NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received

55

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI
GENERAL HALDIMAND AND THE VERMONT REGULATIONS (1780-83)

by Thomas Albert Chadey

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Ottawa, Canada, 1953
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has been prepared under the direction of Professor George Buxton, of the History Department of the University of Ottawa.

I wish to express my appreciation of the valuable aid given me by Mr. A.J.H. Richardson, of the Public Archives of Canada, who kindly loaned me his microfilm of the Diary of Chief Justice William Smith of New York, and who also allowed me to consult his notes on the Collection of the Papers of Sir Henry Clinton, and his notes on Vermont and New York.

I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Miss J. Bourque, of the Public Archives of Canada; the staff of the Manuscript Room of the Public Archives of Canada; Mrs. Mary G. Kye, formerly of the Secretary of State's Department of Vermont, for material on the Separatists; Dr. Chilton Williamson, of the History Department, Barnard College of Columbia University, New York City; Professor Clarence J. Rife, of the History Department of Hamline University, St. Paul, Minnesota and of the staff of the Vermont Historical Society Archives at Montpelier, Vermont.

I wish also to express my appreciation of the work of Mrs. A.D. Stevenson, of Ottawa, who edited and made the final corrections on this thesis.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Thomas Albert Chadsey

Date of Birth - May 21, 1919

Place of Birth - Sherbrooke, Quebec

Graduated in May, 1949, with the degree of Bachelor of Arts (2nd. Class Honours in History and Economics) from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.- BACKGROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.- PERSONALITY OF HALDIMAND</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.- THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CANADA</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Weakness of forces and resources</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Disposition of available forces</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Importance of the western posts</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Difficulties of supply and transport</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.- ATTITUDE OF HALDIMAND TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Beginnings of the negotiations</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Course of the negotiations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Halldimand's views of the Vermonters</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Halldimand's reluctance to proceed without definite instructions</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.- BRITISH POLICY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Influence of the Franco-American alliance</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Progress of the war with the colonies</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Importance of the negotiations in Halldimand's military strategy</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.- CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix**

1. NOTE I - SOME DOUBTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF WILLIAMS' HISTORY  
2. NOTE II- DR. WILLIAMSON AND THE CAPTURE OF TICONDEROGA  
3. ABSTRACT OF General Halldimand and the Vermont Negotiations (1780-83)
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>British troops in Canada 1778-83</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>German troops in Canada 1778-83</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Provincial troops in Canada 1778-83</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Disposition of Haldimand's troops - 1782</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The principal object of this thesis is to ascertain the attitude of General Frederick Haldimand, Governor of Canada, towards the negotiations between his agents and those of the governor and council of Vermont from 1760-63. These negotiations were conducted for the avowed purpose of Vermont returning to her British allegiance. An attempt is made in this thesis to show Haldimand's motives in participating in these negotiations, and the incident placed in its proper perspective in the American Revolution. Haldimand's position in Canada is evaluated and given its proper place in the over-all picture of the war between Great Britain, and France and the American colonies. Haldimand is also judged as an individual, in an attempt to dispel some of the obloquy often associated with his name.

Much of the published work on this topic has been written by Americans, and represents the American point of view. The possibility that Haldimand might have had a secondary motive of strengthening the defences of Quebec as a result of the Negotiations has been ignored. Haldimand's caution in dealing with the Vermonters was dictated by his precarious position. The general American view of his position is not supported by the facts, which present a different picture altogether. The obstacles which stood in the way of a successful defence of the province are examined, and the manner in which the negotiations affected them is described. The factors which motivated Vermont participation in these secret dealings are discussed, and they are relegated to their proper place. The exigencies of British policy in this war are studied, as they were concerned by the war in America and as they affected the larger picture of the maritime war with France.
This thesis was written principally in order to shed some light on General Haldimand and his regime in Canada. It is one of the forgotten periods in Canadian history. Many historians feel that nothing of any importance occurred during the Haldimand period, and therefore it is of slight interest. Much did happen, but little of the credit for achievement falls to Haldimand. Although the Vermont Negotiations occupy a comparatively minor spot in Haldimand's regime, his character is more fully revealed in this episode than in some of the imbroglios of his civil administration. This study is also intended to clarify the whole picture of Vermont-Quebec relations during the American Revolution, and to furnish some additional information on a little-known episode of Canadian history—the Vermont Negotiations.

A preliminary investigation of this topic included the background of the Negotiations. Most of this background deals with the early history of Vermont, and with the tangled relationship of that state with the neighbouring states of New York and New Hampshire. The general interest in Vermont displayed by the British governor, General Haldimand, and his motives for engaging in the Negotiations are also discussed. The personality of Haldimand is assessed, not from the judgment of history but from the individual presented to us in his own papers and those of his contemporaries. In a like manner the situation of the British is described, from the actual records rather than from the historical errors of early historians, so oft repeated that they are now believed to be accurate. Haldimand's predicament as Commander-in-Chief in Quebec is examined, and his views on the Vermonters
and the Negotiations are set down. The ramifications of British strategy and policy in this conflict are examined with their effect on Haldimand's military strategy, and the combined effect of these on the outcome of the Negotiations.

The only abbreviations used throughout this thesis concern the source of materials used. Thus the Public Archives of Canada at Ottawa are referred to simply as (PAC), while the Archives of the Vermont Historical Society at Montpelier, Vermont are referred to as (VHS). Military terms used in the preparation of the tables and of the figure are described on those sheets.

Owing to the paucity of material on Haldimand, original sources have been consulted wherever possible. The greatest part of the research for this study took place at the archives in Ottawa or those in Montpelier, Vermont. Two separate trips were made to Vermont to study state records. Conversations with students of Vermont history opened new avenues of research. Another asset in this study was a familiarity with the district in which the Negotiations took place, the result of fifteen years of residence on the Quebec-Vermont border. Mention should also be made of the correspondence conducted with American writers who have done research recently on the Negotiations. Their information and advice presented different views of the topic which have been included in this thesis.

The complete picture of the Vermont Negotiations will probably never be unveiled. Much can be proved, and more conjectured, from the papers of Haldimand. Little, however, remains to be gleaned from the papers of the Vermonters - the Allens, the Fays and Governor Thomas
Chittenden. Many Vermonters believe that the last-named person was the instigator of the whole episode. As he was illiterate, it is believed that Ira Allen wrote his letters for him. No trace of Chittenden's papers have ever been found, and the papers of the other negotiators contain nothing that might incriminate them. Even today Vermonters are quick to take umbrage at any suggestion that the founders of their state were faithless to a Congress and to a union of states that refused to recognize them. However, Haldimand's real position in regards to the Negotiations is clarified by the study of his papers and that, after all, is the main purpose of this study.
Chapter I

Background of the Negotiations

The negotiations between the leaders of the independent republic of Vermont and agents of Governor Frederick Haldimand of Quebec would well have led to the restitution of the frontier state to the British Crown. The negotiations failed, however, and, as a result, are now largely a matter of academic interest. American historians are still divided on the question of the motives of the Vermonter. Until the last quarter century many historians accepted the view that the infant republic, alone and unprotected, kept the British from invading their territory by pretended bargaining to return to their British allegiance. The originator of this thesis was the Reverend Samuel Williams of Rutland, Vermont, who first published his Natural and Civil History of Vermont in 1794. His main thesis was that when the British attempted to persuade the leading men of Vermont to establish their state as a British province, the "gentlemen of Vermont" inaugurated instead a correspondence consisting of

evasion, ambiguous, general answers and proposals, calculated not to destroy British hopes of seduction, but carefully avoiding any engagement or measures that could be construed to be an act of government; and it had its object a cessation of hostilities, at a time when the State of Vermont, deserted by the continent and unable to defend herself, lay at the mercy of the enemy in Canada."

By means of this explanation Williams hoped to clear the founders of his state of any taint of treason, a charge that had been freely levelled by their political opponents during the preceding quarter century. His arguments gained widespread support because he had lived in Vermont during the early years of

the state and knew many of the persons involved. As a result most Vermont historians tended to incorporate his version if not his exact words into their histories of the state. The fact that he had been allowed free access to the papers of Ira Allen, one of the negotiators, was to many conclusive proof that his version was authentic. Later historical research has unearthed the correspondence between Williams and Allen which shows that Williams pledged that his account of the negotiations could not be said to give a view unfavorable to the Allens. (See Note I)

The growth of a new school of thought can be noticed by 1867, in which year J. L. Payne, of Ottawa, wrote "A Curious Chapter in Vermont's History", in the Magazine of American History, Vol. XVII, issue of 1887. His argument was that there was a genuine interest displayed by the Vermonters in reunion with Britain, and that their dealings bordered on treason to the infant united colonies. His article was bitterly attacked, but within the past twenty years his argument has grown to be the accepted view. The motives of these Vermont negotiators were bound up both with internal dissension in Vermont and with her tumultuous relationship with the neighbouring states. The inception of this view coincided with the period during which the papers of Governor Haldimand were copied in England, and these copies deposited in the Public Archives of Canada, in Ottawa. It is within the realm of possibility that Payne's new ideas came from a study of the letters of the British governor. This collection has proved extremely helpful to students of the Haldimand regime owing to their bluntness and completeness. The Vermonters concerned for the most part left no papers to posterity; the few, who did, left little record of the negotiations, and therefore Haldimand's papers have become the
Background of the Negotiations

sole authority. Relations between the governor and Vermont assume a different light, and both Haldimand's attitude towards the negotiations and the British point of view cast the entire incident in a different perspective. Far from subscribing to Williams' version, these papers make the British position in Quebec appear extremely precarious, with only a weak force available to defend a vast frontier against what appeared to be an imminent invasion.

The ramifications of the negotiations are difficult to follow without a knowledge of the complicated structure of early Vermont history, especially with regard to her involved relationships with the neighbouring colonies of New York and New Hampshire both before and during the period under study. Until shortly before the Seven Years' War (1756-63), the lands on either side of Lake Champlain were uninhabited. The lake itself was the only passable waterway between New France and the British Colonies, and was used as a warpath at various times by Indian, French and British war parties. In the great colonial wars of the eighteenth century armies advanced and retreated along its length, and the land along its shores became a buffer zone between the warring groups. The presence of Indian mounds near Swanton, Vermont, has given rise to the theory that Indians once inhabited the land. The absence of Indian relics in the region lends credence to the view that Vermont was only a fishing and hunting ground for the nomadic savages. Samuel de Champlain's historic encounter with the Iroquois in 1609 took place on the shores of Lake Champlain, but that band has always been regarded as either a small war or hunting party. Champlain left no
Background of the Negotiations

record of finding any Indian settlements in that area. 2

Before 1750 some settlers had established themselves in the area south and east of the lake. Possibly the presence of British scouts and troops in the vicinity heartened them, as did the British forts nearby. The intensity of the Indian raids had slackened off with the advance of a frontier civilization and with the increasingly successful attempts of the British and French military authorities to control their native allies. Very likely the deciding factor was overpopulation along the Atlantic coast, and the consequent movement of the surplus population outward from the seaboard to seek new homes. Many of these settlers gradually made their way into the Lake Champlain valley.

Under the English colonial system at that time, the governors of the colonies could grant crown lands on the payment of a fee, which became a prerequisite of the governor. It was common practice at that time for governors to accumulate wealth by means of these fees, and through the manipulation of land grants in order to enrich themselves and their friends. Benning Wentworth, Royal Governor of New Hampshire, was no exception, and on January 11, 1749, he made the first grant of land in what was soon to be known as the New Hampshire Grants, granting the territory on which the town of Bennington now stands. 3 Almost immediately George Clinton, Royal Governor of New York, 2. The claim filed against the State of Vermont by a Vermont lawyer, Roland E. Stevens, in May, 1952, is merely a reiteration of an Iroquois claim dating back to 1798. A claim for payment for lands taken from them was not settled at the time, and the claim has been revived from time to time. Similar claims have been made by different groups of Indians against other governments throughout North America in recent years.

addressed strong protests to the British Government. In many of the colonies' charters the colonial boundaries were but vaguely defined, and now both New York and New Hampshire laid claim to the land between them, the Green Mountains and the Lake Champlain Valley. The two governors agreed that no further grants would be made in the disputed territory until a decision was laid down from London. Clinton kept to his agreement, and made no grants until after a judgment was handed down in 1761, but Wentworth granted lands indiscriminately during this period. By the spring of 1761 he had enriched himself with 100,000 acres of land, about 6500 of which were west of the Connecticut River. The decision handed down by George III on July 20, 1764 was unpopular with both sides. The boundary line between New Hampshire and New York was placed along the Connecticut River, an unpopular move that nullified New Hampshire patents. The decision that actual settlers who possessed Wentworth grants should be undisturbed until a further decision was handed down was as displeasing to the New York authorities.

The latter decision was never handed down by the king. In due course Governor Wentworth retired, loaded with honours and land fees, but the land problem which he had been instrumental in creating remained. After 1764 Governor Clinton of New York also issued land grants under New


York patent, and in some cases regranted land already owned, cleared and planted by settlers. These settlers had deeds under New Hampshire patent, and were offered peaceful possession only on the payment of a second land fee to the Governor of New York. Most of them could not afford this, as the average settler had little hard money, and the average speculator in New Hampshire patents had more land than money. Most of the original grantees under both New Hampshire and New York patents were keen speculators with no intent whatever to settle on their grants. The picture of the Vermonters as actual or prospective settlers contrasted with the Yorkers as rich, crafty, scheming men of affairs bent on wrestling small farms from the settlers is false. There was no essential difference in the motives which activated the group led by Captain Samuel Robinson, Ethan and Ira Allen and Jehiel Hawley, and those in the group which James Duane, John Tabor Kempe, Samuel Avery and Luke Knowlton represented. 6 Both groups made strong representations to London, and finally, on July 27, 1767, a British Order-in-Council forbade further New York grants in the disputed territory. 7 By this time it was too late, as the damage had been done, and there were numerous cases of two people claiming the same tract of land. There was a great deal of friction, but no conflagration, as both sides awaited a further decision. Claimants decided to test the authenticity of their New York patents in the courts, and the first ejection suits were brought before the Supreme Court of New York at Albany in the June

6. Jones, op.cit., p.40-1

Background of the Negotiations

term of 1770. A test case resulted in a verdict for a New York claimant over the holder of a New Hampshire patent. By this act the Supreme Court implicitly nullified all New Hampshire grants. 8

Although relations between the Yankees of the Grants and the Yorkers had never been too amicable, the court decision forced a showdown. The majority of the settlers in the Grants faced dispossession unless they went beyond the law and defied the colony of New York to evict them. In the southern part of the disputed territory there were many Yorker settlers, but it is with those in the area east of Lake Champlain that we are chiefly concerned. The wooded and rocky terrain in which they lived offered good protection, and New York had to depend on British troops to preserve law and order. The formation of a guerilla band to protect their lands seemed a logical solution, as no band of hastily-sworn-in deputies from New York would risk their lives against a well-armed and organized band of men familiar with the ground. It so happened that the Grants possessed such a band as it was, and many settlers doubtlessly breathed a sigh of relief at the thought that the Allens and their friends were about to pester the Yorkers rather than their neighbours. The leader of this band, later to be known as the Green Mountain Boys, was one Ethan Allen, a late arrival from Connecticut along with five brothers, and three cousins, Seth Warner, Remember Baker and Ebenezer Allen. They quickly became notorious rather than prominent in the Grants for their drinking and brawling exploits which had included occasional brushes with what passed for

the law in the settlements. They engaged in enough farming to support their families, but their main interest lay in acquiring land. Owing to the high price of New York grants, they bought up quantities of New Hampshire grants, and became vociferous supporters of the Yankee faction in the Grants. In 1773 the Allens joined with their cousin, Remember Baker, in forming the Onion River Land Company. Another partner was Thomas Chittenden, who had moved from Connecticut in 1773 and had settled on Onion River lands. He was later (1777) appointed President of the Council of Safety, and ultimately became first Governor of the Republic.

The Allens now appear in two roles, as land speculators and as protectors of the Yankee settlers of the Grants. This period also marks their gradual rise to political power, with the Green Mountain Boys as a formidable force to frighten off or otherwise dispose of political rivals. Chittenden is believed by many Vermont historians to have been the real leader of the group, and his pre-eminent position in early Vermont renders it significant that he should head the group of Separatists who conducted the Negotiations. The land belonging to the Onion River Company was in the area bordering on Lake Champlain in the vicinity of the present city of Burlington. The greatest extent of their holdings was estimated at 77,622 acres by 1775.9 The business dealings of the Onion River Land Company help to explain Ethan Allen's opportune attack on Ticonderoga in May, 1775, as the fort in British hands controlled most of the company's

9. VHS - Ira Allen Papers - Memorandum to the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont. (This appears to be the origin of this statement, often used by Vermont historians.)
Background of the Negotiations

holdings. It also explains to some extent the desire of the Separatists to neutralize British naval strength on Lake Champlain and so protect their lands and crops.

During the next five years the Green Mountain Boys terrorized officials appointed by New York as well as the luckless settlers with New York titles to their lands. In many cases the Yorkers had their homes burned over their heads, their stock confiscated, and were themselves driven out of the Grants. A long string of complaints to the different governors of New York failed to produce any results, as the colony had no troops to send against the outlaws. In September 1773 Royal Governor Tryon of New York petitioned Major-General Frederick Haldimand, in command at New York in the absence of General Thomas Jage, to send British troops to subdue the Bennington rioters. In his reply Haldimand referred to the dangerous tendency of employing regular troops where there were militia laws and local militia called out to aid in the preservation of law and order. He felt that such a move would expose the weakness of the New York government, and render the authority of the civil magistrate contemptible when not supported by troops. Haldimand was later upheld in this decision by the British government. Possibly he realized the situation in Boston and New York was too serious to risk sending any of his force into the frontier to deal with rioters.

While agitation against the British Crown continued to grow along the Atlantic seaboard, the inhabitants of the Grants continued to

press their grievances against New York. It was about this time that a plan was formed to petition the British Government to make the area a Royal colony separate from both New York and New Hampshire. Colonel Philip Skene, a retired British officer and proprietor of Skanesborough (now Whitehall, New York), went to England in 1774 to secure Royal approval to this scheme. The Crown's demands for popular petitions to this end were unsatisfied when the colonies revolted. The Allens believed that a Champlain Valley Province had been formed by 1775, and that when Skene was arrested in Philadelphia on his return in June, 1775, a commission as Governor of Crown Point, Ticonderoga, the Lakes and Surveyor of the Woods had been found in his possession. They appeared to believe that had his mission been successful, the people of the Grants would never have revolted against the King. During the early days of the revolt against Britain the efforts of the Vermonters were largely directed against New York. A letter sent by Isaac Low of the New York Committee of Correspondence to the Cumberland County Yorkers, urging the inhabitants as a whole to protest against the Intolerable Acts, was not divulged to the public. The Yorkers feared that a demonstration against Great Britain would be transformed into a demonstration against New York. That this was not a foolish fear was proved by the instructions of the inhabitants of Chester to their delegates to a convention in Cumberland County in

October 1774. They mirror local grievances which agitated the debt-ridden inhabitants, rather than imperial grievances which set workers elsewhere against Great Britain. Conventions held in the Grants in the winter and spring of 1775 tended to list grievances against New York and to discuss secession from that colony. On April 11, 1775 the Cumberland and Gloucester Counties Convention vowed to resist New York until it should provide protection for their lives and more adequate protection for their property, or until the Crown could send an answer to their petition that the Grants be separated from New York and either be annexed to another colony or established as a new province.

Lexington and the American Revolution intervened on April 19, 1775, and prevented the peoples of the Grants from setting up their own colony. Nevertheless, the favorable reception this plan is alleged to have received in England inclined the settlers favorably towards Britain. Despite this, Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys surprised the British detachments at Ticonderoga and Crown Point and cleared the British from the Lake Champlain area. Many of the settlers took part in the unsuccessful American invasion of Quebec that same year, but it is extremely doubtful that their prime interest lay in freeing their lands from the British. The relationship between the British at Ticonderoga and the people of the Grants had been amicable, and there is reason to believe

---


that Allen's unnecessary night attack on Ticonderoga was made to minimize any fighting and bloodshed. The Grants' support to the Revolution in its early stages is best summed up in Ethan Allen's remark that they saw in it a chance to "annihilate the old quarrel with the government of New York by swallowing it up in the general conflict for liberty." They felt that their efforts on behalf of the revolted colonies would ensure their admission to the Union as the fourteenth colony, with their land titles made valid against future claims of New York.

The settlers of the Grants, or Vermonters as they came to be called, had not reckoned on the influence of the powerful New York land jobbers. The determination of these men to retain or regain their extensive land holdings in the Grants under New York charter was to influence decisions made by both the British government and the American Congress. In New York their interests were protected by the governor, another George Clinton. In Congress, the New York delegation was powerful enough to block early Vermont applications for admission. Congress refused to accept the Green Mountain Boys into military service unless they enlisted as a body in the New York militia. At no time during the period under study did Congress recognize the Grants as anything but a part of New York. While Congress was reluctant to send an army into the Grants to overpower the rebels, at the same time they refused to admit her to statehood for fear of alienating New York. The southern slave-holding states also opposed the admission of Vermont, as the balance between the free and slave states was a very delicate one, and they feared the admission of Vermont would overbalance it.
Background of the Negotiations

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the leaders of the Grants would consider seceding from New York, despairing of reconciliation on the land question. As early as 1769 a number of land speculators had petitioned the British government to establish the Grants as a separate colony, with Fort Edward as the seat of government. This idea of a separation from New York was uppermost in the minds of many of the settlers, and the Allens and their friends and supporters were all avowed Separatists. These promoters were large landowners who would be ruined if the New Hampshire titles were invalidated, and it had become clear to the leaders of the Grants within a year of the outbreak of hostilities that no compromise was possible with New York. Without a settled form of government or without some form of organization they would soon be overwhelmed by either New York or the Congress. They were aided in this scheme by public opinion within the Grants themselves, as more lands had been settled on New Hampshire patents than on those of New York. There is little evidence to prove that even these men originally contemplated a return to their British allegiance, although no doubt the Tories in the area favored the idea. The British in Canada were not as feared as the Yorkers, and the early steps were against that province.

