“Borders of Citizenship: the Securitization of European Citizenship via the European Neighbourhood Policy”

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Graduate School of Public and International Affairs Masters Research Paper

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ABSTRACT

Migration is one of the most contested security issues in the European Union, being represented as a threat to European identity (norms and society) and motivating policies or practices which have successfully securitized migration. Citizenship policy has been the primary tool used to institutionalize migrants as a threat by reforming citizenship acquisition and thus membership in Europe to be more difficult and dissuade migration by third country nationals in general. However, securitization of citizenship literature has focused primarily on the role of European member states in these processes, neglecting important practices which are simultaneously occurring at the European level. I argue that important securitization of citizenship practices, using Benjamin J. Muller’s identity management, occur in European citizenship practices; however, are implemented by border policy or indirect practices driven by the threat of migration.

I use the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy to demonstrate this link, as this policy explicitly targets the identity of illegal migrants, their access to European territory, and in turn European citizenship acquisition. This reveals that European citizenship is not only a meaningful and active policy, but is mobilized by identity management practices which further securitization of migration in Europe. I contribute to both securitization of citizenship and border theory by developing sparse literature on securitization of European citizenship as well as reinforcing the link between identity protection and reproduction via border policy.
INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of the most contested issues in European politics (Léonard, 2010), with member state and European Union policy taking migrants as security issues or threats as a given based on their potential criminality or suspected terrorist links, burden on the European economic and welfare state, or their differing identities and customs (Boswell, 2007; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2000; Neal, 2009). This acceptance has made migration a central topic in security policy, both in European and member state politics, which attempt to manage this threat and results in the securitization of migration or “the extreme politicisation of migration and its presentation as a security threat” (2010, p. 232; Huysmans, 2006; Guild, 2009; van Munster, 2009). In contemporary Europe, migration is primarily securitized based on the perception of migrants as threatening to a European identity as the migrant, third country national, or non-European is seen as a threat to European norms, society, and cultural traditions (Huysmans, 2000, 2006).

In reaction to this threat, European and member state policy has sought to further regulate and restrict migrant access and membership to Europe to protect a European identity. This primarily occurs – as observed by securitization of citizenship literature – via European member state citizenship policy which restricts citizenship acquisition to migrants or third country nationals deemed a security threat based primarily on their inadmissible identity. Citizenship policy at the European member state level has thus been used to demonstrate the securitization of migration based on identity, as citizenship policies implement and enforces these perceptions and representations of who can be included/excluded (Diez & Squire, 2008; Nyers, 2009; Guild,

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1 It is important to note Christina Boswell’s (2007) work denying the securitisation of migration in Europe post-9/11.
2009). This literature is quite strong, demonstrating that not only citizenship policy but also border policies, visa policies, and biometric technologies are increasingly used to monitor the movement of migrants both inside and outside of Europe as well as their access to European territory.

However, while securitization of citizenship and migration literature is quite diverse, there is sparse development of these exclusionary practices at the level of European citizenship since its creation in 1992, given the focus on member states. Scholarly literature which does analyze the securitization of European citizenship policy focuses primarily on the potential benefits of extending citizenship and thus rights – human or mobility rights – to migrants (Fernández, 2012; van Munster, 2009) or criticizes its perceived irrelevance as a form of citizenship and policy tool as its acquisition is rooted in member states (Diez & Squire, 2008; Maas, 2008). This seems to suggest that the primary citizenship practices of inclusion/exclusion based on the perception of the threat of migrant identity occurs at the level of the member state and thus frames all securitization analysis from this lens.

In contrast, my work reveals that European policy practices demonstrate an active European citizenship which both expresses and manages a European identity; however, does so using border policy rather than citizenship policy. I argue that the EU indirectly practices and manages a European identity via the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), rather than directly via citizenship policy, to exclude migrants deemed threatening from entering EU territory and thus access to acquiring EU citizenship. I adopt the approach of Benjamin J. Muller

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2 Bigo (2001) There is also interesting work done on FRONTEX has been done by Léonard (2009) and Neal (2009).
3 Guild work (Other sources)
4 Muller (2009)
5 There has been substantial interesting work done on FRONTEX (Léonard, 2009; Neal, 2009); however, the ENP has been neglected in securitization of migration literature and also in its link to citizenship. It is important to demonstrate the plethora of policy practices/tools which contribute to securitization of migration.
(2009) who finds that securitization of citizenship, or policies which control citizenship acquisition, is now synonymous with identity management, functioning primarily to manage, control, and filter desirable and secure identities from undesirable and insecure identities. This case demonstrates that European citizenship persists as both an active policy practice and tool of identity management based on the perceived threatening identity of migrants to a European identity and the active practices by the European Union (EU) to continue to institutionalize the securitization of migration. While there is recent and strong literature developed on citizenship practises in the EU (Aradau, Huysmans, & Squire, 2008; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Diez & Squire, 2008; Guild, 2009, Huysmans, 2006; Maas, 2008; Nyers, 2009; Rigo, 2011; van Munster, 2009), there is limited work done on securitization of citizenship based on threatening migrant identities at the level of European citizenship and aforementioned European citizenship practices. Thus, I build on existing securitization literature, revealing gaps in the literature on securitization of European citizenship and the role that bordering practices play in managing potential citizens without citizenship policy.

I use the critical case of the ENP as both its creation and implementation are motivated by the desire to filter particular threatening migrant identities from non-threatening ones. The ENP has developed since its creation in 2004 into a policy which extends EU border infrastructure into its Neighbourhood or main immigration source countries by reviewing migration applications in the country of origin. I argue that the ENP performs Bigo’s Banopticon and policing at a distance by pre-filtering all migrants seeking to enter the EU before reaching EU territory itself based on EU defined identity standards, thus controlling who has access to European citizenship. This is a critical case as the ENP demonstrates indirect policy practices by the EU to control access to European citizenship, thus building on undeveloped literature on both
European citizenship and the ENP’s role in securitization of migration. It is particularly revealing as it demonstrates new spaces and policies controlling access to citizenship; as, by limiting access to nation-states, the EU is explicitly controlling and limiting access to Europe and thus both European and member state citizenship access to particular migrants.

My methodological approach is based on the securitization school of International Political Sociology School (IPS) or Paris School, finding that practices – or policy tools – reveal efforts by governments or authorities to further institutionalize securitization. This consists in observing a particular practice, with a practice defined as “an identifiable social and technical dispositive or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). When applied to the EU and migration policy, “securitising practices can be defined as activities that, in themselves, convey the idea that asylum-seekers and migrations are a security threat to the EU” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). I thus see practices as synonymous with policy. To evaluate if this practice contributes to the securitization of an issue, it will either be deployed to confront issues widely seen as security threats or be understood as an out of the ordinary or exceptional policy which has not been previously applied to this particular security issue (Léonard, 2010). I apply this approach to the ENP by reading its respective policy documents, speeches by European Commission representatives who created it, and engage with the relevant literature to see how the intentions of this policy contributes to further institutionalizing securitization of migration by limiting migrants access to European territory. I find that the ENP thus represents a practice which contributes to the securitization of migration which in Europe is already widely seen as a security issue.
This paper will present this argument in four sections. I begin in section one with an overview of the four dominant approaches to securitization of migration theory, beginning with an overview of the two main schools of critical securitization theory and concluding with an explanation of the theoretical approach I adopt. The second section analyses securitization of citizenship theory, demonstrating how citizenship policy at the EU level is both an active policy and aims to exclude particular threatening migrant identities. The third section begins with an analysis of the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy and unpacks the role of borders in managing and excluding migrants while also reifying identities. Last, the fourth section analyses how the ENP practices the function of Bigo’s Banopticon and policing at a distance to demonstrate how the border reinforces and performs the securitization of migration and in turn citizenship.

SECTION 1 – SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

I begin with an overview of securitization theory by presenting the two main schools of thought which are the Copenhagen School and International Political Sociology School (IPS) or Paris School. My analysis is based on IPS, finding that Balzacq (2008) and Léonard’s (2010) work convincingly demonstrates that the issue of securitization of migration in Europe can be better understood using this methodological approach. This is due to both the political and authority structure of the EU – observing a lack of both a single authority and an audience to accept a policy – and it allows one to observe how migration continues to be institutionalised as a security issue after having been successfully securitized as it is generally accepted in Europe as a security issue. I then introduce the five main approaches to securitization of migration which also differ in their use of both schools of securitization. I conclude by combining Jef Huysmans’
understanding of securitization of migration based on identity with IPS’ approach to establish the foundations of how migration is securitized in Europe.

