M.A. (HISTORY)

The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-1918

by

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Svatozar Hurban Vajansky, a Slovak poet of the late nineteenth century, refused to be assimilated by the Magyars. Jailed for his nationalist activities in 1893, he described in a poem the sorry plight of the Slovaks in Hungary and their only avenue of escape—emigration to America. Vajansky's poem hailed the liberating effect of American democracy upon the subjugated Slovaks and hinted at the active role which American Slovaks would play in the liberation of their homeland. The poem, even in translation, provides a theme more stirring for this thesis than could any effort by the author. Here is Vajansky's

Ode to Columbia:

The old men die beholding only ruin,
Their eyes behold no hope, no truth in life,
The young men fall away, at once or slowly,
Even the strong give up the ceaseless strife;
Only a handful still keep up the fight,
Only a few lights burn amid the night.

Suddenly rises proudly from the ocean
A giant woman with majestic face;
Shining the drapery of her snowy garments,
Her eyes like flames upon the altar place;
Her god-like breast like marble fair to see.
"You poor forsaken children, come to me."
"0 come; I know you bring but humble packets
That from your fatherland no gems you bring,
That murderous wrath has chased you from your dwellings
From the ancestral soil to which you cling;
No gifts I offer, but this one reward—
Time for free work, for human rights regard."

And they, disgraced here in their native country,
Lift up proud heads since o'er the seas they came,
And there he speaks aloud who here was silent,
And glories there in what he here thought shame.
Columbia to him self-knowledge gives,
Surprised he finds that only now he lives.

Hail to our brothers whom their stepdame cruel
Drove from their simple huts, their native sod.
Columbia, thou hast smitten off their fetters,
Lifting them up to manhood, heaven and God.
0 land of Christopher, may Christ repay
What for my brothers poor thou dost today.

0 sons of mine, 0 sisters, 0 my people,
I from distant prison speak to you.
0 holy, holy heights of Tatra's mountains,
Our father's fields, naught is on earth like you.
This sinful, wretched world does not command
Aught lovelier, brothers, than the Slovak land.

So in the rigid torment of my prison,
Weeping, I call to you my countrymen.
Oh, be you faithful to our speech, our music,
And if it may be, come, come home again.
If not, yet still in heart with us remain.
I cease, the jailer shakes the clanking chain.1

1 In Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow-Citizens,
New York, 1910, pp. 422-3.
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Louis Kossuth, the Magyar nationalist, Alexander Petofi, the Magyar poet, Pavel Jozef Safarik, a leader of the Czech revival, Jan Kollar, poet in the Czech language, Ludevit Stur, codifier of the Slovak language and Svatozar Hurban Vajansky, the Slovak poet, were all of Slovak descent. The role that these six Slovaks played in the emergence of Czech, Magyar and Slovak nationalism demonstrated the problem that confronted all Slovaks in nineteenth century Hungary. They could accept the assimilation policy of the Magyar rulers; they could seek political union with their linguistic relatives, the Czechs; or they could insist on their identity as Slovaks which frequently earned them a term in prison. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century a half million Slovaks or one out of five chose the alternative of emigration to the New World.

In America the Slovaks found a free opportunity for economic and national development. Drawn to America by higher wages, the Slovaks soon discovered that they could freely use their Slovak language, establish Slovak schools and churches and publish Slovak newspapers. Taking advantage of this freedom, American Slovaks agitated against the Magyar assimilative policy in Hungary and assumed the leadership of the Slovak nation. Before 1914 American Slovaks hoped for the creation of an autonomous Slovakia within Hungary. During the war the Czechs persuaded the American Slovaks to change their minds and to call for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a new Czecho-Slovak republic.

American Slovaks only reluctantly agreed to work for the creation of a new Czecho-Slovak republic because deep differences divided them. The Slovaks in America, as in Europe, were split into three main groups: the secularists, the Lutherans and the Catholics. The secularist and Lutheran minority hoped for the closest possible union with the Czechs in a unitary state of 'Czechoslovakia'. The Catholic majority opposed a unitary state and insisted upon a
federal state of 'Czecho-Slovakia', with full autonomy for
the Slovaks in their own country.

In order to appease the Catholic majority of Slovaks
and to present a united front, the Czechs in America concluded
two agreements with the Slovaks which guaranteed the Slovaks
'home rule' or 'autonomy' in the new republic of Czecho-
Slovakia. The Cleveland Agreement, drawn up by the Czechs in
October, 1915, promised the Slovaks full equality with the
Czechs in a new federal state. The Pittsburgh Agreement,
drawn up in May, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk, the leader of the
Czecho-Slovak movement in exile, promised the Slovaks their
own schools, administration and Diet in the proposed Czecho-
Slovak state. Placated by these two Czech promises, American
Slovaks united and contributed men, money and propaganda for
the creation of Czecho-Slovakia.

Once Czecho-Slovakia came into being in late 1918,
the Czechs and Masaryk renounced the agreements made with
American Slovaks and began to centralize 'Czechoslovakia'
into a unitary state. Catholic Slovaks in America and
Slovakia were aroused by this breach of faith while the
secularists and Lutherans welcomed it. Armed with the
Pittsburgh Agreement, the Catholic Slovaks insisted upon the principle of autonomy contained in it and for the next twenty years they waged a joint political war upon the Czech and Slovak centralists. A political programme, formulated in America, crossed the ocean and was adopted by the Slovaks in Europe. The Czechs finally granted autonomy to the Slovaks in late 1938, but only after Hitler and 'Munich' had stripped the Czechs of their power and, when Hitler invaded Bohemia in March, 1939, he permitted the Slovaks to establish their own state.

The problem of Slovak national identity stemmed from the reforms of Joseph II, that "Convention in a single man," who ruled Austria from 1780 to 1790. Joseph hoped to modernize his empire by enacting a series of reforms, one of which was to establish German as the sole administrative language of his realm. This enactment, among others, aroused the Magyar nobility of the kingdom of Hungary, a part of Joseph's realms, and set them on the road to national revival. Controlling the Diet of Hungary, the Magyars set

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out to 'Magyarize' the kingdom of Hungary which contained five other distinct nationalities who together outnumbered the Magyars. After the death of Joseph, the Hungarian Diet enacted a series of language laws which, between 1830 and 1844, replaced Latin with Magyar as the official language of the kingdom. Through their own academies and newspapers and by the codification of their languages, the other nationalities resisted Magyarization. In 1846 Ludevit Stur codified the central Slovak dialect and it became the literary language of the Slovaks.

The acceptance of literary Slovak reduced the possibility of linguistic and political union with the Czechs and heightened Slovak aspirations during the revolution of 1848. When the leader of the Czechs during the 1848 revolution asked the Slovaks to join with the Czechs in a new

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3 Conrad Malte-Brun, Universal Geography: Or a Description of All the Parts of the World, On a New Plan, According to the Great Natural Divisions of the Globe; Accompanied with Analytical, Synoptical, and Elementary Tables, Philadelphia, 1829, IV, 206. It gave the population of Hungary in 1825 as 8,893,627, which included 3,385,000 Magyars. The other nationalities included the Slovaks in the north, the Croats and Serbs in the south, and the Ruthenians and Roumanians in the west. It gave the population of the 'Slovakas' as 2,903,000.
autonomous state within Austria, Miloslav Hurban and Michal Hodza, two Slovak leaders, refused the suggestion because they hoped to win an autonomous Diet within the kingdom of Hungary. The crushing of the revolution of 1848 in the Austrian empire by the armies of the Habsburgs and of Russia put an end to this speculation of union between the Czechs and Slovaks.

In the aftermath of the revolution, with Hungary under military rule and the Magyars temporarily subdued, Slovak nationalist leaders encouraged the growth of Slovak nationalism and dared to petition for political recognition. They built their own schools, set up three 'gymnasiums' and founded a Slovak Academy. In 1861, at Turciansky Svaty Martin, the Slovak leaders drafted a memorandum for the parliament of Hungary which voiced Slovak nationalist ambitions. They demanded recognition of the Slovak nation and of the Slovak language. They sought the creation of a separate and autonomous Slovak region of 'Upper Hungary' in which Slovak would be exclusively used, Slovak schools and colleges,

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4 Seton-Watson, op.cit., p. 262.
proportional representation in the Hungarian Diet and guarantees of civil liberties. Before the Slovak nationalist nobles presented the memorandum to the Diet, Slovak nobles who had accepted Magyar assimilation denounced it in the name of all Slovaks.

In the 'Ausgleich' or compromise of 1867 the Habsburgs and the Magyars created the Dual Monarchy which gave the Hungarian Diet full powers over the internal affairs of Hungary. In 1868, under the guidance of Francis Deak and Joseph Eotvos, the Hungarian Diet enacted a law which guaranteed the use of the national languages of the minorities in Hungary at the lowest levels of county government and in the primary and high schools. Magyar remained the official language of the state; in the parliament, the county assemblies, the law courts and the University of


6 Scotus Viator, op.cit., p. 123.
Budapest it was the sole language. Count Coloman Tisza, prime minister of Hungary from 1874 to 1890 reversed this relatively enlightened policy. Tisza embarked upon a new policy of Magyarization and, as a result, all Slovak 'gymnasiums' and most Slovak grammar schools were closed and the police sacked the Slovak Academy. By 1907 official statistics revealed that the non-Magyar forty-eight per cent of the population of Hungary had only nineteen per cent of the elementary schools and seven per cent of the high schools. In response to a protest on behalf of Slovak identity, Tisza replied, "there is no Slovak nation."

According to official Magyar statistics, there was indeed no Slovak nation. Cunningly counting the population by "language of business" instead of by "mother tongue", the Magyars tried to show the success of Magyarization. The 1910 census revealed that the Slovak population had ostensibly declined from almost three million in 1825 to less than two million in 1910 while the Magyar population in the same

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7 Ibid., pp. 136-56.

8 Ibid., p. 167.
period had increased from 3,385,000 to 9,945,000. 9

While some Slovak leaders accepted assimilation, others such as Dr. Vavro Srobar, the secularist and Andrej Hlinka, the Catholic priest, fought the Magyars in the newspapers and in the pulpit and spent several years in jail for their efforts. 10 Still others, like P. V. Rovnianek, left the country for the freedom of America where they waged war on the Magyars in a free, Slovak-language press. 11

In America Rovnianek found an ever-increasing Slovak population that had come for a chance to improve their economic status. In Hungary land shortage was acute and over 1,500,000 peasants sought seasonal labour to augment their meagre income. 12 At the same time the rapid industrialization of the United States in the late nineteenth century created a


12 Seton-Watson, op.cit., p. 279.
demand for unskilled labour. Slovak peasants like those from all parts of eastern and southern Europe, which had a surplus of unskilled labour, emigrated to the United States.13 In Hungary the agricultural labourer earned between twenty and forty cents a day; in the United States he earned from $1.35 to $2.36 a day in the steel yards and coal mines.14

It is difficult to estimate the number of Slovaks who emigrated to the United States before 1914. From 1819 to 1899, no Slovaks were recorded because immigrants were counted by "country of origin."15 Only in 1899 did immigration officials count by "race or people" and only in the 1910 census did the United States classify Americans by "mother tongue."16 This latter attempt recorded a mere 284,444 Slovaks in the United States and 3,240,467 "Slavic or Lettic" peoples, a recording as absurd as saying "Germanic" or


14 Warne, op.cit., p. 172.


16 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
"Latin". The extent of the error became apparent in the more refined census of 1920 which recorded 619,866 Slovaks in the United States, an increase of 120 per cent over 1910. Since World War One halted the immigration and since natural increase could not have been responsible for such a rise, there must have been over half a million Slovaks in the United States in 1914.17

The mass emigration of Slovaks from Hungary began in the late 1870's. The Slovaks received the good news of high wages in America from the Poles who were the first Slavs to go to the manufacturing centers in large numbers. They returned with large savings and told about it in the cosmopolitan county of Spis in Slovakia where the most adventure-some Slovaks--the tinkers who wandered all over Europe fixing

household implements—met and discussed business. From there word spread and adventurous Slovaks, those who had a bit of land to mortgage, did so, bought themselves a steamship ticket and soon found themselves on Ellis Island, in New York, en route to Pittsburgh. The trip cost $80.00 and usually the hard-working Slovaks repaid it in four months. After that they sent the largest share of their earnings home to their families, keeping only enough for their daily necessities. Even though these Slovaks sent much of their money home, the United States gained by their immigration because the Slovaks formed a part of the labour force which was indispensable for the expansion of American industry. The Slovaks who came were the most industrious and resourceful of the Slovak peasants and they became an asset to American society.¹⁸

The final destination of the Slovaks was the American industrial heartland which can be approximately defined by lines connecting Chicago, Baltimore and Boston. Of the 377,527 Slovaks who entered the United States between 1889 and 1910, 26,351 gave Illinois as their final

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destination; 35,729 gave New Jersey; 48,310 gave New York; 30,785 gave Ohio. The largest number, 195,632, were headed for Pennsylvania with the result that, "in every village in 'Slovakland'" there were "fifty families or more each with at least one representative in the industries of Pennsylvania, or in 'Spitzburg'."\textsuperscript{19}

The great majority of entering Slovaks worked in the steel mills and coal mines. The mines offered the best wages to non-skilled labourers. Only in iron ore mining did the Slovak earn more than the native-born--$13.83 a week for the Slovak versus $11.60 a week for the native-born.\textsuperscript{20} The workers were paid by the amount they produced and Slovaks were known to dig deeper and harder than other workers. In the coal mines the Slovak could earn as much as $13.26 a week.\textsuperscript{21} This compared to an average of $14.37 a week for the


\textsuperscript{21} Balch, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 285.
native-born in all fields of work combined. By working hard the Slovak, even if he did not speak English, could earn almost as much as the American worker.\(^{22}\)

The Slovaks wished to earn as much as possible in as short a time as possible since most of them came to the United States to make their fortune and return home. From 1908 to 1910, of the 71,172 Slovaks who entered the United States, 41,726 or fifty-nine per cent returned home.\(^{23}\) Many then usually returned a second and third time and eventually became accustomed to American life, sent for their families, and settled permanently in America. This traffic across the Atlantic resulted in a flow of American money to Slovakia which raised somewhat the standard of living of Slovaks in Hungary.\(^{24}\)

If the wages were good in America, life was nevertheless hard for the immigrants. Accidents were frequent in the mines and mills and little or no compensation was paid by

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 301.


\(^{24}\) Balch, op.cit., p. 106.
the employers. In Allegheny county alone in 1907, 529 men were killed and 2,000 injured; many were Slovaks.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 301-2; Imrich Mazar, \textit{Dejiny Binghamtons kých Slovakov /A History of Binghamton Slovaks/}, Chicago, 1919, p. 10.} Intolerance by native Americans and Irish who resented the willingness of Slovaks to work for lower wages coupled with the usual fear, alienation and sense of loneliness of the Slovaks in a sea of English-speaking people drove the Slovaks into congregating in their own districts. Living in similar low-quality houses, speaking the same language and appreciative of each other's desires, the Slovaks felt more at ease in their own neighbourhoods.\footnote{Mazar, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 8; Jan Pankuch, \textit{Dejiny Clevelandských a Lakewoodských Slovakov /A History of Cleveland and Lakewood Slovaks/}, Cleveland, 1930, p. 26.} Gradually they banded together and founded mutual-benefit societies to which they contributed a bit out of their earnings and which they used to pay compensation to widows, to orphans and to the maimed. By 1893, 277 such Slovak organizations existed, usually one in each working district. Pennsylvania had 148 Slovak organizations,
New York had thirty-three, Ohio had thirty, and Illinois had eight.27

As the Slovaks came in increasing numbers they began to build churches, establish schools and publish newspapers. In 1883 the first Slovak Catholic parish arose in Streator, Illinois, and six years later this parish established the first Slovak school. Soon thereafter Slovak parishes and schools sprang up in all major Slovak centers in the United States. The grade schools taught catechism in Slovak, they taught the children to read and write in Slovak but all other subjects were taught in English. Both nuns and laymen served as teachers and by teaching Slovak to Slovak children, they counteracted the work of Magyarization which prevailed in Hungary. By 1920 Slovaks in the United States had 176 Catholic churches, 29 Lutheran churches and 62 Lutheran missions.28

27 Jozef Pauco, 75 Rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty /75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union/, Cleveland, 1965, p. 8.

28 Ibid., pp. 4-7; Kenneth D. Miller, The Czecho-Slovaks in America, New York, 1922, p. 96.
To complete the cycle of educating Slovaks in their own language and to instill political awareness, those Slovaks who had emigrated because of political oppression by the Magyars established Slovak newspapers. The first Slovak newspaper in America was a mere Bulletin containing news from Hungary and the United States. The publishers, both ex-teacher college students, Janko Slovensky and Julius Wolf, had come to the United States after the Magyars had forcibly closed their 'gymnasium'. When they realized that Slovaks in the United States were starved for news they inaugurated their Bulletin in 1885 in Pittsburgh. 29

So successful was the Bulletin that soon more newspapers sprang up in the Slovak centers of Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago and New York. In 1910 there were twelve Slovak weekly papers published in the United States which had a combined circulation of 112,500, while the twenty Slovak weeklies then published in Hungary had a total circulation of

only 48,300. By 1920 Slovaks in the United States read fifty-four periodicals which included six published daily, twenty-five weekly, five fortnightly and sixteen monthly.\textsuperscript{30}

Such a flowering of schools, churches and newspapers reflected the growth of a national awareness among American Slovaks. While the Slovaks in Hungary yearly lost their schools, newspapers and language, Slovaks in the United States yearly gained them. Soon the Slovaks in the United States felt strong enough to assume the role of 'leaders' of the Slovak nation from their free base in exile, the United States.

Two Slovaks, the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek and the layman Peter V. Rovnianek, assumed the leadership of American Slovaks and guided their educational, cultural and nationalist aspirations. In 1882 the Bishop of Prague sent the young seminarian Furdek in answer to the request of the Bishop of Cleveland for a priest to tend to the needs of the Bohemians in the diocese of Cleveland. After he had ordained Furdek, Bishop Richard Gilmour appointed him pastor of the

\textsuperscript{30} Miller, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 96.
Czech parish of Our Lady of Lourdes where he officiated until his death in 1915. At Furdek's suggestion, Rovnianek, also a seminarian, agreed to come to Cleveland and to serve a Slovak parish. Before leaving Hungary Rovnianek stopped at Turciansky Svaty Martin which even after the closing of the Slovak Academy was still a center of Slovak nationalism. There Rovnianek found the spirit more liberating than in the seminary and upon his arrival in Cleveland in 1888 he decided to work for the cause of Slovak nationalism rather than for the Church.31

At first Rovnianek busily wrote articles for several Slovak newspapers already in existence but soon he decided to mobilize American Slovaks. He sought to organize a single Slovak-American society with its own national newspaper which would combat Magyar propaganda and which could enlist moral support for and render financial assistance to the Slovaks in Hungary. On February 15, 1890, Rovnianek founded the Narodny Slovensky Spolok (National Slovak Society) at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Rovnianek's dream of uniting the Slovaks, however commendable, was quite impractical because the Slovaks were hopelessly divided. Catholic Slovaks did not trust Lutheran Slovaks and neither trusted the secularist Slovaks. Not all Slovaks were as anti-Magyar as was Rovnianek; when Rovnianek published anti-Magyar articles in the weekly *Nova Vlast* (*New Home*), the Reverend Jozef Kossalko replied with a defense of the Magyars in his weekly *Zastava* (*Flag*). While Rovnianek wanted the society to be neutral in religious matters and to accept all Slovaks regardless of creed, Furdek opposed him. Furdek feared that neutral would soon come to mean secularist and that association with the irreligious would draw the Slovaks away from their church.