By January, 1776, there was strong agitation to secede from New York, and a movement was begun by four men, Jonas Fay, Heman and Ira Allen (brothers of Ethan), and Thomas Chittenden. They called for absolute

Background of the Negotiations

independence from New York, and the establishment of the Grants as a separate entity. A convention was called at Dorset in the Grants on January 16 to determine "whether the delegates will consent to associate with New York, or by themselves in the cause of America". The chief result of this convention was to make clear to the revolutionaries in the other colonies that this body drew a sharp distinction between the cause of the Grants in their dispute with New York, and the cause of the colonists in their dispute with Great Britain. A second convention was held at Dorset on July 21. Representatives from the settlements on the east side of the Green Mountains attended this meeting, which proclaimed the undesirability of associating further with the province or state of New York. The settlers from the Connecticut Valley were willing to support a separate government, as they had become enraged at the conservative New Hampshire Constitution of March, 1775, and felt a common cause with the Yankees of the Grants. A further convention was called at Westminster, in October, 1776, but it was so poorly attended that a second convention met at Westminster in January, 1777. At this time there was strong opposition to the Allens and their supporters, but nevertheless a final declaration was made that

The New Hampshire Grants of right ought to be and hereby is declared forever and hereafter to be considered a separate, free and independent jurisdiction or state; by the name, and to be forever hereafter called and known and distinguished by the name, of New Connecticut.

16. Slade, op. cit., p. 61
17. VHS Collections, op. cit., p. 21-2
18. Williamson, op. cit., p. 60-1
The province of New Connecticut included both the settlers of the Connecticut Valley and those of the Champlain Valley. Many differences remained to be ironed out, but the parties were to be united for the moment by the New York Constitution promulgated in April, 1777. A further convention at Windsor in June found the Grants' declaration of independence satisfactory to all parties, although the name of the new state was changed to Vermont.

The apparent lack of rancour against the British is extremely noticeable during this period immediately prior to the Negotiations. Many of the settlers in the Grants had resided there for many years, and were out of touch with the more recent happenings in their former homes. Some Tories had been driven from their homes along the seaboard by persecution, and were content to live in the Grants in peaceful obscurity. Even the Burgoyne invasion and the Battle of Bennington (August 17, 1777) did little except to raise the hopes of the Tories. The people of the Grants were too preoccupied with their grievances against New York to become interested or involved in the larger quarrel with Great Britain. Nevertheless a Council of Safety was set up in the autumn of 1777, and Thomas Chittenden, a friend of the Allens and a strong Separatist, became its president. The following year a formal government was established. Twelve people were elected to the Governor's Council by popular vote, and an Assembly was set up by the same means. The Assembly and Council were both controlled by the Allens, partly because the people of the Grants were grateful to their regime, and partly because neither body was representative, and the majority

19. Id., ibid., p. 63
of the members came from the Champlain Valley. Of particular interest at this time is the fact that many of Allen's followers were later to be staunch Loyalists.

In many Vermont minds there was some confusion regarding Loyalism, because loyalty to New York was considered to be far worse than loyalty to Britain. The statement attributed to Ethan Allen is indicative of Vermont thinking at this time. On July 11, 1776 he is supposed to have told Elisha Bane that "these enemical Persons are Yorkers as well as Tories". The people thus complained of immediately assumed sinister proportions, not because they were Tories, but because they represented an immediate enemy in the Yorkers. There was little persecution of Tories, possibly because the exposed position of the settlements would leave them open to reprisals from Canada, but more likely because Vermont was not exposed to the war to any extent at that time. The first steps were not taken against the Tories until March 26, 1778, when a law was passed declaring their property to be forfeit to the state, and could be sold by it. Within a month 158 Tory properties had been confiscated. This scheme was the brainchild of the Treasurer of Vermont, Ira Allen, who saw in it a chance to balance the republic's budget. Money was badly needed to run the government, and Ira realized how unpopular taxation would be among the people. The sale of the confiscated Tory estates punished the Tories, made the government popular, and furnished the republic with over half of its revenue. The main result of this law was to clear out many

20. Williamson, op. cit., p. 74-7
21. E.P. Walton, Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, Vol. I, (no place), (no publisher), 1873, p. 64
of the remaining Yorkers in the Grants, as the courts of confiscation included both Tories and Yorkers among those disloyal to the state. The Allens and their followers saw in the law an excellent chance to dispossess Yankee landholders, and to increase their own popularity by selling good land to small holders. While some of the land passed to small owners, most of it was merely transferred from an absentee Yorker landowner to an absentee Yankee landowner.

Many Tories who had fled the country with Burgoyne and whose lands had been seized returned to the Grants in 1778-9. No further action was taken against them, but a minor crisis was precipitated when many of them tried to regain their old lands. As a result a Proscription Act, on February 24, 1779 to punish Tories who had been banished by the state and had refused to leave, or else had returned boldly in defiance of the state. A list of 106 prescribed persons was drawn up, and the act provided that if these persons returned to the state of Vermont, they would be given forty lashes once a week until such time as they left the state. There is no evidence that this punishment was ever carried out. The act was unpopular, and was repealed on November 7, 1780, shortly after the beginning of the Negotiations.

From 1778-1780 the relations between the republic of Vermont and the state of New York failed to improve, and steadily worsened between Vermont and the Continental Congress. On June 26, 1778, Congress asserted

22. Williamson, op. cit., p.75
Background of the Negotiations

that the Grants could not derive any justification from the Declaration of Independence (which Vermont had endorsed) or from any other act of Congress for declaring its own independence. The new relationship stated in the Declaration was only between the colonies and Great Britain, and was not deemed an invitation for dissident groups within the colonies to partition any of the existing colonies. On September 24, 1779 Congress further infuriated the Vermonters by passing a resolution recommending that New York, New Hampshire and Massachusetts (who had recently revived an old claim to Vermont lands) empower Congress to settle all boundary and land disputes. Congress thus made clear her position in regard to Vermont, and allied herself with New York in the land titles dispute.

Chief Justice William Smith of New York, a prominent Yorker land speculator who had taken refuge in New York as a Loyalist, made some interesting observations in his diary on this resolution:

If I mistake not, these resolves will create fresh animosities; it cuts off the hope of all who sought a separate government for motive of ambition. It touches the interest of those who have lent money to Vermont as a state. It affords the loyalists a cloak for activity and penitents have a pretence to change their conduct. It exposes all inhabitants to dread of being contributors to taxes in one or other of the states.

References:

23. VHS-Manuscript Acts, Conventions and State Papers 1775-91, p.2

24. Williamson, op. cit., p.87

25. NYPL-Diary of Chief Justice William Smith, December 18, 1779
These resolves stiffened and solidified Vermont's opposition to Congress. Governor Chittenden warned Congress that Vermont might take such measures as self-preservation would justify, unless her independence were recognised.

The Allens and their party were now at the peak of their power. They had overcome all opposition to them in the republic, had liquidated Yorker and Loyalist property alike, and had exercised personal power undreamed of when they assumed leadership of the unorganized forces hostile to both New York and Great Britain. Now they drummed up opposition to Congress as well as to New York. George Clinton's proposals to settle the land disputes were neither accepted nor reported to the Vermonters. A rebellion of Yorkers in the Connecticut Valley was put down by force. In October 1779 the Vermont Assembly voted to disregard Jay's proposals in Congress that no further land grants be made in Vermont and granted all unlocated lands and sold all confiscated estates. No attempt was made to close the gap between the republic and Congress, and defense measures were drawn up against the possibility of an invasion by forces of either New York or Congress. In February 1780, Moses Robinson, Jonas Fay and Stephen R. Bradley were empowered by the Governor's Council to present Vermont's case before the Continental Congress, but they made no attempt to reach a compromise.

The refusal of Congress to issue arms from Vermont stores at Rutland early in 1780 prompted a Vermont order-in-council prohibiting the

26. VHS-Collections, op. cit., Vol. II, p.32
export of provisions out of the republic. On July 25, 1780 Chittenden told Congress that "it is indeed time, high time, for her seriously to consider what she is fighting for, and to what purpose she has been, more than five years last past, spilling the blood of her bravest sons". 27

Much of the above would be pure gibberish if Vermont had no other way to turn, but it had become clear by 1779 that Congress had no intention of recognizing Vermont's independence. By the following year a change had occurred in Vermont's attitude towards the British on one hand, and towards Congress on the other, a change that was to lead to the Negotiations with Governor Haldimand of Quebec. Although this change was gradual, it was fostered by the ruling clique in Vermont, who had skilfully built up an antagonism against Congress as being in league with New York. By the end of June, 1780, Congress had declined to offer any support to Vermont, and events in Vermont moved swiftly towards better relations with the British. Unwonted leniency was shown the Tories by Chittenden in his proclamation of August 1, in which he welcomed Tories to the state and offered them fair treatment or safe passage through the republic to Quebec. 28 This came only a week after he had warned Congress that Vermont was considering just what she was fighting for, and this indicates a new turning point in Vermont politics. Less than two months later Chittenden sent another letter

27. Reid Langdon Carr, "The Haldimand Correspondence", in The Vermonter, issue of December 1917, Vol. XXII No. 12, p.209
to Congress with Vermont’s latest petitioners, Ira Allen and Stephen R. Bradley. In this letter he pointed out that if his state continued to be barred from the union

she has not the most distant motive to continue hostilities with Great Britain, and maintain an important frontier for the benefit of the United States, and for no other reward than the ungrateful one of being enslaved by them.

In the past, Vermont had claimed a right to join the Union owing to her position as a bulwark against the British forces in Quebec. Actually there was little activity on the border between 1777 and 1779. Sporadic Indian raids were made on the frontier settlements during that period, but organized raiding was not noticeable until after Haldimand became governor in June 1778. Large and well-organized raids were made on the Lake Champlain settlements in the autumn, ostensibly to destroy the crops that might have provisioned an invading American force. They also served to demonstrate to the Vermonters how indefensible their borders were. They realized how exposed they were to any invading force from the north, and cast about for some possible solution to their dilemma.

The Negotiations which began in October 1780 presented solutions to their problems. A return to their British allegiance with legal title to their lands would free them from any dependence on New York or Congress, and would assure the fortunes of Allen, Chittenden and their friends.


30. PAC B Series, LIV, p. 61-3. Haldimand to Lord George Germain, 21 November 1778. After one raid Major Chris Carleton had reported that they had destroyed four months' provision for twelve thousand men, and that there were no more traitors on either side of Lake Champlain from Ticonderoga to Canada.
Similarly, reconciliation with Great Britain would protect them against further Indian raids, and allow enterprising landowners with holdings in the northern part of the Lake Champlain Valley to improve and exploit those lands. However, the main reason for the Negotiations on the part of Vermont, and for the possibility of ultimate reconciliation with the British Crown is best set down in a letter written by Ethan Allen to Haldimand’s successor, Lord Dorchester, Governor of Quebec, on July 16, 1786:

Vermont is locally situated to the waters of Lake Champlain, which connects with those of the St. Lawrence, and contiguous to the Province of Quebec, where they must be dependent for trade, business and intercourse, which naturally incline them to the British interest.

The fact that the Champlain Valley was a part of the watershed of the St. Lawrence River is of profound significance in interpreting the history of early Vermont. Attempts by Vermonters to promote trade agreements with Quebec extended well beyond the Revolutionary War period. Determined efforts were made as late as 1805, and during the War of 1812-14 the British Army in Canada received a large part of their provisions from New England, via Vermont. For almost a half century after Vermont separated itself from New York the most convenient route along which the Vermonters could ship cattle and timber was that of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. It was not until the completion of the Champlain Canal connecting Lake Champlain with the Hudson River in 1823 that Vermont’s economic interests turned to the south, and to her fellow-states.

31. PAC, Quebec and Upper Canada Papers (1760-1800), (hereafter referred to as the “Q” Series), Vol. XXXVI, p. 448.
Chapter II

General Haldimand's Personality

The main purpose of this thesis has already been outlined, and an attempt made to fill in the background of the negotiations between Vermont and the British in Quebec. Much has been written from an American viewpoint, dealing with the motives of the Vermonters in engaging in a cartel with the British governor, General Frederick Haldimand. Very little can be found assessing Haldimand's views on the subject, and the part it played in his regime. The British viewpoint is usually left out in most accounts, and no attention paid to the influence of the world struggle between England and France at this time. To most American historians the picture of the simple Vermont backwoodsmen besting the shrewd British diplomats at their own game is most satisfying. Haldimand as a person does not appear in these accounts, and he is usually pictured as a master-plotter intent upon enslaving the Vermonters.

Until recently history has dealt very harshly with Haldimand. He is usually depicted in Canadian history books as a despotic ruler, who arbitrarily kept hundreds of people in jails during his regime, and kept the whole colony under strict military rule. Most of this reputation is based on the celebrated du Calvet case. Pierre du Calvet, a French merchant of Montreal, was arrested in September, 1780 on the charge of treasonable correspondence with the rebels. He was kept in jail in Quebec for over two years, being released in May, 1783. Ultimately he made his

1. PAC Q XX, p.36-9 (Maclean to Mathews - September 26, 1780)
General Haldimand's Personality

way to England and entered suit for damages against Haldimand for illegal imprisonment. He received strong support from prominent opponents of the war in America, and received compensation from the British Government for his alleged damages. He wrote a number of pamphlets blaming Haldimand for all his misfortunes, and these pamphlets were used by later historians as factual material, and therefore present a very biased picture of the governor. It is typical of Haldimand that he never deigned to defend himself against du Calvet's vicious attacks. Du Calvet later went to Paris where he contacted Benjamin Franklin and attempted to collect monies which he claimed the Americans owed him for services done.

Haldimand has tended to become a shadowy character owing to the few glimpses which history gives of him. Little is known of his life before he joined the British forces, although he was believed to have served with the Prussians under Frederick the Great for over ten years. He was born at Yverdun, in Neuchatel, Switzerland, on August 11, 1718, and entered the Sardinian army at the age of fifteen. He was therefore typical of the Swiss soldiers of fortune that fought under various standards in Europe at that time. He held a commission in a regiment of Swiss Guards in Holland in 1754, at which time he was appointed to the command of a battalion of the Royal American Regiment (the 60th).

Haldimand landed at New York on June 15, 1756, and was immediately posted to the frontier of Pennsylvania to protect the settlers against the French and their Indian allies. Later he was sent throughout the central and southern colonies to aid in recruiting men for the forces. In 1758 he took part in Lord Abercromby's expedition against Canada as colonel of
the fourth battalion of the Royal Americans, and was slightly wounded at the battle of Ticonderoga. This was his only battle experience in America. He spent the winter of 1758-9 in command at Fort Edward, and trained some of his regular troops to move as scouts with the Rangers. The following summer he spent in the Lake Ontario region rebuilding Fort Oswego and engaging in a lively argument with Sir William Johnson over the succession to the command after the death of General Prideaux. In 1760 he joined General Amherst in the campaign against Montreal, which town he took possession after the capitulation and remained there for two years.

Between 1762 and 1765 Haldimand alternated as commander between Montreal and Three Rivers. During this time he was promoted to colonel and took steps to become a naturalized British subject. In 1765 he was promoted to Brigadier and was granted a leave of absence in England. Two years later he arrived in Pensacola, Florida, succeeding to the command there on the death of his friend and colleague, Colonel Bouquet. In 1773 he became a major-general and was transferred to New York to become commander-in-chief during the absence of General Thomas Gage in England. In the summer of 1775 he was recalled to England and appointed Inspector-General of the Forces in the West Indies, a sinecure intended to keep him out of America. On January 1, 1776 he became a full general in America and its equivalent, a lieutenant-general in the British army. The following year he was appointed governor of Canada upon Carleton's resignation, and took up his post there in June, 1778.

A fair analysis of Haldimand is difficult from this bare outline of his life. Few historical works contain any factual material that can
be used to advantage, and only his own papers give any clue to his personality. Through them he is seen as a lonely, disappointed but not embittered man. Both of these characteristics stem from his foreign birth, and the resultant jealousy at his rapid rise in the British army. A bachelor, he was a man with few close friends, and the death of Bouquet in 1766 saddened him considerably. The diary which he kept the last few years of his life reveals a man who loved parties and dinners, and he writes at length of whist games, and of visits to Lord Amherst and other military notables with whom he had been associated. In Quebec there could be none of this, because he could not dispense with the dignity of his position. Few people in the colony attempted to break through his reserve, and so he remained aloof during his six years of rule.

A much different Haldimand is given in the journals and letters of both Major-General Baron Von Riedesel and his wife. Haldimand had been described to them as a morose and sour-looking man, of a very unsuitable nature. Riedesel and his wife had been captured at Saratoga in 1777, and had only been exchanged in 1781. He was then sent to Canada to take command of the Brunswick troops and to serve under Haldimand. It must have been with a certain amount of trepidation that Riedesel called on the governor to report his arrival at Quebec. However, he was very kindly received by Haldimand who, according to Riedesel, although somewhat morose became friendly and talkative.

2. William L. Stone, Memoirs and Journals of Major General Riedesel During his Residence in America (translated from the original German of Max Von Helsing), Albany, (no publisher), 1868, p. 108
Madame Riedesel, who must have been a remarkable woman, refused to listen to those who endeavoured to inspire her with distrust of Haldimand. She behaved towards him with great open-heartedness - a line of conduct which he was not slow to recognize with thanks, "especially as he was very little accustomed to such treatment in this place". Through Madame Riedesel's journals we see a different Haldimand altogether, seen through the eyes of people who became his friends, and that without any idea of profiting from that friendship. We learn that Haldimand had built a summer house beside Montmorency Falls outside Quebec so that his guests could see the magnificent fall of water at their feet. General Riedesel comments on the governor's residence, the Castle St. Louis, which Haldimand had refitted and refurnished during his stay, and which looked like a palace in comparison to what it had been in Carleton's day. Madame Riedesel was amazed at the governor's gardens, full of choice fruits and foreign plants "which one would scarce have believed could be made to grow in this climate".

The Riedesels became the only real friends that Haldimand had during his stay in Canada. He bought them a house in Sorel, and kept them supplied with newspapers and little comforts from time to time. Their friendly associations are noticeable even in the official correspondence between the governor and Riedesel, and the latter is apparently entrusted with confiden-

3. William L. Stone, Letters and Journals Relating to the War of the American Revolution, and the Capture of the German Troops at Saratoga by Mrs. General Riedesel (translated from the original German), Albany, (no publisher), 1867, p. 194

4. loc. cit.
tial papers. He shows his gratitude in a letter to Haldimand on November 1, 1782.

The confidence which you place in me binds me stronger to you every day. You may rest assured that whatever you intrust (sic) to me is most sacred; and your kindness may command me always. Your wishes are with me law.

It is difficult to understand Riedesel's facility in dealing with the governor, who had the name of being a man with whom no one could get along. Riedesel might have been painstakingly particular to please the governor, and to cater to his wishes, but their friendship appears to have been founded on mutual liking and self-respect. Certainly it is unlike Haldimand to unburden himself to any subordinate as he does to Riedesel on September 16, 1782, when he writes

It is singular that when he [Sir Guy Carleton] has such a safe opportunity of writing me he expresses neither hope nor fear, and that he leaves me, since his arrival, in so much uncertainty concerning everything. I am very sensitive about this.

The following January he writes Riedesel that he hopes that the ministry will make Carleton pay more attention to him than before. The want of attention confirms him more and more in his resolution made as early as the previous summer. Very likely this resolution was to retire to England. He makes no secret of the fact that he would like to return to Europe when Riedesel and his Brunswickers leave. The ostensible reason given was ill-health, the result of a fall in May, 1782, and that he would like to seek

5. PAC B CXXXVII, p. 329 (Riedesel to Haldimand - September 1, 1782)
6. PAC B CXXXIX, p. 204 (Haldimand to Riedesel - September 16, 1782)
7. PAC B CXXXIX, p. 270 (Haldimand to Riedesel - January 13, 1783)
treatment in England. However, his request was not granted that year, and he was not to leave Quebec until November, 1784.

Mention has already been made of the fact that Haldimand was a disappointed man. His rapid rise in the British army had excited the envy of many English officers. Their envy was aggravated by the fact that Haldimand was foreign-born, and a man to whom "English did not proceed from the heart". Not only did this result in strained relations with other high-ranking officers, but it also resulted in more than one case of official discrimination where he was concerned. The first of these instances occurred in 1775, when Haldimand was serving as General Gage's second-in-command at Boston, after having been commander-in-chief in North America for over a year. On April 15, 1775, Lord Dartmouth sent Haldimand official permission to return to England on leave of absence, sending at the same time a letter to explain this action. In this letter Dartmouth points out that if the "present disturbances in America" become serious, and "if any event deprive them of the services of General Gage", that Haldimand would become commander-in-chief. The government apparently was of the opinion that in such a struggle between Great Britain and "her own sons and subjects" British forces should not be commanded by "other than a natural born subject of the King".

Until he was appointed to govern Quebec, Haldimand remained in England as an advisor on American affairs. When the Whig government under Lord Rockingham took office early in 1782, Lord Shelburne, the new Secretary for Home, Irish and Colonial Affairs, lost no time in writing what can only

---

8. PAC B XXXV, p. 134-5 (Dartmouth to Haldimand - April 15, 1775)
be described as a cruel letter to Haldimand. In it Shelburne stated that
the government of Canada would be conducted in the future by Sir Guy
Carleton, who had recently succeeded Sir Henry Clinton as commander-in-
chief. Apparently the preservation of the province of Quebec to the British
Crown had suddenly become of the utmost importance. Shelburne noted that
Carleton, although equivalent to Haldimand in rank, was his junior in
seniority, but pointed out that if it was impossible for him consistent
with his own feelings to accommodate the point of rank with Sir Guy,
"the same reasons which were communicated to you by Lord Dartmouth in the
year 1775 for your coming to England will have equal force at present." 9

Haldimand's feelings were outraged, but his reply that July is
phrased in the stiff formality of his official correspondence. He writes
that he does not wish to serve under an officer his junior, and asks to
be relieved of his post by the following year. Carleton wrote from New
York in September to tell Haldimand that he did not intend to go to
Quebec that autumn, and further stated that it was wholly unlikely that
he would ever go there, as he had quitted "that government" without any
thought of returning. It was at this time that Haldimand mentioned to
Biizdesel how sensitive he was to Carleton's vagueness. He poured out his
feelings in a letter to the Honorable Thomas Townshend, Shelburne's
successor, in November, 1782. He again asked to be relieved of his post.
He points out that his situation has become a most painful one "considered
as commanding officer only until a Junior Officer shall find it necessary

9. PAC B L, p. 168 (Shelburne to Haldimand - April 24, 1782)
or convenient to supersede me"; apparently the contents of Lord Shelburne's letter had become known throughout the province. Haldimand feels that his long years of honorable service should never be rewarded by having such a sacrifice be required of him as a duty. He says that he has never imagined that considerations which influenced the conduct of the King's ministers in 1775 should be revived to his mortification in 1782 when the state of public affairs had so materially altered.

