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THE ORATORICAL STRATEGY AND WAR IMAGERY
IN
JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN’S THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY
by
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PREFACE

The edition of the *Idea of a University* edited by George N. Shuster, published February, 1959 by Image Books, is one of two recent definitive editions and therefore the one used in the preparation of this thesis. Part I only of what is now *The Idea of a University* is the subject of this thesis as it comprises the lectures Newman prepared in order to help launch the Catholic University of Ireland.

The first five lectures were given on successive Mondays, beginning at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 10, 1852, in the New Assembly Room of the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin. The audience, composed of Fellows of Trinity College, Dublin; Jesuits; and prominent Dublin laity numbered about four hundred. The Discourses were published in fortnightly pamphlets shortly after they were delivered. The second five lectures were not delivered, as Newman returned to England June 9 for the June 21 Achilli libel trial and did not resume his lectures. The second five lectures were published with a preface and an appendix in the autumn of 1852. The ten lectures were then bound into one volume and published by James Duffy in Dublin, February 2, 1853. This was the first edition, entitled: *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin*. This thesis is based on the material of the ten lectures that comprised the first edition.

The second edition (the first English one) was published in 1859 by Longmans, London. It was entitled, *The Scope and Nature of
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University Education. According to Henry Tristram, Newman edited this edition "removing much contemporary, collateral, or superfluous matter," but also fusing the first two discourses into one, and omitting the fifth altogether. This is the version reprinted in the Everyman Library. In the final edition 1873, he restored the first two discourses with their original form, but he did not reinstate the fifth, keeping it in reserve for a projected volume of essays.¹

In 1858 Newman had published a volume of his lectures given on various occasions while he was rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. Some of these had been printed in the Catholic University Gazette, a university paper that Newman edited weekly during 1854-55. The volume was entitled, Lectures and Essays on University Subjects Addressed to the Members of the Catholic University. To the final edition of his discourses Newman added the Lectures and Essays on University Subjects to form Part II of a volume entitled The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated. This 1873 edition is the one on which George N. Shuster has based his edition of The Idea of a University. Newman had again omitted his initial Discourse V, his last lecture delivered to the Dublin audience. That lecture is now printed as an appendix to the Charles Frederick Harrold edition of The Idea of a University.

Newman's other writings on educational subjects while he was

actually rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, 1854 to 1858, were printed in Volume III of *Historical Sketches* in the collected works of Newman by Longmans in 1897-98. In 1952, Dr. Michael Tierney, president of University College, Dublin, the academic heir of Newman’s Catholic University of Ireland, edited the material of *Historical Sketches* Volume III with introduction and notes in a volume entitled, *University Sketches*, published by Browne and Nolan, Dublin. *The Idea of a University, Parts I and II, and Historical Sketches, Volume III*, represent Newman’s writing on university subjects during the seven years exactly of his campaign in Ireland from November 12, 1851 to November 12, 1858.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the oratorical strategy and war imagery in the Idea of a University as an expression of the educational controversies that were the occasion and the source of the ten discourses prepared in 1852 for the launching of the Catholic University of Ireland.

Since the ten discourses of the Idea of a University that form the material of this thesis are, in Newman's own words, "of a preliminary nature ... inquiring what a university is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearing," it has been necessary in Chapter One to outline the source and evolution of Newman's educational ideals as they are found in his reading, his education, and his experience as an Oxford tutor and a leader of the Oxford Movement. Furthermore, Chapter One establishes Newman's training for controversy as a preparation for his presentation of his ideas in terms of oratorical strategy and war imagery in The Idea of a University.

Chapter Two discusses Newman's controversial statements on liberalism as they form the intellectual background of the lectures, which Newman took for granted was understood by his Irish audience for whom he originally prepared the lectures. Since some background is necessary for the present day reader, Chapter Two presents the liberalistic ideas current in educational thought as preliminary to Newman's

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greatest indictment of liberalism, The Idea of a University. Also Chapter Two outlines the educational situation in Ireland that made the presentation of the discourses one of the most difficult assignments of Newman's life.

Chapters Three and Four present the two educational controversies that are basic to the lectures as they are effectively expressed in oratorical strategy and war imagery. Newman said in a letter to the Reverend John Hayes that his main aim in writing was "To express clearly and exactly my meaning. ... As to patterns for imitation, the only master of style I have ever had ... is Cicero. I think I owe a great deal to him, and as far as I know to no one else."\(^1\) Newman's oratorical style has, therefore, been discussed from the point of view of Newman's own evaluation of Ciceronian oratory in his essays on Cicero now contained in Volume One of Historical Sketches. Newman's war imagery is an expression of his idea that the educational world of his day was "the arena of as critical a struggle between truth and error as Christianity has ever endured."\(^2\)

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CHAPTER I

THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF NEWMAN'S THOUGHT

AND HIS TRAINING FOR CONTROVERSY

Since the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the oratorical strategy and war imagery in The Idea of a University, it is necessary to establish, by reference to Newman's early life and training, the reasons he tended to see life as warfare and therefore to express his ideas in terms of strategy and war imagery. First, Chapter One discusses Newman's early years at Ealing\(^1\) as they reveal his interest in controversy and drama as well as his admiration for war heroes. At this time too, his reading established the philosophical and theological basis for the ideas that were to result in his personal struggle with liberalism during his youth, while a student at Trinity College, Oxford, and later as a tutor of Oriel College, Oxford. Secondly, the chapter presents Newman's conflicts with liberalism in the educational sector while he was a fellow and tutor of Oriel, and thirdly deals with the educational aspects of the Oxford Movement. It is, therefore, the purpose of Chapter One to establish the source of Newman's lifelong conflict and to reveal the training for and participation in controversy as a preparation for expressing his ideas in terms of oratorical strategy and war imagery in The Idea of a University.

\(^1\) Great Ealing School near London was the boy's school Newman attended from the age of seven to the age of fifteen.
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A. The Years to 1822: Newman's Education at Ealing and Trinity College, Oxford

It is necessary to note at the outset that Newman, even in his early school years, was aware that life is a conflict. His realization that life is warfare is found in such expressions of conflict as his delight in debate and controversial speech-making, his interest in the art form that mirrors conflict, the drama, and his youthful admiration for war heroes. Newman's training in Ciceronian oratory began at Ealing with his enthusiastic participation in speeches that were mock political debates. It is reported that on one occasion he spoke the part of Sir William Wyndham in the House of Commons debate in 1734 in which the Tory attacked the corruption of the Whig leader Walpole. This interest in debate Newman continued in his years at Trinity where his hopes of establishing a debating society were disappointed. However, his propensity to champion a cause and persuade an audience to a point of view were excellent preparation for the kind of Ciceronian oratory required to win his audience's support for his educational ideals in his discourses on university education many years later.

In addition to delivering speeches, the boys at Ealing acted in plays. An annual event that combined oratory and drama was the three "Grand Nights," on each night of which there was a Latin play "and on the morning of the third 'speeches' ... The copy of Terence
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which was used by Newman in doing the Latin plays, ... with its notes on how to read various lines and its indication of a 'Salmon colour silk coat,' for one of the actors, looked more like a prompter's book than a school lesson. Newman himself played the roles of Hegio in Phormio, Pythias in Eunuchus, Syrus in Adelphi, and Davus in Andria.¹

Years later, when he was sixty, with great enthusiasm, Newman taught the boys of his own school at Edgbaston to act these same plays which he edited for them. As a schoolboy, Newman wrote dramas, usually comedies, for his sisters and brothers to act. He even wrote an opera, a burlesque, music and all. It is Newman's particular roles as actor and director in the dramatic presentation of his educational ideals to his Irish audience with which this thesis deals.

The general role Newman was to admire greatly and to play himself throughout his life was that of the soldier in the army of the Church Militant. His youthful admiration for Wellington and Napoleon made him tell J. A. Froude in later years that Wellington's dispatches "made one 'burn to have been a soldier.'" Froude likened Newman's face to Julius Caesar's and said Newman gave one the impression that he might have been a great general.²


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Newman as orator persuading his audience of his educational ideals assumed the military role of general, of master strategist in the struggle to win his audience from their subjugation to the principles of liberalism in education.

Louis Bouyer in his biography, Newman, His Life and Spirituality, says that on the occasion of Newman's receiving the Red Hat in 1879, he [Newman] summed up his life's work in a single phrase, when he said he had always fought against liberalism. What he meant by that term was the claim of man to do without God, to act by himself and for himself, whether it be a matter of comprehending the Universe or ordering his own life.\textsuperscript{1} Newman's discourses on education were his campaign against the forces of liberalism evident in university education. "The claim of man to do without God, to act by himself" were manifested in the current campaign to omit theology from the university curriculum and to establish professional training as the aim of university education. Since these two were the main areas in which Newman concentrated his offensive against liberalism in education, they form the basis of his Idea of a University. Thus, Newman's early training in oratory, his interest in drama, and his admiration for military heroes were a preparation for his seeing life in terms of conflict, a conflict which

involved him in all the drama of an orator's strategy to win his Irish audience in his discourses on education in 1852.

In addition to his early interest in the expressions of conflict, the drama of Newman's own life seemed to be fraught with both inner and outer conflict. The inner conflict was Newman's struggle against his own personal kind of liberalism: intellectual pride and vanity to the neglect of spiritual considerations. Each of the three crises in his personal struggle gave rise to a particular course of action that influenced his future. The outer conflict was first an academic and then a religious one involving Newman in the Oriel controversy over the role of the tutor in university education and then in the Oxford Movement.

Newman's first struggle against personal liberalism took place at the age of fourteen. The development of his intellectual power gave him a self-reliance that was inimical to the idea of the sovereign presence of God. As Louis Bouyer explains, the acceptance of mysteries beyond his comprehension, which he felt to be the whole of religion, struck him as something he had outgrown and left behind.\(^1\) According to his account in the \textit{Apologia}, when he was fourteen he had

\(^1\) Louis Bouyer, \textit{Newman His Life and Spirituality}, p. 16.
read Tom Paine's tracts against the Old Testament, and some of Hume's essays. He had also copied some French verses denying the immortality of the soul and thought: "How dreadful, but how plausible!" By 1815 Newman had reached what he considered to be a state of general or semi-scepticism. He was, however, to become aware of the danger inherent in the supremacy of "reason in which self-reliance amounts to pride, and which refuses, on principle, to rely on any power external to itself. It was reason in this sense of the word, and reason very much alive in the boy John Henry, that led him to turn away from Christ, not indeed in order to live a life of sensual indulgence, but rather to entrench himself in a virtuous independence that refuses to bow to anything or anybody."2

The external force that was to turn Newman towards the Sovereign Will was one of his masters at Ealing, the Reverend Walter Mayers, of Pembroke College, Oxford. During the summer vacation of 1816, which Newman was forced to spend at Ealing, he held long discourses with his master and read the books Mr. Mayers recommended. Although Newman had occasionally collided with Mr. Mayers' particular kind of Evangelical


2 Louis Bouyer, Newman His Life and Spirituality, p. 17.
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Christianity, he states in the *Apologia* that at this time he "fell under the influence of a definite creed" (127). About his own "moment of apocalypse" that summer of 1816, Newman was to write years later in his private journal of 1859, "addressing the Creator: 'Thy wonderful grace turned me right round when I was more like a devil than a wicked boy'." He thought of himself as an evil spirit because of what seemed to him his intellectual pride. He saw his youthful scepticism as "a form of self-will, leading to the substitution of human reason for the divine creative spirit, to a self-centred universe and a final alienation from all love. Like St. Theresa of Avila he 'saw his place in hell'." Newman was to refer to his conversion in the *Apologia* as "a great change of thought" (127) the result of the fact that his intellect had received "impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy have never been effaced or obscured" (127). Newman had won his first battle with the forces of personal liberalism.

The effect of this initial victory over liberalism on his own personality may best be described with reference to some of the books

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recommended by Mr. Mayers: one by William Romaine seemed to be most
influential in Newman's conversion. The main Calvinistic doctrine
Romaine stressed, predestined salvation, gave Newman a consciousness
of God's concern for each individual and an awareness of himself in
relation to his Creator. This idea that the Sovereign Being was con­
cerned with him and perhaps had chosen him, led him to say in the
Apologia that he had become aware "of two and two only absolute and
luminously self-evident beings, myself and my creator" (127). He there­
fore realized that he was not independent of the Sovereign Will. This
realization led to Newman's immersing himself in the Divine Will for
the rest of his life. His later seeing that Will vested in the author­
ity of the Church is evident in his appeal to Papal authority as reason
enough for the establishment of a Catholic University of Ireland.

Another Book, the Force of Truth by Thomas Scott, captivated
Newman with the idea that a faithful adherence to the voice of con­
science and to living truth would bring one unavoidably to traditional
Christianity. What made Scott his hero was "his bold unworldliness and
vigorous independence of mind. He followed truth wherever it led him
..." (128). From Thomas Scott of Aston Sandford, to whom, "humanly
speaking," (128) Newman said he almost owed his soul, he took the
following as mottos describing the progress towards truth: "Holiness
before peace" and "Growth is the only evidence of life" (128). The
independence of the intellect in its search for truth and the necessary warfare implied in the motto "Holiness before peace" made these mottos a kind of battle cry for Newman throughout his life of controversy.

The latter, "growth is the only evidence of life," was to become a main principle of Newman's educational theories. His youthful reliance on the reason and the independence of the intellect, Newman retained years later in his attitude toward religious instruction in education at the time he delivered the discourses. The intellectual aspect of religion dominated his thinking in that he insisted in the discourses, on theology's being a science and on its therefore having an intellectual right to be included in the university's curriculum. Also, his idea gained from Scott, that the intellect's free and independent search for truth will eventually lead the mind to Christian truth accounts in part for his idea in the discourses that the whole truth in the form of all the sciences, including theology, must be available to the intellect. The "Holiness before peace" motto established Newman's lifelong viewpoint that truth must prevail at all costs—an idea that brought him into conflict with the values of his age; the educational values with which he clashed are the concern of this thesis.

The final result of Newman's reading at this time, including other texts given to him by Mr. Mayers such as Private Thoughts by
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Bishop Beveridge and Law's *Serious Call*, was that his thought became dominated by the Calvinistic doctrine of the elect and the great division between the elect and the rest of the world. Law's book impressed upon him a doctrine which seemed basic to his own battle-scarred existence: the "doctrine of the warfare between the city of God and the powers of darkness" (129). Thus at fifteen Newman was aware of the division of the world into two camps, "the City of God and the City of the Evil One"¹ and of the unending and seemingly irreconcilable struggle between the children of light and powers of darkness. When he entered Trinity College, Oxford in June 1817 he "was fortified by the feeling that he had made his final choice between the warring powers which rend the world assunder. Adopting, with juvenile exactitude, the Augustinian scheme (or to put it simply, the Evangelical theory) of things—that is to say, the irreconcilable and unending conflict between the City of God and City of the Evil One—the boy who found himself that June day in the lovely green quadrangle of Trinity had thoroughly made up his mind to make no concession to the enemy."² He himself had chosen "the City of God" and thereby had declared unending warfare on "the City of the Evil one."³

¹ Louis Bouyer, *Newman His Life and Spirituality*, p. 34.
² Ibid., p. 33-34.
³ Ibid., p. 34.
Near the end of his first year at Trinity, Newman scored a material victory by winning the college scholarship, an award of fifty pounds for nine years. He was so elated that he ran off immediately to order his scholar's gown. "This initial triumph set the seal on his allegiance, his lifelong allegiance, to Oxford."¹ After winning the scholarship, Newman made the tactical error of considering the territory conquered and the objective gained when really he had won only the first skirmish; with the result that, he spent too much time in intellectual pursuits that interested him such as reading the tragedies of Aeschylus and Aristotle's Poetics; editing a periodical, The Undergraduate; playing the violin in chamber music gatherings; and reading the early poets of the romantic school, in particular Crabbe and Southey. Then the last year before his B.A. examinations he worked without intermission eleven to twelve hours a day up to the eve of the examination. Not only was his arduous study schedule very unwise strategy, but Newman also suffered from the lax supervision of his tutor Mr. Short who failed to prepare him adequately for the honours degree which was his objective. An additional strain on Newman's delicate nervous system was the fact that high hopes were held for his bringing Trinity the first honours in eight years.

¹ Ibid., p. 42.
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The recognition of the forces of evil in his own soul, personal vanity and ambition, were what unnerved him in the day of battle. His second battle against liberalism began. Not only were outward circumstances unfavourable, but Newman's frame of mind was hardly conducive to his winning honours. He began to fear that he had spent too much time on subjects unrelated to his courses. He accused himself of the personal liberalism that was his lifelong struggle to combat. He considered himself "vain, self-seeking, and worldly."¹ He wrote the following note in his diary. "'The time draws near. I have had anguish in my mind. Yes, and all owing to my former sins. My soul would have been light and cheerful. I could have rested in the loving-kindness of the Lord, I should have been of good courage, but He seems to be threatening retribution, and my enemy takes occasion to exult over his prey"."² He began to be afraid that if he won honours again there would follow a similar spiritual failure to that which he thought followed his winning of the scholarship. He wrote to Mr. Mayers: "'The recollection of my ingratitude ... [after winning the scholarship], this it is that hangs heavy on my heart, and unnerves my arm in the day of battle"."³

Newman's premonitions of defeat were to be realized. He was

² Louis Bouyer, Newman His Life and Spirituality, p. 47.
³ A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 19.
so nervous during the examination that he could not answer half a dozen questions. His memory gone; his mind confused; he had to retire from the contest. He gained a low second class in classics and no standing in mathematics. In a letter to his parents, Newman said that although he had not succeeded, he had done everything possible to obtain his objective. "'If a man falls in battle after a display of bravery he is honoured as a hero; ought not the same glory to attend him who falls on the field of literature'."\(^1\)

It was late November 1820; Newman was nineteen; he still had his Trinity scholarship. Newman's "failure was due to nerves, not to laziness or stupidity; ... [he] had to slave for all gained, and to suffer humiliating defeats for every prize."\(^2\) This blow that he met with such great courage matured him from youth to manhood. "A will flexible, but as unbreakable as steel, went through what it was to go through many and many a time later on in the course of his long and often sorely tried existence. Without trying to smother, or even to minimise, the severity of the blow, his will soon asserted its firm and unaltering mastery over his emotions."\(^3\) He did not brood over his

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1 Ibid., p. 20.

2 Meriol Trevor, The Pillar of a Cloud, p. 31.

3 Louis Bouyer, Newman His Life and Spirituality, p. 48.
failure long; rather with marvellous resilience and self-mastery he succeeded in recovering his calmness of mind and spirit; he turned to the amusement of going to the theatre during Christmas holidays.

Newman's ability to win his inner conflicts, made possible the resolution of the outer ones. He therefore was never really defeated. As soon as he had recovered his equilibrium after the crushing blow of his failure to gain honours, he was able to take the offensive again. As a result of his failure to gain first class honours, he changed his objective from a career in business or government which would have pleased his father to one which better pleased himself; namely, the Church. It was therefore necessary that he seek some educational post at Oxford. He decided to try for an Oriel fellowship. Oriel College had the best academic reputation of all the colleges of Oxford. The great men of Oxford—Copleston, Keble, Hawkins—were all members of Oriel. The odds against his being elected fellow of Oriel were formidable. If he were known at all there, it must have been as the unsuccessful aspirant to an honours degree at Trinity. "Nor was he himself under any illusion as to the forces arrayed against him. But he had the will to succeed, and he surveyed the situation with perfect equanimity. ...Now [he] bore himself with a coolness and courage that did honour alike to his mental sagacity and to his moral determination."¹

¹ Ibid., p. 50.
On April 12, 1822 Newman won one of the most important and decisive victories of his entire life. His triumph was as spectacular as his former defeat had been humiliating. He had been elected fellow of Oriel. Newman had been chosen because he possessed those rare qualities of character and intellect that he was later to proclaim as the end of a liberal education.

The examination set by the Oriel Noetics was just the kind to help them discern the man of culture and intellectual enlightenment. In a letter to his mother Newman explained that "it was ... the sort of examination for which one could not prepare, and yet no one would have a chance who had not been preparing for it most of his life. It was an examination which tested what you were rather than what you knew.

1 Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles (London: Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 93-94. The Noetics was a nickname given to the members of the Oriel Common Room in the 1820's. The members were Provost Copleston, Richard Whatley, Edward Hawkins, John Davison, Dr. Thomas Arnold, and R. D. Hampden. They were a group of the ablest men in Oxford, united by a common spirit "of moderation and comprehension" as Newman said of them; their habit of putting reason before authority made them closely allied to the Liberal school and opposed to the High Church school whose members held most of the high places in Oxford. "A free logic, rooted in a classical tradition, was the note of this society. Conversation in the Oriel common room was a hunting of first principles, and amalgam of Aristotelianism with Christianity, quick, acute, open-minded, learned, earnest and witty."
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It demanded no specific information, but merely a general ability to think, and Newman considered that if his education had done anything for him at all, it must have done something like this.1 Newman said in a letter to his parents: "'Few have attained the facility of comprehension which I have arrived at from the regularity and constancy of my reading, and the laborious and nerve-bracing and fancy-repressing study of Mathematics, which has been my principal subject'."2 Years later, in 1843, Bishop Copleston, provost of Oriel when Newman was elected fellow, defended the Oriel system of examination in a letter to the incumbent Provost of Oriel, Edward Hawkins: "'Every election to a fellowship, ... which tends to discourage the narrow and almost technical routine of public examinations, I consider as an important triumph. You remember Newman himself is an example. He was not even a good classical scholar, yet in mind and power of composition, and in taste and knowledge, he was decidedly superior to some competitors who were in a class above him in the schools'."3

The very intellectual culture and enlargement which were the reasons for Newman's election as fellow of Oriel became his central aim

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1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 29.
3 Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 73.
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in The Idea of a University. The training of the intellect that he states again and again as the main purpose of a university education he was himself to gain at the hands of the Noetics of the Oriel Common Room—Provost Copleston, John Davison, Richard Whately, Edward Hawkins, Dr. Thomas Arnold, and R.D. Hampden. The latter two had left shortly before Newman was made fellow, but they belonged to the Noetic school of thinking. The Oriel Common Room was in a sense a debating society whose members "called everything into question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority as a judge in matters intellectual." To one of their members, Richard Whately, they entrusted the task of whipping Newman into shape. Their newest member had retreated into shy silence in the presence of the most brilliant men of Oxford. It was Whately who sharpened Newman's intellect, brought him out of his shell, and gave him self-confidence. Given Whately's "sort of good-natured, 'shake-up, compelled to stand up for himself, taken up short at the first word or two, then forced to go on and say what was in his mind, this brusque handling braced him and gave him more confidence in himself than he had ever felt before." Newman writes in the Apologia about his training by Whately:

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2 Louis Bouyer, Newman His Life and Spirituality, p. 60.
"He was the first who taught me to weigh my words, and to be cautious in my statements. He led me to that mode of limiting and clearing my sense in discussion and in controversy, and of distinguishing between cognate ideas, and of obviating mistakes by anticipation, which to my surprise has been since considered, even in quarters friendly to me, to savour of the polemics of Rome" (131). Whately's training in controversy is evident in the Idea of a University in which Newman, as a skilled controversialist, circumscribes and outlines his subject, defines his terms, and anticipates the objections of his opponents.

Other Noetics had an important influence on Newman's mind and educational ideals. For Copleston the essential task of education was the training of the intellect to think and the imparting of ideas and principles on which it could exercise its skill. Copleston wrote, "'The more I think on it, ... the more am I convinced that, to exercise the mind of the student is the business of education, rather than, to pour in knowledge'."¹ This principle became for Newman the essence of his idea of a university.

Trained by the Noetics, Newman learned methods of controversy well. "For it was in the Oriel Common Room with its daily collision of mind with mind that he found embodied the very idea of a university. Later, of course, he was to have his doubts. If it was a university in essence, it was not so in integrity. It had the strength of the

¹ A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 38.
intellect, but also the weakness of the intellect insufficiently guided by religion.\textsuperscript{1} Such a weakness was to become clear to Newman during his years as an Oxford tutor and to form the basis of his plea for theology in Discourses I to V of The Idea of a University.

Even at this time, Newman differed from his liberal associates of the Oriel Common Room in that they always put reason before authority; whereas Newman insisted on authority, based on principles and tradition, as a guide of conduct. Such a way of thinking was to result in a rift between himself and Copleston and Hawkins that led to Newman's retreat from Oxford. "To Copleston Newman was in the end something of a traitor to the College which had reared him. He spoke of him in the language of the chorus in the Agamemnon, as the lion-cub brought up by the fireside, gentle and harmless, playing with the children and charming the old people, but destined to bring destruction upon the house.\textsuperscript{2}

"Destruction" however, was anything but Newman's purpose. Even before he had become tutor of Oriel in 1826, he realized that the traditional Oxford interpretation of the tutor as the guide of men rather than the dispenser of information was being lost. He complained

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 45.

\textsuperscript{2} Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 108.
that the tutors had too little contact with the men. The system made unlikely, if not impossible, the kind of mental training Newman was given by the Noetics. Also the champagne parties before and after the end of term reception of the sacrament, Newman thought a scandalous disregard of the meaning inherent in the religious ceremony as well as an indication that the tutors were shirking the responsibilities embodied in the traditional pastoral conception of the Oxford tutor. Nevertheless he suffered the lack of support from Provost Copleston and his fellow tutors when he attempted to initiate reform. "When Newman asked the Provost in 1826 or 1827, 'Are the men expected to take the Sacrament?' he was answered sharply, 'I beg you will not put such an idea into their minds. I am persuaded the question never occurs to them'—though he knew very well that it did. And again when Newman said to Tyler, 'Your men had a champagne breakfast the other day after the Sacrament,' the latter answered, 'I don't believe it, and if it were true I don't wish to know it.'\footnote{A. Dwight Culler, \textit{The Imperial Intellect}, p. 57.} Newman's idea was that the men should not be compelled or expected to attend, unless the religious significance of and reverence for the ceremony were restored. Obviously, Newman was in open conflict with the particular kind of Oxford liberalism or indifferentism that was satisfied with the semblance of
adherence to tradition and principle rather than its reality.

Newman's idea that the role of college tutor was not only secular, but pastoral in character was based partly on the traditional conception of the Oxford tutor and partly on Newman's own serious view of his joint role as teacher and minister. When he was ordained deacon in June 1823 he felt overwhelmed with the thought that he would be responsible for the souls under his care for the rest of his life. On the evening before he was appointed tutor of Oriel in 1826 he wrote of his duties as tutor:

"May I engage in them, remembering that I am a minister of Christ, and I have a commission to preach the Gospel, remembering the worth of souls, and that I shall have to answer for the opportunities given me of benefiting those who are under my care."

Also, he wrote to Harriet, "There is always the danger of the love of literary pursuits assuming too prominent a place in the thoughts of a College Tutor, or his viewing his situation merely as a secular office, a means of a future provision when he leaves College!"

Newman's eagerness to fulfill his role as tutor with its pastoral as well as its academic responsibilities to the best of his

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2 A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect*, p. 52.
abilities in spite of the overt differences with his colleagues placed a considerable strain on him. In November 1827 when he was public examiner in the schools Newman suffered a nervous collapse. He interpreted his public humiliation as the judgment of God on his own incipient liberalism. He said in the Apologia, "I was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence to moral; I was drifting in the direction of liberalism. I was rudely awakened from my dream at the end of 1827 by two great blows—illness and bereavement." (135).

The result of these two blows was that Newman accused himself of becoming too concerned with his academic preparations to the neglect of his pastoral vocation. This was the third battle with the personal liberalism of preferring "intellectual excellence to moral" that Newman was constantly contending against in his own personality. He therefore threw himself into the role of tutor with the renewed purpose of carrying out his responsibilities as he saw them. At the end of 1827, Provost Copleston was given a bishopric. Newman favoured Hawkins for provost because he thought Hawkins had the necessary sternness to carry out needed reforms. Newman wrote in a letter of 1884 the following explanation for his choice: "Let me add, ... what I have never yet brought out, that it was a longing on my part for some stricter discipline which

1 The bereavement Newman mentions was the death of his very dear sister Mary in January, 1828.
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was the direct cause of Hawkins' election. He had the reputation of
even sternness. 'He was just the man we wanted,' I said. When Froude
pleaded for Keble, I said to myself, 'He cannot cope with the evil'.

What Newman could not foresee was that Hawkins' sternness
would be felt more by the tutors than by the students. His peremptory
and donnish manner towards the tutors after his election was not cal­
culated to foster their good-will nor ensure their co-operation. Also
what Newman unfortunately did not realize at the time of the election
was that Keble had the same pastoral view of his obligation as a minister
and a teacher as did Newman and would have been, therefore, more likely
than Hawkins to sympathize with the kind of reforms Newman wanted. But
Newman did not know Keble well at the time and was only later to realize
the similarity of their ideas.

