AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:
THE FREUDIAN UNCONSCIOUS

by William J.C. Kelloway

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Appendix

1. ABSTRACT OF An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind:
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INTRODUCTION

The fundamental question that this thesis raises and endeavours to answer is: "Is there an unconscious dimension of mind that may be active in the determination of human behaviour?" Clearly, to raise such a question is to delve into philosophical psychology as the question bears directly upon the nature of man. It is the work of Sigmund Freud that provides the focal point for this endeavour as it was he who, above all others, contributed the most to the study of unconscious mental processes. Indeed, much of his writing was devoted to demonstrating the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious. It will be argued in this thesis that the task of demonstrating the existence of unconscious mental processes is a philosophical task, and hence it is susceptible of evaluation in terms of a philosophical criterion.

Accordingly, the thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one will briefly develop the history of the notion of the unconscious before Freud so that his efforts at demonstration will be viewed within the context of the history of ideas. The second chapter is structured by a two-fold aim. First, the location of the problem of the unconscious within the geography of knowledge will be sought. In order to accomplish this purpose a philosophical framework will have to be elaborated which clearly distinguishes between philosophical and scientific psychology. Having made the necessary distinctions, the task of showing that the problem of the unconscious is in part a philosophical problem will be undertaken. The second
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aim of this chapter will be to elaborate a criterion in terms of which the Freudian demonstration of the existence of unconscious mental processes may be evaluated.

The third chapter will turn to the work of Freud and seek out the arguments that have been put forward by him in his efforts at demonstrating the existence of the unconscious dimension of mind. A secondary aim of this chapter will be to come to an understanding of the nature of the Freudian unconscious.

The fourth and final chapter will attempt to evaluate the Freudian demonstration thus coming to a response to the initiating question; namely, "Is there an unconscious dimension of mind that may be active in the determination of human behaviour?"
CHAPTER I

THE UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD

The unconscious, the libido theory, and transference and resistance which are basic to psychotherapy are the three pillars which support the theoretical edifice of psychoanalysis. In this thesis, attention will be directed at elucidating the first of these notions.

In this chapter the project will be to come to a historical appreciation

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1 J.W. Higgins notes the following: "It is unquestionable that "the" unconscious became supremely important in psychoanalysis. Even though later developments change its position somewhat, it is unlikely that the concept of the unconscious will ever cease to be near the centre of attention in psychoanalysis. Higgins, J.W., "Some Considerations of Psychoanalytic Theory Preliminary to a Philosophical Inquiry", The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 35-36, 1961-1962, pp. 35-36.

"To reject the concept of the "unconscious" is to reject psychoanalysis in toto."


The challenge that awaits the philosopher in this area is expressed by Fisher as follows: "If man's image of himself is as centrally important as we have suggested, it is not enough that it be passively lived, nor even that it be accurately described. Rather, this image and all the forces that shaped it must be critically examined, carefully evaluated and weighed against all the evidence available to man. And this, I suggest, is the task of philosophy...

But that philosopher's obligations are never discharged simply in the exercise of his critical function. Particularly when it is a question of the nature and being of man, philosophy must enter the arena and actively participate in the shaping of a balanced and comprehensive view."

of the development of the idea of the unconscious, and in so doing, the task of situating Freud in the history of ideas will be, in part, accomplished. Indirectly, this study will provide a fuller understanding of the reality that men have tried to capture through the use of the concept of the unconscious.

It is noted, as a point of departure, that in the history of ideas there are at least four distinct stages through which an idea will pass. Ideas may be (i) conceivable, (ii) topical, (iii) effective, and (iv) at a climax when they have begun to decline in their usefulness. In applying this classificatory scheme to the unconscious, Whyte has written that "the idea of unconscious mental processes was, in many of its aspects, conceivable around 1700, topical around 1800, and became effective around 1900". 2

Just as nothing is produced in a vacuum, so too it is with ideas. In order that they may flourish there are certain conditions which must pertain. These environmental conditions shall be termed an ideational complex, and the significance of this is that it is the nexus of ideas to which any given idea stands in relation and from which any particular idea takes its meaning. This is not to say that an idea is not ultimately grounded in ontological reference to things in reality, but it is to say that meaning is, in part, a relational phenomena. 3

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3 ibid., p. 57.
4 Whyte expresses much the same idea when he writes: "An idea is a focus of unrestricted relationships, just as a point defines an infinity of lines radiating in all directions." ibid., p. 6.
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The ideational complex which conditioned the development of the idea of the unconscious was first, the increased interest in the experience of the individual as manifested in the romantic and transcendental philosophies as well as the application of scientific methods to the study of the individual in the area of psychology. Secondly, the genetic, developmental, and evolutionary ideas of biology placed an increased emphasis upon the organic tendencies as a ground for the reasoning intellect stemming from vitalism and leading to voluntarism. And thirdly, knowledge of the Eastern intellectual tradition was working its influence through its emphasis on feeling, emotion and unity.  

In terms of an etymological analysis, the word "unconscious" received its first known usage in English in 1751, in German in 1776, and in French around 1850.  

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5 ibid., p. 56.

6 "The available surveys suggest that Unbewusstsein and bewusstlos (in meanings close to those now current) were first used by E. Platner in 1776, and these or similar terms were made popular by Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling between 1780 and 1820. The word "unconscious" as an adjective (with the same meaning) appears in English in 1751, and more frequently after 1800, for example, in the writings of Wordsworth and Coleridge. By 1850 both adjective and noun were extensively used in Germany, and were moderately common in England. But in France inconscient, as an adjective or noun, was probably not used until the 1850's, and then mainly in translating the German terms." ibid., p. 59-60.
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Between the years 1680 and 1880 the term was used in relation to the following phenomena which were, in the minds of the users, somehow related to unconscious mental processes:

memory, and its pathology;
perception, images, ideas;
reasoning, inference;
selection, judgment, diagnosis;
imagination, invention, creation, inspiration;
eccasies, premonitions, visions;
vital impulses, volition, motive, interest,
sympathy, aversion, falling in love;
conflict, inhibition, dissociation,
hysteria, obsession, perversions;
mental therapeutics for physical and mental pathology;
dreams, hallucinations, somnambulism,
suggestion, hypnotism;
alcohol, drugs, diseases;
collective myths, religions;
personal and collective rationalizations. 7

This gives an indication of the range of human experience with which the notion of the unconscious had become associated by the 1880's. It is clear that the idea had by then reached its topical stage, and that the way had been well prepared for the advent of Freud to bring the idea to its therapeutic application.

To further display the development of this notion, the following chart 8 which indicates the various interpretations of the unconscious may

7 ibid., p. 61.
be considered. While this approach may distort because of its brevity, it is justified in that it does indicate the dominant trends and shows that the precursors of Freud had done much to contribute to the formulation of this concept.

The Unconscious Mind was Interpreted

By:                        As:
Mystics                    -The link with God
Christian Platonists       -A divine, universal, plastic principle
Romantics                 -The link between the individual and universal powers
Early Rationalists         -A factor operating mainly in memory, perception and ideas
Post-Romantic Thinkers     -Organic vitality, expressed in will, imagination and creation
Dissociated "Self-Conscious Man"
                           -Night: the realm of violence
Physical Scientists        -The consequence of physiological factors not yet understood
Monistic Thinkers          -The prime mover and source of all order and novelty in thought and action
Freud ("Subconscious")    -Mainly inhibited memories ruled by the pleasure principle, in a state of deformation and conflict, accessible only through special techniques; also forgotten memories and inaccessible levels
Jung                      -The prerational realm of collective myth and religious symbolisms.

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In order that the general developmental framework indicated above may take on more significance and that the thesis regarding the fact that men were cognizant of unconscious mental processes long before the advent of Freud may receive historical validation, and so that the unique Freudian contribution may be clearly highlighted against the backdrop of the history of ideas, the ideas and writings of men prior to 1880 will be briefly reviewed.

To sample some of the first known writings on the subject of unconscious mental processes, it is necessary to return almost to the dawn of intellectual history, to ancient India, where the Hindus of about 600 B.C. inscribed their thoughts in a collection of documents known as the Upanishads. These writings, which were to later influence such men as Schopenhauer and P. Carus who both had definite theories of unconscious mental processes,

delineated four states of the self: (i) The waking state, jagarita-sthana; 
(ii) The dreaming state, svarga-sthana; (iii) The deep-sleep state, 
susupta-sthana; and (iv) The supra-conscious state, caturtha, turiya, turya. 
The first state is equivalent to what moderns term consciousness including 
the activities of perception, volition and memory. The second state is 
understood as being subconscious as the realm of the dream is entered 
during this phase thus causing the self to lose its contact with reality. The third state moves deeper into the subconscious and approaches unconsciousness per se. Here reality, desire, and even dreams are left behind and a blissful state is attained. The fourth state is comparable to the "divine madness" of poets of which Plato writes as it is in this state that intuitions of great truths are had. 10 The unconscious as a source of inspiration and as a link with greater forces at work in the universe is a recurring theme in the history of ideas. The first three of the four states of self are levels which are recognized respectively in the well-developed animal kingdom, the less developed animal kingdom, and the vegetable and mineral kingdoms. The fourth state is found only in man, and then only in the profoundest of men, the Seers.

10 "And herein lies the proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration, but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who would understand what he remembers to have been said... must first recover his wits." (Timaeus, 71e-72a) All references to Plato are from Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963.
Thus it is seen that even at the dawn of recorded history men were writing of levels of consciousness which today would have been discussed under the heading of "the unconscious". Is this not a first groping awareness of the unconscious phenomenon with which Freud was later to deal?

Freud exhibited a rather more detailed knowledge of the Upanishads than is given here as is witnessed in the following reference to be found in Freuds Beyond the Pleasure Principle, translated by Strachey, James, Bantam Books, New York, 1967, pp. 101-102.

"I have to thank Professor Heinrich Gomperz, of Vienna, for the following discussion on the origin of the Platonic myth, which I give partly in his own words. It is to be remarked that what is essentially the same theory is already to be found in the Upanishads. For we find the following passage in the Brihadaranyaka-upanishad, 1, 4, 3, where the origin of the world from the Atman (the self or Ego) is described: 'But he felt no delight. Therefore a man who is lonely feels no delight. He wished for a second. He was so large as man and wife together. He then made this his Self to fall in two, and then arose husband and wife. Therefore Yagnavalkya said: 'We two are thus (each of us) like half a shell.' Therefore the void which was there, is filled by the wife.'

The Brihadaranyaka-upanishad is the most ancient of all the Upanishads, and no competent authority dates it later than about the year 800 B.C. In contradiction to the prevailing opinion, I should hesitate to give an unqualified denial to the possibility of Plato's myth being derived, even if it were only indirectly, from the Indian source, since a similar possibility cannot be excluded in the case of the doctrine of transmigration. But even if a derivation of this kind (through the Pythagoreans in the first instance) were established, the significance of the coincidence between the two trains of thought would scarcely be diminished. For Plato would not have adopted a story of this kind which had somehow reached him through some oriental tradition - to say nothing of giving it so important a place - unless it had struck him as containing an element of truth.

In a paper devoted to a systematic examination of this line of thought before the time of Plato, Ziegler (1913) traces it back to Babylonian origins.

This footnote has been quoted in full because it indicates that Freud had a scholarly knowledge of Plato, and hence partially substantiates the claim that will be put forward in the discussion of Plato's influence upon Freudian thought later in this paper.
THE UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD

The next thinker to be considered in this survey not only evidenced a profound grasp of the irrational in man but also foreshadowed much of Freudian thought. Indeed, were one to select only one author prior to Freud in order to situate Freud in the history of ideas, that author would be Plato. In as much as there exist striking similarities between Freud and Plato, and since the historical situation of Freud and his doctrine of the unconscious is being sought; it follows that a more extensive account of Plato's approach to man is merited.

Alexander and Selesnick, in The History of Psychiatry, grudgingly concede that:

Freud himself may have been little influenced by Plato's writing, yet his basic orientation that emotions, deives, ideas, and memories constitute a kind of reality and are worthy of systematic study because they have consequences upon our behavior and bodily processes had been prepared by Platonic views. The recognition that psychological phenomena have profound reality that cannot be disregarded was never fully eradicated from Western thought. 12

It is known, however, that Freud was more than a "little" influenced by Plato as a more thorough-going review of the doctrine of Plato will reveal. It is not without significance that Mortimer Adler's intensive study of Freudian psychoanalysis is subtitled A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism in Psychology. 13 In this work, Adler leaves


little doubt in the reader's mind about the impact of the thought of Plato on Freud. The works of other Freudian Scholars such as Margetts, Reiff, Ramzy, and Jones also record the Platonic influence. Having established the fact of Plato's influence on Freud, it is necessary to turn to the works

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14 Cf. especially p. 69 where he writes: "Freud is most indebted to Plato and Schopenhauer among philosophers, even though he seldom cites Schopenhauer, and his references to Plato are particularly trivial, considering his debt to Plato." ibid., p. 69. (italics mine) Adler's summation of the Platonic influence, though brief, captures the root issue.

Adler's summation of the Platonic influence, though brief, captures the root issue.

b. Here we are only concerned to state Plato's true insights about the nature of man:

(1) That he is a rational animal, and is, therefore, subject to the fundamental conflicts between animality and rationality. (Thus, the myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus, which is devoted to speeches about love.) Here Plato anticipates Freud in great detail concerning sexuality, and love as its proper sublimation. I am referring to the three papers by Freud on the psychology of love in 1910, 1912 and 1918. Here, furthermore, Plato describes in detail the conflicts in man between his lower and higher nature, between his animality and his rationality, between his id and his ego and super-ego.

(2) That he is a loving animal. This means that in all his activities, whether they be sexual or artistic or philosophical, man acts through love. The Platonic insistence upon Eros as a fundamental trait of the psyche is the Freudian insistence that all human activities are an expression of libido. Libido, desire, love - all name the same fundamental root of activity. In the Symposium, and elsewhere, Plato enumerates and orders the objects of love. His distinction between sensual and intellectual is the Freudian distinction between sexuality and its various sublimations.

(3) That man can be rational without ceasing to love, and love without ceasing to be rational. Here the Platonic points are that reason is not reason unless it rules the irrational parts of man, his animality; that love is not human love unless it is ruled by reason (sexuality sublimated into eros.)

(4) Finally, that health is a harmony in the body and that happiness is a harmony in the soul. The important principle here is the insight that human well-being requires integration to resolve conflicts and dissociations; that dissociation is basic to all psychopathology, and that dissociation can be cured or prevented only by the harmony or integration which results from an ordering of the parts. This is achieved only when reason rules, when man is a rational lover.
of Plato and to attempt to seek out his response to the question "What is man?" as given the similarity in doctrines, and the direct influence, it is reasonable to assume that upon completion of this task the work of placing Freud alongside other thinkers in the history of ideas will be more readily broached. In order to establish a frame of reference, the evolution of

c. It is important to note, in passing, that the Platonic discussion does not separate psychological analysis from medical and moral precepts. The close relation in the practical application of psychology, between the medical and the moral aspects should also be noted."

ibid., pp. 69-70.


Reiff further substantiates the claim that Plato influenced Freud in the following footnote: "There is evidence that Freud did not try to avoid the indirect influence, at least, of Plato. In 1879, at the age of twenty-three, he translated the twelfth volume of a collected edition of the writings of John Stuart Mill. The volume included Mill's essay on Grote's Plato, in which Mill comments of the Platonic theory of anamesis. Siegfried Bernfeld writes that Freud is reported to have said that he had been "greatly influenced by the theory of anamesis and that he had, at one time, given it a great deal of thought." Bernfeld, "Freud's Scientific Beginning," American Image, VI, No. 3 (Sept. 1949), p. 188."

This is a note to p. 43 of Reiff, op. cit., p. 399.

Isiah Ramzy sheds more light on this matter when he writes: "In 1879, he (Freud) was asked, through the recommendation of Brentano, to translate some of J.S. Mill's essays. Whether Freud accepted this task to pass time or to earn a little money, as Jones suggests, it is warranted, knowing Freud's erudition and curiosity, to suppose that he did not stop with the mere drudgery of translation. One might safely
the doctrine of the soul and the ramifications of this evolving doctrine on the philosophy of man must be noted. In so doing the therapeutic insights contained therein will be brought to light.

Plato (Phaedo 78 ff.) took an almost puritan approach to the composition of the soul and body. There is a strict dichotomy between the immortal soul of man which is the principle of life and the source of all that is divine in the human realm; (Phaedo 80a) and the body which is the active source of evil - so much so that to escape from its fetters is the desire of all men who seek after wisdom. The following passage capsulizes the attitude of Plato towards the body-soul relationship as found at this stage of his development:

speculate that he read such views of Mill as those on Utilitarianism, association or his book, System of Logic, which was the most important formulation of modern scientific methodology since Bacon's Novum Organum. It is also intriguing that one of Mill's essays, translated by Freud, dealt with Plato's theory of reminiscence, the revival of memories, long standing, but forgotten, in the mind."


Ernest Jones in his renowned biography of Freud (The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1967, pp. 71-72) substantiates the claims of Reiff, Bernfeld and, in part, of Ramzy, and adds that Freud "was greatly impressed by Plato's theory of reminiscence" and that "he wove some suggestions of Plato's into his book Beyond the Pleasure Principle."

15 Cf. infra note 13.
THE UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD

... No, this soul secures immunity from its desires by following reason and abiding always in her company, and by contemplating the true and divine and unconjecturable, and drawing inspiration from it, because such a soul believes that this is the right way to live while life endures, and that after death it reaches a place which is kindred and similar to its own nature, and there is rid forever of human ills. (Phaedo 84a)

In the Timaeus (69c, d, e) Plato is describing the creation of man and here, not only moves to a position where the soul is correlated with the body, but also introduces a dualism of rationality and irrationality within the soul; the former having the task of integrating and controlling the motions of the latter. In the same passages (Timaeus 70-71) there is also in evidence a threefold division of the soul into reason, passions, and appetites. In the integrated individual reason through interaction with the liver in the domain of the appetites, and the heart and lungs in the domain of the passions succeeds in co-ordinating the activities of man. Unity is also secured physiologically through the bone marrow "For the bonds of life which unite the soul and the body are made fast there, and they are the root and foundation of the human race." (Timaeus 73b)

In this second phase he retains the body-soul notation but the soul is no longer simple as in the Phaedo, rather it now consists of three parts or aspects (reason, passions and appetites) which articulate with the body in a definite manner. This is a most important evolution in Plato's thought as now conflict is possible within the soul, and evil is no longer relegated to the domain of the material. We see the conflict in action in the skillful argumentation of the Republic where Plato writes regarding the phenomenon of the controlled appetite:
Then if anything draws it back when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing. (Republic IV, 439b)

This argument well establishes the existence of parts of the soul but the question remains - between what parts does the conflict lie? Is reason always at odds with the passions and the appetites? Plato answers this question immediately in the tale of Leontius (Republic IV, 439e – 440a) who is ashamed of himself for desiring to look upon a heap of dead bodies thus proving "that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien." (Republic IV, 440a)

Clearly, the emotions can vivify reason and be a strong ally against the appetites if trained and educated in a proper manner. (Republic IV, 441e-442a)

In the Phaedrus (253d-254e) the soul is clearly tripartite in nature. The reason is likened unto the charioteer; the passions or emotions are compared with a white horse that is "a lover of glory but with temperance and modesty" responsive to the word of command alone; and the appetites are similar to a black, bullish steed "hot-blooded, consenting with wantonness and vainglory; shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad."

Thus by analogy and argument, Plato is able to account for the dynamic interplay of forces within the soul, a truth which any man can confirm by introspection and observation.

One of the effects of this evolution is that whereas in the Phaedo the body was the active source of evil now "the soul is the cause
THE UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD

of good and evil, fair and foul, right and wrong." (Laws X, 896d)

Grube translates this passage with more insight when he writes:

If it (soul) has acquired wisdom, god unto gods, it guides all things to right and happiness; but if it associates with ignorance it works the opposite in all things. 16

It is on this latter notion of the soul that a depth-approach to psychology can be grounded as it more accurately accounts for the complex nature which is man. Only when the conflict is not seen in the perspective of the immaterial versus the material and is seen as being operative within the soul, then and then only, is therapy and morality possible as the reason, by exercising its responsibility, can integrate and control these forces, instead of only repressing and denying the body and its effects. 17

From Plato’s point of view the proper object of the physician or the psychoanalyst is the besouled body. It is interesting to observe that Plato advocates the clinical method in the training of physicians as is evidenced in the following passage:

Physicians ... would prove most skilled if from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies... (Republic III, 408e)


17 "Plato's most significant contribution is that he considered psychological phenomena as total responses of the whole organism that reflect its internal state. The conflict between the disorganized lower appetites and the higher organizing functions of reason is the basis of Platonic psychology." Alexander and Selesnick, op. cit., p. 60.
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Further, Plato demands that before physicians be allowed to practice that "they should show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works." (Laches 186e)

Plato in his basic approach to illness was not as naïve as some moderns who rigorously divide medicine into the psychic and the somatic. Rather Plato realized what is today called the psychosomatic approach where a profound interaction of the mind and the body are realized, a position, incidently, which implicitly affirms a doctrine of substantial unity.  

Plato aims squarely at the health of the whole individual thus forshadowing the movement in medicine that is still in the process of unfolding.

... that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul. And this ... is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they disregard the whole, which ought to be studies also, for the part can never be well unless the whole is well ... Let no one persuade you to cure his head, until he has given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this ... is the great error of our day in the treatment of human beings, that men try to be physicians of health and temperance separately. (Charmides 156-157b)

Thus as Grube writes: "Everything depends on the soul, but the ultimate aim is the health, physical and moral of the whole man."  


19 Grube, op. cit., p. 145.

20 ibid., p. 123. It is interesting to note that modern trends in psychotherapy, especially Existential Psychotherapy, are endeavouring to deal with the "whole" man as he is in-the-world. Although the orientations are different in many respects, the efforts to avoid "regional" or "differential" theorizing and therapy are held in common.
As was mentioned earlier, Plato affirms the existence of a rational and irrational division in the soul of man; the reason as opposed to the emotions and the appetites. This division is somewhat similar to the conscious-unconscious dichotomy employed by later philosophers and psychologists, indeed the irrational for Plato englobes many of the same functions as is shown in the following rather lengthy quotation which must be recorded in full as it not only establishes the existence of the irrational but also delves into depth-psychology regarding repression, sublimation, sexuality, dreams, inspiration and the emergence of unconscious desires in sleep which are repressed from awareness during conscious states.

Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous.

What desires do you mean? he said.

Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavours to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anything else, man, god, or brute ... in a word, falls short of no extreme or folly and shamelessness.

But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be bridled to sleep and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated
purity to examine and reach out toward and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future, and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall to sleep with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason reside, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.

I certainly think so, he said.

This description has carried us too far; but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even some reputed most respectable, a terrible, fierce, and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in sleep. (Republic IX, 571b-572b)

In the above quotation it is noted that first of all, Plato recognizes the universal nature of the irrational in that it is found in all men manifested to a greater or lesser degree according to the measure of success they have had in controlling and regulating their desires and appetites by reason. He notes that the unruly desires can almost be gotten rid of, or in modern parlance, repressed. Plato mentions the effects of wine and food which tend to lower the inhibitions, or the level of control imposed normally thus releasing the baser instincts from the control of reason. It is interesting to note that these desires are of an aggressive sexual nature and also that the Oedipus complex is suggested. The alternative situation where the person is sober and high-minded produces such a state that even in the dream state a higher awareness is attained. This seeing of "things unknown past, present or future" is another well documented phenomenon. The visions then entertained are not unlike the dream state of which Goethe wrote and during which he composed or, more accurately, received
poetic inspiration. Romanticists of all ages have stressed the role of the unconscious and of dreams in relating them to forces or powers greater than themselves. Plato's concluding point is to re-affirm the "fierce and lawless brood of desires" which are a part of all of us.

Plato elsewhere makes an acute observation on the relation of dreams to conscious life when he recognizes the purpose of the mechanism of repression and the releasing or disinhibiting force of sleep:

Let us sum up, then, said I, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who in his waking hours has the qualities we found in his dream state. (Republic IX, 576b)

Thus in the psychology of dreams there are two distinct aspects to be noted, both fundamentally irrational; first, consciously repressed desires are released; and second, dreams can be the source of inspiration. This latter point is re-inforced by the following passage of the Timaeus:

And herein lies the proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration, but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who would understand what he remembers to have been said ... must first recover his wits. (Timaeus 71e-72a)

21 "In his Republic Plato anticipated Freud's dream theory. In sleep the soul attempts to withdraw from external and internal influences, but desires which are commonly unexpressed in the waking state are expressed in dreams. The greatest differences between Freud's and Plato's dream theories consist in the fact that Plato's was an ingenious intuitive postulation, whereas Freud devised an operational method by which the repressed unconscious content of a dream can be reconstructed and brought into consciousness." Alexander and Selesnick, op. cit., p. 60.

Note that Freud makes direct reference to Plato's theory of dreams to sanction his interpretation of human nature: "Perhaps, then, you will undertake to overlook the offensive nature of the censored dream-wishes
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Or again in the Ion:

... for a poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him. (Ion, 534b)

Thus the existence of the irrational, its relation to the dream state, its relation to poetic inspiration, and its control through the integrating force of reason have all been recognized - all key issues in a depth-psychology.

It is, however, Plato's doctrine of love which expresses best his psychological insight and represents the pivotal point

and will fall back upon the argument that it is surely very improbable that we ought to concede so large a part in the human constitution to what is evil. But do your own experiences justify you in this statement? I will say nothing of how you may appear in your own eyes, but have you met with so much goodwill in your superiors and rivals, so much chivalry in your enemies and so little envy amongst your acquaintances, that you feel it incumbent on you to protest against the idea of the part played by egoistic baseness in human nature? Do you not know how uncontrolled and unreliable the average human being is in all that concerns sexual life? Or are you ignorant of the fact that all the excesses and aberrations of which we dream at night are crimes actually committed every day by men who are wide awake? What does psychoanalysis do in this connection but confirm the old saying of Plato that the good are those who content themselves with dreaming of what others, the wicked, actually do?"


Joseph Jastrow writes regarding the use of Plato by Freud that "with this sanction (Plato's) the Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable." Jastrow, J., Freud: His Dream and Sex Theories, Pocket Books, New York, 1969, pp. 50-51.

22 This passage is strikingly similar to the description that Margetts gives of the fourth level of consciousness in the Upanishads. Cf. fn. 12 infra.
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around which his understanding of man revolves. Like the élan vital of Bergson or the libidinal energies of Freud, 23 Plato clearly states "And who will deny that the creative power by which all living things are begotten and brought forth is the very genius of love?"

(Symposium 197a) Moreover, love is the medium through which a dynamic unity is manifest in the individual as it is the force which links the demonic and the divine in man. Diotima's description of the class of the gods to which love belongs tells as much:

They are the envoys and interpreters that ply between heaven and earth, flying upward with our worship and our prayers, and descending with the heavenly answers and commandments, and since they are between the two estates they weld both sides together and merge them into one great whole. (Symposium 202e)

The ambivalent nature of love is made clearer when it is said that it is "at once desirous and full of wisdom, a life long seeker after truth, an adept in sorcery, enchantment and seduction." (Symposium 203d) Love, as a natural creative impulse, is basically directed towards the good of the individual and manifests itself in all his activities. "For Love, that renowned and all beguiling power, includes every kind of longing for happiness and the good." (Symposium 205d) Diotima succinctly captures the mood and direction of love when she

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23 "In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the "Eros" of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love force, the libido of psychoanalysis, as has been shown in detail by Nachmansohn (1915) and Pfister (1912)...." Freud, S., Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, translated by Strachey, James, Hantam Books, New York, 1965, p. 30. Also on this point see Freud, S., Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, op. cit., p. 79, fn. 1; and the Preface to the 4th edition of the Three Essays, where Freud again associates "the enlarged sexuality of psychoanalysis ... with the Eros of the divine Plato." S.E., VII, p. 134.
tersely remarks: "To love is to bring forth upon the beautiful, both in body and in soul." (Symposium 206b) Love, then, is the ubiquitous energizing force which enables man to transcend himself in a creative, fulfilling relationship with his environment.

In and of itself "love is not of himself either admirable or noble" (Symposium 181a) in its primary manifestations, but if a man acts naturally (qua man) and matures into wisdom, then love assumes a dominant directionality through the mechanism of sublimation.

And this is the way, the only way, he must approach, or be led toward, the sanctuary of love. Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung - that is, from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself - until at last he comes to know what beauty is. (Symposium 211c)

Note that the approach is not one of repression but of sublimation as the life force, libidinal energies, or love is directed to higher goals in the unending search for wisdom.

Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form. By all means.

But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel. (Republic VI, 485d)

The message is clear: 'sublimate or dissipate your energies'.

Also note the emphasis on the habits of childhood and their influence on the adult's behavioural patterns. The lot of those who either by a lack of education or self-mastery have failed to learn the method of sublimation is described as follows:
Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights, and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hoofs of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part of their souls. (Republic IX, 586a, b)

It is only by way of sublimation that man can attain to full manhood and not forever be relegated to the level of the sensual where "grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights" he wallows away his short span of existence.

In the words of the author of The Greeks and the Irrational, the psychological insight to be gleaned from the foregoing can be summed up as:

... the passions are no longer seen as an infection of extraneous origin, but as a necessary part of the life of the mind as we know it, and even as a source of energy, like Freud's libido, which can be "canalized" either towards sensuous or towards intellectual activity. 24

Grube, in Plato's Thought, re-inforces the point being made when he writes:

Plato came to realize the importance of mental conflict... Behind the very real diversity he discovers unity once more, and he pictures this unity as a stream of passionate desire which can be directed and canalized to different objects according to the character of man. 25


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Thus Plato in his psychology of love again proves his merit with such astounding depth of insight so as to rank him with the best practitioners of psychoanalysis in terms of his philosophical insight into human nature. Let us focus once again on the notion of conflict and harmony so that Plato's prescriptions regarding the integrated personality may clearly appear against the background of his understanding of the internal dynamics of the individual. The first crucial metaphysical point to be made in order to comprehend the problem is that there are different forces at work within the individual and this is accounted for, or grounded, in Plato's notion of the composition of the soul.

It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning but a plurality. (Republic IV, 436b, c)

The recognition of conflict renders intelligible such situations as the one in which Leontius found himself (Republic IV, 439e) where his reaction to the sight of the dead bodies demonstrates the interaction of reason, emotions and appetite. Reason acting in conjunction with the emotions censures and attempts to control the appetites thus producing the sense of shame or guilt. Note also that the shame or guilt plays a valuable role and it is not something to be eradicated as it acts in the service of the good of the individual as determined by the reason. The anxiety is legitimately incurred and serves a purpose in the integration of Leontius. The feelings of guilt, when deserved, are in Plato's

26 Cf. fn. 23 infra.
view the sign of a healthy constitution as they demonstrate the dominant control of reason over the irrational.

In Book IX of the Republic, Plato draws the elaborate analogy of the many-headed creature and affirms that good health lies in the integration and control rather than the denial of the irrational. Man must come to terms with himself and in doing so by way of reason and self-mastery he will be better able to creatively unfold his potentialities.

And on the other hand, he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us complete domination over the entire man and make him take charge of the many-headed beast - like a farmer who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild - and he will make an ally of the lions nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth. (Republic IX, 589a,b)

A return to the analogy of the charioteer (Phaedrus 253-254) will permit the further pursuit of the theme of integration. Man's search for happiness lies in the direction of the integration of thought and behaviour, ideals and conduct, for only then is the phenomenon of dissociation avoided and sanity secured.

And so if the victory be won by the higher elements of the mind guiding them into the ordered rule of the philosophical life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and concord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated; they have won self-mastery and inward peace. (Phaedrus 256a, b)

Plato pierces even deeper into the issue in his analysis of the guiding principles present in man, again hitting close to the
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Freudian interpretation of a pleasure principle and a reality principle. 27

We must go on to observe that within each one of us there are two sorts of ruling or guiding principle that we follow. One is an innate desire for pleasure, the other an acquired judgment that aims at what is best. Sometimes these internal guides are in accord, sometimes at variance; now one gains mastery, now the other. And when judgment guides us rationally toward what is best, and has the mastery, that mastery is called temperance, but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasure, and has come to rule within us the name given to that rule is wantonness. (Phaedrus 237d, e, 238a)

Plato recognized the psychological main-springs of pleasure and judgment which, through canalization, ground the notions of temperance and wantonness. Notice that judgment is fundamentally experiential in origin as it is "acquired", while the pleasure principle is "innate"; this indeed seems to herald the Freudian notions as was also seen in the emphasis on love, sublimation, repression, conflict, dreams, and integration. 28 Many of the psychological insights thus far unveiled were ostensibly dealing with other issues, but what is only apparently so is not always the case as Plato's first and last interest always had man and his conduct as the point of reference; indeed, ethics and

27 It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain, that it is automatically regulated by the PLEASURE-PRINCIPLE... The task of avoiding pain becomes for them almost equal in importance to that of gaining pleasure; the ego learns that it must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, the ego becomes "reasonable", is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but follows the REALITY-PRINCIPLE..." Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 365; also see ibid., p. 375; and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 21 and pp. 26-27.

28 Cf. fn. 23 and 27 infra.
morality are what motivates Plato's psychological research as only when a man knows who he is can he determine how he should act. Consider this fine passage from the Republic:

But the truth of the matter was, as it seems, that injustice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns oneself, and the things of one's self. It means that a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendence of the body or it may be in political action or in private business - in all such doings believing and naming the just and honourable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of the soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct, and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance to be the opinion that in turn presides over this. (Republic IV, 443c, d, e, 444a)

The above quotation and its implications serve as a fitting reflection on the theme of integration. Only the actions of the integrated individual who has responded to the Socratic dictum "Know thyself" can be seen to be wise and just in the realm of action. The point is made: who a man thinks he is determines how he should act, and insofar as his self-image is in accord with his nature then his actions shall be just.
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Plato is not prepared to await the advent of the age of reason before beginning to develop the concept of the self. This all important task comes under the heading of education which is a major theme running throughout his works (Protagoras 324d, Republic 376d, 423e, 504a, Laws 643b, Lysis 217b, and the Meno) as for Plato virtue and knowledge are in a reciprocal relationship. For the purpose of this thesis the emphasis on what is today called conditioning or training and the fact that youth is all important in the formation of the adult will be noted. Consider this passage from the Laws:

A child's first infant consciousness is that of pleasure and pain; this is the domain wherein the soul first acquires virtue or vice. For wisdom and assured true conviction, a man is fortunate if he acquires them even on the verge of old age, and, in every case, he that possesses them with all their attendant blessings has come to the full stature of man. By education, then, I mean goodness in the form in which it is first acquired by a child. In fact, pleasure and liking, pain and dislike are formed in the soul on right lines before the age of understanding is reached, and when that age is attained, these feelings are in concord with understanding, thanks to early discipline in appropriate habits - this concord regarded as a whole is virtue. (Laws II, 653a, b)

Clearly then, Plato, like modern psychologists, recognized the importance of the conditioning of the child in habits that would mould his character and endure a life-time. 29 Plato saw that "the habit of transgression is learned from repetition of these petty misdeeds of childhood." (Laws VII, 788c) He calls on the educator to draw upon his experience when he prescribes "The right system of nurture must be

29 Freud's dictum that the child is the father of the man is recalled here, as well as his insistence upon tracing back adult neurotic conflicts to traumatic experiences which have occurred in childhood. The importance of childhood character development is a key aspect of the psychoanalytical approach in contradistinction to modes of therapy which rely primarily on the present life-situation of the patient in seeking their cure.
that which can be shown to produce the highest possible perfection and excellence of body and soul." (Laws VII, 788c)

In another passage (Laws 792d) Plato asserts that graciousness is the watchword and that this is to be attained by those who would pursue moderation and who realize that a portion of pleasure and pain are both to be expected. He stresses that this is the goal of men of all ages and especially "in the newly born, for that is the age at which it is most strictly true that character is made by habit." (Laws VII, 792d)

Therapy for Plato would consist in re-education, re-training leading to self-knowledge and hence self-mastery. Cathartic ritual, Corybantic rites, religion, music, dancing, incantations and poetry also have therapeutic value. (Phaedo 67c, Republic 427, Laws 738, 759)

As Grube points out, the basis of a Platonic therapy is education:

It is ignorance, we are told, the absence of knowledge - which is after all a negative concept - that make some souls misdirect their powers, and this can be cured by teaching and education. 30

Thus the therapeutic process although perhaps not as sophisticated as those of today is nonetheless valid as not only is there a profound appreciation of the nature of man, but also there are all the basic notions and prescriptions necessary to effect integration where disassociation and conflict reign, at least in a nascent state. 31

30 Grube, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
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Aristotle, Plato's most famous student, also came to grips with some manifestations of unconscious mental processes. While an explicit split between the conscious and unconscious is nowhere in evidence, it is nonetheless the case that he dealt with the phenomena in terms which befit a philosophical analysis. In fact, Mortimer Adler in his work, *What Man Has Made of Man*, has performed a transliteration from the psychological terminology of Freud into the philosophical terminology of Aristotle. In so doing, Adler has established two points: first, the fact that the reality that Freud was later to deal with was recognized and dealt with, albeit in a radically different fashion, by Aristotle. And secondly, that the psychological doctrines of Freud are not inherently inimical to the philosophical position of Aristotle. 32

31 Adler's remarks concerning the errors in Platonic psychology are as follows: "The three Platonic errors in psychology are: (1) the substantial separation of soul and body, (2) the assignment of sensitivity to the soul as a power of operation apart from bodily organs, (3) the operation of the intellect in the direct intuition of ideas, apart from sensitive knowledge. Aristotle and St. Thomas corrected these errors by painstaking analysis, but Descartes returned to two of them (1 and 3) and bequeathed the "problem of the soul", in an insoluble form, to modern psychology". Adler, op. cit., p. 193.