Securitization theory was first developed by the work of the Copenhagen School (CS), led by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde (1997), who argue that securitization is a theory which represents particular issues as threats, that in turn motivates exceptional measures outside of normal politics to manage this threat. This occurs by an entity (securitising actor) identifying an existential threat and speaking it (speech-act) to an audience who accepts this threat which transforms the threat into something securitized. This final acceptance of the speech-act in turn justifies the use of policies beyond normal politics as the security issue is represented as something exceptional. Thus, this initial “securitization theory argues that language is not only concerned with what is ‘out there’…but is also constitutive of that very social reality” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 56). In addition, security is a “self-referential practice, not a question of measuring the seriousness of various threats and deciding when they really are dangerous to some object” (Weaver, 1996, p. 106). Williams (2003) importantly shows that securitization simultaneously represents something as a threat and also something to be protected, incorporating Schmittian decisionism into CS theory. Thus, the CS theorizes that “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act … in this instance, security is an illocutionary act, a ‘self-referential’ practice; its conditions of possibility are constitutive of the speech-act of saying ‘security’” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 59).

Much work developed in response to this innovative theory, critiquing primarily the lack of development in the concept of the audience – who constitutes it and which part of society they

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6 Dider Bigo’s work with IPS creates the theory of (in)securitization (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 70) which reflects decisionism as well.
can occupy – and what makes securitization successful (Salter, 2008) but also unpacking the speech-act and the impact of who is speaking or what authority they have (Williams, 2003). Out of this grew the pragmatic, sociological, or French approach, known as International Political Sociology (IPS) or the Paris School (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010). In general, IPS critiques the concept of the speech-act or discourses by questioning both what it means, what it does, and if it is a useful concept to observe. They also look at the status or authority of actors, asking who is speaking and what authority they have, similar to Williams’ contributions (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 63; Williams, 2003). Following the post-structural turn, IPS began by furthering issues such as decisionism, with R.B.J. Walker revealing the creation of an inside/outside by securitization practices, noting “a line is drawn between the inside of political community, associated with safety, security, and amity on the one hand, and the outside of the international associated with lawlessness, insecurity, and enmity on the other hand” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 67). Didier Bigo echoes this, noting that security and insecurity are fundamentally related concepts; when one makes x secure, one simultaneously makes y insecure, creating the concept of the (in)secure, (in)security, and (in)securitization (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 70). Building on the simultaneous creation of inside/outside or secure/insecure categories, IPS incorporates the concept of identity into securitization by showing that (in)secure identities are also produced during processes of securitization. Namely, David Campbell does this by demonstrating that identities are produced as dangerous or needing to be protected against, as “the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p.
Consequently, the production of identity itself as dangerous or threatening to another identity is the foundation of my analysis of securitization of migration in Europe.

However, the most significant criticism establishing IPS, which is led by Bigo (2000), emphasizes the importance of practices rather than speech-acts or discourses which entrench and institutionalize processes of securitization (Léonard, 2010). To demonstrate this, Bigo “fuses a concern with discourses of security and constructions of danger with a focus on security practices” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 69). Practices evolve from Balzacq’s work on tools of securitization and Bigo’s work on practices, but Léonard succinctly concludes that the term securitizing practices encapsulates both concepts (2010, p. 237). A practice is thus “identifiable [as a] social and technical dispositive or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). They are thus seen as a substitute for discursive logics of securitization which works to “convey the idea to those who observe them, directly or indirectly, that the issue they are tackling is a security threat” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237) or “by its very functioning, transforms the entity it processes into a threat” (Balzacq, 2008, p. 80).

Practices are divided into two categories, either deployed to tackle issues widely seen as security threats or as extraordinary practices. As aforementioned, practices are a “tool of securitization as an identifiable social and technical dispositive or device embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured in order to address a security issue” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). They are also “activities that, by their very intrinsic qualities, convey the idea to those who observe them, directly or indirectly, that the issue they are tackling is a security threat” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237) and are therefore justified by the existence of a given threat. However, in contrast to the CS, IPS interprets the concept of extraordinary not as a
process that is beyond normal or ordinary measures; rather, it is a policy which is applied to something commonly seen as a security threat or has not been previously applied to this security issue area. Thus, practices can also be seen as something which is ‘out of the ordinary’ and not beyond or above the realm of politics in the Agambian sense. Moreover, it is with these practices that one can empirically identify and observe securitization as they can be identified as practices which explicitly seek to securitize something, as this is the goal of the practices. IPS thus urges a shift away from discourses to observing “empirical referents of policy” (Balzacq, 2008, p. 76) or practices which aim to resolve or target problems defined as threats.

Moreover, IPS also reconstructs the concept of the audience and the role in plays in securitization processes. They find that an audience is not required to securitize an issue and that it is possible to securitize certain security issues without a speech-act or discourse (Balzacq, 2008, 2010; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Léonard, 2010). On the first claim, an audience is not always required to pass or approve a policy once an issue has already become securitized. This approach thus notes that securitization can still occur even without a public speech-act, showing that “there are cases where a logic of security is at play, even though no securitising discourse is uttered in the public sphere to justify it” (Léonard, 2010, p. 236). Further, there may not be a unified sovereign authority to make said speech-act even if there was an audience. This is worth noting as, even without a President, Prime Minister, or any other central unifying government figure or body, securitization still occurs. Thus, in this case, IPS finds that “the acts of the bureaucratic structures or networks linked to security practices and the specific technologies that they use… may play a more active role in securitisisation processes than securitising speech-acts” (Léonard, 2010, p. 235). It is thus these practices, technologies, and

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7 Based on Agamben’s (1995) work on the Camp or the production of spaces of exception.
institutionalising practises which should be observed when attempting to observe securitization processes and the logics at work in creating and implementing them.

This theoretical overview reveals that IPS powerfully develops securitization theory by addressing both the practices which occur and continue after an issue has become securitized but also challenges the concept of the audience revealing a new understanding of the policy process itself. IPS literature has also demonstrated that using this school of thought which observes practices is necessary when trying to understand processes of securitization in both Europe and migration and asylum policies in the EU and is thus the reasoning for my selection of this approach.

First, this is due to the nature of European migration policy, which Balzacq observes uses primarily policy “to alleviate public problems defined as threats” (Balzacq, The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies, 2008, p. 76) rather than discourses or speech-acts. If one ignores these realities, studying speech-acts they argue could reveal that securitising migrants no longer occurs (Balzacq, 2008). One must thus look at securitising practices which as activities “in themselves convey the idea that asylum-seekers and migrants are a security threat to the EU” (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). Second, given the structure of EU policy making, policy decisions are often made and taken at the European level and are not presented to an audience to accept or reject; thus, the acceptance by an audience is not relevant within analysis or the policy process. If an analysis is limited to looking primarily at audience acceptance in EU politics, one would be left assuming securitization did not occur as there would be none to unpack. IPS resolves this dilemma showing that “securitization sometimes occurs and produces social and political consequences without the explicit assent of an audience”

However, I concur with Léonard, finding that both the CS and IPS could be combined to develop new approaches to securitization theory, but due to space constraints will develop this in further work (2007).

Last, IPS demonstrates that the case of migration also requires the study of practices for securitization of migration in Europe. There is a consensus in securitization of migration literature that migration in Europe has already been successfully securitized; thus, when there is a persistent or recurrent security threat, there is no need to prove securitization is occurring via speech-acts as it is already happening and institutionalized over time (Balzacq, 2008; Léonard, 2010). Thus, one must look at institutions and polices which have developed as a result of securitization of migration which continue to institutionalise it and reify migrants as security threats. The European context of migration also shows that discourses are not useful or possible to observe given that the EU is not a state and has “no government or President to make the kind of dramatic securitising speech-acts that can be identified in national contexts” (Léonard, 2010, p. 236). In the case of border policy in the EU, the European Commission is the entity which decides, approves, and implements border measures with general “border controls... [being] increasingly moved to the EU level...and nations no longer can have the state handle such matters, because the state does not control them” (Weaver, 1996, p. 113). Thus, when looking at the case of the EU and also securitization of migration in the EU, one must look at how its’ policies on migration transform security tools into securitizing instruments and how this change impacts the politics and governing modes of migration.

Securitization of Migration – Five Approaches

I work within this IPS context of a successful securitization of migration in Europe, finding that at an EU level the threatening identity of the migrant has been used to justify developing the
European Neighbourhood Policy to make access to the EU and thus European citizenship more difficult. I draw these conclusions from the plentiful literature on securitization of migration, which explains not only how but why migration has become a security issue in Europe (Bigo, 2005; Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2000, 2006). While there are five main approaches or arguments of thought reflecting how migration is securitized in Europe, they share the perspective that migration has been framed as a security issue based on the threat their identity poses to a European identity and societal cohesion. As a result, much literature has developed observing how citizenship policies or practices represent the divisions created in Europe between a secure European identity and an insecure migrant identity. However, this work linking securitization of migration with citizenship practices focuses primarily on member state citizenship and leaves out of its analysis securitising practices of European citizenship. Moreover, recent literature has observed how citizenship or identity practices are reinforced by border policy in the EU; for instance, interesting work has been done on Frontex (Neal, 2009; Léonard, 2010), visa regimes (Bigo & Guild, 2001; Guild, 2009; Salter & Mutlu, 2010), and biometric technologies (Walters, 2004; Muller, 2009). However, there is a gap in securitization literature on the particular case of the European Neighbourhood Policy which focuses primarily on managing the flow of particular migrant identities into Europe. This is a critical case which contributes to securitization literature in general and is revealing in how it is managed specifically to pre-filter migrants. However, before beginning the development of these ideas in the following sections, it is essential to understand the foundations of securitization of migration in Europe from both the CS and IPS approaches; revealing how a migrant’s identity has been accepted as a security issue and the various practices which further institutionalize it as a threat.

