THE INTEGRATIVE VALUE OF ESCHATOLOGICAL FAITH

A Comparative Study of Allport's Theory of Long-Range Goals and Moltmann's Theology of Hope

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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Religious Studies

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

GENERAL QUESTION

In an age when great progress is being made in all fields of study and endeavor, Western scholars have developed a remarkable interest in man. Having discovered how much power he can wield in nature and among his fellowmen—enough to destroy himself, modern man curiously questions his own being. He questions his needs, motivations, ambitions and ideals, his efforts and failures, his fears and fantasies, his human longing and spiritual hope. Among the many mysteries intriguing man is his future. He finds that it is not toward the past, for all the good it conserves, but toward the future that he lives in the present in tension. The real genesis seems to be not at the beginning but at the end of life.

At the forefront of this search, psychology and theology have intensified an ageless probe into the workings of the human mind and into the meaning of human existence. In this century, psychology has advanced from instinct theories to psychoanalysis and to personalism. Theology has gone through the throes of a death-of-God spasm, and then revived with the hope and the liberation theories. Both psychology and theology are characterized at this time by a parallel development or convergence towards a "futurist" or forward-looking view of man. Much has been learned in this ongoing process, in such a way that it is possible for these two disciplines to speak together to man about his growth to meaningful existence. The question which this thesis asks of psychology and theology is the following: Is there a relationship between personal growth and religious faith?
SOURCES AND SPECIFIC QUESTION

Gordon W. Allport, who can be taken as a representative person-alist psychologist, stated of human growth to maturity that it is based upon the development of personal autonomy and of a long-range goal. Jürgen Moltmann, a foremost hope theologian, maintains that Christianity is fundamentally eschatological, that is, straining forward to a promised final goal of universal and eternal happiness. It is not possible in this paper to study all the social implications which Moltmann's theory suggests: such could be the topic of a subsequent work. However, it is possible to see that the dynamism of human growth described by Allport somehow underlies the dynamism of history interpreted in eschatological terms by Moltmann. Admittedly, the personalist outlook is more individualistic and the eschatological more global in scope; but since the universal contains the individual, the question may validly be asked whether personal goals offer a key to human fulfilment. Specifically, does the eschatological dimension of Christian faith provide the long-range goals which the personalist theory of G. W. Allport claims essential to maturity?

LIMITS AND DEMANDS

Neither discipline has the only answer. On the one hand, psychology can only analyze a human trait (such as the religious sentiment) in mature adults and chart its evolution; it can barely even sense this as experience. A similar limitation applies to the anthropological dimension of theology. On the other hand, modern man is more demanding than ever of religion and spirituality: for example, that faith be (and appear to be) founded on a logical basis, be more compatible with con-
temporary psychology, more stable in the winds of change because founded upon the faithful Promises of God and on the model of Christ's selfless concern for all persons. Faced with such limitations and demands, psychology and theology can only say that what man is and becomes is revealed in his ideals and in the direction he gives to his life.

THEME

Ideals, values, goals, have throughout history been recommended to the young and to whoever would remain young at heart. An ideal alone does not constitute human life; but it can give meaning and stimulate to action. Likewise, the promise of lasting happiness at the heart of eschatological hope cannot remain only a theory; much lies at stake here for the individual Christian life. Imagine what light and élan eschatological hope might impart to one's growth toward human and spiritual maturity, if taken seriously!

PLAN

Such, then, is the thrust of this thesis. In the first two chapters, Gordon Allport's personalist theory will be examined; chapter one will deal with the dynamism, and chapter two, with the structure of personality. Allport held that a person grows and matures only as he or she develops functional autonomy and harmonious long-range goals. Such goals unify or integrate all that a person is and does. And the interest best able to effect this integration is the religious sentiment. This whole theory of becoming or growth towards a goal bears highly interesting points of comparison with the Christian theology of hope as growth toward the eschatological goal of encounter with God. In chapter
three the hope theology of Jurgen Moltmann will be considered, after a brief look at the history of eschatology. Chapter four will make some reflections about the contributions of these two scholars and draw some conclusions about the eschatological hope of the Christian calling, as agent of integration for growth toward human and spiritual maturity.

ILLUSTRATION

In the quest for vision and fulfilment, humankind has timeless-ly expressed its hopes in dreams and legends. Through these, man reaches out beyond himself and finds the courage to live amid ambiguities and to strive toward fulfilment. Interestingly, myths are really "a manifestation of hope,"* as one hope theologian claims. Reduced to essentials, the fairy tale is quite simple. After a happy beginning, the story is suddenly menaced by some form of evil. As the evil nears triumph, the frightened characters receive help unexplainably, overcome the power of evil, and live happily every after. To the child, this is the simple but true metaphysics of life. Truth can only be one, good, and beautiful; it is to be both guarded and shared generously. To the child, if a box is opened, all manner of evil escapes; if a fruit is eaten, all the world can be plunged into misery; if a poor toad is touched by the breath of sincerity and love, he can be transformed into a splendid prince. Everything has the same origin, and everything lies dormant,

waiting to blossom into resurrection and paradise. The ultimate celebration of joy is an idyllic marriage feast: this is the perfect archetype of the Creator's nuptials with His creation. But before this, a judgment must take place that will lay bare the hidden motives of every wicked witch and every innocent Cinderella. Thus, the fruitfulness of man's own innermost reality is borne to eternal pain or joy. In the legend and tale, then, is truly and validly contained the whole ethic of Christian eschatology. In these can be found that sense of mystery which is at the heart of every person and which makes us sing with the Spirit in anticipation: "Someday, my Prince will come!"

In the words of Scripture, "Maranatha! Come, Lord Jesus, come!"

Vancouver, B. C.
Easter Sunday, 1976
CHAPTER I

ALLPORT'S THEORY OF LONG-RANGE GOALS

"Only when we see beyond our limited world can we change it."

( Teilhard de Chardin)
CHAPTER I

ALLPORT'S THEORY OF "LONG-RANGE GOALS"

I. Introduction: Becoming

When psychologist Gordon W. Allport entitled one of his books *Becoming*, he was touching upon one of the most basic themes in Christianity: that of eschatology. Allport meant to express the direction of development in personality toward functional autonomy, because of unique long-range goals. Characteristically, in almost every one of his books, Allport repeated his contention that "people, it seems, are busy leading their lives into the future, whereas psychology for the most part is busy tracing them into the past."¹

This trend, according to Allport, is unrealistic:

It is especially in relation to the formation and development of human personality that we need to open doors... Some theories of becoming are based largely upon the behavior of sick and anxious people or upon the antics of captive and desperate rats. Fewer theories have derived from the study of healthy human beings, those who strive not so much to preserve life as to make it worth living. Thus we find today many studies of criminals, few of law-abiders; many of fear, few of courage; more on hostility than on affiliation; much on the blindness in man, little on his vision: much on his past, little on his out-reaching into the future.


Because of this conviction, Allport made it his own life-long aim to give man his full due, to emphasize normality rather than pathology, to follow the development of functional autonomy in the person through the transformation of motives by dynamic long-range goals.

This chapter will consider, first, the origin in the person of goal-seeking processes and his purposive growth toward autonomy; and secondly, five salient features of Allport's theory of propriate motivation.

II. The Origin and Development of Goal-Seeking Processes

Allport sees the whole development of personality as a goal-seeking process; as a growth from immediate goals to long-range goals, from instincts to foresight planning, from infant to adult motivation, from rational curiosity to religious belief.

A. Objections to Inadequate Theories of Unchanging Instinctual Energies

How far back in personal growth can these goal-seeking processes be traced? Allport rejects certain theories of instincts and maturation:

Psychologists dispute as to whether the equipment of the new-born infant does or does not include a system of latent purposes. Does the primordial stream of activity contain within itself directions which determine its own course of development?... The instinct theory asserts that there

are such propensities operating "prior to experience and independent of training"... Since it is obviously impossible to discern any such elaborately purposive dispositions in the conduct of the new-born infant, it has been necessary for proponents of the instinct doctrine to lean heavily on the theory of maturation which holds that this providential equipment of goal-seeking processes must take time to ripen, and that throughout life the instincts, one after another, come of age. In recent years it has become common to reject this somewhat extravagant portrayal of human purposes.  

Although Allport rejects the prevalent instinct theories, he does take the trouble to examine them briefly to state his objections. William McDougall's hormic theory, he admits, is among the more orderly. Certain basic propensities exist in human beings from birth, as instincts in animals. These become evident or ripen through maturation to provide the essential dynamics of all human conduct. As they blend with "primary emotions" and with learning, there evolves a diversity of human motives. Sentiments develop when habitual (familiar) objects become attached to the instincts, and these sentiments constitute personality. The hormic theory thus offers "an account of the structure of motivation and of personality." But to Allport this account is "wholly speculative" and cramped by the preoccupation with the underlying uniform instincts; it does "not accept the autonomy of new motivational systems." The truth of motivation is "certainly more com-
plex, and individual differences far greater than the theory would allow."\(^7\)

The "instinctual energies"\(^8\) in Freudian theory are even less specified than in McDougall's, according to Allport. The best known are sex and aggression, which are supposed to account for most of human behavior. In order to explain differences between childish and adult activity, Freud offers two suggestions: "object cathexes" and "sublimation." In the first case, the adult satisfies his aggression and love-needs simply by finding new objects; but the basic instincts remain the same. In sublimation, the adult attempts to express his impulses in socially acceptable ways. To this Allport answers: "the maturing of normal personality is a far more complex process than simply redirecting the aim of originally unallowable wishes."\(^9\) Both object cathexes and sublimation are "inadequate to account for the qualitative differences between infant and adult," as also "for the extraordinary diversity of adult motives, unique in each particular personality."\(^10\)

The various needs theories evolved from the desire of some psychologists to establish certain fundamental human urges. As in McDougall's system, these needs are more numerous than Freud's basic impulses and allow more scope for conscious motives. The needs are also tied in with sentiments and thus with motivation and a structured

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8 Ibid.
personality. Once again, however, the variety of desired objects stems from limited basic kinds of desires. To Allport, the needs theory is "too abstract, disembodied, depersonalized"\(^{11}\) to represent the ongoing motivation of actual individuals. It denies the infinity of goals toward which people strive and the innumerable ways of achieving these goals. In brief, "universalized needs fail to depict with exactness the special foci of organization existing in each individual life."\(^{12}\)

The drives theory is simply another example of the category of unchanging energies. Some psychologists, considering that drives are essential to survival, made of these the simple and sovereign concept behind all motivational theory. Conditioning and reinforcement "stretch" drives, to account for diverse response-habits. Allport considers that the theory of drives at best adequately explains the activities of animals and of human children to two years old.

To sum it all up, Allport rejects the above theories and others based on similar unchanging instincts or needs; he claims it to be much simpler to account for individual interests than to try to tie them in mechanically as "common to a species and then be forced to explain away the many exceptions where the 'instincts' fail to put in an appearance"; he insists that we must allow "for the learning of new motives and for the acquisition of novel interests as personality matures."\(^{13}\) It is from this premise that he develops his theory of the transformation of

\(^{11}\) Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 201.
\(^{12}\) Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 241.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 112.
motives toward functional autonomy; this is the key to the present chapter.

B. Allport's Own Theory: The Transformation of Motives

1. Early Dispositions

Allport begins with a description of "inborn dispositions, the raw material for the development of personality." These are comprised of at least three sets of factors: common physical tendencies, inherited characteristics, and the potential for individuation. The first two factors are present in most other theories in psychology. As a matter of fact, Hall and Lindzey claim that "where Allport is a radical when dealing with adult behavior, he is an archconservative when discussing infant behavior." Thus, there are, first, the physical tendencies, common to the species and broadly termed instinctual. Made to ensure survival, these are mostly reflexes, drives, and homeostatic processes. Secondly, there are the inherited dispositions, that are associated with genes, family, race. "The operation of genes accounts for species uniformity, but also starts us well on the road to uniqueness."

2. The Transformation of Motives

Finally, the third array of dispositions brings one to what is peculiar and unique in Allport's theory: it is the very possibility of

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15 Allport, Becoming, p. 25.
each person to grow toward his own specific individuality:

There is yet a third and very different sense in which we may speak of original dispositions. It is not, so far as we know, a matter of specific gene determination or of instinct, except perhaps in the broadest possible sense. I refer to certain latent or potential capacities that play a crucial role in becoming.... If he is normally endowed the human infant will in time develop a conscience, a sense of self, and a hierarchical organization of traits.... We maintain... that personality is governed not only by the impact of stimuli upon a slender endowment of drives common to the species. Its process of becoming is governed, as well, by a disposition to realize its possibilities, i.e., to become characteristically human at all stages of development. And one of the capacities most urgent is individuation, the formation of an individual style of life that is self-aware, self-critical, and self-enhancing.16

The goals of the child are quite primitive, as compared with those of the adult, which are planned and enduring:

The young child's striving is directed toward the immediate object, an object to eat, to play with, enjoy, avoid, or to love. The striving is impulsive, transitory, unreflective, and not referred to self. Its significance does not transcend the present moment. By contrast, mature striving is linked to long-range goals. Thus, the process of becoming is largely a matter of organizing transitory impulses into a pattern of striving and interest in which the element of self-awareness plays a large part.... From adolescence onward... the surest clue to personality is the hierarchy of interests, including the loves and loyalties of adult life.17

The primary problem for the psychology of becoming, therefore, is to account for the transformation from infant to adult motivation, from instinctual drives to autonomous motives:

to account for the transformation by which the unsocialized infant becomes an adult with structured loves, hates,

16 Allport, Becoming, pp. 24-28.
loyalties, and interests, capable of taking his place in a complexly ordered society.  

3. Growth of the Proprium:

The Eight Aspects or Stages of Propriate Development

In order to account for this transformation, Allport analyzes the development of personality as a dynamic process involving most of all the evolution of what is most proper and unique to the person. This he calls the "proprium." The forward drive of this development in Allport's view, belies Freud's concept of a "latency" period; it supports rather the continuous movement of the personality towards its own integration within, and towards ever more specific and dynamic goals without.

It is the proprium which includes "all aspects of personality that make for inward unity." The propriate aspects of personality include eight facets: bodily sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement, ego-extension, rational functioning, the self-image, propriate striving, and the cognizing self or knower. These evolve in more or less chronological stages; but no particular instance of becoming can be explained by one and only one function: "The fact is that at every stage of

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18 Allport, Becoming, p. 29.
19 Allport, Pattern, pp. 213-214. Freud's stages of growth were based on psychosexual development. The "latency" period lies approximately between age five and puberty (or between the "phallic" and "genital" stages). During this time, the dynamics of sex development are more or less stabilized and "impulses tend to be held in a state of repression." Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 51.
20 Allport, Becoming, p. 40.
becoming a fusion of these functions is involved." The whole of the child's proprium is comprised of the first three. The adolescent grows beyond these to extend his interests outside himself and strive toward mature long-range goals.

Allport presents the eight aspects of propriate development in *Becoming*, Section 11. These describe the dynamic transformation of instincts into autonomous motives.

(1) The first is that of bodily sense. The child begins by this basic sense of self between 6 months and 18 months when he first starts to identify the discomforts he feels as his own. This bodily sense remains as a "lifelong anchor for... self-awareness" and the very core, the foundation of his becoming.

(2) The second moment in the development of the proprium is the construction of the self-identity, through the introjection of models. A certain retentive capacity develops in the infant, but it is only by the age of four or five that he becomes fully aware of his own self-identity as a person among persons. This sense grows gradually, mostly through social interaction and, in Allport's words, "partly as a result of being clothed and named, and otherwise marked off from the surrounding environment." 

(3) The third propriate function is to Allport "the most notorious property of the proprium,... its unabashed self-seeking." He

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21 Allport, *Becoming*, p. 56.
22 Ibid., p. 44.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
calls it **ego-enhancement**. Basically, this function derives from man's need for survival and is therefore a necessary sort of self-esteem or self-love. Though often thought of as selfishness or pride, this function also has a very positive role in the proprium:

Egoism is the incontrovertible philosophy of early childhood. But in the process of growth and extension of interests, newly adopted codes and manners represent genuine, not superficial, alterations in personality. Nor is the transformation merely one from unenlightened self-interest to enlightened self-interest.

Ego-enhancement means the dynamic progress towards autonomy. For the ego, gaining autonomy means becoming progressively free from id impulses and environmental pressures. This is an audacious statement!

[It turns] traditional Freudian psychology on its head. The admission means that much of our life is lived on the basis of mature and reportable schemes of values and purposes, and not merely as a conflicted defence against primitive instinctual forces.²⁶

This is the point where personal effort (cognition and action) begins to take pace over purely biological maturation.²⁷

These first three facets of propriate development characterize the whole of the child's proprium. These are strongly biological by

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²⁵ Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 169.
²⁶ Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 216.
²⁷ The proprium here becomes a valid foundation for an advanced personalist concept of freedom, such as that of André Ligneul, in Teilhard and Personalism, New York, Paulist Press, 1968, pp. 20-21: "The person cannot mature without effort on his part. 'External structures favor or hinder, but do not create the new man who is born through personal effort' (Mounier). If freedom is an upsurge, then the person finds himself beyond himself. Teilhard could have made his own Mounier's observation that freedom 'is not a sterile freedom of abstention, but a freedom of involvement.' Not negative opposition but fertile affirmation."
nature and respond almost exclusively to the natural processes of physical development, rather than to the person's taking full charge of himself through perception, cognition, and action.

(4) With time, however, the child grows to a sense of owning things and identifying with persons in an affective way. In older years this identification may extend to groups or nations, and may even extend to abstract ideals and religious values. This fourth facet of proper development is called ego-extension. Allport even sees "a mark of maturity [in] the range and extent of one's feeling of self-involvement in abstract ideals." 28

(5) The next facet of growth is that of the rational agent. The ego is generally charged with keeping the person in touch with reality. Thanks to Freud we know of the defense mechanisms it employs as protective devices. But, more positively, the rational agent can bring about "true solutions, appropriate adjustments, accurate planning, and a relatively faultless solving of the equations of life." 29

(6) The sixth propriate function is the self-image, frequently referred to by psychologists as the "phenomenal self." This is the aspect of most concern to present-day therapy. Allport sees two facets to the self-image: the present outlook of the subject on his own status and abilities, and his future outlook, his aspirations for himself. Although this future ideal may sometimes be compulsive or compensatory (in the one who is not conflict-free but still partially motivated by his

28 Allport, Becoming, p. 45.
29 Ibid., p. 46.
non-integrated past), in the integrated personality, it is insightful and attracts to a realistic goal. In Allport's words, "the ideal self-image is the imaginative aspect of the proprium, and whether accurate or distorted, attainable or unattainable, it plots a course by which much propriate movement is guided and therapeutic progress achieved." This image makes growth possible by keeping a person's view of the present in line with that of the future. One grows according to what one intends to be.

(7) This brings on the seventh function, propriate striving, where Allport situates the level of motivation. It is here that occurs the real transformation to autonomy in the maturing adult. Beyond the peripheral reasons of the early stages of becoming, Allport insists on the propriate motives which animate the mature adult:

At the rudimentary levels of becoming,... it is the impulses and drives, the immediate satisfaction and tension reduction, that are the determinants of conduct. Hence a psychology of opportunistic adjustment seems basic and adequate, especially to psychologists accustomed to working with animals. At low levels of behavior the familiar formula of drives and their conditioning appears to suffice. But as soon as the personality enters the stage of ego-extension, we are, I think, forced to postulate motives of a different order, motives that reflect propriate striving. Within experimental psychology itself there is now plenty of evidence that conduct that is "ego involved" (propriate) differs markedly from behavior that is not.31

Allport contrasts this ego-involved theory of motivation with the empirical doctrine of cognition. Empiricism stems from the Lockean

31 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
tradition, which "assumed the mind of the individual to be a tabula rasa at birth." This presupposition implied that man's nature would be passive. His intellect would acquire content and structure only from external impact upon the senses. The Leibnitzian tradition, on the other hand, held that the person is not only reactive, but active; the source of his activity is within himself and is purposive, directed toward the future: "Personality is something and does something... It is what lies behind specific acts and within the individual." Motivationally speaking, the contrast between empiricism and personalism is this: "For Locke the organism was reactive when stimulated; for Leibnitz it was self-propelled." Empiricism describes motivation as a state of tenseness that leads one to seek tension reduction or equilibrium (homeostasis). Allport holds that such an explanation falls short of the total and true nature of motivation and of proprieate striving. Tension reduction may apply to partial adjustments. The characteristic feature of a life adjustment in proprieate striving is "its resistance to equilibrium: tension is maintained rather than reduced." And Allport cites the example of Roald Amundsen who strove throughout his life, in spite of failures, to achieve his ideal of being a polar explorer. To Allport, it is most inadequate to describe this man's (or our own) insatiable interests in terms of tension reduction.

32 Allport, Becoming, p. 7.
33 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
34 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 48.
35 Allport, Becoming, p. 8.
36 Ibid., pp. 49, 65-68.
Rather, it is the persistence of tension that drives one on.

Propriate motives are all-important for the unification of the personality. They are on a continuum that begins with the rudimentary impulses and goals, in which the individual seeks immediate satisfaction; and that terminates with long-range goals, which imply that the individual has developed the capacity to continue striving, while postponing gratification. The turning point on this continuum occurs in the transformation of motives from "need-boundedness" to "intentionality." It is the future intentions or long-range goals that give direction to a life and mark the person as specifically human and mature. On this matter, Allport makes one of his strongest statements:

Propriate striving distinguishes itself from other forms of motivation in that, however beset by conflicts, it makes for unification of personality. There is evidence that the lives of mental patients are marked by the proliferation of unrelated subsystems, and by the loss of more homogeneous systems of motivation. When the individual is dominated by segmental drives, by compulsions, or by the winds of circumstance, he has lost the integrity that comes only from maintaining major directions of striving. The possession of long-range goals, regarded as central to one's personal existence, distinguishes the human being from the animal, the adult from the child, and in many cases the healthy personality from the sick.

Now, the transformation of motives which occurs is a real change. The behavior of a maturing person may show a historical continuity, while an important shift in motivation may have occurred. A boy may become interested in politics because of father-identification, but with time may make of this his own life style, discarding his original

37 Allport, Becoming, pp. 50-51.
The adult interest we described began as something else. In all cases the activity that later became motivational was at first instrumental to some other end (i.e., to some earlier motive). What was once extrinsic and instrumental becomes intrinsic and impelling. The activity once served a drive or some simple need; it now serves itself, or in a larger sense, serves the self-image (self-ideal) of the person. Childhood is no longer in the saddle; maturity is.

Functional autonomy, then, refers to any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed.  

Two characteristics of Allport's conception of functional autonomy are outstanding here: the contemporaneity of motives (motives actually prevailing) and their organization. Motives apparently contradictory are actually organized among themselves and do not split the personality apart by haphazard accumulation. Rather, all the motives, even if actual (contemporaneous), are integrated in a more complete "organism" which is personality. They are not independent in their manifestations (which would spark conflicts between opposing motives) but ordained to the service of the whole (personality).

(8) Finally, the last or eighth propriate function is the knower. Essentially, this means the full self-awareness of a cognizing self, a state which transcends all other functions of the proprium. Allport rejects William James' explanation that a series of thoughts and

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39 Ibid.
experiences can become aware of themselves as a unit, or in James' words, that "the thoughts themselves are the thinker." Rather, they arise from the thinker. The knowing function is a vital attribute of the self: I am aware not only of things or of my actions, but of the fact that I am the one perceiving those things and I am the one accomplishing those actions. Moreover, in thinking about the various functions of which I am capable, I also perceive their unity among themselves, as well as with the knowing function itself. All these characteristics make the knowing function clearly a state peculiarly "my own," a function of the proprium, "an eighth valid meaning of 'self' or 'ego.'"

