LOUISBOURG AND THE INDIANS:
A STUDY IN IMPERIAL RACE RELATIONS, 1713-1760

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAPS LISTED</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER I
FRANCE FORGES AN INDIAN POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA | 2

## CHAPTER II
THE MICMAC AND THEIR NEIGHBOURGS | 42

## CHAPTER III
NERVE CENTRE FOR RAIDERS OF SEA AND FOREST | 80

## CHAPTER IV
THE GARRISON AND THE GUERRILLAS | 122

## CHAPTER V
OF 'SAVAGES' AND KINGS | 152

## APPENDICES | 186

## SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY | 194
MAPS

Acadia, by N. Bellin, 1764.  

The Lower St. Lawrence and Gulf, showing Abbé Antoine Gaulin's mission, by G. Catalogne, 1723. 

Nova Scotia, Cape Britain, adjacent New England and Canada, by Thomas Jefferys, 1755. 

Ile Royale, showing Marigoeche (Mirliguèche) and Ile Ste Famille, by M. de Poilly, 1757. 

Cape Breton, showing Malagawatch and Chapel Island, 1868. 

iii
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Archives des Colonies, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Archives de la Guerre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Bibliothèques de Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Archives de la Marine, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives Nationales, Paris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The confrontation between Old and New Worlds that in northern North America began in earnest during the opening years of the seventeenth century was in many ways a unique experience. Neither side knew much about the other. While it is true that Breton and Portuguese fishermen had been visiting coastal waters off Newfoundland and Cape Breton for more than a century before colonization had begun, contacts between the two worlds during that period had remained minimal. It was not until the French established their colony on Ile Sainte-Croix in 1604 that relationships became close and continuous.

If the French could muster very few facts about their new friends and allies, the Micmacs, they had plenty of theories. Debates about the nature of the New World's inabitants had been going on in Europe ever since the days of Columbus. The French came armed with good intentions, convinced that the Indians were truly human in spite of puzzling cultural differences from Europeans. A great deal of scholarly effort had already been spent in trying to fit the Indians and their cultures into the classical European conception of the origin and development of man. The French, firmly entrenched in their concepts of an ordered society, could see very little that was orderly
about Indian social organization. They could not even see that the Indians had their own religions. They were naively convinced that the Indians, from having been deprived of the light of Christianity, would quickly recognize the superiority of the French social structure, based as it was on the "right religion" and the "right reason".¹ In very short order they would become Frenchmen, peacefully cooperating in the fur trade to the benefit of all. The French viewed the New World idealistically, envisioning a new Utopia-France inhabited by noble savages who would be converted under the guidance of the perfect apostolic church. As their European policies demanded that they keep their own population at home, they saw the Indians as almost ready-made Frenchmen who, by means of Christianization and the adoption of French customs, would form the corps of a New France overseas. Spiritual, economic and political motives were inextricably mixed in France's imperialistic drive.

To the surprise of the French, the apparently docile, mild-mannered Indians not only displayed a strong desire to retain their own cultural identities, they also indicated that they considered themselves superior to Europeans, in spite of the latter's advanced technology. Indians who were taken to France to be impressed with the might of that country often displayed a critical judgment of what they saw. Clearly,

turning them into Frenchmen was not going to be as simple as first thought.

This cultural resistance on the part of the Indians intensified the ambivalence inherent in the attitude of the French: on the one hand they were convinced of their own superiority, on the other they compared themselves unfavorably with the Indians. It is an ambivalence that perhaps runs through all cultures;\(^1\) there are indications that it troubled the Indians as well. However, in the case of the French, it was counterbalanced by the universal tendency of dominant cultures to look down upon and dislike weaker cultures. The French never really liked the Indians, even while using them for their own ends.

Whatever the motives on either side, the French were faced with the indisputable fact when they first arrived in North America that they were greatly outnumbered. Estimates for the Indian continental population at the time of contact range from 600,000 to 12,500,000 and even more. Difficulties in arriving at an acceptable figure are compounded by the fact that diseases introduced by Europeans very early ravaged entire peoples. The comparatively deserted land taken over by the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 had been well populated before the epidemic of 1616; New England under the Indians had been a major centre of population, as it is now under the Whites.

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Disease and intensified warfare virtually destroyed the Huron tribes in the 1640's.

By the time Louisbourg was begun in 1720, the pressures of contact had been increasing for more than a century and a half. The Indians had become important to the survival of New France; the French, by their network of trade-military alliances, were able to extend their control over much larger expanses of territory than their numbers alone would have allowed. In 1760, the population of New France, which reached as far West as the Rockies in its sweep from the North Atlantic to Louisiana on the Gulf of Mexico, was in the vicinity of 65,000. The English, squeezed into the comparatively restricted space between the Alleghenies and the Atlantic, numbered nearly 2,000,000. That France was able to hold such vast expanses of territory for as long as she did with so few Frenchmen was a tour-de-force in colonial administration. It has long been maintained that her Indian policy was demonstrably effective.

Once they realized they were not going to turn the Indians into Frenchmen, at least not immediately, the French had set about the next best thing -- turning them into allies. The success of this policy is attested by the prevalence of that axiom of Canadian history, that the French were superior to either the English or the Spanish in dealing with the Indians. Parkman set the tone when he wrote his much-quoted "Spanish civilization crushed the Indian; English civilization scorned
and neglected him; French civilization embraced and cherished
him."

1 On another occasion he referred to "that pliant and
plastic temper" of the French, which allowed them to meet
"the savages half-way, and showed an abundant readiness to
mould their own features after his likeness." Such accommodation
was viewed askance by the English, whose attitude has been well
described as "less tolerant than that of the French or the
Spaniards." Benedict was even more emphatic when she wrote
of "traditional Anglo-Saxon intolerance against alien cultures." 4

The Indians, for their part, are usually presented,
in both contemporary and later accounts, as preferring the
French to the English. "They behave well to the English, but
better to the French, because the French have taken more pains
to civilize their manners, and engage their esteem," observed
trader Robson. Carried a little further, this attitude sees
the Indians as trusting the French rather than the English, who
were regarded as deceitful. Nicolas Jérémie, during the early
eighteenth century, wrote that

1. Francis Parkman, The Jesuits in North America in the
Seventeenth Century, (Toronto, 1907), 44.

2. Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac, (2 vols., Toronto,
1907), I: 75, 77.

3. A.L. Kroeber, Cultural and Natural Areas of Native
North America (Berkeley, 1939), 92.

4. Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, 1934), 11.

5. Joseph Robson, An Account of Six Years' Residence in
Hudson's Bay (London, 1752), 53-54.
all the people with whom we trade in the whole bay always treat the French as their fathers and protectors. The same attachment is not shown towards the English. They say they are too deceitful and that they never tell the truth, and this they do not like. Although uncivilized, they detest lying -- a remarkable characteristic when we remember that they have no authority or discipline, controlling their way of living.¹

Similarly, according to La Vérendrye,

tant qu'il y aura des français au passage des Sauvages ils n'iront point chercher l'Anglois qu'ils n'aiment pas et mesme qu'ils meprisent en disant que ce ne sont point des hommes comme les français et qu'ils ont peur d'eux ne laissant entrer que quelques vieillards dans leur fort, que le français est bien différent ne craignant rien et étant bien faisant.²

Some historians saw this as the result of the French concentrating on the fur trade and consequently on developing Indian alliances, while the English concentrated on establishing agricultural communities. Wissler, for one, saw the network of Indian alliances developed by the French on the Upper Mississippi and Ohio as owing their cohesiveness to their "common enemy", the advancing English frontier.³


3. Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States: Four Centuries of Their History and Culture, (Garden City, 1940), 74.
The French, far from being complacent about their hold on the Indians, were convinced that if the tribesmen preferred the French, it was due to self-interest as much as anything. Champlain wrote that Indians "donnent rien pour rien", and La Vérendrye noted that "sans chaudière on ne seroit pas bons amis".

Difficulties in establishing the true nature of the confrontation have been compounded by the indiscriminate use of such words as "civilization", "savage", or "barbarian"; "superior" and "inferior"; "simple" or perhaps "primitive" to describe tribal societies. These words have been flung about with great abandon in colonial histories. Is civilization "the humanisation of man in society" as stated in one of the definitions quoted in The Oxford Dictionary (1893)? Does that mean that "civilized" man is socially more human than "uncivilized" man? Are tribal societies "uncivilized"? Were Indians less virtuous than Frenchmen or Englishmen? Were they more cruel? Did Indians conduct their affairs according to a rational policy, or were they moved by whims, usually bloodthirsty? Were Indians as treacherous as Europeans reported, or was it that Europeans did not understand their motivation? Indians, for their part, considered Europeans deceitful -- was this justified or just another case of cultural misunderstanding?

2. Burpee, Journals of La Vérendrye, 149.
Is another of the Oxford Dictionary citations true, that the "more advanced the civilization, the less powerful is the individual"? Was Captain John Smith justified when he wrote "it is more easie to civilize them by conquest then by fair meanes; for the one may be at once, but their civilizing will require a long time and much industry?"\(^1\) While these questions go beyond the scope of this paper, we shall confront certain aspects of them.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the French and Indians at Louisbourg in order to establish, in so far as this is possible, its nature and the behaviour patterns it elicited, and how these evolved; and to determine whether or not these were consistent with enunciated policy. The role in which the French cast the Indians will also be examined, how this accorded with Indian aims and whether or not they were mere pawns in the game of empire. Finally, the relationship will be assessed to determine its results for both French and Indians.

I have chosen Louisbourg because in many ways it is a microcosm of the larger colony. Technically subordinate to Québec (with Montreal, Trois-Rivières and Louisiana), actually it was administered directly from France, as was Louisiana. It had its own governor, its own Superior Council, its own rules and regulations. It even had dependencies -- Ile St Jean and Canceau.

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Essentially a garrison town, it was also an important centre for commercial fishing and a vital entrepôt in the trade between Québec, the West Indies and France. Louisbourg was the fourth largest port in colonial North America. Its experience cannot be regarded as a duplicate of that of Québec, but it was similar in many ways. The two colonies cooperated closely, yet were far enough apart that they were to a large extent independent of each other. Although the Indians never formed a part of the regular garrison, they were as important to the military operations of Louisbourg as they were to those of Québec, as scouts and guerrillas rather than as fully organized forces. The militia never developed at the fortress-town as it did in other parts of New France.

Louisbourg was deep in Micmac territory, so most of its dealings were with those people and with their neighbours and sometime allies, the Malecite. These people, particularly the Micmac, have the longest history of contact with Europeans of any of the northern tribes; their pattern of living had been altered by the demands of the fur trade long before the first colonists arrived. Both the Micmac and the Malecite were well into a state of cultural decline by the time they became the guerrilla arm of Louisbourg. French-English rivalry put a premium on their services as guerrillas, allowing them to retain a certain amount of their old independence and freedom of spirit for a few more years, although the wise ones among them knew that this was temporary. They were fighting a
stubborn rear-guard battle for cultural survival, although their relationships with the French, with few exceptions, were consistently friendly.¹

Their relationship with the English was another story. In Acadia, the classical contrast between French and English relations with the Indians held true, and consequently presents a prototype: the French went to considerable trouble and expense to develop their alliances, with consequent benefits, first in trade and later in war; while the English tended to regard the Indians as impediments to expansion. This paper's treatment of the English side is necessarily cursory, dealing with it only enough to put the French-Indian picture into context.

Micmacs still live in their ancestral land, on eleven reserves. As theirs remains essentially an oral tradition, they recount exploits of the past, handing them down through the generations. But the full story of the Indians in Nova Scotia's early colonial history still remains to be told.

In describing the Micmac and their allies I have generalized to the extent of including other Algonkin peoples of the Eastern Woodland cultural complex; occasionally, when it has seemed à propos, I have extended this to Algonkins among the Western Indians.

Eighteenth century orthography being phonetic, I have made few attempts to indicate vagaries in spelling, and

¹. François de Laval, first bishop of Québec, typically had a special regard for the Micmac, referring to them as "ces bons sauvages." (Abbé Auguste Gosselin, L'Eglise du Canada, (3 vols., Québec, 1911-1914), 368.
have used the same rule with the grammar, in the interests of simplicity. Occasionally, for the sake of clarity, it has been necessary to modernize spelling or modify punctuation.
LOUISBOURG AND THE INDIANS:

A STUDY IN IMPERIAL RACE RELATIONS, 1713-1760
CHAPTER I

FRANCE FORGES AN INDIAN POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA

When Francis I (1494-1547) asked to see Adam's will to find out how he had divided the world, not only did he commit France to enter into the colonial sweepstakes offering tantalizing visions of sudden wealth, he also committed his country to the necessity of developing a modus vivendi with the New World's aboriginal inhabitants. How France proceeded to do this, how she responded to the challenges arising from her particular contact with the stone-age cultures of the New World, were to become the foundation upon which she built her northern empire. By the time Louisbourg was established in 1720, France's Indian policy had been functioning for well over a century. In order to study her relations with the Indians at the fortress, it is necessary to know what this policy was, and how it had developed.

Jacques Cartier (1491-1557) did not get things off to a happy start in what was to become New France when he kidnapped two of Donnacona's sons and took them to Europe as proof that he really had found new lands. He brought them back on his second voyage, only to repeat the episode, by not only retaking the young men, but Donnacona himself and
several others. This time none of the Iroquois came back. Cartier was able to explain this away on his third voyage but the affair could have done little to enhance the regard of the Iroquois for the Europeans. In 1541, when Roberval tried to establish a colony at Charlesbourg Royal in the St. Lawrence Valley, deteriorating relationships with the Indians were no small factor in his failure.¹

These inauspicious beginnings gave France pause. Indian relations were not the only aspect of colonization that had not been properly considered; for one thing, there were Spanish objections to the French establishing colonies in the New World. Spain seems to have tacitly admitted France's right to do so in an oral agreement at the signing of the treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis in 1559.²

There were also problems in colonization itself. Hopeful colonizers tended to envisage their rôle as that of creating citadels in conquered countries. Nicolas Durand de Villegaignon on his island off Brazil (1555-1560), Jean Ribault and René Goulaine de Laudonnière in their forts in what is now the southern United States (1562-1565), made no attempts


to develop agriculture with the result that they were reduced to either bartering with the Indians for food or living off their charity.¹

Serious doubts had arisen as to the nature of Indians: were they fully human and could they be Christianized? Alexander VI's bull Inter caetera, promulgated 4 May 1493, had answered in the affirmative, and had urged that no labours be spared nor no perils be allowed to deter the colonizers from the task.² But the controversy, instead of being resolved became all the more bitter. In 1510, a Scottish professor living in Paris, John Major, published a justification of Indian enslavement and military conquest in "just wars", arguing from Aristotle's theory that the imperfect must be subject to the perfect and the superior must rule the inferior.³ The idea of natural slavery was a convenient argument to justify the conquest of the New World, particularly when it was combined with Clement VII's authorization of the use of force to Christianize the Indians.⁴ However, it was by no means

² Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, (20 vols., Glasgow, 1905-07) II: 39.
⁴ Henry Harrisse, Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima: A Description of Works Relating to America, (New York, 1866), 273. In a document, dated March 23, 1550, Charles V, sovereign of New Spain, quoted a bull he had received from Pope Clement VII: "Whereupon we trust that as long as you are on earth you will compel and with all zeal cause the barbarous nations to come to the knowledge of God, the maker and founder of all things, but also by force and arms, if needful, in order that their soul may partake of the heavenly kingdom."
universally accepted, and disputes reached the point of open conflict in Spain. Once more the Papacy intervened, this time with the famous bull *Sublimis Deus* issued by Paul III in 1537, in which he declared that Indians were not to be treated as "dumb brutes created for our service" but "as truly men...capable of understanding the Catholic faith". Furthermore, he added, "The said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they may be outside the faith of Jesus Christ...nor should they in any way be enslaved". This position was reiterated by Pope Urban VIII in 1639.

The French undertook the project of converting the infidel with a fervor that was second only to that of Spain. Commercial considerations reinforced this fervor when a new technology (a felting process) coincided with a new fashion (cavalier hats) to make the fur trade highly profitable. The abundance and the high quality of the furs from North America were already well known. France lost no time in granting fur

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1. These conflicts are treated by Lewis Hanke in *Aristotle and the American Indians*, (Chicago, 1959) and in "Pope Paul III and the American Indians" The Harvard Theological Review, XXX, No. 2 (April 1937), 65-102.


trading monopolies, but with two provisos: that colonization be promoted and that missionaries be sent to Christianize the Indians. The conversion of "savages" had become an official French goal in 1540, the year the Society of Jesus was founded.¹

These goals proved to be not so simple to realize. The encounter of an advanced technological culture with stone-age cultures posed problems, some of which were never successfully resolved. Frenchmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries recoiled from the wholesale destruction and enslavement practised by the Spaniards. Lescarbot observed that while it was legitimate to colonize and convert the Indians, there was certainly "no need of force of arms to compel them to the faith".² Neither, he added, should they be exterminated.³

Samuel de Champlain (1570-1635), who had seen something of Spanish methods first hand during his first voyage, 1599-1601, and resolved on more humane methods in New France. At Tadoussac in 1603 he negotiated at a "tabagie" with the Montagnais for the right to set up a French establishment. This was done with full Indian ceremonial -- feasting, speeches,

³ Ibid., I: 17.
exchange of gifts. There was no signed treaty or sale of land.¹

Pierre du Gua de Monts' establishments at Sainte-Croix (1604-1605) and Port Royal (1605-1607) were brief, but marked by good relations with surrounding tribes. When the French returned to Sainte-Croix three years later, they found that the Indians had touched nothing, not even the salt which they loved.² (An Indian characteristic which surprised early Europeans was their habit of leaving food caches and supply depots unguarded). When the French returned in 1608 to re-establish Port Royal, the Micmac Chief Membertou was there to greet them.³ At Quebec also, relations were generally good, although the French found the Montagnais not as complaisant as the Micmacs.

The colonial pattern for New France was taking shape. Based on the exploitation of the fur trade and to a much less extent of the fisheries, it caused comparatively little immediate disturbance to the Indian and his traditional way of life. This was in sharp contrast to English seaboard agricultural colonization, which excluded the Indian from his traditional horticultural and hunting grounds and led to two and a half centuries of wars. The Indian interfered with English colonization but he was essential to that of the French.

¹ Biggar, Champlain, I: 98-102.  
² Grant, Lescarbot, II: 358-359.  
³ Ibid., II: 312-313.
To deal with Indians it was necessary to converse with them. When Cartier kidnapped Donnacona's two sons, he was at least partially motivated by the idea of teaching them French in order to use them as guides and sources of information about their land. This did not prove very successful, so the French turned to the alternative of sending their own young men to live among the Indians. Cartier, on his third voyage in 1541, left two French boys with the Indians in exchange for an Indian girl entrusted to him in 1536. De Monts, during his explorations south of Sainte-Croix, exchanged young men with one of the tribes he met. Champlain continued the practice at Québec. The first Jesuit missionaries to New France, Pierre Biard and Ennemond Massé, who came to Port Royal in 1611, quickly decided that in order to Christianize the Indians it would be necessary first to understand their cultures and ways of thinking, which would involve learning their languages. From the very beginning, the burden was on the French to learn the Indian languages instead of the other way around. Trudel says this was because the French were in effect the clients of

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2. That the Indians were not impervious to European languages is illustrated by Lescarbot's comment that by 1606 the Basques had been on the coast so long "that the language of the coast tribes is half Basque." (Grant, Lescarbot, II: 24). More than half a century earlier, sailor Robert Lefant had been even more sweeping when he testified under oath "that the Indians understand any language, French, English, and Gascon, and their own tongue." (Biggar, A Collection of Documents, 453-454).
the Indians, seeking their furs and the salvation of their souls. However, the French had something the Indians wanted, namely trade goods. Indians quickly developed a total dependence on European guns and ammunition, not to mention axes and kettles. There were Indians who were polyglot within their own cultural framework. Their resistance to European languages could have been part of their general resistance to an alien culture.

Both Cartier and Champlain, struck by the gentleness and apparent docility of the Indians, had concluded that they would be easy to convert to Christianity and even into Frenchmen. They were deceived: severe self-discipline to stand alone against an uncertain world was the stone-age Indian's best defence, along with the acquisition of as much personal magical power as possible. Superbly adapted to his environment, and well aware of his superiority to Europeans in this respect,

1. Marcel Trudel, Histoire de la Nouvelle France: Le Comptoir, 1604-1627 (Montreal, 1966), 388. This is to some extent borne out by Lescarbot, who said the Indians did not care to learn French, claiming that they did not come to seek after them. (Grant, Lescarbot, III: 125.) This attitude seems to have been a later development in view of the earlier reports of Indian facility with European languages.

2. Antoine Laumet dit de Lamothe Cadillac, in his "Memoire de la Nouvelle Angleterre, 1692", reported that the English were teaching their language to selected Indians, who in turn were paid to teach it to other Indians. Cadillac wrote that this system had worked so well "qu'insensiblement ces Indiens ont meme oublie leur language", and recommended it for French missionaries. AC C11D 10, no pagination.

the Indian saw no reason to modify habitual ways of thinking and feeling.

Mother Marie de l'Incarnation was to write in 1668 from hard experience,

C'est pourtant une chose très difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, de les franciser ou civiliser. Nous en avons l'expérience plus que tout autre, et nous avons remarqué que de cent de celles qui ont passé par nos mains, à peine en avons-nous civilisé une. Nous y trouvons de la docilité et de l'esprit, mais lorsqu'on y pense le moins, elles montent par dessus notre clôture et s'en vont courir les bois avec leurs parents, où elles trouvent plus de plaisir que dans tous les agréments de nos maisons françaises.  

In fact, early efforts to transform Indians into Frenchmen often resulted in death for the Indian; those taken to Europe to be presented to the King and lionized at public celebrations usually quickly died; a similar result attended efforts to make French housewives out of Indian girls.

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2. Of the 10 Iroquois Cartier took to France in 1535, none survived to return with him on his third voyage in 1541. More than half a century later, the son of Begourat, installed in the Château Saint-Germain in 1603 with the Dauphin, died the following year. (A-Léo Leymarie, "Le Canada pendant la jeunesse de Louis XIII in Nova Francia. 1, No. 4 (24 février 1926), 168-169).

Pierre Boucher, at that time captain of the town of Trois Rivières, in 1649 married Marie Madeleine Chrétienne, a Huron raised by the Ursulines. She died at the end of that same year in childbirth, something which almost never occurred in Indian society. (Pierre Boucher, Histoire Véritable et Naturelle..., (Boucherville, 1964), xlvii).
A hardly better fate awaited some early Europeans who attempted to live like Indians. Ennemond Massé, the Jesuit, trying to live Indian-style during the winter of 1611-1612, lost so much weight that his host, Louis Membertou (son of the famous chief) feared he would die.\(^1\)

Champlain did not allow such hazards to prevent him from dreaming of creating one race made up of Indians and Europeans: "Our young men will marry your daughters, and we shall be one people," he said on two occasions at Québec.\(^2\)

Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the King's adviser, would later share his dream; indeed the encouragement of intermarriage was at one period official French policy.\(^3\)

By the time a century had passed the policy had been reversed and Maurepas was scolding missionaries who not only permitted such marriages too easily, but actively encouraged them. What was more, the missionaries were doing so without the permission of post commandants, which was against regulations. Observing that the children of such marriages were even more libertine than the Indians themselves, Maurepas said the

\(^1\) Grant, Lescarbot, III: 56.
\(^2\) Morris Bishop, Champlain, The Life Fortitude (Toronto, 1963) 298. One of these occasions is described in Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, V: 211.
\(^3\) Budgets for the years 1690-1697 included 3000 livres annually for the dowries for 60 girls, French and Indian, who married Frenchmen. AC F1A, Fonds des colonies.
missionaries "doivent pas Se porter Si légèrement à marier des français avec des femmes Sauvages".¹

Interrapartment and assimilation had not worked, at least from the official point of view, because what the authorities had in mind was to turn the Indians into Frenchmen. What happened was that Indians remained Indians (with perhaps some vices added) and Frenchmen showed a disturbing tendency to become Indians. Marie de l'Incarnation became convinced that it was easier to make a Frenchman into a Savage than a Savage into a Frenchman.²

This concurred with Gabriel Sagard's observation after his voyage of 1623-1624, that "les François mesmes, mieux instruit & eslevez dans l'Escole de la Foy, deviennent Sauvages pour si peu qu'ils vivent avec les Sauvages."³

Michel Guillaume St-Jean de Grèvecœur wrote in 1782 that Europeans taken prisoner by the Indians often refused to return to their own society, for reasons that

¹. AC B 62: 88v [95-96], Maurepas à Abbé Jacques de Brisacier, supérieur du Séminaire des Missions Étrangères, Paris, 4 octobre 1735. However, voices continued to be raised in favour of intermarriage. For one example, AC C11C 16: pièce 28, lettre anonyme, 9 juillet 1746.


³. Gabriel Sagard, Histoire du Canada et voyages que les Frères Mineurs Recollects y ont faicts pour la conversion des Infidélles (Paris, 1636), 166. The eighteenth century Jesuit historian, P-F-X de Charlevoix, was attributed with a similar observation by Francis Parkman, who did not indicate his source, in The Conspiracy of Pontiac, (2 vols., Toronto, 1899) I: 77-78.
would greatly surprise you: the most perfect freedom, the ease of living, the absence of those cares and corroding solicitudes which so often prevail among us...all these, and many more motives which I have forgot, made them prefer that life, of which we entertain such dreadful opinions. It cannot be, therefore, so bad as we generally conceive it to be; there must be in their social bond something singularly captivating, and far superior to anything to be boasted of among us; for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of those Aborigines having from choice become Europeans.¹

This little-studied aspect of early colonial life worried not only French authorities, but the English as well.²

Such cultural interactions very early developed a group of men called coureurs-de-bois -- the wood-runners of New England, boschlopers of the Dutch colonies, promyshlenniki of Siberia. The latter, however, were not exact counterparts of the North American woodsmen.³ In many ways these men personified the problems of the clash between the old and the new worlds. Their dress and way of life was often more Indian than European. They were a thorn in the side of the authorities

while at the same time being indispensable to them. A contemporary assessment indicates some of this ambivalence:

But what has, at least, an equal share in attaching the savages to our party, is the connivance, or rather the encouragement the French government has given to the natives of France, to fall into the savage-way of life, to spread themselves through the savage nations, where they adopt their manners, range the woods with them, and become as keen hunters as themselves.¹

Governor Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil for his part was not in the least ambivalent as to the usefulness of the coureurs-de-bois. He felt that their capacity to undertake long voyages in the hinterland was extremely useful not only in trade -- they brought merchandise to the Indians and thus prevented them from going over to the English -- but also in

¹. "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne", Louisbourg, 8 May 1756, in An Account of the Customs and Manners of the Micmakis and Maricheets, Savage Nations, Now Dependent on the Government of Cape Breton (London, 1758), 89.

This little book contains an anonymous letter attributed to Abbé Pierre Antoine Simon Maillard, dated 27 March 1755, and a letter from Abbé P-F-X de Charlevoix on the character of Indians of North America.

It also contains a "Memorial on the Motives of the Savages, called Mickmakis and Maricheets, for continuing the War with England since the last Peace." Dated Ile-Royal, 175--. This is a translation, with one short paragraph missing, of one of the documents reproduced by Gaston du Boscq de Beaumont in Les Derniers Jours de l'Acadie (Paris, 1899), 248-253. These had been collected by Michel Le Courtois de Surlaville, lieutenant-général des armées du Roi and ancien major des troupes de l'Ile Royale, who came to the island in 1751. Surlaville attributed the memorial to Maillard. Thomas Pichon presented parts of it as a discourse by Governor Raymond in the work usually attributed to him, Lettres et mémoires pour servir à l'histoire Naturelle, Civile et Politique du Cap Breton (London, 1769), 132ff and 204ff.
war as the Indians always allied themselves with those with whom they traded. By the same token, the *coureurs-de-bois* were also extremely useful as scouts and fighters.¹

At the respectable end of the spectrum of those who had direct dealings with Indians were the official interpreters, soldiers who had mastered Indian techniques of warfare, scouts and perhaps voyageurs; at the other end, *coureurs-de-bois*. This new class had arisen very quickly, forming a considerable proportion of the colony's population during its early years. Jean-Baptiste Patoulet, secretary to Jean Talon, estimated the number of *coureurs-de-bois* at 300 to 400 in 1672² when the colony's population was 5,715. A few years later, in 1680, Intendant Jacques Duchesneau guessed their number at 800;³ the colony's population in 1681 was 9,677. By 1714, however, their number was believed to have dropped to 200⁴ while the population had risen to 18,500. It appears from these figures that the *coureurs-de-bois* were at their most numerous during the seventeenth century, and that they declined rapidly in importance as the colony grew.


². AC C11A 3: 274, mémoire de Patoulet, 25 janvier 1672.

³. AC C11A 5: 168, Duchesneau au ministre, 13 novembre 1680.

In spite of the problems raised by cultural contact, the French in the early days of the colony were optimistic, in official circles at least, about transforming the Indians into Frenchmen accepting French laws. Consider, for example, the charter of La Compagnie des Cent-Associés, article XVII, 1627:

Les Sauvages qui seront amenés à la foi et en feront profession seront censés et réputés naturels français, et comme tels, pourront venir habiter en France, quand bon leur semblera, et y acquérir, tester, succéder et accepter donations et legs, tous ainsi que les vrai régnoics et originaires français, sans être tenus de prendre aucune lettre de déclaration ni de naturalité.¹

This idealistic goal was never fully realized. It stated in principle what Indians actually practised. One theory for the attraction of the Indian way of life for individual Europeans was the fact that Indian societies were inclusive, easily integrating newcomers and giving them rôles to play, and sometimes important ones; European societies tended to be exclusive.²

Central to French-Indian relations was the question of whether or not the Indians were allies or subjects of the French. Did French law apply to Indians in the colonies?

This was a question that was never consistently faced: a decision in each particular case seemed to depend upon its circumstances rather than upon any general law. For instance, in war the Indians were allies, and as such the French repeatedly denied responsibility for their acts; in civil matters, they were not nearly so sure of where they stood.

Champlain, however, did not seem to have such doubts when two Frenchmen were murdered in 1617. He bided his time until 1622, when the murderer (believed to have been Cherououny, a Montagnais chief) came to attend a banquet in honour of some Iroquois ambassadors. Champlain insisted on his expulsion, and the following morning the Montagnais presented Champlain with 100 beaver skins to forget the incident. Champlain agreed to forgive the guilty man on condition that he and his accomplice avow their crime before a meeting of the nations. This was done with considerable pomp July 31, 1623 at Trois Rivieres, and the Indian declared his allegiance to the French.¹

A more clear-cut case occurred in 1664. It involved Robert Hache, an Algonkin who while drunk had raped the wife of an habitant on Ile d'Orléans. Hache's defence was that not only was he under the influence of the white man's "firewater", but he had also committed a white man's crime (rape seldom if ever occurred among Indians). He escaped during the trial,

¹. Biggar, Champlain, V: 66-68, 76, 103-107; Bruce G. Trigger, article on Cherououny, Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto, 1966-) I: 210-211; Marcel Trudel, Le Comptoir, 359-360.
which led the Attorney General to ask the advice of the Sovereign Council. When Algonkin and Abenaki chiefs were consulted, they pointed out that if the behaviour of their young men sometimes gave grounds for complaint, the same could be said for that of some young Frenchmen among the Indians. A Christian Algonkin from Québec, Noel Tek8erimat, asked that the death penalty not be invoked as his people had not been aware of this penalty for rape. However, in view of their long-standing friendship for the French, his people would accept this law for rape as well as for murder in the future. He also asked that the French stop seizing an Indian debtor's goods during war, when hunters were away and could not provide for their families. The Council agreed that such cases deserved special consideration. So, as far as murder and rape were concerned, the Indian allies had agreed to accept French law.¹

The question of imposing French law on the Indians was extremely delicate, as the King observed. The Indians regarded themselves as free and sovereign and did not take kindly to being put into French prisons for infractions against laws they knew nothing about and would not have accepted if they had.

