The Canadianisation of the Holocaust: 
Debating Canada’s National Holocaust Monument

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Abstract

Holocaust monuments are often catalysts in the ‘nationalization’ of the Holocaust – the process by which Holocaust memory is shaped by its national milieu. Between 2009 and 2011, the Parliament of Canada debated a bill which set out the guidelines for the establishment of a National Holocaust Monument (NHM), which ultimately became a federal Act of Parliament in early 2011. I examine the discourse generated by this bill to understand how the memory of the Holocaust is being integrated into the Canadian identity, and argue that the debate surrounding the NHM has been instrumental in the ‘Canadianisation’ of the Holocaust. I summarise my findings by placing them into dialogue with other national memories of the Holocaust, and identify three distinct features of Holocaust memory in Canada: a centrifugal trajectory originating in the Jewish community, a particular-universal tension rooted in multiculturalism, and a multifaceted memory comprising several conflicting – though not competing – narratives.

Résumé

Monuments de l’Holocauste sont souvent des catalyseurs de la «nationalisation» de l'Holocauste – le processus par lequel mémoire de l'Holocauste est formé par son milieu national. Entre 2009 et 2011, le Parlement du Canada a débattre un projet de loi qui crée les lignes directrices pour la mise en place d'un Monument national de l'Holocauste (MNH), qui est finalement devenu une loi fédérale du Parlement au début de 2011. J'examine le discours généré par ce projet de loi pour comprendre comment la mémoire de l'Holocauste est intégrée dans l'identité canadienne, et soutien que le débat entourant le MNH a joué un rôle déterminant dans la «canadianisation» de l'Holocauste. Je résume mes conclusions en les plaçant dans le dialogue avec d'autres mémoires nationales de l'Holocauste, et d'identifier trois caractéristiques distinctes de mémoire de l'Holocauste au Canada: une trajectoire centrifuge d’origine dans la communauté juive, une tension particulière-universelle enracinée dans le multiculturalisme, et une mémoire à multiples facettes comprenant plusieurs récits contradictories – mais pas compétitifs.
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Research is not always easy and, as I have discovered, it becomes exponentially more difficult when it entails the Holocaust. There were times during this project when I was certain that I would become an incomprehensible piece of steamed asparagus, and it is now startling to find myself on the other side. Many people have helped me get here, and I thank them for their motivation and inspiration:

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Preface

As a student of both religious studies and Holocaust studies, I am deeply aware of the fact that no one approaches their research as a neutral observer. While I have tried to maintain an objective and balanced relationship to my subject, I nevertheless have biases which I make no attempt to hide. Firstly, I come to this project as the grandchild of Polish-Jewish survivors who arrived in Canada in 1948 as part of a group of one thousand Jewish war orphans. Although I received the most secular of upbringings, my grandmother made sure that if I was familiar with one aspect of Jewish history, it was the Holocaust. I don’t remember when I first learned about the Holocaust, but one of my most vivid early memories is of my grandmother taking me to the Holocaust memorial on Miami Beach, Kenneth Treister’s A Sculpture of Love and Anguish. For those familiar with this memorial they know that it is one of the most exquisite and emotional manifestations of Holocaust memory, and although I was young at the time it has left a lasting impression on me.

The more I was exposed to the Holocaust, the more I realised that it was not the Holocaust per se that had the greatest impact on people’s lives, but the memory of it. As I listened to people talk about the Holocaust I became aware that it was rarely the facts with which they were concerned but rather the meaning that could be found scattered amongst those facts. I do not deny that there is much value in the study of the Holocaust as a historical event, for memory must have some concrete ground in which to stand; my personal interest, however, is with the ways in which that event has sprouted from the soil to become a memorial force which continues to shape people’s lives. And while I cannot help but see manifestations of Holocaust memory and its impact on social affairs in nearly every setting,
my early experiences with the Miami memorial have continued to shape my belief that there is a special relationship between memory and place.

I never gave much thought to the question of whether Canada should construct a national monument to the Holocaust, and for the most part accepted it as a matter-of-fact that one had never been built. After all, some of the best memorials are private efforts (such as in Miami), and Canada already has many Holocaust monuments scattered throughout Montreal, Toronto, and other major cities (I know of monuments in Calgary, Edmonton, Halifax, Ottawa, Winnipeg, and Vancouver, and am certain that there must be others). But what most shaped my ambivalence was the feeling that the Holocaust lacked in Canadian society the gravity that it had in other national contexts, and so it made sense that there was no national memorial. It was only as I began my research that I realised Holocaust memory is not an innate part of a nation’s consciousness, but rather becomes a part of that consciousness through public debate – particularly those debates which surround the creation of a national memorial.

I therefore come to this project with many different views of Canada’s forthcoming National Holocaust Monument. Because of my family history, I feel that there is great value in Holocaust commemoration and education, and believe that this monument is a wonderful achievement. But as a sociologist of religion, I also recognise that such a monument has no inherent value and that it becomes only what we collectively choose to make it; it can be used for the purposes of good or evil, or for nothing at all. And as a Canadian, I sense it is important that this monument not become isolated from the rest of Canadian history and memory; it should of course speak to the Holocaust itself, but must also reflect Canada’s own history, our multicultural heritage, and our position in global society.
Overall, I have attempted to conduct a neutral sociological analysis. I have sought to represent Holocaust memory as something that is intrinsically neither good nor evil, but as a dynamic entity that is used by different people to different ends. Correspondingly, I seek neither to praise nor condemn the government for this monument; when I speak towards the government’s actions (or the actions of the opposition), I attempt to do so in a non-partisan way. And above all, I have desperately tried to avoid conclusions that are instructive. Studying a memorial prior to its realisation has a certain degree of danger in that one has an urge to say what the final product could or should be. I have attempted to assuage this urge by taking as my subject not the future monument, but the current debate which surrounds it. The memorial should not be anything other than what Canadians want it to be, and apart from that I make no recommendations.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BQ or Bloc</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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<td>CJC</td>
<td>Canadian Jewish Congress</td>
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<td>CMHR</td>
<td>Canadian Museum of Human Rights</td>
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<td>CPC or Conservatives</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
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<td>CWM</td>
<td>Canadian War Museum</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>HEW</td>
<td>Holocaust Education Week</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Holocaust Remembrance Committee</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research</td>
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<td>IHRA</td>
<td>International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (formerly the ITF)</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Jewish Community Council</td>
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<td>LIB or Liberals</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Capital Commission</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>Canada’s New Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NHM</td>
<td>National Holocaust Monument</td>
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<td>NHMA</td>
<td>National Holocaust Monument Act (formerly Bill C-442)</td>
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<td>NHMDC or development council</td>
<td>National Holocaust Monument Development Council</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Supreme Court of Canada</td>
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<td>USHMM</td>
<td>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

To understand Holocaust monuments, it is helpful to understand why Beethoven was a musical master. His symphonies begin with a simple musical phrase which is then twisted, contorted, and manipulated in a seemingly infinite number of permutations to create some of the most complicated (yet simple) and stunning music ever heard. It is easy to wonder how Beethoven was able to create some of the most beautiful art known to humanity from such simple little seeds; how are four notes – consisting of only two pitches – transformed into his magnificent Fifth Symphony? The answer is that Beethoven was a master of the motif; he knew that even the most minor changes to a motif would change everything about the way it was heard. The most subtle technical variation opens up an entirely different world for the audience: move it from the cello to the bassoon and it becomes a different animal; slow it down and it takes on a new life; transpose it from C major to E minor and it will be completely reborn. Beethoven knew that a single motif – the same four note sequence – will sound entirely different depending on which instrument plays it, when it appears in the composition, and which key it is in.

Collective memory is like a symphony, and Holocaust monuments are like one of Beethoven’s motifs. One monument is not the same as another, and any minor difference will dramatically influence the way in which a monument – and the memory it represents – is perceived by the people around it. What might otherwise appear to be a simple, static, and generic piece of public art will take on an entirely different life depending on who is responsible for it, when it was created, and where it is located. Was it built by the descendents of Jewish survivors or the children of former Nazis? Was it erected at the peak
of the Cold War or twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Is it located in downtown Los Angeles, a forest outside of Warsaw, or at the provincial legislature in Winnipeg? Each of these factors will shape the way in which a monument is perceived – so much so that what might appear to be the same physical monument will take on a dramatically different memorial life depending on its place, time, and creator.1 When taken together, a multiplicity of memorials become a symphony of collective memory, and the diversity of monumental, literary, and filmic variations on a single theme – the Holocaust – come together to create the symphonic opus known as Holocaust memory. It is this symphony with which the present analysis is concerned. The entire masterpiece is far too massive and complex to be dealt with in any single study, however, and the best way to approach it is by considering only a small piece. The present analysis will focus on a single particle from which this symphony is composed: a single monument, a simple motif.

The academic study of Holocaust monuments has long understood that many variables – place, time, design, and so on – shape the particular memory that is associated with a given monument. The variable that has received most attention in the academic literature is the national context. Whereas a musical composition might be written in the key of D major, E-flat minor, or C diminished, a monument might be in the national ‘key’ of Poland, Germany, or Lithuania. The study of Holocaust monuments as products of their national milieu was pioneered by James Young in his 1993 study The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. Young’s analysis works from the assumption that monuments are not just static artistic objects but are also public memorials; they are collective creations which are made meaningful through the multitude of competing interpretations that society projects upon them.2 Because the nation-state has been one of the most dominant social structures since the 19th century, he argues that national context often
has such a strong impact on memorials that Holocaust monuments become “indigenous, even
geological outcroppings in a national landscape” which are “invested with national soul and
memory.”

It is necessary to study them as products of their national context, and Young
uses nationality as the primary organisational theme for his study. Most studies on the
subject have followed Young’s lead by taking a nation-oriented approach to monuments.

There is of course significant variation to the way in which this is executed, with some
studies conducting a close study of a particular memorial in a single nation-state while
others take a more comparative approach by contrasting monuments in two or more
different contexts. Understandably, the vast majority of literature looks at monuments and
memorials in Germany, Israel, and the United States, although a few examine them in such
diverse contexts as Finland, Australia, and Uruguay. While there are several studies
which look at Holocaust memory in Canada, very few of them examine it as a specifically
Canadian phenomenon. This may in part be due to the fact that the country has a relatively
small population with only a few scholars in the field, but I suspect it has more to do with the
fact that Canada has not, until now, established a national memorial to the Holocaust.

The creation of a national memorial to the Holocaust is an important factor in what
has been called the ‘nationalization’ of the Holocaust. In the study of Holocaust memory, it
is useful to distinguish between a monument and a memorial. Whereas a monument is a
static physical structure, it becomes a memorial when it is incorporated into the dynamic
reality of a social group; a monument is an object while a memorial is that object after it has
been ascribed with meaning. When a monument is influenced by its national milieu, the
memory associated with it is correspondingly modified so that, when a nation uses a
monument to remember the Holocaust, they remember it in a distinctly national way. The
process by which the memory of the Holocaust is adapted to the ideological, political, and
cultural dynamic of a particular nation-state has been referred to as the ‘nativization’ or ‘nationalization’ of the Holocaust. Researchers tend to observe this process within particular contexts so that, rather than discussing nationalization in general, one focuses on the ‘Americanization,’ ‘Israelification,’ or other ‘-ization’ of the Holocaust.

One of the best such studies is Edward Linenthal’s 1995 book *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create American’s Holocaust Museum*, which documents the process by which America’s national Holocaust memorial – the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) – was conceived and realised between 1978 and 1993. The fact that it was to be a national memorial located on Washington’s National Mall meant that the museum would have to “behave itself” by being a “good neighbor”; both visually and ideologically, it had to be harmonious with its environment in such a way that it could be easily digested by an American audience. As a consequence of the many negotiations, debates, and discussions surrounding the creation of the USHMM and “the appropriate location of Holocaust memory in American culture,” an Americanized memory of the Holocaust was formed. Linenthal’s study is significant because it demonstrates that the nationalization of the Holocaust can, at least in some cases, be caused by public debate – especially those debates surrounding the creation of a national Holocaust memorial.

Similarly, Peter Carrier observes that the Francification and Germanization of the Holocaust were precipitated by the debates surrounding the creation of the *Vél d’Hiv* monument in Paris and the *Holocaust-Mahnmal* in Berlin. This explains why the Holocaust has not yet been Canadianised: Canada has only recently taken the initial steps towards the creation of a national Holocaust monument and has therefore only begun to debate how the Holocaust can be a ‘good neighbour’ in the Canadian community. As the debate surrounding this
monument unfolds, one can expect to see an increasingly Canadianised memory of the Holocaust emerge.

Although Holocaust memory has been most often looked at from a national perspective, there is an increasing amount of literature which argues that it must also be examined in relation to global society. This research is based on the premise that memory is fundamentally linked to identity and that, for much of the 20th century, national identity has been one of the most important factors in the formation of collective memory. As globalisation proceeds, however, it erodes the integrity of the nation-state and gives way to transnational communities. The question concerning theorists is whether the global community can (or will) develop an identity that is coherent enough to sustain a global memory of the Holocaust. One of the most common hypotheses is that collective memory will emerge as part of a universal system of ethics in which the Holocaust will play a foundational role. Others suggest that the concept of memory itself must be reworked in light of globalisation, and Aleida Assmann argues that, while the Holocaust might not become a global ‘memory’ in the traditional sense, it “has spread to become a universal symbol with global resonance.” Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider move beyond the question of whether a global identity will ultimately supplant national ones by suggesting that, rather than ‘totalizing’ memorial culture, “national and ethnic memories are transformed in the age of globalization rather than erased.” They argue that, because “shared memories of the Holocaust...provide the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory,” the Holocaust is an influential force in the process of globalisation. For them, globalisation, national identity, and Holocaust memory are interrelated in such a way that it is difficult to understand one without the other. Overall, this debate reveals that Holocaust memory is located at the
intersection of multiple identities – ethnic, national, and global – and must be defined in relation to them all.

Rather than limit my work to a strict definition of memory, I will take a social constructivist approach which allows its meaning to emerge from the discourse and acknowledges that this meaning may change as the discourse evolves. In general, I consider memory to be the post-facto interpretation of an event; by interpretation, I mean the process whereby information about an event is arranged into a coherent and meaningful narrative (or myth). Because an event must be framed in terms of a (religious, ethnic, national, global, etc.) group’s core assumptions to become meaningful, the process of memory-making is fundamentally related to the (re)construction of a group’s social identity. In keeping with my definition, I consider Holocaust memory to be any post-facto (since 1945) interpretation of the Nazi persecution of European Jewry (among other groups). In addition to commemorative ceremonies and calendrical periods, this includes any monumental, literary, filmic, visual, musical, or other representation of these events that in some way attempts to understand, make sense of, or give meaning to them. I also consider many manifestations of Holocaust education to be memorial in that they present an (often archetypal) narrative of the event and in many cases attempt to make sense of it by extrapolating a moral lesson. Overall, my goal is to use the broadest possible definition of ‘Holocaust memory’ so that a definition can, as much as possible, emerge from the data; rather than imposing a definition, this flexibility will allow me to examine the debates surrounding Canada’s National Holocaust Monument in order to understand what ‘the Holocaust’ and ‘Holocaust memory’ mean within a Canadian context.
Methodology

The present analysis seeks to determine what the National Holocaust Monument reveals about the state of Holocaust memory in Canada, and what impact this memory will have on the Canadian identity. The nationalization of the Holocaust is a well documented phenomenon which, in countries such as the United States, Germany, and France, was in large part a consequence of the discourse surrounding the creation of a national Holocaust memorial. Nationalization has not yet occurred in Canada and, while Canadians are certainly not unfamiliar with the Holocaust, they do not conceive of it as a definitively Canadian event. This has begun to change however because, since 2008, the country has been in the process of debating its own national memorial to the Holocaust – the National Holocaust Monument (NHM). I contend that one function of this debate is to integrate the Holocaust into the national narrative and thereby produce a Canadianised memory of the Holocaust. It is important to note that the NHM is not yet a part of ‘public’ discourse in the sense that all Canadians are aware of it. Rather, it is public in the sense that the debate is taking place primarily amongst those individuals who are purported to represent the general public: elected and appointed officials. This debate has so far not spread to the general public, although my analysis rests on the assumption that, as the monument nears completion and becomes a physical part of the Canadian landscape, the NHM and Holocaust memory will become the purview of the average Canadian.

This analysis seeks to answer a set of related questions about the NHM and the Canadianisation of the Holocaust: How is a relationship between Canada and the Holocaust being constructed? What does a Canadianised memory of the Holocaust look like? What impact does this newly constructed memory have on the existing Canadian identity? How has the interaction between the country’s Jewish minority, Canadian ideology, and the global
community shaped the memory of the Holocaust? I wish to add that, while my analysis is a case study of the NHM, it is not the monument *per se* with which I am interested; rather, the subject of my research is Holocaust memory in Canada, and the NHM is simply used as an entry point into this phenomenon. A study of Canada’s forthcoming NHM will attempt to answer these questions and bring this monument into the broader discussion of Holocaust memory.

Following Edward Linenthal and Peter Carrier, my analysis will consist of a discourse analysis of the debates surrounding the NHM. In Linenthal’s study of the USHMM, he suggests that the Americanization of the Holocaust was a consequence of the debates that comprised the planning and negotiation of a national memorial, many of which played out before ground had been broken for the physical memorial. Peter Carrier takes a similar, albeit more refined, methodological approach in which he offers the “definition of a monument as a social process.” He rejects methodologies that focus on aesthetics because the physical characteristics of a memorial are “largely meaningless if encountered in isolation from their accompanying public debates.” Carrier instead emphasises the ‘rhetorical negotiation’ of monuments – that is, the debates, disputes, and controversies surrounding their creation – because it is this discourse which generates a relationship between the nation and the event being commemorated. He explains that “people do not identify directly with a monument, for its significance is contingent upon meanings acquired by its interactions with and translation via secondary media of speeches, rituals, reports, forums, conferences, exhibitions and political statements. Monuments are rather catalysts of complex social and political communication.” A national monument is a rhetorical device which provokes debate on a particular subject and directs that debate until it congeals into a coherent national memory; thus, a national Holocaust monument produces a discourse on the
Holocaust which then resolves into a national narrative of the Holocaust. In line with this approach, I will treat Canada’s NHM as a rhetorical device which has stimulated a national discussion on the Holocaust in which a relationship between the country and the Holocaust is being negotiated. In this way, it is not problematic that the physical NHM has yet to be constructed, for Carrier is emphatic that the most significant debate precedes any physical memorial; on the contrary, it is quite fortunate that there is still no physical monument to distract me from the reams of discourse that the NHM has already produced.

The data for my analysis consists primarily of the transcripts of public debates which have been made available to the general public. Because the NHM will be brought into existence through an Act of Parliament, the majority of my data consists of the parliamentary debates (Hansard) which preceded the federal legislation; this includes the House of Commons debates, the debates of the Senate, and the proceedings from the standing committees which studied the bill. As the basis for the actual monument, the legislation which emerged from these debates – the *National Holocaust Monument Act* (NHMA) – has also been an important source of data. Other sources that I have found valuable include the transcripts from the speeches given during the announcement of the NHM’s development council, the government website for the NHM, and press releases. I have also considered coverage of the NHM that appeared in the print media, most of which was published in the *Canadian Jewish News* and the *National Post*. In addition to these publicly available documents, I have had access to two resources which have not been made accessible to the general public. One is the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s (DFAIT) results report that has been compiled from an online survey about the NHM which was distributed in late 2011; while this has not been made available to the public, it was a public survey and is therefore an expression of the general public. The other is a set of interviews
that I conducted with several individuals who have been closely involved with the NHM; these interviews have helped to provide background on the monument and to clarify comments made by these individuals elsewhere.

By examining how the discourse surrounding the NHM is shaped by its national context, I argue that the NHM has been (and continues to be) instrumental in the Canadianisation of Holocaust memory. The debates around the NHM reveal that Canadians view the Holocaust as an event which happened to the Jews, was impacted by Canada, and had international implications, and therefore consider its memory to be shared by all of these communities. Thus, the NHM sits at the intersection of three distinct social realms: the ethnic Jewish, the national, and the global. This has two important implications for the monument: first, it means that the monument is influenced by each of these social factors so that the memory it transmits is the collective product of multiple contexts, and; second, it suggests that the monument can function as an intermediary in interactions between these groups. In order to mediate between social spheres it is necessary to define them in relation to one another, and in this way the monument can be a useful tool in the construction of group identities. Canadian society in particular has taken advantage of this function and has begun to instrumentalise the Holocaust in the creation of a national identity. The NHM is utilised in the construction of the country’s internal and external identities. On the one hand, the Holocaust is used to define the outer parameters of the Canadian identity and then reflect these back towards the country’s citizens; it is an act of worldview maintenance which reinforces the nation’s own self-perception. On the other hand, the NHM is used to manufacture a public image which is then broadcast to the global community; by contributing to a public persona, the NHM helps to manage the way in which Canada is perceived by other nations. By serving these purposes, Holocaust memory mediates the
relationship between Canada, its Jewish community, and its global neighbours, and in doing
so negotiates their identities in relation to one another. Because the NHM was the catalyst for
the discourse which led to this negotiation, it is integral to the development of a relationship
between the Canadian identity and Holocaust memory. As this discourse continues to evolve,
it is likely that the national narrative will become increasingly dependent upon this memory
and that the Holocaust will continue to be shaped as a distinctly Canadian memory.

Each chapter of this study addresses one of the social factors which have influenced
the NHM. Because Holocaust memory originated and matured within a distinctly Jewish
milieu, it is useful to consider the impact that Canadian Jewry has had on it. Chapter 2 argues
that, within its Jewish womb, Holocaust memory developed an outward moving trajectory
whereby it continues to expand into increasingly larger social spheres. As a result of this
expansion, this memory has begun to seep out of the Jewish realm and into national
consciousness. Chapter 3 considers the emergence of the Holocaust as a national discourse
and considers the NHM to be a major catalyst in the Canadianisation of the Holocaust. It
examines the discourse surrounding the NHM in order to understand the various ways in
which the Holocaust has been framed as a Canadian memory. The attempt to manufacture a
connection between Canada and the Holocaust has not played out in a neutral arena,
however, and the context of this negotiation has had a profound impact on the process.
Chapter 4 examines how the NHM is also the result of two larger contexts: the multicultural
milieu and global society. By bringing the particular and the universal into relation with one
another, these contexts have contributed to the monument’s ability to mediate between
various social spheres. Much of the monument’s ability to mediate between the national and
global spheres comes from the fact that the creation of Holocaust monuments is a global
phenomenon. Chapter 5 concludes my study by bringing the NHM into dialogue with
Holocaust memory as it has formed in other national contexts. This comparison will demonstrate that Holocaust memory in Canada has been transformed in such a way that it is distinct from those memories generated by other national contexts. But before presenting this analysis, it will be useful to provide a brief history (what James Young refers to as a ‘biography’) of Canada’s National Holocaust Monument.

The National Holocaust Monument

According to nearly every account of the National Holocaust Monument, the idea originated with Laura Grosman, an undergraduate student at the University of Ottawa. Coming from the Toronto suburb of Thornhill, Ontario, Grosman grew up as the granddaughter of a Holocaust survivor on her father’s side and a WWII veteran on her mother’s. As a sophomore, she conceived of the idea for a national monument after learning in an undergraduate course on the Holocaust that Canada had no national memorial to the event. Committed to correcting this oversight, she approached her federal representative, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Susan Kadis, with whom she had completed a high school co-op program, suggesting that steps be taken towards establishing a national memorial. The result was Bill C-547, An Act to establish a Holocaust Monument in the National Capital Region, which Kadis introduced to the House of Commons as a private member’s bill on 14 May 2008. The bill was adopted after its first reading, but died on the table when parliament was dissolved following the call for a general election. It was reintroduced as Bill C-238 by Liberal MP Anita Neville on 1 December 2008. It passed its first reading but, again, died on the table.

The bill was given new life when Grosman went to Thornhill’s newly elected representative, Conservative MP Peter Kent, with her idea. Kent held a governmental office
and was therefore not eligible to introduce the bill himself (only backbenchers can introduce private member’s bills), so he proposed the idea to his colleague from Edmonton, Conservative MP Tim Uppal. Uppal had drawn a high number on the priority list for private member business, enabling him to present the bill early in the parliamentary session and giving him a better chance at getting it passed before parliament was again dissolved. As a member of a minority group himself (he is a Sikh) and a firm believer in human rights, Uppal was enthusiastic for the idea and on 18 September 2009 introduced Bill C-442, An Act to establish a National Holocaust Monument. The bill was virtually the same as those previously introduced by Kadis and Neville except that it now included the concept of a council that would oversee the monument’s development. It was adopted after its first reading and went to debate in the House of Commons on 8 December 2009. Following Uppal’s sponsorship speech, responses were given by members of each party – Irwin Cotler for the Liberals, Carole Lavallée for the Bloc Québécois, Judy Wasylcyia-Leis for the NDP, and Brian Jean for the Conservatives – all of whom supported the bill enthusiastically. It was read a second time, passed by unanimous vote, and sent to committee for study.

