The Evocative Art: 

on the Objective Specification 

of Feeling Arousal in Art 

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Objectivity and Feeling</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Shape of Concern</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Objective Specification</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Tolstoy's Expressivism</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Recent Objections</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Contemporary Tolstoyean Expressivism</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Analytic Account</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) A Phenomenological Interpretation</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Osborne's Variation</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Marcuse and the Anti-structuralist School</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The Spectator's Role in Determining the Objecthood of Feeling Aroused in Art</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Analysis of a Would-be Experience</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Our Approach to Interpretation</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Spectator's Attitude of Concern</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Originally, I thought to entitle this essay, "The Consolations of Bacchus" in honour of the first example we are to examine of a work evocative of feeling, i.e. Antoine-Jean's Bacchus Consoling Ariadne. The present work is intended as an investigation of our states of feeling, especially those stimulated in the spectator by means of art. That proposed title would have been an appropriate one, and the sense of it would have been three-fold. Firstly, it would have suggested, through association with the Bacchanalian orgia of the ancient Greeks, the vague and private character of feeling. The vagueness and privacy of feeling have proven problematic for any objective or theoretical consideration of the emotions, and it is that set of issues which I intend to address. I hope to show that our states of feeling would, given that conditions were made to hold over the spectator's attitude of concern and approach to the interpretation of experience, be objectively specifiable. In other words, even our most intense and violent passions could be made subject to rational consideration.

Secondly, "The Consolations of Bacchus" would have indicated, by its allusion to Boethius' medieval treatise, The Consolations of Philosophy, the direction of the change I shall propose from
the traditional, cut and dry conceptual categories of the philosophy of art to ones more attuned to the object of inquiry. Classificatory systems of the traditional mold - those characteristic of mathematics or physics - are unsuitable in dealing with the passions. The discernment of the passions requires conceptual categories similar to those of such natural phenomena as the mist or a sunnier haze.

Moreover, I thought to apply this appellation to the work because it seemed that this would have intimated the highly pleasurable states of feeling aroused in art, which I have found to be the only consolation for the unwanted change, death, unrequited love and the other pains of human existence. The prospect of our having made clear, practical consideration of such consolation has motivated my going public with these thoughts on objectivity, art and feeling.

In attempting to deal with the issues of the rational consideration of emotion, I found that only one area of feeling would loan itself at all readily to objective consideration. This was the class of artworks picked out by Tolstoy's theory of expressivism i.e. the evocative art. Hence, the title chosen for the essay was "The Evocative Art " and we will be dealing primarily and for the most part with the class denoted by that term. But I wish to suggest that there is a significant cross-over from the pleasures of the arts into those of any other sphere of life.
Our flights of passion might enhance the quality and value of life in ways that we would be at a serious loss never to have known. Therefore, I have tried to show that the vagueness and the private character of feeling do not stand as incontrovertible barriers against specifying objectively, theorizing about or discussing clearly among ourselves our states of feeling. For the objective specification of the emotions has seemed to me worthwhile in order that we may with precision direct one another to, suggest to one another the objects or behavior that might through the emotional effect increase the overall hedonistic enjoyment of our lives. In other words, theory enhances or facilitates hedonistic enjoyment because the objective specification or the development of precisely defined referential terms enables us to locate and relocate certain kinds and degrees of pleasurable experience. The increase of hedonistic enjoyment I have considered an end of the highest value. Thus, a poetic licence is employed throughout the thesis, and in celebration of that end. Thus, portions of vagueness, long-windedness are to be found in this, what, on the whole, should be a sufficiently clear treatment of a
philosophical problem.

In the course of this study, one moves from the art to life, and does not begin with the project of specifying objectively feeling as it occurs already in life. For there it seems that our emotional states will necessarily differ for one and another in relation to a given object of concern. We appear to be required to live with the varying types of individual concern from which the privacy of feeling or our varying emotional responses to objects originates. Thus, one condition of our agreement on the use of terms to designate clearly or to consider objectively the emotions, seems never to be met in life - the condition of public accessibility. But it seems that we could suppress our biases of concern in relation to the class of artworks defined by Tolstoy's theory of expressivism, the class of the evocative art. Thus, though our emotional response may often be private in life, the language of feeling developed in relation to the evocative art may be of use in explaining to others one's particular state of feeling. So I have chosen to speak here of Tolstoy's theory and the evocative art though my principle interest is in the entire life of emotion.

My thesis states that there are certain conditions, that I shall explain further, of the self as a free and rational agent
logically implied in, and implied as causal conditions leading up to our reflective, conscious experience of the passions stimulated in art. This artificially contrived experience of art provides the basis for our agreeing on the use of terms to designate clearly the emotions. Our development of an objective vocabulary of feeling in art may then make it possible for us to deal with further problems in the study of art and the life of emotion. This is because the core of an emotional experience may be expected to remain constant throughout art and life.

The emotions evoked by means of art are, under normal conditions, to be regarded as "private" in the sense of their tending to differ for one and another spectator to the work. This is owing to the emotion being the effect of the work on the shape of the will, or, human concern, and our tending each of us to bring to the work of art a unique type of concern. Moreover, the feeling is, in many instances, vague with respect to the cut and dry, hard and fast conceptual distinctions traditionally employed in the theory of art. The prerequisites of our agreeing on the clear use of terms to designate a thing are that the thing be seen clearly and distinctly by each of us alike. Thus, the privacy and vagueness of feeling are problems for any objective consideration of the evocative art.

Our proposed solution to these issues is that the spectator bring to the viewing of the work of art 1) an attitude of interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern (an attitude that differs significantly from the Kantian), and 2) a set of concepts, similar to our everyday concepts of natural phenomena.
(a notion to be further explained), for the interpretation of the experience. If the spectator adopts this attitude of concern and approach to interpretation of experience in relation to the evocative art then the emotion aroused by the work should be seen clearly enough and alike to a sufficient number for us to have a discernful, practical discussion of kinds and degrees of pleasure. That would seem to be the function of any clear and public understanding in the area of feeling and the evocative art.
1) Objectivity and Feeling

The present chapter is devoted to outlining the problems of the vagueness and the privacy of feeling for any theoretical consideration of emotion in art. Thus, our opening section, "The Shape of Concern," is given over to a general characterization of feeling evoked by means of art. This is followed by a section on the requirements of any objective specification. The contrast between, on the one hand, the privacy and vagueness of feeling and, on the other, these requirements is then brought out in the remaining sections of the chapter as a set of issues in the traditional and the recent literature. This is all by way of clarifying the problematic or the endeavor of specifying objectively our states of feeling.

In the recent literature, these issues are presented by Langer and by Danto in the form of objections to the Tolstoyean expressivism. (Incidentally, the use of such adjectives as, 'Tolstoyean,' 'Kantian,' 'Collingwoodean,' 'Wagnerean,' in the course of this essay, is not name-dropping, but is intended as a convenient method of referring to certain major trends in 20th-century thought). We shall later on in chapter two be discussing recent attempts to circumvent the problems of the vagueness and privacy of feeling for the Tolstoyean theory - the view that art
is a means of stimulating feeling. These two primary chapters will recommend, in the first, that the resolution of these difficulties lay in some alternative to the traditional, scientific manner of interpreting the experience and, in the second, that the aim of our attempt to deal with these difficulties is that of facilitating a drive toward hedonistic enjoyment. These points lead up to our saying we shall successfully denote states of feeling, as such, evoked in art. To show exactly how that is possible is the point of the third and concluding chapter where it is suggested that feeling, as such, is successfully interpreted in the manner of our everyday awareness of natural phenomena. In hoping to resolve these issues one has to look forward to wrestling with even greater problems - of which it would then be possible to speak - both in the area of art and of the whole of the cultural life.

In addition, there will be, throughout, repetition made of such program notes as these along with several reminders of certain key presuppositions of our argument. That may seem a redundancy, an unnecessary repetition. But this expository strategy should actually be helpful in making the thesis more quickly and forcibly grasped. For I fear that with the currently wide proliferation of philosophical studies modelled after the descriptive sciences it is all too easy to acquire a mistaken view of this that focuses attention on a prescribed development of experience.
a) The Shape of Concern

The spectator to art might take up toward a work such as Antoine-Jean's *Bacchus Consoling Ariadne* an attitude of reverence, adoration, desire, or any other of differing nuances of concern. When I view the work with adoration then the soft, Renoiresque contours and suggestive pose of Ariadne in the arms of Bacchus are found somewhat less than other-worldly, and I am mildly repulsed. However, if I look on the work with desire, or, what may be termed "a prurient interest," then the painting yields the satisfaction of that concern. This is the feeling of sexual or Romantic bliss. The spectator's attitude of concern is the shape of the human will prior to the viewing of art; the feeling aroused by the work is its effect on the shape of concern.

The will is, as Schopenhauer suggested, entirely the opposite of what may be perceived or be considered under the traditional categories of the *principium individuationis*, but the will is not "immediate" or perceived without the intervention of any categories of the understanding. Mental attributes, such as willing, are, much as Strawson has said, not merely an aspect of the physical, but constitute another class of the attributes of a person.
Under a type of categorization similar to that employed in the perception of natural phenomena, concern, or, willing, appears clearly and distinctly alongside the physical in experience. The will appears, in conscious experience, indeed, as an autonomous and wax-like substance that allows itself to be molded in certain ways by objects, events, works of art. Human concern is this wax-like substance that, in its various shapes and forms, we term our states of feeling or our attitudes of concern.

Thus, the feeling aroused in art is the product not only of the work, as it stands prior to the spectator's attitude of concern, but also of this prior condition of the will. The feeling is the shape of the human will in interaction with the work of art. We tend each of us, under normal conditions, to bring to the work a unique concern. Variation in the spectator's attitude of concern may be expected to alter the emotional effect. Hence, the passions are said to be 'private' in the sense of their tending to differ for one and another spectator to the work. This is the first problematic characteristic of feeling in art. The second is its vagueness with respect to rigid categorization.

States of feeling aroused in one by means of the artwork do not have the clarity and distinctness of their conceptual
counterparts - the so-called "emotions". In Solomon's general theory of the emotions, he argues that they have to be regarded as evaluative conceptual structures, ranging over rigidly distinct objects and/or persons. Emotions have to be regarded so, he claims, in order that there may be rational consideration of the having of an emotion in view of "long-term needs and the welfare of others".\footnote{1} In other words, we can give clear, practical consideration to an emotion only if it is that, in the manifold of concernful experience, which is objectively specifiable in terms of some rigidly distinct categorization of phenomena. These are distinct, in the way of phenomena considered under the categories of mathematics or physical science.

Moreover, Heidegger went a step further, along these same lines, by condemning in Wagnerean art the evocation of emotional experience which does not meet the condition of clarity and distinctness on any rational consideration. Of Wagnerean art, in general, and \textit{a fortiori} of Tristan and Isolde - a work of special concern to us here - Heidegger said that here was:

the dissolution of everything solid into a fluid, flexible, malleable state, into swimming and floundering; the unmeasured without laws or borders, clarity or distinctness; the boundless night of sheer submergence ... the sheer bubbling and boiling of feeling abandoned to itself.

\footnote{1}{R. C. Solomon, \textit{The Passions} (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor/Doubleday, 1977), p. 121}
In contrast to this, Heidegger extolled what, "only great poetry and thought can create," which was "a solidly grounded and articulated position in the midst of beings."  

Owing to the freely autonomous and wax-like character of human concern, it is possible to limit concernful experience to the having of "emotions" or, to within the borders of the rigidly defined and publicly accessible. One simply limits one's attitude of concern to responding only in certain ways to works of art.

However, the "emotions" could only be one part of what we mean by feeling in art. One may find, for example, in Tristan and Isolde a confusion of the feeling-states of religious ardour and purely sexual longing. Thus, the feeling stimulated in much of the work - and this will be indicated in somewhat greater detail in further discussion - is vague with respect to these rigidly distinct, mutually exclusive categories of emotion. Mutually exclusive conceptual categories are those under which there is no admixture of the thing perceived and its opposite. But one's aesthetic response is the shape imposed by the work on the human will and seems to acquire from its origin in this vague and fluid motion of life the vagueness of certain natural phenomena. By that, I mean phenomena such as the melding of the sky and sea on a bright and windless afternoon. Thus, the feeling is vague with respect to mutually exclusive categories of perception in the same way as are such natural phenomena.

One possible objection to this notion of the vagueness of

feeling is that a confusion of a certain number of the categories of emotion - such as we find in the case of religious ardour and sexual longing in *Tristan and Isolde* - is, itself, clearly and rigidly defined, defined as that set of which it alone may be said to constitute the confusion. The confusion of 'a' and 'b' is a category 'c' set off entirely from 'x' or 'z' or the confusion of any other class of items. However, the feeling aroused at the close of Mahler's *Song of the Earth* seems to be the sense of affirmation given to an indefinite array of human concerns and accompanying natural forces. Moreover, Petronius's *Satyricon* appears to evoke at its close the sense of promise lent suddenly to an uncertain diversity of hopes and desires. The feeling aroused in one by such works of art is vague with respect to any set of mutually exclusive categories. This is because the exact set of that which they may be said to confuse is not clearly defined such as is the set of the categories of sexual longing and religious ardour; rather the aspects of the set are uncertain.