Copleston had said about the tutor system: "My beau-ideal
was that a tutor should see all his pupil's exercises, and remark upon
them; that he should talk to him about the lectures he was attending,
whether in his own classes or not; be ready to assist his difficulties,
observe his conduct, and see more especially that his religious
instructions went on!" But the ideal was not being practised. The

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 63.
2 Ibid., p. 66.
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duties of college tutor had been reduced in practice to that of lecturer or more often auditor of recitations. The serious students who wanted to take honours or try for a fellowship had to employ a private tutor.

During 1828 Newman began to pay special attention to the promising among his own students. According to Tom Mozley, Newman "read walked, and breakfasted with them, took exercises with them ... and saw them in off hours and in the Long Vacation."\(^1\) In order to make possible the influence of one mind and personality upon another, which was for Newman the essence of the educational method, he and his associate tutors Robert Wilberforce, and Hurrell Froude, with the agreement of the senior tutor Dornford, changed the lecture system at the beginning of 1829 so that each tutor would be responsible for the entire instruction of his own men. Newman described his reform as follows in a letter to a former Oxford tutor The Reverend Samuel Rickards: "'The bad men are thrown into large classes, and thus time saved for the better sort, who are put into very small lectures, and principally with their own tutors quite familiarly and chatingly'."\(^2\)

This new system was in force from January 1829 until April 1830 at which time Dornford thought it necessary to obtain Hawkins'\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 67.

\(^2\) A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 65.
permission before continuing with the scheme. Hawkins insisted that
the tutors revert to the former system next term. When the tutors were
adament, Hawkins, acting on the advice of Copleston, officially infor­
med Newman, Wilberforce, and Froude in June 1830 that they would hence­
forth be assigned no more students. By June 11, 1832, Newman had
finished teaching all the students that had been assigned to him before
the quarrel and had therefore ceased to be a college tutor.

It must be said for Hawkins that although he was an administ­
rator primarily concerned with his own image and that of the college,
he did object to a possible weakness in the new scheme: All tutors
would not be of the same scholarship and integrity as was Newman. The
pupils of a poor tutor would certainly suffer from his deficiencies.
However, in Hawkins' view, Newman was instituting a system of favourit­
ism for the good students to the neglect of the poorer ones. Actually,
what Newman was doing for the promising students was giving them the
extra time and help previously available only from a private tutor.
The poor students suffered no more from their own idleness under the
new system than they had under the old.

What was really annoying Hawkins was that his own influence
and prestige were waning under the new system. Another reform that
Newman and his colleagues wanted was the introduction of new texts and
modern classics to compare with the old so that they would be teachers
of subjects not of texts. But the Provost, who presided over the terminal examinations of Collections would have a formidable task trying to master the material for these oral examinations if the tutors kept introducing new books. Hawkins saw all Newman's reforms decreasing his own influence. Furthermore, the keenness of Newman's intellect and the magnetism of his personality drew to him a devoted body of students who even followed him to St. Mary's where his Sunday afternoon sermons were becoming increasingly popular since his appointment in 1828 as vicar of St. Mary's succeeding Hawkins. Geoffrey Faber says of Hawkins: "In the days of his intimacy with Newman¹ he was (in Newman's own words) 'clear-headed and independent in his opinions, candid in argument, tolerant of the views of others, honest as a religious inquirer, though not without something of self-confidence in his enunciations.' Had circumstances not forced him into resistance to a movement which he was not a big enough man to oppose effectively, Hawkins might have played a happier part in the history of his College and his University.²

Newman's conflict with Hawkins was his first skirmish with the liberal-istic mind in the academic sector; other such conflicts, that became full-scale battles, are the subjects of the following chapters in this thesis.

¹ What is referred to are the long chats Hawkins and Newman had over their parochial duties in 1823-24 when Hawkins was vicar of St. Mary's and Newman curate of St. Clement's.

² Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 112.
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The Noetics had taught Newman to think and to question, but they were unprepared for him to question them, to differ with them about the system they had organized. They were unprepared for him to find in their system the same sham they delighted to reveal in an argument. They were disconcerted to have revealed to them the fact that the tradition they revered was not being followed, that Oxford, an ecclesiastical institution where all the tutors were required to take orders, was unconcerned with the personal and spiritual development of those entrusted to its care. As an academic institution it was not giving the training of the intellect the Noetics admired and practised themselves in their common room debate - conversations. When Newman carried the mental gymnastics of the Oriel common room to their logical conclusion in a clear insight into the fact that Oxford education differed in practice from the principles of the Noetics and their predecessors he encountered such concerted opposition that his days as Oxford tutor were numbered.

Newman had written in his private journal a few weeks after he had become tutor in 1826: "It is my wish to consider myself as the minister of Christ. Unless I find that opportunities occur of doing spiritual good to those over whom I am placed, it will become a grave question whether I ought to continue in the tuition." If he reverted to the lecture system without the personal influence over and direction of his

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own students, Newman thought that he would not have the opportunities of "doing spiritual good to those over whom" he had been placed. In his Oxford University Sermon, "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth," Newman explains that the influence of Truth in the world at large arises "from the personal influence, direct, and indirect, of those who are commissioned to teach it." Here he has expressed in general terms the reason he considered the pastoral aspect of the tutorship so very important. He explains in this sermon: "We shall find it difficult to estimate the moral power which a single individual, trained to practise what he teaches may acquire in his own circle, in the course of years. ... The attraction, exerted by unconscious holiness, is of an urgent and irresistible nature; it persuades the weak, the timid, the wavering, and the inquiring; it draws forth the affection and loyalty of all who are in a measure like-minded; and over the thoughtless or perverse multitude it exercises a sovereign compulsory sway, bidding them fear and keep silence, on the ground of its own right divine to rule them."2

It must not be thought that Newman was concerned with exerting only a spiritual influence over his students. Any such influence must necessarily be accompanied and reinforced by a thorough academic training. That such was the case is evident from the number of honours taken by

2 Ibid., p. 95.
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Oriel College during the time Newman was tutor: eleven firsts as compared with two and five respectively for the periods preceding and following the years 1829-33. In Mark Pattison's opinion, after Newman's departure "the college began to go downhill, both in the calibre of the men who obtained fellowships and in the style and tone of the undergraduates."1 However, the result as far as Newman was concerned was fortunate. What seemed an overwhelming defeat was actually a temporary retreat in preparation for a campaign against liberalism on a much wider field: the university, the church, and indeed the country at large.

The campaign referred to is the Tractarian Movement which began in 1833, the year after Newman ceased to be tutor.2

C. Newman’s Years as a Leader of the Oxford Movement; in Particular, the Educational Aspects of the Years 1833 - 1845

Liberalism has been defined previously as "the claim of man to do without God, to act by himself and for himself, whether it be a matter of comprehending the universe or ordering his own life" (see above p. 4). Newman saw liberalism manifested in the tendency of the age to rely on human reason and the advances in the useful arts and sciences as a means

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1 Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 231.
2 Although Newman ceased to be a tutor of Oxford in 1832, he still retained his Oriel fellowship with its duties and responsibilities. Also, he was vicar of St. Mary's, accepted as the official university church. The resignation of his duties as tutor of Oriel left him free to exert a greater influence on the university at large than would have been possible had he remained a tutor.
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of making a better world. Society was becoming less and less Christian in its tone and orientation. The Church, instead of being the centre and source of society's principles, was becoming for the liberals the servant of the state, not its leader. Newman was suspicious of and opposed to such reforms of systems as the Reform Bill of 1832, the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829,¹ the bill allowing Dissenters into the university, and the bill for the supression of of the ten Irish sees,² not because he was averse to ills being remedied, but because he saw little possibility of effecting any

¹ Catholic Emancipation Bill 1829: Sir Robert Peel had been elected to the Oxford seat in Parliament. He decided to support the bill and therefore resigned his seat and decided to stand for re-election on the basis of the issue. Newman campaigned vigorously against Peel and won his first public victory. Robert Inglis was elected to the Oxford seat. Newman said he had no objections to the principle of the bill except that it was being introduced to allow O'Connell to take his seat for County Clare in order to stem the tide of possible Irish uprising. The member Oxford had elected was changing his opinion to suit political expediency, and Oxford, an ecclesiastical institution, in supporting Peel, was changing its stand on the basis of political expediency, and not on that of principle.

² The Bill for the Suppression of the Irish Sees 1833: The ten Irish Bishops who were dispossessed were actually being supported mainly by revenues gained from Irish Catholics. The Bill was the first step in recognizing the fact that the Anglican Church was not the National Church of Ireland. However, the justice of the reform was not the question for the Tractarians. The fact that the state could interfere in the church by dispossessing Anglican Bishops and re-allocation their revenues was an instance of Erastianism that Newman and his followers would not tolerate. This situation Keble opposed in his sermon "The National Apostasy" on July 14, 1833. The sermon marked the beginning of the Tractarian Movement.
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essential improvement by a mere change of system without the change of individuals' wills and the improvement of private virtue. A. Dwight Culler explains Newman's point of view as follows: "It was the fashion of the day, however, to neglect the will and put all trust in the intellect. The intellect, by the aid of the new sciences, could devise mechanisms which, without reforming the will would channel its existing drives into socially acceptable forms, and in this way it could create the good society [at least society would seem good] without going to the trouble of creating good individuals to compose it."¹ This trust in the intellect, through knowledge gained from the new sciences, as a means to virtue is the subject of Newman's second public controversy with Sir Robert Peel (see below, Chapter 11, Section B). The improvement of society through the training of good individuals, intellectually and spiritually, had been Newman's main purpose as tutor of Oriel and would become his essential aim in The Idea of a University. The last three bills: namely, the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829, the bill for the suppression of the Irish Sees 1833, and the bill for the admission of Dissenters to Oxford and Cambridge 1834 were to Newman reforms of systems that would lessen the authority and influence of the Church; in that, the Church seemed asked "to veer and tack with all the winds of political expediency."²

¹ A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 81.
² Ibid., p. 69.
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What was needed if the Church was to assert its rightful role in society was first the establishing of its dogmas and principles on the firm foundation of the Apostolic conception of Christianity; and secondly, a call to holiness for its individual members. With these two purposes in mind the members of the Oxford Movement were determined to ascertain whether Christianity could preserve its spiritual identity in the modern world, or whether it would be transformed by, and absorbed into, the secularized culture of the day.\(^1\)

Keble's sermon on July 14, 1833 entitled "National Apostasy" was for Newman the signal for action. "He had been through severe trial; [his illness in Sicily] he had thought deeply; he had hungered for deeds. The elements of leadership in him had coalesced, and he was ready."\(^2\) He threw himself into the bitter struggle to rescue the English Church from Erastians,\(^3\) Latitudinarians,\(^4\) and politicians. He

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2 Ibid., p. 22.
3 Erastians maintained the supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical affairs.
4 Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 87. Latitudinarians were the Liberal party of the Anglican Church whose main principle was the supremacy of reason. Latitudinarianism "appeared as a recognizable party in the Church of England in the reign of Charles I, but it was not until after the Revolution of 1688 that it became dominant. Its ascendency lasted throughout the eighteenth century, in spite of the encroachments of Evangelicalism, and received a fresh lease of life, as Liberalism, from the apparent failure of the Tractarian movement. In its third incarnation, as Modernism, it lives and flourishes still."
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saw in the Utilitarian radicalism of Bentham and James Mill an enemy of
the church that was of a particularly formidable character. The enemies
of the church were no longer "men of wit and pleasure about town"; they
were "men not only of learning and integrity, but of cultivated argu­
mentative powers, not unversed in the principles of logic." It was
against such formidable enemies as these that Newman was to contend in
the "Tamworth Reading Room" and The Idea of a University.

The Tractarians\(^2\) of the Oxford Movement began their campaign
by setting out to answer the question: What is the seat of authority
in the religious life and social life of mankind? However, the most
important aspect of the Tractarian Movement\(^3\) for this thesis was the
pamphlet warfare that was waged by Newman and his cohorts over the
proposal to allow Dissenters into the Universities of Oxford and Cam­
bridge. For over two centuries, Oxford and Cambridge had been the
great strongholds of the Anglican Church. The security of that position
was maintained by the injunction that the teaching faculty and adminis­
tration be in orders and that the student body subscribe to religious

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1 C.F. Harrold, John Henry Newman, p. 27.

2 The Tractarians were mainly Newman, Edward Pusey, Hurrel
Froude, John Keble, Hugh James Rose (the only Cambridge member), Arthur
Percival, and William Palmer.

3 The Tractarian movement was essentially a religious move­
ment whose tracts dealt with the doctrinal basis of the Anglican Church
and the individual holiness of its members. The situations which follow
are merely instances of how the Tractarian thinking influenced education.
tests. In Oxford the students were required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles on first entering the university and again before taking their degree. The latter subscription was the only one required at Cambridge. The result was that a large segment of the population, including Catholics, Jews, and Dissenters, were excluded from the two great universities of England. The movement of reform which began in 1828 with the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, continued with the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829, and the Reform Bill of 1832 gave the Dissenters courage to petition for redress of their grievances.

The battle actually began in March 1834 when sixty-three liberal members of the Cambridge Senate presented a petition to the House of Commons and the House of Lords for the abolition of all religious tests. At the same time a dissenter, G.W. Wood, brought in a bill making it unlawful to require students to subscribe to any articles of religion in order to enter or graduate from either Oxford or Cambridge.

Newman and Pusey were among the first of the defenders to uphold the traditional Oxford education. Newman was a member of a committee which drew up a Declaration subsequently signed by thousands of people from Heads of Houses to parents and undergraduates and presented to both Houses of Parliament. This Declaration expressed Newman's position on the place of religion in university education, a position he was not to change essentially when he became Rector of the Catholic
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University of Ireland and author of The Idea of a University. However, when he wrote the discourses on education Newman was less concerned with imposing a particular doctrine and more concerned with the necessity for theology in the university curriculum as an intellectual balance and guide for the other sciences. In The Idea of a University Newman was combating liberalism on the broad field of knowledge and contemporary thinking; whereas here, he was fighting in the restricted area outlined in the following section from the Declaration:

They [the professors, deans, and tutors] wish to state in the first place, that the University of Oxford has always considered Religion to be the foundation of all education; and they cannot themselves be parties to any system of instruction, which does not rest upon this foundation.

They also protest against the notion, that Religion can be taught on the vague and comprehensive principle of admitting persons of every creed. When they speak of Religion, they mean the doctrines of the Gospel, as revealed in the Bible, and as maintained by the Church of Christ in its best and purest times. They also believe in their consciences, that these doctrines are held by the Church of England......

In thus stating it to be their solemn duty to provide for a Christian education, they feel that uniformity of faith upon essential points is absolutely necessary; and that the admission of persons who dissent from the Church of England would lead to the most disastrous consequences; that it would unsettle the minds of the younger members of the university; would raise up and continue a spirit of controversy which is at present unknown; and would tend to reduce Religion to an empty and unmeaning name, or to supplant it by scepticism and infidelity.1

A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 104.
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To Newman and the Tractarians what was at stake was the traditional Oxford and Cambridge kind of education with religion as its foundation. Furthermore, the attempt to effect changes in the university statutes by an act of Parliament, they considered another attack by the liberals against ecclesiastical foundations. The wording of the last lines—"would tend to reduce Religion to an empty and unmeaning name, or to supplant it by scepticism and infidelity"—marks the Declaration as a counter attack against the forces of liberalism. The Woods bill passed the House of Commons with an overwhelming majority, but was defeated by the House of Lords. Newman had won a second victory against forces that seemed to be hewing and hacking at the very foundations of the Church and its organizations.

The scene of battle changed to Oxford with the introduction into convocation of a motion to abolish subscription to the Articles and replace it with a Declaration of Conformity to the doctrines and services of the Anglican Church. Provost Hawkins was apparently the villain who, with his ally R.D. Hampden, began a pamphlet warfare based on the idea that young students should not be asked to subscribe to the Articles without a thorough knowledge of their meaning. According to Newman's essay on "Liberalism" (see below Chapter II, Section A) the foregoing idea that "no one can believe what he does not understand"\(^1\)

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is one tenet of liberalistic thought. Newman lamented the first pamphlet as "'an interruption of that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place'".¹ He countered the idea with the fact that the youths giving their assent to the Articles on entering the university was analogous to children memorizing the creed. In both instances their minds were given truths on which to work which would become guiding principles as their minds gradually understood the meaning of the truths. After a winter battle of pamphlets, chiefly between Pusey and Hawkins, the Declaration of Conformity was put to a vote in convocation, May 1835 and soundly defeated. Newman was winning the battle to preserve his idea of a university on the homefront as well as in the nation at large.

An aspect of Newman's educational ideal that he tried to put into practice all the while that he was the moving force behind the Tractarian movement was the ideal of a community of fellows based on that of Oxford's founder Adam de Brome. Pusey had begun the project by inviting into his home a few serious students who would live there, use his library, and discuss with him. When the project became no longer feasible for Pusey, Newman established St. Aldate's. Pattison, James Mozley, and Christie all lived and studied there with Newman from 1838 to 1840. They were free to follow their own studies with the

¹ Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 345.
stipulation they had to collaborate with Newman in the compilation of a Library of the Fathers. The Project was abandoned as it became difficult for those associated with the Tractarians to obtain fellowships in the university. But the idea of a community formed for the purpose of study and discussion was what Newman was later to express as the essence of a university.

After the storm of protest that greeted the publication of Tract XC,¹ in February 1841, entitled, Remarks on Certain Passages in the Thirty-nine Articles, Newman and the Tractarians began to be accused of romanizing. He said in the Apologia, "I was denounced as a traitor who had laid his train and was detected in the very act of firing it against the time-honoured Establishment" (196). By this time, Newman had begun to think that only the Roman church could withstand the tide of evil in the world. In 1842, he retired to his country parish of Littlemore to think and to study. He had retreated from the struggle to make the Anglican Church doctrinally strong enough to withstand the assaults of

¹ Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, p. 396. Tract XC was the last tract Newman wrote in the Tractarian Movement. Its purpose was to illustrate the Thirty-nine Articles to be compatible with Catholic Doctrine in intention if not in wording. In Newman's own words the object was "to show that, while our Prayer Book is acknowledged on all hands to be of Catholic origin, our Articles also, the offspring of an uncatholic age, are through God's good providence, to say the least not uncatholic, and may be subscribed by those who aim at being Catholic in heart and doctrine."
what he saw as the great evil of his day, liberalism: an evil he had fought on three fronts; personal, academic, and religious. On October 3, 1845 he wrote his letter of resignation to Provost Hawkins asking him to remove his name from the books of Oriel College and Oxford University. The man who had been for over twenty years one of the greatest intellectual and moral influences in Oxford's history retired from the educational world and was not heard of until 1850 when he was asked to deliver the discourses on university education to a Dublin audience. Here, Newman was to renew the struggle against liberalism in the academic sector only.

Chapter One has dealt with the three important stages of Newman's life to 1845; namely, his early education at Ealing and Trinity College, Oxford; his years as fellow and tutor of Oriel College from 1822 to 1832; and finally the years of the Oxford Movement as they reveal Newman's training for controversy and the evolution of his educational ideas. It was Newman's education at Ealing that indicated his interest in the dramatic and controversial. There also, guided by Mr. Mayers, he acquired the ideas that would thereafter influence his thinking on education; namely, the importance of each individual to the creator and thus Newman's emphasis on personal influence as a means of propagating truth; the acceptance of a definite creed and as a result the idea of the human

1 October 9, 1845, Newman was received into the Catholic Church.
reason submitting to the guidance of dogma and principles; the possibi­
ility of the mind's conquest of truth under the guidance of divine
principles and thus Newman's emphasis in The Idea of a University on
theology as a science that guides and directs the other sciences; and
finally, the motto "Holiness before peace" that resulted in Newman's
continual warfare against the spirit of godlessness in religion and
education.

Secondly, the chapter has discussed the years of the Oriel
tutorship as they saw Newman's first conflict with the spirit of godless­
ness in education when he quarrelled with Hawkins over the proposed
changes in the tutor system and campaigned against allowing Dissenters
to enter Oxford on the basis of their being a threat to Oxford's reli­
giously orientated education.

Finally, the chapter has outlined Newman's years as an organiz­
ing power behind the Oxford Movement during which he fought to save the
Anglican Church from the aspect of liberalism he terms in the Apologia
the "anti-dogmatic principle" (163) in religion. Newman was to continue
this same quarrel in the form of his opposition to the substituting of
scientific knowledge for religion in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters,
the principal subject of the next chapter, and again in The Idea of a
University. Therefore it is evident from the material of Chapter One
that in matter and form the years to 1845 laid the ground work for con­
troversy in The Idea of a University.
CHAPTER II
THE BACKGROUND OF NEWMAN'S THOUGHT
IN TERMS OF HIS CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS ON LIBERALISM

Chapter One dealt with Newman's struggles against liberalism in the personal, academic, and religious sectors as they concerned the evolution of his educational ideas. It is the purpose of Chapter Two to discuss the definitions of liberalism that Newman gave on various occasions in his lifetime as they relate to his educational thought; then to deal with one of the most important public controversies in which his opposition to liberalism involved him: the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times, as they are an introduction to Newman's most powerful indictment of liberalism in the academic sector: The Idea of a University. Finally, the chapter will outline the educational situation in Ireland that made the writing and presenting of the discourses to a Dublin audience one of the most difficult and seemingly unrewarding battles of Newman's life.

A. Newman's Statements on Liberalism

On the occasion of his being raised to the rank of Cardinal, May 12, 1879, Newman summarized his life's battle in these words: "And I rejoice to say, to one great mischief I have from the first opposed myself. For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion. Never did Holy Church need champions against it more sorely than now, when, alas! it is an
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error overspreading, as a snare, the whole earth"¹ (460). Just what this "spirit of Liberalism in religion" is Newman explains in the following section of his speech: "Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another, ... it teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion" with the result that "religion is in no sense the bond of society" (460). How this liberalism affects education Newman further explains: "Instead of the Church's authority and teaching, they [the Philosophers and Politicians] would substitute first of all a universal and thoroughly secular education, calculated to bring home to every individual that to be orderly, industrious, and sober is his personal interest" (461). Newman has in mind in the foregoing statement the kind of education given by the London University established in 1827 on the Utilitarian principles of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. In place of the principles of religion they would substitute: "the broad fundamental ethical truths, of justice, benevolence, veracity and the like; proved experience; and those natural laws which exist and act spontaneously in society..." (461).

In a note appended to the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, published in 1863, Newman set forth in detail what he meant by liberalism. The

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following, as the central point of definition, expresses Newman's opposition to a main point of Utilitarian doctrine; namely, that all knowledge can be gained by human reason and that only the knowledge thus gained is worthwhile:

Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought or the exercise of thought upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the Truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine word.¹

In that the very object of educational institutions lies in the cultivation of the mind and the spread of knowledge, the "false liberty of thought" or the "pride of reason" (647) is the danger, or as Newman terms it, the "moral malady" (647) incident to the pursuit of the proper idea of a university. It was in order to counteract "the chance of wayward or mistaken exercise" (647) of the intellect in the pursuit of knowledge that Newman insisted in Discourses I to V of The Idea of a University on the study of theology in the university curriculum.

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The Oxford University Sermon, "The Philosophical Temper" gives Newman's prescription for the "moral malady": "And this evil has in a manner befallen us; that it does not increase we must look to that early religious training, to which, there can be no doubt all persons — those in the higher as well as in the poorer classes of the community — should be submitted." Even in one of his first statements on Liberalism and its evils, the Oxford University Sermons, Newman sees religious training as the practical remedy for the growing evil of the day — the increasing influence of Liberalism on men's minds. In the discourses on university education Newman is to see the religious aspect of education, first as the intellectual mastering of the science of theology, and secondly as the moral training resulting from the personal influence and guidance of the tutors much as he had advocated in his controversy with Hawkins over the role of the tutor in university education.

The correct liberty of thought in the personal conquest of truth was for Newman the use of reason exercised in obedience to conscience and to the authorities and traditions with which we are in contact. Newman defines reason in the sermon "Implicit and Explicit Reason" in a war image that compares the reason in its personal

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conquest of truth to an army as it "advances forward ... passes on
from point to point" in the acquisition of new territory: "Reason ... is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another. ... The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffles investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability, then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory."

It is to be noted from the previous image that Newman considers the advance of the intellect towards truth a slow one with the necessity at times for "falling back" to the stable position of "some received law," much as does an army in its conquest of territory. This necessity of reasoning from the secure position of fixed principles is the point at which Newman differs from the Liberal Rationalists of his day such as William Godwin who advocated the free range of human reason on every subject without reference to received laws or testimonies. Fixed principles were to Godwin synonymous with tyrannical authority—the source of all evil. He says, "The instrument by which

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extensive mischiefs have in all ages been perpetrated has been the principle of many men being reduced to mere machines in the hands of the few. Man while he consults his own understanding is the ornament of the universe. Man when he surrenders his reason and becomes the partisan of implicit faith and passing obedience, is the most mischievous of all animals. Ceasing to examine every proposition that comes before him in the direction of his conduct, he is no longer the capable subject of moral instruction."

Newman discusses the attitude of Godwin and company towards the supremacy of the human reason in all matters under points nine and ten of his essay on "Liberalism". According to the Rationalists, "There is a right of Private Judgment: that is, there is no existing authority on earth competent to interfere with the liberty of individuals in reasoning and judging for themselves about the Bible and its contents, as they severally please." The corollary of the "right of Private Judgment" Newman states in point ten is that the "rights of conscience" can be carried to the extreme position of maintaining there is no absolute truth in matters of faith or morals: "There are rights of conscience such, that every one may lawfully advance a claim to profess and teach what is false and wrong in matters, religious, social and

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moral, provided that to his conscience it seems absolutely true and right.\textsuperscript{1}

In his university sermon "The Usurpations of Reason" Newman effectively counters Godwin's claim of the supremacy of reason on all matters of conduct by explaining in military imagery that the two faculties Faith and Reason (the moral and intellectual powers) can be in opposition when either of the two encroaches upon the province of the other. Newman terms the Reason attempting to judge in matters of conduct the aggressor encroaching "on the province of Religion, attempting to judge of those truths which are subject to another part of our nature, the moral sense."\textsuperscript{2} He explains that the absurdity of attempting to find out mathematical truths by "the purity and acuteness of the moral sense"\textsuperscript{3} is an easily recognizable encroachment of the moral sense on the territory of the Reason. "It is a form of this mistake which has led men to apply such Scripture communications as are intended for religious purposes to the determination of physical questions. ... This was the usurpation of the schools of theology in former ages, to issue their decrees to the subjects of the Senses and the Intellect."\textsuperscript{4} The modern error as Newman saw it was the opposite,

\textsuperscript{1} J. H. Newman, "Liberalism", Victorian Prose, p. 651.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 59.
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but equally false, position of the Reason encroaching on the territory of religion.

Newman has the following to say about the usurpation of the secular Reason, or the claim of the world to apply their ordinary sentiments and conventional modes of judging to the subject of religion: "In this day, then, we see a very extensive development of an usurpation which has been preparing, with more or less an open avowal for some centuries, the usurpation of Reason in morals and religion. In the first year of its growth it professed to respect the bounds of justice and sobriety: it was little in its own eyes; but getting strength, it was lifted up; and casting down all that is called God, or worshipped, it took its seat in the temple of God, as His representative. Such, at least, is the consummation at which the Oppressor is aiming; which he will reach, unless He who rids His Church of tyrants in their hour of pride, look down from the pillar of the cloud, and trouble his host."¹ In the military metaphor of reason as the oppressor gradually usurping the territory of morals and religion, Newman effectively conveys his fear of liberalism as "an error overspreading, as a snare, the whole earth."²

¹ Ibid., p. 68.
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The deification of reason as expressed in the foregoing image in the words, "it took its seat in the temple of God, as His representative," led to the idea that all knowledge could be discovered by reason, that the knowledge thus obtained was the only valuable knowledge, and that the acquisition of such knowledge leads to virtue. Newman expresses this last mentioned Utilitarian principle in another key section of his essay on "Liberalism": "Virtue is the child of knowledge, and vice of ignorance. Therefore e.g. education, periodicals, literature, railroad travelling, ventilation, drainage, and the arts of life, when fully carried out, serve to make a population moral and happy."  

B. The Tamworth Reading Room

Newman refuted the idea that "virtue is the child of knowledge" in his "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times published in 1841. On this occasion, Newman's opposition to Liberalism is from the point of view of the benefits to be expected in the moral and social order from secular knowledge. Newman began his campaign by skilfully discrediting his opponent as a slavish follower of Mr. Brougham, the well-known proponent of secular education and founder,


2 In this series of letters to the Times, Newman publicly opposed the principles outlined by Sir Robert Peel in his address on the occasion of the opening of a library and reading room at Tamworth.
with others, of the London University. Newman first notes the simi-
laritv between Peel's ideas and those of Mr. Brougham expressed in
addresses delivered at the universities of Glasgow and London: "Mr.
Brougham pronounces that a man by 'learning truths wholly new to him,'
and by 'satisfying himself of the grounds on which known truths rest,
will enjoy a proud consciousness of having, by his own exertions, be-
come wiser, and therefore a more exalted creature'. Sir Robert
Peel's ideas are similar: "A man 'in becoming wiser will become bet-
ter': he will 'rise at once in the scale of intellectual and moral
existence, and by being accustomed to such contemplations, he will
feel the moral dignity of his nature exalted'" (258).