4. Distinction between Proprium and "Ego": Uniqueness and Unity of Propriate Development

All of the eight phases of propriate development described above are specifically those of the "proprium." Although they do not evolve in strict chronological order, there is a certain successive quality linking them. More or less definable as stages, they are also --in a certain sense--functions of the proprium to be admitted as data in scientific studies of the personality. Allport, however, warns against making these functions coextensive with personality or the self. They can be compared, rather, to various angle shots of a city, or

40 Cited by Allport in Becoming, p. 51.
41 Allport, Becoming, p. 53. It might be noted here that this is the area of full self-awareness and self-control predicated of ultimate sanctity.
42 Cf. Allport, Becoming, p. 38.
separated analyzed parts, the sum total of which cannot but vaguely re­
constitute the whole. Thus, in order to avoid the connotations of both
terms, "phase" and "function," Allport applies the term "aspects":
"special aspects of personality that have to do with warmth, with unity,
with a sense of personal importance."43

Allport stresses the propriateness of personal growth with such
emphasis that he even claims that if the science of psychology were not
limiting itself,44 it would necessarily and automatically be ego psychol­
ogy: personalistic psychology rather than a psychology of the person
lost among other branches of a vague general science. "An adequate
psychology would in effect be a psychology of the ego."45 As a result
of this emphasis, Allport has been hailed as an "ego psychologist," the
most influential scholar in contemporary times "in restoring and
purifying the ego concept."46

But it is only with the utmost caution that Allport treated this
topic of the ego or self. In Becoming,47 he shows that the self or soul
was for centuries a concept of philosophy and theology. Wundt was the
first to denounce this as an impediment to the progress of psycholog­
ical studies. His objection was that the concept seems question-begging;
the ego appears as a deus ex machina,48 a "homunculus," an entity to

43 Cf. Allport, Becoming, p. 55.
44 Cf. ibid., p. 56.
46 Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 289.
47 Allport, Becoming, pp. 36-41. Cf. also Allport, "The Ego in
48 Allport, Becoming, p. 37.
which much is attributed but which defies analysis. Allport puts it this way:

...the danger we have several times warned against is very real; that a homunculus may creep into our discussions of personality, and be expected to solve all our problems without in reality solving any.... What is unnecessary and inadmissible is a self (or soul) that is said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a trans-psychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis.49

Allport states that it was Freud who, quite unintentionally, preserved "the concept of ego from total obliteration through two generations of strenuous positivism"50 (following Wundt). The core concept thus preserved, it was later possible to enlarge upon it, cautiously, in order to promote scientific progress. Allport found a clue to a new understanding of the self in one of Adler's statements: "What is frequently labeled 'the ego' is nothing more than the style of the individual."51 An adequate study of a person's life-style, its inter-related activities and its unity would approach a more adequate concept of self. By separating peripheral matters of fact (or opportunistic modes of adjusting) from what the individual considers matters of importance to himself, one can discover what is "propriate" or proper to the "self." This "proprium" includes "all the regions of our life that we regard as peculiarly ours... all aspects of personality that make

49 Allport, Becoming, pp. 54-55.
50 Ibid., p. 37.
for inward unity.\textsuperscript{52}

In his efforts to distinguish the proprium from inadequate concepts of the "ego" and from other personalistic conceptions, Allport is even more specific yet. For the sake of clarity, four points which he considers basic to his theory must be quoted. These emphasize the uniqueness and unity of propriate development:

1. Person and personality are far broader conceptions than proprium.... Personality includes besides propriate functions a wide variety of adjustive activities, characteristic of the person and rendering the human organism the unique unit that it is. Many doctrines of self are so inclusive as to blur these distinctions.

2. Our position is that at birth we start with an organism (or individual) which develops unique modes of adjusting to and mastering the environment; these modes constitute personality. The earlier modes cannot involve propriate functions, though by the age of two or three they begin to do so.

3. The proprium is not a thing; it is not separable from the person as a whole. Above all it is not a homunculus. Proprium is a term intended to cover those functions that make for the peculiar unity and distinctiveness of personality, and at the same time seem to the knowing function to be subjectively intimate and important. The person is thus an individual organism capable of propriate activities, including, of course, the function of knowing.

4. The proprium develops in time. While we may grant that each human being has a disposition (capacity) to develop a

\textsuperscript{52} Allport, Becoming, p. 40. Cf. Adrian Van Kaam's concept of one's "project of existence," which he defines as an inner orientation which makes one live his life in a more personal way. People display such an individual manner of handling life situations that we "implicitly believe that everyone is guided by some plan or project, by a certain orientation, a certain style of life." (A. Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, New York, Image Books, 1968, p. 20.) This existential project is our way of being present to life and to others, our way of ex-isting, of "standing out" to reality (Ibid., pp. 11, 166). In the case of religious orientation, it is one's way of "standing out" toward God or consciously relating to Him. Cf. also Gabriel Marcel, "Sketch of a Phenomenology and a Metaphysic of Hope," in Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope: \textit{Homo Viator}, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 42.
proprium, we stress the interlocking and emergent aspects of development rather than an unchanging nuclear self. Learning and socialization are major problems in the psychological view of becoming, whereas they recede into vagueness in most personalistic philosophies.\textsuperscript{53}

The person, then is unique; he develops purposively toward a mature autonomy because of future intentions seen to be self-fulfilling and attractive (in the etymological sense of the term).

III. Conclusion:
Five Features of Propriate Motivation

The foregoing discussion of the development of the proprium makes abundantly clear the importance of long-range goals for the gradual integration of the personality. Five characteristic features of propriate motivation now emerge.

A. Change

First of all, growth towards maturity involved a change in motives.\textsuperscript{54} To summarize what has been said:

Personality, like every other living thing, changes as it grows. And since motives are the dynamos of personality we must expect motives also to grow and to change. To account for the vast transformation that occurs between infancy and adulthood is not an easy task. The process is gradual and subtle. Nor can we say that all motives change in equal degree. Drives remain with us. And even in complex adult motives the past is sometimes, to some degree, still alive in the present. But our task is to discover how much of the past is fire and how much of it is ashes.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Allport, Becoming, pp. 61-62.
\textsuperscript{54} Cf. Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 213. Also, Adrian Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{55} Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 394.
It has been seen that this change occurs on a continuum: from the seeking of immediate satisfaction because of need-boundedness to the postponing of gratification because of some future intention or long-range goal. This is to say that motives of a completely different order evolve. There may be historical continuity in an activity, but wholly new motives render it functionally autonomous. The reason is that the person becomes able to leave aside the external motives and pressures which goaded him to action, because he develops motives which he recognizes as clearly his own; each person establishes "his own ideal type." To state it explicitly, a person develops his own motives because he acquires his own long-range goals.

During this transformation, three phases of change seem to occur—as Allport indicates in regard to the conscience, a critical area of growth where the change discussed so far is clearly reflected:

1. External sanctions give way to internal—a change adequately accounted for by the processes of identification and introjection familiar in Freudian and behavioral theory. 2. Experiences of prohibition, fear, and "must" give way to experiences of preference, self-respect, and "ought." This shift becomes possible in proportion as the self-image and value-systems of the individual develop. 3. Specific habits of obedience give way to generic self-guidance, that is to say, to broad schemata of values that confer direction upon conduct.

The development is thus dynamically oriented toward individuality. For, if the person remained forever under the guidance of parents or others, no true self (or proprium or uniqueness) could be possible; such a person would forever be at the mercy of the shifting winds of

56 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 394.
57 Allport, Becoming, p. 73. Cf. Allport, The Individual, p. 100.
opinion and would therefore be no more than a tool or robot. It is

generic self-guidance that allows for a unique style of being:

The generic conscience tells us in effect, "If you do this, it will build your style of being; if that, it will tear down your style of being." In proportion as the generic conscience becomes the monitor of growth, emphasis shifts from tribalism to individuality, from opportunistic to oriented becoming. Fear becomes ought as appropriate development begins to outweigh opportunistic.58

In this way, the whole person changes and grows. Fear dissolves as the person affirms himself with true self-confidence.

B. Contemporaneity

Motivational change, therefore, helps bring about functional autonomy in the personality. Motives move from past pressures to present reasons for activity. This state has been referred to as the "contemporaneity"59 of motives. And Allport here is most emphatic on the normal individual's ability to describe what he is presently doing as purposive, as indicative of what he is trying to do. It is not the past that guides him now, but the future; not what he can do, but what he wants to achieve.

The "go" of my passion for fishing is here and now, stretching into the future—I hope to go fishing next Wednesday—and not into the past. Adult motives are infinitely varied, self-

58 Allport, Becoming, p. 74. Note: This thesis offers an alternative to the psychological "script" in transactional analysis, as described by Berne, What Do You Say, p. 362.

sustaining, contemporary systems. They are not fossils. To put it succinctly, the future is here and now effective and being effected, definitely affecting the present.

C. Directionality

Propriate motivation, then, is future-oriented; that is, it is directional, or intentional, because of long-range goals. Intention gathers all that a person is. In a person-in-project, there is, in a sense, no time; the past and the future are fused dynamically in the actual forward élan. Here the influence of Bergson is clearly felt, as Allport explicitly acknowledges: "Bergson has said that personality is a knife edge pressed against the future."

Allport insists that this intention of the person is the very key to how he will behave in the present.

Such directionality of intention toward future goals essentially involves tension, a tension which is maintained throughout the course of becoming. It cannot be reduced to equilibrium-seeking only, for true mature goals are never fully achieved. If they were, the personality would cease its striving and settle into stagnant complacency. On the contrary, there are always some goals pulling forward. As Allport

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60 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 211.
61 In Gabriel Marcel's terms: future includes, contains present; cf. Marcel, "Sketch", pp. 32, 60.
63 Cf. Ernst Bloch's "the pull of the future" and Teilhard's "the pull of the Absolute," below Chapter III, pp. 81, 94, 103.
notes, the poet Robert Browning was right in saying that "our reach should exceed our grasp." And with Browning, we might add: "Or what's a heaven for?"

D. Organization

But, one might object, are there not many, varied goals in a life? Most true! And a real theory of motivation allows for goals of many types. But it is typical of growth that these goals become organized into a hierarchy of values. No conflict among motives will split the creative personality.

E. Integration

Integration is all the more assured as the long-range motivation of a person tends to become simplified into fewer and fewer major intents, and eventually unified if possible, by one all-pervading long-range goal. Such a goal differs from one personality to another; but Allport climaxes this treatise by stating that the one motive which

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65 From the poem "Andrea del Sarto."
68 Cf. Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, p. 60: "To be a personality is the outcome of a long process of self-integration."
69 Allport, Becoming, pp. 91-92 and 50-51.
best gathers together all others is the religious sentiment. It is within this context, he says, that the most complete integration of personality can be achieved. The next chapter, then, will discuss integration and the religious sentiment.
"Grace builds on nature."

(St. Thomas Aquinas)
CHAPTER II

ALLPORT'S RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AS LONG-RANGE GOAL AND
AGENT OF INTEGRATION

I. Introduction

Chapter 1 considered Allport's theory of growth in the person, especially the dynamism of this growth: it is the evolution of a unique, autonomous individual, because of long-range goals. These goals gradually unify and integrate all that a person is and does. And the goal-oriented motivation which Allport foresaw as best able to bring about this integration is the religious sentiment.

Chapter 2 will focus, first, on the structure of integration, according to Allport; secondly, on the concepts of trait and sentiment; and thirdly, on the religious sentiment as an integrative agent.

II. The Concept of Integration

A. Integration as Dynamic Structure

The phases of propriate development which were examined in the first chapter may be considered broadly as the dynamics of growth. How does Allport represent what is thus constructed?

He does so by describing the process of integration which structures hierarchically all that a person is. "In psychology the problem of becoming is intertwined with the problem of structure; for process leads to product."¹

¹ Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, p. 88.
But as Hall and Lindzey note, the distinction in Allport's theory between dynamism and structure is not so clear-cut as in most other theories of psychology. This is because the becoming of a normal person is such a unified process, in Allport's view. There is a fundamental interdependence between the evolving functional autonomy and the long-range goals. A person can leave aside childish motives only inasmuch as he develops new goals proper to himself—because one cannot exist or act in a vacuum. And these propionate goals can be set only inasmuch as the person becomes independent, or functionally autonomous. There is mutual interplay at all stages, as the growing autonomy of a person calls for more personal motives or goals; while at the same time, these goals invite one forward to greater personal autonomy. To sum it all up, the maturing individual gradually becomes functionally autonomous, as he simultaneously develops long-range goals, and eventually one integrated main interest, ideal, or goal. As Hall and Lindzey put it:

... the extent to which an individual's motivations are autonomous is a measure of the maturity of the individual. The more his present motives are linked to the past and to underlying biological states, the more immature he is and the less he has evolved from a childish state.  

B. Definition of Integration

The process of becoming therefore moves gradually toward integration, through increasing differentiation and organization. The

very concept of integration, Allport claims, has been the most important
single contribution of psychology to mental health.\textsuperscript{4} This concept may
be broadly understood or defined as the sum total or composite of several
parts making a whole, as a result of the passage from a complex and un-
stable state to one relatively simple and stable. "To integrate," says
Allport, "means to form more embracing units."\textsuperscript{5} He makes an effective
comparison between biological integration and psychological:

The significance of the concept of integration is best under-
stood by referring to the cell theory in biology. The initial
fact is that the human body contains trillions of cells, over
nine billion of which are found in the brain. Somehow out of
this astronomic array of single bits a relatively unified per-
sonality is constructed. Separate nerve cells function together
in such a way as to lose their independence. From the many
there emerges the one; the motto of integration is \textit{e pluribus
unum}. We hasten to add that personality is never completely
unified, but the trend of integration is toward this goal.\textsuperscript{6}

Psychological growth involved an ascending hierarchical fusion
of systems, from neural cells and conditioned reflexes to the integration
of the total personality:

Integration means that from disparate units of behavior larger
and more inclusive integers are formed. The actual functional
scope of these new integers may be narrow or broad. A con-
ditioned reflex represents an integration of two or more
sensory pathways (or types of excitation) with one common
motor outlet; at the other extreme, personality itself rep-
resents an hypothetical integer including in a functional
unity all the varied systems of behavior possessed by one
individual.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{4} Allport, \textit{The Individual and His Religion}, London, Macmillan,
1969, p. 103.  
\textsuperscript{5} Allport, \textit{Personality: A Psychological Interpretation}, New York,
\textsuperscript{6} Allport, \textit{Pattern and Growth in Personality}, New York, Holt,
\textsuperscript{7} Allport, \textit{Personality}, 1937, p. 142.
Allport names specific levels of integration in his diagram (following); but he is careful to note, first, that there can be fusion at any point of growth, and secondly, that the terms he uses remain arbitrary:

For convenience intermediate levels may be distinguished, e.g., habits, traits, and selves, representing progressively widening integers of generalized dispositions. Actually, of course, these levels are arbitrary since inclusiveness of any degree may characterize an integration.8

C. Hypothetical Schema of Integration

How then does Allport represent this unified, hierarchical, goal-directed becoming or growth? He begins his study at the biological level. Even as the molecular cells become organized to form the superior systems (nervous, digestive, circulatory, etc.), the organs, and finally the organism itself (which is the physical person as a whole), so the psychological being develops from the simple to the complex in a genetic sequence: the conditioned reflexes are integrated into habits, the habits into traits, the traits into selves, and the selves into the total personality, whose uniqueness is expressed by the term "proprium."

Here is Allport's own description of this:

In ascending order of complexity one might distinguish a hierarchy of the levels produced by integration as follows:

Conditioned reflexes, the simplest learned forms of adaptive behavior involving substitution of associated stimuli for congenitally effective stimuli, with the result that the individual performs innate acts to altered stimulus situations.

Habits, integrated systems of conditioned responses, involving altered responses as well as an extended range of

8 Allport, Personality. 1937, p. 142.
effective conditioning, leading to fairly stereotyped forms of response in the face of recurrent situations of a similar type.

Traits, more dynamic and flexible dispositions, resulting at least in part, from the integration of specific habits, expressing characteristic modes of adaptation to one's surroundings. Belonging to this level are the dispositions variously called sentiments, attitudes, values, complexes, and interests.

Selves, systems of traits that are coherent among themselves, but are likely to vary in different situations. (Cf. the statement of James that a man "has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares.")

Personality, the progressive final integration of all the systems of response that represent an individual's characteristic adjustments to his various environments. (Considered as a perfect integration this level represents the ideal final stage, never actually attained.)

Elsewhere, Allport gives a parallel definition of PERSONALITY:

Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought.

To illustrate the above genetic development, Allport draws the following pyramidal diagram:

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9a Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 28.
A Schematic Representation of Integration

Figure 1

A.

TOTAL PERSONALITY

"SELVES"

TRAILS

HABITS

CONDITIONED REFLEXES

BIRTH

EVENTS REQUIRING ADJUSTMENT

PRE-SCHOOL

HOME ENVIRONMENT

SCHOOL AGE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAHING

adolescence

WORLD OF IDEAS

ADJUSTMENT

PARENTS

GANG

SEX

VOCATION

MARRIAGE

DEATH

Figure 15

A Schematic Representation of Integration

B.

Total personality

"Selves"

Personal traits

Habits

Conditioned reflexes

Neural cells

Figure 13. Schematic Representation of Integration

10 Figure 1 A: Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 141. Figure 1 B: Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 101.
D. The Dialectic of Differentiation and Integration

The child begins with a certain primitive, gross unity which is gradually differentiated, then gathered again through the process of integration. (Simple state to complex to simple.) Constant progress occurs in the direction of ever greater integration, while differentiation continues in dynamic dialectic.11 "An infant is a homogeneous biological system, but an adult is more of a psychologically differentiated and integrated system."12

The unity which Allport envisions is no static homeostasis; rather, the unity at a particular present moment operates on the principle of "convergence":13

At any one time available energies are mobilized in one maximally integrated course of conduct. Although this course of conduct may be largely determined by present demands (such as changing a tire, waiting on a customer, or playing the piano) it is likely to focalize many deep-lying sets.14

This applies as well to the long-range unity-in-process of a lifetime

It is the gradual convergence of reflexes, habits, traits, and selves that forms the total personality, as Allport attempted to illustrate in his schema. Integration requires conscious effort by the individual over a lifetime.

Integration means the forging of approximate mental unity out of discordant impulses and aspirations. No one can say, "I will integrate my life," and expect to find it done. For the most part integration is a by-product of various favourable techniques of living.¹⁵

Without accepting fully William James' statement that a man "has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares,"¹⁶ and leaving aside psychological terminology a moment, we can recognize that we do have different sets of reactions in our various daily encounters. The efficient self which a businessman shows about his work may sometimes differ from his inadequacy in the role of husband or parent. Yet it is one and the same person functioning. From this example we can also understand that the various aspects of our personality do not necessarily develop at the same rate. Certain ambitions or interests may induce us to develop certain capacities more than others. In this way, there frequently are sectors of our lives that remain unexplored. They are nevertheless dynamic; and unless they are consciously uncovered, they may at some time spring forth and create a more or less pleasant surprise in our own

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behavior. In a similar vein, Adrian Van Kaam stresses the need to be aware of as many facets of our being as possible, for psychological maturity as well as for its fulfilment in religious commitment:

I can transcend only what I own in awareness. Therefore, it remains important, even for the deepest religious decision, that it be preceded by a dialogue with spontaneity. 17

But this is getting ahead of our discussion.

The whole dialectic of differentiation and unification is widely recognized as one of crucial importance. To clarify further: a person's assimilation of the past and his realization of a future goal occur throughout a historical becoming which is characterized by the two movements of differentiation and integration. These two constitute "the basic polarity of our existence," according to Van Kaam. 18

Differentiation enables a person to diversify his experience, to learn new things, to encounter varied realities, to acquire new worlds of meaning. Through an effort of integration, these new experiences are incorporated into his being, into his present store of knowledge, and he is richer thereby. Integration brings unity, makes whole. Without differentiation, a person's life would become stagnant; without


18 Cf. Van Kaam, ibid., pp. 13-20. This is exactly what Moltmann talks about in Theology of Hope, p. 91 (as will be seen below, Chapter IV, p. 146), and has everything to do with the "not yet" of man's existence in hope. Cf. Teilhard's dialectic, below III, 94.
integration, he would be lost in a maze of diversified new elements of information and experience. Both movements are obviously essential to a dynamic existence.

III. The Theory of Traits and Sentiments

A. Focus on the Trait

1. Why Does Allport Emphasize the Trait Level of Personality Structure?

In Allport's hierarchical organization of personality, the simplest form of adjustive response is that of reflexes, which later become joined into systems of habits. But habits being limited to specific stimulus situations are still too rigid "to serve as the most typical structural units of personality." It is when habits are functionally grouped into traits that Allport finds "the most important of all levels in the structure of personality." Beyond this, he also speaks of whole systems of traits grouped into "selves" that respond to widely differing zones of environmental situations, and finally he envisions an ultimate total integration of personality, which is never fully achieved.

But, as noted above, it is at the level of traits that Allport finds the most dynamic structures of personality. Besides being called an "ego-psychologist," he has in fact also been referred to as a "trait

19 Cf. here Allport's comments on humor and religion in The Individual, pp. 104-105.
20 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 142.
21 Ibid.
psychologist" because of this emphasis. The trait to him is the major motivational construct, somewhat equivalent to the need in Murray's theory, the instinct in Freud's and the sentiment in McDougall's.

2. Definition of the Trait; Its Origin, Qualities, and Object

Allport defines the trait as

a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior.23

To a great extent, it is in the almost universal experience of mankind that Allport finds the trait.24 Scarcely anyone would think of questioning its existence; it is the common expression used to characterize someone's disposition. Persons are said to be kindly, thrifty, gruff, self-centered, talkative, or hard-working. These dispositions are no mere constructs but are actually present in the personality. Allport is quite adamant on the point that the trait is not dependent upon the observer but has real existence in a person:

A trait... has more than nominal existence; it is independent of the observer, it is really there.... This view does not hold that every trait-name necessarily implies a trait; but rather that behind all confusion of terms,... there are none the less bona fide mental structures in each personality that account for the consistency of behavior.25

24 Ibid., p. 286.
25 Ibid., p. 289.
The trait is "really there" because it is rooted deeply in the proprium. It is a result of innate and acquired dispositions. It is not super-imposed in a personality (i.e., discovered by deductive reasoning), but inferred from "the demonstrable consistency of the separate observable acts of behavior."\(^{27}\)

Besides this consistency, the trait also has a focal quality. It "tends to have a center around which its influence operates,"\(^ {28}\) a center or object which is highly generalized. Moreover, traits are not sharply distinct from one another but tend to be interrelated. Allport notes in fact that this interdependence of traits "takes a long step in the direction of synthesis."\(^ {29}\)

Are traits then a driving force in propriate growth? What about possible dominant traits? Allport holds that traits are definitely dynamic and purposive:

...Since traits, on the physiological side, are undoubtedly neural dispositions of complex order, they may be expected to show motivational, inhibitory, and selective effects upon specific courses of conduct.\(^ {30}\)

Again, this is deeply rooted in the proprium, for what motivates a person is not any element common to all people but "his own particular pattern of tensions."\(^ {31}\) Also, some traits more than others "are clearly motivational, especially those sub-classes ordinarily known as interests,

26 Hall and Lindzey, *Theories of Personality*, p. 269.
30 Ibid., p. 319.
31 Ibid., p. 321.
ambitions, complexes, and sentiments." The more generalized a trait is, the more it tends to become dominant, and thereby the more dynamic. Such a trait is called "cardinal":

It is so dominant that there are few activities that cannot be traced directly or indirectly to its influence.... No such trait can for long remain hidden; an individual is known by it, and may even become famous for it. Such a master quality has sometimes been called the eminent trait, the ruling passion, the master-sentiment, or the radix of a life.33

B. Clarification of Terms

1. The Trait

To summarize and clarify the terms used above:

The trait represents a broad style of adapting, a generalized type of response with motive power of its own. It is central in the dynamism of growth, and thus should be the area of most intense research by psychology. As Allport says, "It is between the levels of specific habit and complete unity that common sense locates the natural foci of personality."34

2. The Attitude and the Sentiment

At the level of traits in the structure of personality, as noted earlier, Allport situates the attitude and the sentiment. Both of these highly resemble the trait. In fact, between them (the trait and the

32 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 341.
34 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 186.
attitude), "they cover virtually every type of disposition with which the psychology of personality concerns itself."\textsuperscript{35} The attitude and the sentiment both focus upon a more specific object; whereas the trait is always more generalized. The sentiment takes its place in Allport's theory between the attitude and the trait.\textsuperscript{36} In the sentiment, the subject lives his relationship with the object; in the attitude this relationship is revealed to the observer. The sentiment, then, holds an importance of its own at the trait level of personality structure. Allport, as quoted above, refers to a "cardinal trait" as a "master sentiment."