32 Adler, op. cit., especially pp. 105-118. To give some indication of the work of Adler in his efforts at transliteration between the psychological terminology of Freud and the philosophical vocabulary of Aristotle, the following may be considered. Freud's basic division into the ego and the id parallels the Aristotelean distinction between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul. Aristotle's division is more subtle in that distinctions are clearly made between the cognitive and the appetitive powers in both aspects, the former is divided into sense and intellect. Freud did
Margetts, in his research, documents the Aristotelean contribution to the development of an understanding of unconscious mental processes in the area of sensation and memory, and it is in this area that Aristotle's explicit contribution to the theme of this thesis is to be found.

not refine his notion of ego to this degree. Aristotle envisages the soul as being clearly tripartite in nature as there is a cognitive, sensitive and vegetative aspect, each with its proper appetite. The Freudian theory of the instincts is in the Aristotelean terminology an analysis of the vegetative powers, and natural appetites and needs. The consciousness of Freud is the act or operation of knowledge or desire in Aristotle. The preconscious would be for Aristotle any knowledge or desire in habit, and the unconscious would be the needs of the vegetative aspect of the soul which are not yet determined by the cognitive aspect. The ego and the super-ego division would parallel the distinction between the speculative reason (knowing the truth) and the practical reason (using the truth in actions). Erotic organizations and the various complexes would be transliterated into the various passions and the determinations which affix to the sensitive appetite. Thus it is recognized that both Aristotle and Freud endeavour to account for the rationality and the animality, Adler suggests that only Aristotle sufficiently accounts for the rationality. Sublimation would be the act of the intellect as it determines the passions. Abreaction would be the catharses or purging of the passions. Conflict and neuroses would be the conflict within the soul where the appetites are at odds with the determinations of reason. Adler leaves his readers with the suggestion that the Aristotelean analysis of rationality and its attending subtle distinctions could well complement the Freudian analysis of animality and the doctrine of the repressed, dynamic unconscious. The point is made that although there be different universes of discourse, the same reality can be pointed to and described; and further, that the insights of one may well complement and supplement the insights of another.

33 In the De Momoria et Reminiscentia, Aristotle set forth his theories of memory, association, and mental activity of which the subject was unaware. Extracts from this work are so clear as to require but little explanation: (450a-30). The process of movement
Saint Augustine (354-430 A.D.) was also fascinated by the phenomenon of memory. Brett records Augustine's observation of the unconscious aspect when he writes that for Augustine, "It is not necessary that one should be always conscious of that which he knows; man, therefore has knowledge as it were potentially, and memory is the (sensory stimulation) involved in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the precept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal. (This simile comes from Plato, Theaetetus...) ... (451a-5). We can now understand why it is that sometimes, when we have such processes, based on some former act of perception, occurring in the soul, we do not know whether this really implies our having had perceptions corresponding to them, and we doubt whether the case is or is not one of memory. But occasionally it happens that (while thus doubting) we get a sudden idea and recollect that we heard or saw something formerly. This (occurrence of the 'sudden idea') happens whenever, from contemplating a mental object as absolute, one changes his point of view, and regards it as relative to something else... (452a-5). It often happens that, though a person cannot recollect at the moment, yet by seeking he can do so, and discovers what he seeks. This he succeeds in doing by setting up many movements (sensory stimulations) until finally he excites one of a kind which will have for its sequel the fact that he wishes to recollect ... (452a-15) But one must get hold of a starting-point. This explains why it is that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes from mnemonic loci. The cause is that they pass swiftly in thought from one point to another, e.g. from milk to white, from white to mist, and thence to moist, from which one remembers Autumn (the 'season of the mists'), if this be the season he is trying to recollect.

"It seems true in general that the middle point also among all things is a good mnemonic starting-point from which to reach any of them. For if one does not recollect before, he will do so when he comes to this. or, if not, nothing can help him ... (451b-25). Thus, then, it is that persons seek to recollect, and thus, too, it is that they recollect even without the effort of seeking to do so, viz., when the movement implied in recollection has supervened on some other which is its condition (i.e. - non-voluntary, without effort of will) ... (452a-1). Accordingly, things arranged in a fixed order, like the successive demonstrations in geometry, are easy to remember (or recollect),
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act of restoring knowledge to consciousness." Augustine was a powerful force in the theological and philosophical thought of his day. In theology, revelation was for him the guarantor of truth. In philosophy, however, Augustine took as his starting point the nature of his inner experience and in terms of his introspective methodology - he was a master.  

while badly arranged subjects are remembered with difficulty ... (453a-10). The cause of this is that recollection is, as it were, a mode of inference. For he who endeavours to recollect infers that he formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and the process (by which he succeeds in recollecting) is, as it were, a sort of investigation." Margetts, E.L., op. cit., pp. 118-119.

34 "It is not necessary that one should be always conscious of that which he knows; man, therefore, has knowledge as it were potentially, and memory is the act of restoring knowledge to consciousness. Augustine recognizes the conditions of a good memory and enumerates at different times what might be called Laws of Memory, viz. strength of the impressions, repetition, order, revision, and above all, the exercise of the mind's activity in the first instance, the application of Will or attention. Memory is naturally connected with reminiscence or the art of reviving one idea by means of another. On this subject Augustine follows Plotinus. He totally disregards the physiological aspect of the process but recognizes the principles of association, agreement of one experience with another in respect to place, time, and manner, and resemblance of one object to another." Brett, op. cit., p. 219.

35 "In the sphere of metaphysics the nature of inner experience is made the starting point for the construction of a metaphysic of knowledge, and this is Augustine's main interest... For the study of psychic life the power of accurate introspective observation is supremely valuable; throughout the work of Augustine we find this power exhibited in a remarkable degree ... when he goes beyond the data of introspection he contents himself with the dogma of revelation; but within the circle of what may be called spiritual phenomena he moves with the assurance of a master." ibid., p. 214-215.
Alexander and Selesnick, who are not always generous in giving accolades to the ancients have nothing but high praise for Augustine as the forerunner of psychoanalytical thought.

Of all medieval authors, the great Church Father, St. Augustine, made the most significant contributions to psychology when he demonstrated that introspection is an important source of genuine psychological knowledge. St. Augustine, as a devout member of the Church, accepted most of its dogmas and superstitions, and believed in Divine revelation as a source of psychological knowledge. However, his addition of introspection as an important tool to the understanding of human psychology was an essential contribution to dynamic psychology. He was the first to describe vividly and in detail subjective emotional experiences, and in doing so he used a methodological principle which is still basic to present-day psychology. Without self-awareness psychology could not exist. Emotions - anger, hope, joy, fear - can be experienced only subjectively; if a person has never experienced anger, there is no way to explain to him what anger is, no matter how precise his information may be regarding physiological changes that accompany anger. St. Augustine's Confessions are a profoundly incisive work of self-analysis; as Brett said in his History of Psychology, "He stands with the greatest, with Plato and Aristotle, and in one respect superior to them. Psychology reaches a second great climax when its expositor can say that the foundation of the soul is continuous self-consciousness, and thought is simply life reflected into itself." To paraphrase this sentence: Thought is simply life reflected and perceived by the living organism. St. Augustine was not only the first forerunner of Husserl's phenomenology and of existentialism but also a forerunner of psychoanalysis. Like Kierkegaard centuries later, he used autobiographical confession as the source of psychological knowledge. It was psychoanalysis without a psychoanalyst listening and interpreting the confessions. 36

Margetts, who has culled the texts of Augustine regarding this point, offers an excellent selection of texts which substantiate the above. Margetts, op. cit., p. 119; cf. also Ellenberger, op. cit., p. 3; and Whyte, op. cit., p. 79.

36 Alexander and Selesnick, op. cit., p. 81.
Saint Augustine, like Freud, recognized "the deep unrevealed motivations that are unacceptable to the conscious personality" and endeavored through self-analysis to reveal them in their unconscious origin, and, through integration into consciousness, gain self-mastery. 37

Saint Augustine's contribution to the history of ideas, and particularly to the history of psychoanalysis is excellently portrayed in the following quotation from The History of Psychiatry:

Augustine refers more than once to those who try to explain man's conduct in physical terms only, thus circumventing individual responsibility and ignoring man's ability to account for his behavior in psychological terms: "Those impostors then whom they style Mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations... (They say) 'The cause of thy sin is inevitably determined in heaven'; and 'This did Venus, or Saturn, or Mars': that man forsooth, flesh and blood and proud corruption might be blameless; while the Creator and Ordainer of heaven and the stars is to bear the blame."

37 "Sigmund Freud offered as the fulcrum of the psychoanalytic doctrine the point that one cannot combat an invisible enemy, that neurotic disturbances can be conquered only by recognizing through self-revelation their unconscious origin. This principle of uncompromising truthfulness with oneself was also Augustine's guiding impulse. As would Freud centuries later, Augustine unwaveringly assailed the hypocrisy of those who tried to slur over the deep unrevealed motivations that are unacceptable to the conscious personality. Fully aware of the asocial forces of mind, Augustine was pessimistic about human nature, but he saw a way toward mastery of inherent evilness through complete devotion to and dependence upon God as the only source of healing grace.

What makes Augustine so important for the history of psychoanalysis is the psychological methods he used to reach the conclusions on which his religious theories were based. His Confessions are an unprecedented example of self-analysis; in this work he methodically presents his earliest memories and bares his soul without reservation." ibid., pp. 83-84.
Fifteen hundred years ago Augustine believed that a sufferer should understand himself psychologically and correct his behavior. In his great work *De Civitate Dei*, the metaphor he uses to express what life would be like without inner turmoil is that of a city of God ruled by truly religious men whose souls are free of all destructive impulses. The City of God, Augustine says, can not be built by technological or political means. Its appearance requires a change in inner values; and it is this sincere concern for psychological matters that makes Augustine's writings so pertinent for twentieth-century psychiatry.

In his *Confessions*, psychology becomes real and concrete; in contrast to the abstract descriptions of Plato and Aristotle, it assumes flesh and blood. St. Augustine's psychology tells about the feelings, conflicts, and anguish of an individual of greatest sincerity and introspective power, and can be justly considered as the earliest forerunner of psychoanalysis. 38

Were one to stop and to return to the texts of Plato, Aristotle and Augustine and to attempt, through the optic of the Freudian experience, to continue to garner the psychoanalytic insights contained therein, one would be hard pressed not to admit the profundity of their grasp of the reality that is man. Plato's subtle grasp of both the irrational and rational aspects of man's nature; Aristotle's profound psychological investigations which excel particularly in terms of his analysis of the content of consciousness; and Augustine's method of insistent probing and his revelation of the depths of his own soul: all of these testify to an awareness of the nature of man which must be termed transhistorical. This is not to suggest that the understanding of the psychic reality of man has not progressed; but it is to suggest that, as far as the history of western thought is concerned, the foundations for the understanding of the psychic reality have been securely laid.

38 *ibid.*, p. 87.
Having glanced at the fathers of the western intellectual tradition, and having determined that the ideas of Freud were nourished, and to a certain extent anticipated by these thinkers; it remains to consider the more recent progenitors of the notion of unconscious mental processes.

Earlier in this thesis, mention was made of the "ideational complex" which grounds and conditions the meaning of notions which evolve out of them. The ideational complex is "the nexus of ideas to which any given idea stands in relation, and from which any particular idea takes its meaning." 39 Again, this is not to assert that ideas do not, in fact, have an ontological referent, but it is to state that the meaning of ideas is, in part, a relational phenomena. 40

This point is given renewed attention because the next philosopher to be considered is largely responsible for creating the ideational complex or conditions which were to nourish the growth of the word "unconscious." As Northridge remarks: "His work is rather preparatory and indirect. He created the psychological conditions out of which the theories (of the unconscious) ... were developed." 41 The man being written about is Rene Descartes (1596-1650).

39 Cf. infra.

40 Cf. fn. 4 infra.

41 Northridge, op. cit., pp. 2-3. Cf. also ibid., p. 2 where he writes: Descartes "may be justly credited with laying the foundations of the earlier theories of the unconscious".
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In the etymological analysis presented earlier, it was noted that the word "unconscious" was fundamentally a post-Cartesian phenomenon. Why is this so? Because there was no necessity to speak of unconscious mental activity (and to name it as such) until consciousness was made the defining attribute of mind; and a fortiori, with Descartes, the defining attribute of man.

The significance of this is noted by Margetts when he writes:

The writings of Rene Descartes ... and John Locke... did much to delineate the meaning of consciousness, which was equated with mind. Following their work the problems of psychology became largely those of consciousness. A number of thinkers who took exception to this notion were those who included in their psychology mind activity outside of consciousness. 42

The ideational conditions, then, were at least two-fold: first, there was the emphasis on consciousness as the defining attribute of mind; and secondly, as a result of establishing a definite dualism of mind and matter, a situation was created whereby emphasis on the nature of mind could surface. 43

Regarding the second of these conditions, Whyte writes that:

"To postulate the existence of two separate realms of being, one of which is characterized by awareness, as Descartes did, may prove one of the fundamental blunders made by the human mind." 44 Whyte further

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42 Margetts, op. cit., p. 122.
43 Northridge, op. cit., p. 3.
substantiates the hypothesis being developed here when he writes that the conception of "unconscious mental processes" developed as "... a first correction of that Cartesian blunder." 45 Whyte gives the fundamental reason for the rejection of the Cartesian dualism by thinkers who followed Descartes: "The assumption of two separate realms is untenable, for the unity displayed in their interactions is more important than their separation." 46

Thus the doctrine of Descartes may be taken as a pivotal point around which the history of modern psychology can be seen to revolve, particularly in terms of the theme of this endeavour. Put simply, "... the discovery of the unconscious was the spreading out of the intellectual illumination that Descartes had focused too sharply. This discovery was unnecessary before him; it was the prestige

45 loc. cit. "... the parts played by the earliest civilizations, in particular those of ancient Egypt, Greece, China, and India, be given their place. It may be that Europe has not developed any ideas of which the germ is not to be found elsewhere in earlier times. More than that, both this "European" error and its correction may be latent in the history of Greek, Indian, or Chinese thought. It would be surprising if that were not the case." Whyte, ibid., p. 25.

46 loc. cit., cf. also fn. 31 infra.
of Cartesian ideas that created "the problem of the unconscious." 47

Clearly, the contribution of Descartes in establishing the ideational complex out of which the specific notion of the "unconscious" was to arise was, although indirect, quite profound.

47 "Descartes the Cartesian was a product of intellectual impatience; Descartes the observer recognized that the pervasive interactions remained a challenge to understanding and offered an opportunity for therapy. But he left it to others to explain why clear fundamental ideas leave so much obscure.

Prior to Descartes and his sharp definition of the dualism there was no cause to contemplate the possible existence of unconscious mentality as part of a separate realm of mind. Many religious and speculative thinkers had taken for granted factors lying outside but influencing immediate awareness; Augustine's remarks on memory are a famous example. Until an attempt had been made (with apparent success) to choose awareness as the defining characteristic of an independent mode of being called mind, there was no occasion to invent the idea of unconscious mind as a provisional correction of that choice. It is only after Descartes that we find, first the idea and then the term, "unconscious mind" entering European thought.

There was nothing remarkable in the ancient view that both divine and physical agencies could influence the mind; that only seemed philosophically disturbing after Descartes had converted many to his view that conscious mentality should be separated from everything else. It may be that part of the appeal of Freud's ideas was due to the fact that he did more than anyone before him toward repairing the dualism into which the thought of most educated Europeans had fallen since the seventeenth century. For Freud's influence has been the greatest in the Protestant English-speaking world, and it was there that the dualism had penetrated furthest. ibid., pp. 27-28.

For a more general appreciation of the impact of Descartes on the history of science and the history of psychology in particular, the following passage from Brett may be considered.

"Descartes' psychology was a consequence of his methodology. As he has been called by some 'the father of modern psychology' it will be useful before embarking on the details of his system, to select the main lines of his influence in advance.
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Spinoza (1632-1677), in his *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata*, indicated familiarity with "association, memory, dreaming, and the various emotions" \(^4\) and their relationship to unconscious mental processes. Margetts cites the following passages which substantiate this assertion:

"Descartes is most famous for his dualism of mind and body, which flows from his method of deduction. Explanation, for Descartes, involved deduction from simple natures clearly and distinctly perceived. Between physical natures like figure and extension on the one hand and mental natures like thinking on the other hand there seemed to be no qualitative similarity. It therefore seemed out of the question that physical events could be deduced from any postulates describing mental events and vice versa. The body which was physical, was therefore explained on mechanistic lines. It was a machine like an animal body. Like the rest of the physical world it could be treated by the quantitative techniques of the physical scientist. The workings of the mind, on the other hand, could not be treated by quantitative techniques; they could only be understood by introspection ... We thus find growing up a mechanistic biology and physiology alongside of a separate science of mind using only the method of introspection. Watson and Pavlov on the one hand and Titchner and Wundt on the others were the final flowers of Cartesian dualism. They were his descendents in more than their concentration on what they deemed mind rather than body or what they deemed body rather than mind.

"... The final general trend of Descartes' influence can be summed up in the label 'intellectualism'. Psychology, because of its close link with epistemology, had a strong cognitive and intellectualistic bias. This was strengthened and perpetuated by Descartes. The investigation of conative factors was more or less neglected, with the exception of Spinoza, by most psychologists right up to the end of the nineteenth century when the advent of biology began to change the direction of interest.

"... Dualism, atomism, 'psychologism', introspectionism, intellectualism, mechanistic physiology - these are the main heritages of Descartes. These trends are as much the consequences of his methodology as of the details of his psychological system. Indeed, he was the father of modern psychology if 'modern' denotes up to the start of the twentieth century. There are many who would maintain, when they consider his heritage, that his revolt against Aristotelianism did more harm than good to the development of psychology." Brett, op. cit., pp. 356-358.

48 Margetts, op. cit., p. 123.
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For when the body is asleep, the mind at the same time, remains unconscious, (Margetts italics) and has not the power of thinking that it has when awake (Ethics III, Prop. II, Note Boyle, p. 87) ... And hence we can clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should immediately fall upon the thought of another which has no likeness to the first (Ethics II, Prop. XVIII, Note, Boyle, p. 56) ... An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it ... Therefore the more an emotion becomes known to us, the more it is within our power and the less the mind is a passive to it. (Ethics, Prop. III, Boyle, p. 203) 49

It is interesting to note that the last quotation in the above paragraph could well serve as a basis for therapy as it points the way to the integration of the passions into conscious awareness. Knowledge is not so much virtue per se as it is the precondition for virtue.

Leibniz (1646-1716) was the first to develop a clear doctrine of unconscious mental processes. 50 He asserted that there was a fundamental continuity between unconscious and consciousness and that the boundary, as it were, marked the threshold of perception. Beneath this threshold, there were countless subliminal petites perceptions which while vague and obscure, were nonetheless the 'stuff' of which the conscious apperceptions are composed. As he was to write: "Our clear concepts are like islands which rise above the ocean of obscure ones." 51


50 Whyte, op. cit., p. 99; Ellenberger, op. cit., p. 4; and Margetts, op. cit., p. 122.

51 Ellenberger, op. cit., p. 5.
Thus there is a distinction between perceptions as existing and perceptions as known. The unconscious was, in fact, the larger domain as it was the basis of the conscious mind, and this applied not only to cognition but also to conation.

A key aspect that was to influence later thinkers, was Leibniz's conception of the "threshold" as quantitative. Whereas Spinoza considered "psychological phenomena to be as significant as material processes", thus preparing the way for a psychological appreciation of consciousness; Leibniz opened the door for a physiological interpretation with his insistence on the quantitative aspect.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) asserted the importance of unconscious processes when he assented to Leibniz's insight as is illustrated in the following: "Innumerable are the sensations and perceptions whereof we are not conscious..." Both the "productive imagination" and the "schematism" were unconscious as they are "activities that underlie consciousness and make it possible."

52 Northridge, op. cit., p. 6.
53 ibid., p. 7.
54 Whyte, op. cit., p. 100.
55 Alexander and Selesnick, op. cit., p. 137.
56 Kant, Anthropology (1798), Section 5; quoted in Margetts, op. cit., p. 124.
57 Northridge, op. cit., p. 10; cf. also Margetts, op. cit., pp. 124-125 for texts from the Critique of Pure Reason which substantiate this assertion.
F.W.P. v. Schelling (1775-1854) inaugurated the school of Naturphilosophie building upon the insights of Jakob Boehme (1575-1624). Schelling wrote of a "primordial will" out of which all had come. This "will" was unconscious of itself. 58

The eternal unconscious, that is also the eternal sun in the realm of the mind, conceals itself by its own undulled light, and though becomes an object, nonetheless impresses all spontaneous activities with its identity, and is at the same time for all intelligence the invisible root of which intelligence itself is only an expression. 59

For Schelling unconscious nature is, in fact, potential mind. It is intelligence in the process of development: "A single unconscious formative energy underlies everything and displays a movement towards consciousness." 60

Alexander and Selesnick note the significance of the contribution of Schelling when they wrote: "The extension of the concept of will to all phenomena of nature carried with it of necessity the concept of the unconscious. Indeed the term "unconscious" was used ... as an alternative for the universal will of the natural philosophers." 61 Although the unconscious is here used as a metaphysical principle, and only secondarily as a psychological one, it is the case that Schelling provided the notion with a currency that it did not heretofore possess.

59 Schelling, as quoted in Whyte op. cit., p. 125.
60 ibid., p. 124.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) took the notion of "will" that Schelling and Boehme had used and developed it further in his work *The World as Will and Idea*. As Ellenberger notes in the following, the realm of the unconscious will became the reality:

... Schopenhauer develops these ideas (of Schelling and Boehme) and describes how, from the powerful stream of Nature's "Will", little streamlets originate, and flowing into each individual are at the basis of one's being and of one's blind will to live. This blind "Will", Schopenhauer said, constitutes almost the whole of our being, while our conscious intellectual life is merely an accident.

Clearly, the notion of the unconscious was becoming topical, at least, on a metaphysical level. Schopenhauer did, however, work out some of the ramifications of his metaphysics for psychology. Margetts records that following a study of Schopenhauer made by Otto Rank, Freud acknowledged the work of Schopenhauer in developing the notion of repression.

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63 Ellenberger, op. cit., p. 6.

64 Margetts, op. cit., p. 125. Freud made his acknowledgement of Schopenhauer's work in "On the History of the Psychoanalytical Movement", translated by A.A. Brill in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, Modern Library, N.Y., 1935, pp. 933-977. Margetts quotes the following passage from Schopenhauer, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 160-169, to substantiate this argument: (italics are Margetts')

"The exposition of the origin of madness in the text will become more comprehensible if it is remembered how unwillingly we think of things which powerfully injure our interests, wound our pride, or interfere with our wishes; with what difficulty do we determine to lay such things before our own intellect for careful and serious investigation; how easily, on the other hand, we unconsciously break away or sneak off from them again; how, on the
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If one considers the following passage gleaned from the writings of Schopenhauer on the nature of mind, one realizes that the Freudian contribution to the development of the notion of the unconscious (more of which shall be seen later) builds directly on the work of Schopenhauer. Indeed, one might think that Freud had written the following:

... let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of water of some depth. Then the distinctly conscious thoughts are merely the surface; while on the other hand, the indistinct thoughts, the feelings, the after sensation of perceptions and of experience generally, mingled with the special disposition of our own will, which is the kernel of our being, is the mass of the water ... The whole process of our thought and purpose seldom lies on the surface, that is, consists in a combination of contrary, agreeable events come into our minds of their own accord, and, if driven away, constantly creep in again, so that we dwell on them for hours together. In that resistance of the will to allowing what is contrary to it to come under the examination of the intellect lies the place at which madness can break in upon the mind. Each new adverse event must be assimilated by the intellect, i.e., it must receive a place in the system of the truths connected with our will and its interests, whatever it may have to displace that is more satisfactory. Whenever this has taken place, it already pains us much less; but this operation itself is often very painful, and also, in general, only takes place slowly and with resistance. However the health of the mind can only continue so long as this is in each case properly carried out. If, on the contrary, in some particular case, the resistance and struggles of the will against the apprehension of some knowledge reaches such a degree that that operation is not performed in its integrity, then certain events or circumstances become for the intellect completely suppressed, because the will cannot endure the sight of them, and then, for the sake of the necessary connection, the gaps that thus arise are filled up at pleasure; thus madness appears. For the intellect has given up its nature to please the will: the man now imagines what does not exist. Yet the madness
distinctly thought judgments; although we strive against this in order that we may be able to explain our thought to ourselves and others. But ordinarily it is in the obscure depths of the mind that the reminiscence of the materials received from without takes place, through which they are worked up into thoughts; and it goes on almost as unconsciously as the conversion of nourishment into the humours and substance of the body ... Consciousness is the mere surface of our mind, of which, as of the earth, we do not know the inside, but only the crust. 65

Thus with Schopenhauer the conscious mind was at the service of the unconscious will, and the latter was the true reality insofar as the determination of behaviour was concerned. The point is made that Schopenhauer had a sophisticated notion of unconscious processes, and that this work heralded the Freudian interpretation of mind. That this is the case may again be seen in the following:

The will, as the thing in itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; in itself, however, it is unconscious. For consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our being; for it is a function of the brain, which together with the nerves and spinal cord connected with it, is a mere fruit, a product, nay, so far, a parasite of the rest of the organism; for it does not directly enter into its inner constitution, but merely serves the end of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the organism to the external world. 66

which has thus arisen is now the lethe of unendurable suffering; it was the last remedy of harassed nature, i.e., of the will ... In accordance with the above exposition one may thus regard the origin of madness as violent 'casting out of the mind' of anything, which, however, is only possible by 'taking into the head' something else."


The last author that will be mentioned in this brief survey of the development of the notion of the unconscious is appropriately Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) who, at the age of 27, wrote a three-volume work entitled Philosophy of the Unconscious. 67 An insight into the nature of this work is provided in the following:

The speculations and findings of German romantic philosophy in the first two-thirds of the 19th century, culminated in 1869 in the famous work of Eduard von Hartmann: Philosophy of the Unconscious. The "Will" of Boehme, Schelling and Schopenhauer, finally took the much more appropriate name of "Unconscious". Von Hartmann's Unconscious apparently acquired the qualities of Hegel's Idee: thus it is a highly intelligent although blind dynamism underlying the visible universe. Von Hartmann described three layers of the Unconscious: (1) the absolute unconscious, which constitutes the substance of the universe and is the source of the other forms of the unconscious. (2) The physiological unconscious, which like Carus' unconscious, is at work in the origin, development and evolution of living beings including man. (3) The relative or psychological unconscious, which lies at the source of our conscious mental life. The main interest of the Philosophy of the Unconscious lies not so much in its philosophical theories, as in its wealth of supporting material. Von Hartmann collected numerous and relevant facts concerning perception, the association of ideas, wit, emotional life, instinct, personality traits, individual destiny, as well as the role of the unconscious in language, religion, history and social life. 68

The influence of this work on the thought of the time was immense as by 1882 the work had been through nine editions in the German, and had been translated into the French in 1877 and into the English in


Von Hartmann succeeded in drawing the notion of the unconscious to its topical peak and in so doing provided "a landmark in the history of philosophy and psychology". The importance of Hartmann's work is recorded by Whyte in the following words: "Yet for the student of the history of ideas von Hartmann's book, and the response it received in many countries, is proof that by 1870 Europe was ready to discard the Cartesian view of mind as awareness, but not prepared to wait any longer for physiology to take over the problem".

One might continue to catalogue the authors who had written about the unconscious mental processes prior to Freud as the literature abounds with such references. Indeed, there are one hundred and fifty-two authors prior to Freud known to this writer who have given concrete indication in their works that they were familiar with some aspect of unconscious mental processes, so the above presentation is but a select sampling of what is available. Sufficient evidence has been presented to accomplish the purpose at hand; namely, the situating of the Freudian experience within the history of ideas, and achieving some indication of the reality that men were grappling with when they wrote of unconscious mental processes.

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69 Whyte, op. cit., p. 163.

70 Margetts, op. cit., p. 130.

71 Whyte, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
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To indicate the range of material that has been discussed under the notion of unconscious mental processes throughout the history of ideas, and to prepare the way for a more detailed study of the Freudian notion, one could do no better than to consider the conclusion of the greatest historian of the unconscious, Henri Ellenberger when he writes:

To summarize this survey, we may say that under the term "unconscious" very different phenomena have been described. They can be classified into four groups:

(1) The metaphysical unconscious: the "Will" of Boehme, Schelling, Schopenhauer, the "absolute unconscious" of Carus and von Hartmann.

(2) The biological unconscious, with its formative and organic activity: here belong the "partial absolute unconscious" of Carus, the "physiological unconscious" of von Hartmann, the "Mneme" of Semon, the "psychoid" of Driesch and Bleuler, the "organic unconscious" of Marie Bonaparte. The phenomena of instinct and habit make the transition between this type of unconscious and conscious activity.

(3) The deep psychological unconscious: the unconscious of the mystics, mesmerists, and parapsychologists, the seat of unconscious creative activity, of the collective symbols (von Schubert, C.G. Jung).

(4) The more accessible psychological unconscious, including forgotten memories (Saint Augustine), subliminal perceptions (Leibniz, Herbart, Fechner), "unconscious inference" (Helmholtz).

To all these concepts, Freud added a new one: the dynamic unconscious of the repressed. Its study had been anticipated by Charcot, Bernheim, Janet and Flournoy, but almost the whole of it was explored and described by Freud. This unconscious of the repressed is the seat of active, primitive, brutish, infantile, aggressive and sexual drives; it follows exclusively the principle of pleasure, ignores time, death, logic,
values and morals: it manifests itself through dreams, symbols, parapraxes, symptomatic actions and neurotic symptoms. Not only did Freud draw the map of this new continent, but he integrated the unconscious into psychiatry and made of it a powerful field of battle for the psychotherapist. 72

With this quotation the survey is concluded; Freud is situated; and new directions beckon to be taken.

CHAPTER II

A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK

Method:

Having situated the Freudian theory of the unconscious within the history of ideas, there remains to consider the Freudian contribution to the development and application of this notion. Since it is the purpose of this thesis to show that the area of the unconscious falls, at least to some extent, into the pale of philosophy, and that accordingly Freud was, however unwittingly, doing the work of a philosopher in attempting to prove the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious, it will be necessary before uncovering the efforts of Freud and his contribution to set forth the distinction between philosophy and the empirical sciences. This will be elaborated from an avowed philosophical posture which will be exposed in the form of a set of basic presuppositions. Having briefly indicated the presuppositions which ground the distinction between philosophy and the empirical sciences, the task will then be to particularize this distinction in terms of the difference between a philosophical and an empirical psychology. Within the framework of this distinction, two tasks will be undertaken: first, the location of psychoanalysis will be ascertained; and secondly, the location of the notion of the unconscious within psychoanalysis will be sought. Furthermore, since the main goal of this thesis is not merely to show that in dealing with the unconscious Freud was entering philosophical waters, but also that his efforts at proving the existence of the unconscious meet with the canons of philosophical respectability; some discussion of the nature
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of philosophical proof will be required before embarking upon a presentation and investigation of the Freudian evidence for the unconscious and the method that he employed. It will be the task of this chapter to provide said background. Its content is accordingly methodological in nature. For purposes of order and presentation this chapter will be divided into two major parts with sub-sections in each. Part one will concern itself with the distinction between philosophy and science, and between philosophical and empirical psychology. Having accomplished this goal, the question will then be raised: in what area or areas does a discussion of unconscious mental processes belong? This question will be considered under the heading: the location of the notion of the unconscious within psychoanalysis. The second part will deal with the nature of proof. Although the concluding chapter of the thesis will attempt to show that only one type of demonstration was in fact used by Freud, the present chapter will elaborate what has come to be known as the experimental method of demonstration, dialectical approaches to proving, demonstration "propter quid", and demonstration "quia". The reason for this plurality of approaches, a plurality which does not in fact exhaust the methodological possibilities, lies in the need to explicitly situate the Freudian demonstration within the area of philosophical proof.
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Part I - Philosophical considerations

1. Presuppositions:

It is clear from a consideration of the methodological outline provided above that a discussion of the issues of this chapter will necessitate the acceptance of a philosophical posture. Indeed, one cannot discuss the issues involved without committing oneself either implicitly or explicitly to a particular view of the nature of philosophy and the manner in which it articulates with the various knowledges. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to explicitly expound or defend a vision of the nature of philosophy, it is, nonetheless, incumbent upon the author to give some indication of where he situates himself on the philosophical spectrum. What are the basic presuppositions that provide the framework within which he works?

This question admits of a general and a specific answer. Generally, the author would hope to situate himself within a tradition which stems from the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, and which is perpetuated and served today by such thinkers as Etienne Gilson, Joseph Owens, William Carlo, Jacques Maritain and Mortimer Adler. While doctrinal differences exist within the works of these authors, they are united in service to what has been described as a moderate realism.

Specifically, this question may be answered by referring to the work of Mortimer Adler whose original contribution to the exploration of the articulation of philosophy and psychology has inspired much of this work. In his book, The Conditions of Philosophy, Adler notes that the
philosophical framework within which he works is grounded in two
basic presuppositions; one about the world and one about man. Adler
presents his first presupposition as follows:

My first presupposition is a commitment to what is tra-
ditionally called realism. This involves: (1) the affirma-
tion of a reality outside our minds - a world of real ex-
istences that are independent of our minds; (2) the affirma-
tion that the world - the order of real existence - has a
determinate structure of its own; that is, it is whatever
it is regardless of how we think about it; (3) the affirma-
tion that the world - the structure of reality - is in-
telligible; and (4) the affirmation that the world, having
this knowable structure, provides us with a basis for de-
termining whether our efforts to know it fail or succeed.
This last point asserts that our theories can be falsified
or confirmed by reference to something which is extrinsic to
and independent of our minds. 1

The second presupposition which Adler presents, and with which
this author wishes to associate himself is as follows:

My second basic assumption concerns the constancy and
character of man. It involves: the affirmation that man
(or more precisely the biological species Homo sapiens)
has a determinate specific nature, which is itself a
determinate part of the real world; the affirmation that
among the properties of man's determinate nature are
cognitive powers adapted to knowing whatever is knowable
about reality, including man himself as a part of reality;
and the affirmation that man's cognitive faculties are
not exhausted by all his sensitive powers (his ability to
perceive, remember, and imagine), but also include the powers
of understanding and reasoning, traditionally regarded as the
powers of mind or intellect. 2

1 Adler, M.J., The Conditions of Philosophy, Delta Books,

2 ibid., pp. 75-76.
These two radical assumptions serve to structure and identify the philosophical posture which grounds this endeavour, and from which the Freudian contribution will be viewed.  

2. The Meaning of Science:

A few general remarks are in order so that the meaning that will be attached to the term "science" will be clarified. Clearly, science can be said in many ways. Especially is this the case today when, in the minds of many, the term is almost exclusively reserved to denote the work of the experimental and mathematical sciences. In view of the origin and development of the word, the question may be raised as to whether or not these are in fact sciences properly so-called? In other words, are the contemporary experimental and mathematical sciences the models in terms of which all endeavours are to be termed either scientific or non-scientific? Do these activities exhaust the range of knowledges that may be termed scientific?

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3 It is contended that all of the above mentioned authors agree with these presuppositions and elaborate their vision of philosophy within their framework. The classical alternatives to this philosophical position are treated by E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1937. Regarding philosophical objections to this position and their refutation cf. chapter two of Joseph Owen's work entitled *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, The Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1963, pp. 29-43.

