THE IMPACT OF ILE ROYALE ON NEW ENGLAND

1713 - 1763

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES AND MAPS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTE ON DATES</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. CANSO, 1710-1721: FOCAL POINT OF NEW ENGLAND-ILE ROYALE RIVALRY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PATTERNS OF TRADE, 1720-1744</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE LOUISBOURG EXPEDITION OF 1745</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. VICTORY AT LOUISBOURG: ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND REALIZATIONS, 1745-1748</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE BITTER FRUITS OF VICTORY: MILITARY AND SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE 1745 ASSAULT ON LOUISBOURG</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. IMPERIAL SUBSIDIES AND CURRENCY ADJUSTMENTS</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. NEW ENGLAND'S ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HALIFAX AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOVA SCOTIA 1749-1755</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. NEW ENGLAND-LOUISBOURG TRADE, 1749-1755</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. POLICY AND PROFITS ON THE PERIPHERY: NEW ENGLAND AND LOUISBOURG, 1754-1758</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. THE FRUITS OF VICTORY, 1758-1763</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLES

- Shipping Entries and New England Ship Sales at Louisbourg, 1713-1744
- New England-Louisbourg Shipping, 1758-1763
- Troop Strength at Louisbourg, 1758-1763
TABLES AND GRAPHS

2. Boston–Caribbean Shipping Compared to New England Shipping with Canso, Louisbourg, and Halifax, 1715–1755 viii
3. New England–Canso Shipping, 1715–1744 ......................... 33A
4. Vessels at Louisbourg, by origin, 1713–1744 ...................... 43A
5. New England Ships Sold at Louisbourg, 1713–1744 ........... 43B
6. Petitions and Memorials to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 1746–1750, for compensation fore services related to the capture and occupation of Cape Breton Island ................................................. 149A
8. Troop Strength at Louisbourg, 1758–1763 ...................... 287A

MAPS

1. New England, Nova Scotia and Ile Royale, 1749 .............. v
2. Canso, 1720 ........................................................................ 19A
3. Boston, 1720 ................................................................. 39A
4. Ile Royale, 1751 ............................................................... 229A
ABBREVIATIONS

A.C. - Archives des Colonies
A.D. - Archives Departmentales
A.N. - Archives Nationales
C.C.G.R.I. - Colonial Correspondence of the Governors of Rhode Island
C.O. - Colonial Office
C.S.P., Col. - Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series
M.H.S. - Massachusetts Historical Society
N.Y.C.D. - Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York
P.A.N.S. - Public Archives of Nova Scotia
P.R.O. - Public Record Office
R.C.R.I. - Records of the Colony of Rhode Island
W.O. - War Office
Problems arise in studying the history of the French and British empires in the eighteenth century prior to 1752 because the two empires employed different calendars. The Julian calendar ("Old Style"), used by Britain prior to 1752, lagged eleven days behind the Gregorian calendar ("New Style"), followed by the French. The following correspondence may be made:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Julian (O.S.)</th>
<th>Gregorian (N.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 April 1744</td>
<td>3 May 1744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sake of simplicity, dates are given in this thesis as they were found. Dates from English-speaking primary sources prior to 1752 will therefore be eleven days behind dates from French primary sources.
Introduction

By sheer volume and monetary value, New England's recorded trade with Louisbourg was only occasionally as important to New England as was that region's trade with the West Indies. Nor is it likely that Louisbourg was often in the minds of most New Englanders except in war years. Nevertheless, Louisbourg had a significant impact on New England when both the direct and the indirect effects are considered. In addition to the recorded direct trade there was unrecorded trade between New England fishermen at Canso and their French counterparts there and at nearby Port Toulouse. There the profits made from supplying military establishments in Nova Scotia made necessary at least in part by the French presence at Louisbourg. These establishments ranged from the modest garrisons at Annapolis Royal and Canso, to the large civilian-military settlement later established at Halifax. There were also expeditions against Louisbourg to be supplied, and French coinage from Louisbourg to earned from the Acadians.

Beyond all this, Louisbourg's relationship to New England is significant in that it reveals much about the ways in which members of the New England merchant community dealt with some of their major preoccupations. New England merchants affected (directly or indirectly) by Louisbourg did not always achieve their objectives in attempting to cope with the implications of Louisbourg's existence in the years between its establishment in 1713 and its abrupt decline in 1763, but the efforts they made to deal with what they saw as major concerns reveal much about their values and attitudes, and the effects of those values and attitudes on other segments of the population.

New England's merchant community, although hardly an homogeneous lot, had four collective goals at the end of the seventeenth century.

1. See Table 1 for one index to the scale of the trade carried on by New England with Louisbourg as compared with Boston's trade with the Caribbean. See Table 2 for a rough comparison of the Boston-Caribbean trade on the one hand with, on the other hand, the combined trade New England carried on with Canso, Louisbourg, and Halifax.
Table 1

New England-Louisbourg and Boston-Caribbean Shipping Compared, 1715-1763

--- Boston clearances for the Caribbean. 1
--- New England-Louisbourg shipping. 2


2. Based on Boston Evening Post; Correspondance generale, ile Royale, series CLlB; New Hampshire Naval Office Lists, Colonial Office 5/967,
Table 2

Boston-Caribbean Shipping compared to New England Shipping with Canso, Louisbourg, and Halifax, 1715-1755

----- Boston-Caribbean shipping.

----- New England shipping to Canso, Louisbourg and Halifax.
These were: "to maintain connections with highly placed individuals in England; to dominate the colonial councils; to control the English functionaries in the colonial service; and to find a solution of the money problems which had been created by the enforcement of the navigation laws and the imbalance of trade." Many of the same problems which bedeviled New England's merchants at the end of the seventeenth century persisted in the period 1713-1763, and therefore the goals of the merchant community remained much the same.

The extent to which Louisbourg affected attempts by New England merchants to grapple with their basic problems varied from time to time, and from colony to colony within New England. Nevertheless, it is clear that within the first decade of Louisbourg's establishment, the French presence on Cape Breton Island had important implications for segments of the New England merchant community. As the French sought to develop Cape Breton Island to compensate for the loss of Placentia under the Treaty of Utrecht, New England merchants attempted to capitalize on opportunities to trade with the French, and New England fishermen attempted to capitalize on Britain's acquisition of Nova Scotia to develop the fishing bases previously denied them by the French. Conflicts over territory arose at Canso, where both French and New Englander fished and traded. Finally, in 1718, the Massachusetts government, at the behest of fishermen and merchants of that colony who had begun to find some aspects of contact with the French at Canso troublesome, launched an attack on the French at Canso, and succeeded in driving them out.3

Massachusetts' action at Canso, authorized by a Governor from England, suggests that the merchant community dominated the colony's government (in relation to this specific issue, at least), and that it had influential connections with highly placed individuals in Britain.

2. B. Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (New York, 1964), 189. One might question the extent to which the navigation laws were enforced in the American colonies prior to 1763, as O.M. Dickerson has so capably done in The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1951), but there is little doubt that New England laboured under a serious imbalance of payments with Britain.
Governor Samuel Shute, often at odds with his colonial advisers on other issues, such as currency problems, not only agreed that action at Canso was necessary and sent a vessel there to resolve the problem, he also backed the colonists in their subsequent campaign to convince the British government of the wisdom of the action - an act of aggression initiated in the face of an entente between Britain and France. Moreover, the effort succeeded. The British government accepted Massachusetts' reasons for having risked upsetting the entente. In effect, then, an examination of the 1718 Canso incident and its aftermath suggests that British imperial policy was, in some instances, being shaped on the periphery of the empire rather than at its centre. Moreover, it was the merchant community in Massachusetts which played the leading role in this development, stimulated by an apprehended need to protect its Nova Scotian interests from encroachment by Louisbourg.

Once they had asserted their claim to jurisdiction over the Canso area, New Englanders could turn their attention to the Canso fishery and to trade with Louisbourg. Having established the parameters of their interests, the New Englanders then had little difficulty in establishing a degree of peaceful co-existence with the French, whereby New England merchants provided the French with ships, building materials and provisions in exchange for manufactured goods from France and products from the French West Indies. Of the four New England colonies then in existence (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut), Massachusetts and New Hampshire dominated the actual exchange of goods. Connecticut's maritime trade was largely coastal in nature prior to the

3. The incident has been described by W.A.B. Douglas "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy 1713-1766" (Queen's U. Ph.D. thesis, 1973), but Douglas used few if any French sources and did not consider the implications of the episode to any great extent.

4. The formulation of policy on the periphery of the British empire rather than at the centre has been identified in the case of India in the latter half of the eighteenth century (see Peter J. Marshall, Problems of Empire, Britain and India 1757-1813, London, 1968), but little attention has been focused on the New England precedent until now.
War of the Austrian Succession, and Rhode Island mariners tended to frequent West Indian waters more than North Atlantic waters, either from preference or as a reflection of the strength of Massachusetts' maritime interests.⁵

In any event, although Rhode Island and Connecticut vessels rarely ventured to either Canso or Louisbourg prior to 1745, it cannot be assumed that the two southern New England colonies did not benefit from trade with Louisbourg. Rhode Island and Connecticut may not have had the timber resources which existed in Maine and New Hampshire in order to sustain a trade in forestry products on the same scale as that supported by the northern colonies, but southern New England did have abundant supplies of foodstuffs. Connecticut sold livestock and produce, tar and pitch in Boston,⁶ and quantities of these goods undoubtedly found their way to Louisbourg before 1745, through Boston and possibly Halifax merchants.⁷

Although the volume of New England's trade with Louisbourg, and the value, may not have been great, throughout the whole period in question, the trade was of sufficient interest to attract a number of the leading merchants of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. They thereby earned funds with which to reduce New England's trade deficit with Britain, and also obtained goods forbidden them or made increasingly costly under the provision of the Navigation Acts. Thus it was the Pepperrell family maintained a fishing establishment at Canso, and trading links with Louisbourg from the early 1720's until at least the

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⁷. An analysis of Louisbourg port records for 1737, 1742 and 1743 indicate that approximately 40% of the New England vessels at Louisbourg in those years carried beef or pork as part of their cargo. Also, from 1752 to 1754, large quantities of Connecticut beef and pork reached Joshua Mauger in Halifax, and he and his friends traded with Louisbourg, so there is ample evidence to suggest that Connecticut products did reach Louisbourg, although indirectly.
mid-1730's. For the Pepperrells, Louisbourg became a means of entry into the French West Indian trade, as Louisbourg became the entrepot which some French officials had (as early as 1707) anticipated it might become. Insufficient information has survived to permit an estimate of the monetary value of the Pepperrells' trade with Louisbourg, but the Pepperrells insisted on trading at Canso and with the French for more than a decade in the face of related losses of vessels and deaths of relatives and employees.

New Englanders experienced little opposition at Louisbourg to their trading ventures. Although Louisbourg always received more of its supplies from other sources than from New England for most of the years between 1713 and 1745, there were times when circumstances made trade with New England not only desirable but also essential, despite efforts by metropolitan French authorities to curb or occasionally to eliminate such trade. In 1714, French vessels attempting to reach a starving settlement at Louisbourg were delayed in leaving France, and were then trapped in icefields off Cape Breton Island. Even when they reached Louisbourg, the supplies they carried were inadequate, and New Englanders found themselves and their cargoes welcome. Thus New Englanders provided Louisbourg with supplies in times of need. They also provided the French with goods at lower prices than could merchants from France, in some instances, and were therefore able to secure a constantly increasing proportion of Louisbourg's total trade.9

8. Byron Fairchild, in Messrs. William Pepperrell: Merchants at Piscataqua (Ithaca, 1954), refers briefly to the Pepperrell establishment at Canso and acknowledges their links with Louisbourg, but makes no use of some important Pepperrell papers in the New England Historical and Genealogical Society, Boston, and consequently suggests, somewhat misleadingly, that the Pepperrells began to curtail their activities at Louisbourg and Newfoundland by the mid-1720's.

9. Aspects of New England-Louisbourg trade have been analysed by A. H. Clark, "New England's Role in the Under-Development of Cape Breton Island During the French Regime," Canadian Geographer, I, 1965, 1-12. Both studies are useful, but neither seriously considers who the New England merchants were who traded with Louisbourg, nor do they consider their activities in the context of the broader aims of the New England merchant community generally. Clark has also analysed aspects of New England's trade with Louisbourg in Acadia, the Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1968). Clark carries his research farther than did his mentor, Innis, and provides the reader with much useful information, but his focus was on Acadia and the impact on New England of that region's trade with Louisbourg was of peripheral interest to him.
British authorities in New England also tried to curb trade with Louisbourg from time to time but were unable to thwart the merchants or the colonial assemblies which the merchants sometimes dominated. When Governor Nicholson of Nova Scotia complained in 1714 about New England trade with Louisbourg, the Massachusetts Council responded by investigating three French officers from Louisbourg but decided that the presence of the French in Boston did not threaten either British or New England interests. In 1715 the Council proclaimed a ban on trade with the French at Cape Breton and elsewhere, but at the same time stated that the proclamation was to be in effect only "until His Majesty's Pleasure be known therein." The Council also advised customs collectors in Massachusetts to seek out vessels trading with the French at Louisbourg and at other French colonies. Customs officials, however, acknowledged that they did not have the means to enforce trade regulations.

War in the 1740's interrupted trade with Louisbourg, but it also provided all the New England colonies with a new opportunity to profit from Louisbourg's existence, an opportunity which proved much more profitable and at the same time more costly than that which had existed in peacetime. At the start of the War of the Austrian Succession, the French authorities at Louisbourg took the initiative and attacked Canso and then Annapolis Royal, then capital of Nova Scotia. They also unleashed a privateering attack against New England shipping. New England responded in kind, and probably gained the upper hand at sea by the end of 1744. At this point, a number of individuals in Massachusetts and New Hampshire began to agitate for an assault on Louisbourg itself. In part, these individuals may have feared for the security of New England's frontiers, but there are compelling reasons to suggest that they also hoped to secure profitable government appointments, lucrative contracts, and possibly a monopoly of the fisheries which New England had previously had to share with the French. Anyone with first-hand information about Louisbourg must have realized that the French capacity to wage war from that centre was rather short-lived and limited. The members of the Canso garrison who had been imprisoned at Louisbourg knew how short of supplies the French were. As the number

10. Massachusetts Council Minutes, 3 January 1714/15, PRO, C.O. 5/792, f.33
of ships reaching Louisbourg from France declined, all the New Englanders had to do was to cease trading with Louisbourg, counter its privateering and cut its links with the Acadians to starve the city into submission.

Alternatively, the New Englanders could strike quickly with an expedition to take Louisbourg by force. This possibility was much more attractive than a war of attrition, in that there would be substantial fortunes to be made for those supplying the expedition, and rewards for those leading and manning the expedition. William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts at the time, and a past-master of patronage, undoubtedly recognized this, and when the Massachusetts House of Representatives agreed to an expedition at the beginning of 1745, Shirley quickly began urging the other New England colonies to co-operate with Massachusetts to defend Nova Scotia and to attack Louisbourg.¹¹

In agreeing to co-operate against the French, the New England colonies embarked on a course of action which did indeed prove profitable for at least some merchants, and which had considerable implications for the goals of the merchant community. Enormous sums were spent, by colonial standards, in the campaign against Louisbourg and during the subsequent occupation. The Pepperrell interests traded actively at Louisbourg, and William Pepperrell received valuable honours for leading the New England forces. Charles Apthorp and Thomas Hancock emerged at the end of the war as the two wealthiest men in Massachusetts, in large part as a result of the government contracts they had at Louisbourg.¹²

¹². Barry M. Moody, in "Paul Mascarene, William Shirley and the Defence of Nova Scotia, 1744-1748" (Queen's University, M.A. thesis, 1969), recognized that war would mean profitable military contracts for New England merchants. He also suggests that Shirley regarded an attack on Louisbourg as a means of relieving French pressure on Nova Scotia, and implies that Shirley regarded Nova Scotia as more important than Louisbourg. Nevertheless, in calling on other New England governments to aid Nova Scotia in 1746, Shirley argued that the aid was necessary in order to ensure that Cape Breton Island did not revert to French control.

¹³. W. T. Baxter, The House of Hancock, Business in Boston 1724-1775 (New York, 1965), capably chronicles Hancock's rise to wealth, but does not concern himself to any great extent with the struggle Hancock waged with Apthorp and Pepperrell interests for the Louisbourg contracts.
Many of the average New Englanders who went to Louisbourg as troops also sought economic gain, although religious motives and a thirst for adventure undoubtedly motivated some participants. Thus, the ordinary soldier who participated in the expedition had similar aspirations to those of the prominent merchants. What happened to the hopes of these men is an important aspect of Louisbourg's effect on New England. Many men died at Louisbourg in the winter of 1745-46. Survivors, and men who had stayed at home during the expedition itself, subsequently found employment supplying and defending Louisbourg. Then, when Britain returned Louisbourg to France in 1749, there was an opportunity to trade with the French, on a large scale, as they rebuilt Louisbourg. There were also opportunities for trade and employment at Halifax, as Britain, in part at the urging of New Englanders and their representatives, funded and organized the establishment of that city.14

Another aftermath of the Louisbourg expedition was stabilization of the currencies of the New England colonies. The inflation which had run rampant in the mid-1740's pleased debtors, but the more important merchants, who found it increasingly difficult to do business, opposed the inflation, as did those on fixed incomes, who found survival a problem. The money Britain granted the colonies as reimbursement of their Louisbourg costs proved an ideal means to stabilize the currency. It was several years, however, after the 1745 expedition, before the New England colonies secured the compensation, and then only after pains-taking negotiations by the colonies' agents in England, and after lengthy debate and discussions in the colonies themselves.15

14. Winthrop P. Bell, The "Foreign Protestants" and the Settlement of Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1961), 106, noted that within a year of the establishment of Halifax some 1,000 settlers had arrived from the other American colonies, and were reportedly "the best of settlers". Bell did not, however, analyse the role the New Englanders played in the government and trade of Nova Scotia.

15. The little which has been published on this subject fails to place it in the context of Louisbourg. There is, however, considerable untapped primary material.
When war clouds gathered once more in the mid-1750's, New England merchants reaped further benefits from the existence of Louisbourg. Men such as Thomas Hancock and William Shirley complained vigourously of the French threat to the English colonies, and then they and their followers took advantage of the British initiatives in North America by securing lucrative government contracts. John Erving, William Shirley's son-in-law, shared in the government business generated by the assault on Fort Beausejour in 1755, and he and Thomas Hancock and Charles Apthorp all benefitted from the subsequent expulsion of the Acadians. By 1758, with the build-up of forces at Halifax in preparation for the assault on Louisbourg, there was a considerable demand for provisions at Halifax, and then, when Louisbourg was captured, it had to be garrisoned and provisioned. Supplies flowed to Halifax and Louisbourg from all the New England colonies in support of Louisbourg operations, from 1755, when the British blockaded Louisbourg, until most British and colonial forces were withdrawn at the end of the Seven Years War in 1763.

Throughout the fifty year period from Louisbourg's establishment in 1713 until it ceased to be significant in 1763, New England was affected by Louisbourg. The extent to which it was affected varied considerably from time to time, and on occasion affected large proportions of the population, as when their interests dictated expeditions and subsequent occupations of Louisbourg.

**Methodology**

In discussing how he went about the research for *The Saxon and Norman Kings* (London, 1963), Christopher Brooke suggested that "The further back we go from the modern world into the Middle Ages, the less material the historian has to work on. If a man wishes to study human society at work in detail, or to learn how to select the significant details from a mass of information, he will do better to study very recent history." In some respects, Brooke's comments are applicable to eighteenth century North America. A host of problems confront the student of eighteenth century North American social and economic history. In the period in question both French and English merchants and sea-captains were adept at circumventing trade regulations imposed on the
colonies by metropolitan authorities, thereby making it very awkward to compute the volumes of certain exports and imports or to reconstruct faultless shipping statistics. English colonial sea-captains consistently misled customs officials about the tonnage of their vessels in order to reduce port charges. Colonial currencies fluctuated considerably, particularly in the 1740's in New England, making it difficult to measure the value of goods and labour. Inadequate medical records for Louisbourg, 1745-1749, make it difficult to assess the relative impacts of disease and bad diet on the death rate among New England troops.

Clearly, the task is not easy - but it is not impossible. Recent demographic studies, such as Kenneth Lockridge's A New England Town, The First One Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 have considerably revised twentieth century ideas about colonial New England. Colonial economic history has so far not received the same attention, although studies such as Byron Fairchild's The Messers William Pepperrell Merchants of Piscataqua, and W. T. Baxter's, The House of Hancock have pushed back the frontiers of knowledge. Some more recent studies by Bruce C. Daniels, such as "Defining Economic Classes in Colonial New Hampshire, 1700-1776," Historical New Hampshire, volume 28: 53-62, are helpful in providing the outline of a quantitative framework within which to study colonial economic history.

Approaches devised in one context may be modified and applied to an analysis of surviving records of the interchange between Louisbourg and New England. French authorities at Louisbourg were fastidious about recording the number of ships visiting Louisbourg, their tonnage, and cargoes. The records have not survived for every year, but enough still exist that, taken with New England records and merchants' accounts, they do reveal a great deal about patterns of trade. By combing through New England's newspapers, shipping records, and the papers of New England merchants it is possible to determine who was trading with Louisbourg at certain times, and how the trade of individuals fitted into the general pattern of New England's maritime trade. It is also possible to comment on the merchants' attitudes towards the French, and more importantly, on the merchants' general philosophy and their attitudes towards their place in society.
Another dimension of Louisbourg's impact on New England emerges from looking at the records of the British and colonial governments. These records range from the official correspondence of governors of the colonies and the colonies' agents in England to proceedings of the colonial legislatures. These sources permit an assessment of the merchants' relationship to their colonial governments and governors in the context of Louisbourg. They reflect the intensity of the campaigns for an expedition against Louisbourg in 1745, and afterwards the struggle for reimbursement. Petitions to the House of Representatives of Massachusetts reveal the sufferings of wounded and ill survivors of the expedition and the subsequent occupation. The records of these petitions are comprehensive enough to provide an idea of the time legislators had to devote to them, and to provide an idea of the extent of inflation in the war period.

There are, therefore, numerous sources on which to base an evaluation of Louisbourg's impact on New England in the 1713-1763 period. Various secondary sources deal with aspects of the subject, but none have exhausted the available primary sources or looked at the subject in terms of the effect Louisbourg had on the merchant community of New England. The subject can be grasped only by sifting through primary sources such as the thirty-nine volumes of official correspondence between Louisbourg and France. In addition, careful attention must be paid to the letter books, ledgers, and accounts of New England and Nova Scotia merchants such as the Pepperrells, Peter Faneuil, Thomas Hancock, and Joshua Mauger. Nor can one overlook sources such as the Suffolk County (Massachusetts) court records, and various Nova Scotia records.

What the nature of the data permits is a wedding of quantitative and qualitative approaches so that one supports the other. The observations made possible by quantitative analysis are useful in supporting or refuting the conclusions of qualitative research, and vice versa. Thus, the correspondence of New England merchants suggests that some merchants regarded trade with Louisbourg as valuable, and an analysis of the scale, volume, and value of the trade itself can place the trade in a comparative framework which bears out what is suggested in merchants' correspondence. Both methods have their merits, and their defects, and
both demand the historian's attention. At the same time it is clear that no single method or combination of methods is infallible. The past can be seen and understood only in part, and the historian "is a humbler and a wiser man when he realizes that this is the only way that he can see or understand."\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} George Wilson, "Wider Horizons," \textit{Canadian Historical Association Annual Report}, 1951, p. 11.
Chapter 1

Canso, 1710-1721: Focal Point of New England - Ile Royale Rivalry

In 1710 the capture of Port Royal by a combined British-New England expedition marked the culmination of some seventy years of sporadic intervention by New England in the affairs of Acadia. During that period Acadia had been in New England's possession twice and had been attacked by New Englanders on numerous occasions. It would not change hands again after the Treaty of Utrecht confirmed Britain's possession of the colony in 1713. For New Englanders, possession of the colony held out the promise of increased trade with the Acadians, with the garrison at Annapolis Royal, and the exploitation of the colony's forests and fisheries. For the French, loss of Acadia and restrictions on their activities in Newfoundland dictated the development of Cape Breton Island. With the landing of French officials and troops on Cape Breton in 1713, and of fishermen and their families in 1714, France inadvertently opened up new markets for New England foodstuffs and building materials. At the same time, the French establishment meant competition for New Englanders for fishing grounds and represented a threat to hopes for the development of Nova Scotia, as the French maintained their influence over the Indian inhabitants of the colony.

There was considerable indecision on the part of New Englanders as to how to deal with the problems presented by French development of Cape Breton. It soon became clear that the opportunities for trade in Acadia would be limited, and settlement by New Englanders in the first decade after 1710 would be negligible. Annapolis Royal was to prove little more than a symbol of British authority. The Acadians would be left largely to their own devices, and relations among the officers at Annapolis Royal would degenerate into petty squabbling. The only place in Nova Scotia where New Englanders would expand their economic investment and extend their sway to any great extent was Canso. Here expansion of the fisheries became a reality. Canso's
proximity to Cape Breton also facilitated trade with the French. But Canso's closeness to Cape Breton also posed problems for New England as it led to clashes with the French over fishing rights and even the possession of the islands at Canso.

It took a decade for the New Englanders to resolve the problem of dealing with the French. For those New Englanders who had been fighting the French for some twenty years it was difficult to accept them as neighbours and to co-exist with them. Other New Englanders had traded with the French even during the warfare of the previous two decades and had no qualms about trading with them even when such traffic was banned by New England governments. The problem was to resolve the conflict between these two conflicting attitudes, and to protect the fisheries. The solution was essentially pragmatic. The unfolding of the solution can best be understood in terms of the growing friction at Canso between French and New Englander. This friction erupted into violence in 1718 and 1719, and subsided only in the 1720's. Here the New England interests made their stand. There were few calls, if any, by New Englanders for the extermination of the French at Cape Breton, but there was an insistence that the French observe New England's interests in the Canso area.

The decade began with great hope in New England, where news of Port Royal's surrender arrived on 1 October 1710. Massachusetts and New Hampshire proclaimed a day of public thanksgiving. The celebration was called for because of the good harvests that year and the victories in Europe, but more especially because of the victory in Acadia, the delivering up of the "stronghold into the hands of Her Majesty's Forces, with so little effusion of blood."¹ The Governor, Council, and Representatives of New Hampshire addressed a vote of thanks to the Queen for

British assistance in the taking of the French capital, "The great pest and trouble" of New England's trade and shipping. Even the Rhode Island government, still complaining of the expense of its share in the expedition, admitted that French privateers had not troubled the colony that summer.

But before long it became obvious to New Englanders that the conquest of Port Royal was a Pyrrhic victory. Individuals such as Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts had foreseen that the conquest would not be enough, because Canada would remain the "last refuge" of the French and their Indian allies. With the miscarriage of the Walker Expedition against Canada in 1711 New England undoubtedly expected a continuation of the raids such as those which had occurred in the spring of 1711 when French and Indian forces struck at eight New England settlements. That Acadia would also continue to be a thorn in the side of New England was less expected, yet the situation there was extremely unsettled. Samuel Vetch, then commander of the garrison at Annapolis Royal, as the English had quickly renamed Port Royal, reported in January 1711 that the Acadians were "still in a ferment" and kept the Indians at war, so that they "threatened to dispossess us of the fort" several times before spring. So precarious was the position of the garrison in 1711 that in June thirty men of a seventy-man contingent were killed while on a wood-cutting expedition only about twelve miles from the fort.

2. Address of the Governor, Council, and Representatives of New Hampshire to the Queen, 23 October 1710, C.S.P., Col., vol. 25, #491xiv.
3. Deputy Governor Cranston to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 15 November 1710, ibid., #490.
4. Governor Joseph Dudley to (Lord Dartmouth?), 22 May 1711, ibid., #850.
5. T. Hutchinson, History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), II, 149.
7. Vetch to Dudley or Nicholson, Annapolis Royal, 24 June 1711, PANS, RG 1 Vol. 8.
In desperation Vetch tried to assert control by such means as removing a local priest to Boston for a year and making threats against the livestock of the Acadian settlers. Indians continued to menace the garrison well into 1712. To counter the Micmacs the Nova Scotia authorities employed a company of Mohawk Indians from New York. Vetch recorded that "Major (John) Livingston's Company of Indians is of wonderful use here and better than three times their number of white men." While seeking aid for his garrison and fending off criticism from fellow officers, Vetch managed to find time for personal business activities. He may have engaged in trading ventures at Annapolis with one of his officers, Sir Charles Hobby, and John Adams of Boston. He also profited from speculation in clothing left over from the Canada Expedition of 1711. Judging from the gifts he made to his wife for spending the winter of 1712-13 with him in Nova Scotia he apparently enjoyed "unaccustomed opulence." Vetch probably would have had difficulty in maintaining amicable relations with his fellow officers regardless of his business operations. Bickering among the officers of outposts was a common feature of eighteenth century colonial life, and Annapolis Royal was no exception to the rule. Vetch was not long in developing a dislike for George Vane, assigned to Annapolis Royal as engineer after participating in the Canada Expedition. In turn, Vane denounced Vetch for being a good governor "for his own profit". Vane complained that Vetch had "raised excessive contributions, and committed aboundance (sic) of extortions, using the people more like slaves than anything else."

9. Vetch to Lord Dartmouth, Annapolis Royal, 24 June 1712, PANS, RG 1, Vol. 8, #41.
10. Brebner, pp. 59, 60. This does not necessarily indicate that Vetch indulged in conduct unacceptable by contemporary standards. All that can be said with certainty is that positions such as those which Vetch held provided their holders with opportunities for personal gain and that Vetch does not seem to have ignored these opportunities.
Nor did Vane maintain friendly relations with other officers. Lawrence Armstrong was so provoked by Vane that once in 1712 "not being able longer to bear it broke a large Glass decanter full of wine upon his head and had very near sent him to the other world." By 1712 the situation at Annapolis Royal had thus resolved itself into "a pattern of semi-poverty, continuing debt and petty quarrels that was to prevail for thirty years."

As Annapolis Royal settled into decades of bickering, the government of France laid plans for salvaging the scraps of territory left to it on the Atlantic coast of North America under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. Forced to evacuate the mainland of Nova Scotia and to abandon the military and fishing base at Placentia, France turned to Cape Breton Island as a new base. It was not the first time that Cape Breton had been the focal point of proposed and attempted development. Richard and Nicholas Denys had fishing interests along the Cape Breton coast as early as the 1630's.

Denys' establishment was probably more or less forgotten in 1706 when Antoine-Denis Raudot, then intendent of New France, submitted a memoir on Cape Breton to the Minister of Marine. The minister, commenting on the subject in June 1707, suggested that no development could take place before the end of the war. But he also stated that he approved of the plan, on the whole, and that he wanted Raudot to look into the matter more closely. Raudot responded in 1708 with an elaboration of his proposals of 1706. The gist of the plan was to erect on Cape Breton a market city to consume the produce of Canada.

12. Vetch to (the Earl of Dartmouth?), 20 November 1712, Sloane Mss. 3607, f.25.
This would revive the stagnant economy of Canada. Moreover, the development of Cape Breton could also consolidate trade between France, New France, and the French West Indies. It would enable the French to capture some of New England's trade with Spain and the Spanish colonies in America. By utilizing Cape Breton as a fishing base France might even force England out of the Newfoundland fishery and thereby weaken her navy and her shipping industry. The ideas intrigued officials in France, but the venture was considered impossible during wartime. Moreover, the Minister of Marine rejected Raudot's contention that the state should undertake the venture.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1713, with the beginning of the evacuation of Placentia, Raudot's proposals took a step towards realization. In the spring of 1713 the French government ordered the 270 ton ship \textit{Semslack}, to proceed to Placentia with some officers, servants and soldiers. At Placentia more officials and soldiers, and some women and children, embarked on 23 July for Cape Breton. A total of 116 men, ten women, and twenty-three children were landed at Havre a l'Anglois, which was renamed Louisbourg.\textsuperscript{18} On 2 September 1713, Joseph St. Ovide de Brouillon took possession of Cape Breton for France. He and his fellow officers did not find the island heavily populated. A survey of the island revealed only one French inhabitant other than the contingent from France and Placentia, and twenty-five to thirty Indian families.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Pontchartrain to Raudot, Jr., 6 July 1709, C11G, Vol. 4, f. 183.
\item \textsuperscript{18} AC, B, Vol. 35, f230.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Declaration of Ovide et. al., 9 September 1713, AC, F3, Vol. 50, f.8. Although European fishermen had frequented Cape Breton waters for perhaps 300 years by 1713, they were not active in the area to any extent in the years just prior to 1713. Fishing conditions may have been less favourable around Cape Breton at the time than they were off the coasts of Newfoundland and the Gaspe. Moreover, the cod apparently did not stay on the Cape Breton coast all year round. C. de La Morandière, \textit{Histoire de la Pêche...} (Paris, 1962), II, 640.
\end{itemize}
In their first winter at Louisbourg the initial group of about 149 inhabitants did not fare too well. Some individuals suffered from scurvy. Some of the cattle had to be slaughtered as early as December, and only two of the original twenty-one cattle survived until the spring of 1714. At that time there was no way of foreseeing that Louisbourg would become the main settlement on the island. Indeed, a memoir of 1713 painted a very gloomy picture of Louisbourg. The area was described as rocky, and lacking in decent wood and building stone. It was handy to fishing grounds and useful as a port of call, but Port Dauphin, to the northwest, had plentiful sources of wood, and was easier to fortify. But the beaches at Port Dauphin, surrounded by high hills, were regarded as inferior for drying fish to those at and near Louisbourg. Moreover, the fishing grounds were considerably closer to Louisbourg than to Port Dauphin.

Despite Louisbourg's disadvantages, more settlers arrived there in 1714 as the French completed the evacuation of Placentia. By January 1715 the French population of the island was about 720, including military and civil officers but not including unmarried soldiers. Most of the 720 people were from Placentia. Among them were 300 fishermen, which explains in part why Louisbourg quickly became the population centre of the island and never surrendered that position during the French regime.

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22. McLennan, Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall (Sydney, 1957), p. 20; IR.G. 466.
23. Louisbourg's superior attractions as a fishing centre made it more attractive to settlers than other centres even though 1715 officials in France directed officials at Cape Breton to make Port Dauphin their headquarters. Minister to Costebelle and Soubras, 17 March 1715, AC, F3, Vol. 50, f.28. In 1717 Louisbourg was made the capital of the island from then until the end of the French regime it remained the administrative centre of the island.
Even with its inauspicious beginnings, Louisbourg soon attracted the attention of merchants and officials in Nova Scotia and New England. Samuel Vetch expressed strong misgivings to the Board of Trade in December 1713 about what he regarded as the French design for the island. After giving an account of the alleged French plans, Vetch declared that it was for the Board "to judge how far this will affect the British interest and trade in those parts." Lest the Board fail to realize the full import of French activity, Vetch warned that all money formerly devoted to Acadia and Newfoundland would now be applied to Cape Breton, with a considerable augmentation, and that 600 regular troops were to go to three forts which Vetch believed were to be erected. Vetch was confident of the accuracy of his information, because it came from a letter from France to "Golino, a missionary at Cape Sables and Cape Breton," and from a conversation Vetch had with the missionary.25

Concern was also voiced to the Board by Archibald Cumings at what he believed to be the French plans for the island. Cumings, a Newfoundland merchant and customs agent, wrote from Boston just before Vetch did, suggesting that French efforts to settle and fortify Cape Breton indicated that the French intended "a vast trade there", and in case of war would pose a threat to both New England's fishery and her trade. As well, French influence over the Indians "on that Island and the Continent adjoyning (sic) might threaten our remotest settlements."26

Such pronouncements were somewhat misplaced at that time. It is true that Raudot had proposed the development of Cape Breton as a major trading centre, but the correspondence of French officials suggests

24. Vetch was probably referring to Louisbourg, Port Dauphin, and Port Toulouse, the present-day St. Peters.
25. Vetch to the Lords of Trade, Boston, 12 December 1713, C.O. 217/1, f.56.
that French authorities did not initially intend Cape Breton as much more than a fishing centre, a replacement for Placentia. As the minister stated in a letter to the Abbe Gaulin, the King had retained the right to fish on the coasts of Newfoundland, but the difference between "permanent fishing and mere sufferance" led him to create a new establishment at Cape Breton. The island was also meant to be a centre of Indian settlement, as the Minister of Marine felt that it was absolutely necessary that the Indians of Acadia remain under French jurisdiction. Had the Indians made the move (few did so before 1723), the English authorities in Nova Scotia might have experienced less difficulty with them than they did. By remaining in Nova Scotia the Indians retained greater freedom of action than if they had moved to Cape Breton, where hunting was not as good, and where they would therefore have been more dependent on the French for provisions. Although the French authorities were undoubtedly pleased that Indian hostilities towards the New Englanders prevented the latter from settling in Nova Scotia in any number before 1749, there were also times when the Indians acted on their own, and threatened to disrupt the accord between France and England. In 1715 the Micmacs of Nova Scotia would become very belligerent toward the English, especially New England fishermen, whose ships they would begin seizing. The French authorities at Cape Breton did not participate in any way. 

27. Pontchartrain to D'Artaguette, 6 March 1713, AC, F3, Vol. 50, f.3.
28. This was probably the Golino referred to by Vetch. He had come to Acadia in 1698 as a missionary to the Abenakis and Micmacs. Acting on orders from Pontchartrain he had his Indian charges harass the English from 1710 to 1713. D. Lee, "A. Gaulin", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, II, 238.
Although some English officials and colonial merchants expressed concern at the possibility of French economic competition from Cape Breton, and at the influence they assumed the French would continue to exercise over the Indians of Nova Scotia, the situation at Cape Breton rebounded to the profit of other New Englanders. The need for a garrison at Annapolis provided opportunities for New England merchants as suppliers. How profitable this trade was is difficult to determine, but information is available on the amount of money expended on the garrison. The cost of victualling the forces at Annapolis Royal for the period 1 May 1714 to 31 May 1715 was estimated at £3,166 6s 8d, Massachusetts currency.

Among the suppliers of the garrison was John Borland, one of the least known of the great Boston merchants of the early eighteenth century. Another of the merchants who supplied Annapolis Royal from Boston was John Alden. It was probably these men to whom William Shirreff, an official at Annapolis Royal, was referring when he complained that since the conquest all the colony's goods came from Boston, and that trade was controlled there by "a few men who make people pay what they please." Shirreff also implied that the clique of Boston merchants controlled Nova Scotia's trade with ease. In fact, this was not always the case, but the doggedness with which the Boston merchants sought

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32. CO. 217/1, f. 303.
34. Memorial of Captain Paul Mascarene to Governor Francis Nicholson, Boston, 24 March 1713, PANS, RG 1, Vol. 9, #1; Estimate of the charges of victualling the Garrison from 1 May 1714 to 31 May 1715, CO. 217/1, Pt. 3, f. 303.
35. William Shirreff to the Lords of Trade, 24 or 29 May 1715, C.O. 217/1, f. 329. Alden's interest in the Nova Scotian trade represents a long-standing family interest in the area. His father was probably the John Alden who took part in the 1690 Massachusetts expedition to Port Royal, and who in 1691 was captured by the French while on a trading mission at the mouth of the St. John River. See C.B. Fergusson, "John Alden", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, II, 14.
payment of their accounts suggests that they valued the trade highly. For example, when Francis Nicholson replaced Samuel Vetch at Annapolis Royal in 1713, Borland sent Archibald Ferguson, a Boston merchant, to Annapolis Royal to settle his accounts there. By Borland's reckoning the British government owed him over £ 1,000. But when Ferguson applied to Nicholson for an order to pay the bills the application was denied, and Borland encountered further difficulties when he tried to collect the sum in London.36

Other merchants, generally less readily identifiable in this decade, found trade with the French at Cape Breton advantageous. This trade seems to have sprung up as soon as New Englanders became aware of the demand for supplies at Cape Breton. The settlers at Louisbourg had experienced privation from their first winter on the island, and their experiences were doubtless echoed by settlers in other parts of the island. In 1714 drift-ice remained off the coast of Cape Breton from 15 January until the end of May. Ships could not approach the coast until mid-May, and the first ship to arrive in 1714 was in the icefields for twenty days. Another ship, carrying provisions from Louisbourg to Miré (Mira), was wrecked in its passage.37

Given the uncertainty of French supplies at certain times of the year, and the ability of the New Englanders to sell their wares at lower prices than could the merchants of France, it is not surprising that Acadian and New England vessels began to appear at Louisbourg with regularity. Peter Arceneau of Beaubassin declared in a statement to Governor Nicholson that when at Louisbourg in the spring

38. L'Hermitte to the Minister, Louisbourg, 1 December 1714, C11B, Vol. 1 ff. 84, 85.
of 1714 he saw two English (New England) sloops there with salt, boards, "and other things". Arceneau himself admitted selling ten sheep at Louisbourg, a transaction which was modest, but not without significance. Arceneau probably initiated the flow of supplies from Acadia to Cape Breton, a trade which became considerable, and provided the Acadians with the means to purchase goods in England, because in addition to receiving payment in French goods, for their foodstuffs, furs and feathers, they also received specie from the French. This species, used to buy New England goods, helped alleviate a chronic shortage of specie in New England and facilitated trade with Europe.

Not long after Arceneau's voyage, other Acadians made the trek to Cape Breton. Two Acadians who visited the island in the spring of 1714 reported that they saw two "English" (New England) vessels, one at Louisbourg, and the other at "Island Michan". (This was probably in the vicinity of what is now Michaud Point, not far from the Canso area.) The vessel at Louisbourg was from Casco Bay, in Maine, and the other vessel was from Boston; both carried boards, salt, cattle and other, unspecified, goods. Governor Nicholson of Nova Scotia mentioned such trade to Governor Dudley of Massachusetts on several occasions, and expressed concern that more vessels would be sent from New England in the spring of 1715. Nicholson also anticipated that the French on Cape Breton would have to draw on New England regularly if they were to develop a large establishment on the island. To forestall this eventuality, Nicholson addressed a letter on the matter to all governors and customs officials in New England. He advised the use of

40. Beauharnois and Hocquart to Count de Maurepas, Quebec, 12 September 1745, E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York (Albany, 1858), X, 5.
41. A Declaration of Denis and Bernard Godet of Annapolis Royal, 1 Sept. 1714, PANS, Mss. vol. 7, p.56.
42. Governor Francis Nicholson to Governor Joseph Dudley, Boston, 25 December 1714, ibid., p.49.
"all lawful ways and means" to prevent the development of Cape Breton by the French, because "I find that they will not be able to make any considerable settlements there unless they be assisted from some of his Majesty's Provinces on this Continent with Lumber Provisions Tobacco, etc." Anticipating the methods by which the trade would be conducted, Nicholson said that he supposed that vessels bound for Cape Breton would enter for "Newfoundland or some place here abouts..."43

Nicholson's complaints met with a prompt response in Massachusetts at least. The Council read Nicholson's letter on 27 December 1714, and then launched an investigation into contacts between New England and Cape Breton. It ordered three French officers then in Boston to be examined on their business in the city.44 The Council Minutes for 28 December indicate that the Frenchmen satisfied the Council that their presence did not threaten either British or New England interests.45 Nevertheless, on 3 January 1715 the Council drew up a proclamation forbidding any correspondence, trade, commerce, or any other dealings with the French of Canada, Cape Breton, or any other place. The proclamation specifically stated that no provisions, lumber or other supplies were to be carried to the French. This action would at first seem to indicate that the Massachusetts government was determined to support Nicholson wholeheartedly. On closer scrutiny it appears that the Council had reservations about placing overly strict restrictions on trade with the French. The proclamation was to be in effect only "until His Majesty's Pleasure be known therein."46 The government took further action in March, when the Council advised customs collectors in Massachusetts to use all possible methods to discover any vessel whatso-

43. Copy of an extract of a letter to all governors, Custom House Officers, etc., attached to a letter to Governor Dudley, Boston, 25 December 1714, PANS, Mss Vol. 7, p. 49.
44. Council Minutes, 27 December 1714, C.O. 5/792, f. 83.
45. Council Minutes, 28 December 1714, ibid., f. 84.
46. Council Minutes, 3 January 1714/15, ibid., f. 33.
ever trading to Cape Breton, Canada, or any other place inhabited
by subjects of the French king. Customs officials, however, acknowled­
ged that they did not have the means to enforce trade regulations,
so that it would appear that the Massachusetts government was merely
trying to placate the more zealous British officials in North America.

As for the authorities at Cape Breton, they could and would
tolerate trade needed for the well-being of their colony, but opposed
any developments in Nova Scotia which threatened French interests. The
proposals Captain Cyprian Southack made in 1713 to improve New England's
fishing industry by settling fishermen along the Nova Scotia coast must
have been a matter of great concern to the French, if the plan came to
their attention. On another occasion in 1713 when a few New England
fishermen erected stagings on the western shores of Cape Breton, "loud
cries of trespass ensued." and the offenders apparently departed
abruptly.

Southack's ventures in Nova Scotia had also aroused the hostility
of the French and their Indian allies, for several possible reasons.
Not only did Southack's activities mean competition for French fisher­
men, but they also threatened to interfere with trade between Cape
Breton and Acadia. In addition to starting a fishing establishment in
Nova Scotia, Southack also obtained authorization from Governor Dudley
to seize any vessels he found trading with Cape Breton contrary to

48. Blechydén to the Board of Trade, 5 April 1721, C.O. 5/868, f. 49,50,
49. Memorial of Captain Cyprian Southack to the Board of Trade, 9
December 1713, C.S.P., 1712-14, #520. Southack, while not a major
New England merchant, was typical of the lesser entrepreneurs who
promoted New England's interests in Nova Scotia. Southack had partici­
pated in the 1690 expedition against Port Royal, and several of the
other raids against Acadia during the War of the Spanish Succession.
He had also commanded the Massachusetts Province Galley during the
war, at the end of which he became involved in the Nova Scotia fishery.
source of information cannot be identified.
Massachusetts government proclamations.\textsuperscript{51} By 1715 Southack had landed stores, built two houses, and made considerable progress in the fishery at Port Roseway (Shelburne). Indian hostility forced Southack to abandon his establishment. According to Southack the Indians had received a present of £200 from Governor Cosetebelle of Cape Breton to pillage his property and then to kill him.\textsuperscript{52} Other fishermen faced similar problems. In 1715 the Indians at Cape Sable seized some twenty-seven fishing vessels, and two commissioners had to be sent there from Massachusetts to negotiate the release of the vessels.\textsuperscript{53}

Hostility against New England fishermen retarded their activities in parts of Nova Scotia but did not stop them from fishing in the Canso area soon after the Treaty of Utrecht was agreed upon by France and Britain. There is some evidence that New England fishermen were operating in the area by at least 1715.\textsuperscript{54} Interest in the area by fishermen was not new, as they had frequented the district at least as early as the first decade of the sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century it was a well-known centre. Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt referred to Canso in 1606 as "the best known fishing harbor of Nova Scotia's coast, and certain to have had dozens of ships visiting it" at that time.\textsuperscript{55} Lescarbot mentioned Canso in his History of New France as one of several places in North America where French vessels dried cod, and as a centre for trade with the Indians.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{51} Dudley to Southack, Boston, 18 April 1715, C.O. 217/2, f. 245.
\textsuperscript{52} Abstract of a Memorial of C. Southack to Governor Samuel Shute of Massachusetts, Boston, 22 January 1718/19, Massachusetts Historical Society, Gay Transcripts, Nova Scotia Papers, II.
\textsuperscript{53} Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, I, 48,58, 25 May 1715 and 26 June 1715.
\textsuperscript{54} Louisbourg officials reported in 1716 that the English had fished in this area the previous year. Soubras to the Minister, Louisbourg, 28 March 1716, A.C., C11B, Vol. 1, f. 348.
\textsuperscript{56} M. Lescarbot, History of New France (Toronto, 1911), p. 309.
work published in 1672, confirmed a continuing interest in the area. He declared that the waters around Canso abounded with fish, and indicated that fishermen not only fished in the region but also erected flakes on the shores for drying their catch.57

Apparently the area was ideal for fishing. From Canso there was easy access to the fishing grounds of both the Atlantic and the Gulf of Saint Lawrence. Chedabucto Bay provided valuable shelter from bad weather and good areas for drying and curing fish. Moreover, the channels among the islands provided so many passages to the inner harbour that ships could enter almost regardless of the direction of the wind.58 In addition, Canso's proximity to Cape Breton greatly facilitated trade with the French. How soon trade with Cape Breton began from Canso is uncertain, but it may have been underway by early 1718. That year Lieutenant Governor John Doucett of Nova Scotia suggested that three or four sloops be employed to cruise along the coast of Nova Scotia from the Gut of Canso to Mount Desert, "to prevent the Smuggling traders...."59

As French authorities became aware of the contacts developing in the Canso area they began to show concern. There were complaints in 1715 of English ships on the banks near Port Toulouse, and reports of French fishermen operating around Canso. Pierre-Auguste de Soubras, appointed financial commissary at Ile Royale in 1714, spoke of a "liaison trop grande" between fishermen of the two nations.60 Despite official concern over such contacts it would appear that there were both French and New England interests who desired the contacts. The situation at

59. John Doucett to the Lords of Trade, Annapolis Royal, 6 February 1717/18, C.O. 217/2, f. 186.
60. Soubras to the Minister, Louisbourg, 28 March 1716, C11B, Vol. 1, f.348.
Port Toulouse, and the steps the French authorities took to deal with the situation illustrate the interest both French and English had in trade. Governor Costebelle reported in February 1717 that all the Acadians coming to Cape Breton wanted to settle at Port Toulouse because the settlement was so close to Nova Scotia. Port Toulouse was also a key point in maintaining contact with the Indians of Nova Scotia, who had demonstrated no overwhelming desire to move to Cape Breton. The Governor advised that of all places on the island, Port Toulouse was most in need of fortification.\textsuperscript{61}

Fortifications would not only protect the settlement as a link in French communications, but would also enable the French authorities to control better the contacts the settlers had with New Englanders. Authorities at Louisbourg had already taken steps to control trade there, and prevent illegal trade. This is evident from a report of St. Ovide in September 1716, in which he mentioned the arrival of four or five English ships at Louisbourg at various times. The ships allegedly put in to Louisbourg because of bad weather and a need for wood and water. The authorities may have accepted these reasons for the calls, but to prevent illegal trade St. Ovide placed a sergeant and two soldiers on each ship. Moreover, each vessel was obliged to leave within twenty-four hours of its arrival.\textsuperscript{62} Such measures having been taken at Louisbourg it seems only logical that the authorities would advise the establishment of an installation at Port Toulouse which would enable the implementation of similar controls there.

But the problems of Port Toulouse and Canso defied easy solution. A report of early 1717 indicated that both French and English lived

\textsuperscript{61} Costebelle to the Minister, 26 February 1717, C11B, Vol. 1, f. 26. 
\textsuperscript{62} St. Ovide to the Minister, Louisbourg, 29 September 1716, C11B, Vol. 1, f. 385.
at Canso then despite prohibitions against trading. There were suggestions that Governor Costebelle tolerated the situation. To these allegations Costebelle replied that toleration of the situation was necessary to keep the Strait of Canso open to the French. Anyway, the Governor felt that trade with the New Englanders was necessary because of the problems the colony had in obtaining supplies from merchants in French ports such as Bayonne, Nantes, and St. Jean de Luz.63 The Council of Marine apparently remained unsatisfied with the situation. It noted in a memoir of September 1717 that trade was easily conducted and rather common at Port Toulouse. The Council then expressly forbade all commerce with the English by residents of Port Toulouse. M. de la Forest was instructed to see that the inhabitants had no trade with Canso either directly or indirectly.64

Issuing decrees was easier than enforcing them. The garrison at Port Toulouse could not be relied upon to curb illicit trade, or to do very much of anything. The soldiers at that outpost were reportedly very undisciplined: no amount of ordering, it was said, could curb their libertinage, for they resorted to cabarets, and worked only when it pleased them. It was said to be impossible to get them to do even the most pressing tasks. Only the suppression of the cabarets, the report advised, would bring about a restoration of order.65

Meanwhile, French authorities launched an investigation into the situation at Canso. St. Ovide, who succeeded Costebelle in 1717, sent M. de la Ronde there in the fall of 1717 to find out how many French and New Englanders had established themselves and in what business they engaged. On the basis of de la Ronde's report, St. Ovide reported

64. Memoir to M. de la Forest, 20 September 1717, ibid., f.279.
65. M. de la Forest, 12 September 1717, ibid., f. 274.
that there were about six Frenchmen settled at Canso, among an unspecified number of New Englanders. The Frenchmen fished and had about 100 men in their service. The French were concerned at the situation at Canso and for good reason. In 1718 some New Englanders with fishing interests at Canso began to agitate for the eviction of the French from the area and for a forceful assertion of Britain's claim to jurisdiction over Canso as a part of Nova Scotia. A central figure in the agitation was Cyprian Southack, who registered the first known complaint about French activity in the area. Southack informed Lieutenant Governor John Doucett of Nova Scotia, in a letter of January 1718, that "a great many French commanders of ships with their men" had come from Cape Breton to fish at Canso and to the west, reportedly carrying off 20,000 quintals of fish. Southack also charged that one of the Frenchmen who came from Cape Breton had built a house and stages at Canso, and "makes all the mischief he can at Canso against the English interest".

Complaints such as Southack's undoubtedly motivated Governor Richard Philipps, appointed Governor of Nova Scotia in 1718, to write the Board of Trade in March of that year, stating that it was necessary to have the boundaries between Nova Scotia and Cape Breton settled, and French traffic with the New Englanders prevented. He declared that the fishery needed protection from French encroachment "which cannot be done without a Man of War on that station...."

Doucett also took action, by writing to St. Ovide to complain of several matters: that

68. Philipps to the Board of Trade, 11 March 1718, PANS, Mss Vol. 18,#4.
The Harbour and Islands of Canso Part of the Boundaries of Nova Scotia

Richard Phillips
French ships caught and dried several thousand quintals of fish on the Nova Scotia coast; that several people came from Cape Breton and built houses and fish stages in Nova Scotia, including one individual who incited the Indians against the New Englanders; that the rest of the French had similar attitudes. Doucett suggested that St. Ovide order the withdrawal of all the French who did not have permission to be in Nova Scotia. Southack's letter had said nothing specific about Indian problems at Canso. Doucett's comments indicate either that individuals other than Southack had registered complaints about the Indians, or that the Lieutenant Governor was exaggerating Southack's comments. The latter possibility is unlikely if one accepts as serious a comment by Doucett to Governor Vaudreuil of Canada that he would do his best to "fulfil the agreement" between France and Britain.

St. Ovide's reply to Doucett did not concede that the French had intruded on English territory. On the contrary, St. Ovide denied any knowledge of French ships and subjects fishing and drying their catch in British territory. As for the occupants of Canso, St. Ovide said that the land they occupied clearly belonged to the French King according to Articles 12 and 13 of the Treaty of Utrecht, which stated that islands in the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence belonged to France. St. Ovide argued that the islands in the mouth of the Gulf also belonged to France, and that Canso was in a mouth of the Gulf. As for the Indian problem, he acknowledged that there was a considerable assembly of Indians at Canso, and that this worried the New Englanders. To remedy the problem he had informed the chiefs that they must not disrupt the peace between the English and the French, and that they must let the English conduct their business in peace.

70. Doucett to Vaudreuil, Annapolis Royal, 15 April 1718, C.O. 217/2, f.217.
Apparently St. Ovide felt that his letter would satisfy the New Englanders and the Nova Scotian authorities, as he then proceeded to discuss a matter which required the co-operation of the Nova Scotia government, and was unlikely to be resolved while there was a climate of hostility between the two governments. This matter was the return of deserters. St. Ovide declared that although some of the deserters who took refuge in Nova Scotia were soldiers, others were domestic thieves. The latter the French wanted returned. If Doucett would order them sent back, the French would pay the costs with pleasure. 72

Authorities in Massachusetts, however, had received a number of complaints about the French operations at Canso, and were not easily satisfied. In June 1718 four New Englanders presented a memorial to Governor Shute of Massachusetts, and to the Council and General Court, on behalf of themselves and their partners in the fishery. They claimed that although the French had been ordered out of the Canso area in 1716, about 300 Frenchmen had since then taken possession of the area, erecting houses in contravention of the Treaty of Utrecht. They stated that:

There is a ship from France in the harbour and more dayly (sic) expected, they have seized the best places for making fish, and threaten the English with a removal, pretending that they act by the advice and direction of the Governor of Cape Breton. 73

A memorandum by Cyprian Southack supported part of the memorial. Southack stated that in August 1716 HMS Rose, under the command of Captain Caley, had sailed to Cape Breton to confer with Governor Costebelle about French fishing at Canso, and that Costebelle had agreed to order the French away. The English ship then sailed to Canso and had found thirty French shallops there, the crews engaged in fishing.

72. Ibid.
73. Memorial of Oliver Noyes, et al., to Governor Shute, etc., June 1718, Boston, C.O. 217/2, f. 283.
Lieutenant Benjamin Young, of the Rose, had ordered the French away, and according to Southack they had agreed to go.\textsuperscript{74} Louisbourg authorities thus seemed sympathetic to the problems of the New England fishermen. But the problems did not disappear. Southack himself, for example, continued to experience difficulties with Indians in Nova Scotia. In a petition of June 1718 to the Massachusetts Assembly, he referred to the seizure of two of his men by Indians at La Have. Southack had to ransom the men at a cost of just over £20, for most of which the Massachusetts Assembly reimbursed him.\textsuperscript{75}

Prompted by the spate of complaints of French encroachments and Indian hostility, Governor Shute and the Massachusetts Council decided that the situation called for prompt action. Shute wrote the Board of Trade on 26 June that he was sending the Squirrel to investigate and that he expected Governor St. Ovide to order the French under his command to pull down their huts and not to fish on the Nova Scotia shore any longer.\textsuperscript{76} In August the Squirrel set sail, commanded by Captain Thomas Smart, accompanied by Cyprian Southack, who was authorized by the Council to assist Smart.\textsuperscript{77} Shute ordered Smart to proceed to Canso, then to Louisbourg. At the French capital he was to ask St. Ovide if he approved the activities of the French at Canso, "which if he disowns you are to give immediate orders that they withdraw themselves their ships and boats from Cape Canso and the coast thereabouts...." If St. Ovide "owns his approbation of the actions of ye French you are to..." protest this as a breach of the Treaty of Utrecht and demand that justice be speedily done. Allow him "a reasonable time to bring off the people and their effects...." If he does not comply, seize fish and

\textsuperscript{74} Memorandum of Cyprian Southack, n.d., ibid., f.249.
\textsuperscript{75} Minutes of the Massachusetts Assembly, 20 June 1718, C.O. 5/792, ff. 231, 232.
\textsuperscript{76} Shute to the Lords of Trade, Boston, 26 June 1718, C.S.P., 1717/18, #575.
\textsuperscript{77} Governor Shute's Instructions to Captain Thomas Smart, C.O. 217/2, f. 289.
other effects, demolish the buildings the French have set up and "compel the French people to quit the said place, except such as are friendly to the English, and have their leave to reside among you." You will "do nothing of moment without" Southack's assistance.78

Southack recorded in his journal of the mission that when he and Smart reached Canso there were three French vessels there, each with thirty shallops fishing. The next day another French vessel arrived, from Louisbourg, with French merchandise to trade. According to Southack, Captain Smart "received a great many afronts here from the French but did not think it proper while (until?) his return from Louisbourg to make any answer to them."79

On 10 September the Squirrel sailed to Louisbourg, and the next day Smart went ashore and conferred with the French authorities about the boundaries of Nova Scotia. Precisely what transpired in the discussions between Smart and St. Ovide is unclear because of conflicting statements by the parties involved. One thing is certain: neither side was willing to concede to the other the possession of Canso. Southack, for instance, presented St. Ovide with a memorial rejecting French claims to any part of the continent or islands from Cape Canso to Cape Roziers.80 Then, according to Southack, Smart asked St. Ovide to order the French to leave Canso, offering the French any reasonable time for them to retire with their effects, but St. Ovide refused to comply with the request. Then Smart protested against the proceedings of the French at Canso, assuring the French governor that the French position would be resented by the English government and that measures would be taken accordingly.81

78. Ibid.
St. Ovide's account of the proceedings varies somewhat from Southack's version. In a letter to Governor Shute, St. Ovide declared that he had taken action to ensure the tranquillity of Canso by having written the French there in June and having forbidden them to trade directly or indirectly with the English, under pain of severe punishment. St. Ovide was at the same time prepared to make a major concession, because he stated that he had offered to withdraw at the end of the fishing season all the French inhabitants of the Canso area, providing that Shute likewise evacuate the English. He suggested that the issue could then be decided "in the courts of our masters".

On 13 September Smart concluded the talks at Louisbourg and returned to Canso. For four days he did nothing about the French inhabitants, then, on the fifth day, he seized a French ship, a brig, a sloop and a quantity of fish and goods, and returned to Boston, where news of his exploits hardly caused a ripple of excitement, although they would result in years of increased Indian hostility for New Englanders at Canso - a result which the New Englanders had not anticipated. Indeed, the New Englanders probably thought that their actions would cause the French to restrain the Indians in case their activities might result in New England reprisals against the French. In any event, the New England expedition suggests that they could accept the French presence on Cape Breton Island, but were determined to set some limits on French influence in Nova Scotia.

Actions taken by the authorities in Massachusetts on Smart's return also suggest that they believed they would be able to persuade the British government that they had acted in the best interests of the empire. The Council took steps to inform the colony's agent in London.

of the events at Canso and Louisbourg. Governor Shute sent a record of the Smart mission to the Board of Trade, along with documentation of the alleged French aggression. The papers sent also included an extract of Smart's journal, and a memorial on French activities at Canso. Smart's memorial indicated that some Frenchmen at Canso had been such a threat to New England interests there that their removal to Boston was advisable. Thus Smart had brought to Boston a Frenchman named Lafond, accused of instigating Indians to disturb the settlement. According to several other statements Lafond had murdered an English subject.

Sending documents to England to justify their actions was a wise move on the part of Massachusetts officials, because it was not long before French authorities began complaining about Smart's actions. Governor St. Ovide informed Governor Shute that he had had such complaints about Smart's behaviour at Canso that he would have regarded his vessel as a corsair had not Smart carried a letter from Shute. St. Ovide suggested that compensation for Smart's depredations would be in order in view of the "alliance" between the two crowns, and especially since, according to the French governor, Smart had left Louisbourg with protestations of friendship. The French governor and the

84. Council Minutes, 18 October 1718, C.O. 5/792, ff. 221, 222.
85. Apparently Lafond had been involved in French-New England hostilities for several years prior to 1718, as Southack mentioned him in a submission dealing with a voyage to Cape Sable in 1712, in which he asserted that Lafond was largely responsible for some £200 worth of damage he had sustained there. Council Minutes, 3 November 1718, C.O. 5/792, ff. 225, 226. Also, William Card Jr. and Benjamin Ingersol of Gloucester testified that they were aboard a sloop seized by French privateers, that one of the English aboard was killed after quarter was given, and that Card heard Robert Elwell of Winter Harbour and William Roberts of Ipswich say that they saw Lafond commit the murder. Council Minutes, 6 November 1718, C.O.5/792.
commissaire-ordonnateur, Soubras, also informed the Minister of Marine what had transpired at the meeting with Smart and his subsequent actions at Canso. St. Ovide declared that he had asked Smart if he had any particular orders to communicate and said that he had been told no.87

French authorities might have acted more promptly than they did to protect French interests at Canso after Smart's visit to Louisbourg, but they had no reason to suspect a New England plan to eradicate the French establishment at Canso. Considering the existence of the entente between France and Britain, it is not surprising that Smart's action caught St. Ovide off his guard. Even when informed of the events at Canso the French did not respond quickly. St. Ovide impressed a thirty-gun ship, placed forty soldiers aboard it, along with sailors from other vessels at Louisbourg, and instructed the captain to set sail immediately for Canso, hoping that with favourable conditions the ship might reach Canso before Smart's departure. The captain and crew, however, found pretexts to delay their departure that day; the next day bad weather caused the project to be discarded.88 The obstacles to prompt action may have been beyond anyone's ability to resolve them, but the commissaire-ordonnateur, Soubras, did not think so, because although he made one joint report of the affair with St. Ovide, he also wrote to the Minister independently and disclaimed any responsibility for the inept proceedings.89 Finally, St. Ovide persuaded Jean-Joseph D'Allard de Ste. Marie to proceed to Canso and evacuate all the French ships and inhabitants with their effects to Cape Breton. The Governor also told Ste. Marie to remain at Canso until the evacuation was completed.90

87. St. Ovide and Soubras to the Minister, 19 October 1718, C11B, Vol. 3 f. 168.
88. St. Ovide and Soubras to the Council of Marine, 19 October 1718, ibid, f. 106.
89. Soubras to the Minister, ibid., f. 186.
The evacuation was probably completed that December, because that month Captain Christopher Aldridge of the garrison at Annapolis Royal reported to Governor Philipps that reprisals for Smart's actions were apparently underway, for he had learned that St. Ovide had had two New England ships seized at Canso, one a brig, the other a sloop loaded with fish. It would appear that one victim of the reprisals was Cyprian Southack, as he wrote Governor Philipps in January 1719 and reported that the French in their anger at him had sent out privateers against his fishing enterprises, and had taken ten sloops of which he was the sole owner. Other fishermen were also affected. Nathanial Cunningham, while on a fishing voyage "to the eastward" of New England, had his vessel seized by two shallops on leaving Canso. Cunningham valued the vessel, which was taken to Cape Breton, at about £150, including furniture and stores.