3. The Characteristic

In \textit{Becoming}, Allport even uses the term "characteristic" which seems to signify much the same thing as the sentiment;\textsuperscript{37} for at the highest levels of growth, he says, a few characteristics become dominant or "cardinal"\textsuperscript{38} and therefore integrative. The reason he gives is significant:

Since we are interested at the moment in the influence of high-level structure upon subsequent growth, we call attention especially to those characteristics that unite biological vitality with a network of meanings. To adapt a term from medieval philosophy, characteristics of this type represent the person's "intentionality." Intentions, as I shall use the term, are complex appropriate characteristics of personality.

Intentional characteristics represent above all else the individual's primary modes of addressing himself to the

\textsuperscript{35} Allport, \textit{Personality}, 1937, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{37} Allport, \textit{Becoming}, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 92.
future. As such they select stimuli, guide inhibitions and choices, and have much to do with the process of adult becoming. 39

Intentional characteristics are of pre-emptive importance to Allport, for they manifest a person’s value system. Values, the "termini" of intentions, 40 show the kind of future one is trying to bring about and so are decisive factors in becoming. Thus, the characteristic is also in the category of "master sentiments."

C. Focus on the Sentiment

1. Origin

Allport was first impressed by the doctrine of sentiments originally launched by Alexander Shand, late in the nineteenth century, and adopted later by William McDougall. 41 To these scholars, "sentiments offered an adequate basis for a psychology of personality." 42

In McDougall’s theory, the cardinal concept is the sentiment. Here is how Allport describes that theory:

The sentiment is itself a complexly organized effective tendency, springing from instinct and emotion, but attached by experience to a certain object or class of objects. In themselves the various sentiments may obstruct one another or conflict with one another unless they are brought into one single system within which their impulses are harmonized. This embracing integration is the "character," and is achieved through the development of a master sentiment of "self-regard," which takes the form of a self-conscious devotion to certain selected ideals with which the person identifies himself. Not only does this devotion to certain

39 Allport, Becoming, p. 89; cf. also pp. 75-78.
41 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 50.
42 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 96.
ideals dominate and harmonize all other sentiments, but it is capable of extension and change so that a continuous and consistent growth of personality is assured.43

Allport adopts much of this doctrine, but amplifies it to allow for the greater complexity of motivation and the more extensive individual differences which he sees in personal development.44

2. Description of the Sentiment

At the basis of his thought, Allport distinguishes sentiment from instinct by describing the former as acquired and the latter as innate. The sentiment is evidence for functional autonomy, since it has "as much dynamic character as has been attributed to instincts."45 As he interprets it, the term "sentiment" allows for individuality of affective organization. It is the only term that closely designates a blend of emotion and reason, of feeling and meaning:

When we study it we are dealing with neither rationality nor irrationality, but rather with a posture of mind in which emotion and logical thinking fuse. We are dealing with a mode of response wherein a combination of feelings is tied to a conception of the nature of things that is thought-provoking, reasonable, and acceptable.46

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43 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 89.
45 Allport, Personality, 1937, p. 201.
46 Allport, The Individual, p. 18. An interesting parallel could be noted here with Jürgen Moltmann's statement on a broader scale, in Religion, Revolution and the Future, p. 132: "To be responsible for history in a revolutionary fashion today means to find the unity of knowledge and action."
3. Dynamism of the Sentiment

Like the trait, the sentiment is the product of two central and vital functions of growth: motivation and organization. "Motivation refers to the 'go' of mental life, organization to its patterning." The sentiment, then, is a relatively stable unit of personality that has emerged from this double source and that becomes purposive and integrative in its own right:

Whatever it is called, this unit is a system of readiness, a mainspring of conduct, preparing the person for adaptive behavior whenever the appropriate stimulus or associations are presented.

4. Object of the Sentiment

The sentiment represents an organization of thought and feeling directed toward some definable object of value. This object may be physically concrete (a mother, keepsake, a fatherland) or abstract (devotion to beauty, to the sacredness of personality, to brotherhood and peace). At the highest abstract levels, the precise object of the sentiment becomes more difficult to define. In this the sentiment comes close to the trait itself. At this point, the sentiment is so broad that it constitutes more a "posture of the mind that persists while various objects and sub-values are successively brought into view." In the religious sentiment, for instance, various aspects of

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47 Allport, The Individual, p. 63. Cf. above, Chapter I, p. 34.
48 Ibid., p. 63.
49 Cf. the objects of hope given by Moltmann in Religion, Revolution and the Future, p. 155.
50 Allport, The Individual, p. 64.
the deity may in turn draw attention, then the problems of evil and immortality, then the significance of a sacrament or an item of the creed. But whether we are dealing with sentiments in general, or specifically with the religious sentiment, it must be recognized that although the sentiment entails many component attitudes and objects of interest, it constitutes nevertheless "a stable unit of mental life." The component attitudes may be variable but they all contribute to a single well-patterned system characteristically oriented to some goal.

IV. The Religious Sentiment

A. The Religious Sentiment and Other Schemata that Are Integrative

Integration, according to Allport, is the gradual development and the long-term result of true human maturity. Its focus and dynamism is the trait. At this level, the sentiment directs attention toward some object of interest, a goal that attracts and unifies all of a person's activity and becoming. Allport claims, and this is the present thesis, that the religious sentiment is the most effective agent of integration.

Perfect integration, of course, is never achieved, but to be even reasonably successful it must ... admit the requirements of the mature conscience. All strongly ideal interests, we know, tend to unify the mind. But in principle, the religious interest, being most comprehensive, is best able to serve as an integrative agent. 52

But are there not other sentiments powerful enough to bring

51 Allport, The Individual, p. 64.
52 Ibid., p. 104.
about integration? What about differing interests claiming attention in different areas of a person's life?

In the process of unification it is possible to promote the development of several interests, providing that they be somewhat related or that one of these become dominant. Many sentiments have the capacity to fulfil this integrative role. Allport's example is that of Roald Amundsen whose entire life was dominated by the passion to become an Arctic explorer. 53 Such general and intense dispositions closely indicate "the unifying theme or themes of a life." 54 Yet, "any working principle that sustains human endeavor" 55 is capable of effectively relating the individual to reality. Any such principle involves some form of faith in one's own values or in some ultimate value, and this is the basis upon which anyone builds a worthwhile, meaningful existence.

All faith--whether religious or not--is an affirmation where knowledge, though made use of, is not the decisive factor. It is a truism that all men live by faith, for no one has knowledge that his values are worthwhile; he only has faith that they are... Religion is not the only unifying sentiment. Logically perhaps, since it aims to encompass all that lies within experience and all that lies beyond, it is ideally designed to confer unity. But the fact remains that many people find a high degree of unification in other directions. 56

And Allport goes on to parallel religious motives with other schemata that integrate:

53 Cf. Allport, Becoming, pp. 49-50, 59. Other examples could be certain saints, or Michelangelo, Marie Curie, or possibly the late Dr. Wilder Penfield.
54 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 387.
56 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 302.
Psychologically speaking, we should point to the close analogy that exists between a religious orientation and all other high-level schemata that influence the course of becoming. Every man, whether he is religiously inclined or not, has his own ultimate presuppositions. He finds he cannot live his life without them, and for him they are true. Such presuppositions, whether they be called ideologies, philosophies, notions, or merely hunches about life, exert creative pressure upon all conduct that is subsidiary to them (which is to say, upon nearly all of a man's conduct).57

But, going a step further, it is possible to see that a person in the process of maturity may refine his ideals, his philosophy of life, his basis of certitude, by growing beyond human reason to human faith and then to religious faith. Allport has an excellent paragraph on this development:

Since, however, the process of becoming continues throughout life, we rightly expect to find the fully developed sentiment only in the adult reaches of personality. The adult mind, provided that it is still growing, stretches its rational capacities as far as it can with the logic of induction, deduction, and a weighing of probabilities. While the intellect continues to exert itself, the individual finds that he needs to build aspiring defenses against the intellect's almost certain failure. He learns that to surmount the difficulties of a truculent world he needs also faith and love. Thus religion, engaging as it does reason, faith, and love, becomes for him morally true. Most religious people claim that it is also metaphysically true because they feel that outer revelation and mystical experience have brought them supernatural assurance. Thus the warrant for certitude comes from the total orientation that the person attains in his quest for a comprehensive belief-system capable of relating him to existence as a whole.58

57 Allport, Becoming, pp. 95-96.
Human and religious motives may thus combine to favor integration. But it is the religious sentiment which will be the best integrative agent.

B. Definition of the Religious Sentiment

What then is the religious sentiment and how does it bring about integration?

Allport defines the mature religious sentiment as a complex, well-patterned, and stable system; it is

a disposition, built up through experience, to respond favorably, and in certain habitual ways, to conceptual objects and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life, and as having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things.59

This definition, Allport maintains, allows for sufficient variation both in the individual's development and in the human race as a whole.

C. A Universal Experience?

Does this imply that the religious sentiment is a universal experience among mankind? After years of scholarly research, after many studies of religion polls among youth and war veterans, and after consultation with other psychologists, Allport concluded that "we cannot say for certain how common is the comprehensive religious sentiment as a unifying philosophy of life."60

59 Allport, The Individual, p. 64.
60 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 303.
For the sake of interest, another investigation taken at random shows that in believers the religious sentiment tends to integrate all aspects of their behavior and to give a positive orientation to their life; whereas in other subjects this sentiment is less highly organized and remains at the level of the superego. Because of individual and cultural differences, specific characteristics or manners of expressing the religious attitude cannot be determined universally. It is the posture of the mind which is significant and revealing:

... There is no single and unique religious emotion, but rather a widely divergent set of experiences that may be focused upon a religious object. It is the habitual and intentional focusing of experience rather than the character of the experience itself that marks the existence of the religious sentiment.°2

Still, Allport maintains that the religious sentiment is found in people everywhere more frequently than is usually expected, especially when abstraction is made from institutional adherence or non-adherence.

... The subjective (personal) religious sentiments of mankind—whatever the fate of institutional religion may be—are very much alive and will perhaps always remain alive, for their roots are many and deep.63

D. Origins; Arrests in Development or Growth to Maturity

What, then, are the roots or origins of the religious sentiment?

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As Allport's definition states, the religious sentiment is a disposition "built through experience." It begins in much the same way as the whole process of becoming itself. The long quest for a common origin has yielded but one possible conclusion: not one but many factors are active to a lesser or greater degree in the development of the individual's religious sentiment. Allport tentatively cites the following factors: first, the person's bodily needs; second, his temperament and mental capacity; third, his psychogenic interests and values; fourth, his pursuit of rational explanation; and fifth, his response to the surrounding culture. Allport comments on each of these factors but insists that "it is only through their synthesis that they engender the religious sentiment."\(^{64}\) As in the whole integrative process, there is complex organization leading to a well-differentiated and simple unified whole.

Perhaps the most striking fact about subjective religion is the contrast between its essential simplicity when, well-formed, it is playing its part in the economy of the personal life, and its extreme complexity in the process of forming.\(^{65}\)

This very complexity leading to integration may be the reason why the religious sentiments of people often remain immature. Little progress is made beyond childhood sentiments wherein self-centered or tribal constructions play a major role.\(^{66}\) Some people fail to realize that a completely rounded personality involves development of all its aspects, from the physical to the moral and properly religious, and this throughout a lifetime.

\(^{64}\) Allport, The Individual, p. 10.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{66}\) Cf. Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 300.
Infantilism in religion results in an arrest due to the immediate needs for comfort and security or self-esteem. Unbelief, while it may be the produce of mature reflection, may also be a reaction against parental or tribal authority, or may be due to a one-sided intellectual development that rules out other areas of normal curiosity. We find many personalities who deal zealously and effectively with all phases of becoming except the final task of relating themselves meaningfully to creation. For some reason their curiosity stops at this point. 67

Further, the fully developed religious sentiment, like other human capacities, cannot be completely matured before adolescence. Because most psychological research in the past has dealt with childhood and adolescence, rather than with adulthood, a one-sided emphasis has resulted with regard also to religion. Childhood factors have remained central in our thinking, for example: "Familism ..., wishful thinking, and magical practice." 68

All this represents a strong critique of psychoanalytic theories of religion, and in particular of Freud's _Future of an Illusion_. 69 But the fully-developed religious sentiment cannot be studied or grasped merely in terms of its empirical origins. It includes these, but more importantly grows beyond them to a personal, interiorized outlook on life and a personal relationship with the whole of Being.

It is not a mere matter of dependency or of reliving the family or cultural configuration: nor is it simply a prophylaxis against fear; nor is it an exclusively rational system of belief. Any single formula by itself is too partial. The developed religious sentiment is the synthesis

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67 Allport, _Becoming_, p. 97.
of these and many other factors, all of which form a comprehensive attitude whose function it is to relate the individual meaningfully to the whole Being.

Growth toward a fully mature religious attitude is, as implied earlier, the work of a lifetime. Allport's definition, in fact, represents the ideal mature sentiment which human beings strive for but rarely attain. One soon finds that his conduct does not always follow his principles, as Allport readily admits:

A person with even a strongly developed religious sentiment still finds that his conduct does not issue as uniformly as he wishes from its directive control. Impulse often wins out, and many of the things he would not do he does; and much that he would do he leaves undone.

Allport refers to such an experience as the "law of reversed effect," and cites the Apostle Paul's reflection on the matter:

St. Paul had discovered the same principle: "I find then a law that, when I would do good, evil is present with me" (Romans 7:21).

It might be added that although Paul finds a struggle within himself, he is quick to insist that his whole person as one self is responsible for and involved in whatever he does: "In short, it is I who with my reason serve the Law of God, and no less I who serve in my unspiritual self the law of sin."

Allport's suggestion for this dilemma is relaxation and surrender --to "give God a chance to do the refreshing." This is made possible
by resigning oneself "to living with one's difficulty, or [losing] his personal turmoil in cosmic perspective." It requires a transcendent faith.  

Thus, Allport holds that the growth of a more generalized conscience ensures self-guidance and the development of a mature religious sentiment. It keeps one alert to new experiences, yet true to one's own propriate striving: "If you do this, it will build your style of being; if that, it will tear down your style of being." The generic conscience delivers from fear and leads to meaningful, oriented becoming. 

In other words, the religious sentiment is highly integrative; but because of the extent of its task, a fully consistent conduct is never achieved, excepting in a unique person such as Christ: 

Unless we are dealing with a religious genius—Christ being the example—we must not expect that the religious sentiment, even when mature, will be absolutely consistent. More than with other sentiments, its fashioning is always unfinished business. Such a heavy assignment, the synthesis of all facts and forces "central in the nature of things," calls for more than can be accomplished.... If the religious sentiment were perfectly organized and in sole control there would be no discrepancy between profession and practice.  

Where a religious attitude or orientation is undertaken, however, the effects upon propriate growth are noteworthy. Here is how Allport sees such effects in those who devote themselves wholly to this task:

Their religious aspiration is their cardinal characteristic. For them the religious form of propriate striving alone seems

76 Allport, The Individual, p. 106.  
77 Ibid., p. 120.  
78 Allport, Becoming, p. 74. Cf. above Chapter I, p. 32.  
79 Allport, The Individual, p. 64.
worthwhile. It provides them with a synthesis of all that lies within experience and all that lies beyond. It monitors the growing edge of personality. Such individuals exercise their capacity for self-objectification, viewing with detachment their reason and their unreason, seeing the limitations of both. They hold in perspective both their self-image and ideal self-image, thus providing themselves with a criterion for conscience. They discriminate between their appropriate striving and their opportunistic adjustments; thus distinguishing matters of importance from mere matters of fact. They weigh probabilities in the theological realm, and ultimately affirm a view of life that seems to leave the least possible remainder. Intricate as the process is, it seems to be the way in which mature personalities adopt and validate the religious premise of their course of becoming. 80

E. Three Integrative Qualities of the Religious Sentiment

In conclusion, how could one summarize all these attributes of the religious sentiment? Just how does this "ideal interest" gather comprehensively all that a person is? Why is it said to give the best direction and purpose to one's life?

The religious sentiment—and this is the present theme—appears best able of all motives and ideals to integrate personal development for three important reasons: first, it is comprehensive; secondly, it maintains forward tension; and thirdly, it provides the longest-range goals.

1. The Religious Sentiment is Comprehensive

In the first place, the religious sentiment provides a comprehensive, synthesizing approach to reality. Once the decision is

80 Allport, Becoming, pp. 97-98.
taken to order one's life according to a religious pattern, one soon finds that this decision influences "every aspect of his daily conduct even at times when he is not aware that it does so." Why is this? Because religious faith aims for wholeness:

Religious faith differs from other faith chiefly in its comprehensive character. It holds that, if knowledge were present, one would find that the universe as a whole, the facts of existence, the puzzling clash of good and evil, all make coherent sense.

Because of this comprehensive character, the religious sentiment reaches out to synthesize all aspects of one's past and present experience, as well as all that lies undiscovered in the future. This is indeed a large order and a challenge, as Allport realized.

... Whenever in a mature personality a mature religious sentiment does develop it has a heavy duty to perform, for it is charged with the task of accommodating every atom of experience.... [It] lays itself open to all facts, to all values, and disvalues, and claims to have the clue to their theoretical and practical inclusion in a frame of life. With such a task to perform it is impossible for this sentiment in a mature stage of development to remain disconnected from the mainstream of experience, relegated to a corner of the fantasy life where it provides an escape clause in one's contract with reality.

Thus, far from being a dulling illusion as Freud would have it, the religious outlook challenges man to unify all of his experience and make it ever more conscious and mature. As Van Kaam aptly puts it:

"We may describe the growth of human existence as a movement from an idealistic to an increasingly realistic project of being."

81 Allport, The Individual, p. 146.
82 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 302.
83 Allport, The Individual, p. 61; cf. pp. 82-83.
84 Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, p. 28.
2. The Religious Sentiment Maintains a Dynamic Forward Tension

And this leads us to the second major quality of the religious sentiment: it maintains forward tension. It is, in fact, the most dynamic factor of growth towards autonomy. "Faith," says Allport, "engenders the energy which when applied to the task in hand enhances the probability of success." There are two main reasons for this.

First, as we have mentioned before, the integration of personality is never completed. Contrarily to the tension-reduction theory of empiricism, Allport insists that propriate striving is a forward élan and a resistance to passivity or arrest: "tension is maintained rather than reduced." This dynamism of the religious sentiment is highly integrative:

Integration does not require a completed view of life. In fact, completed achievements leave us hollow and at loose ends. It is only the unfinished tasks that integrate and motivate.... That which is ever not quite fulfilled is best able to hold the attention, guide effort, and maintain unity. It is for this reason that religion qualifies as an integrative agent par excellence. Precisely because religious accomplishment is always incomplete, its cementing character in the personal life is therefore all the greater.

The religious sentiment is dynamic, in the second place, because of its centrality among other interests. This, of course, is by no means innate. Rather, it is the result of transformation, of growth, 

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85 Allport, The Individual, p. 82. Cf. "love as energy toward the future," in Teilhard, as below, III, 93, 95, 96, 97.
86 Allport, Becoming, p. 49, as above, pp. I, 34 and II, 45 fn. 18. This parallels the "not yet" of hope described by Bloch and Moltmann in Chapter III, pp. 81, 94, 103 below. Cf. "the tension of matter and its restlessness," in Moltmann, Religion, p. 217 and Theology, pp. 64, 88, 274.
and most importantly, of a conscious decision. 88

Although the religious sentiment is highly derivative, with origins in psychogenic needs and childhood interpretations, it nevertheless changes extensively. As Allport pictures it:

Like an oak tree in its growth it shatters and discards the acorn from which it originally drew nourishment. The vitality it acquires becomes authoritative over the motives from which it grew. Tracing its evolution from childhood onward, we clearly see that each stage is continuous with each other, and yet at the same time a definite emergence of new meaning and new motive is taking place.89

All this is evidence for the functional autonomy of the religious sentiment. What makes it special among many possible integrative interests is the centrality it acquires. In the mature person, it assumes naturally the master role among other motives. Allport's description is figurative and highly enlightening:

A religious sentiment that has thus become largely independent of its origins, "functionally autonomous," cannot be regarded as a servant of other desires, even though its initial function may have been of this order. It behaves no longer like an iron filing, twisting to follow the magnet of self-centered motives; it behaves rather as a master-motive, a magnet in its own right by which other cravings are bidden to order their course. Having decided that the religious sentiment is the best instrument for dealing with life, the self, as it were, hands over to it the task of interpreting all that comes within its view, and of providing motive power to live in accordance with an adequate frame of value and meaning, and to enlarge and energize this frame.90

89 Allport, The Individual, p. 72.
90 Ibid., pp. 72-73. Cf. also Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, p. 44: "an increasing permeation of the other modes of existence by this deepened commitment."
It is, in fact, to the degree that the religious sentiment is central among other interests that it maintains its own dynamism and also the whole integrative dynamism of personal development:

When the religious sentiment is central it characteristic­ally keeps its ardor, and maintains throughout life an enthusiastic espousal of its objects, and an insatiable thirst for God. The degree of dynamism in the mature religious sentiment depends upon how central it is among all the various psycho-physical systems that compose the personality.91

And so the religious sentiment promotes integration because it maintains a dynamic forward tension.

3. The Religious Sentiment Provides the Longest-Range Goals

There is a third reason for the integrative value of religion: it provides the longest-range goals.

Religion may remain unexplored and immature in an individual--or it may become a conscious, all-pervading way of life. In this case, it stems from the very heart of life and directs towards the infinite, embracing comprehensively not only present experience but also what lies beyond it.

It is the region of mental life that has the longest-range intentions, and for this reason is capable of conferring marked integration upon personality, engendering meaning and peace in the face of the tragedy and confusion of life. 92

Religious faith envisions eternal values; it provides a long-

91 Allport, The Individual, p. 72.
range goal which gathers together all the interests and all the dynamism of the person-in-project. His whole emphasis, all of his intention, is directed toward the future. All of his activity thus acquires a meaningful perspective.

The poet was right: our reach exceeds our grasp. It is the reach (the long-range intention) and not the grasp (the accomplishment up to now) that confers consistency and integration on personality. Harmony of life, as Goethe said, comes not to him who attains his goals, but to him who "ceaselessly striving bestirs himself." It is the long-range intentions that have the power to order habits, thoughts, traits, into a unity of function.93

Order and purpose: out of these grows the stability of meaningful direction. There is also peace, derived from a decision made in regard to time and eternity, a decision of faith which one determines to maintain throughout life's difficulties and joys. It brings, says Van Kaam, "the precious experience of growing insight in the midst of painful crosses."94 It brings freedom; for [to] the religious person who has settled once and for all what things are sacred and of ultimate value ... nothing else in the world then needs to be taken seriously.95

The religious sentiment, in its decision of faith, confers unity and integration.

94 Van Kaam, Religion and Personality, p. 115.
95 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 103. Cf. also Allport, The Individual, pp. 81 f. Cf. the "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," in The Documents of Vatican II, New York, America Press, 1966, Chap. VII, No. 48, p. 209: "The People of God ... is ... motivated by this faith ... [which] throws a new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are fully human."
V. Conclusion

In conclusion, Allport's view of integration and of religious faith approaches the concept of Christian eschatology, as suggested at the beginning of Chapter I. All mature activity is guided by some intended goal; this is the essence of Christian faith in its vision of a final purpose to life:

Faith is basically man's belief in the validity and attainability of some goal.... A person's intention designates the presence of the rational and ideational component in all productive striving. Some sort of idea of the end is always bound into the act itself. It is this inseparability of the idea of the end from the course of the striving that we call faith.96

And what is this end-goal or purpose? For the Christian it is fulfilment in encounter with the Creator. He begins this in the present, because of his faith and hope in its long-range accomplishment:

A man's religion is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs.97

In Christianity, this "idea of the end" is personalized in the Eschaton; this will be the subject of Chapter III.

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96 Allport, The Individual, p. 149.
97 Ibid., p. 161.
"It was by faith that Abraham obeyed the call to set out for a country that was the inheritance given to him and his descendants, and that he set out without knowing where he was going."

(Apostle Paul to the Romans)
CHAPTER III

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL FAITH OF CHRISTIAN LIFE

I. Transition

The integration of the human person, Allport claimed, axes upon the development of functional autonomy and of a dominant long-range goal. This is the dynamism of propriate motivation. Of all integrative motives or agents, the religious sentiment is purported to be the most effective, because of its comprehensive nature, its dynamic forward tension, and its ultimate, transcendent goal. What light can Christian faith now add to the religious sentiment in psychology?¹ In a particular way, what is it in man that makes possible his response to grace or Revelation?