Furdek's suspicions were confirmed when representatives of the Society came to Cleveland to speak to a gathering which he had assembled. In frankly anti-clerical language the spokesmen encouraged the Cleveland audience to throw off the "clerical yoke" and to follow their priests no longer.

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This incident made most unlikely any clerical support for the National Slovak Society and seriously reduced the chance of a united effort. On September 4, 1890, Furdek founded the Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota (First Catholic Slovak Union) which adopted the motto "Za Boha a Narod" (For God and the Nation).  

For the next several years these two rival national organizations waged editorial war on each other in their weekly newspapers, the Amerikansko Slovenske Noviny (American Slovak News) and Jednota (Unity) while the Lutherans stood aside and set up their own organizations. In 1892 the Lutherans established their Evangelical Union with its own newspaper, the Slovensky Hlasnik (Slovak Herald). They too split in 1893 and thereafter Cleveland Lutherans, led by Jan Pankuch, editor of the Cleveland weekly Hlas (Voice) supported the Slovak national cause while the Slovak Lutherans in Chicago, influenced by the huge Czech population of that city, drew closer to the Czechs and supported the

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34 Ibid., p. 31.
Czechoslovak idea.  

In the campaign for membership the First Catholic Slovak Union and other Catholic organizations easily triumphed over the National Slovak Society and the non-Catholic organizations. The National Slovak Society had included in its charter the provision that all members be Christian and this discouraged secularists from joining. Also, the National Slovak Society insisted that all of its members become American citizens. Since most Slovaks did not at first wish to settle in the United States they did not join the National Slovak Society. The National Slovak Society had only 39,118 members in 1918.

The majority of Slovaks, about eighty per cent, were Catholics and on the advice of their priests they joined the Catholic organizations. From a mere 4,063 adult male members in 1891, the membership of First Catholic Slovak Union rose


36 Pankuch, op.cit., p. 32.
to 46,791 in 1914 and 51,817 in 1918.37 The Catholic gymnastic Falcon organizations similarly outstripped their secularist rivals. In 1905 Catholic members of the Telocvicna Slovenska Jednota Sokol (Gymnastic Slovak Union Falcon) tired of the rampant anti-clericalism of its leaders and founded their own Rimsko a Grecko Katolicka Slovenska Jednota Sokol (Roman and Greek Catholic Gymnastic Slovak Union Falcon). By 1918 the new Sokol outnumbered its parent organization by 19,450 to 14,381 adult male members. The sum total of all Catholic men's, women's and children's organizations was 131,777 in 1918. This compared to 74,134 members of secular, Lutheran and neutral Slovak organizations in 1918.38

The bickering among Slovak leaders in the United States ceased temporarily at the urging of the Slovak leaders in Turciansky Svaty Martin. On October 14, 1897, the Slovak editors of the United States met and agreed to form a

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37 Pauco, _op.cit._, pp. 16, 116 and 143.

committee which would collect a National Fund for Slovakia. This was the first of many such committees that sprang up among American Slovaks during the next decade. On October 15, 1905, representatives of thirteen Slovak organizations and nine newspapers met in New York and established a Central Slovak National Committee to collect money for the support of the Slovaks in Hungary. As if they had not heard of it, Cleveland Slovaks organized their own Slovak National Council for the same purpose about one year later. To complicate matters further, on September 3, 1906, a number of Slovak Catholic priests met in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and founded a Catholic Congress of Slovaks.39

In June, 1906, the Slovak leaders at Turciansky Svätý Martin again urged the American Slovaks to emulate their example and to submerge their differences. If American Slovaks coordinated their efforts and organized a single national committee, the letter promised, then the two committees could represent the 'lower house' and 'upper house' of the Slovak nationalist movement. To this suggestion they

39 Pauco, op.cit., pp. 29, 37, 40, 52 and 55; Pankuch, op.cit., p. 66.
appended a plea for financial aid. The most notable Slovak leaders—-the three Slovak members of the Hungarian parliament, Dr. Pavel Blaho, Milan Hodza and Ferko Skycak; three Roman Catholic priests, Florian Tomanek, Pavel Blaho and Ferdis Juriga; the poet Svatozar Hurban Vajansky and the lawyer Dr. August Rath clearly recognized the role of American Slovaks in the leadership of the Slovak nationalist movement.40

Once again American Slovak leaders strove for a united effort. On April 4, 1907, representatives of Slovak organizations and newspapers met in Pittsburgh and joined in a call for a National Slovak Congress. Over ten thousand delegates packed into Gray's Armory in Cleveland on May 26, 1907, where, in a burst of unity, they founded the Slovak League of America. The delegates elected Furdek first president of the League and Rovnianek as well as all other leaders of Slovak organizations became vice-presidents. The League's programme deplored Magyarization of Slovaks in Hungary and pledged aid to the cause of Slovak nationhood.41

40 Mazar, op.cit., pp. 21-3.

41 Skalica, Ludove Noviny, June 4, 1907, p. 5; Pauco, op.cit., pp. 65-7; Pankuch, op.cit., pp. 71-3.
The first years of the League's existence were deceptively fruitful. It organized lectures, distributed membership badges and sold stamps to raise money. By 1908 it had collected twelve thousand dollars for the support of Slovaks in Hungary and it sent seven thousand dollars home to help Slovak newspapers and politicians. It also aided the widows and orphaned children of the thirty victims of the Cernova Massacre where Magyar police opened fire on Slovak parishioners protesting the consecration of their church by a Magyarone priest. Furdek tried to use the Cernova Massacre as an occasion to strengthen the League but his proposal that all Slovaks in the United States donate one per cent of their earnings for national causes met with no success. In 1909, tired of his duties, Furdek resigned the presidency of the League and the following year he also resigned his post as editor of Jednota.

42 Skalica, Ludove Noviny, November 1, 1907, pp. 1-7, and November 8, 1907, pp. 2-5; Scotus Viator, op.cit., pp. 331-51; Pauco, op.cit., p.69; and Pankuch, op.cit., p. 72.

Under Furdek's successor, Rovnianek, the League encountered financial disaster. In the new president's savings company, P. V. Rovnianek & Co., the League and many Slovaks, too, had entrusted their funds. Several bad investments by Rovnianek drove his company to bankruptcy in July, 1911, and five thousand dollars of League money was lost. Rovnianek fled west to escape the ire of his depositors and tried to make it up to them by gold mining for the next quarter century. He never struck it rich and he died in poverty in 1933.44

The Fifth Congress of the League which met on November 30, 1911, heard the bleak news that the League had only 515 members and that its funds totaled a mere $1,259.33.45 The Congress entrusted the League's future to Albert Mamatey. Mamatey, a former instructor of mechanical engineering at the Carnegie Technological Institute in Pittsburgh, was the newly-elected president of the National Slovak Society. A lutheran, Mamatey tried to be neutral in the

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44 Pankuch, op.cit., p. 77; Rovnianek, op.cit., p. 334; Culen, op.cit., p. 95.
45 Pauco, op.cit., p. 95.
Both Mamatey and Count Albert Apponyi had reason to believe that the fortunes and finances of the League did not adequately represent the development of national sentiment among American Slovaks. In February, 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, former Hungarian Minister of Education, came to the United States on a lecture tour. Cleveland Slovaks prepared for his visit by a public mass-meeting where they aired their grievances and then greeted his arrival at the railroad station with hisses as twenty policemen escorted him through a cheering Magyar crowd. The Slovaks also passed out anti-Apponyi literature and published an open letter to Apponyi in which they upbraided him for his linguistic policy. They pointedly reminded Apponyi that in America they had established their own schools which were undoing the work of Apponyi and his fellow exponents of Magyarization.

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47 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 10, 1911, p. 14; February 14, 1911, p. 2; February 17, 1911, p. 4; February 19, 1911, p. 1; February 19, 1911, p. 2.
Apponyi received much rougher treatment at the hands of Slovaks in Chicago. He was denounced as a tyrant at a mass-meeting of two thousand Slavs who disrupted his address to the American Societies Federation at Fine Arts Hall. In huge mobs Slovaks pressed to the stage and pursued the fleeing Apponyi to his car. Only club-swinging police saved Apponyi from the fury of the mob.\footnote{Ibid., February 20, 1911, p. 4; February 21, 1911, p. 5; February 24, 1911, p. 1.} Worried by these disturbances the organizers of the Washington Festival at which Apponyi was to speak cancelled his invitation. Apponyi later reminisced that "the most interesting, though not the most pleasant, days of my lecture tour were spent in Chicago."\footnote{Count Albert Apponyi, \textit{The Memoirs of Count Albert Apponyi}, New York, 1935, p. 187.}

While many Slovaks in the United States displayed a degree of national consciousness in attacking Apponyi, the leaders of the Slovaks were paralyzed by their political differences. Jozef Husek, Furdek's successor as editor of \textit{Jednota} was a very energetic lay Catholic known for his
opposition to secularism and to any plan of union with the Czechs.\textsuperscript{50} Milan Getting, the editor of \textit{Slovensky Sokol} (\textit{Slovak Falcon}) was an avid secularist and Czechophile. He was based in New York where he had close contacts with the large Czech community.\textsuperscript{51} Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, and Ivan Bielek, editor of \textit{Narodne Noviny} (\textit{National News}), the official organ of the National Slovak Society since 1909, tried to steer a middle course and stood for autonomy for the Slovaks in any future arrangement.\textsuperscript{52}

The divisions among the American Slovaks reflected similar dissension in Hungary. Thomas G. Masaryk, a Czech professor of philosophy, revived the old programme of the political union of Czechs and Slovaks. In 1897 he started the \textit{Hlasist} (\textit{Voice}) movement in Bohemia. Several secularist and Protestant leaders in Slovakia, notably Dr. Vavro Srobar, Dr. Milan Hodza, Dr. Anton Stafanek and Dr. Pavel Blaho, supported the \textit{Hlasist} movement. Catholic Slovaks led by the

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Jednota}, October 18, 1911, p. 4 and September 20, 1911, p. 4; as cited in Pauco, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{51} Getting, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 10; Capek Jr., \textit{op.cit.}, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Narodne Noviny}, December 10, 1914, p. 4.
priests Andrej Hlinka, Ferdis Juriga, Florian Tomanek and by the deputy Ferko Skycak, and a few Lutherans such as the historian Jozef Skultety and the poet Vajansky, opposed union with the Czechs. They hoped to achieve autonomy within Hungary and expected help from Russia in the event of war. Had Masaryk and his followers not been so anti-clerical this split might have been averted but the Hlasist programme, based on the motto "Away from Rome!", destroyed any chance of cooperation from good Catholics.\textsuperscript{53} While Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were thus split the outbreak of the first World War caught them unprepared to exploit their best opportunity thus far to achieve their nationalistic aims.

CHAPTER II

Autonomy Within Hungary or Union With the Czechs:
1914-1916

World War One did not heal the rifts among American Slovaks. They discussed the fate of Slovakia in the years 1914 and 1915 and arrived at two contradictory solutions. The first solution, as expressed in a second Memorandum of the Slovak nation, repeated the demand for Slovak autonomy within Hungary. The second solution, arrived at by Czechs and Slovaks in Cleveland, formally expressed for the first time anywhere, the desire of the Czechs and Slovaks to unite into a federal state. Neither solution was wholly acceptable to all Slovaks in the United States and in 1916 they split into Slovak and Czechoslovak camps.

The outbreak of World War One in August, 1914, found the Slovak League preoccupied with counteracting, in a new Memorandum of the Slovak Nation, the two visits in April and July to the United States of Count Michael Karolyi, leader of the Magyar independence party. On the occasion of both visits
the Slovak League urged the Slovaks to boycott his meetings. In Cleveland on April 10, Slovaks publicly questioned Karolyi and he promised the minorities full freedom and democracy.

In New York, Slovaks enlisted the aid of the Serb professor of physics and engineering at Columbia, Michael Pupin, to denounce Karolyi as a tyrant. At the League Congress in Pittsburgh, on April 26, the four thousand delegates approved the creation of a special ten-man committee to draft a Memorandum to include all the complaints and desires of the Slovak nation. The committee included Ivan Daxner, son of Marko Daxner, one of the Lutheran authors of the 1861 Memorandum of the Slovak Nation. Ivan Daxner, of the Tatra Bank of Slovakia, had come to the United States in 1913 to help clear up the financial disaster of P. V. Rovnianek & Co., had joined the Slovak League in 1914, and had risen to prominence.

1 Narodne Noviny, March 26, 1914, p. 1; Jednota, July 8, 1914, p. 1.

2 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 11, 1914, p. 1.


by his persuasive powers. He became secretary of the Slovak League in early 1915 and he dominated the League until he resigned in mid-1917. Daxner favoured autonomy for the Slovaks within Hungary, he fought for this cause for the next three years and influenced all League policy towards this end, and when the Memorandum of 1914 appeared in July, it carried Daxner's imprint.

The Memorandum of 1914 called for full Slovak autonomy but rejected any thoughts of the dismemberment of Hungary. It demanded recognition of the Slovak nation, the Slovak language and "Home Rule" for the Slovak counties in Hungary. The Slovak League distributed the Memorandum among American Slovak leaders for their approval in July, 1914, and then had it translated into six major languages and sent to libraries, government offices and universities.

5 Ivan Daxner, Ako sa vodi nasmu slovenskemu narodu v Cesko-Slovenskej Republike? /How Fares Our Slovak Nation in the Czecho-Slovak Republic/, Pittsburgh, 1922, p. 3.

Rejection of the dismemberment of Hungary by the drafters of the Memorandum aroused a storm of controversy among American Slovaks. Milan Getting, editor of the secular Slovensky Sokol (Slovak Falcon) and chief spokesman in New York for Czech and Slovak unity, published the then still secret Memorandum and criticized it for not discussing the possibility of Czech and Slovak union. Albert Mamatey, president of the League and the editors Ivan Bielek and Jozef Husek of Narodne Noviny and Jednota defended the Memorandum by declaring treasonous any advocacy of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. They rebuffed Getting for glory-seeking and for trying to assume the leadership of American Slovaks.

The outbreak of the European war in the first days of August, 1914, had no marked effect on the League's autonomy programme. At a quarterly meeting of the League executive on

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8 Narodne Noviny, July 30, 1914, p. 4; August 27, 1914, p. 4; Jednota, July 29, 1914, p. 4.
September 10, 1914, Getting once again called for the overthrow of Austria-Hungary and for Czech and Slovak union but was voted down. Daxner, in all his caution, pointed out that the war's outcome was in doubt, that many Slovaks had relatives in Hungary and that a treasonous programme by the Slovak League would do more harm than good. The assembled delegates concurred.

At the same time the meeting denounced Matus Dula, president of the Slovak National Party in Hungary, because he had declared his open support of the dynasty and of the war. Though it regretted the murder of Francis Ferdinand, the League resolution urged Slovaks in the United States to ignore the call of the Hungarian government for reservists to return home and serve in the army. Finally, the delegates established a fund for widows and orphans of Slovak soldiers killed in the war.9

The League's programme of autonomy did not satisfy those Slovaks and Czechs in the United States who advocated

9 Narodne Noviny, September 3, 1914, p. 4; September 17, 1914, p. 4; Getting, op.cit., p. 39.
the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a new state. On October 1, 1914, a group of Czech-Americans in Chicago announced their readiness to fight for Czech independence and they welcomed Slovak cooperation.\(^ {10}\) The Czechs sounded out Mamatey about the possibility of Czech and Slovak union. Mamatey declared that the Slovak League officially stood for an autonomous Slovakia within Hungary but that he personally favoured union with the Czechs on the basis of full federal equality between the two nations. If this were not acceptable, he said, the Slovaks would seek autonomy in whichever European nation would be willing to grant it to them.\(^ {11}\) On January 17, 1915, a group of Czechs in New York, supported by Milan Getting, held a conference of local Czechs and Slovaks and invited the Slovak League to send representatives. Mamatey and Daxner went but refused to commit themselves on the grounds that only a Congress of the League could make or

\(^{10}\) *New York Times*, November 28, 1914, p. 2; *Getting, op.cit.*, p. 42.

\(^{11}\) *Jednota*, December 9, 1914, p. 4; *Narodne Noviny*, December 10, 1914, p. 4.
alter Slovak policy. When Getting and Tomas Capek, a New York Czech lawyer issued an appeal for 'Czechoslovak' unity, the League at first ignored and later denounced it.\textsuperscript{12}

The eighth Congress of the Slovak League met in Pittsburgh on February 22, 1915, and rejected union with the Czechs. Expressing confidence in their executive, the delegates re-elected Mamatey as president and then elected Ivan Daxner as the first, paid, full-time secretary of the League. Daxner declared the time premature to decide the future and he asked for support for the Memorandum and for autonomy. The Congress backed Daxner, while Milan Getting dissented, and it then accepted the Memorandum as the political programme of the League.\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{Jednota} Jozef Husek rejoiced over this decision and again warned the Slovaks to stay away


from the secularist Czechs of New York. 14

Husek exploited the division between Catholic and secularist Czechs. In America fully fifty per cent of the Czechs had left the Roman Catholic Church and had become aggressive secularists. 15 On September 2, 1914, secularist Czechs of Chicago created the Bohemian National Alliance to work for Bohemian independence. 16 Catholic Czechs and Czechs of New York, Cleveland and Detroit, the other Czech centers, remained aloof. On March 13 and 14, 1915, secularist Czechs from these centers met in Cleveland and agreed to agitate for a free Bohemia. 17 The Czech political programme did not include the Slovaks until T. G. Masaryk, the acknowledged leader of the Czechs in exile, sent definite instructions to
this effect in November, 1915. As late as February, 1917, even T. G. Masaryk did not know exactly what kind of state would result if the Czechs and Slovaks united. He wrote, "It will depend, for instance, how close the union is as to whether the name 'Czechoslovak', 'Czecho-Slovak', or else 'Czech and Slovak', will be decided upon." Only on July 4, 1917, did Czech Catholics and secularists meet and agree to work together for the independence of their homeland in a new Bohemian National Alliance.