It was December 1718 when Cunningham and Aldridge complained of the losses to the French; it was also in December when Allard de Ste. Marie arrived in Boston to deliver St. Ovide's complaints about Smart's actions. The Massachusetts Council read St. Ovide's letter and received Ste. Marie's credentials on 3 December, but took little action to resolve the dispute by dealing with Ste. Marie. He was still in Boston in May 1720. Instead of dealing with Ste. Marie the Massachusetts authorities continued their overseas defence of their


92. Southack to Philipps, Boston, 27 January 1719, C.O. 217/2, f. 242. Southack did not say that all of these losses were incurred after the Smart mission, but the amount of the alleged losses exceeds claims for previous losses by so much that a large portion, at least, of the losses must be for 1718.

actions to ensure that the British government did not concede Canso to France or otherwise make concessions in North America to France in the interests of the entente. On 19 December 1718 the Council voted that the Secretary prepare a draft of a letter to Jeremiah Dummer, the very capable agent of the Massachusetts government in London, giving him additional information about the Canso affair. The Council also instructed the Secretary to send Dummer all relevant papers. That day the Council received a memorial from Southack asking for "suitable considerations" for his services in accompanying Smart to Canso and Louisbourg. To express their satisfaction with his performance, the Council voted Southack £35.

Meanwhile, the British began boundary negotiations with France. Although the commission concerned itself mainly with the boundary between New France and Hudson Bay, Smart's action at Canso resulted in the inclusion of the Nova Scotia-Cape Breton boundary. The French were no doubt eager to include Canso in the diplomatic talks because of representations by and on behalf of Johannis de Hiriberry, a merchant and former magistrate of St. Jean de Luz, who had suffered heavy losses in the Smart action. Hiriberry's persistent representations to both the British and French governments resulted in the British government ordering Massachusetts in 1719 to make restitution for his losses. In early June 1719 the Commissioners of Trade suggested to

94. Council Minutes, 19 December 1718, C.O. 5/792, f. 239.
95. Council Minutes, 7 January 1719, ibid., f. 242.
96. M. Savelle, The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary 1749-1763 (New Haven, 1940), pp. 3, 7. British officials had anticipated that the question of Canso might arise well before Smart's action, because in a memorial to the King in May 1718 the Board of Trade advised that it might prove necessary to settle the boundary between Nova Scotia and the neighbouring French territories, and they had proposed sending a commissioner to view the boundaries and report to the King. Board of Trade to the King, 30 May 1718, C.S.P., 1717-18, #550.
the Lords of Justice that if they "should be disposed in favour to the Memorialist, and to cultivate a good understanding between the two Nations" and therefore order restitution, the commissioners would not object, "provided this restitution be made as a pure act of grace and favour." Moreover, the Council remarked that while the Massachusetts authorities might have found a gentler way of asserting the British right to the lands in question, the Governor and Council had demonstrated "a very laudable zeal for H. M. service." 

As for Hiriberry, he sought compensation on two continents. In 1719 he made a voyage to Boston accompanied by an officer from Louisbourg. The Massachusetts authorities refused to give him anything, and he proceeded to London to demand justice. It was not surprising that the Massachusetts government gave Hiriberry nothing, because in January 1719 the Lords of the Admiralty had ruled that the Massachusetts government should give the booty to Smart to dispose of as he chose. An order in council of May 1719 confirmed the Admiralty's decision, and Massachusetts was ordered to transfer items seized at Canso to the crew of the Squirrel.

Meanwhile, Hiriberry renewed his representations to the British government, and managed to secure a recommendation from the Board of Trade that Britain pay him compensation. Accordingly, in April 1722

97. Board of Trade to the Lords Justices, 5 June 1719, C.S.P., 1719-20, #221.
100. Order in Council, 9 May 1719, C.O.217/3, f.92. Southack and some other New Englanders with interests in Canso may have shared in the spoils. Southack requested a share, and although the government's response is not known, two of the Frenchmen who suffered losses at Canso stated in a memorial to the Massachusetts Council that they had reason to believe that Southack, Captain Giles Hall and others had received some of the plundered property. Memorial of Dominic de Peroche and Martin Delehoute to the Massachusetts Council, 21 March 1720, C.O. 5/792, f. 280.
101. Board of Trade to the Lords Justices, 6 October 1720, C.S.P., 1720-21, #253.
Hiriberry was offered a grant of £800, which was only a fraction of what he claimed to have lost. Further protests by Hiriberry resulted in the scheduling of a hearing in London to which both Smart and Hiriberry were invited. Smart appeared but when no one arrived to represent Hiriberry, the British authorities declined to increase their offer, and Smart was dismissed from further attendance on the matter. It is not known if Hiriberry ever received his £800; he may have spurned the offer as inadequate, since he claimed to have incurred about £3,000 in expenses in pursuing his claims.

Just as in dealing with the Hiriberry case the British authorities had consistently upheld New England's claims to the Canso area, in the boundary negotiations with France, Britain's representatives were equally steadfast in their refusal to make any concessions detrimental to New England interests. The negotiations took place in Paris, where one of the British representatives, Sir Robert Sutton, described a session of September 1720 as "a sort of tumultuary conference". Sutton, suspicious of the French objectives, wrote that he clearly perceived the French design to be "to justify the French fishery, and maintain their claim to the said islands". His reaction, when the French produced maps of the Canso area showing the main island in question in the middle of the strait between Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, predictably was that the French "had framed false charts". English determination not to make any concessions was such that the French abandoned their position, although the British negotiators were not sure just how close the islands were to Nova Scotia. In fact, Sutton and his colleague, Charles Pulteney, were inadequately prepared to argue

102. (Board of Trade?), Whitehall, 3 April 1722, C11B, Vol. 5, f.475.
103. Ibid.
the geographical details of their case. Sutton observed in a letter to England that he and Pulteney would have been able to argue their case more effectively "if we had been provided of a true chart... showing exactly the situation of the Islands of Canceaux...." 104

Pulteney revealed similar uncertainties about the general geography of the disputed area, and of the precise area utilized by French fishermen. Pulteney wrote William Popple, Secretary to the Board of Trade, ostensibly to find out if the French had fishing facilities on the Cape or the islands at Canso. He indicated that he was insisting on the exclusion of the French from all the islands in question, in case exclusion from Cape Canso alone was not sufficient to eliminate the French encroachment. Betraying his lack of information on the area, Pulteney asked if the Cape was really a cape or an island detached from the mainland of Nova Scotia. 105 Pulteney later explained that he had a memorial by George Vaughan, of New Hampshire, and Peter Capon, an officer of the Annapolis Royal garrison, claiming that the islands were a parcel of rocks "joining almost to the Cape" but the French argued that "a large branch of the sea" ran between the islands and the cape. As he had accounts of the area by other Englishmen which seemed to support the French claims, he thought it best not to insist on the account by Vaughan and Capon because if "the French produce better or more plausible proofs this would give them an advantage." 106

No resolution of the dispute was possible at the conference table, but the negotiations did affirm Britain's acceptance of the New England position on Canso, and Britain's determination not to surrender

104. Sutton to Craggs, Paris, 10 September 1720, C.S.P., 1720-21, #222ii.
105. Pulteney to Popple, Paris, 10 September 1720, ibid., #219.
106. Pulteney to Popple, 24 September 1720, ibid., #238.
any of the disputed territory. The French thus failed to gain sovereignty over the Canso area. New Englanders would have to face pressure in the area from the Indian allies of the French in retaliation for the 1718 display of force, but they had established their claim to a base for their fishing and trading operations in the area. Moreover, the British government seemed confident enough of the security of imperial interests in the region that the Board of Trade facetiously suggested a challenge to the French for authority over Ile St. Jean. In a memorial to Lord Townshend in 1731 the Board reported the growing strength of French settlements on the island, and noted that they might prove dangerous in case of war between France and Britain. The Board admitted that the island clearly belonged to the French under Article 13 of the Treaty of Utrecht, yet, considering the claims France had made in claiming parts of Nova Scotia, the Board suggested that Britain might dispute possession of the island on the basis of Article 12, as one of the lands depending on Nova Scotia. 107

Thus, eleven years after Port Royal fell to the combined British-colonial expedition of 1710, New England had resolved some of the many uncertainties associated with British possession of Nova Scotia and French retention of Cape Breton. There had been no rush of New Englanders to settle Nova Scotia, but New England merchants had gained a small-scale but profitable trade with the Acadians and with the British garrison at Annapolis Royal. Most important of all, New England had obtained a major new fishing base. Canso was the great prize. But British possession of the area had not gone undisputed, as the French had also been attracted to the fishing grounds of the area. The problem for New England had been to ensure effective control of the area without disrupting trade with Cape Breton, or the entente which developed between France and Britain after the signing of the Treaty of

107. Board of Trade to Lord Townshend, Whitehall, 14 March 1721, C.S.P. 1720-21, #405.
New England had approached the task in a pragmatic manner which proved strikingly successful. Although New England had waged war with French forces in North America for most of the twenty years prior to 1710, the New Englanders accepted the French occupation of Cape Breton. Cotton Mather preached no sermons demanding the removal of the French from Cape Breton, although in the 1690's he had played a prime role in organizing anti-French crusades. Cyprian Southack, who had commanded a Massachusetts government vessel against the French in the 1690's and the 1700's, made no demands for the elimination of the French establishment at Louisbourg. Nor did the Massachusetts government call for removal of the French from Cape Breton. But Southack and the Massachusetts government were determined to defend the New England base at Canso. The Smart mission of 1718 symbolizes the evolution of New England thought. It indicates that New England accepted Cape Breton as a French colony, but was determined to set the limits of French influence in Nova Scotia. New England was not prepared to leave the setting of these limits to Britain. Policy towards Cape Breton was to be decided on the periphery of the empire - at Canso and Boston rather than in London. The British, for their part, expressed concern that the Anglo-French entente be disrupted, but they approved the New England action, seeing it as New England represented it - as a vigorous and justifiable defence of imperial interests - rather than seeing it for what it really was: a calculated effort by New Englanders to influence imperial policy for their own ends.
Table 3

New England-Canso Shipping

Based on: Fisheries Returns (1721-42), PANS, RG11, C.O. 217, volumes 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8; C.O.5, volumes 968; Boston Gazette, 1740-1743; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, volume 32.
Chapter II
Patterns of Trade, 1720-1744

Massachusetts and New Hampshire "have constantly supplied the French of Cape Breton with provisions and other stores."*

"We then did not, neither do we now know, or are informed of any within this Government, that do Trade there...."**

"La vente des battiments anglais est necessaires dans la colonie, comme nous avons eu l'honneur de vous le marquer les annéés dernières pour procurer le debouche aux cargaisons qui viennent des isles, ce commerce soutent seul la colonie...."***

Although relations between New England and Louisbourg between 1720 and 1744 were dynamic rather than static, the dominant consideration throughout the period was trade. This is not surprising: it simply demonstrates the preoccupation of the leading elements in New England, the merchants, with their main problem, finding the means to pay for English manufactures.¹ For New England, Ile Royale represented a source of West Indian rum, molasses, indigo, French manufactured goods, and occasionally of specie and codfish. The trade was even more important to Ile Royale than it was to New England. Ile Royale was not only meant to function as a fishing base, but as an entrepot, facilitating a flow of goods between France, Canada, and the West Indies. Ile Royale and its dependency, Ile St. Jean, however, never developed substantial agricultural, forestry or manufacturing capacities during the French regime, and Canada and France supplied only part of Ile Royale's need for goods for internal use and for export. Ile Royale imported foodstuffs, building materials, and ships for its own needs and in part for export to the French colonies in the West Indies.

* Governor Shute to the Massachusetts Council, November 1720, P.R.O., C.O. 5/794, f. 85.
** Massachusetts House of Representatives to Governor Shute, 21 March 1721, Journals of the House of Representatives, II, 368.
An analysis of New England-Ile Royale relations in the 1720-1744 period entails a scrutiny of four broad factors. A delineation of the context in which New England merchants functioned requires a statement of the mercantilist-inspired British trade policies in vogue in the period. Then one can examine how New Englanders responded to these policies, by exploring both the legislative response to them, and the nature of New England's trade with Ile Royale. To complete the picture one must then study how the trade affected Ile Royale, and how French officials there reconciled it with the mercantilist-inspired trade regulations promulgated by authorities in France.

Before proceeding to an examination of these themes the dynamic nature of trade between New England and Ile Royale should be made clear in order to explain the organization of this inquiry. The trade falls into two slightly overlapping phases, the first of which began in 1720, as dislocations caused by the Smart affair of 1718 diminished in number and seriousness. During this phase, which extended into the early 1730's, New Englanders traded at Louisbourg with few effective restraints placed on the trade by either British or French imperial authorities. Then, in 1730 and 1733 respectively, new French and British regulations came into effect to control trade between the colonies more effectively. As a result of the regulations the trade became somewhat more covert than in the 1720's. Nevertheless, the volume and value of the trade increased, as colonial realities triumphed over imperial planning.

In turning to British attitudes to New England's trade with Ile Royale, one finds that the position taken by some British representatives in the colonies is clearly articulated from the beginning of the period. In November 1720 Governor Samuel Shute of Massachusetts sent a message to his Council requesting that trade with Cape Breton be prohibited by law. In taking this step Shute was influenced by a raid on the New England establishment at Canso in August 1720, which he referred to in his
message as the "late disaster at Canso." Indicating that he believed the raid might not have been possible if goods had not been reaching Ile Royale from New England, Shute noted that Massachusetts and New Hampshire had "constantly supplied the French of Cape Breton with provisions and other stores." 

Mercantilist assumptions underlay the objections of Shute and other British officials to New England's trade with Cape Breton, and various treaties and acts of Parliament provided them with sanctions against the trade. Some trade could clearly be banned under the Navigation Acts of 1660. Tobacco, which New Englanders carried to Ile Royale on occasion, had been an enumerated commodity since 1660, and could not legally be exported directly to the dependencies of foreign powers. New Englanders also imported French wines and manufactured goods from Louisbourg at times, although the entry of such goods was prohibited unless they were first carried to England. For the most part, however, New Englanders imported molasses and rum, subject to payment of duty, but otherwise eligible for entry. To justify blanket prohibitions of trade with the French, British officials had recourse to the Treaty of Neutrality of 1686, which banned trade between the colonies of France and England, but which was of questionable validity because never renewed, and because a key provision was violated by the French and English in North America in 1688.

3. New Englanders who had been at Canso complained to the Governor of Nova Scotia that the French and Indians had surprised them at night and had taken £18,000 worth of goods: Memorial of John Henshaw, William Taylor, and Richard Pieke of Canso on behalf of the rest of the inhabitants to Governor Philipps, n.d., C.S.P., Col, Vol. 32, #2411i. C.O. 5/794, f. 85.
5. In addition to its trade provisions, the Treaty stipulated that if France and England went to war in Europe the hostilities need not extend to their colonies in North America. This provision was ignored when hostilities flared on the Acadia-New England border area. See "Extract of a Memorial of Mr. John Nelson, 2 July 1697," N.Y.C.D., IV (Albany, 1854), p. 282.
Aside from the matter of possible violations of British trade policies, Shute's concern over the trade is understandable given Canso's importance to New England's fishing industry. According to Captain Benjamin Young of the Royal Navy, Canso exceeded all other areas of Nova Scotia for the value of its fishery. When he visited Canso in 1720 Young recorded ninety-six New England vessels there, many from fifty to seventy tons. Young also noted the presence of 200 Frenchmen fishing in the area. He ordered them away, and went to Louisbourg to complain about them. Governor St. Ovide, Young reported, assured him that he would take precautions "to prevent their doing the like for the future,\(^6\) no doubt as a means of avoiding incidents which might disrupt the Anglo-French entente of 1717."\(^7\)

Meanwhile, Massachusetts legislators explored Shute's proposed remedy for incidents between New Englanders on the one hand, and the French and Indians on the other hand. Some three weeks after Shute's message to the Council, three of its members formed a joint committee with some members of the House of Representatives to consider Shute's request for a ban on trade with Ile Royale.\(^8\) A bill was subsequently drawn up to ban trade, but the House refused its assent. In March 1721 Shute renewed his appeal for a ban: "I must again recommend it, hoping it will have a better fare this session, lest otherwise it should be thought by the Government at Home that we have more regard for

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6. Captain Benjamin Young to the Board of Trade, 21 October 1720, C.S.P., Col., Vol. 32, #269.
7. For a discussion of the entente see: A. M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936), p. 5ff. (When St. Ovide heard of the August 1720 raid he sent Jacques de Pzensens, an officer of the Louisbourg garrison and a member of the Superior Council, to Petit Degrat, the Cape Breton settlement near Canso, to seize all goods which might belong to the New Englanders "et informer contre les francais coupables". Extract of a letter of St. Ovide and Jacques-Ange Le Normant De Mezy, commissaire-ordonnateur, to the Council of Marine, Louisbourg, 10 November 1720, C11B, Vol. 5, f.144.)
some private man's interests than to his Majesties (sic) Treaties or the Public Good." 

Once more, the Council passed legislation to "prevent Carrying on an illegal Trade to Cape Breton alias Louisbourg." When the bill was sent to the House a message was attached to impress upon that body the need for passage of the bill. The message noted that Governor Philipps of Nova Scotia had complained to Governor Shute about supplies going to Cape Breton from New England. Philipps warned that he would be obliged to represent the state of affairs to authorities in Britain. Moreover, the message to the House stated that an unidentified French officer from Cape Breton had allegedly admitted that except for New England supplies the French would have had to abandon their settlements. Such information failed to sway the House, which declared that it knew of no trade with Cape Breton by anyone from Massachusetts, so that it could see no reason to legislate against it.

Although the Massachusetts authorities failed in their attempts to obtain legislation prohibiting trade with Cape Breton, their New Hampshire counterparts had greater success. In 1721 Lieutenant Governor John Wentworth asked for and obtained a provincial act against trade with Cape Breton. Wentworth, apparently sure that New Hampshire merchants had involved themselves in such trade, and that the trade was important to Cape Breton, stated that "if we had not sent them necessary supplies they could not have continued in those parts." It is not clear, however, how Wentworth proposed to enforce the ban, which suggests that it was designed to placate British officialdom rather than interfere with the commercial aspirations of New Hampshire merchants.

10. Council Minutes, 24 March 1721, C.O. 5/794, p. 128. Philipps had already received instructions from the Board of Trade to use the "utmost care" to prevent illegal trade. See: Board of Trade to Philipps, 28 December 1720, C.S.P., Col., Vol. 32, #342.
In examining the trade itself, it becomes apparent that legislation in New England did not stop it, nor did Indian hostility stop trade, although it hampered it, as is illustrated by the case of Captain William Pickering. A resident of Salem, Massachusetts, Pickering was one of many lesser entrepreneurs who did business at Canso and with the French at Ile Royale. \(^{13}\) He was at Canso when the French and Indians attacked in 1720, inflicting losses of just over £40. \(^{14}\) His wife's quest for information about him when he and his vessel disappeared without a trace later that year, shed light on his business at Canso. The correspondence of Giles Hall, a Connecticut merchant who had been at Canso in 1720, reveals that Pickering had carried a considerable amount of pork from Canso to Cape Breton. The pork was consigned to Pickering in part by a Mr. Bowdoin, most likely James Bowdoin, wealthy Huguenot merchant of Boston. \(^{15}\) Thus there is evidence that the Huguenot community of Boston was involved in trade with Cape Breton as early as 1720. Bowdoin's contacts may well have facilitated the entrance of Peter Faneuil into the Cape Breton trade in the 1720's, a trade in which Faneuil became extensively involved.

\(^{13}\) Pickering's involvement in trade in this general area dated from at least 1702, when he sent a ship to Newfoundland. See Pickering and Derby Papers, p. 29, Mss Collections, Essex Institute, Salem, Mass. By 1707 Pickering was doing business with Samuel Lillie, the leading ship-owner in Boston in the first decade of eighteenth century. See B. & L. Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping 1697-1714 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 35, 69. From 1711 to 1718 Pickering owned or was part-owner of several vessels engaged in fishing at Canso, the coastal trade to Virginia, and foreign trade to Fyall and other places. See H. S. Tapley, "The Province Galley of Massachusetts Bay", Essex Institute Historical Collections, Vol. 58, p. 172.

\(^{14}\) P.R.O., C.O. 217/3, f. 212.

\(^{15}\) Giles Hall to Mrs. Hannah Pickering, Boston, 11 September 1723, Pickering and Derby Papers, p. 10.
39A.
Correspondence about Pickering's disappearance also indicates the possibility that New England colonies other than Massachusetts and New Hampshire may have been involved in trade with Ile Royale. "All was no casual visitor to Canso: he had a fishing room there in 1717."

Records of Pickering's activities are not nearly as extensive or as revealing as the records of men such as Joshua Peirce, Peter Faneuil, and the Pepperrells. Peirce allegedly had five or six schooners at Canso by 1723, and one of his vessels is known to have been there in 1725. Peirce conducted business at Louisbourg by July 1726, when he sold a cow, some sheep, and almost 2,000 board feet of lumber there for just under 340. Before long Peirce was engaged in cooperative ventures with a Louisbourg merchant named Dolebra. In September 1728 Peirce arranged to send a brigantine to Louisbourg with a cargo of boards, bricks, cattle, and sheep. He instructed Dolebra to sell the cargo there, and then to send the ship to Martinique under a French captain. From there the ship was to return to Boston, and the English captain would assume command en route. The arrangements are indeed sophisticated, and beyond that appear to have been

20. This may have been either Jean Dolobarat of Bayonne or Joannis Dolobarat of St. Jean de Luz. See: Staff notes, on Négociants et armateurs de France qui eurent des relations commerciales avec Louisbourg et l'Ile Royale au XVIIIe siècle, research division, Louisbourg National Historic Park.
somewhat clandestine. This no doubt because the edicts of 1717 and 1728 excluded all foreign commerce from French islands in the West Indies in order to make both imports and exports monopolies of the metropolis. Thus, not only did Ile Royale serve as an outlet for New England commodities, but it also served as a means of developing trade with the French West Indies.

There is also evidence that officers of the garrison at Canso abetted trade between New England and Louisbourg. In his letter of 10 September 1728 Peirce advised Dolebra that in case of his absence from Canso he should direct mail to John Bradstreet of the Canso garrison. Peirce would direct Bradstreet to send the contents to New England. Peirce also employed Bradstreet to carry messages to Louisbourg.

Peirce's trade with Cape Breton also involved Canso in ways other than as a clearing house for communications with his French contacts. In 1733 one of Peirce's vessels, carrying goods from Louisbourg to Boston, put into Canso to disguise the origin of the molasses and other goods aboard from inquisitive customs agents at Boston. As Peirce explained to his Boston buyer, there would now be no danger of the goods being seized at either Portsmouth or Boston. Such precautions may not really have been necessary, as Boston merchants enjoyed a special relationship with the customs collector there. When John Jekyll the elder, who held the post of customs collector from

23. Bradstreet apparently found involvement in trade with Cape Breton more profitable personally than devoting his efforts to curbing the trade. In March 1725/26 he had complained about trade with Louisbourg and urged his own appointment to curb it. C.O. 217/4, ff. 306, 307.
25. Peirce to P. Faneuil, Portsmouth, 9 & 30 November 1733, Peirce Letter Book. Trade with Louisbourg was not illegal under British law as long as no enumerated commodities were traded and duties were paid on French goods imported by New Englanders.
1707, died in 1733, the Boston Weekly Newsletter reported that by his "courteous Behaviour to the Merchant, he became the Darling of all Fair Traders...with much Humanity (he) took pleasure in directing Masters of Vessels how they ought to avoid the Breach of the Acts of Trade." 26

Not everyone was as cautious as Peirce. In Boston it was common knowledge that New England vessels made voyages to Cape Breton. The New England Weekly Journal and the Boston Gazette both recorded the arrival and departure of such vessels. The Weekly Journal listed eleven such sailings for Boston in 1733. The Gazette listed only eight voyages to or from Cape Breton, but many of the issues of the Gazette for the latter part of 1733 have not survived. From an analysis of those copies which have survived it is apparent that Boston was not the only New England port which sent vessels to Louisbourg in the 1730's. The Gazette, unlike the Weekly Journal, gave shipping information for Rhode Island; Salem; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and occasionally for New London, Connecticut. Among the entries for Salem, which conducted an extensive trade with Canso, was the occasional reference to Cape Breton. The issue of September 3, for example, listed John Babbidge as outward bound for Cape Breton.

Entries in New England newspapers represented perhaps only one-quarter of the actual sailings to Cape Breton, as indicated by some of the newspapers' own entries. For instance, when Michael Hodge cleared Boston in July 1733 he declared his destination to be Newfoundland, but when he returned in September it was from Louisbourg. Further confirmation of the fact that Boston newspapers did not record all New

England shipping to Louisbourg comes from French records. According to French authorities some thirty-two New England vessels called at Cape Breton in 1733. This figure contrasts sharply with the total of eight arrivals from Cape Breton recorded by the Weekly Journal for 1733. It is unreasonable to assume that the differences can be explained by errors in record-keeping. More likely, many of the vessels which came from Cape Breton concealed the fact because they were carrying French goods whose entry was forbidden or on which duty would have had to have been paid.

Authorities at Louisbourg kept a more accurate record of the trade, but were faced with the problem of reconciling the New Englanders' desire to trade with instructions from France to minimize such trade. In keeping with regulations of 1716 and 1717, the King of France had decreed in 1722 that trade with the English for "Bestiaux et de planches" was permissible when there was need at Ile Royale, but all other trade was forbidden except under "the most pressing and indispensable need."^29

Regulations such as those of 1722 appear to have been more honoured in the breech than in the observance, judging from complaints of abuses by inhabitants and officials alike, and from the reiteration of the regulations by authorities in France. In 1724 a number of inhabitants of Ile Royale complained to the Minister of the Marine that

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29. Memorial of the King to St. Ovide and Mezy, Paris, 12 May 1722, ibid., Vol. 6, f. 25.
TABLE 1

Shipping Entries and New England Ship Sales at Louisbourg

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a great number of English (New England) ships were coming to Île Royale and under the pretext of bringing permitted materials were bringing items which French regulations prohibited, such as tar, pitch, salt, lard, tobacco, and even cloth.30

In 1726 authorities in France repeated their orders to Louisbourg officials on trade with foreign vessels. Admiralty officers at Louisbourg were informed that it was expressly forbidden by the order of the court to allow any merchandise to enter Île Royale from foreign colonies except livestock, provisions, building materials, and, in case of need, flour to ensure compliance with these regulations. Guards were to be placed on all foreign ships arriving at Louisbourg. Despite the injunctions of 1726, St. Malo merchants complained in 1727 that St. Ovide allowed foreigners to trade goods other than those permitted. They also charged that the New Englanders received gold and silver when they were available, and fish when they were not.31

A St. Malo merchant charged that St. Ovide maltreated and imprisoned him and the crew of his ship, the Prudent, for having brought about the arrest of a New England ship trading at Louisbourg.32 In his defence, St. Ovide claimed that the merchant had boarded the ship in question with fifteen to twenty armed men and had maltreated the captain.33

According to Admiralty officials at Louisbourg, St. Ovide also interfered with their activities. In April 1727 Admiralty officials seized the brig Travellor, commanded by Captain Philipe Marrett, who admitted making a false declaration of goods landed, having neglected to declare £243 worth of tobacco, and other unspecified items. St.

30. Memorial of inhabitants of Île Royale to the Minister, October 1724, C11B, Vol. 7, ff. 183-85. At least one of the petitioners, known only as Morel, later traded with New England himself, so this complaint may have been motivated by jealousy towards competitors. Morel did business with Peter Faneuil of Boston in 1737. Faneuil to Thomas Kilby, Boston, 15 July 1737, Faneuil Letter Book, 1737-1739, Baker Library, Harvard University.

31. Complaint of Cotterel, enclosed in letter from the ministry to St. Ovide.


33. Ibid., ff. 27.
Ovide had intervened and had the confiscated goods returned. Not long after this the Minister of Marine, Maurepas, warned St. Ovide that "It is to your interest that there should be no more complaints on this score." When Maurepas asked St. Ovide to account for his actions, particularly in connection with charges that he had illicitly carried on trade with New Englanders, St. Ovide claimed that everything he had done had been for the good of the community, and had not benefited any individual.

Interestingly, in the orders of 1726 there were no references to the purchase of ships from New Englanders, although traffic had begun with Costebelle's purchase of New England vessels in 1714, and had continued despite the construction of vessels at Cape Breton from at least 1716. The problems encountered in early ventures into shipbuilding at Ile Royale suggest that in many instances it was easier to buy from New Englanders. In 1716 the commissaire-ordonnateur, Soubras, reported the construction of two boats at Miré (Mira) to carry planks, beams and wood from there to Louisbourg. Both vessels required corrections (repairs or modifications) for defects. The same month in which Soubras related this to authorities in France, they directed Soubras and the governor to encourage the New Englanders to build ships for "the merchants of the kingdom". From that time the French had continued to build some vessels at Ile Royale, but also bought ships from New England.

34. Ibid., ff. 32, 33.
35. Maurepas to St. Ovide and Mezy, 18 June 1728, A.N., B, Vol. 52, f. 582v.
In 1727 new regulations heralded the beginning of a stiff challenge by authorities in France to New England's trade with French colonies, as Maurepas, Minister of Marine from 1724 to 1749, a mercantilist of considerable conviction, decided to ban all trade between the English colonies in North America and the French colonies in America. He did so through an edict of November 1727. Not until October 1730 were the regulations registered at Louisbourg, until which time trade continued. But within a few months of registration it became clear that the regulations were having the desired effect. By December 1730 the ban had prevented many sales of New England ships at Louisbourg. Maurepas believed that the French colonies in North America, particularly Canada, would eventually produce enough ships that there would be no need to buy vessels from New England, but not everyone wanted to wait for the policy to bear fruit, as is indicated by the complaint of some St. Jean de Luz merchants in December 1730 that they needed English ships for the fishery.

Officials at Louisbourg frequently made use of loopholes in the French trade regulations permitting trade when absolutely necessary. In 1731 Governor St. Ovide allowed four New England ships to trade at Ile Royale on the grounds that they carried bricks and planks greatly needed by the contractor for the fortifications. He also acknowledged having permitted the sale by the New Englisher of cattle, sheep, and poultry, Indian wheat, apples, and onions, because the colony suffered shortages of those things. Louisbourg authorities also permitted

42. Ibid.
43. St. Ovide to the Minister, Louisbourg, 25 November 1731, C11B, Vol. 12, ff. 42. The vessels also carried a desk, flour, rice, lamb, pears, cheese, lard, beer and cider, but it is not clear if the authorities permitted the sale of these items. Admiralty report, Louisbourg, 10 November 1731, C11B, Vol. 12, f. 181.
New Englanders to sell five ships there in 1731, and thirteen in 1732.\footnote{44} Also, Mezy gave Michel Bourier permission in 1732 to go to New England to buy a ship, on the grounds that it was necessary in order for him to transport his effects to Martinique.\footnote{45}

Meanwhile, French authorities at Ile Royale continued to seize the occasional New England vessel. In addition to the Suzanne, they also seized the Phoenix in 1733. The commander of the Phoenix, Philip Aubin, had been ordered away from Louisbourg with his vessel four times. The vessel then went to nearby Scatary, where it traded for several days before being seized.\footnote{46} In any event, while the seizure of vessels such as the Suzanne and the Phoenix may have worried New England merchants, the seized did not stop them from trading at poorly supervised outports on Cape Breton Island. St. Ovide and Mezy reported in 1733 that residents of Petit Degrat and Port Toulouse received the New Englanders with tolerance, contrary to orders given to regulate foreign trade. Four New England vessels reportedly called at Port Toulouse in 1733, and several visited Petit Degrat every year. Care was taken to prevent abuses, claimed St. Ovide and Mezy, but it was not possible to catch every ship.\footnote{47}

In 1733 trade between New England and Ile Royale continued to be sanctioned by Louisbourg authorities, on the grounds that there were shortages on the island. By September some thirty-two ships had arrived at Louisbourg from New England.\footnote{48} New England's trade with Louis-

\footnote{44. Mezy to the Minister, Louisbourg, 3 February 1732; list of New England ships sold at Louisbourg in 1732, ClLB, Vol. 13, ff. 7, 110.  
46. Aubin was a frequent visitor to Louisbourg, having been there in 1726, 1728, and 1729. Boston Gazette, 4 July 1726; ClLB, Vol. 10, f. 64; New England Weekly Journal, 1 December 1729.  
47. St. Ovide and Mezy to (?) Minister of Marine), Louisbourg, 16 November 1733, ClLB, Vol. 14, f. 4.  
bourg continued at this level for the next ten years. From 1733 to 1743 an average of fifty ships a year reached Louisbourg from Acadia and New England. The average reported tonnage of New England vessels at Louisbourg in 1743 was 40.5 tons.

Throughout the period, New England merchants traded with confidence at Louisbourg. Concern expressed by New England newspapers at the erection of fortifications on Cape Breton Island was not reflected by the merchant community. In September 1733 the Boston Gazette published a report that the French were still adding to the fortifications at Louisbourg although they were alleged already to have mounted nearly 200 guns on the batteries there. The French were also said to have started fortifications at Port Toulouse. The newspaper expressed concern about the works in case there was war between France and England. It noted that "poor Canso...lies neglected, without so much as one gun for its defence, and in the neighbourhood of so powerful a rival in the fishery." New England merchants doing business at Canso took a rather different view of the military establishment at Canso. Members of the garrison were useful, on occasion, but at times others were a distinct nuisance. The most useful function of the garrison was not military, but rather, as in the case of the two John Bradstreets who were at Canso, it was economic.

49. Filion, p. 193. Some of the vessels which sailed to Louisbourg from Acadia were New England vessels, such as the schooner Pembroke, Thomas Treffry master, which arrived at Louisbourg from Canso on 17 October 1742. A.D., Charente-Maritime, Series B (Amirante de Louisbourg), (hereafter referred to for convenience as A.D., M. or Marine), B272, f. 1035.

50. Compiled from A.D., M., B272, 1742.

51. Boston Gazette, 17 September 1733. Differences in 1733 between France and Britain over the Polish Succession led to fear of a war between the two countries. See A.M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, p. 250n.
The Bradstreets facilitated trade with Louisbourg and one of them, at least, profited from it personally, although not without risk. In 1742 the victualler for the Canso garrison, King Gould, wrote to Bradstreet and warned him that his being engaged in trade "may at one time or other be of dangerous consequence to you". Gould advised Bradstreet "and as soon as you can conveniently wind up your Bottom Knock off."

That other members of the garrison were less useful is apparent from a memorial by Massachusetts and New Hampshire merchants involved in trade at Canso. Addressing Governor Philipps of Nova Scotia, the merchants complained that the garrison at Canso committed depredations on the fishing establishment and on warehouses at Canso. Among the signers of the petition were such prominent New England merchants as Peter and Andrew Faneuil, Stephen Botineau, Charles Apthorp, Jacob Wendall, and Joshua and Nathaniel Peirce. Philipps responded by establishing a court of sessions at Canso, composed of justices of the peace authorized to meet weekly. Several of those who had complained of the disorderly garrison, such as Joshua Peirce and Thomas Kilby, received appointments as justices.

While New England merchants were sensitive to anything at Canso or Cape Breton which might have interrupted or otherwise impeded the fishery at Canso or trade with the French, their representatives in the Massachusetts government demonstrated a like determination to silence

52. King Gould to John Bradstreet, Horseguards, 15 March 1742, Tredegar Mas. 287, National Library of Wales.
53. Memorial of Boston and New Hampshire merchants to Governor Philipps, received by Philipps at Canso, 7 October 1732, C.O. 217/6, f. 148.
publicity about illegal trade. They were especially concerned about statements Jeremiah Dunbar made before a committee of the British House of Commons in 1730, to the effect that New England timber reserved for the Crown was being cut by private individuals, who exported it from Boston to the French colonies. Dunbar reportedly charged that "most of the principal people in that country (New England) were involved," and that "some of the richest men in Boston got their estates by exporting timber and importing French sugar, rum and silks." Cape Breton was not mentioned in the report, but Dunbar reportedly said that there were merchants in Boston who were factors for the French. In that capacity they had ships built and registered in their own names, and afterwards they made the ships over to masters sent to Boston by the French to bring the vessels to the French colonies. This was more or less the technique used by Joshua Peirce in his dealings with his contact at Louisbourg.

An anxious Massachusetts House of Representatives set up a committee to investigate the report, because it contained "sundry injurious restrictions and false insinuations on the people of this Province their trade and Business...." Dunbar, then a resident of Boston, was summoned before the committee. He declared that parts of

57. New England merchants and officials felt that they had good reason to be alarmed. Dunbar's testimony came during a period of growing concern among British merchants at New England trade with the French West Indies. In 1731 a bill was introduced in the House of Commons to encourage the British West Indian islands by forbidding the importation into Britain, Ireland or the English colonies in North America, of sugar, rum or molasses from the colonies of any foreign nations. At the same time the bill would have banned the export of horses or lumber to the French West Indies. C. M. Andrews, "Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700-1750", *American Historical Review*, 20 (1914-15), p. 567. The bill came perilously close to passage into law, having been approved by the Commons, and debated by the Lords before having been dropped. *Ibid.*, p. 772. In 1733 the Molasses Act conceded that sugar, rum, and molasses might be imported, but only on payment of duties of 9d per gallon on foreign
the statements attributed to him were false, that he had said nothing about French silk in New England. The committee then called on Samuel Waldo and Joshua Winslow, who had been present at the Commons committee hearing at which Dunbar had testified. They declared that the report in the possession of the Massachusetts House contained the sum and substance of what Dunbar had said, including the comment about silks. Dunbar again denied the charges, but the committee concluded that Dunbar had misrepresented "His Majesty's good subjects of New-England to the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain."

No doubt Dunbar's charges had embarrassed the Massachusetts government, because Governor Belcher had taken a stand against illegal trade in proclamations of 1731 which reiterated the provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality of 1686, authorizing the confiscation of any French or English vessel caught fishing or trading in the territorial waters of the other sovereign. The Governor's proclamations give the appearance that the authorities did try to curb illicit trade, but they were also an admission that such trade existed. Belcher noted that "divers French Vessels have entered the Ports of this Province under Pretence of being disabled and hindered from proceeding on their voyages."58 The real purpose of the calls, Belcher suggested, was to trade. In

rum and 5s per hundredweight on foreign sugar. The Act permitted free trade in horses and lumber. At first there was concern among New Englanders that their trade would be hampered. Rhode Island's colonial agent remarked that the Act was "as bad as the old Bill, for to what purpose will it be to have Liberty to send away our Commodities if we cannot have returns for them." Kimball, Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of Rhode Island, I, 23, 24; Andrews, op. cit, p. 774n. In fact, the act was violated systematically. In the thirty-one years the Act was in effect only £13,702 was collected in duty on foreign molasses, accounting for a minute proportion of the molasses actually imported into the American colonies. G. M. Ostrander, "The Colonial Molasses Trade", Agricultural History, 30 (April 1956), p. 80.

58. Boston Gazette, 16 August 1731.
reiterating the provisions of the Treaty, Belcher reminded the merchant community that this trade was forbidden by law. The governor also recalled an act passed in 1701 entitled "an act for the preventing of Danger by the French residing within this Province", according to which French residents of Massachusetts were not permitted to live in seaports or on the frontier without a license from the governor and council. Belcher's recollection of this act can only have been directed towards the Huguenot community in Massachusetts, members of which had traded with the French in Acadia during the War of the League of Augsburg, and as an examination of the affairs of Peter Faneuil will demonstrate, also traded with the French at Louisbourg.

Curbs on Huguenot connections with the French would not have ended New England trade with Ile Royale. There were also prominent non-Huguenot merchants dealing with Louisbourg in the 1720's and the 1730's. For instance there were the Messrs. William Pepperrell of Kittery, Maine. In their involvement in the Newfoundland and Canso fisheries the Pepperrells came into contact with the French at Newfoundland and at Cape Breton. Sometimes these contacts resulted in

59. *Boston Gazette*, 16 August 1731.
60. William Pepperrell the elder arrived in America from England in the 1670's. His first trading venture of which there is firm evidence was to Newfoundland in 1682. Within a decade he was trading with the southern continental colonies and the West Indies. By 1702 he was well established as a merchant-shipowner, having an interest in at least seven ships, one of which he owned jointly with the Boston magnate Samuel Lillie. B. Fairchild, *Messrs. William Pepperrell, Merchants at Piscataqua* (Ithaca, 1954), pp. 31, 32, 39. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Pepperrell was in partnership with Andrew Belcher of Boston, the father Governor of Jonathan Belcher. After the war ended and trade revived, the Pepperrells began to show an interest in the Canso fishery. Much of the catch from this area went to Spain and other parts of southern Europe, trade with which ranked third in tonnage for the colonies behind trade with the West Indies and the British Isles. J. G. Lydon, "Fish and Flour for Gold: Southern Europe and the Colonial American Balance of Payments", *Business History Review*, XXIX, p. 172.
losses, but they must have been reasonably profitable overall because they continued for almost a decade. One venture on which the Pepperrells took a loss occurred in 1721, when a sloop in which the Pepperrell had an interest was wrecked on a call at Port Toulouse. The master of the vessel, a sloop called the Prosperous, saved only the clothes on his back.61 This voyage to Cape Breton was not an isolated venture. The same year in which the loss of the Prosperous took place, Pepperrell dispatched another vessel to Canso. This was the John and Humphrey, under the command of Captain John More. Pepperrell instructed More to dispose of his cargo of sundry items to either the French or the English. The cargo was typical of cargoes destined for the area, as it consisted of 2,500 feet of boards and planks, 5,500 staves, four calves, some cows, twenty-four sheep, one hogshead of rum and two hogsheads of tobacco.62 Pepperrell also told More to call at Port Toulouse and "See and bring home what our Vessels have got to send home." And if More could get £200 sterling or goods of that value for the ship he was to sell it.63

In 1723 the Pepperrells' operations in the Canso-Cape Breton area suffered another loss with the death of Captain John Watkins, son-in-law to the senior Pepperrell. Watkins was killed at Canso by either French or Indians. Pepperrell subsequently wrote to Major William Cosby, commander of the garrison at Canso, to ask his assistance in settling Watkins' affairs and getting in his effects, which Pepperrell described as very considerable.64 Such setbacks did not stop the

family from doing business in the area. The death of a business associate in 1726 and the correspondence occasioned by the need to settle his affairs provide an insight into Pepperrell's continued interests in the Canso region. Pepperrell owned a boat jointly with Captain John Dearing, which vessel was left at Port Toulouse on Dearing's death. Pepperrell asked Captain Thomas Richards to dispose of the boat to the best advantage for the Pepperrells and Captain Dearing's widow.\(^{65}\) The death of his son-in-law in 1723 had upset Pepperrell, but it and other setbacks were not sufficient cause for cessation of trade in the area.

Some sources suggest that the Pepperrells began to curtail their trade with Newfoundland and Cape Breton around 1725. Apparently they withdrew from direct participation in the fisheries in this period, as by 1731 they no longer had an interest in any fishing vessels.\(^{66}\) But although there may have been some curtailment of trade, it did not cease. The Pepperrells continued to make use of Louisbourg, as did Joshua Peirce, to facilitate their trade with the West Indies, particularly with Martinique. The details of this trade are sketchy, but the Pepperrells were sending ships to the West Indies via Louisbourg by 1729. That year Hughes Grangent, a Martinique merchant, wrote Pepperrell that a small boat belonging to the latter had arrived in Martinique under a French flag from Louisbourg.\(^{67}\) Grangent owed Pepperrell and a third party, Benjamin Clark, over £6,000 Massachusetts currency, and was remitting

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65. William Pepperrell Sr. to Captain Thomas Richards, 8 August 1726, Pepperrell Papers, ibid.
67. H. Grangent to William Pepperrell and Benjamin Clark, Martinique, 2 October 1729, Pepperrell Papers, Box 2, New England Historical and Genealogical Society. Subterfuge was employed because "France neither encouraged nor, after 1717, even condoned the New England trade (with the West Indies)."
rum and molasses to Boston in payment. The sum is considerable, so the traffic must have been heavy. In Grangent’s account there is a reference to four different New England ships in connection with the trade. 68

Doing business with Grangent was sometimes difficult. In January 1731 Grangent complained to Pepperrell of the latter having held up two brigs, thus making their entry at Louisbourg unfavourable for some unspecified reason. As an alternative, Grangent suggested that the vessels be sent to St. Lucia. 69 In reply Pepperrell advised Grangent that there had been a delay in fitting out the vessels because of an outbreak of smallpox at Boston, where Pepperrell had intended to have the work done. There were other obstacles as well in the way of the transaction. Pepperrell informed Grangent that he was owed over £500 "New England money" and that the debt would have to be settled before the ships could be sent. All these transactions were handled through Louisbourg, and Pepperrell declared that "I shall write to Mr. Daccaratt Junior at Lewisbourgh on Cape Brittain (sic) and if he will send us effects (I) will dispatch the two brigs. But I shall not advance any more money." 70 To make sure that the point was understood, Pepperrell remarked that he did not "care to Venture to Send them to St. Lucia or Louisbourg until the money is Secured in some English place, it is too Great a risque...." 71 Other New England

69. H. Grangent to William Pepperrell, Martinique, 11 January 1731, ibid.
70. Wm. Pepperrell to H. Grangent, 2 April 1731, ibid. Daccarrette was a prominent French merchant at Louisbourgh who was suspected of being involved in shipping New England products to the West Indies. T.J.A. Le Goff, "Michel Daccarrette", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III, 156, 157. His New England connections had not heretofor been identified. Daccarrette also did business with Peter Faneuil. Account of M. Daccarrette, 29 September 1732, P. Faneuil Daybook, 1731-32, p. 426.
71. Pepperrell to Grangent, ibid.
merchants, such as Peter Faneuil of Boston managed to conduct trade with the French with rather less apparent difficulty. For the Faneuils the Cape Breton trade may have been only a small part of their overall operations, but it was nevertheless pursued avidly. The Faneuils' first known venture to Louisbourg was in 1728 when Peter Faneuil received 61 barrels of sugar, and over thirty-two tierces of molasses from Louisbourg. The goods arrived on the sloop David & Susana, Temple Chevalier, master, and were from Anthony Ricord, a Martinique merchant. In 1729 Faneuil received shipments of rum, sugar, molasses, sweetmeats, cotton, wool, cocoa, wine, candles, brandy, and silks from Louisbourg. The goods were sent by merchants

72. Andrew Faneuil had helped supply the Walker expedition against Canada in 1711, and in 1718 looked after the plunder seized at Canso by Thomas Smart. The Faneuils' involvement in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton grew gradually. In the 1720's Andrew Faneuil provided Major Lawrence Armstrong at Annapolis Royal with goods on at least one occasion. C.O. 217/4, f. 111, n.d. In 1732 Peter and Andrew Faneuil were among those New England merchants who complained of the depredations of the garrison at Canso, C.O. 217/6, f. 148.

73. A tierce was one-third of a pipe, which was usually 105 gallons.

74. Invoice no. 101, 10 October 1728, P. Faneuil Invoice Book, 1725-30; P. Faneuil Ledger Book, 1725-32, p. 153; Chevalier's origins are unknown, but he was a frequent visitor at Louisbourg. In September 1727 and December 1731 Chevalier arrived in Boston with unspecified cargoes from Louisbourg. New England Weekly Journal, 30 September 1727, 18 December 1731. In 1731 he entered Louisbourg as master of the Mary, with a cargo of bricks, planks, apples, Indian wheat, onions, pears, cattle, sheep, and beer. C11B, Vol. 12, f. 181.
in Guadaloupe and La Rochelle.\textsuperscript{75}

In 1729 Peter and Andrew Faneuil did business with Abraham Tabois of Louisbourg. Tabois, who cannot otherwise be identified, continued to do business with the Faneuils for at least four years.\textsuperscript{76} Tabois was a middleman for the Faneuils, forwarding goods to them on the account of merchants in La Rochelle, and possibly on the accounts of French West Indian merchants.\textsuperscript{77} By 1733 the Faneuils had developed an arrangement with Joshua Peirce whereby he acted as an intermediary and a shipper of goods from Louisbourg for them. Joshua's brother Nathaniel carried molasses and other goods from Louisbourg to Boston for Andrew Faneuil in November 1733.\textsuperscript{78} In December there was correspondence between Peirce and Peter Faneuil about a delay in the arrival of a schooner from Louisbourg. This was apparently not the same vessel referred to in November correspondence, because it was not commanded by Nathaniel Peirce, but by a Mr. Libby.\textsuperscript{79}

Whether or not Joshua and Nathaniel Peirce still handled business at Louisbourg in the mid 1730's for the Faneuils is unclear. The Peirces were still making voyages to Canso as late as 1737, but by that time Peter Faneuil had appointed Thomas Kilby his agent at Canso, and did at least some of his trade at Louisbourg through him. In selecting Kilby as his agent, Peter Faneuil obtained the services of an individual with an intimate knowledge of the Canso area, an

\textsuperscript{75} Invoices no. 119, 120, 121, 1 and 10 September, & 17 November 1729, P. Faneuil Invoice Book, 1725-30; Baker Library, Harvard University.
\textsuperscript{76} P. Faneuil Ledger, 1730-32, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{77} Invoice no. 121, Invoice Book, 1725-30; Ledger, 1730-32, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{78} J. Peirce to P. Faneuil, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 9 & 30 November 1733, Peirce Letter Book.
\textsuperscript{79} J. Peirce to P. Faneuil, Portsmouth, 14 December 1733, Peirce Letter Book.
individual who, if not then well acquainted with Louisbourg would soon become so. Kilby had worked as a merchant at Boston after completing his studies at Harvard in 1726. His business endeavours took him to Canso, where he was granted land sometime prior to 1729, and named a justice of the peace in 1730.\textsuperscript{80}

Kilby was also an author, and it was allegedly through his writings that he became Peter Faneuil's agent. Kilby failed in business in the late 1730's. He then wrote a humorous will which included a bequest of his sins to a certain clergyman without any, and the choice of his legs to crippled Peter Faneuil, who is supposed to have been so amused that he rewarded Kilby with the agency at Canso.\textsuperscript{81} Many of Kilby's duties at Canso related to the Faneuils' fishing enterprise there. Thus, in a letter of June 1737 Peter Faneuil instructed Kilby to supervise the loading with fish of a ship bound for Bilboa, and to secure cargoes for three other ships. In the same letter Faneuil also instructed Kilby to go to Louisbourg and dispose of a sloop and its cargo or to send the sloop back to Boston. Faneuil advised his agent that he would give him credit for a sum of money at Louisbourg, implying that he had maintained contacts there since the earlier ventures under the auspices of Joshua Peirce. In addition to selling the sloop and its cargo, Kilby was instructed to see if any indigo, rum or molasses was available, "or anything ye

\textsuperscript{80} Governor Richard Philipps to John Henshaw et. al., C.O. 217/6, f. 150. Kilby is in many ways typical of Boston merchants of this period. Although married in the Congregational church in 1726, his rejection of that church is indicated by his membership in the Boston Episcopal Charitable Society a few months later. He thereby allied himself with the commercially-oriented Anglican community in Boston, which included such individuals as Charles Apthorp, one of Boston's wealthiest citizens in the 1740's.

\textsuperscript{81} L. S. Sargent, Dealings with the Dead, II (2 vols., Boston 1856), p. 567.
will turn to account here...." At the same time Faneuil requested Kilby to find out what was in demand at Louisbourg and advise him so that goods might be sent there.\(^{83}\)

Conditions must have been favourable for business at Louisbourg because shortly after writing Kilby, Faneuil sent him a cargo of lumber, salt, and other, unspecified, goods, and instructed him to dispose of them and buy indigo.\(^{84}\) Prices at Louisbourg cannot, however, always have been favourable. In July 1737 Faneuil wrote Kilby that "the French were starving for want of provisions they may thank themselves for it for when we used to carry it to 'em they would give nothing for it...." Faneuil may have complained about the prices he received for his goods at Louisbourg, but that did not stop him from doing business there, nor did it keep other New Englanders away in any great number. In 1736 there were thirty-five vessels from New England and Acadia reported to have called at Cape Breton, and the year before that fifty-two English colonial vessels appeared at Louisbourg.\(^{85}\)

In the summer of 1737 demand was good at Louisbourg. There was a shortage of provisions there which prompted Governor St. Ovide to write to Faneuil and promise that any Englishmen who came with provisions would have his protection.\(^{86}\) Upon receipt of this news Faneuil and Captain Peter Warren decided to send Kilby a sloop with a cargo of biscuit to sell at Louisbourg. In exchange for the food, Faneuil wanted rum, molasses, and cash. Explicit directions were given for the

\(^{82}\) P. Faneuil to T. Kilby, Boston, 13 June 1737, P. Faneuil Letter Book.
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
\(^{84}\) Faneuil to Kilby, Boston, 20 June 1737, ibid.
\(^{85}\) Account of trade for 1736, CHLB, Vol. 18, f. 170.
\(^{86}\) Faneuil to Kilby, Boston, 19 April, 1737, Faneuil Letter Book.
purchase of the rum. Faneuil wanted Cape Francois rum which was available from "Mr. Morpain...and no one else." Faneuil estimated that he and Warren would clear between £400 and £500 on the voyage.\(^{87}\)

Thomas Kilby visited Louisbourg not only on Peter Faneuil's behalf in 1737 and 1738, but apparently also on behalf of other New Englanders interested in trade with Cape Breton. There are references in Faneuil's correspondence which suggest that Kilby represented Philip Dumaresq, another Boston merchant.\(^{89}\) Kilby also represented Thomas Bell, and made a declaration to Louisbourg Admiralty officials for him in 1738.\(^{90}\) Both Dumaresq and Bell were known to Faneuil.\(^{91}\)

Faneuil's correspondence with Kilby reveals several facets of his involvement with Louisbourg: that they were extensive enough to require his agent's presence there frequently, that Louisbourg facilitated Faneuil's trade with France, that there was some trade between Cape Breton and Rhode Island at this time, and that Faneuil sometimes represented Governor St. Ovide's interests in New England. Faneuil did more than merely purchase whatever French goods were available at Louisbourg. He went beyond that and had correspondence with two Bordeaux merchants, Etienne Sigal and P. Griffon, about trade matters. This would imply that although merchants at Louisbourg might handle some details of transaction between merchants in New England and France or the West Indies, there were occasions on which

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87. Ibid., The Morpain referred to was possibly Pierre Morpain, privateer, port captain and naval and militia officer at Louisbourg. See B. Pothier, "Pierre Morpain", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III, 474-76, for a useful sketch, which unfortunately says nothing about his interest in trade.


89. Faneuil to Kilby, 18 August 1737, ibid. Dumaresq's origins are obscure, but by 1731 he was retailing Canary wines, West Indian rum and sugar, and a variety of English goods at his warehouse in Boston. By 1733 he was making voyages to Canso. Boston Gazette, 30 July 1731, 30 July 1733.


the principals would discuss their transactions directly, and eliminate
the middleman at Louisbourg. It is not clear if this was a general
phenomenon in the 1730's, but there is evidence to suggest it was in
the 1750's.

As for trade between Louisbourg and Rhode Island, it does
not seem to have been extensive, although Rhode Island may have been,
along with Connecticut, a source of the livestock and other provisions
which Boston merchants sent to Louisbourg. There was some contact
between Cape Breton and Rhode Island in 1736 and 1738. In 1736 Isaac
Beauchamp of Boston made a voyage from Cape Breton to Rhode Island,92
and in March 1738 Governor St. Ovide granted Faneuil authority to
represent him in settling a dispute between Beauchamp and some Louis-
bourg merchants over a shipment of tobacco.93

The precise nature of Beauchamp's offence is unclear, but
the fact that Louisbourg authorities acted against some residents of
New England for trade violations does not mean that the authorities
were not beyond suspicion of indulging in improper conduct themselves.
During the 1730's there were charges that both inhabitants and
officials of Ile Royale participated in illegal trade. In November
1738 resident fishermen at Cape Breton accused a captain of infantry of

92. Boston Gazette, 7 July 1735; List of New England and Acadian ships
at Ile Royale in 1735, C118, Vol. 17, f. 84.
93. P. Faneuil to Issac Beauchamp, Boston, 6 March 1738, Faneuil Letter
Book. It is not known if Faneuil was able to settle the matter.
Beauchamp, described in certain New England court records in 1725
as a mariner, and in 1728 as a Boston merchant, dropped out of
sight for a decade after the 1738 incident. Suffolk County Court
Files, Vol. 165, writ no. 18752, 17 September 1725; Vol. 188, writ no.
w1892, 9 March 1727; Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 4, p. 591.
An analysis of Louisbourg shipping records for 1737 and 1742-43,
reveals that beef and/or pork (typical Connecticut products), were
携带 on roughly 40% of the New England vessels calling at Louis-
bourg then. See: A.C., Series C11C, vol. 9, and A.D., Charente-
taking the cargo of a Boston schooner and selling it at exorbitant prices. They also accused Duvivier of sending a brig to an area near Canso so as to trade with the New Englanders there. They suggested that he did so with the protection of Mezy.94 Anonymous charges were also levelled at the governor and the commissaire-ordonnateur, in December, to the effect that they allowed Frenchmen to fish at Canso, and thereby obtained contraband to introduce into the colony.95

Such charges met with constant denial. In November 1739 Isaac-Louis de Forant, St. Ovide's successor as governor (1739-1740), and Francois Bigot, commissaire-ordonnateur (1739-1745), declared that they were conforming to the restrictions of 1727 on foreign trade. They stated that they had not allowed any prohibited merchandise to be sold, with the exception of ninety-eight quarts of flour sent by Governor Armstrong of Nova Scotia.96 Bigot did admit receiving reports that several merchants and captains had brought into Louisbourg fish which they had bought at Canso. According to Bigot's information, the parties involved in bringing in this forbidden commodity landed the fish in small ports, and carried it to Louisbourg in shallops.97 In 1740 Bigot and another Louisbourg official, Bourville, reported that they had already warned one resident about trading at Canso, and that if he continued he would be punished.98

Trade with New England continued to grow in the 1740's as Ile

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94. Resident fishermen at Ile Royale to (? the Minister), 26 November 1738, C11B, Vol. 20, f. 304.
96. Forant and Bigot to the Minister, Louisbourg, 9 November 1739, C11B, Vol. 21, f. 19.
97. Bigot to the Minister, Louisbourg, 6 November 1739, ibid., f. 112.
98. Bigot to the Minister, 25 October 1740, ibid., f. 54.
St. Jean failed to become a reliable source of foodstuffs. In 1741 French records record fifty New England vessels at Louisbourg, and in 1742 there were approximately the same number. Severe shortages of food at Louisbourg kept demand high. In June 1742 Bigot wrote the minister that since his previous letter misery had grown in the colony to the point that there was little or no bread and no kind of vegetables whatsoever. Bigot stated that there were four English (New England) vessels in port with planks but that there were such shortages of flour and corn in New England that their export to Cape Breton was forbidden.  

It is clear from another letter from Bigot that the Minister expected Louisbourg authorities to send to France when Canada could not provide the island with adequate supplies. Bigot agreed to follow the order, but observed that it would be expensive for the colony because goods which came from France were always more expensive than those which came from New England.  

In any event, New Englanders did their best to fill the void. If there was a ban on exports of flour and corn from New England it had been lifted by July, because that month the schooner Betty, Captain Joseph Smethurst, brought 156 barrels of flour to Louisbourg along with other foodstuffs, iron pots, cattle, chairs, and planks. Smethurst received permission to sell the entire cargo. Little is known about Smethurst, but his visits to Louisbourg were similar to others in the period. Rather than declare Louisbourg to be his destination,  

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99. Bigot to the Minister, Louisbourg, 18 June 1742, f. 87-89.  
100. Duquesnel & Bigot to the Minister, Louisbourg, 25 October 1742, Cl1B, Vol. 24, f. 35.  
101. Archives Départementales, Marine, B272, ff. 460-480. Smethurst's cargo is typical for the period. The Phoenix, Michael Hodge master, arrived at Louisbourg in June 1742 with a cargo of "bureaux", pulleys or blocks, tobacco, pens, pumps, a human figure, and six leather chairs. Ibid., ff. 130-35. Hodge was allowed to sell all but the leather chairs and tobacco. Ibid., f. 135.
Smethurst declared that he was bound for Newfoundland. Perhaps, like Nathaniel Newman of Newbury, Massachusetts, Smethurst actually went to Newfoundland before going to Cape Breton. Newman, who arrived at Louisbourg on 30 July 1742, had a cargo which included a small quantity of fish (sixteen quintals of cod). Newman received permission to sell everything. Duquesnel and Bigot informed the minister that they were reluctant to permit such sales, but that captains of vessels from France requested permission for the transactions. Duquesnel (commandant of Ile Royale, 1740-1745), and Bigot obviously felt that circumstances necessitated such compromises with metropolitan regulations. They stated in 1742 that Cape Breton Island's fishery was so deficient that most ships from France were obliged to return half full.

Again in 1743 shortages in Canada led Louisbourg officials to secure large quantities of foodstuffs from the English colonies in North America. Late in July word reached Louisbourg that caterpillars had ravaged the wheat crop in Canada. Gilles Hocquart, intendant of Canada, requested the purchase of 4,000 or more quarts of flour from New England. Eventually word arrived that the caterpillars were not as severe a problem as had been anticipated, and that the wheat was more beautiful than anyone could remember in a long time. By that time Louisbourg officials had sent to Canso for the flour, 800 to 900 quintals of biscuit, a cargo of corn, vegetables, and 4,000 quintals of cod.

Requests such as the 1743 request sent to Canso in 1743 for a

103. A.D., Marine, B272, ff. 510-515, 555-560.
105. Duquesnel and Bigot to the Minister, Louisbourg, 12 August 1743, C11B, Vol. 25, f. 3.
large quantity of foodstuffs at short notice are very revealing of the evolution of trade between New England and Ile Royale from the 1720's to the 1740's. At first the contacts had been haphazard. There is no evidence of important New England merchants having been involved in trade with Louisbourg prior to 1720 when Bowdoin traded at Cape Breton. By the late 1720's merchants such as the Peirces, Pepperrells and Faneuils had developed contacts at Louisbourg which enabled them to obtain goods from France and the French West Indies through Louisbourg. Both Faneuil and the Pepperrells also corresponded with merchants in the West Indies, and Peter Faneuil corresponded with merchants in France. This suggests that merchants at Louisbourg may have been playing an increasingly less important role in promoting trade between New England and parts of the French empire by the late 1730's, although French records do not bear this out as a general phenomenon until the 1750's.

French officials at Louisbourg accepted the trade from the very beginning as a necessary means of providing the inhabitants of Ile Royale with provisions and building materials. Authorities in France came to accept this state of affairs even though it contradicted the mercantilist precepts on which French imperial trade policy was based. Louisbourg proved useful not only as a means of infiltrating French West Indian goods into New England, but also as a means of obtaining much needed ships from New England. On occasion unauthorized goods entered the French empire at Louisbourg from New England. Constant vigilance was required by authorities in France to remind Louisbourg officials of the limits set for commercial intercourse between New England and Ile Royale.

