strategies for Japan:
Implications of Scientific Knowledge and International Guidelines

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National Crime Prevention Strategies for Japan
Implications of Scientific Knowledge and International Guidelines

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Submitted to the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Abstract

This thesis identifies what Japan could do to implement effective crime prevention nationally. It analyzes 1) official reports and announcements from the government and mass media reports in Japan (Chapter 2); 2) scientific analyses of crime prevention programs and policing that have influenced governments and policies in other countries (Chapter 3 and 4); 3) international guidelines (Chapter 5), and 4) a preliminary assessment of the implementation of effective crime prevention in the United Kingdom (Chapter 6). It makes eight recommendations for Japan.

The official crime reports in Japan have reported a rapid increase in overall crime rates. The government continues to use situational crime prevention and police. However, the causes of crime can only be tackled by social policy. Scientific evaluation in other countries emphasizes that a multi-sector approach is essential to tackle problems in family, school and community. Review of the effectiveness of policing particularly in the United Kingdom shows that modern policing does not reduce crime while partnership with other agencies and strong police leadership for reform would. Guidelines by the United Nations and the World Health Organization recommend a permanent national responsibility center for crime prevention and a systematic implementation cycle where there are 4 stages; analysis, planning, implementation, and evaluation.
Acknowledgement

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Takeko Yoshioka
Overview

This thesis identifies and recommends what needs to be done in Japan in order to develop and successfully implement nationally coordinated and effective crime prevention. It argues that Japan’s strategies and policies should be a balance of social and situational measures.

The methodology that this thesis undertook a review and analyzed 1) official reports and announcements from the government and mass media reports in Japan; 2) scientific analyses of crime prevention programs that have influenced governments and policies; 3) international guidelines that represent international consensus on how to promote crime prevention, and 4) a preliminary assessment of the implementation in the United Kingdom. This thesis does not test transferability of particular projects which have been successful in other countries, but it seeks possible strategies for Japan to successfully implement crime prevention by bringing the internationally recognized findings together. Each chapter generates summary tables to highlight relevance and applicability of effective elements for successful crime prevention to current conditions in Japan.

The official crime reports in Japan have reported a rapid increase in overall crime rates. This thesis, in Chapter 2, summarizes crime trends using the official crime statistics. The chapter further looks at international crime victim survey and media sources to identify possible root causes of crime and to understand public reactions to crime, including current crime prevention initiatives by governments and citizens. The preferred crime prevention measure is found to be situational crime prevention, and it does not seem to be adopting recent international knowledge. A minor moral panic is also observed agitated by media focus on violent crime.

Chapter 3 identifies what programs have worked to reduce and prevent crime by reviewing three international reports. The three reports were selected because: their evaluation is extensive; and they had policy makers as target readers and have already influenced governments in other countries. Among the main conclusions is that programs that work are those that tackle
problems in family, school and community. The analysis insists on a multi-sector approach to tackle root causes, which are interlocking behind crime.

Police is a strong central agency that deals with crime in Japan. Understanding that both citizens and the police themselves believe that crime prevention is largely a police function, Chapter 4 reviews the effectiveness of policing in crime prevention. It focuses on policing evaluation from the scientific studies used in chapter 3, and it also looks at a review of the effectiveness of policing in the United Kingdom. The analysis emphasizes the importance of strong police leadership, while it finds limits to police work in crime prevention and the need for partnership with other agencies such as local governments, education and public health, and support from the central government.

Chapter 5 indicates elements to successfully implement crime prevention programs. International guidelines from the United Nations and the World Health Organization are analyzed for their relevance to Japan. The guidelines indicate the preconditions to successfully implement crime prevention. Key elements are: the establishment of a permanent responsibility center for crime prevention and a systematic implementation cycle where there are 4 stages; analysis of problems; action plans to tackle the problem; implementation of the plan with good coordination of multiple agencies; and evaluation of process and impact.

Chapter 6 illustrates a case study of implementation of "what works" in the United Kingdom. The UK case was selected because its implementation is consistent with the UN Guidelines, and Japan often follows Western European countries for policy reform. The chapter looks at the crime prevention section in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Crime Reduction Program and Youth Justice Board. The UK experience presents lessons to Japan: the importance of close partnership between the central management level and local partners, who actually deliver programs; the need to implement the systematic implementation cycle of analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation; and the importance of training and capacity building.
In conclusion, this thesis provides recommendations to Japan as to what should be done to start a successful national crime prevention strategy. Eight key points for Japan was identified: strong political leadership; a permanent crime prevention center; systematic implementation cycle; a national advisory committee; a directorate crime prevention unit in the police; investment in local initiatives; development of longitudinal study and victimization survey; and training and capacity building.
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INTRODUCTION

Japan is one of the countries with low crime rates in the world. But today, reports of murder, assault, robbery, and theft appear every day in the news media, and society is shocked because of the violent and cruel nature of those crimes. In particular, heinous crime committed by young people has thrown a lurid fear into society, leaving people feel helpless. Without knowing how to deal with these phenomena, this state of confusion seems to be spreading a fear of crime among people. Such public perception of disorder may disguise a real figure of crime trends and mislead society to take measures that are not necessarily corresponding to reduce crime.

Aims and Goal of This Thesis

I decided to write this thesis because this could provide the Japanese government and motivated citizens with knowledge that would reduce crime through prevention. I propose crime prevention as a part of the solution to crime including social problems, and I argue that an implementation of crime prevention policies should be a national project.

Crime prevention is already a major topic both in academic field (criminology) and policy development in North America and Europe, while it has yet been so well recognized in Japan. During the last decade, scientific and empirical evaluations of crime prevention have been conducted in North America and Europe, and the findings have led to the development of scientific norms of crime prevention and international guidelines. One example of such norms is United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN Guidelines) adopted in 2002.

According to the UN Guidelines, “well-planned crime prevention strategies” prevent crime and victimization; promote community safety; and contribute to the sustainable development of countries. Crime prevention may include:

• Social development/social crime prevention, which emphasizes the healthy development of children and youth;

• Locally based crime prevention, which encourages the commitment of community
members with initiatives and expertise;

- **Situational crime prevention**, which aims to reduce opportunities to commit crime, and increases the risks of being apprehended; and

- **Reintegration programs**, which assist the social reintegration of offenders and seek to prevent recidivism.

The goal of this thesis is to identify effective elements of crime prevention and to provide recommendations of successful implementation of crime prevention policies in Japan. This thesis mainly focuses on key elements in the development and implementation of strategies and policies that can reduce and prevent crime. To reach the goal, this thesis takes the following steps:

Chapter 1 explains methodology showing how the thesis plans to answer the above research questions.

Chapter 2 summarizes the current crime trends in Japan reviewing official crime reports from the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Justice of Japan. Related news articles and other sources from ministries and media are also analyzed to understand the public reaction, including crime prevention initiatives, to the various information on crime. The chapter will illustrate that implementation of crime prevention is desirable in Japan, at the same time, crime prevention is actually preferred by Japanese citizens.

Chapter 3 identifies key elements for effective crime prevention programs using three reports, which provides extensive evidence-based scientific evaluations of crime prevention programs.

Chapter 4 reviews the effectiveness of policing for crime prevention using a police review in the United Kingdom.

Chapter 5 identifies implementation mechanism of successful crime prevention analyzing international guidelines.

Chapter 6 illustrates the major steps that the United Kingdom took in launching crime prevention as a national project, and indicates implementation challenges that any country may
Chapter 7 provides recommendations for the Japanese government as to what needs to be done to implement successful crime prevention policies.

This study should be significant and meaningful in that it gives both Japanese policy-makers and citizens an access to internationally acknowledged strategies of effective crime prevention. Japan should start seeking effective ways to reduce and prevent crime consulting with available knowledge and guidelines, before crime undermines people’s life and nation’s prosperity.
CHAPTER 1
METHODOLOGY

1.1. THE NEED OF CRIME PREVENTION: IDENTIFYING CRIME TRENDS AND RISK FACTORS IN JAPAN

Chapter 2 aims to demonstrate increasing crime in a form of crime statistics and risk factors that may lead to crime, and it tries to demonstrate that crime prevention is a desirable strategy for Japan to reduce and prevent crime. First, the chapter describes the recent official statistics and information on criminal activities and costs of the criminal justice system in Japan, and then it attempts to generate crime trend figures. The official reports employed are:

- White Paper on Crime (Hanzai Hakusho) by the Ministry of Justice;
- White Paper on Police (Keisatsu Hakusho) by the National Police Agency; and
- Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) by the National Police Agency.

These reports are major sources of crime statistics in Japan. They provide not only crime statistics but also deeper analysis of selected topics that each ministry concerns the most. This thesis retrieved the internet version of these reports from the websites of the National Police Agency (www.npa.go.jp) and the Ministry of Justice (www.moj.go.jp). This thesis almost uncritically utilizes the information on crime statistics in these reports. It should be clarified that testing verification of the statistics and the information on crime trends in these official reports is not the purpose of this thesis. This thesis tries to provide policy recommendations to successfully start national crime prevention strategies. For this purpose, employing official crime reports, which aim to influence formulating criminal justice policies (Finch, 2000: 238; MOJ, 1974) is reasonable to understand what policies the central government may be taking to deal with crime.

Social problems, which are not classified as crime, do not appear in the official crime statistics, so I extended a research beyond the official reports, which only cover reported crime. I collected information and data that suggest social problems and potential crime in Japan from:
• Other ministries, such as education and health;
• International Crime Victim Survey; and
• Media sources, such as news articles.

Due to my residency in Canada, I did not have much access to academic literature on current social problems in Japan. In order to analyze relationships between social problems and crime and to identify risk factors in society, I chose to refer to international studies by:

• International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (1999b); and
• World Health Organization (2002).

The reports of these international organizations have assessed social problems and their solutions in various countries, and aim to provide universal understanding of crime, risk factors and issues in criminal justice system.

Chapter 2 also analyzes cost of crime and criminal justice system to show how much crime actually cost citizens and the country in a form of monetary figure. It also aims to illustrate financial burden and limits of the criminal justice system. Information and data were collected from:

• Official announcements and reports from Ministry of Finance and other local governments.

Finally, this chapter explored crime prevention initiatives in Japan, which have been promoted by citizens and ministries. It aims to demonstrate what the Japanese citizens know about crime and crime prevention, and that crime prevention is desirable measure among citizens to fight crime besides relying on the conventional criminal justice system. Sources analyzed are:

• Media sources, such as news articles;
• Local community newsletters; and
• Official websites of ministries, such as National Police Agency.

It should be clarified that Chapter 2 does not aim to:

• Provide descriptive analysis of every crime occurring in Japan and evaluate the
work of criminal justice system; and

- Verify crime statistics and crime trends generated by criminal justice agencies in Japan.

Because:

- Access to most up-to-date literature on social problems in Japan is limited; and
- Criminal justice policies are made based on the official reports, and those reports are made by policy makers, therefore the reports demonstrate the direction that the agencies are aiming to take.

1.2 IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

Chapter 3 attempts to identify effective elements in successful crime prevention programs. The chapter analyzed scientific evaluations of crime prevention programs to show what programs had worked and reduced crime.

The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on three key reports.


Methodological key notes including brief introduction of these reports are provided in Section 1.7 in this chapter. Detailed introductions and background of each report are provided in Annex 2 at the end of this thesis.

The reasons I chose these reports are:

1) They provide extensive evaluation of programs, for example, Sherman et al. (2002) reviewed about more than 600 scientific evaluations of programs;

2) Sherman et al. (2002) applied a 5-point scale to programs throughout the evaluation, which made results of impact-assessment clear (See Section 1.7);
3) Research is done by groups of researchers, unlike classical academic literature which usually have one or a few authors; and

4) All three reports had policy makers as target readers, and have already influenced governments in other countries.

Policy reform is a major focus of recommendations of this thesis, therefore, these four concepts are important upon choosing sources of analysis. Relevance of findings and the effective elements to Japan are summarized in summary tables.

Evaluating and criticizing findings and methodology of the three reports and original program contents, and testing transferability of the effective programs to Japanese society are not the purpose of this thesis: it will use their findings to identify effective elements in successful programs and to develop policy recommendation on what needs to be done in Japan. In order to strengthen credibility of the findings from these reports, I reviewed academic literatures such as Rosenbaum, Lurigio and Davis (1998) and Clarke (1992), which cover the same programs as in the key reports I have employed.

1.3 IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE ELEMENTS OF POLICING

Chapter 4 aims to illustrate the effectiveness of policing in crime prevention. Evaluation of policing is a part of the scientific studies in Chapter 3, but I decided to create an independent chapter considering a police position in Japan. My experiences through conversations with a member of the National Police Agency in 2003¹ and Japanese citizens, reading news articles and community newsletters have provided a consistent figure of police:

1) Police is a dominant central agency that deals with overall crime in communities; and

2) Both police and citizens believe that crime prevention is largely police job.

Therefore, showing police effectiveness evaluations and their findings should be of interest to Japan. To understand police role better and identify its effectiveness in crime prevention, Chapter 4 examined:

- Chapters of policing in Sherman et al. (2002), ICPC (1999b) and Goldblatt and Lewis

¹ The source does not wish to be identified.
(1998); and

- **Beating Crime**, a review of policing conducted in 1998 in the United Kingdom by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).

The role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is to examine and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police service in England and Wales (See also Chapter 4). The **Beating Crime** (HMIC, 1998) is a report of a thematic inspection on crime reduction conducted in England and Wales in 1997.

The reasons this thesis gives a focus on the HMIC report (1998) are:

- Similarities in police in terms of regional discretion that each regional/prefectural police agency has (See Chapter 2) and political system, which is based on parliamentary democracy, in the UK and Japan are an advantage to refer to the UK study;

- It conducted comprehensive assessment of police effectiveness in order to achieve more effective crime prevention/reduction;

- HM Inspectors are selected senior officers that have served in provincial forces and the Metropolitan Police, therefore they are experts in policing;

- Yet the HMIC is independent from both the Police Service and the Home Office, and it has appointed non-police citizens to an inspector since 1993 with the objective of independence and openness;

- The inspection team for the report was comprised of various experts: representatives from the HMIC, the police forces, the Crime Prevention Agency, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Police Research Group; and

- This is currently available and most comprehensive national evaluation of police effectiveness for **crime prevention**.

This chapter does not aim to either evaluate policing in Japan nor test transferability of effective elements of the UK policing to Japan.
1.4 IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

Chapter 5 describes key elements for implementation of effective crime prevention as a national project. The analysis in this chapter tries to illustrate the minimum but essential requirements from international guidelines:

- United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime; and

I chose these two guidelines because they aim to guide the UN Member States' governments on how to deliver crime prevention as a national project. The guidelines are generic to be applicable to all the Member States: they indicate the very bottom-line preconditions to implement successful crime prevention: Japan should be able to employ the guidelines to develop its own strategies.

The UN Guidelines were drafted at a meeting of international governments in Vancouver, Canada, in 1999. The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which is the chief policy-making body in the field of crime control within the UN and a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council, adopted the UN Guidelines at its Eleventh Session in Vienna in April 2002. The Guidelines were ratified by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in the summer of 2002.

The World Report on Violence and Health was released in 2002. Noting the worldwide increase of violent incidences, the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution WHA49.25 in 1996 at the 49th Assembly. This Resolution declared that violence is a leading worldwide public health problem and urged Member States to assess the problem of violence in their own country, and requested the Director-General to initiate public health activities to address the problem of violence. This report is one of the major responses to the Resolution (WHO, 2002: x).

The report is aimed mainly at researchers and practitioners, such as health care workers, social workers, educators and law enforcement officials. The goals are to raise awareness about the problems of violence globally and to make the case that violence is preventable and that public health has a crucial role to play in addressing its causes and consequences (WHO, 2002:}
x). Over 160 experts from around the world participated in developing this report, and an editorial committee coordinated the work. Representatives of all the WHO regions formed an advisory committee and provided guidance to the editorial committee at various stages (WHO, 2002: xxii).

Thus, these guidelines:

- Represent international consensus on how to prevent crime;
- Are based on research conducted by groups of researchers;
- Aim to guide policy makers at the central government level; and
- Have relevant importance to Japan as a Member State of the United Nations.

1.5 CASE STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION – THE UNITED KINGDOM

Chapter 6 explores a case of implementation of “what works” by the central government in the United Kingdom. I chose to look at the United Kingdom because:

1) The implementation in the United Kingdom is consistent with the UN Guidelines; and
2) This is particularly useful because Japan often follows Western European countries for policy reform (Noda, 1976: 41-58).

In the chapter, I looked at:

- Crime prevention section in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;
- Crime Reduction Program;
- Youth Justice Board; and
- Preliminary assessment and evaluation of the series of crime prevention.

While the chapter illustrates the UK’s significant achievement, the preliminary assessment conducted by Homel, Nutley, Webb and Tilley (2004), who are UK Home Office researchers and external criminologists in the UK and Australia, points out problems that the UK has faced to successfully implement the Crime Reduction Program.

The assessment of Home! et al. (2004) is an early assessment, but this is the currently available knowledge on the implementation of national crime prevention policy. Research conducted by multiple researchers for the purpose of providing recommendation to policy makers
is as reliable as other reports in previous chapters. A summary table at the end of the chapter
demonstrates consistency and gaps with the international guidelines.

1.6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION TO JAPAN

In the conclusion chapter, findings from each chapter will be summarized. Based on
the findings and reflecting key elements of effective crime prevention, I will raise
recommendations to the Japanese government.

These recommendations are aimed to show some directions that Japan can possibly take,
but their practicability at this stage is not sought. However, the recommendations are consistent
with effective elements from research findings, and their relevance is clarified in a summary table
at the end of the chapter. This thesis should provide strategies that Japan can refer to, and
should provoke vigorous discussion over substantial implementation of crime prevention policies
and programs as a national project.

1.7. KEY NOTES OF THE KEY REPORTS

1.7.1. Evidence Based Crime Prevention: Sherman et al. (2002)

A) Scientific Approach to Crime Prevention: Evidence-based Crime Prevention

1) Scientific approach: Crime prevention programs need to be reviewed for their
effectiveness by scientific evaluation. "Effective public policy and practice needs to be based
on scientific evidence" (Sherman et al., 2002: xiii). This scientific approach was not always
adopted in crime prevention even though this is a standard in the field of medicine, which is also
dedicated to the improvement of society.

2) Defined by consequences, not by intention (Sherman et al., 2002: 3): There
existed many policies, programs and activities that advocated and claimed to be "crime
prevention." For example, neighborhood watch, block parents, afterschool programs, foot
patrol, and the setting up of closed circuit televisions were implemented with the intention of
preventing crime. However, evidence-based crime prevention does not define them as "crime
prevention" unless they actually produce the measurable consequence of preventing crime or
reducing crime (Sherman et al., 2002: 3); having the intention to prevent crime is not enough.
The clear message here is that crime prevention should bring measurable results, namely a reduction in crime.

3) **Return on investment, costs and benefits:** Some programs may reduce crime, but the effect's duration, strength and the cost that was expended to achieve the reduction need to be measured. Sherman et al. suggests adopting the concept of a “business investment plan,” which is regularly used in business, for it adopts notions such as “profitability” and “payback” periods as standard tools. Such an approach is “entirely lacking in crime prevention policy debate” (Sherman et al., 2002: 4). If the effectiveness is not proportionate to the costs, alternative strategies or modification to the existing program need to be sought for a sustainable implementation.

B) **Five-point Scale of “what works”:**

What works, what does not, what is promising, and what is unknown were evaluated by a simple 5-point scale as a common measure throughout the report. The main purpose of employing this simple scale was to provide policymakers, researchers, practitioners and community leaders with easily understandable sources of information on the value of research methodologies (Sherman et al., 2002: 16).

The aim of this evaluation was to evaluate the impact of the treatment on preventing crime or reducing risk factors, rather than to evaluate the process of program implementation (Sherman et al., 2002: 8). The strongest research design to test a causal hypothesis – Has the program (intervention) prevented crime or reduced risk factors? – is a true experiment with random assignment (Sherman et al., 2002: 13-15). The true experiment measures the effect of an intervention by comparing crime rates before and after the implementation of the intervention in one place. The strongest research design of this experiment randomly assigns program-participants to either a treatment group or a control group. These groups should be equal or similar in every way, and the only difference is that the control group does not receive the treatment that the treatment group does. Thus the experiment can single out the effect of the intervention from other events which might cause some natural changes in both places.

The scientific methods scale employed in this evaluation rated each program according
to the following standards (Sherman et al., 2002: 16-17).

**Level 1:** Correlation between a prevention program and a measure of crime at one point in time.

**Level 2:** Measures of crime before and after the program, with no comparable control conditions.

**Level 3:** Measures of crime before and after the program in experimental and comparable control conditions.

**Level 4:** Measures of crime before and after the program in multiple experimental and control units, controlling for other variables that influence crime.

**Level 5:** Random assignment of program and control conditions to units.

The definition of what works, what does not, what is promising and what is unknown is explained as follows (Sherman et al., 2002: 18-19).

**What works:** Programs coded as working must have at least two level 3-5 evaluations showing statistically significant and desirable results and the preponderance of all available evidence showing effectiveness.

**What does not work:** Programs coded as not working must have at least two level 3-5 evaluations with statistical significance tests showing ineffectiveness and the preponderance of all available evidence supporting the same conclusion.

**What is promising:** These are programs where the level of certainty from available evidence is too low to support generalizable conclusions, but where there is some empirical basis for predicting that further research could support such conclusions. Programs are coded as promising if they were found to be effective in significance tests in one level 3-5 evaluations and in the preponderance of the remaining evidence.

**What is unknown:** Any program not classified in one of the three above categories (what works, what does not work, and what is promising) is defined as having unknown effects.

**C) Settings of Crime Prevention:**

Crime prevention programs are classified into seven settings: (1) families, (2) schools,
(3) communities, (4) labor markets, (5) places, (6) police agencies and (7) courts and corrections. According to Sherman, "[a] ‘setting’ is a social stage for playing out various roles, such as parent, child, neighbor, employer, teacher, and church leader (Sherman et al., 2002: 5)." Research findings of effectiveness are organized according to these frameworks.

In Chapter 3, a major focus is placed on "what works," but some important lessons from the "what does not" category are also described. It should be noted that Sherman’s common scale has made the evaluation results clear and easy to understand, however, it downgraded some programs that have produced a great amount of crime reduction. This is because at least two level-III evaluations had to show "it works." A single program producing great results was not enough to be rated as working. But I used findings from ICPC (1999b) and Home Office (1998) that covered these programs as successful cases, therefore their significance are equally covered in the analysis.

1.7.2. **Crime Prevention Digest II: ICPC (1999b)**

The Crime Prevention Digest II was published in 1999; it examined many crime prevention studies from various countries. The report's significant work was identifying cross national risk factors of crime, analyzing the costs and benefits of crime prevention, and identifying key elements for pragmatic strategies and implementing crime prevention.

This report contributed significantly to promoting crime prevention in several countries at the national level. One of the largest organizations influenced was the British Treasury and Home Office in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 1998:2).

1.7.3. **Reducing offending: Goldblatt & Lewis (1998)**

This research study for the Home Office assessed the effectiveness and likeliness of intervention and implementation from the perspectives of costs, benefits, and timescales². It also examined organizational and institutional arrangements for effective crime prevention.

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² For example, some programs produce outcome shortly after the intervention, but other programs may need longitudinal study to identify the effects of the intervention. Some effects may last for a long time, but others may disappear shortly.
This report was influenced by Sherman et al. (1997) (Home Office, 1998:2). The approach employed in this US report created a new metric to rank the scientific merit of research methodologies. This Home Office report also employed the cost-benefit approach from the work by ICPC (1997) (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 2). The Home Office recognized the ICPC’s significant work on discussions of various interventions which achieved crime reduction in various countries and their cost-effectiveness. Many of the analyses and conclusions in the Home Office report adopted the ICPC’s study findings. The Reducing Offending is designed to be pragmatic rather than academic in order for government and policymakers to actually utilize the information. This report is strictly consistent with the government’s priority as stated, “reshape the pattern of public expenditure now and into the next century” (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 1). Thus, the contents of the report shows clear-cut enumerated evidence of crime prevention and takes a cost-benefit approach as it is a part of the Comprehensive Spending Review.

In addition to these international influences, there were crucial events in England that led to the creation of this report. Those backgrounds are introduced in the Annex 2. It should be beneficial for Japan to know their backgrounds as critical steps towards implementation of national crime prevention.

1.7.4. **Beating Crime: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 1998**

The report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary examined police effectiveness for the purpose of promoting effective crime prevention. The role of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is to examine and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police service in England and Wales. The first HM Inspector was appointed in 1856. The HMIC is independent from both the Police Service and the Home Office. HM Inspectors of Constabulary are selected senior officers that have served in provincial forces and the Metropolitan Police. Non-police citizens have also been appointed since 1993 with the objective of independence and openness.

The HMIC conducts various inspections, for example it conducts formal inspections of the 43 police forces in England and Wales, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, and the
Central Police Training and Development Authority. It also plays a key advisory role to the Home Office, Chief Officer and Police Authority/Northern Ireland Policing Board.


"This was the most comprehensive examination of crime prevention/reduction in the police service that has been undertaken (HMIC, 1998:61)." The great significance of this report is that the preparation was led by police officers themselves, as HM Inspectors. The Inspection team was comprised of representatives from the HMIC, the police forces, the Crime Prevention Agency and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP). It also included the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Police Research Group (PRG). The composition of the inspection team is a testament to the comprehensiveness of the assessment. As a result, not only the police but also the government, local agencies and citizens should pay great attention to this report.

Measures used in the Inspection to examine crime prevention/reduction in the police services were:

- Review of existing research and good practice by the Police Research Group;
- Interviews and information gathering using a questionnaire from all police forces in England and Wales (national level); and
- Comprehensive visits to selected fifteen forces, balancing regions, size and policing environments.

This report states, in its conclusion, the benefits to be gained from reducing crime: "Less crime means fewer victims, fewer costs and fewer harmful consequences" (p.59: 7.12). This statement is striking in that the police, at the management level, have shown the importance of a victim-conscious approach to crime. This is not a mere statement, but the HM Inspector recommends chief constables and practitioners use this report to develop their approach to crime reduction. The aim of the report is practical use by assessing practical issues in the police
service and partnerships, not just a list of ideal suggestions.

Considering the high position of the HMIC, the message that this report sends to the police and society is significant and it has added the UK police system a proactive and productive crime reduction strategies.

Moreover, reviewing this report is important for it further explains the effective elements of policing, which consistent with scientific and international guidelines. Criticizing and requesting a change in the police from the outside is relatively easy, but doing it is difficult. This report is significant because the police have identified effective and essential principles for themselves so as to improve their capacity to prevent crime.