A Spanish visitor to Louisbourg wrote:

These natives, whom the French term savages, were not absolutely subjects of the King of

France, nor entirely independent of him. They acknowledged him lord of the country, but without any alteration in their way of living; or submitting themselves to his laws; and so far were they from paying any tribute, that they received annually from France a quantity of apparel, gunpowder and muskets, brandy and several kinds of tools, in order to keep them quiet and attached to the French interest; and this has also been the political practice of that crown with regard to the savages of Canada.

In other words, as Eccles says, the French had tacitly granted the Indians in the colony something akin to a special status. The French needed the Indians both in their struggle against the British and in the fur trade, and they could not risk alienating them by a vigorous enforcement of French laws.

If anything, the French leaned in the other direction. A contemporary observer found that they "are assiduously caressing and courting them. Their missionaries are dispersed up and down their several cantonments, where they exercise every talent of insinuation, study their manners, nature and weaknesses, to which they flexibly accommodate themselves, and carry their points by these arts".

2. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 78.
3. "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne", Customs and Manners, 88-89.
A tacit acceptance of existing alignments also marked French-Indian relations in the fur trade. Inter-tribal trade had had a long tradition by the time the French arrived. The Indian demand for European merchandize shifted trade into high gear, and the European demand for beaver altered patterns. By the end of the sixteenth century, the fur trade was well developed along the Atlantic Coast and was soon to become important to the Hurons as coastal supplies of beaver gave out. More ominously, it would also become important to the Iroquois, whose natural supply would be quickly exhausted and who would begin to look for other sources.

According to Indian custom, trade alignments involved military obligations, and in this respect also the French stepped into a ready-made situation, rather than creating one. Hostilities of Montagnais and Algonkins against the Iroquois were an old story by the time Champlain appeared, and Champlain's alliance with the Montagnais and Algonkins was a condition of his being allowed to establish his settlement at Québec. Moving westward in search of furs, he encountered the Hurons who were strategically located for this trade. The Hurons, although Iroquoian in speech and culture, were nursing a long-established hostility toward the Five Nations and were not taking kindly to Iroquois overtures for a trade agreement.

1. Bruce G. Trigger, "Settlement as an Aspect of Iroquoian Adaptation at the time of Contact", American Anthropologist, LXV (1963), 93.
So Champlain found himself caught in a web of circumstance; if he were to establish his colony and commercial empire and keep on good terms with neighbouring Indians, he had to enter into alliances with them, and this inevitably meant conflicts. This finally led him, step by step, to formulate the necessity of subduing the Iroquois, which he resolved to do in 1633 when he wrote to Richelieu asking for 120 men for the task.¹

If the Iroquois wars profoundly shook New France, the French in their turn eliminated the Foxes, and with Indian allies (principally the Abenaki) harassed New Englanders to the point of depopulating sections of their northern frontier. With the help of the Micmacs, who had once impressed Europeans as being peaceful, the French made a determined stand against the English in Nova Scotia and in Cape Breton.

At first the French had been the allies of the Indians, but as New France became established, the Indians became the allies of the French. The transformation began the moment Indians accepted Europeans into their lands. As the

1. Biggar, Champlain, VI: 379
Micheline Dumont-Johnson in Anotres ou agitateurs (Trois-Rivières, 1970), 30, says that Champlain decided on "la nécessité d'exterminer les Iroquois, projet formulé très explicitement dès 1633". Champlain, in his letter to Richelieu, 18 August 1634, wrote: "Pour les vaincre et réduire en l'obéissance de Sa Majesté, six-vingt hommes de France bien équipés avec les sauvages nos alliés suffiraient pour les exterminer ou les faire venir à la raison".
frontiers of the fur trade extended west and north, Eastern Indians were overrun both numerically and economically, their old self-sufficiency hopelessly lost. They were also overwhelmed culturally, the most disastrous of all defeats, as it meant the destruction of intricate social forms that had taken perhaps thousands of years to develop. Early observers often showed an insight that did not always penetrate to official levels. For instance, Lescarbot wrote that "on ne peut arracher tout d'un coup les coutumes et façons de faire invétérées d'un peuple quel que ce soit". 1

Customs and behaviour patterns that had created resourceful personalities capable of enduring great hardship with remarkable serenity were not evaluated on their own merits. "Europeans took considerable pride in demonstrating to the Indians that they could defy venerated taboos with impunity; the effect was to undermine the fundamental basis of Indian morality," Walsh wrote. 2

In the seventeenth century, this process was far from being understood. The Jesuits came the closest to appreciating the importance of working within native cultural frameworks. They had developed native churches in China and India, and started the same procedure in Canada. They were

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successful enough to arouse considerable opposition within the Catholic Church on the grounds that such syncretism was close to heresy. Ironically, politics and economics rather than religion decided the issue: when the Iroquois caused the Hurons to disperse in 1649, they also destroyed the mission which had produced a blend of Christian and Huron ritual that was well on its way to becoming the basis of a distinctive new cultural form.

The Jesuits did, however, become exceedingly influential in Indian politics, particularly during the seventeenth century. They were the diplomats operating between French and Indians and sometimes even between French and English: Claude Dablon and Pierre-Joseph-Marie Chaumonot to the Onondagas in 1655, Isaac Jogues to the Mohawks in 1646, and Gabriel Druillettes to Boston in 1651. François-Joseph Bressani accompanied a Huron delegation that came to Quebec in 1648 to ask for help against the Iroquois; and François-Joseph Le Mercier arbitrated a dispute between the Senecas and the Mohawks, who were on the point of going to war.

2. Ibid., XXIX: 47-61.
3. Ibid., XXXVI: 83-111.
4. Ibid., XXXII: 97.
At other times their role was closer to that of an intermediary officer, relaying information to the authorities in Québec and bringing back instructions.¹ The Recollects and the Sulpicians were among the other clergy who shared in these activities. The missionaries were the negotiators par excellence.

The all-pervasive influence of religion throughout this period is evident in the documentation that has come down to us. We are heavily dependent upon the Jesuit Relations, particularly for the years before 1663 for which much of the official documentation is missing. The Relations, of course, make no attempt at impartiality; they were the letters written by the missionaries to encourage the French public to support efforts. Even military matters were connected with religion. For instance, in the Relation of 1642 we read:

The use of arquebuses, refused to the Infidels by Monsieur the Governor, and granted to the Christian Neophytes, is a powerful attraction to win them; it seems that our Lord intends to use this means in order to render Christianity acceptable in these regions.²

Governors continually assured authorities in France that they were doing everything possible to keep the Indians in the proper state of submission and obedience by furnishing them with presents and providing them with missionaries to raise their children in the precepts of the faith.³

¹ E.g., Le Moyne in 1657 went to Québec with news gathered on a journey to the Mohawks. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, XLII: 255.
² Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, XXV: 27.
³ AC C11B 21: 294, Saint-Ovide au ministre, 28 juillet 1739, for one example.
Brouillan de Saint-Ovide, second governor of Ile Royale, mirrored general opinion when he wrote asking for two missionaries, "il n'y a que ces gens là qui puissent contenir les Sauvages dans ce qu'ils doivent à Dieu et au Roy".¹

Missionary Noel-Alexandre de Noinville de Cléfien agreed with the official view, at least as far as the Indians of Acadia were concerned. "These savages are so zealous for the Roman Catholick church, that they always look with horror upon, and consider as enemies those who are not within the pale of it."²

Less interested observers were not always so sure of the power of the Catholic faith in itself, although few expressed doubts about that of the missionaries. An unsigned memorandum dated 1750 remarks that "il y a lieu de croire qu'ils [the Indians] n'Embrassent la religion Catholique que par Interest...ils la pratique en apparence, en font les Exercises, vont même à confesse, mais ils s'y présentent faux honte d'avouer leur turpitude, d'où il est apparent qu'ils en sortent sans repentir de leurs fautes".³

¹. AC C11B 12: 37v, Saint-Ovide à Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, 25 novembre 1731.
². "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne", Customs and Manners, 85. Maillard wrote in a similar vein, "Il n'y a, je vous le jure, Monsieur, que la religion qui soit capable de les rendre quelquefois traitables et dociles." PAC Nova Scotia A 32: 222, Maillard to Governor Peregrine Hopson, 11 Septembre 1748.
³. AC C11C 16: 4 (seconde pièce), Mémoire sur l'Isle Royal, 1750.
De la Varenne thought that missionaries attributed too much power to religion. "Were it not for other concurring circumstances that indispose the savages against the English, religion alone would not operate, at least so violently, to that effect," he wrote.¹ Whatever its other influences, evangelism did not produce a single Indian teacher, nun or priest in New France.² Instead, it was inextricably interwoven with the fur trade, as was expressly stated in the charters of the trading monopolies.

If evangelism required that the Indians be treated "avec douceur, justice et équité,"³ so did the exigencies of the fur trade. Because the economy of their colony was based on this trade, the French did not find it necessary to suddenly exclude the Indians from their traditional hunting grounds. As with other aspects of French-Indian policy, this started as the result of particular circumstances, and only later became consciously used as an instrument for controlling Indian attitudes. Oddly enough, the English recognized Indian proprietary rights, making "purchases" or signing treaties for the transfer of these rights, which the French never did. The latter held that the Indians had not received diplomatic

1. "Letter from Mons. de la Varenne", Customs and Manners, 86.
recognition as belonging to the "family of nations", so therefore they had no such rights to recognize.¹ The point was one of principle rather than practice as early French settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley did not encroach on occupied Indian territory, although, as we have seen, Champlain was careful to secure the agreement of neighbouring nations before establishing his colony. French Mission Iroquois in 1754 put it this way:

Brethren, are you ignorant of the difference between our Father and the English? Go see the forts our Father has erected, and you will see that the land beneath his walls is still hunting ground, having fixed himself in those places we frequent, only to supply our wants; whilst the English, on the contrary, no sooner get possession of a country than the game is forced to leave it; the trees fall down before them, the earth becomes bare, and we find among them hardly wherewithal to shelter us when the night falls.²

The English, by dispossessing the Indians of their lands, placed a powerful weapon in the hands of the French in the struggle for North American supremacy. Indians, not sharing European ideas of property ownership, were dismayed and outraged to find themselves excluded from lands they had "sold" for trifling amounts or had given away. Their idea of

¹. However, the King instructed Governor Daniel Rémy de Courcelle in 1665 "qu'on n'usurpe point les terres sur lesquelles ils sont habituez soubs pretexete qu'elles sont meilleures ou plus convenables aux François". Ibid.

usufruct did not mean that they lacked a keen sense of territorial rights. When the English proclaimed George I as king in Nova Scotia and demanded an oath of fidelity, the Abenaki of Pentagouet were reported to have replied

> qu'ils ne proclamoient point de Roy Etranger ça qu'ils ne vouloient pas qu'on put dire qu'aucun Roy eut pris possession de leur Terre. Qu'ils ne vouloient point prester serment à personne, qu'ils avoient leurs Roys naturels et leurs chefs et leurs anciens, que le François même n'étoit pas leur Roy, qu'il étoit leur Père parce qu'il les instruit.¹

They added that they could not ask for better than to live in peace, without strangers building forts and other establishments on their territory.

It took very little on the part of the French to play on the resentment and hostility aroused by thoughtless or high-handed English actions in this connection. Authorities in England tried to curb the activities of land-hungry colonists, but with little success. When the British sent out surveying parties without informing the Indians, the latter naturally reacted violently. When Halifax was founded in 1749 on favorite hunting grounds, again without consultation with the Indians, the result was years of raids and harassment.²

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² Le Loutre, in a letter to Desherbiers in 1751, wrote that a party of 150 Iroquois, Abénaquis and Micmacs "Sont allés faire un tour de chasse à Chibouctouk" (Halifax). Apparently the Iroquois were not always enemies of the Micmacs. AC C11B 30: 104v, Le Loutre à Desherbiers, 8 mai 1751.
Still, the cards of Indian diplomacy were far from being all in the hands of the French. The English offered generally superior trade goods and the Indians soon realized that they could do better in trade with the English. Louis XIV countered this advantage by urging his officials to buy everything the Indians brought them at the English price, particularly in Acadia. The French also had recourse to the Indian custom of gift-giving, which became an annual event.

Gifts were fundamental to Indian diplomacy. They took the place of words and Indians used them as contracts to despatch their affairs. In the metaphorical language of the wigwam, they dried up tears, appeased anger, opened doors of foreign countries, brought the dead back to life. Ambassadors came laden with gifts, each one having a special significance. At assemblies, each gift was presented with an appropriate speech, such as one asking for fair value in trade or signifying that all might speak freely, or concerning the "lighting" of a council fire. Observing that these customs were not unreasonable, French governors gave back speech for speech and present for present.

Wampum was a notable feature of these diplomatic exchanges. First reported by Cartier, these shell beads had

1. Collection de Manuscrits I: 175, Instructions pour le Sieur de Courcelle au sujet des indiens, 1665.
2. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, XXII: 291.
commercial, diplomatic and ceremonial roles that made wampum's significance difficult for Europeans to comprehend. Originating with the Iroquois, its use spread among the coastal Algonkins, and was used by the Micmac, Malecite and Abenaki, as well as by others to the south and west. Metal tools simplified its manufacture from the linings of conch shells and the quahog clam, so that its use became much more wide-spread after the advent of Europeans. Tobacco also had a special role with mystical connotations.\(^1\)

The importance attached by the Indians to these exchanges can be judged by the fact that the gifts involved had to be of considerable value. For the Indians, this usually meant giving wampum, pipes, furs, or tobacco, and receiving guns, ball, powder, flints, tools, utensils, clothing. Brandy was also used, but at Ile Royale at least it seems to have been mainly for the attendant ceremonies.

The French used gift diplomacy skilfully, offering the protection of the military-trade alliances which the gift-giving ceremonially renewed. Without these cyclical renewals, the alliances would have died.

The fact that this diplomacy was so effective against the better trade values offered by the English was due to the attitude of the Indians, who did not like fluctuating prices

\(^1\) For a description of negotiations with wampum collars, bracelets and earrings as well as calumets, see Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, XL: 203-209.
and wanted an agreed-upon standard of exchange. Intendant Jacques Duchesneau reported that while the Western Indians did not want to be deceived in the sale of merchandize, they would "respond liberally to the presents they [the French traders] make, without exacting any, since it is certain that they are well content if they get only half the value of what is received from them".¹

They admired generosity to the point of impoverishing themselves, which did not strike Abbé Pierre Maillard as a virtue in the Micmas:

> It is neither gaming nor debauchery that disable them from the payment of their debts, but their vanity, which is excessive, in the presents of peltry to other savages, who come in quality of envoys from one country to another, or as friends and relations upon a visit to one another. Then it is, that a village is sure to exhaust itself in presents; it being a standing rule with them, on the arrival of such persons, to bring out everything they have acquired, during the winter and spring season, in order to give the best and most advantageous idea of themselves.²

That the Micmac were not always altruistic in regard to gifts is evident in their periodic threats to go on to the

English, which kept the French in a state of nervous watchfulness. The Indians were also capable of driving a hard bargain, as Governor Raymond discovered. He reported that "nos Mikmaks m'ont demandé, pour prix de leur fidélité pour le Roy, de vous engager, Monseigneur, à leur faire tourner l'augmentation de présens qu'on leur donne depuis quelques années, en présents ordinaire". The Governor agreed that the King "leur accorderait peut-être cette grâce, s'ils continuaient à se bien comporter". He added that the Indians had great confidence in him "mêlée de crainte depuis une petite punition que j'ai faite à deux sauvages, que les autres ont fort approuvé".

In other words, the French exercised as much authority as they could over the Indians while giving in to their demands. Although gifts were essential in Indian diplomacy, they did not automatically ensure success for a mission. When the French began to establish Louisbourg, they relied on gifts to help persuade the Indians to move to Île Royale but with

1. For instance, Commissaire-ordonnateur Jacques-Ange LeNormant de Mezy was instructed to continue to send statements so as to prevent both disappointing the Indians and exceeding allotted funds (AC B 45/2: 260-266 [1123-1129], 13 mai 1722), while Governor Saint-Ovide was informed that everything that was asked for the Indians was being sent in order to end their complaints (AC B 45/2: 267-273, [1129-1134], 13 mai 1722).

2. AC C11B 31: 63, Jean-Louis, Comte de Raymond au ministre, 19 novembre 1751.

3. Ibid.

4. AC B 35/3: 239 [112], Pontchartrain à Saint-Ovide, 20 mars 1713; AC B 35/3: 260v [181], à Abbé Antoine Gaulin, 29 mars 1713; AC B 36/7: 430v [40-41], à Jacques l'Hermitte, 21 mars 1714; AC B 36/7: 443-443v [71], à Costebelle, 22 mars 1714; AC B 36/1: 84v [245], Conseil à Besnard, 26 février 1716.
very little success initially.

There was distrust on both sides, in Acadia as elsewhere in New France. Sir William Johnson, superintendent of Indian Affairs for New York, believed that

The French (tho' few in number) convinced them by their actions, that they were a more Military enterprizing people, and although they loaded all those Nations who were in their alliance with favours, yet, that enterprizing disposition alarm'd the Indians with regard to themselves and probably induced them to look with pleasure upon any checks they might receive, for from us they dreaded nothing at that period, having considered us as a selfish trading people whose only pursuit was gain.¹

The French for their part would have liked more predictable allies -- "le plus souvent ils Se laissent Conduire par leurs Caprices que nous n'estions guère plus à couvert de leurs insultes qu'eux" [the English]² who would settle in permanent villages, becoming a sort of New World yeomanry. But both sides had to accept the situation as it was.

France's centralized form of government enabled her to organize her gift diplomacy more or less uniformly throughout New France. The decentralized English colonies, each jealous of its own authority, had as many gift policies as it had colonial governments -- perhaps even more, because local governments sometimes took the initiative into their own hands.


The one thing that was certain was that neither English nor French could avoid this type of diplomacy during the early days of their colonies. As Sir William Johnson observed,

> If we are determined to possess our Out Ports, Trade, etc., securely, it cannot be done for a Century by any other means than that of purchasing the favour of the numerous Indian inhabitants.¹

The Indian's highly developed sense of prestige made medals and honors extremely useful in attaching the Indians to the French cause. While no evidence has been found that the French King ever ennobled an Indian, the recurring belief among the Indians that they had been so honoured leads one to the conclusion that the French authorities did nothing to disabuse them of the idea.²

While it is evident today that the Indian cultures were doomed from the moment Europeans established their colonies in the New World, it was by no means so clear at the time. At the beginning the Indian position was strong because of numerical superiority and the fact they were there first.

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¹ O'Callaghan, Documents Relative to New York, VII: 650, Sir William Johnson to Lords of Trade, 30 August 1764. For a general treatment of this subject, see Wilbur S. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts (Stanford, California, 1950).

² In one case even the colonial authorities seemed to be convinced that this had actually happened. See Governor Raymond's dispatch concerning Chief Denis whose grandfather was reported to have been ennobled, (AC C11C 15: 257-257v, novembre, 1751). This is dealt with more fully in Chapter V.

The famous half-Indian leader Bernard-Anselme d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin, fourth baron of that name, inherited his title from his father.
But slowly European wares, particularly the rifle, the axe and the kettle, had their effect; by 1670 the technological change was fairly well completed on the Atlantic Coast, and its influence was spreading westward ahead of fur traders along old Indian trading routes. The French, aware of the effect of this technological inundation on traditional Indian values and beliefs, and eager to take advantage of it, quickly learned that persuasion was a far more effective weapon than intimidation in controlling attitudes. Even a chief, wrote Loskiel,


dare not venture to command, compel or punish any one, as in that case he would immediately be forsaken by the whole tribe. Every word that looks like a command is immediately rejected with contempt by an Indian, proud of his liberty. The chief must endeavour to rule over his people by calm reasoning and friendly exhortation.1

What authority the chief had was gained by rhetoric2 and supported by means of his liberality and his feasts.

Perrot, an early fur trader and land-owner, expressed it bluntly:

Le sauvage ne sachait ce c'est que d'obéir: il faut plustost le prier que de la commander; il se laisse néantmoins aller à tout ce qu'on exige de luy, surtout


2. The Indians' response to rhetoric impressed Father Paul Le Jeune, superior of the Jesuits of Québec from 1632 to 1639, who was sure that nowhere else in the world did eloquence have more effect. "It controls all these tribes, as the Captain is elected for his eloquence alone, and is obeyed in proportion to his use of it, for they have no other law than his word." (Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, V: 195).
quand il s'imagine qu'il y a de la gloire ou du profit à espérer...le caractère des sauvages est de pencher toujours du côté de ceux qui leur donnent le plus et qui les flattent davantage.¹

All this demanded a complex diplomacy on the part of the French. As they could not forbid their Indian allies from dealing with the English, or order them to go to war, they had to rely on such leaders as the half-Indian Baron de Saint-Castin to convince them that "leur propre conservation et la seureté de leurs familles depend de la veritable et sincère union d'esprit et de religion qu'ils conserveront avec nous et qu'il est à propos qu'ils conservent tant que la guerre durera entre les princes en Europe."²

The missionaries, whose importance in this connection we have already touched upon, were similarly instructed.³

Governors, who were directly responsible for relations with the Indians, both at Québec and at Louisbourg, were continually advised not only to do everything necessary to

¹ Nicolas Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs, coutumes et religion des sauvages de l'Amérique septentrionale (Johnson Reprint 1968), 78.

² AC C11D 7: 131, Vaudreuil, ordre et instruction pour Baron de Saint-Castin, 18 janvier 1711.

³ For example, Beaulharnois' instructions to Abbé Antoine Gaulin for the retaking of Acadia, 13 January 1711. The missionary was ordered to assemble "tous les sauvages de ces costes pour les induitte à se joindre à M. de Beaubassin pour suivre les ordres qu'on luy donneroit convenable à l'enterprise". AC C11D 7: 127. (The italics are mine).
keep them attached to the French interest,¹ and under control,² but also to take care that they did not become too demanding.³

France's Indian policy is found embedded in such instructions. These were sometimes general statements, as in the case of the instructions to Courcelles in 1665 or to de Forant in 1739. More often, however, they were sketchy, perhaps a single paragraph buried in pages of other matter. Specific procedures were left largely to the discretion of the governor. As with questions of Indians and French law, each point was decided as it arose; France's Indian policy thus emerges, somewhat in the manner of English common law, from a series of specific decisions arrived at under the all-embracing necessity of maintaining the Indians in active alliance to the French cause in the face of English rivalry. Throughout the history of New France the tone is consistent as the goal never varied; Indians were to be treated with every consideration and violence was to be avoided, although some notable lapses occurred, as with the Iroquois, Fox and Chickasaw.

¹. AC B 40/5: 541v-542 [1376], Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction au S. de Saint-Ovide, gouverneur de l'Isle Royalle, 18 juillet 1718; AC B 68/2: 370v-371 [330-383], à Forant, 22 juin 1739; AC B 89: 309v [308], à Desherbiers, 28 mars 1749; AC B 93: 223v [153-154], à Raymond, 24 avril 1751; AC B 99: 238 [183], à Drucour, 12 mai 1754.

². AC B 63/1: 475v [96], instructions à Beauharnois et Hocquart concernant les Abenaki, 19 avril 1735.

³. AC B 95: 294 [265-266], Rouillé à Raymond, 21 juillet 1752.
In return, the French hoped that the nomadic northern tribes would settle down and become sedentary. Recognizing that the men were primarily hunters, they pinned their faith on the women who were reported to be "très laborieuses et surtout pour la culture du mais qui est leur nourriture".\(^1\) Gradually, the Indians would voluntarily become subjects of the King, "travaillant utilement à l'accroissement du commerce qui s'établira peu à peu dans le Canada".\(^2\)

The techniques by which these goals were to be reached were also established early. They were listed by John Nelson, Boston merchant:

First, by seasonable presents, secondly by choosing some of the more notable amongst them, to whom is given a constant pay as a Lieutenant or Ensigne & thirdly by rewards upon all executions, either upon us or our Indians, giving a certain sume per head, for as many Scalps as shall be brought them. Fourthly by encouraging the youth of the Country in accompanying the Indians in all their expeditions.\(^3\)

These four techniques were used by the French throughout the period of New France. A fifth, tried early and later discarded, was to send "eminent and enterprizing" Indians to France "to amaze and dazzle them with the greatness and splendour of the French Court and Armie".\(^4\) Indians were

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1. Collection de Manuscrits I: 175, Instructions pour le Sieur de Courcelle au sujet des indiens, 1665.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
even reported to have been sent down to Flanders where the French armies were mustered expressly to impress them. This was regarded by John Nelson as the best means of all of ensuring their loyalty, particularly when the French gave the same treatment to Indians taken prisoner from the British colonies.1 However, it was discontinued as too expensive in relation to the results achieved.2 Indians had proved to be not so easily impressed.

Gift diplomacy, honours and paid commissions for rank were the most effective means. Sending young Frenchmen to live with the Indians also served well, but raised serious problems, which we have already touched upon.

The French were never as comfortable with their wilderness friends as Nelson or popular legend would have us believe. The Indians' conception of personal liberty made them uncertain allies at best. The fact that "le sauvage n'a point de maitre",3 meant that no technique could be guaranteed to assure control. Maillard, after 14 years with the Indians, observed "heureux celui qui en sachait monter les ressorts pour les faire jouer à Sa Volonté, depuis tout ce temps je n'ai encore pu parvenir à ce point de Science."4

1. Ibid.
2. Infra, 154-155.
3. Pichon, Lettres et mémoires du Can Breton, 140.
The absolute King of France spent a good deal of time and energy, not to mention money, maintaining alliances with these people, whose ideas of liberty and individual freedom he would not have tolerated for an instant in his own subjects. Champlain set the tone: to understand the Indians in order to Christianize them, to cooperate with them in order to trade with them, and to cultivate them in order to win their support as allies in war. New France's dependence upon its Indians, both economically and militarily, forced the absolute monarchy of France to compromise some of its most sacred principles.

Haliburton expressed it differently: he said the French used the Indians for the front ranks of their defence, an innovation as useful in its own way as the traditional military posts. Charles de Beauchanois de la Boische, Governor of New France, and Intendant Gilles Hocquart seemed to have had such an idea in mind when they wrote Maurepas

It is highly important to preserve the Indians attached as they have always been to France; the English have been deterred from forming any settlement in Acadia solely to the dread of these Indians; and though the latter do in one respect embarrass the French, whose cattle they from time to time publicly carry off for their support, the French are not sorry to see them residing in the Province, and themselves, as it were, under their protection.


2. O'Callaghan, Documents Relative to New York, X: 14, Paris Documents IX, Beauchanois and Hocquart to Maurepas, 12 septembre 1745.
The French genius lay in recognizing the potential usefulness of the Indians and capitalizing on it, rather than in sweeping them aside or in marching over them. The particular nature of their contact was the deciding factor, as it was also for the English and Spanish. If the French cherished the Indians, as Parkman wrote, it was for solidly practical reasons. For their part the Indians, unable to control French policy or the course of the Anglo-French conflict any more than they could that of the fur trade, nevertheless influenced the character of all three. Thus France's Indian policy emerges as a blend of give-and-take, of giving when necessary to ensure Indian alliances in trade and war, of taking when reaping the profits or the fur trade. At Louisbourg, the emphasis was to be on the maintenance of alliances, for the Indians formed, in effect, the outer defenses of the fortress.

CHAPTER II

THE MICMAC AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS

The Micmac, and to a lesser extent the Malecite (and to an even lesser extent, the Abenaki) were the Indians who became involved in Louisbourg's imperial designs. They became the fortress' guerrilla arm, protagonists in the long-drawn out confrontation between English and French which was not to be settled until the fall of New France in 1760. Because they influenced the character of this conflict in Acadia, we will examine in some detail who the Micmac were, their cultural background, their relationships with other Indians as well as with colonizing Europeans, particularly the French. And because of the importance of the missionaries in this issue from all points of view, including the military, we will pinpoint as far as we are able the Indians' attitudes toward these controversial figures. But when all is said and done, it was the Micmac who were in the middle, caught between contending France and England.

They called themselves El'nu, "true men," these people of the North Atlantic Coast who could well have been the first Indians of North America to come in contact with

Europeans. 1 Today they are known as Micmacs, probably derived from "Migmac" meaning "allies", 2 although some authorities believe it is derived from "Miscou", an early gathering place for fishing and trading. 3 They were probably the Toudamans of Cartier, were certainly the Souriquois of Lescarbot, and the Gaspésiens of Father Chrestien LeClercq. The first use of the term Micmac appears to have been in a memorandum of 1676 by Charles Aubert de la Chesnaye, New France's leading business man of the period. 4 The term "Canadian" may also have been applied to them as well as to others in very early times. Their allies, the Malecite, were the Etchemin of Champlain, a term which was later extended by others to include the Penobscot; the Abenaki of the Kennebec were the Canibas of early military reports, and the Armouchiquois, tillers of the soil and traditional enemies of the Micmac, seem to have included several of the New England Algonkin tribes.

The Micmacs were linked linguistically and culturally to the Malecite, Passamaquoddy, Penobscot and Abenaki, all Algonkian-speaking peoples of the Eastern Woodland cultural complex. Their language shares certain traits with Cree, the most wide

2. Ibid., 579.
4. Ibid.
spread of the Algonkin group, as well as with Arapaho of the Central Plains. However, its definite genealogical position has not yet been worked out.  

They lived on the Gaspé Peninsula, in present New Brunswick east of the drainage basin of the Saint John River, throughout Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island and in parts of Newfoundland. Their nomadic habits make it difficult if not impossible to fix their boundaries with any precision. They lived in the Gaspe Peninsula, in present New Brunswick east of the drainage basin of the Saint John River, throughout Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island and in parts of Newfoundland. Their nomadic habits make it difficult if not impossible to fix their boundaries with any precision. Their land, a region of forests, rivers, lakes and coasts, included Cape Breton, which after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the French renamed Ile Royale.

The total population of the Micmac before the arrival of the Europeans has been variously estimated. Father Pierre Biard, in 1612, set the figure at less than 2,000 and a few years later (in 1616) revised it to between 3,000 and 3,500. In 1760 a colonel stationed on the isthmus of Chignecto gave the number of Micmac as "near 3,000 souls".

This suggests a stable population, although early accounts indicate that the population dropped after European

1. I have this information from Dr. Gordon Day, Eastern Canada ethnologist, National Museum of Man, Ottawa.


3. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, II: 73, and III: 111.

contact. In 1610, Chief Membertou told Biard that in his youth he had seen Indians as thickly planted there as the hairs upon his head. It is maintained that they have thus diminished since the French have begun to frequent their country; for, since then they do nothing all summer but eat; and the result is that, adopting an entirely different custom and thus breeding new diseases, they pay for their indulgence during the autumn and winter by pleurisy, quinsy and dysentery, which kills them off. During this year alone sixty have died at Capé de la Hève, which is the greater part of those who lived there.