As for the New Englanders, they pursued trade with Louisbourg until the eve of the War of the Austrian Succession. They also managed to

106. Insurance could still be obtained at Boston in 1744 for ships sailing to Louisbourg. An Account of the Early Insurance Offices in Massachusetts from 1724 to 1801", anon., Insurance Library Association, Boston, Reports, 1888-1900 (Boston, 1901), p. 32.
obtain a near monopoly in shipping English colonial goods to Louis­bourg. Only two of the English colonial vessels whose visits to Louisbourg were recorded in the detailed French Marine records for 1742 and 1743 came from outside New England. At first New Englanders conducted trade with Cape Breton quite openly. Early attempts by the Governors of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to stop the trade were futile, and in fact were uncalled for because the trade was legal as long as New England merchants sold only items permitted to be sold under the Navigation Acts outside the British empire, and as long as they paid duty on the French goods they brought back. Only after the Molasses Act of 1733 placed prohibitive duties on some French products did New Englanders resort to subterfuge in conducting their trade with Louisbourg.

Mercantilist-inspired Navigation Acts, and similarly inspired French trade regulations bowed to colonial realities which dictated that colonists would trade wherever they could whenever possible. Both the New Englanders and the French inhabitants of Ile Royale echoed the sentiments of Joseph Robineau de Villebon, the Governor of Acadia, who, immediately on his arrival in the colony in 1691 had to adjust to colonial realities, and explained to his superiors that "Without these compromises it would be impossible to exist in this country...."

107. In August 1743 two vessels arrived from New York. One was the Midnight, Thomas Barnes master. AD, M, B272, ff. 2045-2050. The other vessel was the Letreal, Joseph Beals, master, which arrived from New York in August 1743. Ibid., ff. 2060-2065.

Chapter III
The Louisbourg Expedition of 1745

There are numerous published accounts, some descriptive, some analytical, of the 1745 assault on Louisbourg.¹ These accounts provide a useful framework within which to study the impact the expedition itself, and the events which led up to it, had on the merchant community of New England, and how the values of that community affected not only government leaders but many of the less well placed members of the expedition itself. Such an inquiry must proceed by first exploring the effects of French privateering from Louisbourg on New England, and the effect of New England privateering on Louisbourg, and on the fishing and shipping which Louisbourg was meant to protect and facilitate in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and around Newfoundland. One must also examine New England's concern for the security of its northern frontier in the context of the economic development of the area after 1713, and of New England's concern for the security of its northern frontier in the context of the economic development of the area after 1713, and of New England's pathological fear of Indian attacks.

An analysis of the 1745 expedition and the events which led to it suggest that the fundamental nature of New England's response to Louisbourg during the War of the Austrain Succession was secular. To be sure, religion played a role in the expedition. The English evangelist, George Whitefield, provided a motto for the expedition: **Nil desperandum**

¹ See particularly G. A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, 1967), J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg From its Foundation to its Fall (Sydney, N.S., 1969). Of less value is F. Downey, Louisbourg, Key to a Continent (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965).
Christo duce, and there were New Englanders such as Richard Waldron of New Hampshire who spoke of their desire "to be the person under God that shall reduce and pull down that stronghold of Satan and set up the kingdom of our exalted Saviour. 2

At the same time, however, Whitefield did not encourage Pepperrell to accept the leadership of the expedition. In fact, Whitefield warned Pepperrell that if the expedition succeeded he would be the subject of envy, and that if it failed he would be derided. Waldron, despite his statement indicating that he detested Catholicism, also saw the opportunity for gain from the expedition. As he advised his son Thomas Thomas, after the victory:

"...a Capt's Commission in the King's Pay, would be a fine thing... for there will doubtless be a vast Trade, and a prudent Man in such a Station, with a trading Talent, might make good earnings, besides the Profit of his Commission...." 3

The occurrence of a major religious revival in New England in the 1740's clearly suggests that religion played an important role in the lives of many New Englanders in that period. At the same time, there is no evidence of a major clerical initiative for an expedition against the French - in sharp contrast with the situation in 1690, when Cotton Mather, New England's leading cleric in that day, installed his favourite, William Phips, as leader of the expedition against Port Royal, then capital of Acadia. Mather did his utmost to turn the expedition into a crusade against what he regarded as the Anti-Christ. In a sermon preached on the eve of the expedition Mather declared that the struggle was a matter of:

3. Ibid., Richard Waldron to Thomas Waldron, July 4, 1745.
Jesus against Satan, and who is for the true Christian Religion against Popery and Paganism?

In the 1740's the merchant community had established a degree of control over the legislatures of the New England colonies. The merchants did not always get their way, and there were often divisions among the merchants themselves, but in government circles at least, their values tended to prevail to a much greater extent by the 1740's than they had in earlier decades. (In some respects the Great Awakening might be seen as a reaction against the growing strength of secular values in the colonies.) These changing attitudes were reflected in society's views towards the French. More New Englanders had close and amicable contact with the French between 1713 and 1744 than in the few decades just before 1713. It was therefore probably difficult for the old stereotypes to assert themselves. Consider the account of the capture of the French privateer Doloboratz by Edward Tyng of Massachusetts, in 1744. As the Boston Evening Post reported, "The Captain (of the French vessel) is a Gentleman well known in Town, and has a Son at School about six Miles off. It is said he has been kind and serviceable to the English upon many Occasions at Louisbourg, and he is now civilly treated himself...."

Given changing attitudes in New England, it is not surprising that when the War of the Austrian Succession began in 1744 New Englanders expressed concern for the security of their frontiers and the economy, but there was little or no insistence on a holy war. In fact, rather than anticipating war, there seemed to be surprise at news of the conflict. Samuel Waldo, the Boston merchant received a letter from Maine after news of the war reached New England indicating that people in Maine were quite startled. The news must have filled Governor

6. Alex Nickles to S. Waldo, 5 May 1744, Waldo Papers, Letters, 1744, MHS.
Shirley of Massachusetts with apprehension. Since his appointment as governor in 1741 he had faithfully followed his instructions and constantly importuned the Massachusetts legislature to improve the colony's defences, and to aid Nova Scotia. But members of the legislature showed little concern for Nova Scotia's safety even though Shirley claimed that "The fall of Nova Scotia would leave the New England colonies unprotected from raids originating at the great fortress of Louisbourg...."7

Shirley's concern for Nova Scotia was genuine and not merely a ploy to pry money from a tight-fisted legislature. From Paul Mascarene, commander of the garrison at Annapolis Royal, Shirley learned of a rumour that a French officer with a great number of Indians and "people from Cape Breton" were not far from the village, which news caused panic among women and children living outside the fort and obliged Mascarene to give them refuge in the fort. The report of the French party proved false at that time, although Annapolis Royal was later attacked. Mascarene regarded as more probable, however, a report that "at Lewisbourg (sic) they are fitting out seven privateers, two already out to cruise on the Eastern Coast of this government in order to draw provisions from our settlements of French inhabitants at the upper end of our Bay...."8

French moves to secure supplies for Louisbourg did indeed soon threaten British authority in Nova Scotia. Canso, with its small garrison and lone guard vessel, had for at least a year been an obstacle to French contact with Acadian settlements in Nova Scotia.9 With

9. In 1743 Duquesnel had reported English harassment of French fishermen from Petit Degrat. Moreover, forces from Canso had seized three vessels from Ile Royale and an Acadian vessel carrying cattle, sheep, and poultry to Ile Royale. The English also stopped a vessel which Du Chambon had sent to Ile St. Jean. Duquesnel to the minister, Louisbourg, 12 August 1743, Cl1B, Vol. 25, 1743, f. 54.
shipping from France declining, and supplies from New England likely to be cut off, the French could not afford further interference with their Acadian supply lines. On 19 May it became clear that they had decided to act. A New England vessel off Canso saw the village on fire, concluded that the French had taken and destroyed it, and duly informed New England.  

Aside from strategic considerations, the loss of Canso was a blow to the New England fisheries. Canso had declined in importance in the late 1730's, and by 1744 the British government took it "for granted that there is no Fishery now at Cancea (sic)." What caused Canso's decline is unclear. The migratory habits of the cod may have led to a decline in catches in the area, or increasing reliance on larger fishing vessels which did not have to call at Canso may have made the port less important. At the same time, the war with Spain had eliminated a major market for New England-caught cod. In 1744 the prospect of war might have deterred New England fishermen from operating in the area, but some New Englanders with longstanding interests in the area were still there. Edward How, who had been doing business at Canso since at least 1722, claimed to have lost property worth £1263 sterling when the French raided Canso. Moreover, Governor Shirley suggested that (despite Canso's decline in the previous few years), its preservation was necessary "for carrying on the New England fishery."

Two days after publication of the news of Canso's fall, Governor Shirley addressed the General Court of Massachusetts and advised passage of a law prohibiting trade with "our enemies". Such a law, Shirley...
suggested, would contribute much to reducing the French colonies. On 1 June the Assembly established a committee to consider the matter of the province's defences. Then, on Saturday, 2 June, Shirley received a letter from the Duke of Newcastle requesting him to proclaim the declaration of war against France, which he did within hours. The following Monday Shirley urged the Massachusetts General Court to strengthen Massachusetts' defences, and to secure Nova Scotia, where he expected an attack on Annapolis Royal.

Meanwhile, New England began to feel the effects of French privateering. Early in June the master of a New England fishing vessel which reached Portsmouth, New Hampshire, reported having been taken, then released, by a French privateer schooner. The French told him that their vessel, and another which accompanied it, had fitted out from Louisbourg, and had taken nine New England fishing vessels. Soon similar reports surfaced in other colonies. On 15 June the snow Limpton arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, and reported that a French vessel from St. Malo had taken it off Newfoundland on 20 May, after having taken three other colonial vessels. The French commander claimed to have sailed with ten or twelve other ships, "Letter of Marque Men bound to Cape Breton".

Publication of such news must have had a considerable impact on the New England psyche. In the War of the League of Augsburg and in the

14. Ibid., 1 June 1744.
15. Shirley to the Duke of Newcastle, Boston, 2 June 1744, Shirley Correspondence, I, 125. Boston Gazette, 5 June 1744.
17. Boston Gazette, 19 June 1744. The French placed 27 prisoners aboard the snow and allowed it to proceed.
War of the Spanish Succession, French privateers had ravaged New England's fishing industry and seriously hampered shipping. The possibility of a recurrence of this situation so alarmed New Englanders that in 1744 and 1745 even merchants who had earlier traded with Louisbourg expressed concern for New England's safety if French forces from Louisbourg took Annapolis Royal: "if that should be the case 'tis easy to foresee what the fatal consequences must be to all the English settlements upon the sea coast as well as to the Inland Towns by the Privateers infesting the one, & the Indians destroying the other."  

By this time the New England colonies had begun making preparations to counter the threat from French privateers. Rhode Island prepared to send out a sloop to protect that colony's coast, and proposed a joint patrol with Connecticut, whose Governor, Law, concurred: "Your sloop being joined with ours will be a terror to any small privateer, and thereby a greater safeguard to both our Governments."  

18. Salem, Massachusetts, had approximately sixty fishing vessels at the beginning of the War of the League of Augsburg. By the end of the war only a half dozen remained: MHS, Collections, 3 Ser., vol. 7, p. 202. In 1695 a Canadian privateer operating with the aid of Acadian officials took nine New England fishing smacks in one cruise. Villebon to Pontchartrain, 10 September & 25 August 1695, in J. C. Webster, ed., Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century, Letters, Journals and Memoirs of Joseph Robineau de Villebon (St. John, N.B., 1934), p. 15. In the last year before the capture of Port Royal in 1710, two French privateers operating from there captured thirty-five ships in New England waters. Subcase to the Minister of Marine, 3 January 1710, PANS, II, # 44.  

19. Memorial to Governor Wentworth, the Council, and House of Representatives of New Hampshire, read in Council, 11 February 1745, N. Boston (ed.), Provincial Papers Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, (Nashua, 1871), V. 286. Among the signers were Joshua and Nathaniel Peirce, both of whom had traded at Louisbourg.  

20. The vessel sent out was the Tartar, a 115 ton sloop built for the Rhode Island government in 1740. H. M. Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers in King George's War (Providence, 1926), p. 186. Greene to Law, Newport, 7 June 1744, CCGRI, I, 261.
Rhode Island merchants also outfitted privateers to counter the French threat, with most of them operating in the Caribbean, that traditional haunt of privateers. Some, however, found employment in northern waters intercepting vessels going to and from Louisbourg and Quebec. On a cruise off the Grand Banks in July 1744 the Rhode Island privateer schooner Phoenix seized the French schooner Magdalaine, bound from Louisbourg to Martinique with a cargo of salt, fish, and oil.

Boston interests were also interested in Louisbourg merchant vessels and in the activities of Louisbourg privateers. The Province Snow Prince of Orange departed on a cruise against Louisbourg privateers in New England waters in June 1744. A large brig was ready to sail in that period, and two other privateers were being outfitted for cruises in unspecified waters. At the same time, the Massachusetts General Court prepared an address to the King requesting "a suitable Naval Force" to protect the trade and fishery of Massachusetts, and passed an act to encourage sailors to enlist on the Province Snow "or such Vessels of War as shall be Commission'd and fitted out by this or other of his Majesty's Governments during this present War with France."

Successes by New England vessels offset to a degree the loss of Canso and losses to Louisbourg privateers. The Prince of Orange scored a significant victory when it captured a Louisbourg privateer off Cape Cod on 24 June. The victory appears to have boosted considerably the morale of New Englanders. The French vessel was an eighty ton sloop manned by some ninety-four men and commanded by Johannis-Galand d'Oloboratz. This was the same d'Oloboratz who had commanded a vessel in the attack on

21. During the War of the Spanish Succession at least eighteen privateers sailed from New York, capturing and destroying forty-four French and Spanish vessels, mostly in the West Indies. See J. C. Lydon, Pirates, Privateers and Profits (Boston, 1970), p. 64.
22. Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers, p. 123. Chapin indicates that the French vessel was bound for Louisbourg, but considering its cargo it must have been bound from Louisbourg, as the Boston Gazette stated on 21 August 1744.
25. Chapin, Privateering in King George's War (Providence, 1928), p. 68.
Canso in May. Shirley was very pleased at this turn of events. In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle in early July he referred with pride to the victory, and to the vessel's participation in the assault on Canso. Shirley's feelings were reflected by the merchant community. Boston merchants, pleased or relieved at the capture, presented Edward Tyng, commander of the Prince of Orange, with a silver cup weighing about 100 ounces as a tribute to his exploit.

There were fewer plaudits for Captain Samuel Waterhouse's behaviour. He had set sail, in command of the forty gun brig Hawk, on a privateering cruise off Cape Breton late in June. He returned to Boston with a large French brig "deeply loaded ('tis said) with wine, oil, brandy, sole leatehr etc. bound from France to Canada...." That August the Governor and Council of Massachusetts met to inquire into a report that Waterhouse had permitted the escape of a privateer which he might have taken. Several crew members claimed that Waterhouse had refused to follow the vessel after an initial encounter with it. According to one account Waterhouse had allowed the French vessel to escape "after firing a few guns, by voluntarily parting from him with a salute of three Cheers." In consequence, the French vessel had continued to cruise on the New England coast and had taken several ships, thus providing "the enemies of your King and Country...with Provisions in that French Colony which most wanted 'em."

One possible answer to Waterhouse's behaviour is that he was acquainted with the French privateer and did not want to engage in battle with him for that reason. This is possible, because Waterhouse had made a commercial voyage to Louisbourg in June 1743, and had received permission

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26. Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 7 July 1744, Shirley Correspondence, I, 133.
28. Massachusetts Archives, vol. 64, p. 252. Waterhouse's vessel carried thirty-two guns, and was manned by a crew of 138 men. It was owned by Captain Henry Atkins, John Dennie, and Benjamin Austin. Chapin, Privateering in King George's War, p. 37.
there to sell a cargo of planks, shingles, bricks, "bureaux", cattle and sheep. An even more plausible explanation of Waterhouse's behaviour was provided by a crew member who declared that before the Hawk had sailed from Boston some men he assumed to be the owners had come aboard and had entreated Waterhouse not to engage any privateer, on the grounds that the Hawk was not fitted out for such a purpose.

Waterhouse apparently satisfied the Council that his conduct was not improper, because in August 1744 he was again cruising against the French, and sent in three prizes: a ship, a brig, and a schooner.

Massachusetts authorities, however, may have had cause to fear that other New Englanders were breaking the law and supplying Louisbourg. In July a letter to that effect, signed "Wishwell" was left privately at Province-House. Josiah Willard, the provincial secretary, proclaimed in the Boston Gazette of 21 July that if the author of the letter would provide the governor with evidence of the alleged practices, "he shall receive all proper encouragement, recompense and protection therein."

Whether in response to this request for evidence or for other reasons, enemies of Thomas Hutchinson, wealthy merchant and member of the House of Representatives since 1737, accused him of trading with the French. In reply, Hutchinson stated in the Boston Gazette that Governor Shirley could clear him of any charges of wrong-doing. Shirley explained that the government of Massachusetts owed Frenchmen from

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30. Ibid., 7 August 1744.
32. Deposition of John Flood and Zechariah Foss, 3 August 1744, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 64, pp. 245-246.
33. Boston Gazette, 14 August 1744.
34. Ibid., 21 July 1744.
35. The amount was presumably in Massachusetts old tenor (worth perhaps only £500 sterling at that time). A charge of £1,000 sterling would have been unusually high.
Louisbourg £1,000,\(^{35}\) for the hire of two vessels used in a prisoner exchange. The French agreed to accept paper money if allowed to use it to purchase goods in Boston. At Shirley's request, Hutchinson determined that the French wanted to buy some cider and "common axes for cutting wood". The Council approved the transaction, because as Shirley stated in a conversation with Hutchinson, "Surely those axes can't be deem'd warlike stores."\(^{36}\) Aside from this incident, Hutchinson's extant correspondence does not indicate any involvement in illegal trade.\(^{37}\)

Despite the rumours of illegal trade with Louisbourg in 1744 there is no evidence that such trade was conducted on a large scale, if at all, after the declaration of war became known in New England. In 1743 some seventy-eight vessels from New England and Nova Scotia had called at Louisbourg. But for 1744 the recorded totals declined to twelve.\(^{38}\)

Meanwhile the privateering war continued. Captain Gatman of Boston lost his seventy ton privateer schooner at Port Bass (Port aux Basques?), Newfoundland, to a new French man-of-war built at Quebec.\(^{39}\) Captain Loring, after taking and sinking a small schooner not far from Cape Breton, had his vessel taken by a sixty-four gun man-of-war and led to Louisbourg. Pierre Morpain captured a British sloop bound to Boston some fifty leagues off Cape Cod, and carried it into Louisbourg.\(^{40}\)

Morpain had begun a coastal cruise in the _Succes_ in March 1744. In that period a French vessel took three ships off Boston. They had cargoes of flour, oil, and other effects.\(^{41}\) Morpain had played a

\(^{36}\) Boston Gazette, 17 November 1744.

\(^{37}\) M. Freiberg, "Thomas Hutchinson: The First Fifty Years, 1711-1761", _William and Mary Quarterly_, 3 Ser. 15, 1958, p. 40.


\(^{39}\) The French vessel was believed to have been commanded by Pierre Morpain. Chapin, _Privateering in King George's War_, p. 44.


\(^{41}\) DuChambon and Bigot to the Minister, Ile Royale, 4 November 1744, A.C., C11B, vol. 26, 1744, ff. 32, 33.
prominent role in the privateering war against New England from 1707 to 1710, operating out of Port Royal. The news that he was again active as a privateer spread quickly in the New England colonies. Some Massachusetts fishermen captured by the French in June reached Boston early in July and soon there were reports in colonial newspapers that the "noted Commander, famous for his Exploits on this Coast in the last War", had vowed to "take the Vessels out of Nantasket Harbour".42

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1744 Louisbourg privateers continued to take a heavy toll of New England vessels. Late in October Boston received word that a brig which the French had taken from Captain Loring off Cape Breton had attacked a small New England privateer, the Resolution, commanded by Captain Donahew.43 At the same time New England learned that a French privateer operating off Cape Henlopen had taken four English vessels. The French ship was said to be L'Experience, from Cape Breton. Two of the vessels it took were from New England, one from Rhode Island and the other from Boston.44 Altogether some thirty New England ships of from twenty to 180 tons were carried into Louisbourg along with six shallops and 1350 quintals of cod. Louisbourg Admiralty authorities placed the value of the captured ships at just over 114,409 livres.45

New England vessels secured control of the coast by the autumn of 1744,46 but in the latter part of 1744 and early in 1745 Louisbourg authorities took steps to regain the initiative. In September the Sr. Maillet prepared the La Brador for a privateering cruise. Twelve

43. Donahue had sailed from Newberry, Massachusetts. On that cruise he captured a sloop off Cape Breton laden with livestock, and on 7 October took a French ship with 3,000 quintals of fish and a quantity of oil. The Resolution was owned by Thomas Fillebrown, Jacob Griggs, Andrew Hall, and the well-known Huguenot merchant, William Bowdoin. Chapin, Privateering in King George's War, p. 46.
46. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg, p. 21.
different people at Louisbourg held shares in the vessel, including not only merchants, but also such officials as Loppinot, Prevost, and Bigot. Collectively, these officials owned just over one-third of the vessel. Officials also held shares in Le Lizard, outfitted as a privateer in October 1744, at a cost of 2,400 livres. The armateurs and outfitters of Louisbourg privateers also petitioned the king for permission to change the usual division of prize goods taken to Louisbourg to facilitate their operations.

New Englanders seized a comparable number of French vessels off Cape Breton and Newfoundland. An examination of two Boston newspapers, the Gazette and the Weekly News-Letter, suggests that thirteen to fifteen small vessels at Cape Breton and over twenty vessels in Newfoundland waters fell to New England privateers. The bulk of the small vessels taken at Cape Breton were taken by Captain Joseph Beal of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He reportedly took twelve to fourteen small vessels with his twenty-five ton schooner, "plundered some villages, and surpriz'd some Traders, from whom he took Gunpowder and other Goods to a great Value." He returned to his home port with "a great booty".

New England newspaper accounts of the privateering war were numerous, and seem to have played an important role in stimulating a desire by New Englanders to take Cape Breton. The relationship of newspaper accounts to public opinion, in this context, has not previously been evaluated, and the evidence for a causal relationship may be too tenuous to assert definitely, but such a relationship is not implausible.

47. They held shares worth 5,500 livres. The total value of the vessel was 15,000 livres. AC, M, B275, f. 79, f. 80v-83v, 15 October 1744. Le Lizard must have been a much smaller vessel than La Brador, which cost 34,590 livres to supply and outfit: Ibid., f. 89-93v, 4 Nov. 1744.
49. Boston Gazette, 23 October 1744.
There were no newspapers at all in New England until 1704, and only one when the War of the Spanish Succession ended in 1713. In the War of the League of Augsburg and the War of the Spanish Succession it was difficult to recruit volunteers for the major expeditions against Acadia, or to guard the frontier. Numerous young men fled from Massachusetts to Rhode Island to avoid military service, and in several instances the Massachusetts authorities impressed men. In the 1740's there were several newspapers in Boston, and the success of New England privateers, and reports of rich booty were made well-known. In 1745 there would be no problems in securing recruits for the Louisbourg expedition.

Privateering was probably very profitable for some individuals, but at the same time, it was an expensive undertaking, absorbing considerable capital and manpower. In 1744 Rhode Island had twenty-one privateers at sea. The average crew consisted of more than 100 men, and an unknown number of men were engaged in building, outfitting, and supplying the vessels; moreover, there were admiralty officials and lawyers involved in the condemnation and sale of prizes. A visitor to Newport in August 1744 noted that at the Philosophical Club there was no discussion of philosophical matters: "They talked of privateering and building of vessels."\footnote{Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers, p. 12.}

Merchants also speculated in the shares of privateers. The value of shares in Boston was probably comparable to values in New York, where in 1745 Christopher Bancker paid £68 15s for a one-sixteenth share in the Clinton. By January 1746 Bancker had obtained another one-sixteenth share. He sold them both for a total of £485 9s 8 1/4d.\footnote{James G. Lydon, Pirates, Privateers and Profits (Boston, 1971), p. 239.}
Nor was direct investment in shares the only avenue to profit. A merchant might also purchase a seaman's shares, at a discount, when prize decisions were appealed and likely to involve lengthy judicial hearings. Individuals might even enlist indentured servants or slaves to serve on privateers and collect their prize money. Thomas Hutchinson thought the possibility of profits great enough that he and his partner, Thomas Goldthwait, acted as agent for several Massachusetts privateers in the 1740's. One of the vessels was the Hawk, on behalf of whose officers and crew Hutchinson and Goldthwait secured an exemption from duties for prize cargoes it captured.

Against the profits of individuals must be weighed the great expenses involved in outfitting, insuring, and operating a privateer, the dimension of manpower and vessels from the fisheries, coastal and overseas trades. In examining the cost factor of privateering operations one finds that during the War of the Austrian Succession a sound vessel for privateering could cost £800 to £1,000 exclusive of war stores or provisions. The crew sizes tended to be approximately ten times greater than those of merchant vessels. Massachusetts sent out some fourteen privateers between 1739 and 1748, while Rhode Island fielded forty. Given the average crew size of 100, this indicates that as many as 5,400 men were directly involved in privateering and unavailable for fishing or other productive maritime endeavours. General costs probably absorbed ten to fifteen per cent of the value of the prizes taken, and insurance would have been approximately twelve and two-thirds per cent. There were also losses of privateers to vessels from

52. Ibid., p. 242.
53. Freiberg, "Thomas Hutchinson, The First Fifty Years", p. 39. The Massachusetts House of Representatives granted the concession on all prize goods condemned at Boston during the war. Petition of Thomas Hutchinson and T. Goldthwait, 10 October 1744, Journals of the House of Representatives, XX, 81.
54. Lydon, Pirates, Privateers and Profits, pp. 237, 35, 240. Costs were calculated at these levels on the assumption that they would be comparable to costs at New York, for which precise figures are available.
Louisbourg, such as the privateer schooner commanded by Captain Gatman of Boston (already mentioned), taken by a Quebec-built ship and led to Louisbourg. There was also the Province Snow, *Prince of Orange*, taken while in the pay of the Massachusetts government in May 1745.55

While maritime interests in New England tried to cope with French privateering in the first few months of the war, Governor Shirley dealt with this, and with improving the defences of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia generally. The garrison at Annapolis Royal had to be strengthened because of French and Indian assaults on it. Shirley believed that "The fall of Nova Scotia would leave the New England colonies unprotected from raids originating at the great fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island."56 Clearly, Shirley saw Louisbourg and Canada as the roots of New England's defence problems. In a speech to the General Assembly on 10 October Shirley discussed the incitement of the Indians on the frontier, and stated that "These Attempts indeed of our enemies at Louisbourg have been hitherto and I hope will be frustrated by us...." But French plans to inspire a general revolt of the inhabitants of Nova Scotia still demanded "a most speedy and close attention..."57

New England's fear of Indians cannot be explained adequately in terms of the alliance some tribes had with the French. The root of New England's fear was much deeper, resting in the fact that the

55. The ship had been built at Boston for the Massachusetts govern­ment in 1740 at a cost of £6,500. It was a 180 ton galley, rigged as a snow. It required £3,500 to equip the vessel with guns and supplies. Chapin, *Privateers in King George's War*, p.68. In November 1745 the Massachusetts Council authorized payment of four months wages to the next of kin of each officer and seamen aboard the vessel. *Journals of the House of Representatives, XXII*, 110, 111.
Pilgrims and the Puritans had not been interested in discovering and conquering Indian empires, but in finding a tabula rasa on which they could inscribe their dream. Thus William Bradford's "first thoughts on the New World emphasized the virtual emptiness of the land and dismissed the few Indians present as having little claim to humanity and less to the land." 58

When Shirley became interested in an expedition against Louisbourg he saw it not only as a means to protect and expand New England's maritime interests, but also as a means of coping with the Indian threat. But until the autumn of 1744 New Englanders do not seem seriously to have considered attacking Louisbourg and eliminating it as a threat to New England. Then, in late September, the arrival at Boston of some 350 English prisoners from Louisbourg led to speculation on the merits of an expedition. 59 Given the frequency of commercial contacts between Louisbourg and New England before the war, New England authorities must have had a good indication of the state of the fortifications there. Now the returned prisoners gave authorities an indication of how the French were coping under wartime conditions. Shirley informed the Duke of Newcastle not long after the return of the prisoners that Louisbourg was greatly in need of provisions, and that the French there had "been under Apprehension all this year of a Visit from England...." Moreover, there were West Indian merchant ships at Louisbourg which would not sail until late in October

56. Shirley to Pelham, 15 November 1744, cited by Schutz, Shirley, p. 87. The seventy men Shirley sent to Annapolis Royal in July proved sufficient to bring about the withdrawal of the Micmac Indians then besieging the fort, but there was a chance that the French would attack again.

57. Boston Gazette, 6 November 1744.


or the middle of November. Shirley suggested that if the vessel by which his letter was going to England had a swift passage, English authorities might take action, and the French ships "whose value is reported here to be exceeding great", might be intercepted. In late November Shirley mentioned Louisbourg in his correspondence in such a way as to suggest he may have been hoping to interest the British government in attacking the island, not just intercepting shipping from there. As Shirley stated to Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire, Captain Ryall was on his way to Britain.

where I hope he will be of considerable service to our part of the world, with the Lords of the Admiralty and other parts of the Ministry, from his particular knowledge of Louisbourg, and of its harbour; and of the great consequences of the acquisition of Cape Breton and the keeping of Canso and Annapolis....

Further encouragement to consider measures against Louisbourg came early in December. Many of the thirty-five New Englanders who returned to Boston from Louisbourg that month reportedly voiced the opinion that Cape Breton "might be easily taken by a small force from Great Britain under honest and skillful Officers". It was probably some of these prisoners who informed Shirley that Francois Du Pont Duvivier, the French officer who had led the assault on Canso and an attack on Annapolis Royal, had departed for France, with three pilots familiar with the coasts of Nova Scotia and New England. It was expected that they would return in January or February with "Some ships with Stores and Recruits for the garrison at Cape Breton and also some Ships of Force to proceed to the coasts of Cape Breton, Nova

60. Shirley to Newcastle, Shirley Correspondence, I, 145.
61. Shirley to Governor Benning Wentworth, ibid., I, 152.
Scotia...with a Design to make a Descent on Annapolis Royal and to cruise on the coasts of New England." Armed with this information Shirley suggested to Admiralty officials that British warships intercept the French fleet, and thus deal "a killing blow to the Enemy." Louisbourg, without supplies, would then surrender to a blockading naval force.63

Shirley was probably aware of the several proposals made between 1740 and 1744 to attack Louisbourg,64 but at first he showed no inclination to take the initiative in calling for the reduction of the French colony. When Shirley called for the cooperation of Massachusetts and New Hampshire in December 1744 in carrying on the war he did not mention attacking Cape Breton.65 As late as 5 January 1745, when Shirley wrote Newcastle, there was no reference in his correspondence to Cape Breton, although he did say that "if any opportunity of annoying the Enemy's Settlements from hence shall present itself to me, your Grace may depend upon the most Indefatiguable Attention from me to improve it for his Majesty's Service."66

It was the enthusiastic espousal of an expedition by merchants and place-seekers such as John Bradstreet and William Vaughan which influenced Shirley to approach the General Court on the subject. Bradstreet, an officer at Canso when it was captured by the French in 1744, had familiarized himself with Cape Breton not only for official reasons but also through participation in trade with the French.67 Bradstreet's

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63. Shirley to the Lords of the Admiralty, 7 December 1744, Admiralty I/3817, cited by Rawlyk, p. 29.
64. In 1740 an anonymous proposal to take Cape Breton and Canada suggested such a conquest would be of the utmost importance to British trade, the North American fishery, and the security of the English colonies in North America. Once taken, Louisbourg would be secured by a garrison of 1,000 British troops: British Museum, Additional Mss, 33,028, f. 374. In 1741 Lieutenant Governor Clarke of New York suggested the French be driven out of North America. Louisbourg was the key to his plans. He saw it
captivity at Louisbourg after the French attack on Canso convinced him that a New England force might easily take the French centre. Few New Englanders accepted this argument at first—with the notable exception of the Maine entrepreneur, William Vaughan, whose family had shown an interest in curbing French ambitions in North America at least as early as 1710, when William's father, George, was involved in the capture of Port Royal. William Vaughan no doubt hoped that securing British navigation to Quebec or providing the French with "great opportunities to annoy and interrupt our fishery." Clarke proposed an expedition composed of New Englanders to take place at the end of winter, just as the drift-ice cleared the Cape Breton coast, so that the attack might take place before spring supplies arrived from France: Clarke to the Duke of Newcastle, New York, 22 April 1741, New York Colonial Documents, VI, 182-184. A similar proposal came from Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Court Judge Robert Auchmuty in April 1744: British Museum, Add. Mss., 32,703, f. 320.

65. Shirley to Wentworth, Boston, 20 December 1744, Shirley Correspondence, I, 154, 155.
66. Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 5 January 1745, ibid., I, 159.
67. Several Bradstreets were involved in New England's trade with Louisbourg. (See Chapter 2 for information on the activities of John and his cousin of the same name. For a general discussion of John's career at Canso and Louisbourg see W. G. Godfrey, "John Bradstreet at Louisbourg: Emergence or Re-emergence?" Acadiensis, IV, no. 1 (autumn 1974), 100-120.) John's brother Simon was also involved in the New England-Louisbourg trade. In 1730 he sold a ship called the Six Fleurs to Charles de St. Etienne at Louisbourg. A.C., G3, vol. 2037, f. 97, 18 September 1730.
69. It is noteworthy that two of the strongest advocates of the Louisbourg expedition were entrepreneurs with interests in the economy of northern New England. In addition to Vaughan there was Samuel Waldo, who had traded with the West Indies, and was involved in timber and settlement schemes in northern New England. These two men represent the considerable investment made in that area since the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713. During that struggle and the War of the
his advocacy of an expedition against Cape Breton would result in rewards for him from the British government, since his father had been appointed Lieutenant Governor of New Hampshire allegedly because of his role in the 1719 Port Royal expedition. A successful expedition against Cape Breton would also provide relief for Maine's fishing interests, which had suffered greatly from French privateering. Victory over the French might also provide Vaughan with increased opportunities for trade at Louisbourg, where he had reputedly traded. In January 1745 Vaughan went to Boston to present Governor Shirley with a plan to take Louisbourg by surprise. He suggested that the storming party might walk over the thirty foot walls of the fortress by means of snowdrifts.

On 9 January 1745 Shirley presented the House of Representatives with a proposal that New England attack Louisbourg. Stressing economic factors, Shirley argued that Massachusetts could expect "the utmost annoyance" of its "navigation & Trade in general, and frequent capture of our provision Vessels, & the destruction of our Fishery in particular from the Harbour of Louisbourg...." He suggested that a force of 2,000 men "from the best information that can be had" would be enough to take Louisbourg and ruin the French fishery. Even a partial success would "bring an irreparable loss to the enemy, and an invaluable acquisition for this Country."

Shirley's correspondence leaves no hint of the response he anticipated from the House. One can only assume that he would not have proposed the expedition if he had thought it would not be received favourably. There were certainly some members of the House on whose support he could rely. Paramount among these supporters was League of Augsburg, the northern frontier of New England had been devastated by French and Indian attacks. In 1717 the population of Maine was still less than it had been in 1660: S. H. Sutherland, Population Distribution in Colonial America (New York, 1936), p. 32.

71. C. K. Shipton, "William Vaughan", Sibley's Harvard Graduates,
Samuel Waldo, who in 1739 "as one well acquainted with American affairs" had presented the Duke of Newcastle with a plan for the reduction of Cape Breton and Canada, to be put into execution when war started. Newcastle's response is not known, but when Waldo returned to New England in 1741 he related his plan to Shirley, who allegedly approved, although he took no action on the proposal at that time.73

Waldo's interest in the expedition can be explained largely in terms of his business interests. In addition to his investment in the slave trade with the West Indies,74 Waldo had extensive interests in Maine and New Hampshire, and by the 1740's had shown more than a passing interest in Nova Scotia. His interest in northern New England ranged from the mast trade to colonization schemes. In 1734 he had announced a plan to establish two settlements on the St. George River in Maine, and invited prospective applicants to call on him at his Boston home.75 In 1740 or 1741 Waldo had proposed the "immediate settlement of a considerable number of families from Switzerland, the Palatinate and other parts adjacent" in Nova Scotia if the claim to Nova Scotia which he had purchased from John Nelson in 1730 was confirmed, a civil government established, and garrisons continued at Annapolis Royal and Canso. Then, in case of war with France, Waldo believed Cape Breton might "be the more easily reduced and afterwards supported by his Majesty without which it will be a scourge to all our Northern Colonys & may entirely destroy our Fishery both on the Coast of New England & Newfoundland."76 By the 1740's Waldo was

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72. Shirley to the House of Representatives, 9 January 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I, 159.
73. "The Case of Samuel Waldo of Boston..." n.d., Knox Papers, Vol. 50, p. 73, MHS. Waldo's proposal was prompted by anticipation that Britain, having gone to war against Spain in 1739, would also go to war with France.
74. Boston Gazette, 29 November 1744.
75. Ibid., 10 March 1735.
sufficiently well-known or influential that in 1744 he was elected to the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{77}

Waldo and his friends were an important part of Shirley's political following, but they could not ensure a favorable response to the initial proposal for an expedition against Cape Breton. An expedition would mean a valuable expansion of Massachusetts' trade, and the award of imperial offices for promoters of the expedition, but these prospects did not sway the House at first. As Thomas Hutchinson admitted, the strategy for winning approval for an expedition was "like selling the skin of a bear before catching him."\textsuperscript{78}

A joint House-Council committee was set up on 10 January to consider the proposal. Two days later it reported against the scheme, suggesting that responsibility for the organization and financing of such an expedition rested with the British government. The committee advised that the matter be laid before the king, that he might know of the "imminent hazzard (sic)" of Massachusetts being "extremely impoverished if not utterly ruined by the situation of the French at Louisbourg." The Representatives further advised Shirley "to represent to his Majesty the ready Disposition of this Province, as far as they are able, to exert themselves in Conjunction with the other Governments on such an occasion."\textsuperscript{79}

Some New Englanders thought that accommodation with the French might be possible, that despite the war an agreement with the French might be negotiated whereby "both sides would be willing to leave the fishery unmolested."\textsuperscript{80} That such an agreement might be possible was

\textsuperscript{77} British Museum, Add. Mss. 19049, f.l.
\textsuperscript{78} Schutz, Shirley, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{80} Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, II, 408-410.
suggested by Louisbourg authorities. In a letter to Shirley late in June 1744, dealing mainly with a proposed prisoner exchange, Duquesnel had suggested that if it was in Shirley's power to obtain from the king of England an arrangement ("accomodement"), for the French and English to fish peacefully, "je croix que je disposeroit mon maitre y a consentir." 81

There is no evidence of extensive discussion of this alternative. In fact, by January 1745, despite the legislature's initial rejection of the proposed Louisbourg expedition, Shirley was still trying to enlist support for an expedition. In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle two days after the legislature's initial rejection of the expedition, Shirley asked Newcastle to represent to the king "the ready Disposition of this province to exert themselves to the utmost of their abilities in conjunction with the other neighbouring Governments...", if an expedition should be organized. Shirley represented Louisbourg as a threat to colonial shipping and to New England's fishery, "now in danger of being quite destroyed and lost to the enemy...." Were this fishery to become exclusively English "the revenue would certainly be very large, and the Nursery of able seamen raised thereby for the Royal Navy be very considerably increased...." 82 Moreover, the reduction of Cape Breton could cut off navigation to and from Canada, and would therefore probably lead to the capture of that colony. The advantage of gaining Cape Breton and Canada was staggering by Shirley's reckoning: the new acquisitions, with their fur trade, fisheries, naval stores, and consumption of British manufactures, could make them "a more valuable Territory to

82. Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 14 January 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I, 161-164. Since Elizabethan days "British statesmen saw in the fisheries a national incubator for seamen, 'a feeder of the fleet as unrivalled for the excellence of its material as it was inexhaustible in its resources.'": G. S. Graham, "Fisheries and Sea Power," G. A. Rawlyk (ed.), Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1967), p. 9. In 1761 the Board of Trade decided after studying the resources of Canada, Louisiana, and Newfoundland, that "the Newfoundland Fishery as a means of
Great Britain than what any Kingdom or State in Europe had belonging to it." On the other hand, the loss of Nova Scotia might mean the destruction of New Hampshire and enable the French to dispute the mastery of North America with Britain. "Such may be the differences between His Majesty's reducing Cape Breton and holding Nova Scotia, and the French king's holding Cape Breton and gaining that province...."83 Locally, Shirley suggested to the Boston merchant James Gibson that he draw up a petition asking reconsideration by the House of Represent­atives of the proposal for an expedition.84

Meanwhile, William Vaughan attempted to pressure the General Court into a reconsideration of the expedition by means of petitions he solicited from Marblehead fishermen and "a great number of Merchants, Traders & other inhabitants of the Town of Boston...." In recommending the fishermen's petition to the Assembly Shirley acknowledged its previous rejection of an expedition but suggested that the petition merited consideration because the same spirit "prevails all over the maritime parts of the Province," and because "a particular scheme for effecting the Enterprize therein mentioned is proposed...."85

Four days later Shirley submitted the Boston petition to the General Court with his strong endorsement. The more he considered the proposed expedition, he related, the more he was persuaded that 3,000 men could be landed on Cape Breton where they would at least be able to hold the field until a sufficient naval force and enough troops from England might arrive to guarantee the capture of the whole island. Moreover, he felt assured that New York and the other New England

wealth and power is of more worth than both the aforementioned provinces." Ibid., p. 8.
83. Shirley to Newcastle, 14 January 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I 161-164.
84. L. D. Johnson, A Boston Merchant of 1745: or Incidents in the Life of James Gibson (Boston, 1847), p. 17.
Shirley to the General Court, 23 January 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I, 167.
colonies would assist Massachusetts, and that from "our past experience of His Majesty's Royal bounty..." Massachusetts would not have to bear more than its just share of the costs. 86

Once more a committee of both houses debated the matter. It deliberated for two days, hearing the testimony of two former prisoners at Louisbourg and others who had traded there. It was the consensus of the witnesses that "the place is at this time less capable of being defended against an Attack than its probable it will ever be hereafter." The committee, chaired by William Pepperrell, with his business knowledge of Cape Breton, reported in favour of an expedition of 3,000 men, provisioned for four months. Each volunteer would receive twenty-five shillings a month, a blanket, and one month's pay in advance. The recruits would be entitled to all plunder they took. 87 The implications of the decision were widespread. Shirley had had to tolerate inflationary fiscal policies to satisfy the majority in the House of Representatives ever since he came to office in 1741. At the same time, economic expansion was necessary to placate those elements opposed to a paper currency and the inflation which had accompanied it. As governor Shirley had also to contend with the ever-present horde of place-seekers "whose own appetite for offices, militia commissions, and supply contracts were almost insatiable." The Louisbourg expedition gave Shirley all the patronage he needed, the Boston merchants the trade they desired, and Massachusetts and New Hampshire fishermen, driven from their fishing grounds, the employment they sought. 88

Four days after the General Court decided in favour of an expedition Shirley started writing other colonial governors to request

86. Ibid.
support for the expedition. New York sent no men, but Governor Clinton sent ten eighteen-pound guns to Boston, "Tho' I could hardly get my own (legislature) to pay for the transportation of them...." New Englanders were generally more responsive to Shirley's blandishments. In approaching the other New England colonies Shirley tried to find particular reasons for suggesting that they cooperate. In the case of Connecticut, Shirley could only suggest that the expedition would secure "the safety of the trade and navigation of all those colonies & Provinces...." In writing Governor William Greene of Rhode Island, Shirley advanced very specific reasons for Rhode Island's participation. If Cape Breton were not taken, the open coastline of Rhode Island, and French resentment at Rhode Island privateering "make it particularly probable that you may have a sudden visit from the French, this summer...." For New Hampshire there might be dire consequences if Cape Breton were not reduced, for then, Shirley advised Governor Wentworth, there was great danger that the French would "soon be masters of Nova Scotia...," and then with Indian support "and assistance from Canada would irresistibly over run and destroy all our eastern settlements as far as Portsmouth itself in your Province...."

Connecticut responded readily to Shirley's request for cooperation, perhaps because in a number of ways the immediacy of the war had been brought home to that colony. Rhode Island and Connecticut were both concerned about French shipping activities around Cape Breton.

89. Clinton to the Duke of Newcastle, New York, 18 November 1745, New York Colonial Documents, VI, 284. (Later on Clinton persuaded the New Yorkers to provide New England with some financial assistance.)

90. Shirley to Governor Law, Boston, 29 January 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I, 171.

91. Shirley to Governor Greene, Boston, 29 January 1745, ibid., I, 173.

92. Shirley to Governor Wentworth, Boston, 31 January 1745, ibid., I, 177.
As early as September 1744 the governors of the two colonies exchanged information on the subject. Governor Shirley also kept Connecticut informed about activity at Louisbourg. In September Shirley informed Law of intelligence that there were two privateers from Louisbourg cruising on the New England coast, and another ready to sail. Early in January 1745 the Duke of Newcastle informed Law that the king had decided to use Commodore Peter Warren's squadron to protect Nova Scotia and New England and their trade and fishery. He requested that Connecticut provide Warren with any assistance he might request. When Shirley requested cooperation in the Cape Breton expedition Connecticut agreed to raise a land force of 500 men under the command of Deputy Governor Roger Wolcott.

New Hampshire also responded promptly to Shirley's appeal for assistance. On 1 February 1745 the New Hampshire House of Representatives voted to establish a committee to join with one appointed by the Council to consider Shirley's request. The next day the committee reported that "it is incumbent upon this Province to do all they can to forward & encourage the intended Expedition...." The legislature agreed to raise some 250 volunteers, but seeing this as an opportunity to put more paper money in circulation, stipulated that they approved of participation in the expedition only "if proper methods may be concluded on for defraying the charge," by printing up to £10,000 of new money. The House was prepared to refuse participation in the expedition if Governor Wentworth did not meet its demands, so Wentworth finally agreed to the printing of £13,000 paper money, and on 23 and 24 February the House of Representatives voted to raise 350 volunteers.

94. Shirley to Law, Boston, 19 September 1744, ibid., I, 225.
95. Newcastle to Law, Whitehall, 3 January 1745, Law Papers, I, 249.
97. Ibid., 289-291.
In Rhode Island Governor Greene dutifully called a session of the House of Deputies to discuss Shirley's request for aid. Recommending the affair to the Deputies' "wise consideration", Green said that he did not doubt that they would do everything that they "shall judge most for the Honour and Interest of this Colony." After what the governor described as "a long and Tedium Debate" the Deputies authorized the equipping of the government sloop, and the raising of up to 130 volunteers to man it. The sloop, the Tartar, would be provisioned for four months, and the crew entitled to all prizes and plunder taken in the course of the expedition. In case this and other contributions to the war effort escaped the notice of the British government, the colony petitioned the Lords of Trade to take note of the expenses Rhode Island incurred because of the war, particularly in fortifying the entrance to Newport's harbour. Also, noting a British grant of cannon and mortars to Massachusetts, Rhode Island requested "that we may not be distinguished as the only Colony to which his Majesty's Royal Bounty has not been extended."100

Not until 1 March did the assembly authorize the recruitment of soldiers. Then it agreed to the enlistment of only 150 soldiers. At the same time the authorized maximum complement for the Tartar was reduced from 130 to ninety men. In addition to setting rates of pay the assembly voted various other inducements, such as entitling soldiers to all plunder they might take, and, on release from service, exempting them from all impressment for military service for two years. Furthermore, the assembly granted volunteers immunity from arrest for six months under certain circumstances.101

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98. Ibid., 312, 313. The Deputies did not authorize any land forces at that time "notwithstanding the upper house Sundry times earnestly Insisted upon it."


100. "Form of a Petition to the Lords of Trade", CCGRI, I, 314, 315.

one thing, obtaining them was another. As Governor Greene informed Governor Law late in March, the assembly had not ordered impressment, although there were so many Rhode Islanders away on privateering cruises that "there seems to be but few at present that are spirited in the Affair."102 As late as 7 April only two of the three companies authorized had been raised, and they were so incomplete that the government proposed merging them. Even then Greene was uncertain that Rhode Island would be able to rendezvous its land forces with Connecticut's.103

But if there were problems in recruiting manpower for a land force, there was no problem in enlisting the support of Rhode Island's merchants. They rented the Fame, a 250 ton ship, to the Massachusetts government for use on the expedition. The owners, Philip Wilkinson and Daniel Ayrault, Jr., reportedly received £32,620 5s for the use of the vessel although it was in service only until 7 August 1745. Newport merchants subscribed £2,053 13s 4d for the vessel's costs. Also, the Massachusetts government chartered the sloop Caesar, a 130 ton privateer which carried a crew of 110 men. Newport merchants subscribed £8,000 towards its hire from Wilkinson and Ayrault.104

In Massachusetts preparations for the expedition progressed smoothly. Governor Shirley and the House Speaker prevailed on William Pepperrell to lead the expedition. As Pepperrell later recalled the episode, he had been reluctant to leave New England because his wife was sick and his business unsettled. When, however, he was told that there would be no expedition without him, and he considered the damage the French had done at Canso, and the threat they posed to New England,

103. Greene to Roger Wolcott, Newport, 7 April 1745, ibid., I, 278.
104. Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers in King George's War, pp. 93, 99, 169, 171.
its cod fishery and trade, "upon these considerations I undertook this difficult hazardous enterprize...." These considerations did not preclude looking out for any business opportunities at Louisbourg. Pepperrell discussed such matters with his son-in-law Nathaniel Sparhawk and his partner Benjamin Colman, who were especially interested in prize goods which could be sold in Britain. Pepperrell may also have discussed cooperative ventures with Samuel Waldo, as Sparhawk and Colman advised Pepperrell that they "would be glad to take a third in any purchase with you and Mr. Waldo...."105

Profits from prizes attracted the attention of some merchants, but supply contracts were also very attractive. Sparhawk benefitted from the initial outfitting of the expedition when Governor Shirley asked him to supply 150 men with 150 cutlasses and forty firelocks.106 Thomas Hancock benefitted much more than this. For Hancock the Louisbourg expedition proved an invaluable opportunity to expand business operations. Government contracts which came to Hancock in 1745 and later gave him such wealth that by the end of the war he was one of the wealthiest men in the colonies.107 In the spring of 1745 the Louisbourg expedition brought Hancock a flurry of business. As soon as one ship was manned another appeared. But war also added burdens to doing business. Hancock had "an infinite deal of trouble" getting materials shipped to Placentia because "the Expedition takes up all the vessels & men as I have wrote you, and I am obliged to give an extravagant price." It cost Hancock £100 a month to rent a schooner for Placentia, and the insurance charges came to £115.108 In May Hancock reported that shipping charges had reached an all-time

105. Colman and Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 1 May 1745, MHS, Collections, 6 Ser. X, 133.
106. Shirley to Wentworth, Boston, 6 March 1745, Provincial Papers... of New Hampshire, V, 940.
108. Hancock to Christopher Kilby, Boston, 19 April 1745, Hancock Letterbook, MHS.
high, with £20 a month being offered for sailors to go to Newfoundland. There were no takers. "In short, the Expedition has taken up all our Men & Vessels." Nevertheless, Hancock boasted that his friendship with Governor Shirley was such that it exempted his sailors from impressment.  

As for men who actually went on the expedition, most probably saw it as an opportunity to better themselves economically. Some of the participants wanted to do battle with the French for religious reasons, but not all clergy in New England encouraged enlistment. Before he accepted the leadership of the expedition William Pepperrell consulted the English evangelist George Whitefield. Whitefield, a popular preacher who first visited New England in 1741, was staying at the Pepperrells' Kittery home in 1745 before embarking on a tour of eastern Maine. His advice contrasted strikingly with Cotton Mather's desire to determine the leadership of the Port Royal and Quebec expeditions in 1690, and turn them into crusades against the anti-Christ. Rather than encourage Pepperrell, Whitefield told him "that he did not think the scheme very promising; that the eyes of all would be upon him; that if he did not succeed, the widows and orphans of the slain would reproach him; and that if it should succeed, many would regard him with envy...." Later on, Henry Sherburne, the Portsmouth merchant who served as New Hampshire's commissary for the expedition, asked Whitefield to endorse the expedition and to give it a motto. Rather than leaping at the opportunity, Whitefield hesitated before finally consenting.  

109. Ibid., 24 May 1745.  
110. Hancock to James Wibault, 19 April 1745, ibid.  
112. Ibid.
Despite Whitefield's misgivings, the people of northern New England responded enthusiastically to the expedition. The Rev. T. Smith recorded in his journal on 22 February that "All the talk is about the expedition. There is a marvelous zeal and concurrence through the whole country with respect to it. Such as the like was never seen in this part of the world." This enthusiasm was a cause of misgiving for some clergy. The Rev. Thomas Prince of Boston was said to have been saddened as he saw the "heavenly shower" of the revivals abating, that "from fighting the devil", the recently awakened multitudes "must turn to fighting the French." Prince later changed his mind about the expedition, and saw victory as "the Lord's doing", but it is doubtful if the bulk of the New England recruits saw themselves as the agents of God. Religious enthusiasm may have been one of the main concerns of northern New Englanders from 1713 to 1744, but it has also been suggested that recruits from eastern New England were "more adventurous than pious."

As one anonymous participant in the expedition stated in his diary, "Louisbourg, which was Like to prove Detrimental if not Destroying to our Country So affected the minds of many (together with the Expectation of seeing Great Things, etc.) As to Incline many, yea, Very Many to Venture themselves and enlist into the Service...."

There were clerics such as the Rev. Samuel Moody, who, as he embarked for Louisbourg, seized a hatchet and declared it "The Sword of the Lord and Gideon", and Deacon John Gray who wrote Pepperrell: "O that I could be with you and dear parson Moody in that church to destroy the images there set up...." A more typical response to the expedition, however, was that of J. Payne of Boston. In writing

117. MHS, Collections, 6 Ser. X, 106.
Robert Hale, Payne extended good wishes to him, then expressed the hope that the letter would find him "at Louisbourg with a bowl of punch, a pipe, and a pack of cards in your hand and whatever else you desire (I had forgot to mention a pretty French Madammoizelle (sic))." Indeed, although the New Englanders allegedly "insisted on prayer before they made the successful attack", the attitudes of most participants other than the clergy were overwhelmingly secular. Like most of the participants in New England's assaults on Acadia in the first two colonial wars, the members of the expedition of 1745 were more interested in plunder than popery. Samuel Curwen of Massachusetts, for instance, reportedly joined "because of the stagnation of trade and a desire to settle scores with the French privateers." For some people who joined the expedition, it must have seemed a logical extension of their earlier interests in Louisbourg. Captain Joseph Smethurst, who commanded the ill-fated Prince of Orange, had carried a mixed cargo of foodstuffs and building materials to Louisbourg in July 1742. Another master of a vessel on the Louisbourg expedition, Robert Becket of the Boneta, had been to Louisbourg in July 1742 with a cargo of planks and other items.

In the accounts of many of the participants, acquisition of plunder rated as a main topic of conversation along with the hardships of the campaign. Dudley Bradstreet of Groton, Massachusetts, made no comment of a religious nature, but noted on 2 May that forces returning to the camp before Louisbourg from a raid on a village at the head of the cove brought some treasure home. Three days later he

118. J. Payne to Robert Hale, Boston, 24 April 1745, Gilman Papers, NHS.
recorded that New Englanders had killed two Frenchmen encountered in the woods, and had discovered "goods Sufficient to Load 2 Vessels Besides Two Bags of gold..."\textsuperscript{123} James Gibson, a Boston merchant who joined the expedition and raised 200 men for it, seemed decidedly preoccupied with plunder. The highlight of Gibson's journal was the danger he faced when a body of French and Indians attacked him and four other men while they were loading a schooner with plunder.\textsuperscript{124} The organizers of the expedition also expected that it would acquire much plunder. In advising an attack on St. Peters (Port Toulouse), the plan of operations for the expedition stated that "the Booty taken there will pay the expenses & more in taking it."\textsuperscript{125}

Another observer confirmed contemporary suspicions that members of the expedition would be filled with something other than religious fervour. Connecticut's Governor Law had voiced such suspicions in relaying to the commander of the colony's sloop a warning that the lower house had issued orders against allowing his men to have more strong liquor than a proper allowance, "lest you should be exposed by it in a time of danger...."\textsuperscript{126} Such warnings were needed. As the observer reported on 28 March, while en route to Cape Breton, the captain of his vessel began to drink too much liquor. Too drunk to go to his cabin he lay on the quarterdeck, and an old fisherman had to take command because "the Mate also was Something Disguised with Liquor".\textsuperscript{127}

This behaviour was not unusual in eighteenth century campaigns, nor was the preoccupation men showed with plunder. Even the Rev. Adonijah Bidwell, chaplain to the Connecticut fleet, was not

\textsuperscript{123} D. Bradstreet, \textit{Diary of Dudley Bradstreet} (Cambridge, Mass., 1897), pp. 11, 12.
\textsuperscript{124} Johnson, \textit{James Gibson...}, pp. 36, 37
\textsuperscript{126} J. Law to John Prentis, Milford, 1 April 1745, \textit{Law Papers}, I, 277.
\textsuperscript{127} DeForest, \textit{Louisbourg Journals}, p. 3.
immune to this sentiment. Bidwell accompanied a small force on a cruise around Cape Breton Island, and attacked St. Ann's (Port Dauphin) on 5 May. The New Englanders ransacked the town on 7 May and burned about twenty shallops. Bidwell carefully enumerated the plunder taken: "12 or 15 Feather Beds, 3 or 4 cases with bottles, Chests with Cloths, Iron Pots, Brass Kettles, Candlesticks, Frying Pans, Pewter Plates & Spoons, etc." One member of the expedition, Moses Titcomb of Newberry, Massachusetts, wrote a friend that he took a brig "which Captain Dalton & I sold to the French." 128 Just when the sale of the ship to the French took place is unclear, but Dalton had sold a mixed cargo at Louisbourg in September 1742, and another cargo there in June 1743. Titcomb himself had been trading at Louisbourg in May 1743. 129

This desire for plunder, and to a lesser extent the exhortations of their chaplains, encouraged the New Englanders to persevere at Louisbourg in the face of "Bums (sic) Cannons Etc Continually Roaring night and Day." 130 This perseverance, together with the assistance of Peter Warren's naval squadron, brought about Louisbourg's submission on 17 June 1745. Before New England lay the possible realization of a host of dreams: plunder for the participants, monopolization of the fisheries, valuable military contracts, and government positions.

128. J. J. Currier, Old Newbury (Boston, 1896), p. 468
130. MHS, Collections, 2 Ser. vol. XI, p. 428.
Chapter IV
Victory at Louisbourg: Economic Expectations and Realizations, 1745-1748

With the capture of Louisbourg in 1745 hopes soared in New England at the prospects of economic gain. The victory opened up possibilities of peaceful development both within and outside New England in areas where it had formerly been difficult if not impossible. All the colonies except Rhode Island had frontier areas which had faced the prospect of devastating French and Indian raids when the War of the Austrian Succession had begun. New Englanders must have recalled with considerable fear the two wars fought with the French between 1689 and 1713 - wars which had inflicted so much destruction on Massachusetts' province of Maine that in 1717 its population was still less than it had been in 1660. With victory at Louisbourg these fears subsided, albeit only temporarily. New Englanders hoped that raids on frontier areas would cease, and that the exploitation of the frontier's resources could continue. Victory also held out the prospect of an expanded fishery, and the possibility of trade to meet the requirements of the garrison at Louisbourg. There might also be military investment in Nova Scotia and New England to protect Cape Breton. Finally, there was the possibility that the victory would lead to the creation of new positions, civil and military, in New England and at Louisbourg, to satiate the demands of eager office-seekers.

Many of the hopes raised by the victory of 1745 went unfulfilled.

The war lasted until 1748. Frontier areas suffered numerous raids. The loss due to death during the occupation of Louisbourg, as a result of impressment by the Royal Navy, and as a result of the continued need to defend New England, made expansion of the fisheries impossible, and impeded trade. But some New Englanders, mainly office-seekers and merchants involved in supplying the military establishment at Louisbourg and elsewhere in North America profited from the occupation and related undertakings.

New England's expectations from the occupation of Cape Breton may be gauged in several ways. The columns of New England newspapers provide both an indication of New Englanders initial expectations and of their interest in Cape Breton Island during the occupation generally. The papers of New England merchants and officials are even more useful to an analysis of New England interest in Cape Breton, as they provide details of the contest between merchants for contracts at Louisbourg, of the nature of the trade which the merchants conducted, and of the interest of officials and their followers in positions created directly and indirectly by the victory of 1745.

In Boston three volleys of small arms communicated the news of the victory at Louisbourg to the public. Thus roused at dawn the people passed the day celebrating. In the evening there was a bonfire and the town was illuminated. While the people celebrated, some newspapers speculated on the economic significance of the victory. One Boston newspaper suggested that Louisbourg would be as important to the trade and fishery of the northern colonies as "Gibraltar is to the Trade and Fishery of the Mediterranean." 2 While the Boston

2. Boston Gazette, 9 July 1745.
Gazette pondered the future, the populace drank to it. A tent was erected on the Boston Common, and there was "Plenty of good Liquor for all that would Drink." ³

There were similar scenes in other New England communities. In Newport, Rhode Island, vessels in the harbour displayed their colours and privateers kept up an almost continuous fire. That evening the governor and council, with other prominent citizens, went to the Colony-House, where they drank "a number of toasts". There were "Bonfires, Illuminations, ringing of bells, and all Demonstrations of Joy expressed on this Occasion..." ⁴ In addition to the major centres in New England, many smaller communities also held spirited celebrations to mark the victory. News of the triumph reached Falmouth, Maine, on 6 July. The settlers there passed the afternoon at the fort rejoicing and firing the cannon. The festivities continued throughout the next day (although it was Sunday), when the celebrants "extravagantly blew off a vast quantity of powder".⁵

At Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the celebrations occasioned considerable damage to the fort guarding the town. As Richard Waldron described the incident in a letter to his son Thomas,

And for a further Diversion, and for a Proof of the Strength, of our impregnable Castle, they fired a Shot, at the best part of the Wall, - which passed through it into the Sea, beating down such a Quantity of Sods, and making such a Breach, as evidence that the Last Summer's engineering and Ex pense there, was but to little more Purpose than building a Castle in the Air.⁶

Nor was the £100 voted by the New Hampshire General Assembly "to quicken the Joy" spent without effect. Richard Waldron recorded that "Tipple went plentifully round... (causing) some to close

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⁴. Ibid.
their Joys with goggle Eyes and faultering tongues, and some also on bended Knees, and others, in the yet more humble Posture of Prostration on the Earth."  

In Connecticut, Roger Wolcott, leader of that colony's forces at Cape Breton, received word from Hartford that the news had spread like an inundation, reaching the remotest parts of Hartford and the adjacent towns.

Whence from every quarter rush young and old and promiscuously share the transporting story, and fill up the evening with all the tokens of joy and gladness which nature or art could so suddenly supply.

Even the clergy of New England, some of whom had initially feared that the expedition would detract from the revival underway in New England, began to preach that, in the words of Thomas Prince, a distinguished Boston cleric, "This is the Lord's doing! It is marvelous in our eyes." But even clergy such as Prince, so concerned that New Englanders not forget God's role in the undertaking, could not help but be impressed by the economic possibilities opened up by the conquest. In a sermon preached in Boston on 18 July 1745 Prince claimed that Cape Breton "abounds in the best of Pit-coal known in America." He also noted its commodious harbours, and the fortifications which made it "the Dunkirk of North America, and in some Respects of greater Importance."  

