DIETER HENRICH'S HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING
THE PROOF-STRUCTURE OF THE
SECOND-EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
IN IMMANUEL KANT'S 'CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON'

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to arrive at a judgement concerning one interpretation of how Immanuel Kant, in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction of his *Critique of Pure Reason*\(^1\), established the objective validity of the categories. We refer specifically to that problem which came to be known, because of the article submitted by Dieter Henrich to *The Review of Metaphysics*, as the problem

\(^1\) All references to Kant's works will be by means of the following English translations. However, in the special case of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reference will be made, in addition, to the first ("A") and second ("B") German editions of this work:


This investigation will proceed through five stages. The first stage will involve a close explication of the problem which gives rise to this thesis, a detailed presentation of Dieter Henrich's hypothesis, and an outline of the manner in which his hypothesis will be tested. The second and third stages will involve a comparative study of the theses of H.J. Paton and H.J. de Vleeschauwer with that of Dieter Henrich in order to determine whether the latter's hypothesis

2 The following are the works of those commentators on Kant in relation to whom Henrich developed his hypothesis:


The works listed above, both Kant's and those of the commentators, are those most frequently used throughout this thesis. Any works referred to once only, or which are used with respect to a limited context, will be introduced in footnotes at the appropriate times.
is indeed an advance over the classical interpretations. The fourth stage will be an examination of the new evidence brought in by Henrich from outside the *Critique of Pure Reason* to support his thesis. In other words, the question to be answered is whether this new evidence does, in fact, support Henrich's hypothesis. Finally, the fifth stage will be devoted to examining Henrich's attempt to account for certain passages of the Transcendental Deduction prior to section 20, passages which stand at variance with and, indeed, challenge his hypothesis.
CHAPTER I

EXPLICATION OF THE PROBLEM AND A DETAILED PRESENTATION OF DIETER HENRICH'S HYPOTHESIS

1. Sources of the Problem

Midway through the second-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant pauses to make an "Observation" (section 21) with regard to the structure of the argument:

Thus in the above proposition a beginning is made of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding; and in this deduction, since the categories have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition. In what follows (cf. 20) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category (according to §20) prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained.

This passage, although lengthy, has been quoted in its entirety because, more closely than any other statement made by Kant, it captures the problem with which this thesis aims to grapple. Indeed, it will be necessary in the course of 

1 C.P.R., pp. 160-61, B 144-45.
this work to return to it again and again. In a certain way, this passage appears to be lucid; for Kant is trying to put plainly before the reader what has been done and what remains to be done. In fact, it turns out to be something of an enigma. The reactions of the better known contemporary commentators, that is, the English commentators, to this section of the Critique which Kant had specially marked out to make the above "Observation", have been varied. At the extremes there is both unenlightening silence and the equally unenlightening claims that Kant himself was not clear on the matter.²

² A.C. Ewing's opinion, for example, belongs to the latter extreme: "Kant here speaks as if the transcendental deduction had only just begun, but it may be doubted whether what is left of it can be viewed as much more than an appendix. Kant seems to have been excessively preoccupied with the question of the relation of the categories to the forms of intuition when he wrote this sentence (v. chapter on Schematism)." A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 120.

Also, in his classic work, Norman Kemp Smith urges the following: "In section 21 Kant makes a surprising statement. The above argument, which he summarizes in a sentence, yields, he declares 'the beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding'. This can hardly be taken as representing Kant's real estimate of the significance of the preceding argument, and would seem to be due to a temporary preoccupation with the problems that centre in the doctrine of schematism". Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (2nd ed.; New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 289.
However, two other contemporary commentators of stature consider section 21 as pointing out a significant division within the transcendental deduction. These are the proposals set forth in the first volume of Herbert James Paton's study, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, and in Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer's book, *La déduction transcendantale dans l'Oeuvre de Kant*. It is with both of these most commonly accepted interpretations of section 21 that Dieter Henrich finds himself in disagreement. In the article, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction" submitted to *The Review of Metaphysics*, he challenges the interpretations made by Paton and de Vleeschauwer, and proposes a solution of his own.

Seeking support for that division spoken of by Kant in the "Observation", Henrich turns to examine the conclusions of sections 20 and 26, conclusions also referred to by Kant in the "Observation". At first it appears as if the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction is drawn in two completely different passages. Referring to section 13 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Henrich takes note that the task of the Transcendental Deduction is to demonstrate that the categories of understanding "are qualified to provide knowledge of appearances as they are given to us in the unity of a
synthesis of experience"³. With this aim in mind, he searches out the conclusions of sections 20 and 26. The conclusion of section 20 reads as follows: "Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories"⁴. The conclusion of section 20 does not seem to differ from that of section 26, according to which "the categories ... are ... valid a priori for all objects of experience"⁵. One is thus tempted to see two proofs of the same proposition in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction. But this would be in direct conflict with what Henrich claims to be,

Kant's unequivocal explication in section 21, which states that two arguments, rather than two proofs, are involved and that these together constitute the proof of the deduction⁶.

In that case, to maintain that each section is marked by a different proof of the same proposition would be to stand in contradiction to what Kant "clearly stated" in section 21; namely, that the demonstration of the validity of the categories would be completed in section 26.

³ P.S.K.D., p. 641.
⁴ C.P.R., p. 160, B 143.
⁵ Ibid., p. 171, B 161.
⁶ P.S.K.D., pp. 641-42.
Indeed, he adds, the title to section 26, the "Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Employment in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding", can be read in no other way. Contrary to first impressions, sections 20 and 26 offer,

two arguments with significantly different results, and that these together yield a single proof of the transcendental deduction. We shall call this task the problem of the two-steps-in-one-proof.

This interpretation of the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 along with the observations on section 21, an interpretation which Henrich calls the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis, is advanced against the "double-proof" theories of Paton and de Vleeschauwer. In other words, claims Henrich, these commentators do not take seriously Kant's assurance that this Deduction presents two steps in one proof and, instead, tell us that we are compelled to read the text as "two different and complete proofs".

The sources of the proposals made by Paton and de Vleeschauwer are to be found in distinctions made by Kant prior to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.

7 Ibid., p. 643.
8 Ibid., p. 642.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Paton grounds his interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction on a distinction found in the Preface to the first edition of the Critique. There Kant distinguishes between an objective and a subjective side of the Deduction. It is the task of the objective side to make the validity of the categories intelligible and the task of the subjective side to investigate the categories' relation to the cognitive faculties. We shall quote this text at this point in its entirety; for there will be need to linger over this passage in the more extensive presentation of Paton's interpretation:

I know no inquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have instituted in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under the title the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding... . This inquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded, has two sides. The one refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts. It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so deals with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it. For the chief question is always simply this: -- what and how much can the understanding know apart from all experience? not: -- how is the faculty of thought itself possible? The latter is, as it were, the search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent somewhat hypothetical in character (though, as I shall show elsewhere, it is not
really so)... . For this reason I must forestall the reader's criticism by pointing out that the objective deduction with which I am here chiefly concerned retains its full force even if my subjective deduction should fail to produce the complete conviction for which I hope. On this matter, what has been said on pp. 92-93 should in any case suffice by itself.\footnote{11 C.P.R., pp. 11-12, Axxi-xvii.}

Besides dividing the Deduction according to an objective and a subjective side,\footnote{12 K.M.E., p. 501.} Paton also speaks of these two demonstrations as the demonstration that the categories have validity, and the demonstration how they attain validity.\footnote{13 Ibid., p. 529.}

Paton's source for this particular usage is to be found in Kant's work, the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}. This work was published prior to the second edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. There Kant expresses the hope that an exposition of the Transcendental Deduction which avoids the obscurities plaguing the argument in the first edition will be soon forthcoming. The text introducing the distinction between the argument that and the argument how reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
For it can be proved that the categories which reason must make use of in all its cognitions, can have no other employment whatever than that merely in reference to objects of experience (in such a way that in this experience the categories make possible merely the form of thought), then the
\end{quote}
answer to the question how they make such a form of thought possible is indeed important enough for completing this deduction, where possible; but with reference to the main purpose of the system, namely the determination of the boundary of pure reason, the answer to how is in no way necessary but is merely meritorious.

It is on the basis of these two texts that Paton, at least as far as the terminology is concerned, hopes to find a way of understanding that division of the Deduction spoken of in section 21. Section 20 completes the proof of the objective validity of the categories or the deduction that, and section 26 demonstrates the subjective deduction or the deduction how.

Turning to de Vleeschauwer's version of the double-proof theory, the basis of his interpretation rests on a distinction made in the first version of the Transcendental Deduction. There Kant elaborates upon the relation that obtains between the categories and the empirical representations, a relation which can be developed either from self-consciousness, or from the given sensible representations. Thus de Vleeschauwer distinguishes between a demonstration "from above", von oben an, and a demonstration "from below", von unten auf. In either direction, this demonstration

14 M.F.N.S., p. 12 n.1.

conforms to the hierarchy of cognitive faculties, the highest of which is the understanding and the lowest, sensibility. Between these the faculty of imagination establishes a relation of possible coordination, and between which the two proofs can move in opposite directions. This distinction is applied by de Vleeschauwer to interpret the second-edition Transcendental Deduction. He proposes that section 20 be understood as a deduction "from above", while section 26 is to be understood as a deduction "from below". The Kantian text upon which this distinction is based reads as follows:

If, now, we desire to follow up the inner ground of this connection of the representations to the point upon which they have all to converge in order that they may therein for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception.16

And,

We will now, starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding by means of the categories, stands to appearances.17

Apart from the charge that Paton's and de Vleeschauwer's "double-proof" theories depart from what Henrich believes to be Kant's assurance that there is one proof presented in two

16 C.P.R., p. 141, A 116.
17 Ibid., p. 143, A 119.
steps, Henrich levels other more particular criticisms at each of the theories separately. These particular criticisms we shall consider during a more extensive presentation of Paton's and de Vleeschauwer's positions in our attempt to evaluate the merit of Henrich's hypothesis.

2. Dieter Henrich's Solution

To begin with, Professor Henrich formulates those criteria to which a true interpretation of the text must conform. First of all, the new interpretation must seek an understanding of the proof of the Deduction that would require the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis\textsuperscript{18}. Secondly, it cannot derive support from observations made by Kant in other sources, unless Kant himself explicitly relates these comments to the passage of the text in question; for in formulating his arguments "Kant always allowed so many different trains of thought to influence him"\textsuperscript{19}. Finally, any interpretation as, indeed, Henrich claims his does, will gain plausibility to the extent that it makes intelligible many peculiarities of the text which were neglected by other proposals\textsuperscript{20}. At this point Henrich turns to dwell on

\textsuperscript{18} P.S.K.D., pp. 642, 644.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 645.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
one such peculiarity, and in this way he begins the development of his own hypothesis.

Henrich has in mind that peculiarity which he have already mentioned; that is, that the conclusions of sections 20 and 26, while appearing to be twice repeated, actually offer two different arguments constituting a single proof. Such must be the case if we accept Kant's assurance that there must be two steps to the proof. One must, observes Henrich, take account of the fact that the result of the proof in section 20 contains a restriction. Kant has established here that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity. This restriction is clearly indicated by the use of the indefinite article in the expression "in an intuition" (in Einer Anschauung), where the first letter is capitalized. Norman Kemp Smith renders this phrase by, "in a single intuition" , implying that some single intuition is subject to the categories. But this translation, argues Henrich, leads to no meaningful emphasis in the course of the proof. Unlike English, in German, the definite article (ein) and the word unity (Einheit) have the same root. Thus through

21 Ibid.

22 C.P.R., p. 160, B 143.
the capital letter Kant was able to express, not the distinctness of any arbitrary intuition as opposed to others (singularity), but rather its inner unity. Thus the result of the proof in section 20 is valid only for those intuitions which already contain unity. In other words, wherever there is unity, there is a relation which can be thought according to the categories. But this statement does not clarify the range within which unitary representations can be found.

Turning to Kant's observations in section 21, Henrich sees there the claim made by Kant that the restriction found in the previous section will be overcome in section 26; the second part of the Deduction will show that "the categories are valid for all objects of our senses". Without referring to any definite passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Henrich offers us an account of the reasoning by which Kant attained the desired conclusion. Wherever we find unity, this unity is itself made possible by the categories and is determined in relation to them. But in our representations of space and time we have intuitions which contain unity, and

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 646.
which also include everything that can be present to our senses. The latter is the case because the representations of space and time have their origin in the forms of sensibility, outside of which no representations can be given to us. Therefore, every given manifold without exception is subject to the categories. With this conclusion the aim of the proof of the Deduction has been attained. Yet this is hardly the end of the matter. At this point Henrich adds the qualification that the aim has been attained only insofar as the Deduction seeks to demonstrate the unrestricted validity of the categories "for everything which can be meaningfully related to experience".

Besides the task of proving the objective validity of the categories, Henrich claims that Kant assigned to the Deduction the additional task of "making intelligible the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility". According to Henrich, the following sentence from section 26 provides ample evidence for this claim:

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 651.
29 Ibid.
We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not indeed in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature and even of making nature possible.

Henrich then goes to some pains to point out that this task is not to be confused with that other task which Kant speaks of when in the first preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* he distinguishes between the Objective and Subjective Deduction. The task of the Subjective Deduction is to investigate those cognitive faculties upon which rests the possibility of a functional knowledge by means of the understanding. Such an investigation, maintains Henrich, goes beyond the mere explaining of the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility.

The explanation of the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility proposes to remove a difficulty which arises out of a problem of the critical philosophy itself: "it assumes pure categories and then declares, however, that these categories are originally and essentially related to sensible intuition." The a priori concept being

30 C.P.R., p. 170, B 159-160.
32 Ibid.
what it is, such a relation must seem mysterious and inconceivable. Therefore, contends Henrich, we require an argument where it would be shown that "the meaning of an a priori concept must be so stipulated that it refers necessarily to intuition". Furthermore, it must be shown how one can represent "the fact that the given intuition essentially depends on such concepts". The simplest form of such a proof would proceed by showing,

that categories as well as intuition cannot be thought independently of their relation to one another... (Then) the demonstration of the necessity of a relation between them can provide an answer to the problematical question concerning the possibility of their relations.

In the version of the Transcendental Deduction found in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sought to avoid the problems of the so-called subjective deduction, says Henrich. Nevertheless, this does not allow the conclusion that he neglected the demand for an explanation of the possibility of relating the categories to intuitions. Indeed, Kant used the "same words" to distinguish between

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
the two questions involved in the proof of the validity of the categories:

the objective deduction is a proof that the intuitions are subject to the categories, while both the subjective deduction and the explanation of possibility are investigations how they do this.

Having failed to see that two distinct investigations are included under the deduction how, Professor Paton was obliged, consequently, to consider the second step of the proof to be something which it clearly was not, i.e., a subjective deduction.

Expanding on his claim that the Transcendental Deduction has the added task of making intelligible the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility, Henrich contends that the whole Deduction may be read as an attempt to accomplish that latter task. Furthermore, such an explanation requires, as does the validity proof, two steps:

First it must be shown what the nature of the category actually is, given the fact that it is always at the same time related to the synthesis of intuition. And it must then be shown that such categories can exercise synthetic functions in intuition itself.

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 652.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
If, as Professor Henrich claims, the Transcendental Deduction aims at accomplishing two tasks and each is divided into two steps, what, the question naturally arises, is the relationship that obtains between these two arguments in the exposition of the Deduction? Professor Henrich maintains that the two steps involved in the Deduction can be given at the same time with the two steps of the validity proof, wherein it is demonstrated that the categories in general are valid without limitation. The reason why Kant does not separate the two investigations is that the proof of the validity of the categories must enter into the evaluation of the possibility of their relation to intuition. Indeed, at "the only place" where Kant separated the two investigations from one another, he was compelled to propose a proof of validity that failed to satisfy strict demands. There he had to proceed on the assumption that we are in possession of synthetic a priori

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 652 n.2. At this point Henrich refers to the footnote in the preface to Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and to the opening sections of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, pointing out that they begin with science as an indubitable fact. But this procedure has been judged in the Prolegomena to be legitimate only within an introduction to a critique of pure reason.
judgements concerning all objects of sensibility, and that these judgements stand beyond all doubt in virtue of their employment in the mathematical and natural sciences. But this was the presupposition that Hume called into question. Thus Kant incorporated into the Critique of Pure Reason a proof of validity which involves a proof of possibility. Indeed, in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, the proof of validity is at one and the same time an explanation of the possibility of the categories' relation to sensibility.

3. Clarification of Difficulties With Respect to Henrich's Solution

With these final remarks it would seem that the whole of Henrich's account concerning the proof-structure in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction has been laid bare, at least in its main features. However, two additional points require some further consideration. First of all, it will be recalled that Henrich has limited himself to the consideration of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction. Indeed, in a footnote at the beginning of his article Henrich writes that "in this paper I shall discuss only the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction".

44 Ibid., p. 652.
The analysis of its premises and the problems involved in the application of its conclusion, are themes which will be developed in a future paper. But by this time it should be sufficiently clear that in discussing his two-steps-in-one-proof thesis, he has concerned himself with what are the main arguments, and what are the conclusions. It seems, therefore, that in any discussion of the proof-structure of the Deduction — perhaps, in part due to the difficulty of the text which therefore requires some interpretation — we cannot abstract entirely from the question of content. Secondly, Henrich's account is not without its difficulties as he himself admits — that is, his explanation leaves certain sections of the Transcendental Deduction unexplained. However, Henrich himself chooses rather to speak of the obscurity of the text itself. There are two main reasons for this obscurity.

First of all, the text "constantly involves other elements and gives them undue emphasis". One such text is a sentence in section 26 which Henrich interprets as saying that the "unity in the representations of space and

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 653.
48 C.P.R., p. 171, B 161.
time can be no other than that which is thought in the
categories". Henrich finds this sentence to be a source
of obscurity, in part, due to its being juxtaposed with
the second step of the proof of the validity of the
categories. This second step already requires considerable
effort to be recognized because "it is not represented
separately from the second part of the explanation of
possibility." But the above statement is merely "an
application of the result of section 20 and of the conclusion
of section 26." It contains neither a step of the proof
nor any supplementary explanation of the possibility argument,
and it is, therefore, misleading.

Henrich's account of the above statement in section
26 may well be correct if his thesis concerning the Transcen­
dental Deduction's proof-structure and its contents could be
upheld. If not, then it could be a sign pointing to some
weakness within his own interpretation. The aim of this
study is to determine the truth of Henrich's hypothesis
concerning the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Throughout this study, therefore, this question concerning Henrich's hypothesis must always be asked: how much of the text of the Deduction can this interpretation retain without pronouncing certain key statements and sections as unintelligible or useless with regard to the main concern of the Transcendental Deduction?

The second main source of problems for Henrich's interpretation is all the sections preceding section 20, i.e., sections 15 to 19. What is their role with regard to the thesis that the Deduction consists of two tasks each task involving two steps? In section 16 Henrich claims that "Kant seems to suggest that he has completed the proof of the Deduction that all sensible representations are subject to the categories". If such is indeed the case, namely, that the conclusion of the Deduction has been reached at such an early stage, then how do we account for the presence of this section within the context of Henrich's interpretation? Henrich claims that Kant has been unable to give up entirely an argument which was absolutely indispensable for the proof of the first edition. In other words, Kant is employing "incompatible proof-strategies", a

53 Ibid.
procedure which tends to obscure the lines of the proof-structure. Specifically, the type of proof supposedly borrowed from the first-edition Critique of Pure Reason proceeds, claims Henrich, by means of a simple semantic analysis of the word "mine." Again, with regard to section 16, it will be necessary to apply Henrich's own criterion to test the validity of his interpretation: is Kant actually guilty of using incompatible proof-strategies, or is the latter an attempt by Henrich to save his own hypothesis?

4. Manner of Testing Henrich's Hypothesis

In order that there be maximum clarity with respect to the task which is the aim of this thesis to accomplish, it will be necessary, first of all, to make a résumé of what has been said; and then, with respect to this résumé to state what remains to be done. To begin with, the question of proof-structure was seen to arise out of the enigmatic section 21 of the Transcendental Deduction. Henrich's proposed interpretation was seen as a response to

54 Ibid., p. 656.
55 Ibid., p. 654.
56 Ibid., p. 645.
Kant's statements made in section 21 with regard to the conclusions of sections 20 and 26. Henrich proposed, therefore, that Kant's intention was to present a unified proof proceeding according to two basic steps. Because section 21 had been misunderstood by the prominent commentators Professors Paton and de Vleeschauwer, many parts of the Deduction were burdened by a forced interpretation. Therefore, the task of this thesis, which is basically to determine the truth of the hypothesis developed by Henrich, may be best understood through the following questions:

Is the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction such as the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis would have it to be? Are Henrich's interpretations of the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 such as to lead to the conclusion that the categories are objectively valid? Is his estimate of section 16 correct? Or, is this estimate of section 16, and the interpretation of the conclusions of sections 20 and 26, merely the result of his primary thesis? In short, is Henrich's hypothesis about the proof-structure truly enlightening with regard to the argument of the Transcendental Deduction?

To answer these questions it will be necessary to proceed in the following manner. First of all, Henrich's interpretation will be confronted with those of Paton and de Vleeschauwer. This confrontation, in its first part, will involve a concise but adequate exposition of the views
of Paton and de Vleeschauwer. In relation to such an exposition the following questions will be posed: What are Henrich's general and particular criticisms of Paton's and de Vleeschauwer's interpretations? Since these criticisms will come from the standpoint of the two-steps-in-one-proof theory, it will be necessary to confront Henrich's evidence for his theory with the evidence provided by Paton and de Vleeschauwer. But the key question is suggested by Professor Henrich himself when he posed a criterion which he hoped would vindicate his hypothesis and discredit that of the other commentators: do the interpretations, all of them, "make intelligible many peculiarities of the text" which other proposals neglect?\textsuperscript{57}

But this general question leads us to consider a certain "peculiarity" whose interpretation may serve either to strengthen or to upset Henrich's entire hypothesis; this is the question as to whether and how Henrich succeeds in accommodating section 16 of the Transcendental Deduction to the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis. Does Henrich's proposal explain or produce a peculiarity at this point? Towards the answering of this question, one chapter will be devoted. Apart from the internal evidence that Henrich

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
attempts to muster for his proposal, he claims to find support for his thesis in a number of Kant's Reflections and in a letter to J.H. Tieftrunk, a colleague of his former pupil Johann Sigismund Beck. There, claims Henrich, Kant tried "to show approximately what form the Critique might assume in an altered presentation". In this context Kant indicated "the reasons for retaining the proof construction of the second edition", i.e., of making use of the synthetic method instead of the analytical method.