3a For an appreciation of the literature that surrounds this position see the following: Benjamin, A.C., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1937; Bergmann, G., "An Empiricist's System of the Sciences", *Scientific Monthly*, 59, 1944;
Owens provides the base for a response to these questions when he traces the etymology of the word in the following passage:

The word "science" (Latin scientia, used to translate the Greek episteme) meant knowledge. In Greek and Latin philosophical usage it was given the technical sense "knowledge through causes". It has remained fixed in that meaning through centuries of university tradition from the middle ages down to the present time. Natural philosophers, logicians in the Aristotelean tradition, metaphysicians, moralists, still refer unhesitatingly to their subjects as sciences and to their procedures as scientific. As long as there is seriously a procedure for investigating things in the light of their causes, the method and the work is properly scientific, according to the centuries-old and traditionally established meaning of the term. 4

Science, it appears, is of a much broader range than the experimental and mathematical sciences alone. The basis for this view of science is to be found in the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle where he declares univocally that:

We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. 5

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5 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b8-71b12; Cf. also Physics, II, 5, 417b22-23; Metaphysics, B 6, 1003a14-15; K 1, 1059b26; 2, 1060b20; Topics, VIII, 14, 164a10-11. All references to Aristotle are taken from The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, Random House, New York, 1941.
Maritain expands and clarifies this general definition of science in such a manner so as to render it in explicit accord with the presuppositions elaborated earlier.

We would contend that science is a knowledge perfect in its mode, or more precisely a knowledge in which, under the compulsion of evidence, the mind points out in things their reasons for being. For the mind is not satisfied when it merely attains a thing, i.e., any datum whatever, but only when it grasps that upon which that datum is founded in being and intelligibility. Cognitio certa par causas, the ancients would say: knowledge by demonstration (in other words mediate evident) and explanatory knowledge. We see at once that it is a knowledge so rooted as to be necessarily true, that it cannot not be true, or is in conformity with what is. For it would not be a knowledge perfect in its mode, an infrangible knowledge, if it could be found false. 6

Thus, the search for causes is the key-note of science, and when the cause for any given phenomenon is ascertained, then scientific knowledge properly so-called is said to exist. The clearest example of this type of knowledge is to be found in mathematics, while the most profound example is to be found in metaphysics. 7 The characteristic of necessity is seen to pertain to scientific knowledge. How is it possible for man immersed in a contingent world to attain such certainty? The

6 Maritain, Jacques, *The Degrees of knowledge*, translated by G.B. Phelan, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1959, p. 23. In clear confirmation of the presuppositions Maritain writes: "It is a noetic that recognizes the existence of things outside the mind and the possibility of the mind's attaining these things and constructing within itself and by its own activity, beginning with the senses, a knowledge which is true or in conformity with what is." *ibid.*, p. 22.

7 Maritain makes the following observation: "However, for both the ancients and the moderns - and in this sense they are in agreement - the clearest, the most perfect type of science, the one most perfectly within our grasp is provided by mathematics." *ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
answer is to be found in the nature of the object of scientific investigation which is not "the singular as such but ... universal natures that are realized in the singular and which the mind draws out of the singular by abstraction." Maritain develops the doctrine of the object of scientific investigation in the following passage in such a manner as to give his readers an understanding, not only of the doctrine, but of its history as well.

In this sense Aristotle, following Plato, taught that there is science, absolutely speaking, only of things incorruptible and eternal. However, he corrected Plato by adding that these incorruptible and eternal things (incorruptible and eternal as essences, or negatively) are universal natures which exist outside the mind only in things singular and perishable. Thus, as a result, there can "accidentally" be science of corruptible things, insofar as we apply to the singular the universal truths of science, and to the extent that understanding, "having, so to speak, its own sphere, returns, through the ministry of the senses, to things corruptible in which the universal is found realized." (Cajetan, In Anal. Post., lib. I, 1, cap. 8)

"Although sensible things" says St. Thomas on this score, "are corruptible when taken in their individual existence, they have, however, a certain eternity if they are taken universally." (St. Thomas, In Anal. Post., lib. I, cap. 8, lect. 16) And thus, just as there is no knowledge and demonstration of sensible things except when taken in their universal nature and not in their individuality, it follows that science and demonstration only bear indirectly and "accidentally" on the corruptible; of themselves, they deal with what is "eternal". The immutability and the necessity of the object of knowledge are conditioned by its universality. 9

Thus science in its paradigm instance is the search for essences or natures, and to the extent that it is successful it attains to certain

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8 ibid., p. 27.
9 ibid., p. 28.
knowledge through causes. This shall be understood as the general meaning of science and shall be regulative of the discussion that follows.

3. Philosophical Science and Empirical Science:

Having noted that science in the general sense concerns itself in the quest for essences or natures a further distinction can be made following Maritain. Sciences which are properly explanatory may be distinguished from sciences of observation. In the former, the essences are known; whereas in the latter the essences are known, if at all, indirectly through proper effects. Maritain lucidly explains the sciences of explanation as follows:

There are sciences which deal with these essences as known; not known in any exhaustive fashion (for indeed we do not know all about anything) but nevertheless known or revealed (by their externals). These are deductive sciences, philosophical or mathematical - deductive, however, for very different reasons. In the latter case, mathematical knowledge, the mind grasps entities it has drawn from sensible data or which it has built on them. It grasps them through their constitutive elements, and constructs or reconstructs them on the same level. These things in the real (when they are entia realia) are accidents or properties of bodies, but the mind treats them as though they were subsistent beings and as though the notion it makes of them were free of any experimental origin. In the former case, on the contrary, in philosophic knowledge, it does not lay hold of substantial essences by themselves but through their proper accidents and it only proceeds deductively by being constantly revitalized by experience (the "analytic-synthetic" method).

These sciences are properly sciences of explanation... propter quid est, in the terminology of the ancients. They reveal to us intelligible necessities immanent in the object; they make known to us effects by principles, or reasons for being, by causes, taking this latter term in the quite general sense that the ancients gave to it. 10

10 ibid., p. 32.
Thus philosophy and mathematics are explanatory sciences in so far as they manifest a real outward grasp of the natures involved and are deductive in their movement.

The sciences of observation do not attain essences as such but only surrogate signs of the nature involved. In their movement, they are basically inductive. Maritain describes these sciences of observation as follows:

And then there are sciences which have to do with essences as hidden without ever being able to uncover in themselves intelligible necessities immanent in their object. These are inductive sciences, sciences which (to the extent, at least, that they remain purely inductive - and that is not the case with the experimental sciences of the moderns: Bacon and Mill were quite wrong on that score) are of themselves only sciences of empirical observation (a particular case of knowledge in the simple line of fact ... quia est) and which fall short of explanation properly so called. It is by effects that they make causes, or reasons for being, known to us and so these causes or reasons are not made known in themselves but in signs which, for us, are substitutes for them ... We grasp thereby in a rather blind fashion a necessity whose reason we do not see since a well established experimental constancy is a sign of necessity, and this latter a sign of some essential connection. Inductively established law is much more than a simple general fact; it enfolds an essence but without revealing it; it is the practical equivalent of the essence or cause which in itself remains hidden to us. 11

The foundations for the articulation of the various modes of knowing the world are herein laid. In view of the thesis at hand, these general statements regarding the division of the sciences shall be particularized in terms of the distinction between philosophical and

11 ibid., p. 33; Cf. also Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, Q. 6, a. 1, translated by Armand Maurer, The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1963, pp. 50-65.
empirical psychology, thus many of the issues that could well be discussed at this point will be reserved for further consideration under the theme of this endeavour.

4. Philosophical Psychology and Empirical Psychology:

To write of the history of the science of psychology is to trace a history that stretches back to the work of Aristotle. Adler notes that both philosophical and empirical (non-investigative and investigative) psychology clearly have their roots in the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia of the Aristotelian opus:

His (Aristotle's) psychology (De Anima and Parva Naturalia) was partly investigative and partly philosophical. Thus, the double status of psychology is indicated at the beginning of its history. 12

The history of the distinction between a philosophical and an empirical psychology is much more recent, as is the express use of the term psychology to describe the discipline. Gardeil gives an indication of its development in the following:

ETYMOLOGICALLY, psychology means "the science of the soul." This science is as old as philosophy itself. Every great system of philosophy, from the beginning to the present, has dealt explicitly with this subject, containing a more or less clearly defined presentation of matters relating to it. But if the science is old, the word is comparatively new, tracing back not further than the sixteenth century, when a Marburg professor, Goclenius, used it to title one of his works. The credit, however, for bringing the word into general

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12 Adler, M.J., What Man Has Made of Man, p. 68.
use would seem to go to another German, Christian Wolff (1679-1754). With his Psychologia Empirica (experimental psychology), published in 1732, and his Psychologia Rationalis (rational psychology), published in 1734, he popularized not only the word "psychology" but also a distinction that was to have a long career. 13

Though begun by the ancients and continued by the scholars of the middle ages in the Aristotelean and Platonic traditions, it was not until the eighteenth century that psychology as a strictly empirical science was broached. As Gardeil notes in the following, this attempt was inaugurated by the work of John Locke:

In the eighteenth century, owing to the influence of John Locke (1632-1704), a new step was taken, one that aimed at complete elimination of traditional metaphysical considerations from the science of the soul. Psychological facts were now reduced to purely observable phenomena, behind which the soul and its powers lay, it was thought, inaccessible. Psychology sought to become a purely empirical science, comparable to other sciences of nature; its domain was confined to consciousness, that is, to what was obtainable by direct conscious experience. 14

The antipathy of some forms of psychology to a consideration of unconscious mental processes can be traced to this source. The exclusivity of the spirit of psychology as informed by this empirical tradition of Locke obscured much of the contribution that had been made by the ancients and the medievals, but it did set the stage for


14 Gardeil, op. cit., p. 3.
rapid advances of knowledge attained through the use of the experimental method.  

It will be argued in this section that philosophical and empirical psychology are not mutually exclusive, although a distinction may be made between the contributions that may be expected from each. Indeed, the argument will suggest that these approaches to psychology are complementary and supplementary modes of knowledge, and that each contributes greatly to the understanding of man if their respective proficiencies are properly understood.

Unlike any other branch of human knowledge, psychology is unique as it has for its object a single species of physical things which can be approached both philosophically and scientifically. Indeed, it is the only body of philosophical knowledge that is relevant to a single species of physical thing, and as such it is susceptible of an ontological or dianoetic approach as well as the empiriological or perinoetic approach of the sciences. It is by way of introduction to a detailed examination of the Freudian unconscious that the relationship of philosophical psychology and scientific psychology will be explored, and the various kinds of knowledge that manifest themselves as operative within

15 For an appreciation of the development of psychology see Adler, op. cit., pp. 67-93. Cf. also Brett's History of Psychology and Boring's History of Experimental Psychology.

16 Adler, op. cit., p.186.

17 For a discussion of the meaning of these terms see Jacques Maritain's Philosophy of Nature, translated by I. Byrne, New York, 1951, pp. 73 ff. esp. pp. 74-76.
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psychoanalytical theory will be revealed with a view to situating the problem of the unconscious within the geography of knowledge.

If there is any hope for an integrated approach to man in psychology, then it is clear that the ultimate ground of that unity must be man himself. What then, are the legitimate questions that can be raised regarding man? Adler neatly raises and locates the questions as follows:

(1) Questions concerning the self-subsistence of the human soul, and its mode of being, belong to metaphysics and, within metaphysics, to natural theology. (2) Questions concerning the mode of being of man as composite of form and matter, of soul and body, and in view of the subsistence of the human soul, questions concerning man's unity belong to metaphysics in the province of ontology. (3) Questions concerning man as living, as subject to generation and corruption, and to accidental motions, belong to the philosophy of nature. (4) Questions concerning the specific nature of man, his powers, habits and operations, belong to psychology. (4a) In so far as these questions are concerning the essence of man, the essence of his powers and their essential relationships, the answers must be achieved by philosophical analysis from the data of reflexive experience. The answers constitute philosophical psychology. (4b) In so far as these questions are concerning the accidental conditions of human operation and accidental determination of man's powers, the answers must be achieved by investigative research, by special observations and measurements. The answers constitute scientific psychology.

Psychology, then, begins with the fourth question, and, as shall be seen, it is possible to do psychology respectably both in science and in philosophy. Both philosophical and scientific psychology

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are united in their material object which is man as known through his activities. Man is clearly the proper subject matter of psychology. The difference between the two approaches can be understood in terms of the formal object of each discipline as empirical psychology approaches its material object from the point of view of classification, measurement and prediction of human activities and the goal being sought is a descriptive knowledge which expresses itself in terms of "persistent systems"; while Philosophical psychology, on the other hand, approaches man from the point of view of understanding man's basic nature. The goal here is, accordingly, a causal explanation in terms of basic or ultimate causes. These disciplines achieve their formal objects through the use of different methods which involve different starting points, organizing principles and logics and aetiology. The task will be to explore these differences.

As has been noted, philosophical psychology aims at understanding the nature of man as revealed through his acts, powers and habits. With that knowledge of what man is, it seeks to serve as the archetectonic discipline in matters practical. This may be described as its first-order aim, which because of its method and object it is well equipped to handle.

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18a Joseph Owens writes "The material object is made up of all the things with which the science deals ... The formal object quod is a static aspect according to which the material object is considered in the science ... Finally, the formal object quo is the light in which the inquiry proceeds." Owens, op.cit., pp. 369-370; cf. also Gredt, J., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, ed. 7a (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1937), I, 186-187 (no. 230).
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There is, however, a second-order aim which philosophical psychology is methodologically equipped to perform. Insofar as the psychological sciences rely on philosophy for their basic concepts and principles which are assumed by those sciences, it falls to the lot of the philosopher of psychology to critically evaluate these psychological primitives and to constructively clarify them in relation to their ontological status. Indeed, the thesis at hand is of the critical variety inasmuch as the conscious-unconscious dichotomy which pervades all of psychoanalytical thinking is the subject under investigation. This critical or second-order function can only be performed in the light of the primary or first-order philosophical understanding of the reality that is man. This implies that philosophy has its own method and its own object and can accordingly provide a body of knowledge about man distinct from, and yet supplementary to, the other disciplines that take man as their subject of investigation. Adler notes the utility of this mode of knowledge when he writes:

the use of knowledge to determine the ultimate ends of human conduct and the ordination thereto of all proximate and remote means ... in this sense philosophy is practically indispensable whereas science can be disregarded. 19

The aim of science in general, and scientific psychology in particular, is not to determine the ends of human activity and conduct, nor is it to inform the practical disciplines in the archetectonic sense.

19 Adler, op. cit., p. 136.
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Rather, prediction and control of its formal object has been the commonly accepted aim of science. Recalling the distinction between the empiriological and the ontological, the science of psychology aims at grasping the "... accidental determinations of conditions of the powers in operation, and correlates observable relationships synchronically or diachronically."\(^{20}\) Clearly what is aimed at is the surrogate-sign of essence.

A statement which both distinguishes and unites the aim of psychology, both philosophical and scientific most adequately is to be found in the conclusion of Adler's book where he writes:

Psychology, therefore, seems to me that part of the field of science on which philosophy must win its decisive victory. Contemporary psychology, - particularly the doctrines which proclaim themselves as scientific, - is the source of much disorder in the practical world; in education, in morals, in religion, and even in economics and politics. That this is so follows necessarily from the relation of psychology to all practical problems; it is the theoretic root of the moral disciplines. The view which one takes of human nature determines how one lives as a man, alone and with others. The modern view of man, produced by the divorce of psychology from philosophy and its wedding to science, brings man to a lower state than he fell to from grace. The nobility with which man walked as a rational animal in Greece, the spirituality of man as a person in the middle ages, - these have been lost or obscured. And in their place is the bare objectivity of the man whose nature has been equated to the limited devices of the laboratory and the clinic. The position of psychology in modern culture is crucial both in the practical and the speculative dimension.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) *loc. cit.*

\(^{21}\) *ibid.*, pp. 243-244.
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This passage is directly to the point as it first establishes the role of psychology in shaping the view that man has of himself; and secondly, it situates psychology in relation to the other practical knowledges. When he states that "The view which one takes of human nature determines how one lives as a man, alone and with others", he has succeeded in laying bare the fundamental aim; namely, that of establishing that "view".

One other aim of psychology that permeates all of its history is that of a practical healing art. Here it is psychology as it is applied to effect a cure of the disintegrated, disoriented man that is important. Here a vision of normal or healthy man must be operative as the therapist attempts to rectify the pathological instance. There is every reason to expect that the further elaboration of this normative or normal psychology will be done with both philosophical and scientific psychology participating in an integrative fashion so that each is encouraged to contribute according to their methodological proficiencies.22

(i) Starting Points:

Philosophical psychology is rooted in common or public experience. Adler offers the following definition which asserts that common experience is used:

... to denote the whole set of experiences which men have naturally through the ordinary operation of their senses, their memories and imaginations. Though the experiences of

22 That a rapprochement is occurring is evidenced by the work of Adler as well as by more recent contributions by such men as Kahn, Van Kamm, May, et. al.
two men are not in all details the same, they both have common experience to the extent that they share experiences which have thus arisen naturally in the course of their lives. That men share experiences follow from the fact that they live, for the most part, in the same world of objects and from the fact that as sensitive animals they have the same specific powers and operations. The negative definition of common experience is that it does not result from investigation. This does not mean that ordinary men, who are not scientists, never investigate. It means only that their common experience is not the result of any deliberate research or inquisitive effort on their part. 23

In this description of the nature of common experience that serves as the starting point for philosophical psychology, Adler is referring not only to the common contents of an experience that is attainable by all men, he is also pointing to the common manner in which men experience their environment by virtue of their sharing a common nature which has powers and habits peculiar to it. This common experience will become clearer if it is understood in relation to the starting point of empirical psychology which is "special experience". The starting point of empirical psychology is much more particularized than that of philosophical psychology insofar as it is rooted in special experience.

Special experience is positively defined as being the result of deliberate research and specially contrived inquisitive efforts. An experiment can be defined as an artistically devised experience. Instead of waiting for the multiplication of sensations and memories to do their work toward the production of an experience, the scientist performs operations and manipulations which

23 Adler, op. cit., p. 130.
create for the senses at once what the imagination might never produce naturally. The experiment as an artificial experience has the same quasi-universality that a natural experience has. It is this quasi-universality which makes both the natural experience and the experiment the proximate matter from which an induction can be made. The experiment is the ideal of scientific method, not only because it so readily yields an induction, but because it differs so radically from the natural manner of experiencing ... The distinction between common and special experience is thus seen to be a distinction between natural and artificial experience. Scientific method, from its best experimental to its crudest empirical forms, is the art of creating experiences which men do not naturally have. 24

One can readily grasp that this mode of experiencing the world and, in particular, the formal object under investigation, is highly selective on at least two counts. First, insofar as it is generally directed by a particular problem, only a portion of the possible data available would be deemed relevant to the task at hand. Thus, what H.S. Sullivan called "selective inattention" would be fully operative. Secondly, the data is generally obtained through the mediation of instrumentation and/or a particular experimental design. Here, the "special" aspect is high-lighted as the "artistic" nature of the experience is revealed.

Thus, in terms of the point of departure, scientific psychology is based on data which is the result of some form of investigation (special experience); while philosophical psychology starts from a thoroughly natural, non-investigative form of experience (common experience).

24 ibid., pp. 130-131.
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An important point to note is that while philosophy does defend and correct common sense and, indeed, is continuous with it, philosophy does not rely on common sense as a criterion for its validity. Common sense knowledge is itself based on common experience, and as such, it is susceptible of having its opinions which are, at base, unreasoned and unanalysed, corrected or deepened by philosophical analysis. What is being asserted here is that whereas common sense is the uncritical acceptance of effects, results and conclusions; the intellectually respectable body of knowledge seeks explanations and causes, not destroying, but surpassing and yet sustaining the common sense appreciation of common experience.

(ii) Organizing Principles:

In philosophical psychology, the organizing principles are derived from the philosophy of nature and metaphysics. The key issue here is that knowledge of a higher degree of abstraction is regulative of those knowledges of lower degrees of abstraction. This does not mean that there is not an autonomy proper to each body of knowledge, but it does mean that the principles of any given body of knowledge are derived from that body of knowledge that is immediately superior to it in terms of its degree of remotion from matter. Thus, the philosophy of psychology seeks its principles from the philosophy of nature, and it, in turn, is grounded in metaphysics. The edifice of philosophical knowledge is

25 Adler, The Conditions of Philosophy, pp. 143-144.
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ultimately grounded in the principle of non-contradiction which is the touch-stone of all metaphysical thinking. While there exists a formal independence between the sciences and philosophy insofar as their formal objects differ, there can be a material inter-dependence by virtue of the fact that they share a common material object and that the information gathered by a knowledge of a lower grade of abstraction can be used to exemplify that of a higher grade while the latter still remains regulative of, and formally distinct from, the former.

While in philosophy there are degrees of remotion from matter and hence a regulative hierarchy; in the case of the sciences, all are situated within the same level of abstraction. Since science is limited to the phenomenal or sensible order, its method is characterized as being empirio-logical and productive of perinoetic as opposed to dianoetic knowledge. Adler captures the difference neatly when he writes:

The philosopher of nature seeks only to demonstrate the ratio of the being of changing things; or, in other words the ontological principles which underlie the phenomena of change. The sciences of nature seek to discover the interconnexion of the phenomenon of change, the correlation of the accidental variables which in their covariancy, present to us the uniform face of a changing world.  

25a Cf. fn. 77 infra.

26 Adler. What Man Has Made of Man, pp. 144-150. Adler gives the following sources for this position: St. Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Boetii De Trinitate, Q. 5, Q. 6, A. 1 and Summa Theologica, I, Q. 85, A. 1, ad. 1,2. This is in turn grounded in Aristotle, Physics II, 2, 193b22-35, II, 2 194b15; and in the Metaphysics, VI, 1, 1026a13-21 and XI, 3, 4.

27 Cf. fn. 17 infra.

28 Adler, op. cit., p.147.
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An important point which must not be overlooked is that mathematics, being of a higher grade of abstraction than the philosophy of nature, is regulative of the natural sciences as well. Mathematics is itself non-investigative in method and as such must be classified with philosophy, and within philosophy, mathematics is regulated by the philosophical science which is situated at the third level of abstraction; namely, metaphysics. To the extent that the natural sciences become mathematicized, they increase not only in their usefulness, but also in the probative force that attends them. But the mode of knowledge is still empiriological, perinoetic, and phenomenal as the essence attained is the quantitative essence as opposed to the substantial essence.

The non-mathematical sciences (such as taxonomy, morphology, and physionomy) are grounded in, and understood in terms of, the philosophy of nature. The very possibility of classification is understood in terms of the fact "... that whatever exists is specifically determined i.e. is a substance possessing determinate characteristics, both essential and accidental". The possibility of a synchronic or morphological analysis is understood in terms of the fact "... that substances as integral wholes are determinate organizations of parts".

29 ibid., pp. 148-149.
31 Adler, op. cit., p. 207; Cf. p. 38 for further clarification regarding this terminology.
32 loc. cit.
33 loc. cit.
And finally, physionomy or a diachronic or a temporal ordering is founded in the "... fact that changes occur in regular sequences because individuals of a given species develop and change according to their determinate nature. 34

Thus, in the instance of both psychometrics 35 and the aspects of psychology that are taxonomic, physionomic or morphologic in nature, it is understood that their principles are taken from and grounded in a philosophic mode of knowledge. Inasmuch as theoretical psychoanalysis, as shall be shown, is both philosophical and scientific in the sense of a non-mathematical science, the origin of its fundamental principles and its location within the geography of knowledge are implicit within this discussion of the distinction between philosophical and scientific psychology.

(iii) The Different Logics:

The confusion that reigns in this area is evidenced by the fact that philosophers have often used Aristotelean or predicational logic which is appropriate to an ontological, dianoetic mode of knowledge, when investigating areas that are more adequately dealt with by a relational

34 loc. cit.

35 Adler notes that: "The psychometrician is not concerned with human behaviour in the large or with its causes. He is in theory a faculty psychologist, - dread name for the doctrine of powers and acts, abilities and performances, - and in practice he is a mathematician who tries to make crude measurements approximate rational equations... Vd. L.J. Thurstone, Vectors of the Mind, Chicago, 1935; pp. 44-54 also C. Spearman, The Abilities of Man, New York, 1927; pp. 38-39. Spearman more than Thurstone recognizes that psychometrics employs the concepts of faculty analysis, and is thus subordinated to philosophical psychology." or. cit., pp. 202-203.
or a mathematical logic. That the opposite error is also being made is also clear when one surveys some of the controversies that rage in contemporary thought, and which arise out of the attempt to apply a relational or a mathematical logic (which is appropriate to an empirio­logical, perinoetic mode of knowledge) to areas that are the province of a predicational logic.  

Clearly, if one is seeking an existential conclusion, then one uses the predicational logic of demonstration; whereas, if one is seeking to identify persistent systems within any given universe of data, then one uses relational (non-mathematical) or mathematical logic (the latter is understood as a limiting case of the former). When speaking of the logic of philosophy, then, it is understood that the reference is to a predicational logic which is operative only within a metaphysics or a philosophy of nature, and hence, within a philosophy of psychology.  

When speaking of the logic proper to science it is understood that the logic is relational which when considered in its non-quantitative form, is continuous with mathematical logic which is a limiting instance of the former. The notion of "substance" which grounds the predicational logic is transformed in relational logic so that the ground of relational logic is not substance, but "system", or as Whitehead would term it, "society".  

The principles of relational logic allow for a phenomenalistic approach

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36 The reason why this is the case will be developed in this section through an appreciation of the role that each mode of logic has to play.

37 Adler, op. cit., p. 207.

38 loc. cit.
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which uses the concepts of class, order, and system in grounding its empiriological endeavours. The following chart, which attempts to represent Adler's thought on the matter, should yield added clarity. 39

While the understanding that is presented here is of a general, perhaps even introductory nature, it is nonetheless the case that the solution to the relations pertaining between the two logics appears to be found in the direction in which Adler is moving, and in any case represents the clearest presentation of the matter that this student has come across to date. That this issue under study is by no means settled can be seen in the two works of H.B. Veatch entitled Intentional Logic (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952), and especially Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytical Philosophy (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969).

39 ibid., pp. 207-208.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicational Logic</th>
<th>Relational Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where the philosopher uses the notion of substance</td>
<td>The scientist uses a persistent relational system, the structural form of which endures throughout substitutions of particular matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the philosopher deals with attributes of a substance</td>
<td>The scientist classifies relational systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the philosopher determines the integral parts of a substantial whole</td>
<td>The scientist distinguishes subordinate systems included in the relational structure of a larger system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the philosopher discerns the uniform career of change which a substance undergoes because of its determinate nature</td>
<td>The scientist apprehends the relational transformations of system structure, distinguishing the serial pattern as a diachronic order of relations from the part-whole pattern as a synchronic order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the philosopher uses abstracted concepts</td>
<td>The scientist uses conceptual constructions. Note that the empirical content of these conceptual constructs is their reference not to ordinary perceptions or imaginations, but to scientific operations. Thus the meaning of a scientific conceptual construction is determined by the operations it calls for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The philosopher has an ontological grasp of the reality under investigation</td>
<td>The scientist has an empiriological grasp: he deals only with the relations of phenomena, his conceptual schema is constructed entirely by the logic of relations and this enables him to impose or find systems, classes, orders on or in nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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One of the most intriguing epistemological dilemmas of modern science is raised here. Does the scientist impose or find these systems on or in nature? Adler notes that there are basically two responses, each containing possibilities of modification. First, the response of the radical positivist is to the effect that the scientist imposes systems on nature. This is reminiscent of Kant, but with an important difference. Since the imposition of systems will not be due to the activity of a transcendent mind, science becomes conventional and it makes use of hypothetical constructs, logical fictions, conceptual constructs which are practically expedient. The fact that they work, their pragmatic value, is sufficient to ensure their use. It is interesting to note how a rejection of the transcendental mind or a transcendental ego may lead to an epistemology of convention and utility. The "conventionality", the "public" nature of the language game, the fact of "agreement"; all of these serve the same philosophical function as the transcendental mind or ego.

40 loc. cit.

41 One of the major consequences of the Cartesian experience has been the divorce of thought from things and in the attempt to bridge the gap thus posited between mind and reality various doctrines have emerged which, when scrutinized, are noted to be functionally equivalent. Thus, with Descartes, the existence of God is what guarantees the link; with Kant, the transcendental mind; with Husserl, the transcendental ego; in Berkeley, the mind of God; with Hume, custom and belief; with the earlier Wittgenstein, the logic or structure of language; with the later Wittgenstein, the conventional nature of "public" language which accent "agreement" and "usage". Once the id quo and the id quod of knowledge have been identified, then a form of idealism evolves, and another doctrine must be developed which serves
The second possibility is the response of the Platonist. He would say that he finds systems in nature. He maintains that the relations pertaining to phenomena are a real interrelatedness or interconnectedness, and that scientific knowledge is validated with reference to what is independently the case. The response of Whitehead is a possible modification of this position as, according to Adler, he made the error of "reifying the relational logic of science into a Hericlitean cosmology, in which the Ideas may be substituted for the Logos. 42

Another mutation of the Platonic position is that of the Aristotelean, and here, as we have noted, philosophy has its own legitimate way of attaining knowledge of the world, and it uses a predicational logic as opposed to a relational logic to do so. The Aristotelean position provides a source of unity which informs the scientific endeavour while at the same time, recognizing and respecting the contributions that the scientist makes with his specialized methodologies. As Adler notes, the key Aristotelean position that provides a secure foundation for all the endeavours of science is that: "The relations of phenomena are real interconnections rooted in the determinate substantiality of the actual". 43

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42 Adler, op. cit., p. 208.

43 loc. cit.
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In many respects these epistemological alternatives structure the possible positions that are possible regarding the ontological status of the unconscious. Is the unconscious a hypothetical construct, a logical fiction, an operational concept? Or is it a concept with an ontological referent, a concept through which one attains a reality? It is to this question that consideration will be given later. At this point it is sufficient to note that whereas philosophy defines ultimately in terms of the principles of metaphysics using such concepts as genus and specific difference in an effort to delineate the substantial essence of man, and uses a predicational logic, as opposed to a relational logic, science utilizes operational definitions which specify the meaning of the concept in terms of the measuring operations that it calls for. 44 Thus the definitions of science refer to the model or experimental design that is being utilized in any given experiment and not to the existent per se. Science moves towards the isolation of persistent systems of relations exchanging, as it were, a surrogate-sign for a grasp of the substantial essence. The question will later be raised regarding Freud's mode of definition: does the attempt to demonstrate the existence of the unconscious necessitate the use of the philosophical or the scientific mode of definition? Which mode is better suited to providing the existential conclusion that he sought?

(iv) Aetiology:

In philosophical psychology there is a real explanatory aetiology rooted in the ontological grasp of the being under study. Adler locates this aetiology squarely within the philosophy of nature when he notes that: "... the notion of causality and the distinction of the four causes of form and matter. Cause and substance belong to the philosophy of nature". Clearly, philosophy does have a viable aetiology and can offer explanation.

Can the science of psychology offer explanations? Indeed, what is the aetiology of the scientific mode of knowing? Here the positivist and the philosopher join forces and declare that science does not offer causal explanations in the sense of determining real causes. As noted above, the notion of "persistent system" takes the place of "substance" so that instead of seeking causal relationships, "usual sequences" are sought. As Adler remarks:

In any event it is clear that scientific knowledge of any field of phenomena is either mathematical and functional or non-mathematical and taxonomic, morphologic and physiognomic. There is no aetiology in addition. If the scientist appears to talk or think causally, he does so by making the substitutions above indicated, but not by doing any further research or making new discoveries.

Thus, the sciences are descriptive, as opposed to explanatory, and only when the sciences meet with application do the scientists become aetiological, basing their aetiology on "the concepts of substance and cause only when he must operate as any other practical man, and at that point his knowledge is of the same order".

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45 Adler, op. cit., p. 209.
47 loc. cit.
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Drawing the points that Adler has made together, the following answer emerges to the initial question. $^48$

Scientists explain by:

1) Another science which describes a lower order of phenomena. For example, psychology might offer explanations which are in fact descriptions in terms of neurology or physiology.

2) Because science is operational, all technology including the art of research itself as well as the so-called applied sciences, presupposes an aetiology. - An aetiology consisting of proximate and instrumental causes. - Knows the causes of change in the things (substances) with which he deals.

Aetiology of:

common sense
qua artist or operator
and/or philosophy

3) For all practical and productive purposes, the scientist can give his purely descriptive formulations a causal interpretation; he can convert his mathematical formulations to an aetiology by determining what is really the independent variable; he can translate his physionomy into a causal diagnosis or prediction by penetrating to relations of genuine efficiency beneath his secular trends.

4) In the non-mathematical sciences, there is a relational substitute for causality, just as persistent system takes the place of substance. Uniform or at least usual sequences become the attenuated phenomenal substitute for causal relationship.

Identification of persistent systems.
Characterization of systems in terms of stable and unstable traits.

Considering psychology as a science, there is on the one hand psychometrics which is mathematical, experimental and investigative; and on the other hand, psychoanalysis which is non-mathematical, clinical

$^48$ ibid., pp. 205-211.
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(a source of special experience) and investigative. The first studies the quantitative aspects of human activity, and the latter studies the biographical accidents of the activity which is specifically human. If there is an aetiology, then it is one which must be restricted to accidental causes and hence it is not aetiological in the strict and proper sense of the term.

As a result of this exploration of the differences that pertain between the manner in which philosophical and scientific psychology attain to their formal objects, it is expected that the manner in which each exhibits a unique proficiency has been revealed, and, further, it is expected that the fact that these two approaches to man may be viewed as being complementary and supplementary has been established. Within the framework of the distinctions that have been made the further question may now be raised: in what area or areas does a discussion of unconscious mental processes belong?

5. The Location of the Problem of the Unconscious:

Following Rapaport and Gill, it is possible to distinguish levels of theory within psychoanalysis. That this is the case can be seen if one analyses the various types of propositions that occur within psychoanalysis. Basically, there are four types: (i) empirical propositions, (ii) specific psychoanalytical propositions, (iii) general psychoanalytical propositions, and (iv) metapsychological propositions.49 These are distinguished by their

49 Hilgard has presented an excellent analysis of the work of Rapaport and Gill in his article entitled "The Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis", in Sarason, STP., pp. 184-204.
increasing generality, and the degree to which they are removed from direct empirical investigation. This thesis is concerned with the fourth level, the level of theory known as the metapsychological theory. This metapsychological theory can be stated as follows:

The psychoanalytical explanation of any psychological phenomenon must include propositions reflecting the dynamic, economic, structural, genetic, and adaptive points of view. 50

This statement of the metapsychological theory that underlies psychoanalysis is a refinement of Freud's explicit formulation where he dealt with the dynamic, the topographical (or structural), and the economic points of view. 51 The notion of the unconscious is situated within the topographical or structural aspect of metapsychology.

The topographical problem is fundamentally one of discerning the structure of the human psyche. This morphology of the psyche cannot be scientific in the sense of a strict empiricism inasmuch as the parts of the soul or psyche are not susceptible of empirical observation. 52 Since these structures are not phenomenal entities, and since they must therefore transcend the limits of a phenomenal investigation (they are metaphenomenal); it appears reasonable to assert with Adler that they belong "... to the ontological order, since they are founded in the essence or specific nature of man". 53

50 Hilgard, op. cit., p. 189.
51 loc. cit.
52 Adler, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
53 ibid., p. 103.
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of operation and activity, it is possible to infer their existence, and
this existential conclusion, it is suggested, is the task proper to a
philosophical psychology. Inasmuch as this morphological or topographical
analysis is an aspect of metapsychology that is not scientific but
philosophical, it is clear that the criterion used to evaluate a topo­
graphical analysis that posits an existential conclusion must also be
philosophic in nature. 54

Adler in situating and explaining topography notes that
"Topography is related to taxonomy (the parts of the psyche in different
types of characters) and to physiognomy (the parts of the psyche at dif­
ferent stages of development.") 55 In order that there may be no mis­
understanding of the terminology involved, the following elucidation
that Adler offers is presented:

... the problems of the non-mathematical sciences: they are
taxonomic (classification of relational systems), morphological
(synchronic analysis: the part-whole ordering of inclusive
and included systems), and physiognomic diachronic formulation:
the secular ordering of systematic transformations). The
taxonomic can be made to include the morphological as a special
case. The latter is a classification of systems in terms of
part-whole structure. Taxonomy, furthermore, is more than the
mere identification of persistent systems; it involves the
characterization of these systems in terms of their relatively
stable or unstable traits. (Scientific descriptions do not
distinguish essence, property and accident, but the discrimina­
tion between universal laws and stastical generalizations is
the relational analogue of the distinction among the predicables.)