While the Czechs themselves were so divided, the Slovak League saw no need to unite with the Czechs and many Slovak leaders even resented suggestions to this effect. In a scathing editorial in Narodne Noviny entitled "The Insincerity of Czech Leaders," Ivan Bielek took to task the Serb professor Pupin and the Czech leader Tomas Capek for their references to the Slovaks as a mere "branch" of the


20 The Bohemian Review, August, 1917, p. 15.
Czech race and the Slovak language as a mere dialect of the Czech. 21 The editorial singled out the appeal drawn up by Milan Getting and the New York Czechs and Capek's book, Bohemia Under Hapsburg Misrule. 22 Speaking of Czech imperialistic tendencies, Ivan Bielek rejected emphatically all Czech talk of a "nation of twelve million Czechs" and Jozef Husek in Jednota added impatiently, "The Magyars say we are Magyars, the Czechs that we are Czechs. But we are Slovaks!" 23

The Slovak League set out on an independent course in the summer of 1915. In July, 1915, it announced that it had begun a politico-agitational fund; it suggested that the League send two delegates to Europe to represent the Slovak cause in the allied capitals and that the Slovaks establish a Slovak press bureau in America to rally Slovaks to the cause

21 Narodne Noviny, June 24, 1915, p. 4; Jednota, June 30, 1915, pp. 4-5.

22 New York, 1915.

23 For more anti-Czech articles see Jednota, July 7, 1915, p. 4; and Narodne Noviny, September 16, 1915, p. 4.
of Slovak autonomy within Hungary. The Slovak League also despatched a delegate to Canada to intervene with the Canadian government on behalf of Slovaks interned as enemy aliens. The League delegate went to Canada in June and December, 1915, he assured the Canadian authorities of the loyalty of Slovaks to the allied cause and received permission to visit the camps and to recommend Slovaks for release. The Canadian authorities subsequently released one hundred and twenty Slovaks from detention camps.

Alarmed by this Slovak demonstration of independence, American Czechs and their Slovak supporters invited the Slovak League to a meeting with the Bohemian National Alliance to iron out their differences. The meeting was arranged after some hectic correspondence between New York and Chicago Czechs and after constant prodding by Stefan Osusky, a Lutheran Slovak lawyer from Chicago who agitated in his newspaper

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Slovenske Slovo (Slovak Word) for Czech and Slovak cooperation. On October 22, 1915, representatives of the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League met in Cleveland and resolved their differences.

The Czech and Slovak representatives at Cleveland drew up the first programme for the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a new state of Czecho-Slovakia. They pledged their support of independence for Bohemia and for Slovakia and for the union of these two autonomous parts in a federal state. They agreed to recognize only their respective organizations, the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League, as the representatives of the Czechs and Slovaks in America. Future agreements between Czechs and Slovaks, either in Europe or in the United States, had to be approved by both the Bohemian Alliance and the Slovak League. Further, the meeting created a national fund to support their common effort and the members agreed to issue joint manifestos and

26 Getting, op.cit., p. 61, See also Appendix I, p.144.
to hold joint conferences whenever possible. 27 The Cleveland agreement was signed by Jozef Tvrzicky of Chicago, secretary of the Bohemian National Alliance and Emmanuel Voska, secretary of the New York branch of the Alliance for the Czechs and by Albert Mamatey, Ivan Daxner, Jozef Husek, Jan Pankuch and Stefan Osusky for the Slovaks. Noticeable by their absence were Milan Getting who did not believe in a separate Slovak nation and representatives of Czech Catholics who did not trust the secularists of the Bohemian National Alliance. 28

The Cleveland agreement preceded the better-known Declaration of the Czech Foreign Committee at Paris by a full three weeks and it may well have stimulated the drafting of the Declaration. On November 14, 1915, a group of Czech exiles in Paris organized into a Czech Foreign Committee which called for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the


creation of a Czechoslovak state. This self-appointed committee consisted of two Czech members of the Austrian Parliament, T. G. Masaryk and Jozef Durich, and a former sociology professor at Vienna, Eduard Benes. Certain academics and newspapermen in France and Britain such as R. W. Seton-Watson, Lewis Namier, Louis Leger, Ernest Denis and Wickham Steed supported this committee but it totally lacked a mandate or broad base of support from Czechs and Slovaks in Austria-Hungary. In such a situation support from American Czechs and Slovaks became imperative since the committee in Paris hoped to persuade the allies that it represented the true interests of Czechs and Slovaks.

Support for the Paris Committee came instantly from the Bohemian Alliance but not from the Slovak League. Masaryk was a total stranger to American Slovaks and Mamatey had to introduce him to them in a series of newspaper articles.

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Mamatey also had to warn Masaryk about the sensibilities of American Slovaks, especially their aversion to being called Czechs or to their being ignored by Czech spokesmen. Mamatey pointedly reminded Masaryk to "please remember us Slovaks, who in harmony with Bohemians are working and hoping to attain liberty and national independence."31

Stefan Osusky and his Slovak followers in Chicago had prodded Albert Mamatey to introduce Masaryk to American Slovaks and to hold the next Congress of the Slovak League in Chicago. After having helped bring about the Cleveland agreement, Osusky determined to seek closer cooperation with the Czechs in Europe and he hoped to be sent as a League delegate to Europe. With these aims in mind Osusky and his followers managed to exert enough pressure on Albert Mamatey to have him convene the next Congress of the League in Chicago.32 Mamatey excused his decision by stating that Chicago was not yet a regional member of the League and had to be "won over."33


32 Getting, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

The ninth Congress of the Slovak League convened on February 22, 1916 and it was dominated by Chicago delegates who had taken out instant League membership at the door. Representatives of Catholic organizations as well as the League vice-presidents from the east failed to appear. The Chicago delegates elected Stefan Osusky as vice-president while they re-elected Mamatey and Daxner to their old posts. The delegates resolved to despatch Stefan Osusky to Europe in order to represent the Slovak League in the allied capitals and to explain the League's programme to the Czech Foreign Committee in Paris. Mamatey feared that Catholic Slovaks in the United States would oppose sending a Lutheran Slovak to Europe, especially since they had not taken part in his selection, and he suggested that the League hold a smaller executive meeting in the east to select a Catholic delegate to accompany Osusky. The Congress delegates agreed and adjourned.

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34 Jednota, March 1, 1916, p. 1; Narodne Noviny, March 2, p. 1; March 9, 1916, p. 4.

35 See Appendix I, p. 146.
Mamatey had good reason to be apprehensive about Catholic Slovak reaction to the Congress because Jozef Husek in Jednota had opposed the convening of the Congress in Chicago and the despatch of a League delegate to Europe. Before the Congress, Husek advised the Slovaks to avoid the free-thinking Czechs of Europe, he denounced Masaryk and the "Czechoslovak devil's heel" and added that the League should consolidate its strength among American Slovaks and avoid the Czechs like the plague. After the Congress Husek seized upon a Czech anti-Rome speech in St. Louis to denounce the Czechs once again, and the newspapers Slovak V Amerike (The Slovak in America) and Katolicky Sokol joined Husek in deplored the lack of Catholic representation at the last League Congress and in declaring no-confidence in the Slovak League.  

Alarmed by these anti-League outbursts, Mamatey quickly called the supplementary League executive meeting for

36 Jednota, February 9, 1916, p. 4; February 16, 1916, p. 4.

37 Jednota, March 8, 1916, p. 4; March 15, 1916, p. 4; March 22, 1916, p. 4; and March 29, 1916, p. 4.
April 12 in Pittsburgh and invited the Catholics to select their own delegate to Europe and to help decide the function of the two delegates. The Catholics selected Gustav Kosik, a recent graduate of law at Columbia University and editor of Katolicky Sokol as their delegate to Europe. The conference then decided, over the protests of Milan Getting who wished the delegates to serve Masaryk, that the two delegates should visit the main capitals of Europe and work primarily in Russia. The conference failed to define the function of the two delegates to Europe.

The inability of the conference to define the function of the two delegates revealed the deep disunity still prevalent among American Slovak leaders and foreshadowed the complete loss of control of the Slovak League over its delegates to Europe. Osusky and Kosik believed that they should go to Europe as plenipotentiaries of the Slovak League. Daxner and Mamatey disagreed and, just before the two delegates left America, on May 24, 1916, Daxner presented

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them with a list of instructions outlining their function. The instructions charged the delegates to work in the spirit of the Memorandum of 1914 and of the Cleveland agreement, two contradictory programmes. It further charged them to concentrate their work in Russia, to travel together, to send weekly progress reports and to seek League approval before concluding any agreements with other parties. The two delegates did not accept these provisions and left without signing the instructions. 39

In Europe the two delegates decided that they were in a better position to judge the future than was the Slovak League and they ignored the League's instructions and worked quite independently of the League. After a few weeks of joint work in London and Paris in June, 1916, Osusky decided to remain in France and Kosik left for Russia and the League did not hear from Kosik for the next year. Osusky did send regular reports from France during 1916 but he never asked for advice or instructions. On his own he joined the Czech

National Council in Paris and he persuaded the members of the
Council to change its name to Czecho-Slovak National Council
if they wanted American Slovak support. With his command of
Slovak, Czech, German, Magyar, English and French, Osusky was
invaluable to the Paris Council as a translator and interpreter
of Austro-Hungarian news. In mid-1917, again on his own
initiative, Osusky moved to Switzerland, he befriended
George D. Herron, and together they informed Woodrow Wilson
of Austria's peace moves and desires. In late 1918, as a
reward for his services, the Czecho-Slovak government
appointed Osusky the first Czecho-Slovak charge d'affaires
to Great Britain and in 1919 as second delegate to the Paris
Peace Conference for Czecho-Slovakia. Always working in the
spirit of the Cleveland agreement, Osusky had Czecho-Slovakia
spelled with the hyphen in all three treaties of peace—
Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon. From 1920 to 1939
Osusky served as Czecho-Slovak ambassador to France and he
acquired international fame as a diplomat par excellence. 40

40 Jednota, August 2, 1916, p. 5; August 9, 1916, p. 4;
October 18, 1916, p. 4; Narodne Noviny, August 10, 1916, p. 5;
October 19, 1916, pp. 5-7; Pankuch, op.cit., pp. 125-27;
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of
Trianon, New York, 1924, pp. 3, 267 and 461; See also
Appendix I, pp. 147-164.
The independence of the two delegates to Europe caused great embarrassment to the Slovak League, it heightened tensions among Slovaks and it worsened Czech-Slovak relations in America. Mamatey and Daxner attempted to keep the trip of the two delegates secret by informing only 'reliable' Slovak leaders of its details and by publishing nothing for three months. They included Milan Getting in their list of 'reliable' Slovaks and he promptly told the leaders of the Bohemian National Alliance that the League had sent two secretaries to work for T. G. Masaryk in London. The Alliance in turn alerted Masaryk to their arrival and when he learned that the two secretaries had no intention of remaining in London, his complaints were aired in the Chicago Czech paper Svornost (Harmony). Mamatey became furious at this breach of secrecy and he indignantly attacked the Czechs for their interference in Slovak matters. Mamatey then published the details of the April 12 meeting and the instructions to the delegates, although he remained too ashamed to admit that the delegates had refused to follow the instructions and he did not confess until the following
year.41

The affair of the delegates and the breach of secrecy touched off the most virulent attack on the Czechs by the Slovaks ever. Ivan Bielek of Narodne Noviny seized upon an article published by the Czech press bureau in May, 1916, which used the Czechoslovak name and which advocated its acceptance by the Slovaks. Bielek reprimanded the Czechs for lack of tact and reminded them that "A Czechoslovak nation does not exist, only two brotherly nations, the Czechs and Slovaks."42 Jozef Husek and Albert Mamatey attacked the pro-Czech Slovak Ludovy Dennik (People's Daily) of Chicago because it favoured the Czechoslovak name and because it had referred to the First Catholic Slovak Union as a "Moscow Union" because Jednota opposed the Czechoslovak name.43 In October, 1916, Masaryk, speaking in London, called for the freedom of all the nationalities of Austria-Hungary but he neglected to list the Slovaks among these nationalities.


Ivan Bielek tore into Masaryk for this omission, for Masaryk's use of the word Czechoslovak and he again warned that "a Czechoslovak does not exist, only a Czech and Slovak" and that "such chaos must cease" or else Slovaks would stop working with the Czechs.

The wave of anti-Czech feeling among Slovaks reached its crescendo in October, 1916, when the *Denny Hlas* (Daily Voice) of Cleveland reported that it had learned, via Czech sources, that Gustav Kosik in Russia had signed some sort of agreement with Czechs in Kiev which spoke of a Czechoslovak nation. If it was true, *Denny Hlas* continued, then it advocated that Kosik be censured by the League, that all funds to him be cut off and that he be recalled. Albert Mamatey and Ivan Daxner preferred not to believe the report but if he had indeed signed such an agreement, he had done so without consulting the League. Ivan Bielek and Jozef Husek were not so charitable and both called for a censure.

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of Kosik for having violated the Cleveland agreement. 45

Milan Getting, the foremost exponent of Czechoslovakism in America, could not countenance all this anti-Czech feeling and he left the Slovak League. As a first step, on September 15, 1916, he cabled Masaryk and declared the full support of the secular Slovak Sokols, numbering eleven thousand, for Masaryk and for Czechoslovakism. In November, Getting went one step further and declared his approval of the Kiev agreement which Kosik reportedly signed; he declared that European organizations, not American ones, would decide the future of Czechs and Slovaks; he rejected the Cleveland agreement; and, as a final gesture of contempt, he declared that the Slovaks were not a nation but a group of "illiterate boobs" 46 who needed the Czechs for their survival. He then sent five hundred dollars to Masaryk and re-assured him of his full support.

45 Maurice Janin, MOJE UCAST NA CESKOSLOVENSKEMU BOJI ZA SVOBODU /My Role in the Czechoslovak Struggle for Freedom/, Prague, 1930, pp. 18-9, for the Kiev agreement of August 29, 1916; Jednota, October 18, 1916, p. 4; November 8, 1916, p. 4; and Narodne Noviny, October 19, 1916, p. 4.

46 Getting, op.cit., p. 88; Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1916, p. 4.
All the work of the Slovak League from 1914 to 1916 seemed in jeopardy as dissensions rocked American Slovaks and as the Slovak League lost control of its two delegates to Europe. Failure was in the air as Milan Getting rejected the Cleveland agreement and seceded from the League. The two delegates in Europe went their own way, Masaryk ignored the Slovaks and the cause of Slovak nationhood stagnated. Three years of efforts by the Slovak League for recognition of the Slovak nation smacked of failure.
CHAPTER III

**Success Beckons American Slovaks to Support the Czech Liberation Movement: 1917**

The attitude of American Slovaks towards the Czechs changed radically in 1917. Impressed by the success of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Europe, by Allied sympathy and by newspaper support for the Czecho-Slovak cause, the League became more amenable to the Czecho-Slovak idea. American entry into the war gratified American Slovaks who began to view Woodrow Wilson as their champion. The Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris paid more attention to American Slovaks and sent one of its members to America to win them over. One of the League delegates returned and instead of censuring him the League congratulated him. At year's end American Slovaks fully supported the Czecho-Slovak cause by enlisting men for a Czecho-Slovak Legion in France, by engaging in newspaper propaganda and by establishing a million dollar drive. In spite of appearances, however, deep differences still divided American Slovaks.

In early 1917 American Slovaks changed their attitude towards the Czechs after receiving good news from
Europe. On January 10, 1917, in a reply to Woodrow Wilson's call for a declaration of war aims, the Allied powers voiced their support for the "liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, and of the Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination."¹ The inclusion of the "Czecho-Slovaks" in this reply signalled a victory for the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris. Albert Mamatey and Ivan Bielek chose to share this victory by declaring that "we are bringing in results."² Success beckoned American Slovaks to join with the Czechs in the liberation movement.

Delegates to the tenth Congress of the Slovak League, held in Cleveland on February 22, 1917, openly advocated, for the first time, the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state. They resolved to support Woodrow Wilson in his crisis with Germany while they condemned Germany and Austria-Hungary for crimes against humanity and


² Jednota, January 17, 1917, pp. 1 and 4; Narodne Noviny, January 18, 1917, pp. 1 and 4.
they advocated a United States declaration of war upon them.³

At a quarterly meeting of the executive of the Slovak League on April 12, 1917, the assembled delegates agreed to cooperate closely with the Czechs. Heeding previous Czech suggestions, the League executive announced the formation of a Slovak Press Bureau in New York. Staffed by five Czechs and five Slovaks, financed equally by the Bohemian Alliance and the Slovak League and directed at the American press, the American public and the American government, the Slav Press Bureau represented the first concrete example of official Czech and Slovak cooperation in the United States.⁴

The League executive also decided, on April 12, 1917, to draft a joint declaration with the Czechs expressing the desire of the Czechs and Slovaks to unite into one state. On June 27, 1917, the declaration appeared in English, it restated the League's contention that in addressing the civilized world the Slovaks "do so in behalf of the whole Slovak nation," and that the Slovaks and Czechs in America

³ Narodne Noviny, March 1, 1917, p. 5; March 8, 1917, p. 5.

"demand an independent Bohemian-Slovak state, with complete self-government for the Slovaks." \(^5\)

Czech and Slovak efforts for press support bore fruit in May, 1917. The Slav Press Bureau apparently influenced the editorial policy of the \textit{New York Times}, for in May, 1917, an editorial labeled the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary a "Humbug." \(^6\) The \textit{New York Times} had once praised Hungarian democracy and had spoken favourably of Magyar statesmen. \(^7\) After May, 1917, the paper increased its coverage of the Czecho-Slovak movement.

The Czechs and Slovaks also scored a minor success in Congress. On May 25, 1917, William S. Kenyon, a Republican Senator from Iowa and Adolph J. Sabath, a Democratic Representative from Illinois and a Czech by birth, sponsored a Joint Resolution which asked for United States support for the independence of the Bohemians and Slovaks and for the establishment of a Bohemian-Slovak state as part of the future


peace arrangements. 8

With Woodrow Wilson the Czechs and Slovaks had no success in 1917, but they chose to believe that he was their champion. On January 22, 1917, Wilson delivered his "Peace Without Victory" address in which he reaffirmed the American principle that "governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." 9 American Slovaks interpreted this and Wilson's additional statement that "no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property" as an endorsement of the aspirations of the oppressed nations. In addition to sending Wilson telegrams of appreciation, American Slovak organizations sent representatives to Wilson's second inaugural in Washington. A twenty member committee of the Slovak League, headed by Albert Mamatey, attempted to see the President. They left a note of their support and thanked Wilson "for becoming the champion of the cause of their


9 Address of the President to the Senate, Congressional Record, Senate, 64th Congress, 2nd Session, January 22, 1917, p. 1742.
oppressed brethren in their distant homeland."10 In reply, Wilson expressed regret at having been too occupied to receive the delegation and he thanked them for their "generous assurances."11

In reality, Woodrow Wilson did not yet favour the aspirations of the oppressed nationalities for independence. He favoured the federalization of Austria-Hungary but not its destruction. In April, 1917, he asked Congress to declare war upon Germany but not upon Austria-Hungary because he wished to arrange a separate peace with a reformed Austria-Hungary.12 Even when he asked Congress to declare war upon Austria-Hungary in December, 1917, he publicly affirmed that "we do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire."13


In their efforts at cooperation with the Czechs and in their propaganda work on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak cause, American Slovaks received much encouragement for the first time from the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris. In early January, 1917, Masaryk published an article in Ceskoslovenska Samostatnost (Czechoslovak Independence) entitled "Slovakia in International Politics" in which he discussed the Slovak question for the first time. He promised the Slovaks full language rights in the proposed new state though he neglected to refer to the Cleveland agreement. Eduard Benes followed up Masaryk's article with one of his own in which he praised the Slovaks Milan R. Stefanik, Stefan Osusky and Gustav Kosik for their excellent work on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak cause. Benes added that Stefanik was so valuable that "all our efforts in France are closely connected with his name."

Benes had good reason to praise Dr. Milan Rastislav Stefanik because he was an extremely capable ally who

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14 Narodne Noviny, January 11, 1917, p. 4.

