AN INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE OF THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN
IN SELECTIONS FROM LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S THEORY
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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Thesis submitted to the School of
Graduate Studies of the University
of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Education

Ottawa, Canada, 1976
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was prepared under the supervision of Professor André Coté, Ph.D., of the Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa, to whom the writer extends her appreciation.

The writer also wishes to express sincere gratitude to Professor Mary T. Mulcahy, Ph.D., of the Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa, for her guidance and support in writing this thesis.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION.</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.- BACKGROUND.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Historical Development of Moral Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Definitions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Evaluations of Kohlberg's Research</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.- THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Kohlberg's Writings on Affect</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overtones of the Affective Domain in Kohlberg's Writings</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Description of the Affective Domain</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.- ANALYSIS OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Direct References of Kohlberg</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overtones of the Affective Domain in Kohlberg's Writings</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX

1. DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES | 65 |
2. ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT | 68 |
3. CHILDREN'S STATEMENTS ILLUSTRATING DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES ON AN ASPECT OF MORALITY | 70 |
4. ABSTRACT OF An Inquiry into the Role of the Affective Domain in Lawrence Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development | 72 |
INTRODUCTION

In recent decades there has been an increased interest on the part of educators in the process of moral development. At certain periods during the last seventy-five years the study of children's moral development has been seriously pursued, whereas at other periods it has been somewhat neglected. The study of moral education has been carried out in a variety of ways. One method which is current today is the cognitive-developmental approach. It is to this school of thought that Lawrence Kohlberg belongs.

Kohlberg has been conducting research in this area for the last twenty years and his studies have made a significant contribution in this field. Nevertheless, some of the evaluations that have been made of the Kohlberg studies point to certain inadequacies in his research. One of the most striking of these is his failure to treat the affective domain in his theory of moral development.

It is the purpose of this study then, to make an inquiry into the role of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. This study is timely since this is one of the points for which Kohlberg is being criticized today.

This thesis is arranged in three chapters. The first chapter begins with a brief presentation of the background of the development of the study of moral education in this
century. The definitions which Kohlberg gives in his writings are stated. This is followed by a description of Kohlberg's theory. Then the evaluations of Kohlberg's research are discussed. This discussion paves the way for both the presentation of the particular problem which is to be the topic of this study, and for the stating of the research question which is to guide this study.

The second chapter begins with a review of Kohlberg's explicit and implicit references to the affective domain which are culled from his writings. This will not be an exhaustive study of all that Kohlberg has written. It will deal with those articles that are directly related to the problem at hand. This chapter concludes with a description of the affective domain. It is this description that will be used as a frame of reference in order to analyze Kohlberg's statements about the affective domain.

The third chapter presents an analysis of Kohlberg's statements which deal directly with the affective domain, along with an analysis of certain themes that were found throughout his writings which have affective overtones.

The thesis concludes with a summary of the findings, an annotated bibliography, appendices and an abstract.
CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The first chapter begins with a short presentation of the historical development of moral education and with an attempt to place the Kohlberg studies within that framework. Relevant definitions are then provided. This is followed by a description of Kohlberg's theory of moral development and a summary of the evaluations of his research. The chapter concludes with a statement of the problem along with the research question which is to guide this study.

1. Historical Development of Moral Education.

During the early part of the twentieth century morality was seen as the key to understanding the social development of the child. In the late 1920's the Hartshorne and May studies indicated that conventional and formal methods of moral education used in the past were ineffective. Among their findings two of the more significant ones were the following. Character education classes, whether carried on in the school or elsewhere, had little influence on children's moral conduct. Situational factors as compared to moral training were more important in determining moral behavior.

Piaget's influence on the area of moral development is probably the greatest of the century.\(^2\) His name stands out not only because of his major contribution, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*,\(^3\) but also because of his many observations and his theoretical interpretations which stimulated an abundance of further research. Following this upsurge of interest in moral development there came a period of relative quiet regarding this aspect of child development.

In 1949, Havighurst and Taba,\(^4\) representing the psychoanalytic and neopsychoanalytic theories of personality, indicated that moral character is based upon affective tendencies rather than upon situational factors. As can be seen, approaches to the study of moral development have been many and varied. Three possible ways to describe these approaches as they appear in the research are: the emotional approach, the behavioral approach, and the judgmental approach.

The first school of thought, which is described by some as maturationist, is rooted in the work of Rousseau

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and today is presented by the disciples of Freud. The extreme position of this school is presented by A. S. Neill. Those who hold this point of view believe that what is most important in the development of the child is that which comes from within him and the pedagogical environment should be one which creates a climate to allow inner 'goods' (abilities and social virtues) to unfold and the inner 'bad' to come under the control of the inner good rather than be fixated by adult cultural pressures.

This group proposes an emotional approach to moral development. The basic motive for morality is the emotion of guilt, reactions of remorse after transgressions of cultural standards.

The second school of thought, which is described by some as cultural training, can be traced from John Locke through Thorndike to Skinner. The adherents of this school believe that what is important in the development of the child is his learning the cognitive and moral knowledge and rules of the culture and that education's business is the teaching of such information and rules to the child through direct instruction.

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8 Ibid., p. 1015.

9 Ibid., p. 1015.
Most of the early American research in the area concentrated upon this approach to moral development. Those who hold this viewpoint posit a behavioral approach to moral development. They believe that the underlying motive for morality may be described as conformity or resistance to temptation.

A third school of thought, which may be described as cognitive-developmental or interactional, has been greatly influenced by the work of Piaget. Its most recent exponent is Lawrence Kohlberg. Those holding this view believe

... that the cognitive and affective structures which education should nourish are natural emergents from the interaction between the child and environment under conditions where such interaction is allowed or fostered.

The members of this school of thought hold that moral education implies "the capacity to make judgments in terms of a standard and to justify maintaining the standard to oneself and others."

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It is sometimes difficult to draw clear distinctions between the first two approaches. In the literature they seem to be sometimes combined and they often overlap. However, the third approach seems to be more distinct. Kohlberg claims that recent research indicates that character formation is developmental. Of all those who contributed to the study of moral development in this century, the two who have had the strongest influence upon Kohlberg are Dewey and Piaget. Kohlberg's ongoing study was based in part upon the earlier works of Dewey and Piaget. From Dewey, he adopted the notion that science can make a definite contribution to any discussion of values and moral activity which includes interaction. From Piaget, Kohlberg adopted a structural and developmental approach to cognitive and moral growth. In order to describe Kohlberg's theory of moral development, certain definitions must be provided.

2. Definitions.

Kohlberg does not define many terms but the few that he does are presented here. The term, moral judgment, is


often found in Kohlberg's writings. For Kohlberg, "moral judgments are judgments about the good and right of action. ... moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal or ideal grounds." 16

Another word, principle, also appears frequently in his works. Kohlberg claims that: "By principle we mean something more abstract than the ordinary rule.... A moral principle is a universal mode of choosing, a rule of choosing, which we want all people to adopt in all situations." 17

One of the claims Kohlberg makes is that the only true principle is justice. Kohlberg takes the word justice "to mean a moral resolution of competing claims, that is a reference to a method of distributing or defining claims." 18

The concept of justice is central to Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

The goal of moral education is defined by Kohlberg as "the stimulation of the development of the individual child's moral judgment or character." 19


17 Ibid., p. 58.

18 Ibid., p. 62-63.

He defines moral teaching as "a process of open discussion which is aimed at stimulating the child to move to the next step of his development."  