In the following observation Newman manages to fell both
opponents with one stroke: About Brougham he says, "It is reserved
for few to witness the triumph of their own opinions; much less to
witness it in the instance of their own direct and personal opponents"
(260). Brougham "has achieved ... a mighty victory, and is leading
in chains behind his chariot wheels, a great captive" (260). The
military image of Peel as a captive being led in chains behind
Brougham's chariot wheels expresses Newman's contempt for Peel's

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1 J. H. Newman, "Tamworth Reading Room," Discussions and
The page numbers subsequently quoted in parentheses refer to this
dition.
ignominious submission to the ideas of a thinker such as Brougham.

Newman counters the idea that "virtue is the child of knowledge" with the self-evident fact that "To know is one thing, to do is another; the two things are altogether distinct" (262). Newman points out that there are many examples of the fact that "men may become wiser, without becoming better" (262). Like the careful controversialist that he is, Newman defines exactly what the Benthamites mean by "virtue". Virtue really means for the Utilitarians the knowledge of how to take care of oneself, "of what is pleasurable, what painful, and what promotes the one and prevents the other. An uneducated man is ever mistaking his own interest, and standing in the way of his own true enjoyments. Useful knowledge is that which tends to make us more useful to ourselves" (262).

Newman says he would hesitate to do Brougham and Peel the injustice of supposing them to be Benthamizing when they suggest that moral improvement is the result of diverting the mind from evil by the pleasure of gratifying the curiosity in the acquisition of new knowledge. To Newman they are ignoring, as did Bentham, the fact of natural human frailty which requires that which is above the human for its inherent improvement. As Newman expresses it: "We may surely take it for granted, from the experience of facts, that the human mind is at best in a very unformed or disordered state; passions and conscience, likings and reason, conflicting,—might rising against right,
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with the prospect of things getting worse" (263). Says Newman, what does Peel hope to accomplish: "Not victory of the mind over itself — not the supremacy of the law — not the reduction of the rebels — not the unity of our complex nature — not an harmonizing of the chaos — but the mere lulling of the passions to rest by turning the course of thought; not a change of character, but a mere removal of temptations. ... He makes no pretense of subduing the giant nature, in which we were born, of smiting the loins of the domestic enemies of our peace, of overthrowing passion and fortifying reason; he does but offer to bribe the foe for the nonce with gifts which will avail for that purpose just so long as they will avail, and no longer" (264).

Brougham and Peel are thinking of knowledge as a diversion, as a means of distracting the mind from passion, grief, and the like; (this is what they mean by "elevating the mind"): not as a means of improving the mind itself. Newman says that this way of thinking gives rise to one of the chief errors of the day: the opinion "that our true excellence comes not from within, but from without; not wrought out through personal struggles and sufferings, but following upon a passive exposure to influences over which we have no control. They will countenance the theory that diversion is the instrument of improvement, and excitement the condition of right action; ... they [diversion and excitement] will tend to make novelty ever in request, and will set the great teachers of morals upon the incessant search for
stimulants and sedatives, by which unruly nature may, pro re nata, be kept in order" (266).

Newman does not discredit any "subject of thought or method of reason ... in the cultivation of the mind" (274), but says, "All cannot be first, and therefore each has its place, and the problem is to find it" (274). In other words, there is an order or system in the hierarchy of knowledge. "You must go to a higher source for renovations of the heart and of the will" (274). This principle of order is basic to Newman's thought and is particularly applicable to his educational theories. He says, "Christianity and nothing short of it, must be made the element and principle of all education. Where it has been laid as the first stone, and acknowledged as the governing spirit, it will take up into itself, assimilate, and give a character to literature and to science. Where Revealed Truth has given the aim and direction to Knowledge, Knowledge of all kinds will minister to Revealed Truth" (274). Discourse IX of the Idea of a University develops the foregoing idea.

Newman says that to effect moral improvement in society by human means is to effect "a polished outside, with hollowness within, in which vice has lost its grossness, and perhaps increased its malignity" (275). A "polished outside with a hollowness within" is the result of an education aimed at improvement of society, (a main aim of the Utilitarians) not based on the inherent improvement of the
individual. Newman always maintained that our true excellence comes from within; not from without, and therefore that improvement of society rests on the prior improvement of the individual. The best means of this true excellence, for Newman, was to make Christianity the foundation of education; consequently, his insistence on theology as the foundation of the university curriculum in contrast to the London University curriculum of a diversity of subjects to satisfy the mind's curiosity for information without the frame of reference that theology gives.

The London University, whose distinguishing mark was the omission of all theology and religious teaching from the curriculum, was established on the basis of ideas held by men such as Brougham and Peel. They justified the deliberate omission of theology from the curriculum in the name of "social harmony" (285). Their "great aim is the peace and good order of the community, and the easy working of the national machine. With this in view, any price is cheap, everything is marketable; all impediments are a nuisance" (284).

Newman continues his criticism of the narrow aims of the Utilitarian education in which the bond of society is knowledge rather than faith in terms of bitter irony: "We must abandon Religion, if we aspire to be statesmen. Once, indeed, it was a living power, kindling hearts, leavening them with one idea, moulding them on one model, developing them into one polity. Ere now it has been the life
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of morality: it has given birth to heroes; it has wielded empires. But another age has come in, and Faith is effete" (286-287). Utilitarians would substitute knowledge as the unifying principle that Faith previously was thought to be.

At first seeming to agree with his opponents Newman says:

"The ascendency of Faith may be impracticable, but the reign of Knowledge is incomprehensible. The problem for statesmen of this age is how to educate the masses, and literature and science cannot give the solution" (292). He proceeds to prove why the "reign of Knowledge is incomprehensible" (292). First because "logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude" (294). "The heart is commonly reached, not through reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion" (293).

Obviously, one need not look for the development of true excellence, moral improvement of the individual from a system of education based on the acquisition of knowledge only. The method in such a system, since facts are the material, will be argument. Newman says, "To most men argument makes the point in hand only more doubtful, and considerably less impressive. After all man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal" (294). In order
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To act he has to assume something to be true. "If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith" (295).

Newman is explaining that moral improvement concerns practice, not theory and therefore is not the result of knowledge gained of the universe through the study of the sciences. "But if we commence with scientific knowledge and argumentative proof, or lay any great stress upon it as the basis of personal Christianity, or attempt to make man moral and religious by Libraries and Museums, let us in consistency take chemists for our cooks and mineralogists for our masons" (295-296). To think to effect moral improvement by the acquisition of scientific knowledge is to confuse the practical and theoretical: This idea is the basis of Newman's argument in the Original Discourse V of The Idea of a University.

The second reason that a system based only on knowledge is incomprehensible is that knowledge as such is the result of "inquiring whence things are, not why; referring them to nature, not to mind; and thus they tend to make a system a substitute for God" (299). "To those who are conscious of matter, but not conscious of mind, it seems more rational to refer all things to one origin, such as they know, than to assume the existence of a second origin such as they know not. It is Religion, then, which suggests to Science its true conclusions; the facts come from Knowledge, but the principles come from Faith" (300).
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The necessity for Religion in education is the subject of Discourses I to V of The Idea of a University. Furthermore, it is in Discourse V that Newman explains the effect on education of the scientific mind's "inquiring whence things are, not why" and considering the answer to whence the only end of an education. It is the answer to why that results in the "philosophical habit," and consequently a growth of the mind from within rather than an imposition of systems of information from without.

Another reason that the "reign of Knowledge is incomprehensible" is that the contemplation of Creation through the physical sciences "may take the form of 'How clever is the creature who has discovered it!'" (301) rather than "the pious exclamation, 'O Lord, how glorious are Thy Works!'" (300-301) as Sir Robert Peel and Lord Brougham seem to hope. The result is the deification of reason and the human mind as expressed in the following words of Lord Brougham: "'One of the most gratifying treats which science affords us is the knowledge of the extraordinary powers with which the human mind is endowed. No man, until he has studied philosophy, can have a just idea of the great things for which Providence has fitted his understanding, the extraordinary disproportion which there is between his natural strength and the powers of his mind, and the force which he derives from these powers'" (301). Newman's answer is that "the god we attain is our own mind; our veneration is even professedly the worship of self" (301). Such is
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the basis of the "false liberty of thought"\(^1\) that Newman has defined as liberalism. Such thinking too is basic to the two problems Newman discusses in The Idea of a University: the omission of theology from the university curriculum and the "exercise of the extraordinary powers with which the human mind is endowed" (301) on immediately useful subjects of information in preparation for the professions.

Newman summarizes his ideas in "The Tamworth Reading Room" letters as follows: "Intrinsically excellent and noble as are scientific pursuits, and worthy of a place in a liberal education, and fruitful in temporal benefits to the community, still they are not, and cannot be the instrument of an ethical training; ... that knowledge does but occupy, does not form the mind; that apprehension of the unseen is the only known principle capable of subduing moral evil, educating the multitude, and organizing society" (304). Newman would say that in trying to make knowledge "the instrument of an ethical training" (304) knowledge is usurping the territory of religion and those who hold such a viewpoint are not the profound thinkers. He says in his sermon on "The Usurpations of Reason," "A tyrant need not be strong; he keeps his ground by prescription and through fear. It is not the profound thinkers who intrude with their discussions and criticism within the sacred limits of moral truth. A really philosophical

mind, if unhappily it has ruined its own religious principles, will be silent, ... it will not usurp.\(^1\) It is in Discourses V to IX that Newman deals fully with the training of the "really philosophical mind."

C. The Educational Situation in Ireland

Newman welcomed Dr. Cullen's invitation of April 15, 1851 to deliver a series of lectures on education, as a means of gaining the allegiance of the laity and uniting the Irish bishops in a campaign to establish a Catholic University of Ireland. Newman's eagerness to begin the conflict with liberalism on another front he expressed in a letter written at the time: "The battle there [in Ireland] will be what it was in Oxford twenty years ago [against Liberalism] ... While I found my tools breaking under me in Oxford ... I shall be renewing the struggle in Dublin."\(^2\)

How truly he spoke! The Irish clergy and laity were permeated with liberalism and, in many cases, blinded by irreconcilable fears and suspicions of any person or suggestion that might come to them from a country they had long considered inimical. It would require all Newman's oratorical skill to persuade them of his educational ideals and the necessity of establishing a university based on these ideals.

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One of Newman's former colleagues at Oxford, Robert Ornsby, then assistant editor of the Tablet, gave Newman the following picture of Irish society as a guide for Newman's organization of his oratorical strategy in the discourses on education he was preparing. In a letter to Newman, Ornsby described the education available to Catholics at such colleges as Clongowes in these words: "The education there, as in other Catholic Colleges, has evidently been framed to meet the cry for useful knowledge, and the largest part of the time seems divided among subjects such as natural philosophy, mechanics, declamation etc. The Greek and Latin is correct as far as it goes, but narrow and limited to such a degree that it can in no way form the mind as those studies do in the Protestant schools and universities." Obviously, Newman's objective of persuading the Irish to adopt the traditional Oxford education that trained the mind in place of the useful education emphasized in the Catholic Colleges was to be a difficult one.

Furthermore, according to the same letter from Ornsby, there was very little real Catholic feeling among the class concerned with university education. "Without their knowing it, and perhaps sometimes where they do, the general mind of Catholic society is deeply imbued with Protestant ideas. ...Once in conversation with an Irish Catholic, a very intelligent and right-minded man in his way, I was trying to give

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him a notion of the set of ideas which became familiar at Oxford, in consequence of the religious movement there — admiration of the life of perfection— fasting etc., etc., ... He said, 'Well, all that would be totally new in this country'.

It would seem from the information supplied by Ornsby that few in Newman’s Irish audience would see any necessity for the religiously orientated education that he had so vigorously defended against Hawkins and the Dissenters while he was tutor of Oxford and was again to propose to the Dublin audience in his first five lectures on education.

In addition to the fact that the laity were imbued with the very kind of liberalism that Newman had been combating at Oxford, the Irish bishops were sharply divided in their attitude towards the Queen’s Colleges and the aims of a university education. For Dr. Cullen, who became Archbishop of Dublin a few days before Newman was to deliver his discourses, education should be primarily religious. Dr. MacHale was opposed to the establishment of any educational institution that was not thoroughly Irish in idea and organization. The late Dr. Murray’s followers were in favour of compromising with the enemy to the extent of supporting the recently established Queen’s Colleges modelled on London University whose main principle was the omission of all religious knowledge from the curriculum in order to satisfy the educational demands of a pluralist society. Such a narrow conception of education

1 Ibid., p. 144.
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as that held by the Catholic laity and the conflicting attitudes of the
Irish bishops produced a formidable challenge even for an orator of
Newman's ability.

Newman's ideals differed from those of all three Bishops. His
view of the university and the immediate inutility of a Liberal educa­
tion made him an opponent of Dr. MacHale and of Dr. Murray's supporters.
His deviation from the ideal of Dr. Cullen was more subtle, but nonthe­
less obvious to Newman from the wording of Dr. Cullen's invitation:
"'Should you have any intention of coming to Ireland this season, your
presence at the meeting of our committee in Dublin would be most useful.
Indeed if you could spare time to give us a few lectures on education,
you would be rendering a good service to religion in Ireland'."1 That
Dr. Cullen's view of education was primarily a religious one is evident
again in a letter of instruction Newman was supposed to follow in
composing his lectures. Dr. Cullen wrote as follows: "'What we want
in Ireland is to persuade the people that education should be religi­
ous'."2

But for Newman, a university was an intellectual, not a
religious institution. He wrote in his essay "The Duties of Catholics
Towards Protestants": "I want a laity, not arrogant, not rash in speech,
not disputations, but men who know their religion, who enter into it,

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 131.
2 Ibid., p. 137.
who know just where they stand, who know what they hold and what they
do not, who know their creed so well that they can give an account of it,
who know so much of history that they can defend it. I want an intel­
ligent, well-instructed laity."\(^1\) Again in his sermon "Intellect, the
Instrument of Religious Training," one of a series preached in the univ­
ersity church, Dublin, 1856-57, Newman emphasizes his idea of a univer­
sity: "I want the same roof to contain both the intellectual and moral
discipline. Devotion is not a sort of finish given to the sciences; nor
is science a sort of feather in the cap, ... an ornament and set-off to
devotion. I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout
ecclesiastic to be intellectual."\(^2\)

Even though Newman's distinction between the intellectual and
the moral in the abstract would probably not be realized in fact, his
basic concept of education differed from Dr. Cullen's. "Presumably no
real university could ever exist, at least within the Catholic pale,
which did not provide for the souls of its students as well as their
minds. But in itself and simply as a university, its proper function
was to provide for their minds."\(^3\) So conscious was Newman of this
basic difference that he tried tactfully to prepare Dr. Cullen for the
kind of lectures he would hear. The difference made Newman so very

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\(^3\) A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 151.
uneasy that he thought it necessary on his arrival in Ireland to ask Dr. Cullen, then Archbishop of Dublin, for official permission to deliver the lectures.

Another section of Dr. Cullen's letter of instruction made it obvious to Newman that the usefulness of his prestige as a noted English educator was the reason for the invitation, and not the admiration for, nor the eagerness to hear, his educational ideals. Dr. Cullen suggested as topics: "Mixed education—Examination of the education given to Catholics in Trinity College and its effects—education in Queen's Colleges, or education without religion. The sort of education which Catholics ought to seek for."  Although Newman disagreed in principle with the non-denominational, government-controlled education at the Queen's Colleges as a manifestation of the liberalism with which he had been contending for years, he nevertheless was not going to implicate himself in the internal quarrels of the Irish by openly criticizing the Queen's Colleges or Trinity College. If he did so he would certainly be making himself the open opponent of Dr. Murray's followers, a large majority of the upper class laity in the audience who had supported the Queen's Colleges as the best solution to what seemed to them the impossible situation of higher education for Catholics in Ireland. Those who had fought so hard for equal rights in education were now to be asked to abandon their objectives and turn their support to the Catholic univer-

1 Ibid., p. 137.
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ty. They feared the charge of inconsistency. Many of the young
Ireland, although they disliked the idea of a wholly secular educa-
tion, approved of the Queen's Colleges as a means of uniting all Irish
youth regardless of religion. Furthermore, there were some Irish,
particularly those in the professions, who feared for their own and
their families' professional advancement if they gave their support to
the Catholic University instead of to Lord Clarendon and the government-
instituted Queen's Colleges.

There was not a section of Newman's audience whom he could
count on as being wholly allied with him. His concept that education
made "not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman"\(^1\) would
bring to mind the English gentleman character so hateful to the Irish,
and therefore was sure to make him an opponent of every faction of the
audience. Little wonder that Newman considered the assignment a
formidable one that would tax his rhetorical skill and oratorical power
to its utmost. His letters at the time indicate the toll of anxiety
and fearful toil that his lectures cost him. At the end of the second
week, a few hours before delivering the Second Discourse, he wrote
to Ambrose St. John at the Oratory: "I never have been in such a state
of confusion as now, since the day when I was at Leonforte in Sicily,
ill of the fever... . I am dreadfully afraid of want of strength. I
have just discovered how I ought to have written the lecture, what

\(^1\) J.H. Newman, The Idea of a University, introduction by
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would have been the true rhetoric, and how I have plunged into a maze
of metaphysics from which I may be unable to heave myself'.

The uncertainty and anguish Newman expressed in the foregoing
letter were due not only to his feeling that he did not know his Irish
audience, but also to his anxiety about the forthcoming Achilli trial.
Near the close of the first five lectures, Newman wrote the following to
F.W. Faber: "These lectures have oppressed me more than anything else of
the kind in my life; though when I finished my previous, [Lectures on
the Present Position of Catholics] I was in a state of fainting for
days'. In spite of the fact that his lectures had cost him, as he ex­
plained in a letter to C. Newsham, "no one knows how much thought and
anxiety'," Newman returned to England June 9 with the feeling that his
campaign in Ireland had been a moderate success.

Chapter Two and the preceding chapter have set the scene for
the detailed discussion of the discourses in the following chapters.
The first section of this chapter, which has discussed Newman's
definitions of liberalism and pertinent Oxford university sermons,
explains Newman's insistence in Discourses I to V of the Idea of A
University on theology as a necessary unifying factor in the curriculum.

2 Ibid., p. 162.
3 Ibid., p. 162.
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The second section of the chapter — Newman’s countering, in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters, the Utilitarian idea that knowledge leads to virtue — is a preparation for the idea stressed in discourses V - IX; namely, education has an end in itself: the intellectual improvement of the individual. Finally, this chapter outlines the fact that Newman found the very liberalism in thought that he had been combating all his life permeating the Irish educational scene. The opposition he perceived in all sectors of his Dublin audience made Newman prepare his lectures in the language of a master strategist attempting to unite the warring factions within his command.
CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN TO RETAIN THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY CURRICULUM

As discussed in Chapter Two, Newman said in his sermon "The Philosophical Temper" that the only remedy for the "false liberty of thought," or liberalism that he termed "an error, overspreading as a snare, the whole earth," was an education that included religious training. Newman had in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters successfully combated his opponents, Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel, who advocated the acquisition of scientific knowledge—actually a thoroughly secular education—as the sole means to the moral improvement of society. The Irish Bishops had, therefore, enlisted the aid of a veteran combatant of secular education when they asked Newman to assist them in their struggle against the nondenominational education offered by Peel's Queen's Colleges with a series of lectures on education. Newman's purpose, then, in the first five discourses, was to reveal to his Dublin audience the fact that the nondenominational or mixed education offered by the Queen's Colleges was really their insidious foe whom they would be loath to follow were his malignity disclosed to them. He therefore began what he referred to as his campaign in Ireland with an introductory

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discourse designed to enlist the sympathies of his audience for his
cause by an appeal to their academic comradeship with him and their
common heritage in the English-Irish culture of past ages. In Dis­
courses II and III Newman set his campaign on foot to win the allegiance
of his audience by the logic of his argument in behalf of theology in
the university curriculum. Discourse IV was Newman's attempt to con­
solidate his gains by ample illustration of the ideas he had expressed
in Discourses II and III. Discourse V was the final victory and mopping
up operations in the cause of theology in which Newman drew his argu­
ments to a conclusion and laid the groundwork for his next campaign.

As a master strategist and veteran controversialist Newman
adopted the oral tradition of "present communication between man and
man"¹ as the most effective means of convincing his Irish audience of
his idea of a university and thereby gaining their wholehearted support,
moral and financial, for the establishment of a Catholic University in
Ireland. The effect of personal influence as a means of propagating
truth Newman expressed in his essay, "What is a University?" in these
words: "... if we wish to become exact and fully furnished in any
branch of knowledge which is diversified and complicated, we must con­
sult the living man and listen to his living voice."² Of all living men

¹ J.H. Newman, "What is a University," in University Sketches,
² Ibid., p. 8.
of his day this veteran of the battle with Hawkins and Peel was perhaps the most able to enter the lists against the nondenominational education the Irish Bishops had been battling since the establishment of the Queen's Colleges in 1845 and were committed to oppose by papal Rescript and their own Synod of Thurles. Newman's "living voice" in which he expressed the "symbolism of a living language" in terms of military strategy and war imagery was his means "to win, and hold, and harmonize [the] attention" of his audience in his carefully prepared campaign to win the Irish clergy and laity to his idea of a university on three fronts: professional, educational, and religious.

A. Discourse I: Introductory: Winning the Dublin Audience

Newman opens his discourse with an appeal to the professional men in the audience both Catholic and non-Catholic who have gained their education under the Oxford system at Trinity College, Dublin. He gains their sympathetic attention by taking them in imagination to "the English university of which I was so long a member" and reminding them, in war imagery, that Oxford had for the greater part of his lifetime been

2 Ibid., p. 179.
3 J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University, introduction by George N. Shuster, p. 47. All page numbers subsequently quoted in parentheses refer to this edition.
"occupied in a series of controversies both domestic and with strangers" (47). At the outset, Newman has attempted to gain their confidence in him as one accustomed to university controversy and their allegiance as fellow university men before he mentions the nature of the Oxford controversy.

Then his next move is to excite his audience's prejudice against Oxford's opponents by stating that, just when Oxford "was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping, to a sense of responsibilities which its profession and its station involved," it was "met from without, ... by ungenerous and jealous criticisms" (47). The Edinburgh Review's criticism of Oxford's exclusively classical curriculum Newman presents as an unfair attack against an organization that was doing its best to settle its own internal difficulties.

The second campaign of the Oxford controversy, Newman

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality, p. 134. The Edinburgh Review's criticism, to which Newman refers here, was the 1808 attack on Oxford's exclusively classical curriculum as being of no use in practical life. The Edinburgh Review antagonists were John Playfair, Payne Knight, and Sydney Smith. "Two Oriel Fellows, Edward Copleston and John Davison, rallied to the defence of Oxford, the former in three pamphlets, the latter in two articles in the Quarterly Review." Newman's indebtedness to the arguments of their defence in formulating his own idea of a university he fully acknowledges in Discourse VII (See below, Chapter IV., Section C).

2 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality, p. 136. The second campaign was the Edinburgh Review's combined attack "on the exclusive religious attitudes of the older universities with violent criticism of their teaching methods." In this 1834-35 campaign, Newman was in the front ranks of the defenders in the pamphlet war to admit Dissenters to Oxford and Cambridge (See above, Chapter 1, section C).
represents as even more vicious. His battle imagery is displayed particularly in the phrase political adversaries and the word assailed: This time "political adversaries arose against it, and the system of education which it had established was a second time assailed" (48). But since the battle was fought on its own ground through "treatises and pamphlets" (48) and not political acts, "the threatened dangers, in the course of their repulse" (48) actually strengthened the university's position by more clearly delineating the principles that the university represented. Newman has discredited Oxford's opponents by representing them as meanly taking unfair advantage of the university's internal difficulties to interfere in its organization. He triumphantly asserts that the enemies' interference was a help rather than a hindrance.

Only when his hearers are thoroughly mindful of the injustice involved in the two controversies does Newman mention that they concerned the "inutility" (48) of Oxford's education and the "religious exclusiveness" (48) of that university—two views Newman says, he mentions at this time not so much for their authority as that they "may be serviceable at this season to that great cause in which we are here so especially interested" (48). Newman has carefully avoided being more explicit, although these are the very ideas that form the core of his thought and are his purpose to make convincing; but until he has consolidated his position, he leaves the "inutility" (48) of university education and its "religious exclusiveness" (48) in the minds of the audience as attributes of Oxford that have been unjustly criticized.
In representing himself as a veteran in the field of "intellectual conflict" (48), Newman anticipates and forstalls a possible charge that his ideas are not the result of independent inquiry and past experience. Although he modestly admits that he has lived "long as a witness, though hardly as an actor" (48) in many of these conflicts, he cannot be accused by opponents of adopting a viewpoint that is "the serviceable expedient of an emergency" (49) and of being "ingenious and adroit in the management of an argument which was not my own, and which I was sure to forget again as readily as I had mastered it" (49). On the contrary, Newman explains that these views have grown into his whole system of thought, that he held them at an earlier period of his life, and that he has become even more convinced of their correctness since he has been "brought within its [Catholicism's] pale" (49). He hastens to explain that his educational views are not theological in origin, but rather are based on truths in the natural order. He says, "They may be held by Protestants as well as by Catholics; nay, there is reason to anticipate that in certain times and places they will be more thoroughly investigated, and better understood, and held more firmly by Protestants than by ourselves" (50).

As a skilful strategist in words Newman can persuade, conciliate, and even placate, but never deceive. In the preceding statements he has made clear his position on the question of religion in university education. In opposition to Dr. Cullen, who had invited Newman to give
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"'a few lectures on education'"\(^1\) in order to render "'a good service to religion in Ireland',"\(^2\) Newman states the following: "I have no intention, in anything I shall say, of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church, or any authority at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom" (52). In stating that these views on education may be "more thoroughly investigated, and better understood, and held more firmly by Protestants than by ourselves" (50) (because they have been under the necessity of searching them out by human reason and wisdom) Newman places himself firmly in the opposite camp to Dr. Cullen. He has made an opponent out of the only sector in the audience likely to be favourable at the beginning. Newman states that his justification for "borrowing the views of certain Protestant schools" (51) is "that the Catholic Church has ever, in the plenitude of her divine illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she has found in their teaching or their measures" (52). Dr. Cullen's authoritarian mind would consider such a view close to the heretical, but Newman's purpose is to prepare his audience for the fact that the view of education he is going to present is the one he held as an Oxford tutor and that it is a view he considers to be universally true regardless of time, place, or circumstances.

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1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 131.
2 Ibid., p. 131.
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The result of Newman's strategy in other sectors is that he has disarmed his opponents on all sides. He has gained the allegiance of the professional people by aligning himself with them. He has roused the interest of those embroiled in the mixed education quarrel by suggesting his fitness as an experienced leader in such intellectual controversies. He has somewhat placated the religious sector by stating the security of his position within the pale of Catholicism while at the same time graciously giving the non-Catholics in his audience credit for their views. Lastly, he has mentioned his own two main ideas "inutility" (48) and "religious exclusiveness" (48) in such a way that he has gained their sympathetic support without arousing any suspicion or opposition.

The next move in Newman's war strategy is to unite the Irish Bishops and their followers by an appeal first, to ecclesiastical authority and secondly, to their national pride as Irishmen. In so doing he attempts to win Dr. Murray's followers from the side of nondenominational education. First, Newman attempts to conciliate them by conceding that "the union of theology with the secular sciences" (53), although simple of solution in the abstract, has to be effected in practice according to differing circumstances. He makes clear his idea by comparing the decision of the Irish Bishops to accept the Queen's Colleges to the reluctant but temporary compromise forced on a conquered state. He says, "Where no direct duty forbids, we may be obliged to do, as being best under the circumstances, what we murmur and rise against,"
while we do it. We see that to attempt more is to effect less; that we
must accept so much, or gain nothing; and so perforce we reconcile our-
selves to what we would have far otherwise, if we could" (53). Con-
tinuing his comparison of the concession made to the Queen's Colleges to
that temporary compromise required of a conquered nation, Newman explains
that "such a state of things, however, is passing away" (54) now that
"ecclesiastical authority" (54) has decided otherwise. The church in
the role of mediator, has exercised her "right to interpose, ... in the
conflict of parties and opinions" (54), and has this time "interposed
in favour of a pure university system for Catholic youth, forbidding
compromise or accommodation of any kind" (54). Newman has rendered the
position of the nondenominational education party untenable by illustra-
ting that a compromise that was only temporary is no longer necessary in
the face of ecclesiastical decision to establish a Catholic University.
"Such a decision not only demands our submission, but has a claim upon
our trust" (54).

However, before he demands the surrender of the nondenomina-
tional party, Newman anticipates their two last objections: first, that
his principles of education, like many a battle strategy, are "simply
irresistible on paper" (54), but are impracticable because of "the
numberless impediments [political, social, traditional], great and
small, formidable or only vexatious" (55), that would impede the
establishment of a "university of which Catholicity is the fundamental
principle" (55); secondly, that their support of such a university
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would entail great personal sacrifices. He knows they are wondering how many individual battle scars will result from the alienation of personal friends and "how many wounds, open and secret, would it [the establishment of the university] inflict upon the body politic" (55). Also there is always the possibility of defeat; "then a double mischief will ensue from its recognition of evils which it has been unable to remedy" (55).