Rigid categories of interpretation are incompatible with there being any cross-over from one thing to its opposite. States of feeling sometimes appear outside of such rigid classification, appear as a melding of opposites or as some unbordered and unbroken progression. In view of such possibilities as are suggested by *Tristan and Isolde*, *The Song of the Earth*, *Satyricon* it seems that some additional set of the categories of interpretation alongside the traditional and rigidly defined is necessary in order that we may take a reflective view of the passions stimulated in art.
These are thought to be the unwelcome attributes of feeling generated by means of art: their privacy and vagueness. In the further course of our discussion, I hope to explain the unusual structure of emotional states by analogy to natural phenomena such as the storm, the wind, or the mist. To these phenomena there is already public access due to our common ground for the experience in the human sensory apparatus. I may, therefore, make myself understood. It is in terms of the same type of conceptualization as that under which we reflect on such natural phenomena that states of feeling may be said to meet the condition of clarity and distinctness on any theoretical consideration. It is also in such terms that I may make understood a neutral interest or an interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern which is to play an analogous role to that of the human sensory apparatus, insuring that the experience is publicly accessible or the same for each and every subject or spectator to the work of art. That is the further prerequisite of any objective specification. Hence, these special conceptual categories together with a neutral interest on the part of the spectator work to bring about the phenomenal character of feeling on the basis of which we may employ terms discernfully in association with feeling-states. That is, in brief, my argument for dealing with the problems of the vagueness and
privacy of feeling for any theoretical consideration. It seems necessary to skim over that argument, at this point, in order to say that there is any basis for our understanding of the vagueness and privacy of the emotions.

Of course, it is also true of the feeling aroused in art, in the case of, say, Bach's *St. Matthew Passion* or Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, that the evocation of the work is not vague, but rigidly defined. The feeling stimulated by such works of art as these may be said to have an element of the spiritual about it in the same way as this is said of our vision of the mountain side or the leaves fixed in the still air among the branches of a tree. Moreover, along with the rigidly defined categories of emotion, it appears that in order to comprehend the evocative art - in almost every instance other than music - it is necessary to bring to the appreciation of the work a set of strictly defined expectations regarding the significance of certain signs, symbols, representational features of art. This is because almost every work of art, even the evocative rather than the purely representational, demands for our appreciation and for the enjoyment of its effect that we understand a given formal or natural language. Furthermore, the primary objective features of the work - such as, its size, shape, pitch, resonance and the like - which are rigidly defined, may also play a role in determining the spectator's response. The representational and the primary objective features of art are the type of things that constitute the work as it stands prior to the introduction of the spectator's attitude of concern, and it is this facet of the work along with our concern that
determines the effect. Therefore, though it may not be necessary to drag out strictly defined categories of interpretation in order to specify the more interesting class of emotional effects, it is necessary in most if not all cases, in order to explain the connection between the spectator's response and any given work of art. Consequently, much of what is of interest to us about the evocative art involves us in the traditional categories of interpretation.

Nevertheless, if I am together with another human being in the viewing of a work of art then it seems that we could confer on the kind and degree of our emotional experience of the work - even on those primary objective and purely representational features that may be said to have given rise to it - entirely within the temporal mode of nature. The whole of the experience might thus be altogether coherent and clearly defined. The so-called element of the spiritual found in works such as The St. Matthew Passion or Anna Karenina; the representational and primary objective features of art, and the more problematic, less clearly defined effects of such as The Song of the Earth may form, on the whole, an experience that is coherent, in the same way as are contiguous the felt proportions of a wind and those more exacting of the sail that catches its thrust.

What I shall be referring to, throughout the discussion, as the 'concepts of nature' are those that have the shapes and forms of any and all natural phenomena as these appear in the everyday awareness and prior to our reduction of them to the categories of mathematics and physical science. It is in virtue of the concepts of nature that it is possible to specify clearly and for
the benefit of the public any emotional effect of the work of art.
However, in order to see more precisely the difficulties which
stand in the way of that procedure it is necessary to take a
closer look at the prerequisites of any objective specification
or rational consideration.
b) Objective Specification

Certainly, the requirements for any objective specification, or, in other words, for our speaking clearly and in a way that each of us can understand, about the emotions aroused in art are that they be clearly distinct phenomena and that these phenomena be publicly accessible. What is meant here by an objective specification of a thing or any theoretical consideration of it is that, at the very least, one makes reference to the thing in a way that identifies it for others as that which it is and is distinct from that which it is not. Hence, an objective specification amounts to our agreement on the precise use of a term in reference to some matter. Thus, in order to agree on the use of terms in association with the experience of the work, thought to be essentially its evocation of feeling and to communicate about it clearly among ourselves, it is required that experiences of feeling be distinct from each other and from any other type of thing and that there be in our experience of the work a shared ground of meaning for our use of the terms.

In this way, some set of conditions holding over the object are deemed necessary for any theoretical consideration. These
conditions on the thing specified - that it be clearly distinct and
publicly accessible - may be more precisely defined in terms of
'experience,' 'conscious experience,' 'expectations,' and 'attitudes
of concern'. Drawing the picture of the objective specification
of a thing, in these terms, will also be helpful later on in
identifying the conditions of the self that may be brought about
to insure there being what is necessary for the theoretical
consideration of feeling.

What is meant here by 'experience' is the interaction of
the self and its environment. Sensations result, thus, from the
self as a sensory agent, interacting with objects or activities
in the environment to produce light, colour, sound, textures, or
what have you. The emotional experience has its basis in the
self as a willing or concernful agent in interaction with
objects, activities, or the ideas of such in the world. In the
case of sensations, the common ground of meaning for our terms
is the result of our shared condition of the self as a sensory
agent. Without that condition holding over ourselves as sensory
agents, objects and events would tend to produce on each of us
entirely different sensory effects. We would live each of us in
entirely different sensory worlds, and it would be impossible for
us to agree on the meanings of terms used in reference to
sensations. That condition of a shared nature must be made to
hold also over ourselves as concernful agents in order that our
states of feeling, had in connection with a given object, be
publicly accessible phenomena.

Furthermore, by 'conscious experience' I mean that which is
interpreted under a set of polar opposite conceptual categories. In other words, a conscious experience is one in which we are aware of distinctions. By the 'concept of a thing' I mean the faint image, imagined or recalled of an actual or what could conceivably be an actual impression. We distinguish the actual from the imagined or remembered experience precisely along the lines of Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas. Conceptual categories are involved in the conscious experience or clear discernment of impressions. They enable us to see a thing clearly. The concept of a thing scarcely stands alone. Further, for our clear discernment of it, for our perception of it, it is necessary that there be also present in the experience the concept of the object's polar opposite. That is to say, its contrary, contradictory, or sub-contrary. Hence, we speak of a thing seen under a set of conceptual categories as necessary for there being any conscious experience. Therefore, a set of concepts is involved in any objective specification of feeling. This is because any objective specification requires that we are consciously aware of the object specified.

In addition, it may be observed that these sets of conceptual categories are found in experience as expectations regarding the character or significance of experience. It is the set of our expectations which enables us even to remark on objects in the world. One enters an unfamiliar setting, filled with objects or persons never seen before, and it seems that one has to develop expectations regarding what may or may not be present in that setting before one may recognize these objects or persons for
whom or what they are and to distinguish them from what they are not. Our terms used in reference to such things cannot be used meaningfully unless the referents are so clearly distinct. Because if the referents are not so clearly distinct then there is the tendency for the meaning of a term or its intended referent to be confused with what it is not. This may lead to our expectations may lead to the conscious experience of feeling aroused in art. Thus, not only is there a common condition of the self as a concernful agent involved in the objective specification of feeling, but also the experience of feeling being "conscious" or the feeling being found under a set of distinct categories, some set of expectations regarding the character or significance of experience.

However, owing to the origin of feeling in the vague and fluid notion of life, in the free and wax-like substance of the will, it has proven difficult to specify feeling clearly for each and all or even to bring the emotion, for one of us, to the level of conscious experience. The feeling tends to differ from one individual to the next. The emotion is often inherently ambivalent, vague with respect to mutually exclusive categories. Often, the feeling being of one sort has to be regarded as consistent with its being of another. The categories under which these ambivalent or vague emotions are clarified are sub-contraries rather than the traditional contradictory or contrary categories of interpretation. The privacy of feeling - its tendency to differ for one and another spectator to the work of art - and the vagueness of feeling with respect to the traditional categories of the
identity and uniqueness of things have proven problematic for the expressivist theory or for any proposed theoretical consideration of the work thought to be essentially its arousal of feeling. These quandries may be spelled out more clearly with reference to Tolstoy's original expressivism; to the artwork defined by that theory as essentially an evocation of feeling, and to the objections to his expressivism found in the recent literature.
c) Tolstoy's Expressivism

Having made some remarks about the origin of the problematic character of feeling in the self as a concernful agent and some observations on the requirements of objective specification, I would like now to say more about the artwork that is thought to be essentially its evocation of feeling. This was the way the work of art was thought to be in Tolstoy's theory of art. I wish to contrast the evocative art with the work communicative of feeling - as in Collingwood's theory of expressivism - in order to bring greater clarity to the notion of the artwork regarded as a state of feeling. I mention these theories and later some objections because Tolstoy's specific notion of art together with recent objections to it from Langer and Danto, can be made the basis for the fully developed problematic of the objective specification of feeling.

We shall find with respect to the Tolstoyean work of art, that it would, in order to be interpreted correctly, have to be brought into the light of conscious experience in the manner of impressions rather than symbolic terms. This means that any proposed interpretation - as the basis for any conscious awareness - of the evocative experience is grounded on whether conception coheres with impressions of feeling. Having elicited that
The issues of the privacy and the vagueness of feeling for any objective consideration were ones Tolstoy left unconsidered in his late 19th-century theoretical writings where he advocated one of the original versions of the expressivist theory. On Tolstoy's account, art was essentially a means to the stimulation of feeling. Tolstoy's notion of the 'infectiousness' of the artwork referred to the degree to which the work aroused a given state of feeling in the audience. The intensity of the feeling aroused was, in turn, thought proportionate, at least, in the case of the successful work of art, to the artist's 'sincerity'. That was the intensity with which the artist had, himself, experienced that state of feeling.¹ In other words, the artist's past experience of feeling was to be the model or guide on which the artist based his efforts to contrive that same experience for his

audience. For example, Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* seems to have been his efforts at stimulating in his reader the emotion of Christian faith.

Hence, there was to be a causal relation established between the artist's efforts and the spectator's experience of feeling, and with particular difficulty, since the privacy and vagueness of the experience stand in the way of our direct or empirical, observation of one pole of that relation. Therefore, Tolstoy's theoretical writings have, on the whole, been decried as merely the artist's infelicitious venture along the, in some ways, more demanding avenues of philosophy.

In the early 20th-century, R. G. Collingwood took up Tolstoy's theme, but here was one who had evidently spent a lifetime dealing with the rigours of philosophical analysis. Collingwood held, as did Tolstoy before him, that art was essentially an expression of feeling, however, Collingwood stipulated that the artist's original state of feeling be objectified in the medium of artistic communication. We were to understand how the artist felt by our imagining exactly what anyone would have to go through in order to be prompted to signify it in that way. This was what Collingwood meant by our having to sympathize with the artist's state of feeling.¹

Consequently, while Tolstoy's emphasis was on a means of stimulating, arousing or evoking feeling in the audience; Collingwood drew attention to the artist's mode of communication about feeling. The difference between stimulating and communicating about feeling

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is like that between showing a woman how much I love her - i.e.,
the stimulation of feeling - and telling her so.

Obviously, the distinction is not cut and dry. In some cases,
a state of feeling signified in some portion of the work plays a
role in bringing about the overall effect - such as where Othello
attempts to express his own state of grief and remorse - but our
leading concern will not be with the Collingwoodean theory of
expressivism. Once the problem of the privacy and vagueness of
feeling for any objective consideration of the work evocative of
emotion has been dealt with for an independent set of cases then
the correspondent difficulties pertaining to the feeling signified
in art should meet easily with their resolution. The artwork
signifying feeling is, itself, a purported specification of
feeling in an artistic language. Having established a basis for
correcting and refining our use of terms for emotion in a natural
language then it should be possible to use that language in
determining the precise symbolic content of terms used in
reference to feeling in an artistic mode of communication. In
other words, our argument concerning the evocative art is not
made circular by examples such as Othello. We shall be dealing
primarily with elements of works found in (or taken from),
for example, the music of Tristan and Isolde, which are
evidently purely evocative.
We are starting with the problematic of the evocative art because while the artistic signification of feeling has its meaning grounded in life - that is to say, in the artist's life - where the character of emotional experience is particularly problematic, the work of evocation seems to offer a relatively stable foundation on which to build up the meanings of terms. It seems that in the realm of life outside of art we could never begin, nor even wish to begin, clearing away the numerous biases of concern that have led to our experiencing in relation to objects there such a wide diversity of emotional response. However, it might be reasonable to expect an unbiased attitude of concern on the part of the spectator to the evocative art. Thus, the phenomena of art, defined by the Tolstoyean theory, may be said to represent a more stable basis on which to develop a language of feeling. I am bringing into the discussion the notion of the Collingwoodean theory and the category of art to which the theory would seem to apply only for the sake of clarifying to the fullest possible extent the Tolstoyean theory and the object - the evocative art - of which that theory may be the most apt representation.