There is still another expression which Kohlberg uses especially when he speaks of the application of his theory. The expression is, moral conflict. For Kohlberg: "Moral conflict is a conflict between competing claims of men; you versus me, you versus a third person. The precondition for moral conflict is man's capacity for role-taking."  

The definitions found in Kohlberg's research have been presented. It is now possible to proceed with a description of his theory of moral development.


It was at the University of Chicago that Lawrence Kohlberg began his studies in the area of moral development and it was there that he completed his doctoral dissertation in 1958. For some time after this he continued to do further research in Chicago. Later he conducted studies in the Boston area where he became professor of Education and Social  


Psychology at Harvard. He is currently Director of Harvard's Center for Moral Education. He has conducted numerous research projects in the United States as well as in other countries. Kohlberg's cross cultural studies have been carried out in Britain, Canada, Formosa, Honduras, India, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States.

Kohlberg's longitudinal and cross cultural studies have led him to identify different kinds of moral judgments and he speaks of these different types as moral stages. He makes a distinction between moral content and moral structure. A brief description of each of these terms is provided below.

Moral content may be described as the rules or the commands found in each morality, along with the behavioral responses called for by these moralities. Moral content, then, differs from individual to individual, from culture to culture.

Moral structure may be described as the organizing form and underlying propositions that constitute moral judgment and activity.

Kohlberg proposes that there are three basic levels of moral judgment: preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional. For the individual at level one, usually young children under the ages of nine to eleven, moral value is determined by external, quasi-physical needs rather
than by persons and standards. For the individual at level two, usually the average adolescent or adult who wants to maintain the values and rules of society, moral value resides in performing good and right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectations of others. For the individual at level three, for the most part adults, moral value resides in conformity by the self to standards, rights, and duties. Each level is subdivided into two stages. The model is stated briefly below and presented in its entirety in Appendix 1.

I. Preconventional Level
   Stage 1. The punishment and obedience orientation
   Stage 2. The instrumental relativist orientation

II. Conventional Level
   Stage 3. The interpersonal concordance or 'good-boy - nice girl' orientation
   Stage 4. The 'law and order' orientation

III. Postconventional Level
   Stage 5. The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones
   Stage 6. The universal ethical principle orientation. 22

While the stage concept indicates age trends it should be noted that it implies much more. These implications are drawn from three major findings. First, Kohlberg's stage concept implies universality of sequence under different conditions.

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cultural conditions. Second, his stages define structural wholes, specific organizations of thought, not just attitudes towards particular situations. Third, his stages are hierarchical integrations; the higher stages include preceding types of thought.

Kohlberg's concept of the stages implies an invariant sequence in which each child must proceed in a step-by-step fashion through a series of moral judgments. One passes through these stages in sequence, one through six; that is, one cannot be at stage four without having been through stages one to three. Children may move at varying speeds through these stages, or they may become fixated at any one level of development. However, if they continue to develop they must do so in an upward movement. It should be noted that an individual while being predominantly at one stage may also demonstrate responses characteristic of the stage above and of the stage below. That is, as children develop they are partly in the stage into which they are moving and partly in the stage which they are leaving behind.

As a result of his studies Kohlberg discovered that there were no important differences in moral development among atheists, Buddhists, Catholics, Jews, Moslems, and Protestants. 23 His studies have also shown that the basic

developmental sequence of moral judgments is evidenced in children regardless of whether they come from working class families or from middle class families. The same findings hold true for boys as well as for girls; with popular children as well as with socially isolated children. Socially isolated children and children from working class families progressed more slowly and in some cases did not advance as far, yet they were found to follow the same pattern of development. The Kohlberg studies also indicate that in some less developed countries the difference in development lies in the pace at which individuals move from one stage to the next. Kohlberg concludes that while the rate at which individuals advance and the terminal point of adult development differs from individual to individual, and from culture to culture, the pattern of development is the same regardless of the different environmental and cultural factors.

Kohlberg not only proposes a theory of moral development, but also puts forth specific ways whereby his theory may be implemented in the schools. Kohlberg claims that whether it is accepted or not, moral education does occur in the schools and therefore he suggests that it might as well be done consciously. He maintains that his theory offers an alternative to: (1) a state imposed moral indoctrination, and (2) the type of moralization which inevitably does
occur in classrooms over trivial matters. The aim of moral education for Kohlberg is "the stimulation of the development of the child's moral judgment and character." An element of his theory which Kohlberg considers to be one of its most valuable characteristics is the fact that a student is helped to move towards the direction to which he is already tending rather than having a value system imposed upon him.

The method employed to bring about this goal comprises two steps. The first consists in presenting the student with a conflict situation, one for which he does not have a ready answer. The situation must be genuine and difficult. Kohlberg claims that placing a certain amount of stress on the student's power of moral reasoning will stimulate him to move toward the next level of moral development. The second step consists in having the student engage in a peer group discussion with others who have been challenged to respond to the same moral dilemma. The aim of the discussion is to find some solution to the given conflict situation. Ample opportunity is to be provided for argument and disagreement. The tension created by this interaction should provide the stimulation necessary for the development

of a higher mode of reasoning. It must be understood, however, that Kohlberg is in no way suggesting a specific curriculum. He sees moral education in a much broader context which would permeate the whole educational process.

Kohlberg is suggesting that teachers are able to stimulate a child's ability to make moral judgments. He asserts that in order for a teacher to be effective he must:

1. have knowledge of the child's level of thought
2. match the child's level of communicating at the level directly above
3. focus on reasoning
4. help the child experience the type of conflict that leads to an awareness of the greater adequacy of the next stage.25

Teacher effectiveness in Kohlberg's terms requires that they be able to present students with genuine moral conflicts and create a classroom atmosphere which will encourage the participation of each student in a discussion bearing upon these conflicts. Kohlberg considers it essential for each teacher who is involved in such a program to clarify his own ideas regarding moral development. He claims that it is important for teachers to be aware of the different stages

of moral development; to be able to recognize what level a child is at; to know how to help a child move from one stage to the next stage of his moral development.

Blatt and Kohlberg\textsuperscript{26} conducted a study, the results of which have provided certain insights for teachers. Their results indicated: (1) that there is a greater chance of upward movement when an individual is exposed to thinking which is just one level above him; (2) that an individual understands the thinking of his own stage and that of the stage below him; (3) that some individuals understand the thinking of one stage above their own and in a few instances two stages above their own; (4) that this upward movement seems to occur when one is in transition to a higher stage; (5) that there is a preference for the kind of thinking at the higher stage; (6) that an educational program was able to stimulate or speed up significant and lasting increases in moral judgment. Each one of these findings has specific implications for classroom practice and could serve as a guide for any teacher trying to implement Kohlberg's theory.

The description of Kohlberg's theory of moral development which has been provided is followed by a consideration

of what Kohlberg's critics have said about his research. An outline of these evaluations follows.

4. Evaluations of Kohlberg's Research.

The critiques of Kohlberg's theory recognize that his research has made a contribution to moral psychology in America by offering new insights into the study of moral development and by forcing psychologists to take seriously the cognitive aspects of morality. However, not all of these evaluations have been of a positive nature.