7. Ibid.  
9. Thomas Prince, Extraordinary Events the Doings of God and Marvellous in Pious Eyes (Edinburgh, 1746), pp. 16, 18. In the War of the Spanish Succession, privateering reached a new peak in Western European waters, and Dunkirk was a favourite resort of French privateers. During that struggle New Englanders had often referred to Port Royal as the Dunkirk of North America.
A fellow cleric, Joseph Sewell, saw the victory as "an Earnest of our Lord's taking to himself the entire Possession of this new World. May the Kings of the Earth that have given their Power to the Beast, have their Eyes open'd, that they may hate the Whore, and burn her with Fire!" But even his hatred of Roman Catholicism did not blind Sewell to the economic possibilities of the victory, and he accordingly referred to Cape Breton as "a Place of great Importance with Regard to the Safety of our Navigation and Improvement of our Fishery...."

While New England clergy and newspapers speculated on the value of Cape Breton, Governor Shirley and others sought to ensure that the island's potential was realized. Shirley, Pepperrell, and Warren waged a vigorous campaign to impress the British government with Cape Breton's importance and with the desirability of developing the island for military and economic purposes. In a letter of congratulations to the Board of Trade, Shirley estimated the value of the French fishery (which he claimed employed 27,000 men), at about £1,000,000 sterling. Moreover, he claimed that the rise of the French fishery had marked the decline of the New England fishery after 1713, and enabled the French to enter the trade of the Mediterranean. The decline might now be arrested by development of Cape Breton Island as a fishing base for New England. Militarily, Shirley suggested that the island might be called the "key to the French and British Northern Colonies," as a privateering centre and rendezvous for French shipping to and from the East and West Indies, and as a staging point for assaults on Nova Scotia and northern New England. To thwart any French attempts to regain the island, Shirley recommended strengthening the British position there. He called for garrisoning Louisbourg and stationing a squadron of warships there. This would

11. Ibid., p. 32.
secure shipping and fishing in the area and facilitate "any Attempts to drive the French wholly off from this Continent...." Moreover, a base at Louisbourg would give Britain "a most absolute hold and command" over the English colonies "if ever there should a time come when they should grow Restive and dispos'd to shake off their Dependency upon their Mother Country." Shirley believed that speedy settlement of Cape Breton would help secure the island. He urged the encouragement of fishermen and others from Massachusetts to move to Cape Breton, and recommended the immediate establishment of a civil government and the distribution of land to members of the expedition.

William Pepperrell voiced similar sentiments in a letter to Admiralty officials late in June 1745. Like Shirley, Pepperrell hoped for prompt measures to secure and settle the island. Like Shirley he suggested the establishment of a civil government, but going further than Shirley he advised making Louisbourg a free port for five years. Peter Warren also favoured development of the island, and proposed to Pepperrell that the many shallops and other fishing boats acquired in the course of the island's conquest be given to people interested in settling there. Warren felt that details of such a scheme, if published in all the colonies, would attract enough inhabitants that with a proper garrison they might hold the island in case of a French attack.

Pepperrell also revealed personal expectations of gain in remarking to Shirley that he hoped the governor would recommend "us"

12. William Shirley to the Board of Trade, Boston, 10 July 1745, C. H. Lincoln (ed.), The Correspondence of William Shirley (New York, 1912), I, 243-244. It is also apparent that Shirley felt that the acquisition of Louisbourg could restore the fortunes of Canso, as he stated that he hoped to receive instructions about Cape Breton "together with Directions concerning Canso, which I am inform'd affords much the best Fishery for small vessels of any place in North America."
13. Shirley to the Board of Trade, Boston, 10 July 1745, ibid., I, 244-45.
to the King, because he estimated that he had suffered 10,000 damage to his estate, and he hoped to recoup his losses. Furthermore, Pepperrell wrote his London agent and asked him to watch for any business worth accepting. Pepperrell became a baronet for his services at Louisbourg, but this could not compare with some of the more tangible rewards to be had. Jonathan Belcher advised Pepperrell to consider the contract for victualling the garrison, estimating the money involved at 36,000 a year, "a fine sum to go through your hands in bills of exchange." There is ample evidence that Belcher had not misjudged Pepperrell in assuming that he would be interested in profit-making ventures related to Louisbourg. Pepperrell considered and was involved in a number of Louisbourg-related enterprises. One scheme involved a Mr. Le Mercier (presumably a member of the Huguenot family of that name in Boston), and the purchase of goods at Louisbourg. Pepperrell consulted Samuel Waldo on the matter, and was advised that some of the goods were overpriced and dearer than at Boston, while others would be of "little service in New England." Waldo suggested that the scheme did not merit Pepperrell's investment, because the same money invested in London would bring a better return.

15. Warren to Pepperrell, Louisbourg, 27 June 1745, ibid., n. 293.
17. Pepperrell to Silas Hooper, Louisbourg, 9 November 1745, Collections, MHS, 6 Ser. vol. 10, n. 392.
Other ventures were more fruitful. Pepperrell's son-in-law, Nathaniel Sparhawk and his partner, Benjamin Colman, eventually received a share of the contract to supply the forces at Louisbourg. But at first the contract went to Charles Apthorp, an English merchant in Boston who reputedly secured Louisbourg contracts by virtue of being "in the same social set as Governor Shirley and the British admiral." Regardless of his contacts, Apthorp not only had to compete for Louisbourg contracts with other merchants in New England, but also had to take into account the fact that the contracts might initially be granted to English merchants and that colonial

20. W. T. Baxter, House of Hancock (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), pp. 101, 102. Little is known about Apthorp's early career in Boston. He may have been there as early as 1724, as there is a reference to him in the 1724 correspondence of the Boston merchant Thomas Fitch: MHS, Letter Book of Thomas Fitch, T. Fitch to Silas Hooper, Boston, 20 April 1724. There is little firm evidence of Apthorp's activities in Boston before the 1730's, when he began advertising the sale of imported items such as Lisbon salt: Boston Gazette, 6 September 1731. By 1732 Apthorp was involved in trade at Canso; his name appeared among the names of Boston and New Hampshire merchants who complained of depredations by troops of the Canso garrison on fishing establishments and warehouses at Canso: C.O. 217/6, f. 148, Memorial of Boston and New Hampshire merchants to Governor Philipps, 7 October 1732. By the mid 1730's Apthorp had achieved a reasonable degree of prosperity and had his own warehouse in Boston: ibid., 27 December 1736. By 1737 his business was quite diverse. That August he advertised "a parcel of likely Negroes" for sale along with St. Martin's salt. Later in the year he offered sea-coal for sale: ibid., 1 August and 28 November 1737. At the end of the decade Apthorp was importing British goods and Madeira wine, and shipping fish from Newfoundland to Leghorn. He was also promoting ventures to the West Indies and schemes to obtain a share in the supply of the garrisons at Annapolis Royal and Canso: C. Apthorp to John Thomlinson, Boston, 10 September 1738, 4 April 1739, Apthorp Papers, Newberry Library.
merchants would be subcontractors. In October 1745 two London merchants, John Thomlinson and John Hanbury submitted a memorial to the British Treasury proposing terms for victualling the garrison at Louisbourg. Fortunately for Apthorp, Thomlinson's interest in the supply trade posed less of a threat to him than to other New England merchants. Thomlinson was Apthorp's agent in London, and the men had worked together since at least 1739. Thomlinson and Hanbury were not, however, the only Londoners interested in business at Louisbourg. Samuel and William Baker of London received a contract to supply the garrison at Louisbourg with provisions, and by March 1746 had arranged to send three ships to Cape Breton from Ireland with beef and pork.

Despite the granting of some supply contracts to British merchants, Apthorp secured a considerable amount of business at Louisbourg, and profitted greatly from it even though he had to share New England's portion of the business, first with Sparhawk and Colman, and then with Thomas Hancock. As for Sparhawk and Colman, their share of the business could not have seemed too secure to them. Shortly after receiving a portion of the supply trade, through the efforts of Pepperrell, Sparhawk took steps to ensure that he and his partner would not lose the trade when their benefactor departed from Louisbourg. In writing Pepperrell to thank him for securing the contract for him, Sparhawk asked Pepperrell to "look out to protect my interests after you leave". Sparhawk had good reasons to fear for his interests. Thomas Hancock was waging a determined campaign to obtain at least a portion of the trade for himself. Ever alert

21. PRO, Treasury I/318, f. 18, 22 October 1745.
22. J. Scrope to T. Corbett, 4 March 1746, Treasury 27/26, f. 213.
23. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 16 December 1745, MSs. Pepperrell Papers, II, 7, MHS.
for new business, Hancock had written Christopher Kilby in mid July to congratulate him on the victory. He expressed the hope that Cape Breton would remain an English possession forever, because "the advantage to our nation and country in having it, are of the last consequence to them...." The cost of the expedition was not, of course, to be overlooked, and Hancock expressed his hope that the King would "pay the charges". In closing, Hancock did not neglect to mention his own interests, as he urged Kilby to remember him at the Board, and "let nothing slip worth taking...."  

In his pursuit of government contracts at Louisbourg and elsewhere, Hancock, a particularly apt pupil of eighteenth-century business methods, contacted everyone of influence who might have been useful. He instructed his London agent, Jonathan Barnard, that "if a few Guineas be necessary to expend in the affair, let it be done, and anything else you and Kilby think proper...." He also asked Barnard to work with Kilby on the quest for supply contracts. Hancock had already wrung assurances of assistance from John Henry Bastide, on his way from Boston to Louisbourg as an engineer, but because this was not sufficient to ensure Hancock the contracts, he sought to extend his influence as far as possible.  

Hancock garnered favours for himself by in turn securing them for others. Bastide was anxious for promotion, and Hancock indicated that he could further his ambition. Hancock accordingly informed Kilby that Bastide was interested in a post in the government or a commission in the armed forces, and requested that something be found for him. The contact with Bastide was promising for Hancock. In addition to being chief engineer at Louisbourg during the first

24. Hancock to Christopher Kilby, Boston, 15 July 1745, Thomas Hancock Letter Book (hereafter THLB), MHS.
25. Hancock to Jonathan Barnard, Boston, 29 July 1745, THLB, MHS.
26. Hancock to Kilby, 7 September 1745, ibid.
British occupation, Bastide was also the American agent for the Board of Ordnance. From Louisbourg, Bastide fed Hancock both information and contacts, and Hancock supplied him "with hospitality, credit and a constant supply of luxuries." 27

With Christopher Kilby, Hancock's relationship was equally, and mutually beneficial. Kilby had gone abroad in 1739, leaving two daughters in Boston. He named Hancock guardian of the girls. Hancock also looked after Kilby's business interests in Boston, and intervened with Governor Shirley over a lawsuit between Kilby and Peter Luce. 28 Hancock also looked out for the interests of Christopher's cousin, Thomas Kilby, as did William Pepperrell and William Shirley. 29 In September 1745 Hancock advised William Bollan to see that "something be done for him (Thomas Kilby)." Later that autumn Kilby received an appointment as a commissary for the garrison at Louisbourg.

Pepperrell's part and purpose in promoting Kilby's career are less clear, but Kilby was either reasonably well known to Pepperrell or else he was extremely presumptuous. This is evident from Kilby's request to Pepperrell for a recommendation to the governor at Louisbourg, and from Kilby's request that a house be set aside for himself at Louisbourg if possible, because of his gout, and because of the pressures he anticipated in performing his duties as commissary. 30 Governor Shirley also spoke on Kilby's behalf, but as the only surviving evidence of his intervention came after Kilby had already received his post at Louisbourg it is doubtful if Shirley accomplished anything for Kilby. 31

28. Ibid., p. 203
29. Thomas Kilby was probably known to Governor Shirley through Shirley's son, on whose behalf Thomas secured the continuance of a lease of space in Faneuil Hall in 1743: A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, p. 52, Selectmen's Minutes, 27 February 1743.
30. Thomas Kilby to William Pepperrell, Boston, 3 November 1745, Mss. Peppertell Papers, MHS.
31. On 6 November 1745 Shirley wrote the Duke of Newcastle to
Hancock's assistance to Thomas Kilby did not benefit Hancock immediately. The competition for the Louisbourg contracts was not resolved until 1746 so far as Hancock was concerned. Charles Apthorp was only one of several rivals with whom Hancock had to concern himself. There were also Sparhawk and Colman, and James Allen, who was determined to outbid his competitors. Hancock was incensed that his connections might not enable him to win out against Allen. He advised Christopher Kilby to "give 10% more than (Allen) offers, let it be what it will." He also prepared to ally himself with Apthorp and John Tholminson, who, Hancock informed Kilby, will "join with you against the attempt Allen may make against us at the Board.

Allen was offered the contract, but at a rate considerably above his bid. He refused the contract, thereby leaving the field to Hancock, Apthorp, and Sparhawk and Colman.32

At first Hancock had hopes of eliminating Apthorp. As he commented to William Bollan, "I shall be extremely glad to have this supply separate from Mr. Apthorp. I believe he has engaged the Governor for this also...."33 Hancock did not get his way. A chagrined Hancock wrote Christopher Kilby in February 1746 that the Louisbourg supply business was being jointly shared by Apthorp and Sparhawk.34 Meanwhile, Hancock continued to do all that he could for Christopher Kilby's cousin Thomas. In February, Hancock wrote Christopher Kilby that Thomas was still in Boston, where Hancock had furnished him with "almost everything he wants...."35 Finally, late

recommend Kilby for the position of "keeper of the ordnance stores, or some other post here equivalent to it," because of Kilby's efforts in providing the governor with intelligence, "and every way forwarding and promoting the expedition in a most necessary manner, while it was forming." Shirley to Newcastle, Louisbourg, 6 November 1745, Shirley Correspondence, I, 287.

32. Zemsky, p. 197.
33. Hancock to William Bollan, Boston, 24 September 1745, THLB, MPS.
34. Hancock to C. Kilby, Boston, 14 February 1746, ibid.
35. Ibid., 26 February 1746.
in March, Thomas Kilby was ready to depart for Louisbourg. Hancock wished him well, and requested that he give Hancock's compliments to the governor, and lieutenant governor, to Bastide, Waldo, and "all friends". He instructed Thomas to recommend our "dear friend Mr. Christopher Kilby, so as to make the supply through me as extensive as you can..." Hancock also told Thomas Kilby that he would provide him with any credit he needed at Louisbourg. Hancock lost no time in informing Christopher Kilby of the favours he had extended to his cousin. Writing Christopher on 2 April, Hancock noted that Thomas Kilby would depart for Louisbourg that day "after dinner with me, where (we) shall drink your and Mrs. Kilby's good health, and to his good voyage. I have supplied him with £1,639 N.E. currency." Hancock also mentioned that he had provided Christopher's brother Ebenezer with money to pay off his debts and to maintain his family when he departed for Cape Breton. When he received word that Thomas had reached Louisbourg safely, Hancock promptly relayed the news to Christopher.

On the heels of this news came distressing information. A rumour reached Hancock's ears that the Louisbourg supply might go to New York. Hancock feared this would "ruin the trade of this Province and disspirit the people...." Using Thomas Kilby as an excuse for writing, Hancock wrote Christopher Kilby the next day and reminded him of his interests. He informed Christopher that Thomas had not received his commission yet, asked him to see that the commission was renewed if lost, and pointedly mentioned that he had advanced a large sum to Thomas. Suggesting that he would be perform-

36. Hancock to C. Kilby, Boston, 28 March 1746, ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Hancock to C. Kilby, 2 April 1746, ibid.
39. Ibid., 15 May 1746.
40. Hancock to Zachary Bourayau, Boston, 23 May 1746, ibid.
ing further favours for Thomas, Hancock noted that "he must yet be supplied". With regard to the rumour that the supply business might go to New York interests, Hancock declared that if that happened "this Province is ruined, for (New) York will carry away all the trade of this town and province and Connecticut too." Three days later Hancock let Christopher Kilby know that his cousin Thomas had finally received his commission and had been sworn into office. Noting that "his supply from me has been large", and that Thomas' constitution was not terribly strong, Hancock counselled Christopher to advise Thomas to be frugal, "if for no other motive but in regard to his children"; It is obvious that Hancock was increasingly concerned about the investment he had made in Thomas Kilby, and the possibility that New York might secure the Louisbourg trade, for in addition to reminding Kilby of his services to his cousin, Hancock stated that if New York obtained the trade, it would enable merchants there to carry off the trade not only of Massachusetts and Connecticut, but of the Jerseys and Rhode Island as well.41

For a time it appeared that there would be no improvement in Hancock's fortunes despite all the attempts he had taken to ingratiate himself with influential acquaintances. Hancock grumbled to Christopher Kilby in mid-June that "Apthorp is the lucky man" for continuing in control of the Louisbourg trade. Later that same month Hancock received word that he might hope for a share in the trade with Apthorp. He informed Kilby that he had seen Apthorp, and that he had expressed a preference for Hancock over Sparhawk as a partner in the trade.42 But at the end of June, Apthorp and Sparhawk still controlled the

41. Hancock to C. Kilby, Boston, 27 May 1746, ibid.
42. Ibid., 14 & 26 June 1746.
trade, and were sending quantities of materials to Louisbourg.\textsuperscript{43} In August Hancock received a blow to his hopes and his pocketbook. It was "with the greatest sorrow" that Hancock informed Christopher Kilby of the death at Louisbourg of his cousin Thomas. Hancock was very sorry for the loss to Thomas' children and to himself and Christopher, "as I believe we shall be sufferers and greatly for my advance to him...."\textsuperscript{44}

Hancock must have despaired of his prospects at Louisbourg at this point. Not until November did the gloom lift, when Hancock received word that the Board of Ordnance had left the appointment of agents for Louisbourg to Bastide. The only obstacle in the way of Bastide exercising his influence to favour Hancock was the matter of his commission, which had been sent and lost several times. Hancock was confident that this would be remedied soon. Indeed, a new commission and instructions were being sent again, and as Hancock stated, "then I am certain of one-half at least in the agency for that place as I stand well with him and Governor Knowles...."\textsuperscript{45}

Hancock had cultivated Knowles just as he had cultivated other key individuals. Although he had never met Knowles, Hancock had written him not long after Knowles assumed the governorship at Louisbourg in June 1746, to acquaint Knowles with his credentials. In closing he stated that "in anything I may be servicable to your excellency...I beg sir you will command." Hancock sent the letter via Bastide, who did not think it appropriate to deliver it at the time, but who did suggest a means by which Hancock might initiate the sought-after correspondence with Knowles. The governor had asked

\textsuperscript{43} Hancock to William Bogdani, Boston, 30 June 1746., ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} By then Hancock had advanced about £2,200 Massachusetts currency to Thomas for supplies. Kilby's successor at Louisbourg was Benjamin Green, another New Englander, but apparently not under Hancock's influence. Ibid., Hancock to C. Kilby, Boston, 9 September 1746.
\textsuperscript{45} Hancock to Z. Bourayau, Boston, 21 November 1746, ibid.
Bastide to get someone to procure some pigeons for him to breed. As Bastide informed Hancock, "I pitched on you which will give you an opening for a correspondence." Two weeks later Hancock wrote Bastide to thank him for his services, and to ask him to inform Knowles that he would provide the pigeons, sending them by the first good opportunity. In December, Hancock was rewarded for all of his efforts. He exultantly informed Christopher Kilby that Bastide had appointed him joint agent for Louisbourg with Apthorp. He reported that if Louisbourg continued to require materials on the same scale as in the past the trade would be "all I desire or wish for, as it will make a return (which) will make me and my friends in England easy...." Hancock had thus managed to depose Sparhawk and to thwart Allen, but Sparhawk and his associates had not gone unrewarded for their efforts. The Pepperrell interests had been involved in the supply of Louisbourg from as early as 10 July 1745, when Andrew Pepperrell dispatched to Louisbourg a cargo of 35,000 (feet?) pine boards, 15 (casks?) turpentine, 27 of pitch, 6 hogsheads of West Indian rum, 1127 pounds of tobacco, 5,750 shingles, 3 spars, 14 pairs of shoes, 14 pairs of stockings, 3 white shirts, and 98 sheep. This was followed almost immediately with a shipment of cloth, plates, cups and saucers, molasses, wines and tea. Sparhawk also sent sundry items to Pepperrell in December 1745, most of which appear to have been for Pepperrell's personal use. All of these transactions took place before Sparhawk was awarded a share of the government contract to supply the garrison at Louisbourg. When he received his share in the government business Sparhawk must have found the trade

46. Hancock to Knowles, Boston, 8 July 1746; Hancock to Bastide, 15 August 1746, Hancock Papers, vol. 11, fl Baker Library, Harvard.
47. Hancock to C. Kilby, Boston, 3 December 1746, THLB, MHS.
48. Bill of lading, Kittery, 10 July 1745, Mss Pepperrell Papers, I, 222, MHS.
49. Bill of lading, 11 July 1745, ibid., I, 223.
50. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, 16 December 1745, ibid.
much more considerable. This is certainly indicated by Pepperrell's correspondence with Sparhawk and Colman.

Sparhawk and Colman received word at the end of 1745 that they were to share the Louisbourg trade with Apthorp. This was a time of the year when winter weather normally reduced sailings to and from Louisbourg so that it was not until February that the partners began sending goods to Louisbourg in earnest. In early February Sparhawk wrote Pepperrell that he would load a Piscataqua vessel in a few days with lumber and other items. In addition, Pepperrell was told to expect to receive by the bearer of that news a small quantity of livestock, other foodstuffs, and clothing. Less than a week later Sparhawk informed Pepperrell that he and Apthorp had taken up another vessel to carry items to Louisbourg.

Although the total volume of the official business Sparhawk and Colman did with Louisbourg is difficult to determine with any degree of precision, the trade must have been quite profitable to judge from the eagerness with which it was sought. From Kittery Sparhawk was in a strategic position to procure and ship forest products to Cape Breton. But the vessels Sparhawk dispatched also carried other commodities. In addition to lumber, the two vessels which Sparhawk readied in March—a sloop and a schooner—carried such items as molasses, sheet lead, and 500 to 600 pairs of shoes.

51. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 7 February 1746, Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 129, MHS.
52. The vessel might have been the Indus, Philip White master, which Sparhawk dispatched about 12 February, or the Three Sisters, Captain Gould. Among the items Gould and White carried to Louisbourg was over 1,000 gallons of rum, valued at £706 11s old tenor: Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 10 February 1746; invoice of goods aboard the Indus and the Three Sisters, ibid., II, 130, 132.
53. The correspondence between Sparhawk and Pepperrell gives a better indication of the nature and volume of the trade than its value.
Moreover, a Captain Douglas sent Sparhawk a vessel to load with livestock.\textsuperscript{54} Sparhawk and Apthorp may also have been shipping other items to Louisbourg in this period, because on 20 March Pepperrell wrote to William Shirley to acknowledge receipt of some material needed for new barracks.\textsuperscript{55}

However profitable the supply trade was, it was not the sole object of the attention of the Pepperrell interests. In addition to having been made a baronet for his services in leading the Louisbourg expedition, Pepperrell had been awarded the command of one of the two regiments the British government had decided to establish in North America, with Governor Shirley to receive command of the other. Jonathan Belcher remarked in a letter to Pepperrell in August 1745 that the command would provide Pepperrell with a handsome income.\textsuperscript{56} An excited Sparhawk informed Pepperrell that the post would result in profits of not less than £2,000 sterling per annum. Sparhawk hoped to share in the largesse, and proposed that he and Colman supply clothing for both regiments.\textsuperscript{57}

Sparhawk may have had an exaggerated idea of the profits available from the command of a colonial regiment, but the prospects were nevertheless appealing. The colonel of a colonial regiment could expect pay of some £255 a year. Total pay for the regiment would be £19, 506 4s 2d, and the British government made provision for over £3,000 a year for clothing.\textsuperscript{58} In addition to any money to be made from clothing the regiment there was also the possibility of involvement in victualling it. Sparhawk made inquiries about this matter.

\textsuperscript{54} Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Kittery, 16 March 1746, \textit{Collections}, MHS, 5 Ser. vol. 10, p. 459.
\textsuperscript{55} Pepperrell to Shirley, Louisbourg, 20 March 1746, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{56} J. Belcher to Pepperrell, London, 16 August 1745, \textit{Collections}, MHS, 6 Ser., vol. 10, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{57} Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 11 January 1746, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{58} "Establishment of a regiment of Foot to be raised in North America", Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 41, MHS.
and informed Pepperrell (in the same letter in which he asked for a captaincy in Pepperrell's regiment), that if a colonel had ever victualled his own regiment he did not doubt that Pepperrell would be awarded the contract. The answer to Sparhawk's inquiry was that the colonel of a regiment usually disposed of the victualling contract to the lowest bidder, but that if Pepperrell wished to undertake the task himself, "you may depend upon it you will not be denied."59

An examination of the supply of the garrison at Annapolis Royal gave Pepperrell an idea what to expect in the way of profits. The contractor in England for Annapolis Royal was paid 6d sterling a day per man, and in turn he paid one of the Borlands of Boston 4½d a day per man to carry out the terms of the contract, so that the English contractor gained 1½d. per man per day. If Pepperrell's regiment was to have 1,000 men in it, an English contractor named Williams was prepared to provision it for 5½ a day per man, so that Pepperrell would earn 500d a day or £755 sterling a year. In peacetime Williams would do the job for 5d a day leaving Pepperrell with £1,500 sterling a year, "which will handsomely maintain a Baronet's table."60 Sparhawk managed to get the contract to clothe the regiment, and although it took a long time to conclude an agreement with the tailors in Boston, they reportedly "made a better bargain than the Governor made."61

Having command of the expedition of 1745, and then of a colonial regiment, gave Pepperrell considerable influence and patronage, but it also meant that he was besieged with requests for appointments. Some of the requests Pepperrell would not or could not fulfil

59. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 7 February 1746, ibid., II, 127.
60. Ibid., II, 140, n.d.
61. Lieutenant Colonel William Ryan to Pepperrell, Boston, 16 February 1746, ibid.
even though they came from and on behalf of people with connections with his family. Andrew Belcher made one such request, on behalf of Byfield Lyde, who wanted a captaincy. The same day Lyde himself appealed for assistance. Lyde subsequently prepared to go to Louisbourg armed with a letter from Sparhawk, who referred to him as "my friend and relation". (Lyde, advised by friends to go to Louisbourg in the hope that something would be available there, had asked not only Sparhawk for a letter of recommendation, but had approached William Pepperrell's mother as well.)

It is not clear if Lyde ever reached Louisbourg. The illness of his eldest daughter prevented him from sailing that autumn. Then, in January 1746 he was in Connecticut raising men for Pepperrell's regiment in the hope that this would win him a post as a lieutenant. His efforts made little impression on Pepperrell, and that winter Sparhawk apparently stopped promoting Lyde's interests. Pepperrell may have made it clear to Sparhawk that he could do nothing for Lyde, for in one of his letters to Pepperrell, Sparhawk noted, "as you justly observe he could not expect to be preferred to those on the expedition."

On the other hand, William Tyler was more successful in his pursuit of favours. Tyler wrote Pepperrell in December 1745 to request that Pepperrell "put on the English establishment" Lieutenant Basill Dixwell, whose father was a friend of his (Tyler's). Pepperrell's reply has not survived, but Tyler, who was then involved in forwarding goods from Boston to Louisbourg, was in 1746 himself the recipient of one of Pepperrell's favours. Evidently Pepperrell

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62. A. Belcher to Pepperrell, Boston, 26 October 1745, ibid.
63. Lyde to Pepperrell, Boston, 26 October 1745, ibid.
64. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, 30 October 1745, ibid.
66. Sparhawk to Pepperrell, Boston, 5 February 1746, Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 127, MHS.
67. William Tyler to Pepperrell, Boston, 16 December 1745, ibid., II, 2.
wrote Charles Apthorp sometime before 16 April 1746 and requested that Apthorp see that Tyler receive a share in the brazier and ship chandler's trade with Louisbourg. Apthorp agreed to do what he could on Tyler's behalf. Sparhawk and Apthorp apparently gave Tyler some assurance that he would receive a share of the supply business, for shortly after Apthorp wrote Pepperrell, Tyler wrote him as well to thank him for his intervention on his behalf.

Among those encouraged to seek rewards for their services was Roger Wolcott of Connecticut. His friends advised him that he deserved and could expect ample recompense for his labours. Philip Livingston, prominent New York merchant, advised Wolcott that the least he could ask for was a Lieutenant Colonel's commission in one of the colonial regiments or a pension of £300 to £400 sterling a year, and command of a company for one of his sons or grandsons. People in Connecticut were also interested in supply contracts at Louisbourg. Governor Law wrote Peter Warren in the spring of 1746 and expressed the hope that Warren would use his influence to obtain for Connecticut the contract to victual not only the Louisbourg garrison but also Warren's naval squadron. Law agreed with Warren's observations that this business would occasion a considerable quantity of sterling bills for Connecticut.

In addition to dealing with individuals seeking business at Louisbourg or posts there or elsewhere, officials such as Shirley,

68. Apthorp to Pepperrell, Boston, 16 April 1746, ibid., II, 186.
69. Tyler to Pepperrell, Boston, 22 April 1746, ibid., II, 194.
70. P. Livingston to R. Wolcott, Manor livingstone, 25 March 1746, Law Papers, II, 93.
71. Law to Warren, Milford, 8 April 1746, ibid., II, 201.
Pepperrell and Warren also had to maintain their efforts to sustain Cape Breton and promote its development. Such efforts required promotion in both New England and Britain. In dealing with the situation in New England, Pepperrell and Warren had, early in 1746, inserted a notice in the Boston Evening Post to the effect that anyone coming to Louisbourg to trade or fish would receive the utmost encouragement. Strict care would be given their property, and no such persons would be impressed. Nor would any imposition be placed on trade or the fishery until the King's pleasure was known.\(^\text{72}\) There was also a demand for workmen at Louisbourg. Apthorp and Sparhawk advertised for carpenters, masons, lime-burners and other tradesmen to apply to them if interested in going to Louisbourg for "the Summer season".\(^\text{73}\) Workmen probably found much to occupy them at Louisbourg in the spring and summer of 1746. Much of the repair done to damaged buildings after the siege must have been undone by the storms which struck the town in late February 1746, shipwrecking most of the vessels in the harbour and tearing off the greater part of the roof of the governor's house.\(^\text{74}\)

That spring the movement of men and supplies to Louisbourg from New England occupied enough vessels that Boston averaged one entry a week from Louisbourg. In August Apthorp recorded sending five ships to Louisbourg with supplies, mostly foodstuffs such as bread, beef and pork, but also including 6,950 gallons of rum - the staple beverage at Louisbourg.\(^\text{75}\) Although the trade with Louisbourg meant a great deal to Hancock and Apthorp, they did not always manage to ship satisfactory provisions. In acknowledging the arrival

\(^\text{72. Boston Evening Post, 3 February 1746.}\)
\(^\text{73. Ibid., 17 February 1746.}\)
\(^\text{74. Ibid., 21 April 1746.}\)
\(^\text{75. Bill of Lading, Provisions sent to Louisbourg, Boston, 26 August 1746, Apthorp Papers, Newberry Library.}\)
of some supply vessels in October 1746, Admiral Townsend informed Apthorp that "the Beef in particular is in very bad condition, being nothing but Mud & Dirt; and they are now employ'd in overhauling it, washing it out from the filth & repickling it; and tis a Query, when they have so done, whether it will prove fit for the Men to eat." Townsend remarked that he was not a little surprised at such conduct.  
He must have been particularly annoyed because of Apthorp's earlier promise to send provisions "all new and good, and of every species".76

Despite such problems, New England merchants retained a prominent position in the supply of the military establishment at Louisbourg, including the supply of the naval vessels plying to and from Louisbourg and New England. Late in May several men-of-war and merchant vessels, with Charles Knowles, the newly appointed governor of Cape Breton, arrived at Marblehead, Massachusetts, on their way to Louisbourg.78 These ships required at least fresh water, and probably other provisions, thereby providing business for Massachusetts merchants. There was also considerable shipping activity, of a non-military nature, between New Hampshire and Louisbourg in 1746. Between 24 June and 29 September the New Hampshire Naval Office recorded about seventeen entries from Louisbourg. There were sixteen clearances for Louisbourg in that same period.79

Although the Pepperrells had an interest in several of the New Hampshire vessels going to Louisbourg, they and other of the best known New England merchants did not control all of the trade. One of the

76. Townsend to Apthorp, Louisbourg, 17 October 1746, Admiralty I/480, f. 356.
77. C. Apthorp to Admiral Townsend, Boston, 26 July 1746, ibid., Boston, 26 July 1746.
78. Boston Evening Post, 26 May 1746.
merchants sending goods to Louisbourg from New Hampshire in this period was Meshech Weare, Harvard graduate, businessman, and, during the American Revolution, the President of New Hampshire. Several acquaintances encouraged Weare in the fall of 1745 and in early 1746 to send goods to Louisbourg. One of these acquaintances, Edward Williams, wrote Weare from Louisbourg in October 1745 and suggested that it would be to Weare's advantage to send his schooner to Louisbourg in the spring of 1746, with a cargo of cider, turnips, salt, potatoes and "croft". Weare also heard from his nephew, Nathaniel, and from one Samuel Moore. From Moore, writing in February 1746, Weare received encouragement send a cargo to Louisbourg at the same time that he was informed of Williams' death. Moore advised sending a cargo of foodstuffs, clothing, hay and bricks, and a crew of fishermen to procure a return cargo of fish. The Humming Bird, of which Weare was joint owner, sailed for Louisbourg in July. Weare must have considered the venture promising if not profitable, because the Humming Bird made at least one more voyage to Louisbourg in 1746, returning to New England in October. The Humming Bird returned to Louisbourg in 1747 as well, although it is not clear if Weare still had an interest in the vessel then.

While New England merchants seem to have been more concerned with and involved in shipping goods to rather than from Louisbourg, New England sea-captains did not lack for a return cargo, although their activities greatly irritated Louisbourg officials on occasion. In August 1746 Admiral Townsend informed Governor Shirley that he had

81. E. Williams to M. Weare, Louisbourg, 21 October 1745, Louisbourg Papers, New York Public Library.
82. S. Moore to M. Weare, Louisbourg, 21 February 1746, Louisbourg Papers, New York Public Library.
received complaints from a number of captains of naval vessels about New England shippers. The New Englanders allegedly secreted and carried off many sailors from Louisbourg. Townsend's duty obliged him to bring "so base behaviour" to Governor Shirley's attention. He cautioned Shirley that unless the traffic stopped promptly, he would make good the number of men carried off "in so foul a manner". Shirley responded by stating his concern at the behaviour of the masters of New England vessels trading at Louisbourg, and he assured Townsend that he would do everything in his power to stop "a practice so scandalous and pernicious to His Majesty's Service...." Shirley promised an inquiry into the matter. Where there was a possibility of obtaining a conviction, there would be prosecution. Deserters would be pursued, and if taken, returned to Louisbourg.

Threats of impressment may well have deterred some New Englanders from going to Louisbourg as settlers, fishermen, or sailors, but there is little indication that Townsend's statements became common knowledge or posed as great a problem to New Englanders as did the actions of Governor Charles Knowles. Knowles placed several stumbling-blocks in the way of New England's maximization of economic benefits from the conquest. His disparagement of the conduct of New Englanders at Louisbourg, and his advice to authorities in Britain that Louisbourg did not merit a substantial investment no doubt confirmed the intention of some members of the government in Britain to return Cape Breton to the French. More directly, Knowles put to an end a venture which might have employed many New England ships and men. Early in 1746, on the advice of

86. Townsend to Shirley, Louisbourg, 17 August 1746, Admiralty I/480, f. 256.
87. Shirley to Townsend, Boston, 12 September 1746, ibid., f. 292.
Admiral Townsend, Knowles vetoed the proposed expulsion of the inhabitants of Ile St. Jean (Prince Edward Island). He decided to leave the island's French inhabitants where they were because moving them would have cost £8,000 and would have diverted ships from the proposed attack on Canada.88

As for trade and settlement at Louisbourg, Knowles made it abundantly clear that neither amounted to much (other than the supplying of the garrison). Warren had offered much encouragement to fishermen in the hopes of attracting them to the island. Knowles continued the policy when he assumed command, offering free houses, boats, and fishing equipment. Despite this, there were, according to Knowles, only two settlers at Louisbourg: men who had come to sell rum and who had become settlers only when forbidden to pursue the rum trade. Knowles calculated that Louisbourg was not likely to be inhabited soon by anyone other than troops "unless rum sellers". Knowles saw the land itself as the main problem: "It is so miserably barren...the whole island being rocks, swamps, morasse or lakes...."89 Knowles could see few advantages to Cape Breton. With regard to the proposal that Louisbourg become the rendezvous for vessels in the American and West Indian trade, Knowles argued that this was impossible because the West Indian fleet sailed at the end of May or in early June, and the vessels would reach Louisbourg at the height of the foggy season, resulting in the loss of half of the fleet each year. As evidence of the hazards of navigation at Cape Breton, Knowles cited the loss of three small vessels that month. Knowles believed that the area was also poor for curing and drying fish, and that the

88. Knowles to Newcastle, Louisbourg, 8 July 1746, PANS, vol. 19, document no. 16.
89. Ibid.
cod fish caught in waters close to the coast of Cape Breton were of poorer quality than fish caught on the Grand Banks. Ignoring the possibility that the war had kept fishermen away from Cape Breton, Knowles asserted that if Louisbourg was so convenient for New Englanders they would have flocked there. The New Englanders themselves aroused Knowles' contempt.

The confused, dirty, beastly condition I found this place in is not to be expressed....These New England folks were so lazy that they not only pulled one end of the house down to burn which they lived in but even buried their dead under the floors and did their filth in the other corners of the house rather than go out of doors in the cold.90

The only advantage Knowles could see in retaining Louisbourg was that the fur trade of the island would go to the English.

Such comments did not endear Knowles to New Englanders. Nor did certain of his actions. Peter Warren at one point cautioned Knowles to be more careful not to give offence to the New Englanders, as it would hinder the supply of the garrison. Two specific incidents led to Warren's advice. One was Knowles' action in sending back to New England a ship loaded with timber for the garrison. Apparently the captain of the vessel had offended Knowles by carrying rum to Louisbourg. Warren tried to eliminate the problem by advising Apthorp to put another master in charge and send the ship back to Louisbourg. Warren also advised Apthorp to publish a notice forbidding the shipment of rum on vessels bound for Louisbourg. The other incident involved the impressment of two New Englanders at Louisbourg. As a result of the impressment, Warren experienced considerable difficulty in getting vessels to carry goods to Louisbourg.91

For New Englanders and other colonial North Americans, impressment was a serious problem. It was a point of contention between British and colonial authorities as early as 1702, when Lieutenant Governor Povey of Massachusetts ordered shore batteries at Boston to fire on a Royal Navy vessel engaged in a press. In 1746 and 1747 impressment may have contributed to the economic problems Boston experienced.\textsuperscript{92} The Massachusetts House of Representatives declared in September 1746 that so many men had been lost in the expedition against and occupation of Louisbourg, and so many "Seamen...have been impressed on board His Majesty's Ships of War and carried out of the Province" that it was with difficulty that the colony coped with attacks by the French and Indians.\textsuperscript{93}

Resentment against impressment reached a peak in Boston in November 1747 when an overnight impressment led to riots of such magnitude that Governor Shirley fled to Castle William (now Fort Independence), the strongest fort in the area, and Knowles, who had ordered the impressment, threatened to bombard the city to put down what he termed an "arrant rebellion". The House of Representatives described the riots as "tending to the Destruction of all Government and Order" and declared that it was "incumbent on the civil and military Officers of the Province" to curb such disorders. At the same time, the House resolved to "exert themselves by all Ways and means possible in redressing such Grievances...." as may have caused the riots.\textsuperscript{94} Given the way many people in Boston felt about impressment, it is not surprising that New Englanders were reluctant to go

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\item \textsuperscript{92} J. Lomish, "Jack Tar in the Streets", William and Mary Quarterly, 3 Ser. 25 (1968), p. 383.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Message of the House of Representatives to Governor Shirley, Boston, 10 September 1746, Journal of the House of Representatives, vol. 23, 1746-47, p. 173.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Resolves of the House, 19 November 1747, \textit{ibid.}, vol. 24, 1747-48, p. 212.
\end{itemize}
to a port such as Louisbourg where they might be subject to impressment at the whim of officials such as Admiral Townsend and Governor Knowles. Warren appreciated colonial attitudes on the subject; Knowles did not. Clearly then, the matter of impressment must be considered as a factor which retarded settlement at Louisbourg during the occupation.

Nevertheless, trade between New England and Cape Breton was still extensive in 1747. From 25 March to 29 September, thirty-six ships cleared out of New Hampshire for Louisbourg.\(^{95}\) Trade continued at such a high level that in the autumn of 1747 an observer at Louisbourg remarked on the arrival there in the first week of September of "almost all the sloops and schooners belonging to Boston". This observer believed the vessels must have brought all the cattle and sheep available in New England, because the streets of Louisbourg were so thick with livestock that passage through them was difficult.\(^{96}\)

Massachusetts and New Hampshire retained the lion's share of the colonies' portion of the Louisbourg supply trade, but Rhode Island and Connecticut also benefitted, mainly as suppliers of pork and beef. There was also some traffic in building materials from Rhode Island. Benjamin Colman went to Providence in April 1746 to obtain lime for Louisbourg. Providence was his main source of lime at the time. On this occasion Colman purchased 106 hogsheads of lime, at £600 old tenor, and arranged to have it shipped directly to Louisbourg.\(^{97}\)

Other Rhode Islanders saw Cape Breton as a place of employment.

\(^{95}\) New Hampshire Naval Office Lists, clearances, C.O. 5/968, ff.91,92,94.  
\(^{96}\) New York Gazette, 5 October 1747.  
\(^{97}\) Colman to Pepperrell, Boston, 4 May 1746, Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 213, MHS.
David Lindsay of Newport, who once sailed on a brig owned by Pepperrell, sought the favour of his former employer in April 1746. Later in April, Pepperrell received a request from John Hoyle of Providence, asking that Pepperrell find Captain Richard Hoyle a post in Pepperrell's regiment. Connecticut also had its share of place-seekers. Among them was the unnamed brother-in-law of Benjamin Lynde, who had been practising medicine in Connecticut but who through "several misfortunes" had been persuaded to seek his fortune at Louisbourg. Lynde hoped that Pepperrell could encourage him. Even though Lynde was related to Pepperrell, the General gave no indication that he could provide assistance to his brother-in-law.

If place-seekers were sometimes disappointed at the prospects of advancement because of the occupation of Louisbourg, other segments of the population in New England, in addition to merchants involved in the supplying of the garrison, still managed to benefit in a variety of ways. One way in which New England reaped benefits from the expedition and occupation was ship-building. In 1746 the Admiralty became interested in exploiting the ship-building potential of the English colonies in North America for naval purposes. On 15 March 1746, Thomas Corbett, Secretary to the Lords of the Admiralty, wrote Peter Warren that the Lords of the Admiralty were "very desirous of having one or two ships of forty-four guns and two of twenty-four built" in New England. Corbett instructed Warren "to treat and agree with such persons whose skill you have the best opinion of, for building four such ships." Warren made arrangements to have one ship built in

98. D. Lindsay to Pepperrell, Newport, 4 April 1746, ibid., II, 181.
100. B. Lynde to Pepperrell, Boston, 19 February 1746, ibid., p. 137.
Boston, and another in New Hampshire, because those colonies "have had the greatest share of any in the reduction of Louisbourg". The third vessel would be built in Connecticut and the fourth in New York.102

Opposition to the scheme then arose in the Navy Board, which had not been consulted on the matter. The Navy Board claimed that the project had no advantages. It stated that all ironworks and other stores would have to be sent from the United Kingdom, and that it would be difficult to prevent fraudulent practices regarding materials and workmanship.103 The Board also argued that New England timber was notoriously bad: that it was liable to sudden decay. Therefore ships constructed in New England could not be counted on for more than four or five years service. This prejudice against American timber was apparently the main reason for the Navy Board's opposition to the construction of the vessels in North America. As Navy Commissioners stated "we think the badness of New England Timber is so notorious, as to render it unnecessary to say anything more."104 The Admiralty challenged the Navy Board's opinion of New England timber but informed Warren that he was to contract for only the two twenty-four gun ships if he had not gone too far with the negotiations to be able "to recede with honour".105

Navy Board opposition to the scheme forced a reduction of the number of vessels for which the Admiralty had originally planned, but ultimately two vessels, one twenty-four gun ship and one forty-four gun ship were built in New England. The larger of the two vessels was

102. Warren to Corbett, Boston, 26 June 1746, Admiralty I/480, f. 88.
constructed in Maine, by Colonel Nathanial Meserve, whom William Pepperrell selected to perform the task at a cost of £1,700 sterling. The cost of construction probably exceeded this amount considerably. In October 1747 Pepperrell informed the Commissioners of the Navy that the second payment was due Colonel Meserve. Pepperrell approved a draft on the Commissioners for £1,000 sterling. The reason for the higher than anticipated costs was that Governor Knowles asked that the ship be made longer than was originally specified in the contract.107 The twenty-four gun ship, called the Boston, was built at Boston by Benjamin Hallowell. How well the Boston stood up to service is unclear. The other ship, the America, launched on 4 May 1749, was reported unfit for service in 1755.108

New England also gained financially from the Navy's need to develop more facilities in North America for maintaining Navy vessels. In November 1745 Peter Warren started construction of a careening wharf at Louisbourg. The Navy Board sent out careening gear, storehouses were built, and a number of ships cleaned and refitted at Louisbourg. But the tides made it impossible to ground the ships firmly, and the "generally foggy and very uncertain" weather was a continual nuisance. Governor Knowles found Boston much more suitable for the task, and recommended that "all the American Station'd Ships" be cleaned there, "not only as it can be done with much more Expedition, but better done and much cheaper."109

Another source of investment in New England occasioned by the capture and occupation of Louisbourg came in the form of prize money from French ships captured at Louisbourg. New England soldiers had been bitterly disappointed when denied a share in this prize money,

106. Pepperrell to the Commissioners of the Navy, 8 June 1747, Mss Pepperrell Papers, III, p. 9, MHS.
107. Pepperrell to the Commissioners of the Navy, Piscataqua, 25 October 1747, Admiralty 106/1045.
108. Pool, Navy Board Contracts, p. 86.
but New England still benefitted from the captures. In 1746 and 1747 Admiral Peter Waren loaned £6,479 to various New Englanders. All but two of the loans were in sterling. The money did not go just to Massachusetts, where Warren had business dealings from as early as 1737. Some £3,500 went to three prominent Rhode Islanders: Captain Godfrey Malbone, Colonel Daniel Updike, and Jahleel Brenton, all of Newport.110

New England's economic stake in Cape Breton and enterprises related to it during the occupation of the island are reflected by newspaper interest in the island. An analysis of the type of reference which appeared in the columns of the Boston Evening Post suggests that public interest in Cape Breton was sustained throughout the occupation. If Louisbourg was of little interest to New Englanders there would have been little point in promoting the sale of items concerning Louisbourg, such as the new map of the British Empire in North America which William Price offered for sale with an account of the taking of Louisbourg.111 This advertisement was followed by another a few weeks later, offering a plan of the city and fortress of Louisbourg with a plan of the harbour, from an original drawing by Richard Gridley, commander of the train of artillery at the siege of 1745.112 The Boston Evening Post also published extracts of letters from Louisbourg, such as the one which appeared in the issue of 10 November 1746, commenting on various disadvantages of Louisbourg, but suggesting that overall it was worth keeping. The author argued that if the English kept Cape Breton, and commerce flourished, that the island would "by degrees become finally cultivated, and the present inconveniences

111. Boston Evening Post, 18 August 1746.
112. Ibid., 8 September 1746.
vanish.”

Boston newspapers showed much the same interest in Cape Breton in 1747 and 1748. In February 1747 Apthorp and Hancock advertised for carpenters and bricklayers to work at Louisbourg. In March one paper printed extracts from an article on Cape Breton published in London the previous autumn. The article stated that Cape Breton was expected to have a civil government soon and would become important for trade. New Englanders clearly had reason to feel that Cape Breton would fulfill their economic expectations. Throughout the spring and summer of 1747 there were calls for New Englanders to work at Louisbourg at jobs related to the occupation. In May, Governor Knowles advertised for pilots for his squadron at Louisbourg. The same issue of the newspaper which carried the advertisement called for labourers to go to Cape Breton to dig coal. The terms appear to have been generous. Those who accepted would be paid in silver, on a weekly basis. They would be protected from impressment, and be permitted to return to New England in the autumn if not inclined to stay there longer.

Later in 1747 English interests became involved in coal mining at Louisbourg. The London merchant, Chauncy Townsend, had his proposal to supply the Louisbourg garrison with fuel accepted by the Lords of the Treasury in December. Townsend sent agents and workmen to Cape Breton from England, together with equipment. The men arrived at Cape Breton at the end of May or the first of June. They found that Indians had attacked the colliery and carried away several miners and woodcutters. The raiders had also destroyed much equipment, carried away two vessels and some shallops, and burned a large quantity of wood.

113. Ibid., 10 November 1746.
115. Ibid., 16 May 1747.
116. Secretary of the Treasury Scrope to the Secretary at War, Henry Fox, 18 December 1747, Treasury 27/26, f. 326.
117. Memorial of Chauncy Townsend to Henry Fox, n.d., but internal evidence suggests 1749 or 1750, Treasury I/341, doc. 35.
Despite the problems of the Townsend enterprise, some New Englanders remained optimistic about Cape Breton coal mining. In May 1747 Boston officials asked Governor Knowles's permission to import 3,000 chaldrons of coal. This would relieve the city from suffering caused by a lack of firewood, and alleviate shortages of coal among blacksmiths, "sugarbakers" and others forced to suspend operations because of the small quantities of British coal which reached the city that year. Knowles responded favourably, but warned that Boston would have to send its own crews to mine the coal as he did not have enough men to dig coal for Louisbourg's needs. This condition does not appear to have posed a problem. In August several vessels sailed from Cape Breton for coal.

Thus, well into 1747 Louisbourg fulfilled the expectations of New England merchants and placeseekers. Thomas Hancock, Charles Apthorp, and Nathaniel Sparhawk all profited from Louisbourg's need for supplies. By the war's end Hancock was one of the wealthiest men in New England. His tax bill for 1748 amounted to £1,700 old tenor. He commented that "cruel it is but two in all the Colonys pay a higher Tax than I do viz Apthorp and Erving." Other New Englanders secured other rewards. Pepperrell had his title, and command of a regiment. Captain John Rous, commander of a New England privateer in 1744, and then commander of a New England vessel in the Louisbourg expedition, became a captain in the Royal Navy. Thomas Kilby was representative of a host of New Englanders who secured appointments to posts at Louisbourg.

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118. Petition of the Selectmen to Governor Knowles, 8 May 1747, Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston (Boston, 1887), p. 161.
120. Hancock to Kilby, 17 January 1749, THLB, MHS. The £1,700 old tenor was worth perhaps £170 sterling. Hancock's wealth may be put in perspective by noting that in 1774 the average per capita wealth of New Englanders was only a little over £36. See: A.H. Jones, "Wealth Estimates for the New England Colonies About 1770," Journal of Economic History, 32 (March 1972), #1, p. 101.
All this was accomplished by the constant application of New Englanders to the art of patronage, the cement of eighteenth-century English politics. The military victory at Louisbourg in 1745 represented only one phase of the campaign to translate the war with France into a meaningful program for achieving economic gain and military security for New England. Colonial merchants and officials achieved as much as they did between the victory of 1745 and the spring of 1746 because they were conscious of the growing personal nature of Anglo-American politics. By the early 1730's formal bureaucratic procedure was less important in resolving imperial problems than was "the cultivation of individual influence." 121 New England had adjusted well to the situation, and won the second phase of the battle of Louisbourg, the struggle to translate military gains into economic advances, through their adroit use of personal relationships. There was, however, no guarantee that the gains registered through 1747 could be maintained.

Chapter V

The Bitter Fruits of Victory: Military and Social Repercussions of the 1745 Assault on Louisbourg

Instead of resolving New England's defence problems, the Louisbourg expedition of 1745 led to massive social problems and to further military ventures. These two matters are closely related to each other in that to protect Cape Breton the New England colonies had to keep there (until British forces could relieve them), the bulk of the troops which had taken the island. The occupation was marked by disease, privation, and desertion, which problems plagued some of the survivors for years afterwards. This was the most striking consequence of the occupation.

Paralleling the social disruption of the occupation period were New England efforts to parlay the 1745 victory into military security for New England. These efforts took several forms, and indicate how little military advantage New England derived from the 1745 victory. First there was the futile attempt to impress hostile or potentially hostile Indians on New England's frontiers with New England's military prowess. Secondly, there were the costly reinforcements of Annapolis Royal and the abortive Canada expedition of 1746, all inspired or necessitated by the 1745 success at Louisbourg.

Chronologically, the military and social repercussions of the Louisbourg expedition unfolded first with Shirley's preoccupation with Indian problems on New England's northern frontiers. Then, attention was diverted by the plight of the New England garrison at Louisbourg, wracked by dissension and then decimated by disease,
beginning in the summer of 1745 and continuing without much relief until the spring of 1746, by which time returned survivors were beseeching the Massachusetts House of Representatives for relief from their suffering and losses. At the same time, New England authorities initiated plans to attack Canada, only to have them cancelled at a time when the French were attempting to regain Louisbourg. This French effort failed, but it caused panic in New England, and a related venture inflicted heavy losses on a contingent of New England troops in Nova Scotia. Meanwhile, Pepperrell and Shirley had to contend with various problems in recruiting men for their regiments at Louisbourg.

In essence, New England was beset with a host of social and military problems caused directly and indirectly by the expedition of 1745, and although New Englanders initially mustered enough influence to win promises of support for a Canada expedition, on balance they were unable to maintain sufficient influence to ensure that the expedition took place or to ensure that the British government accepted colonial views on Louisbourg as the Gibraltar of North America.

Of the various military and social problems to plague New England in the period of the Louisbourg occupation, the Indian problem arose the earliest - by June 1745. At first there were hopes that victory at Louisbourg might cow hostile tribes into submission. New Englanders did not abandon this hope easily. When Indians killed three men on the Connecticut frontier, Daniel Edwards of Connecticut suggested that the Indians could not have heard of the fall of Louisbourg, "otherwise it seems to be that they would not have adventured to shed blood...."

Governor Shirley also thought victory at Louisbourg might have a salutary effect on the Indians. In mid-July Shirley sent news of the victory at Louisbourg to the Penobscot and Norridgewock Indians, warning them not to be deluded into breaking their friendship with New England. Any disruption of the relationship, Shirley suggested, would lead to the Indians' own ruin. When the Indians continued to be troublesome, Shirley had difficulty accepting the fact that victory at Louisbourg might not have the efficacious results he had expected. He suggested to William Pepperrell that the Indians were encouraged by "a false report spread by the French...that we were defeated and cut off at Louisbourg...." He confidently asserted that the eruption would subside when the Indians learned the truth.

Meanwhile, problems developed at Cape Breton, forcing Shirley to abandon his quest for security on the frontier and to focus on the problems of the occupation of Louisbourg. Not many New Englanders lost their lives in the siege of Louisbourg, but within a month the condition of the troops had become alarming. Problems first appeared at Canso. In mid-July the Connecticut government sloop and another vessel went from Canso to nearby Isle Madame for a load of wood. The Connecticut vessel returned with many of its crew members felled by an unspecified illness. Two men died and thirty-seven others had to be landed at Canso, where four of the sick men were reported probably past recovery. There were still eight or ten sick men aboard the vessel. Whether the malady developed because of dietary deficiencies or from other causes is unclear. In any event the illness continued.

2. Shirley to the Penobscot and Norridgewock Indians, 12 July 1745, Law Papers, I, 336.
3. Shirley to Pepperrell, Boston, 29 July 1745, Lincoln, Shirley Correspondence, I, 257.
4. A. R. Cutter to Pepperrell, Canso, 18 July 1745, Mss Pepperrell Papers, I, 232, MHS.
Within weeks of the first news of illness, the commander at Canso reported that sixteen of his men and ten men in another company were sick, and that the garrison at Canso suffered shortages of rum, sugar, molasses, spices and "other necessities".5

Illness also struck at the crew of the Rhode Island sloop Tartar, commanded by Captain Daniel Fones. The captain reported sickness among his crew-members in July, and linked the problem to shortages of provisions. Fones wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, stating that he was out of stores of every kind, and his people almost naked. "Since my last (letter) two of my hands are dead and Several others sick." In August, Fones complained that he still had not received any provisions, that four of his crew had died, and many more were sick. A few days later Fones had to move several men to the hospital. Some of them he never expected to see again. Not surprisingly, Fones was eager to leave Louisbourg! "Our circumstances considered, I impatiently wait your orders to go home."7 Fones' compatriot, John Prentis, master of the Connecticut sloop, faced similar problems. He managed to return to New London with his vessel in October greatly relieved to be there, but saddened at having had to bury twenty-one men and come home with several ill.8

As illness struck the troops at Louisbourg and Canso they began to express dissatisfaction with garrison duty. The men were very eager to return to their homes. By the end of July they began to show impatience with their leaders' insistence that they remain at

5. Ibid., 4 August, 1745.
7. Ibid., I, 379, 381, 20 & 23 August 1745.
Louisbourg until British troops arrive. Before long the situation had deteriorated to such an extent as to require Shirley's presence. Apparently unaware of the trouble brewing at Louisbourg, Shirley had postponed a trip there planned for July in order that he might devote more attention to the Indian question.9 The Massachusetts Assembly regarded the situation at Louisbourg as more important. In a message to Shirley the day after he announced the deferral of his trip, the House stated that they viewed the postponement "with no small concern." It was suggested to Shirley that his "immediate presence at Louisbourg" was required. At the same time the House indicated its weariness with the war by requesting that Shirley order the immediate discharge of as many troops and transports as was consistent with Louisbourg's safety.10

Shirley went to Louisbourg in August. He was greeted warmly, by the firing of cannon and by "joyful acclamations" of the troops.11 Despite the acclaim with which he was received, it is clear from his letters and actions that he regarded the discontent among the troops as serious. Shirley addressed the troops on 2 September, informing them that he hoped to raise other contingents to replace them, but that it was essential that a force remain to defend the city. Shirley suggested it would have been better not to have taken Louisbourg at all than to abandon it at that point.12

On 17 September Shirley had to address the troops, first reiterating his earlier promises, then informing the men that he had sent to New York and Philadelphia to supplement clothing ordered from Boston. He also announced an increase in pay, raising each soldier's

9. Assembly Mins., 26 July 1745, C0.5/809.
10. Ibid., Message of the House to Governor Shirley, 27 July 1745.
12. Ibid., 16 September 1745.
wages from twenty-five to forty shillings a month. He concluded with an earnest appeal to the troops' loyalty. Shirley later informed the Duke of Newcastle that "some turbulent spirits among" the troops had planned to lay down their arms at parade, "which even the Soldiers upon the main Guard were near doing; and very very dangerous Consequences must have ensued had I not been upon the Spot to have prevented them...."

True to his word, Shirley had already addressed himself to the matter of replacements for the forces at Louisbourg. On 2 September he had written Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire. First of all Shirley informed Wentworth of his efforts to settle the state of the land forces at Louisbourg. He then pointedly stated that since Louisbourg fell, Massachusetts had voted an additional 1,000 men for service there, while the total number of New Hampshire troops at Louisbourg was only 254 - eleven having died and 169 having been sent home. Without further ado Shirley suggested that New Hampshire was not doing its share. Meanwhile, Peter Warren wrote Governor Wanton of Rhode Island with the same objective. Perhaps aware of Rhode Island's historically poor relations with Massachusetts, manifested on several previous occasions by a reluctance to cooperate on military ventures, Warren did his utmost to convince Wanton of the importance of Cape Breton. He suggested that the conquest would bring relief from "a designing, encroaching, and powerful enemy...." and that the possession of Louisbourg would increase New England's trade to such an extent that the colonies and the mother country would be induced "to be extremely grateful to those who have opened so fair a channel for

15. Shirley to Wentworth, Lbg., 2 September 1745, Lincoln, Shirley Correspondence, I, 264.
the increase of wealth and power." But there was naturally the
danger that the French would try to retake Louisbourg. Therefore,
additional Rhode Island forces were needed to help forestall that
threat.16

Pepperrell followed up Warren's request with a similar one
a week later. He urged haste in sending troops to make up deficien­
cies in the three Rhode Island companies at Louisbourg. Pepperrell
also advised sending provisions, bedding, clothing, and other
necessities,17 which indicates that the commander of the Rhode Island
sloop had not been exaggerating the shortages among the Rhode Island
forces. These and other requests accomplished little. As late as
26 November, Peter Warren appealed to Governor Wanton for assistance.
The lateness of the season forced Warren to acknowledge the unlikeli­
hood of reinforcements reaching Louisbourg before the spring of
1746, so he asked that Rhode Island send reinforcements with pro­
visions by the beginning of March.18

Difficulties such as those encountered in trying to secure
additional troops from Rhode Island were apparently common to most
of the New England colonies. In the case of Connecticut, Governor
Jonathan Law remained optimistic throughout the autumn of 1745 that
Connecticut would profit from English possession of Cape Breton. In
October, Law called Louisbourg "the key of the fur and fish trade...."
In November he sent congratulations to Peter Warren on the success
and honours conferred on him, and spoke of "the advantages that may
accrue to this colony and the government of Louisbourg by a good
agreement and correspondence between them...."19 On the other hand,

16. Warren to Wanton, Lbg., 13 September 1745, Bartlett, ed., RCRI,
V, 144.
17. Pepperrell to Wanton, Lbg., 20 September, 1745, Kimball, ed.,
CCGRI, I, 384.
18. Warren to Wanton, Lbg., 26 November 1745, Bartlett, ed., RCRI,
V, 148.
19. Law to Eliakim Palmer, Milford, 4 October 1745, Law Papers, II,
88; Law to Warren, 5 November 1745, II, 103.
by August at least some of the Connecticut troops serving at Louisbourg had become restless. That month Law received a report that the Connecticut forces were very uneasy, and that many were in great want of clothing. According to Law's informant perhaps no more than fifty men in the Connecticut regiment were willing to remain on the island.  

Complaints mounted as time passed. One Connecticut native at Louisbourg, Jeremiah Miller, wrote Law late in August 1745 that he had been out of rum and bread for some time, and that much of the last lot of bread received had been spoiled. He reported that the troops were "very sickly, and that owing I imagine to Salt Provisions, and the badness of the water". There was no improvement by mid-September. Colonel Simon Lothrop wrote Governor Law then that if special care were not taken of the men, they would suffer exceedingly and most of them would probably die "by the extremity of the winter season...." Nor were illness and shortages the only problems faced by the Connecticut forces. The Indian recruits from Connecticut proved very difficult to control once the fortress fell and they were left with nothing to do. They became quarrelsome, got drunk, and became involved in disputes with the other recruits. Two of Connecticut's officers advised Law that the government should recall the Indians as soon as was convenient.  

For some troops from Connecticut and other colonies the situation was unbearable. Some regarded mutiny, with its attendant consequences, as a viable alternative to life at Louisbourg. In the

21. S. Lothrop to J. Law, Lbg., 16 September 1745, ibid.  
22. A. Fitch and E. Parish to J. Law, Lbg., 19 September 1745, Ibid., II, 61.
fall of 1745 Louisbourg authorities sent the sloop *Dolphin* to Canso Gut to load cord wood for Louisbourg. The ten soldiers sent to assist in the task, five from Connecticut, and five from New Hampshire, forced the crew to sail for New England, declaring that "they would not go to Cape Breton again..." According to another source there were only eight soldiers aboard the *Dolphin*, and they were there for the protection of the crew. In any event, both accounts agree that the soldiers seized control of the vessel and insisted on going to New England. Nor was the *Dolphin* affair the only incident of that nature. A similar case involving Massachusetts troops also took place. Massachusetts authorities vowed that the participants would not to be permitted to go free if they could be apprehended. Lieutenant Governor Spencer Phips of Massachusetts, in reporting the incident to Governor Law, informed him that he had issued a proclamation for the arrest of the men.

Given the problems the troops faced it is not surprising that in late November Warren still did not have as many men from Connecticut as he wanted. Consequently he asked Law to raise more men for Louisbourg, to be there by the beginning of March at the latest. Moreover, Warren assured Law that any expense Connecticut incurred on this occasion or in any other action taken to support the garrison at Louisbourg, he (Warren) and Pepperrell could defray by bills of exchange on the British government.

