PROFILE ANALYSIS

THE FRONT NATIONAL: MODEL FOR THE RADICAL RIGHT?

POL 7979 Research Paper
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Abstract

The Front National (FN) has typically been studied as an archetypal model for contemporary radical right-wing parties across Europe (cf. Art, 2011; Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Hainsworth; 2008). Founded in 1972, the FN was the forerunner among a ‘new wave’ of radical right parties across the continent, becoming the most established political force of its kind (cf. Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 2011: 30). Yet, as its political program extends over four decades, I find it apposite to challenge our conventional understanding of the Front National as a prototype for the ‘New Radical Right’ (NRR). To this end, I perform a comparative analysis of the key ideological features of the Front National in relation to those of the contemporary or radical right. That is, I intend to compare what scholars consider the most prominent features of the radical-right with those advanced by the Front National. I hope to demonstrate that the FN has conserved its core political ideology, thereby remaining a model radical-right party. I present three (3) hypotheses: 1) The Front National continues to promote an anti-immigration platform that exemplifies the nativist traditions of the radical right; 2) the FN’s discourse on insecurity typifies radical-right socioauthoritarian ideologies; and 3) the FN has created a lexicon around ‘euro-globalization’ which expands upon elements of the radical right’s nationalist-populist strategy. Together, these represent key themes of the Front National’s political program, which ultimately aims to defend the French nation and its people.

Introduction

The Front National (FN) is typically characterized as the forerunner among contemporary radical right-wing parties across Europe. Founded in 1972, the FN then led the ‘third wave’ of radical right parties in the early 1980s and became the most established of its kind (Bornschier & Lachat, 2009, p. 364; Rydgren, 2004: 20). The Front National succeeded, not only in breaking into, but in maintaining an electoral stronghold, in the national political sphere (cf. Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000; Kitschelt, 1995; Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 351; Goodliffe, 2012: 137). Perrineau (2011) claims that the Front National “turned French political life upside down for 25 years” (in Hainsworth, 2012: 22). At least until the 2000s, the FN was consistently achieving around 15 percent of the national vote (Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 255). Consequently, the Front has steadily permeated the mainstream right discourse in both national and European politics (cf. Art, 2011; Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 2011, p. 30). For this reason, the FN has been studied as an archetypal model for other radical right parties across Europe (cf. Art, 2011; Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Rydgren, 2004; Mudde, 2012: 4). For instance, Kitschelt describes the Front as nearly “an ideal-typical realization” of what has been defined as “New Radical Right” (1995: 91). Ivaldi confirms that the FN is considered a prototype and has successfully modernized the radical-right agenda (Ivaldi, 2012). Thus, much of the academic literature describes the Front National as a leading example for radical-right parties across Europe.

Yet, decades have passed since the Front National put forth its first political program. This begs the question does the FN’s core ideologies still conform to our conventional understanding of a contemporary radical-right party? Does the FN provide scholars with an adequate conceptual framework with which to study the radical right today? A review of the Front’s official websites and several mediated sources would suggest that the FN is a new and distinctive phenomenon in European politics (FN, 2013; Le Monde, May 23, 2013; Rue89, Jun 6, 2013). For instance, a recent article in Rue89 (Jun 6, 2013) suggests that the rise of a radicalized right-wing movement across European countries is steeped in the legacy of the Front National among some of the oldest extremist parties (Haski, 2013). Hence, is the Front National truly a prototypical radical right-wing party? Following an in-depth analysis of the key ideological themes of a typical radical-right party and those appropriated by the Front National, I argue that the latter has essentially conserved its core radical-right features, and may therefore be considered a model for the contemporary radical right. I base my argument on the following three hypotheses: 1) the Front National focuses heavily, if not primarily, on immigration to forward its ethnonationalist and xenophobic values;
2) the Front National shares the radical right’s socioauthoritarian traditions insomuch as it has developed a comprehensive language on ‘insecurity’ which focuses on the preservation of order and traditions in French society; and 3) the FN practices the nationalist-populist strategy of the radical right in order to gain support for its anti-system and anti-universalist ideas in view of European integration and globalization. Therefore, I hope to demonstrate that the fundamental features of the Front National are in keeping with the conventional literature on the new radical right.

This paper will proceed in the following manner. In the first section, I define the most prominent ideological features of the radical-right party family. The second section describes the historical development of the Front National’s defining features over roughly the last four decades. Thirdly, I present and briefly expand upon my main argument and hypotheses. Fourth, I perform a comparative profile analysis between the Front National and what scholars have defined as the ‘new radical right’. In finding commonalities and dissimilarities between the political features of the FN and the radical right, this analysis aims to determine whether the Front National, as it stands today, may be considered a model for the new radical-right parties. The last sections consist of a discussion of the findings and concluding remarks for future research on the contemporary radical right in Europe.

1| Defining the Radical Right: Main Features and Ideologies

By way of introduction, to speak of the “far right” is generally to denote any political party that differentiates itself from the mainstream right (Art, 2011, p. 10). In broad terms, the ‘right’ is viewed as a political tradition which puts emphasis on ideas such as the right to difference and the preservation of inequality (Hainsworth, 2008: 8). The far right, however, goes further in their rejection of universalist or egalitarian values typical of liberal-democratic societies (Rydgren, 2007, p. 243). Yet, scholars face a number of challenges in defining right-wing extremism. Mudde affirms that 26 definitions of right-wing extremism can be derived from no less than 58 different features mentioned in the literature (2000: 11; in Fennema, 1997, p. 474). Consequently, extreme right parties have assumed a great many labels, including ‘xenophobes’, ‘nativists’, ‘racists’, ‘right-wing populists’, ‘neo-fascists’, and ‘neo-Nazis’ (Mudde, 2012: 3). Still, scholars have typically divided the far right party family into two groups: The ‘Extreme Right’ and the ‘Radical Right’. Until the mid-1970s, the term ‘right-wing extremism’ was used more or less synonymously with ‘right-wing radicalism’. However, the ‘radical right’ is a specific type of far right party that began to emerge in the 1970s. In tandem with rising societal concerns about major transformations across the European continent, radical-right parties came about in reaction to political discontent with mainstream parties that were either powerless or unwilling to address them (Art, 2011: 30; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). Though both party families are neither easily defined nor strictly exclusive to one another, I endeavor to briefly describe similarities and differences between them, in order to provide a clear definition of the radical-right for the purposes of this paper.

Scholars typically agree that extreme-right and radical-right parties can be distinguished by their fundamental views on democracy. In the simplest terms, radical-right parties are nominally democratic while extreme-right parties are decidedly extra-parliamentary (Rydgren, 2007: 243). To briefly explain, extreme-right parties tend to share two key anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements. First is a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic state (Carter, 2005: 17; in Hainsworth, 2008: 12). The second is a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (Carter, 2005: 17). From the first element stems characteristics such as such as anti-partyism, anti-parliamentarianism, and antipluralism (Hainsworth, 2008: 12). The second element accounts for features that include nationalism, racism, and exclusionism (Hainsworth, 2008: 12). In practice, this means that extreme-right parties tend to be ephemeral as they are confined to the “undemocratic fringe” of democratic political systems, though a few have endured in European politics (Demir & Altinaş, 2012; Fennema, 1997: 481).
By contrast, right-wing radicalism nominally accepts procedural democracy and abides by democratic political institutions (Rydgren, 2007, p. 243). Radical right parties may be anti-democratic in orientation but are not totally hostile to liberal democracy (Backer, 2000: 88). Granted, they share many of the nationalist and anti-pluralist views of the extreme right. For instance, both party families reject contradictions within the (ethnic) community and the state (Mudde, 2000: 188). Still, it is important to understand that the radical right is not anti-democratic, per se (Rydgren, 2007). From this point forward, our discussion will focus uniquely on the radical right.

Although many definitions exist, scholars have pointed to a few distinctive ideological features which characterize the new radical right. For instance, scholarship suggests that radical right parties rely on appeals to national sentiments defined in ethnic terms; reject cosmopolitan conceptions of society; react to rising non-European immigration; oppose globalization and reject European integration which they see as undermining national sovereignty and identity; and brand themselves as anti-parties, criticizing domestic political elites as corrupt and removed from the ‘common people’ (cf. Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008). More succinctly, Rydgren claims that contemporary radical right-wing parties promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism, sociocultural authoritarianism, and anti-system populism (2007: 242). Based on this scholarship, I have chosen to categorize the radical right according to three (3) defining features: nativism, socio-authoritarianism, and populism. I will provide a brief overview of these features and later justify my selection for the purposes of my analysis.

Nativism

First, the radical right finds its ideological underpinnings in nativism. Nativism forms the cultural component of far-right ideology that rejects individual or social equality, and the integration of marginalized groups (Art, 2011: 11). From this ideology stems a very strong sense of nationalism or ultra-nationalism. Nationalism can be conveyed by either civic or ethnic orientations – or both. State nationalism is the belief that the nation is the primary unit of organization, consisting essentially of the people living within its borders. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is based on the view that the ethnic community is the primary unit while the state is the political expression of that community. Therefore, state citizenship is based on civic criteria (or ius soli) while membership of the ethnic community is based on ethnic criteria (or ius sanguinis) (Mudde, 2000: 187). Radical right parties support both forms of nationalism, though they tend to place more emphasis on the latter based on their nativist undercurrents. They use the ethnopluralist argument to call for the segregation of ethnicities in order to preserve a nation’s unique cultural and ethnic character (Rydgren, 2007: 244; Mudde, 2007: 18). Put differently, the radical right more often stresses the irreconcilability of cultural differences than forms of social hierarchy (Mudde, 2007: 19; Art, 2011: 11; Eatwell, 2000: 411). In theory, radical right parties avoid racism or an ideology that claims a hierarchical order between biologically defined races (Rydgren, 2008: 743). For instance, the term “cultural differentialism” is used to claim, not the superiority of a given nationality or race, but the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive culture and traditions (cf. Betz 1999; Spektorowskia, 2003; Bornschier, 2005). Having said this, it may be argued that radical right parties have developed elements associated with xenophobia and ethnocentrism, which are based on a belief in the fundamental inequality between ethnic groups (Hainsworth, 2008: 12). All the same, I argue that radical right parties generally direct their ultranationalist and pluralist values toward ethnic dimensions of belonging.

In practice, the nativist values of radical right parties translate into a political discourse which advances anti-foreigner or anti-immigration positions, such as those in favour of “national preference” or giving priority to native citizens (Rydgren, 2004: 4; Art, 2011: 24). The latter is often associated with welfare chauvinism, which partly implies that social policies should work to the exclusive benefit of a nation’s ‘own’ people (cf. Eatwell, 2000b: 413). Some radical-right parties are labeled anti-immigration or single-issue parties as a result of their discerning focus on the immigration theme. However, it is often
misleading to label radical-right parties as such because they tend to present an ideological program that covers a variety of themes (cf. Fennema, 1997; Van Der Brug, 2005). Nonetheless, radical right parties vehemently pursue an anti-immigration agenda to promote “pro-native” policies or curtail the influx of immigrants and refugees (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 6; Rydgren, 2007: 250). Specific policies to this effect may include the tightening of border controls to fight illegal immigration, the reduction of immigration quotas, or stricter citizenship laws (Art, 2011: 9). In brief, radical right parties demonstrate nativist elements which mainly include xenophobia, ethno-pluralism, and ultranationalism. Nativism is therefore at the root of radical with-wing ideology.

**Sociocultural Authoritarianism**

A second key feature of the radical right is *sociocultural authoritarianism*. Authoritarianism is not exclusive to the radical-right. However, radical-right authoritarian values differ from those found in conservatism and other political currents (Mudde, 2010: 1174). To briefly explain, the new radical right has developed a “traditionalist-communitarian” counter-ideology to the liberal-universalist values of the New Left (Bornschiemer, 2005: 11; Bornschier & Lachat, 2009: 374). Communitarians argue that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions (Honneth, 1993; in Bornschier, 2005: 9). Consequently, moderate communitarians would argue that universalistic principles may violate the cultural traditions of an established community and therefore become oppressive (cf. Bornschier, 2005: 10). Communitarianism thus implies the defense of cultural traditions and a rejection of multicultural society and an individualistic conception of the self (cf. Bornschier, 2005). For instance, the radical right has a strong attachment to the notion of family as the backbone and privileged unit of the nation (Davies, 1999: 25). In this manner, communitarianism may be said to nourish many of the nativist and authoritarian features of radical-right ideology⁶.

In practice, radical right parties express their sociocultural authoritarian positions by stressing the need for strong state, law-and-order, as well as traditional and family values (Rydgren, 2007: 242). In general, radical right parties do not adopt the more extreme tenets of authoritarianism, notably the sanction of violence and a desire for a totalitarian form of government (Mudde, 2010; Rydgren, 2004). Nonetheless, they advance authoritarian law-and-order politics insofar as demanding strong punishment in breach of rules and a stronger police force (Mudde, 2000: 188). In other words, they place the state above the individual in the name of security and public welfare (Backes and Moreau, 1994; Jaschke, 1993; in Betz and Immerfall, 1998: 102). For instance, they may practice a kind of welfare chauvinism in relation to social security, thereby calling for a high degree of state involvement in the economy (i.e. economic socialism) (Givens, 2005). Socioauthoritarian politics also relate to value-laden issues surrounding sociocultural norms, national identity, and immigration policy. By and large, radical-right ideology therefore centers on order and authority with the intention of protecting the national interest (Davis, 1999: 7). More precisely, radical right parties focus on security and law-and-order because they regard contemporary democracies as weak or incapable of defending against threats to national security and social order. These threats are generally understood to be immigrants and foreigners – most recently Muslims. For instance, radical right parties warn against the ‘Islamization’ of Western society; Islam being fundamentally incompatible with liberal-democratic values and individualism (Betz, 2004: 319). In brief, radical right parties practice sociocultural authoritarianism in the aim of protecting citizens to wit their native own.

**Populism**

A third and last key feature of the radical right is anti-system or anti-establishment populism. In part, the communitarian beliefs of the radical right often translate into populism or a support for a people’s right to self-determination (Mudde, 2000: 188). As mentioned, radical right parties typically frame the immigration debate in terms of a cultural or security threat to the nation. For example, migration may be seen as a multifaceted threat to economic competition and the cultural homogeneity of society (Mudde, 2012: 9). Therefore, radical right parties make strategic use of populist elements to promote anti-
immigration and anti-foreigner sentiments. Similarly, anti-immigration policies are based on an anti-elite/anti-politics narrative (Mudde, 2012: 31). Populist ideology thus implies that society should be separated into two antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2010: 1175). Populist anti-party sentiments therefore serve as a means by which to reject (usually established) political parties and systems on the grounds of their bad functioning (Mudde, 2008: 188). That is, the populist strategy allows radical right parties to revolt against the “political class” as a supposed revolt against democracy itself (Fennema, 1997: 485). In this manner, radical right parties present themselves as a viable democratic alternative to the political status quo (Betz, 1999: 305). For instance, they portray themselves as “anti-cartel” or defenders of ‘real’ democracy in order to bridge divisions within their electorate (Bornschier, 2005: 22). Radical right parties therefore nominally uphold liberal-democratic rules and systems inasmuch as it serves to discredit the political system from within (Art, 2011; Rydgren, 2007). In short, the radical right rejects pluralist values and seeks to influence popular attitudes under the guise of anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2007: 246).

For the purposes of this analysis, I have adopted Rydgren’s (2007) position that anti-establishment populism is a characteristic, but not distinctive, feature of the new radical right7. This position is based on the fact that other parties of various political shades also make use of the populist strategy. So, although scholars use terms such as ‘populist radical right’ (PPR), ‘neo-populist’ or ‘new populist parties’ (NPP) to identify radical-right parties that demonstrate strong populist tendencies, I will refrain from using these terms in order to conserve a more inclusive definition of a ‘radical right-wing’ party (Rydgren, 2008; Zaslove, 2004: 62). Notwithstanding, anti-establishment populism is a strategic feature of the radical right which may be viewed as an antagonistic expression of more fundamental values, such as anti-egalitarianism and exclusionism.

**Anti-Europeanization and Globalization**

In recent decades, radical-right parties have begun to direct their populist sentiments toward a greater ‘political class’ which exists not only within but beyond the boundaries of the nation; these are the proponents of European integration and globalization. In keeping with the populist strategy, this transition has allowed radical right parties to accentuate the divisions between the nationalist and globalist camps, broadly speaking. In other words, these parties make strategic use of a divisive language which separates the nation’s ‘people’ from the ‘corrupt’ leaders of the globalist project. In constructing an exclusionary language vis-à-vis other European nations and the rest of the world, radical right parties seek to further advance their ethnonationalist and xenophobic agenda. On the whole, radical right parties react to rising non-European immigration, oppose globalization, and reject European integration, which together are seen as undermining national sovereignty and identity (Rovny, 2013: 2). After all, radical right parties emerged precisely in reaction to the inability of mainstream parties to address political discontent created by major transformations across the European continent (Betz, 1993: 413; Lubbers, 1992; Rydgren, 2005). Hence, radical right parties have adopted an anti-integrationist and Eurosceptic discourse as a populist means by which they purport to defend the nation and its citizens against the forces of European integration and globalization.