It was in committee that the bill faced its first major opposition. Sent to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, parliamentary secretary Brian Jean (Conservative) and Joe Volpe (Liberal) took the bill to task. On the first day in committee, 12 May 2010, Jean introduced nine amendments, which Volpe would later note was “an amendment for each and every clause that we had already unanimously accepted in the House of Commons.” Observing that the new amendments required the government neither to fund the monument nor provide the land for it, Volpe objected, arguing that the amendments “go against the very principle of the bill.” The meeting had, however, been reserved as a time during which Uppal could speak to his bill; discussion shifted towards
Uppal and, while tensions were high, they did not yet come to a head. The next day of committee was similarly tense, but not yet explosive. On 26 May 2010, the committee began its clause-by-clause study of the bill. Clauses 3, 4, and 5 were agreed to as written, while clause 6 was modified according to a Liberal amendment. It was when the discussion came to clause 7 that things became volatile. Facing amendments from both the Conservative government and the Liberals, tempers flared over who would be responsible for funding the monument – whether it would be funded publicly by the government or privately by donation. Running out of time and unable to reach a decision, the meeting was adjourned until the following week.

When study resumed on 3 June 2010, tensions were revitalised. Jean introduced a new amendment to clause 7 which stated that “planning, designing, construction, installing, and maintaining the monument, and other costs incurred” would be paid for with private donations collected in a fundraising campaign. The committee chair, Conservative MP Merv Tweed, ruled that the amendment was “beyond the scope of the bill” and therefore invalid.

Jean challenged this ruling and, with the Conservatives and Bloc voting against the chair’s decision, had it overturned; the amendment became admissible. In response, Volpe began a series of long-winded speeches in which he argued that the monument should be funded publicly and that the bill should be passed unamended – a strategy that other committee members suggested was a filibuster. After extended debate and filibustering, Jean moved to have the amendment withdrawn; with unanimous consent, it was.

After a brief suspension of the meeting, Jean tabled a new amendment which was an almost verbatim copy of the one that had been withdrawn only moments before. Based on its similarity, the chair ruled it inadmissible. Again, Jean challenged the chair, and again the ruling was overturned. After more than an hour of debate and continued filibustering from Volpe, the government
amendment was finally passed. From that point, a pattern emerged and the study began to move more quickly: the chair ruled an amendment inadmissible, Jean challenged the ruling, and it was overturned by vote. Ultimately, clauses 2, 7, and 8 were modified in this way.

After committee, however, Volpe brought these procedural discrepancies to the attention of the Speaker of the House, asking him to make a ruling on the admissibility of the revised clauses. On 25 October 2010, the Speaker agreed that, indeed, the amendments to clauses 2, 7, and 8 had been inadmissible; the clauses reverted back to the way they had originally been presented in the bill. Overall, the funding controversy became a minor news event which was covered by major Jewish and non-Jewish publications.

What compelled the funding controversy? The Liberals claimed that their objections were rooted in the desire to make monument as ‘Canadian’ as possible. They argued that the Conservative government’s amendments “took away the concept of public lands, at public expense, to be funded by the Government of Canada” and that, with the creation of a development council, “the legislative authority of the minister would be devolved to the advisory council.” For the Liberals, the monument needed to be funded entirely with public monies, and the Minister, as a public representative, needed to be fully responsible for the creative process. According to the Conservatives, the amendments served only “to elaborate and clarify the means” by which the monument would be realised and “to provide greater transparency and accountability” in that process. For them, the changes were merely ‘technical amendments’ that left the intent of the bill intact. There are however other possible explanations for these tensions. Dennis Bevington, an NDP MP on the committee, suggested that the amendments created a buffer zone between the government and the NHM by which the minister could take credit for the memorial’s success, or blame the development council for its failure. There is also evidence to support the idea that the Liberals were using the
controversy as a way to draw attention to the fact that it was two Liberal MPs – Kadis and Neville – who had initially introduced the bill. They felt that they were not getting credit for a bill that they were the first to support, and simply wanted credit where credit was due. In truth, the controversy was probably fuelled in part by all of these factors. I discuss the ideological motivations behind it in Chapter 3.

After this debate, the bill moved through the remainder of the legislative process rather smoothly and, towards the end, was rushed through due to an impending election which would have caused the bill to die for a third time. The amended bill was debated on 27 October and 8 December 2010, where it was approved by the House of Commons for the third and final time. It was debated by the Senate during February and March of 2011, and was studied by the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology on 24 March 2011 where, unlike earlier, it faced little contention. Knowing that an election would soon be called, the bill was put through to its third reading in the Senate later that day, where it was approved. On 25 March 2011 – only hours before a federal election was called – Bill C-448 received Royal Assent and became An Act to Establish a National Holocaust Monument, or the National Holocaust Monument Act. The creation of a National Holocaust Monument was now required by federal law.

The NHMA sets out the guidelines by which the monument must be realised. It requires that, within one year of the act coming into force, the Minister responsible for the monument must establish a National Holocaust Monument Development Council (NHMDC or development council) which will be responsible for seeing the monument through to completion. Based on an open application process, the council should be composed of five or fewer “members of the public who possess a strong interest in, connection to, or familiarity with the Holocaust.” The act indicates that the council will be responsible for
fundraising, but does not limit the amount of time during which funds can be raised. Once the council has collected “sufficient funds,” however, the monument must be completed within three years, and is to be erected on “public lands in the National Capital Region” that will be provided by the government. Although the act does not specify, John Baird, minister of DFAIT, is responsible for the National Capital Commission (NCC) and will therefore be the minister responsible for the monument.

To fulfill the act’s requirement that the minister “hold public consultations and take into account the recommendations of the public,” DFAIT issued an online survey in which members of the public were invited to provide their input on the monument’s location, design, and function (the contents of the survey are included in Appendix A, along with a partial report of the results). The survey included five questions. The first two questions asked which “characteristics are most important in the choice of a suitable site for this future monument” and how “the proposed monuments and its site [should] be experienced”; several options were provided for each, and respondents were asked to rate them on a scale. The other three questions were open-ended and provided a text box in which respondents were invited to comment: they asked whether there was “anything in particular that visitors should experience” in relation to the monument, what “fundamental values” it should convey, and whether there are any “visual or physical elements” that should be considered in selecting a site.

The results from the survey reveal very little about the public’s opinion of the NHM. Fewer than 400 people completed the survey, suggesting either that the NHM is not high on the list of priorities for the Canadian public or that the survey did not receive enough publicity to make Canadians aware of it (it is probably a combination of both). Given an understanding of mainstream Holocaust memory, the particular results are not surprising; for
example, 62% of respondents said that it was “extremely important” that the monument be “a learning experience,” while 52% said it was “extremely important” that it be “a place of contemplation.” Other responses are more difficult to interpret: in regards to whether the monument be erected in “a natural setting,” “an urban or built environment,” or “an intimate space,” almost as many people indicated that these characteristics were “not very important” as there was suggesting that they were “extremely important.” In the open-ended responses, the majority of respondents were supportive of the monument, a sizable minority expressed (some more neutrally than others) that Canada does not need a Holocaust monument, and a few represented the voices of antisemites and historical revisionists. Apart from the funding controversy, the negative views expressed in this poll have been the only pushback against the monument so far; the survey’s results have not been made public, however, and these opinions have not entered the popular discourse. In general, the survey seems to have attracted those with strong feelings for the NHM – both those in favour and against it – and the findings probably do not represent the attitudes of the ‘average’ Canadian. In addition, it is unclear how, if at all, the NHMDC have integrated these responses into their decision making.57

The members of the NHMDC were announced in Ottawa on 2 April 2012 at an event where Tim Uppal, now the Minister of Democratic Reform, and James Moore, the Minister of Canadian Heritage, spoke on the importance of Holocaust memory.58 Daniel Friedman, rabbi at Beth Israel Synagogue in Edmonton and a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Alberta, was named as the council chair. The other members include: Ralph E. Lean, a senior partner at the Toronto legal firm Cassels Brock and Blackwell who also sits on the board of governors for B’nai Brith Canada; Alvin Segal, a chairman and chief executive officer of Peerless Clothing as well as a recognised
philanthropist; and Fran Sonshine, the national chair of the Canadian Society for Yad Vashem and a member of several women’s advocacy groups. Elliot Lifson, president of the Canadian Apparel Federation and a professor at McGill University, was named as a fifth council member in August of that year. In addition to introducing the development council, Uppal also announced that “The Government of Canada will match funds raised by the campaign to a maximum of $4 million.” While it is likely that no firm number will be attached to the monument until a design is selected, the fundraising website indicates that the council seeks to raise $4.5 million in private funds, meaning that the monument could sit at a cost of approximately $8.5 million. The announcement that the government would be providing this money was published in several high-distribution newspapers and has become one of the few cases in which the NHM was covered by the non-Jewish press.

While entering the early stages of planning and fundraising, the development council participated in several ‘visioning sessions’ in which they discussed the subject of the monument and the various commemorative possibilities. During a ‘pre-visioning session,’ several eminent historians were invited to discuss the subject of Canada and the Holocaust. Following this was a more traditional ‘visioning session’ in which survivors, Holocaust educators, historians, council members, and officials discussed the monument more directly. Based on these sessions, the council, in conjunction with the NCC, will formulate a directive to artists which will identify the goals and parameters for the monument’s design. An open design competition will follow, and the directive will be issued along with an open call for submissions; once submissions have been collected, the final design for the monument will be selected by a jury. According to Mark Kristmanson, Director of Capital Interpretation, Commemorations, and Public Art at the NCC, such a jury typically might be composed of an artist, an architect, a landscape architect, a content specialist, a survivor, and
In May 2013, the NCC issued a request for qualifications for design teams, from which a subset will be invited to submit a design for the NHM.

Fundraising has been a spectacular success from the beginning. Typically, the NCC charges an administration fee (about 15% of the project’s cost) and a maintenance fee (about 10%) which is expected to be paid for by the organisation with whom the NCC is working. According to John Light and Randall Visser at DFAIT, the NCC has committed to using funds from its own operating budget to cover these costs. And whereas many monuments must be funded privately, the NHM may receive up to $4 million from the government; according to Light and Visser, this money has not come directly from the federal government, but is being committed by DFAIT out of its own departmental budget. When, at the end of 2012, I asked Rabbi Friedman how much money had been raised, he indicated that, including the $4 million donation from the government, the council had raised “$5 or $6 million” of the $8 million goal. This is an impressive achievement given that the official fundraising campaign had not even begun; that $1-$2 million in private funds was raised before the campaign began suggests that financial support is strong and that the remaining $2-$3 million will not be difficult to acquire. Judging by the list of ‘Founders’ (donors contributing more than $100,000) and other financial contributors posted on the fundraising website, the project probably reached its financial goal by the end of August 2013.

Definite progress towards the NHM was made in April 2013 when the monument’s future location was officially announced and a projected timeline was made public. During the National Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony on 23 April 2013, Tim Uppal announced that the monument will be located at the corner of Wellington and Booth streets in downtown Ottawa, not far from Parliament and directly adjacent the Canadian War
Museum (CWM). Not only was this announcement widely reported in the secular Canadian press, but the plans to build the Canadian NHM were also covered by international media.

In the days preceding this announcement, the monument’s fundraising website also published a projected timeline for the monument’s realisation. After the design competition is launched in May 2013, submissions will be received during the autumn, and a public showcase of the top ten designs will take place during the winter. The winning design will be announced in spring 2014 and construction will commence that summer. Dedication of the completed monument is expected to occur in autumn 2015.

It is through this largely political and legislative process that popular representatives have begun to formulate a motif that will soon be introduced into Canada’s symphony of collective memory. As this motif enters the symphony, the dual themes of Canada and the Holocaust will begin to converge and become less independent from one another, and the melodies will begin to be heard as one. As this happens, a once distinct motif will be transposed into the key of Canada and will begin to resonate in the hearts and minds of every citizen. My analysis will now consider which themes have so far been introduced into this nationwide symphony.
Chapter 2

The Emergence of Holocaust Memory within Canadian Jewry

As a contemporary interpretation of past events, memory is always being filtered through the lens of a different time, place, and social milieu. Memory – and Holocaust memory is no different – is therefore in a state of perpetual flux and is always acquiring new manifestations. The purpose of the present chapter is to survey how Holocaust memory has historically taken shape within the Canadian context and to observe how it transformed between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 21st century. By reviewing the relevant literature, I trace the development of Holocaust memory through its origin, evolution, and maturation within the Canadian context. Although it emerged within the Jewish community and has lived most of its life within this milieu, this does not mean that the memory has been static. Regardless of what was known during the war, awareness of the genocide of European Jewry dropped after the war so that not only were these events absent from general Canadian consciousness, but also largely absent from mainstream Jewish consciousness. Holocaust consciousness then emerged within the Jewish community amongst a small group of survivors who had come to Canada after the war, and it was here that Holocaust memory began to take shape. This memory gradually spread to ever greater segments of the Jewish community to the point at which it not only impacted the majority of the Jewish community, but also functioned as an essential marker of Jewish ethnic identity. Although it has penetrated communities other than the Jewish one, Holocaust memory at the turn of the 21st century still remains largely the purview of Canadian Jewry.

Because the primary concern of this study is with Canada’s forthcoming National Holocaust Monument, the final section of this chapter will turn to a discussion of
monuments. This section will focus on three existing monuments in Canada – the monument erected in Ottawa’s Jewish cemetery in 1978, the monument erected at Manitoba’s legislature in Winnipeg in 1990, and the *Wheel of Conscience* erected at Halifax’s Pier 21 in 2011 – and use them collectively as a concrete example of the evolution of Holocaust memory. This analysis will demonstrate that the development of Holocaust memory in Canada is reflected in the nation’s monuments, use one of Canada’s most recent monuments to observe the state of Holocaust memory in the 21st century, and help anticipate the approach that later monuments might take. Based on this overview of Holocaust memory in Canada, this chapter argues that Holocaust memory emerged and took shape within the Jewish community, although the movement of this memory has developed a centrifugal trajectory whereby it has continued to expand outwards.

**The Holocaust in Canadian Consciousness: After the War**

While Canada’s contribution to the fate of European Jewry is ambiguous, many Canadians today believe that their nation’s role in the Holocaust was a shameful one. This attitude is largely rooted in the 1982 publication of *None Is Too Many*, which argues that Canadian antisemitism was so strong during the 1940s that the government (especially F.C. Blair, the Director of Immigration from 1936 to 1943) actively sought to prevent European Jews from immigrating into the country – a course of action that indirectly led to the deaths of thousands under the Nazi regime.¹ Other research has identified similar manifestations of antisemitism in the Canadian media and universities during the Second World War.² On the other hand, some scholarship suggests that the Canadian government did make attempts to alleviate the suffering of European Jewry.³ Indeed, Canada fought with the Allies to end the war, and in no way sought to see harm befall European Jewry; at worst, Canada is guilty of
not admitting more Jews than it already had. But regardless of the actual role that Canada played in the Holocaust – good or bad – what these studies rarely consider is that what happened does not matter so much as how people remember it happening; it is whether Canadians remember their country as having acted shamefully or honourably that will ultimately affect future actions. To this end, the legacy of *None Is Too Many* may be one of the strongest, and many Canadians consider their government’s actions during the Holocaust to have been disgraceful. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, this sort of attitude has played a significant role in shaping Canadians’ memory of the Holocaust.

The most significant study of Holocaust memory in Canada is Franklin Bialystok’s *Delayed Impact*. This book documents the development of Holocaust memory within Canada’s Jewish community from 1945 to 1985, observing that while it began as a marginal phenomenon, this memory gradually grew in importance to the point at which it “surfaced as a marker of ethnic identification for most Canadian Jews.” Bialystok concludes his study with the trials of war criminals and Holocaust deniers by the Canadian legal system in 1985, arguing that these trials were a climax in the formation of Holocaust memory. Yet, with the book published in 2000, the reader is left with unanswered questions, chiefly: How has this memory developed since then? Surely the development of Holocaust memory did not conclude abruptly in 1985, for, while this year may have been a crescendo, this memory has continued to evolve since then. So why did Bialystok choose 1985 as the outward parameter of his study?

There are several reasons why Bialystok limits his argument in this way. First, Bialystok is an historian and must deal with historical time by limiting the scope of his research. *Delayed Impact* compresses a span of 40 years into a reasonable 300 pages; other historians have undoubtedly spilt more ink over less. But the reason for this particular period
is a consequence of another way in which he has limited his study. Bialystok is not concerned with Holocaust memory in general, but rather within the Canadian Jewish community where it originated and matured; that is, he is concerned with memory insofar as it is a Jewish phenomenon and the purview of the Jewish community. Thus does he conclude his analysis in 1985 when Nazi war criminals and Holocaust deniers are being tried by the Canadian legal system. Until this point, Holocaust memory had been the domain of Canadian Jewry, but with the onset of these trials it moves out of their hands and begins to enter the realm of national discourse where it will be shaped by both Jewish and non-Jewish forces; 1985 is the transition point at which memory begins to move from the Jewish sphere into the national one. This does not mean that Canadian Jewry has entirely lost control over it, nor does it mean that it will be immediately and fully co-opted by Canadians, but it does mean that Jewish influence will gradually have to compete with national interests. Thus, implicit to Bialystok’s analysis is the assumption that Holocaust memory in Canada is expanding beyond the Jewish sphere.

While Bialystok’s analysis concludes at the point when Holocaust memory begins to spread to the national realm, this does not mean that its expansion cannot be observed prior to 1985. Indeed, the very fact that it has pervaded the entire Jewish community shows that its outward momentum has long been in effect; although the Holocaust is often seen today as something that affects every Jew, this has not always been the case. By reviewing Bialystok’s argument in conjunction with related studies on the Holocaust and Canadian Jewry, it is possible to observe the trajectory of Holocaust memory in Canada. These studies show that Holocaust memory was initially limited only to a very small group of people: survivors. This memory was restless, however: it spread first to the families of survivors,
then to their social networks, and ultimately to the entire mainstream Jewish community with few exceptions.⁵

One of Canada’s most significant roles in the Holocaust – apart from its role as a member of the Allied forces – was as a place of refuge for those displaced by war. While it did provide safe haven for several thousand European Jews between 1933 and 1945, its role as a refuge did not truly begin until 1948. Only a few Jews entered Canada between 1933 and 1948 due to a number of factors: lack of resources due to the war effort, quota-based immigration policies, and an inadequate understanding of the scope of the situation in Europe, among others. According to Abella and Troper, a mere 5000 Jews entered the country between 1933 and 1945, with another 8000 gaining entry between the end of the war and 1948.⁶ Although these specific statistics may be contested, it is difficult to argue that more than a few thousand European Jews entered Canada during this time. In 1948, however, Canada’s Immigration Act was rewritten in a way that opened the nation’s doors to Jewish and other refugee groups much wider than they had been for the previous decade-and-a-half. With the reformation of its immigration policy, Jews began to enter Canada at a much greater rate than had previously been possible.

Bialystok argues that, since the end of the war, the development of Holocaust memory within Canadian Jewry occurred in three stages. His central thesis is that the Holocaust had a ‘delayed impact’ on Canadian Jewry whereby they developed ‘amnesia’ immediately following the war which only gradually lifted during the following four decades. He observes that the lifting of the veil on the Holocaust occurred during three successive periods. The period from 1945 until 1960 was a time in which Canadian Jewry had forgotten about the Holocaust. This amnesia was largely the result of the social upheaval caused by the absorption and integration of thousands of new immigrants into the established
Jewish community. As circumstances changed between 1960 and 1973, Holocaust memory began to take a distinct, coherent form and seep into the collective consciousness of Canadian Jewry. The leading factors in this shift were the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a perceived increase in neo-Nazism and antisemitism in Canada and abroad, an escalating series of conflicts which threatened the existence of the State of Israel, and the continued integration of survivors and their children into Jewish and Canadian society. It was in the period between 1973 and 1985 that the Holocaust finally emerged in its mature form, as a coherent phenomenon with a set of institutionalised memorial and educational practices, and as an essential marker of Jewish identity. This occurred in response to four main factors: survivors had achieved social stability, and therefore influence, in both the Jewish community and Canadian society; the Holocaust became a theme in the popular media; the publication of *None Is Too Many* in conjunction with the awareness that Canada had permitted Nazi war criminals to enter after the war; and the need for a new generation of Canadian-born Jews to define themselves amidst a multicultural landscape. By the end of this third developmental period, the Holocaust had transformed from a stain on the lives of survivors that others would rather not know about into the very platform upon which the Jewish identity was supported.  

There are several reasons to explain why the Holocaust was forgotten during the postwar years. Most obvious is that survivor experiences were almost uniformly unpleasant, and the established community preferred to focus on positive events than dwell on negative ones. Related to this was the belief that survivors could best cope with their trauma by ignoring it, forgetting the past, and refocusing their energies towards the task of establishing new lives. But perhaps most significant was that established Jewry had begun to be accepted as a part of mainstream Canadian society. By the late 1940s much of Canadian Jewry had
been in Canada for two or three generations, was economically stable, educated, suburban, and English-speaking; they preferred to focus on their newly achieved role as members of mainstream society than fixate on their European pasts. For these reasons, Canadian Jews did not ask questions about what had happened in Nazi Europe, encouraged survivors to keep their stories to themselves, and made it clear that what happened during the war should not undermine the security and acceptance that Canadian Jewry had worked so hard to earn; it was this course of action that led to the ‘amnesia’ that began to recede in the 1970s and 80s when the ‘delayed impact’ was finally felt. Until then, however, Holocaust memory would remain virtually non-existent in both Jewish and Canadian consciousnesses.  

The emergence of Holocaust memory within survivor culture was an important development, for it was during this critical period that the dynamic of Holocaust memory first took shape. Unfamiliar with Canadian society, often lacking fluency in English or French, and traumatised by their experiences in Europe, survivors developed their own distinct culture from which a memory began to emerge. There was a massive disparity in experiences between the established Jewish community who had been raised in Canada before the Second World War and the new immigrants who had arrived largely as refugees during or after it. These groups formed into two distinct communities that may have lived in the same neighbourhoods and worked in the same districts, but differed in most other respects. While not every city experienced such a sharp contrast between survivors and the established community, and smaller communities such as that in Vancouver found integration to be a smoother process, the division was clear in the largest Jewish communities of Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg. Separated from mainstream Canadian Jewry, the survivors – representing about 13% to 15% of the overall Jewish population in Canada in the 1950s – tended to rely on one another for social and psychological support;
they moved to the same neighbourhoods, joined many of the same organisations and landsmanschaften (groups for those from shared European hometowns), and formed their own survivor-based organisations. Paula Draper’s reference to these groups as “extended families of survivor friends”\(^{11}\) suggests that the members of these social networks shared a high degree of intimacy, community, and mutual interdependence. The effect of this division was that a distinct survivor culture emerged amongst the survivors in each city. While most still found it difficult to discuss their experiences, many found it easier to express themselves, share their particular stories of survival, and rekindle their memories of the alte heim when in the company of those who shared similar experiences. Thus, it was within the community of survivors – amongst those who had experienced the historical devastation directly – that discussion of the Holocaust first began.\(^{12}\)

It was from within the ‘extended families of survivors’ that the initiative came for some of the earliest commemorative efforts. Because it was mostly survivors who were willing to discuss the Holocaust during the late-1940s and through the 1950s – and generally with other survivors – it was within this community that the Holocaust began to take shape as a collective memory. Memorials were rarely institutionalised during this period because the memory was still too nascent to be articulated fully, although there were several instances in which commemoration took an institutional form. In Montreal, survivors formed landsmanschaften and other organisations shortly after resettling, often for the purpose of mourning and commemorating those who had been killed in the Holocaust; this was also often the case when survivors joined existing organisations, for they would redirect the group’s focus so that commemoration became a primary concern. Holocaust commemoration was therefore “the first activity of a newly formed organization or of an already existing one after survivors joined it,”\(^{13}\) and usually took shape as a monument, memorial service, or
financial support for the State of Israel. Those annual memorial services initiated by survivors are now considered to be “one of the most important” and “longest lasting” contributions to communal Jewish life in Montreal.\textsuperscript{14} Vancouver is home to another early memorial, although its success might in part be due to the relative ease with which survivors integrated into the city’s existing community. Commemorative activities began as early as 1948 when a group of survivors from Warsaw founded Vancouver’s first memorial event: an annual commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising which continues to play an important role in the community’s memorial calendar.\textsuperscript{15} While the memory of the Holocaust would remain mostly dormant in collective consciousness until the 1960s, 70s, and later, it had already begun to take a definite shape in response to survivors’ efforts.