Boston and other parts of New England also faced problems as a result of the occupation of Louisbourg. In October, "an infectious disease brought from Cape Breton" caused a number of deaths in Boston. The city's selectmen stated that some action to isolate sick troops was necessary for "the safety and preservation of the inhabitants of the Province...", because many of those returned had

died, and "Sundry persons that have nursed and tended these soldiers have also been taken ill of the same fevers and died...." The city then asked the Massachusetts Council for orders to prevent the spread of the disease. The Council advised the selectmen to provide a house in a remote part of the town for the reception of sick from Louisbourg, and to appoint a person to visit ships coming from there so that the sick could be ordered removed.

If the situation was difficult for Boston officials, it was impossible for Louisbourg officials. In December, Pepperrell wrote that "it has been a sickly dying time among us....The almighty seems to be angry with us." Yet Pepperrell could not suppress his feeling that despite all the illness "I cannot help thinking, but this must be naturally a very healthy place...." In January 1746 Warren and Pepperrell held out hope that the worst was over, although they had to admit that the situation was still serious. As the two men stated, "A mortal sickness...has for some time prevailed in the garrison, and has carried off considerable numbers, and still continues to do so (though we hope it is abating)...." Within a matter of days it became apparent that there was no improvement in sight. At the end of January 1746, Pepperrell and Warren recorded having buried 561 men since the last of November 1745. At that time there were 1,100 men sick, and fewer than 1,000 men capable of doing garrison duty.

27. Meeting of Selectmen, 16 October 1745, Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston.
Not until April did the situation improve substantially. By the middle of that month the garrison was generally healthy. 32

For many who survived the siege and the following winter, there was to be no relief. By December 1745 the Massachusetts Assembly began to receive petitions from disabled soldiers who needed assistance. On 31 December, David Stanwood petitioned for relief. He had been dangerously wounded and taken prisoner by Indians. His wounds left him too disabled to work. The House voted him £5. 33 Stanwood's petition was the first of many such requests. To judge from the manner in which the Massachusetts government resolved the petitions, it at first had no systematic policy for dealing with them. The disposition of the petition of Roger Hunnawell is a case in point. Hunnawell apparently came through the siege unscathed, but Indians wounded him while he was on his way to Boston. As a result he later had an arm amputated. The Assembly voted him £7, 1s for relief. Ten days later another soldier disabled by wounds received £6. 34

This began an onslaught of petitioning for unpaid wages and compensation for various losses and wounds which petitioning lasted into the 1750's, and forced numerous members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives to attend to consequences of the 1745 expedition long after the bulk of New England's troops had returned to their homes. From the beginning of January 1746 until the end of April, there were forty-six petitions related to service at Louisbourg. 35

32. Pepperrell to Wolcott, 15 April 1746, Law Papers, II, 204.
34. Ibid., 10 & 21 January 1746.
35. Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, vol. 22, 1745-1746 (Boston, 1947.)
Table 6

Petitions and Memorials to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 1746-1750, for compensation for services related to the capture and occupation of Cape Breton Island.

Thirty-eight different members of the House sat on committees dealing with these petitions. There were 103 members of that House, so over 36% of the House devoted time to these matters. Committee assignments went to such leaders as John Choate, Robert Hale, Thomas Hutchinson, and Roland Cotton. The assignments also went to many less prominent members, suggesting that the volume of petitions was too great to be dealt with solely by any single segment of the House.

Paralleling the social costs of the 1745 expedition were a variety of military expenditures, which the New England colonies felt compelled to make to protect their investment. As Connecticut's Roger Wolcott reported to Governor Law in January 1746, officials in Hartford believed it in the colony's interests to support the occupation of Louisbourg, because the omission of assistance might prejudice Connecticut's case in seeking reimbursement for the charges incurred in the Cape Breton expedition. The implications of such reasoning might not have been clear to officials in Hartford, but regardless of their comprehension of what was happening, New Englanders soon found themselves drawn inexorably into efforts to defend Louisbourg, and to carry what they had begun there to its logical conclusion - the conquest of Canada and possibly the total extirpation of the French empire in North America.

William Shirley and Peter Warren began espousing a policy of continued and expanding military commitments shortly after Louisbourg fell. Shirley was apparently the first person to call for a Canada

37. R. Wolcott to J. Law, Hartford, 21 January 1746, ibid., II, 172.
expedition after the success of 1745, but the idea had occurred to New Englanders such as William Pepperrell as early as June 1745, when he expressed his hope that the success at Louisbourg would "be an happy prelude to the reduction of all the French settlements in America." Pepperrell urged an expansionary military policy upon the Duke of Newcastle, and in doing so was seconded by Peter Warren, who declared that the conquest of Louisbourg gave the colonists "the best opportunity of extirpating the French out of North America". The benefits he anticipated from this were largely economic: the conquest of Canada would enable the colonists to monopolize the fish and fur trades, and the latter trade would be infinitely more valuable once the Indians were no longer prevented from trading with the English by animosities fomented by the French.

Such a proposition as an expedition against Canada was difficult for the British government to resist. The capture of Louisbourg had been greeted with widespread public acclaim in Britain. The response was apparently spontaneous at first, but soon propagandists busied themselves trying to ensure that the public did not forget the importance of Louisbourg. The flurry of pamphlets which appeared in London's bookstalls was so well organized as to suggest that it was probably orchestrated by the London agents for the New England colonies.

At this point William Pitt began arguing within the British government for a naval war, and the Duke of Bedford took up the refrain.

Bedford's reasons for advocating a naval war and an expedition against Canada are uncertain, but he had been in contact with Ellis Huske, one of the New Englanders then in London who were active in setting forth the importance of Cape Breton. The Duke of Newcastle went along with the scheme reluctantly, to gain Bedford's support, and because he believed the expedition would be popular with the British people. "These measures", he wrote to Chesterfield, "will meet with pretty general approbation, when it is known from the proposals of France that we cannot now make peace even upon tolerable grounds."41

Although the British government approved the expedition largely because of the efforts of the New England agents, in New England itself support for the expedition was no more unanimous than had been support for the Cape Breton expedition. But Shirley had the support of many key individuals in New England and in other English colonies in North America. Robert Livingston of New York and Jacob Wendall of Massachusetts, wealthy and influential merchants, both supported the idea of an assault on Canada.42 In May 1746 Shirley received assurances that a British fleet, seasoned regular troops, and financing would all be available to assist the colonies in the prosecution of the expedition.

With assurances of British support, cooperation within New England improved. Even while Rhode Island and Connecticut initiated steps to recall their troops from Cape Breton they also indicated that they were prepared to contribute to the Canada expedition. Rhode

41. Ibid., 566, 570, 573.
42. Schutz, "Imperialism in Massachusetts...", Huntington Library Quarterly, XXIII, 223.
Island voted to raise three companies of 100 men each, with each recruit receiving a bounty of £50, a £20 suit of clothes, and other items, regardless of any pay they might also receive from the British government. Warren was apparently not overly impressed with Rhode Island's contribution, but Governor Greene explained that the colony's effort was not as negligible as it appeared, considering that Rhode Island had twelve vessels operating as privateers. In fact, Greene stated that since experience had shown that the American colonies could not be secure "as long as Canada subsists, it was with the greatest joy that His Majesty's subjects in this colony received the news of his intentions to reduce it...."44

In Connecticut, for every person reluctant to serve on the expedition there was someone else who volunteered. An ensign, named Sharp, nominated by the Assembly to serve in a company commanded by William Whiting, refused to serve. In reporting Sharp's reluctance to join the expedition Whiting noted that Ensign John Huntington "who went with me to Cape Breton in that office", was interested in the position which Sharp declined. Also, a Dr. Fitch, "lately returned from Cape Breton" was willing to serve.45 Even Dr. Normand Morison, whose health had been impaired at Louisbourg, was prepared to enlist in the Canada expedition, although he wanted more assistance than was originally offered him.46

There was a flurry of activity in New England in the summer of 1746 as the colonies prepared for the expedition. According to

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44. Greene to Warren, Prov., July 1746, RCRI, V, 201.
45. Wm. Whiting to J. Law, Lebanon, 3 July 1746, Law Papers, II, 251.
46. N. Morison to J. Law, New Haven, 3 July 1746, Ibid., II, 249, 250.
the Boston Evening Post, Louisbourg, to be used as a staging point for the expedition, was very active making preparations and strengthening its fortifications against the French. Looking into the future, Shirley made plans for the period after the reduction of Canada. In June, Shirley raised the question of future employment of the six British regiments designed for the Canada expedition. He wanted to send them to Nova Scotia, where they might "assist in removing the most obnoxious of the French inhabitants...." Shirley elaborated on the proposal in August. It is obvious that Shirley hoped to make the most of the initial wave of enthusiasm in Britain which the victory at Louisbourg had created to garner support for more North American ventures. Securing Nova Scotia had interested Shirley since the early 1740's, but it was the victory at Louisbourg which created an atmosphere in which such schemes appeared feasible. Shirley's Nova Scotian proposal was to apprehend and examine a convenient number of obnoxious and dangerous inhabitants. "Upon finding them guilty" of any offences such as treasonable correspondence with the enemy, such inhabitants might be removed. Then the government might build two strong blockhouses or small forts for 100 men each, one at Minas, the other at Chignecto, and a trading house at Minas or elsewhere to promote trade with the Indians. Finally, Shirley advised removing Catholic priests from Nova Scotia and introducing Protestant English schools, and French Protestant clergy with due encouragement for the inhabitants to conform to the Protestant religion.

Not long after this Shirley received word that there would be no British assistance for an expedition that year. Shirley and Warren felt that the colonial troops raised were not a sufficient force to undertake the expedition on their own. As an alternative

47. Boston Evening Post, 4 August 1746.
48. Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 18 June 1746, Lincoln, Shirley Correspondence, I, 327.
49. Shirley to Newcastle, Boston, 15 August, 1746, Ibid., I, 336, 337.
Shirley proposed an attack on Crown Point for 1746, and consideration of the Canada expedition in 1747.\footnote{Warren and Shirley to Law, Boston, 25 August 1746, \textit{Law Papers}, II, 289.}

Before much could be done to forward the Crown Point expedition, Louisbourg demanded New England's attention in another manner. From considering an expansionary military policy, New England had to adjust its thinking to concentrate on more purely defensive matters - not from choice but from necessity - as Shirley's fears came true and France set into motion a plan to regain Louisbourg. French officials in Canada had proposed such measures as early as September 1745.\footnote{Beauharnois and Hocquart to the Minister, 12 September 1745, \textit{CIL A}, Vol. 83, 1745, f. 3.}

The proposition became a reality with the launching of the D'Anville expedition in 1746. Although the French fleet headed initially for Nova Scotia rather than for Cape Breton, Shirley believed the ultimate objective was indeed to regain Cape Breton, "either by open force or...by possessing themselves of an equivalent for it...."

Shirley believed that the Acadians were ripe for revolt, and that the French would try to use them in the campaign, so he proposed sending troops to Nova Scotia immediately.\footnote{Shirley to the General Court, 9 September 1746, \textit{Shirley Correspondence}, I, 347-349.}

On the surface it appeared that Shirley's concern for Nova Scotia was not shared by the Massachusetts Assembly. The General Court was reluctant to take any action which would undermine the proposed campaign against the French establishment at Crown Point. It also expressed concern at the government's financial capacity to undertake so many commitments. Such expressions of anxiety over finances have to be seen in their proper context. From the War of the League of Augsburg in the 1690's the Massachusetts General Assembly had been quick to complain of defence costs. By the 1740's
such statements were a convention designed to warn royal governors against making excessive demands on the colony's resources, and were made even when the Assembly was prepared to countenance military programs. In fact, it did not take the Assembly long to agree on a formula for reinforcing Nova Scotia. This is clear from the fact that the day after Shirley's proposal, the General Court agreed that if 1,500 men from the Canada expedition were committed to Crown Point the Governor might send other troops to Nova Scotia - if he could give assurances that they would not be required to stay there as a standing force, and that no part of the pay, subsistence or transportation charges would be borne by the province. 53

Shirley also contacted the other New England governors to acquaint them with the threat to Nova Scotia and to ask for their support. He informed New Hampshire's Governor Wentworth of information from Major Paul Mascarene, commander of the garrison at Annapolis Royal, that the French were assembling at Minas for an attack on Annapolis Royal then or in the spring of 1747. The loss of Nova Scotia, Shirley suggested, would prove fatal to the proposed Canada expedition by threatening Maine and New Hampshire, by endangering the other English colonies, "and even the island of Cape Breton itself, the recovery of which would be facilitated to the enemy by their possession of Nova Scotia...." Massachusetts planned to send 300 men to Annapolis Royal immediately and 700 others as soon as possible. New Hampshire, Shirley advised, could help by sending to Annapolis Royal the forces it had raised for the Canada expedition. 54

Concern mounted when William Stanwood, master of a Gloucester

53. General Court to Shirley, Ibid., I, 350.
54. Warren & Shirley to Wentworth, Boston, 12 September 1746, Ibid., I, 351, 352.
fishing vessel which had been fishing between Sable Island and Nova Scotia returned to New England with news of a fleet of thirty vessels, which he judged to be French, off the coast of Nova Scotia. Shirley questioned Stanwood, and on the basis of his information the Council advised Shirley to send two vessels express to Louisbourg and two others to Annapolis Royal with the news. Eight days after Stanwood's appearance, Shirley renewed his request to New Hampshire for aid, asking Wentworth to send 200 men and at least one armed vessel to Nova Scotia.

In approaching the Rhode Island authorities for assistance a few weeks after his appeal to Wentworth, Shirley again stressed the threat the French posed, not just to Nova Scotia, but to Louisbourg as well. Although he had asked New Hampshire for only 200 men, Shirley told Governor Greene that he expected New Hampshire to send 300 men, and asked that Rhode Island provide an equal number of men, which amounted to the same commitment Rhode Island had made to the Canada expedition. Should the French take Annapolis Royal, Shirley stressed, this would add 5,000 to 6,000 fighting men to the enemy's forces, "and thereby enable them to make further attempts even upon Louisbourg, or prevent the success of" the Canada expedition, which Shirley hoped would take place in 1747. The Rhode Island government agreed to the request. It is clear, however, that the threat to Louisbourg was already receding. Warren and Shirley had information by late September that on 6 September there were eleven ships at Louisbourg (presumably they meant naval vessels), and that they might still be there. Given this fact, and the lateness of the season, Shirley and Warren stated that "We are in very little pain

56. Ibid., I. 357. Shirley to Wentworth, Boston, 23 September 1746, 57. Shirley and Warren to Greene, Boston, 14 October 1746, Ibid., I, 358, 359.
about Louisbourg, the season being so far advanced that the enemy
cannot keep the field to besiege it regularly...."58

If the D'Anville expedition was no longer an immediate threat
to Cape Breton, it was still regarded as a problem for Nova Scotia
and possibly for Boston. Ironically, New England's capture of Louis­
bourg in 1745 had spawned the very sort of threat it had been intended
to remove. As a result of information from Rhode Island and New York,
Massachusetts authorities believed their colony might be attacked.
Consequently they readied Boston's defences for any contingency. Until
the condition and disposition of the French fleet could be determined
with certainty no one was disposed to take the threat lightly. Charles
Knowles, from his vantage point as Governor of Cape Breton, wrote
the Duke of Newcastle in late October that the French were headed for
Annapolis Royal. If the French took the fort there, Knowles felt
that this would put them in possession of all Nova Scotia, and not
only cut off Louisbourg's communications with the colonies but also
end New England's fishery.59 In early November, Knowles sent a ship
to Chebucto, the rendezvous for the French fleet, ostensibly for a
prisoner exchange, but in fact to gather intelligence.60 By this time
officials in Boston had reason to suspect that the French fleet was
no longer a serious threat to anyone. Stephen Brown, master of the
sloop Prosperous, revealed late in October, that while bound from
Boston to Newfoundland he had been taken by the French and held at
Chebucto, where he had witnessed the disintegration of the demoralized,
disease-ridden fleet.61

New England could breathe a sigh of relief at the destruction
of D'Anville's fleet, but did not escape unscathed from French efforts

58. Warren & Shirley to Adm. Richard Lestock, Boston, 27 September 1746,
Law Papers, II, 321, 322.
60. Ibid., 8 November 1746.
to retake Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. The French had done more
than send a fleet to Nova Scotia. They had also sent some 600 troops
from Canada to the head of the Bay of Fundy to lend assistance to
the fleet at either Annapolis or Louisbourg. When the D'Anville
fleet collapsed, French land forces from Canada settled down to a
winter on the isthmus separating Nova Scotia from Acadia. Shirley
was determined to dislodge these forces. In asking the Massachusetts
Assembly for troops to drive out the French, he warned that if the
French gained control of Nova Scotia their numbers would be so
augmented by Acadians ripe for revolt that they might be immediately
enabled to break up all the settlements in Massachusetts' province
of Maine, and probably all of New Hampshire. Shirley argued that
under those circumstances the King would probably be obliged to
save the English colonies by giving up Cape Breton in exchange for
Nova Scotia, but at the same time the French might take their chances
on recovering Cape Breton in "the war which their acquisition of
Nova Scotia would so much facilitate to 'em."62

As a result of Shirley's urgings, troops were sent to Annapolis
Royal and from there Major Paul Mascarene sent them to Minas to
counter the influence of the nearby French troops over the Acadians.
The operation proved disastrous, as the 500 New Englanders involved
were attacked at Grand Pré in the middle of a February snowstorm.
Before daylight the French and their Indian allies had killed about
seventy men and taken sixty prisoners.63

While New England tried to cope with these problems, authorities
there also had to concern themselves with the recruitment of men for
the colonial regiments granted to Shirley and Pepperrell. The initial
shock colonies such as Connecticut had felt at the heavy loss of men

62. Shirley's address to the Council and House of Representatives
    of Massachusetts, 1746, PANS, Vol. 9, #14.
63. Capt. Benjamin Goldthwait's report to Governor Shirley on the
at Louisbourg passed by the time recruitment began. There was no difficulty enlisting men in Connecticut. The greatest problem was the small number of commissions available to the colonists. Perhaps to alleviate any dissatisfaction the situation had caused in Connecticut, Pepperrell informed Roger Wolcott that he would not discriminate between men raised in one colony or another in distributing those commissions over which he had control.

Recruiting at Louisbourg also met with problems. Bastide's efforts here on behalf of Governor Shirley met with hostility and obstruction from Pepperrell. Pepperrell granted Bastide freedom to recruit for Shirley's regiment on the condition that he produce a warrant from Shirley giving him authorization to raise men. Bastide could not do so. He informed Pepperrell that copies of the warrant might be aboard some missing vessels, and testily remarked that he had not expected that such documentation would be necessary, as "I am informed enlistments were made for your regiment before you received that power which you think now wanted for Governor Shirley's."64

Pepperrell probably would have been even more irritated had he known that his agents in New Hampshire were not having as much success in recruiting men for his regiment as expected, and this largely because Shirley's recruiters were offering better terms. One of Pepperrell's agents reported that Shirley's representatives were taking men up to forty years old for as little as three years, and offering them £6 for enlisting.65

At the same time that officials in North America grappled with the problems of the occupation of Louisbourg and related military endeavours, they also had to pay heed to developments in Britain. The

64. Bastide to Pepperrell, 10 March 1746, Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 148, MHS.
65. J. T. Mason to Pepperrell, Portsmouth, 9 March 1746, Mss Pepperrell Papers, II, 146, MHS.
military establishment to which the victory of 1745 had led would
disappear all too quickly if the British government was permitted to
overlook the importance of Cape Breton. Shirley, Warren, and
Pepperrell had all advised the British government of the desirability
of retaining Cape Breton for military as well as economic reasons.
Warren and Pepperrell had even counselled the erection of military
outposts at various places on Cape Breton in addition to Louisbourg.
In a letter received in England in February 1746 they suggested the
building of a small fort at St. Ann (Port Dauphin). The post would
satisfy both military and economic needs. Warren and Pepperrell
reported that St. Ann was "very commodious for the fishery", and
that there were a number of farms in the area, the produce of which
would "be very servicable to the garrison." 66 Although no fortifica-
tions were erected at St. Ann during the English occupation of
Cape Breton, Newcastle did direct the Master General of Ordnance to
give orders for erecting a fort there, and for furnishing it with
such cannons as were felt necessary. 67 Many lesser known New England-
ers also aided and abetted the campaign for the retention and develop-
ment of Cape Breton. For instance, there was Ellis Huske, who had
served on the New Hampshire Council, and had been a naval officer
in New Hampshire, postmaster at Boston, and publisher of the Boston
Weekly Post-Boy. He was in London in 1746, where he utilized "all
seasonable opportunities" with courtiers and "men of trade", to
persuade them of the importance of Cape Breton to both New and Old
England. 68

By June 1746 there must have been some suspicion that Britain
was prepared to restore Cape Breton to France. Warren, still at Louis-
bourg then, and increasingly bothered by what he referred to as his

67. Newcastle to the Master General of Ordnance, Whitehall, 3 March
68. E. Huske to Pepperrell, London, 2 January 1746, MHS, Collections,
6 Ser., Vol. 10, p. 423.
"scorbutick disorder", inquired why Britain was considering making another conquest of the same nature if there was doubt about retaining Cape Breton, because the acquisition of Canada would cause similar problems at a peace conference. Warren may, however, have received some news shortly afterwards which led him to believe that Louisbourg would after all be retained. In writing Christopher Kilby that June, Warren expressed pleasure that the value of Louisbourg finally seemed understood in England. He also mentioned wanting to see a civil government there, and certain other encouragements, such as a free port, toleration of all Protestants, the power to grant lands by the governor of the island, and the use of Louisbourg by convoys travelling between Britain and the American colonies.

Warren's optimism was misplaced. By August there were rumours that the establishment at Louisbourg would be demolished. On the basis of information that Knowles expected orders to demolish the fortifications, fill up the harbour at Louisbourg, and to abandon Cape Breton, Shirley wrote to the Duke of Newcastle to salvage what he could from the situation. He suggested that perhaps Louisbourg was not the ideal site for a base on the island, but that there were other sites worth considering. In the event that the destruction of Louisbourg was being contemplated seriously, Shirley suggested that the King be informed of the excellent harbour at St. Ann and of the fact that it could be fortified as strongly as Louisbourg.

Warren contributed to the promotional effort less directly, but no less intentionally. In a letter to a Captain Douglass, Warren stated that while Louisbourg was not a very suitable place of residence for "fine gentlemen", he still hoped that its importance to Britain

70. Warren to C. Kilby, Boston, 26 June 1746, Ibid.
71. Shirely to Newcastle, Boston, 24 August 1746, Lincoln, Shirley Correspondence, I, 340.
would "have more weight with the Ministry than their convenience." Warren encouraged Douglass to see Lord Sandwich and to tell him his (Douglass') sentiments on the matter. "It will richly deserve all they can lay out on it, in encouraging settlement."72

By 1747 it was apparent that the British government was not prepared to invest as much money or manpower in Cape Breton or in Louisbourg-inspired campaigns against Canada as Warren and Shirley wanted. Newcastle wrote Governor Shirley at the end of May that the expedition against Canada would be postponed once more. The British government could not send nearly as many troops as Shirley and Warren felt were necessary. Louisbourg, however, was to be maintained for the time being. Newcastle directed Shirley to meet with Governor Knowles and to take whatever measures were necessary to protect Louisbourg in the event of a French attack, so that the fortress might hold out until Warren's fleet could come to the rescue. The news that there would be no support for a Canada expedition was a major blow to the military aspirations of New England, although New England officials and merchants must have been relieved that there were obviously no immediate plans to demolish Louisbourg. At the same time, Newcastle struck a second blow against the New England military establishment. He informed Shirley that most of the troops in the regiments which Shirley and Pepperrell commanded were to be discharged as cheaply as possible. Knowles and Shirley were to decide how many American soldiers to keep in pay.73 The regiments were eventually broken at Halifax, in 1749, just after the evacuation of Louisbourg.

Shirley still hoped to make use of the forces at Louisbourg

73. Newcastle to Shirley, Whitehall, 30 May 1747, PANS, Vol. 13½, #3.
to secure New England's frontiers, but his proposals were again rebuffed. Newcastle agreed with Shirley that the French should be driven out of Chignecto, and Admirals Anson and Warren were directed to consider Shirley's proposal that 1,000 men from the Louisbourg garrison join with 2,000 New Englanders to drive out the French. Anson and Warren stated that they thought it too late for the project to be undertaken that year.74

Thus New England repeatedly failed in attempts to translate the victory at Louisbourg into military gains elsewhere. The problem was that imperial considerations clashed with New England's aspirations. The unexpected success of the Louisbourg expedition gratified officials in Britain, but it increased rather than diminished Britain's dilemma in seeking a satisfactory conclusion to the War of the Austrian Succession. Some sort of peace with France seemed inevitable. France would insist on recovering Cape Breton, and the Dutch would insist on its return so that they might recover lost territory in Flanders. But surrender of the one substantial gain made in the war would outrage public opinion. British ministers such as Chesterfield, Pelham, and Harrington accepted the Dutch position. They were prepared to give up Cape Breton in return for the restoration of the status quo in the Netherlands. Newcastle was opposed. He was convinced that public opinion in New England and Britain would be infuriated.75 Newcastle summed up the problem in a letter to Chesterfield in October 1745, when he noted that the Dutch would "strongly attack us" for the return of Cape Breton to regain their land, "and there the Duke of Bedford and his friends will be immovable."76 Chesterfield claimed to have been aware of the problem from the very beginning. 

74. Newcastle to Shirley, Whitehall, 3 October 1747, Shirley Correspondence, I, 401, 402.
75. R. Lodge, ed., Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle 1744-46, pp. xxiv-xxvii.
76. Newcastle to Chesterfield, 9 October 1745, Ibid.
I hear'd people bawling and huzzaing for its being taken, I wish'd it in their throats." At the same time Chesterfield realized how difficult it would be to surrender Louisbourg, and suggested that Newcastle might give up Gibraltar rather than Cape Breton.\textsuperscript{77}

Newcastle undoubtedly hoped that there would either be a decline in public interest in Cape Breton or that gains elsewhere would make it unnecessary to give up the island. No solution was in sight in March 1746, when Newcastle wrote that "Cape Breton is a difficulty, which I do not see how it can be got over at present. France will not make peace without it, and that you may depend upon; and who will dare to give it up, I know not."\textsuperscript{78} Abandonment of the Canada expedition left the matter unresolved. As late as 1747 there was still agitation to give up something else to save Cape Breton. (Lord Sandwich argued in 1747 for the surrender of Gibraltar rather than Cape Breton, but Newcastle refused to listen to him.)\textsuperscript{79}

In 1748 New Englanders learned that Britain had decided to restore Cape Breton Island to France. Their bitterness at this news is best understood in the context of the many social and military reverses New England had experienced since the victory of 1745. These bitter fruits of victory probably weighed more heavily in the minds of most New Englanders than the profits which went to the Apthorps and Hancocks of New England. A review of these reverses leads to the conclusion that the victory of 1745 was in many respects a phyrreic victory. The campaign of 1745 and the subsequent occupation of Louisbourg occasioned serious social disruptions for New England as thousands of men were diverted from productive occupations to perform garrison duty at Louisbourg. Hundreds died there; others

\textsuperscript{77} Chesterfield to Newcastle, Dublin Castle, 24 October 1745, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Newcastle to Chesterfield, n.d., but endorsed "15 March 1746, by express." Ibid., p. 127.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 771.
returned to New England with such severe service-related disabilities that they were a burden on the state for the rest of their lives. Hundreds more, perhaps a thousand, remained at Louisbourg in the regiments commanded by Shirley and Pepperrell until they were broken at Halifax in 1749.

Militarily there were a host of reverses, due in part to the inability of New England to enlist sufficient British support for the ventures proposed in the colonies. First of all there was the failure of the victory at Louisbourg to impress hostile Indian tribes on New England's frontiers sufficiently for them to cease their depredations. The reduction of Canada seemed to offer a solution to this difficulty, so New Englanders, convinced by their victory at Louisbourg that, with British assistance, they could take Canada, exerted sufficient influence over the British government, through official representations and a barrage of pamphlets, that the British agreed to the expedition. But that support was later withdrawn, and New Englanders were unable to regain it.

Several other problems followed in rapid succession. A planned assault on Crown Point (Fort Frédéric), in 1746, failed to take place because New England had to shore up its defences against a possible attack from the D'Anville expedition. Rhode Island troops rushed to Annapolis Royal to defend it were shipwrecked in passage. Troops stationed at Grand Pré to defend against Canadian troops at Chignecto were humiliated in a surprise attack in February 1747, and seventy New Englanders were killed before the battle ended.

New England, then, felt bitterness on learning that Cape Breton, "purchased and maintained at the expense of so much New England blood," was to be restored to France. 80 Thomas Hancock

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observed that "this whole country resent it and are in fear for the same." Even the Independent Advertiser, an anti-administration Boston newspaper which had deprecated Louisbourg's value, was critical of the decision.

Who can tell what will be the consequence of this peace in times to come? Perhaps this goodly land itself—Even this beloved country, may share the same fate with this its conquest—may be the purchase of a future peace. Where once there had been hope that Louisbourg would be a stepping-stone to a continent free of French influence now there was widespread bitterness as Louisbourg itself was lost.

81. Hancock to C. Kilby and J. Barnard, Boston. 18 July 1748, Hancock Letter Book, 1745-1750, MHS.
82. Independent Advertiser, 14 November 1748.
THE IMPACT OF ILE ROYALE ON NEW ENGLAND
1713 - 1763

by

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Chapter VI

Imperial Subsidies and Currency Adjustments* in New England

To be reasonably broad, an evaluation of the economic impact of Cape Breton on New England must include not only trade and military ventures, but must also encompass such imperial subsidies and currency adjustments which came about because of New England's interest in Cape Breton. To ignore such aspects of the relationship of Cape Breton to New England is to overlook an area in which Cape Breton had a far-reaching effect on the political and economic life of New England. Compensation or subsidization of the expenses of the 1745 expedition, and the uses to which the money was put, stirred considerable debate in New England from 1745 until the money reached colonies such as Massachusetts in 1749. The matter continued to effect New England for several decades beyond 1749 in that (at least in the case of Massachusetts), compensation led to the redemption of the colony's depreciated paper currency and consequently to a currency stability which lasted until the eve of the American Revolution.¹

Currency problems differed from colony to colony in New England,² but all the colonies shared a determination to obtain compensation for expenses related to the 1745 expedition, and in all the New England colonies the grants led to currency adjustments. Massachusetts began taking steps to secure reimbursement for its expenses before the end of July 1745. The Massachusetts General Court, on 30 July 1745, prepared a petition to the King asking for relief from the costs of the expedition.³

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*"Adjustment" is used here rather than the term "reform" because the former term is neutral, with none of the positive connotations of the latter word. Paper currency was a useful medium of exchange, and many New Englanders lamented the restrictions the British government placed on it.

The next day the House of Representatives took further action to obtain relief from what it termed "the insupportable Charge of the Expedition." It voted to send William Bollan to London to work with the colony's agent, Christopher Kilby, to obtain the compensation. William Shirley had chosen Bollan, then Advocate General for Massachusetts, for the mission on the grounds that "some person well acquainted with...the state of Nova Scotia...shou'd come over to England, to give to his majesty's ministers all the necessary information, in order to its future preservation...."

Shirley's selection of Bollan was well received, despite the fact that Bollan was his son-in-law. The Massachusetts House of Representatives moved swiftly to prepare and send to Kilby "all records and other Evidence necessary to support the Petition of the two Houses to His Majesty respecting the Charge of the Expedition." The appointment also met with approval outside the General Court. The Rev. Charles Chauncy wrote that Bollan "is a gentleman of capacity, and has his heart thoroughly set to do his utmost that New England may lose none of the honor it has merited." Massachusetts also made use of the services of agents of the other New England colonies. Eliakim Palmer, Connecticut's agent in London, assisted Massachusetts in advancing the General Court's petition to the King, and for his services received £100 sterling.

4. Ibid., p. 89.
7. MHS, Collections, I, 50; Freiberg, "William Bollan", p. 92.
Upon reaching England, Bollan proceeded to take Massachusetts' case not only to the British government but also to the public as well. In 1746 he published a 156 page work entitled *The Importance and Advantage of Cape Breton, Truly Stated, and Impartially Considered*. The main theme of the work was the economic and military value of Cape Breton to the British Empire. The book placed stress on the merits of Cape Breton as a staple for goods moving between England and the American colonies, and as a centre for the fishery. "By the possession of Cape Breton we are become, or have it in our Power to become, entire Masters of all the Cod-fishery, which as Charlevoix asserts, is of more value than the Mines of Peru."9 Towards the end of the book, Bollan mentioned that to finance the 1745 expedition Massachusetts "had recourse to their old method of issuing an additional Number of Bills...." He defended the practice as one "without which the Project had been altogether impracticable". At the same time, Bollan declared that the expense was beyond New England's capacity to bear, and that the colonies relied on the British government for a reimbursement. At the least, reimbursement would lift the allegedly intolerable burden. It might also do more than that. In a gesture apparently directed to hard money advocates in England, Bollan suggested that a grant in money would "introduce a Currency amongst them [the New England colonies], which will make the calling in and burning of their bills, or a great number of them, practicable." If no means were found to call in the money, then, Bollan warned that it would cause the ruin of New England, and because the colonists would have no money to pay for imports from England, "all commerce between them and Great Britain will cease of course."10

Bollan's references to the possible use to which the compensation or subsidy might be put must have struck a responsive chord in British

10. Ibid., 149, 150.
officialdom and among British merchants exporting to New England. Massachusetts had issued bills of credit since 1690, when it had issued £7,000 worth of bills to serve as currency. The initial emission was designed to satisfy troops returning from the Phips expedition against Canada. Within a year the £7,000 limit was raised to £40,000. Meanwhile the bills depreciated by 50%. Paper emissions continued despite opposition from the Board of Trade. A succession of Colonial governors failed to resolve the problem, although they had regarded it as serious. By 1718 Governor Samuel Shute of Massachusetts had come to look upon inflation as the chief problem facing the government of the colony. He asserted in a speech opening the February session of the Massachusetts General Court that "we shall never be upon a firm and lasting foundation, till we recover and return to silver and gold, the only true species of money."

Efforts by Shute and later governors to curb the paper currency failed, as a majority in the House of Representatives refused to accept deflationary measures. For many residents of Massachusetts, inflation seemed advantageous. It eased payment of debts, stimulated the fisheries, shipbuilding, and production of export commodities. But with war against France in the 1740's inflation became so severe that it injured British merchants trading with New England, provincial creditors, and colonial residents living on fixed incomes. New England's clergy became increasingly worried about the situation. The Rev. Nathaniel Appleton showed special concern for people living on fixed incomes when he discussed the effects of inflation in a sermon in 1748:

Is there not the cry of many widows, who have taken up with a certain sum, or income, in paper bills, instead of their dower that the value thereof is sunk in such a manner, and will purchase so much less of the necessities of life than at first, that they are brought into great difficulties for a living; and can get no redress.

The rapidity with which inflation increased in New England was matched by the slowness with which Bollan's efforts to secure compensation proceeded. The Privy Council received the petition for compensation by June 1746, and Bollan seemed to have been assured that Massachusetts would receive "satisfaction". In November a qualification was added to the effect that Massachusetts would have "some satisfaction". Bollan objected and managed to get the Council to agree to "reasonable satisfaction". To ensure that "reasonable satisfaction" would not mean much less than Massachusetts wanted, Bollan pressed upon the Board of Trade further information on the conduct of the Louisbourg expedition to prove that Massachusetts had not been extravagant.

New Hampshire's agent in London, John Thomlinson, also experienced difficulties in 1746. His problems, however, seemed to stem more from a failure of communications with the New Hampshire government than with British officials. At the beginning of May, Thomlinson wrote Governor Wentworth that he had heard nothing from him for a long time about the accounts for the Cape Breton reimbursement. As a result, it was likely that the applications of Rhode Island and Connecticut "will succeed, and you shut out...."15 A week later Thomlinson received instructions to solicit the reimbursement, but the New Hampshire authorities neglected to furnish him with some essential details. He dashed off a letter to Governor Wentworth betraying his great frustration: "But for Gods Sake what am I to Sollicit for is there any Sum mentioned to me, have any Accounts been sent as the other Provinces have sent to their agents...."16

13. Ibid., p. 298.
16. Ibid., 8 May 1746.
Meanwhile, Bollan seemed to be making some progress on Massachusetts' behalf. In April 1747 the Board ventured the opinion that Massachusetts' campaign expenses were reasonable, and that the colony's records were in order.17 The Massachusetts House of Representatives also showed satisfaction with Bollan's work. On 14 January 1747 the House voted £500 to Bollan for his support in England, and another £500 for Kilby and Bollan jointly for expenses.18

Further delays then occurred, and when the First Lord of the Treasury, the Hon. Henry Pelham, commented that any grant would be a gift, because Massachusetts had not secured the British government's approval before undertaking the expedition, Bollan replied that if Massachusetts had waited for Britain's approval, "the expedition would have failed".19 Despite Bollan's efforts, the debate dragged on into February 1748, when, prompted by "an irresistible Evidence of the general distress of the Country...," Bollan appealed for action. In remarks which suggest that some British officials were still reluctant to make the grant because New England had acted on its own in mounting the 1745 expedition, Bollan declared: "And I flatter myself...that You will be of opinion that our voluntary engagement in this Service... ought not in any Respect, to operate to our Prejudice, but, on the Contrary, to recommend Us to special Favours as well as speedy Payment of our Charges."20

Meanwhile, New Englanders on fixed incomes, such as the Rev. Appleton, tried to come to grips with the effect of inflation on themselves. Other New Englanders, merchants in England, and colonial

17. Massachusetts Archives, XX, 269; cited by M. Freiberg, "Wm. Bollan, Agent of Massachusetts", p. 94.
19. Massachusetts Archives, XX, 455; Freiberg, "Bollan", p. 94.
20. Massachusetts Archives, XV, 416; Freiberg, "Bollan", pp. 94, 95.
officials tried to resolve the problem because of its effect on trade and on the overall financial position of the New England colonies. There was obviously nothing new in the kind of problem. Finding a solution to money problems was a fundamental task of New England merchants from the end of the seventeenth century. In the mid-1740's, however, the extent of the problem demanded a solution. The value of New England's exports to England had declined slightly from 1741 to 1744 from the level of the previous four years. Then, from 1745 to 1750 the average annual value of exports to England declined precipitously. Compared to the previous four years, exports declined by more than 31% (by value), to their lowest level since the War of the Spanish Succession. At the same time, imports from England began to decline in 1740, and continued to decline until 1746, when they began to rise sharply in value until, by 1751, they had risen by about one-third.

For some colonial merchants the currency problem was minimized by British government spending in North America. It provided Hancock, Apthorp, Sparhawk and some other New England merchants with bills of exchange with which to pay for goods imported from England. For other merchants in New England and in Britain the greatly widened gap between the value of imports from and exports to Britain posed severe problems. The lack of specie in the colonies made payment for British goods in that form difficult, and British merchants were reluctant to accept the depreciated New England currencies. Merchants in England trading with the colonies began approaching the British government in 1748 seeking a resolution to the currency question because of its negative effects

22. The 1741-1744 average annual value was about £56,500 sterling. For the previous four years the annual average was about £60,000. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), Series Z 21-34, p. 757.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., the average annual value for these years was about £162,000 sterling.
on their trade. At the same time, New England officials began
discussions on the matter. The proposed compensation from the British
government was the key to currency stability.

But regardless of the use to which the money was to be put, New
Englanders wanted the grant. The actions of New England authorities
in early 1748 suggest that they thought they might break the deadlock
in Britain through action in New England. Governor Shirley took the
initiative. He contacted Connecticut's Governor Law in February 1748,
and informed him that Massachusetts was considering using its share
of the reimbursement to end the colony's paper money. Shirley probably
felt confident enough to approach Connecticut because he had finally
secured the General Court's acceptance of a redemption scheme. The
last round of this campaign had come when, addressing the General
Court on 3 February 1748, Shirley complained of the problems caused
by the enormous emissions of paper money, and recommended that some
other way be found to supply the Treasury.26 On 25 February the House
began debate on an act for calling in the province's bills of credit.
Initially the House came to no decision.27 Then, on 27 February the
House appointed a committee to meet with the representatives of other
New England governments "pursuant to the Vote of the Court of Accept­
ance of the Committee of both Houses on the Memorial of Thomas
Hutchinson, Esq."28

This was a significant victory for hard-money advocates, as
the vote of the House of Representatives indicated a striking change in

25. Ibid., The other American colonies had earned surpluses in their
trade with England for most years from 1711 to 1745. Then, like
New England, they too began to run consistent deficits. J. F.
Shepherd & G. M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic
Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 41, 42.
26. Shirley to the General Court, 3 February 1748, Journal of the House
27. 25 February 1748, ibid., p. 279.
28. 27 February 1748, ibid., p. 285.
the attitude of the House, whose members had earlier refused to pass measures to adjust the colony's currency. An incident in 1746 suggests the House's earlier attitude. On 6 June 1746 the House was presented with a memorial "of sundry Merchants of the Town of Boston, representing the great Mischiefs accruing to this Province by the great Floods of Paper Money issued and issuing in the Province...." The merchants proposed a scheme to rid the colony of many of the problems caused by the paper money, but the House simply voted to dismiss the memorial. The scheme which the House finally accepted was based on a memorial submitted by Thomas Hutchinson on 3 February 1748. In his memorial Hutchinson suggested that since it was beyond doubt that Massachusetts would be compensated for the expenses of the 1745 expedition, that the General Court should use the grant to recall the colony's money.

Shirley, in writing Governor Law, stated that in accordance with the resolution passed by the General Court, Massachusetts wanted a conference of the New England colonies before it began to recall its paper currency, so that "one general method or scheme might be agreed on." Similar letters went to the Governors of New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Law notified Shirley that Connecticut would recall as much of its paper money as the reimbursement would allow.

Shirley's insistence in 1748 on regional cooperation on the currency issue is understandable. Cooperation of the other colonies, especially Rhode Island, was essential. The government of Rhode Island had been issuing on loan large amounts of bills of credit since the

29. House Minutes, 6 June 1746, *ibid.*, vol. 23, p. 32.
early 1730's in order that the Rhode Island government, and individual Rhode Islanders, might profit from the need in Massachusetts for bills as a medium of exchange. The Rhode Island bills were accepted readily in Massachusetts. The problem had still been very real as late as 1746. That June the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed a motion directing a committee to prepare a bill reviving an early act "to prevent the great Injury and Injustice arising to the Inhabitants of this Province, by the frequent and very large Emissions of Bills of Publick Credit..." by Rhode Island. New Hampshire and Connecticut apparently caused no such problem. The House voted against applying the measure to them.

Although Law had indicated in March 1748 that Connecticut would recall its paper currency, Connecticut would not come to a conference on the matter then. Another attempt to secure the cooperation of the other New England colonies, in November 1748, also failed, when the other colonies refused to come to Boston to discuss redemption. After the latter failure Shirley informed the General Court that "there being now no Prospect of having any Assistance from them, no time should be lost for Proceeding upon this Business." On 25 January 1749 the General Court passed a redemption act. It was acceptable even to Thomas Hutchinson. After informing Israel Williams that the General Court had just spent a whole session dealing with an act to adjust the currency, Hutchinson remarked that the Act "tho' not every way without exception is as good as could be expected." The problem of continued

32. Law to Shirley, Milford, 19 March 1748, ibid., II, 230.
37. T. Hutchinson to I. Williams, Boston, 1 February 1747/49, Israel Williams Papers, Box I, MHS.
emissions of paper money in the other New England colonies was dealt with by a provision excluding the other colonies' paper money from Massachusetts.38

Meanwhile, things had not gone as smoothly in England as had been hoped. Problems in the accounts submitted by the colonies persisted, and colonial authorities had trouble satisfying officials in Britain with the accounts' accuracy. This meant much more work for colonial officials. In May 1748 Governor Law wrote to Connecticut's agent in England that Connecticut had been ordered to draw up "a more particular account of our charges in garrisoning Louisbourg...but the gentlemen have not finished it."39 Connecticut officials were still struggling with the accounts in mid-June. One of the individuals involved in the accounting reported then that he did not see how accounts could be drawn up at that time which would satisfy the appropriate boards in England. As he explained to Law, "The officers concerned in that expedition cannot be had, or prevailed with properly to avouch these new accounts...." He noted with regret that the Assembly had not legislated any measures compelling cooperation.40

While Connecticut struggled with the accounts, Law received word of the restrictions the British government was planning to place on the use of the grant. Connecticut's agent informed Law that at a meeting between the agents of the New England colonies and the Lords of the Treasury, the Lords had made clear their opinion that the reimbursement should be used to recall the paper currency.41 Thus, completion of the accounts would not necessarily mean prompt payment, since agreement would then have to be reached on the uses to which the

38. Then, in 1751 an act of Parliament restricted the issue of paper money in all the New England colonies. Belz, pp. 82, 83.
money would be put. Palmer received Connecticut's revised accounts by December 1748, but because the agents of Massachusetts and Connecticut lacked letters of attorney under the seal of their respective colonies, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General of England ruled that the agents were not properly authorized to receive the reimbursement.42

To help expedite matters in England, the Rev. Elisha Williams went to London in 1749 to assist Connecticut's agents. His activities illustrate how individuals could benefit from the reimbursement negotiations. Williams had been involved in Connecticut's preparations for the Louisbourg expedition, and had accompanied the colony's troops as chaplain. He had been "one of the principal speculators in soldiers' wages". His visit to London enabled him to forge important business connections there. Before his departure for London, Williams formed a partnership with Jonathan Trumbull and two other Connecticut residents. After taking some steps to present his colony's case to the Board of Trade, Williams turned to the affairs of the partnership. He succeeded in opening a joint account with a London merchant which greatly facilitated the partners' business with England.43

By the spring of 1750 Connecticut's agent in London had received the money due to the colony, but several factors frustrated Connecticut's attempts to gain access to the money. Palmer had died in 1749. Benjamin Avery replaced him, but did so reluctantly. Avery was willing to act on Connecticut's behalf regarding the Cape Breton reimbursement but declined to continue as agent after that affair ended.44 Moreover, Avery

was not acquainted with Law's successor, Roger Wolcott, and informed the new governor that as he (Wolcott) was a perfect stranger to him, he could not pay out any money at his request without a certificate drawn up by the Secretary for Connecticut, or else bearing the colony's seal. Avery obviously wanted to rid himself of responsibility for the money, however, as he testily stated that he would "sincerely rejoice to be properly authorized to pay away every penny of it tomorrow." But until he received what he regarded as proper authorization he would have to "be excused in letting it lie where it does".  

When Avery began paying out the money is unclear, but in October 1752 almost £9,000 of the £28,722 15s still remained.  

Difficulties in obtaining reimbursement for services at and related to Louisbourg undoubtedly rankled among New England officials. At the same time, one may gauge the value the New England governments placed on reimbursement by the persistence with which they sought it. Connecticut had first raised the question of reimbursement in August 1745. The colony pursued the matter relentlessly until its agent received the money in 1750. It was still drawing the money in 1752. Thus, Louisbourg still affected the New England colonies financially, in a direct manner, seven years after the expedition of 1745.  

Connecticut's problems in securing reimbursement, although complicated by the deaths of Palmer and Law, were otherwise similar to the experiences of the other New England colonies. Rhode Island sought compensation for Louisbourg-related expenses with comparable determination, and faced comparable difficulties. In February 1748 Rhode Island's agent in London, Richard Partridge, wrote Governor Wanton of Rhode Island that the House of Commons had voted £6,322 12s 10d in compensation to Rhode Island for its expenses in the Cape Breton expedition. At the same time, Partridge cautioned the governor that  

45. B. Avery to R. Wolcott, Guy's Hospital, 5 March 1750, Wolcott Papers, I, 40.  
46. Same to same, 16 October 1752, ibid., I, 190. Connecticut still had not redeemed all its paper money by the autumn of 1754.
the colony could not expect immediate payment, that it might take the Treasury some time to handle the matter. As Partridge noted, it was an affair "for which we must wait their leisure...." In order not to annoy the Treasury at such a crucial point, it would not be prudent for him "to teize [sic] them too much yet a while about the other money aforesaid."47 The other money to which Partridge referred was no doubt reimbursement for the abortive Canada expedition of 1746, and for sending troops to relieve Annapolis Royal in the same year. Subsequent events justified Partridge's caution. Late in March he wrote Governor Greene, who had succeeded Wanton, to inform him that he could learn nothing more as to when the Cape Breton money would be paid, although he hoped that it would be in three or four months' time. In the meantime he suggested that the Rhode Island General Assembly pass an act empowering him to receive the money, in case anyone object that the authority he received from the governor was insufficient. The Connecticut agent had received an authorization from that colony, and Partridge thought that it would be useful to have such authorization himself.48

Rhode Island also experienced delay in receiving the reimbursement money because of the Treasury's desire to see the money used to stabilize Rhode Island's currency. As Partridge informed Governor Greene, the Treasury wanted to pay the money "in such a manner as to oblige the several colonies to redeem their paper currency", but "as yet they are come to no certainty about it."49

Throughout this period Partridge was busy pursuing reimbursement for both the Louisbourg expedition, and related enterprises such

49. Partridge to Greene, London, 1 April 1748, ibid., II, 68.
as the Canada expedition and the reinforcement of Annapolis Royal. Rhode Island had become involved in the latter episodes because of Cape Breton. It was the ease with which New England had taken Cape Breton in 1745 which persuaded Rhode Island and the other New England colonies to cooperate on the Canada expedition. In the case of Annapolis Royal, Rhode Island had been asked to reinforce the garrison there because of the danger the D'Anville expedition posed to England's North American possessions - specifically to Louisbourg. Rhode Island's concern that it be compensated is understandable. The attempt to relieve Annapolis Royal had been disastrous. Rhode Island had sent three companies under convoy of the colony's sloop, with all of the provisions originally intended for the Canada expedition. Two of the transports had been stranded and lost on the coast of northern New England because of contrary winds and bad weather. The weather forced another transport to turn back. The trials of the troops may have ended here, but the expenses to the colony did not. The colony had no orders from the King to disband the troops, so some were furloughed and others billeted out until the King's pleasure was known. The total expenses to the colony for the Canada expedition and the attempted relief of Annapolis Royal in 1746 amounted £10,144 9s 6d sterling.

In November 1748 reimbursement of the Louisbourg expenses appeared at hand so far as Rhode Island was concerned. The Attorney and Solicitor Generals of England, D. Ryder and W. Murray, informed the Lords of the Treasury that whereas Partridge had produced authority under the seal of the colony of Rhode Island to accept the reimbursement for that colony, the Treasury could justifiably pay him the sum

50. Partridge to the Lords of the Treasury, 1 June 1748, *ibid.*, II, 72.
appropriated as soon as he gave a proper receipt. But the Treasury was at the same time advised that "the Merchants of New England" had petitioned for a delay in the payment until it was known what steps would be taken to redress "the inconveniences arising from the paper credit given in that province as well as in the Massachusetts Bay."

The Treasury was informed that Partridge was willing to have the sum appropriated for Rhode Island placed in the Bank of England until he received instructions from Rhode Island as to the disposition of the money. At the same time, Ryder and Murray declared their opinion that the agents of Connecticut, New Hampshire and Massachusetts were not properly authorized to receive the sum due those colonies.  

Partridge had still not received the Cape Breton reimbursement in May 1750, and advised the Governor of Rhode Island that it was not certain when payment would be made. When Partridge did receive the money, in August 1750, the Treasury had deducted what they regarded as an overpayment in the Canada Expedition money.  

Massachusetts managed to obtain its share of the reimbursement in 1749. Most of the £183,649 2s 7d arrived on 18 September aboard H.M.S. Mermaid. The money was landed at Long Wharf, then moved to a vault especially prepared for the occasion at the Treasurer's office. The Boston Evening Post observed that there were "Few tokens of joy shown on its landing: on the contrary, an uncommon gloominess appeared on most countenances." Such a response is not surprising. For merchants such as Thomas Hancock, a stable currency was a prerequisite of doing business. Hancock had written to Christopher Kilby in June 1748 that he was "exceeding glad" that

52. Report of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals to the Lords of the Treasury, 23 November 1748, ibid., II, 84.
53. Partridge to the Governor & Company of the Colony of Rhode Island, 12 May 1750, ibid., II, 100.
55. Already deducted from the grant was £2,710 16s 10d by William Bollan and Peter Warren for their services in buying the coin, packing, insuring and shipping it. M. Freiberg, "William Bollan, Agent of Massachusetts", More Books, March 1948, p. 97.
Parliament had granted the reimbursement. He expressed the hope that it would "be conducted for the best good to the Province", by which he undoubtedly meant a recall of Massachusetts' paper currency. William Pepperrell provided an even more unequivocal statement of hard money sentiment on the question of retiring the paper currency. In June 1749 Pepperrell voiced his hope to Peter Warren that the latter would soon be able to send the reimbursement money to Massachusetts, "that we may get clear of this paper money. I am sure that the time I was at Louisbourg I lost a good part of my fortune by the paper money depreciating."57

For Massachusetts' debtors, however, a continued inflation meant relief from their obligations to the colony's merchants. As the recall of paper money began in 1750 a New England humorist marked the occasion with a ballad entitled "a mournful lamentation for the sad and deplorable death of Mr. Old Tenor, a native of New England, who after a long confinement by a deep and mortal wound which he received about twelve months before, expired on the 31st day of March 1750."

Then, good Old Tenor, fare thee well,  
Since thou' art dead and gone;  
We mourn thy fate, e'en while we tell  
The good things thou hast done.  
Since the bright beams of yonder sun  
Did on New England shine,  
In all the land, there ne'er was known  
A death so mourned as thine.58

Overall, Massachusetts may have gained from the arrival of the £179,260 sterling in 1749, despite public sentiment against the

retirement of the colonial currency. The reimbursement enabled Mass­achusetts to redeem most of its paper currency and consequently stabilized the colony's currency. Indeed, it has been suggested that this stability lasted until the eve of the Revolution. There was, however, such considerable opposition to the fiscal policies advocated by the hard money advocates in the business community and implemented by the governments of New England in varying degrees that the colonial authorities had to exercise constant vigilance lest the fruits of victory be snatched away from them. Rhode Island is a case in point. On 24 August 1750 the Rhode Island House of Deputies debated a measure to issue £50,000 in paper money. Governor Greene appealed to the House to reject the measure, arguing that within the previous few years the value of Rhode Island's currency had shrunk by half. He suggested that a depreciating currency "ought not to be tolerated in any Govern­ment...because it enriches one Part of the Community at the Expense of the other." The Governor advised that a new emission would not only be unnecessary, but might prove "pernicious to the trade of the colony, manifestly injurious to all creditors on general, and ruinous to many Widows and Orphans in particular, and besides all this probably occasion the loss of our charter...." Green's action did not prevent the passage of a resolution calling for the emission, but no law was passed to authorize it. The opposition of Rhode Island merchants stopped the emission. Sixty-nine Newport merchants were prompted by the talk of an emission to petition the King to restrain the Rhode Island government from emitting any more bills without his approval. Obviously, it was not just a segment of

60. Governor Greene to the House of Deputies, 29 August 1750, CCGRI, II, 116-129.
the merchant community of Massachusetts which wanted a stable currency. The Rhode Island merchants did not have enough influence to prevent the Assembly from passing a resolution calling for an emission, but they were able to prevent any further activity by the advocates of emission. An emission in 1751 was the last Rhode Island emission in the period. That year an act of Parliament prohibited the colonies from issuing more paper money except in extraordinary emergencies. The act also legislated against delays in the recall of outstanding bills.62

In conclusion, it is clear that although currency problems differed from colony to colony in New England, and there was no unanimity on the question of whether or not the reimbursement should be used to recall colonial paper money, the colonies did share a common preoccupation with obtaining the parliamentary grant or subsidy. The negotiations with officials in Britain absorbed much of the time and energy of the colonies' agents. Preparing accounts and discussing currency matters and the reimbursement absorbed much of the time of officials in New England between 1745 and 1749.63 The quest for compensation began shortly after the victory, in July 1745. Grants were made to the colonies in 1749, and for several years afterwards the colonies drew on the funds for their financial needs.64 Thus, Louisbourg continued to affect New England, indirectly, some seven years

62. Baxter, House of Hancock, p. 104. The Rhode Island currency had depreciated in value by fifty percent between 1744 and 1750. By 1751 London creditors were claiming that the depreciation had defrauded them of three-quarters of the value of their bills. A group of them asked that paper issues of all the New England colonies be restricted. Bollan and the other New England agents eventually got the bill modified, so that the colonies were not wholly forbidden to issue paper money. But after 29 September 1751 paper emissions could only be used for current and extraordinary expenses. M. Freiberg, "William Bollan, Agent of Massachusetts", More Books, vol. 23, #4 (April 1948), p. 139.
63. For the twelve months from the time Governor Shirley congratulated the Massachusetts House on the victory of 1745, the reimbursement and related matters, such as instructions to the colony's agent, were discussed a total of nineteen times in the House. Currency
after the expedition of 1745. If one acknowledges that the currency stability caused by the use of the Louisbourg grants lasted until the eve of the Revolution, then in the long term, Louisbourg affected New England monetary policies for some three decades after 1745.

64. As has been noted, as late as 1752 Connecticut still had not exhausted the grant awarded that colony.
Chapter VII


At present there appears to be a general Disposition towards Settling Nova Scotia, and I promise myself it will soon be entered upon in earnest; I have a Plan for that Purpose under Consideration of the Duke of Bedford who appears zealous in the Colony's Interest, if it is approved of, I may chance to get some Employment....*

The establishment of Halifax in 1749 was a high point in the longstanding campaign of some New Englanders to exploit Nova Scotia's economic potential. New England's interest in the area, and how it went about securing its objectives help place in perspective the activities of New Englanders as they affected Nova Scotia from 1749 to the end of 1755. Once the campaign by New Englanders and their spokesmen for the establishment of Halifax is made clear, then the role New Englanders played in the evolution of Nova Scotia and its capital from its establishment until the eve of the Seven Years War becomes readily understandable. It was no accident of history that New England shipping was available to carry foodstuffs and building materials to Halifax once it was founded. Nor was it an accident that New England merchants such as Charles Apthorp and Thomas Hancock were prepared to provide financial services and coordinate the flow of goods to the fledging settlement on Chebucto Bay. The availability of New Englanders to help settle Halifax, and

*Otis Little to John Davis (n.d., but internal evidence suggests 1748), John Davis Papers, III, MHS.
and to fill military positions in the developing government were also part of a pattern of New England interest in the area.

In 1748 it became known in New England that Britain would restore Cape Breton to France.¹ With their hopes of the retention and development of Cape Breton dashed, New Englanders turned to the task of securing a quid pro quo for Cape Breton. If there was to be no quid pro quo, New England would lose an important source of bills of exchange, and an equally important outlet for its goods and shipping services.² An establishment in Nova Scotia would provide trade and allay concern about French military strength in North America. Thomas Hancock, echoing sentiments long-held by observers such as Governor William Shirley, informed Massachusetts agent Christopher Kilby on several occasions in 1748 that the best way to counter New England's fear of a French establishment in Cape Breton would be to settle and fortify Chebucto, and give it a civil government. If Louisbourg were surrendered and Chebucto and Annapolis Royal not protected adequately, "North America is gone soon; Nova Scotia if a civil Government & settled will be the finest Province in America & Secure the whole...."³

Hancock's entry into the debate on Nova Scotia, and New England's interest in the colony generally, become readily comprehensible when viewed in the context of New England's economic position at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. At that time there was a surge of imports from Britain, reaching record levels.⁴

1. T. Hancock to Kilby and Barnard, Boston, 18 July 1748, THLB, 1745-1750, MHS.
2. Although information is not available on the value of invisible earnings altogether (mainly shipping services) to New England in the 1750's, a study of the period from 1768 to 1772 suggests that such earnings paid for 58% of North America's deficit from commodity trade. There is no reason to believe that invisible earnings were any less important to New England in the period between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War. J. F. Shepherd & G. M. Walton, "Estimates of Invisible Earnings in the Balance of Payments of the British North American Colonies, 1768-1722", Journal of Economic History, 29 (1969), 234-235.
English suppliers encouraged colonial merchants to take large quantities of goods by making liberal offers of credit. At the same time, some suppliers encouraged vendue sales and entered into direct dealings with shopkeepers and other marginal importers in urban centers who would normally have bought from established merchants. The effect of this pressure on New England merchants, coupled with a sharp contraction in military spending, was a depression of unprecedented magnitude. Colonial merchants found their profit margins small or nonexistent; bankruptcies were common.  

In addition, drought in New England imposed a severe strain on the ability of local agriculture to accommodate the needs of urban centers such as Boston. As prices for farm products rose, Bostonians complained that dishonesty had "become the reigning vice of New England. We have indeed contracted such an Habit of unjust dealing, that the whole business of buying and selling is turned into an act of going beyond and defrauding one another." Rains broke the drought in July 1749 and reduced prices somewhat, but not to the complete satisfaction of the Boston Evening Post, whose editor commented that "...it is evident enough, that the evil spirit of extortion is not yet gone out of them (the farmers)."

Well before the depression began, New Englanders made efforts to turn the return of Louisbourg to France to their advantage, and then proceeded to consolidate their initial gains by exploiting the economic opportunities opened to them in Nova Scotia. This can be established by the following means. First of all, an evaluation of

3. Thomas Hancock to Christopher Kilby and John Barnard, 18 July 1748, Hancock to Kilby, 26 July 1748, Thomas Hancock Letterbook, 1745-1750, MHS.
correspondence between New England and Britain reveals the nature of the campaign for the development of Nova Scotia. The correspondence of New England merchants and nova Scotia officials then demonstrates how the New Englanders employed business acumen and contacts acquired in doing business at Louisbourg between 1745 and 1749 to realize the economic potential of Halifax. Finally, an analysis of Halifax shipping records, Nova Scotia government appointments, and the fortunes of the appointees illustrates the degree to which New Englanders dominated the economic life of Nova Scotia between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War.

By the time the British government began giving serious consideration to settling Nova Scotia with an English-speaking population, Governor William Shirley had been urging such a course for almost a decade. Shirley also wanted at least some of the French-speaking population of Nova Scotia removed, in order to deprive France of a source of manpower to be exploited in any conflict with the New England colonies. There was some support in British government circles for Shirley's proposals. In 1747 the Duke of Newcastle observed that "the French" should be driven out of the Chignecto area of the colony. He informed Shirley that the King had directed Lord Anson and Admiral Warren to consider a proposal by Shirley that Governor Knowles of Louisbourg detach 1,000 men out of the garrison at Louisbourg to join with 2,000 men from New England and drive out the French. The campaign did not take place. By the time the matter received serious consideration it was too late in the year to manage it.8

7. Ibid.
Prospects for the development of Nova Scotia began to brighten as the likelihood of Cape Breton's return to France grew greater. In 1748 Newcastle directed Shirley to submit a plan for a civil government for Nova Scotia. Shirley did so in February. He clearly intended the project to benefit New Englanders, as he advised that a charter similar to Massachusetts' would best serve to attract New Englanders. Nor were Shirley and Hancock the only people in New England determined to have a counterweight to Louisbourg in Nova Scotia or elsewhere. In April 1749 the Massachusetts General Court requested a fortress at Crown Point on the grounds that danger to New England's western frontier had increased "because of our exposed State to the Eastward upon giving up Cape Breton to the French." Throughout this period Shirley continually related Nova Scotia's security to the restoration of Cape Breton. He suggested to the Duke of Bedford "that the preservation of Nova Scotia will depend upon its being secured timely against any sudden attempt of the French, which must be expected to be made with their utmost force from Canada and Louisbourg, upon their first determination to come to a rupture with us."  