Craig, Peters, and Sholl criticize Kohlberg's research for being on the one hand narrow and limited, and on the other hand vague and full of ambiguities. They maintain that there are more factors involved


in moral development than those which Kohlberg considers. They allude to the following specific flaws in Kohlberg's work: he is unaware of the contributions of others who are working in the same area; he implies that moral behavior has one cause, whereas they maintain it is multi-causal; he allows no room for moral inspiration and transformation. Briefly, they claim the problem with Kohlberg lies not so much with what he says but with what he does not say.

Peters\textsuperscript{32} and Alston\textsuperscript{33} are critical of the Kohlberg research because they claim that he fails to show how the transition is made from one of his stages to the next. They claim that more research is required regarding membership in and transition from the stages. They say that further study in this area would probably provide the information needed to fill the gap. They both maintain that it is important for Kohlberg to show these connections because if he does not pursue this neglected area his theory


will lack credibility. This opinion is also shared by Kuhmerler\(^\text{34}\) and Sholl\(^\text{35}\).

Other criticisms leveled against Kohlberg's research are that he fails to consider the formation of habits and that he neglects the affective domain. Peters' analysis of Kohlberg's treatment of the role of habit in moral development is logically developed.\(^\text{36}\) He does not agree with Kohlberg's stated position that habit formation is secondary. Alston\(^\text{37}\) states that since Kohlberg does not discuss the habit category it is possible for one to conclude that Kohlberg believes that there is no place in moral psychology for habit. Peters and Alston, along with Craig,\(^\text{38}\) think that a theory which has overlooked the important dimension of habit is not a substantial theory of moral development.


The same three critics claim that Kohlberg neglects the affective dimension of man in the development of his theory. The strengths of Kohlberg's theory which are brought out in these evaluations are clearly weakened because of these negative criticisms.

5. Statement of the Problem.

All the critiques which have been mentioned above call for careful study. This is imperative since Kohlberg's theory is influencing today's educational practices in the area of moral education. This study addresses itself to one of the criticisms that has been mentioned, namely, that of Kohlberg's neglect of the affective domain. The problem at hand then is to make an inquiry into the role which Kohlberg gives to the affective domain in his theory of moral development. The question which will guide the research will be formulated thus: What role does Kohlberg assign to the affective domain in his theory of moral development? To do this it is necessary to return to the writings of Kohlberg, himself, in order to ascertain whether or not the affective domain, in fact, is neglected. This will be the content of the following chapter.
CHAPTER II

THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN

The purpose of this chapter is to provide details of Kohlberg's references to the affective domain, including both explicit and implicit references to that important aspect of moral development. The chapter begins with a presentation of Kohlberg's statements which refer directly to the affective domain. There follows a synthesis of certain themes found throughout Kohlberg's writings which seem to have affective overtones. The chapter also provides a description of the affective domain. This description forms the framework which will be used to analyze Kohlberg's statements referring to the affective domain.

1. Kohlberg's Writings on Affect.

Reviewing Kohlberg's writings in a search for references to the affective domain, one notes that there are five key articles in which Kohlberg addresses himself directly to this reality. These articles include statements in which he tries to spell out what particular tasks will be accomplished by his research, what his theory is to encompass, and what are its essential components.

Kohlberg states, in 1963, that his research and that of his colleagues concentrated on four specific tasks.
One of these was: "The study of the relation of the development of moral thought to moral conduct and emotion."¹ In the following year he stated that role-taking is an integral part of moral development.

It seems obvious that moral stages must primarily be the products of the child's interaction with others, rather than the direct unfolding of biological or neurological structures....Moral role-taking involves an emotional empathic or sympathetic component, but it also involves a cognitive capacity to define situations in terms of rights and duties, in terms of reciprocity and the perspective of other selves.²

Kohlberg considers his theory to belong to the cognitive developmental school of thought. In an article written in 1968, he describes the basic tenets of those who believe in this approach to moral development. Among the tenets he mentions are the following:

4. From birth, there are inherent motives for cognitive activities, but these motives too undergo structural change in development.

5. Both the 'cognitive' and the 'affective' are functions not psychic contents or structures. Cognitive and affective development are parallel aspects of the structural transformations undergone in development.³


In two articles, both written in 1971, Kohlberg says that:

the cognitive developmental view holds that 'cognition' and 'affect' are different aspects or perspectives on the same mental events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives. It is evident that moral judgments often involve strong emotional components. It is also evident that the presence of strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgment, although it may imply a somewhat different functioning of the cognitive component than is implied in more neutral areas.4,5

However, in spite of the fact that Kohlberg speaks of the place of the affective domain in his theory, he still holds firmly to his claim that his theory has a strong cognitive core which he believes is essential to any intellectual approach to moral education. The following statement summarizes the position that Kohlberg takes with regard to the affective domain:

In general then, the quality (as opposed to the quantity) of affects involved in moral judgment is determined by its cognitive-structural development, and is part and parcel of the general development of the child's conception of the moral order.6


6 Ibid., p. 189.
From the statements quoted above it becomes evident that Kohlberg not only speaks of the affective domain but also indicates that the affective domain has some place in the process of moral development.

2. Overtones of the Affective Domain in Kohlberg's Writings.

While reading the articles already referred to, along with others which deal with moral development, one notices that certain aspects of Kohlberg's theory have affective connotations. It is just as important for the purposes of this study to consider these less direct references to the affective domain if a true picture of the Kohlberg research is to be made. These less direct references seem to form an integral part of Kohlberg's theory. They may be grouped in the following manner: (a) the task of role-taking, (b) the importance of peer group participation, (c) the impact of the atmosphere, (d) the role of the will, (e) the place of motivation, (f) the influence of feeling of some sort.

(a) The Task of Role-Taking.— In one article where Kohlberg describes his cognitive developmental theory, he claims that moral judgment is a role-taking process.
The centrality of role-taking for moral judgment is recognized in the notion that moral judgment is based on sympathy for others, as well as in the notion that the moral judge must adopt the perspective of the 'impartial spectator' or the 'generalized other'.\footnote{Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought", in Theodore Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology, New York, Academic Press, 1971, p. 190.}

Kohlberg considers that this ability for role-taking is necessary for moral development. One reason why he claims that moral judgment rests on role-taking is that moral judgment includes concern for welfare consequences. He describes the developmentalists' idea of role-taking to include three points: rules, sympathy or concern for welfare consequences to others, and justice.\footnote{Idem, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education", in C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, E. V. Sullivan, eds., Moral Education Interdisciplinary Approach, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971, p. 51-64.}

Kohlberg believes that at every one of his six stages of moral development children are able to empathize and to take the roles of other persons and living things. He also believes that traces of justice may be found at the earliest stage of development and that facets of it can be found at every one of the other following stages. He goes on to imply that his moral stages are more than sympathetic feelings towards others. They include a sense of justice. Kohlberg claims that the concepts of role-taking and of a
sense of justice are connected. Role-taking, especially when expressed in terms of sympathy, may well embrace a broader spectrum than the sense of justice. Organized or principled forms of role-taking are defined by justice structures. The environment and its institutions provide for moral development because they offer opportunities for role-taking. However, the justice structure of the environment and of its institutions plays an important part in making these opportunities possible. If the environment and its institutions are to foster moral development, it is important that they be just.

Because the central mechanisms of role-taking are justice structures of reciprocity and equality, institutions better organized in terms of justice provide greater opportunities for role-taking and a sense of sharedness than do unjust institutions.

In his most recent articles, Kohlberg describes morality as

a natural product of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role-taking, toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a universal concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to another.