Tolstoy's theory and the recent objections to it provide us with a foil for displaying the problem of the objective specification of feeling as it is found in art and life. Our interest is not limited to the area of art-theory. Rather our dealings with the problem in the area of art are intended to result in the
development of a vocabulary of terms for feeling as it occurs in any sphere of life. Moreover, I do not propose a defense of the Tolstoyean theory in the form in which it was intended, namely, as a statement of the essential character of art. I am following Weitz in saying that some works may be, say, representational while others are best regarded otherwise, and that the only necessary condition for the concept of 'art' is that the referent of the term be subject to theory. By proposing that the evocative art may be made subject to theoretical consideration, I wish to suggest that this class of works together with the Collingwoodean type of art along with other types of art each have a place in the concept. By the evocative, of course, I mean such works of art as The Song of the Earth, Tristan and Isolde, Hardy's novels, The St. Matthew Gospel, or Bach's St. Matthew Passion in the case of which it seems the most profitable manner of appreciating the work is through the spectator's state of feeling, as the shape of the human will in the viewing of the work.

It may be remarked that Langer proposes a version of the Collingwoodean theory - her version is that the artwork is essentially any one of a number of "forms symbolic of human feeling" and she observes of Wagnerean art that "rarely does the work exhibit any great forms."  

2. Ibid., p. 182
Indeed, it is only as an evocation of feeling that works of art, such as Wagner produced - at least, in the middle and late periods, respectively, those of Tristan and Isolde and Parzival - can be justified. This justification is what makes a work of art enter into the class of the evocative.

The evocative art is further clarified as we proceed to explain again and in greater detail some of the presuppositions of our view, namely that the spectator has a specific function to perform in bringing about the objecthood or phenomenal appearance of feeling in art. It has already been remarked that whether a work of art is considered stimulative or communicative of feeling our conscious experience of the work depends on a set of concepts, in other words, on our taking a certain approach to, or our bringing of a set of expectations to the interpretation of the experience. The conceptual systems employed in the interpretation of experience are constitutive of, and they often may be said to categorize the conditions of the self under which conscious experience is possible. The conscious element in experience results from the development of certain conceptual categories or conditions of the self as a rational agent. There is a causal
relation between conscious experience and conditions of the self as concernful and rational. The development of certain sets of expectations may, I wish to suggest, enable us to remark clearly on states of feeling. In addition, the conceptual categories involved in conscious experience may make reference to, or categorize conditions of the self as sensory and concernful which have helped to bring about the experience, conscious or otherwise. But conditions of the self as a rational agent are such that - like most conditions of the concernful agent and unlike most of those of the sensory - they are freely chosen. Thus, we speak of these conceptual categories or sets of expectations as the subject's approach to the interpretation of experience.

One's approach to interpretation is developed in the same manner as is the Hempelian hypothesis. It is primarily a product of imagination or conjecture, and subsequently tested in experience. Thus, our expectations regarding the symbolic content of a thing - i.e., the sort appropriate to the Collingwoodean work of art - may be confirmed in our traditional use of symbolic terms. This is because our traditional use of symbolic terms determines the character of the work of symbolic art. In other words, for one to appreciate the symbolic or the representational content of experience, one has to have the traditional, the agreed on set of expectations regarding the symbolic content of things. Obviously, in the case of the Allegory of Lotto, it has to be generally agreed on that the mountain leading upwards into light, behind the putto with the
compass, stands for the path to heaven, and the image of shipwreck behind the Satyre with the wine jug is symbolic of moral dissipation. This has to be agreed on for there to be communication between the artist and the spectator through the work. I return again to the notion of the Collingwoodean work of art, but only in order to clarify, by reference to the opposite, and in terms of 'experience,' 'conscious experience,' and 'expectations,' the idea of the Tolstoyean or evocative work of art.

There are our expectations regarding the ideas of experience thought to be communicated in art; however, there are also our expectations regarding the impressions - e.g., feelings or sensations - to be found in experience. These notions are established on the basis of whether our conception of experience coheres with every possible impression. The categories of feeling evoked in art are tested in this manner, that is to say, on the grounds of whether our conception of the work of art is consistent with actual or conceivable impressions of works. This is because the feeling is determined by the artwork, prior to concern, together with the spectator's prior attitude of concern, and independently, in significant cases, of the traditional manner of regarding the symbolic content of things.

How does this observation on the epistemological requirements of the evocative art fit into our overall argument? In answering this question it should first of all be remarked that certain of the conceptual categories implied in experience, or, without which we could not conceive of, or explain it, were said by Kant to be 'transcendant,' meaning that these were implied in
all possible experience. These would be concepts without which we could not conceive of, which is to say, clearly imagine any experience at all. But because of the historical character of conception together with what may be remarked on as the biological nature of the experience, it is questionable whether any of our conceptual categories are absolutely impervious to change. Nevertheless, there do seem to be the conceptual categories which Kant termed 'immanent' in the sense of their being implied in a given facet or type of experience. While history tends to shift the focus of attention from one facet or type of experience to another, and biological changes may result in wholesale alterations in the character of the human, a set of concepts, rightly said to be immanent in a facet of experience, can be expected to pick out or designate ahistorically and in all respects timelessly that given facet of experience. The shared and conscious awareness of the evocative is the type of experience with which we are here concerned.

The conceptual categories implied in a shared and conscious experience, and their given referents, in the area of other conditions of the self, may be regarded as the means by which we bring about that conscious experience. For there is causal interaction between art, the self and experience. But conditions of the self as a concernful, sensory and rational agent are also immanent in experience in that they are conditions without which we could not conceive clearly of certain facets or types of experience. It will be argued that because the traditional approach to interpretation is inconsistent with possible
impressions of feeling, the alternative approach is necessary to our conscious experience of the passions. Thus, in part, I shall argue that the spectator's role in determining and bringing about the objective experience of the passions—i.e., his adopting a neutral interest and non-traditional categories of interpretation—is also a logically necessary one.

The spectator is, as a free and rational agent, found capable of altering not only his attitude of concern, but also his expectations or the set of conceptual categories with which he interprets art. However, our expectations regarding the character of the evocative art are, as we have already seen, determined on the basis of whether conception coheres with conceivable impressions of works. So, in the 2nd chapter of our discussion, I am in a position to show that contemporary and traditionally based interpretations of artistic evocation are disconfirmed in some conceivable impressions of works, such as, Tristan and Isolde or The Song of the Earth. The work is capable of eliciting pleasure of an intensity not comprehended under traditional categories. This has been a decisive factor behind the shift in inquiry about feeling away from the traditional categories of the identity and uniqueness of things, and toward an unbiased analysis of the experience.

The present chapter is intended to set out the problems of the privacy and vagueness of the emotional experience of art for our speaking clearly about these emotions. Thus, we make reference to the Tolstoyean theory and recent objections to the theory from Langer and Danto. I wish, in this chapter, to suggest that
our seeming inability to communicate clearly about feeling is due to a persistent adherence to the traditional approach. It is, once more, the incompatibility of the traditional approach with the impressions of feeling envisaged in the first section of this chapter, that indicates the inadequacy of this approach to the question of feeling in art.
d) Recent Objections

In the preceding, I have tried to say in some detail what is meant by the privacy and vagueness of feeling and also the notion of the artwork regarded as essentially the feeling it stimulates in the spectator. This section employs current literature to state the problem of the objective specification of feeling. I shall review some current objections to Tolstoy's understanding that the artwork is essentially the feeling aroused. In showing that Langer and Danto's objections are invalid it is hoped that more may be said than merely that alternative conclusions would be consistent with their premises. Because it is my intention to elicit from their debate with Tolstoy the problematic of objective specification of feeling, it is hoped that the invalidity of their remarks on the privacy and vagueness of emotion will tell us something more. I hope to show that where Langer and Danto have erred, in their respective studies, is in their having overlooked a way of investigating and of being concerned about the evocative art that would provide for the theoretical consideration of the passions.
The specific issue regarding the privacy of feeling - its tending to differ, under normal conditions, for one and another spectator to any given work - is brought to light in Langer's objection to the Tolstoyean theory. There was to be established, on the original Tolstoyean theory, a relation of cause and effect between the artwork and the feeling aroused in the spectator. The work was intended to stimulate an experience of feeling in the audience. One intermediate factor in this relation, as it has already been remarked, is the spectator's individual attitude of concern. In other words, the spectator's response to the work depends on his interested involvement. This intermediate factor Langer has remarked on as leading up to the privacy of feeling for any objective consideration.

On Langer's own account, she proposes that the spectator take up an attitude of Kantian dis-interested contemplation toward the work of art. In this way, the spectator is understood to attend to, or focus his attention on, only the "sensuous" appearance of the thing. That is the thing regarded purely as an object of perception, and not for the sake of any interest in, say, the satisfaction of desire. The character of the artwork may then be specified independently of the spectator's individual bias of concern.

Langer presents a theory of the work communicative of feeling, and not the work stimulative of feeling. She insists on the
Kantian attitude in the appreciation of art in order that the feeling arising in the spectator will not be confused with the exact character of the work's symbolic form. This is significantly different from Osborne's use of the attitude - which is discussed in the next chapter - where it is intended to insure an objective view of the spectator's own state of feeling.

Langer refuses to consider the evocation of feeling in art for the following reasons. She argues that if the character of the object - i.e., the spectator's state of feeling - is contingent on the individual's involvement then "even so non-sensuous a thing as a fact or possibility appears this way to one person and that way to another." ¹ Thus, the feeling aroused in art tends to differ for one and another spectator to the work. This is the second premise of Langer's argument - in the order of her text - against the Tolstoyean theory, an argument which we will have to disqualify in some way in order to show that states of feeling aroused in art are objectively specifiable.

The first premise of this extremely important objection is that it is impossible for us to answer philosophical questions in the area of the evocative art if the feeling tends to differ for one and another spectator to the work. These are questions, such as: "the exact nature and interrelation among the arts, the meaning of the "essential" and "unessential," the problem of the translatability, or transposability, of artistic ideas."² Just what are the features of the opera that define it in relation to, say, the epic

1. S. K. Langer, op. cit., p. 49
2. Ibid., p. 34
poem? In terms of which qualities or features do we define a given poem or the essential character of any given work of art? Has Fowles' novel, The French Lieutenant's Woman, been wholly preserved, according to our view, in Pinter's screen-play adaptation? It seems that we could not provide ourselves with answers to such questions as these respecting the evocative art, at least not along the lines of the traditional mode of inquiry. Along traditional lines of inquiry it is required that the object of scrutiny appear alike to each and every human being throughout time. That is to say, as I shall further explain, that the true category of the features of art is, itself, rigidly defined. But the effect of the work is private, differing by degrees for one and another. I wish to say that we could answer such of these questions as are of importance in the area of artistic evocation, though not with the use of traditional, strictly defined categories of inquiry.

Could it be the obstinate adherence to the traditional categories of inquiry that has led up to there being the apparent division between feeling and the objectively specifiable? Langer implicitly defines the category of the attributes of art as rigidly distinct in the same way as are discerned those of mathematics or physics. There can be no ambivalence in anyone's correct response to a mathematical sum; e.g., he cannot see it as a different amount in two identical equations. This is why she makes reference to an attitude of dis-interested contemplation. This is in order to insure our perception of a rigidly defined category of artistic production. Thus, Langer's
use of the Kantian attitude of dis-interested contemplation in her appreciation of art indicates her bias in favour of investigating the work under the traditional categories of perception.

Langer might have sought to define a class of art-features that appear to us only to the extent that there is the appropriate attitude of concern among spectator's to the work. Thus, the category of the evocative art is not rigidly defined in contrast to any alternative as is the night in contrast to the day. Rather the evocative art has, due to its participation in the fluid motion of life, a special order of clarity and distinctness that we have also encountered, all of us, in such phenomena as the twilight confusion of darkness and light. This is an entirely different manner of being concerned with and investigating art than that which is based on the Kantian attitude.

The Kantian appreciation of art involves an all or nothing response to the work. One either sees and appreciates it for what it is or sees it incorrectly, which is to say, not at all. We need only speak of the work of art in its truth. Thus, the individual spectator drops out of the relation of art and feeling. But the attitude of concern that insures the objective appreciation of the evocative art is a neutral interest. It is found under what I have termed the concepts of nature. One need only to some extent appreciate the work of art, by which I mean that there is no impenetrable barrier between the correct and the incorrect response. There is rather a segment on a continuum from the one extreme to the other on which the correct response is to be found. Hence, while the spectator's attitude of unbiased concern insures that
there are those who respond similarly to the work, the attitude of concern may be found consistent with the vague and fluid motion of life. This is owing to the fact that the attitude of interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern is capable of being shaped, molded, effected in ways that the Kantian attitude, conditioned as it is under the traditional categories of reason, is not. (I use "effected" here rather than "affected" because to affect an emotion is to profer a histrionic pose, but for the will to be effected is for there to be brought about a change in its condition.) If Langer had willingly embarked from the shores of the traditionally condoned then she might have recognized the alternative to the Kantian attitude. The attitude of neutral interest would insure that the artwork, itself, determined the spectator's response, independently of his individual concern. It was Langer's adherence to the traditional approach that set up the illusory appearance of states of feeling being incompatible with reason.

For while the attitude of neutral interest eliminates the spectator's individual bias of concern, it does not eliminate the individual spectator from the relation of art and feeling. This is because the artwork perceived with this attitude of the spectator appears insofar as one takes up toward it the appropriate attitude of concern. Thus, one explains the appearance of the work only with reference to the individual. Therefore, the theoretical consideration of the evocative art is consistent with Langer's premise that the character of the artwork is grounded in the individual's response. The shift from Langer's
position to our own involves more than remarking on further possibilities, but also taking up a different attitude of concern toward, and approaching the artwork with a different set of conceptual categories than have traditionally been employed. But the attitude and this order of conception would enable us to confer on the kinds and degrees of dis-pleasure and pleasure to be had in the experience of feeling. I can imagine clearly there being no other point behind the theoretical consideration of the emotions.