The situation in Acadia does not appear to have differed substantially from that obtaining in other parts of the vast extent of New France. An anonymous letter written in 1705 at Québec observed that it was hardly worthwhile learning about Indian nations who "autrefois assés nombreuses sont aujourd'huy presque reduits à rien," so that although the entire French colony did not equal a good-sized French town, "il y a cependant deux françois contre un Sauvage dans l'Etendue de 1500 lieues de pays."²

European-introduced diseases were a major factor in the rapid decline of Indian populations after contact. During the Louisbourg period, an epidemic occurred in 1732-1733, reaching such proportions that the Indians refused to come in for their gifts, without which they were reduced to the

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1. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, I: 17.
2. AC C11A 122: 13, 30 septembrel 1705.
utmost misery. To make matters worse, it coincided with a serious famine at Louisbourg (the fortress town experienced three very bad famines, in 1729, 1733 and 1737). There were other lesser outbreaks, particularly after the arrival of "les troupes de terre" in the mid 1750s. However, missionary Antoine Gaulin placed alcohol ahead of disease as the principle cause of the Micmac's declining population.

Even so, the Micmac appear to have held their own better than did neighbouring tribes. The various people who have come to be grouped together under the term "Abenaki" were referred to in "The Description of the Country of Mawooshen" as totalling 14,600 in 1602 in the land of Bashabes, the ranking Abenaki chief. The Abenaki, more warlike than the Micmac and directly involved on the side of the French in the New England border warfare of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were later reduced to a shadow of their former power.


2. ANP Série K: Monuments Historiques, Carton 1232, pièce 4: 110, lettre de Gaulin au chancelier d'Aguesseau, sans date.

3. Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX: 400-405. I am indebted to Dr. Day for this reference.

4. A 1903 report listed the Abenaki at nearly 400 (Swanton, Indian Tribes, 15). The Penobscot, one of the Abenaki group, could be added to this figure. According to the U.S. census, they numbered 280 in 1910 (Ibid., 17).
Biard in 1616 listed the Eteminquois (Etchmin) at 2,500.¹

The exact designation of the term "Eteminquois" is not certain. Often considered to refer to the Malecite, it almost certainly included others.² In any event, Biard estimated the total population from Newfoundland to Chouacoët (Saco, Maine) at 10,000.³ Interestingly enough, an anonymous memorandum of 1748 placed the number of converted Indians in all Acadia at 10,000.⁴

The Iroquois of the Five Nations, who were greatly feared by the Micmac, have been estimated at 16,000 in 1642, during their period of greatest prosperity, shortly after intercourse with Europeans.⁵

Along the Atlantic seaboard, the population decline was so general that in some cases tribes became extinct, as with the Timucuans of Florida and later the Beothuks of Newfoundland; or nearly extinct, as with the Pequots of Connecticut or the Narrangansetts of Rhode Island. The French,

1. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 111.

2. Canadian Malecite were listed at a little over 800 in 1904; in 1910, those south of the International Boundary at 142 (Swanton, Indian Tribes, 579). The Passamaquoddy, closely connected with the Malecite, were enumerated at nearly 400 in 1910 (Ibid., 15).

3. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 111.


5. Herbert M. Lloyd, ed., League of Ho-dé-no-sau-nee or Iroquois by Lewis Henry Morgan (New York, Dodd Mead, 1901), 226-228. Dr. Day recommended this estimate as being based on a thorough survey of available data. Following 1642, the Iroquois declined until after the War of American Independence, when they slowly began an upswing until today they number slightly more than did at their peak.
for their part, increased very slowly at first, gaining momentum during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. According to Grandfontaine's census of 1671 -- Acadia's first -- there were nearly 400 French in what is now Nova Scotia, a figure which Clark revised upward to nearer 500. By mid-eighteenth century, before the deportation, it may have reached between 10,000 and 15,000 although reliable figures are not available.¹

As the Micmac were hunters, both on sea² and on land, they travelled far in their search for food. Originally, they depended primarily on the resources of sea, lakes and rivers and secondarily on those of the forests, a pattern which was reversed very early by the fur trade.³ The Micmac were too far north to practise agriculture with a stone-age technology, although some neighbouring tribes, such as the Abenaki to the south and west, were semi-agricultural. The average amount of territory needed to support two hunters and their families in the deer and moose country of Acadia has been estimated at 400 square miles. The Micmac in their distinctive sea-going canoes

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1. Clark, Acadia, 199-200.

2. For a description of an Indian whale hunt from the Penobscot, see "A True Relation of the Voyage of Captaine George Waymouth, 1605, by James Rosier", reproduced by Henry S. Burrage, ed., in Early English and French Voyages Chiefly from Hakluyt 1534-1608, (New York, 1932), 392. See also Appendix IV

with gunwhales swelling upward at the centre, ranged along the coasts, up the rivers, and across open stretches of sea as far as Newfoundland. It took them 12 days to travel from Port Royal to Québec by means of rivers and portages "carrying their little bark canoes", making long voyages which the French "could not do in the present state of the country". Rosier described the canoes of the Penobscot, similar to those of the Micmac, as "made without any iron, of the bark of a birch tree, strengthened with ribs and hoops of wood, in so good a fashion, with such excellent ingenious art, as they are able to beare seven or eight persons, far exceeding any in the Indies." These gave way very early to small European boats for the sea, which the Indians purchased from fisherman. By 1661 the Indians of the Gaspé were using such shallops, which they handled with great skill, for their war parties across the Gulf of St. Lawrence and over to Newfoundland.

European fishing fleets off Ile Royale and even those off Newfoundland were later to fear Micmac skill and daring at sea. At one point Indian depredations would seriously

2. Burrage, Early English and French Voyages, 368.
3. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, XLVII: 223s describes one such expedition. Nicolas Denys (1598-1688), said the Indians all used shallops for sea-going expeditions. (William F. Ganong, ed., Description and Natural History of the Coast of North America by Nicolas Denys (Toronto, 1908), 196).
4. J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg from its foundation to its fall, 1713-1758 (London, 1913), 67, should not have found this skill so surprising.
hamper fishing operations; their capture of one New England fishing vessel off Ile St. Jean in 1729 would cause 80 others to return to Canceau.

The physical beauty of the Micmac drew as favorable comment as their seamanship. In the early seventeenth century they were described by Marc Lescarbot:

These people have generally less hair than we; for on the body they have none at all... As for the eyes of our savages, they have neither blue nor green, but black for the most part, like their hair... they are well-limbed, well-boned and well-bodied, and robust in proportion; ...If there are any blind with one eye or lame (as sometimes happens), it is an accident and the result of hunting... their bodies are nimble, and so little charged with fat, that it does not hinder them from running at will... all can swim most skilfully. Concerning the other parts of the body they have them very perfect, as likewise the natural sense.¹

More slender and tending to be taller than Europeans of the period, they had great physical endurance,² tenacious memories, impressive emotional control (hence the European stereotype of the "haughty Indian"), and shared the general Indian characteristic of being able to go days without food (eight-day fasts were not extraordinary). They never contradicted

¹ Grant, Lescarbot, III: 141-146.
² Lahontan observed that while their endurance was greater, they did not have the strength of most French "in raising Weights with their Arms, or carrying of Burdens on their Backs." (R.G. Thwaites, ed., New Voyages to North America by Baron de Lahontan (2 vols., Chicago, 1905), II: 415-416).
anyone, and were reluctant to refuse a favor outright. Using humour as a defence, they thoroughly approved of anything that provoked laughter. That Hebrew scholar turned missionary, Biard, wrote of the Micmacs, "they are droll fellows and have a word and a nickname very readily at command, if they think they have an occasion to look down on us".¹

Missionaries described them as peaceful in temperament. However, Recollect missionary Chrestien Le Clercq, who was in Gaspésie from 1675 to 1686, said they prided themselves on being good warriors,² which is also evident in their legends;³ and according to Lescarbot, they had "such high spirit, that they had rather die than fall into the hands of their enemies".⁴ They seem to have been on hostile terms with all of their neighbours at one time or another.⁵ They were so sensitive to affronts that they sometimes gave themselves up to despair, even to the point of making attempts on their own lives.⁶ With such a deep resentment of injuries it is not surprising that they considered vengeance such a point of honour. Within their

¹. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 75; LeJeune on the Montagnais, VI: 243ff.
⁴. Grant, Lescarbot, III: 270.
own group they seldom committed murder, although fights were known to occur. They tortured prisoners of war, but burning them at the stake seems to have been a later development. War cannibalism was not unknown.

We have already noted their intense attachment to personal liberty, which effectively limited group action in both peace and war, and caused Europeans to regard them as fickle. Biard put it another way -- he said that as the chiefs had neither order nor subordination, they seldom reached a decision.

In spite of this, which Europeans regarded as faulty social organization, seventeenth century observers almost unanimously equated the intelligence of Indians with that of Europeans. "Les sauvages nous égalent," wrote Pichon; and fur traders such as Nicolas Denys had no occasion to doubt the Indians' capacities as he saw them matching wits with ship's crews in trade. This was corroborated by Rosier, when he wrote of the coastal Algonkins "we found them...a


2. For a general discussion of the characteristics of Northeastern Indians, see Hallowell, "Some Psychological Characteristics", 195-225.


5. Pichon, Lettres et mémoires du Cap Breton, 95.

people of exceeding good invention, quick understanding and readie capacitie."¹ Antoine Laumet dit de Lamothe Cadillac was even more categoric. "We may say without flattery, that all the Indians are naturally intelligent."²

In diplomacy, their projects were often very well conceived and skilfully handled. "They conduct their affairs cleverly and take wise and necessary steps to make them turn out favourably," Le Clercq wrote.³

They considered themselves superior to the French, just as the French for their part never doubted their own superiority. "They set themselves up for brothers of the King," observed Biard, obviously considering such an attitude presumptuous. Many years later another Jesuit wrote, "these savages were indeed given to understand that the French did not resemble them, and were not so base as they."⁴

These judgments were based on differences in culture, which consistently strained tolerance on both sides. Even points that could not have been considered important drew

1. Burrage, Early English and French Voyages, 368.
2. W. Vernon Kinietz, The Indian of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1670 (Ann Arbor, 1940), 232. Cadillac lived at Port Royal from 1683 until 1691; in 1692, serving with colonial regular troops, he made a reconnaissance of the New England coast that pleased authorities.
5. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXIII: 221.
considerable attention. For instance, the French frequently commented upon the fact that the Micmac, in common with other nomadic northern hunters, did not eat bread. Lescarbot could think of no other reason for this than laziness, as he believed it was easier to live on flesh or fish than on bread. The Indians would labour long and hard at hunting, fishing and seafaring, which they loved, but not at grinding corn, which they considered a bore.¹ Even as late as 1748, this characteristic was noted: "Ils ne vivent que de la viande de leur chasse et de poisson, et ne mangent du pain que lorsqu'ils vont chez les françois."² As for the Indians, their first reaction to bread and biscuit was to declare it had no taste, and to throw it away;³ to them, eating biscuits and drinking wine was eating wood and drinking blood.⁴

Later, as Indians learned to eat bread, a few Frenchmen learned to go without. Recollect missionary Frère Michel Brûlai was reported not to have eaten bread for six years, and Canadian-born missionary Gaulin also lived for

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¹ Grant, Lescarbot, III: 171, 217.
² AC C11D 10: 154, Sur l'Accadie, 1748 (non signé).
³ Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, V: 119.
⁴ Ibid., 121. Indian etiquette for eating, often unfavorably remarked upon, drew from Rosier the comment that they "fed not like men of rude education, neither would they eat or drinke more than seemed to content nature." (Burrage, Early English and French Voyages, 372).
long periods on an Indian diet.\textsuperscript{1} This diet included maize, when the Micmac were able to obtain it by trade from their southern neighbours;\textsuperscript{2} pounded into flour, it was used to make sagamité, a boiled dish. The parched kernels were also eaten, particularly when travelling. Interestingly enough, maize was never as generally adopted by the French as it was by the English colonists.

Neither were the French particularly enthusiastic about Indian uses of medicinal plants, to judge by a comment of Philippe Pastour de Costebelle, first governor of Ile Royale, when asking for doctors and pharmacists for the colony, "sans quoi les simples plantes médicinales employées en nature dont les sauvages se servent deviendront le plus salutaires remèdes des languissants".\textsuperscript{3} Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan, however, observed that there was no wound or dislocation the Indians could not cure with their simples and plants. He attributed the fact that Indians never got gangrene to their

\textsuperscript{1} Louis Chancels de Lagrange, "Voyage fait à l'île Royale ou Cap Breton en Canada, 1716", Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique française, No. 13 (1959), 431-432.

\textsuperscript{2} However, they do not seem to have always procured it by peaceful means. Bradford, early governor of the Plymouth colony, wrote that coastal New England tribes "were much afraid of the Tarentins, a people to the eastward which used to come in harvest time and take away their corne, & many times kill their persons." (Harvey Wish, ed., William Bradford: Of Plymouth Plantation, (New York, 1962), 79). 'Tarentins' have been identified as Micmacs.

\textsuperscript{3} AC C11B 1: 145, Costebelle au ministre, 5 novembre 1715.
general good health as well as to their remedies, as Frenchmen treated by Indian methods sometimes became infected.¹

By 1733 scientific curiosity was beginning to overcome cultural aversion, and the King was encouraging research "sur tout ce qui se pourra trouver de curieux" at Ile Royale, "mème sur la botanie en différentes plantes qui ont des vertus singulières dont les sauvages se servent, tant En plantes, ou simples, terrestres que des plantes marines".²

But the gulf in cultural values between Frenchman and Micmac was wide, as indicated by Maillard,

Il suffit chez eux d'être bon chasseur, et de bien payer ses dettes, pour mériter de porter le nom de virtuosus; ce nom chez les Allemands signifie beaucoup. Quelque vicieux que soit un sauvage marichite ou mimaque, quelque crime qu'il ait commis plutôt grand que petit; qu'il soit le plus mauvais priant de tous, s'il est bon chasseur et bon payeur, il obtient malgré tout ce qui le peut ternir d'ailleurs, la qualité de virtuosus; qu'il persevere, si vous voulez le supposer, de mener jusqu'à sa mort la vie la plus déréglée et la plus dérangée dont on puisse entendre parler, tant qu'il sera bon chasseur et bon payeur, il demeurera toujours en possession de l'attribut et de la qualité de virtuosus, rendu en leur langue par Tochechkag.³

Biard was characteristically more succinct. He said that Indians "do all they can to be renowned and to

1. Thwaites, New Voyages, II: 471.
2. AC C11B 14: 414-415, Vallée au ministre, 22 novembre 1733.
have the name of 'Great-heart'. Meskir Kameramon, 'Great-heart', among them is the crowning virtue'. It was as important to appear generous in personal life as it was in diplomacy. However defective such a scale of values may have appeared to Europeans, they were the result of long tradition.

Before 1600, the Eastern Woodlands had been marked by cultural conflict and change, by kaleidoscopic complexity rather than by uniformity, although certain characteristics prevailed throughout the area. Archeological evidence indicates at least 80 distinct cultures in the area since the appearance of man there at least 11,000 years ago. In precontact days, the Micmac, Malecite, Abenaki and others seem to have been loosely organized into a confederacy which disintegrated with the killing of the chief, Bashabes, at Bar Harbor about 1611. Later most of this group became allies of the French, a fact which helped to maintain peace among them until the fall of New France.

At the very heart of the cultural differences was the question of language, for languages express cultures. Of the 1,000 to 2,000 distinct and mutually unintelligible languages believed to have existed in the Americas at the time

1. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 91.
2. Supra, 31.
of contact, North America had well over 200. Canada's 10 major linguistic groups counted about 55 separate languages, some of which differed as much as French from Japanese. All were fully formed and complex in their structures. The French, in their efforts to learn Micmac as well as other Indian languages, found themselves coping with sounds they had never heard before and had difficulty in articulating (the Micmac for their part struggled with f, l, r)\(^1\), with syntaxes that bore no resemblances to European counterparts, and with the fact that Indian languages, while precise instruments for expressing the necessities of their own cultures, were not at all fitted to express those of the French or of Europeans generally, any more than French served in a Micmac context. Translation with any degree of accuracy was easiest on the practical, materialistic level; on the religious or mythological levels it was impossible.\(^2\)

Edward Sapir said that language is a guide to "social reality" and that no two languages represent the same reality.\(^3\)

\(^1\) AC ClID 10, Mémoire de Lamothe Cadillac, 1693; sans pagination. See also Grant, Lescarbot, 123-125.


\(^3\) According to Sapir, "It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group... The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached." Ibid., 33.
Early missionaries, who had not yet grasped the full complexities of these languages, resorted to circumlocutions and approximations. For such concepts as wisdom, fidelity, justice, mercy, gratitude, piety, they improvised such terms as "happy", "tender love", "good heart"; "prayer" was used for "religion". "Judge for yourself," wrote Biard to his superior in Paris in 1612, "the difficulty surrounding the remainder of the symbols and fundamental truths of Christianity."¹ The trouble, however, was one of cultural approach rather than of inadequacies of the Indian languages.

In spite of these difficulties, Le Clercq found much to commend in the Micmac language:

The Gaspesion language is very beautiful and very rich in its expressions. For it is not so sterile as the European languages, which have recourse to a frequent repetition of the same terms in order to express several different things. Each word of Gaspesian has its particular and specific significance; this shows remarkably well in their speeches, which are always very elegant.²

Maillard, for his part, was surprised at its abundance of words -- "nothing borrowed, as amongst us". He said that it had two distinct styles, "one noble, or elevated, for grave and important subjects, the other ignoble, or trivial, for familiar or vulgar ones". He added that all the conjugations were regular and distinct.³


² Ganong, New Relation, 140-141. Abbé Jean P. de Miniac in 1760 found so much excellence in Micmac that he was persuaded that if its beauties were known in Europe, there would be colleges erected for its propagation. Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, First Series, X: 115-116.
Micmac ideograms were an attempt to reduce the language to writing. Le Clercq, seeing Micmac children using mnemonic strokes on birch bark to help remember prayers, invented a series of characters (or hieroglyphics, as Maillard was later to call his adaptation), each one standing for a word. Le Clercq's "little folly" (to quote Wallis & Wallis, who doubted the value of the idea) was adapted and developed in 1738 by Maillard, who apparently not realizing that these characters originated with a fellow missionary, claimed them as his own. At his death, their number had grown to about 5,000.

What Maillard did do was to compile the first Micmac grammar and dictionary, which took years of labor. Earlier, Gaulin and his assistant and successor, Abbé Michel Courtin, had translated prayers and the catechism into Micmac. Biard also, in 1616, wrote of composing a catechism in the Indian language.1

Of all the missionaries, Maillard mastered the language the most thoroughly. He also composed "une musique sauvage, et a fait de fort beaux ouvrages sur ces objets...".2

Problems deepened as knowledge grew; missionaries learned, for instance, that language and culture did not necessarily coincide. Iroquoian languages were confined to

1. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, IV: 89.
to the Eastern Woodland cultural area, which made for a simple classification. But the Micmacs, whose culture was also that of the Eastern Woodlands, shared their language with the buffalo-hunting Blackfoot, whose culture was that of the Plains, thousands of miles away. On the other hand, the Micmacs and the Malecite, who lived side by side and shared the same culture and had close blood ties as well, could understand each other only with difficulty. According to a Micmac legend, the Malecite had once been Micmacs, but after a fight following a feast on Prince Edward Island, they had been pushed off the island and had changed their speech so that they could not be understood. Malecite means "corrupted speech" or "broken talk".¹

The "simple savage" was being revealed in all his complexities. French attitudes toward him also became more complicated. "Le bon sauvage" of Montaigne appeared in on-the-scene impressions: "Je les regarde comme le plus heureux de tous les hommes," an anonymous letter-writer observed in Québec in 1705, "et parcequ'ils possèdent dans la perfection le plus précieux des dons de la nature; et parcequ'ils n'ont seulement pas l'idée de ces faux biens dont nous jouissons si peu que nous achetons au prix de véritables."²

¹ Wallis & Wallis, The Micmac Indians, 203.
² AC C11A 122: 13v, à Québec, 30 septembre 1705.
The other side of nature's gifts was noted by Daniel d'Auger de Subercase, Governor of Acadia, when he remarked, "pour moy je suis persuadé que le moins meschant des Sauvages est beaucoup plus que Le plus mauvais des françois, parceque je say qu'ils ne refusent rien à la nature."¹

The anonymous letter-writer at Québec replied to his correspondent,

Vous m'avés souvent demandé si l'on avoit commencé a aprivoiser et a policer ces Barbares. Aprivoisé, oui; policé, non; ils sont asséss bonne gens et l'on commerce fort aisement avec Eux, mais ils ne quittent point leurs manières; ils sont dans la pure nature, et je vous diray franchement que je ne sçauois ni empecher de les aprouver en bien des choses, ils ne connoissent point les commodités de la vie, mais ils ne soufrent point de cette privation parcequ'ils sont accoutumés à une vie qui ne séduire que quand on en goûté une plus doux."²

As late as 1748 it was reported that the Micmac "commence à s'humaniser".³

French efforts to "humanize" the Indians -- in other words, to make them into Frenchmen -- had very early stumbled over the problem of liquor, which became a focal point for the tangled area of cultural interrelations. Nothing in the experience of the French had prepared them for the

¹. AC C11D 6: 168v, Subercase au ministre, 20 décembre 1708.
². AC C11A 122: 13, à Québec, 30 septembre 1705.
³. AC C11D 10, Sur l'Accadie 1748, non signé, sans pagination.
Indians' reaction to alcohol; for that matter, nothing had prepared the Indians. Their cultural and psychological orientation did not equip them to handle this new sensation. The Micmac, after first rejecting intoxicants as poisons, soon became too fond of them. They drank to reach oblivion, to gain spirit possession. But instead of finding new spiritual experiences, they were led to devastation and death. Perhaps worst of all was the degradation and moral disintegration that inevitably followed.

Efforts by the missionaries to forbid alcohol to their flocks were no more availing than efforts of civil authorities to ban its sale to the Indians. Because its attendant evils were so obvious, it was only too tempting to lay all the problems of cultural contact at alcohol's door. Unfortunately, it was not that simple. The Indians themselves realized that alcohol was only part of a complicated situation. An old Indian put it this way, talking to Claude-Sébastien de Villieu, an officer serving in Acadia,

D'abord que j'ai appris que tu faisais une cabane proche de mon village, j'ai commencé à trembler de peur et j'ai appréhendé que les Français qui m'ont autrefois donné le prière ne soient cause que je cesse de prier; car je vois mes frères qui sont, par exemple, du côté de la rivière Saint-Jean, ne

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1. For a penetrating look at the question, see André Vachon, "L'eau-de-vie dans la société indienne", Canadian Historical Association Report (1960), 22-32.
prient plus, pour ainsi dire, à cause de la boisson et que la quantité de bâtards qui y sont, fait que nous ne nous connaissons plus. De même leurs parents qui sont à Kénebéké, depuis qu'ils trafiquent avec les Anglais, sont devenus bêtes et ne prient plus, parce qu'ils sont tous les jours ivres... c'est pourquoi je te dis que je ne veux point que tu demeures ici."1

Similarly, a survey of the missions of Acadia reported that "On remarque que les Sauvages qui sont dans le voisinage des francois et des acadiens et des anglais sont encore plus paresseux et plus ivrogne que les autres."2

Versailles was uncomfortably aware of the situation, particularly as it would affect its plans to gather the Indians into permanent villages as part of the establishment of Ile Royale. It considered reports that the Indians were "naturellement portées à la Boisson et autres vices qui en sont les suites,"3

1. H.R. Casgrain, Les Sulniciens et les prêtres des missions étrangères en Acadie (Québec, 1897), 239, citing a letter written by Gaulin at Minas, 24 October 1701. Precise source not indicated.

2. AC C11B 1: 251. Mémoire sur les missions des sauvages Mikmak et de l'Acadie, sans date, sans signature. This survey, the best on the Micmac missions during the Louisbourg period, was probably among the reports taken to Versailles by Saint-Ovide in 1739 (AC C11B 21: 294, Saint-Ovide au ministre, 28 juillet 1739). Information for it must have been provided by the missionaries, at that time Maillard and Le Loutre. Norman McLeod Rogers in "Apostle to the Micmacs" in The Dalhousie Review VI, No. 2, (July 1926), 163, says the best survey of the Micmac missions of this period is found in a letter written by Le Loutre in 1738. In any event the survey served as the basis for instructions on Indian policy to the governors of Louisbourg from this time forward, beginning with the instructions to Forant (AC B 68: 40-41 [379-383], 22 juin 1739).

that they were lazy, begging their bread and passing the summers in doing nothing instead of sowing wheat. This not only led to hardship the following winter, but to "de grands désordres tant par l'yvrognerie que par la fréquence continuelle des femmes dans les maisons des français."¹

French settlers who fell into such habits were discouraged from staying in the colony. Saint-Ovide was following well established practice when he decided to send away useless persons from Ile Royale "qui à l'exemple des sauvages ne Restent aux nous que pour y trouver une oisive Subsistence."² But the Indians were not only tolerated, they were encouraged to come to the island because, among other considerations, "les sauvages sont peu de chose, étant nos alliés, mais pourroient devenir quelque chose de considerable, étant nos ennemies."³

Such a double standard might have answered the immediate policy needs of the French, but did nothing to solve thorny social problems. Maillard saw that it was not so much a question of right and wrong as of a different conditioning:

Il faut que vous sachiez qu'ils sont hommes comme nous; qu'intrinsèquement

¹. Ibid.
³. AC C11B 4: 251v, lettre de l'Abbé Gaulin, 17 novembre 1719.
ils pensent comme tous homme doit penser; qu'ils ne diffèrent que dans la manière de rendre leurs pensées, et que si quelque chose nous paroit étrange dans leur façon de penser, et de dire ce qu'ils pensent, c'est que nous n'avons pas été éduqués comme eux, et nous ne nous trouvons pas en situation semblable à la leur, pour former de pareils raisonnements.1

Be that as it may, the Indians had definitely lost the panache of "le bon sauvage" in the eyes of the French after two centuries of contact:

Les sauvages naturels de l'isle sont de la nation des Mickmacs, l'on n'y compte guère plus de 140 Chefs de famille, ils sont laids et vilains, habitent les bois, n'ont point de demeure fixe, ils en changent suivant les saisons des différentes chasses...leur coutume est de boire le sang des Animaux immédiatement après qu'ils les ont tués.2

They were still living in wigwams, which contemporary observers did not regard very highly,3 and they supported themselves by trading game and furs with the inhabitants.

1. Maillard, Missions Micmaques, 299.

2. AC Cl1C 16: pièce 4 (seconde pièce), Mémoire sur l'Isle Royale, 1750 (non signé).

3. By the time another century had passed, at least one observer was prepared to make concessions as to their utility when he wrote that "in the wigwam there is a place for everything and everything has its place. Everything, every bar, every fastening, every tier of bark, and every appendage, whether for ornament or for use, in this curious structure, has a name, and every section of the limited space has its appropriate designation and use. Perhaps it would be impossible to plan a hut of equal dimensions in which the comfort and convenience of inmates could be so effectively secured. (Duncan Campbell, Nova Ecotia in its Historical Mercantile and Industrial Relations (Montreal, 1873), 18).
At this time Cap de Sable was renowned for its moose hunting.  

This resistance on the part of the Indians to changing their way of life at first surprised the French and then irritated them; even Lahontan, who was generally sympathetic, referred to "their fanatical Opinions of things, which proceeded from their Prepossession and Bigotry with reference to their own customs and ways of living". But the French never allowed their irritation to make them forget that a reprimand was far more effective in controlling the Indians than bullying or threats. Officers who were successful Indian leaders made skilful use of this characteristic. Paul de Marin de la Malgue, who led the force of Canadians and Indians that was too late to relieve Louisbourg in 1745 and whose son, Joseph, stayed to harass the British in Nova Scotia until 1749, and Charles Deschamps de Boishébert et de Raffetot, who had a similar mission in 1755-1758, all knew how to lead by a subtle blend of persuasion and firmness. Joseph Marin reported that

mon crédit sur l'Esprit des sauvages ait arésthé les cruautés qu'ils vouloient Exercer sur les officiers ainsi que sur les femmes qui étoient avec Eux, et il ne luy sera pas difficile d'en être convaincu s'y l a quelque connaissance de la façon dont les sauvages se gouvernent et de leur manière d'agir, lors qu'ils sont En partis de guerre et qu'ils se sentent supérieur en

1. AC Clld 10, mémoire Sur l'Acadie 1748, non signé, sans pagination.
2. Thwaites, New Voyages, II: 471.
nombre au françois comme ils s'étoient de beaucoup dans le partis que j'avois avec moy n'ayant que dix huit canadiens."

It was such a blend, with a large addition of ritual and ceremony, that helps explain the effectiveness of religion as an instrument for controlling the Micmac, among other Indians. Pichon said that used properly, religion was easily the most efficient of such instruments. The Indians

ont besoin d'un culte qui remplisse la durée des moments qu'ils ne donnent pas à leurs besoins. Ils en avaient déjà trouvé l'emploi de ces moments avant que nous les connusions, et en changeant le genre de leurs occupations à cet égard, nous ne devons pas prétendre changer entièrement les goûts qui leurs avaient fait choisir."

Whether used for religion, trade, politics or war, ritual and ceremony were fundamental to the closely interwoven relationships of these activities in Indian life. In order to carry out their religious functions, missionaries also had to operate in commercial, political and military capacities, as it was impossible to separate these roles in undifferentiated Indian societies. Nowhere was this more evident than in Acadia.

For the approximately 100 missionaries who worked among the Indians of Acadia during the French régime, the problem was one of political necessity versus religious idealism - an exercise in syncretism they were variously

1. AC C11A 92: 325v-326, Marin au ministre, 4 octobre 1748.
successful in resolving. Gaulin managed to run afoul of both French and English authorities at different times of his career. Maillard's concern for the welfare of his Micmac flock in the end overcame his devotion to the French cause; he recognized the inevitable when Louisbourg fell for the second time in 1758, and went to English Halifax to continue his missionary work. The year he died he was

1. The governor at Louisbourg also had his problems in drawing the line. When two of his missionaries got into trouble with Major Lawrence Armstrong, acting governor at Annapolis Royal, Saint-Ovide was sharply reminded by Versailles that missionaries were subject to British law as long as they were on British territory, and that if this were respected "il est à croire qu'ils auront toute la liberté qui peut leur est nécessaire". (AC B 65/4: 452-452v [p. 795-797], Maurepas à Saint-Ovide, 16 avril 1737).