Not every early memorial was initiated by survivors; however, those that were not rooted or in some way shaped by the survivor experience tended to be replaced by ones that were. Franklin Bialystok points to several memorials originating in the late 1940s and early 1950s that were initiated by community leaders, observing that “Noticeably absent from the organizing committee of these early events were the survivors themselves.”\textsuperscript{16} It is significant, however, that each of the events to which Bialystok refers was in fact a commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising which, while a staple of early Holocaust memory, waned in importance as Holocaust memory developed. A similar shift can be seen with Holocaust memory in Israel which began with a focus on heroism and resistance, but later came to fixate more on martyrs, victims, and survivors as it matured;\textsuperscript{17} Canada seems to have followed a similar trajectory (although somewhat less overtly) in which an initial concern with acts of heroism was replaced by a preoccupation with suffering.\textsuperscript{18} So while these memorials were indeed a product of the established community, they were not characteristic of Holocaust memory as it would ultimately take shape in the Jewish ethos; it was not these
early memories that took hold of the Jewish psyche, but the survivor-based memories that would later replace them.

The process by which survivor memory supplanted that of the existing leadership can be seen with the Radomer *landsmanshaft* in Toronto, which had been formed during the interwar period and which survivors began to join shortly after their arrival in the city. As an established organisation that had endured throughout the war, the Radomer *landsmanshaft* already had its own memorial activities in place. The survivors who had joined the group after the war, however, felt that neither the existing memorial service nor the interests of the existing group reflected their own experience of loss and consequently created their own informal subgroup, B’nai Radom. In 1955 B’nai Radom began its own memorial service which, two years later, came to replace the *landsmanshaft*’s existing memorial entirely. As this example shows, the established community had indeed initiated memorials during the early postwar years, although survivors would eventually replace these memorials with ones rooted in their own experiences. As a result, memorials not initiated by survivors did not become part of collective Jewish consciousnesses, and it was those that originated within survivor culture that ultimately came to characterise Holocaust memory as it would form in later decades.

As it developed, matured, and spread throughout the Jewish community, Holocaust memory took a variety of forms. Some of its earlier manifestations were as annual *yizkor* (memorial) services, *yizkor bikher* (memorial books dedicated to destroyed communities), and simple monuments that were often erected in a local cemetery. These memorials tended to emerge from small regional groups (i.e. *landsmanshaft* or another subgroup of a city’s Jewish community), focussed on the losses of particular people or communities rather than of European Jewry as a whole, and were often initiated or largely informed by the survivor
population. Educational initiatives such as lecture series or symposia also became a common fixture of early commemoration, although their influence was not as widespread as it would later become. As memory permeated the community and took a more coherent, standardised form, more complex (and arguably more secular) mediums were used to remember the Holocaust. Film and literature became increasingly common ways to convey memory. The establishment of museums and education centres devoted to the Holocaust allowed its memory to be communicated in a multimedia setting. Given that these memorials were often massive undertakings (museums and education centres) or easily transmitted media (film and literature), commemoration was no longer confined to small groups, and the entire Jewish population of a city – or even communities in different provinces – could share the same memorials. In addition, formats that had developed earlier – memorial services, monuments, and educational events – ballooned in popularity, causing them to become more complex, public, and widely observed. While many newer initiatives were not survivor led, they often recognised the important role that survivors played in the transmission of memory.  

With Holocaust consciousness saturating the Jewish community, memorials began to reach into the non-Jewish sphere and, in some cases, were produced by non-Jewish Canadians. Holocaust Education Week (HEW) in Toronto has been a growing annual event since it was first established in 1982. In its first two decades its programme increased from ten to more than one hundred events, and while HEW maintains the Jewish particularity of the Holocaust, an increasing number of these events have been directed towards the city’s non-Jewish community. According to Bodemann and Korn, this has been accomplished by holding an increasing number of events in non-Jewish public venues and by hosting events on non-Jewish themes such as ‘the Righteous Gentile.’ But while HEW remains rooted in the Jewish community, some recent memorials have originated with non-Jewish Canadians.
One of the best examples is *Fugitive Pieces*, a 1996 novel by Anne Michaels which, by following a Polish survivor’s rebirth in Canada, explores the complexities of memory and postmemory as they move through successive generations. Although she does have familial ties to the Jewish community, Michaels herself is not Jewish, and her book reflects on the dilemma of how non-Jewish Canadians can relate to the Holocaust. A similar example is Yann Martel’s 2010 novel *Beatrice and Virgil*, which uses a stuffed donkey, monkey, and Beckettian dialogue to explore the problem of how the Holocaust can be remembered and represented in the contemporary world. Unlike Michaels, Martel has no apparent connection to the Jewish community; despite this, his book was quite well received and became a popular success. These recent manifestations of memory suggest that the Jewish community is losing its monopoly on the Holocaust and that it may soon become the purview of the greater public.

Two recent debates suggest that Holocaust memory is not just finding its footing outside of the Jewish community but is in fact beginning to find a place within national consciousness. These debates revolve around the plans to include a Holocaust gallery in the Canadian War Museum and the ongoing negotiations about the contents of the Canadian Museum of Human Rights (CMHR). When plans surfaced to renovate the CWM in Ottawa during the mid-1990s, many saw it as an opportunity to reinvigorate the museum with architectural additions and an overhaul of its permanent exhibit. Potential contributors to the project expressed interest in having the Holocaust included as part of its new design, and serious consideration was given to including a gallery devoted to the Holocaust; while these intentions began modestly, they inflated so much that the prospected gallery would be the largest exhibit by far. Critics emerged, the most influential of which were war veterans who argued that the Holocaust had nothing to do with Canadian history let alone its military
history. After several years of debate, a subcommittee of the Senate decided that a Holocaust gallery would not be included as part of the museum’s new design, and plans were abandoned in 1998.²⁵

According to A. Dirk Moses, the plans for a Holocaust gallery did not die there, but were transformed into the intention for the CMHR. Since the plans for a CMHR first emerged in the late-1990s, the issue has been volatile. Conceived as a museum to the study of human rights and their violation (read: genocide), it has long been expected that the Holocaust would figure significantly into its permanent exhibit. However, because many understood the museum to have a commemorative function (i.e. to remember certain human rights violations), other groups, particularly Canada’s Ukrainian community, began vying to have their own atrocities enshrined by the museum. Some argued that their atrocities, such as the Holodomor, should be elevated to the status of the Holocaust by receiving their own galleries; others felt that all human rights violations should be included equally without any one receiving favour. The debate has subsequently vacillated between whether the museum should address the Holocaust centrally, the Holocaust and Holodomor equally, all human rights violations equally, or disregard particular atrocities altogether. The latter approach, along with an emphasis on First Nations, appears to be the present choice, although this has resulted in difficulty securing funding and may change.²⁶

From these debates, it is evident that Canadians have begun to experiment with various ways to integrate the Holocaust into their national narrative. This experimentation first manifested as the debate surrounding the CWM, during which consideration was given to whether or not the Holocaust should receive its own gallery. It was decided that the Holocaust did not fit into the nation’s military narrative, and for this reason it was not yet time to remember the Holocaust as a country. One wonders, however, whether the
controversy surrounding the Holocaust gallery was rendered moot by the plans to erect the NHM across the street from the CWM; the anticipated location of the NHM suggests that the Holocaust may become a part of (or adjacent to) Canada’s military narrative after all.

Regardless, the controversies surrounding the CMHR were more fruitful. The debate did not focus on whether or not the Holocaust should be included in the museum, but with how centrally it should be featured and whether it should be placed alongside other atrocities. This was at least the right place to talk about it, and Canadians had finally found the proper forum in which to discuss the Holocaust as a nation: as part of the national narrative on human rights. Thus, if the Holocaust is to be woven into the country’s consciousness, this is one way to do it. Whether the public feels that it is in fact the right time to do so has yet to be determined because, as of my writing, the CMHR has yet to be completed. Of course, the Holocaust did become a part of the national memorial calendar when the Holocaust Memorial Day Act was enacted in 2003. However, a memorial day does not require the same sort of investment – land allocation, design, construction, and maintenance – that a museum or monument requires. In addition, a memorial day often needs to be celebrated at a relevant location, and in this way the need for a physical memorial presupposes the need for a day. The country has yet to integrate the Holocaust into the country’s geography by devoting a physical space to its memory.

What does the history of the development of Holocaust memory in Canada tell us? It provides us with two important pieces of information: first, that Holocaust memory originated within the Jewish community; second, that this memory has expanded and continues to expand into larger social spheres. From its inception until at least 1985, the Holocaust has been the domain of the Jewish community, for it was within Canadian Jewry that Holocaust consciousness first appeared, took root, and ultimately evolved into the
distinct social phenomenon that is now referred to as ‘Holocaust memory.’ In fact, the Jewish community’s involvement in the development of Holocaust memory was so significant that they ultimately came to use the Holocaust as a primary marker of their ethnic identity; Holocaust memory and postwar Canadian Jewry are in many ways inseparable from one another. But Holocaust consciousness was not something that immediately took hold of every Canadian Jew as soon as the war had ended. While there was some awareness of the Holocaust among many facets of Canadian society during the war, this awareness receded almost entirely afterwards so that, for the next fifteen years, the Holocaust was of concern only to a very small segment of the Jewish community: the survivors who had experienced it directly. As these survivors integrated into society and became more influential, their awareness of the Holocaust spread to further realms of their social network, initially to their offspring and family, but later to the entire Jewish community. In recent years, Holocaust consciousness has spread to the national sphere, although this process is still in its early stages and it is unclear to what degree this memory will ultimately penetrate national society.

The movement of Holocaust memory appears to be governed by what one might refer to as a rule of proximity: it begins with those who have the greatest proximity to historical events, but gradually moves outwards to those with a decreasing proximity to those events and the people who experienced them. Morton Weinfeld and John Sigal provide empirical evidence to support this idea. In their study, they compare knowledge of the Holocaust amongst three groups of Montreal Jews: the children of survivors, the children of immigrants who were not survivors, and the children of parents born in North America. They find that knowledge of the Holocaust is consistently greater among the children of survivors than in the other two groups, suggesting that one’s ethnic (familial) proximity to the historical events corresponds to one’s awareness of the Holocaust. That is, Holocaust memory does not
appear randomly distributed throughout society, but follows a distinct pattern. People are socialised into Holocaust memory in such a way that it radiates outward in stages, beginning with those who have a low degree of separation from the events and slowly spreading to those with greater degrees of separation. So far, it does not appear that many groups lose this memory once it has developed (although attrition occurs through mortality), with the consequence that the base of people who share Holocaust consciousness is growing ever larger. And having permeated most of the Jewish community, there seems no reason why this process would stop there.

This understanding of Holocaust memory tells us several things about what it means to create a National Holocaust Monument in Canada, and can help to make several predictions about the continued development of Holocaust memory. First, it tells us that, if Canada wishes to construct a national monument it must transplant Holocaust memory into another social sphere. By demonstrating that Holocaust memory achieved its mature state within the Jewish community, Franklin Bialystok implies that this has been the primary social sphere within which the memory has existed. While Holocaust memory has of course poked its head into public Canadian discourse now and again, it has largely – at least within the Canadian context – remained the purview the Jewish community. If the Canadian government plans to create a national monument to the Holocaust, then this memory must be transplanted from its religio-ethnic context into the national context; that is, it must be moved from the realm of Canadian Jewry into the more encompassing realm of Canadian society.

The implication of this is that Holocaust memory already has begun – or soon will begin – to make the shift from Jewish society to Canadian society, and the forthcoming NHM will function as both a catalyst in and a bi-product of this process. It is difficult to insert an historical event into the national ethos if it has not already sprouted a few roots
there, and the case studies of Austria demonstrate how problematic it can be when Holocaust memory is forced upon an unwilling public. Based on its 1938 annexation by Germany, Austria came to view itself as Hitler’s first victim (Opferstolz) and rejected any memory which suggested that the nation had been complicit in the Holocaust. This mentality endured into the late 20th century, making it difficult to create any public memorial devoted to Jewish persecution which either ignored Austria’s victimhood or actively laid blame on the nation. The realisation of Holocaust monuments – especially Rachel Whiteread’s Nameless Library, erected in 2000 – became incredibly contentious and lacked popular support. In contrast to this, the Canadian government has received overwhelming support for its memorial project, suggesting that the Holocaust has to some degree already been accepted by Canadians and entered the national identity. As this process continues, the NHM will likely function in several ways. By creating a very public and very national discourse on Holocaust memory, the monument should assist in the movement of memory from the Jewish to national sphere; that is, it will be a catalyst in the process by which Holocaust memory is transplanted. Of course, this discourse could also impede the process, although widespread support for the project suggests that this will not be the case. And as a very physical manifestation of memory, the NHM will also function to crystallise the transition of memory from one domain to another; it will also be a by-product of the process. While this process is still in its early stages and the Canadian government has yet to produce a national monument to the Holocaust, the expansion of Holocaust memory to the national realm can be observed on a lesser scale by examining several monuments that already exist in Canada.
The Expansion of Holocaust Memory in Canada: Three Cases

A useful framework for observing the movement of Holocaust memory is one conceived by Tim Cole in which Holocaust monuments are understood to be composed of three elements: politics, place, and poetry. Drawing on the work of James Young and other theorists of collective memory, Cole sees monuments as dynamic entities which – despite (usually) having static forms – interact with the people, events, and other aspects of their surrounding environment. He therefore proposes a model which distils a monument and its milieu into three distinct components, and provides basic research questions with which to address each one. The politics of a monument primarily concern the rationale for its creation and the process through which the memorial has come into existence; when examining the politics of a monument, one is concerned with the questions of what is being remembered, why it is being remembered, and who is responsible for the creation of that memory. The place of a monument is the physical location in which it exists and the way in which that memorial interacts with its physical environment; the primary question to ask is where the memorial is located. The poetry of a monument is the artistic form and the aesthetic features that have been used in its design; to address a monument’s poetry one must first acknowledge it as a representation of events, then ask how those events have been represented and how that representation has been executed.32 By organising one’s analysis around these variables, Cole contends that one can acquire a detailed understanding of a monument and the interpretation of history that it conveys.33

Cole’s framework is particularly useful for mapping the social network within which a monument is situated; with this information, one can track the movement of Holocaust memory within, between, or amongst multiple social groups. To map a monument’s position within a social network, one must begin by asking which social groups are associated with
the politics, place, and poetry of a particular monument. In this way, one might ask which groups are responsible for initiating, realising, and continuing to maintain a monument (politics), which groups have the greatest physical proximity to it (place), and which groups’ symbols and artistic forms have been employed in its design (poetry). With these questions one can map the constellation of groups within which a monument is situated in order to discern whether a memorial is the exclusive property of one community, shared by two or more, or contested amongst several. Furthermore, such an analysis can be used to observe the movement of Holocaust memory over time, either by tracing the evolution of one monument or by comparing several monuments created at different times. The following section will use this approach to conduct a brief analysis of Holocaust memory in Canada by examining three Holocaust monuments produced at different times in Canada: the Ottawa monument dedicated in 1978, the Winnipeg monument dedicated in 1990, and the Halifax monument dedicated in 2011. By applying Cole’s framework to each monument and then ‘connecting the dots,’ I will use these monuments to exemplify the general trajectory of Holocaust memory in Canada.

Ottawa’s Monument, 1978

Though by no means Canada’s first monument, the Holocaust memorial in Ottawa’s Jewish cemetery, dedicated on 7 May 1978, is an early example that illustrates the close bond between Holocaust memory and the Jewish community. Like other memorials, the creation of Ottawa’s monument was a contentious issue, although most of this controversy played out within Ottawa’s Jewish community. Tensions began early on between the newly formed Holocaust Remembrance Committee (HRC) and Ottawa’s long-standing Jewish Community Council (JCC); while the HRC sought to have a full monument erected in the
local cemetery, the JCC would only tolerate the placement of a commemorative plaque at the community centre. After several years of debate, the community leadership finally relented and allowed the HRC to build its monument. Following tensions developed in respect to the monument’s location. Less than a month before it was to be dedicated, the JCC reported that, of the $50,000 it would cost to build and maintain the monument, not even $31,000 had been raised. When Gilbert Greenberg, president of the JCC, inquired as to why more had not been raised, he found that “a number of people...did not contribute because they disagreed with the site selected for the Memorial in the public square at the Jewish Community Cemetery.” Apparently some members of the Jewish community felt that the monument should be located more centrally in the city, closer to Ottawa’s downtown core. Greenberg’s public response was that “Most of the people involved are survivors who lost family in concentration camps. Unlike the rest of us who can visit graves of loved ones each year, they had no place to commune with their departed. The monument was conceived as their symbolic ‘matzeivah’.” While some believed that the monument should be a visible part of the city’s geography, others felt that it should function primarily as a part of Jewish mourning and did not need a central location. Ultimately, it was the commemorative needs of the survivors that took precedent and resulted in the monument’s final location.

The monument was erected not in a ‘public’ area per se, but on the grounds of the city’s Jewish cemetery. The cemetery itself is located significantly outside of the city’s core and, while it sits alongside a major highway, it is not a densely populated area (the street does not even have a proper sidewalk). The monument, however, is located quite centrally within the cemetery, in an area free of other burial markers and with a pathway leading directly to it from the entrance. Although access is not restricted to Jews, its peripheral location in the city suggests that one would not stumble across it by accident; most visits to
the cemetery are probably planned, and it seems unlikely that many non-Jews will encounter the monument directly.\textsuperscript{37} Once in the cemetery, though, it seems unlikely that anyone would be able to avoid the monument, for its size and placement draw attention toward it. The memorial may have faced opposition in its early life, but its prominent placement suggests that, by the late 1970s, Holocaust memory was playing a central role in the life of Ottawa’s Jewish community.

The monument’s aesthetic features also reveal the centrality of the Jewish experience to the memory of the Holocaust (see Figure 1 in Appendix B). Apart from being noticeably taller, the Holocaust memorial does not stand out significantly from other matzevot (burial markers) in the cemetery and is in many ways a traditional Jewish burial marker. All dates inscribed on the monument are presented according to both the Hebrew and Gregorian calendars, and most of the monument’s text is written in Hebrew and English. The only exception to this is the Shema prayer, which is placed centrally on the face of the monument and appears only in Hebrew. Furthermore, a number of other distinctly Jewish symbols are used: a Magen David (Star of David, or Jewish star) appears on each side, and what seems to be a (stone-carved interpretation of a) ner tamid (eternal flame, traditionally found above the ark containing the holy Torah scrolls in synagogues) sits atop the entire structure. This design was made public around the time that the fundraising campaign began in late 1977,\textsuperscript{38} and it does not appear as though there were any major objections to it apart from the location. Artistically and symbolically, the monument is thoroughly steeped within the Jewish commemorative tradition.

Ottawa’s monument is almost exclusively situated within the purview of the Jewish community. The politics through which it was realised were almost entirely internal to Ottawa’s Jewish community, the place in which it is located makes it central to the Jewish
consciousness but peripheral to the national (and regional) one, and its poetics employ symbols that are central to the Jewish tradition. Though nothing prevents it from entering a broader discourse, such a thing is unlikely given that it is located in a place that is only marginally public and that it uses particularly Jewish symbolism; many non-Jewish Canadians would simply find it obscure and largely meaningless. The monument therefore does not stray outside the Jewish community, nor does it attempt to disseminate Holocaust memory to a non-Jewish audience. It does, however, disseminate Holocaust memory. At the time of its creation, Holocaust commemoration was not yet a chief concern for Ottawa Jewry and the monument was of interest mostly to the HRC, which had yet to be fully integrated into the established community; the monument would likely have helped spread Holocaust consciousness to the wider Jewish sphere. So Ottawa’s monument does show the expansion of Holocaust memory, but it does not show it expanding anywhere but to other members of the Jewish community. In later monuments, however, one can see Holocaust memory as it begins to creep into larger social networks.

Winnipeg’s Monument, 1990

The Holocaust monument in Winnipeg, dedicated on 16 September 1990, is similar to Ottawa’s monument in many ways except for one important distinction: location. Symbolically and artistically, both monuments use similar tropes, although Winnipeg’s use of Jewish imagery is more complex (see Figure 2 in Appendix B). Whereas Ottawa’s monument uses the Magen David, Winnipeg’s takes the star as its structural form: the foundation is set in the shape of a Jewish star, and seven granite slabs are positioned on it to create a three-dimensional, broken star. The monument uses other Jewish iconography such as the menorah (nine-branched candelabrum) and what appears to be an Aron Kodesh (Holy
Ark; the niche in a synagogue where the holy Torah scrolls are stored, generally on the eastern wall). The monument’s text appears in English, Hebrew, and Yiddish, although the former appears to be the prevailing tongue; some text is presented in English with no translation. Designed somewhat later than Ottawa’s, this monument also includes several tropes characteristic of mature Holocaust memorials such as a list of concentration/death camps and a brief definition of the Holocaust. However, arguably the only major aesthetic difference between the two memorials is that, whereas Ottawa’s looks much like a burial marker, Winnipeg’s is designed in a more contemporary artistic style. Indeed, whereas it is difficult to find any indication of who designed Ottawa’s monument, the press ensured that the public was aware that the architect Alec Katz was responsible for Winnipeg’s. As important as these aesthetics are, there is still one aspect of the design which stands out from the others: its list of names.

Although it has been one of the biggest things keeping the monument from completion, the list of names is the very thing which roots the memorial in the community. Carved into each granite slab are hundreds of names, each one representing a victim of the Holocaust whose family lives in Manitoba. At the time of its dedication, the list included more than 3,700 names, although it is an ongoing project and Manitobans can continue to submit the names of their relatives. According to media reports, compiling this list has been one of the more difficult aspects of the monument. Failing to collect sufficient names to fill the monument during the planning stages, the Jewish Council thrice extended the deadline for the submission of names. Once the monument was unveiled, one of the main concerns was that those who had submitted names would complain about spelling because a number of them had been transliterated from Polish or Yiddish. Even today, there seems to be continued difficulty with collecting enough names to justify having the new ones inscribed.
But while this list has been an ongoing struggle, it has been integral in shaping the monument’s identity. The massive list is so prominent that the memorial is not so much a monument of stone than a monument of names. While names play an important role in Jewish tradition – and in Holocaust commemoration – they also play an important role in tying the monument to its landscape. By inviting Manitobans to submit the names of their murdered relatives, the monument entreats the community to become actively involved in the commemorative process; the monument is shaped and reshaped by those around it, and in this way becomes a regional effort. That is, it is not just Jews who are responsible for the memorial, but Jews who reside in a particular part of the country. However, this is not the only thing that links memory to place.

What most sets this monument apart from others is that it is located on the grounds of Manitoba’s provincial legislature in downtown Winnipeg. Although it was both initiated and funded by the Winnipeg JCC, they worked with the provincial government to have their memorial erected on the vast lawn that surrounds the provincial legislative building. The lawn itself is riddled with other monuments, and big enough that most of them are hidden from at least some perspectives, but the land itself is in the core of the city and, indeed, the heart of the province. In this very visible and very public area, the monument becomes a physical part of the provincial landscape and thrusts Holocaust memory into public discourse: when the Jewish community is reminded of the monument, they feel as though they are an integrated part of public life; when visitors wander the grounds, they are likely to see it and perceive the Holocaust (and Jewish community) as having an important role in the provincial history; and whenever a Yom HaShoah memorial services takes place, observers flock simultaneously to the site of the Jewish memorial as well as the seat of government. If it were not for its physical location, the memorial would be largely indistinguishably from
other, exclusively Jewish memories of the Holocaust, and it is this location that makes all the difference.

Winnipeg’s memorial is still very much the memorial property of the Jewish community, but one which motions towards the possibility of Holocaust memory spreading into other spheres. The monument’s design and much of its politics are distinctly Jewish, and the memory that it presents is still a very Jewish one. Had it been located in a Jewish cemetery or community centre, there would be no reason to consider it much different than Ottawa’s monument. But it is located in a public space, and not just any public space, but what is arguably the most public place in the entire province. This has a dual function: it indicates to the Jewish community that they are an accepted and integral part of the provincial society; and it reveals that, by accepting this community, Manitobans have begun to accept the Holocaust as part of their provincial narrative. Although this monument is “the first in Canada to be established on public grounds,” it is no longer the only one; Albertans have followed suit by also erecting a Holocaust monument on the grounds of their provincial legislature in Edmonton on 19 April 2003. Memories such as these may have sprouted in the Jewish consciousness, but have since been transplanted into Canadian soil; they suggest that Holocaust memory is still primarily the purview of the Jewish community, but also anticipates that this may not be the case for long. But before it can fully take root in national consciousness, this memory must be transformed in such a way that makes it meaningful to the Canadian public.

Halifax’s Monument, 2011

The monument dedicated in Halifax on 20 January 2011 is particularly worthy of study because it shows how Holocaust memory has begun to penetrate not only Canadian
consciousness but also the global one, all while remaining rooted in the Jewish experience. Known as the *Wheel of Conscience*, this monument is unlike the others in that it is not an all-encompassing memory of the Holocaust but is rather devoted to one particular aspect: the *MS St. Louis*. The journey of the *St. Louis* took place in 1939 when the ship, which was carrying mostly Jewish refugees from Europe, sought entry first to Cuba, then the United States, and finally Canada. Systematically denied by all three, it was forced to return to Europe where 254 of the 937 passengers were ultimately killed in the Holocaust. What is so significant about this journey – the so-called ‘Voyage of the Damned’ – is that it has become a particularly Canadian memory which is often seen as emblematic of Canada’s role in the Holocaust (this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3). The creation of a monument to this memory is therefore an important stage in the development of Holocaust memory, for not only is the *Wheel* the first monument to this particular event, but it may also be one of the only Canadian monuments which takes a distinctly Canadian approach to Holocaust commemoration.