10 Ibid., p. 193.


(b) Peer Group Participation.- Another aspect of Kohlberg's theory which appears to have an affective dimension is that of peer group participation. This is an important part of his research, especially when one considers the implementation of his theory. It has been pointed out earlier that peer group participation is one of the steps proposed by Kohlberg to bring about advancement from one level to the next of his stages of moral development. The Kohlberg research has shown that children who are popular, who come from middle class families, and who have more opportunities for peer group participation advance more quickly through Kohlberg's stages than do children who are isolated, who come from lower middle class families, and who have fewer opportunities for peer group participation. However, studies indicate that the cause for peer group differences, in some cases, lies in the different chances which children have for role-taking in their families. Kohlberg states that these differences are brought about by the differences which are found in "family participation, communication, emotional warmth, sharing in decisions, awarding responsibility to the child, pointing out consequences of action to others." 13

Different environments provide different kinds of opportunities for role-taking. When speaking of the type of environment which provides the best opportunities for role-taking, Kohlberg claims that it does not necessarily have to be a warm, loving environment. On the other hand, it does not have to be cold and aloof. Nevertheless, he does feel that a certain minimum amount of warmth in face-to-face groups or institutions is required if a child or an adolescent is to feel a sense of participation and membership.  

(c) The Impact of The Atmosphere.— This is an element to which he refers from time to time in his works. In his article, "Moral Atmosphere and the School," he expresses his belief that the moral character and ideology of the teachers and of the principal influences the atmosphere of the school and this in turn has an impact on the students. Kohlberg goes on to say that this is not brought about by any kind of an educational technique. Rather, he sees it happening because the educator believes that he has a human message to give. Kohlberg mentions the necessity


of creating a classroom atmosphere which will foster the participation of those children who are socially isolated. This atmosphere will, to some degree, determine the extent to which the child is encouraged to take the point of view of others. Kohlberg claims that the moral atmosphere of the school ought to be the central concern of those responsible for the moral education in the schools. He does not confine the need of such a moral atmosphere to the school alone. He sees it including the home as well as the broader society by which the child is surrounded. He also recognizes the unique influence that the home has upon the child. He speaks of the emotional climate of the home which cannot be duplicated elsewhere.

The only parent attitude variables consistently found to relate to children's moral character are not 'moral-training' variables but variables of parental warmth.16

Even though Kohlberg admits that this type of climate accounts for only slight differences in children's moral development, he admits that it does have some influence on them.

In keeping with his concern for justice, Kohlberg goes on to say that the atmosphere which he advocates should be one of justice; that it should be found both in the

environment and in the institution. He considers the establishment of this kind of a just atmosphere to be an urgent need. According to Kohlberg, there are certain conditions which foster a child's moral development. One of these conditions is the kind of environment, that is, the type of atmosphere in which the child lives. He describes the type of atmosphere which he is advocating as being one of interchange and dialogue; one in which conflicting moral views are compared in an open manner.  

(d) The Role of The Will.- The term in question here is the will. Throughout his writings Kohlberg uses the terms will, ego-strength, and ego-control interchangeably. Two studies, one carried out by Krebs and Kohlberg, and another conducted by Grim, Kohlberg and White, indicate that the will is essentially connected with moral development, but that it does not lie at the heart of morality. In another article Kohlberg admits that

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18 Ibid., p. 52-53.


cognitive potential is not actualized in moral judgments because of a will or desire factor. Again in the same article he says that, "it is easier to think reasonably about physical matters than about moral matters, and this may be due to disruption of will, desire, and emotion in the moral realm."\textsuperscript{21} It appears that Kohlberg is hinting at a non-cognitive reality which is connected with moral development. Although Kohlberg seldom refers to the role of the will, it is an important element which cannot be overlooked when presenting a theory of moral development. This will be discussed more fully in the analysis of Kohlberg's writings reported in the following chapter.

(e) The Place of Motivation.- The concept of motivation cannot be overlooked when considering the role of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. In his original study the interviews which Kohlberg conducted focused on situations where acts of obedience to rules were in conflict with the needs of individuals. As a result of this study Kohlberg identified his levels of moral judgment. In the course of the research he also noted that all his subjects brought into their thinking the same basic aspects of morality, one of these aspects he calls motivational. Consequently, Kohlberg was

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 188.
able to define what he calls the motivational aspect of morality. Using the motives that his subjects gave to justify moral action, Kohlberg drew up six levels of motives for rule obedience and moral action. These correspond to his levels of moral judgment.

Stage 1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
Stage 2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned and so on.
Stage 3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
Stage 4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt.
Stage 5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
Stage 6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.  

However, Kohlberg is quick to add that other aspects of morality are more cognitive. One of these more cognitive aspects he describes as: the basis of moral worth of human life. As one reads the way in which this aspect of the basis of moral worth of human life is defined at the different stages, one notices that at stage three, "the value of human life is based upon empathy and affection of family members and others toward its possessor."  

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In another article Kohlberg summarizes both the cognitive and motivational characteristics of moral definitions for the second level of his stages. One of the points among the cognitive characteristics is described as follows:

Positive, active and empathic moral definition. Duty and moral goodness defined in terms going beyond mere obedience to an actual service to other persons or institutions, or to a concern about the feelings of others.

On the affective side we have mentioned:

Sensitivity to and self-guidance by anticipated approval or disapproval.
Identification with authority and its goals. 24

(f) The Influence of Feeling of Some Sort. Throughout Kohlberg's writings one comes upon expressions which seem to suggest the affective domain. In speaking of moral education classes Kohlberg claims that the real and challenging conflict situations which he and his colleagues present in classroom situations are of 'intense interest' 25 to most adolescents. In one article he describes a moral decision as having a strong emotional component. 26 When speaking


of his different stages Kohlberg claims that at every stage children are able 'to empathize' and 'to take the roles' of others.

Another word found throughout Kohlberg's articles which is indicative of certain affective nuances is the word argument. When Kohlberg describes how his theory is to be put into practice he wants his students to be involved in arguments. This is a way of stimulating their moral development. He proposes presenting his students with prepared arguments. He encourages teachers to present dilemmas and focus arguments between students who are at adjacent stages. As a result of his studies Kohlberg believes that students move to the next level of their moral development as a result of this type of stimulation. Kohlberg clearly states that this process is one which involves discussion and disagreement.

It is held that Kohlberg's references to the affective domain have been identified. A description of the term affective domain, follows. It is intended to provide a frame


of reference for the analysis of Kohlberg's position on affect.

3. Description of the Affective Domain.

Because of the lack of clarity in the literature, it is very difficult to define the term, affective domain. Accordingly, a description rather than a definition will be presented. For the purposes of this study the description will be drawn from the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, which offers a comprehensive description of the term. The authors of this text use the concept of a continuum to describe the affective domain. The typical meaning of commonly used affective terms measured against this continuum range from simple awareness of a phenomenon to a position of some power to guide or control the behavior of a person. In the literature educational objectives of the affective domain have been expressed in terms of interests, attitudes, appreciation, values, and adjustment. Each one of these terms is vague and includes a wide range of meanings. To clarify these terms it is necessary to describe the characteristic behavior of each objective.