2. Antoine Gaulin (1674-1740), born on Isle d'Orléans, Québec, was sent to Acadia in 1698 by the Séminaire of Québec and served until 1731. In 1702 he was named vicar-general of Acadia. He was a major figure in persuading the Indians to help the French in their efforts to retake Acadia in 1711. In spite of his long years of service during which he personally indebted himself (AC C11B 3: 42-43; 56-60v, Conseil, 3 mai 1718; AC C11B 4: 251-256, lettre de Gaulin, 17 novembre 1719), a report that he had encouraged the Micmac to sue for peace with the English so annoyed Maurepas (AC B 49/2: 705-707 [525-529], 28 mai 1726) that Saint-Ovide had to come to his defence (AC C11B 8: 34-38v, 18 septembre 1726). As for the English, his "intolerable insolence" led them to consider taking steps for Gaulin's removal. Alarmed, Gaulin petitioned to remain at his mission, which was granted "on his begging pardon, taking the oath of fidelity, promising not to meddle with government affairs, but to confine himself to his religious functions, and giving other priests and ten or twelve deputies as security for his behavior." (Beamish Murdoch, History of Nova Scotia, (3 vols., Halifax, 1865), I: 437-438). Major Armstrong referred to him as "that old, mischievous incendiary Gaulin" and allowed him to stay even though he could not furnish the required security.

3. Pierre Antoine Simon Maillard (1709-1762) of the Séminaire du Saint-Esprit in Paris, worked as a missionary among the Micmacs from 1735 until his death in 1762. In 1740 he was named Vicar-General of Ile Royale, which was renewed in 1760.
elected Superior of the Seminary of Québec, but Governor James Murray refused to confirm the appointment on the grounds that it had originated in Paris. Le Loutre so devoted himself to the political side of his rôle that at times it overshadowed the religious. His activities leading both Indians and Acadians against the English earned for him the hatred of the latter and the high esteem of the French court.

Edward Cornwallis, founder of Halifax and Governor of Nova Scotia, reflected the official English view when he wrote to the Bishop of Québec that he not only wanted the Acadians and the Indians to have priests, but was pleased to do whatever he could to obtain them. Still, he wondered,

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1. However, France paid for Maillard's subsistence while he was in Halifax. Abbé Pierre de la Rue de l'Isle Dieu, vicar general for the French colonies in Paris, received 500 livres a year for this purpose for the period from January 1758 until September 1762, shortly after Maillard's death. (AC F1A, Article 48: 48v).

2. Jean-Louis Le Loutre (1709-1772), of the Séminaire du Saint-Esprit in Paris, started his missionary career as an assistant to Maillard in 1737. In 1739 he was favorably received by Armstrong; in 1741 he abandoned his missions to the Acadians to work exclusively with the Indians at Shubenacadie. During the English occupation of Louisbourg, 1745-1749, the English issued an order for his arrest because of his activities inciting the Indians against the English while making it look as though the Indians were acting on their own. (AC C11C 9: 130-130v, lettre de Le Loutre, 29 juillet 1749). In 1753 the authorities in Halifax put a price upon his head. He was captured twice by the English: for three months in 1747, and in 1755 until the end of the Seven Years' War. (A. David, "Une Autobiographie de l'Abbé Le Loutre", Nova Francia VI, No. 1 (janvier-février 1931), 1-34; also, Norman MCL. Rogers, "The Abbé Le Loutre", The Canadian Historical Review II, No. 2 (June 1930), 105-128).
Est ce bien vous qui avez envoyé Le Loutre pour missionnaire aux Micmacs, est ce pour leur bien que ce prestre excite ces misérables à exercer leur cruautés contre ceux qui leur font toutes sortes d'amitiés, est ce pour leur intérêt qu'il les empêche de s'unir à un peuple civilisé et chrétien, et de jouir de tous les avantages d'un doux Gouvernement. Si vous lui avez donné cette mission, je suis certain que vous ne luy avez pas ordonné de mener les Sauvages à leur propre Ruine, et Contre les alliés de son Roy.1

As for the Micmac, if their legends are of any significance, Maillard, "Mosi Meial," was their man. One of the two last missionaries of Acadia to come from France (Le Loutre followed him within two years), Maillard was so highly regarded by his flock that he became enshrined in their legends.2 Ile Ste Famille (Chapel Island today) in the Bras d'Or Lakes where Maillard had his mission in the 1750s is still the place where the Micmac gather each year on St. Anne's Day, July 26.

Gaulin was also much loved by the Indians. For close to 20 years the only missionary to the Micmacs of peninsular Acadia,


3. AC C11B 3: 56, Conseil, 3 mai 1718. The reference says 20 years, but Gaulin had an assistant, Philippe Rageot, during his early years as missionary, of whom he thought very highly. Rageot was with him at least until 1705.
he had learned to live like them, especially when France overlooked his salary (one such period was 1707 to 1716, except for 1714, according to a claim he presented to authorities\(^1\)). A contemporary observer says that the Indians called him their "second patriarch",\(^2\)

> il a prie toutes leurs manières, fait leurs mariages, leurs baptêmes, leurs enterrements et leur dit les prières et la messe chaque jour...couche sur la neige, soufre l'extreme froid, porte actuellement des souliers à la sauvage faite des peaux de loups marin; il parte aussi avec la troupe pour aler du costé de Saint Pierre de Canseaux.

  En verité il faut avoir un zelle bien ardent afin de passer sa vie de la sorte avec de tels peuples; les anciens apostre n'en ont jamais mené une si affreuse et si austere; ces deux missionnaires [the other being Frère Michel Brûlai] meritent assurement de trouver place dans la légende des Saints.\(^3\)

French authorities did not appreciate Gaulin as much as the Indians did. His wandering life, his rough-hewn rather tactless manner caused officials to eye him askance. "Le Sr Gaulin est Canadien...et n'est point un esprit fixe

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2. The first was Abhé Jessé Fléché, whose baptisms in 1610-1611 with little preparation caused official concern. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations I: 310-311.

et sur lequel on puisse faire fond," was the verdict. Pierre-August de Soubras, commissaire-ordonnateur, became so suspicious of him that he reported "ce missionaire fait un commerce peu convenable et dangereux pour son caractère". When Gaulin followed his flock to Canceau to go fishing, Soubras charged that "il ne covenoit guère à un Missionnaire de S'établir dans un endroit aussi suspect."

Gaulin found himself in danger of losing his mission. He went to France to defend himself; meanwhile, at Louisbourg Saint-Ovide praised him highly.

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1. AC C11B 2: 44-44v, Conseil, 10 avril 1717.
Gaulin's complaints about his hard life proved to be only too justified; before he was 50 years old he was broken in health and the authorities were concerned about finding him an assistant. Only three years later was Michel Courtin sent to help him; finding missionaries suitable for work among the Indians was a perennial problem for New France.

Several years after he had retired in 1731 to Québec, Gaulin received a tribute in an official report when he was listed with Courtin as the missionary who had contributed the most to the Micmacs.

The devotion of these missionaries to their flocks is too evident to need elaboration. In appraising the spiritual aspects of their work they could be realistic. The Indians, Gaulin wrote, "sont assez bien disposés pour recevoir les impressions qu'on veut bien leur donner mais ils ont besoin d'être aider". Maillard put it more strongly: "Il faut que je les excite sans cesse à la pratique des actes de leur religion." Le Loutre was the most skeptical of all as to the faith of his charges:

2. AC CUB 7: 36, LeNormant à l'aurèsas, 2 août 1724.
3. AC CUB 1: 249v, Mémoire sur les missions des Sauvages Mikmak et de l'accadie, sans signature, sans date.
Sont-ils sous les yeux de leur missionnaire, on les prendrait pour des Saints, ce sont des anges à l'église par leur modestie, dociles à leurs patriarches et soumis à ce qu'il leur dit, mais de n'est qu'un bien passager; tout ce n'est par leurs différentes courses.

He added that missionary work among the Indians was a constant struggle with "l'inconstance, la légèreté et la paresse".

So, while the missionaries did not doubt the ultimate value of their work, neither were they under any illusions as to how deeply Christianity had taken hold of their charges. On the other side of the picture, the Acadian Indians, who had been declared converted by the end of the seventeenth century well before the establishment of Louisbourg, gave consistent evidence of being devoted to their missionaries and to their church. For one thing, they complained throughout the Louisbourg years, about the lack of missionaries. Neither is there any reason to doubt the genuineness of their sentiments when they claimed they had accepted the French king because he had taught them the Catholic religion. The effectiveness of their conversion can perhaps best be judged by the fact that to this day they are still Catholics.

1. Dumont-Johnson, Apôtres ou Agitateurs, 58, citing from Archives du Séminaire de Québec, Lettres R, No. 87, 1 octobre 1738.

2. Some examples are found in AC C11B 14: 103-109v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 13 octobre 1733; AC C11B 20: 85-90v, François Le Coutre de Bourvillé à Maurepas, 3 octobre 1738; and AC C11B 22: 118-124, Bourville à Maurepas, 26 octobre 1740.
It never seems to have occurred to the French to doubt, at least officially, whether or not they had the moral right to manipulate these stone-age peoples for their own ends,¹ any more than it occurred to the English to seriously doubt their right to dispossess them. The King of France considered himself "bon père de famille" and repeatedly urged his representatives in New France to act accordingly. But the "bon père" in seventeenth and eighteenth century terms had the right to control the destinies of his children as he saw fit or as he was capable of doing; and so officialdom saw nothing anomalous in destroying the Indian's faith in their own beliefs in order to replace them with those of Christianity.² Nor was it considered wrong to bring pressure on the Indians to establish themselves in permanent villages, although the Micmac, Malecite and other Algonkin tribes in New France were nomadic hunters and not farmers, with all the cultural apparatus implicit in that distinction; or to fan the embers of hostility toward the English, which throughout the colonial period never ceased to smoulder.³ De la Varenne could write,

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¹ Cornwallis' letter, supra, 71.
² Even Maillard, who probably understood the Indians the best of all the Acadian missionaries, wrote, "C'est ainsi qu'il faut relancer et humilier ces tristes Aristarques, pour s'en faire respecter et craindre." Missions Micmaques, 560.
³ Typical were the instructions to Charles Desherbiers upon his assuming the post of governor at Ile Royale, to inspire "à tous ces Sauvages de la confiance et de l'attention pour leurs missionnaires et de la fidélité et de l'attachement pour les Français et de L'éloignement pour les voisins qui cherchoient à les corrompre. Cette partie est d'une extrême conséquence." (AC B 89: 309v, [308-309], 28 mars 1749).
with much truth, that

it is chiefly to the conduct of the English themselves, we are beholden for this favorable aid of the savages. If the English at first, instead of seeking to exterminate or oppress them by dint of power, the sense of which drove them for refuge into our party, had behaved with more tenderness to them, and conciliated their affection by humoring them properly, and distributing a few presents, they might easily have made useful and valuable subjects of them.¹

The English record is not quite as bad as this would indicate; after all, they did win the active allegiance of the Iroquois, the most advanced of the Eastern Woodland peoples, and of those formidable warriors of the Southeast, the Chickasaw. And while the English were less inclined to compromise than the French, the Indians in the long run had little to choose between the two powers. The French were just as inclined to self-interest as the English; and so, it must be admitted, were the Indians.² The latter realized that the rivalry between the two European powers put them in a position of strength, and they did their best to take advantage of it.³

¹. "Lettre de Mons. de la Varenne" in Customs and Manners, 87.
². Edmond Atkin, superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Department of the English colonies, said that no people understood and pursued their national interest better than the Indian. Edmond Atkin to the Board of Trade, May 30, 1755, Huntington Collection of Loudoun Papers, 578. Cited by Jacobs, Gift Diplomacy, 11.
³. AC C11D 6: 166-166v, lettreуберкéаे а Pontchartrain, 20 décembre, 1708: "Permettez-moi de vous représenter que je crois qu'il sera impossible d'empêcher les sauvages d'aller chez les anglais quand on ne leur portera pas de marchandises parce qu'ils ne sauraient nullement s'en passer et que les nostres sont beaucoup plus chères." There are other examples.
Strangely enough -- at least the Europeans considered it strange -- the Indians did not use their position to profiteer, or to amass personal fortunes. Accumulation of goods had little, if any place, in Eastern Woodlands cultures.¹ To Europeans, this was improvidence. To the Micmac, goods were to be used, either to provide for the immediate needs of himself, his family or his group, or they were intended for giving away to prove his great heart and so establish his position as a leader. Neither he nor his fellow Micmac worried about the future. This unconcern for material wealth contrasts rather oddly with the Indians' already well-established dependence on trade goods and consequent lack of self-sufficiency. One more illustration of their cultural distance from Europeans, it also was one of the many reasons why the French never really learned to like the Indians.

It was not, however, necessary to like the Indians in order to consider them essential to the establishment of Louisbourg. By that time, the Micmac had been in contact with Europeans for two centuries, a contact which had been growing in intensity during the past one hundred years. Their stone-age

¹ Agricultural people such as the Iroquois and the Huron, and semi-agricultural people such as the Abenaki, stored food for winter use, but the nomadic northern hunters, including the Micmacs, did not.

Some Indian cultures placed great emphasis on accumulation of goods; the best-known Canadian example of this is that of the Northwest Coast tribes preparing for their potlatches. But these goods were for giving away in order to obtain prestige.
technology had long since disappeared, but much of their old way persisted, although greatly modified by trade goods as well as by the fur trade. Technologies, however, change faster than cultures. Almost defiantly, Micmac continued to be Micmac, regarding themselves as a free and sovereign people, the allies of the French. The French King was their "father" because he had taught them their new religion. They acknowledged no more obedience to him than they accorded to their own chieftains. In the face of the overpowering challenges of European culture, these once self-assertive, far-ranging people wished only to be left alone, to live their own lives in their own way. But the clash of French and English in the New World dictated otherwise, and so the Micmac became instruments of empire. The French achieved this by developing men with the particular qualities needed to be leaders of Indians, a group which included some of the missionaries. Under the guidances of such men, and with the direction and assistance of Louisbourg, Acadian Indians became a highly effective guerrilla force against the English.
CHAPTER III

NERVE CENTRE FOR RAIDERS OF SEA AND FOREST

France, fighting for imperial survival in North America after the Treaty of Utrecht and acting on the principle that offense is the best defence, decided to build Louisbourg, the mightiest fortress in the New World. While it took some time to select the exact place, its general location was never in doubt -- Cape Breton, which had long since caught the attention of French colonizers. Its proximity to the North Atlantic fisheries, its coal mines and forests may have had their attractions, but it is widely accepted that its strategic location near the entrance to Canada was the deciding factor. This location also made it a natural entrepôt for the triangular (Canada-West Indies-France) trade route. Nicolas Denys (1598-1688), fur trader and land-owner, had brought settlers to the island during the latter half of the seventeenth century and they had successfully grown wheat there, although that initial colony had disappeared. This was remembered by the Indians, who told Pierre Denys de la Ronde (grand nephew of Nicolas) when he visited the island in 1713 that it grew the finest wheat in the world.¹ The leaders of its second colonization

¹ AC Cl1B 1: 24, Denys de la Ronde au ministre, 1713.
were less interested in farming than in capitalizing on the island's strategic location for defence, fisheries and trade. The role of the fortress was to be many-faceted, one of the most important of which would be to direct the Indians in their resistance against the English.

Louis-Joseph de Brouillan de Saint-Ovide, the King's lieutenant at Plaisance in Newfoundland and later to be the colony's second governor, took formal possession on September 2, 1713, declaring, "à tous qu'il appartiendra n'avoir trouvé sur ladite isle qu'un habitant françois et 25 à 30 familles sauvages."1 The newly-named Ile Royale, "Oonumaghee" of the Indians, was to be the touchstone of French hopes in New France. When Beauharnois expressed doubts as to the usefulness of the new colony, Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas, replied that it was

le moyen le plus Solide pour augmenter la Navigation. Je le regarde aussi comme le rempart du Canada qui tomberoit bientost ausy bien que les pesches Si les Anglois estoient possesseurs de Louisbourg, J'espère qu'il n'y parviendront jamais par l'attention que je donne de faire fortiffier cette place de manière qu'on ne puisse l'attaquer impunément.2

Ange Duquesne, Marquis de Menneville, Governor of New France, had another view; Acadia, he wrote in 1754, "is a gulf of indispensable expense."3 Indeed, the economic viability

1. AC C11B 1: 11, prise de possession de l'Isle du Cap Breton.
2. AC B 52/1: 502 [89], Maurepas à Beauharnois, 14 mai 1728.
of the new colony had been considered by Jacques Raudot, intendant of New France, when its establishment was first projected:

On pourroit faire dans les Commencemens quelques pelleteries comme 'Hartres, Renards, Loutres, et Ours à cause des animaux qui sont dans cette Isle. Mais on ne doit pas Compter cela pour un commerce parqu'ils seront bientôt detruits de même que les originaux et caribous qui y sont. Mais ils serviront beaucoup dans les Commencemens de même que le Gibier qui y est fort abondant pour fournir un peu de viande fraiche à ceux qui s'Etabliront.¹

Louisbourg's main role in the fur trade was to serve as a trans-shipping point for cargoes from Canada. As Raudot foresaw, Indians traded furs and game for supplies, but this did not reach the level of organized commerce.

Much more important were the maritime resources off the island. Raudot hoped that the Indians would sell their seal and fish oil, which "à present ils n'en trouvent presque point le debit", and that they would be employed in fishing for cod.² The former was realized to a certain extent, but not the latter; the Indians took very little, if any, part in commercial cod fishing.

From the moment Ile Royale was conceived, Indians played a part in plans for the establishment. Jérôme Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, wrote to Saint-Ovide,

¹. AC C11G 6: 72-72v, Mémoire sur l'Etablissement du Cap Breton, 27 février 1710.
². Ibid., 79.
J'écris à M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil qu'il est absolument nécessaire de déterminer les Français et les sauvages de l'Acadie à aller habiter l'île du Cap Breton et que pour cela il doit prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires.  

Pontchartrain was concerned about the Micmac, Malecite and Abenaki of Acadia falling under the influence of the English. If left where they were under English domination, ils deviendront par la suite anglais et pourroient porter par la suite la guerre au Cap Breton, au lieu que les attirans à cette Île ce sera un rempart qu'on luy produira d'un peuple qui connoist parfaitement toutes les terres de l'Acadie.

This intimate knowledge of Acadia could be used to isolate Île Royale if the Indians should declare themselves against the French. "Qu'on ne peut pour cette raison trop menager ces Sauvages," Bégon declared. Pontchartrain knew enough of the Indian character to be aware that the Acadian Indians could never be lured to live in the St. Lawrence Valley because they were accustomed to live by the sea. But he could see no reason why they could not be attracted to Île Royale. He wrote to Saint-Castin concerning the Abenaki, [Sa Majesté] souhaitterois que les Sauvages qui y Sont fussent habiter à l'Île du Cap Breton. Elle est persuadé qu'ils se determineront volontiers Tant par Rapport à la Religion Catholique qu'ils professent

1. AC F 3 50: 4v, 10 avril 1713.
que par ce qu'ils Sont accoutumés avec la Nation française de qui ils ont toujours reçus toutes sortes de Secours. Il faut que les français et les Sauvages de l'Acadie Voyent le Soleil et les Étoiles de dessus la même terre que la hache des Úns et des autres Se repose et Soit levée Ensemble et que leurs os soient dans le même lieu. Je Suis persuadé que personne n'est plus Capable que Vous de déterminer ces Sauvages de se rendre à l'Isle.1

This letter, so different in tone from the usual official correspondence, was calculated to appeal to the susceptibilities of the young half-Indian leader of the Abenaki of Pentagouet. It is using the oratorical style of Indian negotiators to persuade Indians to fall in with French plans. None of this turn of phrase was evident when Pontchartrain wrote to Saint-Ovide,

J'écris à M. Le marquis de Vaudreuil qui est absolument nécessaire de déterminer les françois et les Sauvages de l'Acadie à aller habiter à l'Isle du Cap Breton et que pour cela il doit prendre toutes les mesures possibles. Je luy Envoye deux lettres l'une pour le Sr. Gaulin et l'autre pour le Père Justinien [Durand] par où je leur marque qu'il faut qu'il mettent tout en Usage pour y faire aller ces peuples. Je Joint Icy des duplicata de ces deux lettres que Je Vous prie de leur faire passer par Voyes Seures Car il est de Consequence quelles ne tombent pas en d'autres mains que les leurs.2

It was easier to form grand designs in France than it was to realize them in Acadia. Gaulin reacted to his orders

1. AC B 35/3: 262v-263 [188-189], Pontchartrain à Baron de Saint-Castin, 8 avril 1713.

2. AC B 35/1: 85-85v [229-230], Pontchartrain à Saint-Ovide, 10 avril 1713.
with some reserve, pointing out to Costebelle that the Acadians would not willingly leave their farms as the English had promised them as good advantages as they would enjoy at Ile Royale; as for the Micmac and Malecite,

\begin{center}
\textit{il sera plus facile à les déterminer et comme ces derniers dépendent un peu plus de moy aussi j'apporteray ce plus de soin pour les engager à se rassembler au lieu que nous leurs marqués.}
\end{center}

Either Gaulin overestimated his influence with the Indians or he was intent on placating the authorities. He well knew that his flock would not take kindly to being confined to a permanent village on an island or anywhere else. He had previously (1706-1708) put himself heavily into debt buying tools and equipment for a similar project under Subercase. The project had failed, and he had not been reimbursed.\(^2\) Hunters on sea and land, the Micmac still retained enough of their pre-contact habits to need an abundance of living space. It would be ten years before the Indian War of 1722-1726 would provide the motivation to enable Gaulin to establish his mission on Bras d'Or Lake.

Nor was Gaulin alone in realizing the obstacles to the French policy. Félix Pain (1668-1741), Recollect missionary who worked in Acadia from about 1694 to 1733, did not mince words when he wrote about the Micmac,

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] AC C11C 7: 224v, lettre de Gaulin, 26 août 1713, envoyée par Costebelle au ministre, 15 septembre 1713.
\item[2.] AC C11B 3: 56-56v, Conseil, 3 mai 1718.
\end{itemize}
ils disent que de Se Renfermer tous dans
cette isle du Cap Breton se seroit
préjudicieux à leur liberté, et que
ce seroit une chose impossible à Leur
Liberté naturelle et aux moyens de
pouvoir à leurs subsistance.

Quand à l'égard de leur attachement au
Roy et aux François qui l'est inviolable,
et que si la Reine d'Angleterre avoient
Les prés de l'Accadie par la cession
que Sa Majesté Luy en avoit faitte, que
pour eux ils avoient Les Bois dont jamais
personne ne seroit capable de les débusquer,
et qu'ainsi ils vous promettent neantmoins
d'estre toujours fidèle aux francois et
leurs donner la preference dans la traitte
des pelletries.1

Officials at Versailles eventually realized that
not even Saint-Castin, with all his influence, could persuade
the Abenaki to transplant themselves from their ancestral
villages to Ile Royale, which, after all, was Micmac territory.
An earlier attempt to lure the Abenaki to Canada by offering
them the protection of a fort and lands prepared for their
use had failed. The Micmac had their own reasons for being
reluctant: they could not see why they should commit themselves
to permanent villages, whether in their own territory or not.
Finally they agreed to establish a community on a river near
Canceau, to which Pontchartrain objected that it was in English
territory, a point which was irrelevant to the Micmac, as they
regarded it as their territory.2 The Indians' contention that

1. AC C11C 7: 227, Félix Pain à Costebelle, 23 Septembre
1713.

2. AC B 36/7: 443, [70-71], Pontchartrain à Costebelle,
22 mars 1714.
they needed good hunting grounds became painfully justified as famine threatened and officials had to come to their rescue with supplies.¹ Pontchartrain bowed to the inevitable, and in 1715 approved the establishment of the mission at Artigoniche (Antigonish), on the strait of Canceau. This was still English territory, but it was unsettled, close to Ile Royale and also close to that troublesome frontier post, Canceau.² Finally, in 1717, a church was approved for Antigonish, "afin d'y fixer les Sauvages".³

But this was not what France had hoped for, and Gaulin found himself facing criticism from officials, particularly from Soubras. The commissaire-ordonnateur suspected the missionary of being so fond of the wandering life with the Indians that he was deliberately hunting for pretexts to prevent their permanent settlement.⁴

Gaulin, who had not received his salary for years, responded by asking for his back pay and for reimbursement for his debts.⁵ He claimed that he had done everything possible

¹. Jacques L'Hermitte, engineer for the fortress, reported in 1714 while he was temporarily in charge that "plusieurs familles ont hivernés dans l'île, je n'ay Peu m'ommescher de les soulager de farines, de plomb et de poudre & une famille entière qui étoit du côté de St. Pierre n'a peu venir icy. On les a trouvé morts toutes entières." (AC C11B 1: 58-58v, L'Hermitte à Pontchartrain, 25 août 1714).

². AC B 37/3: 234, [844-845], Pontchartrain à Costebelle et Soubras, 4 juin 1715.


⁴. AC C11B 1: 431, Soubras au Conseil, 4 décembre 1716.

to fulfil his orders and that it was "bien dur de me voir l'oprobe de bien des gents pour avoir entrepris une mission", and referred to himself as "un pauvre Micmac". If things did not improve he would have to abandon his mission. Alarmed, the Council of the Marine decided that as his work was necessary for Ile Royale, and that as he was esteemed by the Indians and had always worked well with them, his salary should be increased to 500 livres a year and that part of his debts should be paid. The half-hearted quality of that last concession was probably due to the influence of Soubras, who had earlier expressed serious reservations as to Gaulin's financial capacity.

It was not until 1723 that the Indians, harassed by the English in the Indian War, finally agreed to establish themselves on Ile Royale; they selected Mirigùèche, about 22 leagues from Louisbourg, on a peninsula at the entrance of River Denys Basin on the west side of Es d'Or Lake, not far from

2. AC C11 B 3: 59, Conseil, 3 mai 1718.
3. Ibid., 56.
5. AC C11 B 6: 73-74, de Mezy au Conseil, 10 décembre 1722. Saint-Ovide corroborated this by writing that the English were holding 30 Micmac prisoners at Annapolis Royal, embittering the Indians and causing them to seek refuge on Ile Royale (AC C11 B 6: 194v-195v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 24 novembre 1723). The necessity of providing a refuge for the Indians was discussed more fully by de Mezy, writing to Maurepas, (AC C11 B 6: 75-76v, 27 décembre 1722). See also AC B 47: 1264 [279] Maurepas à Saint-Ovide, 26 juin 1724.
Port Toulouse (St. Peter's). Maurepas expressed his pleasure by allotting 2500 livres for the construction of a church and presbytery, urging Gaulin to attract as many Indians as he could to the new mission. The church and presbytery were not

1. AC C11B 6: 194v-195, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 24 novembre 1723; AC C11B 7: 36, de Mezy à Maurepas, 2 août 1724; and AC C11B 7: 27v-29, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 24 novembre 1724.

Not to be confused with the Mirliguèche near La Hève which later became Lunenburg. The latter is the Mirliguèche indicated by Clark, in the map in Acadia, 110. Prof. Clark, who did not know of the Ile Royale site, said it was common in New France to give the same name to two or more locations. The two Mirliguèches are referred to on different occasions in official correspondence -- the one deep in Nova Scotia, the other on Ile Royale. The latter was also referred to as village du Cap Breton or village de l'Ile Royale, probably to distinguish between the two. Seventeenth and eighteenth century orthography being what it is, Mirliguèche appears as Maligouèsche, Marigaoiches, Malligouche, Martigonerech, Mirliguesch, Mirligouesch, Mariguanache, to list only some variations. Rev. Angus Anthony Johnson in A History of the Catholic Church in Eastern Nova Scotia (Antigonish, 1960), 32, refers to the Ile Royale site as Malagawatch. Another English variation is Malagash. Mirliguèche is the French version of a Micmac word signifying Milky Bay, according to Haliburton, An Historical Account of Nova Scotia, II: 2. Both sites were on water, and the name apparently refers to the way the water looks before a storm.

There is some confusion about the Indian establishment on Ile Royale. Johnson says that in 1713, or the year afterwards, Gaulin gathered the Indians around him at Malagawatch, and that this place remained the headquarters of the missionary and his successors until 1750 (32). David Lee, in his article on Gaulin in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography II: 238, says that Gaulin brought together the Micmac at Antigonish between 1717 and 1720, later establishing missions at Cape Sable, La Hève (La Have), Shubenacadie and Mirliguèche (near Lunenburg).

Gaulin established the mission at Shubenacadie (Copeguy) in 1722 (AC C11B 6: 73, de Mezy au Conseil, 10 décembre 1722) while projecting another mission on Eras d'Or Lake, which was founded the following year under the name of Mirliguèche. The mission near La Hève is much older, and could be the same as the Mirliguèche which is known today as Lunenburg.

2. AC B 47: 1263-1264 [279], 26 juin 1724.
completed until 1726 because of administrative difficulties.¹ Mirliguèche remained the headquarters for the Indians of the Island until 1750, when Maillard established his mission at Ile Ste Famille, "Potloteg" to the Micmacs, six miles north of Port Toulouse in Bras d'Or Lake. By that time both church and presbytery had become unusable, which reflects on the quality of their original construction. Accounts for 1726 list their cost as 3,900 livres, 18 sols, 4 derniers.

The people who came to Ile Royale were mainly Micmac, with some Malecite. It is difficult if not impossible to make clear distinctions, as early officials usually did not distinguish between Micmac and "Amalichite". Abenaki are not so frequently mentioned. In spite of the fact that Gaulin was provided with tools to transform his flock into agriculturalists, in which project he reported some success, the Micmac remained essentially nomadic hunters; those on Ile St Jean seem to have been more given to gardening. The Ile Royale group was never numerous; in 1715, Costebelle estimated there were 50 Indian men bearing arms on the island,² about half the population of Antigonish. Gaulin's census for 1721 lists 36 men bearing arms (usually heads of families) on Ile Royale out of a total of 289 men on the Acadian peninsula.³ The following year the Ile Royale figure dropped

¹ For Saint-Ovide's complaints to Maurepas about de Mezy's actions in this affair, see AC CL1B 7: 191-193v, 10 décembre 1725.
² AC CL1B 1: 146, Costebelle au Conseil, 5 novembre 1715.
³ AC CL1B 5: 359, Saint-Ovide au Conseil, 15 septembre 1721.
to 17 out of a total of 164. This census, more detailed than the previous one, lists 107 individuals for the Indian population of Ile Royale out of 838 for the peninsula.¹

In its enumeration of Indian villages it listed "Ile Royale" as of no fixed location; Artigoniche (Antigonish), Picquetou and Guetamigouche (Pictou and Tatamagouche), Ste Marie and La Baye de Toute Isle (near Sherbrooke), Chebenacadie (Shubenacadie); no fixed residence for Mines (Minas); La Hève, Port Royal (also of no fixed residence) Cap de Sable and Beaubassin.

Courtin's census of 1727 reported 62 men bearing arms on Ile Royale, but only 37 women and children, and at Antigonish 31 men bearing arms and 26 women and children.² In 1735, the figures were 45 men bearing arms for Ile Royale out of an Acadian total of 412.³ In 1745, the figures had become 80 souls for Ile Royale and 200 for Le Loutre's mission in Shubenacadie, 195 for Miramichi and 60 for Ristigouche.⁴

The 1738 survey of the Micmac missions gave the numbers of Micmacs bearing arms as 600. The villages enumerated were Mariguaouche (Mirliguèche) near Port Toulouse, Artigounieche (Antigonish), Malpec on Isle St. Jean, Pictou, Tagmegouche

¹ AC C11B 6: 77, Recensement des Sauvages dans l'Isle Royale, 27 décembre 1722.
² AC C11B 10: 9, Conseil, 17 février 1728.
³ AC G1 article 466: 71, Recensement des sauvages Miquemaques, 1735.
⁴ O'Callaghan, Documents Relative to New York, X, Paris Documents IX, 12 September 1745, 15.
(Tatamagouche) on the Acadian coast opposite Port La Joye on Ile St. Jean, Beaubassin, Chedaii (Shediak) and Chibouctou (Halifax), Chebnakadie (Shubenacadie), Port Royal and La Hève (the latter two were regarded as only one village by the Indians as they alternated between the two), Cap de Sable, and Miramichy and Ristigoutchy (Restigouche) in La Baie des Chaleurs. In 1774, well after the departure of the French, the Indians of Cape Breton were listed at 80 men, 50 women and 100 children.