54 ibid., pp. 105-106.
55 ibid., p. 106.
The transition from taxonomy, including morphology, to physiognomy is a shift from a synchronic to a diachronic mode of ordering. Synchronic problems disregard change and time as its dimension. But this indicates that the separation of taxonomy and physiognomy is only analytical. Accordingly, as a system is of a certain type and structural form, so does it undergo systematic transformations; and conversely. (In the substantial order, one would say that according as a thing is, so does it change; its career of modification reveals its specific character.) Although the taxonomic and the physiognomic problems are correlative, they can be independently solved. As a matter of fact, however, they are seldom solved in complete independence of each other. 56

As can be seen above, there is an explanatory reduction to three fundamental notions: classification, synchronic analysis and diachronic analysis. These problems of the non-mathematical sciences are grounded in terms of the philosophy of nature.

The possibility of classification is founded on the fact that whatever exists in specifically determined, i.e. is a substance possessing determinate characteristics, both essential and accidental. The possibility of morphological analysis is founded on the fact that substances as integral wholes are determinate organizations of parts. The possibility of temporal ordering arises from the fact that changes occur in regular sequences because individuals of a given species develop and change according to their determinate nature. 57

Three points are to be noted: first, it is clear precisely what the methods of the non-mathematical sciences are; secondly, it is further evident that these methods are grounded in the philosophy of nature; and thirdly, the point should now be emerging that it is not because

56 ibid., pp. 208-209.

57 ibid., p. 207. Cf. also Hilgard, op. cit., pp. 194-195 for a similar analysis of Freudian metapsychology in terms that, while not identical, make use of the diachronic-synchronic polarity.
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of the method per se that the problem of the unconscious falls within the pale of philosophical psychology, but it is because of the nature of the object itself; namely, the unconscious. Thus, in terms of the metapsychological aspect of psychoanalytical theory, this thesis is focused on Freud's morphological analysis which is part of the topographical problem to which psychoanalysis addresses itself. Through an appreciation of the actions and operations of an integrated substance which consists of a determinate organization of parts and which are given in immediate experience; it is expected that a mediate knowledge of the synchronic structures of the psyche will arise, and because said structures are correlative to the physiognomic aspect, it is also expected that a diachronic developmental appreciation of the psyche will emerge. It is because the object which is being subjected to a synchronic analysis transcends the phenomenal order (is supra experimental or metaphenomenal), this analysis will be philosophical in nature and hence susceptible of being evaluated in terms of a philosophical criteria.

Thus, the argument that has been used to situate the problem of the unconscious is briefly this: because the notion of the unconscious is an aspect of the metapsychology of Freud which is termed the topographical; and because the topography here is an instance of psycho-morphology; and because psycho-morphology involves an analysis that transcends the limitations of an empiriological, phenomenal, experimental method; it is therefore clear that an investigation into the problem of the
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unconscious is a task proper to a method that offers the possibility of penetration to the level of the metaphenomenal and the supraexperimental. If one can establish the fact that the formal object of psychoanalysis, unconscious mental processes, exists; then the problem of what these unconscious processes are may be broached from a scientific point of view.

It will be noted that what is being suggested here is that first, the philosophical mode of definition is prior to the operational definitions of science; secondly, that the problem of the existence of the unconscious falls within the pale of philosophy; and thirdly, that Freud, when he laboured to establish the existence of the unconscious was using, albeit implicitly, the method that is proper to philosophy.
1. Introductory Remarks:

By way of introduction to this section which will consider in greater detail the methods appropriate to a philosophical and a scientific psychology, it should be noted that there are other methods of attaining mediate knowledge available to those who would seek to go beyond that which is immediately given in experience. J.M. Bochenski of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, has written an excellent book on this subject entitled *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, in which he divides his attention between the phenomenological method, semiotic methods, axiomatic methods and reductive methods. Further, it is important to heed the injunction of Bochenski that appears in the epilogue of this book:

> At international conferences there is often no longer any dialogue but rather an exchange of monologues: the proponents of phenomenology and of linguistic analysis confront one another with a complete lack of mutual understanding. But in the light of what present-day methodology has to say to us the various methods of thought are not mutually exclusive alternatives but complementary aspects of thought. An adequate contemporary philosophy should not reject any method, especially since it can be known from methodology how difficult it is to arrive at valid results.  

It is therefore clear that while only two basic modes of attaining mediate knowledge are focussed on herein, there are other modes of attaining mediate knowledge, and that far from being mutually exclusive,

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59 *ibid.*, p. 127.
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these methods may be viewed as being supplementary and complementary
modes of knowing and as such merit a more complete, independent study
by those who would come to a more comprehensive understanding of the
problem of mediate knowledge than the one offered here.

The rationale for discussing only two of the methods is found
in the nature of the quest that has been undertaken. The popularity
of the experimental method in contemporary thought, especially when
it is taken to be the sole, legitimate method in philosophy and
psychology, has been sufficient reason to warrant the inclusion of a
discussion of it here. Since the ontological status of the unconscious
is sought, the method which purports to yield the existential conclu-
sion (namely, the material logic of demonstration which when exposed
should provide a criterion in terms of which an evaluation of the
reasonings of those who assert the existence of the unconscious may be
made in order to see whether or not the fact of existence is anywhere
present in the evidence given) must also meet with attention.

2. The Experimental Method:

The method or mode of attaining mediate knowledge known as the
experimental method will be dealt with in this section with the purpose
of cementing the argumentation put forward in the last section of part
cne. Accordingly, the project will be to come to a fuller understanding
of the method itself and the limitations that are inherent in it.
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So that the discussion will have a focal point, the following description of the method may be considered.

In the experimental method we never make experiments except to see or to prove, i.e., to control or verify. As a scientific method, the experimental method rests wholly on the experimental verification of a scientific hypothesis. We obtain this verification with the help, sometimes of a fresh observation (observational science), sometimes of an experiment (experimental science). In the experimental method, the hypothesis is a scientific idea that we submit to experiment. Scientific invention consists in the creation of fortunate and fertile hypothesis; these are suggested by the feeling or even the genius of the men of science who create them.

When an hypothesis is submitted to the experimental method, it becomes a theory, while if it is submitted to logic alone, it becomes a system. A system, then, is a hypothesis with which we have connected the facts logically with the help of reason, but without experimental, critical verification. A theory is a verified hypothesis, after it has been submitted to the control of reason and experimental criticism. The soundest theory is the one that has been verified by the greatest number of facts. But to remain valid, a theory must be continually altered to keep pace with the progress of science and must be constantly re-submitted to verification and criticism as new facts appear. 60

Were one to accept this as the only method of attaining mediate knowledge, then it would follow that science would be restricted to the sensible phenomena that above all is capable of being measured. The guiding impetus to this mode of thinking is "prediction" and "control." That this is a valuable method is beyond question. That this is the only method is, however, an open issue ... an issue which will be explored further. Before proceeding to that task, some preliminary observations appear to be in order.

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First, it is abundantly clear that the object of the experimental method is presupposed. The existence of the object under study is not thrown into question. What is in question is the manipulation of the dependent and independent variables in a controlled situation that has been experimentally designed so as to yield knowledge that will enable the experimenter to make predictions about the future behaviour of the object of the science, and hence to give the scientist a certain amount of control over the object of his science.

Second, there is an intrinsically open-ended nature to this quest. The jury never comes in to render a positive verdict, although a negative verdict is possible at any time. This has been described as the principle of falsification by Karl Popper. A good example of its application is the attempt of a court of law to settle a paternity case by demanding of the defendant that he submit to a blood test. If the blood type of the defendant and the child do not match, then it is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the man is not the father. If, on the other hand, they do match, then it is possible that the man is the father, but it is not proven by this fact alone.

Third, if one accepts this mode of attaining mediate knowledge as the paradigm instance of human knowing, then all that can be known is the "physical" aspect of the reality that confronts man. Because of the nature of the generic experimental design that the experimental sciences must follow, because of the exigencies of the methodology (and not the object), the aspect of reality that is susceptible of being
studied either is physical reality per se, or the particular aspect is reified, thingified, objectified so that it is made to appear as an instance of physical reality. All of reality is forced to lie in the Procrustean bed of the experimental method and is reduced to the physical or bodily manifestation that can be measured, and if it cannot be measured, then existence is accordingly limited.

This observation constitutes a serious objection to the accepting of this method as the paradigm method of knowing the world, and yet it is the one that may well meet with serious resistance in the eyes of many as the enchantment of ecstatic immediacy has long seduced men into affirming only what they can know directly through sense-contact. Not only is this a hardened intellectual attitude prevalent in the minds of men; but it is also a well articulated philosophical position that has taken on many guises throughout the centuries. Perhaps its best known representative is David Hume in philosophy, while in psychology the Watsonian tradition of Behaviourism which surfaces today in the works of such men as B.F. Skinner comes closest to this position. To assert that there is a reciprocity between existence and commensurability, is to assert that seeing, touching, smelling, hearing and tasting, those first essential steps in all knowledge, are the last steps that man may take. Recalling the second presupposition that was elaborated at the beginning of part one of this chapter, it is realized that the view of the nature of man that informs this thesis militates against the acceptance of the tradition herein mentioned.
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Fourth, accepting the experimental method as the paradigm instance of human knowing, and asserting that all other instances of knowledge are in fact not knowledge properly so-called, leads to the generation of a Weltanschauung which has historically posited the ethical neutrality of science. How much does courage weigh? What are the physical dimensions of honesty? What is the difference between the galvanic skin response of a man who hates, a man who is in love, and a man who is afraid? As far as the galvanometer is concerned, the difference, if there is one, is only one of quantity. The value, the meaning, the qualitative aspect of human experience clearly falls outside the pale of the experimental method.

What is the place of value in a world of fact? Can this question ever be answered, or even asked, by the experimentalist qua experimentalist? The consequence of the loss of "value" and "meaning", the price of having this tendency towards value and meaning frustrated has been termed by Frankl as the "existential vacuum" and the pathological state that develops therefrom is called the "noogenic neurosis". This may in the end be a great price to pay for ethical neutrality.

Fifth, a world-view that is dominated by scientism or naturalism falls prey to the three "r's" that attend the uncritical assertion of the experimental method as the only viable way that man

can come to understand and to possess mediate knowledge. These "r's" are Reductionism, Ratomorphism, and Randomness. 62

Reductionism is capsulized in the words "nothing but". Man is nothing but a glorified computer. Man is nothing but a bundle of associations. Man is nothing but a physio-chemical organism. Man is nothing but a chain of conditioned reflexes. This view is a result of the independent applications of the experimental methodology by the different disciplines, and within psychology, by the different schools.

Ratomorphism may be approached through Lloyd Morgan's injunction warning man against projecting human thoughts and feelings into the rat. Instead of anthromorphic projection, some experimentalists could well be accused of ratomorphic projection. The same laws of behaviour that govern the rat are assumed to govern the behaviour of man. Our large buildings are the equivalent of great Skinner boxes, and the men that populate these boxes are simply emitting operant responses. The work of Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape, is an instance of ratomorphism as is the Human Zoo, another book by the same author. 63 Konrad Lorenz's book entitled On Aggression which was inspired by the "so-called triumph ceremony of the greylag goose" 64 is another such

62 This discussion of reduction, ratomorphism, and randomness is derived directly from a symposium entitled The Ethics of Change during which a paper was delivered by Arthur Koestler entitled "Ethical Issues Involved in Influencing the Mind." The material was published under the title The Ethics of Change, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBC Publications, Toronto, 1969, pp. 1-11.
63 ibid., p. 5.
64 loc. cit.
effort. Frankl's point seems well made when he says that "the trouble
is not that the scientists are specializing but rather that the
specialists are generalizing." 65

The third "r" is randomness which is described by Arthur Koestler
rather succinctly when he writes:

Biological evolution is considered to be nothing but random
mutations preserved by natural selection; mental evolution
nothing but random tries preserved by reinforcement. To
quote from a recent textbook: "... it does seem that the
problem of evolution is essentially solved ... It turns out to be
basically materialistic, with no sign of purpose ... Man is the
result of a purposeless and materialistic process ..."
To paraphrase Einstein, a non-existent God plays blind dice
with the universe. Even physical causality, the solid rock
on which that universe was built, has been replaced by the
driftsands of statistics. 66

Sixth, accepting the experimental method as the paradigm instance
of knowing has telling effects on the philosophical enterprise. Philo-
sophy ceases to become a mode of attaining real knowledge about the
world and becomes a "philosophy of", or else it is diminished and
absorbed into the experimental method. According to some philosophy
in order to assure itself some measure of respectability must imitate
the sciences. Indeed, Auguste Comte's "law of the three stages posits
not merely an imitation but an identification."

In order to understand the true value and character of
Positive Philosophy, we must take a brief general view of the
progressive course of the human mind, regarded as a whole;
for no conception can be understood otherwise than through
its history.

65 loc. cit.
66 ibid., p. 6.
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From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject. The law is this: that each of our leading conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological or fictitious; the Metaphysical or abstract; and the Scientific or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress the three methods of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially different, and even radically opposed: viz. the theological method, the metaphysical, and the positive. Hence arise three philosophies or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding: and the third is its fixed and definite state. 67

Clearly, no position could be more diametrically opposed to the position that is being maintained within this thesis. Comte's Positivism has had a profound influence however, as the position has survived, with modification, and today is served by at least two living schools of philosophy. Following in the footsteps of Comte with Positivism are the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivism, the school of Logical Analysis, and the school of Linguistic Analysis. All of these schools have exhibited the same view, namely, that philosophy in order to contribute must necessarily be a "philosophy of" ... in the first instance, a philosophy of science; in the second, a philosophy

67 Comte, Auguste, The Positive Philosophy, translated by Herriet Martineau, G. Bell and Sons Ltd., London, 1896, p. 1
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of the logic of language; and in the third, a philosophy of common language. 68

If there is one characteristic that dominates this strain of philosophical thought, it is the antagonism that is evinced towards metaphysical thinking. The experimental method is seen as the only legitimate way of approaching the world. It is interesting to note that in reacting against this uncritical acceptance of the experimental methodology in psychology, Rollo May has observed that:

It is also important here to remind ourselves that every scientific method rests upon philosophical presuppositions. These presuppositions determine not only how much reality the observer with his particular method can see - they are indeed the spectacles through which he perceives - but also whether or not what is observed is pertinent to real problems and therefore whether the scientific work will endure. It is a gross, albeit common, error to assume naively that one can observe facts best if he avoids all preoccupation with philosophical assumptions. All he does, then, is mirror uncritically the particular parochial doctrines of his own limited culture. The result in our day is that science gets identified with methods of isolating factors and observing them from an allegedly detached base - a particular method which arose out of the split between subject and object made in the seventeenth century in Western culture and then developed into its special compartmentalized form in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 69


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In rejecting a metaphysic, many thinkers have involved themselves in the uncritical acceptance of an implicit metaphysics, one which has had a deleterious effect on much of contemporary psychological thought.

Seventh, and last, the impact that the experimental method and the philosophy that has accepted an alliance with this method has had on the development of psychology has in turn brought about at least five consequences worthy of note.

First, there is a profound distrust of metaphysics and philosophizing in general. Second, this distrust of philosophy has generated an accompanying distrust of systematizing in psychology. Third, this refusal to perform the synthetic function with the resulting tendency towards specialized analysis has led to a fragmentary vision of man. Fourth, this fragmentation in the study of psychology has led to the formation of the "schools" of psychology each of which focus on one aspect of man and endeavours to understand the totality in terms of the part. Note, and this is the fifth consequence, that in terms of the analytic-synthetic polarity a dialectic has occurred. As a result of the over-extension of the analytical thrust of the human mind, the desire for synthesis has flooded back into contemporary psychological thinking with such intensity so as to mark a return to the very thing that was initially rejected, namely, metaphysics. Thus, assessing the work that is being done by such eminent thinkers as Rollo May, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugen Kahn, et. al., L.E. Lynch observes that:
During the nineteenth century, they (the above mentioned) reasoned, the psychologist as a scientist quite properly proclaimed his independence of the metaphysics of the day. But it has become clear in fairly recent years that in casting off what was expressly recognized as metaphysical thinking in the early days of experimental science, a new and oftentimes unrecognized metaphysic had been substituted for the old. Science always had its presuppositions, and it is important for the psychiatrist to know just what they are, lest those assumptions unwittingly intrude themselves between himself and the patient he is trying to cure. Careful investigation has convinced this group of scholars that on at least three points an unobserved metaphysic has, indeed, come to interfere with their treatment of patients: first, a view of man that alienates him from the world he inhabits; second, an interpretation of human sensation that results from such a view of man and divorces human response from the sensible things of the world; third, a progressive fragmentation of man attendant upon the specialization of the various sciences.

... (these men) ... trace the roots of these three positions back to the philosophical speculation of René Descartes and the classical philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially John Locke and David Hume. 70

The last science to emerge, psychology, is the very science that has put the lie to the assertion that the experimental method is the only valid manner in which man may garner mediate knowledge. It is important to realize that it is not because the experimental method cannot yield valuable knowledge in the study of man that this reversal has come about. Indeed, to discover the wealth of knowledge that has been the result of the application of the experimental method to the study of man, one need only read Edwin G. Boring's A History of Experimental Psychology. 71


The fundamental reason for the return to metaphysics appears to be the limited view of man that the experimental method permits.

Thus, the conclusion that arises is that the experimental method is but a limiting case of the experiential, and, as shall be shown in the remainder of this section, man has at his disposal other modes of attaining mediate knowledge than the one described herein.

3. The Method of Demonstration:

By way of introduction to a consideration of the material logic of demonstration, the question may be raised: why not use the modern relational logic instead of the more traditional predicational logic? The answer to this question lies implicit in the distinctions made in part one of this chapter and is expressed by Adler in the following words:

There is a real difference between these two logics. Aristotelean logic is the logic of a philosophical knowledge in so far as it is concerned with ontological problems. It is the logic appropriate to an enquiry into substance and causes. Relational logic is the logic of modern mathematics and investigative science. Science does not treat of substance and causes; it investigates the phenomena with a view to classification, order, correlation, measurement, systematization. The operational character of relational (or mathematical) logic is appropriate to the operational principles of scientific method. Aristotelean "science" is bad as science because it attempts to apply a predicational logic to the study of phenomena. Modern "philosophy" is bad as philosophy to the extent that it makes the opposite error. 72

72 Adler, op. cit., p. 127.
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The point that is being made is that the scientist "is concerned primarily with the characteristics and relational patterns of the phenomenal world. He never asks, because he need not, whether that world exists. If he sometimes seems to be asking the existential question, viz., whether atoms exist, he has unwittingly turned philosopher." 73 When, in the next chapter, the evidence adduced to support the assertion that there exist unconscious mental processes is examined, it is clear that both the task of demonstrating its existence and of evaluating the demonstration falls to the lot of the philosopher and not the experimental scientist. What is being argued at this point confirms the argumentation of section five of part one of this chapter, namely, that when Freud laboured to demonstrate the existence of the unconscious, he was not using the method proper to psychoanalysis, nor was he using the experimental method or any modification thereof; instead he had unwittingly appropriated the method proper to philosophy in a strict and proper sense.

What then is demonstration? And what are the conditions under which a demonstration is said to have been effected? Both of these questions are answered by Aristotle in the following words:

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause. 74

73 ibid., p. 143.
74 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b16 ff.
Further on in the same chapter of the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle expresses his understanding of the conditions of demonstration as follows:

The premises must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it; its causes, since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause; prior, in order to be its causes; antecedently known, this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding of the meaning, but knowledge of the fact as well. Now 'prior' and 'better known' are ambiguous terms, for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man; objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. 75

Clearly, this notion of demonstration is in accord with the preliminary distinctions offered between philosophy and science, and the distinction between the logic employed in psychology as a science and philosophical psychology, moreover, it is consonant with the generic definition of science that was offered at the beginning of this chapter. Demonstration may be obtained in two ways. Aquinas offers the following as an explanation of the two ways in which a demonstration may be secured:

Demonstration can be made in two ways: one is through the cause, and is called *propter quid*, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration *quia*; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long

as its effects are better known to us; because, since every
effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. 76

In order to lay a foundational understanding for a further
explanation of the process of demonstration, it would appear pertinent
to consider those principles which guarantee its validity. These
principles are the tools without which the validity of the metaphysical
enterprise would be lost. Joseph Owens expresses them clearly and
succinctly when he writes:

The immediate axiom or principle of being, accordingly,
is worded with those conditions: a thing cannot both be
and not be at the same time and in the same respects.
This maxim is so primal that it cannot be proven and needs
no proof. It is presupposed by any proof and it makes
demonstration possible. It shows that the terms of the
propositions may retain their fixed meaning throughout the
course of the demonstration, and excludes a wonderland of
nonsense in which anything could be said indifferently of
anything. For this reason it was known in the Aristotelian
tradition as the first principle of demonstration. Since
it determines a thing to one of the two sides of a contra-
diction, it is known in modern times as the principle of
contradiction. It allows no middle state between the two
sides of the contradiction. This aspect of it is called
the principle of excluded middle. The maxim itself is but
an expression of what is immediately apprehended in the
judgment of being, and so provides its own evidence in a
way stronger than any proof. It formulates what is known
in the immediate apprehension of being. 77

76 Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, 2, 2, translated
by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Burns, Oates, and
Washbourne Ltd., London, 1947, quoted in Lynch, op. cit. p. 62; cf. also

77 Owens, op. cit., pp. 114-115; Owens in a footnote appended
to this quotation writes the following by way of indicating the sources of
this doctrine: "See Aristotle, Metaph., T 3-4, 1005b11-1006b1. This is the
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Not only are these principles the logical primitives in the sense that all reasoning is based on them, but they are believed to be ontological principles in the sense that they accurately reflect the primal structure of reality. In as much as they are truly principles, then it follows that they are not subject to demonstration, but rather they are presupposed by demonstration. Since it is impossible to demonstrate them, then they are given immediately in judgment. That this is the case is seen from the attempt to deny them. Even in order to deny them, one must use that which one wishes to deny. Hence the trenchant truth to the saying that if one wishes to deny metaphysics, then one must use metaphysics.

The reason for introducing the principles at this point is to establish that from the method known as demonstration which purports to yield existential conclusions when used properly, real knowledge about the real world shall be attained; and not just useful hypotheses, hypothetical constructs or useful fictions. The reality of that knowledge is guaranteed by the activity of judgment which operates not in virtue of the knowing subject, but in virtue of the object known. In other words, it is the existential reality of the terms in the premises only axiom or demonstrative principle that is absolutely first: "... for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms". ibid., 3, 1005b33-34; Oxford tr. Cf.: "...it belongs to the primary philosopher to consider the first principle of demonstration". St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 6 (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi), no. 596. "For what first falls under apprehension is being (ens), the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever anyone apprehends. And therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that nothing is to be affirmed and denied at the same time. This is based upon the aspect being and not being; and upon this principle all others are based, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics." ST, I-II, 94, 2c; see also In IV Metaph., lect. 6, no.605."
that allow for the conclusion to be asserted with equal value. Although it cannot be the purpose of this thesis to vindicate a posture which accepts the existence of an external world, nevertheless such a posture has been presupposed, and was expressed earlier in this chapter in the following words:

My first presupposition is a commitment to what is traditionally called realism. This involves: (1) the affirmation of a reality outside our minds - a world of real existences that are independent of our minds; (2) the affirmation that the world - the order of real existence - has a determinate structure of its own; that is, it is whatever it is regardless of how we think about it; (3) the affirmation that the world - the structure of reality - is intelligible; and (4) the affirmation that the world, having this knowable structure, provides us with a basis for determining whether our efforts to know it fail or succeed. This last point asserts that our theories can be falsified or confirmed by reference to something which is extrinsic to and independent of our minds. 78

The point that is being made is that when the metaphysician uses the tools of the logician, he is not merely attempting to elucidate formal truths that apply only to the realm of the ens rationis and that have no material implication. Instead of dealing with the ens rationis inquantum ens rationis, he is grappling with the ens rationis inquantum ens.

Whence arises the certitude of the conclusions arrived at by demonstration? In the position that is being elaborated, if any degree of certitude is attained, it is due to the certitude of the principles. The principles, as was above indicated, are the first principles of the science of metaphysics which are given in any and all judgments. One

78 Cf. fn. 1 infra.
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might consider the notion of principle in a slightly different way and discover that since it is the case that all knowledge, all cognition, begins with the senses, then it is possible to guarantee the validity of a given conclusion by tracing this cognition back to the sense experience that initially gave rise to that cognition. This is not to depart from the position being elaborated as much the same result will be achieved. That this is the case is to be seen from the fact that metaphysics, as a body of knowledge about reality as it exists, must have its origin in cognitions that are ultimately capable of being traced back to the various human capacities involved in knowing. St. Thomas says as much when he writes: "... the cognition of the conclusions has its origin in the principles, hence a correct judgment about the conclusion cannot be had except by analyzing back to the principles. Therefore since all cognition of our intellect arises from sensation, there cannot be a correct judgment unless it be brought back to sensation". 79 Hence, if there is certitude, it is due to the certitude inherent in the first principles of all knowledge, be that knowledge metaphysical or otherwise.

When it is said that certitude is attained in virtue of the first principles, it must be realized that the intellect is not turning in upon itself for its verification. Rather, because the first principles of all knowledge are the primal ontological principles, truth is assured with certainty when that which is in the intellect adequately grasps

79 Aquinas, St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 9, a. 4, Resp. ad q. 1m.
that which is in reality. Thus, truth is the adequation of the intellect to a reality which is independent of that intellect. This is a far different enterprise from seeking to verify one's knowledge by seeking "clear and distinct ideas", or "simple sensations", or even in attempting to discover the meaning of a given statement in how it is "used". In the analysis of cognition that supports this approach to mediate knowledge, there is no divorce between thought and things, and hence to speak meaningfully of a criterion of truth in the Cartesian sense is to create a problem which does not exist in this tradition. Since it is the case that there is no radical rupture between thought and things, then it follows that the attempt to attain real causal knowledge about real beings is possible. 80

Returning to Aristotle's definition of demonstration, it will be noted that he enumerated the characteristics that the premises must have in order to be productive of scientific knowledge. 81 Edward G. Simmons offers the following as an elucidation of these characteristics:


81 Cf. p. 50 infra.
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1. The premises must be true, for only true premises can cause the conclusions to be true. False premises allow for, but in no sense ever guarantee, a true conclusion.

2. The premises must be primary. This means that they must be principles of demonstration which are themselves not demonstrated (or ultimately reduced to such propositions). The alternative to this is an absurd infinite regress in premises. In the strict sense a premise is a primary principle of demonstration only if it is proper to its conclusion, that is, only if it is strictly proportioned to the scientific subject. Thus requires, for example, that whenever a conclusion is about a mathematical subject the middle term in the premises be expressed in a mathematical fashion. A statement out of logic or out of physics would not function properly as a primary premise in mathematical discourse.

3. The premises must be immediate. This means that the predicate in a premise must belong immediately (that is, not by way of any middle term) to its subject. Again, unless we have this, at least reductively, there is an impossible infinite regress in premises.

4. The premises must be prior to the conclusion because they are principles from which the conclusion proceeds.

5. The premises must be better known than the conclusion because they serve as principles which manifest the conclusion, which in itself lacks the evidence they supply.

6. The premises must be the cause of the conclusion. In one sense this is true of all premises. It is the very nature of argument that the conclusion be virtually in the premises as an effect in a cause. Premises and conclusion are always so related so that a knowledge of the premises as premises cause a knowledge of the conclusion. The premises in the strict form of demonstration are related to the conclusion as cause to effect in a very special way. The premises not only cause the conclusion to be known, but they represent the real cause which explains the reality represented in the conclusion.

These six characteristics delineated by Aristotle are the conditions that the premises must satisfy if the syllogism is to be productive of scientific knowledge. A consideration of these six issues would certainly be part of a criterial evaluation of scientific knowledge.

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attained through the use of the syllogism. Regarding the kinds of
demonstration that are possible Simmons, following Aristotle and Aquinas,
offers the following:

Demonstration can be divided into two types from two dif-
ferent points of view. From one point of view, demonstration
is either explanatory demonstration (*propter quid*) or
demonstration of the fact (*quia*). Explanatory demonstration
not only manifests with certitude the fact that something
is necessarily true, but it expresses the proper and
adequate reason why it must be true and could not not-be
true. Demonstration of the fact simply manifests with cer-
titude the fact that something is necessarily true. From
another point of view, demonstration is either a priori
or a posteriori. A priori demonstration moves from a
necessary cause to its effect, and a posteriori demonstration
proceeds from an effect to its necessary cause. 83

In the light of this quotation, it is clear that demonstration
*propter quid* is the paradigm type of demonstration as it yields the
most perfect sort of knowledge. All other modes of demonstration yield
less certitude as they employ remote, instead of proximate causes in their
middle terms. Because of the nature of this type of demonstration, it
is relatively difficult for man to employ it successfully in all of his
attempts to attain mediate knowledge. In as much as a proximate cause
is required, a knowledge of the essence of the subject of the demonstra-
tion is needed. Man's grasp of essence, however, tends to be more
discursive than immediate. Indeed, only in the science of mathematics
is the *propter quid* model of demonstration used frequently as the
quantitative essences are the most accessible to the human mind. As
Joseph Owens notes:

83 Simmons, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-265.
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Because the mathematical essences are so immediately knowable, pedagogically mathematics furnishes the model for demonstrating properties of a subject through the essence as middle term ... In modern times all the experimental sciences have become mathematicized, and thereby have made marvelous progress ... Taking as basic quantitative principles certain observable measures, they are able to explain their sensible objects with all the **propter quid** penetration of mathematics. They give perfect science of things in the sensible world. 84

One can understand and appreciate the desire of the different branches of modern science to appropriate the methods of mathematics in order to render their particular science more perfect. It must be remembered, however, that the essence grasped is the quantitative and not the substantial essence. Sciences that are essentially descriptive in mode have access to the **quia** form of demonstration only, and when they are mathematicized then and then only is it possible for them to utilize the **propter quid** mode of demonstration. But even when these sciences use the **propter quid** demonstration, they do not by that fact attain an ontological grasp of the object of their science as they are focussing on the quantitative essence of that object.

Regarding the **quia** demonstration, it is noted that there are two types: a **priori** demonstration of the fact, and a **posteriori** demonstration of the fact. These are described as follows:

An **a priori** demonstration of the fact proves that the predicate of the conclusion belongs to its subject by relating them through a middle term which expresses the remote or mediate cause of the predicate. In so far as the middle term is not the proximate cause of the effect, this falls short of the perfection demanded for explanatory demonstration.

But in so far as this is a demonstration from cause to effect, this type of demonstration is *a priori*. There are two ways to construct an *a priori* demonstration of fact. In the first case the cause through which the effect is proved is remote in the sense of being once removed in the real order. In the second case the effect is proved through a cause remote in the sense of being generic, that is, once removed in the order of abstraction. The first kind is expressed in the first figure concluding directly. However, the second type can be expressed only in the second figure, and, accordingly, allows only for a negative conclusion. 85

The second type of *quia* demonstration is the *a posteriori* demonstration of fact. This type is subject to two expressions:

An *a posteriori* demonstration of fact is achieved by way of a middle term which is related to the predicate of the conclusion as effect to cause. One instance of this type of demonstration involves an effect convertible with its cause, while another involves an effect less extended than its cause. 86

85 Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 267; Simmons offers the following as examples of the *a priori* demonstration of fact:

- Every rational animal can learn geometry.
- But every man is a rational animal.
- Therefore, every man can learn geometry.

This exemplifies the first instance of the *a priori* demonstration of fact where in 'the cause through which the effect is proved is remote in the sense of being once removed in the real order'... The second instance that he describes in the passage quoted is exemplified as follows:

- Everything capable of speech is an animal.
- But no plant is an animal.
- Therefore, no plant is capable of speech.

In this instance, 'the effect is proved through a cause which is remote in the sense of being generic'...

86 *ibid.*, p. 268. The two instances of the *a posteriori* demonstration of fact are exemplified as follows:

**First:** Whatever is capable of speech is a rational animal.
- But every man is capable of speech.
- Therefore, every man is a rational animal.

The second is as follows:

- Whatever is capable of speech has a soul.
- But every man is capable of speech.
- Therefore, every man has a soul.
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As a result of this exposition of the types of demonstration that are possible, it is clear that the middle term bears the brunt of scrutiny in attempting to evaluate the success of any particular syllogism in generating scientific knowledge as the middle term is the reason offered for accepting the conclusion as a valid inference. As Simmons remarks: "This middle term must in every case be the cause of the knowledge of the connection between the extremes in the conclusion. In an a posteriori proof the middle term is a cause only of the knowledge of the connection". 87 The question would be for purposes of evaluation, what is the nature of the evidence offered to assert the validity of the middle term?

The question that has been raised may be phrased: how is it possible to show that the middle term is sufficient to guarantee knowledge of the connection between the extremes of the conclusion? Note that Aristotle, in the third characteristic that the premises of a demonstration must possess, had said that the premises must be "immediate". In other words, the middle term must in some way be shown to be immediately connected with the extremes of the conclusion, or the impossible alternative is to regress to infinity offering along the way successive middle terms to substantiate the one prior to it. Thus the challenge to the one who would demonstrate is to show in the light of something other than deductive evidence, that the premises are evident.

This challenge may be met in two ways: the first is to use

87 Cf. p. 4 infra.
dialectical argumentation which is a respectable method proper to philosophy; and the second is by way of induction.

4. Dialectical Reasoning:

If the second presupposition that was delineated at the beginning of this chapter is recalled, it will be noted that it involved among other affirmations, the affirmation "... that man's cognitive faculties are not exhausted by all his sensitive powers (his ability to perceive, remember, and imagine), but also include the powers of understanding and reasoning, traditionally regarded as the powers of mind or intellect". 88 According to Aristotle there are four species of reasoning: (i) demonstration, (ii) dialectical, (iii) contentious, and (iv) fallacious reasoning. 89 The relationship of the first two forms of reasoning is of interest here and is described by Aristotle as follows:

Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through the premises which are primary and true; (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. 90

88 Cf. p. 4 infra.
89 Aristotle, Topics, I, 1, 100a25 ff.
90 Aristotle, Topics, I, 1, 100a25-100a31.
The clearest example of the use of dialectical argumentation is to be found in most discussions where the opinions of the "recognized authorities" are taken as the starting point. Clearly the premises of such discussion are not evident in and of themselves, but are accepted as being true "for the sake of discussion". Aristotle notes that dialectics have a significant role to play in philosophy, and he states that role in the following:

For the study of the philosophical sciences it (dialectic) is useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries. 91

Clearly, the skills of the dialectician are particularly useful prior to demonstration as since the principles from which one demonstrates cannot themselves be demonstrated, it is necessary to prepare the mind for receiving them by means other than demonstration, and one such way is dialectics. Indeed, with the skillful use of dialectic, it is possible to lead one to the threshold of insight where one is expected to take the intuitive leap into apodicity and self-evidence that awaits on the other side of that threshold. The principle of contradiction is understood in just such a manner.

91 Aristotle, Topics, I, 2, 101a34-101b5.
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The dialectical method also prepares the way leading to a demonstration by permitting the dialectician to weigh the opinions of others in order to glimpse the possibilities inherent in any given position. Perhaps the capacity of the dialectician to explore the realm of the possible, to plumb the universe of discourse, is the most valuable of his traits, as in so doing many fecund hypotheses may present themselves which open up as yet untrammeled vistas.

Simmons offers the following contrast which sets the scientist clearly apart from the dialectician in the light of the foregoing discussion of demonstration:

The scientist who demonstrates his conclusion resolves one of two contradictory propositions into self-evident principles which demand acceptance of this proposition and the rejection of its contradictory. The dialectician, on the other hand, resolves one side of a contradiction into premises which certainly support it as probable but which allow for other premises which might support its opposite. On the side of form, the demonstration and the dialectical syllogism are of equal status - each must be, for its own purposes, indefectibly valid. It is on the side of matter that they differ. The demonstration proceeds from premises which cannot be false, because they are ultimately self-evident. The dialectical argumentation proceeds from probably true premises, which can, of course, communicate to their conclusions no more than their original probability. 92

When it is said that the principles of a demonstration may be made to manifest their self-evidence through dialectics this does not mean that these indemonstrable principles are the conclusions of dialectical reasoning as such. Rather it means that the mind was led

92 Aristotle, Topics, I, 2, 101a34-101b5.
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to the threshold of insight, which when crossed, was crossed on the basis of the self-evidence of the principles themselves and not on the conclusions of the dialectical argumentation per se. Thus, the manner in which dialectical argumentation may be said to supplement the demonstrative method is revealed. It remains to consider the manner in which induction may supplement the method of demonstration.