The characteristic behaviors of the objective, interest, range from being simply aware of a phenomenon to showing preference for a value. The characteristic behaviors of the objective, appreciation, range from giving selective attention to a stimulus, to showing a preference for a value. The characteristic behaviors of the objectives, attitudes and values, are the same. They range from being willing to respond to a stimulus, to forming some conceptualization or abstraction of a value. The characteristic behaviors which indicate the objective, adjustment, cover the largest portion of the continuum. These characteristics extend the continuum to its opposite pole. They include behaviors which range from being simply willing to respond to a stimulus, to characterization. It is these characteristic behaviors of the educational objectives of interests, attitudes, values, appreciation, and adjustment, that were used to form the continuum.

These behaviors described above are ordered along a continuum. This wide range of behavior is then divided into five categories. To describe these categories in greater detail is to provide a clearer description of the affective domain. A description of each of these five categories follows.

The lowest level of the continuum is the category receiving. It is subdivided into three sections. The first
includes behavior which is simply aware of a phenomenon. The second includes behavior which is willing to receive a stimulus in a rather indifferent manner. A third and slightly higher level of behavior is described as controlling or selecting attention. Here the individual is to some degree, though maybe unconsciously, controlling the amount of attention given to a phenomenon. The second level along the continuum is responding. At this level behaviors range from that which may be described as acquiescence in responding to a phenomenon, through willingness to respond, to satisfaction in response. The category of valuing is next on the continuum. The word valuing is used in its usual sense which means that something has worth. Behaviors found in this category range from accepting a value, through showing preference for a value, to being committed to a value. The fourth category is called organization. This type of behavior is a natural consequence of having become committed to a value. The behaviors belonging to this category are divided into two levels. Those of the first level, described as conceptualization of a value, consist in the process of abstraction. That is, before these values can be interrelated into a system they need to be conceptualized in a form which will allow for organization. The behaviors of the second level are described as the organization of a value system. This consists in organizing one's values into
a system, fixing the interrelations among these values, and establishing a priority among them. The fifth and final category which extends the continuum to its other extreme is described as characterization by a value complex. The behaviors belonging to this category are also divided into two levels. The first, described as generalized set, is behavior which controls the individual in such a way that he is described or characterized as a person by these controlling tendencies. The second level, described as characterization is the integration of one's beliefs, ideas, and one's philosophy of life. This is usually expressed with some degree of consistency.

The authors of the "Taxonomy" use the term internalization to describe the process whereby one moves from one end of the continuum to the other. They describe internalization as a "process through which there is at first an incomplete and tentative adoption of only overt manifestations of the desired behavior and later a more complete adoption."\(^\text{31}\)

As was stated earlier, the term, affective domain, is difficult to define. However, the above description provides a frame of reference to keep in mind when trying to determine the place Kohlberg gives to the affective

\(^{31}\) Ibid., p. 29.
domain in his research. This description will be used in the following chapter to make an analysis of the role of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development.
CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY

The statements which Kohlberg made that deal explicitly with the affective domain were cited in the previous chapter. His implicit references to the affective domain were summarized in terms of themes which were found throughout his writings. In this chapter an investigation of the role of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development will be made. This will be done in the form of an analysis; first, of these explicit statements, and then of these recurring themes discovered in his writings. The description of the affective domain as presented in the last chapter provides the terms of reference for this analysis.

1. Direct References of Kohlberg.

The first statement of Kohlberg to be analyzed here is taken from his 1963 article in which he states that his research and that of his colleagues concentrated on four specific tasks. One of these is: "The study of the relation of the development of moral thought to moral conduct and emotion." The concept from this statement to be discussed

has to do with what he says concerning emotion. By the very fact that Kohlberg sets out initially to study the relationship that exists between the development of moral thought and emotion, he is implying that there is some connection between these two realities. The key word here is emotion.

The authors of the "Taxonomy" contend that emotion is part of the affective domain. The same degree of emotion is not found at all places along the continuum which they use to describe the affective domain. Little emotion can be detected at the lowest levels of the continuum; whereas the middle levels reveal the greatest amount of emotion. As one moves towards the other end of the continuum there is a gradual lessening of the component emotion. It is hard to determine just where in the process of internalization an emotional response occurs. It is impossible to say that it appears at any one single point. It is probable that its appearance depends upon the particular behavior in question. In no way is it confined to a particular point along the continuum. It appears most frequently at the third level of the category of responding. Nevertheless, in some cases, it appears earlier in the receiving category. The component emotion is also found in the category of valuing. Emotion

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need not be found at the lowest level of this category which is described as accepting a value. However, to show preference for a value, and to be committed to a value, does imply some degree of emotion. The degree of emotion expressed varies from individual to individual and from situation to situation. It appears then, that since Kohlberg speaks of the element of emotion he is speaking of an aspect of the affective domain which is located for the most part midway along the continuum. If Kohlberg stated that one of the goals of his research was to study the relationship between moral thought and emotion he must have recognized that emotion was in some way connected with moral thought.

The second statement of Kohlberg's to be analyzed is that taken from his 1964 article:

It seems obvious that moral stages must be primarily the products of the child's interaction with others, rather than the direct unfolding of biological or neurological structures.... Moral role-taking involves an emotional empathic or sympathetic component, but it also involves a cognitive capacity to define situations in terms of rights and duties, in terms of reciprocity and the perspective of other selves.3

The concepts from this statement which will be analyzed are the following. (1) Kohlberg states that his stages are the result of the child's interaction with others; and that moral role-taking involves an emotional empathic

and sympathetic component. (2) There cannot be meaningful interaction with others unless there is some expression of affectivity. (3) To interact with another implies behaviors that are found at the lowest level of the affective continuum, that is, receiving. These behaviors are characterized as: awareness of a phenomenon, willingness to receive, and controlled or selected attention. If the interaction is real then there must be some kind of a response involved. Therefore, there are elements of the second level of affectivity, which is responding. All three levels of this category are present, namely, acquiescence in responding, willingness to respond, and satisfaction in response. The next level along the continuum is the category of valuing. It is characterized by behaviors which are consistent and stable, so much so that the individual becomes characterized by these behaviors. The type of interaction of which Kohlberg speaks is strong enough to bring about changes in the moral development of the individuals involved. This indicates that the child's behavior changes and takes on certain characteristics. The child is characterized by certain types of behavior which are more or less consistent. This reflects that aspect of consistency which is typical of behaviors

found in the third category of the affective domain as it has been described for this study. Involvement is also connected with any kind of meaningful interaction. Involvement is another behavior which is characteristic of the category of valuing. Clearly it appears that to interact with others implies aspects of the first three categories of the affective domain as it has been described for the purposes of this study.

Kohlberg does not provide any special definition for the words empathic and sympathetic. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that he gives these words their normal meaning and implies some degree of affectivity. When Kohlberg speaks of the emotions of sympathy and empathy he is admitting the presence of the affective domain. For example, when he says that role-taking involves sympathy and empathy, he is talking of behavior that is found at the second and third levels of the category of responding in the "Taxonomy." It will be recalled that behaviors typical of these two levels of this category are: willingness to respond, and satisfaction in response. That is, one must be willing to engage in behaviors that are characterized as either sympathetic or empathetic. When one expresses either of these emotions one is usually experiencing some kind of satisfaction in so

5 Ibid., p. 118-145.
doing. It is suggested that to express sympathy or empathy presupposes the behaviors which are characteristic of the category, valuing. Behaviors typical of valuing are: acceptance of a value, preference for a value, and commitment to a value. If a person is going to express sympathy or empathy he must believe that the individual or cause for which he is expressing this behavior is worth his expression of these behaviors. Therefore, it can be said that he accepts a value. Behaviors which indicate preference for a value are ones in which an individual seeks out or pursues a value; they also include some form of deep involvement. Behaviors which indicate commitment to a value usually are characterized by some degree of certainty. In some cases these behaviors include, "a firm emotional acceptance of a belief. Loyalty to a position, group, or cause would also be classified here."\(^6\) In order to show empathy or sympathy, one's behavior is guided by acceptance of, preference for, and commitment to a value. To summarize then, the showing of empathy and sympathy indicates behaviors of the affective domain which are typical of the first three levels of the affective domain as it is described by the authors of "Taxonomy," and Kohlberg, as has been shown, makes reference to these dimensions.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 149.
The third statement of Kohlberg to be analyzed is taken from his 1968 article. Here he describes the basic tenets of those who believe in the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development. Among the tenets that Kohlberg mentions are the following:

4. From birth, there are inherent motives for cognitive activities, but these motives too undergo structural change in development.