A fairly clear statement of the problem regarding the vagueness of feeling for any objective specification of the evocative art is provided in Danto's Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Danto holds, as did Tolstoy before him, that art is essentially a stimulation of, as opposed to communication about feeling. This is what it means for the theory to be Tolstoyean. However, Danto stipulates that the evocation of the work be grounded in well defined rhetorical functions found within the medium of communication. It is the artistic use of the medium to arouse feeling that distinguishes art from philosophy and other modes of representation on Danto's account. Langer has, it has already been remarked, a Collingwoodean version of the expressivist theory.
But Danto has, in contrast, a contemporary version of the Tolstoyean type of expressivism. Both Danto and Tolstoy hold, unlike Langer or Collingwood, that art is a stimulation of feeling rather than communication about feeling. However, Danto, like Langer, objects to Tolstoy's early version of the theory. Danto identifies the feeling stimulated by the work with reference to rhetorical functions found in the work and he objects to Tolstoy's doing so with reference to the spectator's experience.

To the contemporary versions of the Tolstoyean theory, and their particular advantages and dis-advantages, I shall make detailed reference in chapter two.

Leaving aside, for the present, these special advantages and dis-advantages, the point may be discussed here that Danto objects to Tolstoy's claim to specifying the work of art evocative of feeling directly in terms of the spectator's state of feeling. Danto's argument seems to be that an exacting discernment, inconsistent with the vagueness of feeling, is presupposed in our enjoyment of the tragedy:

We may cry at a representation of a mother's despair at the death of a child, but he would be hardhearted who just wept at the correspondent reality; the thing is to comfort and console.¹

In other words, the spectator's enjoyment of, his active and

aesthetic response to the tragic would seem to require that a rigid and well defined distinction be drawn between the real and the representation. (But the spectator's aesthetic response is, like many natural phenomena, vague with respect to any rigid distinction.) Hence, we do not specify the work of art with reference to the spectator's state of feeling, but with reference, in part, to the rigidly distinct, mutually exclusive classification of the real and the representation. This is because it seems that that distinction has already to be made in order for the appropriate aesthetic response even to arise.

Might the tragic, however, be discerned, not under the rigidly distinct conceptual categories of the real and the representation, but in much the manner in which the mist is observed as it slowly disappears over the quay in the light of early morning? Could it be an infatuation with scientific discernment that brings one often to forget the life out of which these ideas may have sprung? I wish to suggest that it is the stolid idea of a rigid distinction that has forestalled our recognizing these possibilities and maintaining concepts of nature for the discernment of feeling. The spectator's aesthetic or emotional response to the events of tragedy might occur prior to the distinction between the real and the represented - that distinction serving just to insure the moral response to actual events - and be discerned solely under the categories of the aesthetic. The feeling may, in instances, appear as ambivalent as the melding of the finite and the infinite in the phenomena of the rain and storm seen approaching over the
distant horizon. But in terms of the concepts of nature it is possible to speak clearly of any aesthetic response to art. Indeed, it is in terms of the aesthetic that we can see directly the character of the evocation of the work, and in the experience of artistic evocation the appropriate active response. The aesthetic response may be perceived under a different order of conception than the rigidly distinct, though the concept of the aesthetic may nevertheless be said to contain wholly that of a given course of action.

Consequently, the tragedy might be identified with direct reference to the spectator's experience of emotion, though it is admitted that feeling does not appear with the clarity and distinctness as might something under the traditional categories of the real and the representation. Danto's argument seems to me to presuppose saying that only a "conscious" mental process, in the sense of one employing rigid distinctions, could explain discernment of the work of art. But the conscious awareness of the work might rest on the categories of feeling and concern. This invalidity in Danto's argument seems to me to indicate that while Danto's use of the traditional categories of reason is a stumbling block, the use of an alternative order of conception is part of the means to objective consideration of feeling.

One's aesthetic response is, as Langer and Danto contend, entirely incompatible with objective consideration in terms of the traditional categories of reason. However, the traditional approach to the interpretation of experience, itself, fosters the illusion that states of feeling are not objectively specifiable. Both Langer
and Danto have concluded, in a manner characteristic of recent literature, that we cannot consider rationally feeling generated in art, but they did not consider the alternative approach and attitude which falsify their conclusion. Thus, I have argued, in this chapter on the problem of the theoretical consideration of feeling, that our problematic, our endeavor involves going beyond the traditional categories of reason. This is a point which I will have occasion to re-emphasize in the next chapter where there will be discussion of recent and traditionally based attempts to deal with the objective specification of feeling aroused in art.

In addition, Langer and Danto's arguments suggest that we want to specify as clearly as possible the feeling evoked in order that we may solve philosophical problems and reason appropriately about our active response to the work of art. Danto's notion of our enjoyment of the tragic, our active and aesthetic response, seems to draw action into the sphere of emotion. However, I cannot see the point behind solving philosophical problems or reasoning about action in this area, unless it is to increase our overall sum of hedonistic enjoyment. We want to deal with questions regarding the essential character of works and the adaptability of artistic ideas in the area of the evocative art in order to locate and to relocate the pleasures made available to us by this art. This is one way in which theory may enhance our enjoyment. Our interest in discussing action connected with the appreciation of this art is in insuring that action generally leads to the greatest pleasure for the greatest possible number. In other words, the drive toward hedonistic enjoyment may be tied up even with Langer or Danto's outlook on art. Citing this drive
in course of our argument does not beg the question against the traditional approach.

On the alternative approach - the one that involves the categories of nature - it is possible to discern clearly the kinds and degrees of pleasure to be found in art, and to designate the action that follows on the experience of a given state of feeling. In other words, and as I shall argue in my conclusion, the alternative approach to interpretation may well enable a sufficient number of people to communicate clearly enough about feeling to facilitate the purely hedonistic enjoyment of art. The prospect of an increase in that enjoyment motivates us - as we will see in connection with contemporary attempts to deal with the problem - to move beyond the traditional categories of interpretation.

It is the acquisition of the required conceptual categories, through our observation of their analogues in natural phenomena, that allows us to begin discussing rationally the satisfaction and frustration of our concerns both in art and in life. The approach to interpretation traditionally employed in the philosophy of art is inadequate to the evocative art. The approach is inconsistent with impressions of art envisaged in the first section of this chapter. But the alternative approach, employing the categories of nature, would be appropriate to the art stimulative of feeling. Thus, I see the problematic of the objective specification of feeling as one of altering conception to suit the experience of emotion. It is a matter of pushing forward, in an interesting direction, the boundary as this has hitherto been drawn between the objective and the ephemeral in art and in life.
When maintaining the traditional outlook has come to take precedence over the purely hedonistic enjoyment of the evocative art then I suspect that pedantry has gotten the best of us, and that we have put ourselves at a tremendous loss. This approach has not only - as we saw in previous discussion - engendered the illusion that feeling, as such, is not subject to theoretical consideration, but also led, as we shall see, to the development of a number of deformations of feeling. These deformations of feeling arise through recent attempts to force the experience into accord with the traditional rubric of thought. I call these "deformations" because they are entirely foreign to some of the most interesting facets of the emotion as such.

Nevertheless, putting the primary and overriding emphasis on the traditional approach is the tendency of contemporary versions of the Tolstoyean theory, found in, for example, Cavell, Osborne, Marcuse. These contemporary art-theorists attempt to reinstate the Tolstoyean theory against recent objections - in, e.g., Langer and Danto - by translating or actually transforming the spectator's experience into something more compatible with the
traditional categories of reason. But intensely pleasurable feeling evoked in art cannot, as we shall see, be pushed into the mold of the age-old principium individuationis, employed in the analytic and other contemporary versions of the theory.

One of our assumptions is that the function of theoretical consideration in the area of emotion and the evocative art is that of enabling us to share our knowledge of the sources of hedonistic enjoyment and, by enabling us to share that knowledge, to help to increase the overall sum of that enjoyment. Hence, it may be said that the contemporary Tolstoyean expressivism fails to perform the function of theory in the realm of artistic evocation. This is another way of saying that contemporary theory has, in its adherence to the traditional categories of interpretation, managed to overlook some of the most interesting facets of emotion. For it is impossible to identify intensely pleasurable states of feeling under the traditional categories of the identity and uniqueness of things.

These most recent versions of Tolstoy's theory are characterized altogether by their proponent's seeking to close the gap between feeling and reason, but at the expense of the
spectator's emotional experience. The analytic version of the theory - in Cavell, and, in a related manner, Best, Tanner - posits a relation of logical necessity between the work of art and the feeling aroused by the work. In other words, the aesthetic is contained in our concept of the work, and our concept is determined by the manner in which we agree to use language. Moreover, though Dufrenne is working within the phenomenological rather than the analytic school, and his study focuses on the feeling signified rather than aroused in art, he provides what I find to be a clear basis on which to build a phenomenological variation of the Tolstoyean theory. These may be regarded as attempts to translate the experience into terms of a logic of appreciation.

There have also been Osborne's efforts to eliminate the spectator's individual bias of concern from the production of feeling in the arts, and so actually to transform the experience into one more compatible with reason. Some alteration in the primary character of the emotions would seem to be a necessary condition for any translation of feeling, as altogether the opposite of the categories of reason, into terms of some such set of categories. Moreover, Marcuse and the so-called anti-structuralists may also be regarded, interestingly enough, as attempting to translate the experience into the terms of the traditional concepts of reason. The emotion is defined, on that school, as altogether the opposite of such concepts; but that use of 'altogether the opposite' defines feeling as one of a set of mutually exclusive categories.
Owing to the freely autonomous character of human concern, the procedure of bringing feeling into conformity with the traditional concept is — as we said in the previous chapter and in connection with Heidegger and Solomon — an altogether viable one. It is simply a matter of holding one's own free will to some extent in check, allowing one's self to respond only in certain ways to certain objects. Thus, the contemporary Tolstoyean seems to have lived on the hope that by pushing the experience of emotion into the mold of the rigidly defined he might be in a position to answer the charge that the experience of feeling is not subject to rational consideration.

However, the procedure of making the emotions conform to traditional categories does not lead up to our specifying objectively what is of most interest to us about feeling in art. It would not bring us to the point of reflecting clearly on the most intense hedonistic enjoyment of art. It would be entirely possible to rest, as it were, complacently within the time honoured structures of reason and never venture forth; except that this would limit the overall sum of pleasure in our lives. It is this that motivates us to reject the contemporary theory and by no means any internal inconsistency in the theory itself.
Contemporary expressivism maintains the traditional approach to the interpretation of experience. But the most intense states of feeling aroused, for example, by the Wagnerean opera or the Romantic novel are conceivably far too intense to be contained within the finite categories of the uniqueness and identity of things. This intensity is conceivable in much the way in which are perceived any extremely prodigious natural phenomena. It has already been said that our approach to the interpretation of the evocative art is determined on the basis of whether it coheres with impressions or conceivable impressions of works. Therefore, I suggest presently that the contemporary theory fails to account for the most intense hedonistic enjoyment of the evocative art. Hence, I am motivated in the 3rd chapter not to take the traditional categories of reason as assumed and given, but rather to assume our conscious experience of feeling evoked in art and seek to derive logically whatever changes in the spectator's attitude and approach are necessary in order to bring about that hypothetical awareness. For our approach to interpretation is never "fixed and given" in the way that sensations of colour are, but may be added to, altered in the way of architectural renovation.

Our principle motivation in theorizing about evocative art is in our locating and relocating the varieties of hedonistic enjoyment to be found there. If this were not our motivation
then there would seem to be no inconsistency in our remaining within the age old hollows of the traditional approach.
a) The Analytic Account

How might it be said more clearly and in more detail that the contemporary Tolstoyean theory fails to deal adequately with what is of most concern to us about the artistic evocation of feeling? We might examine each major variation of the contemporary theory in turn. The analytic version of the theory posits a relation of logical necessity between the artwork and the feeling stimulated in the spectator by means of the work. The spectator's experience of feeling is part of what we mean by the work of art. The feeling is contained in our concept of the work.

Moreover, our concept of the work is said to be determined by the manner in which we have agreed to use language. For example, the feeling of 'noble pathos' may be inferred from the concept of Puccini's Bohemian if, indeed, we tend or may be observed as members of the linguistic community, generally to employ this term in reference to that work. There is then the relation of logical necessity between art and feeling, in just the sense in which Best has proposed that:

it is one's conception of the object that is a
central criterion of one's emotional response, by which I mean that there is a logical or conceptual connection between the object and the response.¹

For if the feeling is part of what we mean by the artwork then we may justify our response with reference to the work. The response may be inferred from the work of art.

On Tolstoy's original account, recall there was to be established a causal relation between the artist's efforts and their emotional effect on the audience. The spectator's attitude of concern has been thought the problematic intervening factor in this relation. The indeterminacy or, at least, the freely autonomous nature of the spectator's attitude prevents the feeling, which has its origin in his concern, from meeting the condition of public accessibility on theoretical consideration. One is free to develop any one of a number of biases of concern in relation to the work of art and the effect of the work on that concern, or that prior condition of the will may be expected to differ accordingly. In consequence, the emotional effect of the artwork is private, in that it tends to differ for one and another spectator. In addition, this freely autonomous, it may be said "plastic" or mobile character of the will is the reason for the feeling based on it not meeting the further condition of clarity and distinctness on any objective specification or theoretical

consideration. The emotional effect of the work derives from its grounding in the vague and fluid motion of human life a vagueness with respect to rigidly distinct, mutually exclusive categories of interpretation. The human will is capable of being molded, drawn by the work of art into shapes unaccounted for under any traditional, strictly defined classification of things.