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To begin, Jeff Huysmans’ (2000, 2006) foundational work - based on a CS securitization approach and thus discourses - is one of the first to introduce the concept of identity in securitization of migration theory in Europe and demonstrates a blending between the CS and IPS. Thus, while he diverts somewhat from my theoretical approach, Huysmans valuably demonstrates the origins of securitization of migration in Europe through a historical analysis showing a shift in the perception of migrants from a necessary labour source to a threat to European identity.

Huymans’ historical analysis begins with migration in Europe post-World War Two which was promoted in efforts to rebuild Europe; however, this changed in the 1960’s and 1970’s “from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive policy” (Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000, p. 754). Huysmans finds this change was “increasingly linked to the destabilization of public order” (Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000, p. 754) as the development of the EU and the Euro Zone changed discourses “about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability... [with migration to] a danger to domestic society” (Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000, p. 756). It is important to note as well that these shifts created lasting dichotomies of categorizing people in Europe as either citizens or immigrants, where the former is entitled to security and the immigrant/foreigner as outside of the state, its identity, and security (Guild, Understanding Security and Migration in the Twenty-First Century, 2009, p. 85). Moreover, this reveals that identity, even if not considered a conventional speech-act, can be a securitising move because “it placed migration within the institutional framework of the internal security of European member states” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 137).
Next, Rens van Munster (2009) builds off Huysmans’ work from a CS framework but applies a risk-based approach to understanding the securitization of migration. Van Munster finds that migration has become more of a security issue rather than an economic or humanitarian issue - challenging Ceyhan & Tsoukala (2002) - by explaining that European integration resulted in feelings of insecurity. Van Munster finds that the process of securitization of migration occurs at the interplay between the bureaucracy and political negotiations by observing the speech-acts occurring between these actors (2009, p. 5). Like Huysmans, he finds that “securitization in both its discursive and technocratic dimensions bears upon the more general question of the political identity of the EU” (2009, p. 7) and security decisions are in turn inherently political, finding that “management of a security situation is at the same time also a founding practice for the community” (2009, p. 8). From this basis, van Munster echoes the conclusions of Huysmans finding that securitization of migration is primarily based on European identity protections; however, defines a European identity as freedom of mobility rather than societal or cultural values. In turn, securitization of migration is based primarily on defending a European identity seen as the freedom of mobility. He is one of the few to incorporate EU citizenship into his analysis finding that “while the mobility of EU-citizens is promoted, the mobility of migrants, by effect of their class membership, is channelled through technologies of security which seek to render them increasingly immobile through preventing them from moving or, in case they move, by restricting and channelling their movement through technologies of risk management” (2009, p. 99). Van Munster thus begins to establish a link to citizenship, notably European citizenship, which represents, controls, and manages acceptable identities within Europe itself.
In contrast, IPS works within the context of a successful securitization of migration and seeks to answer the vital question of ‘how is securitization of migration practiced and permitted to continue today?’ rather than ‘how does securitization of migration happen today?’ They conclude migration was and continues to be securitised based on the threatening identity of the migrant (Guild, 2009; Bigo, 2001), which builds on the newly created space for unconventional speech-acts based on identity from Huysmans’ work (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010). This means that the migrant was thus categorized as an Other – a non-EU migrant or third country national - and IPS demonstrates how European practices continue to reify this dichotomous relationship. Léonard develops this approach when observing the securitization of migration from the case of Frontex, not considering “how the activities of Frontex securitised asylum and migration in the EU for the first time, for they had already been securitised, but rather examines Frontex’s contribution to the perpetuation of the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU” (2010, p. 232).

This approach is led by Bigo and is echoed by Guild, and Léonard. Bigo understands securitization of migration to be motivated by the threatening identity of the migrant and extends his analysis to the processes of surveillance, control, and management of migration flows in the contemporary EU which are practise reflecting this perceived threat. These new processes of control and surveillance to expel migrants reveal that now “the idea is to anticipate the flows and movements of particular groups rather than to follow individuals after the fact” (2001, p. 136). Furthermore, migration “became a security issue when it was united and particular forms of institutional knowledge took over to create a web of meanings of securitarian resonance, thus enabling exceptional practices to become ‘solutions’ to a given problem” (Bigo, p. 142). Bigo consequently establishes a new way to understand and analyse the securitization of migration in
Europe, characterized by continuous and pervasive processes into and beyond the border which are permitted based on the construction of migrants as a threat to society or what Bigo calls ‘risk groups’.

Further, the role of the state to create these risk groups or threat categories is established as central to securitization analyses by IPS. The state is the sole actor able to define “both to the foreigner and the citizen, to the inside and the outside, to the religious and the secular, to the worker and the unemployed; and it is because immigrant crosses identity boundaries that these securitarian links are possible” (Bigo, 2001, p. 140). Guild echoes this analysis, finding that “the foreigner becomes compressed into state-determined categories, those categories are normatively defined, including by reference to insecurity” (2009, p. 2) due to the sovereign power of decision. Vicki Squire extends on this analysis, stating that the categorization of migration in contemporary Europe becomes more complicated and further broken down into either regular or irregular migrants rather than simply citizen/migrant (2011). Squire thus shows that migration is no longer an option for the European Union and they have as a result defined more specific categories of particular types of desired migrant identities, the most common dichotomy filtering desired ‘legal’ migrants from illegal or irregular migrants. She notes as well – echoing Huysmans – that irregular migration is framed based on identity and “intimately linked to processes of securitization and criminalization, which inscribe exclusionary distinctions between ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ or ‘productive’ and ‘threatening’ forms of migration” (2011, p. 3).

IPS has also inspired controversial work by Boswell and Neal who claim that migration has not been successfully securitized in the EU. First, Boswell seeks to unpack the narrow frame of migrants as terrorists, operating within a context of post-9/11 policies to securitize migration;

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10 This build off of Williams’ (2003) foundational work linking Schmittian decisionism into securitization theory.
however, concludes that migration was never successfully securitized in EU policy based on this frame. She comes to this conclusion, based on a CS approach to securitization of discourse analysis, from the inability to find policy which expresses identifying migrants as potential terrorists and policy created to deal with this constructed threat. Her analysis is useful, echoing the idea that discourse is performative, as it “consolidates categories of collective identification, thereby helping mobilize support for the relevant political community” (Boswell, 2007, p. 591) and one can observe resulting processes as expressing these categories. As well, she illustrates that these categories are used to legitimate exceptional policies. However, Boswell’s analysis is conducted based on one threatening discourse of migrants as terrorists and thus concludes that migration is not securitized. This thus directs one to require another frame of analysis. I extend on this analysis by revealing that we must then observe within policies how migrants are represented as threatening or what the intention of the policies in place are to unpack how and if migration has been securitized.

Neal’s contribution to securitization of migration is based on the case of Frontex once again but from a CS framework of discourse analysis (2009). Neal importantly observes the EU as a potential securitizing actor; however, concludes that it is too dispersed as an actor to identify clear speech-acts and in turn securitization coming from this level. Not only is there no single speaker, he also questions who and where an audience would be. This leads Neal to conclude that securitization is not occurring in the EU; rather, he concludes Bigo’s “governmentality of unease” is a more useful frame from which to observe migration in the EU (2009). However, as aforementioned, IPS demonstrates that it is the practices of an actor that reveal securitization processes and these can also be observed to be successful even without the acceptance or presence of an audience or a unified securitizing actor. Even if the EU is a dispersed actor, as
there is not audience required, it could harmonize or consolidate policy quite effectively at this level itself which further securitization practices.