It is difficult to understand Lord Shelburne's action in warning Haldimand that his foreign origin was now to prevent his remaining in command in Quebec, although during the previous four years he had been in command of troops that were fighting against Britain's "own sons and subjects". During this same period the British government showed no compunction in hiring foreign troops and sending them into battle against the colonists. Without evidence to the contrary, the entire incident can only be regarded as additional discrimination against the Swiss governor.

Haldimand's letters also bear witness to the dissatisfaction which he felt in his correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton when that worthy was in command at New York. He complained more than once that Clinton did not keep him posted as to the policies of the British government, and that

10. PAC Q XXI, p. 1-3 (Haldimand to Col. Thomas Townshend - November 10, 1782)

11. General Riedesel, another foreign-born general, suffered a similar mortification when he found that Major General Clarke had arrived in Canada with a commission dated January 1, 1776. He points out that Clarke was a colonel for more than a year after he (Riedesel) received his major-general's rank, but that this new commission makes Clarke his senior by twelve days. PAC Q Series XVIII, p.5 (Riedesel to Lord George Germain - September 21, 1781)
frequently he was unaware what course of action he should pursue. Corrobor-
ration is given this by Chief Justice William Smith of New York, an asso-
ciate of Clinton's, and his diary for May 7,1781 records the following:
"Sir Henry Clinton's negligence of the papers proper for General Haldimand
ever since 29 March ....... puts his character and conduct in a disadvan-
tageous light as a man of business." This neglect of Clinton, Haldimand's
commander-in-chief, in sending Haldimand's despatches to England could have
had disastrous results for the success of British arms in America. It is
debatable whether Clinton was catering to a peevish whim in holding up
Haldimand's despatches, or whether this is merely another illustration of
Clinton's inefficiency. Clinton was succeeded by Sir Guy Carleton shortly
after the news of the debacle at Yorktown reached England, and even today
some British historians are inclined to lay the blame for Cornwallis' 
defeat at Clinton's door. In other respects, however, Clinton did act
peevishly towards Haldimand. During the summer of 1779 he agreed
reluctantly to send reinforcements to Quebec, but stated with ill-grace
that this would force him to forego all his plans for that year. He
appears to blame Haldimand for his troubles, as he asks him, "I trust you
have well weighed the exigency which induces a measure so debilitating to
my operations." 12

Haldimand does not appear to have fared better in his relationships
with Sir Guy Carleton. The following incidents appear to sum up their
relations, although no evidence is available that either of these stories

12. PAC B CXLVII, p. 67-8 (Clinton to Haldimand - June 26, 1779)
is true. When Haldimand succeeded Carleton at Quebec in June, 1778, the latter asked his successor if he would purchase his furniture and carriage, to save him the expense of moving them back to England. To this Haldimand agreed. When Haldimand was preparing to take his departure from Quebec in 1783, he asked his logical successor, Carleton, if he would purchase Haldimand's furniture and possessions which he did not propose to take with him. From the story and also from accounts sent to Haldimand in England by his agent in Quebec, Carleton curtly refused to do so.

In attempting to determine what type of person Haldimand really was, his position in Quebec has to be outlined. As "Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of the Province of Quebec" Haldimand's first responsibility was to retain that province for the Crown. In this he was hampered by a totally inadequate force, by limited support from London, and by a lack of reliable information on the progress of the war in America. These three factors studied together give a clear insight into Haldimand's behaviour while at Quebec. The inadequacy of his forces is an extremely important factor, and will be discussed in detail later. It should be sufficient here to indicate that Haldimand lived from year to year in fearful anticipation of either an American or a French invasion; that this necessitated keeping his scanty forces dispersed at points where he felt that they would serve the most useful purpose.

During the greater part of his stay in Quebec, Haldimand received little direction from London. Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies to whom he was responsible, has been referred to as "the
General Haldimand's Personality

worst minister that ever held office since the days of constitutional government". It might have been due to his foreign birth, but Haldimand never appeared to have the full confidence of Whitehall. For lack of definite instructions, he was often forced to take steps on his own responsibility, although he could never be sure that his actions would meet with official approval. Here the Loyalist problem is a case in point. Canadian historians have for the most part failed to give Haldimand credit for resolving this problem, but give the credit to Carleton for the successful handling of the situation, although he did not arrive in Quebec until 1766, by which time the problem had ceased to be critical. Shortly after his arrival in 1778 Haldimand had voiced his anxiety regarding the problem of settling the Loyalists to the imperial authorities, but they offered no practical assistance. He finally decided on the three main areas of settlement, and had them surveyed on his own initiative. An instance of British indifference to the problem facing the Canadian administration was the reaction to Haldimand's plan to purchase the Sorel seigneury. Although he began negotiating in 1778, he failed to get authorization before 1783, and it was a full year later before he obtained permission to use it for loyalists. 13


The lack of reference material on Haldimand is illustrated in a Canadian history by an eminent Canadian, who mentions Haldimand only once, and then in error. He mentions him as Sir Frederick Haldimand (he was not to be knighted until 1787) and as the seigneur of Sorel, which he had bought. Stephen Leacock, Canada - The Foundations of its Future, Montreal, (privately printed), 1941, p. 162.
Haldimand's failure to secure reliable information of the progress of the war in America has already been noted. Whether this was due to his strained relations with Sir Henry Clinton or not, the fact remains that the greater part of his information came incidentally and through his spies. In many cases he did not receive notice of Clinton's plans until too late in the season to make preparations for any offensive action from Canada. Much of his action on the Vermont border consisted of raiding operations after the crops had been harvested in the autumn in order to destroy provisions for an invading force, and to destroy any military works that might serve as a base for operations against Quebec.

Another aspect of the defence of the province concerned the repression of subversive elements in Quebec. There had been a great deal of sympathy for the republican cause from the beginning of the revolution, and this was apparent during the American occupation of Montreal. After France joined the Americans in February, 1778, the Canadian populace was agitated by enemy agents and sympathizers, and it is remarkable that so few people were imprisoned for their political views. The picture in Canada is in direct contrast to that in the revolted colonies, where imprisonment, confiscation of estates and even hanging was the rule rather than the exception. The names of less than twenty persons imprisoned during Haldimand's regime have come down to us, and the firm attitude adopted by the governor is illustrated in his instructions to the Governor of Montreal, Brigadier de Speth, on November 22, 1781:

The liberty of the subject being by our laws very sacred, it is necessary that suspicion should be well founded to justify imprisonment. Except in cases where the service shall require immediate
decision, it will be necessary in future that you wait for my particular directions as civil governor to apprehend any subject for state crimes.

From these instructions it can be seen that Haldimand was determined to study each aspect of a case with his usual caution before authorizing any arrests. It well sums up Haldimand's attitude towards the hot-headed Canadians who constantly plotted mischief and who furnished the Americans with information. It also disproves the charge that he recklessly imprisoned large numbers of the population on the mere ground that they opposed his policy.

In the case of du Calvet, who was imprisoned over a year before the above directive, it must be remembered that he was not imprisoned on Haldimand's order. The Governor of Montreal arrested him on the complaint of Major Chris Carleton, who had just captured a messenger going to the colonies. Haldimand later approved the detention of du Calvet, and this decision was borne out a year later when Benedict Arnold gave Sir Henry Clinton a list of enemy sympathisers in Canada which included one "Mons. du Calvet".

Haldimand was an austere man, but he had been so moulded by his long years of soldiering. The high position which he had achieved tended to render him unapproachable, although Madame Riedesel wrote that she had hardly ever seen a man who was more amiable and friendly to those to whom he had once given his friendship. One of the Brunswick officers, one Papet,
refers to him in his diary as not being a friend of great formalities, but fond of a good dinner, and satisfied when he could quietly smoke his pipe in his seat before the chimney. His age must also be taken into consideration, and it must be remembered that he was turning sixty years of age when he became governor, and therefore was set in his ways. From his voluminous correspondence he appears a careful, frugal person, who invested his money carefully and deplored expenditure. He was a bachelor, but he devoted both time and money to help his many nephews and nieces.

Many of the difficulties which he faced during his regime can be traced to his background. Like his predecessors, Murray and Carleton, he was a professional soldier, and his training ill-equipped him to deal with problems of a civil nature. The Negotiations with Vermont became at times of a diplomatic nature, and doubt has been cast on Haldimand's ability as a statesman. It must always be borne in mind that Haldimand considered his main duty the preservation of Canada to the Crown, and thought all other issues as secondary. He was primarily a military governor, and therefore the constitutional development of the province was subordinated to its military needs. He was a lonely old man, set in his ways, and perhaps a bit sensitive and shy. The British position in Quebec was extremely precarious, and he did not wish to ruin a "long and honorable service" by losing his command to the enemy. Within the previous quarter-century the island of Minorca had been lost to France, and its defender, Admiral John Byng,

15. Stone, Letters etc. of Mrs. Riedesel, op. cit., p. 194
convicted of moral cowardice and executed. In his position of danger and uncertainty Haldimand never faltered in what he held to be the true performance of his duty. In many cases the performance was tempered with extreme caution, because he felt that he had to remain on the defensive. Above all, he was in command of a province in wartime, but in which there was no actual warfare. The whole colony was virtually under martial law during his regime, and there is something boring about a country on war footing with its emphasis on arbitrary power when no action occurs. Haldimand was fated to miss the fighting and excitement, and to be subjected to the deadly monotony of everyday administration during what can be called a crucial period. The result that Canada remained a British possession is in some respects due to Haldimand's patient understanding and undemonstrative firmness as well as to his inactivity and caution. The effect his caution was to have on the Negotiations with Vermont, and the role they played in his military strategy will be discussed in later chapters.
Chapter III

The Military Situation in Canada

The extent of General Haldimand's forces during his regime, and the use to which he put them, is one of the most fascinating problems of this study. On its solution might hang many unexplained incidents in the Vermont Negotiations. Haldimand's entire strategy depended on the number of men under his command, and similarly his attitude towards Vermont could vary with the size of the force that he could place on the Vermont border. American historians from the Reverend Mr. Williams down to the present day have estimated his forces in the neighbourhood of ten thousand trained and well-armed men. Even Ira Allen, one of the Vermont negotiators, uses that figure in his history of Vermont. George Washington, commander-in-chief of the American forces, estimated that the regular troops in Canada could not exceed 4000 men in 1782, in his plan of campaign for that year. ¹ His estimate of 5000 men, including "British, German and established Provincials", seems ridiculously low from a man whose secret agents were supposed to be in every part of Quebec. He did mention that some accounts made "the force of the enemy in that country equal to this number (8000)", and there he seems on surer ground. ²

The American writers are surprisingly consistent in their view that Haldimand had such a large well-trained army, but few of them pursue the topic any further. Burgoyne had attempted to split the rebellious colonies

² Id. ibid., p.497
The Military Situation in Canada

by marching along the Lake Champlain - Hudson River route in 1777, and Haldimand stood a better chance of succeeding in the same manoeuver in 1781 when the American forces had moved to the south to engage Cornwallis. With a large body of troops at his disposal there was no reason why Haldimand shouldn't have attempted the conquest of Vermont, or even of the northern part of New York State. The American explanation that the British in Quebec were forced to remain neutral owing to the truce imposed during the Negotiations seems fantastic when viewed against British policy and their acute shortage of troops. It is difficult to imagine the British government leaving an army inactive in Quebec for four years when troops were urgently needed elsewhere.

At the beginning of the American war the British had some 48000 land forces to defend their vast empire. Only 8500 of these were in America, largely to protect the West Indian trade and to keep the Indian tribes of North America in check. It was a familiar predicament for the British, who looked to the navy to defend them while they raised troops. The troop situation did not become serious until France joined the rebels in February, 1778. Prior to this British units had been increased by adding new companies or battalions to existing regiments, and by increasing the number of men in existing companies or battalions. Most of this was accomplished by ordinary recruiting until the advent of the French into the struggle. Most world histories regard this as the real beginning of the war, as did the British government. On May 28, 1778 the Press or Impressment Act was passed by the British Parliament which gave the authorities
the right to draft able-bodied men into the Army and Navy. Impressment does not appear to have been a spectacular success; between March and October of 1779 a total of 1,463 men were impressed in the south of England and only 61 men drafted in the North. As troops were badly needed, the King had recourse to the expedient of hiring troops from the rulers of the small German states.

These German mercenaries are the Hessian soldiers so prominently featured in American history textbooks. The greatest number came from Hesse-Cassel, whose landgrave sent fifteen of his infantry regiments and other troops for a total of seventeen thousand. Other contributions came from the profit-seeking rulers of Brunswick, Hesse Hanau, Anhalt-Zerbst, Waldeck and Anspach-Bayreuth. Approximately thirty thousand Germans served in America during the war, but only a few served in Canada. Regiments from Brunswick, Hesse Hanau, Hesse Cassel and Anhalt-Zerbst were stationed in Canada during Haldimand's regime, but saw little service. Their number never exceeded five thousand men.

1. Weakness of forces and resources.

Throughout the entire struggle Britain experienced an acute shortage of military forces, so it is not altogether surprising that Haldimand was always complaining of having too few men to defend the country. Only

---


4. Id. ibid., p. 65-6
a general estimate of Haldimand's strength can be given, owing to incomplete military returns at that time. Tables I - III do not attempt to give a complete picture of Haldimand's military strength, but they are the result of piecing together bits of information and some incomplete returns. The picture they present, while leaving some questions unanswered, gives a comparatively accurate estimate of the size of the military forces in Canada.

When Haldimand arrived at Quebec on June 26, 1778 to take over his new post, he had little cause to rejoice in the troops he was to command. Burgoyne's ill-fated expedition of the previous year had stripped the country of the greater part of its troops, and had depleted the regiments left behind of their grenadier and light infantry battalions. Five regiments remained in Canada, and one of these, the 8th (King's Light Foot), was stationed at Fort Niagara to protect the back country. One unit, the 47th, consisted of two companies stationed on Diamond (later Carleton) Island at the entrance to the St. Lawrence River, and was supposed to protect the fur trading route. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote the governor on April 16 that the troops in Canada exceeded 5000 men, and that it was intended to send a corps of the Prince of Anhalt Zerbat's soldiers consisting of about 600 men. These with additional recruits for the Brunswick and Hanau troops would amount to an addition of near 1200 men. 5 There appears to be no good reason to quarrel with Haldimand's military returns for July, issued a few weeks

5. PAC B XLIII, p. 28-31 (Germain to Haldimand - 16 April 1778)
after his arrival. At that time his men totalled 4152 effectives after making allowance for those to be retained as garrisons throughout the entire region. 6

Haldimand continued to receive reinforcements almost every year of the war, but the majority of these were German troops whom he considered useless except as garrison troops. The only British regiment noted as coming to Canada was the 41st, originally sent from New York by Sir Henry Clinton in 1779. Part of the unit was lost at sea in a storm, and the remainder failed to reach Quebec until the following June. Originally Haldimand had asked Sir Henry Clinton for 2000 men in order to check a threatened invasion. He claimed that his available British regulars consisted of only 1600 men fit for duty. 7 The following year he told Germain that he could not assemble more than 2500 men capable of keeping the field two months in the event of an invasion. 8

On the accompanying tables the forces in Canada are divided into three groups according to their origin. Of these Haldimand regarded the British regiments as the cream of the force in Canada. In his report on the province in September, 1779, he told Germain that these regiments were the best that he had, but that they had been stripped of their grenadiers and light infantry companies, and only composed a corps of about 1200 men. 9

6. PAC Q XV, p. 169-76 (Haldimand to Germain - 28 July 1778)
7. PAC Q XVI-1, p. 111-17 (Haldimand to Clinton - 26 May 1779)
8. PAC Q XIX, p. 268-74 (Haldimand to Germain - 23 November 1781)
9. PAC Q XVI-2, p. 591-601 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 September 1779)
## The Military Situation in Canada

### Table I

**British Troops in Canada 1778-83**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>1778</th>
<th>1779</th>
<th>1780</th>
<th>1781</th>
<th>1782</th>
<th>1783</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Royal Artillery</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Regiment</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>(550)</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 29th Regiment</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>(450)</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 31st Regiment</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 34th Regiment</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>(550)</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Regiment</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 47th Regiment</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># 53rd Regiment</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>(450)</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details</td>
<td>366</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals     | 2936 | 3053 | 3527 | 3200 | 3347 | 3229 |

**Note:** All figures between brackets, i.e. (450) are estimates, owing to lack of returns for that year.

# - Details of these units were listed among Convention troops.
1 - Military Returns of 26 June 1778 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 52-4)
2 - Ration Returns of 21 May 1779 (PAC Q XVI-1, p.281)
3 - Military Returns of 1 August 1780 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 64-6)
4 - Military Returns of 8 January 1781 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 73-5)
5 - Military Returns of 1 January 1782 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 91)
6 - Military Returns of 1 January 1783 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 99-102)
7 - For Disposition see PAC Q XV, p. 21
8 - Three companies stationed at Ticonderoga ordered back to Canada.
9 - Arrival of regiment from New York 12 July 1780. (PAC Q XVII-2, p.118)
10 - No record after 1 August 1782.
The one complaint that Haldimand had voiced about the British troops was that they had only spent two winters in the country, and therefore would not be as expert as the Americans. At different times he deplored the lack of artillerymen and the trouble of getting away from England. As a result he was obliged to form artillery companies from among the German troops.

With the addition of the remnants of the 44th regiment to his forces, the number of British regulars in Canada should remain static, as there is no further record of British reinforcements during this period. Discrepancies will be noticed in the annual totals on Table I. Although no adequate explanation can be given for these, it is safe to assume that the totals for 1783 give the most logical estimate, and that Haldimand's British troops never numbered more than 3300 men. The figures for 1780 should be treated with reserve as two units, the 44th and the 53rd, are shown with totals they were never afterwards to equal. The two companies of the 47th were not mustered after August, 1782, and it can only be conjectured that they were used to fill out the complement in another unit, or were sent to New York against the time when the remainder of the battalion should be released from the American prison camp at Charlotteville. The 366 men listed as details were companies or odd men from some of Burgoyne's troops, left behind as garrisons, sick in hospitals, or men who had returned to Canada during the campaign. In 1778 Lord Jeffrey Amherst suggested to Lord George Germain that these details should be drafted towards completing

---

10. PAC Q XV, p. 169-76 (Haldimand to Germain - 28 July 1778)
the establishment of regiments in Canada, and Haldimand was later ordered
to do so. 11 These two groups, consisting altogether of 541 men, disappear
from the muster rolls. The only noticeable increase shown is in the 53rd.
between 1778 and 1780, and this cannot compensate in full for the missing
details. The lack of records of these details adds a further mystery to
the already tangled situation of military strength in Canada.

The records of the German troops in Canada are complete and compa­
ratively accurate during this period. Table II lists the German forces
both by origin and by unit whenever possible. Some difficulty may be
caused by the practice of mustering the Brunswick troops one year by unit,
the next by detachments under the name of their commander. This accounts
for the great increases under the names of Ehrenkrook and de Barmer in
1779-1780. As Germain had promised, substantial drafts of reserves were
sent out to Canada, and the number of German soldiers in the country rose
from about 2000 in 1778 to nearly 5000 in 1780.

Despite their numbers, Haldimand showed little enthusiasm for his
German troops. In his sketch of the military state of the province soon
after taking over in 1778, he refers to the Germans as heavy troops, un­
used to snowshoes and the handling of the axe and hatchet, totally dis­
interested in the war and fit only for garrison duty. 12 This is not
the evaluation of a general unused to war in America, but of a man who

11. PAC Q XV, p. 20 (Amherst to Germain - 15 April 1778)
    p. 21 (Germain to Haldimand - 16 April 1778)
12. PAC Q XV, p. 169-76 (Haldimand to Germain - 26 July 1778)
### Table II

**German Troops in Canada 1778-83**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>1778</th>
<th>1779</th>
<th>1780</th>
<th>1781</th>
<th>1782</th>
<th>1783</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hesse Hanau</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chasseurs</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Infantry</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Artillery</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anhalt Zerbst</strong></td>
<td>303</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hesse Cassel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losberg Regt.</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>463</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knyphausen Regt.</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>573</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brunswick</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr. Frederick</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Dragoons</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Grenadiers</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># de Rhetz</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>383</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Riedesel</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>365</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># de Specht</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrenkrook</td>
<td></td>
<td>534</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># de Barner</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2598</td>
<td>4339</td>
<td>4705</td>
<td>4646</td>
<td>4781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# - Details of these units were listed among Convention troops.