Population figures for the French on Ile Royale compiled by Clark list 1,740 in 1720; 2,670 in 1723; 3,153 in 1726; and 4,122 in 1752. This completes the census record of the colony.

On the basis of these figures, the Indian population of Ile Royale never exceeded 250 souls. At no time did it reach the 260 families originally planned for by the French, which would have been 1,300 souls. The 1738 survey would indicate that at that time the Micmac population as a whole was equivalent to Biard's 1616 estimate of 3,000 to 3,500. The other polls taken by the missionaries were too fragmentary to provide a sound basis for comparison. It would have been

3. Clark, Acadia, 276.
difficult for the French, with the facilities at their disposal, to make a complete census of these nomadic people, so they usually confined themselves to the missions. In any event, the French were mainly interested in the number of fighting men available for their cause, and in how many presents they had to distribute to keep those men loyal. The censuses were used as a basis for gift distribution.

While the Indian population of Ile Royale doubled after the establishment of Louisbourg, there was no perceptible increase after Mirliguèche was founded. The mission seems to have served as a rallying point rather than as a nucleus for a stable population. The colony's annual statements of expenses showed that the missionaries of Mirliguèche and Shubenacadie reported frequently to Louisbourg. These missionaries were responsible not only for the Indians of Ile Royale, but also for those of the peninsula under the control of the English.

By the time Louisbourg was established, hostilities were long-standing between French and English and between Indians and English. Of all New France, Acadia had consistently been the most embattled. Port Royal had fallen five times to the English, the last time in 1710 when it was renamed Annapolis Royal. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought nominal peace but in fact the confrontation continued, over boundaries, over the missionaries who were allowed to work in Nova Scotia under the terms of the treaty, over fishing rights, over trade.
In spite of the fact that their reasons for wanting the Indian presence on Ile Royale were clear and even pressing, the French were not always considerate of their friends. Periodically, the Indians found it necessary to remind the French that Acadia was, after all, their territory "donte ils prétendent n'avoir abandonné aux français que l'usage et l'usufruit, ils s'en sont expliqués d'une manière forte à M. de Saint-Ovide dans un représentation qu'ils lui firent à Canceau le 3 juin de l'année dernière".

Whether or not the French took this seriously as far as they themselves were concerned, they used it as a weapon in their diplomatic tug-of-war with England.

At the time Costebelle assumed control as first governor of Ile Royale, the problem was not so much to incite the Indians against the English as to keep them under control. Annapolis Royal was little more than a fortress in a hostile land. In 1711 Simhouret, a chief of Pentagouet and an ally of Saint-Castin, had led an ambush against 63 English soldiers and their officers who had been sent "pour aller bruler les habitations du haut de la Rivière" because the inhabitants did not want to furnish wood for the repair of the fort. None

1. Gaulin warned that the Indians could become the enemies of the French given "la manière un peu dure dont ils se plaignent hautement qu'ils sont traités à Louisbourg." (AC C11B 4: 253v, lettre de Gaulin à St Pierre, 17 novembre 1719.)

2. Collection de documents inédits sur le Canada et l'Amérique publiés par le Canada-Français (3 vols., Québec, 1890) I: 196.
of the English escaped.¹

Samuel Vetch, governor at Port Royal, in exasperation asked for a company of Mohawks to deal with the Micmac and the Abenaki on their own terms, saying that they would be worth double the number of Europeans. This proved briefly effective, but Boston disbanded the company.²

Incident piled on incident until Costebelle was moved to deplore "la féroce inutile" of the Indians. The Micmac had declared openly against the English claiming that their people at Minas were dying because of poisoned sagamité given to them by the English at a feast.³ When Gaulin threatened not to hear their confessions unless they made restitution for their looting, they replied that they would never again ask anything of him.⁴ Clearly, the situation threatened to get out of hand.

¹. AC C11D 7: 182, Desgoutins, à Rochefort, à Pontchartrain, 17 novembre 1711. For another version, see AC C11D 7: 177v-178v, de Gaulin à Plaisance, 5 septembre 1711. J.B. Brebner, New England's Outposts (Hamden, 1965) 62, has still another version.

². British Museum, Sloan Mss No. 3607: 77-84, Samuel Vetch Papers, 12 November 1711 to 1 March 1712.

³. The charge of poisoning is a recurrent one, with both French and English being accused at different times. Biard tells of some cases that appeared to be not without foundation, (Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 105). "arie de l'Incarnation tells of a plot of three French soldiers to poison as many Iroquois as they could (Richauveau, Lettres de la Révérende Mère, II: 438-439). The death of more than 200 Indians from poisoned "stuffs" sold in 1746 by the English at Beaubassin is alleged in "Memorial on the motives of the Savages" in Customs and Manners, 66-67.

Costebelle sent a circular letter to the chiefs strongly urging moderation. He sent a copy to Francis Nicholson, who had replaced Vetch as governor of Nova Scotia, assuring him that "bien loin d'autoriser ces Brigandages, il a pris les mesures les plus convenables pour faire ressentir aux sauvages qu'ils ne pouvoient pratiquer rien de plus désagréable au Roy que de tenir une conduite si contraire aux articles de la Paix." Controlling these self-willed allies taxed Costebelle's patience. "Je vous assure, Monseigneur, que se sont là des animaux bien difficile à conduire," he wrote to the King. However, he was able to report some success. The Indians restored 14 large boats they had taken from New England fishermen. Also, "il en avait relâché 15 ou 16 dans le Port Toulouze que les Sauvages vouloient surprendre, et dont ils se seraient rendus maîtres sans les ordres contraires qu'il leur fit expliquer par le Sr Gaulin."

The French were motivated by fear of reprisals as much as anything else. As de Mezy pointed out under similar circumstances more than a decade later, if the New Englanders became convinced of French complicity in Indian hostilities,


2. AC C11B 1: 129v, de Costebelle au ministre, 9 septembre 1715.

they could make things very uncomfortable for the French fishermen.1

The Indians, far from being abashed, told Nicholson's envoy that they recognized only the King of France, that they would not tolerate any new English establishments along the Acadian coast, and that English ships would come into these waters at their own peril. Nicholson's action in barring the Indians from trade with the English did not help matters. This pleased Versailles. A marginal note on Costebelle's report says "il fallait maintenir les sauvages dans ces sentiments, sans cependant que cela parut ouvertement, et de ménager la chose avec beaucoup de prudence et de secret pour ne point donner aux Anglais occasion de plainte.2

Soubras saw other reasons for caution. He noted that English traders could well win over the Abenaki "qui déjà fait perdue à ces sauvages l'animosité qu'ils avoient contr'eux, en sort que la politique des Sauvages semble estre de s'entretenir neutres et de se conserver la liberté d'aller chés les françois et les anglois prendre les marchandises ou ils les trouvent à plus bas prix."3 He hoped that the missionaries would be able

1. AC CLIB 10: 199v, de Mezy à Maurepas, 21 août 1729.

2. AC CLIB 1: 333-336, lettre de Costebelle, 9 septembre 1715, dans les délibérations du Conseil, 28 mars 1716. Francis Nicholson had led the British forces which took Annapolis Royal in 1710; he served as governor of Nova Scotia, 1712-1715.

to use "motifs de la religion" to prevent this from happening.¹

So by a judicious mixture of encouragement on the one hand and disavowal and concealment on the other, the French nursed Indian hostility against the English. Indian vengeance was also a tool in the hands of the French, mainly because English determination to "teach them a lesson" invariably set off new rounds of Indian raids and reprisals. The English were convinced that the French were at the root of their troubles with the Indians, but if they had probed a little further, they would have found that they themselves were at fault; and if they had dug further yet, they would have encountered the deep differences in the basic philosophies of the Indian way of life from the European.²

In the meantime, the Micmac pitched into the fray in the one area they knew best -- the sea. New England fishing fleets and trading ships found their operations seriously hampered and occasionally halted. Official correspondence from Louisbourg refers to at least 80 captures by the Indians during the period 1713-1760, and this is by no means complete. Gaulin claimed with pride that his Indians "prirent même avec leurs

¹. Ibid.
². For a mid-eighteenth century look at the reasons for Indian hostility against the English, see "'Oratio on the Motives of the Savages" in Customs and Manners, 62-72. This memorial is also found in Boscq de Beaumont, Les Derniers Jours d'Acadie, 248-253, under the heading "Motifs des sauvages mickmacques et marichites de continuer la guerre contre les Anglois depuis la dernière paix."
petites Chaloupes et Canots plus de 20 Batimens anglois le long de la Coste, et depuis la prise du fort Royal ils ont continué à molester les anglois". He said his Micmacs would have retaken the fort in 1711 if they had not been so short of amunition.¹

Things reached such a pass that English fishermen sometimes turned to the French for protection, preferring to fish in their company rather than alone. At other times the French joined the Indians in threatening the New Englanders. An incident of this kind happened to Cyprian Southack who in the summer of 1715 had three vessels engaged in fishing off the island. Threatened by a Frenchman and a métis, Capt. Southack had no doubts about French-Indian complicity when he laid his complaint before the Council at Boston that Costebelle had "made a present of two hundred pounds to the Indians" to kill him and pillage his vessels. Southack had decamped so precipitously that he had left behind his three vessels, which were fishing at sea. He set his losses at £600. His fright must have been of short duration, for three years later he was back in the fishing grounds, this time to suffer the loss of one of his sloops which was burned by the Indians after running aground.²

¹. AC C11B 3: 57, Conseil, 3 mai 1718. Also Documents Inédits I: 191.

². PRO Nova Scotia A 10: 3-12, The Memorial of Cyprian Southack, enclosed with a letter of Colonel Richard Philipps, governor of Nova Scotia, to Lords of Trade, 1 April 1719.
In 1727 about 30 Indians took a 70-ton schooner at Port aux Basques, Newfoundland, and sailed it to Mirliguèche on Bras d'Or Lake. The French arranged for the owner in Boston to buy it back, covering up their complicity in the affair.¹

On another occasion they paid Indians for taking an English boat off Canceau.² The story of a lone Indian capturing an English shallop armed with five men was reported with satisfaction by Jacques Prévost, commissaire-ordonnateur who succeeded François Bigot.³ The Indians liked to cruise in their captured ships before abandoning them, sometimes forcing their prisoners to serve as crew. They had no real use for ships of this size, just as they had no use for artillery.

Most of this activity seems to have occurred from about 1710 until 1730, when there was a comparative calm for two decades followed by a revival of lesser proportions in the fifties. A peak was reached in 1722, when French officials reported Indians taking 20 to 25 vessels in the Bay of Fundy and off the coast of Acadia. Governor Philipps formally declared war against the Indians, ordering the Acadians under the English

2. AC B 91: 332 [285], Rouillé à Prévost, 19 mai 1750.
to treat them as enemies. He sent out two sloops, each with a detachment of 60 men, which soon recaptured most of the taken vessels. A ship carrying 15 Indians attacked one of the sloops; the battle lasted for two hours, with the Indians finally saving themselves by swimming ashore, leaving five dead behind them. The English put the heads of the dead men up on pickets at Canso, which did nothing to appease the Indians.

When the English surprised 16 Indians asleep in their camp and killed nine of them, the Micmac burned the houses of English settlers and killed their livestock. Philipps in the meantime had threatened to march on Antigonish, destroy the mission and take Gaulin, to which Saint-Ovide replied that the French and the English were at peace. The dates for


Samuel Shute, governor of Massachusetts, that same summer (July 25, to be exact) declared the Eastern Indians "Rebels, Traitors and Enemies." (J.B. Baxter, The Pioneers of New France (Albany, N.Y., 1894), appendix, 313). Governor Philipps, however, in a letter dated from Canso, 19 September 1722, referred to "hearing from Col. Shute of an Indian War in New England." (PRO Nova Scotia A 15: 196). A search of the documents at the Public Archives of Canada has not turned up the English version of Philipps's declaration of war.


3. Ibid.

4. For Gaulin's description of some other English raids, see AC C11B 6: 75-76v, de Mezy au Conseil, 27 décembre 1722.
the Indian War are given as 1722-1726\textsuperscript{1} although its ending was not very definite.\textsuperscript{2}

Twice during these turbulent years the Indians attacked Canceau. They explained their raid of 1720, in which they did damage estimated by the British at £20,000, as a reprisal for the 1718 British raid. In any event, French authorities were concerned enough to make restitution to the value of £16,000, pointing out at the same time that the British had not yet settled for the damage done in their raid. When the Indians complained the following year that they were not receiving enough ammunition to provide for their livelihood, the annual budget for gifts was increased the following year from 2000 livres to 3,460 livres. However, this was not as generous as it sounds; at least part of the increase was due to rising prices, and de Mezy was asked to reduce expenses, as "il paroist qu'elles peuvent estre considerablement diminuées."\textsuperscript{3}

The Indians in their second onslaught, in 1725, took nine or ten craft and as was their custom went cruising afterwards.


\textsuperscript{2} Infra, 104.

\textsuperscript{3} AC B 44/2: 573v [467-468], Conseil à de Mezy, 1 juillet 1721.
An episode which occurred in 1721 illustrates the mounting tensions between Indian and English at that time. A raid on cattle by some young Abenakis led the English to take several prisoners, including a Malecite chief who had been trading in Boston. Ransom for the chief and the other prisoners was set at 600 beaver pelts, which was the value set on the cattle, but when the Indians came to pay it, the English doubled the price. This was paid and the prisoners released. The Indians, vowing vengeance, led raids and attacks to within 25 leagues of Boston.¹

When 60 Malecite and Micmac attacked the fort at Annapolis Royal in 1724, killing a sergeant and another soldier and wounding several, Philipps replied by taking an Indian who had been in prison for two years and killing him on the spot where the sergeant had been shot.²

This was the year that the Abenaki suffered their defeat at Norridgewock, where Father Sebastien Rale was killed and which ended the Abenaki part of the war. These people signed a treaty with the English in Boston the following year, the first of a series (1725, 1727, 1752, 1760 and afterwards) that were signed by various groups of the Eastern Indians.

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² AC CllD 8: 65, Extraits des nouvelles de l'Acadie rapportées par le Père Felix Pain, missionnaire Recollet de l'Acadie, 1724. The English also burned three houses of French settlers for one English settler's house burned by the Indians.
These were interspersed with ratifications and confirmations, beginning with 1726, when the 1725 treaty was ratified and confirmed by the Micmacs and Malecite of Annapolis Royal. Until the final defeat of New France, these treaties and ratifications did not ensure peace, a situation which the English tried to deal with by declaring the Indians rebels,¹ as Governor Shute did in Massachusetts in 1722.² This only succeeded in arousing resentment, as the trouble lay not in Indian waywardness or fickleness, but in Indian ideas of authority, individual liberty and of the nature of treaties and alliances. These were irreconcilable with English ideas. To the Indian, each man was his own master; even in war, he was free to leave at any time, with no opprobrium attached to his action. Indians had as much trouble understanding the European concept of treaties as Europeans had with Indian alliances, which far from being irrevocable for all time were covenants ritually renewed with full attendant ceremonies, including gift exchanges. The English insisted on their treaties, but also arranged for ratifications and confirmations of the main treaty, to make sure that all the chiefs considered themselves included in its terms. Of the series with the "Eastern Indians" that followed the 1725 treaty, the texts make it evident that the

¹. R.O. MacFarlane, "British Policy in Nova Scotia to 1760" in The Canadian Historical Review, XIX, No. 2 (June 1938), 160.
². See supra, 101n.
English considered them all to be ratifications or confirmations of the first one.\textsuperscript{1} The Indians shared no such view, and considered each new signing as a separate treaty. In this they were encouraged by the French, with whom they signed no treaties.

The English were inclined to accord more power to these agreements than the Indians. For instance, the Indians did not consider that peace treaties in themselves gave the English the right to set up coal mining operations, which they saw only as ruining their hunting grounds. Led by Joseph Marin, with Maillard as attending chaplain, they attacked the Île Royale installations set up during the first English occupation of Louisbourg, 1745-1749, killing and burning, seriously hampering operations.\textsuperscript{2} More than a decade earlier, Indians had forced the English to abandon a project to build a fortified trading post at Minas.\textsuperscript{3} In these as in other instances, the French harnessed and led Indian resistance.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} PRO Nova Scotia A 32: 150-152, Sir Percépre Hosioun, governor of Louisbourg, to \textsuperscript{*}, 3 June 1748; and AC C11A 91: 126-128v, La Gallissonnière à Maurepas, 6 septembre 1748.
\item \textsuperscript{3} AC C11B 12: 254-261v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 14 novembre 1732; and AC C11B 14: 12v-13, Conseil, 9 février 1733.
\end{itemize}
The French combatted overtures between the Indians and the English by the proven methods of feasting,\(^1\) dancing and endless oratory accompanied by gift-giving. A rumor that the Micmac of the Minas area had signed a peace treaty caused Saint-Ovide to hold such an event at Port Toulouse and another one at Port la Joye. It was at this time that Gaulin was supposed to have encouraged the Indians to sue for peace. The report of peace with the Abenakis of Norridgewock was more reliable, as Maurepas regretfully confirmed to Saint-Ovide. However, he added hopefully, the peace would not last as there was every indication that the Abenaki had acted through fear of the English rather than through a weakening of their attachment for France.

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\text{Je me le persuade encore par le discours que vous ont tenu ces Chefs de Sauvages en vous disant que cette paix ne tiroit a aucune conséquence parmi eux, qu'\'ils n'avoient pas de plus grands Ennemis que les Anglois et qu'\'ils avoient gravé dans leurs Coeurs et dans celui de leurs enfants la mort honteuse de leurs frères à Baston et la longue prison de ceux qui avoient été prisonniers au fort Royal d' où ils estoient Sortis perclus. Je ne doute point que vous}
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\(^1\) Maillard tells of one feast for which there was "ni vin, ni eau-de-vie, ni tabac, ni pruneaux". Apparently these articles had been forgotten; but the Indians were good-natured about it. "Avec eux rien ne se perd, ainsi on leur a promis qu'ils recevoient ce qu'ils n'ont pas eu," AG Service historique de l'armée, Al: 23 Maillard à Raymond, 27 novembre 1751

Statements of receipt and consumption of food throughout the Louisbourg period list flour, salt pork, vegetables, butter and molasses for these feasts. However, tobacco and eau-de-vie were also regular features. Prunes were often included.
ne les ayez entretenu dans cette disposition et que vous ne mettiez à l'avenir tout en usage pour qu'ils ne se départent point de ces Sentiments.

The peace of 1749 was held up to the Micmac as odious by Jean-Louis, Comte de Raymond, the new governor at Louisbourg, particularly in view of all the presents the King had given them. When the Micmac assured him that they knew nothing of the affair and that they would never make peace with the English, Raymond chose René, chief from Naltigonish, to go among the "St John River Indians" to break the treaty. ("St John River Indians", which usually refers to the Malecite, here refers to Abenaki who had moved into the area as a result of their wars with the English, although some Malecite may have been included.) Raymond promised René a reward if he succeeded.

The capture by the English of the ship Marie while on its way to Baye Verte with a cargo of gifts (mainly munitions) for the Indians was a serious blow to Raymond's hopes. His fears that the Indians would use the lack of presents as an excuse to continue negotiating with the English proved to be only too well founded, but from an unexpected direction. It was the Micmacs who signed the following year.


2. AC C11B 31: 62-63, Raymond à Rouillé, 19 novembre 1751. Maillard wrote to Raymond on 27 November 1751, "René part aujourd'hui pour la Rivière St Jean. Je crois que Mons, en aurons des nouvelles vers lundi "ras, parce que le temps lui est très favorable pour aller." (AC Service historique de l'armée AI: 23.)

3. AC C11B 31: 106-106v, de Raymond à Rouillé, 12 décembre 1751.
Trouble developed closer to home when Louisbourg heard that Coppe, "mauvais Micmac", had signed at Halifax "une espèce de traité qui n'a été ratifié que de quatre vingt dix à cent Sauvages, Tous mauvais sujets, et tant hommes, femmes qu'enfans." Raymond reacted to the news by asking for a new church and presbytery for Maillard.

Amid continuing acts of hostility, the Indians took advantage of Coppe's treaty to go to Halifax to demand -- and receive -- presents. Prévost reported one incident, in which an English ship sailed to a river near Chibouctou Bay to distribute gifts after a Cape Sable man had been murdered, a deed which the Indians attributed to the English. The Indians waited until the gifts had been apportioned, and then killed the crew of ten and burned the ship.

In the meantime, the New Englanders had jubilantly announced the treaty in their new papers. Antoine-Louis Rouillé, who had replaced Maurepas as Minister of the Marine, observed to Raymond that "cette paix n'estoit point généralle de la part de tous les Sauvages, qu'elle n'estoit que le prix de presents prodiqués à quelques particuliers, et qu'en tout cas elle ne seroit pas longtemps observé." 

1. AC C11B 32: 163-166, Prévost à Rouillé, 10 septembre 1752; AC C11B 33: 159v, Prévost à Rouillé, 12 mai 1753; Murdoch, Nova Scotia, II: 219-222.
3. AC C11B 33: 181v-182v, Prévost à Rouillé, 17 juin 1753.
4. AC B 97: 313 [289], Rouillé à Raymond, 17 juillet 1753.
This was an astute assessment of Indian psychology that was to be supported by events. The Indians simply did not operate by the same ground rules as the English, nor, for that matter, by those of the French. The cultural gap between French and Indians was as great as that between English and Indians; the French and the English were, in the final analysis, in the same camp.

The question of treaties with the Indians was to concern the English long after the fall of New France. A harassed British colonel wrote to the governor of Nova Scotia from Chignecto, that he had received the submission of Lawrence (Laurent in French documents) of La Hève and of Augustine Michael (Michel) of Richibouctou and had sent them to Lawrence at Halifax for terms. Along with two other submissions he had received previously, he hoped that these would clear up the Indian question. He was mistaken. He wrote that Father de Miniac had informed him that "there would be a great many more here upon the same business, as soon as their spring hunting was over; and upon enquiring how many, he gave me a list of fourteen chiefs, including those already mentioned, most of whom he said would come." Surprised to hear of such a number of Indian chiefs in this part of America, the colonel added that "Mr. Munach (sic) further told me that they were all of one nation, and known by the name of Mickmacks." 1

The annual gift-giving ceremonies of the Louisbourg period were lengthy occasions essentially Indian in character marked at times by gestures as when the chiefs prostrated themselves before Raymond as a special mark of honor or by the presentation of a dozen scalps from the Halifax area during a special dance.

A gift distribution at Port Dauphin in 1716 was typical of these events:

1. As Duchesneau had observed in 1681, "these tribes never transact any business without making presents to illustrate and confirm their words." O'Callaghan, Documents Relative to New York, IX, 161, 13 octobre 1681.


3. Ibid., 187.
satisfaire les chefs des sauvages qui paressoignent mécontens et qui atendoint ces présens depuis deux mois.¹

The budget for this purpose before 1713 had been 4000 livres annually for Acadia. In 1716 this was divided into two, 2000 livres for the mainland, particularly for the Abenaki along the New England border, administered from Québec, and 2000 livres for Ile Royale, administered from Louisbourg.² This amount was distributed in goods, mainly powder, ball and flints, but also muskets, tools, blankets, fabrics, clothing and eau-de-vie, to the Indians of Ile Royale, peninsular Acadia, and along the coast of the mainland as far north as the Gaspé. Both the quantities and the cost of these "présents à l'ordinaire" increased through the years. Continual complaints from the governor that the gifts were not sufficient for the needs of the Indians led to a modification of budgeting. Instead of asking for gifts to a total amount -- up to that time 2000 livres annually -- the commissaire-ordonnateur sent a list of goods required, which was filled at Rochefort. The first shipment under this system was sent out in 1721. Expenditures inevitably rose, and the Indians still complained. Although it appears that at least some of these supplies were purchased

¹. Chancels de Lagrange, Voyage fait à l'isle Royale, 431.

². Collection de Manuscrits, III: 21-23, 146; AC C11B 2: 41-41v, Conseil, 10 avril 1717. This resulted in a reduction that year in the quantity of gifts available for distribution, the consequences of which are described by Chancels de Lagrange (supra) and Costebelle (infra, 114).
in the colony from very early days, this does not show up in records until 1740, when François Bigot improved the accounting system. From this time forward, the amount of local purchasing increased, particularly during the fifties, when it was noted that "ils achèteront sur le lieu où tout est plus chère qu'en France," a situation that drew enquiries from Versailles but no apparent change in procedure.

In 1749, when the French returned to Louisbourg after the first English occupation, the year's expenditure was close to 6000 livres for "présents à l'ordinaire" out of a total budget of 1,195,000 livres for Ile Royale. As we have seen, there was an increase in 1721, the year after the Indian raid on Canceau. In 1733, there was another substantial increase, from 3180 livres to 4784 livres, following complaints from Saint-Ovide that there had not been enough gifts to go around; and again in the fifties, which saw renewed aggressions following the establishment of Halifax, and which was also a period of inflation.

"Présents à l'extraordinaire" were distributed as the occasion demanded, and because of the accounting system it is difficult if not impossible to arrive at the sums spent in this way. However, in 1750 Desherbiers asked that the fund of 12000 livres for this purpose be continued until arrangements became more definite as it was necessary "à menager

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1. Pre-Conquest Paper, F 30, Notes sur l'État des fonds de l'année 1752 et de celle de 1753, No. 20.
toujours de plus en plus les Sauvages, que les Anglois cherchent à gagner à force des présens."1 Officers commanding such posts as Port Toulouse and Port Dauphin often found themselves personally out-of-pocket when the demands of the Indians became pressing. Versailles solved this perennial problem in a patchwork fashion, reimbursing officers who complained loudly enough.2

After 1750, payments to suppliers soared. In 1755, one supplier alone is recorded as receiving 26,096 livres; in 1756, 37,000 livres was listed for such supplies. Augustin, Chevalier de Drucour, Louisbourg's last French governor, wrote "il n'est pas possible de se refuser à quelques dépenses extraordinaires que nous causent les Sauvages que l'on est obligé d'employer." He added that what was even more disturbing was the fact that the Indians could be led only with "les présents et les vivres à la main".3 Prévost also reported that under prevailing conditions it was necessary to give more than usual to Acadian Indians who came frequently to Louisbourg.4

3. AC C11B 35: 125, de Drucour au ministre, 18 novembre 1755.
4. AC C11B 35: 194v, Prévost au ministre, 7 novembre 1755. This influx is illustrated by a report that in 1756, 630 Indians received gifts at Port Toulouse. (AC Comité technique du Génie, Bibliothèque Mss in-folio No. 210f, Itinéraire d'une voyage en Isle Royale par Grillot-Poilly, 1757.) Similar influxes had been noted earlier. (AC C11B 12: 255v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 14 novembre 1732; and AC C11B 21: 77, Forant à Rouillé, 14 novembre 1739.)
To the cost of the gifts must be added transportation charges to have the goods taken from Louisbourg to distribution points.

Another cost factor was the growing necessity to provide for the subsistence of the Indians when they gathered to receive their gifts. As game disappeared, they could no longer support themselves on such occasions. In 1741, the accounts list "prêtsents et subsistence," with the inevitable jump in costs.¹

Above all, the Indians' bargaining position improved enormously as the English began to woo them with gifts more lavish than those of the French, if one is to believe alarmed Louisbourg accounts. Prévost reported in 1750 that

La scitation des affaires de l'Acadie obligeant à menager toujours de plus en plus les sauvages, que les Anglois cherchent à gagner à force de présens, M. Desherbiors demande la continuation du fonds de 12,000 livres pour les extraordinaire qu'il faudra donner aux Sauvages chaque année, jusqu'à l'arrangement définitif.²

Once a quantity had been established in distribution, the Indians were not inclined to accept cut-backs. In 1716 when Costebelle had less than the usual amount to give out, the Indians refused to accept those gifts whose quantities had been reduced, charging him with withholding goods.³ Louisbourg

¹ This had been developing for some time. In 1735 Versailles had considered the need to make such provision. AC C11B 15: 12-14, Conseil, 25 janvier, 1735.


³ AC C11B 2: 188-188v, de Costebelle au Conseil, 1717. See also Chancels de Lagrange's description of the incident, supra, 110-111.
governors consistently complained that the quantity of presents was insufficient. Occasionally, officials took matters into their own hands, as when Governor Charles Desherbiers and Prévost supplemented the gifts with goods from the King's stores.¹

Quality also came in for sharp attention. This was of particular concern in the case of muskets; as early as 1695, Joseph Robinau de Villebon, governor of Acadia, had complained of "une friponnerie manifeste sur les armes des présents" when an Indian was killed using a gun.² Saint-Ovide lodged the same complaint in 1729 when Indians appeared before the Superior Council in Louisbourg and presented five of their men who had been crippled by guns given the previous year.³ The guns were listed in the statement for that year as "fusils de chasse" or simply as "fusils"; in 1732, they were listed as "fusils grenadiers sans bayonette"⁴ later becoming "fusils de Tulle sans bayonette".⁵ By that time the French were preparing for an expected British invasion.

¹ AC C11B 28: 40-40v, de Desherbiers et Prévost à Rouillé, 19 octobre 1749.
² AC C11D 2: 258v, de Villebon à Pontchartrain, 20 juillet 1695.
³ AC C11B 10: 189v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 1 novembre 1729.
⁴ AC C11B 13: 97, Le Normant à Maurepas, 15 novembre, 1732. Indians never took to the use of the bayonet, preferring to rely on knife and war club or hatchet.
⁵ AC C11B 37: 209, Prévost au ministre, 29 novembre 1756. Tulle is the arms manufacturing centre of France.
Colonial administrators fought a running battle with suppliers back in France on this question of quality. Early in the century, a governor of Acadia returned 80 shirts destined as gifts for Indians because their quality was so poor. He received them back in the next year's shipment without a thing changed. However, efforts were made through the years to improve matters, particularly if the Indians themselves objected. A tendency became apparent to specify quality, such as "eau-de-vie preuve de cognac" and "chemises de toille de St. Jean de Lyon".\(^1\)

Gifts were distributed annually in June or July by the governor or his delegate, usually at Port Toulouse (St. Peter's), and Port la Joye (Charlottetown) but also at Port Dauphin (Ste. Anne's). Only occasionally was the presentation made at Louisbourg. Once the governor planned to go to Antigonish in British territory for the purpose, but as the Indians had all gone to Minas to join the Abenakis in harassing the English, he gave up the idea.\(^2\)

Indians assembled for the distribution from as far south as Cap du Sable and Pobomcoup, as well as from the isthmus, along the coast of the Bay of Fundy and northward as far as

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1. AC F1A 35: 35v, balance de recettes et consommation, 1744; and AC F1A 25: 29v, 1726.