15 Narodne Noviny, January 18, 1917, p. 4.
favoured a close political union of Czechs and Slovaks. This Slovak Lutheran who had once studied at Prague under T. G. Masaryk, who had become a world famous astronomer and a member of the French Academy, was a French citizen. In 1914 Stefanik joined the French army air-force as a private and by 1918 he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general. Stefanik mingled in high French society, especially in the 'salons' of Paris and he had contacts in high political places. On February 3, 1916, he arranged for Aristide Briand, then President of the Council of Deputies and Minister of External Affairs, to receive Masaryk in an audience and to be informed by Masaryk of the Czecho-Slovak movement.

Stefanik led astray Gustav Kosik, the Slovak League delegate to Europe, and persuaded him to sign the Kiev agreement on August 29, 1916. Kosik befriended Stefanik in

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16 For a biography of Stefanik see Ludovit Holotik, Stefanikovska Legenda a Vznik CSR, Bratislava, 1958. This is a communist account and is not very flattering. In western scholarship Stefanik has gone largely unnoticed. All the emphasis has been on Masaryk and Benes. In D. Perman's book, cited above, Stefanik is not even mentioned by name.

Paris in June, 1916, and accompanied him to Russia. Stefanik went in two capacities—as vice-president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris and as a French officer—in order to form a Czecho-Slovak Legion in Russia from prisoners of war. The two travellers found some Slovaks in Moscow who favoured autonomy within Hungary and others in Petrograd and Kiev who favoured union with the Czechs. Stefanik chose to work with those Slovaks who favoured union with the Czechs and Kosik followed his lead. Stefanik and Kosik renounced the Moscow Slovaks and signed an agreement with Kiev Slovaks which pledged their support for a "Czechoslovak nation."  

The Kiev agreement had little initial value because Kosik found the "court camarilla" in Russia pro-German and the Moscow autonomist Slovaks favoured by the Russian court. Until the March revolution of 1917 government authorities confiscated Kosik's mail and he had to send dispatches to the

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League via courier. These dispatches did not reach America until the end of 1916 which explained why the League did not hear from Kosik for so long. In his dispatches Kosik asked for money, clothes, shoes, tobacco, books and newspapers for the Slovak prisoners of war in Russia. He especially favoured the establishment of a Slovak newspaper in Russia, a project which the League later realized. Until March, 1917, government agents in Russia closely watched Kosik's movements, they restricted his and Stefanik's travel plans and discouraged the formation of a Czecho-Slovak Legion.\textsuperscript{20}

When the March revolution of 1917 erupted in Russia, the new provisional government tolerated the Czecho-Slovak movement. Stefanik laid the nucleus for a Czecho-Slovak Brigade and Kosik appointed a group of Petrograd and Kiev Slovaks as trustees of the Slovak League. Kosik then visited the Italian, French and Serbian ambassadors eliciting support for the Czecho-Slovak cause. Satisfied with his work, Kosik left Russia and arrived in the United States in May, 1917.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Narodne Noviny, May 17, 1917, p. 1; June 14, 1917, p. 5; June 28, 1917, p. 4; July 5, 1917, p. 4; and July 26, 1917, p. 5.
The Slovak League, more amenable to the Czecho-Slovak idea in 1917 than in 1916, welcomed Kosik home. It did not censure him as had been suggested earlier but declared that he had done a good job under the circumstances. The League officially thanked Kosik for his labours and asked him to lecture to Slovaks in various Slovak centers in the United States. 22

Kosik's travelling partner in Russia, Milan R. Stefanik, came to the United States in June, 1917, to seek permission to recruit Czechs and Slovaks for a Czecho-Slovak Legion in France. Stefanik arrived on June 18, 1917, as a French Commandant (Major) and proceeded directly to Washington. Woodrow Wilson granted him an audience but the President refused to sponsor or recognize a Czecho-Slovak movement. In July, 1917, Stefanik negotiated with Frank L. Polk, the acting Secretary of State, and from him he extracted permission to recruit Czechs and Slovaks in the United States. Polk imposed two conditions to the recruitment: that only those men not subject to the draft be

22 Narodne Noviny, August 16, 1917, p. 5.
approached and that it be done discreetly since the United States was not then at war with Austria-Hungary. The War Department granted its final approval at the end of September, 1917.  

Stefanik achieved three major victories in his quest to publicize the Czecho-Slovak movement in America. He won over Theodore Roosevelt in August, 1917, and Roosevelt publicly demanded from then on United States support for the Czecho-Slovak movement.  

On September 16, 1917, Stefanik arranged a large Czech and Slovak meeting at Carnegie Hall in New York to air Czecho-Slovak demands. Stefanik invited the mayor of New York, John P. Mitchell and Henri Franklin-Bouillon, Vice-president of the French Chamber of Deputies, to attend. In a series of questions and answers, Franklin-Bouillon expressed sympathy for the Czecho-Slovak movement but warned


that they would have to fight for their independence. With
the proposed Legion in mind Stefanik replied that the Czecho-
Slovaks would indeed do so. On October 28, 1917, the
New York World featured a full page interview with Stefanik,
giving the aims and aspirations of the Czecho-Slovak National
Council in Paris and eliciting American support.

Stefanik used his trip to the United States to
fortify the alliance between the Czechs and Slovaks and to
present a united Czechoslovak front. Stefanik adhered to the
policy of Masaryk and Benes who tried to deceive the Allies
into believing that the Czechs and Slovaks formed one
Czechoslovak nation which had been artificially separated
by the Magyar invasions of the tenth century. In two joint
meetings of the executive of the Bohemian National Alliance
and the Slovak League on July 1 and 12, 1917, in Washington

25 New York Times, September 17, 1917, p. 5; The
 Bohemian Review, October, 1917, p. 13; Jednota, September 26,
 1917, p. 1; and Narodne Noviny, September 27, 1917, p. 3.


27 C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The
 Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919-1937, London,
 1937, pp. 75 and 83, note 1; Perman, op.cit., p. 8.
and New York, Stefanik stressed the need for Czechoslovak unity and warned against division into Czechs and Slovaks. He called for strong, united, concentrated action by both groups in the struggle for Czechoslovak independence.  

Stefanik's next important hurdle consisted in reassuring the Slovak Catholic clergy of absolute religious freedom in the proposed state of Czecho-Slovakia. Stefanik met with a committee of twenty-one Slovak priests in New York on September 20, 1917, and he gave them this assurance in his capacity as vice-president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council. The priests then publicly declared their support for the Czecho-Slovak cause and many of their parishioners subsequently felt more at ease when working with the Czechs.  

Stefanik's announcement of the general mobilization of Czechs and Slovaks in America on October 3, 1917, produced the greatest response yet by American Slovaks. Mobilization


29 Jednota, September 26, 1917, p. 4; October 3, 1917, p. 1 and 5; Narodne Noviny, October 11, 1917, p. 4.
required vast sums of money, much more than the League could provide. At a special League executive meeting called for October 23, 1917, to deal with the mobilization order, the delegates established a nine-member committee to collect a million dollar fund for the independence of Czecho-Slovakia.\(^{30}\)

The idea of raising a million dollars for Czecho-Slovak independence had been raised before but unsuccessfully. Jozef Husek had suggested it in May, 1917, and the League seconded him.\(^{31}\) The League announced the first million dollar drive on May 23, 1917, and left it up to individual Slovaks to send contributions to the League or to their newspapers.\(^{32}\) Little came of this drive and on June 18, 1917, the League levied a national tax of one dollar for each American Slovak but had no way of collecting it.\(^{33}\) By October 1, 1917, **Jednota** had received only a little over

30 Narodne Noviny, October 25, 1917, p. 3.

31 Jednota, May 2, 1917, p. 4.


33 Jednota, August 15, 1917, p. 4; Narodne Noviny, August 16, 1917, p. 4.
seven thousand dollars and *Narodne Noviny* only a little over two thousand.\(^3^4\)

In order to avoid its previous failure to collect vast sums of money, the Slovak League called upon a group of experts. Six of the nine men appointed by the League to collect money were clergymen. Three were Roman Catholic priests and three were Lutheran ministers. Reverend Jozef Murgas, a Roman Catholic, chaired the committee and he and his colleague, Reverend Jan Martvon, opened the drive in a grandiose gesture by contributing $2,000 each from their personal funds. Applying their special talent for collecting money, the committee members issued diplomas for every five dollar contribution, they issued special one cent stamps and stamp books and rewarded every holder of a full book of 365 stamps, and they inscribed the name of every Slovak who contributed a penny a day for one year in a golden book of the Slovak League. The professionals began their work on November 15, 1917 and by May 4, 1920, when the drive ended,

\(^{3^4}\) *Jednota*, August 1, 1917, p. 1; October 24, 1917, p. 3; and *Narodne Noviny*, October 25, 1917, p. 3.
they had collected $640,887.46.  

The committee for the collection of a million dollars did not collect all the money that American Slovaks raised. Bridgeport, Pittsburgh, New York and Chicago Slovaks arranged collections of their own. At only one bazaar, Chicago Slovaks raised sixty thousand dollars and Bridgeport Slovaks thirty thousand.

No record of all the collections exists nor has a comprehensive list of all contributions ever been drawn up. Peter P. Yurcak, president of the Slovak League in 1945 computed, from records in his possession, that American Slovaks sent over $800,000 to Masaryk, Benes and Slovakia from 1916 to 1921, but his figures have not been verified.


36 Ibid., p. 118.

37 Jednota, October 2, 1918, p. 4; Narodne Noviny, March 14, 1918, p. 5.

38 Peter P. Yurcak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions, Whiting, 1946, pp. 190-1.
The total amount collected and sent to Europe by American Slovaks on behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence remains to be determined.

With the collection of money in capable hands, the Slovak League turned to the recruitment of volunteers for the proposed Czecho-Slovak Legion in France. On August 21, 1917, representatives of Czech and Slovak organizations met in Chicago, in the presence of Stefanik, and agreed to divide the United States for purposes of recruitment. The Czechs received the west, from Cleveland to Chicago, and the Slovaks the east, from New York to Cleveland. The two Slovak Sokols received the task of recruitment and they trained the volunteers at a secret camp in Stamford, Connecticut. 39

In spite of Stefanik's October 3, 1917 mobilization order, the recruitment proved a failure. Stefanik had hoped to raise at least twenty thousand Czechs and Slovaks and the Slovaks in the United States themselves hoped to provide at least fifteen thousand volunteers. 40 Only 3,000 volunteers


40 Narodne Noviny, October 11, 1917, p. 3.
left for France from the end of 1917 to October, 1918, and the relative number of Czechs and Slovaks in this force became a subject of dispute. Czech or pro-Czech sources later claimed that the force consisted of an equal number of Czechs and Slovaks but Slovak sources claimed a Slovak majority. Uncertainty about the numbers of Czechs and Slovaks arose because Milan Getting deposited the records of recruitment in the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh after the war and from there they were sent to Prague, where they were kept in secrecy ever since.

Several reasons accounted for the failure of the recruitment of volunteers in America. The United States did not declare war against Austria-Hungary until December 4, 1917, and before that date many thousands of Czechs and

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41 Eduard Benes, Souvenirs de Guerre et de Revolution (1914-1918), Paris, 1928, II, pp. 149, 368-72; and Ivan Markovic, Slovaci v zahranecnej revolucii (Slovaks in the Extra-territorial Revolution), Prague, 1923, p. 93.


43 Pankuch, op.cit., p. 133.
Slovaks had joined the United States army.\textsuperscript{44} The Legion had no legal status and the Central Powers executed captured Legionnaires for treason.\textsuperscript{45} The Legion was an innovation and uncertainty about dress, pay, hospitals, training and maintenance plagued the recruiters. Only on December 20, 1917, did France grant recognition to the Czecho-Slovak army as an autonomous segment of the French army with all the material benefits of the French army. Only after this date did recruiting begin in earnest.\textsuperscript{46}

French recognition of the Czecho-Slovak army as a part of the French army signalled another victory for Stefanik who had left for France on October 25, 1917, but it proved an added burden for American Slovaks. Czechs and Slovaks in the United States had to provision and dress the troops before they left for France. Slovak women's organizations united into Vcelky (Bees) organizations and these sewed many of the

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 183; and The Bohemian Review, June, 1918, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{45} New York Times, July 29, 1917, I, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{46} Jednota, January 2, 1918, p. 1; New York Times, December 21, 1917, p. 3.
soldiers' uniforms and provided them with their daily necessities in the United States. Their contribution in money and goods has never been computed but it was no doubt considerable.  

Albert Mamatey and Milan Getting expressed satisfaction with the accomplishments of the Slovak League in 1917. Work by the League for the collection of a million dollar fund and for the recruitment of a Czecho-Slovak Legion for France had been begun in 1917. The United States declared war upon Austria-Hungary on December 4, 1917, and while Wilson's promise not to dismember Austria disheartened the League, Wilson's promise not to intern American Slovaks, among others, as enemy aliens but to reclassify them as "natives, citizens, denizens or subjects" of Austria-Hungary, gratified the League.  

\[\text{Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 13, 1917, p. 10.}\]

\[\text{Narodne Noviny, December 27, 1917, p. 4.}\]
Slovak idea had been made among American Slovaks in 1917.

On the other hand the League had faced a severe internal crisis in 1917 and deep differences still divided American Slovaks. At the tenth Congress of the Slovak League in Cleveland on February 22, 1917, two Czechophil Slovaks from Chicago, Pavel Kvorka, a former chairman of the overseers of the League and Dusan Augustiny, a former treasurer, tried to disrupt the proceedings because the Congress displayed too much Slovak individualism. Kvorka and Augustiny opposed autonomy for the Slovaks and they vehemently attacked Ivan Daxner, the secretary, for his autonomist views. They also opposed the expenditure of ten thousand dollars for the establishment of a Slovak newspaper in Russia, a project which Jozef Husek had advocated. After the Congress rebuffed Kvorka and Augustiny by re-electing Daxner as secretary and by approving the establishment of a Slovak newspaper in Russia, the two antagonists of the League obtained a court injunction in Chicago which froze all the League's funds. While the League fought the injunction from February 26 to March 31, 1917, it could not use any of its $22,000 for political activity. The League won the case but the rancour
raised by the court proceedings continued. Indeed, Ivan Daxner gradually tired of being the target of Czechophil attacks and after Stefanik made several Czechoslovak speeches in the summer of 1917 and the League accepted these speeches, Daxner resigned. The League had no active secretary from September 1917 to February 1918.

In addition to political differences, religious squabbles also continued to divide American Slovaks in 1917. In April, Jozef Husek published in Jednota an ironic letter from a group of Czech Benedictine priests of Chicago who warned that the Slovaks would live to regret their cooperation with Czech secularists. In September, Husek attacked the Lutheran Slovak weekly Slovensky Hlasnik for having attacked Pope Benedict's peace plan of August 14, 1917. Benedict had called for a cease-fire and a return to

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51 Pankuch, op.cit., pp. 148-50; Jednota, February 28, 1917, pp. 2 and 5; March 21, 1917, p. 4; March 28, 1917, p. 5; April 4, 1917, p. 6; May 30, 1917, p. 5; Narodne Noviny, March 15, 1917, p. 4; March 22, 1917, p. 5; April 5, 1917, p. 4; and July 5, 1917, p. 3.

52 Pisecky, op.cit., p. 72; Jednota, September 19, 1917, p. 4; Narodne Noviny, October 25, 1917, p. 3.

53 Jednota, April 18, 1917, p. 4.
the pre-1914 boundaries.\textsuperscript{54} Along with the Allies, the editor of \textit{Slovensky Hlasnik} rejected this offer and provoked Husek further by supporting the old Czech secularist motto "Away from Rome."\textsuperscript{55} Furious, Husek warned against such anti-clerical utterances lest Slovak Catholics secede from the joint Czecho-Slovak liberation movement.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, alongside the accomplishments of the League in 1917 lay a series of bitter divisive events which were an ill omen for future Czech-Slovak and Catholic-Lutheran relations.


\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Jednota}, September 5, 1917, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Jednota}, October 10, 1917, p. 4.
CHAPTER IV

Czecho-Slovakia Comes Into Being: Centralist Slovaks are Satisfied, Autonomist Slovaks are Disappointed: 1918

In 1918 American Slovaks split definitely as one group supported T. G. Masaryk and the new state of Czecho-Slovakia while another group remained distrustful of Masaryk and suspicious of the new state. The division followed along the lines already evident in 1917 and widened when T. G. Masaryk sent Jan Jancek to America to lead the Slovaks into the Czechoslovak camp. Jancek filled the empty post of secretary of the League and engineered the creation of a Czecho-Slovak National Council in America which subordinated itself to the one in Paris. Jancek managed to create the illusion of Slovak unity in August 1918 but Juzef Husek quickly destroyed it. Husek's constant fears for the identity of the Slovak nation prompted T. G. Masaryk to draft a new agreement with the Slovaks in Pittsburgh which promised the Slovaks their own language, administration and Diet in the new Czecho-Slovakia. News from Slovakia at the end of 1918 revealed the divisions among Slovaks in Hungary and re-opened the split among American Slovaks. One group in
Slovakia accepted a centralized state while another opposed it. Masaryk seized upon this division to renounce the Pittsburgh agreement. Autonomist Slovaks in America and in Slovakia joined forces in denouncing Masaryk and in demanding the incorporation of the Pittsburgh agreement into the Czechoslovak Constitution.

In early January, 1918, Jan Jancek, a Slovak Legionnaire from Russia, came to America to help consolidate the work of Czechs and Slovaks and to steer them on a Czechoslovak course. Jancek admitted that he had been sent to America by Masaryk "to help out" and his help consisted in providing aggressive leadership. He expressed shock at what he described as the cavalier attitude and laxity which he found among American Slovaks and he determined to correct it by calling the Czechs and Slovaks together and having them work together more closely than ever before.

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1 Jednota, January 9, 1918, p. 1; January 23, 1918, p. 5; and Narodne Noviny, January 10, 1918, p. 5.

2 Milan Getting, Americki Slovaci a vyvin ceskoslovenskej myslenky v rokoch 1914-1918 /American Slovaks and the Evolution of the Czechoslovak Idea in the years 1914-1918/, New York, 1933, p. 145
As a corrective to former Czech and Slovak rivalry and suspicion, Jancek suggested the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak National Council in America and its subordination to the Paris Nation Council. Jancek called a meeting of Slovak leaders for January 11, 1918, in Pittsburgh where he divulged his plans and the assembled Slovaks acquiesced, although Jozef Husek did not attend. Then, again on Jancek's suggestion, representatives of the Slovak League and the Bohemian National Alliance met in Chicago on February 9 to 12, 1918, and they agreed to set up a Czecho-Slovak National Council in America. This Council later declared that it adhered to the same programme as the Paris National Council and by so doing it subordinated itself to the Paris National Council.

Fearful for the identity of the Slovaks in Hungary whom the Czechs in Austria outnumbered by three to one, certain American Slovaks insisted upon equal representation,

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3 Ibid., p. 146.