An overview of the CS and IPS literature on securitization of migration reveals both the foundations of my analysis and also the gaps which my work attempts to bridge. IPS school establishes important theoretical and empirical means to understanding the impacts practices have on furthering a successful securitization of migration and I will adopt this frame of analysis when observing the case of migration and border policy in the EU. I aim to contribute to securitization literature in general by using this framework for policy at an EU level, as the literature could build further develop the securitization of migration on the level of the EU. As well, securitization of migration literature has reached a rather general consensus that migration is framed as a security issue based primarily on the threatening identity of the migrant. Van Munster begins critical work on understanding not only what the threatening identity of the migrant is but also what the resulting EU identity that is created and protected. My work extends on this analysis, finding that citizenship policies and the manner that they are represented are vital in understanding what identity categories the state is creating are and mean. The next section will expand on how securitization of migration and citizenship are linked and will be conducted on the level of EU citizenship policy.11

Further, my analysis seeks to extend on the use of the border to securitize migration with the aim of filtering and monitoring desirable from undesirable migrants. While Frontex serves as an interesting case study, the ENP has not been applied to the context of securitization of

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11 Van Munster’s (2009) work begins to observe European citizenship, but understands it representing mobility rights rather than this paper’s understanding of citizenship as a cultural and normative representative of values and practices. This will be observed further in the following section.
migration and is a policy which is aimed primarily at controlling migrants from the main non-EU migrant countries of origin.

In conclusion, my work adopts the theoretical approach of IPS by observing bordering practices at the EU level which aim to control access to EU citizenship to migrants deemed threatening to an EU identity. Both the case of the ENP and EU citizenship have been underdeveloped in securitization of migration literature; thus, I contribute to both scholarly literature of EU citizenship and securitization of migration practices at an EU level.

SECTION II: CITIZENSHIP AS IDENTITY MANAGEMENT

Following IPS method, the criteria to demonstrate securitization is to identify practices, in this case policies, which are exceptional in nature as they either ensure an issue persists as a security issue or is a policy applied to manage a security issue for the first time. Thus, a securitizing practice will continue to identify a threat, represent it as threatening in a particular way, and attempt to manage this threat. In the case of Europe, the migrant has already been successfully securitized by representing them as threatening to a European identity; one must then identify the practice which continues to represent how an identity is threatening and also manages the migrant identity as a security issue. I argue that European citizenship policy is an appropriate practice to study as it simultaneously creates a European and threatening identity and is used to motivate policies (the European Neighbourhood Policy) to manage migrants gaining citizenship or a European identity. My analysis meets the criteria for securitization practices as this is not the first time citizenship is used to manage identities but is exceptional in nature as it allows for the threatening identity of a migrant to persist or further institutionalized in Europe. I thus demonstrate that European citizenship is an active and influential practice being used to...

12 Europe meaning at a European level of politics and policy.
motivate other policies to manage threatening migrant identities; revealing a new level of analysis where identity management can be performed and observed.

To demonstrate this, I begin with an analysis of the work of Muller who demonstrates citizenship policy is now synonymous with identity management; thus, must be the frame of analysis one adopts when understanding how particular identities are represented and managed as security issues (2009). This demonstrates that citizenship as a concept is a useful tool in demonstrating how identity is formed, protected, and excluded. Next, I unpack the concept of citizenship itself and show how national citizenship has evolved into post-national or European citizenship. I conclude by engaging critically with the debates surrounding European citizenship by beginning to challenge the claims of its irrelevance, overall demonstrating that European citizenship is central to understanding how identities are managed and motivated by a European identity and citizenship. I argue in the following sections that, not only is European citizenship active and meaningful, it is also one of the central motivators in practices securitizing migration in the European Union.

Citizenship as Identity Management

To begin, citizenship policy or citizenship as a policy motivation should be used as the foundation for my analysis on securitization of migration based on identity, as Muller has demonstrated that citizenship policy or practices in Europe is now synonymous with identity management (2009, p. 77). Muller, responding to the provocative question of “what’s left of citizenship?” (Nyers, 2009), claims that the “carcass of citizenship is identity management” (2009, p. 78). With identity management defined as the “means of identifying/authenticating threats” (Muller, 2009, p. 78), Muller finds that citizenship has been transformed “into a question
of verifying/authenticating ‘identity’ for the purpose of access, to rights, bodies, spaces, etc.” (Muller, 2009, p. 78). Identity, or culture or ethnicity as referenced by Muller, remains crucial in this sense, but it is the new means of authenticating and identifying particular identities which have transformed citizenship. Not only are particular ideas represented as (in)secure, but novel and exceptional practices are implemented to monitor and authenticate them giving access to a particular space of rights. Thus, to conceptualize both how migrant identity as a security issue is represented and managed, one must look at the political decisions which implement practices allowing for this to happen or persist. Muller strongly demonstrates that citizenship policy represents the political decision of representing identities and is in turn mobilized as the basis of management policies or policies of control, which in this case is border policy.

Underlying the process of identification and authentication is also the Schmittian notion of politics. Muller uses Williams’ incorporation of Schmitt into securitization theory, seeing the “transformation of citizenship into identity management [as] intensely political, persistently fixed on the Schmittian discrimination between friends and enemies, merely disguising… the exclusionist politics of citizenship and its connection with ‘sovereign discriminations’” (2009, p. 78). Referencing both migration and asylum politics in Europe, Muller finds that they are both taken up “in the contemporary politics of ‘identity management’…moreover, the distinction between migration, asylum, and citizenship is blurred, as identity management strives to authenticate/discriminate between qualified and disqualified bodies” (2009, p. 86). Identity management transforms migration policy into defining accepted/unaccepted or

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13 It is here that Muller begins his analysis of authenticating bodies.
14 According to Balzacq’s of IPS’ method.
15 While Muller uses the case of biometrics, the same logics which he observes play out in bordering practices; further analysis into biometrics at the border could be employed in later research. It is the political process of identifying an issue as a threat and in turn employing practices which manage and implement the friend/enemy decision that is of interest and is a logic which underpins both biometric and border policy.
qualified/disqualified bodies; thus, “the fundamental issue in securitized citizenship politics (read: identity management) is the discrimination between ‘friend and enemy’” (Muller, 2009, p. 88).

Identity management politics thus works as the practice of representing migrants as threats by constructing friends/enemies based on identities and results in citizenship policies managing these identities. Further, Muller notes that citizenship policy has become intensified post – 9/11 with a “heightened exclusionary and restrictive practices of contemporary ‘securitized citizenship’” (2009, p. 89). This fits within IPS’ security criteria of exceptional practices as it has become intensified around an already accepted security issue of the threatening identity of the migrant; however, I also seek to extend his analysis by looking at what makes identity threatening in Europe and how border policies serve to reify identity management.

Citizenship Theory

Muller strongly demonstrates that citizenship is the frame of analysis one should adopt when observing identity practises in securitization; however, it is also important to define what citizenship is as a theoretical concept and how it has evolved into European or post-national citizenship. Citizenship policy has dominated the scholarly literature of securitization of migration in Europe, observing how member states use citizenship to dissuade migrant access and membership to Europe by making naturalisation processes more difficult. However, there are multiple levels of citizenship to be studied in Europe, consisting of national or member state citizenship and European or post-national citizenship.

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16 This could also include limiting dual-nationality, as in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, or making family reunification more difficult.
While they are quite different in application and political origins, both levels of citizenship share the characteristic of deciding who can be excluded/included from a political community (Nyers, 2009). The political decision of who is a citizen is performed by explicitly representing which identities, norms, and traditions are to be included and excluded in the political community. However, as aforementioned, the study of citizenship as creating migrants as a security issue – securitization of citizenship – has been conducted primarily at a member state level (Squire & Diez, 2008), even if looking at European identity, as European citizenship is only acquired after naturalisation to a European member state. This leads one to believe that it is member state citizenship policies that have the most impact in securitization practices as they primarily control access to Europe; leading many to conclude that European citizenship is empty, conditional, and limited by member state citizenship practices (Maas, 2009; Shore, 2004; Squire & Diez, 2008). However, citizenship at a member state level does not allow for a complete analysis of securitization practices in Europe, particularly as it is a ‘European identity’ which is being protected. I argue that migrants are institutionalised as security threats at a European level and this is used as motivation for creating border policies which restrict particular migrants access to Europe.