1.8. WHAT THIS THESIS DOES NOT DO AND RESEARCH LIMITS

Some of what this thesis does not do and research limits have been addressed in the above sections. The following Summary Table 1 reviews and clarifies what this thesis is about, what thesis does not do, research limits and the reliability of methodology that this thesis took: it should help to understand the outline of the thesis.
### Summary Table 1  What the thesis is about, and What the thesis does NOT do

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>About</th>
<th>NOT</th>
<th>Research Limits</th>
<th>Reliability/Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part A: Need of Crime Prevention in Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2: Crime Trends and CJS in Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify:</td>
<td>• Primary analysis of causes of each crime</td>
<td>• Limited access to Japanese academic literature</td>
<td>• Official White Papers influence criminal justice policies: suitable sources to seek recommendations to the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why CP needed and desirable</td>
<td>• Evaluation of the CJS and their work</td>
<td>• Empirical research is yet to be developed</td>
<td>• Supplemental information from other agencies, media sources cover issues, which does not appear in official statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crime trend figure, risk factors, CP initiatives</td>
<td>• Verification of official crime statistics</td>
<td>• Limited analysis of crime data while there are some victim surveys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secondary analysis:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ Official crime statistics (MOJ, NPA);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▶ official reports, announcements, newsletters e.g. MOJ, NPA, Health, mass media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part B: Scientific Knowledge of Effective Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3: Scientific evaluation: what works</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify:</td>
<td>• Test transferability of each program to Japan</td>
<td>• Limited access to Japanese academic literature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective programs that have reduced and prevented crime through prevention</td>
<td>• Analyze original evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Done by groups of researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct:</td>
<td>• Not use classical academic literature Because:</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extensive evaluation (e.g. 600 programs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secondary analysis: comprehensive review</td>
<td>• Not influenced governments (not used by governments)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Use of scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sherman et al. (2002)</td>
<td>• Same programs covered by the 3 reports</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Targeting policy makers = fit the purpose of this thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IPCC (1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Have influenced governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Home Office (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Supplement info from academic literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contrast identified elements with what Japan has now</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 4: Policing for Crime Prevention

**Identify:**
- Limits of policing in crime prevention
- Effective strategies of policing for crime prevention

**Conduct**
- Secondary analysis:
  - Policing from scientific evaluation
  - HMIC

- Evaluation of policing in Japan
- Test transferability of UK policing

- Limited access to academic literature and/or empirical evaluation of Japanese current criminal justice system and administration

- Same as Ch.3
  - HMIC provides extensive review of policing; best knowledge currently available about policing
  - Inspection consists of multiple research groups
  - Similarity in police system

### Part C: Implementation Strategy

### Chapter 5: Implementation. Strategy from International Guidelines

**Identify:**
- Key elements for implementation of effective CP as a national project

**Conduct:**
- Review international guidelines
- UN Guidelines
- WHO
- Contrast required preconditions with what Japan has now

- Step-by-step handbook
- Test transferability

- International consensus: should be applicable to any Member State
- Based on scientific studies
- Aiming to guide policy makers
- Japan is UN Member State
### Chapter 6: UK case study

**Identify:**
- Implementation strategy
- Consistency with international guidelines
- Experienced difficulties
- What needs to be done

**Analyze:**
- Crime prevention section of CDA ’98
- Crime Reduction Program
- Preliminary assessment by Homel et al. (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of the UK implementation strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test transferability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Similar political system |
| Evaluation done by a group of researchers from external member, criminologists, Home Office researchers |
| Best knowledge currently available about delivery of crime prevention as a national project |

### Chapter 7: Conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identify 8 key points to be done from the analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on implementation strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Step-by-step handbook |
| Test transferability/feasibility |

| Limited access to policy makers for interview/survey |
| Limited access to policy analysis |
Part A: Need for Crime Prevention in Japan

CHAPTER 2
CURRENT CRIME TRENDS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN JAPAN

2.1. CURRENT CRIME TRENDS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN JAPAN

This chapter illustrates the current crime trends in Japan reviewing official crime reports form the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Justice of Japan, which show increasing crime rates as their official understandings. The research extends further to reviewing international crime victim survey, media sources and other governmental reports in order to identify causes of crime and risk factors that may be leading to crime in Japan. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that crime prevention is a desirable strategy for Japan arguing that Japan is already open to crime prevention while measures and approaches should be better scrutinized.

2.1.1. Overview of Criminal Justice System in Japan

Before I start examining crime trends, I briefly review the criminal justice system in Japan. The Japanese criminal justice system consists of 5 segments: Police, Prosecution, Courts, Correctional Institutes, and Aftercare Services.

Current Japan’s legal institutions are heavily influenced by the United States occupation forces after the end of the World War II in 1945. The current Japanese Constitution was drafted by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and it went into effect in May 1947. Therefore, the Constitution has many provisions similar to the United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights. The new constitution made the emperor a figurehead and the Diet a true parliamentary body (Castberg, 1990:3-5).

Japan operates within the civil legal tradition (Reichel, 2002: 308-313). Japan’s current Penal Code was originally promulgated in 1907, and it is still in force with several amendments (i.e. in 1947 and 1995) (Noda, 1976:208). Japan’s principal sources of criminal procedural law are the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1948 (Noda, 1976: 210). After World War II, its process of adjudication was heavily influenced by the United States and shifted to an adversarial system
from an inquisitorial system where the imperial family and judges had power (Noda, 1976: 210). Castberg (1990: 4) introduces that the Japanese Constitution of 1947 contains greater protections for the accused than the United States Constitution.

The Japanese police are a single national force, and there are three levels of organizations in the system. The National Public Safety Commission is under the direct authority of the prime minister and is responsible for all police operations and activities. The National Public Safety Commission deals with the administrative work of the whole police, and the National Police Agency supervises local police agencies. Practical police performance is done by 47 prefectural police agencies, whose jurisdiction is restricted only within geographical limits (Shikita & Tsuchiya, 1992: xviii). There is no system similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States, therefore, regional bureaus must cooperate together when inter-prefectural incidents happen. Koban (in urban cities) and Chuzaiso (in rural area) are placed under each prefectural police agency, and work as local community police force. According to White Paper on Police (2002), Koban’s role is a “life safety center (Seikatsu Anzen Center)” for local community members (NPA 2002, Section 1). There are 6,600 Koban and 8,000 Chuzaiso according to the record of April 2004 (NPA 2002, Section 1). Main activities are 1) patrol, which includes questioning for suspicious behavior, finding hot spots, giving guidance to homes in hot area, providing information and look-out by standing in front of Koban or on a busy street; and 2) community based policing, which includes understanding demands from community members through liaison council of Koban and Chuzaiso (Koban-Chuzaiso Renraku Kyogikai) and publishing newsletter for transmission of information (NPA, 2002, Section 1).

2.1.2. Official Crime Statistics

The White Paper on Police (2002) and the Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (2003a) from the National Police Agency and the White Paper on Crime from the Ministry of Justice (2002), which are the major sources of crime statistics in Japan, have revealed a rapid increase of overall crime rates since 1996.

According to the reports, the number of reported criminal offense in 2000 was the worst
on record since the end of the Second World War (1945). Moreover, the increase is alarmingly rapid since 1996, in contrast to international trends among industrialized countries where crime rates have slowly declined or remained relatively stable (ICPC, 1999b).

Both White Paper on Police and White Paper on Crime tend to show only the numbers of reported crime: crime rates were retrieved from Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (NPA, 2003a). Crime rates are calculated by 100,000 populations based on the estimated population projected by the Bureau of Statistics in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication or population census (NPA, 2003a) as of October 1st in each year. Crime rates (see Table 1) indicate a consistent crime increase in Japan along with the increase of the number of reported crime: crime rates in 1999 was 1,709.3, and it rose to 2,148.9 in 2001. The total number of reported crime in 2000 was about 2.24 million: this is a 277,844-case (14%) increase from the previous year, and it rose to 3.58 million in 2001, which is a 325,412-case (9%) increase (NPA, 2003b). The Table 1 shows the change in the number of reported crime and crime rates since 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>2,165,626</td>
<td>2,443,470</td>
<td>2,735,612</td>
<td>2,853,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>case increased</td>
<td>132,080</td>
<td>277,844</td>
<td>325,412</td>
<td>118,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
<td>1,709.3</td>
<td>1,925.5</td>
<td>2,148.9</td>
<td>2,240.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) 2003, National Police Agency

According to the official reports, theft accounts for 90% of all the reported crime, and has multiplied by three to four times within ten years (NPA, 2002; MOJ, 2002). For example, the number of reported robberies has increased about three fold between 1992 (2,189) and 2002 (6,984) (NPA, 2003b). Crime rates in robbery and street-snatch theft are showing the same trends, which is about three-fold increase, in the Table 2.
Table 2  Theft: Comparison between 1992 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total theft</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>1,525,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
<td>1,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>2,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street-snatch</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>14,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) 2003, National Police Agency

The Data on Crime Statistics, No. 393, January – September 2003 by the National Police Agency (2003b) compares the number of six reported crimes (murder, robbery, arson, rape, kidnapping, forcible obscenity), which are classified as “serious crime (Juyou Hanzai),” between 1999 and 2003. They reveal that of all the listed crimes, robbery and forcible obscenity (Kyosei Waisetsu) consistently had the highest reported levels throughout the five years. It does not analyze crime rates, but the crime rates retrieved from Hanzai Tokei Shiryo of 2003 (NPA) show consistent increase in robbery and forceful obscenity since 1998 (See Table 4): both crimes have made about two-fold increase between 1998 and 2003. The total number of reported serious crimes by the end of September 2003 was 17,606, while the previous year counted 15,718 (a 10% increase) (See Table 3). The breakdown of this is: murder 1,097 (a 65 case/5% increase compared to the previous year), robbery 5,692 (+866 cases, +17%), arson 1,463 (+145 cases, +10%), rape 1,788 (+161 cases, +9%), kidnap for robbery 175 (+8 cases, +4%), and forcible obscenity 7,391 (+643 cases, +9%). Although the number of cases has changed more or less in the past five years, the highest reported cases continue to involve robbery and forcible obscenity. This is obvious from the crime rates shown in the Table 4.

\[\text{Forcible obscenity (Kyosei Waisetsu) is differentiated from rape. Definition and description of the offence have not been acquired. The Research Institute of the Ministry of Justice explained that its definition depends on how judges interpret the criminal law. (Telephone interview conducted in May, 2004)}\]
Table 3  Changes in Serious Crime (Juyo Hanzai)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serious Case</td>
<td>10,114</td>
<td>10,652</td>
<td>11,286</td>
<td>12,366</td>
<td>12,725</td>
<td>14,682</td>
<td>18,281</td>
<td>21,530</td>
<td>22,294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) 2003, National Police Agency

Table 4  Breakdown of Serious Crime in the Past Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serious Crime</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder Case</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>1,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery Case</td>
<td>3,426</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>5,173</td>
<td>6,393</td>
<td>6,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson Case</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>1,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Case</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>2,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping Case</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forceful Case</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>5,346</td>
<td>7,412</td>
<td>9,326</td>
<td>9,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) 2003, National Police Agency

The White Paper on Crime 2002 spent one section reporting and analyzing violent crime (MOJ, 2002: Part 5). This section classifies nine types of crime as "crime with violent characteristics." These crimes are robbery, bodily injury, assault, duress, threat, rape, forcible obscenity, breaking and entering, and damage to property. Separating them from murder, which is classified as the most violent crime, this report acknowledges that these nine crimes are serious because they may occur in daily life and the impacts of the crimes impose both physically and psychologically serious damage on victims (MOJ, 2002: Part 5: Preface). Ministry of Justice (2000) reports that the number of reported robberies has increased by 110% in the last five years, rape by 52.4%, forcible obscenity by 84.1%, assault (without theft) by 104.4%, bodily injury by 68.9%, and damage to property concerned as violent matter by 141.6%. In addition, the consistent drop in arrest rates for these serious crimes exposes another acute concern: in 1994, the arrest rate of these nine crimes was about 60%, but it has actually dropped to 23.2% in 2001.
The arrest rate for all criminal offences (traffic law violations excluded) was 23.6% in 2000, but it has dropped to 19.8% in 2001 (See Table 5). For example, the arrest rate of robbery and theft in 2000 were 56.9% and 19.1%, but they dropped to 48.7% and 15.7% respectively in 2001 (NPA, 2001). Even though it came back to 20.8% in 2002, the rate is still low compared to the ones about 10 years ago: 42.3% in 1990, 38.3% in 1991, 36.5% in 1992 and 40.2% in 1993. Looking at this decline, it can be concluded that there is a growing inverse relationship between the crime rate and the arrest rate in today’s Japan. This low arrest rate suggests not only unsolved cases but also potential danger to be produced by repeat-offenders. The only good news is that the arrest rate for murder still remains very high, within a range of 94 to 98%, and this has not changed for the last ten years. But overall arrest rates in 2001 have declined.

Table 5  Changes in Arrest Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Arrest Rate</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street-snatch theft</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forceful Obscenity</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Statistics (Hanzai Tokei Shiryo) 2003, National Police Agency

The White Paper on Crime (2002) shows interesting data about the relationship of crime rates and arrest rates in other industrialized countries. Compared with those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan, Japan has scored the lowest in the number of reported crimes and the crime rates of all countries. However, when it comes to the arrest rates, Japan is now second worst (See Table 6).

One can conclude from these statistics that the capacity of the criminal justice system may be experiencing its limits to keep up with all kinds of crime; public safety in today’s Japan may not be as secure as it had been; and violent crime is growing. Before claiming that today’s
criminal justice system is simply ineffective, this thesis explores causes of crime and risk factors that may lead to crime.

Table 6  The number of reported crime, crime rate and arrest rate of the five countries in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported Crime Case</th>
<th>Crime Rates*</th>
<th>Arrest Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11,605,751</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6,264,723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5,170,843</td>
<td>9,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,771,849</td>
<td>7,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,443,470</td>
<td>6,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France 26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK 24.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA 20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: White Paper on Crime 2002, the Ministry of Justice, Japan
* Crime rate is the number of reported cases per 100,000 population

2.1.3. Juvenile Crime

The number of arrested juvenile offenders (age 14 – 19) was slightly declining until 1995, but it has been increasing since 1996 (NPA, 2002: 138) (See Table 7). The percentage of juveniles in the total arrested population (traffic law violation is excluded) in 1989 was 57.4%, but in 2001 it declined to 42.6% (NPA, 2002: 138). It might sound good news, however, the Statistics Bureau's recent report indicates that children and youth under the age of 19 account for only 20% of the total population\(^4\) in Japan, therefore, juvenile offenders over-represent in the arrested offenders' population. A report called Briefing on Protection and Guidance of Youth in 2003 (NPA, 2004:8) shows the number of arrested juveniles and their ratio per 1,000 population in the same age group since 1949 (See Table 8). The growth rate of the total population in October 2002 was 0.11%, which is the worst on record since the Second World War, and the population of those aged 0 to 64 has continued to decrease (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Statistics Bureau, 2002). The growing population of arrested juveniles stands out in contrast to the shrinking population.

\(^4\) Age 0 – 19, about 25.14 million: total population, about 127.35 million as of March 1, 2003
Table 7  Changes in the Number of Juveniles Arrested for Criminal Offense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of juvenile</td>
<td>126,249</td>
<td>133,581</td>
<td>152,825</td>
<td>157,385</td>
<td>141,721</td>
<td>132,336</td>
<td>138,654</td>
<td>141,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Briefing on Protection and Guidance of Youth in 2003, National Police Agency, 2004

Table 8  The Number and Population Rates of Juveniles Arrested for Criminal Offence Every Ten Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100,851</td>
<td>191,930</td>
<td>133,882</td>
<td>141,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Rate*</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Briefing on Protection and Guidance of Youth in 2003, National Police Agency, 2004

* Juvenile arrested population per 1,000 population in the same age bracket

Characteristics of juvenile crime go along with the general crime trends in Japan. The White Paper on Police 2002 describes heinous youth crime as an acute situation with more than a two-fold increase of arrested youths between 1992 and 2001 (NPA, 2002:17). Street-snatch-theft is highlighted as one of the fastest growing segments of crime, and the arrested population for that crime has increased more than three-fold from 1992 to 2001 (NPA, 2002:19). In addition, as the mass media often reports, the National Police Agency acknowledges recent peculiar and serious crimes committed by young perpetrators, and the NPA points out their violent and rough characteristics as serious concern (NPA, 2002:2, 16; NPA, 2001:15).

2.1.4. Victim Survey

A victim survey is important to more precisely understand and analyze crime trends because a victim survey asks people about crimes that they have experienced, and it includes crime that was not reported to the police. Not all crime victims report crime to police for various reasons, therefore a victim survey is an important source of crime statistics in addition to official police records.

Victim surveys have been developed and actively used in crime analysis in the United
States (National Crime Victimization Survey) and the United Kingdom (British Crime Survey) for more than 30 years. A systematic national victim survey in Japan is yet to be developed, but the Ministry of Justice participated in the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) in 2000 mainly operated by the United Nations where about 3000 respondents were randomly chosen and interviewed face to face in Japan in February, 2002 (MOJ Press Release, 2002).

The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) is an international survey on victimization and crime. It was initiated by the governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 1989 and covered 14 countries. It now involves UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) and UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and 48 participating countries. The ICVS uses a standard questionnaire, ensuring that all aspects of methodology have been standardized, in order to draw internationally comparable results.

Van Kesteren, Mayhew and Nieuwbeerta (2000), which analyzed the ICVS-2000, report that Japan has the lowest crime-reporting rate of the eleven crimes\(^5\) in the 17 industrialized countries\(^6\). Percentage of reporting six common offences (theft from car, car vandalism, bicycle theft, burglary with entry, attempt burglary, thefts of personal property) to police was only 37%; the second lowest of the 17 countries (Van Kesteren et al., 2000: 63). It has also found that Japan has an especially low reporting rate of assaults with force. This finding corresponds to an official crime report, which revealed that only 9.7% of female victims of sexual assault reported the victimization (MOJ, 2000). The percentage of satisfaction with police response after reporting may be corresponding to the reporting rate in Japan: 27 % in contact crime\(^7\), 48% in theft from car and burglary with entry (Van Kesteren et al., 2000: 70). The twenty seven percent in contact crime is the lowest of the 17 countries. Such low reporting rates suggests that there

---

\(^5\) Theft of cars, theft from cars, vandalism to cars, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, burglary with entry, attempted burglary, theft of personal property, robbery, sexual incidents, assaults and threats

\(^6\) Australia, Belgium, Canada, Catalonia (Spain), Denmark, England & Wales, Finland, France, Japan, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, Switzerland, Sweden, USA

\(^7\) Robbery, sexual incidents and assaults and threats.
are more crimes and victimizations that have not appeared in the official crime statistics in Japan.

2.2. CAUSES OF CRIME AND RISK FACTORS

Given the statistical figure of increasing crime, one might ask why the increase is happening and what is causing so much crime and violence in our society. It is not particularly easy to answer these questions; however, there are some research findings in international studies that we can refer to.

The ICPC (1999b) has identified that some factors are associated with delinquency, violence and insecurity in industrialized countries from various international studies. These factors, for example, are dysfunctional families, uncaring and violent parental attitudes, unemployment and poverty, social valuation of a culture of violence, degradation of social bonds as a result of urbanization, and the presence of facilitators such as drugs (p.20-21).

In addition to these, the Crime Reduction Toolkits for persistent young offenders created by the Home Office of the United Kingdom (www.crime-reduction.gov.uk/toolkits/index.htm) has pointed out that low family income, parental criminality, disruptive behaviour including bullying and aggressiveness, lack of commitment to school, low achievement in school, high proportion of unsupervised time spent with peers etc. are also factors that increase the likelihood for young people to be involved in offending.

These factors are also recognized by the World Health Organization in the World Report on Violence and Health as factors that affect the potential violent behavior of young people (WHO, 2002: 25-38).

Reading major Japanese newspapers, there are good amounts of reports that cover internationally recognized risk factors in Japan. Other news sources such as national television programs, magazines and newsletters from local governments introduce analyses and opinions about current crime issues, and they touch upon the causes of crime and social insecurity. Referring to the international knowledge, this section looks at 1) economic shifts, 2) urbanization and degradation of social bonds, 3) dysfunctional family, 4) problems in school, 5) culture of violence and 6) presence of drug.
2.2.1. Economic shifts

Long-lasting recession, increased unemployment rates, massive lay-offs due to corporate restructuring, and a practice of rationalization, have been national concerns since mid 1990s. Japan had enjoyed a practice called “Shushin Koyo,” which large corporations provided their employees with good salaries, reasonable working conditions and permanent employment. In return, employees devoted to the employers, cultivating a spirit of loyalty. Having experienced such a practice since 1950s, current massive layoffs gave the perception of betrayal from the company to loyal workers, and anxiety has prevailed in society. Unemployment, poverty and income inequality are known factors of crime in some criminological theories such as anomie theory, hence, the economic recession in Japan may imply that Japan embraces risk factors that would cause and/or increase crime.

Tsushima (1996) tested correlation between economic conditions (poverty, economic inequality, unemployment, urbanization, industrialization, mobility, percentage of young males) and three types of crime; homicide, robbery and larceny. According to his research, poverty level is significantly correlated with homicide (.582); the degree of economic inequality is significantly correlated with homicide (.671), robbery (.421), and larceny (.430); and unemployment rate shows the strongest correlations with homicide (.687), robbery (.516) and larceny (.475) (Tsushima, 1996: 508). In a multiple regression analysis shows that unemployment largely explains (47%) homicide (Tsushima, 1996: 508). These research findings suggest that unemployment, levels of economic inequality and poverty are risk factors in Japan.

A survey of consumer psychology conducted by Nippon Research Institute (2003) in every two months has revealed that consumers’ anxiety index about life has been worsened. The index\(^8\) in August 2003 was 155, but the one in June 1995 was 109 (Nippon Research

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\(^8\) The index indicates a composition ratio about consumers’ perception on their life in the following year. There are four answer choices: worse (2 points), slightly worse (1 point), slightly better (-1 point), better (-2 points). 1 point is added to the sum of the score, and it is multiplied by 100. [http://research-soken.or.jp/www/reports/csi/outline.html](http://research-soken.or.jp/www/reports/csi/outline.html)
Institute, 2003). In the meantime, society seems to be apprehensive about the future of social security programs. A public opinion survey conducted by the Yomiuri Newspaper (Yomiuri Shinbun, September 11, 2003: http://newsflash.nifty.com/news.ts.ts_yomiuri_20030910it12.htm) revealed that 57% of the respondents did not trust the national pension plan. This is the worst recorded mark since 1997. Eighty eight percent of people in their forties, 82% in their fifties, and 81% in their thirties have expressed anxiety about the post-retirement years in the same survey. The anxiety from the long-lasting recession seems to be prevailing among the citizens.

2.2.2. Urbanization and degradation of social bonds

Simply looking at the size of Tokyo, whose population is about 12 million and population density is 5,514/square km (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2002), large cities in Japan are physically urbanized. Even though there is not a clear method to measure social bonds, it have often been mentioned by studies that strong ties and norms, which have been shared within communities, has been disappearing in urban society. Tsushima (1996) has found that urbanization is positively and significantly correlated with robbery and larceny (p.508). His multiple regression analysis has found that “urbanization explains the greatest amount of the variance (38.4%) (Tsushima, 1996: 510)” followed by economic inequality (12.4%).

2.2.3. Dysfunctional family

The increasing divorce rates may possibly suggest dysfunctional family life. The statistics of population dynamics in Japan (Japan Institute of Labour Policy and Training, 2003) reported that the divorce rate\(^9\) between January to October 2002 marked 2.31, and the number of cases counted 292,000. Both the rate and the number of cases are the worst ever recorded. It should be noted that the number of marriages in 2002 decreased by 45,000 compared to the previous year (799,999 in 2001; 755,000 in 2002).

Child abuse is another part of daily news, and both police and agencies such as

\(^9\) Per 1,000 people
education and health focus on the issues. Issues such as child abuse have been considered highly personal family-matters, and Japanese culture hesitated to give public attention to them. Families at the same time tended to hide their cases from the public. But the recent media coverage of such news suggests that concerns about child abuse are less ignored or hidden.

According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2001), the number of consultations of child abuse at 174 child consultation centers was 17,725 in 2000. Compared with the recorded figures in 1990 (1,101 cases), this number is a 16-fold increase. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare’s analysis indicates that this increase is partly the result of the enforcement of the child abuse prevention law which went into effect in May 2000, which encouraged people to consult and report child abuse cases. The Ministry (2002) estimates that about 35,000 child abuse cases are occurring each year.

From these records, there seems to be a risk of future juvenile crime in Japan, and this rapid increase of child abuse and neglect should no longer be ignored: family problems do not end in the family; they could lead to further crime.

2.2.4. Problems in school

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) reported that the number of absentees\textsuperscript{10} reached the highest level in its history in 2000 (MEXT, website: www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/public/2003/03041134.htm#02). The absentee-rates among students aged 6 to 15 make up 1.2%, which accounts for 138,722 students. Of all elementary school students (age 6-12), absentees make up 0.36%, which is one in every 275 students, and of all junior high school students (age 13-15), absentees make up 2.81%, which is one in every 36 students.

Moreover, long absences called “Hikikomori,” which are refusals to go to school and/or refusals to come out of their own room/house for more than six months, have become a social problem. The relationship between the Hikikomori and youth crime is not clear, however, these

\textsuperscript{10} Students who refused to attend school for more than 30 days a year due to psychological, physical and societal reasons except economical and medical conditions. The definition is retrieved from http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/public/2003/03041134.htm#02
Youths tend to engage in antisocial behavior (Lyons, 2001). The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (June 1998) pointed out this issue, "school phobia (CRC, 1998: C.22)" as one of its principle concerns in the concluding observation.


2.2.5 Culture of violence

In 1998, copycat-stabbing incidents by teenagers shook society. On January 28, 1998, a thirteen-year-old boy murdered a 26-year-old English teacher by stabbing her several times in the school hallway after she scolded him for coming late to class. His classmates had recognized him as one of the normal students, therefore they did not expect such an incident to occur. This boy was carrying a butterfly-knife in his jacket, which became the murder weapon. Oddly, within ten days of the murder, five more stabbing incidents with a butterfly knife occurred in different locations in Japan, and all offenders were teenagers in junior high school. Society was stunned and the question, "why butterfly knives and teenagers?" arose.

Prior to this series of events, a TV show called "Gift" had been broadcast nationwide. The main character in the show was a popular actor, a hero-figure among young people, and he always carried and showed off a butterfly knife in the show. Even though the relationship of the influence of the TV show and the nature of the crime has not been proved, most of the media and intelligentsia focused on the possibility of their causal link.

Columns in newspapers and newsmagazines often pointed out the violent contents of TV shows, movies and TV games as one of the major influences on young people. Progress to regulate media's violent scenes was made when the Broadcasters Council for Youth Programs
was established in April 2000 under the Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement Organization. However, governmental regulation such as the proposal of a Basic Law on the Social Environment for Young People has not been established.

The copycat case alone is not enough to prove the existence of a culture of violence, however, it suggests that the violence found in TV shows and/or video games might be influencing young people in Japan.