One chapter, therefore, will be devoted to an examination of the new evidence introduced by Professor Henrich to determine what support, if any, it gives to his version of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction.

In the concluding chapter, the results of each step of these investigations will be brought together. This means that the particular contribution(s) of Henrich's thesis will be assessed insofar as it contributes towards an understanding of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction. What is deficient in his thesis will be noted and what is positive will be supplemented by the relevant observations made at each step in the course of the thesis. The

58 Ibid., p. 648.
59 Ibid., p. 649.
first step of this task that will lead to those final observations is the comparative study of the interpretations of Professors Paton and de Vleeschauwer with the interpretation developed by Professor Henrich. To this step we now turn.
1. Outline of Procedure

In our attempt to determine the truth of Henrich's hypothesis concerning the proof-structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, it will be necessary to proceed through two phases, a negative one and a positive one. The negative phase concerns Henrich's criticisms and rejection of the interpretations offered by two contemporary commentators of note. In the positive stage Henrich tries to advance his position by showing how his solution makes intelligible many peculiarities of the text which must be neglected by all other proposals. In addition, Henrich offers some new evidence which he hopes will advance his basic thesis.

Turning to the negative stage, first of all, it is clear that Henrich must discredit the proposals of Paton and de Vleeschauwer; otherwise, what could he hope to achieve by suggesting an alternate interpretation, if the current interpretations are in every way satisfactory? This could be done by claiming that the evidence advanced to support their interpretations is irrelevant to the issue,
and does not, therefore, achieve what it proposes (logical criticism) or by arguing that they overlooked evidence unfavourable to their interpretations (textual criticism).

The first step of the task outlined above will require a complete list of the objections raised by Henrich against Paton's thesis. This will be followed by a concise exposition of Paton's thesis and of the evidence believed to support his position. The material for this exposition will be drawn from the first volume of Paton's classic commentary, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. On the basis of such an exposition it will be then possible to determine the following: 1) It will enable us to determine whether Henrich had understood Paton correctly; 2) And if he did not understand Paton, it will be necessary, in addition, to consider the merit's of Paton's interpretation so that at the end of the chapter we might be able to report on the respective strengths and weaknesses of each position; 3) But if Henrich did understand Paton correctly, then it will become necessary to determine the force of his objections — and if there be any valuable points therein, then we shall add them to those observations made in the course of this study of Paton's thesis.

Again, the task of the first step will consist of a list of the criticisms brought in by Henrich against Paton's thesis. These points will serve as the background
to an evaluation of Paton following the presentation of his interpretation. Concerning the thesis itself, Henrich claims that Paton goes against Kant's assurance that the Deduction presents two steps in one proof, and (Paton) instead contends that we must read the text as two complete and distinct proofs\(^1\). Concerning the evidence, Henrich makes the following objections:

1) The division of the Deduction according to an objective and a subjective side, or a demonstration that and a demonstration how, is based on observations made by Kant about the structure of the proof in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. These observations are valid within that context only. It is, adds Henrich, never possible to employ Kant's comments to another text unless he has explicitly related them to the passage in question; for in formulating his central arguments Kant allowed many different trains of thought to influence him at the same time\(^2\).

2) With regard to the text itself, this division can never be applied. For, claims Henrich, Kant "clearly stated" that the demonstration of the **validity** of the

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categories would be completed in section 26. Furthermore, the title and conclusion of this section can be read in no other way. 3.

3) The word "how" appears only incidentally in the text of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction; and there its significance has been misunderstood. Henrich claims that Kant used "the same words" to distinguish between the two questions involved in the proof of the validity of the categories. The Objective Deduction is a proof that the intuitions are subject to the categories, while both the Subjective Deduction and the explanation of the possibility of relating the categories to sensibility, are investigations how they do this. But in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sought to avoid the problems of the so-called Subjective Deduction. Paton, however, "overlooked this distinction" and was forced to consider the second step of the proof as something which it was not — a Subjective Deduction.

3 Ibid., p. 643.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 651.
6 Ibid., pp. 651-52.
4) Furthermore, Henrich makes a logical objection, that is, that the arguments used to support Paton's interpretation can offer no useful distinction between the two proofs.\(^7\)

5) Finally, Henrich concedes that Paton's proposal has the strength that it is supported by "certain fundamental Kantian statements about the Deduction."\(^8\)

In the next stage of this work, we turn to a presentation of what Paton considers to be the proof-structure in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Only then shall we proceed to present and evaluate the evidence upon which Paton's interpretation rests.

2. Exposition of Paton's Interpretation of the Proof-Structure

In Paton's view, the Transcendental Deduction is divided into an Objective and a Subjective Deduction, or a deduction that and a deduction how. Both parts are necessary to the argument. The Objective Deduction without the Subjective Deduction is "manifestly incomplete."\(^9\) That

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 644.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 643.

\(^9\) K.M.E., p. 527.
Paton intends the argument of the Deduction to be a whole is evidenced by the fact that he cautions the reader that the titles Objective and Subjective Deduction are a "way of referring" to the objective and subjective "sides" of the "one" Transcendental Deduction\textsuperscript{10}.

The next question that naturally arises concerns the aim of each section and how it contributes to the argument as a whole. The aim of the Objective Deduction is to demonstrate the objective validity of the pure categories for every intelligent finite being\textsuperscript{11}. But intelligent finite beings are only part of a wider universe, and their thinking does not make the world which they know. Indeed, all finite thinking, insofar as it is about something other than itself, must have its objects given from without. And insofar as they are merely given, they are given to a passive capacity for receiving impressions, i.e., to sensibility. Our human sensibility is but an example of sensibility. Indeed, it is the only example with which we are acquainted\textsuperscript{12}. Other kinds of sensibility might receive altogether different impressions and might

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 528.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 526.
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
not be subject to the forms of time and space. This is implied by the distinction that Kant everywhere makes in both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason when he opposes intuitions in general to human intuitions, to our sensuous intuitions, and to objects of our senses\textsuperscript{13}. On the other hand, for an infinite intelligence having no reality beyond itself, there would be no divorce between thought and intuition: "Its intuition would be intellectual, not sensuous, and its understanding would be intuitive and not discursive"\textsuperscript{14}.

Nevertheless, the pure categories would still apply to an experience which depended on any kind of sensibility. The reasons for this are: that (1) intuitions given to sensibility could never possess unity apart from thinking and thus be intuitions of an object; and (2) thinking must always use the same forms\textsuperscript{15}. If such is the case, says Paton, then the pure categories are not limited to human experience as are the forms of space and time. Indeed, so far as thought is concerned, the categories have an

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 526 n.1.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 527.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 526.
unlimited field\textsuperscript{16}. But, adds Paton, these wider possibilities have no meaning for us\textsuperscript{17}.

Perhaps nowhere except in Chapter Thirty is Paton quite so lucid and concise when it comes to stating what are the aims, conclusions, and achievements of the Objective Deduction. In this chapter called "The Argument of the Deduction," Paton reflects on the previous chapters wherein he had closely analyzed the argument of the Deduction and attempts to give an overview of the matter. There he states that the achievements and limitations of the Objective Deduction with regard to the argument as a whole\textsuperscript{18}. One must not suppose, says Paton, that Kant imagines himself to have made clear the characteristics which objects must have if they are to conform to the pure categories. Nor has it been explained how objects can and must conform to them. He has merely shown that unless the manifold is combined with the pure categories there can be no objects of experience\textsuperscript{19}. But the question

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 527. On this point Paton refers to a footnote in section 27 of the second German edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, that is, to B167 n.a.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 555, 556 n.2.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 556.
of how objects can and must conform to the principles of synthesis contained in the pure categories, can be generally answered by means of an examination of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination\textsuperscript{20}. This task, a task of which Paton says that "it seems .... to be necessary for the understanding of Kant's argument"\textsuperscript{21}, belong to the subjective side of the Deduction.

If one is to show how the categories involved in all thinking qua thinking, i.e., the pure categories, give us a priori knowledge of objects, one must explain their relation to the form of time and to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination\textsuperscript{22}. The categories can give knowledge only if they are related to the manifold of intuition through the forms of space and time. That is, the categories give a priori knowledge of objects insofar as they are schematised\textsuperscript{23}. Thus the first part of the argument deals with the pure categories and the second with the categories as schematised. In other words, the first part shows that the categories are principles of

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 527.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
synthesis imposed by the nature of discursive thought itself, and are necessary for any finite being who can know only objects given in intuition to some kind of sensibility. The second part shows how the categories, as governing the transcendental synthesis of imagination are necessary for intelligent beings possessed of human sensibility, i.e., having a sensibility which involves the form of time\textsuperscript{24}. In short, in the case of the deduction that, it is shown that human intuitions, like all other intuitions, must conform to the categories if they are to be intuitions of an object. Yet there still remains to be understood how they do conform to the categories\textsuperscript{25}.

3. External Evidence for Paton's Interpretation

With regard to the evidence brought forth by Paton in support of this position, the first to be considered concerns that found in those Kantian texts written prior to the second edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. The first passage to be considered will be the one from the Preface to the first edition of that work\textsuperscript{26}, a passage

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 501.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 529.
\textsuperscript{26} C.P.R., pp. 11-12, A xvi-xvii.
which we have already quoted in our Chapter One. Such an examination will require careful attention to Paton's interpretation of this passage and to his subsequent application of it to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In discussing Kant's "Provisional Exposition", which prepares, in the first edition, for the "Authoritative Exposition" of the Transcendental Deduction, Paton explains the distinction between the Objective and Subjective Dedications. Here, the central argument of the Objective Deduction is that the categories must have objective validity since only by their means can an object of experience be thought. Now such a thought of objects, if objectively valid, is knowledge, indeed, a priori knowledge. But, continues Paton, in this knowledge there is more at work than the understanding considered as a power of thinking. Insofar as the understanding relates to the objects, it is a power, not merely of thinking, but also of knowing. What is required now is an explanation of how it can relate to objects. In other words, how can the understanding be a power of a priori knowledge? It is with this task that the Subjective Deduction is in this edition occupied.

28 Ibid., p. 352.
Even with regard to the first edition Paton must interpret Kant's distinction before applying it; for Kant himself does not separate the Subjective from the Objective Deduction in this edition\textsuperscript{29}. In those passages of the Preface that are relevant to this discussion, Kant says that his investigation on its subjective side is concerned with the question, "how is the faculty of thought itself possible?" But Paton claims that what Kant ought to say is, "How can the power of thinking give us a priori knowledge?"\textsuperscript{30} Thus when in the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition Kant speaks of the three subjective sources of cognition that make the understanding itself possible\textsuperscript{31} — and which Paton says "must be sense, imagination, and understanding (as a power of thinking)"\textsuperscript{32} — Paton adds that Kant "must mean that they make understanding possible as a power of knowing."\textsuperscript{33} Of the three subjective sources which form the a priori foundations of the possibility of experience, understanding, apart from

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 241.
\item Ibid., pp. 241, 352 n.4.
\item C.P.R., pp. 130-31, A97.
\item K.M.E., pp. 352 n.4-353.
\item Ibid., pp. 352 n.4-353.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
sense and imagination, is a power of thinking, and not of knowing\textsuperscript{34}. As a power of knowing, the understanding requires the cooperation of sense and imagination. Thus the Subjective Deduction investigates the possibility of pure understanding as a power of \textit{a priori} knowledge and the powers of cognition on which it rests\textsuperscript{35}.

Turning to the Deduction in the second edition Paton states that what he (Paton) has called the Objective and Subjective Deductions in the first edition differ from the Objective and Subjective Deductions in the latter edition\textsuperscript{36}. Why? In the second edition, in order to show how the pure categories give \textit{a priori} knowledge of objects, it is necessary to explain their relation to the form of time. This question is a concern of the Subjective Deduction, and without it, as it has already been mentioned, the Objective Deduction is incomplete\textsuperscript{37}. In the first edition Kant claimed that the Objective Deduction alone was essential to his purpose\textsuperscript{38}. Thus Paton ends by saying

\begin{itemize}
\item[34] Ibid., p. 353.
\item[35] Ibid., p. 352.
\item[36] Ibid., p. 527 n.6.
\item[37] Ibid., pp. 241 n.4, 527 n.6.
\item[38] \textit{C.P.R.}, p. 12, Axvii.
\end{itemize}
that it is at least "a plausible hypothesis" that the distinction between the two parts of the Deduction in the second edition is a distinction between the Objective and the Subjective Deduction. In a footnote Paton elaborates by saying that he does not claim that Kant distinguished the Objective and Subjective Deductions in the first edition in precisely the same way as it is found in the second edition, "as it is possible that he did not at first think out the distinction clearly".

The usage for distinguishing between the deduction that and the deduction how arises, as it has been pointed out in our Chapter One, in a footnote in the Preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Referring to this footnote in his discussion of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, Paton remarks that there, i.e., in the *Foundations*, a "similar" distinction is made between the proof that and the proof how. However, Paton maintains, the distinction was not clear in Kant's mind; for there, time, "curiously enough", was brought under the proof that,

40 Ibid., p. 501 n.3.
41 M.F.N.S., p. 11 n.8-14.
42 K.M.E., p. 529 n.3.
while the proof how did not even bring in the imagination but argued, instead, from the nature of judgement⁴³. It is clear, therefore, that Paton's manner of distinguishing between the deduction that and the deduction how in applying it to the second-edition Transcendental Deduction differs from Kant's manner of distinguishing the same.

4. Internal Evidence for Paton's Thesis in Sections 20, 21, and 26

Having presented the external textual sources which serve as evidence for Paton's division of the Deduction, there remains to consider those texts in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason itself which support Paton's hypothesis; namely, sections 20, 21, and 26. According to Paton, Kant explains the distinction between the two halves in a passage (§21) of "unusual clarity"⁴⁴. Paton expounds upon this passage in the following manner: Kant points out that in the Objective Deduction it was assumed that all finite thinking must have a manifold given to it in intuition prior to or independently of thought. This manifold (the manifold of an intuition in general) must have unity, if

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 528.
there is to be an intuition of an object. The manifold must be synthetised by the understanding, and in this way brought under the unity of apperception and the pure categories. The proof that the categories apply to objects of intuition in general has been achieved in the Objective Deduction. But, continues the commentary of Professor Paton, no account has been taken of the "way" (Art) in which the manifold is given. This means, says Paton, that no account has been taken of the form of human intuition. What remains to be shown is how the unity of the manifold of an intuition in general, a unity thought in the pure categories can be identical with the unity of our empirical intuitions given under the form of time. The second unity is but the first applied to our sensuous intuitions. Kant will argue that because our empirical intuitions are given under the form of time they must be subject to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.

46 Ibid., p. 528 n.5.
47 Ibid., p. 529.
48 Ibid., p. 528 n.6.
49 Ibid., p. 528.
50 Ibid., p. 528 n.8.
which imposes on them unity in accordance with the categories. Only in this way can it be explained how the categories apply a priori to objects of our human senses.\footnote{Ibid., p. 529.}

The passage of the Transcendental Deduction which we have just summarized above, and section 20 also, are both called by Paton the "Objective Deduction." Paton's justification is Kant's own reference in section 26 to sections 20 and 21 as being the "Transcendental Deduction."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 523-24.} But section 21 is a statement of the conclusion of section 20 and a review of the argument as a whole.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 523 n.4, 524 n.1.} Thus it becomes convenient to regard the second half of the Transcendental Deduction as beginning only with section 22.\footnote{Ibid., p. 524.}

Or, adds Paton, sections 22-23 "might be regarded" as an appendix to the first half.\footnote{Ibid., p. 502.}

Having seen the first piece of internal textual evidence that Paton musters in support of the distinction between an objective and subjective side of the Transcendental

\footnote{Ibid., 502 n.2.}
Deduction, let us now proceed to a study of those arguments by means of which Paton sees Kant arriving at the conclusions of each half; for this too is a crucial piece of evidence. This study will begin with an examination of the Objective Deduction, and therefore with section 20, the place where Kant brings together the points of the previous sections and draws the conclusion that the categories have objective validity. Section 20 is what Paton calls the "essence" of the Objective Deduction. Here, then, is Paton's rendering of section 20 whose heading is that "All Sensible Intuitions are subject to the Categories as Conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one Consciousness." In section 17 Kant argued that the manifold of "every" intuition must be subject to the synthetic unity of apperception; for only in this way can the intuition have that unity which is necessary for it to be an intuition of an object. In section 19, Kant argued that judgement is that act whereby the manifold of all given representations (whether intuitions or concepts) is thought under the unity of apperception. Hence

57 Ibid., p. 523.
58 C.P.R., p. 160, B 143.
all the manifold, insofar as it is given in "one" intuition, is determined in relation to one of the forms of judgement. But the categories are forms of judgement insofar as the manifold is determined in relation to these forms. The conclusion is, therefore, that the manifold of a given intuition is subject to the categories, if the intuition is to have that unity necessary for it to be an intuition of an object\(^59\). In other words, adds Paton, section 20 says that the categories necessarily apply to all objects given to sensuous intuition\(^60\).

What remains to be done is to consider the evidence that Paton presents in favour of his hypothesis with regard to the second portion of the argument, i.e., the part concerning the Subjective Deduction. Paton considers the subjective side of the Deduction to be a preparation for the schematism of the categories\(^61\). The essence of the Subjective Deduction is to be found in section 26\(^62\). The two introductory subsections following section 21, sections 22 and 23, show that for us the categories apply to objects

\(^{59}\) K.M.E., p. 524.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 529.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 530 n.1.
of experience only. They apply to objects given in empirical intuition under the forms of time and space, and not to things in themselves. In Paton's opinion sections 24 and 26 are the key passages of the Subjective Deduction.

The general argument proceeds as follows: Because space and time are pure forms of human intuition, there is possible a transcendental synthesis of imagination which determines the given manifold in accordance with the unity of apperception.

The first part of section 24 is followed by an account of the unity of apperception in relation to inner sense and the form time. But it is in section 26 that the essence of the Subjective Deduction is to be found, and there Kant attempts to show "how our human intuitions must fall under the categories if we are to know objects in one common space and time." The heading of this

63 Ibid., p. 529.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 529 n.4.
66 Ibid., p. 530 n.1.
67 Ibid., pp. 530, 557-58.
section is the "Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Employment in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding"\(^\text{68}\). In Paton's view, this heading is not apt unless "experience" can be assumed to mean "human" experience\(^\text{69}\).

Professor Paton's interpretation of the first paragraph in this section is particularly interesting; for here Kant once again speaks of what has been achieved and what remains to be done. Therefore, it will be necessary for us to reproduce Paton's account in its entirety. Thus far, it has been proved that the categories, whose a priori origin was shown in the Metaphysical Deduction, give a priori knowledge of objects of intuition in general. Strictly speaking, adds Paton, a priori knowledge of objects of intuition is general is not knowledge until one can indicate the nature of the intuitions so described\(^\text{70}\). But now it is necessary, continues Paton, to show that they give a priori knowledge of objects of human intuition\(^\text{71}\). Then, adds Paton, in so doing we shall be concerned, not with the

\(^\text{68}\) C.P.R., p. 170, B 159.
\(^\text{69}\) K.M.E., p. 537 n.9.
\(^\text{70}\) Ibid., p. 538 n.2.
\(^\text{71}\) Ibid., p. 538.
form of intuition under which objects are given, but with the laws of combination imposed on them if they are to be thought as objects. That is, what needs explanation is how the understanding prescribes laws to nature and thus makes nature possible. Unless this is done, it will never be possible to understand how everything that is offered to our senses must be obedient to the laws which have their origin in the human understanding\textsuperscript{72}.

The second paragraph of section 26 is but a definition of the synthesis of apprehension\textsuperscript{73}. In the third paragraph Kant presents some of the conclusions of section 26. Paton interprets the argument and conclusion in the following way: Space and time are the forms of all intuition. Therefore, the synthesis of apprehension, which combines the given manifold in one intuition, must do so in conformity with those forms\textsuperscript{74}. As forms of intuition space and time are a mere multiplicity without unity. Only as pure intuitions do they possess unity. In the Transcendental Aesthetic this necessary unity was treated as belonging to space and time in their own right. But, as pure intuitions,

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 539.
space and time possess unity only because they presuppose a synthesis which does not belong to sense. This unity of space and time is an a priori condition of the synthesis of apprehension. In other words, everything that is to be represented "determinately" in time must conform to this necessary unity which is involved in the nature of space and time themselves.

Now, says Paton, comes the contention on which the whole argument rests, and which Henrich saw fit to dismiss as being "only an application of the result of section 20 and of the conclusion of section 26." Kant says here that, this synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories, in so far as the combination is applied to our sensible intuition.

According to Paton this means that the necessary synthetic unity which must belong to all the manifold of human intuition, if the manifold is to be combined in one space and time, is identical with that necessary synthetic unity of the manifold.

75 Ibid., p. 540-41.
76 Ibid., p. 541.
77 Ibid.
78 P.S.T.D., p. 653.
79 C.P.R., p. 171, B 161.
of a given intuition in general which is involved in the transcendental unity of apperception and is thought in the pure categories\textsuperscript{80}. The difference between them is that the unity of intuition is now applied to our human intuitions which are given under the forms of space and time\textsuperscript{81}. According to Paton this doctrine is but another form of the contention that the transcendental synthesis of imagination, which is the condition of synthetising the given manifold in one space and one time, is a synthesis in accordance with the unity of apperception and the categories\textsuperscript{82}. If such is the case, then the synthesis of apprehension necessary for sense-perception must conform to the categories. And since human experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are \textit{a priori} conditions of the possibility of experience. Consequently, they are valid \textit{a priori} for all objects of human experience\textsuperscript{83}.