5. Induction:

By way of introducing what has come to be a thorny problem in contemporary times, the following passage from Aristotle may be considered as it situates induction in relation to dialectics:

Having drawn these definitions, we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction, on the other, Reasoning. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is best at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though Reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictitious people. 93

The reason why Aristotle situates induction as a species of dialectical argumentation appears to be based on the fact that the inductive procedure admits of a probative force similar to dialectical reasoning, and significantly less than that of demonstrative reasoning. That this is the case can be seen from an analysis of the difference

93 Aristotle, Topics, I, 12, 105a10-105a20.
between deductive and inductive argumentation. The basic principle of deductive argumentation is the "principle of triple identity" as two terms of the syllogism are identified or situated in relation to a third term and hence with one another; whereas the basic principle of inductive argumentation is the "principle of sufficient enumeration".

Simmons elucidates the latter in the following manner:

... the principle of sufficient enumeration: what can be said of many sufficiently enumerated instances of a universal subject can be said of that universal subject itself. On the basis of this self-evident logical principle, the inductive argument manifests the identity between the extremes of a universal proposition by enumerating singular instances of this universal proposition sufficient to warrant the intellectual "leap" from the singular to the universal ...

In so far as both deductive and inductive argument "work" in virtue of distinct logical principles, each involves a distinct mode of inference. The two may be interrelated, as, for example, whenever the conclusion of an inductive argumentation is used as a deductive major premise.

Although it is clear in the manner in which the inductive method may supplement the deductive, demonstrative method, the problem remains: precisely when is the process of inductive enumeration of singulars said to be sufficient? Simmons faces this problem in the following passage and in so doing provides an understanding of the reason why the process of inductive argumentation is a species of dialectic:

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94 Simmons, op. cit., pp. 289-290.

95 ibid., p. 290.
... when is the enumeration of singulars (admittedly incomplete) sufficient to warrant the jump from the singulars to the universal conclusion? The best we have been able to do is to suggest that this occurs when the enumeration is quantitatively and qualitatively complete enough so that the possibility of an exception to the universal is ruled out. This occurs when the regularity in the presence of the predicate in a given type of subject is seen as inexplicable unless the predicate belongs necessarily to each and every instance of the subject in question. A conclusion such as this is legitimate only when every conceivable significant factor is checked out. So long as something accidental to the essence of the subject might possibly be suggested as the reason for the predicate in question, it is illegitimate to affirm that the predicate belongs universally to the subject. Under the circumstances it is clear that sufficient enumeration - save in the case of complete enumeration - is extremely difficult. This is at least true for inductive conclusions generated as certainly true. However, this is not the case for probable conclusions to inductive argumentation. Any significant enumeration of singulars generates some degree of probability for the universal that these singulars seem to represent. The more complete the enumeration, the more probable the conclusion. 96

Clearly the exigencies of the attainment of certainty by way of this method are great, so great in fact that it is reasonable to assume that most inductive arguments terminate in probable conclusions with varying degrees of probative value depending upon the sufficiency of enumeration. Three points emerge as a result of this discussion of induction. First, in using the method of induction to arrive at a conclusion that may be used as a deductive, demonstrative premise, it is possible that there may be a sufficient enumeration of singulars to allow one to affirm a universal truth which is particularized in each one of the singulars. Secondly, because of the exacting requirements of the

96 ibid., p. 293.
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principle of sufficient enumeration, it appears that generally the inductive procedure admits of a probative force similar to that of dialectics, and hence can be understood as a species of dialectics. Thirdly, the inductive procedure may perform the same function as dialectics in relation to demonstration; namely, that of leading the mind to an acceptance and understanding of the premises of the demonstration as being true on the basis of a revealed self-evidence.

A question that might be raised at this point is: "Why link induction and essence?" Why not characterize all of our knowledge as eventuating only in varying degrees of probability as a result of the raw enumeration of singulars? Is not the business of speaking about essences or natures in the sense of Aristotelean "forms" passé as a result of (i) evolutionary theory which apparently has succeeded in denying the fixity of species; (ii) Leibniz's contribution of the infinitesimal calculus which at least suggests a progressive construction of logical forms as opposed to a static hierarchy of forms wherein the higher explains the lower; and (iii) the recognition in some schools of philosophy and psychology of the real activity of the knowing subject in the constitution of knowledge?

These questions that are being raised focus essentially on this problem: if scientific knowledge is to be characterized by a certain universality and necessity; and if inductive procedures only provide for a body of knowledge characterized by varying degrees of probability;
wherein lies the principle of justification for asserting such laws as "in all cases water boils at one hundred degrees centigrade under standard conditions?" Either science is denied access to the characteristics of universality and necessity and in so doing a situation is generated wherein the regularities of nature that confront men cannot be accounted for, or a reason must be found which justifies a knowledge of these regularities.

To what sort of world does our knowledge testify? Is it one with an underlying order, pattern, regularity and structure that may be spoken of in such terms as "essence", "nature", "structure", "truths of principle", "family resemblances", "societies", "transcendent hypotheses", "types", "projects", "regularities of nature", "uniformity of operations", "realms of essence", "synchronic structures"? Or does our knowledge testify to an absurd, arbitrary, chaotic noumenon which can only be assessed in terms of "the shifting quicksands of statistics"? And if order is present, is its source in the knower or the thing known or both?

Within the philosophical context structured by the presuppositions presented in chapter two these questions meet with the following response:

Although we do not know through the natural sciences, natures or essential definitions in the way that we do in the philosophical and mathematical sciences, essences cannot be completely eliminated from the natural sciences. Our contention is that if there are no essences in things, then the inductive method is reduced to a raw enumeration.

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which in no way carries with it the principle of its own necessity. If we deny the existence of essences or natures, some sort of structure, then the certainty and necessity so necessary to scientific method has no basis... Unless there is some essential connection between the thing and its characteristic property, then there is no foundation for the certainty of scientific knowledge. Only if there is something about man by reason of which he has the power of speech, if there is some center of stability, some principle of regularity, some inner structure from which this characteristic flows, can we preserve the scientific character of induction. Therefore, although the natural scientist does not deal with essences immediately, he cannot deny their existence, otherwise he cuts away the scientific character of knowledge. Certain modern scientists have seen the problem in just this way and have suicidally followed out the consequences of their denial of essences. The result has been that they have actually denied the certainty of their own knowledge and reduced scientific law to mere probability, a conclusion that contradicts both science and experience.

Consequently, the basic problem in any explanation of induction is an assessment of the role of essence, whether we call this the "truths of principle" as William Kneale does, or the "family resemblances" as Wittgenstein does.

No matter how abstract essences may seem they are always justified by the attempt to explain the intelligible aspects of things. As "transcendent hypotheses" they are no more abstract than many accepted scientific theories and concepts basic to the social sciences. Essences are always rooted in the world of nature, at least minimally, by their explanatory power. This can be regarded as an inescapable truth of philosophic inquiry. It has forced itself on the most diverse thinkers in the history of philosophy from the time of the Pre-Socratics to the present. 98

The point that is so well made by Carlo is that the natural sciences presuppose that there are essences and in so doing they justify the certain and necessary character of the body of knowledge that is arrived at on the basis of the enumeration of a given number of particular

98 loc. cit.
cases. The reason why all water boils at one hundred degrees centigrade under standard conditions, a conclusion reached as a result of observing particular cases, is because it is of the nature of water to do this. How water acts depends upon what water is. The operation of an entity or process depends on the nature of that entity or process. In a philosophical formulation, this insight might be expressed as "agitur sequitor esse".

While the perinoetic, operational, phenomenal modes of knowledge may be well suited to the determination of the "how"; the "how" itself is determined by the "what", and this substantial question is better dealt with by a material predicational logic than by a mathematical or relational logic.

These considerations enable one to turn to the "plain hard work of demonstration" with confidence. With the realization that induction is grounded on the notion of essence, then the possibility of moving from inductive experience to an essential knowledge is made clear. The analytical foundations of a deductive demonstration may then consist of arguments drawn from inductive experience.

If, as a result of inductive experience, it is realized that there do indeed exist psychic phenomena that cannot be accounted for in terms of consciousness, then it will be reasonable to assert that the psychic is not coextensive with consciousness and that those psychic phenomena may be ascribed to, and accounted for, by what has been named unconscious mental processes. In short, the demonstration of the

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99 ibid., p.63.
existence of the fact of unconscious mental processes hinges on the self-evident character of the premises of that demonstration. The self-evident character of said premises may be seen to be so as a result of inductions from experience.

The task that remains is to turn to the work of Freud and to follow him as he argues for the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious.
CHAPTER III

THE FREUDIAN ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES

1. Introduction

The stage has been set for an investigation of the Freudian demonstration of the existence of unconscious mental processes. As has been noted elsewhere in this study, there has been a tendency, since Descartes, to understand the mind in terms of consciousness, to assert that mind was in fact coextensive with consciousness. ¹ That this is the case today can be seen by the work of Medard Boss who systematically endeavours to account for the behaviour of man in terms of an existential and phenomenological analysis of the structures of consciousness. ² Sartre categorically denies the existence of the unconscious, and asserts that those who would assert its reality are acting in "bad faith". ³ Some followers of the Behaviouristic tradition also assert that the notion of the unconscious is not only unfounded,

¹ Cf. infra., p. 38.
³ Sartre sees the notion of the unconscious as being the paradigm instance of bad faith, as he puts it, it is "the idea of a lie without a liar ... it replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the essential condition of the lie, by that of the "id" and the "ego". Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, Inc., New York, 1966, p. 770.
but also an unnecessary assumption that is of little value in the modification of the behaviour of men. 4

Contrast this position with the following assertion of Freud and the relevance of this study will be understood:

The problem of the unconscious in psychology is, in the forcible words of Lipps (1897), less a psychological problem than the problem of psychology. So long as psychology dealt with this problem by a verbal explanation to the effect that 'psychical' meant 'conscious' and that to speak of 'unconscious psychical processes' was palpable nonsense, any psychological evaluation of the observations made by physicians upon abnormal mental states was out of the question. The physician and the philosopher can only come together if they both recognize that the term 'unconscious psychical processes' is 'the appropriate and justified expression of a solidly established fact'. 5

If what Freud contends is true, then it is clear that any psychology that ignores the existence of unconscious mental activities will be, in some respects, inadequate to the therapeutic task. Moreover, there will be a lamentable lacuna in the understanding of man that is conveyed by a psychology that ignores the existence of these activities. Freud has noted "that the term 'unconscious psychical processes'"


is the appropriate and justified expression of a solidly established fact". 6 The task will be to come to an understanding of the Freudian justification of this position. What is the nature of the evidence that permits him to infer to the existence of unconscious mental processes? That it is an inference, and that it understood as such by Freud is clear as he writes that:

It is true that the physician cannot learn of these unconscious processes until they have produced some effect upon consciousness which can be communicated or observed... The physician must feel at liberty to proceed by inference from the conscious effect to the unconscious psychical process. He thus learns that the conscious effect is only a remote psychical result of the unconscious process and that the latter has not become conscious as such; and moreover that the latter was present and operative even without betraying its existence in any way to consciousness. 7

Thus, the procedure, in its broadest outline, is to observe the behavioural manifestations of the individual and to seek regularities and patterns of action. Those instances of behaviour that cannot be explained in terms of the conscious awareness of the individual will be accounted for by understanding them to be the effects of processes as yet unknown. From the existence and nature of the effects, Freud will proceed to infer to the existence and nature of the cause. Clearly, the possibility of attaining mediate knowledge through a process of inference is assumed by Freud, as well as is the validity of the evidence

6 loc. cit.
7 ibid., p. 651.
that he has garnered both from his clinical experience and his encounters with individuals in his everyday life. That the task is an arduous one is evident as Freud notes when writing of the unconscious that "in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs".  

Freud also recognized the dangers that await those who would hope to gain meaning from an application of the methodology of logical inference to the facts of mental life; but it was a risk that he was more than willing to undertake as his desire was to formulate a theory regarding the mental structure that would account for the observations that he and others had made. As Freud put the matter:

... we shall be obligated to set up a number of fresh hypotheses which touch tentatively upon the structure of the apparatus of the mind and upon the play of forces operating in it. We must be careful, however, not to pursue these hypotheses too far beyond their first logical links, or their value will be lost in uncertainties. Even if we make no false inferences and take all the logical possibilities into account, the probable incompleteness of our premises threatens to bring our calculation to a complete miscarriage.  

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8 loc. cit.

9 ibid., p. 549.
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The line of argumentation that threads its way through the
Freudian literature might be formulated in the following fashion: If
there is evidence that indicates that mental processes are at work
in such a manner that they elude direct conscious awareness; then one
is justified in the assertion that there exist unconscious mental
processes. But there is evidence that indicates that mental processes
are at work in such a manner that they elude direct conscious
awareness. Therefore one is justified in asserting the existence
of unconscious mental processes.

Formally, this is a hypothetical syllogism reducible to the
symbolic form: if p then q; but p; therefore q. This syllogism is
in the modus or mood, ponendo ponens which simply means that if when a hypothetical
syllogism is constructed, we affirm the truth of the antecedent, then we
have thereby committed ourselves to affirming the consequent as also being
ture. The point here is that the conclusion is a valid inference from
the premises of the argument. 10

Materially, the validity of the argument hinges on the evidence
that Freud adduces to support the categorical premise, and while it is
the case that he need only show one instance of a mental process that
is both operative and eluding conscious awareness in order to justify

10 Cohen, N.R., Nagel E., An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
the categorical premise will be established by a plethora of experiences, both clinical and common. It is as if the categorical stands as a nexus of inter-penetrating relationships comprised of experiences drawn from a wide range of human affairs. The convergence of probabilities should certainly be sufficient to see 'disbelief hanging high'.

The evidence for the existence of unconscious mental processes may be arranged in four general classes. They are:

(i) Symptom-formation in the neuroses, particularly in the case of hysteria. (ii) The phenomenon of the dream. (iii) The phenomena of parapraxes. (iv) Others: The phenomena of amnesia, of the split personality, and of jokes. 11 That Freud was not satisfied to present evidence from only one source is seen from the following:

No conclusions upon the construction and working methods of the mental instrument can be arrived at or at least fully proved from even the most painstaking investigation of dreams or of any other mental function taken in isolation. To achieve this result, it will be necessary to correlate all the established implications derived from a comparative study of a whole series of such functions. 12


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Other functions of the mental life that manifest unconscious mental processes, but which are not necessary in order to establish the fact of their existence, are found in the writings of Freud's later period where he delved into the areas of art, religion and mythology in an attempt to apply his earlier findings to the entire spectrum of human experience. Whether or not his initial findings met with an over-extension in this later period would be a point of further study. What is of concern here is the manner in which he initially concluded to the existence of unconscious mental processes, and in order to determine this the first four classes of evidence will be examined.


The clearest and most accessible account of the material regarding this class of evidence is to be found in a series of lectures delivered at Clark University at Worcester, Massachusetts in 1909. The lectures were entitled Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, and "contain a sketch of Freud's fundamental hypotheses of the dynamic nature of mental processes and of their being subject to the law of causality, and a view of the observations which led him to the distinction between conscious and unconscious events in the mind and to the concepts of conflict and repression". 14

13 The works entitled Civilization and Its Discontents, Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism, and The Future of an Illusion indicate the range of the Freudian enterprise.

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The case history of Anna O, a patient of Dr. Breuer, is the focal point of the first lecture, and indeed the source from which many of the seminal Freudian doctrines drew sustenance. So that the observations and advancement of Freud may be easily followed, the description of her case is given.

Dr. Breuer's patient was a girl of twenty-one, of high intellectual gifts. Her illness lasted for over two years, and in the course of it she developed a series of physical and psychological disturbances which decidedly deserved to be taken seriously. She suffered from a rigid paralysis, accompanied by loss of sensation, of both extremities on the right side of her body; and the same trouble from time to time affected her on her left side. Her eye movements were disturbed and her power of vision was subject to numerous restrictions. She had difficulties over the posture of her head; she had a severe nervous cough. She had an aversion to taking nourishment, and on one occasion she was for several weeks unable to drink in spite of a tormenting thirst. Her powers of speech were reduced, even to the point of her being unable to speak or understand her native language. Finally, she was subject to conditions of 'absence', of confusion, of delirium, and of alteration of her whole personality, ...

While one well might suspect that these are the symptoms of a serious disease of somatic origin, it was discovered upon differential diagnosis that physiologically Anna was sound, and that she was not suffering from an "organic disease of the brain, but (of) the enigmatic

15 Freud and Breuer published their findings jointly in Studies in Hysteria (1895), this work contains a record of the clinical experiences which led to the formation of the early psychological theories of Freud.

condition which from the time of ancient Greek medicine has been known as 'hysteria' and which has the power of producing illusory pictures of a whole number of serious diseases". Another fact of importance was that this disease appeared during the time that Anna was nursing her father to whom she was very attached, and who was dying of a serious illness. One result of her own illness was that she had to give up attending to him.

The current medical practice was to regard those patients who apparently feigned symptoms as subject to exaggeration, deliberate deceit and malingering. As a result of this view, the doctor would withdraw his interest from them. Dr. Breuer, in contrast, exhibited concern for Anna and sought a cure for this hysterical ailment.

The attention and patience of Breuer was rewarded by a series of observations which contained the clue to temporary relief of the ailment.

It was observed that, while the patient was in her states of 'absence' (altered personality accompanied by confusion), she was in the habit of muttering a few words to herself which seemed as though they arose from some train of thought that was occupying her mind. The doctor after getting a report of these words, used to put her into a kind of hypnosis and then repeat them to her so as to induce her to use them as a starting-point. The patient complied with the plan, and in this way reproduced in his presence the mental creations which had been occupying her mind during the 'absences' and which had betrayed their existence by the fragmentary words she had uttered... When she had related a number of these phantasies, she was as if set free, and she was brought back to normal mental life. The improvement in her condition, which

17 ibid., p. 33.
18 loc. cit.
19 ibid., p. 34.
would last for several hours, would be succeeded next day
by a further attack of 'absence'; and this in turn would
be removed in the same way by getting her to put into words
her freshly constructed phantasies. It was impossible
to escape the conclusion that the alteration in her mental
state which was expressed in the 'absences' was a result
of the stimulus proceeding from these highly emotional
phantasies. 20

Thus it was that the 'talking cure' originated. After continued
application, it was realized that a permanent alleviation of the patient's
symptoms could be achieved "if she could be brought to remember under
hypnosis, with an accompanying expression of affect, on what occasion
and in what connexion the symptoms had first appeared". 21 The
significance of this event is realized if one considers that "Never
before had anyone removed a hysterical symptom by such a method or
had thus gained so deep an insight into its causation". 22 The temporary
nature of the cure was not an essential feature of the process when,
upon further study, it was realized that: "It was actually possible to
bring about the disappearance of the painful symptoms of her illness,
if she could be brought to remember under hypnosis, with an accompanying
expression of affect, on what occasion and in what connexion the symptoms
had first appeared." 23 The occasions that were associated with the

20 ibid., p. 35.
21 ibid., p. 36.
22 loc. cit.
23 loc. cit.
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origin of the hysterical symptom formation were described as "psychical traumas", and it was discovered through an application of the 'talking cure' that all of Anna's symptoms were connected with some psychic trauma, and that they each could be alleviated through the above described method. It was further discovered that a symptom formation was not necessarily the result of one psychical trauma, and that "... the result was usually brought about by the convergence of several traumas..." 24 Freud described the steps towards a cure as follows:

Thus it was necessary to reproduce the whole chain of pathogenic memories in chronological order, or rather in reversed order, the latest ones first and the earliest last; and it was quite impossible to jump over the later traumas in order to get back more quickly to the first, which was often the most potent one. 25

The conclusion that this and other experiences led Freud and Breuer to formulate was that "our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences. Their symptoms are residues and mnemonic symbols of particular (traumatic) experiences." 26 This was a most important step in the recognition of the meaning of hysterical symptoms, and in the creation of a technique which would dissolve the affect that generated such disorder in the present mental life of patients who suffered in this manner. The characteristics

24 ibid., p. 37.
25 loc. cit.
26 ibid., p. 39.
of the neurotic personality were at last being systematically investigated, and the knowledge thus gained was generating a method which could restore these people to psychic normality. The most significant characteristic was noted by Freud as follows:

Not only do they (neurotics) remember painful experiences of the remote past, but they still cling to them emotionally; they cannot get free of the past and for its sake they neglect what is real and immediate. This fixation of mental life to pathogenic traumas is one of the most significant and practically important characteristics of neurosis. 27

A second common characteristic that emerged from this study of Anna was that "... in almost all her pathogenic situations, (she) was obliged to suppress a powerful emotion instead of allowing its discharge in the appropriate signs of emotion, words or actions". 28 The significance of this is seen in the following:

When subsequently she reproduced these scenes in her doctor's presence the affect which had been inhibited at the time emerged with peculiar violence, as though it had been saved up for a long time. Indeed, the symptom which was left over from one of these scenes would reach its highest pitch of intensity at the time when its determining cause was being approached, only to vanish when that cause had been fully ventilated. On the other hand, it was found that no result was produced by the recollection of a scene in the doctor's presence if for some reason the recollection took place without any generation of affect. 29

27 ibid., p. 40.
28 ibid., p. 41.
29 loc. cit.
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Clearly, these affects which Freud was to call, using the
patois of a physicalistic psychology, "displaceable magnitudes (of
energy)" were "... the decisive factor both for the onset of the ill-
ness and for recovery." Freud states that the next logical step
was:

... to assume that the illness occurred because the affects
generated in the pathogenic situations had their normal out-
let blocked, and that the essence of the illness lay in
the fact that these 'strangulated' affects were then put
to an abnormal use. In part they remained as a permanent
burden upon the patient's mental life and a source of
constant excitation for it; and in part they underwent
a transformation into unusual somatic innervations and
inhibitions, which manifested themselves as the physical
symptoms of the case. For this latter process we coined
the term 'hysterical conversion'.

Freud concludes the first lecture with one further observation
regarding Dr. Breuer's work with Anna, and this observation is of para-
mount importance for this investigation.

Breuer's patient exhibited, alongside of her normal
state, a number of mental peculiarities: conditions of
'absence', confusion, and alterations of character. In
her normal state she knew nothing of the pathogenic scenes
or their connexion with her symptoms; she had forgotten
the scenes or at all events had severed the pathogenic link.
When she was under hypnosis, it was possible, ... to recall

30 ibid., p. 42.
31 loc. cit.
32 loc. cit.
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the scenes to her memory; and through this work of recollecting, the symptoms were removed. The explanation of this fact would be a most awkward business, were it not that the way is pointed by experiences and experiments in hypnotism. The study of hypnotic phenomena has accustomed us to what was at first a bewildering realization that in one and the same individual there can be several mental groupings, which can remain more or less independent of one another, which can 'know nothing' of one another, and which can alternate with one another in their hold upon consciousness. Cases of this kind, too, occasionally appear spontaneously, and are then described as examples of 'double conscience'. If, where a splitting of the personality such as this has occurred, consciousness remains attached regularly to one of the two states, we call it the conscious mental state and the other, which is detached from it, the unconscious one. In the familiar condition known as 'post-hypnotic suggestion', a command given under hypnosis is slavishly carried out subsequently in the normal state. This phenomena affords an admirable example of the influences which the unconscious state can exercise over the conscious one; moreover, it provides a pattern upon which we can account for the phenomenon of hysteria. 33

In allowing the texts of Freud to speak for themselves, and in following his argumentation as it develops, it is realized that there is evidence to support the contention that there are in fact unconscious mental processes. If, in fact, symptoms are alleviated as a result of exposing an event in the patient's past history which is characterized by a suppression of affect at the time of the occurrence of the event; and if at the time of the exposure, there is a significant affective release; then it appears as a reasonable conclusion, one that "fits" the facts, to say first, that the past event is a determining cause of the present symptom; and secondly, that the affectivity associated

33 ibid., pp. 42-43.
with the event is essential to the cause and the cure of the neurotic state. In as much as this hypothesis is confirmed by the clinical experience, in as much as it does accurately picture the state of affairs that are observed to pertain, then it is legitimate for Freud to assert the cause-effect relationship as he does. Recall that Freud has explicitly stated that a symptom may be the result of a number of 'psychic traumas', so whether or not one has hit bed-rock in obtaining the affective release, is not as important as the fact that the affective release is obtained, and that the patient is returned, as a result, to a state of mental normality. One can readily understand that there may be levels of psychoanalytic explanation, and that the terminus of the treatment is not the fact that every possible trauma has been brought to life, but the fact that the patient is cured, freed from the burden that his own past had imposed upon him. Now, if the connection between the symptom and the pathogenic conditions that generated the symptom is not known by the patient; if this relation is such that it eludes consciousness; and if when the relation is brought to conscious awareness with the aid of the therapeutic technique, the symptom disappears; then it is legitimate to assert that prior to the therapy, the relation, at least, was unconscious, and that the effect of making that which was

34. The only possible objection that could be raised here is that Freud committed the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, and were his position based on only a few isolated examples one might be tempted to agree with the charge. However, it is the case that the Freudian argument is based on a plethora of studies (cf. Studies in Hysteria (1895); also chapters 16-19 of A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis), thus the conclusions that he arrives at on the basis of his clinical experiences are justified
unconscious conscious is what has constituted the essential step of
the curative process.

As has been indicated by Freud in the examples of symptom forma­
tion, hypnosis, split-personality, and the phenomenon of post-hypnotic
suggestion, there is an excellent case to be made for the assertion
that there exist unconscious mental processes, and that they are
operative in the determination of present behaviour.

A further conclusion that appears justified in the light of the
Freudian experience with hysterical symptom formation is that if through
hypnosis the apparent aberrant mutterings and phantasies can be used
to unearth an experience that lies in the patient's past; and if this
experience can be subsequently validated by sources independent of the
patient; then it is legitimate to assert that these phantasies and
mutterings have meaning in relation to these past experiences and stand
as the effect-sign of these experiences. The importance of all the
patient's symptoms as acting out, as providing outlets or expressions for
affectivity that did not receive normal ventilation, and the fact that these
symptoms are surrogate-signs for the normal avenues of release lead the
Freudian reader to a profound grasp of the processes involved in both
the formation and the dissolution of the neurotic symptom.

The fact that past experiences, "reminiscences", are operative in
the determination of symptoms, in the behaviour of the individual; and the
fact that the patient is not aware of the relation between these past events
and the present actions or symptoms, and, indeed, may have no conscious recall of these past events; these facts alone are sufficient to establish the existence of unconscious mental processes that are dynamic in nature in so far as they are active determinants of present behaviour.

These conclusions regarding the dynamism of the symptom-formation in the neuroses were attained as a result of the clinical experiences of both Breuer and Freud, and involved the method of hypnosis as the key to the pathogenic determinants that lay in the patient's past. As Freud put the matter:

The cathartic procedure, as carried out by Breuer, presupposed putting the patient into a state of deep hypnosis; for it was only in a state of hypnosis that he attained a knowledge of the pathogenic connexions which escaped him in his normal state. 35

Freud, however, found that he was not an effective hypnotist and was forced to seek a method whereby the cathartic effect could be achieved independently of hypnosis. The clue that led him to the formulation of a new method (that of free association) was contained in a recollection of work that Bernheim had been doing:

... there came to my help a recollection of a most remarkable and instructive experiment which I had witnessed when I was with Bernheim at Nancy (in 1889). Bernheim showed us that people whom he had put into a state of hypnotic somnambulism, and who had all kinds of

35 Freud, S., Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, op. cit., p. 46.
36 Ibid., p. 47.
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experiences while they were in that state, only appeared to have lost the memory of what they had experienced during somnambulism; it was possible to revive these memories in their normal state. 37

Recall that the pattern that had emerged in hypnosis had enabled him to formulate experimental hypotheses regarding the mechanisms of the hysterical symptom formation. Again Freud has turned to hypnosis as a model, only this time he is seeking an alternative method of attaining knowledge of the pathogenic connections that pertain between past psychic traumas and present symptom-formations. If people who have been hypnotized perform actions and have experiences of which they subsequently deny all knowledge; and if upon persistent examination those actions and experiences can be brought to light; then perhaps the same holds true in the neuroses. Freud put this hypothesis to the test with his patients and discovered that he could "succeed, without using hypnosis, in obtaining from the patients whatever was required for establishing the connexion between the pathogenic scenes they had forgotten and the symptoms left over from those scenes." 39

The application of this new approach yielded the cure he sought as well as fresh information regarding the mechanisms at work within the minds of his patients.

37 loc. cit.
38 Cf. infra, p. 12, fn. 33.
39 ibid., p. 47.
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... observations I made during my use of it afforded me decisive evidence. I found confirmation of the fact that the forgotten memories were not lost. They were in the patient's possession and were ready to emerge in association to what was still known by him; but there was some force that prevented them from becoming conscious and compelled them to remain unconscious. The existence of this force could be assumed with certainty, since one became aware of an effort corresponding to it if, in opposition to it, one tried to introduce the unconscious memories into the patient's consciousness. The force which was maintaining the pathological condition became apparent in the form of resistance on the part of the patient. 40

In hypnosis it was the case that the individual upon coming out of the hypnoid state would resist acknowledging any awareness of what had transpired during the time that he was under hypnosis, but upon further probing it was found that this resistance could be overcome and the patient could, in fact, recall the knowledge that he had previously denied knowing. It was the strange phenomenon of knowing and yet not knowing that one was knowing. The same process emerged in the instance of the neuroses. The patient would reveal sufficient information for the analyst to come to a conclusion regarding the pathogenic state that had occasioned the symptom-formation, but the patient would resist admitting to the fact. Upon persistent attempts of the analyst to reconstruct the relation existing between the symptom and the psychic trauma the patient's resistance could be overcome. The evidence for this was in the fact that the patient would recognize the material presented as his own, and further that as a result of bringing

40 ibid., p. 48.
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this heretofore unconscious information to light with the appropriate
affective release, the symptom would disappear. Clearly the removal of
the resistances of the patient would be an essential step in the cure.

Consider Freud's next step:

It was on this idea of resistance, then, that I based my
view of the course of psychical events in hysteria. In
order to effect a recovery, it had proved necessary to re­
move these resistances. Starting out from the mechanism
of cure, it now became possible to construct quite definite
ideas of the origin of the illness. The same forces which,
in the form of resistance, were now offering opposition to the
forgotten material's being made conscious, must formerly
have brought about the forgetting and must have pushed the
pathogenic experiences in question out of consciousness.
I gave the name of repression to this hypothetical process,
and I considered that it was proved by the undeniable
existence of resistance. 41

Clearly, the fact of resistance is subject to behavioural
observation. 42 If the patient resists recognizing in the conscious
state, events that have been revealed to the analyst by other means,
or the relation of past events to present actions, and if when these
resistances are overcome a cure is effected, it is the case that were
these resistances allowed to persist then the neurotic symptoms would
also persist. Conceptually, it might be said that these acts of
resisting represent a real 'force' that the analyst must come to grips with

41 loc. cit.

42 For a presentation of thirteen ways in which resistance may be
observed in behaviour see Madison, P., Freud's Concept of Repression and
Defence Its Theoretical and Observational Language, University of Minnesota
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in the course of the analysis. Further, insofar as the resisting acts
of the patient are more or less frequent, then one can, by analogy,
speak of this 'force' as having a certain degree of intensity or magni-
tude. The reason why this force of resistance is active in the analy-
tical situation is to be found in the nature of the material that has
been forgotten and the affectivity that was attached to that material.
The force is an active factor insofar as it keeps the material out of
consciousness, and resists recognition when the material is presented
to consciousness. Freud appears to have established an equivalence
relation between the reason why the unconscious material is actively
avoided by the conscious mind in the process of therapy, and the reason
why the material was forced out of awareness in the first place. The
action of being forced out of awareness is labelled repression, and it is
seen that resistance and repression are two sides of the same psychic
coin. Both resistance and repression describe the active process of
forgetting, the active avoidance of conscious awareness of pathogenic
experiences. The pathogenic conditions which occasioned the first
manifestation of the neurotic symptom, when integrated into consciousness and
accompanied with a discharge of affect literally cause the cure. Because
the resistance and the repression are active in relation to the material
that is forgotten, one can now speak of a dynamic unconscious process; a
dynamic, repressed unconscious.
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It was said that the resistance and the repression function in
relation to the nature of the material that was actively forgotten,
what is the nature of such material? Freud poses and responds to the
question as follows:

The further question could then be raised as to what these
forces were and what the determinants were of the repression
in which we now recognized the pathogenic mechanism of
hysteria. A comparative study of the pathogenic situations
which we had come to know through the cathartic procedure
made it possible to answer this question. All these ex­
periences had involved the emergence of a wishful impulse
which was in sharp contrast to the subject's other wishes
and which proved incompatible with the ethical and aesthetic
standards of his personality. There had been a short con­
flict, and the end of this internal struggle was that the
idea which had appeared before consciousness as the vehicle
of this irreconcilable wish fell a victim to repression,
was pushed out of consciousness with all its attached
memories and was forgotten. Thus the incompatibility of
the wish in question with the patient's ego was the motive
for the repression; the subject's ethical and other standards
were the repressing forces. An acceptance of the incompatible
wishful impulse or a prolongation of the conflict would have
produced a high degree of unpleasure; this unpleasure was
avoided by means of repression, which was thus revealed as one
of the devices serving to protect the mental personality. 43

Why, then, is something forced out of awareness, or why is some­
thing kept out of awareness? It is because of the nature of the material that
is either resisted or repressed. This material is such that it conflicts
with the values, standards, or ethical and aesthetical dispositions of
the conscious mind. Even though the material is forced out of awareness,
it does not cease to exist. As Freud puts the matter: "But the repressed

wishful impulse continues to exist in the unconscious". And as was determined earlier the symptom is the surrogate-sign, the substitute for the repressed idea. Through the process of therapy, the symptom is traced back to the pathogenic conditions which generated it, and the symptom is reconverted into the repressed idea. Freud notes: "If what was repressed is brought back again into conscious mental activity - a process which presupposes the overcoming of considerable resistances - the resulting psychical conflict, which the patient had tried to avoid, can, under the physician's guidance, reach a better outcome than was offered by repression". It is important to note that the resulting integration of the unconscious material into the conscious state is not necessarily accomplished by acceding to the wish expressed in that material. Depending upon the nature of the wish it may either be accepted and acted upon, or rejected and soundly condemned by the conscious mind. The point is that a heretofore neurotic solution is replaced by a human solution in the sense that a conscious, deliberate choice is made. As Freud remarks: "... with the help of the highest human mental functions - conscious control of the wish is attained".

In following the movement of Freud's mind as he has focused on the formation and dissolution of neurotic symptoms, the logical rigour of his

44 ibid., p. 52.
45 ibid., p. 53.
46 loc. cit.
thought has surfaced. It can be seen that his desire was ever to account for the experiential data that the clinic yielded. The theory that he has enunciated thus far does account for the facts that he encountered in dealing with the neuroses of his patients. Moreover, as a result of the efforts of Freud and Breuer, where no help was available to those who suffered from hysteria, there now is a body of doctrine that enables the physician to arrive at an understanding of the disease and which enables him to effect a return to a state of normality. Thus, in the consideration of this first class of evidence, it has been seen how Freud concluded to the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious, as well as what precisely it was that prompted him to do so.

3. The Phenomenon of the Dream.

Thus far Freud has been seen to derive his justification for the assertion of the existence of unconscious psychical processes from his experience with the neuroses, and his reflections upon hypnotism. Using the latter as a model, he was enabled to come to an understanding of the dynamics of the neurotic symptom-formation and in so doing he came to a recognition of the fact that the neurotic suffered from reminiscences, that past experiences were determining present behaviour in a manner that was not understood or known by the patient; in short, in a manner which could best be described as unconscious.

These situations were clinical in character, and the subjects were those that suffered some psychic ailment. Thus, from the study of the
neoroses one might arrive at the necessity of positing unconscious psychical processes. But, was this not the case only with the aberrant psyche? Perhaps these processes were a result of the pathological situation that arose with the psychic ailment? What of the normal person, were these unconscious psychical processes operative under the condition of normality?

In coming to grips with normal psychology, Freud introduced evidence which lent support to his hypothesis. It arose out of the study of three areas: dreams, parapraxes and jokes. It is the first of these phenomena that meets with attention herein.