2.2.6. Presence of Drug

Drug issues among young people ranging from 14 to late twenties have been often reported by major newspapers (Nikkei Shinbun, 2004/8/3, 8/9; Mainichi Shinbun, 2004/6/24, 7/23, 8/6, 9/16, 10/11, 11/2; Asahi Shinbun, 2004/2/5, 8/26). Involvement of drug in crime had been hidden in the official crime statistics until 2003, because only the most serious crime was recorded when one offender committed multiple crimes (Asahi Shinbun, 2004/10/09). Asahi Shinbun (October 9, 2004) reports that the National Police Agency has started focusing on an involvement of drug in crime having revealed the hidden statistics. The National Police Agency has released a report on drug crime, and it reported that the amount of MDMA and cannabis during the first half year of 2003 are rapidly growing (NPA website: 2003/8/7). The same trend is seen in the report of 2004, and it especially emphasizes the spread of both MDMA and cannabis among young people around the age 20s (NPA website: 2004/8/6). Drug issues have existed, but research on drug as a facilitator of crime has just begun (Asahi Shinbun, 2004/10/09).

By analyzing current Japanese society along with the internationally acknowledged risk factors, the causes and risk factors that explain the current Japanese crime trends have gradually become clear. From my analysis above, I conclude that Japan embraces many risk factors that are associated with crime.

2.3. COST OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

2.3.1. Cost of crime

What do the facts about crime mean to the public and victims in real life? Crimes such as larceny and violent crime obviously cause loss and damage to the victims. In addition to the
financial costs, we have to consider that crime also causes physical injury and psychological
damage not only directly to the victims but also to their families and communities. Having
introduced the crime trends, it can be safely assumed that the costs of crime in Japanese society
have grown immensely.

According to the ICPC, the costs of crime include the costs of criminal justice (policing,
courts and prisons), private security, and the costs to victims such as property loss, lost quality of
life, pain and suffering and fear (ICPC, 1999b: 14).

Mark A. Cohen introduces a further detailed definition of the costs of crime; “external
costs” and “social costs” (Welsh, Farrington & Sherman, 2001: 29). The external cost is “the
cost imposed by one person on another, where the latter person does not voluntarily accept this
negative consequence. For example, the external costs associated with a mugging include stolen
property, medical costs, lost wages, as well as pain and suffering endured by the victim (Welsh et
al., 2001: 29).” “‘Social costs’ are costs that reduce the aggregate well-being of society.
Although pain and suffering costs are not actual commodities or services exchanged in the
marketplace, individuals are willing to pay real dollars and expend real resources in order to
avoid the pain, suffering, and lost quality of life associated with becoming a crime victim.”
(Welsh et al., 2001: 29) He also includes the offender’s lost quality of life such as time behind
bars and the inability to be employed in the social cost. For example, if an offender was an
employee prior to his/her offence, his/her employer loses the employee when he/she is
apprehended. This affects the employer’s productivity and the additional cost of hiring and
training a new employee. The offender’s pain and suffering from incarceration are excluded
since these are only what the offender suffers.

2.3.2. Budget and Cost of Criminal Justice System

Unfortunately it is difficult to find precise annual budgets or expenditures of the overall
criminal justice agencies in Japan. The only source I have found is the Global Report on Crime
and Justice by the United Nations (1999), which introduces the expenditure of criminal justice
per capita of various countries in 1994. It shows that Japan’s expenditure per capita in 1994 was
63.33 US Dollars (United Nations, 1999:302). Considering that the crime has rapidly increasing since 1996, the expenditure must have been increasing along with the crime rates.

While the 2002 overall budget of the government of Tokyo was reduced by 4.8%, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department's budget was actually increased by 0.9% compared to the previous year (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2002) (see Table 9). The White Paper on Police reports that the police’s annual budget per capita has been about 29,000 yen (about US$240) for the past five years. It should be noted that if the budget per capita has not been changed while the budget of Tokyo is shrinking, it suggests that budget of other agencies may have been cut.

| Table 9  Breakdown of Budget of Tokyo Metropolitan Government |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                   | 1999      | 2000       | 2001       | 2002       | 2003       |
| Total             | 629.80 bil.| 598.80 bil.| 620.60 bil.| 590.78 bil.| 570.80 bil.|
| Police & Fire     | 87.64 bil. | 85.06 bil. | 85.70 bil. | 87.70 bil. | 84.68 bil. |
|                   | 13.9%     | 14.2%      | 13.8%      | 14.8%      | 14.8%      |
| Education & Culture | 101.93 bil.| 97.11 bil. | 97.56 bil. | 97.58 bil. | 94.48 bil. |
|                   | 16.2%     | 16.2%      | 15.7%      | 16.5%      | 16.5%      |
| Welfare & Health  | 71.22 bil.| 69.96 bil. | 71.07 bil. | 70.67 bil. | 68.33 bil. |
|                   | 11.3%     | 11.5%      | 11.5%      | 12.0%      | 11.9%      |

* Currency is Japanese Yen

The draft of the governmental budget of 2002, which was prepared by the Ministry of Finance, briefly refers to the budget of the courts, the NPA, and the MOJ, who are major criminal justice agencies, in the Approximate Estimate of General Account Expenditure of 2002 (Ministry of Finance, www.mof.go.jp/seifuan14/yosan007-11.pdf). Each budget has been reduced compared to the previous year by 0.8%, 3.9%, and 0.2% respectively. Within the court budget, portions for upgrading computer systems and increasing personnel for faster proceedings of civil law suites, which are generally known as slow procedures, were increased. Within the police budget, portions for strategies in dealing with urban crime and augmenting local police officers
were increased. This particular increase may be implying that crime in urban areas is a major focus in the police, and the increase in police officers is one of the solutions to deal with problems. The MOJ had a significant increase for incarceration institutions, which grew by 30 million yen (about USD$250,000). In addition, the MOJ further suggested the employment of another 406 correctional officers.

A report by an NHK (Nippon Hosō Kyokai: the national channel) TV program revealed that correctional institutions are now facing an overcrowding problem as well as a shortage of correctional officers. According to the NHK report, Fuchu prison in Tokyo, which is the largest prison in Japan, has a 110% incarceration rate; moreover, the ratio of the inmates to correctional officers is 80 to 1. The White Paper on Crime (2000, 2001) also pointed out the overcrowding problem in correctional institutions. The WPC 2000 and 2001 report that 50% of those who completed jail terms and 30% of parolees return to prison within 4 years.

It should be noted that the UN Global Report on Crime and Justice (1999) reported that the annual expenditure per convicted prisoner in Japan in 1994 was US$47,873 which is more than 5 million yen in the Japanese currency.

Even though Japan has not explicitly addressed a mass-incarceration policy, the crime trends indicate the growing need of criminal justice intervention. But at the same time, the prison re-entry rates and overcrowding situation in the correctional facilities suggest that incarceration may not be a suitable solution to the reduction and prevention of crime in our society. Moreover, it should be remembered that the use and maintenance of the formal criminal justice system is very expensive and requires heavy investments.

The following table summarizes known risk factors and causes of crime from international studies and crime and possible risk factors in Japan in order to illustrate the relevance of the international knowledge to Japan.
Summary Table 2  Risk factors from International Knowledge and Problems in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Development</th>
<th>Risk Factors from Scientific Knowledge</th>
<th>Problems in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysfunctional Family</td>
<td>• Dysfunctional Family</td>
<td>• Increasing divorce rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor parenting</td>
<td>• Child abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Family violence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative poverty</td>
<td>• Relative poverty</td>
<td>• Recession</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor school performance</td>
<td>• Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Persistent truancy</td>
<td>• Economic inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High levels of impulsiveness and hyperactivity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Culture of violence</td>
<td>• Bullying in school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Facilitator: gun, alcohol, drug</td>
<td>• Truancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational</td>
<td>• Urbanization</td>
<td>• Student suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of surveillance</td>
<td>• High level of impulsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Repeat victimization</td>
<td>• Culture of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Urbanization</td>
<td>• Presence of drug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Burglary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Street snatch theft</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Community-based</td>
<td>• Various risk factors interlocking each other</td>
<td>Various interlocking social difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Family violence</td>
<td>• Dysfunctional family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• unemployment</td>
<td>• Recession: unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• teenage pregnancy</td>
<td>• Problems in school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• school failure</td>
<td>• Presence of drug</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• high level of environment disorder,</td>
<td>• Urbanization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• repeat victimization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• criminal networks etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>• Recidivism</td>
<td>• High re-incarceration rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Re-entry to correctional facility</td>
<td>• Overburdened correctional facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Expensive, and tight national budget</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES

2.4.1. Official Crime Prevention

In the general policy speech at the opening session of the 161st Diet, Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, stated that "Japan, the safest country in the world" must be revived (retrieved from website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, http://www.kantei.go.jp; November 1, 2004). In the speech, he addressed four policies: 1) strengthen anti-crime measures; 2) reduce empty Koban; 3) target busy entertainment districts in downtown, which is high crime area, and make the districts safe and enjoyable, and 4) strengthen punitive clauses of criminal law for heinous crime such as murder and assault.

Mainstream measures instituted by government agencies include guidelines and manuals on how to protect citizens and children from crime and/or accidents. The MEXT has been active in this approach especially after a murder incident of school children in Osaka in 2001. The Case Examples of Safety Control 2003 and the Crisis Management Manual 2002, which MEXT published, introduce community activities and methods to protect school children. Making a hot-spot map of school-routes and instructions to secure safety along school-routes are major common themes of manuals (Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2003). These manuals have given significant influences to local government agencies. Inspired by the manuals, local government agencies have started renewing or developing their own manuals and methods. In most cases, public schools and their Parents and Teachers Associations are taking leadership, and promoting community-level activities (Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2003). "Inochino Kyoiku" (education on life) is another measure that the MEXT is promoting to prevent violent crime by and among children. The education aims to teach an importance of life, development of communication skills and sociality (MEXT website: 2004 August).

Issuing ordinances at local levels and enacting laws to form a network to prevent crime is another mainstream trend. For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government issued an ordinance on safe city creation in July 2003. This ordinance is aimed at promoting activities to prevent crime, and at mobilizing local agencies, businesses, non-governmental organizations and
citizens to create safe cities in Tokyo. It states that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the police should support and cooperate with local efforts to prevent crime, and should share necessary information to further promote prevention activities. It mainly focuses on situational crime prevention, such as improving design and facilities of residential buildings (Tokyo Metropolitan Government website, www.reiki.metro.tokyo.jp/reiki_honbun/ag10133081.html).

The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare is active in legislation to create a child abuse prevention network. There are already several networks at local levels involving schools, local governments, the police, medical agencies and child counseling centers. Legislation is aimed at reorganizing them into a conference whose management solutions will be regulated to protect information and privacy.

The Ministry of Justice has been promoting “Movement to brighten society (Shakai wo Akarukusuru Undo)” since 1951. This program holds workshops and forums to promote discussion on how to improve systems of correction and rehabilitation for offenders, and holds events to encourage communication between young people and adults through sports and cultural events (Ministry of Justice: http://www.moj.go.jp). The Rehabilitation Bureau in the Ministry of Justice also has a role of crime prevention in cooperation with local community and volunteers (Rehabilitation Bureau: www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/hogo06.html). Among major programs are Volunteer Probation Officers, Big Brothers and Sisters Movement, Women’s Association for Rehabilitation Aid and Cooperative Employers. Volunteer Probation Officers are, for example, part-time government officers commissioned by the Ministry of Justice: they are non-paid volunteers selected from the local communities. There are about 49,000 Volunteer Probation Officers in Japan (MOJ website: retrieved October 2004).

In order to prevent crime by foreigners, the Bureau of Immigration in the Ministry of Justice has “Campaign of Action for Illegal Foreign Worker” which intends to prevent illegal employment of foreign workers. The campaign hands out leaflets and uses patrolling cars in order to enhance public relations activity (Ministry of Justice: website).

Community based policing at local police force level is called, “Anzen Anshin Machizukuri Creation of Safe and Secured Town) (NPA, 2002: Chapter 3).” Main activities are:
1) "Hard" measures (NPA, 2002: Chapter 3), which include designing safe public environment, development and implementation of emergency reporting system and implementation of Community Security Camera; and 2) "Soft" measures (NPA, 2002: Chapter 3), which include patrol, round-table meeting with community members and local governments and releasing crime prevention newsletters. The White Paper on Police (2002: Chapter 3) addresses the importance of cooperation with local governments for crime prevention, and the coordination has been mainly developed through Crime Prevention Associations, which are organized on the basis of police station jurisdictions (Bayley, 1991: 88).

National Police Agency has four pillars in juvenile crime prevention: 1) strengthening capacity of investigation, 2) consultation desk, including "Young Telephone Corner", 3) community activities and sports activities, and 4) mobilization of volunteers in communities (NPA, 2002: Chapter 3). It should be noted that a member of the National Police Agency of Japan pointed out, in a conversation with the author in 2003\(^\text{11}\), that implementation of these policies and programs into prefectural police agencies local police forces often faced difficulties due to the discretion of the prefectural police agencies have. More research is required to find implementation status in local communities. National Police Agency also provides various manuals such as burglary prevention and theft prevention (NPA website).

Holding seminars on crime prevention is new efforts. Tokyo Metropolitan Government has held "Anzen Anshin Machizukuri (Creation of Safe and Secured Town) Academy" in June and October 2004 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government website: www.metro.tokyo.jp, released on September 3, 2004). It invited Japanese professionals, who are active in the fields related to crime prevention, as instructors. Topics such as crime prevention practice in New York, broken window theory, prevention through engineering design, forensic psychology and police work were introduced and discussed. United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), under the authority of the Ministry of Justice of Japan, has set crime prevention as a theme for the 129\(^\text{th}\) International Senior Seminar in January

\(^{11}\) The source does not wish to be identified.

2.4.2. Citizen Based Crime Prevention

According to available new articles and community and local governments’ news letters, citizen based crime prevention efforts seem to have three main activities. The first is creating a prevention manual, mainly for schools; the second is creating regional hot-spot maps which indicate spots where crime occurred in the past; and the third is community patrolling.

The manuals seem to be largely influenced by the manuals issued by MEXT. Boards of education at city levels are taking leadership in preparing and disseminating the manuals to schools and community members (Asahi Shinbun, September 21, 2003). Creating a hot-spot map and conducting community patrols seem to be the most preferred and employed measures in local communities. Most of the patrols mobilize senior residents, parents and local business owners. Many of these efforts seem to be in cooperation with local boards of education. But many of these citizen-based measures do not seem to be in partnership with the police (Morosawa, conversation with the author). However, citizen based crime prevention seems to be rapidly spreading, therefore it is possible that a technical alliance between citizens and the police has been established. Further research should be conducted.

Non-governmental organizations are also active leaders of crime prevention efforts. There are various organizations specializing in, for example, after-school activities and violence prevention. An American non-profit organization, the Committee For Children, created the Committee For Children Japan (CFCJ) in April 2001. It operates the Second Step Program that provides children with cognitive and social skills training such as anger management and communication development aiming to prevent violence. However, program implementation

12 Professor Morosawa is an Administrative Director of the Tokiwa International Victimology Institute, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan.
seems to be encountering difficulties due to regulations strictly enforced by the Ministry of Education. According to the CFCJ, schools in Japan highly emphasize academic curriculums and course instructions, therefore, developing an alliance with schools is difficult (Asahi Shimbun, CFCJ website, http://www.cfc-j.org).

Victim assistance organizations are contributing significantly to promoting public awareness of the need for the prevention of crime and victimization. Having victimologists and lawyers as leaders, they have significantly influenced several pieces of legislation. Examples of the legislation change are: establishment of Victim Support Liaison Council in 1999; Amendments to the Norms and Rules of Criminal Investigation in 1999; and legislation of Protection of Victims during the Criminal Justice Procedure in 2000. The establishment of Tokiwa International Victimology Institute in 2003 is another significant step forward. The Institute aims to bring domestic and international academic scholars, researchers, governmental agencies and victim assistance agencies together as well as further developing victimological studies.

2.5. CONCLUSION

While other industrialized countries have experienced declining or stable crime rates, Japan stands out with its rapid growth of crime rates in the official crime statistics. The mass media’s coverage of heinous crime feeds fear and shock in society, which may be expressed as minor moral panic. This chapter has found that society seems to go to two directions: resorting to more criminal justice intervention, and seeking crime prevention measures. However, the crime prevention initiatives have not produced rigorous evaluation of their effectiveness on preventing and reducing crime, and citizen-based crime prevention is disproportionately situational measures. The effectiveness of the criminal justice intervention as crime prevention or reduction measure is questionable judging from the increasing crime rates, declining arrest rates and overburdened correctional facilities. The national budget obviously indicates that there is not enough resources to enlarge the criminal justice system, but the work of the criminal justice agencies is growing without regard to the budget limits. Summary Table 2 summarizes
crime prevention initiatives which are trying to respond to social problems and crime in Japan, which are described in this chapter, and it also shows risk factors from international knowledge for comparison.

Western countries had experienced the similar situations in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, and one solution to their crime problems was crime prevention (Graham, 1990:6-7; Welsh et al., 2001: 226). Given the findings in Japan, it has good grounds to start seeking alternative ways to deal with crime and social problems, rather than solely depending on criminal justice intervention for crime control. In the following chapters, I will introduce programs that had worked and reduced crime through prevention, which now are becoming important components of national crime policy in Europe and North America.
### Summary Table 3  Crime Prevention Initiatives in Japan to respond to social problems and crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factors from Scientific Knowledge</th>
<th>Problems in Japan</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Prevention initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysfunctional Family</td>
<td>Child abuse</td>
<td></td>
<td>Child abuse prevention network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor parenting</td>
<td>Increasing divorce rates</td>
<td></td>
<td>Home visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social welfare policy (generic services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative poverty</td>
<td>Recession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economical inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor school performance</td>
<td>Bully in school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent truancy</td>
<td>Truancy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Education of life <em>(Inochino Kyōiku)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of impulsiveness and</td>
<td>Student suicide</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive and social skill training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hyperactivity</td>
<td>High level of impulsiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Big Brothers and Sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of violence</td>
<td>Culture of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator: gun, alcohol, drug</td>
<td>Presence of drug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational</strong></td>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hot spot map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood patrol, school zone patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of surveillance</td>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Safety manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street snatch theft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce empty <em>Koban</em> (increase police officers), more surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Recession, unemployment, economic inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase police patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat victimization</td>
<td>More research needed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime prevention association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unknown*
| Comprehensive Community-based | Various risk factors interlocking each other  
|                              | • Family violence  
|                              | • unemployment  
|                              | • school failure  
|                              | • high level of environment disorder,  
|                              | • repeat victimization,  
|                              | • criminal networks etc. | Various interlocking social difficulties  
|                              | • Dysfunctional family  
|                              | • Recession: unemployment  
|                              | • Problems in school  
|                              | • Presence of drug  
|                              | • Urbanization | Child abuse prevention network  
|                              | • Social policy  
|                              | • Crime prevention association  
|                              | • Seminar, Academy  
|                              | • Rehabilitation Bureau and community cooperation |
| Criminal Justice             | Recidivism  
|                              | Re-entry to correctional facility | High re-incarceration rates  
|                              | • Overburdened correctional facilities  
|                              | • Expensive, and tight national budget | Probation  
|                              | • Rehabilitation |
Part B: Scientific Knowledge of Effective Programs

CHAPTER 3
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION: WHAT WORKS

This chapter analyzes scientific evaluations of crime prevention programs to show what programs had worked and reduced crime through prevention in Western Societies. It demonstrates that crime can be reduced through prevention, and it identifies essential components of successful prevention programs. It also demonstrates that successful crime prevention programs are more financially manageable in comparison to the conventional criminal justice interventions.

Findings from Sherman et al. (2002), ICPC (1999b) and Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) are integrated under categories of 1) Social Development Crime Prevention, 2) Labor Market, 3) Situational Crime Prevention, 4) Criminal Justice Intervention and 5) Comprehensive Local Community-based Crime Prevention. A major focus is placed on “what works,” but some important lessons from the “what does not” category are also described. ICPC gives more analysis of the causes of crime, and Goldblatt and Lewis take a more policy-oriented approach with cost-benefit analysis. Combining these elements, which have been scientifically shown to be effective, will suggest policy orientations for Japan.

3.1. KEY ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE CRIME PREVENTION

3.1.1. Social Development Crime Prevention

(A) Family-based Intervention

Goldblatt & Lewis state, “We do know that children exposed to multiple risks and those who engage in anti-social or criminal behaviour at an early age are more likely to end up as serious or persistent offenders” (1998: 7). Some of these risk factors are: poverty and poor housing, poor parenting, association with delinquent peers, low measures of intelligence, poor school performance and persistent truancy, high levels of impulsiveness and hyperactivity. These risk factors were identified by longitudinal and victimization studies conducted by various
international bodies, and are internationally acknowledged, including by the United Nations (ICPC, 1999b: 20).

The research has found that intervening at the childhood levels of early (age 0-5), middle (age 6-12) and late adolescent, produced desirable effects in lowering child abuse, arrest rates, behavior problems, and improvement in academic achievement. Each level of the program, which was successful, used suitable interventions for each target population.

**Early childhood intervention (age 0 – 5):**

Successful programs identified by Sherman et al. (2002) were “home visitation services” and “parent education plus day care/preschool programs.” Both programs target at-risk mothers and children from age 0 to preschool. Generally, parents (mothers) received some combination of parent education and parent training (i.e. parent management training, problem-solving training) by nurses, teachers, social workers or para-professionals. In the day care/preschool program, children received cognitive development programs.

These programs produced reductions in child abuse, neglect and children’s delinquent behavior. For example, the Elmira home visitation program in New York (1978-1982), which offered support to young women during pregnancy and to children until age two, revealed a substantial reduction in arrest rates: children in the treatment group had 66% fewer arrests than those in the control group. It also found a reduction in arrests; a significant reduction in delinquent behavior; and improvement in child emotional functioning and academic achievement (Sherman et al., 2002: 26-27; ICPC, 1999b: 27-28).

The Perry Pre-School Program (early 1960s) is highlighted as a significant example in producing positive effects on children and return of investment (Sherman et al., 2002: 31; Goldblatt & Lewis 1998: 9). Targeting disadvantaged African American children and their mothers, a two year high quality pre-school education and home visits were provided. The follow-up evaluation at age 19 observed the program participants had better academic achievement, fewer school dropouts, and a better employment rate than compared to the control group. This positive effect was also observed at the evaluation age of 27. Notably, the rate of being arrested five times or more was clearly different between the program participants (7 %)
and the control group (35%). The cost benefit of these outcomes was estimated at a 7-dollar return for every 1-dollar invested (Barnett, 1993, cited in Sherman et al., 2002: 31).

Other results from family-based programs include: a 79% relative reduction in child abuse for high risk mothers in the Rochester University study; and a 73% reduction in probation referrals in the Syracuse Family Development Programme (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 10).

Early childhood intervention tends to produce long-lasting effects on the treated group ranging from eight to twenty years.

**Middle childhood intervention (age 6 – 12):**

A combination of school-based child training and parent training has been found to reduce delinquency, aggression, violence and alcohol abuse. The target population was elementary school level children with behavior problems and/or low socioeconomic status. Parent training emphasized developing positive reinforcement for the child’s desirable behavior, and children received school-based social skills training. The interventions lasted for two to six years, and the positive effect was observed at evaluation point six years later. Lower rates of self-reported delinquency, less violence, less alcohol abuse and fewer sexual partners than the control group were identified. This type of intervention may not reduce crime immediately, but follow-up evaluations clearly found signs of preventing crime when the child matured.

An important feature identified in these programs is “the provision of child training in the school environment in a non-stigmatizing manner combined with high quality parent training (Sherman et al., 2002: 41).”

Although not categorized as a “family-based program,” the ICPC (1999b: 30) has identified the Big Brothers/Big Sisters mentoring program (“BBBS”) in the United States as an effective program for middle childhood intervention. This program has existed since the early 1900’s, and principally targets 6-18 year old children from socio-economically disadvantaged single parent families. It provides them with mentoring from carefully selected adults as well as recreational activities for one year (Sherman et al., 2002:183). The program had the effect of lowering aggression and lowering the probability of initiating drug (-46%) or alcohol use (-27%) among the mentored children.
Late adolescent intervention (13 – 18):

Programs were designed to treat serious antisocial behaviors in youth with a focus on intra personal (cognitive) and systemic (family, peer, school) factors associated with antisocial behavior. The target population was the youth who had been adjudicated or approved for emergency psychiatric hospitalization, the range of ages were from 13 to 15 years old.

A significant reduction in recidivism (police arrest), severity of offenses, behavior problems, and improvement in the function of the family unit as a whole were measured at two to four years after the program.

In relation to late adolescent intervention, there is one notable program which targeted young people although it is not categorized as a family-based program. The HALT program in the Netherlands, which took a restorative justice measure, was conducted in the early 1980’s. Twelve to 18 year old young people who were caught for the first or second time committing an act of vandalism were referred to this program as an alternative to formal prosecution. They were required to repair the vandalism damage they had caused, and received assistance to resolve employment, housing and education problems. The involvement in vandalism lowered among the program participants (25%) when compared to the control group (65%). As a result, this program has been expanded to over 43 cities across the country (ICPC, 1999b: 31).

The research findings have given us hints that youth crime is partly an extension of the childhood difficulties including their family and socio-economic status: childhood environments are closely connected to juvenile delinquency and youth crime. Therefore, we need to tackle the risk factors surrounding the children and their life. These findings teach us that when we face youth crime, we must go back and look at the problems surrounding the child, concurrently with investigating the crime itself. We can prevent at-risk children from turning into future offenders when we tackle the right risk factors.

As found in early childhood interventions, successful effects in family-based crime prevention tend to be long lasting, therefore securing these elements and developing and investing in these programs should be encouraged. These types of interventions need longitudinal study in order to evaluate program effects on the prevention of crime. Evaluations
have found that immediate effects take a form of better academic achievement, less violent behaviour, and the prevention of crime could be measured when the children have grown to youths or adults.

There seem to be three major elements in successful family-based crime prevention: 1) clearly targeting both at-risk children and parents (family), 2) improving generic services, and 3) multidimensional approaches to youth problems. The family’s socioeconomic status seems to have a great impact on the child’s life, so removing such difficulties and strengthening social service is crucial.

(B) School-based Crime Prevention

Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) argue that school-based initiatives require the involvement of a wide range of people rather than the initiatives based on individuals. Sherman et al. (2002) have also identified that programs taking a school-wide and/or community-wide approach to the students’ problems and safety produced desirable effects on reducing delinquency, antisocial behavior, substance abuse, and improving both the academic climate and school attendance. Instructional programs such as instructing students to change individual attitudes or behaviors were popularly used, but they were not as effective as the comprehensive programs.

The successful comprehensive programs usually needed school-wide and classroom-level efforts to identify problems, develop and implement strategies to solve the problems, and clarify norms and rules. Some programs involved the parents and the community for norm-setting (i.e. role model) and program review. Consistent feedback to students to reinforce desirable behavior was commonly seen in many programs.