Paton's clearest expression of the achievement of the Subjective Deduction is again to be found in Chapter Thirty. There he restates the conclusion of section 26 and

\textsuperscript{80} K.M.E., pp. 541-42.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 542.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
relates it to the idea of a Subjective Deduction. Time and space must conform to that demand for synthetic unity which is the most ultimate and general demand of thought. If they did not do so, the unity of apperception would be impossible. There must be then only one time and one space, and to this ultimate necessity the given manifold must conform: "The empirical manifold must therefore possess such synthetic unity as is necessary for it to have a definite position in one time and space"\(^{84}\). According to Paton, this "very general conclusion" is the result of the Transcendental Deduction on its subjective side. With this conclusion we can now understand, not only that the empirical manifold must possess the synthetic unity demanded by thought if experience of objects is to be had; we can now understand how it must do so under the "actual conditions of human experience", that is, under the forms of space and time, and the transcendental synthesis of imagination\(^ {85}\).

Still, the argument in section 26 has not come to an end. Kant, says Paton, intends to show that corresponding to each pure category there is a schema, or a transcendental determination of time. He intends to prove that these

\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 557.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., pp. 557-58.
schemata are necessarily involved in all experience of objects in one common space and time. But for the present, Kant confines himself to giving us two illustrations from the categories of quantity and relation. Finally, with regard to the conclusions drawn in the last three paragraphs of section 26 concerning understanding as lawgiver, Paton merely stops to remark that in Kant's final conclusion little is added to what has been said in a corresponding passage in the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction.

5. Evaluation of Paton's Interpretation and of Henrich's Criticisms

Such, then, is Paton's rendering of the proof of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction with regard to the crucial sections 20, 21, and 26. What remains to be done is to give an evaluation of Paton's interpretation and Professor Henrich's criticisms of Paton.

To begin with, Henrich's claim that Paton regards the Deduction as consisting of "two distinct and complete proofs" thus going against Kant's "assurance" that the

86 Ibid., p. 542.

87 Ibid., p. 545. The passage to which Paton refers is A126-28 of the first German edition.

Deduction must have two steps to one proof, seems not to be correct. We have already seen that Paton considers the Objective Deduction to be manifestly incomplete without the Subjective Deduction\(^89\). Before evaluating Henrich's criticism of Paton, however, we must be clear with regard to what the former means by the formula, the "double-proof theory". Does he understand by the "double-proof theory" two arguments having entirely different premises leading to conclusions which are unrelated to each other? Or, does he mean that the conclusion reached in section 20 is intermediate and serves as a premise in what follows and makes possible the final conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction, a conclusion which should satisfy the aim of the Transcendental Deduction? If the latter is the case, then Henrich's formula of two steps to one proof in no way differs from Paton's actual interpretation of the argument. In any case, now the same touchstone can be applied to Henrich as well as to Paton when it comes to determining what are the conclusions of sections 20 and 26, insofar as the aim of the Transcendental Deduction is concerned. Perhaps Henrich's arguments can also find no useful explanation for the distinction, not between two separate proofs, but between

\(^{89}\) K.M.E., pp. 527, 529.
an intermediate conclusion and the final conclusion. In other words, the question becomes one of logical validity. Is Paton's, de Vleeschauwer's, or Henrich's estimation of the conclusion reached in section 20, such that without it the conclusion of section 26 would not be possible?

What is puzzling, however, is why Henrich would in the first place impute to Paton an alien interpretation of the structure of the argument. But let us recall how Henrich originally presented his case. First, he took the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 and claimed that the same conclusion appeared to be drawn twice. Thus "one" is tempted to see two "proofs" of the "same" proposition in the text in spite of Kant's assurance that two proofs together constitute the proof of the Deduction\(^\text{90}\). This means that the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 are each different. Then Henrich went on to speak of Paton and de Vleeschauwer as adhering to a "double-proof-theory"\(^\text{92}\). Somehow Henrich has made a leap from the "one" who was tempted to see two proofs of one proposition to the commentators Paton and de Vleeschauwer!

\(^{90}\) P.S.T.D., pp. 641-42.

\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 642.

\(^{92}\) Ibid.
Furthermore, it must be noted that in spite of Henrich's claim that Kant gives an "unequivocal explication"\textsuperscript{93} or an "assurance"\textsuperscript{94} that two arguments rather than two proofs constitute the proof of the Deduction, and in spite of Paton's claim that Kant explains the distinction between the "two halves" in a passage of "unusual clarity", there seems to be little argument among the two commentators on how to understand this very lucid passage! Both commentators do agree that section 21 is especially illuminating when it comes to understanding something about how Kant actually arrives at the conclusion found in section 26. Henrich, however, does not linger in section 21. Instead he attempts to understand the conclusion in terms of his translation of the phrase found in section 20, in \textit{Einer Anschauung}. According to Henrich the capitalization of the "E" in \textit{Einer} signifies that Kant is emphasizing the "unity" of intuition, and not its "singularity" as the Norman Kemp Smith translation of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} would have us believe.

However, Henrich proceeds, in our estimation, towards a gross misinterpretation of this phrase and of

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 641.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p. 642.
the conclusion of section 20. Henrich claims that the conclusion contains a restriction: Kant had "established that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity". This is the force of in Einer Auschauung! Thus the proof is valid only for "those intuitions which already contain unity". But according to section 21, in section 26 the range within which these intuitions are found will be clarified, the restriction will be overcome, and it will be shown that the categories are valid for all objects of our senses. This conclusion will be possible because in our representations of space and time we have intuitions which contain unity and which include everything that can be present to our senses. That Henrich's interpretation of the argument might be false can already be suspected from his strange emphasis on the word all and also from the opposition that he proposes between a restricted use of the categories, and an unrestricted application, i.e., to all objects of our senses. The point that renders Henrich's

95 Ibid., p. 645.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid., pp. 645-46.  
98 Ibid., p. 646.
emphasis on the word all suspect is that no such emphasis is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason itself. Indeed, it presupposes Henrich's hypothesis which is still subject to justification or proof.

However, the main difficulty of his thesis he shares with Paton. Both assume that when in section 20 Kant speaks of the manifold in a given intuition being subject to the categories that Kant is speaking of a "real" synthesis. Then it becomes a matter of locating the appropriate instances — either "human" intuition (Paton) or the representations of space and time which already have unity (Henrich) — and these will, according to the conclusion of section 20, be subject to the categories. Thus Henrich speaks of the conclusion of section 20 as stating that "wherever we find unity, this unity is itself made possible by the categories and determined in relation to them". According to Paton in section 20 of the deduction that it is proved that "the manifold of a given intuition must be subject to the categories, if the intuition is to have that unity which is necessary for it to be intuition of an object." All that remains to show is

99 Ibid.
100 K.M.E., p. 524.
how they do conform. But if such is the case, then the discomfort that both Henrich and Paton must face is that no further steps are necessary to bring the Deduction to a completion. Indeed, to add after section 20 that consequently our empirical intuition is subject to the categories would, granting their interpretations, be to add nothing which was not contained already in the conclusion of that former section.

Perhaps it is at this point that Kant's emphasis on the article "Einer" will seem to show its true significance. It will not mean that Kant is simply restricting the application of the categories to those intuitions that already possess unity, or that intuitions must be subject to the categories if they are to have that unity necessary for the intuition of an object. Indeed, it may indicate the particular kind of unity Kant has in mind, that is, the level of abstraction on which the argument is being presented at this point. Our contention seems to be confirmed when we refer to other parts of the Transcendental Deduction which are relevant with respect to section 20.

101 Ibid., p. 529.
Thus Kant speaks of the categories as producing a priori unity of apperception. But the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception is "the first pure knowledge of understanding" which is "completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition...". Thus the combination or synthesis of the manifold in the pure categories is "purely intellectual". Then it becomes clear that the categories in section 20 prescribe unity only to the "manifold of a given intuition in general". What is meant for a category to apply to an object of intuition in general is clearly explained by Kant in section 24:

The pure concepts of the understanding relate, through the mere understanding, to objects of intuition in general, whether that intuition be our own or any other, provided only that it be sensible. The concepts are, however, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, through which no determinate object is known.

Such being the nature of the synthesis signified by the categories — a purely intellectual one — it becomes

102 C.P.R., p. 161, B 145.
103 Ibid., p. 156, B 137.
104 Ibid., p. 164, B 150; also, p. 171, n.6, B 161, n.6.
105 Ibid., p. 161, B 145.
106 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
impossible to accept either Henrich's or Paton's conception of the conclusion of section 20 and of the argument of the Transcendental Deduction in general.

In the case of Paton's interpretation, there accompany it special or unique difficulties. That is, one is confronted by what seem to be conflicting statements of what actually is the conclusion of the Objective Deduction. In the first place he says that it concludes that "the categories necessarily apply to all objects given in sensuous intuition. They are, in short, "objectively valid". And, "this is what the Transcendental Deduction was required to prove". However, Paton also says that from the Objective Deduction, or the deduction that, we know that our intuitions, like all others, must conform to the categories. We must now show how they do so. But in this second set of observations, a further remark flatly contradicts his earlier estimation that this was all the Deduction aimed to prove. Paton adds that "our proof that the categories apply to objects of intuition in general is

108 Ibid., p. 525.
109 Ibid., p. 529.
only the beginning, or the first stage, of the Transcendental Deduction. If, indeed, it has been proven that the categories are objectively valid, what is the necessity for the Subjective Deduction without which Paton claimed the argument was manifestly incomplete? The Subjective Deduction, or the deduction how, appears merely as having a clarificatory function. In this case Professor

110 Ibid.

111 H.J. Paton, in his article, "The Key to Kant's Deduction of the Categories", submitted to the review of philosophy and psychology called Mind, 40 (1931), pp. 310-29, reveals that this way of dividing the Deduction was present — although in rudimentary form — even at that early date. He says, in a sentence, that the "question of how the categories can apply to objects is considered in the Subjective Deduction" (ibid., p. 328). However, in this article he does say that the "essence" of the Transcendental Deduction is found in section 20. (ibid., p. 323).

In spite of its title, this article does not concern itself with the problem of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction. The views that are expressed with regard to this point are contained only in a few sentences; and it is difficult to tell whether Paton is merely being brief or that his views on this subject are not fully developed.

The "key" to which Paton refers has to do with the then current view that the forms of judgement are forms of analytic judgement only. But if this is the case, then how can the forms of analytic judgement be a clue to the categories, which are principles of synthesis (ibid., p.310)? The "key" then is that the forms of judgement are forms of both analytic and synthetic judgement. The Transcendental Deduction depends on the Metaphysical Deduction. But the latter depends on the identification of the categories with the forms of judging as applying to and uniting the manifold given to sense. But this is meaningless unless the forms of judgement are also forms of synthetic judgements (ibid., p. 324).
Henrich's criticism would be right, although for the wrong reason, in that Paton has failed to produce a unified argument which through two necessary stages produces the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction.

Finally, Paton's argument betrays its weakness when it cannot make the connection with the Principles of Pure Understanding, a connection Kant clearly intends to make in the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction. In section 26 Kant remarks that it must be shown how one can know a priori by the categories whatever objects may present themselves to our senses in respect of the laws of combination thus making nature possible. In this way the a priori validity of the categories for all objects of experience would be proved. In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant speaks of the Principles saying that "the principles of possible experience are ... at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be known a priori." Thus it is no wonder that the Transcendental Deduction is the "exposition of the pure concepts of the understanding, and therewith of all theoretical a priori

112 C.P.R., p. 170, B 159-160.

113 P.F.M., p. 53.
knowledge, as principles of the possibility of experience..."\textsuperscript{114}. Yet in his book, \textit{Kant's Metaphysic of Experience}, Paton ignores this passage and mentions the Principles in passing only\textsuperscript{115}; for, as it has been mentioned in our exposition, according to Paton, Kant's aim is limited to tying the second part of the Deduction with the Chapter on the "Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding"\textsuperscript{116}.

\textsuperscript{114} C.P.R., p. 175, B 168.
\textsuperscript{115} K.M.E., pp. 541, 546.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 500.
CHAPTER III

AN INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 21, AND OF THE
RESULTS OF SECTIONS 20 AND 26
ACCORDING TO H.J. DE VLEESCHAUWER

1. Outline of Procedure

When we return to Professor Henrich's interpretation
of the proof-structure of the second-edition Transcendental
Deduction as it is worked out in relation to Herman J. de
Vleeschauwer's thesis, we can begin by saying that the
criticism of the double-proof theory is also directed
against the latter commentator. Consequently, this aspect
of Professor Henrich's critique need not be repeated here,
but only kept in mind until we come to criticize explicitly
de Vleeschauwer's interpretation. What does require mention
is the manner de Vleeschauwer chooses to distinguish between
the two parts of the Deduction, and Professor Henrich's
remarks on this subject.

As we have already seen, Henrich frowns upon any
attempt to utilize Kant's observations with regard to the
proof as it if found in the first edition in order to
interpret the second edition\(^1\). This criticism, therefore,
applies both to Paton and de Vleeschauwer. In de Vleeschauwer's

\(^1\) P.S.T.D., pp. 644-45.
case, the distinction made in the first edition, that is then applied to the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition, is that concerning the deduction "from above", i.e., from self-consciousness, and the deduction "from below", i.e., from the given sensible representations. Section 20 is regarded as a deduction "from above" while section 26 is regarded as a deduction "from below". In Henrich's estimation, de Vleeschauwer's interpretation is in better agreement with the text of section 26; for Kant here actually proceeds from intuition, mentions the achievement of the faculty of imagination, and comes then to speak of the unity which can be reached only through the categories and by virtue of the unification of the manifold in a consciousness.

Yet, continues Henrich, the two parts of the Deduction remain unexplained because the first argument in section 20 can "in no way" be regarded as a deduction "from above". Why? Because, says Henrich, in section 20 "the manifold of a sensible intuition is mentioned first". Indeed, "both arguments", claims Henrich, establish that "a given intuition can become a unitary representation only when the intellectual

2 Ibid., p. 643.
3 Ibid., p. 644.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
functions of understanding are applied to it"\textsuperscript{6}. Thus
Henrich is led to level the same accusations against de
Vleeschauwer as against Paton; namely, that there is no
useful distinction for the two proofs, and that there is
a departure from Kant's assurance that there is only one
proof presented in two steps, i.e., that de Vleeschauwer
attempts to find two distinct proofs\textsuperscript{7}.

We shall proceed in the same way as with the case
of Paton by presenting de Vleeschauwer's thesis and the
evidence gathered in its support, so that we may finally
say something about the value of Henrich's criticisms, of
de Vleeschauwer's interpretation, and finally of Henrich's
thesis in the light of de Vleeschauwer's interpretation.

Herman J. de Vleeschauwer presents the argument of
the Transcendental Deduction in the third volume of his
work, \textit{La déduction transcendante dans l'oeuvre de Kant:}
\textit{La déduction transcendante de 1787 jusqu'à l''Opus}
\textit{Postumum'}, against the background of what he considers to
be the direction of Kant's mental evolution, i.e., as a
movement towards objective idealism. Thus the changes
between the first and second edition of the Transcendental

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
Deduction are interpreted as a movement in this direction. For our own purposes, however, we shall consider de Vleeschauwer's exposition, not horizontally, but rather vertically, i.e., we shall take account of the argument solely as it is found within the text of the second edition and on the strength of the text, that is, on its logic, and not as a moment of one kind of development or other.

Therefore, it will be necessary to begin by giving a summary exposition of those features peculiar to the second-edition Transcendental Deduction when compared with the Transcendental Deduction found in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This material is found in de Vleeschauwer's work The Development of Kantian Thought. We shall mention only those feature that relate to the question of proof-structure, and which provide de Vleeschauwer with the evidence he needs for his particular interpretation. Professor de Vleeschauwer himself presents these features as a step in the evolution of Kantian thought. The "changes" that Kant makes concern the aim of the Deduction and the means to achieve this aim. Our task, however, is not to question de Vleeschauwer's interpretation of any "development" that may have occurred. Yet we must state what he considers to be the terminus ad quem of such a development; for, for our purposes, it will reveal something of how de Vleeschauwer
regards the structure of the argument as it is found in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction.

First of all, with regard to its aim, the Deduction of 1787 differs from that of 1781 in that in the latter the problem concerned the establishing of the objectivity of our a priori knowledge. The solution was that the pure concept is valid because it is also a condition of experience and thus the condition of the objects of experience\(^8\). Looking at the period prior to 1787, de Vleeschauwer notes than an evolution occurred in what Kant himself considered to be the problem of the Deduction. In the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, the nervus probandi became the "universal validity of the judgement of experience"\(^9\). But in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant substituted for the problem of objectivity the question of the limitation of pure reason to phenomena, as the critical demonstration\(^10\). Therefore, at the end of this transition, in 1787, the problem to be solved was the limitation of reason to phenomena\(^11\). Professor de Vleeschauwer claims that in 1781 the

\(^8\) D.K.T., p. 93.

\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Ibid., p. 98.
limitation thesis appeared only as an "element" of the solution; afterwards it came to be the problem to be solved. Thus in the Deduction of 1787 the limitation of reason to phenomena is treated "both as the problem to be solved and as the condition of its solution". It is a condition of the solution in sections 16-21 of the Deduction; and it is treated, says de Vleeschauwer, as the problem to be solved in section 22-26. The limitation thesis, therefore, would seem to provide one way of dividing the Deduction. Professor de Vleeschauwer, however, tends to emphasize that way of dividing the Transcendental Deduction which comes from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., according to a deduction "from above" and a deduction "from below". In sections 16-21, the Deduction is developed from apperception. In section 26, it is developed from the given. Sections 22-25 are a preface to section 26 limiting the objective validity of the categories to their empirical use; in section 26 the "limitation is inserted as one of the conditions of reasoning".

12 Ibid., p. 93.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
Finally, when the aim of the Transcendental Deduction was one of establishing the objectivity of our *a priori* knowledge, this meant, according to de Vleeschauwer, that "synthesis was in essence the constitutive act around which the whole procedure of the deduction rotated"\(^{15}\). But it was synthesis, he continues, that was the direct cause of that erroneous interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which regarded it as arguing for subjective idealism\(^{16}\).

Because synthesis is the psychological element in the knowing process, says de Vleeschauwer, it resulted in making the "whole system of human knowledge both subjective and relative..."\(^{17}\). Kant's remedy in the second edition was to eliminate the Subjective Deduction thus taking away the centre of gravity from the synthetising activity\(^{18}\), and replacing it with the notion of unification\(^{19}\). This unity is constituted by the act of judgement\(^{20}\). Furthermore, since unity has been substituted for synthesis, it becomes necessary

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 94.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 93, 95.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 95.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 104.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 105.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
to make apperception absolutely preeminent, or the dominating unity. In any case, even granting Kant's supposed change with regard to the aim of the Transcendental Deduction, de Vleeschauwer allows that there is no formal contradiction between the two objectives.

2. Exposition of de Vleeschauwer's Interpretation of the Proof-Structure

Having seen at least in a general way what de Vleeschauwer considers to be the key features of the second edition Transcendental Deduction relatively to the first edition, let us now turn to his *magnem opus* and study more closely those features which directly relate to the question of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction.

In the chapter entitled the "Economy of the New Transcendental Deduction", Professor de Vleeschauwer dwells at some length on the question of how the argument of the Deduction is to be divided. He regards Benno Erdmann's solution as being a model, at least in some respects. Briefly, de Vleeschauwer presents Erdmann as dividing the Deduction into a first (§15-21) and a second (§28) part.

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Each part is then followed by supplementary comments, i.e., sections 22-25 serve to supplement the first part, and section 27 has the same function relatively to the second part. Sections 22-25 confirm the first deduction by showing that the categories can have no employment other than an empirical one. Section 27 renders a similar service for the second part, says de Vleeschauwer. Professor de Vleeschauwer's own interpretation will aim at, "une solution conciliatrice entre l'unicité que Kant visait incontestablement et le schéma dichotomique de B. Erdmann." Prof. de Vleeschauwer then goes on to present his own manner of dividing the argument of the Deduction.

Insofar as the problem of the objective validity of the categories is the main concern of the Deduction, then, says de Vleeschauwer, it is undeniable that this is arrived at by section 21. However, adds de Vleeschauwer, it is also true that section 26 takes up anew this same problem and leads it to the same conclusion. Consequently, one can

23 T.D., p. 23.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
say that this section also constitutes a deduction\textsuperscript{27}. In de Vleeschauwer's view, no commentator, thus far, seems to have noticed that "la double déduction" of 1787 repeats in its general structure the deduction \textit{von oben an} and the deduction \textit{von unten auf} of 1781\textsuperscript{28}.

The first deduction is a deduction "from above". Kant begins with an examination of pure apperception (916-18). He then follows it to its unifying function in judgement and then traces its diversification into the categories (920). Professor de Vleeschauwer presents the descent in the following manner: All knowledge is combination (\textit{conjunctio}). Unity of consciousness is combination's highest condition\textsuperscript{29}. But an object is a concept of the unity of a given manifold of intuition\textsuperscript{30}. Thus it is apperception that produces relation to an object\textsuperscript{31}. Now judgement is that which relates the manifold to the objective unity of consciousness\textsuperscript{32}. Judgement, however, reveals itself

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.: "... l'objet, dans son sens critique, est le concept de l'unité d'un multiple intuitif donné, ...".
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 25.
as having certain determinate forms. Now the categories are not essentially distinct from the acts of judgement; for, "l'acte judicatif se mue en concept formel d'un objet, lorsque le multiple à unifier est d'ordre intuitif". Thus the manifold of intuition, or, adds de Vleeschauwer, "la perception donnée", acquires unity or becomes an object only by its being subject to a category. This, then, surely is a deduction "from above". Therefore, the Transcendental Deduction can be considered as virtually completed in section 20 where it is shown that "les catégories ont un rapport nécessaire avec l'objet". Kant, continues de Vleeschauwer, could have been content to consider the Deduction as already complete at this point were it not for the currents of subjective idealism. In order for there to be a relation to an object, it is necessary to have a manifold of intuition. But must this intuition be sensible? If we say yes, then

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
the categories are bound to an empirical content. If we say no, then they may be applied beyond the limits of experience, says de Vleeschauwer. Thus de Vleeschauwer claims that the Deduction in section 20 "s'applique indifféremment à l'intuition humaine et à une intuition simplement possible, parce que non contradictoire".