Having said this, the radical right’s economic positions on European integration and global capitalism are less clear. In part, the rise of radical right parties in Western Europe is associated with a backlash against the excessive role of the state in the economy (Ignazi, 2003). For this reason, radical right parties initially used a mix of economic egalitarianism and anti-welfare chauvinism8 to capture disenchanted industrial workers hurt by globalization and the supply of cheaper immigrant labor (Derks, 2006; in Rovny, 2013: 3). This combined economic strategy, known as *economic populism*, therefore refers less to a free-market ideology than a profound distrust in government policies. As such, radical right parties seek to discredit the government along with support for its redistribution and social welfare politics (cf. Derks, 2004). Kitschelt and McGann (2005) also suggest that radical right parties can adopt a ‘winning formula,’ which combines authoritarian and nationalistic social appeal with extreme neo-liberalism. More precisely, the
formula calls for the dismantling of public bureaucracies and the welfare state; demanding instead a “strong and authoritarian, but small” state (in Rovny, 2013:2). In this case, radical right parties are sometimes labeled neoliberal-xenophobic parties (Art, 2011: 19). In keeping with populist tradition, radical right parties inherently distrust actors acting on behalf of foreign entities, including supranational or international institutions (Mudde, 2007: 74). For instance, radical right parties have been known to criticize the decisions of multinational corporations and the Brussels government, which they claim have led to a loss of national supremacy and self-determination (Rydgren 2007: 251). So, while established parties are divided regarding European integration and avoid taking clear positions, radical right parties exploit the situation by portraying the political establishment as a closed cartel (Bornschier, 2005: 22; Kriesi et al.; Bartolini, 2004). In short, the economic strategy of radical right parties is somewhat convoluted because it is continually adapted to capitalize on opportunities presented to them by the changing political climate. Nevertheless, their economic logic is almost always contingent upon the radical right’s core ideologies, namely nativism, authoritarianism and anti-establishment populism. This section served to demonstrate that the political discourse of new radical right is unequivocally fixed upon ethnic and sociocultural concerns with regards to the nation (Rydgren 2007: 243). This discourse clearly displays elements associated with ethno-nationalism, sociocultural authoritarianism and anti-system/party populism (Rydgren 2005; 2007: 242; Minkenberg, 2001). The following section takes a historical approach to the ideological features of the Front National in relation to the radical right-wing party family.

2| Historical Development of the Front National

This section describes the historical development of the Front National over roughly the last forty years. I believe that a careful historical analysis is needed to illustrate the circumstances under which the process of legitimation occurs (Berezin, 2007: 132). Hence, how did the Front National become the first established party of its kind in French and European politics?

France in the 1960s and 1970s: A Party in the Making

It may be said that the far right has a long history in France (Crépon, 2012; DeClair, 1999). The French Fourth Republic (1946-58) witnessed the foundation of some of the earliest extreme right organizations. Among them was Jeune Nation, founded in 1950 by young army officers disenchanted with the Republic’s defeat in the Indochina War (1946-54). Most importantly, Jeune Nation was represented by a young Jean-Marie Le Pen, who would become the founder and President of the Front National. The organization was essentially anticommunist, antimodernist, xenophobic, and in favour of preserving the empire (Milza, 1987: 296; in Art, 2011: 121). During the 1950s, many prominent extreme-right organizations came to the fore on the question of Algerian independence. Perhaps the most significant push was the Poujadist movement and party, which peaked in the 1956 French legislative election (Kitschelt, 1995: 92). Poujadists and members of the French far right trace their political roots to the Algerian crisis and their participation in the OAS. The wave of criminal activities led by l’Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS) during the Algerian War (1954-62) and the exodus of one million French settlers after independence contributed to anti-Arab sentiments in France (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall 1998: 11). Thus, the Poujadist movement resurrected anti-Semitism along with other extreme-rightist themes, such as anti-statism and antiparliamentarianism (DeClair, 1999: 19-20). Jean-Marie Le Pen was prominent among its members. He became the youngest deputy in the National Assembly after winning a seat for the UDCA at 28 years of age (Art, 2011: 121).

Le Pen was immediately determined to orchestrate a resurgence of a new national party on the far right. Despite a forbidding political context, a number of far right organizations skirted the contours of French political life prior to the creation of the Front National. Le Pen created the Comité d’initiative pour une Candidature Nationale in 1963 (DeClair, 1999: 25). He resolved to create a truly unified ‘National Opposition’ (‘Opposition National’) under the impetus of the presidential elections in 1965. Le Pen’s
Committee would coordinate the presidential campaign for Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (1907-89), who became known as ‘TV’. The presidential candidate was firmly linked with far right causes, as a pro-French Algerian and former adjunct secretary of information in the Vichy government. As campaign manager, Le Pen played an important part in TV’s ability to draw other far right movements into the fold (DeClair, 1999: 26). These included the endorsements of a neofascist youth movement called Occident (1964) and a far right periodical titled Europe-Action (DeClair, 1999: 29). Although the TV Committee failed to receive more than 5.3% of the vote, it did however form the core of the Front National (Art, 2011: 122).

In the late 1960s, the French far right had yet to develop a coherent program and remained an isolated conglomerate of groupuscules (small isolated groups) for political action. Former generations of far-right supporters had mobilized during the height of Action Française and later the fight for French Algeria. However, a third generation shifted their political focus away from de Gaulle in search of new issues (DeClair, 1999: 29). This focus fell upon the political Left, such as student-led Communist groups among others. Yet, the far right was no match for leftist organizations given a continued lack of coherence among its political factions. Among these was a wave of far right writers and philosophers from the Nouvelle Droite (New Right) formed the Groupe de recherché et d’étude pour la civilisation européenne (GRECE) in 1968. GRECE and its offshoot, Club de l’Horloge, were formed in an endeavour to revitalize the anti-egalitarian doctrine of the French extreme right (Crépon, 2012: 33; Declair, 1999: 28). GRECE is said to have profoundly inspired the ideological positions of the Front National (cf. Dézé, 2012: 87; Crépon, 2012: 42-47).

Still, the diversity of far right groups and interests posed grave challenges for the future of the far right in France. In 1968, Occident disbanded following its official prohibition due to violent protests carried out against leftist student organisations (Crépon, 2012: 33). Its leaders regrouped to form other far right organizations, namely the Groupe Union-Droite (GUD). In 1969, GUD leaders and former Occident members founded an activist organization called Ordre Nouveau (ON). The organization was different from its predecessors as it aimed to become a large party representing a unified rightist alternative (Kitschelt, 1995: 94). Ordre Nouveau based its model on that of the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) in view of its success in attracting wider support from members of established parties. In adopting MSI’s model for a ‘National Right,’ ON grew in importance and attracted the support of other far right groups, such as Une Jeune Europe and Action Nationaliste (Crépon, 1999: 31). By the 1970s, ON counted approximately 5,000 members (mostly student activists) operating on the far right fringes of French politics (DeClair, 1999: 31).

In June 1971, ON’s political program began to take shape with its manifest entitled “Pour un Front national” (For a National Front) (Dézé, 2012: 38). Although decidedly extra-parliamentary, Ordre Nouveau took the initial step toward nominal democracy in order to challenge political parties in the French electoral arena (cf. Lecoeur, 2002: 32-33; Dézé, 2012: 32-26; DeClair, 1999: 35-42). It represented the rallied forces of the far right in hopes of making political gains at the 1973 legislative elections (Crépon, 2912: 34). In attempting to create a more moderate image, the party sought out a leader who could improve its electoral credibility (Crépon, 2012:35). By the intermediary Roger Holeindre and François Brignone, Jean-Marie Le Pen became the first president of the new party (Art, 2011: 123). In June 1972, the party was officially announced in Congress under the name Front national pour l’unité française (FNUF). The name was literally created to describe a political ‘front’ behind which activists of the Far Right could pursue their goals (Williams, 2006: 82). The FNUF was, again, modeled upon the Italian MSI party and even copied the party’s emblematic tricolored flame (Williams, 2006: 82; Rydgren, 2004: 18). The FNUF nonetheless preserved its revolutionary tendencies as it called for a break with the past: “French renaissance and a new defense of the French people” (Berezin, 2007: 141). At long last, an agglomeration of far right organizations came together to create the Front National (FN) on October 5, 1972 (Berezin, 2007: 131; Kitschelt, 1995: 94). The party strived to present itself as a populist
xenophobic movement that transcended traditional conceptions of left and right (Davies, 1999: 7). The party’s ideologies were presented in its original publication entitled “Defending the French – The Front National Program” (1973). Yet, the Front’s main themes, such as immigration and security, were not significant on the public agenda during this time, and thereby dismissed as propaganda rather than real political issues (Kling, 2012: 18).

In addition to this, the party’s development was impeded by internal schisms that took place between the extremist nationalists and the more moderate supporters of Le Pen as the FN failed to formulate a cohesive program (Kitschelt, 1995: 94). Lepenists believed that the strategies needed to convert the movement into a credible partisan organization required a break with several of its founding extremist ideologies. This ideological rift between “extremists” and “moderates” crystallized as a result of the FN’s poor performance (1.3% of the vote) in the 1973 legislative elections. The FN subsequently lost a substantial portion of its support base and investments in the electoral campaign (Dézé, 2012: 54, 58-9).

In 1973, Ordre Nouveau dissolved but its members continued to rival Le Pen and his party (Art, 2011: 123). In 1974, ON members founded the more moderate “Party of New Forces” (Parti des Forces Nouvelles, PFN) in order to contest the FN in parliamentary elections. Despite media attention and the founding of the Front National de la Jeunesse (FNJ) in 1974, the FN’s electoral ambitions were all but crushed for nearly a decade (DeClair, 1999: 167; Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 12).

During the late 1970s, the French far right remained marginal which made it difficult for the Front National to recruit new members (Art, 2011: 123; Kitschelt, 1995: 94). This meant that the party was rather deferent in selecting its adherents. That is, the party attracted neofascists and extreme-right members so long as it could form the minimal partisanship needed to participate in French political life (Dézé, 2012: 28). François Duprat was among these extremists, who joined the movement in 1974 and became Le Pen’s right-hand man in light of his political achievements. However, Le Pen’s egocentric character led him to regard potential successors with derision throughout his political career.

In March 1978, Duprat was killed by a car bomb between two rounds of legislative elections (Kling, 2012: 59). On one hand, I mention the incident to demonstrate that the Front National had much to overcome in the way of political obstacles. On the other hand, the Duprat incident allowed Le Pen to temper extremist ideologies within the party and consolidate its various factions. Instead of weakening the party, a new image was created for the FN (Art, 2011: 123; Simmons, 2003: 67). Le Pen replaced the extremist discourse with a populist message that could appeal to a much wider audience (Marcus, 1995: 12; Art, 2011: 125).

Of importance, the FN had claimed ownership over the issues of immigration and security in their political program (Dézé, 2012: 66). Although immigration was already embedded in a broader set of ideological interpretations of French society, the Front National was instrumental in hastening its rise to popular salience (Kitschelt, 1995: 92). As discussed, the Front National’s commitment to increasing the ‘security’ of the nation was rooted in authoritarian radical-right beliefs in the importance of protecting the nation and its people (Davies, 1999: 26). In the 1980s, the Front developed a political lexicon around the notion of ‘insecurity,’ claiming an undisputed link between immigration, on one hand, and crime and unemployment of French nationals, on the other (Dézé, 2012: 66; Davies, 1999: 20). The Front’s positioning shifts in relation to these issues therefore tactically followed, rather than preceded, popular attitude shifts (Williams, 2006: 93; Dézé, 2012: 92). The FN thus capitalized on the socioeconomic crisis to advance xenophobic and authoritarian elements that had become engrained in France’s political fabric.

As a consequence, the Front’s defense of French nationals politicized anti-establishment attitudes during this time (Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 254). The Front now thrived on its characterization as the ‘outsider’ in the French political system, thereby opposing mainstream parties and presenting itself as an alternative to the political status quo (Davies, 1999: 18). GRECE was a significant influence in this regard, contributing to a ‘new’ language that put emphasis on concepts like ‘difference’ and ‘identity’
(Davies, 1999: 21). The Front’s populist strategy initially aimed at attracting social cleavages who felt disillusioned with the political mainstream – the “petite bourgeoisie déclassée” (Ysmal, 1991: 183). The Front’s discourse was also linked to exclusionary conceptions of community, which counter those of an internationalized and multicultural society (e.g. Mayer, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Betz, 2004). In tandem with a nationalist-populist discourse, Le Pen rather effectively denounced the anti-colonial and integrationist values of the Left (Frey, 1998: 74). Put simply, the FN’s political program was becoming more amenable to nationalist and anti-party attitudes toward the nation and its political leaders, respectively (Mudde, 2000: 188; 2007: 65). In many respects, Le Pen’s Front National is considered the first party to successfully introduce a strategic model for a new radical right in Europe (Williams, 2006: 79; Laude, 2011: 23).

The FN in the early to mid-1980s: From Fringe to Party Politics

Prior to the 1980s, the Front National had little or no political representation in French party politics (Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 255). The party suffered a series of dismal electoral performances and was squeezed out by the PFN’s political maneuvers in the 1979 European elections. The FN’s 1981 legislative campaign failed to prevent a Socialist victory for the presidency, marking the era of François Mitterrand’s Left-wing coalition (Williams, 2006: 90; Kitschelt, 1995: 97). Le Pen also failed to receive the 500 signatures required to run in the 1981 presidential contest (Kitschelt, 1995: 94). Nevertheless, France’s political climate ultimately gave rise to the Front National: Le Pen has referred to the years during which he struggled to achieve legitimacy as “Crossing the desert” (1972-84) (DeClair, 1999: 42; Williams, 2006: 83).

In the early 1980s, Le Pen seized every opportunity to broaden the reach of the Front’s appeal among the French electorate. Immigration and security issues were finding resonance in French society (Kling, 2012: 31). In particular, immigration served as the cornerstone of the FN’s return from the political margin (Frey, 1998: 71). The salience of the immigration question caused a reconfiguration of the French party system, which created a political space for the Front National as for other extreme parties on either end of the political spectrum (Bornschier & Lachat 2009: 365; Kitschelt, 1995: 91). On one hand, the unified Left essentially collapsed as fears and disappointments aroused by the Mitterand government, and its turn toward austerity (1983), put an end to “L’état de grâce” (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 11). On the other hand, the moderate-Right camp had begun to unravel as its members were divided among supporters of Giscard d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac, and Raymond Barre. As a result, rightist voters began to consider a new alternative – the Front National (DeClair, 1999: 47).

The Front National achieved its electoral breakthrough following a series of second-order municipal elections between 1981 and 1983 (Bornschier & Lachat, 2009: 365). The Front’s 1983 local election campaign in the town of Dreux was a definitive point for a few reasons. The small town of Dreux was mainly composed of unskilled labourers living in public housing and witnessing a steady influx of immigrants during the 1980s (Kitschelt, 1995: 100). Le Pen and Jean-Pierre Stirbois moved into the community in the lead up to the 1981 legislative elections. They organized support for the FN based on anti-immigration appeals. Immigration was linked to insecurity to great effect and was the single most important issue through which the FN mobilized support (Freedman, 2004: 40). Stirbois was particularly instrumental in creating the FN’s xenophobic image during and after the 1981 electoral campaign (Dézé, 2012: 70). Moreover, the party thrived on the strategic dilemmas revealed by the government and party competition between the FN and opposition parties – mainly the PS but also the RPR and UDF (Kitschelt, 1995: 91; Davies, 1999: 4). Jean-Marie Le Pen regularly denounced the policies of the “gang of four” (Le Monde, 1995: 5; in Bornschier, 2005: 23). As radical market reforms and nationalism had been placed on the national agenda, the FN seized the opportunity to place a pro-market and ethnocentric program on the electoral platform (Kitschelt, 1995: 99). The Front’s nationalist standpoint was almost directly opposite to the ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective of the Socialist government. Often times, the Front National even inverted the vocabulary of the French republicans (Safran; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993:
Le Pen’s 1983 campaign appealed to the anti establishment sentiments by focusing on key themes, namely immigration and economic crisis (Kitschelt, 1995: 99). In fact, the Front was steadily attracting members from mainstream parties, such as local RPR and UDF politicians who entered into an alliance with the FN for the run-off elections (Kitschelt, 1995: 100). In the 1983 municipal elections, Le Pen won an astounding 11.26% of the vote in the first round, and was appointed municipal councillor in the 20th arrondissement of Paris. As in Dreux, Le Pen’s campaign proved effective in neighborhoods where unemployment was high and foreigners were poorly assimilated (DeClair, 1999: 60). For his part, Stirbois won 16.72% of the votes and was elected to the municipal council (Kling, 2012: 32). By and large, the 1983 secondary elections marked an initial success for the Front National (Kling, 2012: 34; Charlot, 1986: 43). Following his electoral victory, Le Pen capitalized on the media and increased the Front National’s ratings in public opinion polls. This momentum led up to the Front’s first national electoral success in 1984. The European elections that year sent shockwaves across France’s political landscape (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 21; DeClair, 1999: 61). The FN garnered no less than two million votes (11.2%) among the discontented electorate (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 13). The proportional representation system played to the Front’s strength (Dézé, 2012: 75). The result also demonstrated the FN’s ability to address societal concerns over high unemployment, immigration and social security (DeClair, 1999: 62-3). In Dreux, the party received a staggering 19.1% (Kitschelt, 1995: 101). To the surprise of established parties and the media, the Front appeared to have risen from the political fringes to become a major player in the French partisan system (DeClair, 1999: 63). This achievement served to reinforce the Front’s image and develop the far right movement, more broadly (Kling, 2012: 39). Together, media attention, leftist mobilization, and the internal division of the moderate Right had contributed to the Front’s appeal as a plausible political alternative (Kitschelt, 1995: 101).