The *Wheel of Conscience* is similar to the monuments in Ottawa and Winnipeg in that it is a product of the Jewish community, but differs in the degree to which it moves beyond this point of origin. Officially, the *Wheel* is a collaboration between the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC): the CJC took the initiative to commission a memorial for the *St. Louis*, organised the design competition which collected and reviewed approximately two dozen submissions, and selected the final design for the memorial; once selected, the project received $500,000 in federal funding through the CIC’s Community Historical Recognition Program. The design ultimately selected by the CJC was one submitted by Daniel Libeskind who, in addition to being a world-renowned postmodern architect, is also well known as a child of survivors and for having designed
other Holocaust-inspired works such as the Jewish museum in Berlin. So while the monument is officially a collective effort between the Jewish and Canadian communities, the nation’s primary role was to make the project possible, while it was the Jewish community who was responsible for its content and design.

The physical location of the monument also helps move the memory of the St. Louis beyond the Jewish sphere, causing it to penetrate into the national and global ones. While the monument is not fixed in place and can be moved, since its unveiling in January 2011 it has resided at the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 – the historic site through which many immigrants entered the country during much of the 20th century. By placing the monument at this site, not only is the St. Louis and the plight of European Jewry seen as part of the Canadian narrative, but it also acknowledges Canada’s role as an actor in the global community. At this site of immigration, the Holocaust becomes an interlocutor between Canada and the rest of the world; Holocaust memory is the adhesive which binds Canada to global society. It is worth noting, however, that at the time of my personal visit to Pier 21, the monument was backed into a discreet corner of the museum in such a way that it could only be viewed from one direction and the reverse could not be seen. So while it is recognised as a part of Canada’s narrative of immigration, the memory of the St. Louis is evidently a less important and somewhat occluded part of this narrative.

The way in which the Wheel of Conscience links the Jewish Holocaust, Canada, and the global community is further reflected in the monument’s aesthetic design (see Figure 3 in Appendix B). The primary trope used by the memorial is a set of four interlocking gears which read, from smallest to largest: hatred, racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism. As each gear turns, so must the others in such a way that none of these manifestations of intolerance are separate from the others. This configuration is noteworthy because it acknowledges the
Holocaust as a particularly Jewish event while simultaneously admitting that it is related to other forms of discrimination; the Holocaust does not promote either a Jewish ethic or a humanist one, for the memorial does not see the particular and universal as mutually exclusive categories but rather as aspects of one another. The idea that the particular and the universal are related and interdependent categories – one of the main theses of Levy and Sznaider’s analysis of Holocaust memory and globalisation⁴⁸ – is an important one to which I will return in the Chapter 4. Overall, the monument’s design is distinctly secular: it renders the journey of the *St. Louis* in starkly historical detail, and employs only the English language (not only are Hebrew and Yiddish avoided, but French is also conspicuously absent). The only particularly Jewish feature of the monument’s design is the list of names which appears (or would appear, if the monument were not in a corner) inscribed on its reverse side, which includes each of the 937 passengers onboard. While vestiges of its Jewish roots can be seen, the monument’s design does a great deal to make the *St. Louis* a humanist memory.

The *Wheel of Conscience* rests carefully on the boundary between the Jewish and Canadian spheres, and even enters the global one at times. Not only does this Haligonian monument occupy these three communities simultaneously, but occasionally uses the memory of the Jewish Holocaust as a way to mediate between the national and global narratives. But what is most perplexing is that, despite being shared by three groups, the *Wheel* is not a contested space: it exists harmoniously within them all, and unlike the CMHR, no one group is vying for exclusive ownership over its memory. In fact, it seems that the monument is effective precisely because it belongs to multiple communities, for it is only useful as a Canadian memory because it is also a Jewish one, and vice versa; it is very much a product of Canadian multiculturalism. That the *Wheel* has remained relatively uncontested
has much to do with the way it treats the particularity and universality of the Holocaust. Rather than promoting an ethic that is either particularly Jewish or universally humanist, it sees each as intimately bound up with the other; antisemitism is only an aspect of racism, both of which are in turn aspects of the larger phenomenon of hatred. Neither antisemitism, xenophobia, racism, nor hatred is a more essential part of the equation, for each gear drives the others in such a way that, while hatred fuels antisemitism, antisemitism also feeds back into hatred. This monument represents an important shift in the state of Holocaust memory in Canada for, while keeping it rooted in the Jewish community, the monument also moves memory from the Jewish sphere into the national one and beyond. This may be due in part to the fact that the Wheel of Conscience embodies a particularly Canadian memory, but I suspect that it is also a product of the expansion that characterises national memory. It seems likely that the Wheel is only an early example of a type of monument that will become increasingly common as Canada moves through the 21st century.

These three monuments confirm that the trajectory of Holocaust memory in Canada is centrifugal, with Holocaust consciousness gradually penetrating further social spheres. The Ottawa monument unveiled in 1978 – notably the same year in which the Holocaust miniseries debuted on NBC – conveys a memory of the Holocaust that is rooted in the Jewish experience and does not exit, nor even attempt to move outside, this community. Winnipeg’s monument, erected 12 years later, presents a memory of the Holocaust which is also the purview of the Jewish community although, through its placement on the grounds of the Manitoba legislature, has been inserted into public discourse to play at least a minor role in the Canadian narrative. And the monument at Halifax’s Pier 21, erected a further 21 years later, promotes a memory of the Holocaust that was initiated by and designed within the Jewish community, but then thrust deeply into the national narrative and has even begun to
permeate the global realm. From these examples, it is evident that Holocaust monuments in Canada have generally followed the trajectory of Holocaust memory, with monuments gradually becoming the purview of larger and more distant communities. Now, in the second decade of the 21st century, Holocaust memory has entered Canadian consciousness, although it does not yet play a major role and remains very much rooted in the Jewish community. Admittedly, these are only three examples of many such monuments, and come from dramatically different regions of the country. Not only would an exhaustive analysis of all these monuments prove nearly impossible, but it would also be quite useless as the majority of these memorials resemble Ottawa’s 1978 monument; Canada has yet to develop the diversity of memorials that one observes in the United States, so a selected subset is preferable for analysis. The variety of geographic regions covered in this analysis, however, demonstrates that Holocaust memory is indeed a phenomenon that is not limited only to Toronto and Montreal. While in-depth studies of Holocaust memory in each city may yield different results – especially when one considers that Winnipeg is one of the primary centres of Jewish activity in Canada – it seems reasonable to believe that a monument such as the Wheel of Conscience could not have been produced in Winnipeg, Montreal, or any other Canadian city in 1978, or even 1990. Dramatically different memorials have been produced by different Jewish communities, but the narrative required to bring the Wheel into existence – a narrative largely dependent on the publication of None Is Too Many and Canada’s increasing awareness of its role in global society – has developed only recently.

Conclusion

The development of Holocaust memory has been a long and complicated process, and although this memory has matured into a distinct entity, this is no indication that its
evolution is over. Quite the contrary: the trajectory of Holocaust memory implies that its development is an ongoing process that shows no signs of slowing. While the particular shape it will take is heavily influenced by domestic and international events and is therefore largely unpredictable, the actual movement of this memory has followed a fairly predictable pattern. It spreads according to proximity, continually expanding to those with an increasingly greater distance from the historical events and those who experienced them. At the turn of the 21st century, Holocaust memory has spread throughout mainstream Canadian Jewry and, while it has made minor forays outside this sphere, still remains the purview of the Jewish community. Significantly, the dynamics of Holocaust memory are crystallised in monumental form so that, by studying these monuments, the state of memory can be observed quite concretely. From a monument, one is able to discern its position within a social network, the general form of Holocaust memory at a given time, and may even be able to anticipate future shifts in Holocaust memory.

Thus, Canada’s forthcoming NHM has several implications for the state of Holocaust memory, and there are several predictions that can be made about it. First, such a monument implies that Holocaust memory is already tolerated and accepted to some degree by Canadians; otherwise, the project would not have found such fertile ground. Moreover, the NHM will help push the Holocaust even further into Canadian consciousness, where it will likely be integrated into the national narrative. Holocaust memory will not remain unaffected by its transposition from the Jewish sphere into the national one, however, and it is liable to be transformed in the process. The final product is unlikely to resemble Ottawa’s memorial, and may be more like Winnipeg’s monument which uses Jewish symbolism but is located in a public area. More likely, however, is that it will resemble the Wheel of Conscience (in concept, not necessarily design), which is seen as a collaborative effort between the Jewish
and national communities, and uses a modern artistic idiom that discards most overt Jewish symbolism. The way in which the NHM will most likely resemble the *Wheel*, though, is in the way it dissolves the boundary between the particular and universal and does not restrict itself to the national sphere but instead extends into the global community. While it is impossible to guess what this forthcoming monument might look like (especially since it will be the result of a design competition), it is reasonable to hypothesise about how the NHM might function. The monument must acknowledge the particular tragedy while simultaneously making it relevant to all Canadians, weave it into the Canadian narrative, and outwardly promote the Holocaust as a Canadian event. In fact, the particular function of the monument need not be speculative, for there already exists a great deal of discourse surrounding it. Not only can one anticipate how it will function in the future, but we can observe how it already functions in the present.
Chapter 3

The Canadianisation of Holocaust Memory

It would be misleading to suggest that the Holocaust has not yet entered the national realm, in particular considering the magnitude of this event in Western consciousness in recent decades. As a 1965 speech by Prime Minister Pearson indicates, the Holocaust is something that Canadians have long been aware of even if it has not played a central role in their national narrative.\(^1\) Still, the Holocaust has penetrated the national sphere and become increasingly more visible in Canadian discourse and public life. As this chapter will discuss, the Holocaust and its memory entered wider Canadian consciousness in two stages: through the legal system in the 1980s, and the educational system in the 1990s. During the 1980s, the Holocaust became the subject of national dialogue when the provincial and federal governments began prosecuting Holocaust deniers and Nazi war criminals according to the \textit{Canadian Criminal Code}, with two cases of denial ultimately being heard by the Supreme Court. Awareness that these deniers and war criminals were present in Canadian society triggered a widespread public response, and it was through this reaction that the legal discourse on the Holocaust was transformed into an educational one. In an attempt to protect the integrity of Holocaust memory from deniers, public school curricula began to mandate teaching of the Holocaust during the 1990s. Thus, it was during the final two decades of the 20\(^{th}\) century that Holocaust memory began to emerge within Canadian consciousness. As this memory took an increasingly prominent place in the national mind, it became increasingly ‘Canadianised’ – that is, given a distinct dynamic based on its national context. Now, with the creation of the National Holocaust Monument in the second decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century, the Holocaust is moving further into the national sphere and becoming further Canadianised.
The present chapter will consider Canada’s NHM as a continuation of the national discourse on the Holocaust and Holocaust memory. To show how this Canadianised memory has evolved, I will first review the process by which Holocaust memory emerged within legal and educational discourse, and show how the NHM is presented as an extension of it. Then, using the social constructivist approach outlined in Chapter 1, I will examine the debates surrounding the NHM to understand how this discourse attempts to frame the Holocaust as a Canadian memory. Focusing on parliamentary debates, official speeches and press releases, and the text of the National Holocaust Monument Act – and also considering media documents and interviews conducted with several individuals associated with the NHM project – I look for points at which Canada and the Holocaust appear to intersect. I identify three primary ways by which this intersection occurs: historically, politically, and ethically. Historically, the discourse presents Canada’s military and immigration practices during the 1930s and 40s as having overlapped with the Nazi persecution of European Jewry; politically, it frames the Holocaust as a consequence of the modern nation-state and suggests that, as a nation-state itself, Canada is obliged to remember this event and to prevent similar atrocities in the future; and ethically, these debates present the Holocaust as an event which embodied non-Canadian values while Holocaust memory is viewed as something which promotes Canadian values. Each of these discursive themes uses an aspect of Canadian culture or society to create a bridge between the nation and the memory of the Holocaust, and in doing so produces a distinctly national form of Holocaust memory. From this analysis, I argue that the NHM and its related discourse function to bring the Holocaust into the national sphere and, in doing so, have resulted in a Canadianisation of Holocaust memory.
It was in the 1980s and early 1990s that the highly-publicised trials of two Holocaust deniers were taking place in Canada and capturing the attention of its citizens. In 1984, Ernst Zündel, a German expatriate living in Toronto, was charged under section 177 (now section 181) of Canada’s *Criminal Code* for the publication and distribution of *Did Six Million Really Die?*, a tract which used pseudo-academic language to argue that the Holocaust had never happened. In the same year, James Keegstra, a high-school teacher in Eckville, Alberta, was charged under section 281.2 (now section 319.2) of the *Criminal Code* for teaching a revisionist version of history to his grade 9 and 12 civics classes; this history taught of an international Jewish conspiracy for world domination, and, among other things, claimed that the Holocaust was a hoax perpetrated by world Jewry as part of this plan. In 1985, both were found guilty by their provincial courts, and both appealed their convictions under section 2.b of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* which guarantees the “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including of the press and other media of communication.” Through a series of trials and appeals, both cases were ultimately brought before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). In 1990, the court upheld Keegstra’s original conviction while, in 1992, overturning Zündel’s. By the end of these trials, the highest court in the land had made two rulings on denial in Canada: by denying the Holocaust within a public school, in addition to making other defamatory statements against Jews, Keegstra was guilty of a criminal offense; for publishing materials which explicitly denied the Holocaust, Zündel was protected by his constitutional freedom of expression and was not guilty.

Because of their prominence in Canadian law and media, these cases began a national discourse on the Holocaust. During Zündel’s initial trial, the prosecution’s strategy was to
use survivors, historians, and documentary evidence to refute each of the claims made by *Did Six Million?* and thereby demonstrate that Zündel was in fact guilty of distributing ‘false news.’ The proceedings took the form of a ‘debate’ in which the prosecution attempted to show that the Holocaust had happened while the defense sought to prove that it had not, in effect putting the Holocaust itself on trial. Zündel’s theatrics caused the trial to balloon into a media sensation, although the trial was only a crescendo in his campaign; he had already received a significant amount of attention for his very public denial of the Holocaust, and his flair for the dramatic only caused the trial to become more of a spectacle than it already was.

For teaching of an international Jewish conspiracy, Keegstra was charged with the propagation of antisemitism in general, and, unlike Zuendel, was only guilty of Holocaust denial *inter alia*. However, the Keegstra affair was a massive media event which entered national consciousness in May 1983 with the nationwide broadcast of the documentary ‘Lessons in Hate’ on CBC’s *The Journal*. According to David Bercuson and Douglas Wertheimer, it was the affair’s success as a media event which ultimately propelled it into the legal sphere. Although both trials were significant legal cases, it was also their publicity in the media which brought them to the public eye.

At the same time, criminal charges were being pressed against Nazi war criminals who were now living in Canada, in particular Imre Finta, a commander of the gendarmerie in Hungary who had immigrated to Canada in 1948 and obtained citizenship in 1956. In response to the Deschênes Commission’s report on the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada, the *Criminal Code* was amended in 1987 to allow the legal prosecution of individuals suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The following year, Imre Finta was charged under this section for the concentration, robbery, and deportation of 8,617 Hungarian Jews from the city of Szeged. In 1990, a jury found Finta not-guilty of the charges
and, in 1994, he became a free man when the SCC dismissed the Crown’s appeal. Although he was acquitted, the case made Canadians aware that their country had become a haven for war criminals who now lived free lives despite their past crimes. While the prosecution of war criminals such as Finta did not achieve the media sensationalism that surrounded the trials of Zündel and Keegstra, it nonetheless became an important part of the legal discourse on the Holocaust. Because of its emphasis on crimes against humanity, however, the trial seems to have become more significant as a part of the national discourse on human rights rather than on the Holocaust. It has undoubtedly helped to bring the Holocaust into Canadian consciousness, but its impact has not been as significant as with Zündel and Keegstra.

Together, the trials of Zündel and Keegstra, and to a lesser degree Finta, launched the Holocaust into Canadian consciousness. Although only Zündel’s case dealt centrally with the Holocaust, the trials of Zündel and Keegstra were both major media events that captured the attention of Canadians all across the country. The fact that both ultimately became SCC cases only increased their visibility and enhanced their contours as distinctly Canadian affairs. But because the Holocaust entered national consciousness largely via its denial, it did not emerge as something that Canadians necessarily wanted to talk about but as something which was under attack and needed to be discussed if the integrity of its memory was to be maintained.

**Holocaust Memory in Public Education: the 1990s**

The visibility of deniers in the law and media created the impression that the Holocaust was under attack, and for many it seemed that the best counterattack was education. The Zündel affair contributed to this perception because, at least during the initial
proceedings, it was the Holocaust itself which was the subject of the trial; its very factuality became something to be debated. The Keegstra affair contributed to it because his outlet for antisemitic propaganda had been a public secondary school, an institution intended to shape the minds of young Canadians. The net effect was to create a perception, primarily within the Jewish community but also in the broader public, that the integrity of the Holocaust was being undermined. For many, the solution was clear: the best defense against an institutional attack on the Holocaust was to launch an institutional counterattack by institutionalising Holocaust education in Canadian schools. Thus began the initiatives, lobbying, and other programmes that would ultimately give rise to the inclusion of the Holocaust in academic curricula. The relationship between these phenomena is supported by a 2000 survey by B’nai Brith Canada, in conjunction with the Department of Canadian Heritage, in which a significant number of school boards reported that they began teaching the Holocaust during the early 1990s. This means that the onset of Holocaust education in public schools overlaps with the climax of the Zündel and Keegstra affairs; although this correlation does not mean that one necessarily caused the other, it does suggest they are related. However, much research on the subject suggests that it was in fact the trial of deniers that set the stage for Holocaust education in Canadian schools.

While Holocaust education has yet to pervade the public schools fully, it has made significant steps in that direction. Perhaps the biggest difficulties with institutionalising the Holocaust – like any subject – within Canadian schools is that education falls under provincial jurisdiction, making it virtually impossible to create any sort of nation-wide curricular requirements. To ensure that the Holocaust is taught in ‘Canadian schools,’ then, each province and territory must be influenced separately. There has been some success achieving this so far. In the B’nai Brith study, surveys and questionnaires were sent to the
ministry of education in each province and territory, 430 school boards, and 2500 principles. Although response rates were somewhat low, and the sample size was correspondingly small, the study provides a glimpse into Holocaust education at the turn of the century. It found that the ‘Holocaust’ (or related concepts, such as the ‘Nazi Persecution of the Jews’) was included in the provincial high school curricula in Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, although in each province it was treated as an ‘optional’ topic. In British Columbia, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, teachers’ guides or resource kits on Holocaust pedagogy were provided by the provincial ministry and distributed to school boards throughout the province. In addition, several school boards in other provinces indicated that they integrated the Holocaust into their curricula even though it is not mandated by the province. While this study has its limitations, it shows that the Holocaust has to some degree become a part of public education even if it has not yet become a staple for Canadian schools.

The relationship between Holocaust memory and education has been embedded in the language of school curricula in Canada. In Ontario, where the Holocaust has become a mandatory part of the high school curriculum and is taught to every student in the province, the curriculum does not express interest in the Holocaust per se but rather with “the impact in Canada of the experience and memory of the Holocaust”; the province is not so much concerned with the facts pertaining to the historical events but with the memory of these events and their impact on Canadian society. The curriculum gives several examples of this ‘impact,’ one of which is the “policy dealing with hate crimes.” While this reference to ‘hate crimes’ is vague, it seems reasonable to conclude that it refers in part to the trials of Zündel and Keegstra. By favouring memory over history, the Ontario curriculum appears
less concerned with the persecution and destruction of European Jewry than it does with the denial of these events in contemporary Canada.

A more explicit example of this can be found in British Columbia’s high school curriculum, where knowledge of the Holocaust is a mandatory part of History 12, which is an optional course in the B.C. curriculum. But whereas the Holocaust plays only a small and ambiguous role in the Ontario curriculum, it makes up a significant and clearly defined portion of this course. History 12 surveys major political events in the western world since 1919, focusing on the rise of totalitarianism, World War II and the Holocaust, the Cold War, and the post-colonial world. According to the ‘prescribed learning outcomes,’ the ability to “analyse the significance of the Holocaust” is an integral component of this course. The curriculum includes a teacher’s guide which suggests the ways in which this and other outcomes can be assessed. To ensure that students have acquired a well-rounded understanding of the Holocaust, it recommends a ‘jigsaw activity’ in which students are divided into five or six groups; each group is asked to research a different aspect of the subject and present their findings to the class. Suggested topics include the history of European antisemitism, the mechanics of the Final Solution, the development of universal human rights, and, finally, “Denial of the Holocaust.” For the group researching denial, it is suggested that they examine various forms of denial, its relationship to antisemitism and other ideologies, as well as key individuals, of which ‘Ernst Zundel’ is mentioned by name. In this way, the B.C. curriculum is a direct link between the trial of Holocaust deniers and state-mandated Holocaust education in Canada. Unlike in Ontario, denial is not a peripheral concern, but is considered one of the key themes that must be addressed when teaching the Holocaust; it is given the same emphasis as the rise of Nazism or the implementation of the Final Solution. It may not be mandatory, but it is presumably a popular course, for it is the
only senior-level history course – and one of few social studies courses – offered in the province. History 12 illustrates one of the deepest and most significant inroads that the Holocaust has made into Canadian public education.

A New Canadian Discourse: the National Holocaust Monument

The NHM as an Extension of Legal and Educational Discourse

The public speeches, press releases, and parliamentary debates around the forthcoming NHM represent an extension of existing national discourse on the Holocaust, in particular public Holocaust education in Canada. The NHM is occasionally viewed as a reaction to Holocaust denial, although it is usually viewed as a response to denial at the international level rather than to the Canadian trials of Zündel and Keegstra.18 This connection is not surprising, for legal discourse metamorphosed into educational discourse during the 1990s, and legal, educational, and monumental discourses are treated not as discrete streams running parallel to one another, but rather as a single current which weaves one into the other to create an evolving memory of the Holocaust. Thus, the NHM has tended to be framed in relation to public education, with the monument being considered at times an introduction to, supplement to, and extension of Holocaust education in Canada. The latter case is exemplified during the Senate’s study of Bill C-442, An Act to establish a National Holocaust Monument. During this session, Senator Demers asks Tim Uppal, the Conservative MP who introduced the bill, about his plans “to educate the people...outside the Jewish population.”19 Uppal responds by saying that “Just the construction of this [monument] will be part of the education for the country.”20 The NHM has been situated as part of the Canadian memory of the Holocaust which has been evolving since the mid-1980s.
One of the most elaborate examples of the NHM being woven into educational discourse appears in James Moore’s speech which he delivered at the announcement ceremony for the Development Council, the organisation that is responsible for overseeing the creation of the NHM. As the Minister of Canadian Heritage, Moore has been working closely with DFAIT on the forthcoming monument, and was therefore invited to give a speech at the announcement of the Development Council, which took place in Ottawa on 2 April 2012. After Tim Uppal introduced the four members of the council, Moore delivered a speech in which he expressed his personal belief in the value of learning about the Holocaust. He begins the address by contrasting the importance of Holocaust education with the extent to which history is taught in Canada’s public schools:

A sad fact but an important fact for those of us who are – count ourselves as champion in the teaching of history, not only Canadian history but world history, did you know that in the 13 provinces and territories of Canada in only three is it required that a student take a history class before they graduate from high school? For those of you who are wondering where your kids are going to school, those provinces are Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. In only three of the 13. And the dearth of understanding of Canadians about Canadian history, even local history, let alone world history or human history is atrocious and something for which we should all be ashamed.\textsuperscript{21}

While praising the value of historical education in general, Moore also establishes history as the disciplinary framework within which the Holocaust is taught most effectively.\textsuperscript{22} By acknowledging that the study of history is mandatory in only three provinces, Moore implies that Holocaust education is not available to (i.e. not required for) high school students in the majority of Canada’s provinces and territories. That is, if students are to learn about the Holocaust, they are likely to do so only in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick; at most, Holocaust education within the ideal pedagogical framework can be mandated only in these provinces. Of course, Moore ignores the fact that the Holocaust may be, and often is, taught effectively in other disciplines such as social studies.\textsuperscript{23}
Moore sees the NHM as playing a key role in the improvement of historical education in general, and Holocaust education in particular. As the Minister of Canadian Heritage, he views the various monuments, museums, and historical sites in the National Capital Region not as tourist attractions but as a means “to learn a little bit about Ottawa’s past, about Canada’s past, [and] also learn a lot about our human past.” The addition of a Holocaust monument to this landscape will consequently interact with similar programmes “to teach our kids greater understanding of our past, so that people can understand...what happened at Westerbork, what happened at Bergen Belsen.” The NHM should not, however, be seen as a replacement for adequate education but rather as a precursor to it; while the Holocaust is not yet taught in all thirteen provinces and territories, Moore hints that this monument may be a factor in the creation of “the programming that we hope to see in schools.” As a way to remedy the unsatisfactory state of Holocaust education in Canada, the NHM becomes an extension of the public school system itself. By framing the NHM in this way, Moore directly links the future monument to Holocaust education in Canada’s public schools.