Before delivering the final triumphant blow, Newman conciliates the enemy by conceding that since the battle is being fought on their own soil, they doubtlessly understand the circumstances of the problem better than he does: "What do I know of the state of things in Ireland that I should presume to put ideas of mine, which could not be right except by accident, by the side of theirs who speak in the country of their birth and their home? No, Gentlemen, you are natural judges of the difficulties which beset us, and they are doubtless greater than I can even fancy or forbode" (56).

For the sake of argument, Newman says he is willing to admit all they have to say against the enterprise, but "in the midst of our difficulties I have one ground of hope, ... which serves me in the stead of all other argument whatever, which hardens me against criticism, which supports me if I begin to despond" (56), and that "ground of hope" is that the supreme commander, the Vicar of Christ, has spoken. He who, as Newman explains in the imagery of battle, has defeated all adversaries
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in all wars, and whose commands have not only won wars, but have succeeded as prophecies; who "for eighteen hundred years has lived in the world; ... has encountered all adversaries; ... [has] had an eye for the times, who has confined himself to the practicable, ... whose words have been facts, and whose commands prophecies" (57), has commanded the establishment of a Catholic University in Ireland. Newman exhorts the Irish to follow the orders of their supreme commander because "all who take part with the Apostle are on the winning side" (57). He cites examples of the Apostle's previous victories in true and just causes. In Roman times "in spite of the persecutor, ... he soon gathered out of all classes of society, ... materials enough to form a people to his Master's honour" (57).

In the following vivid war image, Newman depicts dramatically the Pope's power against his adversaries: when "the savage hordes came down in torrents from the north, and Peter went out to meet them, ... by his very eye he sobered them, and backed them in their full career" (57). Peter has been a match for the most ferocious adversaries; he has conquered the most powerful opponents: "Lawless kings arose, sagacious as the Roman, passionate as the Hun, yet in him they found their match, and were shattered, and he lived on" (57).

In another vivid image of conquest, Newman brings before his audience the missionary zeal of the Apostle: "The gates of the earth were opened to the east and the west, and men poured out to take
possession; but he went with them by his missionaries to China, to Mexico, carried along by zeal and charity, as far as those children of men were led by enterprise, covetousness, or ambition" (57).

Newman mingles battle imagery with rhetorical question effectively in the following reminder that the Vicar of Christ has been victorious even in their own day: "Has he failed in his successes up to this hour? Did he, in our fathers' day, fail in his struggle with Joseph of Germany and his confederates, with Napoleon, a greater name, and his dependent kings, that, though in another kind of fight, he should fail in ours?" (57-58) Newman ends his argument on the forceful point that it would be to their shame if their eyes were "too gross to see those victories which the Saints have ever seen by anticipation" (58). He appeals to their sense of national unity and also his own communion with them when he says "least of all can we the Catholics of islands" (58), the products of the missionary zeal of the Apostolic See, "be the men to distrust its wisdom and to predict its failure when it sends us on a similar mission now" (58).

His audience knew that the decision of the Apostle of Peter demanded their submission, but Newman has just proved to them that he also has a claim upon their trust because of his long history of victories. That Newman was able to speak so forcefully on this point was due to his own firm conviction, expressed in so many of his writings, that truth will at length prevail. Thinking of the Faithful as soldiers who
must stay at their posts during troubled times, Newman wrote, as follows in one of the Oxford University Sermons: "Our plain business, in the meantime, is to ascertain and hold fast our appointed stations in the troubled scene, and then rid ourselves of all dread for the future." Just such a stirring message of courage and hope has Newman given his Irish audience, that they "hold fast [their] appointed station in the troubled scene" and that they follow the direction of their Supreme Commander, the Vicar of Christ in this present crisis in Irish education.

Drawing his first discourse to a close, Newman seeks to dispel any remaining distrust in himself as English by stressing the common heritage of the Celt and Saxon, both given "first faith, then civilization" (58), and finally "a joint commission to convert and illuminate in their turn the pagan continent" (58). Newman takes his audience in imagination back to the time "when the glorious St. Patrick was sent to Ireland, and did a work so great that he could not have a successor in it" (58); to the time when Ireland "became the very wonder and asylum of all people—the wonder by reason of its knowledge, sacred and profane, and the asylum of religion, literature, and science, when chased away from the continent by the barbarian invaders" (58); to the time when Theodore of Tarsus, Adrian, and Bennett came to England "with theology and science in their train; with relics, with pictures, with manuscripts of the Holy Father and Greek classics" (59). He reminds

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them that it was Alcuin, "the pupil of both English and Irish schools" (60) who was responsible for the revival of science and letters in the court of Charlemagne and ultimately for the foundation of the School of Paris, the great university of the middle ages.

Newman has not only defeated the enemy; he has given them a reason for joining his side: the prospect of reviving the glories of past ages by establishing an institution of learning based on the union of "knowledge, sacred and profane" (58) with the co-operation of English and Irish, and thereby restoring those days "when St. Aidan and the Irish monks went up to Lindisfarne and Melrose, and taught the Saxon youth" (59), and Ireland was one of the renowned intellectual and cultural centres of the world. How applicable to himself and the closing words of his first discourse are Newman's own words: "Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us."1 The closing words have been a rousing call to action that modern Ireland restore the glories of the past by making the union between "knowledge, sacred and profane" (58) the basic principle of the Catholic University of Ireland.

"To render the position of a controversial opponent untenable, to force him into self-contradiction or into withdrawal, and to leave on the mind of the balanced reader the impression that his particular line of objection has ceased to exist—this is what the controversialist aims

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at; his success in this is the measure of his skill.\textsuperscript{1} Newman has achieved his purpose and therefore an eminent degree of success as a controversialist. He has rendered the position of the nondenominational party untenable by his appeal to their adherence to Papal authority as Catholics and their national pride as Irishmen; and thereby forced the withdrawal of their objections to the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland as the only reasonable position. It would seem that the nondenominational education party were not offended and that some members were captured and even convinced of their erroneous position. In his dispatches on campaign Newman reported the following in a letter to Ambrose St. John at the oratory: "'Surgeon O'Reilly, who is the representative perhaps of a class of laity ... and who on Saturday had been half arguing with me against the University, said, when the Lecture was ended, that the days of Mixed Education were numbered'."\textsuperscript{2}

In the same dispatch Newman gave his estimate of his own success: "'The Lecture, I suppose, thanks to our dear Lady, has been a hit, and now I am beginning to be anxious lest the others should not duly follow up the blow'."\textsuperscript{3} But Newman had carefully laid his plans for the following four lectures on the necessity of including theology

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality, pp. 156-157.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
in the university curriculum by stressing the importance of "knowledge, sacred and profane" (58) in his first lecture, and therefore, there was little doubt "lest the others should not duly follow up the blow" dealt to non-denominational education in the First Discourse.

B. Discourse II: Theology a Branch of Knowledge: The First Stage of the Campaign

In Discourse I Newman has skilfully overcome the hostility of his audience and united warring factions among his listeners by an appeal to their reason, as educated Dubliners, to their patriotism as proud Irishmen, and their common heritage with the English as products of the missionary zeal of the Apostolic See. Whereas his strategy has been based on an appeal to the emotions and imagination of his audience, Newman now turns to the hammer blows of logic and argumentation aimed at those still inclined to favour the mixed education of the Queen's colleges. In Discourse I he has referred only in passing to the core ideas of his lectures; namely, the "inutility" (48) of a university education and its "religious exclusiveness" (48). Now, feeling more sure of his audience, he states these core ideas directly and explicitly in the form of rhetorical questions that it will be his purpose to answer:

"Whether it is consistent with the idea of university teaching to exclude theology from a place among the sciences which it embraces; next, whether it is consistent with the idea to make the useful arts and sciences its direct and principal concern, to the neglect of those liberal studies and exercises of mind in which it has heretofore been considered mainly to consist" (61).
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It is the object of Newman's strategy in Discourse II to reveal to his audience the kind of liberalistic thinking that results in the establishment of educational institutions based on the deliberate omission of theology from the curriculum; and secondly, to show that his liberalistic opponents, in omitting theology, have taken up a position that is contradictory and therefore wholly untenable. His procedure may be described as "an elaborate series of operations, patiently worked out without reference to the temptation of immediate 'scoring', and intended to end, so to speak, in the surrounding and obliteration of the enemy."¹

Newman begins his "series of operations" with the statement that the establishment of universities without the provision for "theological chairs" (61) is, it seems to him, "an intellectual absurdity" (61). His logical reason for considering such universities "an intellectual absurdity" he lays down in the syllogism: "A university, ... by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge: Theology is surely a branch of knowledge: how then is it possible for it to profess all branches of knowledge and yet to exclude from the subjects of its teaching one which, ... is as important and as large as any of them?" (61).

His next move is to point out to his opponent just exactly the nature of the dilemma in which he has placed himself by omitting

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theology. Either he must admit that "the province of religion is very barren of real knowledge, or, on the other hand, that in such a university one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted; ... that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being; or that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not" (63). As a skilled strategist in words, the imagery of war, expressed by the word *compromise* in the following quotation, is never far from Newman's thinking: He says that "the establishment of a university which makes no religious profession" (63) is "a compromise between religious parties" (63) that "implies that those parties severally consider" (63) their religious beliefs not to be knowledge, and therefore not worth the intellect's conquest. "Did they in their hearts believe that their private views of religion, whatever they are, were absolutely and objectively true, it is inconceivable that they would so insult them as to consent to their omission in an institution which is bound, from the nature of the case—from its very idea and its name—to make a profession of all sorts of knowledge whatever" (63). In the foregoing statement Newman, by forcing his opponents to admit that their beliefs are, as far as they are concerned, not knowledge, has made a keen attack against the integrity of their beliefs and has thereby aroused the opposition of the audience (on the basis of their proclaiming their own integrity of belief) to the omission of theology from the university curriculum.

Newman anticipates his opponents' objection that the university "occupies a certain order, a certain platform of knowledge" (66). His
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answer is that excluding theology is comparable to an arbitrary leaving out of territory that really belongs in the organization of a state. He says, "I cannot so construct my definition of the subject matter of university knowledge, and so draw my boundary lines around it, as to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at universities and to exclude the science of religion" (66). He inquires on what basis "are we to limit our idea of university knowledge [:] by the evidence of our senses? then we exclude ethics; by intuition? we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics. Is not the being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by the suggestions of our conscience? It is a truth in the natural order as well as the supernatural" (66).

Newman has pursued his series of operations to the point where his opponents must concede that there is something knowable about the province of religion gained by the same means as are other areas of knowledge. He warns that their frame of mind in which knowledge can be considered as belonging to different kinds or spheres, one not interfering with the other, is a dangerous one: "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge if you begin the mutilation with divine" (67). To Newman all knowledge is a unity reflecting the unity inherent in the subject of that knowledge: the Creator and His creation; consequently, the omission of theology is a "mutilation" of the circle of knowledge. Here Newman makes clear his main reason for insisting on the inclusion of theology in the university curriculum.
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The ultimate end of Newman's strategy is the "obliteration of the enemy" by finding them out in a contradiction; namely, omitting theology from the curriculum yet accepting religion as a body of knowledge. But before he proceeds to this conclusion Newman follows a procedure for which he commends Cicero: "He goes round and round his object; surveys it in every light, examines it in all parts; retires, and then advances; turns and re-turns it; compares and contrasts it; illustrates, confirms, enforces his view of the question, till at last the hearer feels ashamed of doubting a position which seems built on a foundation so strictly argumentative."2

Newman "goes round and round his object" surveying this subject of religion "in every light." He contrasts the idea of religion consisting, "not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment" (68) with "the old Catholic notion, which ... was that faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge" (68). Those in Newman's day who considered that religion consisted "in the affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions and consolations" (68); or "was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, ... on many, many things, but not at all on reason" (69) were the Liberals or Latitudinarians for whom a chair of theology in the university would

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3 Ibid., pp. 293-294.
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be as unnecessary as "one for fine feeling, sense of honour, patriotism ..." (69), since to them "reason was neither its [theology's] warrant nor its instrument" (69).

But it is part of Newman's strategy to prove by illustration that some of the men who profess to consider religion little more than sentiment actually admit that there is that which is knowable about the Supreme Being. Newman begins a "series of operations,\(^1\) that will end in "the obliteration of the enemy,\(^2\) with a reference to Lord Brougham whom, he says, is responsible, as much as any one alive, for advocating "the principle of separating secular and religious knowledge" (70). He quotes Brougham's Glasgow Discourse of 1825 as follows: "that man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control. Henceforward, nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change, than he can the hue of his skin or the height of his stature" (70). Newman's comment is that religious ideas do not seem to represent the real, but rather are "peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, accidents of the individual" (70).

Newman anticipates the possible objection of his audience by hastening to explain that these ideas of Lord Brougham's were not just "the rhetoric of an excited moment" (70). Rather he says those principles stated in 1825 resound "on all sides of us, with ever growing

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\(^1\) Cecil Chesterton, "The Art of Controversy," p. 455.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 455.
confident and success, in 1852" (70). Those principles are, in other
words, the liberalism that is "overspreading as a snare, the whole
earth." He finds in the "Minutes of the Committee of Council on Edu­
cation for the years 1848-50" (70) one of "Her Majesty's Inspectors of
Schools" (70) stating that "the essential idea of all religious Edu­
cation will consist in the direct cultivation of the feelings" (71-72).
He counters, with a little gentle raillery, the viewpoint that religious
education consists in the "cultivation of the feelings" (71-72) rather
than the imparting of knowledge in the phrases to satisfy anyhow
desires after the unseen which will arise in our minds in spite of
ourselves and as for the intellect, its exercise happens to be unavoid­
able: "What we contemplate, then, what we aim at, when we give a
religious education, is, it seems, not to impart any knowledge what­
ever, but to satisfy anyhow desires after the unseen which will arise
in our minds in spite of ourselves, to provide the mind with a means of
self-command, ... to teach it the poetry of devotion, the music of well­
ordered affections, and the luxury of doing good. As for the intellect,
it exercise happens to be unavoidable, whenever moral impressions are
made ..." (72).

After he has examined the subject of religious education in
the light of its purpose being the "cultivation of the feelings" (71-72)
and skilfully discredited his opponents with the rapier of sarcasm,

\[1\] J. H. Newman, "Biglietto Speech," The Life of John Henry
Newman returns to the main point of his attack; namely, his opponents' inconsistency in not considering religion to be knowledge. He advances to the proof that some proponents of mixed education consider religion something more than just sentiment. Newman illustrates from Dr. Maltby's address on the occasion of the laying of the cornerstone of London University. About the Supreme Being Dr. Maltby spoke as follows: "Thou hast constructed the vast fabric of the universe in so wonderful a manner, so arranged its motions, and so formed its productions, that the contemplation and study of Thy works exercise at once the mind in the pursuit of human science, and lead it onwards to Divine Truth" (73). Here is where Newman finds out his liberalistic opponents in a contradiction and proceeds to obliterate the enemy. From Dr. Maltby's very words there is an admission that "there is such a thing as truth in the province of religion" (73). Surveying his subject from the point of view of Lord Brougham's, "Discourse of the Objects, Advantages, and Pleasures of Science", written in 1827, Newman again finds evidence in Brougham's words about "the infinite wisdom and goodness which the Creator has displayed in all his works" that his opponents distinctly admit a basis of truth for the doctrines of religion (74).

But instead of pursuing his advantage and bringing the argument to the conclusion that his listeners see very clearly by now, Newman retires to consider what the liberal thinkers mean by the Supreme Being. Here he proceeds to the attack by turning his opponents' arguments
against themselves. "I must be excused if I exercise towards this age, as regards its belief in this doctrine, some portion of that scepticism which it exercises itself towards every received but unscrutinized assertion whatever" (76). Here Newman becomes bitterly sarcastic: "It would be a relief to my mind to gain some ground of assurance that the parties influenced by that spirit had, I will not say, a true apprehension of God, but even so much as the idea of what a true apprehension is" (76). He finds that they limit the notion of God to a being who keeps the world in order. The liberalistic thinkers have not only usurped the province of religion by considering goodness to follow on the pursuit of knowledge and religion to be a matter of cultivating the feelings, but also have "changed the divine sovereignty into a sort of constitutional monarchy, in which the Throne has honour and ceremonial enough, but cannot issue the most ordinary command except through legal forms and precedents, and with the counter signature of a minister" (76). In the foregoing image of conquest Newman suggests that man in his deification of knowledge has become the "minister" and indeed taken his place in the temple of God; with the result that, the notion of the Divine has been reduced to that of a limited, powerless, "constitutional monarchy" (76), and that the principle of authority rests in "the counter signature of a minister" (76) rather than in "the divine sovereignty" (76).

He pursues the logical outcome of their thinking to that of philosophers, such as Hume, who in his Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding has Epicurus, "a teacher of atheism," (78) say that since God is "known only through the visible world, our knowledge of Him
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is absolutely commensurate with our knowledge of it" (78). Now Newman advances to answer the problem raised in his opening syllogism. He says that in the writings of the author he has several times quoted (Brougham) he finds, contrary to Hume, "that the phenomena of the material world are insufficient for the full exhibition of the Divine Attributes, and implying that they require a supplemental process to complete and harmonize their evidence" (79). Newman has proved that the logical end of the liberalistic thinking is the view of Epicurus quoted by Hume, yet the liberals do not actually consider their knowledge of God to be limited to that which they can determine from the visible universe. Newman has revealed his opponents' unpardonable lack of insight in blindly pursuing a course of reasoning the end of which they did not see.

It now remains for him to reveal the inconsistency of their position. If they consider that "a supplemental process" (79) is necessary for the "full exhibition of the Divine Attributes, ... is not a supplemental process a science? And if so, why not acknowledge its existence? If God is more than nature, theology claims a place among the sciences" (79). Newman has obliterated the enemy by forcing them into the position of having to admit first that something of Divine Truth is knowable and secondly that this Truth forms a body of knowledge separate from that of nature, the subject of the physical sciences. Since theology is a science it is philosophically and logically an untenable position to insist on its omission from the curriculum of a
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university which by its very definition should teach all knowledge. Newman has gained a decisive victory over his liberalistic opponents and advanced the first stage in his answer to his own question: "whether it is consistent with the idea of university teaching to exclude theology from a place among the sciences which it embraces" (61).

C. Discourse III: Bearing of Theology on Other Knowledge: The Second Stage of the Campaign

After Newman has proved to his audience that theology is a science, and therefore worthy to be included with the secular sciences in the curriculum of an institution whose very name indicates that it is dealing with universal knowledge, he turns to the question of the relationship of theology and the other sciences. In this third lecture Newman seems to feel more sure of the goodwill and interest of his audience; he therefore moves into a direct statement of his ideas at the beginning of Discourse III with the assurance that the logic of his argument will effectively carry him to victory. He seems to find no necessity for going "round his object"1 surveying "it in every light"2 in order that the audience anticipate and therefore acquiesce in his ideas, as was his strategy in Discourse II. However there is one aspect of his strategy Newman does follow with predictable consistency: He just mentions, without emphasis, an idea which he intends to amplify in the

2 Ibid., pp. 293-294.
following discourse. In this way, he has made a preparation in the minds of the audience for an important idea he is later to develop. For example, in Discourse II, Newman refers in passing to the disposition of mind that tends to fragmentize knowledge into separate compartments any one of which can be disregarded: "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge if you begin the mutilation with divine" (67). Such a disposition of mind begins by disregarding theology and ends in the narrowness of its own specialization. The danger of "mutilation" and the necessity for maintaining the unity of knowledge is to be the main idea developed in Discourse III.

Newman begins Discourse III with an illustration in military terms, that compares "men of great intellect" (81), intent on their own "study or investigation of some one particular branch of secular knowledge," to isolated states heedless of the "clamour all around them" requiring them to pay tribute to religion as knowledge, "accused of disaffection to it," and calling "the demand tyrannical and the requisitionists bigots or fanatics" (81). Such men insist on preserving their neutrality. Their argument is that "theology and human science are two things, not one, and have their respective provinces, contiguous it may be and cognate to each other, but not identical" (81). They see no necessity for paying tribute to both provinces, human science and theology. "'Let us go our way,'" they say, "'and you go yours. We do not pretend to lecture on theology, and you have no claim to pronounce upon science'" (81-2). Such an attitude of neutrality attempts "a sort
of compromise between their opponents who claim for theology a free introduction into the schools of science, and themselves who would exclude it altogether" (82). What Newman has clearly depicted with the foregoing military image of a neutral province wishing to maintain its autonomy within the state, yet willing to compromise for the sake of the cessation of hostility is the liberalistic mind that sees no necessary connection between religion and secular knowledge and really no necessity for religion whatever if secular knowledge is pursued with one's whole mind. The compromise such men would advocate is "the project of teaching secular knowledge in the university lecture room and remanding religious knowledge to the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour" (82).

That theology and the secular sciences are not separate and autonomous provinces, but integrally related in the whole field of knowledge will be Newman's purpose to convince his listeners. At this point he has entered on the second stage of his campaign to prove that it is not consistent with the idea of a university "to exclude theology from a place among the sciences" (61). This is a crucial stage in his over-all campaign to persuade his Irish audience to abandon their support of the nondenominational or mixed education given by the Queen's Colleges and give their allegiance to the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland.

In this third discourse Newman has reversed the strategy he followed in Discourse II; that is, he has begun with his main idea in
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the form of a comparison in military terms of the liberalistic mind to a state wishing to maintain its neutrality. Newman then proceeds to amplify his comparison with an explanation of why that neutrality in matters religious is not feasible: All the sciences form one whole unified field of knowledge whose object is truth; or in Newman's words: "All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system of complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another" (82). These "indefinite number of particular facts" (82), these "portions of a whole" (82), are the individual sciences which occupy their respective places on the field of knowledge. Newman defines knowledge as "the apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves or in their mutual positions and bearings" (82).

The reason some tend to think of knowledge in terms of fragments or compartments is that the mind can gain possession of knowledge only gradually in progressive stages. Newman explains this gradual acquisition of knowledge accurately in an image of conquest. He compares the mind's conquest of the field of knowledge to that of an army gaining possession of a battlefield. He says, "the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once" (83), but rather like the circuitous advances of an army, "the mind goes round about it, noting down first one thing, then another, as it best may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making
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progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself a knowledge of that universe into which it has been born" (83).

Newman describes the field of knowledge as occupied by the various sciences much as territories hold their respective areas in a state: "These various partial views or abstractions by means of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called sciences, and embrace respectively larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge; sometimes extending far and wide, but superficially, sometimes with exactness over particular departments, sometimes occupied together on one and the same portion, sometimes holding one part in common, and then ranging on this side or that in absolute divergence one from the other" (83). These images of conquest make clear Newman's idea that knowledge is a unity, the individual sciences occupy "larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge" (83) according to their subject matter, and that the mind's conquest of truth is a gradual advance to acquire the territories of the various sciences that occupy the field of knowledge.

The individual sciences themselves are "abstractions" (83); they deal with "the relations of things rather than with things themselves. ... They arrange and classify facts; they reduce separate phenomena under a common law; they trace effects to a cause" (83-84); consequently, they do not constitute the whole of knowledge, but are really instruments or means to the acquisition of knowledge. Newman
explains the role of the individual sciences in the acquisition of knowledge with the war image of prisoners being transferred to a greater security area from which they cannot escape: The sciences "serve to transfer our knowledge from the custody of memory to the surer and more abiding protection of philosophy, thereby providing both for its spread and its advance—for inasmuch as sciences are forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master and increase it; and inasmuch as they are instruments, to communicate it readily to others" (84). In the preceding military image, Newman makes clear that the individual sciences are instruments or means that enable the intellect to conquer and take possession of the field of knowledge. When the mind has so conquered, it has transferred its knowledge "to the surer and more abiding protection of philosophy" (84). In other words, the particular knowledge that is the province of the individual sciences becomes the enlargement of mind, the over-all view that Newman terms "philosophy".

He explains that each science has its particular part in the conquest of truth and that the individual sciences are not necessarily aware of the roles of the other sciences in the over-all battle for truth. Sometimes too, one science has a less important role to play than another. "As the maker of a bridle or an epaulet has not ... any idea of the science of tactics or strategy, so in a parallel way it is not every science which equally, nor anyone which fully, enlightens the mind in the knowledge of things, as they are" (84). This image explains
the fact that each science has its own territory, but also prepares for a later discussion of the narrowness of each science's view. But Newman retires from his argument to summarize. He has led logically to his main idea that the individual sciences are a "subjective reflection of the objective truth" (84) and that the human mind ... "advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object [objective truth] in proportion to the number of sciences which it has mastered" (84). His main idea, now obvious to his listeners, is that the mind's apprehension of truth will be defective "in proportion to the value of the sciences which are thus wanting, and the importance of the field on which they are employed" (84).

His next move is to prove the importance and extent of theology in the field of knowledge. But before he does so Newman amplifies the idea contained in the image of the maker of a bridle or an epaulet. The maker lacks any idea of the science of tactics or strategy even though his knowledge and craftsmanship contribute in a necessary way to the carrying out of the science of strategy. The fact that the various sciences on the field of knowledge not only contribute to one another, but also help to revise and complete one another's subject matter Newman enforces in the minds of his listeners by several illustrations which he climaxes with the following summary of his war images: The scientists who ignore the positions of other occupants of the field of knowledge to follow their own objectives "necessarily become bigots and quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts which do not belong to their
own pursuit, and thinking to effect everything without aid from any other quarter" (87); whereas they should realize that in the "whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for the purposes of fact" (86). The field of "knowledge forms a whole because its subject matter is one" (87): the universe and its Creator. The sciences "all belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and all connected together" (87) like the territories of a state "though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other" (87). Newman's main idea is that no one science, particularly one so important as theology, can be excluded from or ignored on the field of knowledge without "mutilation" (67) of the concept of truth.

Newman has demonstrated the contradiction inherent in his liberalistic opponents' position of neutrality in matters religious by explaining that the sciences "are one and all connected together" (87). Instead of being autonomous states, "they at once need and subserve each other" (87). Therefore the position of maintaining that "theology and human science are two things" (81), and as "separate subjects should be treated separately" (81) is untenable. Consequently, it is not consistent with the idea of a university to compromise for the sake of peace among those of differing beliefs by omitting theology from the university curriculum as have London University and the Queen's Colleges.

At this point in the discourse Newman gives a direction for future discourses and also takes a glance backward to review the way he
has come. As an extension of his idea that all the sciences "are one and all connected together" (87) he says "the comprehension of the bearing of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some senses a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and of a philosophical habit of mind" (87-88). The cultivation of "the philosophical habit of mind" (88) as the end of a university education is the idea that Newman will make the basis of his argument in Discourses V to IX. The argument rests firmly on the foundation he has been laying in this discourse; namely, the interconnection and mutual dependence of all the sciences on the field of knowledge.

Looking back to Discourse II, he says, "if there be religious truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it without prejudice to truth of every kind, physical, metaphysical, historical, and moral; for it [religious truth] bears upon all truth" (89). Consequently, Newman concludes his argument with the reason that sciences "need and subserve each other" (87): "the systematic omission of any one science particularly theology from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that in proportion to its importance" (88).

Newman's description of Cicero's oratorical strategy is applicable to his own procedure in the remainder of Discourse III: "And now,
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having established his case, he opens upon his opponent a discharge of raillery, so delicate and good-natured, that it is impossible for the latter to maintain his ground against it. Or where the subject is too grave to admit this, he colours his exaggeration with all the bitterness or irony or vehemence of passion."¹ Here the subject, the omission of theology from the university curriculum, is too grave for good-natured raillery. Newman turns all the "bitterness of irony" and "vehemence of passion" at his command against the mentality that would perpetrate what he has proved to be an "intellectual absurdity" (61).

Arguing from historical analogy, Newman says that so venerable an intellect as Aristotle's did not disregard "so influential a being as man" (89) in his investigation of the physical sciences, but Newman sarcastically observes, "we live in an age of the world when the career of science and literature is little affected by what was done, or would be done, by this venerable authority" (90). Continuing in a tone of "bitter irony" Newman says it is possible to conceive in mid-nineteenth century England or Ireland of a group of men deciding as "the only way to avoid constant quarrelling in defence of this or that side of the question ... to shut up the subject of anthropology altogether" (90). Then comes the sting in the irony: "I can just fancy such a prohibition abstractly possible; but one thing I cannot fancy possible, viz., that the parties in question, after this sweeping act of exclusion, should

forthwith send out proposals on the basis of such exclusion for publishing an encyclopaedia or erecting a national university" (90).