The Front National’s moderate success incited its leaders to make strategic changes with respect to party positioning and professionalization (Williams, 2006: 84). In 1985, the FN began to enlist a new cadre of elite politicians to run as legislative candidates under the party’s banner (DeClair, 1999: 64). The Front consequently equipped itself with an “organizational backbone” of politically experienced members – most notably Bruno Mégret (DeClair, 2004: 64; Rydgren, 2004: 19). Mégret played a vital role in the popularization of the Front National’s rhetoric, reformulating its xenophobic and exclusionary elements into politically normalised expressions (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 17). Mégret strengthened the Front’s ability to polarize the political debate about their ideas and reach beyond its core constituency (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 17). Le Pen’s charismatic leadership further helped the party capture a relatively significant portion of the French electorate: In many ways, Le Pen personified the populist element by portraying himself as a ‘man of the people’ (Williams, 2006: 92). The Front’s new organizational panache contributed to its legitimacy in making issue appeals, which resulted in a national victory in the 1986 legislative elections. The FN ascended to the National Assembly under the slogan “National Rally” (“Rassemblement national”) (Dézé, 2012: 83). Le Pen garnered a respectable 9.65% of the votes. The FN/CNIP also obtained 35 (out of 577) seats, which is partly attributable to Mitterand’s decision to shift to a proportional voting system (Pedahzur & Bricha, 2002: 42; Kling, 2012: 41; Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 21). The FN’s campaign also had a renewing effect on the composition of its parliamentary representatives; 20 out of 35 FN deputies were new members since 1984 or 1985 (Dézé, 2012: 85). In short, the early 1980s marked the beginning of the Front National’s moderate success in French national politics.
The FN in the late 1980s and 1990s: Ne plus ultra?

By the late 1980s, the Front National’s political discourse and strong nationalist character contributed to the development anti-establishment and anti-system attitudes (Kling, 2012). These attitudes became widespread as both the UDF/RPR\(^3\) and Socialist governments under Mitterand had failed to solve the unemployment problem (Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 23). French voters were equally disillusioned by the inability of mainstream parties to address other social concerns, such as pensions or Islamic fundamentalism. In short, the FN had the renewed opportunity to capitalize on the disaffections of thinly committed voters\(^4\) (Berezin, 2007: 144). The FN’s populist discourse became well-known and appeared effective as mainstream parties absorbed the party’s key themes (cf. in Bourlanges, 1990: 37-40). Both Left and Right governments borrowed elements of Le Pen’s anti-immigration rhetoric to advance their own policy agendas\(^5\) (Mayor; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 22; Davies, 1999: 1). For instance, Giscard d’Estaing was quoted in Le Figaro as having lamented the “immigrant invasion” in France (in DeClair, 1999: 93). Yet, the mainstream Right’s attempts to co-opt the immigration issue only gave more credibility to the FN’s ethnopluralist rhetoric (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 22). In fact, the Front’s attack on the internationalist politics of the ‘plural Left’ called into question the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic (Davies, 1999: 5). In brief, the FN’s populist strategy proved effective in creating a political space for the party’s key themes during the 1980s.

By the end of the decade, however, a pattern of conflict with the media and internal competition threatened the Front National’s electoral prospects. The media had become indifferent or hostile to Le Pen’s frequent provocations. The FN was therefore deprived of a national audience which significantly reduced his political prospects (Mayor; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 42). Nonetheless, the party continued to perform relatively well at the local and national polls. Both Le Pen and his party were disappointed by the results of the 1988 presidential elections\(^6\). Granted, a well-planned campaign and a strong organizational capacity were insufficient to prevent a victory for the Left (DeClair, 1999: 81). Mitterrand’s re-election to the presidency was also attributable to a return to the two-round majority system (Crépon, 2012: 40, DeClair, 1999: 71). Still, the vote total for the Front National (4,375,894) represented an unprecedented political progression since its initial victory. In just four years, the party doubled its vote count from the 1984 European elections and further solidified its place in national politics (Crépon, 2012: 70).

However, the Front National suffered another defeat in the 1988 legislative elections. Le Pen failed to be re-elected while only one FN candidate was elected to office\(^7\) (Kling, 2012: 47). Le Pen’s repeated rhetorical blunders\(^8\) were detrimental to both his and the FN’s electoral ratings \(^8\) (DeClair, 1999: 89-90; Kling, 2012: 68). The Front had moderate success at the local level (e.g. 33% of the votes in Marseille) but suffered a decline in overall support (Rydgren, 2004: 20). The FN’s modest performance (11% of the vote) in the 1989 European election was enough to secure a place in the European Parliament (DeClair, 1999: 91). However, the party was impeded by institutional barriers and campaign fatigue on the part of the French public (DeClair, 1999: 91). The results were also likely affected by the accidental death of the FN’s secretary-general, Jean-Pierre Stirbois in November 1988 (Safran; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 41). The incident left an organizational void in the party’s political cadre, which more or less remained due to a sequence of political mishaps\(^9\) and internal defections (DeClair, 1999: 90). The Front National faced the desertion of no less than 18 regional councilors to the CNI, RPR, and UDF (DeClair, 1999: 64, 162). It became apparent that the Front National had yet to hone its organizational and strategic framework (DeClair, 1999: 108).

The early 1990s marked the beginning of the era of globalization. The Front National did not restore the electoral strength it had conjured in previous years, but was nonetheless presented with new possibilities in view of appropriating the phenomenon among its key themes. As globalization became an extremely salient issue in French national politics, the Front developed a sophisticated argument against the nature
of global capitalism. The FN’s approval of market competition is an important departure from the traditional French extreme right (Crépon, 2012; Rydgren, 2007). Extreme rights parties are typically characterized by anticapitalist or anti-market features. The Front National, on the other hand, is neither anti-modernist nor anti-capitalist per se (Simmons, 2003; Crépon, 2012; Rydgren, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995: 93). Rather, the FN adopted a form of popular capitalism which placed more emphasis on social and anti-neoliberal economics (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995: 91). Although its economic policies have moved nearer to economic liberalism over the years, the Front’s guiding principle remains that the economy must serve the interest of the nation (Bornschier, 2005: 32). In this manner, the FN has arguably evolved toward ‘economic nationalism’ characterized by a focus on national preference and protectionism (Davies, 1999: 24). This partly allowed the Front to advocate a ‘third way’ between liberalism and socialism: “Neither Left nor Right: French” (Davies, 1999: 22; Rydgren, 2004: 128). The result was a market-liberal, anti-state program with populist-authoritarian supplements (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 14). All to say, that the economic logic behind which the FN’s political program was developed was integrated into a broader populist strategy. This meant that the theme of globalization could just as easily be incorporated into its political strategy, in the aim of addressing the related concerns of French voters.

During the 1990s, the Front National’s populist appeal further improved its credibility as a viable political alternative to France’s traditional left-right camps (Rydgren, 2004: 112). By this time, the Front National’s success at creating issue appeals meant that these were being increasingly absorbed by a portion of the French population. The FN had effectively “contaminated” the mainstream right discourse with its themes on immigration and insecurity. This polarized the Rightist camp and shifted attitudes within traditional political cleavages (Lecoeur, 2003:100-1). For instance, the Front’s nationalist discourse had gained considerable ground as increasing fears about an impending monetary union led to declining support for the European Union. And so, the FN modified its divisive “us/them” discourse to include new political ‘enemies’ such as elite members and parties of, not only French, but European and international political institutions (Lecoeur, 2003: 241, 257-9). The legitimacy of the Brussels government and international financial institutions was regularly attacked by the Front National. Yet, the Front National’s new populist discourse mirrored older far right political traditions with respect to its ethno-nationalist and anti-establishment orientations. This discourse therefore continued to focus on familiar national-populist themes: immigration and xenophobia; authoritarianism and authoritarian law-and-order policy; and a continued anti-party/system stance (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 354).

The Front’s populist strategy translated into the party winning up to 15 percent of the votes cast by the mid-1990s (Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 255). The FN received 13.9% of the vote in the 1992 regional elections – more than double the votes (4.2%) in the 1986 elections (DeClair, 1999: 92). The Front National had its best showing ever in the 1993 legislative elections. The Front boasted 12.4% of the vote and 100 candidates passing the 12.5% threshold in the first round (Rydgren, 2004: 20). Le Pen’s anti-EU campaign in the 1994 European elections granted the Front 10.5% of the vote and 11 seats in European Parliament (Kling, 2012: 94; DeClair, 1999: 97). Le Pen continued to benefit from Mégrét’s ability to provide skills and resources during the many elections in 1995. For instance, as social cleavages were becoming divided between supporters of national sovereignty and Europeanization, Mégrét formulated an isolationist discourse that framed the FN as a defender of the French nation (Crépon, 2012: 49-50). As a result, a total of 1075 FN councillors were elected while only 360 left office following the 1995 municipal elections (Kling, 2012: 87). That same year, the FN peaked in the parliamentary elections by winning 14.9% of the votes cast (Rydgren, 2004: 21). The corruption scandals that surfaced among ruling parties helped to revitalize the Front’s anti-establishment rhetoric during the 1995 presidential campaign. The FN collected 2000 local and 250 regional councillors, while placing three mayors in fair-sized cities (2004: 21). In the 1997 legislative elections, the Front National was able to recruit about a million new or former supporters (Williams, 2006: 85). The party received 15.24% of the vote and was considered to be the third most important political force in France (DeClair, 1999: 104). It
appeared that the Front National had become a serious contender in French political life (in Berezin, 2007: 133). Over two decades, the party progressed from the fringes to the center of national politics in spite of an onslaught of organizational and institutional challenges.

This being said, some of these challenges would become insurmountable for the Front National by the end of the 1990s. In 1999, the internal struggles that had afflicted the party for decades culminated in what is commonly known as ‘la scission’. Le Pen had often found himself at odds with his number two, Bruno Mégrét. For instance, Mégrét’s proposal to consolidate the party’s secretariat and general delegation was met with disapproval by the FN leader. A general malaise had pervaded the FN’s cadres to the point of causing a gradual departure of Mégrét’s supporters in 1994 and 1995. The conflict over isolationist practices or alliances with the mainstream right capitulated the rivalry between the two leaders (Williams, 2006: 87). In May, Mégrét openly opposed the FN president and incited severe criticism among party members (Dézé, 2012: 119-20). Mégrét’s opponents launched a campaign entitled “Tout sauf Mégrét” (Anyone but Mégrét) (Beaumont, Jan 2011). In 1998, a group of Mégretists left the FN in defiance of Le Pen’s rigid policies and egocentric leadership. However, tensions between Le Pen and Mégrét peaked over the nominations in 1999 European elections. Le Pen was threatened by suspension while Mégrét was next in line to top the Front National list (Rydgren, 2004: 21). In reaction to Mégrét’s attempts to break with the FN’s orthodox themes and make strategic coalitions with the Right, Le Pen took liberties with Mégrét’s professional character. Mégrét officially contested the FN leader during the national council in December, 1998 (Dézé, 2012: 125). Mégrét was resolutely opposed to a split and called for an exceptional congress to re-establish the solidarity of the Front National. In spite of this, the Executive Bureau voted for the exclusion of Mégrét and his supporters from the party (Dézé, 2012: 127). This break herein completed the scission of the Front National. Mégrét created and was elected president of the Front National-Mouvement National (FN-MN). Soon after, Mégrét formed a breakaway party called the National Republic Movement (MNR). Le Pen and Mégrét factions divided the extreme-right vote in the 1999 European elections. Le Pen’s Front received only 5.7% of the votes (Berezin, 2007: 137; Rydgren 2004: 18) while the MNR secured 3.3% (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 362; Dézé, 2012: 130). Despite the MNR’s defeat, the split was a considerable blow to the Front’s ideological footing and organizational development. Yet, the FN miraculously sustained an electoral presence in the French political arena in the following years (Rydgren, 2004: 21; Williams, 2006: 87).

The Front National in the 2000s: A new ‘Frontisme’ under Marine Le Pen

As the new millennium began, the Front’s influence continued to grow rather than contract (Berezin, 2007: 137). As in past decades, the political establishment appropriated elements of the FN’s rhetoric by assuming positions against the liberal market and in defense of French culture and identity (Berezin, 2007: 138; Ivaldi, 1999b). This decade, however, would be a significant period of change for the Front National: a new strategy for renewal would accompany the succession of the FN presidency from Jean-Marie to his youngest daughter, Marine Le Pen.

Although the political climate was favourable to the Front’s electoral positioning, the party was still recovering from its recent split. The FN had to contend with the loss of a substantial portion of its caucus, its elected members, as well as its supporters (in Dézé, 2012: 130). It was during this time that Marine Le Pen began to take a more active role in the party’s activities. She was first elected to the regional council of Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPDC) in 1998 (Crépon, 2012: 55). Over the next two years, she worked to defend the Front National against the electoral ambitions of Bruno Mégret. With the support of Louis Aliot and the FNJ leader, Samuel Maréchal, Marine endeavoured to revitalize the Front’s image for a new generation of supporters: The “Génération Le Pen” (Crépon, 2012: 56, 59). She sought to do away with the more radical elements of “Lepénism” which still compromised the Front’s democratic legitimacy (Hewlett, 2012; Crépon, 2012: 71). The Front’s results from the 1999 European election — scoring five points lower than in the 1994 elections — were telling of the need for change (Dézé, 2012: 131). Over the
course of the decade, the Front’s scores declined at each subsequent election: That is, all but those of the 2002 presidential elections (Dézé, 2012: 130).

In April 2002, the French media described the elections as a “political earthquake” (Berezin, 2007: 138). Le Pen obtained an astonishing 16.9% of the national vote in the first round, and no less than 17.8% in the second (Rydgren, 2004: 22; Goodliffe, 2012: 137). The Front’s nationalist movement had succeeded for a number of reasons. For one, the left-right “cohabitation” had accentuated a sentiment of confusion that allowed the FN to denounce acquaintances between political camps (Crépon, 1999: 66). More importantly, the Front, once again, ran on an electoral platform of which anti-immigration policies were a major part (Freedman, 2004: 7). Chirac’s campaign also indirectly served the Front’s objectives by breaching “Frontist” themes related to insecurity but also immigration (de Lange, 2007: 421; Cole, 2002). In a sense, the elections were not only a victory for the Front National, but a clear indication of the widening gap between France’s ruling political leaders and its citizens (Ivaldi, 2006: 48). Put simply, the Front National had institutionalized the French extreme right (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 353).

This is not to say that the victory came without the most ardent resistance on the part of established parties and the French public. For instance, PS candidate, Lionel Jospin, went as far as calling for a block of the nationalist threat presented by Le Pen (Crépon, 2012: 65). As for the public, the FN’s campaign was seriously undermined by the media’s anti-FN mobilisation, which had a significant impact on susceptible voters between election rounds. Many FN members, such as Marie-Christine Arnautú, believe that the party would have come to power were it not for the media’s manipulation of the French public (Crépon, 2012: 68-9). However, others have viewed the anti-FN mobilization as an indication that the Front National had effectively “shaken” the political system (Crépon, 2012: 70). In either case, the anti-FN mobilisation incited a turning point within the Front National. Its members had conceded the shortcomings of Le Pen’s strategy in providing the democratic legitimacy it desperately needed (Crépon, 2012: 70). As a result, Marine Le Pen would be afforded the occasion to instill the FN’s themes into the collective consciousness (Kling, 2012: 78). Hence began a political strategy that has come to be known as “dédiabolisation” (Crépon, 2012: 60; Hewlett, 2012: 415). This strategy, according to Marine, essentially consists of rejuvenating the Front (making it more attractive to young people and women) and “normalising” elements associated with her father's bigotry and revisionist pronouncements (Beaumont, Jan 2011; Ivaldi, 2012). In other words, Marine’s dédiabolisation entails rebranding herself and the Front National for a new chapter in the party’s political life.

In May 2002, Marine Le Pen doubled strategic efforts to improve the party’s governing credibility and popular image. The FN continued to take anti-immigrant and authoritarian positions but did so under the guise of the national interest (Williams, 2006: 96). So while Marine campaigned on nationalist-populist themes, she gradually refined the FN’s discourse in a manner which popularized its far right ideas. This process of legitimation greatly contributed to the FN’s ability to secure roughly 10 percent of the French electorate (2005: 364). At the 2002 legislative elections, the Front garnered 11.2% of the votes (Dédé, 2012: 130). The results of the 2004 parliamentary and regional elections were equally strong; its moderate-right counterparts conversely experienced defeats at the hands of the Left on both occasions (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 351). By the late 2000s, it appeared as though the FN’s electoral slide had been arrested. In 2008, Marine Le Pen assumed a “modernist” position that distanced her from her father and softened the image of the Front National (Dédé, 2012: 139). This development bode favorably on Marine’s side in the midst of competition for the FN presidency. The internal struggle between Marine Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch in the years leading up to the succession is perhaps the most prolonged in the history of the Front National (Dédé, 2012: 141). Though Gollnisch was a fierce supporter of Jean-Marie, he took a strong position against his daughter. Despite Bruno’s flagrant attacks on Marine, competition between the two leaders ultimately led to the former’s defeat. In January 2011, at the FN congress in Tours, Marine Le Pen won the presidency with 67.5% of the votes (Dédé, 2012: 141). Despite a few
discontented party members (such as from the older generation who felt slighted), the transition occurred with astonishingly little tribulation, from both within the FN and the media (Kling, 2012: 119).