By positing a relation of logical necessity between the artwork and the feeling aroused by the work, the analytic theorist may have hoped to circumvent the objection either from the privacy — say, from Langer — or the vagueness of feeling to any theoretical consideration such as the Tolstoyean theory. The spectator's response to the work of art would be grounded in a publicly acknowledged conception of the work, and would it seems be found under some rigid category of personal experience. The experience picked out by our terms would meet the conditions of objective consideration.

Should a disagreement arise regarding the appropriate aesthetic response to a given work of art then, on Best's account of the theory, the disagreement among speakers of the language would be adjudicated, not by citing our differing states of feeling, but with reference to the "objective features of the work". Thus, even should it be a matter merely of a new or innovative use of an aesthetic term, it is, as also Cavell suggests, to be defended with reference to the work as seen and appreciated similarly

by us all. In other words:

It is essential to making an aesthetic judgement that at some point we be prepared to say in its support: don't you see, don't you hear, don't you dig?¹

Thus, our response to the work is grounded in traditionally acknowledged modes of signification in sounds, cadences, and the like, and not in one's personal experience. One might, for instance, lend support to the judgement suggested just now of The Bohemian — which was that the work evokes the feeling of noble pathos — by pointing to the great love which is signified in the portrayal of the central characters of the drama. This might be said to have enobled the pathos of the work and made that state of feeling into somewhat more than a weakness for the obscure.

Now, the first and earliest use of an aesthetic term could be, as Wittgenstein in the lectures suggested, contiguous with the impulse, or sudden drive, that gave rise to it — that is, where one were simply to give forth, for whatever psychological reasons, the sound corresponding to the term 'beautiful,' 'marvellous,' 'bravo!' or the like in view of a given object. One's primary use of the term might, thus, be just some sort of spontaneous verbal ejaculation on matters in the world. These matters in the world, in view of which we employ the terms for feeling, are often not just the objects or persons encountered

¹. S. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge, Eng. : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), p. 83
in everyday affairs, but the objective features of works of art, or the rhetorical functions of art that we encounter in connection with Danto's analytic version of the Tolstoyean theory. Once one of these, what may be fully spontaneous, original uses of language, is canonized, that is to say, once we, as a linguistic community, tend to, or agree to use the same term for feeling in connection with the same works of art or objective features of works then this employment of the term need now be recognized as a universal and clearly defined use of language. Thus, the term becomes one of our traditional uses of language in relation to the arts. In this way, the element of individual caprice is shorn from the new or innovative use of the term as this is drawn into the tradition of our use of language.

The experience of feeling is personal - by which we mean that one has to have direct acquaintance with a feeling in order to know what the term for it represents. That is not to say the experience is private. Our traditional use of terms signifying feeling picks out portions of personal experience which are neither private nor vague with respect to rigid classification. Hence, it is unnecessary even to make reference to the spectator's individual nuance on the vague and fluid motion of life in the discussion of the artistic production of feeling, but merely to elicit correctly our concept of the work.

The individual spectator's experience of feeling in the viewing of the work, his personal experience is, nevertheless, said to be preserved, maintained in our concept of the work. That
is to say, the meaning of the term is just the individual spectator's emotional experience in the viewing of a given work of art or some feature of the work. The term picks out that portion of the spectator's personal experience which is the same for each and every spectator to the work. There is no choice to be had between one's own and any other's experience of the work. In other words, that which is regarded, on the analytic school, as the emotional effect of art meets the condition of public accessibility.

This is a point argued for in Tanner's analytic commentary on Wagner. One of the principle contentions of Tanner's article is that Wagner's Tristan and Isolde is a promotion of, rather than, as Peckham and Rapheal have suggested, an exposé of the Romantic ethos. Tanner has made this a significant dispute in the area of the philosophy of art. The Romantic ethos is found in Isolde and Tristan's desire one for the other - a desire reportedly so intense it seems that it must, in order to be satisfied, dissolve the barriers that common sense and good society have set up between them. Both Peckham and Rapheal have, as Tanner takes note, cited portions of the libretto of the work in support of the view that with this opera Wagner sought to bring the ethos to some of its absurd conclusions. For example, it seems to be a necessary outcome of the Romantic ethos that there be Isolde's Verklärung, the scene of her delusion that she can see and enjoy Tristan even after he has died. She could not do so without having entirely sublated and cancelled the separate and unique existence of her desired object. She has to confuse Tristan
with a mental attribute of her own. Thus, Isolde's Verklärung is regarded as the scene of her madness. However, Tanner contends, in opposition to Peckham and Raphael, that though this position is defensible with reference to the libretto of the work, it is defensible only with reference to the libretto taken away from the music.

The music, Tanner argues, is in complete sympathy with Isolde and Tristan's avowed intention - their intention being the entire sublation, cathexis, consuming of the one by the other. Having had four hours of largely the 'longing for Tristan' motif alone, permeating as it does the entire fabric of the work, the listener has developed within him, as the effect of the music, a state of what he could only term 'intense yearning' or any one of its semantic equivalences. He tends to associate this with the longing that Isolde has for Tristan. Consequently, when Isolde claims to see Tristan even after he has died, when she explains to those on the stage who cannot enter into her delusion how he is smiling and laughing, then the spectator is in a position to join in her neurotic fantasies. We also share in the overwhelming joy of the occasion. Far from being an exposé of the Romantic ethos, the work seems rather to be designed to reinforce whatever tendencies the audience might have in that direction.

But it is presupposed in Tanner's position on Tristan and Isolde that the effect of the 'longing for Tristan' motif together with the Verklärung is the same for me as for any other member of the audience. In other words, the effect of Wagner's opera
has to be subject to theoretical consideration before I or anyone else can accept the argument in which reference to this effect plays a critical role. In support of the view that the emotional effect of Tristan and Isolde is objectively specifiable, Tanner has made the following statement:

I'm taking it that there is something approaching a standard, normal response, and that it is unclear by what means it could be shown to be mistaken.¹

What Tanner apparently has in mind by saying that "it is unclear by what means" the traditional response to the work "could be shown to be mistaken" is that there is nothing beyond the work of art, itself, together with our traditional manner of responding to the work in terms of which we could conceive of a response that was unique, individual or differing in some way from our own. A private aesthetic is, in other words, an impossibility. We cannot conceive of a unique aesthetic or one differing from our own, at least, not in terms of our traditional use of language. For our response to the work of art is what we mean by the aesthetic of that work, according to the traditional use of our language. We could agree on there being no other aesthetic response to the work. Therefore, what we mean by the response to the work just is one's personal experience.

In opposition to the analytic Tolstoyean theory, Bates has said that even in view of this position there is still to be considered what he calls "the deepest failure" in Tolstoy's theory. Bates' contention is that Tolstoy failed to "recognize a potential tension, or, even incompatibility, between the artist's sincerity and the infectiousness of the work of art."\(^1\) It may be recalled from our brief exposition of Tolstoy's original account that the 'infectiousness' of the artwork was the degree to which the work actually evoked a state of feeling in the audience and that this was considered to be proportionate to the artist's 'sincerity' or the degree to which the artist had had, himself, that experience of feeling. The artist's past experience of feeling was to be the model on which he based his efforts to recreate that experience for his audience. Thus, the artist had to have both had the past experience of feeling - as his model in the process of artistic production - and to experience the work as the spectator does in order to have something to compare to, and to correct in comparison to his model. The feeling evoked by the work has to meet the condition of public accessibility for any objective consideration - and this is the condition of our

understanding Tolstoy's theory - the condition, namely, of the feeling being alike for each and every spectator to the work, even the artist qua spectator as he is checking and re-arranging his work.

However, Bates' statement suggests that the artist might see his own work with an inordinate degree of enthusiasm, and, in consequence, come to regard the emotional experience as something more than it appears to any other member of the audience. How could we regard the poem with the same degree of fervour as one such as Poe who gave a life-time to the production of poetry. In other words, a unique aesthetic response to the work of art is - contrary to remarks made within the analytic school - conceivable, and conceivable in terms of the varying degrees of enthusiasm or fervour with which one might enter into the viewing of art. Hence, the analytic version of the Tolstoyean theory is put into question by the possibility of an artist's inordinate intensity of concern.

It may be argued that Bates' objection to the analytic version of the theory draws attention to the differences in degree, rather than in kind, in emotional effect resulting from the spectator's
bias of concern. In every other respect, however, Bates' objection to the analytic version is like Langer's objection to the original account. Indeed, Bates' objection is contained in Langer's remarks on the Tolstoyean theory that were examined in the first chapter. It should be recalled from there that, according to Langer's position, any shift in the basis for an artistic effect - whether this is a shift in degree or in kind - in the spectator's individual attitude of concern will have to be regarded as a problematic instability in our concept of the feeling aroused by the work of art. Bates' objection which is, I should like to emphasize, contained in Langer's own, commits a model fallacy, at least, where it is directed against the analytic version of Tolstoy's theory. Hence, Langer's more general remarks would also, directed against the analytic version, be committing the same fallacy. This is inferred by modus tollens on the assumption that we may derive from Langer's position also Bates' objection. That is one reason why it has seemed to me that no internal inconsistency defeats the contemporary approach. It does seem on the whole to circumvent current objections.

Bates' objection to the theory confuses altogether different notions of a possibility. He appears to want to say that our concept of the work evocative of feeling is determined on the basis of what we could clearly imagine about the work. Thus, that which we can clearly imagine about it must be included in the concept. So, it is necessary to include in our concept of the artwork the differing degrees of emotional effect possible owing to varying levels of the spectator's concern. But the analytic
concept of the evocative work is determined by the manner in which we have agreed to use language. The unique aesthetic could never be part of what we, as a group, could refer to as the work of art. A unique understanding of the work, a private response to the work could never be enshrined in tradition. We could not both agree to use 'noble pathos' of Bohemian and also 'high comedy' even though the latter may be appropriate given some individual's response. The analytic theorist might resemble the boorish lover who cannot imagine one's having any other than the traditional response to his advances. He refuses to understand one's viewing these or other things with a unique attitude of concern. I do not wish to suggest that there is not a great deal of interest about the evocative art which the analytic theory does not comprehend, but that there does not seem to be any internal inconsistency in the refusal to consider certain facets of the object. Bates has either to admit the analytic theorist's basic premise concerning the character of the possible, to defend his alternative notion, or to commit the fallacy of petitio principii. Bates has committed this fallacy; this is in evidence by the fact that he has not admitted the analytic theorist's premise and has not given independent reasons for his alternative manner of regarding a possibility.

The failure of the analytic Tolstoyean theory seems to consist in its not taking account of intensely pleasurable states of feeling. In defining pleasurable feeling, I do not wish to create an unnecessary bias. By 'pleasurable feeling' I mean the satisfaction of any given kind or degree of concern. The analytic
theorist wants to reduce the feeling evoked in art to the traditional, mutually exclusive category of experience in virtue of which we may employ the aesthetic term. For none working within the analytic school have proposed an alternative categorization of the spectator's response. Our term for any given state of feeling, thus makes reference only to a rigidly defined portion of the manifold of human experience. There can be no ambivalence in the meaning of the term. The categories of any one state of feeling together with its polar opposite are such as black and white, between which there can be no confusion, no cross over of the one into the other.

However, the pleasure that may be derived from Isolde's Verklärung is of so great an intensity that it appears to reach beyond the boundaries of finite perception. Furthermore, the mathematical conception of the infinite bares little resemblance to this experience. It does not appear as a prodigious though computable sum, but as a confusion of a certain type. It is, indeed, a confusion of the finite boundaries of perception and something that seems to lay beyond these.

Nor is this a confusion of form in the way that the spectator may be said to confuse the separate identity of Tristan and a mental attribute of Isolde. That type of confusion is, as we have seen, entirely unproblematic with respect to traditional manners of categorization. That something which seems to stand beyond the finite boundaries of perception and with which it seems, in the course of the experience, the finite is confused, could never, itself, be the subject of rational consideration.
Hence, the experience does not reduce to the set of those entities that this experience alone may be said to confuse. That was the type of confusion found in Isolde's vision of Tristan. It was this duplistic vision of Tristan that gave rise to the state of feeling which has been far more problematic for any theoretical consideration.