4 The Bohemian Review, March, 1918, p. 46.

5 The Bohemian Review, April, 1918, p. 63.
not proportional, of Czechs and Slovaks on the Czecho-Slovak National Council and they hoped that it would serve as an example to Czechs in Europe. American Czechs quite willingly acquiesced to the Slovak demand for a "50-50" share of the representation, cost and labour in the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Eight Czechs and eight Slovaks sat on the Council and they included Reverend Oldrich Zlamal, Dr. Hynek Dostal, Jan Straka, Karel Pergler, Dr. Ludovit Fischer, Bohumil Simek, Andrej B. Koukol and Mrs. Libusa Motakova for the Czechs and Albert Mamatey, Jan Jancek, Gejza Mika, Reverend Jozef Murgas, Reverend Jan Kubasek, Jan Pankuch, Andrej Sustek and Milan Getting for the Slovaks.  

In the spirit of full equality, the Czecho-Slovak National Council met for the first time on March 9 and 10, 1918, in Cleveland and the assembled Czechs and Slovaks divided their functions equally. Karel Pergler, a Czech lawyer from Iowa, headed a newly created political-consular

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6 Narodne Noviny, March 14, 1918, p. 1; The Bohemian Review, April, 1918, p. 63.

7 Jednota, February 27, 1918, pp. 1 and 4; Narodne Noviny, February 28, 1918, p. 1; and The Bohemian Review, March, 1918, p. 46.
committee based in Washington and working for United States recognition of the Czecho-Slovak movement. Gejza Mika, a Slovak lawyer from New York, received charge of the Slav Press Bureau which was renamed the committee for publicity and it too worked out of Washington where it issued press dispatches urging United States recognition of the Czecho-Slovak cause. Captain Zdenek Fierlinger, a Czech Legionnaire from Russia, received charge of the recruiting committee in New York. Mrs. Etelka Cablkova, a Slovak, aided by Mrs. Libusa Motakova, a Czech, headed the committee for relief work. Andrej Sustek, a Chicago Slovak and Jan Straka, a Chicago Czech, made up the financial committee.  

Having succeeded in drawing the Czechs and Slovaks closer together in a Czecho-Slovak National Council in America, Jancek proceeded to give the eleventh Congress of the Slovak League a Czechoslovak flavour. Jancek prevailed upon Mamatey to heed the call of New York Slovaks and to hold the Congress in New York. Czechophil Slovaks of New York accounted for most of the ninety delegates present at the

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8 Narodne Noviny, March 14, 1918, p. 1; The Bohemian Review, April, 1918, p. 63.
February 22, 1918 Congress and they quickly elected Jan Jancek secretary of the Slovak League. The delegates dropped the autonomist Jan Pankuch from the treasury and elected in his place Frantisek Stas, a secular Sokol and Czechophil. The Congress re-elected the cooperative Albert Mamatey to the presidency, it endorsed the creation of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and it elected the eight Slovak members of the Council.9

Jancek's final victory of the year occurred on August 21 and 22, 1918, at Middletown, Pennsylvania, where, for the first time during the war American Slovaks presented a united front. Jancek arranged a special executive meeting of the Slovak League to meet at the Jednota home and printery in Middletown to demonstrate Slovak unity of purpose. Jozef Husek, in the presence of the League executive, renounced autonomy within Hungary and declared his strong

9 Jednota, February 27, 1918, pp. 1 and 4; Narodne Noviny, February 28, 1918, p. 1; The Bohemian Review, March, 1918, p. 47; New York Times, February 23, 1918, p. 6; and February 24, 1918, p. 17.
support for the Czecho-Slovak movement.\textsuperscript{10} American Slovaks seemed united at last.

Czech and Slovak unity became imperative in 1918 because in January the Czecho-Slovak movement suffered a diplomatic reverse with the loss of Great Britain's support. On January 6, 1918, Lloyd George, in response to Woodrow Wilson's denial of intent to break-up Austria-Hungary, declared that he favoured self-government for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary but not the destruction of the Empire.\textsuperscript{11} Woodrow Wilson, in his Fourteen Points Address on January 8, 1918, reaffirmed his support for "the freest opportunity of autonomous development"\textsuperscript{12} of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, thereby rejecting the destruction of the Empire.

\textsuperscript{10} Jednota, August 28, 1918, pp. 1 and 4; September 4, 1918, p. 1; Narodne Noviny, August 29, 1918, p. 4; September 5, 1918, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{12} Address of President Wilson to the Congress of the United States, Congressional Record, House, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, January 8, 1918, p. 5.
American and British support of the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary stemmed from Woodrow Wilson's desire to conclude a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. In February, 1918, Wilson's confidant in Switzerland, the sociology professor George D. Herron, engaged in peace negotiations with professor Heinrich Lammasch, special envoy of Emperor Charles of Austria. Through their intermediaries, Wilson and Charles agreed to conclude peace on the basis of full autonomy for the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary. However, Charles wanted Wilson to make the first public declaration to this effect and thereby save face for Charles who feared German reprisals, but Wilson wished Charles to take the initiative to prove his sincerity.

While they waited, Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austrian

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Foreign Minister, destroyed the opportunity for peace by losing his temper on April 2, 1918, and denouncing "the miserable Masaryk," 15 declaring the Czechs to be loyal and inferring that Premier Georges Clemenceau of France had made peace overtures. Aroused, Clemenceau declared that "Czernin has lied!" 16 and he then published a letter from Charles which offered peace and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Emperor Charles immediately renounced the letter, dismissed Czernin and publicly apologized before William II of Germany. No separate peace with Austria-Hungary could be made now. 17

Leaders of the nationalities subjugated by Austria-Hungary took advantage of this Austrian diplomatic fiasco to air their grievances at a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Rome on April 10, 1918. Stefan Osusky, Milan R. Stefanik and Eduard Benes attended for the Slovaks and Czechs.

16 Ibid.
R. W. Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed attended for England, Henri Franklin-Bouillon attended for France and Premier Vittorio Orlando attended for Italy. The leaders of the subjugated nationalities called for the overthrow of Austria-Hungary and for the freedom of their nations. Premier Orlando expressed his deepest sympathy for the cause of the subjugated nations and declared in favour of their independence.  

The American Congress and government also reacted favourably to the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. On May 6, 1918, Congressman Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois again spoke on behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence and on May 31, 1918, Senator William S. King of Utah submitted a joint resolution of sympathy for the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary. On June 19, 1918, Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa repeated his previous year's resolution on behalf of

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18 New York Times, April 11, 1918, p. 3; April 12, 1918, p. 3; and The Bohemian Review, June, 1918, p. 86.

19 Congressional Record, House, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, May 6, 1918, pp. 6136-7; Congressional Record, Senate, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, May 31, 1918, p. 7231.
Czecho-Slovak independence. More important, on May 29, 1918, Secretary of State Robert Lansing expressed, for the first time, United States sympathy for the "nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs for freedom." 

The real stimulus for Allied recognition of the Czecho-Slovak movement came from the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Siberia. When the Bolsheviks made peace with the Germans at the beginning of 1918, the Ukraine seceded from Russia and invited the Germans into the Ukraine to protect the Ukranians from the Bolsheviks. The Czecho-Slovak Legion, stationed in Kiev and numbering around fifty thousand men, retreated into Siberia and captured the entire length of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This action cut off food supplied to the Bolsheviks and bottled up hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian prisoners-of-war in Siberia who were then unable

20 Congressional Record, Senate, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, June 19, 1918, p. 7495.


to return home and fight on the western front.\textsuperscript{23}

Grateful for this Czecho-Slovak contribution to the war effort, the Allies now felt justified in recognizing the Czecho-Slovaks as a belligerent power fighting against the Germans on the Allied side. France extended her recognition first, on July 1, 1918.\textsuperscript{24} Great Britain followed suit on August 13, 1918.\textsuperscript{25}

Woodrow Wilson moved more cautiously to extend official recognition. Wilson first granted official recognition to the formation of a Slavic Legion in the United States on June 21, 1918, thus acknowledging what had been common knowledge for a year.\textsuperscript{26} Wilson then negotiated and concluded with the Japanese on August 3, 1918, an

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{23}] New York Times, June 29, 1918, p. 3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 20, 1918, p. 5.
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] New York Times, July 2, 1918, p. 2.
\item[\textsuperscript{25}] New York Times, August 14, 1918, p. 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{26}] New York Times, June 21, 1918, p. 3; June 26, 1918, p. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 20, 1918, p. 3; and "Amendment Dealing With the Slavic Legion," Congressional Record, Senate, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, June 25, 1918, pp. 8227-30.
\end{itemize}
agreement to send a joint American-Japanese expeditionary force to Siberia to help the Czecho-Slovaks. Finally, on September 3, 1918, the United States granted formal recognition to the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation.

Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent power implied the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Therefore, when Austria sued for peace on October 7, 1918, on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points Address of January 8, 1918, Lansing rejected the offer. He replied, on October 21, 1918, that Wilson had changed his mind since January, 1918, and that the destiny of the Czecho-Slovaks lay in their own hands.

The Czechs took their destiny in their own hands and declared their independence several times over. On October

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29 *Congressional Record*, Senate, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, October 21, 1918, p. 11402.
14, 1918, Benes announced in Paris, with Masaryk's approval, the transformation of the Czecho-Slovak National Council into a Czechoslovak Provisional Government. In reply to Emperor Charles's October 16, 1918 decree federalizing Austria, Masaryk issued, on October 18, 1918, a Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence. On October 28, 1918, a group of Czech leaders in Prague proclaimed their independence. Not to be outdone, on October 31, 1918, a group of Czech members of the Austrian Parliament, sent by Emperor Charles to Switzerland to negotiate with Czech exiles and to come to an understanding with them that would prevent the break-up of the Empire, also proclaimed Czechoslovak independence.

Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota, viewed these Czechoslovak proclamations with great misgivings as he had


31 New York Times, October 19, 1918, p. 3.

32 Seton-Watson, op.cit., p. 310.

done earlier in the year. In January, 1918, Husek angrily rejected the insinuation of the Czech professor Ferdinand Pisecky that the Slovaks could not maintain their own state and that they needed the Czechs to help them. Husek then proposed a federation of central European nations as an alternative to Czech and Slovak union.\textsuperscript{34} In May, 1918, Husek questioned the sincerity of T. G. Masaryk, president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris and acknowledged head of the liberation movement, who had come to Chicago from Russia on May 5, 1918, and who spoke of nothing but the Czech cause and ignored the Slovaks.\textsuperscript{35} On May 15, 1918, Husek published an anti-Czech letter from a Slovak Legionnaire in France who complained of ill-treatment at the hands of Czech officers and Husek indignantly demanded that the Slovak League protect its soldiers against Czech arrogance.\textsuperscript{36} On May 22, 1918, Husek rejected the one nation concept to which

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Jednota}, January 9, 1918, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Jednota}, May 8, 1918, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Jednota}, May 15, 1918, pp. 2 and 4.
some Czechs adhered and declared that "the struggle for a 'Greater Bohemia' does not deserve one Slovak penny, or one drop of Slovak blood." On May 29, 1918, Husek again proposed a federation of central European nations instead of union with the Czechs.

Husek's independent stand spelled danger to the Czecho-Slovak movement because, with the complete absence of any mandate from Slovaks in Hungary, the Czechs in exile who advocated a union of Czechs and Slovaks had to depend upon American Slovaks to provide this mandate. The Czechs admitted as much when the editor of The Bohemian Review wrote "... the Slovaks of Hungary have no elected representatives, and those who emigrated to America must speak for the entire race." The Czechs could not afford to have Slovak leaders in the United States denouncing the Czecho-Slovak movement because they strove for Allied and American

37 *Jednota*, May 22, 1918, p. 4.

38 *Jednota*, May 29, 1918, p. 4.

39 *The Bohemian Review*, March, 1918, p. 47.
recognition of the Czecho-Slovak movement and any Slovak declarations against the movement would have proved embarrassing and possibly even damaging to the Czecho-Slovak cause.  40

Reacting to Husek's strong stand, T. G. Masaryk promised, in writing, at a special meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Pittsburgh on May 30, 1918, to grant the Slovaks full autonomy in the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh agreement, signed by all sixteen members of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in America and by T. G. Masaryk in his capacity as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris, specifically promised that "Slovakia shall have her own administration, her own Diet, and her own courts" and that "the Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in public office and in public life generally."  41

40 Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe..., op.cit., p. 284.

41 From a copy of the original text reproduced in Jozef M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe, New York, 1960, p. 235.
Jozef Husek extracted the Pittsburgh agreement from Masaryk only after much wrangling and hard negotiation. On May 30, 1918, Husek appeared at the meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and presented his demands for a guarantee of Slovak autonomy. Jan Jancek and Ferdinand Pisecky, Masaryk's recent envoys to America, seized upon the fact that Husek did not sit on the Czecho-Slovak National Council to shout "shame on him" and "throw him out." Husek withdrew into the adjoining room and presented Albert Mamatey with an ultimatum—either Masaryk immediately promise the Slovaks full autonomy in the new state or else Husek would lead the First Catholic Slovak Union against the Czecho-Slovak movement. Husek had threatened such a move before, and withdrawal of the Union, the largest single Slovak organization in the United States, would cause untold embarrassment and damage to the Czecho-Slovak cause. Mamatey impressed the seriousness of the threat upon Masaryk and Masaryk then, after reading the Cleveland agreement, declared

42 Jednota, June 5, 1918, p. 5.
43 Jednota, March 8, 1916, p. 4.
it out of date and drew up a new one. Masaryk promised the Slovaks full language rights, a Slovak administration and Slovak courts. Husek twice rejected this concession and demanded the inclusion of a separate Slovak Diet. The spectacle of Mamatey carrying Masaryk's pencil-written draft from one room into another aroused the Slovak members of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and they split evenly on the matter of the Diet. Reverend Jan Kubasek, Jan Pankuch, Gejza Mika and Albert Mamatey supported the proposal. Jan Jancek, Reverend Jozef Murgas, Andrej Sustek and Milan Getting either opposed it or else abstained. Masaryk ended the impasse by including the provision for the Diet, and all sixteen members of the Czecho-Slovak National Council followed the lead of Masaryk and signed it. Jozef Husek felt vindicated.

Husek's fears for the identity of the Slovak nation returned in October, 1918, when the Czechs began to declare Czechoslovak independence but the Slovaks in Hungary remained silent. Husek suggested that a plebiscite be held in Slovakia after the war to clear up the question of whether or not the Slovaks wished to unite with the Czechs. Albert Mamatey, on the advice of Masaryk, rejected the call for a plebiscite, declaring that the Slovak League trusted the Czechs to carry out the Pittsburgh agreement. 45

Husek's fears persisted and he persuaded Mamatey to get Masaryk to sign the Pittsburgh agreement a second time. On November 14, 1918, on the very day that the Czecho-Slovak government in Prague officially elected Masaryk President of the Republic, Mamatey, in the presence of Husek, asked Masaryk to sign a calligraphed copy of the Pittsburgh agreement. Masaryk signed it without hesitation. Masaryk's signature

45 Narodne Noviny, November 14, 1918, p. 4; November 21, 1918, p. 5; and Jednota, November 20, 1918, p. 4.
satisfied Mamatey and most members of the Slovak League. 46

Misgivings about the Czechoslovak declarations of independence also emanated from members of the Czecho-Slovak National Council of Paris. General Milan R. Stefanik, vice-president of the Council, in Siberia with the Czecho-Slovak Legions, protested against Benes's and Masaryk's "premature declarations," 47 he expressed his anger at not having been consulted by them before they made their declarations and he especially protested against the role assigned to him by Benes in the new Czecho-Slovak government. At the meeting of Czech deputies with Czech exiles in Geneva on October 28 to 31, 1918, the gathered Czechs appointed Masaryk as President of the new Republic, Benes as Foreign Secretary and Stefanik

46 Ivan Bielek, "Len tak letno cez dejiny minuleho roku" /A Brief History of the Preceding Year/, Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku v Spojenych Statoch Americkych, Na Priestupny Rok 1924 /Almanac of the National Slovak Society of the United States of America, for Leap Year 1924/, p. 107; and Husek, "Prehlad vaznejsich udalosti v historii I. Kat. Slovenskej Jednoty," op.cit., p. 68.

47 Telegram sent to President Masaryk on November 2, 1918, via Tokyo by Milan R. Stefanik, document #59 in Ludovit Holotik, Stefanikovska Legenda a Vznik CSR /The Legend of Stefanik and the Creation of Czechoslovakia/, Bratislava, 1958, pp. 468-71.
as Minister of War. However, Benes feared Stefanik's power and prestige and split the war ministry. Benes gave the domestically more important Ministry for Internal Defense to his follower Vaclav Klofac and left Stefanik with only the Ministry for External Defense. Stefanik never forgave Benes for this demotion and only Stefanik's premature death in a mysterious airplane crash in May, 1919, prevented a direct confrontation of these two men. Benes and Masaryk never admitted this split between Benes and Stefanik but a few fragments testified to it.  

48 The editor of Narodne Noviny published, on November 14, 1918, p. 1, two dispatches from Geneva, one from the assembled Czechs and one from Eduard Benes. The dispatch from the Czechs referred to Stefanik as "Minister of War and Home Defense" but Benes's dispatch listed Stefanik only as "Minister of External Defense" while it added Vaclav Klofac as "Minister of Internal Defense." Ivan Bielek apparently did not notice the discrepancy or did not understand it because he did not comment upon it. Another fragment testifying to this breach was published by Stephen Bonsal in his Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles, New York, 1946, p. 157, where, in a letter of recommendation by Stefanik, Bonsal was asked to help Andrej Hlinka who had come to the Paris Peace Conference to plead on behalf of the Slovaks. Stefanik referred to the Slovak delegation as "my friends" and he would never have done so had he been a friend of Benes because Hlinka and Benes were implacable foes. The telegram of Stefanik to Masaryk, cited above, also testified to this breach. T. G. Masaryk, in his memoirs, cited above, never admitted this breach and he even wrote, "Benes and Stefanik were loyal, true and devoted friends," op. cit., p. 92.
In Slovakia one Slovak leader seemed oblivious to the Czech declarations of independence. On October 19, 1918, Reverend Ferdis Juriga, one of only two Slovak deputies in the Budapest Parliament, declared that he belonged to a revolutionary Slovak National Council, that the Slovaks would send delegates to the Peace Conference, but he said nothing about union with the Czechs when the astonished Magyar deputies asked him about it. Instead, he very emotionally declared "We are Slovaks. We are. We are a nation! We have our own language and we demand our rights!"^49

Dissatisfied with Juriga's Slovak nationalist speech, the Czech government in Prague sent Milan Hodza, a Czechophil Slovak, to Slovakia to persuade the Slovak National Council to declare, for the benefit of the Allies, the unity of a Czechoslovak nation. 50 Three hundred delegates to the Slovak National Council gathered in Turciansky Svätý Martin on October 30, 1918, and proclaimed the secession of Slovakia

^49 Jednota, November 27, 1918, p. 1.