Freud presented his study of the dream in two of his major works; the first being The Interpretation of Dreams, 47 and the second being, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis. 48 For the purposes of this thesis, chapter seven of the former work and chapters five through nine of the latter are especially valuable. In the conclusion of the ninth chapter of A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, he was able to write the following:

We are now prepared to assume that there are processes and tendencies in mental life, of which we know nothing; have known nothing; have, for a very long time, perhaps even never, known anything about at all. This gives the term


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unconscious a fresh meaning to us: the qualification at the moment or temporary is seen to be no essential attribute, the term may also mean permanently unconscious, not merely latent at the moment. 49

It had taken Freud five chapters to prepare the way for the making of the final decisive step in the development of this argument, and the task will be to follow him in the development of the argumentation to discover what it was in the nature of the dream that enabled him to conclude in the manner in which he did.

In chapter five, Freud begins by abstracting from the historical approach in the study of the dream, and instead begins by stating his purpose: "Our aim is to demonstrate the meaning of dreams, in preparation for the study of the neuroses." 50 Recalling that symptoms had had a meaning which could be attained by the therapist, 51 the fact that another psychic phenomena might also yield a heretofore unsuspected wealth of meaning was a reasonable hypothesis to make. In the present work, Freud was building upon the ground work laid in the study of parapraxes that immediately precedes the chapters on the dream and, just as in the case of the study of failed acts, he is taking as his object of study a facet of mental experience which had traditionally

49 ibid., p. 155.

50 ibid., p. 87. Although Freud plunges directly into the study of dreams in this presentation, he does give a historical review in the first chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, op. cit., pp. 1-127.

51 See the section of symptom-formation above, in which this point is developed at length.
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been regarded as "far too unworthy and trivial to be objects of scientific research". 52 Although the scientific community might scorn the phenomena of the dream, it is clear that the dream is of importance to the individual as dreams often generate a mood which lasts throughout the day. 53 Freud reasons that the current scholarly antipathy evinced towards the dreams is in part a result of the fact that the ancients had over-emphasized the importance of dreams, and hence, there was a counter tendency to react in a suspicious manner to any attempt to take the phenomena seriously. 54

Freud observes that present day science uses dreams only for the purpose of illustrating its physiological theories, and that no attempts had been made to account for the meaning or cause of the dream; this, then, is Freud's project. 55 If errors have meaning, why not dreams? 56 This is a legitimate question posed as a point of departure by Freud. "What exactly is a dream?", he asks. 57 Using Aristotle’s definition that "the dream is the life of the mind during sleep", 58 the essential

52 Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 88; The study of paraphrases is undertaken the work entitled The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and chapters one through four of A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis.
53 ibid., p. 89.
54 ibid., p. 90.
55 ibid., p. 91.
56 loc. cit.
57 loc. cit.
58 ibid., p. 92.
fact of the dreamer being asleep when the dream occurs is noted by Freud. But some dreams cause one to wake, therefore it marks the transition from sleep to wakefulness, and hence can be seen as an intermediary. What then is sleep? Biologically, it is a time for recuperation; and psychologically, it is a suspension of interest in the outside world. Freud abandons this line of inquiry as being "unsuited to the purpose of psychoanalysis". He concludes by stating that dreams are "the mode of reaction of the mind to stimuli acting upon it during sleep".

Moving from the nature of sleep back to the nature of the dream, Freud notes that the dream is strange to the waking mind. The differences between dreams that strike Freud are differences of "duration, definiteness, the part played by affects, persistence in the mind." Upon enquiring into the aspect of dreams as a reaction to a stimulus, he asserts that both external and internal stimuli are the "occasions of the dream and afford us no insight into its true nature". The fact that visual images occur in response to auditory stimuli discounts the possibility of a one-to-one correlation between the stimulus and the response. The repetition of past events in the dream is noted.

59 ibid., p. 93.
60 loc. cit.
61 ibid., p. 94.
62 loc. cit.
63 ibid., p. 101.
64 ibid., p. 102. The dynamics and sources of the dream will be treated in greater detail later.
The Freudian Argument for the Existence of Unconscious Mental Processes

Whereas experimental psychology, philosophy, and the occult sciences do little to aid the search for the meaning of the dream, colloquial speech helps a great deal. Note that what is colloquially called a day-dream are phantasies that are dictated by a transparent motivation. They are seen to "gratify either the egoistic cravings ... or the erotic desires of the subject". The aspect of wish fulfillment that is observed in the day-dream is hint of things to come.

The points that have been made thus far in the argumentation by Freud may be summarized as follows: dreams, like errors, are worthy of investigation as it is possible that they may also have a meaning or a cause; Freud has served notice that he intends to seek that cause; the points of how dreams are alike and how they differ have been noted; this comparison and contrast has led to the conclusion that while it may be the case that external and internal stimulation may occasion the dream, they fail to provide an adequate account of the meaning of the dream; this latter point indirectly implies that while the soma conditions the dream, the psychic aspect must be entertained in order to render the meaning clear; and finally, by taking a common-sense approach to day-dreams as gratifying certain needs or desires, Freud has hinted at the nature and cause of dreams.

In the light of the conclusion to be established at the end of the ninth chapter, the import of this chapter is found in the fact that one

65 ibid., p. 103.
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cannot account for the dream by referring only to a somatic explanation, and that since this is the case, one must look elsewhere. This implies that the explanation of the dream may be completed if one looks upon the dream as a psychical act. Given the materialistic bias of the day, this step in the argumentation is exceedingly crucial as it is the first step towards establishing the dream as a mental phenomenon in its own right.

Having outlined the area of research in its broadest details in the fifth chapter, Freud proceeds in the sixth to determine a method which will facilitate his enquiry. According to the scientific approach, Freud first puts forward a hypothesis and then seeks to discover if it will stand the test of evidence. The hypothesis is that "dreams are not a somatic, but a mental phenomena". Since this is to be acted upon as provisionally true, it follows that the dream is "a performance, and an utterance on the part of the dreamer". Now, to discover the meaning of this utterance, he proposes to "ask the dreamer" just as he had done in the study of the neurotic symptom-formation and in the study of failed acts.

His next major assertion is that "the dreamer really does know the meaning of the dream; only he does not know that he knows, and therefore thinks that he does not". In order to substantiate this

66 ibid., p. 105.
67 loc. cit.
68 ibid., p. 106.
69 loc. cit.
second hypothesis, he refers to the work of Liebault and Bernheim in hypnosis just as he had done in the study of the symptom-formation. The subject of hypnosis, in these experiments, underwent a number of experiences that upon revival he could not recall. After much probing, however, the knowledge of these experiences came back to him. Thus it was proved that a person could have knowledge of an experience, and yet not know that he knows.

If these experiments are true in what they reveal, then "it no longer seems improbable that there should be other mental processes going on within him about which also he knows nothing". 70 Arguing by analogy, Freud likens the hypnotic state unto the dream state, and concludes that knowledge in both instances can be possessed and yet be inaccessible to the subject.

Given, then, that this inaccessible knowledge exists, how does one get at it? Freud states that just as in the case of the study of errors, "we shall ask the dreamer how he came to have the dream, and his next words must be regarded as giving the explanation in this case also." 71 The method of association is then elaborated. First, "we divide the dream up into its various elements, and examine each element separately." 72 Secondly, "I require him to give himself up to the process

70 ibid., p. 109.
71 ibid., p. 110.
72 ibid., p. 111.
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of FREE ASSOCIATION which follows when he keeps in mind the original idea. This necessitates a peculiar attitude of the attention, something quite different from reflection, indeed, precluding it". 73 This evokes a train of associations which eventually lead to the meaning.

The guarantor of this method as being valid is, for Freud, a belief in psychic determinism which demands that any association evoked in response to an element of a dream is "strictly determined by important inner attitudes of mind, which are unknown to us at the moment when they operate..." 74 Freud parries with those who would assert psychic freedom by terming it a belief that is most "unscientific". 75

Freud continues to validate his approach and to assert that the associations are attached to the stimulus element presented by the analyst, and "are also dependent, in the second place, on circles of thoughts and interests of strong affective value (complexes, as we call them) of whose influence at the time nothing is known, that is to say, on unconscious activities". 76 This complex is taken to be the one "... which has produced the particular element itself" 77 and hence the cause or meaning of the dream, or at least of an element of the dream, has been

73 ibid., p. 112.
74 loc. cit. Cf. infra., fn. 129.
75 loc. cit.
76 ibid., p. 114.
77 ibid., p. 116.
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discovered. Moreover, that cause is noted to be rooted in an unconscious activity which has an affective or dynamic character.

The recalling of a forgotten name is possible with the use of this technique, and the name forgotten is found to be "eluding our consciousness at the moment", 78 or more simply stated, the name is unconscious at the moment.

Inhibitions, and a desire not to recall are given as two possible reasons why certain contents of the psyche are inaccessible to recall. 79 The conclusion arises: if this inaccessible aspect can be overcome in the case of forgetting, why not in dreams also? 80

The steps taken in this chapter which help to establish the conclusion in the ninth chapter are as follows: dreams are a mental phenomena; as a mental act, the dream will have a meaning; the dreamer knows the meaning of the dream, but he does not know that he knows; this inaccessible knowledge is rendered accessible through the method of free association; these free associations are determined by a relation to the stimulus element, and by a relation to the complex that gave rise to them; these complexes are affective unconscious activities and these are the cause or source of the dream.

78 loc. cit.
79 ibid., p. 117.
80 ibid., p. 118.
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This chapter has gone a long way towards the establishing of the conclusion of the ninth chapter. It remains to be shown that the attribute "at the moment" is not essential, that there is a permanent unconscious; as well as the fact of this unconscious as being dynamic or active in the determination of the dream.

In the seventh chapter, Freud begins by reviewing the facts that have been revealed regarding the nature of the dream and the technique of free association which allows the analyst to pierce beneath the surface content to the elements which give rise to the dream. His first major point is to introduce formally the terminology of psychoanalysis. "Instead of using the words "hidden", "inaccessible", or "proper", let us give a more precise description and say "inaccessible to the consciousness of the dreamer" or "unconscious". 81 Two other terms are introduced, and they too refer to matters already discussed. "Let us call the dream as related the manifest dream-content, and the hidden meaning, which we should come by in following out the associations, the latent dream-thoughts". 82

Three rules are posited as aids to the dream-interpretation. First, "We are not to trouble about the surface meaning of the dream..." 83 This rule is based on the distinction between the manifest content and the latent content, and the belief that the meaning of the dream is to be found on the latent level. Secondly, "We are to confine our work to calling up

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81 ibid., p. 119.
82 ibid., p. 126.
83 ibid., p. 120.
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The Freudian argument for the existence of unconscious mental processes begins with the idea of substitute-ideas for every element and not to ponder over them..." 84 This is designed to ensure that the train of associations is not unduly interrupted. Thirdly, "We must wait until the hidden unconscious thoughts ... appear of their own accord..." 85 This rule will allow the factor of psychic determinism to make itself manifest, as the associations will eventually reveal their cause, or, at least, point towards the cause which may be revealed by the interpretation. The fact that is here being pointed to is that the associations tend to be thematic, and that the revelation of the theme is the clue to the interpretation of the dream.

Freud takes an important step in his theorizing when he formulates the notion of repression, and in so doing he notes that "associations that people wish to repress ... prove without exception to be the most important, to be decisive for the discovery of the unconscious thought". 86 The other side of the psychic coin of repression, resistance, is also noted. "Resistances invariably confront us when we try to penetrate the hidden unconscious..." 87 This notion is what lends the Freudian theory its dynamic character, 88

84 loc. cit.
85 loc. cit., Cf. infra., Fn. 94.
86 ibid., p. 122.
87 loc. cit.
88 ibid., p. 123. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann in her article entitled "Recent Advances in Psychoanalysis" which was originally published in the Journal
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and it is noted that the "number of associations necessarily varies with
the varying strength of the resistances..." 89

In the presentation, Freud analyzes fragments of dreams with
the intent of showing the operational validity of these concepts. The
mechanisms of dream distortion are briefly developed and Freud concludes
this chapter by saying that his audience requires more preparation before
it can apply itself to the task of dream interpretation.

The contribution of the seventh chapter towards developing the
argumentation which leads to the conclusion of the ninth chapter is that
first, what has already been developed in previous chapters is named
explicitly; and secondly, the notions of repression and resistance are
introduced. This latter fact is important as these notions are the terms
which permit the description "dynamic" to be applied to the psychoanalytical
doctrine.

of the American Medical Women's Association, 1949, Vol. 4, pp. 320-326, and
which was more recently reprinted in Sarason, I.G., Science and Theory in
referred to as Sarason, STP) writes the following: "Psychoanalysis under­
stands the functioning of the human mind as the result of the dynamic
interaction between mental operations on various levels and with
different qualities of awareness (Freud: conscious, preconscious, un­
conscious). Thoughts and feelings which are incompatible with the standards
of a person himself or with those of significant people in his environment
or of his culture at large may be barred from awareness or recall ("repressed",
"dissociated") because of the effect of anxiety they would produce, were
they to remain in awareness. Unknown to the person, these repressed
experiences remain alive in his mind and influence his thoughts, feelings,
and actions". Sarason, STP., op. cit., p. 23.

89 Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 122.
The eighth chapter is devoted to the topic of the dreams of children and other dreams that meet with little distortion to discover "the essential nature of dreams" which will be "universally valid". Freud discovers that analysis and technique are not required in order to interpret dreams which are undistorted. Instead, all that is required is a knowledge of the individual's life as "the dream is the mind's reaction in sleep to the experience of the previous day". The investigation of the child's dream reveals clearly that "childhood dreams ... are complete, comprehensible mental acts". And if a child can perform this feat, why deny the adult the same capacity? This is one of the most telling arguments as the dreams of children are so transparent that they immediately yield significance and meaning in terms of the child's past experiences. Since there are dreams that possess an integrity, where there is no divorce between the latent content and the manifest content, and where no distortion is present, then it follows that the distortion itself cannot be essential to the dream.

As a reaction to the events of the previous day, the child's dream is seen as the completion or the fulfillment of those interrupted activities. "In the dream we have the direct, undisguised fulfillment of this wish".

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90 ibid., p. 133.
91 loc. cit.
92 ibid., p. 134.
93 loc. cit.
Wish-fulfillment is, then, an essential characteristic. It can be seen that the function of the dream is to effect a discharge of a tendency or wish which is interfering with the desire to sleep. In so far as this is the case, dreams are the guardians of sleep.

Freud pushes his insight into the nature of the dream as being a wish-fulfillment further when he observes that the value of the dream lies in its representing the wish as fulfilled in the form of an hallucinatory experience. The interplay of the two wishes; the desire to sleep and the desire that arises out of the unconscious residues of past

94 _loc. cit_. The notion of wish-fulfillment in Freudian psychology is of central importance as can be seen in the following declaration: "Thought is after all nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish; and it is self-evident that dreams must be wish-fulfillments since nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work." _The Interpretation of Dreams_, p. 606. This should not be understood as a denigration of thought, but rather as highlighting the fundamental purposive nature of the human intellect. That this latter interpretation is the case can be seen from the following: "For it is demonstrably untrue that we are being carried along a purposeless stream of ideas when, in the process of interpreting a dream, we abandon reflection and allow involuntary ideas to emerge. It can be shown that all we ever get rid of are purposive ideas that are known to us; as soon as we have done this, unknown - or, as we inaccurately say, 'unconscious' - purposive ideas take charge and thereafter determine the course of the involuntary ideas. No influence that we can bring to bear on our mental processes can ever enable us to think without purposive ideas; nor am I aware of any states of psychical confusion which can do so." _The Interpretation of Dreams_, pp. 566-567. Freud further reinforces the point being made when he writes: "I know for a fact that trains of thought without purposive ideas no more occur in hysteria and paranoia than they do in the formation or resolution of dreams." _The Interpretation of Dreams_, p. 56f

95 Freud, S., _A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis_, p. 135.

96 _ibid_., p. 136.
experiences, give rise to a compromise formation. The disturbing tendency is the wish; the disturbed tendency is the desire for sleep; and the compromise formation is the dream. 97

It is evident that the day-dream which provided the initial clue to the characteristic of the dream being a wish-fulfillment, differs significantly from the nocturnal dream in that only in the latter is there a hallucinatory experience. From this it is concluded that sleep is a necessary condition of the dream.

In seeking further evidence in support of his hypothesis that the dream is a manifestation of wish-fulfillment Freud cites common-sense proverbs which attest to this fact as common knowledge. It is also noted that dreams related to imperative physical needs are noted to escape distortion, and to express clearly the aspect of wish-fulfillment. 98 Impatience dreams and comfort dreams also exhibit this wishful characteristic. 99 Freud concludes this chapter by noting that the process of interpretation is the reverse of the mechanism of distortion. 100

The significance of this chapter is that from an analysis of the dreams of childhood, the hypothesis that the dream has a meaning, and that the meaning is to be found in some form of a wish-fulfillment. The thrust

97 loc. cit.
98 ibid., p. 139.
99 ibid., p. 141.
100 ibid., p. 142.
of the argumentation is that if this is so for the dreams of children, why is it not the case for the dreams of adults? The point is well-taken, and the arguments of the fifth and sixth chapters are thereby further strengthened.

The task of the ninth chapter is to investigate the nature, cause, and dynamics of dream distortion which is said to be a product of the "dream-work."\(^\text{101}\) An example of a distorted dream is given and it is noted that: "Omission, modification, regrouping of material - these then are the modes of the dream-censorship's activity and the means employed in distortion".\(^\text{102}\) Freud clearly warns that the censor is not to be reified or hypostasized but rather is to be considered "as a useful term by which to express a dynamic relationship".\(^\text{103}\) Recall the notions of resistance and repression that have already been developed and the point that Freud is making is clarified as "resistance is simply the censorship objectified."\(^\text{104}\)

The tendencies which are in control of, and exercise the censorship are found to be those that are in the waking judgment, while the tendencies that are censored are those which offend the ethical, aesthetic, or social values of the individual.\(^\text{105}\) These latter tendencies are noted for their

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 144; The mechanisms of the dream-work will be discussed in greater detail later.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., p. 147.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p. 148.

\(^{104}\) Loc. cit.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., p. 149.
"boundless and ruthless egoism" 106 and "seem to rise up from a veritable hell". 107 The more shocking the wish: the greater is the distortion; and the severer the demands of the censor: the greater also is the distortion. Thus, the censor is seen to be operative in terms of these two factors. 108

Since the unconscious wishes are inimical to the conscious mind, it is often the case that the dreamer will refuse to admit the revealed wish as his own. This is due to the continued work of the censor, and points to the fact that certain activities and processes are "more than unconscious at the moment". 109

At the end of the analysis of the sixth chapter, it was noted that the aspect of permanence was yet to be established. It is with the notions of repression, resistance, and the censor that Freud is enabled to complete the argumentation, and to establish the existence of "processes and tendencies ... (that are) ... permanently unconscious". 110

Thus it is that with reference to the content of chapters five through nine that Freud's development of the line of reasoning that allowed him to conclude as follows:

106 loc. cit.
107 ibid., p. 150.
108 loc. cit.
109 ibid., p. 154.
110 ibid., p. 155.
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We are now prepared to assume that there are processes and
tendencies in mental life, of which we know nothing; have
known nothing; have, for a very long time, perhaps even
never, known anything about at all. This gives the term
unconscious a fresh meaning to us: the qualification at
the moment or temporary is seen to be no essential attri-
bute, the term may also mean permanently unconscious,
not merely latent at the moment. III

It is clear that in developing his argument for the existence
of the unconscious mental processes from his study of the dream, that
he was led to formulate his initial hypothesis from his prior study
of the symptom-formation in the neuroses, and from his acquaintance with
the hypnotic experience. The immense significance of this particular
study is found in the fact that dreams are found in the normal as well
as in the abnormal individual, and that the same processes are to be
found operating in both instances.

In the interests of clarity of presentation, the Freudian argument
for the existence of the unconscious from the study of the dream is
recapitulated briefly as follows. It was noted that the theories re-
garding the dream up to the time of Freud concentrated on the physiological
aspect, and in so doing failed to provide an adequate account for the dream.
Freud reasoned that if these physiologically inclined theories lacked
explanatory force, then perhaps it was because the dream was fundamentally
a psychic phenomena and deserved to be considered as such. Hypothesizing
that the dream was a psychic act and as such had a meaning, Freud
sought out to see whether or not this was indeed the case. During the course

III loc. cit.
of the investigation evidence arose that indicated that the dream did in fact express a meaning, and further that the meaning expressed generally took the form of a wish-fulfillment. Day-dreams, the dreams of children, comfort dreams, impatience dreams, all of these manifested clearly the fact that the nature of the dream was to picture a wish as fulfilled, and in so doing to guard the sleep of the dreamer. What then, of dreams which apparently had no meaning? Freud knew from his experience with hypnosis, symptom-formation, and errors that it was possible for the subject to know and yet not know that he knows. In the past he had used the 'talking-cure' of the Breuer period to unearth this unconscious knowledge. In the interim he had evolved the method of free-association which through the thematic character of the associations yielded access to the meaning of the dream. Because the dreams which were apparently meaningless did, in fact, possess intelligibility in terms of the subject's past, Freud felt justified in making a distinction between the manifest dream-content and the latent dream-thoughts.

Why was this active forgetting occurring? Freud here used the notions of repression, resistance and censorship to account for the difference between the manifest and the latent content. These dynamisms operated in relation to the ethical and the aesthetic values of the individual and sought to keep thoughts and impulses that were inimical to these values out of awareness. Because the latent dream thoughts were capable of generating dissonance within the mind, they were disguised, distorted
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and hence rendered apparently without meaning or structure. This process
was labeled the dream-work, and although its effects were conscious, its
operations were unconscious.

Thus in the dream there are two tendencies manifested. The
tendency or desire to sleep, and the tendency which would tend to interrupt
that sleep. The dream itself is a compromise formation that permits of
the discharge of the unconscious wish, and yet allows the dreamer to con­
tinue his sleep.

Because of the nature of the dream as an expression of the
unconscious it is clear why Freud would write that:

The interpretation of dreams is in fact the royal road to a
knowledge of the unconscious; it is the securest foundation
of psycho-analysis and the field in which every worker must
acquire his convictions and seek his training. 112

Or again, when he wrote:

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge
of the unconscious activities of the mind.

By analyzing dreams we can take a step forward in our
understanding of the composition of that most marvellous
and most mysterious of all instruments. Only a small step
no doubt; but a beginning. 113

Having viewed the argumentation leading up to the assertion of the
existence of unconscious psychical activities, and having realized that this
aspect of the Freudian literature is of paramount import if one is to
understand his psychological theories, a deeper penetration into the study
of dreams is warranted.

112 Freud, S., Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 60.
113 Freud, S., The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 647.
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(i) **The Study of Dreams Before Freud:**

The first problem that had met with scientific interest was "the relation between the dream and the waking state". The first conclusion to meet with the acceptance of the scientific community was that "the dream borrows its material from the waking state". Oneiric hypermnesia, or the capacity for almost total recall during sleep, was also commonly noted. That some dreams are caused by external sensory stimuli is a proposition that is accepted by most theorists. The focal point of the Freudian study was the search for lawfulness within the realm of dreams.

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114 Dalbiez, R., *The Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud*, translated by T.F. Lindsay, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1941, Vol. I, p. 29. This two volume work is an invaluable contribution to the Freudian literature. Volume one contains a detailed analytical presentation of the Freudian doctrines, while volume two is of a critical nature as it assesses the doctrine of Freud in terms of a philosophical perspective. Wherever Dalbiez exceeds Freud in clarity of presentation, he shall be referred to, and further reference to Freud shall be made in the accompanying notes.

115 *loc. cit.* (Freud's presentation of this material is to be found in the first chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, pp. 35-128.)

116 Dalbiez, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Cf. also *The Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 155 where Freud writes: "Dreams are not to be likened to the unregulated sounds that rise from a musical instrument struck by the blow of some external force instead of by a player's hand; they are not meaningless, they are not absurd; they do not imply that one portion of our store of ideas is asleep while another portion is beginning to wake. On the contrary, they are psychical phenomenon of complete validity - fulfillments of wishes; they can be inserted into the chain of intelligible waking mental acts; they are constructed by a highly complicated activity of the mind."
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Explanations using "subjective sensori stimuli" or "internal sensations" are deemed accurate but inadequate by Freud, as he felt that "The dream always adds something to the sensation." 117 Freud, according to Dalbiez, accepts the distinction between the sensation and the image: the former requiring an object; while the latter is a product of the imagination which requires no object to be physically present in order for it to act. An advance in theorizing was made by those (example, Ribot) who recognized the "profound unity of an affective theme". 118 There are, at least, eight basic properties which have been recognized to accrue to the dream, although some remain moot issues: (i) the readiness with which the dreams are forgotten which is an example of repression; (ii) the setting of dreams is seen to be original when compared to the waking state and the waking imagery; (iii) the preponderent role of images (especially visual) is noted, indeed, images dominate to the point where concepts are almost eclipsed; (iv) in dreams the idea is dramatized; (v) the extent to which a dreamer believes in the reality of the dream is directly proportionate to his detachment from the external world; (vi) all judge the dream to be characterized by incoherence and absurdity; (vii) since some element of problem solving has been noted, it follows that logical values persist to a certain extent; (viii) moral values also

117 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 20; Cf. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 75; also A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 91.

118 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 19.
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persist, but a distinction is made between formal and material morality; the former is free and therefore properly moral; while the latter is un-free, and thus responsibility is substantially modified. It is concluded that there is no real point in formally speaking of oneiric morality. 119 Since Freud believes that "there are no affective illusions", 120 he does maintain the persistence of moral values in dreams.

In his classification of the various types of dream theories, Dalbiez notes three. The first is designated by the fact that "all psychic activity of the waking state is found in dreams". 121 The second type maintains that "all dreams possess a basis of psychic activity, a relaxation of associations, an impoverishment of the fund of usable elements". 122 Generally, the cause is sought for in organic or bodily stimuli. Exceptions here, are Robert, who emphasizes the discharge of residual thought thus making the dream purposive in nature; and Delage, who "emphasizes the dynamic character of these incomplete impressions", 123 thus preparing the way for Freud. The third group espouses the theory that

121 ibid., p. 37.
122 ibid., p. 36.
123 loc. cit.
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there are psychic activities that are particular to sleep, and that the
imagination intensifies to the point where organic stimuli are translated
into symbols which eclipse the intelligence. 124

Basically these preceding views are fragmentary; whereas Freud's
theory is a "synthesis on a methodological base", 125 a factor which is
found to be lacking in the other approaches.

(ii) The Method of Dream Analysis:

For Freud, the basic point of departure is that "the dream is
not a somatic but a psychic phenomena". 126 His first premise is that
"dreams have a meaning", and hence exhibit organization or thematiza-
tion. 127 The major point is that all psychic life is not coincidental
with consciousness. The dream is the effect-sign of the meaning or the cause
which, it is postulated, lies in the unconscious. Dalbiez reasonably presents

124 loc. cit.

125 ibid., p. 39. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 132 where
Freud writes: "I must affirm that dreams really have a meaning and that
a scientific procedure for interpreting them is possible." While the
entire of chapter two of this book is devoted to "The Method of Inter-
preting Dreams", there is an outline of the method given in the discussion
on pp. 128-136.

126 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 39. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams,

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the doctrine of the immateriality of knowledge and makes the attendant assertion that oneiric experiences transcend matter. The important fact to note is that Freud, in his researches, is dealing with the acquired unconscious which is formed as a result of repression and suppression, and this is not to be mistaken for the innate unconscious. Thus, the dream is seen as the product (the effect-sign) of the psychic history of the individual, and the meaning derives therefrom. Psychic causality is viewed as a psychic dependence on "earlier mental processes",

128 ibid., p. 41.

129 loc. cit. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 112 where Freud writes: "I have already taken the liberty of pointing out to you that there is within you a deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom and choice, that this belief is quite unscientific, and that it must give grounds before the claims of a determinism which governs mental life. I ask you to have some respect for the fact that that (sic) one association, and nothing else, occurs to the dreamer when he is questioned ... It can be proved that the association thus given is not a matter of choice, not indeterminate, and that it is not unconnected with what we are looking for," A.L. Fisher quotes an interesting passage from Freud in his article entitled "Freud and the Image of Man", The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 35-36, 1961-1962, pp. 67-68, which modifies the view on psychic freedom that is expressed in the above passage. Freud writes: "But at this point we become aware of a state of things which also confronts us in many instances in which light has been thrown by psychoanalysis on a mental process. So long as we trace the development from its final outcome backwards, the chain of events appears continuous, and we feel we have gained an insight which is completely satisfactory or even exhaustive. But if we proceed the reverse way, if we start from the premises inferred from analysis and try to follow these up to the final result, then we no longer get the impression of an inevitable sequence of events which could not have been otherwise determined. We notice at once that there might have been another result, and that we might have been just as well able to understand and explain the latter. The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory
and the psychic cause operates in an unconscious manner.  

Since the unconscious will has no active role, it is legitimate to assume that "the bonds of association are stable".  

Thus, when the exercise of the will is suspended, and self-criticism is rejected, the analysand, in responding to the images of the dream as presented individually by the analyst, will

as the analysis, in other words, from a knowledge of the premises we could not have foretold the nature of the result ... Hence the chain of causation can always be recognized with certainty if we follow the line of analysis, whereas to predict it along the line of synthesis is impossible."  


Thus, if one considers the two above passages carefully as regards the problem of psychic causality, it is seen that the position of Freud could be justly labeled 'retro-active determinism'. The point being that a 'pro-active' indeterminism is possible. In other words regarding choices that have been made, and actions that have been performed, psychic freedom has been annihilated in the defining existential act. Thus all past psychic events have a real identifiable causal link. They are determined. Regarding the choices to be made, it appears possible to justly assert psychic freedom or psychic indeterminism in the Freudian view as revealed in the second quotation above.

130 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 42.

131 loc. cit. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 113 where Freud writes: "The method is this: a train of associations is stirred up by the name which occurred, and these associations, as you see, are no longer quite free, but are attached just as so far as the associations to the different elements of the dream are attached; this train of associations is then kept up until the thoughts arising from the impulse have been exhausted... The associations to numbers that arise spontaneously are perhaps the most demonstrative; they follow upon one another so swiftly and make for a hidden goal with such astounding certainty that one is really quite taken aback."
allow whatever comes into his mind to be related to the analyst. Since the bonds of association are stable, then it is reasonable to assume that if a thematic set of associations emerge, then that set either contains the cause, or it points to the cause, thus showing forth the meaning of the dream.

Having subjected this hypothesis to experimental analysis, Dalbiez concludes that "Where the naked eye can only see chaos, the psychic microscope invented by Freud reveals the presence of order." 132 Of the dream and its meaning, a distinction pertains; namely, that of manifest and latent content. The former undergoes a process of translation in the dream 133 through what is termed "work of elaboration" or dream work. 134 The mechanisms of elaboration are: (i) condensation, (ii) displacement, (iii) dramatization, (iv) symbolization, and (v) secondary elaboration. At the foundation of this theory lies the hypothesis of "endo-psychic stimulant causality" 135 which exists independently of any knowledge we might have of it or of its operations. Thus, association comes to be seen as the "interdependence of the relations of psychic processes ... (which)... subject to a certain determinism". 136

132 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 44.
134 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 46. The mechanisms of the dream-work will be discussed in greater detail later.
135 loc. cit. Cf. infra, fn. 129.
136 ibid., p. 47. Cf. infra, fn. 129.
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This psychic causality is scrutinized through "objective operations" and thus, the manifest content is linked with the latent content, and seen to be so. Basically there are two types of causes depending upon whether the unconscious "applies to relation or to an image".

Given this view of psychic causality, then it follows that dreams may be construed into three classes. First, there are dreams which can be interpreted without analysis. Secondly, there are dreams which arise from the preconscious, and when the dream is interpreted, the dreamer recognizes it as his own. Thirdly, there are dreams which, when interpreted, are not recognized by the analysand. This is due to resistance and is a manifestation of the unconscious in the strict Freudian sense.

It must be realized that for Dalbiez, "Psychoanalysis is above all a method, an instrument of investigation", and that this method of free association is grounded in a realistic notion of psychic causality. The method of interpretation becomes the inverse of the process of the dream-work, and the guarantor of the approach is the causal link which has been established.

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137 loc. cit. The objective operations referred to are the associations that are evoked in response to the stimulus presented by the analyst. Cf. infra., fn. 131.

138 loc. cit. This is an important point as it indicates that unconsciousness can occur in at least two ways. One may be either unconscious of the relation between two psychic events both of which may be conscious, or one may be unconscious of one of the events. Conscious control is restored when either the relation or the pathogenic image is delivered from the unconscious through the techniques of the analyst.

139 ibid., p. 48. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 174 where Freud illustrates this resistance with reference to a dream of his own that he was endeavouring to interpret.
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(iii) The Dynamics of Dreams:

The fundamental thesis is that "the direction taken by the work of elaboration which leads from the latent ideas to the manifest content is determined by a wish". The latent content contains such elements as wishes, projects, warnings, reflections, preparations and attempts to resolve problems.

Two possible modes of verification of the initial hypothesis regarding the dream as being a manifestation of wish-fulfillment are presented by Dalbiez. First, one might analyze those dreams which appear to be in conflict with the hypothesis to demonstrate that, in fact, there is the element of wish-fulfillment present. Secondly, one might begin with simple dreams, and the dreams of children, both of which clearly exemplify the notion of wish-fulfillment, and then show that other more obscure dreams are merely complexifications of the same process. Freud accepted that one of the functions of dreams was to act as the "guardians

141 ibid., p. 49. Cf. infra. fn. 129.
142 ibid., p. 61. Cf. infra. fn. 94.
143 ibid., p. 50. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, pp. 132-142, where Freud discusses the dreams of children at length. On p. 134 he gives the kernel of the argument when he writes: "We see that these childhood dreams are not meaningless; they are complete, comprehensible mental acts... Now it would surely be most extraordinary if a child were able to achieve the performance of complete mental acts during sleep, and the grown-up person in the same situation contented himself with spasmodic reactions."
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of sleep" 144 by compromising with the tendency which is causing the psychic activity, and representing that tendency as being realized in the dream.

The role of the censor, which is not to be considered an entity, is to inhibit unwanted urges which are discordant with ethical or aesthetic values. 145 The notion may be grasped more firmly if it is compared with the super-ego of the later Freud. Thus, the censor and repression account for the distortion of the unconscious urges which are inimical to the conscious mind. The role of the conscious mind (this may be compared with the later reality principle) is to mediate between the "boundless and ruthless egoism" 146 which surfaces in sleep in proportion to the withdrawal from external reality per se. When sleep allows the individual to slip away from reality, this egoism emerges and the content laid bare in dreams is highly affectively charged, and with this factor, the dynamic character is ensured. As Dalbiez tersely remarks: "these censored wishes seem to rise up from a veritable hell". 147

144 Dalbiez, op.cit., p. 51. Freud writes, in A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 138: "We have learnt (from our study of children's dreams) that the function of dreams is to protect sleep; that they arise out of two conflicting tendencies, of which the one, the desire for sleep, remains constant, whilst the other endeavours to satisfy some mental stimulus; that dreams are proved to be mental acts, rich in meaning; that they have two main characteristics, i.e., they are wish-fulfillments and hallucinatory experiences."

145 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. infra., fn. 88. Also on this point see The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 606, where Freud, in describing the importance of the role of the censor writes: "Thus the censorship between the Ucs. and the Pcs., the assumption of whose existence is positively forced upon us by dreams, deserves to be recognized and respected as the watchman of our mental health."

146 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 56. Cf. infra., fn. 106.

Although the wishes are characterized as being instinctive, and although they can emerge in relation to any instinct, Freud relies heavily on the sexual tendencies in his account. He states univocally that nightmares, which are the oneiric counterpart of neurotic anxiety, are attributable to "The incomplete repression of sexual urges". Disagreeable dreams are generally attributable to one of the following: (i) faulty elaboration, (ii) an anxious response to a wish over which one feels guilt, and (iii) self-punishment which is a variety of mental masochism. Certain dreams are held to be the result of "the automatism

148 ibid., p. 61. For the importance of sexuality in the formation of dreams see The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 432 where Freud writes: "In interpreting dreams we should never forget the significance of sexual complexes, though we should also, of course, avoid the exaggeration of attributing exclusive importance to them... The assertion that all dreams require a sexual interpretation, against which critics rage so incessantly, occurs nowhere in my Interpretation of Dreams. It is not to be found in any of the numerous editions of this book and is in obvious contradiction to other views expressed in it." Freud also discusses this matter at length in a footnote on p. 194 of the same book. In spite of these attempts to refuse to absolutize the role of sexuality in the formation of dreams, his position in this regard is quite clear: "The more one is concerned with the solution of dreams, the more one is driven to recognize that the majority of the dreams of adults deal with sexual material and give expression to erotic wishes." The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 431.