2. AC Cl1B 6: 40-41, Saint-Ovide au Conseil, 31 juillet 1722. Two years earlier he had toyed with the same idea, but had given it up on the grounds that the governor at Annapolis Royal might find it suspect. (AC Cl1B 5: 185, Saint-Ovide au Conseil, 5 septembre 1720.)
the Baie des Chaleurs. In other words, from the whole of the peninsula, the coastal mainland, and Ile St Jean (Prince Edward Island). De Mezy's suggestion that Louisbourg be used as the annual rendezvous was not taken up. His idea was to avoid abuses in distribution, and to impress the Indians with the might of the fortress and its garrison. It could very well have been that the inhabitants of the town would have objected to such an influx. Soubras had earlier expressed disapproval of "l'affluence désagréable" of Indians in Port Dauphin.  

Abuses in gift distribution were not long in developing. Indians frequently charged their missionaries with misdirecting their gifts. Courtin in his turn charged that the Indians sold their gifts for drink.

Les outils, Chemises et Couvertures qui leurs étaient données dans les présents ne leurs étaient d'aucune utilité, qu'au contraire il les vendaient aux particuliers pour avoir de la boisson, c'est ce qui nous oblige, Monsieur, de vous Supplier de vouloir bien faire retrancher ces sortes de marchandises et de ne leurs faire venir que de la poudre, du plomb, des fusils et des pierres à fusil dont il leur en faudroit au moins pour qu'ils puissent subsister.

1. AC C11B 6: 73v, de Mezy au Conseil, 10 décembre 1722.

2. AC C11B 2: 40-44v, lettre de Soubras, dans les délibérations du Conseil, 4 décembre 1716, 10 avril 1717; and AC C11B 1: 431v-432, de Soubras au ministre, 1 décembre 1716.

3. AC C11B 8: 53-53v, Courtin à Saint-Ovide, 30 octobre 1726.
Governor Philips, in declaring war in 1722, had banned the sale of arms and ammunition to the Indians, in effect depriving them of their means of subsistence and increasing their dependence on French gifts. The French, for their part, were pleased to fill the gap so long as the Indians continued to understand that

ce n'est point par nécessité de leur service qu'on leur fait des présens, mais par bonté pour eux, un peu d'indifference les rendra plus soumis, leur faisant cependant connoître que l'on a véritablement de l'amitié pour eux et traitant les chefs avec douceur et leur témoignant de la bonne volonté par quelque augmentation de présens pour eux et leur particulier, afin de les engager à retenir la jeunesse dans leur devoir.¹

What had started out as a matter of protocol to cement alliances and trade agreements had ended up as a means of subsistence for the Indians and a form of protection for the French. The Indians could no make or maintain guns and axes as they had been able to do with bows and arrows and war clubs. So, while insisting on their status as independent allies on the one hand, on the other they became dependent on these diplomatic handouts.

The high cost of presents proportional to the numbers of Indians listed for Ile Royale and Acadia is striking. The alternative to this type of diplomacy for the French would have

¹. AC ClIB 2: 43-43v, lettre de Soubras, 4 décembre 1716, dans les délibérations du Conseil, 10 avril 1717.
been increased immigration and a much larger force of regular troops. France was not prepared to take the first step and the cost of the second would have been prohibitive. Looked at in this light, France got her money's worth for what she spent.

The English in Nova Scotia at first resisted this type of diplomacy on the grounds of its expense and the ease with which the goods could be misdirected. The Lords of Trade also felt that, as Nova Scotia had been ceded to England by the Treaty of Utrecht, there should be no need to mollify the Indians with gifts. Officials on the scene had a different view, and they were the ones who first exercised initiative in this direction. This was the case when Petitpas, an Acadian métis habitant, was given 2000 livres in Boston to attract the Micmac and Malecite to the English cause.¹ The Indians immediately used this to complain to Saint-Ovide of the little attention the King had been giving them, that they had hardly received anything for three years, and that their families were dying of hunger for want of ammunition.²

In the meantime, governors at Annapolis Royal often found themselves out-of-pocket in dealing with the Indians. The Lords of Trade demanded an accounting for distributions

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² Ibid.
made by Philipps and Armstrong and still could not decide upon a regular policy. When it became evident that peace treaties by themselves would not work, they budgeted for presents. This seriously alarmed the French, as we have seen.

After 1760, the official English policy returned to its original position. Jeffrey Amherst, Governor-General of British North America, ruled that Indians could no longer be supplied with arms and ammunition as it was no longer necessary to purchase their friendship or neutrality since the French had lost their footing in Canada. It would now only be necessary to keep the Indians aware "of our superiority, which more than anything else will keep them in Awe, and make them refrain from Hostilities." But he qualified this by adding that local governors (in the case of Louisbourg at that time, Brigadier-General Edward Whitmore, Commander), should not let this opinion hinder them from supplying them with what You Yourself shall think requisite for the good of the Service to maintain them in His Majesty's Interest." Apparently not many governors considered that His Majesty's interest necessitated such expense, as cut-backs became general throughout British North America.

To the French, Louisbourg was indeed a gulf of indispensable expense; to the English she was a challenge, flaunting a defiance that was all the more irritating because

1. PRO CO5 60: 27-28, Amherst in New York, 12 December 1760.
it was so successful. One of the measures of this success was Indian resistance to the English, which severely retarded colonization in Nova Scotia and northern New England. To the Indians, Louisbourg represented a reprieve from the inexorable tidal wave of Western city cultural values that would doom their old free hunting economy, as it allowed them to dictate to a surprising extent their own terms as allies of the French. Because of this, Louisbourg was more important to the Indians than to the colonial powers whose clashing ambitions were responsible for her existence.
CHAPTER IV
THE GARRISON AND THE GUERRILLAS

For most of its 40 years of existence, Louisbourg was neither at peace nor at war. At its most peaceful, it was in a state of suspended hostility with the English; in its wars it was besieged twice and fell twice. Although Louisbourg was a military fortress-town besides being the administrative centre for what was left of Acadia to the French, its career was not particularly warlike by Canadian standards. As Eccles points out, between 1608 and 1760 Canada knew barely 50 years of peace.¹

As for Europe, war had been almost a normal relationship between national states for several centuries. From 1494 to 1559, fighting went on every year in some part of Europe, and during the seventeenth century there were only seven years of complete peace. England, during the 165 years between 1650 and 1815, was at war more than half the time -- 84 years.² If Europeans on their first arrival in North America found a

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¹ W.J. Eccles, "The Social, Economic and Political Significance of the Military Establishment of New France", in Canadian Historical Review (March 1971), 7.
continual state of latent or actual warfare among Indians, they were obviously not encountering a situation they found strange. The most consistent and most successful military activity at Louisbourg consisted of encouraging and abetting the Indian allies in their guerrilla warfare that played such havoc with European battle protocol in colonial America.

This type of warfare was described by Father Georges d'Endemare a century earlier at Fort Richelieu, referring to the Iroquois:

> Il est quasi impossible de faire ni la paix ni la guerre avec ces barbares là, point de paix car la guerre c'est leur vie leur plaisir et leur profit tout ensemble, point de guerre car ils se rendent invisibles à ceux qui les cherchent et se rendent visibles que dans leur grand avantage; allez les chercher dans leurs village, ils se retireront dans les bois à moins que d'abattre toutes forest du pays il est impossible de prendre ou d'arrêter les courses de ces voleurs.  

Rales, observing these techniques among the Abenaki, said they made "a handful of warriors more formidable than would be a body of two or three thousand European soldiers."  

The general principles of Indian warfare can be summed up as mobility plus firepower, speed, surprise, encirclement, fighting in scattered groups, giving ground when pressed, and

1. LE Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Moreau, 841: 251v, d'Endemare au R.P. François de la Vie, Fort Richelieu, 2 septembre 1644.

returning later. The Indian code of bravery did not call for uselessly dying while trying to maintain an untenable position. What it did call for was the proper behaviour under torture, not a quality demanded in the white man's code. Indians on the warpath lived off the land, expecting to endure hunger and discomfort. It was only later, as game became depleted and Indians fought as allies of Europeans, that ordnance became a consideration.

Indian and European concepts of discipline were totally different. To the European, discipline meant acceptance of a superior's authority and the ability to act in close cooperation with others, thus allowing for the development of strategy. To the Indian, discipline was an individual matter: ability to go for long periods with little or no food; calm endurance of inconveniences, hardships and sufferings; ability to resist fatigue, to think for himself in battle. Chiefs had only as much over-all control as their warriors allowed them and even that was not irrevocable. The idea of one man commanding an army was inconceivable to Indians; to them, command should be vested in a council, and even its authority should be circumscribed. It can be readily understood that with this ideology, Indians found it difficult to form alliances that could withstand stress; French uncertainties and doubts on this point were solidly based. However, in spite of this instability and need to be regularly renewed, it would be hard to overemphasize the importance of

alliances to Indians, who could be considered to be technically at war with all nations with whom they had no formal understanding.¹

In this context, the achievement of the Iroquois in forming the Five Nations (which became the Six Nations when the Tuscarora joined in 1713) stands out as truly remarkable.

Of the northeastern tribes, the Iroquois were the only ones who had developed a formality in their warfare which strongly resembled contemporary European methods. That was how they fought against Champlain and the Algonkins. But they abandoned mass attacks as well as their shields and armor in the face of European firearms and resorted to hunting techniques. The northern Indians, including the Micmac, had never fought in any other way. This type of guerrilla warfare helped the Indians to counterbalance Europeans superiority in numbers, at least temporarily. In the end those numbers were to prove to be overwhelming.

Indian adaptation to European small firearms was both quick and effective, forcing Europeans to adapt to Indian war techniques. Conventional European warfare allowed Whites to take advantage of their superior manpower and technology; guerrilla warfare gave Indians the advantage of their superior mobility and speed.

The French early learned from the Indians to move while firing and combined this with European group disciplines.

A classic example of the resultant French-Indian type of military exploit was Coulon de Villier's rapid winter march on Grand Pré in 1747 which caught the English troops completely unaware and overwhelmed them.

From the beginning the Europeans had an advantage in that they controlled the technology. Indians never learned to maintain their own firearms, and there are indications that neither the French nor the English encouraged them to do so. While the Indians had usually been able to go to Louisbourg to get their guns repaired, it was not until after 1740 that gunsmiths, whose duties were principally to aid the Indians maintain their arms, were regularly maintained at Ile Saint-Jean and at Port Toulouse. ¹ Before the founding of Louisbourg, and even during its early days, the Indians had had to go to Canada for the purpose. ²

Neither did Indians ever learn to handle or to face artillery; partly because of this, they did not often attack fortified places. Once during the existence of Louisbourg the Micmac attacked Annapolis Royal on their own. This was in 1724, and as we have already seen, they did little more than give the garrison a good fright. Twenty years later during the opening round of the War of Austrian Succession (King George's War in America), Indians again besieged Annapolis Royal. This

¹. AC C11B 22: 29-29v, Forant à Maurepas, 8 février 1740.
time they were under the leadership of Joseph Dupont Duvivier with a small group of French regulars. The Indians' technique was to steal under cover of darkness to the foot of the glacis, give war whoops and shoot at the parapets. ¹ This war of nerves met with no more success than in the earlier attempt, and when Michel de Cannes de Falaise arrived from Louisbourg and told the Indians to leave, they willingly did so as expected reinforcements had not arrived.²

Governor William Shirley had a different reason for the withdrawal when he announced to the Massachusetts General Court that the arrival of a detachment of Col. John Gorham's Indian Rangers made up of Pigwacket Indians had "greatly revived the Spirits of the Officers and Soldiers, and struck considerable Terror into the Enemy, who thereupon drew off with great Precipation."³ The detachment had been sent to the assistance


². Maillard was the priest who accompanied the French and Indians on this occasion. Persistent reports that it was Le Loutre stem from Judge Jonathan Belcher, who mistakenly identified the accompanying missionary as Le Loutre. However, official correspondence makes it clear that it was Maillard. Duvivier's statement of the siege, of which Maillard was one of the signatories, is found in AC C11B 8: 117, 1744. For an account of Maillard at Annapolis Royal, see Albert David, "L'Apôtre des Micmacs" in La Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa (1935), 49-82. Also by the same author, "Père Pierre Maillard, Apôtre des Micmacs", BRH, 367. For official accounts, AC C11B 26: 79-88, Duchambon à Maurepas, 18 novembre 1744; and AC C11B 26: 48-52v, Duchambon et Bigot à Maurepas, 25 novembre 1744. Major Paul Mascarene, governor at Annapolis Royal, referred to the attending missionary as an "honest man". (PRO Nova Scotia A 26: 113, Mascarene to Shirley, 4 July 1744).

of Mascarene in response to his request for "20 or 30 bold and warlike Indians...to keep in awe the Indians of this peninsula who believe that all Indians from New England are Mohawks of whom they stand in great fear."\(^1\) Apparently the English experienced less trepidation about using Indians on this occasion than they apparently had when Governor Vetch had made a similar request in 1711.\(^2\)

The Pigwackets were a branch of the Abenaki (Pigiguit and Pégouakis are French variations of the same name), who after making peace with the English had left Acadia to settle in New England. Shirley had announced to the General Court

> I think it of great Importance, that, in this first Instance of the Eastern Indians quitting their Dependence on the French in a Time of actual War beteen us and them, we should so treat and manage them, as to convince them and other of those Tribes, how much they will find their Advantage in our Friendship and Protection.\(^3\)

Shirley was notable among English colonial governors for his comparatively imaginative approach to the Indians. But he remained cautious. In this case he added, "I must also desire you to consider in what Manner these Indians may be best disposed of to save Charge to the Province, and to make them in some Measure useful to us." Later that same year, in October, he

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1. PRO Nova Scotia A 26: 90, Mascarene to Shirley, 9 June 1744.
2. Supra, 95.
considered it necessary to declare war on the Malecite of St. John's River and Micmac of Cape Sable.¹

A proposal to organize companies of Indian soldiers on the same basis as the French met with cool response from Vaudreuil and Raudot, who did not think that such a measure would make the Indians any more formidable than they already were.² However, Indians were given quasi-military rank,³ a practice which continued at Louisbourg.⁴

The French custom of rotating officers met with objections from Indians at Port Toulouse, who did not like the officers they dealt with being changed every year. "Il faut du temps pour gagner leurs confiance," noted Isaac-Louis de Forant, who was governor for less than a year when he died, "et touts ne sont pas propres à cet employ." He advised that the rotation system not be strictly followed in this case, and hoped that it would not be taken miss "si je m'en écoute quelque fois".⁵

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2. AC C11G 6: 69-70v, Mémoire sur les compagnies sauvages proposées par le Sieur de la Motte envoyé à Monseigneur en 1708.

3. AC C11A 122: 10-42, lettre anonyme de Québec, 30 septembre 1705.

4. Commissions for "major" are sometimes referred to in correspondence, and appear to have been given to chiefs of villages. (AC C11B 29: 03v, Desherbiers à Rouillé, 27 novembre 1750; and AC C11B 29: 09, Desherbier à Rouillé, 6 décembre 1750.

5. AC C11B 21: 09, Forant à Maurepas, 11 novembre 1730.
Very early, the French paid Indians for military services, an idea that was not regularized among the English until Shirley. If the garrison at Louisbourg never used the Indians as regulars, it relied heavily on their services as auxiliaries and scouts, avoiding what would have been thorny problems of discipline. However, when Governor Du Quesnel formed two militia companies in 1740-1741, one of the two commanders he named was a certain "Petitpas". The Petitpas were a habitant family connected to the Indians by blood, and they maintained a close relationship with them.

For a people who did not have a reputation for being


2. In one case at least the special status enjoyed by the Indians was partly extended to a member of the regular forces when the Indians put in a special plea for him. In 1738, a soldier deserted in order to marry the daughter of Petit-Jean, major of the village of Ile Royale (as Mirliguèche was sometimes called to avoid confusion). The soldier was granted his life and was sentenced instead to be "punir des baguettes et de quelque temps de prison". Petit-Jean was suspended from his rank as major for inciting the soldier to desert. (AC C11B 20: 87-87v, Bourville à Maurepas, 3 octobre 1738; AC C11B 20: 95-95v, also Bourville à Maurenas, 2 octobre 1738; and AC B 69/2: 353 [321-323], Maurepas à Bourville, 11 juin 1739).

warriors\textsuperscript{1} the Micmac were remarkably successful in keeping Nova Scotia in a state of tension until well into the 1760's. This raises the question of what transformed the relatively peaceful, outgoing people of first contact days into the partisans of the eighteenth century. Part of the answer can be found in the nature of the contact itself, and in Indian reaction to it. As the European cultural tidal wave engulfed them, the Micmac resorted to the only measures they knew to preserve their lands and their way of life. While the situation was fostered and directed by the French, it cannot be attributed to them alone. The Indians had a strong motivation of their own for hostility to the English, as the Indian wars of New England that did not involve the French at all clearly indicate. The more perceptive of the English were aware of this; Thomas Pownall, an early governor of New England, remarked that the English "with an insatiable thirs: after landed possessions, have got Deeds and other fraudulent pretences, grounded on the abuse of Treaties, and by these Deeds claim possession, even to the exclusion of the Indians, not only from their

\textsuperscript{1} AC E 68: 371, [382] Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sieur de Forant, Capitaine de Vaisseau et Gouverneur de l'Isle Royale, 22 juin 1739. Based on the 1738 survey of the Micmac missions, these instructions say that "les Sauvages Mikmak sont bien moins guerrier que les Sauvages du Canada. Ils seraient peu capables de conduire une entreprise considérable." Early missionaries spoke of the Micmac as peaceful. However, Lahontan includes the Micmac and Menaki, Etchemin and others as "good warriors, more active and less cruel than the Iroquois". (Thwaites, New Voyages I: 339). Cartier, on his second voyage 1535-1536, was told by Donnacona about the Toudarans "who waged war continually against his people." (Biggar, The Voyages of Jacques Cartier, 177-178).
Hunting grounds (which with some is a right of great consequence) but even from their house and home."¹

The English presence in Nova Scotia was not at all reassuring to the Micmac. On one occasion Saint-Ovide tried to calm the Indians' fears, asking them, for the sake of the French King and for themselves, not to trouble the peace. He assured them that the English would allow them to live as quietly as they had in the past. The Indians, for their part, worried that the French and English would unite to destroy them and felt they should do whatever was necessary to maintain themselves. They observed that if they had listened less to the French, they would have less trouble with the English, who were on their land and destroying their fishing. While promising to be quiet for the present, they said they would prepare to hunt those who only sought to destroy them.²

This indicates that the Indians were no more certain of their French allies than the French were of them. While they may have preferred the French to the English, they were reported in 1755 as "intimidated by the uncertainty of success

¹ McLennan, Louisbourg, 64-65, citing PRO CO5/518. This document is not included in the selections from this series at the Public Archives of Canada.

² Pro-Conquest-Papers 520 III: section 4, Discours fait aux Sauvages du Canada par M. de Saint-Ovide, gouverneur de l'Isle Royale au sujet des mouvements du Gouverneur Anglais de l'Acadie avec les Réponses que les Sauvages en fontes. Sans date. Saint-Ovide was governor of Ile Royale from 16 November 1717 until 31 March 1739.
& even of being given help, & not daring to shake off the yoke of the England which was threatening them at close quarters, which had just taken the fortified places, & which could revenge itself almost without leaving home."  

It also indicates just how disparate the aims of the Indians and the French were: the Indians were thinking in terms of their own survival, and the French in terms of using the Indians to build an empire. Encouraging Indian hostility toward the English was indeed a delicate task that called for circumspection. The French could not reveal their hand, particularly in a time of nominal peace, and it was not always easy to keep a rein on the Indians' hostility in order to avoid an open break with the English. The situation became particularly touchy when the English were reported to have discovered silver and copper mines in the Minas area. As they moved to assess these reports, tensions noticeably increased.

Vengeance being such a point of honour with them -- as Cadillac observed, they never forgave an injury -- the Indians considered it more than enough provocation when the British hanged three Indian prisoners in Boston in reprisal for the capture and pillaging of a vessel in 1726. Neither

1. J.C. Webster, ed., Memorial on behalf of the Sieur de Boishébert (Saint John, N.B., 1942), 16.
2. AC B 64/4: 479 [765], "impres à Saint-Ovide, 3 mai 1736.
had bitterness subsided over the crippling of fellow tribesmen as a result of long imprisonment at Annapolis Royal.\textsuperscript{1} Settlers on isolated farms or unwary fisherman reaped the harvest of Indian anger at these injuries. The French periodically tried to curb this thirst for vengeance, at least to the point of refusing military aid for specific projects.\textsuperscript{2} The British, for their part -- and the French as well in other areas -- showed no reluctance to give as much or more than they received, under the labels of "reprisal" or perhaps of "justice".

Brutality in Indian warfare was calculated to strike terror in the enemy. There is no need to enlarge upon its success here; it is sufficient to remark that Indians exploited the technique to the fullest, and did their best to make sure that everyone knew who had done the deed. It was another means of making up for their lack of numbers and helps explain how so few Indians were able to resist so successfully much larger numbers of Europeans, even though they were no strangers to brutality themselves.

Early accounts indicate that the Micmac did not burn their prisoners of war, but kept them in servitude if they did

\textsuperscript{1} AC C11B 9: 64-70v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 20 novembre 1727; AC B 52/2: 536 [343], Maurepas à Saint-Ovide, 20 juin 1728.

\textsuperscript{2} AC C11B 28: 75-78, Desherbiers à Rouillé, 9 aout 1749. Earlier Saint-Ovide had received a reprimand for promising French aid on a mission of vengeance. (AC B 54/2: 517v-518 [566], Maurepas à Saint-Ovide, 27 juin 1730). Maurepas wrote, "cela ne convenoit en aucune manièere et auroit donné juste Sujet de plaintes de la part des Anglois."
not break their heads or use them as targets for arrow practice. But by the time of Louisbourg this had changed and Maillard described a burning that occurred on Ile Royale.\(^1\) The victim was an English soldier.\(^2\) Maillard said that he knew of three such occurrences in about 20 years, but that in former times they had been more frequent.\(^3\)

Another contemporary observer remarked that while it was impossible to exaggerate the cruelties exercised on prisoners selected for torture, there was no question that the number of instances when this occurred were multiplied well beyond the truth.

That they put their prisoners to death by exquisite torture, is strictly true; but it is as true too, that they do not serve so many in that manner as has been said.\(^4\)

That there was an element of vindictiveness in these tortures is also beyond doubt, but there was also a mixture of piety as they were above all a ritual atonement for the dead, particularly those who had fallen in battle. Indians extended their cruelties to children, because they would grow up and would then have to exercise the vengeance that their code called

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3. Maillard, *Missions Micmaques*, 316. These are the only references that I have found for the Louisbourg period. The French at Louisbourg practiced judicial torture, and this is referred to on occasion in official reports.
4. "Letter from l'ons. de la Varenne" in *Customs and Manners*, 98.
for; and to women, because they produced children. Torture, however, was usually reserved for warriors.

They consider too these tortures as matter of glory to them in the constancy with which they are taught to suffer them; they familiarize to themselves the idea of them, in a manner that redoubles their natural courage and ferocity, and especially inspires them to fight desperately in battle, so as to prefer death to a captivity of which the consequences are, and may be, so much more cruel to them.¹

The French, who were quite prepared to justify torture as part of their own judicial processes (the English, too, shared this practice), were not prepared to accept it as part of the ritual of war. But they had to proceed with caution, to depend as usual on persuasion and influence rather than on force. Officials were admonished from time to time to curb the cruelties of their allies, a policy which was not always followed. During the first siege of Louisbourg, Admiral Peter Warren and General William Pepperrell complained to Louis Dupont Duchambon, acting governor of Louisbourg, that some New Englanders captured by the Indians had been "barbarously murdered and scalped".² Duchambon realized that he could not be held responsible for the behaviour of the Indians, as "ceux qui connaissent cette nation savent qu'elle n'en respectent aucun"; however, he would do his best to see that they behaved

¹. Ibid., 99.

². AC F3 50/1: 309, Warren to Maisonneuve, 6 June 1745; AC F3 50/1: 311, Maisonneuve à Duchambon, 13 juin 1745.
better. Reports that Paul Marin and his Indians were approaching Louisbourg drew a nervous protest from Warren, who wrote to Duchambon to "immediately send some gentleman to desire them to leave this island"; to which Duchambon replied, perhaps regretfully, that they had not arrived.

Protests against Indian war customs apart, neither French nor English were above encouraging those customs when it suited their purposes. For instance, both sides paid bounties for scalps throughout this period. The French paid the Indians for scalps they brought in of the English and their allies; the English paid for scalps of Indians. A 1748 memorandum on Acadia refers to payment of 100 livres for an English prisoner and 30 livres for a scalp. This was still the price in 1756 when two Micmac chiefs, Joseph Embesne and Bernard Guillaume, were paid a total of 300 livres for 10 English scalps. That same year Martin, "chef des sauvages de l'accadie", received 210 livres for seven scalps and Baptiste Conne to 60 livres.

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1. AC F3 50/1: 313-313v, Duchambon à Warren, 19 juin 1745; and AC F3 50/1: 315-315v, Duchambon à Maisonfort, 19 juin 1745.
2. AC F3 50/2: 347, Warren to Duchambon, 19 June 1745.
3. AC F3 50/2: 349, Duchambon à Warren, 30 juin 1745. The previous winter, 80 Micmacs had wintered at Québec; they formed the core of the force led by Marin (AC C11A 85: 120-133, journal de Beaularnois et Rocquart, 1 décembre 1745 à novembre 1746).
4. AC C11B 10: 144-154, Sur l'Accadie, non signé, 1748. Prices sometimes rose higher; one of the best-known incidents in this connection concerns Le Loutre, who found himself having to pay 1800 livres for 18 English scalps brought by Indians to Fort Beauséjour. (AC C11B 33: 197-201, Prévost à Rouillé, 16 août 1753).
for two, according to Louisbourg accounts. Massachusetts in 1694 paid £50 for a head of every Indian, big or little, killed or captured. When it intensified its war against the "Eastern Indians" after the first fall of Louisbourg, it raised the price to £100 for every male Indian killed and £105 for every one captured. For women or children under twelve who were killed, the price remained at £50; but for those captured, it was raised to £55. Connecticut by 1746 was paying £300 each for scalps of male Indians and £175 each for those of women and children. In Nova Scotia, the price in 1749 was a modest £10 for "every Indian you shall destroy (upon producing his Scalp as the Custom is) or every Indian taken, Man, Woman or Child." The governor of Nova Scotia in 1756 offered a reward of £30 for every male Indian over 16 years of age brought in alive; £25 for a scalp of such a male and £25 for every Indian woman and child brought in alive.

1. AC C11B 36: 241-242, bordereau, 20 décembre 1756. Baptiste Coppe was likely the "Micmac Coppe" who had signed the peace treaty of 1752. Supra, 108.


3. Early American Imprints No. 5635, Proclamation of Spencer Phips, lieutenant-governor and commander-in-chief, Massachusetts, 23 August 1745.


5. PRO Nova Scotia A 36: 18, Cornwallis' instructions to Capt. Silvanus Cobb, commanding the sloop York, 13 January 1750.

Voices were raised against the practice. Michel de Couagne, a former engineer at Louisbourg, wrote in 1760,

"Si jamais ces colonies reviennent à la France, que l'on change cette malheureuse politique qui faisait qu'on payait les Sauvages pour aller lever ces chevelures, lors même de la plus profonde paix; la nature et l'humanité crient contre ces choses, et on doivent causer une justic horreur."

In the two sieges of Louisbourg, the Indians were used on both sides mainly as scouts and auxiliaries. During the first siege, which caught the French so poorly prepared, they were not used to full advantage. This is particularly surprising as far as the French are concerned as their acting governor, Duchambon, had a long record in Acadia. He served as a judge for the Indians and was married to Jeanne Mius d'Entremont of Pobomcoup, who had acted for several years as official interpreter at Louisbourg to the Micmacs. It was Gorham's Indian Rangers who led the successful opening assault landing of the New Englanders at Flat Point Cove on May 11, 1745. The best known Indian exploit of this siege was when the New Englanders "had the pleasure, by an Indian of Connecticut" to find that the Grand Battery really was as deserted as it

1. AC C11C 8: 88v, Couagne à Monsieur Acaron, directeur du Bureau des Colonies, 4 novembre 1760.

2. For a sidelight on Mius d'Entremont, see Documents Inédits III: 165. Mme Duchambon was finally rejected by the Indians as an interpreter, as they objected to a woman being present at their negotiations. AC C11B 5: 398-399, De Mezy au Conseil, 20 novembre 1722.

3. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg, 84.
looked. Subsequently Vaughan and his men took possession. ¹

After this bright beginning as shock troops in the landing and in the single-handed capture of Grand Battery, little is heard of Indian participation in the siege. Rawlyk says "the Indians were ceremoniously thrust aside by the New Englanders who assiduously sought the limelight of military glory." ²

The French use of Indians also received some stinging criticism, this time from one of their own. Remarking on the bravery of the Indians and their hatred of the English which was so intense that it extended to their Indian allies, an anonymous reporter bitterly observed:

Notre malheur est de n'avoir pas eu de ces Sauvages qui auroient mis en état de faire de fréquentes sorties; ou plutôt cela doit être rangé au nombre des fautes que nous avons faites, parce qu'ils nous eût été très-facile d'en rassembler tel nombre que nous eussions voulu; mais il aurait fallu s'en pourvoir avant l'arrivée des Anglais,

¹. Admiralty Papers, I, 3817, Waldo to Shirley, 12 May 1745. This reference makes no mention of the Indian being offered a bottle of brandy to scout the battery as frequently told in histories of the first siege. William Vaughan, in his formal account of the event, does not mention the Indian. According to Vaughan, "When by all Appearances he had Reason to judge that said Grand Battery was deserted by the Enemy; he & his twelve Men marched up and took Possession of said Grand Battery for your Majesty." McLennan, Louisbourg, 365. McLennan gives the full text of Vaughan's account, 361-365.

². Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg, 95. An incident in which about 20 marauding New Englanders were killed by Indians appears in several siege journals, among which: Louis "W. de Forest, ed., Louisbourg Journals 1715 (New York, 1932), p. 16; and A Journal of the Siege of the Town from North America Against the French of this Province, the City of Louisbourg and the Territories Thereunto Belonging by James Gibson (London, 1745) 15.
ou avant le commencement du siège... Ce n'est pas leur faute, s'ils nous ont rendu que de médiocres services durant le siège. 1

Duchambon's errors of judgment culminated in his refusal of aid from Marin and his Indian forces, who had come down from Québec especially for the purpose. By the time Duchambon changed his mind, it was too late. 2

Once the English had taken Louisbourg, they burned surrounding woods to guard against surprises from the Indians. This was in accord with the practice of English settlers, who had burned considerable areas of forest in New England for the same purpose. 3

In the second siege the French were much better organized as far as the Indians were concerned. For more than two years preparations had been going on; reinforcements were brought in from neighboring tribes and Indians were posted along the east coast as lookouts, with a particularly big detachment at Gabarus Bay, 4 the scene of the first assault landing during the 1745 siege.

1. George M. Wrong, ed., Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg (Toronto, 1897), 54-55. The writer then tells the story of Petit-Jean, who was shot in the chest and left for dead, but who turned up three days later, giving his comrades a severe fright.