**Canadianising Holocaust Memory**

Holocaust memory has already entered the national sphere as a legal and educational event, and has become such an acceptable topic that there have been few complaints about the government’s proposal to erect a monument to its memory. However, the discourse surrounding this monument confirms that it has yet to penetrate the Canadian ethos fully. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is clause 5(1) of the NHMA which indicates that the Development Council is to be selected from “members of the public who possess a strong interest in, connection to, or familiarity with the Holocaust,” which suggests that currently
only a subset of Canadians have a direct connection of the Holocaust. While the Act itself is not specific regarding who these ‘members of the public’ are, it is clear from other contexts that this clause refers to Jewish Canadians. For example, during the clause-by-clause study of bill C-442, Brian Jean and Joe Volpe argue about which party is “listening to the Jewish community”,\textsuperscript{28} each MP contends that he is the true champion of the Jewish community and that his opponent has not listened to the community’s wishes.\textsuperscript{29} Despite their conflicting views, both attempt to create a bill that will be accepted by the Jewish community because each recognises that the monument must satisfy Canadian Jewry first and foremost. This attitude is dominant throughout most of the discourse, and it is only in rare occasions – such as during Joe Volpe’s ‘filibuster’ during the clause-by-clause study\textsuperscript{30} – that the Holocaust is framed as something that already belongs to all Canadians. Apart from these exceptions, Holocaust memory is almost unanimously seen as a Jewish concern that is not yet of interest to Canadian society.

One of the NHM’s main functions is to integrate Holocaust memory into Canadian consciousness, for the purpose of a national monument is to make its subject matter a national concern. In its preamble, the NHMA states directly that a national memorial is required “to ensure that the Holocaust continues to have a permanent place in our nation’s consciousness and memory”;\textsuperscript{31} as part of the original bill, this phrase was echoed almost verbatim in both Houses, such as in MP Glenn Thibeault’s response speech in the House of Commons\textsuperscript{32} and in Senator Yonah Martin’s sponsorship speech to the Senate.\textsuperscript{33} While the word ‘continues’ seems to suggest that the Holocaust is already a Canadian memory, this may only indicate that it has been given ‘a permanent place in our nation’s consciousness’ through legal and educational discourse. With these discourses, the Holocaust has indeed become a part of Canadian consciousness, although its position is still only peripheral; one
function of the monument is to extend this discourse and thereby give the Holocaust a more central role in Canadian society. This is confirmed by Martin’s speech in which she modifies the bill’s phrasing by conspicuously leaving out the word ‘continues’ and instead demanding that “The Holocaust must have a permanent place in our nation’s consciousness and memory.” Other supporters rely less on the actual phrasing of the bill, arguing that the ‘gravity’ of this memory requires the monument to sit at the nation’s gravitational centre in Ottawa; Roger Gaudet goes even further, suggesting it should be located as close to Parliament Hill as possible. The goal of making the Holocaust into a Canadian memory is one of the most pronounced discursive themes surrounding the NHM, with many sponsors, endorsers, and other supporters unambiguously identifying this as one of the monument’s chief purposes.

At the most superficial level, a number of parameters have been set to ensure that the monument becomes a truly national memorial. The NHMA states that it is the Minister responsible for the NCC – as a representative of the Canadian people – who will ultimately be responsible for the monument’s creation. Beyond this, the public has been consulted regarding the location, design, and purpose of the monument by means of an online questionnaire, the design will come from a nation-wide (rather than international) competition, and the realised monument will stand on a piece of public land. Perhaps most significantly is the fact that the NHM will come into existence via a piece of federal legislation which has been voted on democratically by both houses of Parliament. As Joe Volpe and others observe, the legislative process is not the only way to have a national memorial erected by the NCC and, in fact, it is exceptional when a monument is brought into existence through an Act of Parliament. By passing through the various readings, debates, and studies in both the House of Commons and the Senate, the NHMA and ensuing NHM
may appear to be more Canadian than had the monument been implemented through the more bureaucratic process that has produced many other memorials in the National Capital Region.

At a deeper level, the legislative origin of the monument may actually facilitate the entry of Holocaust memory into national consciousness, for it is through the sort of public debates that take place in parliament that events such as the Holocaust are discussed, contested, consolidated, and ultimately integrated into a national narrative. It is through the dialogue surrounding a monument, rather than the aesthetic design that is given to it, that a nation truly makes a memory its own.

The nationalizing impulse of the NHM can be observed in the only major dispute surrounding the monument: the funding controversy. In response to a government amendment suggesting that the “planning, designing, construction, installing, and maintaining” of the monument be paid for with private funds, Joe Volpe retaliated by arguing that the entire project should be paid for by the government. Volpe’s argument was simple: if this monument is to be national then it must be funded by each and every Canadian, and this can only be accomplished by using government monies that have been collected from the taxpayer. If Canadians as a collective do not contribute, then Canadians as a collective cannot commemorate. Brian Jean, the mover of the amendment, responded to Volpe by claiming that raising private funds best allowed Canadians to be actively involved in the monument. He argued that, by allowing only voluntary donations, Canadians could choose to become actively involved in the monument’s creation; active contributions would make Canadians active participants in the process of commemoration. Thus, the debate was sparked by a single problem: which method of funding best allowed Canadians to be a part of the memorial process? Both Liberals and Conservatives sought the same end, but their
respective left- and right-leaning ideologies reasoned that it should be achieved through different means: for the Liberals, the answer was public monies; for the Conservatives, private funds. In a way, the only significant disagreement was actually rooted in an agreement regarding what the monument should represent and how it should function.

As discussed in Chapter 1, this sort of dispute offers important insight into the assumptions behind Holocaust memory, Canadian identity, and the NHM. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine similar parliamentary debates around the NHM to understand the strategies used to frame the Holocaust as a component of Canadian consciousness. I identify the most prominent discursive themes and demonstrate how they seek to create a relationship between Canada and the Holocaust.

**Canada’s Historical Relationship to Holocaust Memory**

One of the easiest and most common ways to frame the Holocaust as a Canadian event is to identify some sort of historical relationship between them. This approach is one of the most effective because an historical connection is often perceived as a ‘real’ connection. The historical role that Canada played in the Holocaust is not immediately obvious, however. Canada was separated from the European atrocities by an ocean and, apart from those who fought overseas as part of the war effort, Nazism posed little direct threat to Canadians; Canada does not have the obvious sort of historical relationship that one finds in Germany and Poland, for example. There is, however, no single historical narrative used to engage Canada in Holocaust memory, but rather a set of several – both positive and negative – overlapping narratives.

One of the positive roles that Canada is considered to have played in the Holocaust was as a member of the Allied forces during the Second World War. This narrative is not
necessarily obvious because it relies on several assumptions: first, it requires that the Holocaust be viewed as an aspect of WWII (or vice versa), and second, it requires one to accept that the Allied forces were the ones who ultimately brought an end to the Nazi persecution of European Jewry. Both these assumptions are expressed by MP Dennis Bevington during the third reading debates when he states that the bill “speaks to the conclusion of the second world war; to the role Canada played in the victory over the Axis to ensure that the Holocaust came to an end.” In the Senate, Yonah Martin evinces this attitude in greater detail. Like Bevington, she sees the Holocaust as an aspect of WWII, observing that “The atrocities of the Holocaust occurred during the 1930s and the Second World War in which our country took so active a part.” After pointing out that Canada entered the war only “seven days after France and Britain” and that “Canadians served in our own military forces as well as in the service of various Allied countries,” she goes on to outline the sacrifices made by Canada as part of the Allied effort. She calculates that,

> With a population of between 11 million and 12 million people at that time, approximately 1.1 million Canadians served during the Second World War...[and that] by the end of the war, more than 45,000 Canadians had lost their lives and another 55 thousand were wounded.  

By quantifying these losses, Martin emphasises the incredible sacrifice made by Canadians on the behalf of the war effort: approximately 1 out of every 10 Canadians joined the war effort, with 1 out of every 10 of those combatants ending up dead or wounded. With these and similar statements, a narrative is constructed in which Canadians not only fought to end WWII – and by extension, the Holocaust – but in many cases paid the ultimate sacrifice for the cause.

Martin’s statements conflate the victims of Nazi persecution with the casualties of war. Alongside her tally of Canadian casualties, the senator mentions how
The Second World War became the most widespread and deadliest war in the world’s history, with at least 100 million military personnel and more than 50 million fatalities. A substantial number of these deaths resulted from Nazi ideological policies, including the genocide of Jews and other ethnic and minority groups.\(^ {48}\)

Here, the six million victims of the Jewish genocide – along with those victims belonging to other persecuted groups such as the Romani, homosexuals, and the disabled – are placed into the same category as the military and civilian casualties of WWII. This conflation of Holocaust victims with WWII victims appears elsewhere, such as in Tim Uppal’s statement that the monument “would honour all victims of the Holocaust and the Canadian survivors” as well as “the Canadian soldiers who fought and paid the ultimate sacrifice.”\(^ {49}\) When these victims are paired with the sacrifices made by the Allies, Canadian soldiers are presented as having both suffered with, and suffered for, the Jewish victims of the Holocaust.

What has had an even greater impact on Holocaust memory than the nation’s status as an Ally is the role that Canada played in becoming a home to many survivors after the war. While the government’s post-war immigration policy does not necessarily reflect its inter-war attitude towards Jewish refugees, the fact that Canada ultimately became home to tens of thousands of survivors is used to demonstrate the country’s concern for the safety of persecuted Jews. In many instances, this is achieved by simultaneously placing as much or more emphasis on the survivors than the victims, as well as quantifying the country’s assistance with the relief of refugees and displaced persons. For example, Senator Mac Harb points out that “Canada is [currently] home to some 16,000 Holocaust survivors”\(^ {50}\); likewise, no sooner does Tim Uppal mention the ‘six million’ than does he turn immediately to the fact that “With 40,000 Holocaust survivors settling in Canada after the war, our country has the third-largest population of these survivors in the world.”\(^ {51}\) Uppal’s observation that the country absorbed one of the largest populations of survivors is echoed by Senator Joan
Fraser, who notes that “Canada took in more of the refugees after the war, I believe, than any other country, except the United States and Israel.” By highlighting that the overall number of survivors taken in was exceeded only by the United States – a modern mecca of Jewish culture – and Israel – the Jewish state – Canada is presented as being a champion of the Jewish people and all those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis.

These Canadian survivors are presented as one justification for the erection of a national monument. In the preamble to bill C-442 and the NHMA – and repeated in speeches, releases, and other statements – is the proclamation that the NHM will “honour all of the victims and the Canadian survivors of the Holocaust.” The monument is seen as a memorial not only to the Six Million Jews who died at the hands of the Nazis – none of whom were Canadian – but also to the thousands of Jewish survivors who made their way across the Atlantic to settle in Canada. The frequent reference to survivors therefore serves two related purposes: first, it presents Canada as a defender of European Jewry for having accepted and integrated this group of formerly stateless people, and second, it obligates the nation to memorialise the collective experiences of that group.

Stressed as much if not more than Canada’s positive historical role in the Holocaust is the way in which Jewish refugees were prevented from entering the country during the war – a course of action which indirectly contributed to the deaths of thousands of potential immigrants. This counter discourse does not deny that Canada became a home to survivors after the war, but rather focuses on the country’s reluctance to accept refugees – and thereby alleviate Jewish suffering – during it. The narrative that emerges from this discourse declares that “There is no question that Canada did terrible things to our Jewish friends by not letting them come here as refugees before [and during] the Second World War”; the country may not share the same degree of guilt as nations such as Germany, but Canada nevertheless “has
its own guilt to carry." To situate the nation’s complicity historically, MP Irwin Cotler places it within the context of the 1938 Evian Conference in which the wartime globe was “divided into two parts: those countries from which the Jews could not leave…and those that they could not enter,” with Canada falling into the latter category. But while Canada’s reticent approach to the conference may be an accurate reflection of its general attitude, the most frequently used symbol of the nation’s guilt is the 1939 voyage of the MS St. Louis, a ship of Jewish refugees that was denied entry into numerous ports, including Canada. The St. Louis is almost unanimously accepted as a black mark upon the nation and is usually treated as though its message were straightforward and undeniable; the St. Louis is used to convey how little the Canadian government cared about European Jewry and, when given the opportunity to help even a few, callously turned its back. This interpretation is offered as a self-evident truth, and the ‘Voyage of the Damned’ usually receives no more exposition than that which is required to bitterly observe how the government’s actions “forced [the ship’s occupants] back into the inferno that was engulfing Europe.” Although entry into Canada was never formally requested by those on the ship, the country’s responsibility for the fate of those onboard the vessel is framed as an undisputed fact and the incident is perceived as the paradigmatic example of the country’s underlying attitude towards European Jewry.

This narrative of Canadian history is primarily rooted in Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s book None Is Too Many, which is referred to both directly and indirectly. The book, which documents the federal government’s apparently systematic attempt to prevent Jews from entering the country between 1933 and 1948, contains an almost uniformly pessimistic view of the country’s wartime immigration policies. Given that this is the first and only major work addressing Canada’s particular role in the Holocaust, and that it has received a wide popular reception in the last thirty years (it is one of few scholarly works to appear on
Canadian best-seller lists), it is unsurprising that its negative outlook has become one of the most prevailing tones in the discourse. The influence of *None Is Too Many* can be traced back to the monument’s genesis when the memorial was no more than a distant aspiration for Laura Grosman. In an interview, Grosman reflected on her early attempts to gain political support for her project, recalling that the book had a big impact on me... In every meeting I went into I carried a copy of that book with me, ready to whip it out if any MP ever said to me ‘I don’t think this is of importance.’ I was ready to go: ‘there it is, read this and tell me you don’t think that Canada has enough of a role and has had enough participation in this dark time in history.’

*None Is Too Many* has since remained an important part of the discourse. In some cases, such as those addresses made by Irwin Cotler, the book is not referred to directly although it has clearly set the tone; in other instances, the book receives detailed exposition. One of the most extensive discussions was given by Senator Joan Fraser during her address to the Senate in which she provides three reasons to support bill C-442, with the final one being that “Canada has its own inglorious chapter in the Holocaust.” She proceeds to anticipate how “Many of you will have read the devastating book by Irving Abella and Harold Troper,” quoting the book’s introduction and providing a summary of its key arguments. Fraser uses the work to deliver a scathing criticism of Canadian history, concluding that “The fact is that all through the Hitler years, Canada systematically refused entry to the Jewish refugees,” and that “This policy was not an oversight [but] was decided at the highest levels of the bureaucracy and confirmed in repeated cabinet meetings.” For virtually every MP and senator who relies on it, the book is uncritically presented as a factual account of this historical period. *None Is Too Many* is not used to refute the claims that Canada was an important Ally or became a haven for survivors after the war, but it does insist that Canadians cannot neglect this aspect of their national history.
Though these two narratives of Canadian history – that of Canada the Allied hero and that of Canada the antisemite – are ostensibly at odds with one another, they do not seem to be in competition with each other. Each narrative is stressed at different times by different people, but it does not appear that anyone feels that one interpretation must dominate the other. In many cases, both histories are mentioned in the same breathe. For example, Rabbi Friedman recalled in conversation how one of the problems facing the development council is

whether [the monument] should incorporate both Canada’s role – or lack thereof – in the safety of World War II Jewry, or whether the focus should be on Canada’s commitment moving forward to “never again.” It remains to be seen which of these two will be the focus, if not both.  

Despite his phrasing, Rabbi Friedman has listed three potential focuses: Canada as a boon to European Jewry (their ‘safety’), Canada as a bane to European Jewry (the ‘lack thereof’), and the universalist moral of ‘never again’ (which is not specific to the Canadian context). Yet Friedman does not view these as mutually exclusive interpretations, preferring instead to consider them as potentially compatible with one another, even if not necessarily harmonious. Whereas some national memories have somewhat more linear and less paradoxical narratives, it may be this capacity to contain several conflicting narratives – the ability to tolerate a hydra-headed memory which simultaneously views Canada as both the ‘good guy’ and the ‘bad guy’ – which makes Holocaust memory in Canada unique from those memories in other nations. In other ways, however, Canada is not distanced from other nations by the memory of the Holocaust but rather linked to them.
Canada’s Political Relationship to Holocaust Memory

Beyond the historical relationship, a political connection has been forged between Canada and the Holocaust by framing the persecution of European Jewry as a consequence of the modern nation-state. A common refrain is that the Holocaust was an act of ‘state-sanctioned hatred’ which was made possible by the modern nation-state; as a nation-state, Canada has an obligation to acknowledge and remember what can happen when state powers are left unchecked. For example, to demonstrate the dangers posed by the state, MP Michel Guimond surveys the legislative and bureaucratic process by which the Holocaust evolved. In his speech during the third reading debate, he notes that “The first step in the long process toward the Holocaust was the discriminatory legislation that targeted German citizens of the Jewish faith [who] were identified as such by law,” further observing how the “mass murder was carried out by Hitler’s regime and several Third Reich bureaucrats, as well as by numerous collaborators, including individuals and states.” Guimond demonstrates how the Holocaust was made possible by using the apparatus of the nation-state, drawing particular attention to those political structures and governmental procedures that are so familiar to contemporary Canadians. That the political structure of 21st century Canada bears such a striking resemblance to that of Nazi Germany implies that, while Canada may never have engaged in such extensive and systematic hatred, it is not beyond the realm of possibility. Thus does Joan Fraser contend that Canada needs a monument “to remember the fact that horrors of this kind can be perpetrated even in the most civilized societies. No country is immune.” The Holocaust was made possible not only within a modern nation-state but also by means of it and, as a nation-state, Canada is at risk of repeating this sort of power excess.

While it might not be guilty of power excesses to the same degree as Nazi Germany, Canada nonetheless has its own history of state-mandated hatred. In his sponsorship speech
during the second reading of the bill, Tim Uppal mentions three relatively recent instances of institutionalised hatred in Canada:

We must remember that just because no crime so horrible has occurred in Canada does not mean we need not concern ourselves. After all, the history of our country is not perfect: the internment of Japanese Canadians; the events surrounding the Komagata Maru incident; and the treatment of aboriginal Canadians. We should not pretend that crimes against whole groups of people are something that only ever happen far away and long ago.66

Uppal’s examples appear to be selected carefully, for each presents a different aspect of state-mandated hatred.67 The oppression of aboriginal Canadians – most notably in residential schools but also in many other, less obvious capacities – is a poignant example because it is specific to the Canadian, or at least New World, context, suggesting that Canadians possess a very unique sort of racial hatred. It is also effective because the length of time during which native groups have been persecuted shows how deeply rooted and enduring this hatred can be. The internment of Japanese Canadians is another pointed example because it occurred during the Second World War; it suggests that, while Canadians may not have been burning Jews in crematoria, their government nonetheless committed acts that were motivated by racial hatred. Finally, mention of the Komagata Maru is of particular value because of its obvious parallels to the ‘Voyage of the Damned’ some 25 years later. The Komagata Maru was a steamship carrying 376 British subjects from India, most of whom were Sikh while the rest were Muslims and Hindus. Seeking to emigrate to Canada, the ship landed in Vancouver where only twenty passengers were granted entry while the remainder were forced to return to India. When placed in conjunction with the MS St. Louis, one gets the impression that incidents such as these are not anomalous but instead part of a much larger trend; that is, they collectively demonstrate Canada’s historical preference for keeping out ethnic others.
Reference to these domestic instances of state-sanctioned hatred are not frequent, but are still an important part of the discourse. It is primarily in this early speech by Uppal that these incidents are addressed and, although they occasionally occur elsewhere, most criticism of the Canadian government is directed towards its immigration policy during the 1930s and 1940s. It is possible that Uppal chose to limit these references in later discourse for a number of reasons. On the one hand, Uppal is a member of the Conservative government and may have considered it tactful (or been advised) to minimise criticism of the government by focusing only on those criticisms already outlined by *None Is Too Many*. It is also possible that comparison to these events is avoided in order to preserve the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust; to claim that Canada has participated in incidents comparable to the Holocaust is to deny its status as a unique phenomenon. This seems likely given that the Holocaust’s uniqueness is an important part of the discourse surrounding the NHM. Aboriginal oppression and Japanese interment represent an aspect of the political discourse which frames the Holocaust as a consequence of the nation-state. As a nation-state, Canada must mourn the casualties of the nation-state and reflect on its own capacity to cause them; internment and residential schools are domestic examples of this which can help remind Canadians of the potential for this to happen in their own country.

*Canada’s Ethical Relationship to Holocaust Memory*

In addition to the historical and political discourse, one final way in which the Holocaust is constructed as a Canadian memory is through the creation of a binary system based on opposing sets of values. When an idea is incorporated into a binary system, it becomes either congruent with or oppositional to every other idea within that system. The binary opposition which has formed around the NHM is characterised by two sets of values:
one set is associated with hatred, and the other with tolerance. What has enabled a relationship between Canada and the Holocaust to emerge from this system is that both the Holocaust and Holocaust memory, as well as the idea of what is and is not Canadian, have been integrated into it. At one end of the opposition, the historical event that is now referred to as the Holocaust is considered to be the embodiment of hate-based values. By presenting these values as being distinctly non-Canadian, the Holocaust is framed as an antithesis to the Canadian values system. At the other end of the opposition, Holocaust memory is seen as something which promotes values based on tolerance. By framing these as core Canadian values, Canada is linked to the Holocaust vis-a-vis these shared values. The effect is to produce two clusters of ideas which appear to stand in opposition to one another: at one pole is the Holocaust, hate-based values, and the non-Canadian; at the other end is Holocaust memory, tolerance-based values, and the Canadian. The function of this dichotomy is to define what is and is not Canadian, and thereby demarcate the parameters of the Canadian identity.

At one end of the binary is the Holocaust itself, which Canadians can understand only in its capacity as a completely foreign Other. This sort of framing is not unique to Canadian memory, and Tim Cole has argued that the USHMM in Washington presents the Holocaust as “the very antithesis of American values;” it is something that Americans can relate to and understand only as a point of extreme contrast. In Canada, the Holocaust is similarly framed as the ‘antithesis’ of contemporary Canadian values which can be known only by virtue of the fact that it is so un-Canadian. Tim Uppal reflects on the ‘foreignness’ of the Holocaust that is perceived by himself and other Canadians:

As a student growing up in Edmonton...those events [of the Holocaust] seemed distant and dated. They happened before I was born, to people I didn’t know much about, in countries on the other side of the world... For our young people today it is
even more remote. For people privileged to live in a country like Canada, the Holocaust can seem wholly foreign, something that people have difficulty understanding because they cannot relate to its atrocities and horrors... In today’s Canada, those who are honoured to call it home would have tremendous difficulty identifying with the deep horrors of the Holocaust.\footnote{72}

The Holocaust appears distant and foreign not just because of its temporal and physical proximity, but also because Canada is a ‘privileged’ country in which the ‘atrocities and horrors’ of state-mandated hatred do not occur. Its otherness is therefore due in part to the fact that such horrors are inconceivable to Canadians; however, its foreignness is also firmly rooted in the value system which is purported to have inspired those atrocities and allowed them to occur.

This otherness arises from the way in which the Holocaust is presented as the embodiment of intolerant, hate-based values which stand in opposition to those possessed by Canadians. The Nazi worldview from which the Holocaust emerged was a product of what MP Glenn Thibeault refers to as “hate-inspired ideologies.”\footnote{73} This hate-based outlook produced intolerance towards those who deviated from the social norm, leading to the widespread social acceptance of bigotry, racism, antisemitism,\footnote{74} homophobia, sexism,\footnote{75} and other forms of intolerance, and ultimately resulting in violence and genocide.\footnote{76,77} In addition to identifying these values as central to the Nazi worldview, they are further defined as antithetical to those values which are esteemed by Canada and other democratic nations. Uppal explains that “the horrific events of the Holocaust are a stark testament to what can happen when humanity and fundamental basic rights are discarded”\footnote{78}; this sentiment is echoed on the homepage of the NHM’s website, which states that the Holocaust “was a crime that challenged the fundamental values all civilized peoples hold dear.”\footnote{79} Hate-based values and tolerance-based values (discussed below) are mutually exclusive categories in that a society can possess one set or the other, but cannot create a value system which borrows
from both sides of the binary; Canadian values and Nazi values are incompatible. The Holocaust is therefore presented as a consequence of two related actions: accepting hate-based values while, by definition, rejecting Canadian ones.