Marine Le Pen’s strategy of ‘dédiabolisation’ proved successful in subsequent elections. In months prior to the 2012 presidential election, Marine was on a mission to move further away from a political brand known for its anti-immigrant platform (Coomarasamy, 2011). She re-emerged as a strong candidate and rallied supporters under the slogan “Rassemblement Bleu Marine” (Goodliffe, 2012: 137). Marine received 18.03% of the vote (compared to 10.44% for Jean-Marie in 2007). Under the leadership of Marine, the Front successfully campaigned on signature issues such as national identity, law-and-order, and immigration (Hewlett, 2012: 403). In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the FN surpassed its results from the previous elections with a total of 13.77% of the votes (compared with 4.29% in 2007). The elections also marked the first significant gains for the Front in rural France and in the suburbs of large towns and cities (Hewlett, 2012: 415). Marine’s campaign succeeded in appealing to the frustrations of French citizens who felt ignored by mainstream politicians. In addition to national identity and immigration, purchasing power was among the most common themes (Hewlett, 2012: 414). Marine effectively persuaded voters that immigration was intimately linked to socioeconomic hardship (Hewlett, 2012: 404). In brief, the ‘new’ Front National, under Marine Le Pen, experienced a political revival in its appropriation of France’s extreme right space (see Appendix A).

Today, the Front’s message is a continuation of the Front’s signature themes on immigration and insecurity. Nevertheless, Marine has carefully reformulated its populist message to include leading issues related to the theme of Euro-globalization; namely anti-globalization, anti-Brussels, anti-Islamification (FN, 2013). Of course, these themes are advanced as part of its original solution: more national sovereignty (Coomarasamy, Oct 2011). Much like her father, Marine Le Pen portrays herself and the Front National as the very embodiment of France. For instance, she campaigns on slogans such as “Marine Le Pen: The Voice of the People, The Spirit of France” (FN, 2012). The media has likewise depicted the new FN leader, though often satirically, as the reinvented image of the Front National (see Appendix B). Thus, the Front’s strong populist character has remained as it continues to demonstrate antagonism toward the normative framework of the national and European political establishment (Davies, 1999; 18; Eatwell, 2000; Uggla, 2006). As a result, the Front National has profoundly impacted the nature of French party politics (Cordell, 2005, p. 195). Indeed, the Front National’s decisive role in the outcome of the 2012 elections attests to a singular anomaly in national politics, given that the party has almost no institutional recognition (Shields, 2012: 12). Although the Front National’s relationship with democracy remains an open question, it is reasonable to say that the FN has honed its populist strategy and forged a position and secured a space for the extreme right in French national politics (Shields, 2012: 13). Following this account of the Front National’s historical development over the last four decades, I can now present my argument and hypotheses.

3| Research Question and Hypotheses: Ideological Features of the FN

In keeping with the radical right, we can confidently claim that the FN’s discourse is historically centred on the (defense of) the ‘nation’ (Coomarasamy, Oct 2011; Davies, 1999). From this core ideology stems the Front’s nativist, authoritarian, and populist elements, which have been carefully incorporated into a political program that has evolved and withstood the best and worst conditions for the extreme right in France. The Front National has successfully campaigned using nationalist-populist themes, of which the most common are immigration and xenophobia; authoritarianism, authoritarian law-and-order policy; and a continued anti-party/system stance vis-à-vis the political establishment (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 354). Most recently, the Front’s anti-establishment attitudes have shifted toward supranational political leaders which, the party claims, are abetting the demise of the sovereign nation. Therefore, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that the key themes along which the Front National advances its political agenda are a) immigration, b) insecurity, and c) euro-globalization (DeClair, 1999; Davies, 1999; Rydgren, 2004;
Reungoat, 2010). For four decades, the Front National has therefore served as a model for other radical right parties in Europe. And so, my question is does the FN model still apply? Is the Front National the archetypal ‘radical right-wing’ party, still today? I argue that a careful analysis of the FN’s discourses should indicate that,

*Marine Le Pen’s s succession to the Front National presidency is cause and consequence of a successful process of dédiabolisation, through which the party has been reinvigorated but nonetheless continues to appropriate a conventional understanding of the ‘New Radical Right’.*

That is, I firmly argue that the ‘softer’ line adopted by Marine Le Pen has altered public perceptions and improved the political appeal of the Front National, but this rhetorical refinement has not been accompanied by an actual revision of its programmatic positions. Ivaldi (2012), for instance, affirms that the party has retained the vast majority of its core radical anti-liberal policies. In other words, the ‘new’ FN does not significantly deviate from its long-established authoritarian appeal. The Front’s continuity can also be attributed to its uncompromising commitment to a nationalist line. The party’s anti-immigration program has been increasingly influential in French, and even, European politics. The FN’s nationalist-populist tradition has, in turn, underpinned the rejection of European integration and supranational governing bodies since the mid-1980s. In short, dédiabolisation is not so much a process of ‘de-radicalization’ as it is of harmonizing the party’s radical ideological core with a strategic discourse which has the potential to influence the French political consciousness. Therefore, I argue that, although the Front National has undergone changes to its discursive strategy, its core ideological features remain faithful to its radical right underpinnings. My argument is based on the following three (3) hypotheses for my critical analysis (see 5] The Front National: Model for the New Radical Right?).

**Hypothesis 1**

First, an analysis of the Front’s political program should demonstrate that the party campaigns primarily on the fundamental theme of immigration, which is typical of the ethno-nationalist and xenophobic values of the radical right. As mentioned, the Front National’s value system is foremost centred on the concept of the nation and the belief that the latter is ‘natural’ and ‘ethnically-defined’ (Davies, 1999). The FN thus reiterates traditional far-right beliefs about ‘rootedness’ or a sense of historical and cultural belonging to the nation (Davies, 1999: 25). For instance, the Front often stresses the importance of agriculture as an integral part of French heritage (Davies, 1999: 25). In 1973, the FN’s first electoral platform was entitled “Defending the French” which called for the birth of a “new right” – social, national, and of the people (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 16; Williams, 2006: 82). Scholars agree that, over the past thirty years, the Front’s core ideology has been relatively steadfast in its adherence to a form of ‘closed’ nationalism. For instance, the term “differential nativism” has been used to describe the FN’s political doctrine; one that is highly sensitive to foreign elements and the accompanying threat to the nation (Oesch, 2008: 352; Davies, 1999: 3; Rydgren, 2007). Early on, Le Pen refined the party line by speaking not of racial inequalities but of differences (Safran; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 31). In the 1980s, Jean-Pierre Stirbois was instrumental in developing the Front’s theme of ‘exclusion’ of non-European immigrants from France (Kitschelt, 1995: 95). In this manner, the FN shares the xenophobic and ethnonationalist values of the radical right. The Front’s obsession with the nation therefore lends itself to a political discourse which is hostile toward immigrants. Therefore, I argue that the Front National shares the radical right’s utmost concern with immigration and its alleged consequences on society.

In light of this, the Front National presents itself as ‘defender’ of the French nation, particularly in regards to the people’s right to preserve their distinctive traditions (Antonio 2000; Rydgren 2005; in Bornschier & Lachat, 2009: 361, 374). In fact, the FN has described the Le Pen era (1972-1992) as “20 years of national combat” (in Davies, 1999: 3). Thus, the FN’s inimitable commitment to the nation is heavily embedded in (differential) nativist elements, namely xenophobia and ethno-nationalism, and ethno-pluralism.

Together, these elements have guided the development of the Front National’s robust anti-immigration program. Of course, immigration is not inherently a political issue. While mass immigration started in most Western European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, it only became a salient political issue in the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, the immigration issue needed to be made visible to a broader segment of the population for it to find relevance in national politics (Mudde, 2012: 12). The Front National readily seized the opportunity to claim ownership over the immigration issue (Kitschelt, 1995: 119). As a result, the FN pushed its anti-immigrant stance onto the national political scene in the midst of major political and economic changes in France. As the influx of immigrants (e.g. from the Maghreb countries) began to present a number of sociocultural and fiscal challenges to France, the Front further capitalized on the political agenda of established parties to advance their own anti-immigrant appeals (Kitschelt, 1995: 99, 119). For instance, anti-Muslim attitudes led to the notion of “Islamization”, which has become a regular feature of the Front’s xenophobic discourse since the 1990s (Mudde, 2012: 10). Although the Front has, at times, openly advocated mass expulsion, on the whole, the party avoids more extreme forms of nativism (e.g. biological racism) and stand closer in line with the pluralist views of the radical right (Davies, 1999: 20; Safran; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 21).

In treating immigrants and foreign populations as distinctive, the Front has been instrumental in exploiting the immigration theme as a central part of their political discourse. The FN initially attracted vulnerable segments of the French population by advancing policies that would protect and prioritize the rights of French nationals. Such policies include the forced repatriation of non-European immigrants, the restrictive reform of nationality laws, and national preference in allocation of employment, housing, education, and social security benefits (Freedman, 2004: 40). In later decades, the FN became ever more strategic in making causal links between immigration policy and other issues related to the country’s social ills. The importance of the immigration issue in French politics has been highlighted, most notably, by the success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in reaching the second round of the presidential elections in 2002 (Freedman, 2004: 188). Given its carefully constructed language, the FN’s anti-immigration discourse has gradually permeated France’s political consciousness and has been highly influential on that of other right-wing parties (Antonio, 2000; Minkenberg, 2000; in Bornschier, 2005: 10). In making instrumental use of the immigration theme to campaign on a host of social and economic issues, immigration arguably remains the most significant component of the Front National’s core message. I therefore argue that immigration is a central feature of the Front National’s political program.

**Hypothesis 2**

The Front National has developed a language on insecurity that links immigration to security issues, broadly speaking. This is highly characteristic of sociocultural authoritarianism and the authoritarian law-and-order values of the radical right. Put simply, radical right parties practice social authoritarianism as a means by which to preserve an established way of life (Davies, 1999; Bornschier, 2005). In keeping with its ‘differentialist’ discourse, we have seen that the FN adheres to a combination of ethnic and civic nationalism. From an early stage, the Front recognized that an anti-immigration platform was a significant but insufficient condition for radical right success in national politics (Art, 2011: 24). As such, the Font reached far beyond the constraints of a single-issue program and tied the question of immigration into a broader political discourse capable of addressing civic implications for French society (Mudde, 2012: 9). In doing so, the FN borrowed from the authoritarian traditions of the radical right in order to advance a political agenda which would frame the immigration crisis as a threat to order and authority (Rydgren, 2004; 2007; DeClair, 2012). The Front’s authoritarian politics therefore demonstrate a fundamental distrust of foreigners along with a hardline on moral conservatism, security and authoritarian law-and-order (Hainsworth, 2004: 107; Beauzamy, 2012; Rydgren, 2004). In short, these authoritarian features came together to create a lexicon around the notion of ‘insecurity’.

However, scholars agree that the Front’s language on ‘insecurity’ has evolved and been enmeshed by a wide range of traditionalist-nationalist and authoritarian themes (cf. Crépon, 2012; Kling, 2012; Betz &
Immerfall, 1999). For instance, the Front National’s authoritarian program has been described as “a complex interaction of “materialist” values of law-and-order and economic well-being”, which include the threats of crime, immigration, and unemployment (Lewis-Beck & Mitchell, 1993; in Kitschelt, 1995: 105). This project may imply the right to limit immigration, introduce tougher criminal laws (especially for non-nationals), and strengthen police forces to enforce the rule of law (Bornschier, 2005: 11). In this way, the Front National uses insecurity to advance policies which stress the need to defend France against foreign elements found within and beyond its borders. However, scholars also suggest that the FN’s rhetoric in recent years has shifted away from purely identity-related issues toward links between insecurity and economics (Stockemer & Lamontagne, 2010: 690). Therefore, the Front’s language on insecurity takes several orientations but are essentially drawn in one way or another to the FN’s concern over the security of the nation. In broad terms, insecurity thus refers to one or more of the following dimensions: a) social security, b) domestic security, and c) national security. In terms of social security or socioeconomic well-being, the Front National regularly frames immigration as the cause of rising unemployment and crime, on one hand, and declining quality of social welfare programs and redistribution policies, on the other. Immigrants therefore become the scapegoat for problems related to pensions, employment benefits, and health services, among others (Crépon, 2012). In regards to domestic security, the FN focuses more closely on the links between immigration and issues related to crime and delinquency. For instance, non-nationals are frequently targeted as criminals – often as offenders of minor crimes, such as theft and vandalism, or simply those perceived as being responsible for the disintegration of French sovereignty and traditional values (Declair, 1999; Crépon, 2012). Lastly, national security is chiefly addressed by the Front as a means by which to accuse immigrants of more serious crimes and widespread problems in France, mainly illegal immigration. In this way, the party claims legitimacy for foreign policies which call for the protection of French nationals to the detriment and exclusion of foreigners and immigrants (Rydgren, 2004; DeClair, 1999).

Many sources confirm that immigration and insecurity have been profoundly embedded into the Front National’s political program since the days of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Mestre & Nunès, Jan 9, 2012; DeClair, 2012; Kling, 2012). As mentioned, the success of the 1983 municipal elections, as in subsequent years, was largely due to the Front’s ability to manipulate the immigration issue in a manner which associated foreigners with a host of existing problems in French society, including unemployment, crime, delinquency, drugs, and problems with housing and education (Freedman, 2004: 40). For instance, the Front’s 2002 election campaigns emphasized the issue of insecurity in order to push for greater control of immigration (Freedman, 2004: 31). It, therefore, may be said that the Front National effectively politicized the theme of insecurity in French national politics. In short, I argue that the Front’s discourse on insecurity has become a central part of the Front’s political program, and continues to reflect the authoritarian ideologies of the new radical right.

**Hypothesis 3**

Finally, the globalization era gave the Front National renewed impetus as the party began to direct its ire toward “mondalisation” in the early 1990s (Berezin, 2007: 131; Williams, 2006: 97). Scholars suggest that, as national policy became less effective in the face of economic globalization and supranational re-regulation, it became easier for radical right parties to mobilize resentment due to the real or perceived inaptitude of established parties (Davies, 1999; Art, 2011; Betz & Immerfall, 1999). The Front is no exception as it took advantage of the situation as a consequence of European and global economic transformations. In the Front’s vocabulary, ‘mondalisme’ describes a political project with the ultimate goal of world government, understood as the leveling out of different cultures and the collapse of national frontiers (Simmons, 2003: 3). Put simply, the FN associates globalization with ‘cosmopolitanism’. Given that cosmopolitanism is in direct conflict with the anti-universalist values of the radical right, the party vehemently opposes globalization by advancing its ethno-nationalist and isolationist ideals. To this end, the Front has made instrumental use of national-populist themes to depict globalization and European integration as a dividing force between, on one hand, the material and symbolic dimensions of French
identity, and on the other hand, and what the radical right has labeled ‘outgroups’ – foreigners, neighboring countries, international institutions, etc. (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005: 354; Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 32). The FN has been rather successful in conveying its attitudes toward other European societies and the ‘outside’ world among the French electorate (Andersen & Evans, 2003; Grunberg & Schweiguth, 2003; in Ivaldi, 2006: 65). Essentially, the Front constructed a divisive “us/them” position between the ‘Nationalist’ and ‘Globalist’ camps (DeClair, 2012). Over the years, the FN has refined this position and developed a sophisticated argument around the theme of “Euro-globalization”. The all-encompassing term broadly refers to a process by which the political actions of domestic and foreign actors are wreaking social and economic havoc on France (Petit, 2009). Therefore, the Front National’s critique of Euro-globalization is based on the perceived loss of national sovereignty and self-determination at the hands of foreign actors and institutions.

The Front National’s opposition to European integration has been reasonably consistent over the years (Ivaldi, 2006: 65). At least at first, the FN’s populist strategy consisted of promoting the notion that European integration and globalization unites the ‘losing France’ – economic, geopolitical, but most importantly ethnic (Lévy, 1993:6; in Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 34). The Front thus capitalized on societal fears about globalization to advance an anti-neoliberal and euro sceptic agenda (Lecoeur, 2003; Art, 2011). In its earlier stages, as in the 1984 European elections, the FN presented itself under the slogan “The National Front against a Europe of Nations” (Kling, 2012: 39). In “The Flame: The Voices of the Front National” (1990), the party warned that France was in danger of decline and under pressure from major global transformations – globalization, cosmopolitanism, and materialism (in Simmons, 2003). In regards to materialism, scholars suggest that the FN’s economic logic has been shaped by combination of anti-fiscal liberalism and national protectionism. In practice, this rationale translates into policies which draw from anti-global and anti-free market sentiments, along with a strong hostility to European integration and French participation in the Euro-currency (cf. Hainsworth et al., 2003; 2004:107; Ivaldi 2002: 136). Ivaldi (2012) also suggests that the FN’s program follows in radical-right tradition insofar as it encompasses a broader ideological doctrine that combines cultural authoritarian and economic redistribution (Ivaldi, 2012). In any case, while the Front’s economic policy has fluctuated over the years, its core economic principles rest on a firm belief in France’s right to political and economic self-determination. Therefore, I argue that the Front National’s discourse on ‘Euro-globalization’ is in tandem with a broader populist radical-right strategy to protect the nation’s sovereignty and autonomy (Art, 2011; Rydgren, 2007).