By April 1749 the Duke of Bedford already had before him a plan for the settlement of Nova Scotia. Although presented by Lord Halifax, then President of the Board of Trade, the plan derived mainly from statements by Shirley, Warren, Knowles, William Bollan, Lieutenant Governor Clarke of New York, and several New Englanders such as Otis Little, William Vaughan, and Captain John Rous. Otis, who had served at Louisbourg, was in England in 1748 seeking compensation for his

10. Report of French Encroachments, Massachusetts General Court, 18 April 1749, *ibid.*, I, 480; Massachusetts was concerned enough about French threats that in the spring of 1749 the House of Representatives voted to continue the pay and subsistence of 499 men and officers for the defence of the frontier, 19 April 1749, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, vol. 25, p. 234.
services at Louisbourg. His appeals for money apparently seemed doomed to failure, so Little turned to pamphleteering as a means of gaining compensation in a less direct manner. His pamphlet called for the settlement of Nova Scotia. He suggested also that by fortifying the colony and stationing a naval force there "this Kingdom may secure to itself all the advantages that could have arose from the Possession of Louisbourg, at less expense than would have been requisite for keeping so large a Fortress in Repair, and defending it with a proper Garrison."12

Little was anxious that proposals to develop Nova Scotia not be abandoned as in the past but he carried out in such a manner as would benefit New England. As Little explained to a friend in New England, he wrote the pamphlet after the British government decided to give up Cape Breton. He believed the decision to give up the island was irreversible, so that the best course open to New England was to secure compensation in the form of Nova Scotia's development. He referred to his proposals as "a Design which must confessedly appear more beneficial to the whole, than could probably have resulted from the possession of that Island and neglecting the Continent." Little noted that there seemed to be in Britain "a general Disposition towards Settling Nova Scotia, and I promise myself it will soon be entered upon in earnest; I have a Plan for that Purpose under Consideration of the Duke of Bedford who appears zealous in the Colony's Interest...."13 Clearly, Little expected to profit

13. Otis Little to John Davis (n.d., but internal evidence suggests 1748), Massachusetts Historical Society, John Davis Papers, III.
from the proposed establishment in Nova Scotia. In commenting on his submission to Bedford, Little observed that if it was approved, "I may chance to get some Employment".14

Representations from New Englanders such as Little led to the plan for the settlement of Nova Scotia being advanced largely on the grounds of Louisbourg's threat to the English colonies. The settlement of the colony would also redress a number of New England's grievances at the return of Cape Breton to France. Nova Scotia would be a line of defence for New England against the French once it was settled by loyal subjects. As Shirley and a number of New Englanders argued, if Britain did not act promptly to secure Nova Scotia, it would become a powerful French settlement. Under these circumstances, "The precarious footing upon which Her Majesty's possessions in North America will stand is plain to every common understanding which will be at the pains of considering what the united force of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton is like to be."15 Moreover, with English fortresses not just at Chebucto, but also at strategic points such as Chignecto, Louisbourg would not be able to dominate the approaches to the continent. Thus, the fortifications of Nova Scotia could threaten communications between Quebec and Cape Breton.16

By exploiting the imperial rivalries of Britain and France, New Englanders and their representatives hoped to shore up New England's defences and at the same time improve New England's economic position, without great cost to the colonies. The lack of interest by the colonists in spending their own money on the defence of Nova Scotia

14. Ibid.
16. Ibid. A Nova Scotia full of vigorous English-speaking settlements would also render Louisbourg of less importance. This could be of more benefit than any military establishment, and would be in accord with mercantilist policy. See W. A. B. Douglas, "Halifax
does not necessarily indicate that New Englanders had no interest in Nova Scotia. New Englanders had been traditionally reluctant to spend money to fortify frontier areas. Shirley's plans for Nova Scotia do not represent a personal bent for an imperial policy. Shirley was too astute to promote policies for which there was no support in his own colony. New England merchants wanted Nova Scotia developed because of the economic benefits which would accrue to them. They also wanted a buffer for New England. Shirley's plans would accomplish these ends without cost to New England.

Thomas Hancock stated the economic argument for many New England merchants in discussing with a correspondent his impression of the consequences of Louisbourg's return to the French. At the time, Hancock was sending some foodstuffs to Cape Breton, but diverting other materials to Annapolis Royal. Trade considerations overshadowed all else. "If we (lose or leave) one (I) believe demand for the other will be the larger." Hancock's optimism was justified. Within months of submission of the report recommending the development of Nova Scotia, the project was accepted and being implemented. Almost immediately New England began to realize benefits. These accrued on two levels. First of all, New England provided the new settlement at Chebucto with substantial quantities of goods and services. Secondly, many New Englanders found employment in Nova Scotia. The need for goods became apparent with

16...as an Element of Sea Power 1749-1766", Dalhousie University, M.A. Thesis, 1962, p. 28.
18. Thomas Hancock to Zachary Bourayau, Boston, 2 November 1748, Hancock Letterbook, 1745-1750, MHS. (Hancock's correspondence for the early 1750's, to be discussed later, shows that he was also very concerned about New England's defence and the role Nova Scotia
the knowledge that the new settlement would require not only installations at Chebucto (soon renamed Halifax), but also would require posts in other parts of the colony. In July 1749 the Boston Evening Post published a report that three forts would be built in Nova Scotia to secure the colony. The supply trade created by government expenditures on such forts, and on the settlement at Chebucto, benefitted many New Englanders. Chief among them were Thomas Hancock, Charles Apthorp, and Thomas Gunter.

Again, as at Louisbourg, there was a scramble for government contracts. At least one of the competing individuals expected that his family's involvement in the 1745 Louisbourg expedition should entitle him to the new business. As Nathaniel Sparhawk indicated in a letter to Sir William Pepperrell in 1749,

if the Board of Ordnance knew that the Messers Apthorp and Hancock had no share in the expedition to Louisbourg, and have got more money by it than anybody else, that was upon it, it might be thought reasonable that your family should have the supply of Chebucto and Newfoundland rather than they.

Sparhawk was too late. Hancock and Apthorp had many contacts through their business dealings during the English occupation of Louisbourg. They adroitly used these and earlier contacts in their efforts to secure business in Nova Scotia. In the spring of 1749 John Thomlinson recommended Hancock and Apthorp for the government contracts. Although in early June, Hancock professed to be "quite in the dark" with regard to the contract situation, he did tell a correspondent that he hoped for the ordnance board's business if he could obtain no other trade. Hancock had good reason

18...played in it.)
21. Hancock to John Thomlinson, Boston, 1 May 1749, Hancock Letterbook, 1745-1750, MHS.
22. Hancock to Kilby and Barnard, Hancock to Z. Bourayau, 6 June 1749, ibid.
to be confident. In addition to having the support of Thomlinson, a prominent merchant and New Hampshire's London agent, Hancock could also rely on his friendship with Governor Shirley and Christopher Kilby. In 1749 Kilby became Nova Scotia's agent, and by mid-July he had obtained Nova Scotia contracts for Hancock.23

Obtaining business at Nova Scotia in 1749 therefore proved less difficult for Hancock than it had at Louisbourg in 1745, although the arrangements were not entirely to Hancock's satisfaction. By September Hancock was experiencing problems with Governor Cornwallis of Nova Scotia. Hancock had sent the governor several schooners, and had written him to find out how many more he needed and when he wanted them. He did not receive an answer directly. He complained to Kilby that Cornwallis never wrote him except in writing jointly to him and Apthorp, "tho I begged he'd correspond with me separately in regard to what I send him by your Direction...." Moreover, Cornwallis had "employed People obscure and out of town to provide Barracks and Frames for a pretty great value, and at high prices much dearer than I could have provided them for, & I am sure would have had them executed much sooner...."24 A week later Hancock complained that there were designing people about the governor, people concerned only with their own interest.25 By December there was a mercurial change in Hancock's attitude to Cornwallis. Hancock declared that "all things are well at Nova Scotia, the Governor gives great satisfaction & wonders are done there."26

By the summer of 1750 relations between Hancock and Apthorp on the one hand, and Cornwallis on the other hand were again strained,

23. Hancock to Kilby, Boston, 10 July 1749, ibid.
24. Hancock to Kilby, 9 September 1749, ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Hancock to Kilby, 9 December 1749, ibid.
as Cornwallis resisted a bid by the two merchants for a monopoly in supplying the Nova Scotia government with goods and money. Hancock and Apthorp failed in their bid, but in making such an attempt they demonstrated how important the Nova Scotia trade was to them, and how much pressure they felt they could bring to bear on Cornwallis. The affair unfolded in the governor's correspondence. In July 1750 Cornwallis informed the Lords of Trade that when Boston interests heard that some of his bills drawn on the Treasury had not been honoured, the credit of the government of Nova Scotia was "blasted" in Boston. Cornwallis then requested funds from Hancock. Hancock and Apthorp replied jointly with a proposal that they supply the government of Nova Scotia with all the money it needed, or goods, at the customary five percent commission. Furthermore, they asked that all goods needed for Nova Scotia from any of the northern colonies be purchased through them. Cornwallis was willing to give them the commission on business his government did with them, but not to grant them a monopoly. On the advice of his council, Cornwallis wrote Messers Oliver Delancey and John Watts of New York to see if he could do business with them. 27

Cornwallis was able to divert some business from Apthorp and Hancock, but they vigorously resisted his attempts to find other suppliers. In November 1750 Cornwallis absurdly accused Apthorp and Hancock of doing all they could to undermine the credit of his colony. Cornwallis found another Boston merchant, Thomas Gunter, very helpful in this situation. Gunter, Cornwallis reported, had "shewn his regard for the settlement by laying out a great deal of money in it whereas the others have not contributed a sixpence to

Delancey and Watts also did their best to aid Nova Scotia, according to Cornwallis, but at the same time Hancock's friend Christopher Kilby obstructed them. Delancey and Watts complained bitterly that Kilby had not informed them if their bills were being paid. Kilby also allegedly threatened them with the charge of the protest of their bills and all costs. Given Kilby's longstanding friendship with Thomas Hancock, his action is not surprising. Not to be outdone, Cornwallis informed the Lords of Trade that "Mr. Kilby wants looking after...."29

Despite Cornwallis's dislike of Hancock and Apthorp, they continued to do an appreciable volume of government business in Nova Scotia. In 1750 the two partners received £6,924 14s 6d for disbursements at Boston for materials, vessels, and stores.30 For the period from 1 November 1751 to 31 December 1752 the government of Nova Scotia drew £12,000 on Hancock and Apthorp for supplies.31 The firm's total volume of business with Nova Scotia for 1752 is unclear but it was sending shipments of pork to Halifax. How many voyages were involved is not known, but that there were at least three is clear from the fact that Governor Peregrine Hopson, Cornwallis's successor, ordered investigations of the cargoes of three different ships carrying pork shipped from Boston by the two partners. The investigation was started when two barrels of pork were opened and the contents were found to be "tainted and rusty".32 Spoilage was, however, common in the period, and did not lead to the exclusion of Hancock and Apthorp

28. Cornwallis to the Lords of Trade, 27 November, ibid., doc. no. 29, Vessels owned by Gunter had begun to appear at Halifax by April 1750. By March 1752 vessels owned in part or whole by Gunter had made at least six voyages to or from Halifax. C.O. 221/28, ff. 43, 92, 101-02, 103, 165, 219.
as government suppliers. In 1753 they were still shipping supplies to Nova Scotia. Hancock and Apthorp also invested in land in Nova Scotia. Apthorp held a mortgage on a lot and dwelling place in Halifax in 1751. He obtained the property as a means of settling a debt owed him, amounting to £82 sterling. A more substantial transaction occurred in 1753, when Apthorp, Hancock and Henry Laughton secured a mortgage on a waterfront lot for £600.

One reason why Hancock and Apthorp were able to continue doing business at Halifax was that Governor Corwallis received little assistance from the Lords of Trade in his dispute. The Lords indicated that they sympathized with the governor, but that he was bound to have problems as long as the British government appropriations for Nova Scotia failed to meet the colony's needs. At the same time, the Lords seemed to feel that more money would not necessarily solve the problem. When Cornwallis charged that Boston merchants took advantage of the colony on every occasion and demanded exorbitant profit on every contract, all the Board could do was to suggest that the demands would only get worse if more money were made available. As for various accusations Cornwallis levied against Kilby, the Board stated that he appeared "from his answer to those complaints to be entirely innocent of every the least partiality or neglect laid to his charge...."36

Cornwallis's dealings with Hancock and Apthorp were large in scale, but other New Englanders also had dealings of importance with Nova Scotia. An examination of the supply trade puts the matter into perspective. For certain Connecticut merchants trade with Halifax proved singularly important. The individuals in question

33. They also continued to experience problems. Governor Lawrence ordered the examination of a cargo of molasses they sent when he was informed that part of the shipment was damaged and unfit for use. Ibid., pt. 3, p. 11.
were Jonathan Trumbull, Elisha Williams, and Joseph Pitkins. Trumbull and Williams had been involved in the preparations for the 1745 assault on Louisbourg. They entered into a partnership with Pitkins, of Hartford, in 1749. In the winter of 1751-52 the partners turned to Nova Scotia as a market for Connecticut provisions. In June 1752 New England-born Aaron Cleveland, rector of St. Mathew's Church in Halifax, wrote Trumbull on behalf of Joshua Mauger, who as victualler to the Royal Navy at Halifax, was interested in securing a supply of Connecticut beef and pork. Mauger and the Connecticut merchants were able to come to terms, and for several years thereafter Mauger purchased large quantities of beef and pork, as well as hog fat, butter, corn, and Indian meal from Connecticut. In return he supplied the Connecticut merchants with English manufactured goods, and bills of exchange. Mauger was virtually the only supplier of bills of exchange which the Connecticut group had during those years, even though Trumbull was one of Connecticut's largest provisions dealers in the period 1745 to 1753. The Connecticut group maintained the connection until the Seven Years War, when inflation made Irish goods cheaper than Connecticut goods.

Trade such as that in which Trumbull, Hancock, Apthorp and a host of other New England merchants engaged, required a considerable shipping capacity. Since New England possessed a large merchant fleet, largely constructed in New England, its merchants were frequently able to draw on local resources to conduct trade with Nova Scotia.

35. Ibid., II (1749-55), #159, p. 258.
39. Ibid., 80.
Halifax shipping lists provide an invaluable tool for determining the extent of New England shipping to Nova Scotia. The lists indicate clearly that New England dominated the carrying trade of the colony.

A total of 2,471 vessels entered and cleared Halifax from 19 July 1749, when officials began keeping records, until 31 December 1755, on the eve of the Seven Years War. Some 1,715 of the entries and clearances were ships registered in New England. They comprised 69.4% of all vessels to enter or clear Halifax in the period. All but a few of the vessels registered in New England were owned by New Englanders. One of the exceptions was the schooner Betsey. Registered in Boston on 26 October 1748, the Betsey was owned by Joshua Mauger of Halifax.\textsuperscript{40} An idea of the relative importance to New England of this trade may be gained by comparing the Halifax figures with those for Boston. Boston shipping lists for 1753 reveal that there were a total of 805 entries and clearances for that year.\textsuperscript{41} This compared with totals of 374 for Halifax. Thus Halifax had almost half (46.6%) as much maritime traffic as did Boston. Of the 374 vessels which either entered or cleared Halifax in 1753, 58.8% were from New England, which was almost 10% less than the average for the six and one-half year period studied. The records suggest several things. In terms of the total number of vessels entering and clearing Halifax, the port was a major shipping center in North America. Secondly, the port attracted considerable interest from New Englanders. Comparison of the number of New England-registered vessels entering and clearing Halifax with the number of vessels which cleared Boston for (or entered from) the West Indies provides

\textsuperscript{40} C.O. 221/28, f.4, 15 November 1749.
\textsuperscript{42} C.O. 221/28, ff. 143-146, 154-216, 219.
an indication of the magnitude of the Halifax trade. In 1752 some
250 New England-registered vessels entered and cleared Halifax.\textsuperscript{42}
That year only 226 vessels at Boston cleared for (or entered from)
the West Indies.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, in terms of numbers of vessels, New
England's trade with Halifax rivaled Boston's trade with the West
Indies.

Comparisons based solely on numbers of vessels, however,
can be misleading. An examination of the tonnage of New England
vessels at Halifax puts the matter into better perspective. The
average tonnage of thirty-one New England-registered vessels
entering Halifax from 19 July to 25 December was 48.6 tons.\textsuperscript{44} By
way of comparison, vessels from the American colonies which traded
with the West Indies (but did not carry freight from there to
Britain) averaged perhaps fifty to eighty tons.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, New Eng­
land vessels trading at Halifax were not significantly smaller
than those making voyages to the West Indies. These vessels carried
proportionately larger crews than large vessels. The ton-man ratio
of fifty to ninety-ton vessels was less than half that of vessels
larger than 300 tons. But size could be a drawback in the trade.
Large vessels were more likely to be under-utilized.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover,
New England shipping to Halifax kept pace with general trends in
colonial North American manning requirements. These requirements
declined considerably between 1716 and 1765. In 1716 a fifty-ton
ship employed seven men, but by 1765 a fifty-ton ship needed only
five men.\textsuperscript{47} New England vessels calling at Halifax in 1749, with
very few exceptions, carried no more than five crewmen.

\textsuperscript{43} Massachusetts Historical Society, Mss. 91L, p. 44, cited
by R. Pares, \textit{Yankees and Creoles}, p. 18n.
\textsuperscript{44} C.O. 221/28, ff. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{45} R. Pares, \textit{Yankees and Creoles}, p. 17
\textsuperscript{46} J. F. Shepherd and G. M. Walton, \textit{Shipping, Maritime Trade and
the Economic Development of Colonial North America} (New York:
Supplying shipping services to Nova Scotia brought New England a considerable amount in invisible earnings. Wages alone account for an estimated £10,968 sterling for the period from 1749 to the end of 1755, given average crew sizes of five, monthly wages of twenty-five shillings, and one month's duration, on the average, for voyages from New England to Halifax and back, including port time in Halifax. 48

Shipping records also suggest that there was a considerable application to the New Halifax trade of knowledge of northern waters acquired through doing business with Louisbourg. At least fourteen individuals who owned or commanded New England-registered vessels which called at Halifax in 1749 or 1750 had either made voyages to Louisbourg then or at even earlier times. 49

In addition to providing information on the number of New England vessels calling at Halifax, their tonnage, and the names of masters and owners, the Halifax shipping lists also furnish information on cargoes. Quantities of certain commodities, such as lumber and livestock, frequently went unrecorded. Thus, the sloop Greyhound, A. Wirling, master, from Salem, was recorded as carrying unspecified quantities of lumber and livestock. 50 On the other hand, quantities of

47. Ibid., p. 76.
48. Peacetime wages of able seamen remained at twenty-five shillings per month from the end of the seventeenth century to the American Revolution. G. M. Walton, "A Measure of Productivity Change in American Colonial Shipping", Economic History Review, 21 (1968), p. 268. The average crew size was five for New England-registered ships clearing Halifax from 19 July to 31 December 1749, and entering from 24 July to 17 August, a sample of fifty vessels. The estimate of a month for a round trip is based on an average time in port at Halifax of seventeen days, and sailing time of thirteen or fourteen days.
49. C.O. 221/28, ff. 1-103. The years 1742 and 1743 were used in obtaining information on New England shipping to Louisbourg because detailed records of New England ship arrivals at Louisbourg exist for those years, in A.D. Marine, B272, ff. 1-2335.
50. C.O. 221/28, f. 6, entry, 29 July 1749.
other goods were recorded. In addition to lumber and livestock, the Greyhound carried seventy barrels of cider and apples, four casks of Madeira wine, six hogsheads of rum, eight barrels of loaf sugar, and two hogsheads of molasses.

Provisions and building materials were the basic items New England vessels transported to Halifax. Thus the twenty-five ton schooner Salisbury, commanded by Benjamin Ober, which entered Halifax on 10 August 1749, carried 5,000 bricks in addition to salt, tobacco, and a variety of foodstuffs. For the first two months, however, for which records were kept of shipping activity at Halifax, nine of the New England vessels which entered Halifax came from Cape Breton, not New England. Some, such as the forty-ton sloop Sarah, and the sixty-ton sloop Good Intent, carried only seacoal. Others, such as the 100-ton snow Sally, and the fifty-ton sloop Leopard, had cargoes of ordnance stores or a combination of coal and "sundry stores, and merchandise, property of His Majesty's subjects lately at Louisbourg."

While some New Englanders participated in Nova Scotia's trade through shipping and trading establishments in New England, others found it profitable to take up residence in the colony. Among them were the first Jews to move to Nova Scotia. Included in their number were Israel Abrahams and Nathan Nathans. Originally from New York, they were in partnership at Newport, Rhode Island, until bankruptcy disrupted their affairs. They eventually turned to Nova Scotia for new prospects. Both were in Halifax with their families by 1752.

51. Ibid., f. 7.
52. Ibid., f. 6, 24 & 31 July 1749.
53. Ibid., f. 6, 2 August 1749.
54. Abrahams may have moved in 1750, as he purchased two lots in Halifax then for 150. PANS, Halifax Deeds, Vol. 2 (1749-55), #57, p. 18. Moreover, a deed of 1751 lists him as a "merchant of Halifax". Ibid., #160, p. 54.
The firm of Nathans and Abrahams was succeeded by Nathans and Levy, then by Nathans and Hart. Hart was also from Newport. He was involved in shipping ventures to Halifax at least as early as 25 June 1750, when a twenty-five ton sloop he owned, the Little Moses, called at Halifax with a cargo of Madeira wine, gammons, sugar, three boxes of chocolate and ten boxes of soap. Hart and Nathans became well known as large-scale merchants and packers of mackeral. From these endeavours Hart expanded into real estate, and came into possession of extensive property holdings in Halifax. Nathans and Hart began buying property in Halifax in November 1752, and acquired seven and one-half lots within a year.

A large number of other New Englanders also benefitted from such employment opportunities in the colony. More than 1,000 of the original English settlers died in the winter of 1749-50 and New Englanders replaced many, if not all of them. Some of the New Englanders were fishermen, but there were also government officials, tradesmen, New England soldiers, and the ever-present merchants.

Among the tradesmen were a number of individuals who had been at Louisbourg in 1745, but had failed prior to 1749 to secure what they regarded as sufficient reward for their services. Bartholomew Green was one such individual. Green, a Boston printer, served at Louisbourg as a second lieutenant in the Train of Artillery. According to Green his disposition to serve the King put him out of good business, which he had been unable to regain. In 1748 Green

55. C.O. 221/28, f. 51.
57. T. Raddall, Halifax, Warden of the North (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), pp. 34, 35.
59. J. Winsor, Memorial History of Boston, II, 400.
petitioned the Massachusetts General Court to take his case under consideration and appoint him its doorkeeper. He did not receive the post. In 1751 Green removed to Halifax, where he proceeded to erect the first printing office in what is now Canada.

When Green died within five weeks of his arrival, a former partner, John Bushell, assumed control of the operation, and started publishing the Halifax Gazette on 23 March 1752. There is evidence that the printing establishment was financed jointly by Thomas Gunter and Otis Little. Little, the former resident of Boston, pamphleeter and proponent of the establishment of Halifax, was one of a flock of New Englanders who profited from government posts created with the establishment of Halifax. Little became the first Surveyor General of Nova Scotia, in 1749. With the expansion of Nova Scotia's judicial system he became the colony's first Attorney General. He also found employment as a commissary, and with the vice-admiralty court. Another important post went to Jonathan Belcher, Jr., son of the former governor of Massachusetts, and a native New Englander. He became Chief Justice of Nova Scotia in 1754.

Another area of government in which New Englanders played an important role was the Council. The first Council to meet after the establishment of Halifax was sworn in on 14 June 1749. Of the six members other than Governor Cornwallis, four were either born in New England or had close connections with the region. The other two Councillors came to Halifax from England with Governor Cornwallis. The origins of one of those two Councillors who came with Cornwallis,

60. PANS, Records of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, March 1759.
61. Boston Evening Post, 8 May 1749.
Hugh Davidson, are unclear, but he did have commercial ties with New England. Davidson's name appears in the Halifax shipping lists as the owner of the fifty-ton sloop Cornwallis, registered in Boston. In late September 1749 the Cornwallis entered Halifax from Boston with a "parcel of lumber" (quantity otherwise unspecified), twelve hogsheads of corn, twelve barrels of nails, and sundry European goods.\textsuperscript{63} Between November 1749 and May 1750 the Cornwallis entered Halifax on three occasions, carrying lumber, bricks, and corn.\textsuperscript{64} Such voyages probably resulted in handsome profits. Governor Cornwallis reported late in 1749 that he could not purchase boards for less than £4 sterling per 1,000 feet.\textsuperscript{65} Late in May 1750 the governor reported having paid as much as £5 and £6 per 1,000 feet of lumber, although the price had recently dropped to as little as £2 15s.\textsuperscript{66}

Over the next few years the composition of the Nova Scotia Council changed considerably. One of the first men appointed by Cornwallis, Captain Edward How, was killed at Chignecto in 1750. Another, Paul Mascarene, went to New England in 1751 to negotiate a treaty with Indians at St. George. He apparently never returned to Nova Scotia, but spend his last years at his Boston home. Most of the new appointees to the Council were from England. Thus the proportion of Newlanders, or of people who had close ties with New England, declined after the initial appointments made by Cornwallis. But numbers are not necessarily synonymous with influence. During the administration of Loyalist Governor John Wentworth, 1792-1808, Loyalists received only 39% of his appointments, but most of the profitable positions went to them.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{63} C.O. 221/28, f.8, 28 September 1749.
\item\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., f.11, 16 November 1749; f. 28, 30 January 1750; f. 44, May 1750.
\item\textsuperscript{65} B. Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia or Acadie, II, (Halifax, 1865-67), p. 156.
\item\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 180.
\item\textsuperscript{67} M. Ells, "Governor Wentworth's Patronage", in C. A. Rawlyk, ed. Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces, p. 66.
\end{itemize}
vailed in Nova Scotia in the 1750's with regard to New Englanders. They obtained just over twenty-seven percent of the appointments to the Council between July 1949 and January 1755, and they wielded considerable influence despite their numerical inferiority. Aside from the governor, the most important civil officers in Nova Scotia were New Englanders. Benjamin Green, a veteran of the 1745 Louisbourg expedition, was Naval Officer at Halifax throughout the period. He was also Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court from 1750 to 1753, interim Provincial Secretary briefly in 1750 and again in 1752, and Provincial Treasurer from 1750 to 1768. 68 During his career in Nova Scotia, Green also accumulated considerable property - enough that in 1761 he mortgaged properties to two London merchants for £6,000 sterling. 69

Other New Englanders saw active duty in Nova Scotia in a military capacity. For instance, there was Jonathan Hoare, who was at Louisbourg in 1745, and was a captain at Halifax in 1750 and remained in Nova Scotia for another decade. No great effort was required from New Englanders to secure military postings in the colony, as the careers of Hoare and other New Englanders demonstrate. Captain John Gorham, another Massachusetts native who had been at Louisbourg in 1745, commanded a company of rangers at Annapolis Royal after the fall of Louisbourg. He found further employment in the colony with the establishment of Halifax. He continued as commander of his company of rangers, and also assisted in the building of Fort Lawrence, at Chignecto, in 1750. 70 It is not clear how much the rangers' services cost Nova Scotia on an annual basis, but on 17 August 1750 Gorham received £188 19s 4d on account for his company,

69. PANS, Halifax County Deeds, Vol. 6, 1763-64, #129, pp. 128-133.
70. J. C. Webster, ed. The Building of Fort Lawrence in Chignecto, A Journal..., (St. John, 1941), pp. 7, 21.
which had been recruited in New England. John and his brother Joseph also obtained land in Halifax, across the harbour in Eastern Passage, and in Lunenburg County. In 1750 John built for himself the first ship ever built in Halifax.

Another New Englander who found employment in Nova Scotia was Sylvanus Cobb. He appeared in Halifax in July 1749, as master of the sloop Adventure, carrying supplies from Cape Breton. He made two other voyages to Nova Scotia in 1749, and was part-owner of another New England vessel which called at Halifax. In January 1750, Cornwallis hired the sloop York, of which Cobb was master, for £22 10s a month.

Nova Scotia authorities also recruited troops for the colony. In addition to the rangers who served under John Gorham there was also a company led by Charles Proctor. In May 1751 Proctor went to Boston to raise 100 men for this service. In 1755 some 2,000 New Englanders participated in the taking of Fort Beausejour. The commander of the fleet involved was John Rous, a New Englander privateer in 1744 who took part in the siege of Louisbourg in 1745. Rous came to Halifax at or shortly after the city's establishment, and saw considerable service in the "sea militia" as the naval arm of the government has been called. He frequently attended Council meetings prior to appointment to the Council in 1754. As a naval officer Rous earned much prize money. Also, the provincial naval force of which he was a part cost the government of Nova Scotia, according to yearly estimates for 1752 and 1754, approximately £3,000 for "Seamen's Wages, Provisions,

71. PANS, Vol. 35, doc. 17.
73. C.O. 221/28, f. 1, July 29 1749.
74. Ibid., ff. 8, 9, 11.
75. Webster, Building of Fort Lawrence..., p. 21.
76. Boston Evening Post, 27 May 1751.
77. Webster, Building of Fort Lawrence..., p. 22.
Repairs, and Incidental Expenses of four armed Vessels and a Pilot schooner...."80 The monthly rental of vessels by the government was in some cases quite high. John Gorham rented two schooners to the government, one for £94 a month, the other for £91 a month. He also received over £90 a year for eight whale boats. This was almost double the rate paid for vessels used in the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755.81

Much of the military expenditure by the Nova Scotia government was related to its concern about Louisbourg. This was definitely the case with regard to Lawrence's decision to take Fort Beauséjour. Lawrence informed the Board of Trade in January 1755 that he had intelligence of the French having "determined as soon as ever they had put the Fortifications of Louisbourg into a tolerable condition, to make themselves masters of the Bay of Fundy, by taking our fort at Chignecto...." On these grounds Lawrence had "determined to attack them before they had time to collect their strength...."82

Subsequently, Lawrence decided to expel the Acadians from Nova Scotia. Again, the governor's actions were influenced by Louisbourg, and resulted in considerable business for New Englanders. Lawrence's intelligence indicated that in 1755 some 1,400 French troops had slipped past Boscawen's fleet and reached Louisbourg, and that another 1,800 French troops had managed to get to Quebec.83 Lawrence was very apprehensive of attacks on Nova Scotia from the French at Louisbourg and attacks from Acadians influenced by Louisbourg authorities. Lawrence was very sensitive to such activities, and especially to what he regarded as French efforts at subversion

82. PANS, Vol. 36, doc. 11, Lawrence to the Board of Trade, Halifax, 12 January 1755.
in his colony. In 1752 at least four Germans at Louisbourg wrote letters to German settlers in Nova Scotia praising the French authorities for the treatment granted them. The Germans claimed that the French gave them land, provisions and "everything else that we have occasion for. The authors of the letters suggested that their friends in Nova Scotia should come to Cape Breton as soon as they could. 84 There were disturbances among the German settlers in Nova Scotia the next year. The authorities at Halifax suspected that the French had instigated the disturbances, but could find no proof.

Lawrence's correspondence contains repeated statements of his concern at the influence of the French over the Acadians. He noted on 1 June 1754 that the French "continue to do all in their power to seduce our French inhabitants to go over to them. By the summer of 1754 the French had been successful in securing the services of Acadians in the vicinity of Fort Beauséjour. Lawrence reported this and also stated that the Acadians had not brought anything to market for the English for a long time. Instead, they carried everything to the French and Indians. 85 Beauséjour was under the command of officers from Canada, but there were also links with Louisbourg, of which Lawrence was well aware. 86

There was little Lawrence could do about Louisbourg, but he could reduce its influence in Nova Scotia by removing the Acadians. It was easy for the governor to secure the cooperation of his council in this scheme. Three of the five members of the council who took

85. Lawrence to the Board of Trade, Halifax, 1 August 1754, PANS, Vol. 36, doc. 7.
86. In 1754 and 1755 Thomas Pichon, the French official at Beauséjour who entered into a secret correspondence with the English, commented frequently on the movements of individuals between Beauséjour and Louisbourg, especially the Abbe Le Loutre, who had so much influence with the Micmacs and power over Acadians.
part in the decision to expell the Acadians were New Englanders, and two of them had been involved in the New England capture and occupation of Louisbourg. One of the two was John Rous; the other was Benjamin Green.87

Financing of the expedition also involved New Englanders. Hancock and Apthorp agreed to provide Lawrence with unlimited credit, in return for which they became sole suppliers of the forces sent to take the French fort. Organizing the expedition brought so much business to Boston that Hancock declared: "I expect in a month's time things will look here as when we were fitting out for the Louisbourg expedition."88 Some eighteen transports were required to remove the Acadians. Hancock and Apthorp provided the vessels, and the supplies required. The task occupied men and shipping from the autumn of 1755 until the spring of 1756. The expulsion and the Beausejour expedition proved very profitable. Over £77,000 in bills of exchange were drawn in favour of Hancock, Apthorp, and John Erving, son-in-law of William Shirley.89

It is fitting that the last year before the Seven Years War should see such a flurry of activity in Nova Scotia involving New Englanders. It demonstrates the great influence they had in Nova Scotia. New Englanders played a key role in the establishment of Halifax in 1749. They had benefitted considerably from the establishment and maintenance of Halifax and related establishments. They continued to play a key role in 1755, taking part in the decisions to expell the Acadians, and providing the means to carry out the expulsion. Thus the establishment of Halifax and subsequent British

87. Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. 222.
88. T. Hancock to J.H. Bastide, Boston, 4 March 1755, Thomas Hancock Letterbook, 1750-62, Baker Library.
89. Accounting of the Beausejour expedition and the expulsion of the Acadians, C.O. 217/16, f. 249.
investment in it and the rest of the colony of Nova Scotia provided ample compensation to New Englanders for the return of Cape Breton to France in 1749. While merchants enjoyed their profits, the public in New England basked in the reflected glory of the achievement of New England soldiers at Beauséjour. When General Monckton and Governor Lawrence did not give the colonials what they regarded as sufficient credit for the victory at Beauséjour they responded quickly and vigorously. The *Boston Gazette* declared that "Nova-Scotia must have long since fallen entirely into the Hands of the French, had it not been once and again befriended and supported by the Province of Massachusetts Bay".90

90. *Boston Gazette*, 14 July 1755.
Chapter VIII
New England - Louisbourg Trade, 1749-1755

The true-bred Merchant is the most intelligent Man in the World, and consequently the most capable, when urged by necessity, to contrive new ways to live. - Daniel Dafoe

Between 1749 and 1755 New England merchants demonstrated in their trade with Cape Breton that in the face of considerable adversity they were capable of deriving the maximum benefit from old ways and in some cases of contriving new ways to live. The period began with drought and generally stagnant trade conditions in New England as a whole, and declining population for Boston. New Englanders responded by capitalizing on experience gained in almost forty years of trade with Cape Breton to secure quickly and to maintain for themselves a significant proportion of Cape Breton's trade. They did this in the face of repeated objections by British colonial authorities and in the face of opposition by French metropolitan officials wedded to mercantilist ideas. Eventually, even Louisbourg officials, tolerant of the New England trade at first because they needed New England provisions and building materials, and because the New England presence was essential to trade with the West Indies, began to express concern that New Englanders had become so capable in their manoeuvres that even Louisbourg merchants were failing to profit as much as they might from trade conducted on their own doorstep.

Before proceeding to a detailed analysis and description of the New England-Louisbourg trade, it would be useful to indicate the economic problems faced by New England for the first few years of the
period in order to place the trade in its proper context. Evidence of general trade stagnation in New England comes from a variety of sources, some literary, some quantitative. New England merchants experienced severe difficulties in conducting trade from 1749 almost to the beginning of the Seven Years War. Thomas Hancock complained frequently of his problems. In 1750 Hancock reported that New Englanders "are greatly perplexed in Trade, or rather none at all...." A year later Hancock wrote an agent in England that "As goods sell so poorly, I know not what to send for...." In 1752 Hancock informed other agents in England that he had not even opened goods from them.¹

There were bankruptcies, and debts were difficult to collect. In 1752 the firm of Colman and Sparhawk went bankrupt.² Early in 1754 Gerard G. Beekman, prominent New York merchant, thoroughly exasperated at the reluctance of his debtors in New England to honour their obligations to him, remarked that New England men were "bad pay". Later in the year he observed that "seven-eighths of the people I have credited in New England has (sic) proved to be d__d ungreatfull (sic) cheating fellows, that I am now almost afraid to Trust any man (in) Connecticut...."³ Even Peter Warren's debtors became slow to repay loans after Warren's death, despite the fact that his agents in this period included Thomas Hancock and Charles Apthorp.⁴

Contributing to and reflecting the general economic malaise were the demographic adjustments being made in the period. New England, lacking the rich agricultural hinterland of colonies such as New York and Pennsylvania, had begun to experience a slower growth rate than

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¹ Hancock to C. Kilby, 21 June 1750, Hancock to Kilby and Barnard, 14 June 1751; same to same, 29 June 1752, Hancock Letter Book, Baker Library, Harvard University.
² Hancock to C. Kilby, ibid., 4 August 1752.
those colonies, and the population of Boston was in decline. Boston had 17,000 inhabitants in 1740. In 1752 the population was 15,731, and in 1760 it was 15,631. The population of Massachusetts as a whole rose from 151,613 in 1740 to 188,000 in 1750 and 220,000 in 1760, for a fifteen percent increase in the 1750's. In Rhode Island, where there were censuses in 1748-49 and 1755, there was a thirteen percent increase in the population. New Hampshire, still more or less a frontier area, experienced a population increase of thirty percent between 1750 and 1760. New York's population grew thirty-five percent in the decade, and Pennsylvania's grew by almost thirty-seven percent, so both New York and Pennsylvania were growing more rapidly than New England in the 1750's, although in 1760 the population of Massachusetts was still greater than that of either New York or Pennsylvania.

New England's trade with Louisbourg was one of the few bright spots on the economic horizon for the region, and sparked speculation even before the French re-occupied Louisbourg. The correspondence of Sebastian Zouberbuhler, a former agent of Samuel Waldo, provides insight into the situation. Zouberbuhler went to Louisbourg on the 1745 expedition, and remained there as a merchant selling lumber and possibly other items. After news arrived of the end of the War of the Austrian Succession Zouberbuhler sold nothing but a few boards for chests. Nevertheless, he was confident that conditions would improve when the French resumed control. "It is the opinion of every body here that lumber on the arrival of the French must be in great demand...."

Zouberbuhler accurately anticipated what happened. Almost immediately upon the return of the French to Louisbourg in 1749, New Englanders resumed their trade. Under the French Louisbourg continued to be an important market for New England products, and once more became a source for New England of French and West Indian goods.

As for Zouberbuhler, he removed to Halifax in 1749, but continued to do some business at Louisbourg. In September and October 1750 he sold two ships at Louisbourg - one was an eighty-five ton vessel, the other a forty ton vessel. There is no record of what he received for the first vessel; for the second he was paid in merchandise.10 Few ships of this size were then being built in Nova Scotia, so in all likelihood these vessels came from New England.

Estimates of the number and carrying capacity of the New England vessels which visited Cape Breton between 1749 and 1755 can be made although no single source contains a comprehensive account. Francois Bigot, at Louisbourg again briefly in May 1755, stated that since the peace there were always more than thirty New England ships "in this season."11 The total number of English colonial ships calling at Louisbourg (almost all from New England), in most of the years in question was much greater. In 1752 some 156 vessels from New England called at Louisbourg. There were fifty-seven vessels from the West Indies that year, forty-eight from France, and seventeen from Canada.12 At Louisbourg, New Englanders purchased large quantities of rum, molasses and sugar, and lesser quantities of coffee, wine, cocoa, and brandy. The total value of the goods was 654,680 livres.13 In terms of numbers of ships, the trade was comparable to Boston's Caribbean trade; in 1752 there were 156 clearances from Boston for the Caribbean.14

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10. A. C., G3, Notariat, dossier 2041-1, pieces 50 and 57, 29 September and 18 October 1750.
12. Etat of ships fishing and/or trading at Ile Royale in 1752, C11B, vol. 32, (1753), f. 495.
At Louisbourg the New Englanders found a ready market for foodstuffs, building materials, and ships, thanks to the French government's reconstruction of Louisbourg, and to the general expansion of French colonial trade in this period. In 1749 the French purchased twenty-four vessels from English colonists. The vessels ranged in tonnage from fifteen to 200 tons, while the average vessel was sixty tons. Thus the capacity of New England ships sold at Louisbourg, and perhaps those which traded there, compares favourably with the capacity of colonial vessels trading with the West Indies.

New Englanders may have earned (before expenses) as much as £17,100 from the sale of ships at Louisbourg in this period, given certain assumptions. One basic assumption is that New Englanders sold an average of twenty-five ships a year at Louisbourg from 1749 to the end of 1754. This is reasonable, because in the three years for which figures are available (1749, 1750, and 1754), New Englanders sold twenty-four, thirty, and twenty-four ships respectively. The total price the French paid in 1754 was 170,600 livres. The average tonnage of the vessels sold in 1749 and 1750 was sixty tons. The per ton price in 1754 would therefore have been 118 livres or £5.9 per ton. If New Englanders sold 9,000 tons of vessels at Louisbourg in the period, and received an average price of £5.9 per ton, at £1.9 profit per ton the New Englanders made approximately £17,000 total profit.

15. The eighteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in France's external trade, and the most rapid growth was between 1749 and 1755: P. Boulle, "Patterns of French Colonial Trade and the Seven Years War", Social History, VII, May 1974, pp. 50, 51.
16. These figures are in French tonneau, equal to 1.43 English tons. See Boulle, p. 55n. For figures on New England ships at Louisbourg, see: Statement of ships bought from the English, 1749, C11B, vol. 35 (1755), f. 195.
17. The average tonnage of vessels clearing Boston for the Caribbean in 1754 was forty-five tons. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, p. 759.
French records of these transactions, while useful in some respects, conceal as much as they reveal. In many cases the identities of the French purchaser and the English captain handling the sale are contained in the Louisbourg notarial records, but with a few exceptions the names of the New England owners are not given. One exception is that of Godfrey Malbone of Newport, Rhode Island, on whose behalf Jean (John) Beard sold the Amazon to Michel Mitifeu, a Cayenne merchant, in 1753. This confirms that Rhode Islanders were engaged in the Louisbourg trade in this period, and that vessels sold at Louisbourg were being bought for use in French colonies in the Caribbean and South America. (Another vessel was sold to a Louisiana merchant.) Such a limited number of transactions involving merchants of these areas is not, however, statistically significant. It would be rash to suggest that because Malbone was a member of a prominent family that prominent merchants dominated ship sales at Louisbourg. Another ship-owner (tentatively) identified is Thomas Kilpatrick, owner of the Mayflower, Captain Daniel Smith, of Portsmouth registry, sold at Louisbourg in 1753.\textsuperscript{21} There is no evidence that Kilpatrick was particularly prominent.

An examination of the reaction of British officials in North America to this trade reveals that some were adamantly opposed to it. Governor Edward Cornwallis of Nova Scotia, exasperated at the parade of New England ships past Halifax on their way to Louisbourg, relayed information to England in November 1750 that New Englanders were paying cash for rum and molasses at Louisbourg and then transporting the rum

\textsuperscript{18} C11B, vol. 28, f. 195; vol. 29, f. 209; vol. 34, f. 189.  
\textsuperscript{20} A. C., Ser. G3, Notariat, dossier 2041, piece 64, 13 July 1753.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., f. 59, 5 June 1753; ownership and registry given in C.O. 221/28, ff. 28, 54.
and molasses to New England. Cornwallis declared that the traffic was "a most infamous practice and would be worthy of the attention of your Lordships." Moreover, according to Cornwallis' information, the New Englanders supplied Louisbourg "with every necessity and the advantage is so great upon this traffic that they go sooner there than to this port."22

It is not clear if Cornwallis was correct about the New Englanders paying cash for goods they purchased at Louisbourg, but he was correct about them finding a receptive clientele there. One Louisbourg official reported in the autumn of 1750 that because of the pressing needs of the colony he could hardly refuse permission to New Englanders to sell their cargoes of livestock of all kinds, fowls, planks, shingles, beams, timber, and bricks, and all other effects aboard the ships. As if to persuade metropolitan authorities of the wisdom of permitting these transactions, he stated that it was absolutely necessary for the colony's subsistence, and to facilitate the reconstruction by residents of their houses and other buildings. The New Englanders also sold a great number of ships to residents of Cape Breton for fishing and freighting. Moreover, the business the New Englanders did at Cape Breton facilitated the trade of French West Indian merchants at Louisbourg. The mechanisms of this trade followed the same patterns established in the 1730's by merchants such as the Faneuils of Boston and the Peirces of New Hampshire. Governor Desherbiers commented on the West Indian trade - that the great number of ships coming to Louisbourg would have nothing to carry back if the English did not come to buy goods at Louisbourg.23 Cape Breton thus fulfilled the function which

22. Cornwallis to the Board of Trade, Halifax, 23 November 1750, PANS, vol. 35., #29.
23. Desherbiers to the minister, Louisbourg, 13 October 1750, Cl1B, vol. 29 (1750), f. 36.
the Raudots had foreseen for it as an entrepot for goods from various parts of the French empire, and as a base through which French goods might reach markets in the English colonies in America.

Trading patterns, however, rarely conform precisely to the projections of economic planners. The business New Englanders did at Cape Breton did not work out exactly as French officials had hoped it would. By the same token, English colonial officials were not always able to control trade by residents of their colonies with the French. The problems encountered by Governor Cornwallis amply illustrate this point. Cornwallis' complaints about New Englanders trading with the French at Louisbourg initially elicited a hopeful response from the Board of Trade. The Board stated that "the illicit trade" between the northern colonies and the French had been under the Board's consideration. The matter had gone before Parliament, so the Board hoped that some "future act of the legislature" would regulate the trade.24 The statement has interesting implications. In its correspondence with Cornwallis the Board did not explain its definition of illicit trade. The Board may have meant evasion of provisions of the Molasses Act of 1733. But if the New Englanders were violating existing laws, surely new legislation was unnecessary to cope with the problem.

Before a definitive answer to Cornwallis' complaints reached Nova Scotia, the Governor became embroiled in a dispute with Joshua Mauger over the latter's dealings at Louisbourg. Cornwallis charged that attempts were being made to render Halifax a repository for merchandise from Louisbourg, "and this chiefly supported and carried on by Mr. Mauger...." Cornwallis charged that "contraband goods" from Louisbourg were landed by a sloop and moved publicly to different parts of town. Mauger was under suspicion of involvement, "being an offender

by public report." Casks of French molasses were found in Mauger's
warehouse. Mauger claimed that he had imported the molasses as part
of his stock, on the evacuation of Louisbourg. Cornwallis recommended
Mauger's dismissal as victualler to the navy, on the grounds that "this
is done for a trial whether this Colony is to be the seat of fair trade,
a protection to those who pursue it or a rendezvous for smugglers and
people who keep a constant correspondence to Louisbourg with no good
design I firmly believe to the Colony."

In his defence, Mauger stated that he had been a supplier to
the Royal Navy at Louisbourg and that at the time of the evacuation
he had had to dispose of great quantities of provisions. He provided
some of the goods to French residents of Louisbourg on credit. Mauger's
agent attempted to recover these debts, but was unable to obtain good
bills or cash, and was obliged to accept some rum and molasses. 25

That Mauger conducted trade with Louisbourg in West Indian goods
is demonstrated by an incident which occurred in 1753. That year Mauger
arranged a sham sale of the schooner Halifax to Mathew Vincent of Louis-
bourg, to facilitate a voyage to the French West Indies to obtain goods
for Mauger. The venture failed, because Vincent died in the West Indies,
the first mate took control of the vessel, sold the cargo and eventually
disposed of the ship for his own benefit. Mauger's attempts to recover
the ship provide a detailed record of the episode. 26

The 1750 incident involving Mauger's alleged smuggling from
Louisbourg was undoubtedly not the only matter concerning Mauger which
disturbed Cornwallis. Mauger had also successfully defended Thomas Power,
a Halifax resident, owner and master of the fishing schooner Catherine,

26. J. Mauger to Jonathan Trumbull, Halifax, 22 November 1754, Trumbull
Papers, Connecticut Historical Society.
against charges of illicit trade at Louisbourg. Captain John Rous, then commander of H.M.S. Albany, accused Power of being "concerned in carrying on an illicit and clandestine trade between this port and Louisbourg...," and landing foreign brandy and wine without reporting them. Speaking on Power's behalf, Mauger stated that while fishing on the Grand Banks Power had run out of provisions, and had gone to Louisbourg, where "he sold a small quantity of fish which was perishing, and with it bought provisions for his two Vessels."

A portion of these provisions remained when the vessels reached Halifax. Mauger denied an allegation that Power had bought silk stockings at Louisbourg. He claimed that the only footwear Power had purchased was three pairs of cotton stockings. As to the legality of going to Louisbourg and selling fish there to buy provisions, Mauger declared, "I am almost persuaded, that those things are lawfully allowed to be done in all parts of the known world in cases of necessity." Mauger's argument prevented the court from convicting Power. Instead, the court referred the case to the Board of Trade and the High Court of Admiralty. Meanwhile, the court ordered the Catherine released on condition that Power give bond to abide by such final decree as would be given within twelve months.

Mauger paid a price for having antagonized Cornwallis, but his case established an important precedent regarding trade with Cape Breton. The Lords of the Admiralty declared that they were ready and willing to discontinue Mauger's contract with the victualling board if Cornwallis decided that it was necessary. As for the trade

27. Information of Captain John Rous against the schooner Catherine, Halifax, 5 December 1750.
29. If Power was only an accidental visitor to Louisbourg in 1750, he was less than that by 1755, when French records described him as an Irish resident merchant of Louisbourg. See A.C., G2, vol. 204, dossier 357, f. 43, 5 May 1755, also vol. 203, dossier 361, 363.
with Louisbourg, the Board informed Cornwallis that it was not forbidden under any treaty or law but the Treaty of Neutrality of 1686, "and as that Treaty has never been renewed by any subsequent Treaty we fear that this trade so very detrimental cannot be deemed illegal, but it certainly deserves the consideration by what Method it can be prevented." 30

Although he may have been discomfitted by Cornwallis' attempt to remove him, Mauger retained his position as victualler up to and during the Seven Years War. But the important thing about the disputes between Mauger and Cornwallis was that through them Mauger secured freedom for those who wished to trade with Louisbourg. In all probability Mauger himself smuggled goods from Louisbourg to Halifax and then to New England. Aside from the already mentioned dealings Mauger had with Mathew Vincent at Louisbourg, three masters of vessels he owned made voyages to Louisbourg, in 1752, and in 1755.31 Mauger's rise to prominence was phenomenal, and it is difficult to credit his success entirely or primarily to his role as victualler to the Navy.

In any event, the ruling from the Board of Trade which Mauger's case prompted allowed trade with Louisbourg to be carried on openly from Halifax. An examination of shipping records in the Halifax Gazette for the 1750's is mute testimony to that fact, despite the small number of extant copies of the paper. References in the Gazette to traffic with Louisbourg encompass only a small proportion of the total traffic between Louisbourg and the English colonies, but are very revealing about certain aspects of the trade. The Gazette recorded the involvement with Louisbourg of vessels from New York and every New England colony.

30. Board of Trade to Cornwallis, Whitehall, 6 March 1752, PANS, vol. 29, #8.
The issue of 18 August 1753 mentioned the entry of Thomas Prince at Halifax from Louisbourg. The issue of 1 September revealed that Prince then departed for Boston. The newspaper's shipping entries are an invaluable supplement to official naval lists, which show only the last port visited by an entering vessel. Thus, lists at ports such as Boston would indicate only that Prince had come from Halifax and therefore these lists provide a misleading picture of New England trade with Louisbourg.

It is also clear from shipping entries in the Gazette that New England's trade with Louisbourg in the 1750's followed much the same pattern as trade had before 1745. For instance, the Gazette recorded that Captain Nathaniel Peirce set sail from Piscataqua in the Portsmouth in late November 1752 for Louisbourg, with a cargo described as "chiefly lumber". The vessel encountered stormy weather off Cape Breton and headed south. It was subsequently wrecked and only Captain Peirce saved. Putting aside the difficulties which Peirce encountered, the incident illustrates two things. First of all, northern New England found the same ready outlet for forestry products at Louisbourg after 1749 as it had before 1745. (There is also evidence that Peirce might have been at Louisbourg in July 1752. French records state that a vessel called the Porche Mus (? Portsmouth), Captain Persse (? Peirce), loaded a cargo of molasses, rum, sugar and coffee there for New England.)

Secondly, the trade attracted in some cases the same families involved in it in the earlier period. It was not only the Peirces who revisited Louisbourg after 1749. The Pepperrells also had some contact with the French, or at least an interest in the Louisbourg trade, after 1749 as before. Robert Savage advised Andrew Pepperrell in 1750 of

32. Ibid., f. 35, "Etat des Cargaisons...1752."
the availability of information on the price of timber at Louisbourg. 33

Another prominent New England family trading at Louisbourg in this period was the Wheelwright family, a member of which sold a large quantity of flour to the French in 1752. 34 The individual in question is not named in full in French records, but may have been Nathaniel Wheelwright, referred to by one New England historian as "the wealthy Boston merchant who apparently acted as a spy for the French during two wars and died a defaulting bankrupt...." 35 Another Wheelwright was a member of the Massachusetts Council in 1745-46, and Commissary-General for the Louisbourg expedition of 1745. 36

In addition to the obstacles placed in the way of their trade by officials such as Cornwallis, merchants dealing with Louisbourg had to deal with occasional stumbling blocks created by officials at Louisbourg and by Indians. Problems with officials at Louisbourg came about in one case because of the seizure by Captain John Rous, commander of H.M.S. Albany, of two French ships carrying provisions and warstores to the St. John River. In June 1751 Governor Cornwallis wrote the Board of Trade that the Governor of Canada was "much exasperated" at Rous' action, and had stated that he would declare war against Cornwallis and commence hostilities. Cornwallis alleged that the Canadian authorities had sent orders to Louisbourg for the authorities there to seize four New England vessels as a reprisal for the two taken by Rous. 37

Cornwallis' intelligence was accurate. Governor Desherbiers at Louisbourg received and carried out such orders. But he did so reluctantly, because he feared the action would have serious implica-

tions for trade at Cape Breton. Desherbiers fulfilled the orders by detaining four New England ships which arrived after 25 March 1751. Desherbiers warned La Jonquiere that this might end trade between Cape Breton and the West Indies, because the New Englanders would no longer come to Louisbourg for rum, molasses, and other West Indian products. It is clear from Desherbiers' remarks to the Governor of Canada that he believed a stoppage of trade between New England and Louisbourg would have disastrous implications not only for the West Indian trade, but also for the maintenance of Louisbourg itself. He noted that the four ships he had seized had brought a vast range of foodstuffs, "qui etaient très nécessaires pour le pays qui est toujours dans la disette." The vessels also carried bricks and planks "dont l'entrepreneur a acheté la plus grand partie pour les réparations des bâtiments du Roy." 38

Louisbourg was clearly dependent on New England for supplies and could ill afford an interruption in their flow. Not only were the supplies needed for the rebuilding of Louisbourg, but also for the sustenance of several thousand Acadians at Cape Breton and on Ile St. Jean. Retaliation for Rous' action would actually have played into the hands of Governor Cornwallis, whose objective was after all to deprive Cape Breton of all the "comestible et secours" which New England could furnish the colony. As commissaire-ordonnateur Prevost agreed with Desherbiers on the folly of seizing New England ships in retaliation. He informed La Jonquiere and Bigot that until the establishments on Ile St. Jean and in Acadia "aient pris une certaine consistance" the inhabitants of Cape Breton needed to be able to draw by way of New England foodstuffs and supplies for the

37. Cornwallis to the Board of Trade, Halifax, 24 June 1751, PANS, vol. 35, #33.
38. Desherbiers to La Jonquiere, Louisbourg, 4 April 1751, CllB, vol. 30 (1751), ff. 78-82.
under the guise of introducing foodstuffs, the English had introduced a great number of "boucaux" containing a prodigious quantity of all sorts of dry goods.  

Officials at Louisbourg would later call for more careful regulation of trade at Cape Breton, but in 1751 they were preoccupied with maintaining the flow of supplies to their colony from New England. French imperial objectives had to be balanced against the peculiar needs of Cape Breton. Attempts to subordinate Cape Breton's needs to imperial considerations might have serious repercussions for Cape Breton. New Englanders were prepared to accept limitations on their operations at Louisbourg, but if officials there were required to go beyond those limits it might have adverse effects on the trade.

Events which took place in 1750 indicate what regulations the New Englanders were prepared to accept. That year the French seized several New England vessels at Cape Breton. One vessel was the York, confiscated for having loaded a cargo of cod caught by a resident of Gabarus. Another New England vessel, the Dolphin, was seized for a similar offence. A third vessel was also confiscated, but French records do not indicate the nature of the infraction committed. Boston newspapers reported the seizures dispassionately. One commented only that the French had taken "three of our Northern Vessels that was (sic) trading there, and that the men are return'd to Newport." Another paper repeated this information, and casually added that it supposed the French were "well supply'd with provisions, etc...."

Trade began in 1751 as usual. Neither the seizures of 1750 nor the drought in New England stopped it. But when Prevost seized the first four New England vessels to appear that spring no more vessels appeared until June. It was a worried Prevost who reported that a

42. "Observations sur ce qui c'est passe touchant le commerce de France à L'Isle Royale depuis l'année 1750 Jusqu'en 1753," A.C., C11C, Vol. 9, f. 203.
small boat and schooner which arrived that month were the first New England ships to reach Louisbourg since 25 March. Trade with New England did not resume its normal course that summer. In September, Raymond and Prevost spoke of a pressing need for flour in the colony, and spoke of permitting "l'entrée journalière" of foreign flour. The statement is vague in its reference to the entry of foreign flour. It would appear that what the two officials meant was that they were prepared to accept foreign flour as an everyday thing, rather than suggesting that it had been arriving daily. This is suggested by a statement by Prevost eight days later to the effect that very little flour had been arriving from New England, although he was certain that several ships were going to load in New England and at Philadelphia for Louisbourg.

In 1752 shortages at Louisbourg persisted. Raymond and Prevost declared in June that supplies were more scarce than they had been the previous year. The price of flour was allegedly so high that settlers had trouble providing for their families. The authorities insisted that they needed the power to buy English flour unless they received immediate help from elsewhere. French suppliers were unable to meet the needs of the colony. Governor Raymond noted in September that the season was advancing and that there was no certainty of receiving flour from France in time to supply the colony and the posts under its jurisdiction. Raymond stated that he and Prevost considered it advisable to send to New England for supplies.

43. Desherbiers to the minister, Louisbourg, 6 December 1750, and Admiralty officers at Louisbourg to the minister, 9 December 1750, C11B, vol. 29 (1750), ff. 71, 341-342.
In order to cope with the shortages, individual merchants from Louisbourg visited the English colonies in 1752. Their efforts were not very successful, but the freedom with which they travelled about suggests an acceptance by New Englanders of such contacts. The son of Jean Milly, a prominent merchant at Louisbourg, tried to obtain flour at Rhode Island and failed. He then went to New York, but found that flour was as expensive there as in Rhode Island. By the time he wrote his father in September he said it was too late in the year to do business at New York, and that he would have to make arrangements elsewhere.

Milly's visit to Rhode Island indicates how that colony's interest in trade with Louisbourg had grown by the 1750's. Although Rhode Island had little direct trade with Cape Breton before 1745, it became more active in the trade from 1749, probably as an outgrowth of the very active trade which Rhode Island managed to carry on during the war under the guise of prisoner exchanges. In February 1748 the Rhode Island General Assembly had made provisions for an exchange of prisoners with the French whenever there were at least fifteen French prisoners in Rhode Island. By July the Lords of the Admiralty had received complaints of trade between "Rhode Island and the King's enemies, under color of flags of truce." According to the complaints, more than twenty vessels commissioned as flags of truce had made voyages to the French West Indies from Rhode Island. The ships carried few prisoners, "but under color of said commissions, have carried cargoes of fish and other provisions to the King's enemies, and in return have brought back the

48. Raymond to the minister, 10 September 1752, ibid., ff. 39-42.
49. J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 89.
produce of the French sugar plantations." Charges were also made that several French vessels had visited Rhode Island with cargoes of molasses, sugar, and indigo, and had carried away provisions.\textsuperscript{52}

There is no comment on these charges in the correspondence of the governors of Rhode Island at this time. Nor did the colony make any serious efforts to curb the traffic. In 1750 James Birket, a visitor to New England from the West Indies, found at Newport, Rhode Island, many "Transient French merchants" involved in trade with Cape Breton and Cap Francois. One of the Newport merchants involved in trade with Cape Breton, Thomas Vernon, sponsored several voyages to Louisbourg in 1750, possibly as many as six.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, Newport merchants such as Godfrey Malbone, as has already been mentioned, sold ships at Louisbourg. Birket suggested that French goods entered Rhode Island as a result of "the connivance of good natured Officers who have a feeling sense of their Neighbours Industry."\textsuperscript{54} According to Robert Robinson, a customs official, his fellow officers lacked the support of the Rhode Island government, and particularly of Deputy Governor William Ellery. "By this management, Sir, you may see how the power of the King's officers is eclips't...I am weary of complaining."\textsuperscript{55}

What Rhode Islanders thought of the seizure of New England vessels by Louisbourg authorities in the spring of 1751 is not clear, but eventually trade resumed its normal patterns. In 1752, as has been indicated, some 156 New England ships had visited Louisbourg.

\textsuperscript{52} Chambers Russell to Governor Greene, Charlestown, 8 July 1748, \textit{ibid.}, V, 158, 259.
\textsuperscript{53} Thomas Vernon Daybook, 1739-1758, pp. 71, 74, 75-77, Newport Historical Society.
The figures for 1753 are comparable, and at the close of 1754 Prevost reported an increase in trade that year over the 1753 totals, including (in 1754), the purchase of twenty-five English colonial ships. Earlier in 1754 a Boston newspaper suggested that judging from the extent of the provisions trade with Louisbourg, "one would be tempted to think, that the English take more notice of St. Paul's advice to the Romans, Chapter XII, verse 20 than of any other Part of his writings, viz--If thine Enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him Drink." 

New England's trade with Cape Breton continued into 1755, until the British blockade of Louisbourg ended it. French sources record the arrival of six English vessels at Louisbourg between January and April. The cargoes consisted of livestock, and other foodstuffs, furniture, and building materials. These were goods typical of the products New Englanders sold at Louisbourg from the beginning of trade in 1714. The prices Louisbourg merchants paid in 1755 were not typical. In 1737, 1740, and 1752 Louisbourg merchants paid fifteen livres per 1,000 bricks. In 1755 they paid twenty-four livres per 1,000 bricks. Planks, which cost thirty livres in 1740, cost forty-five livres in 1755.

New Englanders found it very profitable to purchase French West Indian goods at Louisbourg. In 1752 the French sold molasses at Louisbourg for fifty-five livres per barique. The livre, an artificial unit in which prices were quoted, was worth roughly one shilling in 1752. Given this rate of exchange, New Englanders paid

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58. A.N., F2B (1755), f. 39. Two of the six vessels were from Halifax, but one was registered at Boston, where it was owned by Andrew Todd & Co. See C.O. 221/29, f. 70, 1 March 1755. Two of the other ships came directly from New England, one from New York, and the other from an undetermined port.
approximately half a shilling (.55), for a gallon of molasses at Louisbourg in 1752. The wholesale price of molasses at Boston then was not less than 1.63 shillings a gallon. If the New Englanders made two shillings gross profit on each gallon of molasses purchased at Louisbourg in 1752, when they purchased 6,056 bariques of molasses there, the total gross profit was £60,560, in Massachusetts currency.

New Englanders also made profits in their purchases of rum, the other West Indian commodity most commonly sold to New Englanders at Louisbourg. In 1752 the average monthly price of New England rum at Boston was two shillings a gallon. At Louisbourg the price was ninety livres a barique or about 1.6 shillings a gallon. New Englanders bought 2,595 bariques of rum at Louisbourg in 1752, for the equivalent of approximately £11,166. The same amount of rum would have cost almost £13,959 at Boston.

Throughout the period, some British authorities in New England and Nova Scotia continued to oppose trade with Louisbourg, as Cornwallis had done, but had trouble finding grounds and means.

60. Statement of merchandise shipped from Louisbourg to New England, 1752, A.N., Ser. F2B. There were a variety of barique sizes in the period, but Louisbourg measures, by a regulation of 1739, were to conform to weights and measures standards of Paris. See A.C., Ser. Cl1B, volume 21 (1739), f. 305. The barique used at Louisbourg would therefore have held about 53.8 Imperial gallons. See Jean Boudriot, Le Vaisseau de 74 Canons, Tome II (Grenoble, 1974), p. 97.