As noted at the beginning of Chapter I, Allport's fundamental theme of Becoming touches upon the most basic theme of Christian faith, that is, eschatology—specifically in its contemporary theological rediscovery as hope. It is precisely the dimension of "becoming" in man that responds to the eschatological message. In fact, it now seems possible to identify the eschatological dimension of that faith which is the subject of this thesis as hope.

One of the foremost theologians of hope today is Jürgen Moltmann. In his Theology of Hope,² Moltmann proclaims an eschatology of cosmic proportions; he challenges mankind to broaden its understanding of life,

society, history, and religion, and to enter into the dynamic of an immense hope for universal fulfilment in the Eschaton. This chapter will trace briefly the historical development of eschatology and outline the particular contribution of this outstanding theologian.

After this study, it will be possible in chapter four to look at Moltmann's eschatology in the light of Allport's personalism and show that Allport's dynamism of personal growth can be seen to underlie Moltmann's dynamism of history, although these theories are in two totally different fields.³

For, this is a human history, wherein there are persons who grow, persons who hope.⁴ What then is the root, the living experience and expression, the explicit human dimension of a grandiose eschatology of hope? It is the present thesis that the religious sentiment or religious faith of the person finds its true source, creative tension, and directional thrust in the dynamic of eschatological hope. In other words, the Christian religious sentiment, or faith, is an integrative agent in the growth of the believer, precisely because of that hope which characterizes its eschatological dimension. It is this hope which gives Christian faith its dynamic tension, its comprehensiveness, and its long-range goals—those qualities which, as seen earlier, make the

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³ In many theologies of hope there seems to be a reaction against personalism as too privatized. Yet, spelling out some prevalent theories in both fields, we find them not at all in basic contradiction but rather with many points of contact that are actually mutually supportive about the truth of human life and its ultimate destiny.

religious sentiment integrative.

With this in mind, consider here Moltmann's approach to restoring the relevancy of Revelation, that is, of the eschatological message:

Our task is to set the subject of divine revelation no longer in antithesis to man's momentary understanding of the world and of himself, but to take this very understanding of self and the world up into, and open its eyes for, the eschatological outlook in which revelation is seen as promise of the truth.\(^5\)

The task is clear; all the elements are there: man and the world are given meaning and direction by the Word of eschatological hope, the Word of Promise. This revealed Word is Jesus whose resurrection is the promise of humankind's eschatological goal.

II. Historical Development of Eschatology

A. The Central Problem

Even as psychology in this century has had to overcome its fixation on man's past and to open new doors upon "his out-reaching into the future,"\(^6\) in the same manner, theology has found whole new vistas in a more profound understanding of eschatology. Relegated for eras as a bleak appendix to theological treatises, eschatology has suddenly come into its own in recent years, as the central problem in Christian theology. For, even as in psychological growth, it is the object or goal in life which gives it meaning and direction, so eschatology is the very

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5 J. Moltmann, Theology, p. 44.
medium of Christian faith, its all-pervading theme. It is in this per­
spective that Jürgen Moltmann situates and defines eschatology and the
theology of hope:

...Eschatology means the doctrine of the Christian hope, which
embraces both the object hoped for and also the hope inspired
by it. From first to last, and not merely in the epilogue,
Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and
forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and trans­
forming the present. The eschatological is not one element
of Christianity, but it is the medium of Christian faith as
such, the key in which everything in it is set, the glow that
suffuses everything in the dawn of an expected new day. For
Christian faith lives from the raising of the crucified Christ,
and strains after the promise of the universal future of
Christ. Eschatology is the passionate suffering and passion­
ate longing kindled by the Messiah. Hence eschatology cannot
be only a part of Christian doctrine. Rather, the eschato­
logical outlook is characteristic of all Christian proclama­
tion, of every Christian existence and of the whole Church.
There is therefore only one real problem in Christian theology,
which its own object forces upon it and which it in turn
forces on mankind and on human thought: the problem of the
future.... A proper theology would therefore have to be con­
structed in the light of its future goal. Eschatology should
not be its end, but its beginning.7

Eschatology is not an appendix or even some part of theology, but a
determining factor in all theological considerations.8

B. The Eschatology of Past Centuries

A new beginning indeed for that forlorn "doctrine of the last
things." It is of interest here to attempt to situate and validate
such a promising position.

7 Moltmann, Theology, p. 16. Cf. Harvey Cox, "Ernst Bloch and
'The Pull of the Future,',' in New Theology No. 5, Martin E. Marty and
8 Cf. Johannes B. Metz, "Creative Hope," in New Theology No. 5,
p. 135.
1. Clarification of Terms and Trends

First, it might be helpful to clarify certain terms. Predating the Christian era, three main trends of thought seem to have contributed to humankind's understanding of the "eschaton" or end.

The first trend was the apocalyptic (from "apocalypsis" meaning "revelation," and "calyptein" meaning "to cover up"). This derived from Old Persian images of resounding catastrophe. An external power would suddenly put an end to all finite being. Without necessarily destroying all, it would simply end things as they are now in order to give them a new form. The second trend, the teleological (from "telos" meaning "goal"), came from Greek philosophy. This one emphasized the fact that all finite beings tend toward a goal, a fulfilment. No external power would bring about the end, but an inner power in the finite being itself. The third trend was the prophetic. (The Hebrew "nabi" was a person under the influence of God.) This trend combined the previous two and went beyond them: it claimed that an exterior power was activating man to shape his own future, to mould his own end.

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Whereas the apocalyptic view foresaw divine interference only at the end, the prophetic implied a constant influence on the part of the external Power, now. The apocalyptic end was based on dualism, separating good from evil, soul from body, heaven from earth. The teleological end was deterministic and cyclic; it was a fixed end, identical to the beginning. The prophetic end was typically Hebrew in its open messianic hope and in its insistence on present conversion and personal responsibility.

Both the profane and the Christian heritages have transmitted these aspects of eschatology in a confused, almost contradictory form; but now theologians are attempting to draw the good from each and thus to harmonize them into one meaningful theology of the "eschaton," the final end. An apocalyptic "new world" can be foreseen, yet not through the destruction of the present world but by its transformation. Man is teleologically akin to nature, yet he transcends it because he is also historical; his capacity to remember and to hope, his freedom and responsibility—these are neither accident nor fate, but define his very nature. Finally, everything here and now, prophetically, has intrinsic value as well as mere usefulness. All things can serve man now to "build" the earth, the community, and himself—and to adore. 13

Around these three trends an almost unlimited variety of mean-

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13 Such a harmonious insight into the end-goal has been significantly enlightened by the theory of Teilhard de Chardin. He goes even beyond our traditional view of heaven as individualized reward. All things having emerged initially, then diverged to the point of exhausting all the possibilities of form and structure—all will finally converge upon the point of perfection, the Omega, Christ. Cf. below III, 93-95, 97.
ings to the concept of eschatology evolved over the centuries. The two extremes seem to be the "futuristic" and the "existential types."  

A futuristic eschatology manifests itself in those people who consider earthly life to be a mere testing ground or waiting place. This view is apocalyptic in that the present earth is considered of no consequence and therefore will simply be done away with; it is teleological in that it anticipates a return to humanity's original perfection and bliss in Paradise.

The other extreme, existential eschatology, claims that the New Testament really tells us nothing about the future. When the Gospels or Pauline writings speak about the future, they do so in apocalyptic images and terms which really say something only about the present. The future is beyond all speculation; God can only be encountered in an "eternal now." Such, then, very briefly, are the extreme eschatological types, between which a whole gamut of theories evolved.  

2. The Traditional Doctrine of the "Last Things"

For centuries, in Christianity, a futuristic eschatology—as outlined in the Apostles' Creed—had meant the sudden, unannounced breaking in upon mankind of Judgment Day, with accompanying cosmic 

cataclysm and the return of Christ in universal glory. Due reference was made to the apocalyptic discourses in Matthew 24-25; and Christians were exhorted to live as conscientious stewards, constantly on the alert for the Son of Man's coming at an unexpected hour. Jesus had completed the work of salvation for all men, so that little remained for men to do but await in readiness of heart for his return, while living in this world though not as part of it. St. Paul even admonished some early Christians not to remain idle while awaiting the last day, but "to go on quietly working and earning the food that they eat." All this shows the expectancy of an imminent end to the world.

This sort of futuristic interpretation of eschatology, for one thing, was so remote from life as to be somewhat fatalistic. It was unrelated to the Cross and Resurrection of Christ, and failed to imply any responsibility on the part of Christians for the improvement and transformation of life "here below." The end events would destroy all anyway, and produce "a new earth and a new heaven." In Moltmann's words:

These end events were to break into this world from somewhere

17 Cf. 1 Thessalonians 5: 2; 2 Thess. 1: 8; Revelations 3:3.
21 Revelations 21: 1.
beyond history, and to put an end to the history in which all things here live and move. But the relegating of these events to the 'last day' robbed them of their directive, uplifting and critical significance for all the days which are spent here, this side of the end, in history. Thus these teachings about the end led a peculiarly barren existence at the end of Christian dogmatics. They were like a loosely attached appendix that wandered off into obscure irrelevancies. They bore no relation to the doctrines of the cross and resurrection, the exaltation and sovereignty of Christ, and did not derive from these by any logical necessity. They were as far removed from them as All Souls' Day sermons are from Easter.22

3. Scholastic Eschatology

In its own time, scholastic theology instituted and analyzed four "last things" as constituting the whole of eschatology: death and judgment, heaven and hell (with purgatory somewhere in between). Commenting on St. Thomas and Moltmann, Louis Weeks points out that even the Summa Theologiae is not much more explicit.23 St. Thomas, however, did give a detailed description of hope (quite separately from eschatology). In brief, hope "is movement towards good."24 St. Thomas distinguished between the natural human attitude of hope and the virtue of hope:

Hope as an irascible passion has its subject in the appetite, while the theological virtue of hope has its subject in the will. In both cases man's activity is presupposed. 25

22 Moltmann, Theology, p. 15.
24 Ibid., p. 219
25 Ibid.
The objects of hope (and this recalls the object of the trait and sentiment) may vary with the type of hope. But these objects always have the same four characteristics: they are "(1) good, (2) in the future, (3) difficult to reach, yet (4) possible to attain." The term "difficult" here means "arduous" in the sense of strength—the strength to be exerted toward the attainment of a goal. The individual's activity presupposed here flavors strongly of appropriate motivation and functional autonomy. To overcome an obstacle, one must draw upon one's own inner resources and surpass the previous day's efforts. What would be the use of hoping in something which did not imply any effort? There must be growth, transcendence. Allport was clear on this: that the tension of appropriate motivation is characteristically maintained, not reduced; that one's reach should exceed one's grasp. This is the resilient tension of a long-term project, and in particular of the development of personality or growth towards wholeness. This is likewise the ardor of Christian hope founded upon God's promise and faithfulness.

Allport sensed this about scholastic theology:

When the Scholastics wrote, "It is more important to love God than to know him," they meant that the intention itself, rather than the clarity of the object, distinguished the religious sentiment.

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26 See Chapter II above, pp. 47-48, 53.  
At the highest level, the virtue of hope becomes most aware of its limitations and need for the help of Him who is its object, "since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good."\(^{31}\) In St. Thomas's view, then, hope is dynamic in tension and direction, growing with experience, hierarchical in its sources, and founded upon the central fact of Christ's Resurrection.\(^{32}\)

One other noteworthy item in St. Thomas here was his view of man's ultimate goal. He held that man does not have both a natural and a supernatural end, but only one single ultimate end, namely the future promised by God.\(^{33}\) This is precisely the convergent oneness that Allport called integration.

There was much potential in St. Thomas's thoughts on eschatology and hope; it is unfortunate that this was so long in being developed and expanded.

In recent decades, theologians have begun to realize that the eschatology of past centuries overlooked a wealth of other biblical evidence pointing in the direction of creative hope, the inheritance and responsibility of Christian faith. This same faith handed on "biblical testimonies which... are yet full to the brim with future

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32 Ibid., pp. 220-223.

hope of a messianic kind for the world."\textsuperscript{34}

C. A New Eschatology: Schweitzer and Weiss

In the late 1800's, the Scripture studies of Albert Schweitzer and Johannes Weiss brought them to a new understanding of eschatology: "the discovery of the central significance of eschatology for the message and existence of Jesus and for early Christianity."\textsuperscript{35} This discovery was probably the greatest gift to theological studies and Christian life in modern times. But its authors did not grasp its full implication. Both Weiss and Schweitzer, according to Moltmann,\textsuperscript{36} came to the conclusion that eschatologism was basically cyclic and illusionary, to be finally conquered and annihilated by the apocalyptic return of the Son of Man.\textsuperscript{37} Schweitzer brought out the fact that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{34} Moltmann, Theology, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{37} About Schweitzer's "illusionary eschatologism," Moltmann cites the following, in Theology, p. 39: "His philosophy of life and of culture is governed by the overcoming of that painful impression which he described as follows in the first edition of his Quest of the Historical Jesus: 'There is silence all around. The Baptist appears and cries: 'Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.' Soon after that comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws Himself upon it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still. That is His victory and His reign.' The 'wheel of history', symbol of the eternal recurrence of the same cycle, takes the place of the eschatological arrow-flight of history. The experience of two thousand years of delayed parousia makes eschatology impossible today."
\end{footnotesize}
Jesus spoke of the end of the world as very close at hand, a theory since called "consequent" or "immediate eschatology." Since that end has not yet arrived, one wonders whether Schweitzer might perhaps have mistaken Jesus' meaning.  

Weiss and Schweitzer were, generally speaking, quite embarrassed with their discover, and finally looked upon "eschatology" as an element in the primitive Christian thought now irrevocably "dépassé."  

D. Some Subsequent Theories  

1. Barth and Bultmann  

In subsequent theologies such as those of Barth and Bultmann, eschatology regained its centrality, but at the cost of reinterpretations, sometimes radical, which made it lose its originality.  

For Karl Barth, according to Moltmann, eschatology is the irruption of the eternal Word into the present and the transcendental breaking into history of the end or "Eschaton." This, then, would be a "transcendental subjectivity of God," or God's self-revelation. Barth's ideas here stemmed from his interpretation of W. Hermann's statement: "We have no other means of knowing God except that He reveals Himself to us ourselves by acting upon us." It is well known

40 Tihon, "Réflexion," p. 988.  
42 Ibid., pp. 45-46, 53.  
how Barth and Bultmann, both pupils of Hermann at Marburg, came to very
different conclusions about this statement. To Barth, Revelation is
the proof that God gives of Himself: "By being the one who acts in his
revelation, God is the one who describes himself." Man can only ask
about his "self" because and if God reveals His self through His
Word. Such is Barth's interpretation: I know myself by knowing God
first. This is the opposite of Bultmann's and Moltmann's approach: By
knowing myself authentically, I know God. For Barth, the Word of God
measures all; God's selfhood measures man's selfhood and he never can
know who he is as self unless God's Word defines him.

For Rudolph Bultmann, all the teachings concerning the "last
things" consist mainly in the accession of man in the present to his
definitive authenticity, the point where he finds his truth in God.
Whence, all discourse about God speaks also of the ultimate truth about
man. Moltmann calls this "an apocalypse of the transcendental subjec-
tivity of man." Bultmann, furthermore, considers all future judgment
to be apocalyptic myth, the only judgment being man's momentaneous re-
lation to God in existential decision. Man's self is "the pure rece-
iving of his person from God."

44 Cited by Moltmann, Theology, p. 54.
45 Moltmann, Theology, p. 53.
46 Ibid.,
48 Ibid., p. 64.
"The object of theology is certainly God, and theology speaks of God by speaking of man as he is confronted by God, that is, in the light of faith." Thus God can be spoken of only in connection with our own existence. If faith is a matter of comprehending our own existence, then that means at the same time comprehending God, and vice versa. "If we would speak of God, then manifestly we must speak of ourselves."49

In both Bultmann and Barth, Moltmann says, true Christian eschatology and the God of Exodus are by-passed in favor of a Parmenidean god.50 The future loses its transforming power in favor of an "epiphany of the eternal present."51 The Christ event ends with His death and resurrection, the latter being merely the manifestation of God's self-revelation in Jesus.

2. Dodd, Cullmann, Danie1ou

Moltmann makes little mention of Dodd, but his theory warrants a place in this context, representing the "incarnational" and "realized" eschatologies. C. H. Dodd, who began writing after World War I, claimed that Jesus preached a final "end" that was not future at all but completely "realized" in Himself.

The implication is that in the events of Jesus' life all that the prophets meant by the Day of the Lord is realized. There is here a divine event, unique and decisive, in which the whole purpose of God in history is made manifest. ... The idea of a second coming of Christ appears along with the emphatic assertion that His coming in history satisfies all the conditions of the eschatological event, except that of absolute finality.52

49 Moltmann, Theology, p. 59.
50 Ibid., pp. 28-32.
51 Ibid., p. 84.
52 C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, pp. 87, 93.
To a great extent this is true, for Jesus is the fulfilment of the promises of God, but not in such a way as to render all subsequent history meaningless, as Jean Daniélou points out.\(^{53}\)

Against a theory similar to this one (the Hellenistic trend in the early Church), Moltmann shows that history is thus deprived of "its eschatological direction";\(^{54}\) that the present time is no longer one of striving to build the future but simply one of revelation of the Lord's past saving acts. History is no longer

...the realm in which men suffer and hope, groaning and trava
ing in expectation of Christ's future for the world, but it becomes the field in which the heavenly lordship of Christ is disclosed in Church and sacrament. In place of the escha
tological 'not yet' (noch nicht) we have a cultic 'now only' (nur noch), and this becomes the key-signature of history post Christum.\(^{55}\)

Moltmann also recalls St. Paul's criticism of any eschatology such as this (the incarnational or realized): it is opposed to a true eschatological understanding of the Resurrection of Christ, the presence of the Spirit, the sacraments, man's earthly obedience and future expecta
tions; it opposes especially the theology of the cross in an "ecstasy that abandons the earth on which that cross stands."\(^{56}\)

Other theories such as that of Oscar Cullmann\(^ {57}\) maintained that Christ's Resurrection was the "essential historical event belong-

\(^{54}\) Moltmann, *Theology*, p. 158.  
\(^{55}\) Ibid., pp. 158-159.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 160.  
\(^{57}\) Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Concep
ing to the end of created time," beyond which nothing of comparable importance could happen. Here again, Daniélou sees a work of salvation as complete in itself: "everything essential has been secured already"; only the consequences are yet to be diffused, the world of corruption destroyed, and a kingdom of saints established.

These "existentialist" and "realized" eschatologies mark an advance on previous futuristic types in that the eschatology of the New Testament is understood not only as realized but as individualized:

For every individual does live eschatologically when he knows himself to be living in the face of his own death: he works out his judgment by his daily deeds and decisions; and so far as he attains an authentic existence, he is laying hold of "eternal life." According to this, a person's relationship with God is that whenever He approaches one, He makes sacred the present moment, almost like a vertical eternal now. To reach the eschatological, then, is almost to break through into present mystic sharing of the divine (that is always present) rather than to live in tension of movement. This is a static concept. Somehow, both moments of real encounter and moments of tension should hold together. What is the God who was, who is, and who will be? When He comes to a person, is there an eternal presence? And yet when He comes, that very coming creates history and tension and movement. Evidently, one cannot simply dismiss any aspect of either a vertical or a horizontal relationship to God.

59 Ibid.
60 Macquarrie, "The Last Things," p. 316. This recalls Johannes Metz's reflections on a "privatized" theology of the world, as below, p. III, 106. Cf. 2 Corinthians 1: 9-10; 4: 11.
Realized eschatology is defective, says Moltmann, precisely by being too individualized and detached from the same New Testament's teachings about the communal and cosmic dimensions. By such a statement as this, Moltmann radically departs from a restrictive personalism both in psychology and in theology. He challenges the individual to be active in society, and society to extend its responsibility and enlarge its view to the dimensions of faith:

Without a cosmic eschatology there can be no assertion of an eschatological existence of man.... World-picture and faith are inseparable—precisely because faith cannot suffer the world to become a picture of God, nor a picture of man. 61

3. Salvation History

Not too remote from these early modern eschatologies was the concept of salvation history: the progressive self-revelation of God through the events of history. Moltmann gives the origins of salvation history as dating from a post-reformation "rebirth of eschatological millenarism," 62 and later from the Enlightenment. The movement marked the beginning of an eschatological sense of history.

In this movement, the Bible is read as a history recording the divine interventions in the affairs of mankind. The whole of world history is considered to be the Kingdom in process; God reveals Him-

61 Moltmann, Theology, p. 69; also p. 89. Theologians like Metz developed this in terms of a political theology, as will be seen below, p. III, 106 f. There are overtones of this in liberation theology. Certainly, this is a crucial development that should be looked into in a more expanded work.
62 Ibid., p. 70.
self progressively, the last decisive instance being the Christ event. Christ is central and climactic, as even our dating system in the Western world unwittingly expresses. History as revelation begins with Creation and the Fall and evolves according to a divine "dispensation" or "economy" or pre-arranged plan of salvation. Essentially, salvation history observes God's ways in the past and from these, "prophetically" draws conclusions about His future actions:

It is "prophetic" in the ultimate sense, since it seeks to take prophecies and events in the past which point beyond the present, and use them as a means of discovering and portraying the future.64

Moltmann, whose own theory is closely involved with history, finds both truth and error in "salvation history." The truth of it lies in the fact that it bothers "to inquire at all into the inward tendency and eschatological outlook which the divine revelation in history has towards the future."65

The error of it, according to Moltmann, lies in the "signs" other than Christ's death and Resurrection which are considered to reveal "the eschatological progressiveness of salvation history."66 These signs are either an apocalyptic view of corruption in the Church and the world, or an optimistic view of progress in culture. The latter, according to Barth, would make revelation "a predicate of history,"67 and history a substitute for God and predicate of eschatologi-
Salvation history has had little impact because it has remained remote from any dialogue with historiography, philosophy, or other cultural dimension. Its contribution, however, has been to "preserve the question of the eschatological future outlook which the Christian revelation holds for a world involved in history." All the eschatological themes of salvation history are properly those of Christian eschatology: "the mission to the nations, the discussion of the future of Israel, the future of world history, of creation, and of the body." But these themes cannot be interpreted in the terms of salvation history, mainly because it lacks contact with the reality of history and because it leaves the following questions unclear: "What constitutes this process, what is the subject of it, and what is its goal?"

4. Pannenberg

Another recent contribution is that of W. Pannenberg. This theory sets out from the Old Testament insight that "history is that which happens between promise and fulfilment," but moves towards a history based on "reality as a whole." The only eschatological di-

68 Moltmann, Theology, p. 72.
69 Ibid., p. 75.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 73.
72 Dr. Wolfhart Pannenberg is Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Mainz. Among his writings is "Appearance as the Arrival of the Future," in New Theology No. 5, pp. 112-129.
73 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 78-79.
mension here is in the negative fact that reality as a whole cannot yet be fully examined since it is not yet complete. The world itself will one day reveal God, but at present it remains provisional.

Moltmann finds here "an open-ended cosmos with a teleological trend towards the future."\textsuperscript{74} The kerygma of the Word of God is replaced by the "language of the facts" of history.\textsuperscript{75} But Moltmann's main problem with Pannenberg's theory is his view of the Resurrection of Christ. According to Pannenberg, the raising of Jesus becomes a prolepsis or "anticipation and forestalling of the end of universal history."\textsuperscript{76} Such an attitude deprives Jesus himself of any "further future,"\textsuperscript{77} and certainly distracts from his being the source of the resurrection of believers. Finally, Moltmann claims, such a theory of eschatology deals inadequately with the Cross of Jesus and with its statement of contradiction against all the negatives of this life that would denounce any hope for the future.

E. Nature and Eschatological Faith: Teilhard de Chardin

Many of the theories following Schweitzer were praiseworthy efforts in search of a true eschatology; but they remained somewhat sterile, particularly in the domain of interpersonal relationships, community building, and common striving toward a better world. One theory that opened a whole new dimension to the question of hope, according to

\textsuperscript{74} Moltmann, \textit{Theology}, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 78.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 82.
Walter H. Capps, was the evolutionary model of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.:

There is probably no single instigator whose presence is more to be felt in the possibility for horizontal retailoring.... The seriousness with which Teilhard's horizontally-modeled innovations were received provided an occasion by which the contentions of the school of hope could be heard.