Kant, therefore, proceeds in sections 22-25 to investigate the nature of the manifold which is given to us and the results flowing from its nature insofar as the extent of our knowledge is concerned. On the other hand, he shows that while it is lawful to think an object in general without regarding the nature of the intuition, knowledge of an object is bound to an actually given intuition. Thus to be decisive the Deduction must take account of the limiting character of empirical intuition and of the nature of knowledge (versus thought). It becomes necessary now to show that perception is unintelligible except by means of the categories. For this reason, then, section

38 Ibid., p. 25.
40 Ibid., p. 25.
41 Ibid., p. 26.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
26 is required. It takes up the Deduction of sections 15-21, but backwards, or "from below"\textsuperscript{44}. Section 26 begins with the empirical elements of our knowledge and ascends to the synthetic functions (les fonctions de synthèse)\textsuperscript{45}, thereby repeating the trek, but this time "from below", or \textit{von unten auf}, as in 1781\textsuperscript{46}.

Beginning with the manifold given in space and time, Kant reconstructs, as it were, objective knowledge passing first to the \textit{a priori} forms and then to the functions of synthesis\textsuperscript{47}. What enables Kant to make the passage from the apprehended manifold to the unity of consciousness is the double nature of space and time. They are both \textit{a priori} forms of sensible intuition and also formal intuitions. Since the unity of consciousness expressed in the categories is the \textit{raison d'être} of the representation of space and time, and since this representation is the form of the empirically given manifold, it is clear that this manifold is not represented save by being brought to unity \textit{via} the categorical function\textsuperscript{48}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 26.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 26-27.
\end{itemize}
Thus the deduction is repeated once again, but, adds Professor de Vleeschauwer, this does not mean that section 20 was not a deduction. Rather it means that the first deduction did not take in the problem in its widest scope.


Having presented in a general way what de Vleeschauwer considers to be the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction, let us now gather the evidence he brings in support of his thesis, especially such evidence as may be found in sections 20, 21, and 26. We shall begin, therefore, with section 21, the place where Kant speaks of the conclusion of section 20 and of the task that lies ahead.

Professor de Vleeschauwer begins his analysis of section 21 by situating, first of all, the reader with regard to what Kant had accomplished thus far, and then telling him how Kant inserted this section so that the reader would not lose the thread of thought of the argument. In section 20 Kant had proved that the categories are logical functions applied to intuitions in general.

49 Ibid., p. 27.
50 Ibid., p. 154.
51 Ibid.
Sections 22-25 function as an extended parenthesis. There Kant proposes a return to phenomenalism in order to prove that the categories are valid only in respect of a sensible intuition conditioned by space and time. This next step, however, does not flow immediately from sections 19-20. There Kant had shown only that the given manifold is subject to the categories "parce que, pour être consciente, elle (the given manifold) est soumise à l'unité objective de l'apperception". This subjection must be considered necessary.

Turning to the analysis of section 21, de Vleeschauwer divides the first paragraph into three parts. The first part seems to be a résumé of the preceding sections. The second part discusses how the preceding sections constitute the 'beginning' of a Deduction. In the third part Kant tells the reader how section 26 constitutes the true Deduction (la véritable déduction).

First of all, the résumé concerns the first two sentences of section 21, and a footnote added by Kant to

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52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 155.
explain the first sentence. According to de Vleeschauwer, the résumé depends directly on sections 16 and 20 omitting any consideration of section 19. In the footnote added to the text Kant sums up the doctrine of sections 17 and 18. Bearing this in mind, he offers the following as an accurate résumé of the argument as it is presented in the opening sentences of section 21: the representability (la représentabilité) of a manifold of given intuition depends on its relation to the objective unity of consciousness through the mediation of the synthetic function called the category.

What is especially interesting in de Vleeschauwer's interpretation of section 21 is his judgement that Kant's reference to sections 15-20 as a 'beginning', Anfang, of the Deduction, is inappropriate. Professor de Vleeschauwer uses the words "bizarre" and "anomalous" to describe Kant's desire to call sections 15-20 a beginning. The Transcendental Deduction, insofar as its aim is to show the objective validity of the categories has, "sans aucun doute," attained its purpose in section 20. Thus the text of section 21 has,

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. H.J. de Vleeschauwer is referring to C.P.R., p. 160, B 144, n.a.
58 Ibid., p. 156.
59 Ibid.
to no purpose, limited the scope of the preceding paragraphs. De Vleeschauwer adds that what Kant really wishes to do is merely to strengthen the proof by a return to phenomenalism, i.e., by showing that the categories have objective validity only relatively to a sensible intuition whose forms are space and time. Thus while in section 21 Kant reaffirms the independence of the categories with regard to sensibility, the purpose of the Deduction will consist in explaining the a priori validity of the categories with respect to objects of our senses. True, it is in the understanding that the categories have their origin; but the understanding and its categorical functions require more than mere spontaneity. Hence one must also suppose 'a' matter previously received, 'a' given, upon which the understanding might exercise its activity. So, concludes de Vleeschauwer, the relation to an intuitively given manifold, in this case, to the manifold of given intuition in general, is "indispensable" for the Deduction up to section 21.

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60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., pp. 156-57.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
Consequently, Kant's term "beginning" applies to a Deduction without the turn to phenomenalism. For this reason, de Vleeschauwer calls section 26 "la véritable déduction"65. In other words, says de Vleeschauwer, the general thesis of section 20 is applied there completely (intégralement), i.e., the specific mode according to which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility is taken into account66.

Section 20 has but demonstrated that intuition in general is subject to the objective unity of consciousness and thus to the categories. But is has neglected the question concerning the mode according to which the intuition is given to us. We must now ask, says de Vleeschauwer, whether the mode of intuition is of such a nature as to allow the empirical intuition to be subject to the categories67. Because the categories are independent with regard to sensibility, they cannot govern, says de Vleeschauwer, this mode of intuition68. In order to bring about synthetic unity, they must presuppose a given manifold and that this given

65 Ibid., p. 158.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
Thus section 26 introduces a new element into the Transcendental Deduction; i.e., that of the formal intuition whereby the empirical manifold can be governed and ordered. In the Transcendental Aesthetic the existence of the pure forms of space and time has been demonstrated. These forms are, however, as we have already noted, also formal intuitions and their unification proceeds according to the determinations of section 20\textsuperscript{70}. This new element had already been introduced in sections 24-25 without being related explicitly to the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction. But in section 26, the formal intuitions are integrated within the structure of the Deduction\textsuperscript{71}. Thus while in section 20 the argument was developed according to a descent from a highest to a lowest condition — that is, the categories conferred unity upon the formal intuitions of space and time — in section 26 these formal intuitions serve as the necessary forms of sensible receptivity. Therefore, the categories are principles of synthetic unity of everything within space and time. This means, then, that

\begin{itemize}
  \item[69] Ibid.
  \item[70] Ibid., pp. 158-59.
  \item[71] Ibid., p. 158.
\end{itemize}
the end attained by section 26 surpasses that of section 20, but only due to "un complément étranger au problème strict que la déduction se proposait de résoudre".\textsuperscript{72}

Having seen the general conclusions of sections 20 and 26, and the aims that the Deduction embodies in its structure from the viewpoint of Kant's observations in, and Professor de Vleeschauwer's comments on, section 21, what remains to be done is that we examine the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 separately. With regard to section 20, however, we have already stated its basic conclusion and argument. At this point there is little to add because de Vleeschauwer contents himself with repeating the argument as it stands, adding nothing new by way of comments. At this point, however, we could merely make the observation that in contrast to Henrich, de Vleeschauwer sees no particular significance with regard to the phrase \textit{in Einer empirischen Anschauung}!

This leaves section 26 as our main point of interest insofar as de Vleeschauwer attempts to find the evidence that would support his particular version of the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction. We have already stated earlier what de Vleeschauwer considers to be the steps of

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 159.
the argument when discussing the proof "from below". We shall direct our attention mainly to what de Vleeschauwer has to say with regard to the first paragraph of section 26 where Kant gives a résumé of the argument up to this point and states what remains to be done so that the Transcendental Deduction might be brought to completion. To begin with, de Vleeschauwer says of section 26, or of the Phenomenalist Deduction (La déduction phénoménaliste) as he names it, that here Kant neglects that distinction made in section 21 where he referred to a 'beginning' of the Deduction. Now Kant speaks of section 20 as the Deduction simply. In sections 20-21, continues de Vleeschauwer repeating Kant, it has been proved that the categories are a priori modes of knowing an object of intuition in general. Again referring to section 20, de Vleeschauwer repeats that Kant has resolved the problem of the objective validity of the categories there. But now Kant wishes to do more. At this point de Vleeschauwer merely repeats Kant's project that now we have to explain the possibility of knowing a priori by means of the categories whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not in respect of the

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73 Ibid., p. 238.

74 Ibid., p. 232. H.J. de Vleeschauwer refers to C.P.R., p. 170, B 159.

75 Ibid., p. 232.
form of their intuition, but in respect of their laws of combination. Professor de Vleeschauwer claims, however, that this is not a new task as Kant would have us believe; for we have already dealt with it earlier in section 24 in its first part! Section 20 considers intuitions in general without being concerned with the different kinds (espèces) of intuition. But section 24 takes an entirely anthropological stance.

Sections 22-25, therefore, form a parenthesis, whereas section 26 is an enriched resumption of a single Deduction. The role of sections 22-25 is clearly seen once we see there those premises that are indispensable to the argument of section 26, just as sections 15-19 are indispensable to section 20. This means that we must abandon the schema suggested by the first paragraph of section 26, or rather the schema that de Vleeschauwer claims to see there. According to that new schema, sections 15-21 would not constitute the beginning of a Deduction, but rather would be a complete Deduction proving the objective.

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76 H.J. de Vleeschauwer is referring to C.P.R., p. 170, B 159-160.


78 Ibid., p. 233, n.3.

79 Ibid.
validity of the categories as necessary forms of an object of intuition in general. Furthermore, according to that schema, sections 22-26 would together constitute a second complete Deduction which would complement the first one, and whose task it would be to establish the same validity of the categories as necessary forms for an object of sensible intuition. This view is rejected because it would proceed against that unity of argument which de Vleeschauwer claims to be Kant's true intention.

Actually the real reason for the existence of section 26 comes from the final sentence of the first paragraph. Here Kant says that unless the categories made nature possible there could be no way of explaining why everything that can be presented to the senses must be subject to laws having their origin a priori in our understanding. Thus their objectivity, says de Vleeschauwer, does not rest on their a priori nature but on their necessary application to an empirical manifold. The question of this section becomes, 'can we meet in the world of experience those same

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 H.J. de Vleeschauwer is referring to C.P.R., p.170, B 160.
connections that the understanding produces according to its particular structure?\textsuperscript{84} This, according to de Vleeschauwer, is the very problem Kant had posed in section 13, and which he sought now to overcome\textsuperscript{85}. The solution of the problem proceeds in the following manner: The manifold is given in space and time only. But space and time are already synthetic unities categorically determined. Thus the manifold is given only in accordance with the above mentioned unities, unities which are categorically determined\textsuperscript{86}. To conclude, the demonstrandum of section 26 is that the manifold given in space and time is necessarily subordinated to the unity signified by the categories\textsuperscript{87}. In section 20 Kant had demonstrated the objective validity of the categories with regard to sensible intuition in general. In sections 21-25 Kant presented the phenomenalist thesis urging that the only real intuition among the possible intuitions is that intuition whose forms are space and time, on account of which all the given intuitions are merely phenomena\textsuperscript{88}. From this point on, Kant was obliged, according

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 234.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 235.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 238.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 235.
to de Vleeschauwer, to resume the Deduction of the categories, not in their use with regard to an intuition in general but with regard to their empirical employment.

4. Evaluation of Henrich's Critique of de Vleeschauwer

Having presented de Vleeschauwer's thesis along with its supporting evidence, let us turn next to a consideration of Henrich's evaluation of the latter's argument. The easiest point concerns the legitimacy of dividing the Deduction using a distinction taken over from the first edition, i.e., dividing it into a deduction "from above" and a deduction "from below". This manner of dividing the argument runs parallel to the hierarchy of cognitive powers, the highest which is sensibility. Between these extremes stands the power of imagination.

Henrich finds that this interpretation is in better agreement with the text of section 26; for Kant actually proceeds from intuition, then considers the contribution of the faculty of imagination and finally speaks of the categories as that by which unity in the forms of intuition comes about. What finally turns Henrich against de

89 Ibid.
Vleeschauwer is that the argument in section 20 cannot in any way be seen as a deduction "from above", simply because "the manifold of a sensible intuition is mentioned first"\(^91\). Kant only then shows that the manifold can assume the character of a unitary representation only if it is subject to the categories \(^92\).

This criticism which Henrich levels against de Vleeschauwer appears to us to be erroneous on two points. First of all, Henrich seems to misunderstand the nature of the so-called argument "from above" and, second, he also misunderstands the argument of section 20. With regard to the former point, the fact that Kant "mentions" sensible intuition first can hardly constitute an objection! If mere priority in "mentioning" constituted the essence of the deduction "from above", then Kant himself in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* would have failed to make a deduction "from above". There Kant says that if we wish to locate that point where our representations for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with apperception. Thus, continues Kant:

\(^91\) Ibid.

\(^92\) Ibid.
Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they participate directly or indirectly. In this way alone is any knowledge possible 93.

According to de Vleeschauwer this must "obviously" be a deduction "from below"!

This misinterpretation of Henrich's appears to us to be a sure sign that he has misunderstood section 20 when he refused to consider it a deduction "from above". When Henrich speaks of de Vleeschauwer's thesis, he adds that there (§20) it is shown that the manifold can assume the character of a unitary representation only if it is subject to the categories 94. On the next page he says that Kant established in this very section 20, that intuitions are subject to the categories "insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity"95. To us this appears to be something of a discrepancy!

Furthermore, even though Kant does mention the manifold of intuition first, it is more important to understand precisely under what perspective Kant considers the manifold of intuition at this point. This can easily be done once the thrust of the argument prior to section 20 is seen.

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93 C.P.R., p. 141, A 116.
95 Ibid., p. 645.
First of all, we must inquire why Henrich is so quick to see in section 20 the demonstration he claims to see there — that is, what is the evidence for such an interpretation? Is there any such evidence? However, if we take note of the clues found in different parts of the Deduction, the achievement of section 20 will become clear in itself, and also with regard to its place within the entire argument.

At first glance, the conclusion of section 20, i.e., that "consequently the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories"\footnote{C.P.R., p. 160, B 143.}, seems remarkably like the statement of what the Transcendental Deduction hopes to achieve. That is, the Transcendental Deduction aims at establishing the objective validity of the categories; to demonstrate objective validity means, explicates Kant in a section added in the second edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, to understand "the possibility of things in confluence with the categories, and so to demonstrate the objective reality of the latter, ..."\footnote{Ibid., p. 254, B 291.}. Our task in understanding the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction requires, as we have already noted, a clear understanding of the
conclusion of section 20. Some of the clues towards the unravelling of this problem are to be found in section 21. There Kant claims that in what has been done we have directed our attention "solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition". But unity has been shown in section 20 to be prescribed to "the manifold of intuition in general". Later on in the Transcendental Deduction Kant adds that the understanding as the source of all combination applies to "the manifold of intuition in general, and in the guise of the categories, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects in general". How can we reconcile these statements with Kant's usage in section 20 wherein he speaks of a "manifold given in sensible intuition", "all the manifold ... so far as it is given in a single empirical intuition", and "the manifold of a given intuition"? Surely, must not this mean that the categories do have objects, and thus signifies more than some possible intuition or object in general?

98 Ibid., p. 161, B 144.
99 Ibid., B 145.
100 Ibid., p. 166, B 154.
101 Ibid., p. 160, B 143.
As we have said earlier, it is important to take note of the perspective from which Kant considers the manifold of intuition, i.e., he refers to it as the manifold of intuition in general\textsuperscript{102}. To understand this we must consider also the "kind" of unity Kant considers or has in mind when he speaks of an intuition in general. Let us begin by recalling that in section 21 Kant said that we are concerned only with the unity that enters into intuition, which in this case is the intuition in general\textsuperscript{103}. The preoccupation with unity at this point is quite in accord with the project that Kant had set for himself at the beginning of the Transcendental Deduction in section 15; namely, that we shall look for that unity which the categories presuppose and which contains the ground of the unity of concepts in judgement\textsuperscript{104}. Now this unity which makes combination possible\textsuperscript{105} is an act of the understanding\textsuperscript{106}, and therefore does not have its origin in the senses. Thus we are considering something that is independent of sensibility.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 161, B 145; p. 163, B 148; p. 164, B 150, B 151; p. 166, B 154; p. 168, B 157; p. 170, B 159; p. 171, B 161; p. 172, B 164.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 152, B 131.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 151, B 130.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to abstract absolutely from a manifold of intuition. Kant himself says this in section 21. There he says that in this "beginning" of the Deduction he had to abstract from the mode in which an empirical intuition is given to us. However there was "one feature"\(^{107}\) from which Kant could not abstract, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined \(^{108}\).

Furthermore, he speaks of the categories at this point as being

rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thought, consists, that is, in the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold, given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception — ... \(^{109}\).

Nowhere, thus far, does Kant commit himself with regard to the nature of the manifold to which a unity is brought. But he cannot abstract absolutely from a possible manifold because then the unity which Kant is seeking in the understanding would be impossible. All that would be is the simple representation "I", one representation among others\(^{110}\).

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 161, B 145.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 155, B 135.
In short, there would be no unity if there were nothing in respect of which it could be a unity; for our understanding is an understanding that "thinks", and its unity requires and is possible through a synthesis or at least presupposes a possible synthesis\textsuperscript{111}.

The perspective under which the manifold is considered becomes clearer. Kant seeks to establish the first or highest objective condition of all knowledge from the side of the understanding. This condition is the synthetic unity of consciousness\textsuperscript{112}. Without this unity of consciousness nothing can be thought or known\textsuperscript{113}. The categories are, therefore, but the diverse rules for the production of this unity of consciousness\textsuperscript{114}. And this is precisely what section 20 establishes! But this very point turns out to be very important in the development of the proof in the Transcendental Deduction. What section 20 establishes revolves around a subjective consideration; not subjective in the manner that the unity of empirical apperception is subjective, but rather subjective with regard to whether there are any objects possessing this unity which we know \textit{a priori} to be a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156, B 138.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}, B 137.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 161, B 145.
\end{itemize}
necessary unity. To clarify what we mean we should compare the result of section 20 with the achievement of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The pure forms are subjective entirely with regard to things in themselves but objective with regard to appearances. True, although the categories along with the a priori unity of apperception belong to the understanding and although this highest condition is "not merely a condition I myself require for knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand to become an object for me"\(^{115}\), all this still leaves the question open, whether there are real objects, i.e., empirical ones, which possess the unity which the understanding thinks.

Further support for this interpretation can be obtained if we also consider those sections added by Kant in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in the chapter "The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena"\(^{116}\). The remarks made by Kant there serve to illucidate the remarks made in section 21 where he speaks of abstracting from the "mode" in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given\(^ {117}\).

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\(^{115}\) Ibid., p. 156, B 138.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., p. 266-70, B 305-309.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., pp. 160-61, B 144.
Kant in the chapter on the phenomena and noumena reveals some features of the categories tied up with their source which is independent of sensibility. He refers to them as "forms of thought" and "modes of combining":

As a matter of fact they are nothing but forms of thought, which contain the merely logical faculty of uniting a priori in one consciousness the manifold given in intuition; and apart, therefore, from the only intuition that is possible to us, they have even less meaning than sensible forms.

Also, they are but "a mode of combining a manifold — a mode peculiar to our understanding —..."\(^{119}\). But if what is established in section 20 is that the categories are a priori modes of combining a manifold, modes peculiar to our understanding, it is further necessary to show that these modes of combining have an object. Then Kant's statement in section 21, that what remains to be shown is that the unity of empirical intuition is none other than that which is prescribed for a manifold of intuition in general\(^{120}\), seems to be the next natural and logical step.

In our estimation, then, we must follow Kant's own assessment of the argument, and say that section 20 established the categories' "possibility as a priori modes of

\(^{119}\) Ibid., B 306.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.
knowledge of objects of intuition in general"\textsuperscript{121}. From the manner that Kant describes the categories when abstraction is made of the mode of our intuition, we can see that the manifold of intuition considered in section 20 is asserted problematically only. Indeed, at one point in the Deduction, Kant speaks of "the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, ..."\textsuperscript{122}. Prior to section 20, the synthetic unity of apperception was shown to be an objective condition of all knowledge\textsuperscript{123}, a condition of all thought\textsuperscript{124}, a condition "completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition"\textsuperscript{125}, something \textit{a priori}, an \textit{a priori} unity produced solely by the categories\textsuperscript{126}. It is inconceivable how Kant could leap from an \textit{a priori} unity of thought and immediately assert that it is also necessarily found in our perception. The emphasis of the argument thus far is on \textit{unity} throughout:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 170, B 159.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 168, B 157.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 156, B 138.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 157, B 138.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 156, B 137.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 161, B 145.
\end{itemize}
I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding enters into the intuition 127.