1 - Military Returns of 26 June 1778 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 22)
2 - Muster Rolls of July-August 1779 (PAC Q XVI-2, p. 393, 435, 470, 501, 533)
3 - Muster Roll of July 1780 (PAC Q XVII, p. 742)
4 - Military Returns of 1 March 1781 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 77)
5 - Military Returns of March 1782 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 93)
6 - Military Returns of 1 May 1783 (PAC B CLXXIII, p. 110-1)
7 - Posted to New York 28 September 1781 (PAC B CXLVII, p. 350)
had trained British regulars to serve with the Rangers at Fort Edward during the winter of 1758-9. In August, 1789 he refers caustically to expected German recruits as being "picked up upon the highways, and probably worse than those already here, who are entirely useless for this kind of war, and rather a burden than an increase in strength." He sums up his opposition to the use of German troops in Canada in a letter to Lord George Germain a month later. In it he refers to them as ill-calculated for American service and little to be depended on owing to their lack of interest in the events of the war. Very few of them could be employed anywhere in the country except on garrison duty, and even in that way they were helpless in many respects. The Regiment Anhalt-Zerbst, which he considered to be the best of them, were but a regiment of recruits. 14

Not only did Haldimand consider the Germans poorly-trained, but he resented losing trained troops and receiving raw levies in exchange. When Knyphausen's veteran Hesse Cassel regiment went to New York in 1781, Haldimand deplored his loss and asked for experienced troops to replace them. 15 He also found fault with the health of the newly-arrived Germans, mentioning more than once their propensity to become sick owing to the change in diet or in climate. In 1778 he refers with relief to the recovery of Anhalt-Zerbst and Brunswick recruits, a month after their arrival, from illness "to an alarming degree." Proof of this falling is

13. PAC B CXLVII, p.75 (Haldimand to Clinton - 29 August 1779)
14. PAC Q XVI-2, p. 596-7 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 September 1779)
15. PAC B CXLVII, p. 350 (Haldimand to Clinton - 23 September 1781)
The military situation in Canada

evident in the muster roll of the Hesse Cassel regiments for July, 1780, a week after their arrival at Quebec. At that parade 558 men were reported sick out of a total of 1068. The rolls are also mute records of men who had died in the hospital or else in their quarters.

The military returns of the so-called provincial troops are very scanty. A complete set of returns would probably show between two and three thousand of these Rangers and loyalist corps. Haldimand does not seem to have included them in his returns to the British government, although they were among his most effective troops. Composed as they were of men who had a direct interest in the war, these units formed the backbone of all of Haldimand's raids on the outlying American settlements. All able-bodied loyalists entering the country were supposed to join one of the corps, and many chose this chance to even the score with their late persecutors. Many of the corps were the offshoot of the ranger bands, formed by men like Rogers, Butler, Jessup and Peters, while others were battalions largely made up of refugees. Among the latter group were the Royal Highland Emigrants (RHE), formed early in the war of men recently arrived from Scotland. Haldimand stated in 1779 that it was a well-disciplined unit with some good officers, but that it was short of the number of its former establishment. That same year Germain informed Haldimand that the two battalions of the RHE were to be put on establishment and numbered the 86th Regiment. He also ordered each of the ten

16. PAC Q XVII-2, p.742 (Holland to Germain) Muster Rolls for 21 October 1780.
### Table III

**Provincial Troops in Canada 1778-83**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>1778</th>
<th>1779</th>
<th>1780</th>
<th>1781</th>
<th>1782</th>
<th>1783</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butler's Rangers</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessup's Volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Johnson's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's Rangers (Rogers)</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>(450)</td>
<td>(450)</td>
<td></td>
<td>441</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal Rangers (Jessup)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peters' Invalids</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Highland Emigrants</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(later 84th Regt.)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Regiment of New York. 1st Bn.</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>337</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>2798</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>2706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All figures between brackets, i.e. (450) are estimates, owing to lack of returns for that year.

1 - Atkinson p. 12
2 - Ration Returns for 24 May 1779 (PAC Q16-1, p. 281)
3 - Military Returns of 1 November 1780 (PAC B173, p.68)
4 - Military Returns of January 1781, (PAC B173, p.74)
5 - State of Provincial Troops 1 November 1782, (PAC B173, p.84)
6 - State of Provincial Troops 1 January 1783, (PAC B173, p.99)
7 - There is a strong possibility that this unit and the 1st Battalion R.R.N.Y. are the same. Johnson was prominent in the latter unit.
8 - Organised as the 84th Regt. 16 April 1779, PAC Q16-1, p.141
9 - Formerly a corps of Loyalists under Jessup, and later under Haim.
companies to be augmented from 50 to 70 men, which augmentation was to take place in America. Table III shows that the unit never reached its minimum strength of 500 men. Both the 84th, and the Royal Regiment of New York (RRNY) have been included among Provincial troops rather than among the British troops, as they were both recruited in America.

Haldimand and his officers experienced great difficulty in raising troops in the province. Few of the many corps planned ever reached their establishment, and many existed only on paper. Even fewer of the Canadians served under the British flag. In 1778 Haldimand had returns for over 16000 militia, but made no move to arm them. He noticed a marked coolness on the part of both clergy and habitants after the Franco-American alliance of 1779, but told Clinton that he was certain that they would take no part against the British until French troops were among them. He did say that he found them very useful in transport work, and that they were tolerably obedient. There was a certain amount of disaffection in some of the parishes, but without outside support these movements never became dangerous.

The one remaining source of strength - the Indians - Haldimand found more of a burden than an increase in strength. In his first report on the province he described them as being of little use, but that they

17. PAC Q XVI-1, p.41 (Germain to Haldimand - 16 April 1779)
18. PAC Q Xv, p. 43 (Monthly Returns of Canadian Militia - 26 June 1778)
19. Curtis, op. cit., p. 43n
had to be kept friendly. This might have been to prevent their defection to the American side, or else to preserve the all-important fur-trade. The Americans had invaded the Six Nations country under General Sullivan in 1779, and had destroyed their crops and settlements. The Indians had retired to the vicinity of Fort Niagara, where they made serious inroads on the fort's scanty supplies. The same was true at Detroit, where the Shawanese and Delaware nations had taken refuge. The young Indian braves were good scouts, and were valuable additions to raiding parties. They were very temperamental, and on more than one occasion their failure to carry out a task jeopardized the success of the whole undertaking. In 1781 Major Ross beat off an attack by a large body of American pursuers after a successful raid on the Mohawk valley. The failure of his Indians to pursue the broken enemy enabled them to regroup and make a second attack on his weary force. In the autumn of 1778 a party of loyalists and Indians, sent out to destroy crops and settlements in the Lake Champlain Valley, returned before completing this task, owing to a disagreement between the two groups. The Indians were valuable in frightening the settlers on the frontier and in keeping the border settlements aroused, but their value when fighting men who were used to their type of warfare was negligible. Haldimand was commended by Lord Shelburne for keeping Indians out of Vermont during the Negotiations. Haldimand knew the impossibility of restraining them to discrimination, and chose rather to

20. PAC B L, p.30-46 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 October 1778)
risk the loss of their services should Vermont attack than to face the danger of exasperating "that people" by trusting the Indians among them. Haldimand used the Indians as little as possible, and their importance to the British cause in Canada during this war has been grossly over-estimated.

2. Disposition of available forces.

An attempt has been made in Figure 1 to show the disposition of Haldimand's forces during this period. The military returns at this time show that Haldimand had nearly ten thousand troops under his command while he was negotiating with Vermont. Superficially it would appear that the American writers are correct in ascribing to Haldimand an army of ten thousand men. Figure 1 is intended to show that Haldimand's forces were so widely scattered over the area from Detroit to the Quebec district that he was unable to mobilize a force large enough to launch a formidable offensive. He referred more than once to this predicament, that "never has it been in my power to send the numbers I wish, or to collect a force in any one given point, in case of an attack". Washington also realized this fact, and incorporated it in his campaign plans for 1782. He felt that 8000 men could easily conquer Canada, as Haldimand's forces were so dispersed and so far apart that "if the intention is concealed till the moment of execution and movements are then rapid, it will be impossible to assemble it in time to oppose such a body".

21. PAC Q XIX, p. 257-63 (Shelburne to Haldimand - 22 April 1782)

22. PAC Q XVI-2, p. 597 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 September 1779)

23. Forde, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 497
A glance at Figure I will bear out the truth of Washington’s contention. The areas and the units allotted to each show how scattered Haldimand’s troops were throughout this period, and how difficult it would have been to meet such an unexpected attack as the American leader proposed. It is noteworthy that the bulk of his German troops were stationed along both banks of the St. Lawrence River, from Montreal to almost one hundred miles below Quebec. This was in line with Haldimand’s contention that they were useful only for garrison duty, and they do not appear to have been stationed at any of the frontier posts. One group of twenty Chasseurs appears in the returns from Carleton Island consistently, and were included in Major Ross’ forces on his expedition to Johnstown. However, this must be regarded as a definite exception to the rule. The two danger areas, the back posts of the Upper Lakes and the Richelieu Valley, were guarded by British regular troops and by provincials. Here the concentration of troops at central points such as Ile aux Noix, Niagara and Detroit will be noticed, and contrasted with the nominal garrisons left at posts out of the line of danger, such as Michillimackinac and Oswegatchie.

The figures on the map should be regarded as an estimate of the garrisons rather than as exact figures. Detachments from the different units were often away on raids, or were shifted from one post to another as strategy and the season’s plans demanded. In this way a post like Oswego would muster about 55 men in July, but show over 400 a month later. Again, troops were sent from one part of the province to another either on a tour of duty or to relieve a unit which had been at an advanced post.
The Military Situation in Canada

for some time. This was not so true of the British units which appear
to remain in one spot for more than a year at a time. The strength of
the various garrisons represents an average taken over a period of time,
but the names and nationalities of the units have been taken from the
disposition in 1782. That year is regarded as Haldimand's peak year from
the standpoint of the number of troops under his command.

3. Importance of the western posts.

Why did Haldimand not make use of his troops when he had nearly
ten thousand men? Why was he unable to invade Vermont, or to make
diversionary thrusts against New York? The theory most commonly advanced
to provide an answer to these questions is that he had to use his best
troops to protect the fur trading route through the lakes and also the
back posts. The importance of the western posts had been impressed upon
Haldimand repeatedly before he left England. Early in 1780 Germain warned
him not to abate his attention to the upper posts, as their safety was
"at all times of the highest concern to this country".24 The influence
of the fur trading interests on British plans is shown later that year,
when Haldimand referred to the importance of the trade of Canada in the
eyes of Great Britain, and to the "amazing sums of money which the country
is at this moment indebted to the merchants".25 In November, 1781 he
again refers to the posts in speaking of "leaving the necessary garrisons

24. PAC Q XVII-1, p.70 (Germain to Haldimand - 17 March 1780)
25. PAC Q XVII-1, p.152 (Haldimand to Germain - 25 October 1780)
in the posts which I cannot abandon". 26 These same posts could not be abandoned after the close of the war, and they were to be retained by the British for more than ten years in direct contravention of the treaty terms, until the area was of little value in the eyes of the fur trading interests.

Although Haldimand repeatedly referred to the troops that he must leave at the upper posts, it never became a staggering total. An approximate figure for the year 1782 shows 1057 British soldiers from two regiments and the artillery, and about 1350 provincials and irregulars, manning all the western posts. This subtraction still left Haldimand about 7500 men with which to stage an invasion. He failed to replace any of his back post garrisons with German troops, as he obviously felt that he could not place the safety of the upper lakes region in their inexperienced hands; in fact, he failed to move his German troops out of the settled areas at all. During the greater part of the war some 2500 men kept the west safe. Haldimand estimated that 1351 British troops plus an equal number of Germans were sufficient to garrison the lower province and to release the rest of the troops for action. 27 The remainder of the troops would number well over 5000, comprising 1100 British, 3000 Germans and 1200 provincials. Despite the number of available troops Haldimand complained in November, 1781 that he could not assemble more than 2500 men capable of keeping the field two months.

26. PAC Q XIX, p. 268-74 (Haldimand to Germain - 23 November 1781)
27. PAC Q XVI-2, p. 591-601 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 September 1779)
28. PAC Q XIX, p. 268-74 (Haldimand to Germain - 23 November 1781)
Apparently it was not the safety of the western posts that made Haldimand cautious. More than three-quarters of his strength were retained in the lower province, but they were scattered along the St. Lawrence River from Montreal to well below Quebec. This apportionment of his troops would suggest that he feared an uprising more than an invasion, but neither his instructions nor his correspondence corroborate this.

4. Difficulties of supply and transport.

Another factor must be taken into consideration to understand this comparative inactivity of Haldimand. He had neither the supplies to keep an army in the field for any length of time, nor in many instances sufficient to maintain a large force in any one place. In August, 1779 Haldimand mentions that he had sent all provisions possible for the relief of the western posts, and so found it necessary to continue the troops in quarters all over the province in order that they might be more easily supplied with fresh provisions. Canada had come a long way in self-sufficiency from the year 1629, when the Kirk brothers forced Champlain to surrender the colony by the simple expedient of capturing the annual food ship. Although the country was able to feed itself in Haldimand's time, the surplus was hardly enough to provide for ten thousand extra mouths, plus the refugees and Indians who had entered the country during the war. For both food and military supplies Haldimand was dependent on the annual victualling fleet from England, and its late arrival more than

29. PAC B CXLVII, p. 73-6 (Haldimand to Clinton - 29 September 1779)
The Military Situation in Canada

once made it impossible for him to carry out his plans against the Americans. In 1779 he was unable even to attack Oswego owing to the failure of the victualling fleet to arrive on time.\textsuperscript{30} That year it did not reach Quebec until October 24, a late date, although in other years it failed to reach Quebec before the end of August. By that time it was too late to undertake any offensive action, and the food was used to feed the troops and dependents until the next fleet arrived.

The whole supply situation was complicated by the enormous demands of the western posts. This was largely due to the necessity of feeding not only the Indians collected at various posts, but also the old men, women and children who had taken refuge with the British. By August, 1779 the governor reported that he was already bare of provisions, notwithstanding a supply received earlier, as large quantities had been pushed up to feed the upper posts.\textsuperscript{31} Some idea of the quantity concerned can be gleaned from the returns of the distribution of provisions. In the year following July 1, 1779 provisions for 6000 people were sent to the upper posts out of a total of 15000 for the whole colony.\textsuperscript{32} It must be remembered, also, that there was little chance of obtaining fresh provisions in the lakes region, and thus they were completely dependent on the supplies sent up the river by bateaux.

Haldimand's supply problem was further affected by local phenomena.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Loc. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{31} PAC Q XVI-2, p. 597 (Haldimand to Germain - 14 September 1779)
\item \textsuperscript{32} PAC Q XVI-1, p. 278 (Returns of distribution of provisions for 15000 men - 2 June 1779)
\end{itemize}
From a letter of Lord George Germain in March, 1780 we learn that there had been a crop failure in the colony the previous year. This meant added consumption of European provisions. It was in 1779 that Haldimand mentions that they had only a few days supply of salt on hand. In the autumn of 1781 Haldimand deplores the non-arrival of the victualling fleet, and mentions that Canada is being threatened by famine owing to caterpillars which had destroyed almost all the hay and a great part of the grain.

The early or late arrival of the food ships can likely serve as a barometer of Haldimand's military activities. Ignorance of their time of arrival kept him from making extensive plans, and is a plausible explanation why his military operations were limited to occasional raids. Only in the spring of 1782 did he make extensive preparations to invade Vermont. The explanation for this is given in a letter to Germain the previous October. He had just learned from Germain's letter of May 4 that the French court had no intention of supporting the Americans in an invasion of Canada. In his reply he states that "military stores are now sufficient so that any operations deemed necessary will not be impeded". It was the only time since his arrival that he felt that he could dispense with hand-to-mouth, day by day existence and plan for aggressive action. This might have been due to the fact that eight or nine victualling ships

33. PAC Q XVII-1, p. 69 (Germain to Haldimand - 17 March 1780)
34. PAC B CXLVII, p. 73-6 (Haldimand to Clinton - 29 September 1779)
35. PAC B CXLVII, p. 401 (Haldimand to Clinton - no date - 1781)
36. PAC B LV, p. 109 (Haldimand to Germain - 23 October 1781)
of the previous year's fleet had only recently arrived at Quebec after being forced to remain in Halifax harbour for a year. Apparently the two ships kept at Quebec for the purpose of protecting the trade in the Gulf of St. Lawrence hadn't been too effective, and enemy privateers were taking heavy toll of English merchantmen.

Haldimand had the troops to invade the northern colonies. The western posts had sufficient forces to maintain themselves against anything but a major offensive. Without sufficient provisions and military stores Haldimand could not see his way clear to attack, and, as a result, there was little military activity on the borders of the colony. Vermont was only in danger in 1782, and by that time it was too late. The North Government had fallen in England, and the Rockingham whigs who succeeded him were interested only in ending the war. Any ideas which the Vermonters had of the success of the Negotiations in preventing an invasion in 1780-1 were therefore false.
Chapter IV

Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

The Negotiations between Vermont and Haldimand can hardly be regarded as the brain child of either group, because the compliance and co-operation of the other party made them equally responsible. The contention of early Vermont writers that the Negotiations were forced on the Vermonters does not ring true when these same Vermonters continued the negotiations after the suspension of hostilities between the colonies and Great Britain. When judged in the light of available evidence and of the events in 1776-79 that preceded them, the Negotiations appear merely as another step in a logical sequence. From the British point of view it was merely one of a number of attempts to divide and rule; from the Vermont point of view an attempt to secure an alternative to the dismal picture of subjugation by New York.

British interest in Vermont is noticeable as early as December, 1775 when Solicitor-General Wedderburn wrote William Eden, Undersecretary of State, regarding the area. He noted that the settlers had risen due to a land title dispute with New York, and that their injuries arose from the abuse of an order-in-council which was never meant to dispossess the settlers in the lands in debate between the two provinces. ¹ Apparently the British considered that Vermont could be treated separately from the other colonies, as their revolt was not directed against the Crown. One

Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

year later Ethan Allen, at that time a prisoner in New York, was approached by a British officer who offered him the command of a brigade of loyalists, prospects of promotion and money during the war and of large tracts of land at its close. Allen claimed that he refused the offer, being, by no means satisfied that the King would possess sufficient quantities of land in America at the end of the war to redeem these pledges. There is not available evidence that this attempt was a part of British policy, and it appears to have been made only on the authority of General Howe, in command at New York.

The suggestion that the Allans might withdraw from the revolution and negotiate with Great Britain was made by William Smith as early as May, 1777. He expressed the belief that if the Vermonters were disavowed by Congress they might suddenly turn about, look to Great Britain and join the army from Canada. While they did not flock to Burgoyne's standard later that year, neither did they join the American forces, and their chief contribution was the defeat of a British detachment seeking to capture stores at Bennington. Smith was a prominent New York lawyer and land speculator, representative of the moderate group in the colonies. Chief Justice of the Royal Colony of New York, he viewed with horror the lawless actions of the rebels, although he also deplored the manner in which the North Government had bungled the taxation issue. He refused for some time to join either side, and lived in retirement near Albany.

2. VHS Collections, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 76n
3. Williamson, op. cit., p. 90
Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

until August, 1778. At that time Lord North's policy of conciliation ended his objection to British imperial policy and he took refuge behind the British lines in New York. He exercised a great deal of influence during the struggle, having powerful connections with the state authorities of New York, and was a confident of Sir Henry Clinton, the British Commander-in-Chief at New York. Despite his prominence, he was never attainted by New York, and therefore his extensive land holdings in that colony were never seized. In the subject of Vermont Smith was torn between two interests. He owned extensive real estate in the Grants under New York patent and, as a Yorker, had resisted the claims of the New Hampshire grantees. After he became a loyalist in 1778, he was sorely troubled by the conflict between his sense of duty that he should do nothing to prevent Vermont's rejoining the empire, and his personal interest in seeing justice done to loyalist Yorkers (such as himself) holding lands in Vermont under New York title. The deference usually given his advice by Clinton placed him in a position of influence in the Negotiations, and their ultimate failure might have been caused by his interference.

The surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga in October, 1777 ended the first phase of the revolution. France decided that the colonists had some chance of success, and espoused their cause with an alliance the following February. The combination of these two events inclined the British government to more conciliatory measures, and in the spring of 1778 the Carlisle Commission landed at Philadelphia in an attempt to secure the return of the colonies to their allegiance. Although they offered Congress all that the colonists had wanted in 1775, they were
three years too late; now only complete independence would satisfy the rebels. Disillusioned, the Commission reported to Lord George Germain that success must come either by force of arms or "by negotiating with separate bodies of men and with individuals". This latter suggestion was to become a concomitant of the first in British strategy in America for the remainder of the war.

This new policy consisted of attempting to deal with the colonies separately in order to restore them to their allegiance, and in seeking to bribe revolutionary leaders in an effort to undermine the colonies' resistance. The latter plan is often credited to George III, who had used it with great success in ousting the dominant Whig party and gaining control of the British parliament for the King's Tory party. The attempt of the British in New York to bribe Ethan Allen was only one in a long list of instances. Other patriots approached included Philip Schuyler, Israel Putnam, Jonathan Trumbull, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Lee, Silas Deane and Benedict Arnold. The best known and most successful attempts made were on Deane and Arnold, but it is with Allen that we are chiefly concerned.

Germain did not inaugurate this policy until September 27, 1779 when he informed Sir Henry Clinton that "gaining respectable members of Congress or officers of influence or reputation is, next to destroying Washington's army, the speediest way of ending the rebellion." 

4. Id. ibid., p. 91.

5. John Pell, Ethan Allen, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1929, p. 305-6
had already forestalled him by a year, and had attempted to contact Allen by messengers on more than one occasion. However, there is no evidence that Ethan Allen ever communicated with Clinton or his agents prior to 1780. Clinton was optimistic that Allen could be tempted to "throw off any dependence on the tyranny of Congress", and envisaged a separate government in Vermont to which refugees would flock to make it a loyalist stronghold. 6

By late 1779 Clinton must have realized that his efforts were not producing results with Allen, and he suggested that future negotiations be carried on from Quebec by Haldimand. Messengers would not be forced to travel through hostile country, and letters were not so likely to be lost or to fall into the wrong hands. Assistance could be given the Vermonters much more readily from Canada, and provisions, arms and clothing supplied them. 7 Germain agreed, and wrote Haldimand in March, 1780 that the adherence of the Vermonters to the British cause was so essential for the safety of Canada and for overaweing the inhabitants of the Northern Colonies, that he wished to emphasize once more that it was the government's desire that he effect it, despite the considerable expenses which it might involve. 8 Haldimand made some inquiries during the summer of 1780, but stated that he did not believe the Vermonters were dependable. He added that Allen had never made any overtures to him, but if he should

6. Williamson, op. cit., p. 91
7. Id. ibid., p. 95
8. PAC B XLIv, p. 14 (Germain to Haldimand - March 17, 1780)
"in consequence of what has passed between you and him, you may depend I shall improve them." No attempt was made by Haldimand to contact the Allens until Chittenden's request for an exchange of prisoners arrived in September, 1780. Haldimand regarded this as a favorable opportunity to negotiate a matter of greater importance, and he agreed to receive a flag of truce upon the business proposed, "having previously employed a proper person to signify my wish and authority to Messrs. Chittenden and Ethan Allen to propose terms for a reconciliation of Vermont with the mother country." This letter is at variance with his previous statement that he had made no attempt to contact the Vermont leaders. With the visit of Captain Justus Sherwood to Ethan Allen in October the Negotiations were officially started.