This is owing to the experience of the pleasure enjoyed at the close of Tristan and Isolde being possibly so intense that one's impressions are inconsistent with any rigidly defined set of expectations. But I do not want to say that the concept of art could not be built up in some way as to contain emotional experience within rigidly defined categories, nor that we could not - due to the basic autonomy of the will - restrict our attitudes of concern to respond only in the least problematic manner to works of art. We are motivated by the prospect of purely hedonistic enjoyment and not by mere conceptual necessity, to allow ourselves the luxury of getting carried away by feeling in the viewing of art and to bring if possible that experience into the concept of art. This is because if there were conceptual-ization or theoretical consideration, of feeling stimulated in the arts then there would also be a publicly acknowledged and clearly defined "map" as it were, in aid to our search for varying kinds and degrees of pleasure.
b) A Phenomenological Interpretation

Perhaps, the Tolstoyean theory must be said to rest on a phenomenological interpretation. Dufrenne's research in the area of artistic expression pertains to the feeling signified by the work as opposed to that which is aroused by the work of art. The feeling signified is that for which the artwork is a symbol rather than a means. In other words, Dufrenne provides a version of the Collingwoodean expressivism. The artwork that is communicative of emotion provides us with the idea of a state of feeling in contrast to the impression of one. Nevertheless, it seems that roughly the same formula as is found in Dufrenne's theory could be applied to the question of the feeling aroused in art. Dufrenne argues that:

... the form of the human is within us. Every sign of the human revives within us an intimate knowledge which precedes all experience and by which experience is clarified.¹

That is to say, the category of the feeling signified by the work is derived from the experience by means of the Kantian, 'transcendental deduction'. There is a relation of logical necessity posited, thus, between the work of art and the feeling signified. The conceptual category of the feeling to be communicated by the work is, on Dufrenne's account, that without which we could not conceive of, in the sense of clearly imagine, the experience.

But if what Dufrenne has proposed may be re-stated to apply to the feeling stimulated in art then the concept of the feeling signified would not be, as Dufrenne suggests, presupposed in the experience of any and all works of art, but merely immanent in the experience of a certain class of works. Of this class of art-works, I would take Lotto's Allegory to be an excellent example. It is of far more worth to us as a statement about feeling than as an experience of one. Furthermore, there seems to be another class of works in the case of which a conceptual category of the feeling stimulated by the work is immanent or that without which we could not conceive of the experience. Numerous examples have already been mentioned of the class of works, where it seems impossible for us to be charitable without reference to the spectator's own state of feeling.

But how may the conceptual categories, said to be presupposed in experience, themselves, be observed in our awareness? I cannot imagine them except as our expectations regarding what may or may not be the character or significance of experience. In chapter one it was argued that most appropriate to the
interpretation of the evocative art were our expectations regarding the primary objective features or impressions to be found in the experience, and that our approach to the interpretation of the evocative art would be testable on the basis of whether the approach maintained the coherency of conception with the impressions found or that could be found in the experience. Thus, we are able to test the phenomenological approach against the possibility of certain impressions of feeling occurring in the viewing of works.

Now, Dufrenne's theory, as it stands, employs the traditional conceptual categories of the principium individuationis, the most rigidly defined categories of reason. Dufrenne says that the work of art, as seen under the "affective categories" or, the categories of the feeling signified - appears "no longer as an equivocal presence but an articulated reality."¹ There is, thus, to be drawn between such conceptual categories, as between night and day, black and white - a line over which no part of the one may cross into the other.

¹. Ibid., p. 424
The concepts of the individual states of feeling aroused in art may be, on our phenomenological interpretation of Tolstoy, similar in that they are mutually exclusive. In other words, there is the concept of the individual impression of feeling, its image in the imagination, together with its polar opposite that are presupposed or logically implied in the conscious experience. Moreover, because these concepts are mutually exclusive, there being the impression of the one is incompatible with the alternative impression occupying the same place in the manifold of experience. However, if the phenomenologist approaches the evocation of the work with just this order of expectations regarding the impressions of feeling to be found then, I wish to say, he finds an incoherency in experience between the concept, his image, his expectation and possible impressions of the evocative art. For these rigidly distinct or mutually exclusive conceptual categories are incompatible with the higher imaginable intensities of pleasurable feeling evoked by means of the work of art.

One might imagine an infinitude in terms of relations among the finite and rigidly distinct quantums of mathematics or set theory. Then our conception is about conception and divorced from the impressions of primary experience. The primary experience of an infinitude — in other words, one's impression of the infinite in, say, religious or mystical experience — could no more be brought into conception as a mathematical relation than one could imagine clearly and distinctly and in terms of each of its members individually, a large number of oranges piled one on top of the other. We can have an image of a great pile of
oranges, but the image that one has of it does not consist in the mathematical relation. Rather the image is of a primary impression of a large number.

Thus, in the case of Tristan and Isolde or Mahler's Song of the Earth, the pleasurable feeling evoked by the work may be of so great an intensity that it appears in experience less as a quantifiable sum than as, for example, the verging of our Northern Lights with the furthest depths of the night sky. Feeling is vague with respect to the mathematical or any of the traditional categories of conception in the same way as is the phenomenon of the Northern Lights. Hence, the phenomenological Tolstoyean theory does not attend to the spectator's enjoyment of intense pleasure.

Nevertheless, it seems that a procedure of translating states of feeling evoked by means of the artwork into terms of a traditional categorization is entirely viable. It would require simply that one limit by an act of the free will the scope of one's concern, that one not allow one's self to get carried away to certain degrees by certain works of art. The experience might then remain one that is perfectly accountable in Dufrenne's
terms. However, in having failed to bring to the light of conscious experience the more intense pleasures of the arts, the phenomenologist would have slighted our interest in this area of inquiry. In the next chapter, therefore, I hope to show that a suitable departure from the traditional approach enables us to deal with the intense pleasure of the evocative art. It is our interest in coming to a conscious awareness of this facet of the experience which motivates our departure from the traditional manner of interpreting the experience.

However, before turning to those pages, it should be remarked that there have been, in addition to the analytic and phenomenological translations, Marcuse's unique and unexpected attempt at translating the experience of evocation into terms of the age old categories of reason (whose attempt I shall save until the close of this chapter). There have also been Osborne's efforts at outlining the changes in the spectator's attitude of concern which are necessary in order to bridge the gap between feeling and reason.
c) Osborne's Variation

Osborne's efforts at actually altering the basis for the emotional effect in the spectator's attitude of concern might have been intended as consistent with either the analytic or the phenomenological program of translation. This is because limitations on the spectator's attitude of concern of the sort Osborne has proposed would seem to support either attempt to fit feeling into the categories of a logic of artistic appreciation. His proposal is that the spectator allow his concern to be guided, molded under a mode of traditional conception.

The spectator is, on Osborne's account, to regard the work in the same way as events in ordinary life. In the case of representational art, he is to see that which is represented in art as that encountered in life. In the case of music, the most obvious case if any of non-representational art, he is to see the object just as an event in life. Osborne stipulates further that the spectator take up toward his own consequent states of feeling an attitude of Kantian dis-interested contemplation. Of the resultant awareness of our states of feeling — that is, of what
Osborne terms 'aesthetic percipience'—he has remarked that it is a more contemplative experience of passion than in the usual course of affairs. Thus, he says:

I cut adrift from emotional involvement just as I cut adrift from practical involvement. When I see something as menacing I savour and enjoy its menacing quality as a feature presented to me and attached to the presented object of attention, not as involving danger to myself.¹

The spectator must, it is true, allow the object to mold his state of feeling independently of his own individual bias of concern in order that the feeling meet the condition of public accessibility on any objective consideration, in order, in other words, that the feeling aroused by the work be alike for each and everyone who might wish to consider it. Thus, Osborne recommends that the spectator take up the Kantian attitude toward his own state of feeling—in the way that Langer suggests we take up this attitude toward the symbolic form—in order to insure the public accessibility of the evocative. The attitude of disinterested contemplation directed toward the artwork represents a concern solely for the work itself and not for anything beyond the work to which it may be regarded as a means. Thus, the taking up of the attitude toward the work leads to there being a satisfaction of concern in the work of art, but the attitude eliminates any

bias of concern that might otherwise distort the appearance of the work.

Originally, the Kantian attitude was employed in connection with traditional and strictly representational art - such as in works of Titian or Donatello - rather than works of evocative art such as with Osborne, or works symbolic of feeling such as with Langer. The attitude insured both the enjoyment of pleasurable feeling and the objectivity of the experience of strictly representational art. But how, more exactly, may it be said that enjoyment may arise from the aesthetic attitude? Gadamer suggests that "Kant sees this feeling as based on the finality that the representation of the object possesses for our faculty of knowledge." 📖 That is to say, the object of concern is taken up in representation as knowledge. Therefore, while Kant allowed that the aesthetic attitude was satisfied, given the shape of satisfaction or effected in this way by the object as it occurs in representation, at the same time it seems that this molding or shaping of the Kantean attitude of concern was to take place only under the rubric of the traditional categories of knowledge.

Where Osborne speaks of our taking up this attitude toward our own states of feeling occurring in the viewing of art, and of our "savouring " the experience, he is not referring to the pleasure arising from the artist's representation of an object. For here the attitude pertains more to the spectator's own state of feeling as viewed under introspection than to the

object represented. On Osborne's account, the spectator has an artistic role to play. He must imagine a representation of himself in the viewing of the object represented or, in the case of music, in the viewing simply of the work of art. The feeling of pleasure which Osborne refers to is that brought with our ordinary responses into conception. But Osborne has not suggested that these responses and this pleasure are any other than as seen under the traditional categories of reason.

What Osborne would seem to have had in mind by our ordinary responses to objects could be something approaching that picked out by our traditional use of language or, perhaps, that which the phenomenologist might suggest is essential to our experience of the work. That is experience observed under mutually exclusive categories. One would have to eliminate one's own bias of concern as this is directed toward the experience of feeling in the viewing of the work of art in order not to be distracted from that facet of experience. In other words, one would have to enter one's self in relation to the artwork into the traditional conception of art appreciation in much the way in which Kant proposed that the object represented be brought by means of representation into the faculty of knowledge. The spectator would seem to play the role of an artist whose imagination is governed by traditional categories of conception.
The traditionally recognized conception of art is, as we have seen in connection with the analytic and phenomenological interpretations of the Tolstoyean theory, at fault for not taking account of intense pleasure evoked in art. The Kantian attitude of dis-interested contemplation, directed toward the feeling aroused by the work, and governed by traditional categories of reason, as it is in Osborne, could not ensure the enjoyment of the wide array of feeling evoked in such disparate cases as Hardy's Mayor of Casterbridge and Le Carré's Spy Who Came in from the Cold. Intense feeling cannot, as found in the latter instance, be brought into conception in the way that Kant thought the object of representation could be seen under the traditional categories of reason. Intense pleasure is incompatible with the mutually exclusive categories of reason. Osborne's use of the aesthetic attitude would bring us to the objective specification of some element of the experience of artistic evocation, but not some of the most interesting facets of the experience.

In the next and final chapter, I shall be discussing the alternative to the Kantian attitude—in the attitude of neutral interest. The attitude of interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern is like the Kantian attitude in being a concern alone for the work of art and not directed toward satisfaction in anything beyond the work. But the attitude of neutral interest has a mobility in terms of the effect that the
work may have on it which is not restricted under the traditional categories of reason, only under what I have termed the categories of nature.
d) Marcuse and the Anti-structuralist School

Before bringing to a close this rather lengthy discussion of recent efforts at developing the theory of the evocative art, I should like to say that there have also been - in addition to the work of translation completed in the analytic and in the phenomenological schools - the attempt made on the part of Marcuse and the anti-structuralists at translating the emotional experience of art into terms of some rigidly defined categories of conception. Those of the former schools have worked avidly at trimming away the ambivalence and subjectivity of the experience by drawing it into a logic of appreciation. On the other hand, the anti-structuralist has developed a new category under which to locate feeling as such. But this would, nevertheless, be a category rigidly distinct from its polar opposite in the way of all traditional conception.

It seems possible to define feeling as something standing in opposition to what may be found under a rigid categorization. However, it is impossible to go any further along these lines toward making any finer distinctions, such as between extremely intense and merely ambivalent feeling, extremely intense pleasure and a similar degree of pain, varying degrees and kinds of extremely intense emotional experience. Therefore, it is impossible
to locate, along these lines, the experience of the most intensely pleasurable state of feeling.

The anti-structuralist points to what is other than, and altogether the opposite of that found under any traditional conception of things. Thus, Marcuse argues that to reduce the experience to a given and well formed concept of the emotion, as has the analytic philosopher of art or the "structuralist" is to confuse, on the one hand, art as "technique" and, on the other, art as "aesthetic form". In other words, artistic production is not a technique, not directed toward specific and well defined ends - in the way that Collingwood described a craft rather than art - but it is, on Marcuse's view, the incitement of just the emotional zeal required to conceive of the overthrow of any strictly defined order in society.

Thus, Marcuse proposes that "under the law of aesthetic form:" 

"data" are reshaped and reordered in accordance with the demands of the art form ... transcendence of immediate reality shatters the reified objectivity of established social relations and opens a new dimension of experience: rebirth of rebellious subjectivity.¹

Though the objects and events found in art are, on Marcuse's account, depicted with formal clarity and distinctness the

fact that the artwork stands as illusion, and in opposition to reality gives rise to a state of feeling that holds a position prior to the development of any given conception of the real. The artwork provides us with the sense of our being free and independent of the real and the given social order.

Marcuse refers to the feeling aroused in art as the polar opposite, the contradictory of a thing found under the traditional categories of reason. For the feeling is thought to be vague with respect to an indefinite number of more strictly defined relations. Reference made in this way to the emotional experience of art presupposes a set of mutually exclusive categories defining the distinction between the emotional experience and the more rigidly defined. Marcuse has hoped that under these categories of conception it would be possible both to recognize the vague and personal character of feeling and also to meet the condition of clarity and distinctness on the theory of art. We might admit that a rigidly defined category of the sort Marcuse has recommended could contain those of a lesser extension and a differing order of clarity and distinctness.