The Board of Trade informed Nova Scotia's Governor Charles Lawrence in October 1754 that it was "sensible of the pernicious consequences" of the trade between the Northern Colonies and Louisbourg. The Board further indicated that it would be pleased if "some measure could be fallen upon to prevent it; but this We fear will be (a) matter of great difficulty, as it does not appear to Us, to be contrary to Law...." The Board's statement seems to have been prompted by Lawrence's comments in June 1754 that Boston vessels supplied Louisbourg with great quantities of provisions. "We sometimes see six or seven sloops in a day pass by the Harbour loaded for that place." Lawrence claimed to have knowledge that thirty vessels from Boston were at Louisbourg at the time he wrote the Board. He would undoubtedly have been even more annoyed if he had known that relations between Cape Breton and New England were friendly enough that in October 1754 a Louisbourg merchant went to Boston to learn English.

About this time, however, relations between the French and the New Englanders began to change. From Boston the merchant studying English reported the arrival of a ship from London bringing news that war might take place between France and Britain. He also reported that there were people in Boston considering going to or sending word to London to demand war vessels to attack Louisbourg. The growing antagonism towards the French also resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of another visitor from Louisbourg. This was Lieutenant Nicolas Loppinot. He was allowed more than a year of

63. Ibid., p. 34.
64. F2B, ff. 30-36.
65. Board of Trade to Governor C. Lawrence, Whitehall, 29 October 1754, PANS, vol. 29.
66. Lawrence to the Board of Trade, Halifax, 1 June 1754, PANS, vol. 36, #5.
freedom in New England after his arrival in November 1753, but in February 1755 he was arrested on Governor Shirley's orders, and imprisoned until June, during which period (according to charges he made later), he was maltreated by his captors. Shirley finally granted him a passport to go to Halifax, but when Shirley departed for Niagara, Lieutenant Governor Phips had Loppinot re-arrested. He was confined until October, when he was allowed to go to England.68

In contrast, Louisbourg officials were much less successful in regulating the activities of New Englanders at Cape Breton. New Englanders repeatedly tested the limits set by the French and attempted to evade trade regulations. The previously mentioned memorial of the St. Malo merchants indicates that the New Englanders frequently succeeded. There is further confirmation of this in the letters and memoirs of Thomas Pichon, a French official who arrived at Louisbourg in 1751 with Governor Raymond, and later served at Fort Beausejour. In 1760 Pichon published a detailed account of ways in which New Englanders circumvented French trading regulations at Cape Breton.

One particular regulation which the New Englanders frequently violated was a French ban on the purchase of cod by New Englanders. According to Pichon, the New Englanders caught proportionately more cod than did the French. By taking fewer pains in curing their fish the New Englanders produced a cheaper, though inferior, product. Merchants at Louisbourg were prepared to buy this, perhaps because they had a ready market for more grades than they themselves produced. As for the New Englanders' motives in wishing to sell fish at Louisbourg, Pichon claimed that French fish was more esteemed by the English

than their own product, and that they bought up a large quantity to "gratify the most delicate palates". 69 Whether some French officials connived at the trade in fish or simply did not take sufficient precautions to prevent it, Pichon was not sure. He stated, however, that French customs officials were very remiss in carrying out their duties. They made their inquiries in a careless manner, and as a result cod and other prohibited commodities entered and left Cape Breton undetected or ignored. When customs officials finished inspecting English ships, the captains, "who generally hold a correspondence with private traders in the town, find means in the dark night to smuggle some of the most portable merchandise, unmentioned in the bill of lading." 70

There were, of course, instances in which French authorities seized vessels for violating French trade regulations. In 1750 Louisbourg admiralty officials confiscated a French ship from Martinique called the Aimable, commanded by Jean Pierre Rossignol. He had touched at Boston and sold some of his cargo there. He claimed that bad weather had forced him into Boston, and that he had sold some molasses and rum only to pay for some work his vessel required. 71 The French also confiscated several New England vessels, as indicated earlier. Robert Becket, captain of the York (one of the vessels taken), was extremely indignant at having his vessel taken. He claimed he had been fishing and had to put into Louisbourg for supplies. On offering cargo for sale he had been ordered to leave, despite bad weather. Two weeks later the weather forced him into Gabarus. Some Frenchmen had boarded his ship, and found fish on it. The vessel was then

carried to Louisbourg where Becket claimed he had been imprisoned under pretence that he had tried to sell fish. The French accounts of the incident are probably a more accurate representation of what actually happened. The French authorities were not likely to jeopardize their supply lines by seizing vessels without cause. Moreover, Becket was acquainted with Louisbourg and must have been familiar with regulations there. He had sold a cargo of sheep and planks at Louisbourg in 1742 without incident. He had also visited Louisbourg in 1743, but the nature of that visit is unknown.

As the Rossignol incident and Pichon's remarks indicate, Louisbourg authorities had to cope with circumvention of their trade regulations by French merchants from the West Indies, as well as by New Englanders. Merchants from St. Domingue, Guadeloupe, and Martinique would go to Louisbourg as passengers on English vessels. The captains would sell such goods as were permitted. Then the pretended passengers would ask leave to purchase the ship and its cargo. If permission was granted they would dispose of the cargo in other parts of the colony and divide the profits with the English. If the whole cargo was sold, the Frenchman would then take on a little fish for form's sake, and pretend that he had a complete cargo to sell at one of the French West Indian islands. Customs officials would sign a bill of lading and the vessel would sail. Once at sea the ship would hoist English colours and go to Boston or elsewhere in the English colonies to obtain a cargo for the West Indies.

Metropolitan authorities tried in 1753 to stop abuses such

73. Louisbourg port record, 14 June 1742, Archives Départementales, Charente-Maritime (La Rochelle), Ser. B, register 272, ff. 160-165.
74. Ibid., ff. 1895, 7 July 1743.
75. Pichon, pp. 227-229.
as those described by Pichon. Raymond and Prevost were informed that the annual statement of cargoes of English ships introduced into Louisbourg was not sufficiently clear. They were told that the statement must include a list of all ships, showing their names, those of the captains, where the vessels came from, the dates of their arrival and departure, and the types and amounts of cargo entered and carried away. Imports had to be confined to livestock, fowl, vegetables, and other goods which the colony could not obtain from France or other French colonies. Exports to the English colonies had to be confined to rum and molasses from the West Indies and surplus dry goods from France. The English were not to be sold things which Cape Breton furnished France or needed to carry on trade with France.\(^{76}\)

Regulations were easier to promulgate in France than to enforce in Cape Breton. The abuses of which Pichon wrote continued. Confirmation exists in the correspondence of Prevost and Augustin de Drucourt, who succeeded Raymond as Governor in 1754. In November 1754 Drucourt and Prevost wrote the minister that they had taken all possible precautions to find one Blain, from St. Domingue, accused of complicity in illegal trade with the English. He had not been at Cape Breton, although the document discussing his case implies that authorities thought he might appear there. Officials at Louisbourg believed that he had gone to New England, where he had relatives.\(^{77}\)

In another case a merchant from Guadeloupe was found to have been involved in a scheme to circumvent trade restrictions in company with several other French merchants and a London merchant. Drucourt and Prevost stated that one of the French merchants involved, an individual

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77. Drucourt and Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 3 November 1754, C11B, vol. 34 (1754), f. 17.
named Chollet, was known at Louisbourg for his connections with the English. He had planned or executed a voyage to Boston in 1750. When his activities had come to light earlier, Prevost and Desherbiers had obliged him to return to St. Domingue. 78

All told, the correspondence of the governors and commissaire-ordonnateurs reveals frequent violations of French trade regulations and a widespread network devoted to the circumvention of the regulations. In the summer of 1755 the authorities at Louisbourg arrested the vessel St. Jean, from St. Domingue, for committing a fraud with an English ship.79 Fraud involving West Indian and New England merchants was only part of the pattern of illegal trade at Louisbourg in the 1750's. Although it was only mentioned once, and not elaborated on, Prevost reported in 1754 that merchants of St. Malo and La Rochelle evaded trade regulations thanks to their proximity to Jersey and Guernsey. This related to Louisbourg in that through Jersey and Guernsey, French merchants had recourse to New England "where they make arrangements with us."80

Although merchants at Louisbourg violated French trading regulations themselves, they were also at times victims of violations. Prevost hints at this in the letter in which he mentioned the actions of the La Rochelle and St. Malo merchants. In arguing for a bureau to control trade more effectively, Prevost stated that under the procedures he envisaged, illegal trade would not be worthwhile, and the money involved would stay with Louisbourg merchants instead of going to the English.81 Drucourt and Prevost were more explicit in a letter of October 1755, in which they declared that Louisbourg merchants

78. Same to same, Louisbourg, 29 October 1755, ibid., vol. 35, f. 42.
79. Same to same, Louisbourg, 18 December 1755, ibid., ff. 62-64.
81. Ibid., f. 186.
were interested in curbing illegal trade between New England and the
West Indies because it prevented the success of their own enterprises
with Martinique, Guadaloupe, and St. Domingue. This indicates clearly
not only that New England exploited weaknesses in the fabric of French
imperial trade regulations, but that French officials at Louisbourg
were unable to stop the traffic. Despite the occasional seizure of
a French or New England ship for violating French trade regulations,
the traffic continued, by the admission of Louisbourg officials them­
selves. In fact, Drucourt and Prevost claimed that illegal trade
between English and West Indian merchants cost Cape Breton merchants
40,000 to 50,000 livres a year.83

According to the proposal Drucourt and Prevost made for a
special bureau to curb illegal trade, all captains of arriving ships
would have to make a declaration of their ship's cargo within twenty­
four hours of arrival, before discharging anything. The vessels would
be guarded until the inspection had taken place. The system would
cost an estimated 15,460 livres to set up, but it was estimated that
it would prevent losses of three times that amount, as it would put
a brake on "l'avidité des anglais, et empecher qu'ils ne projetten­t
aucunes opérations illicites avec les négociants des Isles méridion­
ales et autres...."84

Drucourt and Prevost held out great hopes for the success of
such a bureau, but it is doubtful if it would have been very success­
ful. The government of France lacked the machinery to administer
finances in France itself in the eighteenth century. From the fall
of John Law in 1721 until the administration of Jacques Necker (1776–

82. Drucourt and Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 29 October
    1755, Cl1B, vol. 35 (1755), f. 43.
83. Memoire on the establishment of a bureau at Louisbourg to prevent
    fraud and all abuses in commerce, Drucourt and Prevost to the
    minister, Louisbourg, 27 January 1755, ibid., f. 18.
84. Ibid., ff. 10-18.
1781), no minister tried to remove royal finances from private enterprise.85 The ancient regime never had a budget, or a legislative act foreseeing and authorizing the total receipts and expenditures for a fixed period of time.86 Given the difficulties of financial administration in France, it was too much to expect honest and efficient administration of trade laws in the colonies. Metropolitan plans were doomed to fail in the context of colonial and metropolitan realities. There were manifold opportunities for underpaid or avaricious officials to satisfy their cupidity in the colonies. Where officials were honest, regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to the task. English merchants who wished to avoid the slight risks of detection at Louisbourg when violating French regulations had only to conduct their business in one of the many harbours on the island where there were no officials. For French officials at Louisbourg there was no way to resolve the colony's problems. Trade with New England was necessary as part of the entrepot concept, which was an integral part of the metropolitan authorities' scheme for colonial development. But that scheme required more careful regulation of trade than proved possible.

In conclusion, it may be said that trade between Louisbourg and New England between 1749 and 1755 followed much the same pattern and employed many of the same mechanisms which had developed slowly and arduously between 1713 and 1745, as New England groped its way to an accommodation with the French establishment on Cape Breton Island. Where the trade differed from the earlier period was in that in the latter period interested New Englanders approached the matter confidently, so that from the very beginning of French re-occupation New

86. Ibid., p. 42.
Englanders anticipated a large-volume trade. This they achieved. In 1752 and 1753, and possibly in 1754, the annual average number of ships from New England calling at Louisbourg was double the estimated annual average for pre-1745 peak years such as 1742 and 1743. The number of New England sailings to Louisbourg was comparable to Boston sailings to the Caribbean, and the size of the ships was also comparable.

As for Louisbourg, the trade with New England was essential for the maintenance of the entrepot trade with the West Indies and to ensure that Louisbourg received supplies for its reconstruction, and for the maintenance of the populations of Cape Breton and Ile St. Jean. Whether the traffic was as profitable for the Louisbourg mercantile community as it might have been is debatable. The statements of Louisbourg officials suggest that New England merchants managed to conduct their business in such a fashion that the local community made less money than it might have. But there were no complaints from Louisbourg merchants of this situation. Complaints of illegal trade at Louisbourg, of violation of French trading regulations, came from merchants in France, who may have been displaced at Louisbourg, or at least have had their aspirations blunted by New England competition.

In fact, neither French nor British imperial authorities could control the New England-Louisbourg trade to the degree they desired. New Englanders in particular insisted on developing their foreign trade to benefit themselves. The vision of the Puritan founders of Massachusetts had foundered on the reality of an America which could not isolate itself from unwanted secular and material influences. By the same token, British and French authorities were rebuffed in their attempts to mold the merchant community in New England and at Louisbourg respectively according to mercantilist preconceptions.
Chapter IX
Policy and Profits on the Periphery
New England and Louisbourg 1754-1758

On the eve of the Seven Years War, Louisbourg did not dominate New England's thoughts as it had done on the eve of the War of the Austrian Succession. New England's attention was diffused by its involvement in the war's numerous North American campaigns, and New Englanders played a numerically less important part in the 1758 battle for Louisbourg than they had in 1745. Nevertheless, New Englanders and British officials in New England played a vital role in precipitating the conflict which led ultimately to the end of Louisbourg's existence as an important military and economic centre in North America. In many respects British policy towards the French empire in North America was determined not at the heart of the British empire, in London, but on the periphery, in New England, in Nova Scotia, and elsewhere in North America. Increasingly gripped with fear of encirclement by the French, the English colonists in North America and their officials did their utmost to impress the British government with the need to seize Louisbourg and other focal points of French power in America. New Englanders' determination to shape British policy on Louisbourg is one of the outstanding features of New England's relationship with Louisbourg between 1754 and 1758, and is manifested in the at times intense interest which New Englanders and their leaders demonstrated in the fate of Louisbourg.

Another outstanding feature of New England's relationship to Louisbourg in this period is the business which New England enjoyed as a result of British efforts first of all to contain the French at Louisbourg, then to reduce the fortress to submission. Thomas Hancock, who strenuously urged a campaign against Louisbourg, profited enormously from supplying the British forces. Many New Englanders found employ-
ment in shipping goods to the British forces built up at Halifax from 1755 to 1758. Others found employment taking part in the abortive assault of 1757, and in the final expedition of 1758. As for Louisbourg itself, manoeuverings by British and colonial authorities to deal with the French establishment had a striking effect on the French city for several years before the 1758 assault. Beginning in 1755, colonial embargoes on trade with the French and the British naval blockade of Louisbourg drastically reduced the flow of supplies to the French while pressure on the Acadian population of Nova Scotia prior to the expulsion of 1755 swelled the ranks of refugees on Ile Royale and Ile St. Jean, and imposed a severe strain on the capacity of French administrators to feed the population of the two islands.

In dealing first with New England attitudes to Louisbourg, it must be noted that in their attempts to formulate a strategic approach to Ile Royale in the 1750's, New Englanders' attitudes differed from those of the 1740's. In the earlier period many New Englanders saw Louisbourg as the root of their problems with the French. The solution they devised was to take largely upon themselves the task of capturing Louisbourg. In the 1750's New Englanders were still very concerned with the French threat in North America. Louisbourg, however, was not seen as the prime threat to New England this time, but rather as one part of a French plan of encirclement—a plan which New Englanders and their spokesmen greatly feared. The fifty-seven inhabitants of New London, Connecticut, who petitioned the Connecticut General Assembly in 1757 summed up the concern colonists felt at French encirclement of the English colonies. The petitioners, who claimed to be the principal inhabitants of New London, felt that the French king clearly had a grand program of conquest in North America. This was not just a matter of concern for the inland frontier, but for seaports as well. The petitioners declared that they were "under the Strongest Apprehensions
His Majesty's Enemies the Subjects of the French King, will as soon as the season of the year permits make an Hostile Attempt on this town...."1

There is also evidence of specific fear of Louisbourg. A Frenchman who was in Boston late in 1754 informed the authorities at Louisbourg that there were people at Boston considering going to London, or sending word there to demand war vessels to make an attack on Louisbourg. In February 1755 a former Governor of Ile Royale, the comte de Raymond, declared in a memorial on the colony that the English spoke frequently in secret council meetings at Boston of retaking Cape Breton. William Pepperrell had allegedly admitted this to a Louisbourg merchant whom Raymond had sent to Boston to investigate New England's attitude to Louisbourg. The merchant claimed that New England planned to put into effect plans to retake Louisbourg at the first declaration of war.2

Whatever the substance of such reports, officials in New England and Nova Scotia did take steps which led to large-scale British military involvement in North America. In effect, New Englanders and their spokesmen may be credited in large measure with creating conditions which led to the Seven Years War, the taking of Louisbourg, and vast expenditures in North America, temporarily revitalizing the economy of New England. Colonial officials accomplished this despite the fact that Britain did not want a war in the early 1750's. As Henry Pelham commented to his brother in 1752, "there is such a load of debt and such heavy taxes already laid upon the people, that nothing but an absolute necessity can justify our

2. Extract of a letter from Louisbourg, 27 December 1754, C11B, vol. 34 (1754), f. 41.
engaging in a new War."³ One thing which could justify war was a French threat to the massive investment Britain had made in Nova Scotia. The dilemma posed for the British government by French pressures on Nova Scotia was stated by Horace Walpole in 1754, when he warned the Duke of Newcastle that the settlement of Nova Scotia had cost great sums, "which I must own are very necessary and must in time of war be continued, because the loss of that Province would mean ye Loss of all our Northern Colonys."⁴

From various North American sources the British government received news that Nova Scotia was indeed threatened by the French. Governor Charles Lawrence of Nova Scotia wholeheartedly espoused this point of view. He saw the influence of French authorities in Canada and at Louisbourg behind the refusal of the Acadians to cooperate in more than a perfunctory manner with the government of Nova Scotia. Consequently, Lawrence had the Acadians removed.⁵ But he could not deal with Louisbourg or Canada so directly. In part, at least, Lawrence's views of the problem reflected the attitude of Governor Shirley of Massachusetts. Shirley saw Cape Breton, along with Canada, as a major problem for Nova Scotia. In discussing the security of Nova Scotia with Lawrence, Shirley indicated that Lawrence's main objects should be to fortify the Isthmus of Chignecto, and take possession of the St. John River. This would secure the colony from "sudden descents and attacks of the French from Quebec thro the river St. Lawrence, and Cape Breton across the Gulf...." Moreover,

⁵. Lawrence had contemplated the effect of removing the Acadians as early as August 1754, but it was probably finding several hundred Acadians at Beauséjour which made him fear French influence over them. PAC: N.S.A.: 55, 1 August 1754, cited by N. Griffiths, The Acadians: Creation of a People (Toronto, 1973), p. 50. The decision to expell the Acadians if they refused to swear an unqualified oath was taken and reaffirmed by 11 July 1755. Lawrence's resolve was undoubtedly strengthened when news of Braddock's defeat reached Halifax on 23 July 1755. See Griffiths, p. 54.
fortifications on the Gulf side of the Isthmus would enable Lawrence
to cutt off the present Intercourse, which the French of
Louisbourg have with the Canada Indians, and to molest
the navigation between Cape Breton and the river St.
Lawrence which might distress the inhabitants of that
island, as well as those of Canada, by leaving them no
place but France to supply them with provisions and other
necessaries.  

While Lawrence, urged by Shirley, bombarded London authori-
ties with tales of French perfidy, Shirley gave London officials
additional cause to fear French actions in North America. In April
1754 Shirley informed London of intelligence he had received that
"in the Summer before last, the French made a Settlement upon a
Tract of Land which lies wholly to the Westward of the River
Kennebec", which action constituted an intrusion into territory
which even the French admitted was English.  

When Shirley went to Falmouth, Maine, in May with 800 men to counter the invasion he
found that his intelligence had been incorrect. The French had not
occupied any New England territory. But for some unknown reason,
Shirley did not inform London of this fact until 19 August. As a
result, throughout the summer and part of the autumn of 1754, the
British cabinet believed that the French had invaded and occupied
English territory. The Kennebec affair might not have been a real
problem in ordinary times, but at this juncture London was also hear-
ing of alleged French intrusions in the Ohio Valley and in Nova Scotia.  

Issues such as those raised by Shirley and Lawrence led the
British government to take a position which led ultimately to war.

By March 1755 the British government made demands on France, which,

6. Shirley to Lawrence, Boston, 13 March 1756, T. B. Akins (ed.)
Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova
Scotia (Halifax, 1869), pp. 428-433.
7. Shirley to Holderness, 19 April 1754, Shirley Correspondence, II, 52.
8. Patrice L-R. Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years War",
if granted, would have brought the whole region from New England to
the south shore of the St. Lawrence under the direct control of the
were drafted directing Admiral Boscawen to sail to North America to
intercept and destroy the French fleet designed to reinforce Quebec
and Louisbourg. French authorities were astounded by these actions.
The French Minister of the Marine, Antoine-Louis Rouillé, wrote that
"The proposals of the English Cabinet are so extraordinary and so
excessive, that it is not to be supposed that it could have brought
itself to make them, if the King of Great Britain and his ministers had
been accurately informed of the respective rights and events that
relate to our possessions in North America." By now the die was cast.
Both Louisbourg and New England now had to consider what war would
bring.

As war became imminent French authorities at Louisbourg regarded
its approach with surprising calm. The French relied on the avarice
of New Englanders to guarantee their supplies. At first there was
ever indication that their faith was not misplaced. The first ship
from New England to reach Louisbourg in 1755 arrived in January. It
brought a cargo of frozen meat and left with a cargo of molasses. But
within a few months Massachusetts took steps to prevent supplies
from reaching Cape Breton or other French colonies in North America.
Louisbourg was the only French port specifically named, suggesting a
particular concern on the part of Massachusetts officials with Ile
Royale. The act passed by the Massachusetts General Court, on 31
March, forbade any correspondence or communication with the inhabitants
of the French colonies, for a four month period from 31 March. Violators
would have their vessels and cargo seized. The master of an offending

9. Ibid., pp. 88, 89.
10. Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 28 January 1755, C11B, vol. 35,
(1755), f. 145.
vessel would have one ear cut off. He would also receive thirty-nine lashes, and be forever banned from holding government office. The owners of apprehended vessels would each be liable to a fine of 500.11

Colonial officials enforced the legislation and it had the desired effect of reducing contacts with the French, although there was eventually some dissatisfaction with the legislation. In May 1755 colonial officials seized a ship from Plymouth, Massachusetts, with a cargo of provisions intended for the French. But the vessel and its cargo were condemned and sold. The Boston Evening Post remarked that "tis thought the owner will make but an indifferent voyage on't." Moreover, in an unusual display of rancour towards violators of the legislation, suggesting that New England took fairly seriously the threat from the French, the paper expressed the hope that all such traders would "meet with the same Fate".12

Several sources indicate that the zeal with which officials enforced the legislation against correspondence with the French reduced the number of sailings from New England to Louisbourg to a negligible number. Late in May a vessel arrived in Boston after having been forced to put into Louisbourg because it had lost a mast at sea. The captain reported that there was not one English vessel at Louisbourg, and that none had been there for a long time, "which the French much wondered at, and lamented the want of, the island being full of molasses, and they greatly frightened for provisions."13 French records indicate that only six English colonial vessels entered Louisbourg from January through April.14

There had been reports in New England that in 1754 the French had been buying all the flour they could get and had been bringing it

to Cape Breton and Canada. This was alleged to have been responsible for a "dearness of flour in the Northern Colonies." How "dear" flour was at that time is difficult to determine. The price of flour at Boston in January 1755 was 16.3 shillings per hundredweight, only .7 shilling more expensive than a year earlier. In New York, however, flour was approximately two shillings a hundredweight more expensive from October 1754 through January 1755 than for the corresponding period a year earlier. According to a report from New York, flour was so plentiful at Louisbourg that it was "some shillings cheaper there than..." at New York. There was substance to these reports. Prevost declared late in 1755 that the principal inhabitants at Louisbourg had supplied themselves the previous autumn with enough provisions to last throughout 1755.

Despite the vigour with which people at Louisbourg sought supplies in 1754, the embargo in New England and extraordinary demands on the King's stores at Cape Breton had affected the supply situation to such an extent as to cause alarm among Louisbourg officials. François Bigot, intendant at Quebec, who visited Louisbourg briefly in the spring of 1755, wrote the Minister of Marine that officials at Louisbourg still had hopes of drawing supplies from New England, and he indicated that the prospects of success were uncertain. Bigot declared that Louisbourg needed two years supplies to be safe against the English, but, as he admitted, "nous savons que c'est le comestible anglais que fait vivre en grande partie la colonie, en temps de paix, parce que les armateurs de France ne trouvent pas leur compte à en envoyer..." Other officials stubbornly refused to believe that New Englanders would fail to find some means of supplying Louisbourg. Early in June, Prevost reported that the captains of ships from Ile

Royale had held conversations with the captains of New England ships on the Grand Banks. They relayed the news that the ban on contacts with the French colonies would last only four months. Prevost noted that New England's consumption of rum was so great that the English West Indian colonies could not meet the demand. Consequently, Prevost believed that it was scarcely possible that the English colonies would stop coming to Louisbourg for these items: "Ils seront surement oblige d'en venir chercher ici...."20 The commissaire-ordonnateur optimistically stated that there were signs that several ships were about to come to Louisbourg from the English colonies. If they did come, he declared that he would do everything practicable to began the extraordinary provisioning approved by the minister.

It is clear from Prevost's letter that he regarded as impracticable some of the orders he received from France on the subject of trade with the English colonies. The Minister of Marine had ordered Prevost in 1754 to abstain from any purchases from foreigners without an order from him, but need forced Prevost to operate differently in 1755. Prevost declared that he would always operate in concert with the governor in rendering to the minister an account of what he and the governor did together, but he also stated that he would try everything to entice the English colonists into bringing provisions to Cape Breton.21 A week later Prevost was still hopeful of securing supplies from the English colonies. The English, he reported, did not dare approach the coasts of Cape Breton, but this obstacle was not insurmountable. The French could meet English colonial vessels at sea or in several uninhabited Newfoundland bays.22

Events proved Prevost overly optimistic. By late June there were ten to fifteen English naval vessels cruising off the coast of Cape

20. Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 7 June 1755, C11B, ibid., f. 147.
22. Prevost to the Minister, Louisbourg, 14 June 1755, ibid., ff. 156-158.
Breton. They had captured several French vessels by mid-June: an English frigate took a schooner sent to Ile St. Jean with supplies, and another English vessel seized a brigantine coming to Louisbourg from Martinique. Only two English vessels are known to have reached Louisbourg that month. Although French records do not indicate whether these vessels came from New England or from other English colonies, there is evidence that New England vessels reached Cape Breton in the period. On 25 June, the Massachusetts General Court passed an Act forbidding the export of provisions and warlike stores. It is evident from the introduction of this legislation that the measure passed in March to stop contacts with the French was not regarded as completely satisfactory by the Massachusetts government. In fact, the new act stated that the earlier measure had "proved ineffectual". The Massachusetts government now decreed that vessels could carry munitions, but only sufficient for their own defence. The legislation required ships' masters to give a written account of their cargo to the impost officer or his deputy. Neglect of these provisions would result in fines of 1,000 each for the master and the owner.

New England legislation and the British naval blockade combined to hamper Cape Breton's trade for much of 1755. Late in August HMS Port Mahon brought three French ships into Halifax. One was a packet boat from France, laden with wine, another had a cargo of rum and molasses from Martinique, and the third carried provisions from Eustatia. Shortly afterwards Boston received news that Admiral Holbourn had taken four large French merchantmen, part of a fleet of fifteen vessels bound for Cape Breton.

With the colony's trade disrupted, Ile Royale officials despaired of the future, while in the English colonies some newspapers

25. Ibid., 25 September 1755.
advanced equally gloomy speculation on the consequences of war. The New York Weekly Gazette suggested that if there were a war Louisbourg would "be a nest of privateers, both from Europe, and all the French possessions in America. These will be continually upon our Coast, destroying our Trade, taking our Vessels, land upon the defenceless Parts of our Country, ravage, plunder, burn and destroy our Produce, our People and their Possessions." Worse than this was the prospect of raids on American cities by "the perfidious French" without declaration of war:

What Scenes of Horror and Distress arise to my View! The Sacking of a City by a cruel and merciless Enemy! The lawless Violence of Sailors and Soldiers! our fighting Men slaughtered or subdued! our Streets streaming with Blood! our Houses in a Blaze! our Aged trampled under Foot! Our Wives a Prey to Lust! Our virgins ravished! Our Infants tore from their Mothers Breasts, and inhumanly dashed against the Walls.26

New England was not unaffected by such journalistic excesses. Its trade with Louisbourg had been virtually ended, and in case of war its commerce would be affected by Cape Breton privateers before New York felt the effects of the war. New Englanders were concerned about French encirclement, and should have been realistic about the threat posed by Louisbourg. The New Englanders knew that Cape Breton was dependent on New England and the other English colonies for much of its supplies. They knew that the French could not provision a major military force at Louisbourg as long as Boscowen's fleet prevented supplies from reaching the port. As for New England's loss of trade, this was compensated for by the business created by an enlarged British military establishment in North America. Large quantities of supplies poured into Halifax once the British fleet arrived there to use it as a base for operations off Cape Breton. By 20 September, Halifax had received "near a Thousand fat cattle, and 5,000 sheep, besides Hogs, Goats, and vast Quantities of all kinds

of Poultry and other refreshments...." More provisions were reported arriving daily. Some 110 vessels entered Halifax from August through October 1755. Seventy-five of these vessels were of New England registry.

New Englanders were motivated to make war for several reasons. In addition to the business war generated there was their fear of French encirclement. There were many statements on this subject by New England residents between 1749 and 1758. William Douglass, Boston physician and historian, declared in the first volume of A Summary, Historical & Political, of the...British Settlements on North America that "the French are the Common Nuisance and Disturbers of Europe, and will in a short time become the same in America, if not mutilated at Home, and in America fenced off from us by Ditches and Walls, that is, by great Rivers and impracticable Mountains...." The second of the two volumes of this work appeared in Boston in 1751. The two volumes were reprinted in Boston and London in 1755.

In addition to Douglass' writings there were comments by Jonathan Mayhew, prominent Boston clergyman who became widely known at home and abroad as a result of publishing a collection of sermons in 1749, at the age of twenty-nine. In preaching the election sermon for Massachusetts in 1754, Mayhew expressed great concern for New England's safety:

And what horrid scene is this, which restless, roving fancy, or something of an higher nature, presents to me and so chills my blood! Do I behold these territories of freedom, become the prey of arbitrary power? Do I see the slaves of Lewis with their Indian allies, dispossessing the free-born (American) subjects of King George, of the inheritance received from their forefathers, and purchased by them at the expense of their ease, their treasure, their blood! Do I see a protestant there, stealing a look at his bible and being taken in the fact, punished like a felon! Do I see liberty, property, religion, happiness, changed, or rather transubstantiated, into slavery, poverty, superstition, wretchedness!

Comments such as these, coming from the same man who in 1759 paid tribute to the valour and humanity of General Montcalm, suggest the strength of anti-French feeling in New England during those years of uncertainty between the end of the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War.

Governor Shirley's correspondence in the period just before the war also indicated a preoccupation with French encirclement. Shirley noted in February 1755 that the English colonies were "surrounded with the encroachments of the French", who had marked out "a large empire upon the backs of it (the continent), extending from Cape Breton to the Gulph of Mexico...and they are now finishing the extreme parts by a communication between Louisbourg & Quebec across the Isthmus of Nova Scotia and Bay of Fundy at one end, and a junction of Canada with the Mississippi...", at the other.33 In writing authorities in Britain, Shirley noted that Cape Breton Island and Canada could not produce enough food to maintain their inhabitants without foreign supplies. Shirley commented that the French had only one harbour on the Atlantic coast, but that control of Nova Scotia would give them access to numerous safe harbours and possession of a fertile region in which to raise provisions so necessary for the Louisbourg garrison. None of the individual territories posed an insurmountable threat to the English colonies in North America, but "all these held together would give them so strong a hold upon this Continent...", as to enable them to reduce the rest of the English colonies.34

At the same time, New Englanders such as Thomas Hancock impressed on their correspondents in England the need for action against the French. Hancock remarked in a letter to Christopher Kilby in December 1754 that it was essential that trade with Louisbourg be stopped: "Make it Death for any one that shall be taken supplying them with Provisions, etc., and it will Cut our work very Short." In June, Hancock expressed the hope that "the French Dogs may be followed to their head Quarters & Dens at Canada & wholly Rooted out, which by the help of God, & assistance with money & men of war from home it may be done...." Ten days later Hancock relayed the news that Beausejour had been taken on 17 June, or "Louisbourg day", as he called it. He also expressed pleasure at hearing that while the French fleet was "near or at Louisbourg Our English fleet (was) seen off Newfoundland we hourly expect further news from them and hope we have leave to Give them a good Drubing." From this time until the end of 1756 and the beginning of plans for an attack on Louisbourg, Hancock's letters frequently reiterated the need for action against the French generally and against Louisbourg in particular. Hancock referred repeatedly to the Beausejour expedition as a "good beginning". In a letter to the Honourable James Greenville in July 1755, Hancock flattered the British for their good judgement in sending Boscawen's fleet to North America, "or before this day Halifax and all Nova Scotia had been laid in Ashes." Hancock used the occasion to discuss what remained to be done in North America: "...and if the Ministry will be pleased to push on, we may with ease Take Canada and Louisbourg the latter blow to pieces, and Root ye French out of America." Hancock also pressed his views on William Bogdani, Secretary of the Ordnance Board.

33. Shirley to Lieutenant Governor De Lancey of New York, Boston, 24 February 1755, Parkman Transcripts (MHS), vol. 40, p. 216.
34. Shirley to Secretary of State Robinson, Boston, 24 March 1755, ibid., pp. 206, 207.
Although he did not specifically call for an expedition against Louisbourg, Hancock did note in September 1755 that Boscawen's fleet remained cruising off Louisbourg and had taken many provision-laden vessels from France. As for the inhabitants of Louisbourg, Hancock reported that "they are in a starving Condition there...."39

In December 1756, before Hancock knew that Pitt had ordered General Loudoun, as commander-in-chief in North America, to organize an attack on Louisbourg, Hancock wrote separate letters to Greeneville and Bogdani advocating campaigns against Louisbourg and Quebec. Hancock suggested that America could not be saved unless the two French strongholds were taken. There would be ample support in the colonies. Hancock informed Greenville that the colonists would "most certainly Join heart & hand on those Expeditions, & by God's blessing I should not doubt of Success."40

Throughout this period Hancock was busy filling contracts brought to him because of British military activities in North America. He performed many small services for officers, paying for transports they required, and sending materials to forts in Nova Scotia.41 Even the plight of the many soldiers who returned to Boston ill after the Beauséjour expedition claimed some of Hancock's attention. The men were quartered on one of the islands in Boston harbour until they were:

Clens'd of their Lise and filthy smell of the Feavour which is very bad they are in want of their Jackets and Briches Shirts Stickens (sic) and shoes some have got money to buy and some have none...their (sic) is great want of soap to Clanse these poor soulers and proper Diet for the sick and proper Nurses as soon as possible.42

36. Hancock to Kilby and Barnard, 16 June 1755, ibid.
37. Hancock to C. Kilby, 26 June 1755, ibid.
38. Hancock to the Hon. James Greenville, 14 July 1755, ibid.
39. Hancock to Bogdani, Boston, 24 September 1755, ibid.
40. Hancock to Greenville, and Hancock to Bogdani, 14 December 1756, ibid.
42. Trimbal to Hancock, 16 June 1756, Hancock Mss 13, p. 4; Journal, 29 October 1756, cited by Baxter, p. 135.
Hancock paid for the supplies and the nurses, and presumably received the usual five percent commission.

At the same time that Thomas Hancock was busy with matters indirectly related to Louisbourg, other New Englanders were still seeking rewards for their services at Louisbourg during and after the 1745 expedition. In 1756 Samuel Waldo was in England petitioning for payment of 1,340 as salary due him for his services on the 1745 expedition, and 1,000 for personal losses. Waldo obtained all that he asked. His son Francis also received rewards. In March 1757 Francis submitted that there were no customs houses within 150 miles of his home in Falmouth. He requested that the port be made a customs district, and that he be named collector. The "most considerable Merchants of the City" testified to the need for the customs house, and Francis obtained the post. Moreover, when Sir Charles Henry Frankland gave up his position as collector at Boston, Waldo requested the post for himself, "depending once again on his services at Louisbourg...."43

Meanwhile, the French at Cape Breton were faced with increasingly serious problems. Prevost reported in November 1756 that most of the goods ordered that year had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Compounding the problems of the Louisbourg authorities was the situation at Ile St. Jean, where the number of Acadian refugees steadily increased. The island desperately needed foodstuffs. It also needed improved means of defense in case of an English attack. Prevost declared that the smallest corsaire could descend on the island without opposition, burn everything, and destroy the establishment there.44 By the spring of 1757 shortages at Louisbourg had become more severe. Prevost and

43. T. C. Barrow, Trade and Empire, the British Customs Service in Colonial America (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), pp. 121, 122.
44. Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 29 November 1756, Cl1B, vol.36 (1756), ff. 165-67.
Governor Drucours reported in May that they had had no help or news from France since the previous autumn. Foodstuffs were becoming more scarce every day. Fears of the French officials had escalated sharply with the arrival of L'Apollon at Port Toulouse on 26 January. With this vessel's arrival, officials learned that the Chariot Royal had sailed for Louisbourg on 15 November, and concluded that "as we have had no news that it was taken by New England vessels or forced to the West Indies, we presume that it had the misfortune to fall into English hands on leaving France." Louisbourg not having received supplies for five months, seemed doomed to inevitable famine. Even the weather harrassed the French, as eighteen inches of snow fell in the first twelve days of May. The situation was redeemed only by the fact that the English fleet had retired to Halifax the previous autumn and remained there throughout the winter, thereby permitting French privateers to operate out of Louisbourg. These privateers returned at the end of April with prizes carrying tobacco, grain, flax, planks, cask-wood, bricks, wines, tea, leather, and other things, "a great help to the country...."

Despite the supplies obtained by privateers, Louisbourg's plight had worsened by the autumn of 1757. Officials complained that they had to supply many more people than usual: Indians, Acadian refugees, and crews of the King's ships. Merchant ships carried barely enough provisions for their own crews, and the crews of privateers consumed great quantities of foodstuffs while no longer bringing in many prizes. The only capture by privateers which Drucours and Prevost considered worth mentioning in the autumn of 1757 was that of a vessel carrying 4,000 bushels of wheat. The cargo was sent to Ile St. Jean to relieve

45. Drucours and Prevost to the minister, Louisbourg, 12 May 1757, C11B, vol. 37 (1957), f. 3.
46. Ibid., ff. 3-5.
the misery of the inhabitants there. By December conditions had not improved. French privateers took a New England ship, the Prince of Wales but this was a Massachusetts naval vessel, and could not have been lavishly provisioned. The embargo imposed in New England effectively deprived the French of provisions by regular means and by privateering.

Evidently, the magnitude of Cape Breton's needs overshadowed the achievements of French privateers. Montcalm was certainly under the impression that Louisbourg privateers had been reasonably active and successful. In April 1757 he informed Count D'Argenson that since the declaration of war, Louisbourg privateers had brought in prizes worth 100,000 écus. Most of the captures began late in 1756. Boston newspapers did not record any captures by privateers from Louisbourg until November 1756, when they reported that French privateers had taken to Louisbourg four or more vessels. At the beginning of December a Boston newspaper carried an account of the capture of a Captain Sawyer by a French privateer who also took two New England fishing schooners and their boats. At Louisbourg, one of the vessels was immediately fitted out as a privateer, and became the fifth such vessel operating out of Louisbourg. By the end of 1757 the French privateers had taken fifteen New England vessels.

Early in November 1757 Boston received word that the situation at Louisbourg was deteriorating rapidly. The information came from a New Englander who had been a prisoner at Louisbourg for a few weeks, during which time he claimed that upwards of 300 men had died from aboard a French naval vessel there, the Duc de Bayonne. In that period the New Englanders received no more than one-half pound of meat. He also related an incident which suggested that the French authorities could no longer rely on their Indian allies. The New Englander, John

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47. Drucours and Prevost to the minister, 10 October 1757, ibid., ff.23-24.  
50. Ibid., 2 December 1756.
Samuel Petit, had been released from his shipboard prison into the custody of a French acquaintance named Lahore, who informed him that some Indians had lately brought in some scalps. After they granted the bounty, the French discovered that the scalps were of Frenchmen! The bounty on scalps was then ordered removed, and after that bounties were offered only for live prisoners.51

Despite Petit's tale of shortages and epidemics at Louisbourg, some people still believed that supplies were reaching Cape Breton in 1757 from the English colonies. Lieutenant Henry Pringle of the 27th Regiment wrote his brother Robert from Halifax that he had no doubt that "there are several rogues upon this Continent, who carry on at this time an illicit trade with the French at Cape Breton and supply them with provisions." Pringle asserted that General Loudoun had taken steps to apprehend participants in the alleged trade, by sending out some small patrol vessels. They had no success. Pringle attributed this to "the fogs (which) render their endeavour of little use...."52

A more plausible explanation than Pringle's for the failure to detect New England vessels on their way to Louisbourg was that few shipments were being made. French records certainly do not indicate any quantity of supplies reaching Louisbourg in 1757. Moreover, New Englanders were preoccupied with other activities. In December 1756, Prime Minister William Pitt ordered Loudoun to collect at Halifax sufficient provisions for 12,000 men for six months. The force was meant to attack Louisbourg in 1757. William Baker, prominent London

merchant and military contractor, provided some of the necessary supplies, but the scheme also occasioned business for New England. Acting on a letter from the Duke of Cumberland, Loudoun purchased a supply of "junk" for the artillery, from New England contractors. Those suppliers paid little attention to the quality of materials they provided Loudoun. Loudoun had been told that the New Englanders "are of opinion any metal will do for cannon balls and...if I do not care they will make them of mettel (sic) so brittle that if you let one ball fall on another they will break like glass...."53

To judge from this incident, and their attitude to Loudoun and his New England-born assistant, Christopher Kilby. New Englanders expected to gain much from the British military build-up in North America. The New Englanders were acutely conscious of the value of friends in important places, and highly appreciative of what they might accomplish for New England. In 1755 Boston had appointed Christopher Kilby as the city's agent in London. In 1756 Kilby had become "agent victualler of the army" under Loudoun's command, and they had arrived in Boston together in January 1757. Boston officials promptly congratulated Kilby on his most recent appointment, and thanked him for "the Favours he has from Time to Time Shown us." Also, a committee of the General Court invited Kilby to dine at Concert Hall that day. In reporting all this, the Boston Gazette remarked that "his townsmen rejoice at the opportunity they now have of testifying the deserved esteem they have for him."54 But New England did not reap as many benefits from Kilby's appointment as they had anticipated. On assuming his new post, Kilby had resigned as Nova Scotia's agent, and his successor did not

favour Hancock and Charles Apthorp as Kilby had done. Also, with the army's headquarters situated in New York, Kilby was unable to give Boston merchants much business.55

As one source of patronage and trade dried up, New Englanders cultivated another one. In 1757 Thomas Pownall became governor of Massachusetts. He promoted measures which brought considerable trade to Massachusetts, and New England merchants showed their appreciation on every possible occasion. In many ways Pownall's career in North America is similar to William Shirley's. He came to America several years before his appointment as Governor of Massachusetts. He showed a keen interest in colonial defence problems from his arrival in 1753, and in 1754 he attended the Albany Conference (where he met Thomas Hutchinson), and presented a paper on a general defence plan for the colonies. For his efforts, the Massachusetts legislature rewarded him with a vote of thanks.56 After the new ministry led by William Pitt came to power in England in late 1756, it was Pownall who presented Pitt and four other ministers with Loudoun's new plan for an attack on Canada by sea, preceeded by an attack on Louisbourg.57

It is hard to conceive of a plan more favourable to the interests of New England merchants, and they reacted as might have been expected. When Pownall arrived in Boston in August 1757 to assume the governorship, Boston merchants were the first residents to greet him. They pledged their cooperation and implored Pownall to spare no measures "to recover them from the decay into which they were fallen."58 Pownall further cemented the bonds of friendship with New England's merchants on the occasion of William Pepperrell's handing him the keys to Castle William, Boston's major fortification.

56. J. A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall, British Defender of American Liberty (Glendale, California, 1951), 43.
57. Pownall to Loudoun, 22 December 1756, cited by Schutz, ibid., p. 80.
58. Ibid., p. 88.
Pownall returned the keys to Pepperrell and declared: "The interest of the province is in your heart; I shall therefore always be glad to see the keys in your hands." 59

New England merchants reaped a handsome reward from Pownall's efforts, as the case of Thomas Hancock illustrates. For the years 1754-1757 Hancock handled bills of exchange worth £33,000 sterling on government business. New Englanders also retained a significant proportion of the military supply business in Nova Scotia despite the loss of Kilby's influence there, and despite the fact that the military there also drew on other areas for supplies. 60 New Englanders also dominated the carrying trade to Nova Scotia, and served as agents to the civil and military authorities in Nova Scotia in their efforts to secure supplies. 61 An explanation for this state of affairs, that is, New England's continued domination of the economy of Nova Scotia in a period when New England was losing ground relative to the economic growth of New York and Pennsylvania, is not hard to find. New Yorkers and Philadelphians lacked the years of experience New Englanders had in supplying Nova Scotia, and in some cases were undoubtedly reluctant to invest too heavily there because of earlier disappointments. Certainly, if many New Yorkers shared the experiences of Gerard G. Beekman they would have been very cautious about dealings with Nova Scotia. Beekman did some business with Halifax and Annapolis Royal between 1750 and 1754. At Halifax he "found problems more plentiful than profits", and had little luck in collecting debts. 62

New Englanders figured very prominently in supplying the British forces sent to the Bay of Fundy to counter pressure exerted upon them. 59

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61. Baker's agent in Nova Scotia, Thomas Saul, was a New Englander, and was alleged to have been "the wealthiest and most enterprising merchant" in Halifax. See J. C. Hippen, "Thomas Saul", Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III (Toronto, 1974), 585, 586.
there by French forces from Cape Breton and Canada. Captain John Knox, stationed at Fort Cumberland, on the Isthmus of Nova Scotia, in this period, recorded in his Journal that the troops there received black cattle, sheep and liquors from Boston. He also mentioned that when the number of troops at one of the outposts on the Bay of Fundy was low, they were even supplied with firewood from Boston and other parts of New England. Of nineteen supply vessels whose origins Knox records, sixteen came from New England.

Supplying the Bay of Fundy garrisons was a minor affair, however, compared to the commitment New England assumed when it became clear that despite Loudoun's failure to attack Louisbourg in 1757, an assault would take place in 1758. The business New England received did not assume the proportions of the traffic caused by the 1745 expedition, and some New Englanders betrayed a lack of enthusiasm for the victory, but the expedition and the subsequent occupation of Cape Breton Island provided trade for New England merchants and employment for New England shippers, sailors, and soldiers. The initial lack of public enthusiasm for the 1758 campaign is understandable when one considers the disappointment caused by Loudoun's failure to act in 1757. Also, if New Englanders knew that Admiral Charles Knowles claimed to have drawn up the plans for the assault on Louisbourg, this would undoubtedly have cooled public ardour for the expedition, given Knowles' widespread unpopularity in New England.

There were several reasons for New England disappointment with Loudoun's plans and the eventual abandonment of his 1757 effort. Hancock enjoyed an upsurge in business, but for many New England merchants the improvement in the business climate had been negligible. Loudoun had obtained most of the transports he needed at New York, and

63. J. Knox, Historical Journal, I, 49, 70, 144.
64. "Biographical Memoir of the Late Admiral Sir Charles Knowles, Bart", Naval Chronicle, I, 123n.
had them fitted out there. In Halifax he employed 200 men in making a garden and twenty men, "Gardeners from the Line", to tend it, so there was little opportunity for New England suppliers of foodstuffs in 1757. When Pitt eventually ordered Loudoun to obtain fresh vegetables from New England the late season there prevented it. By mid-March 1757 an embargo requested by Loudoun had been imposed on ports from New Hampshire to Virginia. The disruption of trade this threatened caused merchants everywhere to pressure their governments for exemptions. In Philadelphia breadstuffs already in ships' holds were in danger of perishing. In Massachusetts fishermen would have been unable to depart for the fishing grounds. In Virginia tobacco had already been loaded for England. In some areas people simply ignored the embargo. John Bradstreet and Thomas Hutchinson claimed that fishermen left Boston without opposition, and that the embargo was not kept at all in New Hampshire.

Given the events of 1757 it is understandable that some New Englanders did not seem terribly excited at plans for an attack on Louisbourg in 1758. Notwithstanding public opinion on the subject, New England merchants and their officials were at work in late 1757 and early 1758 to ensure that attacks on Louisbourg and Quebec took place. Among those active in the period were William Bollan, Thomas Pownall, and Samuel Waldo. Some newspapers also showed enthusiasm for the 1758 expedition. The New Hampshire Gazette resorted to poetry to express its hopes for the expedition. Referring to the British fleet assembled at Halifax it declared:

Let now your mortal Tubes discharging roar,  
And warm St. Lawrance (sic), to her frozen Shore:

65. Pargellis, Loudoun, pp. 236, 239n.  
66. Ibid.  
Let now the British Cannons thun'dring shake,
Louisbourg's Walls....

Although most of the troops employed on the expedition were British regulars, the expedition did draw on New England for supplies, financial services, and to a limited degree, manpower. Some ninety New England carpenters found employment on works at Halifax related to the expedition. The organizers also sent to Boston for fifty horses and forty yoke of oxen to move artillery at the siege. On 13 April a vessel was sent to Piscataqua for masts. On 20 April a vessel provided by the Massachusetts government to make cruises against the French brought three prizes into Halifax, two of which had been bound to Louisbourg with provisions.

How many ships carried supplies from New England to Halifax in support of the expedition is uncertain, but Sir Charles Hardy wrote Governor Pownall of Massachusetts in March 1758 and asked him to encourage the shipment of provisions to Halifax. With this prompting Pownall lifted the partial embargo to allow departures for Halifax. New Hampshire responded to a similar request by removing all restrictions on voyages to Halifax. By mid-May Boston merchants had accumulated large quantities of fresh provisions and livestock for shipment to the forces at Halifax. When the expedition departed for Louisbourg it included 200 carpenters and some 538 troops drawn directly from New England. Some of the 1,100 other colonial troops and rangers on the expedition also undoubtedly came from New England. In addition, the general increase in military activity in 1758, of which the Louisbourg campaign was the most important single component, saw Hancock handle £11,000 sterling in bills of exchange for the British authorities, up from an average of £8,000 for each of the previous four years.

68. New Hampshire Gazette, 2 June 1758.
70. Boston Weekly News Letter, 13 April 1758.
71. New Hampshire Gazette, 21 April 1758.
72. Pownall to Boscawen, Boston, 18 May 1758, Pownall Papers, Rosenbach Foundation, Philadelphia.
On the negative side, preparations for the expedition had driven up the prices of certain commodities in the English colonies as far away from the staging point of Halifax as Philadelphia. The prominent Philadelphia merchant, John Baynton, stated that the Cape Breton expedition "has again occasioned Bread to be higher than usual. I gave for that article a few days ago 14/9 and I believe it will rather rise than fall." The preparations for the expedition also caused increases in the cost of shipping: Baynton noted in June that peace was probable in the spring of 1759, and that this would result in at least a one-third drop in the value of ships. This would please many colonial merchants who had seen their costs escalate during the war, but for ship-owners the possibility of a drop in the prices of their vessels was not altogether pleasing. Baynton remarked that in view of his involvement in shipping, the possible drop in prices "Occasions serious reflections, & (I) must be extreamly (sic) Cautious." As for the 1758 embargo on shipping, it did not cause the same problem as that of 1757. In April 1758 three residents of Gloucester, Massachusetts, petitioned the Massachusetts Council on behalf of themselves and other inhabitants of the town for an exemption from the embargo. Governor Pownall asked for advice on the matter and was informed that it was designed partly to ensure a supply of ships to be used as transports. Fishing vessels were regarded as too small for that purpose, so they did not need to be kept in port. The vessels of other governments had been allowed to sail, so holding up Massachusetts' fishing vessels would not serve the other two

74. Baxter, House of Hancock, p. 139.
75. John Baynton to John Noble, Philadelphia, 24 May 1758, Peter Baynton Papers (Pennsylvania Archives), Roll 1. Unfortunately, since Baynton does not indicate the type of bread nor the quantity, an evaluation of the significance of his remarks in the context of available Philadelphia commodity prices for the period is not possible.
76. J. Baynton to Captain Henry Ash, Philadelphia, 1 June 1758, ibid.
reasons for the embargo either, that is, preventing intelligence and provisions from reaching the French. The only advantage to stopping fishing vessels from sailing would be to secure more men for the expedition. On the other hand, failure to prosecute the fisheries would damage the economy of Massachusetts. The Governor was advised that permission to sail should be granted on condition that no vessel under forty-five tons carry more than four men over sixteen years of age.

Hiring transports was another problem, although this was a procedure for which there was ample precedent. General Amherst ordered 6,000 tons of transports to be taken up in the colonies: 2,000 at Boston, and equal amounts at Philadelphia and New York. Joshua Loring of the Royal Navy was sent to Boston in early March to make plans to move men and supplies to Halifax. His methods of making contracts were reputed to have been so unorthodox as not only to have aroused suspicions among the merchants of New England, but also to have cost the government much more per ton than competitive bidding would have cost.

Once the expedition got underway New England followed its progress and related matters with considerable interest. On 29 June a Boston newspaper published a letter from Paris, dated 27 March, dealing with colonial affairs. There was obviously concern in France for the security of Louisbourg, for the letter stated that the Ministry had "made timely and sufficient provision" for Louisbourg's defence. But some doubt persisted in the mind of the letter writer. He felt assured that "they have not neglected that important place; but

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77. Massachusetts Council Minutes, 1 April 1758, P.R.O., C.O. 5/819.
whether they have sufficiently provided for its security, is a question which time can best decide.”

A week later the same newspaper published news that the English forces had landed at Louisbourg, and that the company of Rangers from New England, according to Governor Lawrence, had "behaved at Landing so as to do great Honour to themselves and the country they came from." Various sources suggested that the Rangers played an important role in the assault. New Hampshire's Governor Benning Wentworth later wrote that "had not a sudden panic seized on them (the French), from the party of Rangers that had landed on the backs of them, it might have cost nearly half the land forces to have effected what this little party did without loss in a few minutes." As for the provisions the French government had made for Louisbourg's defence, they do not seem to have been particularly effective. Reports reached New England that the French had only five battalions of troops at Louisbourg at the time of the landing. Many of the French troops were said to be "very sickly for want of fresh provisions and many of the troops ready to desert if they had but had the opportunity."82

Soon, French prizes began to arrive at Boston, and the vessels, with their weapons, rigging and cargo quickly found their way onto the market. On 6 July 1758 the sale of the prize ship St. Michael, at Long Wharf, was advertised. On 14 July part of the cargo of another French prize ship, the Astree, was placed on sale at Boston. The cargo consisted of "a quantity of choice French white wine, claret, and sundry other articles." Two weeks later the vessel itself, with its rigging, was placed on sale.84

80. Boston Weekly News Letter, 29 June 1758, P.R.O.
83. Ibid., Captain Benjamin Hallowell, Jr., had taken this 280 ton French vessel east of Sable Island on its way from Brest to Louis­bour with a cargo of beef, pork, flour, butter, wine and other goods: ibid., 25 May 1758.
84. Ibid., 13 & 17 July 1758.
As the siege of Louisbourg progressed, New Englanders chaffed at the wait for news of the outcome. Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts wrote in mid-July that "the year advances fast & the siege of Louisbourg goes on slowly...." On 17 August 1758 Boston received word that Louisbourg had capitulated. New Englanders and their spokesmen had successfully engineered an assault on the fortress which to many New "Englanders symbolized French power in North America. A peripheral part of the empire had manipulated imperial policy to suit its own ends, as it had done on several other occasions in connection with Louisbourg since 1713. An important part of the quest for security for New England had been achieved. The campaign had also resulted in lucrative contracts for colonial merchants such as Thomas Hancock. Two things now remained to be seen. First of all, there was the question of what short-term benefits, such as supply contracts for the Louisbourg garrison, would accrue to New England. Secondly, there was the matter of what long-term benefits there would be in Cape Breton and Nova Scotia once the struggle for control of North America was completely resolved.

85. Thomas Hutchinson to Col. Israel Williams, Milton, 17 July 1758, Israel Williams Papers, Box II, MHS.
86. Andrew Oliver to Israel Williams, 14 August 1758, ibid.
Chapter X

The Fruits of Victory, 1758-1763

"If we (lose or leave) one (I) believe demand for the other will be larger."

"It is now a year and five Days Sence my time has Been Expired that I enlisted for and now I See no more liklewoods of Getting home then I did the first moment I came heare. I believe Never ware men used so Ill in the world..."

From the time it fell to the English in 1758 until the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, Louisbourg's significance to New England depended largely upon the scope and success of British military efforts in North America in the period. The campaigns against Quebec in 1759 and Montreal in 1760 required the maintenance of Louisbourg as a military outpost and port. After the surrender of Montreal, Louisbourg became less important than in the previous few years, and New England troops there were gradually withdrawn until at war's end only a few hundred remained.

Events at Louisbourg affected New Englanders variously. The economic and social ramifications of the occupation were the most significant ones for New England. Merchants such as Thomas Hancock made what money they could from an occupation much smaller in scale than that which followed victory in 1745. When the fortifications at Louisbourg were demolished in 1760 and the garrison further reduced, they viewed the situation pragmatically, as they had viewed the withdrawal of 1749. What Hancock and others stood to lose by the demolition they stood to gain elsewhere - in Nova Scotia, now secure from French

*Thomas Hancock to Zachary Bourrayau, Boston, 2 November 1748, THLB, 1745-1750 (MHS).
**Diary of Jonathan Proctor (Mss), Peabody Museum, Salem, Massachusetts.
attack and ready for new settlement and fortifications demanding supplies, and financial and shipping services. On the social side, to New England soldiers such as Jonathan Proctor, stationed at Louisbourg for longer than they had anticipated, Louisbourg represented, not economic opportunity, but almost unremitting dreariness, relieved only by the death, discipline, or departure of fellow soldiers.

Economic expectations, and, to a lesser degree, psychological effects of the victory of 1758 were revealed in New England newspapers and the correspondence of New Englanders. Given the immediacy of this response, it merits consideration (before proceeding to an analysis of the economic and social effects of the occupation) in order to make clear the context of public opinion in which the era began.

Just prior to and during celebrations of the victory of 1758, there were voices of caution raised in recognition of the subordinate role New England played in the campaign, and of the fact that victory did not ensure absolutely the safety or prosperity of New England. One New Englander, noting that people in Boston were preparing to illuminate their homes in anticipation of victory, opposed the idea, largely because of the many reverses in the war, the expense of the celebrations, and the fact that the war would not end with the taking of Louisbourg.¹ Objections were raised almost immediately to this individual's views. "A New England man" expressed surprise "that such a number of persons should be against a general illumination of the Town". He noted that there had been such celebrations in 1745, and went on to state the case for similar festivities in 1758.

Is there not the same occasion for it now it has submitted to a British army; especially as the Enemy have made many encroachments since that time, and to which this island, was as it were

a Magazine, from whence they drew their supplies? Will not
the acquisition of this island be the best means to prevent
our fishing vessels falling into their hands? Can the enemy
have so good opportunities to take our vessels in their way to
and from Europe, Halifax, and other places, making prisoners
of our Countrymen?2

New Englanders such as Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire
exulted in achievements of New England troops with the expedition, but
joy was generally tempered by the death of many of the New England
carpenters with the expedition, and possibly because of a fear that
Britain would restore the island to France. On 11 August 1758 the
New Hampshire Gazette published a eulogy to Colonel Nathaniel Meserve,
commander of the carpenters. Mourning for him, if general, presum­
ably had ended by 24 August when, on receipt of news of the victory
at Louisbourg, "an unfeigned Joy was diffused thro' all Ranks of People".
Celebrations lasted all that day and the next, with fireworks and
illuminations.3

Colonel Israel Williams of Massachusetts summed up what must
have been the attitude of many New Englanders when he declared that
he rejoiced when the British interest advanced, and therefore wished
Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson joy on the reduction of Cape
Breton. Williams saw the island as a great advantage whether Louis­
bourg was razed or remained in English hands, "but not if it is given
up for Minorca or any other Such Consideration." The victory would
benefit the economy of New England by making its seacoasts more secure;
"The advantages that will arise to Trade (will be) very great, and
the Country in General (will) be benefitted...." But it also seemed
to Williams that the capture of Crown Point and Canada would be more
important as this would not only open a valuable trade but also bring

2. Ibid.
about universal peace and tranquillity in North America.  

Nevertheless, the victory provided important relief from the fear of French encirclement which had plagued New England and the other English colonies. Victory also pointed the way to a final resolution of the conflict with the French. William Williams declared that he heartily rejoiced with his uncle Israel, his country and his nation at the reduction of Louisbourg. He also expressed regret at not having participated in the expedition: "I am sorry we did not all go that way, we should have made shorter work of It, and redeem'd Time to have gone up the River." Other New Englanders were less critical of the performance of the troops at Louisbourg. Oliver Partridge, in meeting with the commanding officer at Lake George informed him that "it was my opinion that the Door was open'd by the reduction of Louisbourg & what Col. Bradstreet had done at Lake George."  

Although some people had misgivings about unqualified celebrations, the New England public was generally pleased with the outcome of the expedition, and favoured public celebrations. News of Louisbourg's surrender resulted in a day of festivities at Boston and in neighbouring communities. All the bells of Boston rang most of the day. At noon thirty-one pieces of cannon were discharged at Castle William, followed by the firing of guns at several other batteries, and on vessels in Boston harbour, which vessels displayed all their colours. In the afternoon the Governor's company of cadets "made a handsome Appearance under arms", as did a company under Captain Thomas Walter, "performing their exercises and firings with great exactness and regularity". The streets were filled with spectators, a bonfire...
was kindled on Fort Hill, and a variety of fireworks provided for the amusement of the public.7

In other New England colonies there were similar exuberant celebrations. At Newport there were the usual salutes, and displays of ships' colours. In addition, "The inhabitants...were agreeably entertained with several beautiful figures, representing Britannia holding the emblem of peace and war, and trampling the standard of France under her feet; Mercury descending, and approaching Britannia, with the welcome message, of the surrender of Louisbourg." There were fireworks at Newport, including some 400 rockets.8 There were also celebrations at New London, Connecticut, where Captain James Gardiner was killed by the misfire of a cannon.9

Official reaction to the victory also suggests that New England experienced a great sense of relief. On 20 August the Massachusetts Council appointed 14 September as a day of public prayer and thanksgiving.10 Governor Pownall addressed the General Assembly on the victory in early October, when he indicated that the victory was significant for both military and economic reasons, by stating that "By the reduction of the island of Cape-Breton, and its dependencies, the Key of the enemy's only Port is given to us: We have again the uninterrupted possession of North-American Seas, and the Powers of Trade are again restored to His Majesty's Subjects."11

With Louisbourg taken, New England faced the problem of consolidating the gains made as a result of the campaign. The victory held out the possibility of improved trade and settlement at Cape Breton and in Nova Scotia. New Englanders were quick to grasp the opportunity

8. Ibid. (Ibid., 31 August 1758.
9. Ibid., 31 August 1758.
for immediate profit in areas formerly controlled by the French. For instance, letters from Louisbourg noted that the inhabitants of Ile St. Jean had a great number of fat cattle and had liberty to sell them, which they reportedly did at a dollar a head. New England men and ships were employed that autumn in transporting cattle from the island to Louisbourg for the forces there. Admiral Boscawen sent a New England vessel, the Peggy & Sarah, there in September, "to receive on board All such Cattle as Mr. Grant shall put on board you", and carry them to Louisbourg. In addition to placing Ile St. Jean under British sovereignty, the naval force at Louisbourg also visited Gaspée and sailed thirty leagues up the St. Lawrence River. The task force found the settlement at Gaspée all but abandoned, and proceeded to destroy fishing vessels, fish and buildings there. In the St. Lawrence they took two sloops before withdrawing.