Gordon Allport also paid tribute to Teilhard, especially to his respect for "mystery" in his study of nature:

A powerful intellect may, as did Teilhard, spend a lifetime trying to reconcile the course of evolution as biologically understood with the mystery of Christ who stands at the apex of human experience. Only a few intellects are capable of undertaking a synthesis of this scope.

As a geologist and anthropologist, Teilhard studied the past of the earth, of life and of humanity; but this led him to wonder intensively about the future. As a profoundly religious man and a priest, he also wondered what light the promises of his faith could shed on his scientific inquiry:

Religion and science are the two conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act of knowledge—the only one which can embrace the past and future of evolution so as to contemplate, measure and fulfil them.

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79 Ibid., p. 11.


Gradually, he saw all of evolution as progress in the direction of greater consciousness—with specific laws of organization, integration, and complexity-consciousness. To him, man appeared on earth as the summit of evolution; and further development could only be in the direction of greater awareness and love among mankind, or "hominization and socialization." "The only universe capable of containing the human person," he said, "is an irreversibly 'personalising' universe." Ultimately, this evolutionary movement would culminate in the super-personal, a higher centralization of man's spiritual substance around one point, Omega. Already, in the Incarnation of Christ, Omega has tangibly entered the world; in His Resurrection can also be found the tangible promise of final fulfilment of man and the universe.

For these different stages of evolution, Teilhard coined the terms "cosmogenesis," "biogenesis," "noogenesis" (development of intelligence and self-consciousness), and "Christogenesis," the crowning aim of all. Through these stages, all things having emerged initially, then diverged to the point of exhausting all the possibilities of form

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82 Teilhard, PM, pp. 53, 332. These and following elements of Teilhard's theories are condensed here from several of his writings listed in the Bibliography; this is only the briefest resumé.
83 Ibid., p. 334.
84 Ibid., p. 318.
87 Teilhard, PM, p. 325.
and structure—all will finally converge as a new and higher form of reality emerges, the Omega, Christ. This is Teilhard's basic dialectic of differentiation and integration.

Christ provides the future "issue" for the universe, a way out and a fulfilment, which alone can make hope possible. Man stands symbolically with the cosmos at the base of a cone whose apex is an aperture. This end-opening or goal is first in intention though last in execution. The whole significance of the natural world is to be sought for at its summit; the genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, even as maturity is not in the bud or the child, but in the full-grown flower and the adult.

Thus, Teilhard's scientific inquiry and religious faith were synthesized in an immense hope:


92 Teilhard, SC, pp. 30, 36, 151.

The expectation of heaven cannot remain alive unless it is incarnate. What body shall we give to ours today?
That of a huge and totally human hope. ...

Expectation—anxious, collective and operative expectation of an end of the world, that is to say of an issue for the world—that is perhaps the supreme christian function and most distinctive characteristic of our religion.94

The dynamism of this evolutionary movement is the tremendous restlessness and tension95 of an upward and forward surge, overcoming the "tangential" (external) energies of deterioration through the "radial" (internal) energy of attraction96 exerted upon evolution by its ultimate Goal—a future active in the present, the "pull of the Absolute."97

This is the force of Love, crystallized in the Heart of Christ98 and drawing all things to perfection, all men and women to their ultimate personalization in union with the divine.

Personal fulfilment is achieved ultimately through the diminishment of egoism and the expansion of self towards other:

Each one of us [is] an absolutely original centre in which the universe reflects itself in a unique and inimitable way. And those centres are our very selves and personalities. The very centre of our consciousness, deeper than all its radii: that is

97 Teilhard, PM, pp. 335, 319. MD, p. 56. Cf. below, p. 103.
the essence which Omega, if it is to be truly Omega, must reclaim....

To be fully ourselves, it is in the direction of convergence with all the rest, that we must advance—towards the "other".... The true ego grows in inverse proportion to "egoism." Like the Omega which attracts it, the element only becomes personal when it universalises itself....99

Fuller being is closer union.100

Christianity for Teilhard is supremely futurist, universalist, and personalizing, and must follow "the implications of its own creed, be reincarnated."101 It is nothing more nor less than a "phylum of love"102 within nature, with the dynamic task of consciously leading the way to this irrevocable, irreversible goal:

It remains for us to integrate the elemental phenomenon and see how the total divine milieu is formed by the confluence of our individual divine milieux....103

Alone, unconditionally alone, in the world today, Christianity shows itself able to reconcile, in a single living act, the All and the Person. Alone, it can bend our hearts not only to the service of that tremendous movement of the world which bears us along, but beyond, to embrace that movement in love.104

Christian Faith, then, has a future only insofar as it orients itself to


100 Teilhard, PM, p. 35.
102 Teilhard, MD, p. 15, Mooney, Mystery, p. 155. It seems noteworthy to recall here that of the major religions of the world, Christianity is the last to have emerged.
and involves itself in the future of the world:

You can convert only what you love: if the Christian is not fully in sympathy with the nascent world... then he will never effect the emancipating synthesis between earth and heaven from which can emerge the parousia of the universal Christ....

To plunge into in order then to emerge and raise up. To share in order to sublimate. That is precisely the law of the Incarnation....

I believe that the world will never be converted to Christianity's hopes of heaven, unless first Christianity is converted... to the hopes of the earth... so it may divinise them. 105

Teilhard summarized his theory and vision in one succinct "profession of faith":

I believe that the Universe is an Evolution.
I believe that Evolution proceeds toward Spirit.
I believe that Spirit is consummated in the Personal.
I believe that the supremely Personal is the Christ-Universal. 106

Science and philosophy can come far along the road of evolution, but remain finally faceless. 107 Christian faith provides evolution with a Goal Who has a Face and a Name: "Someone"—"Christ, principle of universal vitality," "God, the Centre of centres." 108 This Goal Teilhard found in his "consciousness as a believer,... not only its speculative model but also its living reality." 109 In later life, he wrote: "I go forward to meet Him who comes." 110 The Christ of St. John and St. Paul

108 Teilhard, PM, pp. 318, 322, 327.
109 Ibid., p. 322.
(esp. the cosmic Christ in Ephesians and Colossians) was his main Script­
tural inspiration.

In his study of the "becoming" of man and the universe, Teilhard found constant change, a harmonizing, pyramidal organization, and even­
tual integration through the dynamic tension of evolution toward its final goal. In his religious faithfulness, Teilhard sought the deepest meaning of the Promises of God and the Christian mission in the world for the "novum" of the future; he struggled to understand suffering, evil, sin, and death, his own and all our "passivities" in the light of Jesus' Cross and Resurrection. About the Resurrection of Christ, in which all of humanity and even the cosmos are destined to participate, he expressed the following in 1924:

When, faced with a universe whose physical and spiritual immen­sity tends to stagger us more and more, we become afraid of the ever growing weight of energy and glory which the Son of Mary must bear in order to continue to receive our adoration, let us think of the Resurrection.

The Resurrection is precisely one of the main distinctive features of Christian hope for the world.

In the evolutionary model of Teilhard de Chardin, then, many crucial elements may be found that corroborate the theories of Allport and Moltmann as studied in the present thesis.


Teilhard's rigorous intellectual and religious honesty made him a credible, influential prophet of the future. He showed Catholics in particular: the transformation possible for mankind by the generalization of the category of development in all areas of thought, and the relevance of the "old faith" for the future of human experience. In fact, many documents of Vatican II would be "inconceivable" in their present form without his indications of the "signs of our times."

To conclude here, Teilhard linked eschatology to nature, as Moltmann noted, whereas the theologians of hope are linking it with history. But Teilhard's significant contribution has been to win "religious credibility" for a future orientation and thereby "accelerate the acceptance of other instances of its kind."

F. Philosophy and Hope: Ernst Bloch

Perhaps what is most important for theology as for psychology today is an authentic link with reality. Only in this way will their spokesmen really speak to man and to his desire for wholeness in himself and for a meaningful relationship with the world about him. Carl E. Braaten talks of a "point of contact" which gives validity to a theological theory: "otherwise theology is done in the isolation of its

113 Teilhard, FM, p. 51.
own ghetto with no power to convince or interest anyone outside its circle." For Bultmann, this contact was existentialism; for Teilhard de Chardin, nature and process philosophy. For the new school of hope in Moltmann, Pannenberg, and Metz, it is the philosophy of hope profounded chiefly by the eighty-seven year old Marxist Ernst Bloch, presently teaching in Tübingen.

Four main influences seem to form the background to Bloch's thinking: the oppressive industrialism in his own home town (Ludwigs­hafen in southwestern Germany), the philosophy of Heraclitus, his own Jewish heritage with its messianic yearning, and certainly the world wars in this century. Bloch wrote his Das Prinzip Hoffnung in America during his exile from Nazi German. So profound has been Bloch's belated impact that Harvey Cox seriously wonders how different theology would be today had Bloch rather than Heidegger been "our conversation partner" in this century in America:

Would we be as miserably lacking as we are in a theologically grounded social ethic? Would we be as disastrously out of touch with the revolution that is transforming the third world and burning the centers of our American cities? Would we have needed the catharsis of the death-of-God theology? Would we have allowed the ecclesiastical furni­ture shuffling of recent years to pose as a real renewal of the church? Might we have produced a theology that was truly radical in its impact on the world and not just in

its rhetoric?  

The answer is only hinted at in Bloch's philosophy, and left for Christians to discover within the treasury of their own faith. But Bloch's hints are exciting ones, both for religion and the world in general, and in particular for the individual's psychological and spiritual growth to maturity. This philosophy has been the groundwork of Moltmann's theology of hope.

The key to human existence, says Bloch, lies in the hopes that man holds for the future state of all humanity and the world. The promise of ultimate fulfilment and peace kindles man's enthusiasm to thrust onward resolutely and spend himself to hasten its achievement. Bloch is aware of past attempts to define eschatology and considers present efforts to be incomplete, still straining towards a better understanding. Such a transitional period characterizes much of our existence, so that it is of critical importance to learn its lesson,

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122 Ibid., p. 191.
124 Cf. Cox, "Ernst Bloch," p. 195: "In theology, the study of the 'not-yet,' although we do not usually employ Bloch's phrase, is called eschatology."
for it tells what man really is:

In such periods we live in radical anticipation, hope and expectation. This is valuable, says Bloch, because existence in hope should not be a periodic episode in man's life; it should be the basic posture of his existence at all times. Man is, Bloch contends, that creature who hopes, who phantasizes, who dreams about the future and strives to attain it. These features are not merely accidental to his nature but are utterly constitutive of it. To be human is to be on the way to something else. To be man is to be unterwegs. Man's nature eludes definitive description because by the time it is described it has already begun the transmutation into something else. Thus Bloch helps us to seize the day, to enjoy and profit from the discomfort of transition, to see in the dislocations of our own period an epiphany of what is real in history at large.125

However else man can be described from other points of view, he is certainly in Bloch's and Moltmann's view—and in Allport's as seen earlier—a creature who hopes, strives toward the future, and is constantly in change and transformation. And man's individual becoming is the symbol of that of history in general.

Commenting on Bloch, Harvey Cox says that man is, then, more deeply and intrinsically than a "thinker" or "toolmaker," a "hope-er" with a dynamic thrust forward:

His essential existence tiptoes along the narrow ridge between the disappearing "now" and the ever newly appearing "not-yet." And his basic stance, when he is true to himself, is that of creative expectation, a hope that engenders action in the present to shape the future.126

This intriguing "not-yet" constitutes for Bloch the "pull" of the future. It is like a vacuum127 that exerts a magnetic forward at-

126 Ibid., p. 194.
traction on man and the universe. It is not a deceptive lure but a constantly receding threshold, a quest for essence, for fulfilment, which drives humanity incessantly forward. The "pull of the future" exerts its effect on the present by sustaining a relentless dynamism of inquiry, of growth, of ever greater becoming. 128

Interestingly enough, Bloch sees hope in the "not-yet" as the source of all religion: it is the "dichotomy of man between his present appearance and his non-present essence." 129 Religion expresses misery, as Marx asserted; but it also protests against real misery. Bloch wonders why, and how religion can function as a meaningful expression of protest. 130 Further, Bloch sees continuity between religion and Christianity. To him Christianity is the best expression of man's universal aspirations:

Bloch speaks of Christianity as the purest and most consistent expression of this irreducible content of all religion. In its universal messianism and its inclusive eschatology Christianity becomes the religious expression par excellence of the hope-laden dissatisfaction which spurs man on toward the future. Bloch also believes, however, that there is a crucial difference between Christianity and many other religions in the way it copes with the present. While some religions stress the mythical and thus tend to become static and to serve as an apology for the status quo, Christianity's messianism gives it a critical perspective on the present


130 Ibid.
and loads it with explosive potential.  

Paradoxically enough for this Jewish-Marxist atheist, it is in the prophetic history of the Bible that Bloch "draws much of his understanding of man's directedness toward the future."  

His philosophy of hope is acclaimed as a secular confirmation that biblical eschatology deals with man's real essence and existence:

His categories of hope and the future correspond to the biblical picture of man as one who lives within the framework of promise and fulfillment. Man's hopes burst open his present, connect him with his past, drive him toward the horizons of the not yet realized future.

It is in the Bible that Bloch finds the supreme statement of man's radical hope; here it is that man is best characterized as a creature oriented toward the future, a creature of promise. Even the very name of God Himself, "Yahweh," interpreted by Bloch as "I will be who I will be," indicates how fundamental is that future orientation.

Moltmann acclaims Bloch's relevance "in activating and elaborating a Christian doctrine of hope." For, all of this is fascinating to receive from a Marxist philosopher. Perhaps, says Braaten, the heart of the problem remaining with Bloch is this: who or what is "the

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133 Cited by Braaten, ibid., p. 97.
135 Cited by Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope," p. 97; cf. also Pannenborg's appreciation of Bloch's philosophy as cited by Braaten, ibid.
guarantor of a future that corresponds to the highest hopes of man?"  

Could it be "the living God of the Exodus and the Resurrection?"

Bloch himself does not ground anything on a God of hope; he does not change his atheistic position. But Braaten indicates this much about the Christian dialogue with Bloch:

It affirms the humanism of his hope, but grounds it in the "power of the future" who has revealed himself as the "God of hope" in the eschatological event of Jesus' resurrection.

Bloch's atheism remains correct in protesting against a distant divinity that would obstruct man's freedom and future while guaranteeing the forces of nature and society. Perhaps this is the cue, as Moltmann understood, to discover a more authentic Christian interpretation of the Kingdom, or rather "a new interpretation of the original Christian hope." And Braaten adds these clues:

The first generations of Christians were fired by hopes for the kingdom; the second wave of Christianity built the church as an interim device while waiting for the kingdom; later generations identified the two. Today the task is to reactivate the Christian hope by pointing to the kingdom of God whose biblical images have been blurred in the history of Christianity.

The task is to revive that first authentic experience of faith and make Christians once again an Easter people.

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Cf. Moltmann, Religion, p. 156. 
137 Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope," p. 98. 
140 Ibid., p. 97. 
141 Ibid., p. 99. 
G. The Polis and Christianity: Johannes B. Metz

In his critique of realized eschatology, as noted earlier, Moltmann specifically departs from a restrictive individualism in eschatology, which would remain detached from any communal and cosmic dimension. It is Johannes Metz who takes up this confrontation between individualism and pluralism, or in his own terms, between "privatized religion" and its socio-cultural tasks. This is closely related to the present thesis and somehow at the crux of the main problem here: that is, a certain dichotomy between Allport's personalism and Moltmann's socio-historical eschatology. Metz is primarily critical of "privatized religion"; his theology becomes a challenge for the whole person to reach beyond himself in social and universal involvement. But it is also a challenge for society to keep the individual in view at all time.  

Johannes B. Metz is Dean of the Catholic Faculty and Professor of Fundamental Theology at the University of Munster, West Germany. His reputation grew from his association with Karl Rahner; but since 1965, Father Metz has developed his own "political theology" and is now "regarded throughout the world as the foremost Catholic spokesman in the 'hope-school.'"
Metz strongly believes that Christian faith must answer for its hope to modern man who is both future oriented and action oriented. Old categories no longer suffice: speculation, tradition, origins, commitment to a world beyond and a heaven above; man is now concerned with praxis, with the New and "a passion for what has been made possible," with end goals and a commitment to the future of the earth. Too traditional a Christianity appears powerless toward the future, and the consequent attitude of modern man is simply to discard religion as complacent and ineffective. Metz's suggestion is to restore eschatology to its rightful place at the dynamic centre of faith. No longer does it suffice to speculate on what is; together, men are searching for what will be, and the Church is ideally equipped to enlighten this quest.

The task of political theology Metz defines as twofold: a critical correction of the privatizing tendency of recent theology and a positive attempt to formulate Christian eschatology for today's world.

The era surrounding and following Bultmann, particularly, has viewed faith as transcendental, personalist, existential—in a word, privatized and reduced to the timeless decision of a person. Charity has been of the interpersonal variety only, with the category of encounter predominant. Yes to the individual, says Metz, but to the whole individual!

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149 This is Moltmann's expansion of Kierkegaard's "passion for what is possible," in Theology, p. 20. Also referred to by Metz in "Creative Hope," p. 131.
The positive task of political theology must therefore be to determine anew the relation between religion and society, reflection and revolution, the Church and social "publicness," eschatological faith and societal action.

The foundation for such a political theology, Metz finds in Scripture and the life of Jesus. "Contemporary man's orientation to the future and his understanding of the world as history are themselves grounded in the Biblical faith in God's promises." Salvation, the object of Christian faith in hope, is not private. The Word of the Old Testament, maintains Metz, is not principally a Word of information, of address, of self-revelation, but a Word of Promise. It is a proclamation of what is to come. It is the covenant of the whole people with God, "the solidarity of those who look forward in hope, those for whom the world for the first time has a history ordained to the future." This God names Himself "I will be who I will be"--truly a "God before us." He promises a future greater than men's own possibilities, thereby freeing them for the New. His message in His Word Jesus is also a promise of future newness. And the Gospels are by no means mere biography, but forcefully public proclamation: Kerygma. Jesus was in no way a private person but one who entered into mortal conflict...
with public powers, a conflict climaxed by his lawsuit taken to Pontius
Pilate, representative of the Roman Empire. His very cross was
planted outside the city at a busy crossroads, and his case proclaimed
in three languages for all to know.

Likewise, the Church is in no way a private association. In
her, the trial is now pending between the eschatological message of
Jesus and socio-political reality. Whence, says Metz, "every eschato-
logical theology, therefore, must become a political theology, that is,
a (socio-) critical theology." In the New Testament, Paul defined
Christians as those who have hope, and Peter challenged them to an-
swer for their hope before the world. This hope is one. Metz here
recalls St. Thomas's statement that man has not two goals—one natural
and one supernatural—but only one end promised by God. Christian
hope, then, is responsible for and committed to one promised future for
all. "Faith does not hope for its own sake and the Church does not
hope for only her own sake, but for the world." The Church is not
her own goal, but is for the Kingdom—the City of God to be made and
requiring creative and militant action. No passive expectation here,
but "political" involvement, the salvation of a covenant people, the
resurrection not just of the "body" but of "all flesh."

Crucified God, Chap. 4: "The Historical Trial of Jesus," pp. 112 ff.
335. Cf. above, III, 81.
161 Ibid. Cf. Moltmann, Religion, p. 120.
162 Ibid., p. 139. Cf. Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope,"
pp. 94, 96.
quotes the Vatican II Constitution on the Church which clearly calls
the Christian to collaboration in the promised kingdom of universal
peace and justice: "The renovation of the world...is in a sense really
anticipated in this world."\(^{163}\)

In a special way, the Church is "the institution of the critical
liberty of faith."\(^{164}\) Effective criticism of society is not possi­
ble, says Metz, only from an individual standpoint. And so, the
Church forever stands apart and alert, not identifying with any polit­
ical or economic system, but protecting individuals and groups "from
being considered exclusively as matter and means for the building of a
completely rationalized technological future."\(^{165}\) She reminds systems
and nations that man's whole history lies "under God's eschatological
proviso,"\(^{166}\) and challenges social charity to extend beyond one's self
and neighborhood. The Church, then, must be the criticism of pure
power, sometimes unto revolution.\(^{167}\) Such a task, if true to itself
will bring about change in the Church herself; for criticism must be
turned within and self-applied, if the Church is not to become illus­
trative of the very conditions she criticizes.\(^{168}\)

Finally, Metz suggests some concrete positive tasks for an es­

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\(^{163}\) Cited by Metz, "Creative Hope," p. 138, from "The Dogmatic
Constitution on the Church," in The Documents of Vatican II, Chap. VII,
no. 48, p. 79. Cf. also "The Church Today," Nos. 3-4, pp. 200-203.
\(^{164}\) Metz, "Religion and Society," p. 145. Cf. Moltmann, Theology,
p. 22; Religion, pp. 95, 98.
\(^{166}\) Ibid., p. 148.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., pp. 148-149.
chatological Church of today. She is to be constantly attentive to the reflection going on in all disciplines and groups. She is to be a leader in matters of reconciliation, toleration, and the elimination of sociological prejudices. She is to bear the contradictions of the present while upholding for all the promises of the future. She is that expression of hope against all hope, set up among idols. In contradistinction to all ideologies of the future, she does not attempt to pierce the future and "rob it of mystery," but values and stands by the very poverty of her knowledge about the hoped-for future of the world. The Church must face boldly and faithfully those forms of human alienation which cannot be removed, especially the most painful experiences of sorrow and guilt at the heart of man's existence on earth. And lastly, the Church must be aware of death, the greatest threat of all to hope. Yet even here, she is the guardian of ultimate hope for all. Metz maintains that even death must lose its private character for the Christian, and become a "self-forgetting oblation of love for others, for the 'least of the brethren,' in selfless commitment for their hope." It is through their love for the community (the complete Body of Christ) that Christians overcome death in anticipation, as Christ did, literally, for all:

..."We know that we have passed over death to life be-

172 Ibid., p. 141. Cf. below, p. IV, 151-152.
cause we love the brethren: (1 Jn. 3, 14). Only one who loses his soul in this way will gain it. Christian hope draws to itself and overcomes the passion of death, which threatens our promises, as it accepts the adventure of brotherly love of the least—in imitation of Christ, whose being is not originally self-perfection, not a reeditio subjecti in se ipsum but a "being for others" (Bonhoeffer). Christian hope is creative imitation of the "being for others"; and so it is at the service of creative responsibility for the world.\footnote{173}

Johannes Metz's political theology goes a long way in the direction of human maturity and responsibility. Metz's challenge to both privatized personalism and global eschatology makes personal growth in and through a universal hope possible, makes such growth an integrated and integrating experience.

\textbf{H. Summary: A Hope-Filled Perspective}

To summarize what has preceded and clarify its relevance for the present thesis, it is possible now to share in the enthusiasm of Harvey Cox, as he surveys the thrusts in recent decades toward an eschatology of hope:

I am now pursuing the hints, perhaps misleadingly, of two vagabonds on the periphery of theology, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Ernst Bloch.... Though there are many differences, both Teilhard and Bloch discuss transcendence in terms of the pressure exerted by the future on the present. They both see that his future is the key to man's being, and they recognize that an authentically open future is only possible where there is a creature who can orient himself toward the future and relate himself to reality in terms of this orientation—in short, a creature who can hope.\footnote{174}

\footnote{173 Metz, "Creative Hope," p. 141.}
All of this applies not only to the individual's personal growth but just as forcefully to his responsible commitment to others and to the world about him. With the help of Bloch, Metz, and other advocates of hope today,

...we can be unremittingly concerned with the secular without sacrificing the transcendent. God is not above or beneath us, or even just "within" us. He is ahead. Christian existence is defined by hope and the church is the community of God's tomorrow, eternally discontent with today. 175

It is in such an exciting context and perspective, then, that Jürgen Moltmann's study of eschatological hope can be taken up with all its personal and cosmic implications.

III. Contemporary Eschatology According to Moltmann

Theologians in this century, such as Jurgen Moltmann (1926- ), are writing with the assumption that A. Schweitzer's first insight was right: Christianity is essentially eschatological. Other influences from differing perspectives give to Moltmann's thought its creative tension: German Protestantism with Lutheran roots, the Reformed tradition, and the influence of the Enlightenment. He disclaims Blochian influence, but admits that of Heraclitus in philosophy. A member of the Reformed Evangelical Church of Germany, Moltmann is currently titular professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Bonn and co-editor of Evangelische Theologie and Verkündigung und Forschung. His remarkable Theology of Hope (1965) is said to have launched the present Hope movement. The book is certainly a ponderous one, and it is possible here to attempt only a brief resumé of its main topics.