To begin, citizenship is a concept rooted in the nation state, consisting of either “rights, duty, participation,[or] identity” (Enjolras, 2008, p. 495). It is traditionally celebrated as “the political identity that embodies modern claims to liberty, equality, rights, autonomy, self-determination, individualism, and human agency” (Nyers, 2009, p. 1); however, as the concept of citizenship is unpacked, one observes its constructed nature rooted in exclusionary practices. Contemporary citizenship is based on a liberal conception of citizenship defined as membership to a nation-state based by either *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* which in turn accrues certain rights,
benefits, and obligations to an individual (Vink, 2005; Guild, 2009). These rights can be freedom of speech, freedom of expression, voting, protection, or mobility respectively. This model is seen as both a ‘bundle of rights’ and membership to a community, but has meaning only “within a concrete political situation” (Vink, 2005, p. 24) implying only with government recognition. However, citizenship also reflects membership to a political community based on cultural or national identities and traditions. Being a citizen - a member of a political community - thus reflects that one shares or embodies these cultural representations and is accepted based on their adoption or reflection of this culture (Enjolras, 2008). Moreover, the characteristics defining exclusion are not given, they are “discursively sedimented and institutionally embedded in national tradition, which undergoes processes of continuous re-construction” (Aradau, Huysmans, & Squire, 2010, p. 566). Citizenship should not be seen as simply a legal status, “but it can also be conceived of as forming part of a broader discourse of national identity” (Squire & Diez, 2008, p. 566) that is “central to a wider process through which populations are divided into governable sub-units” (Squire & Diez, 2008, p. 566). This demonstrates that - while some are included - there is a constant exclusion of others from citizenship and thus a given authority, territory, or space (Guild, 2009, p. 29). Citizenship from this light is seen as problematic, “because its accomplishments are almost always realized in a highly unequal – indeed, exclusionary – fashion” (Nyers, 2009, p. 1) by “including and excluding those who are or are not political agents in a political community” (Nyers, 2009, p. 1). Much like Bigo’s aforementioned concept of (in)secure, citizenship is a constant and simultaneous practice of inclusion/exclusion or differentiation between members and non-members of a political community (Nyers, 2009; Squire & Diez, 2008). Citizenship thus becomes an important tool in indicating who belongs to a political community and who does not, which is constantly reconstructed. Important in this
constructed content of citizenship are the power relations underpinning it which decide and enforce these ideas of belonging. Citizenship thus becomes much more than simply giving rights or defining an identity, as “the preconditions for access to citizenship are always an artificial product of human convention, whether the results of one’s birth in a given territory, blood descent or the fiction of an original consensus” (Rigo, 2011, p. 203) and always depends on a decision by the authority in the political community at a given time. Thus, citizenship is instrumentalized to perform and define a political community based on constructed notions of identity or belonging.

More recently, scholarly literature notes the deterritorialisation of citizenship or that citizenship has moved evolved the confines of nation-state authority and membership (Nyers, 2009). This is due to global linkages, globalisation, trans-national affiliations, or the concept of a world citizen, which all demonstrate that one can no longer ground an analysis of citizenship in only the nation-state due to shifting notions of space, territoriality, and membership (Nyers, 2009, p. 2). These shifts “permit new forms of participation beyond the nation-state, and thus in effect ‘post-national membership’... [and is] citizenship in practice without nominal national citizenship” (Tambini, 2001, p. 200). It “betoken[s] a public space within which citizens can become active, make claims and achieve representation outside the formal mechanisms of a representative government instituted at the national level” (Rumford, 2003, p. 29). However, the exclusionary and decisionsist nature of citizenship persists in these new locales of membership. The case of European citizenship typifies this ‘new form’, as “citizenship signifies society, and European citizenship ... heralds new forms of participation in a European public sphere” (Rumford, European Civil Society or Transnational Social Space? Conceptions of Society in Discourses of EU Citizenship, Governance and the Democratic Deficit: An Emerging Agenda,
2003, p. 29) along with a European identity. Thus, post-national citizenship encapsulates the modern concept of European citizenship which has evolved above the nation-state and is “held up as a potential basis for collective identity of Europe and the idea of an inclusive community beyond the nation-state” (Rumford, 2003, p. 29).

However, European citizenship remains a contested concept, many finding that it is an empty or meaningless concept due to its continuing ties to the European member states (Aradau, Huysmans, & Squire, 2010; Squire & Diez, 2008; Maas, 2008; Shore, 2008). I find that this analysis is rather limited, as it frames the analysis of European citizenship quite narrowly in observing speech-acts while omitting important practices, both direct and indirect, which impact primarily European citizenship acquisition.

Before engaging with this debate, it is important to define what European citizenship is and how it has evolved as a modern form of membership. European citizenship began as a legal concept that evolved mirroring the geographic, economic, political, and constitutional expansion of the Union itself. The foundations of citizenship originate from the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which was originally “market citizenship” (Bellamy, Castiglione, & Shaw, 2006, p. 10) based upon freedom of movement for workers for economic purposes. Thus, “EU citizenship first developed within a more juridical and administrative discourse, which had as its prime aim that of defining the specific, mainly economic, rights and liberties that accrue to member state nationals in relation to nascent European juridical space” (Bellamy, Castiglione, & Shaw, 2006, p. 9). This changed with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which codified European Citizenship in article 17, reading: “citizenship of the Union is hereby established... [it] shall compliment and not replace national citizenship” (Bellamy, Castiglione, & Shaw, 2006, p. 11). Citizenship in
Europe is argued to represent more than simply mobility rights\(^{17}\); however, I work from the consensus in the literature that European identity or society is based on culture, traditions, and norms which do exist above the nation-state enshrined in European citizenship (Rumford, 2003; Shore, 2004).

However, European citizenship can only be given after the acquisition of citizenship to a European member-state by either birth or naturalisation. Certain citizenship literature concludes that European citizenship is meaningless or inactive as it is reliant on national citizenship policies which are increasingly more difficult to acquire (Diez & Squire, 2008; Maas, 2008). Diez and Squire conclude that, due to increased securitization of citizenship policies at a national level, “any ‘post-national’ re-articulation of citizenship requires a break from the exclusionary articulation of citizenship that emerges in various forms at the national level in contemporary Europe” (2008, p. 567). Maas argues that this attachment to the nation-state means that “EU citizenship’s transformative potential remains unrealized” (2008, p. 583) as any migrant to the EU only becomes European “by virtue of incorporation into national states” (2008, p. 583). It has been proposed that migrants or third country nationals should acquire Union citizenship based on their residency in the EU rather than via naturalisation into a member state (Maas, 2008, p. 591; Fernandéz, 2011) and the European Commission proposed this idea of “civic citizenship” in 2003; however, no legal provisions have been created (Vink, 2005, p. 50). This leads Willem Maas to conclude that “the idea of EU citizenship as a post-national form of political membership appears, for the moment at least, to remain more dream than reality” (2008, p. 593).

\(^{17}\) Van Munster’s (2009) work focuses primarily on European citizenship from a liberal notion of citizenship, finding that it is primarily based on mobility rights. However, much work has been done and developed a consensus in the scholarly literature that there is a notion of European culture, identity, and norms which are unique and enshrined in a European citizenship. I work from this consensus and do not engage with this substantial and interesting debate.
However, the focus of these analyses on citizenship policy focus do not engage with multiple levels of policy and actors which influence European citizenship and I will engage with here and later on in my analysis on the indirect policy practices of European citizenship. Defining European citizenship as simply based on mobility (van Munster, 2008) is problematic, as this ignores the overarching project in establishing - even if seen as successful or unsuccessful - “a stronger sense of European identity and citizenship above the level of the nation-state while simultaneously contributing to the ‘flowering’ of local, regional, and national cultures below it” (Shore, 2004, p. 28). Identity or cultural factors are thus not taken into account by this analysis. Second, a European identity does indeed exist beyond the level of the nation state, concretely demonstrated by Huysmans’ (2006) linking of identity construction to the Europeanisation project. He identifies a strong project of establishing a European identity which is based on cultural practices and identities that work above the member state.

Last, claims that European citizenship is inactive or empty based on a lack of recent policy developments detrimentally limits the literatures frame of analysis. Rather than claim that a lack of citizenship policy means it is meaningless, I argue that identity management occurs indirectly at the European level. To demonstrate that post-national citizenship is in fact active, I argue that other practices will reflect identity management practices by the European Union which control migrant access to citizenship and protecting a particular idea of European identity. Thus, citizenship policy – shown by Muller to be identity management – is practiced in other European Union policies which expel particular identities and simultaneously encourage migrant mobility and acceptance based on particular European norms and values. Thus, not only are they ensuring that those accepted will conform to a European identity but also follow desired European mobility practices. I argue that the European Neighbourhood Policy enshrines these identity
practices and reflects the desire to maintain a particular European identity as defined by the European Union.

SECTION III: THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY – A CASE STUDY

In general, the border is used to reify and implement identity decisions made by a political authority by controlling access to a particular territory and thus access to citizenship. As a result, borders are drawn or performed based on preconceived identity management. Particularly in the EU, borders are an important and revealing practice used to manage identities by filtering desirable or safe migrant identities from those deemed threatening. In this section, I present an overview of critical geopolitical border theory which demonstrates the nature of the border. This literature demonstrates the borders ability to perform and protect against particular identities, noting that the productive nature of the border and who controls it must be taken into account when understanding the border. Next, I show that the border is the primary tool managing migration in both the international community and the European Union and thus useful for understanding how the EU manages migrants and in turn identities. Last, I conclude with an analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy which is the particular border case study which reveals contemporary identity management practices of the EU reflecting identity and in turn citizenship practices.