^50 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926), Bratislava, 1934, p. 312; Opocensky, op.cit., p. 165.
from Hungary and its union with the Czechs. However, the assembled delegates could not agree on the form of the new state. Matus Dula, an ardent Czechophil and leader of the almost defunct Slovak National Party whose newspaper **Narodne Noviny** had only four hundred subscribers, favoured a centralized state with no Slovak autonomy. Reverend Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party, potentially the strongest political party in Slovakia if the circulation of **Ludove Noviny**, 20,000, could be used as a guide, favoured autonomy for the Slovaks. Hlinka apparently carried the day on October 30, but the Czechophils refused to acquiesce to his victory. Milan Hodza arrived in the morning of October 31, 1918, he found that Hlinka and approximately half of the delegates had left, and he persuaded the remainder to change the previous day's declaration. The delegates destroyed the declaration of October 30, and drafted a new one which proclaimed that "the Slovak nation is a part, linguistically

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and culturally-historically, of the one Czechoslovak nation..." However, the new declaration retained segments of the old one which spoke of a Slovak nation. Hodza and his followers clumsily attempted to fool the Allies into believing in the existence of a Czechoslovak nation and succeeded, much to the chagrin of Hlinka who later declared collectively for the Slovaks that "we have been fools; we helped the Czechs to deceive Europe."^54

News of Juriga's speech to the Budapest Parliament and the declaration of Turciansky Svaty Martin divided American Slovaks again. Jozef Husek welcomed Juriga's speech in favour of Slovak nationhood, he said it destroyed the myth of the existence of a Czechoslovak nation and he again called for a plebiscite for Slovakia.^55 Ivan Bielek expressed surprise at Juriga's speech and counselled caution until more

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53 Jednota, December 4, 1918, p. 1; Narodne Noviny, December 5, 1918, p. 1.


55 Jednota, November 27, 1918, pp. 1 and 4.
news from Slovakia arrived. \(^{56}\) When the full text of the Turciansky Svätý Martin declaration arrived in America in late November, 1918, Ivan Bielek joyfully wrote, "we are vindicated" and "today we are Czechoslovaks, today we form one nation." \(^{57}\) Jozef Husek immediately pointed out the discrepancies in the declaration which spoke of a Czechoslovak nation on the one hand and of a Slovak nation on the other. Husek vainly protested that the declaration was a diplomatic document prepared to deceive the Allies into believing in the existence of a Czechoslovak nation and in including Slovakia in the new state of Czecho-Slovakia. \(^{58}\) Jan Jancek countered Husek's protests by calling on American Slovaks to be patient, to believe in Masaryk and to trust in the Pittsburgh agreement. \(^{59}\) Most did so.

\(^{56}\) Narodné Noviny, November 28, 1918, pp. 1 and 4.

\(^{57}\) Narodné Noviny, December 5, 1918, p. 5.

\(^{58}\) Jednota, December 11, 1918, p. 4.

\(^{59}\) Jednota, December 11, 1918, p. 1; Narodné Noviny, December 12, 1918, p. 3.
American Slovaks erred in trusting Masaryk because he had no intention of carrying out the Pittsburgh agreement. Upon his return to Prague in late 1918 he promptly forgot the agreement. When Prime Minister Vlastimil Tusar reacted to pressure from Slovak autonomists and asked T. G. Masaryk in January, 1920, to comment on the Pittsburgh agreement, Masaryk brushed it aside as "one of many pre-revolutionary programs made beyond the boundaries. It has its historical value." In his memoirs, Masaryk candidly acknowledged that "it was concluded in order to appease a small Slovak faction which was dreaming of God knows what sort of independence for Slovakia." Masaryk later tried to nullify the agreement by incorrectly charging that "the document of that verbal agreement is 'forged', is a 'falsum', because at the time when the American Slovaks wanted that verbal agreement, the League did not exist legally, it was not recognized

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60 Letter of Masaryk to Tusar, February 5, 1920, in Slovak Catholic Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact, Chicago, 1934, p. 34.

61 Masaryk, op.cit., p. 208.
by the state until 1919." Masaryk seemed to have forgotten that he himself had drawn up the agreement, in pencil, and that he had signed it twice. Masaryk also erred in his interpretation of American law when he inferred that the Slovak League could not enter into agreements before 1919 because it was an unchartered organization until then. American Slovaks consulted the Pittsburgh law firm of Alter, Wright and Barron and these American lawyers advised that all organizations with a Constitution and By-laws could indeed enter into agreements, whether they were chartered or not. Masaryk simply did not want to recognize the Pittsburgh agreement and he went to all lengths to discredit it. Masaryk sought to discredit the Pittsburgh agreement because centralist Czechs and their Slovak supporters created a centralized Czechoslovakia with all powers emanating from Prague. In the first few months of 1919 a Czech army occupied Slovakia, Czech teachers took over the schools and

62 Letter of T. G. Masaryk to Andrej Hlinka, October 12, 1929, in Slovak Catholic Federation of America, op.cit., p. 36.

63 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujmy Pravdy! /In the Interest of Truth!, Pittsburgh, 1930, p. 11.
Czech civil servants from Austria filled every possible post in the administration.  In 1920, a self-appointed Constitutional Committee of centralist Czechs and Slovaks drew up a Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic which openly declared that the "Czechoslovak Republic ... is a unified, not a federative state." The Constitution proclaimed the "Czechoslovak language" to be the official language but no such language existed. The drafters of the Constitution hoped to keep up the appearance of a united Czechoslovak nation in the eyes of the world. The Slovaks did not get their own Diet, courts or administration. None of the provisions of the Pittsburgh agreement appeared in the Constitution.

If Czech and Slovak centralists ignored the Pittsburgh agreement, Slovak autonomists received it as the "Magna

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66 Ibid., p. 47.
Andrej Hlinka and his Slovak People's Party, the largest single party in Slovakia after the war, adopted the Pittsburgh agreement and fought for the autonomy promised in it for the next twenty years. A political programme concluded by Slovaks in America crossed the Ocean and won acceptance by a large segment of the Slovaks at home.

American Slovak autonomists kept up their political activity on behalf of Slovaks in Europe. At a quarterly meeting of the Slovak League executive on October 24, 1919, the assembled delegates passed a resolution calling for the incorporation of the Pittsburgh agreement into the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and they forwarded this resolution to Prague. In addition, at the last meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in America on November 7, 1919, the Slovak delegates asked the Czechs to pass a similar

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67 *Jednota*, March 24, 1920, p. 4; and Andrej Hlinka, "Magna Charta Slovenskeho Naroda" /"The Magna Charta of the Slovak Nation", *Kalender Hlinkovej Slovenskey Ludovej Strany na rok 1938*, p. 34.

resolution and the Czechs gladly complied. The Constitutional Committee in Czecho-Slovakia took no notice of these two resolutions. For the next twenty years American Slovak autonomists, led by the Slovak League and the Catholic Congress of Slovaks in America, deluged Prague with memorandums and open letters demanding the fulfillment of the Pittsburgh agreement.

The efforts of the Slovak autonomists in America and in Czecho-Slovakia bore fruit in 1938 but only temporarily. Under German pressure in the fall of 1938, the government of Czecho-Slovakia granted autonomy to Slovakia. In March, 1939, the Germans occupied Bohemia and permitted autonomist Slovaks to establish their own state under German protection. Defeat of the Germans in 1945 led to the re-establishment of a unitary Czecho-Slovakia by Czech and Slovak centralists.

69 The Czechoslovak Review [formerly The Bohemian Review], December, 1919, p. 394.

70 See Bibliography under Publications of the American Slovaks on behalf of Slovaks in Europe.

71 For a history of this period see J. A. Mikus, Slovakia, A Political History: 1918-1950, Milwaukee, 1963.
The main role that American Slovaks played in the creation of Czecho-Slovakia consisted in providing a mandate of union with the Czechs in the absence of such a mandate from the Slovaks in Hungary. When the Slovaks in Hungary could not speak for themselves because of war censorship, Slovaks in America publicly proclaimed the desire of the Slovaks to unite with the Czechs in a new state of Czecho-Slovakia. American Slovaks contributed men, money and propaganda for the Czecho-Slovak effort and hoped that by so doing they would best serve the interests of their countrymen in Europe.

American Slovaks also provided Slovaks in Europe with a political programme for the future. Extracted from Masaryk by autonomist Slovaks in America and subsequently rejected by Masaryk, the Pittsburgh agreement became the rallying cry of autonomist Slovaks in Slovakia who demanded the home rule promised them in this agreement. Slovak autonomists in America supported the efforts of their counterparts in Europe, living up to the poet Vajansky's plea to American Slovaks to remain in heart with the Slovaks in Europe.
Masaryk rejected the Pittsburgh agreement partly because all Slovaks did not support it. During the entire war centralist and autonomist Slovaks in America engaged in polemics which greatly harmed the cause of Slovak nationhood. Centralist Slovaks were willing to unite with the Czechs and create a new Czechoslovak nation but autonomist Slovaks rejected this course. Autonomist Slovaks sought safeguards against assimilation in a Czechoslovak melting pot and the Czechs in America and Masaryk provided these safeguards in the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. Since the Slovak centralists in America never took these agreements very seriously and since their counterparts in Europe did likewise, Masaryk and centralist Czechs felt perfectly safe in disregarding the safeguards promised the autonomist Slovaks in the United States. Slovak disunity which plagued the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement during the war continued to plague the Czechoslovak Republic.
A Note on the Location of Sources

Much has been written by and about American Slovaks but it is widely scattered in the various Slovak centers in the United States. The Slovak Institute Library in Cleveland, Ohio, in the care of the Slovak Benedictine Abbey at 2900 East Boulevard, is the best library on Slovaks in the United States. However, it is uncatalogued and the historian who wishes to make use of it has to wade through several thousand books and periodicals to find what he wants.

The Cleveland Public Library has a large collection of books by and about Slovaks. They are catalogued and arranged properly in the Foreign Language Room. They form one of the better Slovak collections in the United States.

The New York Public Library, second only to the Slovak Institute Library, holds the best catalogued selection of Slovak books in the United States. They are cross-indexed under several headings and very easy to find.

Copies of old Slovak American newspapers can be found in the Slovak printeries in America. Old copies of *Jednota* can be found in the *Jednota* printery in Middletown,
Pennsylvania, along with Jednota almanacs and publications. Old copies of Narodne Noviny and Narodny Kalendar can be found in the offices of the National Slovak Society at 516 Court Place, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

United States Government Publications Consulted

Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1918, Washington, 1919. It contains a list of the number of Slovaks who entered the United States from 1899 to 1918.

Congressional Record, House and Senate, 65th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1917-1918. Speeches on behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence by Senators and Congressmen as well as the speeches of Robert Lansing and Woodrow Wilson on Austria-Hungary are recorded here.


Twelfth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1900, Volume I, Population, Washington, 1901. Again a list of Austrians and Hungarians in the United States appears but no Slovaks are mentioned.

Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910, Volume I, Population, Washington, 1913. Slovaks finally appear in this census but not in their true numbers.
The first fairly accurate count of Slovaks in the United States.

The first comprehensive immigration study in the United States. The Slovaks received their share of its attention and as a result much information about the living standards of Slovaks in the early 1900's is available.

Periodicals

Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio, February, 1911, 1914-1918.
A good account of the Slovaks' mistreatment of Count Albert Apponyi in the United States appears in the February, 1911, issues of this daily newspaper. It also contains occasional reports and commentaries about the Czecho-Slovak movement during the first World War.

This Slovak Catholic weekly newspaper served as the forum for Jozef Husek in his war upon secularism and Czechoslovakism. It held great sway over its Catholic readers and it had the largest circulation of any Slovak newspaper in the United States.

This, the most popular newspaper among Catholic Slovaks in Hungary, carried full coverage of the Cernova Massacre in Ruzomberok, Hungary, in 1907.

Also the unofficial organ of the Slovak League of America, this newspaper presented a neutral stand on religious matters. Ivan Bielek, its editor, wavered between autonomy and centralism but, after a brief fling with Czechoslovakism in the fall of 1918, he returned to his former autonomist stand. This newspaper ranked just behind Jednota in its total circulation.

Published daily in New York this influential newspaper became the first of the English-language newspapers to openly support the destruction of Austria-Hungary in May, 1917.

The Bohemian Review, official organ of the Bohemian National Alliance, published monthly in Chicago from February, 1917, to December, 1924.
This periodical reflected the views of American Czechs during and after the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement. It said little about the Slovaks until 1917. After 1919 it became virulently Czechoslovak. It changed its name to The Czechoslovak Review in November, 1918.

This New York daily published an interesting article about Milan R. Stefanik when he visited America in 1917.

Accounts by Observers of or Participants in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia

Minister of Education in Hungary before World War One and chief delegate to the Peace Conference after the war, this conservative Magyar noble confirmed the rough treatment
accorded him by the Slovaks in the United States in 1911. The book is more jocular than informative.

A wartime propaganda tract by a Czech member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and chief propagator of the concept of a single nation of Czechoslovakia.

The war memoirs of Benes dealing mainly with his work in Paris and of interest to those studying the Czecho-Slovak movement in Europe. He says little about American Slovaks and refers the reader to Masaryk's memoirs for information about American Slovaks.

Here Benes reaffirmed his belief in the unity of the Czecho-Slovak nation and he categorically rejected Slovak nationhood.

Benes, Vojta, Revolucni Hnuti v Severni Americe, Prague, Pamatnik odboje, 1923, 97p.
One in a series of lectures delivered in Prague about the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement, this lecture deals mainly with American Czechs. Vojta Benes was a brother of Eduard Benes and supported his centralist politics.

A short survey of the previous year's history of the National Slovak Society by the editor of Narodne Noviny. Included in this article is the information that Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh agreement a second time on November 14, 1918.
Here Bielek reveals that he sat by Masaryk's side and watched him draft the Pittsburgh agreement in pencil on May 30, 1918. Bielek also affirms that the Slovaks signed it not as American citizens but as revolutionaries who were building a state.

Bonsal, Stephen, *Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1946, 301p. From the diary of the special aide to Colonel House, this little book deals with the petitions of little nations to the Paris Peace Conference, including the petition of the Slovaks as expressed by Andrej Hlinka. Included in the chapter on the Slovaks is a published letter from Milan R. Stefanik recommending Andrej Hlinka to Stephen Bonsal. The letter testified to the breach between Stefanik and Beneš.


---------, ed. by, *Bohemia Under Hapsburg Misrule*, New York, Revell, 1915, 187p. A wartime propaganda tract by Capek and other Czechs urging freedom for Bohemia. Some of the contributors equated the Slovaks with the Czechs but Capek did not do so and he did not deserve the attack levelled against him by Ivan Bielek over this issue in the summer of 1915.

---------, *The Czechs (Bohémians) in America: A Study of their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious Life*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1920, 293p. Capek was one of the pioneer historians of American Czechs and this book represented one of his best efforts. He did not try to cover up the split between Catholic and secular Czechs and he covered his topics well. He wrote little about the wartime activities of the Czechs, however.
The elder Capek's account of New York Czechs is good, in all its brevity, but the younger Capek's account of the Slovaks is naive. Capek junior, in the spirit of Czechoslovakism, lumped the Czechs and Slovaks together into one nation and this only confused him when he dealt with their relative numbers. The only redeeming feature of the article was the list of Slovak organizations and members at the end, but that was compiled by Slovaks.

An excellent account of American Slavs with the emphasis on Czechs and Slovaks. Also a good description of Czech efforts in America towards gaining United States recognition of the Czecho-Slovak movement.

Capek's memoirs of his long life in America and his gratitude to her for a good life. He adds recollections of his wartime activities, especially in conjunction with New York Slovaks, to this work.

A wartime propaganda tract very sympathetic to the Slovaks and calling for their separation from Hungary and their union with the Czechs by the pupil of the famous Slavist Louis Leger. It was a part of the campaign of academics in England and France to gain the recognition of their governments for the Czecho-Slovak cause.

Gero rejects the contention that the
Czechs and Slovaks are one nation and affirms his belief in a separate Slovak nation.


A major source for the World War activities of secular Slovaks. Although Getting exaggerates the influence of the secular Sokol, he does publish many valuable documents and he provides a good commentary on events in America as he saw them.


When T. G. Masaryk began to deny the validity of the Pittsburgh agreement and to minimize his own role in its conception, American Slovaks who had witnessed its inception reacted and published articles designed to clarify the issue. Husek's article about his role in the drawing up of the Pittsburgh agreement was one of them.


A continuation of Husek's history of the Pittsburgh agreement. Here Husek gives full credit to Reverend Jan Kubasek of Jonkers, New York, for having been the most outspoken Slovak member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in America and for having supported Husek's demand for a Diet for the Slovaks in the Pittsburgh agreement.


Exerpts from the papers of Maurice Janin, Commander-in-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Siberia from 1918 to 1920.

--------, MOJE UCAST NA CESKOSLOVENSKEMU BOJI ZA SVOBODU, Prague, J. Otto, 38lp.

The complete memoirs of Janin. They are interesting for those who wish to study the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement in Russia. Janin gives full credit to the work of Stefanik in Russia, he publishes the full text of the Kiev
agreement and he takes pride in having helped the Czechs and Slovaks during the war.


Originally a Royal Commission Report that was finished too late because the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed while it was in preparation, this book contains many valuable statistics about the subject nationalities in the Dual Monarchy.


A vindictive attack upon one of Seton-Watson's books. Jehlicka correctly points out that most of the Slovaks whom Seton-Watson selected to contribute to his book were centralists.


Jehlicka was a Slovak who accompanied Hlinka to the Paris Peace Conference, who was disappointed by its outcome, who feared to return to Czecho-Slovakia afterwards and who became an ardent Magyarone. His book rails against the Czechs but it contains a good account of the trip of the Slovak delegation to Paris.


The memoirs of a liberal Magyar noble who ruled Hungary temporarily in 1918 and who negotiated with the Slovaks in order to keep them from seceding from Hungary. In the description of his trip to the United States in 1914, he did not mention his contacts with American Slovaks.

Ledbetter, Eleanor E., The Slovaks of Cleveland: With Some General Information On the Race, Cleveland, Americanization Committee, Mayor's Advisory War Committee, 1918, 32p.
Compiled hurriedly by a librarian as part of the American desire to learn as much about foreigners as possible in order to ascertain their loyalty during the First World War, this article's main contribution lay in its affirmation, gleaned from the Czechs, that since the Slovaks in Hungary could not speak on behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence, the American Slovaks had to do so.


One of the first propaganda tracts of the First World War calling for the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Leger, the Dean of Slavic Studies at that time in Western Europe, was one of the many academics calling for the creation of Czecho-Slovakia. He did not believe in the identity of a Slovak nation.


One in a series of lectures delivered in Prague about the revolutionary movement. Markovic, a centralist Slovak, spent most of his time in Russia during the War and his book deals mostly with the revolutionary movement in Russia although he does go into the work of American Slovaks but with little success.


A wartime propaganda tract calling for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the union of the Czechs and Slovaks.


The Memoirs of the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris during World War One and President of Czechoslovakia until 1935. These memoirs are candid in some places but inaccurate in others, especially in their treatment of American Slovaks and Milan R. Stefanik. They are useful for a general understanding of the Czecho-Slovak movement in England, France, Russia, and in the United States.

This history of Binghamton Slovaks was the first Slovak history to deal with the participation of American Slovaks in the liberation of their homeland. It contains many valuable published documents, especially letters from Slovaks in Hungary who ask American Slovaks for help and who offer American Slovaks a share in the leadership of the Slovak nation.


Another propaganda pamphlet by an academic calling for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state. Namier equated the Czechs with the Slovaks.