If Kant occupied himself with the manifold of an empirical intuition from the start, he could then establish only contingent unities, the only kind of unity the perceptions in experience can exhibit. Thus, when Kant speaks of the manifold given "in Einer Anschauung" or "in a given intuition", he considers it problematically or as the manifold of an intuition, of some intuition, or of possible intuition. Furthermore, we must remember that the conclusion of section 20 is stated elliptically. The conclusion in its entirety is clearly seen once we look at the project announced by the heading of section 20 128. When expressed fully, the conclusion should read that, 'consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one Consciousness'. The emphasis then falls on the categories as conditions of a priori unity of apperception.

127 Ibid., p. 160-61, B 144.

128 Ibid., p. 160, B 143; see the heading or title of section 20.
This means, therefore, that if Kant were truly dividing the Deduction according to a deduction "from above" and a deduction "from below", then at least with regard to section 20 de Vleeschauwer would, to some extent, be correct and Henrich would be definitely in error; for Kant is concerned here entirely with this most ultimate unity which is completely independent of sensible intuition. If we are to criticise de Vleeschauwer, we would, instead, have to say that there is some question about the accurary of calling section 26 an argument "from below". Thus we would be equally against the position of Henrich who would grant for the sake of discussion that section 26 is a deduction "from below". Instead, section 26 presupposes the work done in section 20 and then applies this highest unity to the manifold of empirical intuition by arguing that in no other way is an empirical synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension, possible.

5. Evaluation of de Vleeschauwer's Thesis

We now turn to the more direct critique of what de Vleeschauwer believes Kant to have proven in section 20, and of how the conclusion proposed by this commentator
relates to the rest of the Transcendental Deduction. Our position is that while de Vleeschauwer was well aware of the problem of proof-structure, he was never clear with regard to precisely how Kant established the objective validity of the categories. To support our contention, we shall examine de Vleeschauwer's thesis critically.

The first point to remember is that his interpretation aims at being faithful to Kant's desire for unity of argument. But de Vleeschauwer also says that the main

129 In a critical notice on H.J. de Vleeschauwer's third volume of *La déduction transcendantale dans l'oeuvre de Kant*, submitted by H.J. Paton to the review *Mind*, 47 (1938), the latter makes some observations with respect to the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction. He says that "at bottom" both interpretations are the same. (ibid., p. 235). He then notes that de Vleeschauwer has also noticed this. (cf. T.D., p. 28 n.1). Both agree that the Transcendental Deduction falls into two parts, says Paton; (1) the part concerning the application of the categories to intuition in general, and (2) the part concerned with applying them to human intuitions. (ibid., p. 235). The first part is connected with the Metaphysical Deduction, and the second with the Schematism. (ibid.).

That Henrich did not make this observation may not be entirely his fault. From our studies it emerges that there is a great deal of ambiguity in both commentators with respect to precisely what section 20 has established. Indeed, Paton himself said that the two interpretations are the same "at bottom"! But we are not concerned merely with the general structure of the argument, but also with its content and the evidence brought forth to justify the different interpretations.

conclusion is already reached by section 21. Still, Kant repeats or takes up anew this problem in section 26 and brings it to the same conclusion. Thus we have a double deduction. In this context, that is in de Vleeschauwer's presentation, the question arises as to what purpose there might be in having a double deduction.

Let us begin by considering what de Vleeschauwer sees to be the achievement of section 20. At one point he says that here, in section 21, Kant has definitely reached the aim of the Transcendental Deduction so far as the proof of objective validity is concerned. A page later, however, de Vleeschauwer says that the proof can be considered as virtually completed once it has been shown that the categories have a necessary relation to an object. Still later, de Vleeschauwer complains about Kant's reference to section 20 as a mere "beginning" because Kant has, "sans aucun doute", established there the objective validity of the categories. Some of de Vleeschauwer's initial

131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 27.
133 Ibid., p. 24.
134 Ibid., p. 25.
135 Ibid., p. 156.
statements seem to express a clear notion of what section 20 has achieved. Yet at the same time a hesitancy is revealed when he refers to the proof as being "virtually" completed. This hesitancy becomes more evident once one begins to inquire as to precisely what de Vleeschauwer means when he speaks of section 20 as proving the objective validity of the categories. It is here that all his problems seem to appear.

In the chapter introducing the problem of the Transcendental Deduction, de Vleeschauwer says, within the context of explaining the need for a deduction "from below", that it is necessary to show that perception is unintelligible without the categories\footnote{Ibid., p. 26.}; for knowledge, versus \textit{thinking}, requires relation to an actually given intuition, i.e., to our empirical intuition\footnote{Ibid.}. And this relation to perception is what section 26 establishes. But in his discussion of section 26 de Vleeschauwer again repeats that Kant has established the objective validity of the categories already in section 20\footnote{Ibid., p. 232.}. Having shown the objective validity of the categories in section 20 Kant wants to do more (\textit{Il veut} \footnote{Ibid., p. 26.}).
plus...). Why? Because the objective validity of the categories rests on their application to an empirical manifold. Indeed, there is no way of understanding what de Vleeschauwer wants to say in claiming that Kant has established the objective validity of the categories in section 20 with regard to a sensible intuition in general; for if Kant has established their objective validity in section 20, how, then, is it possible to speak of conditions that are yet to be met with to establish this validity with respect to objects? And if relation to empirical intuition is what is required for objective validity, does not that mean that this point has not been established in section 20? And if this relation has not been established, as de Vleeschauwer seems to say, what can he possibly mean by saying that already in section 20 the objective validity of the categories has been established? Professor de Vleeschauwer says that section 20 considers intuitions in general without taking account of the different kinds of intuition. Indeed, this is what Kant himself says in section 21. But because

139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., p. 233.
141 Ibid., p. 235.
142 Ibid., p. 233.
the pure categories relate only to objects of intuition in general, they are "for this very reason, mere forms of thought, through which no determinate object is known"143. They are "a mode of combining the manifold — a mode peculiar to our understanding —..."144. Thus, if Kant says in section 24, when referring to the preceding sections, that the combination of the manifold in the pure categories relates only to the unity of apperception and is thus not only a transcendental synthesis but also a purely "intellectual" one145, then the basic question of the Transcendental Deduction remains unsolved, i.e., "how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity..."146. Do these modes of combining represent the way in which appearances are combined? In section 21 Kant asks this same question in the following manner: is the unity prescribed by the categories to a manifold of intuition in general to be found at all in our empirical intuition?147

143 C.P.R., p. 164, B 150.
144 Ibid., p. 266, B 306.
145 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
146 Ibid., p. 124, A 89/B 122.
147 Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.
That de Vleeschauwer's basic understanding of the achievement of section 20 is erroneous becomes clearer once we see his attempts at justifying why Kant must pursue the Deduction beyond section 20. First of all, de Vleeschauwer begins by saying that the conclusion of section 20 applies indifferently to human intuition and to possible intuition\(^{148}\). However, due to the currents of subjective idealism this application must be specified\(^{149}\). Professor de Vleeschauwer begins by pointing out that while one can think an object in general without considering the nature of its intuition, knowledge is tied to actually given intuition\(^{150}\). On so many words, then, having claimed that the objective validity of the categories has been proven in section 20, he must yet show that the categories do have objects! This then accounts for the hesitancy we mentioned earlier; and this mood is revealed by the different words that de Vleeschauwer uses to explain the need for a Transcendental Deduction going beyond section 20. First of all, he says that to be "decisive" (décisive et concluante) the Deduction must take account of empirical intuition\(^{151}\).

\(^{149}\) Ibid., p. 25.
\(^{150}\) Ibid., p. 26.
\(^{151}\) Ibid.
Elsewhere he says that section 20 did not take the problem in its widest scope (dans toute son ampleur). Still later, he says that section 20 must be "strengthened" by a return to phenomenalism. Finally he says that to establish this relation to an intuitively given manifold is "indispensable" (indispensable) for the Deduction. It is remarkable how de Vleeschauwer traverses the road between a mere "strengthening" of the conclusion to a making of those additional sections "indispensable"!

Finally, to complete our Critique of de Vleeschauwer's thesis, we shall make a brief examination of what he considers to be a significant innovation and feature of the Deduction of 1787, when compared to the one of 1781. The misunderstandings here seem to us to be further evidence of de Vleeschauwer's difficulties with regard to the proof-structure. Professor de Vleeschauwer had several times repeated that due to the subjective idealist interpretation of Kant's first-edition Transcendental Deduction, it was necessary to replace "synthesis" by "unity"; for, when

152 Ibid., p. 27.
153 Ibid., p. 156.
154 Ibid., p. 157.
synthesis: determines the phenomenon (it) merely makes the latter a construction of the knowing subject which then has no relation with the transcendent.\textsuperscript{156}

In other words, "synthesis .... seems to result in making the whole system of human knowledge both subjective and relative..."\textsuperscript{157}. That de Vleeschauwer's claim, that synthesis is replaced by unity in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction is false, can be readily seen from the following considerations: 1) The synthetic unity of apperception is the whole "content" of the pure categories\textsuperscript{158}. This unity is synthetic. Thus there is no consideration of unity, especially in the case of that highest unity, apart from synthesis. 2) Second, the role of synthesis is not relegated to the background but plays a prominent role in the argument of section 26; the empirical synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of apprehension, conforms to the transcendental synthesis\textsuperscript{159}. The objective validity of the categories is established when the product of the synthesis of apprehension, a perception of something, can occur only through the pure

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} C.P.R., p. 163, B 148.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 171, B 161, B 161 n.b; p. 173, B 164.
synthesis symbolized by the categories. 3) Third, the accusation that retaining synthesis renders human knowledge "subjective and relative" is beside the point. With regard to Kant's understanding of the problem, it is true that the contribution of the human mind in the construction of the object makes knowledge subjective insofar as things in themselves are concerned. However, with regard to objects of experience these syntheses are objective.
CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE EVIDENCE AFFORDED BY THE
REFLECTIONS AND THE LETTER TO
J.H. TIEFTRUNK: AN EVALUATION

1. Outline of Procedure

Thus far we have concerned ourselves with Dieter Henrich's hypothesis for the proof-structure of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction insofar as he developed his thesis relatively to two other commentators of note. Now there remains for us to examine that part of Professor Henrich's thesis that is developed independently of the other commentators. First of all, this will involve a close examination of evidence external to the Critique of Pure Reason, evidence that has been brought in to support his thesis. Yet before turning to this new evidence, let us make clear to ourselves the role of the following examination relatively to what we have accomplished in our earlier chapters; for we have examined at least part of Professor Henrich's thesis, and it is precisely this thesis that the new evidence is intended to support. His interpretation was, in his own view, one that seriously took account of certain passages in the Transcendental Deduction, passages which the classic interpretations of Professors Paton and de Vleeschauwer ignored. Thus these latter produced
arguments that did not accord with the structure of the Transcendental Deduction. But after examining the proposals and evidence suggested by de Vleeschauwer and Paton and the criticisms thereof by Professor Henrich, we found all three commentators to be lacking either in respect of their interpretation of the proof-structure and/or in respect of the evidence brought in in favour of their unique proposals. Although, as we have already said, the interpretation given by Henrich is highly suspect insofar as it attempts to base itself on the text of the Transcendental Deduction itself, we have still to consider some external evidence brought in to support this very hypothesis. This evidence concerns Kant's "reflections", a letter to his former pupil J.H. Tieftrunk, and drafts of that letter. All this evidence concerns Kant's thoughts with regard to J.S. Beck's book, the Only Possible Standpoint from Which the Critical Philosophy May be Judged. But before examining those texts that are to be used as evidence, let us take note, first of all, of how they are intended to verify that argument which according to Henrich, accords with the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis.

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1 The German title is, Einzig möglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die critische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muss. See P.C., p. 214.
2. Precise Role of the New Evidence

After presenting the thesis that Kant develops an argument in the Transcendental Deduction requiring two steps, and after suggesting an argument that would require such a structure, Henrich reflects on a certain presupposition upon which Kant's argument is supposedly built. This presupposition points to another way according to which the Transcendental Deduction might have been constructed. Evidence for this other way of constructing the Deduction is found in Kant's letters and reflections. This other way of constructing the Deduction would require an elimination of the above-mentioned presupposition. Therefore, depending on what is presupposed, Kant structures the argument of the Deduction accordingly.

To see precisely what the presupposition or presuppositions are, let us recall the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 as Henrich sees them to be. In section 20 Kant's conclusion contains a restriction; namely, that "intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity"². Or, the result of the proof of section 20 is valid "only for those intuitions which already

contain unity."³ But, "the range within which unitary intuitions can be found"⁴, has not been shown. However, in our representations of space and time we do have intuitions which contain unity, and which include everything that is present to the senses⁵. Thus in section 26 Kant demonstrates the "unrestricted validity of the categories for everything which can be meaningfully related to experience"⁶.

The presupposition upon which the construction of this argument depends, Henrich claims, is that of "a merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity in the sensible representations"⁷. The claim that our capacity for making conscious and unifying our own representations might be limited is "an immediate result of the fundamental argument of the whole Critique"⁸. Our consciousness, continues Henrich, is found together only with a passive receptive faculty from which it is distinct and upon which

³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., p. 646.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid., p. 647.
⁸ Ibid., p. 646.
it depends for all the things of which we may become conscious. This means that since it depends, as we have said, on a passive receptive faculty, on something that is not consciousness — it has the peculiarity of being empty — it must therefore be understood as an activity, a making-conscious. This then leaves an opening for the consideration of a merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity amongst representations.

With regard to this distinction, therefore, that our consciousness can encounter intuitions "before all consciousness", Henrich claims, without giving us any textual reference, that Kant "reformulates" the task of the Transcendental Deduction. It must demonstrate that "the categories are capable of taking up something given into the unity of consciousness". The reason for this is, says Henrich quoting a sentence found in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, that "Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., pp. 646-47.
12 Ibid., p. 647.
13 Ibid.
unity"\(^\text{14}\). This being the case, Henrich asks whether such a disproportion between consciousness and givenness might be excluded for all or only for part of the given appearances\(^\text{15}\). However, it is quite possible that given certain considerations the alternatives with which the Deduction would have to concern itself is not, as in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, one involving the possibility that either no, some, or all sensible representations are capable of being determined by the categories\(^\text{16}\). It may be that in different circumstances Kant's alternatives are whether no sensible representations or all sensible representations are capable of being determined by the categories\(^\text{17}\). The latter alternatives, says Henrich, would require quite another proof than the former alternatives which took into account the "merely partial" ability of the understanding to establish unity in the sensible representations. This latter proof required two steps. But the two-termed alternative, on the other hand would not proceed "in terms of those two steps of the proof which are characteristic of the second

\(^{14}\) Ibid. Henrich is referring to C.P.R., p. 124, A90/B123.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
The role why Kant excluded the merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity in the sensible representations is due to the "fact" that we have unitary representation of space and time, and that therefore we can unify all representations of sense. The difference in the alternate way of constructing the Deduction is that, instead of demonstrating the unrestricted validity of the categories in respect to everything that can be given in sense on the basis of the mere "fact" of the givenness of unitary representations of space and time, Kant demonstrated this same point by this time "derived as a necessary condition of every employment of the categories." This latter way appears to be constructed according to the analytic method. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the argument is developed according to the synthetic method which requires two steps. This method accords with the structure of the Critique itself, and this construction

18 Ibid., p. 648.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 649.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
allows Kant to ground separately two fundamental theses of the critical philosophy — the sensible a priori and the active role of the understanding in knowledge — and then to unite them in the Transcendental Deduction by means of a single argument. According to Henrich this unification or binding together is accomplished in the second step of the Transcendental Deduction.

3. Historical Background to the New Evidence: The Letters of J.S. Beck

The evidence for Professor Henrich's thesis, which we have presented above, is to be found in Kant's reflections on the different methods for constructing a Transcendental Deduction, and these reflections postdate the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason by almost ten years. What occasioned Kant's reflections on the question of method is the publications of his former pupil Johann Sigismund Beck, who undertook in 1793 to publish a commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, a commentary which could also be used for lectures. The first volume appeared in 1793 and carried on its title page the subtitle Auf Anrathen

23 Ibid., p. 650.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Kants\textsuperscript{26}. But when he published the third volume in 1796, he considered it necessary to undertake an investigation in order to specify the standpoint from which the Critique of Pure Reason was to be evaluated\textsuperscript{27}. The title of this third volume was, the Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy May be Judged. The reason for this investigation was that Beck came to believe that the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason promoted a false estimate of Kant's doctrine. For, when Kant spoke of "given concepts" and "objects which affect us", he was merely, in Beck's view, accommodating himself to traditional doctrines, and this was but a preliminary concession for the purpose of introducing the reader into the system\textsuperscript{28}. Thus it became necessary to change the method and to remove certain equivocations, especially those concerning the statements about objects that affect us; for "affection" means causality, and the category of cause can be applied intraphenomenally only. Thus, whereas Kant proceeded from the given to synthetic unity, Beck proposed to go from the

\textsuperscript{26} See D.K.T., p. 169.
\textsuperscript{27} P.S.T.D., p. 648.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
synthetic unity to the given. In order to see how the question of method arises in relation to the problem of "affection", let us briefly look at those letters that J.S. Beck sent to Kant, inquiring about the latter's opinion concerning the proposed third volume of *On the Critical Philosophy*.

First of all, Beck states in a letter to Kant, his position by comparing it to the manner of exposition found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> In your *Critique of Pure Reason* you lead your reader gradually to the highest point of the transcendental philosophy, viz., to the synthetic unity. First, you draw his attention to the consciousness of a given, then you make him attentive of concepts by means of which something is thought; you present the categories initially also as concepts, in the ordinary sense, and finally bring him to the insight that these categories are actually the activity of the understanding through which it originally creates for itself the concept of an object and produces the 'I think an object'.

The production of synthetic unity of consciousness is called by Beck "the original activity" (*Ursprüngliche Beylegung*).

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30 *P.C.*, p. 213.


32 Ibid.
Furthermore, continues Beck,

the postulate 'to conceive of an object by means of the original activity' is also the highest principle of philosophy as a whole, the principle on which pure general logic and the whole of transcendental philosophy rests.

If one adopts this standpoint, then, believes Beck, one can understand what the Critique of Pure Reason means when it speaks of objects affecting our sensibility, i.e.,

what is really is that affects us — whether it is the thing-in-itself (or whether this expression only means a transcendental Idea) or; instead, the object of empirical intuition itself, that is, appearance — - 34.

Following the method of the Critique of Pure Reason, this problem, among others, cannot be immediately cleared up. However, if the standpoint is mastered from the start, those problems can be easily resolved, e.g., where one "ought to locate the object that produces sensation" 35.

Therefore, in his third volume of On the Critical Philosophy called the Only Possible Standpoint from Which the Critical Philosophy May be Judged, Beck shall proceed in a way "in which the method of the Critique is reversed" 36. Thus,

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
continues Beck,

'I begin with the postulate of the original activity, locate this activity in the category itself, try to get the reader into this activity itself, ... . Once I think I have the reader completely in the framework in which I want him, I shall then lead him to the review of the Critique of Pure Reason through the Introduction, Aesthetic and Analytic 37.

With regard to this point there are two more letters which are definitely relevant. The first concerns a reply Beck makes to the charge by Johann Schultz, Kant's favorite expositor, that he had totally misrepresented Kant's philosophy. Here Beck is convinced that Kant will see his account to be correct38. Again Beck brings up the question of the correct standpoint which will enable the reader to understand what Kant means when he speaks of objects that affect our senses. First of all, Beck reaffirms the division of the cognitive faculties into sensibility and understanding39. Then on the question of affection he says:

if I were to say what your Critique actually means, when, on the first page of the Introduction it speaks of objects that affect the senses — whether it means by that things-in-themselves or appearances — I should answer that since the object of my representation is appearance, and since it is this representation in which determinations of the object are

37 Ibid.

38 Letter from J.S. Beck, June 20, 1797. P.C., p.227.

39 Ibid., p. 228.
thought, and since I achieve the representation by means of the original activity of the understanding ( ), the object that affects me must therefore be appearance and not thing-in-itself 40.

However, this is seen to be clear only once we see that the categories are not to be regarded "absolutely as predicates of things" but as an original activity of the understanding. And this is evident only when the correct standpoint is assumed 41.

Finally, replying to a letter written by Kant, which is not now extant, but whose purpose seemed to bring about the removal of public disagreement over the fundamental principles of critical philosophy — this public disagreement concerned yet another criticism of J.S. Beck made by J. Schultz 42 — Beck once again spoke on the problem of "affection" and the correct standpoint. On this latter point Beck makes this brief plea to Kant:

Assuredly, excellent sir, if you would only honor me by examining my method, in which I descend from the standpoint of the categories, just as you proceed by ascending to them in your immortal book, you would see the feasibility of what I do 43.

40 Ibid., p. 229.
41 Ibid., pp. 228, 229.
42 Letter from J.S. Beck, June 24, 1797. P.C., p. 231.
43 Ibid., p. 233.
4. Proposed Alternate Construction of the Transcendental Deduction

Now that we have seen the problem with which Beck concerned himself, we can turn to Kant's reflections with regard to the question of method and more particularly to how Professor Henrich understands Kant's reply. On Kant's reply to Beck's suggestion for a change in method, Henrich perceives that "Kant himself at one time proposed an alternative to the transcendental deduction of the second edition". But Kant could not finally bring himself to approve of Beck's stand with regard to "affection" and the objects which affect us. However, since Kant was interested in Beck and in the effect of Beck's commentary, he was willing at least to consider the proposed alteration.