A. Greek and Hebrew Terms

Eschatology, Moltmann claims, has taken on the dimensions of hope. Although this has only recently been made explicit, theolo-
giants find evidence of it throughout the Bible. In fact, the whole
Old Testament "breathes an atmosphere of hope," as John L. Mackenzie
points out. Interestingly, the Hebrew language has no specific word for
hope, so that the whole concept is integrally tied in with faith, both
in fact and in symbol. For the purposes of this thesis, it seems useful
here to examine a few biblical terms.

1. Hope

In the Old Testament, the words most frequently used to express
hope are kawah, "to expect," and batah, "To trust or have confidence."
The Hebrew verbs for faith, 'aman and batah, imply firmness, solidity,
and hence truth, trustworthiness, reliability. They signify that "God
offers firm security because of His fidelity (Ps. 35: 6)." This
understanding lies at the basis of the New Testament Greek word for
faith, pistis, which means "to trust, to show confidence, to accept as
true." This is the word used in the Gospels to express hope (for any
other expression would have connoted desire for earthly realities and a
political kingdom); but the rest of the New Testament employs the Greek

180 John L. Mackenzie, "Hope," in Dictionary of the Bible,
Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 368a. Cf. also Jean Galot, "Eschatologie,"
1019 ff. Cf. also M. E. Williams, "Eschatology: Theological Treatment,"
533-538.
182 Ibid., p. 267c.
p. 142.
term elpis or elpizein (about 53 times, some 41 in Paul's writings alone\textsuperscript{184}). Elpis means "expectation"—but neutrally for good or bad; used to convey hope in the New Testament, it greatly enriches the religious concept of hope in the Old Testament.\textsuperscript{185} The Greek word hypostasis describing "faith" in Hebrews 11: 1 is variously translated as "assurance...evidence," or more probably "foundation"\textsuperscript{186} Thus, the author of Hebrews (11: 1-2) proclaims the relationship and interdependence of faith and hope:

Faith is "the foundation of the things hoped," or "the reality of things hoped"; faith is that which gives a conviction of their reality and furnishes the motive of hope.\textsuperscript{187}

Or, as expressed in the Jerusalem Bible:

Only faith can guarantee the blessings that we hope for, or prove the existence of the realities that at present remain unseen.\textsuperscript{188}

All in all, biblical hope can be seen to mean that a person puts all his faith, his ultimate security in another, in God. Certain aspects of this biblical hope are particularly relevant to this paper, recalling Allport's treatise on personality traits and the religious sentiment.

\textsuperscript{186} Mackenzie, "Faith," p. 269d. This whole approach to faith and hope is richly described in several annotations in The Jerusalem Bible, e.g., Romans 2j and 5d to f; Hebrews 11a; John 14c.
\textsuperscript{187} Hebrews 11: 1-2, as cited by Mackenzie, ibid. These two verses are cited by many other writers, e.g., St. Augustine in Enchiridion, p. 341; and Teilhard, The Making of a Mind, letter dated 31 Aug. 1918.
\textsuperscript{188} Hebrews 11: 1-2 in The Jerusalem Bible. Cf. Galatians 5:5.
In the Old Testament, hope is an all-pervading messianic expectation. It is founded entirely upon the promises of God, upon Yahweh Himself, "the hope of Israel." For God's own faithfulness firmly guarantees the fulfilment of His promises. The motive of hope in the Old Testament is clear:

The motive of hope is the past deeds of Yahweh (Gn 15: 7)
...which gives confidence in His power to fulfill His promises.... His fidelity to His word is guaranteed by His covenant love, which is granted according to the degree in which Israel hopes in Him.... The motive of hope remains the same: only Yahweh can give Israel a future and a hope (Je 29: 11; 31: 17).

Yahweh is the hope not only of Israel but also of each individual. Jeremiah and Ezekiel both present the hope of a new covenant as an interior regeneration in the heart of each individual person.

But the hope of Israel, according to Mackenzie, extended only to the living, "since the OT has no idea of survival until its very latest parts." Hope ceases as death becomes imminent, and only on rare instances is there a flash of hope "that the power and covenant love of Yahweh will find a way to exhibit themselves even beyond the grave (Pss 16: 16; 73: 25)."

In the New Testament, not only the motive but also the object of hope takes on definite form, and hope is given the transcendent perspec-

190 Mackenzie, "Hope," p. 368a-b.
192 Ibid., p. 368c.
193 Ibid.
tive of resurrection, both individual and universal. Hope becomes, in fact, "hope against expectation," hope for eschatological revelation and fulfilment. It includes assurance of even the means to attain the final goal.

In 1 Jn 3:3... the object of hope is to become like God by seeing Him as He is....God can accomplish the impossible. Hope is of the unseen both as to its object and its motive (Rm 8: 24; Heb 3:6). It is the hope of the glory of God... which must ultimately issue in the liberation of all creation from sin (Rm 8: 20).... As the Christian hopes to receive the term from God, so also he hopes to receive from God the means by which he can attain the term.... The object of hope is most frequently eschatological: the glory, the resurrection,... the grace which will be granted in the (eschatological) revelation of Jesus Christ (1 Pt 1: 13).

Thus, Jesus becomes the renewal of the Old Testament Promise, as well as the goal and source of its ultimate fulfilment. This new Promise becomes the Mission of Christians until the Parousia:

The object of hope, presented in the gospel (Col 1: 23), is made real through faith (Heb 11: 1), with a reality which should enable the Christian to give an account of his hope to any enquirer (1 Pt. 3: 15).

With faith and love, hope forms "the great triad of the most precious charismata of the Christian."197

2. Eschatology

In this pristine biblical hope, Moltmann finds the authentic
Christian eschatology. "Eschatology," he states, "means the doctrine of
the Christian hope, which embraces both the object hoped for and also
the hope inspired by it."\textsuperscript{199} Moltmann further defines eschatology as
the doctrine of hope, the doctrine of the future for which
one can hope, and simultaneously the doctrine of the action
of hope which brings the hoped-for future into the suffer­
ings of the present age.\textsuperscript{200}

He does not attempt to replace theology with eschatology, but to re­
store eschatology to its rightful place as the main essential theme of
Christian theology, the one element that makes theology historically
relevant:

The peculiarity of Christian theology can be defined as
follows: Christian theology speaks of God historically
and of history eschatologically.\textsuperscript{201}

The word "eschato-logie" itself presents some difficulty to Molt­
mann, especially in the light of the above biblical concepts of faith
and hope. One of its Greek roots, the logos, implies the kind of doc­
trine that is a collection of theses based on "experiences that con­
stantly recur,"\textsuperscript{202} or "an epiphany of the eternal present of being."\textsuperscript{203}

Braaten explains Moltmann's hesitation over this term:

... There can be no "eschato-logie," for the Greek logos
concept presupposes that language can grasp the truth
about reality that is always and already there. In Greek
ontology reality is not open-ended; it has no real future;
there is no need for hope; and there is no problem of his­
tory. Thus, if we operate with a Greek logos concept, we

\textsuperscript{199} Moltmann, \textit{Theology}, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{200} Moltmann, \textit{Religion},
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 203.
\textsuperscript{202} Moltmann, \textit{Theology}, p. 17. Cf.\textit{The Jerusalem Bible}, 2 Peter, 1k.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p. 40.
can have no eschatology, for the future of Christian hope is not an extension of the past, or recurrence of the present. Reality as nature is circular; reality as history is always unfinished, opening forward toward a real future of new events that have never happened before.\textsuperscript{204}

For Moltmann, the goal of Christian eschatology is not yet attained and not yet realized; it is in promise. The God of faithfulness promised, and Christ came, to bring all to cosmic fulfilment. All religious faith is enlightened with the hope and promise of a future goal and is thereby spurred to action to hasten its coming. In Moltmann's words:

\textit{It was not in the logos of the epiphany of the eternal present, but in the hope-giving word of promise that Israel found God's truth.... Christian eschatology in the language of promise will then be an essential key to the unlocking of Christian truth.}\textsuperscript{205}

Losing eschatology as the key to theological thinking leads Christianity to adapt itself to its environment and surrender its faith!\textsuperscript{206}

\textit{The logos declares what is; the Word of God, what will be.} Faith puts man in contact with the content of the hope which is Promise. It is in faith that he accepts the Word of Promise, which constantly thrusts towards the future. But this Word also looks back: the past becomes prophetic because it is future-oriented; man finds the Promise of the future in the past and tries to gather it all up towards the eschatological. The Word is prophetic in the sense of Promise,\textsuperscript{207} not in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{204} Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope," p. 100. Cf. Moltmann, \textit{Theology}, p. 208.
  \item \textsuperscript{205} Moltmann, \textit{Theology}, p. 41. Cf. Bloch above, p. III, 104.
  \item \textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
sense of predicting the future. But within the Promise there is a way of bringing about the future. Such is the power of the Word. It is biblical that the Word comes and will produce its effect.\footnote{208} It does not just stand back and look into the future; but once God's Word is spoken and is recognized, it becomes a power toward the future.\footnote{209}

Therefore, the prophet is related to the future because God's Word filled with promise and salvation must be fulfilled. It is the power to contradict the past and present, to "negate all the negatives" of the world—the power to bring about what is not yet but will be totally new.

3. Other Eschatological Terms

Christian eschatology is effective promise and power, and therefore a true foundation for hope. It looks forward to a new "Theophany"\footnote{210} or manifestation of God at the end, at the fulness of time or "pleroma,"\footnote{211} "the appointed time" or "kairos."\footnote{212} This is called in the new Testament the "Parousia"\footnote{213} of Christ, and means His Second Com-

\footnote{210} Mackenzie, "Parousia," p. 638b. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Hebrews 1e and 12e.
\footnote{211} Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Colossians 1g, 2e-f; Ephesians 1j, 1u, 3m.
Christ Himself will then be revealed the head of the whole "pleroma" or total cosmos, and the entire universe will acknowledge Him as Lord or "Kyrios." As such, Christ Himself is the Eschaton, the promised future goal of history: "The logos of the eschaton is promise of that which is not yet, and for that reason it makes history." As the Eschaton, Christ will bring fulness to all things, and is already affecting the present, bringing about that very fulness and consummation:

The eschaton of the parousia of Christ, as a result of its eschatological promise, causes the present that can be experienced at any given moment to become historic by breaking away from the past and breaking out towards the things that are to come.... What the future is bringing is something which, through the Christ event of the raising of the one who was crucified, has become 'once and for all' a possible object of confident hope.

In hope, Christians can already call forth "the 'Word' which God will one day speak as he has promised." Their aspiration toward that Day is expressed in the beautiful invocation: "Maranatha! Come,

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214 Mackenzie, "Parousia," p. 638c. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Matthew 24 p, 25e; John 8q; 1 Cor. 1e; Romans 2b; Hebrews 9l.
215 Ibid., p. 639b. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Ephesians 4g.
216 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 83, 132, 216-22; of The Crucified God, p. 179 ff, 261. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Philippians 2lp; 1 Cor. 2e, Romans 1d, 9d.
218 Ibid., p. 165.
221 Ibid., p. 229.
222 Ibid., p. 281.
Lord Jesus, Come!"  

B. Future and Transcendence

If Christian eschatology is not, then, a "logos-doctrine" of the future, in what way can it express the future? Precisely, Moltmann exclaims; it does not speak of a vague future, but of a definite historical event and of its promised effectiveness as a future goal:

It sets out from a definite reality in history and announces the future of that reality, its future possibilities and its power over the future.  

And what is that unique event in Christian eschatology? It is the person of Jesus Christ and His future. It is recognition of the Resurrection of Jesus and of the proclamation of His future as risen Lord. It is the element of otherness encountered in the New Testament and also in the Old Testament God active His promises:

... the "God of hope" (Rom. 15: 13), a God with "future as his essential nature" (as E. Bloch puts it), as made known in Exodus and in Israelite prophecy, the God whom we therefore cannot really have in us or over us but always only before us, who encounters us in his promises for the future, and whom we therefore cannot "have" either, but can only await in active hope.  

The title "Messiah, the coming One," says Moltmann, is once again "timely." It actualizes the promise of the God of Exodus: "I will be

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224 Moltmann, Theology, p. 17; also p. 211.
226 Moltmann, Theology, p. 16.
The Resurrection of Jesus is already "the day-break of the eschaton." The God of the Exodus and of the Resurrection reveals Himself in Jesus to be the power of the future and its final goal. Elsewhere, Moltmann describes a theology of hope as "a theology of questions that can be answered only by the coming of God through the Kingdom of his freedom." Here perhaps we can detect a hint of extremism in Moltmann. Does God meet man only in promise? Rather, if man had not somehow found or known God, how could he be searching for Him? There is a certain sense in which God has fulfilled His Word.

Some promises are also fulfilments that are rich with more promise. Already, God meets man as present power, and maybe in some sense as realized eschatological thrust. Because of Jesus, life is already changed:


230 Moltmann, Theology, p. 58; Religion, pp. 60, 136, 158, 209.

231 Moltmann, Religion, pp. 66, 209.

232 A paradox seems to appear here even in St. Paul between the "already" and the "not yet" of salvation. At one point he says that "baptized in Christ Jesus.... you must consider yourselves to be dead to sin but alive for God in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 6: 3, 11); and also "for anyone who is in Christ, there is a new creation; the old creation has gone, and now the new one is here" (2 Cor. 5: 17). But elsewhere, St. Paul says, "our salvation is not in sight: we should not have to be hoping for it if it were" (Rom. 8: 24). On this whole issue, The Jerusalem Bible comments in Romans 6b: the "resurrection will not be complete or final until the end of time, but is already taking place in the form of a new life lived 'in the Spirit.'" Cf. also 2 Corinthians 5f. Cf. the "dawn" described by Moltmann, Theology, p. 31: also pp. 27, 29. Cf. Moltmann, "The Realism of Hope, the Feast of the Resurrection and the Transformation of the Present Reality," in Concordia Theological Monthly, 40 (March, 1969) pp. 150, 152. Cf. Ladislaus Boros, S.J., We Are Future, pp. 99-112, 138-141. Cf. above p. III, 87.
"Be brave: I have conquered the world."\(^\text{233}\) The future is already at work affecting the present; eschatological life is in some mysterious fashion already begun.

But the fact remains that the future promised by God is truly transcendent: it will be wholly other than anything known or imagined. Whereas other ideologies attempt and claim to describe the future, Christianity cherishes its very inability to do so, as Metz says: "it values precisely the poverty of its knowledge about the future."\(^\text{234}\) To Moltmann, the element of future newness, the novum,\(^\text{235}\) is crucial to Christian eschatology. It is the transcendence\(^\text{236}\) and the futurity of hope which prevents eschatology from becoming "u-topos, that which has 'no place.'"\(^\text{237}\) Rather, with the confidence that Jesus will bring about the newness promised in His Resurrection, the person of hope can look beyond all present realities and stake his faith in the open possibilities of God's transcendent future.\(^\text{238}\) In this perspective, hope becomes an integrative experience, both personally and universally:

Because this future is the future of one God, it is a unique


\(^{235}\) Moltmann, Religion, pp. 4-12; also pp. 79, 98, 50 ff., 190, 156.


\(^{238}\) Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Romans 8g.
and unifying future. Because it brings eschatological liberation, it is the salvation of the whole enslaved creation... As all-encompassing future, its power of hope is able to mediate faith to earthly needs and to lead it into real life.  

C. Realism of Hope

Nor is hope a utopian optimism, a Freudian illusion, in Moltmann's theory.  

It takes experience seriously, but without making it an absolute. One theologian commenting on this says that "hope begins with the realization that human experience is finally inadequate to deal with all the possibilities that reality harbors."  

And Moltmann emphasizes that the resurrected Lord of whom Christians speak is also a crucified Lord; in his Cross are contained all the suffering and death of present experience. The Cross then stands as the sign of contradiction, a sign of the conflict between hope and experience. For, hope is directed toward that which is not yet, and therefore rightly brands man's present experience as "a god-forsaken, transient reality that is to be left behind."  

Hope is a "hope against hope," a "negation

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239 Moltmann, Religion, p. 218.
240 Moltmann refers to this frequently: e.g., in Religion, pp. 53, 57, 79, 94, 96, 175; The Crucified God, p. 295, 298.
243 Ibid., p. 18.
of the negative." 245 Only the Cross that preceded the Resurrection can give meaning even to that earthly horror which Auschwitz revealed to be "worse than death." 246 Evil and death literally become "transient in the promised resurrection." 247

It is in this contradiction between the promise of hope and the experience of present realities that faith takes its stand, straining after the future. "To believe does in fact mean to cross and transcend bounds, to be engaged in an exodus." 248 But this cannot imply an ignoring of misery, guilt, and death; rather, faith can overstep these bounds, but "only at the point where they have in actual fact been broken through." 249 Christ then is himself man's present prospect of freedom: his raising from the dead breaks through all human bounds and makes it possible for faith to expand into hope:

... Hope becomes a "passion for what is possible" (Kierkegaard), because it can be a passion for what has been made possible.... Faith recognizes the dawning of this future of openness. 250

D. "The Hope of Faith" 251

From what has been said, one begins to wonder what Moltmann's definition of faith as hope might be. Certainly, it can only be con-

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245 Moltmann, Religion, p. 120; cf. pp. 127, 161.
246 Ibid., p. 17; cf. The Crucified God, pp. 1-2, 278.
247 Moltmann, Theology, p. 165.
248 Ibid., p. 19.
250 Ibid., p. 20; cf. Religion, p. 169
251 Moltmann, Religion, p. 218, 121, 215, 220.
Faith is called to life by promise and is therefore essentially hope, confidence, trust in the God who will not lie but will remain faithful to his promise.\textsuperscript{252}

Moltmann quotes from Calvin a remarkable description of faith and hope in their interrelatedness and interdependence:

"Hope is nothing else than the expectation of those things which faith has believed to have been truly promised by God. Thus, faith believes God to be true, hope awaits the time when this truth shall be manifested; faith believes that he is our Father, hope anticipates that he will ever show himself to be a Father toward us; faith believes that eternal life has been given to us, hope anticipates that it will some time be revealed; faith is the foundation upon which hope rests, hope nourishes and sustains faith. For as no one except him who already believes His promises can look for anything from God, so again the weakness of our faith must be sustained and nourished by patient hope and expectation, lest it fail and grow faint.... By unremitting renewing and restoring, it [hope] invigorates faith again and again with perseverance." Thus in the Christian life, faith has the priority, but hope the primacy.\textsuperscript{253}

Faith, says Moltmann, shows man the path of life, and hope keeps him on that path. Believing means entering with hope and assurance the "opening" upon the future made by the raising of the crucified Christ. But this means that one can no longer be reconciled to present evils; for the resurrection is God's contradiction to them all, the "protest of the divine promise against suffering."\textsuperscript{254} And so far from any resignation or escapism, faith itself enters into conflict with death and with whatever else puts up with death:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 21.
\end{itemize}
That is why faith, wherever it develops into hope, causes not rest but unrest, not patience but impatience. It does not calm the unquiet heart, but is itself this unquiet heart in man. Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it. Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.255

Let it be noted that the dynamic creative tension toward a long-range goal in Allport's theory, only gains here in scope and intensity.256 Commenting on Moltmann, Paul Tihon strongly hints at this when he says:

[L'esperance] n'est pas dans le message chretien une sorte de postescriptum, mais un motif obstinément present. Car la foi elle-même est toujours un Exode rendu possible par une espérance; et celle-ci rompt sans cesse les chaînes du présent, lui suggère son véritable contenu, donne à la pensée même son intensité et son dynamisme.257

The same dynamic tension characterizes the Church, says Moltmann, making her a "constant disturbance in human society."258 For the Church must show forth the hope of her faith.259 Wherever this happens, Christianity attains "its true nature and becomes a witness of the future of Christ."260 This is the Church's Mission as the "eschatological community"261 of a "pilgrim people."262

Such is, briefly, Moltmann's description of eschatological faith as hope.

256 Cf. above, pp. I, 33; II, 65; III, 80-81, 95.
258 Moltmann, Theology, p. 22.
259 Cf. I Peter 3: 15.
260 Moltmann, Theology, p. 22.
261 Ibid., pp. 224, 284; Religion, pp. 98-99, 106.
262 Ibid., p. 304.
E. Hopelessness to Love

Moltmann then takes a look at the basic sins against hope. In the first place, he seems to find more biblical support concerning the sin of despair than that of presumption:

Temptation then consists not so much in the titanic desire to be as God, but in weakness, timidity, weariness, not wanting to be what God requires of us. 263

It may have been against such resigned, lukewarm indifference that the Lord in Revelations 3: 15-16 spoke such strong words. But presumption is no less possible, not less an offence, as Louis Weeks clearly explains in his Thomistic critique of Moltmann. 264 Moltmann does make a token reference to "overconfidence" in his article "The Realism of Hope":

Hopelessness always takes two forms—it can become over-confidence, and it can become despair. Overconfidence is a badly timed, self-willed anticipation of what one hopes for from God. Despair is an equally self-willed anticipation that what is hoped for is impossible of fulfilment. Both rebel against the suffering of hope. Both want fulfilment right now or no hope at all.... Overconfidence as well as despair afflict with numbness and rigor mortis the truly human, which alone is capable of preserving hope steadily and unquestioningly. 265

The second point made by Moltmann is that whatever else they may be, both presumption and despair pre-suppose hope:

Presumption is a premature, selfwilled anticipation of the fulfilment of what we hope for from God. Despair is the premature, arbitrary anticipation of the non-fulfilment of what we hope for from God. 266

266 Moltmann, Theology, p. 23.
Both forms of hopelessness in their own way "rebel against the patience in which hope trusts in the God of promise." Over against both extremes, Moltmann claims that there can be no real "love without hope for the beloved." Because of the crucified and resurrected Christ, "hope is not born out of enthusiasm but out of love which liberates us from old bonds and opens up new opportunities." Or, as one student quipped: not that "The vocation of every lover is to bring about revolution" (Che Guevara), but that "The duty of every revolution is to bring about love." The very incompleteness of man's own state and of the world about him opens out in tension toward future completion and the God who "makes all things new."

In the third place, however, and more serious than these for a theology of hope, is what Moltmann calls "the religion of humble acquiescence in the present." Anyone who has long been told to "live only the present moment" can relate to this Parmenidean concept. It states that man no longer has a hold on the past and still has nothing of the future; therefore, only the present is open to him. "Is it not always in the present alone that man is truly existent, real, contemporary with himself, acquiescent and certain?" And is it not only in the present

267 Moltmann, Theology, p. 23.
270 Cited ibid., p. 147.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
that God can be discovered in His immanence? This question poses a real problem for a theology of hope: "Does hope cheat man of the happiness of the present?" 274

This whole concept of acquiescence, declares Moltmann, is a "high noon" experience of the transcendent; 275 but the believer is rather "at the dawn of a new day at the point where night and day, things passing and things to come, grapple with each other." 276 Such an immediacy of God's intervention would put an end to Christ's mediation and to history as a "category of hope." 277 Instead, the God of hope sends man and his world forward into their future; He promises his presence to whoever follows that path into the future:

This God is present where we wait upon his promises in hope and transformation. When we have a God who calls into being the things that are not, then the things that are not yet, that are future, also become 'thinkable' because they can be hoped for. 278

Is there, then, no possible harmony and contemporaneity for man? Certainly: whenever "hope reconciles him with what is non-contemporaneous and disharmonious." 279 In love and hope man can take up the "cross of the present," bolstered by the promises to come. "Patience," says Moltmann, "is the art of everyday hope." 280 In other words, hope

275 Ibid., p. 27.
276 Ibid., p. 31.
277 Ibid., p. 30; cf. p. 5.
279 Ibid., p. 31, 32.
Where in faith and hope we begin to live in the light of the possibilities and promises of this God, the whole fulness of life discloses itself as a life of history and therefore a life to be loved.

It is this very comprehensiveness which transforms the hoping love, making it new and different, a love capable of loving even the unlovable, even the intangible:

Only in the perspective of this God can there possibly be a love that is more than philia, love to the existent and the life—namely, agape, love to the non-existent, love to the unlike, the unworthy, the worthless, to the lost, the transient and the dead; a love that can take upon it the annihilating effects of pain and renunciation because it receives its power from hope of a creatio ex nihilo. Love does not shut its eyes to the non-existent and say it is nothing, but becomes itself the magic power that brings it into being. In its hope, love surveys the open possibilities of history. In love, hope brings all things into the light of the promises of God.