Mention has already been made of the worsening of relations between Vermont and the Continental Congress during 1780. Undeniably Congress had avoided a decision in the dispute favorable either to New York or Vermont because either decision would destroy property rights of many revolutionary leaders. This failure led the Vermont leaders to believe that Congress was siding with New York, and made them turn towards another champion, in this case Britain. Their distrust of action by the surrounding states is borne out by evidence that a plan existed in the winter of 1779-80 for New York and New Hampshire to partition

9. PAC B CALVII, p.221 (Haldimand to Clinton - August 13, 1780)
10. PAC Q XVIII, p. 132 (Haldimand to Germain - July 8, 1781)
Vermont, using the spine of the Green Mountains as the dividing line. 11

Events moved very quickly towards a climax in relations between Vermont and the British. On June 2, 1780 Congress condemned Vermont's claim of independence, and little over a month later Ethan Allen received a letter from Colonel John Beverley Robinson, a Virginian loyalist who had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to win over Rufus Putnam of Connecticut. This letter suggested that Allen use his influence to return the grants to their British allegiance. 12 Allen showed this letter to members of Chittenden's Council, and they decided that it should not be answered. However, they served Robinson's purpose when they did not treat it with contempt nor exhibit great indignation. Allen's actions during the first week of July are very mysterious, and all evidence points to his being behind the British lines in New York at that time. He was out of Vermont during this period, supposedly buying gunpowder in Connecticut for the Vermont militia. William Smith noted in his diary that Allen had been in contact with Sir Henry Clinton, 13 and the rumor was strong enough for Washington to send two of his officers to investigate. General Philip Schuyler wrote Washington in October, and referred to the rumors concerning


Proof of this plan is evident in a small map found among the papers of James Duane, a prominent New York politician and land speculator. The map shows the exact dividing line proposed. These papers are now in the possession of the New York Historical Society.

12. PAC B CLXXV, p.19 (Robinson to Ethan Allen -March 30, 1780)

13. Diary of William Smith, op. cit., (Entries for: July 1, 4, 8, 1780)
the person whom Your Excellency was informed to have been in New York in July last negotiating ......." Washington was so concerned that he actually planned to have "the person in question and his papers quietly seized." Other references in these two letters make it clear that Ethan Allen is "the person in question". These letters were written only a month after the discovery of Arnold's plan to sell West Point to the British, so it is easy to understand Washington's concern.

Governor Chittenden's behaviour during the summer of 1780 might also have been regarded as suspicious by Washington. His new leniency to the loyalists, plus the warning in his speeches and letters that Vermont felt free to seek her own salvation, and that "she has not the most distant motive to continue hostilities with Great Britain", makes it appear that he was cultivating friendlier relations with the British. Under these circumstances his letter of September 27 to Haldimand proposing a prisoner exchange cannot be regarded as a coincidence but rather as a logical sequence to what were apparently secret diplomatic manoeuvres. Unfortunately this must be regarded as a conjecture, as no evidence exists to corroborate it. In the light of the events that were to follow, however, such a chain of coincidences could have occurred only through design.

The course of the Negotiations appears to be singularly uninteresting, possibly because they were unsuccessful. There were some high-

14. VHS Collections, Vol. II, op. cit., p.76
15. Loc. cit.
Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

lights, and these can be used to trace the intentions of the Vermonters. During the three years that they lasted there were four main conferences of which records remain, as well as an undetermined number of secret encounters between the negotiators. The representatives for Vermont were Ethan and Ira Allen, and Joseph Fay, while Haldimand appointed two loyalists to act as his representatives. They were Captain Justus Sherwood of Peters’ Corps of Loyalists, an ex-Vermonter and close friend of Ethan Allen, and doctor George Smyth, a Tory from Albany. British scouts and agents were used as messengers by both sides because of their relative trustworthiness.

Immediately upon receiving Chittenden’s letter of September 27, Haldimand arranged for a reply to be taken by Major Chris Carleton, who was about to set out on a raiding party to Lake George. Carleton arrived at Crown Point early in October and wrote Ethan Allen, commander of the Vermont militia, informing him that Captain Sherwood had been appointed to discuss the subject of a prisoner exchange with Allen and Chittenden. He also stated that no hostilities should be committed by the British on posts or scouts within the boundaries of Vermont during the Negotiations, while Allen would be expected to reciprocate. 16 Sherwood contacted Allen at Castleton on October 29, and broached the subject of Vermont’s returning to the British allegiance. Allen claimed that he had no authority to represent Vermont in this matter, but promised that he would take it into serious consideration. He felt that the proposals seemed materially to concern "the whole people of Vermont whose liberties and properties for

16. PAC B CXXXIII, p. 261 (Major Carleton to Ethan Allen - October, 1780)
Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

A number of years past were much dearer to him than his own. This flamboyant outburst was typical of Ethan, although he always made sure that his own interests were a primary concern. He warned Sherwood that a revolution of this nature must be a work of time, that it is impossible to bring so many different minds into one channel, on a sudden, and hopes that he will not be anxious to hurry matters on too fast as that will certainly ruin the whole. 17

This statement of Allan's is the core of the Negotiations. The Separatists realized that time was the one element that would work in their favor, and wanted the British to realize that sudden action would result in the absolute failure of the scheme. Although the Allens and their friends were the dominant political group in Vermont, many of their supporters were intensely hostile to New York but would never countenance a reunion with England. In an attempt to gain support for such a move, the Separatists adopted a policy of leniency towards the loyalists, and tried to place them in positions of authority in the state. The success of this move can be gauged by an indignant petition from the inhabitants of Rockingham to the Assembly, asking that the commissions of election of Noah Sabin, Benjamin Burtt, John Bridgeman, Oliver Lovell, Luke Knoulton, Elias Clcott and Jonathan Hunt be suspended because they were "avowed enemies to all authority save that derived from the Crown of Great Britain". 18 Knoulton was a prominent figure in the

17. PAC B CLXXVI, p. 14-25 "Report of Sherwood on his return from Castleton - November 30, 1780"

Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

state until January, 1783, when the Separatists aided him to escape into
Canada just ahead of Continental troops sent by Washington to arrest him.

Ira Allen took his brother Ethan's place as a negotiator after the
Castleton meeting, and he was present at the British post on Ile aux Noix
in May, 1781 for the second conference with Sherwood. He claimed that he
had no instructions to deal with the question of reunion, but that Vermont
wished to sign a treaty of neutrality and to retire from the war.19 This
was not satisfactory to Haldimand, who sent word that the state of Vermont
must either be united in constituted liberty with Great Britain, or contin­
ue at enmity with it. Allen then asked for a further conference after
the adjournment of a summer session of the Vermont Legislature. This
third meeting was held on board the British ship, Royal George, on Lake
Champlain, two months later. Joseph Fay now replaced Ira Allen, and
during his three weeks' stay the final details for Vermont's reunion with
the empire were drawn up. The Separatists believed that the September
elections would seat an assembly favorable to reunion, and that a revolu­
tion could be accomplished with British aid.20

Immediately after the September elections, Ira Allen and Fay met
the British commissioners at Skenesborough and proposed in writing that
General Haldimand should announce by means of a proclamation the terms
on which Vermont would be constituted and received as a British province.

19. PAC B CLXXV, p. 79 (Ira Allen to Haldimand - May 8, 1781)
20. PAC B CLXXV, p. 104 (Joseph Fay to Haldimand - August 9, 1781)
21. Id. ibid., p. 136 (Ira Allen and Joseph Fay to Smyth - September 16, 1781)
Colonel St. Leger, who had succeeded Carleton as commander at St. Johns, reached Crown Point about October 1 with Haldimand's proclamation and a strong body of troops. This proclamation was never issued, because news of the Separatists' plans leaked out and a further delay was deemed necessary. Shortly afterwards news of Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown reached Vermont, and further plans were abandoned in view of the wave of exultation that swept Vermont.

The schemes of the Separatists had already made their opponents suspicious of them. Remonstrances by two members of the Assembly in the previous November had caused Ethan Allen to resign his command of the state militia, and to retire from active participation in the Negotiations. On October 31 General Schuyler wrote Washington that the sending of a flag [of truce] to Vermont for the purpose of exchanging prisoners appeared to him only a cover to some design of the enemy. 

Governor Clinton of New York wrote James Duane in April, 1781 that he was suspicious of Vermont's negotiations with the British. At the time Clinton had no definite proof to substantiate his suspicions. Disconcerting proof was given Congress in August with the interception and publication of a letter from Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, commenting on the importance of the return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance. Resolutions were quickly passed in Congress to ascertain on what terms Vermont might be admitted to the union of the states. They did require that Vermont, as a prerequisite, dissolve

22. VHS Collections Vol.II, op. cit., p.76
Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

her unions with various New Hampshire towns east of the Connecticut River, and with New York towns between the Vermont boundary and the Hudson River. Washington wrote Governor Chittenden on January 1, 1782 advising him that Vermont would be admitted into the union as soon as this was done. Despite the opposition of the Separatists, who looked to the new acquisitions for support, Isaac Ishenor, an ardent republican, secured their dissolution by the Vermont Legislature on February 22, 1782.

In the meantime Congress had a change of heart regarding Vermont. After Yorktown they felt that the war was over, and adopted a coercive attitude towards the state and repudiated Washington’s pledge. Ethan Allen rejoiced that the last refusal of Congress to admit the state into the union “has done more to awaken the common people to a sense of that interest and resentment of their conduct than all which they have done before”. In refusing Vermont’s application, the Congress played into the hands of the Separatists. Many Vermonters lost hope that Congress would ever admit them, and began to look more favorably at the prospect of a reunion with Britain. Ethan Allen planned to regain the lost unions, and hoped to influence the whole state to declare for Great Britain if a British force could assist and protect them. In the meantime Governor George Clinton liad before the New York Assembly what he called “conclusive evidence” that Vermont was negotiating with the British. The evidence included depositions of former prisoners in Canada and confidential papers sent to Sir Henry Clinton. Acting upon instructions from Lord George

24. PAC B CLXXVII-1, p. 354 (Ethan Allen to Haldimand - June 16, 1782)
Germain, Haldimand reopened negotiations early in 1782, and sought to aid the Vermonters. He was deterred from doing so by Lord Shelburne, Germain's successor, who ordered him to avoid taking the offensive against the Americans. However, he added that the Vermonters were assured of assistance if they were attacked. 25

With the withdrawal of the British from the Negotiations, a final phase is begun. Now the Separatists took the initiative in requesting a commercial treaty or some form of alliance between the two colonies. Both Ethan Allen and his brother, Ira, continued writing to Haldimand throughout 1783, but answers to their letters were written by Major Mathews, Haldimand's secretary. There is no record that Haldimand wrote the Vermonters after August, 1782, and this seems to indicate that the Separatists were more intent on reunion that were the British. During this period Chittenden's correspondence both with Washington and with Congress displayed a truculent tone, as if his purpose was to invite an invasion of the state which would in turn ensure British aid. This maneuver nearly succeeded. In December, 1782 Congress voted to march an army into Vermont and establish congressional authority there by military force. 26 Peace negotiations had progressed to the extent that a cease-fire was to be ordered in the spring, and Congress, dominated by New York and the southern states, determined to coerce the Vermonters. They were diverted from this

25. PAC B L, p. 164; (Shelburne to Haldimand - April 22, 1782)

Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

course by Washington, who was deeply concerned by trouble in the army. On
February 11, 1783 he wrote a Virginian delegate and argued against coercive
measures against Vermont. He feared that the Continental Army might refuse
to act against their brethren, and that the mountainous republic might prove
difficult to subdue. He pointed out that there were many Continental de­
serters in Vermont who would fight desperately, and that there was a possibil­
ity of the Vermonters receiving aid from Canada. From this it appears
that Washington realized Chittenden's plan to badger Congress into an
invasion, and saw little chance of success in a guerrilla campaign in the
Green Mountains. Congress did not bother the Vermonters, and with Lord
North's orders to Haldimand in August, 1783 to abandon the Negotiations as
these were felt to violate the treaty, the Vermont incident came to an end.

General Haldimand has appeared in various Vermont histories as an
extremely credulous person who was consistently bluffed by the Vermont
negotiators. A search through his correspondence regarding the Negotia­
tions reveals a person who made shrewd and accurate analyses of the motives
of the Vermonters. Much of his information came from the reports of his
scouts and agents because, so far as is known, Haldimand never met any of
the Vermonters. He had been interested in the country for some time prior
to the negotiations, however, because the logical invasion route for the
Americans lay through Vermont. His scouts visited the country regularly

27. Ford, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 153 (Washington to Mr. Jones of
Virginia -February 11, 1783)
to ascertain the feelings of the people and to learn in advance of plans that might be made for invading Canada. He possessed the orderly mind of a soldier—administrator, and exhibited strong disapproval of the lack of law and order in Vermont. He had some knowledge of the Vermonters from his experience in New York in September, 1773 when Governor Tryon requested that British troops be sent to subdue the "Bennington Mob". Chilton Williamson in his Vermont in Quandary has attempted to prove that the Vermonters took advantage of a flag of truce to capture Ticonderoga in 1775. If true, this would have prejudiced Haldimand against them for such a treacherous act. Dr. Williamson's references are inaccurate, and he reads into them an interpretation that is not there. (See Note II)

Haldimand's earliest opinion of Ethan Allen and the Vermonters was a harsh one. In reply to queries from Clinton and Germain that he investigate the possibility of their being reunited with England, he wrote Clinton to the extent that no dependence could be placed on Allen, as his character was too well known. He realized how important Allen was to them; that his friendship would open communications between Quebec and New York and effectually secure Quebec and the upper country, but did not consider it safe to allow Allen and his men inside Quebec for fear that he would seize it. Apparently Haldimand looked upon the negotiations from the start as a means to utilize Vermont as a buffer state and so protect Quebec from the Americans. Another misconception about the negotiations is disproved in Haldimand's correspondence, and the Vermont claim that

28. PAC B CXLVII, p. 221 (Haldimand to Clinton - August 13, 1780)
Attitude of Haldimand Towards the Negotiations

they secured a truce for three years is denied. The original truce extended to the Vermonters by Major Chris Carleton did not last for more than a month, according to Haldimand. He claimed that he broke it as soon as he heard about it, fearing that it might be attended with bad consequences, as New York had also been included in the truce. The month later Carleton was replaced at St. John's by Colonel Barry St. Leger, quite possibly for his faux-pas in allowing the truce. British raids were not directed against Vermont during the rest of the war chiefly because no hostile action was being planned there, and because Haldimand wished to preserve the friendly relations that were so valuable in the defence of the province.

Haldimand's views of the Negotiations did not improve during the winter of 1780-81. He was apprehensive that the flag of truce had been sent merely to make Congress jealous, and to intimidate them into complying with their terms of union from the belief that a treaty existed between Vermont and the British. Haldimand therefore guessed from the first the main reason that some Vermonters have assigned the negotiators for entering into the talks. He could not put any trust in them, and warned Sir Henry Clinton that they "sought to deceive both Congress and the Royal Army". Justus Sherwood, through whose eyes Haldimand saw Vermont, confessed himself puzzled by the messages sent by Ethan Allen in particular. In March, 1781 he sent in the report of one of his scouts,

29. PAC Q XVIII, p.135 (Haldimand to Germain - July 8, 1781)
30. Loc. cit.
31. PAC B CXLVII, p. 292 (Haldimand to Clinton - February 28, 1781)
adding that he was "in suspense between fear and hope" that Allen was sincere and that matters were drawing to a favorable conclusion much faster than expected. The alternative view which he expressed was that Ethan was a "most subtle designing fellow". Even Sherwood, a personal friend of Ethan's, was unable to determine whether he was sincere or not at that point in the Negotiations.

The events of the summer of 1781 were to enlighten Haldimand, and he was to arrive at an accurate evaluation of Vermont's possibilities by October. The meeting at Ile aux Noix in May was unproductive of results, except that the British were given the right to send letters officially through Vermont. Major Dundas, the commander at Ile aux Noix, considered the Vermonters a cunning, artful, designing people, but Sherwood disagreed. He believed that the Allens, Chittenden and a few others were determined to effect a union, acting from their personal interests and not from any principles of loyalty. The British in Quebec were enraged at Allen's action in divulging Robinson's letters to Congress, and were not appeased by Ethan's explanation that the messenger had been discovered and that he had acted before the story could be disclosed. Haldimand considered this explanation plausible, and wrote Germain that it might or might not be the truth. He felt that the art and duplicity of the Vermonters justified the most uncharitable suspicions. He realized the desirability of getting a definite declaration from the people of Vermont, but doubted their

---

32. PAC B CLXXXII, p. 175 (Sherwood's report to Haldimand - March 5, 1781)
33. PAC B CLXVI, p. 120 (Sherwood to Mathews - May 25, 1781)
34. PAC Q XVIII, p. 137 (Haldimand to Germain - July 8, 1781)
sincerity. From the very beginning Haldimand was undeluded by the Vermonters and expected very little of them. Nevertheless, he was to change his opinion of them throughout the summer.

During a conference aboard the Royal George in July and August 1781, Joseph Fay impressed Sherwood with his sincerity. He advanced as a proof of the Separatists' sincerity the fact that the influential men in Vermont who were interested in the Negotiations had "for the purpose of being assured of each other's fidelity, on being acquainted with Colonel Allen's proceedings, freely subscribed their names to a paper declaring their approbation." 35 A copy of this paper was sent Haldimand in September to prove that a reunion was being seriously considered. This was the proof that Haldimand needed to assure himself that he was dealing with more than a few Vermonters, and with his recently-arrived reinforcements he planned to aid the Separatists to declare themselves in October. Although his suspicions of the Vermonters were almost entirely removed, he did not believe that the Negotiations would amount to much, owing to the prejudice of the people against Britain and the strong influence of Congress in the state. 36 He realized that the leading men of Vermont were impelled by their real estate interests, as were about a fifth of the population who held extensive land tracts under New Hampshire patent. Possibly one fifth of the population were loyalists, but the great majority of the people were "mad rebels". From this analysis

35. PAC B CLXXV, p. 101 (Joseph Fay to Haldimand - August 9, 1781)
36. PAC B CXLVII, p. 374 (Haldimand to Clinton - October 1, 1781)
Haldimand tried to make Germain realize his predicament, one which only a large body of troops could overcome, but Germain was interested solely in results.

The British defeat at Yorktown is rightly the end of the formal negotiations. The Vermont leaders feared that the colonies would obtain their independence and be free to move against them, but they did not dare move in the direction of reconciliation with Britain in the face of patriotic fervour so suddenly aroused. Ethan Allen, now the most vocal of the Separatists, sent word to Haldimand in March, 1782 that he would undertake to bring the whole state to declare for the British within two months if a British force would assist and protect them. Haldimand, who had seen no hope of success in further negotiations, was now ordered by Germain to reopen the negotiations and to gather a large force at Sorel to protect Vermont from Congress should they declare for Britain. Long before this letter reached Quebec Haldimand was making extensive preparations to send a force of 4,000 men to the borders. Perhaps he had in mind Germain's suggestion of the previous August that the Vermonters would yield readily to his arguments when they saw a large body of troops ready to protect them near at hand. At any rate he warned Clinton that earlier conditions had become unacceptable, and that he was determined to launch an invasion of Vermont as soon as he was sure that Quebec would not be attacked. He felt that the "crisis is arrived when Coercion Alone must

37. PAC B CLXXVII-1, p.25 (Report of Terence Smyth after his visit at Sunderland - March 26, 1782)

38. PAC Q XVIII, p. 95 (Germain to Haldimand - July 26, 1781)
decide the part Vermont will take”. 39

One of the most fascinating mysteries of this topic is the fact that this invasion never took place. The whole incident is shrouded in secrecy, and no adequate excuse has ever been given for its abandonment. General Riedesel wrote Haldimand early in May that he was sure that the whole manoeuver would appear to be a normal change-over of troops on the frontier. 40 Later he mentioned that the shipping of supplies over the Chambly portage was behind schedule, and that judging from the ground around St. Johns, Ile aux Noix must be very wet. He hoped that a convenient spot for an encampment might be found in a short time. 41 Haldimand's only comment on the failure of the expedition is contained in a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, Clinton's successor at New York. In it he mentions that he had been held up trying to ship supplies to Lake Champlain. 42 Possibly a late spring had kept the low-lying land of the Richelieu valley too wet for stores to be taken there. Before an invasion could be launched letters had arrived from New York and London, apprising him of a change in the British Ministry and ordering him to avoid taking the offensive against the Americans.

39. PAC B CXLVIII, p. 24 (Haldimand to Clinton - April 28, 1782)
40. PAC B CXXXVII, p. 116 (Riedesel to Haldimand - May 4, 1782)
41. PAC Id. ibid., p. 121 (Riedesel to Haldimand - May 7, 1782)
42. PAC B CXLVIII, p. 55 (Haldimand to Carleton - June 20, 1782)
Haldimand must have realized that there would never be another chance to return Vermont to the British Empire. He assured Lord Shelburne in August that hostilities on his part had stopped. He still felt the door open for the Vermonters to return to their allegiance if they wished, and correspondence continued for another two years. On October 25, 1782, Haldimand told Hon. Thomas Townshend, Shelburne's successor, that he wished to keep in touch with the Vermonters as their desire for reunion "is only restrained by that despondency and doubt of protection on the part of Great Britain which is so prevalent over North America." Early in March, 1783, Haldimand warned Ethan Allen that the time was past for Vermont to join Britain. However, he agreed to their request that Britain intercede at the peace negotiations in Paris in their favor, and attempt to have them included in Canada's boundary. This was unsuccessful and both Vermont and the Indian reserves of the Ohio Valley were handed over to the American states. This was the real end of the Vermont Negotiations, even though the Allens and their friends tried to get commercial preference in Quebec as soon as the fighting stopped.