The notion that the Holocaust stands in opposition to Canadian values does not mean that the event should be disregarded entirely; rather, it invites Canadians to remember it. Brian Jeans suggests that any event of such ‘magnitude’ should be remembered, noting that “Our government appreciates the importance of remembering and understanding all events throughout history, even those that are inconsistent with the values of Canadians.” The reason for remembering such non-Canadian values is clarified by Tim Uppal, who explains that the failure to remember them “invites a return to the terror of those dark years, and losing those very things which we hold most dear.” Canadians must remember the values which led to the Holocaust in order to recognise them and ensure that they do not manifest again. The creation of a national monument is justified by the fact that the Holocaust was caused by the withdrawal of those values which modern democracies hold so dear. It is only by remembering those values for which they do not stand that Canadians are able to remember those values for which they do.

The need to preserve Canadian values results in the other end of the binary which associates Holocaust memory with values based on tolerance. In his presentation to the standing committee responsible for studying the bill, Tim Uppal indicates that “As Canadians we pride ourselves on a nation that values and demands respect towards other people, affords a personal dignity to all people, and provides an environment of tolerance and understanding.” In contrast to the hate-based worldview of the Nazis, Canadians accept those who deviate from the norm and support such values as democracy, freedom, diversity, social justice, equality, and human dignity. These also happen to be the same
values which are allegedly promoted by the memory of the Holocaust; a national monument will therefore become a physical embodiment of these values and help to maintain their presence in Canadian society. Nowhere is this attitude expressed with more certainty than on the NHM’s website (which is hosted by DFAIT). Directly under the banner on the website’s homepage is a boldface quotation from Tim Uppal which reads: “The National Holocaust Monument will serve as a symbol of Canadian value and diversity as much as it will be a memorial for the millions of victims and families destroyed.” Further down the page in regular type, the ‘fundamental values’ to which this refers are identified as “freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” The monument will of course commemorate the millions of victims who died under the Nazi regime, as does any Holocaust memorial. But just as much as this, it will also function to enshrine Canadian values. Given the fact that this quotation is the most prominent feature of the webpage apart from the banner reading ‘National Holocaust Monument’ – in conjunction with the fact that this homepage is the first item listed in a Google search for ‘national holocaust monument canada’ – suggests that this function may be the most important aspect of the forthcoming monument (or at least the one which most people will have encountered). Indeed, statements along these lines appear too frequently to cite here. Reviewing almost any part of the discourse surrounding the NHM reveals that a central purpose of the monument is to instrumentalise Holocaust memory in the promotion of Canadian values.

In effect, this binary system functions as a boundary marker which delimits the outer edge of the Canadian identity. The Holocaust is presented as the embodiment of non-Canadian values and thereby represents a value system which is outside the purview of today’s Canadian society. Holocaust memory, however, is framed as something which promotes Canadian values and thus represents a value system that is within that purview.
Together – and as a binary they are always together, even if it is only implied – these two opposing sets of values project the horizon of the Canadian identity; they create a clearly defined edge which separates those things Canadians extol from those they condemn. The NHM will become a physical articulation of these values and thereby a concrete manifestation of the national identity. And so long as the monument is presented as an embodiment of those things prized by Canadians, it will also implicitly motion towards those things abhorred by them, and in doing so will reinforce Canadians’ self-perception. To put it another way, the creation of a national memorial is an act of worldview maintenance in which the Holocaust and its memory are used as symbols of Canadian values for the sole purpose reinforcing those values. In this way, the NHM does not function to memorialise the Holocaust and its victims, but is rather instrumentalised as a mirror with which the Canadian identity is reflected back towards Canadians.

Conclusion

The NHM is not an anomaly which emerged without antecedents, but part of an ongoing national discussion about the Holocaust and its place in the national memory. This discussion originated in the 1980s as a legal discourse, evolved into an educational dialogue in the following decade, and is now taking the form of discourse around a national monument. This encounter between the memory of the Holocaust and national consciousness has begun to shape that memory in a way that will make it meaningful to Canadians. The earliest phase of this discussion observed that Holocaust deniers were present in Canadian society, suggested that this denial might conflict with Canadian values, and pointed out that Holocaust memory mattered to at least some Canadians. The next phase proposed that Holocaust education could be an important tool for socialising the nation’s youth, and
suggested that the Holocaust might be something that could matter to all Canadians. These early discussions did not fully Canadianise Holocaust memory, but they did set the groundwork for the discourse which followed. In this most recent debate, the Holocaust is being further integrated into the national narrative to create a mature and distinctly Canadian form of Holocaust memory.

Several bridges have been built by the discourse surrounding the NHM, each of which uses an aspect of Canadian culture or society to weave Holocaust memory into the national narrative. One approach has been to take an element of Canadian history and relate it into the Nazi persecution of European Jewry. This approach is remarkable because it uses seemingly incongruent interpretations of history and allows them to exist simultaneously. This suggests that it does not matter whether Canada is presented as a good, bad, or neutral actor; what seems to matter most is that Canadians see their country as having played a role in the Holocaust, regardless of what that role is. A second approach is to accept that the Holocaust was a consequence of the modern nation-state and suggest that, as a nation-state, Canada is obliged to remember this event as a way to counteract its own potential to perpetrate similar atrocities. While this framing could be applied in almost any modern state, reference to specific instances of domestic state-mandated hatred tailors it to the Canadian context. A final strategy has been to present Holocaust memory as something that promotes those values which are most central to Canadian society. This is one instance in which the distinction between the Holocaust and Holocaust memory is clearly manifested, for it is Holocaust memory which promotes these values and not just a ‘factual’ textbook understanding of the Holocaust as an event. This strategy is particularly important because it does not just make the Holocaust a Canadian memory, but instrumentalises that memory for the purpose of reinforcing Canadian values. Collectively, these approaches create a
relationship to the Holocaust that could not have been produced in any other country. It is clear from the discourse surrounding the NHM that the citizens of Canada are no longer remembering the Holocaust only as people living in a post-Holocaust world, but do in fact remember it as Canadians.
Chapter 4

The Contexts of a Canadian Memory

Although much of the debate surrounding the NHM overtly attempts to frame the Holocaust as a Canadian memory, this discourse has also been shaped in a more subtle way. The previous chapter examined how those involved with the project have more-or-less consciously manufactured a relationship between Canada and the Holocaust. These activities have occurred within a larger context, however, and whether intentionally or not, this context has shaped the debate in significant ways. In particular, two contexts surrounding the NHM have evolved into major discursive themes: multiculturalism and globalisation. The former is distinctly Canadian in that multiculturalism is one of the country’s core ideologies and has played an important role in shaping Canadian society. By discussing the NHM within this context, multiculturalism has a direct bearing on the Canadianisation of Holocaust memory. As this chapter suggests, the NHM is seen as both a consequence of Canadian multiculturalism, but also as a way to enshrine it as an essential feature of national society. The latter context, in contrast, is not particular to Canada, for nearly every modern state is a part of global society. Through its interaction with other members of the international community, Canada plays an active role in the process of globalisation. I suggest that, by using the NHM as a wedge with which to enter global dialogue, Canada seeks to increase its visibility as a member of global society. Because of Canada’s attempt to be acknowledged as a member of the international community, globalisation has in its own way contributed to the Canadianisation of Holocaust memory. Overall, the interaction between the NHM and these contexts reveals something about Holocaust memory in Canada, but also about the very dynamic of Canadian society as it exists in the 21st century.
The current chapter will examine the NHM as a product of its multicultural and global contexts in much the same way that the previous chapter examined it as an extension of the national discourse on the Holocaust. Relying on the same resources – parliamentary debates, media documents, and interviews – I have coded these documents for themes relating to multiculturalism and globalisation. I then analyse this content to determine how these contexts have shaped Canadian perceptions of the Holocaust and Holocaust memory. Similar to the way in which the nation’s ethical relationship to the Holocaust acts as a form of worldview maintenance, this discourse is not concerned solely with the act of commemoration; it is instrumentalised in the manufacture of Canada’s internal and external identity. Domestically, Holocaust memory is used to preserve multiculturalism and to reflect its centrality to the national identity; globally, it is used to construct a public persona with which the nation negotiates its position in the global community. Based on these functions, I argue that the NHM’s multicultural and global contexts have further contributed to the Canadianisation of Holocaust memory.

**Canadian Multiculturalism**

As an important aspect of Canadian society, it is not surprising that multiculturalism has shaped the debate surrounding the NHM. Officially, multiculturalism is defined by the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* as an ideology that “reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage”; particular emphasis is placed on the ‘shared’ aspect of cultural heritage, and the act stresses that multicultural policies should “promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins.”¹ The understanding of multiculturalism as an
interaction between groups has become dominant in academic discourse. Relying on the
work of Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, Patrick Imbert notes that “multiculturalism
distinguishes itself [from other approaches to cultural exchange] in the sense that it
claims...that individual identity formation comes from the acquisition of semiotic, symbolic,
linguistic and cultural codes from the group or groups that surround us.”

Multiculturalism is rooted in two assumptions: that individual identity is dependent upon one’s social
environment, and that this environment can be culturally diverse. Individuals are therefore
points at which cultures encounter one another, and one’s identity is produced dialectically
through this encounter. As the individual identity is transformed by the encounter between
cultures, the cultural and national groups to which an individual belongs are also
transformed. Thus, multiculturalism does not necessarily describe a patchwork of isolated
groups contained within a single political framework, but rather a set of “relations between
different cultures with the goal of reaching a new social partnership.”

The history of multiculturalism in Canada is an ongoing one which continues to move
in new directions. At its root is the ideology of biculturalism, which stems from the presence
of both English and French communities in Canada and the desire of each – though mainly
the French – to protect their respective language and culture. As immigration from non-
English, non-French, and non-European countries increased during the 20th century,
however, the French began to lose their status as Canada’s dominant minority. Through
government inquiries into bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada, it became apparent that
the members of more recently landed linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups also wanted to
be included within the bicultural model; it seemed that biculturalism, which recognised the
existence of two national cultures, might need to transform into multiculturalism, which
rejected the idea of any ‘official’ culture. As a result of growing pressure from cultural
minorities, particularly from the Ukrainian community, Prime Minister Trudeau announced in 1971 that multiculturalism would be implemented as Canadian policy; this promise came to fruition in 1982 when the constitution was patriated and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* was written to include a clause stating that “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada.” Multiculturalism was further entrenched in Canadian society with the 1988 enactment of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, which established a set of guidelines through which the government can regulate the multicultural encounter. It is significant that the transition from bi- to multiculturalism is itself an expression of multiculturalism, for it demonstrates how the encounter between cultural groups can ultimately result in a new cultural perspective that had not been recognised previously; it suggests that multiculturalism was part of Canada’s social dynamic before any government policy had been implemented.

A more recent ideological and political development in the province of Quebec is interculturalism, which promotes concepts of multiculturalism but within a single dominant culture. Interculturalism emerged as a response to the power dynamic between the French-speaking majority of Quebec and the English-speaking majority that dominates the rest of the country; it was born of fears that, by asserting the absence of any dominant culture in Canada, multiculturalism would erode French culture in Quebec and limit its political influence in the rest of Canada. The resulting ideology of interculturalism is what Afef Benessaieh defines as “support for cultural diversity, not precluding the defence of Québécois culture, mostly via the defence of French as the primary language of expression in the province.” Like multiculturalism, interculturalism values cultural diversity and the encounter between cultures, but unlike multiculturalism, it insists that that this encounter takes place within a dominant cultural milieu that must also be protected; minority groups
are encouraged to preserve their own cultures, but only insofar as this does not threaten the integrity of French society. The ideology is endorsed primarily by separatist political parties whose goal is for Quebec to secede from Canada, such as the federal Bloc Québécois and the provincial Parti Québécois. While the debate on interculturalism exists primarily as an intellectual pursuit, it has in recent years begun to enter the realm of popular discourse via the mainstream press.⁸

Although Canada did not practice multiculturalism during the Second World War, this has not prevented the country from applying it retrospectively in order to justify the commemoration of historical events such as the Holocaust. As discussed in the previous chapter, Holocaust memory is believed to promote those values which are based on the tolerance of social diversity; as an ideology which seeks to maintain diversity, multiculturalism is easily framed as one such value. The discourse on the NHM is therefore interwoven with the dialogue of multiculturalism. For example, during the announcement event of the NHMDC, Tim Uppal relates how his understanding of the Holocaust was influenced in part by his wife’s participation in the March of the Living, a trip on which students travel to former concentration camps. He recalls how “the first time I told [my wife’s] story, a woman came up to me and said, ‘You married a Jewish girl?’ No, a Sikh girl, went to Catholic school, Jewish friends, and went on this trip. So Canadian.”⁹ His own grasp of Holocaust memory was based not on a purely Jewish or purely historical understanding of the event, but on one which has been filtered through a multitude of cultural lenses. Such an understanding is a distinct consequence of Canada’s social dynamic in which distinct cultural features are allowed to remain intact and minority groups are encouraged to interact with one another. Uppal remarks that this was ‘so Canadian,’ referring both to the mechanism that allows these individual cultures to interact with one another, as well as the memory which
emerged from this encounter. If his memory of the Holocaust arose from the context of Canadian multiculturalism, then the resulting memory must be credited as a distinctly Canadian one.

The NHM and Immigration

Although multiculturalism stems from biculturalism, both ideologies are ultimately rooted in the fact that Canada is a nation of immigrants. Contemporary Canadian society originated in the waves of English and French immigrants that settled in North America primarily from the 17th through 19th centuries. While English and French groups constituted (and continue to constitute) the demographic and cultural majority, other ethnic and linguistic groups have long been immigrating to Canada, although it was only in the 20th century that these other groups began to have a significant impact on the national composition. Jewish immigrants began coming to Canada in significant numbers in the late 19th century, with tens of thousands of Jewish survivors arriving shortly after the Second World War. As shown in Chapter 3, Canada’s role as a refuge for Holocaust survivors is one of the most prominent themes surrounding the NHM, and it is Canada’s status as a final destination for many Jews that has been used as one of the key rationales for erecting a monument.

Because Canada ultimately became a multicultural society, Jewish immigration resulted not only in the integration of new citizens but also the integration of new experiences; this has provided further justification for the creation of a national memorial. Contemporary Canada is perceived not only as a nation of immigrants but also as a nation of refugees. In her address to the Senate, Joan Fraser observes that “after the war, and in the ensuing decades, many thousands of the [Jewish Holocaust] survivors came to Canada”10 but
also observes that, since the revision of Canada’s immigration policy in 1948, “many thousands have come to this country to build new lives and new hope. We now pride ourselves on being an open society. We have welcomed Hungarian refugees and the boat people and so many others.”

Canada is a point of destination where minorities – especially those religious and ethnic groups not accepted elsewhere – will be welcomed, tolerated, and allowed to maintain a relatively high degree of cultural autonomy. That is, Canadian multiculturalism makes it possible for minority groups to be integrated into mainstream society while still allowing them to maintain their own cultural distinctiveness. But because these groups are integrated into national society as cultural minorities, Canada must also integrate their particular experiences into its own national narrative. This is not a hypothetical process or one observed only in the discourse, but is the very mechanism which has allowed the NHM to become a reality; a national memorial to the Holocaust can be accomplished only if society is willing to accept the Jewish experience as its own.

By absorbing Jewish survivors (and Jews in general) into Canadian society, Canadians also absorb their remembered experience; as part of that experience, the Holocaust can become part of the shared national memory. Thus, by allowing the country to accept Jews as an integrated but distinct part of Canadian society, multiculturalism makes it possible to integrate their experiences and represent the Holocaust as a national event.

Although much of the discourse surrounding the NHM and multiculturalism focuses on Jews (and especially survivors) as an immigrant group, it frequently refers to Canada as a site for the immigration of minority groups in general. Tim Uppal exemplifies this by discussing his personal experience as a member of a minority group who has only recently immigrated to Canada. He makes the expected reference to the Jewish survivors now living in Canada, but also discusses his own family’s immigration to the country. He explains how
“My own parents came to Canada in order to take advantage of all that Canada affords to newcomers and we remain deeply grateful toward this country that values its new Canadians as positive assets to our national identity.”\textsuperscript{13} In regards to what he means by ‘all that Canada affords to newcomers,’ he is referring to those tolerance-based values discussed previously: “a nation that values and demands respect toward other people, affords personal dignity to all people and provides an environment of tolerance and understanding.”\textsuperscript{14} In saying that his family came to Canada for those tolerance-based values that Holocaust memory is purported to promote, Uppal is in a sense saying that they immigrated here precisely because it is the sort of place in which Holocaust memory can flourish. More broadly though, Uppal, a second-generation Canadian Sikh, relates to Canadian Jewry by using immigration as a shared experience. Canada is a multicultural nation composed largely of immigrants, and it is through the acceptance of this diversity of experiences – whether they are of Jews in Montreal or Sikhs in Edmonton – which allows seemingly disparate groups to relate to one another and become part of the national tapestry. Considering that most Canadians can trace their roots to some form of immigration, it is an experience that most can relate to in some degree and thereby find sympathy with the situation of Jewish and other minority groups.

\textit{The NHM and First Nations}

While there is debate concerning the role that indigenous populations play in Canadian multiculturalism,\textsuperscript{15} they are nonetheless an important part of the country’s cultural composition and it is necessary to consider how aboriginal groups contribute to Holocaust memory in Canada. Reference to Canada’s First Nations are infrequent, although, as an aspect of Canada’s cultural milieu, they fit surprisingly well into the discourse on the NHM. During the standing senate committee’s study of bill C-442, Bernie Farber, president of the
CJC, was invited to discuss the bill on behalf of the Jewish community. In response to
questions from the Senate, Farber relates how he used Holocaust memory as a way to bring
together Jewish and native Canadians:

I have been to Yad Vashem, as many of you have here, and I led a tour of First
Nations chiefs from Canada to Israel about four years ago. There were 30 of us
altogether. I learned as much about First Nations people, I suppose, as they learned
about Israel but we ended up one day at Yad Vashem. After going through the
museum, we all came outside. For those who have been there, you know you come
out and see before you the expanse that is Jerusalem; it is quite overwhelming. We
gathered in a friendship circle, put together by the First Nations chiefs, to remember
two things: the residential schools and what happened to their children; and what
happened to our children.16

In response to this story, Senator Lillian Dyck, a member of Gordon First Nation in
Saskatchewan, responds:

Mr. Farber, when you talked about the First Nations chiefs and the residential
schools, I practically burst into tears. A few years back, in Saskatoon, we had the
Anne Frank exhibit. That was a collaborative effort amongst various members of the
community, including some from the Jewish communities as well as the Aboriginal
groups. We have a lot to learn from each other. My mother was a residential school
survivor. In our experiences, we have some similarities.17

By viewing Holocaust memory as a paradigmatic example of intolerance, these vastly
disparate groups relate to each other to a surprising degree. Both groups have experienced
persecution because of their membership to a particular ethnic group – the Holocaust for
Jews and residential schools for the First Nations – and are able to create a bond between
their communities based on this. Not only can they relate to one another via these
experiences, but each has ‘a lot to learn from’ one another’s particular form of suffering; in
other words, First Nations have something to gain from Holocaust memory. Most intriguing
about this interaction is that, by constructing a relationship between Jews and First Nations,
one group of relatively recent immigrants is linked to the only Canadian group that can be
considered non-immigrants. Holocaust memory not only allows Canadian Jewry to connect
to other groups within the multicultural milieu, but links them to the nation at an autochthonic level.

The NHM and French Canada

Given that multiculturalism was preceded by biculturalism and succeeded by interculturalism – two ideological practices which seek to satisfy the French minority’s desire to maintain cultural integrity – it is worth noting how the Bloc Québécois (BQ or Bloc) have treated the prospect of the NHM. The Bloc is a federal political party that runs candidates exclusively in the province of Quebec; their political platform advocates Quebec’s separation from Canada as a way to defend against the cultural and political encroachment of English Canada. As a separatist party which promotes interculturalism as opposed to multiculturalism, their support for bill C-442 is different from that given by other parties. Whereas the Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties have generally justified the monument by using those tactics outlined in the previous chapter (i.e. creating an historical link between Canada and the Holocaust), the Bloc supports the monument primarily because it protects the rights of minority groups. In debate, the BQ emphasise their belief in the rights of minority groups and insist that this is one of the most important values for their party and French Canada – an attitude clearly stemming from their own status as a minority group in Canada. During debate, both Carole Lavallée and Michel Guimond indicate that their support for bill C-442 is witnessed by their support for a different, BQ-sponsored bill, namely bill C-384, a bill that “amended the Criminal Code and created a new offense to prohibit hate-motivated acts of mischief that target specific identifiable groups at institutions such as schools...or any administrative, social, cultural, educational or sports establishment used exclusively or mainly by such groups.” Lavallée indicates how this bill
“is already receiving support from minority groups in Quebec and Canada. For instance, the Canadian Jewish Congress sees this bill as an appropriate response to the concerns of the Jewish community.”

Minority groups are entitled to maintain their own cultural facilities and institutions without being targeted because of their cultural identity, and, if French Canadians are entitled to this sort of protection, then so are Jewish Canadians. As something that “would serve as a constant reminder of the violence inherent in intolerance” towards minorities, the Holocaust monument “in no way contradicts the values of Quebeckers” and the BQ is willing to put their support behind it. The Bloc rarely link French and Jewish culture in any way other than to point out that each is a minority group and entitled to minority rights, but it is through this relationship from which their support for the NHM comes.

In the same way that Holocaust memory is instrumentalised in the preservation of Canadian values, so too is it instrumentalised in the preservation of multiculturalism and, in Quebec, interculturalism. In part, the NHM is justified by multiculturalism; the Holocaust can be remembered at the national level because multiculturalism allows Jews to be recognised as an integral part of the national community. But beyond that, the NHM functions to embody multiculturalism and reflect its centrality to the national identity. It is difficult to discuss Canadian multiculturalism without also discussing those tolerance-based values discussed in the previous chapter; both are rooted in the acceptance of social diversity and the desire to maintain it. Multiculturalism might therefore be considered the ideological canvas against which these values are set, and, just as Holocaust memory is used to promote values such as freedom and equality, so too is it used to promote the belief in cultural diversity. Not only does the NHM reflect the esteem that Canadians feel for multiculturalism as an ideology, but it is also evidence that multiculturalism is alive and well in practice –
how else could Canadians acknowledge this particularly Jewish experience if they are not practicing multiculturalism? To recapitulate a conclusion from the preceding chapter, the creation of the NHM is an act of worldview maintenance: the monument is made possible because of multiculturalism, embodies multiculturalism as a central component of Canadian society, and then reflects multiculturalism back towards Canadians.

**Global Society**

While the multicultural context is particular to Canadian society, both Canada and the NHM are situated within an even larger context: the global community. There are a multitude of definitions of globalisation, each of which highlights a particular process and varies to different degrees of specificity; I intend to use a broad, flexible definition. By globalisation, I mean the process by which people, goods, capital, information, and ideas (including cultural and religious ideas) are transmitted quickly and easily across international borders and large geographical distances; by global community (or society), I mean the webs of communicative relationships that have emerged from this process.²³ In this era of modern globalisation, membership to the global community has an increasingly powerful influence on the nation-state, the individuals within it, and the ways in which they communicate, relate to one another, and conduct their affairs. Canada is an active member of this global community, as evidenced by its membership to international organisations such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the robustness of its Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The country’s status as a multicultural society rooted in immigration – with many of its citizens having allegiance to cultural groups elsewhere – further suggests the impact of globalisation on Canadian society.
Canada has long used the Holocaust as a way to relate to the international community, for its immigration policies during the Second World War were in part a way for the country to develop a national identity within global society. According to historian Patrick Reed, Canada’s movement of 446 mostly Jewish refugees from the Iberian Peninsula during the Second World War marks the country’s entry into global society. Reed observes that, as a consequence of the 1931 Statute of Westminster’s declaration that Canada was no longer a British colony, the country suffered an identity crisis in that it entered a “transitional stage between colony and nation.” The Second World War brought this crisis to light by revealing how dependent Canada was on British and American policy while also providing the country with opportunities to express its autonomy through policy-making; one such opportunity was manifest in Canada’s Iberian Refugee Movement. In response to domestic and international pressure to act upon the refugee crisis that had developed in Europe, Canada announced that it would accept 446 refugees from Spain and Portugal for the duration of the war, with this group arriving between April and October 1944. Because this policy simultaneously responded to domestic and international demands, maintained a sense of national unity in spite of a divisive issue, and demonstrated the country’s ability to act as an independent decision-maker, Reed concludes that the movement “represents a progressive step in Canada’s halting transition from inward-looking isolationism to outward-looking internationalism; from, if you will, national adolescence to adulthood.” That is, Canada’s treatment of the Iberian refugee crisis represents an important developmental period in the nation’s history, for it allowed the country to establish national unity while also carving out a niche in the global community. Even before the Holocaust had become a memory, Canada’s response to the events was as an actor on the world stage.
Globalisation has significant implications for Holocaust memory in Canada. As I argued in Chapter 2, Holocaust memory in Canada has an outwardly expanding trajectory whereby it continues to spread to larger social networks. Because Canada is an active member of global society, its memory of the Holocaust need not stop expanding once it has reached the boundary of the nation-state; once it has pervaded the national consciousness, it can continue to expand to the global realm. As that chapter suggests, this continued expansion has already begun to occur, for monuments such as the *Wheel of Conscience* reach beyond the national sphere and into the global one, using Holocaust memory as a way to mediate between national and global society. It is therefore possible that, once completed, the NHM will reach into global society and act as an interlocutor between Canada and the rest of the world. In fact, this dimension of the NHM can already be witnessed in the discourse. In Tim Uppal’s sponsorship speech during the second reading, he explains that “Canada is a nation of hope and opportunity, a beacon to those around the world seeking to find a new home and brighter future”\(^{26}\) and that “This monument is a statement made by Canadians to the world.”\(^{27}\) Canada is not just recognised internationally, but is in fact a point of reference (i.e. ‘a beacon’) which other members of global society use to measure ‘hope and opportunity.’ Acknowledging its important role in this community, Canada communicates with others nations and intends to use the NHM as part of this communication. The NHM is not meant only for Canadians, but also for *non*-Canadians.