Only with such faith-filled love can humankind find in the "dyings of the present" a hope of happiness. Faith is always a risk and hope awaits fulfilment; but love sustains them both and pulls man through to the end. Love comes finally as the highest integration of faith and hope.

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282 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 31-32; cf. p. 335.


285 Allport, The Individual, p. 81.
F. Hope-ful Thinking

Finally, Moltmann shows that hope draws faith into the realm of thought.286 Hope is the "mobilizing and driving force of faith's thinking.... Faith hopes in order to know what it believes."287 And citing St. Augustine, Moltmann adds: "We know insofar as we love."288 Knowledge, always partial, forms the prelude of a promised future and is therefore committed to hope. It celebrates the memorial of Promise: "Hope exists in the mode of memory, and memory in the mode of hope."289 And hope in turn, arising from faith in God's Promise becomes "the ferment of our thinking, its mainspring, the source of its restlessness and torment."290

Such a hope reveals history to be eschatologically oriented. It also identifies with even the "minor hopes... directed towards attainable goals and visible changes in human life."291 Because it is directed to the ultimate newness, the novum ultimum292 of all creation,293 Christian hope embraces all things, including death, and clothes all with anticipation. All man's limited hopes are stimulated, revitalized

287 Ibid., p. 33.
289 Moltmann, Religion, p. 211.
290 Moltmann, Theology, p. 33. Cf. Moltmann, Religion, p. 217: "To man's 'restless heart' (Augustine), there corresponds a 'restless world.'"
291 Ibid.; cf. Religion, p. 120.
292 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
and given direction—even carried further and made to be precursory, provisional, and therefore flexible goals. In the medium of hope, theology becomes relevant, because its concepts do not limit reality to what is, but anticipate the future possibilities of reality. Finally, the believing hope hopes, comprehensively, for the whole of reality and strains after its creative transformation, out of the inexhaustible resources of its inventive love.

IV. CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to trace the enthusiastic development of eschatology in recent times, from a bleak, often forgotten "doctrine of the last things" to its present position at the heart of Christian theology. A brief study was made of the contribution of one theologian in particular, Jürgen Moltmann. So much more could be elaborated from his lengthy tome, Theology of Hope, but this would be beyond the intention of the present thesis. It will suffice to add here that a few underlying themes from Moltmann will be further described in the next chapter, in an effort to correlate eschatological hope with psychological becoming.

294 Moltmann, Theology, p. 35; cf. Religion, pp. 178-179, fn. 2; The Crucified God, p. 3.

CHAPTER IV
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

"Hope springs eternal."

(Alexander Pope)
CHAPTER IV
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapter, eschatology was studied in its con­
temporary re-assessment as the central issue of Christian theology: the
dynamic urgency toward final fulfilment in the Eschaton. This chapter
will first attempt to correlate eschatological hope with personal growth
to maturity, and secondly, suggest a brief critique of Allport and Molt­
mann.

I. Hope and Personal Maturity

A. Preliminary Remarks:
Comparative Concepts from Allport

The foregoing study reveals some significant correlations and
implications of the new eschatological hope for growth to personhood.
To start with, here are some preliminary comparisons between key con­
cepts in Allport's theory, and the "hope" described by Moltmann.

According to Allport, the religious sentiment is the most effec­
tive motive and agent of personal integration. Eschatological faith, in
Moltmann's thought, is the motive of hope:

Faith is called to light by promise and is therefore essen­
tially hope.... The promise which announces the eschaton,
and in which the eschaton announces itself, is the motive
power, the mainspring, the driving force and the torture of
history.1

Thus, in anticipation of its objects, hope itself becomes motivation, alike in all its characteristics to Allport's propriate motivation.

The "hope of faith,"² says Moltmann, arises from the promises of God and longs for their fulfilment which will change, transform³ these earthly realities of misery into unsuspected eternal joy and glory.

Even as "faith leads to faith,"⁴ hope itself grows in the believer who gradually interiorizes God's promises, through an attitude and events of prayer, service, and celebration. In growing functional autonomy, hope discovers in the past its direction towards a real "future of God for man."⁵ True hope can then overflow in creative action in the present because of present reasons, or contemporaneous (functionally autonomous) motivations. The future promise in the Resurrection of Christ is here and now effective in its dynamic attraction⁶ and in the tension of conflict and contradiction which it opposes to the present negatives of life. The future goal is never fully achieved here; there is always some part in man and in the world not yet reconciled in Him;⁷ the poor are always with us.⁸ God encounters man in His promises; yet man never

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³ Ibid., p. 60.
⁴ Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Romans 1: 17 and 17m.
possesses but "only awaits Him in active hope." Tension in hope is of the essence of transcendence. Such hope can surely surge forth as the well-spring of our thinking, "the source of its restlessness." In its realism and dynamism, hope gathers the "minute" and "great negatives of life" as well as all the "minor hopes" and sweeps all forward towards attainable goals. Yet it shows up their limited, provisional character; hierarchically and comprehensively, it ordains both these intermediate goals and the person, the world and the cosmos, towards their ultimate fulfilment in God Himself—the ultimate long-range goal. To be even more explicit, hope becomes a master trait of the same quality as Allport's model, the motor-force and fundamental motivation to all human activity. As such, hope is of the highest integrative order: it brings about an "inner identity experience... wherein personhood is fulfilled" through a love active in human relationships and in real engagement in the struggle for the "humanization of the world."

B. Synthesis of Allport and Moltmann: Hope as Propriate Motivation (Chapter I)

1. Comparative Themes from Moltmann

The key concepts having been compared, it is now possible to
parallel some basic themes. Allport's theme is "becoming," or growth to personhood because of unique personal motives. In Moltmann's theology of hope, the basic themes are the Promise through history, Mission to the world, the Cross of the present, the Resurrection of Christ, and the "Novum" of the future. In relation to these, recall, here, the salient features of Allport's propriate motivation, as discussed in chapter one of this thesis: change, contemporaneity, direction, organization, and integration. There can be, of course, no question of establishing any one-to-one equivalence among these; but some simple reflections may be made.

To Moltmann, humankind's best experience of the divine is that of a God initiating encounter. He engages an alliance with His people and promises His faithfulness —if they will also remain faithful to Him. The Israelites became more aware of God's faithfulness by remembering the past, as the psalms indicate; for human consciousness of the past occurs in the present, in moments of fulfilment of the Promises or moments recalling these. History is the history of salvation (however much Moltmann tries to dissociate himself from this); it is the history

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17 Cf. above, pp. III, 89-91. "History of salvation" here refers to the faithfulness of God on behalf of man, and not to the negative Freudian concept of immature religion, described by Moltmann in The Crucified God, p. 309.
of God acting on behalf of man and calling forth his response. Far from being a puppet, man can freely become a collaborator with God. Hope—a hope in action—is man's response to Promise.

For, in every "pro-missio," says Moltmann, there is "missio." Promise encounters man in the present; Mission is for the present in view of the future, that the Promise might be lived, realized, brought to plenitude:

Future as mission shows the relation of today's tasks and decisions to what is really possible, points to open possibilities in the real and to tendencies that have to be grasped in the possible.

This is the intent of Proclamation, a long-term project which is individual, collective, and ecclesial. For, Christian hope is intrinsically communal and ecclesial; it is the hope of the People to whom the Promises were made. To be sent or "com-missioned" is to be engaged in the present. Today, the Promise of Jesus calls man to act and to become—or in St. Paul's language to pass from the indicative (of what God has given) to the imperative (of freely becoming whole and helping others and the world to do likewise). Having been made sons of God, we are to become ever more aware of all that divine filiation signifies,
and responsive to it.\textsuperscript{23}

Allport’s concepts of change and contemporaneity are evident here. Hope implies necessarily an opening upon God, upon the infinite—a dynamic of change in tension\textsuperscript{24} toward realization—an evolving event of functional autonomy.\textsuperscript{25} Is this not the evangelical theme of conversion\textsuperscript{26} and sanctification? Does this not require a decision of faith?\textsuperscript{27} Certainly, it is evidence that man is not bound by unchangeable instincts, as Allport maintained; and Moltmann agrees:

> The surplus value of the future over history manifests itself in hope’s permanent surplus incentive and with equal importance in the redemption of the compulsion of the instincts.\textsuperscript{28}

Neither is man bound to a religion of dreams, myths, and illusions, as Freud thought. Moltmann, like Allport, claims that man can achieve maturity as he grows beyond the pleasure principle to the reality principle, providing this development does not settle at a stagnant level of resignation, but remains open to a future of hope.\textsuperscript{29} The present, then, will also be transformed by hope.

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. ibid., p. 162. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Romans 8q; Galatians 4d.
\textsuperscript{24} Moltmann, Religion, pp. 216-217.
\textsuperscript{26} Cf. ibid., p. 139.
\textsuperscript{27} Cf. ibid., pp. 190, 210; Theology, pp. 184-185, 218, 97, 233, 316, 336.
The hope of Christianity is truly to render actual, contemporaneous, the promise of fulness of life—"that they may have life more abundantly, in this life and in the next." The risen Jesus, in Christian belief, is Himself contemporaneous, actually alive and actualizing life in us through His Spirit. Hope, in tension and intention, is the focus of the committed person's attention to Him. The hope-ful attention continually increases its understanding of the divine plan in order to grow in participation with it.

Now, the God of Exodus, says Moltmann, also revealed Himself to be the God of the Resurrection. Jesus fulfilled the Exodus in the passage of His own Paschal mystery. In raising Jesus to a completely new life, God has given meaning to His Cross and promised a newness for all life and all things. This enters the category of the novum which will be, according to Moltmann, not merely a transformation of the old, not a return to primeval perfection, not the morning's waking to a known human life—but a breaking in of the new, the entirely unexpected. The raising of Christ is "without parallel" in history, "a history-making event"; it is the novum ultimum, in "the expecta-
tional category of the eschatologically new." The new is all contained in Promise, somehow, but remains veiled for the present: "The beginning of the new creation of God's righteousness corresponds provisionally to faith but conclusively to a new world." The Cross is the suffering of the present which challenges men and women to become more, to follow Jesus; it is the living out of the long-term project.

A person's response of hope is directed, in and through all the crosses of the present toward that resurrection of which Christ is the model and promise. Hope is hierarchical and brings direction, orientation.

At the personal level, the believer hopes for ultimate peace and happiness, for nothing less than God. For the Resurrection of Jesus is more than a vindication of the Cross: it is man's own "hope of glory." It holds the future open both for Jesus Himself and for every

39 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 34, 126, 132.
41 Cf. ibid., pp. 53, 57-58, 96, 119; Theology, pp. 31, 158, 197.
43 City by Moltmann, Religion, p. 67; cf. Theology, p. 69.
44 Cf. Moltmann, Theology, pp. 34, 66; Religion, pp. 120, 192.
45 Cf. ibid., p. 109; Religion, pp. 106, 120, 176.
46 Moltmann, Religion, p. 103; Theology, p. 329.
47 Colossians 1: 27; cf. The Jerusalem Bible, annotations for Colossians 1-2, esp. 2n: "The body of the risen Christ... is what gives reality to our eschatological hope, and... is the first evidence that the new creation has already begun." Cf. Hebrews 3: 6.
man and woman. For Jesus, says Moltmann, to be true to Himself, must yet have a future: this will be his manifestation as Eschaton to all of humankind and creation, at the Parousia. Like Teilhard's Omega and St. Paul's "mystery" hidden in past ages, Christ is as yet in process of becoming "head" of all creation. The eschatological implication for man is the promise of his own resurrection. The explosion of Christ's Resurrection upon the world has brought about a whole new kind of motive, qualitatively different and unprecedented. It is a wholly new motivation for growth, of the order of functional autonomy. Really to stop and think once of the significance of resurrection for oneself, of its impact on one's thinking, one's values, one's hope of life--this can have tidal effects on the direction and substance of a person's living. For this reason, prayer and contemplation can be highly integrative activities. Such are the stakes of a personal growth in dynamic tension toward the most incredible long-range goal.

In relation to the uniqueness and unity of such propriate devel-

48 Moltmann, Theology, p. 227.
50 Moltmann, Theology, p. 82. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Romans 6 b and 8g.
52 Cf. ibid., pp. 88, 217; Theology, p. 165.
opment, or growing self-identity, it is fitting here to quote the only substantial description Moltmann gives of the man of hope: that person in tension towards maturity, differentiated as to what he is now and what he is "not yet"—as to his present identity and what he is in process of becoming. It will readily be noted how this reflects and integrates that becoming and differentiation depicted by Allport (above p. I, 26 ff and 41ff):

The man who is the recipient of this revelation of God in promise is identified, as what he is—and at the same time differentiated, as what he will be. He comes 'to himself'—but in hope, for he is not yet freed from contradiction and death. He finds the way of life—but hidden in the promised future of Christ that has not yet appeared.

The decision of faith leads one beyond self to place his security in Another, leads one to "ex-ist":

Thus the believer becomes essentially one who hopes. He is still future to 'himself' and is promised to himself. His future depends utterly and entirely on the outcome of the risen Lord's course, for he has staked his future on the future of Christ. Thus he comes into harmony with himself in spe, but into disharmony with himself in re. The man who trusts himself to the promise is of all people one who finds himself a riddle and an open question, one who becomes in his own eyes a homo absconditus. In pursuit of the promise, he finds he is in search of himself and comes to regard himself as an open question addressed to the future of God. Hence the man who hopes is of all people the one who does not stand harmoniously and concentrically in himself, but stands excentrically to himself in the facultas standi extra se coram Deo, as Luther called it. He is ahead of himself in hope in God's promise.

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But this kind of faith is realistic:

The event of promise does not yet bring him to the haven of identity, but involves him in the tensions and differentiations of hope, of mission and of self-emptying. If revelation encounters him as promise, then it does not identify him by disregarding what is negative, but opens him to pain, patience and the 'dreadful power of the negative,' as Hegel has said. It makes him ready to take the pain of love and of self-emptying upon himself in the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead and who quickens the dead. 'Yet it is not the life which abhors death and keeps itself pure of corruption, but the life which endures it and maintains itself in the midst of it, that is the life of the spirit.' 'The power of the spirit is only so great as its outgoing, its depth only so deep as the extent to which in its expending it ventures to spread itself and to lose itself.'

Faith in hope brings ultimate freedom:

Thus the promised identity of man leads into the differentiation of self-emptying. He gains himself by abandoning himself. He finds life by taking death upon him. He attains to freedom by accepting the form of a servant. That is how the truth that points forward to the resurrection of the dead comes to him.57

For, hope leads to responsible service, not to a "privatized" religion:

But if the event of promise in the resurrection identifies man by leading him to the emptying of himself, this experience of self is immediately bound up with a corresponding experience of the world. Man does not gain himself by distinguishing himself from 'the world,' but by emptying himself into it.... Only when the world itself is 'full of all kinds of possibilities' can hope become effective in love... Christian hope is meaningful only when the world can be changed by him in whom this hope hopes, and is thus open to that for which this hope hopes; when it is full of all kinds of possibilities (possible for God) and open to the resurrection of the dead.58

56 Moltmann, Theology, p. 91.
58 Ibid., p. 92.
This striking description of the man of faith seems best summarized by the splendid statement of Jesus, which Moltmann cites as the "strange eschatological principle of life: 'He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it' (Mark 8: 35)."

The long-range project of hope in all of these dimensions is, then, highly integrative of the person. Eschatological faith is personal and personalizing. In theology, hope is part of the virtue of charity; it is love which changes our selfish hopes into a mature hope that is both personal and social. Beyond all psychological resources, it implies the development of all the vital energies of the mature person (in hierarchical organization) towards the Personal and the Infinite. True Christian faith, if it may be said here, never reduced God to an image of the world or an image of man. And final union is never understood as loss in nirvana, pantheistic and de-personalizing. Rather, God as fulness of Personhood, draws all persons to their own fulfilment. Encounter is not assimilation but union.

2. Death: Moment of Propriate Realization

For, between this life and resurrection, one crucial moment a-
waits: death. What do Allport and Moltmann say about this event, unavoidable in each person's life? Death is at once the summary, the disintegration, and the integration of human life.

In death, the stuff of a life is revealed. Death is man's final passage: his individual Exodus and Paschal mystery. It is the "breaking through," the opening upon the ultimate goal. Death is by no means a detached, unrelated event, but a necessary step in the process, the turning point on the continuum of the human being's immortal life. Through growth from parental guidance to propriate motivation and personal decision in faith, the maturing individual gives direction to his life toward the one goal seen to be worth striving for. Death, then, whatever the circumstances, will not detract a person from a really dynamic, hope-filled orientation, but rather liberate one for its fulfillment—lead on by impetus to the target. In the succinct words of one author:

...Death does not in fact crop up by mere chance to contradict the tone of the life we have been leading. Rather, it sums up and brings to completion that life of ours by confirming forever its basic orientation. The things we have cherished and the values that have been dear to us on earth will have shaped our lives and given them an overall direction so that, by and large, they point in one way, aim at one goal, are centred on

63 Moltmann, Theology, p. 131.
one purpose. The man whose life has been reaching towards God will come to make of his death one great and free act of choice that is more decisive and complete than any he has made before.\(^{67}\)

Death is the "vantage point" from which alone the totality of a life can be viewed and its meaning determined.\(^{68}\) Resolute direction in life, therefore, culminates in the right decision in death, "the fulfilment of human capacity for reality, a lasting orientation towards essentials."\(^{69}\)

But for this totality to be revealed, there must be "a disintegration of what cannot be completed... a conclusion of the imperfect, incompletable, and ambiguous."\(^{70}\) In other words, "the new is preceded by the destruction of the old."\(^{71}\) Jesus spoke of the seed that must die for the grain to grow.\(^{72}\) Bloch called death the cracking of the husk to release a core of existence that is beyond the reach of death, but Moltmann criticized this symbol as a dualistic withdrawal from the body and the earth.\(^{73}\)

During life, as Allport repeatedly claimed, the process of maturing is ever incomplete.\(^ {74}\) Man experiences physical inadequacy, reaches only provisional successes, partial knowledge, imperfect love—for only

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\(^{68}\) Moltmann, *Religion*, p. 87.
\(^{69}\) Boros, *We Are Future*, p. 150.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 9.
the Absolute can satisfy. By permitting himself to be "worn out"\textsuperscript{75} by daily events, man allows the Infinite to grow, to take over within him. This is not dualism but a process of becoming, of betterment, a shedding of the limitations, blindness, and dispersions of human nature in favor of its real fulfilment. But there is more to accept than these "passivities and diminishments"\textsuperscript{76} of life: there is death itself. For Christians, life here can only be accepted as "a life unto death"--"death in its radical deadliness"\textsuperscript{77}--because Christian hope is founded on the God who creates out of nothing\textsuperscript{78} and who raises the dead: the "\textit{creatio ex nihilo} and \textit{resurrectio mortuorum} mark the eschatological extremities of the religion of promise."\textsuperscript{79} The only identity maintained is that which hopes in resurrection; then alone can the life that trusts in God "surrender itself to death, to the pain of self-expending and love, can lose itself and be gained precisely in so doing."\textsuperscript{80} Death is the "final enemy"\textsuperscript{81} to be overcome. To hope that God can overcome even death is what Moltmann calls "the passion for the impossible."\textsuperscript{82}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Cf. Teilhard, \textit{Le Milieu Divin}, pp. 74 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., pp. 12, 165, 209.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Moltmann, \textit{Religion}, p. 169; cf. p. 58.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., pp. 119-120, 174; "The Realism of Hope," p. 152, citing 1 Corinthians 15: 26.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., pp. 67, 170; "The Realism of Hope," p. 152.
\end{itemize}
Finally, death makes way for the final human integration. The totalization of a life is to be revealed "in one's historical ability to be integral in the face of death." When the material and the inauthentic dissolve and death seemingly annihilates all, can anything remain, or rather, come forth? In hope, yes: resurrection. "Faith arouses the hope" that man will find "true life with God." Death is that point of convergence beyond which a new life emerges. What was secretly becoming is revealed; integration is finally achieved. Man has learned gradually that the only enduring thing in his life is the selflessness he exercised, which now forms his true reality. This is his only given-ness and his only self-identity; it is also his identification with other, with Christ:

In death, by the total loss of everything external, total interiority is attained. In death alone, therefore, man becomes wholly himself, definitely a person, an absolutely independent center of being. In death man finally becomes adult: free, aware, and unconfined; capable of making a final decision. In this decision he lives the clearest meeting with Christ of his life.

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83 Ibid., p. 89. Cf. the following words of Mother Teresa of Calcutta: "The greatest development of the human person is to die in peace with his God." (Pacific Colosseum, Vancouver, B.C., May 31, 1976, during the U.N. Habitat Conference).


85 Cf. Teilhard, above p. III, 94.


Death as integration of the person is then the moment of ultimate unity.

Beyond space and time, it makes way for resurrection:

Resurrection means existential completeness, direct relation in soul and body with the universe. Corporeality unfolds into personal being. Man posits his own eternity in his final decision. Immortality becomes a total personal event of man as a soul-body unity and therefore as resurrection.89

The following prayer of Teilhard de Chardin eloquently gathers together these thoughts on death as summation, disintegration and unity:

It was a joy to me, O God, in the midst of the struggle, to feel that in developing myself I was increasing the hold that you have upon me... Now... grant that I may willingly consent to this last phase of communion in the course of which I shall possess you by diminishing in you.... Grant that I may understand that it is you (provided only my faith is strong enough) who are painfully parting the fibres of my being in order to penetrate to the very marrow of my substance and bear me away within yourself.

You are the irresistible and vivifying force, O Lord, and because yours in the energy, because, of the two of us, you are infinitely the stronger, it is on you that falls the part of consuming me in the union that should weld us together. Vouchsafe, therefore, something more precious still than the grace for which all the faithful pray. It is not enough that I should die while communicating. Teach me to treat my death as an act of communion.90

Moltmann summarizes as follows man's destiny to death, realization, and immortality: "Hope for a life after death is not alive, but hope against death is."91 And:

Where life is close, death becomes deadly.... And we discover hope... if we hear the promises of a future which stands against frustration, transiency and death. To be

89 Boros, We Are Future, p. 148.
90 Teilhard, Le Milieu Divin, pp. 89-90. Cf. 2 Cor. 4: 16.
91 Moltmann, Religion, pp. 61-62; cf. p. 45.
sure, we can hope for God only in the pain of the open theodicy question. But it does not take more... to make man immortal.92

Christian hope beyond death is integrative because its perspective and goal is "the future of one God,... a unique and unifying future."93

C. Summary and Conclusions of Thesis:
Hope as Agent of Integration (Chapter II)

1. Integrative Qualities of Eschatological Faith

The question at the crux of this thesis may now be re-stated, hopefully in a better light: Are the qualities of propitiatory motivation and of the religious sentiment also those of eschatological faith? In other words, is hope integrative both of personality and of Christian life?

We maintain here that, among other features, eschatological faith, or hope, does have those uniquely integrative qualities: comprehensiveness, dynamic tension, and long-range goals, as described above in chapter two.

In the first place, Allport held that the religious sentiment is comprehensive because it aims for wholeness and tends to synthesize all aspects of one's past and present experience, as well as all that is yet future. With such an all-inclusive task, the mature religious sentiment cannot remain unrelated to any life experience, "relegated to

93 Moltmann, Religion, p. 218; as above p. III, 125 - 126. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Jeremiah 23: 6: "And this is the name he will be called: Yahweh-our-integrity."
a corner of the fantasy life where it provides an escape clause in one's contract with reality."\(^{94}\)

With similar emphasis, it is Moltmann's first concern in his *Theology of Hope* to show that the eschatological dimension of faith is no remote epilogue to Christian theology, dealing with certain presently unrelated "last things." Rather, eschatology *is* the doctrine of Christian hope, the medium of faith and its glow of expectation. "Christianity," he maintains, "is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore, revolutionizing and transforming the present."\(^ {95}\) The eschatological attitude is characteristic and comprehensive "of all Christian proclamation, of every Christian existence and of the whole Church."\(^ {96}\) Far from any stagnant pact "with resignation and with escapism,"\(^ {97}\) hope urges man to engage in a struggle for the improvement of the world. Hope sees in the resurrection of Christ "the future of the very earth on which his Cross stands."\(^ {98}\) Finally, hope is the promise of fulfilment in eternity, and in this promise, is the greatest single unifying influence upon the present. "Faith binds man to Christ; hope opens up his faith to the comprehensive future of Christ."\(^ {99}\)

Secondly, hope is the dynamic forward tension of Christian faith. Allport's religious sentiment was characterized by this tension in two

\(^ {94}\) Allport, *The Individual*, p. 61.
\(^ {96}\) Ibid.
\(^ {97}\) Ibid., p. 21.
\(^ {98}\) Ibid.
ways; first, because the integration of personality is never complete till death; second, because the religious sentiment attains centrality among many interests.