Removal of French installations near Nova Scotia increased the possibility of long term development there. New England stood to benefit as a prime source of settlers and supplies for any new settlements in Nova Scotia, and Governor Charles Lawrence of Nova Scotia planned for the future of his colony with this in mind. Lawrence issued a proclamation on the subject of settlement on 12 October, which the Boston Weekly News Letter published on 2 November. Lawrence declared that success at Louisbourg and elsewhere meant that "the enemy, who have formerly disturbed and harassed the Province of Nova Scotia, and much obstructed its progress, have been compelled to retire and take refuge in Canada." The defeat of the enemy would now permit "a favourable opportunity...for the peopling and cultivating, as well

12. Ibid., 7 September 1758.
13. Admiral Boscawen to Thompson, Louisbourg, 12 September 1758, Ch.E., 10.13, Boston Public Library Mss. Collections.
the lands vacated by the French, as every other part of this valuable province." Interested parties in Massachusetts were instructed to apply to Thomas Hancock.\(^{15}\)

Development in Nova Scotia, while potentially attractive to New Englanders, took a secondary position to Louisbourg until after the demolition of the fortress there in 1760 and the subsequent withdrawal of most of the troops based there. In 1758 Louisbourg was still a busy place. Although eleven British naval vessels left Louisbourg on 1 October 1758, another eight remained there, along with over 2,000 troops. Thus there was a considerable market for supplies. The force which took Louisbourg in 1758 had been supplied largely from Britain, but it soon became evident that Louisbourg officials would have to seek supplies in the American colonies. Brigadier General Whitmore, appointed Governor at Louisbourg immediately after its surrender, proclaimed late in the autumn of 1758 that there would "be no contract proposed or made in regard to supplying Louisbourg with provisions this Winter; but that there will be a free market for all sorts of fresh provisions."\(^{16}\)

Whitmore's proclamation did not, however, mean that certain supplies would not be drawn from the British Isles or that British military contractors would not request or ultimately receive contracts to supply Louisbourg. Plans had already been made by the end of August to send four ships to Louisbourg from Britain with 1,000 chaldrons of coal for the use of the garrison.\(^{17}\) It is not clear if any New England vessels were employed for this task. In any event, since coal was unavailable in New England such arrangements could have little effect on New England merchants hoping to do business at Louisbourg. At the same time, Britain provided other items which might have been supplied to Louisbourg by New Englanders. Jonathan Proctor recorded

15. Ibid., 2 November 1758.
16. Ibid., 24 November 1758.
in his diary the arrival of two vessels from London and two from Cork in the spring of 1760. He believed one of the London vessels carried bedding. The ships from Cork probably carried beef and/or pork, common exports from that port. Also, in September 1758 James Colebrooke and Arnold Nesbitt presented to the Board of Trade a proposal to victual the Louisbourg garrison. The proposal was accepted, and so a primary contract for supplying Louisbourg went to English merchants. But this did not necessarily mean a loss of business for New England, because Thomas Hancock became an agent for Nesbitt and Colebrooke.

In the autumn of 1758 there were demands on New England for extensive shipments to Louisbourg. Some of the traffic was in items such as straw, bed sacks, and bolsters. Such a cargo was sent to Louisbourg from Boston late in September. It is not clear if Thomas Hancock was involved in this shipment, but at General Amherst's orders he did send a cargo of various items to Louisbourg in the period consisting of 2,622 wooden trenchers, ninety-nine camp kettles, 49,000 bricks, fifty-four bundles of hay, twenty bags and sixty bushels of bran. An item such as hay or straw does not appear too important initially, but assumes importance when one considers the quantity needed for the beds of several thousand soldiers. In fact, in January 1759 Governor Whitmore ordered sent from Boston "by every vessel from thence as much straw as possible for soldiers' beds."

Building materials were also high on the list of items required at Louisbourg in order that the fortress be made habitable for the occupying forces. The siege of 1758 had been very destructive. Governor Whitmore informed authorities in England in September 1758 that not one

19. J. Colebrooke & A. Nesbitt to the Board of Trade, 8 September 1758, P.R.O., Treasury 1/382, f. 95.
21. Invoice, Ms. 340.5, ibid.
house was habitable after the siege. The barracks had all burned to the ground. In order to cope with the situation, Amherst had purchased and contracted for a considerable quantity of boards, shingles and other building materials. Much remained, however, for Whitmore to do when he assumed the governorship. To ensure an adequate fuel supply he hired vessels as quickly as possible and sent them to the coal mines and to places where the French had cut firewood. (Apparently the 1,000 chaldrons of coal ordered from England were not considered sufficient for the needs of the garrison.) To dig coal and protect the miners, Whitmore stationed 130 men at the colliery, where he also ordered a blockhouse erected. The erection of this blockhouse and the repairs needed at Louisbourg itself created such a demand for carpenters that the New England carpenters who had survived the outbreak of smallpox which carried off their commander, Colonel Nathaniel Meserve, during the siege, all found employment at Cape Breton after the siege. Their new commanding officer, Colonel Richard Gridley, also recruited eighty additional carpenters for Cape Breton in the spring of 1759. Gridley, a veteran of the 1745 campaign, also provided Whitmore with assistance in purchasing building supplies at Louisbourg, while Whitmore ordered the rest from Boston.

An analysis of Boston Naval Lists for the autumn of 1759 indicates the overall supply needs at Louisbourg in that period. Eight vessels cleared Boston for Louisbourg from 10 October 1758 to 5 January 1759. The cargoes they carried were not very different from cargoes shipped to Louisbourg during the French regime and the first English occupation of Louisbourg. The shipments can be broken down into two basic categories: building materials and foodstuffs. The building materials consisted of the usual bricks, boards, and lime. Foodstuffs

included livestock, cider, roots, wine, apples, peas, molasses, sugar, rum, and coffee. There were also candles, bedding, woodenware, and (on three vessels), "sundry provisions." 25

A profile of the owners of the vessels involved in the New England-Louisbourg trade in the autumn of 1758 can also be constructed from the same shipping lists. All eight vessels were owned by different men, only one of whom was also the captain of his vessel. Several of the ship-owners were prominent residents of Massachusetts. Issac Phillips, owner of the fifty-five ton sloop Good Intent, was a well-known resident of Marshfield, on Massachusetts' north shore. 26 Captain John Stevens, owner of the forty ton schooner Royal George, represented the community of Townsend in the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1748, 27 and Robert Hooper, owner of the sixty ton schooner Breed, was a member of the Massachusetts Council in 1758. 28 This sampling suggests that ownership of vessels participating in the Louisbourg trade was not concentrated in the hands of a few major shipping families, but was diffused widely. This is confirmed by an examination of other available shipping lists for the 1758-1763 period, although one does encounter the names of such prominent merchants as Thomas Gunter of Boston (who was a key figure in the supply of Halifax for the first few years from its founding), and Richard Derby, of the eminent Derby family of Salem. 29

Louisbourg's position as a staging post for the assault on Quebec in 1759 allowed it to maintain its position as an important shipping centre that year. The demand for supplies was considerable. Admiral Saunders, in informing the Governors of New York and Massachu-

27. Ibid., p. 19.
29. "At least sixteen or twenty vessels can be identified as belonging to the Derbys before 1765...." J. D. Phillips, Salem in the Eighteenth Century (Boston, 1937), pp. 243-244.
setts in March 1759 that he was on his way to Louisbourg and from there to Quebec, also informed them of his need for "frequent supplies of all kinds of refreshments. I must beg you will make it known to the people of your province, that such of them as are willing to bring us any supplies, shall not, on any account have their men taken away from them, or detained...."\(^{30}\)

General Amherst, who had replaced Loudoun in 1758 as commander-in-chief in North America, was also very active in these preparations. He sent a regiment to Boston to assist in the embarkation of artillery, stores, "etc." for Cape Breton. Moreover, as the Quebec expedition would take away a part of the Louisbourg garrison, Amherst received orders to send a battalion of not less than 1,500 provincials to Louisbourg as replacements. Amherst informed Massachusetts Governor Pownall that these men were to remain at Louisbourg only as long as necessary, and at the end of the campaign regular troops would replace them.\(^{31}\) Amherst also ordered live cattle sent to Louisbourg weekly for the use of the troops destined for Canada. He informed Governor Whitmore in April 1759 that Colonel Jarvis was sending thirty cattle then, as he had the previous week, and that he would continue to send another sixty cattle a week.\(^{32}\)

New England merchants needed little encouragement to make shipments to Louisbourg, judging from the constant traffic between Boston and Louisbourg. For most of the winter of 1758-1759 Boston received vessels from Louisbourg. There were also numerous arrivals at Boston of vessels from Halifax which may have been coming from Louisbourg. In the week ending on 14 December 1758 four ships arrived at Boston from Louisbourg. For the week ending on 28 December four ships arrived

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30. Saunders to the Governors of New York and Massachusetts, 10 March 1759, P.R.O., C.O. 5/51, f. 27.
32. Amherst to Whitmore, New York, 16 April 1759, P.R.O., W.O. 34/17, f. 177.
from Halifax, and one from Louisbourg. For the first two weeks of January 1759 there was only one arrival from Louisbourg, but for the week ending on 18 January three vessels reached Boston from Louisbourg and two from Halifax.33 There was then a lull in entries until April, when four vessels from Louisbourg and three from Halifax reached the port of Boston in the first week of the month. There were only ten other entries at Boston from all other ports for that week.34

Only in late April was there a substantial interruption in arrivals at Boston from Louisbourg. Drift ice on the Cape Breton coast that spring was heavy. Admiral Saunders' fleet tried without success from 21 to 29 April to get through the ice to Louisbourg. On the 29th the fleet encountered some small New England vessels which had also given up the attempt to reach Louisbourg. Saunders considered it impossible to make Louisbourg for another ten days, and returned to Halifax.35 When his fleet of 119 ships finally departed from Halifax on May 13 it included six ordnance vessels and sixty-eight transports from the American colonies. Some of these vessels carried New England troops to replace regulars drawn from Louisbourg for the Quebec campaign.

To place the New England-Louisbourg shipping of the spring of 1759 in the perspective of New England-Louisbourg shipping for the whole 1758-1763 period, a profile of the annual shipping patterns must be constructed. The fragmentary nature of New England Naval Lists for the period makes the task difficult, but not impossible. (See Table 1.) The table shows clearly that 1759 and 1760 were peak years, although the number of sailings per year did not vary very much from 1758 through 1760. The decline in 1761 reflects the withdrawal

34. Ibid., 6 April 1759.
Table 7

New England-Louisbourg Shipping, 1758-1763

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clearances for Louisbourg</th>
<th>Entries from Louisbourg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1762</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. July through December, excluding transports used on 1758 expedition against Louisbourg.

3. Figures unavailable for New Hampshire for 1762 and 1763.
of most of the troops from Louisbourg late in 1760. The figures indicate that New England's trade with Louisbourg was much less significant than during the years 1749-1754 when perhaps 150 New England vessels a year called at Louisbourg. (See Chapter 8.) It should be noted, however, that the table is based on available figures for Boston, Salem-Marblehead, and New Hampshire (Portsmouth). There are gaps in the sources. For instance, records of New Hampshire clearances for Louisbourg cover only six-month periods for 1759 and 1760. Also, there were other New England ports sending vessels to Louisbourg. In 1760 seven ships from ports such as Casco Bay, Ipswich, and Newbury arrived at Louisbourg. Inclusion of such vessels suggests that from 1758 through 1760 the volume of New England shipping to Louisbourg was comparable to that of most years before 1745.

In terms of average tonnage per vessel the 1758-1763 shipping is slightly less significant than pre-1745 shipping. The average tonnage of forty-six vessels from New England making voyages to Louisbourg in 1758-1763 was thirty-nine tons. The average tonnage of sixty-three New England vessels which called at Louisbourg in 1742 and 1743 was approximately fifty-one tons.

New England shipping to Louisbourg after the 1758 expedition was mainly a function of the war effort in North America, and once the campaign against Quebec got under way, Louisbourg's role was subordinated to that campaign, although in that capacity Louisbourg remained an active port and a military outpost of some consequence. In its capacity of port and military outpost, Louisbourg continued to attract the attention of New Englanders despite their concern with campaigns elsewhere in North America. Captain Joshua Loring was once more sent to Boston to secure transports - 3,000 tons of them -

and forty sloops or schooners for moving troops to Nova Scotia and Louisbourg. At Boston, Loring was to have berths built on the transports to accommodate 660 men. Each transport was also to take on at least four months' provisions, or as much more as they could carry. Hancock and Apthorp were to assist in the efforts.\textsuperscript{36} Late in May, New England was further involved in efforts at Louisbourg when Thomas Hutchinson received a letter from General Wolfe asking that 300 men be added to the Louisbourg garrison from forces raised in Massachusetts, provided that they could be embarked without delay. Hutchinson indicated that he might be able to have the men aboard transports within forty-eight hours.\textsuperscript{39}

There were already a considerable number of New Englanders at Louisbourg. (For an estimate of troop strength at Louisbourg annually from 1758 through 1763 see Table 2.) In a letter probably written before the newest recruits reached Louisbourg, Wolfe mentions "a thousand of the Boston militia at Louisbourg." From their ranks Wolfe had hoped to complete a company of Rangers bound for Quebec, and to obtain 100 labourers besides, as pioneers. The men did not respond enthusiastically to the call for volunteers. Wolfe noted that "as seldom happens, that a New-England Man prefers service to a lazy life, none of them seem'd to approve the proposal."\textsuperscript{40} Life at Louisbourg, in 1759 at least, seemed preferable to the Quebec campaign, even though there were problems in getting supplies through to Louisbourg.

Aside from spring ice conditions, merchants sending goods to Louisbourg also had to contend with French privateers, as the loss of the fortress of Louisbourg had not caused the French to abandon the contest for control of the sea lanes in the area. In August 1759,

\textsuperscript{38} Amherst to Loring, New York, 17 March 1759, P.R.O., C.O. 5/54, f. 272.
\textsuperscript{39} Thomas Hutchinson to General Wolfe, Boston, 25 May 1759, C.O. 5/51, f. 70.
\textsuperscript{40} Wolfe to Pitt, aboard the Neptune, 6 June 1759, \textit{ibid.}, f. 62.
### Table 8

**Troop Strength at Louisbourg, 1758-1763**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New England Troops</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>c. 1,200&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13,142&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759</td>
<td>500-1,000&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>500-1,000&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,685&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1762</td>
<td>100-500&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>622&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>550&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. J. S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall*, p. 262.
5. W.O. 34/18, f. 16.
6. W.O. 34/18, f. 146.
7. W.O. 34/18, f. 36.
8. W.O. 34/18, f. 96.
a French barque chased several New England fishing and trading vessels going to Louisbourg.\(^1\) In early September a report published in Boston stated that a French privateer schooner called the Maria had captured some eight vessels, five of them from New England. At least four of the vessels had been bound for Louisbourg, and one of them had a cargo valued at 3,000 sterling.\(^2\)

Weather and other problems also disrupted shipping to Louisbourg in the autumn and winter of 1759-1760. At the end of February 1760 word reached Boston that the Endeavour, a sloop commanded by Captain Archibald Dinmore, bound to Louisbourg from Boston with stores, had burned to the water's edge at Canso, where it had sought shelter from a December storm.\(^3\) When the vessel had caught fire Dinmore had immediately obtained assistance from the crew of the Falmouth, a sloop from Canso Bay, but the combined efforts of the two crews were not sufficient to save the ship.\(^4\)

Thomas Hancock's records indicate the nature and value of the Endeavour's cargo, and also shed light on the cost of shipping services to Louisbourg at that time. Acting as agent to the English contractors Nesbitt and Colebrooke, Hancock had entrusted Dinmore with twenty-four casks of rice for Louisbourg, as part of his cargo. The costs came to 117 19s 5d. Of this total, 1 8s 8d was paid for cooperage, nails, storage, truckage, and bills of lading. Hancock's commission, at five percent, came to 5 12s 4d.\(^5\) The Endeavour also carried a copper kettle and a copper pot, thirty boxes of dipped tallow candles, linen, glazier's diamonds, and glass, valued at 94 13s 4d sterling. These goods were loaded at the request of William Buttars of Louisbourg.\(^6\) Also, a cargo of straw, lime, candles, hogs, rum, and vinegar was divided between the Endeavour and another sloop, the Success.\(^7\)

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43. Ibid., 6 September 1759.
44. Ibid., 28 February 1760.
44. Statement of A. Dinmore, et. al., Louisbourg, 3 January 1760, W.O. 34/18, f. 7.
45. Hancock Waste Book 1759-1762, 13 December 1759, & Hancock Letter Book,
A short time after Boston heard of the loss of Dinmore's vessel, it learned that three vessels which had tried to make Louisbourg during the winter had been forced to bear away for the West Indies because of bad weather. Two of the vessels had sailed from Boston. Another vessel, the snow Jane & Mary, was blown off course while trying to make Boston from Louisbourg, and eventually made port in South Carolina. An additional vessel, which had sailed for Louisbourg in December, and had not been heard from again, returned to Boston in April, after having been forced away from Cape Breton and ending up at Bermuda.

Once the weather moderated in the spring of 1760, New England vessels flocked to Louisbourg to supply the garrison there and to forward supplies to Quebec, now in British hands. Not only Boston, but several other Massachusetts ports, and New Hampshire shared in the activity. From 5 April to 5 July 1760, for example, four vessels cleared New Hampshire for Louisbourg. The pace remained much the same for the period 5 July to 5 October, after which date the New Hampshire Naval Office Lists are fragmentary. In addition to boards, shingles, poultry, potatoes, and livestock, which New Hampshire traditionally exported, the colony also shipped to Louisbourg items such as sugar, dry goods, beer, and Madeira wine. Vessels from Marblehead and Ipswich also reached Louisbourg in the spring of 1760. There were also five recorded voyages between Louisbourg and Salem between January and July 1760.

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47. Ibid., 4 January 1760.
49. Ibid., 4 April 1760.
This activity could not and did not last indefinitely. It was bound to slacken when Louisbourg became less important as a trans-shipment point, and as the garrison was reduced, once the North American campaigns drew to a close with the capture of Montreal in 1760. Nor was Louisbourg valued highly enough by the British government that New Englanders could expect the British to invest much money in it once the North American campaigns ended. A hint of the fate in store for Louisbourg was contained in a letter from Lloyd's Chronicle, printed in London on 28 December 1759, and reprinted in a Boston newspaper in the spring of 1760. The author suggested that "tho' the harbour and fortifications of Louisbourg be of infinite service to France, it can be of no buse to England, if Canada be left to us...." Also, the possession of Newfoundland and Halifax meant that Louisbourg had no great value as a guardian of the Gulf of St. Lawrence or as a fishing base. The author suggested that orders should be sent forthwith to demolish Louisbourg, "so as not to leave on stone upon another, of the fortifications...and to leave the island, a bare and barren rock." In reprinting the letter, the Boston Weekly News Letter added that there was a report from New York that the demolition of Louisbourg would soon begin. Obviously unsure that the demolition would be a good thing, but not overly concerned at the prospect, the paper merely commented that upon enquiry it could not find any authority for the New York report.53 With Louisbourg demolished it would, of course be useless to France if restored to it - unless the French decided once more to rebuild the town, which would occasion considerable trade for New England.54

54. When General Amherst appointed General Edward Whitmore Governor of Cape Breton on 28 July 1758 he directed Whitmore to demolish all the settlements on Cape Breton other than Louisbourg. See J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 290, and F. J. Audet, "Edward Whitmore", Governors, Lieutenant Governors and Administrators of Nova Scotia, p. 320. He apparently did not carry out the orders, but if New Englanders knew of them it would have prepared them psychologically for the 1760 demolition.
At the time Boston heard of the possibility of demolition, the project was already underway. Much of the town then must have consisted of structures erected or repaired to accommodate the occupying forces. The French barracks had been destroyed in the siege and still not rebuilt in June 1759. The siege had also resulted in the destruction of or severe damage to most other structures in the town. The demolition order in 1760 encompassed all fortifications at Louisbourg, but excluded houses. At the beginning of June, 160 miners were assigned to the task; fifty carpenters assisted them, as did between 100 and 212 of the troops at Louisbourg. The task was much delayed by inclement weather and by the habits of the miners. On 23 June a custom of the miners caused a complete stoppage of work. According to a tradition of the miners, it was on a June 23rd that copper mines had been found in Cornwall. The miners at Louisbourg, drawn from Britain, celebrated the day as a holiday, "and all the miners came from below ground to Carrowse and Drink to the good old man's memory, so they left off work at eleven in the fore noon and none of the Night worke was to be carried on."

New Englanders at Louisbourg showed little regret at the demolition. One of the few people who seemed to lament the destruction of the works was John Henry Bastide, engineer in charge of the task, whose penchant was building rather than destroying. At Governor Whitmore's request he had drawn up plans for "an enclosure" to be made with part of the old palisades on the ruins of the citadel bastion, communicating with a small blockhouse. Amherst registered a vigourous objection, and Bastide, apologizing profusely, stated that

59. Ibid., p. 42.
60. Bastide to Amherst, Boston, 9 December 1760, W.O. 34/14, f. 19.
if Amherst would permit him to hint to Whitmore of his sentiments on the matter, "I dare say it will be immediately Stopt, if begun, and if not, entirely layd aside." 61 The plans were later set aside.

For New Englanders, Cape Breton still held some attractions after the destruction of the fortifications and troop reductions. Cape Breton coal interested some people in both New York and New England, but all available evidence suggests that there were no large scale endeavours on the part of New England entrepreneurs to exploit the coal deposits. In August 1762, however, Hancock arranged the charter of the schooners Endavour and York for the coal service at Cape Breton, presumably to move coal from the mines to Louisbourg. 62 Governor Bernard of Massachusetts also tried to obtain coal from Cape Breton in 1762, but for his own use rather than for commercial purposes. Since his arrival in Boston Bernard had burned Cape Breton coal in several of his rooms. In 1762 he was informed that the commanding officer at Louisbourg would not permit vessels to load coal "as usual". Bernard requested an order from Amherst allowing him to import coal for his own use. 63 He received permission, and from then until at least 1765 he received about fifteen chaldrons of coal a year. 64

There was also still some supply trade at Louisbourg for interested New England merchants. Thomas Hancock continued to send quantities of building materials and foodstuffs to the authorities at Louisbourg, for the people being victualled by them. (In March 1762 there were 622 people being victualled at Louisbourg, and there was a garrison of 100 men at Ile St. Jean.) 65 In August Hancock

61. Bastide to Amherst, Boston, 29 December 1760, ibid.
63. Bernard to Amherst, Boston, 10 September 1762, Sparks Transcripts, 4 Ser., II, 272, Houghton Library, Harvard.
64. Bernard to Governor Wilmot of Nova Scotia, Boston, 31 July 1765, ibid, n.p.
65. Return of Provisions, March 1762, W.O. 34 18, f. 36; Tulliken to Amherst, Louisbourg, 1 September 1762, W.O. 34 18, f. 59.
purchased, at General Amherst's orders, and shipped to Louisbourg for government use a cargo of spades, pickaxe handles, locks, hinges, latches, nails, files, chisels, candles, and sundry other items, worth 546.66

As the British government liquidated its establishment at Louisbourg Hancock symbolically presided over the liquidation of General Whitmore's estate. Whitmore had sailed from Louisbourg to New England in November or December 1761. He fell overboard and drowned while the ship was at anchor in New England. Captain Edward Whitmore gave Hancock power of attorney and directions to secure the governor's effects at Louisbourg. On receipt of this news the commanding officer at Louisbourg, Major John Tulliken, ordered sent to Boston every article belonging to Whitmore.67 In the meantime, Hancock had arranged Whitmore's funeral. To pay for this and other expenses Hancock drew 144 10s 5d sterling on the estate of the dead man.

For the next six months Hancock took care of numerous matters relating to Whitmore's estate, ranging from the payment of 2 12s 6d in wages to three servants and for a pair of shoes for Whitmore's Negro boy, to 1 4s paid pr. printers for advertising the auction of Whitmore's effects.68 Hancock's stewardship was a thorough one. It extended even to securing possession of some household furniture which Whitmore had left at Louisbourg. When Whitmore had departed he had told Tulliken that the furniture was for the use of his successor, but after Whitmore's death, Hancock wrote Tulliken to find out if the instructions had been in writing. If not, Hancock argued that the furniture could not be kept back from Whitmore's heirs. Whitmore had left no written orders on the matter, so Tulliken concluded that the furniture should be sold for the use of the heirs.69

67. Tulliken to Amherst, Louisbourg, 12 August 1762, W.O. 34/18, f. 55.
69. Tulliken to Amherst, Louisbourg, 24 April 1762, W.O., 34/18, ff. 38,39.
Handling Whitmore's affairs also required that Hancock look into a matter of £1626 11s 5d sterling found in Whitmore's trunks.\(^70\) It was believed that this money came from house rents at Louisbourg, and that Whitmore was carrying it with him until it could be determined whether the money belonged to the crown or was his perquisite. General Amherst ordered Hancock to search Whitmore's papers for information about the money. He found nothing to clarify the matter. Amherst understood that all papers relating to money matters at Louisbourg were in the hands of the town major there, and so he asked Tulliken to send him copies of all relevant papers.\(^71\) Eventually it was determined that this money was indeed from house rents and belonged to the Crown.\(^72\)

Although Hancock earned a certain amount of money from his involvement in the Whitmore affair, and from supplying the dwindling establishment at Louisbourg in 1762 and 1763, Nova Scotia had clearly assumed much more importance to Hancock and New Englanders generally than did Cape Breton. Bastide estimated that the works he was expected to develop at Halifax would employ 500 men for three months just to remove earth. Equipment would also be required, as much of what had been sent to Halifax from Louisbourg was "very old, decay'd and bad."\(^73\) Despite his other activities, Hancock found himself involved in buying provisions and supervising the rationing of the force employed on the Halifax fortifications, a work force which eventually numbered 500 men a day. The project lasted for four years, and was one of several in Nova Scotia in which Hancock participated. His tasks included having condemned Nova Scotia provisions shipped to Boston, where the best of the vermin-coated food was

\(^{70}\) Hancock Waste Book, 4 January 1762, Baker Library.
\(^{71}\) Amherst to Tulliken, New York, 17 February 1762, W.O. 34/18, f. 133.
\(^{72}\) Same to same, New York, 1 July 1762, ibid., f. 140.
\(^{73}\) Bastide to Amherst, Boston, 25 April 1761, ff. 38, 39.
separated, repacked, and sent back to Nova Scotia to be issued to French prisoners. Mouldy bread was rationed out to soldiers, while "higher priz'd Bread" was brought from Boston for the officers.74

While New England merchants such as Hancock reaped the benefits of Britain's investment at Louisbourg and Halifax, thousands of other New Englanders did garrison duty on Cape Breton and Ile St. Jean between 1758 and 1763. (See Table 2.) The tedium of garrison duty led to both individual criminal acts and several instances of large-scale resistance to authority. Dissatisfaction of the New England troops with service at Louisbourg stemmed from several sources. In the first instance, neither the New England troops nor their governments expected that New Englanders would have to serve at Cape Breton for more than about six months. Problems arose when it became apparent in 1759 that reinforcements sent to Cape Breton that year might have to winter on the island. 'To allay discontent, the Massachusetts government voted to continue the troops' pay through the winter or until they were relieved. Each man would also receive a blanket and two months' advance pay would go to needy families of troops.75

Conditions at Louisbourg were another source of discontent with garrison duty. For some colonial troops the stay at Louisbourg was trying from the very beginning. It rained all day when a Massachusetts provincial regiment under Colonel Jonathan Bagley disembarked. One member of the force recorded that "the Regiment was drawn up by the Barracks that was burnt by the English, and we stood in the rain for the space of four hours...."76 Some of the New Englanders at Louisbourg

75. Pownall to Amherst, Boston, 11 November 1759, C.O. 5/57, f. 82.
departed for home soon after hearing of Quebec's capture - without waiting to be dismissed. Gibson Clough, a member of Bagley's regiment, summed up the attitude of the men when he recorded at the end of September 1759:

So the month spends away and cold weather is coming on apace which will make us to look round about us and put in our Winter Clothing and we shall stand in need of good Liquors for to keep up our Spirits on cold Winter's days, and we being here within Stone walls are not likely to get Liquors or Cloathes at this time of year and although we be Englishmen Born yet we are debarred Englishmens Liberty therefore we now see what it is to be under Martial Law and to be with the Regulars, who are but little better than slaves to their Officers; and when I get out of their [?] power I shall take care how I get in again.78

Colonel Bagley either did not sense the mood of his men or did not want it known in New England. On 27 October he wrote Governor Pownall that "We have good allowance of every specie both in quantity and Quality, good quarters and a supply of fuel....A good harmony subsists among the troops of every rank."79 On 2 November a New Englander at Louisbourg recorded that many of the men in Bagley's regiment had been "Confined for Denying their Duty their times now being out that they Inlisted."80 From other perspectives the situation appeared very serious. Governor Whitmore described the incident as a mutiny, occasioned by Colonel Bagley having informed the men that the Massachusetts assembly had voted a continuance of their pay (and therefore of their tour of duty) until 1 December. "Above a hundred of them were putt prisoners."81 The confinements did not last long. Whitmore had the garrison called "& the delinquents brought into the square they cried out for mercy and promised to behave well. I pardoned them and they are now doing their duty."82

77. Proctor Diary, 21 October 1759.
80. Proctor Diary, 2 November 1759.
81. Whitmore to Amherst, Louisbourg, 12 November 1759, W.O. 34/17, f. 45
Discipline among the troops at Louisbourg remained a problem in early 1760. Gibson Clough recorded in his diary several instances of crime and punishment at Louisbourg which suggest that petty offences were not uncommon and that punishment was severe. On 28 January 1760 a drummer was shot for breaking into a house and stealing a box of soap, and for several other, unspecified offences. Three other men were to receive whippings, and another soldier, condemned to die with the drummer, was reprieved at the place of execution. On 6 February a corporal who had stolen six shirts from his captain committed suicide from fear that he would be found out. In June a grenadier who had stolen money from one of the officers was sentenced to receive 1,000 stripes. He received 300, then managed to hang himself.

Living conditions and the boredom of garrison duty created most of Louisbourg's social problems, but the (already mentioned) disruptions of shipping in the winters of 1758-1759 and 1759-1760 may have added to difficulties. The harshness of winter conditions at Louisbourg caused several deaths in the winter of 1759-1760. At the end of January 1760 Boston received word that Captain George Hanners had died several weeks earlier at Louisbourg. In February and March there were several other deaths. On the whole, however, mortality rates at Louisbourg between 1758 and 1763 were negligible in comparison to those of the winter of 1745-1746.

In April 1760 the Massachusetts legislature responded to dissatisfaction among Massachusetts troops serving at Louisbourg. The House of Representatives and Council jointly addressed Governor Pownall and requested the discharge and return of the men as soon as possible.

82. Ibid.
84. Ibid., pp. 196, 197. A sentence of 1,000 lashes was not uncommon in areas under British military jurisdiction in that period. Similar sentences were meted out in British-occupied Canada and at Havana for various offences. See F. B. Weiner, Civilians Under Military Justice (Chicago, 1967), pp. 35, 44.
The legislators stated their willingness to provide bounties for the troops and encouragement for them to re-enlist, but they noted that despite all the measures taken to keep the troops at Louisbourg, many men were absolutely unwilling to remain there beyond 1 May, when they were determined to quit at all hazards. In the view of the legislators, detention of the men would lessen Massachusetts' ability to raise men in future. Pownall made no reference to the attitude of the legislators when he wrote General Amherst the next day. Instead, he reported that out of 509 Massachusetts troops at Louisbourg, 300 to 400 had re-enlisted. As for discontent among the troops, Pownall tried to gloss it over by stating his belief that when their apprehension of being detained was removed, most would re-enlist.

Pownall may have decided not to mention to Amherst the legislature's address out of a hope that he could placate the legislators. If this was so, he succeeded, because the next day the House of Representatives voted to raise 500 men for Nova Scotia and Cape Breton to relieve men not inclined to re-enlist. The Council concurred. Shortly afterwards Amherst made clear his determination not to release the colonial troops hastily, and informed Pownall that he desired "to hear no more of this relief for the present...."

New England troops were still at Louisbourg in November 1760, and were very unhappy about being there. One New Englander recorded that "It is now a year and five Days Since my time has Been Expired that I enlisted for and now I see no more likelewoods of Getting home then I did the first moment I Came heare. I believe Never ware men used so ill in the world...." By late November, however, General

87. Massachusetts House and Council to the Governor, 24 April 1760, C.O. 5/58, ff. 48, 49.
88. Pownall to Amherst, Boston, 25 April 1760, *ibid.*, f. 96.
89. Minutes of the House of Representatives, 26 April 1760, C.O. 5.58, f.54.
Whitmore had sent home about 100 invalids from the Provincial regiment, and in December the rest of Bagley's regiment sailed for Massachusetts.  

For some New England soldiers the ordeal did not end with their evacuation from Louisbourg. For several years after the 1758 expedition, as had been the case after the 1745 expedition, men petitioned the Massachusetts legislature for relief from sufferings and expenses incurred in connection with service at Louisbourg. In April 1761 Robert Luscomb of Taunton, asked the Massachusetts House of Representatives for consideration because his ward, Richard Luscomb, had received his bounty for extending his enlistment at Louisbourg, but had not received a blanket and other inducements promised. Another petitioner, Hopewell Foster of Boston, administrator of the estate of Captain George Hanners, requested the unpaid bounty due the late captain. In addition, there were several petitions from soldiers such as Benjamin Pinder, who received £4 16s for sufferings and expenses when ship-wrecked on Sable Island while returning from Louisbourg. Two transports carrying troops from Louisbourg to New England had the misfortune to be driven off course to the West Indies, where one was captured by the French and taken to Martinique. Many men on both ships suffered illnesses.

Those men who remained at Cape Breton and on Ile St. Jean after 1760 also experienced unsettled conditions. In March 1762 a fire broke out in a bakery at Louisbourg. About twelve houses burned down and troops pulled down four or five more to stop the progress of

90. Amherst to Pownall, New York, 30 April 1760, W.O. 34/17, f. 50.
91. Proctor Diary, 5 November 1760.
94. Petition of Hopewell Foster, ibid.
95. Petition of Benjamin Pinder, 26 February 1762, ibid.
96. Petitions of Peter Parker, et. al., 15 & 16 June 1761, ibid., vol. 824.
the fire. 97 In the autumn of 1762 a "daring conspiracy" of an unspecified nature at Fort Amherst on Ile St. Jean led General Amherst to advise that the ringleaders "should be brought to the most exemplary punishment and that without delay." Amherst suggested to Major Tulliken that he might impose death sentences if he wished. "I would prefer that they be hung rather than shot. I think the former strikes more terror into the living, and therefore the example stronger." 98 There was another challenge to authority in 1763, when troops at Louisbourg protested the deduction of money from their pay to pay for their provisions. 99

It was not just soldiers stationed at Louisbourg who on occasion demonstrated a dislike of service at Louisbourg. When the sloop Hannah & Martha was impressed at Louisbourg for government use, the master, William Miller, attempted to leave with the vessel without first securing authorization. After the ship was intercepted and brought back, Miller refused to manage it or to let any of his men work it. 100 Some masters of New England vessels at Louisbourg had experienced difficulties in their dealings with Louisbourg officialdom as early as the summer of 1758. Thomas Hancock became involved when he was asked to locate the sloop Industry, Philip Goldthwait master. Goldthwait's sloop had been employed by Louisbourg authorities to carry coal to the garrison. When refused permission to take some coal with him when he was discharged, Goldthwait slipped away in his ship with coal, 1,000 feet of boards, and four swivel guns loaned him by someone at Louisbourg. Governor Whitmore wanted Goldthwait seized for

97. Tulliken to (? Amherst), Louisbourg, 30 March 1762, W.O. 34/18, f. 34.
98. Amherst to Tulliken, New York, 31 October 1762, ibid., f. 155.
100. Colonel Henry Fletcher to General Amherst, Louisbourg, 1759, W.O. 34/18, f. 2.
robbery and for sailing without a pass.\textsuperscript{101} On 25 October, Hancock had still not located the vessel, which apparently belonged to one of the communities east of Casco Bay.\textsuperscript{102} By the time Goldthwait was apprehended cooler heads prevailed. A calmer Whitmore decided that it was not worth the trouble to prosecute Goldthwait.\textsuperscript{103}

To most New Englanders, such problems no longer mattered by the early 1760's. New England was preoccupied with many other issues by then, as it grappled with post-war depression and shifts in British policies. Even the demolition of the fortifications at Louisbourg in 1760 had caused no outcry in New England, although it represented the drawing to a close of fifty years of involvement in Cape Breton. The Boston Weekly News Letter only inquired meekly if it might not be in the public interest to preserve the island battery, to prevent the French "from nestling there for the future." The paper hesitantly suggested that a modest establishment of 100 men would keep the French away and secure for New England vessels a safe port at the entry of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.\textsuperscript{104}

Even when the French invaded Newfoundland in 1762 and captured St. John's this led to no hue and cry in New England for a larger military establishment at Louisbourg, even though martial law was declared in Halifax in the belief that the French would strike there next. General Amherst sent a force of only 100 armed provincials to Louisbourg in the summer of 1762 to offset the temporary withdrawal

\textsuperscript{101} William Buttars to Thomas Hancock, Louisbourg, 25 September 1758, Hancock Papers, vol. 10, 1745-1764, Baker Library, Harvard.
\textsuperscript{102} Hancock to Buttars, 25 October 1758, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{103} Buttars to Hancock, Louisbourg, 16 December 1758, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{104} Boston Weekly News Letter, 5 June 1760.
of five companies to cope with the situation in Newfoundland.105 Louisbourg would have been an easy target for the French had they decided to attack it. Tulliken reported that he would not have been able to keep a French fleet out of the harbour, and the French might burn the town. He hoped, however, that he might save the citadel, which he worked hard to entrench, and hoped to render impervious to fire from small arms.106

Whether or not the hurried work on fortifications at Louisbourg required extra supplies from New England is unclear, but other activity at Louisbourg related to the French invasion of Newfoundland did lead to the shipment of extra provisions to Louisbourg from other English colonies in North America. Hancock made a shipment of supplies to Louisbourg in October 1762, in response to a specific request from General Amherst.107

Reinforcements sent to Louisbourg in 1763 were not enough to arrest the decline of the military establishment there. At the same time, the smuggling of French goods from St. Pierre and Miquelon through Louisbourg was taking place, although British naval authorities were exasperated at such activities and tried to curb them. Because of the smuggling operations and to maintain British authority at Cape Breton an armed tender was sent there in the winter of 1763-1764, and a garrison of 300 hundred men was maintained at Louisbourg, until 1768.108 Thus, until the end of the Seven Years' War and later Louisbourg existed as a military outpost, although on a sharply reduced scale after 1760.

In conclusion, it is clear that Louisbourg continued to interest and involve New Englanders after the 1758 expedition which recaptured it from the French and after the demolition of the fortifi-

105. Amherst to Tulliken, New York, 9 August 1762, W.O. 34/18, f. 146.
106. Tulliken to Amherst, Louisbourg, 20 July 1762, ibid., f. 51.
cations in 1760, although Louisbourg did not mean the same thing to all interested New Englanders. To the New England public, Louisbourg was largely symbolic. Its fall in 1758 represented a break in the network of French posts which seemed to encircle New England and the other English colonies in North America. Hence the extravagant celebrations in the colonies. The use of Louisbourg as a base from which to launch the 1759 assault on Quebec and the demolition of the fortifications in 1760 kept Louisbourg in the public eye in New England.

Throughout the period when Louisbourg attracted public attention in New England, and later, New England soldiers played a part in the maintenance of Louisbourg. To these soldiers, Louisbourg at its fall may have meant the same thing it did to New Englanders generally, but before long it came to symbolize difficult living conditions and harsh military discipline. This prompted some New England soldiers to leave writings in which they criticized British authorities for the conditions under which the troops functioned. Other soldiers commented by action rather than words—by leaving Louisbourg, without authorization, at the first opportunity or by refusing to perform their duties.

Finally, New England merchants and shippers viewed Louisbourg from another perspective. In 1755 Thomas Hancock had called for the utter destruction of Louisbourg. After its capture he, and other New

109. The residents of Halifax allegedly consumed 60,000 gallons of rum to mark the occasion.
New England merchants were silent on this point. As long as the British government maintained large numbers of troops at Louisbourg, supplying those troops was a profitable proposition. For three years the trade employed as many vessels annually as trade with Louisbourg had for most years from 1713 to 1744. The producers of building materials and foodstuffs had another market at Louisbourg for their products. Merchants such as Hancock earned their usual five percent commission on goods they forwarded to Louisbourg. Hancock's 1748 comment on the business prospects for New England if Britain left or lost Cape Breton was as valid for the period after 1760 as it had been for the period after 1748. Britain left Cape Breton in almost all but name, but it hardly mattered, because demand for New England goods and services in Nova Scotia was great as the British improved fortifications at Halifax and New Englanders poured by the thousand into the south shore and Annapolis Valley.
Conclusion

Fifty years of interaction between New England and Cape Breton Island during the French regime and two English wartime occupations illustrate and illuminate numerous aspects of colonial North American development in the first half of the eighteenth century. Basically, the inter-regional contacts demonstrate how North American colonies responded to the North American "experience". Stripped of its mystique, this experience was primarily a matter of the societies in question evolving in response to geography, climate and resource base. As their outlook became conditioned by their surroundings, both French and English settlers succumbed in different degrees to the pragmatic materialistic outlook demanded of settlers in a new continent.

In the realms of trade and defence the adjustments French and English colonists and officials made because of colonial circumstances had important implications for policy-makers in Britain and France. Sometimes colonists and colonial officials campaigned for adjustments to imperial policies and regulations to suit circumstances in their respective colonies. On other occasions imperial attitudes and regulations were simply ignored.

Rather than always remain passive objects of imperial policies, New Englanders, and, to a lesser extent, the French on Ile Royale, from time to time attempted to influence the policies of the respective empires to which they belonged. In the first decade of interaction between New England and Ile Royale, New England shaped British imperial policy towards the French colony by expelling the French from Canso. Although this action was initiated in New England, and threatened to upset the entente between France and Britain, the New Englanders managed to persuade the British government that the adventure was in the best interests of the empire.
In acting as they did at Canso in 1718, New Englanders precipitated several years of unofficial hostilities from French residents of Ile Royale and their Indian allies towards the New England fishermen and merchants at Canso, but at the same time the move accomplished an important objective. French authorities at Louisbourg never formally conceded that the English were entitled to possession of Canso, but in practice they accepted the New England fishing (and trading) establishment at Canso as a necessary evil. As long as the entente between Britain and France lasted, Louisbourg officials discouraged harassment of Canso. Thus, New Englanders succeeded in defining the limits of French influence in an area they regarded as crucial for their fishing interests.

Although French authorities at Louisbourg had to accept the New England action at Canso, in the realm of trade they exhibited more initiative and demonstrated the necessity of comprising imperial policy because of colonial realities. Metropolitan French authorities tried to plan Ile Royale's economy in accordance with mercantilist preconceptions. French metropolitan authorities demanded that trade between Louisbourg and the English colonies be limited to building materials and certain foodstuffs. Other goods were not to be imported except in cases of great necessity. Louisbourg officials frequently pleaded necessity and thereby facilitated an extensive trade with New England.

Louisbourg officials themselves were permitted to take part in trade, and did so from the early years of the colony's existence, as when Governor Costebelle purchased the contents of four New England ships which visited Louisbourg in 1714. His successor, St. Ovide, applied himself to trade with equal zeal but less discretion, and was reprimanded several times for his activities. Moreover, when metro-
politan authorities attempted to curb trade with New England in 1727, there were inexplicable delays in registering the decrees at Louisbourg, and there were so many complaints from merchants accustomed to buying items such as ships from New Englanders, that the legislation was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

Economic considerations also led New England to question British imperial trade regulations. Except for certain enumerated goods, New England could legally export goods to Louisbourg, and as long as duty was paid on imports such as rum and molasses, they could be imported. Attempts by imperial authorities in the early 1730's to reduce if not eliminate much of New England's trade with the French colonies led to intense lobbying in England by colonial agents, and when their efforts, initially successful, ultimately failed, the New Englanders simply ignored the legislation or evaded attempts to enforce it. The Molasses Act of 1733 thus had no significant effect on the importation of molasses into New England from the French West Indies, whether the molasses came directly from the West Indies or was shipped through Louisbourg. Consequently, such prominent New England merchants as Joshua Peirce, William Pepperrell, and Peter Faneuil continued to prosper from their contacts at Louisbourg.

When war disrupted trade with the French from 1744 to 1749, it provided New England merchants with ample opportunities to gain in other ways from the French occupation of Cape Breton Island. When French authorities at Louisbourg, acting without specific orders from France, attacked Canso and Annapolis Royal, New England responded in kind. Although Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts had instructions to harass the enemy, he had no orders to attack Louisbourg. Nevertheless, in the same spirit which led them to expell the French from Canso in 1718, New Englanders decided to take matters into their own hands. New England's position is readily understandable. Failure to respond to the
French ventures might have encouraged devastating attacks on New England's frontier settlements, on its shipping and on its fisheries. There was no unanimity in New England that an attack on Louisbourg was the best solution or that it would succeed, but a combination of merchants, officials, and place-seekers prevailed and persuaded the governments of the various New England colonies that an expedition was necessary, and might also be very profitable by giving New England the opportunity to monopolize the fisheries, secure the frontier, and obtain an even greater share of the supply trade with Ile Royale than New England had enjoyed prior to 1744.

Victory was, however, a mixed blessing. Some merchants prospered from supplying the expedition, and then from provisioning the garrison at Louisbourg, but at the same time there were costly social problems and unproductive military ventures, and frustrating, time-consuming financial negotiations. The expedition of 1745 and the subsequent occupation of Louisbourg also meant the diversion of considerable manpower from productive pursuits. Nor did the losses end there. Hundreds of New Englanders died at Louisbourg in the winter of 1745-1746. Many others became a burden on the community when service-related disabilities prevented them from resuming productive roles in society. Perhaps as many as 1,000 New Englanders remained at Louisbourg until 1749 as recruits in the regiments William Shirley and William Pepperrell were allowed to raise as one reward for their services in 1745.

One of the most striking failure of New Englanders and their representatives in the occupation period was their inability to manipulate British imperial policy on Cape Breton Island to New England's benefit to the same degree that they had done after the Canso episode of 1718. Pamphlet campaigns helped convince the British public and some politicians of the merits of British possession of Cape Breton, but the British
government as a whole felt compelled to return the island to France in order to ensure withdrawal of French forces from the Netherlands—a proposition the British were forced to entertain as a price of their alliance with the Dutch.

Nor did the eventual conclusion of agreements on the extent and conditions of reimbursement for New England's Louisbourg-incurred expenses please all New Englanders. British insistence that the reimbursement be applied to a redemption of New England's paper currency pleased hard-money advocates in the colonies, but displeased debtors and those merchants who had found paper money a useful medium of exchange. Nevertheless, the redemption which reimbursement made possible aided in the fulfillment of a longstanding quest for currency stability by large-scale merchants in the import-export business, a prime objective of some New England merchants since the end of the seventeenth century. Such prominent merchants as Thomas Hutchinson and William Pepperrell were pleased with the use to which the reimbursement money was put, as no doubt were many others, especially since the currency remained reasonably stable until the eve of the American Revolution.

Despite the mixed blessings brought to them by their military success in 1745, New Englanders did not cease their efforts to turn that success to their advantage even when it became apparent that the British government would return Cape Breton Island to France. The possibility of this development spurred New Englanders to demand a quid pro quo for Louisbourg, and the British government obliged by establishing Halifax in 1749. This opened up new opportunities for trade and for employment. Approximately seventy percent of the vessels calling at Halifax from 1749 until the end of 1755 were of New England registry. They carried large quantities of building materials and foodstuffs. In addition to the trade providing continued profits for such prominent New England merchants as Thomas Hancock, Thomas Hutchinson, and Jonathan Trumbull, the trade provided an important source of invisible earnings for the New England shippers who owned the vessels sailing to Nova Scotia.
At the same time, other New Englanders found trade with Cape Breton Island profitable once the French reoccupied the island. Some years before Louisbourg's establishment in 1713, Antoine Raudot, intendant of Canada, had foreseen an important role for Cape Breton Island as an entrepot. It had quickly become one, but one which never fully accorded with French mercantilist thinking. French metropolitan authorities saw Canada, and to a degree, France, as sources of ships, foodstuffs, and building materials sufficient for Louisbourg's internal needs and for export from Isle Royale. But aggressive New England merchants could supply the needed goods more cheaply, and more reliably than French merchants, and in return provided an outlet for the products of the French West Indies. New England's intrusion into this trading network had been gradual for a decade or more after 1713, but in 1749 New Englanders responded immediately and in large numbers to meet the demand for goods at Louisbourg. Thus, from 1749 to 1754, almost as many ships (an average of 150 a year) from New England called at Louisbourg, as sailed from Boston to the West Indies.

For their part, French authorities at Louisbourg recognized their dependence on New England merchants and responded accordingly. They seized the occasional New England ship for violating trade regulations, which seizures were generally accepted in New England as a legitimate price to pay, to judge from New England's lack of outrage at such actions. Louisbourg officials agonized, however, over possible repercussions of the seizures they were ordered to make in retaliation for the seizure of some French vessels by Nova Scotia officials. There were fears, albeit misplaced, that retaliation would disrupt trade with New England. Thus, French officials at Louisbourg, like British officials in New England, felt that their knowledge of the local situation was superior to that of officials elsewhere in the empire and that imperial considerations at times had to be subordinated to local needs.
Ironically, some of the demand for goods at Ile Royale was caused by an influx of Acadians from Nova Scotia, as British authorities there, urged on by New England officials and aided by New England troops, applied increasing pressure on the Acadian population and on French and Canadian forces operating on the province's borders. Thus, while New England influenced Nova Scotia in dealing with its French population in order to make the province more secure for settlement and development, it also benefitted from the increased demand for goods which actions in Nova Scotia occasioned.

New England's role in influencing and even dictating policy to the British government reached a peak in 1755 with two important measures. The first of these came when, at the urging of William Shirley and with the approval of a New England-dominated Council, Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia employed New England troops to uproot most of the Acadians in Nova Scotia, and hired New England vessels to transport them to other colonies. To Lawrence the French influence (real or imagined) emanating from Louisbourg and manifested by the Lunenburg rebellion of 1753 and the Acadian presence at Beauséjour in 1755, was a compelling reason for acting against the Acadians. Lawrence and various New Englanders attempted to nullify Louisbourg's influence by striking at the Acadians. New Englanders also struck at Louisbourg, by urging the British government to take action against it. The correspondence of Thomas Hancock provides ample testimony of this as he importuned a host of influential contacts in England to consider the threat posed by the French at Louisbourg. His efforts were rewarded by the British blockade of Louisbourg in 1755.

Blockade of Louisbourg did not ensure an assault on the city, but Thomas Hancock's correspondence suggests that this was an objective of his and there is also circumstantial evidence that other New England-
ers had much the same objective and influenced the decision which led to the taking of Louisbourg in 1758. Governor Thomas Pownall of Massachusetts, a creature of that colony's merchants, contributed much to the decision to assault Louisbourg after Lord Loudoun's land campaigns against Canada proved fruitless.

When the attack on Louisbourg took place in 1758, some New Englanders saw little reason for rejoicing in the victory, given the fact that it did not end the war, and that British regulars had dominated the expedition. For other New Englanders the victory had both economic and psychological significance. The victory was the first major victory in the North American campaigns of the Seven Years War. It pointed the way to peace, and indicated the possibility of relief from the fear of encirclement which had gripped New England for several years. Economically, the expedition had meant opportunities to recoup trade which had been lost with the blockage of Louisbourg. Victory held out the possibility that the settlement of Nova Scotia might now extend to the rich farmland along the Bay of Fundy and to the many safe fishing harbours along the Atlantic coast. For these reasons, and because the destruction of the fortifications at Louisbourg meant that they could not be utilized by France if it regained the island, there was scarcely a murmur of protest in New England at the news of the demolition. New England would shed few tears for the passing of one era as it grappled with the prelude to another era of challenge.

Perhaps even more important than the effect fifty years of interaction had on New England's economy, is what a study of the interaction reveals about the attitudes of New England's merchant community. Admittedly, it is difficult to generalize about such a diverse group, but the evidence suggests that merchants such as Peter Faneuil, Thomas Hancock, and the Pepperrells had drifted away from the ethos of seventeenth century New England, and may even have drawn away from the ethos of most New Englanders of their own age. They bear little resemblance to seventeenth century predecessors such as Robert Keayne, who experienced extreme anguish and guilt when reproached for having indulged in business practices not accepted by the community generally.
In the 1730's and the 1740's many New Englanders still found materialistic, secular attitudes reprehensible. In a sermon preached before the Connecticut legislature in 1730, William Russel declared that "The Concern is not as heretofore to accomodate themselves as to the Worship of God, but where they can have most Land, and be under best advantage to get money."\(^1\) In the same vein, in the 1740's a Connecticut farmhand complained that his master's "whole attitude was taken up on the pursuits of the good things of this world; wealth was his supreme object, I am afraid gold was his God."\(^2\)

Such criticism was very applicable to members of the merchant community. Merchants such as Hancock and Faneuil rarely if ever expressed concern in their correspondence for their souls, or raised moral questions about their own conduct. Comfort and material rewards seem to have been more important. Even William Pepperrell, the younger, who invited the revivalist George Whitefield into his home, and sought his advice on whether or not to accept the leadership of the 1745 Louisbourg expedition, sought material rather than spiritual rewards for his success. As Pepperrell stated in a letter to an English merchant,

> I desire you as an old acquaintance and particular friend to bestir yourself on my account and if any thing offers worth my acceptance lay in for me, & I will make you satisfaction (sic) for all trouble & charge, & I do think all my brother merchants ought to assist me, for I think this is ye greatest conquest that has been made in ye English nation for some years by any troops that have had a merchant at ye head of them.\(^3\)

It is little wonder that some merchants viewed the Great Awakening with distaste, given its implied criticism of their highly materialistic attitudes. Thomas Kilby expressed his dislike of the revival by providing financial support for a pamphlet critical of aspects of the revival.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid.
In essence, the experience of New England merchants affected by Louisbourg suggests that the merchant community had become, at least in part, more like the "unfettered entrepreneurs" of nineteenth century United States than like their seventeenth century counterparts. Thus, while the New England press complained bitterly about Britain's decision to return Louisbourg to France in 1749, and recalled the lives lost in the siege and occupation, Thomas Hancock viewed the situation from a different perspective. Noting that there were assurances of a new market being opened up in Nova Scotia to replace the one apparently being lost in Louisbourg, Hancock declared that "If we (lose or leave) one (I) believe demand for the other will be larger."5

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The Impact of Ile Royale on New England

1713-1763

(resumé)

Fifty years of interaction between New England and Cape Breton Island during the French regime and two English wartime occupations shed light on numerous aspects of colonial North American development. In particular, the history of the contacts between French and English demonstrate how North American colonists responded to the North American experience. This experience was primarily a matter of the societies in question evolving in response to geography, climate and resources. As their outlook became conditioned by their surroundings, both French and English settlers succumbed in different degrees to the pragmatic materialistic outlook demanded of settlers in a new continent.

In the realms of trade and defence the adjustments French and English colonists and officials made because of colonial circumstances had important implications for policy-makers in Britain and France. Sometimes colonists and colonial officials campaigned for adjustments to imperial policies and regulations to suit circumstances in their respective colonies. On other occasions imperial attitudes and regulations were simply ignored.

When Massachusetts authorities removed French fishermen from Canso they precipitated several years of unofficial hostilities from French residents of Ile Royale. But at the same time the move accomplished an important objective. French authorities at Louisbourg never formally ceded that the English were entitled to possession of Canso, but in practice they accepted the New England establishment at Canso as a necessary evil. As long as the entente between Britain and France lasted, Louisbourg officials discouraged harassment of Canso. Thus, New Englanders succeeded in defining the limits of French influence in an area they regarded as crucial for their fishing interests.

Although French authorities at Louisbourg accepted the New England action at Canso because they did not want to disrupt the entente, in the realm of trade they exhibited more initiative and demonstrated the necessity of compromising imperial policy because of colonial realities. Metropolitan French authorities tried to plan Ile Royale's economy in accordance with mercantilist preconceptions. They insisted that trade between Louisbourg and the English colonies be limited to building materials and certain foodstuffs. Other goods were not to be imported except in cases of great necessity. Louisbourg officials frequently pleaded necessity and thereby facilitated an extensive trade with New England.

As for New England, its merchants questioned British imperial trade regulations when they inhibited the region's trade. Except for certain enumerated goods, New Englanders could legally export a wide range of goods to Louisbourg, and could import items such as rum and molasses as long as they paid the required duties. Attempts by imperial authorities in the early 1730's to reduce if not eliminate much of New England's trade with the French colonies led to intense lobbying in England by colonial
agents, and when their efforts, initially successful, ultimately failed, the New Englanders simply ignored the legislation or evaded attempts to enforce it. The Molasses Act of 1733 thus had no significant effect on the importation of molasses into New England from the French West Indies, whether the molasses came directly from the West Indies or through Louisbourg. Consequently, such prominent New England merchants such as Joshua Peirce, William Pepperrell, and Peter Faneuil continued to prosper from their contacts at Louisbourg.

When war disrupted trade with the French from 1744 to 1749, it provided New England merchants with ample opportunities to gain in other ways from the French having established the colony of Ile Royale. When French authorities at Louisbourg, acting without specific orders from France, attacked Canso and Annapolis Royal, New England responded in kind. Although Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts had instructions to harass the enemy, he had no orders to attack Louisbourg. Nevertheless, in the same spirit which led them to expell the French from Canso in 1718, New Englanders decided to take matters into their own hands. New England's position is understandable. Failure to respond to the French ventures might have encouraged devastating attacks on New England's frontier settlements, on its shipping and on its fisheries.

When victory came in 1745 it was a mixed blessing. Some merchants prospered from supplying the expedition, and then from provisioning the garrison at Louisbourg, but at the same time there were costly social problems and unproductive military adventures, and frustrating, time-consuming financial negotiations to secure compensation for the costs of the 1745 expedition. The expedition and the subsequent occupation of Louisbourg also meant the diversion of considerable manpower from productive pursuits. Nor did the losses end there. Hundreds of New Englanders died at Louisbourg in the winter of 1745-1746. Many others became a burden on the community when service-related disabilities prevented them from resuming their normal roles in society.

One of the most striking failures of New Englanders and their representatives in the occupation period was their inability to manipulate British imperial policy on Cape Breton to New England's benefit to the same degree that they had done after the Canso episode of 1718. Pamphlet campaigns helped convince the British public and some politicians of the merits of British possession of Cape Breton, but the British government as a whole felt compelled to return the island to France in order to ensure withdrawal of French forces from the Netherlands.

Nor did the eventual conclusion of agreements on the extent and conditions of compensation for New England's Louisbourg-incurred expenses please all New Englanders. British insistence that the reimbursement be applied to a redemption of New England's paper currency pleased hard-money advocates in the colonies, but displeased debtors and those merchants who had found paper money a useful medium of exchange. Nevertheless, the redemption which reimbursement made possible aided in the fulfillment of a longstanding quest for currency stability by large scale New England merchants.

Despite the mixed blessings brought to them by their military success in 1745, New Englanders did not cease their efforts to turn that success to their advantage even when it became apparent that the British
government would return Cape Breton Island to France. The possibility of this development spurred New Englanders to demand a quid pro quo for Louisbourg, and Britain obliged by establishing Halifax in 1749. This opened up new opportunities for trade and for employment. Approximately seventy percent of the vessels which called at Halifax from 1749 until the end of 1755 were of New England registry. They carried large quantities of building materials and foodstuffs. In addition to trade providing direct profits for such prominent New England merchants such as Thomas Hancock, Thomas Hutchinson, and Jonathan Trumbull, the trade provided an important source of invisible earnings for the New England shippers who owned vessels sailing to Nova Scotia.

At the same time, other New Englanders found trade with Cape Breton Island profitable once the French reoccupied the island. Some years before Louisbourg's establishment in 1713, Antoine Raudot, intendant of Canada, had foreseen an important role for Cape Breton Island as an entrepot. It had quickly become one, but one which never fully accords with French mercantilist thinking. French metropolitan authorities saw Canada, and to a degree, France, as sources of ships, foodstuffs, and building materials sufficient for Louisbourg's internal needs and for export from Ile Royale. But aggressive New England merchants could supply the needed goods more cheaply, and more reliably than French merchants, and in return provided an outlet for the products of the French West Indies. New England's intrusion into this trading network had been gradual for a decade or more after 1713, but in 1749 New Englanders responded immediately and in large numbers to meet the demand for goods at Louisbourg. Thus, from 1749 to 1754, almost as many ships (an average of 150 a year) from New England called at Louisbourg as sailed from Boston to the West Indies.

For their part, Louisbourg authorities recognized their dependence on New England merchants for a major portion of the colony's supplies, and responded accordingly. They seized the occasional New England ship for violating trade regulations, which seizures were generally accepted in New England as a legitimate price to pay, to judge from New England's lack of outrage at such actions. Louisbourg officials agonized, however, over possible repercussions of the seizures they were ordered to make in retaliation for the seizure of some French vessels by Nova Scotia officials. There were fears, albeit misplaced, that retaliation would disrupt trade with New England. Thus, French officials at Louisbourg, like British officials in New England, felt that their knowledge of the local situation was superior to that of officials elsewhere in the empire and that imperial considerations at times had to be subordinated to local needs.

Ironically, some of the demand for goods at Ile Royale was caused by an influx of Acadians from Nova Scotia, as British authorities there, urged on by New England officials and aided by New England troops, applied increasing pressure on the Acadian population and on French and Canadian forces operating on the province's borders. As a result, while New England influenced Nova Scotia in dealing with its French population in order to make the province more secure for settlement and development, it also benefitted from the increased demand for goods which actions in Nova Scotia occasioned.
New England’s role in influencing and even dictating policy to the British government reached a peak in 1755 with two important measures. The first of these came when, at the urging of William Shirley and with the approval of a New England-dominated Council, Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia employed New England troops to uproot most of the Acadians in Nova Scotia, and hired New England vessels to transport them to other colonies. To Lawrence the French influence (real or imagined) emanating from Louisbourg and manifested by the Lunenburg rebellion of 1753 and the Acadian presence at Beausejour in 1755, was a compelling reason for acting against the Acadians. Lawrence and various New Englanders attempted to nullify Louisbourg’s influence by striking at the Acadians. New Englanders also struck at Louisbourg, by urging the British government to take action against it.

New Englanders contributed to the decision to blockade Louisbourg in 1755, and to attack it in 1758. Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts in the late 1750’s, contributed much to the decision to assault Louisbourg after the fruitless land campaigns of Lord Loudoun on Canada’s frontiers. Pownall was more or less a creature of Massachusetts merchants from his arrival in the colony. He had already made the acquaintance of the influential Thomas Hutchinson at the Albany Conference of 1754, and had been thanked for his contribution to the debate on colonial security at that conference.

When the attack on Louisbourg took place in 1758 it shared New Englanders’ attention with the land campaigns in North America, and some New Englanders saw little reason for rejoicing in the victory when it came because it did not end the war, and because New Englanders played a clearly subordinate role in the expedition. For other New Englanders the victory had both economic and psychological significance. The victory was the first major victory in the North American campaigns of the Seven Years War. It pointed the way to peace, and indicated the possibility of relief from the fear of encirclement which had gripped New England for several years. Economically, the expedition had meant opportunities for trade which had been lost with the blockade of Louisbourg, and held out the possibility that the settlement of Nova Scotia, begun with the establishment of Halifax in 1749, might now extend to the rich farmland along the Bay of Fundy and to the many safe fishing harbours along the Atlantic coast. For these reasons and because the destruction of the fortifications at Louisbourg meant that they could not be used by France if it regained the island, there was scarcely a murmur of protest in New England at the news that the demolition would indeed take place. A pragmatic New England would shed few tears for the passing of one era as it grappled with the prelude to another era of challenge.

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