Border Theory

The border as a spatial concept was classically defined based on a Eurocentric and state based approach, seeing the border as the limit of sovereign power and defining states within a world comprised of these bounded spaces. However, this “simplistic territorial demarcation of inside and outside” (Kuus, 2010, p. 6) did not go far enough to reveal the power relations which occur within this space. Critical geopolitics reveals that all borders “share a common function to the extent that
they include some and exclude many others” (Salter M. B., When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship, 2008, p. 371) through the power to decide who enters, this discretionary power occurring on and within the space of the border.

This paper observes the power of exclusion and selection at the border, noting that the ENP practices the exclusion of the threatening migrant – the other, non-citizen, and illegal migrant – and how this reflects identity management practise of the European Union. In general, the border as a space and practice plays two roles. First, borders “are managed and self-perpetuated to the benefit of political and economic elites” (Newman, 2006, p. 172) serving to reinforce and reassert their power; in turn, the “the border makes the nation rather than vice versa” (Kuus, 2010, p. 8). The location and practices within and at the border reflect this authority and are arguably dominated/managed/created solely by political and economic elites.

Second, the border serves as a management tool to control the flows crossing it. Management occurs “through a series of binary distinctions which highlight the border as constituting a sharp edge and a clear line of separation between two distinct entities, or opposites” (Newman, 2006, p. 176). While there is movement across borders, they “do not simply differentiate space… they are spaces where both different as well as similar conceptions of citizenship and belonging are operationalized” (Kuus, 2010) to define who is a citizen and non-citizen. A non-physical nature of borders is revealed through border crossing, as “crossing the border [does not] necessarily take place at the ‘edge’ of the space, the place where the border

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18 Some scholarly literature interestingly finds that the mobility of migrants (Aradau, Squire, Huysmans, 2010) or refugees (Nyers, 2006; Nyers & Rygiel, 2012; Rygiel, 2010) challenges absolute sovereign power at the border, revealing that mobility of migrants leads to the creation of borders and reverses traditional notions of power relations at play within this space. However, I find this analysis tangential to my analysis. While migrant mobility does add interesting new ways to observe power relations within the border space, the power to decide the exception (Agamben, 1995) still resides primarily with the sovereign and manages access, rights, and mobility of migrants at all times. Bigo’s (2000) work on the blending of the border interestingly extends on this analysis, revealing that this power of exception does not stop at the border. Critical migration studies (Guild, 2009) as seen in the work above would benefit from further studying how migrant agency is challenge by these developments.
is expected to be found” (Newman, 2006, p. 178) and can have undesirables “filtered out long before they ever reach the actual destination” (Newman, 2006, p. 179). Identity management by the European Neighbourhood Policy exemplifies this role, serving as an externalized border for Europe to filter out illegal migrants – threatening identities - before they reach EU territory and its borders. Thus, the border serves a management function of who can be included or excluded from within the state; in turn, determining who can enter, gain citizenship, and who must is rejected from the space of the European Union and its citizenship.

**Borders and Migration**

The border has been used as a primary policy tool to manage migration, implementing or reifying practices of identity management – or citizenship decisions – by filtering access to a territory for particular identities and limiting access to others. Bordering practices are thus telling as a case study in general as borders as inherently linked to both securitization of migration and thus identity management practices. Border policies are seen “throughout the West [as] the main response to the ‘problem’ of migration as [security threats have resulted in] tougher border controls affecting people all over the globe” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 134). Most pertinently, borders have been actively used in the EU to control migration (Bigo & Guild, 2005; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Squire, 2011), seeing them as solutions to the problem of migration or ways to ensure further control or management of migration flows. The literature notes that “questions of the Union’s borders… cannot be separated form questions regarding the Union’s security” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008, p. 520).

Before delving deeper into how and where this occurs using the case of the ENP, it is important to note how the border works in the contemporary international community in relation
to migration itself. The location and processes of border crossings has changed as “border control is no longer solely to be found at ports, airports, and other conventional crossings, but also off-shored to the point of departure” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 135) which perform risk assessments “according to various categories of ‘dangerousness’, which are often calculated in advance of their travel” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 135). The border as a location is also an important tool in controlling migration, as it is “at the border [that] key decisions are made about who is ‘legitimate’ and who is ‘illegitimate’; who is ‘trusted’ and who is ‘risky’; who can be allowed to cross freely and who is excluded” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 141). In addition, borders are “increasingly designed to maximise the flows of legitimate traffic while at the same time filtering out illegitimate movement” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 147). With this goal, the EU resolved that “border controls were a solution for migration and that stopping illegal migration was a way of constructing a feeling of a shared identity between Europeans facing the ‘same’ danger” (Bigo, 2005, p. 52). Borders reflect in turn intentional identity decisions, as they “have a deep significance in identity formation and preservation” (Brown, 2001, p. 129). Thus, migration and border policies are processes inherently linked with “the identification of migration as a security issue [stimulating] new border security practices that to some extent challenge conventional ideas of what and where borders are” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 135). This introduction demonstrates that borders are important practices to analyse when understanding how migration and identity decisions are linked; observing a trend in the Western world, particularly the EU, in managing migration flows and identity using the border. However, it is not only important to observe that these processes are linked, but essential to unpack how and why they are occurring using the particular case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This case, as mentioned in the
previous section, will be used as a case study as it has transformed since its original creation into a policy to particularly manage migration.

**The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Keeping Out Illegal Migrants**

With these theoretical foundations, I argue that the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) allows for further understanding into how identity management is practiced and I contribute to securitization of migration and citizenship theory by revealing a new case and new actors implicated in securitizing decisions. Specifically, I show how the ENP is a political decision by the field of the European Commission (EC) and its policy makers which is used to manage identities in two ways. I argue that the case of the ENP reveals first, after identifying a European identity, the representation of migrants by the EC as a threat to its social cohesion and in turn implements the ENP to keep out this threat and second serves to reify EU identity via this referent object. The exceptional nature of this practice, based on Balzacq’s method, is the act of moving European borders into migrant countries of origin into the European Neighbourhood to manage populations based on European norms and regulations outside the territory of Europe itself. This policy is a new way to both manage a given security issue and also one which continues to institutionalize a successful securitization of migration. I first observe the history, discourses, and policy goals of the EC, or the securitizing actor, and how this is practiced by the ENP. In the following section, I analyze the simultaneous practices of the ENP excluding migrants and also reifying a European identity based on the protection of norms and rules.

My analysis is conducted by observing the practices of the European Commission (EC) and its representatives as the securitizing actor, critically engaging with the ENP itself and speeches of EC representatives about the content and intentions of the policy. I focus on the
level of elite politics given space restrictions; however, it is also a powerful and relevant level to limit my frame of analysis as it is within this level that the explicit political decisions are revealed and the practices of exclusion/inclusion can be observed. It is relevant to note the challenges to this level of analysis in the relevant literature that can be raised, such as those who find a non-state actor such as an EU political office a dependent actor on EU members states and other sovereign entities within the EU (Neal, 2009). However, I find this field of EU political decision makers powerful as the EC is the sole policy actor which defines the location and logics of borders around the EU, including where they are located and who they manage. It is thus within this field where the logics of external border politics and the explicit political decisions of exclusion will be revealed and understood. In addition, it is the European Commission which decides, approves, and implements border measures, as “border controls... are increasingly moved to the EU level...and nations no longer can have the state handle such matters, because the state does not control them” (Weaver, 1996, p. 113). It is due to this reasoning that I reference both European Commission Legislation and speeches by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, to show the implications or impacts of the ENP, its history, and its policy objectives.

To begin, the ENP is a partnership created and run by the European Commission between them and 16 neighbouring countries “to realise the vision of building an increasingly closer relationship with [EU] neighbours and a zone of stability, security and prosperity for all” (European Commission, 2010). It was first developed in the 2004 enlargement of the EU “with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and [its] neighbours... strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all” (European Commission, 2010). With these agreements, the EC moved the location of the EU border into these
Neighbouring countries themselves to implement the aforementioned objectives and in general promote a secure Neighbourhood by including the 16 countries within its ‘secure zone’. To do this, partnerships at this initial period were made with future EU members with similar values (rule of law, democracy, and human rights) to help them “improve economic, political, and social development, as well as capacity-building” (Guild, Understanding Security and Migration in the Twenty-First Century, 2009, p. 3) and address common challenges of “prosperity gaps, migration, crime, environmental issues, public health, extremism and terrorism” (European Commission, 2010).