5. Both the 'cognitive' and the 'affective' are functions not psychic contents or structures. Cognitive and affective development are parallel aspects of the structural transformations undergone in development.  

The concepts from this statement to be considered are: (1) the notion that there are inherent motives for cognitive activity; and (2) the claim that both cognition and affect are aspects of the process of moral development.

In the description of the affective domain provided by the "Taxonomy" for the category of valuing, motivated behavior characterizes valuing. Behavior which is motivated is characteristic of behavior which is found in the third category along the continuum. The second point from Kohlberg's 1968 article which is to be discussed here has to do with


Kohlberg's admitting that both the affective and cognitive domains are part of the moral development process. Kohlberg makes it clear that he is not denying the existence of the affective domain. In fact, he admits that both domains have roles to play in the process of moral development.

The analysis of Kohlberg's statements which deal directly with the affective domain is completed by an examination of the statements which he made in 1971. In these two articles Kohlberg says that:

... the cognitive developmental view holds that 'cognition' and 'affect' are different aspects or perspectives on the same mental events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives. It is evident that moral judgments often involve strong emotional components. It is also evident that the presence of strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgment, although it may imply a somewhat different functioning of the cognitive component than is implied in more neutral areas.9,10

The concepts to be discussed from these statements are: (1) that all mental events have cognitive and affective aspects; and (2) that moral judgments often have strong


emotional components. With regard to the first point, it seems that Kohlberg is once again affirming that there is a link between the affective domain and the cognitive domain in the process of moral development. With regard to the second point, Kohlberg is emphatic in saying that strong emotions do not in any way reduce the cognitive component of moral judgment. He does not, however, deny that while it does not reduce the cognitive component it may bring about different functioning of that component. From what has been said earlier, it is evident that Kohlberg, by referring to a strong emotional component, is speaking of behaviors which appear normally about midway along the "Taxonomy's" continuum which is being used in this study to describe the affective domain. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that Kohlberg acknowledges both cognitive and affective aspects in all mental events and the presence of strong emotional components in moral judgments and that these behaviors are typical of those described in the "Taxonomy."

2. Overtones of the Affective Domain in Kohlberg's Writings.

An analysis of the six themes of affective overtones which were summarized in the last chapter constitutes the current study's attempt to ascertain what role Kohlberg
gives to the affective domain in his theory of moral development. The first theme mentioned was role-taking which Kohlberg considers to be an integral part of the moral development process. He describes the developmentalists' view of role-taking in such a way that it includes the expression of sympathy, concern for the welfare consequences to others, and justice.  

Central components of the first theme suggest that by the time anyone takes the role of another he has displayed behavior typical of the first two categories of the continuum which is being used in this study to describe the affective domain; the first two categories being receiving and responding. The expression of sympathy which is included in role-taking is characteristic of behaviors found at the third level of the continuum. One of the reasons Kohlberg gives for the importance of role-taking is that moral judgment includes a concern for welfare consequences, and he uses the notion of welfare consequences when he describes justice. Now, once Kohlberg mentions the concept of justice he is using a term which is indicative of a form of


12 Ibid., p. 63.
affectivity reflecting the characteristic of commitment. According to the "Taxonomy," commitment is found in the third level of the category, valuing. One must be committed to a value before one exercises behavior which is sympathetic towards that value. That is, to show concern for welfare consequences is a type of behavior which is found in the next affective category, organization. The organization category includes the quality of abstraction. The individual is able to see how the concept of justice relates to other values he possesses. The second level of the organization category is also found here. That is, the individual is able to organize his values into a hierarchy which forms some kind of an inherent and consistent system. The "Taxonomy" words one of its objectives placed at this level of the continuum in the following manner:

Thus the objective 'Begins to form judgments as to the responsibility of society for conserving human and material resources' appears to call for the comparative evaluation of various values to determine the responsibility of society. This appears to be what Kohlberg alludes to when he speaks of his principle of justice. Clearly, when he refers to a concern for welfare consequences he is speaking of a form of


14 Ibid., p. 156.
affectivity which is located in the fourth category of the continuum. It is also possible that an individual concerned with the welfare consequences of others is reflecting affectivity found in the fifth category of the description provided by the "Taxonomy." This fifth section is called: characterization by a value complex. An individual operating at this level may have integrated that value into his philosophy of life and therefore have his behavior guided by that value. Consequently, it is obvious that to show concern for the welfare consequences to others, to be concerned about justice, is to exhibit behaviors found at every level of the continuum which is being used in this study to describe the affective domain.

In summary then, Kohlberg claims that role-taking is based upon not only the expression of sympathy for others, but also upon a concern for justice. He also states that (1) at every level of his six stages of moral development children are able to empathize and to take the role of others; (2) that traces of justice may be found at the earliest stages of moral development and at every one of the following stages. As has been illustrated above, to empathize, to take the role of another, to be concerned about justice, are behaviors which have affective components. On the foregoing basis it is held that varying degrees of affectivity have been demonstrated to be present in role-taking
and further it has been shown that role-taking is, in Kohlberg's terms, a necessary activity for moral development.

The second theme to be discussed is peer group participation. Kohlberg states that some degree of warmth is needed if a child or adolescent is to feel accepted in a group. Here it is possible to see a relationship between what Kohlberg is saying and what the "Taxonomy" offers to describe the affective domain. Peer group participation implies behaviors that are found at least at the first two levels of the continuum, receiving and responding. Kohlberg also says that emotional warmth in the family provides for differences in opportunities for peer group participation. He implies that this type of emotional warmth provides the child with more chances of being able to enter into peer group participation. Kohlberg's statement only emphasizes the fact that the dimension of affectivity found in the upper levels of the category, responding, are present in peer group participation. As pointed out earlier, the component of emotion is part of the affective domain as described by the "Taxonomy."


aspects of the affective domain in peer group participation is very important. This is obviously the case, since Kohlberg proposes that peer group participation be a means of implementing his theory of moral development. He envisions peer group participation as a method to encourage advancement from one of his stages of moral development to another.