In a letter to Beck's colleague, J.H. Tieftrunk, Kant tried to show "approximately" the form the Critique of Pure Reason might assume in an altered presentation. The Transcendental Deduction must begin with the doctrine of the categories as rules for the unity of a possible universal consciousness. This would correspond to sections 16-18 of

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
the second edition. Then it must demonstrate that intuitions a priori are presupposed in order that the categories can be applied at all to given sensuous intuitions. But the meaning of a priori concepts, such as the categories are, can be accessible a priori only. And the only possibility of securing a meaning a priori for the categories is their application to the form of sensible intuition; for if there is no a priori intuition, there is no employment of the categories at all. Therefore, the categories can be applied a priori to intuition only insofar as they grasp this form itself as a unitary representation. By virtue of this, therefore, the application of the categories to all sensible representations is assured. Why? Because no sensible intuitions can be given independently of the forms of sensibility, which are, in turn, completely subordinate to the categories. This result, says Henrich, can be derived as a necessary condition of every employment of the categories. It differs from the way the same result is achieved in section 26 of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, which depends on "the mere fact of the givenness of unitary representations of space and time," and thus requires the extra step by referring to the results of the Transcendental

47 Ibid., pp. 645-49.
At this point Henrich attempts to relate the proposed alternative statement of the argument to Kant's remarks made specifically with regard to the synthetic and analytic methods. However, it should be noted that these reflections on method are found only in a "draft" or sketch of a letter to J.H. Tieftrunk. They are not included in the letter that Kant actually sent. Continuing, therefore, with Henrich's presentation of the altered form of the argument, he remarks that in this context Kant "also indicated the reasons for retaining the proof construction of the second edition". This proof uses the synthetic method. In other words, it proceeds on the basis of the fact that two doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason are initially developed independently of one another: 1) the doctrine of the categories as functions of unifying in self-consciousness; 2) the doctrine of space and time as given representations. The second step of the proof in the Transcendental Deduction according to the synthetic method has recourse to the results of the Aesthetic as to facts. If the proof were presented

48 Ibid., p. 649.
51 Ibid.
according to the analytical method, then after the first step "the necessity of the forms of intuitions would first have to be justified"\textsuperscript{52}. This would be followed by an Aesthetic showing which forms we really do have\textsuperscript{53}. Only then the Deduction could be brought to a completion\textsuperscript{54}.

5. Outline of Procedure in Detail

We now turn to the task of evaluating Henrich's new evidence for his two-steps-to-one-proof thesis. However, in this case, as we have already noted, the structure of the proof is entirely bound up with a particular context, i.e., the restriction thesis. We can say initially that we agree on two of Henrich's basic contentions: 1) that in section 21 Kant does speak of an additional conclusion which must be drawn if the Deduction is to be completed; and 2) that the unity of the argument must be respected. Whether there are any important intermediate steps prior to section 26 is yet another question. Therefore, our main objection to Henrich's way of using Kant's letters and reflections will be that it is based on an erroneous "understanding of

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 650.
the proof of the deduction that would require the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis"\textsuperscript{55}. That is, granting the schema of the two steps-to-one proof thesis, the content with which he attempts to fill it has no basis either in the text of the Deduction or in the reflections and letters. On the basis of his "restriction" thesis he believes that Kant had an alternative way of constructing the proof of the Deduction which would not require this "restriction" thesis\textsuperscript{56}. We shall argue that Kant in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction never "takes into account the possibility of a merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity in the sensible representations"\textsuperscript{57}. Furthermore, even granting this thesis we shall show that there is no evidence for Henrich's claim that Kant attains the result of section 26 on the basis of the "mere fact" of the given-ness of the unitary representations of space and time. Finally, we shall argue that Kant's distinction, in his draft of the letter of J.H. Tieftrunk, between the analytic and synthetic methods in no way requires Kant to exclude any of the basic steps necessary to establish the objective

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 644.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 647.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
validity of the categories. On the contrary, the analytic method would only postpone the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction because of the need to insert a Transcendental Aesthetic within it. However, the role of the Aesthetic would be such as to comply with the basic argument of the Transcendental Deduction. Let us begin, then, with the first point, i.e., with the critique of the restriction thesis.

6. Critique of Restriction Thesis

In our previous references, that is, Chapters Two and Three, to Professor Henrich's argument which would demand the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis, we have already given ample evidence from the text itself that the conclusion of section 20 and its link with section 26 cannot be understood in the way he understands it. Professor Henrich claims that in section 20 Kant has established only that "intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity"59. This must be the conclusion which takes account of the "merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity in the sensible

59 Ibid., p. 648.
representations. Only in section 26 does Kant demonstrate the unrestricted validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses. However, the argument of the Deduction as seen from Kant's own estimations of it, does not concern itself, in its first part, with any restriction. In the first part, up to section 21, Kant concerns himself only with "the synthesis of the understanding". What characterizes this synthesis is that it abstracts from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given. As the argument progresses Kant comes to speak of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination and in the argument's latter stages Kant includes a synthesis of apprehension. Kant also refers to it, i.e., the synthesis of the understanding as "the synthesis of apperception which is intellectual and is contained in the category completely a priori". But

60 Ibid., p. 647.
61 Ibid., p. 646.
62 C.P.R., p. 160, B 144.
63 Ibid., pp. 160-61, B 144.
64 Ibid., pp. 164-65, B 151-52.
65 Ibid., p. 170, B 160; p. 171, B 161, B 161, n.6, B 162; p. 173, B 164.
66 Ibid., p. 171, B 161, n.6.
through a synthesis in the "mere understanding", the categories relate to "objects of intuition in general" only, or to "the manifold of a given intuition in general". For this reason they are "mere forms of thought ...".

Thus all that is established up to section 21 is that the categories are rules for the unity of thought with respect of a possible intuition. In this way Kant has established one of the conditions of experience, that is, that the categories are rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thinking, i.e., the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold to the unity of apperception, a unity that is pure and a priori, that is, universal and necessary. If such is the case, then Kant's next step would be to prove that this unity which is thought is also to be found in empirical intuition. In this way, therefore, we would have knowledge; for then the categories would have objects and when we think, something would certainly correspond to them.

67 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
68 Ibid., p. 161, B 145.
69 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
70 Ibid., p. 161, B 145.
71 Ibid., B 144-45.
Furthermore, if we approach the argument in this way, then Kant's transition into section 22 will not be as abrupt as it seems to be at first glance. Rather section 22 would provide us with further explications on how the Deduction is to proceed. Kant begins by saying that "to think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing"\(^72\). However, "knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); ..."\(^73\). Kant almost seems to be saying that 'thinking an object is not sufficient for knowledge, and this is all with which we have concerned ourselves thus far'. The quotation with which we began our remarks on section 22 clearly indicates that Kant is concerned thus far only with the unity found in thought; for in the sentence quoted above he does say that through the category an object in general is thought\(^74\). Kant provides clarification on precisely this point when he discusses the difference between inner sense and apperception. Apperception, Kant says,

\[
\text{as the source of all combination, applies to the manifold of intuitions in general, and in the guise}
\]

\(^72\) Ibid., B 146.

\(^73\) Ibid., pp. 161-62, B 146.

\(^74\) Ibid., p. 162, B 146.
of (unter dem Namen) the categories, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects in general 75.

But he says in section 22 that through the categories objects in general are thought 76.

The second factor for knowledge, Kant continues, is "the intuition, through which it is given" 77, that is, that through which the object is given:

For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it 78.

But things are given to us only in empirical intuition 79.

Therefore, only insofar as the categories, the pure forms of thought, apply to these, do they give us any knowledge 80.

And this, we believe, is precisely the very same point made by Kant in section 21 where he announces as the project to be completed in section 26, that the Deduction must show that the unity prescribed by the categories with respect to a manifold of intuition in general is the same unity in the

75 Ibid., p. 166, B 154.
76 Ibid., p. 162, B 146; also, p. 169, B 158.
77 Ibid., p. 162, B 146.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., B 147.
80 Ibid.
manifold given for an empirical intuition!\textsuperscript{81}

In all this there is not the slightest mention of any restriction that must at some point be overcome. If we wish to use the word restriction, we can only mean that Kant has thus far (§20) "restricted" himself to the conditions for the unity of thought. This, however, does not seem to be what Professor Henrich is saying. In short, we find no grounds to support Henrich's contention that in the first part of the Transcendental Deduction Kant restricts the application of the categories and that this restriction takes account of some merely partial ability of the understanding to establish unity among sensible representations.

Furthermore, Henrich's appeal to a sentence from "The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction", section 13\textsuperscript{82}, comes from a part of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} that was not among the added sections of the second edition. On this score Henrich steps outside his own canons, i.e., he uses observations about the proof of the Deduction which were made within the context of the first edition\textsuperscript{83}. This was one of the accusations that he levelled against

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[81]{Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.}
\footnotetext[82]{Ibid., p. 124, A90/B123.}
\footnotetext[83]{P.S.T.D., pp. 644-45.}
\end{footnotes}
Nevertheless, the claim that "Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity" indeed sets out only the problem to be solved, i.e., to show that the appearances are constituted in accordance with the conditions of the understanding's unity. Only then would the categories be objectively valid. There are no grounds for construing this passage to mean that the understanding has perhaps only a limited ability to unite the sensible representations. There are no grounds for this interpretation either in the sentence itself, or in anything that precedes it, or anything that follows it. Indeed, it seems that this sentence better accords with our rendering of the problem, that is, it states precisely the same task as does section 21 of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, i.e., whether the unity thought with respect to a manifold of intuition in general is not also the unity found in the manifold given for an empirical intuition. Our conclusion is, therefore, that Professor Henrich's restriction thesis can provide no means either for understanding the Transcendental Deduction itself or for evaluating Kant's letters and reflections with regard to the

84 C.P.R., p. 124, A90/B123.
method used in presenting the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction.

7. Critique of Henrich's Interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic's with respect to the Transcendental Deduction

Turning to our second point of criticism, we note that there is no evidence for claiming that in the second-edition Transcendental Deduction Kant established the unrestricted validity of the categories in its second part due to the fact alone that we have unitary representations of space and time. First of all, when speaking of the "fact of the givenness of unitary representations of space and time" it is difficult to determine precisely what Henrich is attempting to say. If we understand Henrich in one way, then his views might be made out to accord with Kant's. That is, if he merely means that in the Transcendental Deduction itself Kant is not required to produce an argument showing that there actually are a priori forms, because he has already established their existence earlier in the Transcendental Aesthetic, then there is no disagreement here. In fact, Kant proceeds in precisely this way.

86 Ibid., p. 649.
In section 22, for example, he explicitly refers to the achievement of the Transcendental Aesthetic:

Now, as the Aesthetic has shown, the only intuition possible to us is sensible... Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) and empirical intuition... 87.

And Kant implicitly refers to the Aesthetic in section 24 where he says,

But since there lies in us a certain form of a priori sensible intuition, which depends on the receptivity of the faculty of representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense... 88.

Yet this last quotation indicates that Kant's argument requires more than just the existence of an a priori manifold — this manifold must be unified. Yet from all that we have seen of Henrich's argument, he seems to assert considerably more than just the existence of a priori forms of sensibility as the means necessary to achieve the aim of the Deduction. It is more likely that he means that the unity of the a priori forms of intuition is given along with these forms. But, then, on the basis of Henrich's own argument, such a conclusion is impossible, because the premise on which Kant's argument is supposed to rest is that "wherever we find unity, this unity is itself made

87 C.P.R., p. 162, B 146-47.
88 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
possible by the categories and determined in relation to them. If this is the case, then Henrich cannot say that Kant argues from the "fact of the givenness of unitary representations of space and time ...". On the contrary, by Henrich's own argument this unity is not given, but it must come from the categories, if indeed it is true that "wherever" we find unity it is made possible by the categories.

On the other hand, if we take Kant's argument as he himself presents it, it is also impossible to say that unity is given in the pure forms of sensible intuition. First of all, this follows from a premise set down in the first section of the Transcendental Deduction:

But the combination of the manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition.

Second, in section 26 Kant writes that in the Aesthetic he treated the unity of the manifold of a priori intuition as belonging merely to sensibility ... although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses.

Thus the unity of this a priori manifold is not merely given.

89 P.S.T.D., p. 646.
90 Ibid., p. 649.
91 C.P.R., p. 151, B 129.
92 Ibid., pp. 170-71, B 160 n.a.-B 161.
Consequently, there is no basis for saying with Henrich that the second step relies on the mere givenness of certain a priori unitary representations. This means that Henrich's claim that the above could serve as a means for distinguishing a Transcendental Deduction according to the synthetic method — the way it is given in the Critique of Pure Reason — and the analytic method is also groundless.

8. Critique of Henrich's Thesis concerning the relevance of Kant's Letters and Reflections

In our third criticism of Henrich, we shall argue that all the steps that are required to bring about the conclusion of the Deduction using the synthetic method must also be used by the analytic method. In other words, the difference between the two so-called "methods" turns out to be superficial and is perhaps one of the reasons why Kant never included any reference to them in the letter he actually did send to J.H. Tieftrunk. In order to support our point, let us turn to Kant's "reflections", the letter that he did send to Tieftrunk, and the drafts of this letter. There, we shall see Kant's own comments with regard to Beck's suggestions concerning method.

In a draft of his letter of J.H. Tieftrunk, Kant writes the following concerning Beck's views on the proper
standpoint:

Let me only remark on this point that when he proposes to start out with the categories he is busying himself with the mere form of thinking, that is, concepts without objects, concepts that as yet are without any meaning.

This same point is repeated in another draft of the letter to Tieftrunk, in the actual letter to Tieftrunk, and in his Reflections, 6353 and 6358. The point is that in starting with the categories one deals only with the mere forms of thinking:

the categories are mere forms of synthesis (Formen der Zusammensetzung) (of the synthetic unity of the manifold in general) and they belong to thinking rather than to intuition.

Then, continues Kant, Beck would have to pass from the categories to appearances (as a priori intuitions). Synthesis (die Synthesis der Zusammensetzung) of the manifold requires a priori intuitions in order that the pure concepts of the understanding may have an object and these intuitions are space and time.

93 P.C., p. 238.
96 K.G.S., XVIII, pp. 679, 683, 684.
98 Ibid.
But the forms of intuition are merely subjective, that is, they do not represent the object as it is in itself, but only the manner in which the subject is affected in accordance with its (the subject's) particular constitution. Then the object is presented as it appears\(^99\). In this way the categories are related to appearances following the analytic method.

Nevertheless, in the draft with which we began our discussion of Kant's reflections on Beck's suggestions with regard to method, he remarks that

It is more natural to begin with the given, that is, with intuitions insofar as these are possible a priori, furnishing us with synthetic a priori propositions that disclose only the appearances of objects\(^{100}\).

This same point is repeated in the other draft of the letter to Tieftrunk where Kant specifically refers to the analytic and synthetic methods. Of the synthetic method, which is the method of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that it is more natural (natürlicher); of the analytic method, Kant says that it lacks the clarity and facility (die Klarheit und Leichtigkeit) of the synthetic method which begins with what is a priori in intuitions and ascends to the pure

\(^{99}\) Ibid., p. 247.

\(^{100}\) P.C., p. 238.
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concepts of the understanding\textsuperscript{101}.

From what we have already seen of the Transcendental Deduction, and Kant's comments on the analytic and synthetic methods, there seem to be no grounds for maintaining that there is a change with regard to the kinds of steps required to bring the argument to its conclusion. In the analytic method, which would begin with the pure concepts of the understanding and descend to the \textit{a priori} forms of intuition, the Transcendental Deduction would have to be divided after section 20 in order to allow for a Transcendental Aesthetic, where the existence of such \textit{a priori} forms could be established as would provide a (p) matter for the pure forms of thinking. Then the argument of the Deduction would have to be resumed so that Kant could show that the empirical synthesis of apprehension must conform to the categories; and this would be possible only through the mediation of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination of the manifold of \textit{a priori} intuition. In the Transcendental Deduction as it is presented in the second edition, Kant has merely to say "as the Aesthetic has shown...\textsuperscript{102}", or "since

\textsuperscript{101} K.G.S., XIII, p. 471.

\textsuperscript{102} C.P.R., p. 162, B 146.
there lies in us a certain form of a priori sensible intui-
tion which depends on the faculty of representation (sensi-
bility)..."103, and then he can proceed with the rest of
his task. In other words, Kant's letters and reflections
indicate that a certain number of steps are required to
establish the objective validity of the categories and these
are found in both the analytic and synthetic methods. This
means that Henrich's suggestion that there is an alternative
method of constructing the Transcendental Deduction, which
would no longer require the steps which are characteristic
of the second edition Critique of Pure Reason, is false.
Furthermore, with regard to the content of the argument
proposed by Henrich, i.e., the restriction thesis, we can
find for it no justification either in the Transcendental
Deduction itself or, as is now evident, in Kant's letters
and reflections. In fact, his thesis arises from a complete
misunderstanding of the conclusions of sections 20, 21, and
26; and the letters and reflections serve, on the contrary,
to bring this misunderstanding out even more clearly.

There are, of course, other objections that can be
raised against Henrich's thesis insofar as he attempts to
support it by using what Kant has said in his reflections
and drafts of a certain letter. The objections concern the

103 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
point whether it is even possible to use Kant's unpublished writings in order to understand the Transcendental Deduction. More clearly, we wish to repeat the point which we have previously mentioned, i.e., that Kant chose not to include in his letter to Tieftrunk any mention of the two methods. Perhaps one reason might concern what Kant could have possibly meant by "method" in that case; for, we have argued, the difference between the analytic and synthetic method, is but accidental — in either case the argument of the Deduction must proceed by using the same steps. Indeed, in his draft of the letter of Tieftrunk Kant himself says that all that is involved is a question of pedagogy\textsuperscript{104}. And the synthetic method has the advantage of being more "natural". Yet this way of viewing the matter is quite different from the way Beck himself saw it. For Kant, it appeared to be a question of exposition. But in our brief glance at Beck's letters we saw that there was also a question of doctrine at stake — what are the objects that affect us? Are they things-in-themselves, or appearances? Finally, Kant himself has given another account of the analytic and synthetic methods in his \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics}. The analytic method used in the \textit{Prolegomena} starts from "some

\textsuperscript{104} K.G.S., XIII, p. 471.
uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori" and seeks to know "how it is possible", so that "we may deduce from the principle which makes the given knowledge possible the possibility of all the rest". The discovery of this principle "will not only explain to us what we know but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources". But the synthetic method used in the Critique of Pure Reason proceeds "without resting upon any fact" and aims "to unfold knowledge from its original germs". If we compare what Kant says here in the Prolegomena and what he says in his draft of the letter to Tieftrunk, we cannot see in what way the two accounts are even similar. Indeed, given the account in the Prolegomena, what could "method" possibly mean in that other context?


There remains for us one last piece of evidence to consider, evidence that comes not from external sources but supposedly from the text of the Transcendental Deduction itself. This point must be considered, albeit briefly.

105 P.F.M., p. 22.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
The reason why we include it in this chapter is that Professor Henrich has chosen to connect it with the question of method, and it is intended to give support to the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis. Once again the evidence is concerned with the content of the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis. At this point Henrich brings in the parallel-proof hypothesis.\footnote{P.S.T.D., p. 651.}

According to Henrich, Kant had other reasons which made him argue the proof of the Deduction synthetically, and divide it into two steps. In addition to having to prove the objective validity of the categories, Kant "also" assigned to the Deduction the task of making intelligible the "possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 650-51.} This proof also requires two steps. First, it must show what the nature of the category is, given the fact that it is related to a synthesis of intuition.\footnote{Ibid., p. 652.} And then, it must show that the category can exercise synthetic functions in intuition itself.\footnote{Ibid.} Now, if Henrich means by intuition empirical intuition, then, we ask, how is the proof
of possibility to be distinguished from the proof of objective validity? What would it mean to speak of a proof of the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding if we could not establish that they relate to a thing given under the conditions of space and time —

'Now things in space and time are given only insofar as they are perceptions (that is, representations accompanied by sensation) — therefore only through empirical representation' 112?

Without this relation the categories would remain mere forms of thought.

Professor Henrich's distinction between a proof of validity and a proof of possibility is meaningless; and his inability to state clearly the relation between the two proofs seems to reinforce our view on this matter. First of all, he says that the proof of possibility could be "given at the same time" with the two steps of the validity proof 113. Then, he adds, that one cannot blame Kant for separating the two investigations, for it can be easily shown that the proof of validity must enter "into" the explanation of the possibility of the categories' relation to intuition 114. Then, he adds, that in a second edition of the Deduction the proof

112 C.P.R., p. 162, B 147.
114 Ibid.
of validity of the categories is at "one and the same time an explanation of the possibility of their relation to sensibility ..."\textsuperscript{115}. Finally, the proof of the validity of the categories remains "fundamental" for a Deduction, says Henrich\textsuperscript{116}. Thus, first the proof of validity is merely "given" at the same time as the proof of possibility; then it enters "into" it; then it is at the same time an explanation of possibility, and finally it is "fundamental". How all these different relations between the two proofs could be possible is not clear at all.

The sources of Henrich's difficulties appear most clearly when he attempts to elaborate on what a proof of possibility must accomplish. He gives two versions of this proof. First, the thesis of possibility proposes to remove a difficulty which arises out of a problem of critical philosophy itself — that is, it assumes pure categories and then declares that they are "originally and essentially" related to sensible intuition\textsuperscript{117}. But when we consider the nature of an \textit{a priori} concept, this relation seems "mysterious and inconceivable"\textsuperscript{118}. Therefore, Kant must, first

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 653.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 651.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
of all, show that "the meaning of an a priori concept can be so stipulated that it refers necessarily to intuition"\textsuperscript{119}. If Henrich means by intuition, intuition \textit{in general}, this seems actually to be the case, i.e., that this is precisely the meaning of the categories. Kant says that the "pure concepts of understanding ... extend to objects of intuition in general ...\textsuperscript{120}. Because the categories are rules by which the understanding can produce a priori unity of apperception\textsuperscript{121}, and the synthetic unit of apperception "applies to the manifold of intuitions \textit{in general} ..."\textsuperscript{122}, it seems that the meaning of the pure categories is to be related to intuition, i.e., intuition \textit{in general}. But this is precisely with what Kant is concerned prior to section 21.

Henrich then goes on to say that Kant must next show how one can represent the fact that the given intuition essentially depends on such concepts\textsuperscript{123}. Again, if Henrich means by this intuition \textit{in general}, then this is included in the meaning of the pure categories. If, on the other hand, he means the manifold of empirical intuition, then this is

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} C.P.R., p. 163, B 148.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 161, B 145.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 166, B 154.
\textsuperscript{123} P.S.T.D., p. 651.
precisely the aim of the proof for the objective validity of the categories; and thus it becomes impossible and useless to distinguish the proof of validity from the proof of possibility.