These goals changed in 2006 as it was decided that the ENP no longer offered the promise of membership to partner countries but would continue to promote a stable, secure, and prosperous Neighbourhood. To ensure this, the EU negotiates Actions Plans targeted to the needs of each individual country based on ENP goals. Actions Plans have been made with the current 16 member countries (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine) to, in general, develop border infrastructure and surveillance, provide economic and development assistance, and strengthen migration infrastructure. However, while Action Plans are all unique and tailored to each nation, they all contain similar measures for migration management. It is important to note that all of the countries above are the main countries of origin for migrants coming to the EU and are also increasingly becoming main transit countries (Stancova, 2010, p. 2). It became apparent with these new developments that the primary focus of all Action Plans since 2006 was “border management, management of migration flows..., [and] proposals for improved border protection and controls on cross-border movement” (Stancova, 2010, p.13).
Migration management is thus seen as a main priority in all ENP Action Plans and it is important to observe the particular means by which this occurs. The literature reasons that this particular policy response by the EC reflects a response to threats of illegal migration and the potential humanitarian disasters that can arise from unsafe and desperate migration conditions (Browning, 2008; Del Sarto, 2005; Stancova, 2010). As these 16 countries are the main countries of origin for migration into the EU (particularly Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Ukraine, and Moldova), Stancova notes that migration was targeted in particular as weak economic conditions and high unemployment in these countries “led to desperate human actions such as irregular migration, smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, [and] exploitation” (Stancova, 2010, p. 2). Thus, solutions were integrated into the ENP from the beginning to resolve dire humanitarian situations by “funding projects to strengthen institutional capacities; improve border controls; upgrade reception facilities for asylum applicants and refugees; and fight illegal immigration and people trafficking” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007, p. 1). Particularly, the head of the European Commission Benita Ferrero-Waldner stresses that these issues will be solved in general by the promotion and better management of legal migration, by “tackling illegal immigration head-on [in] assisting our neighbours to improve their migration management; enhance document security, and increase border control capacity” (2007, p. 1). Moreover, the policy goals of the ENP transformed into the creation of border controls outside of Europe with the intention of screening migrants before they arrive in the EU to reduce the flow of irregular/illegal migrants, visas, and human trafficking.

While it is indeed true that “these countries often lack the institutional and financial capacity to address these challenges alone” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007, p. 1), it is also important to note the shift in policy priorities and discourses arising from ENP documents and EC speeches.
The ENP began with a goal of improving humanitarian conditions; however, the legal-illegal representation of migrants became salient and underpinned all new policy developments and Action Plans within the ENP. Browning and Joenniemi find the explicit nature of this target in “policy stressed needs such as avoiding ‘the risk of negative spillover’- with such ‘threats’ usually conceived in terms of illegal immigration” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008, p. 531).

Further, Del Sarto and Schumacher find the desire to stem illegality as a prevailing discourse within the ENP rather than an attempt to develop socio-economic conditions within Europe’s Neighbourhood (2005). Del Sarto and Schumacher argue that with these explicit policy goals and “considering this distinct logic and motivation, the ‘wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ policy was not designated to address socio-economic problems in the EU’s periphery in the first place” (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p. 19). The aims of moving the threat of illegal migration farther away means that “the ‘wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ policy is, first of all, the result of a process in which the EU was primarily concerned with itself – and not with the realities in its southern periphery” (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p. 25). The explicit nature of this threat as mentioned previously is primarily based on the protection of an EU identity. Rather than focus on stopping the flow or containing illegal migration, the policy objectives now seem to represent the desire to encourage legal migration and increasingly surveil and control review processes.

Thus, the ENP reflects “a complex of differentiated institutions, installations, legislations, repressive and preventive policies, and international agreements which together aim at making the liberty of circulation not impossible but extremely difficult of selective” (Bialasiewicz, 2009, p. 85) and legal.

SECTION IV: ANALYSIS – BORDER AND CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
Next, I delve into an analysis of the ENP and how and where it is being used for identity management purposes. I adopt Bigo’s concepts of the Banopticon and policing at a distance to show that the location and role of the ENP reflects these identity management practices. Second, I look at how the ENP as a border performs identity management practices by filtering out the desirable identities (legal migrants) from the undesirable (illegal migrants) by both keeping out threatening identities and also reproducing identities by defining an inside/outside. This section demonstrates the active and constructive role the European Union plays in identity construction and management in the Europe; as well, the indirect way that this is performed using border policy or the case of the ENP.

Bordering Practices: The ENP as a Banopticon and Policing at a Distance

First, I begin by looking at different conceptions from the scholarly literature which describe how the EU border works; concluding with my analysis on the ENP and how it characterizes border practices of Bigo’s policing at a distance and Banopticon.

To begin, border theory began analyzing changes to the border in Europe post-9/11 and all literature “shared the idea that border controls were a solution for migration and that stopping illegal migration was a way of constructing a feeling of a shared identity between Europeans facing the ‘same’ danger” (Bigo, 2005, p. 52). Bigo observes that bordering practices changed first by “displacing the controls both within and beyond the frontiers” (2005, p. 62) also seen as the blending of internal physical checks and the extension of physical controls beyond borders (Squire, 2011). The blending of internal and external security resulted in “security…no longer [being] conceived of as ‘protection behind borders’; [as] security needs to follow citizens everywhere” (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010, p. 134). This blending has also been called a
blurring of borders or the blending of categories of inside/outside (Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010).

However, the blurring of borders is also occurring between the EU’s external borders and the borders of its neighbours (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008), also called creating a buffer zone (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). By moving external migration checks, processes, and surveillance to migrant countries of origin or simply beyond the ‘traditional’ EU border, there is a blending between the external EU and internal borders of its neighbours. Rumford describes this as the “construction of ‘borders beyond border’ or what ‘Balibar has termed the ‘Great Wall of Europe’: a complex of differentiated institutions, installations, legislations, repressive and preventive policies, and international agreements which together aim at making the liberty of circulation not impossible but extremely difficult of selective” (2009, p. 85). Thus, the borders in the EU have been projected at a distance from beyond the outer edge of Europe (Rumford, 2009).

The ENP also follows these general trends; however, I find that recent developments in border theory of the concept of policing at a distance and the Banopticon more accurately represent the border practices at work of identity management. I argue that the ENP represents a practice which furthers and institutionalizes the securitization of migration based on the existential threat of migrants. This case is useful in revealing the securitization of migration based on the protection of EU identity via border policy; however, I argue that this securitization process is not only centred on keeping out the threatening identity but also works to reify a European identity at a European level of policy actors. Both practices reinforce the other and are both important to observe within the case of the ENP whose purpose is identity management practices.
First, the ENP as a security practice of the EC reveals the direct and purposeful efforts to police at a distance; attempting to stem migration from Neighbourhood countries via the increased security presence and extension of borders to their source country. By extending the border, the ENP extends EU practices, values, and norms into territory which is not traditionally governed by these practices. By implementing a security practice of this kind, the ENP in general performs the bordering function of policing at a distance, proposed by Bigo (2001; 2005), or implementing the concept of remote control, proposed by Joppke and Guiraudon (2001). Both concepts essentially define the same bordering function, revealing the recurring practice of moving borders to the source of the threat they are trying to manage and restrict. This type of border reflects the goal of anticipating “the flows and movements of particular groups rather than to follow individuals after the fact” (Bigo, 2001, p. 136) by “infiltrating the countries that immigrants come from” (Bigo, 2001, p. 138)\textsuperscript{19}. Policing at a distance thus “moves the locus of the controls and delocalizes them from the borders of the states to create new social frontiers both inside and outside of the territory, which is envisioned as a European territory” (Bigo & Guild, 2005, p. 1). Thus, migrants are screened and approved before entering the EU by the ENP – thus reflecting the practices of policing at a distance – which unpack both where and how the European Commission is practicing identity management.

Next, Bigo’s concept of the Banopticon applies Foucault’s approach to the border and the power relations which occur at and within this space. Bigo works to extend Foucault’s analysis concerning power relations and surveillance in the Panopticon, with Bigo finding that Foucault “has based his reasoning on the ‘equality’ of all under surveillance, following Bentham, but note that the social practices of surveillance and control sort out, filter, and serialize who needs to be

\textsuperscript{19} Bigo also powerfully observes that this extension of bordering practices also extends the role, scope, and practices of private security agents (p. 139).
controlled and who is free from that control because [they are] ‘normalized’” (Bigo & Guild, 2005, p. 3). In contrast, Bigo states that the border more accurately performs the processes of a Banopticon, reflecting the constant filtering of the (un)acceptable or (in)secure. This concept is more applicable in the space of the border as it also represents the total sovereign discretion at play within this space which, as Bigo mentioned, diverts from the notion of equality under surveillance. The ENP practices the border in this way, by simultaneously filtering legal or desirable from illegal or undesirable migrants that reflect evolving threatening identity profiles of the European Commission at a given time. While I do not focus on the interesting technologies at work within the border, applying the Banopticon to the border allows one to understand how identities are managed differently depending on their perceived threat level and also the unequal power relations which are performed in this space.