A fairly good survey of the Czecho-Slovak movement during the war by a secretary of the Czecho-Slovak Legation in London. Nosek provides such useful information as the Magyar method of counting nationalities by language of business instead of mother tongue. Nosek also gives the relative strength of Czech political parties during the war and shows Masaryk's party to have been among the smallest.


A wartime propaganda tract by one of the delegates of the Slovak League of America to Europe calling for the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state.


A brief account of the life and work of George D. Herron, Wilson's confidant in Switzerland during the war. Osusky befriended Herron and worked closely with him in 1917 and 1918. This article describes, in some detail, the
meeting of professor Heinrich Lammach with Herron in February, 1918, and their discussion of peace terms.

An English condensation of his Slovak article directly above.

A glowing tribute to one of the founders of Czecho-Slovakia on the tenth anniversary of his tragic death. Its value lies in its description of Stefanik's rise in Parisian high society and his subsequent use of this position to help the Czecho-Slovak cause in France.

In 1940 Osusky, Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, broke with Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia, over the issue of Slovak nationality. Benes ejected Osusky from the second liberation movement and Osusky began to expose Benes's hatred of the Slovaks and his wish to assimilate them. This is the first of Osusky's anti-Benes articles.

More of the same, this time in English.

Again an anti-Benes tirade.

Pankuch, Jan, Dejiny Clevelandskych a Lakewoodskych Slovakov, Cleveland, Jan Pankuch, 1930, 303p.
A first-rate history of Cleveland and Lakewood Slovaks by one of the first leaders of American Slovaks. Pankuch's memory served him well and he reproduced events as he saw them quite accurately.
Jan Pankuch was a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in America, he watched Masaryk himself draw up the Pittsburgh agreement, and he reproduced his account of that memorable day in this article.


A propaganda tract, this time by an American Czech, calling for the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Pergler recognized a distinct Slovak nation and respected the Slovak desire for a federal Czecho-Slovakia.


One in a series of lectures about the creation of Czecho-Slovakia delivered in Prague in 1923. A valuable source for the activities of American Czechs towards the liberation of their homeland during the first World War.


Despite its lofty title this booklet is disappointing because it is too general and vague. Pergler here seems bent on revealing no secrets and he succeeds well enough.

---, Do Roka a Do Dni!, Chicago, Americka Narodni Liga Cechoslovaku, 1932, 32p.

A speech delivered by Pergler to a group of American Czechs and Slovaks after Pergler lost his Czechoslovak citizenship because Pergler opposed Benes's centralist policies and because Pergler, as a signatory of the Pittsburgh agreement, defended it and demanded its implementation.
A short account of the work of Stefanik in the United States by an agent of Masaryk to the United States. It is honest in its appraisal of American Slovaks, especially in its affirmation that Stefanik had to 'convert' certain American Slovaks to Czechoslovakism.

One of the earliest wartime propaganda tracts about the Czechs. It attempts to introduce the American public to a bit of Czech history by pointing out that a Bohemian is a Czech from Bohemia and not an inhabitant of the Latin quarter of Paris.

Written before he made his eye-opening trip to Hungary, this book by Seton-Watson urges Great Britain and France to preserve the Dual Monarchy.

Written after his trip to Hungary, this book by Seton-Watson was an indictment of Magyarization, of corruption in Hungary and an impassioned plea on behalf of the oppressed nationalities in Hungary with the emphasis on the Slovaks. The Magyars found this book so offensive that they bought out most of the copies and today it is a collector's item.

This wartime propaganda pamphlet was one of the first to call for the overthrow of Austria-Hungary and the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks.

In the battle between Slovak autonomists and Czech and Slovak centralists, Seton-Watson chose the side of the
centralists. All the Slovak contributors to this book except one, Andrej Hlinka, were centralists, and Hlinka's article was harmlessly religious while the rest of the articles were decidedly political and centralist.


One of the very best general histories of the Czechs and Slovaks but it is coloured by Seton-Watson's disillusionment with the Slovaks and his profound hatred for Nazi Germany.


Seton-Watson greatly aided Masaryk in his quest to gain recognition by the British government for the Czecho-Slovak movement. This is the story of Masaryk's work in England during the First World War and it is of interest to those studying the Czecho-Slovak movement in England.


An excellent biography of the leader of the Slovak People's Party by his most devoted follower. The book is marred only by the more than ninety examples of censorship which struck out words, lines, paragraphs and, in some cases, entire pages of the text. This mutilation bears witness to the kind of democracy which operated in Czechoslovakia in the period between the two wars.


This book by Sidor was a reply to Ivan Markovic's book of the same title which appeared in 1923, which followed a centralist line and which downplayed the role of the Slovaks in the extra-territorial revolution. Sidor's book, on the other hand, exaggerated the role of the Slovaks.

Voska, Emmanuel V., Ceskoslovenska Amerika v Revolucii, Prague, Pamatnik odboje, 1924, 63p.

Written by a Czech who came to America only six weeks after the outbreak of the World War, this book describes the liberation activities of American Czechs in 1914 and 1915.
Publications of American Slovaks on Behalf of Slovaks in Europe

A defense of the Reverend Andrej Hlinka whom the Magyars had arrested for his nationalist activities. American Slovak journalists here recognized Hlinka as one of the leaders of the Slovak nation.

A vitriolic attack on the Czechs, probably by a Slovak member of the Prague Parliament who feared to publish in Czechoslovakia because of the censorship. He also chose to remain anonymous in order to avoid reprisals at home. He defends the Pittsburgh agreement and warns that if it is not implemented, the Slovaks might secede from Czechoslovakia should the opportunity arise.

Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America, Scranton, Bosak press, 1923, 53p.
As the title suggests, this anti-Apponyi tirade by American Slovaks sought to turn American public opinion against Apponyi. He had come to America seeking a loan for Hungary and the Slovaks opposed this loan because the Magyars still made claims to southern Slovakia.

Written by the former wartime secretary of the Slovak League of America and an undying autonomist, this article expresses grave disappointment with conditions in Slovakia in the new state of Czechoslovakia. It also describes, briefly, the work of American Slovaks during the first World War.
Slovak Catholic Federation of America, *Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic by the Slovak Catholic Federation of America*, 1923, 10p.

After having accused Masaryk of deliberate and deceitful treachery for having renounced the Pittsburgh agreement, the members of the Federation demanded the immediate incorporation of the Pittsburgh agreement into the Czechoslovak Constitution. This was a resolution passed by the Congress of the Federation held on October 9 to 11, 1923.


A repetition of the above charges plus a resume of the events that transpired in Czechoslovakia with reference to the Pittsburgh agreement since then. It includes the published letters of Masaryk to Prime Minister Tusar, to the People's Party and to Andrej Hlinka, in all of which Masaryk renounces the Pittsburgh agreement.


Addressed to the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, this Memorandum demands the incorporation of the Pittsburgh agreement into the Czechoslovak Constitution. This Memorandum emerged from a unanimous resolution of the XIV Congress of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on June 28, 29 and 30, 1922.


This appeal of the Slovak League to politicians in Czechoslovakia publishes the response of various groups to its 1922 Memorandum. The Slovak People's Party responded joyfully, the Slovak National Party expressed agreement, but Masaryk's secretary sent only a notice of receipt with no commentary. Here the Slovak League declares that it will never give up the fight for autonomy for the Slovaks in Europe.
A repetition of the League's previous charges and demands and more information concerning the Pittsburgh agreement. It publishes the speech of Karel Pergler, a Czech deputy and a signatory of the Pittsburgh agreement, to the National Assembly in Prague on February 22, 1930, in which he defended the validity of the Pittsburgh agreement and by so doing he called Masaryk a liar. Pergler lost his Czechoslovak citizenship shortly thereafter.

Slovak National Committee, Count Albert Apponyi: The so-called Angel of Peace, and what he stands for in Hungary, a few pen pictures by Bjornsterne Bjornson and others, Cleveland, 1911, 32p.

Excerpts from the works of Bjornsterne Bjornson, Emily Balch, Scotus Viator and other historians acquainted with the Slovaks and Magyarization. It is a flat condemnation of Apponyi's visit to America by the Slovak National Committee.

Vacovsky, Dr. Milan Ivanka, SLOVACI A MADARI, POLITICKO-HISTORICKA UVaha, Pittsburgh, Slovenska Liga v Amerike, 1914, 124p.

The first part of this anti-Magyar dissertation sets out to prove that the Magyars were entirely without culture when they invaded Europe and that they acquired all of their culture from Europeans and much if it came from the Slovaks. The second part contains reprints of the Slovak Memorandums of 1861 and 1914.

Books and Periodicals


An excellent survey of life among the Slavic immigrants to America at the turn of the century. Miss Balch visited Slavic families in both America and Europe for a period of two years to discover their way of life in both countries.
A short survey of the life of one of the most important leaders of American Slovaks at the turn of the century.

A published Master's Thesis from the University of Pittsburgh which traces the rise of Slovak nationalism in America and its influence upon the Slovaks in Europe.

All three peace treaties spell Czecho-Slovakia with the hyphen, testifying to Stefan Osusky's adherence to the Cleveland agreement even at the Paris Peace Conference where he was the second delegate for Czecho-Slovakia.

A good account of the circumstances leading to the drafting of the Pittsburgh agreement and its subsequent role in Slovak history, by a Slovak autonomist. Heavily censored.

---------, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike, II Volumes, Bratislava, Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1942.
Culen was the pioneer historian of American Slovaks and this is so far the first and only history of American Slovaks from the time the first ones came to 1914. Culen was hampered, however, by his lack of English and he could not consult the many good American works on immigration to the United States.

An excellent biography of the founder of the first Slovak newspaper in America.
Droba, Daniel, D., ed. by, Czech and Slovak Leaders in Metropolitan Chicago, Chicago, Slavonic Club of the University of Chicago, 1934, 307p.
Short biographies of the principal Czechs and Slovaks in Chicago.

An excellent survey of the moulding of public opinion by the British press during the First World War, especially towards Austria-Hungary. Hanak also treats of the influence of Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed upon the British government.

The first of the many Czechoslovak constitutions and the most centralist of them all.

A communist biography of Milan R. Stefanik written with the purpose of discrediting Stefanik. The writing can be ignored but the documents published at the end of the book are invaluable, especially Stefanik's telegram to Masaryk from Siberia in late 1918 in which Stefanik complained about not having been consulted by either Benes or Masaryk before they declared Czechoslovak independence and also Stefanik's extreme displeasure at having been demoted by Benes to Minister of External Defense.

A good article about the activities of Chicago Czechs during World War One. It shows their divisions well.
A good resume of the findings of the Immigration Commission by two members of the Commission.

Written by a Slovak separatist and dealing chiefly with the creation of the Slovak state in 1939, this book has many valuable documents in its appendix, especially a reproduction of the original Pittsburgh agreement.

A reaffirmation of Wilson's desire not to break up Austria-Hungary in 1917 and an appreciation of the role of Adolph J. Sabath, the Congressman of Czech origin who spoke so vigorously and so often on behalf of Czech and Slovak independence.

A short sketch of Wilson's foreign policy by the then emerging authority on Wilson. Austria-Hungary received only scant attention but Link reaffirms what his predecessor Ray Stannard Baker had affirmed, that Wilson did not wish to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire but only to reform it.

The fifth volume in a new biography of Wilson by the recognized authority on Wilson, this book goes only to the outbreak of war with Germany in 1917 but it does contain material on Wilson's desire not to destroy Austria-Hungary but to seek peace with her if she became a federal state.

Although Macartney modestly affirms that this book is not a history but a treatise on the problems of treaty revision, it contains the best short history of the Slovaks in the English language. Macartney is one of the few western historians who recognizes the identity of the Slovak nation and the right of the Slovaks to live as they choose.


A very good geography for its time. It made use of the findings of German geographers who were among the best in the world and their count of the population of the Non-Magyar minorities in Hungary was far more accurate than were the later Magyar censuses.


One of many articles that take issue with the 'myth' that Masaryk converted Woodrow Wilson from a pro-Austrian to an anti-Austrian stand. It correctly points out, as Masaryk had already stated in his memoirs, that the exploits of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Siberia had more to do with Wilson's recognition of the Czecho-Slovak cause than had Masaryk's oratory.

--------, "(Documents): The United States Recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council of Paris (September 3, 1918)," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Volume 13, #1, April, 1953, pp. 47-60.

An elaboration, with documentary proof, of Mamatey's article directly above.
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An excellent survey of the attitude of the American Government to the liberation movements of eastern European peoples during the first World War. His account of the Slovak liberation movement in America is based largely on Culcn's Pittsburghska Dohoda, which is included in this bibliography.


A very good history of Slovakia from 1918 to 1950 by a Slovak separatist.


A good survey of Czechs and Slovaks in America by a Presbyterian missionary charged with determining whether Presbyterian missionary work among Czechs and Slovaks would prove fruitful. Miller reported in the negative because he found the Czechs too free-thinking and the Slovaks too Catholic.


Much of the same as the above except that this time he covers all the Slavic peoples in the United States.


A surprising article by a Czech historian who sets out to show that the spelling of Czecho-Slovakia with the hyphen is more correct and more desirable if the Czechs wish to enjoy good relations with the Slovaks.

A very good account of the last days of Austrian and Hungarian rule in 1918 and the events in Prague and in Slovakia which helped in the overthrow of the Monarchy.


A chronological account of the history of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the largest Slovak fraternal organization in the world.


A Ph.D. thesis at the University of California at Berkley, this account by Miss Perman, a Czech, heaps lavish praise upon the work of Masaryk and Benes but completely ignores the work of Stefanik to the extent of never even mentioning him by name.


A short sketch of the life and work of Stefanik by a Czech admirer. Devoid of all controversy.


One of the first studies in the United States of the quality, efficiency, social life and the relations to the native-born of the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. He locates the American industrial heartland as the zone of the new immigration.


The memoirs of one of the earliest leaders of American Slovaks. Indispensable for the early history of American Slovaks.

Delightful reading. Written by a former surgeon in the United States Immigration service, this book catches colourful glimpses of the various types of immigrants landing at Ellis Island in New York.


A very good study of the new immigration by a member of the missionary society. It concentrates on the social aspects of immigrant life and includes a good section about American Slovaks.


An outspoken analysis of the Habsburg Monarchy by a radical English historian. Taylor insists Masaryk used the American Slovaks to gain his political purposes. Taylor is one of the few western historians who take the side of the Slovaks in the debate over Slovak identity.


Thomson is the American counterpart of R. W. Seton-Watson, and like him he sides with the Czech and Slovak centralists. The book itself is a misnomer because half of it deals with Bohemian history before 1914. He is very sketchy in his coverage of the role of American Slovaks in the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement.


Wandycz shows France to have been the chief Allied supporter of the Czecho-Slovak movement and as a consequence, also its chief bulwark after the war. The book also deals with France's support of the Little Entente nations of eastern Europe after the war.
A very good analysis of the numbers, location, social life and condition of recent immigrants to the United States. Much is taken from the Report of the Immigration Commission and analyzed.

Written by a former president of the Slovak League, this charming little book captures many of the legends in Slovak history. Jurchak drew up a list of monetary contributions of American Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak movement and to Slovakia during and immediately following the first World War, but he neglected to give his sources and this makes it impossible to verify his figures.
Interview with Dr. Stefan Osusky, April 5, 1967.

Q. Dr. Osusky, could you please tell me something of your early life and how you came to America.

A. I was born in Brezova pod Bradlom in 1889. I came to the United States in 1906 after one year of study in Vienna and four years at the Magyar Lyceum in Bratislava.

Q. Why did you come to America? Could you tell me about it?

A. Yes. It was 1905 and Count Apponyi was Minister of Education in Hungary. He came to visit our Lyceum in Bratislava as part of his Ministerial duties. I happened to be one of the best students in Latin and this made my instructor draw Apponyi's attention to me. Apponyi asked me where I was from, and, upon hearing me say Brezova, declared that it was the nest of rebellions in Hungary. Then he added with a smile, "But you will be a good Magyar, No?" I remained silent.
This silence of mine was interpreted as an affront to Apponyi and it made my further studies at the Lyceum impossible. Apponyi reported me to the director and my instructor then advised me to go on a 'vacation' until the affair blew over. In the meantime, I would privately continue my studies.

I decided against such a course of action. If I could not live in my native Slovakia, I would go to the best place available, to America, where my married sister lived.

My sister's husband had a tannery and a wool business in Chicago. For some time I helped him. However, what interested me was education and learning the English language. As I knew German I enrolled in Concordia College, a German-English College at Springfield, Illinois, where I studied for three years. It was a Lutheran College, founded to train pastors for the German population in the United States. Since I was a Lutheran and fluent in German, I had no difficulty in enrolling. For three years I devoted most of my time to the study of European history. After graduation I took charge of a Slovak Lutheran Church and School in Wisconsin.
As I longed for an even higher education, I applied for admission at the University of Chicago. Some difficulty arose out of the fact that I had no documents of my studies at the Hungarian Lyceum, and could not obtain any. I was called upon to write a test in English. As I had more schooling in Latin than in English, I was allowed to translate an English text into Latin instead of vice-versa. I passed the test and was admitted on the condition that I take one year of English literature. I never did.

Q. What did you study in Chicago?

A. I was fascinated by Science, and particularly by Geology. During my second and third summers, I went with my professor on geological expeditions to Saskatchewan and to the American Rocky Mountains. With these expeditions I accumulated my University credits. My report on the Rocky Mountains, which my professor had sent to a Wisconsin professor who was a member of the expedition, had the result that I was offered to terminate my last year at the University of Wisconsin, with the promise that then I would be appointed professor of Geology. However, I preferred to terminate Geology under the then world famous geologists, Chamberlain and Salisbury.
Q. But I was under the impression that you graduated with a law degree.

A. I graduated with Ph.B. in philosophy and J.D. (doctor of juristprudence) in law, both in 1915. I shifted from geology to law under the impact of the Balkan wars. Had I stayed with geology, I would have been sent with my professor on a projected governmental expedition to Alaska for three years. With the Balkan war raging in Europe, I did not want to bury myself in the snows of Alaska.

Q. Did you take any public interest in the Slovaks in the years preceding the War?

A. I delivered lectures at American clubs and associations and spoke at meetings of Slovaks and Czechs.

Q. What did you do at the outbreak of World War I?

A. Since the United States was officially neutral, I concentrated on counteracting German, Austrian and Magyar propaganda in munitions factories where they urged the immigrant workers from Central Europe to strike. During lunch hours I used to tell them not to be deceived by Austro-Hungarian and German propaganda which was not interested in higher wages for the workers but in paralysing American
production for the Allies.

Q. Did you not belong to any of the large Slovak organizations in the United States?

A. You must remember that until 1915 I was a student at the University of Chicago, and instead of summer vacation, I took summer courses to finish my education as quickly as possible. Besides, the fraternal organizations consisting mostly of recent immigrants had to be very prudent not to create the impression of being more interested in their old country than in America. Moreover, the secretary of the Slovenska Liga was Ivan Daxner of the Daxner family which in the revolutionary period in the middle of the 19th century played a distinguished role. He could not see beyond the linguistic and cultural Slovak demands contained in the Turciansky Svaty Martin Memorandum of 1861. In that situation I decided to publish a fighting political Slovak daily in Chicago. I called it 'Slovenske Slovo'. and it was edited by the incomparable Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, and financed by my brother-in-law with the aid of some of his friends.