Next, Henrich gives the second form of the proof of possibility: it must show "that categories as well as intuition cannot even be thought independently of their relation to one another." If Henrich really means intuition in general and also thinking strictly understood, then Kant has shown this precisely in that part of the Deduction prior to section 21. If Henrich has in mind the relation to the manifold of empirical intuition, then it is still possible to think the categories without requiring the existence of such a manifold; for the pure categories abstract from our mode of intuition and speak of intuition in general. This then requires the rest of the Deduction to show that the unity which is thought in the categories is also found in the manifold given for an empirical intuition.

In conclusion, we can say that Henrich fails to take into account what it means for the pure categories to be related to intuition. If he means intuition in general, this is but the first part of the proof of objective validity, and cannot be distinguished from it. If he means the

124 Ibid.
manifold of empirical intuition, then this turns out to be the guiding concern of the Transcendental Deduction. Thus, Henrich's parallel-proof hypothesis fails to explain any aspect whatsoever of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction. Indeed, no evidence at all can be found in the text to support the distinction between a proof of objective validity and a proof of the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility. Consequently, the possibility thesis cannot be used to explain why Kant divided the Deduction into two steps and proceeded synthetically. It may be true that Kant divided the proof of the Deduction into two steps and proceeded synthetically, but it is also true that no evidence for this manner of proceeding can come from this parallel-proof hypothesis.
CHAPTER V

PROBLEM OF SECTION 16:
THE USE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROOF-STRATEGIES

1. Outline of Procedure

Thus far, we have considered Dieter Henrich's criticisms of two hypothesis concerning the second-edition proof-structure advanced by two contemporary commentators of note. In addition, we have throughout our investigations subjected all three proposals to criticism. Furthermore, having considered the internal textual evidence given in favour of the above-mentioned proposals, we then proceeded to weigh the evidence for his thesis that was to be found in external sources, i.e., in Kant's letters and reflections. Finally, what remains to be done is to make an examination of a difficulty which Henrich himself admits arises from his hypothesis.

We can best introduce this subject by recalling that it is Henrich's intention to arrive at "an understanding of the deduction that would require the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis." His interpretation ought, therefore, to have the advantage that "it makes intelligible many peculiarities of the text which must be neglected by all other proposals."
Instead, his proposal seems to make peculiarities of parts of the text which the other interpretations found relatively intelligible. Granting Henrich's version of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction, what relation do the earlier parts of the Deduction (that is, those prior to section 20) have to section 20 when it is considered as establishing "that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity"? Dieter Henrich sees the problem in this way. Even with his (Kant's) statement in section 21 of how the proof is to be divided, "it has still not been sufficiently clarified why Kant never presented the actual structure of his proof in a clearer manner ...". Indeed, continues Henrich, the proof-structure has been derived from a text which "constantly involves other elements and at times gives them undue emphasis". This, according to Henrich, is one reason for the apparent lack of clarity with regard to the actual proof-structure. However, "a further reason" to which Henrich devotes several pages of reflection, is the presence in the second-edition Deduction of a form of proof found in and proper to the

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 653.
5 Ibid.
first-edition Transcendental Deduction\textsuperscript{6}. This proof rests on the "semantic analysis" of the word "mine"\textsuperscript{7} when I say that a representation is my representation\textsuperscript{8}. According to Henrich Kant used this procedure in the first edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} to deduce the categories\textsuperscript{9}. In the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction one can see clearly, says Henrich, that Kant could not free himself from such arguments, but also that Kant does not rely on them confidently\textsuperscript{10}. In the first version, however, there is no proof that can dispense with an argument based on an analysis of the meaning of the word "mine"\textsuperscript{11}.

Our task in this chapter will be, therefore, to consider and evaluate the argument which Henrich claims that Kant used to establish the objective validity of the categories, i.e., the argument resting on the analysis of meaning when I say a representation is my representation\textsuperscript{12}. This

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 655.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 653.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 655.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 653.
means that we must inquire, first of all, whether such an argument is truly to be found in the text of the Deduction. Or, is it not perhaps possibly a difficulty arising from, and a necessary consequence of, what Henrich considers to be the conclusions and arguments of sections 20, 21, and 26? That is, is not this perhaps a rationalization supporting Henrich's thesis, rather than something to be found in the text of the Critique of Pure Reason itself? Is it not better to assume first that the early sections, especially section 16, contribute to, and are necessary for the conclusion of section 20, before assuming that Kant is guilty of using an incompatible proof-strategy?

In the process of answering these questions we shall refer only briefly to Paton and de Vleeschaumer's arguments with regard to section 16. We have found their versions of the proof-structure of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction in certain respects inadequate. Thus we could expect some difficulties in their interpretation of section 16. However they both do agree at least with regard to this point; namely, that section 16 is an integral part of the Transcendental Deduction. Their interpretations of how Kant uses the personal pronoun "my" might, at least by way of contrast, cast light on Henrich's interpretation, and perhaps provide some clues for understanding section 16 itself.
But first, we require a clear presentation of Henrich's views on how Kant understands "belongs to me", "my" or "mine" when I say that a representation is my representation.

2. Henrich's Explanation of the Meaning of
"My Representation"

Henrich distinguishes between two uses of the word "mine" in the context of section 16. In the first place, when it is said that a representation "belongs to me", the "mine" signifies the unity of apperception. In other words, the unity of apperception is "the original definition of the meaning of "belongs to me. It is also indicated by the expression "I" or "I think". Thus all representations are "mine" insofar as they are bound together in the unity of self-consciousness. Next, Henrich considers the second meaning of "mine". This is the extended meaning. It includes all representations which can be united in self-consciousness. Henrich suggests a possible reason for this extension of the use of "mine"; for, Henrich says, we do call representations "ours" in virtue of the fact that

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 653-54.
we can become conscious that they belong to us\(^1\). However, this extension is equivocal. Why? If we extend the meaning of "mine" to those representations which can be united in self-consciousness, it can then be maintained that "all representations which arise in the sensibility of a being are to that degree also potentially conscious representations\(^2\)."

Because, continues Henrich, in Kant's doctrine every consciousness presupposes a sensibility, one is tempted to describe this sensibility as "his" and thus to further assume that all given representations must to that extent be "his", that is, they would be defined as possible contents of his consciousness. In this way, the Transcendental Deduction would be completed via a mere semantic analysis of the word "mine". Why? If the representations are "mine" in the above sense, then this means simply that they can be "taken up" into the unity of consciousness in accordance with the categories\(^3\). Thus, for the deepest problem in all Transcendental philosophy, continues Henrich, we have what appears to be a remarkably simple solution\(^4\).

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 654.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
However, Kant's argument rests on not seeing sufficiently clearly the homonymy of the word "mine" when he spoke about "my" representations\textsuperscript{20}. Henrich explains the "shift of meaning" on which the argument of Kant rests\textsuperscript{21}. Although every consciousness presupposes a sensibility, sensibility is distinct from self-consciousness. Thus, if something belongs to me only if I can take it up into consciousness, then as long as it is only "available" to be taken up into consciousness, it is not all "mine", but only "in relation to me"\textsuperscript{22}. Henrich believed that Kant was "certainly" aware of this distinction\textsuperscript{23}. It is precisely this awareness, claims Henrich, which influenced Kant's statements at the beginning of section 16. There Kant says that if the 'I think' could not accompany all my representations, then something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all; this is equivalent to saying that the representations would be "nothing to me"\textsuperscript{24}. Yet Kant chose to express himself in this way so that he could

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 654-55.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 654.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} C.P.R., pp. 152-53, B 131-32.
\end{itemize}
refrain from saying that there could be no intuition at all which would remain inaccessible to consciousness. This seems to imply, from the way Henrich views the matter, that to say that all intuitions are accessible to consciousness, amounts to admitting that the Transcendental Deduction has been brought to a conclusion.

Such is our near verbatim presentation of Henrich's views concerning the role of the personal pronoun "my" when Kant speaks of "my representations". Yet before consulting the commentators Paton and de Vleeschaumer on this matter, a provisional interpretation of Henrich's account would serve at this point to clarify and summarize his position. These remarks concern mainly the manner according to which Henrich distinguished between the two meanings of "mine". A representation is "mine" either as it is actually in self-consciousness or "mine" insofar as it is "available" to consciousness, i.e., insofar as there is potential consciousness of it. Now when representations are actually in the unity of self-consciousness, they are there in accordance with the categories only. Therefore, Henrich seems to say that if these two ways of being "mine" are not recognized, then a simple analysis of the word "mine" would lead one to say that it is proved that all representations

are subject to the categories; for in that case all representations would be treated as if they were actually in the unity of self-consciousness. Thus the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction would be reached already in section 16. But this would contradict Kant's observations in section 21. It seems, therefore, that all depends on how the word "mine" is understood.

3. Paton's Explanation of the Meaning of "My Representations"

In accordance with our plan let us turn to Paton's work, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, and to those passages which would serve to illucidate the role of the pronoun "my". Beginning with the first sentence of section 16, Paton interprets Kant to mean that the reason why the "I think" must be able to accompany all my ideas is that otherwise they would not be ideas of anything — they would not be ideas of an object\(^{26}\). This may be true but, as far as our purposes are concerned, it does not explain why Kant says, all "my" representations\(^{27}\). Why did not Kant, for example, say simply that it must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all representations?

\(^{26}\) K.M.E., p. 510.

\(^{27}\) C.P.R., p. 152, B 131.
Perhaps a clue can be found in Paton's further reference to a remark that Kant makes after providing different other names for the "I think". There Kant says that "the manifold representations, which are given in intuition, would not be all my representations, if they did not belong to one self-consciousness". Paton uses this sentence as a means towards understanding the opening sentence of section 16. He claims that Kant is urging the necessity of apperception on the ground that "without it my ideas would not be my ideas". Paton's further explanations are important. He sees this proposition as making the same point as the very first sentence of section 16; the only reason why my ideas must be mine is that unless they were, they could not possess unity and so be ideas of in one objective world. But what do the words "my ideas" mean? According to Paton, the meaning is that they, i.e., "my ideas", are ideas belonging to one and the same self-consciousness. Thus we can restate Paton's above-cited

28 Ibid., p. 153, B 132.
29 Ibid.
30 K.M.E., p. 511.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
explanation by saying that my ideas must belong to one and the same self-consciousness; otherwise they would not possess unity and so be ideas of objects in one objective word.

It seems that Paton is close to stating precisely what the function of "my" is in Kant's exposition; and he actually seems to do so when he says that "my ideas" means "ideas belonging to one and the same self-consciousness". Yet this does not seem to be precise. This lack is indicated in what Paton has already said; namely, that they ("my ideas") must belong to one and the same self-consciousness otherwise they would not possess unity. But Kant says "insofar (emphasis ours) as I grasp the manifold in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine". According to Paton, therefore, the ideas are mine for the sake of unity, whereas what Kant seems to be saying that in grasping the ideas as "mine" I grasp the identity of consciousness in virtue of which they are mine: "I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I

33 Ibid.
34 C.P.R., p. 154, B 134.
call them one and all my representations..." 35. And I grasp them as mine insofar as I unite them in one self-consciousness 36. Therefore, Paton's suggestion that "my ideas" merely means ideas belonging to one and the same self-consciousness 37 while not erroneous, is nevertheless not adequate. True, my ideas belong to one and the same self-consciousness. But they are mine in virtue of "belonging" to one self-consciousness 38.

There remains one more remark of importance with regard to Paton's interpretation of the function of "mine". This is Kant's statement that the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception is an identical and analytic proposition 39. This remark is repeated in section 17 40. It is important because in the second time Kant restates the above principle but this time using the phrase "my representations" and giving the pronoun "my" great emphasis 41.

36 Ibid., p. 154, B 134.
37 K.M.E., p. 511.
38 C.P.R., p. 153, B 132.
39 Ibid., p. 155, B 135.
40 Ibid., p. 157, B 138.
41 Ibid.
Paton remarks that the analytic proposition to which Kant refers is that "all my ideas must be my ideas"\(^42\). Yet it makes synthetic unity a condition of all thought\(^43\). Let us, then, look closely at this interpretation of that proposition which Kant called identical and analytic. This proposition must, indeed, be very important, for it might provide the key by which the function of "my" in the Transcendental Deduction may be revealed. However, what Paton proposes, that is, that all my ideas must be my ideas, is a simple tautology and no analytic proposition. According to Kant, an analytic proposition is one adding "nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaking it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although confusedly ..."\(^44\). The question arises, what is thought "confusedly" in the subject of the proposition that Paton offers as being analytic? Kant also calls analytic judgements "explicative"\(^45\). What, we inquire, is being "explicated" in the judgement, "all my ideas must be my ideas"? Again, Paton fails to

\(^{42}\) K.M.E., p. 518.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) C.P.R., p. 48, A7/B 11.

\(^{45}\) Ibid.
provide us with a clear and satisfying account of the function of "my" in the argument of section 16.

Finally, with regard to Henrich's claim that Kant extends the meaning of "my" to those representations that "can" be united in one self-consciousness\[^{46}\], Professor Paton has nothing to say. Indeed, it seems that he does not see any such extension of meaning\[^{47}\]. However, when Henrich suggests that Kant's contention is plausible because "we do actually call representations ours in virtue of the fact that we can become conscious that they belong to us"\[^{48}\], he seems to contradict both Kant's own words and Paton's interpretation of them; for to be "my" ideas, it is not necessary to be conscious of them as mine. Kant says that, "as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness..."\[^{49}\] Paton merely repeats this by saying that Kant "disclaims the view that I am necessarily conscious of them as my ideas..."\[^{50}\].

\[^{47}\] K.M.E., pp. 514, 514, n.5.
\[^{49}\] C.P.R., p. 153, B 132.
\[^{50}\] K.M.E., p. 511.
Thus it seems that Henrich asserts much more than does Kant when he says that we call representations ours because we can become conscious of them as belonging to us\(^{51}\). What is really important for Kant is that universal condition in virtue of which we can say that they belong to us.

4. H.J. de Vleeschauwer's Explanation of the Meaning of "My Representations"

Next we turn to de Vleeschauwer's estimation of the function of "my representations", or of "belongs to me". What is interesting about de Vleeschauwer's particular approach is that he gives no attention to the question of the use of the pronoun "my"! Indeed, the statement of the first sentence of section 16 — "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations\(^{52}\)"... — he translates by "Toute représentation doit pouvoir être accompagnée du ich denke"\(^{53}\). His translation omits any reference to "my" representations. Then, he adds, if one denies this proposition, one is forced to admit of a representation that could not be thought\(^{54}\). But Kant says,

\(^{51}\) P.S.T.D., p. 654.
\(^{52}\) C.P.R., p. 152, B 131.
\(^{53}\) T.D., p. 98.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
"something would be represented in me (emphasis ours) which could not be thought at all...". Right from the first, then, de Vleeschauwer ignores that word which Kant in the process of his exposition italicizes several times.

Instead, de Vleeschauwer's discussion of section 16 proceeds, or is guided by, a study of the meaning of the word representation! Thus he claims that in order for there to be a representation there must be a subject conscious of it. In other words, de Vleeschauwer claims that the "I think" is contained analytically in the notion of a representation. Thus the first sentence of section 16 — "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations" — signifies that the "I think" ought always to be found by analysis as "la condition d'intelligibilité de la représentation". Again, Kant demonstrates here the necessity of the 'I think', "comme

55 C.P.R., pp. 152-53, B 131.
56 For example, in C.P.R., p. 153, B 132; p. 154, B 134; p. 155, B 135; p. 157, B 138; p. 160, B 144.
57 T.D., p. 98.
58 Ibid., pp. 98, 100.
59 Ibid., p. 99.
60 C.P.R., p. 152, B 131.
élément constituant la représentation..."62.

Reference to consciousness, however, does not include reference to a single consciousness or even a single subject63. The "I" in the "I think" signifies, in the analysis of the notion of representation, only "some sort" of a subject, "le sujet quelconque"64. Thus each representation could have a different subject65. It is the act of synthesizing which relates to each other the diverse representations of which we become successively conscious66. This act is the sole constant67. Thus we must say that in order that the identity of the subject be made intelligible a priori, the given manifold is united by a relation to an identical consciousness via a synthesis. Then the synthetic unification of an intuitive manifold is at the basis of my identity68. This, then, is in outline, how de Vleeschauwer sees the course of the argument in section 16.

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 106.
64 Ibid., p. 99.
65 Ibid., p. 107.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 108.
However, in section 16 itself, we see no evidence to support that interpretation which would depend on an analysis of the concept of representation. Kant himself never speaks of any such analysis. Furthermore, it seems that de Vleeschauwer's interpretation of the very first sentence of section 16 by omitting the "my" is a clear sign of his not understanding the import of this word in the context of the argument. Our last word on this point is that de Vleeschauwer has nothing significant to say with regard to the question which Henrich has raised. Yet de Vleeschauwer's remarks à propos of Kant's statement that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition, provides a means by which we can attempt to resolve Henrich's problem.

5. The Quest for the Analytic Proposition which would Explain the Meaning of "My Representations"

With regard to Kant's claim, then, that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an identical and analytic proposition, de Vleeschauwer begins by suggesting that "Dieser Grundsatz" refers to the

69 C.P.R., pp. 154-55, B 135.
"synthetic unity of consciousness" directly. It is for this reason that de Vleeschauwer considers it a bizarre joining (un accouplement bizarre) of terms, i.e., that the synthetic unity of consciousness is an analytic proposition. From then on he attempts to account for this bizarre joining; for Kant's statement cannot be disregarded from the fact that he made a point to repeat it twice.

In our estimation, no such bizarre joining is to be found in the text itself; for Kant himself speaks of "the principle of the necessary unity of apperception" which "reveals" the necessity of a "synthesis" of the manifold given in intuition (emphasis ours). Why is this synthesis necessary? Because without it, the "thorough going identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought" (emphasis ours).

In this analytic proposition, therefore, the identity of self-consciousness is thought and the necessity of a synthesis is revealed. The synthesis is necessary because for an understanding that thinks, nothing manifold is given through the simple representation 'I'. It is only by means

70 T.D., p. 115.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 C.P.R., pp. 154-55, B 135.
74 Ibid., p. 155, B 135.
of combination in one consciousness that such identity can be thought. Kant then offers a proposition that would seem to meet these demands: "I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call them one and all my representations ...." Here the role of the "my" seems to be explained. In calling a manifold of representations "mine" I think the identity of self-consciousness. But, since our understanding is only a power of thinking to which a manifold must be supplied from elsewhere, this would amount to saying that I am conscious a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations which would allow me to "ascribe them to the identical self as my representations,...". In other words, we are conscious a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations, i.e., of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Thus the second requisite is fulfilled; the necessity of a synthesis is revealed.

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 157, B 138.
78 Ibid., p. 155, B 135.
This seems appropriate; for Kant announced in section 15 that he is looking for a unity which "itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgement"\textsuperscript{79}, i.e., that unity which makes thought possible, the unity of self-consciousness. Indeed, in the new version of the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" Kant speaks of "the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists"\textsuperscript{80}. Now Kant had once defined self-consciousness as "the idea that another idea is in me,"\textsuperscript{81} or that it is "mine". If such is the definition of self-consciousness, then the use of a procedure which involves an analysis of the meaning of "mine" could be expected to play a decisive role in the argument of section 16 -- that is, Kant is not using some inferior form of argument in which he himself has little confidence, as Prof. Henrich would have us believe\textsuperscript{82}.

That this way of proceeding is necessary to the argument of the Transcendental Deduction can be shown if:

(1) we bear in mind the remarks we have made with regard

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 152, B 131.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 368, B 406.


\textsuperscript{82} P.S.T.D., p. 655.
to the function of the "I" or "my" or "mine"; (2) if we remember the distinctive features of an analytic proposition; and (3) if we then apply these points to that proposition which we have used already several times as a test case for the interpretation of section 16, i.e., the very first sentence found therein. This proposition is analytic; through it the identity of self-consciousness is thought and the necessity of a synthesis is revealed. Furthermore, the possessive pronoun "my" plays a key function, and is necessary for an understanding of this proposition — that is, we do not have to omit the "my", as did de Vleeschaumer, to understand that proposition.

Thus if the "I think" — "a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations and which in all consciousness is one and the same"\textsuperscript{83} — were not capable of accompanying all "my" representations\textsuperscript{84}, then how would it be possible to call those representations mine? Where would be that unity in virtue of which they would be mine? Let us take that proposition and say this time, "it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{C.P.R.}, p. 153, B 132.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 152, B 131.
only some of my representations." On what grounds, then, could we call the other representations ours? The importance of the word "mine" prevails in each part of the first sentence of the first paragraph of section 16. When Kant gives the reason why the 'I think' must accompany all my representations, it is because "something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all" (emphasis ours). Indeed, how could they be mine? — "and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least be nothing to me" (emphasis ours). When Kant turns to speak of the representations given in intuition, he makes the important qualification that they have a relation to the "I think" in the same subject in which the manifold is found (emphasis ours).

Thus we have a truly analytic judgement in which the word "my" plays an important part. That this is only proper that Kant should proceed in this way is seen once we recall some of the characteristics of an analytic proposition. We shall, for this purpose, consult a paragraph that Kant added in the Introduction to the second edition

86 Ibid., p. 153, B 132.
87 Ibid.
of the Critique of Pure Reason. In general, the analytic judgement is one in which the connection between the subject and predicate is thought through identity. Now in an analytic judgement, "there is no need to appeal to the testimony of experience..."\(^8\). Its truth is known \textit{a priori}\(^9\), and we are conscious of the "necessity" of such a judgement\(^{10}\). This is important, therefore, to the argument of the Transcendental Deduction. If the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition which reveals the necessity of a synthesis, it follows then that we can grasp the highest condition of thought before all experience, and know too its necessity. This point, therefore, denies any justification for Henrich's claim that Kant proceeds according to a "mere" semantic analysis\(^{11}\).