149 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 61. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 595-599.
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of repetition", and in them the dreamer constantly relives traumatic experiences which have caused the neurosis.

Thus it is seen that the dynamics of dreams are explained in terms of a dual system of conflicting urges. On the one hand, there are the egoistic and the erotic instincts; while on the other, there are the introjected ethical and aesthetical values. Couple this dualism with wish-fulfillment, and the notion of the dream-work, which makes the transition from the latent content to the manifest content, and the dream meets with explanation.

(iv) The Source of Dreams:

While dreams are occasioned by objective, subjective, or internal sensations, these factors do not yield an adequate explanation of the dream. The matter of the dream is generally taken from the impressions of the previous day, and they go to form the manifest content; but the affective charge which accompanies this content is derived from the latent content, and it is attached thereon through the mechanism of displacement.

150 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 64. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 286, where Freud writes: "The traumatic neuroses demonstrate very clearly that a fixation to the moment of the traumatic occurrence lies at their root. These patients regularly produce the traumatic situation in their dreams; in cases showing attacks of an hysterical type in which analysis is possible, it appears that the attack constitutes a complete reproduction of this situation. It is as though these persons had not yet been able to deal adequately with the situation, as if this task were still actually before them unaccomplished."

151 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 70. Cf. Chapter V of The Interpretation of Dreams, especially pp. 196-274.
or through substitution which is one aspect of the dream-work. 152 Indeed, "the indifferent is the important displaced". 153 Dalbiez draws up a list of four cases which cover the sources of the dream. First, a recent, important fact of an individual's psychic experience receives direct presentation in the dream, and no interpretation is required to discover the meaning. Secondly, the dream is a blend of several recent and important facts thus requiring a limited analysis to resolve the dream. Thirdly, one or several recent, important events are subjected to dream-work and are replaced by a trivial but contemporaneous event. This displacement must be retraced, and at times, analysis into component parts is necessary before the interpretation can begin. The fourth instance (common in neurotics) occurs when an important but past psychic event is the latent content of the dream, while the manifest content is composed of recent and seemingly trivial events. Interpretation in this instance is by far the most difficult. 154

(v) The Mechanisms of the Dream-work:

Essentially the dream mechanisms are processes of transformation, and Dalbiez insists that one may admit the mechanisms without accepting

152 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 65. This will be discussed at greater length in the following section.
153 ibid., p. 66.
154 ibid., p. 67.
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the motivating forces. This distinction is between the descriptive
and the explanatory, and it appears to be most acceptable. The five
mechanisms mentioned earlier are herein elucidated.

(a) Condensation:

In the dream, the mechanism of condensation has the effect of
abbreviating the latent content so that the images that appear in the
manifest content are "over-determined". Clearly, one element at the
level of the manifest content may have many antecedents in the unconscious.
In as much as one element of the manifest content may have many causes,
one might ask if this hinders or helps the task of the analyst? If one
views these various causes as vectors which converge to produce a single
effect, then clearly the analyst is aided in his task of discovering the
complex which has produced the effect-sign. One might ask if the causes
necessarily form a complex; could they not be discrete; or could two sets
of complexes combine to produce one effect-sign? If this is the case then
the analyst is hindered in his task even if he uncovered one cause or set
of causes, would it not then be the case that owing to the nature of
repression, and the censor or the super-ego, that the more fundamental

ibid., p. 74. This point appears to be of great importance to
this author as it prepares the way for a more critical review of the Freudian
literature. One can accept many of the Freudian statements on the process
of unconscious mental activities without necessarily capitulating totally
to the mind of Freud. The distinction between doctrine and method, and the
distinction between accepting the fact that unconscious mental activities
exist, and what it is that comprises and motivates them appears to be crucial
if one is to properly assess the Freudian contribution to the field of
psychology and to the study of mind.

loc. cit. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 312-315, and
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cause would lie deeper, and hence resist or elude discovery? Indeed, if
the mechanism of condensation exists and is functional within the indi­
vidual, does it not by its very nature render the task of the analyst
virtually impossible as he may well think that he has elucidated the
cause, and the patient may even feel somewhat more able to cope as a
result of his new found awareness, and yet the more basic cause, or set
of causes, remain festering within his unconscious waiting to flower
forth at a later date in a new dream or in a new symptom. To take this
line of questioning seriously, one would be forced to conclude with the
ironic fact that one of the key-stones of psychoanalysis - repression -
and the mechanism of condensation conspire to defeat the curative process.

The converse of condensation is also possible. 157 Dalbiez,
however, asserts that "analyzed, a condensation ceases to appear absurd", 158
and that it is strictly thematic. So it does in fact appear that the
analyst can overcome the difficulties inherent in the functioning of
this mechanism.

(b) Displacement:

This mechanism is the "process whereby the affective charge is
detached from its proper object and directed towards an accessory object". 159

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157 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 74.
158 loc. cit.
159 ibid., p. 82. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 340-344, and
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This mechanism reveals itself at work in all psychic formations both
normal and morbid. Thus, its essential notes are its representational
aspect and its affectivity. Displacement is not to be identified
with substitution, transformation, compensation, conditioned reflex
or transferance; rather, it is an "effect or repression" instigated
by the censor, 160 and this marks it off clearly from the other
notions, and this is uniquely Freud's contribution.

(c) Dramatization:

In this mechanism, visual images are the predominant medium in
which conceptual thought is presented. 161 Note the difference between
waking and dream thought as while the former is progressively moving from
the concrete to the abstract, the latter moves regressively from the
abstract to the concrete. 162

Dalbiez notes that the process of discovery is from the pre­
sentation of an idea to consciousness and the later intellection of the
relation which has heretofore been unconscious. 163 Also the notion of a
conventional sign, as being grounded in the natural sign in which a causal
relation is clearly apprehended is noted. 164 Recalling that Freud is

160 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 87.
161 ibid., p. 88. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 83 where
Freud writes: "The transformation of ideas into hallucinations is not the
only respect in which dreams differ from corresponding thoughts in waking
life. Dreams construct a situation out of these images ... they "dramatize"
an idea ... we appear not to think but to experience; ... Not until we wake
up does the critical comment arise that we have not experienced anything
but have merely been thinking in a peculiar way..."
163 ibid., p. 91.
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dealing with the acquired unconscious, the signs which are used would
be acquired and hence conventional. The fact of psychic causality is
herein reinforced. But how can a relation be expressed in images?
Directly, it cannot. 165 Relation is accessible only to reason; thus,
"operations which are properly called relational are never realized in
dreams, but merely signified." 166 The dream does not judge reality; rather,
it is based on past judgments, and hence derives its meaning therein. 167
The point is that the logic of dreams is a "non-cognitive psychic
causality", 168 and that "the dream uses spatial proximity to represent
any form of relations". 169 The relations dealt with by Dalbiez are
opposition, contradiction and negation. 170 An example of the spatial
proximity as expressive of relations is for negation to be present, in
the manifest content, in the inversion of materials. 171

165 ibid., pp. 94-95. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,
pp. 183-192 for a discussion of how relations are represented on the
dream.
166 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 96.
167 ibid., p. 97. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 481-496.
168 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 97.
170 ibid., p. 100.
171 loc. cit.
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is used primarily in representing the relations of similarity,
agreement, contiguity, and 'as if'. 172 Needless to say, much experimental
evidence would have to be presented before the opponents of psychoanalysis
would accept this series of hypotheses.

(d) Symbolization:

This mechanism is marked off from dramatization by two facts.
First, the regressive nature of dramatization is replaced with a movement
from the concrete to the concrete. Secondly, whereas the modalities of
dramatization are unique to the individual, symbolization is a shared
characteristic. Indeed, "the mechanism of forming symbols is a collec-
tive displacement". 173 In practice, symbolization depends upon the
censor. 174 It is worth noting that Freud and Jung disagreed over the
import of symbolization and that "a distinct symbolic method exists
side by side with the associative method". 175

(e) Secondary Elaboration:

This mechanism operates in the transition from sleep to wakefulness
as "the dreamer's mind, in proportion as it draws near to the waking thought,
introduces a more or less artificial order into its oeiric production". 176

172 ibid., p. 101.
173 ibid., p. 105. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 385-419;
and A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, pp. 156-177.
175 ibid., p. 112.
176 ibid., p. 122. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 526-546;
and A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 190.
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This is a subtle notion which one can experientially verify as undoubtedly
this would be the portion of the dream that is easiest to recall as since
it has undergone two elaborations, it is most likely to escape further re-
pression.

This analysis of the mechanisms of the dream is brought to a
conclusion with one statement from Dalbiez which while simple in form is
rife with meaning: "The dream, like natural language, is the effect-sign
of thought". 177

4. The Phenomenon of Parapraxes:

Freud recorded his research in the area of parapraxes in a work
entitled The Psychopathology of Everyday Life which was published first in
1901. 178 The book which was by far the most popular of all of Freud's
writings consisted entirely of evidences taken from everyday life that
attested to the existence of the unconscious. The intent was clearly to
accumulate examples which would prepare his readers for the acceptance
of the existence of unconscious psychical processes, and to demonstrate
the range of his hypotheses regarding mental life. Not only were the
forces that he reckoned with endured by the abnormal, but through the study
of dreams and the study of the slips and errors of everyday life it could
be seen that unconscious mental activities were of the essence of mental life
whatever its state of well-being.

177 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 124.

Library, New York.
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As far as demonstrating the existence of unconscious mental processes is concerned, Freud felt that this area of evidence alone would be sufficient to establish the fact.

But it is not in order to establish this thesis (that there exist unconscious mental processes) that we have summoned up the phenomena of dreams and of the formation of hysterical symptoms; the observation of normal waking life would by itself suffice to prove it beyond any doubt. 179

The pattern of the argumentation follows that presented in the above two studies; that of symptom-formation and dreams. The fundamental proposition that is to be maintained in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* is that common lapses, errors, omissions, etc. have a meaning; "they are at once effects and signs of hidden urges". 180 These urges are brought to light by the associative technique, and in so doing, the motivation for the error or slip is established.

In order to clarify the problem, three distinctions are introduced: the symptomatic act, the disturbed act, and the inhibited act. In the symptomatic act "an affective urge is released without clashing with another urge; there is an absence of repression". 181

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180 Dalbiez, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 1 Cf. Freud, S. *The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest*, Sarason, STP., pp. 3-22. In this short selection Freud attempts to assess the contributions made by psycho-analysis to scientific thought. Regarding the parapraxes Freud writes on p. 5: "Parapraxes are full-blown psychical phenomena and always have a meaning and an intention. They serve definite purposes which, owing to the prevailing psychological situation, cannot be expressed in any other way. These situations as a rule involve a psychical conflict which prevents the underlying intention from finding direct expression and it diverts it along indirect paths."

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disturbed act "an affective urge clashes with another urge and can only
be partially discharged; there is incomplete repression". 182 In the
inhibited act "an affective urge is completely checked in its discharge
by another urge; there is complete repression, an inhibited act". 183
Repression, here, means the "inhibitory action exercised by one urge
upon another". 184

(i) Absence of Repression: The symptomatic Act:

Humming a tune, twisting a mustache, fiddling with a button; these
and similar actions are examples of symptomatic acts which are signs
revealing a deeper psychic process, and which possess meaning and are
perfectly motivated. 185 "The exterior act is at once the effect and the
sign of the interior state, but their relation eludes consciousness". 186
These acts have two possible origins; first, they may have been conscious
but through repetition, they have been rendered unconscious; and secondly,
these acts may have had an unconscious origin. The line of causality is
found by "the accumulation of indications and in the appreciation of their
convergence". 187

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183 loc. cit.
184 loc. cit.
to Psychoanalysis, p. 64 and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p. 85.
187 ibid., p. 3.
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One consequence of Freud's approach in this area is a deep appreciation of the continuity of the normal and the abnormal as in both, the same mechanism is seen to be operative whereby the affective states and urges are expressed by physical acts. Given the expressed physical act, the task is then one of seeking the affective cause. This is, as Dalbiez remarks, the "Leibnizian concept of the symbolization of the soul by the body". 188 Freud enlarges the notion of the unconscious by positing an intermediate notion between the simple reaction and conscious expression; namely, unconscious expression. These are the three causally effective links by which the psyche can effect the organism. 189

The simple reaction is fixed, stereotyped and unconscious in relation. In the unconscious expression, the exterior act is conscious in itself, its relation to the psychic event is plastic (of an associative order), and the relation of the action to the complex is unconscious. In the conscious expression, both act and relation are conscious, and the relation to the psychic state is variable. 190 By the associative technique,

188 ibid., p. 5. Cf. Freud, S., The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest, Sarason, STP., p. 13, where Freud writes: "... psychoanalysis unhesitatingly ascribes the primacy in mental life to affective processes, and it reveals an unexpected amount of affective disturbance and blinding of the intellect in normal to less than in sick people."

189 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 6.

190 ibid., p. 8. An example of the simple reaction is the dilation of the pupil as a reaction to fear. The hysterical or obsessional symptom such as partial paralysis or compulsive hand washing are examples of the unconscious expression. A fist raised in anger is an example of conscious expression. The first and third type of behaviour have received exhaustive attention in the literature of psychology. It is one of the contributions of Freud to have focussed attention on the second intermediate behaviour.
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Freud was enabled to explore the area of the unconscious expression which
was largely ignored by the academic psychologists prior to him.

(ii) Incomplete Repression: The Disturbed Act:

With this act the duality of forces in conflict is more evident,
and the triad of psychic conflict, repression, and unconscious motivation
which is unique to Freud is developed here. For Freud, as for Anaxagoras,
"strife is the father of all things"; but Dalbiez tries to englobe the
same phenomena by likening the dynamic process onto Aristotle's expla-
nation of chance, disorder and evil as being the result of two colliding,
independent causal vectors. This disturbed act "may be either cognitive
or motor but in fact may often be indeterminate". The cognitive
variety of the disturbed act consists of mistakes of (i) seeing, (ii) hearing,
(iii) memory, and (iv) memory screens; while the motor variety are cate-
gorized in terms of (i) inversion, (ii) anticipation, (iii) recall,
(iv) contamination, and (v) substitution.

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191 ibid., p. 9; The majority of examples given and discussed in
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, are of this variety. The following
should serve as an exemplification: "During the war, Freud, on opening
his newspaper, believed he read the headlines: "Der Friede von Gorz"
(The peace of Gorz), while the actual text was "Die Feinde vor Gorz" (The
enemy before Gorz). This mistake is very easily explained: Freud had
two sons at the front. His mind was evidently preoccupied with their
fate, and in the depths of his being he desired peace. A verbal similarity
allowed his desire, which was more or less unformulated and in a state
of repression, to discharge itself in the form of a mistake of reading." loc. cit.

192 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 15.
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Freud, while allowing for some physiological explanations to pertain, emphasizes the psychological in the light of the end to be attained regarding the repressed urge's interference. The dynamics are described tersely by realizing that "every disturbed act has an end, and is caused by the discharge of a repressed affective urge". 193 The disturbed act arises by a "failure of repression" which allows for the "return of the repressed". 194 The urges may be either preconscious or unconscious in origin. If they are preconscious, then the conflicting urge is only suppressed which means that it has been consciously and voluntarily rejected. If the urge is unconscious, then it has been subjected to "unconscious and automatic inhibition". 195 The preconscious consists of "the elements which are only non-conscious at a given moment, which the subject recognizes as his own, and which he can call up at will". 196

A definition of the unconscious emerges as follows:

... the elements which are non-conscious in a permanent manner, which the subject does not recognize as his own, and which he cannot call up at will, but only by means of special techniques such as hypnosis and psycho-analysis. 197

193 ibid., p. 16. Cf. infra., fn. 188.
194 ibid., p. 10.
195 loc. cit.
196 ibid., p. 11.
197 loc. cit. This will be dealt with at greater length later.
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Thus, there are two degrees of unconsciousness: in the first, the effect and cause taken separately are conscious; while in the second degree, only the effect is conscious, but the cause and the relationship of causality are unconscious. The key point in the argumentation put forth by Dalbiez towards establishing the existence of the unconscious is that once one has admitted the possibility of the unconsciousness of the relationship of causality, one would be hard put not to admit the possibility of the unconsciousness of the cause itself. This difference for Dalbiez is asserted as one of degree and not one of kind, and indeed is seen as identical in an intrinsic way.

(iii) Complete Repression: the Inhibited Act:

The inhibited act arises when there is "a conflict of forces, i.e. the inhibitory pressure of a counter-force", it is the mechanism


199 loc. cit. The manner in which Dalbiez has handled the material that Freud has provided on the parapraxes has afforded this excellent argument for the existence of the unconscious mental processes. That Freud was aware of the significance of his work in this area of mental phenomena is also clear, as he wrote in The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, Sarason, STP., p. 5: "Parapraxes are the most convenient material for anyone who wishes to convince himself of the trustworthiness of psycho-analytic explanations."

200 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 19. Cf. A General Introduction to Psycho-analysis, p. 80 where Freud writes: "It is important to begin early to reckon with the fact that the mind is an arena, a sort of tumbling-ground, for the struggles of antagonistic impulses; or, to express it in non-dynamic terms, that the mind is made up of contradictions and pairs of opposites. Evidence of one particular tendency does not in the least preclude its opposite; there is room for both of them. The material questions are: How do these opposites stand to one another and what effects proceed from one of them and what from the other?" Cf. also The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p. 80.
of forgetting and it is seen to have a positive cause. The inhibited act may be either cognitive or motor; and these, according to Dalbiez, differ only in degree and to the extent of the amount of psychic energy required. Accepting the principle of sufficient reason, (every act has a cause) it is clear that forgetting is determined. This point is of crucial import to the acceptance or the rejection of psychoanalysis, as active forgetting necessitates repression, and this, as has been noted earlier, is one of the corner-stones of the theory. Why does it occur? Basically, it is a manifestation of the pleasure-pain principle. As Dalbiez puts the matter: "unpleasant associations and memories which are painful may act as a positive cause in the forgetting of some factor which threatens their evocation". One may explain both


204 ibid., p. 23. Cf. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p. 68, where Freud writes: "I distinguish forgetting of impressions and experiences, that is, the forgetting of knowledge, from the forgetting of resolutions, that is the forgetting of omissions. The uniform result of the entire series of observations I can formulate as follows: The forgetting in all cases is proved to be founded on a motive of displeasure." Cf. also A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, pp. 79-80.

205 Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 24; cf. fn. 204 infra; The following example should serve as an exemplification: "A man who had recently lost his beloved wife, writes Freud, from an affection of the lungs, reported to me the following case of misleading the doctor, which can only
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the forgetting or impressions and projects in this manner. In the
free associations a theme is revealed which points to the unconscious
cause, and through interpretation, this cause may be integrated into
consciousness thus causing the impression to lose its affective charge
(de-repression), and hence, sap it of its dynamic character.

Dalbiez acutely concludes: "Ultimately, the whole Freudian
doctrine of repression and of the censorship ... may be reduced to psycho-
dynamism, to the explanation of psychic facts, by a system of directed
forces." 206

Thus, the symptomatic act, the disturbed act, and the inhibited
act, the three classes of actions that Freud discusses in The Psycho-
pathology of Everyday Life, have been exposed. Dynamically presented, they
are respectively comprised of: a "single force; the meeting of two forces
ending in the 'formation of a compromise'; the meeting of two forces ending
in the complete inhibition of one of them". 207 In each instance, the action
be explained by the theory of such forgetting. "As my poor wife's
pleuritis had not disappeared after many weeks, Dr. P. was called in
consultation. While taking the history he asked among others the
customary questions whether there were any cases of lung trouble in my
wife's family. My wife denied any such cases, and even I myself could
not remember any. While Dr. P. was taking leave the conservation accidently
turned to excursions, and my wife said: 'Yes, even to Langersdorf, where
my poor brother lies buried, is a long journey'. This brother died about
fifteen years ago, after having suffered for years from tuberculosis. My
wife was very fond of him, and often spoke about him. Indeed, I recall that
when her malady was diagnosed as pleurisy she was very worried and sadly
remarked: 'My brother also died of lung trouble'. But the memory was so
very repressed that even after the above-cited conversation about the
trip to L. she found no occasion to correct what she had said concerning
the family incidence of disease. I myself was struck by this forgetting at
the very moment she began to talk about Langersdorf." ibid., p. 25.


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is taken as the effect-sign of processes that lie outside of awareness, and knowledge of them is attained through application of the technique of free association. To read the plethora of examples that Freud offers of these processes at work and to understand but one of them is to come to the realization that there are dynamic unconscious processes which effect even the simplest forms of behaviour.

5. Others: The Phenomena of Amnesia, the Split-Personality and Jokes:

In coming to grips with the phenomenon of amnesia, it is significant to note that in the above presentations what is forgotten is oft-times more important than what is remembered, at least in the determinations of certain behaviours. The amnesia that shrouds the pathogenic situation that generated the hysterical symptom formation must be dispelled before the cure can be effected. Individuals quite literally suffer at the hands of what they have supposedly forgotten, and the task of the analyst is to restore the memories of these amnesia bound patients. Freud has observed that in the obsessional neurosis the amnesia usually extends to the connection between the obsessional act and the pathogenic situation that generated the neurotic response. The actual traumatic experience is not necessarily forgotten, only its relation to the present behaviour is subject to amnesia. In hysteria the amnesia extends to a much greater portion of the patient's past as "... the analysis of

of each hysterical symptom leads to a whole chain of former impressions, which upon their return may be literally described as having been hitherto forgotten.\textsuperscript{209}

Perhaps a more common and interesting form of amnesia is the "amnesia of childhood"\textsuperscript{210} where the first years of life are almost completely erased from the memory. This phenomenon is surprising in that it is a common psychological dictum to say that the first five years of life are the most important for the development of the character of the individual. One would think that having little to remember, as the child does, would facilitate the remembrance of what does occur. But this is not the case. Indeed, even what is remembered is often trivial and seemingly unimportant. Freud called these memories "screen-memories",\textsuperscript{211} and saw them as the product of condensation as upon analysis they proved to lead to a knowledge of the childhood events that had seemingly been forgotten.

What do these amnesias attest to? The fact that knowledge can be possessed and yet the knower does not know that he possesses it. Clearly, this suggests the fact that mind is not coextensive with consciousness.

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{ibid.}, p. 211.
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The phenomenon of the split-personality is another such evidence. The existence of multiple personalities within the same individual certainly attests to the fact that there exist unconscious mental processes. Freud described this phenomenon as follows:

The study of hypnotic phenomena has accustomed us to what was at first a bewildering realization that in one and the same individual there can be several mental groupings, which can remain more or less independent of one another, and which can alternate with one another in their hold upon consciousness. Cases of this kind, too, occasionally appear spontaneously, and are then described as examples of 'double conscience'. If, where a splitting of the personality such as this has occurred, consciousness remains attached regularly to one of the two states, we call it the conscious mental state and the other, which is detached from it, the unconscious one. 212.

Thus, the fact that there can exist a second mental grouping, or a second personality, within the one individual such that the one is dissociated from the other would seem to afford a clear example of the existence of the unconscious.

Before introducing the last category of evidence for the existence of the unconscious, it would be useful to recall Freud's justification for seeking his evidences from such unusual quarters.

As a science psychoanalysis is characterized by the methods with which it works, not by the subject-matter with which it deals. These methods can be applied without violating their essential nature to the history of civilization, to the science of religion, and to mythology as well as to the study of the neuroses. Psychoanalysis aims at and achieves nothing more than the discovery of the unconscious in mental life. 213

212 Freud, S., Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 43.

213 Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 397.
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Clearly, the nature of the material studied was not the important fact, what was important was the manner in which the material was studied. The method used dignified even the most suspect of materials. Thus Freud felt justified in seriously considering the most commonplace areas of human life in seeking to discover the operations of unconscious physical processes.

In his work, *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, Freud undertook a systematic analysis of the techniques, purposes, mechanisms and sources of jokes. As a result of this study he came to the realization that the various mechanisms that had manifested themselves in the study of dreams, also showed themselves to be operative in the realm of the joke. 214

His fundamental insight that determined the course of the investigation was as follows:

... if we insist that the joking activity should not, after all, be described as pointless or aimless, since it has the unmistakable aim of evoking pleasure in its hearers. I doubt if we are in a position to undertake anything without having an intention in view. If we do not require our mental apparatus at the moment for supplying one of our indispensable satisfactions, we allow it itself to work in the directions of pleasure and we seek to derive pleasure from its own activity. I suspect that this is in general the conditions that govern all aesthetic ideation, but I understand too little of aesthetics to try to enlarge on this statement. 215


215 *ibid.*, p. 96.
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Just as in the other studies, his driving insight is that jokes, as psychical acts, have a meaning, and it is his avowed intention to understand precisely what that meaning is. After subjecting a great many examples of jokes to close scrutiny he arrived at an understanding of the purpose and the function of the joke.

The purpose and function of jokes, however - namely, the protection of sequences of words and thoughts from criticism - can already be seen in jests as their essential feature. Their function consists from the first in lifting internal inhibitions and in making sources of pleasure fertile which have been rendered inaccessible by these inhibitions; and we shall find that they remain loyal to this characteristic throughout their development. 216

Freud is saying that thoughts can be expressed, and actions can be performed under the aegis of the joke that would under different conditions be unacceptable. Institutions, people and mores towards which one might be normally hesitant about voicing any rational criticism, become fertile sources of amusement when the joke allows the lowering of inhibitions that normally restrict one's overt behaviour. The development of Freud's thought along this line can be seen quite clearly in the following:

Among the various kinds of internal inhibition or suppression there is one which deserves our special interest, because it is the most far-reaching. It is given the name of 'repression', and is recognized by its function of preventing the impulses subjected to it, and their derivatives, from becoming conscious. Tendentious jokes, as we shall see, are able to release pleasure even from sources that have undergone repression ...

216 ibid., p. 130.
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we may say that tendentious jokes exhibit the main character­istic of the joke-work——that of liberating pleasure by getting rid of inhibitions——... Either they strengthen the purposes which they serve, by bringing assistance to them from impulses that are kept suppressed, or they put themselves entirely at the service of suppressed purposes. 217

The words "sources that have undergone repression", are a clear indication that the sources are unconscious. That this is the case is due to the nature of repression as it has been revealed in the studies of other areas, most notably those of symptom-formation and the dream. Just as in the studies of the other psychic phenomenon, Freud has come to the position that asserts that what is outside consciousness as a result of repression does not cease to determine the conscious behaviour, and further that there are recognizable unconscious processes or mechanisms by which this is accomplished. As a result of his investigation into the realm of the joke, he is enabled to chart the development of this psychic phenomenon throughout its various stages:

If we now survey the course of the development of the joke, we may say that from its beginning to its perfecting it remains true to its essential nature. It begins as play, in order to derive pleasure from the free use of words and thoughts. As soon as the strengthening of reason puts an end to this play with words as being senseless, and with thoughts as being nonsensical, it changes into a jest, in order that it may retain these sources of pleasure and be able to achieve fresh pleasure from the liberation of nonsense. Next, as a joke proper, but still a non-tendentious one, it gives its assistance to thoughts and strengthens them against the challenge of critical judgment... And finally it comes to the help of major purposes which are

217 ibid., p. 134.
combatting suppression, in order to lift their internal inhibitions by the principle of 'fore-pleasure'. Reason, critical judgment, suppression - these are the forces against which it fights in succession; it holds fast to the original sources of verbal pleasure and, from the stage of the just onwards, opens new sources of pleasure for itself by lifting inhibitions. The pleasure that it produces, whether it is pleasure in play or pleasure in lifting inhibitions, can invariably be traced back to economy in psychical expenditure, provided that this view does not contradict the essential nature of pleasure and that it proves itself fruitful in other directions. 218

The joke, then, in so far as it serves the purposes of material that is repressed, is a manifestation of the unconscious. It is interesting to note that while the other studies of areas of evidence for the existence of the unconscious were in areas that might be loosely characterized as asocial, the study of this area reveals clearly that the unconscious is to be found as operative in areas that are eminently social. Thus the unconscious manifests itself in both the normal and the abnormal and in behaviour that is both asocial and social. It is clear, then, that these unconscious mental processes are a general characteristic of mind, arrived at through a process of inference which moves from overt, manifest behaviour. Is this instance of mediate knowledge justified? Perhaps this presentation of the manner in which Freud was led to reason to the existence of the unconscious would best be concluded by observing what Freud has to say as he defends himself in this regard:

I am aware that anyone who is under the spell of a good academic philosophical education, or who takes his opinions at long range from some so-called system of philosophy, will be opposed to the assumption of an 'unconscious psychical' in the sense in which Lipps and I use the term, and will prefer to prove its impossibility on the basis of a definition of the psychical. But definitions are a matter of convention and can be altered. I have often found that people who dispute the unconscious as being something absurd and impossible have not formed their impressions from the sources from which I at least was brought to the necessity of recognizing it. These opponents of the unconscious had never witnessed the effect of a post-hypnotic suggestion, and when I have told them examples from my analyses with non-hypnotized neurotics they have been filled with the greatest astonishment. They had never realized the idea that the unconscious is something which we really do not know, but which we are obliged by compelling inferences to supply; they had understood it as being something capable of becoming conscious but which was not being thought of at the moment, which did not occupy 'the focal point of attention'. Nor had they ever tried to convince themselves of the existence in their own minds of unconscious thoughts like these by analyzing one of their own dreams; and when I attempted to do so with them they could only greet their own associations with surprise and confusion. I have also formed an impression that fundamental emotional resistances stand in the way of accepting the 'unconscious', and that these are based on the fact that no one wants to get to know his unconscious and that the most convenient plan is to deny its possibility altogether. 219

Freud's defense is simply to ask his opponents to return to the phenomena which had initially motivated his reasoning, and to follow him as he evolves his pattern of inference. And this is what has been undertaken here as the areas of symptom formation, the dream, parapraxes, amnesia, split-personality, and the joke have come under scrutiny.

219 ibid., pp. 161-162.
6. The Nature of the Unconscious:

While it is the case that Freud's notion of the unconscious has in part been revealed in the foregoing analyses, a brief presentation of what the notion consists of is warranted. In his essay entitled "The Unconscious" (1915), Freud noted that the repressed content of the unconscious was not co-extensive with the unconscious itself, although it was the case that "the essence of the process of repression lies, not in abrogating or annihilating the ideational presentation of an instinct, but in withholding it from becoming conscious". As has been seen, however, the effects of repression can penetrate the conscious mind, and hence influence the behaviour of the individual. Thus, it is repressed material, the origin of which has already been discussed, is seen to be the significant aspect of the unconscious.

All the knowledge that one is aware of at the moment must be said to exist "in a condition of latency, that is to say unconsciousness".

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221 ibid., p. 116. Cf. The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, Sarason, STP., p. 17, where Freud writes: "Some notable discoveries have been made in the course of this investigation of the infantile mind. Thus it has been possible to confirm what has often been already suspected, the extraordinary important influence exerted by the impressions of childhood (and particularly by its earliest years) on the whole course of later development ... Psycho-analysis has been able to establish the decisive and indestructible character of these earliest experiences in the clearest possible way in the case of sexual life. 'On revient toujours à ses premiers amours' is a sober truth."

222 Freud, S., "The Unconscious (1915)", p. 117.
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The major fact that is to be noted here is that Freud is adamantly refusing to identify the conscious with the mental. The proof that such a state exists has already been discussed at length so the renewed efforts to do the same will be glossed over in favour of an appreciation of what the unconscious is in the Freudian view.

The unconscious mental processes are noted to "enjoy a high degree of independence" as well as "having characteristics and peculiarities which seem alien to us, or even incredible, and running directly counter to the well-known attributes of consciousness." The unconscious, thus far revealed, comprises at least two processes: first, there are those ideas that are merely "temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones"; and secondly, there are those contents or processes "which have undergone repression, and which if they came into consciousness must stand out in crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious mind". The former are "capable of entering consciousness" and are termed preconscious; while the latter have failed to pass the censor and are actively repressed, hence arises the dynamic character of the unconscious.

223 ibid., p. 118.
224 ibid., p. 120.
225 ibid., p. 121.
226 ibid., p. 122.
227 ibid., p. 123.
228 ibid., pp. 122-123. Cf. infra., fn. 88.
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because of the activity of the censor, an individual may hear an idea
consciously and yet fail to relate it to the repressed unconscious idea,
"even though the content may be the same". \(^{229}\) That this cognitive un-
conscious does, in fact, influence behaviour has been seen in the analysis
of failed acts and symptom-formation in the neurosis. Further, it has
been seen to be one of the determinants of the oneiric experience.

Freud in dealing with the notion of the affective unconscious
clearly states that an instinct can never be an object of consciousness,
and that in the unconscious "it can only be represented by the idea". \(^{230}\)
The instinct must attach itself either to an idea or to an affective state
in order that the individual may have knowledge of it. Regarding affective
states themselves, it is noted that "we cannot maintain the existence of
unconscious affects in the same sense as that of unconscious ideas". \(^{231}\)
Three different things may happen to the affect: "either it remains,
wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively
different charge or affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed,
i.e. its development is hindered altogether". \(^{232}\) The thrust of this line of
argumentation is that "it is surely the essence of emotion that we should
feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness". \(^{233}\) Thus the unconscious

\(^{229}\) ibid., p. 125.

\(^{230}\) ibid., p. 126.

\(^{231}\) Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 416.

\(^{232}\) Freud, S., "The Unconscious (1915)", p. 127.

\(^{233}\) ibid., p. 126.
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affect is viewed as a potential state of disposition, and it is not in
any way actual in the unconscious proper.

Repression which acts in relation to the ethical, aesthetical
and social values of the conscious mind has the capacity to inhibit "... the
transformation of an instinctual impulse into affective expression". 234
This means that the conscious system controls "affectivity as well as
access to motility". 235 Note that Freud deems the exercise of this
conscious control over the affective development to be definitive of
normality, and the loss of said control, of abnormality. 236

The characteristics which mark the unconscious off from the higher
systems are summarily stated as: "exemption from mutual contradiction,
primary process (motility of cathexis), timelessness, and substitution of
psychic for external reality". 237 These unconscious processes are most
easily observable under the conditions of dreaming and the neuroses,
"... that is to say, when the processes of the higher system Pes. revert
to an earlier level by a certain process of degradation (regression)". 238

234 ibid., p. 127.
235 loc. cit.
236 ibid., p. 126. This point should be considered in conjunction with
discussion occurring infra, fn. 129, as it highlights the role of consciousness
in the determination of behaviour.
237 ibid., p. 135. Cf. infra, fn. 221.
238 loc. cit. Freud uses the notation Ucs., Pes., and Cs. to refer
to the unconscious, preconscious and conscious systems respectively.
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Because the preconscious and conscious process control access to
motility, direct the discharge of affectivity, and sustain the values
in relation to which repression operates, it is therefore clear that the
unconscious system under normal conditions would have difficulty
operating such that it influenced behaviour were it not for the cooperation of
the higher systems. 239 Thus it can be seen that the "... system of the Ucs
in the strict sense functions only as a stage preliminary to the higher
organization". 240 Freud sums up the activities of the unconscious by
saying that "... the Ucs is continued into its so-called derivatives, is
accessible to the influence of life, perpetually acts upon the Pcs., and
even is, on its part, capable of influence by the latter system". 241

Note that Freud clearly states that "psychoanalytic treatment is
based upon influence by the Cs. on the Ucs., and shows at any rate that,
though laborious, this is not impossible. The derivatives of the Ucs. which
act as intermediaries between the two systems open the way ... towards
accomplishing this". 242 Freud simplifies the matter as follows:

239 loc. cit. Cf. The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific
Interest, Sarason, STP., pp. 20-21 where he writes: "And psychoanalysis
can also show that precious contributions to the formation of character are
made by these asocial and perverse instincts in the child, if they are not
subjected to repression but are diverted from their original aims to more
valuable ones by the process known as 'sublimation'. Our highest virtues
have grown up, as reaction formations and sublimations, out of our worst
dispositions. Education should scrupulously refrain from burying these
precious springs of action and should restrict itself to encouraging the
processes by which these energies are led along safe paths."