Q. What exactly did this paper advocate?

A. It agitated for action by the Slovak League of America. It advocated a pooling of resources of Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States, for, I believed that only by united action could the Czechs and Slovaks free themselves. I never believed that the Magyars would give the Slovaks any of the rights contained in the League's Memorandum of 1914 presented to the Congress and State Department.

Q. What was the result, if any, of your activity?

A. It raised an interest in the idea that the Slovaks and Czechs should meet, discuss the issues and agree on common action. It resulted in the Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915 between the Slovak League of America and the Bohemian National Alliance. At this meeting, representative organizations of Slovaks and Czechs agreed to work together as equals, for the creation of a federal state of Czecho-Slovakia of two equal Slovak and Czech nations.

Q. What happened at the famous 9th Congress of the League held in Chicago on February 22, 1916?

A. The Congress had been called because, despite the Cleveland Agreement, the difficulties between the Slovaks and the Czechs continued. The aim of the Congress was to clarify the issues. At the outset the Congress was informed that Masaryk, Durich, Benes and Stefanik had set up a Czech National Council in Paris. The information created a great
commotion in the Congress. Very naturally this raised the question of what the Slovak American League would do in the face of this new situation. The idea was raised that the League send a delegate to explain to Professor Masaryk and to responsible persons in London, Paris and Petrograd the program of the Slovak League of America. The proposal was made that I be delegated. In the course of the deliberation, President Mamatey suggested that since Osusky was Lutheran, it would be in the interest of the harmonious collaboration within the League if besides a Lutheran there was a Catholic delegate. As the Catholic organizations from the East were not fully represented, the Congress decided that there would be a smaller League executive meeting in Pittsburgh which would designate the second delegate. This took place on April 12, 1916 and Dr. Gustav Kosik, Editor of the Katolicky Sokol, was designated as the second delegate. (Be it added that at the Chicago Congress I was elected Vice-President of the League.)

Q. Did you receive any instructions at the small League executive meeting in Pittsburgh?
A. Not at all. The discussion turned around the Czech National Council in Paris. In the middle of May I informed Mamatey that I expected to leave for Europe at the beginning of June. He asked me to stop in Pittsburgh on my way to New York, which I did. We had a long discussion of the various issues involved and reached a general agreement. Ivan Daxner, secretary of the League, apologized that he was not able; on the spot to put down on paper the principal issues of our agreement and he promised that he would send them to me in New York before the boat sailed. He did so and the note was based on the Cleveland Agreement.

Q. How did you get to Europe?

A. Kosik and I were supposed to leave and travel together. However, Kosik had an American passport and I had none. To get to Europe I was advised to go to the British Embassy in Washington for help. I had to go to the Notary Public, get a certified paper declaring who I was, my profession, my function as Vice-President of the Slovak League of America and my mission as delegate to assure the Allied Powers of Slovak loyalty to their cause and to plead with the Allied leaders for the cause of Slovak independence. With this paper legalized by the Notary Public, I went to the
British Embassy where I was told that if I was willing to risk it, I could board passage on a British munitions ship bound for England. I took advantage of the offer and went. Before boarding, the American customs officer, when he saw my travelling papers and the kind of ship that I was boarding, exclaimed: "Well sir, these are historic days".

Q. Then you and Kosik did not go together.

A. That is correct. We met in London, however, and continued our journey to Paris together. After that we split up. I remained in Paris and Kosik went to Russia where there was also a Czech and Slovak liberation movement underway.

Q. How were you received in England?

A. I arrived at Liverpool on June 10, 1916. I was the only passenger besides the five members of the British military mission returning from Washington. On our arrival I was locked up in my cabin and was refused permission to communicate with the Foreign and War Offices. However, after several hours I was allowed to land, and was most kindly treated by the officials. Then I made my way to London where Scotland Yard ordered me not to leave my hotel.
Only after Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed vouched for me, on Masaryk's advice, was I released. I spent the next three weeks in conversations with officials in the Foreign and War Offices and in writing reports based on Magyar newspapers and periodicals for the British Offices and newspapers.

Q. Did Masaryk regard you as his secretary or did he ask you to stay on as his secretary. I ask because Masaryk complained to American Czechs that he had been under the impression that you had been sent out by the League as a Slovak secretary for him.

A. No. I do not know how Masaryk could have gotten such an impression. I was not his secretary. Indeed, he himself advised me to go to Paris to see Benes and get informed about the organization of the liberation movement.

Q. How were you received in Paris?

A. When I arrived at Benes's headquarters I noticed that all of his official envelopes were stamped "Narodna Rada Ceska". There was no mention of the Slovaks at all. I immediately objected to the fact that the Slovaks were not mentioned in the name of the Council, and told him that I would and could not collaborate with the Czechs if the name of the Slovaks were not included.
After consulting with Masaryk, Stefanik and Durich, Benes informed me that they agreed on the name: "National Council of the Czech Lands". I stuck to my position. If the Paris National Council did not change its name to include the Slovaks, I would return to the United States and tell the League that collaboration of Slovaks with the Czechs was impossible.

After a new consultation between the members of the Council it became Czecho-Slovak National Council in late 1916.

Q. What kind of work did you do in Paris?

A. As a delegate of the Slovak League of America I fulfilled the mission with which I was entrusted. Since under the totalitarian brutal rule of Hungary by Istvan Tisza, the Slovaks could not speak, the Slovak League of America voiced the sentiments and aspirations of their silenced brethren.

I began to state the position of the Slovaks in America and wrote reports on Magyars and Hungary to the French Ministries for Foreign Affairs and War. This was indispensable because the Magyars, since the Kossuth Revolution, enjoyed immense sympathies in France. I wrote
daily reports for the French Press. Then I wrote a booklet entitled "Magyars and Pangermanistes" demonstrating that the Magyars were the most loyal supporters of the German plan to unite all Central and South-East Europe including Turkey, into a block ruled over by Germany.

Q. Did you have any difficulty in learning French?
A. Not very much. Because of my knowledge of Latin, I mastered French very fast. Indeed, I was the only person in the liberation movement who mastered altogether English, French, German and Magyar.

Q. But you soon left for Switzerland, did you not?
A. Yes, I went to Switzerland in July 1917, to explore the contacts with Austria and Hungary from this neutral country. I found the news sent to the Paris papers by their correspondents stationed in Switzerland insufficient for our needs. After two weeks in Switzerland I decided to set up a Press Service in Geneva, which was the center of diplomatic activity, of press news and of espionage.

Q. Did Benes not object?
A. Not at all. I simply told him that I was moving to Switzerland where I could do more for our common cause
than in Paris.

Q. How did you support yourself in Switzerland?

A. The League had paid my passage across the Atlantic by giving me a total of $2,000, and later sent me $1,000 more to Paris. After my graduation from the University of Chicago Law School, I became a member of the law firm Synden, Hassel and Osusky. After the death of the elder Busse, former Major of Chicago, I helped to settle the inheritance quarrel between the surviving brother and the family of the dead brother, for which I was amply rewarded. I never received any money from the Paris National Council.

Q. What was the nature of your work in Switzerland?

A. I wrote reports for the American and British Legations and the French Embassy at Bern. Moreover, I established intimate friendship with Professor George Herron, American Sociologist living in Geneva.

Q. You mentioned that Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary attempted to exploit President Wilson's goodwill.

A. Professor Herron, previous to the United States entry into the war, interpreted President Wilson's policy by lectures, articles and pamphlets. His house in Geneva became a place of pilgrimage for German, Austrian and Hungarian
intellectuals visiting Switzerland, with whom he had wide acquaintances.

In the beginning of February 1918, Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary dispatched Professor Lammasch on a secret mission to Professor Herron destined for President Wilson. Emperor Karl confided to the American President his plan to propose a separate peace of Austria-Hungary to the Allied Powers and wanted to know whether President Wilson would be against it. The President's reaction to it was that he must first know what sort of peace the Emperor wanted to propose. The Emperor promised to articulate it, but instead of doing so he played around it in such a way as to give the impression that it was President Wilson who was suggesting separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Professor Herron warned President Wilson, demonstrating to him that Germany had such a military grip on the Dual Monarchy that she could not withdraw from the war without Germany's agreement.

Q. You said that you were the first one to meet a delegation of Czech members of the Austrian Parliament when they came to Switzerland. What prompted the Austrian Government to allow the Czech members of the Vienna Parliament to visit Switzerland?
A. The Austrian Prime Minister told them that it would do them a lot of good to convince themselves that the talk about America, France and Great Britain backing the Czecho-Slovak National Council for an independent Czecho-Slovakia was propaganda designed to undermine Austria's will to fight.

The Delegation, consisting of the leaders of all Czech political Parties, headed by Karel Kramar, came to Switzerland on October 26, 1918. I went to meet them after they crossed the Swiss frontier and took them to Bern to introduce them at the French Embassy and the American and British Legations. Then I took them to Geneva, where I gave them a report of the political situation. On the third day Benes arrived from Paris.

We agreed that Masaryk would be President, Kramar Prime Minister, Benes Foreign Minister and General Stefanik, Minister of War. I learned later that Benes and Klofac, (President of the National Socialist Party of which after the war Benes became Vice-President) secretly agreed that Klofac would be Minister of National Defence, which reduced Stefanik's function to that of Minister of our Army abroad, thus
eliminating Stefanik from playing a well deserved official role in Czecho-Slovakia.

Q. How did Stefanik take it?

A. He was profoundly offended. But, since at that time he was in Siberia with the Czecho-Slovak Army, he could do nothing about it. On his return to Paris in March 1919, Stefanik and Benes bitterly quarreled about it. Stefanik never got reconciled to it.

Q. Where did you fit into this?

A. At the Geneva meeting it was decided that Kramar and Benes would be Delegates to the Peace Conference and myself Secretary General of the Delegation.

Also, the Kramar Government appointed me the first Czecho-Slovak Charge d'Affaires to London, and in 1919 I was appointed Minister of Czecho-Slovakia in London. However, after the convocation of the Paris Peace Conference, as I was Secretary General of the Czecho-Slovak Peace Delegation I spent very little time in London. In 1920 I was transferred to Paris as Czecho-Slovak Minister to France. In the month of May 1919 when Kramar resigned as Prime Minister, I was appointed second delegate to the Peace Conference.
As most of the Czech and Slovak Members of the Delegation to the Peace Conference spoke neither English nor French, you can imagine how busy I was. Later on, for seventeen years I was a member and for fourteen years President of the Supervisory Commission of the League of Nations. In addition, I represented Czecho-Slovakia in the Reparations Commission, created by the Peace Conference, and for some years I also represented Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Greece.

Q. Getting back to the Peace Conference, can you tell me something of your work in Paris as Czecho-Slovak Delegate?

A. At the Peace Conference we had many difficulties, the principal of which were the boundaries. It was an anomaly. Czecho-Slovakia was recognized as an Allied and Associated Power but had no recognized boundaries. The members of the Supreme Council—Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando—argued that if we wanted historical frontiers we had a right to the Sudeten lands, inhabited by Germans, but which never belonged to Germany, but in that case they contested our right in Slovakia. To our arguments, going back to the Great Moravian Empire, they turned a deaf ear.
They insisted that we could not have it both ways and that we had to choose between historical and strategic-economic boundaries.

On March 15, 1919, Kramar, Benes and I agreed that I should go to Prague to consult President Masaryk.

During my discussions with the President I did not hide my disagreement with Benes on the future structure of Czecho-Slovakia. Coming from America I was a "federalist" while Benes had France as a model: "a nation one and indivisible, a State one and indivisible".

After a discussion lasting several days, President Masaryk decided that our Delegation should inform the Supreme Council that Czecho-Slovakia was going to be organized on the model of the Swiss Confederation. This was done in writing.

Later I discovered that while I was in Prague, Benes suggested to the members of the Supreme Council that the Sudeten land could be given to Germany. The British and the French objected, and Lloyd George declared that it would be preposterous to give Germany, responsible for the war and defeated in the war, territory which never belonged to her. So the Sudeten land was attributed to Czecho-Slovakia.
Such a decision produced great problems. Over 3,000,000 Germans inhabited these lands and the question of their future arose. Some delegates proposed, besides the protection of minorities applied to all States which inherited minorities, special guarantees for the German minority in Czecho-Slovakia. But, Philipe Berthelot, the French chairman of the Boundaries Commission disagreed. He pointed out that the Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia had demonstrated that the Czecho-Slovaks could be trusted. The presence of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Siberia, he continued, prevented the transportation of raw materials and food to Germany which she urgently needed and about 3,000,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war to the Western front in France which would have prolonged the war for several years. Hence, the Czecho-Slovaks had made a great contribution to the victory of the Allies.

Q. Could you tell me something of your work in the inter-war years?

A. After the signing of Peace Treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary on June 28, 1919, Benes, the Foreign Minister, returned to Prague. However, the Treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, were still to be negotiated.
We were vitally interested in the drafting of the Treaty with Hungary, because of Slovakia. Negotiations were delayed because a revolution broke out in Hungary and a hungarian army attacked Slovakia in order to prevent the constitution of Czecho-Slovakia. The Peace Treaty with Hungary was negotiated by me. Also, I was in charge of the partition of the river fleets on the Danube, Elbe and Oder.

I lived a dramatic moment when, as the head of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, I found myself face to face with the head of the Hungarian Delegation, Count Albert Apponyi, the same man who, as Hungarian Minister of Education, caused me in 1906 to leave the Pressburg Magyar Lyceum because I refused to promise to be a good Magyar and, consequently to emigrate to the United States to get my education. However, during the negotiation of the Trianon Treaty with Hungary, we treated each other with exquisite courtesy. I greeted him in Magyar and he greeted me in Slovak. I never asked whether he remembered the sixteen year old Slovak student who refused to promise him to be a good Magyar.

Next to the fixing of Czecho-Slovak boundaries by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the vital problem for Czecho-Slovakia was reparations for war damages. As the
damages caused by the war were enormous, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not want to resign themselves to the idea that one of the two main sources of reparations, that is, Austria-Hungary, by dissolving itself, should dry out. That is why particularly the British and the Italians insisted that Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia, which profited from the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy, should equally pay reparations as did Austria and Hungary. Under their pressure, the Supreme Council, that is, President Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, decided that Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia should pay for all State property on their territory and a share of Austria-Hungary's debts to the Allied and Associated Powers. The evaluation made by the Reparations Commission of the State property which Czecho-Slovakia inherited from Austria-Hungary, represented four billion 542 million gold crowns. In addition Czecho-Slovakia was to pay 750 million French gold francs for liberation.

However, Czecho-Slovakia as an Allied and Associated Power had the right to deduct from the above payments the amounts represented by her damages suffered at enemy hands during the period when she was actually at war with her enemy.
Before the deductions could be made, the Reparations Commission had to decide, first, that Czecho-Slovakia was a sovereign Allied State and second that the State was at war with Germany. As Czecho-Slovakia's delegate to the Reparations Commission from its inception, I presented the various declarations made during the war by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing Czecho-Slovakia. The Council of Jurists, at first could see nothing else in those declarations but a moral and political aid to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, a moral and political encouragement to their nation. The Jurists did not deny that Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia were mostly inhabited by Czechs and Slovaks, but insisted that their territory was not organized as one State, and that it could not have had a united sovereignty, because it was not grouped under one administration.

However, I succeeded in convincing them that the Czechs and Slovaks, throughout the war, both at home and abroad, helped the Allied and Associated Powers against Germany and the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, I proved that while the war was still on, Czecho-Slovakia from October 28,
1918 had an independent territory, an independent population and her own sovereignty. In consequence the Council of Jurists, in conformity with Article 232 of the Versailles Treaty decided, and the Reparations Commission approved, that Czecho-Slovakia was in a state of war with Germany from October 28, 1918.

For ten years I fought for Czecho-Slovakia's right to take part in the decision concerning reparations, that is, that the Allied and Associated Powers should not take any final decision regarding Czecho-Slovakia's financial obligations without consulting her and without her consent.

At the first Hague Conference, convened in August 1926 to settle the reparations payments, the Allied and Associated Powers insisted that Czecho-Slovakia should contribute to the settlement, on account of the four billion 542 million gold crowns and the 750 million gold francs, as a special charge for liberation. I successfully resisted by invoking the treaty right to deduct the wanton damages caused by the Austro-Hungarian Army when it withdrew in October 1918 from Czecho-Slovakia's territory. This saved Czecho-Slovakia from becoming a slave of the World War I Allies for two generations.
At the conclusion of the Conference, my wife and I took the first train to Paris. Dr. Benes and his wife accompanied us to the Railway station. On parting, Benes embraced me most affectionately, repeating that he would never forget what I had done for him and for Czecho-Slovakia.

Q. What about you, Benes and the Slovaks?

A. Benes was hostile to making any regional administrative concessions to Slovakia, fearing that it would encourage the Sudeten Germans to disrupt Czecho-Slovakia. On the contrary, I was convinced that by satisfying Slovak claims, Czecho-Slovakia would be strengthened against Sudeten German subversions.

Q. Dr. Osusky why have you not yet written your memoirs?

A. First, from 1919 to 1938 I was too busy with the problems inherited from World War I. Every year I was a delegate to the meetings of the League of Nations; moreover I was until 1937 chairman of the Supervisory Commission of the League of Nations. After Munich I did not capitulate but stuck to my guns, preparing thousands of my compatriots, living in France, for the war which I regarded inevitable.
Moreover, my criticism of the political regime of Czecho-
Slovakia would have aided the Nazis during World War II. I
could not write for fear of aiding Gottwald and Stalin. It
is only now that I am free to write, and I am doing so.
APPENDIX II

ABSTRACT OF

The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia, 1914-1918

The role of American Slovaks in the creation of Czecho-Slovakia has been largely ignored by historians. An understanding of this role is essential to understand the subsequent history of Czechoslovakia since the majority of Slovaks in the new state adhered to a political programme which had been drawn up in America during the first World War.

In the freedom of America, Slovaks, who had emigrated from Hungary, became nationally conscious and hoped to help their countrymen achieve the same kind of freedom. The first World War gave them this great opportunity to agitate for the freedom of their fellow-Slovaks in Hungary. Ironically, it was the Czechs in America and in exile who provided the opportunity. The Czechs asked the Slovaks in America to abandon their old demand for autonomy for the Slovaks in Hungary and to create a new state of Czecho-Slovakia on the ruins of Austria-Hungary. The Slovaks in America hesitated to take such a step and had to be reassured by the Czechs in
two written agreements, one in Cleveland in 1915 and one in Pittsburgh in 1918. The agreements aimed at the full equality of the Slovaks with the Czechs in the proposed state and of complete home rule in the Slovak half of the state. The American Slovaks then joined the Czech liberation movement and contributed men, money and propaganda for the creation of Czecho-Slovakia.

These agreements did not survive the peace. A unitary state was created. The Czechs, taking advantage of the religious and political dissensions among the Slovaks, which had been apparent during the war and which increased after it, ruled Slovakia with impunity. The largest segment of the Slovaks adopted the Pittsburgh agreement of 1918 as their political programme and agitated for its incorporation into the Czechoslovak constitution for the next twenty years. Only German pressure on the Sudetenland in 1938 frightened the Czechs into granting home rule to the restive Slovaks. In 1939, when the Germans invaded Bohemia, they permitted the Slovaks to establish their own state, under German protection.