Throughout the entire course of the Negotiations, Haldimand was left to carry out his own plans because of the failure of the Home Office to send him clear-cut instructions. Jermain was no model of efficiency. He was interested only in results and could not visualize the difficulties.

43. PAC B LV, p. 6 (Haldimand to Townshend - October 25, 1782)
44. PAC B CLXXVIII, p. 162 (Sherwood to Mathews - April 10, 1783)
under which Haldimand had to work. Haldimand believed quite rightly that
his main responsibility was the retention of Quebec for Britain. Beyond
that he was chary of doing without definite orders, despite Germain's
reiteration of the importance of the return of Vermont to the Crown. A
more definite course drawn up by the Government would have aided Haldim-
and in his dealings with the Separatists, and might have secured Vermont
by prompt action in October, 1781. It was a critical juncture in the
Negotiations, and Haldimand told Clinton that he desired particular
instructions

fearing on one side to let an opportunity escape - which may never
be recalled, and on the other, taking upon myself a decision of such
importance, a firm disinterested seal for the King's service which has
hitherto, will in this instance guide my conduct, and in acting for
the best, I shall hazard the consequences with the generosity of my
Royal Master. 45

In this letter Haldimand outlines his predicament in dealing with the
Vermonters, but his plea for instructions went unanswered. Clinton
offered neither advice nor aid to Haldimand, and seemed bent on thwarting
his plans by inactivity. In 1782 when Sir Guy Carleton advised Haldimand
against sending an army into Vermont, Haldimand appeared disgruntled that
he had not been kept informed of the intentions of the Government. The
Cabinet do not appear to have adopted any definite policy in regard to the
Vermont problem, and Haldimand was usually at a loss to know whether his
actions would be approved or not.

One of his problems in regard to the negotiations concerned the

45. PAC B 8 ALVII, p. 374 (Haldimand to Clinton - August 2, 1781)
ratification of the New Hampshire patents in Vermont. The British Order in Council of 1764 had implicitly nullified New Hampshire land titles when it awarded the territory in which these grants had been made to New York. The Vermont leaders were in favor of joining the British in order to protect their extensive land holdings under New Hampshire titles. British approval of these titles was therefore essential to the progress of the Negotiations. Germain had been notified by 1778 that the root of Vermont opposition to Congress was the land title question, and he had favored granting them whatever land they wanted in the Grants. Despite Haldimand's inquiries he was not given definite instructions on what to offer the Vermonters. In October, 1781 he wrote Clinton that he had found it necessary to keep his promises to the Vermonters to issue a proclamation, and that until he heard to the contrary would consider the recently-annexed areas as belonging to Vermont. He added that he hoped that Clinton would see the necessity of ratifying these promises without loss of time. 46 Both Clinton and General Robertson replied early in November to the effect that the powers of the King's Commissioners in America extended only to the granting of pardons to individuals and to the restoration of rebel provinces to the British Empire. An act of Parliament would be necessary to dispose the land titles, especially when the Order-in-Council of 1764 had never been repealed. 47 In March, 1782 Clinton mentioned that

46. PAC B CXLVII, p.380 (Haldimand to Clinton - October 1, 1781)
47. PAC B CXLVII, p. 385 (Clinton to Haldimand - November 14, 1781)
recent despatches had not contained the necessary powers, 48 and this is the last mention made of them. William Smith noted in his diary that he suspected the difficulty of reconciliation lay with the King, whose stubbornness stood in the way of reconciling the Vermonters. 49

Mention has already been made of the influence which Chief Justice William Smith appeared to have over Sir Henry Clinton. A diary entry for April 29, 1781 is most revealing in giving Smith's opinion of Clinton and disclosing to what extent Clinton relied upon his advice. From a talk with Clinton he discovered that he did not understand the state of things in Vermont, and that he was jealous of Haldimand. When Smith spoke of Vermont as being "dealt with and moved by Haldimand, he started at the supposition and took to himself the credit". Smith claims that he was aware that Clinton had never written Allen, and that Robinson's letters were never answered by the Vermonter. Most revealing is Smith's conversation with Clinton, fostering the contention that he influenced Clinton where Vermont was concerned. He claimed that Clinton asked him to state his idea of the temper of Vermont.

I'll send to the minister, says he, whatever you choose (sic) in name, or my own.
I believe, said I, it may be a representation.
Anything you please, said he. 50

48. Williamson, op. cit., p. 119
50. Id. ibid., entry for April 29, 1781
Clinton's letter to Haldimand on November 14, 1781 reflected the views of Smith. Haldimand was never able to satisfy the Vermonters that he could grant them their land titles, and here Smith determined his policy. As a lawyer he advised Clinton that an act of Parliament was necessary to settle the land titles. The effect of this advice on the negotiations can be imagined, as the Vermont land speculators were not eager to risk their lives unless they were assured of a good title to their lands. Smith's fondest hope was to see the efforts of the Yorker loyalists in Vermont succeed in reuniting Vermont with New York and both of them become reconciled with Great Britain. In this way his lands, both in New York and Vermont, would be saved. His apparent efforts to block the negotiations between Vermont and Haldimand are understandable when studied with this view in mind.

William Smith is also strongly suspected of betraying the negotiations to his old friend and former law student, Governor George Clinton of New York. On February 23, 1782 Clinton laid documents and depositions before the New York Assembly, supposedly proof that the Vermonters were negotiating with the British. The identity of the person who had given the Governor these papers has never been satisfactorily established, but A.J.E. Richardson, of the public Archives of Canada, accuses Smith of being the culprit in an article, "Chief Justice William Smith and the Haldimand Negotiations", published in the Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society in June, 1941. This article is well-documented and informative and little can be added to it. Lord Dorchester, in a letter written on January 17, 1791, quotes Sir Henry Clinton as saying that Smith,
on being taxed with the result of their confidential conversation being published in the congressional newspaper, acknowledged it. Smith further said that they would save New York with ships, that they had lost Vermont but could not have both colonies. In the end both colonies were lost, but Smith was allowed to retain his property in New York. He also shared in the $30,000 which Vermont later allotted to reimburse holders of New York patents in Vermont. To blame Smith's interference alone for the failure of the Negotiations seems unfair, however, when other factors such as British ignorance of the problem, Haldimand's reluctance to act, and the strength of republican feeling in Vermont are considered.
Chapter V

British Policy and the Negotiations

Haldimand's attitude towards the Negotiations with Vermont was influenced to some extent by a lack of instructions from the British Government. Lord George Germain, a notoriously-inefficient Secretary of State for the Colonies, has usually been blamed for the failure to give Haldimand strong support and definite instructions. During the whole period of the Negotiations no policy on the part of the British Government is apparent, nor is there evidence that much interest was shown by Lord North and his colleagues in the possible restitution of Vermont. When viewed with all the other problems confronting Britain at that time, the problem of Vermont was insignificant. With the future of a world empire at stake, it is not surprising that the British Government showed so little interest in a small frontier area containing a few small settlements. Vermont historians stress the importance of the Negotiations and of the relationship of Vermont with New York, because it represents the stage in which they participated. American historians likewise have a tendency to present their revolution as an event of world importance, because it was the only phase of the war in which they were interested. In the eyes of British historians the period is important as a renewal of the ancient rivalry between England and France. The American Revolution is reduced to its true stature of a prelude to the main struggle, and the Vermont Negotiations are virtually omitted as befits a very minor incident that had no bearing on the main
struggle. Nothing succeeds like success, and nothing fails like failure. The Negotiations were a failure. The eyes of the British Government were so intent on France that they had no time for Vermont.

1. Influence of the Franco-American Alliance.

The intensive rivalry between England and France was by no means a recent one. The whole course of British foreign policy from the Revolution of 1688 had been one continued contest against French power and ambition. A series of wars between the two ended in 1763 with Britain triumphant and in possession of the bulk of the French overseas empire. Yet the British people and William Pitt the elder, the brilliant Secretary of State during the Seven Years' War (1756-63), were bitterly opposed to the terms of the treaty. England's aims during this period had included the conquest of America, control of the West Indies and the continued prosperity of the East India Company. In 1763 the Treaty of Paris restored to France her colonies in the West Indies together with valuable fishing rights off the east coast of North America. Pitt opposed these concessions because, as he said,

France is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all through the injury to her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility of reviving her navy. 1

Pitt, who had resigned from the Cabinet in 1761, was aghast at seeing

Britain threw away in the Treaty the advantages she had gained during the war. He rightly felt that the restitution of France's West Indian colonies would keep her interests in colonial expansion alive, and that she would build up her navy and commerce in the hope of obtaining revenge in the future.

Pitt's analysis was very accurate. In 1759 the Duc de Choiseul, a new and active-minded minister, was called into power by Louis XV of France. As foreign minister Choiseul negotiated for peace in 1762. He found the long-looked-for Spanish aid in the Family Compact to be a broken crutch, and he became convinced that he must make peace at any price. This would afford France a chance to rebuild her navy and to foster alliances in order to ensure revenge and compensation in the future. Accordingly a ten year plan of rebuilding and of training personnel began in France as early as 1760. An example of the thoroughness of this project can be gleaned from the reorganization of the artillery of the navy in 1767. A body of ten thousand gunners was formed, and these were systematically drilled once a week for the next ten years. At the same time the Family Compact between France and Spain was built up to the point where it would be more successful in a subsequent struggle with England.

The Treaty of Paris ended the old tripartite balance of power in America. With the acquisition of French Canada and Spanish Florida, the British gained possession of North America east of the Mississippi River.

---

2. Mahan, op. cit., p. 333
and thereby overshadowed both her European rivals. Both Choiseul and his
disciple, the Comte de Vergennes, were convinced that the balance of power
in America must be redressed for the rectification of the balance of power
in Europe. 3 This was the main contribution of Choiseul to French foreign
policy. Like Canning, the brilliant British Foreign Secretary a half-
century later, he believed that the New World could be called in to balance
the Old. The repercussions of this policy will become noticeable during
French participation in the American Revolution, and serve to explain the
apparent reluctance of the French to invade Quebec. Its influence on
Haldimand's policy towards Vermont is great, as much of his indecision can
be blamed on his fear of French intervention in Quebec. Unlike many of
his predecessors, Choiseul recognized the importance of French colonial
expansion and the contribution which her colonies would make to her mate­
rial prosperity. Although he was dismissed from office in 1770 his disciple
Vergennes acceded to power four years later, so that Choiseul's policy of
a balance of power in America continued to be followed throughout the
American war.

As early as 1764 Choiseul had foreseen a revolt of the British
continental colonies, and had sent agents to America to watch developments. 4
He welcomed the possible defection of the colonies as an opportunity to re­
store a balance of power in America and to strike a blow at the British

3. Richard B. Morris, (ed.), The Era of the American Revolution,
New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 162
4. Id. ibid., p. 163
hegemony. Once the revolt started France moved quickly to give the colonies all aid short of war. In 1776 a Frenchman named Beaumarchais was given a million francs by each of the French and Spanish governments, and was allowed to buy military stores from government arsenals to supply the colonists. Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris as American agent in December, 1776, and the Comte de Lafayette went to America the following March. Preparations for a sea war were pushed on and the navy was steadily increased.

Although Pitt correctly evaluated the menace of France, very little was done about it. With the accession of George III in 1760, a bitter struggle between the king and the Whig party began with the control of parliament as its goal. The Whig party had been in power since 1714, when a coup d'etat placed the Protestant Elector of Hanover on the English throne as George I, ruined the Jacobite party and discredited the Tories. By 1760 the Whigs had split into factions, and George III was determined to oust them with the help of the Tories. The King was resolved to play an active part in politics, and saw himself as the first minister of the state. His wish was not to govern against law, but simply to govern, free from the dictation of parties and ministers. Open bribery of members, favors and positions of all types lavishly bestowed, and the prestige of the Crown - all combined to gather about the King a large number of politicians who became known as the "king's friends".

Not until 1770 was the King able to install a group of his favorites.

5. Mahan, op. cit., p. 345
as the government. During that ten year period England saw no less than
seven Whig governments, all of whose downfall was obtained by the King.
Between 1760-1770 there were no less than twelve changes in the office of
Secretary of State, while the Presidency of the Board of Trade changed
seven times in seven years. Consistent ministerial policy was out of the
question due to such shiftings and variations. England was robbed of a
vigorous and overbearing foreign policy, and the British policy to nip the
growth of the French navy in the bud was never carried out. The neo-
Tory government under Lord North was concerned more in pleasing the King than
in constructive planning, and no attempt was made prior to 1776 to
strengthen either the Navy or the Army. North's opposition was divided
in everything but their opposition to the personal rule of the King.
During a time in which the combined efforts of both parties should have
been used to counteract the French menace, the British Parliament was
largely concerned with the King's struggle for control.

The outbreak of the American war did not change the views of either
party. On the contrary, the Whig opposition felt that a British defeat
in America was essential to defeat the personal rule of the King in Parl-
liament, and they encouraged the colonists in order to humiliate the govern-
ment. Not until France entered into an alliance with the rebellious
colonists on February 6, 1778 was any alarm felt and any attempt made to
strengthen the British forces. The interference of France in the war
caused a shift in popular feeling in England against the colonists, and
even William Pitt the younger had pleaded for reconciliation with the
British Policy and the Negotiations

colonies, but not at the sacrifice of England's honour to France. As a result of French interference, England now found herself involved in a world-wide struggle in which she had everything to lose, and little to gain. France had nothing to lose. She saw no reason why she should lose any of her West Indian islands, and hoped to gain some of Britain's West Indian possessions. Spain was reluctantly dragged into the struggle, hating England, and wishing to regain Gibraltar, Minorca and Jamaica, she rightly feared the effect on her own enormous empire of a successful revolt of the British colonies. Frederick the Great of Prussia, inimical to Britain after what he termed their desertion in the Seven Years' War, joined Russia, Sweden and Denmark in an Armed Neutrality League against Britain. In December, 1780 England foolishly declared war against Holland, which act forced her to keep ships off the Downs for the "paltry purpose" of distressing the Dutch trade. After 1778 England was everywhere on the defensive, except in America, and there she was in a false position. She everywhere awaited attacks which the enemy, superior in every case, could make at their choice and in their own time.

2. Progress of the War with the Colonies.

No one realized the lack of a definite British policy in America better than Haldimand. Many of his complaints that he was kept unaware of British plans were largely due to the fact that there was little policy to transmit to Haldimand. No one in the British Cabinet knew how to hold off the French while subduing American resistance. Haldimand
British Policy and the Negotiations

feared a French invasion so greatly that he kept his forces in constant preparation to repel one, and did not inaugurate any aggressive action until he was certain that the French were not going to invade the country during that particular year. No definite action could be taken against Vermont because of this. Owing to their defensive position, the English leaders in America were reluctant to plan campaigns until French plans for that season were clear. The whole American campaign became a virtual stalemate, chiefly because the British fleets were forced into a position of protecting the West Indies and New York. The defeat of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown was the immediate result of De Grasse's French fleet gaining control of the sea when the British troops needed to be evacuated. No Dunkirk was possible, because Admiral Graves was unable to rescue the beleagured British troops.

The surrender at Yorktown was likely as great a disappointment to the French government as it was to the British. French policy had as its primary motive maritime and political superiority over England. Their principal object was the capture of the British West Indies. It was in the interest of France that the colonies should not achieve their independence, and that continental strife should be kept in vigorous life. To accomplish this France was only required to furnish as much support as would sustain a resistance on the part of the colonists. This would keep England exhausted by forcing her to ship supplies over three thousand miles of ocean, and would immobilize a large part of her fleet to protect her

6. Mahan, op. cit., p. 511
troops and her long lines of communications. This plan succeeded for three years, during which time the French Government gave the Americans only enough support to continue their resistance. In 1761 a naval squadron and a division of troops were sent to America. Although only half the number of troops intended ever reached America, they succeeded in opening the eyes of England to the hopelessness of the contest with the colonies, and thus put an end to a diversion of her strength which had been most beneficial to her opponents. 7

In Choiseul's plan to redress the balance of power in America, Quebec occupied a prominent place. Both Choiseul and Vergennes felt that a British Canada would keep the united colonies weak and dependent on the friendship of France. Through her friendship with the colonies France hoped to restore a tripartite balance of power that she would control. When Admiral Comte d'Estaing sailed from Toulon on April 15, 1778 in charge of a naval force to aid America, he carried as a passenger a minister accredited to Congress. His instructions reflected the control the French meant to keep on the Americans. He was to decline all requests for subsidies, and was to avoid explicit engagements relative to the conquest of Canada and other British possessions. France considered French interests first, and the Cabinet at Versailles was not sorry for the United States to have near them a cause of anxiety which would make them feel the value of the French alliance. 8 If Haldimand had known of

7. Mahan, op. cit., p. 535
8. Id., ibid., p. 359
these instructions the next four years might have been different, as he could have made plans without fear of a French invasion. Instead of that he was to be plagued by predictions of invasions almost every year, as well as the numerous rumors that reached his ear from time to time. 

Shortly after Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in October, 1777 there was a strong move for an American attack on Canada in 1778. This proved to be part of a plot to replace Washington by General Gates as Commander-in-Chief. Early in March congress suspended indefinitely "the present invasion of Canada". During the summer session congress, impressed by the French fleet, proposed another invasion. Much of this was probably due to the impetuosity of the Comte de Lafayette, whose youthful exuberance and love of adventure persuaded many of the American leaders. In October, 1778 he persuaded Admiral d'Estaing to issue a proclamation to the French Canadians inviting them to join the invading armies. Copies of this proclamation were spirited into Quebec and gave Haldimand some concern.

Before the French government had an opportunity to discourage the proposed expedition, Washington declared very strongly against it, and the whole scheme was abandoned. He stated his views privately in a lengthy letter to Henry Laurens, President of the Congress, on November 14,

9. Ford, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 266n. It is a curious political fact that notwithstanding the suspicions which prevailed in the United States, the French Government was opposed to an expedition against Canada, or any attempt to take that province from the English. This fact was not known, of course, to the Marquis de Lafayette, nor to the Count d'Estaing, when he issued his Declaration to the Canadians, dated at Boston on the 28th of October.
1778.

This is the introduction of a large body of French troops into Canada, and putting them in possession of the capital of that Province, attached to them by all the ties of blood, habits, manners, religion and former connexion of government. I fear this would be too great a temptation to be resisted by any power actuated by the common maxims of national policy ... But it is maxim, founded on the universal experience of Mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it. In our circumstances we ought to be particularly cautious. 10

This shrewd analysis of Washington's is interesting, and shows how uneasy was the alliance between the two countries. Washington was thinking only in terms of his own country, and failed to take into consideration the main factor that had brought about the French alliance. Surely he must have realized that France was impelled by motives of self-interest, and had not entered the war solely for the altruistic reason of aiding America to become a democracy. He saw France in possession of New Orleans on one side, Quebec on the other and controlling the numerous tribes of Indians in the rear. In such a position he felt that France would have it in her power to dictate to the states of the union. Washington favored an invasion of Canada, but suggested that it be an attack on both Fort Niagara and Detroit, to assure the peace and safety of the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia. 11 Such a campaign would not require the aid of either the French fleet or the French regulars, and France could gain no advantage from it.

Although the year 1779 was very quiet and peaceful in Haldimand's eyes, there was a good deal of negotiating in the colonies. The French

10. Id. ibid., p. 260-4
11. Id. ibid., p. 265
government felt that Lafayette's hasty action of the previous year had made the Americans suspicious of their motives, and Conrad Gerard, the first French minister to the United States, was instructed to reassure the Americans. He wrote Vergennes on July 9, 1779 asking for approval of the course that he had taken. He felt that the Americans had been appeased, as "no person during the course of the present negotiations has proposed to demand Canada even on the supposition of the indefinite continuance of the war." 12

During the rest of the war France refused to alter her original policy of refusing any encouragement of aid to the Americans where an invasion of Quebec was concerned. The American Congress again proposed an invasion in May, 1780. George Washington, now reassured of French sincerity, wished to use the project to immobilise Haldimand in Canada. Vergennes sent word that the king did not wish to participate in such an enterprise until the states occupied by the British were freed. 13 This forced postponement of the project, as the Americans realized that little help would be forthcoming from the Canadians unless they were accompanied by French troops. Haldimand was reassured by a letter from Lemaistre, who quoted an unknown officer as saying "si les rebelles pénètrent dans la province sans être accompagnés de force Francaise, il se trouvera parmi les Canadiens plus de spectateurs que d'agents". 14


13. Gustave Lanctot, (ed.), Les canadiens-français et leurs voisins du sud, Montreal, Valiquette, 1941, p. 120.

14. PAC B LXXII, p. 17 (Lemaistre to Haldimand - June 14, 1779)
Nevertheless Haldimand continued to separate the agents from the spectators. It was during 1780 that the two greatest conspiracies were broken up with the arrest of Charles Hay and François Caseau in April, of du Calvet and Pilon in September. Haldimand believed that the Quebec Act alone had prevented the clergy and the noblesse from switching their allegiance back to France.

George Washington continued to cherish the conquest of Canada among his favorite projects. He faced many difficulties, however. The scene of the war had shifted to the south after Saratoga, and Washington could not spare the troops for an invasion on another front. His conference with the French leaders at Hartford in September, 1780 had been unproductive of results, and in December he wrote dishearteningly of the "political dissolution of a large part of our army and of the weakness of our navy". He had been forced to watch Clinton send detachments to Cornwallis without being able to counteract them "at the southward" or to "take advantage of them here." 15 Many of his soldiers had only enlisted for a stated period of time, and their enlistments expired at the end of the year. He experienced difficulty raising new levies, as the paper money with which the troops were paid had entirely lost its value. 16 It had become clear to the American Commander-in-Chief by 1780 that no decisive advantage would be gained over the British without the aid of French ships and soldiers. During 1779 and 1780 nothing conclusive was achieved by the French because

---

15. Mahan, op. cit., p. 397
16. FAC Q XVII-1, p. 72 (Germain to Haldimand - March 17, 1780)
their operations were directed at their immediate objectives in the Antilles. The victory at Yorktown was accomplished almost solely through the combined efforts of de Grasse's fleet and Rochambeau's troops, and virtually freed the American colonies by the one victory. The North government in England fell a few months later, and the Whig ministry which replaced it began immediate negotiations to end the conflict.