In successful programs, Students were involved in the procedure of norm-setting and program implementation. Students received, at the same time, various interventions in each program: among others are problem-solving skill training, normative education, cognitive skill-training and targeted behavior modification. The PATHE project combined institutional change with individually-based initiatives to increase educational attainment and reduce delinquent behavior in high school and middle school. This program brought about an average drop of 14% in the suspension rate in experimental high schools, as opposed to a 10% increase
in the control schools (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 13).

In addition to setting norms for students, Norway’s program against bullying indicated the importance of school-wide commitment with teachers’ involvement to develop a positive school environment. The program recommended improving supervision of the playground and more active teacher involvement as well as setting clear class rules. The result was a 50% reduction in bullying. A program similar to Norway’s “whole-school” approach was implemented in 23 schools in England. Primary schools experienced a successful reduction of bullying, and so did secondary schools even though the impact was smaller (Sherman et al., 2002: 82; Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 14).

The Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP) conducted in the United States provided disadvantaged high school students with intensive and long-term (4 years) in- and out-of-school services such as academic support, development and service activities, and some scholarships. Importantly, each student was assigned to a mentor. This program has been tremendously successful in reducing delinquent behaviors, for example: 63% of program members graduated high school compared to 42% of the control group; 42% of program members went on to post-secondary schools compared to 16% of the control group; and the program members, were less likely to be arrested: 19% compared to 23% of the control group (Sherman et al., 2002: 136-137; ICPC, 1999b: 30-31).

These research findings suggest that the social climate where the students carry on their daily life plays a key role in order to reduce their risks. Conditioning the environment around the child with social services, norms and standards and academic assistance are critical. The key element in preventing criminality in children and youth is a multifaceted approach: in other words, targeting only the child at risk may not be the solution.

Research findings have suggested that the school-wide and community-wide, namely a comprehensive approach, to student’s problems is a crucial element and would lead to preventing and reducing crime. We should recall that risk factors are interrelated in a complex way (ICPC, 1999b: 23). This means that the existence of one risk factor does not immediately lead to crime, but various risk factors interacting in a complicated network emerge in a form of crime. The
need for a comprehensive approach suggests that we need to invest in the child’s life.

Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) provided more cost effectiveness aspects of both family-based and school-based crime prevention. Six out of seven studies were found to have a favourable cost-benefit outcome in the review which Welsh conducted (Welsh, B. in press. cited in Goldblatt & Lewis 1998: 17). The benefits saved from the program effects are: reduced crime and delinquency, less reliance on welfare payments, more subjects employed, which leads to an increase in tax revenues, less use of remedial education and less use of security and emergency services. This information demonstrates that the benefit of crime prevention is not limited to just reducing crime, but rather to a wide spectrum of social stages (See also ICPC, 1999b: 32).

The analysis of the causes of crime in Japan in Chapter 2 shows some of the risk factors that are identified in the scientific evaluations. For example, child-abuse and neglect by mothers or their partners, lack of support for young parents partly because of the nuclear family and divorce, unemployment due to recession, and increasing truancy. These risk factors are well recognized by the mass media and police reports as serious concerns in Japanese society. However, not so many programs or policies that specifically try to tackle these risk factors with a long-term vision to prevent future crime have not been launched.

Child abuse and neglect have become a national focus these days partly due to saturation coverage by the mass media as introduced in Chapter 2. Active discussion and current revision of legislation to detect and prevent child abuse is a step in the right direction, however, it still seems more “reactive” than “proactive” compared to the successful crime prevention programs introduced in this section. We have to realize that child abuse and neglect is not only the “result” of struggling parents, but also a critical “beginning” of the risk that the abused child may become a future offender. Therefore, we have to tackle the root-causes such as how the parents came to abuse the child and support the whole family rather than merely punish the parents.

The HALT program is a significant example for Japan. Graffiti and vandalism are one of major agendas in some local communities and business districts, and effective ways to deal with the disorder have been sought in order to protect communities and property (ICPC, 1999b:
If we take an approach like the HALT program, it suggests that there is a way to protect both our properties and our young people from moving towards further criminal offending.

The anti-bullying programs in Norway and the United Kingdom send a strong message that we may also be able to reduce bullying, which has long been a problem among school children in Japan as identified in Chapter 2. This issue has to be tackled as the Committee on the Rights of the Child specifically pointed out as a concern in Japan (see Chapter 2, 2.2.4). We have to have a long-term view and consider that some children’s lives are taken away as a result of the bullying. There is also a potential risk that a current bully may become a young offender, or the risk that the anger of the bullied might explode in the future. This argument is not about watching out for bullying and the bullied children. What we need to do is tackle the complicatedly interrelating risk factors surrounding young people’s lives, then we can reduce and prevent future offending behavior. Most importantly, the proven successes of these programs suggest that crime prevention programs should be studied and practiced in Japan.

3.1.2. Labor Market

This category is independently evaluated in Sherman et al. (2002) as unemployment is one of the known risk factors, especially among young people.

The Job Corps, which has been operating since the 1980s, provides residential support, vocational training for an average of 8 months, and one additional school year of education, has produced positive outcomes. The program targeted a severely disadvantaged population. The evaluation (Sherman et al., 2002:215-217) identified that the participants were more than twice as likely to have gained better academic achievement and more vocational certification than non-participants. In the 30-month follow-up period, the participants had a lower arrest rate than the control group, and the seriousness of their crime, in cases where crime was committed, was reduced.

The Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP) is also evaluated in the labor market category (Sherman et al. 2002: 218-219). Finding the same positive evaluation as in the school-based program evaluation, this evaluation underscores the importance of students’ routine
contact with their mentors in both QOP and Job Corps.

The evaluation in Sherman et al. (2002) has identified three steps as requirements to shift poor people out of crime and into employment. “Step 1. Reduce the attraction of crime. Step 2. Treat substance abuse problems. Step 3. Provide social and educational support to help high-risk individuals obtain employment” (Sherman et al., 2002: 232).

These key elements can be commonly seen in family-based and school-based crime prevention. Providing young people with alternative activities to crime in and out of school, and improving generic services is an important principle in the labor market setting. Thus, these three steps are the principal needs of social development crime prevention.

One major finding in this labor evaluation is that there has to be a pro-social environment and good supervision, such as a mentorship, otherwise it is difficult to implement interventions in highly disadvantaged areas which lack such conditions. The evaluation points out the necessity of policymakers’ contributions in order to bring about “large-scale change” in such a disadvantaged community (Sherman et al., 2002: 232). This concept is also equivalent to the generic service as identified in the family and school interventions.

Chapter 2 introduced that unemployment is a national concern in Japanese society. Given this situation, assisting young people with vocational training and education is crucial in order to prevent them from being involved in crime.

The traditional employment system has changed in Japan as shown in Chapter 2, and working styles may vary person to person. Nonetheless, jobs must be secured and young people’s lives must be stabilized. Their needs must be assessed, and programs should be developed reflecting these needs in cooperation with the local business sectors for future employment.

3.1.3. Situational Crime Prevention

Paul Ekblom in Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) explains that situational crime prevention aims to influence an offender’s decision or ability to commit crimes at particular places and times. “Thus it (situational crime prevention) seeks to make criminal actions less attractive to
offenders rather than relying on detection, sanctions or reducing criminality through, for example, improvements in society or its institutions (p. 23).”

There is a tendency for some victims to be repeatedly victimized, and some offenders repeatedly commit crime. Similarly, some places and times experience concentrations of crime occurrences; these are referred to as “hot places” and “hot times.” Situational crime prevention focuses on the factors that cause the concentration. The followings are the factors in relation to private property: “the availability of goods, particularly goods that are easy to carry and sell (e.g., cars, bicycles, televisions); homes left without surveillance; having been a burglary victim once or more; and accessibility of entrances and natural hideaways (ICPC, 1999b: 35).”

Most interventions reviewed in the Sherman et al. (2002) are rated “unknown” due to their weak research designs. Situational crime prevention in many cases did not use a true experiment or the experiment was not appropriate. Notably, targeting large areas like neighborhoods and cities is much more difficult than controlling participating people. Although Sherman’s scale could not judge them as “they work,” it recognized that situational crime prevention reduces crime in many circumstances: “Over 90 percent of the interventions reported evidence of crime reduction following the installation of an opportunity-blocking tactic” (Sherman et al., 2002: 281). Some target hardening measures, such as installation of deadbolt locks, short walls, alarms and security camera have produced some burglary reduction (Rosenbaum, 1998: 133-134). Increasing street lighting has reduced crime in some cities, but also has been found to have no impact on crime in other cities (Rosenbaum, 1998: 140).

Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) and the ICPC (1999b) also admit there are limits to situational crime prevention. However, these two studies more positively value the effects of situational crime prevention. These reports emphasize practicality and the cost-effectiveness of situational crime prevention.

One very well known situational crime prevention tactic is a closed circuit television camera (CCTV). In Newcastle, England, for example, large numbers of people and vehicles in the city center often lead to problems such as property crime, public disorder, and traffic congestion (ICPC. 1999a: 122). The use of CCTV helped to address the situational factors
which promote or deter criminal behavior in public areas. After 15 months of surveillance, strategies that targeted identified risk factors resulted in reaching monthly reductions in burglary, -56%; theft from motor vehicles, -50%; and thefts of motor vehicles, -47%.

Another successful example is the Kirkhoff Estate case in England in 1986 (ICPC, 1999a: 132-133; Clarke 1992: 223-229). This program targeted the repeat burglary in a high-risk area by upgrading home security, conducting a systematic neighborhood watch targeting once-victimized home ("cocoon watch"), and removing targets of burglary. This program produced a striking success in one year: 58% reduction in burglaries, 80.5% drop in repeat victimizations, and 75% reduction in burglaries over four years. In addition to these, it produced more than a 500% return on investment.

The benefit of situational crime prevention is not limited to reduced crime and victimization. For example, prevented crime such as fraud, robbery and vandalism in business will benefit profitability, help avoid of business interruption, build user confidence, and ultimately reduce prices for the wider community (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 34).

Successful interventions in situational crime prevention focus on specific problems and their context in areas such as neighborhoods and cities. Wider targets contain various factors and features, therefore it is difficult to control treatment and measure its direct effect. It is also difficult to apply a universal treatment to different places. Due to this specification, a successful program in a certain place may not be easily generalized to a larger population. In terms of generalizability, situational crime prevention in general may not be classed as working, but the large reductions that some interventions produced in certain situations cannot be ignored.

The limits of situational crime prevention and the mixed results of evaluation suggest that the costs may outweigh the effectiveness and benefits in many programs. In a time of tight national budgets, monitoring and evaluation should be rigorously used to mobilize limited resources efficiently and effectively. "Nevertheless, insofar as they have targeted clearly identified risk factors and have similar findings, it may be concluded that most are worth replicating (ICPC, 1999b: 41).”

Goldblat and Lewis (1998) address that situational crime prevention does not aim to
abolish conventional crime control, but rather confirms the importance of a partnership between local authorities and the police; for example, it addressed the need for central government to fully support local activities since they are working for the national interest (1998:45).

The elements introduced in this section must be the most immediately applicable and effective in Japan since the current citizen-based crime prevention efforts in Japan are mostly situational crime prevention (see Chapter 2). Those existing efforts and programs should be evaluated using the available knowledge as soon as possible.

The following items should be assessed:

- Whether or not an intervention is appropriately matched with a problem;
- Whether or not the intervention is monitored and evaluated;
- Whether or not the intervention has produced any results; and
- Whether or not the produced results are proportionate to the cost of intervention.

Discussion of “displacement” is still a concern in situational crime prevention (Rosenbaum, 1998: 164): study of displacement should also be promoted.

3.1.5. Criminal Justice Intervention and Crime Prevention

Interventions in the courts and corrections are for people who have already committed offences. Therefore, programs by court order mainly focus on recidivism prevention.

Sentencing itself is generally believed as a formal and powerful tool to control crime as a deterrent effect on both criminal and general populations. Goldblatt and Lewis (1998: 85) addressed the principal aims of criminal justice interventions with regards to crime prevention as follows: change future behaviour of offenders for the better; deter those who might otherwise be tempted into crime; and maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system.

General deterrence encourages potential offenders to decide not to commit crime by perceiving: “the risk of being caught and convicted; and the severity of sentence on conviction (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 93).” But such perceptions are subjective depending on a person. and the real deterrence effect is difficult to measure.

The most well-known disposition by criminal justice is incarceration. It was estimated
that achieving a 1% fall in the crime rate through incarceration requires a 25% increase in the prison population (Tarling, 1994, cited in Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 95). A 25% increase would mean about 16,000 people in the United Kingdom, and 15,000 people in Japan.\(^{13}\) However it should be noted that incarceration costs great amounts of money. It has been reported that a reduction in serious crime by 10% through increasing incarceration costs about US$228 in tax increases per capita. However, it is only about US$48 tax increase with parental training and US$32 for school graduation incentives to achieve the same reduction (ICPC, 1999b).

Finally, it should be noted that some research on the reconviction rate in the United Kingdom have reported that there was no significant difference between the effects of custody and community penalties (Kershaw & Renshaw, 1997, cited in Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998: 90).

However, incarceration is not the only intervention that the conventional criminal justice can provide. Goldblatt and Lewis (1998), Sherman et al. (2002), and ICPC (1999b) acknowledge that sending offenders to community-based rehabilitation programs is effective. The Sherman et al. (2002) evaluation has rated rehabilitation programs as “it works” based on substantial evidence. Effective programs, which reduced recidivism by 10 to 20 \%, shared some important elements: programs targeted “a behavior that is clearly associated with criminal activities” (Sherman et al., 2002: 385). Many of the effective programs involved communities where program graduates return.

To the contrary, the more traditional approach, for example increasing the punitive impact of the sentence such as Scared Straight program, intensive supervised probation or parole, and home confinement, was found to have no impact on reducing recidivism. Even though the general deterrence effect has not been measured, as introduced earlier, Sherman et al.’s evaluation (2002) has found that simply increasing control over offenders does not work to prevent recidivism. This finding suggests that punishment from the criminal justice may not deter potential offenders from committing the first offence.

\(^{13}\) The average population of the imprisoned people per a day in Japan is 63,415 (National Police Agency (2002) White Paper on Police).
Incarceration has its own role in protecting the society: by reducing risks to the public during the incarceration, and satisfying the public need for retribution (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 98). But this research suggests that the costs of incarceration easily outweigh the benefit that it can bring in terms of crime prevention. Upon developing effective crime prevention policies, we should recognize that incarceration is a very expensive sort of intervention, and there are alternative ways to achieve comparable outcomes at less cost.

In Japan, a debate on hardening criminal justice sanctions has attracted national attention. Major news media and television shows vigorously introduce public opinion and host public debates. However, the knowledge that this chapter demonstrated does not seem to be well known to the public yet.

The public is confused and seeking better solutions to make the country safer. A vigorous debate itself is a positive initiative of public engagement. The scientific knowledge needs to be provided to the public to find effective solutions for their society.

3.1.6. Comprehensive Local Community-based Crime Prevention

Community-based interventions include both social development and situational prevention, and local institutions take leadership to bring local people together within communities. Sherman et al. (2002) and Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) found common elements: even though community-based crime prevention has a broad target population, “promising” programs tend to target specific populations such as young people from low-income families.

The importance of community-based programs such as afterschool recreation programs is a vital bridge between disadvantaged or at-risk young people and the “wider community” (Sherman et al., 2002: 186) through activities and mentors.

Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) paid attention to social problems lying behind the crime phenomenon pointing out that social difficulties, once accumulated, eventually add up and lead to “a spiral of deterioration” (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 53). For example, drug-misuse, family violence, teenage pregnancy, school failure, high levels of environment disorder such as vandalism and graffiti, repeat victimization and criminal networks, which are not necessarily
mafia or gang, are indicated as fueling further criminal activities.

Its main conclusions in Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) are based on this recognition: "target crime prevention on high crime communities; and apply comprehensive community initiatives to tackle the interlocking problems of social dislocation, of which crime plays an important part" (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 58). It also recognizes the effectiveness of inter-agency co-ordination at the local level in order to deliver such comprehensive strategies.

3.2. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated throughout this chapter, effective crime prevention requires comprehensive community-based efforts in all settings. Effective crime prevention takes multi-disciplinary approach by multiple partners, and interventions have to meet local needs. Each partner has a crucial role to play to reduce and prevent crime, but acting alone does not effectively achieve the goal. Risk factors are complicatedly interrelated to each other, therefore, community-wide intervention and a coordinated inter-agency approach are indispensable to tackle social problems.

Having reviewed and analyzed the evaluations of most aspects of crime prevention, it has become clear that most of the successful programs share some key elements as principle. Interventions have to:

- Set a clear target population and problem (risk factors), and use specific tactics to tackle the problem;
- Take a comprehensive approach involving all key partners surrounding the problem (i.e. school-wide and community-wide efforts, cooperation and partnership among key partners);
- Remove the identified risk factors, and condition the environment with good social support; and
- Plan well, monitor the process of implementation, and evaluate the effect of the intervention.
Crimes seem to be breaking out in various settings in Japan. It is a daunting challenge to decide where to start to tackle these crimes. Japan tends to expect the police to deal with all the problems connected to the crime. What needs to be recognized first is that there are many precursor risk factors before the crime, and they need to be tackled one by one at the community level. Various crime prevention initiatives in Japan should be reviewed if they are consistent with the strategies proven to be effective by scientific evaluations. The following summary table illustrates risk factors and what is known about successful prevention programs, and they are contrasted to problems, crime prevention initiatives and/or capacity and gap from the knowledge in Japan.

The summary table elucidates that crime prevention initiatives in Japan are missing numbers of essential elements identified in scientific evaluations. For example, no monitoring and evaluation appears in every setting, and a large vision to prevent crime as a multi-agency work seems to be missing.
### Summary Table 4  What has worked from scientific evaluations and Possible Gaps in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factors from Scientific Knowledge</th>
<th>Problems in Japan</th>
<th>Crime Prevention Initiatives in Japan</th>
<th>What has worked from Scientific Evaluation</th>
<th>Possible Gap in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysfunctional Family</td>
<td>Child abuse</td>
<td>Child abuse prevention network</td>
<td>Targeting risk factors works</td>
<td>Programs under the name of crime prevention are mostly situational measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor parenting</td>
<td>Increasing divorce rates</td>
<td>Home visit</td>
<td>Interventions in early (0-5) and middle (6-12) childhood and late adolescent (13-18) work (e.g. Perry Pre-school, Big Brothers and Big Sisters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social welfare policy (generic services)</td>
<td>Comprehensive approach works (e.g. Quantum Opportunities Program)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative poverty</td>
<td>Recession</td>
<td>Recession</td>
<td></td>
<td>No monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many social development approaches are not recognized as crime prevention measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economical inequality</td>
<td>Economical inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor school performance</td>
<td>Bully in school</td>
<td>Education of life (Inochino Kyoiku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent truancy</td>
<td>Truancy</td>
<td>Cognitive and social skill training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of impulsiveness and hyperactivity</td>
<td>Student suicide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of violence</td>
<td>High level of impulsiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator: gun, alcohol, drug</td>
<td>Culture of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of drug</td>
<td>Big Brothers and Sisters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Hot spot map</td>
<td>Identifying risk factors and setting a specific target, and tailored strategies work (e.g. CCTV targeting specific risk factors, Kirkholt Estate Program)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of surveillance</td>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Neighborhood patrol, school zone patrol</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation are essential</td>
<td>No monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street snatch theft</td>
<td>Safety manual</td>
<td>Return on investments</td>
<td>No assessment of displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>The degree of technical support from police is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce empty Koban (police officers), more surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase of police officer is expensive and shrinking national budget</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase police patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime prevention association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat victimization</td>
<td>More research needed</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>e.g. Kirkholt Estate Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table outlines various risk factors, problems, and initiatives in Japan, along with what has worked from scientific evaluations, and possible gaps in Japan.*
| Comprehensive Community-based | Various risk factors interlocking each other  
- Family violence  
- Unemployment  
- School failure  
- High level of environment disorder,  
- Repeat victimization,  
- Criminal networks etc. | Various interlocking social difficulties  
- Dysfunctional family  
- Recession: unemployment  
- Problems in school  
- Presence of drug  
- Urbanization | Child abuse prevention network  
- Social policy  
- Crime prevention association  
- Rehabilitation Bureau and community cooperation (i.e. Volunteer Probation Officer) | Comprehensive approach (both social development and situational) works  
- Partnership works  
- Bridge between at risk people and wider community is necessary (e.g. Quantum Opportunity Program)  
- Setting specific target population works  
- Interagency coordination for delivery is needed | Mostly situational  
- Many of social development approaches are not recognized as crime prevention measures  
- No monitoring and evaluation  
- Coordination of delivery unknown/questionable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Criminal Justice | Recidivism  
- Re-entry to correctional facility | High re-incarceration rates  
- Overburdened correctional facilities  
- Expensive, and tight national budget | Probation and Rehabilitation  
- Victims' activities, i.e. restorative justice  
- Increase police officer for more arrest and deterrence | Community-based rehabilitation program works  
- Targeting specific behavior works  
- Harsh traditional measures have no impact  
- Use of formal criminal justice system is expensive  
- Not cost-effective | Need cost-benefit analysis  
- Tight national budget  
- Need evaluation from outside of ministries |
CHAPTER 4
POLICING FOR CRIME PREVENTION

This independent chapter, exclusively for policing, examines the effectiveness of police in crime prevention. It demonstrates findings from the scientific evaluations of policing from Sherman et al. (2002), ICPC (1999b) and Goldblatt and Lewis (1998), and it further examines a report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, which assessed police capacity to promote effective crime prevention. Some findings may challenge conventional thoughts of police role in Japan, where police and citizens believe that crime prevention is largely police job, and police is a dominant central agency that deals with overall crime in communities.

4.1. KEY PRINCIPLES AT THE POLICE PERFORMANCE LEVEL

4.1.1. Police Leadership

What "bring[s] life to strategies and policies" (HMIC, 1998: 20: 2.13) is unequivocal leadership from the highest level of management. HMIC argues that a key part of a comprehensive approach to crime management is a positive crime reduction emphasis by the police service (HMIC, 1998: 17).

HMIC (1998) requires unequivocal leadership from the highest level of management within the police. The Inspection realized that crime reduction activity was most focused when there was clarity of leadership. It found that strong leadership not only substantially contributed to the integration of crime reduction into general policing, but also contributed to a positive impact on the belief of their own staff and on relationships with external partners. Continuity and consistency of leadership needs to be secured by getting systems and structures in place. One motivated person may be able to substantially commit to crime reduction, but it has to continue beyond the tenure of that person. Leadership also needs to be encouraged at the local managers level. The report requires chief officers to support local managers with guidance and encouragement instead of merely demanding them to achieve success. Such support will lead to co-ordinating total crime reduction efforts in the entire police force (HMIC, 1998: 20: 2.19).

In relation to the co-ordination, the Inspection found that where central co-ordination is absent,
there is duplication of efforts. So there is a pressing need for the center to co-ordinate and support the municipal levels.

4.1.2. Clear Target and Problem Solving Approach

*Whether additional police prevent crime may depend on how well they are focused on specific objectives, tasks, places, times and people* (Sherman et al., 2002: 295).

The police are necessary in modern society, but it had not been made clear-cut if a “large” police force would effectively reduce crime. Thus, the typical public view, “[t]he more police we have, the less crime there will be (Sherman et al., 2002: 295),” should be questioned. The HMIC (1998) revealed that some police forces have achieved a 40% reduction in crime in five years without receiving any significant increase in police officers (HMIC, 1998:9). This finding alone suggests that there are ways to reduce crime without exclusively depending on increasing the number of police officers.

The most essential element for policing to be effective as crime prevention as identified by the evaluation is to focus on specific risk factors. Scientific evaluations have found that programs that have been proved to be effective in preventing crime are:

- precisely directed patrols in hot spots;
- making arrests focusing on high-risk persons or places;
- proactive arrests of repeat offenders and drunk drivers; and
- problem-oriented policing tackling certain problems with certain tactics

For example, Sherman and Weisburd’s study (1995) (cited in Sherman et al., 2002: 309) on hot spot patrol found that the doubled patrol presence in hot spots reduced crime up to 50%. A problem-oriented policing program focusing on gun crime in hot spots during hot times (Sherman, Shaw & Rogan. 1995, cited in Sherman et al., 2002: 320) produced strong evidence as well: “Gun seizures in the target area rose by 60 percent, and gun crimes dropped by 49 percent” (Sherman et al., 2002: 320). The effectiveness of targeting and arresting drunk drivers has been recognized in both US and UK studies. It is notable that the police initiative to tackle drunk drivers in the United Kingdom has eventually caused a change in public attitude against drinking
and driving (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 71). The HMIC (1998) point out that targeting "hot spots" is one example of problem-solving approach.

Neighborhood Watch programs by the police illustrate an opposite feature. Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) pointed out that the police most commonly implemented the Neighborhood Watch scheme in areas with low crime rates, but could not easily implement and maintain the scheme in high crime areas where the intervention is most needed. These research findings revealed the weakness of police strategies. They ignored local conditions. The research states, "that the mere establishment of neighbourhood watch schemes cannot be expected to bring down crime automatically (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 68)." This suggests that mere police interventions without strategic planning not only makes no difference but could also waste limited resources.

A good contrast to Neighborhood Watch is the Kirkholt project in the United Kingdom (see Situational Crime Prevention section in Chapter 3). Goldblatt and Lewis (1998) referred to this project in the policing section as a successful case of both targeting repeat victims (clear target) and a good partnership between police and local authorities.

Crime prevention measures and policing strategies should be tailored to each problem. "[S]uccess is more likely where a crime and disorder problem has been defined and analysed holistically in terms of a specified locality (HMIC, 1998: 27, 3.7)." Understanding how crime prevention measures work in different contexts for different problems is crucial: police must conduct systematic analysis of problems in order to solve them. Then, develop and implement measures that are based on the nature and causes of the local problem. The Inspection reveals that "[i]nformation provided by forces indicated that a large proportion of crime reduction effort was unfocused and therefore likely to be unproductive and wasteful (HMIC, 1998: 26)."

An important principle to support the effectiveness of the problem-solving approach is the partnership work. Identifying entangled risk factors behind crime in a variety of localities requires the involvement of partners (Rosenbaum, 1998: 179). The problem-solving approach is a community-oriented approach, which will be explained in the following section.
4.1.3. Partnership

"There is a tendency to overstate their (the police) role... it is not their job to intervene in many of the circumstances which lead to crime being committed. They do not make decisions about the deployment and management of staff in housing estates, schools, youth clubs and shopping centres..." (Bright, 1997, cited in HMIC, 1998: 39).

When implementing community policing, the community's participation with its initiative, especially in high crime areas, is vital. Chicago style community policing has actively mobilized the high crime communities by involving them in meetings with the police, and made the greatest perceived reduction in serious crime where people perceived police to be “most responsive” to citizen concerns (Sherman et al., 2002: 318).

The survey conducted by HMIC (1998) has found that the police service sees partnership as an important factor for success, and both police and partners at the local level valued partnerships for providing public consensus and community ownership of problems and their solutions.