4| Methodology

Following an in-depth review of the literature on the new radical right and on the historical development of the Front National, I now propose a methodology for my comparative profile analysis. The academic literature on the new radical right provided us with an understanding of the key ideological features of radical right parties. I relied upon a collection of texts (10) and academic journals (21) which discuss these ideological features in relation to the emergence of radical right parties in the early 1980s until the present. I found that the vast majority of selected sources identified the three aforementioned features: nativism, sociocultural authoritarianism, and anti-establishment populism. The literature on the Front National generally indicated that the party had either contributed to the development or taken ownership of at least one of these features. These academic sources (10) focusing specifically on the French Front National tend to confirm that the party is seen by scholars as a forerunner among new radical right parties in Europe. From this, I was able to formulate my argument and hypotheses, as found in the previous section.

In terms of methodology, I will perform an analysis of primary and secondary sources on the Front National. I intend to collect quantitative data that indicates that Marine Le Pen’s superficial ‘cleansing’ of the party’s programmatic positions (dédiabolisation) has not significantly affected the FN’s core political
ideology. In doing so, I aim to demonstrate that the Front’s political program continues to adhere predominantly to its signature themes—a) anti-immigration, b) insecurity, and c) euro-globalization. I further aim to demonstrate that the Front National’s themes are firmly embedded in conventional radical-right ideologies, thus supporting my argument that the FN is, indeed, prototypical of the contemporary radical right in Europe. My analysis of primary sources mainly consists of examining the discourses and political materials presented by the Front National on their official websites. The FN’s official websites include the following: The official website of Marine Le Pen; Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM); FN Infos (official site of FN supporters); The official website of Marion Maréchal- Le Pen, Deputy for Vaucluse; Front National de la Jeunesse (FNJ); and France Ruralité. Primary sources may also include links from the national and subnational websites, such as official blogs and the websites of various members of the Front National. However, the latter websites tend to reflect the opinions of the individual and not necessarily those of the FN party. Given that these are subject to interpretation, I do not perform an exhaustive analysis of these ancillary websites. However, I perform an analysis of the FN’s regional websites, of which some prominently feature the FN councils’ respective members. Such examples include France Jamet for FN Languedoc-Roussillon (LR), Michel Guiniot for FN Picardie, or Bruno Gollnisch for FN Rhône-Alpes (RA). Although I examine the FN’s regional websites, my analysis is restricted due to the scope of this study and therefore serves but to confirm my findings at the national level. Likewise, I will perform only a brief analysis the FN’s social media sources given that posted materials are not limited to official statements and may include un-sourced or inaccurate materials. The Front’s social media sites include Twitter, Flickr, Dailymotion, Google Plus, and Facebook. Secondary literature mainly consists of news articles and press releases (e.g. speeches, interviews) collected from reputable French and European media sources (e.g. The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique). I also websites such as Nations Press Info (NP Info), which is not directly affiliated with the Front National but openly claim to support the party’s political views. Although these sources will not be directly included in my quantitative findings, an overview of on-line press releases and commentaries related to the Front National help to perceive the influence of the Front National’s ideological themes on public opinion.

In selecting these sources, I hope to perform a content analysis of the FN’s materials, which include but are not limited to manifestos, campaigns, speeches, and press releases. Although my focus is on the discursive strategy presented in these materials, I also consider the effectiveness of aesthetic or graphic elements with which the Front conveys its political message. More precisely, I study the Front’s key ideological themes by identifying and quantifying keywords and/or taglines in the FN’s materials which directly relate to one of more themes. I also evaluate the frequency and pervasiveness of the party’s political themes in space and time. For instance, I can attempt to categorize the number or percentage of contributions made to the FN’s websites for each ideological theme. In selected the theme of immigration, keywords may include ‘immigrant’ or ‘foreigner’. Similarly, political documents related to insecurity may be quantified using words such as ‘security’, ‘authority’, or ‘law-and-order’. The themes of ‘insecurity’ and euro-globalization’ are more difficult to categorize given that they may touch upon any range of social and economic issues. As such, keywords must be carefully selected and may not fully reflect the significance of the Front’s themes in its political discourse. For instance, ‘Euro-globalization’ may be studied using keywords such as ‘European Union’ or simply ‘Euro’. While the first keyword might yield a result that understates the importance of ‘Euro-globalization’ in the Front’s material, the second might overestimate the predominance of this theme. This represents a weakness in my analysis, though I aim to be consistent in my choice of keywords and my data collection methods. I can also seek to demonstrate whether there has been an increase or decrease in the use of the FN’s central themes over time. In most cases, I collect quantitative findings at the national and subnational levels, in order to reveal variations in the FN’s political discourse. In short, this methodology may be used to construct a comprehensive typology of the Front National’s core ideological features and, subsequently, compare them to those of the contemporary radical right. Finally, I can track the prevalence of the FN’s key themes in its official program and manifestos, namely Marine Le Pen’s presidential program (2012) and the FNJ’s official
charter (2012). In doing so, I compile the number of principles devoted to each theme and, in turn, compare my findings to past programs.

Among the limitations of this comparative analysis is the availability and/or variability of materials and press releases retrievable from the FN websites. For instance, certain regional websites do not contain a search field or list of keywords, which requires the user to perform a manual search for key topics or press releases. Also, a keyword search may generate different results, depending on whether the keyword is identified in the body or simply the title of the article. In addition, the regional websites do not appear to be subject to criteria over content or visual formatting. This presents challenges insofar as maintaining a baseline for the timeframe and scope of my analysis. For instance, some regional websites may contain archived materials which are recorded from earlier dates than others. Nevertheless, I endeavor to collect quantitative findings which are reasonably reliable, such that they reflect the composition and prevalence of the FN’s ideological themes. On the other hand, the FN’s current visibility on the web provides information that is both current and ex post facto in relation to its organizational strategies and official positions. As such, I can attempt to ascertain various trends in the use of the Front’s signature themes over time. For instance, I can examine whether the Front has more campaigns relating to ‘Euro-globalization’ at present than in the past (e.g. 2 or 5 years ago). In short, this methodological approach should satisfy my analytical criteria for a comparative profile analysis between the Front National and the new radical right.

5| The Front National: Model for the New Radical Right?

To date, there have been close to two hundred texts, chapters, and articles in reference to the Front National (Dézé, 2012: 19). Yet, scholars have struggled to categorically identify the Front National’s features within a vast and growing body of literature on the New Radical Right. As discussed, much of the literature has described the Front National as a leading example or a new phenomenon for contemporary radical-right parties across Europe (Mudde, 2012: 4; Ignazi, 2003; Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 256). While initially labeled a protest or single-issue party (cf. Mitra, 1988), the FN’s ideological platform grew, over time, to capture a solid constituency in repeated elections74 (Mayer, 2002; Neucleous & Startin, 2003; Evans & Ivaldi, 2005). So, while many of radical right parties failed to establish themselves in national politics75, the Front National is singular in the way in which it has endured in national and European politics (cf. Arnold, 2000: 256-7; Freedman, 2004: 40). Moreover, the FN websites and several mediated sources portray the party as an incontrovertible force in French and European politics (FN, 2013; e.g. Le Monde, 2013; NationsPresse, 2013). Over the years, the media has taken note of the party’s main themes: Anti-immigration; hostile to the European Union and in favour of trade protection over globalization; and a policy of "national preference" with respect to jobs, benefits and public housing for French citizens over outsiders (Beaumont, Jan 2011). In tandem, a preliminary analysis of the Front’s official websites suggests that the FN mainly concerns itself with the themes of immigration, insecurity, and euro-globalization (FN, 2013; France Ruralité, 2013; RBM, 2013). Yet, is the Front National veritably a new radical right party? Do the FN’s key themes reflect the ethno-nationalist, authoritarian, and populist undercurrents of the contemporary radical right? I address this question in the next section, which consists of a comparative analysis of the Front National vis-à-vis the New Radical Right.

Hypothesis 1: Immigration is a fundamental theme in the FN's political ideology and discourse

*The French identity is a priceless treasure.*
In light of my analysis, I find that immigration remains a fundamental theme in the Front National’s core ideological discourse. As with many radical right parties, the Front’s political program cannot be explained using the single-issue thesis, given that the party has a broader ideology and stresses multiple issues. The Front National has gradually refined its political platform, such that it addresses some of the most relevant issues in French politics, ranging from employment and social assistance, to foreign policy. In fact, a study of the Front National’s press releases (communiqués in French) illustrates that the party maintains a rather well-balanced program with respect to the distribution of its key ideological themes (see Figure 1 - Percentage distribution of the FN’s key ideological themes in online press releases).

As shown above, immigration is a central theme among online contributions to all of the FN’s official websites, though the party appears to place almost equal emphasis on insecurity and the European Union in its online press releases (FN, 2013). The key term ‘European Union’ was used in lieu of ‘Euro-globalization’ given that only the former is found in the list of key topics available on the national-level websites and those regional websites containing such a list. In other words, I selected a term that could be quantified in a manner that is consistent with the key terms ‘immigration’ and ‘insecurity’. Although the number of articles related to the European Union may not correspond exactly with those that directly address Euro-globalization, I believe the term provide us with a reasonably accurate picture of the theme’s prevalence in the FN’s political discourse (Euro-globalization is further discussed later on). Thus,
Figure 1 helps to illustrate that the Front National would be misleadingly described as an anti-immigration or single-issue party. Note, however, that in three of the four cases, immigration is the most prevalent among the Front’s key themes. If we consider that many of the articles on insecurity, and to a lesser extent euro-globalization, touch upon issues related to immigration, I affirm that this theme remains a fundamental, if not predominant, part of the FN’s political discourse.

A content analysis of the Front’s online materials would further indicate that there is an inextricable link between the FN’s attitudes toward immigration and radical-right nativist ideology. As a first point, the Front’s online contributions often assume an exclusionary and assimilationist language in relation to ‘outsiders’ – particularly foreigners and immigrants. For instance, Marine’s presidential program stipulates the reform of French nationality law, such that naturalization would be subject to the strictest conditions with include, under legal terms, prolonged residency in France, proficiency in French, and, most strikingly, “proof of assimilation” (FN Élysé, 2012: 6). The message is echoed at the regional level by FN members, such as France Jamet, FN President for Languedoc-Roussillon (Avignon, Oct 16, 2010): “To be French: either a birth right or an earned right. France, love it or leave it” (FN LR, 2011). In keeping with the ethnopluralist doctrine of the radical right, the Front therefore stresses the distinctiveness of French identity and its irreconcilability with foreign identities and cultures.

Overall, I find that little has changed over the years in regards to the Front’s defensive and exclusionary position on the immigration issue. The Front National’s ultranationalist rhetoric abounds in simple slogans such as “Defend our colours” and “To Defend France and the French” (FN, 2013). Following a careful analysis of the 2012 manifesto, I find that the FN endorses the full array of discriminatory and assimilationist immigration policies that were developed in the late 1970s (Ivaldi, 2012; FN, 2013). For instance, the FN’s policies on immigration remain strongly opposed to the reunification of immigrant families, and support a drastic reduction in the number of asylum seekers allowed to stay in France, as well as the systematic deportation of illegal immigrants (FN, 2012). Although the immigration theme is explicitly addressed in only three (out of 21) sections of the manifesto (Pensions, Immigration, and European treaties), a closer examination reveals that issues related to immigration pervade nearly a third of the 2012 program. For example, six (6) sections make reference to at least one of the following key terms: immigration; immigrant; foreigner; national preference; nationalisation; and zero tolerance26 (FN Élysé, 2012). As an example of the ‘softened’ quality of the Front’s political discourse, the presidential program maintains that ‘national preference’ would be applicable to all French citizens, regardless of their place of origin (FN Élysé, 2012: 6). Yet, this necessarily implies that immigrants must renounce their native culture and traditions in order to ‘merit’ the right of French citizenship. Thus, I maintain that Marine Le Pen’s process of dédiabolisation has not had a profound impact on the core principles of the Front National’s anti-immigration program.

Moreover, the Front’s core principles are demonstratively faithful to the radical right ideologies insofar as the party has retained its age-old “zero tolerance” policy on immigration. In fact, to overlook this element of the FN’s xenophobic rhetoric would be rather difficult. Marine Le Pen’s presidential project includes a section almost entirely devoted to the Front’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy, in which she proposes to reverse the trend of a ‘massive’ and ‘uncontrolled’ foreign migration, which includes the immediate and systematic expulsion of illegal immigrants and policies in favour of ‘social patriotism’ and ‘national preference’ for housing, employment, and social services (FN Élysé, 2012). The policy is also prominent in recent propositions made by the FNJ, as illustrated in articles such as “The Youth is with Marine” (Apr 22 2012): The FNJ frames immigration as an “alarming communalism” causing “a crisis of assimilation” in France (FN, 2013). As is typical of the radical right, the Front therefore employs an assimilationist and xenophobic rhetoric in its anti-immigration policy. In fact, the Front goes so far as to reverse its xenophobic discourse in order to legitimate its “zero tolerance” policy. For instance, the FN portrays the party along with French citizens as victims of “anti-French racism” and “foreign preference” policies (FN, 2012). In view of the Front’s policy toward immigration, I conclude that the immigration issue is
still found atop the party’s political agenda, which is underpinned by many of the ethnonationalist and xenophobic traditions of the new radical right.

The FN’s anti-immigrant attitudes have, most recently, been directed toward Arabs and Muslim immigrants. Among the FN’s list of key topics (50) found on its official website, the party now includes such terms as ‘fundamentalism’ and even ‘halal’ (FN, 2013). Together, the proportion of press releases categorized under immigration that have at least one keyword that relates directly to Muslims or Islamism account for just over 10 percent (10.5%) of the total contributions to the site (158 out of 1498) (FN, 2013). Thus, the Front’s xenophobic orientations have increasingly found expression in anti-Muslim and anti-Islam messages. In recent campaigns, the Front National warns against an “Islamic movement” and the “terrorist threat” to French society (FN, 2013). For instance, a publication entitled “Radical Islam” (2012) criticizes the UMP for condoning actions which, the FN claims, is leading to an “Islam of France” (see Appendix A).

\[\text{Evolution of the National Front vote (2007-2012)}\]

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidential election 2007</th>
<th>Regional election 2010</th>
<th>Local Election 2011</th>
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<td>15%</td>
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<td>Men</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<td>60 + years old</td>
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<td>High level of education</td>
<td>5%</td>
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Appendix B

MARINE LE PEN CHANGE LE TON DU FN

Je suis la lumière
dans la nuit!

Creseveur
Appendix  Here again, there is a parallel between the radical right’s nationalist-populist strategy and the FN’s defensive stance against terrorism and the dangers of an ‘Islamized’ France. Anti-Islam propaganda is also seen on the part of the Front National Jeunesse, which has led campaigns under such slogans as “No to Islamism” (FNJ, 2011). Very recently, however, the FNJ’s language suggests that the party is less opposed to the notion of Islam per se than those elements of Islam which challenge French identity and culture. For instance, FNJ member, Véronique Fornilli, writes in a recent article (Apr 11, 2013),

Certain radical factions of Islam are clearly contradictory with the laws of the [French] Republic, the question is whether there exists an Islam that is compatible with the French Republic (FNJ, 2013).

This gives further weight to my argument that the FN’s anti-immigrant, and particularly anti-Muslim, politics are steeped in ethnonationalist views regarding the fundamental incompatibility of foreign cultures with the traditional values of the French nation. My analysis also indicates that the Front relies on a nationalist-populist strategy to advance its anti-immigrant and xenophobic agenda. For instance, in a statement made by the Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM), the Front National presents itself as a ‘conquering’ political force motivated by a single goal: “To restore the voice of the people” (RBM, 2013). The FN’s regional chapters have followed suit with slogans such as “FN the Voice of the People/Defending National Identity” (FN NPDC, 2013). By and large, it appears that the Front National’s anti-immigration platform is rooted in a desire to protect the nation’s identity and cultural heritage, which is a reflection of nativist and populist ideologies of the radical right.

On the question of religion, the Front National seldom makes explicit reference but the issue adds a dimension to the immigration debate. In general, I find that the FN has a strong position on secularism and the curtailing of religious symbolism and practices in matters of state (FN, 2013). For instance, the FN’s regional program in Nord-pas-de-Calais (NPDC) includes policies in favour of restricting subsidies for associations of “communalistic, ethnic, or political character” and celebrations considered to be neither French nor “Nordic” (FN NPDC, 2013). More particularly, Marine Le Pen has described Islamism as, not only a threat to national identity, but also to individual rights and liberty. For instance, the FN President has labeled Islamism an “oppressive tyranny” that seeks to “choke pluralism” in French society (FN Eure, 2011). In other words, the FN purports to defend individual rights in the interest of the nation. In this manner, the FN adopts a lexicon around secularism as a means by which to popularize anti-immigrant and ethnonationalist attitudes. Of course, this populist discourse mirrors the same strategy adopted by the Front National during the years under Marine’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. I therefore conclude that the Front National’s obsession with the preservation of the nation and its people is characteristic of the radical right’s nativist ideologies, and is the driving force behind the party’s anti-immigration discourse.

Hypothesis 2: The Front National uses the notion of ‘insecurity’ to promote the socioauthoritarian values of the radical right.

Dear Compatriots. For two decades the left and the right have followed each other in power. They have said everything and promised everything. They have done nothing and failed....Women and men of the Front National, I want to give back France her vitality and her power, and to the people their pride and prosperity. I believe in France.