241 ibid., p. 137.
242 ibid., p. 141. Cf. infra., fn. 236 and 129.
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The content of the Ucs may be compared with a primitive population in the mental kingdom. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being - something analogous to instinct in animals - these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. Later there is added all that is discarded as useless during childhood development and this need not differ in its nature from what is inherited. A sharp and final division between the content of the two systems, as a rule, takes place only at puberty. 243

The description of the contents of the unconscious is concluded with statements from two other of Freud's works. In The Ego and the Id, Freud simply states that the "... repressed is the prototype of the unconscious ... we restrict the term unconscious to the dynamically unconscious repressed." 244 And in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud writes that "... everything conscious has an unconscious preliminary stage; whereas what is in the unconscious may remain at that stage and nevertheless claim to be regarded as having the full value of a psychical process. The unconscious is the true psychical reality..." 245

243 ibid., pp. 141-142. Cf. The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, Sarason, STP., pp. 17-18, where Freud writes: "... in spite of all the later development that occurs in the adult, none of the infantile formations perish. All the wishes, instinctual impulses, modes of reaction and attitudes of childhood are still demonstrably present in maturity and in appropriate circumstances can emerge once more. They are not destroyed but merely overlaid - to use the spatial mode of description which psychoanalytic psychology has been obliged to adopt. Thus it is part of the nature of the mental past that, unlike the historic past, it is not absorbed by its derivatives; it persists (whether actually or only potentially) alongside what has proceeded from it. The proof of this assertion lies in the fact that the dreams of normal people revive their childhood characters everynight and reduce their whole mental life to an infantile level ... The strength in which the residues of infancy are still present in the mind shows us the amount of disposition to illness; that disposition may
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To briefly state a capsule definition of the Freudian unconscious
written from a more philosophical point of view, one could do no better
than to consider the words of Dalbiez when he writes:

The second level of the cognitive unconscious, that of
acquired modifications of innate tendencies plays an
absolutely primary role in psychoanalysis. All Freud's
explanations involve reference to the unconscious traces
left by antecedent psychic activity, and emphasize their
efficiency. 246

The second level of the affective unconscious (that of
acquired modifications of innate tendencies) is equally,
if not more important, from the psychoanalytical point of
view, than the corresponding level of the cognitive un­
conscious. We are fully agreed with Freud on its dynamic
role... 247

Recall that at the beginning of this chapter the problem was posed
as follows: 'The line of argumentation that threads its way through the
Freudian literature might be formulated in the following fashion: If there
is evidence that indicates that mental processes are at work in such a
manner that they elude direct conscious awareness; then one is justified in
the assertion that there exist unconscious mental processes. But there is
evidence that indicates that mental processes are at work in such a manner

accordingly be regarded as an expression of an inhibition in development.
The part of a person's psychical material which has remained infantile
and has been repressed as being unserviceable constitutes the core of
his unconscious.'

244 Freud, S., The Ego and the Id, W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., New
York, 1962, p. 5.
245 Freud, S., The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 651.
247 ibid., p. 48. Cf. infra., fn. 188.
that they elude direct conscious awareness. Therefore, one is justified in asserting the existence of unconscious mental processes. 248

Through the studies that have been made of the various psychic phenomena, the evidence that Freud adduced in support of the minor premise has been exposed. The pattern of his thought has been followed throughout the basic theoretical formulations that surround the development of the notion of the unconscious. While it is possible to express dissatisfaction with the physicalistic vocabulary he has used to clothe his experience, and while it is possible to call some of the analogies into question, is it possible to deny the fact that Freud has succeeded in demonstrating that mind is not co-extensive with consciousness, and that unconscious mental processes do, indeed, exist?

It is suggested that the convergence of the evidence, and the economy of the theory that has thus far been revealed are certainly sufficient to see 'disbelief hanging high'. Might not the Freudian arguments for the existence of unconscious mental processes be assessed favourably in the light of a stricter philosophical criterion?

248 Cf. infra., p. 4.
CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION OF THE FREUDIAN ARGUMENT

1. Review

So that the Freudian demonstration of the existence of unconscious mental process may be focused on with greater clarity in the light of what has gone before, a brief review of the previous chapters will be offered. The movement of the first chapter was regulated in its development by a two-fold aim; namely, an historical appreciation of the development of the idea of the unconscious would be sought, and in so doing, the task of situating the work of Freud in this regard would be in part, accomplished.

Five points were elaborated regarding the evolution of ideas: first, certain conditions are required before they may come into being; secondly, when those conditions have been met, then the idea is conceivable; thirdly, the movement from the point where an idea is conceivable to where it becomes topical was noted. This movement may be expressed in the adage "Ideas have legs", as it is during this stage that ideas acquire adherents, they are taken up by certain traditions and nourished there until they are firmly rooted in the popular mind. Fourthly, ideas become effective when (as the unconscious did with Freud) they become part of the conceptual apparatus to the extent that they become a "tool" in the penetration and manipulation of the reality that confronts man. Fifthly, an idea may come to a climax when it has out-lived its usefulness and begins to decline.
These five points structured the development of the first chapter. The remote ideational conditions that generated the notion of the unconscious were traced through a brief survey of ancient thought wherein it was noted from the Upanishads, and the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine that the reality of the irrational element in man, or what has come to be known as the "unconscious", was dealt with in a significant and profound way. The work of Plato was the focal point of this section as it was established that above all others he had anticipated many of the notions that were to flourish in the works of Freud. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Plato's contribution was to highlight the fact that if the soul is considered as "simple", if there is a strict dualism of soul versus body, of mind and matter, then it is impossible to deal with conflict within the soul. In order to understand psychic conflict as being genuine, the complexity of the soul must be recognized as being real. Thus, within Plato's doctrine of the soul, the movement from simplicity to complexity was traced, and it was established that only on the latter stance could a depth approach in psychology be grounded. Thus, the recognition of the irrational aspect in man as being real and operative, and as being a necessary part of man preludes the notion that good health lies in the integration of the irrational element, and not in its denial.

The proximate ideational conditions of the notion of the unconscious were generated by Descartes as he reverted to a strict dualism of mind and matter, and defined mind solely in terms of consciousness. In so
defining the nature of man, he generated the conditions that were to support the actual introduction of the word "unconscious" into human thought. That this was the case was testified to by an etymological analysis of the word. Thus it was in reaction to the Cartesian influence that the necessity of speaking in terms of an "unconscious" aspect of mind arose. Having created the ideational environment in which the idea was conceivable was Descartes' contribution to the development of this idea. Through a brief review of such thinkers as Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann, the idea of the unconscious was traced through its topical development. It fell to the lot of Freud to bring the idea to its effective peak.

Whether or not the unconscious has reached a climax and should be discarded as an intellectual "tool" depends on whether or not Freud has succeeded in saying something about the nature of man as if he has, then it is doubtful if the notion will ever lose its currency. If on the other hand, it is simply a tool with which man can be operationally manipulated, then it may be discarded as conventional usage declines.

Whereas chapter one endeavoured to supply the historical background against which the Freudian demonstration of the existence of the unconscious could be seen, chapter two laboured to establish and to lay bare the philosophical framework that structured the task. The major purpose was again two-fold. First, the point that the problem of the unconscious is to a certain extent a philosophical problem, and hence that Freud in his efforts to demonstrate the existence of the unconscious was performing the philosophical task, was made. A secondary, although
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equally important intent was to give an indication as to the criterion against which such a demonstration might be evaluated. Before either of these tasks could be undertaken, the philosophical posture from which the various necessary distinctions could be made was elucidated. Thus given a philosophical realism, the meaning of science as certain knowledge through causes, the distinction between philosophical and empirical science and hence philosophical and empirical or experimental psychology, was developed through an appreciation of the manner in which each attained their respective formal objects. This latter task necessitated a discussion of philosophical and experimental psychology in terms of their aims, different starting points, different organizing principles, logics and the problem of aetiology. Part two of chapter two attempted to come to grips with the second intention by dealing with the experimental method from a more critical standpoint so that the reasons for not using the method which is exceedingly popular in the practice of psychology might be understood. Subsequent to this examination which indicated the weakness inherent in any position that maintains that the experimental method is the only valid manner in which mediate knowledge may be attained, the methods of demonstration, dialectics and induction were explored, thus providing a backdrop against which the Freudian demonstration could later be seen and evaluated.

Arising out of the above mentioned considerations came the conclusion that Freud in his demonstration of the unconscious was endeavouring to explicitly come to grips with the structures of mind. He was not merely
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adding a useful word to the human vocabulary; he was attempting to actually extend the frontiers of human knowledge by establishing that there do indeed exist unconscious mental processes. In arguing towards a conclusion regarding the nature of mind he was participating in the philosophic venture that concerns itself with shaping the view that man has of himself. To the extent that Freud is concerned with the elaboration of the psychical structures, he is entering the ontological order and is dealing with structures and processes that are ultimately founded in the essence and nature of man. In short, Freud is here doing philosophical psychology. To the extent that Freud is addressing himself to questions of an operational order as he did when he confronted the patients in his clinic, he is doing psychoanalysis proper, a project which involves a specific method (that of free-association) and, more importantly, a project which presupposes the existence of unconscious mental processes. The practice of psychoanalysis involves one in a commitment to a position regarding the nature and essence of man. The task of providing the rational basis for such a commitment falls to the lot not of the psychoanalyst qua psychoanalyst, but to the lot of the psychoanalyst qua philosopher. The logic required to effect such a project was seen as the material, predicational logic of demonstration.

The third chapter was structured by a two-fold aim; namely, to follow the arguments of Freud for the existence of unconscious mental processes, and to come to an understanding of the nature of the Freudian unconscious. To this end a hypothetical syllogism was constructed which
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seemed to capture the intent of Freud, and the manner in which he endeavoured to substantiate the categorical premise of that syllogism was sought. The evidence was arrayed under four major headings: (i) Symptom formation in the neurosis, (ii) dreams, (iii) Parapraxes, and (iv) Others: Jokes, amnesia and the split-personality. From the development of the first two classes of evidence, the method of psychoanalysis and the basic concepts were seen to evolve. A more extensive penetration into the second class of evidence permitted an understanding of the nature of the Freudian conception of the Freudian unconscious to emerge. From the second, third and fourth class of evidence, the fact that the Freudian arguments were derived to a certain extent from the common experience of mankind was noted. Finally, an explicit comment on the nature of the Freudian unconscious was introduced. The concluding question to the third chapter was to the effect that having come to an historical appreciation of the development of the notion of the unconscious; and having proposed a philosophical framework in terms of which a demonstration of the existence of the unconscious might be evaluated; and having come to an appreciation of the Freudian arguments for the existence of unconscious mental processes; is it the case that the labours of Freud meet with the canons of philosophic respectability?

2. Some Epistemological Preliminaries:

Just as there is no method in biology that enables biology to explain itself - the biologist does not use the methods proper to biology when he speaks of those methods and attempts to describe, to account for,
and to justify their being the way they are - so too it is with psycho-
analysis. When the psychoanalyst attempts to describe, to account for,
and to justify the method that he uses, he is not performing the task that
is proper to psychoanalysis. Rather he is performing a task that is
philosophic in nature. It is the psychoanalyst *qua* philosopher that
endeavours to validate his procedures through the demonstration of the
existence of the formal object *quod* which grounds the methodology or the
formal object *quo* of his discipline. As a philosopher he may avail him-
self of the methods of philosophy which although accessible to all men, are
practised by few. Armed with such methods, he invades the substantial order
raising and attempting to answer such questions regarding the object of his
discipline as: "Is it?", "What is it?", and "Why is it?" Having answered
these questions in either an implicit or an explicit fashion, he proceeds
to ask: "How is it?", and in so doing he moves back into the method
proper to his discipline. Hence the trenchant truth to the saying that phi-
losophy explains science to itself, although it may well be the scientist
*qua* philosopher who is in fact offering the explanation.  

1 W.E. Carlo puts the matter succinctly when he writes: "Philosophy
explains to science its own nature. No science, except metaphysics, judges
its own nature or its own first principles, but it receives them from a higher
science, ultimately metaphysics." Carlo, W.E., *Philosophy, Science and
this point at length throughout part two of this book. Cf. also on this point,
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While the above noted situation has often been of profit for the progress of human knowledge, there is a danger present that must be noted. If one realizes that it is possible that scientists who turn philosophers have acquired their first-order convictions through their activities as scientists; then a problem arises. This would mean that these convictions arose in the progress of answering "how" questions while equipped with an operational, empirical, perinoetic method. The problem is that these convictions may be held regarding issues that are substantial in character and hence more susceptible of a dianoetic appreciation.

A possible consequence of this problem might be the attempt of a man infatuated with his discipline which has as its formal object one aspect of reality, to endeavour to account for all of reality in terms of his discipline. Thus, the philosopher might abuse his method by blundering into areas that are better studied by other more operational methods, the economist might see and understand reality only in terms of economics; a psychologist might relate all aspects of the real to the ideational matrix of psychology; the mathematician might use mathematics as a grid in terms of which reality is interpreted; indeed the grammarian could conceivably see the world through the structures of language; and the sociologist might be tempted to structure his thinking about the multi-phenomenal world in terms of the social phenomenon alone. 2 "Useful" though this may be in the structuring of an individual's thought, this process eventuates in an unhappy situation. Because of the inherent exclusivity of a method that is

2 Carlo, op. cit., p. 65.
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specified by a particular formal object there follows an embittered rivalry amongst the particular knowledges as each seeks to be the arbiter of the real and to claim that special place in the hearts and minds of men that would be proper to a metaphysics per se. 3

If this observation is particularized in terms of psychology, one can understand how and why the "schools" of psychology have at times engaged in embittered debate in attempting to explain the reality of man to men. 4 And what is perhaps more tragic is the estranged silence that ensues when men of different methods pursue their goals in relative isolation for as Piaget has noted: "The human person only succeeds in being productive in symbiosis with others, even in the solitude of mental work." 5 Thus, there is a very real need for a philosophical psychology and the synthetic thrust that it endeavours to provide. It is when the various analytical thrusts are taken as being synthetic in character that confusion, exclusivity, and antagonism are bred. The existence of a need for a synthetic thrust in psychology may be identified through a consideration of the following chart which indicates the very real differences that exist between the various psychological approaches to man. 6

3 loc. cit.
4 Adler, What Man has Made of Man, pp. 124-125.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Major Systems</th>
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<th>Chief Method of Original School</th>
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<td>Behaviourism</td>
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As this brief survey indicates, the analytic function of the human intellect is being well-served. Is the time not propitious for a corresponding synthetic thrust to occur?

What is needed is a science that has a formal object broad enough so that it can articulate a first-order body of knowledge and thus provide a frame-work so that all the other sciences which are specified and identified by their own respective formal objects can be seen and understood not as being antagonistic and mutually exclusive, but as being complementary and supplementary. It is suggested that a "philosophical realism" that takes as its ultimate formal object being qua being, and in so doing elaborates a first-order metaphysical framework discharges such a task. In the light of this achievement, the articulations of the various knowledges can be understood in terms of the manifold contributions that they each make according to their methodological proficiencies to the human enterprise of knowing.

In this thesis, this intellectual quest has been particularized to a consideration of one area of human knowing-psychology; and within psychology - Freudian psychoanalysis; and within psychoanalysis - the notion of the unconscious as understood by Freud. Regarding the unconscious, only one question has been raised, and that question, though simply phrased, has ramifications for all the sciences that endeavour to come to grips with the reality that is man. The question to which an answer is being sought is simply: "Is it?"
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That the reality named by the word "unconscious" is not new in the history of ideas has been indicated by the first chapter which sketched the growth of man's awareness of unconscious mental processes from the dawn of intellectual history to the time of Freud. The reality that has been named "the unconscious" clearly has a history of usage that situates the Freudian notion of unconscious mental processes within the western intellectual tradition flowing from the East through Plato, through German Romanticism and Naturphilosophie to Freud.

That the question that is being raised is relevant is seen by the fact that some contemporary thinkers assert the existence of unconscious mental processes, while others vehemently deny their reality. If man is to understand his own nature, he clearly must try to seek a response to this question. And further, if psychoanalysis is to be an intellectually respectable body of knowledge, the fact that its formal object exists must be respectably established.

But psychoanalysis cannot use the method proper to psychoanalysis to justify its own existence as this would clearly eventuate in a vicious circle. Claiming its validity because of successful results obtained in the application of its method would be a modification of that circular argument, and however appealing, it is not in and of itself convincing. The only context in which such an argument might be acceptable would be one structured by a thorough-going pragmatism.

By way of concluding from the considerations offered in the second
chapter, it is argued that psychoanalysis may be understood as a modification of the empirical, investigative method to the extent that it is specified by its own formal object (unconscious mental processes); has a method adapted to studying them (the method of free association); and uses the clinical situation as a source of special experience. If it is the case that psychoanalysis may be understood as a modification of the experimental method, then it follows that the experimental method or any of its modifications may not be used in seeking to validate that self-same method lest it be charged with circularity.

A further consideration that has emerged in support of the contention that the experimental method may not be used in seeking an answer to the question of this thesis is that the experimental method has a dominant operational character. It is well adapted to responding to the "how" question. But the question that is being raised here is not "how is it?", but rather "Is it?" As was mentioned above, the experimental method presupposes its object, and hence is incapable of formulating a response to the fundamental question of the formal object's existence.

A further argument that may be advanced to situate the problem of the existence of the unconscious within the pale of a philosophic approach regards the nature of the unconscious. Unconscious mental processes are meta-phenomenal. They are not susceptible of immediate sensory observation. They are meta-empirical. If the conclusion: "the unconscious exists", arises, it arises not because of the powers of sensation per se, but rather
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because of the powers of reason. A conclusion regarding the ontological status of the unconscious is a mediate inference reached as a result of the application of man's specific powers of reason. The propositions: "unconscious mental processes exist", and "unconscious mental processes do not exist" are mediate propositions - "propositions reached only as the term of rational discourse". If the experimental method by virtue of its proper logic is best suited for the determination of the relations of phenomenal entities and processes, and this presupposes the existence of those entities and processes so-related; then the experimental method should not be used to determine the existence of said processes; and a fortiori, if the unconscious transcends the phenomenal realm, if it is meta-phenomenal, then a method must be sought that is capable of dealing with questions of a meta-empirical, meta-phenomenal nature. Such a method could be characterized as being meta-physical.

The conclusion that arises is that in seeking to establish the ontological status of the unconscious, which is the formal object of psychoanalysis, the method used will not be the psychoanalytical one, nor will it be the experimental method or any of its modifications; rather it will be a method which is philosophical as philosophy addresses itself to the question that is being raised and is methodologically equipped to handle it.

7 Simmons, op. cit., p. 289.

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What is this method, this activity of mind that attains to the meta-physical? As Adler remarks it is:

... not irresponsible poetizing, not system building, not the pretensions of a Weltanschauung, but the plain hard work of demonstration. Unless the philosopher solves problems by laying adequate analytical foundations for demonstration and, in the light thereof, by proving conclusions from self-evident premises, he does nothing. 8

3. The Construction and Analysis of the Demonstrative Syllogism:

Because of the nature of the Freudian quest, the mode of demonstration used is specified. Because Freud moved from present behaviour, and understood that behaviour to be the effect-sign of the cause, and from a knowledge of the effect he proceeded to infer to a knowledge of the cause, the demonstration is a posteriori in nature. Further, since a knowledge of the fact is being sought, it is a demonstration quia. Because the conclusion will testify to the existence of a cause as yet scientifically unknown, and because it will have been revealed by a prior knowledge of the effects of that cause, the form of the argumentation is best expressed in the hypothetical syllogism. 9

The hypothetical premise is as follows: If there is evidence that indicates that mental processes are at work in such a manner so as

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9 Adler suggests that every a posteriori syllogism must be formulated in the hypothetical form. ibid., p. 209. The point to be stressed is that this is a legitimate formulation of a quia demonstration wherein the middle term is related to the predicate of the conclusion as effect to cause.
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to elude direct conscious awareness; then one is justified in the assertion that there exists unconscious mental processes.

The categorical premise is as follows: But there is evidence that indicates that mental processes are at work in such a manner that they elude direct conscious awareness.

The conclusion is: Therefore one is justified in asserting that there do exist unconscious mental processes.

Further, if it is the case that these unconscious mental processes are active in the determination of present behaviour, then it is legitimate to assert the existence of a dynamic, unconscious mental processes. 10

It might be successfully argued that Freud in his investigation of the phenomena of symptom formation, dreams, parapraxes, amnesia, split-personality, and jokes has presented sufficient inductive evidence to substantiate the categorical premise. This would mean that the conditions regarding the premises of the demonstration have been met in the exposition of chapter three; namely, that the premises have already been recognized as being true, primary, immediate, prior to the conclusion, better known than the conclusion, and as being the cause of that conclusion. Were this argument to be advanced, it would imply that as a result of a process which is fundamentally inductive in nature, the self-evidence of the categorical premise had been established. In response to the question as to whether or not the concept of the "unconscious" was or is "theory-laden", it might be said

10 While this may be formulated into a second hypothetical syllogism, it is clear that the evidence adduced in support of the categorical premise of the elaborated syllogism bears on both.
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that since it is the case that Freud drew on experience that was both clinical (special) and common in nature, that he had succeeded in attaining to a truth regarding the nature of man that meets the canons of philosophical respectability.

Instead of advancing that argument immediately, and concluding directly, a philosophical analysis of the Freudian experience thus far exposed will be undertaken.

It appears as an undeniable conclusion of this investigation that the one, fundamental assumption that Freud has made is that of psychic causality. This assumption provides the principle of his investigations as it structures all that which follows. It may be expressed in any of the following ways: 'All behaviour is caused'; 'all behaviour is perfectly motivated'; 'all behaviour is meaningful'; 'all acts are such that they possess a meaningful structure'; 'all acts are such that they may be understood as the effect-sign of their cause'; or 'every agent acts for an end'. 11 If these various formulations may be accepted as being functionally equivalent; if they all serve to express the same fundamental insight; then any one of them may be used to come to a philosophical understanding of the Freudian experience.

Since the principle "every agent acts for an end" is one which arises out of common experience, and which can be understood as being self-evident as a result of experience with human beings in various situations, and as a result of introspection; it will be chosen as the means whereby the Freudian

11 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 2; cf. also Aristotle, Physics, II, 8, 198b12.
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evidence for the existence of unconscious mental process shall be evaluated.

If this principle be accepted as the one that is operative and regulative of the Freudian experience of human nature, then two definitions may be obtained therefrom. First, an understanding of what is meant by consciousness may be attained. A man would be said to be conscious if he were aware of first, the action; secondly, the end of that action; and thirdly, the relation of that given action to its end. Thus if a man could take an instance of his behaviour and render it intelligible in terms of what the action consists in, the aim of that action, and the manner in which that action was related to the attainment of that end, then one might say that the behaviour is perfectly conscious. A nominal definition of what it means to be unconscious, or of what an unconscious process might be may be arrived at in terms of a consideration of what is meant by consciousness. If the action, end, or the relation between the two are such that any one or a combination thereof eludes explanation in terms of consciousness, then the name "unconscious" shall be legitimately appended to that behaviour. In order to understand the usefulness of such a procedure, one might consider the following degrees of awareness that follow therefrom. First, one might be conscious of the action, the end of that action, and the relation pertaining between the two. Any action that is undertaken deliberately with full knowledge of the consequences may be said to be of this variety.

Secondly, one might be unconscious of the action, and hence unconscious of the end and the relation. The symptomatic actions described
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in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, such as absent-mindedly stroking one's mustache, or fiddling with a button may be taken as examples of this kind.

Thirdly, one might be conscious of the action, and yet be unconscious of the end and the relation. Symptoms of a neurotic disorder would exemplify this kind, as would the phenomena of the dream where the fact of the dream is known but the end towards which it is tending is not immediately known.

Fourthly, one might be conscious of the action and the end, but not be aware of the relation between the two. Avoidance techniques in stressful situations may serve to exemplify this kind of unconsciousness. The profound dislike of a certain task, and the very real headache that occurs, may be very well related, although not consciously admitted as such.

Fifthly, one may be conscious of the end, but unconscious of the action and the relation of the action to the end. The dynamics that underlie self-image psychology testify to this possibility. Another clearer instance of this might be unconscious problem solving.

One can see from the range of variations to which this principle lends itself that potentially it is extremely useful in the description and explanation of human behaviour. Accordingly, the question may be raised as to its possible use in rendering the Freudian experience and the Freudian demonstration of unconscious mental processes accessible.

Permitting the aforementioned principle to explicitly structure the observations that Freud made, the following structure is revealed. In the instance of symptom-formation in the neuroses, and particularly in the
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case of Anna O., it is realized that since every agent acts for an end; and since Anna is an agent; therefore Anna is acting for an end. Further, if all actions of an agent are for an end; and if symptoms are indeed actions of an agent; then it follows that symptoms are such that they may be understood as being for an end. But symptoms are understood as being the effect-sign of some disorder, and disorders may be either of soma or of the psyche. If through differential diagnosis, it was learned that Anna's disorder was not of the somatic variety, then it must be a psychic disorder.

Prior to Freud and Breuer, it was believed that those whose sufferings were not somatic in origin were in fact nothing but malingerers. In short, it was believed that the symptom was not symptomatic of a real disorder, but of deceit instead. This belief clearly implied that the medical practitioners prior to Freud held that "all conscious events are psychic" was convertible with "all psychic events are conscious". Only within such a context could symptoms such as those of Anna's be understood as symptoms of deceit. If in the normal as well as the abnormal it was believed that all psychic events were conscious; and if the fact of being conscious implied a certain amount of control over one's actions; then if the symptoms were psychogenic in origin, it would be clear that the patient is malingering.

The very fact that Anna was taken seriously by Freud and Breuer implied that the possibility that while all conscious events are psychic, only some psychic events are conscious was being considered. As was seen
in the first chapter, there was strong historical justification for con­sidering this possibility seriously, and within a context structured by these propositions expressive of the fact that the psychic is greater than the conscious events alone, then Anna's symptoms could be seen to be psychogenetic in origin and still taken seriously. In short, Freud failed to confuse mental illness with immorality as his immediate predecessors had done. In so doing, Freud had taken one of the most significant steps in the history of psychiatric medicine.

Through previous experience with the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion, Freud had come to a realization of the fact that people could know, and yet not know that they know. Here is the regulative experiential insight that structures the Freudian epic. Taking this fact in conjunction with the principle of psychic causality, it became clear that one could possess knowledge of which one was unaware, and that this knowledge could determine behaviour. Given that every agent acts for an end, that all behaviour is somehow determined, then the fact of dynamic mental processes which are unconscious is established. These two insights are not mere assumptions as they both arise from experience and are susceptible of validation by others. Once accepted, however, these insights do govern the interpretations of human behaviour that follow.

That these insights were confirmed in the case of Anna and others is seen when it was discovered that "Our patients suffered from reminiscences". The end of Anna's symptoms consisted in the release of affectivity
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associated with some of her past experiences. This meant that the efficient cause of the present disorder was the poorly handled past experience, and the formation of the neurosis was a manner in which the cognitive and affective discomfort generated by the experience could be coped with. To restore normality, the ends of those actions, and the relation between the action and the end had to be integrated into awareness. At first this occurred naturally as through apparent meanderings, moments of peace were secured. Later the 'talking-cure, hypnosis, and finally free-association' were the methods used to integrate that which was unconscious into conscious awareness. Once the patient was aware of her actions and the end towards which they were tending, and once the patient could accept that knowledge as being properly her own, and once the affective charge cathexed to that end was released; then the burden that the past imposed upon the present behaviour was alleviated, and conscious control was regained. Thus in hysterical symptom-formation, although the action is known, the end and the relation of the end to the action is not known. When the three aspects are rendered conscious, then conscious control returns and the patient regulates her own behaviour. This human experience testifies to the reality of the categorical premise in the demonstrative syllogism, and if the reality is seen as such, then the conclusion stands as demonstrated.

At this point in the evolution of Freudian thought the pattern which structures all of his subsequent investigations has emerged. All of his work after this initial discovery can be interpreted in terms of the
two insights recorded above; namely, that every agent acts for an end, and the fact that a person can know and yet not know that he knows, and that this unconscious knowledge can be active in the determination of behaviour. The work that Freud did in the areas of dreams, parapraxes, jokes, and others can be understood as confirmations of his initial insights. That this interpretation of Freud is justified meets with confirmation in the following texts taken from The Interpretation of Dreams:

For it is demonstrably untrue that we are being carried along a purposeless stream of ideas when, in the process of interpreting a dream, we abandon reflection and allow involuntary ideas to emerge. It can be shown that all we ever get rid of are purposive ideas that are known to us; as soon as we have done this, unknown - or, as we inaccurately say, 'unconscious' - purposive ideas take charge and thereafter determine the course of the involuntary ideas. No influence that we can bring to bear on our mental processes can ever enable us to think without purposive ideas; nor am I aware of any states of psychical confusion which can do so. 12

The same insight is again stated as follows:

I know for a fact that trains of thought without purposive ideas no more occur in hysteria or paranoia than they do in the formation and resolution of dreams. 13

Or again, when the principle that every agent acts for an end is encased in the following:

In the psycho-analysis of the neuroses the fullest use is made of these two theorems - that, when conscious purposive ideas are abandoned, concealed purposive ideas assume control of the current of ideas, and that superficial associations are

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12 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 566-567.
13 ibid., p. 568.
only substitutes by displacement for suppressed deeper ones. Indeed, these theorems have become basic pillars of psychoanalytic technique. When I instruct a patient to abandon reflection of any kind and to tell me whatever comes into his head, I am relying firmly on the presumption that he will not be able to abandon the purposive ideas inherent in the treatment and I feel justified in inferring that what seems to be the most innocent and arbitrary things which he tells me are in fact related to his illness. 14

Thus the fundamental regulative insight that vivifies the Freudian opus is that 'every action of man is for an end, be that end conscious or unconscious'. Armed with that principle, aspects of human behaviour that were heretofore unintelligible could be rendered intelligible.

In the area of dreams for instance, if all actions of an agent are for an end; and if dreams are actions of an agent; then dreams have an end. If because of their variety, they cannot be assigned exclusively to physiological causes, then the fact that they are meaningful mental actions is evident. Thus the Freudian contention that dreams possess a meaning is founded.

Given that the action of dreaming is not conscious to the extent that the dreamer has relinquished conscious awareness and is asleep, does it not follow that the intention contained in the dream will be a manifestation of the unconscious mental processes at work? And if in the dream material and the associations that flow therefrom, there emerges a theme, a structure, may it not be the case that the theme denotes the meaning of the dream, and that one then understands something of the

14 ibid., p. 570.
nature of the unconscious mental processes? If this be granted as a result of the considerations offered in chapter three, then it is clear why dreams are the "royal road to the unconscious" and hence merit special attention when seeking to discover the nature of those unconscious mental processes.

In the area of the parapraxes which Freud illuminated with the use of his conceptual tools one finds strong evidence for the existence of a dynamic unconscious as this area of evidence is accessible to all. Mistakes of reading, writing, and of speech often reveal tendencies that are unconscious at the moment but which upon a moment's reflection are recognized as one's own. As actions they are easily recognized as possessing an end, but that end was unconscious at the moment when the action was performed. Once having accepted that unconsciousness at the moment, then the bare fact of unconsciousness is verified, and it is only a matter of degree between being unconscious at the moment, and being unable to recall any given event without the aid of special investigative techniques. This aspect of inaccessibility to voluntary recall is one of the prime characteristics of the Freudian unconscious, and if material that is unconscious at the moment can actively determine behaviour, then why would material that is more deeply unconscious be denied the same status? Clearly, the area of parapraxes gives rise to testimony to the validity of asserting the existence of unconscious mental processes.

Other areas such as those of amnesia, split-personality, and jokes supply confirmation of the argument for the existence of a dynamic unconscious.
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In the presentation of chapter three, these areas were presented in a rather declarative fashion with the intention of indicating the range of confirmatory evidence that supports the Freudian argument.

As a result of these dialectical considerations, can it be denied that the self-evident nature of the categorical premise has been manifested? As a result of the presentation regarding the manner in which the inductive experiences of man may lead him to genuine assertions regarding the nature of things, may it not be said that the principle of sufficient enumeration has been satisfied?

What was initially named "unconscious mental processes" is now a fact established upon the consideration of a certain order of effects. By observing behaviour, and by seeking regularities and patterns of action, those instances that could not be explained in terms of conscious awareness were accounted for by understanding them to be the effects of processes as yet unknown. Taking these instances of behaviour as the effect-signs of their cause, the inference regarding the existence and nature of the cause was made, and this was done in terms of a material, predicational logic. Clearly, it is possible for an individual to know and yet not know that he knows, and further it is possible for that knowledge of which he is unaware to determine his behaviour.

To the question regarding the unconscious, namely, "Is it?" - the demonstrated response is "Yes". Realizing that it is, there remains the immense task of discovering what it is, and how it operates. Can any psychology, either philosophical or experimental, ignore this challenge?
4. The Philosophical Implications of the Existence of a Dynamic, Repressed Unconscious as a Dimension of Mind:

In as much as the conclusion of one research project often marks the point of departure for another, a final comment will be offered in the form of a prospectus for further study. If it is established that Freud has acted as a psychoanalyst qua philosopher in demonstrating the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious; and if he has done so in a philosophically respectable manner; then what are the implications of his findings for areas other than the philosophy of mind?

From a metaphysical point of view, one might inquire into the impact of such a doctrine on the structure of a metaphysics. How would a doctrine of a dynamic, repressed unconscious be absorbed into a realistic or an idealistic perspective? Intuitively, it would appear that the doctrine would be acceptable within a realistic context, while having deleterious effects on a more idealistic approach such as that of Descartes. Could the ontology of a Sartre ever support a doctrine which asserted that mind was not coextensive with consciousness? Is a metaphysics of the unconscious possible? And, if so, what does this say about a metaphysics which cannot tolerate a notion of a dynamic, repressed unconscious?

In the area of epistemology, many fruitful hypotheses could be generated. If epistemological doctrines are shaped by either an implicit or explicit view of the human mind, in what manner are they either reinforced or changed by a philosophy of mind that accepts the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious? It has been said that Locke and Hume used an associationist psychology in the formulation of their epistemological theories; that Russell relied on a behaviouristic approach; that Dewey made use of a
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functionalist psychology; that phenomenology employs concepts derived from Gestalt psychology. 15 What, then, would be the shape of an epistemological theory that was informed by a conception of mind that included a dynamic, unconscious dimension?

What impact would the recognition of unconscious mental processes have upon ethical theory? Did Freud's apparent determinism follow his acceptance of the doctrine of the unconscious? If freedom and responsibility are the key notes of an ethical theory, does the unconscious dimension of mind preclude the possibility of the rational assertion of either of these characteristics? Does the manner in which the dynamics of repression work suggest anything of significance for the acquisition of conscience? Can the acquisition of a value structure be rationally undertaken?

Could one speak meaningfully of a logic of the unconscious? Are there regular structures and processes the laws of which can be externalized to form the basis of a philosophy of creativity?

If the elaboration of a social philosophy necessitates an understanding of the dimensions of man, does not the notion of the unconscious challenge and change that social thought which was vitalized by a view of man which focused exclusively on consciousness as the defining attribute of mind?

Clearly, the acceptance of the existence of unconscious mental processes marks the point of departure for an intellectual odyssey barely begun, and yet it is at the same time to partake in a task that is centuries old. Can the contribution of Freud be safely ignored by those who would seek to understand the nature of man?

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APPENDIX I

ABSTRACT OF

An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind:
The Freudian Unconscious

The fundamental question that this thesis raises and endeavours to answer is: "Is there an unconscious dimension of mind that may be active in the determination of human behaviour?" In seeking a response to this question, the author has focussed on the writings of Sigmund Freud who has provided the most significant body of research pertaining to unconscious mental processes. The uniqueness of the Freudian contribution lies in the fact that serious efforts are directed at demonstrating the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious.

It is the contention of this thesis that the task of demonstrating the existence of unconscious mental processes is in part a philosophical task, and hence that any such demonstration is susceptible of a philosophical evaluation. In asking the question: "Does it exist?", a question about the being and nature of man is raised, and this is within the domain of a philosophical psychology.

Accordingly, the thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter situates the notion of the unconscious within the history of ideas; attempts to come to an understanding of what men have meant by the term "unconscious"; and thus provides the historical background against which the Freudian demonstration may be seen.

1 M.A. Thesis presented by William J.C. Kelloway, in 1971, to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa, 249 pages.
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The second chapter lays bare a philosophical framework in terms of which the problem of the unconscious is situated. Having elaborated the necessary distinctions which enable the author to situate the task at hand, a philosophical criterion in terms of which the demonstration will be evaluated is developed.

The third chapter turns to the work of Freud and presents the Freudian arguments for the existence of a dynamic, repressed unconscious. In so doing, an understanding of the nature of the Freudian unconscious emerges.

The fourth and final chapter evaluates the Freudian arguments. The response that arises in answer to the initiating question is that Freud, in seeking to demonstrate the existence of an unconscious dimension of mind that is active in the determination of human behaviour, has succeeded in doing so in a manner that respects the canons of philosophical demonstration.