Problems that occur in a local community mainly originate in that community, as identified in scientific and international norms. In many circumstances, community members must intervene and produce solutions to their problems, especially if the problems have not yet become crime, because the police may not be able to intervene in many such situations. If dealing with crime is solely dependent on the police without any community commitment, the police may take a long time to identify the root-causes of crime or the root-causes may never be identified and/or cured. The causes of crime problems must be removed to reduce crime, and community ownership of problems and their solutions should be promoted by including them as partners in crime management.

HMIC (1998) emphasizes the importance of linking crime reduction and other relevant work, and accordingly, recognizes the need for a variety of approaches to reduce crime. Partners includes education, environmental and social improvement as necessary approaches to crime in addition to other conventional criminal justice approaches such as enforcement, investigation and incapacitation (HMIC, 1998: 17: 2.3). HMIC (1998) also urges the provision
of appropriate resources and supports to the communities (see also Rosenbaum, 1998: 180). In order for communities to effectively tackle their problems, good professional knowledge and assistance from police is essential. Police involvement is necessary: “[t]he police were seen as having credibility and influence ranging from effect on government policy and its subsequent application, to requirements for their partnership in single regeneration budget bids and the ability to encourage new members into projects and partnerships (HMIC, 1998: 39: 4.3).” Also police involvement adds value to community activities. For example, the ineffectiveness of citizen-based neighborhood watch was due partly to a lack of police involvement (HMIC, 1998: 44). The police’s role as law enforcement authority and their professional skills (resource) must work with community intervention. These findings explain the recommendation in Goldblatt and Lewis (1998): “To be successful, they (Neighborhood Watch schemes) need to be planned and introduced with sensitivity to community dynamics (p.68).” Good relationships and technical alliances among the police, local authorities and community organizations must be formed.

Clear directions and clear reduction-targets should be set along with a clear statement of the priority of the project. Both police forces and their partners should set long and short term reduction targets (HMIC, 1998: 18: 2.8). Working together involving multiple partners comes with the risks of being misled and inefficient: furthermore, duplication work might waste resources. Poorly co-ordinated efforts and a lack of clear objectives may cause such a situation. Therefore, coordination and clear objectives are necessary in working with partners (p.40).

In addition to such cross-sectional approaches, policing itself has to have several strategies to tackle crime: “no one single strategic model is prescribed as the ideal to be adopted by all forces (HMIC, 1998: 17: 2.2).” In order to manage such various strategies and policies under one objective, a consistent, integrated and cohesive approach must be formed.

4.1.4. Sharing Good Practice

There should be mechanisms to identify, validate and disseminate good practices both within and outside the force (HMIC, 1998: 37). Interviews of the forces conducted by the HMIC found that most of the police forces acknowledge the advantages of sharing good practices

Good knowledge should be replicated and tested for implementation in more places. Examples of successful practices will give other forces a platform from which to start their own crime prevention strategies and programs. A lack of encouragement to use good practices from chief officers and a "‘not invented here’ attitude (HMIC, 1998: 33: 3.34)" were found to be possible obstacles. This demonstrates that without positive executive leadership effective knowledge sharing is not possible.

4.1.5. Accountability

Sherman et al. (2002) have identified that perceived police legitimacy is a crucial element in crime prevention through community policing. The legitimacy is determined by citizens judging from police attitudes towards them during encounters with police. For example, the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment found an association between respectful police attitudes towards offenders and low recidivism of domestic violence. Such a result was consistent in other programs’ evaluations (Sherman et al., 2002: 318).

In the meantime, HMIC (1998) points out the importance of accountability in the police themselves, arguing that accountability needs to be held at all levels of the police. The highest level of police is, needless to say, crucial, but at the same time, “[t]he most important within a force is that of the basic command unit (BCU) commanders. This is not just because of their delegated responsibility for service delivery but also because accountability at that level inevitably percolates to lower management levels and individuals (HMIC, 1998: 21).”

Accountability can be established in many forms: for example, a chief officer reviews trends in crime and the performance of his BCU commanders in relation to targets, and checks with the commander when necessary. Or, the Basic Commander Units can hold weekly tasking and co-ordination meetings where priorities are set, responsibility allocated and reports on progress and achievement can be determined for the next meeting (HMIC, 1998: 22: 2.23). The Inspection has found that some forces still have not established and developed approaches to accountability. The Inspection concludes, “The absence of accountability makes continuous
performance improvement unattainable (p.22).”

HMIC (1998) further argues that police partners should be held to the same standards as police. Police practitioners articulated that some of their partners, who could impact levels of crime, are not held accountable, and this can act as a disincentive to partners to commit resources to crime reduction (HMIC, 1998: 54). Police has limits to give accountability to their partners: the government must take a role to reinsure the importance of the role of partners by assigning robust accountability, and it must bring the partners to the crime management table (HMIC, 1998: 53-54).

4.1.6. Information System

HMIC (1998: 34) points out that good quality information, its accessibility and comprehensiveness is essential. Information from various sources must be integrated for systematic use, and problem-solving databases should be established. Accessible, comprehensive, up-to-date and accurate information systems enable the police to be responsive to emerging trends, analyze problems, target resources and monitor and evaluate effectiveness (HMIC, 1998: 34: 3.39).

Developing protocols and good practice guidelines are recommended because the police tend to unfairly limit information sharing citing data protection. Good quality information, as well as good practices should be shared among police forces and their partners. However, we should recall that “[g]ood information systems alone do not lead to effective action (HMIC, 1998: 35: 3.45).” Staff awareness, senior management commitment and training on how to use the information systems are necessary.

4.1.7. Monitoring and Evaluation

“Monitoring … is not an option. Failure to implement a programme as planned is a common cause of project failure; monitoring is way of ensuring that those responsible for actions carry them out (HMIC, 1998: 30: 3.24).” The message is clear: monitoring a program implementation is an essential element in producing a difference in our society with crime reduction programs. The Inspection found that a claim of success in many cases was based on the existence of the crime reduction initiative; not what it achieved. As evidence-based
prevention stipulates, crime prevention/reduction programs should be assessed on what they achieved; not by their intention.

A critical step in achieving crime reduction and making a difference in our society is to implement a well planned program in the way it was planned. Accordingly, close monitoring is essential to ensure that actions are responsibly carried out. Monitoring is also identified as crucial in that it provides an opportunity to withdraw from projects and initiatives that are failing.

Besides measuring if an initiative's goals were achieved, evaluation is important to measure if costs associated with a project were proportionate to the benefit. Expending considerable resources motivated by the spirit of "we have to try something" is "unacceptable (HMIC, 1998: 31: 3.31)." Such an approach "should not continue without routine problem identification and analysis, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (HMIC, 1998: 31: 3.31)." Evaluations should be conducted and better information on costs and savings should be prepared. Finding failure is an important step towards successful crime reduction if the failure is assessed and collected for better operation.

4.2. NATIONAL CONTEXT: ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS

It should not be misunderstood that the principles identified in this chapter are solely left responsible for police and local communities. HMIC (1998) argues that conditioning a national environment, where the police service and crime reduction activities operate, should also be improved. Crime prevention is a national project: there must be a national context that helps crime prevention activities to be more deliverable and sustainable. National conditions that the HMIC (1998) addresses are integrated into Chapter 5, where details of the national context are discussed.

4.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter showed that police is necessary in society, and police has a key role in crime prevention. At the same time, this chapter showed limits of police to effectively prevent crime, arguing that mere police presence does not effectively reduce or prevent crime, but a strategic implementation of it can be effective. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, crime has a number of interlocking causes, and they need to be comprehensively tackled by multi-disciplinary
approach. In addition to "what works" in policing, HMIC (1998) addressed structural principles to deliver effective crime prevention.

Police must take a strong leadership to promote crime prevention, but working in partnership with community and other agencies such as education, health and housing is equally important. A crime problem should be identified and analyzed, and policing strategies should set a clear target taking a problem-solving approach: merely increasing the number of police and patrol could not only be ineffective but also waste resources. As identified in Chapter 2, Neighborhood Watch and patrol is one of popular citizen-based crime prevention initiatives in Japan. However, it is not clear to what degree the local police are involved in community activities and provide technical assistance to them. In addition, there is a basic understanding that increasing police officers in Koban and police patrol would be a solution to crime. The findings in this research should be shared by both police and citizens: these findings might be challenging to police, who is criticized by researchers that "the near absence of those (transparency and accountability) qualities (Marx 2001, cited in Johnson, 2003: 32) among Japanese police renders them conspicuously undemocratic (Abe, 2001, cited in Johnson, 2003: 32)."

Besides partnership with local communities and multiple agencies, police themselves must develop a horizontal partnership within their own organizations. Good practice should be shared with police forces across the country, and a mechanism to identify and disseminate good practice should be implemented. In this regard and to develop effective problem-solving strategies, establishing accessible and comprehensive information systems are essential. A conversation with a member of National Police Agency of Japan revealed that program delivery is within the discretion of local police agencies, and the system faces difficulty to implement good practice across the country. Both police and their partners must be held accountable: local police station levels are crucial because they actually deliver programs. Monitoring and evaluation essentially measure a delivery of well-planned programs and impacts of programs on crime reduction. Traditional criminal justice intervention is expensive. The cost of its use for crime prevention would easily outweigh the effectiveness and the benefits. Scientific research
highlights the cost-effectiveness of alternative interventions. In a time of tight national budgets, we need to invest in the research and implementation of these interventions.

Again, it should not be misunderstood that the principles identified in this chapter solely leave police and local communities responsible for crime prevention. Police, citizens and the government must understand that crime prevention is a national project, and they need to develop good partnership and implement a system that effectively delivers crime prevention programs.
### Summary Table 5  Knowledge from scientific evaluations and HMIC vs. Policing in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is known from Scientific and HMIC evaluations</th>
<th>Possible relevance to policing in Japan</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership from the highest level of management within the police is essential</td>
<td>Large expectation from citizens and government to prevent and/or deter crime</td>
<td>Accountability within police organization, especially local police force level is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting clear targets and problem-solving approach work</td>
<td><em>Koban</em> (as surveillance)</td>
<td>The presence of police may reduce street crime, but it is unknown if it takes problem-solving approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merely implementing patrol and increasing police officers do not make a difference</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>No scientific and extensive evaluation on effectiveness of prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manuals</td>
<td>Increasing police officers and patrol is the trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive approach to interlocking risk factors work</td>
<td><em>Koban</em> (community policing)</td>
<td><em>Koban</em> does not respond to social risk factors to be called as comprehensive approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership with other agencies and local community is essential</td>
<td>Child abuse prevention network</td>
<td>Effectiveness of partnership is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime prevention associations</td>
<td>Effectiveness of partnership is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Koban</em> (community policing)</td>
<td>They may develop partnership with only residents in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice should be shared within and outside the police force</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful police attitudes towards offenders and accountability in local community work</td>
<td>Respectful police attitude unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large expectation from citizens and government to prevent and/or deter crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and their partners should be held accountable</td>
<td>Legislation of some specific issues (e.g. Child Abuse Network)</td>
<td>Accountability within police organization is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partners' accountability is unknown: Some may be accountable for only some specific problems (e.g. Child abuse prevention network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation are essential</td>
<td>Official reports e.g. White Papers</td>
<td>No evaluation on effectiveness of practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part C: Implementation Strategies

CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FROM INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES

We now have a good idea from the research as to what sorts of factors would prevent and reduce crime and what we should invest in. The next step we need to consider would be “how we can actually deliver the elements?” In this chapter, strategies of how to organize and implement crime prevention as a national project are the main focus.

5.1. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE UN GUIDELINES AND THE WHO REPORT

The effective elements and main suggestions from the UN Guidelines and the WHO report are integrated in this section. These reports appeal to Member States at their government level for action. Therefore, the elements analyzed in this section are crucial hints for effective implementation and delivery of crime prevention policies and programs as a national project. Recommendations of role of governments from HMIC (1998) are referred in relevant sections.

5.1.1. Government Leadership and a National Action Plan

UN Guidelines: Article II.2; III.7; IV.A.17
WHO report: Recommendation 1

A leadership role must be recognized and played by all levels of government. We now know that crime prevention should be multisectorial work involving various agencies, organizations and businesses. An organization that can govern all of these is the national government. Due to this multi-disciplinary nature of crime prevention, cohesive and sustainable nation-wide crime prevention is difficult to establish without strong leadership from governments. Setting “reduction” as a key objective, the government sends a strong message to all related agencies of crime reduction (HMIC, 1998: 53).

Crime affects not only the parties directly involved, but also has national repercussions. It is the responsibility of all levels of government to create, maintain, and promote an institutional
framework that develops, implements and reviews sustainable crime prevention, by bringing all key partners together from multiple sectors and agencies in the government. The WHO report explains the benefits of the sustained public health approach as more substantial and long-lasting than reactive and short-term policies. Leaders must understand the benefits of prevention efforts and promote and support crime prevention as a national project.

Governments must develop a multi- sectored national action plan for sustained prevention efforts. It must bring all relevant key partners together including non-governmental organizations and private business sectors, and mobilize resources effectively and efficiently to maximize the crime prevention efforts. HMIC (1998: 55) also points out that many police and partners indicated a need for some national guidance in order to integrate their actions into partnership arrangements.

5.1.2. Tackling the Cause of Crime with Social Services

UN Guidelines: Article II.3; III.9, 11, 14; IV.C.25, 26, 27

WHO report: Recommendation 4, 6

Crime is the outcome of multiple interrelating risk factors and a wide range of causes. The first step of effective crime prevention identifies the risk factors and seeks to reduce the root-causes. Then, effective crime prevention should intervene to tackle and remove the multiple risk factors of crime.

The risk factors identify the target in people at risk; for example, "poor parenting" suggests the need for more generic services to single mothers. Specifically the UN Guidelines Article III.14 points out that special considerations need to be made in regards to the vulnerable members of society. The Guidelines particularly emphasize focusing on children and youth to promote their well-being (Article II.6 (a)).

Corresponding to this, the WHO report recommends promoting primary prevention, which has been identified as most effective when carried out early among people at higher risk, by providing health care and social development assistance to mothers, children and adolescents. It further recommends that government strengthen social protection policies and programmes for
both general and disadvantaged groups. Recognizing the established links between domestic conditions and violence, for example, reductions in the quality and quantity of health, education and social services would increase violence; the WHO asserts government’s responsibility to “do their utmost to keep social protection services operational (WHO, 2002: 251).”

The UN Guidelines Article II.3 is significant for acknowledging the limits of the formal criminal justice system in addressing the scope of the Guidelines. Although the Guidelines admits that the formal criminal justice system performs preventative functions, it states that enforcing laws, does not cover all aspects of a comprehensive approach to crime prevention.

5.1.3. Partnership and Comprehensive Community-based Crime Prevention

UN Guidelines: Article II.5; III.8, 9; IV.16; IV.A.19; V.30

WHO report: Recommendation 4, 6

Community involvement and cooperation/partnerships are regarded as important elements of effective crime prevention. As identified in the scientific research, the UN Guidelines Articles III.8 and 9 explain the importance of recognizing the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime. Tackling the multiple causes requires a multidimensional approach, therefore, partnerships across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens are essential.

Article III.8 suggests integrating crime prevention into relevant social and economic policies and programs, for example, employment, education, health, housing and urban planning, poverty, social marginalization and exclusion. The WHO report also recommends governments integrate violence prevention into social and educational policies.

At the practical level, the involvement of the community becomes critical: problems and needs are different in each community; therefore each community should identify its own crime prevention priorities. Implementation and evaluation of crime prevention and allocation of resources should be arranged according to the community’s characteristics.

5.1.4. Sustainability of Crime Prevention Policies and Programs

UN Guidelines: Article III.10; IV.A.20
WHO report: Recommendation 1

Crime prevention requires adequate resources. Funding and resources must be secured from the planning stages to delivery and evaluation in order to sustain effective programs and initiatives.

The UN Guidelines Article IV.A.20 (a) suggests governments and other funding bodies review resource allocation to establish and maintain an appropriate balance between crime prevention and the criminal justice and other systems. This suggestion is notable because it declares that crime prevention is as important as other criminal justice systems. This idea implies crime prevention must be managed by a permanent body responsible for crime prevention. The next section in this chapter will explain this concept of crime prevention as a permanent body.

We should recall that the scientific evaluations found that social development crime prevention programs take some years to produce crime reduction (see Chapter 3). Longitudinal evaluation can measure both immediate outcomes in the form of, for example, people’s improved behavior, and long-term effects in the form of crime reduction and prevention. The WHO report endorses the recommendation (WHO, 2002) that the sustained public health approach is more substantial and longer-lasting than short-term and reactive policies (Recommendation 1). In addition, multiple causes of crime, which interlock in a complex way, require persistent and patient engagements to be comprehensively tackled.

Considering these findings, we have to understand that crime prevention should be a long-term and consistent project; therefore program sustainability has to be secured at both financial and policymaking levels.

5.1.5. Permanent responsibility center

UN Guidelines: Article III.A.17

WHO report: Recommendation 1, 2, 7

UN Guidelines Article III.17 states that governments should include prevention as a permanent part of their structures and programmes for controlling crime. This ensures the
position of crime prevention as the 4th component of criminal justice in Europe.

Both UN Guidelines and the WHO report emphasize the importance of establishing centers or focal points with expertise and resources for crime prevention. A specific organization needs to collect and analyze data, monitor and report on progress made in prevention plans, facilitate and improve cooperation and collaboration and the exchange of information, as well as joint research and advocacy work.

Considering the multidimensional and multidisciplinary nature of crime prevention, establishing a responsible body for planning crime prevention and coordinating partnerships independent from a specific agency or interest, such as police, is essential. It tends to be thought that crime prevention is the territory of the criminal justice system, but it has already been made clear that crime prevention goes far beyond it.

Each partner involved in crime prevention has a different role and specialized task, but it must be ensured that everyone is working for and sharing one common purpose, preventing and reducing crime for our society. It is essential to have an independent responsibility-center, which works exclusively for the purpose of preventing and reducing crime.

Positive initiatives of crime prevention have been demonstrated in Japan at both governmental and citizen levels, but they are still fragmented and without integration. There is a need to assign responsibility to a specific organization to form and direct integrated crime prevention.

5.1.6. Knowledge-base
UN Guidelines: Article III.11, 14; IV.A.17 (e); IV.B.21, 23
WHO report: Recommendation 2, 3, 6

Knowledge base, or evidence-based crime prevention, is a key to the success of crime prevention. Scientific research has revealed that there is a gap between what we believe to be true and what actually is: some crime prevention measures believed to work and commonly used have been revealed to be ineffective. It is difficult to challenge this common belief, but scientific research has clearly indicated that there is a need to inspect current crime prevention
efforts in order to effectively prevent crime and victimization as well as saving our limited resources.

While some countries advance their knowledge-base, the WHO points out that not enough research has been done about risk factors that are shared across different settings, and even less research has been conducted about protective factors (WHO, 2002:248, Recommendation 3). Knowledge needs to be continuously generated and updated so we can understand the problem in different contexts and develop appropriate responses to it. Government must support academic institutions and independent researchers by advancing a research agenda through government policy and funding. Thanks to international crime prevention research, a great amount of knowledge has become available. But we must replicate and test the knowledge and further develop our own knowledge base. We should stop implementing what we think crime prevention is, and base our investments on a rigorous knowledge-base in order to maximize our results.

We must undertake rigorous evaluation of crime prevention effectiveness and its cost-effectiveness. It is recommended to conduct regular surveys of victimization and offending, and establish data systems. A national capacity to collect and analyze data should also be established (UN Guidelines Article IV.B.21; WHO, 2002: 247, Recommendation 2). "These data are necessary in order to set priorities, guide programme design, and monitor the progress of the action plan" (WHO, 2002: 247, Recommendation 2).

Furthermore, the knowledge should be provided to communities to inform them of the need for, and means of, crime prevention action (UN Guidelines Article IV.B.21). Good initiatives in Japan sometimes are not recognized as crime prevention. This is largely because information and knowledge is not well disseminated to communities. A good knowledge base is crucial for initiatives to take off as national crime prevention.

5.1.7. Systematic Implementation

UN Guidelines: Article 22, 23

In addition to urging development and use of the knowledge base, the UN Guidelines
indicate a need to establish a systematic process to implement knowledge and evidence-based
crime prevention (Waller, 2004). Both scientific and international guidelines in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 and this chapter have confirmed that implementation of crime prevention includes
identifying risk factors, planning based on the knowledge base, policy/program delivery, and
monitoring and evaluation. HMIC (1998: 54) has found a fragmentation and incompleteness of
coordinating function in both police and the national approach. It recommends coordination
system of crime reduction strategy and policy, national activity, similar projects and initiatives,
partnership, and evaluation.

A process of effective crime prevention must include multiple key actors, such as
criminal justice, education, health, social services, housing and urban development, community
organizations and the police (ICPC, 1999b: v). This cycle must be well coordinated by the
central responsible organization. The cycle is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1.
Key Elements of Successful Crime Prevention

5.1.8. Training and Capacity Building

UN Guidelines: Article IV.A.18; V.29

WHO report: Recommendation 2

Without appropriate training for accurate delivery of program objectives, well-planned crime prevention cannot produce its optimal effect. Training and capacity-building at the practical level need to be secured as the central government's responsibility (UN Guidelines, Article IV.A.18 (a-c)). HMIC (1998: 55) has found that there was not an integrated national provision for crime reduction training; trainings were individually provided to different agencies by different bodies.

Government must make sure to provide all relevant agencies with integrated professional training, and involve relevant educational and professional sectors in the provision and certification of professional qualifications. Governments, at the same time, must support the community throughout the nation to build their capacity to respond to their own needs. The WHO emphasizes establishing or enhancing national capacity to collect and analyze data (UN Guidelines, Article IV.A.18 (e), WHO Recommendation 2). Capacity building should not be left with only local communities, but it should be promoted as a nation-wide project.

Technical assistance among Member States and international funding organizations is also encouraged in the scheme of the UN Guidelines (Article V.29). The Japanese government should actively seek technical assistance from other countries where crime prevention has been advanced in quality and quantity if we are still at a loss as to what to do.

5.2. CONCLUSION

Crime prevention is a national issue for which the national and local governments need to take leadership. In this section, it has been made clear how governments should implement crime prevention as a national project.

Some of the individual elements and recommended strategies in the international guidelines are in fact already present in current Japanese society. For example, there are policies to tackle some risk factors such as poverty and unemployment by providing good social
welfare services. In addition, the knowledge-base concept is rigorously used in various fields of government such as technology, science, medical care and education. However, these good features do not seem to be integrated into crime prevention activities by multiple sectors as a national project. What urgently needs to be done in Japan is to form and carry out an integrated cross-ministerial and multi-disciplinary project under strong governmental leadership.

The review of the current crime prevention initiatives in Japan demonstrates an emerging trends of community prevention activities besides an over reliance on the criminal justice system. This is a positive sign, though still in the very early stage, and both citizens and governmental agencies need more professional support. The effective elements and analysis in this thesis should supplement their initiatives towards effective crime prevention.

What needs to be done

International guidelines guide the government on how to organize and manage crime prevention as a national project. What needs to be done by national leaders to deliver the essential elements for effective crime prevention is:

- Ensure that crime prevention is a national issue where national and local governments must take leadership and responsibility.
- Develop policies that tackle causes of crime, and be aware of the meanings of the existing social-welfare policies and services, which are relevant to the social development programs, in Japan. Insure that all related key actors are brought together.
- Develop partnerships and carry out integrated cross-ministerial, multisectorial and multidimensional work under strong governmental leadership.
- Secure resources and funding in order for crime prevention to be sustainable.
- Establish a permanent body in charge of crime prevention. Responsibility should be assigned to an independent organization for coordination of partnerships, planning and evaluation of crime prevention.
- Establish a knowledge-base of effective measures for crime prevention: Given the reality
of the crime trends, the ‘do something and feel good’ approach should not be acceptable.

- Provide training at all levels from management to practitioners. Seek technical assistance from other countries where crime prevention has been advanced. And support communities to build the capacity to respond to their own needs.

Changing established and traditional systems and thoughts, especially if they were functioning well before, requires tremendous effort. In particular, recommendations coming from foreign bodies whose culture and governmental structures are different might be difficult to smoothly integrate, and difficult for existing organizations to accept. But as the crime prevention initiatives in Japan have demonstrated in Chapter 2, Japan’s preference to use crime prevention is consistent with the international movements. The following summary table 6 well illustrates the possible relevance of both the scientific norms and international guidelines to Japan.

Japan is a Member State of the United Nations; it should contribute to international consensus, implement the UN Guidelines and promote its principles. Japan’s crime rates are still low among industrialized countries, and because of this, the international community is already studying Japan to try and lower crime in their own respective countries. Adopting these policies in Japan, an already closely studied model, might help promote the use of similar policies in the rest of the world.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Elements from International Guidelines</th>
<th>Possible relevance and capacity in Japan</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government leadership</td>
<td>• Prime Minister's leadership</td>
<td>• Sustainability is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National action plan</td>
<td>• Crime prevention policies</td>
<td>• Disparity, uncoordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tokyo Metropolitan Government's leadership</td>
<td>• No monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tackling the cause of crime with social services</td>
<td>• Various social and welfare policies</td>
<td>• Reactive policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Child abuse prevention network</td>
<td>• Many of social and welfare policies are not recognized as crime prevention measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on children and youth</td>
<td>• Social development initiatives (See Chapter 3)</td>
<td>• More research needed for their effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partnership and comprehensive community-based crime prevention</td>
<td>• Community involvement in situational crime prevention</td>
<td>• No evaluation on effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Crime prevention associations</td>
<td>• School related programs are mostly situational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrate prevention programs into relevant policies</td>
<td>• unknown</td>
<td>• Comprehensiveness still to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• unknown</td>
<td>• unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainability of crime prevention policies and programs</td>
<td>• Funds for evaluation unknown</td>
<td>• Fund allocation to private programs is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Funding and resources must be secured from the planning stages to evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sustainability is unknown and/or questionable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review resource allocation</td>
<td>• Tendency to use formal criminal justice intervention</td>
<td>• Use of criminal justice system is expensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Balance between crime prevention, the criminal justice system, and other systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Tight national budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Longitudinal evaluation is necessary</td>
<td>• Study of child abuse</td>
<td>• Longitudinal evaluation of crime prevention programs needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Permanent responsibility center</td>
<td>• Criminal justice agencies</td>
<td>• Interests of agencies are disproportionately for criminal justice agencies: not impartial for multidisciplinary crime prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UNAFEI</td>
<td>• Need an independent responsibility center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fragmented crime prevention initiatives must be integrated by a responsibility center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge-base</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No scientific evaluations including cost-effectiveness analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct regular surveys of victimization and offending</td>
<td>International Crime Victim Survey</td>
<td>Original survey should be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge to be provided to communities</td>
<td>Newsletters from local criminal justice agencies</td>
<td>Not multidisciplinary knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic implementation cycle: analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Good initiatives are not recognized as crime prevention measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and capacity building</td>
<td>Tokyo Metropolitan Government Academy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building should be promoted as a national project</td>
<td>UNAFEI Seminar</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance from other countries</td>
<td>UNAFEI seminars</td>
<td>Mostly for criminal justice agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELEMENTS:
CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

This chapter illustrates a case of implementation of "what works" under the central government's leadership in the United Kingdom, and shows what is known about implementation of crime prevention. The steps that the United Kingdom has taken are found to be consistent with scientific norms and the international guidelines. The UK case study demonstrates how its actions are relevant to scientific norms and international guidelines. It also provides lessons for effective implementation leaning from a preliminary assessment of the implementation in the UK.