FN campaign literature, 1997 Legislative elections
Few youth on Earth inherit more of such a grandiose and abundant culture and civilization as our own: of such a beautiful language, of such an admirable History, of so many remarkable artistic, scientific, and philosophical achievements

FNJ Charter, 2013

The notion of insecurity was developed by the Front National as a populist means by which to create a causal relationship between immigration and security in France. Insecurity, as mentioned earlier, can be understood in reference to a wide range of issues, from socio-political freedom to the economic well-being of French citizens. In this regard, the Front National’s discourse on insecurity is partly shaped by radical-right socioauthoritarian elements, but is arguably more elaborate than the authoritarian programs of typical radical right-wing parties. In light of my analysis, I therefore suggest that the theme of insecurity is a central feature of the Front National’s political program, which combines ethnonationalist and authoritarian undertones of the new radical right.

As mentioned, the Front’s language on insecurity is complex and may be discussed in terms of social, domestic, or national security. Most importantly, the Front makes instrumental use of this theme to advance its anti-immigration and socioauthoritarian agenda. From a study of the Front’s online publications, I find that the theme of insecurity has become nearly as central as that of immigration in the party’s political discourse. For instance, a quantitative analysis of the FN’s available campaign publications (e.g. posters and pamphlets) illustrates that the number devoted to insecurity more or less equivalent to the number which directly relate to immigration (see Figure 2 - FN online campaign publications (posters, pamphlets, and petitions) by theme).

As shown in the case of the FN’s official website, the number of publications devoted to insecurity and immigration are 10 and 11 (of a total of 28), respectively. As for the FNJ and an average of the FN’s regional websites, I find that the number of publications on insecurity, in fact, exceed the number which address the immigration issue (FN, 2013; FNJ, 2013). In order to evaluate what may be considered a publication on insecurity, I selected publications which negatively related immigration (or immigrants) to any of the following political issues: employment and housing, delinquency and crime, social programs and healthcare, taxes and fiscal debt, family values, and communitarianism. I believe these issues sufficiently encompass the Front National’s ideological positions with respect to the theme of insecurity.
Overall, I find that insecurity is among the most prevalent themes in the Front’s political discourse, and is based on a complex interaction of anti-immigration and authoritarian politics, which seek to address an increasingly vast array of concerns in French society.

In regards to social security, the FN’s language on insecurity appears to be centered on a concern for social order and traditional norms and institutions. In turn, I believe this concern is in keeping with the socioauthoritarian and traditionalist-authoritarian values of the radical right. For instance, the Front regularly frames insecurity as a set of conditions which have weakened traditional family values and a sense of civic belonging in France. In a sense, the Front’s language on insecurity serves to depict moral liberalism as a threat to the internal ‘cohesion’ to wit security of the nation. For instance, the homepage banner of the FNJ’s official website reads: “Isolation and Poverty, Consequences of the death of our traditional societies” (FNJ, 2013). In reaction, the FNJ emphasizes French traditional identity and culture using slogans such as “Traditions, Nation, Republic, Nature, Culture, History, Civics, Heritage, […] French Fraternity” (FNJ, 2011). Moreover, my analysis shows that the Front National has, more recently, broached the issue of homosexuality to promote socioauthoritarian views on the traditional family unit. For instance, Christophe Boudot, FN Secretary for Rhône, describes the legalization of homosexual marriage as a “forced march” toward the total abandon of France’s traditional values (FN RA, Apr 22, 2013). In this way, the Front partly uses insecurity to address questions on the social and moral well-being of the French nation, thereby engaging with the traditionalist-nationalist sentiments of the radical right. Therefore, the Front National seemingly shares many of the radical right’s socioauthoritarian views on traditional family values and cultural heritage. These views are reflected in the Front’s lexicon around insecurity, which is a key part of the anti-immigration and traditional-authoritarian program.

As shown, the theme of insecurity was developed in order to make strategic links between immigration, on one hand, and the security of the nation and its people, on the other. Put simply, the Front focuses on both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism. In this regard, I maintain that the FN digresses slightly from the radical right’s nativist doctrine in associating immigration with, not only ethnic, but civic or secular values in French society. According to the FN, the principle of secularism averts communalism and the influence of social cleavages in French civic life (FN, 2011). Such a discursive strategy, however, speaks to the radical right’s nationalist-populist character inasmuch as the FN makes appeals to French citizens on the grounds of national civicism in order to promote anti-immigration policies, such as the restriction of dual-citizenship and the rescinding of rights for non-nationals (FN, 2013). For instance, the 2012 presidential program stipulates that foreigners who, under legal terms, fail to become employed should be sent back to their country of origin, and their pension contributions rendered as capital. The program also calls for priority to French nationals with regards to housing and family allocations (FN, Élysée, 2012: 6). Thus, I affirm that the Front National under Marine Le Pen, in many ways, continues to promote anti-immigration and social policies, which are characteristic of the radical right’s ethnonationalist and socioauthoritarian ideologies, under the guise of a sophisticated language on insecurity.

What I found to be an important point in my analysis of the FN’s discourse on insecurity is that the party appears to make little or no distinction between immigrants and criminals and social delinquents. For instance, FN member, Gilbert Collard, released an article (Mar 18, 2013) in which he voices concerns over problems of violence and insecurity in the vulnerable zones of Gard: He sympathizes with ‘honest inhabitants’ (read French nationals) who are allegedly exasperated by the “increasing aggressions, harassment, and incivilities” (FN LR, 2013). In this manner, the FN’s socio-authoritarian and law-and-order themes are strategically promoted by presenting protectionist and exclusionary solutions to immigration and insecurity (see Appendix ). Furthermore, the Front National’s lexicon around social security also advances a socioauthoritarian program which reflects the party’s desire for economic self-determination. By and large, the Front’s authoritarian policies are intended to curb immigration in favour of job security and social welfare for French nationals. For instance, according to the FN, immigrants should contribute equally to medical and employment insurance, while being strictly ineligible to receive
RMI or AME^{80} (FN, 2011). In a press conference (May 13, 2011), Marine Le Pen claimed that foreign workers are impinging upon national income levels and forcing pensioners to earn a meager living (FN, 2011). In reaction, the 2012 program calls for “solidarity” allocations to senior citizens and a reallocation of social benefits, for foreign workers legally living in France, according to a ‘national preference’ scheme (FN, 2013). In essence, the Front National considers social security to be highly dependent upon measures to strengthen its anti-immigration program.

In this manner, social and domestic security fall closely in line given that the Front’s political discourse often appeals, at once, to nationalist and protectionist attitudes regarding the security and economic well-being of the nation. For instance, the Front’s 2012 manifesto is wrought with a vocabulary that aims to address social and financial insecurity by using terms such as “monetary freedom” and “fiscal justice” (FN, 2012). The Front makes a number of proposals to this end, which are, for the most part, in tandem with the anti-liberal and isolationist views of radical right parties. For instance, the Front claims that the influx of migrant workers and the ultraliberal practices of large corporations are encroaching upon France’s local industries to wit economic security and self-determination (FN, 2013). In reaction, Marine has long intervened in industry politics in order to advance a protectionist agricultural policy and to call for urgent reform of the Modernization Act of the Economy (France Ruralité, 2013). Among the press releases found on the FN’s France Ruralité website, nearly two thirds (62.5%) of online contributions to the site make a direct causal link between migrant workers or multinational corporations (MNCs) and the insecurity of local industries in France (France Ruralité, 2013). For instance, in a recent article (Apr 8, 2013), Leif Blanc, National Delegate for France Ruralité^{81}, writes

> French breeders are in the worst of situations, our territories are threatened by the unlimited appetite of agribusiness giants [...] is it not time to urgently revise the fundamentals of a system which functions on its head and has long decimated the added value, expertise and jobs that go along with it? (FN Auvergne, 2013)

Therefore, my findings suggest that the FN’s language on insecurity refers as much to the impact of foreign elements on France’s economic situation as to socio-political implications of immigration for French society.

Elsewhere, the Front’s theme on insecurity partially speaks to the various dimensions of domestic security. The socioauthoritarian and authoritarian law-and-order values of the radical right are strongly evident in elements of the Front National’s political discourse which bring together issues related to immigration and crime. For decades, the FN’s policy positions have called for “zero tolerance” on, not only illegal migrants, but on criminals and delinquents, more broadly. For instance, Jean-Marie Le Pen claimed, on several occasions, that zero tolerance for crime was among his top priorities, and that France’s police force must be massively reinforced (Henley, 2002). In a similar vein, the FN’s 2012 manifesto includes policies which would impose stricter laws for repeat offenders and readily enforce existing laws, namely life imprisonment (FN Élysé, 2012). Therefore, the FN’s discourse on domestic ‘insecurity’ mirrors earlier socioauthoritarian policies which, seek to remedy the ineffectiveness of France’s criminal and justice systems. Over the years, the FN’s law-and-order policy has been fairly consistent and arguably no less drastic today than in the past. For instance, the party’s 2012 program includes measures for the reintroduction of the death penalty, the lowering of the age of majority to 13 years of age, the deportation of convicted foreign nationals for trial in their country of origin, and the closure of religious institutions (e.g. mosques) that seemingly endorse fundamentalist persuasions and advocate terrorism and Islam (FN Élysé, 2012). It thus becomes clear that the FN has honed a lexicon around the notion of insecurity that enmeshes a combination of nationalist-traditionalist and authoritarian views on security and social justice.

On a last point, the notion of insecurity also bleeds into the Front National’s authoritarian program on national security and foreign policy. Notably, the FN associates principles for peace and security with
foreign policy concerns such as immigration and border control. For example, the Front publicly criticized Justice Minister, Michel Mercier, over a decision made by the European Union’s Court of Justice (Apr 28, 2011) which would prohibit EU member countries from imprisoning illegal immigrants. The Front denounced the decision as one of compliance, affirming that states should have the right to impose penalties they deem acceptable (FN, May 2011). In no uncertain terms, the FN stated, “In agreeing to comply, the French government deprives itself of a weapon against illegal immigration” (FN, 2011). Therefore, insecurity is a fundamental theme with which the Front National promotes social authoritarian policies – both within and outside its national borders. My findings seem to confirm the Front’s vocabulary around insecurity is constructed in a way that allows the party to convince French voters that immigrants are infringing upon the social well-being of French citizens. Based on my analysis, I therefore conclude that, although the FN’s language on insecurity has been gradually modified to include new issue areas in French politics, the FN’s political program remains firmly embedded in the ethnonationalist and social authoritarian values of the radical right. In short, the notion of insecurity, as a fundamental feature of the Front National’s discourse, is a highly comprehensive strategy with which the FN advances, at once, nativist and authoritarian features of the new radical right.

Hypothesis 3: The Front National’s unique argument on euro-globalization is reflective of the radical right’s nationalist-populist traditions.

France will act in the interest of nations around the world. The country will make diplomatic strides in international dialogues and through specific actions such that the national rule is recognized as the foundation of international order. France will systematically stand in favour of nations, of the sovereignty of peoples, of their right to self-determination, and of the need for them to claim a territory of their own.

Front National, 300 Mesures, 1993: 343

Without the nation, without the sense of belonging to a common people, there is no solidarity, there is no mobilization, there is no success! For this reason the European Union, as it stands today, is a pipe dream.

Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM), 2013

Finally, the third key theme found to be a part of the Front National’s core ideology is ‘Euro-globalization’. The globalization era has afforded the FN a political space in which to popularize its anti-globalist and eurosceptic attitudes. As discussed earlier, the FN opposes European integration and globalization on the grounds of preserving the character of the French nation. Most notably, the FN adopts an anti-establishment and anti-system position in reaction to the potential impact of foreign elements on the sovereign power of France, which is steadfastly aligned with the nationalist-populist strategy of radical right parties. In creating a barrier between French nationalists and globalists, the Front frames globalization as a danger to French society and deems itself ‘defender’ of the people. Alongside, the party finds frequent reason to criticize the actions of supranational actors and institutions, most notably the European Union (EU). The FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen has described the supranational body as the ‘Europe of Brussels’ while the former president claimed that the mistakes of the political class will bring an end to a French France (in Berezin, 2007: 136). Accordingly, the Front loosely understands Euro-globalization as the loss of France’s sovereign power in favor of an internationalized system led by supranational bodies and agreements. The FN has also been highly strategic in seizing opportunities presented by the recent Eurozone crisis and the bailout of European banks. Thus, I argue that the Front National’s discourse on Euro-globalization is essentially an extension of its nationalist-populist strategy, which consists of promoting the ethnopluralist and exclusionary orientations of the radical right.
In the early 1990s, the Front strived for the recognition of national sovereignties in Europe; or a French France in a European Europe (FN, 1992; in Davies, 1999: 23). In 1993, for instance, the FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen was intensely opposed to the Maastricht Treaty, claiming that it represented “the end of France, the French people, its language and its culture” (Front National, 336-37; in Harmsen & Spiering, 2005: 46). In other words, the Front developed a critique of European integration and globalization which is fundamentally based, once more, on the preservation of the French nation and its people. However, the Front’s political discourse on Euro-globalization encompasses a wide range of nationalist-populist themes, which bring together elements of the radical right’s xenophobic, authoritarianism, and anti-establishment populist orientations. Among these, I find that the Front’s opposition to ultraliberal politics and the notion of a supranational government are among the party’s most visible arguments against Euro-globalization. During a speech at the regional assembly in PACA (Apr 29, 2011), FN Councillor, David Rachline, asserted that globalization is the “outcome of a liberal mind-set” which has led to economic crisis and hastened the destruction of the nation-state in favour of a supranational state—the European Union (FN PACA, 2011). From this, it appears as though the Front opposes economic integration in much the same way that it does the sociocultural integration of France. That is, the Front relies on radical-right nationalist and populist ideologies to formulate a political program which proposes to defend France against the threat of foreign actors and entities on the future of national identity and well-being. Euro-globalization may therefore refer to any number of issues related to the social, political, or economic security and well-being of the nation. For instance, the Front writes,

In order to preserve European currency, a number of rigorous and unparalleled plans are being put into place, everywhere to the detriment of growth and employment and finally of the people (FN, 2011).

As shown, the Front ultimately reduces its political rhetoric to the defense and preservation of the national sovereignty and self-determination. However, in comparison to immigration and insecurity, I find that the Front National’s discourse on ‘Euro-globalization’ is softer and maintain a defensive position which further victimizes the French people in the face of global and integrationist forces. For instance, Jean-Marie Le Pen speaks of restoring the country’s diplomacy by re-establishing respect for national sovereignty (FN, 2011). Of course, the Honorary President of the FN has not ceased to make his opinions public. For instance, Jean-Marie Le Pen has made a number of references to the fact that France has been culturally, politically and economically “conquered” by the foreign powers, namely the United-States and China (FN, 2011). On the whole, however, I affirm that the Front’s anti-globalist discourse has become more and more polished as a result of dédiabolisation. In particular, I find that, in particular regards to euro-globalization, the Front under Marine Le Pen directs its ire toward supranational bodies and agreements which supersede national parties and political leaders. I believe this discursive shift is a reflection of Marine’s populist strategy to appeal to fears and anxieties concerning such a complex and widespread phenomenon as globalization, in hopes of advancing the party’s ethnonationalist and authoritarian agenda. In reaction to the EU’s recent decision (Jun, 2013) not to grant financial aid to Cyprus, Marine Le Pen tweeted that a technocratic Europe is a “tyrannical business” and that the decision “demonstrates the absurdity of the European project” (FN Twitter, Apr 18, 2013). Therefore, the FN leader appears to adopt a broader, and therefore more sophisticated, critique of Euro-globalization.

My analysis of the Front’s official websites would suggest that the theme of euro-globalization has, in certain regards, begun to take a more prominent place in the Front National’s political program. For instance, in a recent campaign entitled “12 Commitments by Marine Le Pen”, four (4) of these commitments are directly related to the process of euro-globalization – as many as are found for the theme of immigration (see Appendix E). My criteria for commitments related to Euro-globalization consist of the presence of at least two of key terms among a list that includes ‘European treaty’ and ‘national sovereignty’ among others. Therefore, it appears that Euro-globalization has recently become a prolific theme in the party’s political discourse. As in the past, the party associates integrationist views with the loss of national sovereignty and identity. However, the Front National has sharpened the party’s
program in order to make comprehensive arguments against globalization as a veritable threat to French sovereign power, identity, and values. In fact, my findings indicate that the percentage distribution of the FN’s key themes across online publications, when comparing the FN’s national and regional websites, is heavily weighted in favour of euro-globalization at the regional level (FN, 2013; FNJ, 2013).

Figure 3 - Percentage distribution of FN publications by source and theme

Although the proportion of publications devoted to immigration remains predominant in all of the Front’s official websites, the theme of Euro-globalization is, on average, more or less equally stressed in the FN’s regional websites (FN, 2013). These results could, perhaps, be attributable to a higher level of concern for local industry and cultural traditions at the regional level. It could also be explained by a lower percentage of publications devoted to issues related to national, rather than regional, politics. In any case, it may be said that European integration and globalization are increasingly finding relevance in the Front National’s political discourse.

Although the Front National has not softened its anti-globalist discourse with respect to its more xenophobic elements, global issues allow the Front to frame the immigration question as a matter of political and economic security. For instance, the RBM states,

> And our ambition, more than ever, is to rise to power, in order to deliver our nation from the grip of oligarchies which work only for themselves or for the ‘foreigner’, never for the French. Restoring the people’s power over their own destiny, […] therein is the meaning of our struggle (RBM, 2013).