It is not difficult for his audience to see that the omission of theology is an analogous situation, but Newman illustrates further: supposing such parties establishing a university found it "simply impracticable to include in the list of university lectures the philosophy of the mind" (91). He sarcastically observes that "what relieves... their regret is the reflection that domestic feelings and polished manners are best cultivated in the family circle and in good society. ... With this apology, such as it is, they pass over the consideration of the human mind and its powers and works 'in solemn silence,' in their scheme of university education" (91). Newman has illustrated that the omission of theology is a measure of expedience not a matter of principle by constructing the hypothetical and analogous situation of omitting anthropology and psychology because there is, at the time, an "extreme sensitiveness of large classes of the community, clergy and laymen" (90) concerning the subject matter of those sciences.

Newman climaxes his argument with the ridiculous picture of a university, based on the omission of the essential area of truth, gaining a charter, appointing professors, giving lectures, examinations, and awarding degrees. The "vehemence of passion" resounds in Newman's question: "What sort of exactness or trustworthiness, what philosophical largeness, will attach to views formed in an intellectual atmosphere
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thus deprived of some of the constituent elements of daylight?" (91)

He points out that what is first tolerated, soon becomes accepted, and then believed. "Common sense indeed and public opinion set bounds at first to so intolerable a licence; yet as time goes on, an omission which was originally but a matter of expedience commends itself to the reason; and at length a professor is found, more hardy than his brethren, ... who takes on him to deny psychology in toto, to pronounce the influence of mind in the visible world a superstition, and to account for every effect which is found in the world by the operation of physical causes. Hitherto intelligence and volition were accounted real powers" (91-92), but now, the professor, following "a new theory in philosophy ... ascribes every work, every external act of man, to the innate force or soul of the physical universe" (92).

Newman maintains that unless a particular professor teaches his science with the guidance of the other sciences in mind, there is a great danger that he will have a "one-sided, a radically false view of things" (93); and he will tend to consider his "own study to be the key of everything that takes place in the face of the earth" (93). In terms of a favourite war image of Newman's, "He [will make] his particular craft usurp and occupy the universe" (94). Such a mentality constitutes the usurpation of reason, an essential quality of the liberalistic mind discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.
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After he has routed the enemy with the "bitterness of irony"\(^1\) and the "vehemence of passion"\(^2\) in his brilliant argument from analogy, Newman calmly reiterates his main idea: that none of the sciences "can safely be omitted if we would obtain the exactest knowledge possible of things as they are" (95). However, before he can claim the victory, Newman must prove that theology is such an important subject that its omission would be a positive privation of an influence which exerts itself in the correction and completion of the rest" (95) and would "destroy the equilibrium of the whole system of knowledge" (95).

In Discourse II, Newman has discredited his liberalistic opponents for reducing the Supreme Being to a "constitutional monarchy" (76) and limiting knowledge of him to what we can learn from our study of the physical sciences. Here Newman gives his definition of theology as "the science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system" (96). In opposition to those who would limit our knowledge of God to that which our knowledge of the physical universe can give, Newman stresses the supremacy, separateness, and omnipotence of the Creator towards the created: "Behind the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible, intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when He will. ... This invisible Agent ... is absolutely distinct from the world as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord" (96). Consequently,

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 294.
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the subject matter of theology is "so mysterious as in its fulness to be beyond any system, and in particular aspects to be simply external to nature, and to seem in parts even to be irreconcilable with itself, the imagination being unable to embrace what the reason determines" (97). Newman has proved the science of theology to concern the most important of subject matters—the "Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord" (96) of the universe.

Newman has proved theology to be "a branch of knowledge" (102), not only "of wide reception, of philosophical structure, of unutterable importance" (102), but also, "of supreme influence" (102). Theology is a science that exerts "a powerful influence on philosophy, literature, and every intellectual creation or discovery whatever" (100). Newman draws his argument to an emphatic conclusion with the imagery of conquest expressed in such words as hostile, occupies, secret, and vigilance: Theology "has had a place, if not possession, in the intellectual world from time immemorial; it has been received by minds the most various, and in systems of religion the most hostile to each other. ... It occupies our language, it meets us at every turn in our literature, it is the secret assumption, too axiomatic to be distinctly professed, of all our writers; nor can we help assuming it ourselves, except by the most unnatural vigilance" (101). Theology, like the strongest province of a state, guides and directs the others even without the others being aware of its direction.
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Newman summarizes his most powerful lecture to date with an hypothesis and a conclusion: "If the various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of teaching in a university, so hang together that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if theology be a branch of knowledge, ... of unutterable importance, ... of supreme influence, to what conclusion are we brought from these two premisses but this: that to withdraw theology from the public schools is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them" (102). Newman has thoroughly enforced his view with apt illustration, reiteration, and analogy until it has become "impossible to entertain a question of the truth of his statement":1 "Religious truth is not only a portion but a condition of general knowledge" (103).

D. Discourse IV; Bearing of Other Branches of Knowledge on Theology: Consolidating Gains

Newman has convinced his audience that religious truth is a body of knowledge, and that theology must be retained in its place among the other sciences in the field of knowledge. He now anticipates opposition from another quarter: He perceives his listeners raising this one last objection to the inclusion of theology in the university curriculum; namely, that the world will accuse them of being the enemy of secular

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science. As Newman explains in terms of war image that views "human science and revelation" as opponents, "Nothing is more common in the world at large than to consider the resistance made on the part of religious men ... to the separation of secular education from religion as a plain token that there is some real contrariety between human science and revelation. To the multitude who draw this inference, ... religious men would not thus be jealous and alarmed about science, did they not feel ... that knowledge is their born enemy, and that its progress, if it is not arrested, will be certain to destroy all that they hold venerable and dear" (104). Newman says he has answered this objection in his previous discourse when he said that "in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth, and no one science ... not even all secular science is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters to a very great extent into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it [revealed truth] on one side ... is ... to do science a great damage" (105). Therefore, Newman would conclude, the "religious men" are really the allies of secular knowledge rather than, in the opinion of some, the enemies of secular science.

Since Newman's subject in this Fourth Discourse is the "supposed opposition between secular science and divine" (104), he has effectively opened the lecture with war imagery that strikes the keynote of the conflict which his opponents think exists between religion and secular science. Once more Newman models his oratorical strategy on
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that of Cicero's: After stating the circumstances of the case, he outlines the intended plan of his oration. He explains that the objection, which forms the subject of this lecture, he anticipated last week. "Now I am going to make it the introduction to a further view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine" (105).

This "further view" Newman expresses in the military terms of one state usurping the territory of another; "If you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge ... the other sciences close up; ... they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right. For instance, I suppose if ethics were sent into banishment, its territory would disappear, under a treaty of partition ... between law, political economy, and physiology" (106). Continuing his war image of the dispossessed state Newman says, theology "would be the prey of a dozen various sciences if it were put out of possession; and not only so, but those sciences would be plainly exceeding their rights and their capacities in seizing upon it. They would be sure to teach wrongly, where they had no mission to teach at all. The enemies of Catholicism ought to be the last to deny this—for they have never been blind to a like usurpation, ... on the part of the theologians" (106). Here Newman adroitly turns his opponents' arguments against themselves when he says, "those who accuse us of wishing, in accordance with Scripture language, to make the sun go round the earth are not the men to deny that a science which exceeds its limits falls into error" (106).
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Newman has abandoned his attitude of conciliation in previous lectures for one of crisp clarity and direct statement. He further outlines his plans: "I neither then am able nor care to deny, rather I assert the fact, and today I am going on to account for it, that any secular science cultivated exclusively may become dangerous to religion" (106). He introduced this idea in Discourse III when he said that the scientist who pursues his own subject to the deliberate exclusion of others is in danger of "making his particular craft usurp and occupy the universe" (94). In a similar war image here Newman reiterates; "no science whatever, however comprehensive it may be but will fall largely into error if it be constituted the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth, and that, for the simple reason that it is encroaching on the territory not its own, and undertaking problems which it has no instruments to solve" (106). Such an encroaching science does not have the instruments to solve problems in other sciences because it is the victim of the "extravagances of undisciplined talent, and the narrowness of conceited ignorance" (108) and because it lacks the "interpretation and restraint from other quarters" (109) that it would have if it recognized the existence and respective provinces of other sciences. Then too, as Newman explains, "a little science is not deep philosophy" (109); that is, is not the comprehensive view that comes from the knowledge of the interconnection and dependence of the sciences on one another. Newman skilfully uses the argument of his natural opponent Lord Bacon to emphasize his idea that a science which sees its
own subject matter as the whole of knowledge is really encroaching on the territories of all the others: Lord Bacon called such an attitude of mind an impediment to the advancement of the sciences. Newman quotes: "'men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceit which they have most admired, or some Sciences which they have most applied; and give all things else a tincture according to them utterly untrue and improper ...'" (109).

Newman summarized his argument on the "refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of universal knowledge" (108) and introduces the result of that refusal: "What it [theology] unjustly forfeits, others unjustly seize" (109). The result is that "they do teach what in its place is true, though when out of its place, perverted or carried to excess, it is not true" (109). And the great mischief is that "as every man has not the capacity of separating truth from falsehood, they [those who ignore theology] persuade the world of what is false by urging upon it what is true. Nor is it open enemies alone who encounter us here; sometimes it is friends, some persons who, if not friends, at least have no wish to oppose religion, and are not conscious they are doing so" (109-110). Not only the "open enemies" (110), the physical sciences, but also the "friends" (110), the "fine arts, painting, sculpture, architecture" and "music" (110) are guilty of seizing the territory of theology. Instead of being "attendants and handmaids of religion" they "are apt to forget their place, and unless restrained
with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals" (110).

Newman expresses the conflict for territory between one of the fine arts, painting, and religion in the following war image: "Not content with neutral ground for its development, it[ painting] was attracted by the sublimity of divine subject to ambitious and hazardous essays. ... Under these circumstances religion was bound to exert itself, that the world might not gain an advantage over it" (110-111). Music too has "a field of its own, ... into which religion does not and need not enter; ... here also, ... it is certain that religion must be alive and on the defensive, for if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal over it" (111). The result of the encroachment of the fine arts into territory belonging to religion is that "the fine arts may prejudice religion by laying down the law in cases where they should be subservient" (113).

The diction of conflict expressed in the words neutral ground, hazardous essays, defensive, encroachment, subservient, clearly presents Newman's idea that the fine arts if not held in check by theology will tend to encroach on theology's territory by appropriating "the sublimity of divine subjects" (111) to their own ends: the creation of what they consider natural beauty, rather than subservience to the cause of religion. Newman expresses the fact that it is possible, as the fine arts develop, for them to become leaders instead of followers; to subject
Newman continues to marshall illustrations to support his contention that particular provinces of knowledge, without the guidance of theology, tend to encroach on the territory of other sciences. What is true of the fine arts is even more applicable to science whose objects are material and whose "principles belong to the reason, not to the imagination [;] ... their disciples, if disinclined to the Catholic faith, act the part of opponents to it" (114) by making the principles of their own particular subject of thought "the measure of all things" (114). Such a danger, Newman expresses effectively in the battle diction of opponents, pass the bounds of, contends, betrayed, and treacherous fascination. A particular disciple of science may be "betrayed into a false step by the treacherous fascination" (115) of seeing his own "exclusive line of study" (114) as the key to all knowledge: the political economist who has so "fixed his mind upon" (118) his own subject that "he
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has forgotten there are subjects of thought higher and more heavenly than it" (113). To state not only how but also why wealth is sought; that is, to state "that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness ... is to pass the bounds of his science" (117).

When such an exceeding of boundaries occurs the "architectonic science or philosophy" (120) must be called in as mediator, or "when an opponent of a particular science asserts that it does not conduce to happiness, and much more, when its champion contends in reply that it certainly does conduce to virtue" (120), "that architectonic science or philosophy ... the arbiter of all truth" (120) will refer the ethical matter to its proper province, religion, in order to settle the dispute. Without such guidance, political economy can be betrayed into crossing the boundary into the province of ethics as the following statement indicates: "the pursuit of wealth, that is, the endeavour to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment is to the mass of mankind, the great source of moral improvement" (120). The claim that the accumulation of wealth is a source of "moral improvement" brings political economy into conflict with an aspect of religion, Revelation, which states: "'Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth ... for where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also!'" (121).

At this point, Newman anticipates and counters an objection to his argument. He says, "doubtless 'beggary' ... is not desirable; doubtless, if men will not work, they should not eat; there is doubtless a
sense in which it may be said that mere social or political virtue tends to moral and religious excellence; but the sense needs to be defined and the statement kept within bounds" (122). He hastens to assure his would-be opponents that he is granting the political economists' views to contain "reason and truth" (122), but "I only say that, though they speak the truth, they do not speak the whole truth; that they speak a narrow truth, and think it a broad truth; that their deductions must be compared with other truths, which are acknowledged to be truths, in order to verify, complete, and correct them" (122). This is the strongest and clearest argument Newman has made for the necessity of including theology in the university curriculum.

In this section of Discourse IV Newman is combating the thoroughly Utilitarian view that the pursuit of wealth is "the great source of moral improvement" (120) for mankind. In the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters, Newman was opposing a modified version of the foregoing aspect of liberalism; namely, that knowledge was "the great source of moral improvement" (120) for society. Newman admits that there is truth in what his opponents advocate, that wealth and knowledge do seem to have improved society to a certain degree. In his "Biglietto Speech" he admitted the great social improvement in society that the liberalistic mentality had effected. But Newman's point of view is that although "they speak the truth, they do not speak the whole truth" (122). What Newman means here he has explained in the "Tamworth Reading Room"
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letters: any improvement of society without the inherent improvement of the individual effects "a polished outside, with hollowness within." ¹

The real and permanent means to the improvement of society's individuals is the subject of Discourses V to IX on liberal education.

In summarizing his argument, he returns again to his military image of one state encroaching on the territory of another and employs such war diction as take up a position hostile, defend its own boundaries, encroachment, occupy its own territory, foreign, take possession of, and occupation is proved to be an usurpation: "Secular Science in its various departments may take up a position hostile to theology" (124) when it [secular science] is deflected from its proper course and "theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder the encroachment. ... If theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory, adjacent sciences, nay, sciences which are quite foreign to theology, will take possession of it. And this occupation is proved to be an usurpation by this circumstance that these foreign sciences will assume certain principles as true, and act upon them, which they neither have authority to lay down themselves, nor appeal to any other science to lay down for them" (124-125).

Newman seems to feel secure in his victory against the hostile forces in his audience. The following is a master strategist's account

of the winning blows by which he has subdued, in Discourses II, III, and IV, those opposed to "the claim of theology to be represented among the chairs of a university" (125):

Whereas it is the very profession of a university to teach all sciences, on this account it cannot exclude theology without being untrue to its profession. Next, I have said that all sciences being connected together, and having bearing one on another, it is impossible to teach them all thoroughly unless they all are taken into account, and theology among them. Moreover, I have insisted on the important influence which theology in matter of fact does and must exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and correcting them; so that, granting it to be a real science occupied upon truth, it cannot be omitted without great prejudice to the teaching of the rest. And lastly, I have urged that, supposing theology be not taught, its province will not simply be neglected, but will be actually usurped by other sciences, which will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their own in a subject matter which needs its own proper principles for its due formation and disposition. (125-126).

E. The Initial Discourse V: Universal Knowledge Viewed as One Philosophy: the Routing of the Enemy

As a veteran controversialist, Newman finds it necessary, before demanding the capitulation of his nondenominational education opponents, to illustrate the main points of his campaign as set forth in Discourses II and III. The main issue is the necessity for safeguarding the unity of the circle of sciences by retaining theology in the university curriculum. The warning, "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge if you begin the mutilation with divine" (67), resounds like a battle cry through the first
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five discourses. Since for Newman the purpose of a university is to maintain the unity of knowledge, he draws his campaign against mixed education to a close by illustrating that the London University and Queen's College are just the institutions that do not maintain the unity and hierarchy of knowledge.

Newman begins this final stage of his campaign against mixed education by making clear the essential difference between his idea of a university and that of the founders of the London University and the Queen's Colleges. The latter would maintain that no substantial difference exists in the two ideas of a university. Newman insists that the similarities are superficial and the differences are essential; consequently, there is no possibility of compromise between the two. Newman contends against those who would say that it little matters what "a teacher's persuasion may be, whether Christian or not" so long as he is dealing with non-religious subjects with his statement "that a positive disunion takes place between Theology and the Secular Science, whenever they are not actually united" (389). In other words, where there is a lack of agreement in principles which would lend a perspective to the subject, there exists a state of hostility, or as Newman expresses the idea in war imagery: "not to be at peace is to be at war; and for

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this reason: The assemblage of Sciences, which together make up Universal Knowledge, is not an accidental or a varying heap of acquisitions, but a system, and may be said to be in equilibrio, as long as all its portions are secured to it. Take away one of them, and that one so important in the catalogue as Theology, and disorder and ruin at once ensue" (389). With his military comparison of the various secular sciences to a heap of acquisitions instead of states belonging to a system secured by a central authority, theology, Newman again emphasizes his main idea throughout the first five discourses: the necessity of maintaining theology in the system of knowledge lest disorder and ruin at once ensue.

At this point in his discourses, Newman, the oratorical strategist, thinks that he has won his audience to the extent of risking some hostility from the Bishop Murray - Queen's Colleges supporters. He therefore launches an offensive against those supporters who think it possible to compromise with the enemy. He begins the attack by reminding his audience of the 1826-7 controversy over the establishment of London University based upon the idea that it was possible and even desirable to divorce Religious and Secular Knowledge. Newman's first manoeuvre to gain his audience's allegiance and arouse their contempt for the enemy is his ironic appraisal of the enemy as formidable and composed of an array of high intellects: "Let us see how they spoke twenty-five years ago in the defence formally put out for that formidable Institution,
formidable, as far as any array of high intellects can make any paradox or paralogism formidable, which was then set up in London on the basis of such a separation" (390). Withering too is Newman's scorn that such a celebrated periodical as the Edinburgh Review should find itself champion of so erroneous a position: "The natural, as well as the special, champion of the then University of London, and of the principle which it represented, was a celebrated Review, which stood at the time, and, I suppose, stands still, at the head of our periodical literature" (390).

Newman's next move is to illustrate the erroneous position of the formidable array of high intellects by quoting two examples from an article in the Edinburgh Review "devoted to the exculpation of the Institution in question, from the charges or suspicions which it incurred in consequence of the principle on which it was founded" (390). Before he refers to the examples Newman consolidates his position with his audience and further discredits the enemy by saying that he will have to abandon his usual seriousness of argument lest he not do justice to the "liveliness and wit" (390) of the Reviewer; "You must pardon me, Gentlemen, if, in my desire to do justice to him and his cause in his own words, I suffer him to interrupt the equable flow of our discussion with unreasonable mirth" (390).

The first example Newman cites from the Reviewer's article is that of a young man who is a student of surgery. He attends a lecture
on political economy in the morning; then goes to the hospital for an explanation of modes of reducing fractures, and lastly attends a class in French or German. He attends to his religious observances as he sees fit himself. The Reviewer asks how this programme differs from that pursued at London University or "Is it in the local situation that the mischief lies?" (390) Newman answers his useful knowledge opponent that this is no common ground for dispute since they do not have the same idea about knowledge. He says in effect that what the surgery student is acquiring is not an education but a training. "Whatever may be said of Political Economy, at any rate a surgical operation is not a branch of knowledge, or a process of argument, ... or an abstraction, or other intellectual exercise: it is a grave practical matter" (391). Newman places such practical matters in the same category as spelling and grammar, that are not trials of "reason, imagination, taste, or judgment" (391), scarcely have truth for their object, and therefore "belong to the first stage of mental development, to the school, rather than to the University" (391). He ends his defence by saying that since such subjects as surgery are "grave practical matters" (391), but not knowledge that involves "reason, imagination, taste, and judgment" (391), and do not have for their object the exercise of the intellect in the cause of truth, it is little wonder that they can be taught aside from theology. Newman maintained that such practical subjects properly belonged to the schools and not to the University.

With the first example Newman has demonstrated the difference
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between practical matters and knowledge and has made clear that since the combatants occupy two different fields, one of knowledge, the other of practice, there can be no battleground. His second example illustrates an essential characteristic of this knowledge. The Reviewer asks how the education of a London University student differs from that of a girl taught different subjects—music, Italian, French, dancing—in her own home by tutors of varying religions, whereas her religious instruction is left to her parents. Newman counters again with the assertion that these subjects—music, Italian, French, dancing—are not the knowledge or Philosophy that it is the task of the university to foster. He says that the writers who see no difference between a course of individual subjects and the acquisition of Philosophy do not understand the idea of a university. Again the combatants are not fighting over the same issues since each one has a different idea of a university.

To illustrate the London University idea of a university as an accumulation of information, Newman compares such information to wares sold at a bazaar: "They consider it [a university] a sort of bazaar, or pantechnicon, in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other; and that to save the purchasers the trouble of running from shop to shop" (391). Newman's shopping plaza illustration points out the essential weakness in his opponents' idea of a university: a lack of unity in their conception of education, with the result that "their whole ... is an accumulation from without, not a growth of a principle from within" (393). Also, there is no
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purposeful and ascending order of knowledge as an army is arranged in an ascending order from the soldiers in the ranks to the general in the command.

When the human mind does not see knowledge as a unity and the sciences as members of a related group, it tends by its very nature to make a unity and hierarchy of its own. To illustrate his opponents' position Newman refers to a military image he has mentioned several times in *The Idea of a University* and elsewhere: that of one state encroaching on the territory of another. "The human mind is ever seeking to systematize its knowledge, to base it upon principle, and to find a science comprehensive of all sciences. ... It starts with whatever knowledge or science it happens to have, and makes that knowledge serve as a rule or measure of the universe. ... We see the intellect in this instance, as soon as it moves at all, moving straight against its own conceits and falsities and upsetting them spontaneously, without effort, and at once" (392). The intellect hemmed about by "a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments" (392) like a surrounded army "bursts violently and dangerously through the artificial trammels laid upon her, and exercises her just rights wrongly, since she cannot rightly" (392).

The areas of knowledge that assume leadership Newman refers to as usurpers and tyrants. "Usurpers and tyrants are the successors to legitimate rulers sent into exile" (392). Private judgment takes the
place of the rightful ruler and disunity and tumult follow. "Private judgement moves forward with the implements of this or that science, to do a work imperative indeed, but beyond its powers. It owns the need of general principles and constituent ideas, by taking false ones, and thus is ever impeding and preventing unity, while it is ever attempting and thereby witnessing [to] it. From the many voices crying 'Order' and 'Silence' noise and tumult follow. From the very multiplicity and diversity of the efforts after unity on every side, this practical age has thrown up the notion of it altogether" (392-393). Like a leaderless army, knowledge led by the usurper Private judgment retires from the field in noise and tumult and is routed from the battle for truth.

Newman states that his opponents do not base their idea of a university on "man's nature and the necessity of things, exemplified in all great moral works whatever" (393). The mind of the educated person, to Newman, should reflect the order and unity that is everywhere visible in creation. No where does Newman express this idea more clearly than he does in his sermon, "The Second Spring": "We have familiar experience of the order, the constancy, the perpetual renovation of the material world which surrounds us. ... It is bound together by the law of permanence, it is set up in unity; and, though it is ever dying, it is ever coming to life again. ... Each hour, as it comes, is but a testimony, how fleeting, yet how secure, how certain, is the great whole."1 The

provinces of the individual sciences are the contingent aspects of creation, those which are "ever dying" and "ever coming to life again."

But it is the knowledge of the "science of sciences" (394) or the "architectonic science or philosophy" (120) that gives unity and permanence to the intellect. This knowledge is "an intellectual grasp of things" (394); or "Philosophy" (394). It is acquired by science "which is not mere knowledge, it is knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one, and hence is its power; for properly speaking, it is Science that is power, not Knowledge" (394). Newman's liberalistic opponents—those who established the London University, and the Queen's Colleges in Ireland—considered the acquisition of knowledge a sufficient end of a university education, and therefore were unaware of the existence of or necessity for the "intellectual grasp of things" (394) that relates and unifies knowledge into a "science of sciences" (394).

In opposition to his opponents Newman says that it is the acquisition of the "Science of Sciences" (394) that is the scope of a university education. He considers this intellectual "grasp of many things brought together in one" (394) as the living principle that gives unity, form, and meaning to an education. "We consider that all things mount up to a whole, that there is an order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge one with another as well as one by one, and that to destroy that structure is as unphilosophical in a course of education, as it is unscientific in the separate portions of it. We
form and fix the sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim, instead of letting them wander up and down in a sort of hopeless confusion" (394). The "centre" and "aim", Newman speaks of, is the "grasp of many things brought together in one" (394) or what he has referred to as the "Philosophical Habit of mind" (88). It is this habit that gives a unity to the mind, and therefore all that the mind grasps has a significance in relation to its unified grasp of reality.

Newman now returns to answer the objection raised at the beginning of Discourse V: that it little matters what "a teacher's persuasion may be, whether Christian or not" (389), so long as he is dealing with non-religious subjects. His answer is as follows: Whether or not the mind possess the "Science of Sciences" (384) will influence the teaching of an ostensibly neutral subject. As Newman expresses the idea: "No subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact, though it may be in itself; because it takes a colour from the whole system to which it belongs, and has one character when viewed in that system, and another viewed out of it. According as a teacher is under the influence, or in the service, of this system or that, so does the drift, and at least the practical effect of his teaching vary" (398).

Newman's summary of his ideas in Discourse V constitutes a summation of those in the Discourses I to V. He emphasizes that the unity of the field of knowledge is necessary in order that the mind reflect that unity in its acquisition of a "Philosophical Habit of mind" (88).
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It is the task of the University to maintain this unity by retaining theology in its rightful place with the other branches of knowledge, the secular sciences. "Not Science only, not Literature only, not Theology only, neither abstract knowledge simply nor experimental, neither moral nor material, neither metaphysical nor historical, but all knowledge whatever, is taken into account in a University, as being the special seat of that large Philosophy, which embraces and locates truth of every kind, and every method of attaining it" (399). Newman has routed his mixed education opponents by revealing the difference between their respective ideas of a university. Instead of the narrow aim of accumulating information or acquiring a training, Newman's university is a training ground for the formation of the mind. There the student's mind can acquire the "science of sciences" (394) which will result in his possessing "a philosophical habit of mind" (88) that will give a "centre and an aim" (394) to his thinking for the rest of his life.

With Discourse V, Newman draws this first campaign against liberalism in education to an effective conclusion. In Discourse I Newman has gained the respectful attention of his audience by arousing their hopes for the restoration of past glories. At the same time, he has mentioned the two core ideas that give unity and direction to his discourses; namely, the two Oxford controversies that involved the "inutility" (48) and "religious exclusiveness" (48) of that university's education. It is the principles concerned in the "religious exclusiveness" (48) controversy (1827-28 and 1834-35) that form the material of
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Discourses I to V in the Idea of a University. In Discourse II Newman has proved that theology is a branch of knowledge and therefore it is inconsistent with the idea of a university to omit theology from the curriculum. He has soundly defeated his opponents by proving that their position of conceding theology to be knowledge, yet deliberately excluding it from the university curriculum is a wholly untenable one since a university by its very name should teach all knowledge. Then in Discourse III he has entered the second stage of his campaign by presenting theology not only as knowledge, but also as occupying such an important position that its omission jeopardizes the validity of truth in the other sciences. By illustrations of his ideas in Discourses II and III, Newman consolidates his gains in Discourse IV. Finally, he draws all his forces together in the emphatic conclusion of Discourse V:

Without theology, the circle of the sciences will be broken; the mind will not reflect the unity and order that is in creation; consequently, it will not possess the "science of sciences" (394) which gives the circle of sciences a "centre and an aim" (394). As a result, learning will be a process of "accumulation from without, not a growth of principle from within" (393). Newman has obliterated his London University-Queen's Colleges opponents by patiently and skilfully building in the minds of his audience a distrust in the kind of education that is a mere "accumulation from without. ..." (393) and finally, he has made his opponents ashamed of supporting a form of education that offers "so little for the mind" (168).
CHAPTER IV

THE CAMPAIGN TO MAINTAIN LIBERAL KNOWLEDGE AS THE END OF A UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

The Third Chapter dealt with Discourses I to V of The Idea of a University, in which Newman attempted to disclose to his Irish audience the real nature and danger of the liberalistic foe who had exacted a compromise from them in their acceptance of the mixed education offered by the Queen's Colleges. The Fourth Chapter concerns the second series of five lectures, Discourses V to IX in which Newman opposes two other aspects of liberalism in education: first, the end of a university education is the practical usefulness of professional training; and secondly, the acquisition of knowledge will result in the moral improvement of the individual and of society.

The key lectures in the second series of five are Discourses V and VI in which Newman presents his idea of a university as a training ground for the formation of the intellect in the acquisition of "a philosophical habit of mind" (88). Such exercise and formation of the mind Newman considered to be the effect of a liberal education. Discourse VII illustrates the ideas in Discourses V and VI by referring to the 1808 controversy between the Oxford defenders and the Edinburgh Review attackers of the "inutility" (48) of Oxford's education. Discourses VIII and IX amplify the ideas presented in Discourses V and VI. Discourse VIII, the relation between liberal knowledge and moral improvement, is Newman's answer to his "Tamworth Reading Room" opponents.
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Discourse IX, the relation between liberal knowledge and the Church, forms an excellent conclusion to the series of ten lectures as it deals with the principles basic to the two Oxford controversies that are the foundation of The Idea of a University.