The practices of the ENP can be best described and analyzed using the concept of the Banopticon along with policing at a distance, as the former describes the practices of the border while the latter locates the new position of the border and where these practices take place. Applying this to European citizenship analysis, both of these bordering practices make it more difficult for particular migrants to access European territory and in turn a European citizenship. The European Commission in this case actively filters out migrant identities it deems (un)acceptable by the two techniques above, limiting their access to European member states and in turn a European citizenship. Claiming member states have sole authority over citizenship acquisition decisions and policy neglects important bordering practices which primarily manage mobility in and out of Europe and thus access to the member state in the first place. Border practices, typified by the ENP, are thus foundational to identity management and, as

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20 Such as visas, biometrics, or passports.
aforementioned, are managed solely at the European level of the European Commission. This requires a broader analysis of both the actors creating and influencing practices of identity management in the European Union, which must extend beyond the member state and citizenship policy at both a European and member state level. Further, if citizenship literature focusing its analysis on member state citizenship policy practices, it narrowly understands citizenship practices and also the political level or governing authority underlying mobility and citizenship decisions in the EU. Thus, the ENP allows one to understand the broader context of how identity management (aka. Citizenship policy) occurs when observing the border as performing border functions of policing at a distance and the Banopticon.

**Citizenship Practices: European Indirect Identity Management**

Borders also contribute to both the management and creation of identity, as they reflect specific intentions of using the border to prohibit the entrance of particular identities into a territory – creating an inside/outside dichotomy – which also constructs and promotes an acceptable identity on the inside. Markedly, the ENP reifies a European identity by preserving its identity gains from ‘Europeanisation’ and second promotes European values or identity by expanding its influence within the international community via the expansion of its Neighbourhood.

First, Jones and Clark argue ‘Europeanisation’ sees Europe “gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally” (Jones & Clark, 2008, p. 545) by extending its norms and values

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21 Salter (2008) usefully expands on securitization literature, from a CS frame, by unpacking the idea of different levels where speech-acts are performed and political decisions are made. He contributes by pointing to the need to understand and further analyze the differences of how securitization occurs at each level and the differences of authority each have. I extend on this analysis for citizenship literature in Europe, by demonstrating that mobility decisions – or decisions which allow access to Europe and in turn citizenship – are made at the European or elite level. This reveals new spaces and means by which citizenship is given and controlled, revealing important identity management decisions.
beyond its borders and into its Neighbourhood. As mentioned in the previous section, a substantial gain to the Europeanisation project was the idea of a European identity built off of European specific norms, values, and practices which attempted to create a European society. This is also a distinct effort to promote European power in general, which Bialasiewicz notes occurs through ‘Europeanising’ its neighbourhood via the spread of norms and practices (Bialasiewicz, 2009). Thus, the creation of an extended Neighbourhood reflects a specific practice by EC policy actors to promote its significance as an actor and also the practice of the values of its identity. The ENP is a subsequent and important part of a Europeanisation project, to both project Europe’s values elsewhere for security purposes, but also to reflect “the need to preserve the significant gains of the European project” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008, p. 520). This ensures a wider practice and acceptance of the values constructing a European identity elsewhere and thus the importance and relevance of them.

Looking at the Neighbouring countries themselves, extending the border of the EU into migration source countries also serves to export EU norms and practices into the migration countries themselves. When applied to the ENP, Bigo’s Banopticon shows the border acts to ensure migrants are processed through an increasingly controlled and regulated EU border in migrant source countries proper, ensuring that they will be monitored and accepted based on EU norms and regulations. Only those desired will be allowed to enter with the logic that they will be legal migrants, respect EU norms, and in turn be deemed secure. This is useful to the production a European identity in two ways. This first serves to increase and maintain common migrant and border crossing practices within Europe’s Neighbourhood, ensuring the security or a European society mentioned in the ENP mandate with this continuity. In practice, as the EC increases support for border crossing infrastructure and migration and asylum processes services,
this ensures that the EU can screen migrants more effectively and legally based on the processes and qualities the European Commission creates. These practices are institutionalized, reinforcing the securitization of migration, and become the norm for ‘safe’ border procedures and ‘legal’ migration processes. Thus, “instead of simply drawing a line of ultimate exclusion... external threats are to be countered by EU attempts to order the space beyond its borders through the export of EU norms and practices” (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008, p. 531). Thus, the ENP serves to reify a European identity by both exporting and promoting its norms and regulations beyond its border, into the space of the EU’s Neighbourhood, and into neighbouring countries. This increases both the practice and acceptance of these norms, serving to reify its identity and promotes the Europeanisation project of a particular set of norms and practices. Further, by defining both unacceptable practices and attempting to reform them, the ENP also projects the idea that an EU identity is both existent and also accepted.

While this analysis of norms and practices of migration flows outside of Europe reveals the export and defence of parts of a European identity, it also represents an active defence of European citizenship. I argue that this is an important practice of projecting and reproducing values and norms which are thought to constitute a European identity and that this in turn reflects an active European citizenship.

First, critiques of European citizenship find that member states are the primary actors giving but also defending the acquisition of citizenship making them the primary actors in citizenship practices in Europe. However, the case of the ENP reveals that there are identity practises at work at the European level as well which expressly work to manage threatening identities to protect and promote a European identity. This reveals that two main concepts or questions need to be unpacked when discussing and researching identity management in the EU.
First, the type of identity being promoted and protected need to be further analyzed and second it would serve useful to look at the policy or political level where practices occur which impact identity management. Securitization of migration literature (Huysmans, 2000) and ENP literature (Browning & Joenniemi, 2008; Stancova, 2010) reveal a consensus that there is indeed a European identity and that the ENP – and border policies in general which are all managed by the European Commission – reflect the policy goals of protecting a European, not member state, identity and one which actively manages other identities. Second, it is essential for citizenship analysis to take into account where identity management is practiced, delving deeper into practices which are not directly citizenship policy but which indirectly reflect and implement identity management decisions. This is occurring at a European level, as the ENP demonstrates; revealing an active and continuing practice of protecting and defining a European identity and thus a European citizenship. In turn, the ENP and border practices in Europe reveal indirect means by European policy actors to create and defend a European identity. Post-national citizenship literature would benefit from expanding their policy analysis beyond specific citizenship policy to look at practices which are further institutionalizing both the values which underpin a European identity but also control who has access to it.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I have demonstrated that the bordering practices of the European Union reveal explicit identity management practices based on perceiving particular conceptions of migrants as threatening. The ENP reveals indirect practices by the European Union to control access to European territory based on these identities and thus access to citizenship, suggesting that European Union is active in expressing European citizenship and identity and is indeed an active and meaningful form of citizenship. Further, Bigo’s concept of policing at a distance and
the Banopticon are both useful in revealing how the ENP performs identity management. Adopting an IPS approach, I argue that European citizenship policy is an appropriate practice to study as it simultaneously creates a European and threatening identity and is used to motivate policies (the European Neighbourhood Policy) to manage migrants gaining citizenship or a European identity. I thus demonstrate that European citizenship is an active and influential practice being used to motivate other policies to manage threatening migrant identities; revealing a new level of analysis where identity management can be performed and observed.

Previous work on securitization of migration and citizenship in the European Union has been limited to member state citizenship policy analysis or, if conducted at a European level, has limited its analysis to purely citizenship policy. My analysis demonstrates the importance of observing European actors and bordering practices previously left out of both citizenship and securitization of migration studies, as it is these securitising practices which reveal European efforts to manage, construct, and reify a European identity against that of the illegal migrant from its Neighbourhood. Further, the case study of the European Neighbourhood Policy has not been taken up in securitization literature which valuably contributes to debates on migration and border theory given its purposeful use and implementation to manage and pre-filter migration into the European Union. This analysis thus suggests the need to broaden the scope of identity management/citizenship literature, to observe where, who, and how these practices happen and not simply within the direct frame of analysis of citizenship policy.

Using an IPS approach could limit my analysis as traditionally a sociological approach would employ purely sociological methods. Thus, it could be valuable to extend my approach in future work by employing a more rigorous sociological method by conducting interviews with EU policy makers or field work in a given country which is a member of the ENP. However, I
find that the adoption of this approach when observing policy in the European Union and particularly the case of securitization of migration is best analyzed by employing an IPS method based on Balzacq’s work. Following IPS method, the criteria to demonstrate securitization is to identify practices, in this case policies, which are exceptional in nature as they either ensure an issue persists as a security issue or is a policy applied to manage a security issue for the first time. In the case of Europe, the migrant has already been successfully securitized by representing them as threatening to a European identity and one must then identify the practice which continues to represent how an identity is threatening and also manages the migrant identity as a security issue. My analysis meets the criteria for securitization practices as this is not the first time citizenship is used to manage identities but is exceptional in nature as it allows for the threatening identity of a migrant to persist or further institutionalized in Europe. By using this method, I thus demonstrate that European citizenship is an active and influential practice being used to motivate other policies to manage threatening migrant identities; revealing a new level of analysis where identity management can be performed and observed contributing to securitization literature on citizenship, practice based methodology, and migration.

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