Immediately after Yorktown Washington met with M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister to Congress, and again proposed an invasion of Canada. The French again temporized, as they did not contemplate any aid to America in 1782. Their main project, to capture Jamaica, was later to be abandoned after Rodney's smashing victory over de Grasse in the Battle of the Saints on April 12, 1782. Now that the war in the South was over, Washington made plans for an invasion of Quebec in 1782 even if it meant proceeding without French support. This attack was never made, possibly because Washington was uncertain of Vermont's attitude, possibly because the colonies were tired of the war and welcomed the British peace overtures. Certainly he would not have been assured of French aid or supplies for such an undertaking. French policy remained triumphant, and Canada was left in British hands. It did not ensure a balance of power in America as France had hoped, and both France and Spain were to lose their sphere of influence and to withdraw from the New World during the next half-century.

The importance of the French alliance in the conduct of the Negotiations cannot be underestimated. Montgomery's defeat in 1775-76 showed that
an American invasion of Canada, unsupported by French military and naval might, had little chance of success. After the French aligned themselves on the American side, Haldimand feared for the safety of the province. He warned Germain pessimistically in October, 1780 that he thought that only a moderate force could take possession of the country. If the Canadians would stand neutral, I think I could defend this province with a less force... but I am led to believe that the appearance of an enemy would be followed by the revolt of a great part of the province. 17

One year later Haldimand explained that his reluctance to arm the Canadians was due to his belief that they would rise if the country were invaded. 18 He did not see his way clear to invade Vermont while faced with the menace of a French invasion. It is noteworthy that his only proposed attack, in 1782, was planned after being notified by Germain in 1781 that Luzerne had orders from his government to dissuade the Americans from an invasion. 19 Apparently Haldimand did not understand French motives, but he was quick to take advantage of his unique security.

3. The Importance of the Negotiations in Haldimand's Military Strategy.

There is yet another theory connected with the negotiations that fits in well with Haldimand's policy and military strategy. During the period of the Negotiations there was little danger of an invasion from Vermont. Except by means of a naval force ascending Lake Champlain, 17 PAC Q XVII-1, p. 152 (Haldimand to Germain - October 25, 1780) 18 PAC Q XIX, p. 268-74 (Haldimand to Germain - November 23, 1781) 19 PAC B L, p. 209-10 (Germain to Haldimand - May 4, 1781)
Vermont offered the one direction by which an invading army could enter Canada, bypassing British naval might on lake Champlain. While amicable relations continued between Vermont and Haldimand, the province of Quebec obtained an immunity from an invasion on its weakest front. During 1779-80 Haldimand was greatly concerned with a possible invasion route through the interior of Vermont along a road which was being built by one Moses Hasen. He feared that this was being done in order to invade the province from above Lake Champlain by the Yamaska and St. Francis Rivers. If this were done, the Americans would be able to bypass the fortified works along the Richelieu River. This never happened, although Washington listed it as a possible route for his planned invasion of 1782.

Haldimand was a professional soldier above all, and his correspondence shows him more at home setting up the defences of the province than in dealing with the intricacies of a civil administration. Within a month after his arrival he sent Lord George Germain a complete report on the number of soldiers available for duty and on the condition of the defences of the province. The remainder of the summer was spent putting the frontiers in defensive order. Cataraqui (now Kingston, Ontario) was abandoned and fortifications built on Carleton Island, at the entrance to the St. Lawrence River. This strengthened his line of communications with the upper posts, and enabled him to watch for signs of American activity at Oswego. His other activity centred around the weak link in the colony's defences - the Richelieu valley. Additional fortifications were thrown

20. PAC Q XVI-2, p. 592 (Haldimand to Germain - September 14, 1779)
up at Ile aux Noix, St. Johns and Sorel, and advance posts established at Pointe au Fer and at Dutchman's Point in northern Lake Champlain. Two armed vessels patrolled the lake as far south as Crown Point (see figure 1), rescuing loyalists and keeping a sharp eye on the enemy's actions. 21 The possibility of an attack on Quebec via the St. Lawrence River always remained, but Haldimand had to depend on the vigilance of British naval units to prevent such a fleet from reaching the capital. He kept large bodies of his German and British troops concentrated near Quebec to meet such an attack.

Haldimand's chief responsibility was to retain Quebec for the Crown of Great Britain. In carrying this out he was faced with a defect of the over-all British policy that was one of the contributory factors of the British defeat.

This is one of the most common and most flagrant violations of the principles of war - stretching a thin line, everywhere inadequate, over an immense frontier. The clamour of trade and local interests make popular governments especially liable to it. 22

Haldimand was forced to dispose his troops in order to defend the upper posts and the long line of communications between them and Quebec. The influence of the fur trading group in Britain was instrumental in making Germain reiterate his warning to Haldimand "not to abate your interest in the upper posts". The capture of Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton at Vincennes in 1779 made Haldimand fear for the safety of the region. Luckily men could not be spared from Washington's forces, and no campaign was ever undertaken against

---

21. PAC Q XV, p. 261 (Haldimand to Germain - October 12, 1778)
22. Vahan, op. cit., p. 414
the British posts. Haldimand's forces were inadequate to set up a proper
defence of the colony, and he concentrated the greater part of them in the
lower province. This would enable him to meet any attack against the colony
by way of Vermont or of Lake Champlain.

Haldimand's military strategy was forced to be defensive in charac­
ter, and he determined early in his regime to set up buffer zones along the
borders of his province. For this reason raiding parties of Indians,
regulars and provincials were sent out each autumn to attack frontier settle­
ments and to destroy their crops. This appears to be inhuman procedure with
winter in the offing, but from a military viewpoint the destruction of crops
that might feed an invading force was essential. In November, 1778 Major
Chris Carleton was able to report that he had completely destroyed four
months' provisions for twelve thousand men. 23 Not only was the Lake Cham­
plain area neutralized by these raids, but similar activity was carried out
in the Mohawk valley by bands from Fort Niagara. In one raid Major Ross got
within twelve miles of Schenectady before being discovered, and destroyed
Warrensburgh, a settlement seven miles long. He returned to Carleton
Island after two skirmishes with the enemy, having lost thirteen killed,
twelve wounded and forty-nine missing. 24 These raids kept the American
settlements alarmed for their safety and reduced their usefulness to Washing­
ton. They also neutralized the border zones so that large bodies of troops
could be sent elsewhere in the event of their being needed.

23. PAC B LIV, p. 61-3 (Haldimand to Germain - November 21, 1778)
24. PAC Q XVIII, p. 320 (Haldimand to Clinton - October 3, 1781)
In order to keep casualties to a minimum on these raids, Haldimand attempted to deceive the Americans with a feint attack in one area while the real attack was being sent against another objective. This strategy proved very successful. In 1780 Major Carleton penetrated to the Hudson River with 700 men, and captured Fort Anne and Fort George. Another raiding party under Lieut. Bougton of the 53rd marched across Vermont to attack settlements on the Connecticut valley. While reinforcements were being rushed to meet Carleton's threat, Sir John Johnson with a force from Niagara swept into the Mohawk valley and destroyed Schoharie and Stone Arabia. The following year saw Ross' famous raid on Warrensburgh succeed because all available forces in that region had been sent to Albany and Saratoga to meet possible attacks from British troops under St. Leger. The Americans had no way of knowing that St. Leger's troops were sent to Crown Point to aid the Vermont leaders in the event of their declaring for Great Britain.

Washington's correspondence shows that he planned invasions of Canada from time to time. In 1776 he had in mind to bluff Haldimand with the same type of feint attack that Haldimand was later to use with such success. In a letter to Schuyler he makes it clear that he doubts the success of any expedition via Lake Champlain owing to a lack of provisions in that region plus the strength of the British naval units on the lake. He suggests instead an attack on the upper posts by way of Lake Ontario; at the same time the

25. PAC Q XVII-2, p. 718 (Account of Carleton's expedition - October 25, 1780)

26. PAC Loc. cit.

27. PAC Q XVIII, p. 320 (Haldimand to Clinton - October 3, 1781)
British in Canada would be led to believe that an attack via Lake Champlain was imminent. In 1780 a different plan was found among Henry Laurens' papers, when the former President of the Continental Congress was captured off Newfoundland. Washington's later proposal was to march an army overland through Vermont to attack Quebec directly, bypassing Lake Champlain and the Richelieu Valley. Hazen's road was not finished until some years later, so it was never used as an invasion route. The British raiders were watching any unusual activity in Vermont very closely, and no American attacks would therefore have the benefit of surprise.

Haldimand's strategy therefore demanded a succession of raids to keep the Americans from attacking the upper posts. With British naval superiority on Lake Champlain, Riedesel's and St. Leger's troops were sufficient for defence against ordinary attacks. No doubt Haldimand had in mind the support given the invading Americans in 1775, and feared the entrance of any force into the province. The danger was even greater after the entrance of France into the conflict in 1778, and he feared that French agents would foment a rebellion in the colony. The Vermont Negotiations enabled his scouts to keep in contact with informants in New York and Vermont, and lessened the danger of a surprise attack from that quarter. There was little military activity in Vermont, and it became a buffer zone through its own efforts. During the remainder of the war Haldimand, certain of Vermont's friendliness, was able to relax some of his vigilance on their borders, and released troops for duty elsewhere.

Chapter VI

Conclusions

An attempt has been made in this thesis to evaluate the importance of the Vermont Negotiations. The motives of the Vermonters have been studied, in the hope of discovering why they engaged in such a maneuver. The attitude of the Continental Congress and of the neighbouring states towards Vermont and the Negotiations has been described, in the light of internal politics and the progress of the Revolution.

Some attention has been paid to the policy of both England and France towards the American colonies, to determine the extent of their influence on the Negotiations. The main trend of this study, however, has been concerned with conditions in Quebec during the period of the Negotiations, and with the attitude of His Excellency, Governor Frederick Haldimand, towards the Negotiations. American writers ignore him as an individual, and picture him merely as a symbol of British aggression. The idea that local conditions in his province might have had some effect on the course of the Negotiations is not taken into consideration by them.

They assume that his dealings with Vermont occupied the centre of the stage in Quebec, as they had in Vermont. They assume also that the attempt to inveigle Vermont back to her British allegiance represents a major phase of British policy. Once that France joined the Americans by an alliance in 1778, British policy was directed against France on a worldwide scale. Even the revolt of her American colonies became an interest
in British eyes secondary to the threat posed by France. Under these circumstances the Vermont affair from 1780-83 would be of interest only to Lord George Germain and a few members of the British Cabinet, and of minor interest at that.


Available evidence now indicates that the Vermont leaders were sincere in their desire to be reunited with Britain. By 1780 there appeared to be no chance that Vermont would be granted statehood by Congress. The influence of New York was too strong in Congress, and it was exerted on behalf of the land speculators of that state. Many of these had interests in Vermont which they would lose if Vermont were recognized as a state. The Vermont leaders were also land speculators, and their main interest lay in the land in Vermont which they would lose if Vermont's independence from New York was recognized. These men, under the leadership of Thomas Chittenden and of the Allens, were not loyalists in any sense of the word. They were motivated solely by self-interest and possessed little love for Britain. They are usually referred to as Separatists because of their wish to be free from the domination of New York. These Separatists had originally bought land in Vermont under the cheaper New Hampshire land titles, much of it under the name of the Onion River Land Company. To secure this land, they erected a political device—the State of Vermont. Then they overcame all opposition to their party in the state, and granted themselves more land. Their interests by this
time had become so great that they would venture anything to retain their land. Their later reluctance to join the other states contradicts the belief that the Negotiations were intended to preserve Vermont from a British invasion. Vermont did not join the united colonies until 1791, and the Separatists were still attempting to negotiate with the British in Quebec in that year. Not only would a reunion with Britain promise them their land titles, but it would also assure them of a market for their products along the most convenient water route of the Richelieu River.

During most of the Negotiations the Separatists were supported by many Vermonters. There are various reasons for this phenomenon. The settlers of the Connecticut River Valley supported the Negotiations through a fear of further British raids on their settlements. Although a part of New Hampshire, they were thoroughly disillusioned with the Revolution and with seaboard New Hampshire's shabby treatment of the back country people.

The influence of the loyalists in Vermont also swung behind the Allens for the sole purpose of detaching Vermont from the Revolution. They did not emerge as a factor in Vermont politics until after the Assembly repealed "An Act to Prevent the Return of this State of Loyalists" in November, 1780. Many loyalists took refuge in Vermont from neighbouring states, and soon loyalists were appointed to high posts in the state. Many of these were conservative Yorkers who were unable to reconcile or compromise their interests with those of the radical Yankees, and saw reunion with Britain as the only solution.
Many Vermonters supported the Separatists because they wanted reasonable assurance of protection of their private rights. They were too far from the areas of discontent on the sea coast to have a genuine grievance against the British, and their antipathy was chiefly directed against New York. In many of the revolted colonies the rebels were bound by patriotic duty to their states rather than to Congress. In Vermont this factor was not present, as Vermonters could hardly be expected to support an authority which they knew would deprive them of their homes and make them exiles and outlaws at the earliest opportunity. They lacked any strong feeling of nationality and of loyalty, except to their own neighbours. Their loyalty to Vermont was assured in November, 1780 when the Assembly disposed of all lands within the state not previously granted. Many Vermonters were thus forced to support the government or lose the lands they had been granted.

Despite this, the Allens felt that Vermont would never become a British province unless Haldimand could send sufficient troops into the state to protect the Separatists. Opposition to their regime included not only men like Jacob Bayley, who had confiscated loyalist property for his own use, but also ardent republicans like Isaac Tichenor, who suspected the possibility of a British connection. The alignment in Vermont ultimately saw the loyalists and land-speculators confronted by the republicans as well as those opposed to the Chittenden-Allen faction. This combination with the backing of Congress proved too strong for the Allens to overcome, and the Negotiations failed.
2. Policy of Haldimand

Governor Haldimand's attitude towards the Negotiations is difficult to understand unless his policy in Quebec is considered. His primary responsibility was the retention of that colony for Britain, and his actions throughout his regime were directed to that end. He looked upon every aspect of his rule through the eyes of a professional soldier, and this is reflected even in his approach to problems of a civil nature. The continued detention of suspected characters was dictated by what he believed to be the restless state of the inhabitants of Quebec. In the absence of any fighting Haldimand was forced to continue a program of repression in order that his main objective might be achieved.

When Haldimand became Governor in June, 1778 the situation in Quebec could be described as critical. Burgoyne had stripped the colony of many of her available forces for his expedition. The capture of his army at Saratoga opened the main invasion route of Lake Champlain to the American armies, and left the colony virtually undefended. An American invasion three years earlier had been beaten off with difficulty, and an attack in 1778 might have met with greater success. The raw and ill-equipped levies of 1775 had now become experienced soldiers, and the bounty of France had provided them with arms and equipment. The recent addition of France to the ranks of Britain's enemies posed a further possibility of an invasion via the St. Lawrence River. Raiding parties of frontiersmen operating in the Ohio Valley appeared to presage an American campaign against the upper posts.
Conclusions

The conditions within Quebec were far from heartening. Haldimand was soon aware that Sir Guy Carleton had done little to protect the province. The fortifications of Quebec had rotted away and were useless, and the military posts had degenerated to the point where they were defenceless. The available troops were insufficient to guard the immense frontier against a determined attack, and there was a strong possibility that the line of communication between Quebec and the back posts might be cut. The Richelieu Valley was virtually undefended except for the fort at St. Johns, which was too far away to assure adequate control of Lake Champlain from within the province. The habitants in Quebec presented an additional problem. There was a great deal of sympathy for the republican cause in the parishes, and this was skillfully fostered by American agents and their counterparts among the Canadians. The influence and prestige of both the seigneurs and the parish priests appears to have diminished after the passing of the Quebec Act, and they failed to inculcate their own loyalty into the peasantry. The danger of a local insurrection became greater after the Franco-American alliance of 1778, and almost every year after this occurrence there were rumors of a French invasion. Enemy sympathisers within the province were not only engaged in attempting to arouse the habitants, but also were active in sending information to the Americans that they thought might be of value in a military sense.

Haldimand's first action after reaching Canada was to make an evaluation of the military state of the colony. His first report, sent to Lord George Germain at the end of July, 1778, was not optimistic. In it he
stressed the need for reinforcements, and critically evaluated his available forces. He spent the summer and autumn of 1778 building up his defences, particularly in the strategic Richelieu Valley. The fortifications of Sorel, Chambly and St. Johns were strengthened; Ile aux Noix near the entrance of the Richelieu River became the British naval base and shipbuilding centre, and outposts were established at Dutchman’s Point and at Pointe au Fer. In order to protect the fur trading route to the upper posts, a new British base was established at the entrance to the St. Lawrence River. The site was near the south shore of the river, on Diamond Island, afterwards renamed Carleton Island. Substantial renovations were made in the fortifications of Quebec.

Haldimand’s strategy was simple, and was directed solely towards the retention of Quebec in British hands. He attempted with a great amount of success to set up a buffer zone between Canada and the American colonies. This was done by sending raiding parties from the frontier posts to devastate American border settlements and to destroy provisions and supplies that might be used by an invading army. The loss of Vincennes and the capture of Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton early in 1779 was a serious blow to this plan, but luckily the Americans did not follow up their advantage by attacking Detroit. A naval force from Ile au Noix retained a naval superiority on Lake Champlain held uninterruptedly since the Battle of Valcour Island in 1776. The control of the lake also allowed British scouts to penetrate deep into American territory without risk of detection. To forestall a possible overland invasion from the Connecticut River, blockhouses were
Conclusions

116

built on the Upper Yamaska River (See Figure 1), and these were manned by rangers.

There is no evidence to show that the British planned any invasions from Canada after 1777. Certainly Haldimand had no wish to risk losing any of his meagre forces in an invasion, and endanger British possession of Canada as a result. His strategy was of a protective nature, and his operations followed a strictly defensive plan. The disposition of his troops was the result of a need to protect the entire length of an immense frontier. Despite the claims of some American writers, Haldimand was more interested in preventing the Vermonters from invading Quebec than he was in subjugating that state. The Vermont Negotiations appear in a different light altogether when studied from the point of view of Haldimand's policy.

Haldimand's strategy was influenced by the quality of his troops as well as by their numbers. The cream of his forces were the 3200 British soldiers. He did not regard them as a striking force, however, but preferred to leave them as garrisons, guarding the important posts in the province. They were accordingly disposed strategically throughout Canada at Niagara, Detroit, Carleton Island, Montreal, Quebec district, St. Johns and Ile aux Noix. Although he had nearly 5,000 German troops, he treated them with disparagement. He made very little use of them, did not allow them in any of the frontier posts, and placed them as garrisons in the rear areas. He found them totally unsuited for anything but pitched battles in the European style, and doubted that they would stand and fight even then. They did not fit into his strategy, and were used only as a show of force in the parishes
to deter the habitants from rising against the government. The provincial troops fitted admirably into the governor’s plans, and formed the backbone of many of his raiding parties. They also shared the responsibility of garrisoning the border posts, and they were also extensively used as scouts because of their knowledge of the country and the people. However, Haldimand had the distrust of irregular troops common to professional soldiers, and did not consider them capable of sharing in a regular campaign. He considered the Indians as fit only for scouting duties, and as members of raiding parties. Even in these roles they proved temperamentally and un­dependable, and he used them very little. Haldimand’s defensive strategy was therefore dictated both by the size of the area he was required to defend, and by the quantity and quality of his available force.

Throughout the greater part of his regime Haldimand’s plans had to include the possibility of a French invasion. Almost every year he received warnings, either from London or New York, that the Americans and their French allies were planning an advance on Quebec. Some of these rumors might have been started by the Americans to keep the British in confusion. The normal disposition of Haldimand’s troops reflects that fear, with the greater part of his forces stationed along the St. Lawrence River from Montreal to well below Quebec. Such a disposition would facilitate the feeding of the troops, and enable them to purchase fresh provisions to eke out their European rations. It would also serve to counteract any local insurrections in the event of an attack by a French fleet. Haldimand realised that the American invaders of 1775-76, with their worthless paper money,
their intolerance and their slack discipline, had made a poor impression on the Canadians. While he doubted that the habitants would flock to the Americans if they invaded the country, he had no illusions as to the effect of a French invasion would be on their compatriots in Quebec. He was therefore in the position of preparing for a possible French invasion every year, until 1782. By October, 1781 he was in possession of Lord George Germain's note that the French had no intention of attacking Quebec. He also learned that they were throwing obstacles in the way of an American invasion. The projected invasion of Vermont for 1782 was the result of this disclosure, and it is noteworthy that this was the only time that such a move was planned.

William Kingsford in his History of Canada sums up the advantageous position which Haldimand occupied in Quebec.

In this crisis Canada was more indebted to the current of events which, in the view of Congress, made an invasion by French troops inexpedient, and without this aid no invasion was possible, than to her own power of resistance, or to the foresight exercised in the mother country for her defence.

The British Government exercised very little foresight, however, as they regarded the retention of the West Indian islands more highly than they did Canada. From the start of the war with France Britain was at a disadvantage she was never to overcome. The British had commitments in North America that they disliked to relinquish, and were thus forced to use their navy as a defensive force to protect their many possessions. At home the Whig party offered strong opposition in Parliament to any continuation of the war, and the persecution of the war was further hindered by jealousy among high
officials and by the conflicting interests of powerful groups in England. The government was never able to assist Haldimand nor to map out a policy for him because of their preoccupation with other aspects of the war that were deemed more important. It was indeed fortunate for Haldimand that neither France nor Britain attached any importance to Canada as a possession. Although he was unaware of the situation, he was in danger only from the Americans, and they were too occupied trying to oust the British to contemplate any invasion of Canada.

3. Haldimand and the Negotiations.

The Negotiations between Haldimand and Vermont proved to be most advantageous to Haldimand's strategy. He failed to see his advantage at first, and expressed a fear to Germain that he feared that the Vermonters would attempt to capture the province if they were allowed inside Quebec. He did not trust them, and saw in the Negotiations only an attempt on their part to force Congress to admit them to statehood. He did not relax his guard against them, and his agents continued active in Vermont throughout the Negotiations. He was able to make good use of the privileges granted him to send messengers in comparative safety to the British lines in New York.