Discourses I to V are based on "the religious exclusiveness" (48) controversies at Oxford (1827-28 and 1834-35) in which Newman was personally involved. Also these discourses were prepared with the necessity of presentation to an indifferent or critical, if not hostile, Dublin audience. As a result of the personal involvement in the subject and the stress of immediate battle, there is an anxious tenseness, a multiplicity of illustrations and reiteration in order to convince, and a conscious emphasis on the strategy of presentation in Discourses I to V that is not evident in the remaining five discourses. Since Discourses V to IX were prepared in the summer and early autumn of 1852 for possible presentation later in the fall, there is not the immediate necessity for winning a hostile audience evident in style of the lectures. The Discourses V to IX have their roots in the 1808 controversy over Oxford's exclusively classical curriculum. Newman could view this controversy with a detachment and admiration since his own liberal education was the result of the Oxford defenders' victory. The polish and integration of his oratorical strategy and war imagery with his ideas in Discourses V to IX are an excellent illustration of the kind of liberal education Newman hoped would be effected by the Catholic University of Ireland.
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A. Present Discourse V: Knowledge its Own End: The Aligning of Forces

Newman has skilfully led from his main principle in Discourses I to V, that knowledge is a whole, to his consequent idea in the Present Discourse V that the intellect's apprehension of that knowledge has an end in itself; namely, the perfection of the intellect. To convince his Irish audience that the training of the intellect is a good in itself was going to require even more subtle, but forceful oratorical skill than that displayed by Newman in his first encounter with his opponents on the question of maintaining theology in its place on the field of knowledge. It would be difficult to persuade the Irish Catholics to think otherwise of a university education than as a training for the professions. Financially, socially, and politically, they needed the remuneration and the prestige that professional training would give them in a country where they held the position of majority in number, but minority in power. Newman therefore advances, in Discourses V to IX, to the consideration of the second educational controversy, the "inutility" (48) of a university education.

Newman outlines his intended procedure in the second battle of his Irish university campaign much as a commander who has just won a decisive victory and is launching a second offensive with courageous determination. The opening paragraph has the crisp clarity of a military
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briefing: "A university may be considered with reference either to its students or to its studies; and the principle that all knowledge is a whole and separate sciences part of one, which I have hitherto been using in behalf of its studies, is equally important when we direct our attention to its students. Now then I turn to the students, and shall consider the education which, by virtue of this principle, a university will give them; and thus I shall be introduced, Gentlemen, to the second question which I proposed to discuss, viz., whether and in what sense its teaching, viewed relatively to the taught, carries the attribute of utility along with it" (127).

Newman expresses in military imagery the value of that "intellectual proficiency ... which is the result of exercise and training" (150) in the "Preface," actually written as an introduction to Discourses V to IX. He compares the Supreme Pontiff, with truth as "his real ally" (8), to a military commander who has in mind the establishment of an institution that will train his soldiers to fill their respective posts in life better; consequently, with the "conviction that truth is his real ally ... and that knowledge and reason are sure ministers to faith" (8), the Supreme Pontiff suggested the establishment of a university:

His direct object is, not science, art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of knowledge, but some benefit or other, to accrue by means of literature and science to his own children; ... their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or intellectual. ... Just as a commander wishes to have tall and well-formed and vigorous
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soldiers, not from any abstract devotion to the military standard of height or age, but for the purposes of war, and no one thinks it anything but natural and praiseworthy in him to be contemplating, not abstract qualities, but his own living breathing men; so in like manner when the church founds a university, she is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and of making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society (9).

The preceding military image expresses Newman's idea of a university as an institution of training and discipline for the battle of life and the knowledge gained there as a means to this training. Therefore he insists on order and system in the place of education. For this reason Newman has thought the including of all the sciences necessary.

Now in the context of students rather than curriculum he refers to his war image of the sciences, without the guidance of theology, as encroaching states; "as regards the influence which they exercise upon those whose education consists in the study of them" (127) Newman states as follows: "To give undue prominence to one is to be unjust to another; to neglect or supersede these is to divert those from their proper object. It is to unsettle the boundary lines between science and science to disturb their action, to destroy the harmony which binds them together. Such a proceeding will have a corresponding effect when introduced into a place of education. There is no science but tells a different tale, when viewed as a portion of a whole, from what it is
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likely to suggest when taken by itself, without the safeguard, as I may call it of the others" (127-128).

Newman explains that the students "will be the gainers by living among those and under those who represent the whole circle" (128). He describes the university faculty as: "An assemblage of learned men, zealous for their own sciences and rivals of each other, are brought by familiar intercourse and for the sake on intellectual peace, to adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects of investigation. They learn to respect, to consult, to aid each other" (128-29). In comparing the sciences and their respective professors to the various rival factions within a state which must learn to live amicably together, Newman expresses an aspect of his main reason for insisting that a university must not systematically omit any one science; namely, the sciences "complete, correct, balance each other" (127).

Such harmony and balance creates "a pure and clear atmosphere of thought, which the student also breathes" (129). Newman describes the intellectual training that results from this healthful atmosphere of unity: The student "profits by an intellectual tradition ... which guides him in his choice of subjects, and duly interprets for him those which he chooses. He apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little" (129). Thus he will become one of the "tall and well-formed and vigorous soldiers" trained "to fill
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their respective posts in life better" (9). The student gains the kind of education which Newman terms "liberal" (129); the education that "brings the mind into form" (13). The effects of the resultant intellectual training are these: "A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit" (129).

As an efficient strategist Newman proceeds to outline his plans. "And now the question is asked me, What is the use of it? and my answer will constitute the main subject of the discourses to follow" (129). In a war metaphor basic to all the discourses Newman describes the value of a liberal education in terms of the mind always being eager for the conquest of truth:

The most unpropitious circumstances have been unable to conquer an ardent desire for the acquisition of knowledge. That further advantages accrue to us and redound to others by its possession over and above what it is in itself; ... but independent of these, we are satisfying a direct need of our nature in its very acquisition; and, whereas our nature, unlike that of the inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection, but depends, in order to it, on a number of external aids and appliances, knowledge, as one of the principal gifts or accessories by which it is completed is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us after the manner of a habit, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end (130-131).
Here Newman describes the acquisition of knowledge as essential for the development of the mind and the perfection of its natural capacities.

The subject matter of liberal knowledge has always been in the world although opinions have differed as to what pursuits belonged to it. Newman expresses the idea in terms of a state that has maintained its ground in spite of conflicts and changes: "That idea [liberal knowledge] must have substance in it, which has maintained its ground amid these conflicts and changes, which has ever served as a standard to measure things withal, which has passed from mind to mind unchanged" ... (136).

Newman defends the subject matter of liberal knowledge from his useful knowledge opponents: "I consider, then, that I am chargeable with no paradox when I speak of a knowledge which is its own end, when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman's knowledge, when I educate for it, and make it the scope of a university. And still less I am incurring such a charge when I make this acquisition consist, not in knowledge in a vague and ordinary sense, but in that knowledge which I have especially called philosophy or, in an extended sense of the word, science; ..." (136-137). Such is the "comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values" (130) that Newman has termed in the previous discourses the "science of sciences" (88) and the acquisition of which he now proclaims as the use of a liberal education. This "comprehensive
view of truth" (130) is the "liberal or philosophical knowledge" (130) that is the end of a university to impart.

After Newman has defined liberal or philosophical knowledge, he proceeds to differentiate it from useful knowledge. Before he does so, he entreats the patience of the audience with the best Ciceronian oratorical strategy: "Now bear with me, Gentlemen, if what I am about to say has at first sight a fanciful appearance" (137). Having disarmed his opponents, Newman proceeds to give a definition of such clarity and concreteness, it could hardly be termed fanciful. Knowledge is designated as useful if it resolves "itself into an art, and terminates in a mechanical process, and in a tangible fruit" (137); knowledge is liberal if it "fall[s] back upon that reason which informs it, and resolve[s] itself into philosophy" (137).

What follows is an application of the definition: "You see, then, here are two methods of education; the end of the one is to be philosophical, of the other to be mechanical; the one rises towards general ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external" (138). Since liberal knowledge "is an acquired illumination, ...a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment," ... it is more correct, as well as more usual, to speak of a university as a place of education, than of instruction" (139). Newman differentiates between instruction and education: "We are instructed, for instance, in manual exercises,
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in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of business; for these are methods, which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained in rules committed to memory, to tradition, or to use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent ..." (139).

What Newman is implying is that the purpose of a university as far as his London University - Queen's Colleges opponents are concerned is the imparting of useful knowledge; and their method is instruction, which has "little or no effect upon the mind itself" (139). Whereas, the purpose of a university for Newman is the imparting of liberal knowledge; and the method is education, which is "the communication of knowledge" (139) that results in the "cultivation of mind" (139).

Having proved that liberal knowledge is useful only in the sense of its being a "cultivation of mind," (139) and not in its issuing in any practical effect or end beyond itself, Newman now turns to that aspect of the utility controversy he dealt with in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters; namely, that education makes men virtuous, or "at least, ... that refinement of mind is virtue" (140). Taking the philosopher in Rasselas and the scientist Francis Bacon as examples, Newman clearly illustrates that knowledge is no balm for the grief-stricken heart, nor is it an inducement to loyalty and justice for a politician.
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The philosopher in Rasselas advocated the equanimity that was one of the results of liberal education: "He communicated the various precepts given, from time to time, for the conquest of passion, and displayed the happiness of those who had obtained the important victory, after which man is no longer the slave of fear, nor the fool of hope. He enumerated many examples of heroes immovable by pain or pleasure, who looked with indifference on those modes or accidents to which the vulgar give the names of good and evil" (141). In spite of this lofty ideal quoted by Newman and expressed dramatically in such battle imagery as conquest of passion, obtained the important victory, heroes immovable by pain, the philosopher, Newman recounts, did himself succumb to personal grief. The philosopher's ideals and Newman's liberal knowledge have in common the fact that they do not issue in a practical effect although they are none the less valid in theory. Newman illustrates with reference to Francis Bacon, the "man of great intellect" (142) who "was not bound by his philosophy to be true to his friend or faithful in his trust" (142). Although he was "the 'meanest' of mankind, he was so in what may be called his private capacity and without any prejudice to the theory of induction" (142).

The foregoing illustrations effectively prove that "knowledge is one thing, virtue is another" (144). Newman maintains concerning liberal knowledge that "for all its friends, or enemies may say, I insist upon it, that it is as real a mistake to burden it with virtue or reli-
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gion as with the mechanical arts. Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptations, or to console it in affliction; ... be it ever so much the means or the conditions of both material and moral advancement, still, taken by and in itself, it as little mends our hearts as it improves our temporal circumstances" (144).

Those who would claim for philosophy the "command over the passions" (144) "commit the very same kind of encroachment on a province not their own as the political economist who should maintain that his science educated him for casuistry or diplomacy" (144). Newman has drawn boundary lines around liberal knowledge in order to separate its territory from that of virtue and made clear these distinct areas with one of his frequently used military images: the danger of the encroachment of one province on another. He vividly depicts the powerlessness of human knowledge and human reason to produce virtue in an image of conflict that is memorable for its dramatic clarity: "Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against these giants, the passion and the pride of man" (145).

What liberal knowledge does achieve is the "intellectual excellence" (145) of a trained mind evident in "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and
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courteous bearing in the conduct of life" (144). These are the attributes of the "tall and well-formed and vigorous soldiers" (9) for which Newman hoped the Catholic University of Ireland would be the training ground. This ideal was the truth as Newman saw it: that the end of a university education was "nothing more or less than intellectual excellence" (145).

Newman himself "is always the man with a mission: to spread the truth; and to spread the truth is 'warfare'." ¹ The truth certainly involved Newman in conflict; in that, his idea of a university education made him the opponent of Dr. Cullen and his adherents, who wished the professors to be priests, in strict obedience to their bishop, their intellectual equipment to be secondary to their priestly functions, their students to be brought under a quasi-seminarist discipline and thus to be kept from the contagion of modern thought, scientific, literary, theological, political. Newman held that in a Catholic university, theology was an essential science; but he also held that any jealous ecclesiastical supervision of scientific investigation, or the study of literature would prove fatal to the idea of a university, to its universal scope, and its ability to "fit men of the world for the world".²

Newman has summed up all three aspects of the "inutility" (48) controversy when he said "that it is as real a mistake to burden it

² C. F. Harrold, "Preface," The Idea of a University, p.XVIII.
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[liberal knowledge] with virtue or religion as with the mechanical arts" (144).

Always in the midst of controversy himself, Newman turned to the role of the soldier in order to make his thought clear and draw the first stage of his campaign in behalf of liberal education to an emphatic conclusion. The great soldiers of history, models of excellence, seemed to Newman to embody his educational ideals: "The heroes, of whom history tells, Alexander, or Caesar, or Scipio, or Saladin, are the representatives of that magnanimity or self-mastery which is the greatness of human nature" (146). This greatness of human nature that Newman finds epitomized in the soldier—his power, sagacity, resource—are the characteristics effected by a liberal education: "To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible ... as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time, it is absolutely distinct from it" (146). This is the education that has as its object training "to fill their respective posts in life better, and of making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society" (9).

Throughout Discourse V Newman has been making use of one of his favourite methods of oratorical strategy; that is, turning his
opponents' arguments against themselves. He has selected the word useful as the important point of their argument and proved that a liberal education is really more useful in a more permanent and exalted sense than any envisaged by their narrow practical aims of education. Just how useful Newman considers a liberal education to be he expresses in the last lines of the discourse: "We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own" (147).

B. Discourse VI: Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning: The First Stage of the Campaign

In Discourse V Newman has "determined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and sufficient in itself" (150) and that it is "the business of a university to make this intellectual culture its direct scope" (149). After this introductory summary to Discourse VI, Newman, the careful oratorical strategist, outlines his procedure for the following three discourses: "I have then to investigate, in the discourses which follow, those qualities and characteristics of the intellect in which its cultivation issues or rather consists" (150). In order to determine the characteristics of a cultivated intellect, Newman states that he will discuss three questions: "the relation of intellectual culture, first, to mere knowledge; secondly, to professional knowledge; and thirdly, to religious knowledge" (150). Before he begins
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the first of his subjects—the relation of intellectual culture to mere
knowledge or learning—Newman entreats, in Ciceronian oratorical strat­
eggy, the indulgence of his audience: "I hope to be excused if, in this
anxious undertaking, I am led to repeat what, either in these discourses
or elsewhere, I have already put upon paper" (150).

After defining the terms liberal knowledge, useful knowledge,
education, and instruction in Discourse V, Newman, in Discourse VI,
moves into the thick of the battle between liberal education and the
mere acquisition of knowledge as regards the effect on the students'
minds. Frequently Newman concedes a point to his opponents in order to
catch them unawares with the next move in his argument. He concedes
that factual "Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion
of the mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be den­
ied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first prin­
ciple"(152). But after he has won his hearers, he warns against their
being misled by the truth of the preceding statement to the fallacious
idea that "A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little
knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal" (152).
It is by contrast with their former narrow, confined view that people
who gain knowledge through travel and new experiences think that they
have acquired an enlargement of intellect. Newman expresses this sense
of freedom and enlargement in the war image of a prisoner freed from
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his manacles: "We seem to have new faculties, or a new exercise for our
faculties, by this addition to our knowledge; like a prisoner who,
having been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly finds his
arms and legs free" (154).

Newman concedes that additions to our knowledge are the "condition or the means of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment" (156),
but what is required for the enlargement itself is "the action of a
formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements" (156). This "formative power" (156) consists in "a comparison
of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding then,
when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already" (156). Citing authorities, Newman states that great intellects such as
Aristotle, St. Thomas, Newton, Goethe, have possessed the characteristics
he sees as the end of a liberal education: "A truly great intellect ... is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present,
far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these
one on another; without which there is no whole, and no centre. It
possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual
and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement,
but as philosophy" (156).

Newman proceeds to develop his argument further by contrasting
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the "connected view" (156) that is characteristic of the great intellects with the minds that "abound in information in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things; and having lived under the influence of no very clear or settled principles, ... they speak of every one and every thing, only as so many phenomena, which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing... . No one would say that these persons, well informed as they are, had attained to any great culture of intellect or to philosophy" (157).

Newman describes the mind without the whole view, without a centre as a state in a condition of unrest or siege: "Men whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despondent if it happens to fail them. They are ever in alarm or in transport" (159). By contrast, the mind that possesses "illuminative reason and true philosophy" (159) is a mind that is "above the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, unsettlement, and superstition ..." (159). It is a mind that possesses a discipline similar to that acquired in a physical order by a soldier's training. Newman expresses the discipline and quality of a trained mind in the following implied military image: "The intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows and thinks while it knows" (159),
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is the trained intellect. Such intellects "are able to cast a light, ... on a subject or course of action which comes before them; ... have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted magnificent bearing, and an energy and keenness which is but made intense by opposition. This is genius, this is heroism" (160). In the words presence of mind, undaunted magnificent bearing, energy and keenness, heroism, Newman has described the power and resourcefulness that are alike the characteristics of the intellects and the soldier's training.

The view of the whole that is possible to a trained intellect Newman compares to the reconnoitring that a soldier takes of his field of operation in order that he may command it.

It matters not whether our field of operation be wide or limited; in every case, to command it, is to mount above it. ... You hear of practised travellers when they first come into a place, mounting some high hill or church tower, by way of reconnoitring its neighbourhood. In like manner you must be above your knowledge gentlemen, not under it, or it will oppress you; and the more you have of it the greater will be the load. The learning of a Salmasius or a Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant. 'Imperat aut servit'; if you can wield it with a strong arm it is a great weapon; otherwise, ... you will be overwhelmed, like Tarpeia, by the heavy wealth which you have extracted from tributary generations (161).

By citing examples of "the various mistakes which at the present day beset the subject of university education" (160), Newman describes the effect of minds oppressed by their knowledge rather than in command...
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tent day beset the subject of university education" (160), Newman describes
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of it. Commentators, for example, on the classics and ecclesiastical history are guilty of "breaking up this subject into details, destroy[ing] its life, and defraud[ing] us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts" (161). The effect on the reader is an accumulation of facts "which they have not thought through, and thought out" (162). Consequently, in terms of his military metaphor of the intellect oppressed by knowledge, Newman says, "Such readers are only possessed by their knowledge, not possessed of it; nay, in matter of fact they are often even carried away by it, without any volition of their own. Recollect the memory can tyrannize, as well as the imagination" (162). The mind, tyrannized by memory, "becomes the victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a mechanical process, or some physical necessity" (162). Newman comments ironically on the mind "which is the prey ... of barren facts" (162) as follows: "Derangement, I believe, has been considered as a loss of control over the sequence of ideas" (162).

Another mistake which besets the subject of university education follows from the mind's being tyrannized by memory and therefore possessed by facts it does not comprehend. "I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years—not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to force upon him so much that he has rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of
subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement, which it is not" (163). In the phrases force upon him and enfeebling the mind Newman maintains his central war image describing the enslavement of the mind by mere knowledge. The result of this enslavement is that "all things now are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing" (163). In other words, to keep Newman's war imagery, the mind is to be possessed by knowledge, instead of going through the exertion, the toil, the grounding, the advance that are involved in the conquest of truth.

With the tact of a skilled orator Newman says he is not dis- paraging a thorough acquisition of factual knowledge in any area nor does he intend to banish "the possessors of deep and multifarious learning from my ideal University" (162), but "call things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view" (164). Newman has successfully combated his liberal opponents by showing how paltry is their aim of merely acquiring information against his aim of training the intellect.
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By painstaking definition and skilful use of contrast Newman has built in the minds of his audience a distrust of what he terms ironically, "the ideal systems of education which have fascinated the imagination of this age" (165). He now brings his campaign against the London University - Queen's Colleges system of education to a victorious climax with all the resources of his oratorical skill. He begins by contrasting the liberalistic system with a system he admits for the sake of argument is not ideal.

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called university, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a university which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, ... if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, ... I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that university which did nothing over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun (165).

The "bitterness of irony and vehemence of passion"1 underlie such expressions as so-called university, gave its degrees to any person who

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passed an examination, an acquaintance with every science under the
sun.

Newman pursues his purpose of discrediting his opponents' so-
called university by an elaboration on the two systems he has been
contrasting. He describes the system he would prefer as follows: "When
a multitude of young men, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant,
as young men are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are
sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them;
the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each" (166). Such
a university is what Newman refers to in University Sketches as a
"'Studium Generale' or 'School of Universal Learning',"1 to which
"students come from very different places, and with widely different
notions, and there is much to generalize, much to adjust, much to
eliminate" (166).

But what is important is that "the whole assemblage is moulded
together, and gains one tone and one character" (166). The fact "that
the youthful community will constitute a whole, it will embody a speci-
fic idea, it will represent a doctrine, it will administer a code of con-
duct, and it will furnish principles of thought and action" (167) is in
keeping with the main idea in Discourses I to V; namely, that knowledge

1 J.H. Newman, "What is a University?" University Sketches,
p. 6.
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is a unity and in order that the students gain that "enlargement of
mind" (166) that is a liberal education not only the curriculum but
also the learned assemblage of which the student becomes a member must
reflect that one tone and one character.

Newman stresses another aspect of his educational ideal, the
importance of personal influence and association as a means of forming
the mind, with an obvious reference to his beloved Oxford: "There is a
sort of self-education in the academic institutions of Protestant
England; a characteristic tone of thought, a recognized standard of
judgment is found in them, which, as developed in the individual who is
submitted to it, becomes a twofold source of strength to him, both from
the distinct stamp it impresses on his mind, and from the bond of union
which it creates between him and others—effects which are shared by
the authorities of the place, for they themselves have been educated in
it" (167).

In order to recommend his argument and maintain a close
parallel between the two systems of education, Newman has presented his
own as something less than ideal. He explains that he is "not taking
into account moral or religious considerations" (166). Nevertheless,
his idea of a university "at least tends towards cultivation of the inte-
llect; it at least recognizes that knowledge is something more than a
sort of passive reception of scraps and details; it is a something, and
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it does a something, which never will issue from the most strenuous
efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-
communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions which they dare prof-
ess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set
of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large
number of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philos-
ophy, three times a week, ... in chill lecture rooms" (167).

By contrasting his idea of a university as a source of principles of thought and action with his opponents' institution that effects
a sort of passive reception of scraps and details, Newman has prepared
for his final onslaught against the enemies of liberal education. He
comes crashing down upon his foe with the most thoroughly insulting and
derogatory comparison of the entire lectures: "Nay, self-education in
any shape, ... is preferable to a system of teaching which, professing
so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut your college gates
against the votary of knowledge, throw him back upon the searchings and
efforts of his own mind; he will gain by being spared an entrance into
your Babel" (167-168). The image of the tower of Babel that suggests
an utter lack of purpose, direction, comprehension, and achievement is a
blow calculated to fell the most obstinate antagonists.

But lest he has not thoroughly routed the enemy, Newman
describes the effect on the students' minds of being condemned to
acquire a so-called education from such institutions as London University or the Queen's Colleges: He refers to the students as "those earnest but ill-used persons who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much on their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premiss and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory, and who too often, as might be expected, when their period of education is passed, throw up all they have learned in disgust, having gained nothing really by their anxious labours, except perhaps the habit of application" (168). The "active and thoughtful intellect" (169) might better "eschew the college and the university altogether than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a mockery so contumelious!" (169)

In no lecture are all the devices of Ciceronian oratory displayed so effectively as in Discourse VI. Newman has entreated the patience of his audience; he has excited prejudice against his opponents; he has amplified his ideas by comparison and contrast; he has built his argument to a climax with bitter irony and vehement passion; and finally he has routed the enemy by leaving in the minds of his audience a thorough distrust in the value of any education offered by his opponents. "But the appeal to the gentler emotions of the soul is reserved for the close of his oration, ... the most striking instances
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of which are the poetical burst of feeling... .\(^{1}\) Newman describes the
education of "the poor boy in the poem" (169) with the gentler emotions
of the soul expressed in a poetical burst of feeling: The boy "with
only such slender outfit
as the village school and books a few
Supplied,
contrived from the beach, and the quay, and the fisher's boat, and the
inn's fireside, and the tradesman's shop, and the shepherd's walk, and
the smuggler's hut, and the mossy moor, and the screaming gulls, and
the restless waves, to fashion for himself a philosophy and a poetry of
his own!" (169) So ends Discourse VI in quiet and peace after the fury
of conflict that characterizes one of the best examples of Newman's
oratorical strategy in the ten lectures.

C. Discourse VII: Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill:
The Second Stage of the Controversy

Newman said at the end of Discourse VI that he would postpone
the summing up of his argument to another day. In Discourse VII he
summarizes by marshalling the arguments of the original combatants of
1808 as authorities to support his claims for a liberal education.
Before he does so, he reverts to the war image that was basic to
Discourses V and VI; namely, the training of the intellect in order to
make it fit "to apprehend and contemplate truth" (170) as it resembles

\(^{1}\) J.H. Newman, "Cicero's Orations," Historical Sketches,
the training and discipline that makes a soldier fit for battle. Newman summarizes his argument in behalf of liberal education as follows:

"This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called liberal education" (171). Without such training, the mind, unfit for its own proper object, is sacrificed to some specific trade or profession. The result of the mind's lacking training is that it "may have no grasp of things as they are; ... no power of advancing one step forward of [itself ], no power of discriminating between truth and falsehood, ... of arranging things according to their real value" (170). But with the "formation of the mind" there is developed the qualities that fit the mind for the conquest of truth: "an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and repose" (171). The university as a source of this training Newman expresses in these words: "And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a university" (171).

Now Newman begins the amplifying of the useful versus liberal
education controversy with his own vivid depiction of the battle between the Oxford defenders and the three giants of the North. The war imagery in this discourse recreates a dramatic picture of the first major battle over "inutility" (48) in education—a conflict that is raging with even greater fury at the time Newman is delivering the discourses. He reminds his listeners that the useful versus liberal education battle has been raging for some time. It was waged "in the first decade of this century by a celebrated northern review on the one hand, and defenders of the University of Oxford on the other" (172).

Newman gains the admiration of his listeners for the Oxford side by representing the Edinburgh Review as an unworthy opponent; first, from the point of view that the Review's attack was unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Oxford; and secondly, the opposition to culture of the intellect came from a city sometimes referred to as the Northern Athens. The passage in which Newman gains approbation for his side by arousing prejudice against the opponent is as follows: "Hardly had the authorities of that ancient seat of learning, waking from their long neglect, set on foot a plan for the education of the youth committed to them, than the representatives of science and literature in the city, which has sometimes been called the Northern Athens, remonstrated with their gravest arguments and their most brilliant satire against the direction and shape which the reform was taking. Nothing would content
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them, but that the University should be set to rights on the basis of the philosophy of utility" (172).

Newman continues to represent the Edinburgh Reviewers in an adverse light, this time as an arrogant foe ignorant of the seriousness of their accusations who think to have the field of controversy all to themselves; however, the brave defenders of Oxford did not allow the Reviewers' charges to go unchallenged. "They were little aware of the depth and force of the principles on which the authorities academical [at Oxford] were proceeding, and, this being so, it was not to be expected that they would be allowed to walk at leisure over the field of controversy which they had selected" (172).

Newman suggests that although the Edinburgh Reviewers started the fight they would not finish it; rather they would be met by heroes who were giants in their own field and united in their opposition to the philosophy of utility: "Accordingly they were encountered in behalf of the University by two men of great name and influence in their day, of very different minds, but united, as by collegiate ties, so in the clear-sighted and large view which they took of the whole subject of liberal education; and the defence thus provided for the Oxford studies has kept its ground to this day" (172).

It was natural that the defenders of liberal education should
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come from Oriel College as they had been the heroes of "their collegiate reform synchronized with that reform of the academical body" (174). They had acted with independence and resourcefulness when they were the first "to throw open their fellowships to the competition of all comers" (174) and when they resolved not to allow "the table of honours, awarded to literary merit by the university in its new system of examination for degrees, ... to fetter their judgment as electors" (174), but rather selected the men whose "intellectual and moral qualities" (174) were most in keeping with the ideas of the university's founder. Newman himself was one selected (see above Chapter I). Therefore, "it was not unnatural that, when the storm broke upon the University from the North, their Alma Mater, whom they loved, should have her first defenders within the walls of that small college, which had first put itself into a condition to be her champion" (174).

Newman speaks of Oxford's defenders as trained soldiers in condition to be champions of liberal education. Only now does he identify the defenders: the distinguished Dr. Copleston had a "peculiar vigor and keenness of mind which enabled him, when a young man, single-handed, with easy gallantry, to encounter and overthrow the charge of three giants of the North combined against him" (175). Those three giants "now, as himself, removed from this visible scene, Professor Playfair, Lord Jeffrey, and the Rev. Sydney Smith, threw together their
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several efforts into one article of their Review, in order to crush and
pound to dust the audacious controvertist who had come out against them
in defence of his own institutions" (175).