6.1. CRIME AND DISORDER ACT 1998

6.1.1. Knowledge-base and Key Reports

Tony Blair's Labor Government strongly advocated gathering knowledge as a fundamental strategy in dealing with current crime trends. The culminations of this knowledge gathering effort have produced several reports, some of which had already been written and available, and others newly requested by the Labor Government.

The Labor Government conducted the Comprehensive Spending Review and it took "zero-based analysis that aimed to find the best way of delivering the Government's objectives (HM Treasury, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_index.cfm. See also Annex 2)." This zero-based analysis was critical for enabling the new strategy to be free from conventional thoughts and practices to deal with crime (See Annex 2).

Among many reports, which have become the bases of the Government, are Misspent Youth (1996) by the Audit Commission, which had warned that the youth justice system was failing both offenders and victims, and it was both expensive and inefficient (See Annex 2); Reducing Offending (1998) by the Home Office, Beating Crime (1998) by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and Crime Prevention Digest 1997 by ICPC. At the same time, the knowledge base demonstrated the importance of tackling the root-causes of crime and the
effectiveness of multidimensional, social development and comprehensive community-based crime prevention.

Given all the research evidence, the Labor Government came to the decision to implement the elements in the key reports by passing the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. These key reports contributed significantly to the government's decision to start reform.

6.1.2. Statutory Requirement

The Crime and Disorder Act was published in December 1997, and received Royal Assent (enacted) on 31 July 1998. The major purpose of this act is to build a safer community and a more responsible society. This Act is an expression of the UK's attempt to turn accumulated knowledge in crime prevention into practical policy. Enactment has helped solve some of the difficulties associated with crime prevention, such as a lack of integration, funding and clear directions, and it has made progress towards a nationally integrated crime prevention policy. The Act has enabled crime prevention to become a statutory responsibility, and all the necessary principles are to be implemented, mobilizing all the required partnerships.

6.1.3. Key Sections for Crime Prevention

Part 1, Prevention of Crime and Disorder, Crime and disorder strategies, Sections 5 – 7 “require local authorities and the police, with other key agencies and the community, to work together at district level to develop and implement strategies for reducing crime and disorder in the area (Home Office, Online).”

Part 1, Youth crime and disorder, Sections 8 – 18 set out new orders such as Parenting Order, Child Safety Orders, and Local Child Curfew Schemes Orders. The aims of these orders are to tackle serious, persistent but low-level disorder, requiring parents, social workers and the police to be involved as a statutory responsibility (Bell and Jones, 2002).

Part 3, Criminal Justice System, Youth Justice, Sections 37 – 42 address that prevention is the ultimate goal, requiring local authorities to establish a local structure of teams and services to deal with young offenders in partnership with other relevant agencies. The sections also require to create a Youth Justice Board to monitor the operation of the youth justice system as a
whole and work to improve standards.

The next sections introduce two major innovations produced by the requirements of the CDA 98: One is the Crime Reduction Programme, and the other is the Youth Justice Board.

6.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF CDA 98 – CRIME REDUCTION PROGRAMME

6.2.1. Crime Reduction Programme

The requirements in Sections 5-7 in the CDA 98 established a three-year, Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) in April 1999. These sections require local authorities and the police to work together, and place a joint responsibility for the formulation of crime and disorder reduction strategies in each district.

Strategies to reduce crime and disorder must be implemented by the partners, and their process and outcome must be reviewed and published locally for feedback. Section 6 specifically requires them to analyze and develop a strategy for tackling crime and disorder, and states that strategies will be expected to run for three years (CDA Guide by Home Office, online; Crime and Disorder Act 1998).

The Government provided the Crime Reduction Programme with significant amount of funding: the initial budget was 250 million pounds, and then raised to 400 million pounds. The budget invested in strengthening evidence-base research on effective methods and practices (Crime Reduction Programme website: http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/crimered.htm).

The CRP was comprised of various initiatives supporting and running various projects. The following are examples of the budgets made available for projects under the CRP (CRP website):

- 153 million pounds for Closed Circuit TV Initiatives;
- 30 million pounds for Targeted Policing, which aimed to help the police to develop and implement a problem oriented approach; and
- 13 million pounds for Youth Inclusion to enable about 70 Youth Inclusion schemes to be established.

Those projects were undertaken by local agencies in each region, and each Government
Regional Office had direct responsibility to monitor and coordinate the local delivery. The central government’s role was mainly providing the funding.

6.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF CDA 98 – YOUTH JUSTICE BOARD

6.3.1. Establishment of the Youth Justice Board

Part 3, Criminal Justice System, *Youth Justice*, Section 37, which addresses prevention as the principal aim of the youth justice system is remarkable for requiring the shift to the new strategy (prevention) from the conventional criminal justice approach of response.

Section 38.(2) specifically names chief officers of police, police authorities, probation committees and health authorities to cooperate with the local authority to secure that all youth justice services are available. In addition to these partners, Section 39 requires that local authorities act in concert with social services and education responsibilities and establish one or more Youth Offending Teams for their area. The Youth Offending Teams are required to include at least one of: a probation officer; a social worker; a police officer; a person nominated by a health authority; or a person nominated by the chief education officer in each youth offending team.

Importantly, Section 38.(3) provides that the local authority and every person or body mentioned in its subsection (2) above should make payments and contribute to expenditures and funding incurred in the provision of youth justice services. Thus, financial commitment has gone beyond the ministerial framework, and officially become the duty of all partnerships in crime prevention projects.

Section 41 announced a new body corporate, the Youth Justice Board, to be in charge of crime prevention. The establishment of the Youth Justice Board (YJB) has been another focal point in implementing and operating effective and integrated crime prevention throughout the nation. The Youth Justice Board was set up in order to help the delivery of the statutory responsibilities that were newly assigned to multiple agencies to work together by the legislation.

6.3.2. Remarkable Feature of Youth Justice Board

A remarkable feature of the Youth Justice Board is that it is a permanent national body
independent from police, courts and corrections. It impartially concentrates on youth crime prevention, and it has the power to direct necessary partners to act in cooperation with the YJB and Youth Offending Teams (YOTs). The Board consists of 10 – 12 members appointed by the Secretary of State.

The functions expected by the legislation are:

a. Monitor the operation and the provision of the youth justice system and youth services.

b. Advise the Secretary of State on:
   • The operation and the provision of the youth justice system and services;
   • Effective ways to pursue the principal aim;
   • Drawing up national standards for youth justice services.

c. Identify, promote, disseminate, and make grants for the development of good practices in the operation of the youth justice system and services, the prevention of offending, and working with at-risk children and young persons.

The YOTs are the leaders at the local level. The duties for local authorities to establish multi-agency youth offending teams addressed in the CDA 98 came into force on 1 April 2000 (Mullan & O’Mahony, 2002: 5). In the year 2002, their budget was about 155 – 202 million pounds provided by the statutory agencies, with additional 46 million pounds from the YJB (Youth Justice Board, n.d.).

6.3.3. Research-based Intervention

The YJB is committed to the use of research and evaluating evidence. It employs all available knowledge of effective practices. Furthermore the YJB continues developing its own knowledge base using its own data collection tools. Approaches and interventions of the YJB and the YOTs are planned and delivered based on their research findings. Essential data collection tools used are (YJB website):

a. ASSET (Young Offender Assessment Profile): a nationally common assessment tool for identifying factors which may put young people at risk of offending.

b. MORI (Market and Opinion Research International) Youth Survey: annual survey
among young people relating to youth crime for identifying its trends.

c. Data from YOTs.

6.3.4. Youth Inclusion Programme (YIP)

(i) Overview

The Youth Justice Board’s “Youth Inclusion Programme” is one of the initiatives in the Crime Reduction Programme, and the CRP and the Home Office jointly provide funding of 20 million pounds per year.

In the Youth Inclusion Programme, which is an evidence-based program, 70 projects are operational in deprived areas around the nation. Each project receives 75,000 pounds per year and it is expected to spend 6,500 pounds each year for evaluation. YIP coordinates with Crime Concern, which is an independent national crime reduction organization (See Annex 4), and local YOTs and targets about 50 of the most at risk youth. Local youth offending teams are connected with local agencies such as the police and schools to obtain appropriate referrals of young people at risk of offending.

Interventions vary:

- Family intervention with support services for parents and caregivers;
- Skill development for educational standards and future employment prospects;
- Mentoring; and
- Recreation (sports etc.) and community service activities with adult volunteers.

Key objectives set by the program are a 60% reduction of arrest rates in the target group, a 30% reduction of recorded crime in the area and a one third reduction in truancy and school exclusions.

(ii) Impact

The results are mixed. The findings from the Evaluation of the Youth Inclusion Programmes (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003: 126-134) have revealed both positive and non-effective impacts, and some outcomes varied region by region.

- Arrest rate: about 65% reduction among the selected 50 participants in each region who
have been actively engaged in the programme from the beginning.

- Decrease in seriousness of crime.
- Truancy: 12% decrease of temporary exclusions and 27% decrease of permanent exclusions. But among the selected 50 most at risk participants, there was about 40% increase.
- Crime in the neighborhood where YIPs took place: crime decrease in 29 project areas, crime increase in 30 project areas during the first year. 7.9% increase of crime in 57 project neighbourhoods during the second year.

The evaluation values the progress and influence the program has had and its empirical approach. However, it recommends making some modifications or changes to bring about better results (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003: 126-134).

- Re-examine the circumstances in which projects are being carried out: to ensure the areas selected are high crime locations where a substantial proportion of crime is believed to be committed by 13-16 year olds.
- Resolve the uncertain definition of ‘at risk’ young people, and clearly instruct who to focus on (those who have been arrested or ‘at risk’ but not involved in crime, etc.).
- Require complex longitudinal study to assess its impact, including a ‘negative’ impact.
- Re-assess the target outcomes of the programme: should be challenging but also achievable by a majority of projects.

Summary Table 7 shows key elements from the international guidelines analyzed in Chapter 5 and key elements initially included in the Crime Reduction Programme and the Youth Justice Board. The table aims to show that the crime prevention policy in the United Kingdom has been consistent with the international guidelines. The unknown or weak elements, which are identified in the table, are clearly revealed as weakness of the programme: the following section points out challenges that the Crime Reduction Programme has faced and provides recommendations by reviewing key elements for successful implementation.
Summary Table 7  Key Elements from International Guidelines and Initial components of CRP and YJB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Elements from International Guidelines</th>
<th>Crime Reduction Programme</th>
<th>Youth Justice Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government leadership and a National action plan</td>
<td>✓ • CDA 98</td>
<td>✓ • CDA 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tackling the cause of crime with social services</td>
<td>✓ • Youth Inclusion • Sure Start</td>
<td>✓ • Work with at-risk children and young people • Youth Inclusion Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partnership and comprehensive community-based crime prevention</td>
<td>✓ • CDA 98 requirement • Projects undertaken by local agencies</td>
<td>✓ • CDA 98 requirement • Youth Offending Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainability of crime prevention policies and programs</td>
<td>✓ • Funding: 400 million pounds</td>
<td>✓ • Financial contribution = duty of all partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Permanent responsibility center</td>
<td>• Not particularly for CRP • Each Government Regional Office was directly responsible for the local delivery</td>
<td>✓ • YJB is a permanent national body • Cooperate with Crime Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Knowledge-base</td>
<td>✓ • Designed to strengthen and promote evidence-based research and its use</td>
<td>✓ • Research-based intervention (i.e. Asset, MORI Youth Survey, Data from YOTs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Systematic implementation cycle: analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation</td>
<td>• Unknown</td>
<td>✓ • YIP = evidence-based program, each project is expected to spend 6,500 pounds for evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training and capacity building</td>
<td>• Unknown</td>
<td>• unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW BY HOMEL ET AL. (2004)

The UK government has demonstrated strong leadership and has prepared a framework for delivery of crime prevention policy. In order to implement the policy throughout the nation, the actual delivery needs to be done by local staff in each region. The delivery phase is crucial in order to make a difference in the country, because it is the local practitioners and volunteers who actually intervene and target people and deliver the effective elements of the programs. However, program delivery was not as smooth as was planned. Implementation problems and frustration were seen in various forms from the beginning. A rather conspicuous problem was that the CRP only managed to spend 13% of its allocated budget in its first year. By early 2001, the Home Office had recognized the need to investigate the implementation problems (Homel,
Inviting an expert from Australia, an independent research group was formed to undertake a review of the Crime Reduction Programme. The process of evaluation was managed through the Home Office’s Research Development and Statistics Directorate and independent university-based research groups. The review identified various critical problems.

Reviewing the problems that the United Kingdom has gone through is an important step for Japan, because Japan would probably face similar challenges if the government decided to implement national crime prevention projects. This section introduces the implementation problems identified by an independent research group and their recommendations for future implementation in Japan.

6.4.1. Problems

The followings are common and critical problems found in the implementation of the Crime Reduction Programme (Homel et al., 2004: 6-7).

a. Less use and promotion of evidence-based approaches: The CRP was designed to strengthen and promote the evidence-based research and its use. However, projects that had less direct involvement with the center tended to be less evidence based.

b. The gap between an original objective and a field objective: One of the original objectives of the CRP was promoting and strengthening evidence-based research and the use of it. However, the mainstream objective in the field became reducing the volume of crime, and evidence-based strategies were not always used.

c. Low level of crime reduction activities: Crime reduction activity increased significantly, but its level was lower than had been originally expected. More inputs are necessary to deliver program rather than simply providing money and good plans.

6.4.2. Lessons from the Challenge

A number of implementation problems were found, and these were the root-causes of the
problems that the CRP encountered. There are clear lessons that we can learn from the implementation challenges, and they should certainly be considered for improved program delivery and policy implementation.

A) Strengthen training of experts and staff at the local level to properly deliver programs

Many problems were related to a lack of technical skills, especially at the local delivery level.

- Difficulties finding and recruiting suitably qualified and skilled staff at local levels.
- A lack of technical and strategic advice, guidance from the center and regions, and management competence and skill.
- A lack of adequate tools for program performance monitoring throughout the life of the program. Evaluations overly relied on financial monitoring systems.
- A lack of skilled staff at the local level for development and implementation the CRP thought. Small individual programs were competing for a limited range of resources rather than cooperation and sharing.
- A lack of support for putting research evidence into practice. Knowing what to do does not deliver what is the best to local communities.

These problems illustrated the importance of providing sufficient training to local delivery staff. It is these individuals who carry out the principles of the programs, not the program planners. Without properly trained staff at the local level to implement program objectives even the most well planned programs are nothing more than empty theory.

B) Develop capacity of a responsibility center

Responsibility centers must have a sufficient capacity to manage, coordinate and monitor the local delivery process. Insufficient preparation at the Crime Reduction Directors level was commonly observed in the form of:

- A general absence of leadership capable of operating a programme or its constituent parts at all levels of the delivery process.
- Little or no ability to assist local and regional capacity to implement evidence-based policy programs.
Merely giving commands to local delivery staff does not lead to a successful delivery. The center must be able to work with delivery teams in a close partnership.

C) **Set and disseminate clear objectives**

A lack of clear objectives at the practical level, in addition to vague leadership, make the programs digress from the main direction. This tendency was found in the following forms:

- Past lessons were not reflected, and many avoidable errors were reproduced.
- Limited capability to deal with external pressure or events. Programs must not be shaken by unanticipated political or community demands.

Programs must be designed to be flexible so they can deal with external events, but at the same time, the objectives should not be lost in daily routines and unexpected situations.

6.5. **CONCLUSION**

Even though the Government understands the importance of the knowledge base and the implementation of effective elements into practice, bringing partners and funding together from various fields, such as police, public health, education and private business sectors, under one roof and with one new task, “crime prevention,” is not easy. But in the case of the United Kingdom, the government has backed the effective elements from scientific and international norms with deeds. The United Kingdom has demonstrated that the effective elements are doable.

Negative findings from the evaluation should not be considered as more constructive. The United Kingdom is pioneering national crime prevention policy and as with any venture into new policymaking, we can expect a certain amount of growing pains. What is more important than these simple growing pains is to learn from the missteps and incorporate these lessons into the next step. Summary Table 8 illustrates key elements from the international guidelines, initial components of CRP and weakness identified by the implementation evaluation.

The review states, “the review clearly identified that CRP’s problems were not the result of any intrinsic failure of this policy approach. Rather, they stemmed from a lack of understanding of (or commitment to) what is really required to implement such an approach
(Homel et al., 2004).” Lessons we learned from the UK’s case are as follows.

1. The center must be in a close partnership with regional local partners sharing power and responsibility. The United Kingdom has been able to form partnerships at the central management level. However, the evaluation has revealed that issuing commands remotely from above does not successfully deliver programs. It must be remembered that a strong vertical partnership must be developed in order to deliver plans at the practical level. Therefore proper resources must be secured for all levels of program delivery.

2. “Evidence-based research” and “program delivery” are two different projects. Having two tasks at the same time confuses the delivery process. These should be separated and conducted by two different groups sharing the common objective of achieving crime prevention and reduction. This lesson strengthens the need for a permanent body that coordinates and directs crime prevention programs.

3. A knowledge management system needs to be built under the above-suggested permanent responsible body. The United Kingdom has generated a tremendous amount of knowledge by conducting various research, but it is not well disseminated, particularly at the practical level. Responsibility to disseminate usable knowledge should be given to a specific organization by building a knowledge management system. Having good knowledge is not enough, as international norms point out, practices must be based on knowledge employing effective elements.

4. Providing funding is not enough. Developing new models of fund management and budgeting is necessary. Even if adequate resources are secured for the program delivery process, the resources will not be adequately used if there is no fund management system in place and there are no budgetary skills. The review suggests learning from and seeking technical assistance from Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, which have advanced systems in place.

5. Systematic processes of analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation must be followed throughout an implementation of crime prevention. The overall difficulties of
the Crime Reduction Program seem to come from lack of a systematic procedure. Following the Figure of the Key Elements of Successful Crime Prevention (see Chapter 5), process, action and role of each partner must be properly assigned and monitored.

6. Training and capacity building must be strengthened at both the central level and the local delivery level. Most identified implementation difficulties seem to stem from a lack of adequate training and capacity to effectively and properly deliver programs. As international norms advocate, training at all levels from management to practitioners must be provided. Technical assistance should be actively sought from relevant fields and other countries.

Current situation in Japan, whose crime rates have been increasing, criminal justice system has been overburdened and their effectiveness has been questioned (see Chapter 2), recalls the 1980s and 1990s in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom faced rising crime rates, the ineffectiveness of formal criminal justice intervention, failure of the Neighborhood Watch programs, and struggles in trying to form inter-ministerial partnerships. But towards the late 1990s, accumulated research findings, the success of individual crime prevention projects and political leadership led the nation towards an integrated action for crime prevention. The ongoing innovation in the United Kingdom should show a precedent for both policy makers and motivated citizens in Japan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Guidelines</th>
<th>Crime Reduction Programme</th>
<th>Weakness of CRP from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Government leadership and a National action plan | • CDA 98 | • Merely giving commands to local delivery staff does not lead to a successful delivery  
  • Must work in a close partnership with delivery teams  
  → Lesson 1 |
| • Tackling the cause of crime with social services | • Youth Inclusion | • Lack of clear objectives at the practical level  
  → Lesson 1 |
| • Partnership and comprehensive community-based crime prevention | • CDA 98 requirement  
  • Projects undertaken by local agencies | • Small individual programs were competing for a limited range of resources rather than cooperation and sharing  
  → Lesson 2 |
| • Sustainability of crime prevention policies and programs | • Funding: 400 million pounds | • Crime reduction activities increased, but its level was lower than had been originally expected  
  • More inputs are necessary to deliver program rather than simply providing money and good plans  
  → Lesson 4 |
| • Permanent responsibility center | • Not particularly for CRP  
  • Each Government Regional Office was directly responsible for the local delivery | • A general absence of leadership capable of operating a programme at all levels of the delivery process  
  • Little or no ability to assist local and regional capacity to implement evidence-based policy programs  
  • Limited capability to deal with external pressure or events. Programs must not be shaken by unanticipated political or community demands  
  → Lesson 1, 2 & 4 |
| • Knowledge-base | • Designed to strengthen and promote evidence-based research and its use | • Less use and promotion of evidence-based approaches than expected  
  • Lack of support for research evidence into practice  
  • Past lessons were not reflected  
  → Lesson 3 |
| • Systematic implementation cycle: analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation | • Unknown | • Lack of adequate tool for program performance monitoring  
  • Evaluation overly relied on financial monitoring system  
  • past lessons were not reflected  
  → Lesson 5 |
| • Training and capacity building | • Unknown | • Lack of skilled staff at the local level  
  • Lack of technical and strategic advice, guidance from the center to local levels  
  → Lesson 6 |
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. CONCLUSION

In Japan, the idea that problems of crime should be dealt with by the criminal justice system: police, courts, prosecution, correction and after care services is still dominant. Once social problems such as child abuse and school bullying violate law and become crime, they seem to be passed to hands of criminal justice system even though they were primarily dealt with by social policy. However, this thesis has shown that there should not be such an explicit dividing line between social problems and criminal matters, and that the problems must be addressed and tackled by both criminal justice agencies and their partners such as health and social services, education, business and grass-roots organizations. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that crime can be reduced by comprehensively tackling risk factors, and that it can be achieved cost effectively.

7.1.1. The Need of Crime Prevention in Japan

Chapter 2 revealed that Japan stands out among industrialized countries with a rapid increase in reported crime. Moreover, findings from the International Crime Victim Survey (2000) indicate an existence of crime which does not appear in the official crime statistics.

Analysis of possible causes of crime in Japan has found that Japan has internationally acknowledged risk factors that would invoke crime. The possible causes of crime in current Japanese society exist in settings where law enforcement (the police) does not usually intervene, such as unemployment (national economy), divorce and child abuse (family), and bullying (school).

While the national budget indicates that there are no longer enough resources to enlarge the criminal justice system, work for the criminal justice agencies continues to grow without regard to budget limits. This suggests that citizens must further pay the cost of the criminal justice system and resources allocated to other agencies such as social and health services and
education might be moved to the criminal justice system.

Crime prevention initiatives are also rapidly increasing at both the governmental and local levels. These initiatives suggest a need for more proactive and effective strategies in communities in addition to a traditional criminal justice approach. But the efforts have yet to be coordinated and supported for sustainability, and their effectiveness should be evaluated.

7.1.2. Effective elements from scientific evaluations of crime prevention programs

Chapter 3 has demonstrated that effective crime prevention must tackle root causes (risk factors) that would initiate crime. It has been shown from the scientific research that multiple risk factors interlock in complex ways before the crime occurs; no one factor immediately triggers crime.

Social development and comprehensive community based crime prevention are needed to tackle problems surrounding people’s lives. Early interventions of at-risk children’s lives tend to produce long-lasting effects. The primary work of many of such interventions do not belong with the police, therefore, partnerships must be formed among key practitioners and community members, such as local governments, social and health services, the police, schools, families, non-governmental organizations and business.

Situational crime prevention programs that successfully identify and target risk factors, such as Kirkholt program and effective use of CCTV, have produced large reductions in crime and victimization. They also mobilized resources efficiently and effectively. These successful cases should be further invested in for more research and replication.

Traditional criminal justice intervention is expensive. The cost of its use for crime prevention would easily outweigh its effectiveness and benefits. Scientific knowledge has highlighted the cost-effectiveness of alternative interventions, namely, social development and situational crime prevention.

Both the scientific research and the police review by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary have identified that police presence alone does not effectively reduce or prevent crime, but a strategic implementation of it can be effective. A positive crime reduction emphasis from the police service is crucial, and policing does have a significant impact on local
crime rates. One very important element is to plan where, when and for what problem to allocate police officers and suitable problem-solving programs. Merely increasing the number of police officers and randomly allocating them in places are not effective. Effective policing requires good partnership work with local authorities and other partners (as referred to in the social development approach), and public engagement.

7.1.3. **Effective strategies from international guidelines**

International guidelines appeal to governments to take leadership, and organize and manage nationwide crime prevention. Effective crime prevention requires innovative national arrangements and mechanisms to tackle crime and its risk factors.

Under unequivocal government leadership, partnership and integrated cross-ministerial, multisectorial and multidimensional work must be developed and carried out. Policies that comprehensively tackle the causes of crime must be secured and further developed.

A substantial knowledge base of effective measures, which shares information on crime data and “what works”, must be established. Policies and programs must be monitored and their effectiveness must be evaluated.

A cycle of systematic implementation must be established. A course of effective crime prevention must have a coherent cycle of analyzing social problems, identifying risk factors, planning prevention programs, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. A model of this process introduced in Chapter 4 must be prepared.

Crime prevention must be sustainable. A permanent and independent body in charge of crime prevention must be established for coordination of partnerships, planning and evaluation of crime prevention and securing funding and its management.

Training must be provided at all levels from management to practitioners actively seeking technical assistance from countries which have advanced crime prevention. The Government must support communities in building a capacity to respond to their own needs.

7.1.4. **Lessons from the UK case study**

The case study of the United Kingdom has demonstrated the feasibility of effective crime prevention and crucial milestones of implementation. But at the same time, the
implementation evaluation has revealed delivery difficulties of a national program, and provided us with crucial elements for successful implementation of crime prevention.

Comprehensive intervention in youth problems as a statutory requirement by the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 is a significant innovation. It has achieved a significant change by establishing the Youth Justice Board.

The evaluation of the Crime Reduction Program has demonstrated that the implementation of systematic processes of analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation is essential throughout the implementation of crime prevention. The overall difficulties of the Crime Reduction Program seem to come from a lack of this systematic procedure and adequate training.

7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

At last, based on the above review and analysis, I would like to suggest recommendations to Japan for the implementation of effective crime prevention policies and programs. Summary Table 9 at the end of this chapter shows the relevance of the recommendations to knowledge from international guidelines. This table should be used as a guiding principle of national crime prevention strategies for Japan.

Recommendation 1. Undertake political leadership and set a clear reduction target

The central government and local authorities must take unequivocal leadership to implement coordinated nationwide crime prevention. Some structural arrangements in the government are required for this purpose. Chapter 2 on Japanese crime trends has recognized a disparity of policies, programs and organizations for crime prevention; therefore, they must be integrated and coordinated under a good governmental leadership.

Crime and its prevention is a national concern: political leaders who represent the nation must undertake the leadership to develop and conduct crime prevention.