American writers have concentrated on the benefits accorded Vermont by the Negotiations, and little thought has been given the possibility that Quebec might also have benefited. The prolonged negotiations neutralized the Lake Champlain valley and minimized the danger of an attack from that quarter. This was one of the main objects of Haldimand's military policy.
and it was thus achieved with very little effort on his part. The routine patrol of Lake Champlain by British naval craft deterred the Americans from any attempt at shipbuilding on the lake. The British control of the lake was never challenged, and no danger to Canada was expected from that source. The only other route in that quarter by which an invading army could enter Canada lay through Vermont. While amicable relations continued between Canada and Vermont, the British province obtained an immunity from invasion. After October, 1780 when the Negotiations began, there were no further systematic raids on Vermont's outlying settlements. From this it can be conjectured that the British no longer feared that Vermont crops would be used by an invading army. The discontinuation of these raids tended to lull anti-British feeling in Vermont, and gave the Separatists the support they so eagerly sought. Although the British did not relax their vigilance along the frontier, they were able to strengthen other frontier posts with troops released by this truce. This favorable situation justified Haldimand's participation in the Vermont Negotiations, even if no other benefits accrued to the British.

Historical records have since revealed that Quebec was in little danger from either France or the Americans after 1778, but Haldimand was not given an inkling of his peculiar security until the arrival of Lord George Germain's note of May 4, 1781. This knowledge might have determined his decision to invade Vermont the following year. The failure of the British Government to send him definite instructions might have prevented an earlier attempt against Vermont, but it is more likely that Haldimand
was deterred by a shortage of troops. Any offensive action against the Americans could only be undertaken after leaving sufficient troops behind to protect the posts on the upper lakes, as well as the frontier posts in the lower province. An added factor to be considered was the spirit of unrest among the Canadians, who might stage an uprising if they considered the troops in the province too few to restrain them. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that no serious attempt was made to subjugate the Vermonters during Haldimand’s regime.

Haldimand’s position in regard to the Negotiations is vindicated when the official records of his regime are consulted. His main responsibility was the retention of Canada for Britain, a trust which he fulfilled. That this was accomplished as a result of the mutual reluctance of both France and the American Congress to allow the other’s troops inside Canada does not detract from his performance. He was given the task of conducting the Negotiations chiefly because of the proximity of his province to the little republic. His correspondence makes it clear that he considered the Negotiations of secondary importance, and his apparent caution in acting against Vermont proceeded from a fear that by doing so he might endanger Quebec. His early analysis of his situation made him realize that Vermont furnished the most logical route for an invader to enter Canada, and the neutralization of that area was one of his primary aims. The Negotiations were a fortuitous occurrence of which he was able to take advantage, and they secured for Canada an immunity from invasion for the remainder of the war. From the reports of his scouts Haldimand obtained an accurate picture
of events within Vermont which he used to determine his own actions in respect to that republic. He realized from the start that there was little chance that the Negotiations would succeed, but nevertheless he offered the Separatists all the encouragement in his power. He realized better than the Vermont leaders the temper of their people, and deduced shrewdly that the power of Congress in Vermont was too great for the Separatists to be successful. The Negotiations prevented any Vermont attempts to invade Canada, and as a result can be regarded as a phase of Haldimand's military policy. This is the place which they occupy in the history of his regime. Haldimand never attached to them the importance ascribed to them by American writers, because to him they were merely one of the means to an end. Only in that they contributed to the retention of Canada in British hands can the Vermont Negotiations be said to occupy a place in Canadian history.

FINIS
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A - Primary Sources


8. Slade, William (ed.), Vermont State Papers; Being a collection of records and documents, connected with the assumption and establishment of government by the people of Vermont, together with the Journal of the Council of Safety, the First Constitution, the early Journals of the General Assembly and the Laws, from
the year 1779 to 1786, inclusive. To which are added the Proceed-ings of the First and Second Councils of Censors, Middlebury, (no publisher), 1823, XX-XXXI pages.


B - Secondary Sources

General Reference Material


29. Monarque, Georges, Un general allemand au Canada - Le Baron Friedrich Adolphus Von Friedsell, Montreal, (no publisher), 1927, 160 pages.


37. ———, (translator), *Letters and Journals Relating to the War of the American Revolution, and the Capture of German Troops at Saratoga, by Mrs. General Riedesel*, (translated from the original German), (no place), (no publisher), 1867, 235 pages.


Specific Material on Haldimand


46. Woodley, E.C., Short Essays in Canadian History - Governor Sir Frederick Haldimand, [possibly a magazine article], 4 pages.

Specific "material on Vermont


53. Pell, John, Ethan Allen, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1929, XII-331 pages.
Specific Material on Vermont


Specific Material on the Negotiations


Specific Material on the Negotiations


A NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY

The material for this thesis has been drawn as much as possible from the original sources. I did not have access to the collection of The Papers of Sir Henry Clinton in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan, but was fortunate enough to secure the use of notes made by another student from this collection. The principal source studied were The Haldimand Papers (or "B" Series) in the Public Archives of Canada at Ottawa, and these have been used wherever possible. Other material was secured at the Archives from The Quebec and Upper Canada Series (or "Q" Series), The British Treasury Records, Colonial Office Papers (CO-42) and the Shelburne Transcripts. These were the main sources for material on Haldimand, the military situation in Canada and on the Canadian attitude towards the Vermont Negotiations.

The Haldimand Papers are copies of the originals in England, and contain copies of all letters written by Haldimand as well as those received by him. Copies of his personal letters, written for the most part in French, yield valuable information on his views of various people, his attitude towards various events and give an insight into his character. His official correspondence presents information on Canada and the state of the Negotiations as well as his advice and policies in regards to Quebec and its problems. Military returns of troops under his command, their ration and supply returns, have been invaluable in evaluating his situation in Canada. The "Q" Series contains some letters pertaining to this period.
that I was unable to find in the "B" Series.

The Vermont Historical Society Archives at Montpelier, Vermont, contained some useful material, in particular the Miscellaneous State Papers of the State of Vermont. These contain material of value that has not been published, and which give a clearer picture of the beginnings of the state and of their early struggles with New York. The Collections of the Vermont Historical Society consist for the most part of documents relating to early Vermont history. Volume I deals with the struggle against New York and with the early Councils of the republic. Volume II contains a file of letters and documents from the Haldimand Papers relating to the Negotiations. An attempt is made to prove that the Vermont negotiators were trying to stave off a British invasion, but the file is not complete, and several important documents have not been included. The collections of documents edited by William Slade and E.P. Walton respectively contain many of the state records, and furnish a record of the steps by which Vermont became a republic and later a state of the union.

The uneasy alliance between France and America is explained to great extent in the collections of letters edited by John Mung, and these are duplicated to some extent in the Correspondence politique, Etats-unis, Ministere des affaires etrangeres. The American side of this question is presented in the material provided by Frances Wharton in his collection of The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. These consist of the opinions and plans of the diplomats of both sides in their official correspondence.
The collections of the letters of various American revolutionary leaders offer assistance in determining the attitude of the revolutionary side towards the Vermont question. The two leaders most affected by the events in Vermont during the war were the American Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington, and George Clinton, the revolutionary governor of New York. Their letters provide an opportunity to study the inhabitants of Vermont and their activities as seen through the eyes of other Americans. Washington's letters reflect his preoccupation with the French alliance and with other problems that seemed of greater magnitude to him. In his letters can be noted a growing suspicion that the Vermonters were engaging in a correspondence with the British treasonable to the United colonies. George Clinton, who produced evidence that purported to prove that such a condition existed, was involved both in the land titles dispute and with the problem of the New York settlements on the Vermont border that had joined that state. O'Callaghan's collection of documents relative to the colonial history of New York contain many documents relating to the early struggles between New York and the settlers of the New Hampshire Grants, and also contains the correspondence between General Haldimand and Lieutenant-Governor Tryon of New York pertaining to the "Pensington Riots" of 1773.

The Diary of Chief Justice William Smith of New York proved to be a source of some astonishing information. He was in the peculiar position of having influence with the revolutionary leaders in New York state, and exercised great influence over Sir Henry Clinton at the same time. He was
able to comment on important questions as they arose, as he saw all official papers received by Clinton. In particular he furnishes us with a first hand opinion of Clinton, and gives very candid views on the war and on the manner in which the British were handling it. His views and advice on the Vermont episode reflect the two points of view between which he was torn. While there is little reason to doubt the veracity of the statements in his diary, it is possible that he only included certain matters in it, and scrupulously omitted other facts.

The secondary sources on this topic proved very disappointing. American writers, and in particular those from Vermont, have included long accounts of it in their books. In most Canadian histories the Haldimand regime occupies a very inconspicuous place and the Negotiations are rarely mentioned. With the exception of a few magazine articles, most of the Canadian and British authors were studied in an attempt to provide background material for the thesis. Many standard Canadian history textbooks and many prominent Canadian authors are omitted from this Bibliography because there was nothing in their works that could be used in the preparation of this topic.

Much has been written by Vermont historians on the subject of the Negotiations, which were an important episode in the history of the state. Until recent years they have followed the patriotic version originated by Samuel Williams and Ira Allen in their histories written over a hundred and fifty years ago. There is a great amount of background material on the history of the state, although much of it is a repetition
of the words of earlier historians. Valuable material on the land titles dispute and on the relations between Vermont and New York is found in Slade and Walton, as well as in the textbooks by Giland Hall, Thompson, Van de Water and Samuel Williams. Jones' Vermont in the Making 1750-77 ranks in stature with Williamson's Vermont in Quandary 1763-1825 as a scholarly treatise on early Vermont. Williamson presents a well-documented and critical analysis of the Vermont problem; however, he has a distinct tendency to make sweeping statements with which the facts are at variance. Earl Kenton tends to generalize about the Negotiations, but states in a footnote that the assertions contained in some of the early Vermont histories are questionable.

The first attack on the traditional Vermont account of the Negotiations was made by J.L. Payne in his article "A Curious Chapter in Vermont's History", published in the Magazine of American History in 1887. This coincides with the arrival of copies of the Haldimand Papers from England. He appears to have used these transcripts to prove that the Vermonters were sincere in their desire to rejoin the British Empire. At least two articles were written in furious rebuttal immediately, one by B. Fernow in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography that same year, and a second by J. H. French in The New England Magazine and Bay State Monthly in 1888. Neither of these articles contains an adequate rebuttal of Mr. Payne's arguments, and they merely parrot the assertions of earlier Vermont historians. Modern Vermont historians of the iconoclastic school include Reid Langdon Carr, H. S. Wardner, Chilton Williamson and Clarence W. Rife.
A NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY

The last-named author's "Ethan Allen, an Interpretation" makes no attempt to mask Allen's activity in dealing with the British, and blames the self-interest of the Vermont land-speculators for their actions. H.S. Wardner's article on "The Haldimand Negotiations" in the Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society is extremely provocative and unbiased, and the research done on this topic supports many of his contentions.

Miscellaneous works on the Vermont scene include articles by Mrs. Mary C. Nye and H.H. Noble. Mrs. Nye's articles are chiefly concerned with the problems of the loyalists in Vermont, and they contain some interesting facts on the treatment meted out to them, and on the land expropriations that took place. Noble's article on "A Loyalist of the St. Lawrence" takes as its subject Captain Justus Sherwood, Haldimand's chief negotiator. Dorothy Dillon's book on The New York Triumvirate deals with the methods of the New York land speculators and the influence they had on revolutionary Vermont.

John Bell's Ethan Allen is a straightforward treatment of this doughty patriot, but Wilbur's book on Ira Allen is a disappointment. Wilbur has appointed himself as an apologist for Ira, and glosses over his shortcomings.

The main source of material on Haldimand is found in the "B" and "Q" Series. However, there are some good secondary sources as well. Jean Mollweith's Frederick Haldimand is an adequate bibliography, although no attempt is made to probe or evaluate the various crises of his regime. The articles by Audet, Latt and LeMoine furnish a picture of Quebec in the time of Haldimand, but there is little in these articles that is not found elsewhere. Justin Smith makes no mention of the Negotiations, but presents a
sympathetic picture of Haldimand and the difficulties which he had to face. Kingsford champions the cause of Haldimand and becomes an apologist for his actions. His account exhibits a great deal of anti-French Canadian bias, which might account for his vigorous defence of the governor. He devotes a great deal of space to the Haldimand regime, and the Negotiations are given adequate treatment. A.J.H. Richardson's article on Chief Justice William Smith's influence on the Negotiations deals with a specific part of the Negotiations, and gives a well-balanced account of the Vermont land titles dispute. Haldimand's problems while Commander-in-Chief at New York from 1773 - 1774 are recorded in the "B" Series, and copies of the letters between Haldimand and Lieutenant-Governor Tryon of New York can be found in O'Callaghan. Recourse was also had to Carter's collection of the letters of General Thomas Gage, and to Alden's book on the same person for further material.

Most of the material on the military situation in Canada was obtained from the original sources. Both Atkinson and Curtis were also studied with the view of learning the details of the organization of British troops in America during this period. Neither of them mention much about the Canadian situation, and their subject matter deals largely with the situation in the colonies. The translations of both Stone and Rosengarten provide valuable information on the German troops in Canada, and present a picture of Haldimand different from the accepted view. Monarque's book gives a similar treatment to the above, although he includes a broader picture of life in Canada at that time. Cruikshank's book is largely made up of papers from the "B" and "Q" Series, with a general historical summary of
military events of that period.

Background material on Quebec in Haldimand's time is found in Burt, Garneau, Gillis and Justin Smith. Lanctot devotes some space to a description of the wave of sympathy for the revolutionary cause that swept through Quebec. McIntosh's article discusses the geographical and economic factors that impelled Vermont to seek a closer understanding with the British in Canada. The importance of Canada in French military strategy during this war, and the unique security against invasion afforded Canada by the Franco-American alliance, is well presented in a magazine article by John Meng, and in more detail in an excellent study by Marcel Trudel. This latter is well-documented and shows the result of careful research. Morris' *The Era of the American Revolution* contains an excellent chapter on the importance of the Balance of Power in French foreign policy during this period.

The most valuable book on British policy during the war, and on the maritime struggle between England and France, is A.F. Vahan's *Influence of Sea Power Upon History* (1660-1783). In many respects it was the book most commonly consulted on the over-all picture of the war, and presents the whole struggle in its proper perspective. Lord Mahon's text on English political history provided valuable background material on the British political struggle at that time.

The importance of the undercover work undertaken by scouts and agents on both sides throughout the war cannot be underestimated. Much of Haldimand's information on Vermont came from the reports of his scouts, and are now faithfully chronicled in his papers. Emmett's article contains some
interesting material, and some valuable references to the Vermont problem as recorded by Sir Henry Clinton in his "Secret Record of Daily Intelligence". Van Doren's Secret History of the American Revolution describes the defection of General Benedict Arnold from the American cause, but also calls attention to the widespread British scheme for subverting American leaders from the revolutionary side. It was a part of this scheme that started the British on their attempts to seduce Ethan Allen into joining the British forces.
NOTE I - SOME DOUBTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF WILLIAMS' HISTORY

While the Reverend Samuel Williams was writing his two volume History of Vermont, he wrote Ira Allen on July 11, 1792, seeking information on the Haldimand Negotiations. He stated that he did not know whether it would be proper to ask him to see his papers on the Negotiations, or whether Ira wished to trust them out of his hands. In this letter Williams promised that, if he saw the papers, no one else would ever see them or know that he had examined them, nor would he make any use of their contents without Ira's permission and approval. After seeing the papers, Williams wrote Ira that he had delayed printing his volumes to make corrections in conformity with the ideas he had gained from the papers and from their conversations. He claimed that he had incorporated everything which Ira had told him, and that the account would not "be construed unfavorable to any person who was concerned in it, or by the British in Canada, or elsewhere ....". Although he did not suppose that the account was free of errors, Williams wrote that he was certain that no one could say that he had given a view unfavorable to the Allens, or in any way abused the information, or the confidence which had been placed in him.

1. New York State Library - Samuel Hunt Papers - Box 1777-1801.

NOTE II - DR. WILLIAMSON AND THE CAPTURE OF TICONDEROGA

In his Vermont in Quandary 1766-1825, Dr. Chilton Williamson mentions a British claim that the Allens approached the British officer in command at Ticonderoga, one Captain De la Place, in the spring of 1775. They suggested to him that the disturbances at Boston should not disrupt the peace and good feeling between the representatives of the British authority in the valley and the inhabitants of the Grants. A truce was accordingly arranged, and the Allens hastened away, gathered together the Green Mountain Boys and took the fort by surprise.

If correct, this treacherous action would have prejudiced Haldimand against the Vermonters, a fact that would have been of great value in this thesis. The American view that the Vermonters were able to keep their true feelings from a credulous Haldimand would be discredited. Williamson bases his story on a letter from Lord Dartmouth, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, to General Thomas Gage, the British commander-in-chief at Boston. In this letter he warns Gage that

at the same time we must not trust to appearances, or give credit to declarations, and the conduct of the people of Connecticut, who, in the moment of their meditating and preparing for an expedition against Ticonderoga, had the affectation to propose to you a Suspension of Hostilities, is an example of such consummate duplicity as ought to put us very much on our guard against such proposals. 1

A query to Dr. Williamson revealed the source of his reference material, and a copy of the book was fortunately located in the Parliamentary Library. Further research revealed that Dr. Williamson had omitted the words "to you" (underlined in the quotation) from his quotation. A study of the Gage manuscripts shows that Dartmouth was castigating the Connecticut Assembly rather than the people of the Grants. Some state officials had borrowed money from the State Treasury to aid the project, and Dartmouth apparently felt that the whole idea had been planned and financed by the Assembly acting in their official capacity.

The proposal of a suspension of hostilities to which Dartmouth refers has no bearing on Ticonderoga, as Dr. Williamson's fanciful version would have us believe. General Gage had written Dartmouth on May 13, 1775, and mentioned that he had been approached by the Connecticut Assembly "on the subject of the skirmish" [Lexington]. He apparently wrote Governor Trumbull of Connecticut in a conciliatory vein on May 3 as he further states to Dartmouth:

> whether the Assembly of Connecticut wishes for conciliatory measures time alone must evince. I have laid the means of a Reconciliation before them.

Undoubtedly the Assembly of Connecticut, like the Continental Congress and several of the colonies, was embarrassed by the Lexington skirmish, and determined not to defy the British openly. Their letter was likely a conciliatory one, in the hope that they could remain neutral until they found out how united the colonies would be in opposing Britain.

---

General Gage did not connect the capture of Ticonderoga with Connecticut or its Assembly in his report to Dartmouth regarding the capture of the fort. In a letter written May 17 he places the blame of the local settlers, but does not even hint at treachery. He states that "it is conjectured that the Settlers in that part of the Country must have been concerned. They doubtless must have had knowledge of the Affair". 3

APPENDIX 3

AN ABSTRACT OF

GENERAL HALDIMAND AND THE VERMONT NEGOTIATIONS (1780-81)

A little-known incident in Canadian-American relations is the series of negotiations held between representatives of the independent republic of Vermont and agents of Governor Frederick Haldimand of Quebec. These negotiations lasted for the last three years of the American Revolution, and concerned the possible inclusion of Vermont in the British Empire. The case for the Vermonters has been presented in many forms by many American writers. This is the first attempt to present the British case, and to determine Haldimand's real position in regards to Vermont and the negotiations.

A resume of Vermont history prior to the negotiations forms a background to the main topic. Particular attention is paid to the land titles dispute with New York, which resulted in Vermont declaring herself independent of the other state. The events which led to the negotiations are discussed, and the probable motives of the Vermonters are set down.

The personality of General Haldimand is next evaluated in order to present a picture of him as an individual. The historical judgment of him is given with some reserve, and an attempt is made to judge him from his own records and those of his contemporaries. His precarious position at Quebec is discussed, and attention is called to various factors that might have influenced him in his handling of the negotiations.

Haldimand's position at Quebec is described in more detail in the section on The Military Situation in Canada. The problem of the defence
of Quebec — his main responsibility — is discussed in relationship to the size and quality of his forces, the vast area to be defended, and the difficulties of transport. Attention is drawn to the implied importance of the western fur-trading posts in the eyes of the British government, and the influence of this factor on Haldimand's military policy. An attempt is made, by the use of tables, to prove that the British forces in Canada were inadequate for anything but normal defensive policy. A map of the area under study is used to show that Haldimand's disposition of his troops reflected a defensive attitude.

The actions of both parties prior to the negotiations are set down, and a brief summary of the actual events during the negotiation period is made. Haldimand's views on the Vermonters are traced throughout this period, in order to show that he had shrewdly analysed the situation and had foreseen the ultimate failure of the negotiations. The lack of constructive advice or of definite instructions from his superiors in England accounts for his caution in dealing with the Vermonters.

The diffidence of the British government in regards to both Canada and Vermont is accounted for by their preoccupation with the war against France during this period. The entrance of France into the war endangered British possessions in both the East and in the West Indies, and little thought was given to the possible survival of Canada. Under these circumstances the problem of Vermont was not deemed important, and Haldimand was never given the instructions or aid which he wished. The advent of the French into the struggle was to force the British into a defensive position
on most of the fighting fronts. Haldimand was therefore left in a position where he could only use defensive strategy. The influence of his strategy upon the conduct of the negotiations occupies an important place in this thesis. He did not realize until late in 1761 that no invasion of Quebec was likely, owing to the mutual distrust of the French and Americans. He would therefore see in the negotiations a chance to use the resultant amicable relations between Canada and Vermont to assure the security of his province by neutralizing the Lake Champlain invasion route with a minimum of his forces.

The conclusions summarize the main points gleaned from the research on this topic. While the records appear to indicate that the Vermonters were sincere in their desire to be reunited with Britain, it is the attitude of Haldimand that is most important. His reluctance to attack Vermont was dictated by his lack of troops and supplies, by the immense frontier he had to guard, and by the fear of a French invasion. His strategy of neutralization of the border areas was implemented by the Vermont negotiations, which prevented an invasion from being launched against Quebec through that district. His main responsibility was to retain Canada for Britain, and in this he was successful. This one factor was his main consideration, and must be considered in determining his attitude towards the Vermonters and the negotiations.