However, intensely pleasurable feeling is not discerned except in terms of conceptual categories holding the order of clarity and distinctness found in natural phenomena. It is impossible to specify the intensely pleasurable in terms of any set of the more rigidly defined categories of identity and uniqueness. It is for this reason that Marcuse's approach fails to make precise reference to that in the evocative art which we have, on the whole, sought to define.
The emotional experience of art is altogether incompatible - as it was suggested already in the first chapter - with the traditional categories of the identity and uniqueness of things. It is owing to our adherence to these categories of interpretation that recent versions of Tolstoy's theory fail to deal adequately with the objective specification of feeling. Best, Cavell, Tanner, Osborne, Marcuse have each of them accepted as given just the mutually exclusive or most rigidly defined categories of interpretation. These theorists have sought, at the expense of emotional experience, to close the gap between feeling and reason. Our most instinctual or fundamental craving for hedonistic enjoyment is not enhanced by any traditional categorization of the experience. For this type of interpretation does not enable us to reflect on or to communicate clearly about all the varying degrees and kinds of pleasure to be had in the work.

Therefore, I shall, in chapter 3, take as my starting point not the traditional categories of reason, but a hypothetical awareness of the phenomena or objecthood of artistic evocation. I shall seek to derive from this hypothesis whatever changes have to be made in the traditional approach to the interpretation of experience - rather than to make changes in the experience - in order to establish the grounds for theoretical consideration of feeling, as such, aroused in art.
3) The Spectator's Role
In Determining the Objecthood
Of Feeling Aroused in Art

Tolstoy's original account of the expressivist theory has been widely disparaged, and apparently suffered severely in the literature of the past few decades. This is, as I have suggested, due to the incompatibility of the states of feeling aroused in art with the traditional or rigidly defined, mutually exclusive categories of reason, and to our persistent tendency to employ such categories in our reasoning about art. Expressivism may be called, on any of the many versions and types of the theory, the view that art is essentially an expression of feeling. On the Tolstoyean type of the theory, the emphasis is on the feeling aroused and not, as on the Collingwoodean, communicated about in the work.

Our concern is not primarily with the Collingwoodean expressivism, though I suspect that a workable variation of it may be brought to the surface if we could develop the basis for the theoretical consideration of human feeling. Our principle concern is in getting to the position of communicating clearly about states of feeling.
as these are found either in the isolated confines of art or in the much wider sphere of human life. I choose to begin by dealing with the Tolstoyean theory of art and the feeling aroused in the spectator by means of the work because the emotional effects of artworks provide an isolated and comparatively stable phenomenon. Having developed precise and universal reference to feeling aroused in art, it may then be possible to approach questions regarding the specialized symbology of the Collingwoodean artist's medium or questions regarding the psychology of the emotional life as a whole. Only if there are well established terms for feeling in a natural language can we identify the artist's state of feeling prior to his use of the language of art, and to substantiate the Collingwoodean claim that the artist is using the artistic medium to communicate about a prior state of feeling. Furthermore, it is only with this condition holding of a natural language that it is possible to specify both poles of any given empirical relation to be established in psychology between a state of feeling and any further activity in the world.

On Tolstoy's original account, art was held to be an 'expression' of feeling, in the sense of stimulation, arousal, evocation. Hence, there was to be a causal relation between the artist's efforts to evoke a feeling in his audience and the effect of his efforts on the audience. Human concern is a disturbing factor in such a relation. The emotion aroused in one by the artwork is the effect of the work on the spectator's prior attitude of concern. The emotion is the shape of the human will in the viewing of art. The indeterminacy or,
at least, the freely autonomous character of the will leads to the basis for the effect - in the type of concern or condition of the will brought to the viewing of art - being different for different persons. Thus, Langer has proposed that the state of affairs is conceivable in which the emotional effect of the work differs for each and every spectator. This is the problem of privacy of the emotional effect.

Furthermore, the feeling aroused appears to acquire from its participation in the vague and fluid motion of life - i.e., the life of the human will - the vagueness of certain natural phenomena such as winds or clouds of mist. This is a vagueness with respect to the mutually exclusive categories of the identity and uniqueness of things. On the whole, the privacy and vagueness of feeling have proven problematic for Tolstoy's theory or for any proposed objective consideration of the evocative art.

I propose that the problem for Tolstoy's theory could be given *prima facie* resolution. If the spectator adopts a specific role in the appreciation of art then the emotions evoked by the artwork will be alike for a sufficient number, and be clearly distinct to the extent that it is possible to fulfill the function of theory in this area. By "the function of theory" in the area of art and feeling, I mean that of enhancing or facilitating the drive toward purely hedonistic enjoyment, our instinctual craving for the most powerful satisfaction of what may be any given type of concern.

Theory enhances such a drive by providing us with a meaningful vocabulary in which to speak clearly among ourselves about various
kinds and degrees of pleasure. We are then able to direct one another, in such terms, toward the satisfaction and away from the dis-satisfaction of concern. If that function is completed respecting the comparatively stable phenomenon of artistic evocation then I suspect that the same vocabulary may be employed in designating the emotions occurrant in any other sphere.

Contemporary versions of the Tolstoyean theory - i.e., the most recent versions instigated in defense of something like Tolstoy's original account - have been altogether various: there have been Best, Cavell and Tanner, in the analytic school, Osborne, Marcuse and the anti-structuralist variation, and also a phenomenological version of the theory. While some of their efforts have been directed at translating the passions stimulated in art into terms of what might be called a logic of art appreciation, some have appeared as attempts actually to transform the spectator's experience into something more compatible with the traditional rubric of theory. However, the intensely pleasurable feeling that might be enjoyed in the viewing of such works as Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, Mahler's Song of the Earth, or Petronius' Satyrecon would require our relinquishing the rigidly defined categories characteristic of logic or science. Intensely
pleasurable feeling is simply not to be found under the mutually exclusive categories of reason. It is vague with respect to such classification.

Therefore, the contemporary Tolstoyean theory fails to account for what seems to be most yearned for in the experience. The theory does not provide the objective specification of intense pleasure. Proponents of the contemporary expressivism have not secured the function of theory in this area. I do not wish to suggest, however, that the satisfaction and frustration of concern could not - by means of suitable alterations in the basis for the effect in the human will - be confined to within the traditional concept. I do not wish to say that traditional conceptions of the evocative art suffer from any strict inconsistency, but that our interest in hedonistic enjoyment motivates us to try to insure by means of a theory such future and repeated enjoyment.

The proponents of the contemporary expressivism have accepted as assumed and given the type of conception that has always been employed in the interpretation of art. In contrast to this, I shall take as assumed and given, as my starting hypothesis the apparently self-contradictory state of affairs in which the state of feeling aroused in art together with its origin in the vague and fluid motion of life are objectively specifiable. I then derive from this hypothesis whatever changes are required in the traditional approach to the interpretation of experience (or in the area of any other factor, such as the spectator's attitude of concern) in order to bring about the state of affairs in which the emotions, as such, are subject to theoretical consideration.
a) The Analysis of a Would-be Experience

Our experience is comprehended only in terms of a set of concepts. And these are such that, as has already been remarked in the first chapter, they are both constitutive of, and make reference to the causal conditions for our conscious awareness of the experience. The condition of the self as a concernful or willing agent is a factor leading up to the shared experience of feeling. Thus, the conceptual categories under which we comprehend our experience must make reference to conditions of the self as a concernful agent. Moreover, the conscious experience of feeling is impossible unless one interprets it with the appropriate set of categories or expectations regarding the character of feeling.

The set of concepts employed in the conscious awareness of feeling must include 1) a concept or image of feeling that coheres, fits over the impression had of it along with 2) the concept which stands as the polar opposite of the emotion in order that it may be said that this is seen for what it is and in a way that distinguishes it from what it is not. Thus, we are not even said to remark on a thing unless one encounters it with the appropriate set of expectations regarding its character or significance.

Again, our hypothesis is that there exists a state of affairs in which we have a shared and conscious experience of feeling stimulated in the spectator by means of art. There are among the conditions logically inferred from our hypothesis - that is
to say, among the conditions without which we could not clearly imagine our shared and conscious awareness of the passions stimulated in art - the causal conditions related to the production of our conscious awareness of the evocative art. In other words, among the conditions inferred from the experience are those of the self as a concernful and rational agent. Thus, my intention is to derive by a logical analysis the precise role of the spectator in determining or bringing about the objecthood, the phenomenal appearance of feeling aroused in one by means of the work. On the basis of that awareness, we may begin to correct and to refine our traditional uses of language in relation to states of feeling.

Thus, the present line of research is directed toward designating the conditions of the spectator by means of which the curtains are drawn, so to speak, on this astonishing mental landscape: the phenomena of aesthetic experience. In order to prove that the conditions finally specified are those without which we could not explain the experience, I shall enlist the services of an inductive analysis. I shall be seeking continually to review each and every possible approach or attitude of the spectator in order to discount all except his most certain means to the objective awareness of emotional experience. The thesis is intended to establish a relation of logical necessity between the phenomena of artistic evocation and the spectator's role in bringing it about.

There is the question to be considered, at this point, of whether one could rightly arrive by a logical analysis at an empirical statement or a statement of cause and effect. I
doubt that I could provide a fully adequate answer to this question. However, it seems that the matter is quite different in the case of a causal relation which is independent of the human will, and one which is directly involved with human concern. It is doubtless untrue that logical analysis or the limits of what can be clearly imagined, serves to determine what is the case in the world apart from ourselves. But we have a far more intimate knowledge of ourselves than the world. So it seems that a logical analysis may play a role in the investigation of one's emotional response.
b) Our Approach to Interpretation

In the area of the spectator's expectations, the scope of our inquiry may be limited to questions about expectations regarding the primary character of, or the impressions found in experience. The feeling aroused in one by the work of art is the product of the artwork, as it stands prior to the spectator's attitude of concern, and the spectator as a concernful agent. Hence, the experience may arise in significant cases (e.g., the case of music), independently of our expectations regarding the symbolic content of a thing.

The clear perception or conscious awareness of a thing has traditionally been thought to involve a set of concepts that are 'polar opposite' in the sense of contraries or direct contradictories. This would be the relation of contrariety as found in that holding between alternatives within the colour spectrum. In the instance of direct contradictories the relation would be as that born between good and bad, desire and resentment, etc. For that reason our traditional expectations regarding the character of experience are thought mutually exclusive in that no portion of the one in a set may be found in the other. That is to say, a segment of the manifold of experience occupied by the one thing could in no way also contain its alternative.

But Zola called the emotion of jealousy a melding of desire and resentment. It is possible to imagine a work of art that excites the emotion of jealousy, and this would seem to be a
particularly difficult thing to perceive clearly in terms of traditional categories. Moreover, the feeling that might be aroused in one throughout much of the performance of Tristan and Isolde — I refer especially to the Ein Kineider section — is a similarly confusing brew of sexual longing and religious ardour. Furthermore, Mahler's Song of the Earth seems to evoke the affirmation of an indefinite array of widely differing concerns. Petronius' Satyricon may be experienced as the feeling of promise lent to an indefinite or open set of hopes and desires. Hence, the passions stimulated in art may be regarded as inconsistent with any clear view of them under the traditional categories of perception. This seems for our purposes to be most significantly the case with the intensely pleasurable feeling evoked at the close of either Tristan and Isolde or The Song of the Earth. For here the feeling is so intense that it appears as the melding of an infinitude with the finite field of perception.

The feeling, as such, has a clarity and distinctness of its own. It is the clarity and distinctness of certain natural phenomena such as the twilight, the wind, the storm, the mist, the stars spread out unendingly into darkness. This is the particular structure of the conceptual categories involved in the perception of feeling and which it seems that I can make clear to another only with reference to what already appears to all of us alike in just such natural phenomena.

Thus, the feeling is seen clearly for what it is and in a way that distinguishes it from what it is not, but in much the way in which we discern a particular segment of a spectrum of
greys. The feeling is often such that there is some cross over between what it is and what it is not. The conceptual categories involved in the perception of passion are polar opposites, but in the relation of sub-contraries by which I mean that the one thing taking up a given place in the manifold of experience is consistent with that place being taken up also by the alternative. Thus, the feeling of, for example, jealousy is understood as consistent either with resentment or with desire.

The feeling would be clearly discernible, but only with the introduction into the traditional set of our expectations of a further set of conceptual categories i.e. a set of the sort regularly employed in the perception of natural phenomena. These are phenomena involving the clarity of the twilight of dusk or the Autumn in the gradual transition from one to another season of the year - i.e., the so-called vague phenomena of nature - along with those as rigidly defined as the valley or the mountain side. Expectations of these sorts, and that resemble the shapes and forms of any or all natural phenomena are, on the whole, what I mean by the categories of nature.
c) The Spectator's Attitude of Concern

It is with the introduction of the concepts of nature that, in the area of the spectator's attitude of concern, we are able to conceive of an alternative to the traditional manner of appreciating the work of art. Recall that the emotions evoked in art are the products not only of the primary and representational features of art - i.e., the artwork, as it stands prior to the spectator's attitude of concern - but also of the kind and degree of the spectator's concern. In other words, the emotion is the effect of the work on the self as a concernful agent. Under normal conditions, we each of us tend to bring to the work a unique attitude of concern and this diversity is due to the freely autonomous character of the agent. Consequently, the aesthetic response may conceivably differ for one and another in the viewing of art. Hence, the spectator's attitude of concern as it stands, under normal conditions, is inconsistent with the public accessibility of the response.