Newman has words of praise for the two noble defenders of
Oxford's classical education. About Dr. Copleston he says, "to have
even contended with such men was a sufficient voucher for his ability"
(175). For Mr. Davison, Newman has even greater praise: "He [Copleston]
was supported in the controversy, on the same general principles, but
with more of method and distinctness, and, I will add, with greater
force and beauty and perfection, both of thought and of language, by
the other distinguished writer ..., Mr. Davison; who, though not so well
known to the world in his day, has left more behind him than the Provost
of Oriel, to make his name remembered by posterity" (175).

Newman pays tribute also to the strategy of John Keble's
answer to the Edinburgh Reviewers while ostensibly employed in a critic-
ism of Mr. Edgeworth's writing. As Newman describes the manoeuvre:
Keble "goes leisurely over the same ground, which had already been
rapidly traversed by Dr. Copleston, and though professedly employed upon
Mr. Edgeworth, is really replying to the northern critic who had brought
that writer's work into notice, and to a far greater author [Locke] than
either of them, who in a past age had argued on the same side" (176).
Newman has enlisted the support of his audience by involving them in the
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excitement of the battle between the Edinburgh Reviewers and the Oxford defenders, each one of which seems to excel the former in his prowess in controversy. He has adroitly roused his audience to the side of Oxford by his commendation of the Oxford defenders while at the same time leaving his listeners with an attitude of disapprobation against the Edinburgh Reviewers.

With his audience securely on the side of Oxford and liberal education Newman analyzes the arguments of Locke and the Edinburgh Reviewers. Newman is adept at selecting a word from his opponents' speech and giving that word his own particular meaning. In so doing, he turns his enemies' weapons upon themselves. The word useful Newman selects and interprets for his own purpose. The modern disciples of Locke have written: "'What ought the term University to mean, but a place where every science is taught which is liberal, and at the same time useful to mankind?'" (178) Newman answers: "Certainly it is specious to contend that nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; and that life is not long enough to expend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles. Nay, in one sense, I will grant it is more than specious, it is true, but, if so how do I propose directly to meet the objection? Why, Gentlemen, I have already, viz., in laying down that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also" (178). The end of a liberal education is the training
of the intellect; that training is useful in so far as it does train the intellect. Newman has defeated his opponents on their own ground by proving that liberal education is indeed useful.

With similar tactics Newman turns the phrases "understanding", "a talent for speculation and original inquiry", and "the habit of pushing things up to their first principles" (179) quoted from the Review's objection to the Oxford curriculum, to his own account, for these are exactly what he means by liberal education. It would seem that he and his opponents both have the same objective: "If then the Reviewers consider such cultivation the characteristic of a useful education, ... it follows that what they mean by 'useful' is just what I mean by 'good' or 'liberal'" (179-180). Newman and his opponents are on the same ground "in that mental culture consists in what I have called a liberal or non-professional, and what the Reviewers call a useful education" (180).

Continuing his definition of terms, Newman argues that "the good is always useful" (180): "the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent" (180); consequently, the cultivation of the intellect "must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, just to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too" (180-181).
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Arguing from analogy, Newman says that "as health ought to precede labour of the body, ... so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study; ... and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyse, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, ... or a statesman, or a physician, ... but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings, ... with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense, ... mental culture is emphatically useful" (181-182).

Newman makes clear his position on professional or scientific knowledge: "If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against professional or scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a university education, let me not be supposed, Gentlemen, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them" (182). Anticipating the charge of inconsistency in his idea of a university, Newman explains: "in saying that law or medicine is not the end of a university course, I do not mean to imply that the university does not teach law or medicine, ... It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge ..." (182). But rather a university which
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considers its "proper function" that of "philosophical or liberal education" (183) will be able to protect a professor of "professional or scientific knowledge" (182) from the "danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit" (182). In such "a university he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education" (182).

Newman has refuted the fallacy "that no education is useful which does not teach us some temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some physical secret" (183). Newman summarizes his brilliant argument in behalf of the usefulness of liberal education as follows: "I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, ... to human society as such, to the state to which we belong, to the sphere in which we move, to the individuals towards whom we are related, and whom we successively encounter in life ..." (183).

Having successfully proved that a liberal education is a good
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in itself and is therefore useful in the broadest sense, Newman marshals authorities to help him consolidate his victory. The authorities are Copleston and Davison, the early combatants, in the useful knowledge battle. The war image of members of society as unconnected units of an army and the mind given a soldier's training are evident in Copleston's argument in behalf of liberal education as useful. He says that without a liberal education members of society tend "'to act, ... as so many unconnected units, displacing and repelling one another'" (184). Liberal knowledge as opposed to professional knowledge, "'expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all'" (184).

Mr. Davison emphasizes the narrowness of an exclusively professional education in a military image of one state usurping the territory of another frequently mentioned by Newman. "'The specific duties of that calling are exalted at the cost of those free and independent tastes and virtues which come in to sustain the common relations of society and raise the individual in them. In short, a man may be usurped by his profession'" (185).

Mr. Davison continues his defence of liberal education by comparing the professional person to a soldier who "'is not always upon duty"
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There are services he owes, which are neither parochial, nor forensic, nor military. ... As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the connections of domestic life; in the improvement and embellishment of his leisure, he has a sphere of action, revolving, if you please, within the sphere of his profession, but not clashing with it; in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other, he is no more than an ill-educated man" (186).

The result of a liberal education for Mr. Davison is a trained judgment which possesses "'exactness and vigor'" (188). Furthermore, such training of the judgment must be "'drawn from much varied reading and discipline, first, and observation afterwards'" (188). For "'a man who has been trained to think upon one subject or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one'" (188). On the other hand, a judgment trained to compare and discriminate becomes the "'master-principle of business, literature, and talent, which gives him strength in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables him to seize the strong point in it'" (189).

After Newman has marshalled the original combatants in the useful education struggle to support his views, he draws the discourse to a close with the emphasis on the value for society of giving individuals a liberal education. "If a practical end must be assigned to a university course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world" (191). As
far as the value to the individual is concerned, "it is the education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant" (192). Newman would say an education is truly useful that not only prepares a person to profit from professional training, but also equips him for the strife of battle, the strategy of living: "It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them" (192). A person so trained "is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you can depend upon" (192).

Here Newman emphasizes one of the main principles of his educational ideals: that education is the growth of a principle from within. This growth he describes as "the repose of a mind which lives in itself, while it lives in the world" (192), that "has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar and with which failure and disappointment have a charm" (192). So convincing has been Newman's argument on behalf of the usefulness of a liberal education that his hearers should feel ashamed of their own previous inability to see its value. His final words bring to an empha-
tic conclusion the liberal versus useful knowledge controversy: "the art which tends to make a man all this is in the object which it pursues as useful as the art of wealth or the art of health, though it is less susceptible of method, and less tangible, less certain, less complete in its results" (192).

D. Discourse VIII: Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religious Duty: Consolidating Gains

Newman opens Discourse VIII with one of his favourite devices of Ciceronian oratory: He outlines his achievements, his intended plans, and then entreats the patience of his listeners: "We shall be brought, Gentlemen, today, to the termination of the investigation which I commenced three discourses back, and which, I was well aware, from its length, if for no other reason, would make demands upon the patience even of indulgent hearers" (192). What follows is an excellent summary of the previous three Discourses, V, VI, and VII, in which Newman has dealt with the role of liberal knowledge as a means to the training of the intellect and the formation of better, more useful citizens for society. Much as a soldier's training fits him for combat in any battle, Newman says that the end of a university course is the "training of good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world" (191).

He now directs his attention to the relationship between intel-
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lectual training and moral advancement. He says that at times "The educated mind may be said to be in a certain sense religious; that is, it has what may be considered a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism, partly co-operating with it, partly thwarting it; at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church in Catholic countries—and in countries beyond her pale, at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance" (194). In his contrasting phrases expressed in the diction of battle, open warfare and defensive alliance, Newman emphasizes the states of conflict and alliance that sometimes seem to exist between the secular and religious worlds. The foregoing war image establishes the basic pattern in Discourse VIII as Newman first shows how liberal knowledge and religious duty are in defensive alliance and then deals with the open warfare that exists between religion and liberal knowledge when the latter becomes the religion of reason or philosophy.

He speaks of the church being concerned with the battle for the soul's salvation: "Teaching the ruined state of man; his utter inability to gain Heaven by anything he can do himself; the moral certainty of his losing his soul if left to himself; the simple absence of all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the presence of the Creator; the illimitable claims of the Creator on the service of the creature; the imperative and obligatory force of the voice of conscience;
and the inconceivable evil of sensuality" (196). The military comparison of man to a ruined state emphasizes the necessity for allies to rescue him from the foe and restore the ruined state laid waste to by the enemy.

The philosopher, one who has the attributes of a trained intellect, can be an ally of the Church in the battle for salvation: "The first step which they have to effect in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature is his rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state. To be able to break through the meshes of that thraldom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thousand holds upon the heart, is to bring it, ... halfway to Heaven. Here, even divine grace, ... is ordinarily baffled and retires, without expedient or resource, before this giant fascination" (197). The enemy is the giant fascination of sensuality which keeps the state of man in fearful subjection, unless he be rescued from the meshes of that thraldom by his allies, the Church and the philosopher.

Newman speaks of man as a battlefield where divine grace battles the giant fascination sense, but is often baffled and retires, without expedient or resource; consequently, the soul finally succumbs to the fearful subjection to sense unless assisted against the foe by some fortifications in its own nature. For as Newman explains, "nothing can act beyond its own nature" (197). In the battle against the giant fascination, "religion indeed enlightens, terrifies, subdues; it gives
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faith, it inflicts remorse, it inspires resolutions, it draws tears, it inflames devotion, but only for the occasion" (197). Then too "for a while [the soul] is protected by disgust and abhorrence from the malice of its foe. But that foe knows too well that such seasons of repentance are wont to have their end: he patiently waits, till nature faints with the effect of resistance, and lies passive and hopeless under the next access of temptation. What we need then is some expedient or instrument, which at least will obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual enemy, and which is sufficiently congenial and level with our nature to maintain as firm a hold upon us as the inducements of sensual gratification" (197-198).

Newman says that providence sends antagonists to the soul's enemies in the form of "sorrow, sickness, and care", (198) but nature itself needs some combatant that will become "a match for the besetting power of sensuality" (198). That combatant Newman sees as "intellectual cultivation" (198) that will aid "in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will" (198). It does so by expelling "the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect" (198). However, Newman hastens to explain, contrary to the claim of Sir Robert Peel in the "Tamworth Reading Room" address, that intellectual culture "does not supply religious motives," (198) is not "the antecedent of anything supernatural," (198) and "is not meritorious of heavenly aid or reward" (198). However, the discipline by which knowledge is gained, "though
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no protection in the case of violent temptation" (199) has a tendency "to refine the mind, and to give it an indisposition, ... a disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormities of evil" (199). Intellectual culture is no substitute for the Church in the battle against the foe sensuality; it does not make men virtuous, as Sir Robert Peel at Tamworth seemed to claim, but rather the culture of the intellect is a valuable ally of the Church in the battle to rescue man from his ruined state.

In "rude and semi-barbarous" (200) ages "counteractions of evil" (200) such as "exposure to the elements, social disorder and lawlessness, the tyranny of the powerful, and the inroads of enemies are a stern discipline, allowing brief intervals, or awarding a sharp penance, to sloth and sensuality" (200), but, says Newman, in the present age in which "art gives men comforts, and good government robs them of courage and manliness, and monotony of life throws them back upon themselves" (201), they have no protection from evil. "Cheap literature, libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings and gardens are ... the human means for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the individual soul, but of society at large" (201). These examples of intellectual culture "are the instruments by which an age of advanced civilization combats those moral disorders which reason and Revelation denounces" (201). Newman makes clear here that he is not
disparaging the human means for ... parrying the assaults of moral evil such as establishing a reading room at Tamworth, but what he is contending against is the tendency to see a partial truth as a whole truth. The war imagery in this Discourse VIII makes clear Newman's idea that liberal knowledge, the culture of the intellect, is an ally, but not the sole means to moral improvement.

Newman warns, however, that "the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice, and the utter disgust and profound humiliation which may come over it if it should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them" (202) is in danger of becoming the "besetting sin" (203) of a civilized age. "Conscience tends to become what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offense against God, but against human nature" (203). Newman emphasizes by means of his military imagery expressed in such words as betrayed, command of duty, an aspect of the warfare between "the City of God and the powers of darkness;"¹ that is, there is a tendency as the result of intellectual culture to substitute shame for fear and thereby ignore the Divine Lawgiver and consider transgressions of His law as merely unfitting or unbecoming to human nature. Newman terms this way of thinking the mere conscience of self-respect, and

¹ J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 129.
implies in the following quotation a lack of submission to the Divine Lawgiver; "Instead of doing one thing and then another, as each is called for in faith and obedience, careless of what may be called the keeping of deed with deed, and leaving Him who gives the command to blend the portions of their conduct into a whole, their one object, however unconscious to themselves, is to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves, that they have done their duty. When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation" (203-204).

Newman compares this religion of reason or philosophy in which "decency is virtue" (211), "detection, not the sin, ... is the crime," (211) and "whatever disgusts are offences of the first order" (211) to that which has no roots and therefore soon loses its authority and majesty as do dethroned princes: "It [the religion of reason] appeals to what is in nature, and it falls under the dominion of the old Adam. Then, like dethroned princes, it keeps up a state and majesty when it has lost the real power" (212). This image of the dethroned princes suggests the loss of authority, but the retention of its surface ornamentation, and also expresses effectively an idea Newman stated in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters; namely, that the religion of reason having fallen under the dominion of the old Adam, requires that which is above nature in order to subdue "the giant nature, in which we were
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The religion of self-respect and taste is another aspect of the "godless intellectualism" (207) which Newman termed later in his life liberalism. In this discourse he refers to the arguments of his foe Lord Shaftesbury who maintains that the source of conversion and renovation of men's nature is the attraction for the beauty of truth and virtue rather than fear of rewards and punishments from the Divine Lawgiver. Newman counters his opponent as follows: "He will have a difficulty proving that any real conversion follows from a doctrine which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike" (211). Such a doctrine effects what Newman termed in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters, "a polished outside, with hollowness within." Even such "a great and wise man" (211) as Mr. Burke was betrayed into expressing "the ethical temperament of a civilized age" (211) when he said that the "'spirit of chivalry'" (211) was a system "'under which vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness'" (211).

Those who consider the "splendours of a court, and the charms of good society, ... the prestige of rank, and the resources of wealth, ... an apology for vice and irreligion" (211) are betrayed into thinking they are "repelling sensuality" (211) and end "by excusing it" (211).


2 Ibid., p. 275.
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Here Newman has been describing the open warfare that can exist between liberal knowledge and religion if intellectual culture is allowed to become the religion of self-respect and taste. Newman continues his argument with an explanation for the open warfare that can exist between intellectual culture in the form of the religion of reason and religious duty. "The world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths of the heart" (213).

Since "philosophical morality" (214) is concerned with "the embellishment of the exterior" (214), the virtues adopt their less harsh features; humility becomes modesty, pride, self-respect; and vanity, self-conceit.

Newman makes effective use of war imagery to indicate this adaptation of virtue to the civilized world; "Great as is its charm, modesty is not the deepest or the most religious of virtues. Rather it is the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant, and watches continually over its nascent intercourse with the world about it. It goes the round of the senses; it mounts up into the countenance; it protects the eye and ear; it reigns in the voice and gesture. Its province is the outward deportment. ... And being more superficial than other virtues, it is more easily disjoined from their company; it admits of being associated with principles or qualities naturally foreign to it, and is often made the cloak of feelings or ends for which it was never given to us" (215). The comparison is that modesty as the advanced guard or sentinel is in danger of being disjoined from its
comrades, the other virtues, and therefore can be drawn into association with foreign qualities.

Newman is not condemning modesty itself, but is saying that the religion of philosophy substitutes modesty for the less satisfactory, as far as it is concerned, virtue of humility. Pride ceases to be "the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is in itself" (216) and is given "the large field of exertion" (216) called self-respect. "It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience; and it becomes the very staple of religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity ... (216). Self-respect "becomes the enemy of extravagances of any kind; it shrinks from what are called scenes; (216) ... if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy or the powerful, it demands greater subtlety and art in preparation. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous self-conceit; ... it teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the tone of their judgments. As Lord Shaftesbury would desire, it prefers playful wit and satire in putting down what is objectionable, as a more refined and good-natured, as well as a more effectual method, than the expedient which is natural to uneducated minds" (216-217). Such superficial goodness is the result of the religion of philosophy, the aspect of liberalism in religion in which "vice has
lost its grossness, and perhaps increased its malignity.\textsuperscript{1}

Newman's definition of a gentleman is the expression of the epitome of intellectual culture. The war imagery here suggests that the gentleman will avoid unnecessary conflict, but is a fair opponent whenever he is drawn into controversy.

The true gentleman ... carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or jolt in the minds of those with whom his is cast—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling; ... he guards against unseasonable allusions, (217) ..... He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, ... (218). He observes the maxim of the ancient sages, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. ... If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. ... He throws himself into the minds of his opponents, ..... He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. ... He honours the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them (218).

\textsuperscript{1} J. H. Newman, "Tamworth Reading Room," \textit{Discussions and Arguments}, p. 275.
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Newman concludes by saying that these are "the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle" (129); or as he has explained previously, "at this day the 'gentleman' is the creation, not of Christianity, but of civilization" (212). These can be found in the saint or the pagan. "Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens; and one became a Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe" (219). Now it is clear, although perhaps not altogether acceptable, to Newman's Irish and ecclesiastical audience just what he meant by saying that a liberal education makes "not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman" (144).

The war image basic to Newman's discussion of the relation between intellectual culture and moral advancement has been as follows: The training of the intellect that is the effect of the acquisition of liberal knowledge "concurs with Christianity in a certain way, and then diverges from it; and consequently proves in the event sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes, from its very resemblance to it, an insidious and dangerous foe" (222). Intellectual culture has been an ally in the sense that it refines the mind and disposes it towards the moral, but is a foe in the sense that the moral can be considered from the purely human point of view in which case right conduct becomes a matter of good sense and good taste, not a matter of keeping the laws of the God of Revelation.
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Newman does not answer the problems of liberal knowledge
tending to become "an insidious and dangerous foe" to Christianity in
Discourse VIII, but his sermon, "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious
Training" is the answer to the conflict between Knowledge and Virtue
with which Discourse VIII deals and is also an introduction to the sub­
ject of Discourse IX; the Church versus Knowledge. In this sermon,
one of eight preached before the Catholic University of Ireland in 1856-
57, Newman depicts the conflict between the intellectual and moral fac­
culties as "a state of tumult, sedition, or rebellion\(^1\) in the human
kingdom. "Here, then, I conceive, is the object of the Holy See and the
Catholic Church in setting up Universities; it is to reunite things
which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put
asunder by men" (12); they are the intellectual and the moral. Newman
assures his audience that he has no thought of "distorting, and stunting:
the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision" (13) nor of
compromising in matters of religion. "I wish the intellect to range
with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom. ... I
want to destroy that diversity of centres, which puts everything into
confusion by creating a contrariety of influences (13). ... Youths need
a masculine religion [the union of intellectual and moral], if it is to

\(^1\) J.H. Newman, "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Train­ing", Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (London: Longmans, Green &
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carry captive their restless imagination, and their wild intellects, as
well as to touch their susceptible hearts" (14). Here is Newman's
answer to the problem of safeguarding liberal knowledge from becoming
the insidious and dangerous foe, the religion of reason: the union of
the intellectual and the moral in a university such as the Catholic
University of Ireland.

E. Discourse IX: Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge:
Defeating the Enemy

Newman opens his last discourse with "a profession of ...
diffidence"1 in the best Ciceronian tradition: "I have to congratulate
myself, Gentlemen, that at length I have accomplished, with whatever
success, the difficult and anxious undertaking to which I have been
immediately addressing myself" (220). In order "to conciliate the
favour of his audience"2 he impresses on their minds the anxious sincer­
ity with which he has approached his task: "No anxiety, no effort of
mind is more severe than his, who in a difficult matter has it seriously
at heart to investigate without error and to instruct without obscurity;
as to myself, if the past discussion has at any time tried the patience
of the kind persons who have given it their attention, I can assure them
that on no one can it have inflicted so great labour and fatigue as on
myself" (220).

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1, p. 292.
2 Ibid., p. 292.
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Newman follows the next move in Cicero's strategy: "He then states the circumstances of his case, and the intended plan of his oration."\(^1\) Newman first states what he has intended to accomplish throughout the discourses.

What I have been attempting has been of a preliminary nature, ... inquiring what a university is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearings. I have accordingly laid down first, that all branches of knowledge are, at least implicitly, the subject matter of its teaching; that these branches are not isolated and independent one of another, but form together a whole or system; that they run into each other, and complete each other, and that in proportion to our view of them as a whole, is the exactness and trustworthiness of the knowledge which they separately convey; that the process of imparting knowledge to the intellect in this philosophical way is its true culture; that such culture is a good in itself; that the knowledge which is both its instrument and result is called liberal knowledge; that such culture, together with the knowledge which effects it, may fitly be sought for its own sake; that it is, however, in addition, of great secular utility, as constituting the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life; and lastly, that, considered in a religious aspect, it concurs with Christianity a certain way, and then diverges from it; and consequently proves in the event sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes, from its very resemblance to it, an insidious and dangerous foe.(221-222).

With the precision of an efficient commander, Newman has outlined in the foregoing summary what has been accomplished in the field of operations. In Discourse VIII he has warned that the development of the philosophical habit without the guidance of religion can make liberal knowledge the insidious and dangerous foe of Christianity. It will be

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 292.
his purpose in Discourse IX to illustrate with reference to two of the three main divisions of the liberal arts curriculum, science and literature, how liberal knowledge becomes the serviceable ally of Christianity if the philosophical habit is acquired under the direction of religion.

Up to this point in the discourses, Newman has been inquiring the nature and aims of a university as far as its curriculum and the corresponding effect on the minds of the student are concerned. In Discourse IX he inquires what constitutes a Catholic university as a final means of persuading his audience to concur in the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland. Newman explains that it is not just the teaching of Catholic theology that makes a university Catholic; it is the active jurisdiction of the Church over the university in order that the university not become the rival of the Church: "A direct and active jurisdiction of the Church over it [the university] and in it is necessary lest it should become the rival of the Church with the community at large in those theological matters which to the Church are exclusively committed—acting as the representative of the intellect, as the Church is the representative of the religious principle” (222).

Before he discusses the way in which the Church can exert an active jurisdiction over science and literature in the university, Newman
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illustrates, with an example from history, the evil and error that occurs when the Church fails to exercise such rule over institutions within its pale. The Spanish Inquisition "was a purely Catholic establishment, devoted to the maintenance, or rather the ascendancy of Catholicism, keenly zealous for theological truth, the stern foe of every anti-Catholic idea, and administered by Catholic theologians; yet it in no proper sense belonged to the Church. It was simply and entirely a state institution, it was an expression of that very Church-and-King spirit which has prevailed in these islands; nay, it was an instrument of the State, according to the confession of the acutest Protestant historians, in its warfare against the Holy See" (222-223). Newman makes clear with his preceding use of war imagery in such expressions as stern foe and warfare against the idea that unless an institution, although Catholic "materially" (223), is permeated by the spirit of Catholicism, it will be in warfare against, rather than devoted to, the maintenance of the principles for which it supposedly stands.

Similarly in a University, it is necessary that the Church take the part of a sovereign state which "watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action" (223). From its very nature as a living, changing entity concerned with the temporal world, the University may tend to come "into collision with the supreme Catholic authority" (223) as did the Spanish Inquisition and thereby
actually "become hostile to revealed truth" (223). Newman has again emphasized in the imagery of conflict the danger to those who pursue liberal knowledge of becoming hostile to revealed truth by adopting "a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in place of Revelation" (224). Their contemplation of "a sense of propriety, order, consistency, and completeness" (224) in their secular subjects "gives birth to a rebellious stirring against miracle and mystery, against the severe and the terrible. This intellectualism ... comes into collision with precept, then with doctrine, then with the very principle of dogmatism—a preception of the beautiful becomes the substitute for faith" (224). Newman explains that without faith the rebellious stirring that is characteristic of intellectualism runs to "scepticism or infidelity" (224) and "even within the pale of the Church, ... if left to itself" (225), becomes "an element of corruption and debility" (225). Such is the error overspreading, as a snare, the whole earth¹ that is liberalism. The result of the rebellious stirring against the inexplicable and the collision with precept is "first indifference, then laxity of belief, then even heresy ..." (225). Newman foresees the conflict between intellectualism and the spirit of Catholicism the result of the development of the philosophical habit without the guidance of the church.

Thus his reason for insisting that liberal knowledge be acquired within the spirit of Catholicism in a Catholic University.

In the battle between Revelation and the masters of human reason, Revelation may suffer two injuries: "Here then are two injuries which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the masters of human reason unless the Church, as in duty bound, protects the sacred treasure which is in jeopardy. The first is a simple ignoring of theological truth altogether, under the pretense of not recognizing differences of religious opinion" (225); This ignoring of theological truth was the basis of Newman's conflict with his London University - Queen's Colleges opponents. "The second, which is of a more subtle character, is a recognition indeed of Catholicism, but (as if in pretended mercy to it) an adulteration of its spirit" (225). The second injury is a warning to his audience not to establish a university that is Catholic in name and organization, but not in spirit. Newman's use of war imagery here stresses the idea that Revelation is in danger of incurring two injuries, that of being ignored or adulterated. The idea expressed in pretended mercy suggests a combatant allowed to live, but perhaps tricked into joining the enemy's side.

Newman next turns his attention to the subject matter of instruction at the university in order to consider the dangers to the spirit of Catholicism which he has just mentioned. He intends to
consider the latter two of the three great subjects "on which Human Reason employs itself: God, Nature, and Man" (225). He has made the first, the subject of God, the material of Discourses II, III and IV. The other two subjects, "nature and man, ... when subjected to human reason, form two books: the book of Nature is called science, the book of man is called literature" (225-226). These "nearly constitute the subject matter of liberal education; and, while science is made to subserve the former of the two injuries [ignoring the theological truth], ... literature subserves the latter—its corruption" (226). Newman speaks of science and literature in the military terms of their possibly being enslaved by the masters of human reason to the injury of Revelation.

"As to Physical Science, of course there can be no real collision between it and Catholicism" (226) since they both concern the "Divine Author" (226) and his works. "Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, in matter of fact, there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between religion and physical philosophers. An illustration of this jealousy and hostility is Newman's account of the conflict between Galileo and the theologians: "Not content with investigating and reasoning in his own province, ... he [Galileo] went out of his way directly to insult the received interpretation of Scripture; theologians repelled an attack which was wanton and arrogant; and science, affronted in her minister, has taken its full revenge upon theology since" (226). In viv-
id war imagery of repelled an attack, wanton and arrogant, taken its full revenge. Newman conveys to his audience something of the drama inherent in a skirmish that has become the classic example of the warfare between science and religion.

Newman emphasizes the apparent collision between Physical Science and Catholicism in the war imagery of opposition, antagonism, and hostility: "I do not of course mean to say that there need be in every case a resentful and virulent opposition made to religion on the part of scientific men" (226); but nevertheless Newman recognizes that antagonism has and does exist between science and religion: "The same antagonism shows itself in the Middle Ages" (226). Also, "the hostility between experimental science and theology is far older than Christianity" (227) according to Lord Bacon. Newman accounts for the prejudice between the two in that the "satisfaction in the laws of nature indisposes them [scientists] toward the thought of Moral Governor" (228); as well, "the occasional interference of religious criticism in a province not religious, has made them [scientists] sore, suspicious, and resentful" (228).

Still continuing his imagery of conflict, Newman makes clear another area of contention between science and theology; that is, in their different instruments or methods of gaining truth. "Induction is the instrument of physics, and deduction only is the instrument of theology" (228). Little wonder that Bacon's school of the inductive
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method "should be irritated and indignant to find that a subject matter remains still, in which their favourite instrument has no office; no wonder that they rise up against this memorial of an antiquated system, as an eyesore and an insult; and no wonder that the very force and dazzling success of their own method in its own departments should sway or bias unduly the religious sentiments of any persons who come under its influence" (229). The power, influence, and success of the scientific method Newman illustrates in his war diction, irritated and indignant, rise up against, force and dazzling success, and sway or bias. The central point of the strife between science and religion Newman expresses thus: "They assert that no new truth can be gained by deduction; Catholics assent, but add that, as regards religious truth, they have not to seek at all, for they have it already" (229). The second opponent has won the skirmish on a point of logic.