The next theme to be discussed is the impact that atmosphere has on the process of moral development. The word atmosphere of itself connotes certain affective elements. The very fact that Kohlberg titles one of his articles, "Moral Atmosphere and the School,"\(^1\) is indicative of the fact that he claims that the atmosphere of a school has some influence on the students. When Kohlberg speaks of the atmosphere of the school he is implying a just one. As previously shown, the component justice contains elements of the affective domain which range along the full spectrum of the continuum. Now Kohlberg insists that the kind of atmosphere which he advocates is one which allows for interchange and dialogue; said interchange and dialogue to be carried out in an open manner. Chances for the occurrence of this kind of activity are enhanced by a just atmosphere. Kohlberg

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speaks of an emotional climate of the home as a factor influencing the child's moral development. As has been mentioned earlier, emotional responses are behaviors which are located at the third level of the category, responding. Therefore, it is suggested that Kohlberg's concern about the impact of the atmosphere on moral development is indicative of the presence of an affective element located for the most part in the category, responding. However, in areas where a just atmosphere is the predominant concern, it is quite possible that behaviors characteristic of other categories further along the continuum may be manifested.

The third theme to be discussed is the role of the will. Kohlberg affirms that the will is connected with moral development. Since Kohlberg says so little about the will it is impossible to relate his statements regarding the will to any part of the affective continuum. However, it is important to point out that Kohlberg seems to be leaving room here for the belief that man has a will, that the will is a separate faculty from the intellect. He implies that there is some relationship between the two. When he speaks of man's cognitive potential not being actualized because of the will, he seems to be allowing for the belief that man's will is informed by the intellect.

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Since this is such an important issue it may be well to clarify here the relationship between the will and affectivity as it is understood in this study. There is evidence of the will in the first category of the continuum, in terms of willingness on the part of an individual to receive or tolerate a given stimulus. This is behavior characteristic of the second level of this category. Behavior typical of the third level is also present in the individual's controlled or selected attention which is given to a stimulus. Again in the second category, responding, the will is involved when an individual gives his voluntary response to a phenomenon. Behaviors of this nature are usually located at the second level of the category, responding. One cannot accept a value, show preference for a value, or be committed to a value without willing to do so. Therefore, it appears reasonable to suggest that all levels of the third category, valuing, include the presence of the will. The fourth category, organization, also seems to require the presence of the will. That is, in order to organize one's values into a hierarchy one cannot avoid employing the will. The fifth and final category involves behaviors which clearly require the exercising of the will, since to act in a consistent manner so much so that one may be characterized by these behaviors, obviously requires the use of the will. Just as to integrate beliefs, attitudes,
and ideas into one's philosophy of life requires the presence of the will. It is held that the will is manifested in some way in each of the categories of the affective continuum.

The fourth theme to be discussed is the place of motivation in moral development. By the very fact that Kohlberg defines what he calls the motivational aspects of morality he is admitting its existence in the process of moral development. The relationship between motivation and the affective domain has been discussed earlier. The authors of the "Taxonomy" indicate that motivation is one of the characteristic behaviors located at the middle levels of their continuum. Therefore, when Kohlberg speaks of motivation he cannot avoid reference to elements which are related to some degree of affectivity.

The sixth and last theme to be discussed is the influence of feeling of some sort. The use of the phrase, "intense interest," which is an emotional response,


reflects affective behavior which is located in the category, responding. The use of the expression, "a strong emotional component,"\textsuperscript{23} is indicative of the same type of behavior. The authors of the "Taxonomy" speak of the presence of the emotional component as valuable in the building of affective behaviors.\textsuperscript{24} The words argument and disagreement which Kohlberg uses to describe the kind of discussions he advocates for peer group discussions relate to behaviors demonstrating some form of affectivity. Behaviors of this nature are typical of those found about midway along the affective continuum. However, it is possible that the reasons for the disagreement and argument may reflect behaviors that are found further along the continuum. To argue because one is committed to a value, to disagree because of one's philosophy of life, reflect behaviors that are typical of categories further along the continuum.

From all that has been said so far regarding Kohlberg's references to the affective domain it would seem that he admits that the cognitive and the affective dimensions


of man are both involved in the process of moral development. However, it appears that in the working out of his theory, Kohlberg, influenced as he was by Piaget, concentrated more on the cognitive dimension of man. This is not hard to do since this side of man is easier to study, to test, and to analyze. In a way, it may be said that this side of man is easier to get at, it is more tangible. The affective side of man is much more difficult to study. Little testing has been done in the schools in the area of affectivity. This dimension of man is often thought to be more personal and a certain privacy has surrounded this aspect of man. These reasons no doubt led Kohlberg to place a greater emphasis on the cognitive side of man in the course of his research. It also seems that his colleagues and those who have followed in his footsteps have placed their energies on the development of the cognitive aspects of his theory.

Although Kohlberg does not develop the affective dimension directly, there are traces of it to be found throughout his writings. He speaks openly of the existence of the affective domain in elaborating his theory and there are certain affective overtones which can be found in his work. It is possible to say, then, that Kohlberg allowed the affective domain to enter his research. If he really denied its existence in moral development he would have not only avoided using affective terms and phrases in his
writings, but also would have made some statements whereby he would have excluded the affective domain completely.

The preceding pages have documented the evidence which leads one to conclude with some certainty that Kohlberg's writings contain meaningful references to the affective domain. Regrettably those references are by and large not elaborated upon. However, Kohlberg does commit himself to the fact that the affective domain is important. He himself says:

I think the question of cognition and affect in morality, in moral development at least, has to be kept separate from the other issue of whether rationality determines behavior or moral choice.... However, the difference between physical and moral principles is that the latter embody certain affective components in themselves. You cannot have a conception of justice without some sort of affective reaction being involved.25

Clearly what is needed is a statement from Kohlberg with regard to the place of the affective domain in his theory and a fuller development of what he means by affectivity. There can be no denying that the cognitive and the affective domains are both elements in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Yet, his theory, as it now stands, places heavy emphasis on the cognitive dimension of man. If Kohlberg's theory is to be complete, this affective side of

it must needs be developed. If this were done then, his theory would be more comprehensive. It would be a theory which would recognize man as a whole being, not man divided into parts. If Kohlberg fails to develop his theory along these lines it is very important to point out its one-sided nature since its exclusive use could be a dangerous thing.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was undertaken in order to ascertain what place Kohlberg gives to the affective domain in his theory of moral development.

In the first chapter a description of Kohlberg's theory was presented along with evaluations that have been made of his writings. The research question which guided this study was expressed in the following manner. What role does Kohlberg assign to the affective domain in his theory of moral development?

The second chapter provided Kohlberg's explicit references to the affective domain. It also provided his implicit references to that domain in terms of themes found throughout his writings. The chapter concluded with a description of the affective domain which was drawn from the "Taxonomy" of Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia.

In the third chapter this description was used as a framework in making an analysis of both Kohlberg's explicit and implicit references to the affective domain.

Kohlberg admits the existence of the affective domain in his theory of moral development. He maintains that there is a relationship between the cognitive and the affective dimensions of man. From the analysis that has been made it can be said that traces of the affective domain are to be
found at all levels of Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Although it appears that the affective domain is largely ignored in Kohlberg's theory, it may well be that upon further study the affective domain may be found to play an even greater role than the present study indicates, possibly even greater than Kohlberg himself has, as yet, articulated or imagined.

It is hoped that this study may help: to clarify some of the ambiguity which seems to surround the position of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development; to indicate specific areas where experimental research is needed; and to strengthen the awareness of teachers with regard to the importance of the affective domain in the area of moral development. The methodology used here might be helpful in determining the significance of the affective domain in the materials that are being used in moral education programs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


An enlightening article written from an objective point of view. Indicates areas which Kohlberg fails to develop. Of particular value to anyone trying to assess Kohlberg's contribution to the area of moral development.