In this manner, the party does not fully oppose the notion of a common European civilization. Rather, its loyalty to Europe is contingent upon national integrity and the preservation of France. Rather, the FN simply ascribes, first and foremost, importance to the distinctive values and cultural traditions of the French nation: “In defending our identity, we are defending all identities” (FN, May 2011). In this way, the FN’s argument is unique in that its political doctrine remains the preservation of identity – both French and European. In other words, the Front’s populist discourse is extended to European identity, such that the party assumes a broader sense of social and cultural belonging. In other words, the FN’s political logic is underpinned by the ethnopluralist doctrine of the radical right, which calls for the respect of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Front National makes strategic use of euro-globalization in view of
ultimately protecting the sovereignty of the French nation in the face of integrationist and universalist forces.

In tandem, globalization provided ample opportunity to discredit established mainstream parties and the policy decisions of the Brussels government. For instance, the Front has recently criticized the ineffective austerity policies of French Prime Minister, François Hollande (May 6, 2013): The FN leader accused Hollande of essentially acting as a political puppet to a technical bureaucracy that is “selling French heritage” and weakening the independence of France (LCI, 2013). Similarly, the FNJ states,

Globalization without border and without protection of any kind, one of thoughtlessness and irresponsibility, led by a very small few, considerably weakens all that is wonderful of our country (FNJ, 2013).

This “small few” mainly refers to French politicians who, according to the FN, endorse the decisions and actions of the ‘leaders’ of globalization. Here, we can see that the Front continues in the nationalist-populist tradition of the radical right. At the onset of the European crisis of 2009, the Front maintained that the failures of the ruling UMP had left France in a worse financial situation following the recession than in the past. In a petition entitled “In the face of crisis: Sarkozy the president of inaction” the FN accused the government of having forced France into a downward spiral, resulting in a situation of interdependence which left the country heavily indebted83 (FN, 2011). In a press release (Sep 15, 2008), Marine Le Pen referred to the collapse of Lehman Brothers as the symptom of ultraliberal ideology which has been imposed upon us by the global elite (FN, 2013). The Front’s 2011 economic plan therefore rejects the material and symbolic value of the euro, describing it as an overvalued currency that is “choking the French economy” and that carries with it an ideology that will ultimately lead to social devastation (FN, 2011). In response, the FN proposed an immediate return to the franc and a complete withdrawal from the ‘Europe of Brussels’ (FN, 2011). The Front has even advocated a ‘deglobalization’ of France, which consists of relocating enterprise and employment, and restructuring finance to allow for more national control and regulation (FN, 2011). The Front therefore constructs a divisive language between the French people and the political leaders behind the globalist project. This standpoint was made clear in a party campaign entitled, “Financial crisis: The French are victims of globalization” (FN, 2013). In blaming the European Union for the country’s financial deficit, the Front can advocate self-governance in defiance of the European parliament. These anti-party and anti-establishment sentiments are in line with the populist ideologies of the new radical right.

However, the fiscal policies of the Front National have varied slightly along with party’s changing views on globalization and the leaders of the Brussels government. The party generally continues to oppose Euro-globalization and the loss of economic and political self-determination it engenders. For instance, a recent article (Mar 6, 2013) by France Jaimet, FN President for Languedoc-Roussillon, decried the ultraliberal economic practices of the EU, describing it as a zone in which “borders have been lifted to give way to the free flow of merchandise, excessive free-trade, and catastrophic consequences (FN Languedoc-Roussillon, 2013). However, Marine Le Pen’s economic action plan appears as a progressive strategy that would allow France to keep up with, rather than opt-out of, globalization. As with her father, she perceives globalization as a threat to the country’s sense of solidarity and economic stability. This is not to say that Marine Le Pen’s presidential program in any way supports integrationist policies. For instance, the FN’s defense policy reads, “France’s participation in an integrated leadership with NATO will be plainly denounced. Our strategy will be refocused on preserving the independence of France” (FN Élysé, 2012: 9). In other words, the Front does not oppose cooperation so much as the infringement on the part of foreign entities upon the French nation.

Accordingly, Marine’s presidential program proposes a number of economic steps to break away from the current government’s ‘ultraliberal’ policies in order to reinvigorate the French economy. For instance, the FN current program calls for measures to restore France’s ‘monetary freedom’ and promote ‘economic
patriotism’ by re-establishing the Euro’s competitiveness as a common currency alongside the franc, and protecting French industries against the encroachment of big business (FN, 2013). In this way, the Front appears to be concerned, not with Euro-globalization per se, but the threat of global commerce and free-market trade on employment and local industry. The FN Picardie recently stated (Apr 3, 2013): “Industrial employees in Picardie, month after month, pay a heavy toll to the ultraliberal politics of Europe and to a new world economic order” (FN Picardie, 2013). The FN Alsace takes a similar position with respect to ‘big business’, as its website contains petitions such as “No to the implementation of IKEA” which decries the expansion of large-scale commercial zones that would overrun local businesses (FN Alsace, 2013). Overall, these views reflect the national program, which essentially proposes to put an end to the “false dogma of free-market competition” (FN Élysé, 2012: 9). In true populist fashion, the Front therefore supports the notion of a ‘Europe of free nations’, in which France’s domestic industries, national borders, and fiscal autonomy is protected from forces of globalization. In turn, this situation would ensure the independence and overall well-being of the French people. For this reason, I maintain that the Front has formulated a sophisticated language on Euro-globalization that frames European integration and globalization as phenomena which have broader implications on the future of French society. Most importantly, the Front makes instrumental use of Euro-globalization, in all its dimensions, to advance an ethnopluralist and nationalist-populist agenda which is characteristic of contemporary radical right parties (see Appendix E).
Therefore, I conclude that Euro-globalization is among three (3) key themes which, together, are at the core of the Front National’s political ideology.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper sought to address a question that merited attention after four decades of the FN’s political life in French national politics: Is the Front National a model for new radical right parties in Europe? In attempting to answer this question, I studied the Front’s signature themes in comparison to the key ideological features of the new radical right. I argued that Marine Le Pen’s dédiabolisation of the Front National’s political discourse has little consequence on the core political ideologies underpinning the party program. Although the party has been reinvigorated by a refined rhetoric and polished image as a viable alternative to the political status quo, the FN under the new president nonetheless continues to appropriate a conventional understanding of the ‘New Radical Right’. I supported this argument by examining each of the key themes of the Front’s political doctrine in relation to radical right-wing ideological features. Following a review of the literature, I developed three (3) distinct hypotheses: First, immigration is a fundamental theme in the FN’s political ideology and discourse; second, the Front National uses the notion of ‘insecurity’ to promote the socioauthoritarian values of the radical right; and third, The Front National’s unique argument on euro-globalization is reflective of the radical right’s nationalist-populist traditions. Using these hypotheses, I hoped to demonstrate that the FN continues to promote its core ideological themes all while reaching beyond a conventional understanding of radical-
right parties to develop a unique and sophisticated program, capable of appealing to societal concerns in French politics. I discuss each of the Front National’s fundamental themes in turn.

First, I claimed that the Front National incorporates ethno-nationalist and xenophobic ideals, typical of radical right parties, into a political program, which focuses heavily, if not chiefly, on immigration. I found that, beginning in the 1980s, the Front National managed to break into national politics by taking ownership of the immigration issue, and subsequently advanced themes which related to immigration and immigrants to concerns over national identity. By and large, the Front National developed its anti-immigration program using a carefully constructed language which gradually moved away from more extremist attitudes toward immigrants and foreign entities. As a result, the Front’s discourse on immigration continues to resonate with French citizens who may be disposed to more nationalist and chauvinistic sentiments toward outsiders. The effectiveness of the FN’s anti-immigration platform is evidenced by the fact that, unlike many radical right-wing parties, the FN has remained a stable force in French national politics, and is therefore considered a forerunner among them. In short, the fundamental theme of immigration has, since its beginnings, been at the core of the Front National’s political ideology. Where the Front National diverges slightly from other radical right parties is that the immigration issue is advanced not as an end in itself, but as a means by which the FN purports to defend the French nation in the face of foreign actors and institutions. For this reason, I conclude that the Front is not merely a single-issue party, but advances its anti-immigration program is an integral part of a much broader political project – to protect and preserve the sovereignty of the French nation.

Secondly, I claimed that the Front National has expanded upon its anti-immigration program to develop a complex lexicon around the notion of ‘insecurity’. I further suggested that the notion is largely rooted in various elements of socioauthoritarianism and ethnopluralism of the new radical right. Since the late 1980s, the Front has refined its language on insecurity by doing away with more explicit policies against immigration and moving closer in line with relevant socioeconomic issues, which already existed in the mainstream discourse and therefore could be used to push an authoritarian and ethnonationalist agenda. Insecurity has, indeed, pervaded the political discourse by claiming a direct causal relationship between immigration and France’s social and economic ills. From my analysis, I was able to confirm that the Front National’s use of the insecurity theme has benefited from Marine Le Pen’s process of dédiabolisation. However, insecurity also sets the Front National apart from other radical right parties, given that it brings together an array of radical right-wing ideologies which can be adapted to an increasingly complex set of societal concerns over immigration and security in France. I demonstrated that insecurity touches upon any number of social, economic, domestic, and foreign security issues, which, together, support a robust anti-immigration platform. Therefore, the FN’s discourse on insecurity has been successful in allowing the party to convey the nativist and socioauthoritarian ideas of the radical-right into the French political consciousness. In short, insecurity continues to be a vital part of the Front Nationals’ political agenda, which strategically frames the immigration debate in terms of dangers to the preservation of France’s political autonomy and self-determination.

Third and lastly, I claimed that the Front National expands upon the nationalist-populist strategy of radical right parties to develop the theme of ‘Euro-globalization’. Beginning in the 1990s, globalization provided new opportunities for the Front to advance its ultranationalist and exclusionary agenda in French and European politics. I found that the Front’s anti-globalist and anti-integrationist discourse largely reflects the party’s ability to translate the nationalist-populist values, typical of the radical right, into a an elaborate protectionist scheme vis-à-vis other European nations and the ‘outside’ world. By and large, the Front’s eurosceptic rhetoric and critique of ultra-liberal economics are in line with the nationalist-populist themes, namely xenophobia and social authoritarianism. Therefore, the Front’s discourse on Euroglobalization is in keeping with new radical right traditions. However, a limitation of my quantitative analysis included the fact that, although Euro-globalization is a commonly used term in the academic literature on the Front National, it is rarely referred to as such throughout the FN’s official websites as
well as the media. I therefore had to quantify the term, which I claimed to be among the FN’s key themes, using related keywords, such as European Union. In view of this, I conclude that the theme of Euro-globalization is a real and significant issue area in the Front’s political discourse but has not been fully developed. Euro-globalization, therefore, is not as prevalent in the Front’s official websites, especially at the national level. Nonetheless, the Front National practices anti-system and anti-party populism in order to challenge established forms of liberal-democratic governance. In particular, the Front’s anti-integrationist discourse lends itself to a critique of supranational actors and institutions, such as the European Union and multinationals, in their purported role in the European or globalist project. Overall, the FN may be considered a leading example for the new radical right, as the party continues to adapt its nationalist-populist strategy to France’s political climate in order to make issue appeals surrounding the notion of ‘Euro-globalization’. In doing so, the Front presents ultimately seeks to legitimize its ultranationalist and protectionist policies on the grounds of defending the French nation and the sovereign rights of its people.

In sum, I reasonably demonstrate that the key themes which form the Front National’s core political ideology are rooted in the characteristic features of the contemporary radical right. Immigration, insecurity, and Euro-globalization serve to create a flexible and formidable political discourse which has become increasingly influential over the past forty years. This discourse, however, is based on a set of fundamental principles which have remained relatively steadfast throughout the FN’s political life. I hope that this comparative analysis provides scholars with new insight as to ways of fine-tuning existing analytical frameworks for the study of contemporary radical right-wing parties. While the Front National is not limited to conventional definitions of the new radical right, I conclude that the party is and remains an archetypal model for other radical right parties. Future studies could examine new possibilities with regards to the elements of nativist, authoritarian, and populist ideologies which could better define the key themes belonging to the Front National and other radical right parties. In conclusion, while some believe that the FN, under Marine Le Pen, represents both change and continuity, I strongly believe that the FN’s political discourse remains much the same as in the past.
List of References


## Appendix A

### Evolution of the National Front vote (2007-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidential election 2007</th>
<th>Regional election 2010</th>
<th>Local Election 2011</th>
<th>Presidential election 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average vote for National Front</strong></td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>60+ years old</strong></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High level of education</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B

MARINE LE PEN CHANGE LE TON DU FN

Je suis la lumière dans la nuit!

Cresveur
Appendix C

IL FAUT EN FINIR AVEC LE LAXISME DE L’UMPS

Les horribles massacres qui ont eu lieu en mars à Montauban et à Toulouse ont apporté la preuve de ce que Marine LE PEN avait déjà souvent dénoncé : le fundamentalisme islamique s’est développé dans notre pays et constitue un péril pour les Français. La situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que les autorités politiques font preuve d’un laxisme total, les promesses électorales n’étant jamais suivies par des actes.

DÉVELOPPEMENT DU FONDAMENTALISME ISLAMIQUE EN FRANCE


LAXISME DU GOUVERNEMENT FACE À LA MENACE TERRORISTE

En 2007, le candidat Sarkozy s’était engagé à traquer toute forme de criminalité, notamment « en nettoyant les caves » dans certains quartiers. Comme toutes les autres, ses promesses n’ont été que des mots.

Depuis 5 ans, le gouvernement n’a pris aucune mesure pour éradiquer la menace terroriste. Le cas de Mohamed Merah est emblématique : condamné 15 fois par la justice, s’étant manifesté par des propos favorables à Al Qaida et ayant effectué plusieurs « stages » de formation au combat en Afghanistan, il restait libre de ses faits et gestes alors même que les services de renseignements l’avaient repéré !

M. Béchizza, conseiller de M. Sarkozy pour les questions de Sécurité, indiquait le 22 mars que le gouvernement avait expulsé en 2011 « 10 personnes » liées à la mouvance islamiste ! Un chiffre dérisoire par rapport à l’ampleur du phénomène.

D’autre part, Sarkozy et le gouvernement, ont supprimé 15 000 postes de policiers et de gendarmes depuis 5 ans ce qui prive les forces de sécurité des effectifs suffisants pour mener à bien leurs missions de renseignement et de maintien de l’ordre.
Appendix D
Appendix E

1. **Revaloriser les salaires les plus modestes et les pensions de retraite** pour améliorer le pouvoir d'achat. Instaurer une véritable justice fiscale par la simplification et la progressivité des impôts.

2. **Stopper l'immigration et instaurer la priorité nationale** pour l'emploi, le logement et les aides sociales.

3. **Assurer la sécurité des Français** par l'application de la tolérance zéro.

4. **Restaurer la morale publique et redonner la parole au peuple français** par le recours au référendum pour les choix politiques importants.

5. **Rétablir de véritables services publics** sur tout le territoire national en assurant notamment un accès pour tous à des soins de qualité.

6. **Aider les familles** par l'instauration d'un revenu parental.

7. **Réorienter l'école dans son rôle de transmission des savoirs**, rétablir l'autorité et la méritocratie.

8. **Réindustrialiser la France** par des protections raisonnables aux frontières.

9. **Se libérer de la tutelle des marchés financiers** pour sortir de la spirale de la dette.

10. **Renégocier les traités européens** pour retrouver la souveraineté nationale.

11. **Imposer la laïcité républicaine** face aux revendications politico-religieuses.