This has lead Osborne and also Tanner to propose that the spectator take up toward the work some special attitude. They have done so in order to insure the perception of the objective or publicly accessible character of the emotional response. Osborne suggests that one view one's own experience with an attitude of Kantian dis-interest. However, though it seems that this would insure the public recognition of some facet of experience, it would not - as it has been shown in the previous
chapter - provide for the conscious awareness of the intensely pleasurable evocation of art. Hence, the attitude of concern suggested by Osborne must fail to account for the objecthood of feeling on its most important plain.

In addition, Tanner has proposed that in order to appreciate the publicly accessible character of the artwork, it is necessary that one "suspends disbelief... in the ethos which the work embodies". Thus, one has to view the work with some traditionally condoned and re-inforced attitude of concern - presumably, the one characteristic of the culture of which the artwork was spawned. The successful or true appreciation of Beethoven or Wagner depends, that is, on our listening to performances of their music with the degree of fervour typical of their 19th-century audience. However, it seems to be true, especially in the case of Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, that one has to have already responded appropriately to the music in order for one to have recognized "the ethos which the work embodies". That is to say, Tanner's explanation of the correct appreciation of the evocative is circular, involving as it does Colridge's attitude applied to what must already be seen as the emotional effect of the work. But these are the various manners of appreciation to be found in the literature pertaining to the evocative art.

Therefore, the objecthood of feeling is dependent rather on the spectator taking up an attitude of neutral interest with respect to specific types of concern. For I can imagine clearly no further alternative in the area of the spectator's concern. The attitude

1. M. K. Tanner, op. cit., p. 182
of neutral interest is the will that wills every shape and form of willing. It is this and only this attitude that both eliminates the spectator's individual bias of concern and insures that there be the kind and degree of interested involvement on the basis of which the widest scope of feeling is possible. The attitude of the spectator's neutral interest is that, I suspect, of the ordinary man who stands in possession of a free will, unindoctrinated into any given rubric of appreciation. Thus, it is with the introduction of the conceptual categories of nature that alone we are made capable of imagining this alternative attitude of concern. Clearly, the free will, unindoctrinated into any specific rubric of concern, is not given under any set of the traditional categories of interpretation, but it is perceived under certain of the categories of nature.
Conclusion

On the whole, I wish to say that if the spectator were to take up an attitude of neutral interest toward the artwork and to view the resulting experience with the categories of nature, then we would by these means be placed in a position to specify objectively the feeling stimulated by the work. The attitude of interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern brings it about that the experience of passion is determined by the work of art, alike for each and any who have this type of interest. The conceptual categories of nature for the interpretation of experience enable one to bring the experience, as such, to the level of conscious awareness. Under these conditions, the feeling stimulated in one by the work would be alike to a sufficient number with clarity and distinctness of an appropriate order, to insure agreement on the precise reference of aesthetic terms. We could denote precisely what is of interest to us in the sphere of the evocative art, namely, the varying kinds and degrees of aesthetic experience even among pleasures of the highest intensity.

What we would mean by our use of an aesthetic term would be
just a given segment of the manifold of aesthetic experience. A new or innovative use of language could be defended with direct reference to the phenomena of feeling in art. Moreover, the precise and publicly acknowledged denotation of artistic effects may be regarded as the end result of a process of correction and refinement on the manner in which these terms are already commonly employed. This would mean merely making more precise certain of what seem to be already current associations between signs and experience. Having established, thus, a language of feeling for use in the region of the Tolstoyean work of art, it might then be possible to employ that same vocabulary of feeling in inquiry about the satisfaction or frustration of concern in any other sphere. For it seems one may now, using language borrowed from the discussion of art, report meaningfully one's own state of feeling and the prior condition of the will from which it was spawned. This seems to be so even though these may differ, outside of the sphere of art, for one and another individual in relation to a given object. One would have simply to report one's unique experience of feeling employing language conditioned by our appreciation of the arts in order to be understood.

It might now be possible to begin the task of correlating members of the unique class of symbolic terms found in Collingwoodean works of art with the states of feeling that the artist may have had in mind. The time may now also be for the task of correlating states of feeling with the kind of mental imagery that we find spoken of in Lyman's theory of emotion. For there may be developed an accurate and public use of natural language in reference to feeling, in terms of which it may be possible to
justify the relation between states of feeling and the language of art, or states of feeling and other events in life. We are, perhaps, now in a position to address the central question raised by such artists and philosophers as Wagner, Schopenhauer, Mahler, Nietzsche and the entire philosophical tradition of jouissance - i.e., how is our most intense and highly valued experience of feeling correctly defined? This owing to our having terms with which to accurately distinguish and compare purportedly worthwhile emotional states e.g. Wagner's Romantic ethos in opposition to Tolstoy's emotion of Christian faith.

It may be, as Hegel, Heidegger, and also Zuckerman have seemed to suggest, that the Romantic ethos is dangerous, pernicious, immoral, but this would not be as they appear to have argued because intense feeling is less readily subject to rational or practical consideration than some other state of the self. But would the momentary enjoyment of the one be more intense than of the other? Would the one be accessible to a greater number? May the pleasure derived from the one be expected to endure through a longer period of time? Those are possible lines of further inquiry which I mention briefly in order to clarify the thesis by locating it in a larger though related field.

One has only to recall throughout these discussions that it is the core of an emotional experience found in the evocative art that is carried over into any further talk of the emotion, and not that part of the feeling that may be said to result from
factors involved specifically with the viewing of art. These are factors, for example, of sitting in the theatre as a member of an audience, or just holding up in front of one the pages of a book. Only the core of the experience remains the same no matter in whatever sphere and it is this core of experience taken apart from its context in the viewing of art that we mean by the term for the emotion.

The thesis is intended to establish a relation of logical necessity between the phenomena of artistic evocation and the spectator's role in determining the phenomenal character of the experience. Our claim regarding the appropriate attitude and approach of the spectator is defeated if it has failed to take into account any important, actual or even merely clearly imaginable vicissitude of feeling. To a few such possible counter-examples, I should like before closing to make adequate reference. However, if this position is to have any other than a purely conceptual significance then it is imperative that one take it to the works themselves.

In order to lend some concreteness to my position, I refer to a few of its implications for Peckham and Rapheal contra
Michael Tanner on the intention of *Tristan and Isolde*. Tanner's view is that if one attends to the emotional effect of the music of the opera, as opposed to just the *libretto*; then far from appearing, as Peckham and Rapheal suggest, as an exposé of the Romantic *ethos*, the work is a promulgation of intense sexual longing. The question seems to be whether we can agree on the emotional effect of a work that for many of us runs counter to our most profound emotional tendency - our strong tendency to condemn on ethical grounds the actions of the central characters of Wagner's opera.

It is the music of intense longing that enables the spectator to enter into Isolde's neurotic delusion at the close of the opera and makes the overwhelming joy of that scene ours as well as Isolde's. In its bringing of the spectator to the enjoyment of this type of satisfaction, the work represents a reinforcement and promulgation of the Romantic *ethos*. The fact that Peckham and Rapheal have suggested *pathos* is the final effect of the work seems to indicate their taking up a moralistic attitude toward the work rather than an attitude of neutral interest. They have not allowed themselves to get carried away by the music.

If we view the work with the appropriate attitude of concern and approach to interpretation, then we have to agree with Tanner in applying the term 'intense longing' to the effect of the music. The effect is, under the appropriate conditions, the same as that of Goethe's *Sufferings of Young Werther*, Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, or Le Carre's *Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, and I think Peckham and Rapheal would agree, we do already use the
term of that class of art. One extends the use of the term in this way not because we have agreed to do so, but rather because some effect of each of the works is, under appropriate conditions, the same. Hence, our attending to the work with the appropriate approach to interpretation and attitude of concern lends support to Tanner's view that Tristan and Isolde is a promulgation of intense longing. It is this state of longing that is apparently given satisfaction at the close of the opera. In this way, certain already current uses of language may be corrected or supported with direct reference to the experience of art.

Moreover, it is under conditions of a neutral interest and the conceptual categories of nature that one can with reference to the experience discern the differences in the kind and degree of the emotional effect found at the close of Tristan and Isolde, on the one hand, and that on the other, of Bach's St. Matthew Passion. On the one hand, there is from Wagner the generation in the spectator of intense Romantic or sexual bliss and on the other, from Bach the almost equally intense emotion of Christian faith. This is a set of distinctions that Tanner has had evident difficulty in making. For a distinction between two extremely intense emotional states could be made only with reference to the experience viewed with the categories of nature. Thus, our use of aesthetic terms is said to be corrected or supported and refined with reference to the experience of artistic evocation. Thus, a vocabulary of terms may be developed for the emotions in art and life though primarily in connection with feeling in art.
It might be fair to say, at this point, that we do tend to become with any given work of art or event in life, after a time, quite simply bored. The boredom may be expected to alter significantly the character of one's emotional response. This boredom might, however, have nothing to do with any attribute of the work or of the event in life, nor with the amount of time spent with them, but stem rather from one's failure to satisfy, during a period of time, some number of independent or extraneous concerns. These works of art or these events in life might never have appeared at all tedious if concerns not specifically connected with them had long ago been put to rest. I do not wish to suggest that one subdue any of the more profound attitudes of concern with which one might view most events in life, since some of these attitudes would seem to be of extreme importance to our survival. However, it would seem possible for us to quell any bias of concern — i.e., any extraneous attitude of concern — that might stand in the way of the objective appreciation of a work of art.

In addition, it may be observed that there are a few cases of it being impossible for the spectator to attain to an attitude of a purely neutral involvement. It is difficult to imagine one having the same experience of, say, a novel by De Sade or certain portions of Mann's *Holy Sinner* before and immediately after the event of one's orgasm. But such an event is a special case, one that it would be special pleading to cite in opposition to the thesis.
The distorting effect that such events might have on the phenomenon of the evocative art would be neutralized in much the way as are the effects of unusual lighting conditions on our understanding of colour phenomena. Indeed, the correct approach and attitude of the spectator may be expected to play the same role to the evocative art as proper lighting to painting, simply the best and most appropriate setting for careful examination of certain works of art.
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Summary of the Thesis

Our flights of passion might enhance the quality and value of life in ways that we would be at a serious loss never to have known. Therefore, I have tried to show that the vagueness and the private character of feeling do not stand as incontrovertible barriers against specifying objectively, theorizing about, discussing clearly among ourselves, our states of feeling. For the objective specification of the emotions has seemed to me worthwhile in order that we may, with precision, direct one another to, suggest to one another, the objects or behavior that might, through the emotional effect, increase the overall hedonistic enjoyment of our lives. In other words, theory enhances, or facilitates, hedonistic enjoyment because the objective specification, the development of precisely defined referential terms, enables us to locate and relocate certain kinds and degrees of pleasurable experience. The increase of hedonistic enjoyment I have considered an end of the highest value. Thus, a poetic licence is employed throughout the thesis, and in celebration of that end. Thus, portions of vagueness, long-windedness are to be found in this, what, on the whole, should be a sufficiently clear treatment of a
A philosophical problem.

In the course of this study, one moves from the art to life, and does not begin with the project of specifying objectively feeling as it occurs already in life. For there it seems that our emotional states will necessarily differ for one and another in relation to a given object of concern. We appear to be required to live with the varying types of individual concern from which the privacy of feeling, or our varying emotional responses to objects, originates. Thus, one condition of our agreement on the use of terms to designate clearly, to consider objectively, the emotions, seems never to be met in life – the condition of public accessibility. But it seems that we could suppress our biases of concern in relation to the class of artworks defined by Tolstoy's theory of expressivism, the class of the evocative art. Thus, though our emotional response may often be private in life, the language of feeling developed in relation to the evocative art may be of use in explaining to others one's particular state of feeling. So I have chosen to speak here of Tolstoy's theory and the evocative art though my principle interest is in the entire life of emotion.

My thesis states that there are certain conditions, that I shall explain further, of the self as a free and rational agent
logically implied in, and implied as casual conditions leading up to our reflective, conscious, experience of the passions stimulated in art. This artificially contrived experience of art provides the basis for our agreeing on the use of terms to designate clearly the emotions. Our development of an objective vocabulary of feeling in art may then make it possible for us to deal with further problems in the study of art and the life of emotion. This is because the core of an emotional experience may be expected to remain constant throughout art and life.

The emotions evoked by means of art are, under normal conditions, to be regarded as, "private," in the sense of their tending to differ for one and another spectator to the work. This is owing to the emotion being the effect of the work on the shape of the will, or, human concern, and our tending each of us to bring to the work of art a unique type of concern. Moreover, the feeling is, in many instances, vague with respect to the cut and dry, hard and fast, conceptual distinctions traditionally employed in the theory of art. The prerequisites of our agreeing on the clear use of terms to designate a thing are that the thing be seen clearly and distinctly, by each of us alike. Thus, the privacy and vagueness of feeling are problems for any objective consideration of the evocative art.

Our proposed solution to these issues is that the spectator bring to the viewing of the work of art 1) an attitude of interest neutral with respect to specific types of concern (an attitude that differs significantly from the Kantian), and 2) a set of concepts, similar to our everyday concepts of natural phenomena.
(a notion to be further explained), for the interpretation of the experience. If the spectator adopts this attitude of concern and approach to interpretation of experience in relation to the evocative art then the emotion aroused by the work should be seen clearly enough and alike to a sufficient number for us to have a discernful, practical discussion of kinds and degrees of pleasure. That would seem to be the function of any clear and public understanding in the area of feeling and the evocative art.