*Invoking Globalisation*

Perhaps the most common way in which the NHM invokes global dialogue is by observing that Canada is the only Allied nation still without a national Holocaust memorial. This is an often heard refrain in the discourse, and has been repeated multiple times in both
houses of Parliament, in the standing committee for each chamber, and during the announcement of the development council. The argument generally sounds something like this:

Like many, I was surprised to learn that Canada remained the only allied nation without a Holocaust monument in its nation’s capital... By placing the monument in the nation’s capital, at the seat of government, we accord an appropriate respect and acknowledge the gravity of this terrible event. Great Britain, the United States, France, all our allies have understood the importance of remembering the Holocaust and so should Canada.28

In similar statements, it is further observed that Canada is one of few Western nations without a monument, and that even members of the Axis countries such as Germany and Austria have recognised the national significance of this event.29 This is an interesting way to frame the debate because it suggests that Holocaust memory does not have its own intrinsic value, but that its worth is determined by general consensus; the majority of Western nations already commemorate the Holocaust – including those responsible for the atrocities – and if they have recognised its importance at the national level, then ‘so should Canada.’ In this regard, Canada is not merely interested in building the NHM for the benefit of its own citizens, but in order to project a certain image to the international community.

Even Laura Grosman, who responded in the negative in conversation when I asked whether she thought that the monument has significance on the international scale, makes reference to the impacts of globalisation:

It doesn’t speak to keeping up and...ensuring that we’re aligned with other countries. I think it speaks to our collective history and our memory as a country... It has nothing to do with the other countries. I mean, that’s definitely a way to convince people. I’ll admit that the easiest way to convince people was to say, ‘Well, you really want Canada to fall behind? The other Allied nations have one’... I became political! So it did come in handy in that sense.30

Grosman was adamant that the monument serves a purely national function, but also admits that she promoted it by suggesting it does serve a larger, international purpose. Despite her
personal beliefs, she framed the monument as something with global significance, and, judging by the popularity of this argument in parliamentary and other debate, this has become one of the predominating attitudes towards the NHM. It is worth restating that this study is not so much interested in how individuals feel about the NHM but about how Canadians as a whole perceive it based on the way it has been framed in politics and media. Regardless of how they actually feel, those politicians and members of the public responsible for the NHM have clearly framed it as something that will reach into the global sphere.

Another way in which global society has been invoked is by identifying antisemitism and Holocaust denial as international threats. This theme is of particular importance because a national discourse on the Holocaust first emerged from the criminal trials of James Keegstra and Ernst Zündel. However, it is the fear of denial at the international level that has inspired further dialogue. In several instances, the NHM is considered necessary because, “Worldwide, there has been an increase in the number of major violent manifestations that are anti-Semitic in nature. This increase is linked to Holocaust denial and questioning the legitimacy of Israel. Similar events are being reported here in Canada.”31 A national monument, so the reasoning goes, will increase awareness of the Holocaust at home and abroad, decrease denial, and thereby reduce antisemitism. In particular, Tim Uppal identifies Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, as a high profile denier in the global community, and although Uppal acknowledges that deniers and antisemites exist in Canada, he makes no explicit reference to either Zündel or Keegstra.32 Although a distinctly Canadian memory of the Holocaust began to take shape in response to antisemitism and denial as domestic threats, it is their presence on the international stage which has continued to sculpt this memory. While continuing to maintain a Canadian perspective, it is the shift from national to global concerns which represents the new face of Holocaust memory in Canada.
As further references to global society, a number of MPs and senators have shown their support for Holocaust memory and bill C-442 by citing a trip abroad. As expected, several mention that trips to Europe, and especially to former camps, have impacted their support for bill C-442. However, even more mention trips to Israel as experiences that have validated their support for the monument, and while several mention visits to Yad Vashem specifically, many refer to Israel in general.\(^{33}\) This is remarkable in that, although Israel’s national narrative has been linked to the Holocaust,\(^{34}\) the relationship between the Holocaust and Israel – like the one between the Holocaust and Canada – is not necessarily rooted in history; the State of Israel received independence three years after the war ended and, although it absorbed many survivors, played no role in the actual event. Despite this, several MPs and senators refer to trips there as having shaped their belief in the importance of Holocaust memory. Showing his support for the bill during the third reading debate, MP Jim Maloway recalls how

I had the privilege and pleasure of travelling to Israel. I am due for another visit, because it was in December of 1986, 24 years ago now. It was a very inspiring visit that I made there. I was there only a week. I was amazed to see the progress made by Israel in turning deserts into productive lands and cultivating crops in the middle of the desert. We had the privilege of visiting a kibbutz. We went to the Ein Gedi Spa, where I had my first sulphur and mud baths. I would recommend those to anybody who goes to Israel. Visiting Israel was a very inspiring experience.\(^{35}\)

Maloway makes no reference to Yad Vashem or the Holocaust whatsoever. Rather, he focuses on the state itself, and especially the building of that state via kibbutzim and land cultivation. He seems to have accepted the national Israeli narrative which views the Holocaust as the impetus for the creation of the modern Israeli state; nowhere does he explain the link between Israel and the Holocaust or between Israel and Canada, but for him they appear to be intimately related. This attitude is common and, while the precise relationship between the Holocaust, Israel, and Canada is usually unclear and largely
unstated, the state of Israel repeatedly enters the discussion of Canada’s NHM. Canada is linked to the Holocaust via Israel and to Israel via the Holocaust, and it is partly through Canada’s relationship to the Israeli nation-state that the NHM is rationalised.

The NHM as a Catalyst for Global Dialogue

Several questions arise from this: Why has Canada invoked global society in the discussion of its own national Holocaust memorial? Why does it matter whether or not other countries participate in Holocaust commemoration? Why can the NHM not be a purely domestic affair? The answer seems to be that one of the monument’s functions is to reach into the global sphere and actively engage Canada in the dialogue of globalisation. The Holocaust is remembered around the world, and while it may adopt a particular dynamic based on its national context, it also contains universal characteristics. Holocaust memory is observed globally, has a considerable amount of gravity, and can easily capture people’s attention; if a country wants to participate in dialogue with the global community, Holocaust memory can be an effective way to do so. To understand the relationship between Holocaust memory and globalisation, it might be more effective to replace the question ‘Why does the NHM invoke global dialogue?’ with ‘Can the NHM be used to enter global dialogue?’ It is not that Canada needs to justify the NHM by invoking globalisation, but that Canada can engage in globalisation by invoking Holocaust memory.

On the surface, Canada must commemorate the Holocaust because it has a formal, international obligation to do so. In 2009, Canada became a member of the Taskforce for the International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF; now the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, or IHRA); Canada demonstrated further commitment to the organisation in 2013 when it assumed the IHRA chair, making the
country host to the IHRA’s activity for the year. The ITF “is an intergovernmental body whose purpose is to place political and social leaders’ support behind the need for Holocaust education, remembrance, and research both nationally and internationally,” and currently has 31 member countries. Any ‘democratic’ nation can apply for membership, although acquisition of full membership occurs in stages based on adherence to educational and commemorative initiatives. As a newer member of the ITF, Canada has already demonstrated some form of commitment to education, remembrance, and research, but will need to show its continued devotion to these areas. The creation of a national monument is a definite step in that direction. Thus, the ITF is referred to several times during the discussion of the NHM, and the monument is acknowledged as something that will “help Canada in its effort to fulfill this pledge” to the organisation. Canada has a commitment to the global community to remember the Holocaust, and the NHM will help to fulfill it.

However, this does not answer the question of why Canada seeks to enter global dialogue. There was no obligation to join the ITF, and the country applied for and received its membership freely and without coercion. Canada could have chosen to remember the Holocaust in its own way, without the need for an international organisation to dictate the terms of remembrance. So the question remains: Why would Canada willingly join an international organisation devoted to the memory of the Holocaust?

The answer seems to be that, by participating in Holocaust memory at the global level, Canada is able to validate itself to the international community. Based on the ITF’s website, one of the universal features of Holocaust memory seems to be that it promotes values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights; by demonstrating its support for Holocaust memory, Canada simultaneously indicates its support for these values and thereby aligns itself with those nations that also share them. In a sense, publicly broadcasting one’s
commitment to Holocaust memory is a way of identifying who one’s allies are. Rabbi Friedman confirms this. When I asked him the same question posed to Grosman – concerning whether the monument serves an international function – he responded affirmatively:

Yes, in as much as we are currently the only Allied nation without a monument in the capital. So that’s a deficiency on our part – internationally. You know, when we talk about internationally we talk about international: the aim of the nation state to gain legitimacy in the international society. This is a deficiency in the ability to be a legitimate holder of the values that we do hold dear.41

To be recognised as a member of the international community, Canada must achieve some degree of legitimacy; the country must be seen as a ‘legitimate holder’ of values such as democracy and freedom. According to Rabbi Friedman, who is also a doctoral candidate in International Relations, this can be achieved in part by demonstrating a commitment to Holocaust memory. The creation of a national monument will not only ally Canada with those countries that already have one, but will also create allies with any country that possesses democracy as a core value. Thus, by erecting the NHM, Canada will be validated as a ‘legitimate’ member of the global community (insofar as that community includes ‘democratic’ states) and can begin to build allies within it. Once an accepted member of this global network, it can begin to benefit from its new partnerships.

As a member of global society, Canada is able to engage not just in the trade of economic goods such as oil, but also of ideological resources such as Canadian values and Holocaust memory. No one is more explicit about this than Brian Jean, who states directly during the debate of bill C-442 that “Democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law are the things we stand up for in Canada and the things we try to spread around the world.”42

In conversation, Jean clarified how Holocaust memory fits into this process:
People look at Canada not only as the greatest economic power of this century, but also as people that will stand forward for those that are more vulnerable and less able to take care of themselves – whether it be sub-Saharan Africa – with some of our donations, etc. through CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency] or personally. But also from the standpoint of we are a small nation in people but we are large in resource and also determination. And I think this particular monument goes to state exactly that... When world powers stand up to dictators, I think it becomes a better world. When world powers succumb to dictators and choose fascist regimes over democracy – democracies such as Israel – something’s definitely wrong.\textsuperscript{43}

I asked him whether he meant that Canadians ‘stand up’ against dictators by offering military assistance. He responds that, yes, Canada offers military protection, but that, more importantly, the country provides economic protection:

I believe that not just militarily but also we have a tremendous economy. We are the richest country in the world by far, and we will be for the next fifty years according to the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. I think that we should use that might to encourage peace and to leverage other countries to understand that that’s what we will accept and not accept the opposite, which is what’s going on in, for instance, China and other non-democracies. So, I think that, for instance, CNOOC [Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation], they want to invest 15.2 billion dollars in the oil sands – which is my riding. Well, that’s nice and all, but I’m not really that attracted to a Chinese-state owned oil company owning a resource in northern Alberta, to be blunt. Am I happy with Israel owning it? Absolutely. Am I happy with the United States owning it? Yes. Am I happy with other investors that believe in democracy and capitalism? Absolutely. Anybody from any country as long as it’s a democracy and believes in the rule of law. And I think that’s how we can encourage people to move towards that position.\textsuperscript{44}

In the same stream of thought, Jean refers both to material exports (oil) and ideological exports (Canadian values and Holocaust memory). That Canada has lots of resources (oil, in particular) makes it a great economic power and, according to Jean, the monument ‘goes to state exactly that.’ Therefore, the NHM embodies both Canada’s values and its economic status. Because of the intimate relationship between these, the country must take its values into consideration when engaging in foreign trade; in particular, Canada must not trade with non-democratic nations because to do so would be to compromise its core ideological beliefs.\textsuperscript{45} The threat of economic sanction from Canada becomes incentive for non-
democratic states to adopt democratic values, and these values are likely to spread as a result. Holocaust memory can be a useful tool in this process because, by indicating which countries possess democratic beliefs, Canada can decide which nations are viable trading partners.

Foreign trade is one of several global dialogues that Canada enters via the NHM. The NHM also joins in some of the more expected dialogues, such as those relating to defense, support for the State of Israel, and, of course, those on genocide, human rights, and crimes against humanity. Through its association with Canada’s resources and foreign trade, Holocaust memory becomes a foreign export in its own right. The country has a definite interest in exporting its values to other states. To spread Holocaust memory is to spread democracy, thereby increasing the number of Canadian allies and increasing the amount of trading partners that the country has. Admittedly, Holocaust memory is never explicitly referred to as a foreign export, although this seems to be an implicit part of the discourse surrounding the NHM. Standing up for Canadian values is not a purely ideological practice but an economic one too, and in order to promote them it is necessary to take certain measures in the trade of material goods; because Holocaust memory can be used to facilitate this process, it is inseparable from international economic practice. Overall, the most important thing to realise is that Canada is using Holocaust memory as an entry point to several global dialogues – commemorative, ideological, economic, etc. – in order to become a part of global dialogue and thereby become an active participant in global society.

This global discourse suggests another way in which Holocaust memory is instrumentalised. In Chapter 3 and the first half of the present chapter, I demonstrated how the NHM acts as a form of worldview maintenance by embodying Canadian values and then reflecting them back towards the country’s own citizens. From the global discourse, it becomes clear that the NHM is also being used to maintain a public persona. Again, it
embodies values and ideology, but now projects them outward into global society in order to present Canada as an ally to certain nation-states. Once built, the NHM will become part of Canada’s manufactured self-image which is projected in multiple directions: inwardly to reinforce its own self-perception, and outwardly to manage its public image.

**Conclusion**

By forcing the nation to manufacture domestic and international personas for itself, multiculturalism and globalisation have helped to create a distinctly Canadian memory of the Holocaust. The NHM’s multicultural context, which is specific to the Canadian milieu, has allowed Canadians to relate to the Holocaust in several ways. By preserving the cultural integrity of linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups, multiculturalism allows Jews to relate to other cultural groups based on their experiences as minority groups; Jewish and non-Jewish Canadians have been able to relate to one another based on common experiences of persecution and immigration. More significantly, however, is the way in which official multiculturalism allows Canada to absorb the experiences of minority groups and integrate them into the overarching national narrative. By absorbing Jewish immigrants after the war, the country was also able (once it had adopted multiculturalism) to absorb their experiences of persecution in Nazi Europe. This process is somewhat paradoxical in that it recognises cultural diversity while simultaneously integrating that diversity into a common national identity; multiculturalism has allowed Canada to absorb Holocaust memory from its Jewish community, but has also continued to recognise it as a specifically Jewish memory. This leads to a unique form of universalisation. In one way, it universalises Holocaust memory by allowing all Canadians to relate to it, but in another, it particularises that memory by recognising its cultural significance for the Jewish community. While Holocaust memory has
been universalised in other national contexts, multiculturalism has enabled Canada to
universalise it in a novel way.

Globalisation may not be specific to Canada, but it has sculpted Holocaust memory in
a distinctly Canadian way. Holocaust memory has developed a unique trajectory within
Canadian society (Chapter 2) and, by providing it with the means to continue expanding,
globalisation has allowed this trajectory to continue. Beyond that, however, Canada’s
presence in the global community has produced the need for validation; if Canada wishes to
be an active member of global society, then other members of that community must
acknowledge it as a legitimate political entity. The nation is compelled to prove that it is an
ally by constructing an image for itself that other nations will find acceptable. In effect, the
country is forced to create a public persona based on the states that it wishes to have as
ideological, political, and economic allies. By building the NHM, Canada presents itself to
global society as a resource-rich nation that supports human rights, the rule of law, and other
democratic values. So even though Canada is participating in Holocaust commemoration as
part of a global trend, it does so in a particularly national way. The NHM reveals that
Holocaust memory is a product of neither the nation-state nor global society, but rather of an
interaction between the two.
Chapter 5

Conclusion: Canada’s Unique Memory of the Holocaust

I began this study by suggesting that Holocaust monuments are like musical motifs: on their own they appear quite simple, but, when viewed together, it is clear that they are only elements in a much larger symphony. As the motif that has formed the basis for Canada’s collective memory of the Holocaust, the NHM has been presented and represented through a variety of different lenses in order to create a distinctly Canadian memory. By examining these interpretations, my analysis has sought to use the NHM as a window with which to analyse Holocaust memory as it exists in Canada at the beginning of the 21st century. It has argued that, by constructing multiple relationships between Canada and the Holocaust, the discourse surrounding the NHM has been instrumental in the Canadianisation of the Holocaust. In the present section, I hope to understand what makes this memory unique by gleaning from my analysis several features that have come to characterise Holocaust memory in Canada. What exactly does a Holocaust monument composed in the ‘key’ of Canada sound like, and how does its melody compare to those produced in other nations?

As a result of Canada’s unique pattern of immigration, Holocaust memory acquired a centrifugal trajectory. As I outlined in Chapter 2, this trajectory has two components. The first is that Holocaust memory originated within the Jewish community, and specifically amongst the Jewish survivors who immigrated to Canada after the war. Second, this memory did not remain the purview of this specific group but has continued to expand outward into increasingly larger social networks. Following this trajectory, Holocaust memory originated with survivors, spread to their families, and ultimately saturated Canada’s mainstream Jewish community. In recent years, it has begun to spread from the Jewish sphere into the national
one via legal, educational, and now monumental discourses. It is possible that, with the realisation of the NHM, this memory will eventually saturate national consciousness and become the purview of all Canadians. Yet the national boundary does not represent the horizon of Holocaust memory, for it has continued to expand into global society in some cases and functions as an interlocutor between Canada and the rest of the world. This dynamic is rooted in the country’s pattern of postwar immigration; Canada is a small country which absorbed an inordinately large number of survivors and, as these survivors gradually became integrated into Canadian society, they had growing influence. Thus, their concern with Holocaust commemoration was transmitted to others as their range of influence increased. One wonders if – and indeed how – this memory can continue to expand, and it will be fascinating to observe how this trajectory evolves as memory changes.

Because this aspect of memory is so intimately related to Jewish immigration it may not be surprising to those familiar with the scholarship on Canadian Jewry, but it is nevertheless important because it differs so dramatically from other national contexts. In countries such as Germany and especially Poland where the devastation was witnessed directly and the Jewish populations were reduced dramatically, memory emerged from the non-Jewish nationals who sought to make sense of the destruction they had experienced. It may be possible to observe the expansion of memory in these countries, but it does not have a Jewish point of origin; it has only been in recent decades – as the Iron Curtain fell, the descendents of European Jewry became interested in seeing the sites of terror first-hand, and Holocaust tourism increased – that Jews have taken an interest in monuments and other memorials in these countries. In countries where memory did originate with the country’s Jewish community, such as in Israel, the dynamic is different because the patterns of immigration were different. In Israel, the Holocaust is widely viewed as the impetus for the
establishment of the state and has become an integral part of the nation’s founding myth. In addition, the fact that the majority of Israel’s population is Jewish means that Holocaust memory very quickly saturated the national realm. Holocaust memory may have originated within Israeli Jewry, but it also became part of the national consciousness early on and did not adopt the same sort of centrifugal trajectory seen in Canada.¹

Because it shares a similar war and postwar history, the country that most resembles Canada in this respect is Australia. Like Canada, Australia is a Commonwealth nation and was therefore a member of the Allied forces during the Second World War. Afterwards, Australia experienced a similar pattern of postwar immigration in which the country became home to a substantial amount of Jewish survivors; it was from these survivors, and largely in response to domestic incidents of Holocaust denial, that many commemorative efforts originated. Holocaust memory in Australia is consequently characterised by a similar outward trajectory, although it does not appear to be as robust as in Canada.² This may be due to the fact that, while both absorbed a similar amount of survivors, Canada has a larger overall Jewish population; Australia’s smaller Jewish community is presumably less influential than Canada’s and has not had as much success bringing memory into the national sphere. That Australia has a more subtle trajectory is consistent with Judith Berman’s thesis that the Holocaust has not been ‘Australianized’ in the same way it has been nationalised in other contexts. She contends that Holocaust museums in Australia present the Holocaust in an objective way which reveals that the “Australian Jewish memory of the Holocaust has not been assimilated and recast by Australian culture.”³ I would argue that the country’s failure to Australianize the Holocaust only indicates that Holocaust memory has not yet entered national consciousness; once a national discourse on the Holocaust emerges – perhaps one surrounding the creation of a national memorial – it is likely that memory will be
increasingly shaped by national interests. Whether this is likely to happen in the near future is uncertain, for Berman also argues that “Public institutional forms of Holocaust remembrance have been intricately connected to sustaining Jewish unity and identity”;  

Australian Jewry is primarily concerned with the Holocaust as a Jewish event and have therefore had little reason to move it into the national realm. Both Berman’s studies are over a decade old, however, and the situation may have changed since then; Avril Alba suggests that Holocaust memory has begun to enter Australian consciousness, although only in very preliminary ways. While Holocaust memory has a similar trajectory in both countries, it appears to have less of a nationalising impulse in Australia and has not gained the same momentum as in Canada.

Another distinct feature of Holocaust memory in Canada is that it embodies a tension between the particular and the universal which is rooted in its multicultural context. That Holocaust memory contains a particular-universal tension is certainly not unique to Canada, for scholars have observed this phenomenon in nearly every manifestation of memory; it may in fact be one of the most universal characteristics of Holocaust memory. Depending on one’s definition, the Holocaust happened either primarily or exclusively to the Jewish inhabitants of Europe; to apply it to any other situation or context, one must extend its implications by universalising it to some degree. So it is not the tension itself which is unique, but the way in which a national milieu resolves, explains, or frames that tension. In Germany, for example, one strategy has been to construct a dichotomy between victims and perpetrators and then establish an identity based on it; by adopting a perpetrator-identity, the German people are able to commemorate the Jewish victims. In this way, the Jewish Holocaust is extended (i.e. universalised) to the non-Jewish citizens of contemporary Germany.
As I suggested in Chapter 4, this tension is resolved in Canada using the nation’s multicultural ideology. In their study of Holocaust Education Week in Toronto, Michal Bodemann and Hyla Korn observe that multiculturalism has had a significant impact on Holocaust memory in Canada, noting that Jewish “particularism is now being embedded into the multiplicity of particularisms in Canada.” My study elaborates on this by further demonstrating how ideologies of multiculturalism as well as emerging notions of interculturalism allow Holocaust memory to be injected into the national ethos. In respect to my analysis, multiculturalism rests on two key principles: the tolerance and acceptance of cultural diversity, and the transformative encounter between cultural groups. Within a multicultural society, minority groups may nurture their unique cultural traditions without feeling pressure to assimilate into a dominant culture, although they are also encouraged to interact with one another in such a way that they are transformed by the experience. That is, multiculturalism is a negotiation which both enhances and limits the freedom of cultural minorities: it allows for cultural diversity, but also requires minority groups to tolerate and interact with one another even if they possess conflicting worldviews. Within this multicultural dynamic, many different memories are used in the construction of many different group identities, although the absence of a dominant culture suggests that no memory is common to all groups; for multiculturalism to function properly, however, each memory must be tolerated by every other cultural group. Thus, the memory of the Holocaust must be tolerated and allowed to exist freely in Canadian society, and to this extent it is a ‘Canadian’ memory. Through the multicultural encounter, the Holocaust has been further transformed into a Canadian memory. This encounter has allowed the Holocaust to enter the national sphere via the NHM; this has, however, changed the way in which the memory is treated, especially in regards to the way it is treated as the purview of a particular ethnic
group. In the debate surrounding the NHM, the Holocaust is framed not as a Jewish memory but as a symbol of multiculturalism; in effect, this symbol conveys the idea that Jews are entitled to their cultural memories because other groups are also entitled to theirs, and that by accepting Holocaust memory on the national level Canadians accept all cultural memories. The Holocaust becomes a common symbol which means two different (but related) things to two different (but related) groups: to Canadian Jewry it conveys a memory of persecution, and to Canadian society it conveys the value of cultural diversity and exchange. While the Holocaust remains a particular Jewish memory, it has also been extended to the larger national society.