The White Paper on Crime of 2001 indicated that reported crime in 2000 have almost doubled since 1980 and a rapid increase began in 1996. This trend is similar to the ones in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and France in the 1970s and 1980s. While the crime rates in industrial countries have fallen or remained steady in recent years, Japan’s growing
crime cases are significant in international crime trends. Japan needs to launch a national initiative to reduce crime and must set a clear reduction goal with clear priorities and targets towards success.

**Recommendation 2. Establish a permanent national crime prevention center.**

An independent body in charge of crime prevention must be established as a permanent part of crime policy. This national crime prevention center should:

- Take a leadership role and coordinate diverse partners into collaborate work;
- Develop a knowledge base of “what works” and establish a knowledge and data management system;
- Create a research unit within the center. Monitor and evaluate processes and results of policy/program implementation;
- Publish an annual report covering comprehensive aspects of crime, society, criminal justice and crime victims for the purpose of educating the government and the public;
- Promote legislation of crime prevention policies;
- Raise funding and manage the resources;
- Provide training and support educational agencies to offer training courses;
- Be a liaison for international cooperation; and
- Submit a report to its advisory committee for evaluation (See 7.2.4.).

The chair of the center should be appointed from ministers of partner ministries.

Crime prevention efforts in Japan are currently operated by various agencies and groups as introduced in Chapter 2. For example, the Ministry of Education (MEXT), Public Health, Justice, and the National Police Agency are operating their own programs. Even within the Ministry of Justice, Bureaus of Crime Affairs, Rehabilitation, Civil Liberties, Immigration, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office have different programs to prevent crime. A national crime prevention center must coordinate all of these initiatives into one coherent program.
Recommendation 3. Prepare a national mechanism to coordinate the implementation cycle

Stages of 1) analyzing social problems, identifying risk factors, 2) planning prevention programs, 3) implementation, and 4) monitoring and evaluation must be defined. Each partner should take a responsible role in a relevant stage. The above recommended national crime prevention center should be placed as the central organization.

For example, the first stage can be assigned to criminologists, victimologists, and research institutes of the Ministry of Justice and the National Police Agency. The second stage should include both central and local governments in cooperation with the National Police Agency. The implementation stage must mobilize public engagement to deliver principles of programs in local communities. Local governmental agencies, grass-roots organizations and business should be proactively involved maintaining close contact with the national crime prevention center. Monitoring and evaluation should include social science researchers criminologists, and existing research institutes in the Ministry of Justice and the National Police Agency.

Recommendation 4. Form a national advisory committee.

An independent national advisory committee must be established in order to facilitate impartial and critical evaluation of overall crime prevention implementation, including the work of the national crime prevention center. Monitoring, review and evaluation of policies, projects, programs and their implementation processes and results at all levels is crucial for success.

This committee should prepare an evaluation report every two years, and submit it to the Prime Minister.

Members of the committee should include both domestic and international criminologists and experts from the fields of crime prevention, victimology, and policy evaluation.

Recommendation 5. Establish a directorate crime prevention unit in the police organization.

A directorate crime prevention unit in the universal police organization must be
established, from the National Police Agency to the municipal policing level.

Regional police department currently operates its own programs based on its own discretion. Even though the National Police Agency instructs regional departments to implement crime prevention programs, whether or not to implement such programs is up to each regional department’s discretion. This must be corrected: plans for crime prevention prepared by the National Police Agency must be delivered at practical levels through a directorate crime prevention unit.

The National Police Agency should play an advisory role to regional departments providing them with information and resources, and the municipal forces must collaborate with the NPA to carry out the policies and directives announced by the NPA.

The crime prevention unit in the NPA should be a liaison to the national crime prevention center and police partners as a representative of the police.

Involvement of the NPA is crucial because, on the one hand, it can provide national policies and strategies with practical police opinions and experience. On the other hand, the NPA informs the regional police departments of decisions made by the national policymakers and partners and directs the local forces to deliver those decisions.

**Recommendation 6. Invest in local community based initiatives and promote public engagement**

The government should invest at least 10 million yen (about US$100,000) in some existing local initiatives as a pilot program. Such initial investment may encourage local communities and non-governmental organizations to get actively involved in crime prevention. Moreover, the existing programs will be assessed and evaluated for further improvement.

Good public awareness strategies are required from the beginning of the implementation plan. Those who are already, or potentially, interested in crime prevention and people who would benefit from crime prevention must be mobilized. As identified, crime prevention cannot be efficiently achieved without good partnerships between the police and the communities where crime prevention intervention is most needed. Besides the leadership of the central government and the local authorities, engagement of the community is essential for program delivery.
Therefore, existing local efforts to protect themselves and prevent crime must be further mobilized.

News reports and journals/magazines often report active initiatives of crime prevention at both governmental and citizen-based levels. However, they still need to be well publicized in order to promote national movements of crime prevention.

Easy access to crime prevention programs must be secured to encourage interested people to get involved. Websites and brochures that introduce program policies and activities with contact information should be prepared.

Recommendation 7. Conduct longitudinal study and systematic victimization survey

Intervention results must be longitudinally studied through follow-up evaluations. Results must be reported to the national crime prevention center and recorded in its database. Social development interventions, especially interventions in children’s life, tend to produce both immediate and long-term effects. Immediate effects tend to take the form of academic improvement and less violent behavior. Reduction or prevention of crime may not be identified until the children have grown into youths or adults. Thus, multiple longitudinal studies are essential in order to identify which interventions and elements are consistently effective.

A national victimization survey should be developed and conducted every two years. Questionnaires from the International Crime Victim Survey should be modified to meet domestic needs to identify Japanese crime trends and risk factors of victimization. The survey should also be designed to identify the needs of crime victims.

Recommendation 8. Training and Capacity Development

Producing trainers of crime prevention and making training available at all levels from management to practitioners is an urgent need. To meet this need, experts from other countries, for example, Crime Concern in the United Kingdom should be invited.

The central government must also support local governments and communities to build capacity to respond to their own needs.
### Summary Table 9  International guidelines for delivery of “what works” in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Elements from International Guidelines</th>
<th>Possible relevance and capacity in Japan</th>
<th>Gap</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government leadership</td>
<td>• Prime Minister’s leadership</td>
<td>• Sustainability is unknown</td>
<td>• Undertake political leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National action plan</td>
<td>• Crime prevention policies</td>
<td>• Disparity, uncoordinated</td>
<td>• Set a clear reduction target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tokyo Metropolitan</td>
<td>• No monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>(Recommendation 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government’s leadership</td>
<td>• Reactive policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tackling the cause of crime with social services</td>
<td>• Various social and welfare policies</td>
<td>• Many of social and welfare policies are not recognized as crime prevention measure</td>
<td>• Establish coordination mechanism for multi-agency work (Recommendation 2 &amp; 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Child abuse prevention network</td>
<td>• More research needed for their effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on children and youth</td>
<td>• Social development initiatives</td>
<td>• No evaluation on effectiveness</td>
<td>• Establish a directorate crime prevention unit in the police organization (Recommendation 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(See Chapter 3)</td>
<td>(See Chapter 3)</td>
<td>• School related programs are mostly situational</td>
<td>• Invest in local community-based initiatives and promote public engagement (Recommendation 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Partnership and comprehensive community-based crime prevention</td>
<td>• Community involvement in situational crime prevention</td>
<td>• Comprehensiveness still to be developed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Crime prevention associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Integrate prevention programs into relevant policies</td>
<td>• unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sustainability of crime prevention policies and programs</td>
<td>• Funds for evaluation unknown</td>
<td>• Fund allocation to private programs is unknown</td>
<td>• Form a national advisory committee, which monitors, reviews and evaluate implementation process and impacts of policies and programs. (Recommendation 4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Funding and resources must be secured from the planning stages to evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sustainability is unknown and/or questionable</td>
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<td>• Review resource allocation</td>
<td>• Tendency to use formal criminal justice intervention</td>
<td>• Use of criminal justice system is expensive</td>
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<td>• Balance between crime prevention, the criminal justice system, and other systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Tight national budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Longitudinal evaluation is necessary</td>
<td>• Study of child abuse</td>
<td>• Longitudinal evaluation of crime prevention programs needs to be developed</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Permanent responsibility center | Criminal justice agencies | Interests of agencies are disproportionately for criminal justice agencies: not impartial for multidisciplinary crime prevention  
| Need an independent responsibility center  
| Fragmented crime prevention initiatives must be integrated by a responsibility center | Establish a permanent national crime prevention center (Recommendation 2) |
| Knowledge-base | Unknown | No scientific evaluations including cost-effectiveness analysis | Conduct longitudinal study and systematic victimization survey (Recommendation 7) |
| Conduct regular surveys of victimization and offending | International Crime Victim Survey | Original survey should be developed |  |
| Knowledge to be provided to communities | Newsletters from local criminal justice agencies | Not multidisciplinary knowledge  
| Good initiatives are not recognized as crime prevention measure |  |
| Systematic implementation cycle: analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation | Unknown | Unknown | Prepare a national mechanism to coordinate the implementation cycle (Recommendation 3) |
| Training and capacity building | Tokyo Metropolitan Government Academy  
| UNAFEI Seminar | Unknown | Produce trainers of crime prevention, asking assistance from international experts |
| Capacity building should be promoted as a national project | Unknown | Unknown | The central government must support local governments and communities to build capacity to respond to their own needs (Recommendation 8) |
| Technical assistance from other countries | UNAFEI seminars | Mostly for criminal justice agencies |  |
I strongly believe that the recommendations are meaningful and significant for Japan in that they present “what needs to be done” if Japan decides to take substantial action to change crime trends towards crime reduction and prevention. All recommendations are well consistent with the knowledge from scientific evaluations, international guidelines and the UK evaluation, and the analysis in this thesis has shown that there is a good ground to implement the recommendation in Japan.

There certainly needs to be more detailed research to implement all the recommendations, but I hope that my recommendations will provoke discussion of the implementation of effective crime prevention policy and programs. My thesis must be a very small step, but it certainly is a step forward. I strongly believe that my recommendations will contribute to the promotion and development of crime prevention, identification and more effective delivery of existing programs, and the implementation of a national crime prevention policy through government leadership.
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ANNEX 1
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME
2002/13
Action to promote effective crime prevention

The Economic and Social Council,

Bearing in mind its resolution 1996/16 of 23 July 1996, in which it requested the Secretary-General to continue to promote the use and application of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice matters,

Recalling the elements of responsible crime prevention: standards and norms annexed to its resolution 1997/33 of 21 July 1997, in particular those relating to community involvement in crime prevention contained in paragraphs 14 to 23 of that annex, as well as the revised draft elements of responsible crime prevention prepared by the Expert Group Meeting on Elements of Responsible Crime Prevention: Addressing Traditional and Emerging Crime Problems, held in Buenos Aires from 8 to 10 September 1999,

Taking note of the international colloquium of crime prevention experts convened in Montreal, Canada, from 3 to 6 October 1999, by the Governments of France, the Netherlands and Canada, in collaboration with the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime in Montreal, as a preparatory meeting for the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,

Noting that the draft elements of responsible crime prevention were considered at the workshop on community involvement in crime prevention held at the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Vienna from 10 to 17 April 2000,

Acknowledging the need to update and finalize the draft elements of responsible crime prevention,
Aware of the scope for significant reductions in crime and victimization through knowledge-based approaches, and of the contribution that effective crime prevention can make in terms of the safety and security of individuals and their property, as well as the quality of life in communities around the world,

Taking note of General Assembly resolution 56/261 of 31 January 2002, entitled “Plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century”, in particular the action on crime prevention in order to follow up the commitments undertaken in paragraphs 11, 13, 20, 21, 24 and 25 of the Vienna Declaration,\textsuperscript{57}

Convinced of the need to advance a collaborative agenda for action with respect to the commitments made in the Vienna Declaration,

Noting with appreciation the work of the Group of Experts on Crime Prevention at their meeting held in Vancouver, Canada, from 21 to 24 January 2002, and the work of the Secretary-General in preparing a report on the results of that interregional meeting, containing revised draft guidelines for crime prevention and proposed priority areas for international action,\textsuperscript{58}

Recognizing that each Member State is unique in its governmental structure, social characteristics and economic capacity and that those factors will influence the scope and implementation of its crime prevention programmes,

Recognizing also that changing circumstances and evolving approaches to crime prevention may require further elaboration and adaptation of crime prevention guidelines,

1. Accepts the Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, annexed to the present resolution, with a view to providing elements for effective crime prevention;

2. Invites Member States to draw upon the Guidelines, as appropriate, in the development or strengthening of their policies in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice;

3. Requests relevant United Nations bodies and other specialized organizations to strengthen inter-agency coordination and cooperation in crime prevention, as set out in the Guidelines, and, to that end, to disseminate the Guidelines widely within the United Nations system;

4. Requests the Centre for International Crime Prevention of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of the Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, the institutes of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme network and other relevant entities in the United Nations system, to prepare a proposal for technical assistance in the area of crime prevention, in accordance with the guidelines of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention;

5. Requests Member States to establish or strengthen international, regional and national crime prevention networks, with a view to developing knowledge-based strategies, exchanging proven and promising practices, identifying elements of their

\textsuperscript{57} General Assembly resolution 55/59, annex.
\textsuperscript{58} E/ CN.15/2002/4.
transferability and making such knowledge available to communities throughout the world;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its fourteenth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

37th plenary meeting
24 July 2002

Annex

Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime

I. Introduction

1. There is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime. Crime prevention offers opportunities for a humane and more cost-effective approach to the problems of crime. The present Guidelines outline the necessary elements for effective crime prevention.

II. Conceptual frame of reference

2. It is the responsibility of all levels of government to create, maintain and promote a context within which relevant governmental institutions and all segments of civil society, including the corporate sector, can better play their part in preventing crime.

3. For the purposes of the present Guidelines, “crime prevention” comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. The enforcement of laws, sentences and corrections, while also performing preventive functions, falls outside the scope of the Guidelines, given the comprehensive coverage of the subject in other United Nations instruments.59

4. The present Guidelines address crime and its effects on victims and society and take into account the growing internationalization of criminal activities.

5. Community involvement and cooperation/ partnerships represent important elements of the concept of crime prevention set out herein. While the term “community” may be defined in different ways, its essence in this context is the involvement of civil society at the local level.

6. Crime prevention encompasses a wide range of approaches, including those which:

(a) Promote the well-being of people and encourage pro-social behaviour through social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular

emphasis on children and youth, and focus on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimization (prevention through social development or social crime prevention);

(b) Change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence offending, victimization and the insecurity that results from crime by building on the initiatives, expertise and commitment of community members (locally based crime prevention);

(c) Prevent the occurrence of crimes by reducing opportunities, increasing risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims (situational crime prevention);

(d) Prevent recidivism by assisting in the social reintegration of offenders and other preventive mechanisms (reintegration programmes).

III. Basic principles

Government leadership

7. All levels of government should play a leadership role in developing effective and humane crime prevention strategies and in creating and maintaining institutional frameworks for their implementation and review.

Socio-economic development and inclusion

8. Crime prevention considerations should be integrated into all relevant social and economic policies and programmes, including those addressing employment, education, health, housing and urban planning, poverty, social marginalization and exclusion. Particular emphasis should be placed on communities, families, children and youth at risk.

Cooperation/partnerships

9. Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. This includes partnerships working across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens.

Sustainability/accountability

10. Crime prevention requires adequate resources, including funding for structures and activities, in order to be sustained. There should be clear accountability for funding, implementation and evaluation and for the achievement of planned results.

Knowledge base

11. Crime prevention strategies, policies, programmes and actions should be based on a broad, multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge about crime problems, their multiple causes and promising and proven practices.
Human rights/rule of law/culture of lawfulness

12. The rule of law and those human rights which are recognized in international instruments to which Member States are parties must be respected in all aspects of crime prevention. A culture of lawfulness should be actively promoted in crime prevention.

Interdependency

13. National crime prevention diagnoses and strategies should, where appropriate, take account of links between local criminal problems and international organized crime.

Differentiation

14. Crime prevention strategies should, when appropriate, pay due regard to the different needs of men and women and consider the special needs of vulnerable members of society.

IV. Organization, methods and approaches

15. Recognizing that all States have unique governmental structures, this section sets out tools and methodologies that Governments and all segments of civil society should consider in developing strategies to prevent crime and reduce victimization. It draws on international good practice.

Community involvement

16. In some of the areas listed below, Governments bear the primary responsibility. However, the active participation of communities and other segments of civil society is an essential part of effective crime prevention. Communities, in particular, should play an important part in identifying crime prevention priorities, in implementation and evaluation, and in helping to identify a sustainable resource base.

A. Organization

Government structures

17. Governments should include prevention as a permanent part of their structures and programmes for controlling crime, ensuring that clear responsibilities and goals exist within government for the organization of crime prevention, by, inter alia:

(a) Establishing centres or focal points with expertise and resources;

(b) Establishing a crime prevention plan with clear priorities and targets;

(c) Establishing linkages and coordination between relevant government agencies or departments;

(d) Fostering partnerships with non-governmental organizations, the business, private and professional sectors and the community;

(e) Seeking the active participation of the public in crime prevention by informing it of the need for and means of action and its role.
(b) Supporting the generation of useful and practically applicable knowledge that is scientifically reliable and valid;

(c) Supporting the organization and synthesis of knowledge and identifying and addressing gaps in the knowledge base;

(d) Sharing that knowledge, as appropriate, among, inter alia, researchers, policy makers, educators, practitioners from other relevant sectors and the wider community;

(e) Applying this knowledge in replicating successful interventions, developing new initiatives and anticipating new crime problems and prevention opportunities;

(f) Establishing data systems to help manage crime prevention more cost-effectively, including by conducting regular surveys of victimization and offending;

(g) Promoting the application of those data in order to reduce repeat victimization, persistent offending and areas with a high level of crime.

Planning interventions

22. Those planning interventions should promote a process that includes:

(a) A systematic analysis of crime problems, their causes, risk factors and consequences, in particular at the local level;

(b) A plan that draws on the most appropriate approach and adapts interventions to the specific local problem and context;

(c) An implementation plan to deliver appropriate interventions that are efficient, effective and sustainable;

(d) Mobilizing entities that are able to tackle causes;

(e) Monitoring and evaluation.

Support evaluation

23. Government, other funding bodies and those involved in programme development and delivery should:

(a) Undertake short- and longer-term evaluation to test rigorously what works, where and why;

(b) Undertake cost-benefit analyses;

(c) Assess the extent to which action results in a reduction in levels of crime and victimization, in the seriousness of crime and in fear of crime;

(d) Systematically assess the outcomes and unintended consequences, both positive and negative, of action, such as a decrease in crime rates or the stigmatization of individuals and/or communities.
C
Approaches

24. This section expands upon the social development and situational crime prevention approaches. It also outlines approaches that Governments and civil society should endeavour to follow in order to prevent organized crime.

Social development

25. Governments should address the risk factors of crime and victimization by:

(a) Promoting protective factors through comprehensive and non-stigmatizing social and economic development programmes, including health, education, housing and employment;
(b) Promoting activities that redress marginalization and exclusion;
(c) Promoting positive conflict resolution;
(d) Using education and public awareness strategies to foster a culture of lawfulness and tolerance while respecting cultural identities.

Situational

26. Governments and civil society, including, where appropriate, the corporate sector, should support the development of situational crime prevention programmes by, inter alia:

(a) Improved environmental design;
(b) Appropriate methods of surveillance that are sensitive to the right to privacy;
(c) Encouraging the design of consumer goods to make them more resistant to crime;
(d) Target “hardening” without impinging upon the quality of the built environment or limiting free access to public space;
(e) Implementing strategies to prevent repeat victimization.

Prevention of organized crime

27. Governments and civil society should endeavour to analyse and address the links between transnational organized crime and national and local crime problems by, inter alia:

(a) Reducing existing and future opportunities for organized criminal groups to participate in lawful markets with the proceeds of crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures;
(b) Developing measures to prevent the misuse by organized criminal groups of tender procedures conducted by public authorities and of subsidies and licences granted by public authorities for commercial activity;
(c) Designing crime prevention strategies, where appropriate, to protect socially marginalized groups, especially women and children, who are vulnerable to
the action of organized criminal groups, including trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

V. International cooperation

Standards and norms

28. In promoting international action in crime prevention, Member States are invited to take into account the main international instruments related to human rights and crime prevention to which they are parties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Assembly resolution 44/25, annex), the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (General Assembly resolution 48/104), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) (General Assembly resolution 45/112, annex), the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (General Assembly resolution 40/34, annex), the guidelines for cooperation and technical assistance in the field of urban crime prevention (resolution 1995/9, annex), as well as the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century (General Assembly resolution 55/59, annex) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (General Assembly resolution 55/25, annexes I-III, and resolution 55/255, annex).

Technical assistance

29. Member States and relevant international funding organizations should provide financial and technical assistance, including capacity-building and training, to developing countries and countries with economies in transition, communities and other relevant organizations for the implementation of effective crime prevention and community safety strategies at the regional, national and local levels. In that context, special attention should be given to research and action on crime prevention through social development.

Networking

30. Member States should strengthen or establish international, regional and national crime prevention networks with a view to exchanging proven and promising practices, identifying elements of their transferability and making such knowledge available to communities throughout the world.

Links between transnational and local crime

31. Member States should collaborate to analyse and address the links between transnational organized crime and national and local crime problems.

Prioritizing crime prevention

32. The Centre for International Crime Prevention of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of the Secretariat, the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme network of affiliated and associated institutes and other relevant United Nations entities should include in their priorities crime prevention as set out in these Guidelines, set up a coordination mechanism and establish a roster of experts to undertake needs assessment and to provide technical advice.
Dissemination

33. Relevant United Nations bodies and other organizations should cooperate to produce crime prevention information in as many languages as possible, using both print and electronic media.
ANNEX 2
INFORMATIVE BACKGROUND OF KEY REPORTS

**Evidence-Based Crime Prevention: Sherman et al. (2002)**

An earlier version of the report was prepared under a directive by the U.S. Congress in 1996 to evaluate the effectiveness of existing crime prevention programs. The task was assigned to a team led by Lawrence Sherman, a professor at the University of Maryland. The first report was published in 1997, titled *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising*.

"Why would Congress require a review of the effectiveness of programs," is a question of great curiosity to Japan, where such systematic evaluations of crime prevention have not been conducted, or even discussed. Japan has used a review (evaluation) as a critical step towards the development of forefront technologies in many areas of science, so applying a systematic review to other policy areas should be a natural step. But an assessment of crime related issues still seems to be the exclusive domain of the police or criminal justice agencies. Such an assessment and evaluation, extending beyond the police and the criminal justice agencies, may not occur so easily.

Crime prevention programs in the United States have been funded by the Federal Government for more than thirty years. Most of the funds were used for operational services; not much was used for the evaluation of the services. In 1988, Congress began to limit Federal assistance to evaluation programs or projects that had demonstrated proven success. But the mandate to conduct evaluation remained unfulfilled (Sherman et al., 1997:1-1).

The 104th United States Congress was a crucial event. The Senate required the Attorney General to reserve two to three percent of the funds to conduct evaluations of the effectiveness of programs. Thus, a congressional committee came to call for "a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of all Justice Department funding of local assistance for crime prevention (Sherman et al., 1997:1-2)." Furthermore, this requirement was significant in that "there has never been a requirement to spend a percentage of operational funds exclusively on program impact evaluations demonstrating crime prevention effectiveness (Sherman et al.,"
The requirement was enacted on April 27, 1996 at the 104th United States Congress. This requirement expected the research to be independent in nature and to employ rigorous and scientifically recognized standards and methodologies. The expected areas of measurement were:

a) Reductions in delinquency, juvenile crime and youth violence;

b) Reductions in the risk factors in the community, schools, and family environment with emphasis on juvenile violence; and

c) Increases in the protective factors for reduction of delinquent and criminal behavior.

Ultimately and most importantly, crime prevention has to bring a result of reducing crime. It has to be effective and manageable within the provided resources. Federal money had been spent, and crime that affects each citizen’s daily life needs to be solved, therefore Congress sought a rigorous evaluation and further effective crime prevention. In order to obtain objective and rigorous evaluation, this task was assigned to professional scholars.

**Crime Prevention Digest II: ICPC (1999)**

The International Center for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) was established in 1994. Its origin dates back to 1986: the Council of Europe organized a meeting on the role of local policies in dealing with urban violence and insecurity. The governments of France and the Netherlands took initiatives to create an international center for crime prevention. Later the ICPC was created as an organization whose main focus was the prevention of urban and violent crime. The Board of Directors of the ICPC is composed of various international agencies and organizations, and it has various financial and advisory contributors from international governments. For example, the Attorney General’s Department of Australia, Youth Justice Board of England and Wales, South African Police Service of South Africa and other as Advisory and Policy Committee (ICPC website: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org).
Reducing Offending: Goldblatt & Lewis (1998)

**Background 1: Misspent Youth (1996, 1998)** – Report on Youth Crime and Youth Justice System by the Audit Commission

*Improving the effectiveness of the system dealing with young offenders is important, but only 3 per cent of offences lead to a conviction or caution. So the way to reduce significantly the overall level of youth crime must be to stop young people from offending in the first place, by targeting those who are at risk but have not yet begun to offend.* (Audit Commission, 1998: 6)

The Audit Commission inspected youth crime and the youth justice system, and published a report, Misspent Youth in November 1996. The Audit Commission is “an independent public body sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister with the Department of Health and the National Assembly for Wales” and “responsible for ensuring that public money is spent economically, efficiently, and effectively in the areas of local government, housing, health and criminal justice services” (Audit Commission, website: www.audit-commission.gov.uk/aboutus/index.asp).

1) **Youth crime, police, and the youth justice system**

Given this role and purpose, the Audit Commission focused on youth crime and the youth justice system. The first report published in November 1996 was prepared recognizing crime as high on the public agenda in England and Wales. According to the report, crimes against individuals increased by 73 percent between 1981 and 1995 (Audit Commission, 1996: 2). In particular, the report highlighted the disproportionate number of youth offenders in the offender population. Then, the report pointed out the amount of money spent on processing and dealing with young offenders: the total is one billion pounds per year, and 600 million pounds of it was spent by the police mainly on conventional investigations.

Another concern was delays in the youth court process and its expensive costs, which is about 2,500 pounds for each young person sentenced. Moreover, little was done by the police either to change young offenders’ behavior or to prevent youth crime: the response to crime at this time was limited to apprehension and prosecution of an offender through the formal criminal justice system.
2) Prevention in the first place is better

This report argued that preventing the offending behavior in the first place would be preferable to focusing on curing and relying on public service. It acknowledged and listed factors associated with offending among youth: gender (boys), inadequate parenting, aggressive and hyperactive behavior in early childhood, truancy and exclusion from school, peer group pressure to offend, unstable living conditions, lack of training and employment, and drug and alcohol abuse (Audit Commission, 1996: 4).