This article presents the results of an experiment. Testing indicated that the experimental group had tended to move towards a higher level of thinking when compared with control groups. Particularly helpful in clarifying Kohlberg's position regarding the relationships between the different stages of his theory and moral development.


Includes a brief summary of Kohlberg's theory and questions Kohlberg regarding certain aspects which he has neglected. Those reflecting on the issue of moral development, today, would find this article thought-provoking.


An excellent article giving the results of the author's research. It clarifies the psychological nature of moral development as well as the process leading to such development. It makes for difficult reading but would be relevant to anyone specializing in the psychological aspects of the author's work.


Presents a concise report of the author's findings with regard to a sequence of stages in moral development. Some comparisons are made between the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. One of the best articles to use as an introduction to Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

Besides an exposition of Kohlberg's study, this article gives three possible ways of approaching moral development as the problem has been considered in earlier research. Particularly relevant to anyone interested in an overview of the research that has been done in this field.


This article would be useful to anyone interested in moral development and it serves as a good introduction to the research of Lawrence Kohlberg.


Other cognitive-developmental theories are reviewed and the concept of cognitive stage is analyzed. Empirical studies are given to illustrate the validity of this conception of intellectual development. It includes some definitions which illucidate the author's position. Considering the importance of the pre-school years, this article offers special insights for all but particularly for those involved with young children.


This article centers around Kohlberg's most controversial claim. Of particular interest to those trying to understand what the author means when he says that justice is the core of morality.


Some of the author's philosophic positions, a description of the results of his research, and practical implications for teachers are put forth. Although more difficult to read, this is one of the author's more comprehensive articles and is essential to the understanding of what he has to offer. Essential reading.

The author's most comprehensive exposition of his philosophical viewpoint. It also presents the empirical psychological aspect of his work. The author tries to answer some of the questions raised by his critic, Alston. The most difficult of Kohlberg's writings but adds a dimension to his research which cannot be found elsewhere. Necessary reading.


This article is somewhat repetitive of the author's earlier writings, yet it contains certain distinctions not made earlier. It is of particular value since it is one of Kohlberg's more recent statements and explains his current experimental work.


This article provides a summary of the basic tenets of Kohlberg's theory of moral development. It contains the most recent concerns of the author and for this reason is of special value.


This book provides a complete and detailed description of the categories and subcategories of the affective domain and gives illustrative objectives and test items for each category. Relevant for anyone trying to determine the components of the affective domain. Essential reading.


A simple, direct, easy-to-read outline of Kohlberg's stages of moral development. This article indicates five of the issues for which Kohlberg is most frequently criticized. Of benefit to those concerned with the problem of moral education.
Peters, R. S., "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism", in Theodore Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology, New York, Academic Press, 1971, p. 237-267. Written by Kohlberg's most adamant critic, this article includes a comprehensive outline of Kohlberg's theory and a constructive criticism of his work. It indicates specific areas that Kohlberg has neglected in his research. It is perhaps one of the most valuable critiques offered by a recognized scholar in the field.

---------, "A Reply to Kohlberg", Phi Delta Kappan, June 1975, p. 678. A short but concise criticism of Kohlberg's view, indicating certain areas which Kohlberg seems to overlook even when he has been previously criticized for these omissions. Important to students attempting to evaluate Kohlberg's contribution to moral education and offers insights to those involved in moral education programs.

Sholl, Doug, "The Contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to Religious and Moral Education", Religious Education, Vol. 66, No. 5, 1971, p. 364-372. A brief but good background of Kohlberg's studies is provided. A very positive appraisal of Kohlberg's contribution is made. The author suggests the possibility of a relationship between moral development and religious education. This article may not have as widespread an influence as others but it may provide new horizons for anyone involved in religious education programs.
APPENDIX 1

DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES
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DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES

I. Preconventional level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy—nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority of "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention—"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
APPENDIX 2

ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT
APPENDIX 2

ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

I. The modes of judgment of obligation and value
   A. Judgment of right
   B. Judgment of having a right
   C. Judgment of duty and obligation
   D. Judgments of responsibility—conceptions of consequences of action or of the demands or opinions of others one should consider over and above strict duties or strict regard for the rights of others
   E. Judgment of praise or blame
   F. Judgments of punishability and reward
   G. Justification and explanation
   H. Judgments of nonmoral value or goodness

II. The elements of obligation and value
   A. Prudence—consequences desirable or undesirable to the self
   B. Social welfare—consequences desirable to others
   C. Love
   D. Respect
   E. Justice as liberty
   F. Justice as equality
   G. Justice as reciprocity and contract

III. The issues or institutions
   A. Social norms
   B. Personal conscience
   C. Roles and issues of affection
   D. Roles and issues of authority and democracy, of division of labor between roles relative to social control
   E. Civil liberties—rights to liberty and equality to persons as human beings, as citizens, or as members of groups
   F. Justice of actions apart from fixed rights—reciprocity, contract, trust, and equity in the actions or reactions of one person
   G. Punitive justice
   H. Life
   I. Property
   J. Truth
   K. Sex

APPENDIX 3

CHILDREN'S STATEMENTS ILLUSTRATING DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES ON AN ASPECT OF MORALITY
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CHILDREN'S STATEMENTS ILLUSTRATING DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES ON AN ASPECT OF MORALITY

Aspect 10: Motivation for Moral Action

Stage 1: Punishment--Danny, Age 10:
(Should Joe tell on his older brother to his father?)
"In one way it would be right to tell on his brother or his father might get mad at him and spank him. In another way it would be right to keep quiet or his brother might beat him up."

Stage 2: Exchange and Reward--Jimmy, Age 13:
(Should Joe tell on his older brother to his father?)
"I think he should keep quiet. He might want to go someplace like that, and if he squeals on Alex, Alex might squeal on him."

Stage 3: Disapproval Concern--Andy, Age 16:
(Should Joe keep quiet about what his brother did?)
"If my father finds out later, he won't trust me. My brother wouldn't either, but I wouldn't have a conscience that he (my brother) didn't."
"I try to do things for my parents; they've always done things for me. I try to do everything my mother says; I try to please her. Like she wants me to be a doctor, and I want to, too, and she's helping me to get up there."

Stage 6: Self-condemnation Concern--Bill, Age 16:
(Should the husband steal the expensive black market drug needed to save his wife's life?)
"Lawfully no, but morally speaking I think I would have done it. It would be awfully hard to live with myself afterward, knowing that I could have done something which would have saved her life and yet didn't for fear of punishment to myself."

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APPENDIX 4

ABSTRACT OF

An Inquiry into the Role of the Affective Domain in Lawrence Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development
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ABSTRACT OF

An Inquiry into the Role of the Affective Domain in Selections from Lawrence Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

The purpose of this study was to make an inquiry into the role of the affective domain in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. The research question which guided this study was the following. What role does Kohlberg assign to the affective domain in his theory of moral development? Kohlberg's writings were reviewed in order to ascertain what he says regarding the affective domain. His explicit and implicit references to that domain were culled from his many articles. The "Taxonomy" of Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia provided a description of the affective domain which was used as a framework in making an analysis of both Kohlberg's explicit and implicit references to the affective domain. As a result of the analysis it was found that Kohlberg admits to the presence of the affective domain in the process of moral development. However, the exact role that is played by the affective domain is not clearly stated.

1 Mary E. Sally McLean, Master's thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, July 1976, vii-73 p.