Because the particular-universal tension is such a ubiquitous feature of Holocaust memory there is no ‘best’ example of it, although the United States is one of the more interesting points of comparison. As in Canada, Holocaust memory in the United States has been shaped by national values, and one value which has had a significant impact on this memory is pluralism. Pluralism is similar to multiculturalism in its focus on diversity, but whereas multiculturalism emphasises the group, pluralism is concerned with the individual. In American consciousness, the Holocaust has been reduced to a universal symbol of absolute evil and injustice; the Holocaust can be applied to any event in order to frame it as a manifestation of absolute evil, regardless of its (dis)similarity to the Nazi persecution of European Jewry. Within the pluralist milieu, this enables any individual or group to co-opt the Holocaust and frame their particular cause (i.e. slavery, factory farms, gun laws) as a case of absolute injustice. For example, anti-abortion groups present abortion as a ‘holocaust’ on the unborn and thereby frame it as an absolutely evil practice. This differs from Canada in that, in the American context the Holocaust becomes a symbol of absolute evil that can be co-opted and instrumentalised for any number of ideological causes, while in Canada it
symbolises the need for transformative dialogue between minority groups.\textsuperscript{10} That is, Holocaust memory in the United States allows groups to promote their own interests within the free-market of cultural ideas whereas Holocaust memory in Canada represents what groups can accomplish through their interactions with one another.\textsuperscript{11}

Perhaps the most intriguing characteristic of Holocaust memory in Canada is that it is not a homogeneous system, but instead contains several conflicting – though not necessarily competing – narratives. On the one hand, Canada is framed as a member of the Allies during the war and as a haven for survivors after it; on the other hand, a counter-discourse emphasises the narrative of \textit{None Is Too Many} and the \textit{MS St. Louis} which views Canada’s wartime policy as exclusive and antisemitic. As I observed in Chapter 3, the country is therefore presented simultaneously as a hero and a villain. What is most fascinating about these conflicting narratives is that there appears to be no competition between them; there seems to be little concern with producing a unified memory by forcing one to become the dominant narrative. Canadians – at least those representatives who have contributed to the discourse – seem to be content to remember their nation as both a ‘good guy’ and ‘bad guy’ in the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{12}

That Canada has a bifurcated memory of the Holocaust has been pointed out by other scholars. In his study of the Holocaust in Canadian cinema, Jeremy Maron argues that Canadian Holocaust films are characterised by ‘experiential barriers’ which separate the experience and inexperience of the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{13} This tension is never reconciled, and the conflict between experience and inexperience remains fundamentally ‘unbridgeable.’ This unbridgeability is not necessarily a problem that must be resolved, however, for it is only a reflection of the films’ Canadian context and its relationship to the Holocaust. Other support for this perspective comes from Mark Kristmanson, a scholar in Canadian Cold War history
and the Director of Capital Interpretation, Commemorations and Public Art at the NCC who has been actively involved with the development of the NHM. In conversation, Kristmanson reflected on one particularly draining visioning session that he led in preparation for the NHM:

Emphases of commemorative interpretation emerged that were not easily reconciled. For example, whether the monument should have a distinctly Canadian perspective. That is, should the monument be reflective of Canada’s passivity in face of the emerging Holocaust during the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the important contributions of the survivor community to Canada? Or should it be a monument that evokes a universal message related primarily to the Holocaust as a human catastrophe? As such, should it thus transcend specific national situations? Should it be a cloistered, contemplative experience that draws people intimately into the horror of thinking what it would mean for them if they were a victim of such violence? Or should it be a great, jagged monolith that is seen for miles and is like a wound in the landscape? In those sessions you had people advocating from different perspectives. But I think out of that came, if not consensus, then, at least a way of articulating polarities and issues that need to go into the design competition. The artists are really the ones in the end who have to somehow capture those tensions.14

He points to several commemorative dilemmas facing the NHM: Should the monument be particular or universal? Should it have a national outlook or a global one? Should it emphasise the positive or negative? As I illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, such tensions are common themes in the discourse surrounding the NHM and, although they may be paradoxical, they are generally not seen as problematic. Likewise, Kristmanson acknowledges that these positions are ‘not easily reconciled’ but does not suggest that they need to be. Rather than resolving these tensions into a single, homogeneous narrative, the final monument should instead ‘articulate polarities’ by ‘capturing those tensions.’ The Canadian identity is a conflicted one, and it seems that if one wishes to remember the Holocaust in a national way, that memory must also be conflicted.

This may in fact be one of the most unique features of Canadian memory because, while many nations suffer from conflicting narratives of the Holocaust, Canadian rhetoric...
does not seek to resolve them. For example, Peter Carrier argues that a function of the debates surrounding national memorials in Germany and France was to achieve ‘national consensus’ and ‘national reconciliation’ (respectively) by establishing unified and consistent memories of the Holocaust. Of course, he does not suggest that such homogeneity is ever actually achieved; Carrier is careful to acknowledge that Germany only achieved the _impression_ of consensus while France achieved _relative_ reconciliation. Another clear example is Austria, where the national narrative has long viewed the Austrian nation as a victim of Nazi Germany (Opferstolz). When initiatives were taken to shift this narrative towards one that also recognised the nation’s complicity in the suffering of European Jewry, it was met with considerable backlash from the public. But again, the American context is one of the most helpful points of comparison. American pluralism means that there are many groups instrumentalising many different narratives of the Holocaust, and that Holocaust memory in the United States is actually a multiplicity of memories. However, each memory seeks to become the dominant narrative, and most of these memories are in competition with one another; so, for example, while the ‘official’ narrative of the Holocaust presented at the USHMM recounts a primarily Jewish genocide in which Americans were the liberators, there are narratives that conflict with this and seek to usurp it. Thus, the main difference is that, whereas memory is conflicting in both the United States and Canada, it is competing only in the United States. In Germany, France, Austria, and the United States, among others, there is at least an impulse to resolve Holocaust memory into a single narrative, and even though such resolution is probably impossible, this is what sets apart Canada as unique. Of course, Canada will no doubt ultimately present an ‘official’ memory which does not acknowledge every possible narrative of the Holocaust, but it will likely tolerate at least a few intertwining narrative threads.
Further studies of Holocaust memory in Canada and of the National Holocaust Monument will be invaluable because, as stated previously, memory is constantly changing. The NHM has yet to be realised, but as it nears and surpasses completion it will become the subject of further debate, be known to more Canadians, and will likely become the centre-point for memorial and educational events; further discourse may refine some of the features of Holocaust memory that I touched upon in this analysis, reveal additional characteristics that I did not, or prove one or more of my observations incorrect. But beyond the monument, research into other aspects of Holocaust memory in Canada will be necessary. After all, I have argued that the NHM represents only the beginning of a national discourse on the Holocaust, and as Holocaust memory pervades national consciousness more manifestations of memory will appear; the NHM is only a point of origin for other monuments, educational programs, and memorial ceremonies. I have also posited that the global impulse of Holocaust memory is strong and, while national contexts should not be neglected, the globalisation of memory deserves more interest than it has so far received. So while my efforts have focused on the Canadianisation of the Holocaust, I hope it is clear that the nationalisation of memory is sometimes inseparable from the globalisation of it. Further studies of Holocaust memory in national and global society can, by observing the unique way in which Canadians remember the Holocaust, help understand how the Canadian identity is constructed in the contemporary world. The NHM may be a single motif, but as Holocaust memory pervades national consciousness and more memorials emerge, it will join in harmony with these to create an increasingly textured memory. As this discourse evolves and the Holocaust is integrated into the identity of every Canadian citizen, a single monument will become the basis for a symphony of collective memory.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 The Warsaw Ghetto Monument is an excellent example of this. Initially erected on the rubble of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1948, it was later recast and erected at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem over twenty years later. Although they are nearly identical versions of the same monument, they have lived shockingly different lives. See “The Biography of a Memorial Icon: Nathan Rapaport’s Warsaw Ghetto Monument” in James Young’s The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 155-184.
3 Ibid., 2.
5 See Linenthal, Preserving Memory.
6 See Carrier, Holocaust Monuments.
7 See Engelhardt, Topography of Memory.
11 While this is a useful distinction to make, it is certainly not a mandatory one. There are various ways to differentiate a monument from a memorial, although in many cases the terms are used interchangeably. I do in fact use them interchangeably because it is uncommon for a monument to exist without it also being a memorial. Thus, I use this as a general definition, but do not adhere steadfastly to it.
13 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 192-3.
14 Ibid., 15.
15 Carrier, Holocaust Monuments.


Ibid., 4.

For more on the social constructivist approach to Holocaust memory, see Jeffrey Alexander, “On the Social Construction of Moral Universals.”

By ‘myth,’ I mean a traditional story which lends continuity to a narrative. My use of the word does not imply that a myth is necessarily untrue; I do not view it as a pejorative term.

As for the Holocaust, my definition follows the one established in the NHMA which defines it as “Hitler’s plan to exterminate the Jews of Europe [as well as other] vulnerable groups such as disabled persons, the Roma and homosexuals in their bid to establish the hegemony of the Aryan race.”

Linenthal, Preserving Memory.

Carrier, Holocaust Monuments, 22.

Ibid.

Ibid., 219.


House of Commons Debates, 1 December 2008 (Hon. Anita Neville, Lib.), 464.

Laura Grosman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 13 November 2012.  

House of Commons Debates, 18 September 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 5200.  


Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, Evidence of Proceedings (3rd sess., 40th Parliament, Meeting No. 18), 2.

Ibid. (3rd sess., 40th Parliament, Meeting No. 17), 9.

Ibid. (3rd sess., 40th Parliament, Meeting No. 21), 3.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 13-4.


House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Hon. Joe Volpe, Lib.), 5452.

Ibid. (Mr. Ed Fast, CPC), 5455.


Ibid., 9; Ibid. (3rd sess., 40th Parliament, Meeting No. 18), 8.


Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Capital Commission, NHM Survey Results Report, 2011. I thank John Light and Randall Visser for making this report available to me.


Tim Uppal, Address by Minister Uppal and Minister Moore.


Daniel Friedman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 6 December 2012; Mark Kristmanson, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 22 January 2013.

Kristmanson, interview by author.

Friedman, interview by author.

Friedman, interview by author.


John Light and Randall Visser, interview by author, personal interview, Ottawa, 30 January 2013.

Friedman, interview by author.


Chapter 2


5 For example, it does not play a significant role in Orthodox Judaism. Orthodoxy may however be considered a minority in Canada, and are generally not considered part of the mainstream.

6 Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, xxii.
9 Gerber, “Opening the Door.”
14 Ibid., 80.
16 Bialystok, *Delayed Impact*, 72.
18 This can be observed by comparing the Holocaust-related resolutions from the CJC plenaries during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. See Bialystok, *Delayed Impact*, 109-10, 150-1, 174.
19 Bialystok, *Delayed Impact*, 89-90.
20 This is not an exhaustive list of commemorative forms, but one which highlights some of the primary shapes that memorial has taken. Depending on the breadth of one’s definition, it is possible to include a variety of other phenomena as Holocaust memorials: pilgrimages such as the March of the Living, charities devoted to providing financial support to the State of Israel, efforts to acquire legislation against antisemitism, and the trials of Holocaust deniers and Nazi war criminals.
28 When juxtaposed with other nationally recognized memorial days – such as Tartan Day or International Dance Day – the significance of Holocaust Memorial Day pales in comparison to a museum or monument. See
a list of memorial days on the Department of Canadian Heritage’s website at
29 Morton Weinfield and John J. Sigal, “Knowledge of the Holocaust among Adult Children of Survivors,”
30 Rebecca Comay, “Memory Block: Rachel Whiteread’s Holocaust Memorial in Vienna,” in Image and
Remembrance: Representation and the Holocaust, eds. Shelly Hornstein and Florence Jacobowitz, 251-71
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Abigail Gillman, “Cultural Awakening and Historical
Forgetting: The Architecture of Memory in the Jewish Museum of Vienna and in Rachel Whiteread’s
‘Nameless Library,’” New German Critique 93 (2004): 145-73; Eva Kuttenberg, “Austria’s Topography of
Memory: Heldenplatz, Albertinaplatz, Judenplatz, and Beyond,” German Quarterly 80, no. 4 (2007): 468-91;
Young, Texture of Memory, 91-112.
31 Much like the way that an acid reacts with a base to produce water and salt, social spheres similarly interact
with one another to produce some form of crystallized by-product. In this case, the Jewish memory of the
Holocaust will react with Canadian society to produce the NHM.
32 It is worth noting that Cole’s framework draws on several methodological approaches, including the
historical and sociological (politics), semiotics and geography (place), and aesthetics and art history (poetry).
33 Tim Cole, “Turning the Places of Holocaust History into the Places of Holocaust Memory: Holocaust
Memorials in Budapest, Hungary, 1945-95,” in Image and Remembrance: Representation and the Holocaust,
34 Bialystok, Delayed Impact, 218.
14 April 1978, 2, Ottawa Jewish Archives of the Jewish Federation, Ottawa (OJA/JFO).
26 May 1978, 2, OJA/JFO.
37 Presumably, the only reasons why one would come into contact with the monument are that one was already
in the cemetery, knew of the memorial in advance and sought it out, or saw it from the sparsely populated and
non-pedestrian road.
38 Ottawa Jewish Bulletin and Review, “To Head Holocaust Memorial Campaign,” 9 December 1977, 2,
OJA/JFO; Ottawa Jewish Bulletin and Review, “The Ottawa Holocaust Memorial,” 23 December 1977, 1,
OJA/JFO.
39 I thank Heather Barkman for helping to document this monument for me.
Archives (WFPA).
41 Nick Martin, “Holocaust Memorial Rises at Legislature,” Winnipeg Free Press, 17 September 1990, 3,
WFPA; “Holocaust Monument Project 2011-2012,” Jewish Federation of Winnipeg, 2013,
42 Martin, “Holocaust Memorial Rises.”
43 “Holocaust Monument Project 2011-2012.”
44 Winnipeg Free Press, “Holocaust Memorial Constructed.”
45 Martin, “Holocaust Memorial Rises.”
46 Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many, 63-66.
47 Sarah Boesveld, “Daniel Libeskind Memorial to Mark Canada’s Refusal of Jews in 1939,” Globe and Mail,
30 August 2010; “Commemorating the St. Louis Voyage,” Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21,”
48 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. Assenka Oksiloff

Chapter 3

1 Franklin Bialystok, Delayed Impact: The Holocaust and the Canadian Jewish Community (Montreal and
3 David Bercuson and Douglas Wertheimer, A Trust Betrayed: The Keegstra Affair (Toronto: Doubleday
Canada Limited, 1985); Alan Davies, “A Tale of Two Trials: Antisemitism in Canada 1985,” Holocaust and

4 Kahn, “Rebuttal versus Unmasking,” 10-12.

5 Davies, “A Tale of Two Trials,” 77.


7 Ibid.

8 For an excellent example of this, see David Matas’ variation on Martin Niemöller’s 1938 ‘First they came’ poem. In Matas’ version, he states that “First Canada gave a haven to the murderers of the Jews. But the state did nothing because Canada is not a Jewish state. Then Canada allowed entry of Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese war criminals. But officials did nothing because Canada is not an Asian state. Then Canada found itself with Ugandan, Rwandan, and Somali war criminals…” and so on. David Matas, “The Struggle for Justice: Nazi War Criminals in Canada,” in *From Immigration to Integration: The Canadian Jewish Experience*, eds. Ruth Klein and Frank Dimant (Toronto: B’nai Brith Canada, 2001) 104-5.


12 B’nai Brith Canada, “Holocaust Education in Canada.”


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid., 69-71.

17 Ibid., 71.

18 Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7814-5.


20 Ibid., 14.


22 Many would likely agree with this and, indeed, the Holocaust is often taught within a historical framework. This is, however, not the only framework within which it can be taught.
In fact, the study of the Holocaust is mentioned more frequently in social studies curricula than in history. In some provinces, history is considered a sub-discipline of social studies; the Holocaust consequently falls under the domain of social studies, not history.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

**National Holocaust Monument Act, Statutes of Canada 2011, c.13, §5.1.**


Volpe repeatedly argues that it does not matter what the Jewish community wants because the NHM is a *national* monument, yet he continues to ask the committee chair to allow representatives from the Canadian Jewish Congress to speak on behalf of the community.

Ibid.: 8-10.

**National Holocaust Monument Act, preamble.**

House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Glenn Thibeault, NDP), 5454.

Canada, *Debates of the Senate*, 10 February 2011 (Hon. Yonah Martin), 1800.

Ibid.

Standing Committee on Transport (Meeting No. 17), 3.

Ibid., 6.

**National Holocaust Monument Act, §6, §7.**


Daniel Friedman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 6 December 2012.

**National Holocaust Monument Act, §6.b.**

Joe Volpe, letter to John Baird, 14 May 2010; Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, 16.


Standing Committee on Transport (Meeting No. 21), 3-13.

Ibid., 6-7.

Ibid., 3, 10.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2010 (Mr. Dennis Bevington, NDP), 6984.

*Debates of the Senate*, 10 February 2011 (Hon. Yonah Martin), 1800.

Ibid.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2010 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 6986.

*Debates of the Senate*, 17 February 2011 (Hon. Mac Harb), 1858.

House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 5450.

*Debates of the Senate*, 22 March 2011 (Hon. Joan Fraser), 2081.

**National Holocaust Monument Act, preamble.**

Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, 9.

*Debates of the Senate*, 17 February 2011 (Hon. Mac Harb), 1857.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Hon. Irwin Cotler, Lib.), 7816.

Ibid.

Laura Grosman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 13 November 2012.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Hon. Irwin Cotler, Lib.), 7816-7; *House of Commons Debates*, 27 October 2010 (Hon. Irwin Cotler, Lib.), 5456-7.

*Debates of the Senate*, 22 March 2011 (Hon. Joan Fraser), 2081-2.

Friedman, interview by author.


**National Holocaust Monument Act, preamble.**

House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Michel Guimond, BQ), 5453-4.

*Debates of the Senate*, 22 March 2011 (Hon. Joan Fraser), 2081.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7814.

In giving these examples, one can never be certain of the true causes behind them. However, Uppal seems to imply that each of these incidents was motivated by either implicit or explicit racism.
It is important here to maintain a clear distinction between the Holocaust, which is seen as the Nazi persecution of European Jewry, and Holocaust memory, which is the post-facto interpretation of that event. I personally maintain that ‘the Holocaust’ is a social construction and is therefore an aspect of Holocaust memory. However, the discourse treats these as distinct phenomena and requires this distinction for the binary to function properly.


Standing Committee on Transport (Meeting No. 17), 3; cf. *House of Commons Debates*, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7814.

House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Glenn Thibeault, NDP), 5454.

Ibid., 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7815.

Ibid., (Mrs. Carole Lavallée, BQ), 7818.

Ibid., 27 October 2010 (Mrs. Glenn Thibeault, NDP), 5454.

Some might object to the term, but this list can certainly be considered a set of ‘values.’ Social values are a set of attitudes, beliefs, and practices which are held in esteem by a given group; we ourselves do not need to consider them ‘good,’ but only need to recognize that others might value them. This list plausibly contains the sort of ‘values’ that would be prized in a society where hatred is purported to flourish – in this case Nazi Germany.

Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, 7.


House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Brian Jean, CPC), 7820.

Ibid. (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7814.

Standing Committee on Transport (Meeting No. 17), 3.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Brian Jean, CPC), 7820.

Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, 21.

That this quotation indicates ‘value’ in the singular is presumably a typo. The speech from which this statements has been taken – Uppal’s introduction of bill C-442 during its first reading – refers to ‘values’ in the plural. Furthermore, it is clear from the quotation’s context that it refers to ‘values’ such as ‘freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.’

“National Holocaust Monument,” *Foreign Affairs*.

Chapter 4

3. Ibid., 50.
5. For a more detailed survey of the development of Canadian multiculturalism, see the introduction to Elspeth Cameron, ed., *Multiculturalism and Immigration in Canada: An Introductory Reader* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2004); Stephen Tierney, ed., *Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), particularly the chapters by Hugh Donald Forbes and Michael Temelini.
11. Ibid., 2082.
Of course, it is possible to rationalize a national memorial by framing Holocaust memory as a Canadian – and not Jewish – phenomenon. And while this has been done to a certain degree, the discourse has also maintained that the Holocaust is a distinctly Jewish memory.

Ibid.


Ibid., 31.

Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mrs. Carole Lavallée, BQ), 7818.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 7819.

Ibid., 7817-9; House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Michel Guimond, BQ), 5453-4.

While this definition is my own, my understanding of globalisation has been informed by several important studies, particularly: Peter Beyer, Religions in Global Society (London: Routledge, 2006); Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone Books, 2010); William E. Connolly, Neupolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).


Ibid., 18.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7814.

Ibid., 7815.

Ibid.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2010 (Mr. Thomas Mulcair, NDP), 6982; Debates of the Senate, 17 February 2011 (Hon. Mac Harb), 1858.

Laura Grosman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 13 November 2012.

House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 5450.


No less than four MPs and senators mention personal trips to Yad Vashem (Nicole Eaton, Art Eggleton, Jane Cordy, and James Moore) while at least seven mention general trips to Israel (Glenn Thibeault, Ed Fast, Jim Maloway, Tim Uppal, Jacques Demers, Pana Merchant, and Brian Jean).


House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2010 (Mr. Jim Maloway, NDP), 6985.


House of Commons Debates, 27 October 2010 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 5450; Debates of the Senate, 10 February 2011 (Hon. Yonah Martin), 1801; Debates of the Senate, 17 February 2011 (Hon. Mac Harb), 1857-8.

Debates of the Senate, 17 February 2011 (Hon. Mac Harb), 1858.


Daniel Friedman, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 6 December 2012.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Brian Jean, CPC), 7820.

Brian Jean, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 21 November 2012.

Ibid.

To see the interrelationship between ideology and economy, one need only consider the Cold War. The American embargo against Cuba is perhaps one of the best examples.

House of Commons Debates, 8 December 2009 (Mr. Tim Uppal, CPC), 7815.
Chapter 5


2 Admittedly, there is only a handful of research on Holocaust memory in Canada and Australia, and hardly any in which the two countries are compared.


10 The Holocaust also becomes a symbol of absolute evil in Canada, but it is the violation of minority rights which is the act of evil. That is, the symbol is less general in that it can only be applied to situations in which group rights have been violated.


12 In some ways, this appears to be an ideal way to remember the Holocaust given that it is often viewed as a rupture in historical time.


14 Mark Kristmanson, interview by author, digital recording, Ottawa, 22 January 2013.


17 Linenthal, *Preserving Memory*; Young, *Texture of Memory*, 283-349.
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Websites:


Scholarly Works:


Kandiyoti, Dalia. “‘Our Footholds in Buried Worlds’: Place in Holocaust Consciousness and Anne Michaels’s *Fugitive Pieces*.” *Contemporary Literature* 45, no. 2 (2004): 300-30.


Appendix A

National Holocaust Monument Survey and Partial Report of Results

This survey was originally posted on the website for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada in November 2011. The NHM Survey Results Report, 2011, was made available by John Light and Randall Visser at the National Capital Commission, DFAIT.

1) What characteristics are most important in the choice of a suitable site for this future monument? [1=Not very important, 5=Extremely important]

- A place of contemplation

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Total responses 378

- A site of high visibility

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Total Responses 376

- A natural setting

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Total Responses 375

- An urban and built environment

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<tr>
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<td>68</td>
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</table>

Total Responses 372

- A location that can accommodate larger gatherings (e.g. Commemorative ceremonies and events, school groups, tour buses, etc.)

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Total Responses 379

- An intimate space for small groups and families

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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total Responses 370

- A functional as well as symbolic physical structure (e.g. pedestrian bridge)

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2) In your opinion, how should the proposed monument and its site be experienced? [1=Not very important, 5=Extremely important]

- Primarily seen from a moving vehicle or from a distance

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<td>5</td>
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Total Responses 377

- Seen as a backdrop to major events related to the theme or not

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<th>Count</th>
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Total Responses 372

- Up close by visitors (in a cloistered environment)

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Total Responses 375
5 29% 108

Total Responses 372

- As an interactive experience

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Total Responses 374

- As a learning experience

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Total Responses 375

- Differently at night than during the day

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>82</td>
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</tbody>
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Total Responses 375

- Other

Total Responses 60
3) Is there anything in particular that visitors should experience at this site?
   Total Responses 235

4) What fundamental values should be communicated through the site?
   Total Responses 249

5) Are there visual or physical elements that could be significant in choosing the site? (i.e. near water, overlooking the city, etc...)
   Total Responses 195
Appendix B

*Images of Some Existing Holocaust Monuments in Canada*

*Figure 1.* Holocaust monument in Ottawa, Ontario. Dedicated on 7 May 1978 at the Jewish Community Cemetery. Photo: jason chalmers.
Figure 2. Holocaust monument in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Dedicated on 16 September 1990 at the grounds of the provincial legislative building. Photo: Heather Barkman.
Figure 3. The Wheel of Conscience, a memorial to the voyage of the MS St. Louis in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Dedicated on 20 January 2011 at the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21. Photo: Justin Mountain.