This report argued that these risk factors and youth problems “can be helped” by providing appropriate interventions. By introducing a risk factor and its matching intervention, it clearly sent a message that these problems could be addressed and greatly improved. This report, therefore, proposed to shift resources from simply processing young offenders through the criminal justice system to preventive measures that dealt with their behavior and risk factors. It indicated the areas where pilot interventions were most needed:

a) Parents: improving parenting skills and producing better behaviour;
b) Schools: dealing with difficult pupils;
c) Leisure: mixing young people at risk with others who behave responsibly and engaging in constructive activities promoting a positive and responsible self-image, improving reasoning skills;
d) Housing: providing stable conditions of living;
e) Training and employment; and
f) Substance abuse problems with emphasis on locally responding the needs of young people under the age of 18.

Equally important things are the benefits of the prevention. If crime is prevented or a court process is avoided, the resources saved from the court process may be released to fund services for preventive measures. One example introduced as an alternative to prosecution of young offenders are “caution plus” action programmes. This program “both arranges compensation for victims and addresses the behaviour of the young offender, at one-quarter of the cost of the youth court process” (Audit Commission 1996: 2). The report in 1998 estimated that
such a program could save over 20 million pounds.

3) Actions for local authorities and multi-agency strategies

The Audit Commission also emphasized the role of local authority chief executives in forming and developing multi-agency work (Audit Commission, 1996:6). The central government can help to assign duties to local authorities and allocate resources to reduce offending. It also recognized the importance for all the agencies involved to work together, as well as with local residents, for more effective intervention.

Background 2: The Labor Party’s Government

The Labor Government of Tony Blair was elected in May 1997 with a Manifesto, and one of the major campaign pledges was tackling crime. Criticizing the crime trend under the Conservative government, the Manifesto 1997 raised a new approach to law and order: “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime” (The Labour Party of the United Kingdom, 1997).

Concurrently with the Audit Commission, the Manifesto identified youth crime as one of their major targets in regards to crime issues. A sharp increase in youth crime and disorder (seven million crimes a year), a slow procedure of the youth justice system, repeat offending even before a first court hearing, and parents’ responsibility for children’s misbehaviour were the major concerns. While understanding the need for more effective public service to deal with offending, prevention of crime was also one of the major targets.

The tough-on-crime-approach paints images such as zero-tolerance and “three-strikes and you are out” laws as in the United States urged, but the Blair Government placed higher priorities on improving education and strengthening family life.

In order to carry out Blair’s pledges, the government took an approach that aimed to reallocate money to key priorities by weeding out unnecessary or wasteful spending. It also emphasized the importance of investments producing benefits in return, in the form of “reform” (HM Treasury, 1998).

Thus, the focuses of the government were clear: producing reform in Britain by reallocating money more efficiently and effectively, and ultimately making Britain a better place to live (HM Treasury, 1998).
Background 3: The Comprehensive Spending Review

The Comprehensive Spending Review (the “CSR”) was directed and concluded in July 1998 by the Her Majesty’s Treasury (equivalent to the Ministry of Finance or “Zaimu-Shou” in Japan). Spending Reviews play a key role in assessing the government's economic and budgetary position and help out the government's tax and spending plans. The functions and aims of the Spending Reviews are to set firm and fixed three-year Departmental Expenditure Limits and, through Public Service Agreements, to define the key improvements that the public can expect from these resources. Successive Spending Reviews have targeted resources at the government’s priorities, have matched these resources with reforms, and have set ambitious targets for improvements in key public services: in education, health, transport and criminal justice (HM Treasury: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_index.cfm).

The CSR 1998 was significant in that it, for the first time, reviewed thoroughly Her Majesty’s Treasury’s departmental aims and objectives. Moreover, it used “a zero-based analysis of each spending programme to find the best way of delivering the Government’s objectives” (HM Treasury, 1998). Reviewing without sticking to the former ways of thinking is strikingly innovative.

The CSR 1998 set three key objectives (HM Treasury, 1998): 1) increasing the sustainable level of growth and employment; 2) promoting fairness and opportunity; and 3) delivering efficient and modern public services. Key methodologies in securing these objectives require securing a commitment from all departments and applying modern management techniques to deliver clear and quantifiable targets. What is significant here is that the government’s ultimate interest was achieving “change.” A new and greater emphasis on preventing problems was adopted as one of the major targets in achieving change in society. The 1998 CSR pointed out the importance of prevention rather than simply dealing with the symptoms of deep-rooted social problems. Cutting wasteful expenditures and subsidies was another target in delivering reform.

In the course of the Comprehensive Spending Review, researchers were directed to review the current criminal justice system dealing with offenders, and the Home Office released
Reducing Offending, in 1998. This project on Reducing Offending involved many scholars and experts on crime prevention from both domestic and international bodies. The authors of the report are researchers from the Home Office and academic scholars. In addition, many other international experts were invited for a workshop to review the report before finalizing it.

It should be noted here that this operation was significant: Home Office researchers conducted research and a review after receiving a request and direction from Her Majesty’s Treasury. If we were to apply this situation in the Japanese context, the significance may become more obvious. It would be: researchers from the National Police Agency (Keisatsu-chou) and the Ministry of Justice (Houmu-sho) conducting research and compiling a white paper for the Ministry of Finance (Zaimu-sho) following its request and direction.

From this feature, we can understand that this project to review the current criminal justice system in the United Kingdom was a national project bringing different ministries together under one national objective: bring about change in the United Kingdom to make it a better place to live.
ANNEX 3
INFORMATIVE BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES

A) United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime

The UN Guidelines were drafted at a meeting of international governments in Vancouver, Canada, in 2002. The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which is the chief policy-making body in the field of crime control within the UN and a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council, adopted the UN Guidelines at its Eleventh Session in Vienna in April 2002. The Guidelines were ratified by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in the summer of 2002.

Europe and North America took initiatives in order to achieve this international agreement on how to approach crime prevention. The following introduces how international movements progressed towards the agreement. It also supplements our knowledge in regards to understanding the international environment, which was concurrently conducting its own scientific research and identification of effective elements.

Montreal Conference on Urban Safety, Drugs and Crime Prevention, 1989: North America and Europe came in concert to reduce and prevent crime in the 1980s. The first European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention was held in Montreal, and it “represented the first global attempt to bring direction and greater political action to an effort (UN, 1999: 194).” The conference’s final declaration, the Agenda for Safer Cities set out four key crime prevention principles:

• the community is the focal point of crime prevention;
• any response to crime needs to go beyond the criminal justice system and be part of a long-range approach that is also responsive to immediate needs;
• crime prevention must bring together those responsible for housing, social services, schools, policing and justice to tackle the situations that breed crime; and,
• partnerships need to be developed at local and national levels (European Forum for Urban Safety et al., 1989, quoted in UN, 1999: 194-195)
*Eighth UN Congress, 1990:* This Agenda was adopted at the Eighth UN Congress in 1990 as the Prevention of Urban Crime resolution.

*Paris Conference on Urban Safety, Drugs and Crime Prevention, 1991:* The second international conference held in Paris set out further concrete action-steps in its final declaration to bring about crime prevention with an emphasis on government responsibility.

- Governments must invest in and meet the socioeconomic and urban needs of at-risk and disadvantaged populations;
- Governments must establish national crime prevention structures to recommend policies, undertake research, development and evaluation of crime prevention programmes by cities;
- Municipalities must establish crime prevention structures to mobilize local officials including housing, schooling, youth, families, social services policing and justice;
- The public must be educated to participate in comprehensive crime prevention;
- Developed countries must support the creation of an International Centre for the Prevention of Crime. (UN, 1999: 194)

*Vancouver Conference for Crime Prevention Practitioners, 1996:* This conference was a turning point in moving the international agreement from “political rhetoric and scientific conclusions to the practical projects and activities that will reduce crime and violence (Pearcey, Welsh, Waller and French, 1996, cited in UN, 1999: 196).” One of the important steps that the conference outlined was the, “development of crime prevention guidelines and standards and a greater emphasis on evaluation (UN, 1999: 196).”

This agenda was carried on through various international conferences, UN Congresses and expert meetings. Elements of responsible crime prevention: standard and norms were annexed to the resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council in 1997, and it was further revised by the Expert Group Meeting on Elements of Responsible Crime Prevention in September 1999. The draft elements were considered at the Tenth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Vienna in April 2000, and the UN
General Assembly adopted “Plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century” in the resolution 56/261 of 31 January 2002 (UN, 2002).

The Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime were adopted by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and ratified by the Economic and Social Council.

The Scope of Crime Prevention

The introduction of the Guidelines addresses the basic scope of crime prevention that the United Nations aims for. According to it, well-planned crime prevention strategies (a) prevent crime and victimization; (b) promote sustainable development of countries; and (c) produce long-term benefits in terms of reducing costs.

a. Preventing crime and victimization

Crime prevention is a measure to prevent crime from happening. In crime prevention, preventing people from being victimized is also an important objective. While many offender-centered measures, such as rehabilitation programs, have been developed, support for victims has yet to be advanced. Victimization occurs even when the offender is not identified or apprehended, therefore preventing victimization should be included in the scope of crime prevention. Crime prevention should target potential offenders, victims, and all those who are related.

b. Sustainable development of countries

The impact of crime goes beyond the direct parties (offenders, victims, and the criminal justice system). Crime greatly affects the development of countries as we will see in the cost of crime analysis (see Chapter 2), therefore, crime prevention is a matter to be considered and developed at the national level. Preventing crime will contribute to the sustainable development of countries.

c. Cost-effectiveness

The costs due to crime in society and the criminal justice system are very high. Successful crime prevention can achieve lowering crime rates with less direct expense, bring long-term benefits, and reduce problems in society.
Difference from the Traditional Response to Crime

The UN Guideline Article II.6 clearly illustrates distinctive features of crime prevention, which helps us to understand the differences between crime prevention and the traditional criminal justice system, which typically enforces law, investigates incidences, and apprehends and prosecutes an offender.

The range of approaches to crime prevention is wide. It includes:

a. **Social development**: promoting the well-being of people and encouraging pro-social behaviour through social, economic, health and educational measures with a particular emphasis on children and youth.

b. **Locally based**: building initiatives, expertise and commitment of community members to change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence offending, victimization and the insecurity that results from crime.

c. **Situational crime prevention**: reducing opportunities and increasing risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits of committing crime through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims.

d. **Reintegration**: assisting the social reintegration of offenders and other preventive mechanisms to prevent recidivism.

Thus, crime prevention must go well beyond traditional criminal justice approaches. Upon planning and development of crime prevention policies and programs, policymakers and all those involved with crime prevention must understand and remember these distinctive features of crime prevention.

B) **World Report on Violence and Health**

Over 160 experts from around the world participated in developing this report, and an editorial committee coordinated the work. Representatives of all the WHO regions formed an advisory committee and provided guidance to the editorial committee at various stages. (WHO, 2002: xxii) Based on sound international-research on violence, this report examines the
root-causes of violence and prevention strategies in seven settings: 1) Youth violence; 2) Child abuse and neglect by parents and other caregivers; 3) Violence by intimate partners; 4) Abuse of the elderly; 5) Sexual violence; 6) Self-directed violence; and 7) Collective violence.

The research findings have illustrated important lessons.

- **Predictable and preventable:** “Violence is often predictable and preventable (WHO, 2002: 243).” The identified risk factors such as impulsivity, depression, marital conflict, sharp economic downturns and unemployment as well as situational factors, can indicate the risk of occurrence of violence. In other words, we can prevent violence as long as we properly deal with the known risk factors.

- **Focusing on the most vulnerable groups:** Research consistently suggests that people in the lowest socioeconomic strata are at the greatest risk from violence. The report criticizes governments and policymakers for “neglecting” public health approaches and people in poverty, and it also criticizes them for favoring policing and prisons. “This neglect must be corrected if violence is to be prevented (WHO, 2002: 245),” and resources and care-services must be focused on vulnerable people.

- **Gaining commitment from decision-makers:** “[M]uch of the success of public health efforts ultimately depends on political commitment.” (WHO, 2002: 245) Commitment of political leaders is crucial for ensuring funding and effective legislation. Grassroots efforts can achieve crime prevention, but support from political leadership is essential for increasing the legitimacy of crime prevention and giving prevention efforts higher profile in the society.

These lessons indicate that prevention of violent crime requires broad social services and a political leadership beyond the conventional criminal justice approach.

Both the UN Guidelines and the WHO report have identified and indicated indispensable principles for all the Member States. Adopting evidence from scientific research, these reports have set out worldwide norms and standards. Both the United Nations and the WHO are aware of the diverse differences in governmental structures of Member States, and as a result they have determined the most basic, but essential, principles for all of us to achieve, and set them out as
standards and norms.
ANNEX 4
SHIFT TO THE NEW STRATEGY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Initial movements in the government

The initial crime prevention movement in the United Kingdom in the 1980s was influenced by the recognition of growing problems such as overcrowding prison populations, inner city riots and a growing feeling of insecurity among citizens (Waller, 1989; Loveday, 1994). Since the 1930s, overall recorded crime had been increasing by about 5.5% per year. By the mid 1980s, crime figures rose to become about 20 times more than in the 1930s (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 2).

In the 1980s, the Home Office heavily committed to developing Neighbourhood Watch to respond to crime. This policy emphasized an extension of police force responsibility for crime prevention, but this strategy was ineffective. The reasons for this failure have already been explained in the Chapters 3 and 4: the police acting alone without partnerships with local communities is not effective.

Influenced by the failure of depending heavily on policing, the Home Office, in 1983, established a crime prevention unit bringing together the Home Office Research Unit and generalist policy analysts. The idea to establish this unit originated in the Standing Conference on Crime Prevention created in 1966. This conference brought together representatives of industry, trade, insurance, trade unions and Chief Police Officers. The Crime Prevention Unit promoted situational crime prevention as in the major approach (Waller, 1989: 21; ICPC, 1999a: 13).

In 1984, an Inter-Ministerial Circular was prepared by the Home Office, the Department of Education and Science, Environment, Health and Social Security, Welsh Office. Upon this establishment, crime prevention policy recognized that some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control of the police. This finding was very significant because it led to the recognition that every citizen and agency is expected to contribute to crime prevention, and it recognized the importance of collaboration among ministries, public, police and local authorities.
In 1986, an inter-departmental ministerial group on crime prevention was launched. The chairmanship was given to the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. The main purpose of this launch was to publicize crime prevention and to encourage British industry to do more for crime prevention on its own initiative.

The Home Office Crime Prevention Division initiated the Safer Cities Programme in 1988. This programme was the precursor of the current crime prevention programs in the United Kingdom. Its aim was to reduce crime and allow cities to flourish. In addition to these goals, the program has also supported the establishment of over 4,400 crime prevention projects in 30 inner-city and urban areas (ICPC, 1999a: 14).

These crime prevention initiatives in the 1980s were criticized in a report, called the Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991), prepared by a working group on safer communities in the Home Office in 1991. The problems highlighted by the Morgan Report were (Home Office, 1991):

(a) Too many initiatives, a plethora of bodies;
(b) An absence of consultation with other governmental departments and local authority; and
(c) A lack of local co-ordination.

In response it suggested:
(a) Local authority primacy,
(b) A need for extra funding;
(c) A need for a code of practice to encourage good practices in the multi-agency approach; and
(d) A need for consistency in developing crime prevention programs.

Interestingly, these criticisms and recommendations in the United Kingdom are very similar to the ones from the scientific and international norms. Through a central government agencies’ leadership the United Kingdom has started recognizing and accumulating the basic elements of effective crime prevention policy. Given such indications much earlier than the scientific and international norms came about, the United Kingdom recognized and promoted, at
central government agencies, the basic elements of effective crime prevention policy.

It is significant that the idea of partnership among multiple agencies existed from the early stages of crime prevention in the United Kingdom. This may partly be due to the incorporation of research in crime prevention in the United Kingdom from its very beginning in the 1970s.

It is notable that this series of initiatives demonstrates that there was a significant amount of research work behind the scenes, and that these initiatives were set forth as a result of the research and knowledge base. In the United Kingdom, there has been a substantial basis for knowledge base from the early stages of crime prevention development.

2. **Movement from Governmental Leadership and Knowledge Base**

After the Morgan Report, there was not a significant governmental movement for quite some time, although research and initiatives continued. A long-term trend showed that a continuous increase of recorded crime by about 5 per cent per year was still a great challenge to society (Goldblatt & Lewis, 1998: 1; ICPC, 1999a: 13). Moreover, the International Crime Victim Survey had revealed that “the proportion of the population victim of at least one infraction in the past year has increased from 19.5% in 1992 to 30.9% in 1995 (ICPC, 1999a: 13).”

Facing a need to improve the effectiveness of dealing with crime, programs and research such as the Kirkholt estate project (1985-), the Safer City Program (1988-1995), and the Close Circuit Television Camera initiatives (1992-) were conducted.

Given the circumstances and research findings of reports such as Misspent Youth 1996 by the Audit Commission, the Labor Party lead by Tony Blair announced a new direction and strategy. The Manifesto 1997 of the Labor Party became “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime.”

In order to carry the pledges, the Labor Government took an approach that aimed to reallocate money to priorities and emphasize the importance of investments that produce benefits in return. Crime prevention was selected as the priority based on the amount of knowledge base the Government had compiled.

For example, In November 1997, Home Secretary Jack Straw announced the most
radical reform of the youth justice system. The principal aim of reforming youth justice system was to shift to preventing offending and reoffending (Home Office, News Release, 27 November 1997: http://www.newsrelease-archive.net/coi/depts/GHO/coi5149d.ok).

The White Paper by the Government, "No More Excuses – A New Approach To Tackling Youth Crime In England And Wales" proposed key elements as follows:

- A clear strategy to prevent offending and reoffending;
- Earlier, more effective intervention;
- Faster, more efficient procedures from arrest to sentencing;
- Partnership between all youth justice agencies to deliver a better, faster system.

Besides the initiatives introduced above, a crucial and substantial knowledge base has steadily been built up before crime prevention policy became national policy. In order to implement and coordinate the nationwide project, knowledge and technical assistance from practical levels were essential. Crime Concern is one of the crucial actors in developing, coordinating and implementing the Labor Government’s crime prevention policy.

**Crime Concern**

Crime Concern is an independent, national crime reduction organization, which was established in 1988 with help from the Home Office. It is tasked with working with various agencies such as government departments, the police, local authorities, housing, youth and voluntary agencies, to help reduce crime and create safer communities.

Since its creation, Crime Concern has contributed substantially to the shift of the United Kingdom to new approaches to crime reduction by (Crime Concern, website: http://www.crimeconcern.org.uk):

- Research and development of a range of proven approaches to reduce particular crime problems, and the establishment of a knowledge base;
- Set up and manage national and local projects based on the knowledge base; and
- Development of consultancy, support and training services for government departments, crime reduction partnerships, police, local authorities, and all other related agencies and
groups.

The role of Crime Concern is important: it has contributed to building the knowledge base, coordinating partnerships, developing and managing practices, and providing technical assistance such as training. As identified in effective elements, securing an independent and permanent body exclusively for crime prevention is crucial to success.

Thus, based on research and knowledge and with a strong national leadership, the United Kingdom has shifted to strategies beyond the traditional approach to crime.
ANNEX 5
CRIME AND DISORDER ACT 1998
PART III
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Youth justice

37. - (1) It shall be the principal aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by children and young persons.

(2) In addition to any other duty to which they are subject, it shall be the duty of all persons and bodies carrying out functions in relation to the youth justice system to have regard to that aim.

38. - (1) It shall be the duty of each local authority, acting in co-operation with the persons and bodies mentioned in subsection (2) below, to secure that, to such extent as is appropriate for their area, all youth justice services are available there.

(2) It shall be the duty of-

(a) every chief officer of police or police authority any part of whose police area lies within the local authority's area; and

(b) every probation committee or health authority any part of whose area lies within that area,

to co-operate in the discharge by the local authority of their duty under subsection (1) above.

(3) The local authority and every person or body mentioned in subsection (2) above shall have power to make payments towards expenditure incurred in the provision of youth justice services-

(a) by making the payments directly; or

(b) by contributing to a fund, established and maintained by the local authority, out of which the payments may be made.

(4) In this section and sections 39 to 41 below "youth justice services" means any of the following, namely-

(a) the provision of persons to act as appropriate adults to safeguard the interests of children and young persons detained or questioned by police officers;

(b) the assessment of children and young persons, and the provision for them of rehabilitation programmes, for the purposes of section 66(2) below;

(c) the provision of support for children and young persons remanded or committed on bail while awaiting trial or sentence;

(d) the placement in local authority accommodation of children and young
persons remanded or committed to such accommodation under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 ("the 1969 Act");

(e) the provision of reports or other information required by courts in criminal proceedings against children and young persons;

(f) the provision of persons to act as responsible officers in relation to parenting orders, child safety orders, reparation orders and action plan orders;

(g) the supervision of young persons sentenced to a probation order, a community service order or a combination order;

(h) the supervision of children and young persons sentenced to a detention and training order or a supervision order;

(i) the post-release supervision of children and young persons under section 37 (4A) or 65 of the 1991 Act or section 31 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 ("the 1997 Act");

(j) the performance of functions under subsection (1) of section 75 below by such persons as may be authorised by the Secretary of State under that subsection.

(5) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (4) above so as to extend, restrict or otherwise alter the definition of "youth justice services" for the time being specified in that subsection.

39. (1) Subject to subsection (2) below, it shall be the duty of each local authority, acting in co-operation with the persons and bodies mentioned in subsection (3) below, to establish for their area one or more youth offending teams.

(2) Two (or more) local authorities acting together may establish one or more youth offending teams for both (or all) their areas; and where they do so-

(a) any reference in the following provisions of this section (except subsection (4)(b)) to, or to the area of, the local authority or a particular local authority shall be construed accordingly, and

(b) the reference in subsection (4)(b) to the local authority shall be construed as a reference to one of the authorities.

(3) It shall be the duty of-

(a) every chief officer of police any part of whose police area lies within the local authority's area; and

(b) every probation committee or health authority any part of whose area lies within that area,

to co-operate in the discharge by the local authority of their duty under subsection (1) above.

(4) The local authority and every person or body mentioned in subsection (3) above shall have power to make payments towards expenditure incurred by, or for purposes connected with, youth offending teams-

(a) by making the payments directly; or

(b) by contributing to a fund, established and maintained by the local authority, out of which the payments may be made.

(5) A youth offending team shall include at least one of each of the following,
(a) a probation officer;
(b) a social worker of a local authority social services department;
(c) a police officer;
(d) a person nominated by a health authority any part of whose area lies within
the local authority's area;
(e) a person nominated by the chief education officer appointed by the local
authority under section 532 of the Education Act 1996.

(6) A youth offending team may also include such other persons as the local
authority thinks appropriate after consulting the persons and bodies mentioned in
subsection (3) above.

(7) It shall be the duty of the youth offending team or teams established by a
particular local authority-

(a) to co-ordinate the provision of youth justice services for all those in the
authority's area who need them; and

(b) to carry out such functions as are assigned to the team or teams in the youth
justice plan formulated by the authority under section 40(1) below.

40. - (1) It shall be the duty of each local authority, after consultation with the
relevant persons and bodies, to formulate and implement for each year a plan (a
"youth justice plan") setting out-

(a) how youth justice services in their area are to be provided and funded; and

(b) how the youth offending team or teams established by them (whether alone
or jointly with one or more other local authorities) are to be composed and
funded, how they are to operate, and what functions they are to carry out.

(2) In subsection (1) above "the relevant persons and bodies" means the persons
and bodies mentioned in section 38(2) above and, where the local authority is a
county council, any district councils whose districts form part of its area.

(3) The functions assigned to a youth offending team under subsection (1)(b) above
may include, in particular, functions under paragraph 7(b) of Schedule 2 to the 1989
Act (local authority's duty to take reasonable steps designed to encourage children and
young persons not to commit offences).

(4) A local authority shall submit their youth justice plan to the Board established
under section 41 below, and shall publish it in such manner and by such date as the
Secretary of State may direct.

41. - (1) There shall be a body corporate to be known as the Youth Justice Board
for England and Wales ("the Board").

(2) The Board shall not be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown or as
enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown; and the Board's property
shall not be regarded as property of, or held on behalf of, the Crown.
(3) The Board shall consist of 10, 11 or 12 members appointed by the Secretary of State.

(4) The members of the Board shall include persons who appear to the Secretary of State to have extensive recent experience of the youth justice system.

(5) The Board shall have the following functions, namely-

(a) to monitor the operation of the youth justice system and the provision of youth justice services;

(b) to advise the Secretary of State on the following matters, namely-

(i) the operation of that system and the provision of such services;

(ii) how the principal aim of that system might most effectively be pursued;

(iii) the content of any national standards he may see fit to set with respect to the provision of such services, or the accommodation in which children and young persons are kept in custody; and

(iv) the steps that might be taken to prevent offending by children and young persons;

(c) to monitor the extent to which that aim is being achieved and any such standards met;

(d) for the purposes of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, to obtain information from relevant authorities;

(e) to publish information so obtained;

(f) to identify, to make known and to promote good practice in the following matters, namely-

(i) the operation of the youth justice system and the provision of youth justice services;

(ii) the prevention of offending by children and young persons; and

(iii) working with children and young persons who are or are at risk of becoming offenders;

(g) to make grants, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to local authorities or other bodies for them to develop such practice, or to commission research in connection with such practice; and

(h) themselves to commission research in connection with such practice.

(6) The Secretary of State may by order-

(a) amend subsection (5) above so as to add to, subtract from or alter any of the functions of the Board for the time being specified in that subsection; or

(b) provide that any function of his which is exercisable in relation to the youth justice system shall be exercisable concurrently with the Board.

(7) In carrying out their functions, the Board shall comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State and act in accordance with any guidance given by him.

(8) A relevant authority-
(a) shall furnish to the Board any information required for the purposes of subsection (5)(a), (b) or (c) above; and
(b) whenever so required by the Board, shall submit to the Board a report on such matters connected with the discharge of their duties under the foregoing provisions of this Part as may be specified in the requirement.

A requirement under paragraph (b) above may specify the form in which a report is to be given.

(9) The Board may arrange, or require the relevant authority to arrange, for a report under subsection (8)(b) above to be published in such manner as appears to the Board to be appropriate.

(10) In this section "relevant authority" means a local authority, a chief officer of police, a police authority, a probation committee and a health authority.

(11) Schedule 2 to this Act (which makes further provision with respect to the Board) shall have effect.

Supplementary provisions.

42. - (1) In the foregoing provisions of this Part and this section-

"chief officer of police" has the meaning given by section 101(1) of the Police Act 1996;

"local authority" means-

(a) in relation to England, a county council, a district council whose district does not form part of an area that has a county council, a London borough council or the Common Council of the City of London;

(b) in relation to Wales, a county council or a county borough council;

"police authority" has the meaning given by section 101(1) of the Police Act 1996;

"youth justice system" means the system of criminal justice in so far as it relates to children and young persons.

(2) For the purposes of those provisions, the Isles of Scilly form part of the county of Cornwall and the Inner Temple and the Middle Temple form part of the City of London.

(3) In carrying out any of their duties under those provisions, a local authority, a police authority, a probation committee or a health authority shall act in accordance with any guidance given by the Secretary of State.