2. Ibid., 42-44.

3. "Lettre from Mons. de la Varenne" in Customs and manners, 32-83. The burning of the forest around Louisbourg is referred to in Lettre d'un habitant, 55.

4. Subsistence for 700 Indians during five months employed as lookouts along the coast is listed in accounts in AC C11B 37: 209v, 29 novembre 1756; and in AC C11B 37: 122v, 30 octobre 1757. Poudre de guerre "aux sauvages par extraordinaires étant employés pour le service" is found in lists in AC C11B 37: 128v, 30 septembre 1757; and AC C11B 37: 278v, same date.
In 1757, out of 2,468 in the Louisbourg garrison, 260 were Acadians and Indians who would be particularly useful for sorties. The following year, the garrison was listed at 3,000 regulars, 1,000 militia and 500 Indians.\(^1\) These were beside the Indians and militia stationed along the coast.\(^2\)

Statements of expenditures for those years reflect some of this activity: in 1755, a Sieur Le Roi was paid 3320 livres for firearms for Indians and Acadian militia employed "à la larges des côtes de cette isle,"\(^3\) and Sieur Daccarette received 5983 livres for biscuit "pour la subsistance des soldats miliciens et sauvages du détachement du M. Boishébert,"\(^4\) and even larger sums were spent on shoes, including "souliers sauvages" and clothing.\(^5\) In 1757 we find 46617 livres listed for the general provision of "les troupes habitans et sauvages pendant un an", and a total of 95234 livres for two years.\(^6\)

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2. Engineer Louis-Joseph Franquet reported fortifying dangerous places along the coast, expecting to use as many Indians as possible in their defence. AC C11B 37: 289-291, Franquet au ministre, 13 juin 1757. An English officer told of seeing parties of Indians along the coast who lit fires on his approach to inform the French. Pre-Conquest Papers, L8, lettre from Capt. Henry Pringle, 31 July 1757, 54.

3. AC C11C 14: 69, Prévost au ministre, 16 décembre 1755.

4. Ibid., 69v.

5. Ibid., 69v, 70v.

Not the least of these preparations was a full-scale war dance, the last of its kind in Nova Scotia. The ceremonies, which continued for several days, included both Catholic and Indian ritual. A naval commander described the scene:

Le dimanche 10 juillet on nous annonça une grande messe en rickmac qui devait être dite par M. l'Abbé Maillard et chantée par ces Sauvages et leurs femmes; la curiosité y attira une grande partie des officiers de l'escadre qui furent tous aussi édifiés de la décence et du recueillement avec lesquels ils avaient vus ces Sauvages adresser leurs prières au Seigneur, que surpris et satisfait de l'harmonie et de l'unison qu'ils mettaient dans leurs chants nouveaux sujets d'admiration pour le respectable Missionaire qui avait dû former leur croyance.

The appearance of a detachment of Boishébert's Malecites and Canibas, "gens très forts d'une taille très élevée, et qui avaient déjà fait la guerre avec distinction dans le Canada," was the occasion for more ceremony. The chiefs prostrated themselves at the feet of the commander, who raised them up. A Malecite chief advanced and placed at his feet four scalps woven into a wampum collar, which de la Motte received with the hope there would be more to come, saying that the moment was near when they would be counting on their bravery and valor.

1. AN B4 Article 76: 41, Mémoire concernant les Sauvages Mikmacs, malechites et Cannibas rassembler sur la côte de L'île Royale en 1757, de Emmanuel-Auguste de Canideuc, Comte du Bois de la Motte, lieutenant général des armées navales.

2. Ibid., 4lv. Boishébert, the last French partisan leader in Acadia, and his men had spent the previous two years raiding in the Halifax area.
The assembled warriors responded with their cry "heur". The Micmac chiefs also made speeches. Several days later Drucour held a feast for the Indians, "consistant en lard, raisin sec, vin et biscuit que ces gens la recurent avec bien moins d'avidité qu'on ne s'y etait attendu, emportant la pluspart tout ce qu'on leur avoit donne pour le partager avec leur femmes et leurs Enfans." This time the speeches were concluded with "un simulacre de leur guerre" and a dance "qui firent grand plésir autant par la cadence et la prédiction avec lesquelles tous ces mouvemens s'executoient que par la singularité de leurs attitudes et de leurs cris auxquels les bizarries de leurs ajustemens et de leurs physionomies chamarrées par je ne sais combien de couleurs donnoient encore un nouveaux prix."

Ritual attended to, the hard business of preparing and waiting for the British attack became the main preoccupation. Five companies of volunteers were used as scouts, and during the siege Canadians and Indians posted outside the fort were used to harass the enemy. This operation was expected to go into high gear with the arrival of Boishébert and his forces.2

Governor Drucour had prepared for this arrival by setting up food depots outside of Louisbourg. However, as he wrote sourly in his journal,

1. Ibid., 41-42.
2. AC CIIB 25: 234v, Relation de l’Isle Royale, sans signature, 28 juin 1758.
M. L'Abbé Maillard Prêtre Missionnaire des Sauvages de cette Isle et premier chef des missions qui étoit en ville le jour de la descente des Anglois à Cabarrus et ayant parti par précaution pour sûreté de sa personne le soir du même jour s'est fait suivre par la plus grande sûreté encore par tous les Sauvages qui se sont trouver ici alors, et vraisemblablement il a quitté Louisbourg dans la ferme croynance qu'il alloit être sous peu de jours au pouvoir des anglois, au moins il faut pieusement le croire à cause de la conduite qu'il a tenue, car étant parfaitement informé du dépôt de ces munitions et de ces vivres les Sauvages qui l'accompagnaient ont enlevée l'un et l'autre avec beaucoup de soins.1

With the English fleet in the offing, resupplying the depots involved considerable risks for Drucour. He observed, with some asperity,

La conduite de ce Missionnaire est à remarquer non seulement il aurait dû faire ces efforts pour empêcher l'enlèvement de ces dépôts mais encore n'avoir il pas dû rester dans la ville? En restant les Sauvages y eussent rester aussi qui étoient au nombre d'environ soixante.2

Drucour had difficulty not only with Indians who insisted on helping themselves (Le Loutre's Indians, who came to Ile Royale after the fall of the forts Beauséjour and Gaspareau in 1755, did not ease the situation),3 but also with "un fripon d'administrateur" who distributed such supplies to families at Miré without permission, thereby hampering military

2. Ibid.
operations.\(^1\)

Vaudreuil complained that

Boishébert est arrivé à Louisbourg le 3 du mois dernier... son détachement est de près de 500 hommes accadiens et sauvages y compris un petit nombre de soldats et de Canadiens. Il a beaucoup souffert de misère, les vivres que j'avais pris M. de Drucour de faire passer à Miramichi ne s'y étant pas trouvés.\(^2\)

For whatever the reason, the arrival of Boishébert and his forces did not bring the much hoped-for results. Ironically, the King, in anticipation of his services, had already sent the Cross of Saint Louis for presentation to Boishébert. The Indian leader still received it, in spite of the failure of his Louisbourg venture.

On the whole, however, the services of the Canadians and Indians were effective during the siege, a judgment supported by the fact that no terms were offered for them in the capitulation. Besides, the British were in no mood to give quarter after recent events at Fort William Henry,\(^3\) which led the garrison to quietly arrange for the Indians to depart during the night before the formal capitulation.\(^4\)

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2. AC C11A 103: 140-141, Vaudreuil au ministre, 3 août 1758.

3. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (Toronto, 1900), I: 474ff; also, Boscq de Beaumont, Les derniers jours d'Acadie, 223-224.

Were the Indians pawns or did they hold a balance of power during the Louisbourg years? That they were used by the French for their own purposes is beyond doubt. This was hardly a new position for the Indians; well before the building of the fortress, an Abenaki chief had vividly pictured the Indian situation to Joseph Dudley:

It is well that the kings should be at peace; I am contented that it should be so, and have no longer any difficulty in making peace with you. I was not the one who struck during the past 12 years: it was the Frenchman who used my arm to strike you. We were at peace, it is true, I had even thrown away my hatchet, I know not where, and as I was reposing on my mat, thinking of nothing, the young man brought a message, which the governor of Canada had sent, and by which he said to me, "My son, the Englishman has struck me; help me to avenge myself; take the hatchet and strike the Englishman." I, who have always listened to the words of the French governor, search for my hatchet; I find it entirely rusted; I burnish it up; I place it in my belt to go and strike. Now, the Frenchman tells me to lay it down. I therefore throw it away from me, that no one may longer see the blood with which it is reddened. Thus let us live in peace. I consent to it.1

However, they were more than pawns. They had their own motives, and they expected Louisbourg to provide them with direction and assistance against the English. Without that help, their resistance would have collapsed much sooner, as the odds against them were too great.

1. Brown, Cane Breton, 159-160. No date, no source given. Joseph Dudley was Governor of the Dominion of New England for seven months in 1636; and Governor of Massachusetts, 1702-1715.
If they were more than pawns, they were less than imposers of a balance of power. Their support ensured success for the French in restraining English expansion, but not in stopping it. The Indians began to see the handwriting on the wall after the disaster at Norridgewock, as attested by the series of treaties they signed with the English thereafter. But the French voice was still the most attractive, particularly as long as the French provided the Indians with goods, did not threaten their hunting grounds and helped them against those who did. The French nervously noted changes in their dispositions toward them. Maillard reported in 1738 that the attitudes of the Micmac and Malecite were noticeably cooler toward the French, but François Le Coutre de Bourville, who was acting governor at the time, doubted the soundness of the missionary's judgment. 1

The Indians had not become guerrillas from any particular attachment to war. In pre-contact days, when war was little more than a dangerous ritual, at least for the northern tribes, and not fought on an organized basis, then perhaps it could be true to describe some of these people as being devoted to war. However, such an acute observer as Lahontan, a soldier himself, said that Indians were "never rash in declaring war; they hold frequent Councils before they resolve upon it." 2 And Le Clercq

1. AC C11B 20: 89v, Bourville à Maurepas, 3 octobre 1733.
wrote that war was never declared except by the advice of the old men, who alone decided, in the last resort, the affairs of the country. But as the new technology changed the character of war, and as the true dimensions of the European invasion began to reveal themselves to the Indians, the ritual aspects receded, and war became a desperate attempt to save something of the Indian way of life. In pre-contact days, Indians had waged war neither for the same motives nor in the same "total" manner as Europeans.

Something of this is contained in the declaration which the Micmac made to the English in 1749, after the latter established Halifax. It began,

L'endroit où tu es, où tu fais des habitations, où tu batis un fort, où tu veux maintenant comme t'intronisier, cette terre dont tu veux présentement te rendre maître absolu, cette terre m'appartient, j'en suis certes sorti comme l'herbe, c'est le propre lieu de ma naissance et de ma résidence, c'est ma terre à moy sauvage; oui, je le jure, c'est Dieu qui me l'a donnée pour être mon pays à perpétuité.


2. Jaenen, "The Meeting of the French and Amerindians", 8. While the Indians did not aim at "total defeat" as consistently as Europeans, their attitude toward the persons of their enemies was more unrestrained. "Il est notoire que les sauvages se croient tout permis contre ceux qu'ils regardent comme leurs ennemis." Boscoq de Beaumont, *Les derniers jours de l'Acadie*, 252.

3. Documents Inédits, I: 17-18. The declaration was given to an English officer at Fort Toulouse who passed it on to the governor at Halifax. Abbé Maillard sent a French translation to the superior of Les Missions Etrangères at Paris, 18 October 1749, from which these extracts were taken. It was written in ideograms and script. The text is in the Archives du Séminaire de Québec. The English version is in PRO Nova Scotia A 35: 69-71, 17 October 1749. Text of the declaration is reproduced here in Appendix V.
The English and French kings had divided the lands between them, the declaration continued, but "montre-moi où moy sauvage me logerai?" After taking nearly all of the Micmac lands, the English are now taking Kchibouktouk, "tu m'envies encore ce morceau, jusques-là même que te veux m'en chasser."

However, the door was still open for negotiation:

Ta résidence au Port Royal ne me fait plus grand ombrage, car tu vois que depuis long temps je t'y laisse tranquile, mais présentement tu me forces d'ouvrir la bouche par le vol considérable que tu me fais. J'iray bientôt te voir, peut-être recevra tu bien ce que je te dirai; si tu m'écoutes et que tu me parles comme il faut, et que tu exécutes tes belles paroles, je connoîtrai par là que tu ne cherches que le bien, de sorte que toutes choses prendront un bon tour; je ne t'en dis pas davantage pour ne te pas plus longtemps rompre la tête par mes discours.1

The contrast could hardly be greater with Philipps' blunt declaration in 1722, which after listing the reprehensible deeds of the Indians, stated

Je declare et denonce Lesd, sauvages avec leurs confédérés, Ennemis de la Couronne et dignité de Sa Majesté Le Roy George, Et je Requiers par ses presents Et Commande à tous les Sujets de Sa Majesté Et Autres habitans de cette Province de les traittent comme tels, et à leur peril de ne point ayder, assister Lesd. sauvages ny leurs Confederés, Leur Vendunt, donnant ou prestant aucunes d'effets, marchandises ou autres choses, ou choses quelles soient, ou d'aucune sorte de manières les protéger, secourir ou Logeraucune d'eux dans leurs maisons ou autrement.

1. Ibid.

2. AC Cl1 B 6: 105, sans date.
Indian objections were not listened to, and the establishment proceeded at Halifax; its price was the peace of mind of the early English settlers, who lived in a state of almost constant terror. Governor Cornwallis considered the situation serious enough to ask for arms for all British subjects, claiming that "at present above ten thousand people are awed by two hundred Savages."\(^1\)

More than pawns, less than imposers of a balance of power, the Indians fought by every means they knew to save something of their way of life. They fell in with the designs of Louisbourg because they considered them to be their best hope of success.

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1. PRO Nova Scotia A 35: 4, Cornwallis to Secretary of State, 20 August 1719.
CHAPTER V
OF 'SAVAGES' AND KINGS

Maintenance of the Indian alliances, so important to the designs of Louisbourg, absorbed a great deal of official time and attention. No detail was too small to escape notice; for instance, when Raymond, Louisbourg's second-last French governor, arrived to assume his new post, one of his first official acts was to hold a meeting with the Indians at which he showed them a portrait of the King, which he reported made "une impression singulière sur eux."\(^1\) He did not elaborate either as to the reactions of the Indians nor as to the details of the portrait. But for it to have produced the desired effect, it would have had to have been carefully chosen according to the known rules of Indian preference: full face, as a profile would have indicated that the King was but half a man; looking directly at the beholder, with open eyes and painted in bright colors. Such were the instructions sent by Garnier when asking for holy pictures for his missionary work.\(^2\)

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1. AC C11C 15: 257, Raymond à Rouillé, 8 octobre 1751. From their earliest days in the colony, the French had used this method of awing the Indians and impressing them with the might of the King.

2. Parkman, The Jesuits in America, 133.
The fact that the French were willing to concern themselves with such details does much to explain their success in maintaining their all-important Indian alliances at Louisbourg as elsewhere in New France. In this chapter we will consider some of this minutiae as it concerned Acadia and Louisbourg.

For instance, ceremony and protocol took precedence over the negotiations themselves in establishing and maintaining alliances. Biard in 1616 had some sharp comments on this:

You may be sure they understand how to make themselves courted... Gifts must be presented and speeches made to them, before they condescend to trade; this done, they must have the Tabagic, i.e., the banquet. They will dance and make speeches and sing Adesquidex, Adesquidex. That is, that they are good friends, allies, associates, confederates and comrades of the King and of the French.¹

What Biard took to be presumption LeClercq realized was an expression of their need for prestige and security.

They are fond of ceremony and are anxious to be accorded some when they come to trade at French establishments; and it is consequently in order to satisfy them that sometimes the guns and even the canon are fired on their arrival. The leader himself assembles all the canoes near his own and ranges them in good order before landing, in order to await the salute which is given him, and which all the Indians return to the French by the discharge of their guns. Sometimes the leader and chiefs are invited for a meal in order to show all the Indians that they are esteemed and honoured.

¹. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 81.
Rather more frequently they are given something like a fine coat, in order to distinguish them from the commonalty. For such things as this they have a particular esteem, especially if the article has been in use by the commander of the French.  

If the all-embracing characteristics of Indian alliances and the basic importance of ceremony and gift exchanges in cementing them was not at first fully understood, this love of prestige certainly was. The French early conceived the idea of bringing Indians to France to impress them with their might. Lahontan tells of six sagamos at Versailles at the same time, all soliciting aid against the English.  

The inference here is that the sagamos were less interested in being impressed than they were in using French power for their own ends. In any event, these visits do not seem to have achieved the hoped-for results, and when Beauharnois proposed sending Indian chiefs to France, he was told that His Majesty


2. One of the best illustrations of this is the treaty signed by the Micmac and the English at Halifax in 1752 (the French signed no treaties with the Eastern Indians). Of its eight articles, the first renews former treaties; the second buries the hatchet; the third makes an offensive and defensive alliance; the fourth deals with trade as well as hunting and fishing privileges; the fifth and sixth concern gifts to be given annually to the Indians; the seventh with helping shipwrecked mariners; and the eighth with procedures for settling disputes. (Nova Scotia B 5: 164-176, 22 November 1725. Cf. de Puy, British Colonial Treaties, 30).

3. Murdoch, Nova Scotia, I: 204. However, no mention of such sagamos is found in Thwaites, New Voyages I, 323ff.
n'a pas jugé cela nécessaire, on en a fait venir plusieurs fois et cela n'a produit qu'une dépense inutile. Les Sauvages n'ignorent pas la puissance de la France, il ne s'agit que de Soutenir de plus en plus la haute opinion qu'ils en ont et c'est à quoy vous devés vous appliquer dans toutes les affaires que vous traités avec eux.¹

An unauthorized passage to France for a Micmac and his interpreter drew the severe displeasure of Maurepas on the head of the captain involved.²

The Micmac, Denis d'Esdain, was given red cloth, gold braid, gold fringe, ribbon in assorted colours and beads, and Le Loutre was instructed "de faire valoir à ce sauvage ce present du roi et de lui dire Sa Majesté l'aurait fait mieux traiter s'il fut venu en France avec des gens autorisés."³

A more effective way of impressing the Indians was by means of ranks and honours. "Commissions" were given to Indians throughout the period of Louisbourg; "major" seems to have been the most important, but there were also "captains" and "lieutenants". Medals were by far the most effective. The first official suggestion for their use appears in 1739 when Forant said it would be "fort à propos" to award silver medals

¹. AC B 57/1: 639 [139], Maurepas à Beauharnois, 8 avril 1732.
². AC B 71: 83v [88], Maurepas à Guillot, 2 mai 1740.
³. AC C11B 23: 74-74v, Du Quesnel à Maurepas, 19 octobre 1741.

Bourville was given the task of explaining to the Indians why they should not take such unauthorized trips; his report is in AC C11B 22: 120v-121, 26 octobre 1740.
to village chiefs and to "ceux qui donneroient des preuves éclantantes de leurs fidélité." He added, "Je suis persuadé que cela fera un excellent effet."\(^1\) He was right. The suggestion caught the official imagination back in France and a packet of 20 medals was sent to following year,\(^3\) and Forant was told that 10 more were coming, to make the total of 30 he had asked for.\(^4\) Unfortunately Forant did not live to see them arrive. The acting governor rather pompously acknowledged their receipt:

> Je ne manqueray pas De Leurs (the Indians) faire sentir que cette nouvelle Grace de Sa Majesté Doit les Engager à Redoubler Leurs fidellité Envers Elle, j'ay L'honneur De vous assurer que n'en Distribueray qu'a juste titre Et qu'après avoir pris Des Certificats De Leurs missionnaires, De Leurs vie Et moeurs Et avec plaine Connoissance De Leurs parfaites fidélité à Sa Majesté et De Leurs capacite à Conduire Leurs frères.\(^5\)

Bourville, accompanied by François Bigot, the new commissaire-ordonnateur, went shortly afterwards to Port La Joye where he presented medals on the occasion of the annual gift-giving. Only two chiefs were present, the five others who were expected being away hunting. Bourville reported that

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1. AC C11B 21: 77, Forant à Maurepas, 14 novembre 1739.
2. Ibid. He repeated this point in a letter two days later.
3. AC B 71: 49v [32], Maurepas à de Cotte, 14 février 1740.
4. AC B 70/2: 384-384v [269-270], Maurepas à Forant, 6 mars 1740.
5. AC C11B 22: 107-107v, Bourville à Maurepas, 28 mai 1740.
the two chiefs who received the medals "me jurerent autentiquement, qu'ils mourroient et vivroient dans la religion romaine et jurerent pareillement une fidelité inviolable pour Sa Majesté."¹

The acting governor left the five other medals with Duchambon, Lieutenant du Roy on Isle St. Jean, for presentation to the other chiefs. Three medals were awarded at Port Toulouse upon Maillard's assurance that "les dits chefs étoient sans reproche, tant Ju costé de la religion, que de la fidelité envers le roy."²

Bourville believed that "cette nouvelle grace de Sa Majesté seroit pour eux une antidotte contre les poursuites des anglois, qui cherchent par toutes sortes de moyens de les attirer, et j'ay crû cette antidotte plus nécessaire qu'ils sont très à portée d'estre gaigné."³

The following year Du Quesnel awarded commissions to chiefs and captains and on the same occasion presented medals, telling the Indians that these honours would be given as they were merited.⁴ In 1749 Charles Desherbiers now governor, added a new element when he asked for 12 medals to give "à ceux qui se sont distingués dans la derniere guerre et à ceux qui s'oposereont aux établissements projetés par les Anglais."⁵

¹. AC C11B 22: 120, Bourville à Maurepas, 26 octobre 1740.
². Ibid.
³. Ibid.
⁴. AC C11B 23: 28v, Du Quesnel à Maurepas, 10 octobre 1741.
Not only had the religious element faded from view, but the medals were now awarded for military action and more specifically for harassment of the English. The next year Desherbiers sent two medals to Le Loutre at the missionary's request to present to Indians who had distinguished themselves in the war.¹

In 1755, Drucour on one occasion remarked that if he had had a medal, he would have presented it to an Indian chief for taking scalps near Halifax.² He asked that medals be sent so that he would be prepared for such contingencies. On May 4, 1758 he acknowledged receipt of a packet of medals; on July 27, 1758, Louisbourg fell for the last time.

The importance of these medals to the French in their Indian relations is evident from the concern they aroused in official correspondence. What they meant to the Indians can only be inferred. Maillard wrote that when "il est nécessaire que nous nous assemblions, c'est toujours chez le commandant du Port Toulouse avec le chef décoré de sa médaille."³

¹ AC C11B 30: 117, Desherbiers à Le Loutre, 4 avril 1751. It was Indians from Le Loutre's mission who shot and killed Captain Edward Howe while attempting to institute talks under a flag of truce. According to French accounts, Howe had acted against the advice of both Le Loutre and the Indians. Howe, fluent in French, was well-liked by the Acadians. (AC C11B 29: 131, Prévost à Rouillé, 27 octobre 1750). The decoy was said to have been Jean-Baptiste Coppe from Chubnacadie, the chief who signed the 1752 treaty. (Will R. Bird, A Century of Chignecto (Toronto, 1928), 99).

² AC C11B 35: 117, Drucour au ministre, 12 novembre 1755.

³ Maillard, Missions "indigènes", 370-371.
Maillard tells of a war party during the first siege, led by Réné, "un des plus vaillans mikmaques qui fût alors... marchant en chantant leurs chanson de guerre."\(^1\) On perceiving some English, Réné stripped himself for battle, keeping only his medal.\(^2\)

Governor Duquesne at Québec worried about the effect on the Indians when he did not receive the number of medals he had requested,

> ce qui m'a exposé à faire beaucoup de mécontents... Cette décoration prend beaucoup faveur chez les sauvages puisqu'ils la regardent à titre de noblesse Et il devient indispensable d'en donner parce qu'il est rare que ceux qui en sont pourvus s'écartent de l'attachement que cette même distinction leur fait contracter, C'est toujours par le choix du village que j'ay décoré les nouveaux Chefs qui m'ont été proposés.\(^3\)

Duquesne's reference to Indians considering themselves ennobled when they received medals could be the explanation for one such claim which found its way into Louisbourg correspondence in 1751.

> LeNommé Denis [Michaud] Chef des Sauvages de l'Isle Royale est mort. C'était un excellent sujet, dont le grand père avait rendu de si grand services que le feu Roy lui avait accordé des Lettres de noblesse. Il laisse une Veuve et un fils dans la misère. On fera quelque secours à la Veuve; Et le fils a été remis entre les mains du Sauvages qui a

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1. Ibid., 371.
2. Ibid., 372.
3. AC C11\1\99: 249-250, Duquesne au ministre, 1 octobre 1754.
été chef, et qui c'est chargé du soin
de l'élever.¹

Of the 23 letters, confirmations and justifications
of ennoblement recorded for persons living in New France until
1733, the letter for Simon Denys was registered 12 March 1680.²
Younger brother of Nicolas Denys, Simon was in Acadia and Cape
Breton off and on from 1632 until he was taken prisoner to
Québec in 1651, where he remained until his death about 1680.
He was married twice, both times to women of France. On the
basis of dates alone, Simon could have been the chief's grandfather.

Sieur de Dièreville wrote that he met at Port Royal
a chief who had been the grandson of an Indian who had been
ennobled by Henry IV for his services in the wars with the English.³

It is interesting that both these claims concern
grandfathers, which may or may not indicate something about
the characteristics of family lore. "Grandfather" may not have
had as specific meaning for the Indians as it had for the French.
Whatever the original honours, they had become letters of
ennoblement in the minds of the Indians, indicating how highly
they were prized.

¹. AC C11C 15: 257–257v, Raymond à Rouillé, octobre 1751.
The chief's medical bills during his last illness had been paid
by the government. (AC C11C 13: 150v, 11 octobre 1751). The
year before he had been decorated with a medal (AC C11B 29:
63–63v, de Desherbiers, 27 novembre 1750).

². AC C11A 120: 408.

³. J.C. Webster, ed., Sieur de Dièreville, Relation of
the Voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France (Toronto, 1953)
150. Dièreville visited Port Royal 1699–1700.
A few years before the death of Chief Denis, another Ile Royale chief had died and had been interred with military honors at Louisbourg. Bourville thought that such a measure would strengthen the attachment of the Indians to the King.¹

The French also used more personal means to attach the Indians to their interest. Surgeons were paid to look after Indians at such posts as Port Toulouse and Port La Joye as well as at Miriliguèche. The hospital at Louisbourg did not list Indians among its patients; however, Maillard spoke of Réné, wounded during the first siege, being taken to hospital. But he qualified it:

Réné, fort connue de messieurs Du Chambon et Bigot et de la plus part des officiers de l'état major, fut bien reçu. On le mit à l'hôpital, où son mal, bien loin de diminuer, ne fit qu'augmenter. Il en sortit de lui même le jour qu'il sut qu'on devoit capituler avec l'ennemi.²

The implication is clear that without his powerful friends Réné might have had trouble being admitted. But judging from the hospital's reputation, the Indians probably considered themselves better off being cared for by surgeons at the posts or by their own traditional medicines.

¹. AC C112 19: 56v-57, Bourville à Maurepas, 27 décembre 1737. A search of the parish registers for that year has revealed no record of such a burial. The records could, of course, be incomplete. For the years 1722-1745, I have found listed nine baptisms and 3 deaths of Indians identified as such at Louisbourg. Two of the baptisms were for children of Chief Denis Michaud.

². Maillard, Missions Micmaques, 377.
When Maillard changed the mission from Miriliguèche to Ile Ste Famille, Governor Raymond supported the move by telling the new chief he could have the 300 livres promised for his new house only if his people established themselves around the mission.¹ Whatever the importance of such an establishment from the French point of view, it continued to be bedeviled by the old problem of subsistence for the Indians, a situation that was aggravated by the growing scarcity of game. Officials discovered that it was easier to destroy old cultural patterns than it was to build new ones. More than a decree was needed to transform nomadic hunters into sedentary farmers; among the Eastern Woodland Indians, cultivation was women's work and hunting was men's work. The Micmac had started cultivating gardens at Miriliguèche, encouraged by Gaulin, but this does not seem to have developed as he had hoped. Maillard in his turn reported that the soil was not suitable and gave this as one of the reasons for moving the mission. A more realistic project, considering the Indians' sea-going proclivities, had been to develop seal-hunting at Iles de la Jadeleine. This had been envisaged in 1713 by Pontchartrain, who had observed that as the Micmac were coastal dwellers, it should be possible for them to develop seal-hunting and cod-fishing into industries.²

¹ AC C11B 31: 59, Raymond à Rouillé, 4 novembre 1751. The previous chief, Denis Michaud, had received 300 livres a few months earlier "pour le prix de la première maison qu'il a Baty au Bois de Charpente et de Piquet" in the village on Bras d'Or Lake. (AC C11C 13: 148v, 13 mars 1751).

² AC B 35/3: 239 [112], Pontchartrain à Saint-Ovide, 20 mars 1713.
Courtin persuaded Saint-Ovide to supply the Indians with fishing boats and other equipment. The seal hunt in 1726 was successful, which along with a good harvest of Indian corn, provided for that winter.¹

Courtin thought that sealing could also be developed off Ile St. Jean, and that, combined with the cultivation of Indian corn and peas, it could be of considerable value.² LeNormant remarked that sealing and walrus-hunting were done by the men during the summer, leaving the women and children behind to work the gardens.³ If these occupations were properly developed, the Indian establishments at Mirliguèche and Malpec "peuvent devenir considerable."⁴ But competition on the sealing grounds from individuals from Canada and war interfered with the project, which did not thrive.⁵

Unfortunately Courtin, who gave promise of becoming an outstanding missionary, was lost at sea in 1732.⁶ He was temporarily replaced by an Irishman who happened to be at Louisbourg at the time. But Father Eyrne proved to be unsuitable

1. AC C11B 8: 50v-51, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 18 novembre 1726
2. AC C11B 14: 14v-15v, Conseil, 9 février 1733.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. AC C11B 15: 97-97v, Saint-Ovide et LeNormant à Maurepas, 5 novembre 1734; AC B 65/2: 527v [315], Maurepas à Saint-Ovide et LeNormant, 19 avril 1735; and AC B 73/2: 591 [308], Maurepas à Du Quesnel et Bigot, 17 avril 1744.
6. AC C11B 14: 96, Saint-Ovide à "maurepas, 1 septembre 1733.
for the work of an Indian mission; he could not learn the
language or accustom himself to the way of life; besides, the
Indians did not like having an "Englishman" in their midst.¹

Adaptation had its problems as each side resisted
the pressures exerted by the other. For one thing, while the
Indians acknowledged the superiority of European technology,
they did not consider the European way of life superior to
their own. Quite the contrary, in fact, as Europeans had no
skill in hunting or in travelling through the woods without
guides or food. Biard observed,

You will see these poor barbarians,
notwithstanding their great lack of
government, power, letters, art and
riches, yet holding their heads so high
they greatly underrate us, regarding
themselves as our superiors.²

Even at the time of Louisbourg, this was still largely
true. A Louisbourg resident, more generous than Biard, wrote,
"If, while hunting, they meet a Frenchman and have only a little
food, they deprive themselves of it, telling him that, since he
does not know how to fast as long as they, he must keep it for
himself."³

¹. AC C11E 14: 103-105v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 18
octobre 1733; AC C11E 15: 138-139v, Saint-Ovide à Maurepas, 1
novembre 1734. Father Lyme quits the service, AC C11E 15:
211-211v, LeNormant à Maurepas, 5 novembre, 1734.

². Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, III: 73.

³. Wrong, Lettre d'un habitant, 54-55.
Such cultural self-confidence, however, was eventually shaken by the more advanced European technology.

Just at a time when he needed all the self-confidence he could muster, the Indians' reliance upon many of his own technical skills vanished as his stone, wood, bark and bone materials were swept into the discard by the metal implements and utensils of European manufacture. Pride in craftsmanship could no longer be entertained and dependence upon an external source for essential materials was a blow to self-esteem, since the Indian inevitably came to feel himself as inferior to the purveyors of such technical marvels as fire-arms, iron axe-heads, and copper kettles.

While the eventual collapse of Indian society cannot be attributed to technology alone, it was an important factor. The Indians at first showed signs of assimilating the new technology and adapting it to their own cultural patterns. There is every indication that, given a chance, this would have led to the development of a distinctive new culture. But there was not enough time to provide a cushion against the shock of contact, and the Indian was overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers.

The French, moved by humanitarian impulses, at first sought the answer in assimilation. Intermarriage had occurred most frequently in Acadia during the seventeenth century, and at one point seemed to be well on its way toward realizing

Champlain's dream of a new race.\textsuperscript{1} Maillard was led to observe in 1753,

\begin{quote}
Je ne donne pas plus de cinquante ans à ceux-cy aux marichites pour qu'on les voye tellement confondus avec les Français colon, qu'il ne sera presque plus possible de les distinguer.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

This would seem to indicate that intermixing was proceeding apace, at least at the habitant level. As Rameau de Saint-Père has indicated, this is extremely difficult to trace, as parish records, even when available, usually do not give the requisite information. In cases where Frenchmen went to live with Indians, records do not exist at all. However, it is safe to conclude that by Maillard's time intermixing was slackening off, and official approval of such marriages had cooled considerably. This had been presaged by the troubles of the celebrated Indian leader Baron de Saint-Castin, whose mother was Abenaki, and who had problems claiming his family inheritance in France as a result. At Louisbourg, inter-racial marriages were not approved. One of its more notorious scandals involved the marriage of second ensign Dogard de la Noue to Marguerite Guedry at Baie des Espagnoles in 1754. The Superior Council at Louisbourg pronounced the marriage "scandaleux et abusif," and annulled it declaring "les enfants procrées ou à

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} Documents Inédits, III: 151-181. \textsuperscript{2} Rameau de Saint-Père discusses aspects of métissage in Acadia.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{2} Boscq de Beaumont, \textit{Les derniers jours d'Acadie}, 85.
\end{flushleft}
process dudit marriage, Batards et inhabiles à succéder et hériter."\textsuperscript{1} The fact that the young man had married without his commanding officer's permission did not help matters. The court records noted that Marguerite Guedry "avait pour mère la fille d'une sauvagesse concubine de Mius d'Entremont, Acadien."\textsuperscript{2}

Rameau de Saint-Père had no doubts as to the reason for the nullification:

\begin{center}
Ce mariage fut attaqué en nullité, au nom du roi, parce qu'il était défendu aux officiers d'épouser des filles de sang mêlé.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{center}

The English, impressed with French success with Indians and overlooking the changes in the French position regarding intermarriage, proposed the subsidization of such marriages in Nova Scotia. Philipps was instructed to endow each white man or woman who complied with £10 sterling and 50 acres of land free of quit-rent for 20 years. This proposal appeared off and on in governor's instructions from 1719 until 1763,\textsuperscript{4} bringing to mind the Québec experiment of the 1690s. In both cases the projects were dropped because of lack of claimants.

\textsuperscript{1} AC F3 50: 504v-524, Conseil Supérieur, 17 février 1755; AC G2 189: 270-360, Greffes des colonies, 1754-1755 (pièces non cotées).

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. Also cited by Rameau de Saint-Père, Une Colonie féodale en Amérique, L'Acadie, 1604-1831 (2 vols., Paris, 1889), II: 376.

\textsuperscript{3} Documents Inédits, III: 170.

\textsuperscript{4} Brebner, New England's Outposts, 74.
If intermarriages occurred, it was not because of such official encouragement.

If not actual intermixing, then a close familiarity between the races was needed, at least in certain areas, for the French and Indians to act effectively as allies. This was especially true for interpreters. Louisbourg's interpreters, with one exception, were Canadian-born. Mme Duchambon, as we have seen, came from Pobomcoup; Charles de Saint-Etienne de La Tour was the son of the La Tour of the same name who was famous in Acadian history for his feud with Charles de Menou d'Aulnay; and Claude Petitpas, who belonged to an Acadian habitant family of mixed-blood. Claude's son, Barthelemy, was interpreter during the first siege of Louisbourg and died in a Boston prison. Another Petitpas, Louis-Benjamin, served as an interpreter during Louisbourg's last days. He and his family lived with Maillard, and accompanied the missionary to Halifax. The exception was a French-born officer, Jean-François Bourdon, who, however, was the nephew of Simon-Pierre Denys de Bonaventure, who had been prominent in Acadian government, and was married to Marguerite Cauthier, of an old Acadian family. Interpreters were paid 300 livres a year until Barthelemy Petitpas, who complained he could not support his family on

1. This is how the incident is referred to in official correspondence (AC C112 27: 283, Bigot à "maurespas, 7 septembre 1743"). The "Memorial on the "otives of the Savages" in Customs and Manners says Petitpas was put to death (63).
such a salary, and so it was doubled, bringing it into lira with interpreters' salaries in Canada. This increased salary applied only to principal interpreters; auxiliaries such as Louis-Benjamin received 300 livres a year.

Because Louisbourg had such families to draw on, and because it had only one dominant Indian language, Micmac, to contend with, it never found itself in the position described by La Galissonnière in Canada:

Un des plus grands embarras au je me trouve ici est celui des Sauvages des différentes langues dont je suis sans cesse obsédé, et la plupart du temps manque de bon interprètes. Il n'est pas aisé de trouvé des personnes qui veulent faire cette fonction tant à cause de l'importunité des sauvages qui est au dela de toute expression que par la modicité de ce que le Roy donne; on gagneroit beaucoup à les paier plus cher, et a en avoir de bons et affider, ceux qui sont tels trouvent les moyens de restringire les demandes des sauvages, au lieu que les autres les excitent à demander; c'est peut-être une des principales causes de la dépense excessive de ce pays-ci.1

If the Indians became a considerable factor in the Louisbourg budget, it was directly due to the military situation, both active and latent. If the Indians were demanding, the French were willing to pay the price.

An easily overlooked aspect of Indian-French relations at Louisbourg is that of slavery, as it has left so little trace

1. AC C11A 87: 262-263, La Galissonnière à Maurepas, 23 octobre 1747.
in official records. Of the nine baptisms recorded for Indians between 1722 and 1745 in the parish registers, three are listed for persons belonging to someone, and one is listed for Louis, born to Louise, a panis. The father is given as unknown.1

It was Louise who became the subject of a court case. The notarial records note a "cession d'une sauvagesse Panis élevée comme esclave au Canada," by Pierre Ruette d'Auteuil, Sieur de la Malotière, owner and captain of the schooner "Le St-Pierre" of Québec, to Sieur Jean Seigneur, proprietor of an inn at Louisbourg.2

The following February, Seigneur lodged a complaint that Louise was pregnant, and that she had been sold to him under false pretences. He had agreed to pay four barrels of wine for her, two at the time of the transaction, two at a later date. However, her pregnancy had made her useless for the purpose for which he had bought her, which was to be a family servant. Besides, it was a bad example for his children.3

Louise, questioned by Frère Michel Ange Le Duff, said that Sieur de la Malotière had brought her down from Montreal in a schooner, had slept with her during the trip, and that he knew she was pregnant when he sold her.

1. AC Gl 406: 36v, registre IV, 3 avril 1728.
2. AC G3 Carton 2058 [No. 15], notariat, 20 août 1727.
3. AC G2 190 [No. 3]: 74v-76v, Grecques des tribunaux de Louisbourg et du Canada, 19 février 1723.
The records for the next year tell us the outcome. Sieur de la Malotière agreed to cancel the payment of the two remaining barrels of wine, and to split the costs with Seigneur of sending Louise and her baby to Martinique where she would be sold. The agreement continued,

Que si la dite Louise et Son enfant est vendue assės avantageusement pour pouvoir en acheter un Naigre, que le dit naigre restera par preference au dit Seigneur en reconnoissance des avances qu'il fait.¹

Indian slaves sold for less than negroes. For example, an inventory for French shipping from Canada and Mississippi arriving at Martinique in 1755 include the Québec ship La Légère with six Indians listed as cargo and valued at 1000 livres apiece; negroes that same year were selling at Martinique for 1025 livres apiece.² The listing for the Québec ship had the notation, "Le capitaine avait deux permissions de M. le Général de Québec pour transporter les six Sauvages en cette Isle."³

1. AC G3 Carton 2037 [no. 58], Notariat, 28 août 1729.

2. AC F2C Art. 4: 228, État de batimens français arrivés du Canada et du Mississippi à Martinique pendant l'année 1755 et des Marchandises qu'ils ont apportées des dits Lieus.

Louisbourg accounts list the payment of 154 livres to the widow Laflourie for a slave to be the wife of the fortress-town's executioner. This, however, seems to be referring to blacks. (AC C11C 12: 105-117, bordereau de dépenses, 1743). The executioner had been a slave in Martinique, where upon his conviction for killing a negro boy, he had been given the option of serving as executioner at Louisbourg or of suffering the death penalty. (AC C2 86: 437-438, Extrait des registres du Conseil Supérieur de la Martinique, 9 septembre 1741).

3. AC F2C Art. 4: 223, 1755.
If the Micmacs and their allies were used as slaves during the Louisbourg years, the records are silent.

They are also silent as to whether Micmac or French individuals ever attacked each other. This may be more apparent than real, because unless a person is identified by race as well as by name, it can be impossible to tell from the record. We know, for instance, that hungry Indians killed livestock, and that the government patiently reimbursed the owners without taking the Indians to task.

1. McLennan, Louisbourg, 66, wrote that le Comte d'Agrain (a French officer who had contracted to ship timber from Ile Royale to the Rochefort timber yards) was murdered by two Indians. Actually, the murder was done by two engagés, Antoine Courrieu and Pierre Corroyer. The year before his death, the Count had brought over 10 prisoners as engagés (AC F2C carton 2: 355-356 [50], 9 septembre 1721). There was a trial at Rochefort at which Courrieu was condemned "à être rompre vif", but it was annulled and the two accused were sent to Louisbourg for retrial, which took place in 1723. Courrieu was executed and Corroyer had his sentence commuted to service as a soldier in America. (AM, Series E, Fonds de Mss. No. 6, Port de Rochefort, 4 février 1723). See also Bulletin de Recherches Historiques XX, No. 6 (juin 1914), 192, for Regis Roy's version of the affair; and the article by John Humphreys on Jean-Antoine d'Agrain, Dictionary of Canadian Biography, II: 12.

Efforts must have been made to persuade the Indians not to behave in that way. One wonders how patient the French would have been if they had not been confronted by the English. We do know that there was no such patience evident in their attitude toward Frenchmen guilty of the same offence. Versailles officials approved when Saint-Ovide had a proclamation read to the troops forbidding the killing of animals on pain of death.\(^1\) They also approved the punishment Saint-Ovide had earlier meted out to soldiers who had killed and eaten livestock belonging to local inhabitants. The price of the livestock was deducted from the soldiers' pay.

Occasions when French property was burned, such as the 1748 attack on the Ile Royale colliery and the 1750 destruction of Beaubassin by Le Loutre's Indians\(^2\) were French-led incidents in the war against the English.\(^3\)

An effort to establish a code of behaviour acceptable to both French and Indians is illustrated by a set of rules drawn up in 1739 on Ile Royale. They specified among other

\(^1\) AC B 45/2: 1132 [271], Conseil à Saint-Ovide, 13 mai 1722.

\(^2\) AC C11B 29: 73-77, Prévost à Rouillé, 22 juillet 1750.

\(^3\) One case in which Micmac attacked French settlers occurred near Abshaboo (Nathurst, N.B.). The French settlements, which had previously been dispersed by the Mohawk, had begun again in 1670. Disturbed in their turn by the encroachments of the French, the Micmac, led by Halion, dispersed the settlements once more in 1692. (Abraham Gesner, New Brunswick with notes for Immigrants, (London, 1847), 29).
things that anyone who hits his father or mother or takes them by the hair will be put to death, and that anyone who aids the English by such means as carrying letters will not receive presents. The Indians agreed to bind themselves by those regulations "car ils n'ont en vue que de faire à la volonté du Roy leur Père ils aideront en cela leurs frères tant de costé de l'âme que de costé de corps." They also agreed "à estre autant soumis et obéissant au Roy qu'ils se font eux mêmes."  

The following year Bourvillc reported with satisfaction that the rules were being enforced. One of the examples he gave concerned a woman who had been in the habit of destroying her babies. When she repeated the offence in the spring of 1740, the Indians whipped her at the door of the church "conformément à leurs règlements ce qui n'avait jamais été jusqu'à lors."  

Bringing the French and Indian concepts of social order into some sort of accord was not only important to the

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1. AC F3 Art. 95: 35, Collection Moreau-et Mery. Règlements faits par les chefs sauvages de l'Isle Royale, de Martigonneiche et de Chikpenakady et monsieur de Bourville dans le conseil tenu au Port Toulouse pour la distribution des présents, 9 juillet 1739. The text is written in French and twice in Micmac, in script and ideograms.

2. AC C11B 22: 113-124, Bourville à "maurepas, 26 octobre 1740. The rules had been drawn up by a council of Indians and French following complaints from "aillard and Le Loutre that their missionary work was being nullified because the chiefs would not punish crime."
running of the colony but also to the fostering of Indian loyalty. The success of these efforts, which rested as much on resolving minor issues as well as major ones, is written in the pages of Canadian history. For all the Indian reputation for fickleness, the Micmac and the Malecite remained faithful allies to the French to the end. Neither did they abandon the Catholic faith when left without priests for long periods, even after the French left. Perhaps we can give the last word to a Micmac, who in replying to a Frenchman's efforts to convince him of the superiority of the French way of life, asked: "Which of these two is the wisest and happiest -- he who labours without ceasing and only obtains, and that with great trouble, enough to live on, or he who rests in comfort and finds all that he needs in the pleasure of hunting and fishing?" 1

* * * * *

The completeness of the collapse of the Micmac and Malecite world was not immediately evident after the departure of the French. The spectre of France still hung over long-disputed Acadia, and at least one English governor of Nova Scotia, Montague Wilmot, believed it would be in England's best interests to continue the custom of annual gift-giving. When Amherst's policy led to the refusal of the Micmac chief's request at Louisbourg, the chief had replied that he would have to go

to St Pierre or Miquelon where the French would give him supplies. "I am fearful," wrote Governor Wilmot to the Board of Trade in 1763, that the French "very readily and perhaps bountifully supplied this man's wants, and would gladly seize the opportunity for re-establishing once more that interest with these people, by means of whom they so long and effectually obstructed the settlement of this country."¹

Wilmot would not have been so apprehensive if he had known of the King's instructions to Gabriel François Dangeac at St. Pierre and Miquelon. Dangeac was forbidden to receive any Indians from Cape Breton, "leur apparition à St Pierre et à Miquelon ne pouvant qu'être désagréable aux Anglais et aussi dispendieuse qu'inutile aux français."² As they were no longer useful to her imperial designs, France was no longer concerned about the Indians. It is interesting to note in this connection that an Indian is listed among the refugees in France who received a pension. She is identified simply as Thérèse.³

Although the English gave some gifts to pacify the Indians (mostly useful articles, but including, at the special request of some chiefs, gold-laced hats, ruffled shirts and

¹. Richard Brown, Cape Breton, 356.
². AC C12, 1: 3v, Mémoire du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sr Dangeac nommé au gouvernement des Isles St Pierre et de Miquelon, 23 février 1763.
³. AC C11D 9: A-U, Pensions accordées aux réfugiés, sans date.
ribbons), they did not prevent the Indians from migrating to the French islands as well as to Newfoundland during the next two years. Sir Hugh Palliser, governor of Newfoundland, ordered the newcomers to leave, and became more alarmed than ever when he heard that even more Micmacs were planning to come over to help the French retake the colony.

The sad truth for the Micmacs was that they had been thrown back on their own resources when they had practically no resources left. Their interest in Newfoundland seems to have been aroused by its hunting and fishing.

When Saint-Luc de la Corne was shipwrecked off Cape Breton in 1761, he found his old friends and acquaintances living on the borderline of starvation. They brought him down to Artigongué (Antigonish) "où nous trouvâmes cinq cabanes de Sauvages qui mouroient pour ainsi dire de faim, & nous n'étions pas chargés de vivres...Nous ne trouvâmes pas de meilleurs hôtes, ils jeunoient tous."¹

Twenty years later, in 1780, S.W. Prenties, ensign of the 84th Regiment of Foot, was also shipwrecked in the same area. Again Indians came to the rescue. They agreed to help him, but made it clear they expected some compensation, as otherwise their families would suffer if they took time out from hunting without making some provision for them. Prenties

showed them some money "and observing an eagerness in their countenances at the sight of the coin, which I had little expected amongst Indians, and that the women in particular seemed to have taken strong fancy to it, I presented them with a guinea each."

He and his companions stayed for several weeks with their hosts, although once the Indians knew the castaways had money, the situation was not as comfortable as before. "They became as mercenary as they had hitherto been charitable, and exacted above ten times the value for every little necessary they furnished for myself and the rest of my companions," Prenties sadly observed.

This recalls Le Clercq's observation a century earlier that the Indians did not give anything for nothing and that they would demand compensation for the least service.

The Indians' devotion to their Catholic faith struck Prenties. "Perhaps," he concluded, "it was this very circumstance of their communication with Christians that had inspired them with that vehement love of money."

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2. Ibid., 54.
CONCLUSION

Of the three major colonizing powers in North America, France was the most skilful in establishing a working relationship with the Indians and in using them for instruments of empire. The French genius lay in recognizing and developing Indian potential for this purpose. This was largely due to the circumstances of contact: the French in the north established a commercial colony based on the fur trade, which depended heavily upon the cooperation of the Indians; the English established agricultural colonies in the central regions, for which Indians were an impediment; and the Spanish established their rule upon the conquered Indian civilizations of the south. French attitudes toward the Indian did not differ so very greatly from those of the English or the Spanish, at least not on the theoretical level. It was hardly a case, as Abbé Casgrain put it so euphemistically, of the French embracing the Indians "comme des frères". But necessity can produce strange alliances, and so the term "French and Indians" has become a cliché of colonial histories.

Other factors besides the obvious one of economics contributed to this. Religion, for one. The winds of the Counter-Reformation had whipped up fervour in France to the point where the salvation of souls was accorded an overwhelming importance. In New France this led to the great consequence of missionaries throughout the seventeenth century, which by the eighteenth century had begun to wane. There were also the factors of political ideology and personality. The French, few in number and spread over an immense territory, had to use every means at their disposal to make those numbers count to the utmost. Without their Indian allies, they could neither have expanded nor held that territory as they did. For all of these reasons, friendship of the Indians was indispensable.

For the Indians, the choice between French and English or Spanish was in the end irrelevant, for the technology and competitive commercial individualism of the Europeans spelt doom for collective Indian societies in spite of the good intentions of individuals and of particular policies. Time ran out for Indian cultures; even those which had begun to adapt were swept aside by the sheer force of numbers of the European invasion.

From the moment Louisbourg was envisaged, a vital rôle was seen for the Micmac, Malecite and Abenaki. Their hunting would help to provide food for the colonists, at least in the beginning; their furs would provide income, although it was realized this would never be great, as sources of supply were already failing along the Atlantic seaboard. Indians could
develop seal-hunting, which could be used as the basis of industries and they could help with the fisheries. Since their neighbours the Abenaki were semi-agricultural, it was hoped that the Micmac could also be persuaded to take up farming, or at least gardening.

The purpose of all these plans was far from being just the welfare of the Indians. They would be extremely useful in harassing and perhaps discouraging English settlement in troubled Acadia. Throughout the Louisbourg period the Indians were used as partisans in the French-English confrontation. It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance the French attached to this; in the end, it overwhelmed all other consideration including thrifty notions of encouraging Indians to learn new forms of self-sufficiency as farmers and commercial fishermen. As the Indians' services as partisans were at a premium, they could use them to bargain for the necessities of life as well as for such side-benefits as gold-braid or brandy. This meant that the Micmac and the Malecite did not feel the full impact of their dependence on trade goods until after the fall of New France.

Gift diplomacy was essential to maintaining the active allegiance of the Indians. Where in pre-contact days this type of negotiation had been essentially an exchange, under the pressures of colonization it became a diplomatic handout, providing subsistence for the Indians and protection for the French. The French also ensured the loyalty of their allies by appointing influential
Indians as officers and paying them accordingly, by awarding medals and by carefully paying for services. They sent young men to live with the Indians, and at first encouraged intermarriage. This policy cooled, however, at least at the official level, as it became apparent it was easier to make Indians out of Frenchmen than Frenchmen out of Indians.

While there is no question that the French manipulated the Indians for their own ends, it is equally true that the Indians were engaged in the same game. However, the goals were different: the French were building and maintaining an empire, while the Indians were seeking self-survival. The Indians played off the French against the English, realizing that the rivalry between the two European powers put them in a position of strength. As soon as that counterbalance was removed, the Indians were defeated by superiority of numbers if not by superiority of technology.

While they never controlled the course of the English-French confrontation in Acadia, they influenced its character. Their special brand of guerrilla warfare with its emphasis on terror forced the Europeans to adapt their own techniques of warfare. Indian ideas of personal liberty forced the French to tacitly grant their wilderness allies a special status and to refer to them as allies and not as subjects. This was a reversal of the original French position, which aimed at the Indians' "recognition of and submission to the authority and domination of the Crown of France." As for the Micmac, they regarded themselves

as free and sovereign allies of the French; they accepted the French King because he was their "father", having taught them their new religion. They did not feel they owed him any more allegiance than they owed their own chiefs. The French counterbalanced this by developing leaders (usually French, but sometimes part Indian) who organized the Indians into highly effective guerrillas, both on land and on sea. By this means the French were able to challenge the much more populous and hence more powerful English colonies. They severely retarded English colonization in Nova Scotia and to a lesser extent in northern New England. Their harassment of English fishing fleets was particularly effective during the early days of Louisbourg.

The general tone of official Louisbourg correspondence reveals little liking for the Indians. The cultural gap was too wide to allow for more than tolerance. But official communiqués were characterized by restraint, by the need to persuade and influence rather than to command. This caused the French to be unsure of their allies and hence not always comfortable with them.

There is little evidence of every-day fraternization between Indians and French at Louisbourg. In fact, what fraternization there was very early drew official protest. Soubras, for one, did not think it proper "que les français se meslent si fort avec les Sauvages."\(^1\) The Indians seem to have

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come into the fortress-town principally for special occasions;\(^1\) their preferred rendezvous with officialdom were at such posts as Port Toulouse, Port Dauphin and Port La Joye. The main Indian village on Ile Royale was Mirliguêche on Bras d'Or Lake until 1750, and then at Ile Ste Famille, on the same lake.

Assimilation does not seem to have been considered at Louisbourg; at least, it does not reveal itself in correspondence.\(^2\) By the time the fortress was established, Micmac and Malecite had already been converted to Catholicism. The problem was one of maintaining missions, not one of conversion. Schools received little enough consideration at the fortress-town, and none of it was for the Indians.

It has been said that if there was any discrimination by the French against the Indians, it was cultural and not racial.\(^3\) Certainly cultural values were not reconcilable between the French, who in commerce were individualistic and competitive and in politics were absolutist, and the Indians, who were collective in trade and land ownership, but individualistic in politics and war. While the pressures of contact changed the Indian way of

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1. This is suggested by Louisbourg's accounts, which from time to time list such expenses as "pension pendant 69 jours à 37 sauvages, 138 livres". (AC C11C 14: 111v, diverses dépenses, 1755). Excavations at Fortress Louisbourg, currently being carried out by the Federal Government in connection with restoration of part of the fortress and town, have not so far yielded any Indian artifacts.

2. A case in Louisbourg court records concerns the sale of the effects of Rose Négresse, who had died owing rent during the absence of her husband, Baptiste Laurent Indien. The goods listed indicate a very moderate standard of living. (AC G2, 212: dossier 552, bailliage de Louisbourg, 27 avril 1757).

life, it did not change them into Frenchmen. Micmac remained Micmac, as they are to this day.

If the French adapted to their Indian allies, the Indians adapted to the French. For instance, in spite of their feelings about usufruct of land, they did not disturb the Acadians on their farms, at least not during the eighteenth century, and even considered them as allies -- not the kind of relationship New Englanders achieved with the Indians whose lands they took over for farming.

The Micmac and Malecite paid the final tribute to French policy in their continuing loyalty to the French, not only when they were present but also long after they had gone. And to this day they are still Catholics.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

MINISTERS OF MARINE, 1669-1761

7 March 1669, Jean Baptiste Colbert
6 September 1683, Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Seignelay
7 November 1690, Louis de Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain
6 September 1699, Jerome Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain
September 1715, Victor Marie d'Estrées, Maréchal de France, Président du Conseil de la Marine
24 September 1718, Joseph T.B. Fleurian, Comte d'Armenonville, Secretary of State (for signatures only)
9 April 1722, Charles F.B. Fleurian d'Armenonville, Comte de Marville (takes full control, 22 March 1723)
14 August 1723, Jean Frederic Phélypeaux, Comte de Maurepas
30 April 1749, Antoine Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jody
31 July 1754, Jean Baptiste de Machault d'Arnouville
1 February 1757, François Marie de Moras
1 June 1758, Claude Louis, Marquis de Massiac
1 November 1758, Nicolas René Berryer
4 October 1761, Etienne François de Choiseul de Stainville

Source: Index to Reports of Canadian Archives from 1872 to 1908 (Ottawa, 1909) 105 (corrected).
APPENDIX II

GOVERNORS OF ILE ROYALE, 1714-1755

French

9 April 1741, Philippe Pastour de Costebelle
1714, 1715, Jacques L'Hermitte, acting

16 November 1717, Louis-Joseph de Brouillan de Saint-Ovide

November 1722 - July 1723; 1730, 1731, November 1737-1739, May
1740 - November 1740, François Le Coutre de Bourville, acting

1 April 1739, Isaac-Louis de Forant

18 September 1740, Jean-Baptiste-Louis Le Prévost, Seigneur
du Quesnel

9 October 1744, Louis Du Pont Duchambon, acting

1 January 1749, Charles Desherbiers, Sieur de la Ralière,
commandant

1 March 1751, Jean-Louis, Comte de Raymond et Seigneur d'Oye

October 1753 - August 1754, Charles-Joseph d'Ailleboust, acting

12 May 1754, Chevalier Jean-Louis Augustin Drucour

English

August 1745, Peter Warren

14 March 1746, Charles Knowles

30 November 1747, Thomas Percgrine Hopson

Sources: Archives des Colonies, Série B, Série G2
Fairfax Downey, Louisbourg: Key to a Continent,
APPENDIX III

COMMISSAIRE-ORDONNATEURS OF ISLE ROYALE

12 April 1714, Pierre-Auguste de Soubras
19 June 1718, Jacques-Ange LeNormant de Mezy
23 March 1735, Sébastien-François-Ange LeNormant de Mezy
   (in effect, 1729; commissaire, 1733)
1 May 1739, François Bigot
28 March 1749, Jacques Prévost

Source: Archives des Colonies, Série B, Série G2.
APPENDIX IV

PENOBSCOT WHALE HUNTING

One especial thing is their manner of killing the Whale, which they call Powdawe;\(^1\) and will describe his forme; how he bloweth up the water; and that he is 12 fathoms long; and that they go in company of their King with a multitude of their boats, and strike him with a bone made in fashion of a harping iron fastened to a rope, which they veare out after him; then all their boats come about him, and as he riseth above water, with their arrows they shoot him to death; when they have killed him and dragged him to shore, they call all their chiefe lords together, and sing a song of joy: and those chiefe lords, whom they call Sagamos, divide the spoile, and give to every man a share, which pieces so distributed they hang about their houses for provision: and when they boile them, they blow off the fat, and put to their peace, maiz and other pulse, which they eat.

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1. Abenaki for "he blows".

DECLARATION DE GUERRE DES MICMACS AUX ANGLAIS
S'ILS REFUSENT D'ABANDONNER KCHIBOUKTOUK (HALIFAX)

C'est ainsi qu'écrivent les chefs sauvages au Gouverneur de Kchibouktouk.

SEIGNEUR

L'endroit où tu es, où tu fais des habitations, où tu bâtis un fort, où tu veux maintenant comme t'inthroniser, cette terre dont tu veux présentement te rendre maître absolu, cette terre m'appartient, j'en suis certes sorti comme l'herbe, c'est le propre lieu de ma naissance et de ma résidence, c'est ma terre à moy sauvage; oui, je le jure, c'est Dieu qui me l'a donnée pour être mon pais à perpétuité.

Que je te dise donc d'abord les dispositions de mon coeur à ton égard, car il ne se peut que ce que tu fais à K'chibouktouk ne m'allarme, Mon Roi et ton Roy ont fait entre eux le partage des terres; c'est ce qui fait qu'aujourd'hui ils sont en paix. mais moy il ne se peut que je fasse paix ou alliance avec toy. montre-moy où moy sauvage me logerai? tu me chasse toy; où veux tu donc que je me réfugie? tu t'es emparé de presque toute cette terre dans toute son étendue, il ne me restoit plus que Kchibouktouk. Tu m'envies encore ce morceau, jusquès-là même que tu veux m'en chasser. Je connois par la même que tu veux m'en chasser. Je connois par là que tu m'engage toy-même à ne cesser de nous faire la guerre, et à ne jamais faire alliance contre nous. tu te glorifies de ton grand nombre moy sauvage en petit nombre ne me glorifie en autre chose qu'en Dieu qui scâit très bien tout ce dont il s'agit; un ver de terre scâit regimber quand on l'attaque. moy sauvage il ne se peut que je ne croye valoir au moins un tant soit peu plus qu'un ver de terre à plus forte raison scâurai-je me defendre si on m'attaque.

Ta résidence au Port Royal ne me fait plus grand ombrage, car tu vois que depuis long temps je t'y laisse tranquille. mais présentement tu me forces d'ouvrir la bouche par le vol
considérable que tu me fais. J'iray bientôt te voir, peut-être recevra tu bien ce que je te dirai; si tu mécoutes et que tu me parles comme il faut, et que tu exécutes tes belles paroles, je connoîtrai par là que tu ne cherches que le bien, de sorte que toutes choses prendront un bon tour; je ne t'en dis pas davantage pour ne te pas plus longtemps rompre la tête par mes discours.

Je te salue, Seigneur.

Ecrit au Port Toulouse cinq jours avant la Saint Michel.

Source: Collection de documents inédits sur le Canada et l'Amérique publiés par le Canada Français, I, 17-19.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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MG 4: Archives de la Guerre

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MG 7: Bibliothèques de Paris

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