12. **Retrouver l'indépendance diplomatique et militaire de la France.**
Appendix F

La France doit rester une terre d'accueil

FN Franche-Comté, Bourgogne (2011)
Notes

1 Anti-pluralism is generally described as the repression of differences and plurality of values and opinions (cf. Rydgren, 2004).
2 Note, however, that the anti-democratic “bravado” of the extreme right is not aimed at the common people but at democratic leaders and institutions (Fennema, 1997: 484).
3 Some of these include the British National Front (NF), Germany’s National Democratic Party (NDP), and the Italian Social Movement–Tricolour Flame (MsFt).
4 Ethnocentrism is the belief in cultural differences between groups of people, whereby the own group is considered superior to the others (Mudde, 2000: 187).
5 For instance, the literature has referred to the Vlaams Blok (VB), the Scandinavian Progress Parties (SPP) and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) as single-issue parties given that they appear to be mainly based on an anti-immigration position (e.g. Van der Brug et al., 2005: 147-64; Rydgren, 2004: 474-502; in Akkerman, 2005: 340)
6 Note that far-right ‘traditionalist-communitarianism’ differs widely from the notion of (cultural or ethnic) ‘communality’, which largely contradicts the notion of secularism by accepting religious fundamentalism and sociocultural sectarianism. Therefore, the Front National supports communitarianism but fervently denounces communalism (Mondon, Apr 2013; Davies, 1999).
7 For the purposes of this analysis, I diverge somewhat from Mudde’s use of the term populist radical right (PRR) in order to adopt a broader definition for radical-right parties that share a core ideology that combines nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.
8 In this case, anti-welfare chauvinism does not reflect a belief in neo-liberal market capitalism, but rather a radical expression of welfare chauvinism, inspired by a rigid form of social conservatism and a profound distrust of current social policy arrangements (Derks, 2004: 519).
9 Under the leadership of Pierre Poujade, the Union for the Defence of Tradesmen and Artisans (Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans, UDCA) made frequent appeals to the proponents of Algérie Française, as it opposed decolonization and Algerian independence (cf. Crépon, 2012: 32).
10 For instance, he acted as defense attorney for extreme right figures such as General Raoul Salan and Colonel Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry (DeClair, 1999: 25).
11 General Charles de Gaulle (1980-1970) assumed the presidency in 1959, at which time he supported French Algeria. He later rescinded as the military situation deteriorated, inciting a rift within rightist political circles. Though the French far right had been favorable to de Gaulle, his decision to grant Algerian independence irrevocably separated the far right camp from the Gaullist mainstream (cf. DeClair, 1999: 21-23).
12 GRECE is a far right intellectual group whose writings and publications espoused nationalist and racist principals founded in anti-universalism and a “differentialist” paradigm (which called for the preservation of cultural and ethnic particularities).
13 Notable among its members were Alain Robert and former Occident member, François Duprat (1940-1978).
14 MSI was a neofascist political party created by supporters of former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in 1946.
15 The MSI’s Secretary-General, Giorgio Almirante, managed to attract members of the monarchic parties, Christian-democrats, and liberals, among others.
16 The party received an unprecedented 8.7% of the votes in the 1972 parliamentary elections (cf. Dézé, 2012: 39-41).
17 ON members were partisans of the “Révolution Nationale,” a nationalist movement which called for the demise of the Fifth Republic and the subsequent instauration of an authoritarian regime (Art, 2011: 123).
18 Jean-Marie Le Pen is often credited with creating the Front National. In reality, we can see that the party was created by François Brigneau, François Duprat, and Alain Robert (Declair, 1999: 57).
19 The FN brought together any number of Poujadists, neofascists, antigaulists, activists, and intellectuals, among others (in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 12; Soudais, 1996: 184-7; in Davies, 1999: 27).
20 The revolutionary-nationalists remained staunchly antiparliamentarian, while supporters of Le Pen (or “lepénistes”) generally accepted the Republican democratic system (Art, 2011: 123). The FN party became divided between “pragmatists” who conceded the need for a strategic change in view of ON’s politics, and the “radicals” who feared the dissolution of the FN’s nationalist thrust (cf. Dézé, 2012: 45-9).
21 Between 1972 and 1981, the Front National’s share of the votes in presidential and legislative elections was consistently under 1.5% (1.3% in 1973; 0.8% in 1974; 0.3% in 1978; and 0.4% in 1981).
22 As a former member of Jeune Nation and Ordre Nouveau, Duprat led one of the Front’s strongest extremist wings. He is also credited with having gathered many extreme right factions to the Front’s membership, including the Fédération d’action nationale et européenne (FANE) and the Groupes Nationalistes Révolutionnaires (GNR). In the mid-1970s, the FN managed to attract approximately 300 GNR and 500 FANE members, bringing its total membership to just under 1,000 (Dézé, 2012: 60).

23 Le Pen has notoriety as a charismatic but vigorously narcissistic leader. Le Pen once said of himself, “There is only one number one, the number one” (in Kling, 2012: 79).

24 The Duprat incident was an opportunity for the FN to engage in electoral politics with less stigmatization from direct associations with Nazi or fascist parties (cf. Camus; 1996: 35-6; Hainsworth, 2000b; Simmons, 2003; in Rydgren, 2004: 19). The FN consequently attracted support among broader segments of the population, including veterans, professionals, and students (in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 15).

25 An important communication tool in the politicization of the FN’s message was through the use of graphical discourses. Between 1972 and 2005, over 200 posters disseminated the FN’s propaganda amplified societal fears about immigration and security with slogans like “La Peine de mort” (1984-86) and “3 millions… de chômeurs, ce sont 3 millions… d’immigré de trop” (cf. Dézé, 2012: 93-8).

26 For instance, the FN’s political formula has consisted of making frequent recourse to an ethnic scapegoat. The tactic has been termed ‘diabolic causality’, whereby the Jew, the foreigner, and most recently the North African and Muslim immigrant are the “author and bearer of all evils” (Perrineau, 1997; in Arnold, 2000: 253; Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 11).

27 For instance, an opinion poll (IPSOS, 1988) showed that French voters sympathized with Le Pen’s views on immigration; “approximately 45 percent of citizens wanted the nationality code to be made more restrictive, and an equal proportion favored sending immigrants back to their countries” (Safran; in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 47).

28 In France, a candidate’s placement on the presidential ballot is contingent upon the solicitation of 500 signatures from mayors, senators, National Assembly deputies, or other official representatives. In the 1981 presidential elections, Le Pen was unable to secure the sponsorship signatures and the FN ran a mere 74 candidates (cf. DeClair, 1999: 44).


30 By the 1980s, the immigrant population in Dreux had reached approximately 30% (Kitschelt, 1995: 100).

31 Jean-Pierre Stirbois was a former Union solidariste and militant for the OAS-Metropole. He was among the most active members of the Tixier movement (Dézé, 2012: 69). In 1977, he was appointed to the FN’s political bureau, and quickly became Secretary General of the Comité Le Pen (CLP) (Dézé, 2012: 70).

32 The Front National uses the term ‘gang of four’ to describe what the party views as a corrupt oligarchy at the centre of French political: the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République), UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française), PS (Parti Socialiste) and PCF (Parti Communiste Français) (cf. Davies, 1999: 4).

33 From February to June 1984, Le Pen made a nationwide political tour of France (Kling, 2012: 38). For instance, he appeared on a television interview program called L’heure de vérité (The Hour of Truth) on February 13, 1984. By that time, the Front’s ratings in opinion polls had reached 7.0% (Ignazi, 1989: 65).

34 Some scholars claim that the electoral system played an important role in the results. France had shifted to a proportional representation system, which may have allowed the FN to gain more seats (Kling, 2012: 37; Kitschelt, 1995: 101).

35 In France, a survey in November 1984 found sympathy with Le Pen that reached into the moderate rightist camp: 46% of RPR voters and 37% of UDF voters expressed such inclinations (Schain, 1987: 135; in Kitschelt, 1995: 117).

36 It furnished itself with a training program, a structured order service, a weekly journal (National-Hebdo), and an information hotline (Crépon, 2012: 40).

37 Other well-known intellectuals and politicians include Yvon Briant, Jean-Yves Le Gallou, Pascal Arrighi, and François Bachelot (DeClair, 1999: 64).

38 Bruno Mégret left the RPR (1978-81) and joined the Lepenist movement in 1985, and is considered highly influential among these new members. Mégret is well-known for creating the FN’s radical anti-immigration program (1991), which outlined “50 concrete measures” including the cancellation the naturalization granted after 1974 and repealing the “anti-racist laws” protecting minority rights (Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 16).
For instance, by presenting a differentialist discourse under the slogan “Les Français d’abord”, Mégret skirted the antiracist legislation and advanced a ‘disguised’ xenophobia under an a priori principle of non-exclusion (Dézé, 2012: 91).

The FN won 8.8% of the votes in the 1985 municipal elections, and 9.6% (obtaining 136 seats in 21 of 22 regional councils) in the 1986 regional elections (Dézé, 2012: 75).

The FN temporarily made an alliance with the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP) party for the 1986 legislative elections.

The Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF) and the Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) are right-of-centre parties that formed a coalition called the “Union for France” (Union pour la France, UPF) between 1992 and 1997.

For instance, the 1995 presidential elections demonstrated the FN’s strategic ability to attract voters from the Left, who were politically disillusions with the Mitterand government (Mayer; in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 20).

For instance, hard-line Gaullists adopted tough anti-immigration rhetoric in the lead up to the 1988 presidential elections in order to keep Gaullist voters from deserting to the Front (in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 41). However, in taking the decision in 1988 to distance itself from the FN, the RPR government played into Le Pen’s hands (in Merkl & Immerfall, 1993: 41). The anti-immigration policies pursued by the post-1993 conservative government and RPR interior minister, Charles Pasqua, also attest to the Front’s influence in France’s mainstream politics (Kitschelt, 1995: 119).

In May 1987, the FN leader secured only 14. 38% (Kling, 2012: 47). The vote for the Front’s candidates was below Le Pen’s in 115 electoral districts by a margin of 4 to 14% (Mazzella, 1989: 20). Overall, the FN received 9.7% of the votes – a respectable 2.35 million voices (Crépon, 2012: 40). However, not a single Front candidate received a majority of the first-round vote (Crépon, 2012: 83).

Only Yann Piat was elected among the FN’s candidates. He was appointed FN Deputy of Vars.

Le Pen’s anti-Semitic expressions frequently prompted national outrage. One of his most disreputable moments was on September 13th 1987, during an interview on Grand Jury RTL-Le Monde, when Le Pen infamously referred to the gas chambers that killed millions of Jews as “a detail” in the history of the Second World War (Kling, 2012: 68; DeClair, 1999:89).

Pascal Arrighi and François Bachelot were among the important politicians to resign (Kling, 2012: 68).

Among the FN’s political mishaps, perhaps the most profound followed an incident in the southern town of Carpentras, which witnessed the desecration of 35 graves at a Jewish cemetery. The FN was denounced by established parties and the French public, alike, because its members were discernibly absent in the ensuing mass demonstrations held in support of the Jewish community (in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 42).

Pétainists and other far right groups bared hostility toward free market competition and liberal capitalism, which ultimately contributed to their demise (in Merkl & Weinberg, 1993: 35).

Popular capitalism may also be termed as “political entrepreneurialism” or “capitalist-authoritarianism” (cf. Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995: 91).

For instance, a 1990 survey showed that 71% of the National Front’s party activists who were delegates at the party’s 1984 national convention would abstain in the second round if the choice was between a candidate of the moderate Right and a Socialist (Ysmal, 1991: 189-91; in Kitschelt, 1995: 118).

Debate was particularly heated over the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. The narrow margin by which the initiative was ratified by the Socialist/RPR government was a repudiation of Mitterand and underscored the discontent of French citizens with EU policy-making. Le Pen seized the opportunity to be a leading voice against these policies for EU integration (cf. DeClair, 1999: 96). These mainly economic policies provided Le Pen with a discursive platform for cultural differentialism. The FNJ was particular keen in adopting this program during these years (Crépon, 2012: 48-9).

The FN reinstated a strategy for the “National Right” that opposed bureaucratic cosmopolitanism, economic ultraliberalism, and Islamism based on the notion that the Muslim culture was fundamentally incompatible with the values of French democratic society (cf. Crépon, 2012: 47-50).

In addition to anti-immigration and security measures, Le Pen’s campaign proposals included the promise to create a Sixth Republic in order to replace the scandal-plagued institutions of the Fifth Republic (DeClair, 1999: 97-100).

The Front National took political power in Marignane, Toulon, and Orange (Perrineau, 1997: 82).

In 1988, the party contested the second round in only 14 constituencies: This figure increased to 100 in 1993 and reached 132 in 1997 (Williams, 2006: 85).
Le Pen rejected the proposal despite a petition signed by 72 regional councillors and 80 members of the national council in favour of the scheme.

A first group of Mégret supporters left following the 9th congress of Front National in 1994. A second group departed shortly after Carl Lang’s resigned from his position as secretary-general (Dézé, 2012: 117).

Le Pen fervently opposed any alliances with the mainstream right while Mégret considered it a necessary strategy if the party was to gain sufficient credibility (Rydgren, 2004: 21).

On April 2, 1998, the French judiciary in Versailles suspended Le Pen’s civic rights for two years due to violent meetings and public injury. The terms of his suspension call for the withdrawal of the FN leader’s name from the top of the list in the upcoming 1999 European elections (Dézé, 2012: 115).

Le Pen’s attacks on Mégret include personal threats, the dismantling of youth groups developed by Mégret (Renouveau Étudiant), economic disincentives, as well as Mégret’s demotion on the list for the 1999 European elections (Dézé, 2012: 125).

Both parties had been stifled by party competition from Rassemblement pour la France, headed by Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers, which “offered a more sanitized version of the Front’s program” (Eatwell, 2000b, 409-10; in Rydgren, 2004: 21).

Although her first political experience dates back to the 1983 municipal elections, Marine Le Pen had, until this time, preferred to keep politics at a distance and occupied only ephemeral positions within the FNJ. She made her first significant appearance on the FN’s central committee at the 1997 congress in Strasbourg. A lawyer by profession, she created the Front National’s judicial branch in January, 1998 (Crépon, 2012: 54-5).

Louis Aliot joined the Front National in 1990. He acted as regional secretary (1998-9) and is regional councillor for Languedoc-Roussillon since 1998. Aliot is now FN Vice-president, as well as member of the Executive Bureau, Political Bureau, and Central Committee (cf. Crépon, 2012: 56-60).

The 2004 regional elections are also an exception (Dézé, 2012: 130).

Marie-Christine Arnautu is presently the FN secretary-general for l’Île-de-France, member of the Political Bureau and Central Committee (Crépon, 2012: 67).

Following the opening of the official campaign for the succession in June 2010, Gollnisch’s blatant remarks (for which he was suspended from his role as professor at the University of Lyon) had considerably weakened his candidacy. He was forced to make concessions to dissidents of Marine from outside the FN. For instance, he received the support of a number of websites that disseminated unflattering images of Marine as “candidate de l’établissement” (Dézé, 2012: 140).

For instance, some 30% of the blue-collar electorate (blue-collar workers who went to the polls) voted for Marine Le Pen in the 2012 parliamentary elections, which marked a percentage point higher than for Hollande (Lepartmentier & Schneider, 2012; in Hewlett, 2012: 415).

The program advocated an increase in the French birthrate and the repatriation of foreign workers, among other things (Marcus, 1995: 19; in Williams, 2006: 82)

During these years, a number of slogans pointed to the FN’s defensive and ethno-nationalist views on immigration: “French First (Les français d’abord)” in 1984; “France has Returned (La France est de retour)” in 1985; and “300 measures for the recognition of France (300 mesures pour la reconnaissance de la France)” in 1993 (in Betz & Immerfall, 1998: 16).

Initially, the populist appeal of the Front National’s anti-immigration platform was most evidenced by the success of the party’s 1983 municipal election campaign in blue-collar municipalities with cheaper housing – most notably in Dreux (cf. Kling, 2011; Dézé, 2012; Crépon, 2012).

In the 1990s, extreme and mainstream right-wing parties lost ground to Eurosceptic movements led by right-wing politician Philippe de Villiers, leader of the Movement of France (Mouvement pour la France, MPF) and Gaullist veteran Charles Pasqua (Hainsworth, 2000: 83). It, consequently, becomes all the more astounding that the Front National has since managed to maintain a stronghold on the vote-winning issue of European integration (cf. Harmsen and Spiering 2004; Lodge, 2005; in Hainsworth, 2000: 83).

Between 1989 and 2002, the FN has consistently won over 10% of the votes in national elections (Rydgren, 2004: 18; Berezin, 2007, p. 131). Also, European Elections Studies in 1989, 1994, and 1999 show that the FN is the only anti-immigrant party whose electoral success (estimated percentage votes, based on national election outcomes in the election prior to and after the year of data collection) represented over half of its electoral potential for each election year, with the exception of the FPÖ in 1999 (in van de Brug, 2005: 547).

Unsuccessful parties include Germany’s Republicans (REP), Sweden’s New Democracy (ND) and the Netherland’s List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), to name a few. Unsuccessful parties are those who failed to receive 5% of the vote in three successive national parliamentary elections (cf. Table 1.1. in Art, 2011: 6).
Each of the indicated key terms (with the exception of ‘national preference’) are found in at least two (2) sections of the 2012 manifesto, which are listed here: Immigration, Security, Laxity, Pensions, European Treaties, and Debt (FN Élysée, 2012).

Increasingly, the immigrant is seen as a Muslim (rather than, for example, a Turk or Moroccan). While Muslims have been migrating to Western Europe since the 1960s, their numbers and visibility have increased significantly since the 1980s. Today, the vast majority of Muslims in Western Europe live in France (3.5 million) and Germany (3.4 million). Consequently, the integration of new already present “immigrants” has become an important part of the immigration debate since the early 1990s (Mudde, 2012: 10).

Keywords used to determine the proportion of recent press releases (not including archives) that related directly to Muslims or Islamism are the following: ‘Islamism’, ‘Islam’, ‘Islamist(s)’, ‘Halal’, ‘Ramadan’, ‘Imam(s)’, and ‘Muslim(s)’ (FN, 2013). These terms were selected based on the criteria for keywords provided for available press releases on the FN’s official website.

The Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM) was created in the lead up to the 2012 presidential and legislative elections, and became a 1901 association. Although the RBM has a logo and judicial body, it is not a political party but a forum for all “patriots of France” (RBM, 2013).

Dans cette perspective, il cherche à rassembler toutes les personnes physiques ou morales, dont des partis politiques, qui sont attachés à la souveraineté de la France et aux valeurs de la République.

The ‘Revenue minimum d’insertion’ (RMI) is a French form of social welfare and ‘L’Aide Médicale État’ (AME) refers to the state’s healthcare system.

France Ruralité is the FN’s official information source on issues related to the country’s agricultural sector, fishery, and environment (France Ruralité, 2013).

The full list of key terms which relate to Euro-globalization is found here: European treaty, Euro, Europe, national sovereignty, autonomy, European Union, globalization, global, Brussels, world, economic crisis, and technocrat.

The Front National pointed to France’s increased unemployment rates (8.3% to 9.5%) and decreased share of international trade (4.5% to 4%) between 2009 and 2011, to highlight the failures of national and EU politicians to address the economic crisis and its consequences on France’s socioeconomic situation (FN, 2011).