The attitude towards theology of those who "scorn any process of inquiry not founded on experiment" (230) is that "they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it" (230). The exiling of theology as an intransigent division that cannot be brought under the control of the inductive method is an effective way of emphasizing the reason for outlawing theology from such liberal institutions as London University whose nonsectarian, non-denominational education Newman has been condemning throughout his
lectures. Furthermore, Newman maintains that Protestantism becomes the ally of the experimental scientists in that it "treats Scripture just as they [the scientists] deal with nature; it [Protestantism] takes the sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which, by an inductive process each individual Christian may arrive at just those religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment" (230). Newman concludes that "sympathy, then, if no other reason, throws experimental philosophers into alliance with the enemies of Catholicism" (230).

Newman further answers the London University Utilitarians who would reduce the knowledge of God to what can be gained from the knowledge of His creation, in the diction of conflict, "but they [manifestations of the Almighty] cannot in any sense be gathered from nature, and the silence of nature concerning them may easily seduce the imagination, though it has no force to persuade the reason, to revolt from doctrines which have not been authenticated by facts, but are enforced by authority" (231). The phrases seduce the imagination and force to persuade the reason present the idea that the weaker faculty of the imagination can be misled by the tenets of a natural theology into thinking that knowledge of God is limited to our knowledge of a natural phenomena; whereas the stronger faculty of the reason will not be persuaded to revolt from doctrines enforced by authority, but will realize that there are aspects of God not knowable from the experimental know-
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ledge gained of nature. Newman ends his presentation of the conflict between physical science and theology in the areas of drift, method of proof, and subject matter by saying that the physical sciences' preoccupation with and indulgence in "those sentiments of beauty, order and congruity" are "the ensigns and colours (as they may be called) of a civilized age in its warfare against Catholicism" (231). The military imagery here suggests that the physical sciences are proudly flying their battle ensigns and colours as though they had full possession of the field of knowledge to the exclusion of theology and the spirit of Catholicism. It is therefore necessary that the Church watch over and protect theology and see that its spirit prevails and permeates the whole university. "Where theology is, there she [the Church] must be; and if a university cannot fulfil its name and office without the recognition of revealed truth, she must be there to see that it is a bonafide recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on" (232).

Newman now turns his attention to the other main subject matter of liberal education: literature and its relation to the Church. "Here then, I say, you are involved in a difficulty greater than that which besets the cultivation of science; for, if physical science be dangerous, as I have said, it is dangerous because it necessarily ignores the idea of moral evil; but literature is open to the more grievous imputation of recognizing and understanding it too well" (233). Newman's
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war imagery suggested by the words beset and dangerous illustrates his idea that the two provinces of knowledge, physical science and literature are apt to fall prey to a danger within their own provinces. He has dealt at length with the danger to the physical sciences—the tendency to liberalism. The danger as far as literature is concerned is the tendency to forget that it is the study of human nature and therefore necessarily man's "literature will be the expression of his sin, and this whether he be heathen or Christian" (233).

Newman argues that "If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a convent, it is not a seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world" (236). Therefore he says do not refuse the student "the masters of human thought, who would in some sense have educated him, because of their incidental corruption" (237). If you do, "you have shut up from him those whose thoughts strike home to our hearts, whose words are proverbs, whose names are indigenous to all the world, the standard of their mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their countrymen, Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because the old Adam smelt rank in them" (237). In other words, do not deny them the company of the masters of human thought, the heroes of literature because of their incidental corruption.

The influence of the Church over literature should be similar
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to that over science: "each has its imperfection, and she has her remedy for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole" (237). Unlike science, "literature does not argue, but declaims and insinuates; ... it persuades instead of convincing, it seduces, it carries captive; it appeals to the sense of honour, or to the imagination, or to the stimulus of curiosity; it makes its way by means of gaiety, satire, romance, the beautiful, the pleasurable" (237-238). The war diction expressed in the phrases, it seduces, it carries captive, it makes its way by, suggests the captivating and all pervading influence that literature has on the mind and emotions of the reader.

Newman questions: "Is it wonderful that with an agent like this the Church should claim to deal with a vigor corresponding to its restlessness, to interfere in its proceedings with a higher hand, and to wield an authority in the choice of its studies and of its books which would be tyrannical, if reason and fact were the only instruments of its conclusions?" (238) The idea Newman seems to be expressing by the image of the Church in the role of tyrant wielding authority over the choice of literature's studies and books is that since reason and fact are not the only means of its conclusion, but rather there is the necessity of keeping all in line with religious principle, the Church is taking the role of guide and director rather than tyrant. Newman
concludes with his summary of the position of the church towards the subjects of a liberal education: "not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doctrines pass under the name of truth but those which claim it rightfully" (238).

Newman draws his final discourse to a close with the hope that in the years coming he will "have a share in the great undertaking, which has been the occasion and the subject of these discourses" (241). With true Ciceronian humility and diffidence, yet complete sincerity of feeling he says, "Neither by my habits of life, nor by vigor of age, am I fitted for the task of authority, or of rule of initiation" (241). Nevertheless, he sees his forthcoming position as rector of the Catholic University of Ireland as one in which he is fitted to "proffer my suggestions, to express my sentiments, as has in fact been my occupation in these discussions; to throw such light upon general questions, upon choice of subjects, upon the import of principles, ... as past reflection and experience enables me to contribute" (241). He graciously expresses gratitude to his audience and asks for their friendliness and confidence. "I shall have to make appeals to your consideration, your friendliness, your confidence, of which I have had so many instances, on which I so tranquilly repose" (241). Newman does not end the discourses in the same spirit of vigorous and confident enthusiasm with which he began them. His final words seem to be those of a weary
commander who has just concluded a long and arduous campaign, fraught with fatigue, anxiety, and uncertainty. He seems to have some misgivings about the final outcome of a somewhat tentative victory: "Neither you nor I must ever be surprised, should it so happen that the Hand of Him, with whom are the springs of life and death, weighs heavy on me, and makes me unequal to anticipations in which you have been too kind, and to hopes in which I may have been too sanguine" (241). How could Newman foresee in this moment of uncertain victory that his greatest triumph and the most permanent aspect of his 'anticipations' and 'hopes' would be his incomparable statement on higher education, The Idea of a University.

With Discourse IX Newman brings his second campaign against liberalism in education to a quiet but effective conclusion. In Discourse V, Newman defines his subject, liberal education, for the five lectures in the campaign. "What is the use of it?" (129) is the main subject of the discourses to follow. In Discourse VI, Newman contends against his useful knowledge opponents that liberal knowledge has an end in itself, the cultivation of the intellect. Discourse VII presents the theme of this series of five lectures in the form of the 1808 controversy over the "inutility" (48) of Oxford's education. Furthermore, Discourse VII adds the social use of liberal education by explaining that if "a practical end must be assigned to a university course, I say
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it is that of training good members of society" (191). Newman discusses the use of liberal knowledge with reference to religion in Discourse VIII by re-opening the "virtue is the child of knowledge" controversy that he dealt with more fully in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters. Discourse IX discusses the usefulness of the Church as a guide in maintaining the spirit of Catholicism alive in the secular subjects of science and literature. Thus Discourse IX draws the ten lectures to a conclusion in that it deals with the guiding role of religion, the subject of Discourses I to V, in the acquiring of a liberal education, the subject of Discourses V to IX.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to discuss the oratorical strategy and war imagery in *The Idea of a University* as an expression of the educational controversies that were the occasion and the source of the ten discourses prepared in 1852 for the launching of the Catholic University of Ireland.

Chapter One has dealt with the evolution of Newman's educational ideas from his reading, his own education, and his experience as an Oxford tutor. From his reading he gained two mottos that can be considered the basis for the matter and form in *The Idea of a University*; namely, "Growth is the only evidence of life" and "Holiness before peace."¹ From the first motto, "Growth is the only evidence of life" (128) is derived the main principle of Newman's idea of a university: the business of education is the cultivation of the mind and that cultivation takes the form of "a growth of a principle from within,"² not "an accumulation from without."³

The idea that education is not "an accumulation from without" (393) brought Newman into conflict with the utilitarian concept of education as exemplified by London University and the Queen's Colleges in Ireland. This conflict issued in the material of the ten discourses on education that are the subject matter of this thesis. If education

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³ Ibid., p. 393.
is to be "a growth of a principle from within" (394), the mind must have access to all the sciences, including theology, in order to acquire the general view that Newman termed the "science of sciences" (88). In turn the acquisition of this "architectonic science" (120) would result in "a philosophical habit of mind" (88) that is the cultivation of the intellect Newman called a liberal education.

The second motto, "Holiness before peace" (128) was the principle of complete dedication to "the city of God" that involved Newman in uncompromising warfare against "the city of the Evil one." It was the battle for the truth as he saw it that resulted in Newman's conflict with Hawkins over the tutor system at Oxford, with Sir Robert Peel in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters on the substitution of knowledge for religious principles as a means to moral improvement, and finally led him to proclaim to his audience a kind of education that opposed Dr. Cullen's exclusively religious aims and the Irish laity's professional aspirations. The battle to convince his Irish audience that it was essential to establish the Catholic University of Ireland on the principle of education as the training of the intellect found natural expression in the oratorical strategy and war imagery of The Idea of a University.

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1 Louis Bouyer, *Newman His Life and Spirituality*, p. 34.
2 Ibid., p. 34.
Newman's education at Trinity College, Oxford gave him the kind of liberal education he was to proclaim as the end of a university. Also, the collision of mind with mind in the Oriel common room taught him the methods of controversy evident in the style of *The Idea of a University* and also convinced him that such mental exercise was an essential means to the formation of the mind.

Newman's years as Oxford tutor added to his educational ideas the realization that the formation of the mind is the result of the personal influence of one mind on another. This idea became the basis in Discourses V to VII for Newman's opposition to education as the acquisition of a number of cold facts for the purpose of an examination or the training for a profession. It was during his years as tutor in which he fought to maintain Oxford's religiously orientated education that Newman encountered the beginning of a liberalism that he was to term in Discourse VIII the "godless intellectualism" (207) of replacing religious principles with the religion of reason or philosophy.

Chapter Two explains in more detail the nature of the stern foe, liberalism, particularly in the two aspects that are basic to Newman's ideas in the discourses: First, the "pride of reason" which glorifies the human mind in its ability to acquire knowledge to the extent of giving it "a false liberty of thought" (647) that substitutes

private judgment for "the truths of revelation" (647). Secondly, this 
"pride of reason" (647) results in the idea that "virtue is the child 
of knowledge, and vice of ignorance" (651) that Newman countered in the 
"Tamworth Reading Room" letters and again in Discourses VIII and IX. 
The "pride of reason" (647) is also the basis of the idea that Newman 
is contending against in Discourses I to V; that is, the utilitarian 
idea that human knowledge is so all important that universities can be 
established on the principle of omitting theology from the university 
curriculum. Also since human knowledge only is important the aim of a 
university is to dispense information that would be useful for prof­
essional advancement. Newman counters this idea in Discourses V to IX 
when he insists that a liberal education, "the cultivation of the mind 
is surely worth seeking for its own sake" (139). In summary, Chapters 
One and Two have explained the source of the educational ideas that 
brought Newman into conflict with his age and culminated in The Idea of 
a University.

The ten lectures that form Part I of the Idea of a University 
are based on the two educational controversies that Newman outlines in 
his opening paragraph; these are, the "religious exclusiveness" (48) 
and the "inutility" (48) of Oxford's education. The former is the 
subject of Discourses I to V, Chapter Three of the thesis; and the 
latter controversy is the material of Discourses V to IX, Chapter IV 
in the thesis.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION

The oratorical strategy and war imagery are an expression of the educational conflicts in which Newman's idea of a university involved him and of the struggle entailed in his purpose "to investigate without error and to instruct without obscurity" (220). Since Discourses I to V were delivered to a Dublin audience there is greater emphasis on the oratorical strategy necessary to win his listeners, than there is on war imagery in these first five discourses. The strategy is particularly effective in Discourse I in which Newman expends all the charm of Ciceronian oratory to conciliate his audience. Discourse II is an excellent example of argument from a syllogism that makes use of the Ciceronian tactics of going round about a subject, viewing it in every light, until the enemy is surrounded and finally obliterated in the dramatic conclusion of the discourse. Discourse III makes use of an opposite pattern; that is, Newman here opens the lecture with a war image of the neutral state in order to establish his basic theme of compromise on which he elaborates for the rest of the discourse. Discourses IV and V are also aspects of Newman's Ciceronian oratory in that they are illustrations of the ideas expressed in Discourses II and III which he wishes to amplify. In Discourses I to V, dealing with Newman's opposition to the liberalistic purpose of omitting theology from the university curriculum, he makes use of a central war image, the encroachment of one state on the territory of another, in order to emphasize the dangers involved in such an omission.

Since Discourses V to IX are what have been called "closet"
lectures, the oratorical strategy is conventional, but the war imagery is varied and expressive of Newman's very great concern for an education that forms the mind. Therefore, the war image central to Discourse V is that of the mind's being trained for the battle of life much as a soldier's training fits him for combat. However, Discourse VI, unlike the others discussed in Chapter IV of the thesis, is a lecture in which Newman displays all his skill in Ciceronian oratory in his brilliant defeat of his useful education opponents. Discourse VII, in which Newman continues his battle with the useful knowledge antagonists, this time with some reinforcements from the original combatants, Copleston and Davison, Newman's important war image is that of the memory becoming the tyrant over the mind in an education that is based on the acquisition of facts. The basic war image in Discourses VIII and IX expresses the ambivalent character of liberal knowledge which can be the serviceable ally of religion or its insidious and dangerous foe depending on whether liberal knowledge is guided by the spirit of religious truth or is allowed to become the religion of reason.

Newman's own words at the end of his sermon "Personal Influence, the means of Propagating the Truth" are a prophetic tribute to himself and his educational ideals that he has expressed so vividly by means of oratorical strategy and war imagery in The Idea of a University: "A few highly endowed men will rescue the world for centuries to come. ...Such men, like the Prophet, are placed upon their
watch-tower, and light their beacons on the heights. Each receives and transmits the sacred flame, trimming it in rivalry of his predecessor, and fully purposed to send it on as bright as it has reached him; and thus the self-same fire, once kindled on Moriah, though seeming at intervals to fail, has at length reached us in safety, and will in like manner, as we trust, be carried forward even to the end.  

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Newman, John Henry. The Idea of a University, defined and illustrated, preface and introduction, Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947. 413 pp. This edition has valuable background information in the introduction. As well it includes some of the essays from Historical Sketches that pertain in particular to university education. Also it contains in an appendix Newman's original Discourse V, included in the material of this thesis.

Newman on University Education, ed. Roger J. McHugh. Clonskeagh: Browne and Nolan, 1944. 167 pp. This edition contains a lengthy and excellent introduction which was valuable background for this thesis as it deals with the Irish university question, Newman's difficulties as rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, and the source and influence of The Idea of a University. This edition includes only Discourses V, VI, VII, and IX and three lectures from Part II of The Idea of a University.


The Idea of a University, introduction, George N. Shuster. New York: Image Books, 1959. 477 pp. The introduction contains a brief outline of the educational situation in Ireland and Newman's writings during the period he was rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. Shuster's comments on Newman and the modern world are interesting although not valuable for this thesis. This edition is based on the definitive edition of 1873 and is the edition used in the preparation of this thesis.

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. On the Scope and Nature of a University Education, introduction, Wilfrid Ward. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1955, Everyman Library. 237 pp. This edition is based on the 1858 edition of the discourses from which the original Discourse V was omitted and Discourses I and II were included in one. Also several paragraphs, now included at the end of Discourse I, on the educational heritage of the Irish were omitted. This edition includes only one lecture from Part II of The Idea of a University, "Christianity and Scientific Investigation." The information in the introduction concerns textual comment and biographical detail.


B. Secondary Sources: Other Writings of John Henry Newman


. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1899. Section IV of this work contains the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.

. Historical Sketches, Vol. 1. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897-98. Part II contains the "Personal and Literary Character of Cicero." Sections 6, "His Orations," and Section 7, "His Style" are particularly important for this thesis as the study and evaluation of Newman's own oratorical strategy in The Idea of a University have been based on Newman's critical evaluation of Cicero's style expressed in these essays.

. Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. Charles Stephen Dessain. Vols. 11-16. Volumes 14, 15 and 16 contain the letters Newman wrote at the time he delivered the discourses and during the early years of the establishment of the university. Volume 16: Founding a University, January 1854 to September 1855 contains details and dates not given elsewhere about the founding of the Catholic University of Ireland. Also Appendix 2 contains a reprint of an article.
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by Robert Ormsby published February 1, 1955 in the Catholic University Gazette. The article gives the substance of Newman's inaugural address to the staff and students on Sunday evening November 5, 1854.

. Letters and Correspondence to 1845, ed. Anne Mozley. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. The brief autobiographical sections between the letters supplied helpful information for Chapter 1 of this thesis.


. Oxford University Sermons. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897-98. This volume contains some of the important sermons that Newman preached before the university of Oxford while he was tutor of Oriel and Vicar of St. Mary's. The following four sermons contained in this volume have been valuable in the preparation of this thesis: "The Usurpation of Reason," "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating Truth," "Implicit and Explicit Reason," "Wisdom, as Contrasted with Faith and with Bigotry."

. Sermons Preached on Various Occasions. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897-98. The first part of this volume contains eight sermons preached before the Catholic University of Ireland in 1856-57, being the first year of the opening of its church. "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training" was the most important for this thesis.

C. Secondary Sources: Biographical Material


Moody, John. John Henry Newman. London: Sheed and Ward, 1945. 273 pp. This is one of the many books published at the centenary of Newman's conversion. It is a shorter biography than that of Ward's, mainly for the general reader. The
spiritual aspects of Newman's life are emphasized; therefore, the book was not particularly valuable for this thesis; however, it is interesting for the reprint of Cardinal Mannings' sermon at Newman's requiem. The book also has an annotated bibliography of Newman's works and critics.


Ward, Maisie. Young Mr. Newman. London: Sheed and Ward, 1948. 477 pp. This work is an excellent and very readable biography that deals with Newman's life up to his conversion.


D. Secondary Sources: Newman Anthologies


Connolly, Francis X. ed. A Newman Reader. Toronto: Image Books, 1964. This volume of important selections from Newman's writings presents the many aspects of Newman's personality, wisdom, and genius. As well as prose, Connolly has included a representative selection of Newman's poetry. Newman's famous sermon "The Second Spring" referred to in the thesis is quoted from this anthology.

E. Secondary Sources: Critical Commentaries

Barry, William. Newman. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Chapter VII of this work which deals with Newman's literary style and his own comments from his letters about his own writing style was most helpful for this thesis.
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Bremond, Henri. *The Mystery of Newman*, trans. by H.C. Corrance. London: Williams and Norgate, 1907. 360 pp. This book was not particularly helpful. Chapter III on Newman as a controversialist lacked the organization and clarity necessary to make it an important comment on the subject of the thesis.


Culler, A. Dwight. *The Imperial Intellect*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. 327 pp. This book is an account of Newman's education, of his works as an educator, and of his educational thinking as expressed in *The Idea of a University*. It was one of the most valuable for the thesis, not only because of its comparatively recent scholarship, but also because of the number of letters and otherwise unavailable documents that were quoted.


Harrold, Charles Frederick. *John Henry Newman, An Expository and Critical Study of His Mind, Thought, and Art*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966. This book, by one of the outstanding Newman scholars, was one of the most helpful in the preparation of this thesis as it deals with the biographical detail and intellectual content of Newman's writing. It is one of the few books that make any significant comment on Newman's prose style.

Houghton, W.E. *The Art of Newman's Apologia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. This book is a general survey of Newman's prose style in the *Apologia*. Since it deals with all aspects of prose style, the book was not too helpful for a detailed study of one aspect, such as oratorical strategy and war imagery, the subject of this thesis.


Neill, Thomas P. *The Rise and Decline of Liberalism*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1953. This is an excellent tracing of liberalism from its beginnings in early nineteenth century to the present day. The book is not directly helpful except as an aid in understanding the liberalism that Newman considered to be a great evil overspreading the whole earth.

Newman, Bertram. *Cardinal Newman: A Biographical and Literary Study*. New York: Zondervan, 1925, 223 pp. This is one of the few biographical works that emphasize Newman as a man of letters. Particularly useful were Chapter VI, "The Dublin University and the Literary Works in Connection Therewith" and Chapter XI, "Newman a Man of Letters."
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Ryan, J.K. and Benard, E.D. *American Essays for the Newman Centennial*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of Americas Press, 1947. This collection contains several excellent essays on Newman; for example, J.J. Reilly, "The Tone of the Centre" and Daniel M. O'Connell, "For the Modern Reader." There is also a comprehensive bibliography listing books and articles of Newman scholarship to 1945.


Tierney, Michael, ed. *Newman's Doctrine of University Education*. Dublin: Sealy, Bryers and Walker, 1952. 76 pp. These are a series of lectures delivered in University College, Dublin, on the occasion of the Newman Centenary, 1952. The first lecture "Newman's Doctrine of University Education" by Dr. Tierney is an excellent commentary on the discourses.

Tierney, Michael, ed. *University Sketches*. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1952. 310 pp. Dr. Tierney has edited, with an excellent introduction, these essays written by Newman during his term as rector of the university. They deal with Newman's definition of a university, the history of universities, and problem of the advancement of knowledge through research.

F. Articles

Arnold, T. "Louvain and Dublin." Dublin Review: 113-121 (January 1889). This article discusses the organization of the University of Louvain following the author's visit to that university. The article is of historical and background interest to the thesis in that Newman and the Irish clergy had intended to model the Catholic University of Ireland on that of Louvain. The article indicates that the plan
was not being followed and the university by 1889 was in financial difficulties.


Colby, R.A. "Poetical Structure of Newman's Apologia." Dublin Review 460:140 (1953). This article is a thorough discussion of the content of the Apologia from the point of view of its dramatic structure.


Hughes, Philip. "Newman and His Age." Dublin Review 435: 111-136 (October 1945). This is the main article in a centenary issue devoted entirely to Newman on the occasion of the centennial of his conversion. The article is a very well-written summary of the political, social, and religious forces of Newman's age against which he contended.

Neill, Thomas P. "Newman's Idea After a Century." Catholic World CLXXVI: 103-109 (November 1952). This article presents an excellent summary of the main ideas in The Idea of a University from the point of view of their validity for the modern world.

O'Byrne, Patrick Justin. "Cardinal Newman," Dublin Review: 187-203 (July 1879). This article is one of a series on the "Lives of the Cardinals" written by Byrne for the Dublin Review. The article was written just after Newman was made Cardinal in May 1879. It is a critical evaluation of Newman's life, influences, and writing made by a contemporary. It contains probably one of the first printings of Newman's "Biglietto Speech."

Svaglic, Martin J. "The Structure of Newman's Apologia" in Victorian Prose, ed. Austin Wright, New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. The article was valuable from the point of view of revealing Newman's life in terms of a conflict that was mirrored in the style of his writings.

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G. Unpublished Material

Croteau, Jacques, O.M.I. *The Catholic University in a Pluralist Society*. This article is the text of a lecture given to the teaching and student bodies of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy of the University of Ottawa. The material in the article concerns the same subject as that of Discourses I to V in *The Idea of a University*.

Gilson, Etienne. "The Breakdown of Morals and Christian Education." This lecture deals with the material in Chapter IV of the thesis, in particular Discourses VIII and IX.
ADDENDA

1. The following explanation of the philosophical basis for the mind's agreeing with or assenting to ideas presented to it should be read with reference to statements made on pages VIII of the Introduction and 126 of Chapter III. Newman differentiates in the Grammar of Assent between two "modes of holding propositions;" namely, notional assent, the intellectual apprehension of an idea in its abstraction, and real assent, in which the reality and truth of the idea comes alive in the imagination as a result of the method of expression bringing before the mind "the living image" (30) of the idea expressed.

Newman explains the value of real assents as follows:

They are sometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes; and, as given to moral objects, they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful. Till we have them, in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, and wandering lights whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religion. These beliefs, be they true or false in the particular case, form the mind out of which they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world. They create, as the case may be, heroes and saints, great leaders, statesmen, preachers, and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in science, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers. They have given to

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the world men of one idea, of immense energy, of adamantine will, of revolutionary power. They kindle sympathies between man and man, and knit together the innumerable units which constitute a race and a nation. They become the principle of its political existence; they impart to it homogeneity of thought and fellowship of purpose (85-86).

The following quotation, as well as the foregoing, has relevance to Newman's method of expressing his educational ideals and, in particular, to the ideals themselves as presented in the Idea of a University. "Belief, on the other hand, being concerned with things concrete, not abstract, which variously excite the mind from their moral and imaginative properties, has for its objects, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful, admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion, rouse the passions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal" (87).

Also, Newman writes in the Grammar of Assent that in order to explain his distinction between "beliefs, on the one hand, and notional assents and inferences, on the other" (88), he will quote his own words (the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters, see above pages 49 to 59) written many years previously "with a freshness and force which I cannot now command" (88). Newman then quotes from the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters, what can be considered among his clearest statements on the
mode of real assent as a means of influencing the mind's assenting to ideas: "The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma; no man will be a martyr for a conclusion!" (89). (See above, p. 55.) For other pertinent ideas also quoted from the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters in the Grammar of Assent see above pages 55 and 56.

The foregoing is the philosophical explanation for the reason Newman's war imagery and oratorical strategy in The Idea of a University is an effective means of expressing his educational ideas. It is evident from the preceding discussion that there is in Newman's writings over a period of approximately thirty years a remarkable unity, consistency, and continuity of thought: The ideas expressed in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters (1841) are background for those presented in the Idea of a University (1852) and are reiterated in more philosophical terms in a Grammar of Assent (1870).

2. The following is an amplification of the relation between J. H. Newman and St. Augustine mentioned on page 10 of this thesis. Augustine's nine years as a Manichee, as well as the events in his early life, make it natural that he divide the world into the City of God and the City of the Evil one. The awareness of such a division remained with Newman.
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throughout his life. Yet he implies in The Idea of a University the hope and faith that the City of God is realizable to some extent as a temporal entity through the growth of the intellect in the liberal education of the individuals in society. Newman emphasizes the correct use of human reason in keeping with tradition and authority in contrast to Augustine's emphasis on Divine Grace as a source of human improvement. (See above a pertinent statement by Newman, page 143.) However, both men see wisdom (although the emphasis is on Divine rather than on human wisdom in Augustine) as the bond of society. Both see that wisdom carried forward and made to prevail by the great human intellects which rise up at necessary times in human society. The incomparable expression of the light of wisdom being carried forward as a torch from generation to generation to the end of time has been quoted from Newman's sermon as the closing paragraph of this thesis (See above pages 202-203).
ABSTRACT

In 1852 John Henry Cardinal Newman prepared ten lectures on education to be delivered to a Dublin audience in order to help launch the Catholic University of Ireland. The first five lectures were delivered in Dublin from May 10 to June 9. The second five were prepared and published with a preface in the autumn of 1852. The ten lectures were bound into one volume and published early in 1853 with the title: Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin. These ten lectures are the subject matter of this thesis. The Idea of a University, Part 1 now contains the discourses with the exception of the original Discourse V.

The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate the oratorical strategy and war imagery in The Idea of a University as an expression of the educational controversies that were the occasion and source of the ten discourses on education prepared in 1852 for presentation to a Dublin audience.

Chapter One establishes by reference to Newman's early life and training, the reasons he tended to see life as warfare and therefore to express his ideas in terms of strategy and war imagery. The chapter discusses his early education as a source of his interest in controversy and his reading as it established the philosophical and theological basis for his educational ideals. This chapter also presents Newman's conflicts with liberalism in the personal, educational, and religious sectors as they establish his lifelong conflict with liberalism.
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Chapter Two discusses the definitions of liberalism that Newman gave on various occasions in his lifetime as they relate to his educational thought. Then the chapter deals with one of the most important public controversies in which his opposition to liberalism involved him: the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times as they are an introduction to Newman's most powerful indictment of liberalism in the academic sector: The Idea of a University. Finally the chapter outlines the educational situation in Ireland that made the writing and presenting of the discourses to a Dublin audience one of the most difficult and seemingly unrewarding battles of Newman's life.

Chapter Three deals with the oratorical strategy and war imagery as they effectively express Newman's attempt to convince his audience of the necessity for retaining theology in the university curriculum in order to maintain the unity of knowledge that results in the acquisition of a philosophical habit of mind. Oratorical strategy predominates as Newman is concerned with the immediate necessity of convincing his audience of his idea of a university.

The remaining five lectures are the subject matter of Chapter Four. Here war imagery is of primary importance in expressing the value of liberal education as a formation of the mind in opposition to the useful knowledge opponents who claim for a university the aim of giving a training for the professions. This chapter also deals with the danger of liberal knowledge becoming the religion of reason unless it is guided by the spirit of religious principles.
ABSTRACT

The conclusion is that The Idea of a University expresses the culmination of Newman's lifelong battle against the forces of liberalism in education. By means of oratorical strategy and war imagery Newman has successfully combated his liberalistic opponents who would establish a system of education based first on the primacy of human knowledge to the ignoring of Divine principles, and secondly, on the principle that education is the acquisition of facts for their usefulness in professional training. Newman's oratorical strategy and war imagery have made clear the following educational ideals: Education is the cultivation of the intellect as the result of the acquisition of a philosophical habit of mind.