Eschatological hope makes God's people a pilgrim people, spurred onward by the Promise of a totally new, unforeseeable future. Since its very origin, humankind had received words of Promise from the Creator, Promises constantly renewed and eventually elaborated into Covenant. To Moltmann, the God of the Bible is not an eternally present and immutable God, but One who constantly creates the unimagined newness of history (personal, national, universal): Who He Is is manifest in what is becoming. 100 The basis of salvation for Israel was her living memory of a living hope, her trusting reliance upon God's unfailing faithfulness. And Yahweh did come to her in faithfulness and newness, becoming truly Immanuel, 101 becoming Himself incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. In word and deed, and finally in agony and death on a Cross, Jesus called forth not only a renewed people, but an entirely new people—all of human-kind. 102 In the triumph of his Resurrection, Jesus fulfilled the Promise of new life—and proclaimed the new Promise of a "hope against death." 103 This hope is characteristically the dynamic tension of Christian life leading man forward to new life, "not yet" visible and

100 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 285-287; cf., "The Realism of Hope," p. 151: "One learns to understand Him only when one is led by hope."
102 Cf. ibid., pp. 138, 141.
forever incomplete in the present. It is the cor inquietum of man arising from the promissio inquieta of resurrection, an "unrest... burdened in hope because it wants to be free." Thus, through an ongoing dialectic, each individual grows in hope, as humanity as a whole does, from the undifferentiated "innocence of mankind in its beginnings" to the maturity of "the 'integral,' free, personal man," modelled on the obedient and exalted Christ.

Hope is also uniquely central to the whole Christian attitude: firmly based on faith, it is the condition, the inspiration and dynamism of a love which suffers with the unredeemed world and becomes radically engaged in its liberation from sin and misery. Thus, Promise becomes Promissio: it is Mission to the world—it is for God's people the Church, as for each individual mature Christian, an "apostolate of hope," an "apostleship of the new." Christians go forth with "a divine promise in their ears and a restless hope in their hearts."

Thirdly, hope is integrative of Christian life by reason of its one long-range Goal. To Allport, the long-range goal of an integrated person embraces comprehensively not only the present but also the future,
including eternity. As ideal and intention, it has the power to order all thought and action in unity and to orient the whole person in singleness of mind towards one purpose. An existential decision for the sacred and ultimate confers an inner peace amid the uncertainties of earthly existence. In Allport's words, to the person who has decided "what things are sacred and of ultimate value,... nothing else in the world then needs to be taken seriously."\textsuperscript{111}

Christian hope is qualitatively of this type and lineage; but because of the vision glimpsed in God's Promise, hope by far transcends every human long-range goal, both in urgency and in scope!

Man's hopes and longings and desires, once awakened by specific promises, stretch further than any fulfilment that can be conceived or experienced. However limited the promises may be, once we have caught in them a whiff of the future, we remain restless and urgent, seeking and searching beyond all experiences of fulfilment, and the latter leave us an aftertaste of sadness. The "not yet" of expectation surpasses every fulfilment that is already taking place now. Hence every reality in which a fulfilment is already taking place now, becomes the confirmation, exposition and liberation of a greater hope.\textsuperscript{112}

The God of Exodus and the Resurrection is Himself the power of the future and its final Goal.\textsuperscript{113} Jesus "represents and mediates" to us the future of a new creation; his Resurrection is the ground of a new kind of hope\textsuperscript{115} for all men, a hope negating all the negatives of

\textsuperscript{111} Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 103; as above, p. II, 68.
\textsuperscript{112} Moltmann, Theology, pp. 105-106.
\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Moltmann, Religion, pp. 60, 136, 203, 209.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp. 61, 213-218. Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Hebrews 8b.
\textsuperscript{115} Cf. "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," No. 2; "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," No. 5; and "Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity," No. 3; in The Documents of Vatican II.
\textsuperscript{115} Cf. ibid., p. 191.
the present. The Spirit poured forth in Himself the urgency of our hope, the "earnest of the still outstanding future," the active energy that strives against the works of "the flesh," against all the forces of destruction and hopelessness. God has covenanted Himself to bring forth a future of unimaginable joy, beauty and peace. He calls forth men and women to a response in faith: a decision which is wholly risk in hope because it has no precedent in the past, and because it contradicts all human experience. Included in this call is the participation of those who respond to God in the decision-making of the world, and their involvement in bringing about "provolution," -- a transformation of the world in order to hasten the Kingdom.

Where freedom has come near, the chains begin to hurt.... We begin to suffer from the conditions of our world if we begin to love the world. And we begin to love the world if we are able to discover hope for it....

... Revolutionary criticism does not pull the flowers off man's chains so that he will accept his chains, but so that he will throw off his chains and pick the living flower.

Through the vision of Christianity, "religion" becomes "proligion," that is, "the joining of faith in God with hope in the liberation of man on a new earth and under a new heaven."
Christians then should be the first to rejoice, to "laugh and sing and dance as the first to be liberated in creation,"¹²² For, Jesus has broken ground ahead of them and "guides time to his day,"¹²³ the Parousia, and to the complete Lordship of the future of God: "Yahweh, ... a God of promise and of exodus, a God of covenant and of hope, a 'God going before us,' into the future."¹²⁴ Christian hope is not some arbitrary addition to human longing. It assumes man's native, instinctive yearning for some-thing and enlarges it to a great hope for Some-one,¹²⁵ a hope not only in God but for God Himself, in the promised future of His Presence.

To sum up, the kind of integrity to which the hope of Christian faith calls man is not a teleological return to the undifferentiated "original justice" of classical theology, or an apocalyptic change to a nature other than human. It is the integritas of Genesis "still almost exclusively a promise": "what awaits us rather than what we have lost."¹²⁶ This integritas places man "wholly within grace" and changes him personally, inasmuch as he makes a functionally autonomous decision of faith and maintains this orientation, unto the final goal:

Integritas, then, is nothing but the "personalizing," unifying, liberating, whole-making aspect of grace itself. It liberates man from his impulses so that these do not de-

¹²³ Moltmann, Theology, p. 194.
¹²⁴ Moltmann, Religion, p. 136; The Crucified God, p. 256.
¹²⁶ Schoonenberg, "He Emptied Himself," page 59.
velop into "lust"; he is even free from death itself, for
death becomes the entering upon final fulfilment. 127

Eschatological hope, therefore, because of its comprehensiveness, its dynamism, and its long-range Goal, can be a most effective agent of personal integration.

2. Christ: Model of Integration

In concluding these remarks on "Hope as Agent of Integration," it seems imperative to note here what Allport and Moltmann considered to be the ultimate model of mature personhood. Allport saw this in the Supreme Being Himself:

God Himself I may declare to be the supreme expression of personality, a necessary and final value required to explain and to conserve all other values of selfhood. 128

Elsewhere, Allport affirms that in Christ can be found the highest "degree of integrated direction of conduct," 129 the only fully consistent and mature religious sentiment. From this premise, Allport can suggest, then, that "the highest mode of existence for the religious person is commitment to the divine," 130 and that a person's effort to bind himself to the Creator is the "ultimate attempt to enlarge and complete his own personality." 131

Moltmann also abundantly upholds Christ as model, He who was not

127 Schoonenberg, "He Emptied Himself," page 59.
128 Allport, Individual, p. 16.
129 Ibid., p. 64. Cf. above p. II, 62.
only perfectly faithful to God but also the perfect fulfilment of God's Promise to humankind.

It is the Christ event that first gives birth to what can be theologically described as "man," "true man," "humanity."  

...The patience of Christian hope has its basis and model in the patience of Jesus, in His love, in His self-emptying (kenosis).

Christ is the "rebirth" of the Promise, "its liberation and validation," because in his Resurrection and in his future is "the future of what was aforetime promised." In fact, Moltmann emphasizes that "Christian eschatology is at heart Christology in an eschatological perspective": As a result:

It is only in this context... that the question of 'true human nature' arises--the question of what makes man to be true man--and is answered by the disclosure of a way, a promise and a future in which 'the truth' comes to man and he himself is brought into the truth. Communion with Christ, the new being in Christ, proves to be the way for man to become man. In it true human nature emerges, and the still hidden and unfulfilled future of human nature can be sought in it.

But always, for Moltmann, the Christian hope includes "the solidarity of the believer with the whole of creation which, like him, is subjected to vanity," for only thus can the Christian community be "the sacrament of God's hope for the world." In the cosmic Christ,

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132 Moltmann, Theology, p. 142; Religion, p. 60.
134 Moltmann, Theology, pp. 145, 190.
136 Ibid., p. 192; cf. Religion, p. 44.
139 Moltmann, Religion, p. 216.
then, Moltmann envisions both personal and universal fulfilment:

The cosmic ideas of Christian eschatology are therefore not by any means mythological, but reach forward into the open realm of possibilities ahead of all reality, give expression to the 'expectation of the creature' for a *nova creatio*, and provide a prelude for eternal life, peace and the haven of the reconciliation of all things.  

This writer finds that such a theme—Christ the supreme Model of personhood—would needs be elaborated in its own right, possibly with some of the following clues from Scripture. The seminal source here would be the excellent article by P. Schoonenberg, "'He Emptied Himself'—Philippians 2,7," which demonstrates theologically how Christ grew to "personalization" and "integrity" through "utter self-emptying," thereby revealing the Father's love for humankind as "a hope against all hope." St. Paul also suggests this theme: "And we who have been modelled on the earthly man will be modelled on the heavenly man."  

Thus: Christ's psychological and spiritual stance of *kenosis or "self-emptying"* indicated in Hebrews 10: 7; Mark 10: 45; 2 Cor. 8: 9; and Phil. 2: 6-11; Jesus' growth in Nazareth as son of Mary and Joseph "to wisdom, maturity and grace before God and man" (Luke 2: 52) and his Sonship as Word of God the Father,"full of grace and truth" (John 1: 14);

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Jesus' driving concern as the Man-for others for healing and reconciliation, as noted in Luke 4: 18-21 (prophetically the eschatological signs of the arrival of the Kingdom); Jesus' compassion for misery and his sensitivity to friendship, his assurance and authority in proclaiming the Good News of God's love, and his calm self-possession among crowds and enemies; Jesus' own redemptive mission given to his disciples in Matthew 25: 31-46 as criteria and sign of men's entry into his Parousia; Jesus' "perfect love" (John 13: 1) shown by his own acceptance of suffering (Luke 12: 49-50; 22: 15; John 21: 24) before requiring it of others (Mark 8: 34); Christ's fulfilment in his Resurrection and glorification (Acts 2: 23-24), and finally his ultimate self-effacement in sending the Spirit (John 16: 7, 13; 19: 30; Acts 2: 32-33). "Because of his obedience," Jesus became the source of fulness of life for all (Hebrews 5: 9; Col. 2: 9; 3: 4; Isaiah 52:13-53: 12). As "first-born of the dead," Christ can henceforth bring all things to fulfilment and unity (Col. 1: 15-20; 3: 9-11; Eph. 1: 10).143

And so, Jesus Christ is the "Bridegroom" (John 3: 29) of the eternal wedding feast (Luke 22: 18; Rev. 19: 7-9) and the "Prince of Peace" (Eph. 2: 14; Isaiah 9: 6; cf. Acts 3: 15; Micah 5: 4),144 to whom all can aspire in the Spirit: "Maranatha! Come, Lord Jesus, come!" (1 Cor. 16: 22; Rev. 22: 20).

The above suggestions are substantially borne out in the Vatican II document, "The Church Today":

The Church believes that Christ, who died and was raised up for all, can through His Spirit offer man the light and the strength to measure up to his supreme destiny....

She likewise holds that in her most benign Lord and Master can be found the key, the focal point, and the goal of all human history....(No. 10)

The Lord is the goal of human history, the focal point of the longings of history and civilization, the centre of the human race, the joy of every heart, and the answer to all its yearnings....(No. 45) 145

D. Response to the Question

The study of Allport and Moltmann presented in the past four chapters arose from a general and a specific question posed in the Introduction of this thesis: Is there a relationship between personal growth and religious faith? Does the eschatological dimension of Christian faith, that is, hope, provide the long-range goals which the personalist theory of G. W. Allport claims essential to maturity?

In response, it is now possible to state that the eschatological faith of Christianity can effectively lead the person to a psychological and spiritual, fully integrating maturity. Such a faith holds out to humanity Allport's long-range goal, that of personal fulfilment in divine encounter. It provides humanity with Moltmann's hope, that of the assurance of attaining this Goal through the love and faithfulness of God. In fine, eschatological hope is a crucial factor of integration in both human growth and spiritual maturity.

II. Critique of Allport and Moltmann

A. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis has been an attempt to study the relationship between personal growth and religious faith. The personalist theory of Becoming of Gordon W. Allport was considered in chapters one and two: first, from the point of view of the dynamism of appropriate motivation; second, from that of the structure of personality, with special emphasis on the religious sentiment. Chapter three, then examined the new theology of Hope. This theology was first situated in the historical development of eschatology; hope was defined, according to Jurgen Moltmann, as the eschatological dimension of Christian faith. In this chapter, several significant points of contact between personal becoming and Christian hope have been indicated. This last section will offer a brief critique of Allport and Moltmann.

The present thesis does not presume to be an exhaustive study of the question; rather it seems to provoke more questions that it answers. In addition, this thesis has laboured under the difficulty that Moltmann considers the universal man rather than the individual person, as did Allport. Furthermore, where Moltmann does consider the individual at some length (in The Crucified God, Chap. 7: "Ways towards the Psychological Liberation of Man"), it is from a position that is analytical of Freud's psychoanalysis of religious neuroses. Allport, on the other hand, tried to go beyond pathology and the psychology of youth to study the mature experience of religion. However, the goal-oriented becoming implied by these two scholars presents enough similarity to warrant a comparison, with Allport's dynamism of person growth underlying Molt-
mann's dynamism of history. In the end, psychological becoming and
growth in hope are seen to be parallel, or better yet, complementary move­
ments.

B. Gordon W. Allport

Gordon W. Allport created a truly novel approach in psychology
by his efforts to study personal development in terms respecting the
uniqueness of every living being. Two of his books, Becoming, and
The Individual and His Religion, have especially contributed to the
present thesis on the complementarity of psychology and religion.

Critics, however, have noted the most obvious lack in his theory
of a social dimension to personal growth. One does not grow to per­
sonal maturity in a vacuum or on an island. Allport made some attempt
to reply to this with his book Personality and Social Encounter and
an important paper "Traits Revisited." "This oversight," he admitted,
"needs to be repaired through an adequate theory that will relate the
inside and outside systems more accurately." But Allport implied
that even such a larger theory would not invalidate his own, for the
individual will always be free to relate in an unique way to any social
system.

146 Allport, Pattern, 1961, p. 141. Cf. Hall and Lindzey,
147 Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, pp. 293-295.
148 Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, Boston, Beacon
149 Allport, "Traits Revisited," in American Psychologist, 21
(1966) 1-10.
150 Cited by Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 294.
Nonetheless, much remains to be explored in the areas of person-to-person relationships, dialogue, group interaction, family and community living, and collective action towards a common purpose. What, for example, would be the particular qualities of the attempt of a couple to live out together the oneness of their marriage? Or, how do friends influence each other's growth to personhood? What about the growth of physically handicapped or mentally retarded persons to their own fullest potential? It would be highly interesting to pursue the hints Allport gives concerning the therapeutic value of Christian love, when for example he quotes 1 John 4: 7-8;\textsuperscript{151} when he says that "love received and love given comprise the best form of therapy";\textsuperscript{152} or when he makes suggestions concerning the collaboration of clergy and psychiatrists in pastoral-psychotherapeutic teamwork.\textsuperscript{153} All this, in a time when "we are confronted," according to Allport, "with the age-long failure of religion to turn doctrine into practice."\textsuperscript{154} Effective practice will be possible, Allport suggests, if each counsellor is aware of his true role:

\begin{quote}
The antinomy of mystery and problem is reflected in the dual designation of minister and priest. Although there may be no sharp dividing line, is it not meaningful to let the term minister refer to all the countless problem-solving activities that fall to the profession, and the term priest refer to a service that lies beyond problems—to the invocation, adoration, and full acknowledgment of mystery? The average parishioner needs both a minister and a priest. There are minis-
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] Allport, \emph{Individual}, p. 92.
\item[152] Allport, \emph{Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality}, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, p. 33; cf. \emph{Individual}, pp. 90-92, 56.
\item[154] Ibid., p. 93.
\end{footnotes}
tries of scholarship, ministries of prophecy, ministries of social service and counseling. Yet all the while there is, there should be, there must be, a continuing priesthood of presence.155

Further, how would a personalist psychology describe the upper reaches of maturity in those grown wise with age? What is the psychological stance of an individual in collective involvement in local, national, and world problems? Finally, in what way would a personalist psychology describe a human person's encounter with a personal God? These are open questions at the heart of man's search for meaning in a de-personalizing, despairing world. Only in the briefest way does Allport dwell on the love and the joy of mature personhood. But one thing, at least, can be said for Allport which seems lacking in Moltmann, that Allport is concerned about prayer as the expression of ongoing relationship with God.156

In spite of certain definite limitations, Allport must clearly be granted a place of choice among innovative psychologists in this century, as one committed to respect for the uniqueness of every individual.

C. Jurgen Moltmann

Moltmann's theology of hope, like Allport's theory of personal-

ity, made possible whole new perspectives in its field. Certainly, eschatology has risen to its greatest importance in history, thanks in many ways to Moltmann's efforts. However, some practical difficulties must be noted. Several critics, such as M. Douglas Meeks, have obliged Moltmann, as he himself admits in *The Crucified God*, p. 6, "to give fresh thought" to his arguments.

Thus, Moltmann's theory of hope in some sense almost contradicts itself by becoming stagnant and cyclic. Hope is shown to be the reality for the Christian, almost wholly equivalent of future. Whence Moltmann is highly selective of Scripture. God, to him, is power, promise, faithfulness--active in a history of salvation. He is not known for his own nature; He is not a God of love and never the Father revealed by Jesus. There is a lack of relationship between man and God: no mention of encounter in the present moment through prayer and communion or any other sacramentality than the Word. We only relate to Jesus by the Cross, and the present is but "corrupt reality." Love on the part of man is always a suffering love, a "pain of love" which must bear patiently--and impatiently--all the crosses of the present. There is only future, which brings us back full circle to hope, the reality of human existence, the characteristic of Christian life.

Jesus, in Moltmann's theology is very nearly only a pawn, a tragic hero. One never hears the Father say, "This is My beloved Son!"

---

158 Ibid., p. 227.
159 Ibid., p. 338.
The redemption falsely appears to be the result of Jesus' suffering rather than of his love; and the Resurrection is but the proof of God's power and promises instead of the beautiful revelation of the Father's total love. With such a fate for the Father and the Son, even less remains for the Spirit. He is, but for a few scant references, almost totally absent from Moltmann's study. Yet, is not this Pentecost-time-of-waiting properly the Era of the Spirit?  

Furthermore, what new light upon grace could a theology of hope not reveal—no longer just the static possession of "having" divine life within us, but the dynamic becoming of living with the life of Christ. Grace is that interior motivation, that dialogue of Presence which transforms and brings persons to participation in Christ as sons and daughters of God, to the eschatological living now of promised life.

Finally, the Church is assigned her various duties of proclamation and mission; but she is only weakly viewed as community, existentially or experientially, in her essential dimensions of celebration, liturgy, and sacrament. Yet, is not the triune God "Community," and therefore best known and encountered in community?

To sum up, Moltmann, for all his valid objections, departs some-

163 Cf. The Jerusalem Bible, Galatians 2: 20 and 2m.  
what too radically from realized eschatology. The problem here is that eschatology deals with such a distant, paradoxical, apparently unreal and unrealizable goal. Psychology shows that the further ahead the goal is, the more it gathers all of one's being and activity. Yet, the further ahead the goal, the less it is discernible. Everything depends, then, upon how that goal is perceived now. This is a constant problem in Christian life and prayer. The end must somehow be sensed as close now, so that everything is changing here because of it. From a human and scientific standpoint, people tend to try explaining everything, which always clearly reveals human limitation. Faith goes beyond these limitations. The power of faith is to actualize what is in the distant future here and now, to make it present and effective. Without faith, heaven is only a daydream; at best, it may be seen as a goal to be obtained in the future by various means relatively interchangeable (and possibly a good final confession). With faith, heaven is a life to be begun now, shared with all, and continued into an eternal future. Psychologically, one does a particular action because of a specific motivation; but as soon as the motive disappears, so does the action. This is often the case in the religious life of individuals, unless an extremely high degree of personal autonomy and appropriate motivation is achieved. Yet, such an achievement is not so remote, as Allport suggests, when he finds such highly integrative value in the religious

sentiment. What a challenge this throws out to the Christian proclamation of the Good News! The content of faith must be so well presented that it contains its own motivation. In faith, motivation, message and action must be one, integral and integrative. A qualitative change in the life of man really depends on his grasp and acceptance of eschatological reality; the more one understands that, the more it affects qualitatively one's decisions and growth. In the final analysis, faith complements, goes beyond all psychological commitment; the maturity of a person truly finds fulfilment in faith.

It should be noted here that there has been no intention to criticize Moltmann's theory from a standpoint outside its own discipline, but merely to point out some practical difficulties it raises. Moltmann's recently published book, The Crucified God (New York, Harper and Row, 1974) does offer some clarifications on his past work, Theology of Hope, both theologically and psychologically. Neither work is comprehensive but focusses on certain aspects of theology, and so must necessarily be partial. In general, Moltmann gives the latest modern interpretation of Revelation through Hegelian philosophy, which is highly prevalent in the Western world at present. Jurgen Moltmann is certainly a profound and influential writer today and is rightfully acclaimed as one of the great theologians of this century.

D. Conclusion

All in all, Gordon W. Allport and Jurgen Moltmann have provided a serious contribution, and in fact have been leading exponents in their own fields, toward man's better understanding of himself and of his
growth to human and spiritual maturity. Although they start out from different disciplines, psychology and theology, they are seen in this thesis to come to similar conclusions with regard to the integrative effect of long-range goals, and thus to the integrative value of eschatological faith.

At the end of this thesis, however, it will be found that the initial questions have only partially been answered. Ample scope then remains for research and study. Appropriately so, for a hope faithful to its own nature and mission.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I

OUTLINE - CHAPTER I

"G.W. ALLPORT'S THEORY OF LONG-RANGE GOALS"

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Ottawa, Ontario
August, 1970
### OUTLINE - CHAPTER II

"ALLPORT'S RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AS LONG-RANGE GOAL AND AGENT OF INTEGRATION"

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APPENDIX II

ABSTRACT OF "The Integrative Value of Eschatological Faith"*

Gordon W. Allport's theory of long-range goals has invited here a comparison with Christian eschatological goals, under the general question of a possible relationship between personal growth and religious faith.

In the past, psychology tried to understand human behavior by analyzing the various influences in a person's early life and by reviewing childhood and adolescent history. Allport considered this a limited, unrealistic approach because it disregards the person's present intention and future-orientation. In an attempt to determine what constitutes normality rather than pathology, and maturity beyond youth, Allport stressed the uniqueness of personal development. He held that a person matures only as he or she develops functional autonomy and harmonious long-range goals. Such goals unify or integrate all that a person is and does; and the best agent of this integration is the religious sentiment.

Long-range goals of this nature are highly suggestive of Christian eschatology, the study of the final goal of man and the universe. Eschatology, long overlooked as an unrelated doctrine of last things, has recently been re-discovered as the central issue in Christian faith. Jürgen Moltmann, a leading exponent of this trend in theology, describes eschatology as hope for ultimate fulfilment. As such, it permeates and revolutionizes present life, propelling the individual, the Church, and the world forward to a promised resurrection in Christ. In conclusion, eschatological hope is seen to be a crucial factor of integration in both human growth and spiritual maturity.