6. Final Evaluation of the Theory of Incompatible Proof-Strategies

Professor Henrich, as we have seen, believes that the argument of section 16 rests on an equivocation on the

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 49, B 11.
\(^9\) Ibid., B 12.
\(^10\) Ibid.
pronoun "my". In one way representations are said to be "mine" insofar as they are actually bound together in one self-consciousness. In another way they are said to be "mine" because we "can" become conscious of them. In our estimation, the distinction Henrich makes is limited to the level of empirical apperception; for Kant has himself indicated that it is not necessary to be conscious of representations as mine for them to be mine. Kant is concerned with that universal condition under which representations must stand if they are to be "mine". Therefore, Henrich's claim that Kant's so-called extension of the meaning of the word "mine" leading to the more extensive thesis that all the representations which arise in the sensibility of a being are already potentially conscious representations and to that extent "his", misses the thrust of the argument entirely. That representations have a relation to an empirical consciousness is necessary insofar as awareness of their existence is concerned.

92 Ibid., p. 654.
93 Ibid., p. 653.
94 Ibid., p. 654.
95 C.P.R., p. 153, B 132.
97 C.P.R., p. 142, A 117, n.a.
However, to grasp that representations are "mine" involves a relation to transcendental consciousness or to one universal self-consciousness. Henrich's confusion of empirical with Transcendental consciousness appears even more clearly when he argues that as long as something belongs to me only if it can be taken up into conscious or is available to be so taken up, it is not all "mine" but only in "relation to me."\(^{98}\) We have said earlier that here Henrich is making a distinction between actual and potential consciousness of representations\(^{99}\). Now we add that this distinction is made merely on the empirical level, i.e., I am now conscious of a certain manifold and at some other time I could become conscious of another manifold. This is to say that Henrich regards Kant proceeding on the level of real synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of apprehension, and not on the level of an \textit{a priori} and merely intellectual synthesis.

This point is important to remember, and various texts in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} seem to point to this very conclusion. For example, in a footnote in section 26 Kant refers to the "synthesis of apperception, which is


\(^{99}\) Chapter V, p. 8.
intellectual and contained in the category completely a priori. This synthesis of the understanding is, "if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, which as an act, it is conscious of itself, even without 'the aid of' (sic) sensibility ...". In the second-edition version of the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason", Kant says of this synthesis of apperception which is found in the categories completely a priori, that the "unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories ..... is only unity in thought by which alone no object is given ...". And, "thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition ...". Therefore, if we remember that it is merely the unity in thought that Kant is concerned with in section 16, then it will become impossible to conclude, as Henrich did, that merely on the analysis of the word "mine" the Transcendental Deduction has already been completed within the first few paragraphs.

100 C.P.R., p. 171, B 161, n.b.
101 Ibid., p. 166, B 153.
102 Ibid., p. 377, B 421-22.
103 Ibid., p. 381, B 428.
There is, therefore, no ground for Henrich's claim that Kant is utilizing incompatible proof-strategies. Henrich's proposal lies on a total misunderstanding of the argument of the Transcendental Deduction. Finally, his claim that a "careful stylistic analysis" would show that Kant modified his language in section 20, also is groundless. As far as Kant's vocabulary is concerned, the use of the "my" disappears only after section 21. All this can mean, and most likely means, is that Kant's argument has gone to another phase. If Henrich means that Kant's "style" changed within the course of writing the Transcendental Deduction, the evidence is still forthcoming!

104 P.S.T.D., p. 656.
CONCLUSION

1. Résumé of Difficulties Encountered as the Result of Examining Henrich's Hypothesis

In the first paragraph of his essay "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction", Dieter Henrich speaks of the Deduction as the place where "Kant has formulated his most profound thoughts and presented the decisive foundation for his theory of knowledge". Therefore, once we have arrived at an understanding of this text, we have also provided ourselves with a key to the entire Critique of Pure Reason;

But Kant's text is so complex and elusive that it is difficult to follow the line of argument and to perceive within it the structure of a proof which could support the whole system of critical philosophy.

This, then, has been our concern throughout our work; namely, to understand and evaluate Professor Henrich's thesis with regard to precisely what this structure might be and to do the same with regard to that particular argument or content that demands such a structure as he had proposed; for surely the inability to find an argument that would accord with this particular structure would cast doubt upon whether

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1 P.S.T.D., p. 640.

2 Ibid.
Henrich correctly understood Kant's intentions with regard to the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction.

Professor Henrich presented his thesis as being an advance over the classical interpretations of Paton and de Vleeschauwer. They proposed what he called a "double-proof theory". Against them Henrich advanced the "two-steps-in-one-proof theory". The basic piece of evidence came from section 21 where Henrich says that there is found "Kant's unequivocal explication" that two arguments rather than two proofs, are involved. The source of misunderstanding seems to arise at this point because, says Henrich, the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 give the initial impression of being the same. Yet on Kant's own word in section 21, the results of each section are significantly different and only together do they yield a single proof. This is the problem that Henrich uses to raise the question of proof-structure. From our own studies we have

3 Ibid., p. 642.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 641.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., pp. 641, 642.
8 Ibid., p. 642.
also come to see that the burden of any interpretation of the conclusions of the argument must rest on section 20 — section 20 came to provide the touchstone determining whether or not a particular commentator had understood the argument of the Deduction correctly. For, granting a unity to Kant's argument, it was necessary to provide an interpretation of the conclusion of section 20 such that would in turn contribute to the conclusion reached in section 26. This we then declared to be at least implicit in Henrich's thesis.

Also, in the course of our investigations we found another persistent problem that was highly relevant both in understanding both the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction and the argument which would accord with it. Thus far we have been merely content to mention it in passing, but, in fact, it deserves more attention and to it we shall now attend. It concerns certain statements made by Kant in the first paragraph of section 26, where as in section 21, Kant states what has been achieved and what remains to be done. Indeed, it was this paragraph which came to be the source of many problems of de Vleeschauwer when he attempted to relate it to what Kant had said in section 21. There Kant spoke of the "above proposition" which had summarized what had gone before; in it a 'beginning' was made of a
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deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, in section 26 Kant refers to section 20 calling it simply the "transcendental deduction." To make the issue even more difficult, Kant gives to section 26 for its title, the "Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Employment in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding."  

Thus the task of finding an argument to suit Kant's intentions is now expanded to the giving of a careful consideration of the conclusion reached in section 26, with the aim of harmonizing the intentions expressed in section 26 with those expressed in section 21. That is, we must understand how the aim of section 26 as expressed in section 21 coincides with the project as it is expressed in section 26:

In what follows (cf. §26) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility that its unity is no other than which the category (according to §20) prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general —

We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori by means of categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of making

9 C.P.R., p. 160, B 144.

10 Ibid., p. 170, B 159.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.
nature possible. In other words, how is the intention to explain why everything that can be presented to our senses is subject to laws that have their origin a priori in the understanding alone, coincide with the aim to show that a unity thought in the categories is also found in the manifold given for an empirical intuition? If we cannot see any harmony at this point, then we may find ourselves in the position of Professor Henrich who was compelled to posit a parallel proof, i.e., a proof whose task concerned the "making intelligible the possibility of relating the understanding to sensibility", a proof given in addition to the one establishing the objective validity of the categories. Indeed, Henrich refers in a footnote precisely to that sentence which we have quoted above from section 26 as providing evidence for the need of this additional proof.

2. The Reconciliation of Sections 21 and 26 With Respect to Section 20

Fortunately, there does not seem to be an equally difficult problem when it concerns Kant's own words in sections 21 and 26 with regard to what section 20 has

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13 Ibid., p. 170, B 159-60.
15 Ibid., p. 651, n.11.
accomplished. As we have said many times, section 20 establishes that the category prescribes unity to a manifold of given intuition in general. Now in section 26 Kant refers to section 20 saying that in the Transcendental Deduction he has shown the possibility of the categories as a priori modes of knowledge of objects of an intuition in general. Both statements, in our view, mean the same thing and throughout our work we have, in addition, found other passages in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which would seem to provide sufficient evidence for precisely this interpretation. At this point we need merely to refer to but one source by way of example: because the pure concepts of the understanding relate, through mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, they are for this reason mere forms of thought through which no determinate object is known. Thus Paton, for example, who failed to understand the conclusion of section 20, could not make the connection between the remarks made by Kant in section 21 and the remarks found in section 26 where Kant reviewed what has been accomplished.

16 C.P.R., p. 161, B 144-45.
17 Ibid., p. 170, B 159.
18 Ibid., p. 164, B 150.
In fact, he distorts what Kant says in section 26. Paton writes that in the Transcendental Deduction it has been shown that the categories give us a priori knowledge of objects of intuition in general\(^{19}\). Kant, however, says that they are a priori "modes" of knowledge of an object of intuition in general\(^{20}\). To say that the pure concepts of the understanding are a priori modes of knowledge need not commit Kant to saying that it has already been established that objects have been given in intuition corresponding to what is thought in the categories; for if the synthetic unity of consciousness is an objective condition of knowledge, a condition under my intuition must stand if it is to become an object for me\(^ {21}\), and the categories are rules of its unity, they will necessarily be a priori modes of knowledge. Why? Because in no other way can an object in general be thought. But it is only when the relation to the manifold of an empirical intuition is established, can we say that they give us knowledge. For this reason Paton added a footnote explaining that "strictly speaking" a priori knowledge of objects of intuition in general is not

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19 K.M.E., p. 538.

20 C.P.R., p. 170, B 159.

21 Ibid., p. 156, B 138.
knowledge until we indicate the nature of the intuitions\textsuperscript{22}.

3. The Reconciliation of Sections 21 and 26
With Respect to Section 26

Thus far we have been able to see that Kant's own account of what section 20 has achieved is the same in both sections 21 and 26. What now remains is for us to see whether Kant's account of what section 26 has for its aim as expressed in section 26 can be harmonized with what he says on this matter in section 20.

That the aim of section 26, as it is described both in section 21 and section 26, is the same, can readily be seen from the following: As we have already noted, "the principles of possible experience are... at the same time universal laws of nature"\textsuperscript{23}. The aim of section 26 is to show that the categories make nature possible, that is, prescribe laws to nature\textsuperscript{24}. According to the above quotation taken from the \textit{Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics}, this would mean that Kant would have to show that the categories make experience possible. Indeed, when Kant is reviewing

\textsuperscript{22} K.M.E., p. 538, n.2.
\textsuperscript{23} P.F.M., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{24} C.P.R., p. 170, B 159-60.
in the final paragraph of section 26 what he has achieved, he states that the categories prescribe laws to appearances a priori, laws which are involved in "nature in general, that is, in the conformity to law of all appearances in space and time." And these laws instruct us as to what can be known as an object of experience. As we might have expected, Kant actually does conclude in the third paragraph of section 26 that the "categories are conditions of the possibility of experience," that is, they make possible the objects of experience; in other words, they make nature possible. But experience is said to be a knowledge by means of connected perceptions, or empirical knowledge. This means that the pure concepts of the understanding are now found to have objects, that is, their objective validity has been established. For, as we said, experience is empirical knowledge, and

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\text{in space and time are given only insofar as they are perceptions (that is, representations accompanied by sensation) \text{— therefore only through empirical representation}} \text{.}
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\begin{itemize}
  \item 25 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 173, B 165.
  \item 26 \textit{Ibid.}
  \item 27 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 171, B 161.
  \item 28 \textit{Ibid.}
  \item 29 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162, B 147-48.
  \item 30 \textit{Ibid.}, B 147.
\end{itemize}
Indeed, this was precisely the very aim that Kant had proposed in section 21 with regard to section 26; namely, that it be shown that the unity thought with respect of a manifold of intuition in general is found in the manifold of empirical intuition\textsuperscript{31}. Once an intuition is found corresponding to the concept of an object in general thought by way of the category\textsuperscript{32}, a \textit{priori} knowledge by means of the categories becomes possible.

This, therefore, appears to be the way by which the aim of the Transcendental Deduction is actually achieved. Thus according to our rendering of the argument, it was, first of all, possible to see that Kant's evaluation of the conclusion of section 20 is precisely the same in both sections 21 and 26. It was also possible to show that the same aim was expressed with regard to section 26 in both sections 21 and 26. A further consequence of this latter conclusion is that the actual conclusion of section 26 and our understanding of it in relation to the results of section 20 coincides perfectly with the intention Kant expressed in the heading of section 26: this section is called the "Transcendental Deduction of the Universally

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 162, B 146.
\end{itemize}
Possible Employment in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding". Section 26 proves that the categories are the "conditions of the possibility of experience and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience". Because the categories lie at the possibility of objects of experience, it is therefore established that they have objects and are objectively valid. Thus we can reduce the title of section 26 into three parts and show how this heading is appropriate. Section 26 is called a "Transcendental Deduction". A transcendental deduction proves the objective validity of the "Pure Concepts of the Understanding". For us things are given in space and time through empirical intuition. But empirical knowledge is experience. Therefore, to establish a Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding is to establish their "Universally Possible Employment in Experience". And this is what Kant says in section 21 about how in section 26 the a priori validity of the categories will be demonstrated in respect of all objects of our senses:

In what follows (cf §26) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is

33 Ibid., p. 170, B 159.
34 Ibid., p. 171, B 161.
given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category (according to §20) prescribes to a manifold of a given intuition in general 36.

4. Final Evaluation of the Commentators' Theses and Final Evaluation of Henrich's Hypothesis

Turning to the commentators with regard to the question of relating the second steps or project announced in sections 21 and 26, to the laws of nature and how this contributes towards establishing the objective validity of the categories, we find that all three have failed. This failure ought, to say the least, cast serious doubts on their interpretations of the proof-structure. Kant himself clearly brings out this relation in section 27, the "Outcome of this Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding", after he makes the statement that the categories contain on the side of the understanding, the ground of the possibility of all experience in general 37. He then goes on to say:

How they make experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility of experience that they supply in application to appearances, will be shown more fully in the following chapter on the transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment 38.

36 Ibid., p. 161, B 144-45.
37 Ibid., p. 174, B 167.
38 Ibid.
Professors Henrich and Paton chose to ignore this passage. Professor de Vleeschauwer merely repeats Kant, omitting the word "principle". Then he adds that Kant is referring at this point merely to the Schematism. Furthermore, Kant's qualification that something will be shown "more fully" (das mehrere lehren) implies that Kant's proof thus far must somehow have involved showing that the categories prescribe laws a priori to appearances. However, when Kant says "what" these principles are, this implies that he has considered the principles in general only — the particular system of principles is yet to be examined. But none of these commentators have even bothered to stop and reflect what might be the import of these sentences insofar as they might shed light on the proof-structure of the Transcendental Deduction, and suggest an argument that might be made to accord with it.

Our conclusions and résumé, therefore, with regard to how the commentators understood him, must be the following: It is true that all three commentators agree that Kant sees the Transcendental Deduction as presenting a unified argument. But the commentators also agree in that each on of them fails

40 C.P.R., p. 174, B 167.
to provide an interpretation of the proof that would respect this unity. In each case, after presenting what they believe to be the conclusion of section 20, we are left to wonder why the Transcendental Deduction must go on any further. That is, it is impossible to understand in what way the conclusion of section 20 might contribute towards bringing about the conclusion of section 26. Furthermore, when the conclusion of section 26 is examined, there are no clear explanations why the laws of nature must be considered, nor of how the introduction of the Principles relates to the intentions Kant expressed in section 21 with regard to section 26. This, of course, means ignoring Kant's words that the Transcendental Deduction is

exposition of the pure concepts of the understanding, and therewith of all theoretical a priori knowledge as the principles of the possibility of experience ... 41.

Turning to what is peculiar to Professor Henrich, we saw his inability to provide a unified proof having two steps. Because he failed here, he was forced to add qualifications for which there is no evidence in the Transcendental Deduction. Thus with regard to the proof of the objective validity of the categories, Henrich comes to claim that Kant

41 Ibid., p. 175, B 168.
had to "reformulate" the task of the Deduction to take into account a merely partial ability of the understanding to unify sensible representations. In addition, Henrich was forced to include a parallel proof, a proof of "possibility" which at one point looks remarkably like the manner of proceeding Kant himself suggested in sections 21 and 26. Furthermore, the external evidence Henrich brought in to support his restriction thesis served only to show how untenable this interpretation was in actuality. In Kant's draft of a letter to Tieftrunk, in the letter he actually did send, and in his reflections no evidence was found to support the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis insofar as a certain content was concerned, i.e., insofar as the restriction thesis was concerned. Finally, Henrich's last attempt to save his thesis by accusing Kant of using incompatible proof-strategies was found to be wanting on two counts. First, no evidence was to be found for this accusation in the Transcendental Deduction itself. Second, this accusation presupposed Henrich's interpretation of the argument that should fill the two-steps-to-one-proof thesis, an argument which these investigations have shown to be untenable.

42 P.S.T.D., pp. 646, 647.
43 Ibid., p. 652.
Thus the benefit of Henrich's thesis of two-steps-to-one-proof, was to highlight Kant's intention of presenting a unified argument, and in particular to examine closely those steps to which Kant refers in section 21. Whether there are two steps only to Kant's Transcendental Deduction, or whether in addition there is a series of intermediate steps, has not been our exclusive concern. What was important was that these investigations led us to try to understand in such a manner those steps of which Kant actually speaks, so that the one arrived at in section 20 would demand completion and would contribute to the conclusion of section 26, wherein the aim of the Transcendental Deduction was finally attained.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Kant Bibliography


Although this work was not included in the body of the thesis, it was necessary to study it in order to appreciate the need for, and function of, a transcendental deduction.


It was, however, the second edition of 1787 which was the main concern of this thesis.


Certain remarks made by Kant with respect to philosophical method and with respect to the nature of the principles of the possibility of experience were especially relevant to this study.


The remarks Kant made in a footnote in this work suggested to H.J. Paton a way of understanding the argument of the Transcendental Deduction.


Kant's famous definition of self-consciousness is found here.

Beck's letters to Kant and Kant's letter to Tieftrunk found in this collection helped to give an estimate of Henrich's new evidence.


Dieter Henrich relied on some of Kant's untranslated reflections and drafts of a letter to Tieftrunk to supply evidence for his hypothesis.

B. Commentators' Works


An evaluation of the hypothesis presented in this article was the aim of this thesis.


This work was not used in the thesis. However, Paton does make a brief reference to a proof that and a proof how. But in this context, the distinction seems to parallel Kant's distinction made in the Prolegomena with respect to the synthetic and analytic method.


In this work -- that is, in the first volume -- Paton gives a detailed exposition of what he considers to be Kant's proof in the Transcendental Deduction.

"The Key to Kant's Deduction of the Categories", in Mind, 40 (1931), pp. 310-29.

Paton discusses the relation of the form of judgements to the pure categories insofar as the form of judgements is that of synthetic judgements also. The question of the structure of the Transcendental Deduction is mentioned in passing.
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In this review Paton makes some observations with respect to the similarity of manner according to which he and de Vleeschauwer divide the Transcendental Deduction.


In the first part of this book de Vleeschauwer gives a detailed exposition of how Kant established the objective validity of the categories.


Of course, there are other commentators than Paton and de Vleeschauwer who could have been closely scrutinized in a thesis of this sort, e.g., A.C. Ewing and N.K. Smith. However, the manner of limiting the material has come from Dieter Henrich himself, whose hypothesis has been subject to examination. First of all, he is concerned with contemporary commentators of repute. Secondly, he has concerned himself specifically with those commentators who have seen the problem of proof-structure in the Transcendental Deduction and who have sought an interpretation of this text bearing in mind Kant's remarks in section 21. Ewing and Smith are examples of contemporary commentators of repute; they are also examples of commentators who did not deal specifically with the above question.
ABSTRACT OF

Dieter Henrich's Hypothesis Concerning the Proof-Structure of the Second-Edition Transcendental Deduction in Immanuel Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

The aim of this thesis was to evaluate Dieter Henrich's hypothesis "concerning" the proof-structure of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. We say "concerning", because Henrich, besides claiming that Kant presented one proof in two steps, offered a new interpretation of the text which would require such a structure. His belief was that because he took account of Kant's observations in section 21, he could produce such an interpretation. His interpretation alone would render intelligible certain peculiarities of the text of the Transcendental Deduction. The classical interpretations, e.g., those of Paton and de Vleeschauwer, failed because, neglecting Kant's observations, they saw the Deduction as presenting two separate proofs. Furthermore, they could not explain why two separate proofs were required.

These investigations were able to show that Henrich failed to take account of Paton's and de Vleeschauwer's concern for the unity of the Transcendental Deduction. But he was correct that they could not offer any useful distinction

1 Leon R. Wartzaba, M.A. thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies, University of Ottawa, May 1973.
between the two "sides" or "aspects" of the one proof. This was most clearly reflected in the ambiguities and even conflicting accounts within the works of Paton and de Vleeschaumer with respect to what the conclusion of section 20 might be. But Henrich's own interpretation also suffered on this point. His interpretation of section 20 by means of the restriction thesis was found to be unacceptable by virtue of what Kant himself had plainly said in the Transcendental Deduction. Furthermore, it was established that the evidence introduced by Henrich from outside the Critique of Pure Reason served rather to confirm our negative judgement with respect to his interpretation. Finally, it was found that Henrich's account of Kant's use of the pronoun "my" in the argument of section 16 presupposed an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction which had already been disqualified. Furthermore, it was argued that another more obvious and plausible interpretation of the use of "my" was possible, a use that accorded with the rest of the Transcendental Deduction. The "Conclusion" of the thesis glanced back at the problems that arose in the course of examining Henrich's hypothesis, and attempted a resolution thereof. It appeared in the course of these investigations that, granting Kant's intention to present a unified proof, it was necessary to interpret the conclusion of section 20 in such a way that it demanded completion by means of the
conclusion of section 26. But Kant spoke twice of the relation of the conclusion of sections 20 and 26 to each other. This occurred in sections 21 and 26. However, it was not immediately clear whether Kant's accounts differ, or not. It was concluded that only such an interpretation that could reconcile Kant's remarks with respect to the conclusions of sections 20 and 26 would provide the best understanding of the Transcendental Deduction.